Abhinavagupta's Theory of Reflection

A Study, Critical Edition and Translation of the *Pratibimbacāda* (verses 1-65)
in Chapter III of the *Tantrāloka* with the commentary of Jayaratha

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ABSTRACT

Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection: A Study, Critical Edition and Translation of the Pratibimbavāda (verses 1-65) in the Chapter III of the Tantrāloka along with the commentary of Jayaratha

Mrinal Kaul, Ph.D. Religion
Concordia University, 2016

The present thesis studies the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE), the non-dualist Trika Śaiva thinker of Kashmir, primarily focusing on what is often referred to as his magnum opus: the Tantrāloka. The present study has as its foundation a new critical edition of a small, nonetheless important, passage of the Tantrāloka—chapter-3, verses 1-65 and the commentary titled -viveka thereon by Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE)—along with an annotated English translation. The edition here presented represents the very first philologically exhaustive edition of any part of the Tantrāloka or Tantrāloka-viveka.

The textual critical exercise undertaken in this thesis based on the examination of twenty-nine manuscripts has shown that the textual transmission of the Tantrāloka and - viveka (at least of the small part that I have studied) thereon has undergone corruption, but of a minor sort. The present edition is a much improved version over the editio princeps yet nothing significantly different from the latter as far as the interpretation of the text is concerned.

Abhinavagupta’s teachings are laid deep under the esoteric influence of the Kaula and the Krama systems, and he employs a robust model of developing a critical dialectical structure that manifests in his works like those of the theories of reflection amongst many others. In the Tantrāloka as also in his other Trika works, he is endeavouring to establish a unique ontological status to a reflected object (pratibimba) rejecting the thesis of Naiyāyikas, Sāṃkhya-vādins and Vijñānavādins. The varied textures of his hermeneutics finds groundings in many branches of knowledge as diverse as metaphysics, epistemology, soteriology, aesthetics, mysticism and phenomenology.
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per mio maestro

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Abbreviations

[] The lemma sign that precedes variant readings.
+++ illegible akṣaras
*** missing akṣaras
a, b, c, d, e, f first pāda, second pāda, etc.
ABSP Akhil Bhāratiya Sanskrit Pariṣad, Lucknow
ante correctionem
A Marginal annotation or gloss
BCE Before the common era
BHU Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Central Library, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi
BORI Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune
BPV Bimbapratibimbavāda
C. circa
CE common era
cen. century
cf. compare with
conj. conjecture
conj. em. conjectural emendation
corr. correct reading
cr. ed. critical edition
D Devanāgarī
dAL Dheanāñāloka-locana
Ed. editor / edition
EFEO Ecole française de’Extrême-Orient
em. emendation
f./ff. folio(s)
ff. and following
Fig. figure
fl. flourished
fn footnote
fol. folio
ÍPK Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā -> TORELLA 2002
ÍPV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvīmarśinī
ÍPVV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvīrttivimarśinī
ÍPVYākhya ĪśvarapratyabhijñāvīmarśinīvYākhyā
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Tantrālokaviveka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Tantrasāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Tantroccaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVDh</td>
<td>Tantravāladhānikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAK I</td>
<td>Tantrābhidhānakosa I -&gt; BRUNNER et. al. 2000</td>
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<td>Tantrābhidhānakosa III -&gt; RASTELLI &amp; GOODALL 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>trans.</td>
<td>translated by</td>
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<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>The verso side of the folio</td>
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<tr>
<td>v./vv.</td>
<td>verse(s)</td>
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<td>VBh</td>
<td>Vijñānabhairava</td>
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<td>VP</td>
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<td>YS</td>
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Introduction

This thesis is a study of the Theory of Reflection or the pratibimbavāda of Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975-1025 CE), the non-dualist Trika Śaiva thinker of Kashmir, primarily focusing on what is often referred to as his magnum opus: the Tantrāloka (TĀ). Abhinavagupta, an unusual literary figure belonging to pre-modern South Asia, is recognized for his major contributions to diverse domains of knowledge, primarily philosophy, theology, and aesthetics. He is usually associated either with what is popularly known as ‘Kashmir Śaivism’ or with the Sanskrit aesthetic theory of rasa (“relish”). The former is an historically problematic designation for non-dualist Śaivism, of which Abhinavagupta is one of the main representatives. Although its scale and concerns extend beyond those typical of the genre, the TĀ is, formally speaking, a ritual manual (paddhati) of Trika Śaivism based upon a revealed scripture (āgama or tantra), the Mālinīvijayottara (MVUT). The only surviving commentary on the TĀ was composed by Jayaratha (fl. c. 1225-1275 CE) and is entitled Tantrālokaviveka (TĀV).

To explore the ontological status of ‘reality’, classical Sanskrit thinkers have engaged in extensive philosophical discussion and have tried to interpret ‘reality’ in various ways that best suited the doctrinal positions associated with their theological traditions. The

5. Rastogi (1987:103-104). There certainly was a commentary titled -vivaraṇa by Subhata Datta available to Jayaratha. Pandey 1963:261 regards him as the first commentator of the TĀ. Rastogi mentions the possibility of another commentary as well which, according to Pandey, (p. 262) was called -vivṛti, but is not available.
question they ask is very basic: whether and in what way this universe is ‘real’ or an
‘illusion’. In other words, is this universe a reality or does it just appear to be real? They
have thought deeply about such questions and through the course of history all of them
have come up with different answers. Many of them have used either the mirror metaphor
or the Theory of Reflection to explain their philosophical positions. Thus Sāmkhyavādins,
Yogavādins, Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, Buddhists (particularly Vijñānavādins), Jainas,
Vedāntins—all have closely engaged with explaining the phenomenon of reflection. To
consider a few, one may recall that Sāmkhya and Yoga postulate the reflection of purusa in
the buddhi which is the first evolute of prakṛti. It is not purusa itself but its reflection that
manifests in prakṛti.7 The Naiyāyikas believe that the perception of the reflected image is
brought about by the peculiar colour of the mirror’s surface when a man puts his face in
front of it and the rays of light emanating from his eyes strike the mirror, thus turning back,
wherefrom its colour and form is perceived.8 On the other hand the Mīmāṃsakas consider
that the perception of reflection is completely erroneous, but that it necessarily depends on
an external locus. Criticising the Mīmāṃsaka’s theory two representatives of the Buddhist
Pramāṇa tradition, Śāntarakṣita (8th CE) and Kamalaśīla (8th CE), believe the reflection to be
a sheer illusion.9 As far as the Buddhist Vijñānavāda tradition is concerned, they also
believed reflections to be completely unreal. Ratié proposes that Abhinavagupta might have
been influenced by Vasubandhu’s (4th-5th CE) debates about reflection discussed in his
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.9 In the non-dual tradition of the Vedāntins the Consciousness
reflected in avidyā is Īśvara, and the Consciousness reflected in intellect is jīva. According to
the Darpanatīkā, a section dealing with the pratibimbavāda in the Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda
(8th CE), the Consciousness that is reflected and is present in avidyā or intellect is real and is
identical with the original.10 Another adherent of the dualistic branch of Vedānta,

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7. The Nyāya perspective on the Theory of Reflection is discussed in the NSB 3.1.30-50 (See Jha, 1984 pp. 1180-1218). Also see Ratié (forthcoming: 5ff)
8. See Ratié (forthcoming: 7ff)
9. See Ratié (forthcoming: 3ff)
10. For more on ‘reflection’ in Advaita Vedānta see Roodurmun (2002).
Madhvācārya (1238-1317 CE), whose philosophical system itself is called *pratibimbavāda*, advocates the existence of individuals to be grounded in the divine, where they are depicted as reflections, images or even shadows of the divine, but never in any way identical with the divine.\(^\text{11}\) In this thesis our focus is to explore how Abhinavagupta has engaged with this essential philosophical question by establishing his own Theory of Reflection.

This study has as its foundation a new critical edition of a small, nonetheless important, passage of the *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrālokaviveka*—chapter-3, verses 1-65 and the commentary thereon—along with an annotated English translation. This edition and translation forms the basis for the study of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection. The edition here presented represents the very first philologically exhaustive edition of any part of the TĀ or TĀV. This will, I hope, make a major new contribution by its comprehensive use of manuscripts and philological transparency, and contribute towards the desideratum of a full critical edition of the TĀ and the TĀV. I will suggest in the present work that the small portion that I have edited using several manuscripts shows that the textual transmission of the TĀ and the TĀV has undergone minimal corruption, but, this may not be the case with all the chapters or sections within the chapters of the TĀ. In an unpublished draft chapter of the fourth ṛhnikā of the TĀ, Alexis Sanderson has already shown us how a revised critical edition of the TĀ can tremendously contribute to our understanding of the text and its contents.\(^\text{12}\) Also, Rastogi\(^\text{13}\) has highlighted a number of corruptions pointed out by Jayaratha himself who had also attempted to adopt correct readings based on the authority of a related scripture holding considerable importance.

The philological method, I believe, is crucial for allowing the pre-modern Sanskrit authors to speak for themselves. I cannot but help quoting Alex Watson (2006:9-10) here who has expressed his view on this matter:

> If we want the classical Indian traditions to reveal themselves, not our own preconceptions, and the voices of their thinkers to come across louder than our voices, our most powerful tool is philology. While we can never completely

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\(^{11}\) See the relevant parts in Sharma (1962).

\(^{12}\) Sanderson’s unpublished draft of the chapter IV of the TĀ.

\(^{13}\) See Rastogi, 1987:143ff and 246.
eliminate our own subjectivity, we can, as philologists, attempt to set it aside to some extent by sticking closely to an observation of the texts themselves, and, when interpreting, allowing our analysis to be guided by concepts and ideas derived from the text itself or other texts of the same general period and tradition. By devoting energy to the recovery of the precise wording of the author prior to the many copying mistakes that have entered the transmission—through gathering variants and parallel passages, and identifying and solving corruptions—we can, as if turning the dial of a radio closer to the precise frequency of the station, reduce background noise and allow the voice to come across with more clarity, and consequently with less distortion or blurring of the thought behind the words. By accumulating more and more information about the cultural, linguistic and religio-philosophical context of authors/texts and by setting them more deeply in that context, we move further from our own thought-world and closer to theirs. As we read more sources, the back and forth of the hermeneutic process mean that the categories we apply to the texts are tested against richer and richer materials, shown to be inadequate and hence repeatedly refined, such that we move closer and closer to the author’s own perspective.

In this spirit, and in accord with the concerns felt by modern philosophers like Daya Krishna and Ninian Smart and philologists like Sheldon Pollock and Raffaele Torella, I have chosen a predominantly philological method to study Abhinavagupta’s philosophy. The main thesis of Krishna and Smart is that since most of what we know today about Indian philosophy is “a synthesis of western and Indian thinking in the period since the second half of the nineteenth century”\textsuperscript{14}, we must strive to look for the original sources of such philosophical traditions and the language in which they are written and how they are to be understood in their own indigenous contexts. This gives us a comparatively better understanding of the pre-modern authors. Thus I have purposely avoided a comparative model for I agree with the main thesis of Daya Krishna who maintains, to take one example amongst many others, that the questions of mokṣa and revelation may be discussed as a part of philosophy of religion in the West, but they form the very backbone of “philosophy” in India. Such questions play a crucial role while studying philosophical literature written in Sanskrit in general and in the context of Abhinavagupta in particular. This is by no means to suggest that the comparative model of study should be avoided, but rather to argue that one should first understand such traditions as thoroughly as possible before using a comparative model.

\textsuperscript{14.} Smart (1989:176)
Philological pursuit is, as Pollock puts it, making sense of texts\textsuperscript{15} and as also suggested in two recent important papers by Raffaele Torella in the context of Śaiva tradition of Kashmir itself, it is like walking on the edge of a sword, i.e. something perilous and difficult to accomplish;\textsuperscript{16} otherwise our misunderstanding, misinterpreting or misleading the context of a text, even if minimal, might prove dangerous and we may be inadvertently doing injustice to the concerned author or the tradition he belongs to. As Ashok Aklujkar puts it:

If misinterpretations and wrong leads are to be avoided, studies of ancient and medieval works must, as far as possible, be based on critically presented texts.\textsuperscript{17}

Therefore, like the above mentioned philologists and philosophers I also believe that it is important to understand what philosophy is in Asia as Asians themselves have understood it, and not simply how the West has projected it over the past few centuries. Some like Daya Krishna strongly emphasize that Indian philosophy should create its own definition of itself and try engaging with what he calls “comparative ‘comparative philosophy’” instead of doing comparative studies with a Eurocentric bias.

“Comparative studies”, thus, meant in effect the comparison of all other societies and cultures in terms of the standards provided by the Western societies and cultures both in cognitive and non-cognitive domains. The scholars belonging to these other societies and cultures instead of looking at Western society and culture from their own perspectives, accepted the norms provided by Western scholars and tried to show that the achievements in various fields within their cultures paralleled those in the West and thus they could not be regarded as inferior in any way to those which were found there. This hindered the emergence of what may be called “comparative ‘comparative studies’” which might have led to a more balanced perspective in these fields.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Pollock (2015)
\textsuperscript{16} Torella (2013b) and Torella (2014). Here I am translating the Sanskrit idiomatic expression \textit{asidhārāvrata} which translates ‘vow of [walking on] the edge of a knife [or sword]’. This is in keeping with what Torella points out as the sensitive role of a philologist in his two papers.
\textsuperscript{17} Aklujkar (1976:286)
\textsuperscript{18} Krishna (1989:59-60)
Unlike Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta and other widely studied philosophical traditions of pre-modern South Asia, scholars have only recently engaged with an in depth study of the Advaita Śaiva tradition of Kashmir. Thus, because Abhinavagupta and his tradition was never really studied by early colonial Indologists, this tradition has not been subject to misinterpretation at their hands. However, the *sui generis* nature of Abhina’s non-dual Śaiva system is often neglected in favour of the popular non-dualistic Vedānta represented by the Upaniṣads. There are marked similarities, no doubt, between the two non-dualistic systems, but one cannot and should not ignore the stark distinctions in their basic doctrinal positions. Thus Torella strongly criticises the point made by Georg Feuerstein that Hindu Tantrism rests substantially on the foundations of Advaita-Vedānta.19

Keeping in line with my above argument I propose to present, before beginning to introduce and analyze Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection, a brief overview of his textual tradition and doctrinal positions. This is all the more important because, as suggested by K.C. Pandey,20 Sanskrit knowledge systems should not be interpreted in isolation from the pedagogical tradition they primarily belong to. Thus it would be difficult to understand Abhinavagupta in isolation from the various Śaiva traditions existing or functioning in Kashmir during or before his time. This requires insight into the Tantric textual traditions of Kashmir prior to Abhinavagupta.

Kashmir possessed vibrant Tantric Śaiva traditions up through at least the thirteenth century of the common era.21 Alongside the other major branches of the tradition, viz., Siddhānta, Krama and Trika Śaivism emerged in the middle of the ninth century as a major post-scriptural ritual system of the Mantramārga.22 It was at the same period that Mantramārga traditions were gradually evolving from their scriptural anonymity into an extensive body of Kashmirian exegesis, in which the two major traditions competing with each other were the dualists (*dvaita*) and non-dualists (*advaita*). The former includes authors

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of the Śaiva Siddhānta, said to subscribe to the doctrine of the ‘right’ (dakṣīna), who in addition to embracing a dualist ontology accepted orthodox Vedic boundaries of purity and impurity. The non-dualist authors adhered to the Trika and the Krama cultic systems, following the doctrine of the ‘left’ (vāma). The Siddhānta adhered to a ritual system functioning within the boundaries of Brahmanical purity, while on the other hand Trika ritual involved transgressive contact with impure substances, persons, etc. The Siddhānta ritual system centered on Śiva alone, who was to be worshipped without his consort, but the two non-dualistic currents were predominantly śākta, i.e. centered upon worship of various female śaktis, in addition to the worship of Śiva, particularly in the form of Bhairava. The most defining feature of the scriptures of the Trika is their pantheon of three Goddesses, Parā, Parāparā and Aparā, while the Krama or Kālikrama is devoted to worship of a sequence (krama) of Kālis. Krama is a Kālikula tradition that teaches the esoteric worship of many forms of the goddess Kāli or Kālasaṃkāraṇī. Commenting on this Kāli worship, Sanderson (1988:683) says:

The outstanding characteristic of this tradition is that it worships a sequential rather than a simply concentric pantheon. A series of sets of deities (cakras) is worshipped in a fixed sequence as the phases (krama) of the cyclic pulse of cognition (saṃvit): These phases are Emission (sṛṣṭikrama), Maintenance of the emitted (sthitikrama) (also called Incarnation (avatārakrama)), Retraction of the emitted (saṃhārakrama) and the Nameless fourth (anākhyakrama) (also called the Phase of the Kālis (kālikrama)), in which all trace of the preceding process is dissolved into liberated and all-pervasive consciousness.

The Śaiva Siddhānta was a tradition placing considerable importance on ritual, both doctrinally and in praxis, believing that emancipation (mokṣa) essentially transpires through the salvific power of Śaiva initiation (dīkṣā). Abhinava, on the other hand, endeavored to establish a system emphasizing the paramount significance of knowledge (jñāna). Thus he

attacked the perceived ritualism of his Śaiva Siddhānta contemporaries, who adhered to doctrinal dualism. In Trika, the absence of knowledge (jñāna) was taught to be the true cause of the impurity (mala) which obscures the soul’s inherent Śiva-nature (śivatva). This impurity (mala) is nothing but ignorance (ajñāna) that gives rise to bondage (bandha), and it is the removal of this impurity (mala) that leads one to the state of liberation (mokṣa). This emphasis on gnosis did not of course mean that there was no ritual practice prescribed in the Trika itself, but Abhinava understood the path of following ritual as inferior, positing superior means, such as meditation and imaginative visualization through which liberation was possible. It is also important to mention here that both the dual and the non-dual Śaiva traditions understood the descent of the power (of grace) (Śaktipāta) as the only means of getting rid of the ajñāna or mala. However, while an individual (aṇu) is expected to make an effort towards attaining the grace of the Great Lord (Paramēśvara) yet this grace descends on an individual only at Śiva’s own autonomous ‘power of willing’ (icchāsakti). In the earlier Tantric scriptures the means of doing away with the mala was usually said to be knowledge (jñāna), Yogic practices (yoga), ritual (kriyā) and observances (caryā). Thus an arrangement of dividing the teaching of an Āgama into four sections (pādas) corresponding to the four means was common. However, moving away from this tradition Abhinavagupta categorizes the Trika paddhatis after the idea of means (upāyas).

The basis of this non-dualistic tradition of Abhinavagupta was rooted in the teachings of the Śivasūtra that was further elaborated in the works belonging to the Philosophy of Vibration (Spandaśāstra). Based on the doctrine of the MVUT, the great masters of this tradition Vasugupta (c. 825-850) and Bhaṭṭaśrī Kallaṭa (c. 875) also taught that ‘ignorance’ is the cause of bondage (bandha). This ‘ignorance’ was not defined as the absence of knowledge but as the incompleteness of knowledge or limited knowledge.

31. MVUT 1.23cd: malam ajiñānam icchanti saṃsārāṅkurakāraṇam |
33. See Rastogi (2012:94)
34. See ŚSV, Sū: 2.2 (p. 11-12).
For unlike in the case of the sentient (cetana) objects complete absence of knowledge is only found in insentient (jaḍa) entities. Insentient entities are never subject to bondage and liberation. Thus the idea of mala that does not allow the complete manifestation of knowledge essentially refers to the incompleteness of knowledge and not not-knowledge. Abhinavagupta, in the first chapter of the TĀ, is clearly articulating the definitions of jñāna and ajñāna on the basis of the Śivasūtras. Further, in the TĀ Abhinavagupta suggests both ignorance and knowledge to be of two types. As Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi (2011:42) have suggested:

Alone among the texts of the system, it seems, the Tantrālōka develops, in the context of emancipation, the original doctrine of double-ignorance: ‘spiritual’ (pauruṣajñāna) and ‘intellectual’ (bauddhajñāna)—and along with it its positive, counterpart, the doctrine of double-awakening: ‘spiritual’ (pauruṣajñāna) and ‘intellectual’ (bauddhajñāna). If the rationale for these concepts is present in the Śaiva Āgamas, the terminology, which presents overtones of the Śāṃkhya, seems to be a creation of the Tantrālōka.

For non-dualists, mala is not a physical substance, but a mental hinderance or veiling of one’s own true nature, which has to be removed by knowledge at a noetic level. On the other hand, dualists understand mala as a substance (dravya) and since it is a substance, it can only be removed by performing an act of ritual which is called dīkṣā (ritual initiation). While refuting the dualist’s position on mala that it is a substance (dravya), Abhinavagupta lists more telling identifications of mala and suggests that this ignorance can be removed not only by a ritual performance—reconceptualized in gnostic terms—but also by mystical

35. TĀ 1.25: ajñānam iti na jñānābhāvas cātiprasāngataḥ | sa hi loṣṭhādike ’py asti na ca tasyāsti samśrītah ||
36. TĀ 1.26-30: ato jñeyasya tattvasya sāmāstyaṇāpratītāṃnam | jñānam eva tad ajñānam śivasūtras bhāṣān || 26 || caitanyaṃ ātma jñānam ca bandha ity atra sūtraḥ | samaścetaranagābhyaṃ aṣṭam arthaḥ pradarśitaḥ || 27 || caitanyam iti bhāvāntalajābadhāv śāśvatreṇāṃ purūlāne || 28 || devitiyena tu sūtraḥ kriyāṃ vā karaṇāṃ ca vā | bruvata tasya cintāmāṇupasya dvātattam ucayate || 29 || devītāpratīthā tad ajñānam tucchatvām bandha ucyate | tata eva saucchedyāṃ ity āṛttīyā nirūpātāṃ || 30 ||
37. TĀ 1.36: jñānānāsvarūpaṃ yaduktam pratyekamāpyadāḥ | dvidhāpauruṣabauddhatsabhidoktaṃ śivasūtrāṃ ||
38. For more on Dīkṣā in the Tantrālōka see Takashima (1992).
39. See TĀ 9.84-86.
experience and ‘knowledge’. Abhinavagupta’s Trika also advanced the claims that while the Siddhānta could bestow liberation only at the time of death, its more powerful methods may accomplish liberation during the initiate’s very lifetime (jīvanmukti, ‘living liberation’). 40 For the Siddhānta liberation meant attaining equality with Śiva (śivatulyatā); one can never actually become Śiva. For the Trika, one is already Śiva, but on account of the veil of ignorance forgets one’s real nature; liberation is thus to re-cognize the real nature of oneself, which is just Śiva. 41 Recognizing one’s true nature which is nothing but the nature of Consciousness (saṃvit) is liberation according to this system 42 and for this, as Abhinavagupta himself suggests in the PS one does not need to go anywhere for there is no abode of liberation. 43 When the Light of knowledge is manifested, the darkness of ignorance is dispelled by itself. This indeed forms the basis for the designation pratyabhijñā, ‘the doctrine of recognition’.

The Philosophy of Recognition (Pratyabhijñā) was not only a further elaboration of the teachings expounded in the Śivasūtra and the Philosophy of Vibration (Spanda), but also a way of strengthening the non-dualistic tradition on the strong and firm pillars of logical and analytical arguments. Thus, while the teachings of the Śivasūtra and the Spandakārikā were elucidating the spiritual path of this tradition, at the same time the Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda (fl.c. 900-950 CE) was formulating an analytical structure for such teachings. As Raffaele Torella (2002:XIII) maintains:

Vasugupta and Kallata with the doctrine of the Spanda, on the one hand and Somānanda, on the other, were the first to undertake this task. The former chose a plan that was more closely connected with spiritual experience, the latter one that was more in terms of conceptual elaboration (though his work is clearly based on direct experience, which is sometimes visionary and ecstatic). But both the teachings and the tone of the SS [Śiva-sūtra] and SK [Spandakārikā] and of the ŠD [Śivadṛṣṭi] are perfectly compatible.

40. For more on the concept of jīvanmukti in the non-dual Kashmirian Śaivism see Muller-Ortega (1996) and Rastogi (2010).
41. See Sanderson 1995:17
42. TĀ 1.156: mokṣo hi nāma naivānya svarūpapratthanaṁ hi sah | svarūpaḥ cātmanaḥ saṁvimmānyattatram tu yāh punah ||
43. PS 60: mokṣasya naiva kīṁcād dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanamanyataḥ | ajñānagranthabhidā svaśaktyabhivyaktatā mokṣaḥ ||
Building upon Saiddhāntika doctrine, the Trika also taught that there are various means (upāyas) an individual may follow to get rid of the various kinds of mala. To remove the malas there is the prescription of the means which when followed helps get rid of the malas. Even the cause of mala itself is the absolute free-will of the Lord. The malas are said to be of three types: āṇava-mala, māyīya-mala and kārma-mala. The three malas reside in the māya-śakti. The āṇava-mala is understood as the main cause of bondage (bandha) and it is this that gives rise to the innate ignorance (pauruṣa-ajāña). Even though it is beginningless, according to the teachings of this system, it can still be removed. The cause of kārma-mala is supposed to be āṇava-mala which in turn is the cause of transmigratory existence (māyīya-mala). These malas, viz. āṇava-mala, māyīya-mala and kārma-mala can be removed by taking recourse to śāmbhava, śākta and āṇava upāyas respectively.

The Theory of Reflection (pratibimbavāda) is in part Abhinavagupta’s manner of explaining how the pure, mirror-like Consciousness can become obscured by the impurity of ignorance (ajñāna). This impurity of ignorance or mala is metaphorically defined as the non-immaculate entity that, when cast on to Consciousness’s pure mirror, does not allow one to perceive one’s true nature. In this analogy, the ‘pure mirror’ is ‘pure Consciousness’ while an individual’s true nature also belongs to the same ‘pure Consciousness’. Perceiving one’s true nature leads one to the state of liberation, which can be attained following any one of the following three means (upāyas): śāmbhavopāya, śāktopāya and āṇavopāya. Abhinavagupta takes up these upāyas on the scriptural basis of the MVUT. These upāyas are also referred to as icchopāya, jñānopāya and kriyopāya, respectively, named after the three powers (śaktis) of Śiva, viz: icchā, jñāna and kriyā. The first śāmbhavopāya or icchopāya is the highest means, meant for advanced Yogis, and is characterized as the practice of unity of means with goal. In other

44. MVUT 2.20cd-23cd: evam śāmbhatvam apy ebhir bhedair bhimnam vilakṣayet | uccārakaranadhyānavarnashāmkapradarpanaiḥ || yo bhavet sa samāveśaḥ sannyāś āṇava ucyate || uccāraraññatam vastu cetasavāri vicintayantam || yaṁ āvēśaṁ acāpnaṁ śāktaḥ so 'atrābhidhiyate || ākīmaccintakasyatva gurumāvī pratibodhataḥ || jāyate yaś samāveśaḥ śāmbhavo 'asaṁ udīritaḥ || Also paraphrased by Abhinavagupta in TĀ 1.22-23.

45. MVV 2.121-122: anupāyam idam tasmād upāyopeyayogatāḥ || bhedabandhād vimucyeta katham vetarathā janāḥ || 120 || anupāye 'pi caitasmin kincit sāmānbandhaṁyavṛttataḥ || upāyasopadeśo 'yaṁ stātre 'tra bahudhā kṛtaḥ || 121 ||
words it also means practicing to visualize the entire universe within one’s own self or the practice of identifying oneself with Śiva. And this is possible only by means of the power of Will (icchā). Abhinavagupta introduces pratibimbavāda in context of the śāmbhavopāya. The second, śāktopāya, is concerned with mental practice where contemplation of mantras is involved. Since this transpires at the level of jñānaśakti it is also called jñānopāya. āṇavopāya, the third, which is at the level of ‘action’ (kriyā), is for all individuals who can only achieve liberation by recourse to the performance of ritual.

The best documented Trika Śaiva cult is represented by Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka, and may be referred to as the Anuttara Trika, following Abhinavagupta’s own expression (anuttara-ṣaḍadha). In the TĀ, one can observe the culmination of the synthesis of Trika and Krama ideas, how they are made to complement each other and how the Krama ideas are appropriated into the Trika fold. As Sanderson has put it:

Though the Tantrāloka is a work of the Trika based on a text untouched by the Kālikula, Abhinavagupta reads the Kālikula-influenced strata of the tradition into the very core of his exegesis and develops this further in the light of postschriptural Krama theory, though always doing so obliquely as though to conceal the purely Śaṭka ground of his Śaivism from profane eyes, as examples from the opening chapters are sufficient to demonstrate. Thus the opening benedictory verse of the work reveals this character by showing in a veiled manner that the author’s chosen deity (iṣṭadevatā) is Kālasamkarṣāṇī. In the first chapter he alludes to the twelve Kālis as the fullest expression of Bhairava’s nature, presenting them in a syncretistic fashion as the three principal goddesses of the Trika subdivided by emission, stasis, withdrawal, and the [nameless] fourth. In the third chapter, after defining the twelve vowels from A to AH (omitting Ṛ Ṛ Ḍ Ḍ) as the principal circle of Bhairava’s powers, he equates them both with the twelve Kālis of the Krama and with the twelve Yoginīs that form the retinue of Parā in the Trika. In the same chapter he equates the Trika’s syllabary-goddess Mālinī with Kālasamkarṣāṇī as the highest state, saying that the first self-limitation that she manifests is that of her pairing with Bhairava, that is to say, of the relationship between her as power and him as the powerful, though in reality she transcends this duality.\(^\text{47}\)

\(^{46}\) I am using the term ‘Anuttara Trika’ for the Trika system of Abhinavagupta. When I do this, I have the expressions like ‘anuttarasaḍadha’ in mind. cf. TĀ 1.14: santi paddhatayaḥ citirāḥ srotobhedeṣu bhūyasāḥ
This synthesis and appropriation is not always evident for, since we are dealing with ‘special’ scripture (viśeṣaśāstra) as opposed to the ‘common’ scripture (sāmānyaśāstra), Abhinavagupta weaves it into a mystically esoteric language. The deep implications hidden in the esotericism of Abhinavagupta often emerge from Kālikula praxis. The complex nature of these implications is not always unambiguous since it is meant for advanced practitioners of Kaula order. And more secret the teachings are, as Abhinava himself claims, more esoteric the language becomes so that it is accessible only to the advanced practitioners who are the sole people who can understand the encoded language. Thus, following the esoteric teachings of his masters, Abhinava says that secret instructions should neither be revealed all at once, nor they be completely hidden from the practitioners.49

Abhinavagupta’s deep concern was that there were no ritual manuals available for Trika. Thus he wrote the TĀ, a comprehensive manual (paddhati) of the Trika extending to thirty-seven chapters and 5859 verses. It is not simply a detailed practical guide to the performance of the Trika ritual, but is also devoted in large degree to philosophical expositions of these Kālikula-based Trika rituals.50 The other texts to be considered in this pool of Anuttara Trika are the Tantrasāra (TS), Mālinīślokavārtika (MŚV) and Parātrīśikavivaraṇa (PTv). According to Alexis Sanderson, Abhinava is the sole author of this stream of Trika.51 The scriptural foundation of all his Trika writings lies in the Mālinīvijayottaratantra (MVUT); despite significant departures from his source, Abhinava declares the TĀ to be an exposition of the MVUT, which contains the ‘essence’ of the Trika.52 Although the doctrine of the MVUT may itself have been predominantly dualistic, as argued in a groundbreaking study by Alexis Sanderson (1992), it nonetheless could be used by Abhinava to establish his position that the scriptures of the Trika contain the essence which

48. For more on the distinction between the Viśeṣaśāstra and the Sāmānyaśāstra see Sanderson (2012:15, n. 20)
49. TS 4, p. 31: na atirahasyam ekatra khyāpyam na ca sarvathā gopyam iti hi asmadguravaḥ ||
50. Pandey (1963:461-540) for more on Krama system.
51. Sanderson (2007a:371)
52. TĀ 1.17-18: na tad astīha yan na śrīmālinīvijayottare | devadevena nirdīṣtāṃ svasaśādanātha lingataḥ ||
daśāṣṭādaśaścaraḥabhinmaṣaḥ yac clāsanaḥ vibhoḥ | tātāraṃ trikaśāstraṃ hi tātāraṃ mālinīnantam ||
animated all branches of the Śaiva canon." Abhinavagupta took up the earlier form of Trika represented in the MVUT, which he profoundly reshaped through a combination of additional scriptural sources, oral teachings, and his own creative brilliance.54 He ascribes primary importance to his own spiritual experience (svaṃṣvit)55 followed by clear logical arguments (sattarka), and the scriptural authority of Siddhānta and Trika.56 Though Abhinavagupta claims that he bases the TĀ on the MVUT, he very evidently draws on a wide range of other scriptural texts of the Śaiva Mantramārga, from the wider pool of Trika scriptures, including the Siddhayogēśvarīmata, Triśirobhairava, Devyāmala, Tantrasadbhāva, and Trikasadbhāva,57 to Krama scriptures such as the Kākōkula, as well as the archaic Brahmayāmala of the vidyāpīṭha and various Saiddhāntika scriptures.58

II Philosophical Rationalization and Creative Reuse

As mentioned above Abhinavagupta presented his teachings following clear logical arguments (sattarka). Indeed one of the most significant tasks that Abhinavagupta was engaged in was providing critical philosophical structure to the teachings of the Trika scriptures.59 A master of his exegetical craft, Abhinavagupta mines and even manipulates his sources, making use of their teachings to counter the arguments of his opponents. A central purpose in this philosophical rationalization is to counter antagonistic contemporaries, such
as the staunch followers of Śaiva Siddhānta ritualism, who embrace philosophical dualism. Abhinavagupta’s ‘higher non-dualism’ (paramādvayadṛṣṭi) is itself as much made of the doctrinal principles of the Siddhānta as it seeks to transcends it. Even though from doctrinal point of view, the Siddhāntins are his opponents, he affirms and justifies the claims of their dualistic scriptural sources and appropriates their theological principles to fit them in his non-dualistic Śaivism. Theories such as that of Reflection, I argue, serve as a part of the critical philosophical structure which Abhinavagupta uses for explaining scriptural claims, and for developing philosophical arguments in debates with real or imagined opponents. By applying this strategic method he is laying a solid foundation for explaining the Supreme means (śāmbhavopāya) as far as the Theory of Reflection is concerned. As Pandey rightly observed:

It was Abhinava, who, for the first time, took up the system as a whole for a rational and exhaustive treatment in his great work, the Tantrāloka; gave the philosophical conceptions of the different branches a proper place in the whole; showed the comparative merit of all the four means of Moksa, Anupāya, Śāmbhava, Śākta and Ānava; exhaustively dealt with the monistic Śaiva rituals; supported the philosophical and psychological theories of the system with strong and convincing arguments as well as with extensive quotations from the Āgamas of accepted authority and elucidated the existing texts with learned commentaries, like the Śivadṛṣṭyālocana and the two vimarśinis.60

Another example of Abhinavagupta’s philosophical rationalisation of Trika rituals and scriptural doctrines is his treatment of the theory of causality (kāryakāraṇabhāva) before dealing with the description of the tattvas and their mutual relationship in book nine of the TĀ (9.1-44). To explain, in the hierarchy of the tattvas the causal sequence cannot be denied in view of the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) between them. Thus each tattva is related to the next by a cause and effect relationship: each higher tattva permeates and pervades the succeeding ones, with the highest and most subtle pervading and permeating all tattvas. This makes it clear that each successive lower tattva exists in and draws its

60. Pandey (1963:294)
sustenance from the successive higher tattvas which are also its material cause.\footnote{61} Hence in book nine of the TĀ Abhinavagupta ensures that he first establishes a robust model of the theory of causality prior to discussing the tattvas and their ontological hierarchy. In the same fashion he also seeks to establish the Śaiva theory of knowability (vedyatā) (TĀ 10.19-97) at the beginning of the book ten of the TĀ, prior to discussing the nature of and relationships between the seven knowing subjects (saptapramātrs) and seven objects of knowledge (saptaprameyas). Abhinava bases his discussion on the refutation of the position of the Mīmāmsakas, establishing that ‘knowability’ (vedyatā) is an essential nature of an object.\footnote{62}

While the above examples will need separate platforms for detailed discussions, without treating them in depth I move on to another example which is the focus of this thesis. Following exactly the lines of argument discussed above, Abhinavagupta offers an analytical account of the Theory of Reflection in book three of the TĀ before discussing the doctrine of phonemic emanation. Again, as in the previous examples Abhinavagupta has a specific purpose in doing so. As Padoux says:

But the particular characteristic of the phonematic emanation, thus summarized, is that it does not occur directly and all at once from the primal principle down to earth. It goes through several phases, occurring through projection of light and reflection (pratibimba), which is in accordance with the tenets of Abhinavagupta’s emanationist nondualism.\footnote{63}

While we will discuss about the phonemic emanation in a little more detail in the appropriate context, I do, however, want to mention that theories like Reflection used in a particular context in the TĀ is not merely a matter of style (as suggested by some scholars in the past) that Abhinavagupta is following, but a well thought structural model based on reasoning and used with a specific purpose.\footnote{64} He affirms this in his own loud and emphatic voice while cementing his Theory of Reflection with reasoning:

\footnote{61. For a discussion on the tattvas in the TĀ, see Kaul (forthcoming).}
\footnote{62. See Allen (2011) whose thesis is precisely based on the study of TĀ 10.19-97.}
\footnote{63. See Padoux (1992:231)}
\footnote{64. See Rastogi (1987:79-82)}
Thus, this [argument] is protected by the sword of reasoning which is well fixed in one’s own awareness: the kingdom only of the reflected image unfolds everywhere.65

By employing such critical methods and strategic models he is using a well thought-out mechanism re-using the older scriptures: he reshapes their content and using dialectic methods offering them the efficacy of a convincing argument thus defending and presenting his own new system. In other words Abhinava developed a Trika Śaiva system that, on one hand, adhered to key features of earlier Śaiva scriptures and, on the other, emerges as a distinct tradition with unique features of its own, much like an architect’s creative re-use of older structures and building materials.

This process of creative re-use is visible not only in Abhinavagupta’s use of Āgamic scriptures, but also at the polemic level in Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Recognition (Pratyabhijñā). In his two elaborate commentaries titled -vimārśinī (İPV) and -vīrtvimārśinī (İPVV) on the Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā (İPK) of his venerable master Utpaladeva66 (fl. c. 925-975 CE), besides further building upon the teachings of the latter, he restructures the theories of his philosophical opponents to develop his own thesis. In fact much of what is taught and argued for in the non-dual Śaiva exegetical literature is the reworking of ideas drawn from other systems, including ostensible opponents.67 This is particularly the case with the Buddhist logical-epistemological school’s profound influence on the Pratyabhijñā system.68 The Buddhists, who were anātmavādins, were the staunch philosophical rivals of the Śaiva non-dualists, so much so that sometimes the non-dualistic Śaiva masters were seen siding with Siddhānta Śaivism to mark their animosity for the Buddhists.69 To challenge the position of Buddhists and Siddhāntins a stream of thought gradually emerged adhering to a

65. TĀ 3. 51: ithametatsvasanvitiidhrangāyāstrarakṣitam | sāmrajyameva viśacatra pratibinbasya jñabhate

66. Historically speaking, it is clear that Utpaladeva was not a direct master of Abhinavagupta, but the latter belonged to the same tradition and regarded the former his master, even though indirect. Utpaladeva was the teacher of Abhinavagupta’s teacher, Laksmaṇagupta.

67. See Ratié (2010a) and Ratié (2011b).


69. Torella, 2002:XXII.
strongly non-dualistic position. The emergence of non-dualistic Śaiva traditions may be understood in part as a reaction to Siddhānta Śaivism and the Buddhist Vijñānavāda in the same way as, in the earlier philosophical realm, the advent of Buddhist logic was basically a reaction to the Naiyāyikas. This non-dualistic position manifested into such branches as the Philosophy of Recognition (Pratyabhijñā), which was purely a dialectic method to encounter the Buddhists and to re-structure dualistic Siddhānta positions as non-dualist.

In fact this process of creative re-use was not confined to Abhinavagupta alone. His celebrated predecessors like Utpaladeva himself, as suggested by Rastogi, were influenced by Bhartṛhari’s dynamism of Consciousness, Sāṃkhya’s ontology, the epistemology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (particularly the ideas related to inferential cognition), the pramāṇa notions from the Siddhānta and pramāṇa ideas of the Vijñānavāda.70 Both Torella71 and Rastogi72 have put forth their assessments of how Bhartṛhari has influenced the Śaiva Advaita system. Isabelle Ratié has shown us how Utpaladeva appropriated the Sāṃkhya theory of the satkāryavāda to fit his Pratyabhijñā model.73 Ratié has further given us detailed and critical accounts of how both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta skilfully, subtly and purposefully appropriate the themes and arguments of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism to fit their own Śaiva theological framework.74 As indicated earlier, Abhinava also heavily draws upon the Saiddhāntika tantras as source material, attempting to rationalize their doctrinal principles.

While Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta spoke for the non-dualistic Śaiva tradition, their contemporaries Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇaśaṅkha (11th CE) and his son Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha (II) (c. 11th CE) were performing exactly the same role translating the dualistic teachings of the Śaiva Siddhānta into the philosophical-analytical realm. Thus Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha wrote commentaries on Sadyojyotih’s Paramokṣanirāsakārikā, Mokṣakārikā, Nareśvarāparikṣā and also on Mataṅgapānmeśvaratantra, Kiraṇatāntra and Sārdhatriśatikālottaratāntra.75 The strategies of philosophical rationalization were not missing in Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha. Like Abhinavagupta,

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70. Rastogi (2013:4-5)
71. Torella (2008)
72. Rastogi (2009)
73. Ratié (2014)
75. For more details on the works of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha see Goodall (1998:xviii ff.).
he too, was a master of creative re-use. As a conclusion to his work Alex Watson states about Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha:

The present work demonstrates how, as a strategy to undermine Buddhist arguments, a Śaiva Siddhāntin author creatively assimilated certain features of Buddhism, thereby strengthening his own armoury, and then used these to overcome those other features of Buddhism that conflicted with his own tradition.76

In the case of Abhinavagupta, I argue that he achieves several objectives by advancing his Theory of Reflection. First, he uses the Theory of Reflection as a methodological strategy to illustrate his Theory of Manifestation (ābhāsavāda), one of the fundamental doctrines on which his philosophical system is based. Śaiva Ābhāsavāda propounded that whatever is perceived is known because it becomes the object of Consciousness in Consciousness. Each entity that exists is manifesting itself or shining forth (bhāti) and that is how it becomes part of the phenomenon of knowledge.77 Abhinavagupta carefully works out the ontological structure of this Theory of Manifestation by evaluating the status of the thirty-six ontic-realities (tattvas) posited in his cosmology, and by showing how the Theory of Reflection operates in reference to these. Also, Abhinavagupta takes recourse to a metaphor to convey the Śaiva Theory of Reflection and through it the Śaiva Theory of Manifestation: the metaphor of the reflection of a city or a face in a mirror. He maintains that this universe is simply a reflection in the mirror of the supreme Consciousness, Śiva. But as I will demonstrate, the metaphor is more complex than it may seem initially, since it involves other fundamental concepts, for instance the relationship between the oneness of Consciousness and the plurality of the universe, and the evolution of multiplicity from Consciousness and the reflection of the former in the pure surface of the latter.

76. Watson (2006:388)
77. See Pandey (1962:320ff) for more on Śaiva Ābhāsavāda.
Abhinavagupta also refers to the Theory of Reflection simply in terms of a maxim. Maxims are sometimes used as a logical reasons (pramāṇa or hetu) to support an argument, while at other times we see authors proving maxims right with the support of logical arguments. Thus, this can either be a starting point or a concluding sentence. This is what we see Jayaratha doing in his -viveka, for instance, who sums up Abhinavagupta’s thesis on the pratibimbavāda in the following words:

The universe is placed in consciousness according to the maxim of the reflected image in the mirror, but it is not a real entity which exists as separate from this consciousness assuming the form of an external object. One should not be attached to it.

III What is Novel in Abhinava’s use of the Metaphor of Reflection or Mirror?

Previous efforts to understand Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection include those of Navjivan Rastogi and David Peter Lawrence. The most recent attempt to understand Abhinavagupta’s pratibimbavāda is a remarkable study by Isabelle Ratié. Ratié advances two main arguments: first, she argues, it has simply and erroneously been assumed that the Theory of Reflection or the mirror metaphor was an innovation on the part of Abhinavagupta. Her second argument is that in order to understand the Śaiva idea of reflection one should first understand what it is not. While I have to agree with Ratié’s second argument, since Abhinavagupta peculiarly uses the metaphors of mirror, water-surface, crystal etc. to explain what I may call the mundane Theory of Reflection and then alludes to the fact that this is exactly how it does not function according to the Śaiva

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78. lokaśtrā Fraud Mark | pramāṇer arthaparikṣaṇam | samastapramāṇavyāpārād arthādiṣṭatārājyaḥ (Nyāyavrāti, 1 p.14) quoted in the Nyāyakoṣa. nīyate pāpyate vivakṣitārhasiddhir anena iti nyāyaḥ (Nyāyakoṣa, p. 446).
79. TĀV 3.23: yadvaiścaumāṇam sansvedi darpanapatribimbaṃgaṇyena avasthitam na tu tadarśita tataḥ bahirūpastvena vastusaditi na tatrābhiniveśva manyitṛ | |
80. Rastogi (1984)
81. Lawrence (2005)
82. Ratié (forthcoming)
83. This argument is also made by Dwivedi 1972: thā (upadhyāta) and Dwivedi 2001 (vol. II), pp. 559-560.
metaphysics, at the same time I feel reluctant to agree completely with Ratié’s idea that Abhinavagupta’s doctrine of reflection lacks novelty—that he simply follows and elaborates upon the ideas of his venerable predecessor, Utpaladeva. In this matter she departs from Rastogi and Lawrence both of who suggest that Abhinavagupta was certainly the first to make use of this analogy with “added dimensions”.84 That is to say even though it is gradually becoming clear through the discoveries of Ratié that Abhinava’s celebrated master Utpaladeva did make a significant use of the analogy of reflection in his ĪPVivṛti,85 yet I argue that Abhinavagupta should certainly be regarded as someone who “established the use of the metaphor of reflection fully to articulate basic mythic and recapitulatory ritual structures of monistic Kashmiri Šaiva tantrism”.86 I say this even while I am fully aware that the most recent, ground breaking studies on Utpaladeva, by Ratié87 herself and also by Rastogi, Wenta and Cuneo,88 demonstrate that not only Pratyabhijñā, but even the seeds of Kula/Krama and Rasa were already present in Utpaladeva’s work.89 Even though it is clear that Abhinava built his monistic Šaiva edifice on the foundational philosophical platform prepared by Utpaladeva, we cannot and should not diminish the novelty of Abhinavagupta’s contribution.

Abhinavagupta’s presentation of the Trika is deeply imprinted with elements of the Krama and it is highly probable, as suggested by Sanderson, that all of his Krama work should be seen as work from within the territory of the Trika.8 This Kālī worship gradually transformed from an idea of performing physical ritual into the process of internal realization of that ritual. Emphasis was given to the visualization of Tantric goddesses within one’s own mind, understood as the powers of one’s own cognition. Abhinavagupta offers two metaphors for the results of such visual meditative practice in the TĀ. In one case he says that just as a horse who runs through all kinds of uneven paths is still able to keep a

84. I am using the phrase of Rastogi (1984:28).
86. Lawrence (2005:586).
88. See Torella and Bäumer (eds.) (2016).
steady pace through the power of Will (icchā-śakti), in the same way even if Consciousness is full of differentiation, yet it is able to overcome it and maintain its steadiness. The second metaphor is more relevant to our context. He says that just as a person repeatedly looking at his face inside a mirror eventually starts thinking that the reflection of his face is nothing different from his face itself, in the same way by repeated meditative practices, a practitioner who sees himself as Bhairava in the mirror of conceptual awareness (vikalpamukura) eventually becomes one with Bhairava. This is to say when a Yogi is able to reach such a Yogic state where merely by the power of his intense will he is able to create whatever he ‘wills’, it is like a pratibimba state where a reflection does not depend on its prototype in order to manifest. It can manifest by itself if it wills hence it is also named as śāṃbhava-samāveśa that is governed by icchā-śakti. This is what Muller-Ortega (2005:202) says in the following words:

This highest of the three actual methods corresponds only to those aspirants who have received a very high degree of intensity of śaktipāta and who can work entirely with the subtle energies of the will or subtle intentionality (icchā) in order to see the entirety of existing things as a reflection within their very own consciousness. Here there is no need for refinement or purification, no need for strenuous restraints or explicit forms of discipline, external practice, or performatative methods. Rather, the direct vision of the totality of the cosmos appears as a reflection (pratibimba) in the practitioner’s awareness. Such a cognition (parāmarśa) is here characterized as free or devoid of conceptualization (avikalpa) as a result of an immersive possession (samāveśa nirvikalpa) by the super consciousness that is utterly undifferentiated and beyond all forms of limiting conceptualization.

In the TĀ the chosen deity to be meditated upon is represented by the goddess Kālasamkarṣā. It is the same goddess Kālasamkarṣā in its highest state that is further equated by Abhinavagupta with Trika’s syllabary-goddess Mālinī. She is of the nature of absolute Consciousness (Parā-saṃvit) represented by the non-dual nature of Light (prakāśa)

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91. TĀ 4. 205-206: yathāḥi tatra tatrāśvah samaninmnaatādiṣu | citre deśe vāhyamāno yātīcchāmātrakalpitām || 205 || tathā saṃvidvicitrābhīḥ śāntaghoratādibhiḥ | bhūgibhirabhīto dvaitam tyājitā bhairavātyate || 206 ||

92. TĀ 4. 207-208: yathā puruṣasthe mukure nījan vakratam vibhāvayan | bhūyena bhūyastadekātma vaktraṃ vetti nījātmanah || 207 || tathā vikalpamukure dhyānapūjārcanātmān | ātmānaṃ bhairavam paśyanacirāttanmayibhavet || 208 ||
and Reflective Awareness (vimarśā). This goddess Kālasaṃkarṣaṇī, according to Abhinavagupta, is the causal agent of five-acts (pañcakṛtya) because of which this universe becomes manifest.  

These five acts are also the names of her reflected aspects and that are defined etymologically on the basis of four Sanskrit verbal roots as five ideations (kalanās) that come into being because of the Power of Will (svātantryaśakti): ‘to project’ (kṣepa), ‘to enumerate’ (prasaṃkhyāna), ‘to go’ or ‘to know’ (gati) and ‘to sound’ (nāda).  

As Pandey (1962:504-505) interprets the five kalanās:

(i) One that externally manifests what lies within; (ii) that grasps what is so manifested as identical with itself; (iii) that marks out the manifested as distinct from one another as “It is this and not not-this”; (iv) that manifests the manifested as related to itself much in the same manner as the reflection is to the reflecting surface such as mirror etc.: (v) that brings about the disappearance of all that is manifested and shines in its true original form as pure self-consciousness (Nadanamātra).

In this system there are several noteworthy points. One of the definitions of the goddess Kālasaṃkarṣaṇī is as she who “maintains her relation with the manifest as image and counter-image (bimba-pratibimba)”. She is also defined as the one who manifests her internal reality into the external while maintaining complete identity of the external with herself. At the same time, in the externally manifested form she is able to maintain the distinction of one form from the other as, for instance, in the case of a reflected image in a mirror, where one can see images in the same shape, size etc. exactly as they are in their original form. In her reflected form she is also characterized as the one who manifests simultaneously in her true form as pure Consciousness along with the object that is being reflected in her thus making the former manifest along with herself. Her static nature is Light (prakāśa) while at the same time her dynamic nature is Reflective Awareness (vimarśa).

93. TĀ 4.176: iti pañcavidhāmenāṃ kalanāṃ kurvatī parā | devī kālī tathā kālakarṣaṇī ceti kathye ||


95. These five attributes of Kālasaṃkarṣaṇī are also discussed by Timalsina (2015a:98).

96. Timalsina (2015a:98)
The same goddess Kālasamkarsanī, whom Abhinava also identifies with Mātsraddhāva, at the syllabary level is called Mālinī, as already noted. Being of syllabary nature Mālinī follows a particular rearrangement of the Sanskrit alphabetical system called nādiphāntakrama (literary, ‘sequence following na to pha’). This Mālinī is defined by Abhinavagupta as the universal supreme power (viśvarūpinī-śakti) that is emitted from the union of vowels (bija) and consonants (yoni). Here the vowels and consonants are understood as male and female principles respectively representing Śiva and Śakti. It is the perfect union (yāmala rūpa) of these two principles that brings about the manifestation of the universe. At the level of phonemic emanation this sequence of śabdarāśi is identified with Śiva and that of the māṭkā and mālinī are interpreted with respect to Śakti. As Padoux (1992:305) describes it quoting the TĀ:

Abhinavagupta sums up in the TĀ this threefold emanation as follows: “When [the manifestation] has for its essence (svabhāva) a single act of consciousness (ekāmarśa), that is Bhairava, the mass or totality of sound (śabdarāśi). When it is joined to the shadow of what is touched by this act of consciousness (āmṛśya), the energy and the māṭkā are produced. And when the latter encounters and fuses with śabdarāśi, the mālinī is produced, she of the mixed wombs.” (TĀ 3.196-199ab)

It is very clear to me now why Abhinava discusses the Theory of Reflection (pratibimbavāda) in the first sixty-five verses of the third chapter of the TĀ immediately preceding an exposition of the theory of phonemic emanation (parāmarśodayakrama). In the phonemic mysticism of Abhinavagupta the first vowel of the Sanskrit alphabetic system, A is analogous to the Anuttara, the Unsurpassable Being that is nothing but Śiva. This A because of his absolute autonomous nature as if extends his own reflective nature into himself when he desires to procreate. In the phonemic realm, it is nothing other than its own extension represented by the long vowel form of itself, viz. Ā. The theory of phonemic

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97. See TAK III, p. 165
98. TĀ 3.233: bijayonisappattivisargodayasundara | mālinī hi parā śaktimittā viśvarūpinī ||
99. TĀ 3.68: tuvoryaṭāmālāmaṃ rāpaṃ sa sanghuṭṭa iti smṛtah | ānandaśaktiḥ satvoktaḥ yatō viśvaṃ visṛjyate || Also see TĀ 3.234
100. TĀ 3.89: tatastāntaraṃ jīyaṃ bhinnakalpatvanicchati | viśvabījasāraṃ bāhyāṃ bimbam | visarṣyati ||
emanation presents the three major Trika goddesses Parā, Parāparā and Aparā as the three short vowels of the Sanskrit alphabetic system, A, I and U respectively. However, the potential (Śakti) of the potent (Śaktimat), who are inseparable from one other, is what Abhinavagupta calls the supreme Power of Universality (kaulikī śaktih) and ‘creativity’ (Pratibhā). Abhinavagupta himself explains this phenomena in his TĀ:

So this universe is a reflection in the Lord, in the perfectly reflective void of Bhairava’s consciousness, [and arises] under the influence of nothing outside [that consciousness]. This ability of the Lord to embody himself as the universe without drawing on anything outside [his own nature] is the supreme goddess that [our masters] call ‘creativity’ (pratibhāṃ), ‘the feminine ultimate’ (anuttarāṃ). It is the supreme Power of Universality (kaulikī śaktih), the ability of this (asya) deity (devasya) [Bhairava] [embodied in the sound a (akulasya)] to manifest the universe (kularathanasālini) [though] [transcending it (akulasya)], the power with which the Lord is ever one (avīyuaktō yāyā prabhuh). The Power of Bliss (ānandaśaktih) [=ā] is the combination (gāmalanī rūpam) of these two, the ‘passionate embrace’ (saṅghattah) out of which the universe is emitted [into consciousness]. This is the [ultimate] reality beyond both the universe-transcending and the universal (parāparāt paraṃ tattvam). It is ‘the Goddess’ (devī) ‘the Essence’ (sāram) and ‘the Heart.’ It is the highest (parah), omnipotent (prabhuh) state of absolute potential (visargaḥ).

It is also important to mention here that the śāmbhavopāya, which Abhinavagupta equates with the reflective state of the mind of an advanced Yogī, is a state of non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) immersion (samāveśa) or ideation (parāmarśa) where he is expected to make an effort to unify the plurality of the fifty phonemes in the Sanskrit alphabetic system by visualizing all of them within one’s own self as a singular supreme phoneme. That is to say a Śāmbhava Yogī, as affirmed by Abhinavagupta, should be able to visualize, in parallel terms with the phonemic realities, the outer most ontic-reality (tattva) Earth (prthivī) in an inward

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101. TĀ 3.192. Also see Rastogi 1987:201. For more details see also Pandey 1963:652-667.
102. I have used Sanderson’s translations of the terms kaulikī śakti and pratibhā.
103. I have used Sanderson’s translation of the TĀ 3.65-69. See Sanderson, 2005:98
104. TĀ 3.274: nirvikalpe parāmarśe śāmbhavopāyanām | pañcāśadbhedatāṃ pūrvasūtratāṃ yojayedbudhah ||
(ahantā) sequence inside his own non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) state of mind whereafter he attains oneness with the absolute Bhairavic Consciousness.105 As elaborated by Padoux:

For Abhinavagupta the emergence of the fifty phonemes (from a to kṣa) occurs through successive "phonematic awarenesses" (varṇaparāmarśa) of the supreme Siva. The latter, as supreme consciousness (parasaṃvid), is, as we have said, both undifferentiated pure light or pure consciousness (prakāśa) and active awareness, self-representation, free activity of consciousness (vimarśa); and it is this free activity, this self-reflective actualization that gives life to the supreme consciousness. It also makes manifestation possible, for it is the state peculiar to the agent of cognition, the knower (pramātṛ) who perceives manifestation and, as such, is intent on it. Finally vimarśa, as we have seen, too, characterizes the Word aspect of the supreme consciousness; now Word indeed is that which brings the universe into existence. This being so, within consciousness - thus defined as an undifferentiated radiance of consciousness or light, inseparable from an active, living self-awareness tending toward manifestation and which, moreover, is Word (panṅcic) - will arise a more clearly defined, more intent on creation, state of consciousness, referred to by the term parāmarśa. This word denotes a synthetic awareness, or consideration, bringing together in a single act of consciousness the oneness of the agent of cognition (pramātṛ), that is, of the divine, absolute, consciousness which brings forth the universe, and the particularized forms of this universe, which, as we know, ever dwells in the knower. Thus the phonematic emanation will occur through a succession of fifty "phonematic awarenesses:" varṇaparāmarśa, through which the supreme Siva will become aware, and thereby bring forth fifty different aspects of his own energy, that of the Word, which he will apprehend both as being all different and yet dwelling all within him. Parāmarśa is thus the creative act itself. Through it Siva brings into existence within himself what will be subsequently projected into the energy, which will reflect it, and thereby give birth to the worlds, for the fifty phonemes are associated' (somewhat intricately, as we shall see) with the thirty-six tattvas of which the manifestation consists.106

Practicing in such a way gradually leads a Śāmbhava Yogi towards Bhairavahood where he finds himself in identity with Bhairava. This is called jīvanmukti which is nothing but the state of equanimity with Bhairava where eventually he sees the ultimate reality (Parama-Śiva)

105. TĀ 3.275-276: dharāmeśevikalpena svātman pratiḥbinbatām | paśyanbhairavoḥ gāta jālāśvapajyam | vidiḥ | 275 || | yācante param tattvam samastāvaracandahagam | vyāpi svatantra sarvajñam yačchiva parikalpitam | 276 ||

enveloping all the ontic-realities in totality (pūrṇatā).\textsuperscript{107} And this only happens when he is in complete identification with his own real nature (pūrṇāhantāparāmarśa) and there is no physical ritual involved at all.\textsuperscript{108} This, Jayaratha points out, happens only by the intense grace (tīvra-śaktipāta) of the Lord.\textsuperscript{109} Following the mātrkākrama teaching as taught in the MVUT, a Śāmbhava Yogi is able to visualise and make manifest within himself the reflected forms of the thirty-six tattvas. These realities are then seen and realized by a Yogi as nothing but the reflected realities manifesting within his own self. Thus the state of Śiva (Śāṃbhavāvasthā) is defined as the state of reflection or pure reflective awareness.

IV. Reflection in the Trika Texts

Apart from the TĀ, Abhinavagupta engages with the pratimbavāda in some of his other works, viz., TS (third āhnika), the TU (third āhnika), PTv, PS (verses 6-13), ĪPV 1.2.8 and 2.4.19, and ĪPVV 1.2.8 and 2.4.19. In addition to this he also makes allusions to the pratimbavāda in his commentaries on non-tantric works, the NŚAB and DĀL.\textsuperscript{110} In the TĀ apart from discussing the pratimbavāda in the first sixty five verses of the chapter three - the section of the text presented in this thesis - Abhinava continues to discuss it again in verses 268-294ab in the same chapter where he engages with the topic of Śāmbhava Samāveṣa as the state of Jīvanmukti.\textsuperscript{111} While the TS and the TU, which are very short summaries of the TĀ by the same author, touch upon the Theory of Reflection very briefly, PTv is another seminal text

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\textsuperscript{107} TĀ 3.271: bhūyobhūyasya samāveśam nirvikalpanimani śritah | abhyeti bhairavibhūvam jīvamuktyaparābhidham |
\textsuperscript{108} TĀ 3.270: pūrṇāhantāparāmarśa yo 'asyaśāya praviveṣitaḥ | mantramudāriyopāsāstadanyā nātra kāścana |
\textsuperscript{109} TĀV 3.268-270: yasya tīvraśaktipatavataḥ sādhakaśāntiyośaḥ pratimātprameyattānā tadbhedopahedādīnā prapancaāvatātmane bhūyobhūyaḥ samvidātmane pratimātprameyattānā bhāttī darpananagaranagāraṇāntiṣṭiriktyamanāntave 'api anatiriktātvena scatmanātpratipatayaivaśabhasate, sa khalu viśveśitarah para-prakāśātmabhūvagadākāśātmabhāvame prakāśate ityarthāḥ |
\textsuperscript{110} For the NŚAB and the DĀL see the three remarkable articles in the section on Saundarya aur Kalā (361-450) by Navijivan Rastogi in Rastogi (2012).
\textsuperscript{111} TĀ 3.267cd: alamanyena bahunā prakṛte atha niṣṇijate | | See also Jayaratha’s comment in the TĀV thereupon: athyānāntarye tadītite anantaram prakṛtām viśveśita pratimātpratimātpramādantō prastūyate ityarthāḥ | |
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where the pratibimbavāda is discussed from linguistic-cosmological point of view.112 In both the TĀ and PTv, the idea of ontological categories (tattvās) is complexly related to the linguistic philosophy of the evolution of the phonemes.113 As noted by David Lawrence114, there are a few other examples of Abhinavagupta’s basic metaphysical use of the analogy of reflection. For instance there is mention of the reflection metaphor also in ĪPV 1.6.3, ĪPV 2.1.1 (benediction), ĪPV 2.1.8, ĪPV 2.4.10, ĪPV 3.1.1-2, the Bodhipaścadasikā (verses 4 and 5) and Paramārthacārvavāraṇa (verses 4-5).115

I would argue that Abhinavagupta’s fundamental philosophical intuition is basically rooted in Krama116 and that the Theory of Reflection in the TĀ is one of the best examples of this. Abhinavagupta cannot be seen only confined to the Pratyabhijñā system and thus his logical-epistemological interpretation of reflection is just a single dimension of what his larger project was. While in the ĪPV and the ĪPVV Abhinavagupta was building upon the Pratyabhijñā-based Trika, in the TĀ he engaged in crafting a Trika grounded in the Krama cult of Kāli. In addition to this in his Anuttaraprakāryā that is basically represented by the PTv, he is shaping the Trika immersed in Kula-prakriyā. The PT, on which -vivāraṇa is a prose commentary by Abhinavagupta, is “a short text teaching a form of the Trika known as the Anuttara, Ekavīra, or Parākrama, in which a simplified, essentializing form of worship and meditation is directed to Parā alone and her seed-syllable SAUH.”117

While reading Jayaratha’s TĀV, it was his commentary on verse 3.8 that brought my attention to the verses 1.2.8 and 2.4.19 in the ĪPVV, Abhinavagupta’s masterly commentary on ĪPVivṛti. Before long I realized that the commentary of Abhinavagupta on these two verses of Utpaladeva is a significant source for critically exploring the complex nature of his Theory of Reflection if one is interested in the polemics of reflection in Śaiva philosophy.

112. See also Bäumer (2011) on this topic.
114. Lawrence (2005:592, fn. 39)
nonetheless decided to continue to make the TĀV the focus of my study because my primary interest is in how Abhinavagupta appropriated the idea of reflection to fit within his Śaiva soteriology. Abhinava’s polemical discussions are deeply embedded in his Śaiva theological metaphysics. At the same time it was impossible to ignore the ĪPVV because it is actually there together with PTv where Abhinava’s idea of reflection reaches its culmination. As I went ahead, and compared the TĀV and the ĪPVV, it was soon very clear to me that Jayartha, in his commentary on the TĀ, was gleaning most of his philosophical arguments, some times even verbatim, from the ĪPVV. In my present edition, besides showing such instances wherever possible, I have also taken help from the ĪPVV whenever a certain point in Jayaratha’s interpretation was not clear.

As noted earlier Abhinava’s Theory of Reflection works at several levels: ontologically, through its application with respect to the ontic-realities (tattvas) it seeks to establish that the universe is a reflection of the Divine. At the phenomenological level it describes the Yogic practices prescribed in the Trika Śaivism. From the epistemological point of view this theory is being advocated through the doctrine of recognition (pratyabhijñā). From the point of view of the philosophy of language Abhinava explains his theory of phonemic emanation using the Theory of Reflection, since for him language is an essential form of reality. And the principle of reflection also operates in his aesthetic theory of rasa, where he claims that the process of identification (sādhāranākaraṇa) is the manifestation of the reflection of the performer in the heart of the audience. In the coming pages we will touch upon several dimensions of these varied explanations of the Theory of Reflection in relation to the section on reflection in the TĀ.

From the phenomenological point of view, Abhinavagupta has discussed and prescribed the practice and teaching of the sequence of mātrkā (mātrkākrama) in the TĀ and the sequence of mālinī (mālinīkrama)\(^{118}\) in the PTv for the benefit of Yogis.\(^{119}\) The latter text discusses in more detail and in a very subtle style and abstruse language the ontology of the thirty-six ontic realities accepted by the Śaivas.

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\(^{118}\) mālinī and mātrkā are further interpreted as synonymous with Śakti and Śiva respectively.
\(^{119}\) cf. PTv pp. 151-154 (KSTS). Also see MVUT 3.36-41
The tattvas associated with phonemes are enumerated from earth, the final "gross element" up to Śakti, whereas emanation should of course occur the other way around. The reason for this, says Abhinavagupta in the PTV, is that the "great Emanation," projected outside Śiva or the supreme energy, is reflected in the supreme-nonsupreme energy, so that the latter, working like a mirror, makes the tattvas appear in a reversed order; revealing first the one which comes last in Śiva. As we are going to see, indeed, only the order of the tattvas is reversed, not that of the phonemes.120

While the Theory of Reflection enters another complex territory in the PTv that I am not attempting to discuss here,121 however I should conclude this section by coming back to my argument that Abhinavagupta’s philosophy is deeply and esoterically rooted in the Krama and Kula ideas, and there is hence a notable degree of novelty attached to his use of the metaphor of reflection. It is discussed in the ĪPV and the ĪPVV from the Pratyabhijñā point of view, it is discussed in the PTv from the Kula point of view, it is discussed in the NŚAB from the aesthetic point of view and in the TĀV it is discussed from the Krama point of view. However, none of these points of view can be completely understood in isolation.

V. Defining Pratibimba

As far as the definition of bimba and pratibimba is concerned, Abhinavagupta clearly defines bimba (‘image’) only in the TĀ and the TS. In the TĀ he states that a bimba is something ‘which is not mingled with other things, is independent, is real, and is appearing, like a face.’122 Jayaratha’s commentary on this verse tells us that ‘not mingled with others’ (anyāmiśram) should be understood as ‘devoid of homogenous and heterogenous things’ (saśātiṣṇiṣṭḥiṣṭaḥṣātyāvṛttam).123 And this ‘homogeneity’ is defined as an important

120. Padoux (1992:308)
122. TĀ 3.53: naivaṃ tallakṣaṇābhāvād bimbaṃ kila kim ucyate | anyāmiśram svatantraṃ sad bhāsamānaṃ mukhaṃ yathā ||
123. TĀV 3.53
characteristic of ‘purity’\footnote{cf. TĀ 3.7cd: ‘And the purity is a single complex of very compact and homogenous elements.’} which would mean that \textit{bimba} is not understood as pure at all. In fact, purity, according to Abhinavagupta, lies in \textit{pratibimba} and not in \textit{bimba} just as purity lies in a mirror and not in a face. Also, a \textit{bimba} is defined as independent and real, i.e. as a face cannot ‘be’ a mirror, but there is only the reflection of a face in a mirror, in the same way a \textit{bimba} cannot manifest ‘as’ \textit{pratibimba}. A thing lies only in its own nature. It cannot lie in the nature of another, as blueness can lie only in blue, and not in the reflection of blue nor in yellow. In other words, blueness manifests as blueness and the reflection of blueness manifests as the reflection of blueness in a mirror. This is what is meant by Abhinavagupta when he says it ‘is appearing’ (cf. TĀ 3.53).

As for \textit{pratibimba}, Abhinavagupta says that it is a distinct object which is very different from its original image:

By union with the mingling with another [thing], its manifestation is impossible without that [thing]: [that is] the reflected image according to the masters, like a face in the mirror.\footnote{TĀ 3.56: \textit{nānaḥ ittham pratibimbasya laksanam kim tad ucyate | anyayāmiśraṇāyogōt tadbhedāsakyaḥbhāsanam | pratibimbam iti prāhur darpana cādānaṃ yathā ||}

Our worldly experience says that until we put our face in front of a mirror, our face cannot reflect inside it. As far as mundane reality is concerned the principle of simultaneity is important; without it reflection cannot take place. We cannot expect to see our face in a mirror which is not in front of us. Nor can I expect to see my face in a mirror at this very moment if the mirror had been in front of me yesterday. In other words, the reflected image has to be independent from the locus, albeit at the same time it has to appear in union with it. From this point of view, only the mirror and so on is the right locus of reflection, and not the light, eyes and consciousness, which are only means for it.\footnote{TĀ 3. 19-20: \textit{tasmāttu naiṣa bhedena yadbhāti tata ucyate | ādhārastatra tīpāyā dipadraksanvīdalā kramāt || 19 || dipacaksurivodbhānāṁ kātiḥingabhāvataḥ param | sarvataścāpi nairmalyānma vibhādarsavaṇṇāprthihak || 20 ||} We are talking about the specific ontological status of the reflected image on the one hand and of the locus on the other hand.

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[124]{cf. TĀ 3.7cd: ‘And the purity is a single complex of very compact and homogenous elements.’}
\footnotetext[125]{TĀ 3.56: \textit{nānaḥ ittham pratibimbasya laksanam kim tad ucyate | anyayāmiśraṇāyogōt tadbhedāsakyaḥbhāsanam | pratibimbam iti prāhur darpana cādānaṃ yathā ||}
\footnotetext[126]{TĀ 3. 19-20: \textit{tasmāttu naiṣa bhedena yadbhāti tata ucyate | ādhārastatra tīpāyā dipadraksanvīdalā kramāt || 19 || dipacaksurivodbhānāṁ kātiḥingabhāvataḥ param | sarvataścāpi nairmalyānma vibhādarsavaṇṇāprthihak || 20 ||}
\end{footnotesize}
Contrary to the common-sense understanding of reflection, Abhinavagupta posits that a reflected image can exist on its own even in the complete absence of a prototype. A critical point for interpreting Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection is the distinction he makes between reflection as it pertains to physical mirrors and reflection in the mirror of Consciousness; the former is merely an imperfect analogy for the latter. When analyzing the attributes of reflection taking place in a mirror, Abhinavagupta says that what applies in the case of a mirror does not apply in the case of Consciousness simply because a mirror is endowed with a numberless limitations. But Consciousness has no limitations of any sort whatsoever:

Here, within one’s own self, this entire universe manifests like a variegated image inside a mirror. Consciousness, however, becomes aware of the universe by the activity of its own nature of awareness. But this does not happen at all in case of a mirror.

Abhinava says that the image that is reflected in Consciousness indeed does not possess a separate existence as if it were an independent reality, separate from the mirror of Consciousness. There is no existence separate from or outside of Consciousness. This is precisely why the reflected image in Consciousness does not have a form and other attributes. As Abhinava proclaims:

[The image reflected in Consciousness has] no space, no form, no union with time, no measure, no mutual conjunction, no negation of this [conjunction], no density, [it has] no state of being non-entity, no innate essence, whatever it is. The teaching of the mirror pointed out [that thinking] in such a way (īti) the delusion should surely disappear.

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127. Also pointed out by Ratié (forthcoming:3).
yatvadveśācittātānām막ukurāntarālē |
| bodhaḥ punarnijavārasānyāṃṣita vīṣvam pariṃśrati no makurastathā tu
| ||
129. TĀ 3.23: na deśo no rūpāṁ na ca samayayo no parimā | na cānāṃśaśaṅgo na ca tadapahānirna
ghanatā | || na cānāśutvam syānna ca kimapi sāraṁ niṣamitī | dhruvam mohāḥ śaṃyedīti
| nirdiśaddarpurāṇicīdhiḥ | ||
Jayaratha maintains that Abhinavagupta’s purpose in advancing the ‘teaching of the mirror’ (i.e. the mirror of Consciousness) is that it should aid the person suffering from mala to rid himself of it and help him in realizing his true self. Since limited or incomplete knowledge is based on duality, it is only the total or complete manifestation of knowledge that can make limited beings discern the true nature of knowledge. Here the other thing to keep in mind is that Abhinava is emphasizing the idea of the totality of manifesting (pūrṇābhāsa). That is to say knowing a thing in its totality or in its completeness without delving into the binaries of what may or may not exist is what is referred to as complete knowledge which has ‘manifesting’ alone as its very nature.

According to a Śaiva what is reflected in a mirror is a configuration of form and not an illusion or an error at all. Even though there is the absence of touch etc. in this form, still the other tanmātras are present there in a state of latency. If it were not the case it would be impossible to distinguish between a bimba and its pratibimba. For Abhinavagupta, pratibimba is:

that reality which is the simple configuration of form, which is united with touch, smell, taste etc. in a state of latency.130

The unique property of a mirror is that it can conceive a ‘form’ within its surface owing to its purity. In other words we can also say that a mirror has a unique quality of manifesting within itself anything that is reflected in it. The unique quality is that a mirror is able to singularly and simultaneously manifest all the diverse entities in itself without causing any change to what is being reflected within it. Abhinavagupta’s purpose is to prove that even if worldly entities are diverse, their cognition is singular. That is to say he emphasizes the singular manifestation of the diverse entities (many different objects) in a mirror. Objects occupying different spaces in the single limited surface of the mirror is logical according to Abhinava since those objects are condensed together through reciprocal mixing (paraspara samnelana), for it is otherwise illogical that they could share the same space. If that were not

130. TĀ 3.16: rūpasaṃsthānamātraṃ tatsparṣagandharasādībhīḥ | nyagbhāṭaireva tadyuktaṃ vastu tatpratibimbhitam ||
the case, a town could never be reflected in a mirror. All things manifest in a mirror are mutually independent. And because what is reflected cannot be not-reflected, the reflection cannot be said to be a non-entity. While a reflected image is a kind of entity, at the same time it does not possess its own real, independent form. Ratié makes an important observation here:

Le miroir est un objet. Et pourtant, ce n’est pas un objet comme les autres. Il possède en effet le pouvoir étrange de manifester des choses qui lui sont extérieures comme si elles lui étaient intérieures. Cette manifestation n’est pas, cependant, de l’ordre de la pure et simple illusion, puisque, contrairement à ce qui se passe lorsque nous commettons une erreur et prenons de la nacre pour de l’argent, lorsque nous observons le monde dans un miroir, nous ne confondons pas deux objets différents : nous sommes capables de distinguer ce qui manifeste de ce qui est manifesté – nous savons que nous ne sommes pas en train de percevoir la montagne, mais le miroir manifestant la montagne. C’est pourquoi nous savons que la montagne n’est pas dans, ni sur, ni derrière le miroir – elle n’y est pas, parce que le miroir se contente d’assumer la forme visuelle de la montagne. Il y a quelque chose de fascinant dans un tel objet, parce qu’il possède un pouvoir qui d’ordinaire n’appartient pas aux objets: celui de manifester une multiplicité tout en restant un, en assumant une forme à laquelle son être ne se résume pas.\(^\text{131}\)

As Ratié explains, a mirror has the unique quality that it is able to reflect within its own surface the multiplicity while itself being completely unitary in nature. It has the power of letting objects of cognition manifest within it while itself remaining completely unaltered. Coming back to the definition of \textit{pratibimba} quoted above, Abhinavagupta teaches that a mirror can only reflect a ‘form’ but not other sensory perceptions like touch and taste. In the same way it is only the ear which can reflect within itself sound and not touch, form etc. In contrast, Consciousness alone is capable of reflecting everything within its own ‘surface’ because it is not pure only with respect to certain qualities, but it is completely pure in every sense. In Consciousness all aspects reflect in their totality simultaneously.

Abhinava tells us that what might be understood as the original image and what is the cause of a reflected image from the worldly point of view, itself becomes a reflected

\(^{131}\) Ratié (2011a:286)
This universe cannot be called, he says, an original image in Consciousness because it lacks the characteristics of an original image. Abhinava himself raises an objection: how could a reflected image exist in the absence of an original image? To this he first replies with almost taunting clumsiness, saying, "As a matter of fact it appears like that, what can we do?" But later, in TĀ 3.59cd he revisits this point and says:

What from that? [We do not care about this] for the original image is not identical with the reflected image. And therefore, in the absence of this [original image], nothing goes wrong as regards the said definition of the [reflected image]. This question is merely confined to the cause.

The main point that Abhinava seems to make here to counter the argument of his opponents is that the reflected image is not identical with the original image. That is to say, he would continue to argue, that if a face is reflected on the surface of a bright sword, it can look elliptical or oval etc. taking the shape of the surface of the sword thus no more remaining identical with the original image.

In the same way one can also argue about the reflection of a face in a coloured mirror where the colour which is not present in the original image, is but manifested in the reflected image alone. Our face may attain many different shapes when it is reflected in a crystal depending on the shape, size and colour of the latter. Jayaratha explains this using an example of a Śimsipā tree. The Śimsipā maxim is used commonly in Sanskrit literature signifying that a thing cannot exist without its essential nature, i.e. a rose cannot exist without its being a flower. What Abhinavagupta is suggesting is that this relationship of identity does not exist in the case of an original image and a reflected image. The reflected image has nothing to do with the acquisition of the nature of its original image. In that case then the question that arises is, what is the difference between

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132. TĀ 3.50: yadvapi kāraṇam kiṃcidbimbatvenābhiṣicṣyate | tadapi pratibimbatvatmeti bodhe’ anyathā tvusat
133. TĀ 3.52c: nanu bimbasya virāhe pratibimbam katham bhavet | kim kurmo ṍṣiṣyate taddhi nanu tadbimbamucyatam
134. TĀ 3.59cd-60: kim tataḥ pratibimbhe hi bimbam tādātmyavṛtti na | | 59 | | lakṣaṇasyāsya proktasya tadasambhavet | na hānirhetumātre tu praśno ‘ayaṃ paryavasyati | | 60 | | 135. TĀ 3.54: svarūpānapahānena pararūpasadṛṣyataḥ | pratibimbātmatāmāḥuḥ khadgādārītatalādivat | |
136. TĀV 3.59cd
the original and the reflected image and what is the relationship between them? Abhinavagupta defines a reflected image as dependent and the original image as the one that is not mingled with others and is independent.\textsuperscript{137} And since this universe is mingled with Consciousness its manifestation without Consciousness is impossible. It is absolutely true, Abhinavagupta concludes, that this universe in which there are worlds, tattva etc. is a reflected image in Consciousness.\textsuperscript{138}

But if the relationship between an original image and the reflected image is not that of identity, then what is their relationship? Jayaratha contributes to this debate saying that the original image is not the material cause of the reflected image, for that material cause continues to exist under the aspect of its effect once its own nature has been transformed, like the clay into a pot. This is not the case with the original image here since even when the reflected image comes into being, its untransformed form itself is perceived separately. Therefore, as Jayaratha puts it, the original image is the instrumental cause, like a potter’s stick in the case of a pot.\textsuperscript{139} This indeed means that a reflected image can exist without an original image since there is also another cause which is capable of producing this reflected image and which is ancillary to it.\textsuperscript{140} Abhinava alludes to the metaphor of the ‘universal sovereignty of Consciousness’\textsuperscript{141} for emphasizing the power of Consciousness that is supposed to be prevailing everywhere.\textsuperscript{142} This also supports his Theory of Manifestation (ābhāsavāda) since it is Consciousness that is manifesting everywhere in everything whatever exists.

Another important point that Abhinava introduces is about the similarity of form (sādṛṣya) or identity (tādātmya). A mirror is not able to reflect anything more than the similarity of form of an object that is being reflected in it. We are talking about the identity

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} TĀV 3.56
\item \textsuperscript{138} TĀ 3.57: bodhamiśramidāṃ bodhād bhedenāśakyabhāsanam | paratattvādi bodhe kim pratibimbam na bhanyate ||
\item \textsuperscript{139} TĀV 3.60
\item \textsuperscript{140} TĀV 3.61
\item \textsuperscript{141} Such expressions as akahandasamvītsāṁrāja and samvītsāṁrāja are also used by Varadarāja in his Śiva Sūtra Vārtika 1.11.60 (p. 7) and 3.45.122a (p. 45).
\item \textsuperscript{142} TĀ 3.51cd: sāṁrajyameva viśvatra pratibimbasya jñābhate ||
\end{itemize}
between what shines forth and the Lord’s Consciousness. Abhinava says that even if a mirror with specific qualities (i.e., thin, circular etc.) does not abandon those qualities when something is reflected in it, yet the principle of reflection is based on the similarity of form. This is further illustrated by Jayaratha with a couple of examples: when a town is reflected in a mirror, it should also become manifold since there is the perception of many things—as for instance, in the case of a butterfly, where there are different understandings of the variegated cognition of the butterfly yet there is no loss of unity of cognition. And for this reason it is unitary and not manifold in as much as it is simply similar to the many aspects of the butterfly. In the same way, a mirror also has a single nature even when it is united with manifold reflected images. There is no undesired consequence of the manifoldness, but simply a mere similarity with the original image. Therefore, the fact of possessing a reflected image is simply the fact of having a similar form as the original image.

VI. Metaphysics of Light and the Motif of ‘Pure Mirror’

According to Abhinava, the ‘means’ (upāya) and the ‘goal’ (upeya) are two distinct ways of representing the same reality from the absolute point of view. There is no distinction between the two of them. This is explained by Abhinava using the binary of Light (prakāśa) and Reflective Awareness (vimarśa) in Śaiva metaphysics. On the other hand from the theological point of view, it also translates into reintegrating Śiva and Śakti. Śakti or reflective awareness functions as the only means to reach Śiva or, in other words, integrating the means (upāya) with the goal (upeya) is like the process of reflection (pratibimbā) that takes place only when Śiva is able to make cognizance of his real nature in the ‘reflective medium’ of Śakti, which is basically nothing but an integral form of himself. Just as the ‘luminosity’ of light is not different from the light itself, in the same way vimarśa is nothing but the very nature of prakāśa. The totality of Light which pervades or envelops everything is beyond the binary of Light and Reflective Awareness. Thus when

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143. See Ratié (2011b:note 14) who also quotes ĪPVV, vol II, p. 89 to illustrate this point.
144. TĀV 3.54
145. VB 20d: sātīḥ mukhamihocyate
Abhinavagupta refers to prakāśa, he is actually referring to both prakāśa and vimarśa (prakāśavimarśamaya). The plurality of manifestation is inherently present in the unity of Consciousness according to Abhinavagupta as, for instance, the variegated-ness of a peacock’s plumage already resides in the plasma of the egg of a peacock where it lies in an unmanifested form.

In the TĀ Abhinavagupta has a specific purpose in mind while he speaks of the fundamental Śaiva idea of prakāśa in chapter two and about vimarśa in chapter three. In fact, the second chapter mirroring the idea of prakāśa is titled anupāya and the third chapter describing the nature of vimarśa is named śāṃbhavopāya. One of the unique features of Abhinavagupta’s Trika is the addition of anupāya (‘means without a means’) to the scheme of the three immersions (samāveśa) or upāyas taught in the MVUT. Even though the anupāya is understood to be the fourth means, it is basically the culmination of the śāmbhavopāya. The independent nature of anupāya is mentioned only to signify the intention of reintegrating the two components involved in this process - the means and the goal. Thus it is only by following the means of śāmbhavopāya that one is to reach anupāya. Rastogi (1992:253) makes an important observation here:

When AG [Abhinavagupta] presents this plane as anupāya, his sole intention is to integrate the means (upāya) with the goal (upeya). In this sense alone anupāya is mentioned independently, otherwise it represents the final phase of śāmbhava. The dissolution of all the states simply means emergence of the state of pure awareness in which the universe is ever shining in its totality. Emancipation within life (jīvanmukti) is nothing but one’s establishment in such a trance on a permanent basis technically described as “ever-away” (nityodita) samādhi. This is what we understand by Trika or anuttara-yoga.

These ideas of prakāśa and vimarśa also echo in Abhinavagupta when he refers to the terms like anuttara and anuttarā or akula and kauliš śakti or vācyā and vācaka in his Kaula interpretations, and jñāna (cognition) and kriyā (action) in his Pratyabhijñā system. It is the

146. Here I am referring to another often used metaphor by Śaiva authors: mayūrāṇḍaṇya-ṇyu. 
147. IV 1.8.11 sa eva hi ahaṃbhāvaṇaṇa vimarśa devasā krīḍādīvayasya svadhyā pāramārthakhyau jñānakriye, prakāśarūpaṇa jñānaye tatratva svāttantrīyātmā vimarśaḥ kriyā, vimarśaśca antalṣkṛtyapraṇāṣaḥ |
realization of the inseparable nature of prakāśa and vimarśa or Śiva and Śakti or upāya and upāya which leads one to emancipation. As pointed out by Rastogi such a state is referred to as ‘ever-awakened’ (nityoditā). An adept practitioner’s self-reflexive awareness, when s/he is in its highest stage, is supposed to reflect on the pure surface (bhitti)148 of his/her own Consciousness thus awakening him/her. This is what is the nature of śāmbhavopāya and this awareness arises through the power of Will (icchā-śakti), which is why, as mentioned previously, this upāya is also called icchopāya.

The first level of reflection is where prakāśa (Light) is reflected in vimarśa (Reflected Awareness) as a face is reflected in a mirror, and the second level of reflection is where vimarśa, which is nothing but the extended form of the prakāśa itself, is reflected back in prakāśa. This does not happen in the case of a mirror, however, because a face is indifferent towards receiving reflection owing to its impure nature. In both the cases ‘reflection’ takes place in the prakāśa itself. The idea of reflection we are talking about here is sort of self-generative reflection which may not necessarily need a bimba or a prototype. It is a matter of the self-luminosity of Light, which does not require any other external bimba or prototype to shine forth or reflect. This idea of reflection in Abhinavagupta’s thought is what I may call ‘meta-reflection’ and the concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa are absolutely fundamental in understanding it.

Before we begin to consider in what other ways this concept of prakāśa is understood in the system of Abhinavagupta, a small note on vimarśa or svātantrya will not be out of place here. Jayaratha defines svātantrya or autonomy as ‘the state of being the agent of the act of illumination’.149 Here there is an implicit reference to the well-established concept of agent in the Pāṇinian sūtra- "svatantrah kartā",150 which defines the agent as absolutely autonomous. And we know, again from Sanskrit grammar, that any kriyā or action requires a kartṛ or agent. Thus, the act of illuminating or making something appear or manifest requires an autonomous illuminator. This position is likely to be accepted by almost all other systems, but carrying the argument forward both Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha maintain that ‘being

148. For more on the concept of bhitti see Castro (2013).
149. TĀV-3.1: svatantrateti prakāśanakriyākartṛtvam
150. Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.54
the agent of illumination’ is ‘being the one who manifests everything according to his own Will on His own surface’. The important question to ask might be why ‘on His own surface’. This is an implicit statement of non-duality that claims that what shines on one’s own surface is not really distinct from oneself, and here we can see the relevance of the mirror-analogy. Kṣemarāja sums up the same ideas in a sūtra of his PHṛ: ‘all becomes manifest by [His] own Will on [His own ] surface’. In other words, the universe shines in identity with the Lord’s Consciousness on His own surface.

According to the Anuttara Trika of Abhinava-gupta the foremost attribute of a reflection is the condition of untaintedness (nairmalya). This idea of untaintedness or purity has been interpreted by Abhinava at various levels. Here our focus is how purity has been understood by him to play a role in the idea of reflection in Consciousness. As far as our common experience is concerned the idea of ‘purity’ or ‘non-contamination’ or ‘untaintedness’ is understood when a reflection takes place on the clean surface of a mirror that is free from any kind of contamination. If, for instance, the surface of the mirror is dusty or is not clear because it has been exposed to steam etc., it would be impossible to see one’s face in a mirror. In the system of Abhinavagupta the idea of purity or nairmalya is closely connected with the idea of Light or prakāśa. Rastogi (2002:35) brings our attention to how Abhinava defines prakāśa etymologically. Abhinava says that, in the word prakāśa, the root (prakṛti) signifies the idea of absolute purity (nairmalya) and the affix (pratyaya) means autonomy (svātantrya) or reflective awareness (vimarśa). This means prakāśa has two functions: one is to manifest itself (prakāśate) because of its absolute purity (nairmalya) and the second is to cause others to manifest (prakāśayati) along with it owing to the power of absolute autonomy (svātantrya). This is also true about our common experience - when Light manifests it also makes everything else manifest along with it. To perceive the reflection of a face in a mirror one requires the external support of light, but Consciousness is like a self-luminous mirror which is not dependent on any external support for its sustenance.

151. TĀV-3.1: tāsyā ceyattatvam yat svabhīttayena svacchāya sarvaṃ prakāśayatīti
152. PHr 2: svacchāya svabhīttayena vīśvaṃ unmiṣāyati \| \| 153. ĪPVV, Vol II, p. 177: atra nairmalyāḥ prākāśanarūpīḥ prakṛtiḥbhūteviśrāntātātiriktaḥ kārtrīdākṣaṇaḥ svātantryasvabhāvo yāḥ pratyayasya arthaḥ |
absence of that self-luminosity of Consciousness the universe would be insentient and thus
devoid of the Light.  

But this is not the case. Light is defined by Abhinavagupta as Śiva's own body that is not only self-dependent, self-sufficient and self-effulgent, but it is of the nature of Light alone, internally and externally, and nothing else. This Light is what Abhinava also calls Bhairava Consciousness or Anuttara which is absolutely autonomous (pūrnastātantra). Other features of this Light are that it is of the nature of non-duality and that it is beyond the relationship of cause and effect. That is to say that Abhinavagupta's idea of Light transcends the dichotomy between light and not-light. As explained previously this can be understood using the example of knowledge and ignorance. One thing is known and something else is not known. The fact that in this process of 'knowing' and 'not-knowing', the common feature of 'knowing' that transcends both these ideas is what is complete knowledge or Supreme Knowledge. This is because, according to Abhinavagupta, in both the forms of non-duality and duality or knowledge and ignorance, it is basically the Great Lord manifesting Himself in the form of Light. Thus for Abhinavagupta this Light has a unitary nature and if it does not have a unitary nature, then it ceases to be Light. So when Abhinavagupta refers to Light one should understand Supreme Light which has two indivisible characteristics of light and not-light, but as far as it is itself concerned, it remains unitary. According to him, this universe is manifest because Light is manifest and the true

154. TĀ 2.10: sanvitattwam svaprakāśam ity asmin增进 na yuktibhīḥ | tadabhāve bhaved viśvam jadatvād aprakāśakam 
155. TĀ 2.15: kiṃ ca yāc ca bāhyam āntaropāyasaṃmatam | tat prakāśātmatāmātraṃ śivasyaiva nijam vapuh 
156. TĀ 3.1: prakāśamātraṃ yatproktam bhairavīyaṃ param māraḥ 
157. Here, 'not-light' should not be understood as 'the absence of light'. 
158. So, for instance, if we compare the idea of 'not-light' with 'ignorance', the 'ignorance' does not mean the 'absence of knowledge', but it means 'limited knowledge'. See ŚSV 1.2. 
159. TĀ 2.18: idam dvaitam ayaṃ bheda idam advaitam ity api | prakāśavapu evaṃ bhāsate parameśvara 
160. TĀ 2.22: atā ekapākaśo ‘yam iti va de ‘tṛa susthite | dārañā dāvāyātāḥ satyaṃ vibhinnajñānavaśādinaḥ 
161. This idea of singular Light is repeatedly emphasized both by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha. Cf. TĀV 2.16-23. The one thing that Abhinava makes clear in TĀ 2.23 is that the 'single' should not be understood in terms of a number or an enumeration.

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essence of all the entities is Light alone. Nothing can be manifest if Light is not manifest. The concept of prakāśa has another property which is the absence of impurity. Light can only manifest when it is free from any kind of impurity. Abhinava says that Light is by definition pure in an absolute sense; if there is impurity in it it ceases to be the Light.

But what is this purity? Abhinavagupta defines purity as ‘a single complex of very compact and homogenous elements’ such as that which one finds in a reflected image in a mirror. The idea explained is that the face is impure and the mirror is pure; an impure object cannot reflect in another impure object. For instance, a face cannot reflect in another face because both of them are bereft of purity, but it can only reflect into an object which possesses the purity of form like a mirror. A pure thing, however, can reflect into another pure object as, for instance, a mirror can reflect into another mirror. The idea is that Consciousness can manifest or reflect anything in itself since it is completely pure in its totality, while other objects are unable to reflect Consciousness in themselves owing to their impurity yet the fact that they exist is a proof that they are being reflected in cosmic Consciousness. So my face can reflect in Consciousness, but Consciousness cannot reflect in my face. While Consciousness is endowed with the quality of absolute autonomy (svātantrya) owing to which it can manifest itself into any form or shape as it would want, the mirror is bereft of such a quality. In a mirror, the atoms of form (rūpaparamāṇavah) are compact and homogenous. These atoms are associated with the atoms existing in the same substratum, and there is no contact with other atoms at all. This is to say that purity of form can only arise when there are only atoms of form in a certain substratum, for instance a mirror. If the atoms of touch also arise along with the atoms of form in a mirror, in that case purity cannot exist in a mirror, and hence a reflection cannot occur in a mirror. In ordinary experience there is no surface that is capable of reflecting all the aspects of a given entity at the same time except Consciousness. There are only surfaces that are able to reflect a given entity partially, and therefore they are pure to a certain extent. For instance a mirror is a pure surface only with respect to form. And consequently, only subtle elements can be reflected in

162. TĀV 2.30ab: prakāśa eva sarvabhāvānāṃ parā sattā | TĀV 2.30cd: na hi tena vinā kimcidapi idam prakāśate |
163. TĀ 3.7cd: nairmalyāṁ cātinividasajītyākāsangatiḥ | |
their purest form on their respective pure substratum. This is what Abhinava states in 3.5cd: ‘in pure form, only form is manifested’. And as far as the purity of form (rūpa) is concerned Abhinava illustrates this offering an example of a woman who while wishing to feel excited and looking at her beloved in a mirror, does not feel excited at all since a mirror does not have the capacity to reflect the purity of touch:

A secretly enamoured woman, even though touching with her breasts a mirror that is beautiful for the reflected image of the beloved, does not feel satisfied.\textsuperscript{164}

Jayaratha says if the above principle of Abhinavagupta is not accepted then even a mirror can possibly be reflected back in a face. In the common experience it is observed that not everything is reflected in everything else. So as far as our own experience of this world is concerned, reflected forms are perceived only in something that is pure or clear, i.e. a mirror. Jayaratha proposes that this can be understood from both positive and negative concomitance. So the contact between a form and its reflected image occurs only when the form (for instance, of a mirror) is perceived as not contaminated by the elements which are devoid of homogeneity. But it does not happen when the dirt on that form (i.e., mirror) is produced by non-homogenous elements like steam or dust. With respect to the projector of reflection, what possesses the specific quality called ‘purity’ is indeed the same which perceives its reflected image.\textsuperscript{165} Jayaratha strengthens this argument in his commentary on the verse TĀ 3.9 where he further adds that the purity manifests as primary and as secondary. The former belongs to Consciousness and the latter is attributed to things like mirrors. If this is not accepted then even the reflected image of our face in the mirror can be reflected back in our face.

In a mirror one can only see whatever is reflected within the limited area or surface of the mirror. So for instance, if a mirror is in front of my face I can only see my face in the mirror, but I cannot see the face of my friend who is standing away from me. Abhinavagupta says this is because the purity of a mirror is limited with certain conditions such as that one

\textsuperscript{164} TĀ 3.6: \textit{pracchannaraṇī kāntapratibimbitasundaram | darpanāṃ kucakumbhābhāṃ spṛṣantyati na tṛpyati |}

\textsuperscript{165} TĀV 3.7
needs to stand in front of it, and so on. This quality of reflection is possessed by a few more things such as crystals. But the limitation does not apply in the case of Consciousness since Consciousness is completely pure in every respect. This is indeed why, as already mentioned above, Abhinavagupta talks about the manifestation of purity in two ways: as primary purity and as secondary purity:

The primary purity belongs completely to [that] single [principle] which is the Lord-Consciousness. The other [i.e. the secondary purity] is related to a specific [entity] according to its partial aspects.\textsuperscript{166}

Abhinava probably intends to use the secondary or limited purity possessed by objects like mirrors as a model to explain the primary or unlimited purity which belongs to Consciousness alone. Owing to the complexity of the mirror-metaphor it is only if one understands how this works in the case of a mirror that one can clearly understand how it functions in the case of Consciousness as well.

When talking of purity Abhinavagupta is referring to the same idea as explained by Utpaladeva before him:

According to the teaching of the master [= Utpaladeva] pureness is nothing but the capacity of manifesting a different [reality] in identity with one’s own self, a capacity possessed by [the mirror etc.] which [while acting in such a way] does not lose its own luminosity.\textsuperscript{167}

Since Consciousness is self-luminous, it does not need any external light to make itself manifest. When it manifests, it manifests along with its light because that is its true nature. It is just as a mirror is able to manifest itself and the form reflected in it simultaneously without losing its quality to reflect, except for the fact that the mirror needs external light for this process to take place while Consciousness does not. So Jayaratha would further explain it:

\textsuperscript{166} TĀ 3.9: nairmalyam mukhyamekasya sañcinnāthasya sarvataḥ | amśāṃśikātāh ksāpyanyakvimalam | tattadicchayā ||

\textsuperscript{167} TĀ 3.8: svasminabhedādbhinnasya darśanakṣamataiva yā | atyaktaśvaprakāśasya nairmalyam tadgurūditam ||
[This complex] is ‘purity’, a compactness of [entities] endowed with smoothness, which derives from [their] being placed in close connection, that is to say by the elimination of unevenness and so on.\textsuperscript{168}

One can imagine that if the surface of a mirror is not smooth or if it is uneven or rough, one cannot see one’s face in it clearly. So smoothness and evenness of the surface in which an image is being reflected are defined as further attributes of purity.

As regards form (\textit{rūpa}), purity is the capacity or the ability of grasping the reflected image which is completely absent in things like a wall etc. Jayaratha remarks that, as regards one entity, for instance a mirror, ‘its own luminosity’ is not concealed even when another object is reflected in it, since entities like the mirror and so on, manifest in identity with that object, holding the absence of distinction with one’s own self. What Abhinava and Jayaratha assert here is that ‘apart from the surface of mirror the reflection cannot take place outside its surface even for a single atom’.\textsuperscript{169} And it is this uncontaminated mirror that eventually is compared to the Lord of Consciousness. In other words Consciousness is pure like an uncontaminated mirror since the universe, which is intertwined with Consciousness, reflects in its entirety only in Consciousness,\textsuperscript{170} and as Abhinavagupta suggests, purity belongs completely to the latter alone.

\textbf{VII. Ontology of Reflection}

Abhinavagupta uses the metaphor of the reflection of a city or a face in a mirror to establish the Śaiva Theory of Manifestation (\textit{ābhāsavāda}), maintaining that this universe is simply a reflection in the mirror of the supreme Consciousness. But the metaphor is more complex than it may seem at the beginning, since it involves other fundamental topics, for instance the relationship between the oneness of Consciousness and the manifoldness of the

\textsuperscript{168} TĀV 3.7
\textsuperscript{169} TĀV 3.8:
\textsuperscript{170} TĀ 3.4: \textit{nirmale makure ṣadvadbhānti bhūmijalādayah | amisrāstadvadekasminścinnāthe viśvavṛttayaḥ}
universe, and the evolutions of the multiplicity from Consciousness and the reflection of the former in the latter. The metaphor is also relevant in our day to day life: when we see our face in a mirror, is that image of our face in the mirror to be understood as a reality or an illusion? In other words we might simply say that what we see in the mirror appears to be our face but is not precisely our ‘face’. In other words it is just a reflected image of our face. Here we encounter another crucial question: is a reflected image itself real? That is to say, does it have an independent ontological status of its own, or is it something that can never exist in the absence of its prototype? Even if Abhinavagupta’s use of the mirror metaphor sometimes sounds paradoxical, his ontological position is abundantly clear, in that a reflection is as real as an original image. He is not always clear in his use of the mirror-metaphor, however. On one level this metaphor is used for Consciousness: the idea of this universe as a reflection of the divine in the mirror of absolute Consciousness. Here the Divine is a prototype or image and the universe is a reflection, while Consciousness is compared to a mirror. On another level, he seems to suggest that just as a face or a city is reflected in a mirror—a mirror having this unique capacity to manifest whatever is reflected within its surface—in the same way, the variegated nature of the Divine manifests on the ‘surface’ of its own Consciousness.

The employment of the mirror metaphor in this tradition should be understood from two perspectives: from the worldly point of view, both image and reflected image are to be understood as separately existing, while they are not to be understood as two different entities from the absolute point of view. Here the important thing to keep in mind is that a mirror has numerous limitations when it is reflecting but Consciousness has no limitations of any sort. So the mirror metaphor is somewhat misleading. It can show that just as a face or a city is reflected in a mirror or just as any number of varied objects - of different colours, sizes, shapes and weight etc. - are simultaneously manifesting on the clean surface of a mirror, in the same way whatever is perceived as this universe is nothing but a reflection in Consciousness. But the mirror metaphor cannot be employed to explain Consciousness

171. Also observed by Ratié forthcoming:15ff.
beyond a certain limit: the major difference between the two cases is that in the case of Consciousness it is exactly how it is not in the case of a mirror. That is to say that in the mirror of Consciousness there is no prototype (bimba) required for the reflection to take place because Consciousness itself is self-reflexive. It has a unique capacity to make something or anything manifest or shine forth on its own surface without requiring any external bimba to make this happen. I think the analogy of prasena used by Jayaratha makes the Śaiva position of pratibimba clearer than the analogy of a mirror. Jayaratha quotes:

Now, [O Lord !] without you the original image is not visible in one's own self which is pure, like a magical image (prasena) [is not visible] without a mirror. It is by [your] power that the entire group of entities [exists].

Prasena or pratisenena is a reflecting object somewhat like the oracular crystal ball of European folklore. This object was used by magicians of yore to foretell future incidents to people. Images of future incidents would appear or manifest on the surface of the oracle mirror. What is important for our purpose here is that there is no external archetype (bimba) involved which reflects inside the oracle mirror: the image manifests by the sheer magical power of the oracle. This is exactly how the idea of pratibimba or reflected image is to be understood, according to Abhinavagupta. However, since any image needs a substratum on which it is reflected, it is to be taken for granted that even if a reflected image can manifest by itself, it still needs a surface on which it can reflect itself. Even in the case of an oracle, the image could only manifest on the surface of an oracle mirror; without it the manifestation of an image is obviously not possible. In the case of Consciousness, however, since the differentiation is dissolved, bimba and pratibimba are to be understood as a single entity. This is how Consciousness is compared to a mirror: because it manifests the reflected image on its own surface.

Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection claims that this universe and the processes of creation and dissolution taking place within it are manifestations of the powers (śaktis) of the

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173. This verse is quoted by Jayaratha in TĀV 3. 65ab and attributed to anupratyabhijñākāra by him. However, it is not to be found in the IPK and thus this verse remains untraced.
174. For more on Prasena see Vasudeva (2014) and Orofino (1994).
Lord, who is the supreme self (paramātman). These energies of the supreme self become manifest without causing any change in the supreme self, exactly as an image manifests inside a perfectly clean mirror in which the reflected image is not modified. Thus, even while the supreme self unfolds, making manifest this universe and absorbing it back into himself, it remains changeless. The supreme self is defined as absolute Consciousness and its nature is absolute bliss; it is because of this power of bliss that the supreme self manifests the reflections of its internal powers within the Light of its own Consciousness. It is only then that this universe constituting of the thirty-six ontic realities (tattvas) becomes manifest.

According to Abhinava, it is the Lord, Consciousness itself, who manifests as the universe while illuminating his own manifestation in form of both the original image (bimba) and reflected image (pratibimba). He explains this using the Šaiva ontological model of tattvas, as briefly mentioned earlier. In the set of thirty-six tattvas, the first five tattvas are ‘pure’ (śuddha) and the remaining thirty-one belong to the realm of impurity (aśuddha). Abhinavagupta demonstrates in the TĀ the five-fold division with which Parama Šiva manifests himself. There arises a set of five tattvas called Šiva, Šakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara, and Śuddhavidyā as a result of the coming into full vividness of one or other of the five powers of Parama Šiva.175 Parama Šiva, being of the nature of autonomous Consciousness overflowing with the five powers, is categorised into five tattvas through the division manifested by his own autonomy. This autonomous Consciousness of Parama Šiva does not need anything else in order to accomplish what it accomplishes. In that sense it is truly autonomous, needing nothing else for its operation. But what are these five powers of Parama Šiva and how do they operate in the Trika ontology? According to Trika Šaivism, from cit śakti arises the Śivatattva, from ānanda śakti comes the Šaktitattva, from icchā śakti comes forth the Sadāśivatattva, from jñāna śakti emerges the Īśvaratattva and from kriyā śakti arises the Śuddhavidyātattva.176 This distinction is based on predominance and is also clearly articulated

175. TĀ 9.49cd-50ab: śivah svatantrampratigrāpah pañcaśaktisunirbharaḥ || "svātantryabhāsitabhidhāḥ conj. Sanderson | svātantryabhāsitabhidhā Ked. pañcadhā pravibhajate ||
176. TĀ 9.49cd-9.51ab: cidānandes‘najānakriyānām susphutatvataḥ || śivaśaktisadesānavidyākiṃ tattvapañcakam | ekaikatrāpi tattve ’smīn sarvaśaktisunirbhare ||
in Abhinavagupta’s TS. For instance, one cannot think of cit (consciousness) without the other four. The power of Parama Śiva is that which is able to manifest this play of predominance within its totality. So where cit is the predominant element in Parama Śiva’s autonomous nature (svātantrya), that is regarded as citśakti; when ānanda is predominant that is ānanda śakti. So Śivatattva is where cit is predominant. Moreover, each of these tattvas is in fact replete with all the śaktis; their distinctions are based on the predominance of one śakti over the other. ¹⁷⁷

A brief summary of how Jayaratha explains the position of Abhinava further helps us understand this better. Reiterating Abhinava’s thesis, Jayaratha comments that it is clear that Śiva, being supreme and fully expanded, is regarded to be of the nature of nothing but Consciousness according to the Trika system. Even though, he adds, Śiva is without desire because of his fullness, nonetheless, by virtue of the greatness of his autonomy, there arises a desire within him to project himself externally. As a result of this he shines forth, entering the state of Śakti first by representing himself as I (aham). This comes about through a gradual intensification of the relish of his total bliss (ānanda). This state of Śakti that is represented by I is the first contraction of citśakti. Immediately after this he projects the two branches of self-reflexive re-apprehension which are I and this (aham-idam), where I can see its own reflected-self as this. In other words it is as if Śiva were able to see his own reflected image in a mirror, but both the mirror and the image reflected within the mirror belong to the same homogenous Consciousness that is Śiva. With that projection of Śiva there arise two possibilities which further manifest into two tattvas: Sadāśiva and Īśvara. In both cases the state represented is: aham-idam. In both cases the supreme Lord is manifested in this aspect (objective aspect) represented by idam along with the I aspect (subjective aspect) represented by aham. However, at the Sadāśiva level I is principal and this has a subordinate

¹⁷⁷. TS 8, p. 73-75: tatra parameśvarauḥ pañcabhiḥ śaktibhiḥ nirbhara ity uktam sa svātantryatśaktim tām tām mukhyatāyā prakatajun paścakhā tiṣṭhāti | citprādhānye śivatattvam ānandapraṇāh śaktihattvam icchāprādhānye sadāśivaśaktyatattvam icchāyā hi jñānakriyayaḥ saṃyarūpābhāvapagaṇaṁmuktaṁ vajñaśaktiśaktiprādhānām āmiśvaratattvam kriyāśaktiprādhānām vidyātattvam iti | atra ca tatvāvārh śivaśaktisadāśīvābhāvatām brahmaṇeva nīryttau eṣām saṃyugyārūpāṃvīśesām anugeśaśaktiprāh pañca tadyathā saṁbhavāḥ śaktāḥ mantramahēśvarāḥ mantrasvarāḥ mantrāḥ iti śuddhāhṛvā | 178. TĀ 9.51cd: tattatprādhāṇyayogenā sa sa bhūdo nirāpyate |
position while at the Īśvara level, *this* has a principle position and *I* is at a subordinate place. The ground of the *aham* aspect is nothing but pure Consciousness. In *Sadāśiva tattva*, will (*icchā*) is predominant while in *Īśvara tattva* knowledge (*jñāna*) is predominant. At the *Sadāśiva* level, Śiva is supposed to take as his object the mass of phenomena which are like a picture of which the mere outline has been drawn and that takes the form *aham-idam* (the *aham* element is predominant). But when the mass of phenomena has become fully vivid and he submerges the *I* element within the *this* element which has that mass of phenomena as its basis then there arises *Īśvara tattva*. Therefore, according to Abhinavagupta, although there is no difference of the *I*-awareness, there is a difference in the cases of *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara* in accordance with the vividness and non-vividness of the *idam* element. The last in the pentad of the pure-universe (*Śuddhādhyāya*), the *Śuddhavidyā* *tattva* arises when kriyā *sakti* is predominant and when there is the awareness *aham-idam* where both *aham* and *idam* are in perfect equilibrium. This occurs when for *Īśvara* the *I* element flashes forth as grounded in pure Consciousness and when there is the manifesting of the *I* element in the midst of the mass of phenomena in which duality is now fully developed. The supreme Lord Śiva has this single undiluted potency, nonetheless, just as his activity becomes *Śakti tattva* through extraversion, so also for *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara* there is *Śuddhavidyā tattva*.

The objective multiplicity of Śiva manifests in the form of an image and a reflected image. And this is what is repeatedly, emphatically emphasised both by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha. This emphasis is time and again also cemented by what has already been proclaimed by the scriptures. Thus Jayaratha quotes a verse from an anonymous scripture:

> Therefore, the Great God is one. He, whose existence depends upon [His] freedom, appears as being two-fold, that is to say, appears as image and reflected image.\(^\text{179}\)

The very nature of Paramaśiva is that of Consciousness (*Cit*). Here there is another interesting and important idea that should be introduced—the idea of divine play (*krīḍā*). There is no logical argument that works in this idea of *krīḍā*. It is because of the complete free Will (*pūrṇa-svātāntarya*) of Paramaśiva and because of the overflowing joy (*Ānanda*) within

\(^{179}\) TĀV 3.11
him that he spontaneously chooses to engage in this divine act (krīḍā). In fact the Lord’s very nature is playful and as Bhaskarakaṇṭha puts it, his playfullness itself is his nature of autonomy.\textsuperscript{180}

According to Abhinavagupta, when the Cīt Śakti starts dancing by the influence of the Ānanda Śakti, that ānanda helps create the krīḍā. The same krīḍā is nothing but the act of manifestation of Śiva. When there is an act of manifestation of Śiva’s inner krīḍā, he lets the reflection of his inner power (Śakti) reflect on to his own inner self. Thereafter, the creation beginning with Sadāśiva to Prthivi comes into being. The universe is an outward appearance of the inner powers of the great Lord. Even though there is outward appearance or manifestation of the inner power of the great Lord, yet the Lord does not undergo any change, just as when a face is reflected in a mirror, the face does not undergo any change. Another important point is that a mirror is able to reflect within itself a limited image; there are limitations of periphery, etc., for instance, but these do not apply to the reflection of the Divine. Reflection cannot take place outside of a mirror, and it has no separate existence outside of the mirror. At the same time, even though reflection can only take place within the mirror, the reflected image is very much a reality. But when it does reflect, it is by no means an illusion. For all Trika Śaivas a mirror, an image reflected within the mirror and its prototype—all these are not three different components, but simply the different manifested forms of the same reality. This system holds that from the absolute point of view there is a certain uniformity in variety. But how do we explain variety? Variety is simply the manifested form of the unitary nature of reality. For instance, tea, water, yogurt, wine, rain and so forth have the unifying factor of liquidity; in the same way uniformity exists within the variegated universe as well. However, as mentioned, the principle of reflection in our world works exactly opposite to how it works in the divine world.

At the phenomenological level this divine world is compared to the internal world of a Yogi. The whole creation basically resides within us as a reflected image. In the inner world there is no expectation of a bimba. This indeed is the glory of the overflowing svātantrya of Śiva. Even though there are thirty-six different tattvas, the universal nature of

\textsuperscript{180} IPV-Bhāskarī 1.5.7, Vol. I (p. 229): devo hi krīḍāśīla ucyate krīḍā eva ca svātantryam |
each one of them is of Paramāśiva. In fact in each tattva there is the nature of thirty-six tattvas\textsuperscript{181} and it is for the same reason that Abhinavagupta emphasises the idea of sarvamī sarvatmakam—’everything is of the nature of everything’\textsuperscript{182}. The philosophers have imagined Śiva and Śakti as the static and vibrating powers respectively but in reality Śiva and Śakti are not two different entities at all. What is transcendentally (viśvottīrṇa) known as Paramatātva, that which we call Śiva, the same principle is called Śakti in its immanent (viśvātmaka) form. In reality, Paramāśiva and Śakti are both one and the same reality.

Even though a reflection and its prototype are also to be understood in terms of subjective and objective experience, respectively, which in terms of hierarchy is also represented by śāktoṣha and ānavoṣha, from the absolute point of view the subjective and objective cease to exist. It is more like an integrated experience which is named as śāmbhavopṣha, the self-reflexive experience. The Āṇava-level is the level of impure substratum represented by the thirty-one impure tattvas and the Śākta-level is the locus of five pure tattvas. The Āṇava-level lacks transparency and cannot comprehend its prototype while the Śākta-level is more transparent and thus is capable of conceiving a reflected image. It is only the śāmbhava-level which is the purest and the most transparent and the highest level of śāmbhava is the Anuttara experience. This is what Abhinava seems to suggest when he says:

That form (vapus) of the entities which resists is indeed of the nature of māyā, but made of sadvidyā, they have [another form] which does not resist.\textsuperscript{183}

Jayaratha elaborates this further (see the table below) and says that ‘pratibimba’ has the capacity of bearing a reflection because it is pure, does not resist and there is dominance of power of knowledge (jñānaśakti) in it. On the other hand ‘bimba’ does not have the capacity of bearing a reflection since it is not pure; it resists and is dominant with the power of action (kriyāśakti). The former is sentient and the latter is insentient.

\textsuperscript{181} See the anonymous quotation in TĀV 3.45-46: ekaikasyāpi tattvasa ṣadtrīṃśatattvarūpatā

\textsuperscript{182} See Padoux (1992:181) for more on this concept.

\textsuperscript{183} TĀ 3.10: bhāvānāṃ yatpratīghātivapurmātmakaṃ hi tat | teṣāmevaśti sadvidyāmayām tvapratīghātakam ||
Thus ‘bimba’ which is made impure by the concealing of five sheaths (pañcakañcuka) produced by māyā is reflected in ‘pratibimba’. The realm of ‘pratibimba’ is pure and the five tattvas therein represent the five powers (śaktis) of Parama Śiva, viz. Consciousness (cit), Bliss (ānanda), Will (icchā), Knowledge (jñāna) and Action (kriyā). Pandey (1964:345) offers an example illustrating the above phenomenon clearly:

A phenomenon of knowledge is, therefore, like the rise of two waves in the sea of the Universal Consciousness. One of these has Nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection, and the other is without it. The former is called Jīvābhāsa (limited sentient manifestation) and the latter, jadābhāsa (insentient manifestation). When the rising sentient wave is affected by insentient, which rises simultaneously with the former, as a mirror is by the objects, placed before, the phenomenon of knowledge is said to have taken place. Thus knowledge is simply the affected sentient wave of consciousness; but the power of knowledge is that capacity of the Universal Consciousness which is responsible for the rise of both the waves, necessary for the phenomenon of knowledge.
Abhinava eventually connects this process of reflection with the phenomenon of knowledge in his Pratyabhijñā (Philosophy of Recognition). Śaiva epistemology accepts three means of knowing, viz. Perception (pratyakṣa), Inference (anumāna) and Verbal authority (āgama). The Theory of Reflection has an important role to play in perceptual cognition or pratyakṣa. The process of pratyabhijñā is such that the element of Prakāśa tries to recognize itself through the means of its own Reflective Awareness. Purity (nairmalya) is nothing but the removal of mala and the ability to access the unitary compactness or homogeneity (ekaghaṇatā) of Consciousness by removing the heterogenous (vijāţīyatā) elements. In the Reflective Awareness (vimāraśa or svātantrya), the concept of Vibration (spandana) is inherently present and according to the Śaiva epistemology it is the relationship between the prakāśa and the vimāraśa that is designated as pratyabhijñā. In the Śaiva metaphysics, however, it is termed as the anusamdhāna, i.e. finding the unity of prakāśa and vimāraśa.

In the ĪPVV Abhinava eventually seeks to establish reflection (pratibimba) as a third entity (tṛtīyarāśiḥ) which is different from both pratibimba and bimba.184 This he does in order to plead for a complete autonomous ontological status for reflection (pratibimba) which contrasts with the position of the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists. This should be understood keeping in mind the ideas of prakāśa and vimāraśa while at the same time also discerning their integral form (saṃghaṭṭa) as a third entity. In the TĀ, apart from criticizing the Naiyāyika position, Abhinavagupta also counters the Buddhist view that the nature of pratibimba is exactly like the nature of its prototype i.e., bimba.185 This view, Jayaratha reiterates, Abhinavagupta has paraphrased from the Prajñālaṃkārakārikā186 of Śaṅkaranandana and taken it up for criticism maintaining that the Buddhist view is opposed by the Śaivas. One should also pay attention to the similarity of words in the two verses pointed out by Jayaratha:

184. TĀV 3.16. In this context, as also in many others in the TĀV, Jayaratha is clearly seen to have borrowed the ideas of Abhinavagupta from his ĪPVV.
185. TĀ 3.55
186. Since only parts of this text have become available in the form of manuscripts and the text is still not published, it has not been possible for me to look at the context in which Śaṅkaranandana is referring to the discussion of bimba and pratibimba. For more on Śaṅkaranandana, however, see: Eltschinger (2006), Eltschinger (2008), Krasser (2001) and Krasser (2002).
Śankaranandana says: “The nature of the reflected image is said to be in accord with the nature of the other [i.e. of the original image] without abandoning one’s own qualities, like the surface of the mirror and of the sword.” (Quoted by Jayaratha in TĀV 3.54)

Abhinavagupta paraphrases: “The [masters] say that the nature of the reflected image is in accord with the nature of the other [i.e. the original image] without abandoning one’s own nature, like the surface of the mirror and of the sword.” (TĀ 3.54)

In the above words Abhinavagupta is paraphrasing the position of the Buddhists. The Buddhist Yogācārins

……… did not focus on consciousness to assert it as ultimately real (Yogācāra claims consciousness is only conventionally real since it arises from moment to moment due to fluctuating causes and conditions), but rather because it is the cause of the karmic problem they are seeking to eliminate.187

But for Abhinavagupta Consciousness is nothing but supreme reality itself and since, according to him, nothing exists outside the domain of Consciousness there is no question of external reality. Abhinava summarizes the Buddhist position and maintains that reality is one and not many:

And it has been said by the Buddhists that even in the presence of the external object the cognition, perceiving one and many, assumes the form of many, but it is one.188

VIII. Reflection in Subtle Elements (tanmātras)

To explain the Theory of Reflection further in the TĀ, Abhinavagupta uses the model of the subtle elements (tanmātras). The tanmātras are pure, and purity (nairmalya) is defined by

187. See Lusthaus, year not mentioned.
188. TĀ 3.55: uktam ca sati bāhye ’api dhīrekaśekavedanāt | anekasadaśākārā na tvaneketi saugataiḥ ||
Abhinavagupta\textsuperscript{189} as the quality of perceiving the reflected image of everything in the universe, which consists of the five tanmātras. And because the tanmātra is intermediary between a sense organ (jñānendreyat) and a gross element (mahābhūta), it bears the commonality of both and thus has the characteristic of both.\textsuperscript{190} As Torella puts it:

\begin{quote}
The relation between the series of subtle elements (tanmātra) and that of the gross elements (bhūta, mahābhūta) is referred to in both the Sāṃkhya and Āgama texts as the relation between universal and particular. The tanmātra represents the archetypal, quintessential form of the relative mahābhūta of which it constitutes the primary quality (sound-ether, tactile sensation-air, etc.), though not the only one, as all the schools are forced to admit.\textsuperscript{191}
\end{quote}

Keeping the above model in mind we understand that the universal form of sound reflects in ether and its particular form reflects in the ear. In the same way the universal form of touch reflects in air and its particular form reflects in skin. The universal form of ‘form’ reflects in fire (and also in a mirror) and the particular form of ‘form’ reflects in the eye. Likewise the universal form of taste and smell reflects in water (or saliva) and earth respectively and the particular form of both of them reflects in the tongue and the nose. Here we are concerned with the undifferentiated unity that makes the objects of knowledge cognizable. Rastogi has paraphrased these ideas as found in Utpaladeva’s ĪPK:

\begin{quote}
The cognizable reality consists of twenty-three types divided into two classes of means and effect. The means, comprising the external and internal, are thirteen in number and the group of effects is tenfold owing to its division into subtle and gross. The subtle effects stand for what is popularly known as tanmātras and the gross for five elements (pañcamahābhūtas). Both of them are universals where former is cause-universal as clay (mṛt) in jar and may be likened to para-sāmānya, the latter is similarity-universal like jarness in a jar and may be likened to apara-sāmānya.\textsuperscript{192}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{189} TĀ 3.8: svasminabhahadbhinnasya darśanakṣamatacaḥ yāt | atyaktaśvaprakāśasya nairṇaḥ | tadgurūditam ||
\textsuperscript{190} See Rastogi (2013:202)
\textsuperscript{191} Torella (2002:195, fn. 19)
\textsuperscript{192} Rastogi (2013:200-2001)
This scheme of using tanmātras to interpret the Theory of Reflection is mentioned both in Abhinavagupta’s TĀ and his PS, but is evidently missing in the ĪPV and the ĪPVV. Elsewhere in his works we do find a treatment of the pañcatanmātras in the context of the pratībimbaśāda. Also in the PTv, the PS and in the TS, while dealing with the pratībimbaśāda, Abhinavagupta, in order to illustrate the mechanism of reflection, makes reference to the pañcatanmātras.

In the TS Abhinavagupta states:

The reflected image is what is incapable of shining independently [and] it manifests only as mingled with another thing, like the form of the face in the mirror, like the taste/ juice in the saliva, like the smell in the nose, like the touch while in sexual union in the faculty of bliss [= genitals], or like the touch with trident or spear in the faculty of the internal touch, or like the echo in the ether.

Jayaratha, while commenting on TĀ 3.4, states that ‘the universe is nothing but the five [subtle elements] starting with form and so on,’ and to support his stance he quotes a verse from the Svābhodhamañjari of Vāmanadatta. Here one can also observe that Jayaratha seems to move away from the main doctrinal position of the Śaivas who believe that this universe constitutes of nothing but thirty-six tattvas. But probably why Abhinavagupta has focused only on the five tanmātras to explain the process of reflection in the TĀ is because for him purity and the tanmātras are connected; even if he accepts the common knowledge that “[…]
the (five) gross elements (bhūtāni) cannot exist without the five tanmātras. It is clear to him that when we talk about the bhūtas or the tattvas in general, other qualities are also involved, for instance heaviness, smell and so forth - i.e., the other qualities that should be reflected in their turn. However, in the case of each tanmāra, it is only possible to have one reflection at a time. They can only reflect what they are related with. For example, a mirror can only reflect a form, it cannot reflect touch. We never have a surface that is capable of reflecting all the aspects at the same time of a given entity: we only have surfaces that are able to reflect partially a given entity, and therefore they are never completely pure but pure only to a certain extent. And consequently, only subtle elements can be reflected in their purest form in their respective pure substrata. This is what TĀ 3.5cd states: ‘in pure form, only form is manifested’. This, according to Abhinavagupta, also applies to the other four tanmātras.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tanmātra</th>
<th>mahābhūta</th>
<th>buddhindriya</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gandha</td>
<td>prthivī</td>
<td>nāśikā</td>
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<tr>
<td>rasa</td>
<td>āpas</td>
<td>jīrvā</td>
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<tr>
<td>rūpa</td>
<td>taiīas</td>
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<td>sparśa</td>
<td>vāyu</td>
<td>tvak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>śabda</td>
<td>ākāśa</td>
<td>karna</td>
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Table 2

Also, as mentioned above, in the case of five tanmātras, this process takes place both inwardly and outwardly. For instance in our daily life what we see is that a form is reflected outwardly as fire and inwardly it is reflected in an eye. All the tanmātra reflections, according to Abhinavagupta, are like reflections in a mirror, but there are limitations attached to each one of them. However, in Consciousness everything can reflect simultaneously. Even the individual reflections cannot take place if there is no Consciousness. In Consciousness, it is the svātantrya that is reflected. In other words svātantrya is the bimba.

197. Pīṭa, Singh 1988:117
198. See Lakshman Joo (1988:29ff)
which is reflected in the mirror of Consciousness. But in Consciousness we can only see a reflected thing and not its prototype.

Out of the five tanmātras Abhinava’s emphasis on the rūpa-tanmātra is justified, for in a reflected image it is only a manifestation of the configuration of ‘forms’ that appears and not ‘touch’ etc. The characteristic of heaviness is not the characteristic of a reflected image in a mirror. Abhinava regards a mirror simply as a means of perceiving the reflected image.\(^{199}\)

This brings us to a possible doubt that might arise: if it is said that ‘touch’ also resides in the reflected image then it would become evident that there is also heaviness in it, and our common experience contradicts this, since when we see the reflected image of a mountain in a mirror, the mirror does not gain weight at all. And the question arises whether ‘form’ and ‘touch’ always reside together and if both of them are present in the original image (bimba), then why is only the ‘form’ reflected and not the ‘touch’? Abhinava states that a mirror simply works as a means for the realisation of ‘form’ which manifests bereft of touch and so on. But a ‘form’ can manifest only when it is in its purest state.

Abhinavagupta’s point here is that when a face is reflected in a mirror, the reflected image in the mirror assumes the characteristics of the mirror where the face is being reflected. So, for instance, if the colour of the mirror is blue, our face in the mirror will also appear as blue, or depending on the shape and size of the mirror, our face will also take the respective shape in the mirror. This is also true in the case of a sword, for instance, where because of the oblong shape of the sword our face reflecting in the oblong sword also looks oblong. Exactly, in the same way, because this universe is a reflection in the mirror of Consciousness, whatever is reflected in it takes the form of the collection of the qualities of Consciousness which are nothing but Light and Reflective Awareness. As Abhinava says:

And as smell, form, touch, taste and so on, being reflected, appear with the characteristics of their support, like a face in a sword [assumes the characteristics of the latter], in the same way, this universe, being reflected in Consciousness, takes refuge in the collection of qualities [of Consciousness] beginning with ‘being light’

\(^{199}\) TĀ 3.18: kiṁ ca ata eva gurutvādirdharmo naitasya lakṣyate | nahṛṣādārśa saṃsthito.asau taddṛṣṭau sa upāyakāḥ ||
and ‘being freedom’.  

After having established how the Theory of Reflection works in the context of form (rūpa), Abhinava focuses on explaining how the echo (pratiśrūtkā) works. He calls the reflection of sound an echo. An echo, for him, is not a sound arising from another sound, nor is it a rebounding sound as we commonly think it to be. An echo, Abhinava says, is a ‘reflection’ of sound. Moreover, for Abhinavagupta the echo itself is an original sound because when we make some sound, it is the same sound that comes back to us in the form of an echo just as in the case of the reflection of a face in a mirror. In other words echo as echo is a new sound and not just the bouncing of the so called original sound. Echo like reflection of face in a mirror also has its own unique ontological status. In an echo we hear a sound that seems as though it is produced by someone else even if it is the echo of our own voice. The idea is that the echo is our own sound that goes out and eventually the final recognition of that sound in the form of an echo is recognized by the speaker himself or herself. As in the case of a reflected image, Abhinava advocates the same position in the context of a sound using the analogy of a lady in mirror and her beloved:

But also without the perception of the main image, the perception of the reflected image is possible. [A lady] can perceive the beloved who is standing in one’s own back (behind her back), [but] which is reflected in front of the mirror.

Abhinavagupta argues, that an echo is also heard by means of a reflection (pratisamkramaṇa) and it very much has the nature of the original sound. The sound arises on its own. It should not be understood, as the Vaiśeṣikas do, that it comes into being either by contact or

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200. TĀ 3.45-46: yathā ca gandharūpaspṛgrasādyāḥ pratibimbitāḥ | tadādāho parāgyena bhānti khaḍge mukhādīvat   | 45   | tathā viścamiṇḍaṃ bodhe pratibimbitamāśrayet | prakāśatvasavatānatrapraprabhṛtiṃ dharmaśiṣṭuṃ | 46   |

201. TĀ 3.24-26: ittham pradarṣīte‘ amutra pratibimbaṇavartmani | śabdasya pratibimbaṇaḥ yat pratiśrutketi bhaṅgayte   | 24   | na cīnau śabdajāḥ śabda āgacchattvena saṃśravat | tenaiva vākāṃ dūrasaṅkhāḥ śabdasyaśrāvatādapi | 25   | pithûrdipidhānāṁśaviścīṣṭaḥdirdhasaṅgatau | citraścācāyāḥ śabdasya pratibimbam mukhādīvat   | 26   |

202. TĀ 3.29: mukhyagraham tvapi vinā pratibimbagrahō bhavet | svapaścāṣṭham priyaṃ paśeṣṭaṃ kitam mukure vāpuḥ   |   |
breaking. In the Vaiśeṣika theory of sound, ether is regarded as the inherent cause of sound. Each sense faculty, according to them, is made out of the substance with which it is particularly associated. Accordingly the faculty of hearing is made up of ākāśa (ether). Here Abhinava critiques the Vaiśeṣika theory of sound and advocates the unity of the cognition of sound. That is to say that he emphasises the unique quality of ether (ākāśa) that is capable of conceiving the sound. Ether is the only substratum that is able to catch sound, just as a mirror is the only substratum which is able to catch hold of form (rūpa). In other words ether is the only substratum which is pure with respect to sound—hence a sound is able to reflect in ether. Since according to Vaiśeṣikas, an ear (the auditory faculty) is part of the all-pervasive ether (ākāśa) and also sensitive with respect to it, the other important point that is implied here is that in spite of all sorts of various intensities of sounds, an ear is able to hear all of them at the same time with the same intensities with which they were produced. This is exactly like in a mirror where when a variegated city is being reflected, the mirror is able to clearly manifest within itself the reflected image of that city exactly as it is.

The point Abhinavagupta is making is that as far as sound (śabda) is concerned, it is only reflected in ether and not in anything else. This is exactly not the case in the context of Consciousness where reflection takes place without any condition. In the case of the production of sound, the speaker and the listener have a number of conditions or limitations which determine how and where, the sound is produced. That is to say it depends on the distance between them, and the direction that one is speaking in or listening towards, but all this becomes irrelevant in the case of Consciousness. The ether is the ‘perceiver’ of the reflected image of the sound, only in as much as it is in front of the original image. This is what Abhinavagupta is trying to illustrate:

And it is said that being in front of [the original image] is because of the steadiness [of the reflected image] due to [its] non-difference with such mirror. Therefore, the space of the speaker, which is being reflected in the space of a cavity such as a well,
appears endowed with sound, as if appearing in a speaker who is different from that.\footnote{206}

This is to say that a reflection can only reflect in a mirror when the mirror is exactly in front of the reflected object and not in back of it. This is an important condition for reflection to take place within the surface of a mirror. Jayaratha elaborates further saying this is exactly what happens also in the case of sound, the reflection of which takes places in the ether. This is what Jayaratha reiterates:

In as much as the sound is the quality [of the ether], since it is connected with its quality-bearer [i.e., with the ether], it is dependent on the latter. Its reflection in the quality-bearer is logically tenable only together with the quality-bearer; it has been said: ‘In the ether there is the ether’\footnote{207}

Jayaratha compares the space of an ear with the space in a well or a cave saying that just as in the case of a mirror where the reflected image may not necessarily be similar to its original image, the same is the case with sound. Since the sound is reflected in ether, it also takes the shape of the substratum where it is reflected, i.e. if we blow air into an empty jar it sounds different from the original sound. Likewise, when we blow air into a musical instrument like a flute, the reflected form of the original sound is completely different. In the same way people far away from a certain sound may not be able to hear it while others who are near to the place where the sound originated may be able to hear it clearly and loudly. Since the reflected sound (i.e. the echo) may not necessarily be similar to the so called original sound, so it becomes clear, according to the argument of Abhinavagupta, that the reflected sound (i.e. the echo) is in itself an original sound.

Having explained in a bit of detail about the application of reflection in the tanmātras of form (rūpa) and sound (śabda), Abhinavagupta continues by saying that this is exactly how it works in the domains of touch (sparśa), taste (rasa) and odour (gandha) as well. In other

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{206. TĀ 3.31: atah kīpādiñīṭhirākāśe tatpratibimbitam | vuktrākāśaṃ saśabdaṃ sadbhāti tatpratavaktyatvat ||}
\footnote{207. TĀV 3.31: śabdasya guṇatvena guṇini samavetatvāt tatprataratvameveti guṇinaiva saha aṣya guṇini pratibimbanāṃ yukramityuktam ākāśe ākāśam iti ||}
\end{footnotesize}
words for Abhinavagupta ‘a pleasant contact is reflected in the blissful abode of touch’ it is indeed due to the pureness of contact that when reflected, touch becomes fit for the enjoyment of making love. For the same reasons, explains Jayaratha, there could also be the pleasure of the emission of semen owing to sensitive (or pure) touch. Since a touch could be both pleasant or unpleasant: there is also the reflection of touch in a violent blow of a trident on our skin because of which we feel excitement in our body. Here Abhinavagupta is pointing out the unitary nature of excitement that is created because of either pleasant or unpleasant touch. In other words he is suggesting that since we are concerned about the cognition of touch, the idea of pleasant or unpleasant touch is not relevant at all. It is the manifestation (ābhāsa) of all the objects of cognition that establishes their existence. This unitary nature (or what is translated by Jaideva Singh as ‘homogeneousness’) is called khecarī samatā in the PTv by Abhinavagupta. In the PTv Abhinavagupta says:

That very khecarī is perceived separately (from the Divine) in the form of desire, anger, etc. However, the samatā or sameness of khecarī means the perception of her full divine nature everywhere (in śabda or sound, rūpa or form and colour, rasa or taste, gandha or smell, sparśa or contact) because of her being of the nature of perfect Bhairava. Even an iota of the ignorance of the nature of the integral anuttara amounts to a contrary state of mind. It is this contrary state that constitutes transmigratory existence (saṃsāra).

Touch, taste, smell etc. cannot be perceived without the associated sense faculty. These faculties are located in the internal sphere and manifest only through the activity of one’s own senses that are governed by internal organs. In the experience of touch, even though it (touch) is predominant because it is only touch that exists in its purest form there, yet the other tanmātras are not completely absent. They exist in their latent forms.

208. TĀ 3.36ab: sānande sparśadhāmani sundarah  |  
209. TĀV 3.35-36  
210. TĀ 3.36: sparśo ’anyo ’api drṣṭādghaṭasūlaśītwādikodbhavah  || parasthaḥ pratibimbatsvadhēdātānākaraḥ  ||  
213. TĀV 3.40
IX. Dialectics of Reflection

The doctrine of reflection is discussed both by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta at the pure philosophical level in their Pratyabhijñā texts. Here their soteriological concerns utilize the language of epistemology and thus the problems of knowledge, perception, error, causal efficiency become important. This gives rise to debates between the non-dualist Śaivas and the traditions advocating realism. In engaging in this Abhinavagupta’s intention is abundantly clear: establishing valid ontological status for the seemingly illusory objects of perception or imagined objects, such as, to use Abhinavagupta’s own language, ‘a five-trunked, four-tusked elephant running in the sky’. In other words he is pleading for the valid cognition of objects which are deemed to be external to Consciousness. But what is the ontological status of illusory objects? Since Abhinava’s subsequent goal is to appropriate his Pratyabhijñā position that reality is a synthesis of prakāśa and vimarśa, how does he achieve this goal by exploiting the mirror analogy and establishing a non-erroneous ontological status for otherwise illusive idea of reflection?

Abhinavagupta’s fundamental philosophical position is that of an absolute idealist or, as Pandey fittingly proposes, ‘realistic idealism’. This is to say that his system does not negate realism but melds it with idealism. This obviously brings him into conflict with other philosophical systems which maintain either idealism or what Matilal calls ‘direct realism’, but not both at once. Talking about the ontological status of ‘reflection’ and the metaphysics of Light, realists and idealists hold diametrically opposed views. To find a solution to these problems they consider the analogy of reflection of a face in a mirror. As we discussed previously the question is whether a face in a mirror is a reality or simply a sensory illusion.

Contemporary scholars have already studied in depth the philosophical conflicts arising between Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta with those of other schools who either

214. See Ratié (2010b) for more on Abhinavagupta’s use of this metaphor.
216. Matilal (1986:371)
subscribe to idealism or to realism. It is well established that on the side of idealism, the Buddhist Vijñānavādins are the main opponents of the non-dualistic Śaiva system, apart from others who may be termed ancillary opponents. In the small fragment of the pratibimbavāda in the TĀ that I present in this thesis, Abhinavagupta particularly chooses to counter the arguments of the logicians (Naiyāyikas), for they advocate a solely ‘realist’ Theory of Reflection. In his unique debating style, Abhinava does not completely reject the thesis of his opponents, but rather suggests ways to improve upon their models by accepting his own proposals as additions to their own, i.e. accepting the ‘realistic-idealistic’ position of the Śaivas as well. Thus, for instance, Abhinava does not reject the twenty-five lattras of the Sāṅkhya system, but adds eleven more to it adhering to the cosmology of early Śaiva scriptures. Also, for instance, he does not ask Naiyāyikas to shun their realism but only to accept idealism as well.

In his Pratyabhijñā exegesis Abhinava strongly contests the Sāṅkhya idea of reflection. However, while discussing reflection in the TĀ there is no mention of the Sāṅkhyas at all—at least not in the chapter that we are dealing with. Even though Jayaratha bases most of his commentary on the original ideas of Abhinavagupta found in his great commentary IPVV, he nonetheless does not touch upon the Sāṅkhya theory in his commentary on pratibimbavāda in the TĀ. Evidently as a loyal commentator, he apparently does not wish to put words in the mouth of Abhinavagupta, and thus focuses on Naiyāyikas alone.

I think that there is much in the development of discussions on the Theory of Reflection in classical India that comes from the speculations of Sāṅkhya. The differences between the dualistic Siddhānta and Sāṅkhya contain many clues about how this development might have taken place. The Siddhānta point of view significantly differs from Sāṅkhya on the following point: as opposed to the Sāṅkhya, Siddhānta does not admit puruṣa to be originally pure because the Self has beginning-less impurities. From the

218. See Goodall (pp. 77-111) in Goodall and Isaacson (2016) and Kaul (forthcoming).
219. In the context of Śaktipāta Abhinavagupta does have a detailed discussion on Sāṅkhya in the TĀ 13.3-41b.
Siddhānta point of view the cognition of something arises when two reflections are united by *ahaṃkāra*, the reflection of the subject comes from inside and *buddhi* receives the reflection of the object from without. According to them the *buddhi* is insentient and cannot be an agent while *puruṣa* is an agent since it is sentient.220

On the other hand, in the Pratyabhijñā system Abhinava makes the Sāṅkhya-vādins his target because there, as already mentioned above, he has to establish that the *buddhi* is sentient as opposed to the Sāṁkhya view that it is insentient. The Śaiva perspective attributes purity or luminosity to the *buddhi*. Abhinavagupta enunciates this idea in his PS:

> As a face is reflected clearly in a mirror free from dirt, so does this [Self] become manifest, being nothing but radiance, in the ‘intellect-principle’, made by Śiva’s grace.221

In Sāṅkhya, *sattva*, one of the evolutes of Prakṛti (the other two being *rajas* and *tamas*) is understood as the quality of purity. Abhinava equates the idea of *asattva* with *aprakāśa*, i.e. *sattva* is nothing but *prakāśa*.222 Sāṅkhya believes that if purity does not exist in the principle of intelligence (*buddhitattva*), the individual-principle (*puruṣatattva*) cannot be reflected in the former. Both the Sāṅkhya and Yoga postulate the reflection of *puruṣa* in the *buddhi*. They believe that the *buddhi* is sentient, but it can cognize by means of the light that is reflected in it from *puruṣa*. Reflection, according to Yoga, denotes the reflection of the transcendent Self-awareness in the most lucid aspect of the mind called the *buddhi*. “Vācaspati Misra speaks of the mind as a mirror (*darpana*) in which *puruṣa*’s awareness is reflected”.223 Vācaspati argues that knowledge takes place due to the reflection of *puruṣa* in the *buddhi*. The *buddhi* coupled with the principle of ego (*ahaṃkāra*) becomes an agent of knowledge due to the reflection of *puruṣa* in it. According to Yoga a reflection is regarded as real and unreal at the same time.224

220. See Pandey (1986:67) for more details.
221. I have used Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi’s translation, PS vs. 9 (p. 100)
222. TĀ 2.30ab: *asattvam āpракāśatvam na kutrāpyupayogitā |
In the ĪPV 1.2.8 Abhinavagupta focuses precisely on this issue and in his commentary on the same verse in the ĪPVV he devotes several pages to this problem. If we go back to Abhinavagupta’s statement that “in pure form, only form is manifested” in TĀ 3.5cd, then we can infer that the buddhi assumes the form of external objects in itself. The buddhi owing to its sentience and purity is able to receive the reflection which also means that the quality of sattva predominates in it. However, not all reflections can be received in it simultaneously because the quality of tamas is also involved therein. And as Torella reiterates on the basis of the ĪPV and the ĪPVV, the purity of buddhi is anyway no clearer than puruṣa.225 This again drives us to the conclusion that ultimately Consciousness alone is pure according to Abhinavagupta.

Like Abhinavagupta, a Buddhist Vijnānavadin also argues that the entire universe is nothing but Consciousness alone (vijñaptimātra). However the difference between the two idealistic positions is that a Vijnānavadin believes that the objects apparently external to Consciousness are not a part of Consciousness at all. They merely appear to be there because of our ignorance. For a Vijnānavadin there is no evidence that external objects exist. On the other hand Abhinavagupta’s thesis is diametrically opposed to that of a Vijnānavadin. In his idea of Consciousness there is nothing external to it. Even what are called external objects by a realist are very much within Consciousness according to the non-dual Śaivas. Since Isabelle Ratié has extensively discussed non-dual Śaivism in relation to Vijnānavadins,226 I have chosen to reflect upon the non-dualistic Śaiva position on Nyāya that corresponds with the theme of my work.

Let me begin by touching a bit of history of Nyāya in Kashmir since it would be useful to interpret what Jayaratha is trying to say. Uddyotakara besides being an erudite Naiyāyika himself gave rise to many controversies within the tradition of Nyāya by presenting new and alternate explanations of the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama thus disagreeing with the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. This gave rise to two streams of scholars in the Nyāya tradition, viz. those who remained faithful to the Bhāsyakāra, and the others who accepted

225. Torella (2002:93, fn12)
Uddyotakara’s new interpretations. Uddyotakara emerged in a period when Nyāya was encountering criticism from the Buddhist logicians like Dignāga (450-520 CE) and Dharmakīrti (635-650 CE). This was the time when two schools of Indian philosophy, viz. the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika were gradually moving towards developing a merger in future and Uddyotakara was championing this cause. In Kashmir, however, there manifested a new school of Nyāya represented by Bhāsarvajña (860-920 CE) whose Nyāyasūtra was commented at least eighteen times. Thakur (1997:xii) records that the unique characteristics of the Kashmirian school of Nyāya were to adhere more towards the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama besides not agreeing with the Vaiśeṣika system and developing a rivalry with the Vijñānavādins. Abhinavagupta was certainly not untouched by such developments in the Kashmir of his time. As pointed out by Ratié he was aware of the works of both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara.227

In his commentary on TĀ 3.12 Jayaratha says that Abhinava’s use of ‘singular’ should be understood as indicating that this is not maintained by all the Naiyāyikas since the sūtrakāra,228 the vṛttikāra and the bhūṣanakāra have not mentioned such theories at all. But, he goes on to add that this has been maintained by some Naiyāyikas who are only interested in the study of perception. In other words Jayaratha maintains that Abhinava’s target is neither Gautama (2nd CE), nor Bhāsarvajña (860-920 CE) nor Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (840-900 CE), but he does not name the ones whom Abhinava targets. It does not require much effort to imagine Jayaratha may be referring to the two famous Nyāya authors namely Vātsyāyana (450-500 CE) and Uddyotakara (550-610 CE). In fact, at one place in the TĀV 3.14 Jayaratha does quote a small passage from Vātsyayana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (1.1.9 - tasya bhogāyatanam sarīram). I think it is very likely that Abhinava and Jayaratha are referring to these two Naiyāyikas. As will become clear gradually in the pages to follow, Jayaratha particularly seems to take upon the

227. cf. Ratié forthcoming: 76
228. It is clearly inferred that the sūtrakāra is Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra and bhūṣanakāra is Bhāsarvajña, the author of the Nyāyabhūṣana. Even though the expression vṛttikāra is dubious here, but it may be referring to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Jayanta has been named as vṛttikāra both as a Naiyāyika and as a Vaiyākaraṇa. Ratié (forthcoming:22, fn. 75) has listed other references supporting why Jayanta is referred to as a vṛttikāra. Also, of interest is Raghavan (1960:173-74) who establishes that the vṛtti in question was not on Nyāya but on grammar. Jayanta is also supposed to have written a commentary on the Aśṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini which is lost.
arguments of the Naiyāyikas mentioned above and to establish Abhinavagupta’s Śaiva position. In the Nyāyasūtra (3.1.30-50) the section comprising the description of the sense organs and their material character, the two commentators thereupon, viz. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara should be understood as the opponents whose Theory of Reflection is being countered by the two Śaiva masters in the TĀ and the TĀV.

According to the Naiyāyikas a reflection is simply caused by an erroneous apprehension of an entity. For them a reflection (pratibimba) does not have a real existence at all. There are only two ways of looking at a reflection: it can either simply be an original image (bimba) or an illusion (bhrānti). There is no scope for any third entity apart from something being an error or a non-error. To illustrate, for a Naiyāyika, says Jayaratha, a face in a mirror is an error. There is no third type of rays apart from real and illusory rays. According to Jayaratha the Naiyāyikas have completely failed in producing any tenable logical reason to prove the logical connection between the mirror and the production of the reflection.

For a Naiyāyika a reflection cannot be something different from the original image. In other words if a person is looking into a mirror, in reality he does not see his reflection but in fact the rays of the vision which in turn, according to Naiyāyikas, emerge from his eyes and are simply reflected back from a surface which is pure, and because of this he can see nothing but his face. As mentioned earlier they maintain that the perception of the reflected image is brought about by the peculiar colour of the mirror’s surface when a man puts his face in front of it and the rays of light emanating from his eyes strike the mirror thus turning them back, wherefrom its colour and form is perceived. This peculiar colour is nothing but the specific substance that is usually found in the back of a mirror called prasāda. 229 Naiyāyikas understand prasāda as any other colour which is opaque, 230 but the typical quality of prasāda, the colour in the back of the mirror, unlike other colours is that it reflects back anything that is reflected in it. So there is no major role played by any idea of purity (nirmalya).

229. NSB 3.1.48
230. According to Naiyāyikas (NS, NSB and NSV 3.1.48) prasāda lies only in mirror and water.
The Naiyāyikas also believe that the pupil of our eye can perceive colour when it is
not damaged but it cannot perceive colour when the pupil is damaged. However, when
colour is perceived, the pupil itself does not come in contact with the object of perception.
This pupil of the eye is regarded as material substance while an eye is understood as
immaterial. And to the question of how we are able to perceive things of varied sizes and
dimensions, a Naiyāyika would reply that it solely depends on the different contacts that
ocular rays establish with the objects we look at. It is for this reason that something like a
mountain looks like lofty and majestic to us and a mouse looks like a tiny little thing. The
contact of ocular rays with the object of perception is absolutely essential, otherwise if the
ocular rays are obstructed as in the case of a wall, we are unable to perceive things through
the wall. If asked why can’t we perceive the ocular rays themselves, a Naiyāyika says that
since they lack in intensity they always need external light to travel. Such rays cannot be
observed in every eye at every time. Even though such rays exist in all eyes but they can only
be observed in a few animals in the night. They refer to animals like cats whose eyes glow in
the night. They do not make a distinction between the eyes of animals and humans. This
summary is based on the NSB 3.1.30-50.

On the other hand, challenging this position of the Naiyāyikas, according to
Jayaratha, Abhinavagupta establishes pratibimba as an autonomous and real entity that is
endowed with a specific ontological status. Therefore, since pratibimba is not an error for
Abhinava, what is called a reflected image is nothing but another real entity (vastu) which is
different from the original image.

And the compassionate God of the Gods has revealed this [nature of the reflected
image] for increasing the knowledge of the dull [people]. [This reflected image] is a
real entity (vastu). Neither does it exist in another place from that [mirror], nor is it
sufficient [within itself]. Indeed, it does not have resistance, it is not autonomous. It
is neither enduring nor transient. This is the glory belonging to something that is
absolutely pure.  

231. TĀ 3.21-22: etacca devadevena darśitam bodhavrddhaye | mūḍhānāṁ vastu bhavati tato.aryanyatra
nāpyalant | || 21 || pratīghāti svatantram no na sāhityasvāṁyāyā caṇi na | svacchāsañtaivā saṣyāpi mahiṃeti
kṛpālunā | || 22 ||

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A reflection is defined by Abhinavagupta as a third real entity (tṛtiyāśīḥ)\textsuperscript{232} that exists apart from something being either an error or non-error. He maintains that it is the face itself that is being apprehended by the rays of sight reflected back from the mirror onto the face. The thesis that a face in a mirror is actually perceived owing to an error according to Naiyāyika, is outrightly rejected by Abhinava.

Out of all the five tanmātras, Abhinavagupta emphatically bases his argument in constructing his Theory of Reflection on the reflection of ‘form’ (ṛūpapratibimba). For establishing his Śaiva thesis proving reflection to be a real entity, he has to disprove the theory of his opponents, the ‘naïve’ realists, who maintain that reflection is not a reality. Abhinava does not name his opponents clearly in this section of the TĀ. He simply uses a pronoun for them saying "to the one who maintains ..... we ask" (TĀ 3.12). However, Jayaratha hypothesizes the principle opponents of Abhinavagupta to be the Naiyāyikas. Raising his concern Abhinava says:

But, to the one who maintains that the rays of the eyes, while coming back from a pure [surface, like a mirror], reflect well, namely perceive one’s own face, we ask [as follows]. That [ocular] light which comes from [something] other than the body [according to you] belongs to the Self who governs it. If one knows [this reflected image of face] only by means of this light, why should we need a mirror?\textsuperscript{233}

According to the Naiyāyikas a body can be the locus of Self, but Śaivas do not agree to this. Naiyāyikas maintain that the ocular rays are governed by means of the Self endowed with the body. The Śaiva replies that if we agree to that how would the reflected image be different from the original image which is a tangible reality. The main argument of the Śaivas against the Naiyāyikas is that it is wrong to say that there is the perception of one’s own face by means of the rays of the eyes. The light that a Naiyāyika maintains to be coming from the body in fact "belongs to the Self who governs it" according to the Śaivas. To this Abhinava and Jayaratha answer by a counter-question: what would be the use of a mirror if

\textsuperscript{232} TĀV-3.11
\textsuperscript{233} TĀ 3.12-13: yastiḥa netratejāṃsi svacchātpratiphalantyālam | viparyyasya svakam vaktam grhūntīti sa prechaṇate | 12 | | dehādanyatra yattejastadadhiśṭhātātmanāh | tenaiva tejasā jñatve ko.arthah syāddarpanena tu | 13 | |
one can see oneself by the same light of vision that emerges out of the body? Moreover, if these supposed rays of vision were to be thus reflected back one who views himself in the mirror, would see his own form within his own face as his own when the rays reach back to him. And because of being capable of touch it should not be an isolated object perceived to be different from the face of the one who views it. In that case even a wall could also reflect the image of a face, and since both wall and mirror are opaque, why should one act as a reflective medium and not the other?

For a Śāiva any entity should be able to cause a reflection provided it bears the characteristic of purity. Whatever possesses purity can reflect an image like a mirror does. It does not matter whether it is a wall or a mirror. The fact that the purity is present in a mirror and not in wall is the reason why a mirror is able to reflect and a wall is not. Unlike Naiyāyikas, for Abhinava purity is not like an additional quality present in mirror that causes it to reflect.

In addition to the debate over the ocular rays, the two important philosophical problems arising in the present context are: causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva) and error (akhyāti). One of the many points of disagreement between the Śaivas and the Naiyāyikas is concerning the concept of causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva). According to Naiyāyikas actual objects, as also this universe, are real for they have causal efficiency or pragmatic value (arthakriyākāritva) attached to them. Objects are real because they serve our purpose. For a Naiyāyika causal efficiency is the testimony of truth. Śaivas do not accept causal efficiency as the nature of reality in the same manner as Naiyāyikas do. Even for Abhinavagupta the universe is real because it has causal efficiency or pragmatic value, but unlike Naiyāyikas Abhinavagupta thinks that an illusion also has causal efficiency. For a realist illusion does not exist at all. The so called illusory objects are nothing but real things. But for Abhinavagupta illusion only takes place because of incomplete knowledge.234

According to Abhinava we know an object when the idea or the knowledge related to that object enters our mind. In other words this universe is made up of many smaller ābhāsas which manifest into a single ābhāsa called the universe. This universe is known to us because

234. Cf. IPV Vol II, p. 113: apiṇṇakhyātirūpā akhyātireva bhṛānti tattvam |
this universe is reflected in our mind as universe. For Abhinava it is not possible for us to know an object as it really is. One can only know it by having its knowledge. For instance, when we know a book, that book does not enter physically into our mind, it is the knowledge of that book that is reflected into our mind. I know this book because I have knowledge of this book. To explain further, when we know an object it is not the original image (bimba) of that object that goes into our mind, but it is the reflection (pratibimba) of that object that goes into our mind, and thus the object is known.

In fact this causal efficiency of an object does not belong to itself. This indeed belongs to the Will of the Lord.235 This can also be explained by looking at the main doctrinal position of Abhinavagupta that is rooted in Utpaladeva who says in his ĪPK (2.3.4-6):

> Just as the various manifestations are differentiated as ‘long’, ‘round’, ‘tall’, ‘man’, ‘smoke’, ‘made of sandalwood’ and so on, without this entailing a spatial-temporal differentiation, so one also has various distinct manifestations such as ‘being’, ‘jar’, ‘individual substance’, ‘made of gold’, ‘shining and so on; each has its own separate efficiency. They are the object of the word. Things possess a determinate causal efficiency (niyatārthakriyā) depending on the variety of the manifestations they are composed of; and, on the contrary (punalī), [a different] one based on their appearing as unitary realities owing to a common substratum (sāmānādhikaranyena).236

Abhinava says that the causal efficiency is actually caused by internal organs with the aim of activating the corresponding external organs. In other words there is a reflection of external as internal. What one sees happening outside is actually being reflected inside. It is internal senses that govern the external organs. And when this process of ‘reflecting’ takes place, the reflection generates its own causal efficiency. That is why for Abhinava the causal efficiency is of two types: internal and external.237 This is what Abhinava means when he says in TĀ 3.41:

> Therefore, when [an action] is performed by the internal organs with the aim of

235. See ĪPK 2.3.12
236. I have used Torella’s translation. See Torella (2002:164-166).
237. For a discussion on this see Pandey (1962:303, 388).
[activating] one’s own proximate, corresponding [external] organs, at that very moment the reflected image, which is realized when the sense faculty [is activated], generates its own corresponding causal efficiency \((kriyā = arthakriyā)\).\(^{238}\)

So for instance, in the case of touch, when an internal sense promotes the impulse of activating the sense organ, a corresponding reflection generates one’s own causal efficiency which in turn is characterized by the sense of bliss and so on. A reflection (\(pratibimba\)) is said to have taken place when contact between cognition in the sense faculty and external touch (supposed to be original image - \(bimba\)) takes place.\(^{239}\)

The imagined opponent of Abhinava objects that the causal efficiency that is supposed to be caused because it is a part of memory is not real. In other words it is remembered even while it is reflected being in its own sphere and even when the external touch is missing. To this Abhinava answers that the causal efficiency always comes from something present. It cannot arise from something that is an object of past, i.e. an object that is remembered is an object of past and not present because it is remembered. Here Jayaratha clarifies that Abhinavagupta means to say that even while it is possible that an experience of pleasure can come from a touch that is remembered, that should not be regarded as real pleasure. The experience of real pleasure should only belong to present.\(^{240}\) Here, it is important to come back to the very fundamental notion of Abhinava which he mentions in the very beginning of chapter three of the \(TĀ\): that "in a pure form it is only form which manifests".\(^{241}\) So real causal efficiency is supposed to have taken place when the touch arrives in its own sense faculty in its best form (the internal sensation of touch) because in a pure touch it is only the touch that manifests.

The other important concept in the context of reflection is that of the error. In this system the words \(aṅkāna\), \(mala\), \(akhyāti\) or \(saṅkoca\) refer to the same idea of error. At the metaphysical level we have already dealt with the idea of \(mala\) previously. Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Error is called \(akhyāti\) which is an abbreviated form of \(apūrṇakhyāti\) (incomplete

238. \(TĀ\) 3.41: \(ṣoḥ nītikasāsvakatādṛgindriyapravajatāṃ nāṃkaranairyañā kṛtā | tadā tadaittato
da pratibimbanidriye svakāṃ kriyāṃ sāyata eva tādṛśiṃ ||

239. \(TĀV\) 3.41
240. \(TĀV\) 3.42
241. \(TĀ\) 3.5cd

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knowledge). In other words, for Abhinava an error occurs because of incomplete knowledge or limited knowledge or imperfect knowledge. As Rastogi puts it:

Abhinavan theory of error is a corollary of the Śaiva metaphysics of ignorance - ignorance is imperfection brought about by the obscuration of one's real nature, which is a synthesis of knowledge and freedom, through its own internal dynamism.\textsuperscript{242}

For a Śaiva an error is simply only the manifestation of what is being superimposed which is bereft of the manifestation of true reality. When a Śaiva non-dualist speaks of knowledge it is not wrong knowledge like a Naiyāyika would maintain, but it is an incomplete knowledge of an object that gives rise to illusion. Abhinava maintains that an illusory object is not non-existent. It is merely a projection or an appearance of Consciousness in that way. An illusion as an illusion is a reality, just like a reflection as reflection is a reality. This universe, which is a configuration of several real ābhāsas (appearances), manifests as one single real ābhāsa that we call the universe. All ābhāsas are real. This is also very clear from the words of Utpaladeva quoted a few paragraphs above. These ābhāsas cannot be not-real because they exist within the realm of Consciousness, which is the only reality, and everything that exists within the domain of Consciousness has to be real. What one sees around oneself is ‘matter’ which is simply a projection or manifestation of Consciousness as Consciousness in Consciousness. The matter outside is the reflection of the Consciousness. For Abhinava a dream is as real as Consciousness itself; it is not like the illusion of snake and rope. What one sees in a dream is not an empirical reality but it is a reality with respect to dream alone. For Abhinava a mind cannot conceive within itself a bimba, but it can only conceive a pratibimba. And if one asks how can there exist a pratibimba without a bimba, Abhinava answers,

And the reflected image is projected [in the mirror] by the original image which is outside. Once the latter is itself a reflected image, what remains of the original image?\textsuperscript{243}

\textsuperscript{242} Rastogi (1986:1)
\textsuperscript{243} TĀ 3.49: pratībimbam ca bimbena bāhyasthena samarpaye | tasyātva pratībimbate vikṣa

bimbamavāsīsyatām ||
Here Abhinavagupta is saying that as a matter of fact seeing a reflected image without an original image is not a common experience. No one would disagree with the fact that an object that is reflected inside a mirror is an external object (i.e., external to the mirror). But if an external object itself becomes a reflected object what would then be the original object? An object is nothing distinct from its cognition. Thus with respect to the reflected image there is no distinct object as such, i.e. no internal or external reality exists outside the realm of cognition.

A pratibimba can exist without a bimba just as an ābhāsa manifests in a dream without a bimba. In case of a mirror it is possible that there is no reflection of a thing unless there is a bimba, but this is not true in case of mind or consciousness. Mind certainly can create a thing or a pratibimba by itself without having a bimba. But are not the ideas that we see in the day to day world eventually the things which reflect into our mind even if they are not present in front of our mind when we are dreaming? For Abhinavagupta all the ideas are inherently present in Consciousness. That is what is the autonomy of Consciousness. In Consciousness, things do not come from outside; everything lies within the Consciousness and manifests or appears since Consciousness also has vimarśa as its inherent characteristic. We know this through the experience of Yogis who are able to create things out of their own thoughts. In other words just as yogis do not need any outer bimbas to create a pratibimba within their minds, in the same way Consciousness does not need external matter that can work as a bimba for the image that is reflected within Consciousness. This is what is also claimed in the ĪPK (2.4.10):

By sheer power of will of the Yogins, even without clay or seed, jars etc., which have permanency and serve their respective purposes, come into being.

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244. TĀ 3.64-65: atva evāntaram kiṃciddhīśasan江南 bhauçtu sphutam | yatṛṣya viccidā bānaṃ sarkalpavupnadarsane || 64 || ittham viśvidam nāthe bhairaviṣcidambare | pratibimbamalam svacche na khalvanypnasādatabah || 65 ||

245. I have used Pandey’s translation. See Pandey (1954:173).
Conclusion

What I have presented in the pages above should be understood as an attempt to explore the basic model of the Theory of Reflection according to the TĀ and the TĀV. I have mostly remained confined only to these two texts and made a careful attempt to make sense of them. I maintain that there is no unidimensional way of exploring Abhinavagupta and his Theory of Reflection. This study explores one of the many dimensions. I am now completely convinced that if one wants to understand Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection one should study the relevant portions of the TĀV, the PTv, the ĪPVV and the NŚAB together and make the best possible sense out of them. Otherwise, no matter what, our understanding of Abhinava’s Theory of Reflection will always remain incomplete.

The crucial question I have posed is whether we should ignore the novelty of Abhinavagupta’s Šaiva Theory of Reflection in his works other than those related to the Pratyabhijñā epistemology of recognition where only the pure analytical justification for reflection is discussed. The analytical part is only the outermost crust of his metaphysics while the inner most kernel placed deep in the very centre of his metaphysics is his soteriological concern that in turn is profoundly embedded in Kula and Krama ideas. Abhinavagupta’s vision of reality is both mystical and erotic following a complex symbolic-ritual scheme. And this depth can only be plumbed when Abhinavagupta is studied across the scriptural traditions that he is a part of.

A further attempt worth making would be to locate the origins of Abhinavagupta’s ideas in the works he has been influenced by. This would include not only early Tantric scriptures both dual and non-dual, but also the works of philosophers of language like Bhartṛhari who clearly had tremendous influence on both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. When one tries to deconstruct the concepts discussed in the TĀ, one is clearly able to see how in this Trika manual (paddhati), ideas from Krama and Kula traditions are scattered throughout. The
discussions focusing on the Theory of Reflection and the Theory of Grammatical cosmology suddenly emerging in the context of the Śāṃbhavopāya in the TĀ are clear illustrations of this.

A study of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Reflection in comparison with the theories of other Sanskritic traditions, as also suggested by Ratié, will further help us situating him appropriately on the broader canvas of South Asian philosophical traditions. I am indeed curious to explore the contrasting ideas between the two non-dualistic traditions of Śaivism and Vedānta in future. Both use the metaphor of reflection to explain their non-dual position, and both differ radically in their main doctrinal position.

The metaphor of the mirror itself needs to be looked at from different angles. Metaphor of mirror is very commonly discussed in South Asian Sanskrit textual cultures yet a comparative study is needed. Does mirror work as a sacred object in Abhinavagupta as it does in many Buddhist rituals? One finds striking similarities in the use of mirror metaphor between Abhinavagupta and early Buddhist traditions. In such traditions an undifferentiated mind has very often been compared to a clean mirror. How do we understand the mirroring or visualisation of divine images and explore their meanings? These visualisations are seen by Abhinavagupta both as linguistic and cosmic and are deeply connected with his metaphysics of Light. All these questions and suggestions will remain a part of the desideratum of my future research.
TEXT AND TRANSLATION
I. Conspectus Siglorum of the Mss of the *Tantrāloka-viveka*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Sigla</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Extent</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Berlin</td>
<td>B&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>SBB Hs or 12 434</td>
<td>TĀV 1.1-5.158 [26.42]??</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Berlin</td>
<td>B&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>SBB Hs or 12 641</td>
<td>TĀ 3.66-4.278</td>
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<td>3. Delhi</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>NM 80.1212</td>
<td>TĀV ??</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Göttingen</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>NSUBG COD MS SANSKR VISH 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Jammu</td>
<td>J&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
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<td>BPV</td>
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<td>6. Jammu</td>
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<td>J&lt;sub&gt;3&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
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<td>8. Jammu</td>
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<td>9. London</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>SOAS 44256</td>
<td>TĀV 1.1-7.71</td>
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<td>L&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>ABSP 126E (1537)</td>
<td>TĀV 5-11, 15, 21-26&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Lucknow</td>
<td>L&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>ABSP 127E (1644)</td>
<td>TĀV 1-4</td>
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</table>

1. This composite MS contains 15.194-217b, 220c-225b, 339-343a; 10.19-31b, 55c-58b; 29.239c-241b, 243c-247, 241c-243b; 3.66-294b; 3.1-23 with -viveka; 3.24-65 without -viveka.
2. The 11, 15 and the last chapters are incomplete.
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<td>BORI 449 (1875-76)</td>
<td>TĀV 1.1-37?</td>
<td>Š</td>
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<td>TĀV 1.1-10</td>
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<td>Pune</td>
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<td>TĀV 21-43-37.85</td>
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4. Listed under serial No. 1847.2 mentioned on page 386 of Cat. ORLS 2011.

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<td>38. Varanasi</td>
<td>V₃</td>
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</table>

6. ORL 2404-1 and ORL 2404-2 is a single codex.
Description of the Mss of the *Tantrāloka-viveka*

For the purpose of this thesis I have studied the following 39 Mss of the TĀ. But since not all the Mss contain chapter three, the critical edition presented here is based on only 29 Mss. Out of all the 39 Mss, four (B₂, P₄, K₁, and T) contain only the text of the TĀ without the commentary of Jayaratha and thirty Mss (B₁, D, G, J₂, J₄, L, Lk₁, Lk₅, P₁, P₅, P₇, P₉, K₁₂, K₁₄, K₆, K₉, K₁₀, K₁₁, K₁₃, K₁₅, S₁, S₂, V₁, V₂, V₃, V₅, V₇) include the commentary of Jayaratha along with the text of the TĀ. Five manuscripts (J₁, P₆, K₁, V₄, V₃) include only the verses 3.1-22 from the TĀ those are often titled the *Bimbapratibimbāvāda*. Out of all five Mss of the BPV, two (J₁ and K₁) include only the text of the TĀ and the other three Mss (P₆, V₄, and V₃) include excerpts from the TĀV as well, but none of them include the complete commentary on the verses 3.1-22.

As recorded by Pandey (1962:75-76) probably *Bimbapratibimbāvāda* was understood as a separate work of Abhinavagupta earlier since independent Mss of this work were discovered but as pointed out by Pandey and as I have also discovered, all the Mss by this title basically contain just the first 22 or 23 verses from the third chapter of the TĀ. It is also possible that probably some traditional Kashmiri Sanskrit scholars studied this excerpt from the TĀ independently keeping in mind its philosophical importance. Janārdana Śāstroṇa Pandeya (1997:ix) has suggested that Abhinavagupta might have written this earlier on in life and add it later to the chapter three of the TĀ in a fitting context. As also observed by Alexis Sanderson, such practice of studying specific excerpts from the TĀ was not unusual. According to him this was also the case with the section comprising of verses TĀ 13.3-41b which discusses Abhinava’s discussion on Sāmkhya and sometimes is referred to as an independent work titled the *Sāmkhyanirnaya*.¹ To this one can also add the Mīmāṃsaka’s discussion on the *vedyatā* falling in the TĀ 10.19-97, but I have not

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¹ This opinion of Alexis Sanderson is noted in Wezler and Motegi (1998:XXIV-XXV)
come across any independent Mss of either Śāṃkhyanirṇaya or vedyatā separately. In this context
the Bimbapratibimbavāda seems to be the only exception. At least that is what the evidence based
on the tradition of manuscripts shows.

Apart from the 39 Mss I have studied, there are a few Mss those I have either heard
about or found mention of them in the catalogues, but have not been able to have access to them
owing to a number of reasons. Thus, Alexis Sanderson mentioned to me the three Mss of the TĀ
(or TĀV) from Darbhanga in Bihar. Apart from this I am at least aware of one uncatalogued Ms
from Srinagar (Kashmir) belonging to the private collection of Jenab Manzoor Ahmed Daiko. I
did see this Ms personally in the summer of 2008, but I was not allowed to either make a copy of
it or to note anything from the Ms. It was shown to me for such a brief time that I could not even
identify its contents in detail. All I could see was that this Ms was written in Śāradā characters,
had rich marginalia (at least on the first few folia) and was bound in a thick leather cover.

In addition to this I found the mention of the following Mss in the three hand-lists of
ORL, but none of them could be physically located:

Acc No. 1563.83 (Sigla: K₅) in ORL listed under serial No. 1847.2 mentioned on page 386
of Cat. ORLS 2011. The catalogue mentions it to be written in Śāradā script on paper,
having 5 folia and 19.5 *13 dimensions.

Acc No. 1934.6 (Bimbapratibimbavāda)4 in ORL listed under serial No. 2003.2 mentioned on
page 396 of Cat. ORLS 2011. It is mentioned to be written on paper in Śāradā script
having 6 folia with the dimensions 18.5*16.2.

Acc No. 2080.38 (Sigla K₆) in ORL is only mentioned in the Cat. SORL 1989 and is not
located in the other two hand-lists.

2. The identifiers of the three Mss are as follows: First Ms: 162 (1) 2824, Second Ms: 171 (1) 2825 and the
third Ms: 259 (3) 2823.
3. In Cat. SMLS 1983 this title is listed under serial No. 796.
4. In Cat. SMLS 1983 this title is listed under serial No. 798.
Acc No. 2539.14 (Bimbapatribimbavāda) (Sigla K13) in ORL is mentioned on the p. 45 of Cat. SORL 1989. It is reported there to be written in the Śāradā characters.

Cat. SMLS 1983 also mentions the following:

- serial No. 793 Bimba (pratibimba)-stotra (?) in Śāradā, 2 folia, Acc. No. 1586.31
- serial No. 794 Bimbapatribimbavāda in Śāradā, 2 folia, Acc. No. 1586.31
- serial No. 795 Bimbapatribimbavāda in Śāradā, 9 folia, Acc. No. 1192.06
- serial No. 797 Bimbapatribimbavāda in Śāradā, 3 folia, Acc. No. 1740.12

Rastogi (987:246) also makes mention of a TĀ Ms belonging to K.C. Pandey, but this is not accessible. In a personal conversation with Rastogi I was told that Pandey’s collection of books and MsS was donated to the University of Lucknow’s Tagore Library wherefrom some material was stolen a few years back and since then, because the matter went into the hands of external legal authorities, Pandey’s collection has been sealed and no one, unfortunately, has access to it at all. Vrajvallabh Dwivedi mentions that a part of Pandey’s collection was burnt by a few miscreant students of Lucknow University.5

In the following description of the MsS I have mostly depended on either digital copies or the photocopies of MsS. Very rarely have I actually been able to collect the physical descriptions of MsS in person baring a few cases. Thus mostly for physical descriptions of the MsS I have depended on the details as furnished either in the catalogues or in the meta-data pages attached to the digital copies of the MsS. This description of MsS does not confine to the chapter three of the TĀ alone. Even though I have described all the accessible MsS in detail yet the description is suffering from a number of limitations. Thus wherever any particular details were not available I have not listed them. It is difficult to mention physical details of any MsS when one is dealing just with their digital copies, and it was impossible to visit all the Ms repositories personally.

I have listed the contents of each Ms also giving the details about where a certain chapter begins or ends. This is also true of composite MsS where I have at least given the names of the

5. Dwivedi in Rastogi and Rastogi (2013:12)
texts other than the TĀ along with their extent. Wherever I had special observations to make, I have listed them in the ‘Notes’ and if a certain Ms is also listed in published catalogues or unpublished hand lists, I have made note of it in ‘Bibliography’. Wherever such details were missing I have skipped such section instead of leaving them blank.
1. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection (Hs. or. 12 434)

320; Śāradā; microfilm

Contents: TĀV 1.1-26.42

Incipit: om śīrṣparamapadāprāpanasamarthagurucarana jayantarām ityom | om namah śivāya | | om yasmādiṣaṇa

tathā tathocchalita ityuktam bimbatveneti pratibimbatayeti ca [8] etad iti pratibimbabhiṣvacitmatayā
darśanam | | | | iti śrītantra[9]lokaḥ

2. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection (Hs or 12 641)

45; Śāradā; microfilm

Contents: TĀ 3.66-4.278


viviktam | |
3. Delhi, National Museum of India (80.1212)

Sāradā; digital photographs

Contents: I received 1110 images of this Ms in three DVDs. The first image in the first DVD begins with TĀV 31.106 and the last image in this DVD (image No. 500) contains TĀV 10.222. Somewhere in the middle of the DVD, image No. 148 includes TĀV 28.88-90. The second DVD’s first image (image No. 501) mentions TĀV 10.193 and the last image in the same DVD (image No. 1000) mentions TĀV 8.184. In middle of this DVD I could also locate parts of the TĀV 1 and 3. For instance image No. 642 mentions TĀV 1.154, image No. 651 mentions TĀV 3.288, image No. 669 mentions TĀV 3.84, image No. 707 mentions TĀV 3.263. The third DVD contains 110 images those roughly include TĀV 8 and 9. The first image in this DVD (image No. 1001) mentions TĀV 8.180 and the last image (image No. 1110) mentions TĀV 9.306.

Notes: It is very clear from the details listed above that the images of the Ms are not in sequence. Unfortunately, the same is the case with the original Ms. Since it is written on dark birch-bark and each folio is mounted with thick brown paper, in majority of folia the folio number is not visible. There are arabic numerals written on each folio with a pencil which seems to be an attempt on part of someone trying to put the folia in sequence. But unfortunately, even this sequence is not correct. It is very difficult to say if the Ms is complete.

This is the oldest and the only birch-bark Ms of the TĀ so far available. It can be placed between 17th-18th century CE. From the point of orthography there are two more features that could help for approaching an average date: the conservative use of jihvāmīlīya / upadhāṃānīya and of prṣṭhamātri diacritics.

Bibliography: Not catalogued except in the accession register of the manuscript section of the National Museum of India in New Delhi.
4. Göttingen, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek
(COD MS SANSCR VISH 4)

548; paper; Śāradā; digital photographs

Contents: TĀV 1.1- 6.12.

Incipit: [fol. 1r1 om śrīganeśāya namah || om namah śīvāya || om śrīguru[2]pādukābhyo namah || om yasmāđiśāya


Āhṇika 2 begins on 58v. On 60v the text is interrupted midway with the avataranikā of 2.20. However the very next page starts with the beginning of the Āhṇika 2 which is completed. Hereafter the pages are marked from the beginning. Chapter three begins with the image 77 (pages are marked afresh). 3rd ends in 87v. 4th ends in 159r. 5th ends in 199v. 6th begins in 101r but abruptly ends in 102r.

Explicit: [fol. 202r22]...prathamāḥ parispanda iti tadbhedavṛtyayavasacca (TAV 6.13, K60 Vol. IV, p. 12)

Notes: The 1v page of the Ms has a ‘Acc Mss 1966.5’ marked on it. There is something written on this page with a pencil that is not clearly visible. The first two chapters have individual page numbers, but the beginning of the chapter 3 is marked by page 1 and this continues till the end of the Ms.

Bibliography: uncatalogued
Śāradā; digital images

Contents: BPV (TĀ 3.1-22). This is a composite Ms containing eight works: 1. Kūṣmāṇḍastotra (1v-7r) 2. Mukundamāla (1v-7v) 3. Ātmabodha (1v-7v) 4. Śivasūtra (1r-5r) 5. Sūryacintāmani (66v-81v) 6. Viśvacitpratibimbavādāh (81r-84v) 7. Bodhapāncadasikā (84v-86r) 8. Viśaygaśataka (1v-26v).

Incipit: [81r1] om namah śivāya om prakāśamātraṃ

Notes: The first page of the Ms bears the number 20 and titles of all the eight texts in modern hand-writing. The first four Mss are numbered individually. The fifth Ms titled Stavacintāmani is marked to begin from folio 66v. Then Bodhapañcaśikā and the Vairāgyaśatakā are also numbered individually.

Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute (uncatalogued)
6. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute (623 (20 ka 2))

667; Devanāgarī; photocopy

Contents: Contains the Viveka of Jayaratha. Folios are missing in between. This composite MS contains 15.194-217b, 220c-225b, 339-343a; 10.19-31b, 55c-58b; 29.239c-241b, 243c-247, 241c-243b; 3.66-294b; 3.1-23 with -viveka; 3.24-65 without - viveka. (AS)

Incipit: oni śri gaṇeśāya namaḥ || oni śri gurave namaḥ || oni prakāśamātra


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6. I am very grateful to Prof Alexis Sanderson for sharing the extensive details of this composite Ms with me via email of 1 July 2015.

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Bibliography: Patkar, Vol: III, p. 1154 (mentioned under the title Mālinīlokaśāṅkara)
7. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute (1466 ka - 5913)

folia 608; Kashmirian Devanāgarī; digital photographs

Contents: Contains the TĀV from 1.1-37.85

Incipit: [fol. 1r] om śrīganesāya namah


Notes: 2nd chapter ends in 83v. 3rd ends in 152v. 4th ends in 217r. 5th ends in 252v. 6th ends in [291v]. 7th ends in 302v. 8th ends in [363v]. 9th ends in 421r. 10th ends in [467v]. 11th to 19 chapters are missing. 20th ends in 436v. 21st ends in 538v. 22nd ends in 542v. 23rd ends in 551v. 24th ends in 553r. 25th ends in 556v. 26th ends in 561v. 27th ends in 563v. 28th ends in 577r. 29th ends in 587v. 30th ends in 592v. 31st ends in 592v. 31st ends in 597r. 32nd ends in 599r. 33rd ends in 600r. 34th ends in 602v. 35th ends in 602r. 36th ends in 603r and 37th ends in 606r. On fol. 608v there is a table of contents.

Bibliography: This Ms is mentioned in Cat. RSRI 1984, p. 1064. The details mentioned there are: size: 33.2 * 21.16 cms. 667 folia, 24-25 lines, 20-24 letters.
Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute (1466 ka - 5913) (folio 84v)

8. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute (4908)

Kashmirian Devanāgari; digital images

Contents: TĀV 1.1-11.79
Incipit: [1r] om śrī ganeśāya namah om *oravi*o*vidhvasavicaśaṇamibhānanam natvittigopyaṃ
līkhati tantrām vaidhīrāḥ [2] vīrakah om yasmādiṣaṇa

Explicit: It is very interesting to note on page 158r, line 11 that the text suddenly shifts from
11.79 to 10.61ab.

[TĀV 11.78-80] [158v9] mahatvaṃ yasya tasmin parasamviddhasavidhavartinītyarthah
paradhardhirohe punah sarvajñānakriyāyoga eva syl[10]īt yāha yaścaddhāmanī
sanketanikārakalanojīhite viśrāntaścinmaye kim kim na vetti kurute na vā
ataścāgam[11]oapycam ityāha ata eva hi viśkṣiddhau varnāṇāṃ muṇipāsyatā Here the text
suddenly shifts to TĀV 10.79: [158v11] arthakriyākaram taccenna dharmah kovasa bhavet
nacedam vedyā[12]tvam jñānātmakaṃ samvinnāṭrameva yato bhāroāmśprasṛṣṭhamamiti ata eva
tsatsavyinnmātrāritikatatenārthābhāvāṇāṃśadhaṃmah [13] tathātve cāṣya kim nibhandhanam
ityuktamarthakriyākaramiti sā cārthakriyā samanantarameva darśitadharmaścenesyaṭe [14]
tannīlātipī kaścidhāmṛṣaḥ syādityuktaṃ na cet kovasa bhavet iti mātrāgraḥanēna ca
vedyatavasya jñānasamvitterādhi[158r1]kyami dhvanitam adhikaśca bhāvo vā syāt taddharmo vā
na tāvadvedyatavam bhāvoḥ tasā hi vedyatvaṃ na tāvadvedyatevaṃ saḥ ataśca [2] taddharme
etvi yuktamuktam vedyatvaṃ bhāvadharmo iti nantuṇroka eva …… || | Here the text
abruptly ends.

Notes: 1st chapter stops abruptly on 47r [TĀV 1.204]. 2nd chapter is completely missing. The
next folio i.e., 48v reads 3rd chapter.

Bibliography: This Ms is mentioned in Cat. RTL 1894 p. 221 (in the section on Bhakti). The
details mentioned are folia: 381, śenayaḥ 14, aksarāṇi 42, asanāptaḥ, navinā kāśmīrikī
lipi.

folia 371; size 12 * 8. Śāradā; digital photographs

Contents: TĀV 1.1-7.71

Incipit: [fol. 1v, line 1] om śrī ganāḍhipataye namaḥ || om namaḥ paramapurave [2] om namaḥ vāgydevai om namaḥ mṛteśvarabhairavāya ||


Notes: 1st Āhnika ends in 86v. 2nd ends in 98r. 3rd ends in 181r. 4th ends in 261v. 5th ends 304r. 6th ends in 355r. 7th ends in 371v. The abbreviations on the margin of each page also lists the number of the Āhnika. From the digital images I have access to, it looks like this Ms is written on what is called new Kashmiri paper.
Bibliography: This Ms is mentioned on p. 13 in Cat. SOAS 1978. The details listed in the hand-list are: “Tantrāloka. A digest of Kāśmīrī Śaiva theology in Sanskrit verse. Text with Rājānaka Jayaratha’s Sanskrit commentary Prakāśa, from the beginning of the work to the end of the 7th āhūnika. Written in Śāradā script on Kāśmīrī paper, in roughly tooled brown leather cover with flip. 19th century. ff. 371. 12 * 8. MS 44256.”
10. Lucknow, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parisad (126E (1537))

folia; 419 (1-388, 1-3, 1-28) size: 19.4 × 11.2 cm; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: TĀV 5-11, 15, 21-26. The chapters 11, 15 and 26 are incomplete. Each folio contains 22 lines.


Notes: 5th chapter [1-49], 6th chapter [49-105], 7th chapter [105-120], 8th chapter [120-212], 9th chapter [212-300], 10th chapter [300-366], 11th chapter is not complete, 15th chapter is from verse 115 to 132. 21st chapter [1-3], 22nd chapter [3-7], 23rd chapter [7-19], 24th chapter [19-21], 25th chapter [21-24], and 26th chapter [24-27]. There are corrections made with a modern pen on a few initial folios.

Bibliography: This Ms is listed on p. 417 of Cat. ABSP 1970.

11. Lucknow, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parisad (127E (1644))

folia; 187; size:19.2 × 12.3 cm ; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: TĀV 1-4. Each folio contains 22 lines.

Incipit: (On the top of the fol. 1v is written || tantrālokaḥ | abhinavaguptācārya tantrāloka vivekaḥ - jayaratha) [fol. 1v, line 1] om śrī ganeśīya namah ||

Explicit:

Notes: This text is bound with other texts: Īśvarapratyabhijñāhydaya, Dehasthadevatāstotram, Siddhamata.

Bibliography: This Ms is listed on p. 419 of Cat. ABSP 1970.
12. Lucknow, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parisad (128E (4408))

folia: 108 (1-68, 70-109); size: 23.8 × 14.1 cm; Devanāgari; photocopy

Contents: TĀV 1-3. Each folio contains 10 lines. According to the catalogue folio no. 69 is missing in the Ms. The Ms abruptly closes with the words vibhādarśavat prthak iti 21 kramā TĀ 3.20.

Incipit: [fol. 1, line 1] om śrī ganeśāya namah ||

Notes: First chapter ends at image 183.

Bibliography: This Ms is listed on p. 420 of Cat. ABSP 1970.

13. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (449-(1875-76))

folia: 307; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: 25-27 lines approx. each folio

Incipit: om svasti | | | śrīgurupādudākhya+++ | | | śrī|saravatya]| namo namah | | śrīganeśaya namah

Explicit:

Notes: This is a composite Ms, containing the Parātrimśikāvivaraṇa, the Tantravatadhānīkā, and the TĀV (AS).


2. On 27r and 28v (even though the page numbers are not marked) there is TVDh. TVDh begins on the top of 27r(?): vicitra* kāla evāyam saṃvidām spanda īdrāaḥ pārthīva prāktā (27r line 2) māyā sāktam aṇḍacatuṭāyam and ends in (28v line 3) esābhinaavaguptena nacī tantradhānīkā hrdbhūnau āsva (line 4) rūdhā sau śvokalpāvanīmahāḥ (?) bhedābhedaakṛto āsva kriyātantram ihoditam scatantrasya mato jñeyam svopāyam (line 5) śrīghanāsiddhaye | | | | tṛīgamāhinikam | | iti tantradhānīkā samāptā | | kṛtiḥ śrī***śiva śrīmadi abhinavaupatāpādānām | | | |

The first chapter abruptly stops at 1.217 and then begins again at 3.7. The second chapter is completely missing. Otherwise the text seems to be complete, at least the last folio of the Ms gives such impression.

About the above Ms Georg Bühler says the following: “In conclusion I have to add that the complete MS. of the Tantraloka-viveka, No. 449, which comes from Dilhī, is probably unique. The MSS. from Kaśmīr are all mutilated, and the Pandita asserted
that the commentary on a number of āhnikas has been lost.” (p. 83 of the Report, 1877).

Bibliography: Mentioned in Cat. Report 1877 p. CXLVIII-CLV.
105

14. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (450-(1875-76))

folia: 315; Kashmirian Devanāgarī; photocopy

Contents: TĀV-1-10.

Incipit: om ganeśāya namah || om yasmādīṣaṇavitkriyā.....

Explicit: [fol. 316, line 13] iti śrīman mahāmāheśvarācāryavaryābhinnavaguptaviracite tantrālo[14]ke viveke tattvabhedaprakāśanaṃ nāma daśanamālānikam iti śivam || 10 ||

Notes: Chapter 1 ends in image 108. Chapter 3 starts at image 121.

Bibliography: Mentioned in Cat. Report 1877 p.XXIX.

Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (450-(1875-76))
15. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (451-(1875-76))

folia: 89+10; Devanāgar; photocopy

Contents: TĀV-21.43-37.85 (BORI List says XI-XXXVII mostly without commentary)

Incipit: [fol. 1v, line 1] oṃ namaḥ śivāya dīkṣāyām aṃyatidiśati ....

Explicit: [fol. 89, line 13] iti śrīmadācāryābhinavaguptaviracite tantrāloke saptatrisṇamāhnikam
   sapātaścāyaṃ tantrālokaḥ śubhamastu lekhakapāṭhakayoḥ
   saṃvat 1932(?) || ||

Notes:

Bibliography: Mentioned in Cat. Report 1877 p.XXIX.

16. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (452)

Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: TĀV-1.1-3.215

Incipit: +++ oṃ yasmādiṣāṇavātikriyā

Explicit:

Notes: There is a bit of confusion I have about BORI Nos. 452(1875-76) and 453 (1875-76). Cat. Report 1877 p.XXIX. mentions the following details of No 453 (1875-76):

   with com. I-XI, fol. 416, Śāradā

   The copy of the Ms that was made available to me as from No. 452(1875-76) from BORI does not match the above description of Cat. Report 1877 p.XXIX.

Bibliography: Mentioned in Cat. Report 1877 p.XXIX.

17. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (453)

folia: 127; Devanāgar; photocopy

106
Contents: TĀV-1 (?), 3-7.

Incipit: niyatāvacchedah sangacchate ityāśamkyoktamanyah saktotrahva niṣṭha iti anyā iti tattasyogavipyasamuththā ghaṭapatādayah |

Explicit: [126v17]ti || || evaṃ rātrāvapītyevam viṣuvaddivasāt sanāt ||
ārabhyāharniśārdhāhhrīsāsamkrāntigopyasau || ity evam vāhyenāhorātre

Notes: There is a bit of confusion I have about BORI Nos. 452(1875-76) and 453 (1875-76). Cat. Report 1877 p.XXIX. mentions the following details of No 453 (1875-76):

with com. I., III.-VII, Fol. 172 Śāradā

But the physical Ms that I have seen lists the contents as: TĀV 3.201ab to 6.205 and is in Devanāgarī.

Bibliography: Mentioned in Cat. Report 1877 p.XXIX.

18. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (469 (1875-76))

folia: 4; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: PBV 3.1-22

Incipit: om namah śrī guruve | om prakāśamātram yat proktam......

Explicit: (main text ends in) iti bimbapatibimbabvādah samāptah |
(commentary on margins ends in) śrī tantrāloke viśvabhimabvādah sampāraḥ |

Notes: Pratibimbavāda...Pandey (1963:76) has also mentioned this Ms in his book and noted that this is just the same section from the TĀ-3. This Ms is bound together with the Spandakārikārtti. This is a collection of first 22 verses from the TĀ-2. The viveka is written on margins.

Bibliography: Mentioned in Cat. Report 1877 p.XXX.

folia: 34; size: 19*14 cms; Sāradā; scan

Contents: This is a composite manuscript containing two titles: Vijñānabhārava and Viśvapratibimbavāda.
Incipit: TĀ 3.8 na kṣamataiva yā atyaktaśaṃprakāśasya nairmalyam tadgurūditam

Explicit: TĀ 3.23 dhruvaṃ mohaḥ sānyeditī nirṇīṣadarpapavaḍhim

Notes: The folia containing the first seven verses of the Viśvapratibimbavāda are missing.

Bibliography:


folia: 288; size: 18 × 12.5 cm; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: TĀV-1-5, beginning of 6.
Incipit: [1v1] om yasmādīṣaṇa First 7 lines are marked to be deleted and the same lines are repeated on the top of the page.

Explicit: [fol. xxx, line 15] iti śrītantrālokaviveke pañcamamāhnikam Chapter 6 starts on the same folio and the next folio in sequence of images I have, there is a page which reads the commentary on 5.158. The final lines in the unnumbered last folio reads: [fol. xxx, line 23] laṅghanena paro yogī mandabuddhī kramena tu | | para i[24]ti tīrtaśaktipātāviddhah yogīti paratatvaikyabhāgabhavedi[25]tyarthah | | nanu pūrvaṃ pūrvamuttarasottarasya vīryamityu

Notes: 1st chapter ends in 87v. 87r, 88v, 88r contain some verses. 2nd chapter begins from 89v. The 2nd chapter ends in 108v. The folio numbers are altered after 90. 3rd chapter ends in 185r. 4th chapter ends in 262r. The page numbers in chapter 5 is marked from the beginning.

Bibliography: Listed on the serial No. 1832 in the Cat. ORLS 2011, p. 385.


text: 190; size: 22 * 16.5 cms; Sāradā; digital photographs

Contents: TĀ (without -viveka) 1.1-37.85


Notes: Chapter 1st ends in 14v. 2nd chapter ends in 15r. Chapter 3 begins on folio 15v and ends in folio 25r (image 25 in the scanned images). 4th chapter ends in 34r. 5th chapter ends in 39v. 6th chapter ends in 47v. 7th chapter ends in 49v. 8th chapter ends in 39v. 9th chapter ends in 72v. 10th chapter ends in 81v. 11th chapter ends in 84r. 12th chapter ends in 85r. 13th chapter ends in 96v. 14th chapter ends in 97r. 15th chapter ends in 98v. 16th chapter ends in 107v. 17th chapter ends in 116v. 18th chapter ends in 126v. 19th chapter ends in 130v. 20th chapter ends in 130r. 21st chapter ends in 132v. 22nd chapter ends in 140v. 23rd chapter ends in 141v. 24th chapter ends in 143v. 25th chapter ends in 145v. 26th chapter ends in 148v. 27th chapter ends in 158v. 28th chapter ends in 168v. 29th chapter ends in 172v. 30th chapter ends in 177v. 31st chapter ends in 179v. 32nd chapter ends in 180v. 33rd chapter ends in 181r. 35th chapter ends in 182v. 36th chapter ends in 185r.

Initial few pages have annotations on top of the text. The MS is moth eaten on margins but the text is mostly intact. Text of the TĀ only. Handwriting is not always very clear. Old Kashmiri paper.

Bibliography:
Srinagar, Oriental Research Library, Government of Jammu and Kashmir (1054.03)


folia: 526; size: 18 * 18 cms; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: TĀV 1.1-26.42.

Incipit: [1r1] om svasti om namah svavya sriganesaya namah om namo gurave || om yasmadisha The first page of this Ms is fully annotated with marginalia. The beginning on the top reads: om yasmadishanuvitkiya

Notes: Handwriting changes in the mid of folio 50v. Afterwards there is the use of thick and straight characters. 50v and 50r have a different handwriting and beginning 51v it looks like a different hand. Again, after folio 75r there is different handwriting; the Śāradā characters are cursive. On folio 75v there are two numbers mentioned - one is 75 and another is 50. Evidently the first 75 folia stop here and the scribe who has started copying the text later has put the number 50 because he continues with folios continuing 51, 52 etc. Beginning 92r again had different handwriting. 1st chapter ends in 65v. 2nd chapter ends in 74v. 3rd chapter ends in 113r. 4th chapter ends in 179r. 5th chapter ends in 223r. 6th chapter ends in 264v. 7th chapter ends in 277v. 8th chapter ends in 345r. 9th chapter ends in 413r. 10th chapter ends in 466v. [chapters missing] 21st ends in 485r. 22nd chapter ends in 489r. 23rd chapter ends in 500v. 24th chapter ends in 502v. 25th chapter ends in 505v.

Bibliography: Listed on the serial No. 1833 in the Cat. ORLS 2011 p. 385.


folia: 382; size: 20.4 cms * 13.9 cms; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: TĀV-1.1-11.80. The first 17 folia contain the Vedāntasāra (possibly some Nyāya work. Abbreviation says Si. Mu. Might mean Siddhantamuktāvalī) and the TĀV starts from fol. 1r [image 18].

Incipit: [1r1] om svasti prajābhyas da(sa)prajābhyaḥ śrīpratibhā devyai namaḥ śrī gurave namaḥ [2] om viśveśaṃ duṇḍirājan jagadudayakṛtam śāradāṃ

16v [end of the Si. Mu. text]

After folia 16 there is a folia black with a verse written on the left lower corner of 17r reading bhedābhedavatāṛthena na bhrāntiridṛṣiḥ || nāhantādiṣparāmsabhedād asyāṇyataṃmanah aham mṛṣyataivāsya srṣṭestīvā ca karmanat || The next folio i.e., 1r begins with the TĀ. 1r1 reads: om namah sarasvatyai || om namo gurave || om namah śivāya || [2] om ghoravighnoḥvādhiśravaśāvahamāmābhāvanam nūtav[3]īṭgopyam likhati tantram vai sūryarāmakāḥ || om yasmādiṣa[4]navātikriyā……..on the same page [line 24] the text ends with the words [24] dṛg ityuktam, tadubhayetī tadāyārdhavādyākhyānaṃ K, “(vyākhyāsyamānaṃ K,”) ca tad The next page 2v1 begins again with the beginning of the TĀV [2v1] om namah śivāya || om namas svastyi || om namo gurave || om[2] yasmādiṣaṇavātikriyā and somewhere in the mid of the page [line 12] the text stops with the words: [12] t tatpāremeśvarāṃ śrāmanmahāmahādevaśrībhītan || iha khalu Thereafter, the text begins on the folio which is left unnumbered. bhāyaṃ, tasyāmalae tāyor yadyāmalam rūpaṃ sa saṅghatta iti [2] smṛtaḥ


Notes: The folio abbreviations also list the āhnikā name. So the first chapter is listed as Vi. Bhe. Pra. (Vijñāna-bheda-prakaraṇa). 1st chapter ends in 56v. 2nd chapter ends in 63r. 3rd chapter ends in 115v. 4th chapter ends in 164r. 5th chapter ends in 194. 6th chapter ends in 223r. 7th chapter ends in 233v. 8th chapter ends in 287r. 9th chapter ends in 340r. 10th chapter ends in 380v.
Chapter 3 begins in folio 64v. Date of Ms: 1837 CE (?).

Bibliography: Listed on the serial No. 1839 in the Cat. ORLS 2011 p. 385.


folia: 544; size: 25 * 16.5 cms; Śāradā; digital images

Contents: TĀV 9-37

Incipit: [line 1] tattvakramāvabhāsānavibhāgavibhavobhujīgamābharaṇāḥ bhaktajanajayāvahatāṁ vahati ja[3]yāvahojayati | |
Explicit: [image 509] | | [line 8] iti śrītārālokaviveke sapta[9]trīṃśamāḥnikam | |

Notes: There are no page numbers marked. The scanned file available to me has a number of little fragments towards the end of the Ms.

Bibliography: Listed on the serial No. 1834 in the Cat. ORLS 2011 p. 385.

Srinagar, Oriental Research Library, Government of Jammu and Kashmir (1792)

folio: 91; size: 22.1 * 16; Śaradā, digital images

Contents: TĀV 1-2.


Notes: The first āhnika ends in folio 77v and the second āhnika begins on 77r.

Bibliography: Listed on the serial No. 1835 in the Cat. ORLS 2011 p. 385.

folio 299; size 26.4 * 18.7 cms; Śrādā; digital images

Contents: TĀV 1-4. TĀ 13-37.55

Incipit: om svat+prajābhyaḥ [ga]nēśāyanamah om yasmādesaṇa [The top of the folio again reads the verse om yasmādesaṇa…]. Second āhnika begins from folio 60r.

Explicit: [120r] line 19: tārunyasāgarataranāṅgabharin apohya vairāgyapotam adhiruhya ardhan[20]hayyena yo bhaktirohanam avāpya maheśabhaktiratnair ālāṅ ālaṃ (The text ends abruptly here. The pages after this are missing).

Notes: 1st chapter ends in 60v. 2nd chapter ends in 68r. 3rd chapter ends in 128v. 4th chapter abruptly ends in (TĀV 4.231) - [178v24] vaidikyā codanayā sāmāyay[25]na sarvapuruśasāvayatāḥ vihite api te sādhyasūddhī ta[26]ttvajñavisaye arthādvibodhena bādhite eva na na bādhite bādhita iti[27] bhāvaḥ || After this the next page is blank and chapters 5 to 12 are missing. Thereafter begins 13th chapter in new handwriting, and the page numbers begin from 1. The chapter 13th is without -vīcēka. The beginning reads: [1v1] om śri ganeśāya namaḥ om śrīguruve sarasvatirūpāya [namaḥ om [2] athāha kṛtaḥbhājanam. Chapter 13th ends in 13r. 14th chapter ends in 15r. 15th chapter ends in 39r. 16th chapter ends in 51r. 17th chapter ends in 56v. 18th chapter ends in 56r. 19th chapter ends in 58r. 20th chapter ends in 49v. 21st chapter ends in 61r. 22nd chapter ends in 63r. 23rd chapter ends in 66r but it stops with 23.91. Other verses from chapter 23 are missing and immediately the beginning of the chapter 24 follows. 24th chapter ends in 67r. 25th chapter ends in 68r. 26th chapter ends in 71r. On page 72v suddenly there appears a colophon of 23rd chapter which was left incomplete earlier. The scribe writes a note here in continuation of the text: itah param āhnikatrayamasyaṃ Likhitam saptavinsaṃāhnikam idāniṃ likhyate || 27th chapter ends in 74r. 28th chapter ends in 90r. 29th chapter ends in 101r. 30th chapter ends in 106v. 31st chapter ends in 112v. 32nd chapter ends in 114r. 33rd chapter ends in 115r. 34th chapter ends in 117r. 35th chapter ends in 118v.

Bibliography: Listed on the serial No. 1836 in the Cat. ORLS 2011 p. 385.
Srinagar, Oriental Research Library, Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2201.01)


folia: 341; size: 15 * 28 cms; Śāradā; digital images

Contents: TĀV 1-37 (some parts missing)

Incipit: [TĀV 4.29] mokṣe kimiti nāmāyaṃ janaḥ samsārātronmajjatī+++ | mokṣol[2]pi vaiṣṇavāderyāḥ svasānkalpe na bhūvitaḥ | param prakṛtisāyujya

Notes: In the sequence that I have received images in, the Ms begins in TĀV 4.29 and also ends with TĀV 4.29. The Ms does not have page numbers. 4th chapter ends in image 36. After this 5th chapter begins with new page numbers. 10th chapter ends in image 66. 21st chapter ends in image 78. 22nd chapter ends in image 81. 23rd chapter ends in image 87. 24th chapter ends in image 88. 25th chapter ends in image 90. 30th chapter ends in image 106. 31st chapter ends in image 110. 32nd chapter ends in image 112. Image 114 reads 21st chapter ends here. The pages are numbered from image 114. 21st chapter ends in 3r. 22nd chapter ends in 5v. 23rd chapter ends in 8v. 24th chapter ends in 9v. 25th chapter ends in 10v. 26th chapter ends in 12r. 27th chapter ends in 15v. 28th chapter ends in 29v. After this three pages are left blank and next four pages include the opening text of the Vijñānabhairava. 16th chapter ends in image 154. 17th chapter ends in image 158. 34th chapter ends in image 161. 35th chapter ends in image 162. 37th chapter ends in image 165. The end of the text of the I part of the Ms on image 165 reads: [line 1] iti śrīmadabhīnavaguptairacite tantrālo[2] ke sapta-trīṃśamāhnikam 37 samāptaścāyaṃ tantrālaḥ || kṛtis trinayanacaraṇacintanalabdhaprasiddeḥ śrīmadabhīnavasrīyaḥ +kathadasuvi++śrīmadādīvyayavurgahupari[4]karaṇendam sarvaśāstroddhatam sat tadottlapariyate naṃya samac[5]ntya sadbhir hyudaya kanalakṣedhārtyamātyāḥ śitoṣa yaḥdhi[6]nti[6]khalīgāmesu yadvidyaya yo vyārthahasamāna[7]uṣy kṛtarthiḥ śrī pratyaḥbijñāntaḥ yastatkāntaraviṣrulaḥ śrutabhaḥ[8]yāñcāśāṣṭomāya vajñānavit sosti**ṃyādīddhiḥkāṇḍalakalakalapra[9]ntyaṃ pareśāṃ vacah iti śramaṇaḥ sabhamastu lekhakapāṭhaka[10]yoḥ sabhamastu sarvajagatāṃ oṃ tatsat || || ||

From image 168 onwards it is basically part II of the Ms No. 2404 which starts with chapter TĀV 1.1. First chapter is numbered individually. Chapter II and III are numbered in sequence which continues till the end of the Ms. Incipit: [1r1] oṃ śrī gurave paramāścavārāpāya namah oṃ śrī[2]ganeśaḥ śrīḥ namah namah sarasvatyai śrīśanviddevyai [3] namah oṃ yasmādīṣana

On the top margin of 1r the verse yasmādīṣana…..is repeated again. 1st chapter ends in 77r. Chapter 2nd ends in 13r. Chapter III begins on folio 13r8 (image 256). Folia between 92 (chapter III) and 103 (chapter IV) are missing. Chapter V begins from image 36-37 bearing folio No. 1 for chapter V.

In some cases like Vasudeva (2013:227) this Ms has been wrongly listed as ORL 7771/7772.

Bibliography: No. 2404-1 is listed on the serial No. 1830 in the Cat. ORLS 2011 p. 385. And No. 2404-2 is listed on the serial No. 1830.1 in the Cat. ORLS 2011 p. 385.

folia: 281; size: 21.5 * 15.5 cms; Śāradā; digital images

Contents: TĀV-1.1-3.150

Incipit: [1r on top of the page] śrīmadādidevyai namaḥ [1]oṃ svasti || prajābhyaḥ || oṃ namaśvāya || || oṃ yasmādiṣaṇavitkriyā


Notes: 1st chapter ends in 167r. 2nd chapter ends in 189v.

30. Trivandrum, Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, University of Kerala (22.5442)

Old Malayalam; microfilm

Contents: TĀ 1.322-7

Incipit: rūṣaṇāyā jñāṇaṃ vikalpaḥ kila kathyate… | (TĀ 7.33b)

Notes: It starts on the second folio on page 9 in the pdf, line 7. There are two syllables and anusvāra, and then a puspikā. After that the chapter starts: atha paraupayikaṃ pranigadyate...

The end is on the second folio on p. 22 of pdf, line 6 (underlined): iti śrīmādaśūryābhijnacaturācāryaḥ śrītantra[1.8]loke paropāprakāsanaṃ tṛtiyaṃ āhnikaṃ pūrṇaṃ.

First folio: beginning (with 7.33b): rūṣaṇāyā jñāṇaṃ vikalpaḥ kila kathyate… | end (with 7.44b): te na siddhanti yatne | second folio: beginning (could start with 1.295, though the beginning is a bit different): yat tu vicāryate vastudharmastattvavidhīrajāgradādinīrūpaṇam | end (1.109a): adhvanāśaśrjā śodhyāśodhakādīvicitratā diṣkā |

Folio marked as no. 1:, beginning (with 1.322a): dhista(tah parvabhedās tadviśeṣa) thā vyākhyaśrjavīdhiḥ śrutavedhirgurupāśaṇāḥ iḥ śrītāḥ | end (penultimate line): atmā samyutiṣṭhīṣtmayāvayaḥ samvid ityāttāśaktivān tasya sva

Third picture, First folio: Beginning (with 1.309b): yojanikādeśa sādāśe syādīdāhānike sūtrakāptis tattvāsuddhiḥ pāśadāho tha yo | end (1.321a with changes): stadviṣēṣaḥ paviṇtāvādhi...taḥ cakracarccā carccyoga?rtthāyatanacarnangūr

Second folio: beginning (with 7.20b): pi sūkṣmakaśalairardhārdhādiprakalpate bhāgāśāṣkasāsthitāyā sūkṣmaḥ cāro bhilaksiṇa | end (7.31 commentary and 7.32a): ko vikalpaḥ syādāvīdham vasti kalpayet ye to ITHAN na vidus teṣāṃ vikalpo nopapa

Bibliography: Listed on p. 19 at serial No. 6539 in Cat. MLT 1965.
Trivandrum, Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, University of Kerala (22.5442)

31. Varanasi, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University (26692 - 3044)

folia: 326-372, 374-375, 377-416, 418-420; size: 13.3 * 7.2; Devanāgarī; photocopy

Contents: TĀV 9.260-13.60

Incipit: [9.260] [326v1] smin pādāśadhiṣṭānānmani sāne mukhyato vṛttimaṃti yena sarvesāṃ
tatra vāndriyatvābhimānah | vastutaḥ punah sakalamevaiṣāṃ śa[2]rīramdiṣṭheyam |

Explicit: [420r]

Notes: 9th chapter ends in 333r. 10th chapter ends in 369. 12th chapter begins in 397v. 26th chapter ends abruptly with verse 42 on page 397r.

32. Varanasi, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University (82735 (4/151))

folia 497; size 10 * 6.6; Śāradā; photocopy

Contents: TĀV 1.1-11.81, 21-25

Incipit: [1r1] oṁ svastyastu prajābhyaḥ śrīgaṇeśāya namah oṁ [2] yasmādiśaṇa

Explicit: [116r]: tve iti ṣvetaḥ prāthamikena udrekena ucchalattaḥ mahattvam yasya tasmin
parasamvādhamasavidhatartini ityarthah paradhārāhirohe punah sarvaajaṅṅakriyāyoga eva
syāt ityāha yāvaddhamani saṅketanikārakalanojjhi. This is a part of 11.78-79. The text
continues on the next page but that reads a fragment from 10.61: [117v] adhikaśca bhāvo
vā syāt taddharma vā na tācavedvāyatan bhāvastasya hi vedyatvam na tu vedyatvameva sah
ataśca taddharmena eveti yuktāntikānt vedyatvam bhāvadharmaḥ iti || nanvatrokta eva. Even
this text stops in the mid of the page. After this the Ms is not numbered un till folio 5
and it contains chapters 21-25.

pratibimbatayeti ca | etadītī pratibimbabhāvātmataḥ darśanam || || || (Up un till here
this is a part of 27.42.) [14] itah param vā-aivocātāritam vivaśaṇat tathaivbhūtam iti
kāraṇaṅḍarśi[15]bhāvin na likhitam || || ||

Notes: 10th chapter ends in 106r. 21st chapter ends in image 8162. 22nd chapter ends in image
3v. 23rd chapter ends in image 10v. 24th chapter ends in image 11v. 25th chapter ends in
12r.
Varanasi, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University (82735 (4/151))

33. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (139)

gola 39; size; 31 ×17.3 cms Śāradā; digital images

Contents: TĀV 1.1-1.40. The text in the Ms abruptly ends in nanu kiṃ nāma pāra (1.41) which is the beginning of the avataranikā of 1.41.

Incipit: [fol. 1v, line 1] om svasti prajābhyaḥ śrīgaṇesāya namaḥ om namo gurave ∥

Explicit: [fol. 39v, line 25] aṃśāṃśikākramāditi āvṛtini[26]ṛhrāsatāratamyamandātiprāyatvāt nanu kiṃ nāma pāra

125
Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C1114)

Contents: TĀV 3.34ab-3.270. The MS starts abruptly from folio 12 which means that the first 11 folios are missing. This roughly consists of the third chapter of the TĀV. Contains the viveka of Jayaratha. Starts at 3-34ab and ends at the end of the commentary of the verse 3-270.

Explicit: [70v18] sphuratītyarthāḥ na hyetatpadamadhiśayānasyaitadupayoga i[19]ti
bhāvaḥ yaduktam ayaṃ raso yena maṇḍagavāptaḥ svacchandeśyāṣya

The text stops here abruptly TĀV 3.270.

Notes: Folios 12-17 are badly damaged.

Bibliography: Cat. BHU 1971 mentions author’s name to be Someśvara.
35. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C1150)

folia 62; size 36.4 * 31.0 cms; Sarada; digital images

Contents: TĀV 3.113-6.20

Incipit: [line 1] rthaḥ | atha ca sa eva sarvaprāṇinīṇāpya[V3p]ḍha ūrḍhvaṁ vibhāgena
sūryācandrātmprāṇānapratīparatayāpya[V2p]asthilaḥ satva parā jīvakaleti bhāvah
evamapyasau nīskriyena rūpenāvatīṣṭhaṁ | kriyāśaktiparyantaṁ [V3p] tattvātictryātmanā
parisphurāṇepi nāsyā svarūpaḥ prayāyitaḥ ityarthah |

Explicit: kṛtya sarvamidaṁ suṣṭhitaṁ syāt jādaṁmeva ca parināmo bhaveditī na cetanatvenāsaṁ yuyyaṁ
ityanyairbhūktamīti tata evāvadhāryaṁ ata evāsti[V4p]kṣāsaṁāryā[V4p]stādvasthyena
anyeśāṁ darśanāntarasthānām agnihotraṁ jukyāṁ na hiṁṣṣyā

Bibliography: Cat. BHU 1971 reads the title as Tantrālokāsāra.
36. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C1198)

folia: 3; size: 12.3x13.5; Sāradā; photocopy

Contents: BPV 3.1-23, Bimbapratibimbavāda (TĀV)

Incipit: (main text) om namah śrī gurave om prakāśamātram yat proktam...... ||
(Commentary) om antar vibhāti sakalam jagadātmanī iha ||
Explicit: (main text ends in) *iti bimbapratibimbavādaḥ samāptah |
(commentary on margins ends in) šrī tantrāloke viśvapratibimbavādaḥ samāptah oṃ śubham ||

Notes: This is a collection of first 23 verses from the TĀ-3. The -viveka, the only extant commentary by Jayaratha is written on margins.

Remarks: The commentary on the margins begins with a maṅgala of Abhinavagupta antar vibhāti sakalaṃ jagadātmanī hi...... instead of Jayaratha’s maṅgala and then immediately follows the commentary from TĀ 3.1. prakāśātramiti prādhnyāt | na hi nirvimarsah ..... skipping the earlier part of the commentary.
37. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C4138)

folia 33 1/2; size: 21.3 * 17.1 cms; Śāradā; digital images

Contents: TĀV 1.1-1.140

namah śubham || [3] oṁ nāmo vignahartre ganaṁukhāya siddhiketra || svastiprajābhyaḥ || oṁ atha
tantrālokaṁ || yasmādeṣaṇa

Explicit: [34v22] daśāṃśikākramātm | | kamcit iti tīvranirhrāsa[23]lāṅgītārāratamya amśāṃśikākramātm
iti āvṛtini[24]hrāsatāratamya mandādiprayatvāt (The text stops at 1.140).
38. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C4779)

folia 7; size: 197 * 14.5; Śāradā; digital images

Contents: BPV 3.1-23 (TĀV)

Incipit: (main text) oṁ namaḥ śrī gurave | oṁ prakāśamātram yat proktam..... ||
(Commentary) oṁ namaḥ śivāya antar vibhāti sakalaṃ jagadātmanī iha ||

Explicit: (main text ends in) iti bimbapratibimbavādah samāptah śubham bhavatu ||
(commentary on margins ends in) iti śrī tantrāloke bimbapratibimbavādah samāptah ||

Notes: A collection of first 23 verses from the third āhnika of the Tantrāloka. The -viveka, even thought not complete in all respects, is written on the margins.

Remarks: The commentary on the margins begins with a maṅgala of Abhinavagupta altar vibhāti sakalaṃ jagadātmanī hi..... instead of Jayaratha’s maṅgala and then immediately follows the commentary from TĀ 3.1. prakāśamātramītī prādhnyāt | na hi nirvimarsāḥ ..... skipping the earlier part of the commentary.
Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C4779)

39. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C5019)

folia 16; size 35 * 18.5 cms; Devanāgarī; digital images

Contents: TĀV 1.204-3.6ab

Incipit: [1.204] [1] evaṃ ca prakarṣeṇa nissamskāratayā dhvastāni bāhyāvaraṇani yeyā sā prasāntabhedeyarthah ata eva śānta cinnatārūpāryarthah evamapi sarvadikā sarvadikṣu bhavā sthāvarajangamālmakajagadrupatrī citrasvabhāvā iti yāvat
Explicit: [3.6ab] [line 1] keśu kandaḍyādhaśādūsa sparśādeḥ sambharvān pratisamkramati tena ya eva yatra svacchasti guṇah sa eva tatra pratisamkrāmati ityāśayaḥ na vaitadpratibaddham ityavadāhaśayitumatra drṣṭāntamāḥ praccchannarāgiṇī kānta pratibimbihasvandaram || ……

(The text abruptly stops here).

Notes: 1st chapter ends in image 19. 2rd chapter ends in image 30.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, interest gradually emerged in the various princely states in British India concerning what western scholars usually referred to as ‘Oriental’ literature. While many western ‘Orientalists’ were becoming interested in South Asian literature in its original sources and were trying to gain access to manuscripts through the good offices of these princely states, others like Georg Bühler (1837-1898 CE) were deputed by the British Government to search for Sanskrit manuscripts in Kashmir and other areas of Northern India. Yet others, like K.C. Pandey (1898-1974 CE), were completely denied access to manuscript collections by the Kashmir Government. There, no doubt, was also a gradual interest developing amongst the many royal powers of princely states in British India, about such original sources as manuscripts along with artefacts of archaeological importance. They would issue orders to collect manuscripts and emphasized their acquisition, preservation, study and publication. In many cases such concerns were invoked in the princely states as a result of the recognition offered by the western scholars. Thus while introducing the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series by His Highness Rama Varma Maharaja, G. Harihara Shastri says:

Since the recognition by western scholars, a century and a half ago, of the cultural attainments of the Sanskrit language, a number of rare Sanskrit works has been published in India alone in the form of “Series”……” Shastri (1925:772)

Such concerns of the princely states—“a structure and concept whose very existence derived from a complex set of colonial appropriations and indigenous re-appropriations of pre-colonial enactments of sovereignty”—gave rise to a number of book series published across British India. The most famous among these were the Kashi Sanskrit Series, Trivandrum

1. cf. Cat. Report 1877
2. See Pandey (1962:XIV)
3. About the politics of archaeology in the colonial India, particularly in case of Kashmir, see ‘Contested Sites - Religious Shrines and the Archaeological Mapping of Kashmiri Muslim Protest’ (p. 183-223) in Rai (2004).
Sanskrit Series (1905-), Bombay Sanskrit Series, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, The Bibliotheca Indica (1849-) and many others.

On a somewhat similar pattern was established the ‘Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies,’ sometimes also referred to as the ‘Kashmir Sanskrit Series’. The then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State, Maharaja Pratap Singh (1848-1925 CE), established the Jammu and Kashmir Archaeological and Research Department (JKARD) in 1904. The creation of JKARD and also of Sardar Pratap Singh Museum in 1898 were, as Ananya Kabir maintains, not only the “Dogra responses to European scholarly practices” but also had the intention of propagating knowledge of the Hindu texts. The main purpose of this department was to publish the unknown and unpublished texts from Kashmir. Even though the JKARD had plans of publishing literature of the local vernacular languages as well, it clearly focused on Sanskrit alone. The choice of Hindu texts over Islamic texts—or, more precisely, Sanskrit

5. They published around 100 titles in a span of 20 years.
6. Published by Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal. They published around 277 titles up until 1953.
7. For a list of such series please see Banerji (1989:633). This list also includes the series published from outside India.
8. On the Sanskrit title pages of the KSTS volumes, an equivalent of ‘Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies’ was used as ‘kāśmīra-sanskrta-granthāvalli’.
9. Since its inception in 1904, the Jammu and Kashmir Archaeological and Research Department (JKARD) changed its name and structure many times. For a detailed history of this organization, see Rai (2004:196 ff)
10. For the reasons mentioned in n. 8 above, I have chosen to refer to the organization as Jammu and Kashmir Archaeological and Research Department (JKARD) throughout, even though most KSTS publications do clearly bear the name ‘Research and Publication Department’ as publisher.
12. Note Chatterjee saying that the Mahārāja wanted to publish the work titled ‘The Ranavīra Prāyaśchitta-Nibandha’ which he adds, “forms part of a great work entitled Dharma Shāstra Prapañcha, compiled by order of His late Highness Mahārājā Ranavīra Simha, and consists largely of quotations from nearly all branches of Hindu Scriptures.” See The Śivasūtra Vimārshini, KSTS No. 1, p. 1 of the ‘A Full List of Works in the Press and in Preparation’ and Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya KSTS No. III, p. 1 of the ‘A Full List of Works in the Press and in Preparation’. Also, cf. Śāstrī saying “…it is the munificence of the Kashmir Durbar which, in fact, is to be applauded for publication of such philosophical works, and deserves the heartfelt thanks of the students of Hindu Philosophy all over the world.” Preface to the Parātrīṃśikāvīvāraṇa, KSTS No. XVIII, 1918. Also, Kaul mentioning “…which I hope will be useful not only to the general Hindu public but also to…. “ p. iii, Preface to Mālinīvijayottararaṃśikā, KSTS No. XXXI, 1921.
13. See ‘A Full List of Works in the Press and in Preparation’ mentioned in the end of The Śivasūtra Vimārshini, KSTS No. 1; Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya KSTS No. III.
over Persian—was obvious. The Hindu king of the Muslim majority State was evidently interested in publishing Hindu literature alone,\(^{14}\) or at least literature that was closely connected with Hindus.\(^{15}\)

It is most probable that it was Jagadish Chandra Chatterjee, the first director of the JKARD, who would have set the precedent for the KSTS. He probably introduced the initial editorial policies followed in the KSTS volumes and also set a precedent for what kind of texts were to be published in the Series. My hypothesis is that Chatterjee was invited by the then king, Mahārājā Pratap Singh, to head the JKARD because he was seen someone who combined in himself the qualities of both a traditional pandita and a modern philologist trained in the West. Since Chatterjee studied in Cambridge, it is not difficult to hypothesize that he was trained in modern philological and text-critical methods in Sanskrit. Indeed, he was an excellent choice for the Mahārājā to establish the research department, yet it is nonetheless curious that someone like Mukunda Rāma Śāstrī (1860-61? [Vikrami 1917]-1921 CE) (now onwards Śāstrī), a local Kashmiri Sanskrit pandita who was already a well trained, renowned and by all means an efficient scholar, was not found fit for this position.\(^{16}\) Unlike Chatterjee, Śāstrī was not educated in the West, but he was by all means a prolific traditional scholar equally conversant with modern research methods, which he had learnt assisting reputed scholars such as George Abraham Grierson, Marc Aurel Stein, Sir John Marshall, David B. Spooner, etc. In fact he served in his capacity as a head paṇḍit under the directorship of Chatterjee. In fact Chatterjee himself praised Śāstrī saying:

"The Head Paṇḍit, Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍit Mukunda Rāma Śāstrin, who had, previous to his appointment in this Department, worked with European Scholars and is therefore acquainted with what is expected by the world of modern Scholarship of the edition of an ancient Text, has been"

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14. Since dealing with this topic would be a stark digression from the main topic, I should simply refer the readers to Kabir (2009) and Rai (2004).
15. For an elaborate discussion on this see Ananya Kabir’s ‘Modern Nation, Antique Land’ (pp. 80-103) in Kabir (2009).
16. For a detailed account of the achievements of Paṇḍit Mukunda Rāma Śāstrī see Kalla (1997).
of help, in that he has readily grasped what I have wanted him to do and has done it well.17

Chatterjee edited the first six volumes in the KSTS from 1911 to 1916 with the immense help provided by the team of young Sanskrit pandits in his department.18 While acknowledging the help he received from Paṇḍita Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī (1874-1951 CE), for instance, he mentions:

… I have not allowed a single sentence to be finally written out or printed without carefully going through it and understanding its full meaning and bearing—from Pandit Hara Bhatta Shastrin, who has made a deeper study of the Kashmir Shaiva system and has a wider acquaintance with its literature than the other Pandits of the Department...19

While on the one hand this shows the indebtedness of Chatterjee towards the learned pandits of the JKARD, at the same time it also tells us how meticulously both of them would have edited the texts taking all possible assistance from each other. The impression that one gets while reading the KSTS volumes is that Chatterjee and his team, including the subsequent editors who followed Chatterjee, have put enormous efforts into editing and recording parallel readings from the available manuscripts. Mostly, as also noted by Rastogi (1987:161), their endeavor was to prepare error-free and readable editions and present well-edited texts. However, almost all KSTS volumes are not totally free from errors and even severe editorial lapses. We will discuss some of these problems below.

Having said that, it is nonetheless clear that the editors of KSTS and their teams were working under a number of limitations. Even though JKRDP was a State run institute, the editors worked under all manner of extenuating circumstances. One such incident is recorded by Kaul in his preface to the Śivadṛṣṭi:

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18. Thus he acknowledges the assistance of Paṇḍit Mukund Rām Śāstrī, Paṇḍit Harbhaṭṭ Śāstrī, Paṇḍita Maheśvar Nāth Rāzdān amongst others.
The press copy was fully prepared and sent early in the year 1924 to the Aryabhushan Press Poona. Its printing has unfortunately taken a decade of years to reach completion owing to the disastrous fire, which the said Press caught in 1926 when the whole portion of the Sivadriṣṭi printed up-to-date was destroyed….

Nonetheless, the Śivadṛṣṭi was finally published by the JKARD in the year 1934. Today, we can only imagine the problems they faced.

The bulk of the titles edited in the KSTS are texts belonging to what Chatterjee called ‘Kashmir Śaivism’. A Descriptive Analysis of The Kashmir Series of the Texts and Studies published by the JKARD sometime in 1950s (publication date not mentioned) thus mentions:

The publications of the Research Department of Jammu and Kashmir State number, up to date, 87 volumes, large and small, comprising 97 separate works. Of these, 74 are included in “The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies,” while the remaining 13 are outside the series—being extra numbers………. Out of the total number of 87 volumes, no less than 56, comprising 64 separate works, are just on the one subject of what is known as the “Trika Shāstra”, that is ‘The Threefold Science’; or briefly, the ‘Trika’, ‘The Triple’. (p. 1)

The first book intended for publication in the KSTS was Chatterjee’s remarkable, but now somewhat obsolete book entitled Kashmir Shaivism (Being a brief Introduction to the History, Literature and Doctrines of the Advaita Śaiva Philosophy of Kashmir, specifically called the Trika System). This book was published subsequently, rather than as the opening volume of the KSTS, as had been intended. The publication of this book was the first ever attempt at introducing the Śaiva tradition of Kashmir to the world, and the fact that the book was written in English aided the rapid dissemination of ‘Kashmir Śaivism’. Chatterjee, basing his study of the texts that were still in their unpublished forms of manuscripts, made the first historical and philosophical study of the Śaiva tradition. Pandits of the department, Paṇḍita

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20. Preface by Kaul to Śivadṛṣṭi, p. i, KSTS Vol. LIV.
21. This term is quite problematic and modern scholarship has reasons to believe it. Muller-Ortega (1989:17ff) has a discussion on why the term ‘Kashmir Śaivism’ is problematic.
22. Chatterjee mentions that his book was to be published together with the Śivasūtra Vimaršini (KSTS No. I) as a single volume, but this was not possible. Chatterjee mentions reasons for this. See The Śivasūtra Vimarśini, KSTS No. 1, p. III (Introduction), fn marked with *.
Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī and Paṇḍita Maheśvar Nāth Rāzdān,23 helped him in this pursuit, and soon he came up with a list of titles to be published in the KSTS.24 Chatterjee might have left the JKARD sometime immediately before or after 1916. He probably served as the director of the JKARD for about fourteen years.25 The next KSTS editor, Mukunda Rāma Śāstrī, most probably took over the department immediately after Chatterjee left, sometime in 1916. Śāstrī retired from the department in 1918. However, as mentioned earlier, he was already a head-pandit under Chatterjee in 1911.26 From this we can conclude that he served in the department for about seven years. While the volumes edited by Chatterjee were published over a period of five years, it is interesting to note that all the twenty titles edited by Śāstrī bear the same publishing year, 1918, except one case which indicates publication in 1917.27 It might have been, as we could imagine and also as I recall hearing personally from Paṇḍit Dinānāth Yaccha,28 a common practice in those days to edit volumes for several years and then send several of them together to press. It is also the case, for instance, with the KSTS volumes edited by Paṇḍit Jagaddhar Zadoo, all ten29 of which mention the year of publication as 1947. Another possibility, as suggested by Shaman Hatley, is of course to keep in mind the two strategic years—1918 and 1947—the first World War ended and 1947 the British left India. In the first case a possibility of delay in getting the volumes printed because of the World War might sound plausible, but in the second case, however, reasons might have been different. By 1947 printing was also introduced in Kashmir and in fact all the volumes edited by Zadoo were printed in Srinagar itself. The Indian war of independence against the British had hardly any repercussions in the Kashmir valley.

23. ibid. Also see Tantrasāra, KSTS No. XVII, p. III and Parātrinśākāśīvarana, KSTS No. 18, p. 2.
24. Such lists are mentioned in the back of The Śivasūtra Vimarshti, KSTS No. 1; Paramārthasāra KSTS No. VII; Pratyabhijñāhrdaya KSTS No. III.
25. Preface by Kaul to Śivadṛṣṭ, p. i, KSTS Vol. LIV.
26. Preface of Chatterjee to Pratyabhijñāhrdaya, KSTS No. III, 1911. Here Chatterjee says that a Ms used in preparing the PHṛ sigla ‘ṅa’ was obtained by Śāstrī from Lahore who was already a head pandit of the department.
27. The case of Spandasaṁdoha, KSTS No. XVI, 1917.
28. Paṇḍit Dinānāth Yaccha (1921-2004) served in the JKARD first as a copyist and then as the head-pandita from 1948-1976.
29. All the ten titles are mentioned in the bibliography.
Madhusūdana Kaul Śāstri (from now onwards Kaul) probably served in the department from 1919 to 1945. Kaul also wrote the preface of the ĪPV, volume I, which was edited by Śāstri and published in 1919. The final KSTS volume edited by Kaul is the Vāmakeśvarinātām (KSTS No. 66) published in 1945. Kaul would have spent the longest time in the department, as is also evident from the number of texts he has edited in the KSTS.

As mentioned previously, it is evident that the KSTS editors were working under a number of limitations. Many, such as the limitations of time and facilities, were unavoidable, but a number of editorial lapses could have been avoided. Based on an evaluation of the texts published in KSTS, I present below some remarks. The general practice followed by the editors of KSTS was to offer minimal details concerning any given Ms, whether who the Ms belonged to, the script, material on what it was written or how old it was. Chatterjee, with one exception, however, offers at least basic details of the Mss he collated for the texts he edited. On the basis of the editorial patterns followed by Śāstri, the texts edited by him can be categorized into three: those where the variant readings and the details of consulted Mss are given, those where the variants are given but the details of the Mss are absent, and those where no Ms details are furnished and the variants are also completely absent. Unfortunately, as also pointed out by Rastogi, our text, the TĀV falls into the category where manuscript details are completely absent but variants are listed. It is hard to speculate why Śāstri chose not to follow a uniform editorial policy in spite of the fact that he also, like Chatterjee, was evidently a careful and meticulous editor. As already mentioned, he had assisted many western-trained scholars and was already conversant with modern methods of philological research. In fact a majority of his edited texts make this very clear when on

31. This is the case of Spandakārikā Rāmakānta Vṛttī, Vol. VI, 1913.
35. Rastogi, 1987:160
each title page of the texts he edited, he claims: “...mahāmahopādhyāya-pandita-mukundarāma-
śāstrinā uddiṣṭakāryālayasthetarapāṇḍitasaḥājena saṃgyṛha, saṃśodhana-parāyōṅkana-vivaraṇādi-
saṃskaraṇottaram pāścātyavidvatparisatsamatā-ādhunika-sūgama-ṣuddha-
ṛātyupāṇyāṣādisamskāraik pariśkrtya...” ([edited] by Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandita Mukunda
Ram Shastri after having improved [the edition] by improving [and] scribing [and] following
the modern, easy, perfect method approved by the council of Western intellectuals. [And]
after having put together, emended, collated [and] edited with annotations by the help of the
other pandits of the said department). In many editions he has assiduously provided useful
annotations and copious notes. In many cases, however, as we will also see in case of Kaul
below, these notes are in fact just excerpts from other commentaries on the same text.37

Having said that one still wonders why both the prolific editors chose not to offer any
details about the Mss used for preparing the edition of as important a text as the TĀV. Was it
simply indifference towards such details? Unfortunately, this seems to have been a common
practice not only in KSTS but also in many other book series those days. In the first volume
of the ĪPV edited by Śāstrī the year of publication is mentioned as 1918. Even though this
volume mentions Śāstrī as the editor yet it’s preface dated 28 March 1919 is written by
Madhusūdana Kaul Śāstrī. In his preface Kaul has offered the details of the Mss used for
preparing the edition of the ĪPV.38 But as far as the second and the subsequent volumes of
the TĀV are concerned, also edited by Kaul, there are no traces of any Ms details to be found.
Both the editors are completely silent about the Mss used for preparing the edition of the
TĀV in all twelve volumes. Kaul edited almost forty KSTS volumes. Even though almost all
the KSTS volumes edited by Kaul contain the details about the Mss used, there are volumes
among those which do not report any variant readings at all,39 and still others which include

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36. Here I am purposely avoiding the post-colonial question of why, for instance, Sanskrit texts
needed to be edited on the pattern of Greek or Latin texts. This question, even though crucial, merits
extended discussion. In future I plan to discuss the examples of textual criticism in the Tantrāloka-
viveka itself.
37. See fn 44 below.
39. Thus we have: Lāugākṣi, Vol I, KSTS No. XLIX, 1928; ĪPVV, Vol. I, LX, 1938; Deśopadeśa and
Narmanāla, KSTS No. 40, 1923; Vātulanāthasūtra, KSTS No. 39, 1923. Netratantra, Vol. II, KSTS No. LXI,
1939; Ghaṭakarpāra KSTS No. LXVII, 1945.
only extensive annotations and notes but no variants at all. One would have expected that if Śāstrī did not include any details of Mss used for the edition of the first volume of the TĀV, Kaul would have filled in the lacuna by providing the Mss details in the second or subsequent volumes of the TĀV (which were being edited by him) as he did in case of the ĪPV. But unfortunately this did not happen.

IV. About the editio princeps of the Tantrāloka

The editio princeps of the Tantrāloka along with the commentary by Jayaratha called -viveka was published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (KSTS) in twelve volumes between the years 1918-1938. Volume one, containing the first two chapters of the TĀ and published in the year 1918, was edited by Pandit Mukund Rām Śāstrī41, while the remaining eleven volumes containing chapters three to thirty-seven were edited by Pandit Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstrī42 between 1921 and 1938.

A closer look at the variant readings noted by the editors gives an impression that they might have used four Mss since the sigla used for the anonymous Mss are four Sanskrit consonants: ka, kha, ga and gha. The maximum number of occurrences of variants are listed from ka and kha, and those attributed to ga and gha are comparatively fewer. Those from Ms gha are as less as five in the first two āhnikas.43 It is clear that the editors have selectively noted the variant readings from the likely four Mss. This choice of using negative apparatus by the editors turns out to be misleading for later scholars so much so that the occurrence of as many as five variant readings from the Ms gha can easily be overlooked. Likewise Rastogi (1987:160) has also noted that the KSTS edition has used four MSS but the five readings of the Ms gha have been overlooked. Upon a closer scrutiny of only the first volume (containing

40. Thus we have: Śivadṛṣṭi, KSTS No. LIV, 1934; ĪPV, Vol. II, KSTS No. XXXIII, 1921; Devināmaravilāsa, KSTS No. LXIII, 1942.
41. Only the first volume KSTS No. XXIII (1918).
42. KSTS Nos. XXVIII (1921), XXX (1921), XXXVI (1922), XXXV (1922), XXIX (1921), XLI (1924), XLVII (1926), LIX (1938), LII (1933), LVII (1936), LVIII (1938).
the first two āhnikas of the TĀV one can observe that Śāstrī provides a greater number of variants than volume two (containing only the third ānika of the TĀ), which is edited by Kaul. For example it is difficult to imagine that there is not a single variant worth reporting between pages 87-131 and 155-242 of volume two. What I am trying to suggest is that probably Kaul chose a less exhaustive approach in editing the rest of the volumes of the TĀV than Śāstrī, which was simply a flawed editorial practice.

On the other hand we should not judge how well or bad the transmission of a certain text was simply based on the frequent occurrence or complete absence of the variant readings recorded in the editio princeps without scrutinizing the original manuscript material. In the complete absence of the scrutiny of the manuscript tradition how can we draw conclusions concerning the patterns of textual transmission of a given text? Thus what Rastogi (1987:161) says may not be really helpful if we want to establish the history of textual transmission of the TĀV:

It appears that the text of the Āhnikas from first to thirteen was more corrupt than the latter ones as the profusion and frequency of foot-notes suggest. Even among the initial Āhnikas the 1st was most defective and the incidence of mistakes has been gradually on the declining scale in the subsequent ones. From 14th onwards footnotes become conspicuous by their absence. (1987:161)

There is more evidence of the uneven editorial choices made in KSTS. We see Kaul providing profuse annotation to his edition of the Śivadṛṣṭi, but at other times, like for instance in case of SvT which is published in six volumes along with Kṣemarāja’s commentary titled udyota, or in case of the NTU, there are very few variant readings recorded and no annotation attempted at all. With regard to annotation and notes, one may, however, say that wherever the editors felt the topics are abstrusely philosophical, they supplied notes to improve intelligibility. This, unfortunately, is not the case with equally abstruse descriptions of rituals. At the same time one can clearly see that in many cases such notes, for instance in the two volumes of the ĪPV, are basically nothing but extracts from the ĪPVV.44

As mentioned earlier as well, it is not completely clear what policy the editors of the
KSTS adopted from time to time. However, one can clearly see that no uniform method was
followed. In some cases, I suspect, probably the editorial team was focusing more on
transcribing the Mss from Śāradā into Devanāgarī (which was already a cumbersome
process) instead of carefully collating the Mss. My collation of a number of Mss used for my
edition has shown that there are still many improvements to be made in the editio princeps of
the TĀ and TĀV, even if minor. Based on the philological exercise of editing a short fragment
of the TĀ using almost twenty-nine manuscripts, it is clear that the transmission of the Mss
of the TĀV has not been bad at all, yet I am sure that there might be other parts of the TĀV
where a critically edited text could be very helpful in understanding the problematic
passages. This might be particularly the case with more ritualistic and thus more technically
complicated parts like āhnikas 29-32.

As pointed out by Rastogi, it is also important to keep in mind that the TĀ had
already undergone corruption in just a couple of hundred years, as is clearly observed by
Jayaratha himself.\textsuperscript{45} Thus one can only infer what other textual problems the TĀ and the TĀV
would have gone through since the time of Jayaratha. Since compared to the complete text of
the TĀ and the TĀV, the part of the text I have looked at is minuscule, it has been difficult to
offer any straightforward answer to this problem. In this context a firm answer can only
emerge upon the collation of the complete text of the TĀ and the TĀV. A number of modern
scholars such Gnoli,\textsuperscript{46} Padoux,\textsuperscript{47} Goodall and Isaacson,\textsuperscript{48} have already noted the importance

\textsuperscript{45.} Rastogi (1987:108, 142-146)
\textsuperscript{46.} “I manoscritti si sono moltiplicati e con essi gli errori o le improprie transcrizioni degli scribi.”
Gnoli (1999: LXXXII)
\textsuperscript{47.} “La plupart de ces textes, il est vrai, étaient alors considérés comme perdus, ou étaient
inaccessibles. Ce n’est que récemment que certains ont été retrouvés, en manuscrits, au Népal ou dans
les bibliothèques d’Europe, que l’on a pu les consulter et commencer à les étudier. Une nouvelle
édition du TĀ et de son commentaire, qui serait fort désirable, serait dès lors maintenant possible.
Mais elle nécessiterait la consultation de manuscrits au Cachemire, auxquels on ne peut guère accéder
aujourd’hui, et elle exigerait une grande érudition et un travail considérable. Il faut donc pour le
moment se contenter de l’édition existante, qui n’est d’ailleurs pas mauvaise.” (p. 60-61) Silburn -
Padoux
\textsuperscript{48.} “but we think that it is high time for an entirely fresh treatment of Abhinavagupta’s masterpiece –
one which does not rely solely on the KSTS edition, laudable pioneering attempt though it is, but
makes use of the plentiful manuscript material that is available, some of which was not at the disposal

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of having a revised critical edition of the TĀ. Highlighting the importance of a critical edition of the TĀ, Rastogi points out:

Our most urgent task is to have a critically edited text of the Tantrāloka and the Viveka. In the foregoing pages we visualised its necessity several times. By the time of Jayaratha the text of the T.A. was eclipsed by corruptions and he gives ample testimony of his having edited and restored the text (e.g.,) the Viveka on the T.A. 23.23, 23.25, 29.265-66 and 37.4-5 etc.). The printed KSTS edition is in dire need of the same type of approach. An effort is to be made to locate as many MSS as possible and to collate and compare them. This may help settle many such problems as we have seen with regard to the difference in readings between Pandey’s Ms and the KSTS edition and resulting complications or with regard to several variants given by Jayaratha which are traceable to none of the MSS on which the KSTS edition is based. As a first step, an internal comparative study may be undertaken as we notice variations in the portions referred to or cross referred to. As a second step, citations appearing in the T.A. and the Viveka may be compared with their original sources wherever available either in print or in MS. This may be done with an historical overview since even some apparently correct readings give to historical absurdities (e.g., Bhrātā’pi for Bhartā’pi in the T.A. 37.75). As a third step, a track has to be kept of the situations where Jayaratha, through seldom, is at variance with his master. For example the T.A. 8.406 says something, but it means something else from Jayaratha’s comments.49

Apart from this, another level of problems in the TĀ and the TĀV concerns the editing and printing of the editio princeps. Rastogi has already pointed out some printing mistakes.50 It is also observed that the readings of the TĀ when quoted in Abhinavagupta’s other works also vary sometimes. We see a few examples in the ĪPVV itself.51 At least in the case of chapter three, one can also add that wherever Jayaratha’s TĀV clearly paraphrases from the ĪPVV, one should closely cross-check the Mss of the latter also. I have only located a few minor variations. It should also be mentioned that the modern punctuation marks used by the editors of KSTS create many misleading situations. This was revealed in Chatterjee’s own words in the first volume of the KSTS, where he says:

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49. Rastogi (1987:245-246)
51. Thus the verses 3.29, 3.23, 3.25-34 are quoted in ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 164, 168, 165. TĀ 3.25cd is missing in the quoted text in ĪPVV.
… the only point which has resulted in failure is that, during my absence in Europe, when I could read only one proof of each form and the final reading was done in my office in Kashmir, a confusion has been made as to the use of the signs of punctuation. The old Sanskrit Mss. never used signs and the old type Pandits are generally unacquainted with their meanings. It will thus be seen that in certain parts of the text a comma has been used where there should have been a semi-colon, where the latter has been substituted by a comma.\textsuperscript{52}

While the obvious intention of the editors was to facilitate the reading of such texts to a modern reader, yet in some cases, after a thorough reading of the texts, it gradually becomes clear that the punctuation marks provided by the editors are misleading. In such cases sometimes one has to think of reading the text ignoring all the punctuation marks. Such exercise might help in making more sense of the text in question. Needless to say, modern punctuations marks were not used in the premodern South Asian manuscript cultures and the running text (without spaces between words in a sentence) gives rise to many issues related to sandhi. For this reason, wherever I felt that the text was either dubious or the punctuation was misleading, I have printed the text in my edition without punctuation marks and only supplied them wherever I thought it was really necessary.

V. About Other Editions and Translations

The editio princeps was reprinted as another edition by R.C. Dwivedi and Navjivan Rastogi in 1987 in eight volumes, of which the first is an analytical study of the structure of the TĀ and TĀV, and the last an index of the verses of the TĀ and those quoted in the TĀV. This edition or rather a reprinted version of the KSTS mislead many scholars into thinking that there was a new revised edition of the TĀ and the TĀV prepared by the editors, as the cover page appears to declare. However, the editors make it clear that they have not attempted a critical edition of the text and what they have in fact done is only prepared an “enlarged reprinted

\textsuperscript{52} The Śivasūtra Vimarsini, KSTS No. 1, p. II (Preface).
While the introductory volume by Rastogi was the first remarkable study of the TĀ and the TĀV in its structure, the cover page saying "edited by" is misleading.

As far as later published editions and translations of the TĀ are concerned, the first ever complete translation of the text (without the commentary of Jayaratha) was made by Ranerio Gnoli in 1972 into Italian. A second revised edition was later published in 1999. The translation is completely based on the KSTS and does not include the original text in Sanskrit, however, the notes propose several important emendations and corrections, and contains learned annotations, all of which help in improving the actual readings of the text besides making it easy to understand. Owing to the scale of his project, Gnoli does not analyze individual themes of the TĀ exhaustively, which is a limitation of his work. I have personally taken considerable help from this edition and have also considered a number of corrections and emendations proposed by Gnoli.

An edition only of the Bimbapratibimbavāda was prepared by Śrī Janārdana Śastra Pāndeya as a part of the Śaivādvaitaśāstra in 1997. The Śaivādvaitaśāstra is an anthology of twenty shorter Śaiva texts. The first section in this anthology includes nine shorter works of Abhinavagupta, with the Bimbapratibimbavāda on pp. 36-38. This includes only the first 23 verses of the chapter three of the TĀ. Pandeya has based his edition on the two Ms from the BHU, which I have already mentioned and described in the list of Mss in this thesis. The two BHU Mss he mentions also include parts of the commentary from the -viveka, but Pandeya has not included these in his edition.

Two Hindi translations of both the TĀ and the TĀV have appeared, by Paramahamsa Mishra and Radheshyam Chaturvedi in 2000 and 2002, respectively. The text reproduced in both editions is based on the editio princeps, and both are simple translation projects with no concern for textual problems. Mishra’s edition, published in eight volumes, contains an extremely loosely constructed translation into Hindi that hardly clarifies any problematic parts of the text. His translation is more or less Hindi paraphrasing of the Sanskrit text. Chaturvedi, on the other hand, in his five volume edition, has attempted a more literal translation, which nonetheless does not help much in improving our understanding of the

problematic parts of the TĀ or the commentary thereupon either. The complete absence of a
single note or annotation in five volumes speaks for itself. Both these translations are far
from being critical.

In the year 2000, a French translation of the first five chapters of the TĀ was
published by Lilian Silburn and André Padoux. This translation is also based on the editio
princeps and includes notes, references and interpretation based on the commentary of
Jayaratha. The Sanskrit text is not reproduced. The commentary is not translated, but
selected parts are paraphrased wherever authors have thought it to be necessary. The first,
second, fourth and fifth chapters were translated by Lilian Silburn while the chapter three
was translated by André Padoux. I have gone through the translation of the 3.1-65 in this
translation but have made no use of it in my translation partly because it did not address any
problematic parts of the text.

The only comprehensive study of a single chapter of the TĀV (Chapter - 29) along
with its English translation and annotation was made by John Dupuche (2003). However,
Dupuche has completely ignored the textual problems in the text.

An unpublished doctoral thesis was defended in the University of Lucknow by Ira
Bajpai in the year 1971 discussing Abhinavagupta’s philosophy as expounded in the first
three chapters of the TĀ along with an English translation without Jayaratha’s commentary.
This is the first worthy attempt of understanding Abhinavagupta’s pratībimbavāda, however it
ignores textual problems and the translation is not always appropriate.

VI. Editorial Policy

The apparatus used for the edition has a maximum of four levels. The first level records
occurrence of the parallel concepts mentioned in other texts of Trika Śaivism such as IPVV
and other parts of the TĀ /TĀV. The second level records the variant readings from the
manuscripts examined. In the variant register all significant variants have been marked by
line numbers for both verse and prose. The lemma is cited first followed by lemma mark (a

right bracket) and supporting readings. This is followed by a semicolon that separates the two or multiple sets of readings. Each variant reading is followed by the sigla that supports it. The third level of apparatus includes notes from Mss. For instance, wherever a certain word has been marked by a short gloss on top or below, or if a part of text is missing or marginal notes, occurrences of secunda manu etc. The fourth level marks the change in folio numbers wherever available. If a certain Ms does not bear page numbers, I have not marked them in the apparatus.

I have generally preferred to apply sandhi in lemma except in the cases where it would have contributed to the probable misunderstanding of the text in a certain context. This has been my preference so as to avoid as much confusion as I possibly could and to keep away from any ambiguities. I have also applied punctuation marks only wherever I thought it was actually necessary. Thus as in the case of the editio princeps I have not marked a pratika / mūlapada in prose text using single or double quotation marks. The verse text of the TĀ is set in bigger type and the prose text the TĀV is set in comparatively smaller font size.

I have not proposed any stemma since for a text spread over thirty-seven chapters and 5859 verses, proposing a stemma on the basis of sixty-five verses is not possible. However, I must make a few important remarks. Amongst the Mss I have consulted thirty are written in Śāradā script, three in Kashmirian Devanāgarī, five in Devanāgarī and one in old Malayalam. The oldest Ms is a birch-bark probably belonging to 17th CE or earlier. The Old Malayalam Ms is also an exception because it is the only Ms of the TĀ available in a script other than Śāradā and Devanāgarī. Keeping in mind the age, number and variety of Mss consulted, I have observed that the text of the TĀ and TĀV has not undergone any significant change over a longer period of time.

For the purpose of this edition I did not continue to complete the collation of the three Mss from Jammu written in Kashmirian Devanāgarī. After collating a few folia it was clear to me that these Mss are a unique example of what Bühler called 'cooked Mss':

As the Devanaāgarī MSS. are mostly prepared for the market, they are also not unfrequently cooked, i.e. the lacunae and defects in the original are filled in
according to the fancy of the Pandit who corrects them. This most objectionable habit prevails in Kasmīr to a very great extent, perhaps to a greater extent than in India proper, though in India proper, too, the Pandit has little respect for the sacredness of the ancient texts. That sentiment is in Europe, too, of modern growth, and not much older than the historico-critical school of philology, which arose in the end of the last century. In no part of India have I, however, been told of the practice of restoring or 'cooking' Sanskrit books with so much simplicity as in Kasmīr. I was asked by my friends if the new copies to be made for me were to be made complete or not; and one Pandit confessed to me with contrition, after I had convinced him of the badness of the system, that formerly he himself had restored a large portion of the Vishnudharmottara.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} Cat. Report 1877 p. 33
Khāṭmatvāpi vichīrī vishāldhīmāṃ vācāvachakātaṃ jagat.

Dṛṣṭaṁnaṃvadāntaṁ vinivasamḥviṣajyate vijñay.

Indrīṇimukyāntarṇyāṇaṃ kramaṃ prāyaṃ śāṃbhovāpyaṃ dvitiyāyaśāṃ viniyogadāntaṃ pratiṣajjānte.

Atha paroṣadikam pravaṇādyate padamuttarṣaṃv māheṣṭhitu.

1 khaṭmatvāpi | Kṛd Bh.6 G J3 K4 K2 K6 K10 K12 K14 P1 P2 P3 L Lk3 S2 V1 V3 V5 V7; khaṭmatvā Bh.1ac; svāmātvaḥ 'pi conj. em. Sīra Sanderson 2 darpāna | Kṛd B1 G J3 K4 K6 K10 K12 K14 L Lk3 S2 V5; tarpaṇa V7.

3 anupāyāntaryena | Kṛd B1 G J3 K4 K10 K12 L Lk3 S2 V5; anupāyānāntaryena K14 mg; anupāyāntārena K2 K4 3 kramaprāptaṃ śāṃbhavopāyaṃ | Kṛd B1 G K12 L P3 S2; kramaprāptaśāṃbhavopāyaṃ J3 K3 K14 K2 K1 Lk3 V7; kramaprāptaśāṃbhavopāyaṃ K3 3 dvityārdhena | Kṛd B1 G J3 K6 K12 L Lk3 P2; dvityāyādheṇa K14 K10 Lk3 S2 V7; dvityābena K2 K4 3 prāṇiguditaṃ | Kṛd B1 G J3 K4 K10 K12 L Lk3 S2 V5; prāṇiguditaṃ V7 3 pratiyānte | Kṛd B1 G K14 K2 K4 K10 K12 L Lk3 L P2 P3 S2; pratiyānāne J3 4 parapayikam | Kṛd B1 G J3 K3 K14 K2 K4 K6 ac K10 K12 L Lk3 P3 S2 V7; parapayikam L; parapayikam K6 ac T; parapayikam Lk3.

4 mahēṣṭhitu | Kṛd B1 G J3 K4 K14 K10 K12 P3 S2 T; mahēṣṭhitu K2 Lk3 S2 V7; mahēṣṭhitu P2

1 khaṭmatvā is retained by all the Ms and also by edīto princeps KSTS. However, I think both the readings are equally acceptable. The reading svāmātva makes more sense but I think Jayaratha has a special purpose in using khaṭmatvā referring to the letter kha representing Vījaya Rudra. Please see Appendix for more details. I have also retained the meanings arising from both the readings in my translation. Misra (2000:321) has retained khaṭmatvā and translated it as so. Caturvedi (2002:284) has changed the reading to svāmātva, but translated it as sūrya. The use of the word khaṭmatvā also occurs in TĀ - 4.190e but in a different context. See khāṭmatavacca samprāptam saṁkṣitāvadgocaritā. 1 Also, see TĀV - khaṭmatavām ityādānaṃ vyomātmaraṇaḥ, khaṇḍavāsaṣa prasāṭpaṃ prāṇātmaraṇaḥ saṁkṣitāvadgocaritā.

2 In K14 vija adventurer, glossed by mānteṣvaraṃ on the top. In Lk3 and L vija adventurer, glossed by prameṣvaraṃ on the top and in K2 and Lk3 vija adventurer, it is glossed on the margin. 2 In B1 the text from idāntānāc up until mahēṣṭhitu is missing from the main text. However, this text has been recorded on the top of the same folio and it has been indicated with a + mark. 3 In K4 gādi in prāṇiguditaṃ is added later below the line using a + mark by the same scribe. In K6 meva in anuttarameva is added later on the right margin. 4 In Pā ala parapayikam prāṇiguditaṃ padamuttarameva mahēṣṭhitu | is missing

1 K2 96r; K4 73r; K6 64v; K10 68r; K12 12r; G 1v; L 98v; S2 100r; J3 48v; V4 1v; Lk3 102v
3 Lk3 102r 4 K9 96r
ननु यदि नाम परोपायस्यायनुतसव रूपं तत्पूर्वेणव गतर्थवतज किमर्मिदमाधिका- 
न्तरमालयत्यस्य

प्रकाशमात्र यत्सर्वं भैरवियं परं महः ।
तत्र स्वतन्त्रतामात्राधिकं प्रक्षिप्तं ॥ ३-१ ॥

प्रकाशमात्रतन्त्रमिति प्राध्यतात। न हि निरिष्माः प्रकाशं समस्तुपपपतेः वा। प्रको- 
विचीर्मिति कर्त्तनायाग्रेः। न हि वस्तुतो वस्तुः स्वाभावातिर्ति- 

9 Cf. TĀ 1-54 prakāśo nāma yaśāyam sarvatratva prakāśate | anapalnavaniyatvē kīm tasmim- 
mānakaśpanaiḥ ||


5 K2 97v, Lk2 1r and Lk3 102v records a verse on top of the page from the Vākyapadiyam (1.132): vāgīrpatat ced utkhrmed avabodiṣya śāsivit | na prakāsah prakāśeta śā kṛtpratya-

8 J3 Lk2 K14 K4 K6 L P2 P2; read verse 3.2ab along with 3.1cd 9 ma in nirvimaṁśah in G is added on top of the same hand and ink 9 Here K10 and S2 have a note on the right margin and G on the left margin. All read the following: samāśīti sambhavati upapady- 

10 K4 23v1 5 K5 74v 7 P6 1v 10 L 98r
च्ये | तथापि वा स स्वभाव एव न स्यात । स्वतंत्रत्व तिपकाशोनिवाचत्वम्, तत्र चें-
यत्तवं यत् स्वभित्वायेव स्वेच्छया सर्व प्रकाशयतीति ॥ ॥

तदेवाह

य: प्रकाशः स सर्वस्य प्रकाशात्वं प्रयच्छितः ।

12 PrH - 2 स्वच्छयाय स्वभित्त विषयम उन्नियति | IP Vyākhyā, p. 102, kim ca svātmanām
svakartaye svayamāyā prāgaṇītyā स्वच्छया स्वभित्तित विषयम उन्नियति। स्वकाशये
bhrāmādav prakāśātāro नुपेक्षात् iti svārisvataνत्र—svatantravāvā sampramātā anubhuvan
nāntarakābhūte kīl pā sthitavānumbhūtamātmanā sa iti vīmātati |

11 svabhāvo'ṭīrītye KED; svabhāvād atīrītye J2 11 svabhāva J
KED B1 G Lk2 K1 K1 L P2 P3 P6 e S2; svaya V 7; svabhārya J3 11 svatantrateti
KED G P K6 P K12 P Lk4 P; svatantra prakāśakārttvam KED t; svatantritē
drāṣṭānākriyā B1 Lk4 P; svatantryaprakāśanākriyā G P K6 P K12 P; svatantra
(prakāśanākriyā) J3 K14 P5 Lk2 Lk3 S2 V 7; svatantra prakāśanākriyā (without iti)
K6 P; svatantrāprakāśanākriyā L; svaitante P2 11 kārttvam J KED B1 K2 K1 L;
kārttvam V 7 12 yat svabhāttāveva svēcchāyā sarvaṃ prakāśayatīti J KED Lk3;
svabhīttāveva yatasrvām prakāśayati KED t; yat svēcchāyā svabhītt-
tāveva B1 13 sarvam J B1 G Lk2 K1 K6 K10 K12 L S2 V 7 sarva KED 15 prakāsāh J
KED B1 G J; K14 K14 K2 K6 Lk2 Lk3 L P2 P3 P6 S2 V 7 prakāsā K1 prakāsaya T
15 sarvasya J KED K4; visvāsya B1 G J; J J J K2 K14 K2 K6 L Lk2 Lk3 P2 P3 P6 S2 T V 4 V 7 V 6
15 prayacchati J KED; prayacchayi Lk3.
च: कल्प प्रकाशामिकियां कर्ता परिप्रमात्मासुनंतरशब्दबिखेय: प्रकाश: स सर्वस्त्र प्र-
मातुमेरास्मा विध्यत्र प्रकाशत्र प्रकाशमात्ना प्रवचन्ति स्वात्मकान्यनाभवाभायतित्यथः।
न हि विद्य नाम प्रकाशामात्नात, तद्तिरित्वी किष्कितस्मभवती, तद्नितिरिक्ष्युपमे श्रस्य
प्रकाशमानामायोगादानमेव न स्यादिति।
तदाहु।

न च तद्नितिरिक्ष्यति विद्य सदा न भासते। ॥ ३-२॥

वाक्षीदोभुपमे। ॥ २॥

16 kriyāyām] KED G K₂ K₄ K₆ L Lk₃ S₂; kriyāyām V₇; kriyāyāh B₁ 17 pramāṭ] KED; sa pramāṭ Lk₃. 17 prakāśatvam] KED B₁ G K₂ K₄ K₆ L S₂; prakāśat-
vam V₇. 17 prakāśamānatām] KED G² K₁₄ K₂ K₄ Lk₂ P₂ P₃ S₂; prakāśamā-
natvam B₁; prakāśamānatām G°; prakāśamānatām Lk₁ V₇; prakāśamānānām J₁ 17 prayacchati] KED Lk₃; prayacchati P₆ MS V₄ MS. 17 svātmākrtmyena] KED B₁ G K₁₆ Lk₁ P₂ P₃ S₂; svātmakṛtyena KED kha K₁₄ K₂ K₄ V₇ Lk₂ ac Lk₃ L. 18 atiriktam kiṁcitsambhavati] KED G K₂ L Lk₁ S₂; atiriktakiṁcitsambhavatiK₁; atiriktam kiṁc-
asti B₁ 18 tadātirekābhyupagame] KED B₁ G K₂ K₄ L S₂; tadātirekebhyupagame Lk₃ V₇. 21 vyatirekyasti] KED; “vyatirekyasti B₁ ac”; “vyatirekyasti B₁ ac”, “vyatirekyasti P₆; vyatirekyosti Lk₃. 21 sad vā na bāhāsate] KED kha K₃ ac, GNOLI also accepts this reading; sad vā ababhāsate KED B₁ G² J₁ J₂ K₃ ac K₁₄ K₂ (unclear) K₁ K₆ L Lk₂ Lk₃ P₂ P₃ P₆ S₂ T V₄ MS V₆ V₇; sa vābhāsate G° (the character between sa and va has been evidently eliminated); vā ārya bāhāsate iti J₁

16 The text from yah khalu up un till vabhāsyatitīyatharthāḥ is missing from J₂. 16 The text from yah khalu up un till prakāśamānatām is missing from V₄ MS. 16 V₇ omits the aṅavarga and uses two dots on the top and also omits a and ta in the word anu-
tara. 17 Lk₃ writes sa sārvasya pramātrpyayamītaman vīśvasya pramātrpyayamītman. 17 In P₆ MS yah khalu... to prakāśamānatām is missing. 18 J₁ does not read clearly here: mānatarat adiṭṭhitam (?). 18 tad in adiṭṭhitam is missing from V₄ MS. 18 tad is missing from J₂. 19 iti is missing from B₁ G J₁ K₁₄ K₂ K₄ K₆ P₃ S₂. 21 In K₁ I see the original reading is sad vā na bāhāsate but an unsuccessful attempt has been made by a later reader or scribe of changing na into a vā. In G the original reading is not visible since the the original reading has been altered using yellow ink. In P₆ the scribe has put a comma in-between sad vā and
ababhāsate.

16 G Ir 18 S₂ 101v 21 Lk₃ 103v

157
ननु यथेष्ट ताहिः प्रकाश एव प्रकाशात् इति विश्वास्यावभास एव न स्वयात्। अथ च भास्ते
विद्मिति किमेतित्वायाराख्यात्

अतोस्य परमेश्वर: स्वात्मयोमन्यनर्गितः।
इत्यत: सुधिसहाराउदवरस्य प्रदशेकः। ॥ ३-३ ॥

अत इति प्रकाशातितिरिन्त्रय विष्णुस्य भानायोगात्। परमेश्वरो द्यवंतातवक्ष्मण्य स्व-स्वात्मन्यमाहात्म्यात् स्वात्मिनिन्वेति विष्णुतित्रि
स्वतिति। इत्येवं विश्वाचविनियोजयासः स्पष्टं प्रकाशातित्रस्वात्मन्यनायं कित्विद्माहात्।

24 prakāṣata | KED: prakāṣeta P6 mpg. 24 atha ca bhāsate | KED B7 G PC K6 PC; atha bhāsate G ac K6 ac L S2 27 ādambaram | KED V4 PC; ādambaramJV4 ac TV6
27 pradarśakah | KED Lk2 K4 K14 K2 K1 P6 V4 PC V7; pradarśakah G L P2 S2; pradarśakah J1; pravartakah J2 २६ bhānā] | KED Lk1; bhāvanā"P6 mpg. 28 tvalakṣaṇa | KED K6 P2 J1 S2; anargalasvātantryaB1 ac; anargalalakṣaṇasvātantryaB1 PC; svalakṣaṇaKEDg K13 K9 K4 Lk3 Lk6 L S2 V7; anargalakṣaṇa P8 29 māhāmyāt | KED K14 K2 K14 K6 Lk2 L S2 V7; māhāmyāt J3 29 anātrikamaprayātikāyāmānam iyad | KED K2 K4 L Lk1 S2; anātrikamaprayātikāyāmānam iyad B3; anātrikāyāmāna V7 29 viśvāvacitryam | KED; viśvāvacitram B1 30 pradarśayati | KED B7 ac L Lk3; pradarśati B1 PC 30 ityevam | KED B7 K2 K4 L V7; evam P6 mpg 30 prakāśamātrasvabhāve | KED G PC K2 K4 K6 L Lk3 P6 mpg V7; prakāśamātāt svabhāve B1 P5; prakāśamātrasvabhāve G ac

24 ca is missing from J3 K11 K2 K4 Lk3 Lk6 P2 S2 V7 25 kimarati is missing from P6 mpg V1 mpg 27 G has a note on the right margin here: kimarati iti samuditaeva nipa- tāh tāvī. 27 In K6 the scribe has written pradarśikah and then eliminated the letter i using yellow ink 28 J2 writes a and not ata 28 ata iti missing from V4 mpg 28 In P6 mpg paramesvaro... to pradarśayati is missing. 28 After bhānāyogat J2 writes evam viśvāvacitryaollāse' pi which is the next line in the text. The scribe has skipped a few lines here and then he has put double + sign between yogat and evam 28 The text from paramesvaro hi to pradarśayati is missing from V4 mpg. 29 K2 seems to read svātantra. 29 P5 does not read clearly here. 29 api in anātrikāt anpy is missing from K6 29 In J4 the next folio starts here.
मिति कटाभवित्तम ्त्र योग निरूपण कृतम्। अत एव चारेन विश्रष चिन्तितिविवक्तम्-
व्युत्पन्नोदशीलित्र्य प्रतिविम्बादस्यवकाशो दृता:। यथा हि दर्पणादी परस्परव्यवहारात्मान: 
प्रतिविम्बवित्तार्थिविश्वासातोत्तदिरिक्तेः अथितिरिक्ता एव भास्त्ते तद्दिहाविपि।॥ ३।॥

तद्वां

निर्मते मुकुरे यद्दशान्ति भूमिज्ञायान्। अभिभाषात्तदेकरिमथिष्ठाये विश्ववृत्त्यः ॥ ३-४॥

सूक्ष्मशास्त्रां।

31 nādhikam kiścit | KED J3 K14 K2 K6 L Lk1 lnc P4; asayāndhikam jātam KED ka; na kiścit adhikam jātam B1; svātmanādhikam kiścit G; na kiścit lk2 m; nādhikam kincin Lk1 V7; 31 katāksayitum | KED B1 K2 K6 L Lk1 P6 mg; katāksitum G; katāksayitum V7. 31 nirūpanaṃ KED Lk3; rūpanaṃ P6 mg. 32 viśvasya ci-

31 pratimbhatvamītyanjuddhodesḍitaśyāya | KED K2 K6 Lk3 L; “viśvasm B1; “itiyanaades-

31 ṃḍiṣṭasya K2; viśvaṃ citpratimbhavte ityanjuddhiṣṭasya KED ka. 33 pratimbhitā | KED B1 K6 L Lk1; pratimbhātī K4. 33 anatiriktate‘pi atīrktā iva bhāsante| KED B1 G m; K2 K6 lnc L Lk1 V7; tato anatiriktā iva bhāsante G m; anatiriktā iha bhā-

33 saṃkārāya. 34 nirmale makure | KED Lk2 K2 K1 K4 K6 L P6; nirmale saktare Lk1 V7; nirmale muktaye J1; nirmale mukure T. 36 jalādayah | KED; jalādayā Lk3. 36 ekasmīm | KED V7 G L Lk2 Lk1 P1 P2 P3 P4 P6 K1 K4 K6 P6 K1 K4 K6 K10 Lk3 S2 V1 V4 V3 V4 V7; “etasmīm T. 36 viśva’ | KED B1 G Lk2 K2 lnc K14 K2 K6 L Lk1 P6 P6 V7; citta’ K4 ac. 37 subodha” | KED; svabodha’ L.

31 J1 writes svātmanājñātya vyommi nirūpanam krtam// 31 nirūpanam krtam is not clear in B1. In V1 mg the text from ata eva... to dattah is missing. In P6 ac at a eva..... to tadvabhāpitā is missing. In P6 ac and V4 mg rūpanam krtam is followed by svātmanājñāta. 32 In G there is a note below : vyoma hi meghadacchādupanīprācchādityāṃ saucahaṃca tadapagampi tattāma-

32 cyam cyam tathāvrti sambhavati. 32 hi is missing from J2. 32 J2 writes evaśrītvātmakānaḥ. 33 In Ms V7 the evr in evaśrītvātmakānaḥ is missing. 33 In V7 tato writes like tattā. 34 V4 mg writes yathā hi darpanādāya.....tadvadhāhitā | tadvādā virmūleti as the avatāranākā 34. The other part of the commentary is missing. 34 In the Ms V7 the asaka ‘a’ in tadvād writes like na

36 TĀV on 3.21-22 has a different reading of the verse yathābhāvanirmālādīrse bhānti bhūrī virodhināḥ / aṇābhāyaśtatadvādanimścintāmāḥ viścaryātyāḥ // 36 In T the ś in etasmīm is missing. 37 G J1 Lk3 V7 does not mention the reference to the text and it only quotes the ab. of the verse. However, it mentions it later. B1 does not mention any reference to the text, and quotes only the ab of the verse. L mentions the reference here, but quotes it later in TĀV 3.5ab. 37 In K6 svādviṣhāvyājāsām is added later on the right and left margins respectively, but is not a part of the main text. K4 does not mention the name of the reference here, but it mentions it later.

36 K15r
तेषां प्रतिविम्बन व्यवस्थया विषयविभागं दृश्यति

सत्त्रो भाटि नयनदर्पणामयकरवारिषु ।

शब्दमिश्र सत्त्रायणम् । अभिलेख आमरस्य नातितीव्र नातिमन्दं सौरं चाल्द्रं वा तेजः । तत्र

39. *Saubodhayana* verse 2. This verse is also quoted in Tāv. 4.149 as pointed out by Torella (2000:402) as well. However, Torella has missed TĀV 3.4. Jayaratha quotes first two padās of this verse in the TĀV in 4.149 and 4.221 besides TĀV 3.4. 43 Verses 3.5-6 are also quoted by the editor of the TS in foot-note 2 (p. 10). 44. Cf. this construction in the words of Abhinavagupta in the IPV (Vol. 1, p. 159) : vyomadaksā ca parichinmadirghavartulākāre yad idityateja na attītvarna na atimandam va candriteva va, tatra sārīnasamsthāna pratibimbaṁ dṛṣyate chāyāparuṣopadesāpariśiśālaṇaḥ |

39 etāvadeva J KED K1 K2 K4 Lk2 ac Lk2 FC Lk1 L P5 V7; etāvadiva J3. Probably the case of Kashmirian pronunciation 40 ityādyuktyuṣṭā J KED K2 K4 K6 L Lk3; ityādyuktya81P5 ac; ityādyuka82P5 FC 41 sarvamīti J KED K2 K4 K6 L Lk3; sarvasāti V7 42 vyavasthāya J KED B1 K2 K6 Lk1; vyavasthāyā K14 K4 L V7 42 vibhāgam B1 J3 K14 K2 K6 Lk2 Lk3 L P5 FC V7 bhāgam KED; vibhāge K4; vibhāhāgam P5 ac 43 ambaravarīa J KED B2 FC K3 K6; ambaravāīsvati V7; ambaśāriṣu B1 ac; vāriṣu iti Lk2; svaravāriṣu Lk3. 44 sadṛṣaṃiti J KED B1 K4 K6 L Lk3; sadṛṣayaṃṭi V7 44 ambareti ambarastham KED; avstav parasvarastham Lk4. 44 nātītvaram J KED K2 FC K4 K6 Lk2 FC L P5; nātīrīktaṃ K2 ac K2 Lk2 ac Lk3; nātīrīktaṃ V7 44 8mandaṃ J KED B1 FC K2 K6 Lk6 Lk3; ṭ bandhand B1 ac; ṭ sandamb V7

39. K4 P5 Lk2 ac has only the ab of this verse and Lk2 FC has the complete verse. In Lk3 the verse is repeated twice. At the end of the first repeated verse it says subodhamaṇijaṛītvaram. 39 The pāda cd are missing from J2. 42 In V4 mg the text from leṣaṃ pratibimbenā to sadṛṣayitāṃ is missing. 43 In P6 V4 V6 Sadṛṣayitam is glossed by sajāṣṭitam in the top 44 sadṛṣayitāṃ sajāṣṭitam is missing from J2. 44 V4 mg ac writes nātītvaran sauram cāndram va tejāḥ and V4 mg P8 writes nātītvaran nātīmandaṃ sauram cāndram va tejāḥ. 44 va is missing from J2.

39 Lk3 103v 42 J2 2v 43 J1 82
हि छायापुरुषोपदेशविद्वः  शरीरसंस्थानप्रतिविधिम् दत्तते । यदाहः

नमस्ये च तेनसि  रुपप्रतिविधिमयोः । इति ।

यद्य विषयान्तरोपकश्यणपरत्या शब्दप्रतिविधिमिथपेवन व्याख्येयम् । तेन नमसि प्रतित्रु- 
त्त्का, तथा परानूमानमान्य कटुतिकादे रसस्य, खादिरपशस्य, गभरस्य च, दृश्यादन कः-

46 the source of this verse is untraced  48 Cf. IPVV, vol : 1, p. 159

45 त्रत हि ] क्षेत B₁ K₁₄ K₂ K₄ K₆ L Lk₃; तक औ स उ्व V₇  45 द्रशयते ] 
क्षेत B₁ K₁₄ K₂ K₄ K₆ P₅ L Lk₃ V₇; मुक्ति J₃  45 यदाहुह | क्षेत B₁ K₄ P₆ K₄ L Lk₁ V₇; 
यदाहु K₁₄ K₂  46 नहबस्त्वे ] क्षेत Lk₃; नहबस्त्वे K₂ O V₄ mc ac V₄ mc pc  46 तेजसी 
रुपप्रतित्विमयोगा ] क्षेत K₄ K₆ L Lk₃; तेजसी प्रतित्विमयोग क्षेत ka B₁; तेजस प्रा- 
तित्विमयोग Va₄ mc ac; तेजसी रुपप्रतित्विमयोग Va₄ mc pc  47 विशयान्तरोपकश्यण 
क्षेत B₁ K₂ K₄ L Lk₃ V₇; विशयान्तरोपकश्यण K₆ ka  47 विशयात्वेन ] क्षेत G mc; विशा-
त्वेन G ac  48 प्रातिश्वत्का ] क्षेत B₁ L; प्रातिश्वत्का K₂ K₄; प्रातिश्वत्का V₇; प्रातिश्वत्का 
J₂  48 कातुतिक्तेड ] क्षेत B₁ K₁₄ K₂ K₄ P₅ L Lk₃ V₇; कातुतिक्तेड J₃  48 श्रीदिसपरस्या 
J₃  48 श्रीदिसपरस्या V₇; श्रीदिसपरस्या J₂; श्रीदिसपरस्या J₃ [Not very clearly read] 

45 V₇ writes pratiiti bha like pratiiti bha  46 e in nabhasthe is not legible for the page is 
broken  46 V₇ writes pratiiti bha like pratiiti bha  46 In V₄ mc the text from yadac vi-
shipantara... to krama pratiiti bhan iti is missing.  47 In K₁₄ the vā in viśaya atve is in-
serted later  47 In G there is a note on the left margin : atra ca candra pratiiti bha rśādīnām 
apyapalasāman ityāh

46 K₄ 98v  47 K₄ 75v  47 Lk₂  ?  47 L 99r
न्दादी स्पर्शक्षेत्रे तव्च, प्राणे गन्धक्षेत्रे च क्रमेण प्रतिविम्बनमिति ॥ 
पत्रदेव दर्षयति 
तथा हि निर्मले रूपे रूपमेवावभास्ते ॥ ३-५ ॥

इह पृथ्विसैनकान्तर यवाणामेव प्रवर्तितयिति पाविवेक दर्पणारी, आपेक्षितमुच्यते जलाशयः

52 Cf. ÍPVV, Vol. I, p. 159. ताथाहि परिवहे भूमिकृत्तिम्, वायुरात्मिद्विपुरुषे श्यामा, अपे निशारागजालिस्ये, ताजासे काकुरोमकांतरावतुद्रिष्टिमुदले रूपाकूण्डु गुणाः |

49 कंदादार ज केठ; कर्मादार लक्षणा कंदादार स्पर्शक्षेत्रे ज केठ कंट; गंधश्रय जा दंतोदार कंदादार स्पर्शक्षेत्रे ज केठ कंट; प्रातिभिम्बितर ज कंट; प्रित्वियापेजासं ज केठ बल; प्रित्वियापेजासं लक्षण कंट; प्रातिभिम्बितर ज केठ बल गण्डकिः प्रातिभिम्बितर ज केठ बल लक्षण कंट; रुपात्विमि कंट अर्क कंट लक्षण वे ॥

49 In Lk 2 there is a marginalia on left indicated by the sign + saying trace ग्ह्रणे स्पर्शक्षेत्रे गांड्हक्षेत्रे का क्रमेना 49 G का writes कंदादार स्पर्शक्षेत्रे गांड्हक्षेत्रे रूपापांचावर्गयम्वी स्वासेतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः तत्ता काकुराधिभ इति इव सुवादस नाणियं / ग्न्रानक्षेत्रे का क्रमेना प्रातिभिम्बिति एतेद्वा दार्शयति / G का writes कंदादार स्पर्शक्षेत्रे का क्रमेना ... / ...... क्रमेना प्रातिभिम्बिति इति 49 सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे ज कंट लक्षण कंट ज केठ का सघरे स्पर्शक्षेत्रे गांड्हक्षेत्रे ग्राहनक्षेत्रे का ; J 3 here writes like this : गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति इव सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गयम्वी स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति इव सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गयम्वी स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति इव सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति इव सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गयम्वी स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति । 49 सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति इव सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गयम्वी स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति इव सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति । 49 सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति इव सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति । 49 सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति । 49 सघरे त्वचि क्षेत्रे गांड्हरुपादिपांचावर्गोऽयम् स्विष्मम् एतावदेवहि ग्रहयते पाणिभिः काकुराधिभिः इति।

51 प्रौढ़ १र
यादैः, तेजसे चक्षुरात्रि च स्पर्शेऽप्रसिद्ध स्वच्छोऽगुणः संविशेष्य संध्यानात्मते तस्तत्त्विभव-नमेव तत्रविभासते न स्पष्टः। तत्त्वलिङ्गानन्यायाधारात्मेषु कुन्दायाधारादिषु स्पष्टः।
sंविन्याय प्रतिसंकामित। तेन एव यत्र स्वच्छोर्दिष्ट गुणः सैव तद्र प्रतिसंकामात्वा-
शयः ॥ ५ ॥

न चैतंदस्मद्भिमन्त्यायाधारितम् यद्धानमाह

प्रच्छल्लापिष्की कान्त्तप्रतिक्षितस्तुनद्रम्।

53 Cf. IPVV, Vol. 1, p. 159: tatāṃsattvāscasākṣaṃ samstāhātmā gūṇo’sti svacchapprāyānāmapi rūparatvāditi teṣu rūpasamsthānapratibimbavāca upārhati, na avyāpaturaviparādī । 59 IPVV, vol.1, p.159 that quotes this verse has several different readings: prachchannukāmānti kānta-pratibimbatisundaram । mukaram kucakamūrbhāyām sprāntyagati na hrṣyati।।

53 taijase | KED; tejase Lk2. 53 prthivyādeh | K14 | mg 53 ca is missing from B1; G,2, K14, K1 Lk2 Lk3 L P, V7 53 rūpākhyo’sti | KED; rūpātvaṃ KED | kā; rūpākhyo G; rūpākhyah B1, K14, K1 Lk5 P, V7; rūpākṣah J3. 53 svaccho | KED; svaccho’sti B1, G,2, K14, K1 Lk2 Lk3 P, V7 53 samsthānātmā | KED B1, K4; samsthānātvā V7; samsthātmā Lk3. 54 pratibimbānam| KED; pratibimbam Lk4. 54 rūpa | K14 | mg 54 sparśādeh | KED B1, K1 Lk1; sparśanādeh | KED | kā 54 sthānādyātmakesu | KED; sthānātmakesu G; sthānātmakesu K4 54 kanda-kEDG | p, kada-cae 54 adhāraḍisu | KED Lk3; adhāraḍisu B1 (not very clear here). 55 sparśādeh | KED G p,; sparśanādeh B1, G p, 55 pratīsamkrāmāti | KED K1 Lk3; pratī ca samkrāmāti (but the ca has a delete mark on top of it) B1; pratīsamkrāmāti V7. 55 svaccho’sti gunah | KED B1, K1 P, V7; svaccho gūno’sti P, 55 pratīsamkrāmāti | KED B1 Lk1; pratīsamkrāmāti V7 58 asambhādam | KED; pratibaddham | KED | kā; K14 p, K1 J3 Lk2 L P, V7; pratibaddham K14, K1 Lk3 L P, V7; avadhārayītum | KED; avadhārayītum Lk3. 59 drṣṭāntam | KED; saradṛṣṭāntam G K14 K4 Lk3 L V7. 59 rāginī | KED G p, K14 p,; rāginī B1 G p, K14 K4 Lk3 P, V7

53 V7 writes caktarāda | 53 asti is missing from L. 53 samnivṛtvasāya is glossed by prthi-
vyāgah on the top in K2 Lk2. 53 In K2 rūpa is written on the top of tat. 53 In Lk3 it writes samsthānātmā iti rūpe where rūpe is just inserted later. 54 tat is glossed by rūpe on the top in Lk2. 54 In Lk3 in the right marging it says ghāne and traci sparāskeṣēre gandhakṣēre kramena, but there is no mark where they belong to. 54 In Lk3 there the ac writes kha-
leu, and the pc writes khalṇa. 54 'ādi is missing from G 55 In K4 it seems that the scribe has got confused with the word pratīsamkrāmāti. He has skipped the line tena ya eca .... eca tatra pratīsamkrāmāti 58 G writes caitat pratibaddham ityacadhārayītum 58 Lk3 seems to read avadhārayītum sa drṣṭāntamāh. 58 atra is missing from K2 K14 J3

54 Lk3 104v 54 V7 32r
दर्शन कुतुकमभायो स्पन्शम्यि न तुष्यि ॥ ३-६ ॥

अत्र तावत प्रच्छदितार्गाय: कान्ताया गुरुस्निधादर्शत्तत्यायापमता साधात् दर्शनाधारापि दर्शनप्रतिविधियोरणुणयन्त्रसंबंधेत्यद्यो मया कान्त इति सत्तयाभिभामनात् कान्तदर्शन वृत्तम्। अत एव सुदरमित्यनेन दर्शनवशोचिमित्याहादतिशिकारितापि सुपतिम्। एवमन्यासिद्ध एतत्तपशीपि मे भूयादित तत्र कुतुकमभायो सा दर्शन स्पष्टी- प्रतिसंक्रमतमलमानान न तुष्यि न प्रीयत्त इत्यथ: ॥ ६ ॥

60 pratibimbitasundaram] Kṛd K₁ K₄ L₃; pratibimbanasundaram Kṛd²;
pratibimbhasvandaram V₇ 60 darpanam] Kṛd B₁ K₁₄ K₄ L₃ P₆; dahanam J₁; makura K₅ T 60 sprāntyapi Kṛd; sprāntyapi J₁ 60 trpyati] Kṛd; drṣyati L₃. 61 rāginyāḥ] Kṛd; rāginyāḥ L₂ K₃. 61 antarāyaprāyvatā] Kṛd L₁; anurāyaprāyatvāt Kṛd P₆. L₁ seems to read samnidhāyadarantarāyaprāya; praghāyatvāt V₇. 62 darsanādyā Kṛd; darsanātyā "L₃. 62 drṣṭo] Kṛd; drṣṭe L 63 santoṣābhīmanāt] Kṛd K₁₄ P₅ L₃; santoṣābhīyapagāmāt B₁; santoṣābhīmāna J₁ 64 sundarāmyanena darsanāvاصिमित्यā Kṛd; sundarāavyanenādārsanāvاصिमित्यā sāhāḍā Kṛd²; sundarāityanena darsanāvاصिमित्यādā B₁; sundarāmyanena darsanāvاصिमित्यā sāhāḍā K₂; sundarāvyanena darsanāvاصिमित्यādā L₃; darsavāso L₂ ac; darsanāvāso L₃² ac. 64 vāsonmiśāt] Kṛd P₆; vāsonmiśādā "K₁₄ K₄; vāsonmiśātā J₁; vāsonmiśādāhāla "L₂ ac; vāsonmiśādāhāla "L₃² ac. 64 anyāsamveda] Kṛd P₆; anyāsamveda Kṛd². anyāsamyagveda B₁ G K₂ K₁₄ K₁ J₁ L₃ P₆ (alternate reading) 65 samkramāt] Kṛd B₁ ac K₄ P₅ ac; samkramām attam B₁ P₆; samkramāt L₃ P₆ ac; L₃ seems to read "mālabhāmanāt. 65 priyate] Kṛd G ac K₁₄ K₁ P₆; pratiyate G ac J₁.

60 Ms V₇ ends here abruptly 60 Note the reading kāntapratisnitasundaram in B₁ P₆ V₇ V₈. The reading sundaram instead of "sundaram is the case of Kashmiri pronunciation 60 G.L writes 7ab along with 6 61 P₆ ac is mention only 'gurusamniśādāranyāyaprāyvatāt darpanapratisnatischāna kāntadarśanām iccañti as part of the commentary on verse 3.6. V₁ mg mention only gurusamniśādāranyāyaprāyvatāt darpanapratisnatischāna kāntadarśanām iccañti as part of the commentary on verse 3.6. 62 sākṣāt darsanādyāprāyptāvi is missing from V₄ mg. 62 api is missing from B₁ G K₂ K₁ L₃ L₅ V₇ mg. 63 In K₁ folio 75r begins in a different hand. It seems that the earlier scribe stopped writing the text till drṣṭo mañāy kānta at the end of folio 75r and then there is a long line and text continues from 75r. 64 K₁₄ ac has a double daṇḍa after iti and K₁₄ P₆ has removed the double daṇḍa after iti. 65 B₁ writes sparśapratisamkrama. 65 The last two syllables nā in alabhāmanā are added by the scribe later. It seems that it is just a slip of eye what he has corrected later. 65 The tr in trpyati is corrected in K₁₄ mg, but the original reading is not visible. 65 The L₁₄ mg writes pratiyate but is not very clearly read. L₁₄ P₆ clearly writes priyate.

60 B₁ 50v 61 K₂ 99v 63 K₄ 75r 63 L 100r 63 G 3r
ननु यशव्रूपं प्रतिविम्बितं ततद्विभिषितस्वभवः स्यशोपि कि न प्रतिविम्बितं इ- न्याशाखाः

न हि स्यशोपि विमलो रूपमेव तथा यतः ।
नैर्मल्यं चातिनिविरदजातीयेकस्मतः ॥ ३-७ ॥

अस्येति दर्शणस्य । सत्येति विमलम् । स्वच्छमेव हि अस्वच्छस्य दर्शणेति इव मुखस्य

66 kim na | K\text{ED}; na kim B₁ D G K₂ K₄ J₃ Lk₂ Lk₃ L P₅  67 ityāśānkyaḥ  
| K\text{ED} K₁₄ K₄ P₅; iyāha J₃  69 tathā yataḥ | K\text{ED} K₄ K₄; yathā tataḥ  
K₂ K₁₄ K₁ Lk₂ L P₅ (alternate reading)  69 naimalyam | K\text{ED}; vaimalyam J₁ J₂ P₆ T V₄ V₆  
69 sajātīyaśaṅgatīḥ | K\text{ED} P₆; sajātīyaśāṅgatīḥ akaluṣ̖| K_{1₄}^{mg}  70 asvacchasya  
darpaṇaḥ iva | K\text{ED} K₄; asvacchasya mukham darpaṇasya pratīti K\text{ED}^{kha}; darpaṇaseva  
mukham darpaṇasya K\text{ED}^{gkh}  70 iva | K\text{ED} K₁₄ K₄ P₅ (alternate reading); eva J₃

66 In K₄ it looks that the same scribe first wrote yadevam but them immediately corrected it into yadgatra by using the cancel stroke marks on e and va  66 K₁₄^{ac} has a double danda after svabhāvah and K₁₄^{ac} has removed the double danda after svabhāvah. The word svabhāvah is missing from K₄ P₅ (alternate reading). bhāvah is not visible in B₁.
68 In P₆ V₄ asya is glossed by darpanasya on the top.  68 In G here it only says na hi iti but on the left margin the complete verse is written which does not read very clearly 69 K₁₄ K₁ J₃ P₅ read 3.7ab along with 3.6. In P₆ V₄ tathā is glossed by vimalam on the top.
69 Here K₁₄ P₅ Lk₃ J₃ abbreviates this verse simply as na hi iti because it writes 3.7ab with 3.6. Lk₂ writes only nāḥiḥ but the 3.7ab is written on the top margin of the folio.  70 K₂ K₁₄ L writes vimalam rūpaṃ  70 svaccha is glossed by rūpa on the top in Lk₂.

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प्रतिविम्ब स्वीकरतीति भावः। नैमिन्त्य नाम चैतलिकःभूयत इत्याह नैमिन्त्य चेति । अतिशयन निविडः। विजातितमेवेकृतंसूक्तिः ये सजाति; यथा दुर्प्प्रसारणः। तेनाः एक विजा-तीयाभावादसहाया वा सजाति: नैरन्तर्याणवथानात्मकमात्मिदिपरिहारेण श्रेष्ठतां सहातः

71 Cf. IPV, vol.1, p.158. nirmanam ca asa vijñātīparāpāh sajātīyabhaṅgīca akalūṣṭam nirvādaśaṅkham yādā bhavati, tada pratibimbaṅgo bub, vipāvajaraṇa-vāraṇaśu vijñātīparāpāh kalūṣṭam tasmin r̥pe na bhavati, iti uṣadvacitraṅkābyām manāyanaḥ | 71 Also, Cf. IPV, vol.1, p.158. na svacchātmaḥ nāma pārībhāṣakam kINCana, yadeva ca anapratibimbraṅgahanasamārtalam tadeva svacchāḥ; buddhi-tattvam ca punsamārtamāṃ samārtamāṃ, tadapi kINC na svacchātmiti

71 mukhasya | KED; mukhadaranasya K14 ms; darpanasya K14; mukham darpanasya P5 (alternate reading) 71 svikaroti | KED K14 K1 P5; karoti J3 71 ceti | KED; cetāyati B1 K1 74 atisaṇyena | KED K1 P6 ms; atisaṇyena K14 72 nividāḥ | KED; nividā P6 ms V4 ms. 72 vijñātya[ ] KED K14 PC Lk2 PC; sajātīyā D K1 ac G; sajātīya K14 ac K1 Lk2 ac P5 (alternate reading) 72 the reading is not legible in P5; vijñātyā K2 pc P6 ms V4 ms. 72 bhāvār KED; ‘abhāvār K14; ‘bhāvād P6 ms V4 ms; bhāvānākalūṣitā K2. 72 sajātīyāḥ KED; sajātīyā G1 72 rūpaparamānavaḥ | KED K1 P6 ms; rūpasaparapara KED la KED gbh; P5 writes rūpapratiśālāvas, but the reading is not very clear. 73 śaṅkṣāntvatāma | KED K14 P5; śaṅkṣānantatāma V1 ms

71 L writes asvaccasasya darpanasya ṭva mukham darpanasya pratibimbaḥ. K2 99v writes darpana ṭva mukha darpanasya pratibimbaḥ on the left margin. 71 Lk3 seems to read sukhasya. 71 The right margin in Lk3 writes darpana ṭva mukha darpanasya pratibimbaḥ. 71 In B3 ca in citat is missing. 71 After nairmalyam J1 writes cāti nividāḥ sajātīyabhāṅgīca akalūṣṭaḥ. P5 writes 3.7cd here. P3 (alternate reading) has nairmalyam cetāyati 71 Lk3 writes nairmalyam cāti navidāḥ sajātīyabhāṅgī ca akalūṣṭaḥ ye sajātīyāḥ darpana ṭva mukham darpanasya pratibimbaḥ +++++ sajātīyabhāṅgī ca akalūṣṭaḥ. In Lk2 the cd of the verse is included here. G5 ms writes nairmalyam cāti nividāḥ and the G ms writes nairmalyam cetāyati; the G ms writes nairmalyam cāti navidāḥ sajātīyabhāṅgī ca akalūṣṭaḥ ye sajātīyāḥ. 72 The right margin in Lk2 writes sajātīyabhāṅgīca akalūṣṭaḥ. 72 L writes vijñātyābhāṅgīca akalūṣṭaḥ. 72 V4 ms writes atisaṇyena nividā śaṅkṣāntatā | followed by nairmalyam nāma kimuccate ityāha vaśāyam cāti |. Other parts of the commentary are missing from V4 ms. 72 The visarga in paramānavaḥ is missing from Lk1. 72 ekā missing from B3 K1 P5 72 Here on the left margin it writes in G: sthāpayum visāmānnavatam kośaḥ // uccāṣṭhāya ... 73 B3 D K14 K1 Lk2 P6 ms V4 ms writes vijñātyābhāṅgīcī nissahāya but B1 K14 seems to be reading it with a single s; J1 writes vijñātyābhāṅgīcī ... nissahāya yā; P5 writes nissahāya. Lk3 on top of the folio writes teśām vijñātyā bhāva and nimmottavāparāhāravāhāṅāḥ but it is not clear where there sentences belong. G has nissahāya and J1 has bhāvanī nissahāya 73 In Lk2 a note on right margin writes nimmottavā parāhāravāhāṅāḥ. The same note is read in K2 on the left margin. 73 In G on the top of śaṅkṣa the mark * refers to the right margin where it writes niruttikṣṇatādi

166
स्वस्थमभेदन्दिग्राहित्य तर्नक्षमतात्य या।
अत्यत्तरकराधार सळेन्त्रत तदरूपदित्तम || 3-8 ||
अत्यंतः प्रतिविभम्बेडः पाविन मान्यरै तथ्यविभक्तसौ निर्मोर्त्तितत्वं: स्वपकार्यो व्रक्त्य द्विपूर्णात: स्वातंत्रयकालवल्लभ्य वद्विद्यात्यस्य प्रतिविभम्बकर्यात्यस्य पर्वताविद्येऽस्त्रीनः गर्भीत्तक्तृचर्यताविद्येऽस्त्रीनः। न हि द्विपूर्णादायुगमेतेदपि वाष्पे देशो प्रतिविभम्ब भवतीति

भाषा:। तत्र या क्षमा यो कुञ्जविद्वेश्येति प्रतिविभम्बायुगसहिष्णुता, तदेव नरेन्द्रयम्। न चैतत्वोपदेशायुगम्यभिमुल्लिकत्याः गुरुदितिमिति गुरुणा परस्मगुरुणा श्रीमद्धुपलदेवेन 

अथर्थस्य व्याहृते .........................। १० ॥ २.८ ॥

इवायदि। तथा

न च युध जागद्येव .........................। १० ॥ २.४.९ ॥

82 atyakata | J₁K₁mgP₀mgV₄mgpc; atyakata KₓED Kₓ₁₄Kₓ₃Pₓ; atyakata V₄mgac
83 pratimibble/pe | KₓED Kₓ₁₄Kₓ₃Pₓmg; pratimibblebepe KₓEDgha B₁; atyaktvaprab-
84 harkasya KₓEDgṛ; pratimbibotepi G₁₂; 82 avikalpasyativa | KₓED Kₓ₁₄Kₓ₁₄Kₓ₁₃Pₓ₁₃Pₓ₆mg; 
vikalpasyativa J₁; avikalpasyativa B₁V₄mg; 83 'desasaya KₓED; 'desarapasya Kₓ₁₄mg
85 'arpakasya | KₓED; 'átmakasya J₁ | 84 parvatāde | KₓED Kₓ₁₄Kₓ₁₃Kₓ₁₃Pₓ₁₃Pₓ₆mg; 
sarvatāde Lk₁; parvatāde J₁ | 84 'anyartha | KₓED Kₓ₁₄Lk₁Pₓ₆mg; 'anyartha Kₓ₁₃Lk₁ac; 
anyartha J₁V₄mg; anyartha Kₓ₁₃Pₓ₆mg. 84 prakatakaranam | KₓED Kₓ₁₄Kₓ₁₃Kₓ₁₃Pₓ₁₃Pₓ₆mg; 
prakatakaranam J₁ | 84 darpana] KₓED; darpa 'K₁mg 
85 anumātre/pi | KₓED Kₓ₁₄mgpc; anumātra anumātre/pi Kₓ₁₄mgac 84 bāhaye deśe | KₓED; bāhyadeśe 
B₁J₁K₁mgKₓ₁₄Kₓ₁₃Pₓ₁₃Pₓ₆mgV₄mg 85 tatra | KₓED; taca B₁ 85 vailakṣaṇa|a KₓED Kₓ₁₄Kₓ₁₃Pₓ₁₃Pₓ₆mg; 
'grahasahāsinutā Kₓ₁₃; 'grahanāmāhistutā J₁ 86 'svapajña] KₓED; 'svapajña Lk₁; 
caitātspapākāsamāvāmābhurukta... V₄mg 86 'śrīmad'KₓED; 'śrīsad 'Lk₁

82 Serra proposed to emend the reading to atyakath since it goes with svaparakāśa
83 B₁j writes bhāvantare instead of bhāvāntare. 82 K₁ has an annotation on the right margin pūrṇaṣa which should refer to tasā. 83 bhinnas is missing from Lk₁. 83 In K₁ the new scribe changes the folio numbers here. He begins the new folio from number 50. I have retained the same folio numbers as marked on the Ms. 84 J₁j writes garbhikātyāṇārthā. 85 In P₆mg the scribe has written bhavati first and then eliminated it with a few strokes and retained the sandhi of bhavati. J₁j writes bhavatyārthā. 86 svapajña in Lk₁ is glossed by prathamajñānam on top. 86 paramagurūna is missing from P₆mg V₄mg. Instead it adds nirūpita iti after śrīmadutpaladvena. P₆mg ends here and does not quote the two verse from the ÍVP. V₄mg writes śrīmadutpaladvena nirūpita V₄mg. 87 KₓED mentions that the bcl of this verse from ÍPK (1.2.8) are interpolated in KₓEDgha and KₓEDgha. 88 athārthasya ..muktiṣṭyārthāḥ is missing from V₄mg. 89 KₓED mentions that the bcl of this verse from ÍPK (2.4.19) are interpolated in KₓEDgha and KₓEDgha.
इत्यादि श्रीप्रत्येककाशाकारिकाद्वितीयकायामेतशिनिनिगतमेव प्रतिविम्बसत्तचुदंतिनिविवक्षणः

॥ ८ ॥

tदेतारस्रेणिन्य मुख्यमिथ्यस्तत्त्व हिमङ्कारमितिः दृश्यितुपुराणः

नैर्मल्यं मुख्यमेकस्त्र संविशेषायस्त सर्वतः : || ९ ॥

ंशाशिकातः काव्यन्यद्रेष्टर्याततदिच्छया || ३३ ||

मुख्यमिति सर्विष्ठेयं रूपाधारोऽन्नमिति विशेषतः प्रतिविम्बग्रहणशस्त्रिनिवाचः। अत उक्त सर्वत्रा इति। संविशेषस्तत्त्वं हि विशेषं संचारते, अत एव्यः सर्वत्रः स्वच्छताम। तथा कार्यदेशीयाः नैर्मल्यमयं अन्यदेशु मुख्यमयं। तद्वुष्कर्णः शाशिकातोऽपूर्वविशेषार्थणेत्मभवन्त।


91 uktaṁ is omitted in J̐3.
92 etad is missing from P̐6 m̐g V̐4 m̐g.
93 dviprakeyam iti is not very clear in P̐6.
94 L writes kvaipunya iti.. L does not complete the verse.
94 In Ms K̐3 the i in anāmsaśīkataḥ is replaced with (K̐3 image 15) on the margin. In L̐K̐2 tadicchāya is missing but is added later in the commentary. vimalam tad tad tadicchāya is missing from G but is added later on the left margin.
95 in V̐4 m̐g is missing from J̐3 P̐6 m̐g V̐4 m̐g.
95 In P̐6 m̐g there is pu in-between in rupā and dyā.
95 L̐K̐2 ac writes sahiṣṭutaḥ.
95 grahaṇa is missing from P̐6 m̐g V̐4 m̐g.
96 hi is missing from B̐J̐1 L̐K̐2 ac L̐K̐3 ac K̐4, L̐K̐2 ac and L̐K̐3 ac adds hi.
96 P̐6 m̐g writes samvīruttanāma instead of samvīruttanāma.
96 In L̐K̐3 asyaḥ is glossed by samvīruttanāma on the top.
97 In L̐K̐2 the right margin writes: anupūrveva itīti-vacanam एव and the left margin writes anāsāravamalambya.
97 In G anāsārāmā is changed into anāsaṃ. B̐J̐4 writes only one anāsaṃ.
97 K̐E̐P̐ mentions an alternate reading laksananiṃśanāṃśanāmavamalambya but does not mention the source. In L̐K̐1 the reading dādilaksananiṃśanāṃśanāmavamalambya is not very clear. A note on the right margin in L̐K̐3 says anupūrveva dhi devecaṇam.
97 In P̐6 m̐g the commentary stops here.

94 J̐1 r? 95 L 101r
देव किविश्रिम्भमन्यथा सर्व तरुण सर्व भावार्थिन दर्पणेषु प्रस्तुविय गुढीयात। एवं च
मुख्यदर्श में भेदो न यस्तात। तत्रेन्द्रे च तत्रभावत्यमेव निमित्तमिनीथाय विशं तत्तद्वियः
वेति। तदिति रूपादि। अत एव स्पष्टादि। तत्रात्वविचारमिनीथायः। तेन तत्तक्षितेन तथा
प्रस्तुतिति भावः। ॥ ॥

अत आह
भावानं चतुर्लीलाति वर्मुद्यातमकं हि तत्।
tेतामेराविसं सहिक्रियां त्वप्रतिघातकम्। ॥ ॥

98 kvacid | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$; kaṃcid Lk₂ 98 nirmalam | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ B₁; $\text{P}^\prime$; nirmāyam B₁ $\text{sr}^\prime$ 98 bhāyāt
$\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ P₅; bhayādi J₃ 98 darpanē'pi | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ P₅; tarpanē'pi J₃ 99 mukhyādasya
$\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₂; mukhādāsya K₂ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$ P₅ 103 māyaṁtamaṃ | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ K₂ P₅ P₆; māyat-
mikam J₃ T 104 sadvidyā $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ K₄ P₅ P₆; madvidyā J₃; maivāstā Lk₃; yad-
vidyā T 104 "pratīghātakaṃ | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁; pratīghātakaṃ P₆; tva pratīghātakaṃ J₁; 105 pratīghātī | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ P₅ P₆ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$; pratīghātī B₁ $\text{sr}^\prime$ J₁; pratiśāti B₁ $\text{sr}^\prime$ 105 taddhī | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$
; tadhi P₆ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$; tad iti V₄ $\text{mg}$. 105 māya | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ P₅ P₆ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$; mayā Lk₂ (?)}; māyo
J₁ 106 svarūpapopana | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$; svarūpaṇopana $\text{P}^\prime$ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$ V₄ $\text{mg}$ 106 pārameśvarī | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$
; pāramēśvarī J₂; pārameśvari J₂; pārāmeśvari $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$ 106 "saktīḥ | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$; sāktā D 106 prādhānyād
$\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$; prādhānyād Lk₃ 106 vedyātāyāh | $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ P₅; vedyatāyāh J₃ 106 sthāulyāt J
$\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$ K₁ P₅; sthāulyā J₃

98 The त्वा in kvacid eva is added on the left margin in B₁. 98 The text from taddhi kvacid eva
...... prasṛtī bhāub | is missing from V₄ $\text{mg}$. 99 ca is missing from $\text{B}₁$ K₃ P₅ 99 ca is
missing from $\text{B}₁$ 100 L writes the main text here. 103 bhāvānām $\text{K}_{\text{ED}}$; bhāvānām K₁
105 V₄ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$ writes pravāśa instead of pravēśa. 105 In Lk₂ the ta in tad does not read like ta.
106 Instead of yeyam $\text{D}$ writes eyeyam. 106 J₂ writes māyātmakaṁ hāti māyāvrūpaḥpāṇīhā-
naśaktisvabhāvākārīvādyeyam 106 P₆ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$ skips the commentary on 3.10 after this, but only
retains the sentence sadāyāmayām jāhānaśaktisvabhāvām. 106 The text from ata eṣa bhed-
haprādhamāya to bhāvānām vacāḥ is missing from V₄ $\text{ms}^{\text{mg}}$. 109 Lk₂ v₄ 100 Lk₂? 103 P₆ $\text{sr}^\prime$ 104 G v₅ 104 B₁ $\text{sr}^\prime$ 10r

170
तद्विच्छिन्नत्वसंन्यासः। बिषमः कठोरः न्यूनतः विवेकः निःस्वाभावः।

अत् एव तद्वेषाय ततः प्रतिभाविष्यति तत्र प्रतिभावं निःस्वसंन्यासं।
तेन पुरं प्रतिभावं निःस्वसंन्यासं तु तद्विच्छिन्नत्वाय निःस्वाभावः।

णावभावते तत्पर्यं || 10 ||

तदेवमभूयाकारसंबन्धस्य प्रकाशयन् ।
विभागतः वर्षोऽप्रितिभिम्बं विषयं ॥ ३-६ ||

उभयाकारमिति प्रतीचात्यत्र प्रत्यत्यतात्यत्वमभूयाकारसमायोऽभ्यासमेवत॥
न तु तालितकमितुयुजः

भवासं प्रकाशयनिति ।
उष्णः

तस्मादेको भवासं: स्वात्म्योपपदितस्थिति ।

107 grahanāsāmarthyaṃ | K<sub>ED</sub> प⁵; grahanasamrthyaṃ B₂; grahanasamrthym K₄; grahanamasantarthyam J₁. 108 apratīghati | K<sub>ED</sub> B₁<sup>P</sup>; apratīsati B₁<sup>ac</sup>.
107 tattasadvidyāmayam | K<sub>ED</sub> L<sub>k</sub>⁵<sup>ac</sup>; tattva L<sub>k</sub>⁵<sup>ac</sup>; tatttadsāvidyāmayam K₄<sup>ac</sup>; tatttadsāvidyāmayam K₄<sup>ac</sup>
108 tena K<sub>ED</sub>; tena tat G<sup>ac</sup>; tena pūrvaṃ tat G<sup>ac</sup> 108 pūrvam pratibimbātmakam | K<sub>ED</sub>; pūrvapratiibimbātmakam K₂ 110 "bimba-pratibimbād"] K<sub>ED</sub>; pratibimbabādb B₁ 113 'drśākhile | K<sub>ED</sub> K₄ P₃; 'ta-
108 pūrvam pratibimbātmakam | K<sub>ED</sub>; pūrvapratiibimbātmakam K₂ 110 "bimba-pratibimbād"] K<sub>ED</sub>; pratibimbabādb B₁ 113 'drśākhile G<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup> K<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup> K₃ J₁ J₂ J₃ P₆ V₄ V₆ 114 ubhayākāram | K<sub>ED</sub> K₄; ubha-
yakāram J₃ 114 "mātrasārameva etat| K<sub>ED</sub> K₄; "mātrasāramatattātvikam K<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup>
116 mahādevaḥ | K<sub>ED</sub> K₄<sup>ka</sup> K₄ L<sub>k</sub>²<sup>ac</sup> P₃; māhiśānaḥ K<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup> (this might be the case of
Kashmirian pronunciation); māhiśānaḥ K₄<sup>ac</sup> G J₂ J₃ L<sub>k</sub>²<sup>ac</sup> P₆<sup>ms</sup> L.
vāṃ śrāddhāṁ pratiṣṭhātāṁ sarvāhāraṁ sarvāhāraṁ
delitum ad deśam phāyate

108 bhājanaśāktaṁ bhāṣāśāktaṁ bhājanaṁ bhājanaṁ
delitum ad deśam phāyate

109 prāṇāhāraṁ prāṇāhāraṁ prāṇāhāraṁ
delitum ad deśam phāyate

110 kṣīṇaṁ kṣīṇaṁ kṣīṇaṁ
delitum ad deśam phāyate

111 kṣīṇaṁ kṣīṇaṁ kṣīṇaṁ
delitum ad deśam phāyate
देवधान्य यतोजनस्तदिक्ष्यातरात्मनः।
तेनेत तेजसा इतवे कौश्चः स्वादर्पणेन तु ॥ ३-१३ ॥

उद्यासितव्र्यूः प्रमादुदर्शाहः प्रस्तुतं यश्चायं तेजः; तेनेत विपर्यस्ते तेजसा स्वाधिशा-
यकस्यातमनो यदि स्मुख्यात्मतं जायेत तद्धन्येन पुनः कौश्चः। पुरः प्रतिफलवेदनावताय न कुज्यातदाय देशत् चेत स्वच्छः-

125 vrttikāra may be referring to Jayantabhaṭṭa. bhūsanakāra is the author of the Nīyāb-
hūṣana Bhāsarvajña. 127 The expression viśesanadvāreṇa hetuḥ is used by Jayarātha in
other parts of the Tāv. Cf. 1.59, 3.12, 29, 40, 4.232, 6.214, 9.264, 10.129, 11.13, 13.69, 247,
257, 249, 30.28

125 pravṛttair [ KṣṭD ]; pravṛttier L. 127 esām [ KṣṭD ]; teśām B1 K2 pC 131 jñātve [ KṣṭD D K1 K4 pC p6 ]; jñātve K4 ac 131 darpanena [ KṣṭD ]; dahanena J1 133 jāyeta [ KṣṭD ];
jāyate B1 K2 G L 133 taddarpanena punah ko'rthaḥ [ KṣṭD D]; taddarpano ko'rthah
pratiphalo KṣṭD ku K4; taddarpano ko'rthah punah K2 134 kudyādinām [ KṣṭD B1 pC ];
kudiyādinām B1 ac 134 pratiphalana [ KṣṭD Lk2 pC ]; pratiphalo Lk2 ac

125 In K2 naiyāyikāḥ is written below kaśicād and in the Lk2 naiyāyikāḥ is written on the
right margin. 125 bhūsanakāra is glossed on the top in G by bhūṣya 127 hi is missing from G
eva missing from B1 K2 pC L. 131 T has only one da in sādārpanena.
131 ko'rthah śāyād is not visible in Lk2 because of a blot on the Ms. 132 In P6 pC the
only commentary on 3.13 is bhāntir evaśād darpano pratibimbashya iti naiyāyikatam [ |]
132 sād pramāṇo is not visible in Lk2 133 prāraḥ is missing from B1 K2 K4; prāraḥ is also
missing from D, but I can see a n between ko'rtha and pratiphalo which I am not sure about.
134 itrā is missing from B1 K4. 134 The left margin in Lk2 says: pratiphalana pratigādah
134 In K4 scribe's eye has skipped iti cet svauchandādhibhāvanam etat yatāḥ samāne’i prātiprā-
tihetutāva darpānādaya eva tathā na kudyādaya. Evidently he is getting confused with iti cet and
iti atr. In B1 also there is an eye-skip. The text between the two words kudyādaya is
missing. 134 cet is missing from K2 Lk2 L

126 Lk2 5v 127 L 102r; L 102r 131 J1 83 131 K4 52v 131 P6 2r 131 G v6
भिषणमेतस्त यतः समानेन्द्र प्रतिधात्तेतुनिष्ठ दर्पणादुष्य एव तथा न कृद्यादुष्य इत्यत्र न किंविष्णूमग्नेयस्यां। अथात्स्थितः स्वच्छलिवन्याये, धर्मोऽसित, निमित्तमिति चेतत। नैतत। स्व-च्छलव हि न प्रतियादेन निमित्तम। पर्त्व हालोकस्य स्वच्छलिव तस्मिन्नति नभिस न कृद्यादुष्य-वकाशः स्वात्त प्रतुनुत तवानन्दनय्याहै मन्नितमिति विरुद्वतमेव हेतौरावहै। तेन प्रति। चाहे मूर्तितलाथेव निमित्तम, तवोभयार्थपापमस्य समानम्। यद्य दर्पणेन प्रतिफलनस्य वृत्ताददियमनी दर्पण विनापि रवमुक्तमितव्यावह तेन कं प्रयोजनम् ॥ १३ ॥

एवदिक प्रतिफलनकलानालयवरुणा यधि नायनान्नस्य: रवमेव वक्र गृहितै तश्चित एव देशे तन्याय्या नानाय दर्पणादूर-नरसिर्यायाय।

पिनितेतरुत तेनोभिधात्ताक्तमव्यमायार्यतः।

रूपं दस्येतेव वदने निजे न मजुरान्तरे॥ २-१४ ॥

रूपमिति रवदनससर्वभिः। वदने निज इति रवदनदेशे एवेत्यस्य। स्वदेशारिधात्ममेव

135 iti cet svacchātā] "अम; iti cet svacchādā "Kṣaṇa D Lk, iti sva-

cchanda K, svacchanda" L 135 pratighāta] "Kṣaṇa; pratighāta L 136 athārādhikāh

[ "Kṣaṇa; athārādhikāh Lk 137 pratighāta] "Kṣaṇa B, pratiśāte B, 138 nabhās

na kasyāpi avakāśāh Kṣaṇa; nabhāsa kasyāpi anavakāśāh Kṣaṇa dha D 139 pratighāte

[ "Kṣaṇa B, pratiśāte B, 139 mūrtavāvyeva] "Kṣaṇa D; mūrtvāvyeva Kṣaṇa dha D 139 prati-

phalanasya] "Kṣaṇa K, prati phalanasya K, prati phalanasya K 141 nājanā

rāmaṇaya] "Kṣaṇa; nājanaraṇāmaṇaya B, 141 tannāja] "Kṣaṇa B, tannāja


136 atha missing from K,.

136 Lk, writes dharmanimitta on the left margin

136 B, writes svacchākhyādharma. 137 In K, above the pratighāte nimittam is written dharmo nimittām. 138 Right margin in K, writes prati ghātanimittattvād ityarthāh. 138 tat is glossed by svacchātan on the top in K, Lk, 139 taccobhayatāpi is glossed by ādirāktya-

rathāyogah on the left margin in Lk, 139 In K, on top is written ādirāktya kūthoh. 140 svā in svamukhā is not visible in D. 141 "ārta[ Kṣaṇa G, "ārta G 142 nāyastra darpāhāde is not clearly visible in D. 144 Instead of rūpam dṛṣyeta vadane T writes dṛṣṭarūpāṇa dṛṣyeta. 144 nije na ma is not clearly visible in D. 144 Kṣaṇa mentions that Kṣaṇa also contains the alternate reading vadane na punarmukhātare. 145 vadane in vadane nije iti is missing from B, K.
हि ग्राह्य हालको गृहात्मीति भावः। न हि नीलदेशं परिहर्ष्य नीलदातान्य नीलं परिच्छन्दकमिति
हृदयं। ग्राह्यकल्पतत्वं ग्राह्यते संबंधं सैंकड़त्वं चैतज्ज्वेयं। आत्माधिशिंितात्मानेव हृद्यं ग्राह्यत्
व्यक्तः।

किंच बहि-निगुणाः सुतानं नवनतेजसात्मानाधिशाना किमन्तरिणं सदिकिरणा व। आदैं प-
क्षेत्रसाधीस्य भूमिकायन्तं न स्थानं। तेन विनः वहितुक्तिलक्षणाय भेस्यस्यक्षासात्, एवं च
तत्स्य भोगायतं शरीरम् इति स्वमन्तरात्मोभन्ते। ॥ १४ ॥

सदिकिरणां व विवेकदेवम् प्रतिपत्ति: स्याय्व तन्यथेत्याह

स्वमुक्तेदिवैचौत्तुष्य भायान्ममेत्यत्वं।

न त्वस्य स्युधर्मचिम्ब्रस्य वेयचकान्तस्वभिप्रण: ॥ ३-१५ ॥

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151 Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.9 - tatrātmā sarvasya draṣṭā sarvasya bhoktā sarvañjñāu sarvasnubhavī |
tasā bhogāyatam sarirāṃ | bhogāvadhanāṇīndriyāṁ |

146 grāhyam grāhako | KED ए | grāhyagrāhako K2
d parihrtya | KED D K4 | parityajña KED ṅa
g rāhakātmata | KED | grāhakātmakata | L
g sambaddheva | KED | kṣaṇam | D Lk2 ṅc
g nayana | KED K2 ṅc | na nayana | K2 ṅc
g tāmādhiṣṭhānam | KED K4 | tāmādhiṣṭhānam | KED ṅa

150 bhogāyatata | KED | bhogāyana | K2
g sāsārādhiṣṭhāne | ca | KED ṅa K4 | sāsārānādhiṣṭhāne
na d K2 | G L | sāsārādhiṣṭhāne ca K2 L2 | bimbāvade" | KED | bimbāde L
gyāna K2 | nyasyāt Lk2 | bhāyān | KED | bhāvan L

146 hi is missing from B1 K4 P6 ṅṛga. 146 The commentary in P6 ṅṛga writes svaśāntāshhitam
ev a grāhyam | kṣa | (with an elimination sign on the top)grāha <grahā | (gṛha) kātmatvam | iti grā-
hātsambaddham eva ca | K2 | K3 | K4 | K5 | grāhakātmakata | vṛttvāhārāh rū-

150 Lk2 v6 | 152 B1 5iv | 153 K4 52r | 156 G v7
यदीं निनमुखविधिकरणेनात्मने रूपसचारेत तत्त ममेदं रूपमित्यहन्तासथंदृष्टु पार्यत: स्यातू। न पुनर्विकालनोद्वेदं रूपमितीयहन्तासथंदृष्टु। अतः हस्यस्यानो वालादीनामयित्वेनेकरसा प्रतिपतं। व्युपस्तु मन्युमवेवेद्वम्म प्रतिविबिधित्वाभिमान्यं नाम। को दोषः। विवाहपुनस्तत्र प्रतिविबिधु ने भेदन प्रतिविद्यार्टमेव तत्वेन प्रतिव्याप्तयो रूपमित्यहन्तासथंदृष्टु।

किंच स्वस्यं प्रयात्मने रूपभानं स्यातू तत्पशूाणिध्य भायतु। रूपसनिवेशो हि कार्यं गृहस्यन्वयनवचारविद्वानः त्वयात्मस्य। न पुनस्तद्विद्विधिकरणेन रितवभावार्दृष्टु वस्थिनुस्नैं रूपमित्यहन्तास्य रूपितर। न हस्यस्यानोऽविकालनो मुकुरयस्त्र करित्यन्तमुस्तथम्य। तद्यावासे यथा तद्वस्य सनिवेशस्यावर्त्य भानं तथा तद्वस्यभाषारिणं: स्वस्थिनौ रूप यदिः स्वस्यनेव स्वकर्मे रूपमित्यहन्तास्य।

157 yadayam | KEK K1; yadayam KEK kh D 157 िभासेः | KEK; िभासेः G
158 paryaptam | KEK k2 K4; paryastā B, KEK D 158 prātipattih | KEK, prātiḥ L 158 िभामोके KEK; िभामोके D; 159 िभामोके B; 159 िभामोके B L 159 ekaivakarasā | KEK D K2 ac; ekaivakarasā KEK kha B, K2 K4 L 159 vyuaptannām tu | conj. Sierra; vyuaptannām uke | KEK D; manukhamevedmatrā | KEK D; manukhameveda K4, 160 ityābhī KKEK; ityābhī D 160 bimbāt punar asya | KEK D; bimbād asya punah K4 160 prātipimbātve bhedena | KEK; prātipimbātve bhedena KEK kha D; prātipimbātbevedena B1, K1 161 िस्यवस्या | KEK D K1 F; िस्यवस्या K4 ac 161 asakatvät | KEK, asakat B1 162 rūpabhānam | KEK D; bhānarūpaṃ KEK kha; rūpaṃ bhānaṃ K2; rūpatā na K4 L; bhānaṃ rūpam G Lk2 162 sparśo pi | KEK, sparśe pi K2 162 bhāyat | KEK, bhāvat L 162 rūpasamniṣteṣu | KEK; rūpasamniṣteṣu L 165 mukurasya KEK; makurasya D G L 165 upālabdham | KEK; upālabdham L. 165 tadrūpavabhāse | KEK Lk2 ac; tasmāt rūpavabhāse Lk2 F 165 avasyaṃ bhānaṃ | KEK; avasyaṃ bhānaṃ B1; avasyaṃ bhāvaḥ G 166 grhyeta | KEK; grhyate G

157 G ac writes: ta svaparyaptā prātipattiḥ sjāt and G F writes: tan nāmedam rūpam ityāntāśpadatvam svaparyaptā prātipattiḥ sjāt. dam in nāmedam is missing from B1.
158 KEK kha L also follows punarbhodhyakharmāntamaṇo saysa 158 G ac idantāśpadatvam ayupannāstu svamukhamevedamatrā prātipimbabotamītyāhīnamatāṃ and G F writes idantāśpadatvam ayuṇpannānam bālāādīnām ayaṃti eka sā prātipattiḥ 160 asya glossed on left margin by svātmanāḥ in K2. 161 In B1 apahodontum is added on the left margin, but the original reading is not clear. 163 na is missing from K2. 166 mukhasvākṣara D ac 166 sva in svākṣara is not legible in Lk2

158 K2 159 L 103r 164 Lk2 v7
हणिमिति।

नन्तेवोक्ष भान्तिरियमिति यत्रमुखमेव गृह्यमाणं भान्तियामिन्यस्ते दर्पणं गृहितमिति।

यथेऽ तीति मैतास्तृ किममेवमाणस्त्य सत्यमुख्यग्रहणस्याभ्यासमेव।

भान्तियामेव परीत्वुर्ति न वस्तुतत्त्वमणि।

शुक्तिकार्यतनतिंसे हि यदि शुक्तिकार्यतात्त्वकृत रज्ञनिर्मितिः

भान्तियसंत्वे रज्ञनिर्मितिः

अन्तिनति। अन्तिनपि या कि दर्पणं एव मुखते भान्ति सत्यमुख्य परमुखते।

न तवद्वयं परीत्वुर्ति यथार्थ।

नानात्वमेव सत्यमाणं भान्ति नाना अन्तिनति।

तत्त्वादिर्भावादिर्विनियमिर्यमेव श्रवणविन्यासस्य धनादेव अनवादेव ॥

अत आह ॥ १५ ॥

Note also the use of saiva astu in the sentence bhṛntiṣamātyit cer, saiva astu kiṃ satyāmukhagrahanābhūtyapagamenā asanvadyamānena।

169 maivāstuk Ekd Bh; saivāstuk Ekd Satya[ ] Ekd; satyam L 170 parishurati[ ] Ekd; sphrati Kd 170 satyikā[ ] Ekd; śukti kāyā Kd Lk2 L; śukti kāyām G Kd1 nirbhāsena Ekd; "bhāsena Kd1 172 "vapi [ ] Ekd; "napi L 172 व किम[ ] Ekd; किम व ग G 172 L 104v 173 ना hi rajataniṁbhāsāvasare[ ] Ekd nahi tavat rajatanirbhāsāvasare Kd ka 174 evam[ ] Ekd; eva Kd 174 sarvo[ ] Ekd; sarve G 175 svamukhe bhūśana[ ] Ekd; svamukhābhūsana B1 175 prasādhana[ ] Ekd; prasādhana B1; prasādana G 176 मेवातद[ ] Ekd; metad Kd

167 pratiṭṭhitāḥ, natu ango.ayamitii।

168 G 7r 170 D 171 K2 175 Lk2 r7 175 K4 53v
रूपसंस्थानमात्र तत्पर्शाकर्षणसादिभि:।

न्याम्भूतेऽव तद्युःक्त वस्तुत् तत्प्रतिविमित्वम्॥ २-१६॥

तदुक्षोन्नत्यभावोऽर्थोऽस्य स्पर्शादिशुज्ञत्वं तद्युःक्तसंस्थानं दर्शात्। जस्तीति प्रतिविमित्वविद्यमानः। अन्यथा दस्य विश्वासविशेषेऽव स्यात्। तस्मात् तद्युःक्त प्रतिविमित्वस्तुत्सवीयो राशिरित्यावश्यः॥ १६॥

किण्नाम चेद्य स्पर्शादिनां न्याम्भूतविमित्वायः

न्याम्भौऽव अर्थात्मावतद्भावोऽप्रमाणण:।

183 Jayaratha clearly brings this argument about the tṛīṭyaṛāśiḥ from the Ṣīva. See the Ṣīva, Vol-I, p.160: nāma svacchenā dravyena pratibhātā nāyanaśrayaḥ purāṇaśīya svameca maṇīhṛīṃhantī, darpane mukhamiti tu bhūṃtāyām; nātu satyavādabhūṃtāvagatātireṇa anya rāśiḥ pratibimbabhūṃdheṣu.asti tṛīṭyaḥ | naivam | ecām hi sati nāma etamābhyāṃ sparaśavatītyapī bhūṣetā; paramahāsasahastādau ca bimbapatrotimadhyam drṣṭate | and p.169 - tasmādastī prati- bimbalakṣanastrīṭyaṛāśiḥ | tasya ca samānagṛhe svacche ca nirbhāṣanam drṣṭamiti svacchāvā svamanāgraṇṭrulaksanam kāryam prati- bimbabāsivāriṣe vastuśāṃkati śiddhām |


179 In K̄, the scribe has mistakenly put the dot over pa, but has eliminated it using yellow ink and a dot has then been put on sa correcting the mistake. 179 In V̄, V, vaṣṭu is glossed on the top by the words vaṣṭu iti na punar avastu. 180 tad in tadrāpasamsthānam is missing from B̄, K̄. 181 sparsādībhīr in sparsādībhīrnyagbhūtaireva is missing from K̄, K̄. 181 eva tad missing from D. 182 viṣeṣa is inserted later in K̄. 184 cedam is missing from J̄, P, 6, 68.

180 G 8v
स चार्चस्मुमात्मावतसोप्यादर्शंनवस्थितेः ॥ ३-१७ ॥

स इति प्रमाणाभवः। अनविधयतेर्विश्वास्यादिनाम। यदि वा नामात्र हि स्पर्शादिनामवस्थानम् स्वातः ततोऽऽहन्निदारणं संयुज्यते। तत्यवध्याशेहैर्यदैव चोत्याशेहान्ति ज्ञात्तेन तत्र प्रमाणात्य वायुदिति तदभव्यस्मायमाणस्य स्पर्शादिग्रंथाभावो भवेदिति भावः ॥ १७ ॥

किच

अत एव गुरुवादिर्मों नैतस्त्य तत्क्ष्यते ।

न द्वारां संस्थितोदसो तद्यति स उपायः ॥ ३-१८ ॥

अत इति स्पर्शादिनामनवस्थिते । यदि क्षेतस्त्य प्रतिविशिष्ठस्य रूपसंस्थानमाणस्य स्पर्शादिपि स्वातः तत्ततोम् गुरुवादिर्मिहि भायात् । तदभवेच्छ च क्ष प्रमाणमिश्वाय नवश्यादत्दः

187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195
संस्थालोकाः इति गुरुत्वादिर्घेम: प्रतिविम्बितस्य पर्वतादेः। असाविति गुरुत्वादिर्घेमं संभवे हि तयोगानं दर्पणं प्रवचालयः स्यात्। न चैवम्। इति प्रतिविम्ब्यं इति तन्त्रस्तीत्युपकः गुरुत्वादिर्घेमिः नैत्यस्य लक्ष्यते इति।

ननु रूपे तात्त्वायाधित्विचारी तर्कं विवेचते दर्पणं रूपमेव केवलं कि-मिति प्रतितं कान्तिमित्वाशाङ्गाः तत्त्वो स उपायक इति। तद्धाराविति तत्त्व रूपसंवर्णानमात्रस्य दर्पणवभासानेत्यत्रः। दर्पणं हि पूर्वकतुक्ता रूपमेव स्वच्छमस्तीति तद्वभासन एवास्य साधनवं न स्माद्यादिर्घेम स्वास्यविभेदेत्यपकः। उपायं एवोपायक इति स्वार्थं कन्॥ १८॥

ननु यथा दर्पणस्तहाद्युपायस्तथायाधित्युपायोकादयः। इत्यूपायत्वस्वेदेषप्रयोगं एव क-रमाद्याधार उच्यते इत्याशाङ्गाः।

tatpatau nayap bheden yadraati tat ucyate

196 samsthito’sau | Kṣ ṃ | samsthitoviti asāvīti D | samsthitāsāvīti asāvīti Kṛ J2

196 L writes naḥṛṣāḥ saṁsthitōsūti asāvīti gurutvādhiḥ harmah pratiśimbhaṣa parvatādhi gurutvādhiḥ saṁsaḥ bhave hi. 196 asāvīti is missing from Bṛ Bṛ Kṛ G Kṛ. 198 īti is missing from D Kṛ. 201 darpaṁ hi is not visible in D. 201 yuktā is missing from Kṛ. 202 asya is glossed by rūpasya on the top in Lkṛ and on the left margin in Kṛ. 202 ‘api is missing from Pṛ mṛ. 202 In J2 upāyakah it writes: tadābhāve cāṣya kīṁ pramāṇānimityāḥ... which is a part of the commentary of the previous verse. 202 Kṛ writes ikan instead of kan 202 iki bhūr-vā upāya evopāya iki swārtha kan / is not visible in D. 205 In Lkṛ ucyate is added on the top margin.

196 J2 V5 201 Kṛ 114r 202 Kṛ 53r 202 Bṛ 52v 204 Lkṛ 7r

180
आधारस्त्र तुपाया दीपदकस्विदः कमात् ॥ ३-१९ ॥

चत: पुन्तस्मादादशीदः प्रतिविव्य भेदेन पुष्कराया न भाति । ततो हेतुतत्ततेशु तेन-मितिवदभिभवास्यस्वेष्याधार उच्यते । अत: पुनंतप्रस्त्वत सतः प्रतिविव्य िसावालो-काद्य उपाया इति । तेम्योक्त्र बिवष: । तदाह तत्र विवति । कमादिति । दर्पणनेमोतपपत्वें-भासाद्वस्तकां समहितेपि दर्पण जातेद्विपि प्रतिविम्बे दीप्य विना कस्तववहारः । को हि वे-दान्तस्तमसे दर्पण मुखे समानात्मिति । एवमन्यस्य संकाशादोपि मुखे सत्यपालोके न तवबहारः । अन्नमयस्य तु सत्यपायेववसमायां केनापि वैगुण्येन यदीन्द्रार्थसिन्धकपभावात् तज्जानो नौत्रस्तत्त्वज्जानो नौत्रप्रिच्छन्यादित्वतज्जानो नौत्रसमुदायार्थाम् । अवभास-नामात्सारेम् हि प्रतिविव्यस्तत्किम्यतदिधिः प्राथान्योनिक्ष्टम॥ १९ ॥

ननुतातुल्फः दर्पणाधीपादीनामयविशिष्टसेव प्रतिविव्याहणासिद्धिहस्वानमसनात्मिति किमिति न तेनपि


207 J has two dots in sequence in place of nai in naśa. 207 Lk₂ ends this verse in ā-dhāra it. 207 P₆ writes here dīpam dīram dīram samvidah but had tried to put the reading dīram tatra in a square perhaps marking its deletion. 207 L writes 19d and 20abcd together. 208 Lk₂ G read āदāरस्कद्दाप्रतिबिम्बो P₆ writes tasmādādārasāle śrī pratibimbam adhāraya iti tīlaya taitam tvateti jñaptau ।। 210 G writes verses 3.19cd and 3.20abcd here. Lk₂ writes verses 19c and 20 together here 210 In G on the right margin of 9r there is a verse which writes: aupāśle saivaśaykās, tvadhvīyapaka eva ca | adhārastraṇvihā jñāyāḥ, kaṝhakāśāṭilādīṣu ।। (source unknown) 210 In Lk₂, the commentary from kramādiṭṭī begins as on the verse 20. 211 D K₂ read hi also after api. 213 tu is not very clear in Lk₂ 214 tajjñānam notpannam is read in compound as tajjñānanotpamn. 217 G v9 writes 3.20 on top of the folio

208 G v9 ; L 105v 214 K₂ 115v 214 Lk₂ 19v 217 G v9
भारतविद्या इतिहास

सत्यमस्त्रेय दीपादित्त्वादा

सत्यमस्त्रेय दीपादित्त्वादा

सत्यमस्त्रेय दीपादित्त्वादा

सत्यमस्त्रेय दीपादित्त्वादा
शिकम्। न हि यथा पृथिव्यं काठिन्यमर्ति तथापथु। यथा चात्र तथा न तेजसि। न हि ते- जसि काठिन्यं नासीतुमयेछ। कि सु तद्यथायपि स्वल्पं प्रतिविर्भयं पृथक्काशानायो- यथामिति। अन्यथा ह्यामूर्त्तात्ताकाशलुक्ता एव दीपादयपि भवेछः। संविदि फुसैत्तब- रस्वपेक्षमूर्त्तात्त्र न प्रतिविर्भयं पृथक्काशः। कि न दर्शाणदि पुरुष्यैव स्वच्छः, न प- श्यामिति तत्र मौलिन् पाशाद्गर्मिन्नित्वनाश्च च स्वच्छं पूरोभागं प्रतिविर्भं भासते। इह
tu सर्वं: स्वच्छाद्वेरङ्केन भागेन प्रतिसंकानात्मपि मुखादि न लक्ष्यते। भागान्तरेन्ततत
आत्मिकाडिना प्रतिसंकानात्ल तत्स्यानावृक्तत्वात्। यथा यथा कृत्वस्तिकीकरतादयः स-
ब्रति: स्वच्छाद्वादु तद्यविहिततस्वदोहोत्तचयायनान्त्वाणुपमत्या नायननानं रष्मीनां न प्रतिभाषकारस्तथा
दीपादयपि काठिन्याभावेच सति सर्वं: स्वच्छाद्वाद्वांगान्तरेन निर्मच्छतः प्रतिविर्भयेति
न तत्र तद्यथानोऽहमिति। मौलिन्मय तत्तत्ताेहास्त्रयाभावः। संविद्यु: सर्वान्
नैर्मयाद्वात्रकारयिना न तस्या वेदार्थगूढ्यपस्तौतिति तत्र कथं प्रतिष्ठनायस्य पृथक्काशः
। यत्पुन: प्रसरावस्ये दीपे छायापुष्पमात्रा न नमस्ते तेजसि प्रतिविर्भं लक्षयते तन्मान्त्रादि-
माहात्म्यातः। चक्षुषयिः वा पद्मतिविमं दर्शयते तत् तेजसे चक्षुरिन्द्र्येये तस्य नित्यपरोक्ष-त्वातः। किं त्यत्ये गोलक इति न कथिते:॥ २० ॥

न चेतन्त्रिथितिविब्धसत्वाप्रमाणः रोपझमेवोक्तिमित्राः

एतच देवदेवने दर्शिते बोधवृद्धे।
मूहानां बस्तु भवित ततोऽयन्त्र नायण्यम्॥ ३-२१ ॥

प्रतीचिति स्वतत्रे नो न स्थाययस्याचि चापि न।
स्वच्छवस्थेवेश कर्मयापि महिमेति कृपालुना॥ ३-२२ ॥

पूजयद्येववनेऽरवरणे निधित्वी:।
इति। तथा

जस्तद्धात्वकान् सवं व्यापं चराचरम्।

254 In TĀ - 1.66 this verse is attributed to Kānikāgama

242 māhātmyāt | KED; mahātmyāt L 242 tajase | KED; tejase L 247 ०vrddhay e | KED; ०siddhay e J2 248 pratigātī | KED K1 P0; pratigātī D G K3; pratigātī T 249 cāpi na | KED; cāpyalām J2; cātyanah T 250 sattvam | KED G F; tattvam G ac 250 devadevena | KED G F; devema G ac; devadevendrā J2 250 ०vrddhay e | KED; ०siddhay e J2 252 deviḥ | KED; devi K2 L 252 didhitih | KED Lk2 F; dih++thīh Lk2 ac

० etat is missing from P6. ० J2 writes pratiṃbhitatattvākṛpatunā iti missing from J2. In D nā in miśāhānāti is added later. ० K2 Lk2 J2 L read it as a compound: vākyamānānapakāvṛti ० Here P6 retains only the following part of the commentary:pratibhītākṛpatunā devadevena iti up to sambandhāḥ. ० In Lk2 on top of folio 10r it writes: yataḥ karaṇaśvavibhīrābhiṣitaḥ sa iti bhairave iti

० K3 250 L 106r ० Lk2 10v

184
इति तथा

सदस्यस्मातुगार्थसी दर्पणप्रतिविम्बवत्।

इति तथा

यथान्तरप्रभुत्वाय भाविन भाव विशेषणम्।

अनानामायतथेतत्त्वगतिःक्रियेव विशेषवन्यः॥

इति तथा

प्रतिविम्बलित यस्यार्थस्थवत्: स्वच्छमणरिव।

इति तथा

न में वन्यां न में मृत्यों जीवयोग्यता विशेषिकाः।

प्रतिविम्बलित इस्वदेवत्वाय: विशेषवन्यः॥

इति तथा

तत्र तावदेवत्तत्रितिबिवं वस्तु भवति प्रतिभासमानवात्।

न च भास्तमभावं भवति हि सर्वाश्रमावातावादः।

न च चात्र कविष्ठाध्यक्षः प्रत्येकसिरं तत्स्योत्तरकालमनुद्धियात्।

259 TĀ-3.4. Note the varied reading in TĀ-3.4 264 Vijnānabhārava 135

256 'nirbhāsi KED; 'nirbhāsa KED 259 'tathātasminścinnāthe KED; tathākasmīnścinnāthe KED 263 me mokṣo KED Lk2RC; mokṣo Lk2SC 264 jivasyaitā KED; bālasayitā L KED 265 L

256 In G it seems previously it was sī but the t has been turned into se 262 G RC adds tathā 263 In Lk2 jivasyaitā is glossed on the top by bālasya 264 G on the left margin adds bāla. K2 on the lower margin writes bālasyaitā. 266 hi is missing from K2 LG Lk2 266 atra in sarveśāneucātā missing from K2 LG Lk2 G.

256 G H v 258 D 263 K2 106r

185
ननु यथवेव तद्वेद्य विशिष्टदस्तुजातीयेनभविवु कुरुक्षौ। अन्यथा द्रानियत्व वस्तुवं भवेत्।

तेन शास्त्रायुपस्याधारमक्षो विषाण वस्तुभूतमस्तीत्यपि स्यात्। न चास्य प्रसिद्धस्थवत्तरः

नातजातीतिति कथं वस्तुभूतवत् स्यात्। बाह्य कलु उत्प्रेतं वस्तु देशादिशात्तसमिधि

बलेत्, न चैवेयतं। तदह ततोविन्यय कन्ति। तत इति दर्पणदेशात्। अन्येनि देशानः

भवति सर्ववेच सम्बन्धनीयम्। बाह्य च रूपादि स्पर्शाध्यव्यभिचारित्वं प्रभवति।

नैवेद्यतिदित्याः नायालोधितं नैतस्याप्सितत्वमाभ्येपि

प्रतिमासः। नालाद्विक्रः कायासाठक्ष्ण्। बाह्य पर्वताति सर्वस्येच प्रतिहतं, सर्व चास्य, मृ

त्वात्। न चैवेयतं। अत आह प्रतिपद्यति।

नालाद्विक्रः अन्यं नस्मि। अन्यायार्य भवे

से दर्पणे कथं तदन: प्रवेयः। न बैतलिण्येश्च पृथवत् युव्यते। तथास्येव हि दर्पणाय

दर्शने भवेत्। बाह्यस्य च सर्वस्येच यायो यायो यायो सिद्धिः।

न हि स्वयम्भू कविभद्वूर्त संभ-
वित | उत्पन्न पुनर्मृत्युपरिपक्षमेवास्ते। यथा चक्रादिपरिहरण घटः। इदं पुनःन्ततरमिः मरणं न किषिबद्धिः सत्वाः शुभः। न हि दुर्गचारिः तत्रत्वमेव अत एव नैतत्वस्य स्थिसंस्थिः वापीत्याह न स्थायिः तथा यथा विद्याधिः चापि निःति। बायं हि वक्तुत्वः सत्व बहुकाल्योगितात् स्थायिः तुच्छति। अन्यथा तस्थापिः एव। प्रत्युन्दुर्गचारिः तस्तामेव नोपपातं इति कस्य कालयोगः येन स्थायिः स्वयमहत्तुलस्य चापि भवेत्। तस्मातोत्तत्त्वजनातीयवाभाबच्चाश्चिविषणादिवद्वद्वस्तेवधैत्। नास्य प्रतिविषाः न्यायः।

अथ चारित प्रतिभास इति किमेतुष्क्यतः इत्यह स्वच्छश्चरेवः कस्यापि महिमेति। स्वच्छस्य दुर्गचारिः श्राव्यः प्रभावः। यहर्द्वस्तु विलक्षणमाभभासमात्सरः प्रतिविषयं नामेऽत् प्रतिभासत इति। तेन भवतात् यथा दुर्गचारदावाभभासमात्सराः एव भावाभभाज्यः तथा संविचारीते न बहीरूपनकाः सच्चत्तत्तीति वोधं वर्धिष्ठु बायपाभिनिविशिष्ठनामेत्तपविष्यः। अतः सर्वभेददावाभभासमात्सरे मेवेदावाभभासमात्सरामेव। न बाहुरूपनतिलिङ्गः येन इत्तमः। शाम्यः ॥ २१-२२ ॥

278 utpannam | $\text{ked}$; tat sarvam $j_2$. 278 cakrādiparīhārena | $\text{ked}$; cakrādhramaparīhārena $p_5^{mg}$. 279 "utpatti" | $\text{ked}$; "uktī"$j_2$. 279 darpañādi upeksya | $\text{ked}$; darpanamepeksya $\text{ked}$; darpanādyapeksya G. 279 kimcit" | $\text{ked}$; kvacid$D_j_2$. 279 kvacid$D_j_2$. 279 $p_5^{mg}$. 280 kvacid | $\text{ked}$; kimcid $\text{ked}$; 282 asthāyi | $\text{ked}$; asthāyī $L$. 282 kālayogas yena | $\text{ked}$; kālayogena $k_2.l_2.p_5^{mg}$; 283 tadb$\text{ked}$; 284 nāṣya | $\text{ked}$; nānya $j_2$. 284 pratibhāso | $\text{ked}$; pratribhāso $p_6^{mg}$. 284 nyāyah | $\text{ked}$; nyāyah $k_2.l_2.p_5^{mg}$. 285 pratibhāsa | $\text{ked}$; prabhāsa $p_6^{mg}$. 285 svacchāsavaipāśa kasyāpi $\text{ked}$; svacchāsavaipūśa kasyāpi $j_2$. 286 svacchāsavaipūśa kasyāpi mahimeti sva- chāsya darpañādērēvēśā prabhāvo yadvastu | $\text{ked}$; svacchāsavaipāśa prabhāvo yad- vastu vaut $\text{ked}$; 286 yadvastu$'\text{ked}$; 286 "ābhāśa\text{ked}$; "ābhāśana$p_5^{mg}$. 287 avabhāsante | $\text{ked}$; avabhāsante $\text{ked}$; abhāsante $p_6^{mg}$. 287 bahūrūpa$'\text{ked}$; bahūrūpā$p_6^{mg}$. 288 sattvam | $\text{ked}$; sattvam $\text{ked}$; bāhyē'rhte $p_6^{mg}$. 288 ca is missing from $p_6^{mg}$.

280 $a$ is missing from $p_6^{mg}$.

283 api is missing from $j_2$. 283 $v$ in vastu is added later on left margin in G. 283 $j_2$ writes "jīyatōbhāvā" 286 In $L_k_2$ yadavastuvastu is glossed on the top by yadavastuvam... Later aksaras are not clearly visible. 286 $p_6^{mg}$ here writes nāṃmeti tena bhagavatā...
अत एवाहः
न देशो नो रूपं न च समधयोगो न परिमा
न चान्योचायसहो न च तद्विनिन्न घनता।
न चावस्तुन्तु स्याम्यं च किमापि सारं निजामिति
ध्रुवं मोहः शाम्येदिति निर्दिशदर्पणाविधिः। ॥ २३ ॥

प्रतिविबं तावदर्पणातिसेकेण स्वतन्त्रत्वा पूर्वकस्तो नोपघमत इत्युपदितम्।
तत्थः
नास्तस्य दर्पणातिसेकेण इत्युक्तं न देश देति।
एवं चायस्य न घनता काबिन्यश्लक्षणम मूलिष्पी
नास्तिक्षयः।
अनन्याः हि दर्पणाय पूर्वयदेशः यथा।
एकस्येव नमोदेस्यस्य रूपं दर्पणे
नाकान्तस्य मूलिन्तरणमहिमाक्षत्वात्。
मूलानि समानदेशविविधताः।
अत एव चार्यस्य नो रूपं रूपाध्यमुण्योगो नास्तिक्षयः।
स हि युर्तेऽक्षेत्र भवतित भावः।
अत एव चार्यस्य न कालवसंबन्धः।
स हि किंचित पूर्वपरभवित्वपयेक्ष्य पृथ्वयदेशस्ताक्षसः च यस्य।
अस्य पुरुस्तर्णात पृथ्वस्तर्णे नास्तिक्षयः बहूः।
अत एव चार्यस्य न परिमा परिमाणं नारिति

291 eva missing from J2 G Lk2 L P6 \(\text{ms}^s\).
294 In K3 the ghanatā has \(\text{ta}^s\) written on top of \(\text{nu}^s\) and \(\text{nu}^s\) on top of \(\text{tā}^s\) making it sound like ghanatā. However, it is not a replacement. It just seems that someone has tried to write it on the top of the aksaras arbitrarily.
297 \(\text{na}^s\) is missing from L.
300 \(\text{nāśi}^s\) is missing from J2 G Lk2 L P6 \(\text{ms}^s\).
301 \(\text{nu}^s\) is missing from G Lk2.
302 \(\text{pūrva-paṛābhāvi}^s\) glossed by \(\text{pūrva-paṛābhāvi}^s\) on right margin in Lk2.
304 In K2 asya has \(\text{pūrva-paṛābhāvam}^s\) on the top.
305 \(\text{parimā}^s\) missing from K3 J2 G Lk2 L.
सत एवं तदयोगपतेः। अन्यथा हि परिमिते दर्पणदेशो महाकारः वर्तादि कथं प्रतिसंकालं भवेत्। नापि दर्पणनारके संयमां सहप्रतिमहे दिपिः परस्यं नाविधेन संखेष इत्याहं न चावनोनायारः इति।

ननु नयानारकेः वचनेर्कं मिल्यायानारकामस्त्रिकेन परिमिते दर्पणदेशो प्रतिमासस्तदेर्मि-श्चान्याः नायाः परस्यं समेतनेनकोपिणीभवेन्वा स्या िन। न चेदेवं तदं नयानारकाः एवं न भवेन्याः न च तदयोगनिरित सर्वामेवतथां न च भातमभातं भवः। अतस्य च नायाः न च भवः। अत एव च नायाः न च भवः। अत एव च नायाः न च भवः। 

303 katham I KeD; kaṃ L 304 darpanāntaranakēṣām I KeD; darpanāntare keśām KeD ka; darpanāntare keśām K2 J2 G Lk2 L P6 mg. 307 pratibhāsāh tadeteṣām I KeD; pratibhāsātvam tadā eṣām KeD ka; pratibhāsāh tadeṣām K2 J2 G Lk2 L P6 mg; pratibhāsāh tadā teṣām L. 307 anupapattya parasparam I KeD; anupapattya parasparam G. 307 sammelana I KeD; sammelana KeD; nyāyah I KeD; nyāyah K2 P6 mg. 308 cedēvam I KeD; caivam P6 mg. 309 parasparam vaiviktyenaiva pratibhāsāt I KeD; parasparam vaiviktyenaiva pratibhāsāt K2 J2 G Lk2; parasparavaiviktyena pratibhāsāt P6 mg. 310 na cāvastuvam I KeD; na ca vastuhaṁīr J2 P6 mg. 311 evamyasya vastutvo I KeD; evamyasya vastutvo D; evam vastutvena K6 kha; evamyasya vastutvena P6 mg. 312 dvaitapratthātmakaṁ samkucītam I KeD; dvaitapratthātmakaṁ samkucītam J2. 313 vidhiḥ I KeD; vidhiḥ P6 mg. 313 'sahisnuvastupraṇāra K KeD; 'sahisnurvastupraṇāra K6 kha L; 'sahisnurva-

303 nāṣti missing from K2 J2 G Lk2 L P6 mg. 303 J2 writes aha evadigopapaṭeh. 303 KeD has pāramāte 306 arthānāṁ is missing from P6 mg. 307 In J2 tav in deśata is missing. 308 In Lk2 there is text added on the left margin: taśya abhimāṇābhāsāyāpyahāh. 308 eva is missing from K2 J2 Lk2 G ac L P6 mg. 310 P6 mg writes aha eva cāṣṭānāvastutvam. 310 P6 mg adds iti bhāsah after pratibhāsāt. 311 api missing from J2.

306 Lk2 12v 306 K2 108v 308 G 13v 309 J2 7r 310 L 108v
निदिष्टवान् । एवं च सत्ययमथि: प्रदर्शितो भवति । यहिःशमिदं सजिति दृष्ट्यन्तिरिविविधम् नन्द
चनावस्थितं न तु तदनिरिक्ततया बहीःपचेन वस्तुतदिति न तत्राभिविष्यतीममिति ॥ २३ ॥

tदेवमुपयाति तत्रितिमार्गं वच्छदयत् सत्ययमथि: तत्सामावयिकनाभिवानान्तरणायप्य-
भिन्नीयत इत्याह्

इत्यः पदार्थतेनेन्तु गंधिरिजेमनवतानि: ।
शब्देर्स्य प्रतिविम्य: प्रत्ययुक्तेन भवते ॥ २-२४ ॥
न चासी शब्दे: शब्द आगच्छः संघ्रावष ।
तेनेव वक्रा दृष्ट्यः: शब्दयाश्रयावणादीपि ॥ २-२५ ॥
पिठिरदिपिधानांश विशिष्ठिङ्ग्राष्टतो।

चित्रावाचायः शब्देर्स्य प्रतिविम्य: मुखादिवत् ॥ ३-२६ ॥

\[ \text{314 arthah pradarśito } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; arthah' pradarśito } \text{K}_{\text{ED}}^{\text{"kha"}} \text{ 315 darpanapratibimbanyāyena } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; darpananyāyena } \text{K}_{\text{ED}}^{\text{"kha"}} \text{ 318 sāmāvāyika } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; sāmayike } \text{G}\text{K}_{\text{2}}^{\text{"ac"}} \text{; sā-
mayika } \text{K}_{\text{2}} \text{ 318 abhīdhāyate } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; abhīdhāntareṇa } \text{K}_{\text{ED}}^{\text{"ka"}} \text{ 319 ittham } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; evaṃ}
\text{T} \text{ 319 amutra } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; amusmin } \text{T} \text{ 320 pratibimbavanartmani } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; pratibim-
banavātmani } \text{J}_{\text{2}} \text{; pratibimbasatattvake } \text{G} \text{. 320 yatpratiśruteti } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; tal } \text{[tal] pratiśruteti } \text{T}
\text{ 321 sābdajah } \text{sābdha } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; sābdajasābdha } \text{L}_{\text{2}} \text{. 321 āgacchattvena } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; āgacchetvena } \text{T}_{\text{2}} \text{. 322 samśrayāt } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; samśrayāt } \text{K}_{\text{ED}}^{\text{"ka"}} \text{J}_{\text{2}} \text{L} \text{. 323 vakrā dūrastāha } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; vaktrāddūrastāha } \text{K}_{\text{ED}}^{\text{"kha"}} \text{ 323 pithāra}^{\text{"a"}} \text{[K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; pithāra}\text{[IPVV}, \text{Vol: 1}, \text{p. 165}
\text{ 323 pithārādāpyadhānāṃsa } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; pithārādāpyadhānāṃsa } \text{J}_{\text{2}} \text{G } \text{K}_{\text{2}} \text{; pithārādāpyadhānāṃsa } \text{IPVV}, \text{Vol: 1}, \text{p. 164}
\text{ 324 viśiṣṭa } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; vicitra } \text{IPVV}, \text{Vol: 1}, \text{p. 165} \text{ 324 "chitra" } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; "chattra"}^{\text{"T"}} \text{ 324 citravāc } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; citravāc } \text{L} \text{ 325 mukhaḍivat } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{; mukhaḍiva } \text{K}_{\text{2}} \text{K}_{\text{3}} \text{.} \]

\[ \text{315 L writes bhavati after yanāvashītāḥ. 316 The Ms } \text{P}_{\text{e}} \text{ ends here. In}
\text{Lk}_2 \text{pratibimbamārga is glossed by sanketasamayādātah on the left margin. 318 } \text{K}_{\text{2}} \text{ writes}
\text{sāmayādātah on the lower margin. 320 } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{ mentions in fn ittham pradarśite iti padyādyārd-
ham ga pustakāḥ pūrṇitaḥ. It seems that the verse 24a was not mentioned in other Ms except ga. 322 In}
\text{Lk}_2 \text{right margin writes samyogajah vibhāgajah śabdajah. 323 In } \text{Lk}_2 \text{ the } \text{di}
\text{ in pithānādī is not visible but has been recorded on the left margin. 324 L writes viśiṣṭa-}
\text{chitra. 325 } \text{K}_{\text{ED}} \text{ mentions that } \text{K}_{\text{ED}}^{\text{"a"}} \text{ also has the alternate reading chidratvācchāya}
\text{.} \]
प्रतिसंकमणेन श्रुत-अवर्णमस्यवति प्रतिश्रुत्कादा प्रतिस्वदशः श्रवणं प्रतिश्रुतं संवेचति । इह
खलु नैवायिकानां दर्पणं च शाखायां रसमीनां प्रतिफलनात् श्रवक्वक्रमः प्रतिश्रुत्कादाः मुख्यादशदः पतापरिक्लथनेनापि तद्यथवैत
न कविदीपि प्रतिविम्बमस्तत्त्वश: । तत् रूपप्रतिविक्रमं तावदस्तीत्युपपादितम् । एवं शवदः
दीनमापि प्रतिविम्बार्थिपत्रोपपादनाय तन्नतमाष्टकं दूषयति न चासवित्यादिना । असाववित
प्रतिश्रुतकः । शवदु इति न पुनः संयोगजः विभागजः वा । स्वतं एव स्वेतुस्मुर्थ्यलादयं मु-
र्यः । शवदु इति भावः । स च वक्षेद्यात् गच्छेन्न विभागः विभागः । अत एव तस्विथवर्थविभिः प्रा-
मातुभिराय एव शवदुस्तीत्रमाध्रायः श्रुतेः व, न पुनर्नत्वः मनंत्रत्माध्रायः । दूरःदातविभिः पु-
नर्यः एव न त्यागं इति । प्रतिश्रुतकः पुनर्नत्वेन वक्ता तत्सम्भिकांग्नरत्तो श्रवत्यं त्तुमातृभराग्नरत्तो
ल्लेन स्वस्मुखं प्रवर्त्तमानलेन संस्कृते । अत एव च दूरस्थः गहराहुमायूर्तदेशः प्रमातु-
भिन्नः श्रुतेः तदाभिमुखाः तत्यः । प्रवर्त्तमानामाभावाः । मुखः । शवदु नाथाः ओठ्ठाः ओठ्ठाः ओ-
भ्राकाशदेशमयजियािो न भ्रीभ्रुभ्रुवृपुषातमुम्मिित । तथाते हि सर्वभाव श्रोत्तुमक्क- 
विषय्यनेन प्रवृयािव र् मात । प्रतिमुनुक्का पुनर्वधिवितसशब्दयानीयािािो ग्ाधादनरू- 
पः । यिनिठग्राबो य उपादानविशेषायायाय िाििि विशिश्यायि स्थूलसूभुमािदिरूपायि छिद्रायि मु- 
षिरा भागः । तर सख्तो तदरकासमेवनेन एकशब्दात्मविचित्रघ भािविधिि वस्तुभूतशदन- 
शब्दजातीयवत्तापमुिुिग्या नासी शब्दः शवः । तस्माधथा मुखवस्तु दुर्घणादो प्रतिभव्य- 
मर्तिि तथास्म िुम्यस्य शब्दवायि नम्मीमयायि अस्य शब्दस्य प्रतिगम्य मुखादिरूपिति ॥

२४-२६ ॥

न केिलिि वस्तुभूमिमुम्यशब्दजातीयवािवािद्य प्रतिभव्यमध्ये यावहुँ प्रतिभव्यजातीय- 
व्यादिरूपायहे

इदम्यस्य वेदस्य रूपमित्यमाभािस्तेन।

यथादशेय प्रेषा केनायुतात्मकणिये ििििि ॥ ३-२७ ॥

यथा दुर्घणादाद्वन्तायात्मकवािपि श्वसुमुखसंबिधिनो रूप्यस्यािािो वेदशाय प्रे-

337 श्रोत्रकाशदेिािीमियानो [Kṣ] ; श्रोत्रकाशात्मभिसायानो G. 339 ‘रूपाय [Kṣ] ;
‘रूपाय K2. 339 ‘विशेसाि’ [Kṣ] ; विशेसाय G. 339 ‘सुक्मामदिरूपायि [Kṣ] ; ‘सुक्मायि 
रूपायि Lk2. 340 सुिििा भगाय [Kṣ] ; सुिििाभगाय L 340 िाििििािमलेिनेता
ekaśabdātma [Kṣ] ; िाििििािमलेिािकासाबदा Kṣ‘[a]; मलिे िािििािकासाबदा Kṣ‘[a];
tadekaśāmālipilena K2 Lk2 L ; tadekaśāmālipilena G. 341 anupalabdhya [Kṣ] ;
anupalabdhya G‘; anupalabdhya G‘. 347 anyasya [Kṣ] Kṣ‘; atrasya Kṣ‘[c]।

337 bhinnabhimnusvarūptāpatāmbhyeti is glossed on the right in G 14v by bhinnasvarūptave.
338 339 In K2 L one bhīma is missing. 340 c in ekaśabdātma ‘ is not visible in Lk2. 342 After
pratibhīmasasti L writes itii. 347 The Kṣ‘[c] does not seem to be a correction because the
previous alphabet does not have any marks of replacement, but the readings of Kṣ‘[c] are
just the words written above the main text 348 The Kṣ‘[c] does not seem to be a correction
because the previous alphabet does not have any marks of replacement, but the readings
of Kṣ‘[c] are just the words written above the main text. 349 api missing from Kṣ G‘ Lk2 L.
349 L writes pratyāyasvamukha. 339 L 109v 339 Lkb 14v 342 G 14r 346 K2 119r
तीतिस्था मर्यत्कम्बिति परार्मण्यस्यापि स्वयमुचारितस्य शब्दस्य केनाप्युक्तमहामाञ्चलस्य इति। अतः प्रतिविभावतरजातीयत्वाद्यत्र प्रतिविभावचतिमित्याध्यायः। तु शब्दश्रेण्यस्य स च पूर्वपेश्याः। इति शब्दो वाचस्माकः॥ २७॥

ननु केनिष्ठका यथुचारितः शब्दो दूरे गुहायाकाशे प्रतिसंक्रान्तिमेिति तर्कदेशविनामेव तत्त्वब्धन भवेच्छ तन्यस्मातविभागः। नियमाद्विसांमुख्यं प्रतिविभावचतः। तन्त्राध्यायः। श्रेणविन्ति प्रतिशब्दकम्॥ ३-२८॥

यस्माद्विसांमुख्यं प्रतिविभावं निर्यमेन विम्बसांमुख्येऽव भवितं तत्त्वाध्यायः। विम्बप्रति-विम्बयोगसंर्गितं एव प्रामितसर्गं विम्बसांमुख्यं प्रवर्त्तमानं प्रतिशब्दं श्रेणविन्ति। न पुनर्दूरे गात्तदिरितिरागिगासिद्धिदयः॥। तदाभिमुख्येण तत्त्वाप्रवर्त्तः॥ २८॥

ननु यथेव ताहं तन्त्राध्यायेऽव इशानिपि निमित्तनाश्चविम्बमात्रितस्वाद्वादाकाः। प्रमाताः। कथं विम्बाभिमुख्येण प्रवर्त्तमानं प्रतिशब्दं गृष्णुपितिर्याश्चार्णः॥

351 kenāpyuktam ahamākārnaye | K_Ed ; kenāpyuktasyākārnaye (?) K_Ed kā ; kenāpyuktasyākālayeti G ; kenāpyuktamākārnaye Lk₂ L । 352 vākyasamāptau | K_Ed ; vākyaparismāptau K₂ Lk₂ L । 354 vaktarā yadducchāritaḥ sabdo | K_Ed ; vaktroccaritaśabdhā K_Ed kā K_Ed kha । 357 yattataḥ | K_Ed K₁ ; yatnataḥ J₁ ; K_Ed kā । 358 śrūvanti | K_Ed ; śrūvanti L । 357 'kam | K_Ed ; 'gam J₁ । 358 pratiśabdhāvatniyamena K_Ed kā । 359 pramāṭarastam | K_Ed ; pramāṭarastam G । 361 apravartanāt | K_Ed ; apravartamaṇātvāt G L।

357 K₁ has this reading for 3.28cd tanmadhyagāṇustā śṛṇvanti pramāṭāro na dārāgāḥ (?) which is not very clear to me. And it is obviously incomplete; IPV, Vol.: 1, p.165 writes tanmadhyagāṇustā śṛṇvanti pramāṭāro na dārāgāḥ। 363 K₂ writes pravartamaṇāpratissabdhām।

355 Lk₂ 14r । 358 L 109r । 358 G 14r ।
मुख्यां ह त्व पि विना प्रतिविम्बघों ह भवेत। ।
स्पष्टार्थम् प्रियं पश्येक्षितं मुक्रे पुरः ॥ ३-२९ ॥

भवेदिति प्रतिविम्बाहणोपयोगदशाःस्थानात्। स्पष्टार्थमित्तवतितोपनतविम्बभूत-
प्रियार्थने विशेषार्थयेत्॥ २९॥

ननुतक्षुच्या दर्पणादेशितक्रेण प्रतिविम्बे पुष्करस्तात्मेव नोपत्तनम् इति कस्य तत्स्य विम्बसांमूल्यं
भवतीत्वाश्रयः

सांमूल्यं चोच्यते ताहदर्पणाभेदस्तिथे। ॥ ३-३० ॥

ताद्रित्विवल्लसम्मूलो योपसो दर्पणः। तेनाभेदः। दर्पणाकर्त्यम्। तेन या प्रतिविम्बसि सर्वप्रतिविद्यमानम्
तेनेतेवार्थ विम्बसांमूल्येण वर्तते। तदनविषयव्यवस्थात् ता- ।

365 mukhya[a] [KED K3 ac]; bimba[G KED ka K3 PC L 366 svapaścātstham J KED; paścāt
gataṁ [IPV, Vol: 1, p.165 366 priyam J KED; priya K2; mukham T 366 paśye [K KE;
pasyet K2 366 taṁkitama mukure purah J K3 This reading is also supported by K3 of the
[IPV, Vol:1, p.164; taṁkitam mukure vapuh GPC KED L; taṁkitam
śārīrakam G ac; paśyed amkitam mukure punah T 367 pratibimbagrahanayogyadesa[a]
[KED; pratibimbagrhaṇe deśāvaK2 G L; bimbagrahe deśāKED ka; grahanadeśa KED kha;
pratibimbagrahanedaśaLk2 369 priyādarserane J KED; priyadarśane K3 G L
370 darpana J KED G ac; darśana G PC. 370 iti katham tasya J KED; iti tasya KED ka;
iti na tasya KED kha Lk2 ms; iti kim tasya G. 372 samsthitah J KED; samsthitih KED ka G;
samsthitah K3 373 tenābhedah J KED; tenābhedi K2 374 yaddarpamo J KED; yadd-
darpane KED ka

365 The K3 PC does not seem to be a correction because the previous alphabet does not have any marks of replacement, but the readings of K3 PC are just the words written above the main text. 366 Here K3 has sāmbhavah written on the margin. 366 K3 writes vapuh, but the right margin in Devanāgarī says purah iti pāthah ।. 370 K2 L read na after prthaksattāmeva and not before upalabhate. 370 katham is missing from Lk2. katham tasya is missing from K2 L. 373 K3 writes samsthitih in Devanāgarī on the right margin.

373 Lk2 15v 373 G 15v

194
स्य दर्पणादेः पुनरवस्यभावी विम्बसामुष्यमन्यथा हि प्रतिविम्बवस्योत्पतिेः न स्यात्। एव-
माकाशशरदेपि विम्बसामुष्यभावी हि शाब्दात्िप्रतिविम्बवस्योत्पतिवन्यत्वम् ॥ ३० ॥
तदाह

अतः कृपादिपिठिरा कायो तत्त्वातिवधिग्नम् ।
बनकाशाः सशव्य सद्धारति तत्त्वावयवकृति ॥ ३-३१ ॥

अते यथोक्तकिल्ल्वसांस्मशाहिरविशेषकालिन्याधेतोः । कृपायथकाऽष्ट्र तद्वपवर्तत सशव्य व-
कः संबन्धायथां प्रतिविम्बितिः जातत्ताभेदवृत्ति सद्धारति प्रतिभासत इत्यथाः। शाब्द्वय गुण-
लेन गुणिन्न पञ्चवेदस्तत्त्वपरमेवेति । गुणिनेन सहायस्त गुणिन्न प्रतिविम्ब्वेच युक्तमि-
त्युत्त्काशाः आकाशमिति । कृपायथकाऽष्ट्र सशव्य सांस्मशाहिय हृदयज्ञीकत्तुः हृदयावयवति
तत्त्वावयवकृतिः ॥ ततः प्रकुणािकः परो वक्ता प्रतिविम्बोति । यथा वक्तुसमुखिन
एव प्रतिविम्बातुः श्रोत्रािश्यो वक्तुसमुखिनः सशव्यशाश्चायश्य प्रतिविम्बृ गुणािति तथाः

t 379 \text{sadbhātā } [Kṣ] ; \text{sa[sadbhātā T}^c ; \text{ta[tad]bātā T}^{ac} । 379 \text{paravaktavat } J.K^c \text{IPV.,}
Vol. 1, p. 165 ; paravaktavat Kṣ ; paravaktavat J.K^c \text{kl}^c ; \text{paravaktavat Kṣ Kṣ}^c \text{L}^c ; \text{vaktavat } Kṣ । 380 \text{bimba } J.K^c \text{; pratibimba } Kṣ \text{L}^c \text{.}
380 \text{viśeṣaikā Yingdhekah } J.K^c \text{.}
381 \text{“ākāśam } J.K^c \text{; “ākāśam } Kṣ \text{L}^c \text{.} 381 \text{pratibimbatam } [J.K^c , Kṣ^c ] ; \text{pratibimbatam } Kṣ^c , Kṣ^c । 381 \text{ja[tata]dēbhed } J.K^c \text{Kṣ} ; \text{ja[tata]dēbhed } Kṣ \text{Kṣ} ।
382 \text{gūnini samavetattatparantarātmatvam } [J.K^c \text{G Kṣ}^c \text{L}^c \text{.} \text{gūnini samavetattatparantarāά } Kṣ \text{L}^c \text{.}
383 \text{hrdayangamit } [J.K^c \text{.} \text{hrdayangamit } \text{G}^c \text{L}^c \text{.} \text{tasminnavā } ] \text{Kṣ} ; \text{tasminnavā } Kṣ ।
385 \text{“sambandhi } J.K^c \text{; “sambandhiṇah } Kṣ \text{.} ।

375 \text{hi missing from G.} । 378 \text{In } Kṣ \ldots \text{tah kūpāḥ...is not visible because the edge of the page}
appears to be folded in the image. However, since \text{ṭ} \text{dri is clearly visible, so the reading of the}
Kṣ should be understood as kūpāḍī and not kūpādi.} । 379 \text{In } Kṣ \text{the reading \text{“vaktavat}
simply seems a typo. \text{The }} vīveka \text{also writes \text{“vaktavat} and this is also supported by the read-
ing found in the } Kṣ \text{of IPV. In } Kṣ \text{at para} \text{is not visible because the edge of the page a-
pears to be folded in the image. However, it writes \text{“vaktavat.} Kṣ \text{has on the right ma-
rin written in Devanāgari: vaktavādi.} ३८२ \text{As far as the reading of } M \text{Kṣ L} \text{is con-
cerned consider here if the scribe could have overlooked the reading } \text{ākāśam} \text{since just in}
the above line we have } kūpāḍyākāśa । ३८३ \text{Kṣ L} \text{writes } ca \text{after } \text{“ākāśasya.} ३८५ \text{śrotāvikāśa}
vaktvāsambandhūnaḥ is missing from Kṣ \text{.} ।

376 L 110v । 379 J 2v । 381 Kṣ 120v । 384 G 16v
कृपायाकाशोऽपि ।

इह खलु तत्तदिनन्तर्यं ज्ञानं गृहीतततततत्तततततिकयमं मेवं विषयं परिचिन्यात् । अन्यथा हि निराकरस्य ज्ञानस्य नीतिपातनमोक्षसाधारणत्वादिदुं नीलिमापं नीलिमाविदं पीताविदं नियमं न स्यात् । अतः साकारं ज्ञानमारकवतांतरेनाः प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानुपयोगं । न च यथेवास्य ज्ञानं तदेव विषयं इति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थापि सिद्धिदितं वदुं युस्त ज्ञानक्षेवोऽपि वाचिकाश्रद्दिनामपि तद्विषयत्वप्रदात् ।

धेयोत्रिदेन कर्मणं सहा जन्यं तेवं चक्षुसालिना इत्यत्व तदेवकर्मविदात्मिते चे-श्रीतं । कर्मव्यति हि कारकतः । तच किमाथोकशादार्बि । अन्यथा हि तदस्तुसारेष्य ज्ञानं, न कारकम् । नीतिस्य चेह ज्ञानालक्ष्यविदेश एव विचारितृं प्रसुतृं इति कथं तत्तत्ततविदं अस्य कर्मव्यति तदेकविदात् न सुलगन्ते तदेव कर्मव्यति सिद्धेषत् । यथपुनर्गन्तविदात्-पेदेय वस्तुवस्तुवकृ तं एवां विशेषं इत्यत्वं तत्पत्यानं कारकारामधीत मित्यादित वहुना ।

पलियानपरकारं गृहीतं कितिनबां तदविषयपरिच्छेदमयातमभावतं इति साप्रभां दशा नित्यवनति तपातवकृ तदित । यथायत्च्चर्थोत्सरसं संभवति तथा विनिवेशशादिना वकृ तितिवादेकच्चे च चतपच्छेद्यां भावकृ तं एवादशायं तदशायं इति उत्तर कर्मव्यति संभवेत्। वशय सतायमयानं च न जनकं तदर्व इति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थापि सिद्धिदितं वदुं युस्त ज्ञानक्षेवोऽपि वाचिकाश्रद्दिनामपि तद्विषयत्वप्रदात् ।

386 kūpāyākāśo’piti | KED; kūpāyākāśe’piti G Lk2.
387 sākāram jñānam ākāravat-tām | KED; sākāraṇānaṃ ākāravattam KED ka
388 pratikarmavavasthā | KED; karma-vavasthāyā KED ka
389 jñānakāta’] KED Lk2; jñāka jñānakāta Lk2 ac.
390 cennaita] KED G ac; cennaita G ac.
391 kāra] KED; kāra KED G ac; kāra KED G ac.
392 jñānakāyā] KED; jñānakāyā”Lk2
393 vicārayita] KED; vicārayita G
394 tattadvaparicchedā | KED G ac; tattadvaparicchedā G ac.
395 “mādhātu”] KED Lk2 ac; “mādyatu”Lk2 ac; “māyātu” Lk2
396 yādyapeyata] KED; yādyapeyata Lk2
397 niḍarśanikṛtam | KED; niḍarśanikṛtam L
398 sāṃmukhyamapi | KED Lk2; sāṃmukhyapī Lk2 ac.

390 prati is missing from G.
391 hi is missing from K2 Lk2.
392 api in tatpūrva api is missing from Lk2.
393 api in viśeṣe’ pi is missing from K2 G Lk2.
394 Lk2 15r
395 L 110r
396 K2
397 G 16r

196
तथावें वदन्तो ठोकिकाः: श्रीतारो देहपृणं न तथा श्रुतमननोकृतमिति। यदर्था सामान्येये
कृपायाकारो प्रतिविम्यथो वक्राकारशः पर इव वक्रशे भाषिः। वक्रावेन वोकारितः
शब्दः शूपत इत्यः। एवं प्रतिविम्यमपि तद्भवृत्तिकालिविवसायमेवति मुक्तमुक्ते नियमादित्वां
समुविष्ये। प्रतिविम्यस्थिति ॥ ३१ ॥

अत एव च विभविन्यमयें बक्त्वेदवेत्र एव प्रवृत्ति तत्तावृत्ताति नान्य इत्यः
यथा चाद्वर्षापाण्ड्रमावशं वेदति। नो मुखम।
तथा तथाविधाकारवर्षात्स्थलयानुनिः वेदति। न धानिम। ॥ ३-३२ ॥

मुखामित्यन्त्याविष्कारमुखाधिविविष्यम। तथाविशेषित विभवसमुविष्ये।। पश्चात्तथा गहरगु-
हापाण्ड्रमावशं इत्यः। धानिनिमित धातुमत्वक्त्स्यौः।। नो वेदती स्वयम्यसमानीत्वतिवि-
मयव वस्तुन्तोदवनस्त्रानायतोतितिस्थितम।। न इह ज्ञानवादोधेयायायस्य इति भावः।
ते-नोदधामितिप्रतिविम्येव योग्येदावस्या नामावश्च ज्ञानातीतिस्थितम।।
यथापि चैतिःसमाध्विवसम-
मुखामित्यादिनेव गतात्र तथापि। रुपाधिविम्यसाज्ञात्योपंड्रमावशं।
पुनरुपात्। ॥ ३२ ॥

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400 laukikāḥ | कृति; laukikah Lk₂ | 404 madhyadeśa eva | कृति; madhyadeśa
eva कृति kha; madhyadeśe iva pramātattŚ’g Lk₂; madhyadeśe iva कृति L 405 vetti |
कृति मुक्तम | कृति; mukhyam कृति 406 dvhanim | कृति; vanim T
406 tathāvidhākāśapascātsthā | कृति K₁; tathā bhūtākāśapārśvasthām कृति ka; na dvhanim |
कृति naddhvani K₁ 408 pasācātsthāghrvaragahā | कृति K₁; pasācātsthāghruga गहाकृति ka
408 dvhanimiti | कृति; dvhaniriti कृति K₁ 408 no | कृति; na D K₁ G Lk₂ L 409 “niśedhā” |
कृति; “niśedhā” G 409 mātrānīśedhāpratibimbasya vastuto | कृति; mātrāniśedhā-
pratibimbasyāva vastraunah 409 jñānābhāvājñāṇīyaśyāpyabhāva’] | कृति G Ṛ; jñānābhā-
vāh Lk₂ L; jñānābhāvājñāṇīyaśyāpyabhāva’] कृति G Ṛ; jñānābhā-
vāh Lk₂ L; jñānābhāvājñāṇīyaśyāpyabhāva’] कृति G Ṛ; jñānābhā-
vāh Lk₂ L; jñānābhāvājñāṇīyaśyāpyabhāva’] कृति G Ṛ; jñānābhā-
vāh Lk₂ L.

402 yaktamuktā is missing from कृति G Lk₂ L. 406 In K₁ “tathā (in tathāvid”)...is not visible because the edge of the page appears to be folded in the image. 407 In G Lk₂ L nahi in ‘sammukhiñah’ writes compounded with pasāti

401 D 404 L 111v 406 G 17v 406 K₁ 16r 406 K₁ 410 Lk₂ 16r

197
नन्त्र रूपातिविधिमजातीयले किमशालिक्यां सर्वसार्वाक्यां वा। तत्राथे पशे वस्तुमृत–
शब्दः शब्दः जातीयाश्चैवमिपि श्रीमागसामान्यादिनां केनायतेनात्तीति तद्वापि प्रस्तुता प्रस्ताव।
सर्वसार्वाक्यां चतुरार्थित। यद्यप्रेषेदिपि रूपातितिकः हस्तादुविम्बस्य प्रर्थित। इह तु न
tथा। इत्याशास्त्रू दर्शयति

शब्दो न चानमित्वतः प्रर्थितविम्बति तद्वाम्।
अभिव्यक्तिशृणु तस्य समकालं द्वितीयकं॥ 3-33॥

क्षणे तु प्रर्थितविम्बतः श्रुति शमकालिका॥

इह शब्दस्तवादनमित्वात्त्वोऽनुचारितः प्रर्थितविम्बात्ति नाथ्मेवतीति नूनामश्री यथैव क्षणोऽ
स्थानकरणाभियात्तादुविम्बतः। सनातनेन्द्रियाभाषात्तमकालवहेत। द्वितीयः क्षणे पुनः प्रर्थितवि-
म्बात्त्मवश्चानां श्रुतः इति नाथ्योऽचारितप्रवचिन्यो बिम्बस्मेंतस्य प्रर्थितविम्बात्तवरे प्रर्थितः।

| अतः नान्त रूपातिविधिमजातीयले, तत्र प्रर्थितविम्बकालिकेः प्रविम्बस्य प्रर्थिते॥ 33॥ |

140. 415 G 17r 422 K2

In G on right margin of 17v it writes: ‘नास्ति इति काकुस्यः गोपाल’ 418 anabhivyaktapratibimba writes together in K3 418 K3 has a script error on the top of the alphabet प्रा in pratibimba 421 In K3 ac Lk3 L anabhivyakthi in anabhiv-
vyaakti nucaritaḥ is missing. 421 K2 prsa writes anabhivyakto nucaritaḥ iti. L writes va-
ktah after nucaritaḥ. 422 In K2 G Lk3 L sansārotrendraśyāvyakhyatamavagahate / dvi-
tīye kṣatre is missing. Instead, in both it writes sa punah. However, G prsa mentions the mis-
sing text on the left margin. 423 In G it seems to read ityasva naccaritaḥ but the o in no se-
ems to be removed by another hand.
तदेतश्चेत्वाहि।

तुल्यकालं हि नो हस्ततत्त्वायारूपनिष्ठयः ॥ ३-३४ ॥

विश्रय इति विमार्शात्मावासः। तत्रापि न प्रतिविम्कालेव विम्बवर्ती प्रतीति। न हि प्रतिविम्बप्रतीती विम्बस्वार्थ हस्ततदेः प्रतीतिपुरका, युगपत्ततततिल्लमियोदधिविरोधः। न च चेति चिंत्तचानविदेशोभयाल्पमना, विम्बप्रतिविम्बयोरुद्देशार्कपतित्वः। अधिबिच्छेदन प्रतिभाषाभावः।

ननु हस्तादेः प्रतिभाषाभावेक्षो वस्तुन्नोदवस्त्रानमस्ततीति चेति। नेतृत्वात्। आभास एव हि सर्वस्तुवस्त्राक्षः। तस्मात् एव तस्मात् माः सर्वस्तुवस्त्राक्षः। स एव चात्र नामस्ततीति हस्तादेः प्रतिभाषाभावेक्षो वस्तुतः। सद्यव्रते कि प्रमाणम। शब्दस्य च हि द्वितीये क्षणेषु पराग्रहः। न नयदवस्त्राक्षः। न अधिकारिकेति न विम्बप्रतिविम्बयोरुद्देशार्कप्रतीतिपरिवर्तित्वमिथापिवस्त्राय ज्ञातीत्वम् ॥ ३४ ॥

एवं नैयोगिककायमत्तर्नेन प्रतिविम्बस्त्रायाध्यक्षप्रकृतेः विम्बरोपक्षैः।

इत्यत्र पद्यितेऽप्रमुख प्रतिविम्बसतत्त्वः।

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426 hastatacchāyā | KED; hastatacchāyā T 427 niścaya | KED; vimarśa L 428 dvayodavyāvirodhat | KED; dvayāvirodhat KED bha; dvayāvīrodhat G 429 bimbapratibimbayor | KED; bimbanābhimbapratibimbayaḥ K2 429 vidūrdeśavartī | KED; videsavartī K2 G Lk2 L. 430 pratibhāsābhāvāt | KED; pratibhāsābhāvāt G. 431 hastādaḥ pratibhāsābhāvāpī | KED; hastāder pratibhāsepī KED bha Lk2 434 pratibimbātmātāvasare | KED; bimbanāvasare KED bha G Lk2; pratibimbatāvaśare L

425 G writes tadatannety ityāsankhyāta 432 hi is missing from K2 Lk2. 433 In K2 L the text between sadbhāve kim pramānām and sadbhāvos ’ti kim tu is missing due to the clear case of eye-skip by the scribe. 433 ca is missing from Lk2. 435 na missing from K2 G Lk2 L. 437 G writes idānām after sūpapādyā.
प्रकृत बुधकृत तत्त्र प्रतिविम्बनमहिति ॥ ३-३५ ॥
शब्दोऽहनमसि सानन्दे स्पर्शिधामकनिसुन्दरः ।
स्पर्शोऽयोऽपि हठाधात्सूद्धीतादिकोऽध्रवः ।
परस्तः प्रतिविम्बवाच्छेदोऽहोऽूलनाकरः ॥ ३-३६ ॥

तदाह त्रेतेयादि । त्रेतीत एवं सिथते सतितथेः । नमसीति त्रेतेव शब्दस्य नैमेयन्तवः ।
स च परस्तः सन्त प्रतिविम्बनमहितीत्यन्तः । पएतव सर्वेऽयोऽयाः । सानन्दैयात्सन्दोऽथात्मकेकन्द्रहङ्गु
लातुतलातुतलादावाधारिवधेः । त्रेतोऽह हि स्पर्शस्य नैमेयन्त्वामिश्वुनोपोमोगसमु
चितः । स्पर्शोऽ प्रतिसंकामिति येन धारणैऽयोऽसूदसूवाधारिनः । अत्येवात्सन्दगतिसाक्षातः
त्लात सुन्दरं इत्यूक्तम । अत्युऽहुऽसूदकारित्वात्सन्दसूद्रोऽपि स्पर्शोऽद्यूऽहुऽवाधारिकेके म
स्तम्भजठसूद्रस्वलक्षणरूप्यंति आधारिवधेः प्रतिसंकामिति येन मूऽचोऽधारिनः ॥ परस्तः
िति पराभूतं प्रमानमः । त्रेतोऽह हि स मूऽचः । प्रतिविम्बववत्वं चायस्य कृतोऽत्त्वेः । इत्यथा प्रतिविम्बवाच्छेदोऽरू
णादिरूपायनस्य एवं स्यातः । प्रतिविम्बववत्त्वं चायस्य कृतोऽत्त्वेः । प्रतिक्रियाय तस्मातेव चायस्य कृतोऽत्त्वेः ॥ ३५-३६ ॥

440 IPV, vol. 1, p. 160 kocit tu duñkhåcgalà na muttagandhagathakirmanadikàntaçuabhabh]],
440 sänande J KED; cânande T 440 MMP vs. 59 (p. 148) writes cânandasparśadhānani
441 sundarā K2; svandarā K2 G. 442 parasthā K2; parasthā K3 442 svadeh J KED; svādhō K3 442 ‘oddhinānakarah J KED, K2 LTS p. 11; ‘oddhinānakarah J2 K3
443 ‘anvayah J KED; ‘sambandah G 445 ‘nātmakam J KED; nātmakam K2 447 sundara J KED; svandara K2 G 447 ‘sundara J KED; ‘svandara K2 G 449 parastha J KED; parasya
450 smaryamāna J KED; smaryamāne Lk2 450 laksyate J KED; laksate G

442 K2 has a upadhānīya on the top of the alphabet pra in parasthapatritibimba
443 ‘oddhinānakarah is also proposed by Sanderson on the basis of MMP. K2 J mentions
444 ‘oddhinānakarul in Devanāgari script. 445 etu is missing from G Lk2 L. 445 hi is added
446 atīṣāya in āndātiṣāya is missing from G. 448 In K2 Lk2 G L the text from
449 sa looks like missing from
440 K2 443 Lk2 17v 446 G 18r
नन्मेवमर्थक्रियाकारित्वादेश मुख्य एव स्पष्टः किं न भवतित्वाशास्त्रां

न चैव मुख्यस्तत्कार्यपारम्पर्यप्रकाशनात् ॥ ३-३७ ॥

मुख्य इति विद्व मूलः। तत्स्य स्पर्शस्य यत्कार्यमानन्ददं। तत्स्य वह पारम्पर्य प्रबन्धेन प्रयत्नः। तत्स्यानवादस्ताद्। सास्त्रिद्वी मृत्तियन्तेचर्यामविच्छेदन्वेंद्रव्याधित्वे, न चैवमिहेत्वस्य न मुख्यस्त ॥ ३७ ॥

पत्तेवधाव्यायामितिदाशित

एवं ध्रुवान्तरेण गन्धो रसो दन्तोदके स्मुटः ॥ ३-३८ ॥

दन्तोदक इति निर्माणसन्मुणुके रसोद्वाधिशानभूत इत्यतः ॥ ३८ ॥

एवं प्रतिश्रुत्वाददसादिप्रतिद्विवानामाणि रूपप्रतिविभाजितीयतलं कटाक्षय यथासंभवं व्य-वर्षा दृश्ययति

यथा च रूपं प्रतिविभिन्त्वं दृश्यो- ने चैवधाव्याय विना हि दृश्ययते ।

453 eva [ KED G^ac; evaïṣa G^pc 454 mukhyastat^a J2
456 prabandhena [ KED; pratibandhena G 456 anavabhäsana[t J KED; anavanâ-sât K2 456 kāryamavicchedenaiva [KED; kāryamavacchedenaiva Lk2; kāryamavacchedeneva L 457 asya na J KED; na asya D Lk2 L 460 sputah [KED; sputāh K3; sputa[t K2 Lk2 466 yathā ca J KED; yathāvad K3 J2; yathā hi G; yaccaiva L 466 śaṁyena [KED G^pc; śaṁye G^ac; śaṁyena J2; caksuśānaya K2

453 eva missing from G. K2 Lk2 L read eko.

455 L 112r 455 K2 459 Lk2 18v 463 G 19v

201
तथा रसपर्शार्मिार्मार्मादिकः
न लक्ष्येऽक्षेषण विना रथानः त्वपि || ३-३९ ||

इहावभासनमाऽसारमतृसति बमाः अवभासनं च तवेचेकोऽवलयं
कुशलं तवेचेकोऽवलयं जातम्। कुशलं तवेचेकोऽवलयं जातं नाम सङ्केत्योऽवलयं
कुशलं तवेचेकोऽवलयं जातं तवेचेकोऽवलयं जातं

एवं यथेन्द्रतथा रसादि प्रतिसंकालं सर्वतिमचेव येववायमार्मन्त्रेण सुनर्थ लक्ष्येऽ
कुशलं तवेचेकोऽवलयं जातं तवेचेकोऽवलयं जातं

467 hi lakṣyate [Kṣa] vilakṣyate J2; abhilakṣyate K3 468 rasasparsana'[a] Kṣa GPr; rasasparsana' GAc; sasparśana' K3 469 'kṣena [Kṣa]; kena K2 469 avabhāsamātrā [Kṣa]; bhāsanāmātrā Kṣa ika; avabhāsamātrā G Lk2Pr 469 avabhāsanam ca [Kṣa]; avabhāsamānam ca Kṣa 470 'anugrahā'] Kṣa; 'anugrahā' G 471 adhiṣṭhitam [Kṣa]; adhiṣṭhite L 472 'krāntam [Kṣa]; 'krante G 472 caksurāndriyena [Kṣa]; caksurāndriyena L 473 caksurāndriyantaravāyāyāpāra [Kṣa G Lk2Pr]; caksurāndriyantaravāyāyāpāra K2 Lk2Ac L 474 'kuṣalāsūnye [Kṣa GPr]; śūnye GAc 474 caksurāndriyapayo [Kṣa]; caksurāndriyapayo G 475 yāvatvayam evam [Kṣa GPr]; yāvatvayam K2 GAc; yāvatvayam D 475 'nādīvad [Kṣa]; 'nādīkavad K2 Lk2. 476 tena na indriya'] [Kṣa]; tenyendriya' K2 GAc; tenyendriya' GPr 476 antareṇatāni' [Kṣa]; antareṇatāni Lk2Ac; antareṇatāni Lk2Ac 477 rasādi pratishāṃkrāntam [Kṣa GPr]; rasām pratishāṃkrāntam G Ac 478 avabhāsānanyā [Kṣa]; avabhāsamānanyā L.

470 According to Kṣa dṛṣṭā is missing from Kṣa ika. It is also missing from K2 Lk2. 473 bhi in abhilakṣyate missing from Lk2. 473 na is missing from K2 475 eva is missing from K2 Lk2. 478 Lk2 writes upapattyāḥ

466 J2 9r 474 Lk2 18r 474 L 113v 474 K2 476 G 19v
लक्ष्यत इति न स्वकाणपनेतदपातम, अन्यथा हि व्याप्रियमाणमापि चक्षुरादि न कितिविरिच्छन्यात।

ननु इह रूपश्ववद्योरसन्तक्षुः श्रोतादी वहिष्ठ दर्पणाकाशादि प्रतिविम्बयोगः इति वाह्यः प्रति, विकस्मान्यसंवंधिभ्यं चछुः श्रोताभ्यः परिविच्छिधत इत्युपपन्म। रस्स्फार्दि पुनर्न्यवधि एव कन्दुदो प्रतिसंयकान्तिति तत्र स्थःतम। तत्वस्तानास्य नित्यादुवन्त्वाच अनन्य संबिन्नो वायुनियुक्तानास्य विषयो न भवेत। तत्वकथामुखुः रूपप्रतिविम्बवदन्तदशेण विना न लक्ष्यत इति।

॥ ३९ ॥

तदाहः

न चान्तेर स्पर्शनाम्राणिन स्थःतम।
बहिः सङ्क्वदन्यायाक्षिधियः स गोचरः।॥ ३-४० ॥

आन्तेरित अन्तःद्वृत्तित्वात। स्पर्शनाम्राणेनृपक्षणः। तेन गन्धर्ष्यक्रोपिग्रहणः। अन्तः अक्षराधितान्तरस्पर्शाद्यमाख्यः बहिः सङ्क्वः इति विशेषणार्थः हेतु।। स इति गोचराश्वययोऽन्निदेशः।। पयूपन्तःद्वृत्तित्वत्वाक्ष्यन्दोः स्पर्शादिक्षरस्य च चक्षुरङ्गकाशिवः। प्रमाणातः इन्द्रयोगचरतान्नास्तीति।॥ ४० ॥

तत्र स्थःत्त्व स्पर्शादित्त्वान्तःकरणापितज्ञनसंवन्तियब्यापारादेव निर्भरसत इत्याः

479 अधिष्ठानम् | K<sub>ED</sub>; अधिष्ठाना K<sub>2</sub>
479 लक्षयते | K<sub>ED</sub>; लब्यते K<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup>
481 प्रतिबिम्बयोगः | K<sub>ED</sub>G<sup>ac</sup>; प्रतिबिम्बनयोगः K<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup>G<sup>pc</sup>
483 तत्परः | K<sub>ED</sub>; सध्याचार्यानि सिन्धुमार्गितानि इति विशेषणार्थः हेतु।
484 विवाहः | K<sub>ED</sub>; नावयात् G<sub>2</sub>Lk<sub>2</sub>L
484 रूपप्रतिबिम्बवादः | K<sub>ED</sub>; रूपप्रतिबिम्बनवादः K<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup>
488 स्पर्शनाद्हामानि सिंहानि | K<sub>ED</sub>, K<sub>3</sub>Lk<sub>2</sub><sup>ac</sup>; स्पर्शनाद्हामानि सिंहानि सिन्धुमार्गितानि
490 द्वारकाः | K<sub>ED</sub>; द्वारेन गर्भम् उत्तरहार्यतिवतः | K<sub>ED</sub>; अन्तर्दहार्यतित्वप्रकाशः कृतानि

483 ca missing from G.L. 484 In G.tat in tattkatham is missing. 488 According to K<sub>ED</sub> the verse 41 has been inserted immediately after verse 40 in the Ms K<sub>ED</sub><sup>ka</sup>. In D K<sub>3</sub>G Lk<sub>2</sub>L verse 3.41 is read together with 3.40. 490 Lk<sub>2</sub> seems to read anksāñadhīga instead of anvikṣadāhyā.
अतो यथोकादान्तर्वचनादि करणाः कथा। तदा तदादि तत्तदादिः करणकथा स्वाभाविक रूपमात्र यथा।

अतो यथोकादान्तर्वचनादि करणाः कथा। तदा तदा तदादि तत्तदादिः करणकथा स्वाभाविक रूपमात्र यथा।

तदा तदा तदादि तत्तदादिः करणकथा स्वाभाविक रूपमात्र यथा।

वापि वियोजनानि। करणकथा स्वाभाविक रूपमात्र यथा।

नु समयराहस्यणां मनोरोधी एवं वैव्रतार्थे।

न षु समयराहस्यणां मनोरोधी एवं वैव्रतार्थे।

अति राहस्यवाक्यं नस्ते यथोकादान्तर्वचनादि करणाः कथा।

न षु समयराहस्यणां मनोरोधी एवं वैव्रतार्थे।

न षु समयराहस्यणां मनोरोधी एवं वैव्रतार्थे।

न षु समयराहस्यणां मनोरोधी एवं वैव्रतार्थे।

495 svakatädrga [K$_{ED}$; svakatām drk$^2$] J$_2$ 495 tádrgindriya$^a$ [K$_{ED}$; tádrgindriyaam L 495 “nāntah K$_{ED}$; “nānta T” 495 yadda kṛta [K$_{ED}$; kṛta yadda D K$_2$ G Lk$_2$ L 497 tadā tadā tattam [K$_{ED}$ K$_3$; tadā tadā tat K$_{ED}$ la 502 “māttaam [K$_{ED}$; “mātram Lk$_2$. Consider EMENDATION 505 svakṣetra [K$_{ED}$; svakṣetra K$_2$ L 506 “kāri - ityāha [K$_{ED}$; “kāri - ityāha K$_{ED}$ la 508 smṛtā”$^a$K$_2$ J$_2$ 508 “dṛtā” [K$_{ED}$; ṣṛtā G 508 kila [K$_{ED}$; kila T

496 tadā [K$_{ED}$; yadda T 499 K$_{ED}$ writes aduṣṭam which is obviously a typo 503 ādi in ānandādi is missing from Lk$_2$ 503 atra is missing from K$_2$ L 503 In Lk$_2$ tra in cātra is added later.

495 K$_2$ 124v 496 G 20v 501 G 20r 501 Lk$_2$ 19r 502 K$_2$ 124r 506 L 114v

204
समागतं सतिनिदितस्तथाक्रियं ॥ ३-४२ ॥
सम्प्रतिदितं वहिष्करणसंभवं उक्तं । तथ्या अतीताधिविषयत्वात् । मानसत्वनस्य हि सुग- 
मिथ्यवृक्षादिनि बहिष्करणसंभवनि विषयों भविदितं भावं । अतं भवेत् न तु न भवेदेवत्यभिप्रायः । 
सर्वभावानादिनि हि सप्ताहृदि स्यात्, किंतु न तत्रत्वां, प्राप्तभिन्नात्मसंभवतः । 
अतं हेतुः सा किंतु वर्तमानस्तितं । किंतुरां हेतुः । यतं सार्थकियं वर्तमानतं, ब- 
हि संभवतं एवाध्यात्मित्यं । तं तथापि अतिरिक्तों । अतं उक्तार्थिविम्यालाभं संभवन् 
उक्तिः स्पष्टं तदं विद्यते यथानिद्विप्यानि, समागतं दत्तशास्त्रिक्यं । अतं एव विद्यतं सन् 
तथाक्रियं सत्यनिर्देशिक्यकारि भवतथायं ॥ ४२ ॥

नन्दे तसं एवाध्यात्मश्चाश्रमशास्तृतात् वहिष्करणं संभवनं स्पष्टविषयं अतिरिक्त 
तीति स्मृत्यादि को नामाधिक्रियामेव कुर्यात् । वस्तवत्तत्वत्वमध्ये परिकल्पत्वत्तेषायाम 
असभ्यं बाह्यगतस्तथा तार्थवः.

510  “varas”] Kṣṛ; “varas”] T । 510 समागताः [ Kṣṛ; समागताः J3; समाय- 
510 ताः K5 । 510 सन्दिताः [ Kṣṛ; सन्दिताः K5 । 510 क्रियाः [ Kṣṛ; क्रियाः K5 । 
511 बहिष्करणसंभवाः [ Kṣṛ; बहिष्करणसंभवā] Kṣṛka । 512 शुद्धिः [ Kṣṛ; शुद्धिः Kṣṛ] । 
512 बहिष्करणसंभवाः [ Kṣṛ; बहिष्करणसंभवाः Kṣṛka । 513 रीति न भवेत् रीति न भवेत् । रीति न भवेत् [ Kṣṛ; रीति न भवेत् Kṣṛ] । 
514 प्राकृतिकनिर्देशिक्रियाः [ Kṣṛ; प्राकृतिकनिर्देशिक्रियाः Kṣṛka] । 515 बाह्य- 
515 गताः Kṣṛ; संभवन [ Kṣṛ; संभवन Kṣṛka । 516 बहिष्करणसंभवाः G5 । 
516 ‘सम्प्रागतिः सम्प्रागतिः Kṣṛka । 517 बहिष्करणसंभवाः G5 । 
517 ‘सम्प्रागतिः सम्प्रागतिः Kṣṛka । 518 सम्प्रागतिः सम्प्रागतिः Kṣṛka । 519 बाह्य- 
519 गताः G5 ।
र्व एवं तर्मन्त्रतिविभिन्नतत्व ।
करोति तत्त्वं स्पर्शवर्ग: सुखात्मकं
स चापि चर्यामपि नाहिसंतति ॥ ३-४३ ॥

बाध्यविभागे तत्तत्त्व: स्मृतादविविक्तपरेषैः दिखित: र्व एवाकारीभूत: स्मर्तं तु
बाध्य: तर्मन्त्र स्पर्शवर्गादृशौ प्रतिविभिन्न: सन तथा चीत्यादितत्वाः सुखात्मकाः तामथाभिन्नताः
किवां करोतिक बाध्याभिः |

नन्तु कन्दः नन्त्तु स्पर्शवर्गाः संभवात किं सर्वं स्पर्शाः प्रतिविभिन्न: उत्त कुकुटनु्षेन
करत्सितमिदु नाहिसंतत्त्वार्थम: कन्दः
द्वाधारविशेष इत्याः 

नन्त्र द्वाधारविशेषादृशौ कृष्णचिन्हे किंदेवाधारविशेषाः संभवात्तिव: य- विभेषण नैतिकतानाः
तालुका इव घण्ठा तन्त्रेण तेषां चर्यासंकानितिरिति भावः ॥ ४३ ॥

एवं प्रतिविभिन्नस्ताच्चमुपपाध्य योजयति
तेन संविश्वासलमुकुते विश्वासानि

523 “tathā | KṣE; taddā Kṛ.2 G J₂ L
524 sparsāvarah sukhaṁ KṣE lḥa; sparsāparsukaṁmakaṁ Kṛ.3; sparsāvarah sukhaṁ Kṛ.3
dō Kṛ J₂ G Lk₂ L; sparsāvarah sukhaṁ KṣE T
525 sa cāpi | KṣE K₁; sa cāpitā KṣE lḥa
526 san tathā | KṣE; samstathā Kṛ.2 G Lk₂ L
527 sa cāpi | KṣE G’T; sa pṛī Kṛ.2 G’ac Lk₂
530 kandādhārayād KṣE; kandādārāyād D KṣE lḥa; KṣE G’S Kṛ.2 Lk₂ L
531 ‘vaiṣamān KṣE; ‘vaiṣamān D Kṛ.2
534 upapādyā | KṣE; pratisparīdaya KṣE lḥa

522 lāḍrśāḥ is glossed in Lk₂ but is not very clear. 523 tāṁ is glossed by kṛiṣiṁ in Lk₂.
525 KṣE mentions the Ms KṣE lḥa writes tatsadāsūryāḥ together. 530 In G there is some correction made for prādhānyā, but the correction on the left margin also
writes prādhānyā which probably means that the original reading would have been different.
531 prati in pratīsūryānti is missing from G Lk₂

525 L₁₁₄r G₂₁v 528 Lk₂₁v
नाथस्य वदतेःमुख्य विषमलं विश्वरूपताम् ॥ ३-४४ ॥

तेन समन्नतरोक्षेत हेतुना विष्ठं, सवितरिव स्वन्ततातिशिवायन्मकुः, तस्मिनात्मान-भवात् प्रत्यषयेदं दददमुख्य सविष्ठयात्ममो नाथस्य विषमलं युक्तानुभोपदित्वहितवाववतं विश्वरूपतं स्वात्माभिः वदते भासयित। सवितरिववेषक्षेत्रेन समुद्धीततीतो जात् । तेन नवितिमेतेधं जगत सविष्ठयात्मन्: परमेशक्तवेत्तरूपमिति पिण्डधाः। यदृङ्ग प्रज्ञाल्लाघृः

पदेन ताहिः जगदेकस्यकर्त्यचिन्तनः
यथोत्तिधिनाय रुपमस्तु कि न: क्षीरतृ इति।

वदृङ्ग इति भास्सोपभाषाः (पां  सू  १। ३। ४५) इत्यदिनः भासन आत्मनेष्टम् ॥

543 This is a verse from the Prajñālankārakīrtī of Śaṅkaraṇandesu. Dr Vincent Eltschinger who is working on a critical edition of this text tells me that it could be a verse from the first two chapters of the Prajñālankārakīrtī since the unique manuscript of this text containing the stanzas from the first two chapters are totally illegible.

536 arpayat [ K<ED; arpayet K<3]; samarpayan J<2  536 vadate [ K<ED; vadane T]
538 samvittātmano [ K<ED; samvītātmano K<2]  539 upapādītatvāniravasyām [ K<ED; upapādītām niravadyām G K<ED kā; upapādītatvāniravasyām Lk<2 L]  539 samvittār”[ K<ED K<2 m; samvittir”K<2 m]  539 sphurati [ K<ED; sphuranti K<ED kā; kā; K<2  539 yāvat [ K<ED; bhāvah Lk<2  541 evaikasya [ K<ED; ekasyaikasya K<ED kā]

539 In L the scribe has an eye-skip confusing itīti in sphurantītī and bhavatītī.
540 In G and Lk, the line na khalu darpānādeh śvādāhrājukhādeh prthak svātāntreyena pratibhāso bhavatītī bhāvah / is missing. It is clear that the scribe has had an eye skip from the itī bhāvah of the previous sentence to the itī bhāvah of the sentence following it. G, however, has the line written on the right margin of the same folio.  541 D K<2 Lk<2 L read prajñālankārepi  542 eva in ekasyairu is missing from K<2 Lk<2 L.  544 K<2 Lk<2 L read sambhā-śaṃte.

542 G 22v  542 L 115v  543 K<2 125r
ननु संविवेनतिरिक्तमेव चेदिर्थं तस्यिवित्त्वाचकतात्तस्य तद्भर्मितममपि स्वातं। स- त्यम। अस्तग्ने तदिनि बालस्थानपुरः सरमहाः

यथा च गन्धरुपसयुगाया: प्रतिविभिन्नता:।
तदाधारोपरमणेन मानितु सत्यं मुखादिवित। ॥ ३-४५ ॥
तथा विश्वमिदं वोपो प्रतिविभिन्नतमाग्रियेत्।
प्रकाशश्वतवत्त्वप्रभृति यर्मिविततरम्। ॥ ३-४६ ॥

इह सल्लु रुपादयं प्रतिविभिन्नता: सत्त्वस्यापि धिश्विणाथेनववायमानत: यथा च येन तद्भर्मितान्तरतत्त्वात मुखं तथा महति स्थमे वा दृश्यं तथावेनित।

भयैः धर्म प्रकाशं प्रतिविभितं सत्त्व प्रकाशमानवादितं तद्भर्मितान्तरत्त्वं स्वीकृतं देवत्त्वं।

प्रकाशदाननिरिक्तव एव हि विश्ववर्य प्रकाशमानवादि स्वत्त्वम।
अन्यथा हि प्रकाशमानवायोगमानबृविठ-दृष्टिस्फुरौिशत।
अतं रुपः च यथा च स्वयं प्रकाशमानवादवादरस्य व्यात्त्वयम।
प्रकाशदाननिरिक्तव च हि स्वरूप नीलसुखवादस्य विश्वमय प्रकाशाधूपतलात्त्व स्वात्मनान न प्रकाशं: अपि तु परेणिति

548 tad J KED; etat K2 G L  548 bāhyadṛśṭāntapūrāhsāramāhā J KED; bāhyapratibimbodṛśṭāntapūrāhsāramāhā yāhā D K2 G L K2 L  550 pratibimbatāh J KED; pratibimb śīthi G

551 khadge mukhāhāvat J KED K2; khadgamukhāhāvat KED ka  552 prakāsāvatā J KED; prakāśāvatām L  555 avabhāsante J KED; bhāsante L K2 L  554 taddharmodyavatā"yā J KED; taddharmāphōṣātāyā L; taddharmādhyavatāyā L; taddharmātāvyā L; taddharmātāvyā Lapa K2  554 uparākatāyā

mukham tathā mahati sūkṣme vā J KED; uparākatāyatā mahati sūkṣme vā KED lā  554 tadādvā J KED; tadā L K2  556 prakāśādantātrikatā J KED; prakāśādantātrikatā G L; prakāśādantātrikatā K2  558 tṛupatvāyat J KED; tṛupatvābhavāt G KED ka

547 The tsa in ātmakātāttasāya is missing from G Lk2.  550 K3 has a upādhyāntya on the top of the alphabet prā in pratibimbatāh  552 prabhrtim dhārma] KED; prabhṛtihdharma J2  556 In Lk2: the text from prakāśādantātrikatāta....to parāpaksāyam pāratantryaṁ bhavedāti bhāvaḥ / is missing. The text is, however, added on the right margin of the same page. This is another instance of the scribe of Lk2 having an eye skip between stālantryam and pāratantryam  556 L writes prakāśamāṇam.  558 tsa is missing from L.

547 Lk2 21 v  547 D  551 J2 10 v  552 K3 17 v  557 G 22 r  208
पराप्रायां परतत्त्व भवेदिति भक्त: । अत एव च सबवेवें वेदज्ञानं प्रकाशतानं: परमेश्वरस्य
रत्न शरीरीभूतिमि प्रकाशत्वादिप्लमेव । तत् तु कृतः
प्रबंधितोपि ब्रह्मयो: सारस्यमनस्तत्त्वाविकल्पन्य: । इति ।

तथा

एकेकस्यापि तत्चति पशुवतात्तचरुपतः ।

इति च ॥ ५५-५६ ॥

ननु रूपार्द्वीं महावत्तनिष्ठ विषीषेदित्विवेद्यविश्वाति नृत्यादिति त्रियुधि प्रकाशेन, तत्कर्त्य रूपार्द्वीं-
वयुक्तं निक्षिन्तं विश्वमरास्मिन्य्योपे नृत्यादितियुविश्वात्तात्तत: ।

यथा च सर्वेऽस्य स्वच्छोऽस्मि सर्वतो भवेत् ।

प्रतिविम्यतं तथा वृष्णे सर्वेऽस्य स्वच्छतात्ताजुः ॥ २-५७ ॥

561 Also quoted in the TÄV-1.165, 4.98, 12.5, 28.376  563 Also quoted in the TÄV-14.45-46
559 sarvamevedam | KED; sarvamidaṃ | K2 G Lk2 L  560 saṁrībhūtamitī | KED G="; saṁrībhūtpraṇāyamika KED "h; saṁrībhūtapam K2 Lk2 L  561 pradeśo | KED; prādeśa G  561 rūpyam | KED; rūpam L  563 sāṭrīṃśattvārūpātā | KED; sāṭrīṃśādṛśupāt G Lk2 "ac; sāṭrīṃśattvārūpā Lk2 "c  566 pratipāditaṃ | KED; upapāditaṃ D K2 KED "h Lk2

559 ca missing from G  561 K2 G Lk2 L read ceti instead of cātākalyāṣcā  565 ca is missing
from K2 L  568 e on the top of sphaṭīke is not visible in K2 because it is concealed under a small patch of paper that has been used to restore the binding of the Ms  568 o on the top of saruṣa is not visible in K2 because it is concealed under a small patch of paper that has been used to restore the binding of the Ms

559 K2 106v  560 L 115r  566 Lk2 21r

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सर्वं इति स्फटिकः सर्वस्य: पूर्वपाराविकाया दिशः। बोधपसे सर्वस्माधापदेः।

यथापि सर्वः स्वच्छे स्फटिके सर्वतो रूपमात्रप्रतिविम्बेभवेदिति नास्ति द्वादशस्त्र
पादप्रतिविम्बश्रणसहिष्णू बोधे सार्यं, तथापि यथायथं स्वच्छतातिसारसंबन्धादु भावानं
प्रतिविम्बश्रणोत्तरक्षप्रतिपादितिष्ठया एतदुपास्यं। तथाहि दर्शणस्य पुरुषोभागेऽव स्फटिकर्ष
च सर्वं एव स्वच्छतातिसारय इत्येषां यथायथं प्रतिविम्बमुहारीणः
तातरस्य संधिवेत्ति। एवं सोधस्यापि सर्वः स्वच्छतवादुपाद्रितप्रतिविम्बमुहारीणसंधियमिति।
एवं च स्फटिकाद्वित्त्वन्तरस्यः बोध इति तत्स्पष्टः॥ ४७॥

नेतु का नामास्ति ततोऽपत्न्तन्त्यस्य चतुः

अत्यन्तत्रचछतता सा यत्वाकृत्यनवभासनम्।

570 mātrapratibimbam eva bhaved | KṛD | mātrabimbam eva bhavati KṛDkha | mātrapratibimbam eva bhavati KṛD | mātrapraitimbigam bhavati D Kṛ G L
571 pratibimbagrahamasahināu | KṛD GPC | pratibimbasahināu Gac L
573 svacchātātisasambhavād bhāvanām | KṛD | svacchātātisasambhavābhāvānam Lk2
574 ṛupāttam | KṛD | “rupāditam Lk3 575 pratibimbagrahāta tāratapam | KṛD | pratibimbatāratapam G 575 grahāne sāmārthyaṃ | KṛD | grahāne pya-
sāmārthyaṃ D Kṛ Kṛ kha Lk2; grahanetanta sāmārthyaṃ G 576 “svaccho bod-
haṃ | KṛD | svaccho tyāha Gac | svaccho bodhah ityāha GPC 579 atyanta | KṛD | ādy-
nta T

570 iti missing from L. 571 In K2 the scribe has had an eye-skip confusing between
sarcasmād and sphaṭike sarvaḥ because of which the text in between in missing from K2.
571 eva missing from L. 572 K2 has the text between pratibimbagrahamasahināu and prati-
bimbagrahāta tāratapam saṁbharavā missing because of the scribe’s eye-skip. 572 In G on
the top of f.22r it writes: svacchātātisasambhavād bhāvanāṃ pratibimbagrahamātāratapam prati-
pipādayaisaiddudvāma tathā 1ī darpanaśaṃ puro bhāga eva khadgasāṃ pūrvaparabhāgga eva spha-
tikasya ca sarvāta eva svacchātātīśa ityāśam pratibimbagrahāta tāratapam. 572 In Lk3
the text from svacchātātisasambhavād to svacchātātīśa ityāśaṃ yathāyathām is missing as the
main text. However the missing text has been added later on the left margin of the same
page. The scribe seems to have had eye-skip because of yathāyathām. There is hence same
part of the text missing from L as well. 576 ca missing from G L 576 G writes atya-
nta svaccho bodha ityāha atyantaśaccha... 576 In K2 the text between sphaṭikādaśaśyanta-
svaccho and tato śāsadāśyantaśaccha (this is a part of the avatārakā of the next verse) is
missing probably because of scribe’s eye-skip. 579 ya in yatsvākrt is inserted later in K3
579 “tā śā” is not visible in D.

572 G 22v 575 D

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अत: स्वच्छतमो बोधो न रल्य ल्वा कृतिधात ॥ ३-४८ ॥

इह सलु प्रकाशः स्वप्रकाशलाभ स्वालमन पद प्रकाशते न परस्परसमनेकाश्रयः
त्वमभागमिव न स्मृतवातिष नास्य स्वतन्त्रकारिज्ञानात्त्वादिक्यं येनकारावभासोऽपि
स्यात्। इह स्वच्छवेह हि अस्वच्छस्वत्त्वितिमहं चिन्तकुस्तुष्‌कृत्यवित्तिमव स्फटिककारणीः
न च परप्रस्तुतकृष्ण प्रकाशप्रेषण अन्यदिकस्वच्छ तितिदर्शधिरत यद्यान्त्वपाद्यायशहनिपुरण
स्वादिशि युक्तमुक्तव्यतान्तस्वच्छत ता यत्वाकृत्यनवभासनमिति। स्फटिकादि पुनःब्रह्म
त्वादेतदेश्यथा न स्वच्छम। यथा यथा हि सुष्क्ष्मे वेदता तथा तथा स्वच्छवस्याभाव इति
भावः। अनेनेकातृत्रावेण पूणः

नेतमल्य मुक्तमेतस्य संविवास्य सर्वत्।

ेंशांशिकातः कायन्यत् [विपर्यं तत्तद्विच्छया ॥

इत्यादिना बोधस्य तत्तदेनेषणे केवलवात्र भावानां च स्वच्छवस्य मुक्तमेतस्यतथा हृदविध्वनम्
। एवं दृष्टान्ति स्वच्छ स्फटिकें स्वच्छतरं बोधस्य स्वच्छतम इत्याशयः ॥ ४८ ॥

589 TĀ-3.9

580 tvākṛtā ॐ Kṛd K₃; svākṛtā ॐ Kṛd ka G 581 eva ] Kṛd L₂k₂ F; e K₂ L₂k₂ ac
582 ityanyāpeksanāt ] Kṛd; ityanyāpeksanāt Kṛd ka; ityananyāpeksanāt G 582 ॐ gandhamātra ] Kṛd; ॐ gandhomātra L 583 syāt ] Kṛd K₂ J L₂k₂ F; bha-
vēt K₂ ak L₂k₂ 583 ["dukūla"] Kṛd; ["dugūla"]L₂k₂ 584 sphaṭikamanau] em;
sphaṭikamanij G Kṛd L₂k₂; sphaṭikamanij Kṛd ka 584 parapramātrekāraṃ
prakāśapekṣyam ] Kṛd; parapramātrekāraprakāśapekṣaḥ G ac;
parapramātrekāraprakāśapekṣa G ac 584 adadhičhyaacam ] Kṛd; adadhičhyaacam svaccham G 586 sputāvedyātā ] Kṛd; sputāvedyātā D K₂ G L 589 ॐāmsāṃsikaṭāh
] Kṛd G F; ॐāmsāṃsikaṭāh G ac

583 hi is missing from G. 584 In L rūpa is missing and it writes ॐ apekṣyaṇya L.
590 K₂ writes yeṣaṁ before lādilārēvaṁ and also writes kecana instead of kecāṇa.

583 L₂k₂ 22v 583 L₁₁6v 589 G 23r

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तदेव संवित्तातिबिम्बेन विकृत्य सर्वंः संभवत्यपयु प्रातिविम्बसः अर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসं�्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंক्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंক्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थসंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थ스ंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽर्थसंक्षिप्ततेऽর্থসংক্ষিপ্ততাঃ বিষমবিশিষ্টতাঃ তত্ত্বেচ্ছিং প্রতিবিম্বেন বাদ্যস্থেন সমমতে। ॥ ৩-৪৯ ॥

তদীয় প্রতিবিম্বেন বিকৃত্য সর্বেঃ সমভবসামম আর্থ কথিততে স্থিতভাবানীতে বিশেষ ইত্যাদি।

ইহ খট্ট মুদ্রাপ্রণীতা বিম্বেন বিকৃত্য সর্বেঃ সাত্ত্বিক মহাবিভাগীঃ। যদা পানল্পর্বতে বিদ্যমান তথাকথিত সম্ভবত: তদ বিভাগ প্রতিটি প্রতিবিম্বাদি লিখিত নির্দেশিত হয়।

ননু যথায়েতেতে তথ্যাপি নির্দিষ্টতমেহ কথ্য প্রতিবিম্বজন্যাদি ধিকন্তৃকারণ কথায়মিত্যাশশ্চ।

তথ্যাপি কারণ কিতিবিষ্মেননিষিদ্ধানাভিষিক্ততে।

তদপি প্রতিবিম্বাদিতি বোঝাত্যাহ ত্বস্ত। ॥ ৩-৫০ ॥

597 This verse is quoted in MMP 59 (p. 148).
598 khalu is missing from DGL. 599 punastasya is glossed below by mukhadeh in Lk2. 601 In D yathā jītā is missing, but is added later. 601 G writes mukhādṛktaḥ. 601 api is missing from L.
अत्र खल्ल बिम्बवचन प्रतिविम्बार्णकश्चम कारणामिथ्ये तत्त्व बोधादनिर्दिष्टमतिरिक्त वा। अतिरिक्तमवे तदनुयथा प्रतिविम्बमेव न विम्बम्। अतिरिक्तमवे च चुल्लाम्याभावत्।

तत्र नियमानुसार सुदर्शन तस्येव प्रतिविम्बलो विम्बमाविश्वास्यतामहे। II ५० II

एतदेवोपसंहरति।

इत्यथप्रतिविम्बार्णसदिच्छिन्यायार्धार्धतम।
सामाजिकमेव निर्देश प्रतिविम्बस्य जुम्मते। II ३-५१ II

एवकारे भिनकमः तेन प्रतिविम्बवेदः न पुनर्विम्बर्षापीत्यथः। विनिर्देशी न पुनर्विद्धे मुखाने। तत्र त्यति प्रतिविम्बवेद्योद्धारणी साम्यान्तिरेऽभावः। II ५१ II

ननु तये। परमप्रसांसेचवाते कर्य विम्बमावे प्रतिविम्बवेदः सज्ज्ञार्य इत्यहाः।

ननु विम्बस्य विरहे प्रतिविम्बमध्येते। किम कुमारौ दश्यते तच्चं ननु तद्भिम्बमुच्यताम। II ३-५२ II

एतदेव समासाते किम कुमारं इत्यहां। दश्यते इति न हि ट् पुरस्त्रप्रति नामाता भावः। ननु।

This verse is quoted in MMP 59 (p. 151).

608 कारणम्] K\(_E D\); dhāraṇa\(_K\(_2\); 609 atiriktam vā | K\(_E D\); atirikte tu K\(_E D\)\(^{ka}\) (?) 609 taduktayuktyā | K\(_E D\)\(_G\(_P\); tvaduktayuktyā D\(_Lk\(_2\)\(_G\(_L\) L. 614 sāmrājya\(_r\)] K\(_E D\); sāmrāja\(_L\). 616 bimbaprabhimbhayor | K\(_E D\); pratibimbabimbhayor K\(_2\) L\(_k2\) 618 bimbabhāve | K\(_E D\); bimbabhāve D\(_Lk\(_2\)\(_L\) 621 nanu | K\(_E D\); na tu T

608 tat in tatkin missing from L\(_k2\), but is added later on the right margin. In G kin is missing. 610 K\(_2\) writes “bhāsīṁ kūtidd.” 614 T seems to read “nyāyāśtra”instead of “nyāyāśtra”. 615 In G tu in eva is added later on the right margin. tu is missing from L. 616 hi is missing from K\(_2\) L. 618 eva is missing from K\(_2\) G L\(_k2\) L 623 iti is missing from G.

609 D 615 L\(_k2\) 23v 616 K\(_2\) 127v
न खलु वर्यः एवमहुः येदेवमुच्यते किं तु दशमानमिदं विशेष प्रतिविम्यतया न वाचयमपि
तु विमलतयेतयमिदं इत्याह ननु तद्विमुच्यतामिति ॥ ५२ ॥

पतेदे निराकरोति

नैवं तत्त्वाभावाविन्ध्यं किल्किमुच्यते ।
अन्यामिश्रं स्वतन्त्रं सद्यासमानं मुखं यथा ॥ ३-५३ ॥

tatākābāvayogatā । किं न नाम विमलत्त्वामित्याह विमलत्त्वादि ।
अन्यामिष्ठमिति सजातीयविनाजातीयवावदोत्तमित्यथः । अत एव स्वततत्र स्वरूपात्मानिन्दं पर-
स्य परिष्कर्तातुपपत्तेः । तथावे हि स ततः पृथभद्र न भवेदित्रिभावः । एवंहृतं चास्यावात-
वाधिततमेवास्ति प्रामाण्यमित्युप भास्माप्यात्मिति ॥ ५३ ॥

एवं विमलत्त्वान्तरं तत्रुत्त्वक्षत्तया तत्त्वाभावाय विमलत्त्वाय प्रतिविम्यतयां पीठिकावयं कर्तृं तदा-
धारस्य ताबुडः वर्धबादिसहिष्ठत्तां चोतिधितम्

विज्ञधारायणं परशारकालिति ।

629  This verse is quoted in MMP 59 (p. 152).
628  tallaksanabhavadbimbaṃ [KṣED ; lakṣaṇābhabhavabhādbimbaṃ Lk3] 629 sadbhāsa”[KṣED ; tadbhāsa”G L 632 paraniṣṭhatānupapateḥ [KṣED ; paraniṣṭhitānupapateḥ D ; pa-
raṇiṣṭhibhānupapateḥ K2 ; niṣṭhitattvopapatteriti hi sat KṣED kha 632 sa tataḥ J KṣED ; sa-
tah K2 L 635 nāntaram J em. nāntaraṃ KṣED
624  namu missing from G. 624 yadevamucate is missing from L. 625 K2 Lk2 L read ca instead of tu. 632 G Lk2 L read ca between parasa and paraniṣṭha... 632 On the left margin of G 24v it writes: vistarenavratitasārūrbhasādau +āsangrahaṃ pithikāvandhah ।
प्रतिविम्बात्मान सोका खज्जादशर्तात्त्विदिवत्।

इति प्रज्ञाज्ञारकारिकाधर्मिकरेरेन तक्षणामाह

स्वरूपान्रोहनेन पररूपसद्धशताम्।

प्रतिविम्बात्मातामहु् खज्जादशर्तात्त्विदिवत्॥ ३-५४॥

इह दर्पणाद्विनांतविरिणाकल्याणान्तः: स्वस्त्याभारणांक स्वस्त्यापरिवर्त्यातपोषय पर्यय मुखादं संबन्धनाः: रूपणेन वत् सारद्व तदेव प्रतिविम्बात्मानं न तु तद्वपालस्वादनमेव इति सर्वे एव वादन आहुः। नात्र कस्यपि विनिर्विद्वद्वितिरिति भावः। तद्भवे हि ऋकृणेनपुष्पोपिति दर्पणाय निर्मोक्तमुखस्यतिविम्बपरिश्रयं ऋकृणाधिको भवेत्। नगरायुपितिविम्बयोगोम्यनेकु-रूपपरियहात दर्पणायानके स्यात्। तेन यथा चित्तानावेतनेनेपिति चित्त्यानादृभावो एण्यानपादेतनेनकर्तयाकत्वमेव नानेक्तलम्। एवं दर्पणाद्विनेकः क्रतिविम्बयोगो नानेकुपरिपरित्तिनत नानेक्प्रथमः अति तु तसार्थ्यमात्रमेव। न च सार्थ्यमात्रेदेत तद्भवम्।

| 638 | According to Dr Vincent Eltschinger's preliminary edition of the Prajñālankārakārikā of Śaṅkararandana, this verse numbers 3.27cd-28ab. |

638 dharmāprahāṇena | KED | dharmāpaḥāṇena KED ka G 639 ca kāreṇa | KED | kāreṇa K2 640 parimandalatvāyātmanah | KED | parimandalatvāyātmanah KED ka G | tanatavamādālātvātmanah K2 643 rūpatāsādanam | KED | rūpatvāpādanam KED kva L | rūpatvāsādanam D K2 G Lk2 644 vipratipattiriti | KED | vimatiriti D 646 anekavedane'pi | KED | anekatvam syād KED ka | anekavadane'pi K2

639 iti is missing from G. 639 artha is missing from G ac L. 642 L writes in compound: svuṣṣoṣaḥārānarāparśāparītāyātmanah pi. 643 L writes 'ātvamācāvām. 645 'mukha' is missing from K2 Lk2. In Lk2 it is added later on the top. 645 In a pari in parīparāhe is missing. 647 sa in sadṛśā is added on the top in Lk2. da in "pāy melodica" is missing from G 648 D writes anekānāt rūpam. In K2 G tvā in anekārūpam is missing. In Lk2 tvā in anekārūpam is added later on the top. 648 tv is missing from G Lk2 L. 648 In G mātra in textisādṛšayāmātra is added later. 649 K2 writes "gāvahāt sadṛṣya".

638 K2 128v 641 G 24r 643 L 117r 643 D
तत्त्वार्थम् ॥ ५४ ॥

प्रतिविम्बस्य स्वविशेषतिः

उर्फ च सति बाध्योपि धीरकानेकवेदनातः।
अनेकसद्याकारा न तन्मेकति सौगते:॥ ३-५५ ॥

उक्तमिति प्रजालिङ्गासौः। तदुपक्तं ततः

तस्मात्तत्त्वपि बाध्यं प्रीतीकानेकवेदनातः।
अनेकसद्याकारा नानेकेव प्रसुप्यते इति ॥ ३-५५ ॥

नन्वेवमयिः प्रतिविम्बस्य लक्षणं न किंचिदुहुः स्वादित्याशः प्रदर्शं तद्वरसमेवाह

नन्वेवमयिः प्रतिविम्बस्य लक्षणं कि तदुच्चते ।
अन्यप्रकारणांपथात्तद्रुद्धाशकभासनम् ॥

प्रतिविम्बमिति प्रार्द्धपरं वदनं यथा ॥ ३-५६ ॥

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658 According to Dr Vincent Elsinger's preliminary edition of the Prajñālāṅkārākārikā of Śaṅkaranandana, this verse numbers 3.35. Also quoted in TĀV-7.24. 662 The verses 3.56cdef is quoted in MMP 59 (p. 152).


657 nā in nānekaivā added later in G. 659 na missing from K₂. 662 Verses 3.56cd are missing from K₂.

650 K₂ 128r 651 Lk₂ 24v 662 L 118v 662 G 25v
इह खल्च सवं एव वादिमस्तत्वतिप्रम्यः; यदनेन स्वाधिकरणभूतेन दर्षणादिना या व्यामिश्रणाः ततदत्त्म्यत तया योगात्तदनितिरिज्ञत्वावः॥ ततोत्त्वस्थात् तदव्यक्तस्यारणसेवः। व्योरत्त्दर्पणेऽद्विन्दुः पुष्कवतन्येवयुक्तक्रमे भासनं यस्य तत्त॥ तत्परत्निमित्यः। अनेन चार्वय वियवैपरीत्य दृश्यितम्। तद्यथा अन्यायिष्ठ स्वतत्ब चेतनुम्। एतत् पूवेव्य ब्रह्मक्षमानेन तीह न पुनरास्त्सम॥ ५६ ॥
प्रत्वत्वशादि बोधे किं प्रतिविभवति न भण्यते॥ ३-५७ ॥

इदं खल्च तत्भनुवानात्मकं विशेष बोधे प्रतिविभवं किं न भण्यते। अवस्थमेववाविधताः
व्यामित्यः। ययातिदधिमपीः दर्शणेऽव बोधेन प्रासात्त्दकाल्मवृ यह दर्शणादिव मुः
खर्य बोधाद्देशेन पुष्कर्यायक्त भासनं यस्य तत्त। न हि वकारमान्तनेषां किष्ठिदेवीदं भवाजां
स्पुर्द्दिति वावः॥ यदुकम् ।

670 This verse is quoted in MMP 59 (p. 152).

663 svādhikaraṇa[6] J KE; svādhikārāna G 664 tayā J KE; tathā K2 G L 664 tayā yogā- 

tananirikṣa-vādhe ta J KE; tathāyogādhatu-rikṣa-vādhe ta K2 G L; tathā yogādhatu-

rikṣa-vādhe G स Lक L; tathā yogādhatu-rikṣa-vādhe ta G प \ 666 anvāmiśram J KE; anvāmiśram K2 G L; taddhyānāmiśram G L 669 bodhamiśramadām J KE L प \; bo-

dhamiśramadām L स 670 bhāsanaṁ J KE D प; bhāsakāmaṁ D स 670 puratattvaṅi J KE L प; puratattvaṅi D J KE L 670 bhanyate J KE; bhāsyate MMP 59 (p. 152).
670 MMP writes bheda vā śākya-bhāsanaṁ | 671 atmakāmaṁ J KE; ārāmākham K2 प \ क् 673 mukhasya J KE; mukhyasya L 673 bhedena J KE L क L प; "bhinnena K2 L क L प \ 673 prthag J KE G प; apṛthag L

664 The a in vyāmiśraṇā is added later in G. 665 tat is missing from K2 G L. However, it

is not clear if this is the latter or the former tat. 667 G L writes iha later saying puna-
rīhāyaṁstam. 670 T writes bodhā[ā] bheda cāsākyabhāsanaṁ. 670 Verses 3.57ab is missing from J2 671 G प \ writes visūm. The original reading is not visible. 671 G प \ writes kiṃ. The original reading is not visible. 672 K2 writes darpanenteva instead of darpanenteva.
तददृष्टवर्णम्। जान्न वहिश्रत: प्रकाशते।
 जानात्ते नारधस्ता जानृत्य ततो जगता॥
 न हि जानात्ते भावः। केनिविशिष्यितता:।
 जानां तदात्मं प्रापमेतस्वादसीयते॥ इति।

tatha,

युगस्वदनाज्ञानिभयोरकरुपता।

इति॥ ५७॥

तदेवं प्रतिविमलेषण्योगेशि पिनिच्छ। विश्वस्य यदि निरनिमित्तमेव विब्लिश्चुयं तदुच्चताम।
 को दोषः। एष कष्ठु नास्ति विवादः। न चाव विदुष्यं भरः। ते हि वसन्नेणानिनिविश्वः।
 तव नान्यथा कर्त्तृ शाक्षम:। प्रतिविमलेषण्योगेश्वानाग्रोपादित्वं, विब्लिश्चुश्च च
 योज्यितुमहश्चत्राः। तदाह।

श्चiciency: स्वभावेणांकस्माच्छेदिनमुच्छ्वताम्।

678 This verse is attributed to the Śrīkālākārama in the TĀV-5.80cd and the Paramārtasa-

677 jānādṛte | KE | jānāśrte G 678 krtabh | KE; ‘krtah k₂ 680 vedanājñānajñeya | KE; vedenājñānajñeya k₂ Lk₂ 683 pratibimbalaśanayoge’pi viśvasya | KE; pratibimbagrahanaśayoge’pi bimbasya KE bha; pratibimbagrahanaśayoge’pi viśvasya k₂ Gèmes Lk₂ L; pratibimbalaśanagrahaśayoge’pi viśvasya Gèmes 683 bimbavatva'] | KE Lk₂ ac; pratibimbavatva Lk₂ ac

680 G does not read à in vedanà but marks it on margin. 685 KE has kartu, and not kartum 685 K₂ writes: lañasanaya ca yoṣajyitum.

675 Lk₂ 25v 676 D 680 L 118r 683 G 25r
प्राज्ञा वस्तुतः युज्यते न तु सामयिके ध्वनोऽ ॥ ३-५८ ॥

अकस्मादिति निर्मलुकमित्वः ॥ ५८ ॥

ननु तत्त्वश्चयोगादिकत्रयः प्रतिविम्बल्ये यथुच्छये तदर्थो नान्स्वामकमव अभिप्रेयः ।
तत्त्व पुनःविम्बायायाय कारणमन्तः सद्वमाव एव कथो स्पृहितावशः

ननु न प्रतिविम्बस्य विना विभिन्नभवत्वति: ।

पृष्टेव प्रतिविधते

कि तत्: प्रतिविम्बे हि विभिन्न तादात्म्यवृत्ति: न ॥ ३-५९ ॥

कि तत् इति विभिन्ने वेच्यायाय स्वदेहार्थ: । न हि प्रतिविम्बे दिश्यितपत्ति
इव नूतनं विभिन्नकेल्मेव वर्त्ते । येन विभिन्नायेव प्रतिविम्बर्थिपि न स्यात् ॥ ५९ ॥

तदाहः

688 praṇā vāstu\[^{a}\] K\(_{ED}\); praṇāvāstu\[^{a}\] J\(_2\) 688 yuyjante J\(_{KED}\) K\(_3\); yudhyante K\(_{ED}\) bha L\(_{K2}\);
budhyante K\(_{ED}\) kha; vudhyante J\(_2\) 688 sāmayike J\(_{KED}\); sāmayike J\(_2\); kasmāditi L\(_{690}\) 688 nāsmākamatra J\(_{KED}\); nātāsmākam L\(_{K2}\); nātrāsmākam D K\(_2\) 693 na J\(_{KED}\) L\(_{RC}\); tat L\(_{ac}\)
694 prativedhatte J\(_{KED}\) L\(_{K3}\) a\(_{u}\); prativedate L\(_{K3}\) p\(_{c}\); prativadate G L 697 iva J\(_{KED}\);
eva K\(_2\) 699 tadāhā J\(_{KED}\) L\(_{K2}\) a\(_{u}\); ityāhā L\(_{K2}\) p\(_{c}\)

688 It seems that the scribe first wrote ucyate, but then corrected it to ucyatām 688 In G yuyja is removed in the main text and right margin writes the correction as yuyja.
691 In L\(_{K2}\) du in yaducyate is added later on top. 692 āśāntyāha is missing from L\(_{K2}\).
694 D G L writes etadeva prativedhatte after the verse 3.59cd. 695 T writes na\(_{f}\) instead of na.
695 L\(_{K2}\) writes the ab and cd of 3.59 together. 695 K\(_3\) has a upadhimānyā on the top of the alphabet pra in pratibimbē 696 In L\(_{K2}\) iti is missing. 696 K\(_2\) G L read kim tatā ityādīnuō.

688 Kb 129r 688 L\(_{K2}\) 25r 697 L\(_{K2}\) 26v

219
अतेन तन्मत्रास्य: प्रज्ञतस्य तदसंभवेः ।
न हानिच्छतिमां तु प्रशोध्यं पर्यवस्यति ॥ ३-६० ॥

अत इति विमर्शानिवियोपस्तादत्स्वरूपिताभावात्। प्रज्ञतस्य अर्थाविश्वस्ये ।
तदसंभव इति विमर्शाये।

ननु न वचन प्रज्ञानिवियोपस्तादत्स्वरूपिताभावात्। इत्याश्च इत्यादि। इत्यादि।

ननु त्यतिकारणामां संभवः। इत्याश्च इत्यादि।

ततथं न निमित्तकारणामां संभवः।

ततः न निमित्तकारणविषय प्रशः प्रशो नानावनेत्या

ततापि च निमित्तस्ये नोपादाने कथचन ।

निमित्तकारणानां च कथाचित्कारिष्य संभवः। ॥ ३-६१ ॥

नतः निमित्तकारणाः सर्वस्विकारवेय संभवो भवेदित्वाय निमित्त्विदायत। इत्य खलु दुष्पदः

परिश्रायणाय वस्तुरूपं वेय च कथं भगवयन कुमकारः। कुम्भं कुर्वातः। मृत्तिरहेण पुनःर्तिनिपु-
णोष्पि कृमभारः कुष्ठं कर्तुः न शुचयात्। अतशोषादनकारणवत् नावशय निमित्तकारणोपयोगः।
| तेन बिमभि विनापि प्रतिविम्बं भवेत्। तदुपादसमधर्श्य तदात्तिनिधिभूतस्य कारणात्तर-स्यापि भावात्।|| 61 ||

तदाह

अत एव पुरोवर्तिन्यालोकेः स्मरणादिना।
निमित्तेन घनेनास्तु संकान्तदृष्टिकृतिः॥ 3-62 ॥

अत इति विमाभवेष्टि निमित्तान्तरेण प्रतिविम्बोद्धार्थसंभूताः। धनेश्वरिति भवानात्तमावपेश्व इत्यतः। अन्यथा हि स-वाक्यम् सम्भुः। सवदेव पुरः स्मर्यमाणं भावात्। अत तवद्विवेकं नास्थि, दयितवायं देशाविविप-कृष्ट्वनास्तिनिधित्वाः। अथ च तन्त्रायं प्रतिविम्बं दृष्टयते इत्यत्र स्मरणादिना निमित्तान्तरे-पावर्ष्यं भाष्यम्। न हि निमित्तान्तिर्वेदतसंकान्ताया: कालत्या विच्छेदनं कादानिचकः प्र-तिभासों भवेत्।|| 62 ||

717 "uptāda"] KED; "uptādana" Lk2; "uptadāna" DK2 G F L; upādāna G ac
721 purovarith J KED; purovāti Lk2 722 "kṛthā J KED; "kṛtah T 722 samkrānta J KED; samkrānta K5; samkrāntādāyata J2 723 bimbābhāve J KED; pratibimbā- bhāve L 723 pādasya sambhavāt J KED; pādasambhavāt K2 Lk2 G ac; pādanasya sam- bhavāt G F; pādana sambhavāt L 726 "prakṛṣṭatven”[ J KED; prakṛṣṭe G 727 bhāyam J KED; bhāvah G

716 In K2 G L the scribe has had an eye-skip confusing the word kumibhakāraḥ kumibhan G F has written the missing text on the margin. 716 na is missing from K2 Lk2 L. In K2 and Lk2 it is added later on the top. 716 Instead of kāranaṇāt vāyusvāya L writes kārana- mnāvāyaṃ. 725 Instead of sarvadātva L writes sarva deva. 727 In K2 G Lk2 L the scribe suddenly shifts back a few lines and writes desādipipraṅkṛṣṭatvenāsannihītatsāt after kāntāyā. It is clear that he is confused by the words dasyāyā and kāntāyā.

721 J2 11v 723 L 119r 724 K2 130r 724 G 26v
तदाह  
अन्यथा संविदारूढप्रकार विच्छेद्योगिनी।  
kर्माद्भावः ते संविदो विच्छेदो पुरतो गता॥ ३-६३॥  

अन्यथेति समरणादिना निमित्तान्तेषः यतद्रतिसंकामिना कान्ता न स्थायित्वः। संविदारूढेति न हि संविदमाफूल्टयत्स्तं वस्तुतो विच्छेदेत्रेन भाने भाने भवेतितिभावः। सनविदो विच्छेदे हि जाग्यापस्तेन किङ्किंदिपि स्फुरेदितिः सवीमिदमर्यं स्यातः। संविदारूढः च वस्तु संविदेशमानलत्वेव। न नतोद्विकारिति न तदपि विच्छेदेत्रेन भायात्। अत आह न संविदरूढेत्रेन पुरतोगतति॥ ६३॥  

ननु च यथेवै तस्माह्राधिकामघवः पुर न भविदिति समवास्वहारविविरापुः स्यातः। सत्यमः।  

न हि परं संविदमपेत्यं मेद्धग्नयमाफेर्यस्तिति सर्वं सविदेव। इति क्यमिन ग्रंिहं ग्रंिहैं वपि  
स्यातः। सैव पुनः र्वस्तयात्वस्य रूपं गोपिकल्लावं यदा र्तं र्तनुस्मित्तत्तसम्मर्मभव्यायति  
तदर्वं सकलं ग्रंिहायाहकाल्मा मेद्धवहारः।  

तदाह  
अत प्रवान्तरेन किङ्किंदीसंहं भवतु स्फुर्तम्।  

730 तदाह वी निरोज्ने भिन्दुढ़िकाले स्मरितम्।  
732 न सवि गृहे, अनु दर्षि नु ताज्जी काहिनी।  
733 गृहे, कोइं न सवि गृहे अरु नु ताज्जी काहिनी।  
734 सवि गृहे, कोइं न सवि गृहे अरु नु ताज्जी काहिनी।  
735 सवि गृहे, कोइं न सवि गृहे अरु नु ताज्जी काहिनी।  
736 अत प्रवान्तरेन किङ्किंदीसंहं भवतु स्फुर्तम्।  

730 तदाह is missing from G<sup>ac</sup> but mentioned in G<sup>PC</sup>.  
732 L writes सम्विदारूढ़कालं।  
733 In G prati in pratisamakrānta is added later.  
734 The mā in samvidmārdhāyasya is missing from K<sub>2</sub> G L.  
734 bhāne missing from D K<sub>2</sub> G L<sub>2</sub> L.  
734 L writes na after bhānam.  
735 L writes viccheda instead of viccheda.  
736 D K<sub>2</sub> G read hi between kilicdapi and sphurdeiti.  
737 D K<sub>2</sub> G L<sub>2</sub> L read vai between na and sam<sup>r</sup>.  
740 iti missing from G L<sub>2</sub> L.  
744 In T bhavatu almost writes like bhavati.
यत्रायथ विचिद्वा भानं सहन्त्यवस्वदर्शने ॥ २-६४ ॥

अत एव परसविद्वेश्या वच्छेदासंभवार्थः | किचित्संकुचितमात्रात् सुपृवदृ निर्विकल्पः

श्रान्तंश्चमान्तरं परसविन्यायमं विकल्पति भवति । यत्रायथ प्रतिविभास्य विचिद्वा मेदेन सह

न्यवात्स्वस्वादी भानं मेवेत । विरहिनो हि सहन्त्यवाचार्य स्मायावतीचतुर्स्मरणार्दिनिमित-

तान्तरसनिधानपतेव कालाप्रतिविम्बां भायादिति भावः ॥ ६४ ॥

एवं बहः: स्मृत्यादी यथा विमाभावेकपि निमित्तात्तत्त्व प्रतिविम्ब भवेतेषाणि भावः]

अतो निमित्त देवयत्र शक्तयय: सन्तु तादशः ।

अत उक्तात निमित्तकारणमहस्यवस्यपेश्यववश्चक्षणादेशेदवस्य धोतनात्मनिख्यतचत्वाय तादशः

विश्वामितिभवेत ज्ञानकियायाः: शक्तयेऽनिमित्त भवन्तु । एवं न किश्चीत्ह: संभायत इत्यथः:

शाक्त्याण्य

वहुश्वरित्वमययस्य तह्चछचेवावियुक्ता ।

इत्यायूत्युक्ता स्वातम्यशक्तिमात्रापरमाथः एवेति निमेनेन्यमात्रादेवस्य स्वातम्य मित्र-

शाक्तार्थार्थितमिति पिण्डायतः: यहुदस क्षीत्यभिषाधकृताः

745 TA-1.68cd

746 vicchedasambhavādy kEd; vicchidām sambhavā kEd khū 746 susputām | KEd; samputām k2 gLk L 747 jānasaṁjñāmāntaram | KEd; jānāmāntaram KEd kūh k2 gLk L 748 vicchidā | KEd; viccheda Lk2 749 kāntā’’ | KEd; kāntādī’’k2 L 756 bahu’’kEd; bahī’’L 758 viśvākāradhāri | KEd; viśvādhāri Lk L 758 pindārthah | KEd; pindārthah L.

745 In T bhāṇam almost writes like hāṇām. 747 k2 writes: madhyavarti bhavarti bhavatu. 749 nimittāntara is missing from k2 gLk L 749 bhūṭa writes samāñāhārya instead of samāñāhārya. 753 tu in “evapkeṣayalaksanād” is missing from k2 L. 753 na in ātmānaścita missing from Lk2 754 In G ac saṃbhāvyata is corrected as saṃbhāvyata.

754 k2 131r 754 Lk2 28v 757 L 120r 758 G 27r

223
तत्र तर्पकाद्यापेश्यस्तदकार्त्वं चित्तस्य तु निजेश्वर्यं। इति ॥

नाथ लया विना विमयं स्वच्छे स्वात्मनि दहितम्।
प्रभवन अर्जनेन प्रभावात्राकम्पदत्मम्॥

इत्याचुकम्।

तदेव विश्वचित्ततिविम्बलयोग्यसंहरित

इत्यं विश्वमिदं नाथे भैरवीयचिदम्बरे।
प्रतिविम्बमलं स्वच्छे न खलन्यप्रसादत:॥३-६५॥

अन्वेषं अन्यमुक्तिः हस्त्य स्वातन्त्र्यं श्रवण्ये इति भावः। स्वातन्त्र्यं हि विमयं
इत्युच्यते। स चाहु मूः स्वाभावः। न हि निर्विमयः प्रकाश: संभवतुपपैते वा।

अयमेव हस्य विश्वकार्यार्थिव जडेऽयो विशेषो ऋत्वकमामुश्चार्थिः। युक्तमन्यन्त्रान्वत्र।

762 The exact source of this verse has not yet been traceable. Jayaratha attributes it to A-
nayantabhiṣijñä but it is not clear which text he may be referring to. Both Rastogi (1979:160)
and Dwivedi (1983:17) have raised the doubts if this is either another work by Abhinava-
gupta which never came down to us or is it simply a reference to one of his existing com-
mentaries. The former is certainly not the case since we are unable to locate the quo-
ted verse in any of the Pratyabhijñā texts available to us today.

765 tvarpaka० KED K2 G; tvaneka० Gac 759 tadakāratvam | KED Gpc; tathākāratvam Gac; tadakāram K2 L 762 prasenā | KED Gpc K2; pras-
inā L; prasannā Gac 764 tadevam viśva”] KED; tadevaviśvam G; tadevaviśvāL 766 bhairaviya”] KED B1 K3 K4 K5 K9 K10 K12 K14 P1 P2 P3 Lk3 Ls2 V7 L; bhairevaya K2 j2 Lk2 766 ‘alaṃ] KED L; ‘aṃpi K3 T 767 svātantryam |
KED B1 K2 K4 K5 K9 K10 K12 K14 P1 P2 P3 Lk2 Lk3 Ls2 V7; sātantryam G 768 viśvākāradhāritve | KED B1 j1 j2 K3 K4 K5 K9 K10 K12 K14 P1 P2 P3 Lk3 S2 V7; viśvā-
kāridhāritve K2 Lk2; viśvākāritve Gac L

759 itu is missing from G. 762 darpaneneva | em: Sanderson; darpanenaiva KED K2

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अन्तरिक्षाति सकर्तजगदात्ममीह
वद्धितिचित्रवोत्साहमकृतरा
"वोधः पुनर्विनियमंमसारवृष्टमा
विष्णु प्राप्ते नो मकुरस्थथा तु ॥ इति ॥ ६५ ॥

774 Cf. Tantrasāra p. 19 (KSTS). This verse is also quoted in IPvV, Vol 2, p. 203 and PSv 13 (p. 39 KSTS). Yogarāja in the PSv wrongly attributes this verse to the IPvV. While in the IPvV Abhinavagupta himself says that he has said this [tathā ca uktaṃ mayā śrītantrasārā
dau] in the TS. This would mean this this verse originally belongs to the TS and is simply quoted in the IPvV. Note the different readings in the TS, TA, PS and IPvV

773 ॐवर्त्तेः । किन्तु गा Lक, Lकल्ले ; ॐयुक्तेः क्ष्ण K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K10 K12 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Lक S2 V7 ; 773 parāmrśati । किन्तु गा Lक, Lकल्ले ; ॐयुक्तेः क्ष्ण K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K10 K12 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Lक S2 V7 ; prakāśayati Gा L

773 The KSTS editions of the TS (p.19) and the IPvV (Vol. II, p. 203) also read ॐसायुक्तेः.

771 Lक, 28r

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Translation

Chapter 3 (verses 1-65)
(pratibimbavāda)

Although it consists of emptiness (khaṭma), this entire universe consists of signifier and signified [entities] and is variegated. Let the Vijaya [Rudra] be victorious, while manifesting [this universe] in His own self, like a town in a mirror!

Now, immediately after [the explanation of] the anupāya, with the second half [of the verse], in order to explain the sāmabhavopāya, which comes naturally at this point, [Abhinavagupta] pledges as follows:

Now we shall explain the unsurpassed state of the Great Lord which is connected with the

1. The distinction between signifier and signified mentioned here alludes to Light (prakāśa) and Reflective awareness (vimarsa), and in our present context also implies bimba and pratibimba. cf. VBv - 56 by Śivopādhyāya for a deeper discussion. Also see Torella (2004) for more discussion on Abhinavagupt’s understanding of vācya-vācaka.

2. In each of the thirty-six chapters (except the first chapter) Jayaratha has invoked thirty-six Rudras in his mangalas. He follows this schema as taught in the MVUT 3.20-24. See Appendix for more details.

3. Alternatively, if we retain the reading svātmate ‘pi, this initial verse could be translated as follows: “Let [the Rudra] Vijaya be victorious! Although this entire, variegated universe, which constitutes of signifier and signified [entities], is [already] part of Himself (svātma-), He is making [it] manifest in His own self, like a town in a mirror”.

4. The second chapter of the TĀ is titled anupāyāhnika and it describes the nature of anupāya.

5. Jayaratha ends each āhnika of the TĀ with the first half of the concluding verse and begins the subsequent āhnika with the second half of the same verse. This strategy is followed in all chapters except in āhnika 36. He names this strategy as saṅcaya nyāya. (cf. TĀ, Vol I, p. 309). Also see Rastogi (1987:76-78).

6. In the sequence of the upāyas, Abhinava, in sequence, has made the prescription of anupāya, sāmabhavopāya, sāktopāya and āṇavopāya. According to this sequence, it is sāmabhavopāya that needs to be explained after anupāya.
supreme means. 7

Objection: “If the unsurpassed nature belongs also to the supreme means [and not only to the anupāya], then, since the meaning [of the unsurpassed nature] has been previously understood, i why is the following chapter undertaken?” [Abhinavagupta] replies:

Of that Supreme effulgence of Bhairava which has been previously defined as mainly light, it is [now] examined, its being essentially freedom, which is its additional [characteristic]. 3.1

Owing to the predominance [of light] it is ‘mainly light’. [In other words, it is not light alone, but light and reflective awareness], since light without reflective awareness is neither possible nor can it exist. It was ‘previously defined’ in the anupāya chapter. 10 It is ‘additional’ according to mere conceptualisation. Actually, [it is already part of its own nature], since, from the absolute point of view, the inner nature of an entity is never exceeded. 11 In case it were [exceeded], this would not be ‘its own nature’ at all. ‘Being freedom’ is the state of being the agent of the act of illumination. And such is the reality of this agency: that he makes manifest everything according to his own Will on His own surface. 12

7. The terms Anupāya, Śambhavopāya, Śāktopāya and Āṇavopāya are synonymous with the terms Gatopāya, Paropāya, Śāktopāya and Naropāya respectively. In fact Abhinavagupta always prefers the latter terms. cf. TĀ 1.278cd-279a.
8. See TĀ 2-28, 34, 50 for the nature and the description of the anuttara in the second chapter.
9. Since the nature of Light (prakāśa) has been described in the previous chapter (āhnika 2) of the TĀ, here (āhnika 3) Abhinavagupta proposes to add the nature of Reflective awareness (vimāraśa) which is also called the Power of autonomy (svātantrya-śakti) of Śiva. Gnoli (1999:51) translates adhikam in the sense of pure.
10. See note 9 above.
11. In other words, the point Jayaratha is trying to make here is that the nature of an entity is already full, it does not need to be modified, nor is it to receive anything from “outside” itself or it cannot afford to have anything further additions to it.
12. “On his own surface” is a fundamental phrase here. It is this idea of surface (bhitti) that is compared to a mirror. cf. svecchayā svabhittau viśvamunmilayati | PHr-2. For more on the idea of bhitti see Castro (2013).
[Abhinavagupta] says exactly this:

Light is what bestows luminosity to everything. 3.2ab

Verily, the agent of the act of illumination is the ‘Light’, which consists of the supreme knowing subject [and] is expressed by the word ‘unsurpassed’. It ‘bestows luminosity’, namely the state of being luminous, ‘to everything’, that is to say to the universe which consists of knowing subjects and knowable realities. The meaning is that it makes [the universe] manifest in identity with itself. It is not at all possible that the universe, due to its being illuminated, is something separated from it, since in case it were separated from it [that is, from the light], its illumination would never be possible, due to the absence of connection with the nature of being illuminated.

[Abhinavagupta] said this:

And the universe is not distinct from it [i.e. from the light]. Or, if it were [distinct,] it could not manifest. The word ‘or’ is used to express admittance.

[Objection:] But if this is so, then only light shines [in other words, only light exists].

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13. Apart from a few descriptions of *Anuttara* given in the *āhnikā* 2 of the TĀ, Abhinavagupta offers elaborate definitions of the word *anuttara* in the PTv. In the PTv he has given as many as sixteen interpretations of the word *Anuttara*.

14. “manifesting in identity with itself” means that the *Anuttara* has manifestation as its very nature. Like, for instance, when light manifests, it does not manifest itself alone. The nature of light is such that when it manifests, it also makes manifest everything that comes within its realm. Here, the meaning is that when the *Anuttara* manifests, the universe is also made manifest by itself since the universe is nothing different from *Anuttara*.

15. The subtle idea here is that the very nature of light is illumination. It is not possible that something is light and cannot be illumined or make something else illumined at the same time. The very fact the something is light also means that it is illumined and thus it can illuminate at the same time, otherwise it cannot be light.

16. I have considered the alternate reading in the verse sad vā, na bhāsat; it is mentioned in the alternate readings of the KSTS and K37. Gnoli (1999:51) also accepts the same reading.
Thus, the universe should not appear at all, but if it shines [as our experience demonstrates],
what is then the universe? [We should simply say light].

After this possible doubt [Abhinavagupta] says:

For this reason, the Supreme Lord, who is unrestrained, displays in the firmament of his
own self such immense manifestation of the creation and the destruction [of the universe].

‘For this reason’ namely ‘because the manifestation of the universe distinct from light
is not tenable’. The ‘Supreme Lord’ certainly manifests in the surface of his own Self such
immense variety of the universe which looks as if it were distinct from Himself, although it
is not by means of the greatness of His own freedom characterised by [His]
unrestrainedness. Thus, in this [verse] a description using [the metaphor of] ‘firmament’ has
been offered in order to give a glance [disparage or belittle] to the fact that since His own Self
has essentially the nature of light even when the multiplicity of the universe manifests, there
is nothing which is superior to it [i.e., to the Self]. And, therefore, with this [verse] it is said
that the universe is a reflection of consciousness. Thus, an opportunity has been given to the
theory of reflection which has been mentioned in the anujodeśa\(^\text{18}\): in fact, in this case
[namely, in the case of the universe which is being reflected in consciousness] it works
exactly in the same way as it happens with particular forms which, mutually opposing each
other, are reflected, for instance, in a mirror. Although these are not distinct from that
[mirror], they appear as if distinct [from it]\(^\text{19}\).

\(^{17}\) The ideas of ‘creation’ and ‘destruction’ are sometimes also indicated by the words like vanana or
unmeṣa and grasana or nimeṣa in this system.

\(^{18}\) With the words viśvasya citpratibimbate, Jayaratha is paraphrasing Abhinava’s verse from the
description of the contents in TĀ-1.288a. According to the schema of Abhinavagupta followed in the
TĀ, he offers two lists of the contents of the TĀ: one is a brief list which he calls pūrvajodeśa (TĀ
1.278-284) and this is followed by a detailed listing (either naming various sections in the respective
chapters or the main themes these sections deal with) of contents called anujodeśa (1.286-326). cf.

\(^{19}\) In his commentary on the TĀV 1.66, Jayaratha sums up the basis of mirror-metaphor:
darpanādyantā pratibimbitaṃ ghatādi yathā darpanādīcyatirekena prakāśamānātapi
darpanādyantādirātikramena, anvāthā darpanādātyaṇaṃbhānāṃ ṛttam yāt, tavaha prakāśātmanā
śīvenāpi śhāvarajgamanātānāḥ viśvaṃ svecchayā svascarāpātirākāśamānātvena avabhāstāt sansat,
This [Abhinavagupta] said [in the following verse]:

*Just as discrete [entities] such as earth and water become manifest in an uncontaminated mirror, in the same way the various dynamic aspects of the universe become manifest within the Lord of consciousness that is one.* 3.4

Actually, according to the following reasoning expressed in the [second verse of the] *Subodhamañjarī*, the universe is nothing but the five [elements] starting with ‘form’:

‘Indeed, the class of the five [‘subtle elements’], starting with form, is nothing but the universe and this is perceived by the five senses beginning with eyes.’

Through the distinction made by their reflection [i.e., the reflection of form and so on], [Abhinavagupta] shows [that] part of the subject-[matter]:

*[A form] with the same nature appears in the eyes, in the mirror, in the ether and in the water.* 3.5ab

‘With the same nature’ means belonging to the same class. ‘Ether’ means the splendour either of the Sun or of the Moon, which is situated in the ether, that is neither extremely intense nor extremely weak. Here, indeed [in this luminous ether] the knowers of the

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21. It is not very clear why Jayaratha says that the “universe is nothing but the five [elements] starting with ‘form’”. According to the Śaiva cosmology the universe is made up of the thirty-six elements (*tattvas*) and not only of the five *tanmātras* alone.
22. Each one of the five *tanmātras* reflects uniquely. That is to say *rūpa* reflects in a different way than *śabda*, *sparśa* and so on. For instance *rūpa* can only reflect form and not touch or smell. The idea is that all the five *tanmātras* reflect only their respective senses, but it is only in Consciousness that all the *tanmātras* reflect simultaneously.
teaching of the ‘man in form of shadow’ see a reflection which resembles a body [of a man].

As has been said:

‘And the reflection of the form is connected with the splendour in the ether.’

Alternatively, in as much as [what appears ‘with the same nature’] is a synecdoche of another object, it can be interpreted as the object of the reflection of sound [and not only of ‘form’]. Therefore, in the ether there is echo. In the same way, the reflection of taste such as pungent which is being experienced by others, the reflection of touch of a women and so on, and the reflection of smell are respectively [reflected] in saliva, in bulb etc., namely in the skin which is the field of touch, and in the nose which is the field of smell.

This is exactly what [Abhinavagupta] illustrates:

In other words, in a pure form it is only the form which manifests. 3.5cd

23. It is not very clear in what sense the expression chāyāpuruṣa is used by Jayaratha. Also mentioned later in TĀV - 3.20. See n. 25 below.
24. chāyāpuruṣa occurs as a measurement, often related to the sundial. In my personal communication with Gérard Huet (October 2013), he said: “The word chāyāpuruṣa is used to designate the gnomon of a sundial, frequently represented as a man figure I presume. This would fit well for chāyāpuruṣalakṣaṇa “time indication of the sundial”. And chāyāpuruṣopadesāpariśīlāṇena [the expression used in the IPVV] could just denote a person skilled in reading the time given by a sundial.” This is a reference to IPVV p. 159 (vol.1) [1.2.8]. While I am not completely sure what is being said here, on the basis of TĀV 3.20 it seems to mean that by the power of mantras there is a sort of smoke-figure created in the ether. There is also a Yogic practice mentioned in the MVUT 23.8-12, which describes how a Yogi should do a certain practice with respect to his shadow. But I am not sure about the possible connections.
25. According to Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi (2011:302, fn. 1373) kanda is not exactly a penis, but the area which is sensitive to sexual energy. It lies at the opening of the mūlādhāra. It is also known as guhyasthāna and medhākanda and she has translated it as ‘bulb’. I am using the same translation. See Bansat-Boudon et al (2011, p. 302, fn. 1373) for more details.
26. The idea expressed here is that when there is the manifestation of ‘form’, we should understand that it is manifesting or reflecting because it is in its purest form. If it was not it would not manifest at all. A thing becomes manifest only if it is completely pure. This is further explained by using the mirror-metaphor. A mirror is pure only with respect to form and not with respect to touch or smell, so a mirror can only reflect ‘form’ and not touch or smell.
Here, only the three – earth, water and fire – possess form. In a mirror and so on, which belongs to the earth, in a still surface of water and so on, which belongs to water, and in the eyes and so on, which belong to fire, what is called ‘form’ is a pure quality, namely the essence of the configuration (सामस्थानात्म) of the totality (सम्न्वेश) [which appears].

Thus, it is only the reflection of this [i.e., of form] ‘which manifests’ here [in earthly, aquatic and igneous substrata], and not [the reflection] of ‘touch’ and so on. This [reflection of form] indeed comes back again (प्रतिसांक्रमति) [to the above mentioned substrata] since [the reflection] of touch and so on occurs in the substrata of bulb and so on which are the loci of joy and so on. Therefore, [the entity] where there is a pure quality is [the same entity] where [the image] is reflected. This is what [Abhinavagupta] meant to say.

And in order to ascertain that it is not incoherent, [Abhinavagupta] gives an example:

A secretly enamoured woman, even though touching with her breasts a mirror that is beautiful for the reflected image of the beloved, does not feel satisfied. 3.6

Regarding this, ‘a secretly enamoured woman’, a lover, sees her beloved with the idea of contentment ‘I have seen [my] beloved’ - a vision that is concealed to others - even though she does not see directly [her beloved], that is to say, even though [she sees him only] through a reflected image in a mirror, since she is hindered by the presence of the elders etc. Therefore, by saying ‘[the mirror] is beautiful’, also its excellent capacity to gladden etc. is indicated which is disclosed by the vision [of the beloved that appears in it]. Thus, even though the contact with the [mirror] is concealed to others, albeit she has made an effort in this regard thinking ‘let [him] be mine’, ‘she does not feel satisfied’, she does not rejoice, since she is not having a physical contact with him for in the mirror there is absence of

27. This is what Abhinavagupta is explaining also in the ĪPVV, vol 1, p. 159: तत्तत् पार्थिव bhūmikāttime, vajraatnādiimage darpane, āpye nistaraṅgaṇṭalāśaye, tajjase cakṣuṛgolakāntaraṅgadvimandale rūpākhyo guṇah | tatsaṃniveśaśca sāṃsthānātmā guṇo ‘asti svacchapriyānāmapi rūpaśvartvaśāditī teṣu rūpasāṃsthānāpratibimbamacca upārohaḥ, na anyat gurutvasparśādī | 28. In a mirror, one can only see the ‘form’ of someone but that form cannot be touched. What one can touch is a mirror. According to Abhinavagupta this happens because a mirror can reflect ‘form’ alone and not other tanmātras.
contact. This was the meaning.29

[Objection:] ‘Surely, if the form has been reflected here, also the touch, the nature of which does not deflect [from the form]30, should reflect. Why does this not occur?’ Having doubted in this way [Abhinavagupta] says:

Indeed, the touch of this [mirror] is not pure since only the form is such. And the purity is a single complex of very compact and homogenous elements. 3.7

‘Of this’ means ‘of mirror’. ‘Such’ means ‘pure’. Indeed, a pure [surface] catches the reflection of an impure [form], like in case of face in a mirror. This is the meaning.31 [To the one who should ask:] ‘What is meant by the word purity?’ [Abhinavagupta] replies: ‘And the purity…’. Those entities that are extremely ‘compact’, that are not stained by non-homogenous entities, are ‘homogenous’, like, [for instance] the atoms of form in a mirror. Of those entities there is a ‘single complex’, i.e. [a complex that is] not associated [with other elements], due to the absence [in it] of non-homogenous [elements]. [This complex] is ‘purity’, a compactness of [entities] endowed with density, which derives from [their] being placed in close connection, that is to say by the elimination of unevenness and so on.32

Indeed, the contact with the reflected image of form occurs only when the form of a mirror etc. is perceived as not contaminated by [elements] which are non-homogenous and [elements] which are devoid of homogeneity, but not when its dirtiness [i.e., the dirtiness of

29. His sparśa is not transferred, i.e. reflected, in the mirror, but remains outside it, within the physical complex of the man, far from the locus in which reflection takes place.
30. In the mirror, there is rūpa-pratisāṅkramana but not sparśa-apratisāṅkramana. Thus she touches the mirror with sparśa but the contact in the mirror is only with a pure rūpa. These two, touch (of the lady) and pure form (reflected in the mirror by her beloved) cannot generate excitement.
31. The idea is that the face is impure and the mirror is pure and it is always an impure thing being reflected in a pure thing. An impure thing cannot be reflected in another impure object like a face cannot reflect in another face.
32. The word ślaksana also appears in TĀ-27.27, 9.208 (in the commentary in the sense of subtle), 3.54. Here it is used in the sense of ‘extremely dense’.

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the mirror etc.] is produced by non-homogenous [elements] like steam, dust etc. Thus [this] is ascertained by the positive and negative concomitance. With respect to the procurer of the reflection, that which possesses the specific quality called ‘purity’ is the same which perceives the reflected image of this [object]. And therefore, on the basis of the initial statement given in sentences like: ‘the form manifests in the form itself’ (cf. above vs. 5cd), even a mirror could reflect in a face. Thus, due to the non-distinction [between the two, i.e., mirror and face], the relationship between image and reflected image does not take place. This is also communicated.

[Abhinavagupta] explains the same thing also in another way:

The capacity of manifesting a different [reality] in identity with one’s own self, a capacity possessed by [the mirror etc.], whose own luminosity has not been lost, that alone is pureness, as taught by the master [Utpaladeva]. 3.8

Since the [mirror and so on] manifests without differentiation, its ‘own luminosity’ has ‘not been lost’, namely it is not concealed, even when another entity has been reflected [in it, that is to say in the mirror]. The ‘manifesting’, namely appearing evidently (since the ātmanepada meaning is implicit), of a ‘different [reality]’, viz. of a mountain and so forth, which occupies a different place [and] which is producing a reflected image,33 is possessed by the mirror and so on, in identity with its own self. Indeed, apart from the surface of the mirror, the reflection cannot take place outside its surface even for a single atom. This is the meaning. Regarding this [capacity of manifesting], ‘purity’ is nothing but ‘the capacity’, namely the ability, of grasping the reflected image, an ability which does not occur at all in a wall and so on. And this is not simply what we have said of our own; that is why [Abhinavagupta] said ‘taught by the master’. The teacher [referred to in this verse] is the grand teacher [of Abhinavagupta, namely] the Glorious Utpaladeva, who has taught, that is,

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33. Ratié (2011, fn. 14) has translated arpaka as ‘projects’ which is certainly more literal in meaning. However, I am translating arpaka here as ‘producing’.
who has explained, all this core teaching of the ‘reflected image’ in [his] commentary (ṭīkā) on the two verses of the Glorious [Īśvara]pratyabhijñā[ṇākārikā], that is verse 1.2.8 and verse 2.4.19.34

Therefore, in order to show that this pureness manifests in two ways, namely as principal and as secondary, [Abhinavagupta] says:

The principal pureness belongs completely to [that] single [principle] which is the Lord-Consciousness. The other [i.e. the secondary pureness] is related to a specific [reality] according to its partial aspects.35 That which is pure [for instance form and so on] is due to the Will of the [Lord].36 3.9

It is ‘principal’ since it is capable of perceiving the reflected image of everything, that is to say, of the universe which consists in form and so on. That is why it has been said ‘completely’. Since the universe is known only intertwined with Consciousness, therefore, the pureness belongs completely to it. Thus, ‘the other’, namely the secondary pureness, ‘is related to a specific [reality]’, to a mirror and so on, ‘according to its partial aspects’, that is to say after having taken as an object this or that aspect, such as form. This [pureness] in fact is only [perceived] in a specific [reality], corresponds to a specific thing which is pure. If it were not the case, even the contact with a mirror should catch the reflected image [in it] on the basis of the principle that everything should appear in everything else. And thus there would be no difference between this [secondary pureness] and the principal [pureness]. [But this would be illogical]. And with respect to this [secondary] pureness, the cause is nothing

34. It is sufficiently proven by Ratié that Utpaladeva had already discussed the theory of reflection in detail in his now lost -vīrtī. Here Abhinavagupta is referring to the same teachings of Utpaladeva which he himself wrote elaborate commentaries on. cf. Ratié (forthcoming:3, fn. 8). Also see Ratié (2016b).
35. In TĀ and TĀV 1.140-143 amśāmśikātaḥ is defined as apūrṇa (incomplete). See there for more discussion.
36. Thus, the principal purity resides only in Consciousness that has the capacity of conceiving the reflected image of everything. It can receive reflection completely. But in a mirror, there is secondary purity that can only conceive a specific reality corresponding to a certain thing which is pure.
but the freedom of Him. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘That which is pure is due to the Will of the [Lord].’ ‘That’ means form etc. [and] therefore contact etc. What is impure regarding this [that is to say form etc. and contact etc.] is self-evident. Therefore, it is only His Power that manifests in such a way. This is the intended meaning.

Therefore, [he] says:

That form (vapus) of the entities which resists, is indeed of the nature of māyā, but they have [another form] made of sadvidyā which does not resist. 3.10

‘Resists’ means that it is incapable of entering the other [entities] since it is an opposer. ‘This [form] indeed is of the nature of’ that [namely of māyā], which, since it does not conceal one’s own nature, is the Power of action that belongs to the Supreme Lord. Therefore, due to the prevalence of differentiation, i.e. due to the grossness which belongs to the nature of the knowable reality, there is no purity in this [form], that is to say it is incapable of conceiving the reflected image. But that form of entities ‘which does not resist’ is ‘made of sadvidyā’, namely, its own nature is the Power of Knowledge. Therefore, depending on this [Power], this [form] is pure. Regarding this [form] there is the capacity of conceiving the reflected image. Therefore, the former [form, namely the one which is made of māyā] consists of the reflected image\(^\text{37}\), but the latter [form which is made of śuddhavidyā] conceives it. This is the difference [between the two forms].\(^\text{38}\) Therefore, the meaning is as follows: it is only Paramēśvara who, owing to the greatness of His own freedom, shines according to the variety of the several manifestations of images and reflected images etc.

This is what [Abhinavagupta] says [in the coming verse]:

Therefore, while illuminating in this way the manifestation which is endowed with both forms, the Beneficent [Lord] manifests in the universe according to the two aspects of image and

\(^{37}\) “consists of the reflected image” means ‘it can reflect’ or ‘it is capable of reflecting’.

\(^{38}\) For a detailed Krama explanation of the two forms and their epistemic analysis see Rastogi (1967:418ff).
[its] reflection. 3.11

‘Both forms’ means that it, the essence of which is only manifestation, consists of [both] obstructing and non-obstructing [forms]. But [the words by Abhinavagupta] ‘while illuminating the manifestation’ have not been taught according to true reality [since, according to the latter, it is only one reality].” And it has been said:

‘Therefore, the Great God is one. He, whose existence depends upon [His] freedom, appears as being two-fold, that is to say, appears as image and reflected image.’

Therefore, after having accepted the truthfulness of the reflected image in accordance with cognition [namely, common experience], [Abhinavagupta] composes [the next verse] in order to refute the following idea of some Naiyāyikās: ‘Even though we perceive one’s own face [in the mirror] by means of the rays of the eyes which come back [from the mirror], it is an illusion [to believe that] “there is a face in the mirror”; but there is no reflected image at all, since there is no third further possibility apart from [its] being true and [its] being false.’

But, to the one who maintains that the rays of the eyes, while coming back from a pure [surface, like a mirror], reflect well, namely perceive one’s own face, we ask [as follows in verse 13)]. 3.12

The use of the singular (‘the one who...’) indicates this is not the doctrine of all Naiyāyikas since it has not been mentioned in the sūtras of the sūtrakāra [= Gautama]. The intended meaning is that this has been said only by some who are intent [in analysing] perception [alone]. For this reason the vyrtikāra [Jayantabhaṭṭa] and the bhūṣanakāra [Bhāsarvajña] do not even touch this point. ‘From a pure’ means from an external [object] like a mirror. ‘While coming back’ means ‘having returned’ [from the mirror]. And at this point they ‘reflect’. Thus, the logical reason is given by means of a distinguishing mark. Otherwise, since the presence of their own body itself could not be possible for them, how

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39. This is to say that it appears to be two, but in reality it is one. In other words, a certain ‘form’ may not be singular, but the cognition of the form is purely singular and that is what is referred to as singular reality.
could they even perceive ‘one’s own face’? ‘We ask’ means ‘in accepting this [point of view], what is your intention?’

Exactly this [Abhinavagupta] has said:

\[That\] [ocular] light which comes from [something] other than the body [according to you] belongs to the Self who governs it. If one knows [this reflected image of face] only by means of this light, why should we need a mirror?\] 3.13

‘That’ ocular ‘light’ has been emitted outside the body of the limited knowing subject whose eyes have been opened up. If the Self, which is self-governing, should become the knowing subject of our own face ‘only by means of that light’ which has come back [from the mirror], therefore, ‘why should we need a mirror’? Because of the [absurd] possibility, in this case, that also other entities, like the wall, are the causes of the reflection of the town.

Now, if one objects: ‘Is it really only the mirror and so on [and] not the wall and so on that are the causes of the reflection?’, [we answer] that we are talking about purity (svacchatā), since, even though their being the cause of opposition [i.e., of the reflection of the bimba which then becomes pratibimba] is the same [in either cases], it is only the mirror and so on that are like this [i.e. pure, namely able to reflect the image], and not the wall and so on. In the latter we do not see any cause [of the reflected image].

Now, if one objects: ‘Is this additional quality called ‘purity’ which is present here [in the mirror] the cause [of the reflected image]?’, we would say that it is wrong, for purity is not the cause with respect to opposition. In fact, since the light is pure, once the light is in the ether, there is no scope of any [reflection/opposition]. Rather, it [i.e., pureness] is [only] the cause of the perception of the reflected image. This entails the contradictoriness of the logical reason [namely, ‘purity’ (hetu = svacchatva); in our example there is the hetu, i.e. pureness, but the production of the reflection is not there]. Therefore, only materiality and so on can be the cause of opposition. And this is the same in both the cases [i.e. in the mirror

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40. Here Abhinavagupta starts targeting the position of the Naiyāyikas as explicated in the NSB 3.1.30-50.
and in the wall]. Alternatively, since the reflection is produced by means of the mirror [but you, Naiyāyika\textsuperscript{41}, have still not provided any tenable logical reason to prove the logical connection between the mirror and the production of the reflection], then [you should admit the undesired consequence that] even without a mirror there could be the perception of one’s own face. What is then the use of this [mirror]?

And thus, if the ocular rays which are turned back by the force of reflection perceive one’s own face, then this [face] should be perceived only in its own locus, not elsewhere in the mirror and so on. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says:\textsuperscript{42}

\textit{But, the form [of one’s own face] should be seen owing to the [ocular] rays which have returned back [and] which have attained the state of perceivers, in one’s own face, [and] not in the mirror}. 3.14

The ‘form’ is the one related to one’s own face. ‘In one’s own face’ means precisely in the locus of one’s own face. In fact, a perceiver perceives a perceivable reality which is situated in its own locus alone. This is the intended meaning. Nowhere, indeed, is it experienced that a cognition of blue is ascertaining the blue, while abandoning the locus of the blue. And ‘the state of perceivers’ is that one (\textit{etat}) which has to be known as related to the perceiving subject; in fact, the common designation of ‘being the perceiver’ belongs to these [i.e. the ocular rays], which are governed by the Self [which is the perceiving subject par excellence].\textsuperscript{43}

Moreover, does the Self govern the ocular rays which have been emitted outside without the body or with the body? If we accept the first thesis, a bodiless [Self] cannot be

\textsuperscript{41} Reiterating Abhinavagupta, Jayaratha suggests that since Naiyāyikas have completely failed to offer a good argument that can actually negate their proposition, so they i.e., Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha, do not accept the reflection-theory of the Naiyāyikas.

\textsuperscript{42} See NSB 3.1.40

\textsuperscript{43} The idea is that the cognition of blue cannot reside outside the locus of blue. The idea of the blue colour resides in the object that is blue. It cannot reside in an object that is yellow. And even the ocular rays are governed by the Absolute Self who is a perceiving subject par excellence.
the basis of fruition, since, outside (bahir), also without the [body], fruition could take place. [And fruition] is characterised by the mind (buddhi) [which is instead commonly accepted to be corporeal]. And thus, there would be the failure of your own thesis: “The body is the basis of fruition of the [Self]”.

And, in case we admit the governing [of the ocular rays] by means of [the Self] endowed with the body, the attaining of the [reflected image] could be only like [the one of] the original image [, which is a tangible entity], and never otherwise. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

> And, if this form [namely, the form of one’s own face], which we well perceive ‘as mine’, would appear [in the mirror as a true reality. This form should be] endowed with touch [which we perceive] in one’s own [real] face. But [it] should not belong to the [reflected image in the mirror], which is distinct from tangible realities, [and] which possesses a nature that is only knowable [but not tangible]. 3.15

If this ‘form’ [of the face] which belongs to the Self, in as much as the latter is the substratum of one’s own face, would appear [in the mirror], then the resulting understanding would be: ‘this form is mine’, as if it were based on the ahantā, and not ‘this form belongs to this’, i.e. only to a knowable reality, as if it were based on the idantā. In the latter case, in fact, those who are inexperienced, like children, would have the simple, homogenous idea ‘this’. But the one who is experienced should indeed think: ‘it is exactly my own face which is reflected here’; what is wrong [in that] ? [In this case] the understanding occurs, indeed, on the basis of the distinction between this, which is being reflected (pratibimba), and the original image (bimba), since here [in the mirror] it is impossible to deny its having such form [i.e. the form of reflected image].

Furthermore, if precisely one’s own face would be the manifestation of our own form [in other words, if the bimba would correspond exactly to the pratibimba], then also touch should be present [in the pratibimba]; form (rupa) and appearance (samniceṣa) would be easily

44. Here Jayaratha is quoting the NSB 1.1.9: *tasya bhogāyatanaṁ śarīraṁ ||*
present [in the \textit{pratibimba}] lacking heaviness, smell and so on, but [in common experience] we never see [that form and appearance] are devoid of touch since their own nature never deviates from this. In the reflected image of the form, however, form is perceived distinct from touch. In fact, nowhere we perceive that a mirror possesses heat if fire is reflected in it. When there is the manifestation of the form of the [fire], in the same way as necessarily there is the manifestation of an appearance which possesses the qualities of [fire], there should be also [the manifestation of] touch, which never deflects from that [appearance], if one should [truly] perceive one’s own face. Therefore it has been wrongly stated that there is the perception of one’s own face [by means of the rays of the eyes...].

\textbf{Objection:} ‘But it is exactly for this [reason] that [we Naiyāyikas have] said “it is an illusion”, since it is by illusion (i.e., mistake) that it is believed that one’s own face which is being perceived is [actually] perceived in the mirror.’

\textbf{Reply:} If you say so, then [we answer:] ‘it is not possible’ (\textit{maivāstu}). What is the point of accepting the perception of a real face that is not being known [in the mirror]? In fact, in the [experience of] illusion, what manifests is only what is being superimposed, not also the true reality [together with the superimposition]. [For instance,] in the appearance of the silver in the conch, if the conch would also appear, there would be no illusion at all [and we would think]: ‘this [reality of the conch] is produced together with the manifestation of the silver’. Similarly, if it is [one’s own] real face which is perceived, what is the illusion? Or, in case there were illusion, is it the mirror that appears like [one’s own] face or is it one’s own face that appears as another face? The first hypothesis is not acceptable, since the mirror manifests as a unitary reality; when the silver manifests, indeed, the manifestation of conch

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item 45. cf. vs. 3.12cd
\item 46. cf. introduction, vs. 3.12
\item 47. For a Śaiva, an error is simply only the manifestation of what is being superimposed which is bereft of manifestation of true reality. This is illustrated by Jayaratha with an example of silver in the conch-shell. The idea of manifestation is that a thing manifests in totality when it is made manifest together with its illusive form. That is to say, from empirical point of view, an entity that we perceive to be real (\textit{bimba}) and an entity which is the reflection (\textit{pratibimba}) of what we perceive to be real are both the manifested forms of true reality or absolute reality.
\item 48. For Abhinavagupta’s discussion related to the example of silver and conch-shell see IPV 1.7.12, 1.8.6-7 and 2.3.13.
\end{itemize}}
is not possible at the same time. Even the second [hypothesis is not acceptable]. In this case, in fact, everybody, indulging in indifference, would become careless towards one’s own face, which [usually] is the object of embellishing [oneself] by putting on jewellery and so on. Therefore, since there is no mistake, it should be accepted that what we call reflected image is nothing but another entity (vastu), different from the original image. [This is the conclusion.]9

Therefore, [Abhinavagupta] says:

> Therefore, it is a reality, a simple configuration of form, which, united with touch, smell, taste etc. in a state of latency, is being reflected in this [mirror].10 3.16

‘Therefore’, since it has been said that there is not a illusion etc., because of the absence of touch etc. it is only a configuration of form, a reality which is being ‘reflected’ in ‘this’, namely in the mirror and so on, not a non-reality. But ‘it is united with touch and so on in a state of latency’, for otherwise there would be no difference between [the pratibimba and] the bimba. Therefore, there is indeed a third entity which can be defined as pratibimba. This is the meaning.

‘Why is there the latency of touch etc.? ’ [Abhinavagupta] says:

> The latency [of touch etc.] is due to the absence of perceptibility. The absence of the latter is due to the absence of proof. And in its turn this [absence of proof] is due to the absence of contact with the objects. [And] also this [absence of contact] is, in the mirror, due to the absence of stable presence [of touch etc.]. 3.17

‘This’ means the lacking ‘of proof’. ‘Due to the stable presence’, that is to say, [the stable presence] ‘of touch etc’. For if there were actually the stable presence of touch and so on,

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9. In other words, the naiyāyika’s view-point is that we do not really have a pratibimba, but we have only bimba and brānti. On the other hand, Abhinavagupta wants to establish pratibimba as a real entity, endowed with a specific ontological status (a third category). That is why it is a perfect metaphor for the relationship between consciousness and the world.

10. Here I have followed Gnoli’s translation of nyagbhīta.
here [in the mirror], then the sense faculties should be endowed with them [i.e., with touch and so on]. And, the cognition, which is being produced in connection with these [sense faculties], would became a proof regarding the [perceptibility of touch etc.]. Thus, the meaning is that there is the absence of perceptible[-ness] of touch and so on which are being the object of cognition.

Furthermore,

Precisely for this reason the characteristic of heaviness etc. is not observed in this [reflected image]. In fact, this [characteristic] does not reside in the mirror. When there is the vision of this [reflected image], then this [mirror] is a means. 3.18

‘For this reason’ means ‘for the absence of stable presence of touch etc.’ If also touch etc. would be [observed] in this reflected image, which is only a configuration of form, then also its characteristic like heaviness would manifest. And since this [characteristic] is absent, what is its proof? [In order to answer to this implicit question Abhinavagupta] says: ‘In fact, this [characteristic] does not reside in the mirror’. [In this pāda, the word] ‘this’ means the characteristic of heaviness etc. of a reflected image such as a mountain. [This characteristic cannot have a stable presence in the mirror] since in case it does, also the mirror should become immovable, being united with this [characteristic], but this is not the case. Thus, it has been said ‘the characteristic of heaviness etc. is not observed in this [reflected image]’ just to point out that although there is the reflected image, this [characteristic] does not exist [in it].

‘We object that the form is always found to be together with touch and in the original image (bimba) it is in this way, then why only the form gets reflected in the mirror [and not even touch]?’ Having doubted thus, [Abhinavagupta] said: ‘When there is the vision of this [reflected image], then this [mirror] is a means’. ‘When there is the vision of this’ means when there is the vision, namely the manifestation, of this [reflected image], which is simply a configuration of form.

In fact, in the mirror, on the basis of the previously discussed argument, only the form
is pure. When there is its manifestation [i.e. the manifestation of the form], [the mirror is] a means for the realization of that [form], not also of touch and so on. Thus is the meaning. [The word] upāyaka is nothing but upāya since the suffix kan51 is used in its own sense.

Objection: ‘In the same way as the mirror is the means in case of vision of this [reflected image], so are also other things like the light.52 Since there is no difference [between mirror and light etc.] in being the means [of the vision], why is only the [mirror] regarded as its support?’ Having doubted thus, [Abhinavagupta] says:

But since this [reflected image] does not shine as distinct from this [mirror], therefore, the [latter] is said to be the locus. But in it the means are, in sequence, 1) the lamp, 2) the eyes, [and] 3) cognition. 3.19

But ‘since this’ reflected image ‘does not shine as distinct’, namely as separate, from ‘this mirror’, ‘therefore’, for this reason, ‘it is said to be the locus’ of this [reflected image] in as much as it pervades [all the other means] like oil in the sesame seeds. Then, light and so on are ‘the means’ as regards the apprehension of the reflected image which is being arisen here [in the mirror]. [However] there is a distinction between this [mirror] and those [means]. That is why [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘But in it’.

‘In sequence’ [means that after the mirror we need the light, and then the eyes and cognition.]

1) Since the manifestation of the arising [of the reflected image] occurs in union with the mirror, at a later moment, even if a reflected image is being produced in a mirror which is nearby, if there is no light, what is the use of the [mirror] ? In fact, who could perceive [one’s own] face reflected in a mirror which is in the dark ?

2) In the same way, for a blind man, there is no use of the [mirror] even though [his] face is reflected [in it] notwithstanding the light is present.

51. Pāṇini 5.3.97.
52. Here the opponent is arguing that if a mirror is regarded a means for a reflected image to take place, then why not regard light also the means because without light the manifestation of an image anywhere, lest alone a mirror, is not possible.
3) But [this can also apply] to someone who is not blind [and] even in the case there is such group of causes: who could perceive in such a way [the reflected image] if the cognition of that is not arisen due to the absence of contact between the senses and object, owing to some deficiency?

Thus, in such an understanding, these which have been mentioned are the means, since the true nature of reflected image is having as its essence only manifestation. This has been referred to here as the main point.

[Objection:] ‘Surely, on the basis of the previous argument, also the lamp and so on possess a capacity of perceiving the reflected image which is not distinct from [the capacity of] the mirror. Why these too [like the mirror (cf. vs. 19)] are not capable of manifesting this [reflected image] in unity (abhedena) with themselves?’ Having doubted in this way [Abhinavagupta] says:

However, since 1) lamp, 2) eyes, and 3) cognition are devoid of heaviness and since, from all sides, they are also pure, the manifestation [of the image] (vibhā) does not appear independently [from them] as it occurs in the mirror. 3.20

It is definitely true that the lamp and so on possess the capacity of perceiving the image in one’s own self, but, in the case of [lamp, eyes and cognition,] it does not happen as in the [mirror]: the manifestation of the reflected image appears in the mirror as if it were distinct from [the mirror itself] even though it is not really independent [from it]. For this reason [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘the manifestation [of the image] does not appear independently [from them] as it occurs in the mirror’53, since the lamp etc. lack heaviness. A face and so on, indeed, which is reflected in a heavy mirror etc. appears [at the same time] as distinct [from the mirror] due to the stability of the locus [i.e. of the mirror], but in the case of the light of the lamp and so on [the face appears] as if it were one with them (ekavat) since

53. In other words, the reflected image has to be independent from the locus, albeit at the same time it has to appear in union with it. From this point of view, only the mirror and so on is the right locus of reflection, and not the light, eyes and consciousness, which are only means for it. We are talking about the specific ontological status of the reflected image on the one hand and of the locus on the other hand.
[they] lack heaviness. Because of the instability there [i.e. in the lamp and so on] this
[reflected image] does not manifest in the same way [as it is reflected in the mirror]. Just as in
a reservoir of water etc., although pure, a face and so on even though reflected is not seen
due to the instability [of water], the same is true here [in case of the lamp etc.]. This was the
intended meaning.

Objection: “Well if you are right (nān evam), also in a still water, since it is fluid and
lacks heaviness, the reflected image should not manifest independently [but we all see that it
does]”.

Reply: This is wrong. There indeed exists the heaviness in the water. Here [in the
water] it is not the same case of the one who is rotating his arm in the space which does not
find obstruction. Therefore, here [in the water] a person swimming using his arms has to
make effort in cutting through the [water] especially with the arms, but that is relative. In
fact, the [kind of] heaviness that exists in water is not the same that we find in earth and [the
kind of heaviness that exists] in fire is not the same that we find here [in water]. [With the
above words] we do not claim that there is no heaviness in fire [at all], but [we affirm that]
even with regard to this [heaviness of the fire], [the heaviness of the image] is lesser, namely
the reflected image is incapable of shining separately, otherwise, since they lack a material
form, even the lamps etc. will become like the ether.

But this is surely not the case with cognition. Thus, here, since it lacks material form,
the reflected image does not manifest independently.

Moreover, the mirror etc. is pure only in the front, [but] not in the back. Here, [in the
case of mirror] the reflected image manifests in the front part [of the mirror], which is pure,
rebounding on the back part [of the mirror], which is impure, on the basis of the principle of
wall.54 But here [in the case of lamp and so on], since [the latter] are pure ‘from all sides’, the
face and so on, even if reflected by one side is not perceived, since [the face and so on] are

54. From an empirical point of view reflection cannot take place in a wall for it is impure, but it can
take place in a mirror because of the purity of its surface. Even a mirror or a lamp or a crystal has
limitations because even if the latter is purest in relation to the previous two entities, yet it is not
absolutely pure like prakāśa which has the two eternal qualities of svacchātva and svātantra inherently
present in it because of which only it able to manifest by itself (does not need any external light to
become manifest), but it also makes everything else shine forth along with it.
not obstructed (anāvratvāt) by the light which is reflected within through the other side.

Or, for the lamp etc. it occurs in the same way as in the pieces of glass, of crystal etc., which, due to their being pure ‘from all sides’, are not able to resist the ocular rays, because it would be otherwise impossible to see the objects that have passed them over (tadvyavahita) [but this is indeed a common experience we all have]. Since [lamp etc.], in as much as they lack heaviness, are ‘pure from all sides’, [they are not able to resist] the reflected image which is coming out from the other side. Thus, here [in the lamp and so on], this [reflected image] does not come into being [as an independent entity], since there is no impure [part], namely there is not the other part which is able to resist to that [reflected image].

1) Moreover, cognition is self-luminous since it is immaculate ‘from all sides’. Thus, it [i.e. cognition] does not have even the smell of knowable-ness; so how is it possible that the reflected image manifests in it separately?

2) In addition, the reflected image [which appears separately] when a lamp is lit, or that is perceived in a light spreading in the ether when there is the knowledge of a chāyāpurusa (chāyāpurusajñāna)\(^5\), [appears indeed but] by means of the power of mantras and so on.

3) Or the reflected image which is also seen in the eye [actually] is not seen in the sense faculty of the eye which belongs to fire, since [this faculty] is always beyond the direct perception, but this [image] is [visible] in the eyeball which belongs to water.

Hence there is no problem.

And we do not affirm that [the existence of] this real nature of the reflected image has been invented by us. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

\[\text{And the compassionate God of the Gods has revealed this [nature of the reflected image] for increasing the knowledge of the dull [people].}\]

55. See fn. 25 above.

56. Jayaratha interprets ‘revealed’ as taught in almost every scripture. He also quotes verses from various scriptures like the Kāmikāgama, VBh etc. to support his stance.

57. ‘dull [people]’ here is an indirect reference to all those who do not subscribe to the views of realistic idealism i.e., Naiyāyikas.
resistance, it is not autonomous. It is neither in-transient nor transient. This is the glory belonging to something that is absolutely pure. 3.21-22

‘This’ means ‘the essence of the reflected image’ that ‘has been revealed’ by ‘the compassionate God of the Gods for increasing the knowledge of the dull [people]’ in a way that will be explained later. This was the syntactical relation [of the words in the verse]. By using the expression ‘revealed’ in a generic sense, the intended meaning is that [it has been taught] everywhere’. This has been said:

‘[The practitioner] should worship the Goddesses like an image, [and] the rays in the form of senses.’

In the same way:
Like the [still] water and the mirror, everything, movable and stationary, is pervaded by Him.

Likewise:
He manifests real and unreal objects like reflected images in the mirror.

Likewise:
Just as [plural] entities (bhāva) opposing one another become manifest within an uncontaminated mirror, in the same way the various [dynamic] aspects of the universe (viścavṛtti) [become manifest] within the Lord of consciousness individually.

Likewise:

58. source untraceable
59. Quoted also in TĀ 1.66 from the Kānikāgama.
60. source untraceable
61. TĀ 3.4.
The objects (*artha*) reflect within Him in the same way as in a pure gem.

Likewise:

I have neither bondage, nor do I have liberation. These [bondage, liberation and so on] cause fear to the *jīva*. [All this is] nothing but a reflected image of the intellect [in the *jīva*], like [the reflected image] of the sun [appears] in the water.

On this regard, ‘this’ reflected image, indeed, ‘is a real entity’, since it is becoming manifest. And it is not that [something] which is manifest [i.e. which is real] becomes non-manifest [i.e. unreal], for there is no point of disagreement on that. And in our case, [the fact that the reflected image exists only in the mirror] is not a contradicting proof (*pratyaya*), because the [reflected image] does not arise at a later time [namely when there is no mirror].

Objection: “But if this is the case, [namely if the reflected image is a real entity, this] should logically possess the well-known characteristics of this ‘real entity’, otherwise, indeed, the fact of ‘being a real entity’ would not be established. As a result of it, we should even accept that the horn of hare, which lacks visual form and touch, is a real entity, but its [hare’s horn] being a part of the class ‘real entity’ is not established. Then, how could [it possess] the nature of being a real entity? Actually, an object that appears outside can also move from one place to another; this is certainly not so [in our case, because the image does not exist outside a mirror].”

Thus, [in view of this objection, Abhinavagupta] said: ‘Neither it exists in another place from that [mirror].’ ‘From that’ means ‘from the place which is the mirror’. ‘Another place’ means at a different place [other than its own]. The word ‘exists’ should be applied to all other words of the sentence (*sarvatraivat*).

And a visual form etc. that exists outside is always connected with touch etc. This is not the case [of the reflected image]. That is why [Abhinavagupta] said ‘nor is it sufficient

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62. source untraceable
63. VBh 135.
64. Epithets like ‘the horn of hare’ (*śaśāśāraśga / śaśāśāraśāṇa*) or ‘son of a barren women’ (*vandyaśuta*) or ‘a flow in the sky’ (*khaupuṣpa*) are used to suggest non existence of something.
[within itself]’ - which means ‘this is not enough’, since here [in the reflected image], by excluding touch etc., only the configuration of forms appears. In this part of the text the negation should be applied [to both sides], like the eye of the crow.\textsuperscript{65} An external reality, let us say a mountain, offers resistance to everything else, and everything [offers resistance] to it because of [its/their] corporeality. But this is not the case [for the reflected image]. That is why [Abhinavagupta] said ‘resists’. The negation should be applied here also. Otherwise, [namely in case the reflected image possessed resistance like a stone,] since the mirror would break, how could it [even] enter it? Moreover, this [reflected image] does not enter the mirror from the back side. For, if it were the case, there would be the non-vision of the mirror. [At the time of their] production all external [entities] depend on a cause, because nothing comes into being out of its own. But, it is only an already produced entity that exists independently from other [things], like a pot, which exists, without the wheel etc. [that have been used for its production].

But this [reflected image], expecting the mirror etc. as the cause of [its] production, does not gain existence independently even to a small extant, for, apart from the mirror etc., the reflected image is not seen anywhere else [once produced]. It has been said ‘it is not autonomous’. And for this reason, indeed, thinking that this image is in itself neither stable nor unstable, [Abhinavagupta] has said: ‘neither is it transient, nor in-transient’. Indeed, an external reality, being arisen, is said to be in-transient since it is united with many portions of time (bahukālayoga), otherwise it is in-transient. But this [reflected image] does not gain existence at all without a mirror and so on. [In this regard] what could unite with time so that it could be permanent or impermanent? Therefore, this [reflected image] is a non-entity, like the horn of a hare and so on, due to the absence of the well-known characteristics of that object. And, its reflection is not logically justifiable [because it is not a vāstu].

“And if [its] reflection occurs, then what is it said [to be] ?” Thus, [Abhinavagupta]

\textsuperscript{65} ‘like the eye of the crow’ (kākākṣi-golaka-nyāya) is a famous śāstric maxim in Sanskrit which often means that a certainly particle in a sentence should be used twice or in two separate clauses in a sentence even if that is present only once, much like a how crow can see in two opposite directions at the same time.
says: ‘This is the glory which belongs to something which is absolutely pure’, namely it is the power of the mirror and so on which is pure.\textsuperscript{66} That object which is different from a non-object is what shines forth as a reflected image, the essence of which is only manifestation. Therefore, in the same way as the Bhagavān makes entities shine forth in the mirror etc. having manifestation as their only essence, in the same way it makes them manifest also in consciousness.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, these [entities] do not possess true existence as external realities [independent from consciousness]. Therefore, it is in order to increase knowledge for those who are attached to external objects\textsuperscript{68} [that the Lord] has taught this [namely their independent existence]. Therefore, all this [universe] has as its essence only the manifestation [of consciousness]. One should not attach to the external objects, so that the obfuscation of duality might disappear.

That is why, [Abhinavagupta] says:

\begin{quote}
[The reflected image in Consciousness has] no space, no form, no union with time, no measure, no mutual conjunction, no negation of this [conjunction], no density, [it has] no state of being non-entity, no innate essence, whatever it is. The teaching of the mirror pointed out [that thinking] in such a way (\textit{iti}) the delusion should surely disappear.\textsuperscript{69} 3.23
\end{quote}

The reflected image, indeed, does not possess a separate existence as if it were an independent reality, outside a mirror – this is established. And therefore, it does not have any space outside the mirror [and] that is why [Abhinavagupta] said ‘it has no space’. And, in the same way, it has no density, which means that it even does not have a solid form that has the characteristic of heaviness. Otherwise, it will surely have a separate space than the

\textsuperscript{66} At the mundane level this glory belongs to a mirror, but at the supra mundane level this glory belongs to the Lord alone.

\textsuperscript{67} It is important to keep in mind here that even in mundane reflection i.e., reflection in a mirror takes place owing to the glory of the Lord.

\textsuperscript{68} This is a reference to ‘externalists’ (\textit{bālyārthavāḍīns}). And ‘external objects’ should be understood as external to consciousness.

\textsuperscript{69} By the means of this verse Abhinavagupta is putting forth ‘Teaching of Mirror’ which is his strong message to the externalists. See Ratié (forthcoming:28). Also to keep in mind is that all the Mss titled \textit{Pratibimbavāda} only read the verses TĀ 3.1-23.
mirror, since it is impossible that something which is located in the space [and] which is reflected through the corporeal mirror reflects through another corporeal form, because corporeal realities cannot share the same locus. And therefore, it has no form. The meaning is that there is no union with the characteristic known as form. This [union] (sa) indeed is only corporeal. Thus was the intended meaning.

And therefore, it does not possess connection with time. The latter, indeed, is possible of something which exists independently with reference to something else which can be either prior or posterior [to it]. But, as we have repeatedly said, of this [reflected image] there is no separate existence outside the mirror. And therefore, of this there is ‘no measure’, i.e. there is no measurement, since the application of this [measurement] is possible only of a real entity (sat). Otherwise, how is it possible that something like a mountain etc. which has a big form might reflect in the limited surface of a mirror? Nor within the mirror is there reciprocal mixture due to the compactness of the many things although they appear together. That is why (iti) [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘no mutual conjunction’.

Objection: in case a town etc. manifests, if there is the manifestation of many objects which occupy different spaces in the single limited surface of the mirror, then this [manifestation] is logical since these [objects] are condensed together through the reciprocal mixing (paraspara sammelana)70, for it is otherwise illogical that they share the same place. If this were not the case, then there would be no manifestation of the town here [in the mirror]. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘no negation of this [conjunction]’, since all things manifest as mutually independent, and – it has been repeatedly been said71 – what is reflected does not become non-reflected. And, therefore, its non-entity does not exist. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘there is no state of being non-entity’ since many things appear. Even if that is the case

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70. The idea of reciprocal mixing is that when we look into a mirror, we are able to see the reflection of the prototype exactly as it is i.e., it is not the case that even though the reflected image has a singular locus and everything is appearing to be the same. That is to say in a single manifestation of any reflected image in a mirror - a tree looks like a tree, a river looks like a river, a mountain looks like a mountain, people look like people, small things look small, big things look big, my face looks like my face so on and so forth. In all this a mirror does not muddle the variety reflected in it. On the other hand even though there is mixing of entities reflected in it, yet a mirror is able to reflect entities with a perfect reciprocity or arrangement.

71. Jayaratha repeats this expression here from TĀV 3.21-22.
(evam api) [namely, that the reflected image is a kind of entity, at the same time], it does not possess its own real form, even though small, which produces reality (vastutva). That is why [Abhinavagupta] said: ‘no innate essence, whatever it is’. ‘In such a way’ (iti = evam), the true nature of the reflected image has as its essence nothing but manifestation. ‘The teaching of the mirror’ – given that [the mirror], it being different from the wall and so on, is a kind of object which is capable of [reflecting] a reflected image – [was imparted] with the following aim: [in order to realize that] the ‘contracted’ knowledge based on duality (dvaitaprathātmakaṃ) which is ascertained by the bāhyārthavādin⁷² should be removed.

Since things are in such a way, the following meaning has been shown: the universe is established in Consciousness according to the maxim of reflected image in the mirror, but it is not a real entity which exists as separate from this [consciousness] assuming the form of an external object. Therefore, one should not be attached to it.

Therefore, after having thus established the way [of functioning] of the reflection, it is [now] explained the reflection of the sound by means of another concomitant expression. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

After having shown in such a way, in the previous verses (amantra), the way of [functioning] of the reflection, [it is explained now that] the reflection of the sound is called echo.⁷³ 3.24

And this [echo] is not a sound arisen from [another] sound (as the Vaiśeṣikas maintain). Since 1) the speaker who has produced it hears it as something which is coming [towards him]; since 2) those who are far away do not hear the sound [at all]; and since 3) the sound is variegated once it is [produced] when there is the contact with particular holes on one part of the lid of a pot and so on, it [echo] is a reflection like the face etc. [in the mirror]. 3.25-26

It is ‘echo’ (prati-śrutkā) since one can hear (śrut), i.e. listen (śravaṇa), it by means of a

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⁷². bāhyārthavādins should be understood as externalists i.e., those who believe in the entities existing outside the Consciousness.

⁷³. Beginning this verse Abhinavagupta takes up the second tanmātra i.e. śabda-tanmātra.
reflection (prati-samkramana). Alternatively, it is ‘echo’ since there is a similar (pratisadṛśa) hearing (śravaṇa) [of it].

In this [world], indeed, for the Naiyāyikas, given that the reflection of the form through the perception of one’s own face is due to the reflection of the ocular rays in the mirror etc., [and] since it is not possible the reflection etc. of the ears etc. in the case of the echo and so on, the latter is negated (tadapahnava) even if we conceive [the echo as] having the nature of principal sound etc. Thus, nowhere is there a reflection. This is the intended meaning.

Regarding this it has [already] been established that the reflection of form does exist. Thus, in order to establish the existence of the reflection also of the sound etc., [Abhinavagupta] refutes the above theory after having doubted it with the words ‘and this [echo] is not’.

‘This’ is the echo. ‘Arisen from [another] sound’ means [it is] neither arisen by contact, nor by breaking [as Vaiśeṣikas maintain]. [In other words] it is arisen by itself. The meaning is that this is a principal sound, since it is manifested by itself. And this [principal sound] is known just coming [out] from the mouth. Therefore, the first sound that is extremely intense is heard by the knowers [i.e., hearers] who are in its proximity, certainly not the last [sound] that is extremely weak. However, [the hearers] who are far away [hear] only the last and not the first. Thus, the echo is heard by the speaker or by those knowers [i.e., hearers] who are close to him as ‘coming towards’ [them], that is to say as coming near. And therefore, it is not heard [at all] by knowers ‘who are far away’, who dwell in caverns, caves etc., since it [the echo] is not coming close to them. And the principal sound, which is lying in the space of ears of many hearers never becomes variously differentiated. For, in case it were [divided], the activity [of echo] would never be possible as the single object of all the hearers.

Furthermore, the echo assumes the nature of the lid of the pot under which there is boiling noisy water. Pot and so on are particular materials of which there are specific holes (chidra = suṣīra = bhūga), that are bigger or smaller and so on.74

‘When there is the contact’ [with these holes] by means of coming in contact with the

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74. This sentence is a very tentative translation since it is not very clear what Jayaratha is meaning to say. suṣīra means perforated or hollow.
space of these [holes], the sound, which is [in itself] unique, becomes manifold (ekaśabdān
dvācinītyāṃ).75

Thus, this sound is not arisen from [another] sound since there is no perception of its belonging to sounds born from [other] sounds that are real entities. Therefore, in the same way as there is the reflection of the face in the mirror and so on, there is the reflection of this principal sound in the ether. That is why [Abhinavagupta] has said: ‘it [echo] is a reflection, like the face etc. [in the mirror].’

The fact of [echo’s] being a reflection is [demonstrated] here not only since its does not belong to the class of principal sounds, which are real entities, but also since it does belong to the class of reflected images of forms.

But as well as this form of a different knowable reality manifests in a mirror [as something separated from the mirror], in the same way, [as regards the sound,] I hear (ākarnaye) something which has been pronounced by someone [else]. 3.27

As well as, [while looking] in a mirror etc., a form, albeit related to the idea of I-ness, connected with ones own face, is conceived as a knowable reality connected with someone else, in the same way, a sound which I myself have pronounced, albeit should be conceived as being expressed by me, is [imagined] as if pronounced by someone [else].

And therefore, since it makes part of the same class of the reflected images, here too [in the case of echo] we have its being a reflected image. This is the meaning. The word ‘but’ has to be understood as ‘and’, and this is in reference to what has been said before. The word ‘iti’ is simply to complete the sentence.

Surely, if a sound pronounced by a speaker is reflected in the space of caves etc. that are far away, then it is heard only by those who are there, certainly not by others. That is why [Abhinavagupta] says:

Since, by rule, the reflection is facing the image, as a consequence those knowing subjects

75. Note that this is a conjecture instead of ekaśabdābhāvaśītyāṃ.
that are in the middle of the two [bimba and pratibimba] hear the echo. 3.28

As a rule, since the reflection is only facing the image, like in case of the mirror and so on, only those knowing subjects who are within the two – image and reflected image – hear the echo (pratistabda) which is produced as facing the image, certainly not those who are far away, who are at a different place like caves and caverns etc., because it is not produced as facing the [original sound].

Surely, if that is the case, how could the knowers, who for some reason do not hear the form of the sound which is supposed to come from the source (bimba), perceive the echo which is being produced by the presence of the image, albeit they are between the [image and the reflection]? Having doubted thus, [Abhinavagupta] says:

But also without the perception of the main image, the perception of the reflected image is possible. [A lady] can perceive the beloved which is standing in one's own back, [but] which is reflected in front of the mirror. 3.29

It ‘is possible’ when one resides in a place which is fit for the perception of the reflected image. ‘Standing in one’s own back’ means that the cause [of reflection] is by means of the vision of the beloved, i.e. the original image, produced unexpectedly, in other words it is by means of a quality.

Surely, according to the aforesaid reasoning a reflected image never attains an independent existence from the mirror and so on. Then, how can it be in front of the original image? Having doubted thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

And it is said that being in front of [the original image] is because of the steadiness [of the reflected image] due to [its] non-difference with such mirror. 3.30

‘Such’ is the ‘mirror’ which is facing the image. ‘Non-difference’ from it means identity
with the mirror. The steadiness, i.e. the stability, of the reflected image due to this [identity]. Therefore, the following and nothing else is its being in front of [the image], i.e. that the mirror exists in front of the original image. Since its activity is nothing more than that, the fact that the mirror and so on is in front of the image is then absolutely necessary, for otherwise [in it] it would never be possible the arising of the reflected image. In the same way, it has to be accepted that also the ether and so on are perceivers of the reflected image of the sound and so on, in as much as they are in front of the original image.

This is what [Abhinavagupta] says:

Therefore, the space of the speaker, which is being reflected in the space of a cavity\(^76\) such as a well, appears endowed with sound, as if appearing in a speaker who is different from that.

3.31

‘Therefore’, i.e. due to above-mentioned identity with the specific substratum which is facing the original image. ‘The space’ belonging to ‘the speaker’, which is being reflected, namely in which it is being manifested the variegated activity of the [original image], ‘appears’, namely shines, ‘in the space of [a cavity] such as a well’, ‘endowed with sound’, which is its image. This is the meaning.

In as much as the sound is the quality [of the ether], since it is connected with its quality-bearer [i.e., with the ether], it is dependent on the latter. Its reflection in the quality-bearer is logically tenable only together with the quality-bearer; it has been said: ‘In the ether there is the ether’.\(^77\)

In order to understand better that the space of the well and so on is in front of the space of the speaker, [Abhinavagupta] uses an example: ‘as if appearing in a speaker who is different from that’. [Different] ‘from that’ means [different] from the original speaker. The ‘different speaker’ is one who answers (prativaktā). [It appears] as if in him. That is the meaning.

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\(^76\) Here I have translated \textit{pithina} as ‘cavity’ and not as ‘pot’ or ‘pan’.

\(^77\) Source untraced.
In the same way as the space of the ears which, in front of the speaker, is connected with the responder [and] receives the reflection of the space which, connected with the speaker, is endowed with sound, in this very way this is also true about the space of well and so on.

[excursus on the nirākāra and sākāra]

[A sākāravādin says:] Actually, in this world, a cognition, which is born out of this or that sense faculty, can discriminate an object only if the reflection of the latter has been grasped by this or that [sense faculty]. Otherwise, there would be no restriction – ‘this is the cognition of blue’, [and] ‘this is the cognition of yellow’ [etc.] – of a cognition which is formless, since it is common to many objects starting with blue, yellow and so on. And therefore, the cognition is endowed with the form [of the object], since, without the nature of being endowed with forms, its distinction from the counteraction would be impossible.

And it is not correct to say that the distinction of the counteraction can also be proved because one might say that the generator of the [cognition] is the object itself [and not the senses], since there would be the undesired consequence that also the eyes and so on, due to the absence of [their] specific quality of being generators, would be [in their turn] the object of the [cognition].

[A nirākāravādin objects:] If this [cognition] is generated by means of the blue, namely by means of a karman, and not by means of eyes and so on, then it is the unitary object of that.

[Answer of the sākāravādin:] This is not true. For ‘the nature of karman’ is [here] ‘[having] the nature of kāraka,’ and the latter occurs by virtue of compenetration (āveśa)\(^\text{78}\) with an action (kriyā). Otherwise, this would be simply an object, [and] not a kāraka. And here the compenetration with the action of knowing the blue has been introduced in order to reflect upon. How then its being a karman could be possible also before that? Nor, in as much as it is also a generator, its having a unitary sphere would be realized. What is then said: ‘This

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\(^{78}\) I have translated āveśa here as ‘compenetration’ referring to mutual interfusion of two ideas.
specific property (viśeṣa) is produced by the nature itself of the object although there is no distinction regarding [its] being generator', this is nothing but a way to escape from the problem. This is enough.

[End of excursus]

Therefore, also the sense faculties in which there is the reflection of that [object] which has been perceived are engaged in distinguishing various objects. Thus it has been well-illustrated with the words (iti) 'as if appearing in a speaker who is different from that'. Even though this [echo] is possible only in the listener, however, due to the strong adherence [he has to common experience] and so on, the reciprocal presence of a speaker and counter-speaker is [held] to be necessary. That is what has been illustrated. However, it is well possible that there are hearers that do not face each other. To explain: in common experience we all see that there are hearers who say as follows: 'I have not heard what he has said'. Alternatively, in general, the space of the speaker which is reflected in the space of the well and so on looks like as if it were the other speaker. In other words, the sound is heard [by its own speaker] as if it were uttered from another speaker. In the same way, also the reflected image, since its activity is not different from that [of the echo], is facing the original image. Thus, what has been said above, i.e. ‘Since, by rule, the reflection is facing the image’, is right.

And therefore, only a knowing subject who is in between the original image and the reflected image perceives either this or that, not another [knowing subject]. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

*And in the same way as someone who is in the back of a mirror really does not perceive a face, in the same way indeed the one who stays beyond such space does not perceive the sound.*

3.32

79. cf. TĀ 3.28a
‘Face’ is the reflected image of a face of another [person]. ‘Such’ means connected with the original image. ‘The one who is beyond’ is the one who is in places like a cave and a cavern. This is the meaning. ‘Sound’ here is the echo. With the words ‘really he does not perceive’ is suggested that the reflection is actually present since the negation is only of the perception. For, when knowledge is absent it does not mean that also the knowable is absent. This is intended. Therefore, the meaning is that when one is not located in a fitting place, he does not know the reflected image even though it has been produced. Even though this meaning has been understood with the words ‘by rule, facing the image’, however it has been repeated [here] in order to corroborate (upodbalana) the homogeneity with the reflection of a form.

One might ask: the form and the reflection [in the mirror] have the identical nature [only] on the basis of a portion or on the basis of all parts? In case the former hypothesis is right, the original sound and the echo should also have the identical nature by means of a portion i.e., the fact of being manifesting and so on. Thus its form-ness would also be attached [to it]. But this does not occur by means of all parts. For even if the reflection of form arises, there should be the apprehension of the image of hand and so on, but that does not happen here. This doubt is raised [by Abhinavagupta]:

And therefore, necessarily, the sound which reflects [namely, the echo] is not non-manifested [in other words, it is the only one which is pronounced]. Its manifestation and hearing occur simultaneously. At the very second moment, however, it is reflected and [we have] the contemporaneous hearing [of it]. 3.33-34ab

Here, indeed, the ‘word’ is non-manifested, in other words it is un-uttered, namely it does not reach the stage of reflection. Thus, verily, having been manifested in the first

80. TĀ 3.28a
81. Cf. TĀ 1.143 and com. thereon.
82. Here in a few lines above the Sanskrit is not very clear to me thus I am providing a tentative translation.
83. The idea of ‘simultaneity’ is important in Reflection. In the process of Reflection the reflector and the reflected should manifest simultaneously failing which reflection cannot take place. cf. ĪPK 1.6.3.
moment, when the places of articulations and the articulatory organs come in contact with each other, it reaches the state of being perceived by the auditory organ. But in the second moment, reaching the state of reflection, it is heard. Of this supposed image, which disappears as soon as it is pronounced, there is no understanding in the moment in which it is reflected. And therefore, here there is not the fact that the form and the reflection [in the mirror] have the identical nature, since here there is the knowledge of the image even at the time of the reflection.

This is not true. [Abhinavagupta] says:

*At the same time, indeed, there is actually no ascertainment of a hand and its shadow.*

3.34cd

The ‘ascertainment’ is the manifestation consisting in reflective awareness. In this case too, there is no understanding of the [original] image at the time of the reflection, for it is not right that there is the understanding also of the image such as a hand when there is the understanding of the reflection, since there is the contradiction of the arising of two [different] cognitions simultaneously. And in this single [cognition] there is no support of both [image and reflection] as in the case of the knowledge of a picture, because of the remoteness of the image and reflection, due to the absence of the uninterrupted manifestation.

[Objection:] Surely, even though there is no manifestation of the hand and so on, there is the presence of the real object.

[Reply:] This is wrong. For the manifestation (ābhāsa) indeed is the establisher of all the objects, since without it we cannot ascertain the reality and the non-reality of the objects. And here we do not have a manifestation. Thus, with reference to the existence according to true reality of an [original] image, like the hand, what is the proof? And also in the second moment of the sound whose condition is lapsing there is the existence according to reality. However, at the moment of the existence of reflection, its understanding cannot occur. Thus,
also in this case we do not have the simultaneous cognition of image and reflection. Therefore, its having the nature of it is established.

Having thus established the ultimateness of the reflection by refuting the position of the Naiyāyikas, [Abhinavagupta] comes back to the main topic:

Having thus shown the reality of the reflection in the previous section (amūtra), [in the following] we talk about the main points. In this regard the sound is reflected (pratibimbanam arhati) in the ether, a pleasant contact is reflected in the blissful abode of touch. Also, the other [i.e. the unpleasant touch] which belongs to another person, [and] which is produced by a violent impact such as [the one with] trident and coldness is reflected [in our body]. Since [all those are] reflection, they cause the excitement (uddhūlanā) in our own body. 3.35-36

Therefore [Abhinavagupta] said: ‘In this regard’. ‘In this regard’ means since things are in such a way. ‘In the ether’, because the sound is pure there alone. And the syntactic order is that since it belongs to another person, ‘it is reflected’. The latter words [= 3.35d] should be applied in all cases. ‘Blissful’ is a specific substratum like the bulb, the heart, the base of the palate (tālutala) which are loci of bliss. There, indeed, due to the pureness of the contact, the touch that is fit for the enjoyment of making love is reflected; by means of this [touch] there could be also the pleasure of the emission of semen and so on. For this reason, since it produces abundance of bliss it has been defined as ‘pleasant’ (sundara). Also, the other contact which is unpleasant since it produces pain and so on, necessarily, is reflected in a specific substratum (ādhūra-viśeṣa) such as the perineal region (mattagandha), the belly (jāthara), the bronchial tube (kūrmanāḍī) and the throat (kaṇṭha), which are painful and so

84. In the NTU Kṣemarāja mentions sixteen ādhūras and mattagandha, jāthara, kūrmanāḍī and kaṇṭha fall under this list. cf. NTU 7.5. He also interprets all the sixteen in the light of Kaula system.
85. mattagandhaśthāna is referred to as perineal region. cf. NTU 7.36. The contractions and relaxations of the perineal region (mattagandhasamkoca) that Jayaratha refers to in TĀV 5.55 is supposed to be a painful experience just like as if a serpent is hit by a stick. See TAK 3, p. 330-331.
86. In the vyāsabhāṣya of the YS 3.32 kūrmanāḍī is mentioned as a tortoise-shaped tubular structure. If one is able to control the bronchial tube (kūrmanāḍī) one can attain calmness. See Aranya (2000:307).
on, and through which one can even lose consciousness. ‘Which belongs to another person’
means which is perceived by another person since, in this case, this [touch] is the main
[source of reflection]. This was the meaning. And the implication is as follows: by virtue of
this, this [other touch] would be in such a way [namely, would remain the main source of
reflection] even though it is [simply] remembered or imagined and so on. And how is it
recognized that it is a reflection? In order to answer this question he says: ‘Since [all those
are] reflection, they cause the excitement in our own body.’ And that is the same in the
experience of both pain and pleasure. In this regard (iii) the non-distinction [between these
two] is accepted.

Objection: If that is the case, since it produces a causal efficiency, does it not become in
its turn the main touch? Having doubted in such a way, [Abhinavagupta] says:

And this is not the main [touch] since it does not manifest the series of its own effects.
3.37ab

‘Main’ means the original image. ‘Its’ means of the touch, the effects of which are bliss
so on. Of those [effects] there is a ‘series’, a continuous sequence. [The reflection is not the
main substratum] since it does not manifest this [series]. The principality of this [reflection]
is not [admitted] since, in this case, we do not have the following experience: that the effect
rises up immediately even though the cause is evidently present.

[Abhinavagupta] applies the same argument also elsewhere:

In the same way, [the same occurs for] smell in another nose; [and] the taste becomes
manifest in the one which is the [basis of] saliva. 3.38ab

‘The one which is the [basis of] saliva’ means the one ‘which is connected with the
quality of the pure taste’, in other words [the tongue] which is the basis for the sense of the
taste.

Thus, indirectly considering that also the reflections of the taste and so on have the
same nature of the reflection of form like the echo, [Abhinavagupta] shows the difference [between them] accordingly:

And in the same way as a form which is reflected in the two eye-balls [like in a mirror] is not perceived without another eye [i.e. the eye of another person], in this very way, although they are present, taste, touch, smell and so on are not perceived without [another] sense faculty.87 3.39

Here [in this world], it has been repeatedly said that the true nature (satatvam) of reflection has as its essence only manifestation. And manifestation depends on this or that object [which is perceived], on a sense faculty, which perceives it, and on the power of the internal sense, which is the subsequent perceiver. For, even if a mirror and so on are present, if something which appears in the sense faculties starting with eyes does not appear under the power of the internal sense, what is then the manifestation of the reflection of face and so on?

And therefore, a form that is reflected in the two eye-balls, that is to say pupils that are under the power of the visual sense faculty, is not perceived without another visual sense faculty, namely the one which is connected with another [person] (anayasambandhin). The meaning is that it does not appear without the activity of another visual sense faculty. But in the manifestation of a form that is reflected in a mirror and so on, which is unable to distinguish the [reflection itself], there is no need of the visual sense faculty of another person, since our eye-balls are themselves able [to perceive] in this way. The two ‘eye-balls’ have been mentioned in order to demonstrate this point. The meaning is that [the two eye-balls] are not enough to discriminate something which is extremely close to them, like the collyrium in the eyes. Therefore, the intended meaning is that this [form] does not appear without the activity of a sense faculty.

Thus, exactly in the same way as it is [for the eye-balls and the form], also the taste and so on, which is being reflected, even though present, is not perceived again that is to say

87. cf. IPVV vol. 1, ad st. 1.2.8.
does not manifest without the activity of one’s own sense faculty. This is the meaning. Here, since it is not possible otherwise the manifestation of the sense faculties starting with eyes, the presiding power \( \text{adhiṣṭhāna} \) of the internal sense is understood. This is not an unverified claim, otherwise indeed even though employed, the eye and so on would not determine anything.

Objection: Here, the form and sound are capable of reflecting internally in the eye and in the ears and so on, and externally in the mirror and the space and so on. So it is logical that the external reflection is determined by the eyes and the ears connected to another [person]. However, touch and so on reflect only internally, in one’s own body, in the bulb and so on. And this is evident. And therefore, since the [mental] continuum of another [person] is always the object of inference, it does not become the object of the cognition [depending on the] external senses of another [person]. Then, why has it been said that this is ‘not perceived without [another] sense faculty’ like the reflection of the form?

[Abhinavagupta] says this:

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\text{And the sphere (kṣetra) of touch that is located in the internal abode of touch is not the external touch. It is the senses and mind of another [person] that is (sa) the field [of the external touch]. 3.40}
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[The sphere of touch is] ‘internal’, since it is an internal activity of the body. ‘Abode of touch’ is synecdochical expression. With this [expression] also the spheres of smell and taste are meant. And the senses and mind of another [person] is the reason, occasioned by the qualification ‘external touch’, for the non-perception of the internal touch as well as [internal smell and taste]. ‘It is... that is’ \((sa)\) is a specification which depends [directly] on the word ‘field’. In the same way, since [touch] is an internal activity of the body, the bulb and so on and [whatever has] as its field touch and so on is not the sense-field of another knowing subject like the eye-balls and so on [which instead need another knowing subject].

The touch and so on, which are located there [in the internal sphere], manifest only through the activity of one’s own senses that are governed by internal-organs. Therefore,
Therefore, when [an action] is performed by the internal organs with the aim of [activating] the proximate, one’s own, and corresponding [external] organs, at that very moment the reflected image, which is realized when the sense faculty [is activated], generates its own corresponding causal efficiency (kriyā = arthakriyā). 3.41

‘Therefore’ i.e., since the reason – as has already been said – is internal etc. Sense faculty is here skin and so on. It is ‘proximate’ namely conjoined since the internal organs starting with mind can gradually combine with all the sense faculties; it is ‘one’s own’ that is to say it is fixed in as much as it is fitting with a [specific] object, and it is ‘corresponding’ that is to say not vitiated since there is no injuring of the sense faculties. When an impulse towards an object, let us say for instance touch, is promoted by the ‘internal organs with the aim [of activating]’ the [sense faculties], then, as a matter of fact, ‘the reflected image’, consisting in touch and so on, ‘which is realized’, which is being perceived (grhitam sat), ‘generates’, namely produces a ‘causal efficiency’ (arthakriyā) that is ‘one’s own’, i.e. that is consented by the [original] image, [and] that is ‘corresponding’, i.e., that is characterized by bliss and so on. [The reflected image is realized] ‘when the sense faculty is activated’ (jāta indriye), namely when a cognition in sense faculties is [produced] due to the contact with the external touch and so on which is the original image, since, as it has been said before, a cognition which is endowed with the aspect of the external object is logically different from this or that specific object (niyatavisaya). This was the meaning. It is precisely for this reason that we have here the reality, since the relationship between perceivable and perceiver everywhere occurs in this way.

But touch and so on, which is being remembered when there is no external image, is not able to produce a real causal efficiency (arthakriyā), even though it is reflected in one’s own sphere [such as bulb]. Thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

But a causal efficiency (kriyā = arthakriyā) cannot be real from something remembered,
which is object of the mind. That [causal efficiency] verily comes from something present. Therefore, the best touch, [once] arrived in its own sense faculty, being understood (viditaḥ san), is established as having such causal efficiency (tathākriyāḥ). 3.42

By saying ‘from something remembered’ it is [usually] said that an external object is absent, since the content of the [memory] is a past object. For instance, the well perfumed Pentapetes phoenicea (bandhūka) can certainly be the object of a mental cognition although it is not present outside. This is the meaning. By saying ‘[it] cannot be real’ the intention is not that it is not possible at all, for it is well possible that the [experience of] pleasure etc. comes also from a touch and so on that is [simply] remembered; however, this is not a real [pleasure], since no activity is produced from this experience of pleasure and so on.88

On this regard the reason is as follows: ‘That [causal efficiency] verily comes from something present’. The word ‘verily’ is used in the causal sense since this causal efficiency ‘comes from something present’, that is to say, it derives from a real object existing outside. This was the meaning. Thus, [Abhinavagupta] says ‘therefore’. ‘Therefore’, namely on the basis of what has been said, the superior ‘touch’, being produced by an external image, [once] ‘arrived in its own sense faculty’, namely in the cognition of the tactile faculty, receives a reflected image. Therefore, ‘being understood’, becomes endowed with ‘such causal efficiency’ i.e., becomes capable of producing its own real effects. This is the meaning.

Objection: If things are as you say (evam), since only a real object is capable of producing a reflected image, touch and so on, being non-existent outside, does never become a reflection. Then what could make a causal efficiency possible in memory and so on? [In that case] we can imagine that also [memory and so on] are false. Having doubted thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

When such external object is absent, the best touch [=the internal sensation of touch],

88. Here the meaning of the word prābandhinyāḥ is not very clear to me.
being reflected in this [locus of touch], it accordingly (tathā) produces [the activity of] pleasure and so on. And moreover, this [best touch] reflects in some group of veins. 3.43

In the absence of an external image, touch and so on, which resembles it, engraved by the conceptual constructions of memory and so on, becomes ‘itself’ the [original] image (ākāriḥbhūtah), but there is no external object. ‘Being reflected in this locus’ of touch and so on, it ‘accordingly’, namely in accordance with one’s own nature (svaucityāt), ‘produces this causal efficiency’ characterized by pleasure, which is unreal. This was the meaning of the sentence.

Objection: Since there are many loci of touch starting with bulb, does touch reflect everywhere or only in some of them? Having doubted in this way, [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘And moreover, this [best touch] reflects in some group of veins’. In other words, [touch reflects] in specific places such as the bulb, which consist in certain groups of veins. Due to the predominance of bulb and so on, for some [people] only some specific places are [sensitive to touch]. The meaning is that for them there is the reflection of touch precisely in that place where they perceive the abundance of pureness, as for instance the root of palatal for sterile (phonemes).

Having established the true nature of reflected image in this way, [Abhinavagupta] comes back to the main topic:

For this [reason], the universe, reflecting itself in the mirror of consciousness, expresses the pure, universal nature of such Lord. 3.44

[The compound] ‘mirror of consciousness’ is actually a karmadhārṇya. The reason for this is that [both, mirror and consciousness] are extremely pure. ‘For this’ reason, namely [for the reason that] has just been mentioned, ‘the universe’ is ‘reflecting itself in’ this [mirror of consciousness], i.e. is producing (dadat) [its own] reflection. While doing this, it

89. The four liquids of the Sanskrit alphabetical scheme viz. ṛ, ṭ, ḷ and ḹ are named as sterile phonemes in the Tantras. For more details see Padoux (1992:254 ff).
expresses', namely it manifests, the 'universal nature', the oneness with one's own nature 'of such Lord' made of consciousness. This nature is 'pure', namely it is unblemished, since it is demonstrated by reasoning and personal experience. In other words, it does not shine independently from consciousness. This means that there is no manifestation which occurs freely, independently from the mirror and so on, i.e., from one's own support, from [one's own] source. Therefore, this entire universe is simply a form of the Supreme Lord, which is one, which consists of consciousness. This is the condensed meaning. As it has been said in the Prajñānāśikāra:

Thus, according to the above mentioned rule, the universe is a form of a single, part-less reality. What is it [really] that disappears [in front] of us?

The ātmanepada in the word 'expresses' is used in the sense of 'manifestation' [i.e. 'manifests'] on the basis of Pāṇini's sūtra 1.3.47.90

Objection: If the universe is not distinct from consciousness, then as much as it is made of consciousness, is it [with consciousness] in a dharma-dharmin relationship?

[Answer:] Surely, it is! [Abhinavagupta] says that there is [such a relationship] by offering an example from the external world:

And like smell, form, touch, taste and so on, being reflected, appear with the characteristics of their support, like a face in a sword [assumes the characteristics of the latter], in the same way, this universe, being reflected in consciousness, takes refuge in the collection of qualities [of consciousness] beginning with 'being light' and 'being freedom'. 3.45-46

In this world indeed, 'form' and so on, 'being reflected', appear according to the specific nature of the limiting factor of one's own support. For instance, 'a face' which reflects 'in a sword' [assumes the qualities of the latter:] it becomes as if affected by the

90. According to Pāṇini 1.3.47 when the vad is to be used in the sense of 'manifesting' (i.e., vadate), it should be used in ātmanepada.
longness and so on which is a quality of the [sword itself]; reflected in a mirror, it assumes the quality of the latter: it becomes big or small accordingly. Analogously, also ‘this universe, being reflected’ in the light [of consciousness], ‘takes refuge in’, i.e. assumes, the entire collection (jātam) of the qualities of [consciousness] such as the quality of being illuminated. This is the meaning. Since it is absolutely not distinct from light, the universe will be manifesting. If that is not the case, due to lack of capacity of shining, nothing could ever shine forth. And therefore, in as much as it is itself shining, it [universe] is free. In case it were distinct from light, the universe – being insentient, consisting in blue, pleasure and so on – in as much as it is itself not shining, could not even shine by itself, but only by means of another [entity]. Thus, the meaning is that given the expectation on another, it [universe] would be dependant. And therefore, all this collection of knowable realities is [nothing but] the body of the Supreme Lord who is light. Thus, in as much as it consists in light [the Lord] is made of universe. It has been said:

‘Even a single portion of the Brahman has the nature of all the others, it is both unsurpassable and beyond conceptual constructions’.

And also:

‘Also, each one of the tattvas has the nature of [all the other] thirty-six [tattvas]’.

Objection: It has been demonstrated before that, within form and so on, only something becomes reflected in a specific [support], then how is it possible that the entire universe, consisting in form and so on, could be reflected in one single consciousness? Having doubted thus [Abhinavagupta] says:

*And as well as a reflection is present completely in the crystal which is completely pure, in the same way it is present in consciousness which is completely pure. 3.47*
‘Completely’ in the case of the crystal means from each side, the preceding and the subsequent and so on. In case of ‘consciousness’ it means from everything, starting with form. Even if in a completely pure crystal only form can be completely reflected – thus, of this example there is no applicability to consciousness which is capable of catching the reflection of [everything] starting with form – however, the [applicability of this example] is acceptable [in our case] since things (bhāva), in due order, according to their level of purity, are desirous of attaining the eminence of catching the reflection. To explain, of the mirror there is only the front side, of the sword there are two sides, the front and the back, and of the crystal there is abundance of purity on all the sides. Thus, regarding those [surfaces], there is in due order, a gradualness in the catching of the reflection. Thus, also in case of consciousness there is a capacity of catching a reflected image of form and so on in as much as it is completely pure. And therefore, consciousness is absolutely much more pure than even the crystal. This was the meaning.

Objection: What is then its [i.e. of consciousness] absolute purity ? [Abhinavagupta] says:

This absolute purity [of consciousness] is [its] non-manifestation of its own form. That is why consciousness is purest and not a jewel, since [the latter] posses a form. 3.48

In this [world] indeed light shines forth for it is itself luminous and not [because it receives light] from another one. Thus, since it is independent from any other reality, [light] even does not touch the odour of knowability. [In other words it never becomes knowable.] Unlike crystal and so on, it never becomes graspable by another cognition by which there could also be the manifestation of a form. Here, one can [easily] accept that there is pure reflection of something impure, like a white cloth in a crystal. And there is no further, additional purity in reference to light – the single nature of which is the one of the supreme knower – that could even be capable of catching its [namely, of the light] form. Thus, it has been rightly said: ‘This absolute purity [of consciousness] is the non-manifestation of its own form’. But the crystal and so on since in as much as it is perceivable, with reference to this
[light] is not pure. The meaning is that: the more the knowability [of a thing] is evident the less pure it is. And it is with this very intention that previously it has been said that the purity of consciousness and the purity of some other entities which are different form it is twofold: principal and secondary. [And this has been said with the words] starting with: ‘The principal pureness belongs completely to that [single principle] which is the Lord-Consciousness. The other [i.e. the secondary pureness] is related to a specific [reality] according to its partial aspects.’ [TĀ - 3.9abc]. Thus, the intended meaning is as follows: the mirror and so on is pure, the crystal is purer, but the purest is consciousness.

Therefore, then is there anything unique which is conveyed by the force of logic?

[Abhinavagupta] says:

> And the reflected image is projected [in the mirror] by the original image which is outside. Once the latter is itself a reflected image, what remains of the original image? 3.49

Here indeed, the reflected image is projected in a mirror and so on by an external original image like a face and so on. Regarding this, no one disagrees at all. When, however, one accepts that the external reality which is held to be its original image is nothing but the reflected image itself, ‘what is then the original image?’, ‘what remains of the’ object capable of producing the reflected image? No [object] can exist at all. This was the meaning. In the same way as no one would accept that an object, let us say a blue thing, pleasure and so on, is distinct from [its] cognition, in the same way, also with respect to this [reflected image] no one would accept that there is another, distinct object [i.e. the original image].

Objection: Even if this is so, however, it will be without a cause; how can [then] the reflected image arise? In this regard, you should mention some cause which stands for the original image. Having doubted thus, [Abhinavagupta] says:

> Even if some cause is consecrated as ‘original image’, that also would become a reflected image in consciousness, otherwise it would be unreal. 3.50
Here indeed, whatever is admitted as a cause, capable of projecting the reflected image, in the same way as the original image is able to do (bimbatvena), is it indistinct or distinct from consciousness? In case it is indistinct, then, on the basis of the previous reasoning, a reflected image is not the original image. And in case it is distinct, due to the absence of what is being brought to consciousness, it is simply nothing. Thus, it has been rightly said: ‘Once the latter is itself a reflected image, what remains of the original image?’

[Abhinavagupta] summarises precisely this:

_Thus, this [argument] is protected by the sword of reasoning which is well fixed in one’s own awareness: the kingdom only of the reflected image unfolds everywhere._

The particle ‘only’ is not in the due sequence. Therefore, the meaning is that [the kingdom] is only ‘of the reflected image’ and not of the original image. ‘Everywhere’, i.e., not [only] in the external reality, like a face. For it is in [everything] that we have the capacity of both the original image and the reflected image. This is the intended meaning.

Objection: Since those two [original image and reflected image] are interdependent, how is it possible that we have the true existence of the reflected image when the original image is absent? Thus, [Abhinavagupta] says:

Objection: But in the absence of the original image, how can the reflected image exist?

Reply: What can we do? As a matter of fact it is commonly experienced.

Objection: But it should [simply] be called the original image. 3.52

With the words ‘what can we do?’ he admits precisely this [namely that we have the reflected image without the original image]. By saying ‘it is commonly experienced’ it is

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91. cf. st. TĀ 3.49cd
92. Gnoli interprets the compound the _svasamvittidhanyāga_ as the _dvandva_ compound which is also possible. Basically everything in the world is just the reflected image of the original image.
intended that it is not illogical in common experience (drṣte). But [someone might say that] we do not actually object the common experience which is called [by you] in this way [i.e., reflected image], but, we claim (abhidadhmah) that this universe which is being experienced should not be defined as a reflected image, but [simply] as the original image. That is why [the objector] says: ‘Objection: But it should [simply] be called the original image.’

[Abhinavagupta] refutes precisely this:

This is not true (naivam). Since it lacks the characteristics of it, what is indeed called the original image? It is not mingled with other things, it is independent, it is real, appearing like the face. 3.53

‘Since it lacks the characteristics of it’ means since it is not identical with the characteristics of the original image, what is indeed the characteristic/definition of the original image? [Abhinavagupta] replies with the second pāda and so on. Thus it is said ‘not mingled with other things’ [and so on] which means that it is devoid of homogeneous and heterogeneous things. That is why ‘it is independent’, that is to say, it resides only in one’s own nature, since it is not logically possible that one thing resides in another thing. If it were the case, it would be non distinct at all from that. This was the intended meaning. And only the fact that the image is not obstructed by anything is the proof its having such nature. That is why it has been said ‘appearing’.

Thus, immediately after (anantaraṃ instead of anantara) the definition of the original image, in order to establish a basis (pīṭhikābāndham) for the reflected image which needs to be defined, in as much as it is equal to the original image, in other words, in order to point out that it is established by all the debaters that [the original image is] the support of the [reflected image], [Abhinavagupta] mentions the definition of the original image by paraphrasing the meaning expresses by the Prajñālamaṅkārakārikā:

‘The nature of the reflected image is said to be in accord with the nature of the other [i.e. of the original image] without abandoning one’s own qualities, like the surface of the
mirror and of the sword.’

The [masters] say that the nature of the reflected image is in accord with the nature of the other [i.e. the original image] without abandoning one’s own nature, like the surface of the mirror and of the sword. 3.54

In this world, even if there is no abandonment of one’s own, i.e. specific, nature of mirror and so on, namely thinness, circularity and so on, the nature of the reflected image is nothing but the similarity with another form, that is to say, the form of the face and so on. It has nothing to do with the acquisition of the nature of that [form]. This is what all debaters say. The intended meaning is that no one would ever object this. For if it would have the nature of that [form], when we perceive the reflected image of the face which is uneven, the mirror itself although endowed with a single smooth body would become un-smooth. Also, when a town etc. are reflected in a mirror since there is the perception of many things, the mirror should also become manyfold.

Therefore, since when we perceive a variegated butterfly, even though the latter implies several cognitions, the cognition of variegated[ness] (citrajñānasya) does not lose unitariness, [this cognition] is unitary and not manifold, in as much as it simply becomes similar to the many [aspects of the butterfly]. In the same way, also the mirror and so on do not have a manifold nature even when they are united with manifold reflected images. Thus there is no undesired consequence of the manifoldness, but simply a mere similarity with that [i.e., the original image]. Nor do we have the sameness of nature by the mere similarity [of it]. For due to the similarity with the ox, the cow is not an ox. Therefore, the intended meaning is that the fact of possessing a reflected image is simply the fact of having a similar form of the original image.

[Abhinavagupta] makes [Śaṅkaranandana] to say this [idea] on the basis of meaning:

And it has been said by the Buddhists that even in the presence of the external object the cognition, perceiving one and many, assumes the form of many, but it is one. 3.55
'It has been said’ means [it has been said] in the Prajñālāṅkāra and in other works. There it has been taught as follows:

‘Therefore, even if we admit the existence of the external object, the cognition, perceiving one and many, assumes the form of many, [but] there is no undesired consequence that it becomes many.’ (3.35)

Objection: “But also in this way, nothing has been said about the definition of the reflected image!” Showing this possible doubt, [Abhinavagupta] explains the definition of this [reflected image]:

“But, in this way, do we have the definition of the reflected image?” We reply: By union with the mingling with another [thing], its manifestation is impossible without that [thing]: [that is] the reflected image according to the masters, like a face in the mirror. 3.56

Here, indeed, all the debaters agree that the reflected image is just a ‘mingling’, i.e. [a kind of] identity, ‘with another thing’, which is its substratum, such as a mirror.93 ‘By union with’ this mingling means by its not being separated from it [namely, from the substratum]. Its manifestation is impossible ‘without’ this (tato), that is to say alone, independently from another thing, such as a mirror, which is capable of assuming its form. The meaning is that this [reflected image] is dependent [on its substratum]. And with this [definition] it has been pointed out the difference with respect to the original image. For the latter has been defined as not mingled with others and independent. And this has been said previously many a times. Thus it is not repeated here.

This is exactly what [Abhinavagupta] adds to the main discussion:

93. Note the use of Jayaratha here. How he splits the compound anyena vyāmiśrāṇayā yogāt. Also, refer to TS p. 10.
This [world] is mingled with consciousness. Its manifestation is impossible without consciousness. Is it not that [this universe] in which there are worlds (pura), tattvas etc. is called a reflected image in consciousness? 3.57

Is it not that this universe, which surely consists of the tattvas, worlds etc., is called reflected image in consciousness? The meaning is that [the universe] has surely to be defined in [such a way]. Since, also this [universe], in the same way as a face becomes identical with a mirror, becomes identical with consciousness, therefore, ‘its manifestation is impossible without’, i.e. separated from, consciousness, like a [reflected] face from a mirror. The intended meaning is that, indeed, without the light this entire collection of entities will not shine at all. Since it has been said:

It is consciousness that shines without and within assuming all various forms. Without consciousness there is no reality of things (arthasattā), therefore the universe consists of consciousness.

No one, indeed, can make entities as his own object [of cognition, activity and so on] without consciousness. Therefore, it has to be ascertained that consciousness is identical with them.\(^\text{94}\)

Also:

Since there is a simultaneous cognition, the cognition and its object have the same nature.

Therefore, although we apply in this way to the universe the definition of the reflected image, if without any reason it is said to be original image, let it be so. What is wrong? This indeed is not the [real point of] dispute and the learned men are not interested in this, for they plunge in [exploring] reality alone, and this cannot be made otherwise, since it (atma) has been demonstrated as being connected with the definition of the reflected image, and

\(^{94}\) From the Kalikākrama. Also quoted in TĀV 5.80.
since it is impossible to apply the definition of original image to it (atra). This is what [Abhinavagupta] says:

This is the arrangement of the definition [of the reflected image]. If without any reason one would call it original image [there is no problem]. The wise men are interested in real facts, but not in the common hearsay. 3.58

‘Without any reason’ means reasonless.

Objection: “Let it be that the universe, in connection with this definition, is called reflected image. We do not care about it. But how can this [reflected image] be possible without a cause that is called original image?” While doubting in this way [Abhinavagupta] says:

“But the existence of the reflected image is impossible without the original image”. 59ab

[Abhinavagupta] refutes precisely this:

What from that? [We do not care about this] for the original image is not identical with the reflected image. 3.59cd

‘What from that?’ means if the original image does not [exist], what is the consequence? This means that there is no [consequence] at all for the original image does not reside in the reflected image by [a relationship of] identity, like the nature of tree resides in the nature of śīṃśipā,95 [a relationship] by which the reflected image would also cease to exist in absence of the original image.

That is what [Abhinavagupta] says:

And therefore, in the absence of this [original image], nothing goes wrong as regards the

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95. PTv also uses this example. cf. p 116 of PTv Jaidev Singh (1988).
said definition of the [reflected image]. This question is merely confined to the cause. 3.60

‘Therefore’ means because the original image and the reflected image do not act as being identical. ‘Said’ is necessarily in reference to the universe. ‘In the absence of this’ means in the absence of the original image.

Objection: “We are not disputing regarding the definition of the reflected image, but we are asking how can it exist without the original image? It is not proper that the entities can exist without a cause.” Having doubted thus, [Abhinavagupta] says ‘merely [confined] to the cause’ etc. And the cause is twofold: material and instrumental. Material like the clay and so on with respect to pot and so on; instrumental like the [use of] stick etc. regarding the same thing [pot etc.]. And the original image is not the material cause of the reflected image, for that [namely, the material cause] continues to exist under the aspect of [its] effect once its own nature has been transformed, like the clay into a pot. This is not the case here with the original image, since even when the reflected image comes into being, its untransformed [form] itself is perceived separately. Therefore, in our case, the original image is the instrumental cause like the stick in case of [the production of] a pot.

And therefore, the topic of the instrumental cause alone is the [subject of your] question here, nothing else. Then [this is why Abhinavagupta] says:

And also, in this case [in the case of the cause], it is someway connected with the instrumental [cause] and not with the material [cause]. And the arising of the material causes is limited to certain times and places. 3.61

And the presence, in their totality, of the instrumental causes is not necessary. That is why [Abhinavagupta] says ‘instrumental’ etc. In this [world], indeed, a potter can produce a pot simply by striking to rotate the wheel by his own hand even without a stick. But, without the clay, even the most efficient potter cannot produce a pot. And therefore, the use of the instrumental cause is not mandatory as the material cause. So a reflected image can exist
also without an original image, since there is also another cause which is capable of producing this [reflected image] and which is substituting it.

That is what [Abhinavagupta] says:

_Therefore, in the light which is in front of us, it is by means of memory and so on that [we can perceive] the reflected form of the beloved. [This memory and so on] is the material cause [of our vision]._ 3.62

‘Therefore’ means since the reflected image arises by means of another cause even if the original image is absent. ‘In the light’ since it is capable of grasping the reflected image of forms. ‘Intense’ means that it has acquired the nature of imagination, for otherwise indeed everyone who remembers would always have ‘in front of’ him whatever he is thinking of. Here indeed, the original image does not exist since the beloved is not near in as much as she is at another place and so on. And if the reflected image [of our beloved], which is its effect, is perceived, here it takes place necessarily by means of another cause, namely ‘memory and so on’, for without a cause, that is to say apart from the beloved [namely, the original image] who is reflected [in the mirror], there is no appearance [of the beloved], which is occasional [in other words, which needs causes and conditions to manifest].

That is what [Abhinavagupta] says:

_Otherwise [i.e. without memory] how could the beloved, who has reached consciousness, manifest [in front of us] while being far away? Consciousness is always in front of us._ 3.63

‘Otherwise’ means if there were not a cause, namely memory and so on, the beloved who is reflected [in the mirror] would not exist at all. ‘Who has reached consciousness’, for it is not possible the manifestation [of something] in the perception if there is not an entity who has reached awareness. This was the intended meaning. For, when there is separation from consciousness, nothing could manifest, having attained a state of insentience. Thus all

96. Translation of _gôana_ as intense is borrowed from Gnoli.
this world would be blind. [Any] entity is ascended to consciousness since it is being perceived; it does not exceed it. Thus it could not even shine without consciousness. Therefore, [Abhinavagupta] said ‘Consciousness is always in front of us’.

Objection: If this is the case, the relationship between the perceiver and perceived would not exist. And thus the entire worldly behaviour will collapse.

[Answer:] True, for regarding the supreme Consciousness there is not even the odour of differentiation. Thus everything is nothing but Consciousness. What indeed could be the perceiver or the perceived? Furthermore, this very consciousness, owing to its own autonomy, after having concealed its own nature, when it manifests the state of limited cognition, then this entire differentiated world manifests in the form of perceived and perceiver.

That is what [Abhinavagupta] says:

*Therefore, we should admit the evident existence of an intermediate level (āntaram kimcit) [still] called Consciousness, where - be it imagination, dream, vision - this [reflected image] appears as distinct. 3.64*

‘Therefore’ has a causal meaning: since it is impossible the distinction with respect to the Supreme Consciousness. Let us admit an ‘intermediate level’ (kimcit āntaram), being in the middle between Supreme Consciousness and perceivable realities, which is [still] labelled consciousness, which consists in the limited knowing subject (samkucitapramāṇa), which is ‘evident’, [and] the nature of which is without conceptual constructions. In this level - be it imagination, dream’, and so on - this reflected image appears as ‘distinct’, i.e. as different [from the original image], for also in imagination and so on the reflected image of the beloved, which has been put within by means of an extremely intense memory etc. without the [external] cause (since the original image is absent), could shine for the one who is separated [from the beloved]. This was the intended meaning.

Therefore, here also it is the same case as, when the original image is absent, the reflected image can [still appear] in memory and so on without a cause outside. Thus
[Abhinavagupta] says:

*Therefore, let us admit that the cause of such [reflection of the universe] are the powers of the Lord.* 3.65ab

‘Therefore’ has a causal meaning: since its being expected only as instrumental cause, as has been said above, let us admit that the ‘cause of such’ reflection of the universe ‘are the powers’ of knowledge, action and so on ‘of the Lord’, whose reality is consciousness, whose nature is illuminating. Thus, the meaning is that there is no problem at all. And, on the basis of the popular notion:

‘He is endowed with many powers, and he is also not separated from his power,’

the powers, according to the absolute point of view, are simply the power of autonomy. The core meaning is that it is only by means of his own Lordliness that he sustains [all] the aspects of the universe within himself. It has been said by the glorious author of the Pratyabhijñā[kārikās]:

In this regard, a limiting condition assumes the same form of what is limited by it (*tad-* since it is forced to do this (*arpakāt*). However, the reality of consciousness assumes the form of the knowable reality] because of its own Lordliness.

It has also been said by the *anuprathyabhijñākāra* with the same intention:

Now, [O Lord!] without you the original image is not visible in one’s own self which is pure, like a magical image (*prasenā*) [is not visible] without the mirror. It is by [your] power that the entire group of entities [exists].

---

97. It is not clear who Jayaratha is referring to my *anuprathyabhijñākāra*. The quoted verse is neither found in IPK nor IPV or IPVV.

98. For more on *prasenā* or *pratisenā* see Orofino (1994) and Vasudeva (2014).
Thus, [Abhinavagupta] summarises the nature of the universe as being a reflected image of consciousness in the following way:

*Thus, this universe is only a reflected image in the Lord, in the pure firmament of Bhairavic consciousness. Surely [this does] not happen because of the grace of something else.*

3.65cf

‘Something else’ means that in case he were depending on another’s intention, his autonomy would collapse. This is the intended meaning. For autonomy is said to be the reflective awareness and the latter is his own main nature. For the light without reflective awareness cannot exist and is even illogical. The following, indeed, is the distinction between the insentient realities and Him, giving the fact that he is the bearer of the form of the universe, namely that he becomes aware of everything as it has been said by [Abhinavagupta] himself elsewhere:

Here, within one’s own self, this entire universe manifests like a variegated image inside a mirror. But, consciousness becomes aware of the universe by the activity of its own nature of awareness. But this does not happen at all in case of a mirror. 99

99. Cf. TS p. 19. This verse is also quoted in ÍPVV, Vol 2, p. 203 and PSv 13 p. 39. Yogarāja in the PSv wrongly attributes this verse to the ÍPVV. While in the ÍPVV Abhinavagupta himself says that he has said this [*tathā ca uktam mayā śrītātrasāradai*] in the TS. This would mean this verse originally belonged to the TS and is simply quoted in the ÍPVV.
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Appendix:
Benedictive Esotericism in
Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha

Following his esoteric style deeply influenced by the Kālikula tradition, Abhinavagupta designs the structures of his seminal works following the doctrinal principles of his Trika Śaivism. We know that the major source of his Trika system is the MVUT and he is basing most of his doctrinal principles on this scripture. The MVUT mentions the following sixteen rudra-bijas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>amṛto amṛtapūrnaś ca amṛṭābhō amṛṭadraṇāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>amṛtaugho amṛtormiś ca amṛṭasyandano aparāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>amṛṭāṅgo amṛṭavapu r amṛṭodgāra eva ca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>amṛṭāsyo amṛṭatanus tathā cāmṛṭasecanah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>tanmūrtir amṛṭeṣaś ca sarvāmṛṭadharo aparāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>śodaśaite samākhyātā rudrabijasamudbhavāḥ'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These sixteen rudra-bijas are the presiding deities of the sixteen vowels of the Sanskrit alphabetical system. They are called bija-varṇas. Abhinavagupta pays obeisance to them in the maṅgala verses in the beginning of each of the sixteen vimarśas (chapters) of his ĪPVV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lines</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MVUT 3.17,18,19</td>
<td>amṛṭam amṇantamanuttaramaghorasodaśakaśakticakra cātamaṃ makāśa kartahātakāṃ bande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. MVUT 3.17,18,19</td>
<td>ānanda mamṛtapūrṇam sāmanase parapade parām satyam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. MVUT 3.17,18,19</td>
<td>ghaṭītānuttara dṛḍhatamanirūḍhīhbhajam śivaṃ vande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. MVUT 3.17,18,19</td>
<td>ichāśaktisunirbharamamṛṭābham anantabhu vanajanana pātum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. MVUT 3.17,18,19</td>
<td>vande svaśaktiharibahalitabhairavaparānandam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. MVUT 3.17,18,19</td>
<td>īśvaramaṇeṣatāpapraśaman amṛṭadraṇām sadā vande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. MVUT 3.17,18,19</td>
<td>apratīghātisvecchāvīkāśavīśrāntamamṛṭakaramaulim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
yadanuttarasambodhādānandavakṣavrecchayā pūrnam |
śvaramunisadāmṛtaughasundaram tatstuve dhāma || u

ahamānandaghanecchāghaṭiteśvaratonmisatsamastormih |
ityullāsatarangitāmāmṛtormimahāṃ cidāmavaṃ vande || ū

svaprasarprenkhitaviladūrīmisakṣubhitacidrasāpūram |
amṛtasyandanasārāṃ bhairavaśaṃvinmahārṇavavāṃ vande || ř

pūrvaṃ yadanuttararamāṃṛtabhūmimāsādyā saptaṃ kalanāṃ |
viśrāmyati tatprāmāṃsyāmṛṭāṅgadāṃ parānandi || ř

śivamāmṛṭavapusṣamanāṃṛtakalācatusṭayatriyabhāgajuṣam |
prāmāṃśi bhāsayarṣam kramarāhite ‘api kramamanekam || ſ

saṃjīvanaturyakaḷakilavibodham saṃstabhāvānāṃ |
dūṣanaviśāśirnānāṃmamṛtodgāraṃ śivam vande || ſ

ekamanuttarārūpāṃprabhṛṭitrīkaṇaṭipūrītānandam |
amṛṭasyamasya jagataḥ pramāṇabhūtaṃ śivāṃ vande || e

aiyaparaṃṭhathakalāyā triśaktiyugaghaṭitavaivārūpyamahāṅ |
amṛṭatanumatanubhoprasarāmahākāraṇāṃ smarāmi haram || aí

otaprotam sakalam viddhvā svarasena śivamāyīkurute |
yo’anuttaradhāmāṃvūdayasvayamāmṛṭaniṣecanūṃ tamāṃ kalah || o

ausadhamādhyādhiṣu pāṣatrasyāśatanāṃ triśūlakaram |
vandē ahamaṃṛṭamūrtim pūrṇatrikaṇaṭiparamāṛthām || au

bāṅdavamāṃṛtaramayāṃ vedyo yo’anuttare nihe dhāmni |
pūrṇibhāvayatitamāmṛṭesāṃ tāṃ namasyāmi || aṁ

prasṛtamanuttarārūpāṃdānandādikramaṇa viśvamadāḥ |
sarvāmṛṭadharāmantarbahīśca visṛjantamabhīvande || aḥ

The sort of same pattern is followed in the context of the thirty-six consonants in the TĀV by Jayaratha and in the context of thirty-six ontic-realities (tattvas) in the NŚAB by Abhinavagupta.
MVUT gives a list of the thirty-four rudras in the MVUT 3.20-24 those are said to be manifested from yoni-varṇas.

jayaṣ ca vijayaṣ caiva jayantaṣ cāparājitaḥ |
sujayo jayarudraṣ ca jayakīrtaḥ jayaḥvahāḥ || 3.20 ||
jayamūrtir jayotsāho jayado jayavardhanah |
balas cātibalas caiva balabhadro balapradah || 3.21 ||
balāvahāṣ ca balavān baladāṭā baleśvaraḥ |
nandanaḥ sarvatobhadrō bhadramūrtih śivapradah || 3.22 ||
sumanāḥ sprhaṇo durgo bhadraṅalō manonugāḥ |
kausikāḥ kālavīśvesau suśivaḥ kopaśwarah || 3.23 ||
ete yonisamudbhūtāḥ catuṣṭρīḥ pratikirtītāḥ |
strīpāṭhavaśam āpannā ēta evātra saktayāḥ² || 3.24 ||

It is also important to keep in mind that Jayaratha’s thirty-four mangala ślokas in the TĀV range from āhnikas 2-35 and the last two verses in the āhnikas 36 and 37 are an obeisance to Śabarāśi and Mālinī respectively.

jayatān natajanajayakṛt sajayo rudro vinābhypāyaṃ yah |
pūrayati kam na kāmam kāmam kāmeśvaratvena || ka

khātmate ‘pi vicitraṃ nikhilam idam vācyavāca kātma jagat |
darpanāna garavad ātmani vibhāśayanvijayate vijayāḥ || kha

yo durvikalpavighnavidhvaṃse sadvikalpaganapatītām |
vahati jayatī jayantāḥ sa param paramantraṃvīrāyātmā || ga

yo nāma ghoraninadoccaravāṣāḥ bhīṣayatī aṣeṣa jagaṭ |
svaṣṭhānaḥ yānaḥ rājāḥ sa jayatī aparājito rudraḥ || gha

kavalayītaṃ kila kālam kalayati yo vyāyatasyatāṃ satatam |
jayati sa sujayāḥ sāksāt saṃśaṃraparākrīlaḥ sa jayaḥ || na

tattanmantrābhhyudayapraṇikṛtastaṃdabhairavāvēśaḥ |

² MVUT 3.20-24
vidrāvitabhavamudro draḍhayatu bhadrāṇi jayarudrāḥ | | ca

jayakīrtir iyam jayatāj jagadambhōjam vibhaktabhuvanadalam | ravir iva vikāsayati yaś cidekanālāśrayatvena | | cha
tattvakramāvabhāsanavidhānavibhavo bhujaṅgamābharaṇāḥ | bhaktajanayāvahatām vahati jayāvaho jayati | | ja
tattattavibhedanasamudyatoddyotiniśitasūlakaraḥ | jayati param jayamūrtih samśāraparājayasphūrtih | | jha
svātmamahābhūmaravāmarśanavaśakalīdhasvanantāṇāḥ | bhavadurgabaṅjanajayotsāho jayatāj jayotsāhāḥ | | ā
amrātmakārdhacandra-pragunābharaṇo 'dhvamandalam nikhilam | viśramayannijasamvidi jayado 'stu satām sadā jayadāḥ | | ta
jayavardhanaḥ sukhardhim vardhayatāt pūrṇacandraviśadagatih | āpyāyayati jagad yaḥ svaśaktipātāṃrāsāraḥ | | tha
yo yoginīpriyatayā tirohitivyapagati kramam jagatām | prabalikaroti balato balāya tasmai balim yāmāḥ | | da
yāḥ parameśasaparyākryopadeśānkuśena bhavakariṇam | kṛtvāṁś tam anatibalam atibalam asmi nataḥ phaṇabhṛdābharaṇām | | dha
pranamāmi nikhilapāśapravāhasambhedhabalabalabhadram | balabhadraṃ prāṇāśvapracacāturyapūrṇabalam | | ū
nījaśaktijanitakarmaprapaņcasamīcārcātūriyāvibhavam | bhavataraṇabalabalapradatām samāvahantar balapradam naumi | | ta
ṛtdhāmānām anantar balāvahām tam balāvahām vande | jagad idam amandam akhilam svamahinnā yo 'nugṛhrṇāti | | tha
bhavabheda-vibhavasambhedabhavasambheda-balabhavabalan | balavantaṃ naumi vibhum dārunarūpagrahāgraḥahāḥ | | da
jayati vibhur baladātā mūdhajaniśvāsādyai yena vapuh | bahirādyantavad api madhyaśūnyam ullāsitaṁ satatam | | dha
bhedapratāhāvilāpanabaleśvaram tāṃ baleśvaram vande |
vaḥ sakalākalayar mitātmāyā niśedham ādādyāt | | na
durvṛttanakusāṃśkritisaṃharaṇaavyāvṛtasyatām dadhatam |
devam amandāṃ vande vadanam ānandānāṃ jagatām | | pa

āsthāya bhairavavapur nijākrteḥ samvibhāgena |
vidadhātu vaḥ sa bhadraṃ sarvata iha sarvatobhadraḥ | | pha

vaḥ paramāṃṛṭakumbhe dhāṃni pare yojayed gatāsum api |
jadātmabhadramūrtir diśatu śivam bhadramūrti vah | | ba

bhīmam adhiśthāya vapur bhavam abhito bhāvayan na vaḥ |
prabhavati hṛdi bhaktimatāṃ śivapradō ’sau śivo ’stu satām | | bha

bhavati yadichhāvaśataḥ śivapūjā viśvalāṅchanaṃ viśvak |
viśvāṃ jayati sa sumanāḥ prapannajanamocane sumanāḥ | | ma
devaṃ cakravyomagranthigam ādhāranātham ajam |
apī parasāṃvidṛduḥhaiś sprhaṇiṣyaṃ sprhaṇam asmi nataḥ | | ya

samayavilepavilumpanabhīmavapuḥ sakalasampadāṃ durgam |
śamayatu nirargalaṃ vo durgamabhadvadurgatīṃ durgāḥ | | ra

bhadraṃī bhadrakālaḥ kalayatu vaḥ sarvakālam atulagatiḥ |
akulapadastho ’pi hi muhuḥ kulpadam abhidhāvatiḥa prasabham | | la

sahajaparāmarṣātmakamahāvīrvasaudhadhautatanum |
abhimaṭasāḍhakasāḍhakamanonugam tāṃ manonugam naumi | | va

vidyāmāyāprakṛttiprakṛttikam adhvasaptakāram idam |
viśvatrisūlam abhito vikāsayaṅ jayati kauśikāḥ śambhuḥ | | śa

śuddhāśuddhādhiḥvāhinī dvigahvaram mudrayaty aśeṣajagat |
samvīdrupatayā yah kalayatu sa kilīṣam sa tatāṃ kālaḥ | | śa

paramāṇandaśudhānīdhir ullasad api baḥir aśeṣam idam |
viṣramayanparamāṭmani viṣveśa jayati viṣveśaḥ | | sa
In the context of the NŚAB, one should keep in mind what Pandey says:

It may be pointed out here that not only Abhinavagupta himself refers to the text of Bharata as consisting of 36 chapters at the beginning of his commentary but also refers to the 36 categories of the Pratyabhijñā system as propounded by Utpalācārya. At the beginning of each successive chapter he praises the deity in terms of one of the thirty six categories beginning with the Earth (Bhūmi) in the first chapter. In the Kashmirian recension of the Nāṭya Śāstra there were 36 chapters only as is clear not only from the reference to them by Abhinavagupta himself but also from the views of those who differed from him on some points. For, they also asserted that the Nāṭya Śāstra consists of thirty six chapters only. An additional support to this view is lent by Madhurāja Yogin, a pupil of Abhinava's commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra, talks of thirty six chapters only.3

And below are the maṅgala verses from the NŚAB:

viśvabājaprārāhītham mūlādhāratayā sthitam |
dharmāṅkātimayaṁ vande dharanirūpamīśvaram || 1 ||
samsāranātyajananadhātrībajalatāusīm |
jalaprārāṇaṁ śivām patyūḥ sarasāṁ paryupāśmahe || 2 ||
yadāpyāyaparā lokāḥ sve sve karmanā sanṛgatāḥ |
prāpnuvaṁ phalam vande tattejovapuralīśvaram || 3 ||
svavilāsaṁ idaṁ viśvaṁ yo darśayati santatam |

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3. Pandey (1963:59-60)
समीरामुर्तिः तम वदं गिरीजासुताप्रियाम || 4 ||

सांसारणानित्यां यावकाशविद्हानताः
पूर्वार्गायात् वोयमामुर्तिः तम शान्तार्म नुमाः || 5 ||

पूर्वार्गाविद्धिः शृङ्खला पुनरावृह महात्माः
भरातम मुनयाः सर्व प्रस्नाः पञ्चाभिधात्स्वा नाः || 6 ||

स्थायी प्राबुद्धहर्दये व्याभिर्विभुताः
कामकुलसू जातासू महानुभावाः
अन्तरविभावविशयो रसामात्रामुर्तिः
श्रीमन्नप्रसानहर्दयाः सु मामा त्रिनेत्राः || 7 ||

(न्यायभाषा 8वें पाठ बुक में उल्लिखित नहीं है)

अलंक्रियानं गात्रानि यत्स्पर्शाविवासाष्टिहेः
स्पर्शतात्रावपवा षमश्चतुष्म परमात्मेवाः || 9 ||

निःस्कलुष्टिमत्योपकर्मसदश्चतिप्रदाः
सर्वाः ध्वानिमतात्माः षमभुर विज्ञातत प्रभुः || 10 ||

गतिमान्दलाविचित्रयमास्तुत्रयाति याः सदा
तथा नेदिष्टनिर्मात्रिः साक्षिः वन्दे महेशितुः
स्वाप्ते पाठ्ये नाति याज्ञवल्क्यो मयाः याताः
विभोर विश्वात्मां श्लोकां मुख्यामन्यत प्रसांगनाः
श्रुतयात्विश्रांविद्धिह याः गताः परमात्मनाः
ताः महानान्दसांभोहतत्त्वमुर्तिः षट्माः सदाः || 12 ||

देशस्या बाह्यात्तराब्धेदिकस्य
विभागदधर्मी विविधान्म प्रावित्तिः
असूत्रायसोवात्सुधिदाक्षा
क्रमोर्कत्रिष्ठ जयानि वृष्णांगह || 13 ||

dvidhasitam sadma (karma) sadvibhaktam
visvapanapardhān samupādadānam
pāṇīndriyaṃ samvyavahārahetum
yasyeṣvāram tāṃ varadāṃ namāmaḥ || 14 ||

समस्तवर्त्तानो विना न येन पातुद्भवाश्रत्सारसर्यानेन || 308 ||
chhandāmsi yasmāt prabhavanti vande tāṃ vāṅmayāṃ rūpamihāṣṭamūrteḥ || 15  

vicitram rūpakabhuvāṃ laksāṇaṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ bhuvah  

bhāsyate tena tāṃ vande prācyadhiśādhitam śivam || 16  

yadāntarrasāśvādākākuvśrānti sundaram  
rasājñāpaksāgam vande tadvapūḥ paramēśvaram || 17  

rūpaṃ yadetat bahudhā cakāsti tadyena bhāvī bhavītā na jātu  
taccakṣurātmakamīśvarasya vande vapustaijasārādhāmnaḥ || 18  

dehe sasandhyāṅgagane samaste  
yatsthāpanāṃ sparśanavrūttikāri  
tadindriyam yasya vapur namāmi  
tamāntasparśamayaṃ mahēśam || 19  

niśśeṣaśābdavyahāravrūttivāicitryamabhyeti yatahpratīṣṭhām  
śrōḷātmaṇāṃ tatparamēśvarasya vande tamāṃ rūpamarāpadhāmnaḥ || 20  
yasya samkalpamātṛena viśvamāhāryam adbhuṭam  
tāṃ mānasamahāmūrtiṃ vande girisutāmapi || 21  

bhedenātmābhūmukhatāṃ nayantāṃ bhedakāraṇam  
sāmānyābhīnayākāgarvamūrtiṃ śivam numaḥ || 22  

puṃsām aśaktāmapi tadekabhāvamādārāvantī bahubhāvapūrṇā  
veṣyāmatir nirvṛttidhāma yatsthā tasmaī namastāt paramēśvarāya || 23  

tridhā vikalpanāṃ yasyāṃ pumāṃ yatropacaryate  
tāṃ vande prakṛtiṃ sambhoḥ śaktitrayavijṛmbhānāt || 24  

vāgaṅgasattvaceṣṭācitṛbhīnayaprayogaracanacanānāṃ  
samsāraṇātyanāyakapuruṣakāraḥ śivo jayati || 25  

yasmin sati prakṛtibhūmivikalpa eṣa  
stredhāsyā yāti hṛdayādaranāyabhāvah  
rāgah sa yasya mahīmā mahānīyādhamānī  
bhūyāt sa nityamāpi tatra ca rāgavantaḥ || 26  

sattvamītyamalaraṅgamaṇḍale daivamānuṣavibhededhīdātā || 309
siddhimānayati yath svavidyā tām namāmi girijārdhadhārinam || 27 ||

madhyamasvaramuśanti yadvaśān nādaśatīkumuditāṁ śrutikramāt ||
sō’pi yadvilasitaṁ kalātmakeṁ tām namāmi śisirāṁśumaṇḍanam || 28 ||

jātiviniyogakalpaṁ bhūsanavaicitryamapi hi janayati yāṁ
vande tamabhedakarīṁ tāṁ niyatiṁ sāṇkarīṁ saktīṁ || 29 ||

rāgātmakeṁ sthāyipadāṁ niyaccha-
nacchinnavamśasvaralabdhasāraḥ ||
kalātmakō’ sau paramesvarasya
syādvigraha’ smad bhavabhandhanāya || 30 ||

yasyāṁ kalākālalayā (ya) prabhāvāt
sāmyaṁ param bhāti jagatkriyāṁ
māyātmikāṁ tāṁ tanumāśtāṁmarter
vande tridhā bhogapadaṁ dadhanāṁ || 31 ||

prāveśikyapavargāntāmahaṁbhāgeṣu yā ksepikā
citrāṁ samṣṛtāṁgamanadatālādadasmācā naiskrāmikā
sambhogāntarasamprasādasubhaṅgāśriṣuddhavidyāṁtikā
cchandaḥsāramayī dhruvā vijayatāṁ spar dhātmikā sā tanuḥ || 32 ||

jñānakriyādivargāvidhānahaṇetu-
doṣāpavarjanapatuh kila bhaktibhājām ||
ānandapūrṇaparasāṅkarasārasandhu-
dhārāsthitirvijayatāṁ paramesvāro’ sau || 33 ||

mārjanāṅgatamārthasarasundarāṁ
puṣkaratritayāmāśrītāṁ sadā ||
citrānangapadakrāptavigrahaṁ
śrīśadasīvatanunāṁ śivaṁ numaḥ || 34 ||

yadbhūmikālabhpahārd sadāśivapada sthitāḥ
tāṁ vande paramāṁ saktīṁ candramauleḥ parāṁ tanum || 35 ||

yasmin nigūḍhapanamārthamabudhyamānāḥ
samśāranāṭyasahasvāmupāśrīyante ||
budhvā punar muhurahā njameva yānte
tat pūrṇadhāma śivatattvamahaṁ prapadye || 36 ||

310
ākāṅkṣānāṃ praśamanavidheḥ pūrvabhāvāvadhītāṃ
dhārāprāptastutigurūrāṃ guhyatattvāṃ pratiṣṭhāḥ |
ūrdhvādhdhyāḥ (dho yah) parabhūvi (ca) vā yat samānaṃ ca kāsti
proḍānantam tadahamadhunā’ nūttaraṃ dhāma vande || 37 ||