For Empire or Dominion? Prestige or Adventure?
The Men of the Canadian Legation in Tokyo, 1929-1933

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Abstract

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In May 1929, the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) formalized diplomatic ties with Japan by opening its Tokyo legation. Although the third of its kind, Canada's Tokyo legation initiated and managed bi-lateral relations with a degree of autonomy unparalleled by those in Washington and Paris. Within this newfound autonomous space was room for each of Canada's diplomats to negotiate, internalize, and perform their roles differently. This thesis investigates how and why First Secretary Hugh Keenleyside, Minister Herbert Marler, and Second Secretary Kenneth Kirkwood – the vanguards of Canadian national self-representation in the Pacific – engaged and employed that personal and national autonomy, studying their reactions to and participation in transnational political and cultural exchanges at the imperial Japanese capital. Their dissimilar experiences meanwhile act to demonstrate the complexities of those exchanges and highlight the various motives and opinions prevalent amongst Canada's late-interwar social political, and intellectual elite.

By adopting the perspectives of the individual as its primary subject of analysis, this study contributes to an extant literature that has regularly portrayed the DEA and its foreign offices as unitary practitioners of a singular ideology or policy. Furthermore, the individual voices of Canada's first ranking official in the Japanese capital are recovered from the silencing effect of top-down, national-political analyses that have so dominated the field. Finally, it eschews teleological readings of the period preoccupied with Europe, a North Atlantic Triangle, and the 'road to war' narrative, thus providing a new view of an understudied aspect of Canadian international history.

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List of Abbreviations:

DEA – Department of External Affairs

HLK – Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside

HMM – Herbert Meredith Marler

KPK – Kenneth Porter Kirkwood

LAC – Library and Archives Canada

MULA – McMaster University Library Archives

UMA&SC – University of Manitoba Archives & Special Collections

Introduction

For decades, the conclusion of the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference, and the resultant Treaty of Versailles have been centrepieces in the history of Canadian political autonomy. Indeed, it was only after their contributions of human life and supplies in that great conflict that the British territories were provided equal status within the empire, culminating in the Balfour Declaration of 1926 which established the principle of equality within the Commonwealth. Uncertainty regarding Canadian foreign policy remained into the late-interwar period, however, and it was not until Canada opened its own foreign offices at Washington, D.C. and Paris that the tension between imperial authority and dominion autonomy in international relations was truly tested.[1] Observers in England as well as Canada continued, as English Prime Minister Lloyd George had in 1921, to see "the instrument of the foreign policy of the Empire" as entirely that of "the British Foreign Office."[2] Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, together with his new Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Oscar D. Skelton, sought to challenge this system by building for Canada its own, self-interested and self-serviced diplomatic service and foreign policy. Following the opening of Canada's first two foreign legations in 1928, however, tensions between Ottawa's careful autonomists and outright imperialists smothered the effectiveness of the diplomats stationed there, limiting their ability (and, in some cases, desire) to act entirely in the interest of Canada.[3] The establishment of Canada's Washington and Paris legations thus did little to change the established order which, since before Confederation in 1867, saw British foreign offices in charge of all imperial external policy as well as the management of the affairs of Canadians abroad.

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[1] Historian H. Gordon Skilling points to the words of British Prime Minister Lloyd George who in 1921 declared in the British House: "Since the War the Dominions have been given equal rights with Great Britain in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire […] The machinery is the machinery of the British Government – the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors. The machinery must remain here." Equal rights within empire, he stressed, meant not that each now had the right to reach out and form new and unique bi-lateral arrangements with foreign states. Instead, it meant that while "the sole control of British foreign policy is now vested in the Empire a whole," the actual, working advantage was that "joint control mean[t] joint responsibility" at a time when "the burden of Empire ha[d] become so vast." Great Britain, House of Commons, 14 December, 1921, quoted in H. Gordon Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945), xiv.

[2] Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad,* xiv.

[3] Canadian foreign policy and affairs were conducted abroad until the Second World War by legations which, headed by ministers plenipotentiary, were a rank lower than embassies and ambassadors.

In 1929, however, the Canadian Department of External Affairs opened its third legation abroad. Turning away from the Anglo-American dominated Atlantic world, King and Skelton pursued plans for a diplomatic mission to the Japanese imperial capital of Tokyo. While the Tokyo legation shared some features with the young Dominion's two extant foreign offices, Canada's only legation in the Pacific initiated and managed bi-lateral relations there with a degree of autonomy unparalleled by those in Washington and Paris. Nearly ten thousand kilometres from the overlapping and hegemonic Anglo-American influences at the two aforementioned capitals, the Canadians at Tokyo enjoyed freedoms in their professional as well as personal lives. As this thesis will show, this influenced the ways they were able to represent their nation amongst the diverse diplomatic corps of foreign elite, as well as a wider Japanese public largely unaware of Canada's colonial and imperial history. Within these fluid political and constitutional circumstances, Canadian diplomats established for their nation a place in East Asia and, by extension, the global sphere of diplomacy and foreign policy by asserting and exercising individual autonomy in operations at Tokyo fully two years before the Statue of Westminster codified the dominions' ability to do so.

It was only because of the work of Under Secretary of State Oscar D. Skelton that the very opportunity to negotiate and pursue a distinctly Canadian policy abroad was realized. Nevertheless, the actual negotiation and exertion of that autonomy was entirely up to the three ranking Canadian diplomats assigned to Tokyo, the three men whose work and lives are at the heart of this study. The disparate experiences of these individuals demonstrate the complexities of the international exchanges made at Tokyo, while highlighting the various motives and reactions prevalent amongst Canada's social and intellectual elite during the late-interwar period. External's newest first secretary in 1929 was Hugh L. Keenleyside, a trained historian and former professor at the University of British Columbia. Keenleyside arrived in Tokyo ahead of his minister and colleagues in May, 1929. Later that summer, Canada's first appointed minister to Japan, Herbert Meredith Marler, arrived from Montreal. Though he had left behind his successful law firm, Marler & Marler, as well as his impressive estates and social connections, he brought with him to Tokyo the material and social privileges he enjoyed as the patrician head of one of Quebec's most prominent families. Travelling alongside him was Kenneth Porter Kirkwood, third secretary and, like Keenleyside, a postgraduate scholar and published academic. Just as their operation of the legation was afforded certain administrative freedoms, so too were their

personal politics and philosophies given room to be tested and applied amongst themselves in their newly adopted home. Their personal accounts reflect episodes of friction and clashes of ideals occurring when, for example, the paternalistic, racialized perspectives of one conflicted with the humanistic universalism of another.

Thus, as the experiences of Marler, Keenleyside, and Kirkwood demonstrate, there was room within their newly carved-out spaced in Tokyo for each to negotiate, internalize, and perform his role differently. Far from insisting on a unitary effort, the three held disparate views regarding their nation's policies. Moreover, the Canadians in Tokyo each had distinct conceptions of individual purpose and responsibility there. From 1929, the Department of External Affairs, staffed by Skelton's selection of the best educated and most 'cultured,' worldly civil servants, therefore operated an institution in Tokyo that exerted a form of national autonomy in foreign relations hitherto unprecedented in the history of the Dominion. Taken together, meanwhile, their work – however differently understood by each of the men individually – represented the first official demonstration of Canadian autonomy and national identity in East Asia.

By studying the alternatively similar and dissimilar experiences of these individuals, a chapter of international history hitherto interpreted by historians in terms of economic growth and immigration numbers can be shown to have in fact incorporated a much more complicated set of interpersonal processes.[4] The private accounts of these diplomats are coloured by a number of pressures emanating from the Canadian capital of which the men at Tokyo were repeatedly reminded. Indeed, the top priority of the legation in 1929 was the question of Japanese immigration to Canada, King's plans to open the legation having been born of these very concerns.[5] As historian John Price has argued, there was also the Prime Minister's familiarity

[4] These interpretations centered upon the policies and agreements made between governments at Ottawa and Tokyo, downplaying any explanations of the legation, the processes of its opening, or the experiences of its staff in favour of national, political perspectives. Skilling provided one example characteristic of this reductionist view in 1945 when he wrote: "the motive for its [the Tokyo legation's] creation was primarily that of giving added support and encouragement to the export trade with the entire Orient, and to Canadian financial interest in Japan." There was also the matter of "the regulation of Japanese immigration to Canada, especially the viséing of passports of prospective immigrants." For Skilling, as for many subsequent academics across a number of disciplines, policy was the starting point as well as the ending point of analysis. Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy*, 242.

[5] As described in cables sent between the Dominions office at London and Skelton's in Ottawa, the target for the Tokyo legation was bi-lateral "co-operation in limitation" of Japanese immigration to Canada. Dominions Secretary

with Japan which, together with his political and economic interests, made Tokyo an ideal site for a third foreign office.[6] Still, however important in the minds of British Columbians still pointing to the 'yellow peril' of cheap Asian labour in 1929, the immigration question itself was more apparent than real.[7] Meanwhile, Marler elevated the cause of Canadian export and trade, making it his pet project for his six years in Tokyo, delegating the many other tasks of his office to his junior staff.

The most important and lasting legacy of the Tokyo legation, however, relates to the introduction and demonstration of intra-Imperial differentiation of Commonwealth states. Indeed, this was a central motivator for King and Skelton's earliest desires for an expanded Department of External Affairs. Selling their efforts to imperialists in the Conservative party as a way to relieve British officials abroad of duties pertaining more exclusively to Canadian interests, their plan was realized during External's recruitment cycles of 1927 and 1928.[8] Skelton then

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to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 December 1927; Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 January, 1928. Both in *Documents on Canadian External Relations,* vol. 4, 33-4. See also: John D. Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-1941* (Vancouver and Toronto: UBCPress, 2004), 9-10.

[6] The Prime Minister no doubt respected Japan's imperial status. Price also notes that "hopes for trade were also significant in [the Prime Minister's] decision to open a legation, but his desire to enforce exclusion through passport and visa controls in Tokyo came first." This, Price continues, "reflects the institutionalization of state racism during this era" – itself a part of those secondary or even tertiary concerns influencing his government's decision to move into the region. He draws the following quote from King's 1927 diary to demonstrate this point: "It seems to me that our only effective way to deal with the Japanese question is to have our own Minister in Japan to vise passports. This will be the only way to meet the Tory policy of 'exclusion' which we can never consent." John Price, *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific* (Vancouver: UBCPress, 2011), 30-1; William Lyon Mackenzie King, *The Diaries of W.L. Mackenzie King* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) 18 October, 1927, quoted in Price, *Orienting Canada*, 31.

[7] Historian John Hilliker demonstrates the falsity of nativist British Columbian fears more directly, noting that in 1934 only 55 Japanese arrived on Canadian shores, a decrease not initiated by any effort of the legation staff at Tokyo. John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I, The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 162.

[8] It was with great professionalism that, as civil servant, Skelton kept his views, as well as his operation of the Department of External Affairs, nonpartisan. Like both his predecessor and successor, the Under Secretary's term spanned Liberal and Conservative governments, though he was always closer with King. Regarding his recruiting campaign and 'push' for expanded representation abroad, Hilliker explains that "while Skelton had tried to recruit candidates committed to the idea of dominion autonomy, there was otherwise no uniformity of opinion on political, social, and economic matters. These varied from radical to conservative; Skelton's methods of recruiting had tested not so much the point of view as the ability to express and to defend it well." Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I,* 123; there were of course those who saw in his requests to both the Prime Minister's office at Ottawa and the Dominion Office at London the products of Liberal- as well as nationalist ideology but, when challenged, he accepted the limitations placed upon him by his position and authority. On Skelton's

successfully attracted his ideal candidates – namely, Canadians with graduate degrees taken abroad.[9] Together with two of Canada's newest scholar-diplomats, Marler was tasked with introducing and explaining the Dominion's status and role to not only Japanese populations in Tokyo, but also to a number of representatives from elsewhere who found their assumptions of British Imperial political structures challenged by the presence of Canadians with diplomatic authority. For Canadian and British representatives now living and working as neighbours in foreign capitals, the first and most frequent order of business was to assure their host governments and various international observers that, despite the arrival of Canadian representatives, there was no disunity or fracturing within their Empire.[10]

By focusing on the experiences of these three men, I will propose an alternative view of Canadian diplomacy in interwar East Asia by highlighting the fluid autonomy enjoyed on both the institutional as well as individual level. Arriving in Tokyo during the summer of 1929, these Canadians became a part of a worldwide performance of Imperial identity and authority, while at the same time introducing and representing their national and personal identities to Japan and the world. Subsumed within political negotiations at the national level, then, was a more diverse set of processes of identity formation and performance among the very individuals who, as a group, represented and operationalized their respective nations in Tokyo. The personal papers of these men provide a fascinating window into this realm, illuminating the unique and exclusive environment inhabited by the first Canadian diplomats at Tokyo in the late-twenties and early-thirties.[11]

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autonomism and the structures of authority within which he negotiated and deployed it, see: Norman Hillmer, *O.D. Skelton: A Portrait of Canadian Ambition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015): especially chapters 7 and 8.

[9] Hilliker explains that the under secretary's preferred candidates would have gained "more varied education" and the "experience of living in an unfamiliar cultural setting" as graduate students abroad. Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I,* 120. On Skelton's efforts to "democratize" this recruitment process, as well as the general aims and more specific logistics of his 1927 and 1928 hiring campaigns, see: Hillmer, *O.D. Skelton*, 162-5.

[10] One characteristic and oft-repeated interpretation described how, while Vincent Massey now represented Canadian interests at Washington, his presence was merely to address those "local questions" unique to Canadian society and markets "in order that the harmony, and so the strength, of the whole may be preserved for the larger occasions when common action is needed." *The London Times,* 28 September, 1926, quoted in Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad*, 215.

[11] Indeed the diplomatic community at Tokyo during these years was almost entirely self-made and self-sufficient. Goto-Shibata quotes from British Ambassador John Tilley's *The Foreign Office:* "It must be remembered that the idea that diplomats are constantly entertained by the people of the country where they live is generally speaking,

Recent developments in the field of historical biography guide both the analysis and presentation of this study of Canadian diplomats at the Tokyo legation. Built upon the achievements of historians in the fields of social and cultural as well as feminist and gender history, 'new biography' accounts for and indeed demonstrates how individual personality at once moulds and at the same is moulded by culture. Taking the "individual as the 'text' and the surrounding culture as the 'context,'" as Lois Banner explains, "it follows that the individual 'text' not only reflects the 'context' but also influences it."[12] Thus the experiences of Keenleyside, Marler, and Kirkwood can illuminate not only the histories of three individuals, but also the institutions, nations, and cultures with which they came into contact. As the subject of analysis then, the individual is not "studied for its own sake, but as evidence that could provide a different path into the past," as Alice Kessler-Harris has posited. Indeed, the present study is in many ways inspired by her claim that "an individual life might help us to see not only into particular events" – the opening of Canada's first diplomatic mission to Japan and East Asia, for example – "but into the larger cultural and social and even political processes of a moment in time."[13]

Adopting the experience and perspectives of these men, the present study challenges an existing literature that has framed the Department of External Affairs as a unitary practitioner of a singular ideology or policy.[14] It thus aims to reveal how and why these individuals influenced and, in turn, were themselves influenced by the transpacific, transnational political and cultural

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entirely fictitious. [… A]part from official entertainment, it is only in the English-speaking capitals that people habitually entertain, even each other, in the own diplomatic houses. […] Diplomats, therefore, depend chiefly on each other for society." Sir John Tilley and Stephen Gaslee, *The Foreign Office* (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons Ltd., 1933), 258, quoted in Harumi Goto-Shibata, "Sir John Tilley: Ambassador to Japan, 1926-31," in *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972,* edited by Hugh Cortazzi, et al. (Kent: Global Oriental, 2004), 129.

[12] Lois W. Banner, "Biography as History," in *The American Historical Review* vol. 114, no. 3 (June, 2009), 581-2.

[13] Alice Kessler-Harris, "Why Biography?," in *The American Historical Review* vol. 114, no. 3 (June, 2009), 626.

[14] Shared, hegemonic processes of self-identification, as well as processes through which an identification or attempted understanding of the native 'Other' was procured by Canadians in Tokyo (and beyond), must also be considered when critically assessing these individuals' perspectives. In these instances I draw upon Edward Said to contextualize, historicize, and plot the assumptions and prejudices that appear within the historical record left by each of these men, thereby attempting to account for their individuality in outlooks while locating them within a larger, social and intellectual realm of interwar Canadian or Western-European thought and history. As the vocabulary and lenses used by these men to make sense of their surroundings in Tokyo were devised (usually in a Western setting and context) through either social, cultural, or 'academic' means, it becomes necessary to consider how and why the knowledge and assumptions they brought with them persisted. Moreover, the exteriority demonstrated by their recorded observations – as outlined and adopted as a central framework in Said's analysis – speaks not only to their views of Japan from 1929, but also to place and role as representatives of the nation of Canada there. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), especially 20-4.

exchanges – exchanges within which the diplomat has, in the case of the Canadians in Japan, been understood primarily as the facilitator of policy. It asks how and why the political ends to these men's actions (Canadian policy in East Asia) were shaped and how each understood and performed his duty in Tokyo's concert halls and hotel lounges, and in the homes and offices of friends and colleagues. The perspectives and experiences of these individuals are thereby recovered from the silencing effects of the top-down analysis of the political or diplomatic histories to date.[15] Indeed, as each had a hand in guiding his nation's political, economic, social, and cultural relationship with Japan, the individual views and experiences of the legation staff are as important to explanations and analyses of late-interwar international relations as the policies and actions of nation-states.

The bilateral relationship inaugurated with the exchange of ministers and reciprocal opening of offices at the respective capitals established channels by which the Canadian Department of External Affairs promoted trade, negotiated immigration restrictions, and advertised various selling points of Canadian life and society. But how did the men at Tokyo actually conduct these tasks? How were the lofty goals of the Prime Minister and Parliament interpreted and pursued? Moreover, how did Keenleyside, Marler, and Kirkwood negotiate their own perceptions of their role at Tokyo, as well as their perceptions of Canadian identity? To investigate these processes of reflection and negotiation, conflict and deliberation, I turn to not only the cables and despatches which streamed from the desk of the legation staff, but also to the candid reflection and musings in the personal papers of Canada's first diplomats in Japan.

Literature Review

The Canadian legation at Tokyo has received only limited attention from historians of Canadian foreign policy or Canadian-Japanese relations. Moreover, much of the work on this period and region remains limited to the political spheres of the ascendant Atlantic powers of Great Britain

[15] These histories, as we shall see, have often privileged a certain event before attempting to explain causes, the reasons for its placement as a watershed moment, or how (and if) the national, political realm was thereafter irrevocably affected. The present study rejects such teleological models – explanations of the thirties that pit Canadians against the interests of a Europe (or, less commonly, an East Asia) on a 'road to war,' for example – attempting instead to demonstrate in the experiences of the men of the legation aspects of an ascendant, interwar Canadian society that was measurably more uncertain of itself than has been previously shown.

and America.[16] Recent developments in the fields of Pacific world and international histories have meanwhile made space for new studies of Canadian relations in East Asia by reconceptualizing the region as an inclusive, transnational 'arena.' By adopting this framework for a study of interwar Canadian diplomacy, the themes of political autonomy and international manoeuvring generally framed in previous studies with near exclusive reference to the Atlantic powers can become visible.

The only monograph devoted to the history of the legation, John D. Meehan's 2004 *The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-1941,* reflects several important and emerging trends in the discipline. By carefully organizing his political analysis around empire without silencing the historical voices of individuals, Meehan straddled a methodological divide that for decades separated the field of political history from its social and cultural counterparts. This allowed him to at once examine the legation's effect on national, British, and, to a lesser extent, American policy in the increasingly Japanese-dominated East Asia of the 1930s.[17] His work thus provides the political and contextual base for the current study, while at the same time representing one model of the new international history – a model that, as David Meren has explained, offers "reappraisals of Canadian action in the traditional North Atlantic Triangle but also in explorations of the regions beyond it" while acknowledging the "significance

[16] While the venues, actors, moments, and politics that the established historiography emphasised did shift – focus moved from the words of Canadian delegates at the League of Nations, to the earlier, and less glamorously internationalist, exchanges with British or American policy-forming elites at various conferences organized within the frameworks of either Empire and, later, Commonwealth or the Anglo-American dominated 'North Atlantic Triangle. Beyond the subject of Canadian opinion and policy on the 'Manchurian Question' of 1931 and subsequent Second Sino-Japanese War, little analysis was conducted.

[17] Meehan demonstrates how "collective security, pacifism, disarmament, and appeasement" became the dominant and guiding ideologies of the inter-war governments of both Bennett and King, placing Canada within a moderate middle-position between American isolationism and the larger, global-imperial concerns of Great Britain. Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 4. Moreover, on the subject of purveyors of autonomism within the Dominion and its Department of External Affairs, Meehan finds their efforts checked by King's unwillingness to challenge British politic hegemony outright: the new offices created abroad in 1927 and 1929 are notably "legations, not embassies," run by "ministers plenipotentiary rather than ambassadors." Ibid., 7. Nevertheless, he agrees with Hilliker in asserting that "there was greater distancing from British officials in Tokyo than had been the case in Washington or Paris" – something he implies was the product of British preoccupation with Chinese nationalism as a "more apparent threat to regional security than Japanese imperialism" Ibid., 18; Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I* vol. 1, 122; Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 36.

of empire and its legacy in the Canadian experience" with a "more expansive geographical approach."[18]

The individual and Canadian society were, however, only peripheral concerns of Meehan's study. Like much of the scholarship on early Canadian diplomacy in East Asia, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun* highlights an early form of Dominion political autonomy and identity while only unevenly considering how the interpersonal exchanges between Canadian and foreign representatives propelled and shaped official, bilateral relations between the two nations.[19] Resistant to bottom-up approaches, Meehan's analysis only partially penetrates beyond the national, political level. As recent observers in the fields of international history, political science, and sociology have noted, "diplomats are real people, who do a practical job, and the diplomatic corps which protects their collective identity and professional integrity, is the most tangible expression of international society that exists."[20] To access this historical, international society, the individuals who comprised it must be adopted as both the starting point for, and indeed central subject of, that analysis.

For decades, trends in the research and writing of Canadian political history relegated the Tokyo legation to a place beyond the pale of the mainstream, national-political narrative. Meehan's work at once built upon their research while meanwhile challenging their shortcomings. To explain the shortcomings of the half-century of literature before Meehan, Ian McKay's 2000 article, "The Liberal Order Framework," is useful for its highlighting the number of perceptibly hegemonic trends of Canadian historiography, demonstrating how historiographical modes are themselves part and parcel of forces that have long shaped the social and political environment of Canada. Describing the nation of Canada, its socio-political environs, as well as its national history, McKay identifies an "arrestingly contradictory, complicated, and yet coherent process of liberal rule."[21] This liberal order, he argues, stretches back to the Rebellions of 1837 and has led

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[18] David Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," in *The Canadian Historical Review* Vol. 96, No. 4 (December 2015), 562.

[19] Indeed, others in the field of Canadian international history criticised Meehan for his apparent hesitancy to push his study further beyond the limits of traditional diplomatic history. See, for instance, John Price, review of *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* by Meehan, *The International History Review* Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sept., 2006), 626.

[20] James Mayall, introduction to *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society,* eds. Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5.

[21] Ian McKay, "The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History," in *The Canadian Historical Review* 81:4 (2000), 623; As a broad and provocative sketch of the national historical 'project,'

Canadian historians to explain, justify, and ennoble their nation-state via its history.[22] These were and are the writers of the aforementioned historiographies of Canadian interwar foreign policy and East Asian relations. The voices marginalized in the selective historical record of these dominant narratives remained silenced until the interventions of academics in the fields of social and cultural history of the sixties and seventies. Thereafter, historians adopting increasingly inclusivist and transnational approaches attempted to recover these voices, paving the way for a "new Canadian political history," one that remains in a state of constant redefinition in relation to its usage of balanced and varied critical perspectives.[23]

As the force behind this liberal order's entrenchment in both the dominant historiographies and the ostensibly collective, national consciousness, the works of academics in the fields of political and diplomatic history in the mid- to late-twentieth century are striking for their avoidance of Marler's diplomatic mission to Tokyo. The founding of the Canadian legation to Japan in 1929 was an event that, in even the most tactless of readings, represented an unprecedented break from the political and ideological Atlanticism of the day.[24] Matching neither the interests of the southward gazing continentalists and autonomists, nor those of nostalgic imperialists, the legation experiment to East Asia could not serve the liberal nationalist historiography of the twentieth century mainstream.[25] The experiences of the men at Tokyo from 1929 thus resisted placement in nation-building narratives as result of conflicting periodization, as well as the inconsistently articulated nature of their diplomatic mission.[26] While McKay's

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complete with his own biting criticisms and politically charged recommendations and demands, the initial 2000 article continues to incite much debate. For a sampling of the various responses and positions formulated in the wake of McKay's first and later successive presentations of this historiographical intervention, see: McKay, "Canada as a Long Liberal Revolution: On Writing the History of Actually Existing in Canadian Liberalism, 1840s-1940s," in *Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution*, ed. by Jean-Francois Constant and Michel Ducharme, 347-452 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009)

[22] McKay, "The Liberal Order Framework," 632-3, 642.

[23] Ibid., 618, 620.

[24] Historians have in fact struggled to recover this history for the liberal-national project. Attempts to align aberrations from of the status quo in foreign policy with the Eurocentric frameworks of the North Atlantic Triangle or Ottawa-Washington paradigms have appeared only sporadically since that decade.

[25] Distinction between these otherwise similarly liberal-nationalist views is made in David Meren's succinct description of their respective central narratives of "colony-to-nation" and "empire-to-commonwealth" – at once neither incompatible with one another, nor groundbreaking for an improved inclusivity of voice or experience. Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 540-1, 544.

[26] The diminished effectiveness of Marler and his staff in dealing with the radicalizing face of Japanese militarization and expansionism in mid-decade, as we shall see, further reduced their potential usefulness to the

intervention helps to explain this liberal order's silence regarding Marler and his staff at Tokyo, its wider implications provide important tools with which to now reassess and reinsert the Canadian diplomatic mission to Tokyo into the diverse and interconnected histories of late-interwar international, social, and cultural histories.

Together with studies aimed to demonstrate the processes and circumstances of nation building in Canada, early histories of Canadian foreign policy contributed to the birth of two dominant frameworks of diplomatic and international political history that persist today. The first is the so-called 'North Atlantic Triangle.[27] The second, which sometimes includes the first as its central form of demonstrative evidence, is the colony-to-nation narrative framework.[28] Depending on one's politics, these two representations affirmed and perpetuated the state-centered, progressivist narratives of either Canada's place within a global British Empire, or its alignment with an Anglophone fellowship of nation-states.[29] The first wave of studies of Canada in East Asia were a part of what David Meren, building upon the historiographical observations of McKay, has identified as the "liberal-nationalist school" of Canadian historical thought.[30] Meren notes that despite its fractiousness over particulars, an important and powerful mainstream of Canadian academics put forth concerted efforts to respond to empire, thereby

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statist, geo-political narratives of a world history (as represented primarily by European and Western powers) aimed to explain the preparations or road to war for war. Neither did its staff take a completely autonomist, nationalist position in Tokyo. Marler's tendency to at once espouse empire and autonomy hindered his ability to present his mission as much as either of these ideals.

[27] For the earliest conceptualization of this 'North Atlantic Triangle,' see John Bartlet Brebner, "Canada, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," in *Political Science Quarterly* vol. 50, no. 1 (1935): 45-58.

[28] The colony-to-nation parable was developed by Arthur Reginald Lower in his *Colony to Nation: A History of Canada* (Toronto: Longmanss, Green, 1946).

[29] In the field of early Canadian-Japanese relations, works central to the concurrent efforts to explain the nation of Canada – its history, as well as its future place in the world – include: Arthur Lower, *Canada and the Far East, 1940* (New York: International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations: 1940); J. S. Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient: A Study in International Relations* (Toronto: MacMillan Company of Canada: 1941); for a bibliographic sketch of Canadian diplomatic history at the mid-century, see: George Parkin de Twenebroker Glazebrook, "Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century," in *The Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 21, No. 1 (March, 1949): 44-55.

[30] Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 541.

producing a shared interest in the "asymmetrical power relationships" of Canada and either its southern neighbour or imperial motherland.[31]

Meren's recent appraisal of the history of Canadian foreign relations and diplomacy plots shifts in the fields of both 'diplomatic,' as well as the more broadly inclusivist 'international' history in Canada since the last decades of the nineteenth century. While the scope and range of analysis within these two approaches are distinct – diplomatic history being limited to "intergovernmental relations," international approaches making way for "phenomena beyond the governmental or political spheres" – he finds the latter to be applicable across all prior moments and periods traditionally the subjects of diplomatic history. In fact, mindful of McKay's conclusions and recommendations,[32] Meren argues for an adoption of the international approach in place of strictly diplomatic analyses.[33] Tracing Canadian nationalist historiography from the capitulation of "the imperialist version," with its focus on "participation in the British Empire" in the 1910s, to an "imperial rivalry" model, he thus locates and connects the trends and schools of (often nationalist) thought articulated and demonstrated by both himself, and the recent works of others, across a century's worth of literature.[34] This he uses to illuminate debates amongst imperialist and continentalist academics who, wielding their respective forms of nationalism while drawing on research and observations, attempted to demonstrate the historically justified

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[31] More specifically, he explains how the tensions between "rival 'imperialist' and 'autonomist' narratives" within the liberal-nationalist school persisted from the late-1930s, as it did in Canadian "political and cultural life." In this way, attention was directed toward either America or England in order to explain Canada. Ibid., 541, 539-40.

[32] While Meren is primarily interested in practises in the fields of diplomatic or international history, he expressed intentions to contribute to a larger examination of "current trends in order to emphasize the potential of Canadian international history as a means to explore and interrogate Canada as a project of rule." Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 538. He goes on to clarify that 'project of rule' by quoting McKay's 2009 articulation of the framework introduced in his 2000 *CHR* article: Canada as a project of rule, as examined with Meren's formulation of good international history addresses McKay's claims that it was a state that "came into being as an extended colonial experiment in British liberal forms of rule in northern North America." McKay, "Canada As a Long Liberal Revolution," 349, quoted in Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 538.

[33] Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 527.

[34] On the earliest, imperialist interests of (diplomatic) history in Canada, see McKay, "Canada as a Long Liberal Revolution;" on the imperial nationalism typical of Canadian historiography pre-WWI, see Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writings since 1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); on the subsequent rise of autonomism (in its various forms), see Ibid., as well as Phillip Buckner, "How Canadian Historians Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Americans!," *Acadiensis* Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 1996); and on the concurrent and influential trends of professionalization and specialization within the field of history in English Canada more broadly, see Donald A. Wright, *The Professionalization of History in English Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

place and purpose of Canada in the post-Paris Peace global and international community.[35] Meren thus provides the outline upon which the relevant works on Canadian diplomatic, governmental engagement with Japan have been presented, helping, along with McKay, to explain how and why historians wrote (or, just as importantly, did not write) about the Tokyo legation.[36] Meanwhile, the "shift of focus from government to civil society" Meren advocates offers important alternatives to the top-down approaches of more traditional institutional histories in this field by "yielding more complex studies of the social and cultural phenomena – immediate and latent – that inform the actions of foreign policy elites," highlighting "the importance of individuals and elements on the margins of, or excluded from, formal power structures and their impact on international affairs."[37] As entry points to the history of the

[35] Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 538-9. It is within the latter group that he notes a more staunchly autonomist stream appeared in both the literature and the socio-political reality; this was perhaps best demonstrated by the academic and later diplomatic career of Oscar D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs throughout this period, as well as Hugh L. Keenleyside, First secretary to the Tokyo legation. He turns to Skelton's academic contributions to demonstrate the autonomists' position. The popularity of Skelton's work, *General Economic History of the Dominion: 1867-1912* (Toronto: Publisher's Association of Canada, 1913), amongst international and often socialist audiences has been elaborated by Hillmer in: Hillmer, *O.D. Skelton*, 40-1. See also Hillmer's discussion of Skelton's earlier thesis, revised and published in 1911 as *Socialism: A Critical Analysis* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911) in: Hillmer, Ibid.

[36] Indeed, as Meren explains the lasting liberal-nationalist influence on Canadian scholarship: "The colony-to-nation theme meant that 'empire' figured in the liberal-nationalist telling as a foil against which Canada's evolution and international activity could be measured. [For continentalist-autonomists,] Empire became something Canada had allegedly outgrown, even overcome. However, this interpretation, with its nation-building logic and rejection of imperial dynamics, encouraged the obscuring, if not deliberate forgetting, of Canada's participatory role in empire, the active and enthusiastic contribution of Canadians to the imperial enterprise, and the fact that Canada was itself a project of empire, one with dramatic consequences for those finding themselves on its margins or excluded. [...] The liberal-nationalist interpretation thus encouraged a reduction in the number of subjects worthy of study, notably those that would have sown doubts about its triumphalism" – until, that is, the opening of the twenty-first century witnessed the 'return' of empire with what Meren calls the "*neo-imperial-nationalist*" current. Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 543, 557 (emphasis in the original).

[37] These perspectives, he argues, shifts attention from "[f]ormal diplomacy, the state, and the nation to explore questions of race, culture, class, gender, and religion, recognizing that these shape the international activities of governments and populations." Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 562. This is not to completely discredit and discard the importance of the 'nation' in all of this. Indeed, even as a social, political, or legal construct, the state's existence can hardly be disputed – as diplomats at Tokyo, Marler, Keenleyside, and Kirkwood's lives and jobs were made possible only by the power, privilege, and authority their diplomatic status (vested in them by their head of state) granted them. Reciprocal acceptance and respect for these vested credentials remains a foundational tenet upon which diplomacy is conducted today. Meren gestures to the vestigial importance of the 'nation' in this new diplomatic history when he explains: "Attention to the transnational facilitates the interrogating of nationalist accounts, the transcending of what is ultimately an arbitrary domestic/foreign divide, a

Canadian legation to Tokyo, as well as that of early diplomatic relations between the two states, the lives and experiences of the three ranking officials posted there from 1929 will serve to decenter analysis, as Meren advocates, to foster a nuanced and broadly illuminating, inclusive study of the seemingly peripheral, interpersonal and social aspects of international exchange.

In *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* Meehan drew primarily upon four major works in Canadian foreign policy noteworthy for their considerations of East Asia.[38] Taken together, these works are useful in sketching out the changing and politicized landscape of the more traditional scholarship on Canadian foreign policy in the Pacific, and elsewhere. An early example is C.P. Stacey's two-volume work, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies.* Like his liberal-nationalist colleagues, Stacey concentrates these volumes on demonstrating and explaining Canadian diplomatic manoeuvrings in the first half of the century as processes the state's evolution from a colonial – and thus powerless and underperforming – position through its becoming a Dominion of the Commonwealth and Canadians' realization of their state's full potential as a soft-power, peacemaking, autonomous political entity. While eschewing opportunities to demonstrate the colony-to-nation trajectory of Canadian policy in East Asia, Stacy situates the history Canadian involvement in Atlantic- and European developments within precisely that narrative.[39] Indeed the growth and achievement of political autonomy alongside or within empire persisted as the dominant framework of Canadian national history until at least the last decade of the century.[40] John Thompson and Allen Seager's 1985 book, *Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord,* further demonstrates this trend. The authors turn

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shift of focus from government to civil society, and a recognition that although the 'national' and the 'state' need to be taken into consideration, what is more rightly called international history is far more complex." Meren, Ibid.

[38] C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Neighbors Across the Pacific: The Development of Economic and Political Relations Between Canada and Japan* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983); H. Thompson and A. Seager, *Canada 1929-1939: Decades of Discord* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985); Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I.*

[39] In a work that as a second volume spans more that 400-pages, the opening of the legation is given a paragraph; pre-war economic relations between the two states cover less than three; and Marler's seven-year career as Canada's first Minister to Japan is mentioned twice. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2,* 90-1, 191-3, 125-6.

[40] As Meren has noted, the obsession with empire never really dissipated amongst the liberal-nationalists. While the form and purpose of 'empire' in these cases has no doubt shifted – Meren explains how empire as a way of defining a national, Canada policy, position, or identity become for some linked with an American empire after September 11 – the reality is that empire remains a lighthouse with which Canadian historians orient their positions on and explanations of past and present (and, when writing less formally, future) national policy or discourse. Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 558-60.

to the 1921 Imperial Conference – an international meeting of imperial representatives at which Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen led an effort to dismantle the Anglo-Japanese Alliance – to explain the earliest examples of Canadian autonomy and agency in foreign relations and the fact that, for the first time, "a dominion could play a role in shaping an imperial decision."[41] They thus echo previous representations of Canada as an emergent nation within a framework of power itself grounded in the contexts of the North Atlantic Triangle.[42]

Others, however, have begun to challenge the liberal-nationalist perspective. One of the earliest examples is Klaus Pringsheim's 1983 monograph, *Neighbors Across the Pacific.*[43] Born in Germany, Pringsheim fled in April 1939 and, avoiding military service and renouncing his German citizenship, sought asylum in Japan where he was educated and waited out the war as a resident and later prisoner. During the occupation of Japan, he moved to America for graduate studies, beginning a career as a professor and then relocating to Canada. Later, Pringsheim became a facilitator and advisor of Japanese-Canadian business in Ontario.[44] *Neighbors Across the Pacific* anticipates later interest in the circumstances of relations between the two states, in particular the study of British Columbian opposition to Asian immigration in the first half of the twentieth century. Many of the issues Pringsheim's work included are those on which scholars seeking to challenge or circumvent the liberal-national mainstream have since focused. Though initially drafted in fulfilment of a contract with the Department of External Affairs, editors there refused Pringsheim's manuscript after reading his accounts of the early century living conditions of Japanese immigrants in British Columbia.[45] Moreover, his insistence that excerpts from

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[41] Thompson and Seager, *Canada 1929-1939*, 39.

[42] The authors' considerations for Canadian-Japanese interactions and Canadian foreign policy in the region are limited to Ottawa's reactions to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the League of Nation's Lytton commission, and the words of Canadian delegates to The Hague on the issue. Thomspon and Seagar, *Decades of Discord,* 307.

[43] Not bound to periods of formal diplomatic connection, Pringsheim instead traces flows of trade and peoples crossing the Pacific from as early as 1870, allowing for a more inclusive, decentralized account the 100-years leading up to his present. Pringsheim, *Neighbors Across the Pacific*, 5.

[44] Klaus H. Pringsheim and Victor Boesen, *Man of the World: Memoirs of Europe, Asia & North America (1930s to 1980s)* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1995), 29-31, 49, 100-1.

[45] This arrangement included a sizable advance and deadline framework similar to that from which Kirkwood's drafts were completed (though left unpublished) nearly twenty years prior. On the particulars of the initial arrangements for Pringsheim's monograph, see his memoirs: Ibid., 219. The work highlights Anti-Japanese sentiment and white nativism British Columbia while explaining the internment of residents of Japanese descent in early 1942. Pringsheim, *Neighbors Across the Pacific*, 8, 37.

Mackenzie King's diary revealing the former Prime Minister's racialized views of the hierarchies of the world's populations be quoted in full led External to terminate his contract.[46]

Although Pringsheim's own life set him apart from any predisposition to write nationalist Canadian history, he also refused to acknowledge any actively autonomist intentions on behalf of those at the legation in Tokyo.[47] Moreover, Canada's profitable relationships with East Asia and Japan, he asserted, were realized only under the direction of the next generation of External employees – the celebrated group of Canadian diplomatic stars: Norman Robertson, Arthur Menzies, and Lester B. Pearson.[48] Indeed the allure of empire, the North Atlantic Triangle, and Canada's so-called golden age of balanced and noble foreign policy continued to occupy Canadian political historians writing about policy and international relations, including John Hilliker who, in 1990, published the first institutional history of the Department of External Affairs. Though he adopted a much broader scope of analysis to examine all arms of the department, his interwar analysis remained largely shaped by developments in Europe. *Canada's Department of External Affairs* can be aligned with Meren's observations of the neo-imperial-nationalist current – one that has reasserted the various liberal-nationalist streams that came

[46] Hearing about the bombing of Hiroshima, Pringsheim explains King's reaction by including the following quote in its entirety: "Naturally this word created mixed feelings in my mind and heart. We were now within sight of the end of the war with Japan. We now see what might have come to the British people had German scientists won the race. It is fortunate that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese people rather than upon the white races of Europe." Library and Archives Canada, King Papers, quoted by Pringsheim in *Neighbors Across the Pacific*, 91; Pringsheim then notes that in J.W. Pickersgill's official history of the Prime Minister during this period, *The Mackenzie King Record,* the last sentence is absent. J.W Pickersgill and D.R. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record: Volume 2: 1944-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 451. Moreover, Pringsheim uses this discrepancy – as well his determination to set the record straight, so to speak – as an explanation as for why his contract from the Department of External Affairs to write the institution's history was abrogated. Pringsheim and Boesen, *Man of the World,* 221.

[47] Pringsheim's assessment of Marler and his staff is informed mainly by Canada's economic performance. As he demonstrates, economic growth enjoyed through the twenties (perhaps unsurprisingly) peaked in 1929, dropped substantially in 1933-4, and was later followed by Bennett's "trade war" with Japan which King quickly abrogated after regaining the premiership in 1935.Pringsheim, *Neighbors Across the Pacific* 42, 44-5. Concluding his assessment of Canada and Japan's pre-war diplomacy, Pringsheim dismisses the legation as a failed endeavour: "the hopeful beginnings of Keenleyside, Marler, and Tokugawa [Japan's representative to Ottawa before the war]" had to "begin all over again" in the fifties, when circumstances provided healthy relations between the two states "a far better chance to succeed." Pringsheim, Ibid., 106.

[48] Here, however briefly, Pringsheim's reading of Canadian diplomacy becomes aligned with that of his adopted nation's established mainstream, demonstrating the ability of the post-war, golden age narrative to silence the unprecedented action and circumstances of Tokyo in 1929.

before it, meanwhile demonstrating a "renewed interest in Canada's place in the 'British World" as well as in its golden age peacekeeping achievements.[49]

Through the 1990s, the achievements of the social and cultural historians were slowly making an impact on political history, dealing direct challenges to the North Atlantic Triangle-based readings of Canadian foreign policy which still favoured the imperial framework of Commonwealth and intra-imperial relations when explaining Canada's role and effectiveness in Japan after 1929.[50] On the subjects of diplomacy and international (or transnational) exchanges, however, top-down nation-building narratives remained the norm.[51] Nevertheless, the lives and experiences of the men sending the cables and despatches so much of the prior research was built upon began for the first time to take a place in the historiography. While not representative of a complete break from the hitherto established nationalist mainstream, the work of Tou Chu Dou Lynhiavu in the 1990s in some ways anticipated the discipline's changing appreciation for the role of the individual in intergovernmental and intersocietal exchanges. It is for his use of personal papers to supplement records of External, House debates, and the Prime Ministers'

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[49] Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 557-8. To demonstrate the return of interest in Canada-via-a British World, Meren points to a number of studies of turn of the century and early twentieth century Canadian constitutional and domestic, political history to which I would propose that large sections of Volume 1 of Hilliker's *Canada's Department of External Affairs* match. For the triumphs of this period see the roles of Lester Pearson and Under-Secretary after 1941 Norman Robertson, see especially pages 242-3 and 282.

[50] Tou Chu Dou Lynhiavu, "The Establishment of Canada's Tokyo Legation in 1928: Canada's Relations with Japan, 1894-1933" (MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 1991); Lynhiavu, "Canada's Window on Asia: The Establishment of the Tokyo Legation in 1928-1931," in *Journal of Canadian Studies* vol. 31, no. 4 (winter 1996/1997). Lynhiavu's study, while grounded in the familiar framework Anglo-Canadian relations as related to the inauguration of the Dominion's diplomatic ties with Tokyo, was unique for its demonstration of the history of bi-lateral treaty signing capabilities of the Dominion. This he uses to show how the role of federal institutions evolved in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century – analysis resembling that of Hilliker, if only more narrowly focused (temporally as well as geographically) and thorough.

[51] To Lynhiavu, the twenties "witnessed a struggle for genuine recognition of Canadian nationhood." Lynhiavu, "Canada's Tokyo Legation" (MA thesis), 27. His final assessment of the legation is inextricably linked to this statement as he finds that "despite divided counsel on the Manchurian Crisis, the Legation performed its intelligence role as well as could have been expected." Lynhiavu, "Canada's Window on Asia, 115. For an even more pronounced 'return' to the imperially, nationally framed perspective, see: Greg C. Kennedy, "Imperial Crossroad: The Influence of the Far East on Anglo-American Relations, 1933-1939," (PhD diss., University of Alberta, 1998); Johnson, "Canada and the Far East During the 1930s," in *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century,* edited by Schultz, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); as well as equivalent streams amongst Japanese scholars with personal professional connections to Canadian institutions and academics communities. For example: Toshihiro Tanaka, "W.L.M. King, O.D. Skelton, and Their Diplomacy," *Reitaku Review* no. 10 (2004): 15-37.

office that Lynhiavu's work offered such valuable contributions.[52] Thereafter, several more studies on related historical episodes – each framed and plottable amongst the streams of either the neo-imperial-nationalist or the budding, diplomatic history-variant of study established by the social and cultural historians of a previous generation[53] – began to crystallise across a handful of articles and chapters in the journals and volumes of Canadian history.[54]

After roughly 2005, the individual began to re-emerge alongside and as a part of the otherwise political or institutionally framed international Canadian histories. Meehan himself remained active in this endeavour, contributing chapters focused alternatively on the policies and forces driving the expansion of External Affairs, or the people who shaped those developments. Volumes such as *Architects and Innovators: Building the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009* returned to the well-known, as well as lesser-known men and women to which that institution's successes, failures, and expansions are attributed.[55] Its editors and contributors engaged in a re-examination of the individual in history as not only

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[52] Lynhiavu nevertheless halts his investigation of the interpersonal relations and experience after demonstrating his somewhat questionable argument that Ottawa simply expected too much from understaffed legation. This point is hardly convincing given that all three of the offices' highest ranking officials wrote of Ottawa's apparent disinterest in their work at the Japanese capital. Furthermore, Lynhiavu overlooks Marler's personal desires, most obviously (and contemptuously) exemplified by the minister's constant requests for expanded authority over the entire region of East Asia.

[53] Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 559-561.

[54] Important and representative works from this stream with relation to the states, societies, and period in question here include: Peter Oblas, "Canada's Far West Policy: China and Japan 1929-1932," in *The Journal of American and Canadian Studies* No. 18 (2000), accessed January 2015, http://dept.sophia.ac.jp/is/amecana/Journal/18-2.htm; in the field of architectural history, Marie-Josee Therrien, "Canadian Chanceries in Tokyo," in *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Greg Dinghy and Patricia Roy (Vancouver: UBCPress, 2008): 232-243; and J.H. Taylor, "A New Base for Promoting Canada's Interests in Japan in Japan," in *"Special Trust and Confidence": Envoy Essays in Canadian Diplomacy,* ed. David Reece (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996): 255-268; in women's and gender history see: Vivien Hughes, "Women, Gender, and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1909-2009," in *British Journal of Canadian Studies* Vol. 23, No. 2 (2010): 159-178; Margaret K. Weiers, *Envoys Extraordinary: Women of the Foreign Service* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995), especially Introduction, Chapters 1-2; on the individuals and non-state actors who experienced Japan during this period, see A. Hamish Ion, *The Cross in the Dark Valley: The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movement in the Japanese Empire, 1931-1945* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999); Yuko Ohara, "J.W. Dafoe and Japanese-Canadian Relations during the 1920s," trans. Peter Currie, in *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*: 60-74; Eber H. Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler and the Canadian Legation in Tokyo," in Ibid.: 75-84.

[55] John D. Meehan, "Herbert Marler: The Tokyo Legation and Canada's Pacific Debut, 1929-1936," in *Architects and Innovators: Building the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009,* eds. Greg Dinghy and Kim Nossal (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 109-125.

representatives of the various "phases" of the institution itself, but also as windows into Canadian and international society more broadly – political, cultural, or otherwise.[56]

For their part, social anthropologists have also ventured into the fields of international history, similarly taking the diplomat as subject in order to understand precisely how political international relations are and have been conducted on the interpersonal level. Iver B. Neumann provides one framework with which to identify and understand the agency of the individual in diplomacy, as well as the processes of identification with which they define, protect, and employ it. Within the Western diplomatic discourse, he argues, the realm of the diplomat and diplomacy is that of "mediation between political entities with diverse cultures."[57] At the most fundamental levels of these processes are the lives and work of diplomats; it is as result of their actions and negotiations in the various national capitals that international policies are formed. For much of the twentieth century, diplomats were in control of a division between public and private aspects of their individual lives, but also aware of their role and responsibilities as negotiators in a transnational exchange of knowledge and power.[58] Thus, Neumann argues, the important aspects of the real processes of diplomacy are found only when one considers the "specific instances when diplomats present what they themselves think are the practices that form the key or even core of diplomacy."[59] It is through their own management of self, constantly reflected upon and performed as they live and work as the most basic unit in a global system of communications and politics, that the real processes of diplomacy are revealed. As subjects of historical analysis then, the diplomat is as valuable a source of knowledge about past political, social, and economic

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[56] In its editors' words, the volume examines "the national institution by exploring the experiences of particular individuals who contributed to the transformation of Canada's foreign ministry over the last century" – their efforts to do so they describe as "illustrative rather than comprehensive." Greg Dinghy and Kim Richard Nossal, introduction to *Architects and Innovators*, 2.

[57] Iver B Neuman, "To Be a Diplomat," in *International Studies Perspectives* vol. 6 (2005), 72.

[58] Working on subjects from within his own lifetime, Neumann operationalizes the diplomats' perceived role by generalizing that as negotiators, diplomats "do not experience negotiation as taking place on behalf of themselves. They see their role as being that of incorporating their Minister, their Ministry, their government, their state" – though he adds that "[t]here are a range of other possibilities here, including the ones of representing a class, an ethnic group, an NGO, or humanity as such." I would argue that, for the Canadians at Tokyo in 1929, the bond between a personal position or role in Japan and that of the young dominion they represented were far less hegemonic and that, in fact, considerations of class and ethnicity alluded to by Neuman were more easily and deeply folded into their self-perceived roles both within and without the aforementioned diplomatic (as well as interpersonal and self-reflexive) practice of negotiation. Neuman, "To Be a Diplomat," 85.

[59] Neumann, "To Be a Diplomat," 83.

histories as they are about the real processes of diplomacy past and present. Moreover, the individual offers a way to circumvent the hegemonic, top-down perspectives which, as we have seen, have limited the scope and reach of international history in Canada.

Since the early 2000s, others have adopted transnational frameworks in writing global or Pacific-world histories, using them to critically assess the intricate networks of exchange preceding and persisting alongside official, governmental relations.[60] These methods represent a shifting view of the Pacific and Pacific Canada that historian Henry Yu has described as "a perspective on Canada's past, present, and future that highlights the ways in which the nation has been and increasingly will be shaped by its engagement with the Pacific rather than the Atlantic world."[61] For these scholars, the state represents the point of departure – the lives and experiences of those facilitators of exchange provide the sources and narratives with which the historian might illuminate the alternatively unusual, individualisms of experience, or the universal and collective aspects of various societies and movements. In this way, the weight and influence of the nation as the central, organizing category of analysis is checked, allowing the interpersonal and more fluid and mobile forces of social and cultural origin to rotate to the front of this presented history.[62] John Price's study of Canadian East and South Asian foreign and domestic policy, *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific,* is to date the best application of these aspects of new international, diplomatic history to the subject of Canadian policy in the Pacific.[63] By adopting inclusive frameworks of periodization and analysis and applying them to a source base of multiple provenances, Price seeks not to justify the present conditions of his subject, but rather to critically and diametrically expose aspects of its history

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[60] See Price, *Orienting Canada*; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[61] Henry Yu, "Global Migrants and the new Pacific," in *International Journal* (Autumn 2009), 149-50.

[62] Importantly, however, Meehan's *The Dominion and the Rising Sun* does not completely eschew the nation – nor does it completely embrace the transnational or transregional model(s). His work on the subject is essentially and by definition a study of bi-lateral political relations. Its author spends some time contrasting and refuting claims by prior scholars of a North Atlantic Triangle that in fact paralleled its well-known North Atlantic counterpart throughout this period – Meehan returns to the national-political position to explain that any such comparison is an overestimation of the Canadian impact of Anglo-American relations in East Asia. See Meehan, “From Ally to Menace: Canadian Attitudes and Policies toward Japanese Imperialism: 1929-1939” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2000), 9.

[63] The work is a multiregional study of the pervasive racism and white supremacism that has shaped and continues to shape Canada's political and legal systems, and its treatment of Asian migrants and naturalized-Canadian citizens since confederation.

hitherto marginalized and erased, thereby circumventing the influences of mainstream historiographies.

Despite all of their achievements, Canadian scholars – especially those writing in the decades since Stacey – have yet to exhaustively analyse Keenleyside, Marler, Kirkwood's experiences in Tokyo. Therefore, rather than assessing the legation as a unitary actor in a field of multilateral exchanges between nations, an appreciation for the role and experience of the individual allows us to assess precisely how and why the men of the Canadian legation put dominion autonomy in foreign affairs after 1929 to work to such an unprecedented degree. By eschewing various forms of top-down analysis, we can understand the Tokyo legation as at once an effort in the cultivation of business, of the nation-state, and of the self, highlighting the individual autonomy, agency, and privilege employed by these three diplomats, as well as their relevant and respective processes of identification. By beginning with their personal reflections, the present study seeks to uncover how the legation operated and how and why its staff chose to navigate and negotiate their own positions within the precarious space carved out for them.[64] Finally, it engages ongoing efforts in the field of Canadian history by questioning the persistent liberal-nationalist narrative derived from the very period in which these men lived and worked, accepting that they themselves at times contributed to or caught sight of the so-called liberal order that recent historians have argued so shaped the Canadian polity and its dominant, mainstream society. For these reasons, this thesis stands to benefit from and build upon the accomplishments and experiments of the existing scholarship, thereby contributing to a broadening of the field and to an increased inclusiveness in the range and scope of future projects in international Canadian history.

[64] The ability of the legation staff, and their cohorts at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, to exercise Canadian autonomy through bi-laterally negotiated and informed foreign policy in 1929, for example, is but one of the important questions whose answer remains obscured amongst the top-down, Eurocentric historiography within which there is no standard against which to measure the unique developments and circumstances of 1929-1932. By framing analysis of Canadian international relations in East Asia around the three ranking diplomats posted there in 1929, the social and cultural forces that, emanating from and reaching beyond the realm of high politics or diplomacy, shaped the operations of the Canadian legation in Tokyo.

Canadian-Japanese Diplomatic Relations in Context

Although the subject of Japanese-Canadian relations was discussed numerous times in the House of Commons before the turn of the century, it was not until Laurier struck down British Columbia's anti-Asian legislation in 1903 that the creation of more official and amicable transpacific relations became of interest to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. As Laurier explained, Canada and Japan were "neighbouring nations." As such, immigration and trade were issues that needed to be ironed out between them so as to that ensure that profits and friendships would persist for the duration of Canada's twentieth century.[65]

With economics and immigration at the forefront of the party's concerns, Laurier sent the first Canadian representative of any official capacity to Japan in 1903. Sydney Fisher, the Minister of Agriculture, visited Osaka, attending the National Industrial Exhibit there to promote trade and technology while overseeing the Canadian exhibit.[66] The Canadian showcase handed out wheat and bread to attendees and local restaurants. The exhibit was so popular, in fact, that the emperor of Japan himself paid a visit to the Canadian pavilion.[67] The trip, which Fisher had himself proposed in the House as a method to increase Canadian markets for flour as early as 1897, was not limited in its scope to matters of economics, however.[68] Immigration regulations remained a goal of the mission, and Fisher met with members of the Japanese Foreign Ministry for informal discussions on the subject. He also took the opportunity to attend the many social

[65] Canada, *House of Commons Debates,* vol. 1 (1903), 602-3; see also Robert Joseph Gowen, "Canada and the Myth of the Japan Market, 1896-1911," in *Japan and North America, Volume 1: First Contacts to the Pacific War,* ed. Ellis Krauss and Benjamin Nyblade (New York: Routledge and Curzon, 2004), 91.

[66] While documentation of this exhibit is sparse, a book length work produced as a supplement to the visual attractions remains at Library and Archives Canada. The book, "printed by order of the Hon. Sydney A. Fisher," includes a number of photographs (as well as a colour map) of Canadian geography, agriculture, and industry is meant for English speaking visitors of the exhibit. See: *The Dominion of Canada: The Fifth National Exhibition of Japan, Osaka, 1903* (Ottawa, 1903), Agriculture Canada, A22-566, LAC. Accessed January 12, 2016, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.697406/publication.html.

[67] Frank Langdon, *The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations, 1952-1983* (Vancouver: UBCPress, 1983), 5-6; Gowen, "Canada and the Myth of the Japan Market," 92, 103n19. As Anne Shannon has recently demonstrated, there emerged from the experience at the Canadian exhibit the feeling that Japanese society might even switch from a rice-based diet to that of grain and cereals. See: Shannon, *Finding Japan: Early Canadian Encounters with Asia* (Victoria, BC: Heritage House Publishing Co, 2012), 106.

[68] News of the Week, in *The Quebec Saturday Budget* July 17, 1897, 2.

events organized by the established diplomatic community, unofficially introducing the young Dominion to the numerous and mainly European faces of East Asian diplomatic society.[69]

No official, bilateral agreements came from Fisher's visit to Japan however. Instead, the Canadian government joined into the Anglo-Japanese agreement, thereby ensuring themselves the trade and immigration conditions British and Japanese negotiators had bilaterally agreed to in 1894.[70] Canada had thus yet to negotiate or establish any agreements with Japan and was instead subject to the conditions offered to Japan by Britain in that original treaty. Importantly, this included fair and equal treatment of Japanese imperial subjects within the lands of the British Empire.[71] Japanese immigration persisted through the first years of the century, eventually coming to a head in 1907 when nativist white populations, protesting their government's unwillingness to bar South- and East Asian populations from immigrating to BC, rioted in the streets of Vancouver.[72] White British Columbians thus provided the biggest challenge to the Liberal party's effort to promote 'friendship' between the two nations and the earliest diplomatic exchanges between Canadian and Japanese governments took place only in response to racialized, anti-Asian violence in western Canada. Ottawa had repeatedly blocked provincial

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[69] Fisher was a noted guest at a dinner party hosted by Sir Claude Macdonald, British Minister (and later, its first Ambassador) to Japan. Baron Komura, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended the event, and Eleanora Mary d'Anethan, wife of Belgian Minister Albert d'Anethan, noted in her diary that the many "globe-trotters" in attendance were impressed by Fisher's "intelligence and thoroughness." Eleanora Mary d'Anethan, *Fourteen Years of Diplomatic Life in Japan: Leaves from the diary of Baroness Albert d'Anethan* (London: Stanley Paul & Co, 1912), 327.

[70] Signed in 1902, the alliance stipulated was primarily a military agreement aimed to provide bi-lateral, collective security, though it also recognized Japan's imperial status and implied respect for the passage of either nation's subjects through the other's lands. Thus, it was the target of later attacks by those seeking Asian exclusion in the dominions. "The Anglo-Japanese Agreement," 1902, accessed January 14, 2015, http://www.russojapanesewar.com/ang-jap.html.

[71] As historian Frank Langdon explains: "Having dealt only with British diplomats, Tokyo officials thought that the Canadians had abandoned their insistence on restricted immigration" upon their joining the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Thus, labourers continued to flow unabated from Japan to British Columbia. Langdon, *The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations,* 6.

[72] Historian Henry Yu has focused on 1907 as an important moment in the history of politicization and codification of anti-Asian sentiment in BC and Ottawa. The riots that year "directly precipitated the creation of the 1908 Gentleman's Agreement between Japan and the United States and Canada," which, he explains, "illustrate[s] the ways in which transpacific Asian migrations intersected with those of Atlantic migrants arriving at the same time." Yu, "Conceiving a Pacific Canada: Trans-Pacific Migration Networks Within and Without the Nation," in *Within and Without the Nation: Canada History as Transnational History,* eds Karen Dubisnky, et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 203. The influence of these domestic trends, in fact, persisted through the period, shaping the way Canadian diplomats performed their duties at Tokyo after 1929.

attempts to institute exclusionary, anti-Japanese immigration policy, but grassroots support for exclusion persisted.[73]

The violence of 1907 provoked strong reaction across the nation. In Ottawa, Laurier redoubled his efforts to respond to the calls of British Columbians for exclusion of non-whites. The Dominion was, however, bound by the stipulations of equal treatment and open immigration by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Heeding the call of white rioters but refusing to adopt such a blatantly racist measure as complete exclusion, the Liberals set out a plan of action that singled out certain preferred groups while severely limiting or barring others. Head taxes on Chinese migrants were increased; South Asians, many of them legal British subjects from India, were turned away at various moments of heightened nativist fervour. Meanwhile, a "Gentleman's Agreement" was negotiated by Labour Minister Rodolphe Lemieux, the first official Canadian representative sent to the East Asian imperial capital, ensuring that the Japanese government would not send more than 150 of its citizens into Canada per year.[74]

The anti-Asian fervour from which the riots emerged persisted long enough to shape Canadian policy in East Asia until at least 1941, highlighting the proximity of the local, domestic events in BC and the formation of Canadian foreign policy in the Pacific as well as even the

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[73] One method of exclusion consisted of requiring immigrants to read and write a European language. Such literacy testing was inspired by the "Australian model" of exclusion and the American example of literacy testing, adopted or supported in white settler colonies from Natal and the Transvaal, to New Zealand, and, on the North American west coast, from BC to California. Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line,* 129-30, 164-5.

[74] As Price has argued, the same white supremacist and nativist ideologies of rioters in 1907 effected the treatment of Japanese negotiators at the Washington Conference of 1921. This, he as well as others explain, was the product of "efforts to build an Anglo-Saxon accord" in the Pacific in order to render Japan "a subordinate imperial power while keeping China open for business." Moreover, Price argues the opening of the Canadian legation at Tokyo in 1929 was justified to Canadians and to its critics for returning the responsibility of visa and passport matters to the hands of agreeable, Anglo-Saxon Canadians. Price, *Orienting Canada,* 31-1. Young civil servant William Lyon Mackenzie King headed the inquiries, their titles reflecting both the interest and tone of their analysis. See: William Lyon Mackenzie King, *Report of W.L. Mackenzie King: Commissioner Appointer to Enquire into the Methods by which Oriental Labourers Have Been Induced to Come to Canada* (Ottawa: 1907); King, *Losses Sustained by the Chinese Population of Vancouver, BC on the Occasion of the Riots in That City in September, 1907,* (Ottawa: 1908); King, *Losses Sustained by the Japanese Population of Vancouver, BC on the Occasion of the Riots in That City in September, 1907,* (Ottawa: 1908). An up to date overview of the inter-imperial immigration policies of Canada, England, and America in relation to Japan in this first decade of the century and with reference to the extant literature and source-base is Igor R. Saveliev, "'A Question Between Empires': The Restriction of Japanese Immigration in British Columbia and the reassessment of Japan's Foreign Policy, 1907-1908," in *Japan Forum* vol. 208, no. 3, (March 2016), 299-319. On the Japanese response to these efforts, including the nation's militarization and repudiation of the League of Nations and other Anglo-Saxon-led multilateral networks, see Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*, 287-92, 308-9.

actions and views of the individuals abroad conducting those foreign relations. Reflecting on Anglo-Saxonism in the foreign relations and diplomacy of the decades that preceded the Second World War, American journalist and policy advisor Frederick Moore explained his troubles with interpersonal East-West relations: "I had never liked my Occidental people's attitude in the East," he wrote from America in 1942, after more than a decade in East Asia. A contemporary of Keenleyside, Kirkwood, and Marler in Tokyo after 1929, Moore explained that in Japan, as on the East Asian mainland more broadly,

> There were men – many I knew personally – who were models of exemplary conduct. There were the nobler missionary, the honest teacher, the self-sacrificing doctor, the student of what was fine in Asia, the states-man diplomat; since the days of Saint Francis Xavier the West had sent of its best to Asia. But such men had not given the tone that prevailed among the white men. There was the predatory class, the swaggerer, the whiskey addict, and even the opium runner. And these were not only Europeans; I knew Americans in every class, including the last.[75]

The personal philosophies – political or social, and however variously racialized – of a number of representatives of Western nations to East Asia were so often troubling for Moore that, even while his nation waged war against the Empire of Japan, he aimed his criticisms at the racial chauvinism and destructive self-interestedness his government and its Western allies had perpetuated there for decades.[76] To Moore, the men posted to Tokyo were more than their titles and ranks – they were representatives of a global, ascendant, and characteristically white society.[77]

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[75] Frederick Moore, *With Japan's Leaders: An Intimate Record of Fourteen Years as Counsellor to the Japanese Government Ending December 7, 1941* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1942), 304.

[76] As Moore remarked happily: "When [British controlled] Singapore surrendered [to the Japanese], men the world over – in London and Washington as well as Tokyo – said that the day of the white man's supremacy in Asia was done. The end of a notable era had come [. . .] It may be that the white man will never again hold the position of authority he held for a century or more in the East. But if his prestige is gone that will not be bad for the white man." Moore, *With Japan's Leaders,* 304.

[77] While, at the turn of the century, America did have a handful of black representatives abroad – most relevant to this study being the case of Richard Theodore Greener, consul and later commercial agent to Vladivostok from 1898 to 1905 – the presence and acknowledged contributions of non-whites in Western society was, by the interwar period, curtailed by those threatened by social and political heterogeneity. Realizing this threat, structural and organized resistance toward such developments snowballed, and the position of black individuals in the upper levels of the civil service was curtailed. On black American representatives abroad, see Brian Russell Roberts, *Artistic Ambassadors: Literary and International Representations of the New Negro Era* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013); On Richard Theodore Greener, see Ibid., 22-4; and Benjamin R. Justesen, "African-American

In 1929, with the Chinese polity appearing increasingly unstable by western, democratic standards, the unified, rapidly industrializing and militarily-capable Empire of Japan surpassed its mainland neighbour in what observers of political and international histories have since called a "regional restructuring."[78] The imperial capital of Tokyo was, by 1929, the new hub of political relations between nations with interests in East Asia. Certainly, the diplomatic corps of the Japanese capital had existed in official form since the 'opening up' of Japan to foreign trade and relations in the late nineteenth century.[79] The arriving Canadians would therefore need to jockey for position amongst the international powers already established in the city. Describing Tokyo's diplomatic corps of elite foreign representatives, James P. Manion, a junior member of the Trade Commissioner Service who worked alongside the External Affairs staff at the legation, remembered the "peculiar sort of intimacy which is inherent in the semi-colonial atmosphere which such a restricted community then lived."[80] Self-contained and insular, its members stuck together, rarely connecting with the local Japanese communities as the foreign residents engaged in business or missionary work did. Their rigid system of making and returning 'calls' with one another guaranteed that for even the most recent arrival there was "created in short a confraternity ensuring close consultation at all levels of diplomatic life."[81] The diplomatic corps

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Consuls Abroad, 1897-1909," in *Foreign Service Journal* (September, 2004), 75; on the threat of a racially heterogeneous society, as conceived in response to greater and closer contact with the non-white populations of the world by primarily Anglophone, white individuals of authority or influence, see: Lake and Reynolds, especially "Part Four: Challenge and consolidation"; finally, for distinctly (Western) Canadian examples of the racialized response of whites (as well as those of Mackenzie King) in response to the 'challenge' of cohabitation or international and political cooperation with, as well as the provision of naturalized citizenship to non-whites during this period, see Price, *Orienting Canada,* especially "Chapter 1: Prologue to War: Migration, Race, and Empire," and "Chapter 2: China and the Clash of Empires."

[78] Tosh Minohara, Tze-ki Hon, and Evan Dawley, "Introduction," in *The Decade of the Great War: Japan and the Wider World in the 1910s* (Boston: Brill, 2014), 2-3

[79] This opening of Japan directly influenced the end of the Tokugawa shogunate's policy of national isolation. On the role of the diplomat in the this prolonged and far-reaching process of upheavals in Japanese social and political life, see Ernest Mason Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1921).

[80] Upon arrival to this community, a newcomer would have to make a series of calls on members of the established corps by order of their rank and seniority at Tokyo. No official business was to be conducted by these individuals until they had met the necessary and superior representatives of not only his new host nation, but also that of all other officials of equal or greater rank. James P. Manion, *A Canadian Errant: Twenty-Five Years in the Foreign Service* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1960), 24.

[81] By the 1950s, Manion wrote, each "[m]ission plays its cards close to the chest, partially because of a greater consciousness of 'security' and the growing divergences in outlook which so frequently occur in our sad state of cold war tensions." He lamented the passing of an era when open political discussion amongst diplomats was the norm –

thus indulged and protected the elite privilege of the foreign representatives in Tokyo, setting the stage for the three Canadians to perform and project their national, political identities – as they each understood them – alongside the world's leading powers for the very first time.

the very circumstances that gave the three Canadians the room to act and reflect upon diplomacy as individuals, and that thereby provide the historical perspectives necessary for the present study. Manion, *A Canadian Errant,* 24-5.

Chapter 1 – Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside: The Autonomist Academic

The first Canadian diplomatic representative to Japan was Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside who, on 20 May 1929, arrived in Tokyo to establish the Canadian Legation. He was thirty years old and only one year into a career at External when he left for Japan ahead of his minister as the legation's First Secretary and chargé d'affaires. His appointment to Tokyo reflected the interests of Skelton and King in establishing Canada's diplomatic presence in East Asia. It also showed their confidence in Keenleyside's ability, not only to manage the myriad details involved in the opening of the offices but also to officially project an agreeable image of the Dominion and its diplomacy into the region for the first time. While the new legation was an important step for Dominion autonomy in foreign policy, neither the Prime Minister's office nor External was prepared to manage its operations directly. With few instructions from Ottawa and limited means of communication between the capitals, Keenleyside navigated the first four months as head of mission almost entirely on his own. Moreover, with no pre-existing structures of administration on which to rely, Keenleyside's experiences in Tokyo were shaped by his own discretion and individual autonomy in ways unmatched by any other Canadian diplomat up to that point. That September, after all his independent work and with the arrival of his minister as well as his wife and child, Keenleyside adapted the same individual autonomy he used to establish a place for Canada in the Japanese capital to build a life for himself and his family, striking a balance between time spent in and away from the legation and diplomatic corps in Tokyo.

For the delicate task of opening a new mission in a region where, up to 1929, Canadian political interests were managed by British delegates, Keenleyside proved a contentious choice. On the subject of separate, autonomous Dominion representation in foreign relations, his views aligned with Skelton's.[1] His critical view of Canadians' imperialism shaped both his aspirations for the new diplomatic mission and his interpretation of the Liberal government's aspirations. This fact is reflected in Keenleyside's writings about his time in Japan; he was the only one of

[1] Keenleyside had extensive knowledge of Canadian constitutional and legal history. His acute view and analysis of that history informed his argument for Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs. This is nowhere better demonstrated than in his 1949 essay "Canada's Department of External Affairs" in which he outlines how, in the late-twenties, separate Canadian representation abroad was not only necessary, but also a rather simple and logical step in a longer process of political developments in Canada and the British Empire. Keenleyside, "Canada's External Affairs," in *Essays in History and International Relations in Honor of George H. Blakeslee,* ed. Dwight E. Lee and George E. McReynolds (Worcester: Clark University Publications: 1949): 60-82.

Canada's first three diplomats posted to Tokyo to publish an account of his experiences there. Keenleyside's record of the inauguration of Canadian-Japanese diplomatic relations provides an invaluable look into a period and region otherwise obscured for a lack of perspectives of diplomats 'on the ground' in Tokyo. Complemented by a selection of archived letters and interviews, as well as official, diplomatic reports, academic essays, and speeches, Keenleyside's depictions offer the most comprehensive account of the history of diplomatic society and practice in Tokyo after 1929. Moreover, they confirm his personal opinions and processes of identification from this period while indirectly illuminating the motives of his supervisors in the Canadian diplomatic service – namely Marler, Skelton, and King. These sources therefore provide evidence of not only the personal autonomy enjoyed by Keenleyside and his colleagues in the daily operations of the Canadian legation to Tokyo, but also that which allowed the Canadians in Tokyo to act in accordance to their own personal views and politics in the capital and in Japanese society more generally.

In a region with no history of Canadian representation or official, governmental presence, Keenleyside managed not only the institution he was charged with establishing, but also his own personal experience of his host city and society. More specifically, his avoidance of the British delegates and institutions – his rejection of the sole possible source of precedent or instruction for Canada in the Japanese capital – was significant in so far as it freed him to interpret and decide how to present Canada to the international, political community at Tokyo. He ensured that Canadian representation in Japan was separate and autonomous from the beginning. For these reasons, Keenleyside's case offers an instructive starting point for analysis of the circumstances under which he and his colleagues lived and worked after 1929, while at the same time acting as a veritable gauge to make sense of the parallel experiences of Kirkwood and Marler.

Early Life

Hugh Keenleyside was born in Toronto on 7 July 1898. Shortly after his birth, his father, a North American Life Assurance Company employee, was transferred to Vancouver and the family relocated. Thereafter, he lived in the city's West End, amongst the hardly developed neighbourhood's old-growth trees and sparse, wooden structures. Keenleyside was introduced to Chinese and Japanese culture by the burgeoning immigrant communities of Chinatown and 'Japantown' on the opposite side of the city center – the latter a lesser-known settlement of

Japanese workers and families around Powell Street, east of what is now Main Street.[2] Compared to his colleagues at Tokyo, Keenleyside was aware of the real, day-to-day conditions and challenges faced by Japanese and East Asian immigrant populations in Vancouver, as well as the strained labour relations they experienced with the city's white majority. Though only nine years old at the time, he remembered the 1907 anti-Asian riots in that city; from then on he was conscious of the overtly racist, anti-Asian sentiment prevalent in western Canada.

Growing up as an only son with two sisters, Keenleyside was also made aware of the struggles of women in Canadian society. Learning from the experiences of the women in his immediate family, Keenleyside became an advocate for greater gender equity across the various cultures with which he later came into contact.[3] This critical gaze on the structures of power in the world around him, adopted at a young age and honed throughout his early life and education, remained with him, influencing his later politics and actions while a foreign officer at the Canadian legation in Tokyo. He remained a vocal critic of historical as well as contemporary examples of reactionary racism and sexism in Canada for his entire life.[4]

Keenleyside attended the University of British Columbia, graduating in 1920.[5] While still an undergraduate at UBC, Keenleyside met Katherine Hall Pillsbury. They were engaged and moved together to New England where Katherine completed further studies at Simmons College.

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[2] Japantown no longer remains. For discussions of its history, as well as that of Japanese immigration to BC and the reactions of white nativists in and around Vancouver during this period, see Howard Hiroshi Sugimoto, *Japanese Immigration, The Vancouver Riots and Canadian Diplomacy* (New York: Arno Press, 1978); Ken Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991); W. Peter Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); Patricia E. Roy, *A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914,* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989); Roy, *The Oriental Question: Consolidating a White Man's Province, 1914-1941* (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2003); Roy, *The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941-1967* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); and Price, "Orienting the Empire: Mackenzie King and the Aftermath of the 1907 Race" in *BC Studies* no. 156 (winter 2007/8): 53-81.

[3] His memoirs are filled with critical comments of the unjust limitations placed upon women by social or professional 'etiquettes' of the day. Moreover, he himself attributed his attention to the struggles of women in Canadian – and later Japanese – society to his experiences growing up with his family and learning of the women of that family from his mother. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 23-4.

[4] For his efforts in defence of the rights of Asian immigrant populations in Vancouver, and especially for his defence of the rights of those of Japanese descent after 1941, historian John Hilliker argued that Keenleyside was passed over as Under Secretary of State and head of External. Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs,* 240.

[5] During his B.A. he spent a year being trained then stationed overseas after volunteering for service during the First World War. On 11 November, 1918 his battalion was awaiting its orders in north Wales. Keenleyside subsequently returned to Canada having seen no combative role in that conflict. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 124-32.

Meanwhile, Keenleyside studied history at Clark University, obtaining a PhD in 1925. He later published his dissertation as *Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion*.[6] Keenleyside spent the mid-twenties lecturing at Penn State and Brown Universities while still a student. He and Pillsbury were married in BC in 1924 after Keenleyside returned to his adopted hometown of Vancouver to teach at UBC.[7] Becoming "more and more conscious of the complexity of human society and the difficulty of coming to any important and satisfactory conclusions as to what was historically true," he left UBC and the discipline after only two years. He worked in publishing in Toronto before being enticed by the Department of External Affair's call for applicants in 1928.

Keenleyside wrote exams for the positions of first and third secretary. Although each exam was comprised of different questions, the examination processes were identical – so too was the stipulation that the candidate be male.[8] He scored in the top three for both competitions, ranking behind Lester Pearson for the position of first secretary and Kenneth Kirkwood for third. Determined to increase the number of men in External with post-graduate degrees, Skelton and King found Keenleyside – a proven scholar with international experience – a model candidate for the senior position.[9] Moreover, the pair valued Keenleyside's west coast background. He interviewed in the capital and his experience thereafter demonstrated the personal interest and hands-on involvement Mackenzie King had in the Department's hiring process; before offering Keenleyside either of the positions available, King personally met and dined with him. The young historian joined the department in September 1928 as a first secretary. Having witnessed the very tensions that had influenced the earlier government's decision to initiate diplomatic connections with Japan in the first place, Keenleyside was made a de facto specialist on East

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[6] Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion* (New York: A. A. Knopf, Inc., 1929).

[7] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 151-4.

[8] "Civil Service of Canada: Civil Service Positions," Kenneth Porter Kirkwood fonds, MG27 III E 3, Vol. 28, File 17, LAC. Women were not permitted to be foreign service officers until 1971. On the exclusion of women from diplomatic positions within the Department of External Affairs, a rule upheld until 1971, see: Weiers, *Women of the Canadian Foreign Service*, 2-5.

[9] As John English demonstrates: "In Skelton's fifteen years as under-secretary, thirty-one of this forty officers had postgraduate degrees from universities outside Canada." John English, *Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson, Volume One: 1897-1948* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Limited, 1989), 148. For more on these early years of External with its newest 'class' of young officers, see: Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific,* 32-3; Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 233-44; Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1,* 120-125.

Asia while at Ottawa.[10] After spending the fall and early winter working in Ottawa on a variety of assignments, he was approached by Skelton on the subject of Canada's impending diplomatic mission to Tokyo.

Before departing for Japan, Keenleyside visited the Washington legation. There he realized which aspects of Canadian society and policy were "valuable in emphasizing," meanwhile noting which practises his colleagues in Tokyo "should avoid rather than emulate." Keenleyside noted that the Washington mission suffered for its minister Vincent Massey's despondency – he felt that Massey was more interested in socializing than managing the legation staff. Moreover, the office appeared disorganized and inefficient.[11] These observations strengthened his own values and views of how diplomacy should be conducted. An effective mission, Keenleyside decided, would represent the nation to all levels of local society, meanwhile maintaining orderly and responsive administration. The former initiative directed Keenleyside's management of the Tokyo legation's accessibility and image – aspects of its operations which resembled community outreach. To ensure the new legation ran with order and efficiency, Keenleyside prepared a rigorous filing system (which, he was proud to note, was in use there until at least the 1960s), challenged himself to acknowledge all correspondence within 48-hours or less, and prepared plans for an office space more utilitarian than gaudy.[12] Furthermore, he became all the more resolute in his belief that alcohol was a wasteful use of tax payers' dollars. This view was undoubtedly influenced by his and Katherine's own adherence to strict abstinence from alcohol throughout this period. As his colleagues liked to note, this

[10] Reflecting on the demographics of his own application cycle, as well as the many subsequent ones he administered, Keenleyside explained: "Time after time our examining boards found applicants from Ontario and Quebec who had visited the eastern United States, Britain, France, and other European countries but knew little of the Maritimes and nothing of the West. [. . .] Most of the candidates from the central provinces were young people with exceptional intellectual, social, and in many instances, financial resources, but apparently they saw nothing incongruous in seeking to represent abroad the country about which they knew or apparently cared so little. And yet central Canadians wonder why the West and the Maritimes so often seem disaffected!" Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 224.

[11] Canada's Minister to America in 1928 was Vincent Massey. Keenleyside recalled him to be "the essence of courtesy and kindness" though "not very greatly concerned with the kinds of problems with which the legation staff was required to deal." Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 247-8.

[12] See: Ibid., 279, 281; Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1,* 122.

practice brought with it a nickname from those who paid visit to Keenleyside's drink-free office and home: "Canada Dry," a name derived from his favourite alternative to alcohol.[13]

Recording History as a National Representative

Keenleyside carefully documented his experiences in Tokyo. After departing Vancouver for Tokyo in May, 1929, he kept a journal.[14] As he later explained, the journal was "to serve as a safety valve" for opinions or feelings that might compromise the image of the nation and institution he represented. As the first Canadian with diplomatic authority in Tokyo, Keenleyside took very seriously the "necessity of avoiding any public expression of too candid or emphatic views on people or events, especially Japanese people or events."[15] Voiced expressions of his personal views were from then on restricted to house, family, and diary. Only there could he speak and act entirely on his own behalf, he thought. At all other times Keenleyside saw himself as symbol of Canadian government and autonomy, a public figure performing for foreign observers a newfound national image in place of the persistent and formerly mainstream imperial or colonial identities.

Together with his conceptions of Canadian national identity, autonomy, and nationalism, Keenleyside's own processes of identification were intrinsic to his role as first secretary and chargé d'affaires of the Tokyo legation. Canada, he thought, much like its Commonwealth counterparts around the world, was comprised of its own distinct cultures, languages, and politics. In his mind, its nationhood was the product of its people and their own social and political development. For these reasons, Keenleyside believed that there could be no "single voice" in foreign affairs for the entirety of the Commonwealth, and that separate and autonomous representation abroad for each of its member states was not only appropriate but in fact necessary.[16] Also necessary was the abolition of all prior forms of British domination over its former territories and subjects. He saw Canada's relation to England as a voluntary union of

[13] He thought that alcohol should only be included in a mission's hospitality budget under the most unavoidable of circumstances. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 237. Kirkwood, *The Diplomat at Table*, 224-5; James Langley, "Early Days in the Life of a Trade Commissioner's Family," in *Bout de Papier* Vol. 11, No. 3 (fall 1994), 24; Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 16.

[14] While not available to present researchers, important sections of it appear reprinted and integrated into Keenleyside's lengthy memoirs.

[15] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 261.

[16] Keenleyside, "Race, Colour and the Commonwealth," speech delivered 1961, HLK fonds Vol. 28, File 60, LAC.

sovereign states capable of separate unilateral decisions in domestic as well as external affairs. This conceptualization of Canada's place within the new, decentralized British Commonwealth guided him in his determined efforts to expand Dominion independence abroad and anticipated the developments which followed the Statute of Westminster.

His understanding of Liberal party aspirations for Canadian foreign policy similarly informed his actions. According to Keenleyside, the legation was not only an experiment in foreign policy with legal, constitutional implications for the wider Commonwealth – it was also the result of King's personal interests. Keenleyside respected King's appreciation for trade potential in Japan. Finally, the diplomatic mission was seen as bridge into China, a somewhat more slowly developing market of immeasurably larger potential.[17] He therefore understood the importance of economics and immigration, two issues which, following Marler's arrival that fall, busied him the most. Keenleyside knew firsthand the need for an immigration policy limiting the number of Japanese landing on British Columbian shores, at least superficially, in order to appease racist calls for a complete ban on Asian immigration.[18] Most of all, however, he appreciated the power of individual affinities and tastes. Keenleyside recalled that King's visit to the Japanese capital after the Vancouver riots in 1907 made Tokyo the East Asian city most familiar to the prime minister. Himself struck by a lifelong affinity for Tokyo and its surrounding area after 1929, Keenleyside sympathized with a Prime Minister who had "brought his personal influence to bear on the matter" of opening the third Canadian legation – his flagship mission in the pacific – in Tokyo rather than Shanghai, Peking or the Nationalist Party's (Kuomintang) recently established capital at Nanjing. He understood how Tokyo and Japan's natural beauty could influence the views of a Canadian.[19]

Early Work in Tokyo

With all of Skelton and King's confidence came freedoms of decision making and management of the legation's operations in the first months before Marler's arrival. Keenleyside was able to

[17] As he explained it, "By 1932 or '33 we expected to have a Legation in China." "The Keenleyside Interview (1977)," Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, Box 9, File 1, McMaster University Library Archives.

[18] This amounted to their upholding on the Gentleman's Agreement and ensuring that no more than 150 Japanese left for Canada in a year. As Kirkwood noted elsewhere, however, "in light of the ensuing depression [. . .] the number of Japanese applicants [for visas] never reached this figure." Kirkwood, "Diplomatic Diary: Canadian Legation, Tokio, I. 1929-1930," note appended to the 14 July 1929 entry, KPK Fonds, vol. 2, LAC.

[19] "The Keenleyside Interview (1977)," KHP fonds, MULA.

apply his own personal knowledge and experiences to the circumstances of Canada's representation in Tokyo. With "no instructions beyond Skelton's advice to use his head and, if difficulties arose, to consult Ottawa by cable," historian John Hilliker argues that Keenleyside acted "according to his inclinations" as chargé d'affaires, seeking, for example, "to establish rather greater distance from the British embassy at the start of operations than had been done in Washington or Paris."[20] This freedom did come with its downfalls, however. He soon expressed frustrations over Ottawa's apparent lack of interest in replying to the legation's many letters and cables.[21] Although he did check with Ottawa for guidance in turning down Sir John Tilley's offer to be received as the British Ambassador's guest at Tokyo, Keenleyside thereafter acted of his own volition, taking King and Skelton's first instructions to avoid close association with the British to heart and applying similar discretion through the coming summer.[22] The Canadian government, he reasoned, "felt it important to ensure from the start that neither the Japanese nor London should be allowed to feel that our legation was in any way subject to the authority of the British legation."[23] This became the guiding principle of Keenleyside's public and professional role in Tokyo. Far outnumbering him, however, the British embassy staff was irregularly involved in the early meetings and arrangements following Keenleyside's disembarking at the bay of Tokyo. Their presence and offers of assistance, however benevolent or apolitical they might have been, nevertheless tested his rigid interpretation of Skelton's vague instructions to keep away and emphasize separateness of missions.[24]

The spring and summer months of 1929 were thus entirely Keenleyside's own. It was during his time as chargé d'affaires that Keenleyside hosted an event which proved to be the most symbolic and memorable display to date of Canadian national identity and distinctiveness in any part of East Asia. On 1 July 1929, the Canadian ensign was raised and a recording of 'O

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[20] Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1,* 122.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Rather than stay within the British compound, Keenleyside rented rooms at the Imperial Hotel for himself and clerical secretary Nancy Baird. Keenleyside, Charge d'Affaires of the Canadian Legation in Tokyo to William Lyon Mackenzie King, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 May, 1929, Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside fonds, MG 31, E 102, Vol. 20, File 12, LAC.

[23] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 264.

[24] His reluctant dependency on British advice and contacts in his first week at Tokyo tested Keenleyside's own resolve and desire to be seen as independent; as he required their introductions while making his first rounds amongst the diplomatic corps, Keenleyside redoubled his resolve to never again rely on the British ambassadorial staff for any favours. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 266-7.

Canada' was played as a number of Canadian and Japanese attended for the first time an official event hosted by an official representative of the Canadian government to Japan.[25] An example of his motivation and, indeed, his personal desire to promote Canada abroad, Keenleyside's Dominion Day celebrations were characteristic of the pride and professionalism he demonstrated as the legation's first secretary in the years that followed. He adopted these practises by becoming a public figure outside of the office, participating in the associations of Canadian missionaries, teachers, and entrepreneurs. As Meehan notes, Keenleyside's repeated displays of tact in the promotion of Canadian national imagery impressed and pleased Skelton.[26]

Provided a blank canvas and freedom to do as he pleased, Keenleyside exercised his autonomy in action by emphasizing Canadian sovereignty and national identity to both Japanese and international observers in Tokyo. Whereas the Paris and Washington missions had evolved from previous, smaller operations into fully fledged legations, the Tokyo mission was an entirely new venture. Keenleyside recognized this opportunity and made the claim for Canadian autonomy in operations and representation at the earliest possible opportunity.[27] He chose the first offices himself and while announcing its location and name refused the British suggestion that he introduce the institution as "la Légation du Gouvernment de sa Majesté Britannique au Canada." He opted instead for the more succinct "la Légation du Canada," a decision he justified with the (inevitably correct) belief that Skelton would not disapprove.[28]

The offices he selected were located in the Nagai compound, an international neighbourhood just north of Shibuya Station in what was then a quiet area on the edge of central Tokyo. With a residency on their second floor, he believed the building to be suitable for Marler's September arrival. Ultimately, Keenleyside's tastes did not match with his minister's and, upon their arrival, rather than move in directly upon arrival to the Japanese capital, Herbert Meredith and Beatrice Isabel Marler went to the Imperial Hotel while the residence was brought

[25] Keenleyside's account is found in *Hammer the Golden Day,* 276-7. See also, Meehan's take on the importance of the event, as well as its history as documented at the time and remembered officially by the Department's historians: Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 2, 5, 19.
[26] Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 19.
[27] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 247.
[28] As he told Mackenzie King, more than a week after making the decision: "I trust that the wording of these communications will meet with your approval." Keenleyside to King, 30 May, 1929, HLK fonds, MG 31, E 102, Vol. 20, File 12, LAC.

up to their standards.[29] The minister's otherwise smooth and tactful transition into his newly established post alongside the long since established British presence, however, can be attributed to Keenleyside's determined efforts to present Canada as separate. The first secretary prided himself on this accomplishment and he worked hard to utilize the connections he had established that summer to ensure Marler's early public appearances reflected the distance and balance of his legation's relationship with the British authorities.[30] Keenleyside's connections with Canadian residents of Japan provided him with resources to ensure that balance. He was always prepared to ensure a Canadian audience for his minister's public appearances, projecting the image of a strong sense of nationhood, even on the opposite side of the Pacific.

Inequalities, Critical Perspectives, and Lasting Relationships

Of his own Canadian identity, Keenleyside was unabashedly proud. Meanwhile, he maintained a critical eye turned inward, demonstrating in his letters and in his personal and published writings an awareness of his own privilege as a white, male Canadian.[31] He was in part motivated to write his memoirs by his perception that, as a civil servant in the Department of External Affairs, he had participated in work that was, "in its *objectives* at least, [. . .] worthy of approval." This, he said, "assuaged to some degree the strings of conscience" that made him wonder about his own "entitlement to the luxuries of life when so many others of equal or greater desert have suffered" for poverty and want.[32] He expressed a desire to affect change and improve the lives of those who struggled on the margins of society in a way that few other diplomats in the early-twenties – his colleagues at Tokyo included – ever did. His class and gender consciousness influenced his motivation to expand his role as a public figure while abroad, leading him to interact with associations and individuals across a wide spectrum of society.

Of the three Canadian diplomats, Keenleyside had the closest and most constant connection with the Japanese public during his posting to Tokyo. On his evenings and weekends,

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[29] Marler, *Marler: Four Generations of a Quebec Family* (Montreal, QC: Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, Price-Patterson Ltd., 1987), 119.

[30] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 283.

[31] He demonstrated this in the introduction to the first volume of his memoirs, writing that the "evils from which so many human beings have suffered have been for most of us [Canadians] events to be imagined or viewed from afar, rather than lived experience. In a true sense most Canadians, though certainly not all, have enjoyed first-class tickets through life." Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 10 (emphasis in the original).

[32] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 10.

he mixed with many Canadian missionaries and teachers, many of whom had already lived and worked in Japan for decades by 1929. Attending meetings held by the YMCA, entrepreneurs, as well as teachers and missionaries' associations, Hugh and Katherine Keenleyside learned about Japanese culture and society from Canadians who lived, taught, proselytised, and traded across rural Japan as well as occupied Korea and Taiwan. Many of them spoke Japanese. It was through them that Keenleyside was introduced to the array of cultures and conditions spread throughout the archipelago. "As a member of the staff of the Canadian legation and a representative of my country abroad," he wrote to his Japanese publisher, "I was given an enviable opportunity [. . .] to observe notable and varied aspects of Japanese life through contact with many members of the business, military, educational, and government communities."[33] Recognizing the value of these contacts' knowledge of Japanese culture and society – indeed, at times appreciating them over the appointed political and economic delegates who remained largely ignorant of actual social and political conditions there – Keenleyside utilized them in his official work for the legation and while navigating public life in Japan. When on fact-finding missions, such as those to Korea and Manchuria, for example, he benefitted from their intimate relations with locals when making his reports. Meanwhile, when vacationing with his wife and children, his family was afforded a more humble, private experience with good company and quiet reprieve from the incessant business and formalities of the diplomatic community.

As the only diplomatic secretary openly critical of the discriminatory policies of many of the western nations, Keenleyside's accounts of his first years at Tokyo are interspersed with episodes of disagreement with the racist views of his (usually senior) colleagues across the Canadian, British, and American diplomatic services.[34] Keenleyside sympathized with Japanese officials who repeatedly lambasted the racist, exclusionist immigration policies of Canada,

[33] These individuals also allowed him to extend his "knowledge of the characteristics of the people of the villages and countryside through walking trips and both winter and summer holidays" with his family. Letter from Iwasaki Tsutomu to Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside, 28 September, 1983, HLK fonds, Vol. 20, File 7, LAC.

[34] The most volatile of these episodes followed Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria, as well as their subsequent and violent expansion on that continent. Marler, whose views on these incidents fluctuated constantly between appeasement – then the British policy in response to Japanese aggression – and those akin to Keenleyside's condemnation. In moments when the minister was, according to Keenleyside, so obsessed with keeping the Japanese government happy so as to continue profitable trade, any critical analysis of Japan's aggressions was written off by the minister as "too 'anti-Japanese." Keenleyside, journal entry, 6 November 1931, reprinted in Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 404-5.

Australia, and America.[35] He was critical of views of natural or innate racial superiority, rejecting the tendencies of the older English (and, by extension, Canadian) imperialists to look down upon "the lesser breeds" and "lower classes."[36]

Seeing firsthand the factories, mines, and fields of East Asia had a deep impact on Keenleyside's already sympathetic views towards the world's labouring or impoverished populations. His perceptions of the conditions facing the working classes of Japan stuck with him after these years. He published his second book on the education system in Japan in 1937, thereafter giving a number of speeches on the subject in Canada.[37] For his engagement with people of varied economic backgrounds, Keenleyside distinguished himself from his colleagues as an individual who was conscious of the people and society around him. Later in life, while assisting historian Klaus Pringsheim with his manuscript on the history of a century of Canadian-Japanese relations, Keenleyside made sure to highlight the civil injustices faced by the Japanese in Canada throughout the early twentieth century. He also encouraged the author to resist criticisms emanating from External's Historical Department regarding the history of racial prejudice in domestic as in foreign Canadian policy.[38]

Despite never learning Japanese – having been assured by External before his departure for Tokyo that he would only be there for six months, he decided not to devote serious time to studying – Keenleyside made and maintained relationships with a number of high-level Japanese government officials during his stay.[39] In this regard, his private life in Tokyo represents yet another stark departure from the rather isolated experiences of Marler and Kirkwood, whose personal relationships with native residents of the city and nation extended no further than their

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[35] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 126. By the mid-century, Keenleyside publicly criticised even the usage of the word 'race' to describe individual- or groups of peoples. See Keenleyside, "Race, Colour and the Commonwealth."

[36] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 250.

[37] Keenleyside, *The Spirit of Japanese Education* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1937). See also "The Education of Girls in Japan," speech delivered 1937, HLK fonds, Vol. 27, File 19, LAC.

[38] Keenleyside to Pringsheim, 29 March, 1978; Pringsheim to Keenleyside, 7 June, 1978; The pair remained in close contact with one another in the last decades of the century as each compiled their respective memoirs, exchanging and comparing pre- and post-war observations of East Asia and the Pacific world, united in their efforts to expose and critique racism in Canadian society past and present. Keenleyside to Pringsheim, 9 June, 1978, KHP fonds, Box 3, File 13, MULA.

[39] While he attempted to study Japanese in his first months there, he never acquired a "real knowledge of the language at all," and instead chose to rely entirely on interpreters on staff at the legation. "The Keenleyside Interview (1977)," KHP fonds, MULA.

housekeepers and cooks. Indeed, as he recalled in his memoirs, "[n]ext to the pleasures of exploring the Japanese countryside and becoming acquainted with its people and their ways, the most important activities of our [he and Katherine's] years in Japan come from our contacts with officials of the government and leaders in the worlds of business and the professions."[40] Most notable of his relationships with Japanese elites were those shared with Yoshida Shigeru and Prince Chichibu. Both continue to enjoy powerful and lasting legacies in Japan. Yoshida is remembered as the creator of Japan's more liberal pre- and post-war foreign policies and for orchestrating his country's recovery from that conflict while Prime Minister 1946 to 1947 and 1948 to 1954. Chichibu was the Emperor Taisho's second son and his role as purveyor of Anglo-Japanese and Western-Japanese exchange has not been forgotten. Returning to Japan to visit in 1951, Keenleyside was the guest of Yoshida Shigeru, then Prime Minister, who remembered and contacted him, insisting that he visit his home as his personal guest.[41] On the occasion of Prince Chichibu's early death, Keenleyside was asked to provide a chapter for publication in a commemorative collection.[42]

Diplomacy and Work under Herbert Marler

As his minister remained resolutely interested in transpacific trade after 1929, much of Keenleyside's work within the legation related to reports on economic and industrial conditions in Japan and its empire. His connections with Japanese and Canadian industrialists, entrepreneurs, and public figures in Japan and East Asia helped Keenleyside survey the economic conditions there for Marler and External. While Marler appreciated the first secretary's reporting, the pair's conflicting views regarding the most fundamental aspects of diplomatic practice – observance of etiquette and formalities, for example – caused a number of disagreements between them. The first of these conflicts came when Keenleyside's learned of the minister's plan to outfit his staff in the British diplomatic uniform tradition. The feathered hat, together with an "implausible" sword, tested Keenleyside's patience and aggravated his preference for modesty in presentation and

[40] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 297.
[41] "The Keenleyside Interview (1977)," KHP fonds, MULA.
[42] In commemorating the late Prince Chichibu, Keenleyside worked closely with Herbert Norman, then Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand, to write of the two Canadian's experiences with the royal son. See: Toshio Maeda to Keenleyside, 3 July, 1954, HLK fonds, Vol. 20, File 11, LAC; Keenleyside to E. H. Norman, 16 September, 1954, in Ibid.

appearances. Although he acquiesced to his minister's demands and did purchase the suit, it remained his most memorable example of the difference of opinions amongst Canadian diplomats as to their rightful image and behaviours from this period.[43] As he did not censure himself when writing, entertaining sketches of these differences of opinion and character between minister and first secretary are spread across a number of the pages of his memoirs.[44] To these descriptions, Marler's son Howard replied in 1986 that "savagely critical" views of his father stemmed from Keenleyside's misreading of the minister's "demanding attention to detail and his devotion to perfection in all his actions as arrogant pomposity."[45]

Keenleyside's modesty and humility were only amplified by the presence of his pompous, arrogant Minister. The pair's contrasting values did however benefit the legation as an institution seeking to establish a place and identity amongst international powers in Tokyo. With the British already long since established amongst the diplomatic corps at Tokyo, Marler's ability to indulge the more ceremonial delegates with his own ostentations and patrician manners pleased high members of the imperial court or diplomatic community. Meanwhile, in times when the minister's actions appeared unsympathetic or gaudy, Keenleyside's approachability and humility evened things out. Invariably, their disagreements carried on behind closed doors.

In keeping with the subject of his PhD dissertation and first book, Keenleyside's views were defined largely by Canada's position in relation to The United States. He thus experienced several more conflicts of opinion regarding Japanese militarism and the appropriate Canadian position and response to it, as Marler's views leaned much more consistently in favour of British policies.[46] This too, however, had a balancing effect as Marler's distrust of American business culture, together with his affinity for Victorianisms, kept his attention diverted. Nevertheless,

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[43] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 256.

[44] Much like they do in the pages of some of Marler's later colleagues. See: Manion, *A Canadian Errant;* Charles Ritchie, *The Siren Years: A Canadian Diplomat Abroad, 1937-1945* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974).

[45] Such "cutting remarks and unkind anecdotes" – referring to Marler as humourless and 'ivory from the neck up,' for example – "should be forgiven as an expression of intolerant youth in conflict with a more measured and mature approach to form and manner" his son argued, defending his father from sixty year old criticisms. "Fortunately for them," he snapped, "their superiors were more charitable, and their careers and future were fostered by those whom they themselves derided." Marler, *Marler,* 143, 173.

[46] See, for example, Meehan, "From Ally to Menace: Canadian Attitudes and Policies toward Japanese Imperialism, 1929-1939," PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2000; and Meehan, "Steering Clear of Great Britain: Canada's Debate over Collective Security in the Far Eastern Crisis of 1937" in *The International History Review* Vol. 25, No. 2 (2002): 253-304.

Keenleyside, always separating work from the personal aspects of his life, remembered his former minister as a generally "kind, appreciative, and generous man."[47]

Conclusion

While legation first secretary, Keenleyside mixed regularly with his fellow diplomats in the Japanese capital. Despite his austere attitude toward luxuries and excess, socializing amongst the diplomatic corps at Tokyo was neither a distraction nor a wasteful practise, he insisted. He and his colleagues at Tokyo "enjoyed an occasional official function." Nevertheless, it was, he maintained, "difficult to recall anyone who would have put such events high on his list of priorities."[48] With two children and a still growing family in Tokyo, Keenleyside balanced his social calendar with other, household responsibilities; while his younger colleague Kenneth Kirkwood attended the opera and theatre, Keenleyside travelled exploring the local mountains and coastline. His memoirs are filled with descriptions of the sights and sounds of the Japanese countryside then so easily accessed by short jaunts from central Tokyo. With him in nearly all of these trips was his wife and, whenever possible, his children.[49] Besides spending time with his family, he had numerous obligations to various sporting teams and associations – another practice which filled Keenleyside's time away from the office and distinguished him from his two legation colleagues.[50]

The freedoms afforded to Keenleyside by Skelton and King's confidence, together with the absence of any precedents for Canadian representation in Tokyo, allowed him to claim for himself and for the legation an autonomous space in which to live and work. Moreover, with the arrival of his young family and his general disinterest in alcohol or high culture – two central features of diplomatic practice in Tokyo in 1929 – he found fulfilment in a schedule he balanced with a public role in the diplomatic corps by day and a private life he built around his family and

[47] Keenleyside's many pointed criticisms of Marler revolved around his obsession with appearances which, owing to his humble, Methodist upbringing, Keenleyside simply could not identify with. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 290. For his seemingly unending anguish over appearances and workaholic tendencies, however, Keenleyside elsewhere remembered his former minister with what he called a "personal sympathy." Keenleyside to Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, 14 January, 1982, HLK fonds, MG 31 E 102, Vol.1, File 19, LAC.

[48] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 232.

[49] See Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* especially chapter 11: "Life Abroad."

[50] Keenleyside played in net when the Canadians around Tokyo answered the local university students' challenge for a game of ice hockey. Manion, *A Canadian Errant,* 33.

a few close friends on evenings and weekends. His individual freedoms thus extended beyond the office and beyond the position to which King and Skelton had appointed him. Although he knew little of "the way people lived" in Japan before his appointment, during his first years there he sought connections with people outside the diplomatic corps of Tokyo. It was in these moments that he realized the aspects of his Japanese experience that would have the deepest and most lasting effect on him. For all his achievements in opening Canada's first diplomatic mission in the Pacific world, and for establishing it with such unprecedented levels of autonomy from Britain, it was his experiences amongst the natural geography and tranquil environments surrounding Tokyo that he remembered most warmly for the remainder of his life. In his accounts of those years, he reflected numerous times on the impressiveness of the environments – urban, as well as rural – that he visited. One exemplary description is found in a 1977 interview. In it, he explained:

> One of my happier recollections of Tokyo and Japan is of the beauty of its natural environment, and of a mood and an atmosphere such as would be evoked by a moonlit summer night with a cool breeze, and as the crickets chirp you hear the sound of a lone *shakukachi* (flute) drifting over from a nearby house.[51]

Perhaps most importantly, however, Keenleyside's experiences in Tokyo are demonstrative of matters that extend far beyond his individual case. They help us understand the processes of political, international, and interpersonal exchanges undertaken at Tokyo by his contemporaries and colleagues. As the first Canadian diplomat to Japan and author of the only published firsthand account of the legation's earliest months and years, his insights provide the background against which the experiences of Marler and Kirkwood are best situated and understood. His politics, modesty, and connectedness in Japan were, after the fall of 1929, a benefit to both of his (comparatively self-absorbed and conflicted) Canadian colleagues at the Tokyo legation. Keenleyside was thus at once the founder and the foundation of Canadian representation in the Japanese capital, East Asia, and the greater Pacific world. It is only because of his work across the late spring and summer of 1929 that the institution was able to provide its diplomats the freedom from the influences which had for so long relegated the interests of Canada – and the Canadians charged with representing it – to the periphery of international relations. By the time he met his colleagues at the docks on the Bay of Tokyo in September,

[51] The Keenleyside Interview (1977)" KHP fonds, MULA.

1929, he had already cleared the way for them to pursue an autonomous role for themselves, meanwhile furthering just such a role for their nation. The divergent experiences of Marler and Kirkwood, each demonstrative of important aspects of individual as well as collective, national aspects of political and social forces in Canada, were made possible by Keenleyside's work in 1929.

Chapter 2 – Herbert Meredith Marler: The Conflicted Imperialist-Nationalist

Through his experiences as Canadian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan from 1929, Herbert Meredith Marler personified the paradoxes of Canada's first diplomatic venture into East Asia. Furthermore, the distinct processes of identification Marler brought with him and employed in his role as minister in Tokyo reflected divergent sets of interests then prevalent within elite, Anglophone Canadian society. Steeped in historical conceptions of citizenship and empire, Marler – together with a number of Canada's established elites – faced the challenge of renegotiating his social and political positions in response to new streams of autonomism and nationalism in Canada. Throughout this period, he retained an appreciation for empire and Great Britain engrained in him by the elite Anglophone circles of Montreal in which he had grown up. The conflicted nature of his imperialism was thereby indicative of aspects of the late-Victorian period that still lingered in 1929. Nevertheless, in performing his role as the first Canadian minister to Japan, Marler was a purveyor of Canadian autonomy in international affairs and a trailblazer for the very causes that undermined his own claims to traditional forms of authority and privilege. In the fall of 1929, as Herbert Marler assumed his role as the first Canadian Minister to Japan, a conflicted, dualistic identity went on display for the eyes of Canada, the Commonwealth, and the world. Meanwhile, as a representative of Canadian state and society in Japan, he projected the image of an emergent nation still grappling with its own conflicted identity.

Although he derived his status and privilege from his English, imperialist background, Marler's mission in Tokyo was not always congruent with this identity. In representing Canada amongst foreign powers at Tokyo, he spoke and worked entirely in the name of Canadian interests. When challenged by multilateral politics, however, he proved himself enduringly British in his preferences. Nevertheless, he rarely distinguished between these two seemingly conflicting loyalties. Nor did he relegate one or the other to the private areas of his life. He kept no separate personal or professional sphere for himself as minister. Instead, Marler moved at once between the two 'sides' of his life with each of these loyalties in tow, unbothered by their inherent contradictions. Indeed, his own ability to demonstrate and embody Canadian autonomism abroad, while at once espousing imperial unity and the prosperity and predominance of the English crown, exemplified the unique individual freedoms afforded him as an elite, appointed citizen and subject in Tokyo. Given this freedom, he was able to escape pressures to

abandon either his appreciation for empire or his government's push for Dominion political autonomy.

Perceptions of his self, together with those of the nation-state and society he represented, illuminate the ways Marler performed a narrowly conceptualized form of one emergent Canadian national identity on the global stage.[1] Moreover, as his own presence in Tokyo symbolized a hitherto unprecedented level of Canadian autonomy in foreign relations, assessments of his actions originating from within and beyond the legation – including Marler's own self-reflection – demonstrate the diversity of critical, popular conceptions of Canada's place in the world after 1929. Thus, Marler's life and work in Tokyo exemplify how Canadian interwar foreign policy in East Asia involved not only national politics, but also the thoughts, decisions, and actions of the individuals informing that policy.

Early Life

Herbert Meredith Marler was born 7 March 1876 in Montreal, Quebec. The son of a successful notary and professor of law, Marler graduated from the Montreal High School and received a degree in civil law from McGill University before joining his father's practice.[2] Through his father William de Montmollin, a man who had himself derived wealth and authority from lands inherited from his own father, Marler enjoyed all connections and memberships to the city's most powerful people, associations, and clubs.[3] In addition to his many professional achievements in Montreal society, he married Beatrice Isabel Allan, a descendant of Andrew Allan and Matthew

[1] This national identity lacked regard for the large number of diverse ethnic and social groups residing in Canada. Women, non-Christians, and non-whites were neither represented within the political ranks of External, nor were they the subjects of much discussion (official or otherwise) by its officers in Tokyo. The Canada these men (and Marler, in particular) represented was thus one narrow slice of the individuals who in fact inhabited that land.

[2] Marler enjoyed the fruits of his father and grandfather's ascendancy from birth. The year he was born, his mother and father regularly sat for portraits at the Notman photography studio in Montreal, then a practice and marker of wealth and status. Herbert Meredith appears in the photography archives numerous times across the early years of his life, a reminder of his family's wealth as well as their desire to leave behind an impressive recorded, visual legacy. These numerous images are housed in the Notman Photographic Archives at the McCord Museum in Montreal.

[3] For more on Marler's life in Quebec, as well as the Marler men who came before him, see Meehan, "Herbert Marler: The Tokyo Legation and Canada's Pacific Debut, 1929-1936," in *Architects and Innovators*, 111-3; Eber H. Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler and the Canadian Legation in Tokyo," in *Canada and Japan in The Twentieth Century*, 75-84; and Jason Butters, "Sir Herbert Meredith Marler: The Life and Lineage of a Montreal Patrician," in *Past Tense: Graduate Review of History* Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2016): 38-66.

Hamilton Gault, two of nineteenth-century Canada's most eminent capitalists.[4] With his marriage into the Allan family, Marler expanded his own social standing and authority by building upon privilege endowed to him by his father. From 1921 to 1925, while a Liberal Member of Parliament, he became close with William Lyon Mackenzie King, developing a friendship that would later benefit him in his pursuit of still more prestige. These achievements elevated not only his personal status, but also that of a lineage now representative of a multi-generational patrician family.[5]

Further solidifying his patrician status, Marler purchased and cultivated real estate across southern Quebec. The centrepiece of these efforts was his Grantham Hall estate in Drummondville, constructed at the very site where his grandfather had founded the Marler family legacy by initiating his professional ascent. He envisioned the property as a "base" from which future generations of Marler men – thereafter becoming a part of what he called a "dynasty" – would "continue to build the family fortunes." Remembering the estate, Marler's son described it as "England transported to a remote corner of a new land."[6] Together with his Senneville and Square Mile manors, the properties represented their proprietor's appreciation for

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[4] Andrew Allan prospered alongside his family members in the steamship and cargo business. Matthew Hamilton Gault was founder of the Sun Life Assurance Company. See Gordon Burr, "Allan, Andrew," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography,* vol. 13 (Toronto and Laval: University of Toronto/Universite Laval, 2003), accessed 25 August, 2016, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/allan_andrew_13E.html.; Gladys Barbara Pollack and Gerald J. J. Tulchinsky, "Gault, Mathew Hamilton," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography,* vol. 11 (Toronto and Laval: University of Toronto/Universite Laval, 1982), accessed 25 August, 2016, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/gault_mathew_hamilton_11E.html.; Beatrice Isabel Marler died in Montreal in 1968. "Lady Marler," obituary, *Montreal Gazette,* 18 July, 1968, 35.

[5] It was during William de Montmollin Marler's lifetime that Montreal surpassed Quebec City as the economic center of Lower Canada. William de Montmollin's management of both property and career accelerated his ascension at this crucial time. As land was being commutated to Freehold tenure in the wake of the abolition of the seigneurial system, he profited from his own holdings and those of the Sulpicians of Montreal who held the rights to the entire island of Montreal. As their highest paid notary, William de Montmollin directed the commutation and sales of much of their. On this process and the impact of the seminary's status and wealth on the course of Montreal history then and after, see: Brian Young, *In Its Corporate Capacity: the Seminary of Montreal as a Business Institution, 1816-1876* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press).

[6] Marler, *Marler*, 82, 85-6. Other estates included an impressive manor on Montreal's Redpath Crescent in the city's 'Golden Square Mile,' as well as a "colonial style" estate at Senneville. Ibid., 104. The Redpath Crescent and Senneville structures remain standing today – the Drummondville estate later became a part of the Drummondville Golf and Country Club's facilities. Martin Bergevin, "Le Club de golf de Drummondville," *La Société D'Histoire de Drummond Défraie la Chronique,* May 29, 2014, accessed December 1, 2014, http://www.histoiredrummond.com/Chroniques/le-club-degolf-de-drummondville; Meehan, "Herbert Marler: The Tokyo Legation and Canada's Pacific Debut, 1929-1936," 111. On earlier examples of this practise of bringing "an English noble aesthetic to Lower Canada," see Colin M. Coates, *The Metamorphoses of Landscape and Community in Early Quebec* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 146-51.

family heritage, imposing architecture, the English value and prestige of landed wealth, as well as the cultivation of one's outward appearance and image. Although he tried his best to reproduce these impressions in Japan, it took several years and hundreds of thousands of dollars to purchase the appropriate land and erect the structures he saw fit.[7] Nevertheless, as in Montreal, Marler produced a structural, material legacy – the legation building and minister's residence he constructed at Tokyo in 1933 remains the home of the Canadian Ambassador today.[8]

Accepting King's appointment as Canada's first Minister to Japan in 1929, Marler eclipsed the reach and authority of his patrician predecessors, expanding his privilege beyond the local and even national level, projecting it onto the global stage of high, international diplomacy. By the 1930s – the last decade of his life[9] – Herbert Marler was one of only a handful of Canadian-born patricians to have successfully made such a transition.[10] His experiences at Tokyo from 1929 to 1933 represent the high-water mark and coda in the history of Quebec patrician authority.[11] From then on, the influence and authority enjoyed by Marler and his patrician

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[7] Privately, Marler admitted that if "the average Canadian" could see the residences they now filled, he and his wife would "look like two very foolish people" for "giving up our two very beautiful houses in Canada and coming out to this country." Marler to Adelaide North (née Marler), 5 April, 1930, Herbert Meredith Marler fonds, MG30 E528, Vol. 1, LAC.

[8] With the opening of a new and consolidated legation and minister's residence in 1933, Marler completed his primary real estate and construction venture in Japan. Now named 'Marler House,' the land and structure remain alongside the new embassy in Minato ward, one of the city's most exclusive neighbourhoods. The history of this building, its construction as well as its importance as a site of political, economic, cultural, and social exchange ever since, has been well covered. See: Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler, 75-84; Mary Taylor, "Marler House in Tokyo," in *Bout de papier* vol. 11, no. 1 (1994), 8-10; J.H. Taylor, "A Base for Promoting Canada's Interests," in *Special Trust and Confidence: Envoy Essays in Canadian Diplomacy,* ed. David Chalmer Reece (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 255-268; Marie-Josée Therrien, "'This Proper and Dignified Accommodation:' The Marler House in Tokyo," in *Society for the Study of Architecture in Canada: Bulletin* Vol. 22, No. 3 (1997), 66-73; Therrien, "Canadian Chanceries in Tokyo," in *Contradictory Impulses*, 231-243.

[9] Herbert Meredith Marler died 20 January 1940 in Montreal, having returned from his post as Canadian Minister to the Washington combatting illness allegedly stemming from overwork and fatigue. See the family history, Marler, *Marler,* 184-7.

[10] Though the outward projection of prestige and authority, as derived from individual privilege, wealth, and social position, had been central to European and American traditions of international diplomacy since at least the early nineteenth century, Canadians had been shut out of bi-lateral or multi-lateral political exchanges between nation-states up to this point as result their subordinate colonial- and later dominion status.

[11] By adopting the term 'patrician' to describe the Marler men, I draw from the recent work of historian Brian Young on their elite nineteenth- and early-twentieth century contemporaries. As he explains, the term "reaches beyond material wealth and is suggestive of birth, the landed, hegemonies [… and w]ith its Greek roots in 'father,' […] is suggestive of both domestic masculinity and civic identities associated with 'fatherland.' In seeking social permanence, the patrician family gravitated to the customary, legal, and religious rights of the father, brushing by

counterparts atop Canadian society stagnated and diminished.[12] Having begun to experience challenges to his position and authority in Montreal at the hands of a new generation of professionals and industrialists, Marler's transition to diplomacy allowed him to not only prolong his privileged position, it also allowed him to improve that position, if only temporarily, by way of the titles and decorations afforded to heads of missions during this period. When Mackenzie King offered him the appointment in January 1929, the Marlers were acutely aware of these possibilities. Meeting to confirm his friend's appointment to Tokyo, King wrote in his diary that it was "quite clear" that the aspect of the assignment most enticing to both Herbert and Beatrice Marler was the "social significance of the position."[13]

Patrician Diplomat

In the late 1980s – long after the upheavals of the Second World War marked the conclusion of the interwar period, and with it, the inherent authority of Canada's patrician elite – Marler's son Howard reflected on his father's career as a Canadian foreign minister. He wrote with a mix of nostalgia and bitterness, explaining that his father was "quite at home in the patrician environment in which diplomacy was conducted during that period when it was still the métier of gentlemen who were expected to have the appropriate educational and social background."[14] Indeed Herbert Marler's social and political standing exceeded these qualifications. He already enjoyed the ample wealth and authority accumulated by his father through land ownership during

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the presence of female family heads and the evident contribution of wives, widows, and daughters. Culture, custom, and religion determined that it was through male flesh that flowed name, profession, and legal priority. This focus on gender and authority in family and society, as opposed to a focus on great wealth, tacks us away from historians like Sven Beckert and interpretations based on the 'monied,' on 'the model of social relations of competitive capitalism,' and on a New York elite that come to be through 'the ownership of capital rather than heritage and birth.' Young, *Patrician Families and the Making of Quebec,* 5-6; Young is here quoting from Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6, 321.

[12] On the wartime and postwar shifts driving the specialization of the individual and the bureaucratization of the institution in Canadian public and private life, two processes historian Christopher Dummitt has argued were central to Canadian conceptions male authority, masculinity, and modernity in this period, see his *The Manly Modern: Masculinity in Postwar Canada* (Vancouver: UBCPress, 2007), 3-7.

[13] W.L.M. King Diary, 5 January, 1929, MG26-J13, LAC.

[14] Howard Marler lived with his parents at Tokyo before returning on his own to Canada to attend university. Having missed out on the authority and position he was otherwise set to inherit from his father, Howard's account reflects a longing for the society which, dismantled by the effects of the Second World War in Canada, he was himself never able to benefit from. Marler, *Marler,* 109.

Quebec's transition from seigneurial to freehold land tenure, as well as successive and skilful applications of Anglo-Canadian privilege in addition to his own acumen in navigating an industrializing and urbanizing Montreal society.[15] Only his invitation to the Order of St. Michael and St. George on the recommendation of Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in 1935 (the last year a Canadian accepted such a title) surpassed the prestige of his appointments abroad.[16]

As the basis for his ascendant position in both public and private life, Marler's patrician identity permeated his entire character. Realizing his role and responsibilities in the Japanese capital as a culmination of his thirty years experience among Montreal and Ottawa's elite he made little effort to distinguish between a public and private sphere. Instead, he maximized his power and authority by applying them equally across the two dimensions of his life in Tokyo.[17] As minister, Marler joined the ranks of only two others atop the Department of External Affairs' foreign missions – themselves equally patrician in their manners and identities.[18] He answered only to Under Secretary of State O.D. Skelton and the Prime Minister, although he was not

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[15] It is during this mid- to late-nineteenth century developments in the province that historians Brian Young and J. I. Little have identified their archetypical patrician subjects of biography. On the importance of prior, nineteenth century forms of these constructs – those from which Marler derived his initial authority and privilege – see: Young, *George-Etienne Cartier: Montreal Bourgeois* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981); Young, *Patrician Families and the Making of Quebec*; Young, "Patrician Elites and Power in Nineteenth-Century Montreal and Quebec City," in *Who Ran the Cities? City Elites and Urban Power Structures in Europe and North America, 1750-1940,* ed. Ralf Roth and Robert Beachy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007); and J.I. Little, *Patrician Liberal: The Public and Private Life of Sir Henri-Gustave Joly de Lotbinière, 1829-1906* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

[16] Indeed the practice had already passed out of style under King's prior governments. In 1935, however, outbound PM Bennett submitted his recommendations to the Crown's offices in London, including Marler among a number more following the minister's many petitions for consideration. On the history of the relationship between Canadians and the processes of knighthood, as well as the importance and meaning of debates surrounding Canadian's acceptance of such titles in 1935, see Christopher McReery, "Questions of Honour: Canadian Government Policy Towards Titular Honours from Macdonald to Bennett" (Master's Thesis, Queen's University, 1999). On Marler's opinion of the "self-denying ordinance" regarding British titles adopted in Canada 1919, Prime Minister Bennett's disregard for that Liberal convention in 1934, and the glee of Herbert Meredith and his son Howard in the wake of this recommendation, see Marler, *Marler,* 159-161. See also: Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs,* 164. As Keenleyside remarked in his diary on the news of Marler's knighting: with his "greatest wish" now gratified, "there may be no holding [Marler] now." Keenleyside, diary entry, 3 June, 1935, reprinted in Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 438.

[17] Marler's actions demonstrate that he shared with Vincent Massey – Canadian Minister to America and himself a patrician of similar type – the opinion that, as a foreign diplomat, one is working 24-hours a day. See Massey quoted in Kirkwood, *Diplomat at Table,* viii.

[18] With his three appointed patricians – Marler at Tokyo, Vincent Massey at Washington, and Phillipe Roy in Paris – Mackenzie King boasted that Canada enjoyed "the beginning of a diplomatic service which ha[d] not been surpassed by any country in the world." Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1,* 117, quoting from King Papers, diary 5 January, 1929.

averse to bringing his concerns directly to King, owing not only to their friendship, but also to Marler's disregard for Skelton's unabashed autonomism and sometime anti-English attitudes.[19]

As the patrician head of a Quebec family of professional and public prominence, Marler felt he had certain advantages on the job over those climbing the social or professional ladder. He believed that lived experience amongst the moneyed leaders of productive society made a man. This was, of course, how his own father and grandfather before him made their achievements. Adapting to his new position in Tokyo, Marler wanted the legation to act as a training ground where the future generations of elite, Canadian patrician diplomats could learn from and emulate the best. Keenleyside recalled his minister's belief that "each legation should train one or more young men of *manners and wealth* with a view to their ultimate appointment as *ministers*."[20] This view bothered his junior officers who, valuing the meritocracy through which they saw their own accomplishments achieved (including their own postings to Tokyo), called it a "horrid negation of the whole principle of the [foreign] service."[21] Believing that he alone was capable of imparting these virtues, Marler hesitated to admit that those beneath him might have learned by their own skill, intelligence, or volition.[22]

Indeed, for those living or working under his authority after 1929, Marler remained a difficult person to please. So stilted were his views on privilege and power as a birthright that he could hardly sympathise with the problems facing his junior colleagues. He was by his own definition a 'hard worker,' and he projected this image onto the men around him as a way of judging their worth as well as their potential.[23] The case of his son's stay in Tokyo provides a

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[19] On Skelton's autonomism and the use and implementation of this ideology through External during this period, see Hillmer, *O.D. Skelton,* esp. 263, 329-35. On his fluid anti-imperialism or anti-English views, see Ibid., 11-3, 100-1.

[20] Keenleyside, diary entry 8 March 1929, reprinted in *Hammer the Golden Day*, 256-7 (Keenleyside's italics)

[21] If they are not able to "pass the competitive exams, and work up through the system" then surely they "are not good enough to become ministers" he exclaimed. Keenleyside, diary entry 8 March 1929, reprinted in *Hammer the Golden Day*, 257.

[22] Students, he thought, were ill equipped for the formalities of real world business and socializing. Upon first meeting Kenneth Kirkwood in 1929, for example, Marler gave a "little inquisition on Diplomatic Principles and requirement." The questions were themselves hardly unusual coming from a head of mission interviewing a new hire. That Kirkwood already had substantial experience in 1929, however, highlighted Marler's unwillingness to consider the values of a post-graduate pedigree. Kenneth Porter Kirkwood, "(Excerpt from Letter to Father) Personal Diary," 14 July 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.

[23] Evidence suggests that he expelled his first son George Leonard from the family sometime in the early thirties. Thereafter his father laboured to keep him as far from Montreal society as possible. These rocky relations came to a

characteristic example: Howard lived with his parents there for a year from 1929 to 1930. While there, Marler tried all he could to get him interested in the public associations and professional networks of Canadian, British, and American elites with which his father so readily mixed.[24] Staying in Tokyo before heading to France for his second successive year of travel, with plans to return to Montreal and begin his study of law at McGill, the first months of his time living under his father went smoothly and Marler's early letters from Tokyo reflect a certain optimism about his youngest son's future.[25] Howard did not pass the preliminary law exams at McGill and he returned to Tokyo that summer on his way to Paris, his future shrouded in uncertainty. Howard's later disinterest and otherwise disagreeable behaviour soon exacerbated his father's patience, driving Marler to write his eldest daughter to complain that the twenty-two year old Howard "should be very much further ahead in life than he is."[26] Anguish over his sons' apparent failure to live up to and take full advantage of the opportunities their father afforded them troubled Marler for the remainder of his life. After seeing Howard off from Tokyo a second time, Marler again confided in his adult daughter about his two sons:

> I fear very much that unless [Howard] adopts an entirely different attitude towards his life worked, and if he was in a position he would be then able to indulge every pleasure that comes along, that he will risk having to be written down as a serious failure. I must say it has been a source of the most bitter disappointment to me as to Leonard and indeed to a great extent as to Howard. I had looked forward so much for so many years to them both taking a position which, with all the advantages

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head a few years later when Marler intervened in his son's attempt at a second marriage to an American woman by having him incarcerated on account of his mental health. Leonard sued for damages, claiming that Marler and the doctor conspired to diagnose him falsely in order to keep him from wedding. He dropped the case in early 1938 after an out of court settlement. "Plot Charged to U.S. Envoy," *Berkeley Daily Gazette,* 18 Oct., 1938, 11; "New Motion Taken in Marler Hearing," *The Montreal Gazette,* 15 December, 1938, 23; "Leonard Marler's Suit Against Father Stands," *The Ottawa Citizen,* 9 Dec., 1938, 1; "Leonard Marler Drops Suit Against Father," *The Montreal Gazette,* 22 March, 1939, 9. These events do not appear in any subsequent literature on the family and George Leonard is not discussed in his brother Howard's 1987 family history, nor in the McCord Museum online exhibit about the Marler family compiled by Eric Marler, son of Herbert Marler's half-brother George C. Marler. Eric Marler, *The Marler Family in Quebec by Eric Marler, M.D.,* Musée McCord Museum, Public Tour, accessed 15 July, 2016, http://www.mccord-museum.qc.ca/scripts/printtour.php?tourID=Marler&Lang=2.

[24] Marler to Adelaide, 31 October, 1929.

[25] Marler thought it imperative that Howard learn French and he paid for his son to spend a year travelling France by car; "I think by doing so that I am giving him something very much more than a college degree, [. . .] because a perfect knowledge of French [. . .] is a wonderful thing for an English-speaking Protestant to have in Canada." Marler to Adelaide, 5 February 1930.

[26] Marler to Adelaide, 4 September 1930.

> they had, they could take. With Leonard I fear the situation is almost irretrievable and as to Howard I am very much afraid that the future does not hold the brightest prospects.[27]

His lofty and unbending expectations made him a harsh critic of character, unsympathetic of the conditions or troubles of others. Professionally, Marler appeared to his juniors as overbearing and old-fashioned, a relic of a late-nineteenth century society waning in the face of technocracy and the specialization of experts across professions. As his management of familial matters demonstrates, his stringent character in the office was rather an extension of his own self than any managerial technique adopted to affect efficiency or quality of work.

Conflating his role as head of mission with these paternalistic views, in his first year Marler began a series of efforts to utilize the institutional structures of External, the legation, and the wider diplomatic practice to enhance the prestige of his junior officers. He started with a campaign to procure from Skelton and King promotions and raises for his staff, justifying their needs with not only their personal, financial reasons, but also the importance of their respective appearance as Canadian representatives to the Japanese capital.[28] Marler assured anyone at External who would listen that he "could not be comfortable while [his] staff was uncomfortable," repeatedly offering to have his own salary reduced so that Government might agree to expand the legation's payroll and budget.[29] Just as he thought Canadian representatives to Tokyo should be amply paid, so too did expect them to be suitably dressed. Marler insisted on wearing the gold and plumes of the British diplomats before him, extending this rule onto his

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[27] Marler to Adelaide, 4 September 1930. Perhaps feeling guilty for criticising her younger brothers, Marler sent an unprompted follow-up letter to Adelaide five days later clarifying his words: "I am simply terrified that Howard may follow the lack of success which Leonard has pursued and that, I must admit, colours my attitude very much indeed." Marler to Adelaide, 9 September, 1930.

[28] Marler made these requests across various personal letters to Skelton and King before summing them up and submitting them again, in their entirety, in his preface to the legation's first annual report. See Marler to King, 24 December, 1929, RG 25 D1, Vol. 794, File 469, Department of External Affairs fonds, LAC. King wanted to keep salaries low, however, for reasons both political and practical. As he wrote in his diary, he did not wish to "make these positions social positions." W.L.M. King Diary, 5 January, 1929, MG26-J13, LAC. Marler later turned to precedent set in parliament, citing sections of Hansard to demand more money for his secretaries while comparing their pay to the men at Washington. Marler to Skelton, 30 May, 1930, RG 25, D1, Vol. 794, File 469, DEA fonds, LAC; Skelton to Marler, 19 June 1930, ibid.

[29] Marler quoted in Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 283; Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler and the Canadian Legation in Tokyo," 77; King, writing in his diary about the decision to appoint Marler, said that "his willingness to use his own means to the extent of $50,000 a year, in addition to his salary shows how pleased he is to have this opportunity." W.L.M. King Diary, 5 January, 1929, MG26-J13, LAC.

staff. As Keenleyside remembered, highlighting yet another difference in opinions between generations, "no one could convince Mr. Marler that [. . .] the best ornamentation was its avoidance."[30] All this to ensure that the diplomatic corps at Tokyo – the eyes and ears of the world's leading powers – saw Canada in the most affluent light possible. Although his junior officers appreciated their minister's advocacy, the lack of a shared perception of the inward purpose of the legation as a means to ennoble its officers, as well as a clashing set of values concerning age, experience, professionalism, and various other perceived indicators of individual 'standing,' highlighted the minister's paternal and patronising attitude toward his younger, less-privileged staff.

The titles afforded to Marler by virtue of his position only added to his social and professional repertoire. Officially, he was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Although the constant use of this full title was already anachronistic in the eyes of many – including Skelton – Marler went further, demanding that members of the diplomatic community as well as all chancellery and residence staff in Tokyo call him and his family 'their Excellencies.' Herbert Meredith and Beatrice Isabel Marler even adopted the practise in referring to one another. The two often sent memos and notices to the various members of the diplomatic corps to remind them of any recent occasions in which an incorrect title was used, especially when 'The Honourable,' or similar honorifics, were overlooked.[31] Furthermore, and in a classically patrician sense, Marler saw to it that his titles passed among the men of the family; his visiting grandson, he insisted, was "His Little Excellency."[32] Though not without precedent, Marler's interpretation and application of such formalities were somewhat uneven and often awkward. Earlier in the century, the British Foreign Office – the institution upon which External modelled itself – had slackened in its own attention to formalities. This did not last, however, and as the Canadian diplomatic corps was taking shape in the late interwar period, it looked to its

[30] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 255-6; Elsewhere, Keenleyside said that Marler was "overly impressed and misled by a feeling of dignity which posed the necessity of maintain a very rigid interpretation of government which was sometimes perhaps unwise." "The Keenleyside Interview (1977)" KHP fonds, MULA.

[31] See, for example: Marler to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Koki Hirota, 29 November, 1935, N-0008, File 0517, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan, Tokyo; Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 287-8.

[32] This description is drawn from the separate memoirs of Keenleyside and Charles Ritchie, junior colleagues of Marler's at Washington and Tokyo, respectively. Ritchie, *The Siren Years*, 13-4. At Tokyo, Marler even went as far as having placards his son's bedroom doors made to read "Young Excellency's Room." Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 287-8, 289-90.

English counterpart and under the watch of certain individuals like Marler adopted this renewed formalism in places.[33] It was not until Skelton ordered he abandon its usage that Marler relented with the 'excellencies.'[34]

For all his formalities and love for ceremony, Marler always operated according to and within the conventions of diplomatic tradition. Skelton's disapproval came as a matter of his own preference, not for any objective error on Marler's part. Nevertheless, many viewed his practices as antiquarian and unnecessary, including his junior officers at the legation. His refusal to attend gatherings hosted by those of lesser rank, for example, was one practice that especially embarrassed his fellow Canadians in Tokyo. James Manion, a commercial officer attached to the legation, explained that Canadian officials would often "meet the American Ambassador and other Heads of Mission at the homes of their most junior officers" but were "never to have our own Minister when we entertain them." When asked about this by his staff, Marler reasoned that he found it "beneath his dignity" to visit the homes of social and professional subordinates.[35] Though he sought to distance himself from them, he meanwhile laboured to cultivate the image and airs of even his most junior officers, managing their appearances and behaviour with his unbending social conservatism.[36] Keenleyside noted that the Marlers were quite fond various late Victorian "characteristics" which, he added, "lasted so much longer in certain parts of Canada than they did 'back home' in sophisticated circles in the United Kingdom."[37] Criticism of his love of ceremony and aristocratic values came not only from those subject to his authority at the

[33] John Tilley, British Ambassador to Japan from 1926 to 1931, notes that when he first arrived at in the Foreign Service as clerk in London in 1894, "it was only Ambassadors who were addressed as 'Sir' by their staffs." "We were not in awe of our superiors; there was no question of saying 'Sir' to an Under-Secretary […] we were all on equal terms." By the thirties, however, Tilley notes that the expanding bureaucratic network of the British Foreign Service had become far less personal; "Now," he wrote in the early 1940s, "Sirs are broadcast in all directions." Marler certainly attached himself to these practices and personally enforced their implementation wherever possible. Sir John Tilley, *London to Tokyo* (London: Hutchison & Co., 1942.), 22.

[34] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 289.

[35] Manion, letter to his father, 27 October, 1933, reprinted in Manion, *A Canadian Errant,* 47-8.

[36] One case that tested the differences of opinions and values of his staff arose when Marler refused to welcome the fiancée of a junior trade commission's officer within the legation building because she was a divorcee. Rather than simply forbid her from the premises, however, he actively opposed their marriage, allegedly doing so for the sake of the junior staff member's honour. Manion, *A Canadian Errant*, 54.

[37] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 286.

Canadian offices, however. Several noted privately that Marler was sometimes "ridiculed by the other Heads of Mission" for his behaviour.[38]

Other perceptions of Marler from this period portrayed him as an unread, untraveled, humourless aristocrat obsessed with prestige and title.[39] He published neither diaries nor memoirs with which to compare or defend his reputation from this period.[40] Save for letters written to his daughter from his office in Tokyo, few traces of his private thoughts and feelings during this period exist.[41] Despite a lack of direct insight into Marler's intimate and immediate perceptions during this period, it is clear that he concerned himself more with patronage and posturing than self-improvement or education through self-reflection. In fact, Marler valued academic education very little. In addition to being ignorant of world histories, one specific event symbolized his relationship with the humanities. Upon receiving a copy of Kirkwood's acclaimed monograph *Turkey* (co-authored with the eminent historian Arnold Toynbee) from him for Christmas, Marler promptly forwarded the inscribed edition to the McGill University library, appending his own name under that of his third secretary before donating it to his alma mater's collection.[42]

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[38] Manion records that Sir Francis Lindley, British Ambassador from 1931 to 1934, openly mocked Marler's behaviour. Manion, letter to his father, 22 April, 1932, reprinted in Manion, *A Canadian Errant,* 33-4. Keenleyside also recalled that both Herbert Meredith and Beatrice Isabel Marler were subjects of "jest in Ottawa as well as in Tokyo." Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 287.

[39] See Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 286-292; Manion, *A Canadian Errant,* 27, 34; Meehan, *Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 15-6; Price, *Orienting Canada,* 33; Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler and the Canadian Legation in Tokyo," 75; Langley, "Early Days in the Life of a Trade Commissioner's Family," 22-24.

[40] In 1977 Keenleyside lamented that "Sir Herbert Marler did not write any memoir," adding that he in fact "wrote very badly." "The Keenleyside Interview (1977)" KHP fonds, MULA.

[41] His letters to his daughter are shallow and almost devoid of serious discussion about his work, politics, or opinions. Instead, Marler filled them with lectures about childrearing and marriage. See Marler to Adelaide North (née Marler), various, 1929-190, HMM fonds, Vol. 1, LAC. The Marler's were extremely strict with Adelaide. Her parents would not permit her to seek a secondary education, despite her desire to do so. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 287.

[42] The book was subsequently donated by McGill to the Sir George Williams University (later merged with Loyola College to form Concordia University). It remains today amongst the Concordia University Library collections, bearing the parallel inscriptions of Kirkwood (addressed to his minister), Marler (addressed to McGill), and McGill (addressed to Sir George Williams University Library). Both diplomats' inscriptions are dated 1929. On Kirkwood's presenting the book to Marler, see: Kirkwood, "Personal Diary," 25 November 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.

Diplomacy in Practice

Marler himself saw no need to adapt or learn from his experiences in Tokyo. He made no effort to acclimatize to the culture or customs of local Japanese society. Instead, he retained the identity and outlook he had developed in Montreal through the early decades of the century, bringing to Tokyo his prejudices and assumptions about not only Japan, but also Canada and the Empire. On the various and contentious political matters facing Canadians in 1929 – immigration and social welfare, for example – Marler reflected little. Instead, he focused entirely on what he thought he knew best: trade. He did not challenge established systems of exchange between national representatives in the Japanese capital. Keeping himself and his work limited to the official diplomatic domain, he minimized his engagement with unfamiliar practices, cultures, and experiences. With all the privilege and means at his disposal, Marler never once had to acquiesce to the values of the society around him. He lived and worked in Tokyo as if in his home and office in downtown Montreal. Thus, Marler protected both his dignity as well as his ego, for a working knowledge of life in Japan was neither tested nor required. This was possible only by way of the autonomy afforded him as the head of his own, Canadian mission, separate from that of the British and answerable to no other authority in the region.

One of the few issues on which Marler was open to change were his views regarding Canadian national identity and the Dominion's autonomy in international relations. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1925 – before his failed campaign for re-election that October and his subsequent retreat from electoral politics – Marler defended his essentially conservative position on Dominion autonomy. Marler told his fellow MPs that, while Canada was a nation "for interior purposes," for "exterior purposes" Canada was not prepared and that Canadians were better served "minding our own business" while "assisting the British Empire" by staying out of "various matters abroad." "Those foreign affairs," he argued, were already in "good hands."[43] After accepting the diplomatic position in early 1929, however, his every mention of 'Canada' and 'England,' or 'empire' and 'autonomy' was heavily weighted with meanings now related to his own authority as Canada's representative to Tokyo. The imperialist-autonomist conflict thus became a central part of both his professional as well as private life and he quickly (and perhaps unsurprisingly) abandoned his opposition to Canada's participation in foreign affairs.

[43] Canada. *House of Commons Debates,* 14th Parliament, 4th Session, Vol. 1, 19 February 1925 (Mr. Herbert Marler, LPC), pp324-5, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC1404_01.

Throughout the summer of 1929, after he had accepted his appointment as minister, and while en route to the Pacific from Montreal, Marler delivered speeches to Canadians across the country espousing the need for independent representation in order to fulfil the nation's responsibility as an equal member of the Commonwealth. To illustrate the purpose of his newly adopted position, he emphasized the structures of Commonwealth that placed Canada as England's equal in this union. In this new conceptualization, "the term 'equality'" he argued, "in no way indicates separation in foreign affairs. Quite to the contrary, it means cohesion in the way that no one nation of the Commonwealth, except in matters which concern her alone, can speak for the others or for the Commonwealth as a whole."[44] He thereby justified his own title as Minister to Japan, securing for himself the additional personal and political autonomy afforded by that position. The freedoms of that job thus had the reciprocal effect of allowing him to move freely between his imperialist and autonomist tendencies, demonstrating the Canadian public's concurrent appreciations for either position.

Although his public statements and actions across the late-twenties revealed the glaring contradictions embedded in his own politics and beliefs, Marler continued on, seemingly unbothered by these tensions. He retained these values, adding nuance where necessary with a more complex view of the purported economic benefits of global free trade and, where possible, Imperial preference after his first year in Tokyo.[45] For his new role, he reenvisioned the British Commonwealth of Nations as an "economic unit" and it was in these terms that he described his conception of Canada's place therein, thereafter measuring the effectiveness of his mission by economic conditions.[46] Herein lies another example of Marler's – as well as Canada's – paradoxical and dualistic position in Japan, East Asia, and the Pacific after 1929. Once becoming minister, Marler deployed the Canada-as-nation position strategically, at times utilizing it to justify his power and position as Canadian Minister to Japan, while at other times downplaying it in order to gain from the established British institutions and authority in the region. Nevertheless,

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[44] Marler, "Canada and Trade with Japan," transcript of speech, mailed to Skelton, 27 June, 1929, RG 25, D1, Vol. 795, File 472, DEA fonds, LAC.

[45] One rare look into Marler's critical view of Canada, Empire, and the global sphere of (developed) nations appears in a letter he wrote to his daughter in November 1930. Generally, however, his point was to repeat the perspectives he demonstrated in his work. That is, that "the various nations of the Commonwealth must develop economically along their own lines, but where they cannot produce or usefully manufacture goods themselves, then we should give very decided preference to Empire products." Marler to Adelaide, 14 November, 1930.

[46] Marler to Adelaide, 14 November, 1930.

beyond the realms of trade and commerce, he kept his views regarding global politics, international relations, and the validity of British Imperial claims to superiority therein, ambiguous.

Marler's fixation with trade shaped more than his abstract position regarding the Dominion within Empire. The project of increasing Canadian trade in East Asia became an obsession, guiding him in his daily operation of the legation offices. At times annoyed by his minister's disregard for the bigger, political picture, Keenleyside privately criticized Marler's "fetish about maintaining good relations for the sake of trade." He joked, for instance, that given the rising tensions surrounding Japan's military expansionism in Manchuria, the Canadian minister seemed content to "sink the League of Nations to sell a million bushels of Canadian wheat."[47] Furthermore, in his unending search for prospective markets for the Dominion's goods, Marler angered Canadian Trade Commissioners already active in Japan and China. He assumed authority over their work, pressing them to seek his approval on reports and local budgets, demanding their assistance and undivided attention when touring through their cities. Marler apparently felt these impositions completely justifiable and indeed a part of his authority as Minister to Japan. Indeed, he had revealed these desires to King soon after accepting the Prime Minister's offer; "I believe if I have to travel in China as I think I should," he wrote from his offices in Montreal in January 1929, "it would increase my prestige being accredited to that country."[48] These intentions resulted in clashes with the civil servants of the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, a separate bureaucratic entity with its own hiring processes and hierarchies of regional authority.[49] Repeatedly requesting an expanded mandate so that he could become minister to not only Japan, but also China, Marler never truly accepted the only real limits of his appointment to East Asia.

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[47] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 404-5. For more analysis of the Manchurian crisis, the legation's role in informing Ottawa, and Ottawa's own, belated response to it at the League of Nations, see: Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 63-71, 74-5, 83-9.

[48] Marler to Mackenzie King, 18 January, 1929, LAC, RG 25, vol. 794, file 469, pt. 1-2.

[49] This issue garnered resentment from several Canadian trade commissioners in the region who felt Marler's ad-hoc imposition of superiority and command was unwarranted and unauthorized. See: Manion to his father, 12 October, 1932, reprinted in Manion, *A Canadian Errant,* 40-1.

His limited focus on trade also distanced him from his secretaries, as he remained aloof and uninvolved in their work until it came time for his signing off on their reports.[50] Rather than adopt a heuristic, inclusive approach to his role as head of the legation – an approach which might have framed him as the general supervisor, equally involved in the various intelligence gathering projects, political reporting, or intra-ministerial dialogues underway at any given time – Marler delegated tasks unrelated to trade to Keenleyside and Kirkwood. These preoccupations, together with this rather hands-off approach to the particulars of intelligence, meant that the Minister was often uninformed of the complex and fluid circumstances of Japanese domestic and imperial politics. In the actual practice of political exchanges at Tokyo, his only desire was to nurture relationships he thought were conducive to the growth of Canadian trade. The task proved more difficult than anticipated after the onset of the Depression stagnated Canadian, and later Japanese, markets. Save for his promotion of trade, Kirkwood claimed, Marler had already done all he could in Tokyo by opening the legation and hosting introductory banquets. He was thus eying nothing less than an appointment to King's next Cabinet as Finance Minister, with ambitions to eventually become party leader and Prime Minister.[51]

Socializing, Subordinates, and the British

Although he kept his distance from his social and professional subordinates, amongst the most senior members of the Tokyo diplomatic corps Marler embraced social life, taking advantage of the various events held outside of the office to build relations and promote Canada and its exports. Socializing, as Marler saw it, was of "vast importance" as information and serious

[50] As British Ambassador to Japan Tilley observed during the Marler's first year in Tokyo, the Canadian legation had "few political questions to handle" and was instead occupied with the "furtherance of trade." Tilley, "Annual Report on Japan for 1929," in *Political Reports 1923-1931,* ed. R.L. Jarman, vol. 3 of *Japan: Political and Economic Reports 1906-1970* (Chippenham, Wilts: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2002), 376.

[51] As Kirkwood argued in the fall of 1929, since coming to Japan and assuming the titles and authorities afford to Ministers abroad, Marler had already done all he could for himself. He had already "achieved all the glory he may expect in this diplomatic post" Kirkwood thought. "If he returns this year, he will still have the distinction of having been the first Canadian Minister to Asia, of having been the first Canadian diplomat appointed by his Majesty to another sovereign, of having made a deep impression on the Japanese people of his urbanity and dignity, his aristocratic manners and lavish diplomatic establishment." Evidence of his intentions for premiership do not appear in any of Marler's letters and might simply be Kirkwood's hyperbolic reaction to his minister's ego and self-confidence. It does however reflect Marler's desires for more power and authority as well as his attitude of self-entitlement, evidently very visible to his colleagues in Tokyo. Kirkwood, "Personal Diary," 29 November 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.

discussions were inaccessible by methods more "direct." Rather than simply "going to a man's office," Marler explained to his friend John W. Dafoe, "[i]t is only by being friendly in a social way […] that once reaches some information of major importance."[52] Indeed, Marler was warmly regarded by at least one other top-ranking foreign representative in Tokyo – Sir John Tilley wrote kindly of the Canadian in his memoirs, recalling warmly the farewell dinner Marler hosted for the British Ambassador on his departure from Japan in 1931.[53] Among the most senior in rank at Tokyo, then, Marler was both capable and willing to consort. Meanwhile, however, he lived in seclusion from the Japanese public. Indeed, as one British Ambassador to Japan from this period noted, very few foreign representatives mixed with Japanese government officers or their families outside of official events.[54] Because of this, Marler reflected little on the ways of life of the people of his host nation, urban or otherwise, relying on calls from the handful of English-speaking officials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make his judgements about a Japanese national character or characteristic manner. This disconnect (and general ignorance), however, did not limit his confidence when speaking of Japanese society, culture, or politics. In Japan, as in Canada, Marler did little to hide his racist views of the inferior Japanese and 'Oriental' peoples, a view which matched well with his paternalism and self-serving interpretation of a *noblesse oblige*. No doubt a product of his time, this reflected his own racist views of his host nation, its cultures, and its inhabitants.[55] Canadians in Tokyo, he proudly

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[52] Marler to Dafoe, 18 April, 1930, John W. Dafoe Family fonds, Box 10, Folder 5, University of Manitoba Archives and Special Collections.

[53] Tilley indeed appreciated Marler's company, though he took the opportunity in his memoirs to reflect again upon the purpose of Canada's legation in Tokyo. "We were excellent friends from the beginning. [. . .] It was doubtless natural that Canada should wish to have her own representative, but exactly what matters he could deal with, apart from trade questions for which a Commercial Mission would have sufficed, was not quite apparent." Tilley, *London to Tokyo,* 194.

[54] Tilley offers another useful example: "At a big dinner in connection with some International Conference [at Tokyo] I was astonished to hear a delegate form one of the Dominions refer in the course of his speech to their having been privileged to see something of Japanese family life. When, after dinner, I asked what this meant, as I did not know that they had had any such opportunities, the speaker explained that they had seen something through the open shutters as they walked along the street." Tilley, *London to Tokyo,* 144.

[55] Marler displayed Orientalist understanding of the eastern 'other,' in fact paralleling the very case of Balfour and Cromer used by Said to first illustrate his theory. See: Said, *Orientalism,* 31-8. On the *noblesse oblige* of the Quebec patrician from which I draw upon in identifying and explaining Marler's own adapted and expanded motives, see: Little, *Patrician Liberal,* xiii.

explained, were prepared to "cultivate the people of Japan."[56] About what precisely this entailed, and to which Canadians this task fell, Marler remained characteristically ambiguous.

Certainly, Marler was aware of the implications of opening a Canadian mission in a foreign capital already served by a British ambassador. He also realized the uniqueness of the circumstances at Tokyo. Reporting to Mackenzie King on his arrival in Tokyo, Marler emphasized that his mission was "entering into an entirely new field of activities" in East Asia, with "factors totally different" from those facing the Washington and Paris legations. Nevertheless, with the British ambassadorial staff already well established in the Japanese capital, Marler recognized the need to "proceed cautiously" while not interfering to avoid even the "slightest embarrassment."[57] Given his personal history of imperialist leanings, Marler had no trouble indulging British authorities there, and his reports that there were no major rifts between the separate missions in the first three years were genuine. One British Ambassador remembered Marler to have been "entirely loyal," never showing "any desire to separate his interests from ours."[58] His paradoxical character thus proved useful as it helped smooth relations between an institution breaking new ground in Dominion autonomy and that of the established, imperial 'homeland.' To his Prime Minister, Marler insisted that his "whole objective" in Tokyo was to promote "co-operation [. . .] between Canada and Great Britain and vice versa," while "indicating the complete independence of Canada in her own affairs."[59] In the meantime, however, Marler struggled to impress upon his Japanese hosts the separateness of the Canadian and British nations. Demonstrating this division of authority while maintaining a balance and cordial relations with the resident British diplomatic staff weighed heavily over Marler's every action. He proved, however, an amicable and willing candidate to balance these polarizing and politically charged manoeuvrings.[60]

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[56] Marler to Skelton, 19-20 June, 1929, RG25, vol. 794, file 469, quoted in Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 20.

[57] Marler to King, "Memorandum: British Embassy and Canadian Legation," 1 July, 1936, RG 25, vol. 1802, file 665, LAC.

[58] Tilley, *London to Tokyo,* 194.

[59] Marler to King, 1 July, 1936.

[60] In his annual report to London, Tilley explains that he has worked with the Canadians in Tokyo "on the most cordial terms," though the Japanese press and public had yet to grasp entirely Marler's position or "the international status of Canada." Tilley, "Annual Report on Japan for 1929," in *Political Reports 1923-1931*, 376.

However sceptical of Canada's status or capabilities in global politics British representatives to Tokyo were, they offered no official opposition to Marler's integration into the diplomatic corps there. In fact, Marler boasted that his introductory address to the Tokyo diplomatic corps – in which he stressed that his legation was "an entirely separate entity from the British Embassy," that Canada was an equal members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and that he expected to be consulted on all matters pertaining to the greater British Empire – was met by British Ambassador Tilley's resounding approval.[61] Although Marler at times adopted the British policy or position on sensitive matters in East Asia, leading more than once to disagreements amongst legation staff and clashes with Skelton and King in Ottawa, he adamantly represented his own, separate nation in all official appearances as minister.[62] Nevertheless, he was left wanting a stronger endorsement from the British officials, however, and lamented that through his years in Tokyo the English never once acted to promote the "prestige" of the Canadians. He busied himself with gathering up as many memberships and public positions as his British counterpart, publicly protesting any resistance he faced while doing so. At Tokyo, he told King, he had improved Canada's prestige – though he had to "fight for it" as the British officials there were unwilling to provide any assistance or generosity toward their Canadian neighbours. They "tolerated the Canadian legation," but did not go out of their way to assist it. For this reason, Marler argued that all Canadian accomplishments in Tokyo were the product of "unaided" efforts by Canadians and for Canadians.[63]

A National Image, Reconsidered(?)

More than anyone involved in Tokyo, Marler worked incessantly to promote the legation and Canada in the press. This he began with his Canadian speaking tour. Afterwards, he drafted many press releases, beginning with one he delivered at the docks of Yokohama upon his arrival.

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[61] "The Minister has considered that address in the light of his chart or textbook to be followed in Japan and he can say with truth that he has never deviated from it," Marler continued. Marler to King, 1 July, 1936.

[62] Following Japanese military aggression in China, for example, Marler's pro-British views were the cause of disagreement amongst Canadians on various levels in Tokyo and Ottawa. See the Mukden incident and subsequent Japanese operations on the mainland in Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 53-71.

[63] Later, a breakdown in professional co-operation between the two offices occurred under the watch of Sir Robert Clive, British Ambassador to Japan after 1934. According to Marler, Clive saw the Canadians as politically and socially below the English at Tokyo. Marler's efforts to be seen as the British Ambassador's equal in public life were thereafter blocked. Marler to King, 1 July, 1936.

He provided many more to the English-language papers in Japan (of which there were as many as three in concurrent publication between 1929 and 1933), meanwhile maintaining an open line of communication with the Canadian media. A friendly relationship with John Dafoe, editor of the *Manitoba Free Press* and ardent Canadian nationalist, provided Marler with a sympathetic ear as well as a platform from which to promote the work and image of the Tokyo legation back in Canada.[64] The two exchanged lengthy personal letters, orchestrating the newspaper's special coverage of the Canadians' work in East Asia, meanwhile giving Dafoe's paper a leg up on competitors who relied on Ottawa and External for their stories. Dafoe used the legation to demonstrate and celebrate the work of the Canadian government abroad.[65] Marler accepted this praise, taking the chance to demonstrate to his critics in Canada that his job was more than a simple "joy-ride," as some claimed.[66]

In 1931, Marler negotiated the inclusion of works by Canadian painters in an exhibition organized by the new British Ambassador Francis Lindley. On the Canadian minister's suggestion, Lindley added another, separate room where the Canadian Minister displayed fifteen pieces from those on loan to the legation by the Canadian National Gallery, as well as number from his own private collection. While Marler's reactions to the event remain unclear, Lindley admitted to the Foreign Office in London "though the exhibition contained examples of the work of some good artists," it was not "worthy of all the expense incurred."[67] Popular response was positive, however. Canadian Second Secretary Kenneth Kirkwood reported in the local English language press and in private that the Canadian pieces – all of which were of landscapes,

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[64] John W. Dafoe was editor-in-chief of the *Manitoba Free Press* (later named the *Winnipeg Free Press*) for over four decades from 1901.

[65] Dafoe recognized opportunities for Canada in East Asia on two fronts: the first was the vast and largely untapped market for Canadian exports – in this interest, Dafoe had Marler's complete and enthusiastic cooperation in discussions. The second was the concept of East Asia as a proving ground for Canadian autonomism in foreign policy and affairs. Here, Marler's interest and support were tacit, though uneven and often understated as the minister himself grappled with his own desires regarding the Dominion's place in Empire. It is on this subject that the widest difference in their opinions appeared on and off after 1929. Regarding his work and thoughts on Canada's connection with East Asia in the earlier part of the decade, see: Ohara, "J.W. Dafoe and Japanese-Canadian Relations During the 1920s:" 60-74.

[66] "Those I wish I could have sit at my desk for a month and see how much joy-riding is involved." Marler to Dafoe, 18 April, 1930.

[67] Marler, Lindley reported to his superiors in London, "was kind enough to lend some pictures of own by modern Canadian artists which added greatly to the interest of the exhibition." Sir Francis Lindley, "Annual Report on Japan," in *Political Reports 1923-1931,* 519.

including several Group of Seven works – communicated the geographical diversity of the Dominion to its audience, demonstrating a "complete break with European conditions" in both subject and composition. The Canadian art displayed was "characterized by an adoption, to some degree, of European standards" but thereafter strengthened for their adoption of "more indigenous" influences in the New World, providing a sharp contrast with the portraiture works that filled the remainder of the British exhibition, he said.[68] Audiences were thus treated with yet another new perspective on Canadian identity and culture, this time in the form of a visual, material culture presented alongside symbols of the very national-imperial entity from which the Canadians at Tokyo laboured to present themselves as distinct.

The projection of image – both his individual image, as well as a purportedly collective, national image – was so important to Marler that on numerous occasions he spent private funds to promote it. In this way, he performed the role of patrician representative of culture and authority much as he had in Montreal. Indeed, his reputation for spending private funds while a public, government figure had followed him from the Quebec metropolis to the Japanese capital. Critics of his appointment to Tokyo remembered his 1921 campaign for election to Parliament, in which he had been accused of spending $75,000 to ensure his victory. As Keenleyside argued, on hearing this rumour from a previous electoral opponent of Marler's, "this, in those days, was an enormous sum, and the charge was almost like accusing Mr. Marler of corruption." When he asked Marler about this episode privately, the minister replied that the sum had more likely been $100,000.[69] Later, during the 1925 election, his subsequent Conservative opponent claimed to have capitalized on Marler's unabashed and unsympathetic tendencies to flaunt his wealth; MP Charles Cahan charged that Marler publicly touted his own social position to his electorate in appealing for their votes.[70] In Tokyo, however, such practices went over comparatively well with

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[68] Kirkwood, article in the *Japan Times,* 7 November, 1931, reproduced in "Diplomatic Journal: 1931," KPK fonds, MG27 III E 3, vol. 2, LAC.

[69] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 313n3.

[70] Keenleyside recalls hearing the story from Marler's opponent in that election some years later upon their meeting in Tokyo. Cahan told Keenleyside that Marler defeated himself after circulating a pamphlet that noted his own "social position" as reason for his candidacy. In response, Cahan said that he released his own flyer that read: "Mr. Marler asks you to elect him because of his social position. Mr. Cahan appeals for your votes on the basis of his intellectual ability." Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 436. Decades later, Howard Marler defended his father by providing a rather different account. He argued that Cahan, "a lawyer of Irish extraction" who Howard explains " had enjoyed a chequered career," played on his father a "damaging trick" by circulating in Marler's name the aforementioned 'social position' pamphlet. Marler, *Marler,* 106.

the diplomatic elite. Moreover, he no longer needed the confidence of his Montreal electorate. He benefitted from both his spending and from his celebration of social standing, personally organizing and financing a number of projects aimed at promoting a prosperous image of Canada in Japan. Whenever External refused his budgets for these purchases, Marler paid with his own funds.[71] This included the construction of a new legation building, a project he supervised until its completion in 1933, thereafter furnishing it with the finest and most expensive furniture and decorations. His obsession with appearances went further, however, as the Minister insisted on wearing the gaudiest of Windsor uniform, complete with plumed hat and sabre.[72] He saw his prestige as Minister as the most important tool he had in a Japanese society he deemed obsessed with the presentation and maintenance of 'face. As the loss of 'face' meant the loss of one's position in society, Marler insisted that the "prestige of the Canadian Legation," together with that of its Minister, "be acknowledged in every particular."[73]

Self Interest in the National Interest: Conclusion

Marler's ideas regarding Canada's place in the empire remained unchallenged for much of his early life in Montreal and Ottawa. In Tokyo, however, an internal conflict pertaining to his negotiation of seemingly conflicting identities and interests is evident. As Minister to Japan, he had to negotiate and discern Canada's role and position relative to England and empire from within an institution whose very existence challenged Britain's claims to authority over its dominions. Thus, while his professional performance as Minister to Japan was important in terms of establishing Canada's place and purpose in Pacific as well as global, international politics and exchange, it simultaneously demonstrates how the individual influenced structural developments in international politics and relations. Furthermore, as recent studies of the international as well as domestic political implications of Marler's actions at Tokyo have similarly shown, his paradoxical character and loyalties reflected more than just one individual's identity.[74] He personified the imperialist-autonomist dichotomy amongst Canadian policy-

[71] Marler to Skelton, 12 February, 1930, RG 25, D1, Vol. 794, File. 469, pt. 1-2, DEA fonds, LAC.
[72] Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 255-7.
[73] Marler to King, 1 July, 1936.
[74] See, for example, Meehan's depictions of Marler as a man making decided efforts to forge a distinct identity for Canada in East Asia while retaining an aloofness about Japanese imperialism in continental Asia that brought him ideologically closer to his British counterparts in the region. Meehan, “From Ally to Menace,” 351.

shapers during this time while simultaneously demonstrating that, from 1929 to 1933 at least, these ideologies could and did coexist in Canadian political circles and even within an otherwise autonomist institution such as the Department of External Affairs and its Tokyo legation. Marler's personal conflicts of identity, together with his perhaps inadvertent attempts to reconcile them, highlight the cleavages then prevalent within ascendant, interwar Canadian society. Importantly, though, it was his ability to extend his privilege and authority beyond the local and onto the global stage of interwar diplomacy that kept him from succumbing to forces challenging patrician elites in Canada.[75] By oscillating between bouts of autonomist nationalism and loyalist imperialism in order to protect his own position, Marler was able to prolong his relevancy and, with the titles and accolades afforded him after 1929, pad his accumulated privilege one final time.

In his survey of modern diplomacy, Jeremy Black writes of Sir Nevile Bland's 1956 account of the practises of international relations. Black highlights Bland's defence of tradition and 'proper' diplomacy, recorded as a preface to Ernest Satow's seminal *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice,* to demonstrate how Hitler and the war had affected the diplomatic conduct by the mid-century, and how men like Bland (and Marler) – diplomacy's 'old guard' – were then left to watch bitterly from the outside. Like Marler, Bland had been a foreign minister for his King and country in the interwar period, similarly earning a title as Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG) in its second decade.[76] Living through the war to write about the halcyon days of diplomacy, Bland lamented the head of mission's loss of autonomy in daily operations. "Increasing questioning and criticism in parliament and the press; a growing tendency for ministers dealing with foreign affairs to travel about the world and take into their own hands consolations which a few decades back could, and would, have been conducted by the heads of the diplomatic missions concerned" had, in Bland's understanding, undermined the "confidence and independence of members of the Foreign Service."[77] Herbert Meredith Marler

[75] As Young argues, the archetypical nineteenth century patrician founded his wealth not purely in "either commerce of industry" – but rather in their social and cultural connections with those atop the various institutions of collectively recognized authority within Quebec society. Throughout this, however, "landed property was at the base of their influence." Young, "Death, Burial, and Protestant Identity in an Elite Family: The Montreal McCords," in *Negotiating Identities in 19th- and 20th-Century Montreal: A Collection of Essays by the Montreal History Group,* ed. Bettina Bradbury and Tamara Myers (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 105.
[76] Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2010), 180-2.
[77] Nevile Bland, preface to *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice,* by Ernest Satow (London: Longmans, 1964) v-vii.

utilized this very same autonomy to capitalize not only on the few privileges that were not available to him in Montreal – namely, international prestige – but also to sustain his social and political relevance in the face of a changing urban Canadian mainstream.[78]

Yet Marler paid little notice to the waning influence of patricians such as himself – even as junior officers all around him made their daily notes and comments to that effect. Even his son longed for his father's society a half-century after the Second World War had snatched his patrician inheritances away from him, highlighting how those turn of the century structures underpinned patrician heads of families' claims to authority. Marler's experiences were thus limited to, and contained within, the period and society that made room for and accommodated his individual privilege and authority. Just as he ignored the views of those beneath him, so too did he ignore the signs of a coming change. Meanwhile, he utilized the political developments in both Canada and the greater Empire in the 1920s, as well as a comparatively simple, liberal nationalist version of constitutional history to justify the authority, status, and title afforded him as Minister to Japan.[79] Thereafter, however, his greatest contributions to Canadian distinctiveness and autonomy abroad came not in the form of political action or discourse. Instead, they came from the visual and material representations of Canadian culture and identity his person and work in Tokyo represented.

In light of the contrasting and parallel experiences of his fellow Canadians and members of the diplomatic corps in Tokyo, Marler's individual experience, as well as the various external perceptions of it, point to important turning points in three concurrent but separate histories. His arrival in Tokyo as first Canadian Minister to Japan in 1929 represented the reification of Dominion autonomy in international diplomacy. His quick and seamless transition from public life in Montreal to the elite, diplomatic circles of Tokyo meanwhile exemplify the twilight years of high diplomacy as practiced (albeit in slightly revised forms) since the Congress of Vienna.

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[78] Young has demonstrated how the changing urban landscape of Montreal, the industrial and economic capital of Canada in these early decades of the twentieth century, challenged the position of its patrician families and individuals, eroding the power and authority they had accumulated and concretized through the prior 150 years. His study of the McCord family up to 1930 provides the exemplary and indeed archetypical Montreal patrician case, meanwhile illuminating the forces at work in Southern Quebec and Canadian society that acted to curtail the patrician's predominance. See Young, *Patrician Families and the Making of Quebec,* 260, 326-8.

[79] In public speaking engagements in both Canada and Japan, Marler often grounded his argument in the historical progression of the state, tracing its "process of development" and its "natural and orderly steps from a Crown Colony to a self-governing Dominion and from a self-governing Dominion to one the equal nations of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Marler, "Canada and Trade with Japan."

Finally, Marler's reluctance to embrace change in social and political spheres in Canada – those he once dominated unchallenged – marked the final abdication of the patrician from the heights of Quebec, Canadian, and, with the cataclysm of World War Two on the horizon, international society.

Chapter 3 – Kenneth Porter Kirkwood: The Inquisitive Adventurer

The longest serving Canadian diplomat to Tokyo during the interwar period was Kenneth Porter Kirkwood who worked there as its most junior diplomatic secretary from 1929 to 1939. Unmarried and without children for the duration of his time in Japan, Kirkwood enjoyed the greatest amount of personal independence of the three legation men examined here. Unlike Keenleyside and Marler, Kirkwood was motivated less by the national policies of Canada or the position of the Dominion within empire and amongst the world's powers. Instead, he navigated his experiences in the office, ballroom, and wherever else possible, by the direction of his individual interests, passions, and desires. In his life and work in the Japanese capital, I will argue that Kirkwood saw himself as more of a contemplative adventurer than a national representative. To Kirkwood, diplomacy was an avenue for research and for intercultural exchange. He saw foreign policy as the work of officials and politicians in Ottawa who, using information provided by diplomats like himself, were responsible for its creation and deployment. The partisan politics shaping Canadian-Japanese relations were beyond his personal influence and interest. Kirkwood was not, however, without opinions regarding the structures of authority upon which this system operated. In fact, he rooted his understanding of Canada's place in international politics in a deep appreciation for the British Crown and Empire.[1] It was through the lens of Empire that he understood all aspects of international and cross-cultural, global exchange. While this appreciation for empire informed many of Kirkwood's actions and decisions throughout this period, he kept his politics private. The views he so often expressed in his diaries and essays thus remained hidden from his colleagues and acquaintances, left unspoken throughout his tenure as a Canadian national representative to Tokyo.

Kirkwood utilized the independence he found while in Japan primarily to make time to write. In the first three years of his posting there, he diligently recorded his thoughts and experiences about diplomacy, the world, Canadian and Japanese societies and cultures, and his individual role and responsibilities. He reflected, in his diaries and letters, upon his role and

[1] Kirkwood's position on Canadian autonomy is explicitly laid out in a draft chapter of his autobiography authored in the late fifties. In it, he explained his persistent view that "[T]he Dominion must remain a keystone in the magnificent arch of the British Commonwealth" and that "an independent republican Canada [would] result in the disintegration of the Empire," causing harmful effects to Canadians. Kirkwood, "Undergraduate Days," in 'Autobiographical notes. Memoirs (Chap. 1-12) (2 of 2),' Vol. 14, File 21, KPK fonds, LAC, 9.

experience as a diplomat, citizen, and imperial subject while deconstructing the various international exchanges his work facilitated. The written record he left illuminates how often these exchanges occurred on the periphery of official, bi-lateral, or multi-lateral national discussions. As such, they demonstrate both the personal and political freedoms the men of External in East Asia enjoyed during the twilight years of interpersonal, high diplomacy, as well as the actual influence of these individuals. Despite his reluctance to admit to any personal influence on Japanese-Canadian relations, his papers demonstrate how imperative the individual was to the cultivation and maintenance of international ties. His writing from this period was often broadly anthropological. Kirkwood compiled numerous essays about society and culture around him, as he saw and understood it. Much more of his writing followed an inward and reflexive gaze onto the self. While discovering and asserting his ability to devote time to contemplate and write in Tokyo, the individual experience supplanted his prescribed professional objectives as the most valuable aspect of Kirkwood's life in East Asia.

Adapting to life and work in Tokyo, Kirkwood was determined to spread his time across his public and private lives, thus differentiating himself from the obsessive careerism of his minister, Herbert Marler, and the comparatively family-orientated first secretary, Hugh Keenleyside. Unlike his two superiors in Tokyo, Kirkwood did not take the position for reasons of professional advancement. Although the salary and future opportunities it afforded were enticing, Kirkwood appreciated the position for more personal and immediately pragmatic reasons. These pertained to a two-part desire, first to escape the doldrums of southern Ontario (as he saw life there in the late-1920s); and second, to return to the foreign and exciting 'orient' which he had visited as a graduate student.[2] Thus, relative to his colleagues in Tokyo, Kirkwood

[2] Kirkwood's conceptualization of the 'orient' fluctuated as he employed popular usages of the term to affirm his own expertise on the expansive region that he justified with his publications, graduate degrees, and experiences in Turkey. At other times, he lampooned the idea that a scholar of Turkey had any transferable, specialized skills that might provide advantages when shifting focus to another 'oriental' nation or society such as Japan. In this way, a specific shift in his deployment of privilege is measurable. Never relinquishing these perspectives, however, his later, nuanced Orientalism provided all the more reason for western modernity's intervention into the lives and cultures of those living beneath it. Kirkwood himself thus became the beneficiary as a person identifiable with European superiority over the Other. His changed rationalization of the Other, in relation to his self, marked only a shifting set of means to an end that was for all practical purposes, identical. See Said, *Orientalism*, 2-4; on the structures of professional academia and its self-serving markers of authority in relation to the Orient during this time – how "every discrete study of one bit of Oriental material would also confirm in a summary way the profound Orientality

saw himself as more of a contemplative adventurer than a vessel of political authority or reform. Contented with the structures of the Empire he so loved, Kirkwood valued the chance to explore the frontiers of Western modernity and authority. Consequently, his papers from this period reflect matters of Canadian and international politics far less than those of his two senior colleagues in Tokyo. Instead, Kirkwood's writings relate the broader and more diverse set of experiences of a man who travelled to Japan to be a noble, self-styled example of liberal, democratic modernity amongst ancient and foreign peoples. To make sense of and record for posterity what he witnessed there, Kirkwood turned to the English Romantics and explorers of empire from the previous century, borrowing from their works their Orientalist perspectives and language.[3]

Early Life

Kenneth Porter Kirkwood was born April 14, 1899, in Brampton Ontario. The Kirkwood family's southern Ontario roots stretched back to when his great-grandfather arrived from Scotland in the late eighteenth century.[4] Shortly after Kirkwood's birth, the family moved to Cleveland, Toronto, and then London, England. Writing in the preface to her late husband's memoirs, Christine Kirkwood explains that he received his primary education from "various private and county schools in and around London until the age of eleven," after which his family returned to Canada.[5] Kirkwood developed his lifelong penchant for writing as a child. At nine, he won a national essay contest in Britain, meanwhile publishing short stories in his school's

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of the material," revealing for Western audiences "such things as the Oriental character, mind, ethos, or world-sprit" across time and space – see Ibid., 255-6.

[3] Kirkwood's papers are filled with references to Wordsworth, Keats, and Byron. Moreover, he constantly referenced the words and memoirs of colonial surveyors, explorers, and diplomats, reflecting his appreciation and indeed acceptance and internalization of the glorified journeys of the very authors Said references to demonstrate the importance of the Orientalist's 'residence' and pilgrimage there. Said, *Orientalism,* 157-66, 168.

[4] The 1933 staff questionnaire, prepared by Canadian Minister to Japan Herbert Marler and sent to Ottawa at the capital's request, lists Kirkwood's 'Racial Origin' as Scotland. "Canadian Legation, Tokyo, Japan: Information for Staff Questionnaire," DEA fonds, RG25 158, Volume 1583, File 1931-80-G, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Ottawa.

[5] Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note," in *The Diplomat at Table: A Social and Anecdotal History Through the Looking-Glass,* by Kenneth P. Kirkwood (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1974), v. This brief overview of her late husband's life appears synthesized from the voluminous contents of his private papers which are found organized as his "Autobiographical Files," a part of a much larger and meticulously curated and typed fonds donated after his death Library and Archives Canada. See: KPK fonds, LAC, especially volumes 13 to 15, "Autobiographical Notes."

bulletin.[6] Graduating from high school in Ontario during the First World War, he enlisted in the army and completed training as an infantry lieutenant in Toronto before switching to the Royal Naval Air Service. He served as a pilot in France and the Mediterranean, while continuing to write essays and poems.[7] Decades later in Tokyo, Kirkwood explained how the experiences of living in London as a boy and serving "for the sake of England" in the First World War instilled in him an appreciation for the British crown as an "institution" that, as the "node of the Commonwealth," represented the "greatest fact of modern political history."[8]

Like all of the diplomatic secretaries hired under Oscar Skelton at External in the late twenties, Kirkwood had a long list of academic achievements to his name. He began his post-secondary education at Victoria College of the University of Toronto, graduating there in Political Science. At Toronto, Kirkwood attended the debates and conferences of the Student Christian Movement, a liberal theological and political discussion group.[9] This organization afforded him numerous opportunities and it was here that he met Maryon Moody.[10] The two became close and remained in frequent contact following Kirkwood's graduation and subsequent reading year in England and Scotland.[11] However, in 1923, toward the end of Kirkwood's stay in the British Isles, Maryon began her courtship with a young professor at Toronto named Lester B. Pearson. The couple were quickly engaged and Kirkwood ceased regular correspondence with the soon to be Maryon Pearson.[12] While Kirkwood knew 'Mike' Pearson from the circles at

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[6] Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note," v.

[7] His status as both a pilot and ranking Canadian diplomat gained him a private house call with Charles Lindbergh during the famous American's brief stopover in Tokyo in 1931. Kirkwood to his mother, 3 September, 1931, KPK fonds, Vol. 23, File 6, LAC.

[8] Though in public Kirkwood was less vocal about his love for empire, in private he lauded England's imperial achievements: "The British Empire, more of Victorian and Kipling nature than the post-war 'Commonwealth,' and with it the 'Pax Britannica' is to me the greatest fact of modern political history. In union there's strength, and I am profoundly at heart a unionist and proudly an imperialist." Kirkwood, "Notes By the Way: The Irish Free State," KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 12, LAC.

[9] English, *Shadow of Heaven,* 103-4.

[10] The pair's relationship is said by historian John English to have become more serious following a 1922 conference trip taken to London by Student Christian Movement members. English, *Shadow of Heaven*, 103.

[11] Later, his wife Christine Kirkwood explained that "as a roving student, he attended lectures at Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Glasgow." Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note." vii. On Moody and Kirkwood's continued correspondence, see: English, *Shadow of Heaven,* 104-8; and Maryon Moody to Kenneth Kirkwood, various, Volume 34, File 7, KPK fonds, LAC.

[12] Kirkwood continued to reply in brief for a few months after the announcement of Maryon's engagement. Thereafter, however, he sent very few messages to them. He skipped their wedding in an early example of his later characteristic practice of avoiding wedding ceremonies. English, *Shadow of Heaven,* 113-4.

Toronto, relations between the two remained reticent.[13] The Pearson wedding marked the end of one personal relationship, and the beginning of another much longer, professional one for Kirkwood. In the decades that followed, as he distanced himself from Maryon, Kirkwood was increasingly subsumed under Pearson's professional and political authority.

Indeed, Kirkwood neglected and lost a number of relationships during his early life. The rupture between him and Maryon was only the most recent event making southern Ontario an uncomfortable location for him in the mid-twenties.[14] Furthermore, as his personal essays and diaries demonstrate, making friends remained a challenge throughout this period.[15] Thus, the lure of a life abroad became ever more enticing to a man who, entering the elite professional workforce as a well travelled and educated bachelor, sought an escape from pressures to settle down in either sleepy Ottawa or the growing, though nevertheless still socially 'small,' Toronto. Utilizing his background in 'Near-Eastern' history, Kirkwood took a teaching job at an international college in Smyrna (now İzmir), Turkey. He translated this experience into an opportunity to conduct research on the side. In 1926 he co-authored his first book, *Turkey*, under the guidance of his friend and mentor, historian Arnold J. Toynbee.[16] Kirkwood's academic as well as personal experience engaging 'the orient' continually afforded him opportunities in life. Colleagues and employers thereafter knew him as an expert or specialist on this expansive region – an important distinction in this moment of academic and public service professionalization.[17]

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[13] John English explains that "Mike [Pearson] and Ken[neth Kirkwood]'s [later] colleagues were vaguely aware that there was 'something' between the two of them. They heard about a poem, "Three Loves," [Kirkwood] wrote in Tokyo about Maryon and him." English, *Shadow of Heaven,* 114-5n; see also, Kirkwood, *Song in My Heart* (Tokyo: privately printed, 1932), Things were perhaps not as chilly between the two (at least during these early years) as English insists however, as, in 1928, Pearson happily sublet to Kirkwood his Ottawa apartment. Kirkwood to his father, 16 June, 1929, Vol. 23, File 4, KPK fonds, LAC.

[14] Indeed there was at least one more bit of troubling 'history' for Kirkwood in Toronto: the father of a mutual (female) friend of Kenneth and Maryon had "discouraged Ken from ever returning to Canada" for some reason that remains unclear to English, even after his examination of their letters. English, 112; see also: Maryon to Kenneth, Mar. 29, 1925.

[15] Despite the apparent "incompleteness" of solitary life, he spent many pages justifying his status. He insisted that his "nature is too delicately adjusted, too complex and equilibrated, to easily meet the struggle of forced combination." Kirkwood, "Bachelordom," October 1936, KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 12, LAC.

[16] Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927). The two had reconnected in Turkey the previous year after having met among the academic circles of London in 1923.

[17] Kirkwood admitted that while his experience in Asia was limited to its "other parts" – namely, Turkey – he nevertheless felt justifiably qualified to advise on matters regarding "Asiatic races." Excerpt from Letter to Father, in "Personal Diary," 14 July 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC. On the professionalization of the humanities in English Canada at this time, see: Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History*; and Wright, *The Professionalization of*

That fall he took a lectureship position at Columbia University, continuing his graduate studies there in the meantime.

Re-imagining a Modern World

Kirkwood lived in the prestigious International House while in New York, sharing a building with a number of the men and women with whom he would cross paths as a career diplomat.[18] International House residents in the mid-twenties were beneficiaries of earlier shifts amongst leading intellectuals and elite professionals who sought alternatives to the destructive nationalisms they perceived as responsible for the First World War. These answers, they thought, lay in the promotion of global co-operation through networks of international education and exchange. In the graduate studies departments of Columbia, these efforts culminated in the invitation of a growing number of international faculty and students. As historian Liping Bu argues, the elite, American purveyors of this internationalism – individuals who backed such institutions as Columbia and International House – saw themselves as tutors to a caste of future liberal democratic leaders in the rebuilding Europe and its modernizing, colonial periphery. Kirkwood assimilated these views, taking on what he later described as the "responsibility of my generation of students for future leadership."[19] The opening of International House New York in

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History in English Canada. On similar trends (many of which informed their Canadian variants) occurring south of the border and within the social sciences, see: Thomas L. Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority* (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2000). Finally, on the rather exaggerated scope of scholars such as Kirkwood's applicable knowledge – i.e., their specialities as "Orientalists" – see Said, *Orientalism,* 50-1.

[18] International House New York was a popular and prestigious boarding house in the Morningside Heights neighbourhood of Manhattan's Upper West Side. Founded in part by YMCA official Harry E. Edmonds and John D. Rockefeller, Jr., it opened in 1924. Rockeller, Jr. called it a "meeting place for the most intelligent, forward-looking students of the world in the hope and belief that the informal association which they thus have while residents of the House or members of the Club would lead to better international understanding when they return to positions of importance in their own countries." Rockefeller to Mrs. George Catlett Marshall, 10 February, 1949, GCMRL/G.C Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office, General, quoted in George Catlett Marshall *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 6: "The Whole World Hangs in the Balance," January 8, 1947-September 30, 1949,* eds. Larry I. Bland, Mark A. Stoler, Sharon Ritenour Stevens, and Daniel D. Holt (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2012), 678n1. For a more comprehensive history of the New York institution, as well as the internationalism of its founders and early administrators, see Liping Bu, "Education and International Cultural Understanding: The American Elite Approach, 1920-1937," in *Teaching America to the World and the World to America,* eds. Lisa Jarvinen and Richard Garlitz (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 111-33.

[19] Kirkwood, "Undergraduate Days," in 'Autobiographical notes. Memoirs (Chap. 1-12) (2 of 2),' KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 21, LAC.

1924 "characterized the internationalist endeavour of the cultural elite" who, Bu explains, gleefully imbibed the liberal optimism of the 1920s while celebrating the religious, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic diversity of its residents.[20]

Explaining the ideals prevalent amongst student organizations at Columbia and elsewhere in the early 1920s Kirkwood wrote: "there was an inspiration in all this post-war participation in attempting to rebuilding [sic] a better world and extend the ideals of international brotherhood."[21] The philosophy of international exchange and experience upon which American philanthropists built International House matched well with Kirkwood's outlook. His time there strengthened his faith in the power of international exchange and friendship as a way to combat what others saw as naturalized, ethnic or racial differences. Privately, Kirkwood expressed his sense of racial superiority.[22] The global brotherhood was to be cast in a mould of liberal democracy and led by the 'Anglo-Saxon' peoples so experienced in its forms of governance. Those privileged enough to live International House while attending Columbia in the mid-twenties were educated in these Anglo-Saxonist, liberal democratic terms. Their brand of internationalism took the democratic nation-state as central actor in a world of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation.[23] Through the sequential upheavals of the 1930s, Kirkwood's generation of international (and internationalist) graduate students retained these perspectives to varying degrees, while the tides of racial

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[20] Bu, "Education and International Cultural Understanding," 116.

[21] Kirkwood, "Student Life in Europe," in 'Autobiographical notes. Memoirs (Chap. 1-12) (2 of 2),' KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 21, LAC.

[22] Privately, Kirkwood expressed his sense of racial superiority. One example from this period are his reflections on lecturing at Columbia at the height of the institutions' apparent 'internationalism:' "Even though my classes were composed mostly of Applebaums and Finkelsteins, Guargliardis and other such foreign names, and rarely had any students with an Anglo-Saxon surname, I found them keen and serious, - good workers and agreeable companions in the classroom." Kirkwood, "Further School & University Teaching," in KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 21.

[23] Bu describes their aims as defined by "a liberal belief that 'brotherhood' could be forged among people of all nations if there were educated to understand and appreciate one another's cultures." Thus, International House prided itself on co-ed living spaces of "racial integration." Bu, Education and International Cultural Understanding," 113, 122. International House, and its allies at amongst the faculty and student body at Columbia, were not without their racist, exclusionist counterparts in that city and institution, however. In its more extreme forms, this 'Anglo-Saxon'-led conception of global governance and authority sought to either subjugate or completely expel non-whites from white enclave, settler-societies like British Columbia, Australia, and South Africa. One these concurrent, transnational processes, as well as overviews of popular conceptions and usages of this fabricated, exclusionist Anglo-Saxon identity during and just before Kirkwood's time, see Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line,* 3-5.

prejudice and nationalist fervour continued to rise around them.[24] Later, in the wake of the Great Depression, the very same forces of racism and nationalism America's elite philanthropists envisioned Kirkwood's class combating met with waves of austerity, stifling internationalist education movements of this type and dealing a fatal blow to institutions such as International House.[25] This tension between the apparent universalism of this portion of global elite and the narrowly defined nationalisms then proliferating across regions of the world troubled Kirkwood throughout the early portions of his foreign service career. In the mid-century, he was somewhat unknowingly witness to the sowing of the seeds of resistance against the very liberal democratic framework his colleagues and educators regarded so dearly. Emerging across the growing number of post-colonial contexts within which this framework had been imposed upon its subjects, these movements clashed spectacularly with the institutions and structures of authority that had so privileged Kirkwood in his interwar life and career.

Professional Crossroads

In 1928, faced with the chance to complete his PhD and begin a career in academia, Kirkwood wrote and passed examinations for two new positions at Canada's Department of External Affairs. He skipped over questions on Political Science and Political Economy at each opportunity, opting instead for those in International Law, his most recent field at Columbia, as well as Modern History.[26] Meanwhile, his candidacy was further benefitted by Skelton's weighting of the professional and academic experience of applicants, part of the Under Secretary's campaign to attract and recruit internationally educated candidates in addition to the usual professional elite. Worth even more than the exam questions, Kirkwood's ninety per cent score in "Education & Experience" insured him top rank amongst the sixty others who wrote.[27] In a 'graduating class' of

[24] Kirkwood explains: "I have few major prejudices, and little of that narrow patriotism which makes one critically and unfriendlily disposed toward other races, peoples or States […] I even like the Americans." This statement is made in the preamble of an essay criticizing the "treasonable" behaviour of the Irish Free State – a state for which Kirkwood had little respect for its "treason against a sympathetic and beneficent King." Kirkwood, "Notes By the Way: The Irish Free State," KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 12, LAC.

[25] This "resurgent racism" is demonstrated across the cases of Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, American, and South African policy by Lake and Reynolds, from 1924 on, as each respective nation installed yet another layer of exclusionist laws to ensure the maintenance of the local white majority. See Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line,* 312-21.

[26] "Statement of Marks Obtained," KPK fonds, Vol. 28, File 17, LAC.

[27] Ibid.; Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note," vii.

eight hires that included Lester Pearson, Hugh Keenleyside, and Norman Robertson, Kirkwood ranked second for both positions he applied for.[28]

Kirkwood's first posting was under Canada's first Minister to Washington D.C., Vincent Massey.[29] Massey gave Kirkwood his earliest lessons on diplomatic etiquette and lifestyle. "In the diplomatic career you are on duty 24 hours a day" Massey told his newest secretary, "there is no interlude when you can forget your role, rank and representational character, and become a private individual."[30] In the years that followed, Kirkwood reflected on the nature and practise of diplomacy in these terms – though, as he later realized, Massey's notion of diplomacy was not its only possible interpretation. The social circuit of Washington D.C. in 1928 was Kirkwood's trial by fire. There he learned the ins and outs of the interpersonal 'extras' by which diplomacy was then so often conducted: the luncheon, the dinner party, and the ball.[31] Working abroad for the first time, alongside the enduringly condescending Hume Wrong, Kirkwood's earliest days at External were trying ones.

After 1928, any desire Kirkwood had to return to Ottawa was limited to concerns about his career. To be away from External's head offices often meant falling out of contention for promotions and accolades. Nevertheless, Kirkwood remained adverse to the idea of living in the capital. "Ottawa is a city that has attractions for those who have roots there, or who have friends or a social niche," he wrote to himself. "[U]nless one is intimately associated with those circles, it possesses few stimulating advantages."[32] Returning from his yearlong posting at Washington to Ottawa, the Canadian capital's "small town manner and small town code of morality" was jarring.

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[28] Pearson edged out Kirkwood 86.5 to 84.3. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 245n1, 245n2. As English remarked about the exam results, "once again, as with Maryon, Mike won out." English, *Shadow of Heaven,* 140.

[29] Kirkwood thus left Columbia with a Master's degree in Public Law, completing only the course work of the PhD program in which he registered. Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun,* 21.

[30] Vincent Massey, quoted in Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note," viii; Kirkwood wrote himself about advice received at this time – likely from Massey or at least by another of Massey's staff whose principles matched perfectly with the Canadian Minister to the United States – when "as a young diplomatic secretary, I was repeatedly adjured by one of my seniors that once a dinner engagement had been accepted no excuse 'except death' would justify its last minute cancellation or defection." Kirkwood, *The Diplomat at Table,* 101.

[31] He complained about his time in Washington in his diary, noting that despite their equal rank, Wrong treated him "as a freshman" – this he chalked up to a nature that he decided was "unconscious in most of the Wrongs." Kirkwood, "Personal Diary," 10 July 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.

[32] Kirkwood, "Ottawa," KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 21, LAC. As historian H. Gordon Skilling noted in 1945, it was not until the early thirties that, despite the "complete hiatus" of External's expansion under Bennett, a lively diplomatic community flourished in Ottawa. Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad*, 244-5.

No longer able to see the "movies and plays that millions of people enjoyed in other cities," and with only a few "insignificant restaurants," Kirkwood found himself bored. With wines and spirits in short supply, he regularly crossed with friends into nearby Hull, Quebec to imbibe.[33] Again, the incongruity of his personal and professional desires troubled him.[34] Meanwhile, however, his practical experience abroad made him the most certified secretary in 1929 without a post. Soon after his arrival in Ottawa, Skelton proposed his addition to the staff of the Legation in Tokyo, scheduling his September arrival in East Asia.

Privately, Kirkwood admitted to having his heart "set on a European post, and a chance to see family at home."[35] He wished for a return to the cuisine, culture, and familiarity of Europe, a place that had supplanted the town and province where he was born as 'home.' Keenleyside had only five weeks earlier opened the Tokyo offices when, on 8 July, 1929, Kirkwood accepted the posting.[36] He met with Marler in Montreal before their August sailing from Vancouver to Yokohama on the Canadian Pacific Railway steamer, the *Empress of France*.

Upon arrival in Tokyo, Kirkwood became third secretary. This was a demotion in rank relative to his previous two assignments at Ottawa and Washington. Kirkwood's acceptance of these conditions – the reduction in rank and the posting to a non-European capital – demonstrated his persistent desire to experience life outside of Ottawa.[37] As Skelton would not approve Marler's requests for an additional hiring, Kirkwood's role became that of the minister's assistant.[38] Meanwhile, Kirkwood admitted to his father that his status as a childless bachelor

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[33] "There was of course no night-life [in Ottawa]," he explained; "In other words I found the city extraordinarily dull." Kirkwood, "Ottawa," KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 21, LAC..

[34] These concerns were not completely remedied by his posting abroad, however. In Tokyo he often reflected questioningly on the professional benefits or purpose of his presence at the legation there – his desire for a European post at which he might contribute to Western geo-politics more directly while soaking up the ascendant culture of the continent remained the subject of his desires for throughout the interwar period.

[35] Kirkwood, "Personal Diary," July 10, 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC. His frequent letters his immediate family, then living in London, lamented his inability to see them as regularly as a European posting would have allowed.

[36] Kirkwood, "Personal Diary," July 10, 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.

[37] As the position was initially intended only as a three-year term, he could not have anticipated the professional stagnation it would induce. Kirkwood ended up spending a decade in Tokyo as second secretary.

[38] Marler had wanted Keith Crowther as his assistant but, after a long period of deferential treatment of Marler's request by Skelton, was finally turned down before in the early summer of 1929 and told to manage with his two diplomatic secretaries and trade commissioner James Langley who would be moved over from his Kobe offices. See Herbert Marler to Oscar D. Skelton, 9 April 1929, RG 25, D1, Vol. 794, File 469, Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, LAC.

made him a "cheaper" option for Skelton and the Department. He was self-conscious of how he had been "foisted upon [Marler], rammed down his throat so to speak, by the High Command" who decided that he was, on his own, a better option as at once a junior officer and personal assistant to Marler than the hiring of another, junior staff member.[39] In just his first six months on the job, this self-consciousness turned to bitterness as he reflected upon the very nature of his role, as well as the overall productivity of the legation. Meanwhile, however, he benefitted from his minister's desire for institutional prestige. By the end of the spring of 1930, with the help of Marler's many letters to Ottawa, Kirkwood returned to the rank of second secretary.[40] Nevertheless, he found himself worked to the point of exhaustion tending to Marler's social calendar and he remained unable to pinpoint the greater purpose of his various duties. He battled loneliness as a sense of alienation from the local Japanese and foreign populations Tokyo set in.

Although Kirkwood remained unwavering in his duties as a civil servant, his private papers from this period reflect a continuing tendency to question the circumstances and conditions that had brought him to East Asia. "I sometimes wonder what a Canadian Legation can accomplish in Japan," Kirkwood wrote, admitting that while "Mr. Marler is definitely anxious to 'drum up business,'" he wondered whether "this should rather be the work of trade commissioners than the function of an ambassador."[41] With their daily filling of mailbags, attendance to the nightly events of the diplomatic corps, and their various speeches on Canada's place in the Empire, the Pacific, and the maintenance of amicable bi-lateral relations therein, he was bothered by his belief that though the Canadians in Tokyo were thoroughly busy, the legation was producing no new policy. Kirkwood thus found little inspiration in his work. From

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[39] Kirkwood explained to his father that, as "only bachelor member of the service" without a posting, he was the most versatile and cost effective choice. "(Excerpt from Letter to Father) Personal Diary," 14 July 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC. His struggles as personal secretary to Marler began with the Minister's trip from Montreal to Vancouver and continued through their journey to Tokyo as the ministers particular tastes and demands tested Kirkwood's patience. Kirkwood, "Diplomatic Diary: Canadian Legation, Tokio, I. 1929-1930," 31 August 1929, KPK Fonds, MG27 III E 3, vol. 2, LAC.

[40] Regarding Kirkwood's promotion, Marler appeared sympathetic to the position of his junior office – he even went so far as to offer to pay Kirkwood himself, or have his own salary reduced, in order to facilitate the promotion. See Herbert Marler to Oscar D. Skelton, 30 May 1930, RG 25, D1, Vol. 794, File 469, Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, LAC; Skelton to Marler, 19 June 1930, in Ibid.

[41] Kirkwood, "Diplomatic Diary: Canadian Legation, Tokio, I. 1929-1930," 14 July 1929, KPK Fonds, MG27 III E 3, vol. 2, LAC.

his perspective, the legation was hardly promoting a 'greater good' or engaging in the active improvement of the lives of those it encountered.

The Individual and His Society

In private, Kirkwood described the early objectives of the legation in rather solemn terms. "Unlike our European missions, which are largely concerned with encouraging immigration," he explained to his father, "our Japanese Legation must be concerned with discouraging immigration, with all the tact and diplomacy at our command."[42] He had only an indirect role in these early tasks, the centerpiece of which was the renewal of the "Gentleman's Agreement on Immigration." Still acting personal assistant to the minister, Kirkwood facilitated the meetings and banquets at which Marler and Keenleyside, together with their counterparts from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducted the necessary discussions.

Kirkwood was thirty years old and unmarried when he arrived in Tokyo.[43] During his first years there, the many comments and questions he received on this matter caused him some distress.[44] Adding to his colleagues' and friends' interest, Kirkwood avoided wedding ceremonies, skipping the celebrations of even the most politically and socially important couples. In private, he prepared arguments in defence of his unmarried status.[45] Though he repeatedly resisted the

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Kirkwood married Christine Czerwinski in the 1950s. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 393n9.

[44] He wrote long and often on the subject, including essays titled "On Being a Bachelor," "Bachelordom," and "Bachelor Musings."All in KPK fonds, LAC. Often, his explanations as to his unmarried status centered around the apparently innate complexity of his character, the sensitivities of his heart, and the inevitable inabilities of women to understand or match his features and passions. Moreover, it was during this period that he was in the midst of a case of unrequited love involving New York socialite and former fellow student at Columbia University, Louise Hawkes. Louise was the daughter of the prominent social conservative Republican senator for New Jersey, Albert Hawkes, and was in her later life a hardliner anti-communist and opponent of liberal education reform. She was wed in 1932, becoming Mrs. Louise Padelford, dealing a seemingly fatal blow to Kirkwood's faith in monogamy, love, and the institution of marriage. On Kirkwood and Hawkes' rather one sided relationship, see: "Hawkes, Louise R. Correspondence," Vol. 27, File 12, KPK fonds, LAC. A collection of essays, poems, and autobiographical reflections about the experience are found bound and ordered by Kirkwood himself in "Hawkes, Louise R. Intimate Reflections by K.P.K.," Vol. 27, File 13, in Ibid. On the life and later conservative political activism of Louise, see: Michael E. James, *The Conspiracy of the Good: Civil Rights and the Struggle for Community in Two American Cities, 1875-2000* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005), 258-274; Andrew Hartman, "Progressive Education is *Red*-ucation: Conservative Though and Cold War Educational Vigilantism," chapter 5 in Hartman's *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008): 91-116.

[45] He cited the economic dangers of marrying young, when a man is still in the midst of his "scramble for professional success and achievement;" and that a lifelong commitment requires a certain "spiritual affinity" which

expectations placed upon him as an elite, Anglophone male – pressures to start a family after university in Ontario, for example – Kirkwood's resistance was not founded in opposition to such values. He in no way sought to change or even oppose his society's values; he praised and respected (at times, even envied) his male colleagues who had married. Rather, he valued his own personal autonomy in deciding when and how these moments would occur in his own life. During this period, it was this personal autonomy that he cherished most. This level of self-involvement, free from desires to change the status quo, led him to adopt practises of intense self-reflection and the cultivation of a specific personal image and history. Realizing this at the start of his second year in Tokyo, Kirkwood began a wholehearted engagement – obsession, even – with his mind, philosophy, and personal experiences.

From 1930, Kirkwood asserted a more formal division between home and work, thereby relieving himself of the triviality of the office duties he found so inconsequential.[46] His management of this division demonstrated a form of personal autonomy which he used to create a private sphere where there was once only a public, professional one. He first did this by renting and establishing a home some distance away from the legation.[47] Then, within this new space, he built relationships with a number of Westerners who, arriving on private business, offered a way to expand and enliven a life outside diplomatic circles. Furthermore, in his first year in Japan, Kirkwood took advantage of the reduced summer office hours to expand this personal sphere by spending the season at Lake Chūzenji and at Karuizawa, mountain villages that offered the privileged foreign residents of Tokyo reprieve from the oppressive heat of the coastal summers.

The prestige and connections afforded by his diplomatic status, as well as his growing connections amongst the local elite, allowed Kirkwood to reap the benefits of the collective social institutions of the diplomatic corps and foreign community of Tokyo. He navigated these circles in order to circumvent Vincent Massey's rule that as diplomats were "on duty 24 hours a

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is not easy to find; and that the older one gets, the more particular in one's taste one becomes. Kirkwood, "On Being a Bachelor," KPK fonds, Vol. 14, File 12, LAC.

[46] Kirkwood kept both 'personal' as well as 'diplomatic' diaries – the latter being typed and edited, completed with footnote citations and careful, respectable descriptions of colleagues and events, the former offering a much more forthright parallel account, hand-written and un-annotated. On the subject of the home and work, private and professional divide, and the 'management of self' of the diplomat, see: Neumann's social anthropological study of the individual in diplomacy, "To Be a Diplomat," especially 77-83.

[47] Kirkwood completed his 'house hunt' in the fall of 1929, moving into a "bungalow" off of Shiba park in a neighbourhood with a number of American and English residents. Kirkwood, "Personal Diary," 7 October 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.

day" they were inherently unable to "become a private individual."[48] For all the stasis being in Tokyo brought to the progression of his career, to be so removed from the scrutinizing gazes of Skelton, the Prime Minister, the variously imperialist and autonomist MPs and journalists brought a level of personal freedom and autonomy in action unmatched amongst Canadian diplomats elsewhere. Importantly, it was only after he had established for himself a private, home sphere and life for himself in Tokyo that his creative productivity and happiness returned. It was amongst these private hobbies and passions – the most important of which was writing – that Kirkwood found his purpose in Tokyo.

Kirkwood was in fact aware of the ancillary opportunities and privileges afforded by the position in Tokyo when he took the job. While in Ottawa, he rationalized his decision to his father, citing the freedom and exploration the post would allow. Kirkwood explained that while he accepted "the appointment like a soldier ordered off for foreign service," the chance to make the trans-Canadian trip by rail, to reside in the "Far East under the most favourable circumstances of prestige and position," and to have audience with the Emperor of Japan helped to ease his longing for a European post.[49] The office work at the legation was a small price to pay for these privileges. In his second year in Tokyo, Kirkwood realized these opportunities by asserting his personal autonomy, taking advantage of urban life in Tokyo while seeking out the imported high, western culture he so craved.

For members of the late-interwar foreign diplomatic corps in Tokyo, official social engagements demanding attendance were held on a near nightly basis. In this capacity, Kirkwood was an active, if reluctant, socialite. While some Canadians embraced this aspect of interwar diplomacy – his former and current ministers in the early 1930s Vincent Massey and Herbert Marler, for example – Kirkwood's preference for quiet seclusion amongst books proved a challenge as the seemingly endless stream of invitations and obligations rolled in. As one of the central reasons behind the legation's opening was to promote and project Canada's name, image, and autonomy onto the world stage, these social events represented invaluable opportunities for Marler and his staff. For those aligned with Skelton's outright autonomism, they were chances to

[48] Massey, quoted in Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note," viii.

[49] Kirkwood went on, justifying his decision to his father (and simultaneously, it seems, himself) by noting the opportunities for travel that awaited him once settled in Tokyo – from the Japanese capital, Kirkwood made numerous tours through the islands' countryside and cities, several times going to the mainland. "(Excerpt from Letter to Father) Personal Diary," 14 July 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.

make headway in distinguishing the Dominion from its Imperial motherland. For others, they were further chances to sell Canadian wheat. For Kirkwood, however, these events were nothing more than compulsory showcases of the collective roles of the diplomatic corps, all conducted with a polite and polished hollowness he found unfulfilling.

As the central venue of exchange between national representatives, the luncheon, dinner party, and reception were important to the life and work of those whose purpose it was to ensure that discussions among national governments remained cordial and constant.[50] Kirkwood's recorded experiences reflect this fact. Despite the apparent importance of the "social side of diplomatic life" however, Kirkwood confided that it did not appeal to him: "It thoroughly bores me," he wrote,

> it is all so farcical and vapid and vain. I have no innate relish for the social masquerade, or any high and exciting regard for respect for the high person of high place whom one perfunctorily meets in the diplomatic round. All of them are empty of stimulating enthusiasms or thoughts, all of them wear the same benevolent but meaningless mask and say little of what their think or feel; all of them, perhaps, are equally envious of the simple man in the street who is free to live and love to think and act without always keeping to the inhibiting and restricting vacuousness and fatuousness of form.[51]

At these events, as with the private outings he increasingly took part in after 1930, Kirkwood's companions were always foreign. He had few personal relationships with Japanese citizens outside of those he employed as servants or guides.[52]

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[50] One glance at Kirkwood's schedules and invitations from this period demonstrates how, even for the lowest ranking officer of the legation, social obligations were myriad. See: "Japan. Clippings re Festivals, Socials, Travels, etc.," Vol. 34, File 17, Vol. 35, Files 1-2, KPK fonds, LAC; "Social Activities in Japan," Vol. 35, Files 4-5, KPK fonds, LAC.

[51] Kirkwood, "Personal Diary,"3 November, 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 17, File 5, LAC. As his years in Tokyo stretched on, the numerous and compulsory diplomatic luncheons and soirees continued to challenge his patience. On one of his rare visits to Ottawa in 1937, Kirkwood complained that Marler's replacement in Tokyo had turned the legation into an entirely "social operation." English, 193; see also Diary, Jan.-May 1937, MG26 N 8, Vol. 1, File 3, Lester B. Pearson fonds, MG 26, N, LAC.

[52] This was the common experience of diplomats in Tokyo up to this point. In her study of British Ambassador to Japan JohnTilley, Harumi Goto-Shibata harnesses her subject's apparent dislike for Japan and Tokyo society to illuminate how the diplomats' contacted Japanese society only through networks of nobility, the highest level of the local civil service, or other exalted peers and aristocrats. Amongst this community, it is noted, English was the primary language and social and diplomatic meetings (often one in the same, as mentioned) were held in public or official venues. Goto-Shibata explains that Tilley, like other foreign diplomats, was rarely invited to Japanese houses. Goto-Shibata, "Sir John Tilley," 128-9.

His limited contact with native residents of Tokyo and its surrounding areas was no doubt result of the difficulties of communication, but there was also the matter of differences of culture. Rarely in his writings and journals did Kirkwood describe adapting to Japanese customs or manners. Moreover, while appreciative of the opportunity to observe and study local culture there, Kirkwood expressed no desire to adopt any aspect of it in his daily life. With ample amenities and support provided amongst the foreign community – usually attained with the assistance of bilingual Japanese or long-time foreign residents, who had themselves adopted to either the 'western' manners of their employers or to local customs – Kirkwood was not forced to adapt to life in Tokyo. Instead, he lived on the assistance of those who adapted to him. He left all that was irreconcilably foreign around him outside the ambit of his day to day, ignoring aspects of Japan that conflicted with his own sensibilities until he became inspired to observe, record, and explain the apparent peculiarities from afar.

While Kirkwood began to enjoy a small circle of friends by 1931, the key difference was that social obligations assumed among them were completely on his own terms. While still submitting to the many social liaison duties of the legation, he combated the boredoms of work by embracing the two most prominent non-governmental forces in his life in Tokyo: the natural environment and the various aspects of culture available to him in Tokyo. With a small handful of young foreigners (often American or British, though he preferred the latter), Kirkwood attended concerts and dinners, other times taking his car to explore the nearby regions. One characteristic tour occurred in his second summer at the legation when, along with a male Japanese staff member, he travelled through the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The trip allowed Kirkwood to escape the office where he had been increasingly taking lunch at his desk, busied by the seemingly unending, if menial, tasks demanded by Marler.[53] Due to his unwillingness to accede to Japanese mores and norms, however, his up close experience with the dominant culture of his adopted home was thus bound to his ability to appreciate through observation. Fortunately, he found a growing theatre and concert scene that was increasingly importing European and North American acts and productions.

[53] Kirkwood, "Diplomatic Diary: Canadian Legation, Tokyo, I. 1930-1931," 13 August 1930, KPK Fonds, MG27 III E 3, vol. 2, LAC. This particular trip was a part of a mandated plan by Marler to have his staff peruse the entire nation and eastern continent. Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 377.

New Projects

Rather than abandon his practises of academic research and writing, Kirkwood adapted them to fill his new found private, individual time on evenings and weekends. He again put to use skills learned as a graduate student at Columbia and in a further attempt to make sense of his experiences, Kirkwood looked to learn from those before him. He absorbed every diplomatic memoir and biography he could find. He read Baroness Eleanora Mary d'Anethan's *Fourteen Years of Diplomatic Life in Japan* and Mary Crawford Fraser's *Letters of a Diplomat's Wife in Japan,* along with the letters and memoirs of former British Minister to Japan Sir Ernest Satow.[54] He studied the written experiences of the western consuls, missionaries, and sojourners of the previous decades, adopting their perspectives, comments, critiques, and methods of documentation in order to leave after himself a similar written record. He looked to the pantologist "scholar-diplomats" who, under circumstances similar to his own, laboured to explain aspects of Japanese and East Asian – or, 'oriental' – traditions and cultures for their English-reading audiences back home.[55] Language barriers challenged these authors' abilities to get close to their subjects – very few were able to converse with locals directly and without interpreters. Instead, these scholars and scholar-diplomats based their conclusions on their

[54] Mary d'Anethan, *Fourteen Years of Diplomatic Life in Japan*; Mary Crawford Fraser, *A Diplomat's Wife in Japan: letters from Home to Home* (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1899). Kirkwood identified with the two observer's appreciations for the natural environment, as well as their complaints about the various and compulsory social engagements. On this, see: Kirkwood, "Diplomatic Journal: 1932," 9 August, 1932, KPK Fonds, MG27 III E 3, vol. 2, LAC. Like many diplomats before and after himself, Kirkwood found Satow's work useful as not only an educational introduction to turn of the century Japanese politics and society, but also to the actual conduct of diplomacy as it occurred until at least the end of the 1930s. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*. Keenleyside called Satow's volume "the bible of British diplomatic practice." Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 279.

[55] These efforts, together with the more widely and determinedly pursued academic endeavours of those Orientalists outside the diplomatic profession, comprised the "system of knowledge" Said identified as the "accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness." This system at once characterized the central arrangement by which power and authority relations between Orientalists and their subjects were founded, along with the ways in which these scholars presented their findings to their fellow Occidentals. Said, *Orientalism,* 5-6. On the role of the 'scholar-diplomat' in governmental, as well as their anthropological or ethnographical work (much of which the present author would argue was indeed of this Orientalist sort) see: J. E. Hoare, "Introduction to Part IV: Scholar Diplomats and Consuls," in *British Enjoys in Japan, 1859-1972,* eds. Hugh Cortazzi et al. (Kent: Global Oriental, 2004), 219-22. Perhaps no better example of the archetypical Imperial scholar-diplomat was Satow, British consulate official at Yokohama for two decades and, later, Minister to Japan from 1895-1900. Among a number more works on travel, language, and politics in Japan, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice* was an important instruction manual to the professional as well as personal experience of being a diplomat. Satow, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice,* ed. Lord Gore-Booth, Desmond Pakenham (London: Longman, 1979). On the continued importance of *Satow's Guide* in the training of diplomats around the world today, see: Neumann, 84.

distanced observation and a logic derived from western, post-enlightenment conceptions of the individual, modernity, and society. They projected their western categories and measurements onto their subjects. Kirkwood too had little direct contact with local Japanese residents, though this did not deter him from drawing conclusions about Japanese society and its people.[56] Relying primarily on translated works of national history, as well as English language literature of the scholar-diplomats who came before him, Kirkwood produced no fewer than eight manuscripts while in Tokyo, including studies of Japanese history, literature, and art.[57]

Kirkwood best demonstrated his interest in the experiences of Westerners who had lived in Japan in the decades before him with his book-length biographical study of the life and work of Lafcadio Hearn.[58] Tracing Hearn's personal and professional life from the time of his departure from America in 1889 through his fourteen years in Japan, in *Unfamiliar Lafcadio Hearn* Kirkwood highlighted a number of parallels between Hearn's experience and his own.[59] Hearn was born in the Ionian islands of Greece amidst the Mediterranean, near where Kirkwood was some sixty years later when he took his first extended leave from home to work in western Turkey.[60] The biography opens with Hearn's move from America to Japan in 1890, a trip that began with his transcontinental journey aboard the Canadian Pacific Railway. Kirkwood made the same trip in 1929. Moreover, as Kirkwood explained, focused primarily on "the important

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[56] Kirkwood was essentially illiterate in his early years in Tokyo – he did not begin seriously studying the language until about his fourth year in Japan, when it became clear to him that a transfer out was not imminent. His wife explains (if somewhat dubiously) that "as soon as he had become more or less fluent" he was transferred to Holland in 1939. Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note," viii. Moreover, like many of the aforementioned 'diplomat-scholars' who published monographs and memoirs during or about their time there, fluency in Japanese was often self-assessed and not demonstrated or corroborated by Japanese sources. Important exceptions do, of course, exist: Satow had a strong ability with the language. Furthermore, in the wake of increased missionary arrival and activity in Japan in the late nineteenth- early twentieth century, a new generation white residents, born and educated in Japan and skilled in the language, emerged. Amongst their ranks was the important scholar of Japanese history, E. Herbert Norman (n. 1909 – ob. 1957) whose works on feudalism in Japan and the history of its political development remain highly respected there to this day.

[57] His largest academic work, completed while living in Japan, was *Renaissance in Japan: A Cultural Survey of the Seventeenth Century* (Tokyo: Meiji Press, 1938).

[58] International author and teacher, Hearn remains a well known figure in Japan today. In English, see: Sukehiro Hirakawa, ed., *Lafcadio Hearn in International Perspectives* (Kent, CT: Global Oriental LTD, 2007).

[59] The title is itself homage to both the man, and his work. It is a reference to Hearn's 1895 book *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan.* Kirkwood, *Unfamiliar Lafcadio Hearn* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1936).

[60] On the subject of historical as well as contemporaneous Greco-Turkic relations, Kirkwood was an expert. His MA thesis at Columbia was "Compulsory Exchange as a Solution of Minority Problems; with special reference to the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations," (master's thesis, Columbia, 1927).

phase of Hearn's *transition* from a frustrated career in the West to a career of fulfilment and relative happiness in the East," *Unfamiliar Lafcadio Hearn* was an attempt to describe and understand how Hearn adapted to life in Japan.[61] Thus, when Kirkwood highlighted in Hearn's life the "crucial turning point upon which, so often, success or failure in life depends," he was not only speaking of his subject's experiences in Japan, but also his own. By empathizing with and illustrating the struggles Hearn faced in adapting to life in Japan, Kirkwood indirectly described many of the challenges he felt himself.[62]

Curating a Legacy: Conclusion

For a tendency toward self-reflexivity, then, Kirkwood's own character appears in his academic writing as in his private works. Indeed, his favourite subject of analysis throughout this period remained his self. Self-reflexive material comprises the largest parts of his now public fonds. The Kenneth Porter Kirkwood papers, donated in batches to Library and Archives Canada, demonstrate the lengths to which the scholar-diplomat Kirkwood went to create a lasting legacy and record of his own lived experiences. Between his retirement from External in 1959 and his death in 1967 Kirkwood prepared no fewer than three versions of book-length memoirs and a volume of vignettes, musings, and epigrams about diplomatic life and its various observed practices. These edited accounts, donated to the national public archives in the years after his death, reflect an official account that is at once critical as well as sympathetic of the many politicians and individuals mentioned in his anecdotes and memories, many of whom were still living in the 1970s. These are the products of Kirkwood's desire to leave something for future diplomats, civil servants, students, and writers: an arranged, accessible, and, most importantly, celebratory image of himself. The mass of papers deposited in 1990, however, adds important nuances to these volumes. His original, handwritten journals include the names of individuals with whom he was romantic, as well as individuals he thought poorly of – two groups of people who do not appear in the typed and edited 'Diplomatic Diaries' versions, for example.

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[61] Emphasis is the original. Kirkwood, *Unfamiliar Lafcadio Hearn,* viii-ix. Smaller sections of the work center upon literary criticism, focusing on Hearn's lesser known forays into lyrical and poetic forms of expression. Here Kirkwood draws upon his familiarity with critics of the Romantics. The crux of Kirkwood's argument here, however, is aimed solely to demonstrate that Hearn did in fact write poetry – an aspect of the writers' practise that was relatively unknown at the time. See Ibid., 70-2.

[62] Ibid., viii-ix.

The only autobiographical work Kirkwood published, however, was *The Diplomat at Table: A Social and Anecdotal History Through the Looking-Glass.* The lack of further autobiographical publications was primarily result of his death from cancer in 1968 at age sixty-nine – his private papers include several boxes of draft chapters and plans for a voluminous work about his life. The main themes of *The Diplomat at Table*, meanwhile, are those of consumption and gastronomy. It is through these experiential, social processes that Kirkwood explains diplomatic practices and international social and cultural historiographies through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Anticipating a number of developments in the fields of historical research, Kirkwood posited that while "history most often deals with the prosaic narratives of politics and statecraft, diplomatic negotiations and treaty-making," his own perceptions of history convinced him to "bring into the historical picture of politics and diplomacy some aspect of this other side, the social and gastronomic side, as it may be found in social annals, as well as in personal experience."[63] In explaining this view, he highlighted the very same realms of Canadian diplomacy in Japan within which he both established his personal autonomy and grounded the passions and identity necessary to his happiness.

While he remained dedicated to his official responsibilities as a representative of Canada in Japan, after 1930 he increasingly found his passions and fulfillment beyond the professional sphere. He realized the effectiveness of this division at Tokyo, reproducing it at his various postings thereafter for the remainder of his career while becoming less self-conscious and more explicit about these intentions as his life went on. As the source of fulfilment and literary productivity in those early years at Tokyo, Kirkwood kept this freedom closely guarded. He used the personal autonomy afforded by his diplomatic status to create for himself a place on the "sidelines" of diplomatic life – a place where he could observe, think, write, and create much like his literary idols had before him.[64]

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[63] "A lifelong diplomat knows only too well that man's gustatory tastes and habits and uses underlie much of the business of history," he continues. Kirkwood, *The Diplomat at Table,* 7. Bread is hereafter linked to narratives of revolution. The histories of staple ingredients – namely sugar and wheat – are linked to those of Canadian growth in production (A.R.M. Lower's *Colony to Nation* providing the impetus here). Ibid., 26, 20, 28.

[64] His term. See, for example: Kirkwood, *The Diplomat at Table,* 3. Invariably, he remained exposed to the stresses that so easily affected his happiness and health. Keenleyside remarked how Kirkwood let "Marler worry him too much," the stress causing the already slender young officer to grow "thinner than ever." These observations regarding the mental and physical health of Kirkwood he made upon return from a month long fact-finding tour during which time Kirkwood was placed in charge of the legation in both Keenleyside and his minister's absence. In

Kirkwood's Tokyo writings, composed in the late hours of the evening in that private space he so valued, remain the single most comprehensive look into Tokyo's diplomatic society as experienced by a Canadian representative from this late-interwar period. Kirkwood's works meanwhile reveal their creator's desire to be remembered, looked-up to, and studied by the students and gentleman-scholars he envisioned would lead the world for future generations. His obsession with leaving this legacy meanwhile influenced the way he wrote about cultures, the company he kept, and the way he observed the world. Cultivating his personal, recorded identity, Kirkwood never limited himself to the particularities of Canadian party politics. In public life, he chose not to personify the parliament or policies his fellow Canadians had selected back home. Instead, he was a sponge that soaked in the foreign and decoded from it meaning before returning it to the page for an imagined, future (and always 'western') audience.

Kirkwood's profound respect for the written word, and the power and stature of the legacies of men, however romanticized, directed his thoughts and actions in Tokyo more than any allegiances to political or societal forces. For the purposes of the Department of External Affairs, this meant that Kirkwood saw himself as a fact-finder – a researcher providing the information that would allow his government to produce the appropriate policy. What he truly valued about the position was the sense of adventure and the opportunity to travel and observe foreign societies. As a result of the individual autonomy afforded to Canadian diplomats in Tokyo in the early 1930s, Kirkwood was able to occupy his place on the sidelines. And it was from there that he utilized his privileged gaze and education to critically assess and record the various moments of high diplomacy and international exchange comprising Canada's first diplomatic mission to Japan.

While his minister, Herbert Marler, saw Tokyo as a stage from which to promote Canadian exports and his first secretary, Hugh Keenleyside, saw it as one from which to perform Canadian political autonomy, Kirkwood envisioned Tokyo as a series of opportunities to develop and reflect upon the self. Although certain challenges kept him from doing so in his first year there, by 1931 he had harnessed the individual agencies afforded by diplomatic status in this era

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a supplementary note, appended by Keenleyside to this 1930 diary entry and reprinted in his memoir, Keenleyside added the following: "I once described Ken in a bathing suit as being so thin that a praying mantis would look corpulent in comparison." Keenleyside, *Hammer the Golden Day,* 392, 393n9.

to carve out an autonomous realm for his self, right alongside that which the legation had created for the newly autonomous Dominion of Canada.

Conclusion

In his seminal manual of modern international relations, Sir Ernest Satow wrote, "diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states."[1] Ignoring for a moment the varying levels of importance observers and analysts of international relations have placed upon the state in the decades since Satow, the process of states officially exchanging individual representatives has been, and remains, the product of efforts to apply the intelligence and tact Satow described. The experiences of those individuals sent abroad are meanwhile indicative of the national, political, and cultural identities their governments sent them to represent and perform. Moreover, the forces driving Keenleyside, Marler, and Kirkwood's self-perceptions and processes of identification in Tokyo after 1929 paralleled those that challenged critical observers across the Dominion in the lead up to the Statute of Westminster. Like many Canadians, these three diplomats reflected upon questions regarding the idea of autonomy within empire, the place of Canada within a changing Commonwealth, as well as its place within a global community of nation-states. Just as there would be no consensus amongst Canadians regarding Canadian national identity, autonomy, and its international role, neither had Canada's first three representatives to Japan achieved amongst themselves any consensus on these issues.

With the opening of the Tokyo legation in 1929, Canada's Department of External Affairs forged ahead with a claim for autonomy, laying claim to a physical and political presence in a part of the world far removed from the traditional strongholds of Western political power and the successively British and American global political hegemonies. Yet, after the initial plans were finalized, King and Skelton left the operation of the legation in the hands of the three ranking officials posted there. This hands-off approach amplified disparities amongst the individuals of its staff, meanwhile raising the stakes of the offices' own autonomy within that larger push for separate and specifically Canadian representation abroad. As demonstrated by the distinct experiences of the three Canadian representatives to Tokyo after 1929, there was room within this newly claimed space for each to negotiate, rationalize, internalize, and perform his self-identified role in the Japanese capital. This was possible without compromising the effectiveness of their mission, nor their ability to project a national, Canadian image into Japan and greater

[1] Satow, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 3.

East Asia. Thus, from within a Canadian institution on the far side of the Pacific were reflected the identities of three men of distinct geographical, political, and social backgrounds.

First Secretary Hugh Keenleyside, the legation's autonomist-academic, embodied Skelton and King's vision of a Canadian debut on the Pacific stage while balancing this work with retreats away from the office with family and non-state organizations. Canadian Minister to Japan Herbert Meredith Marler's conflicted imperialist-nationalism demonstrated how tensions surrounding the nation's past, present, and future troubled its fading classes of urban patricians. His experiences in East Asia also showed how expanded initiatives in managing Canada's foreign policy at once bolstered and challenged a patrician's individual claims to authority and privilege. Marler's personal finances and status, meanwhile, ensured that the first Canadian diplomatic institution in Japan and East Asia remained comparable and capable of standing on its own alongside an established foreign presence there. Finally, Second Secretary Kenneth P. Kirkwood's forays in literature, travel, and (however reluctantly) international politics demonstrated a third space within the legation and the diplomatic corps in Tokyo – a space that allowed the inquisitive adventurer to indulge his self-interest and adapt the privileges of diplomatic authority to wholly personal ends. For all their differences, however, Keenleyside, Marler, and Kirkwood nevertheless introduced their ideas of Canada to the world in a way never before seen in East Asia and the Pacific. For these reasons, their respective experiences, understandings, and performance of roles in Tokyo indicate the heterogeneity of even the most privileged stratum of interwar Canadian society.

The Canadian legation to Tokyo was therefore not simply a triumphant moment for Canadian autonomists seeking to retrieve the reins of the Dominion's foreign policy from its former colonial and imperial leader. While the three Canadians were stationed there to claim and exercise this triumph of autonomy, they undertook three separate exercises in individual autonomy and self-identification, exercises which, as we have seen, were important to the very formation of that institution and, consequently, the way in which Canada was seen in Japan and around the world. Though living and working as representatives of a single nation, the Canadian diplomats in Tokyo after 1929 each enjoyed personal freedoms to negotiate, internalize, and perform their role as the combined result of individual privilege, prestige, and manoeuvring. It was these varying forms and degrees of personal autonomy that made collective efforts to exercise a Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs possible.

Thus, and in spite of much of the extant literature on Canadian foreign policy from this period, the lives and work of Canada's first three diplomats in the Pacific from 1929 represented not only the politics of that nation's first experiment in an autonomous foreign policy, but also a number other socio-cultural trends of transnational origin, importance, and impact. Free from the hegemonic influences of the long established structures in power of Western Europe and Atlantic world foreign relations, conditions in East Asia benefitted these newcomers. Furthermore, in 1929, the inevitability of Japanese aggression on the continent, or any multi-lateral warfare amongst nations present in that region, was far from the minds of diplomats there. While the institution established by Keenleyside in May 1929 ostensibly projected and represented a single national identity, the experiences of its three ranking officers reflected disparities so common amongst even the affluent, urban, white, male Canadian populations of the period – disparities unbridled, if only for a few months or years, by such omnipresent concerns as a global economic depression, or a second world war.. Thus, such theological explanations such as the road to war narrative, so often adopted from Atlantic histories of this decade and applied to East Asia, have here been circumvented to reveal a more intricate history of interpersonal and ad-hoc relations and exchanges.

The present study contributes to trends that have already instigated the birth of a new diplomatic history in Canada – one that does not uncritically accept such constructions as nation, nationality, or the various political institutions therein. Within this new diplomatic history is contained the concerns and questions of both the familiar and established political historical tradition, as well as those of the more recently established social and cultural histories. By taking these three diplomats as main subjects of analysis, the present study has borrowed from and embraced these developments. Finally, by eschewing the top-down analysis that has so characterized political and diplomatic history in Canada, the present application of biography as history highlights the usefulness of historical biography beyond traditional application to comparatively revered or famous individuals of the past.

In 2010, Canadian political historian Adam Chapnick argued that "the relative paucity of scholarship on the history of [Canadian] foreign relations has resulted in a dearth of views."[2] By investigating the individual yet parallel experiences of the three men who managed the creation a

[2] Adam Chapnick, "Where Have all of Canada's Diplomatic Historians Gone?," in *International Journal* (summer 2010), 732.

completely new Canadian governmental institution in a region previously untouched by that nation's diplomats, I have provided one new perspective. There remain, of course, many more views yet to be recovered and examined. Meanwhile, the growing importance of the Pacific world demands that we continue to take note of not only contemporary moments of transnational and transcultural exchange, but also those conducted by individuals of past generations and centuries.

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