What Other Can Disturb Me?
The Temporality of Alterity in Levinas’s *Totality & Infinity*

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Abstract

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This paper investigates the temporal meaning of the alterity of the Other in Emmanuel Levinas’s *Totality & Infinity* and its implications for the recent debate concerning the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethical philosophy. Through a close reading of sections from *Totality & Infinity*, I articulate, first, Levinas’s argument that because pre-reflective experience is characterized as an interiorizing *jouissance*, discourse is the condition of possibility for objectivity, and, second, that this discourse is afforded only by the asymmetrical ethical relationship that Levinas develops as his main thesis. On my argumentation, this asymmetrical ethical relationship is afforded by the diachronic and discontinuous temporality Levinas exposes in his analysis of fecundity. As such, I argue that the alterity of the Other, which, on Levinas’s account, shatters egoist *jouissance*, is inherently and radically futural.

It is my contention that because it is this futural alterity of the Other that calls me into question and inaugurates ethical life, one cannot articulate categorical restrictions on what sort of Other could disturb me in advance or once and for all. As such, and on my argumentation, one need not “extend” Levinas’s account of ethics to include non-human Others, because *Totality & Infinity* already offers intrinsic provisions for a more-than-human ethics.
Acknowledgements

I would like to begin by acknowledging that this paper was written on the traditional territory of the Kanien’keha:ka (Mohawk) people. Levinas’s philosophy is inextricable from the horrific genocide committed against the Jewish people in the 20th century. Indigenous communities in Canada continue to suffer cultural genocides and state-sponsored violence, and their resilience and resistance to our government’s violent totalization of difference inspires my project.

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Dedication

For Braden, my brother, who died too young. May your absence always haunt me.

For Meghan, my partner, whose love saturates my world.
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**Introduction**

Levinas opposes Western philosophy, in its drive towards universal truth and objective knowledge, for effacing the alterity of the Other by appropriating alterity as a moment of self-consciousness or being. Ontology has attempted to violently reduce the unthematizable excess of the Other by systematically assimilating them in the concepts of totalizing thought. Levinas articulates his opposition this tradition at length in *Totality & Infinity* (henceforth *TI*) by insisting upon an irreducible heteronomy: an Other who remains radically outside of any relationship I might have with them.

In her 2013 *Levinas and the Crisis of Humanism*, Claire Katz explains that “for Levinas, modernity’s description of the subject in terms of freedom and rationality is opposed to a positive understanding of the human as vulnerable and dependent.”¹ She believes pedagogical methods inherited from modernity do a poor job maintaining the fragile ethical subjectivity Levinas describes in *TI* because “the moral theory that emerged from modernity’s view of the free and rational subject is a smoke screen for the underlying ethical obligation that informs those theories.”² Following Katz’s insight, I aim to explicate why Levinas makes this distinction between ethics and morality.

Morality is any “series of rules relating to social behaviour and civic duty,” or any attempt to construct a valid system of rules that can guarantee desirable behaviour when taken up and followed by moral agents, such as utilitarianism, consequentialism, or deontology, or any other systematic attempt to prescribe *how* one ought to be good.³ Ethics is the fact *that* one ought to be good, the exigency that, once represented, systematized, and organized, is morality.⁴ Levinas’s philosophical approach is, in general, phenomenological. He proceeds by way of phenomenological reduction, a “bracketing out” of second-order morality, to see how the ethical
exigency to value the well-being of the Other over myself first appears in pre-reflective experience. In *TI* he argues that such “a calling into question of the same ... is brought about by the other,” and names “this calling into question ... by the presence of the Other ethics” (*TI* 43).

Katz maintains that Levinas’s Other is always and only a human other. Like the overwhelming majority of contemporary commentators, she interprets Levinas’s ethics as anthropocentric, as excluding non-human others in the first instance. It is my aim in this paper to reframe the question, “What Other can disturb me?” in light of the diachronous and discontinuous temporality that affords the ethical relationship Levinas develops as his main thesis in *TI*.

I will develop two consequences of this reframing. First, because it is the Other’s alterity that disrupts egoist *jouissance* and inaugurates ethical life, and this alterity is essentially and radically futural, one cannot decide in advance or once and for all what Other may disturb them. And, second, to explain the Other’s ability to call my freedom into question as the consequence of their humanity, reason, dignity, suffering, or even their language amounts to a thematization of the essentially unthematizable: a violence to their alterity. I develop my rejoinder to Katz in a refinement of Levinas’s ethics as not necessarily restricted to a human Other in four sections, accordingly. The first three sections are exegeses of Levinas’s arguments in *TI*, and the final section engages in the contemporary debate regarding the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethics.
1. The Discursive Origin of Objectivity

In this section, I will articulate Levinas’s relationship to phenomenology by explicating his unique account of embodiment, and will conclude with an articulation and defense of his argument that discourse is the condition of possibility for objectivity.

Levinas claims that “the presentation and the development of the notions employed [in T] owe everything to the phenomenological method” (T 28). But he nonetheless distances himself from fundamental features of the respective phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger.

Husserl’s phenomenology brackets out metaphysical assumptions about objective reality to discover how objects first become meaningful in lived experience, prior to being coloured by abstract assumptions. An example of such an abstract metaphysical idea is Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are simple mathematical features of objects in-themselves that necessarily persist through any changes the objects to which they belong might undergo. Secondary qualities are sensations that are the effect of primary qualities, such as “colours, sounds, tastes, etc.” They “in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us.” Locke takes primary mathematical qualities to be original and to hold objectively, whereas secondary sensual qualities are derivative and merely subjective affectations. Like much of modern science, Locke attempted to reduce the truth of secondary qualities to their correlative primary qualities. This sort of reduction is committed when, for example, one posits that the true meaning of a B♭ m7 chord is the mathematical relationship between a set of waves oscillating at different frequencies, and insists that emotional response is merely a subjective affect.

Husserl’s phenomenology is opposed to such a reduction. He claims that understanding secondary qualities as mere subjective effects of primary objective qualities renders lived
experience derivative, which is untenable because mathematical relations are in fact discovered in human experience. And, as Dan Zahavi explains, Husserl’s position is that to understand objective mathematical principles and objects “we have to turn toward the subjectivity that experiences [them], for it is only there that they show themselves as what they are.”

In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl describes intentionality as a general feature of this subjectivity. Intentionality is the concrete fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something. Zahavi explains that “one does not merely live, fear, see, or judge, one loves a beloved, fears something fearful, sees an object, or judges a state of affairs.” Regardless of whether I am experiencing some actually existing object, or imagining something non-existent, my consciousness always experiences objects. Consciousness intends an object, or is intentional.

Intentionality is “a decisive argument against a theory,” such as Locke’s, “that claims that an object must influence me causally if I am to be conscious of it.” Because even imaginations intend objects—that even the hypochondriac’s paranoid dread is always dread of a tumor absent in reality—we need not postulate that subjective experience is influenced causally by an objective state of affairs to make sense of it. If we stick closely to a faithful description of subjectivity (pre-reflective, first-personal experience), by bracketing out the assumption that there is a metaphysical distinction to be made between primary and secondary qualities, we will encounter neither a sharp distinction nor a causal/metaphysical relationship between them. Rather, in the intentional act, these qualities emerge simultaneously at the same level of reality, and neither can be localized to the perceiver (subject) or to the thing itself (objectivity), so Husserl argues that Locke’s distinction cannot be substantiated.

Levinas agrees with Husserl’s rejection of Locke’s metaphysical distinction and with his critique of the reduction of meaning to primary qualities, but criticizes Husserl for too strongly
correlating noesis, the intentional act of perception, with noema, the object intended. Levinas’s position is that, by emphasizing their correlation, Husserl posits a naïve perceptual realism and effaces the “alterity” of objects, their radical inaccessibility to perception. This is why Levinas claims Husserl “too hastily discredit[s]” intellectualism (TI 94).

Intellectualism posits that our experience of the world is a product of the mind’s active imposition of order and meaning on otherwise meaningless sense data. For the intellectualist, our experience of the world admits of no exteriority, it is “pure interiority.” Following Husserl, Levinas rejects that meaningless stimuli exist prior to the mind’s imposition of meaning and order. Because pre-reflective experience admits of no distinction between things as they appear subjectively and as they are objectively in themselves, this distinction is unfounded.

But Levinas thinks that Husserl’s rejection of intellectualism effaces the extent to which our pre-reflective experiences of the world are particular to our various unique embodiments, because it “fail[s] to recognize the plane on which the sensible life is lived as [jouissance]” (TI 187). As Seán Hand explains, for Levinas “life is … from the beginning … full of the stuff that makes life enjoyable.” The enjoyment of material sensuality is a more primordial mode of subjectivity than intentionality.

James Mensch explains that “in the bodily experience of eating an apple, our experience is not objectifying but affective,” in that “it is one of tastes, textures, chewing, swallowing, the sense of something being within us, and of hunger being satisfied.” Because my engagement with the world is not in the first instance perceptual or representational, but jouissance, a deeply personal and material enjoyment, “the experience that each of us has is private, not open to the public.”
Levinas writes that “the very distinction between representational and affective content is tantamount to a recognition that enjoyment is endowed with a dynamism other than that of perception” (TI 187). The dynamism of perception, the activity or movement of intentionality, is objectification, insofar as consciousness is always consciousness “of” an object. But jouissance, precisely because we can distinguish it from perception, must involve a fundamentally different sort of activity.

Material sensuality is not, as Locke would have had it, “the subjective counterpart of objective qualities, but [a jouissance] “anterior” to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject and object” (TI 188). As Mensch explains, “when I bite into a fresh peach, its sensuous presence in my mouth has no sides.”18 This enjoyment does not happen here in my mouth, but unfolds in a medium prior to the distinction between my body and the world. As Levinas writes,

In [jouissance] quality is not a quality of something. The solidity of the earth that supports me, the blue of the sky above my head, the breath of the wind, the undulation of the sea, the sparkle of the light do not cling to a substance. They come from nowhere. (TI 141)

The sensations “take form,” rather, “within a medium in which we take hold of them,” that “remains essential to things,” and “has its own density” (TI 130-131). Here Levinas calls this medium “the elemental” (TI 131), but elsewhere in TI describes it as the il y a, the “there is.” The il y a is Levinas’s description of being in general, indifferent to this or that existent and ontologically prior to the distinction between interiority and exteriority.19 When Levinas writes that “in [jouissance] things revert [retournent: return, turn over, go back] to their elemental qualities” (TI 134), he means that, in jouissance, sensations unfold not here in my mouth, but
“there” in an element that cannot be said to be in me or outside of me, that is prior to a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity.

Though the elemental is prior to the distinction between the interior and the exterior, it is nonetheless experienced first-personally. Levinas therefore claims that “[jouissance], as interiorization, runs up against the very strangeness of the earth” (TI 142). Jouissance is a process of interiorization: “the transmutation of the other into the same” (TI 111). It returns things to an elemental status that admits of no exteriority—an interiority so pure as to not be posed against exteriority. In jouissance, Richard Cohen explains, “there is no exteriority, no otherness; interiority is made up of its own excited, exalted dependency, ... its immersion in the wealth of the world.”

Mensch makes sense of the privacy of jouissance by explaining that “embodiment distinguishes us” from one another, because “the uniqueness of the ego’s ipseity is a function of the privacy of the body in its organic functioning.” The fact that “no one can eat for you, sleep for you, breathe for you, or perform any of your functions” means that “the functioning of the body is non-substitutable, irreplaceable.” When Levinas writes that “objects are not objects when they offer themselves to the hand that uses them, to the mouth and the nose, the eyes and the ears that enjoy them” (TI 95), his claim is that objects appear in jouissance by conforming to my body. Precisely because it is my hearing and enjoyment of a B♭m chord, it is an experience that conforms in advance to my body, and not an experience of what is true for each and all. As things meaningfully appear for me, they are simultaneously withdrawn from intersubjective availability.

Levinas thinks Husserl is right to demand we return to the pre-theoretical appearance of things. But by effacing the extent to which things conform to each of our sensuous, material
experiences of the world, Husserl’s phenomenology involves a “clarity” that “detaches the object from something other than itself” (*TI* 95).

Levinas compares intelligibility in Husserl to Descartes’s “clear and distinct idea manifested as true and as ... entirely present, without anything clandestine” (*TI* 124). He finds in Husserl a clarity that he defines as “the disappearance of what could shock” (*TI* 124). Because things conform in advance to the particularities of my body, my experience “advances on a terrain already familiar” (*TI* 124). Because perception is singularly embodied, and because Husserl claims things exist *only* as they appear for the perceiver, Levinas claims that their “reality” is implicitly *relative* to the body of the perceiver. Levinas therefore claims that the “clarity” of Husserl’s phenomenology is tantamount to relativism (*TI* 96). Because Husserl stresses the correlation between the perceptual act and the intentional object, but ignores the singularity of *jouissance*, there is no alterity in his understanding of perception (*TI* 95).

Levinas does not return wholesale to intellectualism. But he attests to and maintains alterity by radicalizing both the extent to which experience is contingent upon the particularities of our different bodies *and* the extent to which the intentional object is radically inaccessible to experience.

For Levinas, there is no objectivity in my pre-reflective enjoyment of the world. Left to my own devices, I would be unable to distinguish between what sensations hold only for my private sensuous experience and what holds for each and for all. But if objectivity is not available to my material enjoyment of the world, then how is it possible at all?

While objectivity has not yet emerged in *jouissance*, Levinas is *not* claiming that objectivity remains unavailable: “the objectivity of the object and its signification comes from language” (*TI*...
96). I can distinguish objective meaning from subjective illusion because I can discourse with others. As Levinas writes,

The generality of the Object is correlative with the generosity of the subject going to the Other, beyond the egoist and solitary [jouissance], and hence making the community of the goods of this world break forth from the exclusive property of [jouissance] (TI 76).

Discoursing with the Other invests my experience with objectivity, and “abolishes the inalienable property of [jouissance]” (TI 76) by alienating things from interiorizing jouissance, rendering them “objective” in that they become offerable to the Other. Objectivity is thus not a theoretical disinterestedness, but “is defined by gift, by the abolition of inalienable property” (TI 75). The Other has me recognize things and the world as suitable for their needs. And it is only through this recognition that “the world possessed by me—the world open to [jouissance]—is apperceived from a point of view independent of the egoist position” (TI 75).

Objectivity is thus inextricable from this suitability for others. And, for Levinas, discourse names this work of alienating things from the elemental status to which jouissance submits them. Levinas’s claim in Totality & Infinity, then, is that discourse is the condition of possibility for objectivity.
2. The Ethical Origin of Discourse

In section III B, subsection “5. Language and Objectivity” (pp. 209-212), Levinas reiterates that “objectivity results from language, which permits the putting into question of possession,” or the undermining of objects’ conformance to my body in *jouissance*, but as a consequence of the asymmetrical ethical relationship. In this section I will explain how the discourse in which objectivity first emerges is afforded by the asymmetrical ethical relationship with the Other.

Richard Cohen explains that “at [the] level of sensibility the subject is entirely self-satisfied, self-complacement [sic], content, sufficient.”\(^{23}\) This is why Levinas refers to embodiment as freedom, or a “determination of the other by the same” (*TI* 85). Because it involves an interiorizing *jouissance*, my embodiment can be understood as a freedom to take for granted the exteriority invested by the other, to be satisfied with pre-reflective sensuality. As Levinas writes, “to sense is precisely to be sincerely content with what is sensed … to maintain oneself at home with oneself” (*TI* 138-9).

This freedom is, however, arbitrary. For the satisfied and self-sufficient subjectivity of *jouissance*, there is no objectivity but only a flow of immediate sensuality. Levinas writes that “in the eyes of reason, the contentment of sensibility,” the self-satisfaction of *jouissance*, its constitutive disregard for objectivity, “is ridiculous” (*TI* 138). In the first instance, the exigency for objectivity is not a rational one. Because it entails generosity, a recognition of the suitability of the world for others, a calling into question one’s self-sufficient experience, the exigency for objectivity is ethical.

Levinas writes that “a calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics” (*TI* 43). The Other calls
jouissance into question, not by limiting or weakening its freedom, but by shattering it. The Other fractures jouissance in this way because they are radically irreducible to its subjectivity. While sensuous life divests things and the world of their alterity, the alterity of the Other cannot be divested.

The presence of the Other is unlike the presence of things. Levinas distinguishes the speaking being, the Other, from its thingly manifestation, when he writes that “the speaking being guarantees his own apparition and comes to assistance of himself, attends to his own manifestation” (TI 98). The Other “appears” in such a way as to render their manifestation an apparition. Levinas articulates the complex appearance of the Other in “Meaning and Sense” (hereafter MS), where he explains that “[w]hereas a phenomenon is already ... an image, a captive manifestation of its plastic and mute form, the epiphany of a face is alive” (MS 53).

Levinas calls the Other’s complex mode of presentation, the appearance that rends appearance, the epiphany of the face. “The Other who manifests himself in a face ... breaks through his own plastic essence, like a being who opens the window on which his own image was already taking form,” in the sense that “his presence consists in divesting himself of the form which does already manifest him” (MS 53). As Edith Wyschogrod explains, “the face belongs to the world it inhabits but must in some fashion retain the alterity of a beyond, a transcendence that is inscribed as a trace that attests an indestructible alterity.”24 The face, “[a]s signifying the transcendent, ... does not nullify what it signifies in order to force its entry into an immanent order.”25

In TI Levinas claims that the infinity of Other, their radical irreducibility to me or any common concept, “stronger than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is the primordial expression, is the first word: ‘you shall not commit murder’” (TI 199). The face of the Other is the flash of a shocking alterity that shatters the self-sufficiency of jouissance, rendering
its arbitrary freedom a consciousness of shame. The Other “expresses itself [and] imposes itself [upon me] by appealing to me with its destitution and its nudity—its hunger—without my being able to be deaf to that appeal” (TI 200).

The Other does not force me to tend to their suffering. “The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power [mon pouvoir de pouvoir]” (TI 198). While I am not free to not respond to their destitution, I am free to respond by ignoring their destitution. I can turn away from this or that other, shirking my responsibility in particular cases, but am not free to not have been called into question.

“The primordial essence of ... discourse does not reside,” Levinas claims, “in the information they would supply concerning an interior and hidden world, but a solicitation that concerns me by its destitution and its Height” (TI 200). Ethical life involves an asymmetrical valuation of the Other above (“higher” than) myself. This asymmetry is the condition of possibility for the discourse through which objectivity, the suitability of my things, my body, and my world for the Other, emerges. “The face,” he writes, “opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation, which no “interiority” permits avoiding” (TI 201).

This is why Levinas claims that ethics is first philosophy or metaphysics. In the first instance, I question my satisfied and sufficient understanding of the world, that, qua jouissance, refuses a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, not for rational or epistemological ends, but for ethical ends. I desire to know how things are objectively because I want to know how things might serve the Other. Ethics is thus prior to ontology and to epistemology. To encounter things as objects—how they are objectively for others—I must encounter them as suitable to the Other’s needs, as offerable to “the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom I
am obligated” (*TI* 215). Thus, for Levinas, the asymmetrical ethical relationship is the condition of possibility for the discursive relationship wherein objectivity emerges.
3. The Temporality of Ethics

My contention in this section is that the asymmetrical ethical relation is afforded by the temporal diachrony that Levinas exposes in fecundity. On my argumentation, when Levinas argues that the Other is ontologically prior to Being, he is implicitly arguing that a diachronic temporality pre-exists the continuous and singular temporalizations of particular existents.

In the “Fecundity” chapter, Levinas describes parenthood to reveal a discontinuous and diachronic temporal structure. But making sense of his analysis of time necessitates a brief recollection of some features of temporality in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (hereafter *BT*).

Heidegger claims that *Dasein* has a fundamental structural involvement in the world, and refers to this involvement as care [*Sorge*]. This structural involvement is evinced in the fact that things always appear within the horizons of *Dasein*’s pragmatic projects, which are always possibilities afforded by the world. As such, meaning appears neither “inside” a transcendental subject nor “outside” in an already determined empirical world. Meaning appears, rather, *there* where *Da-sein* stretches out into the world: its ekstatic being-in-the-world (*BT* 84).

Given that meaning appears in this way, Heidegger claims temporality must be an *a priori* condition for the possibility of meaning. As he writes, “Dasein’s totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” (*BT* 375).

For Heidegger, temporality has three modes or *ekstases*. *Dasein* is always ahead of itself stretching towards the future because it makes decisions by weighing the different anticipated futures against each other. It is always encumbered by a past because these options are afforded by the resources of its past decisions. And it meaningfully occupies a present because things appear either as relevant or irrelevant to its current concerns. Heidegger argues that because
these three *ekstases* always appear together, they evince a more primordial and unified temporality. When Heidegger analyzes understanding, state(s)-of-mind, and falling/discourse, he finds that while they are grounded primarily in the future (anticipation), the past (having-been), and the present (making-present), respectively, each nonetheless involves the others. Temporality thus fundamentally involves all three *ekstases* as an intertwined and non-discrete whole, and, as such, is a singular and continuous flow: “temporality temporalizes itself ... as a future which makes present in the process of having-been” (BT 401).

Levinas, too, analyzes lived experience to interrogate temporality. But because he attests to a subjectivity different than *Dasein*, he articulates a temporality that differs from Heidegger’s.

Mensch explains that subjectivity described in *TI* exists generationally. None of us are *causa sui*, insofar as we are each born from an other, and it is meaningful to us that future generations will outlive us. Levinas teases out the temporal significance of this generational subjectivity in his description of parenthood in the “Fecundity” subsection.

There is a sense in which the son both is and is not the father: the child as “both my own and non-mine” is “a possibility of myself but also a possibility of the other” (*TI* 267). The child both reiterates and refuses the parent’s identity. They are both an extension of the parent’s unique experience of the world, insofar as they inherent a perspective on the world that to some extent conforms to their parent’s projects and concerns, *and* a being with their own body, to some extent free of their parent’s interests. Thus, in their relationship with their child, the parent relates to a future both meaningfully determined by their past *and* radically free from it. While carrying out their own life, the parent, by offering their life to the needs of the child, lives for a time radically other than their own, and, in this sense, the parent lives a life beyond their own
mortality. Levinas names this futurity fecundity: “[a] being capable of another fate than its own is a fecund being” (*TI* 282).

The fecundity of parenthood is afforded by a temporality of reiteration and interruption. Rather than singular and continuous, Levinas understands time as disjointed and diachronous, a flowing plurality of non-synchronizable temporalizations. And this diachronic and discontinuous temporality is not localizable to the experience of biological parenthood. Levinas writes that “the discontinuous time of fecundity makes possible an absolute youth and recommencement,” and claims that “this recommencement…, this triumph of the time of fecundity over the becoming of the mortal and aging being, is a pardon, the very work of time” (*TI* 282; emphasis my own). A discontinuous and diachronous temporality, involving the non-synchronizable temporalizations of different existents, underlies and affords the fecundity of parenthood.

For Levinas, in contrast to the “Heideggerian possibility which constitutes being itself” (*TI* 267), meaning is not determined solely by the various projects at my disposal. I must anticipate the future not only egoistically, but as offerable to and suitable to the destitution of the Other. Meaning appears not only in light the possibilities of my future, but in “light” of a time other than my own mortality. It is thus not solely my anticipation of the future that offers meaning, but also the radically unanticipatable future of the Other. My future, more than a projection of the possibilities at my disposal, is a future offerable to the other. As such, the Other invests a radical sort of novelty.

It is the non-appropriability of the Other’s future, its irreducibility to my own anticipations, the non-synchronizability of our unfoldings, that affords objectivity. It is the Other’s irreducible excess with regard to any present or common essence that invests my experience with objectivity.
In *Existence & Existents* (henceforth *EE*), Levinas claims that his contemporaries (e.g. Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) attest to an “existence where past, present, and future would be caught up all at once,” and, as such, the idea of the moment, of “the pure present,” must be considered an abstraction, because “the concrete present, pregnant with all its past, already leaps towards the future; it is before and after itself” (*EE* 101). A consequence of this temporality is that “to take human existence as something having a date, placed in a present, would be to commit the gravest sin against the spirit” (101). His contemporaries’ argument, expressed generally, is: lived experience, because it involves freedom and change, fundamentally involves time; arguments for the existence of a “pure present” assume the reality of an abstract and discrete moment that is incapable of change; thus, the affirmation of a pure present involves a denial of time that renders experience, at best, groundless and, at worst, illusory.

But Levinas claims that “human existence does contain an element of stability” insofar as “it consists in being the subject of its own becoming” (*EE* 102). By attesting to a temporality that admits of no gaps or moments, his contemporaries contradict the stability of pre-reflective subjectivity. “Modern philosophy,” Levinas asserts, “has been little by little led to sacrifice for the sake of the spirituality of the subject its very subjectivity, that is, its substantiality” (*EE* 102).

Levinas agrees that it is “impossible to conceive of substance as the persistence under the current of becoming of an invariable substratum,” because one could not account for how an invariable subject would relate to the changing world without situating the subject “outside of time” (*EE* 102). But he attests to stability of the subject through his articulation of the present.

“The present,” he claims, “is the very fact that there is an existent,” an embodied subjectivity (*EE* 103). This is an early formulation of the provisional stability and self-sufficiency of *jouissance* in *TI*. He writes that “the present introduces into existence the preeminence, the
mastery and the very virility of the substantive” (EE 103). The subjectivity that maintains egoist self-sufficiency by divesting objects of their exteriority takes place in this present. It takes up a position that “is not equivalent to the abstract position of the idealist ego, nor to the engagement in the world of Heidegger’s Dasein, which always goes beyond the hic et nunc,” but rather consists of “the fact of putting oneself on the ground, in that inalienable here which is a base” (EE 104).

“A subject’s immobility, its steadiness,” Levinas claims, “is not the result of an invariable reference to some coordinates of ideal space, but of its stance, the event of its position, which refers only to itself and is the origin of fixity in general” (EE 69). He likens subjectivity to the statues of Rodin, writing that “the event [Rodin’s] statues realize ... is much more in their relationship with the base than in their relationship with a soul, a knowing or thought, which they would have to express” (EE 70). Levinas’s point is that Rodin’s statues, like our materiality, presuppose the support of a unique and inalienable place and position, a hic and nunc. I could not be the sort of being that I am without the “present” of my embodied identity. If we suppose that my materiality, the ever-changing atoms and elements of which my body is composed, is fundamentally disinterested with my personhood, we might posit the existence of an immaterial soul or an absolute subject to make sense of the stability of my identity. Levinas, on the contrary, claims that human materiality itself necessarily takes position, or involves an inalienable hic et nunc, and so already attests to this stability.

Just as in TI the provisional subjectivity of jouissance divests things of their alterity, in EE the ego maintains itself, remains in its “present,” by refusing temporal exteriority. “As a self-reference in a present,” Levinas writes, “the identical subject is ... free with regard to the past and the future” (EE 89). Its freedom, however, “is a weight and a responsibility,” in that it is
“articulated in a positive enchainment to one’s self; the ego is irremissibly itself” (EE 89). One is *enchained* to one’s ego. Because my embodiment is a constitutive taking-place, I cannot but unfold in the presence of my self-identity. As Levinas writes, “the dynamism of the “I” resides in the very presence of the present” (EE 95). But does not the experience of self-identity, as much as it involves stasis, the present, and sameness, also involve change, time, and difference?

“The personality of a being.” Levinas writes, “is its very need for time as for a miraculous fecundity in the instant itself, by which it recommences as other” (EE 95). Personality is one’s capacity to remain oneself through change, to recommence as differently the same. But given the ego’s enchainment to the present, the difference presupposed by change is not found in the ego. Rather, Levinas’s claim here is that “this alterity comes only from the other,” that “the nothingness necessary to time, which the subject cannot produce, comes from the social relationship” (EE 96).

This analysis of the “present” of embodied subjectivity in EE is carried forward to Levinas’s characterization of “the Same” in *TI*. Jouissance is characterized by a temporality that admits of no proper or radical future. Prior to the discursive relation, my anticipation of the future conforms to the particularities of my embodiment. A future sufficiently alien to call jouissance into question originates only from the radically unanticipatable future of the Other.

Ethical alterity is thus inherently futural. It involves offering things and the world, even my own body, to the future of the Other, a future irreducible to my own anticipation. Ethical life is a life lived for the precarious future of the Other. And the unavailability of the Other’s future, which affords objectivity, is only sufficiently “alterior” because of its non-synchronizability, its irreducibility to my own temporality. As such, it is time’s discontinuity and diachrony that affords the ethical relation.
4. Consequence for Anthropocentrism Debate

In this concluding section I articulate the practical consequences of the diachronic and discontinuous temporality that underlies the ethical relationship in *TI*. It is my contention that this temporality reframes the recent scholarly debate regarding the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethics. I contend that no such extension is necessary because the temporality of alterity in *TI* implies that Levinas cannot be anthropocentric or exclusory of non-human animals in the first instance. I will first challenge the common prejudgment that Levinas inherits the anthropocentrism of Kant and Heidegger and will conclude by articulating how *TI* offers *intrinsic* provisions for a more-than-human ethics.

In “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” (Hereafter *ND*), Levinas recalls his time as a prisoner in a Nazi labor camp, explaining that while the free people who dealt with him and the other prisoners “stripped [them] of [their] human skin,” they were often visited by a dog named Bobby, for whom “there was no doubt that [they] were men” (*ND* 151-153). Bobby “was the last Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” (*ND* 150).

John Llewelyn, in *The Middle Voice of Ecological Consciousness*, takes these remarks to place Levinas in the Kantian tradition that excludes animals from moral consideration. He takes the comment that Bobby lacks “the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” (*ND* 153) to exclude Bobby from Kant’s kingdom of ends. And because he understands Levinas’s ethics as “analogous to the ethics of Immanuel Kant,” this exclusion is tantamount to exclusion from moral consideration in Levinas’s own ethics. In *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, Derrida, too, places Levinas alongside Kant and Heidegger in a tradition that has always
excluded the animal from speech, reason, and dignity, claiming the “[Levinasian] subject of ethics, the face, remains first of all a fraternal and a human face.”

While Levinas is undoubtedly influenced by Kant, there are fundamental divergences between them. In The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, Diane Perpich explains that whereas for Kant dignity is “a function of the capacity for reason and thus for a moral will,” for Levinas “what matters is not at all a what but a who: an absolutely incalculable other who cannot be reduced to some subset of properties,” who is “not worthy of ethical … consideration only in virtue of certain qualities or capacities.” Contrary to Llewelyn’s interpretation, Perpich takes the comment that Bobby “was … without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” (ND 153) to mean precisely that, given that Kant would deny Bobby reason, “reason may not be what makes you ethical.”

Derrida includes Heidegger in the anthropocentric tradition by recalling his thesis in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics that “the stone (material object) is worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is world-forming.” Given Levinas’s intellectual debt to Heidegger, we might suspect he inherits Heidegger’s distinction between the animal and the human as “poor in world” and “world-forming,” respectively.

However, Colleen Glenney Boggs explains when Levinas remarks that he and the other prisoners were “no longer part of the world” (ND 153), he “invokes and challenges Martin Heidegger’s argument that ‘the animal is poor in world’ whereas ‘man is world-forming’.” Boggs claims rather that “Levinas indicates that the distinction between human beings and animals is not absolute but relational, that their position in regard to the world is not ontological but situational.” Engagement in an “objective” world is not a structural or ontological feature
of human life, but emerges only in *ethical* life, or sociality—a worldliness the prisoners found themselves robbed of.

Llewelyn and Derrida’s respective texts inaugurated an interpretation wherein there is some principle, quality, or characteristic that makes a face “the face” in the Levinassian sense. Recent critics, too, have considered the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethics by assuming, first, that there is some principle at stake in Levinas’s account of the “face” (that secures a being its moral standing), and, second, by arguing that this principle either can or cannot be extended to include more than only human beings.

Those who argue *against* the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension take this principle to be one that cannot be attributed to animals. For Llewelyn and Derrida this exclusory principle is language.42 For Mensch, it is speech, so speechless beings are excluded from Levinas’s account.43 For Peter Atterton, it is “the ability to feel pain and organs for expressing it,” so only organisms complex enough to experience pain can disturb *jouissance*.44 And those who argue *for* the possibility of such an extension identify a principle that can be extended to include non-human others. Christian Diehm argues that because any being with its own existential project can call me into question, Levinas’s account can be extended to include any self-conscious life.45

However, in *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, Diane Perpich finds that scholars commonly conflate ethics, or what it is about the Other that calls egoist spontaneity into question, with politics, or what sort of systematic response is the most just. On Perpich’s interpretation, it is always another human being that disturbs the enjoyment and self-sufficiency of *jouissance*, but they introduce the possibility of distributing justice in a way inclusive of all others, not only humans.46 She takes Levinas’s politics to be potentially non-anthropocentric, while maintaining that his ethics excludes non-human others.
While I agree that Levinas’s account of ethics is not interchangeable with his politics, I contend that the diachronic and discontinuous temporality of *TI* contests Perpich’s and other scholars’ claims that, in the first instance, Levinas excludes the possibility being called into question by a non-human Other.

To claim that only a human other can disrupt egoist spontaneity, by explaining the Other’s shattering of *jouissance* as the effect of some positive, identifiable property, is to compromise the futural alterity of the Other in *TI*, and, as such, is inconsistent with the diachronic and discontinuous temporality that I argue affords the ethical relationship.

It is not the Other’s humanity, reason, dignity, language, suffering that disturbs *jouissance*. It is rather their *alterity*—the Other’s irreducible and radical excess with regard to my interiorizing, material enjoyment of the world—that disrupts the self-sufficiency of *jouissance*. Indeed, no feature that the other and I might share in common (language, the capacity for suffering, etc.) could act as the exigency by which self-sufficiency is disrupted. The potential commonality of such a feature would mean it is not radically exterior to *jouissance*. Because the interiorization of *jouissance* would be free to divest such a feature of its alterity, such a feature could not disrupt egoist spontaneity. “If the resistance to murder were not ethical but real,” if it involved not a radically futural alterity, but some present, empirical feature, Levinas claims that “we would have a *perception* of it, with all that reverts to the subjective in perception” (*TI* 199): the interiorizing movement of *jouissance*.

Therefore Levinas describes the Other’s shattering of *jouissance* as an epiphany or revelation. The Other’s alterity entails a break and excess with regard to the present. While I can offer explanations of what has shattered *jouissance*, they always necessarily do violence to the radically unthematizable excess of the Other.
Thus there can be no atemporal criteria by which the Other ethically matters. While we can explain what criteria seem to have, historically, determined the moral standing of the beings before whom we’ve felt we must justify ourselves, if Levinas is right that a diachronic temporality structures experience, a possible and necessary consequence of this temporality is that we are exposed to possibility of radical change, to the future of the Other that fractures the “present” of egoist jouissance. Alterity, the face of the Other, disturbs my satisfied enjoyment of the world because it is radically asynchronous with my own finite temporality. It is a future more alien than my own anticipation of the future, that renders my body, my things, and my world offerable to the precarity of the Other. This asynchronicity, qua asynchronicity, cannot be reduced to the effect of some criteria that can be determined in advance.

Thus Levinas’s ethics need not be “extended,” because the diachronic and discontinuous temporality of TI remains open to the future in a radical way, already offering intrinsic provisions for a non-anthropocentric ethics. Because Levinas’s rethinking of ethics presupposes a radical sort of futurity, it is open to an irreducible diversity of potential others. Because the future of the Other is irreducible to any present, given essence, one cannot clarify in advance or once and for all this alterity of the Other that disturbs egoist jouissance. Because alterity is on Levinas’s account intrinsically and radical futural, one cannot restrict in advance or once and for all what sort of Other can disturb me. On Levinas’s account, we cannot posit categorical restrictions on what sorts of beings can interrupt the self-sufficiency of jouissance. Perhaps Levinas’s narrative about Bobby attests precisely to the surprise of being disrupted by the alterity of a dog, to the radically unthematizable event whereby egoist jouissance is called into question by the Other.
Conclusion

In the first section, I articulated and defended Levinas’s argument that, because pre-reflective experience is characterized by the interiorization of *jouissance*, discourse is the condition of possibility for a reliable sense of objectivity. In the second section, I articulated and defended Levinas’s argument that this discourse is afforded by the asymmetrical ethical relationship with the Other. In the third section, I argued that the ethical relationship with the Other is afforded by the diachronic and discontinuous temporality Levinas exposes in his analysis of generational being, and, as such, that the alterity of the Other is inherently futural. In the fourth section, I argued that, because the alterity of the Other is essentially futural, Levinas’s ethics is radically open-ended, and we cannot categorically restrict who or what counts as an Other in advance or once and for all, and thus *TI* offers intrinsic provisions for a non-anthropocentric ethics and need not be “extended.”

To say that Levinas’s ethics cannot be restricted to human others in the first instance, however, is *not* to say that it is open to *all* beings. A potential limitation (and future line of inquiry) is the capacity of Levinas’s ethics to articulate responsibilities towards existents that do not exhibit temporal processes. Although he claims that even “the arm of Rodin” may disrupt egoist *jouissance*, insofar his account of the face, on my interpretation, depends on the non-synchronicity of temporal flows—on a futural alterity that rends its own image—it is not clear how such a disruption could be sustained by, for example, a stone. Levinas’s descriptions of the irresponsibility of images seems to suggest that *jouissance* is only fractured by existents who evince change. Existents who do not, or do so only over durations whose spans exceed the capacities of human perception—such as, perhaps, a rock, a mountain, or a work of art—may be excluded from Levinas’s ethics as presented in *TI*. 
Endnotes


4. “…[W]hile morality thus operates in the sociopolitical order of organizing and improving our human survival, it is ultimately founded on an ethical responsibility towards the other.” Levinas, “Ethics of the Infinite,” 80.


12. “There are … not two things present in experience, we do not experience the object and beside it the intentional experience directed upon it, there are not even two things present in the sense of a part and a whole which contains it: only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention in question.” Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol. II, p.98.


14. In his 1969 translation of *Totality & Infinity*, Alphonso Lingis translates *jouissance* as enjoyment. But because Levinas’s usage of this term in *TI* seems inextricable from the context of embodied sexual pleasure, I have left it untranslated. Further, I do not take it to be a coincidence that Levinas publishes *Totality & Infinity* in 1961, not far after Lacan’s 1959-1960 seminar *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, where Lacan speaks of a *jouissance* beyond the pleasure principle. The psychoanalytic undertones of *jouissance* also seem to better place Levinas within the wider context of the French philosophy of gender and sexuality in the 1960s.


22. Mensch, Levinas’s Existential Analytic, 77-78.


26. “Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same” (TI 43).

27. “…understanding is in every case a Present which ‘is in the process of having been’;” “one’s state-of-mind temporalizes itself as a future which is ‘making present’;” and “the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the process of having been” (BT 401).

28. “…we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling—that is the unity of the care-structure” (BT 401).

30. Levinas’s choice to describe generational being with the masculine fecundity of the father-son relation, excluding the possibility of a fecundity with the feminine Other, has been the subject of much feminist critique. While a sufficiently nuanced discussion of these criticisms demands its own study, I will briefly sketch out some key positions. The earliest can be found in the Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*, where she claims that Levinas’s characterization of the feminine in *Time and the Other* “deliberately takes a man’s point of view, disregarding the reciprocity of subject and object. When he writes that woman is mystery, he implies that she is mystery for man. Thus his description, which is intended to be objective, is in fact an assertion to male privilege” (p.16, n.1). In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida characterizes Levinas’s *TI* in a similar way, writing that “its philosophical subject is man” because Levinas “pushes the respect for dissymmetry so far that it seems to [him] impossible ... that it could have been written by a woman” (p.320, n.920). Luce Irigaray follows and radicalizes Derrida’s critiques in two influential texts: “Questions to Emmanuel Levinas,” and “The Fecundity of the Caress: A Reading of Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*.” Lisa Guenther nicely summarizes Irigaray’s critique in her 2006 *The Gift of the Other*. For Irigaray, Guenther explains, because “[o]nly the emergence of a child transforms eros into fecundity and opens the radical alterity that ethics demands,” a “hierarchy between feminine voluptuosity and paternal fecundity threatens to reduce the beloved woman to a means to an end, a condition for the lover’s own ethical and temporal enrichment” (84-85).

More recent feminist criticism is well represented in the 2001 volume *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas*. On the more critical end is Stella Stanford’s argument that Levinas’s notion of fecundity is restricted to biological heterosexual reproduction and that “the
feminine is made to give way to the masculine” (199). Tina Chanter, on the other end, suggests that “Levinas's understanding of the feminine as a disruption of the virile categories of mastery, domination, and self-possession opens up the possibility of another way of (non)being, a different mode of existence” (252). My argument in this section follows Lisa Guenther’s own claim that “the discontinuous temporality that Levinas describes as a “paternity” cannot be coherently restricted to fathers and sons” (76).

31. Whereas in TI Levinas associates the Other with radical futurity, in his later texts, such as his 1975 Otherwise than Being and his 1985 “Diachrony and Representation,” he associates the Other with an immemorial past.

32. This positive point of comparison runs up against Levinas’s aesthetics in EE and his 1948 “Reality and its Shadow.” In these texts Levinas characterizes art as dangerous because of its capacity to provoke ethical quietism. This positive construal resonates more with his later aesthetics—for example, his claim in a 1988 interview that the disruption of responsibility “can come from a bare arm sculpted by Rodin.” Emmanuel Levinas, “The Other, Utopia, and Justice” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Micheal B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, 223- 234 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), 232.

33. I here follow Cristian Ciocan’s account of the genesis of Levinas’s understanding of embodiment in “The Problem of Embodiment in the Early Writings of Emmanuel Levinas.”


47. Levinas, “The Other, Utopia, and Justice,” 232.
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