Urban governance after urban renewal:

The legacies of renewal and the logics of neighbourhood action

in post-renewal Little Burgundy (1979 – 1995)

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Abstract

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Urban renewal is perhaps the most widely studied approach to transforming neighbourhoods, but less attention has been given to its lasting effects and its influence on the forms of governance that emerged after it ended. This study of the Montreal neighbourhood of Little Burgundy explores how the physical, social, and ideological conditions left by urban renewal shaped neighbourhood action in the post-renewal period by focusing on three aspects. The first, a logic of governance stressing community participation, emerges as citizen committees contested renewal and problematized the top-down plans of outside experts. In the post-renewal period, this thesis argues, community participation became the major source of legitimacy for neighbourhood action, a logic that came to be reflected in the activities of groups like the Little Burgundy Coalition as well as the municipal state. The second is a concern with concentrated poverty in neighbourhood sociodemographic governance, frequently traced in the literature as emerging in the post-renewal period. In contrast, this thesis shows that this preoccupation emerged much earlier (during the renewal period itself) and was less prominent in the post-renewal period. Third, this study shows how both police actions and responses to police were part of the efforts to transform the neighbourhood, an area neglected in post-renewal governance literature. Tracing the connections between these areas shows how the impact of urban renewal extended beyond the transformations of the renewal period, but instead continued to shape the ways community participation, sociodemographic management, and policing were part of urban governance in post-renewal Little Burgundy.

Acknowledgements

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List of Abbreviations

ACES	*Actions concertées en enquête des stupéfiants, Actions concertées en élaboration des solutions*
CDC	Community Development Corporation
COM	*Conseil des œuvres de Montréal*
MCM	Montreal Citizens' Movement
NCC	Negro Community Centre
OMHM	*Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal*
SMBC	Saint Martin's Blocks Committee
SPCUM	*Service de police communauté urbaine de Montréal* (later SPVM)
TCSHPB	*Table de concertation des organismes communautaires de St-Henri et Petite-Bourgogne*
VMS	*Vivre Montréal en santé*
VVS	*Villes et villages en santé*

1. Introduction

Among the approaches to transforming neighbourhoods, urban renewal is perhaps the most dramatic and widely studied. Though authors have different definitions of what constitutes urban renewal, in broadest terms it describes a post-war form of urban governance in which centrally-planned, expert-led programs facilitated the clearance of urban areas identified as blighted (often areas of working-class housing that had fallen into disrepair) to build new structures according to the principles of Modernist planning. Whether these demolitions made way for highways or high-rise housing, urban renewal transformed the social landscape as much as the built environment through the massive displacement and resettlement that resulted. By the 1970s, urban renewal had been largely discredited and abandoned as a coherent approach to planning, although some countries continued to use modified aspects of it.

Urban governance itself has multiple definitions, but here I use the term to represent the collection of actors, policies, and practices that are part of attempts to regulate the physical and/or social conditions of a city or neighbourhood. These actors may include elected officials at various levels of government, but may also include urban planners, public housing officers, business people, developers, police, citizens, and their respective institutions or associations. Urban renewal, as a form of urban governance, has no shortage of research on its creation, deployment, and demise. Some of this work examines how the actors, logics, and practices constitutive of urban renewal governance came together.[1] Other work in this vein highlights the impacts renewal had on residents,[2] while still others examine renewal as a site of ideological

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[1] John Bauman, *Public Housing, Race and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Robert Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York City* (New York: Vintage, 1975); Kevin Fox Gotham, "A City without Slums: Urban Renewal, Public Housing, and Downtown Revitalization in Kansas City, Missouri," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 60, no. 1 (2001): 285–316; Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Christopher Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin*, Historical Studies of Urban America (Chicago London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012); Raymond A Mohl, "The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966–1973," *Journal of Policy History* 20, no. 2 (2008); Douglas W. Rae, *City: Urbanism and Its End* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996); Jon C. Teaford, *The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985*, Creating the North American Landscape (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Samuel Zipp, *Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[2] Martin Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal: 1949–62* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964); Herbert Gans, "The Failure of Urban Renewal," *Commentary*, April 1, 1965; Harold Kaplan, *Urban Renewal Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen

contestation, documenting how citizens and scholars responded to the assumptions, processes, and power structures that constituted this form of governance.[3]

While research on urban renewal itself is abundant, much less attention has been directed toward the forms of governance that emerged in the places that had been dramatically transformed by urban renewal after it was no longer being used. There are, to be sure, many studies of the forms of urban governance that emerged in the period after renewal (i.e., the 1970s and 80s). But very seldom do these studies connect the new forms of urban governance to the specific physical and social conditions created by renewal. *How have the physical, social, and ideological legacies of urban renewal shaped the development of these neighbourhoods? How did citizens, governments, or other actors attempt to transform the conditions of the neighbourhoods that resulted from urban renewal? What new logics of neighbourhood action did these efforts produce?* These questions, under-examined in the existing literature, lie at the centre of the research I present here**.**

This thesis project explores the relationship between urban renewal and post-renewal urban governance by responding to these questions through an historical case study of the efforts to transform one Montreal neighbourhood, Little Burgundy, during the post-renewal period (approximately 1979 – 1995). Little Burgundy is a deindustrialized neighbourhood that has been the centre of Montreal's Black anglophone population since the 1880s. Between 1965 and 1978, Little Burgundy was the site of urban renewal demolitions that made way for low-income public housing and an expressway, displacing many long-time residents and fracturing the community.

Urban renewal in Little Burgundy, as elsewhere, has been relatively well studied.[4] What has not been studied is how the physical and social conditions created during this renewal period shaped the forms of governance that emerged in the years thereafter. My research shows that post-renewal conditions defined many of the "problems" that efforts to transform the

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Participation in Urban Renewal," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 29, no. 4 (November 1963): 242–49; Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).

[3] Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York City*; Chester Hartman, *Yerba Buena: Land Grab and Community Resistance in San Francisco* (San Francisco CA: Glide Publications, 1974); Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal*; Rae, *City: Urbanism and Its End*; Zipp, *Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York*.

[4] See for example Robert Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec (quartier St-Roch) et à Montréal (quartier Petite Bourgogne)" (Doctoral dissertation, Université Laval, 1976); S. Y. Piotte, "La rénovation urbaine et le phénomène de pression: étude monographique, le cas de la Petite Bourgogne" (Master's thesis, Université de Montréal, 1970); Jean Lavigne, "La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne" (Doctoral dissertation, Université Laval, 1971).

neighbourhood in the 1980s and 1990s would attempt to address and also shaped the nature of the responses themselves. By examining the connections between these two periods in Little Burgundy, I shown how urban renewal continued to influence the logics of neighbourhood development even after renewal itself had been discontinued.

During the post-renewal period, Little Burgundy was the site of a new security problem known as the 'crack crisis.' Drug use and trafficking were accompanied by violent crime that left many residents afraid to leave their homes. Every account of the crack crisis, which peaked between 1989 and 1992, depicts the most significant event of the neighbourhood's history as the urban renewal program of the 1960s and 1970s.[5] These reiterated links between urban renewal and the post-renewal conditions suggest that Little Burgundy is an appropriate case study for this research. In reality, this project was advanced in response to a reoccurring question in my exploratory research: why was it when I asked about the events of the 1990s, people always told me about the urban renewal program?

This introductory chapter lays the foundations for the subsequent chapters which detail my research. It begins by reviewing the literature that considers urban governance in post-renewal neighbourhoods. From this literature, I retained three themes which guided my investigation of this subject in Little Burgundy: first, that top-down, state-led actions were delegitimized through the failure of renewal, constraining the possibilities for action in the post-renewal period; second, that community participation took on a growing importance in urban governance; and third, that problems of post-renewal neighbourhoods were often framed as the result of a concentration of poverty, and through this understanding of the problem, the solutions proposed sought to establish an appropriate sociodemographic balance or 'social mix.' To these three themes I add a fourth: the role of police and policing. Though little work on this topic appears in the literature, attention to policing was essential to understanding urban governance in post-renewal Little Burgundy. As I outline the existing scholarly work on these four themes I

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[5] For example, Janin Hadlaw, "Locating Crisis: Representations of Race and Space in the English Media, Montreal 1987-1992" (Master's thesis, Concordia University, 1996); Robert Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat," in *L'habitation comme vecteur de lien social*, ed. Paul Morin and Evelyne Baillergeau (Québec: Presses de l'Université de Québec, 2008), 131–53; Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais: 40 ans de logement social public* (Montréal: Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, 2011); Éléni Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin : problématique et principes d'intervention" (Master's thesis, School of Urban Planning, McGill University, 1994); Brandon C. Welsh and Claude Roy, "Un habitat plus sûr: Réunion nord-américaine sur la prévention de la criminalité dans les collectivités de logements social" (Montréal, Québec, March 1996).

also highlight how my research contributes to them by giving attention to the way the urban renewal program shaped the governance initiatives and the conditions that these attempted to change. The methods and sources used to answer my research questions conclude this chapter.

1.1 Post-renewal urban governance literature

The literature on urban renewal itself is relatively vast. Urban renewal, the literature demonstrates, is a form of urban governance that dramatically transformed the physical and social landscapes of cities throughout North America and Europe during the mid-twentieth century. Characterized by large-scale, state-led demolitions of blighted areas to make way for new construction, urban renewal was widely implemented in neighbourhoods near city centres that were home to marginalized populations. Though local deployment varied—some cleared the way for expressway infrastructure while others constructed public housing or conference centres—these programs shared coherence through a set of Modernist logics that became incorporated into the cultural, political, and architectural processes that formed the "urban renewal order."[6]

Urban renewal came to an end 25-30 years after it began. The disastrous consequences of renewal for displaced residents combined with scant evidence that the programs benefited either individuals or communities caused the renewal model to be labelled a failure in the late 1960s and early 1970s, only a few decades after it had been enthusiastically taken up. The lofty objectives, violent displacement, grassroots contestation, and recognized failure of urban renewal programs have made them rich subject matter for researchers in urban geography and urban history, and in recent years there has been renewed interest in placing these histories into wider social and political context.[7]

While the demise of renewal is well studied, its legacies are not. What were the conditions left by urban renewal and what forms of governance formed in response to those conditions? This literature review considers the legacies of urban renewal and their role in shaping urban governance by examining a literature that I have defined on post-renewal urban governance. This post-renewal urban governance literature is made up of a collection of

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[6] Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal.*
[7] Samuel Zipp and Michael Carriere, "Introduction: Thinking through Urban Renewal," *Journal of Urban History* 39, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 359–65, doi:10.1177/0096144212467305.

academic works that, though not necessarily in direct dialogue, are interested in how actors attempted to transform neighbourhoods in the aftermath of urban renewal, a period stretching roughly from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. Within this literature I include articles on urban governance that emerged in response to the physical conditions directly created by urban renewal programs. However, I did not include articles that were limited to the conditions within public housing, though these were often a result of urban renewal. Articles about public housing were included if they were discussed in relation to the governance of the neighbourhood or city more broadly.

The majority of academic writing on post-renewal urban governance is focused on the United States. One transatlantic comparison also included two European cities (Berlin and London) and Toronto.[8] Toronto is featured in most of this scholarship on Canada, often related to public housing in that city, including multiple studies on Regent Park, Canada's first public housing project.[9] Richard White has argued that the outcome of Toronto's urban renewal owed much to steady economic growth during a period in which many cities were facing the devastating effects of deindustrialization and global economic restructuring.[10] This suggests that Toronto may not be generalizable to other Canadian cities which did not enjoy the same status as growing financial centers. While studies of urban renewal in other Canadian cities exist, discussion of post-renewal urban governance is largely absent.[11]

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[8] Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal*.

[9] Martine August, "Revitalisation Gone Wrong: Mixed-Income Public Housing Redevelopment in Toronto's Don Mount Court," *Urban Studies* 53, no. 16 (December 1, 2016): 3405–22; Martine August, "'It's All about Power and You Have None:' The Marginalization of Tenant Resistance to Mixed-Income Social Housing Redevelopment in Toronto, Canada," *Cities* 57 (September 2016): 25–32; Ryan K. James, "From 'Slum Clearance' to 'Revitalisation': Planning, Expertise and Moral Regulation in Toronto's Regent Park," *Planning Perspectives* 25, no. 1 (January 2010): 69–86; Stefan Kipfer and Jason Petrunia, "'Recolonization' and Public Housing: A Toronto Case Study," *Studies in Political Economy* 83 (2009): 111–39; Tom Slater, "Municipally Managed Gentrification in South Parkdale, Toronto," *The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien* 48, no. 3 (September 2004): 303–25; Richard White, "Urban Renewal Revisited: Toronto, 1950 to 1970," *Canadian Historical Review* 97, no. 1 (March 2016): 1–33.

[10] White, "Urban Renewal Revisited."

[11] Catherine Charlebois and Paul André Linteau, eds., *Quartiers disparus: Red Light, Faubourg à M'lasse, Goose Village* (Montréal (Québec): Éditions Cardinal Inc, 2014); Martin Drouin, "De la démolition des taudis à la sauvegarde du patrimoine bâti (Montréal, 1954-1973)," *Urban History Review* 41, no. 1 (2012): 22, doi:10.7202/1013762ar; Tina Loo, "Africville and the Dynamics of State Power in Postwar Canada," *Acadiensis* XXXIX, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2010): 23–47; Margaret T. Rockwell, "Modernism and the Functional City: Urban Renewal in Hamilton, Ontario and Buffalo New York (1949 - 1974)." (Doctoral dissertation, McMaster University, 2013).

Definition, logics, failure

What is widely understood as urban renewal is also widely understood to have failed. However, the terms of this failure depend upon the way urban renewal is defined. Some scholars have brought attention to the strict definition of the term and the ways this differs from the popular understanding. The 'federal bulldozer' symbolized the popular understanding of urban renewal as the wholesale demolition of the old to make way for the new, whether for highways or housing.[12] However, returning to the origin of the term in the United States introduced in the 1954 Housing and Urban Renewal Act, Alexander von Hoffman demonstrated that 'urban renewal' had been conceived of as an alternative to the slum clearance which had been the basis of the earlier Housing Act of 1949.[13] Urban renewal was intended to spur improvement incrementally through incentives and subsidies for renovation or other investments, but the term became popularly understood as analogous with demolition as the two were generally used in combination. Richard White made a similar assertion about urban renewal and public housing in Canada, which were technically separate programs but were implemented together so often that public housing projects were generally thought of as urban renewal.[14] White demonstrated that only two urban renewal projects had been implemented in Toronto according to the strict definition that excluded public housing and went so far as to suggest that the lack of urban renewal programs might explain its perceived failure.

Both these examples rely on federal definitions to evaluate what was or was not urban renewal, but other scholarship has demonstrated that urban renewal was not strictly a federal program, despite popular notions to the contrary. While many countries adopted policies that funded and defined the terms of urban renewal projects, and these policies were instrumental to the wide adoption of urban renewal, similar urban transformation also took place independent of federal programs. Jon Teaford compared federally-funded renewal projects in the United States with a long list of similar programs in cities that did not receive federal urban renewal funding in the same period.[15] Kevin Fox Gotham demonstrated that private developers and real estate

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[12] Also the title of a contemporary critique by Martin Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal: 1949–62.*

[13] Alexander von Hoffman, "The Lost History of Urban Renewal," *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability* 1, no. 3 (November 2008): 281–301.

[14] White, "Urban Renewal Revisited."

[15] Jon C. Teaford, "Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath," *Housing Policy Debate* 11, no. 2 (2000): 443–65.

interests played crucial roles in promoting and shaping urban renewal in Kansas City, Missouri.[16] These articles are a testament to the idea that urban renewal was more than a particular government program or definition, but an entire approach to urban governance. The ideas which underpinned it travelled and materialized through different actors and mechanisms.

Christopher Klemek called the "convergence of forces" which underpinned this form of governance the "urban renewal order."[17] Approaching urban renewal as an order rather than a particular program allowed Klemek to account for the interlocking collection of architectural trends, professional expertise, policies, and political ideologies that made different forms of urban renewal recognizable even between cities in countries on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Klemek, urban renewal across the United States, Britain, Germany and Canada shared in common an attempt to address problems of post-war cities through an architectural form, legitimized by the expertise of planning professionals, which promised to establish order and efficiency. This architectural form was functional modernism, an approach to architecture that was also accompanied by an ideological order in which these ideas were seen as legitimate. These experts were entrusted with the authority to craft a variety of policies, which would also be based on the logics of modernism. These policies, including slum clearance, highway construction, and large-scale public housing development, Klemek showed, went on to become tools that were available for municipal leaders which were incentivized by the funding made available through them. Used in whatever combination they believed would respond to their local needs, the multiple forms of urban governance that resulted would all be recognized as urban renewal by the general public because of the interrelations of expertise, policy, and ideology throughout various levels of the urban renewal order.

What these authors indicate is that regardless of what the term 'urban renewal' was intended to mean, its popular understanding carried political weight, as did the popular consensus of its failure. Urban renewal lost much of its credibility through the outcry of the residents whose homes were to be destroyed to make way for the new construction. Resettling the displaced residents was often difficult in the context of housing shortages, and even where replacement housing was planned, the large-scale projects often took years to complete. The accounts of communities being destroyed and the highly-mediatized resistance from the residents

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[16] Gotham, "A City without Slums."
[17] Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal*, 12.

who fought against the renewal programs that threatened their neighbourhoods began a cycle of critiques and oppositional movements. When these programs failed to return businesses and middle-income families to urban centers, but instead seemed to reproduce the problems of urban poverty at alarming rates, the failure of urban renewal seemed unequivocal. A whole renewal "order" at this point began to unravel. At stake, one can assume, was the entire interlocking collection of architectural trends, professional expertise, policies, and political ideologies that propelled renewal until this time.

Klemek, examining this unravelling, points toward one of the legacies of renewal: a crisis of legitimacy for some of the actors and logics that propelled renewal. The failure of renewal, he argued, served to delegitimize not only urban renewal itself but also the logics that underpinned it by limiting the possibilities for expert- and state-led planning in American and British cities after urban renewal had been discredited. He observed that in Toronto and Berlin, where backlash against urban renewal was less pronounced, government and planning professionals were able to maintain a leading role in urban governance even after the notion of urban renewal had soured. After a long decline, the end of urban renewal in the United States is usually marked at 1974, the year when the federal program was cut, and somewhat later for Britain.[18] In Canada, federal support was withdrawn following the 1969 Hellyer Report, but programs that had already begun were allowed to complete. As a result, it was not until 1978 that the renewal period in Little Burgundy ended. Klemek argued that the failure of urban renewal had an impact on the development of urban governance to follow in constraining the possible responses to urban issues, and one of the legacies of urban renewal was discrediting forms of governance that relied too strongly on state- and expert-led initiatives. In chapter two I discuss how, in keeping with Klemek's analysis, citizen contestation of the Little Burgundy renewal program worked to discredit planning approaches that imposed expert plans without the input of the people they would affect. This discrediting cleared the way for new forms and logics of governance, some of which have been documented in the studies to which I now turn.

Community participation in post-renewal urban governance

The role of community members and organizations in urban governance is another theme that emerges in the post-renewal urban governance literature. The proliferation of citizen resistance

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[18] Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal*.

to urban renewal, discussed above, signalled the beginning of the end for urban renewal and effectively delegitimized the urban renewal order as a viable form of urban governance. Community-based initiatives, which emerged during and after the renewal period, could then gain credence as alternatives to top-down planning. Klemek described organizations in Harlem and Philadelphia that were working against the grain of expert-led urban renewal through community-based planning projects and had the potential to provide an alternative form of urban governance. However, by the time urban renewal had been delegitimized, the withdrawal of federal funding from community organizations seriously constrained the capacity of locally-run organizations such as these and made them unable to fill the gap in available governance models.[19] In these contexts, at least, it was not the existing community organizations that became involved in post-renewal governance.

Within the literature reviewed here, community approval is widely recognised as a political need for post-renewal urban governance, whether led by municipalities or private developers. The redevelopment of public housing at Regent Park relied on community consultation and participation to maintain legitimacy.[20] If necessary, it was also possible to merely create the impression of community approval. Martine August cited tenants and organizers who claimed that dissenters to the project were being bought out, that those who spoke favourably were rewarded and their voices amplified, and that some residents kept their opinions to themselves because they felt the risk of repercussions was too great.[21] In Chicago's Pilsen neighbourhood, Sternberg and Anderson observed that while one post-renewal revitalization project was blocked by community opposition, a second project in which promoters aligned themselves with certain Mexican community associations was able to proceed despite opposition from local groups with a less pro-growth orientation.[22] Community resistance has also been documented as halting the redevelopment of public housing. Plans to demolish public housing towers at Chicago's Cabrini-Green and replace them with mixed-income housing

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[19] Ibid.

[20] August, "It's All About Power and You Have None"; James, "From 'Slum Clearance' to 'Revitalisation'"; Kipfer and Petrunia, "'Recolonization' and Public Housing: A Toronto Case Study."

[21] August, "It's All about Power and You Have None."

[22] C. Sternberg and M. Anderson, "Contestation and the Local Trajectories of Neoliberal Urban Governance in Chicago's Bronzeville and Pilsen," *Urban Studies* 51, no. 15 (November 1, 2014): 3198–3214.

were stalled for over a decade by opposition from residents who saw the net reduction of low-income housing as an attack on their ability to survive.[23]

Community organizations can also take the lead in urban governance. Hula, Jackson and Orr called these "governing non-profits."[24] Rather than offering a service or focusing on a specific cause, the authors defined governing non-profits as organizations having broadly defined goals related to the needs of the community and working within or attempting to reconfigure local political structures in order to address them. These groups may represent the interests of marginalized groups, as in the example of BUILD Baltimore, which pushed for better housing and employment conditions for African American and low-income residents in the wake of that city's expensive downtown revitalization project. On the other hand, the examples of governing non-profits in Detroit and Los Angeles were formed by middle-class white residents following race riots in these cities in 1967 and 1992 respectively.[25] Another example of governing non-profits in the United States are Community Development Corporations (CDCs), which Owens described as local non-profits engaged in improving the social and physical conditions of the community.[26] CDCs began in the 1960s but gained momentum during the 1980s until they were present in 95% of American cities over 100,000 people in the early 1990s, suggesting community involvement in urban governance through CDCs was a common theme across the country in the post-renewal period.[27] Owens' case study in South Jamaica, Queens, provides an example of a non-profit organization pursuing neighbourhood revitalization, notably by increasing homeownership and middle-class families to the area, but avoiding displacement of the existing community through a commitment to constructing affordable housing and improving conditions in rentals as well. The activities of the CDCs described by Owens demonstrate that the type of revitalization pursued through public-private partnerships could also be done through the participation of local non-profits instead of state actors.

In Montreal, multisectoral neighbourhood roundtables ("*tables de concertation de quartier*" or "*tables de quartier*") are a form of governing non-profit that has gained recognition

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[23] B. J. Miller, "The Struggle Over Redevelopment at Cabrini-Green, 1989-2004," *Journal of Urban History* 34, no. 6 (May 30, 2008): 944–60.

[24] R. C. Hula, C. Y. Jackson, and M. Orr, "Urban Politics, Governing Nonprofits, and Community Revitalization," *Urban Affairs Review* 32, no. 4 (March 1, 1997): 459–89.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Michael Leo Owens, "Renewal in a Working-Class Black Neighborhood," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 19, no. 2 (1997): 183–203.

[27] Ibid.

and become an institutionalized part of neighbourhood governance.[28] *Tables de quartier* have their origin in the post-renewal period, in groups that formed to coordinated the efforts of local actors to address problems in their neighbourhoods.[29] In 1991, a similar type of multisectoral neighbourhood roundtable was introduced by the City in an effort to "democratise municipal management," which was based on an international program called *Villes et villages en santé* (VVS), or Healthy Cities.[30] The *tables de quartier* can be seen as positioning local actors as the experts on the issues of their neighbourhoods rather than privileging the expertise of professional planners under urban renewal.

Scholarship on the *tables de quartier* rarely elaborates on their early formation and does not link their emergence to the physical/social legacies of renewal or to the neighbourhoods in which renewal was carried out. Chapter two contributes to the existing literature by examining the early activities of a community-led roundtable, the Little Burgundy Coalition, and the arrival of the VVS model at the initiative of the City. The Coalition united local community groups to address problems that its members connected to the effects of urban renewal. The VVS committee, too, united community groups to address problems in the neighbourhood. Despite having similar structures, the 1994 merger of the community-led Coalition with the VVS roundtable was a point of tension for Coalition members who worried about being coopted by the state. In the Coalition, the member community groups developed the action plans and engaged with state agencies as partners to achieve them, while in the VVS committee, state agencies took on a greater role in governance. My research shows how logics of community participation that emerged in the renewal period informed both these roundtables, and though the role of state agencies differed in each, both functioned to legitimate the use of state capacity.

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[28] Annick Germain, Richard Morin, and Gilles Sénécal, "L'évolution du mouvement associatif montréalais : un retour au territoire programmé par l'État ?," *Lien social et Politiques*, no. 52 (2004): 129, doi:10.7202/010595ar; Laurence Bherer, "Les trois modèles municipaux de participation publique au Québec," *Télescope* 17, no. 1 (2011): 157–71; Gilles Sénécal, Geneviève Cloutier, and Patrick Herjean, "Le quartier comme espace transactionnel: L'expérience des Tables de concertation de quartier à Montréal," *Cahiers de géographie du Québec* 52, no. 146 (2008): 191, doi:10.7202/019588ar; Gilles Sénécal et al., "Les grands projets résidentiel au defi de la concertation de quartier: Le cas des Tables de quartier à Montréal," *Les annales de la recherche urbaine* 106 (2010): 74–83; David Longtin and Juliette Rochman, *Les enjeux du développement social à Montréal: évolution entre 1998 et 2014*, 2015.

[29] Although some neighbourhood roundtables predate the post-renewal period, such as the roundtable in Notre Dame de Grâce which formed in 1942, the majority emerged in the 1980s. Gilles Sénécal et al., "Les effects de la concertation: Étude sur les Tables intersectorielles de quartier de Montréal" (Montréal: Institut national de la recherche scientifique Centre - Urbanisation Culture Société, 2010), 4.

[30] Germain, Morin, and Sénécal, "L'évolution du mouvement associatif montréalais," 131.

The literature shows that some community members involved in post-renewal politics considered the possibility of controlled, socially-sensitive forms of gentrification as a strategy to transform their severely distressed neighbourhoods in the post-renewal period. In her study of the revitalization of the South Bronx, Catherine Guimond has suggested that the more influence local community members had in revitalization efforts, the less it would resemble the negative aspects of gentrification.[31] This claim seems to be supported by Owens' account of the Community Development Corporation in South Jamaica, which was able to avoid displacement of low-income residents while pursuing an explicit agenda to attract middle-income families and increase homeownership by ensuring affordable housing was being constructed simultaneously.[32] Similarly, in Hochelaga, community organizations hoping to improve the conditions of the neighbourhood realized their strategy was essentially to induce gentrification, but were also vigilant to include affordable housing options in development.[33] Sternberg and Anderson also described the efforts of a coalition made up of Black middle-class homeowners to revitalize Bronzeville, known as Chicago's historic 'Black Metropolis.'[34] The coalition's goals aligned with the pro-gentrification agenda of the City and they partnered with city programs to achieve their goals. This group was not opposed to gentrification as long as the benefits went to the Black community rather than the speculative investors whose history of racial discrimination was at the root of the neighbourhood's disinvestment in the first place. However, the authors warned that the Black community was fractured along class lines which resulted in the interests of lower-class African Americans being marginalized in the revival of the Black Metropolis. The parallel existence of the Coalition and the VVS committee described in chapter two shows that even groups with virtually identical objectives and structures can hold different and sometimes conflicting ideas about local governance depending on which actors are in positions of leadership. In a similar vein, in chapter four I describe how the police were seen as partners in addressing criminality and insecurity, but also as a source of insecurity for some residents. These

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[31] Catherine Claire Guimond, "Battle for the Bronx: Neighborhood Revitalization in a Gentrifying City" (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 2013).
[32] Owens, "Renewal in a Working-Class Black Neighborhood."
[33] Annick Germain, Damaris Rose, and Amy Twigge-Molecey, "Mixité sociale ou inclusion sociale ? Bricolages montréalais pour un jeu à acteurs multiples," *Espaces et sociétés* 140–141, no. 1 (2010): 143.
[34] Sternberg and Anderson, "Contestation and the Local Trajectories of Neoliberal Urban Governance in Chicago's Bronzeville and Pilsen."

contrasting understandings of the police led to different approaches to addressing the conditions of insecurity in the Little Burgundy.

Concentration of Poverty and Social Mix

A third theme in the literature concerns the social conditions produced by renewal and the logics of neighbourhood action that emerged to address these conditions. Large-scale construction of low-income public housing was one of the legacies that many urban renewal programs shared, and problems arising from the perceived 'concentration of poverty' that resulted were among the issues with which subsequent forms of urban governance would attend. Urban renewal was used to realize modernist architectural forms such as the rational, high-rise buildings which had been advanced as solutions to the congested, disorderly, and morally-deprived slums they would replace. Pursuit of these ideals physically and socially transformed urban landscapes by expropriating land into public ownership, building housing at high densities and designating this housing to low-income occupants. Although areas identified as 'slums' had been cleared to construct these projects on the premise that the deprived living conditions reproduced poverty like a disease or contagion, somehow the new modern dwellings did not improve the social issues of the urban poor. Instead the signs of social disintegration, such as unemployment, single-parent families, vandalism, and drug use, only continued.

Seeking an explanation for the social conditions that only seemed to worsen in inner cities in the post-renewal period led W. J. Wilson to develop the concept of spatially concentrated poverty.[35] While Wilson's concept of a concentration of poverty was meant to encompass complex processes that included economic restructuring, migration, demographic changes, and social norms, Crump has argued that the term quickly became a catchphrase through which the spatial concentration of poverty was seen as the cause of social issues rather than a symptom.[36] For policy makers, framing a concentration of poverty as the root of inner-city problems "provided legitimacy for a wide range of policies that explicitly aim to deconcentrate

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[35] William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[36] Jeff Crump, "Deconcentration by Demolition: Public Housing, Poverty, and Urban Policy," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 20, no. 5 (October 2002): 581–96.

poverty by reorganizing the spatial structure of the city" rather than addressing the actual causes of poverty or social issues.[37]

Inducing this demographic redistribution was justified by both social and economic logics which built upon a long history of viewing social mix as a corrective to social ills, an idea that had been building since the early 1800s.[38] In the post-renewal period, the main social logic was based on the idea that middle-class neighbours would model behaviour that could serve as an example to the lower-class who were ostensibly trapped in the culture of concentrated poverty (created, in part, by renewal). This logic was paired with an economic logic that sought to address the lack of property tax revenues in low-income areas which constrained cities in their ability to provide municipal services. Under both logics, establishing a better socioeconomic balance was argued to benefit low-income populations through the improvements to their living environments and the increased social mobility through their new behaviours and access to resources.[39] The concentration of poverty framing and social mix solution provided a benevolent justification for further rounds of displacement and a new process of gentrification.

Public housing, however, served as an obstacle to displacement, at least initially. This form of housing was subject to different legal and property systems which effectively locked in low-income populations and locked out private speculation and development. Special programming was thus required to release this land into that property ecosystem. For the public housing complexes created by urban renewal, the most significant social mix policy was the HOPE VI program in the United States. Launched in 1994, HOPE VI provided federal funding to demolish public housing and rebuild the areas with mixed-income developments through public-private partnerships in order to achieve a more desirable social mix. The redevelopment of public housing promoted through HOPE VI would become a model for cities beyond the United States, including Toronto's Regent Park.[40] Managing the socioeconomic balance under HOPE VI was achieved by building new housing of different tenure types throughout the

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[37] Ibid., 584.

[38] Wendy Sarkissian, "The Idea of Social Mix in Town Planning: An Historical Review," *Urban Studies* 13 (1976): 231–46.

[39] Crump, "Deconcentration by Demolition"; L. Lees, "Gentrification and Social Mixing: Towards an Inclusive Urban Renaissance?" *Urban Studies* 45, no. 12 (November 1, 2008): 2449–70.

[40] Martine August, "Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization: The Benefits of Concentrated Poverty in Toronto's Regent Park," *Environment and Planning A* 46, no. 6 (2014): 1317–33, doi:10.1068/a45635; August, "It's All about Power and You Have None"; August, "Revitalisation Gone Wrong"; James, "From 'slum Clearance' to 'revitalisation'"; Kipfer and Petrunia, "'Recolonization' and Public Housing: A Toronto Case Study."

neighbourhood, including some public housing, private marking rentals, and options for homeownership.

Social mix has been criticized by scholars and others who argue that simply managing socioeconomic spatial distribution does nothing to address the root causes of poverty.[41] Many analyses of the interventions to deconcentrate poverty of public housing through redevelopment projects point out how these interventions set the stage for gentrification.[42] Portraying a low-income area as problematic can be used to justify redevelopment or other interventions through a concentration of poverty logic, even if these representations had little in common with the realities in the neighbourhood. Martine August showed that in Regent Park, in line with the findings of many other studies, the City and media argued that redevelopment was necessary by portraying the area as one overwhelmed with problems that did not necessarily correspond with the lived experience of the residents, but were rather carefully constructed images of social pathology.[43] August argued that through these images, cities gained license to make dramatic interventions in the name of social mix, including public housing demolition and redevelopment, even when the needs of residents may have been addressed through interventions that did not require demolition or displacement.

Studies have reported mixed findings about the impacts of these public housing redevelopment initiatives and whether the poor actually benefit from social mix policies.[44] James Hanlon investigated the claim that by deconcentrating poverty HOPE VI improved conditions for the former tenants in his study of the program in Louisville, Kentucky which was celebrated as a success story of the program.[45] Though the demographic information available for the census area did show a greater socioeconomic diversity after the HOPE VI project was completed,

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[41] August, "Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization"; Crump, "Deconcentration by Demolition"; Edward G. Goetz, *New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice, and Public Housing Policy* (Cornell University Press, 2013); James Hanlon, "Success by Design: HOPE VI, New Urbanism, and the Neoliberal Transformation of Public Housing in the United States," *Environment and Planning A* 42, no. 1 (January 2010): 80–98; Lees, "Gentrification and Social Mixing."

[42] August, "Revitalisation Gone Wrong"; Crump, "Deconcentration by Demolition"; Kipfer and Petrunia, "'Recolonization' and Public Housing: A Toronto Case Study"; Lees, "Gentrification and Social Mixing"; Slater, "Municipally Managed Gentrification in South Parkdale, Toronto"; Elvin K. Wyly and Daniel J. Hammel, "Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification," *Housing Policy Debate* 10, no. 4 (January 1, 1999): 711–71.

[43] August, "Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization."

[44] Rowland Atkinson, "Neighbourhoods and the Impacts of Social Mix: Crime, Tenure, Diversification and Assisted Mobility," Occasional Paper 1 (Housing and Community Research Unit/ ESRC Centre for Neighbourhood Research, 2005).

[45] Hanlon, "Success by Design."

Hanlon noted that, given the net-loss of public housing units, the low-income residents were deconcentrated through displacement rather than dilution. The partial data available to track former residents suggested that displaced households moved to areas with the highest rates of unemployment in the city, consequently increasing the concentration of poverty elsewhere.

Social mix was also used to address problems linked to undesirably high rates of poverty in neighbourhoods that did not have public housing. Different methods of governance were required to regulate the sociodemographic distribution of people living in private rentals, however. Slater described a formerly affluent neighbourhood in Toronto which became low-income following the construction of an expressway as part of an urban renewal program.[46] Proximity to a psychiatric hospital and affordable rents due to disinvestment after the expressway arrived led to a large number of residents struggling with mental health and addiction problems. In this case, the City connected the levels of moral deviance and crime to the high proportion of single-occupancy dwellings in the neighbourhood. They addressed this concentration of poverty with a moratorium on this housing type and stricter enforcement of building regulations. Meanwhile, they encouraged the construction or conversion of larger units in order to attract families, whose presence was seen as stabilizing, to the neighbourhood. Though the particularities of this neighbourhood differed from those with large public housing projects, it exhibits similarities to the urban governance used in HOPE VI, namely by managing demographic composition through housing type and availability. In this example, rather than public-private development projects, the City used regulatory tools and it adjusted demographics through unit size rather than tenure type.

In Montreal, studies of social mix have focused on quite different attempts at creating social-mix. In the efforts studied, social mix provided a logic, not to deconcentrate poverty and demolish public housing, but rather to promote the inclusion of low-income housing in new developments. This is was the focus of Germain, Rose and Twigge-Molencey's study in Hochelaga, Montreal.[47] Community groups there recognised that the new dwellings created by a public-private partnership would only be accessible to homeowners and would categorically exclude the working-class and low-income residents that made up the majority of the neighbourhood. Using a rhetoric of social mix, these groups pushed for a diversity of tenure-

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[46] Slater, "Municipally Managed Gentrification in South Parkdale, Toronto."
[47] Germain, Rose, and Twigge-Molecey, "Mixité sociale ou inclusion sociale ?"

types in the project, including cooperative and low-income housing. One important difference between this case and the public housing redevelopment programs such as HOPE VI is that the Hochelaga development was on a brownfield site, so there was no need to "free" public land into the private markets. It exhibited, nevertheless, the logic of neighbourhood action often deployed in post-renewal neighbourhoods: a logic of social mix.

In the case of post-renewal Little Burgundy, my research reveals that the ways concentrated poverty and social mix were part of (or absent from) efforts to manage the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood run counter to the ways they are generally presented in the literature. Chapter three offers new perspectives to this theme in the literature. A closer look at an important housing initiative by the City to attract a middle-income population reveals that, contrary to appearances, it was not motivated by concerns about the high rates of poverty in the neighbourhood. For some local community organizations who provided services to the poor, however, a concentration of poverty had benefits for them to accomplish their work, and they saw the increasing homeowner population as a threat. This perspective represents a reversal of the views on concentrated poverty generally presented in the literature, in which it tends to be framed as a problem. It is more in keeping with Martine August's effort to expand this narrative to include the advantages that such concentrations can also provide.[48]

The instances from Little Burgundy that do frame concentrated poverty as a problem also differ from the general literature. Rather than emerging after renewal, for example, concerns about concentrated poverty were already being articulated by Little Burgundy's citizen committees at the onset of the renewal period. These views informed legal and administrative structures that enabled the housing office to maintain a social mix in public housing early in the post-renewal period. Only after these mechanisms were removed do we see the problems of the neighbourhood being attributed to a concentration of poverty by some actors, the public housing office amongst them. The housing office responded to this problem with various initiatives, some more successful than others. One of these attempts resembled HOPE VI in that it aimed to reduce the number of public housing units and add housing options for households of higher income levels. It did so not through redevelopment but by changing the property mode of the existing units. Though such a solution may seem simple compared to a vast demolition-

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[48] August, "Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization."

rebuilding program such as HOPE VI, the housing office's initiative in Little Burgundy failed while HOPE VI was widely adopted.

Finally, with limited means to address the problems of insecurity related to the drug trade in its properties, the housing office used a strategy of eviction and a moratorium on renting to displace unwanted tenants and reduce the (extremely low-income) public housing population. This strategy relied on a collaboration with the police to supply evidence needed to justify the evictions, but one advantage was the burden of proof was less stringent in civil law of the rental board compared with criminal courts. I describe the policing aspects of this collaboration in chapter four, but in terms of the concentration of poverty thesis, I observe that the preponderance of public housing in Little Burgundy allowed this mode of governance to be applied across the neighbourhood. Predominantly low-income neighbourhoods were not limited to those with a high proportion of public housing, of course, but the predominance of a single cooperative landlord, rather than multiple disinterested private slumlords, facilitated this strategy to displace tenants who were considered a problem.

Discussion

Aside from the public housing redevelopment programs such as HOPE VI, few of the studies discussed above deal *directly* with the legacies of urban renewal and the urban governance that emerged to address it. Nonetheless, this literature shows that a popular understanding of urban renewal as having failed contributed to the delegitimization of certain forms of urban governance and constrained the responses that could be mobilized to respond to these challenges, especially in the United States. Top-down, expert- and state-led projects became particularly unviable. This corresponded with a shift from Keynesian to neoliberal ideology in Western governments more broadly, and although the extent to which this was a cause or effect (or both) has been discussed at length by Klemek, it will probably never be decided conclusively.

The wake of urban renewal's failure left Western cities with a crisis of 'state capacity,' as government-led planning initiatives became politically unviable.[49] Ruth Gilmore refers to state capacity as the "fiscal, institutional and ideological means" available to the state, which took the

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[49] Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007).

form of the welfare state in response to the Great Depression.[50] During the same period that urban renewal was being called into question, Keynesian welfare programs were also being delegitimized. Yet, as Gilmore notes, "the state did not disappear… Rather, what withered was the state's legitimacy to act *as* the Keynesian state."[51] Gilmore illustrates how this surplus (no longer legitimate, but still extant) state capacity was reconfigured and deployed in the prison industrial complex in California throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

The failure of urban renewal, the literature suggests, contributed to this surplus capacity by delegitimizing state-led social programs in general. Surplus state capacity was, at least partially, a legacy of urban renewal. Following Gilmore in her tracing of connections between legitimacy and state capacity can, I think, be a productive way of thinking through the constraints on urban governance in the post-renewal period. Through this literature we have seen that delegitimized state capacity and a lack of available alternative policies for managing urban conditions meant that private development (and abandonment) was left unchecked until this surplus state capacity could be reconfigured in a politically viable mode; that is, one supported by the legitimacy of the rising neoliberal ideology. The ways this surplus state capacity would be reanimated were dependent on the conditions of the areas being governed, including the legacies of urban renewal programs.

Though using state capacity in a leading role in urban governance had become unviable, the literature – and my own research – suggests that partnerships with private developers and community organizations lent legitimacy to the use of local as well as federal government programs, policies, regulations, grants, institutions, and so on. Renewal, in effect, created the conditions in which this specific form of governance became viable. Acting through partnerships was a new form of governance in some ways. How fully it departed from the renewal 'order,' however, is unclear. Indeed, despite the popular consensus of urban renewal's failure and Klemek's claims that its mechanisms had lost legitimacy, Derek Hyra has called the forms of urban governance that predominated from 1994-2007 a "New Urban Renewal" due to similarities with the earlier version of the mid-century: the massive federal funding and large-scale architectural fix to urban social problems predicated on displacement.[52] The 'new' urban

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[50] Ibid., 78.
[51] Emphasis in original, ibid., 85.
[52] Derek S. Hyra, "Conceptualizing the New Urban Renewal: Comparing the Past to the Present," *Urban Affairs Review* 48, no. 4 (July 1, 2012): 498–527.

renewal seems to have carried out similar actions through a different form of legitimacy, a form of legitimacy regained through public-private partnerships and community consultations and participation, as the HOPE VI redevelopment projects demonstrate.

The rise of public-private partnerships contributed to David Harvey's seminal claim that the main difference in urban governance in the post-renewal period was the speculative nature of the projects that local governments undertook.[53] Whereas until that point government had played more of a managerial role in executing projects, such as those of urban renewal, the post-renewal period saw governments increasingly involved in public-private partnerships in which they subsumed much of the risk that would otherwise be sustained by private developers in a bid for any kind of reprieve from the recession. These projects were rarely designed to benefit the poor except through the potential, much-anticipated spill-over effects of attracting capital. In combination with public-private partnerships, local governments also shouldered risk through tax-increment financing in which they could borrow for development projects against the anticipated increase in property taxes in the target area.[54]

These authors clearly situate new forms of governance in the post-renewal period. They do not, however, link these forms of governance to the particular physical and social legacies of renewal. State capacity in Little Burgundy was employed through partnerships with community organizations to address conditions created by urban renewal. The Coalition made demands of state agencies such as the housing office and the police in order to pursue the action plans that the community had developed to address the conditions left by renewal. In the same period, the City was developing its own initiative to incorporate community participation in neighbourhood development and planning based on ideals that had entered municipal politics through the contestation of urban renewal. Animating state capacity through community participation came from both bottom-up and top-down initiatives that were shaped by renewal.

Forms of urban governance which emerged in response to what was considered unacceptably high concentrations of poverty are more closely linked to the physical and social legacies of renewal. Efforts to create an appropriate social mix might attempt to attract more

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[53] David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism," *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 71, no. 1 (1989): 3.
[54] Teaford, "Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath"; Rachel Weber and Sara O'Neill-Kohl, "The Historical Roots of Tax Increment Financing, or How Real Estate Consultants Kept Urban Renewal Alive," *Economic Development Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (August 2013): 193–207.

homeowners or decrease the low-income population. Some uses of state capacity to achieve social mix were put in place without the need for accompanying legitimization, such as in Slater's example of using regulatory tools to control private housing unit sizes to reduce the availability of rental stock for single, and often low-income, residents.[55] This was a more passive form of governance than the redevelopment of large public housing complexes, in which governments actively displaced residents and demolished buildings. Both public-private partnerships and community participation were indispensable to legitimizing this active use of state capacity here, perhaps because, as Hyra identified, it closely resembled the urban renewal process that had generated much of the public housing in the first place. Sociodemographic governance in post-renewal Little Burgundy, as I have indicated, offers new perspectives to this literature on how ideas about concentrated poverty and social mix related to the physical, social, and ideological legacies renewal.

Considering the very high profile place of crime in the discourse around urban issues since the 1960s, policing is conspicuously absent from the urban governance articles surveyed here.[56] Elizabeth Hinton has placed the disinvestment of community organizations in the United States, to which Klemek attributed the weakening of community-led alternatives to renewal, into context of a political project that shifted away from programs designed to address poverty and instead toward policies that policed and contained it.[57] This included using police to provide services offered by community groups and social non-profits, such as supervising youth activity centres or helping illiterate citizens fill out government paperwork, but with the objective of gaining greater cooperation of citizens with the police.[58] The creation of stronger police-community links in the 1960s and 70s has been documented by other scholars but Hinton's work makes it possible see some of the connections with post-renewal neighbourhoods.[59]

A second study which did mention policing was explicit about its role in urban governance, if less so about the legacies of urban renewal. Edward Goetz, better known for his

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[55] Slater, "Municipally Managed Gentrification in South Parkdale, Toronto."

[56] The relative absence of the role of police in urban governance in this literature may be attributed to the sampling method, which may have missed relevant articles on policing in post-renewal neighbourhoods. For example, I did not include articles on managing crime and security in public housing, though the majority of public housing in the United States is a legacy of urban renewal.

[57] Elizabeth Kai Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

[58] Ibid., 114.

[59] Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Craig Gilmore, "Beyond Bratton," in *Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter*, ed. Christina Heatherton and Jordan Camp (London: Verso, 2015), 173–200.

academic work on public housing, argued that the lack of a coherent federal urban policy was a void that was filled by the war on drugs.[60] Using examples from a study in Minneapolis, he illustrated this claim by describing the cooperation of municipal housing inspectors in police drug raids to evict tenants and the role of police in organizing property managers to identify potential 'bad tenants' and share information about tenants they had evicted. These two existing works by Hinton and Goetz fill an important void, but leave many questions unaddressed. Did the actors who promoted these new forms of policing tie their arguments to the conditions of post-renewal neighbourhoods? Did the physical and/or social conditions of post-renewal neighbourhoods create challenges for existing forms of policing that some actors felt needed to be overcome? What role, if any, did community actors, community participation, and/or public-private partnerships have in the rise of these forms of policing? To what extent, if at all, were these forms of policing related to the "social mix" that was then being promoted?

Addressing the paucity of research on the relationship between the new forms of policing that emerged in the 1960s and 70s and the legacies of urban renewal is one of the clearest contributions of the present thesis. I show that increasing police violence and police harassment was one of the sources of insecurity that community organizations attempted to address, and their mobilization and protests on this issue contributed to the turn toward community engaged approaches to policing. Although police harassment itself was not directly shaped by renewal legacies, renewal's role in weakening the social fabric of the neighbourhood was an important logic through which criminality and insecurity in the neighbourhood were understood. Framed in this way, two post-renewal policing programs that incorporated community development were deployed in Little Burgundy insecurity problems. Finally, as with the partnership between municipal inspectors and police that Goetz described, the public housing office and police collaborated to evict unwanted tenants facilitated police work. As mentioned above, the high proportion of public housing in the neighbourhood, a result of renewal, helped this strategy play an important role in addressing the crack crisis.

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[60] Edward G. Goetz, "The US War on Drugs as Urban Policy," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 20, no. 3 (September 1996): 539–49.

1.2 Post-renewal urban governance in Little Burgundy

This thesis builds on the literature reviewed here through an historical study of post-renewal governance in Little Burgundy, a Montreal neighbourhood subjected to an urban renewal program. Between 1965, when the program was announced, and 1978, when the last phase ended, this pericentral industrial working-class neighbourhood was dramatically transformed. The questions that I seek to answer in this work are the following:

- *How have the physical, social and ideological legacies of urban renewal shaped the development of these neighbourhoods?*
- *How did citizens, governments or other actors attempt to transform the conditions of their neighbourhood that resulted from urban renewal?*
- *What new logics of neighbourhood action did these efforts produce?*

Chapter two discusses the delegitimization of top-down planning and the rise of community participation in urban governance between the renewal and post-renewal period. Citizen committees in Little Burgundy contested the renewal program developed by experts in the planning department, calling into question the legitimacy of this form of planning and helping bring a new ideal of community participation in neighbourhood development into the political agenda. In the post-renewal period, this ideological legacy was put in to practice by both citizen and state initiatives, the Little Burgundy Coalition and the municipal program *Vivre Montréal en santé* (VMS). I argue that the logic of community participation did not preclude state involvement, but community involvement facilitated the use of state capacity regardless of whether the initiatives originated from the community or the state.

In chapter three, I explore the notion of concentrated poverty as a problem and social mix as a solution through the lens of sociodemographic governance, presenting alternative findings to those generally found in the literature. Already in the renewal period, citizens feared that the new public housing would become a "ghetto" of the extremely poor, and the rent scale they developed to address these concerns provided the basis for the legal and administrative mechanisms that the housing office used to maintain a social mix in its properties into the post-renewal period. It was only after changes to the laws removed these mechanisms that the housing office began to identify problems in the neighbourhood as consequences of concentrated poverty, but its means to address this problem were limited. Evictions were one of the few tools

remaining to it, which were used strategically in cooperation with the police in response to the crack crisis. Also in the post-renewal period, the City launched the programs *Operation 10,000* and *20,000 Logements,* which changed the sociodemographic balance in the neighbourhood by significantly increasing the home-owning population in an attempt to overcome the failure of renewal to attract private residential development.

Observations about the role of the police in post-renewal governance is discussed in chapter four. The main changes to policing in this period were increasing levels of police violence and harassment toward Black residents and the emergence of the efforts to incorporate neighbourhood communities into the management of criminality and security. Although renewal legacies can only be a partial explanation for policing practices in this period, and some practices may have had little to do with renewal, I show how three legacies of renewal shaped the forms of policing in the neighbourhood. First, I describe how the idea of a weakened social fabric was part of the logic for two programs applied to Little Burgundy, Tandem and ACES, both of which relied on the involvement of communities and citizens in the practice of policing. Second, I draw connections between policing and the unfulfilled promise of development, left by renewal in Little Burgundy's physical landscape as its vacant lots. Finally, the abundance of public housing constructed during urban renewal made the public housing office the single major landlord of the neighbourhood, and one in which the police found a cooperative partner in managing criminality across the neighbourhood. I show how, through a strategy of eviction and moratorium on renting, the public housing office and police collaborated to displace tenants considered to be causing problems by using police evidence in civil courts of the rental board.

In the conclusion, I summarize my findings and show how they contribute to the themes of the literature. Urban renewal cannot be credited with shaping all the neighbourhood conditions and the forms of governance discussed in this thesis alone, and certainly some had little to do with renewal at all. Nonetheless, tracing these connections has helped distinguish the logics of these actions. In short, this study shows that the effects of urban renewal extended beyond the transformations of the renewal period, but instead continued to shape the ways community participation, sociodemographic management, and policing were part of urban governance in Little Burgundy even after renewal itself had ended.

1.3 Research methods

I addressed my research questions through an historical study of Little Burgundy, focused on the post-renewal period from 1979 to 1995, but which also engages with the renewal period (1965–1978) to establish the connections between renewal legacies and post-renewal governance. This research is based on archival records, as well as other sources such as reports, newspapers and scholarly publications. The sources consulted are outlined in the sections below. Through these records one can only present a partial representation of the period, and as such this study should be considered the groundwork for future research which should include interviews with participants, many of whom are still active in the neighbourhood.

Renewal period

The renewal period itself is not the focus of this research, but in order to understand its physical, social and ideological legacies I consulted various primary and secondary sources related to this period. The most thorough reference for urban renewal in Little Burgundy is the doctoral dissertation of Robert Mayer.[61] Other graduate theses provided insight into the implementation of the renewal program and the activities of the citizen committees.[62] For the citizen committees, I consulted the records of the social animators in the Southwest, including articles and reports by *Conseil des oeuvres* animators Michel Blondin and Hector Ouellet,[63] reports by the Company of Young Canadians,[64] documents from the Montreal Council of Social Agencies[65] and academic writing on these groups and individuals.[66] The activities and views of the Saint Martin's Blocks

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[61] Two volumes weighing 15lbs, Mayer's dissertation can be called the Bible of Little Burgundy's urban renewal program. Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal."

[62] Piotte, "La rénovation urbaine et le phénomène de pression: étude monographique, le cas de la Petite Bourgogne"; Lavigne, "La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne."

[63] Michel Blondin, "L'animation sociale en milieu urbain : une solution," *Recherches sociographiques* 6, no. 3 (1965): 283, doi:10.7202/055279ar; Michel Blondin, "Vie urbaine et animation sociale," *Recherches sociographiques* 9, no. 1–2 (1968): 111, doi:10.7202/055396ar; Michel Blondin, Hector Ouellet, and Robert Chagnon, "Rélogement des familles expropriées: Ilôts-St-Martin - première étape du projet de rénovation urbaine du secteur 'Petite Bourgogne,'" March 1967; Hector Ouellet, "L'animation sociale à Montréal ; Elements du programme de travail 1966-1967" (Montréal: Conseil des oeuvres de Montréal, November 1966), F013 HA04170 File 9, Concordia Library Special Collections.

[64] Suzanne Veit, "La participation des citoyens et la Compagnie des Jeunes Canadiens en 1971 : Trois études de cas" (Compagnie des Jeunes Canadiens, August 1971); "Rapport sur le développement du projet Petite Bourgogne, présenté au 'Comité intérimaire des programmes' de la C.J.C.," May 31, 1968.

[65] Montreal Council of Social Agencies, MG 2076 44 File 00779, McGill University Archives.

[66] Vincent Garneau, "Le Conseil des œuvres de Montréal : animation sociale, démocratie participative et affrontement politique" (Master's Thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2011); Martin Croteau, "L'implication

Committee (SMBC) come across in an article by its president Jeanne LeBlanc,[67] in the NFB film *La P'tite Bourgogne*,[68] and in documents preserved in the archives of the Negro Community Centre (NCC).[69] I also referred to studies and reports on the renewal program from the urban planning and housing departments.[70] The biography of Guy Legault, former director of the planning department, the housing department and the OMHM, provided a perspective from these municipal and paramunicipal agencies.[71]

Post-renewal governance

In the post-renewal period, I looked at the actors, policies and practices that seemed to reflect the four themes retained from the literature. For insight into the general logics of urban governance from the City, I consulted the Montreal's urban planning and development Master Plan, and the Directive Plan for the Southwest borough, as well as for Ville-Marie.[72] I also consulted the archival documents of the public consultations for the Master Plan in the Southwest.[73]

Community participation

My major sources for the activities of the Little Burgundy Coalition were meeting minutes and letters held in the archives of the Negro Community Centre.[74] These convey the objectives of the Coalition, action plans of some of its committees, and provide snapshots of the actors and

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sociale et politique de Jacques Couture à Montréal de 1963 à 1976" (Master's Thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2008).

[67] Jeanne Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin," in *Petite Bourgogne*, Les Gens du Québec 2 (Montréal: Éditions québécoises, 1973), 46–57.

[68] Maurice Bulbulian, *La P'tite Bourgogne*, Documentaire (ONF, 1968), https://www.onf.ca/film/la_ptite_bourgogne. Also available in English but with a shorter runtime.

[69] Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal)," 1968, F013 HA04170 File 3, Concordia Library Special Collections; Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "St-Martin Blocks Bulletin Vol 1 Issue 1," December 1967, F013 HA04173 File 44, Concordia Library Special Collections. The NCC fonds also has documents from the citizen committee Réveil and the Little Burgundy Council.

[70] Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "La Petite Bourgogne: Bulletin Spécial no. 1" (Montréal: Ville de Montréal, 1965), VM097-Z_025op, Archives de la Ville de Montréal; Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "La Petite Bourgogne: Rapport Général" (Montréal: Ville de Montréal, 1966), Archives de la Ville de Montréal; Montréal : Service de l'habitation, "Les Habitations des Îlots Saint-Martin" (Montreal: Ville de Montréal, 1968).

[71] Guy R. Legault, *La ville qu'on a bâtie: trente ans au service de l'urbanisme et de l'habitation à Montréal, 1956-1986* (Montréal: Liber, 2002).

[72] Montréal : Service de l'habitation et du développement urbain, *Réussir Montréal : plan d'urbanisme* (Ville de Montréal, 1992); Montréal : Service de l'habitation et du développement urbain, *Plan d'urbanisme : plan directeur de l'arrondissement Sud-ouest* (Ville de Montréal, 1992); Montréal : Bureau du plan d'urbanisme, *Master Development Plan for the Ville-Marie District* (Ville de Montréal, 1990).

[73] CA M001 VM049-12-D08, Archives de la Ville de Montréal.

[74] Negro Community Centre / Charles H. Este Cultural Centre fonds F013 HA04193 File 4; F013 HA04151 File 21, File 24; F013 HA04212 File 1, File 2, Concordia University Library, Special Collections.

activities. A chapter on Little Burgundy by Annick Germain and collaborators in a volume on interethnic cohabitation in Montreal neighbourhoods paints a detailed portrait of the neighbourhood in the first half of the 1990s, with some useful observations about the Coalition.[75] The OMHM's bulletin *Le Nid* ran articles on the Coalition as well as housing office's initiative to support community development in response.[76] Certain oral history collections pertain to Little Burgundy and the post-renewal period, and though I consulted these they did not contribute significantly to this research.[77]

For the program *Vivre Montréal en santé* (VMS), a variety of documents and reports are available at the Marie-Morin documentation centre.[78] I also consulted records on file at the municipal archives.[79]

Concentration of poverty and social mix

Chapter three describes how ideas about concentration of poverty and social mix were part of the legacies that shaped how the actors in the neighbourhood approached the issues of the post-renewal period. In the post-renewal period, the municipal housing office (OMHM) was the main actor whose actions were shaped by this idea. Social mix and concentration of poverty informed the way the citizen committee designed the rents scale which allowed the housing office to maintain a social mix in its properties.[80] When these mechanisms were overruled by changes to the provincial laws, the intensification of very poor residents in public housing lead to a renewed concern about the ill effects of a concentration of poverty.

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[75] Annick Germain, Jean-François Marchand, and Édith Mukakayumba, "La Petite-Bourgogne : un quartier tourmenté à la reconquête de son image," in *Cohabitation interethnique et vie de quartier*, études et recherches 12 (Montréal: INRS-Urbanisation, 1995), 169–200.

[76] "Petite-Bourgogne, certifiée prioritaire," *Le Nid: Bulletin de l'OMHM*, August 1991; Yves Sauvé, "Un géant dans la Petite-Bourgogne," *Le Nid: Bulletin de l'OMHM*, June 1991; "Les Ados: Dans l'ouest de la ville," *Le Nid: Bulletin de l'OMHM*, October 1991; "Dossier: Pour l'O.M.H.M., la Petite-Bourgogne, c'est toujours... certifiée prioritaire," *Le Nid: Bulletin de l'OMHM*, February 1992; "Les Îlots St-Martin font parler d'eux," *Le Nid: Bulletin de l'OMHM*, September 1993.

[77] Little Burgundy Oral History Project (1981-2), P007 Oral History-Montreal Studies collection, Concordia University Records Management and Archives; COHDS-05-001 Voices of Little Burgundy, COHDS-10-048 Alfie Roberts Institute fonds, Centre for Oral History and Digital Storytelling.

[78] Montréal: Service des loisirs et du développement communautaire, "Adhesion de la Ville de Montréal au Réseau québecois de villes et villages en santé 'Vivre Montréal en santé'" (Ville de Montréal, January 1990); Murielle Leduc, "Vivre Montréal en santé: Une première évaluation," October 20, 1993; Danielle de Connick, "Réflexion sur les indicateurs dans le cadre du projet de «Vivre Montréal en santé (VMS)»" (Montréal: Division des analyses d'impacts, Module de la recherche et de la planification, Service de la planification et de la concertation, December 10, 1990); "À Thomas Chapais, la santé, ça compte!," *Le Nid: Bulletin de l'OMHM*, September 1989.

[79] CA M001 P077-0-D309, Archives de la Ville de Montréal.

[80] Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal)."

The role of the OMHM in Little Burgundy during the crack crisis is told in its retrospective history and in accounts by its former staff and municipal housing officials.[81] It can also be traced through newspaper articles and their own annual reports, although reports were not published for most of the 1980s. Finally, I have recuperated some of the eviction case decisions that went before the rental board (*Régie du logement*), either published in jurisprudence reporters or used as jurisprudence in cases on file at the *Cour du Québec*. These cases provide insight into the rationale of the housing office. Though I have also obtained data of cases taken to the Régie by the OMHM for the years 1985-1995, unfortunately the motive of the eviction cases cannot be determined from this data and only 3% of the original cases have been preserved in the archival process.[82] One of the OMHM's initiatives to retain the wage-earning families at Îlots Saint-Martin aimed to transfer some of the public housing units from Îlots Saint-Martin into a cooperative housing model, and the master's project of Éléni Reed includes a report on this topic.[83]

For the programs *Opération 10,000/20,000 Logements* I consulted the phase reports from 1979- 1986, available at the Marie Morin documentation centre, as well as evaluations of the program.[84] This program was continued under Doré as Habiter Montréal, and although I consulted the phase reports for these (also at Marie Morin), Little Burgundy did not feature in them.[85]

Policing

After many, many access to information requests, the majority of my sources on policing are secondary, with the exception of some files in the NCC archives. Newspapers are an important

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[81] Legault, *La ville qu'on a bâtie*; Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat"; Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais*; Norman Daoust, "Letter from Norman Daoust to Robert Gagnon," March 7, 1995, 2008-0024.01.05.219 15 25 A, McGill University Archives.

[82] OMHM data from the Régie du logement, personal communication, July 24, 2016. Archived decisions at E34 Fonds Régie du logement, Bureau de Montréal-SudOuest (34) – Décisions, 2010-10-004/5, 2010-10-004/12, 2010-10-004/19, 2010-10-004/20, BAnQ Vieux-Montréal.

[83] Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin."

[84] Ian MacBurnie, "Inner-City Housing through the Partnership Approach: An Evaluation of Three Initiatives," 1988; Lacroix, "Analyse de l'Opération 20,000 logements de la Ville de Montréal et de ses principales réalisations." (Master's thesis, School of Urban Planning, McGill University, 1989); Montréal : Service de l'habitation et du développement urbain, "Opération 20,000 logements : son bilan," Cahier d'étude en habitation (Montréal: Ville de Montréal, January 1988).

[85] There was only one lot in Little Burgundy offered through this program. Montréal : Service de l'habitation et du développement urbain, "Habiter Montréal : Phase II," Habiter Montréal : Programme de développement résidentiel (Ville de Montréal, 1993).

source but, as Janin Hadlaw has shown, news reporting is not neutral.[86] Hadlaw's master's thesis provides an excellent analysis of how the coverage of police racism by the English media in Montreal constructed Little Burgundy, already spatially coded as Black, as a site of criminality and crisis which legitimized policing transgressions both in the neighbourhood as well as toward Black individuals elsewhere in the city. Her thesis includes transcripts and descriptions of the CBC Newswatch exposé *Black & Blue*, which is no longer available. The doctoral thesis by Daniel Desbiens, who was himself a police officer, provides insight into the community policing program ACES.[87] This thesis contextualizes the program and quotes interviews and internal documents which were available to him. A letter about community relations in Little Burgundy from one of the officers at Station 24 is cited at length, for example. One interview provides the explicit rationale for starting the program in Little Burgundy rather than one of the neighbourhoods that had been identified as a higher priority.

Operation Tandem, later Tandem Montreal, is a community-based crime prevention program that was developed in the post-renewal period and later implemented in Little Burgundy. I was not able to find many details about Tandem's actions in Little Burgundy but I include a portrait of the program in general to give a sense of the logics behind it based on newspaper articles and scholarly work.[88]

1.4 Limitations

This project is presented as an archival research project. Many of my sources are published work by academics, such as masters or PhD theses or government reports, but as contemporary research they witness conditions in the neighbourhood that have historical importance. By combining these sources with archival materials, I hope to reconstruct a faithful approximation of the events that took place. But the absences in the archives were gaping, and I experienced

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[86] Hadlaw, "Locating Crisis."

[87] Daniel Desbiens, "Opinions et attitudes des policiers face à un changement organisationnel important - l'implantation du programme ACES au SPVM" (Doctoral dissertation, Université de Montréal, 2002).

[88] Marie-Axelle Borde, "Pour une approche territoriale de la question de la sécurité : Le cas du programme communautaire Tandem dans les quartiers Hochelaga-Maisonneuve et Côte-des-Neiges à Montréal" (Master's thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2015); Julien Garnier, "Métro, quartiers, ville : étude de quelques dimensions de l'expérience quotindienne de Montréal au travers du concept foucauldien du pouvoir" (Doctoral dissertation, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2016); Montreal, "1982–2007: 25 années de réalisations remarquables en sécurité urbaine à Montréal, Tandem" (Ville de Montréal, Service du développement culturel, de la qualité du milieu de vie et de la diversité ethnoculturelle, 2007); Tandem Montréal, "Tandem Montréal... Déja 10 Ans," *La Presse*, October 31, 1991, sec. Publireportage.

these as months of searching for records that I refused to believe had not been preserved. I am conscious that when researching a period in living memory of its participants, interviews are a valuable component of historical research. My initial research plan had included interviews. At one point there was potential for interviews with early members of the Coalition to be conducted in partnership with a parallel study on Community Participative Action Research through Concordia's department of Applied Human Science at Concordia. Unfortunately, issues of logistics and time constraints ultimately precluded this option. This thesis project can be thought of as a first stage in research that should, ideally, be extended to include interviews in a later stage.

2. Community participation in urban governance

In 1989, Reverend Francis-Xavier called a meeting of community organizations and citizens interested in taking their neighbourhood back from the violent crime surrounding the drug trade that seemed to hold residents hostage.[89] Co-director of the Tyndale St-Georges community centre which served the residents of Little Burgundy, Father Francis had become concerned about the "demonic fear" and insecurity that he observed.[90] By 1990, over twenty local organizations, both francophone and anglophone, worked in concert as the Little Burgundy Coalition to change the conditions of their neighbourhood. Based on action plans they developed to attain their collectively defined objectives, these groups formed committees and engaged public agencies in their efforts to achieve their goals. In 1995, Little Burgundy was showcased at an international conference on crime prevention as a success story and as a model of how the coordinated efforts of citizens and community organizations could improve the security of their neighborhood in the face of criminality.[91] The 46% decline in crime rates in the neighborhood between 1990 and 1993 was presented as evidence of the success of the local community coalition which formed in response to the security crisis.

Illustrated above is a logic of neighbourhood action premised on community participation. This logic, central to urban governance in Little Burgundy, has its roots in a much earlier struggle over urban renewal in the same neighbourhood. It was in the face of urban renewal that local residents organized into citizen committees and, for the first time, collectively contested the plans of experts that were being imposed on the neighbourhood from above and proposed alternatives from their positions as experts on life in the neighbourhood. The political work of the citizen committees undermined the legitimacy of top-down planning, but it also introduced the notion of community-led planning as an ideal form of urban governance. This ideal became an important new logic of neighbourhood action, which provided an alternative to

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[89] "Minutes of Meeting Held with English Speaking Groups, June 14, 1989," June 14, 1989, F013 HA04212 File 2, Concordia Library Special Collections; Martin Pelchat, "Mobilisation général contre le crack dans le Petite-Bourgogne," *La Presse*, July 9, 1990.
[90] Ingrid Peritz, "Attack on Crack; Little Burgundy Residents Work to Oust Pushers," *Gazette*, July 14, 1990; Sauvé, "Un géant dans la Petite-Bourgogne."
[91] Welsh and Roy, "Un habitat plus sûr."

the top-down logic that guided urban renewal governance and that, due to citizens' opposition to renewal, lost its legitimacy in Little Burgundy and many other cities.

The dominance of community participation was observable in Little Burgundy in the mid-1980s and early 90s. It was most visibly put into action in this period when, in 1989, a collection of local community organizations from multiple sectors called the Little Burgundy Coalition collaboratively developed plans of action to address the problems in the neighbourhood that emerged in the wake of urban renewal. The initiatives of the Coalition were developed by local actors based on their experiences, reflecting the arguments the citizen committees had raised against top-down planning of the renewal program. This time, however, their plans were not in opposition to an external plan, but developed to address urgent problems in the absence of state action. And yet, the state was not absent from this form of governance. State institutions also worked in partnership with the Coalition to carry out the action plans that the community groups developed in matters of housing, security, youth programs and employment. In this arrangement, the City was able to employ its state capacity, its actions legitimized by the community-led plans.

At the same time, the City had been developing ways to formalize community participation in the municipal urban governance system, launching its program *Vivre Montréal en santé* in 1991. Based on the international *Villes et villages en santé* model, the structure and process mirrored that of the Coalition, but tended toward greater involvement of state agencies in the decision-making process of neighbourhood action. Whether through partnerships with the Coalition or through its own initiatives, state actions were legitimized through the logic of community participation that had taken shape during the contestation of the citizen committees to urban renewal. The logic of action that emerged in response to renewal was one that centred community, but this community focus did not preclude the state. Regardless of whether an initiative originated from the community with the state as a partner, or was based on state objectives that then engaged community to achieve it, in each case the logic of community legitimized the use of state capacity.

2.1 Urban renewal and community participation

As I noted in the introduction, Little Burgundy was one of several areas of Montreal targeted by post-war urban renewal, but it was the first to face coordinated opposition from citizens. The first

study preparing for the renewal of the neighbourhood was announced in 1965. The announcement of an urban renewal program for Little Burgundy was the beginning of significant social and physical changes for the neighbourhood. It was also the beginning of a new form of community participation that eventually undermined the legitimacy of expert-led top-down planning and demonstrated the value of citizen involvement in developing the plans for the places they lived. The Little Burgundy renewal program was not the first case of urban renewal in Montreal, but it was the first time the expert plans from the planning department were met with organized contestation by the residents.[92] After the actions of the citizen committees in Little Burgundy, however, many other Montreal communities mobilized against their residents' expropriation and/or displacement from their neighbourhoods.[93] As such, this episode has gained attention from researchers in various fields who mark it as a turning point in the phases of social organising in Montreal.[94]

The Little Burgundy renewal program was at least discursively intended to address the social and economic problems in the neighbourhood as well as to improve the physical conditions.[95] The declining population, poor housing conditions, and dwindling incomes of the households that existed in the neighbourhood were the types of problems used to justify the large-scale clearance and rebuilding project in the renewal study and proposal.[96] In his dissertation on urban renewal in Little Burgundy, Robert Mayer has demonstrated that although

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[92] Pierre Hamel, *Logements et luttes urbaines à Montréal (1963-1976)*, Cahier de recherche (Montréal: Faculté de l'aménagement, 1983), 208.

[93] For example, the Lower Westmount tenants organized in response to demolishing their homes for the Ville Marie expressway and the Milton-Park community against the Concordia estates development. Jacques T Godbout and Jean-Pierre Collin, *Les organismes populaires en milieu urbain : contre-pouvoir ou nouvelle pratique professionalle?*, Rapports de recherche 3 (Montréal: INRS-Urbanisation, 1977), 63.

[94] Paul R. Bélanger et al., "Le mouvement populaire et communautaire: de la revendication au partenariat (1963-1992)," in *Le Québec en jeu. Comprendre les grands défis*, Les classiques des sciences sociales (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992), 713–47; Gérald Doré, "L'organisation communautaire et les mutations dans les services sociaux au Québec, 1961 – 1991. La marge et le mouvement comme lieux de l'identité," *Service social* 41, no. 2 (1992): 131, doi:10.7202/706573ar; Louis Favreau, *Mouvement Populaire et Intervention Communautaire de 1960 À Nos Jours: Continuités et Ruptures*, Alternatives (Montréal, Québec: Centre de formation populaire : Editions du fleuve, 1989); Jacques T Godbout and Jean-Pierre Collin, *Les organismes populaires en milieu urbain : contre-pouvoir ou nouvelle pratique professionalle?*, Rapports de recherche 3 (Montréal: INRS-Urbanisation, 1977); Jacques T Godbout, *La participation contre la démocratie*, Les classiques des sciences sociales (Les Éditions Albert Saint-Martin, 1983); Pierre Hamel, *Logements et luttes urbaines à Montréal (1963-1976)*, Cahier de recherche (Montréal: Faculté de l'amenagement, 1983); Pierre Hamel, *Action collective et démocratie locale. Les mouvements urbain montréalais*, Les classiques des sciences sociales (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1991); Donald McGraw, *Le developpement des groupes populaires à Montréal (1963-1973)*, Collection Pratiques Sociales (Montreal: Editions Coopératives Albert Saint-Martin, 1978).

[95] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal."

[96] Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "La Petite Bourgogne: Bulletin Spécial no. 1."

the language of the renewal program put emphasis on social uplifting, the actual interventions had little relation to the needs of the citizens and failed to consider the negative impacts the program would have on the existing population.[97] Analysing the actual content of the plans led Mayer to conclude that the urban renewal program was designed to improve the profitability of the declining pericentral neighbourhood rather than improve the living conditions of its residents.[98]

Just as the renewal plans were being drafted, a new form of local organising was emerging in the Southwest. Beginning in Saint-Henri, which included the area that would soon be delimited as Little Burgundy, citizen committees began to form to take action on the physical and social conditions of their neighbourhood.[99] These citizen committees were composed of the individual residents of the neighbourhood or block, supported by social animators.[100] The latter were usually employed by family social service agencies, in particular the Catholic organization *Conseil des œuvres de Montréal* (COM). Vincent Garneau has provided a detailed account how the social animation project in Saint-Henri was the first phase in COM's shift from an individual "case work" approach to social service provision to developing capacities and motivating citizens to "take charge of their own conditions and work to obtain the necessary improvements."[101] Though COM undeniably played an important role in the development of citizen committees in Little Burgundy, the Montreal Council of Social Agencies and the Company of Young Canadians also funded social animators in the area during the urban renewal period.[102] The social animators helped the residents develop skills and access resources needed to make interventions in the conditions of their neighbourhoods.

The *Association des parents de Saint-Henri* is generally recognised as the first citizen committee of this kind in Montreal. Its first project concerned the conditions of a local school,

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[97] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal."

[98] Ibid.

[99] Little Burgundy would include the parishes of Sainte-Cunégonde and Saint-Joseph, often administered with a variety of other parishes as Saint-Henri. Sainte-Cunégonde was also an incorporated city annexed by Montreal in 1905. Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "La Petite Bourgogne: Bulletin Spécial no. 1."

[100] *Animateurs sociaux*, basically community organisers.

[101] Garneau, "Le Conseil des œuvres de Montréal : animation sociale, démocratie participative et affrontement politique."

[102] At one point there were 17 social animators from CYC working in Little Burgundy, though not all of them related to urban renewal, according to Suzanne Veit, "La participation des citoyens et la Compagnie des Jeunes Canadiens en 1971 : Trois études de cas" (Compagnie des Jeunes Canadiens, August 1971). For the Montreal Council of Social Agencies see MG 2076 44 File 00779.

but it soon formed a variety of subcommittees on topics such as recreational activities, playgrounds and community facilities, and housing.[103] This parents' association was not formed in response to renewal, but one of its subcommittees, *Réveil des citoyens de Saint-Cunégonde,* began organizing independently to focus on the urban renewal program in Little Burgundy after it was announced in 1965.[104] It soon changed its name to *Réveil des citoyens de la Petite-Bourgogne* to include residents in the western half of the renewal area, and acted as the citizen committee representing Little Burgundy.[105] An English-language group simply called the Citizen's Committee of Little Burgundy was also organizing in response to the urban renewal program around the same time.[106] Though it supported Réveil's initiatives and sometimes referred to itself as the anglophone component of that group, it seems to have been organized autonomously from the francophone committee until it integrated into the Réveil in 1967.[107]

Réveil and the anglophone committee organized around the issues of the neighbourhood at large. But over the next decade, as the urban renewal program unfolded in phases by parcelled areas, it became more practical to organize through smaller citizen committees by blocks (*îlots*). The first block-level citizen group was the Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee (SMBC), formed in 1967.[108] As the City moved forward with the subsequent phases of the renewal plan, more block-level committees formed: *comité des îlots Quesnel-Coursol* (1968), *comité des îlots Campbell* (1969), *comité des citoyens de Parc-Vinet* (1970), and *comité des îlots Parc des Seigneurs*

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[103] Garneau, "Le Conseil des œuvres de Montréal : animation sociale, démocratie participative et affrontement politique"; McGraw, *Le developpement des groupes populaires à Montréal (1963-1973).*

[104] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal"; McGraw, *Le developpement des groupes populaires à Montréal (1963-1973)*; Hamel, *Logements et luttes urbaines à Montréal (1963-1976)*; Garneau, "Le Conseil des œuvres de Montréal : animation sociale, démocratie participative et affrontement politique."

[105] On the name change see Blondin, "L'animation sociale en milieu urbain," 297; and also Godbout and Collin, *Les organismes populaires en milieu urbain*, 53.

[106] The histories of citizen committees have little to say about this committee. The details here draw from records found in the Montreal Council of Social Agencies manuscript group (MG 2076 44 File 00779) at the McGill University Archives, Montreal.

[107] The anglophone citizen committee called meetings, and made decisions independently of Réveil. They did exchange information, including inviting representatives from Réveil to their meetings and support their initiatives. According to their interpretation, the inefficiency of bilingual meetings made a single organization for both language groups impossible. Mayer states that this committee integrated into Réveil in January 1967, and the Réveil stopped organizing in favour of the block committees in 1968. Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 184; "Citizen's Committee," 1971 1966, MG 2076 44 File 00779, McGill University Archives.

[108] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal"; Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin." The committee at *Îlots Saint-Martin* produced a bilingual newsletter and published English versions of its reports with the English name I use here. Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "St-Martin Blocks Bulletin Vol 1 Issue 1." Less than half the residents of Îlots Saint Martin were francophone, compared with 73% in Little Burgundy at large, according to Blondin, Ouellet, and Chagnon, "Rélogement des familles expropriées," 10.

(1970).[109] Neighbourhood-based organising of Réveil was abandoned in favour of the block-level committees.

For many of these citizen committees, the first concern was obtaining information. They demanded that the City meet its minimum responsibility to inform the public about its plans, especially how they would impact citizens' realities.[110] To get information from the City to the public, the committees organized public assemblies with representatives of the planning department. The attendance at these assemblies, some of the earliest interventions organized by these groups, often reached 300 people.[111] However, the City's attitude toward the population was perceived to be paternalistic when they dismissed the questions and concerns of the residents, and so more aggressive tactics, like public protests, were organized.[112] Jeanne Leblanc, president of the block-level SMBC, described the decision to stage a 1967 protest at City Hall about their demands on the expropriation terms as an effort to "be treated as human beings and not as a herd of cattle being lead to the slaughter," which was the impression that their exchanges with the planners and officials had given at the public assemblies.[113]

The citizen committees did not oppose urban renewal in principle.[114] They did, however, contest the negative impacts on residents due to the top-down delivery of a pre-determined program designed by supposed experts. In the 1968 National Film Board film, *La P'tit Bourgogne*, members of SMBC are shown explaining to the municipal officials that their opposition to the urban renewal plan could have been avoided if they, the people it would directly impact, had been included in its creation from the beginning.[115] Discussing the controversial rent scale established at Habitations Jeanne-Mance, one resident explained to

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[109] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 185. It is not clear how many of these were bilingual, so I have written their names in French.

[110] Lavigne, "La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne," 64; Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 156–62.

[111] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal"; Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin." Citizen committees were not alone in organizing these public events. Community organizations also coordinated events. Negro Community Centre, "Role of the Negro Community Centre in Urban Renewal Planning," June 1967, F013 HA04173 File 43, Concordia Library Special Collections.

[112] Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin," 48.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal)." However, the Mayer suggest the naïve belief that urban renewal was intended to benefit the local population was dispelled after the expropriations for the East-West (later Ville Marie) highway began in 1971. Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 415.

[115] Bulbulian, *La P'tite Bourgogne*.

Saulnier in the film: "If there had been prior participation by citizens, it would have less difficult to resolve this problem."[116]

The committees' criticism of urban renewal clearly aimed to reconstitute the basis of political legitimacy in urban governance and planning. Based on the information they obtained, the citizen committees were able to evaluate the plans by the specialists in the planning department and critique them from the perspective of resident experts. In highlighting the shortcomings of the urban renewal program for the people it was supposedly designed to aid, these citizen committees called into question the legitimacy of the expertise of the planning professionals.

This process of delegitimization through contestation resembled the broader process of urban renewal activism that Klemek described, and citizens in Little Burgundy made reference to the broader context of the time. By the time citizens mobilized in Little Burgundy, doubt had already been cast on top-down planning by earlier renewal projects in the United States and elsewhere in Canada for their failure to address the social problems that had existed in the slums and for seemingly compounding problems by destroying the social ties that had developed.[117] In Little Burgundy, citizen committees frequently framed their concerns about the plans for Îlots Saint-Martin in terms of not wanting to repeat Habitations Jeanne-Mance, the only other example of public housing in Montreal.[118] In the statements from SMBC, the Jeanne-Mance housing project was described as a ghetto of people on welfare and a prison for its residents, who lived under surveillance on precarious month-by-month leases.[119] The planning department tried reassert their legitimacy by claiming they had learned from these earlier mistakes, but the logic of expert-planning was called into question each time the citizen committees pointed out how elements of the plans for Little Burgundy would reproduce the conditions in Jeanne-Mance.

In addition to questioning the legitimacy of top-down planning, the citizen committees demonstrated that members of the community were also capable of developing their own plans with the proper support. With the help of social animators, the committees created their own

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[116] Ibid. 33:03.

[117] In addition to the reporting that reached Montreal through the news media, these ideas also circulated by academic trajectories. For example, social animator Blondin referred to the work by Herbert Gans on community ties destroyed by urban renewal in Boston, and may have passed these ideas on to the citizen committees that he worked with. Blondin, "L'animation sociale en milieu urbain."

[118] Lavigne, "La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne," 85.

[119] Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal)"; Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin"; Bulbulian, *La P'tite Bourgogne*.

proposals that addressed, or at least minimized, the shortcomings they identified in the renewal plans. After studying the plans for a new park, members of Réveil found the location too dangerous (due to the surrounding street traffic) and observed that the sequence of construction would create a great inconvenience for the residents of that area.[120] Réveil drafted an alternative proposal for the park in three phases, which would create a cul-de-sac in front of the school by closing parts of two streets and would connect the park to the churches on adjacent blocks. When the committee submitted the plan to the City, the planning department admitted it was a valuable improvement to their own plan.[121]

Other proposals were soon developed by the committees as well. In one example, the committees conducted surveys of families expropriated in earlier renewal projects and drafted their own recommendations about the relocation process.[122] Although the City alleged the survey could not be used as it was not scientific enough, it did agree to install a relocation office in the neighbourhood in response.[123] In another example, the committees addressed the question of how the rents of the soon-to-be tenants of Îlots Saint-Martin would be calculated. This was a priority for SMBC and one that they repeatedly raised with officials.[124] The citizens made clear they would not tolerate the rent scale in place at Jeanne-Mance. Having no plan of their own, the planning department invited the committee to propose their own rent scale.[125] The SMBC researched the question for five months and proposed a rent scale designed to balance the needs of lower-income residents without punishing working families that had been expropriated.[126] After modification by the City and a series of rejections and counter-proposals from the Province, their proposal was the basis for the rent-scale used in all public housing in Quebec, at

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[120] Réveil des citoyens de Saint-Cunégonde, "Mémoire préliminaire du Comité 'le Réveil des citoyens de Saint-Cunégonde' sur le projet de rénovation urbaine 'La Petite Bourgogne' tel que proposé par la Ville de Montréal; Sujet traite: Le parc proposé pour le secteur 185.," 1965, F013 HA04170 File 3, Concordia Library Special Collections.

[121] Blondin, "L'animation sociale en milieu urbain," 299; Lavigne, "La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne," 69; For the report, see Réveil des citoyens de Saint-Cunégonde, "Mémoire préliminaire: Le parc proposé pour le secteur 185."

[122] Blondin, Ouellet, and Chagnon, "Rélogement des familles expropriées."

[123] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal"; Blondin, "Vie urbaine et animation sociale."

[124] Questioning of this kind is portrayed in the NFB film when the committee poses the question to Saulnier. Bulbulian, *La P'tite Bourgogne*.

[125] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 541.

[126] Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal)."

least for a time.[127] The logics behind this rent scale and how it shaped the sociodemographic composition of public housing into the post-renewal period is discussed in chapter three.

The City's response to the committees' efforts was alternatively congratulatory and dismissive. Improving the plans of the park may have been relatively easy to accept, only hurting the pride of planners, but some of the other demands were less convenient.[128] The anglophone committee, for example, suggested that new housing be built on existing vacant lots in advance of the eviction notices so they would be ready to rehouse expropriated residents, a seemingly practical solution to the difficulty finding interim housing between demolition and reconstruction. In response, Saulnier merely referred them to the existing services of the rehousing office.[129] This response illustrates the perspective of the City in general. For the City, the citizen committees were simply a random collection of individuals that could not be treated as representative. Local representation was the role of elected counsellors and it was through them that citizens should voice their concerns. The City might listen to citizens' suggestions at times, but it did not allow the structural relationship between state and citizenry to be changed. In this structure, City officials made the decisions, the professionals in the planning department carried out the objectives assigned to them, and the citizens, whose lives were directly affected by the actions of the other two parties, endured the consequences.[130]

Within this structure, acting as pressure groups was one way the citizen committees motivated a response to their concerns on more contentious issues. Tactics included writing letters, circulating petitions, holding press conferences, and stirring up media interest.[131] Protests were among these tactics, and seemed to get results. For example, after receiving eviction notices that did not reflect the concerns they had voiced through their meetings with the officials, the residents of Îlots Saint-Martin staged a protest outside City Hall.[132] They presented a short list of demands about the terms of the notice, including delaying the evacuation date and increasing the

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[127] Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin"; Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 540–44. Mayer specified that though the SHQ agreed to use SMBC's plan (called "Option A amendée") for two years, the SHQ implemented their own rent scale in 1970 which did not include SMBC's recommendations regarding families.
[128] Blondin identified the insecurity of planning professionals as one of the obstacles to the Réveil's work. "L'animation sociale en milieu urbain," 298.
[129] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 516.
[130] Lavigne calls Réveil's relationship with the City as one of «consultation de la société technocratique.» Lavigne, "La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne," 53–55.
[131] Ibid., 54.
[132] Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin," 48.

compensation, all of which were eventually met.[133] A second protest took place during Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to the newly inaugurated Îlots Saint-Martin. This action helped SMBC's rent scale proposal advance at the provincial level.[134]

Through these encounters between Little Burgundy's citizens and state advocates of urban renewal, from the public assemblies to public protests, different logics of planning had emerged in which residents played an active role. These logics were taken up and elaborated by citizen committees in other Montreal neighbourhoods and would later become part of the platforms of municipal electoral parties. The literature on Montreal's community action contends that the demands and initiatives of Réveil and the Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee in response to urban renewal introduced the question of participation in urban governance into the political discourse and forced the City to relate to its citizens differently.[135] This episode changed the logics of action in two ways: by shifting legitimacy from experts to citizens and by inverting the process from top-down to bottom-up planning through participation.

Community participation in urban governance, first advocated by citizen committees, eventually became part of the electoral political agenda through the political parties that formed to oppose Drapeau in the late 1960s and 1970s. The first of these parties, the *Front d'action politique* (FRAP), was formed in 1969 and competed in the 1970 municipal election.[136] The second, the Montreal Citizen's Movement (MCM), was formed in 1974 and won its first majority election in 1986.[137] Translating citizen priorities into a political agenda, in 1976 the MCM included decentralized urban governance through neighbourhood councils in its platform.[138] Although there was no change in municipal leadership until much later, the idea had enough traction that in the early 1980s, Drapeau's Civic Party proposed its own version of neighbourhood councils, albeit in an elite version composed of local business leaders rather than

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[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid., 56; Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 541.

[135] Hamel, *Logements et luttes urbaines à Montréal (1963-1976)*; Pierre Hamel, Jean-François Léonard, and Robert Mayer, "Introduction générale," in *Les mobilisations populaires urbaines*, Les classiques des sciences sociales (Montréal: Les Éditions Nouvelle Optique, 1982), 7–16.

[136] The *Front d'action populaire* (FRAP) was formed through a coalition of labour unions and citizen committees. Labour organizers called citizen committees *deuxième front*.

[137] *Le Rassemblement des citoyens de Montréal* (RCM)

[138] Croteau, "L'implication sociale et politique de Jacques Couture," 140; Jean-François Léonard and Jacques Léveillée, *Montreal after Drapeau* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1986), 23; Dimitrios I. Roussopoulos, "Neighbourhood Councils," in *The City and Radical Social Change* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1982), 215–16.

ordinary citizens.[139] The logics about community participation that had emerged at least in part through the contestation and counter-proposals to the urban renewal program by citizens had eventually become part of the dominant approach to urban governance in Montreal more generally.

2.2 Post-renewal community participation

Community participation was central to the forms of urban governance that emerged in the post-renewal period, providing legitimacy to neighbourhood action that could not, as before, rely on the legitimacy of top-down plans and planning experts. Community participation in this period, however, also took different forms than the contestation and counter-proposals of the citizen committees of the renewal period. Post-renewal participation often involved a collaboration between a variety of local actors to respond to common concerns, called *tables de concertation* or roundtables for concerted collaboration. In Montreal, sectoral roundtables brought together actors from around the city who were working on a specific topic, such as the *Table de concertation sur la faim du Montréal métropolitain*, a roundtable dedicated to addressing hunger.[140] Participants in neighbourhood roundtables, on the other hand, came from various domains, from health to employment, education to youth centres. Little Burgundy saw two community-led multisectoral neighbourhood roundtables for its territory during the post-renewal period. Later in the period, the state also initiated a roundtable (discussed in the next section). The first community-led roundtable covered both Saint-Henri and Little Burgundy, and its activities consisted mainly of making recommendations to public agencies from the perspective of the community. The second was the Little Burgundy Coalition, which continues to function as the official roundtable for the neighbourhood in the present day. With the Coalition, however, community members turned to developing their own plans for intervention in the conditions of Little Burgundy. Though the nature of the actions were different, both these roundtables were community-led initiatives intended to play a role in the development of their neighbourhoods.

Drafting documents that brought the needs and perspectives of residents to the attention of officials was one form that community participation took among neighbourhood roundtables.

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[139] Roussopoulos, "Neighbourhood Councils."

[140] In 1991 Coalition had two representatives on this roundtable. Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the Meeting on March 13, 1991," March 13, 1991, F013 HA04151 File 24, Concordia Library Special Collections.

In 1986, the *Table de concertation des organismes communautaire de Saint-Henri et Petite-Bourgogne (TCSHPB)* formed to advance community perspectives on issues pertaining to the Southwest.[141] As the name suggests, this roundtable was a collection of existing community organizations that consulted together on matters affecting the two neighbourhoods in order for their response to have a stronger voice. Some of the TCSHPB's first actions included submitting a memoire in 1986 regarding the redevelopment of the Stelco factory along the Lachine canal and contributing to the city-wide public consultation on the management of the public housing office in 1988.[142] Later, the TCSHPB also organized a conference on the community perspectives on the redevelopment of the Lachine Canal.[143] Once the industrial heart of Montreal (and Canada), the Lachine Canal had lost its economic importance due to a combination of factors, and was designated a National Historic Park in 1974.[144] Over the decades that followed, Parks Canada transformed the Canal into linear recreational parkway which was anticipated to be accompanied by redevelopment, for example through the conversion of decommissioned factories into condos, although this process may have advanced more slowly than some expected.[145] The conference called for a specific plan guiding the development of the Canal that took into account the residents of bordering Saint-Henri and Little Burgundy, who had traditionally been employed by factories that were steadily closing.[146]

In addition to contributing to issues affecting the entire Southwest, the Little Burgundy organizations involved in the TCSHPB found themselves coordinating on matters specific to

[141] "Letter from Jean Bellefeuille & Lucille Brisson (Table Concertation St-Henri et Petite Bourgogne) to Leith Hamilton (NCC) Regarding Projet de Table de Concertation," July 10, 1986, F013 HA04214 File 22, Concordia Library Special Collections.

[142] Table de concertation des organismes communautaires de St-Henri et Petite Bourgogne, "Document de revendication sur les conditions de vie et le logement dans St-Henri et Petite Bourgogne," October 1986, Fonds RCM P86-F7.1, Archives de la Ville de Montréal. Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, "Mémoire concernant les clientèles, le développement et la gestion" (Montréal: Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, 1988); Montréal: Commission de l'aménagement, de l'habitation et des travaux publics, "Relations de l'Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal avec ses locataires" (Ville de Montréal, March 1989).

[143] Table de concertation des organismes communautaires de St-Henri et Petite Bourgogne, "'Ensemble… CANALisons le changement!' Colloque sur les transformations dans les quartiers Saint-Henri et Petite Bourgogne," May 5, 1989, F013 HA04212 File 1, Concordia Library Special Collections.

[144] Geoffrey Paul DeVerteuil, "Evolution and Impacts of Public Policy on the Changing Canadian Inner City: Case Study of Southwest Montreal 1960-90" (Master's thesis, McGill University, 1993), 94.

[145] The Redpath Sugar refinery, closed in 1976, was still abandoned in 2002 when work began to convert it to condos. Geoffrey Paul DeVerteuil, "The Changing Landscapes of Southwest Montréal: A Visual Account," *The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien* 48, no. 1 (2004): 79.

[146] DeVerteuil, "Evolution and Impacts of Public Policy," 101.

their own neighbourhood.[147] Many of these groups had coordinated since 1984 to put on the annual Little Burgundy Festival.[148] In 1987, Reverend Francis Xavier of Tyndale St-Georges community centre called a meeting of anglophone organizations that served low-income groups, including the Negro Community Centre (NCC), the Good Shepherd Centre, the Salvation Army, and the Welcome Hall Mission, to discuss concerns about the growing homeowner population in the neighbourhood.[149] Two years later, as the insecurity around the crack trade was reaching crisis levels, these same groups would be among the founding members of the Little Burgundy Coalition.

The Little Burgundy Coalition

The creation of the Little Burgundy Coalition in 1989 was a new development in community participation in urban governance in the neighbourhood.[150] Similar to the TCSHPB, this bilingual group was predominantly composed of community organizations working in the area, including the Little Burgundy members of the TCSHPB itself. However, the Coalition went further than the TCSHPB in certain ways. Most notably, rather than presenting recommendations or demands to various authorities as the TCSHPB had, the Coalition developed its own plans and invited government agencies to engage with them through partnerships.

The Coalition's overarching objective was to coordinate the efforts of neighbourhood-based organizations to "strengthen the societal fabric of Little Burgundy while developing and maintaining a community identity."[151] Over twenty organizations were involved when it first formed, including Catholic Community Services, Union United Church, RÉSO, the Garvey Institute, École de la Petite Bourgogne, Maison de la Culture, Tandem Montreal #24, Amitié Soleil, Le Portage, and Le Gardien de Mon Frère, in addition to Tyndale St-George, the NCC, the Good Shepherd Centre, the Salvation Army, and the Welcome Hall Mission, mentioned

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[147] Germain, Marchand, and Mukakayumba, "La Petite-Bourgogne," 179.
[148] "Little Burgundy to Hold Festival," *Afro-Can*, May 1985, F013 BOX HA04141 File 14, Concordia Library Special Collections.
[149] "Community Development Meeting, October 15, 1987," October 15, 1987, F013 HA04212 File 1, Concordia Library Special Collections.
[150] On early documents the name is often written "Little Burgundy Coalition de la Petite Bourgogne."
[151] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Goals and Objectives," March 1, 1990, F013 HA04193 File 4, Concordia Library Special Collections.

above.[152] They collectively identified key problems, established corresponding committees, and drafted action plans to address the issues they had defined. The Coalition built on the financial and human resources of its members, believing that by acting in coordination the efforts of the member organizations would have a stronger impact and create meaningful changes in the neighbourhood. They also transcended the resources and activities of member groups, however. When existing services were not meeting the needs of the community, the Coalition created new projects. It also aimed to meet coalition-wide objectives "by making full use of external resources," and as such requested support and resources from government agencies to meet its goals.[153]

The crack trade was a major concern for the Coalition from the beginning. One of its main motivations was to reduce the sense of insecurity in the neighbourhood, which member organizations believed had reached urgent levels due to the crack crisis.[154] Seeking to address this issue led the Coalition to propose changes to police activities in the neighbourhood. But the Coalition also aimed to address the broader systemic issues in the neighbourhood that members believed had exacerbated the problems related to drugs. For the Coalition, the insecurity emanating from the crack crisis was merely a symptom of these broader systemic issues and served as a catalyst for the community-based action that aimed to address both the immediate problem of insecurity as well as its underlying causes.

Analyzing the systemic causes of the drug trade and insecurity, the Coalition found the legacies of urban renewal partly at fault. As the action plan of one committee explained:

> In an environment defeated by urban renovation, as is the case in Little Burgundy, other problems accompany the drug issue: Problems of a population rejected by society because of its poor employability; unemployment, poverty and health problems; poor relationships between French and English speaking persons and the various ethnocultural groups; an almost non-existent sense of belonging to the neighborhood; juvenile delinquency; violence; prostitution; etc.[155]

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[152] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the Meeting, April 18, 1991," April 18, 1991, F013 HA04193 File 4, Concordia Library Special Collections.
[153] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Goals and Objectives."
[154] Their efforts in this respect were considered such a success that they were featured at an international conference on managing crime in public housing held in Montreal in 1995. See Welsh and Roy, "Un habitat plus sûr."
[155] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91," May 1991, 9, F013 HA04193 File 4, Concordia Library Special Collections.

In general, the Coalition saw the insecurity issue as a result of a weakened social fabric, a consequence of the upheaval of renewal. This weakening ostensibly made the community unable respond to the underlying problems of drugs and insecurity and prevent the situation from reaching a point of crisis. For the Coalition, the crack crisis itself was not a legacy of renewal, but the social conditions that renewal had created had set the stage for the crisis.

This analysis, tying insecurity to a weakened social fabric, shaped the Coalition's actions in the early years. To improve the security of the neighbourhood and prevent the situation from repeating, the Coalition believed it was necessary to actively create new community ties. The Social Fabric Committee, the Committee Dealing with Racism, and the Festival Committee (which coordinated the annual neighbourhood festival) reflect the importance that the Coalition placed on rebuilding the social aspects of the neighbourhood that had been destroyed by urban renewal.[156] Like other Coalition projects, importantly, these events and actions were developed by community-based actors, not outside experts. They were a prime example of the logic of neighbourhood action, constituted in the struggle over renewal, that became dominant in the post-renewal era.

Though its creation was motivated by the immediate conditions of insecurity, the Coalition understood this problem to be a symptom of broader social and economic issues and aimed to address these root causes as well. The Coalition's Employment-Employability Committee was not limited to job training and placement; it also aimed to create jobs and address hunger by starting a food recuperation and canning operation.[157] The issue of drugs was addressed by two committees, the Special Committee on Drugs as well as the Prevention Committee, which had slightly different objectives and were composed of different organizations. The Special Committee tackled existing drug use and associated problems such as criminality, and its membership included the neighbourhood crime prevention program, a drug rehabilitation centre, as well as the local schools and community centres.[158] The spectrum of issues behind the Coalition's approach to the crack crisis is perhaps best represented by the

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[156] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the General Assembly Nov 24, 1992," November 24, 1992, F013 HA04151 File 21, Concordia Library Special Collections.
[157] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the Meeting on March 13, 1991."
[158] The members of the Special committee were: Tandem-Montreal (see chapter four); Le Portage, a drug addiction rehabilitation centre; Tyndale St-Georges community centre; Amitié-Soleil, a family centre; and the two schools in the neighbourhood, École de la Petite Bourgogne (a French public school) and the Garvey Institute (a private Afrocentric school). Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91."

permanent committees that later replaced the Special Committee on Drugs: the Housing/Environment/Security Committee and the Mental Health Committee.[159] The Prevention Committee, meanwhile, was focused on creating programs to support the development of youth in order to promote healthy attitudes and make responsible decisions, as opposed to taking a "just say no" approach to preventing drug abuse.[160] The action plan of the Prevention Committee listed 17 proposed projects ranging from peer mentoring to rap battles to after-school tutoring.[161] Supporting the youth centre Youth in Motion was important for this and other committees. Taken together, it is clear that through its different committees the Coalition was working toward improvements to the social, economic, and physical conditions of the neighbourhood by facilitating collaboration of organizations in different categories of activity. Although the insecurity of the crack crisis had motivated the Coalition's formation, when the community members analysed the problems based on their experience of the neighbourhood, the solutions they proposed addressed the broader issues that contributed to it.

The work of the Coalition was based mainly on the financial and human resources of the member organizations, but it also requested resources and support from government agencies and worked closely with them in partnerships. Early news articles reported that the Coalition was asking for participation from the City, the OMHM, the CLSC, and the police.[162] In response, the City provided support through the *Service des loisirs et du développement communautaire*, which also handled the volet for Operation Tandem.[163] The OMHM arranged for a former post office to be used as a community centre to host the activities of many of the Coalition's initiatives and associated programs.[164] The OMHM also developed its own action plan for Little Burgundy to complement that of the Coalition, called "*Petite-Bourgogne, certifiée prioritaire*,"

[159] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the General Assembly Nov 24, 1992."
[160] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91."
[161] Ibid.
[162] Mike King, "Once Crime-Torn Little Burgundy Becoming Pleasant Place to Live; Grass-Roots Effort by Residents Showing Results," *Gazette*, January 29, 1992; Suzanne Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne: Première réunion fin août; on veut pas devenir un autre Cartierville," *La Presse*, July 10, 1990.
[163] Germain, Marchand, and Mukakayumba, "La Petite-Bourgogne," 181.
[164] According to the OMHM, the post office space was used by Tandem, Garde Manger Pour Tous to prepare hot lunches for school children, the Association des voisins du Carré Richmond, Youth in Motion and Impact (a program for reintegrating people with mental health issues). There were also plans for the food recuperation and preservation project to be based in this location. "Dossier: Pour l'O.M.H.M., la Petite-Bourgogne, c'est toujours... certifiée prioritaire"; "Petite-Bourgogne, certifiée prioritaire"; Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the Meeting, April 18, 1991."

and dedicated technical support and human resources to the needs of the neighbourhood residents, many of whom were public housing tenants.[165]

The involvement of the CLSC was also important. As social and community development was part of the mandate of the CLSC network, employees of the CLSCs had been supporting community-based neighbourhood action groups throughout the 1980s. CLSC St-Henri had provided secretariat and research support to the TCSHPB and seems to have done the same for the Coalition.[166] With their help, the Prevention Committee received support through a pilot project with the CSSS which helped them realize numerous projects for youth, which included drama workshops, intercultural activities, and creating a job co-op.[167]

Despite initial scepticism about the community initiative against the drug problems, the local police also collaborated with the Coalition and capitulated to some of its demands, for example by hiring a Black female police officer for patrols.[168] These actions of the police are elaborated in chapter four.

The activities of the Little Burgundy Coalition reflect a logic of community participation in which organizations that had been providing services in the community and consequently developed local expertise and associative networks led an initiative to substantially change the conditions of the neighbourhood. Independently, these community organizations had limited resources, but when pooled together they could support the work of developing community-based solutions. It is this *logic* of neighbourhood action– rather than particular organizations– that I have argued emerged in the struggle against renewal and carried into the post-renewal era. And yet, there was some continuity between organizations involved in the anti-renewal struggle and the post-renewal Coalition. Some of Coalition's member organizations, such as Tyndale St-Georges, the Negro Community Centre, and the Good Shepherd Centre, had been operating in the neighbourhood well before the urban renewal projects began. Although most of the literature on the renewal period in Little Burgundy emphasizes the actions of the citizen committees and social animators, these longstanding community insitutions were also involved community

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[165] "Dossier: Pour l'O.M.H.M., la Petite-Bourgogne, c'est toujours... certifiée prioritaire"; "Petite-Bourgogne, certifiée prioritaire."
[166] Many of the meeting minutes were taken by CLSC employees.
[167] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91." In the Fall of 1992 the Prevention committee reported that 6 projects had been completed and another 13 were in progress. Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the General Assembly Nov 24, 1992."
[168] Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne"; King, "Once Crime-Torn Little Burgundy Becoming Pleasant Place to Live; Grass-Roots Effort by Residents Showing Results."

organising in response to urban renewal by providing space for meetings, coordinating public assemblies and discussions, and applying for resources from funding agencies.[169] Other Coalition member organizations, such as Amité Soleil and CÉDA, were formed during the later portion of the renewal period, which the social movement literature describes as the phase when citizens stopped appealing to the state and instead started their own collective services such as community clinics, day care services, and education centres.[170] Finally, some organizations, such as Youth in Motion, were created in response to the conditions of the post-renewal period and were supported by the action plans of the Coalition.[171]

Although the post-renewal actors were predominantly community organizations rather than groups of citizens as in the renewal period, there were clearly some continuities between the actors of the renewal and post-renewal period. But regardless of the particular people or organizations involved, the actions of the Coalition in the post-renewal period relied on the logic of community participation that had been established by the contestation and counter-proposals of the citizen committees in the face of urban renewal. However, with no plans from above to contest and faced with problems in desperate need of attention, the Coalition directed the logic of community participation into a leadership modality, limiting itself neither to contestation nor counter-proposals. In this iteration, the community would take the initiative, plan, and govern, and the state could participate when invited.

Institutionalizing community participation: *Vivre Montréal en Santé*

Though the Coalition took a leadership role in community planning and development, the state remained involved in these processes. Indeed, working with groups like the Coalition made it possible for the state to govern in an era in which top-down state action and expertise had been discredited. No longer able to design plans for neighbourhood action in the isolation of its planning department, the City of Montreal was able to act through the logic of community participation and attempted to incorporate this logic systematically into its urban governance

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[169] Negro Community Centre, "Role of the Negro Community Centre in Urban Renewal Planning."

[170] Favreau, *Mouvement Populaire et Intervention Communautaire*; Hamel, *Action collective et démocratie locale. Les mouvements urbain montréalais*; Bélanger et al., "Le mouvement populaire et communautaire"; Doré, "L'organisation communautaire et les mutations dans les services sociaux au Québec, 1961 – 1991. La marge et le mouvement comme lieux de l'identité."

[171] Youth in Motion is sometimes referred to ask a creation of the Coalition, but it seems to predate it as it was one of the members of the Coalition's first committee, the Special Committee on Drugs. Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91."

mechanisms. The initiatives that it introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s drew on this logic enough to enable its state capacity to be put to use, even if these initiatives did not embody the ideal of autonomous community action.

The election of the MCM in 1986 was an important moment for the logic of community participation within the state apparatus in Montreal. The election gave the MCM a majority of councillors, ending nearly 30 years of the Drapeau mayoralty.[172] Although this municipal party had grown out of the same movements as the citizen committees of the 1960s, the MCM's position on community participation in urban governance had changed over time. In the 1976 campaign they had proposed creating neighbourhood councils throughout the city with decision-making power on local issues. This, the MCM believed, would promote citizen participation in municipal democracy. By the 1980s, however, this proposal had been dropped.[173] When the press raised the topic again in 1986, the MCM brushed off neighbourhood councils as a project for their second term.[174] Community participation in urban governance was instead institutionalized through the creation of the public consultation office in 1988.[175] It was this office that facilitated the public consultations in 1990 that informed Montreal's Master Plan, which established the guiding principles of urban development in the city and its boroughs for the years to come.[176] In this structure, community participation was clearly labelled as consultation and limited to an exchange of information and recommendations. Participation, for the MCM, no longer meant bottom-up decision-making power.

In addition to the office of public consultation, the MCM was exploring another model of urban governance intended to promote the health of citizens through multisectoral collaboration

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[172] Drapeau was mayor from 1954-1957 and 1960–1986.

[173] Croteau, "L'implication sociale et politique de Jacques Couture," 133.

[174] Léonard and Léveillée, *Montreal after Drapeau*, 23–24.

[175] Public consultation had been enshrined in the Land Use Planning and Development Act (LUPDA, *Loi sur l'aménagement urbain*, LAU) of 1979, and although this law did not apply to Montreal until 2002 it was considered best practice to use LUPDA as a guideline. Also of note, the "*Bureau de consultation*" set up by the MCM was abolished under Mayor Bourque in 1994 and is not the present day OCPM. Andrew Sancton and Robert Andrew Young, eds., *Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada's Provinces*, IPAC Series in Public Management and Governance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 114–15; Bherer, "Les trois modèles municipaux de participation publique au Québec," 165.

[176] The Master Plan (*Plan d'urbanisme*) was released in 1992 with detailed plans for each borough. For the consultation documents see VM049 Fonds Bureau de consultation, Série 12 Plan d'urbanisme, Archives de la Ville de Montréal.

and community participation in their local environments.[177] This model was the *Villes et villages en santé* (VVS, or Healthy Cities) program, officially launched in 1986 by the World Health Organization and adopted in countries around the world. VVS was based on the idea that physical and mental health were interconnected with social, economic, and environmental conditions, which converged in the living environments of people, especially in cities. Through this 'territorialized' view of health, VVS promoted the involvement of citizens in the development of their neighbourhoods. Unlike cities in Europe and other parts of Canada, health was not one of Montreal's direct responsibilities. However, the VVS program offered a framework for multisectoral action at the neighbourhood scale that was consistent with the MCM's perspectives on local participation that it had inherited from the renewal period, was a model that the City was well positioned to support.[178]

The City began developing its own VVS program, *Vivre Montréal en santé* (VMS), following a successful attempt in one of its neighbourhoods. In 1988, the CLSC in Mercier-Est had initiated a program based on VVS in which various public agencies, including the public housing office, supported community members in taking action in their neighbourhoods.[179] Inspired by this experience, Montreal launched its VMS campaign in 1991 and began establishing committees to promote the program in ten neighbourhoods.[180] A VMS promotion committee was established in Little Burgundy the same year, bringing together actors from public institutions, the private sector, the health sector, the City, public security, and residents.[181] The Coalition reported having representatives on the VMS promotion committee beginning in September 1991. For three years, the VMS promotion committee and the Coalition acted in

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[177] Montréal: Service des loisirs et du développement communautaire, "Adhesion de la Ville de Montréal au Réseau québecois de VVS"; Francine Ouellet, Gilles Forget, and Danielle Duran, "Une ville et deux quartiers en santé: Étude de cas des trois premières initiatives dans l'île de Montréal" (Direction de la Santé Publique, 1993).

[178] Leduc, "Vivre Montréal en santé: Une première évaluation," 5, 8, 18; Montréal: Service des loisirs et du développement communautaire, "Adhesion de la Ville de Montréal au Réseau québecois de VVS," 5.

[179] "À Thomas Chapais, la santé, ça compte!"; Ouellet, Forget, and Duran, "Une ville et deux quartiers en santé," 28–29.

[180] Under *Vivre Montréal en santé*, the program establishing the promotion committees was called *Quartiers en santé*, while each committee established had its own name (for example, *Vivre Petite-Bourgogne en santé*). Leduc, "Vivre Montréal en santé: Une première évaluation," 31.

[181] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the General Assembly Nov 24, 1992."

parallel. Perhaps the redundancy of having two multisectoral neighbourhood roundtables was the reason the two groups merged in 1994 to become *Coalition de la Petite Bourgogne en santé*.[182]

Vivre Montréal en santé was discontinued after the election of Pierre Bourque and the Vision Montreal team in 1994, but this post-renewal initiative is significant nevertheless. It represents the beginning of the institutionalization of the multisectoral neighbourhood roundtable (*tables de concertation de quartier*) approach to urban governance, which continued to play a part in urban governance even after MCM's defeat. After the 2002 Summit of Montreal, a formalized funding structure was developed for the *tables de quartier* and the "Tables" have become one of the recognised methods of community participation in urban governance at the neighbourhood scale.[183] Community participation, it should be noted, does not take the same form in all Tables. Sénécal, Cloutier, and Herjean have identified two types of *tables de quartier*: one based on autonomous community organising, and the other from the VVS model initiated by the state.[184] The main difference these authors identified was the involvement of government institutions in the decision making, which had more prominence in the VVS model, while those focused on autonomous community organising tended to resist this involvement.

The distinction between these two participation models presented a point of tension for the Coalition. During their research on the neighbourhood in 1993-94, Germain and her collaborators observed that members of the Coalition were concerned that the VMS promotion committee had increased the role of government agents in the Coalition and that the community-led Coalition risked being co-opted by the state.[185] Of course, government agencies such as the OMHM and the police had been involved in the Coalition well before the arrival of the VMS promotion committee. And yet, while it is true the Coalition had always worked in partnership with government agencies, there also seems to have been an effort to keep these institutions at a distance from the operation and governance of the Coalition itself, at least initially. For example, the members of the Special Committee were exclusively community organizations while the

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[182] Rénald Bujold, "Coalition de la Petite-Bourgogne, quartier en santé," Développement des communautés locales : Portrait de concertations de quartier à Montréal (Montréal, c 2001); Germain, Marchand, and Mukakayumba, "La Petite-Bourgogne," 181.

[183] See, for example, various research on *tables de quartier*. Sénécal, Cloutier, and Herjean, "Le quartier comme espace transactionnel," 200–203; Gilles Sénécal et al., "Les effets de la concertation: Étude sur les Tables intersectorielles de quartier de Montréal" (Montréal: Institut national de la recherche scientifique (INRS) Centre - Urbanisation Culture Société, 2010), 16; Longtin and Rochman, *Les enjeux du développement social à Montréal*, 119; Bherer, "Les trois modèles municipaux de participation publique au Québec."

[184] Sénécal, Cloutier, and Herjean, "Le quartier comme espace transactionnel," 200.

[185] Germain, Marchand, and Mukakayumba, "La Petite-Bourgogne," 179.

representatives of the OMHM, the City of Montreal, and the police sat on the committee only as resource people.[186] Since that time, government institutions have gained more of a governance role, as the administrative committee in later years included representatives of institutions as well as community groups, citizens, and the private sector.[187]

Though the structures of the Coalition and VVS model were remarkably similar, being initiated by the state meant the VMS promotion committee was more closely aligned with state interests. An evaluation of the VMS program in 1993 observed just that: although developing partnerships between local actors showed promising results, the City was the most interested party and the best positioned to promote the neighbourhood approach.[188] The evaluation pointed to the lack of human and other resources available to community actors compared with the salaried public agents, which constrained their ability to participate in the roundtables. Developing the skills and associative networks necessary to operate in concerted collaboration required the work and time, all of which demanded resources. The Coalition addressed these resource needs by patching together what was available through its member organizations and focusing on a common goal, bringing in state resources where appropriate. In the VMS promotion committees, in contrast, the City provided the resources and support to facilitate multisectoral collaboration for neighbourhood action. The local actors involved developed their common goals through a program which was accountable to the City, which had established indicators to monitor the success of the program.[189] When the VMS committee tried to establish itself in Little Burgundy, where goals and plans had been set independently of state participation, a clash was felt between the modes of operation. VMS provided a stability and support to community-based neighbourhood action, but, at least from the perspective of some Coalition members, this occurred at the expense of some autonomy in the decision-making process.

Regardless of whether government institutions were engaged through partnerships or were involved in the governance of the roundtables, the logic of community participation served to legitimize state action in the neighbourhood. Unlike the renewal period, in the post-renewal period it was not possible for a program designed entirely in the planning department to be delivered to the community, as this type of top-down planning had been delegitimized. Acting in

[186] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91."
[187] Bujold, "Coalition de la Petite-Bourgogne, quartier en santé."
[188] Leduc, "Vivre Montréal en santé: Une première évaluation," 8.
[189] de Connick, "Réflexion sur les indicateurs dans le cadre du projet de «Vivre Montréal en santé (VMS)»."

partnership with groups like the Coalition, initiating community participation through VMS committees, and conducting public consultations on planning objectives were legitimate means to put state capacity to work, regardless of the level of autonomy the community members had in the decision-making about those actions.

2.3 Conclusions

The urban renewal period was a point of transition in urban governance – in Montreal and many other North Atlantic cities. In Little Burgundy, the top-down, expert-led urban renewal program was met with opposition from citizens who organized in committees formed to address their neighbourhood conditions. Their contestation cast doubt on the expert plans, contributing to the delegitimization of top-down planning. In addition, their counter-proposals helped establish that citizens were experts in their communities who should be involved in the development of plans that affected them and their living environments. The contestation and counter-proposals of Little Burgundy's citizen committees to urban renewal are considered to be the first examples of this type of engagement with municipal planning in Montreal. The effects of these actions were twofold. They served both to delegitimize top-down action and expert planning and newly legitimize community level decision-making and planning.

By the post-renewal period, the ideal of community participation had become part of the dominant logic of neighbourhood action. The Little Burgundy Coalition operated on this logic, uniting the various community organizations, already active in their own sectors, to coordinate their efforts on neighbourhood issues. However, it also went further by taking the lead in developing plans to address the social, economic, and physical needs of Little Burgundy. The logic of community participation, though grounded in the community sector, did not preclude the involvement of the state. The Coalition engaged with public agencies on a partnership basis, which was a legitimate means of employing state capacity. Eventually, the City attempted to incorporate this logic of community participation into municipal planning more systematically by implementing the public consultation office and the *Vivre Montréal en santé* program. The latter supported neighbourhood-based action by promoting multisectoral roundtables which resembled the structure of the Coalition. When the two types of roundtable (the Coalition and VMS) existed in parallel and then merged, the tensions in power relations emerged. Both types were effective in legitimizing the use of state capacity, as both types were later identified in the

tables de quartier which had become formalized as one of Montreal's privileged approaches to urban governance at the neighbourhood scale.

This shift in governance in Little Burgundy clearly parallels changes in other neighbourhoods and cities. As Klemek and others have shown in the literature on the downfall of urban renewal, the expertise of planning professionals and top-down plans from the state were called into question by neighbourhood residents and activists until they had become unviable modes of action. Klemek also highlights the community-based planning that emerged during the renewal period, but concludes that the loss of funding sources undermined the ability of these initiatives to step into the void created by the discredited state modes of intervention after renewal. In the United States, he concludes urban governance was left to the whims of private initiatives, while in Toronto, where state action had not been so thoroughly discredited, a fusion of community and state governance emerged. In these contexts, the delegitimization of top-state action was not paralleled by the assertion of community-level power and legitimacy.

Thus, the process of community participation in post-renewal Little Burgundy departs from the contexts examined by Klemek. In post-renewal Little Burgundy, this chapter has shown, community-level actors were able to exercise leadership. When faced with a situation of crisis, the resources needed to support community-based neighbourhood planning were assembled through collaboration between local organizations. It was after the community had established its goals that it sought out partnerships with state agencies to tap into state resources. Eventually, the state sought out the legitimacy of community actors. It was through partnership with the community that state action in the neighbourhood, in the form of VVS, was legitimized. Though this parallel initiative by the City may have had different power structures, it served the same function in legitimizing the use of state capacity through the logic of community-based neighbourhood action. It was successful enough to have survived and gained prominence the *tables de quartier* model. Though it took different forms, community participation – a logic formed in the struggle against urban renewal – was essential to urban governance in the post-renewal period. Little Burgundy, a neighbourhood deeply affected by renewal, was also deeply involved in this shift in governance.

3. Sociodemographic governance: Concentrated poverty and social mix

In the 1980s, one of the ways that actors attempted to transform neighbourhood conditions in Little Burgundy was by managing the sociodemographic profile of the population that lived there. This preoccupation was not new, of course, but what was new was the conditions that structured it. The built environment, particularly housing, was an important factor in this type of governance, and Little Burgundy's built environment had been dramatically transformed by urban renewal. Efforts to manage the sociodemographic composition of the neighbourhood involved attracting new, higher income residents by constructing homes on the land left vacant after renewal's demolitions, and managing the population that made up the tenants in the plentiful public housing, also an outcome of renewal. In public housing, urban renewal had left a set of legal and administrative mechanisms that were used to maintain a sociodemographic balance of tenants. After these mechanisms were removed during the post-renewal period, the housing office (OMHM) found it had few means to manage the population that inhabited its properties. It thus adopted new methods, which had important effects on the sociodemographics of public housing.

A focus on sociodemographic governance is a common feature in the literature on post-renewal neighbourhoods. Specifically, this literature has highlighted how various problems in the large public housing complexes that were constructed during urban renewal were eventually framed as a caused by a high 'concentration of poverty.' This kind of analysis, the literature shows, rationalized the demolition of public housing projects and their redevelopment into mixed-income residential areas on the premise of creating an appropriate sociodemographic balance, or 'social mix.' The OMHM's actions at Îlots Saint-Martin, though less dramatic, were consistent with this new form of analysis and action. The problems at Îlots Saint-Martin, especially criminality, were seen as symptoms of unduly concentrated poverty and action was taken to deconcentrate this population – not through the demolition of the complex, in this case, but through the strategic eviction of its residents.

And yet, the situation was more complex than this rendering – focused on the OMHM – suggests. For one thing, a concern with sociodemographics was integral to the governance of Îlots Saint-Martin since the time of its construction. A rent scale, established for Îlots Saint-Martin at the beginning of the renewal period, sought to prevent a concentration of households

relying on social assistance by enabling a mix of income-brackets in public housing. It was after the mechanisms for creating social mix adopted from this rent scale were modified in 1982 that the OMHM developed a newfound concern with the sociodemographics of Îlots Saint-Martin and Little Burgundy more generally. Perhaps more importantly, other actors in Little Burgundy viewed the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood differently. Members of the Coalition, in particular, were concerned about the arrival of higher-income residents in the southern section of the neighbourhood, which was growing due to the City's efforts to attract middle-income, home-owning families. The program that the City developed for this purpose, however, was not concerned with the levels of poverty in the area. Conversely, the community organizations that provided social services to the poor felt they were better able to serve a concentration of relatively low-income residents, and saw the influx of better-off families as a threat to this work.

In post-renewal Little Burgundy there were, in sum, various efforts to manage the sociodemographic balance of the neighbourhood, but they have not necessarily been based on a problematization of a high "concentration of poverty." Managing the number, proportion, or density of different social classes was one component of post-renewal governance, and though the aims of actors in this domain differed, they were to a certain extent shaped by legacies of renewal. The built environment that was left in the wake of renewal, housing in particular, shaped the conditions that were framed as problems and the attempts to regulate them. Some efforts aimed to encourage a new middle-class population to the neighbourhood to generate tax revenue by developing the lots left empty after urban renewal. The rent scale, developed by the citizen committee of Îlots Saint-Martin, was itself a legacy of renewal which had allowed the housing office to maintain a sociodemographic balance until the provincial laws were changed in the post-renewal period. When the concentration of public housing units at Îlots Saint-Martin served as the geographic centre of the crack crisis, the OMHM used the limited means available to manage the population through a combination of evictions and a moratorium on renting. All of these practices shaped the social landscape of the neighbourhood, through different conceptions of appropriate sociodemographic balance and different mechanisms available, but in many ways these example of governance run counter to that generally represented in the literature.

3.1 Urban renewal legacies: vacant lots and public housing

The sociodemographic profile that actors sought to govern in the 1980s was significantly shaped by the project of urban renewal, especially through the changes to the built environment and housing stock. The main objective of the Little Burgundy urban renewal program, according to the plan report, was "the systematic and progressive improvement of the physical, social and economic conditions of the area as a whole."[190] The 1966 report that outlined these objectives stated that the housing created through program was intended for "low and average income people" in order to meet the needs of existing residents.[191] The renewal program also aimed to create a separation of land uses, consecrating the section north of Notre-Dame street as a residential area.[192] Through the large-scale demolition and rebuilding program, the City hoped to improve Little Burgundy's depressed land values and attract housing development to the pericentral neighbourhood during a period when the central city was being redefined as a modern business centre.[193] Although Little Burgundy was a relatively low-income neighbourhood, the renewal plan had more to say about changing the physical conditions than the sociodemographic composition, although intervening in the process of urban decline may have been motivated to prevent the poverty of the area from becoming further concentrated.

The renewal plan never achieved its development objectives. By the end of the renewal program in 1978, much more demolition than rebuilding had occurred in the neighbourhood. Indeed, Little Burgundy was left with a preponderance of vacant lots. The extensive demolition of existing housing, whether to build new housing, create parks, adjust the road network, or make room for the Ville Marie expressway, resulted in a net loss of dwellings.[194] In 1981, the beginning of the post-renewal period, the Canada Census reported only 2,060 housing units

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[190] Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "La Petite Bourgogne: Rapport Général," 69.

[191] Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "La Petite Bourgogne: Rapport Général." 69.

[192] Ibid., 78.

[193] For more on land valuation see Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 440. For the Southwest in relation to Drapeau's modernist ambitions for Montreal, see Bridgette M. Kelly, "The Transformation of Landscapes in Southwest Montreal and Identity Formation during the Quiet Revolution" (Master's thesis, University of Toronto, 2010).

[194] A provincial project, the Ville Marie Expressway involved the demolition of the entire north block of Saint-Antoine street and the displacement of 1160 households between Saint-Henri and Little Burgundy. DeVerteuil, "Evolution and Impacts of Public Policy," 53.

compared with 4,901 in 1961, before the renewal demolitions had begun.[195] DeVerteuil claims that a third of land in Little Burgundy was still undeveloped in 1980.[196] This loss in housing units was paired by a loss of population. The population, which had been declining since the mid-century, dropped sharply from 19,810 to 5,861 in the corresponding period.[197] The population changed, importantly, in more than just numerical terms. The housing that was constructed by the end of the renewal period, primarily public housing, was destined to the lower strata of the population. Though public housing construction also fell short of the original targets, the most significant failure of the renewal program concerned the attraction of private development.[198] The 1441 public housing units completed during the renewal program represented 70.0% of all housing in Little Burgundy in 1981.[199] The largest concentration was Îlots Saint-Martin, with 313 family units in four square blocks.[200] Meanwhile, private construction had failed to create housing for families with higher incomes on the lots that had been cleared in anticipation. Clearly, then, the renewal program had not produced the intended sociodemographic mix in the neighbourhood. This was the social and physical legacy of renewal that actors in the 1980s sought, in different ways, to manage.

3.2 Sociodemographic governance at the neighbourhood scale

One of the earliest post-renewal efforts to change the physical and sociodemographic landscape of Little Burgundy at large came from the City of Montreal. The City, at the outset of the post-renewal period, faced a pressing problem: significant post-Olympic municipal debt, paired with a lack of tax revenue. The lack of tax revenue was related, in part, to the continued trend of

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[195] Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 1961, 1981, Occupied private dwellings. Census Tracts 4620067.00, 4620068.00, 4620077.00, 4620078.00 (CANSIM at CHASS). See Annex 1 for figure.
[196] DeVerteuil, "Evolution and Impacts of Public Policy," 63. Some of this vacant land was famously appropriated by Îlots Saint-Martin residents in what would be known as Montreal's first community garden. Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais*, 44.
[197] Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 1961, 1981, Population. Census Tracts 4620067.00, 4620068.00, 4620077.00, 4620078.00 (CANSIM at CHASS).
[198] The shortfall is at least partly due to the end of federal funding for urban renewal with the Hellyer Report in 1969. Barcelo also attributes the shortfall to the failure to remove the CN rail line, which had been one of the premises of the program. M Barcelo, "Urban Development Policies in Montreal: 1960 - 1978.," *Quebec Studies* 6, no. 2 (1988): 65.
[199] Calculation based on figures from Statistics Canada (see Annex 1) and public housing figures reported in various sources, notably Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin," 37.
[200] Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais*, 40.

suburban development in the metropolitan region.[201] With continued sprawl, the City of Montreal had lost many of its middle-class residents to neighbouring municipalities, who took their property taxes with them. Aiming to address this problem, the City introduced a major housing program called *Operation 10,000 logements* that would (it was hoped) help to attract a stable, owner-occupant population within the municipal borders. Little Burgundy became a major target of this program, which would significantly alter the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood by bringing in higher-income households. Recognizing the relationship of this program to sociodemographic governance, however, requires a closer look at the program's aims, mechanisms, and results.

Launched in December 1979, *Opération 10,000 logements* was a program to construct housing that was both affordable and attractive to first-time homeowners within the city limits.[202] As top-down plans from the state had become unviable by this time, the program was designed to entice the private construction industry (then focused on the construction of suburban homes) back to the city. To make this possible, *Logements* offered lots from the municipal land bank at below-market rates through a call for proposals. The City attached certain criteria for type of construction and number of units to ensure this land was put toward homes for families.[203] *Opération 10,000 logements* was deemed such a success that it was renewed in 1982 as *Opération 20,000 logements* which ran until 1986. In Montreal, over 18,000 homes were constructed through these programs between 1979 and 1986, ninety percent of which by the private construction industry.[204]

Little Burgundy was a privileged site for the *Logements* program. This was not, however, because the City wanted to address a problem of concentrated poverty. Rather, it was because developers tended to prefer large lots, which were rare in the central city but were available in Little Burgundy due to the failure of urban renewal– which is to say, the preponderance of

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[201] The construction of highways facilitated this outward movement from the suburbs. In this sense, the renewal period expropriation and demolitions for the Ville Marie expressway played a double role in the population loss in Little Burgundy.

[202] *Logements* translates to dwellings or homes. For evaluations of Opération 10,000 and 20,000 Logements see MacBurnie, "Inner-City Housing through the Partnership Approach"; François Charbonneau and René Parenteau, "Opération 20 000 logements et l'espace social de Montréal," *Recherches sociographiques* 32, no. 2 (1991): 237, doi:10.7202/056609ar; Lacroix, "Analyse de l'Opération 20,000 logements de la Ville de Montréal et de ses principales réalisations."

[203] Montréal : Service de l'habitation et du développement urbain, "Opération 20,000 logements : son bilan."

[204] MacBurnie, "Inner-City Housing through the Partnership Approach," 64.

undeveloped land.[205] Through renewal much of this land had already accumulated in the municipal land bank and was ready to be offered through the program. The area also boasted other qualities attractive to development, such as its proximity to downtown, its access to the Metro, and its new infrastructure due to the renewal program.[206] For these reasons, Little Burgundy became an important focus in the city-wide demographic and development program. However, Little Burgundy it did not see the success that was expected.[207] Between 1979 and 1982, 342 new dwellings were built through this program in Little Burgundy, but the private sector was responsible for only 145 of these units.[208] The effort to attract middle-income households had fallen short of its objectives.

The failure of *Logements* in Little Burgundy was attributed, in part, to the popular image of the neighbourhood. The urban renewal program had not succeeded in improving its image, as Little Burgundy still had a reputation as a slum.[209] The City concluded that this stigma was discouraging developers and decided to rename the neighbourhood 'Georges-Vanier' to better appeal to middle-income families.[210] In 1981 Lamarre told *La Presse* that Little Burgundy "is often considered an area for low-income housing and it is time to modify that image and to modify the name."[211] Whether due to this name change or other factors, Little Burgundy did see more development through *Logements* between 1982-1986, with 1179 units constructed through by the end of the program.[212] The number of owner-occupied homes in the neighbourhood grew

[205] Ibid., 61.

[206] Yvon Laberge, "Montréal entend changer l'image et le nom de la Petite Bourgogne," *La Presse*, January 7, 1981.

[207] Yvon Laberge, "Un plan de mise en valeur du secteur Georges-Vanier," *La Presse*, January 23, 1982; Laberge, "Montréal entend changer l'image et le nom de la Petite Bourgogne."

[208] Non-profit housing amounted to 101 of these with the *Foyer Hungrois* retirement home. The remainder were developed through one of Montreal's paramunicipal agencies. Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "Phase VIII - État d'avancement," Opération 10,000 logements (Montréal: Ville de Montréal, March 1982).

[209] Jennifer Hunter, "Don't Call Our Home a Slum Says Proud Little Burgundy," *Gazette*, June 12, 1980; Earl Devine and Bob White, "Letter: 'Little Burgundy Is a Slum Area,'" *Gazette*, June 26, 1980.

[210] The description in La Presse was fairly direct: « *Cette changement de toponyme est devenue nécessaire parce qu'il identifie une zone rénovation urbaine où la ville de Montréal a construit une forte proportion de logements à loyer modique et cette 'débaptisation' cadre mieux avec l'opération de construction de logements pour ménages à revenu moyens.* » Laberge, "Montréal entend changer l'image et le nom de la Petite Bourgogne." In the 1990 public consultations for the urban planning Master Plan in the Southwest, citizens requested that the name of neighbourhood be changed back to Little Burgundy.

[211] «La Petite Bourgogne … est souvent considerée comme un secteur à HLM et il est temps de modifier cet image et d'en modifier le nom. » Ibid.

[212] In terms of other factors, the CN railway was finally removed in 1982, freeing up a hefty tract of land for development. MacBurnie also noted that *Logements* did not see much success in the inner-city region until later in the program when the target clientele was expanded from young families to "non-standard" households, such as singles and gay couples. MacBurnie, "Inner-City Housing through the Partnership Approach." Also of note, of the

from 105 in 1981 to 555 in 1986, and this number continued to grow after the end of the program.[213]

Although increasing the middle-income population was seen as a solution for the tax-starved City government, for some members of Little Burgundy this sociodemographic shift was seen as a problem. In October 1987 a group of anglophone anti-poverty organizations, many of which became founding members of the Coalition, met to discuss the changing conditions in the neighbourhood and the future of their organizations.[214] Reverend Francis Xavier of Tyndale St-Georges had called the meeting due to mounting concerns about the growing homeowner population in Little Burgundy and the displacement of community members. He criticized City policies that favoured condos over forms of housing accessible to other income levels. For groups with a mandate to serve low-income and disadvantaged people, he argued, the implications of this engineered sociodemographic change were "serious to the point of being threatening."[215] Other groups at the meeting shared the Reverend's concerns. The Mission Hall and Salvation Army observed that from their experience gentrified neighbourhoods were generally hostile toward support services. The increasing homeowner population also coincided with increasing pressure from their main funding agency, Centraide, to justify the demand for their services. This discussion suggests the contours of a reverse logic to the concentration of poverty logic. For these organizations, it was an undesirable concentration of middle-income households that presented an obstacle to their work with the poor, whose needs would certainly not disappear by being redistributed spatially.

In these examples, the *Logements* program and the community response to it, the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood become an issue, but not in the way that the literature on concentrated poverty would suggest. In the *Logements* program, the motivation to modify or balance the sociodemographic composition of the neighbourhood was not necessarily based on a concentration of poverty logic. The aim was simply to increase tax revenues at the city scale, and Little Burgundy became a target because of the vacant land it possessed. The large low-income

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1179 units constructed through *Logements,* 233 were non-profit or cooperative housing. Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "Phase XVIII," Opération 20,000 logements (Montréal: Ville de Montréal, October 1986), 33.

[213] In 1991 owner-occupied dwellings had reached 1045 units. Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 1981, 1986, Census Tracts 4620067.00, 4620068.00, 4620077.00, 4620078.00 (CANSIM at CHASS). See Annex 1 for figure.

[214] This meeting was attended by representatives of Tyndale St-George, the Negro Community Centre, Welcome Hall Mission, the Salvation Army, Unity Boys and Girls Club and the Good Shepherd Centre. "Community Development Meeting, October 15, 1987."

[215] Ibid.

population did create an obstacle to creating the desired sociodemographic balance, but deconcentrating poverty was never the goal and the City does not seem to have contemplated displacing low-income residents in order to better fulfil its development agenda. From the perspective of the charities working to address the needs of the poor, meanwhile, the predominantly low-income population was a context in which they could deliver their services without the complaints of a petit bourgeoisie. Considering the amount of public housing stock in Little Burgundy and the legal frameworks that assured it was occupied by low-income households, not all of the clients of these organizations would have been displaced, however rampant and well-facilitated by municipal policy the process of gentrification might have been. The management of the public housing population posed its own challenges, as the next section demonstrates.

3.3 Sociodemographic governance in public housing

From the very beginning of the urban renewal program in Little Burgundy there was a problem that was not simple to resolve: how to prevent public housing from becoming a "ghetto" of people who depended on social assistance?[216] This was a question of concern for the expropriated residents who came to inhabit Îlots Saint-Martin. For these residents, public housing was not a safety net for the members of society most in need—the traditional role of public housing— but a replacement for their former homes, whether they were "in need" or not. When SMBC designed a rent scale for their new, publicly owned and managed homes, they did so with the objective of preventing an undue concentration of poverty and, in the same stroke, ensure a place for the working families that had been expropriated during renewal. The ideas they proposed to obtain these objectives created an opening which allowed the housing office to create and maintain a social mix in the public housing population.

Îlots Saint-Martin was the public housing first venture under Quebec's new and still developing public housing laws, and the notion of exactly who public housing was intended to house was somewhat confused and, to a certain extent, contested. The Little Burgundy renewal program claimed to be designed for the existing "poor and average income" residents, and

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[216] The term ghetto was used repeatedly, especially by the residents of Îlots Saint-Martin. Mayer contends that the term entered into the lexicon of the journalists and administration through the tenants. Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal," 485.

expropriated residents were to have priority in the public housing built through the program.[217] This promise was difficult to reconcile with the dominant understanding of public housing in North American cities up to that point, which were dedicated to the poorest members of society. Montreal's first public housing project, Habitations Jeanne-Mance, predated the provincial public housing laws and the municipal public housing office, but still served as the closest example of what tenants might expect of life in public housing. When the soon-to-be residents of Îlots Saint-Martin looked at Jeanne-Mance, they saw a ghetto of the extremely poor that they did not want reproduced in their neighbourhood.[218] When they confronted Saulnier about the risk creating a segregated area of poverty at Îlots Saint-Martin, the president of the executive council replied that, although the existing residents should have priority, society had an obligation to offer any remaining housing to those in greatest need.[219]

The City ultimately maintained the conventional notion of public housing as a social service for its most needy citizens, but had also promised public housing to expropriated residents, who did not necessarily fit into the category. Precisely how the City planned to meet these contradicting objectives was unknown: Îlots Saint-Martin was already under construction, but the City had still not developed its plans about the terms of the lease or calculation of rent. Having no plans of their own, the housing department asked SMBC to submit a proposal for the terms of the rent scale.[220] SMBC's rent scale, discussed in chapter two as an example of citizen participation in urban governance, would influence sociodemographic governance in Montreal's public housing into the early post-renewal period.

SMBC worded their proposed rent scale with explicit discourse about the risk of (unwanted) concentrated poverty and the need to create a social mix. They decried the "illogical," "Jeanne-Mance style" of lease, saying "this solution brings about a concentration of very low income families, which degenerates easily into 'ghettoes,' grouping almost exclusively needy families" and making it "difficult to ensure a naturally and normally diversified

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[217] Montréal : Service d'urbanisme, "La Petite Bourgogne: Rapport Général."
[218] Lavigne, "La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne," 85. Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal)." Members of SMBC visit Habitations Jeanne-Mance to learn about the conditions there in a scene in Bulbulian, *La P'tite Bourgogne*.
[219] Bulbulian, *La P'tite Bourgogne* 32:40.
[220] Leblanc, "La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin," 51; Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal."

population."[221] They proposed two mechanisms to safeguard a properly diversified population. The first was to set quotas for different income brackets to fill when selecting tenants. SMBC proposed three categories, suggesting that the lowest income group should make up 25% of the tenants, based on a survey they conducted which showed a quarter of existing residents at Îlots Saint-Martin relied on social assistance.[222]

The second mechanism was the rent scale itself. SMBC tried to strike a balance between the needs of low-income and better-off households by proposing two rates (18% and 25% of household income) that levelled off at a maximum, which became known as the 'rent ceiling.' In addition to these mechanisms, their proposed rent scale included provisions to aid large families as well as longer leases to provide more security to the tenants, addressing most of their fears about Habitations Jeanne-Mance. What was significant about SMBC's rent scale was that it was designed to allow the tenants expropriated by urban renewal to remain in public housing (which had otherwise been seen as a form of welfare) even if their incomes increased. In so doing, it also introduced mechanisms to create and maintain a social mix at Îlots Saint-Martin.

The concepts from the SMBC rent scale were generally adopted by the OMHM and became the two mechanisms that managed the sociodemographic profile of public housing tenants in Montreal. Influenced by the citizen committee's ideas, the OHMH had, until the 1980s, a policy of maintaining a proportion of 35% of households to be headed by workers (of these, 75% male and 25% female).[223] Maintaining this balance was possible because of the discretion the housing office had in selecting from the applicants.[224] In addition to selecting households to attain a desired proportion of income-levels, the notion of a maximum 'rent ceiling' ensured that wage-earning families did not pay more than market rates. The rent ceiling was presented in the recommendations of the Rogers report in November 1969 and soon entered into the provincial law on public housing.[225] The proposals from the citizen committee's rent scale would consequently be applied to all public housing in the province.

In the post-renewal period, however, changes to the provincial law limited these mechanisms and constrained the housing office's ability to manage the social mix in its

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[221] Saint-Martin's Blocks Committee, "Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal)," 11.
[222] Ibid., 46.
[223] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat," 150.
[224] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat."
[225] Léopold Rogers, "Rapport : groupe de travail sur l'echelle de loyers dans les logements municipaux subventionnés (Rapport Rogers)" (Société d'habitation du Québec, November 1969).

properties. In 1982 the rent ceiling was removed, meaning all public housing tenants would pay 25% of their income to rent with no maximum amount. Wage-earning households could find themselves paying more for public housing than what was available in the private market. The result was the flight of many of these families, leaving the housing office with a higher proportion of households relying on social assistance. The resulting sociodemographic changes were noticed in Little Burgundy, with its high proportion of public housing, and especially in Îlots Saint-Martin where the concentration was highest.

Following the removal of the rent ceiling, maintaining a sociodemographic balance in public housing was more difficult, but still possible. Some working families chose to remain in public housing despite the removal. The housing office still exercised discretion over the selection of tenants and could attempt to create a socioeconomic balance through the applicants it chose from the waiting list. However, this modest discretion was further restrained in 1990, when the rules on attribution became more stringent. The housing office was subsequently required to select from applicants based on greatest need, as determined by an elaborate weighted point system.[226] As a result, new public housing tenants not only relied heavily on social assistance, but were often also dealing with other difficulties such as heading single parent households or living with mental illness.[227] The housing office could no longer exercise discretion in the selection process to establish the little social mix they had after the rent ceiling was removed. Both the removal of the rent ceiling and the changes to the rules on attribution affirmed the vision of public housing as a form of social assistance by removing the measures that SMBC had proposed (and the OMHM had adopted) to accommodate the expropriated wage-earning families and to maintain a social mix.

No longer able to maintain a social mix in its properties, the OMHM saw the intensification of poverty that followed as one of the determining factors of Little Burgundy's crack crisis. In chapter two I described how members of the Coalition understood the crack crisis as a result of the weakened social fabric in the neighbourhood, leaving it unable to respond to the problems that accumulated until conditions had become that of crisis. However, observers from the OMHM attributed the crack crisis to the removal of the rent scale, the subsequent loss of

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[226] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat"; Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais*, 50; Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin."
[227] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat"; Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais*.

wage-earning population in public housing, and the increasing proportion of tenants with additional difficulties.[228] Such an analysis attributes the crack trade and associated problems of insecurity partly to the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood and, in particular, the loss of once-available mechanisms to manage the sociodemographic balance in public housing. A high concentration of poverty appears here as a problem for the first time.

Public housing tenants saw a straightforward resolution to problems of concentrated poverty: reinstating the rent ceiling. They raised this request on multiple occasions throughout the post-renewal period. In the public consultation on the management of the OMHM in 1988, in the action plan developed by the Coalition's tenant committee in the early 1990s, and again near the end of the crack crisis in 1993.[229] In these requests, the rent ceiling served both as a way to allow wage-earning families to remain in public housing and as a mechanism to maintain a social mix, just as it had for SMBC. This time, however, there was not enough political pressure to create room in the provincial law for the two competing visions public housing.

When the crack trade reached the level of a crisis, the public housing office felt the need to respond quickly, but its means of action were limited. The OMHM attempted to manage the sociodemographics in Little Burgundy, and Îlots Saint-Martin in particular, through two initiatives which used different mechanisms. One initiative involved changing the property mode of units in high-density housing projects; the other used the tenant-landlord agreement to manage the public housing population through strategic evictions.

Changing the property mode of some of its properties was one approach to deconcentrating poverty by reducing the number of public housing units. This approach was also a solution to allow wage-earning families to stay remain in the area. Îlots Saint-Martin was the largest public housing project in the neighbourhood and therefore the highest concentration extremely low-income tenants, but it also had the highest proportion of wage-earning families who chose to remain even without the rent ceiling.[230] Little Burgundy's polarised housing market had few options for families with modest incomes who wanted to stay in the neighbourhood. The OMHM had explored the idea of transferring public housing units to other modes of ownership

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[228] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat"; Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais*; Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin."

[229] Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, "Mémoire concernant les clientèles"; Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat"; "Les Îlots St-Martin font parler d'eux."

[230] With 50 wage-earning households or 21% of the total in 1993, Saint-Martin's had the highest proportion of wage-earning families of all OMHM properties, according to Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin," 44.

as early as 1988.[231] However, after the Little Burgundy Coalition helped form a new tenant association for Îlots Saint-Martin and neighbours of Richmond Square, the idea was taken up with new vigor. Éléni Reed, a graduate student at McGill's School of Urban Planning, researched the viability of converting the units to cooperative housing or establishing a rent-to-own system and presented her findings to the tenants in July 1993. Reed noted that some tenants had already begun the process of creating a cooperative charter.[232] Transferring units out of the public housing stock to a different form of ownership would serve to reduce the number of public housing units in the neighbourhood's largest project, and make more housing available to households of modestly higher income, effectively deconcentrating the extremely low-income public housing population. Despite the interest observed at the July meeting, the cooperative housing initiative at Îlots Saint-Martin does not appear to have come to fruition.

Another approach reduced the overall number of tenants in public housing, through a strategy of evicting unwanted tenants and holding the housing units vacant. The lease between the landlord (the OMHM) and tenant was one of the few tools that remained at its disposal. This was perhaps more "demographic" than "sociodemographic" management: its most direct effect was to reduce the raw numbers of tenants. Although the impact of the strategy on the sociodemographic composition of the housing projects was limited, working in collaboration with police, as I describe in the next chapter, it could target individuals suspected of being involved with drugs. At the same time, it alleviated the burden of proof that was required in pressing criminal charges by passing through the civil courts of the rental tribunal. This strategy, which have been more effective as an extension of policing activities, began as an effort to manage the (increasingly "problematic") public housing population when mechanisms to maintain a sociodemographic balance had been eliminated.

Until the 1980s, the housing office was able to manage the sociodemographic composition of public housing in Montreal with mechanisms that were conceived of by the expropriated residents of Îlots Saint-Martin who were concerned that their future homes in public housing would resemble Habitations Jeanne-Mance, which they saw as an unacceptable concentration of poverty. The rent scale they developed was intended to allow for a sociodemographic balance that included families with modest income as well as those that

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[231] Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, "Mémoire concernant les clientèles," 188.
[232] Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin," 33.

depended on social assistance. This idea was a departure from the conventional treatment of public housing, and during the time that these ideas were applied in Montreal, they enabled the housing office to maintain a kind of social mix.

Although the expropriated tenants may have had a persuasive voice at the onset of urban renewal, in the post-renewal period the idea that public housing was a social safety net for society's least fortunate retook its former place as the dominant logic. As a result, the public housing office was left with limited options to manage the sociodemographic composition of its tenants. When this was followed by the rise of criminality surrounding the crack trade in their largest public housing property, the housing office identified the problem as one of a concentration of poverty that they were powerless to prevent. They attempted to address this by changing the tenure type of units to reduce the density of public housing and through the eviction and rental moratorium, to reduce the number of public housing tenants. The fears that the citizen's committee had expressed about a concentration of poverty, which their rent scale had been designed to prevent, seemed to have become a reality once the mechanisms to maintain a sociodemographic balance had been removed or constrained. Reinstating the rent ceiling, however, was also limited by the prevailing notions of the social role of public housing and who it was intended to house.

3.4 Conclusions

This chapter examined how sociodemographic management was one of the forms of urban governance that emerged in post-renewal Little Burgundy. It focused, in particular, on how different actors analysed and/or altered the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood. This focus allowed us to observe not only where the concept of a concentration of poverty was at work in the management of sociodemographics, but also where it was absent. The two *Logements* programs undoubtedly transformed the sociodemographic composition of the neighbourhood, facilitating an increasing middle class and initiating gentrification, but an undesirable concentration of low-income residents was not the rationale behind them. In this case the vacant lots left by renewal presented an opportunity to attract middle-income residents back to the city of Montreal (the primary goal of the *Logements* programs). The changing demographic balance away from a predominantly low-income neighbourhood was, on the other hand, a source of concern for the charity organizations who would later found the Coalition. These groups

expressed beneficial aspects of concentrated poverty, a departure from most observations in the literature which represent actors who frame concentrated poverty in almost exclusively negative terms.[233]

Other actions, while they mirror the dominant view of concentrated poverty in the existing literature, emerged much earlier than usually suggested. The rent scale developed by the SMBC, in particular, was positioned in square opposition to public housing as a site of concentrated poverty, and its recommendations allowed the housing office to maintain a desired of sociodemographic balance as a result. This effort to address concentrated poverty, ironically, emerged *during* the urban renewal period rather than after it. It contrasts, in this sense, with the existing literature's tracing of the concentration of poverty thesis to the post-renewal period and programs like HOPE VI.

Attempts to address concentrated poverty in the post-renewal period occurred after the SMBC-inspired rent scale policies were revoked and social mix could no longer be maintained. The loss of these mechanisms resulted in an increased proportion of extremely low-income residents in public housing and (because public housing was so prominent in post-renewal Little Burgundy) in the neighbourhood overall. When the crack crisis emerged, some observers, including the OMHM, saw concentrated poverty as its cause. The strategy of evictions and moratorium on renting was one of the few means by which the housing office could manage the population in public housing, and it applied this strategy as a short-term fix.

Longer-term attempts to address a concentration of poverty, by changing the property model of certain units or by re-establishing the rent ceiling, seem to have failed, although the reasons for their failure did not emerge clearly in my research. The attempt to transfer public housing units to a cooperative model is the post-renewal initiative that most closely resembles the mixed-income redevelopments of HOPE VI. Like HOPE VI, the OMHM's initiative aimed to address concentrated poverty by reducing the amount of public housing and by creating homes for better-off families in the area, but it attempted to do so by changing the legal status of the property rather than through a demolition-rebuilding program. The failure of OMHM's alternative approach to deconcentrating public housing seems to confirm the accusations of

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[233] One notable exception to this overarching representation of the negative aspects of concentrated poverty is the counternarrative provided by August, "Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization."

scholars who argue that the concerns about concentrated poverty that motivated HOPE VI merely provided a pretext for the redevelopment of coveted land.

What is revealing about studying the various sociodemographic governance initiatives described in this chapter is that although each was shaped by conditions left by urban renewal and seem to respond to the high levels of poverty in the Little Burgundy, on closer inspection, their relationship to notions of concentrated poverty are unexpected, where they exist at all. The physical landscape transformed by renewal, both the built environment and that which was un-built, created a preponderance of public housing for low-income residents, but scant accommodations for households of other income levels. The City's *Logements* program was not designed to deconcentrate the low-income population, but rather to attract households likely to provide reliable tax revenue. In addition to the physical legacies, ideological and legal legacies shaped the way that public housing was populated. The housing office inherited a set of tools that had been born out of the citizen committee's preoccupation with concentrated poverty in the renewal period. The OMHM's original policies for maintaining a social mix was both shaped by the arguments in SMBC's rent scale proposal and enabled by the legal structures that were based on its ideas. It was only after these legal structures were changed in the post-renewal period that the housing office began to identify problems, namely the crack crisis, as a result of concentrated poverty, but it had limited means to respond. While the short-term strategy of evictions and holding units vacant seemed to produce results, initiatives that aimed to address concentrated poverty in public housing in a more permanent way were not or could not be implemented.

4. Policing and urban governance

One of the most visible and important changes to occur in post-renewal Little Burgundy occurred in practices of policing. In large part, this change involved heightened police surveillance of, and violence toward, the neighbourhood's Black population. Police harassment of the Black population was not new, but seemed to increase at certain moments in the post-renewal period.[234] During the crack crisis, in particular, police harassment seemed to have reached new heights. In addition to quotidian harassment such as following Black residents and stopping them on trivial infractions like jaywalking or not wearing a seatbelt, the Little Burgundy police had become notorious for more spectacular incidents, such as entering homes without warrants and being implicated in the deaths of two Black men in the span of five months. Faced with actions like these, the Black community responded with outcry in the media, protests, and complaints to the police ethics commission. Accused of racism and rights violations, the legitimacy of police in Little Burgundy, and in Montreal more generally, was called into question. In response to this, Little Burgundy was selected for a new community policing program developed by the police narcotics unit. From heightened police repression to the introduction of Montreal's first community policing initiative, policing practices in post-renewal Little Burgundy were clearly changing.

The highly mediatized policing scandal in Little Burgundy during the crack crisis suggests that an investigation of post-renewal urban governance in this neighbourhood cannot ignore the role of the police. Such an investigation needs to consider how the practices of the police department changed in this period, but also how the relationship between the police and community organizations were remade. The Little Burgundy Coalition, for example, was

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[234] Using the term police harassment, as was often used by residents and journalists, usefully encompasses both racial profiling and police violence. It also denotes a kind of persistence of these interactions appropriate for the experiences expressed by Little Burgundy residents. Although this chapter deals with police harassment of Black residents, which is how most of the accusations were framed, it seems reasonable to believe that other racialized groups may have been targets of police harassment. For example, Tyndale-St-Georges noted a growing population of Latin American origin in the neighbourhood, and some arrests related to the drug trade involved individuals from Colombia. However, I have not seen any instance of white residents complaining of police harassment or its corollaries. There is a report of white residents (and others) starting a petition to show support for one police officer accused of ethics violations. Michael Farber, "Centre Struggles in Changing Area," *Gazette*, October 10, 1985; William Marsden, "Traffickers Found 'Cocaine' Was Sugar: Then RCMP Pounced," *Gazette*, April 12, 1989; Éric Trottier, "Pétition de citoyens blancs en faveur du lieutenant Pablo Palacios," *La Presse*, December 17, 1991; Marie-France Léger, "Une résidante de la Petite-Bourgogne se porte à la défense d'un lieutenant peu orthodoxe," *La Presse*, July 4, 1994.

concerned with violent crime and insecurity in the neighbourhood from the beginning; this was the initial reason that community groups had united to form the Coalition. The Coalition sought to address these concerns, in part, by engaging with the police, making demands of them and their resources. But the police were not just a potential partner in the fight against violent crime and insecurity. They were also, as I noted above, a major source of insecurity, as they discriminated against and harassed local residents, Black residents in particular. Addressing this problem was part of the work of Black community organizations. These organizations worked to improve police-community relations, but the situation only seemed to worsen.

Also during this period, the police began to seek the cooperation of community members in their work. During the 1980s, community policing had not yet become part of the approach of Montreal's police service (SPCUM), despite being increasingly embraced in other North American cities. In the early 1990s, however, the SPCUM narcotics unit developed a program, called ACES, which used community engagement in the efforts to overcome the drug trade. By entering into partnership with community groups, the police could gain information useful to their own work, but they could also encourage the community to take control of spaces and prevent the return of illegal drug activities and their associated insecurity. These first overtures to community policing would be directed toward Little Burgundy, although it did not arrive not until the end of the crack crisis, after the efforts of the Coalition had been underway for nearly four years.

What is the relation between these changes in policing and the legacies of urban renewal? Three legacies stand out as potentially relevant to the question of policing in post-renewal Little Burgundy. The first was the weakened 'social fabric,' a perceived outcome of urban renewal to which the Coalition attributed the crack crisis and which it therefore sought to repair in its response to the crisis. This view of the problem and its solution became the basis of two important new security programs that were introduced in this period, Operation Tandem (later Tandem Montreal) and project ACES. The second legacy is the failure of renewal to attract the anticipated levels of private residential development. Efforts to address this legacy in the post-renewal period (e.g., through the *Logements* programs) seem to have been hampered partly by the crack crisis. This ultimately provided a political-economic rationale for *resolving* the crisis as quickly as possible. The third legacy of renewal is the abundance of public housing in the neighbourhood and the importance of the public housing office as the landlord of the majority of

households in Little Burgundy. The implication here is not just that public housing (as a milieu of "concentrated poverty") was blamed for the crack crisis, but also that the public housing office became an important partner of the police in resolving the crisis. Indeed, the housing office was also able to use legal mechanisms available to it (and not available to the police) in an effort to control the drug trade, through a strategy of evictions and a moratorium on new renters.

Three legacies of renewal, in sum, shaped the changes in policing that occurred in the post-renewal period. These changes, the increase in police violence and trend toward community involvement in policing, were not entirely or only shaped by the legacies of renewal. However, investigating the relations between these periods has revealed the ways the relations between police, community and other state agencies were reconfigured.

4.1 Policing and insecurity in post-renewal Little Burgundy

Although police harassment did not begin in the post-renewal period, concerns about this issue began to be raised more publicly by the Black community in Little Burgundy in the mid-1980s. In January 1985, the Black Community Coalition of Quebec (BCCQ) wrote to Mayor Drapeau about the "increasing incidents of police violence between the MUC police and especially the [B]lack residents of Little Burgundy," following up on a similar letter from the Negro Community Centre (NCC) in 1984.[235] Residents warned that if things did not change "police are going to shoot somebody and there's going to be a riot."[236]

In the period that followed, Black community organizations did what they could to respond to the reality of police harassment by providing resources for Black residents to defend their rights and attempting to create better police-community relations through shared activities. The organizations in question addressed the Black population in Montreal at large, but many of their initiatives focused on Little Burgundy where some, such as the NCC and the Garvey Institute, were based. The NCC was working toward an advocacy service for youth apprehended by police to help them defend their rights.[237] These groups also facilitated interactions with the police and the community. For Police Week in May 1986, NCC arranged for its daycare program

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[235] David Johnston, "Blacks and the Police; Rookie Cops Guilty of Racism Little Burgundy Residents Say," *Gazette*, January 26, 1985.
[236] Ibid.
[237] "Letter from Leith Hamilton to Mr Paul Stubb Re: Youth Advocacy Program," May 5, 1986, F013 HA04218 File 5, Concordia Library Special Collections.

to visit the police station, invited police to meet with children in their afterschool program, and held an evening panel discussion on "Youth and Police" for the community at large.[238] The latter seems to have served as a forum for citizens to voice their outrage about the police behaviour. This is indicated in a letter from the NCC interim director to the officers of Station 24 following the event, commending the officers for enduring the "initial mistrust" and "much pent-up frustration and anger" of the community.[239] The NCC went on to work with the police on a conference for Police and Minority Youth Relations later the same year.[240]

The years to follow would call into question the efficacy of such programs in improving police-citizen relations and reducing police harassment. In a news article in 1990, the director of Station 24 claimed his station "was recognised for its good relations" with the Black population, and referred to their regular meetings with the Garvey Institute, a local private Afrocentric school.[241] In the same article, however, Reverend Francis Xavier disagreed with the police director about the state of police-community relations, adding that citizens were reluctant to contact the police about the criminal activity in the neighbourhood because they were worried innocent people would be arrested.[242] The article appeared on the same page as another article that recounted the numerous problems Little Burgundy residents had with police, in particular two officers from Station 24 known as Batman and Robin.[243] Black residents, especially youth, felt these two officers regularly went out of their way to ask for identification, search, and even photograph them.[244] "If you don't run," a 25-year-old resident explained, "they're going to take you to the station and waste your time."[245]

Police harassment and racial profiling reached the news again when professional football player Tommy Kane was stopped by police during his return home to Little Burgundy from

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[238] "Letter from Leith Hamilton (NCC) to Mr Lalonde (Director Station #24)," April 22, 1986, F013 HA04218 File 5, Concordia Library Special Collections; "Letter from Leith Hamilton (NCC) to Mr. Lalonde (Director Station #24)," June 17, 1986, F013 HA04218 File 5, Concordia Library Special Collections.

[239] "Letter from Leith Hamilton (NCC) to Mr. Lalonde (Director Station #24)" June 17, 1986.

[240] June 17, 1986 ibid.; Negro Community Centre, "Presse Release : BLACK COMMUNITY AGENCY SEEKS COLLABORATION WITH MUC POLICE"," May 14, 1986, F013 HA04218 File 5, Concordia Library Special Collections; "Negro Centre, Police Discuss Aid Link," *Gazette*, May 15, 1986.

[241] Richard Hétu, "Le directeur du poste 24 n'a jamais reçu plaintes de Noirs de la Petite-Bourgogne," *La Presse*, September 30, 1990.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Richard Hétu, "«Batman» et «Robin» sèment la terreur chez les Noirs," *La Presse*, September 30, 1990.

[244] Ibid.

[245] "Si tu cours pas, ils vont t'amener au poste et te faire perdre ton temps." Ibid.

playing for the Seattle Seahawks.[246] Kane reported he was held for 45 minutes while the officers checked his identity. Responding to the controversy, the director of Station 24 defended the police decision to stop the local hero with a logic that suggested that questioning the actions of the police was itself questionable. "The ordinary citizen backs what we're trying to do," he said apparently without irony. "The only complaints we hear come from those we arrest."[247]

By summer of 1991, the situation had only worsened. One Black youth described the neighbourhood as being "under siege" by police officers who followed them at night, a comment that bears a strange parallel to the earlier reports of the neighbourhood being "held hostage" by the drug trade when the Coalition first formed.[248] In addition to Batman and Robin – later identified as officers Gilbert Gavreau (badge 4456) and Richard Prud'homme (badge 3992) – officer Pablo Palacios (badge 4803) had gained a reputation for himself under the nickname "Dirty Harry."[249] Having formerly worked in the narcotics unit, Palacios enthusiastically took on the fight against drug trafficking with methods described as "unorthodox."[250] In the CBC exposé *Black & Blue*, which followed Palacios on the job in Little Burgundy, Palacios was shown saying "I'm not here to shake hands, I'm here to kick ass."[251]

Palacios' name was also connected with the two shooting deaths of Black men in 1991. In July, he was the first to respond to the call for backup in the police shooting of Marcellus François in a case of mistaken identity only blocks away from Little Burgundy in the financial district. Twenty-four year old François was unarmed in a stopped car when he was shot in the head, dying of the wounds two weeks later. Palacios faced ethics charges in this incident for arresting the passengers of François' car without cause.[252] In November, Osmond Fletcher died in Little Burgundy after being chased by police, from gunshots which the police claimed was suicide. Weeks before his death, Fletcher had been interviewed for the CBC exposé in which he

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[246] "Seahawks' Kane Hassled by Montreal Police," *Ottawa Citizen*, January 13, 1991; "Step up Police-Minority Ties," *Gazette*, January 15, 1991, sec. Editorial.

[247] Eddie Collister, "Batman and Robin Are Called an Urban Myth; Bogeyman Cops Feared by Blacks Don't Exist: Director of Station 24," *Gazette*, November 9, 1991.

[248] Bart Kasowski, "We Won't Take More Police Racism: Young Blacks," *Gazette*, July 14, 1991. For example, Pelchat, "Mobilisation général contre le crack dans le Petite-Bourgogne"; Peritz, "Attack on Crack; Little Burgundy Residents Work to Oust Pushers."

[249] Jean-Paul Soulié, "Témoignages embrouillés devant le Comité de déontologie policière," *La Presse*, February 18, 1993.

[250] Jack Todd, "Boss of Burgundy; Cop's War on Drug Dealers Requires a Few House Calls," *Gazette*, January 21, 1992; Léger, "Une résidante de la Petite-Bourgogne se porte à la défense d'un lieutenant peu orthodoxe."

[251] Todd, "Boss of Burgundy."

[252] Bruno Bisson, "Suspension de cinq jours pour Dirty Harry," *La Presse*, November 24, 1993.

accused Station 24 officers, including Palacios, of being involved in the drug trade.[253] The deaths of these two Black men fuelled growing skepticism about police racism in Montreal generally and only served to intensify the sense of insecurity and injustice regarding the police in Little Burgundy.

For many community organizations, eliminating police violence and harassment without significant changes to the dominant approach to policing seemed impossible. The Coalition, as I noted, was formed to address security issues in the neighbourhood. While this meant working with the police to address security issues stemming from neighbourhood residents (something I discuss in more detail below), it also meant confronting the insecurity *caused* by the police. At one of the earliest meetings of the Coalition, community members shared the organizing they were doing around the issue of police harassment.[254] A public information session with lawyers was held at Tyndale St-Georges for citizens to gain information about their rights in relation to the police and the responsibilities of police officers toward citizens.[255] While the Coalition affirmed the need for police action in addressing the insecurity around the drug trade, this was not to be at the expense of their rights as citizens. Francis Xavier told reporters at a Coalition press conference that excessive police action in the neighbourhood, particularly their entry into homes, was "a violation of human dignity and of democracy."[256]

Black community groups confronted the police as well, most often by supporting citizens in defending their rights through the newly established provincial Police Ethics Commission.[257] At the end of September 1991, the BCCQ opened a hotline for citizens to report police harassment.[258] Although this service was for all of Montreal, information gathered from this hotline led to fifteen complaints to the ethics commission in December of that year and five of these were from Little Burgundy residents against officers of Station 24.[259] The accusations in question included use of excessive force and entry without a warrant.[260] Using video footage

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[253] Jack Todd, "Freedom at Risk; Rights Ignored as Police Take Aim at Drug Dealers," *Gazette*, January 23, 1992; ibid.; Hadlaw, "Locating Crisis," 54.
[254] "Minutes of Meeting Held with English Speaking Groups, June 14, 1989."
[255] Hétu, "Le directeur du poste 24 n'a jamais reçu plaintes de Noirs de la Petite-Bourgogne," 24.
[256] Jean-Paul Soulié, "La Petite-Bourgogne Se Prend En Main et Veut Le Montrer," *La Presse*, January 29, 1992.
[257] Prior to the creation of the provincial police ethics commission (*Commissaire à la déontologie policier du Québec*) in 1990, police misconduct was generally investigated by an internal board of the police service itself.
[258] Richard Hétu, "Plaintes au Commissaire à la déontologie contre le policier Palacios," *La Presse*, December 14, 1991; "Phone Line Set up to Help Blacks Deal with Police," *Gazette*, October 1, 1991.
[259] Hétu, "Plaintes au Commissaire à la déontologie contre le policier Palacios."
[260] Debbie Parkes, "Blacks Seek Probe of Police Conduct in Little Burgundy," *Gazette*, December 15, 1991.

from the *Black & Blue* exposé, Palacios was found guilty of abuse of authority in one case and was ordered a suspension of five days.[261] At the same time these complaints were filed, the community demanded these officers be transferred to another station, but the police director claimed this would not be appropriate while the charges were still under investigation.[262] Palacios, Gavreau, and Prud'homme were still in the neighbourhood in April 1992 when a Little Burgundy resident filed another ethics complaint against them.[263]

It was not only these three officers, of course, who were contributing to the concerns about police harassment. That same month two other officers apprehended three Black teenagers, fingerprinting them and holding them at station 24 for three hours before releasing without charges.[264] The boys, all three between the ages of 14 and 17, were returning home late after attending a baseball game with their army cadet unit. Their parents sued the police service and four years later were awarded damages for their mistreatment.[265] The pervasiveness of the problem was duly noted by the Coalition. During a meeting in autumn of 1992, members of the Coalition observed that "the harassment of the Black community continues to be a reality in spite of reports of more positive relations."[266]

Efforts to improve police-community relations through mediated exchanges and events continued in the 1990s, but many were skeptical of such endeavours. An article that described meetings between the police and the Garvey Institute in 1993 revealed that young people, the very community members that police had the most trouble with, were not represented at these meetings.[267] Youth, for their part, were not interested in meetings with no results, which a representative of one Black youth group called "verbal masturbation."[268] Throughout 1991 and 1992, both establishment and more radical Black organizations organized protests against police

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[261] Bisson, "Suspension de cinq jours pour Dirty Harry."
[262] Richard Hétu, "Des Noirs exigent le transfert de trois policiers du poste 24," *La Presse*, December 5, 1991.
[263] Richard Hétu, "Palacios nie d'avoir brutalisé Kathleen Cork," *La Presse*, January 30, 1993.
[264] Albert Noel and James Mennie, "Police Say They Had Reason to Arrest Boys; `Several Witnesses Saw Them with Stolen Scooter,' Captain Declares," *Gazette*, April 22, 1992; André Picard, "Montreal: Just the Usual Story, except ...," *Globe and Mail*, April 24, 1992.
[265] Lisa Fitterman, "Teens Win $13,500 from Cops for Wrongful Arrest: Judge Renders Immediate Decision against MUC Police Officers," *Gazette*, December 14, 1996.
[266] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the General Assembly Nov 24, 1992."
[267] Marlene Blanshay, "Blue and Black : Blacks and Police in Little Burgundy Are Getting Together in Church Basements to Discuss Ways of Reducing Distrust," *HOUR*, June 27, 1993.
[268] Ibid.

racism throughout Montreal to create political pressure for substantial changes, many of which were held Campbell Park, just across the street from Îlots Saint-Martin.[269]

In this section I have traced the increase in police harassment and violence against Black residents that Black community organizations observed and struggled against. The accounts of police activity and responses to it in the archival record and news reports can only partially represent the conditions in the neighbourhood, but give some indication of the nature of policing during this period. Certainly, police harassment and mobilization against it were not limited to Little Burgundy nor to the incidents that were covered in the media. The situation in Little Burgundy in 1984 was significant enough to reach the newspapers and demand the attention of the mayor. In the wake of the police killing of unarmed Marcellus François, the police harassment in Little Burgundy received special media coverage, which peaked in the exposé that showed officer Palacios at work. However, as Janin Hadlaw has demonstrated, the media constantly cast doubt on the credibility of accusations of police misconduct from the Black community, and depicted Little Burgundy as a site of crisis where these actions were justified.[270] Though the events of the period are preserved through media accounts, their framing tends to undermine the experiences of Black residents and excuse police actions.

The media helped the police recuperate their image, but its coverage of the community mobilization also helped create political pressure. At the close of 1991, Faced with growing mistrust and confrontation, chief of the police service Alain St-Germain contemplated plans to regain the trust of groups that had "lost confidence" in the police, through getting to know communities better and working in partnership with the public.[271] In the case of project ACES, as Desbiens revealed, the Communications director of the police service requested Little Burgundy be the next neighbourhood to receive the program as an effort to improve police-community relations following the scandals surrounding Palacios.[272] The introduction of this new community-based policing model, I show in the next section, was another important change

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[269] Kasowski, "We Won't Take More Police Racism: Young Blacks"; Mike King, Thanh Ha Tu, and Michelle Lalonde, "Four Blacks Arrested, Police Cars Damaged in Little Burgundy Clash; Angry Group Gathers after News of Arrests Spreads," *Gazette*, July 16, 1991; Mary Lamey and Bart Kasowski, "Black Community Leaders Plan March Today," *Gazette*, July 6, 1991; Paul Wells, "We Won't Ask Permission for Anti-Racism Rallies: Group; `More Civil Disobedience to Come'," *Gazette*, July 28, 1991; "Speakers Blast Black Leaders at Little Burgundy Rally," *Gazette*, May 10, 1992.
[270] Hadlaw, "Locating Crisis."
[271] James Mennie, "Police Chief's Tough Case: Rebuilding Public's Trust," *Gazette*, December 30, 1991.
[272] Desbiens, "L'implantation du programme ACES," 61.

in policing in the post-renewal period. Although the increasing police harassment does not seem to have been related to legacies of the urban renewal period, the turn to engaging community in policing does resonate with a renewal legacy.

4.2 Policing and the community

Instituting a new relationship between policing and the community was an important objective for many actors in post-renewal Little Burgundy, including certain community organizations. The Coalition, as I noted, often confronted the police as a source of insecurity for community members. However, it also sought to work with the police to combat the insecurity associated with the drug trade. Indeed, the Coalition was formed in response to the high levels of drug-related insecurity in the neighbourhood, and resolving this problem was a major priority for the Coalition in the early years. Much of this insecurity, for the Coalition, was due to crime in the area, including gun violence, increase in thefts, and the use and trade of drugs.[273] The sense of insecurity generated by these problems, the Coalition noted, left many residents afraid to walk alone or let their children play outside. It also affected access to services, as taxi drivers and pizza deliverers were observed to avoid the area.[274]

The Coalition's response to these conditions was varied and complex. As discussed in chapter two, its organising recognised that police action alone was not enough to address a problem that its members believed was rooted in wider economic and social issues. Much of its work, then, was focused on resolving these wider issues – usually without the aid of the police. Alongside this work, however, the Coalition also engaged with the police. Its very first response to the neighbourhood's sense of insecurity, for example, was to call for increased police presence.[275] It requested the establishment 24-hour police patrols and a mini-station in the neighbourhood, and asked that the police work with the Coalition committees in achieving their action plans.[276] Although the police expressed scepticism that the community initiative would be

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[273] Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne"; Pelchat, "Mobilisation général contre le crack dans le Petite-Bourgogne"; Peritz, "Attack on Crack; Little Burgundy Residents Work to Oust Pushers."

[274] Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne"; Pelchat, "Mobilisation général contre le crack dans le Petite-Bourgogne."

[275] Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne"; Peritz, "Attack on Crack; Little Burgundy Residents Work to Oust Pushers."

[276] Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne"; Peritz, "Attack on Crack; Little Burgundy Residents Work to Oust Pushers."

effective, they seem to have fulfilled many of the Coalition's requests.[277] The director of Station 24, for example, sat as an observer and resource person on the Special Committee on Drugs.[278] Among the accomplishments it presented in a press conference in 1992, the Coalition mentioned that a Black policewoman had been assigned to patrol the neighbourhood.[279] Though there is no evidence of police opening a mini-station, the neighbourhood-based crime prevention program Tandem (discussed in more detail below) had an office in the former post office that the OMHM furnished as a community centre.[280]

While the Coalition engaged the police as a potential partner in addressing insecurity, the police and other state institutions were also seeking to partner with community organizations in addressing their own criminality-related objectives. In what follows here, I examine two programs related to policing and crime prevention, which were deployed in Little Burgundy during the post-renewal period. The first, Operation Tandem, was an initiative of the City based on encouraging citizens to develop habits that prevent crime and promote safety in their neighbourhoods. The second, project ACES, was a program developed by the SPCUM narcotics unit which involved elements of community policing that had not been used in Montreal previously. Although the details of their activities in Little Burgundy are scarce in both cases, descriptions of the projects give an idea of the logics behind their implementation. Both of these programs shared notions about the role of community in neighbourhood crime prevention, an important change in policing in this period. The community element, moreover, was partly related to the legacies of renewal, as it was believed that the social fabric required to promote safe neighbourhoods had been weakened by renewal and needed to be repaired through the community initiatives central to both Tandem and ACES.

Operation Tandem

Operation Tandem originated as a 'neighbourhood watch' crime prevention program commissioned by the City in 1982 to address a spike in break-and-enter robberies in Montreal. In 1987, its mandate was expanded to include matters of security more generally under the name

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277 Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne."
278 Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91"; Little Burgundy Coalition, "Minutes of the General Assembly Nov 24, 1992."
279 King, "Once Crime-Torn Little Burgundy Becoming Pleasant Place to Live; Grass-Roots Effort by Residents Showing Results."
280 "Dossier: Pour l'O.M.H.M., la Petite-Bourgogne, c'est toujours... certifiée prioritaire."

Tandem Montreal.[281] Tandem's approach was based on informing residents about and encouraging them to adopt daily behaviours that promoted safety and discouraged crime. In a report of its first year of activities, the coordination team described the program as aiming "to make the citizen the primary artisan of their security in their environment."[282] They were also encouraged to become "the eyes and ears of the police."[283] As the name suggests, the program worked in collaboration with existing community organizations, including the Coalition, on initiatives related to its crime prevention and security promotion mandates. To this end, Tandem did not involve a centralized programming; each Tandem office developed activities with its partner organizations according to the needs identified in the community. Typical activities might include distributing bookmarks about vandalism, security themed power-lunches, marking bicycles and valuables to prevent theft, holding information sessions about security.[284] Tandem worked with the OMHM in many of their homes for the elderly, launching, for example, a campaign to encourage tenants to remember to lock their doors at night.[285]

It is not clear at what point Tandem came to Little Burgundy or what it did once it was established. Tandem units were geographically organized by police district until 1992 when they were reorganized according to boroughs.[286] Station 24 was not one of Tandem's initial eight districts in 1982, but there are references to Tandem #24 in Coalition documents in 1990.[287] It seems possible that Tandem #24 opened in 1988 when the program was broadened and transferred to the City of Montreal's *Service du loisir and du developpement communautaire,* but it is also possible it was created in response to the actions of the Coalition itself. The YMCA, located in Pointe-Saint-Charles, was the community organization responsible for the Tandem in police district 24. However, Tandem was one of the groups that used the community space in the post office in Little Burgundy that was provided by the OMHM at the request of the Coalition.[288]

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[281] Garnier, "Métro, quartiers, ville"; Borde, "Pour une approche territoriale de la question de la sécurité"; Montreal, "1982–2007: 25 années de réalisations remarquables en sécurité urbaine à Montréal, Tandem"; André Noel, "Opération Tandem: La collaboration avec la communauté est un succès," *La Presse*, September 29, 1986.
[282] Opération Tandem cited in Garnier, "Métro, quartiers, ville," 111. Garnier has done a very nice analysis of Tandem in terms of Foucault's governmentality.
[283] «Ils sont les yeux et les oreilles de la police. » Noel, "Opération Tandem: La collaboration avec la communauté est un succès."
[284] Tandem Montréal, "Tandem Montréal... Déja 10 Ans."
[285] Welsh and Roy, "Un habitat plus sûr," 11.
[286] Garnier, "Métro, quartiers, ville."
[287] Little Burgundy Coalition, "Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91."
[288] "Dossier: Pour l'O.M.H.M., la Petite-Bourgogne, c'est toujours... certifiée prioritaire."

Aside from having a presence in the neighbourhood and having a representative on the Coalition, it is not clear exactly what Tandem did in Little Burgundy. By one account, Tandem was involved in launching the youth centre Youth in Motion.[289] According to its mandate, Tandem would be able to use its resources and networks to support community initiatives related to security, which certainly applied to many of the Coalition's projects.

The establishment of Tandem represents an important change in policing practices – namely, the extension of responsibility for policing from the formal police department to the community at large. This extension is apparent, first of all, in the organization's emphasis on constituting everyday residents as the artisans of their own security and the "eyes and ears" of the police on the ground. With this change, the domain of policing was significantly enlarged, with every citizen becoming a potential informer. The very existence of Tandem is another sign of this extension: an extension that gave a large role to community organizations in addressing criminality. Tandem, it is often pointed out, was not a police program, but neither was it an alternative to the police. Instead, Garnier argued, it served as an extension of the police.[290] Even as its mandate expanded over the years to include concerns other than criminality and insecurity, its connection to the police was formalized in the stipulation that Tandem's activities must always have the support of the police.[291]

The extension of policing to the community at large is also apparent in the importance now assigned to community development in reducing crime and insecurity. Notably, the City's 1987 evaluation applauded Tandem's role in improving social cohesion through its activities, especially in neighbourhoods experiencing a changing population. Indeed, the evaluation found that Tandem had actually failed to prevent the crimes it was created to address, but deserved praise for other reasons – namely, its contribution to community development.[292] Following the City's evaluation, Tandem's mandate was modified to add community development to its objectives and to expand its field of interest from preventing specific crimes to promoting a broader notion of security.[293] Entrusting community development to an organization committed

[289] From an interview with a founder of Youth in Motion, in Nisha Nathani, "Educating for Democratic Development: A Study of Women Leaders in Social Action" (Master's thesis, McGill University, 1998), 54.

[290] Garnier, "Métro, quartiers, ville," 108.

[291] Ibid., 130 ft 195.

[292] Districts with Tandem did not see a significant reduction in the crimes it was targeted to prevent (theft and graffiti) compared with areas in Montreal that did not have the program. Ibid., 121.

[293] Ibid., 130.

to addressing insecurity was a novel move. One of its effects was ultimately to shift the prevailing understanding of community development and social cohesion to become more closely linked to crime prevention and more likely to be valued.

This relationship between crime/insecurity and community development is consistent with the analysis of groups like the Coalition, which emphasized the social causes of criminality. As we have already seen, in their Coalition's view one of causes of crime was the social fabric that had been damaged by renewal. In this context, it would be logical for the City to deploy the Tandem program in the neighbourhood and for community development to become an important crime prevention activity. In a neighbourhood where insecurity and crime were seen to be related to a weakened social fabric, such as Little Burgundy, Tandem offered an attractive, community-based form of policing.

Project ACES

Project ACES (*Actions concertées en enquête de stupéfiants*, later renamed *Actions concertées en élaboration de solutions)* was the second community-based form of policing introduced by the state in Little Burgundy. As counterintuitive as this might sound, the project – the first sustained attempt at community-based policing in Montreal – began in the narcotics unit of the Montreal police service (SPCUM). In 1990, some of the coordinators recognised that the repressive tactics they had been using were not solving the problem of the drug trade nor improving the quality of life for the communities where it was taking place.[294] The program that they developed, project ACES, involved engaging with the communities where drug activity was taking place, partially to gain information, but also to help the community reappropriate spaces liberated from the drug trade to prevent the trade from returning. This initiative is often overlooked in histories of community policing in Montreal, which tend to focus on the development of the city's neighbourhood police system deployed later in 1996-97.[295]

Prior to ACES, community policing in Montreal was seen as a community relations effort, improving the relationship between police and community rather than changing the policing strategies themselves. According to the account of Daniel Desbiens, a police officer

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[294] Desbiens, "L'implantation du programme ACES," 147.
[295] Even so, SPCUM policy with a community-police relations orientation was only announced in 1985. Jacques Duchesneau, Gilbert Cordeau, and Maurice Chalom, "L'approche communautaire au Service de police de la Communauté urbaine de Montréal (SPCUM): vers la police de quartier," in *Une police professionelle de type communautaire.*, ed. André Normandeau, vol. 2 (Montréal: Éditions du Méridien, 1998), 88–90.

involved with the coordination of ACES, the program was intended to improve the conditions in neighbourhoods that had been overwhelmed with illegal drug trade by working with the community members through a problem-solving approach. The program involved a repressive phase, meant to destabilize the existing drug networks, which was followed by a "sociopreventative" phase, in which the community re-appropriated the area with support from the police through a partnership approach.[296] Based on this combination of repression-reappropriation, Ouimet and Paré described ACES as a type of 'weed and seed' program.[297]

ACES was implemented in Little Burgundy in spring of 1993, the second neighbourhood to receive the program.[298] Upon arriving, the ACES coordination team found that the repressive phase of their operation was not needed, as they had already been done by "an officer" of the neighbourhood and the narcotics unit in 1990-91.[299] Thus, they moved directly into the sociopreventative phase.[300] Like Tandem, the sociopreventive element of the ACES program involved a new conception and practice of policing, one that emphasized the role of the community in preventing and combatting criminality. From the beginning, ACES was conceived of as a means for police to fight the drug trade more effectively by engaging with the community affected and supporting them in taking control of their neighbourhood. The need to engage the community in Little Burgundy was linked, in part, to the tensions created by the previous years of police violence and harassment. Through his interviews Desbiens learned that the decision to implant ACES in Little Burgundy was motivated by the outrage in the Black community following the police shooting of Marcellus François, compounded by officer Palacios's involvement in the incident and, one can imagine, the history of police harassment in the neighbourhood in general. Desbiens observed that "the real reason [for choosing Little Burgundy] seemed to be to re-establish links of trust between the population and its police service."[301] The decision to send ACES to Little Burgundy was an effort to recover the

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[296] To a certain extent this was done by targeting urban decay, inspired by Broken Windows theory. Ibid.
[297] Marc Ouimet and Paul-Philippe Paré, "La recherche sur la police au Québec durant les années 1990," in *Traité de criminologie empirique*, ed. Marc Leblanc, Marc Ouimet, and Denis Szabo, Les classiques des sciences sociales (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2003), 24.
[298] Desbiens, "L'implantation du programme ACES," 131.
[299] Ibid., 174.
[300] Ibid., 174.
[301] « *...la raison véritable semble d'être le rétablissement des liens de confiance entre une population et son service de police.* » Ibid., 239.

legitimacy that the police had lost through the outrage about police harassment at the height of the crack crisis.

The program's emphasis on engaging the community was also based on the idea that social cohesion in Little Burgundy had been damaged by urban renewal. Like the Coalition and Tandem, the designers of program ACES believed that a weakened social fabric was an obstacle to a preventing criminality. Writing to advise the ACES team of the conditions in Little Burgundy and what they could expect, a community patrol officer explained that the biggest challenge for the neighbourhood was rebuilding the community ties.[302] She attributed the sub-optimal conditions of the community to urban renewal, writing "the neighbourhood was physically rebuilt but did not build the social fabric that was destroyed."[303] She also observed that the growing middle-class population in the neighbourhood led the lower-income residents to believe that they would soon be pushed out, which left them with a damage sense of belonging. Despite this evaluation of the social dimensions of the neighbourhood, a survey ordered by ACES before entering the neighbourhood in spring of 1993 indicated that the sense of security in Little Burgundy was higher than the average of Montreal neighbourhoods at large.[304] This seems to indicate that conditions had improved since the time that the Coalition identified the feelings of insecurity in the neighbourhood as a major concern and began mobilizing to improve the sense of security.

Both Tandem and ACES were developed independent of the conditions in Little Burgundy and later applied to the neighbourhood. Although their specific actions in Little Burgundy are not fully clear from archival records, the evolution of the programs suggest that it was a logic of community responsibility for security, which required a strong social fabric, that made them appropriate for this neighbourhood. This approach to criminality paralleled that of the Coalition and other community-based actors, who had also credited urban renewal with the destruction of the social fabric and, through this, given rise to the criminality and insecurity of the crack crisis. Tandem and ACES can thus be understood as tools through which state institutions (the municipality and the police, respectively) could supply resources and support for

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[302] In fact, this report was likely written by the Black policewoman who had been hired to patrol at the request of the Coalition. She is identified as Michelle in the interview guide and is said to have worked in the neighbourhood for 3 years. Ibid., 204.
[303] « *Bref, on a rebâti physiquement le quartier mais on n'a pas construit le tissu social que l'on a détruit.* » Ibid.
[304] Ibid., 174.

community response to crime and insecurity. Both also functioned as approaches that potentially improved police-community relations, or in other words, recover the legitimacy of the police.

4.3 Legacy of stalled development

Another change in policing that emerged in post-renewal Little Burgundy concerned the built landscape. It is notable that, as the crack crisis emerged, the neighbourhood had still not been fully rebuilt from the renewal-era demolitions and still had not attained the desired mix of public housing and privately built homes. This was a lingering problem. One of the objectives of the urban renewal program itself was to reignite development in the neighbourhood. The authors of the renewal study for Little Burgundy concluded that, although the neighbourhood was not yet a slum, it did show signs of decline.[305] Thus, the renewal program was meant to interrupt this process of decline by demolishing the outmoded buildings that suppressed the surrounding land valuation, which would supposedly spur new construction and new investment to the neighbourhood. This was one of the foundational logics of urban renewal. As noted in chapter three, the urban renewal program failed to attract private development, leaving instead large tracts of vacant land. The City attempted to encourage private residential development in the post-renewal period through the programs *Opération 10,000* and *20,000 logements*. Private development was slow to establish in Little Burgundy even with this subsidized program, possibly due to its reputation as a low-income slum, but it did see a major in increase in private construction through the *Logements* program between 1982 and 1986.

The ongoing failure of residential development seems to have shaped how security programs were viewed in 1980s Little Burgundy. A direct relationship between policing and property interests in post-renewal Little Burgundy is difficult to establish, but some observations suggest that further investigation of the role of police in protecting property and in creating the security conditions conducive to development might be warranted. The increase in police violence reported in 1984-85 coincided with the uptick in private housing development through *Opération 20,000 logements*. In the *Gazette* article reporting these concerns, a Little Burgundy resident was quoted as saying, "We get chased by cops carrying guns a lot. … I was walking home via the back of the new buildings they're building in the area. Police don't like it when

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[305] Mayer, "L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal."

[B]lacks do that."[306] This juxtaposition of police harassment and the new housing developments is telling of the relationship between policing and property.

The logic of property interest in relation to security emerged again as the crack crisis was escalating, this time from the perspective of a property owner in a letter to the editor:

> WRONG GEOGRAPHY
> I live in a beautiful, quiet area, rich with landscaped pedestrian walks, flower gardens and a new children's park.
> Your July 14 story, titled "Attack on crack," has erroneously lumped our area between Guy and Mountain Sts. into Little Burgundy. A check with city hall on the name of the area would inform you that officially the area commonly spoken of as Les Floralies belongs in Bonaventure and is not part of St. Henri or Little Burgundy.
> This kind of story, designed perhaps to alert the public and to influence the police to take action, *is very harmful to the residents* as the value of real estate is clearly affected adversely.
> Thérèse M. Brault, Montreal[307]

The July 14th article that this letter refers to featured a sensational description of a neighbourhood gripped by violent crime that left residents afraid to leave their homes.[308] Even after reading of the physical and psychological insecurity that her not-quite-neighbours were living through, Brault was still able to pen a claim that even being associated with the crime of the area was "very harmful to the residents" of *Les Floralies*. This letter articulates the stakes for homeowners in controlling the crack crisis in Little Burgundy. This connection shaped the dominant perspective on criminality and points to one of the potential logics behind the increased police harassment observed during the growth of a property-owning population segment.

In addition to threatening the interests of existing property owners, criminality and the crack crisis may have also deterred further development. Although the proportion of owner-occupied units had quadrupled by the end of *Logements* in 1986, there is a sense that housing development had not reached the desired level. Planning documents from the 1980s and 90s make little mention of Little Burgundy and outline no significant plans to stimulate residential development, but the historical progression of owner-occupancy shows a trend of growth that

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[306] Johnston, "Blacks and the Police; Rookie Cops Guilty of Racism Little Burgundy Residents Say."
[307] Emphasis added. Thérèse M. Brault, "Wrong Geography," *Gazette*, August 2, 1990, sec. Letters.
[308] Peritz, "Attack on Crack; Little Burgundy Residents Work to Oust Pushers."

was notably stalled during the period of insecurity called the crack crisis.[309] Comparing the census data on owner-occupied homes with renter-occupied homes from the renewal to post-renewal period (see figure in Annex 1), we can observe a dramatic rise in owner-occupied units between 1981 and 1991. This growth levels off in the period between 1991 and 1996, with barely 30 units added, only to increase by nearly 50% between 1996 and 2006. Considering the insecurity surrounding the crack trade started to enter the media in 1989 and continued to be in the news through 1992, it seems reasonable to conclude that the crack crisis was a factor in the lack of growth, and once it was contained development resumed. Further research into the geography of policing policies would be necessary to come to conclusions about the spatial relationship between promoting residential development and managing insecurity.

I have suggested here that changes in policing in the post-renewal period may well have been shaped by the physical legacy of urban renewal of a neighbourhood with vacant land and unfulfilled development which had been its promise. Many factors contributed to the struggle to actualize the desired level of development, and as I have already shown, there were different governance efforts to overcome the obstacles that were envisioned, whether by changing the name of the neighbourhood or subsidizing land prices for private developers. The examples in this section provide clues that connect interests of development and property ownership to the changes in policing in post-renewal Little Burgundy.

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[309] Whether promoting private housing development by improving security conditions was part of the logics of governance during the post-renewal period, however, is harder to establish. In the first part of the post-renewal period, facilitating development was a priority and the reputation of the neighbourhood was important enough to warrant changing its name, but it is not clear if there were preoccupations with crime or security specifically. After the MCM was elected to City Hall in 1986, Little Burgundy was absent from plans for private housing development. *Opération 20,000 logements* program resumed in 1991 under the name *Habiter Montréal*, but very few lots in Little Burgundy were made available through this program (In the second phase in 1993 one lot was listed for 10 proposed units). Montréal : Service de l'habitation et du développement urbain, "Habiter Montréal : Phase II." In the Directive Plan for the Southwest borough of the Montreal Master Plan, certain sites were targeted for residential development, but none located in Little Burgundy. Montréal : Service de l'habitation et du développement urbain, *Plan d'urbanisme : plan directeur de l'arrondissement Sud-ouest*, 19. The directive plan did, however, include a general aim for residential development "in the areas likely to offer a quality environment." « *...dans les secteurs susceptibles d'offrir un environnement de qualité* » Montréal : Ville, "Réussir Montréal : résumé du plan d'urbanisme" (Ville de Montréal, 1992), 10. The directive plan for neighbouring Ville-Marie included further residential development in Bonaventure, on the site of the former CN rail terminus the same area of Les Floralies, which bordered Little Burgundy along Guy street. Montréal : Bureau du plan d'urbanisme, *Master Development Plan for the Ville-Marie District*, 32.

4.4 Legacy of public housing coverage and one major landlord

The final change in policing in the post-renewal period was also related to the built landscape, but was related in a different way than the one described above. In chapter three I outlined how one of the renewal legacies of the built environment was the high proportion of public housing units in the neighbourhood. This legacy eventually shaped how criminality in Little Burgundy was understood. When, in the mid-1980s, the legal structures used to create a desirable mix of tenants in public housing were removed, the sociodemographic profile of the housing's residents shifted to become more homogenously low-income – a problematically high 'concentration of poverty' in public housing and (since public housing accounted for so much of the neighbourhood's housing in general) in the neighbourhood. As the crack crisis escalated, this concentration of poverty was deemed by the public housing office to be partly responsible for the rise in criminality in the neighbourhood. The legacies of urban renewal, therefore, clearly shaped how criminality was understood.

The particular sociodemographics of public housing, however, was not the only legacy of urban renewal relevant to conceptions of criminality and policing. In this section, I explore how the same legacy of the build environment, the high proportion of public housing in Little Burgundy, created an administrative condition that became part of the management of criminality and insecurity in the neighbourhood. This administrative condition was the predominance of a single landlord, the housing office (OMHM), which was committed to improving the conditions for its tenants and was willing to cooperate with the police. The housing office cooperated with police and used the limited tools at its disposal in the fight against the drug trade, including using evictions and a moratorium on new renters, to do what police arrests could not. These mechanisms, because the OMHM was such a significant landlord in the neighbourhood, became important and consequential policing practices.

Over the course of the 1980s, the OMHM's activities changed in various ways and for various reasons. One important change was the extension of its mandate beyond that of simply managing public housing properties to one that involved supporting the quality of life and personal development of its tenants.[310] Consistent with this mandate, the OMHM became more involved in community development, neighbourhood activities, and connecting tenants with

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[310] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat"; Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal, *Mieux loger les Montréalais*.

resources such as accompaniment programs for people with mental health issues.[311] The OMHM was a partner in programs that encouraged active participation of citizens, such Tandem, as mentioned above, the initial experiment with of *Villes et villages en santé* in Mercier-Est, as noted in chapter two, and encouraging the creation of tenant associations.[312]

Ensuring that public housing was a safe place to live was also part of the OMHM's mandate. In service of this mandate, the housing office cooperated with the Coalition to re-establish a sense of security. It also cooperated with the police, though the details of this cooperation are not entirely clear. The OMHM and the Station 24 police both worked in partnership with the Coalition, but the records available do not explain where these collaborations originated or what their specific motivations were. It is also unclear whether the OMHM's cooperation with police and efforts to manage criminality was a new development, or a practice it had taken on previously. As I explain in this section, the OMHM certainly helped the police fulfill their duties, such as providing keys without asking for a warrant, but also used its own mechanisms. One practice, the eviction of tenants and keeping the dwellings empty, is mentioned briefly in many accounts of how the crack crisis was overcome. These practices– forms of policing, broadly conceived– require close attention.

Keys and warrants

Whether it was the first time the public housing office had collaborated with police or not, their cooperation was made uncomfortably public in January 1992, when the CBC exposé *Black & Blue* showed the controversial officer Palacios rifling through a ring of keys to unlock an apartment in a Little Burgundy public housing complex.[313] Further investigation revealed the public housing office had given keys, including master keys, to police officers on 45 occasions for the purpose of raids on the crack trade. Questioned about the legality of this exchange, the OMHM director of tenant relations replied they never asked for warrants from the police before handing over keys because they had "a relationship of trust with police and we always assumed

[311] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat."
[312] "À Thomas Chapais, la santé, ça compte!"; "Pourquoi Des Associations de Locataires?," *Le Nid: Bulletin de l'OMHM*, December 1991; Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat."
[313] Todd, "Boss of Burgundy."

they were following proper procedures."[314] The police insisted that no warrants were required because the apartments they raided were not occupied by tenants, but were only vacant units that the police used for surveillance purposes and were also sometimes used by people who sold drugs.[315] Although there was no evidence the keys had been misused, some observers were concerned that police would still have the keys after new tenants moved in.[316] Following the CBC exposé, the OMHM resolved to require search warrants before lending keys to police in the future.[317]

This form of collaboration between the police and the OMHM parallels the expanded role of the community in policing activities. The change seems to have come from both ends of the relationship: the public housing office saw its mandate expand to include issues related to security (providing a motivation to collaborate more closely with the police) and the police had begun to place more importance on community involvement in crime prevention and repression (providing a motivation to work with the OMHM). The key sharing episode, revealed after two years of this cooperation, demonstrates that even public administrators such as the employees of the public housing office were not overly concerned with the strictures of the law– as these strictures applied to the police. The legal mechanisms to protect against abuses of police power, such as requiring search warrants, were not raised by the housing office until it entered public scrutiny. The willingness of the housing office to comply with police requests facilitated police action in the neighbourhood. And, because the OMHM was such a significant landlord, this cooperation extended to a large portion of the rental properties in Little Burgundy.

Evictions and intentional vacancies

It is not clear where the plan to massively evict tenants originated, but it is clear from descriptions of this period that this was an explicit strategy to manage the insecurity surrounding the drug trade in Little Burgundy.[318] An action plan developed by tenants of the neighbourhood

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[314] The director of tenant relations was Robert Mackrous. Aaron Derfel and Michelle Lalonde, "Police to Probe Drug Investigator's Conduct; News Reports Raise Questions about Methods Used in Little Burgundy," *Gazette*, January 24, 1992.
[315] Ibid.
[316] "City Urged to Change Locks on Housing-Agency Apartments," *Gazette*, January 28, 1992.
[317] Derfel and Lalonde, "Police to Probe Drug Investigator's Conduct; News Reports Raise Questions about Methods Used in Little Burgundy."
[318] Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin"; Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat"; Legault, *La ville qu'on a bâtie*.

with the housing office's social development and community service and submitted to the Little Burgundy Coalition included a call for a "more efficient eviction process for drug dealers."[319] This suggests an eviction process was already being used to deal with criminality before the action plan was drafted (albeit one of questionable efficiency). The same action plan also called for a moratorium on renting. Here, too, it is unclear where the idea originated, but Norman Daoust, director of the OMHM, confirmed that the institution had adopted such a strategy in a written response to criticisms about withholding these units from the lengthy waiting list of applicants. The housing office had, Daoust wrote, "deliberately kept the dwellings vacant in Little Burgundy in order to be able to take care of a problem of trafficking narcotics, particularly in Îlots Saint-Martin."[320] The housing office used the combination of evicting unwanted tenants and preventing new tenants from arriving by keeping units vacant to displace tenants it believed were contributing to the criminality and insecurity around its properties.

How many households were evicted by the OMHM to address the crack crisis is impossible to verify with the surviving data, but the numbers cited by the secondary sources give an idea of the range. Mackrous says around 60 households were evicted during this period, of which those most active in the drug trade were imprisoned, and that the OMHM held a total of 300 units vacant in Little Burgundy.[321] Reed refers to 70 vacant units at Îlots Saint-Martin following the evictions, though some of these may simply have been vacated by tenants trying to escape the crime environment.[322] According to Guy Legault, 30 units at Saint-Martin had to be "evacuated" during the efforts to curtail the drug trade, although he does not use the term eviction.[323] Germain *et al.* also report that thirty traffickers were evicted and that due to the moratorium on renting 20% of units at Îlots Saint-Martin were still vacant in 1994.[324]

The OHMH could not simply evict tenants on a whim. Beginning in 1978, public housing tenants have had recourse under the *Régie du logement*, the provincial tribunal that adjudicates

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[319] Point 11 "Processus d'éviction plus efficace des *dealers* de drogue." Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat," 140.

[320] « *Il est vrai que l'Office a maintenu délibérément des logements vacants dans la Petite Bourgogne afin de pouvoir régler un problème de trafic de stupéfiants, particulièrement dans les Îlots Saint-Martin.* » Daoust, "Letter from Norman Daoust to Robert Gagnon."

[321] Mackrous, "Le développement social à partir de l'habitat," 141.

[322] Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin," 47.

[323] Legault, *La ville qu'on a bâtie*, 164–65.

[324] Germain, Marchand, and Mukakayumba, "La Petite-Bourgogne," 180.

cases between landlords and rental tenants.[325] Cases with the Régie fall under two main types: rent adjustment and all other civil cases. This second category includes a range of cases, including non-payment of rent, not upholding one's obligations as a landlord or tenant, or transgressing the lease terms. In order to evict tenants at Îlots Saint-Martin or elsewhere, the housing office was required to present a case to the Régie.

I investigated two types of empirical material from the Régie to gain insight into the evictions that the OMHM undertook to manage the crack crisis in this period. The first, a register (*rôle*) of the cases, preserved basic information, such as the date of the hearing and the names and addresses of the parties involved. From this data I hoped to determine the scale at which this strategy was used. The second source was case decisions, which describe the proceedings of the hearings and their outcomes. The case decisions provide a sense of the arguments presented to justify the eviction request. Unfortunately, the data that has survived of these cases is partial and is not able to provide a comprehensive view of the cases brought to the Régie by the OMHM in Little Burgundy. I located only four case decisions of OMHM eviction requests from Little Burgundy that survived from this period.

I obtained the data from the register for all cases the OMHM brought to the Régie in the Southwest (office 34) between 1984 and 1995. In this register, however, the nature of the case is limited to the general category it falls under (i.e., rent adjustment or all other civil cases) and the article of the Civil Code invoked. While the latter may seem to provide clarification about the landlord's motive for bringing the case in broad terms, when comparing the register with the surviving decisions we see that the clauses of the law cited in the decision are not always reflected in the corresponding section of the register. This data therefore does not include enough information to conclude how many cases were taken to the Régie for more specific reasons, such as non-payment of rent, and I could not make any conclusions about the extent to which the OMHM used the eviction-moratorium strategy. Based on the numbers of the broad category

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[325] Thérèse Stanhope, "Les luttes de locataires en HLM," *Revue internationale d'action communautaire / International review of community development* 4, no. 44 (1980): 101–4, doi:10.7202/1035046ar. Prior to 1980 it was known as the Régie des loyers.

"other civil cases," at least, the data does not suggest a significant variation in cases to the Régie in the Southwest or in Little Burgundy over the period covered.[326]

The decision file is the best source for a glimpse into the logics and motives of the cases brought to the Régie, providing a detailed account of the proceedings. Though decisions from 2009 onward are publicly available online, and from the Régie itself beginning in 1999, for my research period (1979–1995) records of the decisions survive only in limited forms.[327] The original decision files from 1981 and 1993 were deposited to the *Bibliothèque et Archives national du Québec* (BAnQ) in 2010; of these a 3% sample were archived and the rest were destroyed, in accordance with the law.[328] Consulting the files for the Régie's Southwest office I found very few cases involving the OMHM and all of these related to non-payment of rent.

Another source of full Régie decisions is the jurisprudence reporters *Jurisprudence Logement* (JL), published by the Régie itself, and *Jurisprudence OHM* (later *Jurisprudence OH*), published by an organization representing the municipal housing offices of Quebec. These published cases related to rental decisions that were selected for their value as precedents in the interpretation of the law. Among these, one case referred to evictions from public housing related to drugs (OMHM v. Ruben Reid), which partially cited two other precedents (OMHM v. Alleyne and OMHM v. Ubald Chatelain) in its text.[329] Both Reid, a case in Little Burgundy, and Chatelain, located elsewhere in the Southwest, had appealed their rulings to the Cour du Québec, and because these had not yet been part of an archival deposit, I was able to access the case files in their entirety. These files contained the texts of related decisions used as jurisprudence by the attorneys in the appeals, including three from Little Burgundy: OMHM v. Alleyne, OMHM v. McGuire, and OMHM v. Dixon.[330] These Cour du Québec files thus provided the most abundant source for the text of decisions and insight into the OMHM's eviction strategy.

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[326] The annual number of cases in Little Burgundy hovered around 260 from 1989 – 1991, dropping to 200 in 1992. These figures are actually lower than the years 1985-1988, which were all above 300 cases with the exception of 1987, the year of the review and public consultation on the OMHM, with only 207 cases.

[327] See the websites soquij.qc.ca or canlii.org

[328] M.D. v. Régie du logement, 2013 QCCAI 343 SOQUIJ (Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec 2013); Evelyn Kolish, "Guide des archives judiciaires" (Archives national du Québec, December 2000).

[329] OMHM v. Ruben Reid (1991), JL 91-64 4–11, R.L. Montréal sud-ouest, no. 34-910516-013G, appealed C.Q Montréal 500-02-037426-918 31-oct-1991, decided 18-feb-1992. OMHM v. Ubald Chatelain (1991), C.Q. Montréal, no. 500-02-021483-909, 11-mar-1991.

[330] OMHM c. Alleyne (1990), R.L. Montréal sud-ouest, no. 34-900504-066; OMHM c. McGuire (1990), R.L. Montréal sud-ouest, no. 34-900713-024-G ; OMHM c. Dixon (1990), R.L. Montréal sud-ouest, no. 34-901219-008-G.

Studying these four decisions (Alleyne, McGuire, Dixon, and Reid) with an aim to understand the outlines of how the evictions were rationalized, certain themes emerge. I will discuss the four cases here, in turn. Alleyne was a tenant at Îlots Saint-Martin. The hearing was held July 30, 1990, after being filed May 4th the same year. The OMHM requested her eviction on the basis of three points: that the tenant was using the dwelling for non-residential purposes; that the tenant allowed unknown occupants in the building; and that she infringed on the right of peaceful enjoyment of other tenants. The fact that Alleyne had allowed people to come and go from the premise who were "involved with trafficking, presumably of drugs" led the OMHM to conclude that the premises was being used for non-residential purposes.[331] Alleyne admitted to allowing people into the building but claimed ignorance as to their activities. The tribunal accepted the testimony of Constable Lessard of the narcotics unit of the Montreal police that the apartment was used for drug trafficking. In a statement that would be cited as a precedent in one of the other surviving decision, the Alleyne decision noted that the officer's testimony was sufficient evidence as in civil law it was not necessary to prove the accusations beyond reasonable doubt, but only with a "sufficient probability."[332] The use of the apartment for drug trafficking was deemed to have caused the OMHM appreciable harm, and Me Joly ruled in favour of the request to dissolve the lease and evict the tenant.

McGuire was a tenant of an apartment tower managed by the OMHM that faced Îlots Saint-Martin on des Seigneurs street. The hearing was held on October 30, 1990, after the request to the Régie filed on July 13, 1990. The termination of the lease was requested on the basis that the tenant and people he had admitted to the building not only disrupted other tenants' rights to peaceful enjoyment, but specifically that their coming and going "terrorised" the other tenants. It was also stated that the apartment was being used for trafficking drugs. Constable Lessard testified that crack had been seized at the apartment during a search. This was deemed to represent appreciable harm for the OMHM and justified eviction.[333] Additionally, McGuire had received a warning from the Régie in a case earlier that year which had ruled that he must respect his obligation as a tenant by not disrupting the right to quiet enjoyment of the other tenants or the

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[331] *« La locataire permet l'accès au logement à d'autres personnes qui s'adonnent à un trafic quelconque, présumément de drogues… »* OMHM v. Alleyne.

[332] *« En matières civiles, la preuve suffisante n'établira pas les fautes reprochées au-déla du doute raisonnable, il suffit que les faites mis en preuve par le locateur aient un caractère de probabilité suffisant. »* OMHM v. Alleyne (1990).

[333] *préjudice sérieux*

lease would be terminated. In light of the previous case, Me Harvey's ruling allowed only 10 days for McGuire to vacate the dwelling.

The request to evict Dixon from her Îlots Saint-Martin apartment was placed on December 19, 1990, and the audience was held in February 1991. According to the register, this was her second case before the Régie in less than six months, although there was no mention of this previous case in the decision. The decision begins by stating that the tenant allowed many people access to the building, and that a police search found drugs in the dwelling. Although the defendant did not deny these allegations, her lawyer argued for the case to be dropped as there had been no complaints from the other tenants and thus no appreciable harm. The régisseure, Me Dupont, was willing to entertain this argument, and had in fact ruled against the eviction of Chatelain, a public housing tenant in Verdun, in 1990 due to a similar argument.[334] This time, however, she expressed concerns about the nature of the dwelling, which had not been raised in the other cases. She argued that it would be against good moral judgement to allow publicly subsidized housing to serve as a location for drug trafficking. The case was therefore decided in favour of the OMHM's request to evict.

Reid was the case that was published in the reporter *JL* for its value as jurisprudence, listed under the key terms *changement de destination, traffic du drogue,* and *jouissance paisable*. Reid lived in Little Burgundy in an OMHM public housing unit not far from Îlots Saint-Martin. The OMHM applied for the termination of the lease and the eviction of the tenants based on the claim that the use of the dwelling had been changed and it disrupted the peaceful enjoyment of other tenants. The Régie ruled in favour of the OMHM on October 23, 1991 on the request made in May the same year. Reid appealed to the Cour du Québec but the Régie's decision was upheld (February 1992). Reid's case cited both the Alleyne and Chatelain decisions and also reflected aspects of the other cases described above. In his defence, Reid's main arguments were that he should not be held responsible for the activities of his adult sons, who did not live in the residence, and that the evidence provided did not definitively prove that Reid's residence the location used for drug trade.[335] The first argument was discounted on the grounds that in tenant-landlord leases what mattered was that the activity was taking place in the dwelling in question,

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[334] OMHM v. Ubald Chatelain.

[335] Two of Reids sons had been arrested in the drug raid of the apartment although it is not known if they were charged or convicted.

not who was conducting the activity. Regarding the second argument, the OMHM cited the Alleyne decision which argued that in civil cases it was only necessary to prove an accusation within reason rather than beyond doubt. This evidence was supplied through the testimony of police officers as well as police documents. Finally, just as she had in the Dixon case, régisseure Dupont raised the concern that publicly subsidized housing should not be used to support drug sales. In the appeal, the provincial court confirmed the decision to evict.

Examining these four cases, not as legal documents but as snapshots of how the OMHM attempted to manage the population in its public housing, reveals some of the advantages and limitations of the strategy that it clearly adopted in this period. One limitation is obvious: the process was long. For each case there were approximately three months from the time it was requested to the audience before the Régie. In instances where a first case resulted in a warning that was followed up by a second case, such as with McGuire, or an eviction decision followed by an appeal, such as with Reid, the time from the initial request to the final decision was about ten months. The point in the tenants' action plan that called for a more efficient method of evicting drug dealers mentioned above seems to reflect a frustration with this aspect of the process. However, the advantages were perhaps worth the wait for the housing office, and perhaps for the police as well.

The onus of proof in civil cases, as the decisions pointed out, was less stringent than in criminal cases. The OMHM needed only to establish reasonable evidence that the terms of the lease (i.e. changing the use of the residence) or the obligations of the tenant (i.e. infringing on the peaceful enjoyment of neighbours) had been transgressed for their requests for eviction to be sustained. The burden of proof had been a limiting factor in pursuing the individuals implicated in the drug trade with criminal charges. In July 1990, shortly after the Coalition had begun drafting its plan of action, the manager of Îlots Saint-Martin was quoted describing the limitations in managing the people and activities around the properties: "The problem is we don't have the means to kick out the drug sellers. The simple fact that they sell crack does not give the right to get rid of them: you have to prove their actions."[336] Through the civil law tribunal of the

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[336] « *Le problème est qu'on est pas à mesure de foutre des vendeurs de drogue à la porte. Le simple fait qu'ils vendent du crack ne donne pas le droit de les chasser : il faut prouver leurs agissements* », Colpron, "Le crack à la Petite Bourgogne."

Régie du logement, the actions needed only to be proved to the point of being "sufficiently probable."

The evidence required to meet this standard was readily supplied by the police. The Reid case provides a clear example of this. Five police officers testified at the appeal hearing to evict this tenant. Police documents were also presented as evidence, such as a request for a search warrant which outlined the observations of police and informants with dates, times, and addresses.[337] The credibility of the police played an important role in establishing this proof. The appeal stated that "the testimony of the police officers is infinitely more credible in the eyes of the tribunal than that of the other party."[338] The "other party" in this case was the witness who had testified on behalf of Reid that they had not noticed anything out of the ordinary around the residence. The credibility of police were important to the success of these cases.

Even in cases where police had enough evidence to make an arrest, there may have other advantages to pursuing an eviction from public housing. The spatial consequences of evictions were somewhat different than in a criminal case. Like incarceration, eviction displaces certain unwanted bodies from a particular location, the housing unit. However, eviction does not only affect the individuals accused or convicted of a crime, but also extends to all others residents of that dwelling. Furthermore, while a prison sentence has a specified term, eviction from a dwelling could be effectively permanent. For example, if Reid's sons, who were arrested for drug activities, had been convicted and sentenced to prison, after being released they might have feasibly returned to their father's apartment. Instead, Reid's eviction would displace the entire household, not only those accused of a crime, from that particular dwelling.[339] Once evicted from public housing, furthermore, the person was no longer eligible to apply for public housing, nor be part of a household applying for public housing, for five years.[340] Considering the small

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[337] « *Dénonciation en vue d'obtenir un mandat de perquisition* » by Daniel Morin of the narcotics unit, in OMHM v Reid C.Q. Montréal 500-02-037426-918 18-feb-1992, evidence I-2.
[338] *« Le témoignage des policiers est infiniment plus crédible aux yeux du tribunal que celui de l'autre partie… »* OMHM v Reid C.Q. Montréal 500-02-037426-918 18-feb-1992 p. 3.
[339] I use the conditional "would" here because Reid was listed in the Lovell's directory at the address of his eviction until 1993, although the provincial court confirmed his eviction in February 1992. It is not until 1994 that his name disappears from the Lovell's directory at this address. There is evidence that the OMHM did not enforce the eviction it had won through the Régie in another case related to drugs in Little Burgundy as well, as reported in Hétu, "Palacios nie d'avoir brutalisé Kathleen Cork." It is unclear, however, if not evicting tenants despite having received the right to do so from the Régie was strategic on the part of the OMHM. It may have been related to the decision not to evict households with children, as described below.
[340] S-8, r. 1 - Règlement sur l'attribution des logements à loyer modique, Article 16.

proportion of private rental stock in Little Burgundy compared with public housing, they may have found it difficult stay in the neighbourhood at all. In this sense, eviction had the potential to geographically disrupt kin and neighbour networks in a way that mirrors the displacement of urban renewal.

The coverage of public housing in Little Burgundy seems to have helped the eviction strategy succeed in Little Burgundy while it had failed elsewhere. Evictions had been used in attempts to control the crack trade in other neighbourhoods, but with less success. In Cartierville, a neighbourhood in the north which had experienced its own 'crack crisis' just before the problem had escalated in Little Burgundy, evictions were used by private landlords but failed to improve the security in the area.[341] Some landlords evicted entire apartment complexes, but the unwanted tenants they aimed to displace still remained in the neighbourhood. The attempt in Cartierville highlights how having one major landlord to apply the strategy and exclude evicted tenants from the majority of the housing stock would facilitate the displacement of the unwanted residents compared with piecemeal implementation by a variety of landlords.

It is worth noting here that 'households' in Îlots Saint-Martin mainly referred to families, some of them large ones. Reid's household, for example, listed seven family members on the lease.[342] When the urban renewal project was proposed, the study of housing needs of the neighbourhood's population identified a lack of units for large families. At Îlots Saint-Martin, 42% of the 313 units had between 3 and 5 closed bedrooms.[343] Guy Legault recounted that architect and consultant Hans Blumenfeld had warned that this proportion of large units would lead to a "strong concentration of adolescents," rather than poverty, which would present difficulties for the area.[344] The practice of evicting families seems to run counter to a policy proposed by the assembly of administrators of the OMHM in 1987. Recorded in the minutes is a decision to follow through with the evictions of certain tenants whose cases before the Régie had been approved.[345] Of the nine tenants presented at the meeting, only three were to be evicted.

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[341] Gauthier, Gilles. "Un quartier où la fortune côtoie la misère... et le crack." La Presse. October 30, 1990.
[342] The lease is among the evidence on file in OMHM v. Reid, Q.C. Montréal 500-02-037426-918 18-feb-1992.
[343] Only nine units had five bedrooms but 47 had four bedrooms. Reed, "Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin," 41.
[344] « …une trop fort concentration d'adolescents. » Legault, La ville qu'on a bâtie, 163.
[345] « … en raison du fait qu'il s'agit de ménages avec enfants… » Assemblée des administrateurs pour l'Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal. "Procès-verbaux, 2838 Cas d'éviction," July 16, 1987. P37-D2. Archives de la Ville de Montréal.

The other six were not evicted "due to the fact that they were households with children."[346] The assembly proposed that a policy of not evicting families with children be presented to the executive committee of the City. However, I could not find evidence that this policy was ever voted on or implemented.

Like providing keys to empty apartments, the strategy of eviction and moratorium on renting involved the public housing office cooperating with the police and contributing to the management of security in Little Burgundy. In this case, however, the OMHM provided access to a civil court, which provided advantages in terms of the burden of proof. Police testimony was seen as more credible than that of tenants and they could easily provide sufficient evidence through the information gathered in the course of their duties. The end result displaced tenants from public housing, which effectively removed them from the neighbourhood in the case of Little Burgundy due to the high proportion of public housing created in renewal. This coverage of public housing also meant that through the collaboration of the police and the housing office, this strategy could be used throughout the neighbourhood in cases where tenants were considered problematic but there was not sufficient evidence for criminal charges. Like other changes outlined in this chapter, this approach extended policing into the community, but using legal mechanisms that were not available to community groups or the police.

4.5 Conclusions

This chapter has explored important changes in policing in Little Burgundy's post-renewal urban governance. During this period, increasing police violence and harassment was the target of mobilizing and protest from the Black community. This period also saw the emergence of the idea that local communities could take on an expanded role in policing. The examples from Little Burgundy have shown that some programs concerned with insecurity, such as Tandem and ACES, relied on neighbourhood action, but in both cases they also promoted cooperation with the police as well as encouraging citizens and communities to take responsibility for local security.

Not all the changes related to policing in the post-renewal period were related to legacies of urban renewal. The rise in police violence and harassment, in particular, does not seem to have been connected to renewal or its outcomes. Although the programs developed in this period

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[346] Ibid.

which engaged community in the management of security and collaboration with police, Tandem and ACES, were applied to Little Burgundy, both originated outside the neighbourhood. The community development aspects of these programs usefully addressed problems of criminality and insecurity attributed to the social fabric in Little Burgundy that had been left weakened by renewal. The failure of renewal to spur private residential construction put pressure on the City to create conditions that would bring the desired levels of development in the post-renewal period. In addition to other means of encouraging development, I have suggested that managing security and criminality was one of the logics that informed urban governance in this area, although the evidence to support this conjecture is not conclusive. Finally, the high proportion of public housing in the neighbourhood help facilitate management of insecurity around the crack crisis by positioning the housing office as the largest single landlord, whose cooperation with police extended over much of Little Burgundy. The willingness of the housing office to collaborate with police by using the administrative resources and legal mechanisms available to it seems to have been a method to displace those tenants deemed problematic from public housing where traditional police actions were less effective.

Examining the changes to policing in Little Burgundy in relation to the conditions of renewal helps view at urban governance in new light. Aside from Hinton and Goetz, few scholars have commented on the role of police in the post-renewal governance literature, and this chapter enriches this area. First, it suggests that, as police were themselves a source of insecurity, efforts to address police violence should be included in the category of urban governance alongside the other initiatives to change the conditions of the neighbourhood. Second, it shows that the attempts to extend policing into communities involved, at least in the instances examined here, efforts to support community development. This aligned with the Coalition's understanding that the insecurity of the neighbourhood was at least in part due to the destruction of its social fabric through renewal, and it also shared logics of community participation that emerged in response to renewal. Third, this chapter traces interactions between policing and other forms of governance, illustrated in the collaboration between police and the public housing office, which bear a close parallel to the relationship between municipal inspectors and police that Goetz reported. This new relationship between the police and the housing office allowed both agencies access different mechanisms and resources which facilitated their efforts to change the security conditions of the neighbourhood. My research shows it was not just this relationship that made

the eviction-moratorium strategy effective, but also the spatial distribution of public housing left by renewal. Confirming Goetz's assertion that policing filled the urban governance void left by the lack of urban policy, however, would require further research to situate these findings within broader directives and policies, which was beyond the scope of this project.

Mobilization against police violence in post-renewal Little Burgundy was clearly an effort to change the conditions in the neighbourhood, although this is not generally viewed as a form of urban governance. In practice, this organising to address police violence and harassment paralleled the opposition of citizen committees to urban renewal in the 1960s. Contesting police violence undermined the legitimacy of contemporary police practice, just as the actions of citizen committees had for top-down planning. The new logics of community participation that emerged in the renewal period, as I have shown, could serve to support community interests or to recover lost legitimacy of the state– and this logic appears to have been transferred to apply to the police as well. Program ACES demonstrated both tendencies; the developers of the program may have been motivated incorporate community policing to more effectively address the problems identified by communities, but in Little Burgundy ACES was deployed instead as a means recover the legitimacy police had lost through the contestation of police violence. The similarities between the contestation of policing and urban renewal seem to suggest that in addition to policing, the efforts to address police violence also deserve further study as a form of urban governance.

5. Conclusion

This thesis set out to explore how the physical, social and ideological legacies of urban renewal shaped the forms of governance that emerged in post-renewal neighbourhoods and the conditions they sought to address. By examining the connections between these two periods in Little Burgundy, I have shown how urban renewal continued to influence the logics of neighbourhood development even after renewal itself had been discontinued. This research project builds upon the post-renewal urban governance literature and contributes to the four themes that organised my investigation of these questions by confirming some observations, filling gaps in the existing literature, and providing counterexamples to some common themes.

Legitimacy and community participation in urban governance

One of the important consequences of renewal for urban governance in the period to follow was that state- and expert-led action became unviable after renewal was discredited, as authors such as Klemek have demonstrated. As in many cities where renewal took place, citizens in Little Burgundy contested the top-down plans that were imposed on them. I show that citizen response to renewal plans not only called into question the legitimacy of expert plans, but also positioned citizens as experts through their counterproposals. This changed the legitimacy of actors involved in planning as well as the process itself. Top-down planning was contested in favour of an ideal in which plans were developed by the residents. These findings generally support what has been reported in the literature in terms of delegitimizing state-led plans and constricting their ability to act. What my research adds is that the citizen contestation and counterproposals *contributed* to the logics that would emerge, rather than simply delegitimizing the existing models. While Klemek does discuss community-based planning in the renewal period, he says less about their influence on the logics of governance that would carry into the post-renewal period.

In Montreal, the beginnings of community participation in urban governance can be traced, at least in part, to the way these citizen committees responded to the urban renewal plans for Little Burgundy. The ideas about community-based planning, brought to the forefront in response to the Little Burgundy renewal plans, became part of the political agenda in the period to follow. The Montreal social movement literature holds this episode as an important moment in

the history of community organising, but these scholars have less to say about the implications of these citizen committee actions for urban renewal and post-renewal urban governance. When local community organizations united as the Little Burgundy Coalition to develop plans to transform the conditions of their neighbourhood in 1989, the idea that community members were best positioned to evaluate the conditions of their living environment and develop solutions was put into practice, and pushed further by communities taking the lead in urban governance initiatives. This idea of community participation had also gained traction within the municipal administration, reflected in the *Vivre Montréal en santé* program launched in 1991. My research shows that while logics of community participation that emerged in the renewal period informed both these roundtables, the role of state agencies differed in each. In the Coalition, state agencies were engaged through partnerships to achieve plans developed by the community, while the VMS committee was meant to encourage community participation, but was more closely aligned to state objectives. Regardless of the form it took, in both approaches community participation functioned to legitimize the use of state capacity.

Sociodemographic governance

Achieving a desired sociodemographic balance was part of various initiatives in post-renewal Little Burgundy, but in terms of concentrated poverty and social mix my findings provide counterexamples to the way these ideas are presented in much of the literature. Some initiatives that appeared to respond to concentrated poverty were not directly motivated by these concerns. The City's *Logements* programs responded to and were shaped by conditions left by renewal (as vacant lots, stalled development and property accumulated in the municipal land bank), but these attempts to increase the home-owning population in the neighbourhood were not in response to a problematic low-income population as much as to a lack of tax revenue. Where concentrated poverty did figure in the initiatives studied here, they did so in ways that departed from the usual observations in the literature. Not all understandings of concentrated poverty were uniformly negative, for example, as the responses of the local charities to the growing middle-class population demonstrates. These groups expressed benefits of keeping the neighbourhood predominantly low-income, which contrasts with the negative views reported in the majority of the literature, with the exception of work by Martine August.

In Little Burgundy, concerns about concentrated poverty had already appeared in the renewal period, as the citizen committee's rent scale clearly illustrated, much earlier than most of the literature which claims it emerged in the post-renewal period. This concern shaped the legal and administrative mechanisms that the public housing office would inherit in the post-renewal period, and concerns about concentrated poverty would appear again after these mechanisms were removed. Viewing the growing insecurity surrounding the crack trade as a problem of the high concentration of public housing (a legacy of renewal) which was, in turn, populated by the poorest members of society, the housing office responded with efforts to deconcentrate poverty. One approach aimed to reduce the number of public housing units. The failed attempt to transfer public housing units into other property models used a logic similar to the redevelopment projects of HOPE VI, although through different means: converting public housing to cooperative housing would increase the housing options for higher-income households, while decreasing the density of public housing that had been deemed problematic without the demolition and redevelopment. The failure of this tenure-change initiative supports the critiques of HOPE VI which contend that correcting concentrated poverty was only a premise for initiating new rounds of redevelopment.

The OMHM's other approach aimed to deconcentrate poverty by reducing the number of tenants in public housing. The eviction and rental moratorium strategy displaced tenants, with the cooperation of police who served as witnesses, not only from the address covered by the lease but from all public housing. The success of this approach seems to have been aided by the coverage of public housing in the neighbourhood that was viewed as the source of the problem. This strategy also brought the housing office into new relationship with the police in an attempt to overcome the limitations of the mechanisms at the disposal of both actors.

Policing and urban governance

The role of policing in urban governance is the least developed area of the literature, and is where my research makes its most significant contribution. It was also within this theme that the relationship between renewal legacies and post-renewal governance was the most difficult to establish. I showed that in terms of managing criminality and insecurity, members of the Coalition saw police both as partners in overcoming the insecurity conditions in the neighbourhood and as a source of insecurity. Although neither police violence nor efforts to

counter it began in the post-renewal period, the community mobilization in response to police violence and harassment attempted to change the conditions of the neighbourhood, which should be recognised as a form of governance. The post-renewal period also saw a change in policing that involved a growing role of communities, illustrated here through the examples of Tandem and ACES. Neither of these programs originated in Little Burgundy, but they were deployed in the neighbourhood and shared the Coalition's analysis that weakened social fabric created conditions that made crime and insecurity difficult to counter. As with the engagement of communities into policing, other state agencies also took on new roles in the management of security and in police work. The collaboration between the public housing office and the police demonstrates that new relationships developed in the efforts to change the conditions of the neighbourhood. The episode of sharing keys without search warrants suggests that the shared interest of managing security seems to have been greater than an interest in tenants' rights.

Remarks

Not all the changes described in this study were exclusively shaped by renewal – in some cases, renewal seems to have little influence, if at all. Nonetheless, approaching the subject of urban governance by tracing connections with renewal has made visible logics of action in the post-renewal period which are significant regardless of renewal's influence. This is perhaps best illustrated by the crack crisis and the initial question that motivated this study: How was the crack crisis related to urban renewal, as so many accounts of this episode had suggested? The crack crisis itself was not a legacy of renewal, but it was shaped by conditions created by the renewal program. Local actors attributed the problems of the crack crisis to two of these conditions – the weakened social fabric and the density of public housing – although I have suggested that others factors also contributed.

The efforts to address the insecurity attributed to the crack crisis were also shaped by the legacies of renewal. The community-led action plans of the Coalition represent a logic of neighbourhood action that emerged, as noted, in the renewal period. The housing office, for its part, was constrained by the loss of mechanisms it had inherited from renewal to manage the public housing population, but it was able to more effectively deploy its remaining tools due to the coverage of its properties in the neighbourhood. Examining responses to the crack crisis also demanded that certain activities which are not commonly viewed as urban governance be

included in the analysis, although their connection to renewal was less clear. This was the case for policing, a theme which is neglected in the literature, as well as the responses to police violence and harassment, which did not figure in the urban governance literature at all. Attention to the connections between renewal and policing as urban governance in the post-renewal period put into relief the similarities between the citizen committees' opposition to renewal and the Black community organising against police violence and harassment, which undermined the legitimacy of the means of governance they opposed. It also reveals how community participation was one means of regaining legitimacy in both cases.

This thesis has shown that urban renewal continued to shape the development of neighbourhoods long after it had ended. The conditions it created in the social environment through displacement, the physical environment, through demolition and reconstruction and the ideological landscape, through the contest of legitimacy between ideas, shaped the problems that subsequent forms of governance attempted to address in these neighbourhoods as well as shaping forms of governance themselves. Through these conditions, urban renewal continued to influence the ways community participation, sociodemographic management, and policing were part of urban governance in Little Burgundy even in the post-renewal period. While many studies focus on urban renewal by tracing its rise and its fall, this study suggests there is much to be learned about the lasting influence of renewal by examining it from the perspective of the attempts to deal with its legacies.

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
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Annex 1: Occupied dwellings by tenure, Little Burgundy, 1961 – 2006

Urban Renewal
1965 - 1978

Crack crisis
1989 ~ 1993

Year	OCCUPIED DWELLINGS	OWNED	RENTED
1961	4901	563	4338
1971	2510	150	2370
1981	2060	105	1965
1986	2845	555	2285
1991	3670	1045	2625
1996	4060	1075	2985
2001	4085	1305	2780
2006	4460	1505	2950

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Source: Statistics Canada

Annex 2: Timeline

Renewal period

1965   Preliminary study for the Little Burgundy urban renewal program published.
Réveil des citoyens de Sainte-Cunégonde becomes *Réveil… de la Petite-Bourgogne.*
Expropriations for the East-West Expressway (later Ville Marie Express) begins.

1966   General report on the Little Burgundy urban renewal program approved.

1967   SMBC protests terms of expropriation at City Hall.

1968   Îlots Saint-Martin housing project inaugurated.
SMBC rent scale proposed.

1969   Residents protest at Trudeau's visit to Îlots Saint-Martin.
OMHM created.

1972   East-West Expressway project approved.

1974   Lachine canal designated a National Historic Park.

1978   Little Burgundy urban renewal program ends.

Post-renewal period:

1979   *Opération 10,000 logements* launched.

1982   Public housing rent ceiling removed.
Opération 10,000 logements extended to *20,000*.
Operation Tandem launched in 8 neighbourhoods.

1987   MCM majority elected.
Operation Tandem mandate expanded as Tandem Montreal.

1989   Little Burgundy Coalition formed in response to growing insecurity around crack trade.

1990   Laws governing selection of public housing tenants modified.

1991   Shootings of Marcellus François (July) and Osmond Fletcher (Nov).
Black residents file ethics complaints against Station 24 officers.
Vivre Montréal en santé launched, Little Burgundy promotion committee formed.

1993   Project ACES deployed in Little Burgundy.

1994   Little Burgundy Coalition and VMS promotion committee merge to form
Coalition de la Petite-Bourgogne, Quartier en santé.
Vision Montreal elected.