

A Critical and Cultural Examination of Canadian Mainstream News Media's Coverage of the
Umbrella Revolution

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ABSTRACT

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Shiyao Liu

This thesis examines the coverage of Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolution in the Canadian metropolitan newspapers and the political/diplomatic publications. Positioned in a ritual view of communication, this thesis intends to reveal how Canadian mainstream journalists relayed and interpreted the multi-faceted events, and whether serious Canadian journals succeeded in informing their readers in a meaningful way from a cultural studies perspective. This thesis examines the discourses around the Umbrella Revolution published in *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star*, two daily newspapers serving major Canadian cities with large ethnic Chinese populations. To a lesser extent, Canadian publications targeting diplomats and policymakers are scrutinized to ascertain whether different discourses were published in more specialized journals and public releases of information. Prominent Chinese-language and English-language newspapers in Hong Kong are utilized for "control and reference" and as cultural exemplars to compare and contrast with the Canadian print media.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis examines the coverage of Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolution in two Canadian metropolitan newspapers and selected political/diplomatic publications. Its intention is to employ a cultural studies perspective to reveal how Canadian mainstream journalists relayed and interpreted the multi-faceted nature of protests against the centralized Chinese authority, and whether serious Canadian journals succeeded in informing their readers in a meaningful way. To accomplish this objective this thesis examines the discourses around the Umbrella Revolution published in daily newspapers serving Vancouver and Toronto. To a lesser extent, Canadian publications targeting diplomats and policymakers are scrutinized to ascertain whether different discourses were published in more specialized journals and public releases of information. Prominent newspapers in Hong Kong are utilized for "control and reference" or as cultural exemplars to compare and contrast with Canadian print media.

The politics of Hong Kong (or of any place) is intricate by its nature. Constructive ambiguities over the method for selecting the Chief Executive in the Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984) and the Basic Law of Hong Kong – the overarching legal instruments that promised and codified the "one country, two systems" policy – have left Beijing some leeway for when and how to implement universal suffrage through the office of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong.¹ In 2007, ten years after Hong Kong's handover, China's legislative body, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC), announced that "the election of the fifth Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage" (The Basic Law, 2015, p. 124). On 31 August 2014, the NPCSC further decided that "the Chief Executive has to be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong," and that "(starting from the 2017 election) a broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed." The NPCSC further advised that "[t]he

¹ "The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally" (The Sino-British Joint Declaration, 1984, p. 1).

"The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures (The Basic Law, 2015, p. 15).

nominating committee shall nominate two to three candidates for the office of Chief Executive,” and that “[e]ach candidate must have the endorsement of more than half of all the members of the nominating committee” (The Basic Law, 2015, pp. 135–137).

In effect, these provisions gave Beijing control over the composition of the nominating committee and, ultimately, the Chief Executive. The prospect of the nominating committee coming under the influence of pro-Beijing members and business tycoons sparked a series of mass protests in the streets of Hong Kong in defiance of Beijing’s electoral reform plan. The protesters took serious issue with the imposition of a form of universal suffrage that critics claimed would simply permit the central authority to control election outcomes. The street protests, starting in September 2014 and ending in December of the same year, were initially dubbed the “Umbrella Revolution” on social media because protesters were seen holding umbrellas to deflect pepper spray (Guiton, 2014). The name was quickly picked up by international media and the act of carrying umbrellas developed a symbolic meaning as the “badge” of the protesters.

During those four months, the Umbrella Revolution attracted extensive international media coverage because it was the largest civic protest that China had faced since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Part of the reason for such extensive reporting has to do with the historical association that Hong Kong has with the West. This includes its status in international trade, which continues to afford the former British colony a reputation as a global city.

Hong Kong also inherited a tradition of press freedom unknown in China that resulted from the confluence of social and historical conditions and the negotiated dual-power structure in which political power was relatively balanced between British and Chinese forces (Lee, 2007). Although Hong Kong’s ranking in the Press Freedom Index had dropped – from 18th in 2002 to 61st in 2014 – this is largely attributed to an increase in either self-censorship by local journalists to conform to new socio-political realities, or to interference in the journalistic process by media owners (Lee, 2007; Maheshwari, 2014).² However, there is no current evidence to suggest that the operations of international news agencies and their correspondents in Hong Kong have been

² The first annual worldwide index of press freedom was released in 2002 by Reporters Without Borders.

meaningfully restricted or repressed. This relative freedom to report applies to the period of the Umbrella Revolution.

Democracy in Hong Kong might be an afterthought to many Canadians, but the development of the Umbrella Revolution was certainly relevant to Canadian interests. The numbers tell the tale. Speaking for the region of Hong Kong alone, the Canadian government's National Household Survey reports that 205,430 Canadians were born in Hong Kong (Statistics Canada, 2013) while an estimated 295,000 Canadian citizens currently reside in the former colony (Government of Canada, 2015). About 500,000 people of Hong Kong descent call Canada home (Statistics Canada, 2013). From the end of World War II to 1997, the year when sovereignty over Hong Kong was transferred to China, Hong Kong had been the primary source of Chinese emigration to Canada (P. Li, 2005). Accordingly, trade between Canada and Hong Kong has been of great significance. Hong Kong was the second largest destination in Asia for Canadian Foreign Direct Investment in 2012, outstripping both China and India. Conversely, Hong Kong was Canada's tenth largest export market (Government of Canada, 2015). As to prominent ethnic Chinese communities in Canada, Toronto is home to more than 40 percent of all Chinese-Canadians and Vancouver to more than 30 percent (Statistics Canada, 2013).

In general, whereas a Eurocentric vision of the world is established and dominant among Canadians, the changes in demographics and trade patterns have introduced a growing perception that Canada is a Pacific as well as an Atlantic country (Segal, 1991; Lee, Chan, Pan, & So, 2002). Moreover, the shared British colonial heritage reinforces Canada's notion of a special linkage to Hong Kong. Eric Rankin, a veteran journalist at the CBC has argued that Canadians were not only interested in Hong Kong in terms of how it would affect Canada, but also how it could affect Hong Kong or China (Lee, Chan, Pan, & So, 2002). Jonathan Manthorpe, the former Hong Kong-based Asian correspondent for Canada's now-defunct Southam News once proclaimed: "Hong Kong is a domestic story for us. I sometimes feel like I could do the daily traffic reports in Hong Kong and it would get printed in my newspapers" (as cited in Lee, Chan, Pan, & So, 2002, p. 151).

In spite of the obvious importance of Hong Kong to Canada (and *vice versa*) the Government of Canada appeared disengaged from the events as the Umbrella Revolution

unfolded on the streets of Hong Kong. Apart from sporadic and quasi-official responses such as those provided by Adam Hodge, then press secretary to Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird, not a single formal press release related to this issue can be found in the online news archives of the Government of Canada. As a matter of record, Hodge's thoughts on the Umbrella Revolution were contained in an email (Logan, 2014). Baird's only recorded comment on the events in Hong Kong was delivered via Twitter.³ It may make sense that the Canadian government had its reasons to be overly diplomatic and tactful when dealing with what many considered to be an internal Chinese matter. It also makes sense that Canada, in its geopolitical role as a "middle power," saw no advantage to its national interests in provoking an international economic superpower.

But the coverage by Canadian mainstream media, especially in the cities with sizeable ethnic Chinese populations, is less easy to justify. Big city newspapers had no problem criticizing the *Canadian* government on its position with respect to Hong Kong, characterizing Ottawa's response as "tepid" (Toronto Star, 2014a). Yet reporting "from the scene" of the Umbrella Revolution was limited and, in the analysis of the texts produced during the protests, superficial. The historic view that Canadian media in general, and mainstream newspapers in particular, have not been big players on the international news stage because of limited financial resources and perceived audience preferences (Soderlund, 2002) does not hold water in the case of the Umbrella Revolution. This is especially the case in the age of the Internet where time and distance are not impediments to the delivery of first-person accounts. Indeed, there is evidence that Canadian news media do have the ability to cover world events thoughtfully and effectively when it suits them (Kim, Su, & Hong, 2007). The events that transpired in Tiananmen Square in 1989 were widely and thoroughly covered by Canadian news organizations, yet this was not the case with the Umbrella Revolution. Why?

A cursory search of newspaper archives shows that in June of 1989, *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star* each generated more than one hundred articles about the Tiananmen Square Massacre in a single month. One article from the *Toronto Star* produced the headline: "West shares blame for Beijing tragedy" (Gwyn, 1989). It suggested that the West had not been paying

³ "Aspirations of people of #HongKong are clear. Canada supports continued freedom of speech and prosperity under the rule of law" (Baird, 2014).

attention to China: that the West had both indulged Mao's Cultural Revolution and bought into exaggerated reports on the extent of China's economic reforms in the pre-Tiananmen era. Another article from the same period (Harper, 1989) revealed that Canada was the first Western country to summon back its ambassador to China and cited then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark as saying that Canada alone was capable of getting the attention of the Chinese leaders responsible for the massacre.⁴ Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown was also praised in Harper's article, quoting a Chinese student leader in Montreal: "Canada can play a leading role in the world because they have leverage in China."

The juxtaposition of these two very different incidents from different times may not be perfectly fair because a "protest" is not a "massacre" and "Hong Kong" is not "Beijing." The dynamics of world power have changed. However, considering the experience of past coverage, the diversification of Canadian society and the bonds between Canada, Hong Kong and China today, it is not too great a stretch to expect that Canadian news media would cover the Umbrella Revolution with at least a degree of the professional enthusiasm afforded to the events in Tiananmen Square.

In general, Hong Kong media did not seem impressed by the reports circulated by their international media cousins during the Umbrella Revolution. Alex Lo, a columnist with the *South China Morning Post (SCMP)* wrote, "[It's] the kind of struggle of good vs evil that makes great headlines for the foreign media...if you ignore all the local details and nuances" (Lo, 2014a).

This thesis contends that Lo is precisely correct: it is the local details and nuances that mattered in attempting to interpret the meaning of the Umbrella Revolution for international readers. In this, Canadian media were no exception. Therefore, this thesis postulates that for a series of events geopolitically remote, culturally distant to most of the Canadian population but proximate to a sizable minority, Canadian mainstream media journalists did not grasp the embedded meanings and nuances in the Umbrella Revolution. For some reason, they were not able to relay and interpret the full significance of the events on the ground to their audiences, even though experience demonstrates that this was indeed possible. Thus, significant and influential Canadian mainstream news media failed to provide a platform to engender

⁴ Canada never formally recalled its ambassador, although it did bring its ambassador to China at the time, Earl Drake, back to Ottawa for "consultations." (VanderKlippe, 2015).

meaningful public discussions over the issues related to the Umbrella Revolution and, by doing so, abdicated responsibility for a core mission of journalism and its part in the democratic process: to offer a public sphere for facts, reasoned understanding, and rational-critical public debate so that people might legitimately assess their role in the expression of their democratic rights (Garnham, 1990; Habermas, 1991).

From the point of view of methodology, therefore, this thesis is founded on the analysis of discourses as presented in three main areas of publication. *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star*, two English-language newspapers serving the Canadian cities with the largest populations of Hong Kong/Chinese immigrants, are studied as exemplars of influential daily newspapers of record. *The Hill Times*, *Diplomat & International Canada*, and *Policy Options* are included as representatives of publications with a more diplomacy-oriented or policy-analysis bent. The English-language *South China Morning Post* and the Cantonese/Chinese language *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong) serve as locally trusted, Hong Kong-based control and reference sources in order to compare and contrast the inclusion, or lack thereof, of local details and nuances in Canadian accounts of the events of 2014.

Since both the quantity (a necessity for quality) and quality of Canadian print media's coverage are to be examined, this thesis employs a critical discourse-based comparative study supplemented by a brief content analysis informed by a theory of framing. This combined approach, which probes journalistic texts and the problematic discursive and social practices in the production of those texts, demonstrates how Canadian media covered the Umbrella Revolution, and how the coverage differed from that in Hong Kong. The critical discourse analysis (CDA) that forms the backbone of this thesis seeks to reveal that Canadian English-language print media in general, including influential mainstream English newspapers and political/diplomatic publications, underrepresented the magnitude and importance of the Umbrella Revolution, and failed to grasp the full significance of this major disruption and convey that significance to readers, despite the significant cultural and economic ties between Canada, Hong Kong, and China.

In order to demonstrate this central thesis of the research, the following research questions are considered:

RQ1. Did *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star* provide sufficient news coverage of the Umbrella Revolution, both in quantity and quality, in terms of the events that were depicted

and explained, and when compared to the coverage in local Hong Kong news media? In other words, were Canadian readers given a clear picture of the development of the events that characterized the Umbrella Revolution if they only consumed news and commentary in their local mainstream newspaper?

RQ2. How was the Umbrella Revolution introduced and sustained in general domestic Canadian discourse? What frames were present/absent in the editorial coverage of Canadian print media, compared to those in Hong Kong?

RQ3. What does the analysis tell us about the journalistic practices of Canadian journalists who were responsible for crafting fair and accurate reporting on distant events involving international complexity?

Based on the research questions, two hypotheses are formed:

Hyp.I: Canadian journalists were disseminating the barest factual information or focusing on the sensational conflicts between people and authority in covering the Umbrella Revolution, rather than providing active and thoughtful cultural interpretations to enable public debate and to enhance cross-cultural understanding among their readers.

Hyp.II: Canadian journalists were unable to grasp and interpret the cultural codes that were embedded in the Umbrella Revolution because of their lack of presence on the ground, dependence on syndicated news services and logically, a lack of intercultural proficiency.

The thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter Two explores the mutual constitutions of culture and discourse, and of discourse and society. It first positions the thesis within a ritual view of communication (Carey, 2009), treating news as the representation of shared beliefs and events as socially constructed. Chapter Two then discusses how news is heavily influenced by the linguistic and cultural practices of journalists and how their traditional roles of advocacy and criticism diminish when they fail to comprehend linguistic and cultural nuances. It further addresses cultural affinity in international news and the importance of intercultural proficiency among mainstream news media in building a more diverse and inclusive society.

Chapter Three contextualizes the Umbrella Revolution by providing a review and discussion of Hong Kong's political culture, democratic development, recent immigration trends to Canada, and related research findings. It introduces Hong Kong's

political system under the influence of Confucian benevolent paternalism, classic British conservatism, local business elites and the actual clauses in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong that were intended to provide for the protection of Hong Kong's "special status" while allowing for future transformation within the Chinese state.

It also addresses the history of Chinese immigrants to Canada, especially the waves of immigrants that arrived from Hong Kong around and following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and the 1997 sovereignty transfer. This section includes a discussion of the "Canada first" immigration policy to attract the brightest and wealthiest Hong Kong people.

The Canadian news media's use of a "special diasporic linkage" to Hong Kong when covering the 1997 retrocession and four ideological packages identified in American coverage of the retrocession are also considered in order to contextualize the discussion.

Chapter Four explains the application of an articulated methodology crafted to extract meaningful insights into the way that Canadian journalists covered the Umbrella Revolution. This involves a content analysis informed by a theory of framing and its application to the discourse-historical approach (DHA). After elaborating the design of a brief combination of a content analysis and a frame analysis, it introduces the three dimensions of the critical discourse analysis and applies the three critiques of the discourse-historical approach to craft a guideline encompassing the sampling process, the discursive strategies employed, and the linguistic realization of these contents and strategies. The theory of "domestication" of international news is mobilized to carry out the research. The sampling process and the detailed criteria for the research subjects as well as the contextual information of the selected media outlets are provided.

Chapter Five produces the findings from the content analysis, the frame analysis, and the discourse analysis. Timelines of the events in the Umbrella Revolution constructed by Canadian and Hong Kong daily newspapers are compared. Excerpts of the texts are contrasted and compared linguistically and critically. Codes omitted in the Canadian coverage are unpacked and interpreted. Scrutiny of the Canadian news media's discursive practices and social practices are performed through the overlapping analyses.

Chapter Six answers the research questions and (in)validates the hypotheses based on the findings from the content analysis, the frame analysis, and the discourse analysis. It then mobilizes the findings in Chapter Five to affirm the claim that the Canadian mainstream media's lack of intercultural proficiency was reflected in the coverage of the Umbrella Revolution. The chapter reiterates the importance of the mainstream media's active role in building a well-functioning intercultural nation. Possible correctives are offered with an eye to improving the quality of international news reporting. Elements of the research methodology and the findings are interrogated with the intention of refining approaches to further research on the topic.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

As a global city with a colonial history, Hong Kong has a culture in flux predominantly marrying British conservatism and Confucian paternalism (Tsang, 2004; Poon, 2007; Jones, 2015). For this reason, the political culture and news media culture in Hong Kong are different from those in Canada. Because the differences in cultural and linguistic codes are central to this thesis, the core of this study deploys a cultural studies approach. Indeed, elements of the cultural studies canon are likely to be the only way to fruitfully untangle the interpretive nature of the shared values and meanings reflected by the Umbrella Revolution through the accounts of Canadian news media.

A good conceptual starting point for an analysis of mediated messages is James Carey's transmission versus ritual view of communication, something Carey tied directly to newspaper culture. Carey (2009) identified two views of communication in American culture since the term "communication" entered public discourse in the nineteenth century. The transmission model of communication, according to Carey, has been dominant in industrialized capitalist societies, which considers communication as "a process whereby messages are transmitted and distributed in space for the control of distance and people" (p. 13). The transmission model of communication calls for examining what message has been transmitted, which part of the message is loyal to the "truth," and the effect that the message has on those who receive it.

Conversely, the ritual view considers communication as a symbolic process and a ritualistic practice "whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed" (p. 19). It is "directed not toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs" (p. 15). The ritual itself, according to Durkheim's (1995) interpretation of the origins of the religious beliefs, is a shared and mediated practice in which the meanings of signs are used in the communication within a bounded social group. It engenders commonly held agreements within in the group based on common understandings. Social cohesion and solidarity are promoted because a simultaneous shared experience is created following the process in which individuals are coordinated and administered by a ritual to act in relation to sacred objects, such as totems (Durkheim, 1995; Schroeder & Lin, 2014; Burroughs & Ka'ili, 2015). As Durkheim

(1995) wrote, “[i]t is by shouting the same cry, saying the same words, and performing the same action in regard to the same object that they arrive at and experience agreement” (p. 232).

From a secular perspective, Dewey was succinct in his appraisal of the role of communication in the creation of a community. Acknowledging the unprecedented *physical means of communication* in his time and *communication by means of signs or symbols* as a prerequisite for associated interpersonal activities and shared experiences, Dewey (2012) proclaimed that “the Great Society created by steam and electricity may be a society, but it is no community” (p. 94) yet “[c]ommunication can alone create a great community” (p. 118).

Highlighted by its religious and communal characteristics, the ritual view of communication connotes notions such as “‘sharing,’ ‘participation,’ ‘association,’ ‘fellowship,’ and ‘the possession of a common faith’” (Carey, 2009, p. 15).

Since the main purpose of this study is to reveal and interrogate the inadequate representation of the Umbrella Revolution from the perspective of a lack of intercultural proficiency in the mainstream Canadian media (and the Umbrella Revolution itself was to show solidarity against a creeping incursion of centralized administrative and political power emanating from Beijing), the examination of these protests must by its nature embrace the ritual view. Examining the event from a ritual view, as in Carey’s (2009) metaphor, is like attending a mass, “a situation in which nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed” (p. 16). Accordingly, to reveal the recondite cultural differences through the representations of the Umbrella Revolution in two different cultural settings is to view the culture as communication, as a system of signs, as a representation system existing through myths, rituals, and classification (Keating & Duranti, 2011).

In practice, the ritual view of communication has been effectively validated in the studies of *traditional* media effects, especially from the *uses and gratifications* perspective, although the approach itself has a reputation of “theoretical and methodological imperfections” (Ruggiero, 2000, p. 12). There may not be an explicit dichotomy, however, the nonrational-ritualized use of newspaper and television accounts; i.e., the participation in “a ceremonial or ritualistic or near-compulsive act” as part of social fulfillment (Berelson, 1949, p. 129) has been well documented in tandem with

rational-instrumental media use (Berelson, 1949; Rubin, 1984; Dayan & Katz, 1992; Carey, 1998a).

However, the evolving ethnoscaples, mediascaples, technoscaples, finanscaples, and ideoscaples (Appadurai, 1990) in the age of globalization (Giddens, 1990) have contested the ritual view. Carey (1997; 1998b) has acknowledged minority media's centrifugal force on society. Particularly, in the context of a laissez-faire economy of mass media, the Internet, with its nonterritorial/non-vis-à-vis nature, and unprecedented capability of compressing time/space at a global level, is believed to have altered the shared experience of simultaneous media consumption, fragmented society, and weakened the sense of a community if not a nation (Carey, 1998b; Soffer, 2013).

But Carey (2005; 2009) also realized the change in communication technologies has presented a double-edged sword as the centripetal force of the national media has not been diminished. "Every fundamental change in the system of production, dissemination, and preservation of culture simultaneously borders and deborders the world...[O]ne set of borders, one set of social structures is taken down, another set of borders is erected" (p. 453).

At the macro-level, exactly as Carey (2005) anticipated, the world of the Internet age is witnessing the revival of religious fundamentalism and the withdrawal of traditional ethnic groups or even nations. These are the extreme examples that potentially impact the vitality of coherent national communication systems and the conditions of ritualized communication.

At the micro-level, it may be argued that the ritual view of communication has held true in the Internet age. On one hand, the Internet is "an extension of the Web of meaning (brought into being by communication) that constitutes the common culture" (Sen, 2016, p. 4). The absence of geographic barriers and simultaneous changes to media consumption have not lessened the national or the ritualistic character of Internet-based communication (Miller & Slater, 2000; Soffer, 2013; Burroughs & Ka'ili, 2015; Sen, 2016). On the other hand, traditional media such as the mainstream newspapers selected in this research have maintained their social and cultural influences (Hoffmann, 2006; Bressers & Meeds, 2007; Brin & Soderlund, 2010; Goyette-Côté, Carbasse, & George, 2012; Tremblay, 2015).

Upholding the ritual view of communication, this thesis then takes as a general starting point the definition of “news” as outlined by Hall et al.; that is, the account of any event, “is the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories” (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 2000, p. 424). The selection of news is subject to various forces including the institutional structure of the specific news organization; the professional ideology of the media practitioners; and the identification—the contextualization of the news to its assumed audience. The cultural mapping process; i.e., the social identification, classification, and contextualization of news events, assigns the selected events to the frames of meanings that the assumed audience is likely to apprehend. Through this crucial process, events are “made to mean” by the news media and become intelligible and perceivable by the audience. The logic and assumption behind this are based on our acknowledgment of the process of signification, enabling us to refer to the world and the ability of members of one culture to share and access the same cultural-conceptual map (Hall, 1997; Hall et al., 2000).

How meaning and linguistic structure coincide in signifying systems has been conceptualized from Saussure’s (2011) system of semiology to Barthes’ (1977) adoption of Saussure in his own semiological research. The upshot is that events cannot be simply passed from one to another without going through a semiological system. This thesis takes the position that only by unpacking communication through the process in which signs are used to share meanings are we capable of understanding the full cross-cultural meaning of an event such as the Umbrella Revolution.

In a way, this is self-evident since the Umbrella Revolution was signified within forms of discourse that include the subsumed meaning of passive protest itself: the choice of protesters to carry umbrellas as a means to identify one another, but also to embrace an innocuous practice that could not be reasonably punished as an act of defiance against the state. However, once the event was captured by the general rules of discourse, the signification was also subject to the “rules” by which language is used to circulate meaning (Dewey, 2012; Hall, 1999). This thesis makes the point that a certain cultural dissonance occurred between real events as they were portrayed by the press in Hong Kong, and how those events were interpreted and conveyed (or not) to Canadian newspaper readers.

In this communicative process, journalists served a crucial role as professional communicators. A professional communicator, as Carey (1997) outlined:

[I]s one who controls a special skill in the manipulation of symbols and who uses this skill to forge a link between distinct persons or differentiated groups. A professional communicator is a broker in symbols, one who translates the attitudes, knowledge, and concerns of one speech community into alternative but suasive and understandable terms for another community (p. 132).

The ability to manipulate symbols and to connect differentiated speech communities empowers journalists with objectified and institutionalized cultural capital, symbolic capital, and a considerable volume of social capital (Bourdieu, 2011). The recognition of the importance of the journalists' role in the Canadian society and successful conversion of forms of symbolic capital can be seen from the cases of René Lévesque, Adrienne Clarkson, and Michaëlle Jean, for example. However, despite being important, the operation of journalists, as agents in the *journalistic field* can neither avoid the imposing demands from the economic and the political fields, nor escape from the constraints within the fields of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993). Especially for mainstream journalists in a mass society, their classic roles as “intellectual critics, interpreters, and contemporary historians” have become secondary. The structure of mass society and the centripetal force of mass media inevitably lead to the progressive institutionalization of “objective reporting” (Carey, 1997). Thus, contemporary journalists may excel in their writing skills but often opt not to infuse their distinct interpretations into events of complexity.

Even if journalists do offer critiques, as seen in editorials and opinion columns, it is still problematic if the event on their radar is actually outside their comfort zone of knowledge, language, and culture. As this thesis demonstrates, prior to conveying the meaning of the far-flung events in Hong Kong to Canadian readers, Canadian journalists inevitably put forward their own understanding of the Umbrella Revolution. As non-linearity and polysemy exist in the production, circulation, consumption, and reproduction of television discourse (Hall, 1999), the operational codes within the syntagmatic chain of the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution employed by Canadian press journalists would be likely to differ from those employed by the protesters and journalists in Hong Kong (assuming dominant or global codes existed in Hong Kong) and by the targeted readers.

In other words, the codes were not transmitted or acquired in culturally specific interactions (Bernstein, 2003) especially when we consider that the use of contemporary signs is a convention inherited from the preceding generation, and the relationship between the signified and the signifier is always subject to a shift (Saussure, 2011).⁵ This is by no means implying the validity of the twin assumptions of “linguistic relativity” and “linguistic determinism” from the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, but rather acknowledging that Canadian journalists who were unfamiliar with the social conventions and historical context of contemporary language use in Hong Kong may not have fully understood the Umbrella Revolution from a critical-linguistic perspective.⁶

One famous example outside the journalistic realm was the debate over the controversial concept and the subsequent implementation of “accountability” – or “*fu ze*” (負責) in Chinese – in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law: the constitutional document of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the Hong Kong SAR). “Fu ze” in the Chinese paternalistic political and cultural tradition connotes responsibility, answerability, and consultation, whereas “accountability” is largely interpreted as a system of sanction and control in the liberal democratic context (Poon, 2007). The potential for cultural-linguistic dissonance was, therefore, of real and enduring concern.

For example, the Joint Declaration (1984) claimed that, “the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature” (p. 3). In the Basic Law (2015), Article 43 stated that “[t]he Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to the Central People’s Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the provisions of this Law” (p. 15) and Article 64 further spelled out that “[t]he Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must abide by the law and be accountable to the Legislative Council of the Region” (p. 22). In each article, the word “accountability” is predominant. There is no mention of responsibility,

⁵ Bernstein (2003) put more emphasis on specific social relations affecting the semiotic values of the codes. Bernstein views codes as culturally determined positioning devices, presupposing competences (linguistic/cognitive) that all participants in the communication process acquire and share.

⁶ The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis hypothesizes that languages differ fundamentally in their structures and differences of linguistic structure cause the speakers of different languages have different mental maps to perceive the world (Fowler, 2013).

answerability, or consultation. Such a distinction might mean little to a journalist unfamiliar with “fu ze,” but it means a great deal to people concerned about an incursion of authoritarianism.

A similar bifurcation in meaning may have applied to media coverage of the Umbrella Revolution. The unconscious differences in episteme (Foucault, 2005) between Canadian and Hong Kong journalists and editors almost certainly influenced their comprehension of the protests and, therefore, the way the Umbrella Revolution was covered. This speaks to Dewey’s (1966) contention that knowledge is socially constituted. “[K]nowledge,” wrote Dewey, “is a function of association and communication; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned” (Dewey, 2012, p. 127). Foucault (2005) has supported such an observation: “In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice” (p. 183). Furthermore, the structure of human knowledge further entails the formation of habit, which Dewey (2012) deemed to be the conditioning influence of human action and was mostly formed under the influence of the customs of a social group.

In relation to his discussion of the “field” as a social universe or a structure of structured relations, Bourdieu (1993) mobilized the term “habitus” to describe the socialized subjectivity of the agents within the field. In Bourdieu’s notion, habitus are both *structured* and *structuring* structures, the dispositions of which generate and organize practices. In the case of journalists and editors, as agents occupying dominant-subordinate positions (dynamic roles) in the journalistic field, the formation of their habitus is subjected to numerous external factors such as their given culture, language, class, education, and institution. Then, in the expression of their predispositions and behaviors, they act in ways that are neither random nor autonomous. Their actions are organized through habitus and in reaction to the system of dispositions resulting from long term inculcation.

From a more cognitive sense, Kenneth Burke’s (1966) notion of the “terministic screen” suggests that the choice of linguistic terminology affects the nature of our observations and our use and understanding of language. For Burke, the nature of any terminology was both a selection of reality and a deflection of reality. In this respect, the Umbrella Revolution may be seen as an inherently multifaceted event that was subject to different perceptions and interpretations akin to respective terminologies that were mobilized by Hong Kong and Canadian

journalists. This is to say, simply, that journalists used language and symbols to describe the event arising from and fitted to their terministic system.

Apart from the functioning terministic screen, journalists' perception and reconstruction of a culturally, empirically and structurally remote event may also be influenced by pre-existing stereotypes. In a mass culture, as Barthes (1975) argued, all official institutions of language including news, are repeating machines spreading "the same structure, the same meaning, often the same words. The stereotype is a political fact, the major figure of ideology" (p. 40). In terms of linguistic consistency, solidification, and naturalization, Barthes (1975) elucidated that:

...the stereotype is the word repeated without any magic, any enthusiasm, as though it were natural, as though by some miracle this recurring word were adequate on each occasion for different reasons, as though to imitate could no longer be sensed as an imitation: an unconstrained word that claims consistency and is unaware of its own insistence ...[S]tereotype is the present path of "truth" (pp. 41–42).

Lippmann (1998) has attributed the tendency to use stereotypes in journalism to an "economy of effort" in producing journalistic accounts and the defense of a particular group's position in society. R. Dyer (2000) demonstrated a quartet of elements were embedded in Lippmann's idea of "stereotypes." First, as an ordering process, stereotypes enable us to understand the complex world through existing generalities, through patterning and the use of "types," since the true order of the world is rarely self-revealed and univocally interpreted. Second, stereotypes provide us with a shortcut or a makeshift tool to grasp the prominent information within a cluster of meanings. Third, stereotypes serve as a reference to the world, from both the perspectives of the social function and the aesthetic function. Such points of reference are not neutral; rather, they project consensus within a social group onto the complexities of the world. Finally, the expression of values and feelings is closely attached to stereotypes.

As a result of using stereotypes in news production, this thesis makes the case that Canadian journalists deployed a discursive toolset to keep their relay of information between cultures motivated and organized. Canadian readers (those without roots in Hong Kong) were then presented with familiar footholds to understand the accounts being generated *for them*

concerning the Umbrella Revolution. In this complex process of news production, there was much negotiation and selection happening over “what items shall be printed, in what position they shall be printed, how much space each shall occupy, what emphasis each shall have” (Lippmann, 1998, p. 354). Or, as Lippmann put it more succinctly, “There are no objective standards here. There are conventions” (p. 354).

The idea that participants in language improvise the “taken-for-granted” as a form of reduced knowledge shortcut to conform with interactive norms and to make sense of events, can also be seen from notions such as “orderliness” (Fairclough, 1995a) and “frame” (Gamson, 1989). But unlike “stereotypes” and “orderliness,” which suggest fixed images in cognition and language, “frame” has its focus on the process of “selection and salience” (Gamson, 1989; Entman, 1993). This is especially the case when relaying information in accounts produced through journalistic processes (Chang, Salmon, Lee, Choi, & Zeldes, 2010).

In agreement with the structured and structuring nature of habitus (Bourdieu, 1993), socially constituted knowledge used by professional communicators leads to the socially constituted production of discourse (Carey, 1997; Foucault, 2005). Hence, media discourses elucidating the same event in different newspapers, and in newspapers of different cultures, exhibit specific idiosyncrasies. In this respect, different discourses concerning the Umbrella Revolution reveal differences in *a priori* knowledge, habitus, and, by extension, a different totality of relations to the event experienced and recorded by Canadian and Hong Kong journalists. Foucault’s discursive approach to representation explicitly articulated that discourses were “controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role [was] to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality” (Foucault, 2005, p. 316). Foucault also outlined the role of qualified statement-makers and hence defined various statuses, sites, and positions that a subject can occupy (Sluga, 1985).

This mutual constitution is made manifest between discourse and culture. Within the scope of linguistics, Halliday’s idea of the “register” pertained to the configuration of semantic resources that members of a culture associated with a particular situation (Fowler, 2013). Keating & Duranti’s (2011) cross-cultural research in diverse speech communities indicated that social identities were produced and managed through the act of speaking and other semiotic resources. They contend that discourse made human cultures possible and unique. “...

[D]ifferent languages offer a number of specific resources for establishing and interpreting attitudes, negotiating social status, and dealing with changes in the context of interaction ...[D]iscourse plays a key role in expressing and guiding our individual and collective experiences” (p. 353).

The tradition of gathering cross-border and cross-cultural information out of concern for trade, war, and religion has been around since the nascence of the traditional newspaper (Raymond, 2012). As Gans (1979) has discussed with respect to the traditions of American journalism, international news was “relevant to Americans or American interests; with the same themes and topics as domestic news; or when the topics [were] distinctive, with interpretations that [applied] American values” (p. 37). In Canada, the nature and intentions of international news may arguably be similar. However, international reporting is in a declining trend. According to a series of surveys conducted among editors of Canadian daily newspapers between 1988 and 2000, just three percent of editors believed Canadians were not interested in international news, yet financial constraints and audience preferences under the influence of the Internet have forced Canadian newspapers to concentrate on local stories (Soderlund, Lee, & Gecelovsky, 2002). Outside of the newspaper sector, in 2003, a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation poll found that the majority of Canadians were “extremely interested” in international issues, and believed international reporting could contribute to tolerance and diversity (Goodrum & Godo, 2011).

Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) seminal research proposed that cultural proximity was operative among other determinants of international news flows. Their research suggested that the more interpretable an event was within the cultural framework of the listener or reader, the more likely it was to be captured as news. Since then, cultural proximity as an effective determinant has been demonstrated repeatedly and universally (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Wu, 2000; Wu, 2003; Wu, 2007; Golan & Wanta, 2003; Golan, 2010). With regard to the situation in Canada, Kariel and Rosenvall’s (1983) research found that Canadian daily newspapers displayed remarkable cultural affinities toward their readers’ respective cultural homelands; i.e., Francophone newspapers showed an affinity toward France, while Anglophone newspapers showed an affinity toward the United Kingdom and the United States.⁷

⁷ The United States news flows constituted nearly half of all foreign news for all Canadian newspapers in the research. However, Kariel & Rosenvall (1983) purposely excluded the United States in their results

This was the case even though each newsroom had equal access to the same foreign news pool delivered by the same source. Hackett's (1989) findings with respect to Canadian TV networks illustrated that cultural proximity was partly responsible for the consistently high profile of the U.S. and Western Europe in television news accounts, while less developed countries were often ignored. A similar phenomenon has been observed in more recent research (Wilke, Heimprecht, & Cohen, 2012), where it was revealed that more than half of the international news on Canadian television originated in the United States.

If consuming the news *about* the U.S. is a matter of perceived audience's preference, seeing the world *from* American perspectives may not be so. As early as the 1850s, when Canada was still part of the British North America, the New York-based Associated Press was providing international news to Canadian newspapers. Allen (2006) argued it would have been "virtually impossible and prohibitively expensive" for any Canadian newspaper to gather international news on its own. But the concerns of American perspectives rather than "nationalist-cum-imperialist sentiments" were expressed from the beginning. Canada's international news system was thus "characterized by a varying balance between domination and subordination, between global homogeneity and national self-expression" (pp. 206–207).

Neither the continuous demand for a "New World Information and Communication Order" to counterbalance the Western-dominated international news flow (Thusu, 2006), nor the related cultural hegemony of dominant social groups (Gramsci, 1971) is a major concern in this research. Rather, the tendency of "seeing the world through U.S. eyes"; that is, the continuity of Canadian media's dependence on American sources in international reporting (Soderlund, Lee, & Gecelovsky, 2002; Allen, 2006) and to some extent Canada's quest for cultural autonomy (Smythe, 1986), still need to be examined. This elides naturally with public sphere theory.

The press in general, as "public organs" and "the public sphere's preeminent institution," have been effectively providing a platform for rational-critical debate since the establishment of the bourgeois constitutional state and the legalization of a political public sphere (Habermas, 1991). Echoed by Carey's concern for the eclipse of the traditional journalists' roles of advocacy and criticism (1997), Habermas also asserted that the expansion of mass media under its inherent structural and commercial drive

because they did not consider the United States as part of Canada's cultural heritage nor did they find imbalanced results meaningful.

hollowed out literary-political debate and rendered a mass public of culture consumers. There is no conclusion on whether an overarching *accessible-to-all* public sphere or a plurality of competing and accommodating *subaltern counterpublics* (Fraser, 1990) is suited or even feasible at all for promoting ideal participation in stratified societies. Nevertheless, if multi-cultural literacy in cross-cultural communication can be acquired through practice (Fraser, 1990), and if mainstream news media communicate (*with*) intercultural proficiency *through practice* and *by altered practices*, then a bracketing *accessed-by-more (all)* public sphere is more likely to be materialized for the common good and democratic participation. This has particular resonance in the Canadian example.

In Canada, cultural diversity has long been celebrated. The policy of “Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework” was announced by then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1971 and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act was passed into law in 1988 with the aim of preserving and enhancing multiculturalism. Therefore, if the law is not to be seen as simple window dressing, it is particularly important that media discourses reflect and convey significant events pertinent to each constituent social group in order to live up to the recognized multicultural nature of Canada.

Unlike the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), which has jurisdiction over licensing and can take an explicit stance on diversity, advocating “programming by and for specific groups” and “reflecting diversity in all broadcast services” (CRTC, 2016), in the Canadian newspaper industry only a limited number of studies, such as the Davey Report in 1970 and the Kent Commission in 1981, have made inquiries into concentration in newspaper ownership and editorial diversity. These high-profile studies soon faded from public view and no measures were taken to counter increased corporate concentration (Jackson, 1999; Cohen-Almagor, 2002). From this perspective, oligopoly in the Canadian newspaper industry is open to criticism over the thinning out of the richness of public discourse and the lessening of the mainstream media’s sensitivity to the codes of other cultures.

Multiculturalism has its critics and there are, of course, inherent problems in news media applications. Bissoondath (1994) argued that protecting the independence and wholeness of every ethnic group threatened Canadian national identity and encouraged

immigrants' romantic imaginations of their previous homelands. Ojo's (2006) study of English-language newspapers in Montreal that served the black community implied that ethnic media created cultural enclaves rather than cultural diversity because of their focus within the ethnic groups and their limited reach into mainstream society. Yu and Murray (2007) claimed that most Korean-language media in British Columbia fell into the "heritage type," covering largely international news from the "home" country. Goodrum, Godo, & Hayter (2011) found that *Ming Pao* (Toronto), a Chinese newspaper mainly serving the Chinese community in Toronto, did not necessarily confine itself to the intra-cultural circle in its reportage. Only ten percent of *Ming Pao* (Toronto)'s local coverage featured stories that referred exclusively to Chinese ethnicity. However, they claimed that the *Toronto Star*, a mainstream English-language newspaper in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), where there is a substantial population of ethnic Chinese, conveyed a cultural disconnection between Canada and China. Their research showed that the *Toronto Star*'s coverage of both the local Chinese community and international Chinese business was disproportionate, and forty percent of China-referencing stories came from news agencies, suggesting limited effort was being made to serve the Chinese community in the GTA.

Multiculturalism does not necessarily support one rigid form or concept, as Hu Shih (1919), a student of John Dewey argued in *More Study of Problems, Less Talk of "Isms."* As Hu pointed out, each "Ism" was created for its specific time and space, and was used to connote a series of complex notions. Put simply, everyone has their own understandings of multiculturalism, be it the mosaic, the melting pot, or something in between. The problem is, if different cultures within one nation do not endeavour to communicate with deep mutual understanding, in an age when ethnoscaples, mediascaples, technoscaples, finanscaples, and ideoscaples (Appadurai, 1990) are rapidly changing with globalization (Giddens, 1990), we risk being trapped out of ignorance in a divided and alienated society, rather than enjoying the richness of a society of respectful diversity and coherence.

Historically speaking Chinese culture, particularly the dominant Han Chinese culture, did not tend to be easily assimilated into other cultures. Even under the complete domination of the Mongols or the Manchu people, *Sinicization* was more the outcome

than the other way around (Rawski, 1996; Ho, 1998). The trend did not suddenly reverse when Chinese immigrants traversed the Pacific, as evidenced by the cohesion of pioneer railway-worker communities and Chinatowns, to the stereotypical characterizations of nouveau riche Chinese that populate “Hongcouver.” In terms of the integration of Chinese people into the Canadian mediascape, Lee and Tse (1994) surveyed media consumption patterns of Hong Kong immigrants in Canada and found that they generally retained media habits from the homeland. Even immigrants who had lived in Canada for more than seven years spent 41 percent of their media time consuming ethnic media. Twenty years later, Veronis and Ahmed (2015) still found that among four immigrant groups in Ottawa, the Chinese community was the least willing to use local English media and the most likely to use ethnic media to access City of Ottawa services.

Besides language barriers (especially the broad gap between the ideographic Chinese and the phonetic English), cultural inconsonance is identified as a central reason as to why Chinese immigrants prefer ethnic media. Part of the responsibility for this preference can be placed at the feet of establishment Canadian news media. After the latest layoffs at Bell Canada’s news media division, the failure of the mainstream TV consortium to sponsor a national election debate in 2015, and the failure of racialized wedge politics in the Conservative Party advertising campaign during the same election campaign, Murray (2015) claimed that both the market and cultural power of the mainstream media were in decline and called for the diasporic media to increase its involvement in the construction of social narratives. It is up for debate whether Canadian mainstream media merit characterization as what Murray called “isolationist” or “rentiers of the emerging global imaginary” in terms of their role in interpreting Canada to the world and the world to Canada. It is also too early to tell whether the established mainstream media are indeed “fragmenting” as visible minorities are now in the majority in significant Canadian urban centres, and whether “old dichotomies of cultural majority/minority Canadians and mainstream and ethnic/community/alternative media” (Murray, 2015, p. 9) will be contested.

Nevertheless, when ethnic media in Canada, and Chinese-language media outlets in particular, are trumped by their narrow definitions of social responsibility, audience tastes, and perceived community needs accompanying struggles in the capital and human resources (X. Li, 2015), the mainstream news media are presented with an opportunity to step up to make a conscious cultural effort to *interpret* international affairs for a national audience (Clausen, 2004),

and certainly to enhance the intercultural understanding between different groups within that audience, Chinese-Canadian readers included.

Sharing a common “discursive competence” (Fowler, 2013) is of great importance. Established mainstream media practitioners, as the major professional communicators in society, with the cultural capital to make intercultural competence possible; that is, the ability to relate to and with people of different cultures and the appropriate management of this interaction (Lustig, 2005; Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009), have largely ducked responsibility. If cultural diversity is to be truly celebrated, then the current generation has the mandate to create a “well-functioning intercultural nation” (Lustig, 2005). Furthermore, a well-functioning intercultural nation “must be culture-appreciative rather than culture-blind, must recognize what differences matter and when they need to be considered, and must know when differences ought not to make a difference in how we respond both legally and interpersonally” (p. 378). Canada is a geographically vast nation with a culturally diverse population, bordering the world’s largest exporter of cultural commodities, the United States (Cohen-Almagor, 2002). This thesis supports the position that mainstream media in Canada should *lead* the cultural mandate by increasing their efforts in the coverage of international news, to better inform a diverse and changing public in order to both enhance and celebrate the intercultural proficiency of a complex and dynamic society.

Chapter 3: Hong Kong in Contemporary Context

To understand the value-laden discourses that helped to construct the Umbrella Revolution, it is fruitful to trace the roots of Hong Kong's distinct culture, or more specifically, political culture as well as democracy campaigns in its modern history.

Geopolitically, British Hong Kong included Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories. Hong Kong Island was granted "possession in perpetuity" to the Crown under the 1842 *Treaty of Nanking* as a result of the First Opium War (1839–1842) between Great Britain and the Qing dynasty.⁸ Kowloon was leased "in perpetuity" to the Crown under the 1860 *Convention of Peking* following the Second Opium War (1856–1860). Britain's 99-year lease of the New Territories was granted under the 1898 *Convention between the United Kingdom and China, Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory*. These treaties were perceived as unequal by many Chinese (Tang, 1994) and the incurred "national humiliation" was predominant in the construction of official narratives of Chinese nationalism (Callahan, 2004). Despite the changes of the regimes and ideologies in mainland China, these narratives have been consistent from Sun Yat-sen's "Revive China" (*zheng xing Zhong Hua* 振興中華) to Xi Jinping's "Great Renaissance of the Chinese Nation" (*Zhong Hua min zu wei da de fu xin* 中華民族的偉大復興) (Beretta, Berkofsky, & Zhang, 2017).⁹

Prior to the British presence, only a small number of indigenous people such as the Tanka inhabitants (literally, "boat dwellers," not officially recognized as an ethnic group in China, speaking the Yue dialect rather than Cantonese) lived ashore (Bruche-Schulz, 1997). In the earliest days of the colony, as Tsang (2004) has contended, the British colonial government was "largely nonintrusive, adopting a policy of benign neglect towards the Chinese" (p. 198). Colonial government intrusions, such as the number of administrative officers involved in day-to-day regulation, were kept to a minimum. The Great Qing Legal Code (*Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, in traditional Hong Kong law) remained partially in force for the local Chinese population until 1971 (Chen, 2002). The colonial government was primarily concerned with maintaining a basic

⁸"In perpetuity" was used in the English version of the treaty. But in the Chinese version, a portmanteau word "*chang yuan* 常遠" (literally, constant and distant) was used rather than more common "*chang yuan* 長遠" (literally, long and distant) or "*yong yuan* 永遠" (literally, eternal and distant).

⁹ Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) was the founding father of the Republic of China.

political and legal infrastructure (Tsang, 2004).¹⁰

Under British governance, Chinese migrants from other regions gradually came to the territory to escape war, famine, or repressive regimes. The colonial government did not impose permanent immigration restrictions at the border until 1950 after realizing these refugees were refusing to return to the mainland to live under Communism. Hong Kong's population increased rapidly from about 600,000 in 1945 to 2.5 million in 1955 (Tsang, 2004). Among those who remained were Cantonese small entrepreneurs and Shanghainese industrialists who greatly influenced Hong Kong's long-term economic success and its zeitgeist (Wong, 1988; Yu, 1997).

On a side note, the most noticeable cultural changes under the influence of the dynamics between the growing Chinese population and the shrinking colonial power were the establishment of Cantonese as a lingua franca and eventually Chinese (non-specific in the Official Languages Ordinance of Hong Kong) as an equal official language with English in 1974 (Bruche-Schulz, 1997). Mandarin, essentially a Beijing dialect of Chinese, on the other hand, disappeared in colonial Hong Kong's public-school examinations after 1965 (Bruche-Schulz, 1997). It was only after the 1997 handover that the Hong Kong SAR Government announced the "Bi-literate and Tri-lingual Policy" (*liang wen san yu*, 兩文三語) aiming to achieve bi-literacy in written Chinese and English, and tri-lingualism in Cantonese, Mandarin, and English.¹¹ Extra efforts in promoting Mandarin, such as setting up compulsory school subjects and a Radio Hong Kong Mandarin station, have since been observed (Leung, Lim, & Li, 2013).

Following the Second World War, although anti-colonial movements and subsequent decolonization were on the rise in other British colonies, the main objective of British rule in Hong Kong was to maintain the colony's stability and good order as an industrial and exporting economy. This remained the general priority from the early 1950s to the early 1980s (Tsang, 2004). Even after Hong Kong was set to return to Chinese rule, Ian Strachan (1994), then Director of Social Welfare of Hong Kong was confident that Hong Kong would retain and benefit from a firm connection to the British Commonwealth because the shared beliefs in free market, the rule of law, and individual freedom formed the basis of an open society. Christine Loh (1996), a then Hong Kong legislator, also applauded Hong Kong's link to Commonwealth

¹⁰ For instance, the government had only 35 administrative officers in 1941 (Tsang, 2004).

¹¹ The dynasties and states in China have been using unified formal written Chinese systems since Shi Huangdi, the First Emperor of Qin (259 BC) (X. G. Qiu, 2000).

NGOs.¹² Loh suggested that Hong Kong should continue and expand its Commonwealth links after the handover because “they have helped Hong Kong people to capitalize on many opportunities, ranging from economic to professional ones, as well as in research, sports and culture.” Hong Kong’s rights to “maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions, and relevant international organizations” have been prescribed in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.

During the major period of the British governance, democracy in Hong Kong was of little concern either to the British or to the local inhabitants. As a matter of fact, elements of democracy such as representation, accountability, and mandate were alien, if not totally unheard of until the later transitional years. Hong Kong, as a British colony, was governed as a bureaucratic state, following the classic British conservative tradition of virtual representation, where power was predominantly held in the hands of a Crown-appointed governor and a permanent Civil Service establishment (Poon, 2007). In this sense, British governance embraced an 18th-century notion of trusteeship most eloquently expressed by Edmund Burke, which considered the role of the government as a trustee rather than a delegate. “A trustee acts for the welfare of the beneficiary, but does not necessarily have to be responsive to their wishes or be sanctioned by the beneficiary. Virtual representation does not see election as a necessary defining act that confers power on the representative” (Poon, 2007, pp. 2–3).

British conservatism in its early days, as reflected in Burke’s (2013) view, was opposed to universal suffrage largely because it was thought that “the majority of the citizens are capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority” (p. 347). In addition, average people were considered to be less qualified intellectually and emotionally in the use of power; indeed, it was believed that the exercise of power by the masses would be arbitrary and lead inevitably to forms of irresponsible domination. Finally, it was argued that popular authority would result in “no control, no regulation, no steady direction whatsoever. The people are the natural control on authority; but to exercise and to control together is contradictory and impossible” (p. 376).

Unsurprisingly, distrust and discouragement of plebeian meddling in politics and particularly participatory democracy can also be seen in the ancient Confucian approach to governance. “Every man should mind his own business. The Master said, ‘He who is not in any particular office has nothing to do with plans for the administration of its duties’” (Confucius,

¹² Hong Kong was not a member of the Commonwealth states.

1893). In the traditional Chinese political appointment system, emperors appointed magistrates among the candidates who excelled in *Ke Ju*, the imperial civil service examinations. Various rules of avoidance, which forbade magistrates to serve in their home jurisdictions, have been generally in effect from the Han dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD) to the present as measures to prevent nepotism and increase the centralization of authority (X. L. Qiu, 2014). However, colloquially, local magistrates were still called *fu mu guan* (literally, “father and mother officials”), which implies an authoritative social status and duty of guardianship over the locals.

Arguably, Burke’s notion of trusteeship bears a basic resemblance to the traditional Chinese political appointment system. Both employ top-down hierarchical structures, assume the role of more-or-less benign guardian, and rely on the intrinsic qualities and virtue of their representatives. Although the former model supports a greater degree of individual autonomy, neither system supports a popular mandate to justify local administrative decisions.

In brief, the convergence of classic British conservatism and Confucian paternalism, the entrepreneurial spirit of the post-war Chinese immigrants to Hong Kong, and the full establishment by the 1970s of the Anglo-Saxon concept of the rule of law, collectively shaped a distinct political culture that influenced generations of Hong Kong subjects (Tsang, 2004). As a result of the dominant political culture, the traditional use of appointed politicians, and an economy driven by corporate capitalism, Hong Kong inherits a largely executive-led and elitist political system, which is “prone to the maintenance of the status quo and toleration of Chinese involvement in Hong Kong’s internal affairs” (Lam, 1996, p. 24).

This may be part of the reason why, unlike the outcome of decolonization in other former British colonies, democracy never took firm root in Hong Kong even though there were several attempts to install a more liberal-democratic system. From early petitions signed by British and international expatriate merchants in 1894 and 1916 respectively, to the demand for elections by political groups formed by the local Chinese population in the 1950s and 1960s, all endeavours were turned down by British officialdom, which cited trusteeship as its justification (Poon, 2007).

It is worth noting that after the end of the Japanese military occupation during the Second World War, the then Governor Mark Young proposed a reform plan in 1946 that called for a municipal council in which two-thirds of members would be directly elected. The Young Plan did not become a reality because Young was replaced in 1947 for health reasons. His successor Alexander Grantham did not support any form of self-governance for Hang Kong because the

colony's cultural and geographical affinity to China made its allegiance to the British Empire tenuous (Tsang, 2004). Full independence, for Grantham, was out of the question. In Grantham's own words, "the fundamental political problem of the British Colony of Hong Kong is its relationship with China and not the advancement to self-government and independence as in the case of most British colonies" (as cited in Tang, 1994, p. 320). The farthest Grantham would go was to alter Young's plan to acknowledge "a constructive partnership with the local community" (Tsang, 2004).

As a matter of fact, even though the once "barren rock" (in the eyes of Lord Palmerston) had been transformed into Britain's most important trade hub in East Asia, the question of Hong Kong's future was increasingly seen as a diplomatic issue for both Britain and China as the lease-end date for the New Territories approached (Loh, 1996; Lam, 1996).¹³

On one hand, the British Empire was crumbling after the Second World War (1939–1945). When Winston Churchill proclaimed that "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire" in 1942 (as cited in Tang, 1994, p. 319), he might not have foreseen the dramatic turns of postwar international politics. From the defeat in the 1956 Suez Crisis to the pullback of the final presence of the British army in Suez in 1971, Britain's imperial power was rapidly dissipating in the polarized postwar world led by the United States and the Soviet Union (Tang, 1994).

On the other hand, after a protracted civil war, Mao Zedong and his communist army established the People's Republic of China in 1949. From the beginning, Britain's Foreign Office recommended a pragmatic policy of "keeping a foot in the door" in the emerging republic because of British assets and trade interests in China (Tang, 1994). According to a classified British Cabinet Memorandum (as cited in Tang, 1994), in 1949, prior to Mao's final victory, the British cabinet agreed that "the British government 'should not discuss the future of Hong Kong with a central Chinese government unless that government were friendly, democratic, stable and in control of a unified China.' The word 'democratic' was later deleted" (p. 337). Moreover, Hong Kong and China have been increasingly economically interdependent, even integrated since the 1970s when China started to divert its attention away from political movements and to focus on domestic economic growth (M. Chan, 1996). Because Britain did not have enough

¹³ Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, served as Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the 19th century.

resources to maintain its traditional position in Asia, the use and the rhetoric of Hong Kong as a gateway into China, either in spreading democracy or channeling investment, have been sustained to the present (Strachan, 1994).

As the power and interest shifted, Hong Kong's political future became inevitably linked to that of China. "Decolonization without independence" was a pragmatic solution for the two masters (Tang, 1994) at the cost of the local inhabitants' aspirations. For instance, no indigenous politicians were involved in the seventeen rounds of Sino-British talks held between April and December of 1993 over political reforms in the transition to the handover (Lam, 1996).

Therefore, limited democracy in Hong Kong was not only a reflection of the pervasive conservative culture but also an active choice for achieving the goal of "decolonization without independence." In spite of several riots with significant casualties that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, the colonial government continued to disregard full democratic participation as a means to address social and political disruptions.¹⁴ The newly empowered government of the People's Republic of China also expressed its objection to any move toward the self-governance of Hong Kong. According to the declassified records from the British National Archives (as cited in Guilford, 2014), in early 1958, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told British Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Cantlie that Beijing would regard Hong Kong self-governance as a "very unfriendly act." In 1960, Liao Chengzhi, then Minister of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, reiterated that China would "not hesitate to take positive action to have Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories liberated" if the British allowed self-governance (as cited in Guilford, 2014).

In 1972, shortly after the People's Republic finally took over a seat in the United Nations, China clarified Hong Kong's political status as "a Chinese territory under British administration" and successfully requested that Hong Kong and Macau be removed from the UN's list of colonial territories (Carroll, 2007). By denying Hong Kong's colonial status and framing the issue as "an internal Chinese matter," China effectively excluded the possibility of Hong Kong stepping into the path of decolonization and full independence.

The pressure from China to keep Hong Kong's colonial administration intact, the general unwillingness of Hong Kong's vast Chinese community to fully advocate for a more democratic system, a colonial government that remained supportive of trusteeship as the best means to

¹⁴ Noticeably, the Hong Kong 1956 riots, the Hong Kong 1966 Riots, and the Hong Kong 1967 leftist riots.

manage governance, and a pragmatic approach adopted by a Britain distracted by other concerns such as growing unrest in Northern Ireland, combined to hinder democratic development in Hong Kong between 1947 and 1982. As Tsang (2004) contended, although democracy was largely absent, continuous revisions to governing strategies, the rule of law, a booming economy, and improved relative prosperity for the vast majority of Hong Kong subjects came to signify “the best possible government in the Chinese political tradition” (p. 206).

When British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing for the first time in 1982 to discuss issues pertaining to Hong Kong, the Iron Lady certainly did not expect that her tumble from the stairs of China’s Great Hall of the People would become a metaphor, circulated widely in Chinese state media, for Britain’s capitulation to China in matters of interest to Hong Kong. When, following Thatcher’s trip to Hong Kong, it became increasingly accepted that the Crown Colony’s retrocession to China was inevitable, the colonial government started to promote the idea of “accountable government.” In 1984, a few months before signing the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the colonial government published a Green Paper entitled *The Further Development of Representative Government* and, a year later, introduced indirect elections to the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo). In 1991, the first direct election of the LegCo was held (Carroll, 2007).

In 1992, then Governor Chris Patten launched a reform package to enfranchise 2.5 million voters and restructure the Legislative Council. By 1995, the LegCo had become a fully elected legislature. Thus, a strong popular mandate was acquired in the LegCo (Poon, 2007). However, Patten’s democratic reform angered the Chinese government. Beijing abandoned the original “through train” arrangement with the British and set up a separate Provisional Legislative Council in Shenzhen to take over the Council after the handover, although more than half of the members were in both councils (Tsang, 2004).¹⁵

With regard to the method for the selection of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, an ambiguous framework was stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong. In the Joint Declaration (1984), Clause 3(4) stated, “[t]he chief executive will be

¹⁵ The original “through train” arrangement promised that the Legislative Council, be formed in line with the Basic Law in 1995, to continue to function after the handover in 1997.

appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally" (p. 1). The Basic Law (2015), Article 45 stated:

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government. The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures (p. 15).

Additionally, Article 158 stated, "The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress" (p. 50). However, "the principles of gradual and orderly progress" and "a broadly representative nominating committee" were not clearly defined, nor was the aforementioned notion of "accountability." With the help of constructive ambiguity and the power of interpretation, Beijing has since been legally authorized to practice great latitude in adding detailed annexes to influence the actual fulfillment of the law, especially in the case of selecting a Chief Executive.

In 1996, pro-Beijing tycoon Tung Chee-Hwa was elected by a 400-member Selection Committee as the first Chief Executive to govern Hong Kong after the handover. Since then, the Chief Executives have been chosen exclusively by a much smaller election committee. In 2007, the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress of China decided that the election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong in 2017 *may* be implemented by the method of universal suffrage and the election of the LegCo *may* be implemented by the method of electing all the members by universal suffrage (The Basic Law, 2015).

While post-handover Hong Kong sees its limited democratic rights arguably "systematically dismantled by China" even as "stability and prosperity" becomes the mantra of Beijing's rule (Jones, 2015), its culture, which melds Confucianism with Western capitalism and its influence on daily life, as well as embracing the Anglo-Saxon concept of the rule of law (Tsang, 2004), is genuinely in flux. Chiu (2013) attributes the current culture of Hong Kong to

the dilemma of serving three mutually contradictory ideologies: a triangular articulation of Chinese nationalism, British colonial heritage, and globalism. Chiu writes:

Hong Kong has to face a double bind. It must retain its global capitalistic characteristics in order to safeguard its “autonomy” under the “One Country, Two Systems” framework (making it distinct from other Chinese cities), while, at the same time, it must risk sacrificing its autonomy in the midst of the globalized free market dominated by corporate capital (pp. 7–8).

In light of Hong Kong’s changing political and economic autonomy, its cultural autonomy may just be another castle in the air. With the sense of insecurity, the immigrant mentality, and the rising yet weak local identification among Hong Kong’s population (Tsang, 2004), waves of mass migrations from Hong Kong reached their peak during the period from the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre to the 1997 sovereignty transfer (P. Li, 2005). In 1990 alone, approximately 60,000 people left Hong Kong out of a total population of 5.7 million, many of them young professionals. Canada was a preferred destination (Segal, 1991). Compared to the poorly received British Nationality (Hong Kong) Selection Scheme which tried to anchor 50,000 of the most influential Hong Kong people and their families to the colony but ensured their life in the UK by giving them citizenship, Canada did a better job attracting the brightest and the wealthiest from Hong Kong with the help of the Entrepreneur Program introduced in 1978 and the Investor Program introduced in 1986. Under these programs, those with a net worth of \$500,000 Canadian dollars or more to invest in a business in Canada were granted passports without the need to actually reside in Canada (Segal, 1991). In 1987, a Canadian immigration counselor in Hong Kong commented, “Canada is in the immigration business. These are the kind of people we want. They bring family values, a devotion to law and order, and especially a drive towards competitiveness and achievement which we seem to breed out of our own young people” (as cited in Segal, 1991). This strategy proved to be extremely appealing to wealthy but insecure Hong Kong residents. As of 2011 about a half-million people of Hong Kong descent call Canada home (Statistics Canada, 2013).

Beijing also made attempts to ease the nerves of the panicked locals, including China’s then supreme leader Deng Xiaoping. In 1987, Deng was quoted assuring the members of the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee that their Western lifestyle would not change after

the handover: “[After the handover,] keep running your gambling horses and keep your entertainers dancing” (as cited in Apple Daily, 2017). Deng’s hedonistic version of Hong Kong’s culture, along with other official discourses, may have reduced Hong Kong’s residents to *homo economicus* (Jones, 2015), but it is also true that numerous Hong Kong immigrants returned to the former colony when they saw that stability and prosperity were maintained. According to past newspaper surveys, Hong Kong immigrants returned because of the standard of living in Hong Kong, the employment and investment opportunities available to those with professional and technical qualifications, and a lower taxation rate (P. Li, 2015).

Following the handover and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the number of Hong Kong immigrants choosing to emigrate to Canada declined substantially. Between 2006 and 2011, 15.3 percent of immigrants self-identified as Chinese. Of those 85 percent were born in China while three percent were born in Hong Kong (Statistics Canada, 2016).

This brief review and discussion of Hong Kong’s unique political culture, democratic developments, evolving social reality, and dynamics of recent Chinese immigration to Canada provide a valuable and necessary context in which to situate the Umbrella Revolution, the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution, and the analysis of the discourses that characterized this unique mass protest. Against such a complex socio-historical backdrop and its political expressions, it is relatively easy to make a *prima facie* case that much international journalism was and remains ill equipped to report effectively either on the origins of events on the ground in Hong Kong, or the meaning of their outcomes.

Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter first discusses *why* and *how* a combined methodology of a content analysis, a theory of framing, and a discourse-historical approach was applied in the research. It then lays out the contextual information of the selected media outlets, the sampling procedure, and the recorded data of media content.

The aim of the research, is to undertake a comprehensive and critical examination of the Canadian news media's coverage of the Umbrella Revolution and how the practices of news production were reflected in the coverage.

The “comprehensiveness” refers to the three interconnected perspectives of the research design. First, both the quantitative and the qualitative elements of the coverage were examined. Second, both the manifest and the latent elements of Canadian news media's coverage were examined. Third, Canadian news media's coverage was examined in comparison with that of the Hong Kong counterparts. The critical element of this research, pertains to the multi-dimensional concerns of the texts depicting the Umbrella Revolution in Canadian newspaper accounts, the historical context of the Umbrella Revolution, Canadian journalists' discursive practices, and the general social practices reflected in the coverage.

By design, each part of the combined methodology focused on different aspects of Canadian newspaper coverage. A basic content analysis dealt with the quantitative and manifest elements: the quantity of the related articles, the proportion of the opinion pieces, the origin of the authors and news sources, and the timelines of the events reflected in the coverage. Its integration with a frame analysis surveyed the qualitative and latent elements by sorting and categorizing the texts. A discourse-historical approach critically inspected the qualitative and latent elements embedded in the texts (See Appendix A). In practice, these research methods were utilized overlappingly and functioned as a totality of the methodology.

4.1 A content analysis informed by a theory of framing

A basic content analysis underlies the evaluation the scope of the Canadian news media's coverage of the Umbrella Revolution by offering an “objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952, p.

18, as cited in Kolmer, 2008). The manifest elements considered in the content analysis included:

- The headline of the article. Conventionally, a headline is the most prominent element in a news article. A headline serves the purpose of optimizing the relevance of a news story for the readers. A headline not merely summarizes the content; it often conveys how editors and journalists understand their readers in terms of their state-of-knowledge, their beliefs and expectations, and their cognitive styles (Dor, 2003). Hence, a look into the headlines aided in the assessment of news framing and cultural inconsonances.
- The news source. In this research, a news source was defined and recorded exclusively as the origin of the article, i.e., from an external news service agency or from a media outlet's own newsroom, because the proportion of non-Canadian content was the concern. Canadian perspectives are important for *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star*, which serve the metropolitans with large Chinese Canadian population, and for the Canadian political and diplomatic publications, which provide insights to Canadian politicians and diplomats.
- The quantity of the Umbrella Revolution-related articles in each media outlet. Since the Umbrella Revolution consisted of enduring democratic campaigns involving and affecting numerous parties in a global city, the quantity of the related articles not only suggests the general volume of coverage but also implies how important and relevant Canadian media practitioners perceived these events.
- The quantity of the related opinion pieces in each media outlet. The opinion pieces in this research included editorials, columns and satirical cartoons. While editorials over controversial issues are seen less often, media organizations do not hesitate to transfer part of the political risks to individual writers (Lee & Lin, 2006). The quantity of the opinion pieces and its proportions to all related articles were used to indicate the engagement or lack thereof of major Canadian newspapers during the Umbrella Revolution.
- The publication date. The publication date matters because it suggests the responsiveness of the selected Canadian metropolitan daily newspapers to the distant events. It also exhibits whether continuous attention or efforts were paid

during the Umbrella Revolution by these newspapers, especially on the “slow news days” when the developments in Hong Kong were less dramatic.

- The name and occupation of the author. The identity of the author is relevant because the thesis takes a general stance that journalists defer to their cultural and contextual knowledge in news production (Carey, 2009; Fowler, 2013). The proficiency of the coverage is therefore correlated with the specific expertise and knowledge of the author. In addition, the name and occupation can offer useful background information about the author in the absence of interviews. Apart from the explicitly stated occupations of the columnists, the names searched in the Wade-Giles system were noted as they imply the authors of possible Hong Kong origin. The Wade-Giles system, developed by Thomas Wade and Herbert Giles, is a transcription system that transcribes characters of Chinese proper nouns to English spellings. It was replaced by the *pinyin* system in mainland China but the use of its variations has been preserved outside the mainland (Lee & Wong, 1998).¹⁶A cross-examination of the backgrounds of all the columnists was also performed through Internet/social media searches.
- The pagination choices used for the article. The pagination of the article includes the distribution of the article across the pages of the publication and the layout of the article within the page. How and where an article is presented indicates the importance placed on it by editors.
- The section where the article appears. The section of appearance indicates how it was categorized for the study. The basic dividing line lies between “news” content and “editorial” content; one dealing with fact-based reporting of events and the other dealing with opinions about the meaning of those events. As this research mainly focuses on opinion pieces such as editorials, columns, and to some extent letters to the editor, the sections are useful in determining the kind of journalism under examination.
- The constructed timeline of the Umbrella Revolution. Media content is generally constructed by professional communicators in conformity with specific

¹⁶ Hong Kong employs a Romanization system deriving from the Wade-Giles for dealing with Cantonese proper nouns, as contrary to *pinyin* for the Mandarin nouns on the Mainland. For example, Hong Kong is Hong Kong in the Wade-Giles, but Xiang Gang in *pinyin*.

conventions and cultures pertaining to both the media organization and the norms of the location that it seeks to report on (Carey, 1997; Priest, 2009). The representation of the Umbrella Revolution was, therefore, a mediated process, of which the outcome was both institution-dependent and society-dependent. Hence, besides measuring the quantitative elements, the timelines of a series of events during the Umbrella Revolution *constructed* by Canadian and Hong Kong daily newspapers were *deconstructed* and compared. By examining what events were picked up by local newspapers but possibly omitted by Canadian counterparts (and vice versa), a superficial idea of the scope and quality of the Canadian coverage can be considered.

By deploying this series of quantitative measures, the content analysis applied here assesses the presence or absence of different features of the news content (Priest, 2009). The introduction of the framing theory to the content analysis and an assessment of the news frames may then be used to bridge the analysis of both the manifest and the latent contents.

Departing from a philosophical perspective, Goffman's (1974) notion of *primary frameworks* as an epistemological system renders "a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful" (p. 21). Primary networks, according to Goffman, have two broad classes. Compared to *natural frameworks*, which are unmotivated, "natural" determinants-driven, and "purely physical," *social frameworks* "provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being" (p. 22). Goffman (1974) articulated that "the primary frameworks of a particular social group constitute a central element of its culture" (p. 27).

Media frames, the application of social frames in media research, are central organizing ideas "for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue" (Gamson, 1989, p. 157). Identifying and comparing media frames in the coverage of the Umbrella Revolution, through the subjective reading of the *texts* by the author (*receiver*), serves the purpose of manifesting conscious or unconscious judgments of the professional *communicators* in the process of selecting and omitting news stories

(Entman, 1993).¹⁷ Thus, partial evidence for concealed discrepancies in *cultural values* (Entman, 1993) and Canadian journalists' lack of proficiency in recognizing and respecting the discrepancies could be established.

Because texts of an interpretative nature incorporate the intent and motivation of the message sender (Gamson, 1989), five common media frames identified in earlier research (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) were adopted to categorize and assess the opinion pieces on the Umbrella Revolution.¹⁸

The *conflict frame* “emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest;” the *human interest frame* “refers to an effort to personalize the news, to dramatize or ‘emotionalize’ the news, in order to capture and retain audience interest;” the *economic consequences frame* “reports an event, problem, or issue in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group, institution, region, or country;” the *morality frame* “puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of religious tenets or moral prescriptions;” and the *responsibility frame* “presents an issue or problem in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, pp. 95–96).

The commonalities often found within these broad media frames can be seen as a by-product of the distribution of news through international news agencies, against the backdrop of a changing mediascape, technological development, and globalization (Clausen, 2004; Gurevitch, Levy, & Roeh, 1991; Appadurai, 1990; Giddens, 1990). Meanwhile, a tendency to domesticate international news as a counterforce to globalization and a means to increase domestic perspectives has been observed in the previous studies (Gurevitch et al., 1991; Clausen, 2004; Olausson, 2014). Despite covering the same international events, international news is domesticated to be understood within local media frames and fit the primary frameworks of the local audience (Clausen, 2004; Goffman, 1974).

¹⁷ The author shares the same cultural roots with the potential ethnic-Chinese readers of the selected media outlets.

¹⁸ The letter section in the *SCMP* was excluded in the frame analysis because it included a significant number of short letters and comments from the *SCMP*'s Facebook followers.

Against the backdrop of globalization, Olausson (2014) has suggested that three types of domestication processes exist in news discourses. *Introverted domestication* focuses news at a purely local level, ignores global relevance and thus, disconnects the domestic from the global; *extroverted domestication* ties local phenomena to their global ramifications; and *counter-domestication* constructs news without local reference and creates geopolitical de-territorialization.

This thesis questions how the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution was introduced and sustained in a general domestic Canadian discourse. Therefore, only extroverted domestication, which interconnects the domestic and the global, was studied in the research along with the applicable common media frames.

The measurement of the occurrence of frames was based on the coded topic of each article and twenty yes-no questions (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) listed in Appendix B.

4.2 A discourse-historical approach within the critical discourse analysis framework

Building on the results of the content analysis, the critical discourse analysis in this research further interrogated the latent problems concealed in the texts.

From a political economy perspective, in a capitalist economy, news is manufactured industrially and is deeply influenced by the bureaucratic and economic structure of the media industry, by relations between the media and other industries, and by relations with authoritative apparatuses and institutions such as government. As Fowler has observed (2013), from a cultural perspective mainstream news reflects the perceived prevailing values of a society in a particular historical context and simultaneously contributes to shaping the society. In that “the practices of news selection and presentation are habitual and conventional as much as they are deliberate and controlled” (Fowler, 2013, p. 41).

Hence, a critical discourse analysis, which views discourse as social practice, studies the dialectical relationship between discourse and society (Fairclough, 1993; Fairclough, 1995a; Wodak & Fairclough, 2010), emphasizes the role of discourse in society, and challenges established relations of power and dominance in society (van Dijk, 2001). For this reason, CDA is particularly suited for examining how and why Canadian mainstream newspapers and political/diplomatic publications covered the Umbrella Revolution differently from news media in Hong Kong. Such an approach reveals how media discourses of the Umbrella Revolution

differed and permitted the researcher to further discern the potential lack of intercultural proficiency embedded in discourses constructed around the event. The outcome of such an analysis is to call for a refreshed mandate for mainstream media: to improve intercultural literacy in Canadian society.

More specifically, given that my intercultural analysis is interpretative, has elements of advocacy, and is somehow emancipative, and that the Umbrella Revolution was of political and historical relevance, a discourse-historical approach within the CDA framework serves as the overarching methodology of this thesis. Developed from Fairclough's (1993) three-dimensional model of CDA which treats the *text* as a *discourse practice* exemplar and subsequently a form of *social practice*, DHA bases its critique on a foundational notion of emancipation (Forchtner, 2011) and mobilizes much ambient knowledge of the historical background and the social and political fields where discursive events are situated (Wodak, 2001). DHA embraces three interconnected aspects of social critique: the *discourse-immanent critique* aiming to reveal the anomalies in discourse-internal structures; the *socio-diagnostic critique*, which is concerned with the context of discursive events; and the *prognostic critique*, which contributes to the transformation and improvement of communication in general as a form of social practice (Wodak, 2001; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

My qualitative analysis as practice-oriented and context-oriented research addressed not only the discourse itself but also revealed some practices of the production of the discourse that were embedded in the discourse.

For the discourse-immanent critique, the texts, in a broad sense, were analyzed as “the form of the social relationship made visible, palpable, material” (Bernstein, 2003, p. 13). When approaching the texts, my principal focus was on the *manifest intertextuality* which incorporates or responds to other texts and the *constitutive intertextuality*, i.e., *interdiscursivity* that unites the potentially complex relationships it has with the structured conventions (Fairclough, 1992).

In manifest intertextuality, *other texts* are explicitly present in the text under analysis, most noticeably indicated by quotation marks in journalistic texts. However, there are many circumstances in which manifest intertextuality is not easily identified because its attributes are, by nature, often connected and articulated. Fairclough's (1992) discussion of *discourse representation*, *presupposition*, *negation*, *metadiscourse*, and *irony* sheds a light on both the complexity of manifest intertextuality, and how it can be analyzed.

The analysis of the texts used in this research begins by analyzing quotes from journalistic sources and their reproduction or translation into the voices of the *representing* discourses (discourse representation). Attention was then paid to the texts in which Canadian journalists took established language use as their natural starting point (presupposition). A metadiscursive question of whether Canadian journalists were distancing themselves from their own discourse—especially in cases revolving around the discourse of the involvement of Canadian nationals in the Umbrella Revolution—was asked (metadiscourse). Possible intercultural mismatches between apparent meaning and situational context were also considered (negation and irony).

As to interdiscursivity, an emphasis upon the heterogeneity of texts is implied as well as the combination of elements of orders of discourse, which suggests the configuration of discursive formations (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 2005). For this reason, as Fairclough suggests, a comprehensive discourse analysis, it is best to include as many discursive practices as possible to highlight all “orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 1995b). However, to achieve optimized feasibility in this research I have limited the scope of the textual object of study to the written and published form of media discourse, setting aside ephemeral media such as radio and television news reports and certain non-archived Internet media offerings. To compensate for any possible shortcomings arising from this research design decision, a number of published text categories were examined.

Mainstream newspapers were chosen for their volume of data, their continuity, and the ability to scrutinized them closely. The inclusion of other media genres—specialized Canadian politics/diplomacy publications and Government of Canada press releases—was originally intended to provide a means to consult other comparable types of linguistic practices associated with specific institutional norms (Chouliaraki, 1998), and to explore the connection between “fields of action;” i.e., “segments of the respective societal ‘reality,’ which contribute to constituting and shaping the ‘frame’ of discourse” (Girnth, 1996, as cited in Wodak, 2001, p. 66). Although minimal samples from the last two genres were found, nevertheless the *lack* of discursive representation helped in revealing problematic social practices and setting the tone for the socio-diagnostic critique. From a sociocultural perspective, the social-diagnostic critique in this research endeavoured to address the lack of intercultural proficiency of Canadian mainstream media projected by the totality of inherent relations of power in society. My own

background and contextual knowledge as a Chinese national with experience in Canada played an active role in the process of interpreting the news of the Umbrella Revolution, as a particular form of discursive and social practice, against the backdrop of wider social and cultural structures in Canada and Hong Kong.

In order to discern the entropy of information and the shift of meaning in the processes whereby the social practices that supported the Umbrella Revolution were represented in the discursive practices of Canadian media practitioners' news production, the principle of *re-contextualization* is crucial. As Bernstein (2003) has pointed out, this occurs when discourses are relocated "from the primary context of discursive production to the secondary context of discursive reproduction" as discourses/practices move between spatially and temporally distinct contexts and their transformations remain context-dependent. This is further elaborated by Wodak and Fairclough's assertion that "social events (and texts) are contingent upon and shaped by structures and practices and their semiotic moments, languages, and 'orders of discourse,' but they are also deployments of social agency and the strategies of different agents and groups of agents which are directed at shaping (reproducing or transforming) structures and practices and may, contingently, have such effects" (Wodak & Fairclough, 2010, p. 22). This is important because the research for this thesis takes the position that the lack of intercultural proficiency of Canadian mainstream media was embedded in the dialectical relations between discourse and society, and was therefore concretely manifested in the analysis of intertextuality and interdiscursivity in the coverage of the Umbrella Revolution (August 31, 2014–December 16, 2014). As per Wodak's (2001) analytic procedures, the wider social and cultural structures or the *context* were tackled on four levels:

1. The immediate, language or text internal co-text.
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres, and discourses.
3. The extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific "context of situation."
4. The broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to (p. 67).

The compilation of newspapers, news releases and political/diplomatic publications used in this study, along with the available information on the historical background and the original sources in which the practices of reporting the Umbrella Revolution were embedded, enable “a multi-dimensional deconstruction of the way certain topoi and arguments are re-contextualized and reformulated” (Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999, p. 91).

4.3 The relevance of news accounts in mainstream newspapers

Hong Kong is arguably a more connected society than most parts of the world. Over the course of the Umbrella Revolution, the protesters were avidly using social media and alternative media to communicate internally and spread their voices (Lin, 2016). It appears that much of the production and circulation of discourses was centred on the Internet. Why is this research still focusing on mainstream media especially newspapers?

The news accounts preferred by mainstream newspapers remain relevant and critical to society at large for various reasons. First and foremost, mainstream newspapers’ accumulated historical and cultural capitals and their established role as “news leaders” have continued in the digital age.

From the historical perspective, the newspaper industry has traditional significance as a typography fostered within the embryo of nationalism (McLuhan, 2011); its convergence with capitalism, following the explosion in book production and reading, helped to create an imagined community of shared values (Anderson, 2006), “which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation” (p. 46). Newspapers have *survived* the challenges from the advent of every medium induced by new communication technologies—more recently—radio (Lacy, 1987) and television (Belson, 1961; Parker, 1963).

Certainly, the ongoing disruption attributed to the Internet has been the fiercest. As Carey (1998b) elaborated, national media represented a centripetal force in social organization whereas minority media represented a centrifugal force. The Internet, which compresses time and space at a global level, indeed represents a further transformation of national communication system that has implications for “structures of social relations” (p. 34). However, Carey (1998b; 2005) admonished against technological determinism and advised to consider historical backgrounds, the contemporary media ecology, and vital contemporary dynamics in spheres of influence as diverse as politics, economics, religion, and culture. In this context, what the Internet has

wrought may still be considered a communication evolution rather than an abrupt revolution.

This point of view supports the position that the backbone of established social structures has never been shattered; rather, it settles gradually after constant negotiation and re-arrangement. In terms of media ecology, with consideration for accumulated capitals of all forms—social, economic, cultural, and symbolic—mainstream newspapers have generally coped in the digital era. Certainly, the larger ones have managed to re-establish themselves at the new journalistic frontline by embracing online technologies. There is considerable scholarly evidence to suggest that mainstream newspapers have maintained their cultural influence with the help of responsive media practices such as migrating newspaper content online, sharing newsroom staff between newspapers, websites or even mobile apps, and the delivery of their articles through the share button on their own websites or social media accounts (Hoffmann, 2006; Bressers & Meeds, 2007; Brin & Soderlund, 2010; Goyette-Côté, Carbasse, & George, 2012; Tremblay, 2015).

As a matter of fact, all newspapers and publications selected in this research have significant digital editions that very much resemble the content in their traditional printed editions. Furthermore, print journalists have adapted to new technological realities and have been generating vast amounts of content for both traditional print media and the Internet (Compton, 2010). The *New York Times* is a case in point. With the convergence of media forms, it is now difficult to define the *Times* as a newspaper, a website, or a mobile application, yet the influence of the *Times* as an international journalistic leader remains intact if not enhanced. The same might be said of traditionally regarded newspapers in Hong Kong. According to the Wisers, a computerized social data-mining database, during the Umbrella Revolution, Hong Kong newspapers provided 30,214 reports compared to 19,997 recorded on social media (Lin, 2016). Additionally, readers of mainstream newspapers are more established in society and have “consistently been correlated with higher rates of political participation, voter turnout, and civic engagement” (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 69).

By simultaneously addressing relations between discourse and other social elements—for example, relations between social events/texts and social practices and structures, and spatial and temporal relationships between events and texts—a clearer map of operating media/social practices such as the “domestication” of international news for a national audience have been scrutinized (Cohen, Levy, Roeh, & Gurevitch, 1996; Clausen, 2004; Olausson, 2014). In addition, the Canadian mainstream media’s continuous dependence on transnational news agencies has

been mapped (cf. Goodrum, Godo, & Hayter, 2011; Thussu, 2006).

The prognostic critique in this research utilized the two overlapping critiques mentioned above together with the results of the content analysis. This is applied to the discussion and conclusion of the thesis in offering suggestions on improving some of the social and institutional practices that are associated with the production of international news in Canada. The goal is to offer a more sustained and engaged level of mutual cross-cultural understanding across civil societies.

4.4 Sampling

Although the significant street protests in Hong Kong did not take place until September 26, 2014, the decision of the National People's Congress, which ultimately provoked the movement, was finalized on August 31, 2014. This was contextually important and relevant in the chain of events and their representation in texts. Hence, bracketed dates of newspapers articles were August 31, 2014, to December 16, 2014, one day after Hong Kong police cleared last protest site at Causeway Bay, Hong Kong. This took into account the time difference between Hong Kong and Canada and a possible delay in the publication cycle.

To avoid imbalanced results, a triangulated approach surveying three media genres in Canada was taken. These included mainstream newspapers, political/diplomatic publications, and press releases from the federal government. Because of the time-insensitive nature of in-depth reports in political/diplomatic publications, bracketed dates of those publications were August 31, 2014, to July 2017, when the compilation of the research materials was completed.

For the newspaper analysis, *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star* were chosen because they are the most circulated regional newspapers respectively in terms of weekly total circulation (print and digital combined) (Newspapers Canada, 2016) in the two Canadian metropolitan areas where large Chinese communities are present. Both newspapers are historically noted for their policies with respect to covering ethnic communities and the way those policies are implemented, especially with regard to the Chinese community (Ma & Kai, 1993).

In addition, the *South China Morning Post*, as the most prominent player in Hong Kong's English-language newspaper market, was chosen to represent the discourse circulated in Hong Kong and to serve a "control and reference" role. It is worth noting that the *SCMP* was acquired

by China's e-commerce company Alibaba in late 2015 and the question of its editorial independence has since been raised (CBC News, 2015). However, during the time of the Umbrella Revolution, the *SCMP* remained as a relatively credible source of news and information even though the paper was not totally immune to the Chinese government's influence prior to the acquisition by Alibaba (Lee, as cited in Reuters, 2015). The abbreviated coverage of the death of a Tiananmen Square dissident, Li Wangyang, also exposed its editor's self-censorship practice (Greenslade, 2012). Nevertheless, the *SCMP*'s extensive coverage of the Umbrella Revolution still drew the ire of Beijing and led to speculation that the recent cross-industry acquisition was not purely driven by commercial interests (Buckley & Perlez, 2015). For the purpose of this thesis, the "control and reference" function of the *SCMP* is supported by independent scholarship indicating that the paper displayed a relatively neutral stance toward the government during the Umbrella Revolution, whereas it had previously been identified with more democratic-leaning publications (Bhatia, 2015).

It was also necessary to add a Cantonese/Chinese language newspaper to serve a "control and reference" function from a linguistic-cultural perspective; a means to cross-reference the accuracy of depictions in the *SCMP*, for example, with a more grassroots perspective. For this reason, the popular *Apple Daily* was included because of its democratic stance, popularity among the locals, and its preference for using written vernacular Cantonese. However, for the balance of the results, the *Apple Daily* was intentionally excluded from the research participants because it played an active organizing role in the Umbrella Revolution. Indeed, its founder, Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, was arrested.

The alternative readily-available Cantonese/Chinese language newspaper was *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), a more elite-oriented newspaper with a significant circulation and even separate operations bearing the same name in Canada. *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong) has gained in credibility over past several years by upholding a principle of objective news reporting (Lee & Lin, 2006). It served as a source for "control and reference" along with the *SCMP*.

The Vancouver Sun was accessed through the Canadian Newsstream database in ProQuest. The *Toronto Star* and the *South China Morning Post* were accessed and cross-checked through both the databases in ProQuest and in Factiva because many articles were missing in ProQuest's databases for unknown reasons. *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong) was accessed through Factiva.

For political/diplomatic-oriented reporting, *The Hill Times*, *Diplomat & International Canada*, and *Policy Options* were chosen. All claimed a role as providers of in-depth analysis for potential decision-makers and more “global affairs-aware” readers.

The Hill Times is an Ottawa-based weekly newspaper covering Canadian politics and government since 1989 (The Hill Times, 2016). *Diplomat & International Canada* is an Ottawa-based quarterly “read by diplomats, business and government executives, professionals, and individuals who want to stay informed about global issues and who follow Canada’s role in the world” (Diplomat & International Canada, 2017). *Policy Options* belongs to the Institute for Research on Public Policy, a Montreal-based non-partisan, not-for-profit think tank. While a print run was sustained until July 2015, the digital copy of *Policy Options* has “a high-impact readership” which includes “key opinion leaders on the Canadian scene,” such as “cabinet ministers, television hosts and influential academics” (Policy Options, 2016). *The Hill Times* was accessed through its own online archive via <http://0-www.hilltimes.com.mercury.concordia.ca/archive-page>. Digital copies of *Diplomat & International Canada* were accessed via <http://diplomatonline.com/mag/previous-issues/>. *Policy Options* was also obtained by accessing digital copies via the Ottawa Public Library.

As to the sources of the official discourse, press releases from the federal government have been accessed via the online news archive of the Government of Canada (<http://news.gc.ca/web/srch-rchrch-en.do?mthd=advSrch>). Searching conditions (where applicable) are listed in Appendix C.

In general, the media outlets selected in the research were circulated either in the cities with significant Chinese-Canadian population or in the politician/diplomat communities across Canada. It was not unreasonable to expect them to provide sufficient, accurate and insightful interpretations of the Umbrella Revolution for their readers. However, the results of the multidimensional analysis contradicted the expectation. Compared to the Hong Kong media, the Canadian media focused more on and did quite well in delivering general factual accounts of the protests. But the cultural and political significances embedded in the Umbrella Revolution were more uninterpreted rather than misinterpreted.

Chapter 5: Results and Findings

This chapter first presents the results of a content analysis of perspectives from Umbrella Revolution-related articles from each media outlet, the respective quantity and percentage of the opinion pieces in each media outlet, the proportion of non-Canadian news sources in the Canadian media, and the articles written or co-written by journalists and columnists based in Hong Kong and/or of Hong Kong origin in the Canadian media. It then offers a comparison of the constructed timelines of the Umbrella Revolution by Canadian and Hong Kong daily newspapers. After that, the results of the frame analysis are provided. The last part of this chapter discusses the findings of the discourse-historical approach.

It was not to be expected that the quantities of the related articles in two Canadian metropolitan daily newspapers would be remotely comparable with those in the local Hong Kong newspapers. *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star* published a similar number of articles, averaging one Umbrella Revolution-related article every three to four days. However, the Canadian political/diplomatic publications, over a longer survey period (August 2014–July 2017), showed significantly less interest in the Umbrella Revolution. None of these publications offered in-depth reports or analysis of the situation in Hong Kong.

The quantity of the Umbrella Revolution-related articles in each media outlet is listed in Table 1. The average number of articles per day during the 108-day sampling period is shown for daily newspapers.

Table 1. The quantity of the related articles.

Publication	Total articles	Daily average
The Vancouver Sun	29	0.27
Toronto Star	35	0.32
The Hill Times	2	n/a
Diplomat & International Canada	5*	n/a

Policy Options	1	n/a
The Government of Canada Press Releases	0	n/a
Ming Pao	1743	16.14
SCMP	848	7.85

*Note: Including three satirical cartoons

While the absolute quantity of the opinion pieces in the Canadian newspapers and the Hong Kong newspapers differed vastly, the percentages of the opinion pieces in their coverage were more comparable. While the local *South China Morning Post (SCMP)* led in this category by a small margin, the two Canadian newspapers (*Med* $\approx 22.07\%$) were arguably at a similar level of participation (*percent difference* $\approx 17.72\%$) as their Hong Kong counterparts (*Med* $\approx 26.36\%$).¹⁹

The Vancouver Sun did not feature any related editorial content in their coverage. *The Hill Times* did not produce any opinion pieces regarding the Umbrella Revolution over the surveyed period (August 2014–July 2017). Political-satirical cartoons in *Diplomat & International Canada* were considered as opinion pieces because of their traditional contributing role in the constructive debate about the political issues that affect the public (Townsend, McDonald, & Lin, 2008). Regrettably, possible appearances of satirical cartoons in *The Vancouver Sun*, *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), and the *SCMP* were not considered because pictorial features were not archived in their online databases.

The respective quantity of the articles that were labelled or identified as editorials, columns, letters to the editor, or satirical cartoons is listed in Table 2. The combined percentage of all opinion pieces is also listed.

Table 2. The quantity and percentage of the related opinion pieces.

¹⁹ The median value of the percentage of the related opinion pieces in all related articles in the Canadian newspapers $\approx 22.07\%$. The median value of the percentage of the related opinion pieces in all related articles in the Hong Kong newspapers $\approx 26.30\%$. The percent difference of the median values = $\frac{26.36\% - 22.07\%}{\frac{26.36\% + 22.07\%}{2}} \approx 17.72\%$.

Publication	Editorial(s)	Column(s)	Letter(s)	Cartoon(s)	Total quantity/Percentage of opinion pieces
The Vancouver Sun	0	6	1	n/a	7 / 24.14%
Toronto Star	3	2	2	0	7 / 20.00%
The Hill Times	0	0	0	0	0 / 0.00%
Diplomat & International Canada	0	0	1	3	4 / 80.00%
Policy Options	0	1	0	0	1 / 100%
Ming Pao	56	101	254	n/a	411 / 23.58%
SCMP	27	119	101	n/a	247 / 29.13%

Despite a small sample volume, the findings of non-Canadian content (including both news and opinion pieces) in the Canadian media's coverage of the Umbrella Revolution were consistent with the pattern found in the previous studies; that is, a high percentage of American-sourced content was included (Kariel & Rosenvall, 1983; Hackett, 1989; Wilke, Heimprecht, & Cohen, 2012). Within the selected Canadian daily newspapers, content derived from U.S. sources occupied a substantial portion of the coverage, at least for "factual" news. The pattern was not as evident in the newspaper opinion pieces (See Table 3 and Appendix D).

Table 3. The quantity and respective percentage of American-sourced contents/opinion pieces.

Publication	Quantity/Percentage of the American-sourced contents	Quantity of all contents	Quantity/Percentage of the American-sourced opinion pieces*	Quantity of all opinion pieces
The Vancouver Sun	12/41.38%	29	1/14.29%	7
Toronto Star	23/65.71%	35	1/14.29%	7
The Hill	0/0.00%	2	0/0.00%	0

Times				
Diplomat & International Canada	1/20.00%	5	1/25.00%	4
Policy Options	0/0.00%	1	0/0.00%	1

*Note: Relative percentage in proportion to all the opinion pieces

The Vancouver Sun and *Diplomat & International Canada* were also noted for their frequent use of content from third-country sources (defined as non-American and non-Canadian sources. See Table 4 and Appendix D). In total, the Canadian newspapers originated less than half of the content they published with respect to the Umbrella Revolution.

Table 4. The quantity and respective percentage of third-country-sourced contents/opinion pieces.

Publication	Quantity/Percentage of the third-country-sourced contents	Quantity of all contents	Quantity/Percentage of the third-country-sourced opinion pieces*	Quantity of all opinion pieces
The Vancouver Sun	3 / 10.34%	29	1 / 14.29%	7
Toronto Star	0 / 0.00%	35	0 / 0.00%	7
The Hill Times	0 / 0.00%	2	0 / 0.00%	0
Diplomat & International Canada	2 / 40.00%	5	2 / 50.00%	4
Policy Options	0/0.00%	1	0/0.00%	1

*Note: Relative percentage in proportion to all the opinion pieces

The results from the newspaper credits and Internet/social media searches suggested that journalists and columnists who were based in Hong Kong and/or of Hong Kong origin generated more than one third (*The Vancouver Sun*, 44.83%; *Toronto Star*, 34.29%) of the reports published by Canadian newspapers (See Table 5).

However, these reports predominantly came from Hong Kong branches of American news agencies and were, therefore, mostly news stories (See Appendix E). *The Vancouver Sun* had two journalists of Hong Kong origin. Chuck Chiang, the *Sun*'s Asia Pacific affairs columnist was a former journalist in Hong Kong. Chiang contributed the only two columns in this category. The *Sun*'s Daphne Bramham, based in Vancouver, covered the 1997 Hong Kong handover and was rushed to Hong Kong during the Umbrella Revolution to cover events on the ground. Hence, Bramham was not considered as based in Hong Kong. The *Toronto Star*'s original content did not feature any journalist of Hong Kong background or experience.

It is worth mentioning that *The Vancouver Sun* published a letter supporting Hong Kong's universal suffrage from Ma Ying-jeou, the then-President of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The *Toronto Star* also published a letter by a visiting scholar living in Taiwan who is from Mainland China.

Table 5. Quantity and percentage of the articles co-written by authors of Hong Kong origin and/or based in Hong Kong.

Publication	Quantity/Percentage of the articles (co-)written by authors of Hong Kong origin and/or based in Hong Kong
The Vancouver Sun	13 / 44.83%
Toronto Star	12 / 34.29%
The Hill Times	0 / 0.00%
Diplomat & International Canada	0 / 0.00%
Policy Options	0 / 0.00%

As shown in Figure 1 below, the general trends in both timing and frequency of Umbrella Revolution-related articles in Canadian newspapers closely tracked those published in Hong Kong newspapers. The Canadian newspapers generally followed the course of the Umbrella Revolution in a responsive and timely manner.




Figure 1. Timing and frequency of Umbrella Revolution-related articles

The Canadian newspapers did have a few days when coverage of the Umbrella Revolution was absent. A cross-examination of the articles in the four newspapers found

that on these dates the Umbrella Revolution was generally uneventful in terms of conflicts on the ground. However, there were several significant events that were not covered by the Canadian newspapers. These events were relatively important to Canadian readers who wanted to grasp a comprehensive understanding of the Umbrella Revolution.

For example, on August 31, 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, China's legislative body, set a legal framework to abet the approval Hong Kong chief executive candidates in the 2017 election. This decision was the direct cause of the immediate street protests that lasted for four months. However, the decision and the immediate response from the academic-led group Occupy Central were not covered by *The Vancouver Sun* until September 8, 2016. The pleas for and the subsequent launch of class boycotts from Hong Kong college and secondary student organizations were covered by *neither* of the Canadian newspapers.

Similar to the Hong Kong newspapers, the Canadian newspapers had peak coverage after the crowds of students and Occupy Central supporters clashed with police in Hong Kong's central financial district (September 28, 2014). When the situation on the ground became more calm in anticipation of a negotiated response by the government, the first and only formal talks between the Hong Kong government and the student leaders (October 21, 2014) was not covered by the Canadian newspapers.

In terms of various agents and their actions off the streets in the Umbrella Revolution, the anti-Occupy Central group's rally for public support, and the mediation by lawmakers from both the "pan-democratic camp" (泛民主派) and "pro-establishment camp" (建制派) were not evident in the Canadian coverage. But the "gangs" and "mobs" harassing the pro-democracy protesters were promptly mentioned in both *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star*.²⁰

Additionally, the disagreement on the tactics of protests between the Occupy Central leaders and student leaders was not evident at the early stage of the Canadian coverage. Both the *Sun* and the *Star* reported that police cleared the main demonstration site in Admiralty, Hong Kong. However, the Canadian newspapers did not follow up with

²⁰ "Activists suspect 'triad gangs' behind attack," *The Vancouver Sun*, October 14, 2014, p. A9. "Angry mobs turn on Hong Kong protesters," *Toronto Star*, October 14, 2014, p. A20.

the police action in the final protest site in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong on December 15, 2014.²¹

The frame analysis of the opinion pieces suggests that the conflict frame was the most frequently adopted in Canadian editorial coverage. The responsibility frame came a close second. This pattern was not reflected in the results pertaining to Hong Kong media where the responsibility frame had a clear edge over the other frames, exceeding more than 50 percent in both local newspapers (See Table 6).

Table 6. The frames of the opinion pieces on the Umbrella revolution.

	The Vancouver Sun	Toronto Star	Diplomat & International Canada	Policy Options	The Hill Times	Ming Pao	SCMP
Conflict	3 (27.27%)	4 (44.44%)	4 (100%)	0 (0.00%)	n/a	113 (21.16%)	54 (30.68%)
Human interest	2 (18.18%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	n/a	10 (1.87%)	6 (3.41%)
Economic consequences	2 (18.18%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	n/a	3 (0.56%)	17 (9.66%)
Morality	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	n/a	19 (3.58%)	2 (1.14%)

²¹ See Appendix F for a non-exhaustive timeline of the events in the Umbrella Revolution and the related coverage (or lack thereof) in the Canadian and Hong Kong newspapers. The timeline is deconstructed according to the news coverage in the SCMP and Ming Pao. The events included in the timeline were covered in detail in the local media. Therefore, they were considered relatively important in a valuable representation of the Umbrella Revolution.

Responsibility	2 (18.18%))	3 (33.33%))	0 (0.00%))	1 (50.00%))	n/a	333 (62.36%))	95 (53.98%))
Enlightenment	0 (0.00%))	0 (0.00%))	0 (0.00%))	0 (0.00%))	n/a	56 (10.49%))	2 (1.14%))
Domestication	2 (18.18%))	2 (22.22%))	0 (0.00%))	1 (50.00%))	n/a	n/a	n/a

The disruptive and sensational nature of the Umbrella Revolution inevitably encouraged a taste for street encounters between the conflicting parties. The Canadian media showed a clear interest in capturing this dynamic, but less so in the responsibilities and solutions that would be involved in an intrinsically foreign matter. Typically, the conflict frame dominated the limited coverage by *Diplomat & International Canada*, where in-depth report and analysis of the Umbrella Revolution were altogether absent. All of the satirical cartoons picked up by the magazine portrayed two conflicting parties: Hong Kong versus Beijing, pro-democracy protesters versus riot police, and communism versus democracy (See Appendix G).

The frames in the Canadian media were especially imbalanced at the local text level (within an individual article) compared to the articles in the Hong Kong newspapers. For example, of all the opinion pieces in the analyzed Canadian news media, only one article, “Face-saving solution needed” in the *Toronto Star*, contained both the conflict and responsibility frames. This article suggested that the conflicting parties needed to seek middle ground:

...[P]ro-democracy protesters who crowded Hong Kong’s streets should be seeking compromises that give Beijing a face-saving pretext to ease up ... China should remove Hong Kong’s current chief executive and postpone questions about the 2017 election until an acceptable solution can be negotiated. Meanwhile, protesters should be careful to give China a dignified way out of the crisis (Toronto Star, 2014c).

Yet this article was an edited copy of an editorial from the *Boston Globe* and, therefore, reflected an American view. “If China lashes out violently, there is little the United States can do to a country that has become such an important investor and trade partner,” stated the editorial (Toronto Star, 2014c). The Hong Kong newspapers took a more constructive approach in their coverage. In addition to a high percentage of opinion pieces with the responsibility frame only, 73 (13.67%) opinion pieces in *Ming Pao* and 22 (12.50%) in the *SCMP* that depicted the conflicts between parties also assigned responsibilities or offered solutions.

The human-interest frame, which “brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95), only applied in a fraction of all the frames identified in both the Canadian and Hong Kong opinion pieces. On one hand, the scale and spontaneity of the massive street protests overshadowed the leadership character of any individual, leader or follower. This is supported by the apparent inability of any leader or organizing group to persuade the remaining crowds to leave the streets at the later stages of the protest. On the other hand, despite the use of tear gas, extreme cases of individual suffering, which might have drawn the attention of both journalists and readers, were rare.

Nevertheless, among the articles bearing the human-interest frame, the Canadian media were charmed by the “faces” of the young student protesters. For example, the following excerpt from one of the *Sun*’s columns featured Joshua Wong, a secondary school student leader and his optimistic fellow students:

In the face of Beijing, run by some of the world’s most ruthless politicians, and a local government largely seen as detached and incompetent, it was easy to be charmed by the protesters ... The most memorable protest leader is 17-year-old Joshua Wong, who seemed to epitomize the sense of purpose voiced by many in Hong Kong’s new protest generation. “I’m organizing,” he explained to WorldViews last week, “because 30 years from now, I don’t want my own kid to be on the streets, fighting for democracy.” Everywhere you looked at the height of the protests, you saw young students chanting, singing songs, passing around supplies, swapping stories, painting banners and sharing

the moment together. The events of the past week will live long in their minds (Tharoor, 2014, p. B4).

Another column did not capture any individual student but portrayed a peaceful scene at the student protest site:

In the protest camp, there is a calm and somewhat surreal order... A “QUIET” sign is posted on a canteen where dozens of young people huddle over their phones and laptops, some of them scarfing down food from the nearby McDonald’s... There are sculptures and art installations near one of the underpasses, where the concrete walls are papered with colourful Post-it notes with heartfelt messages in dozens of languages (Bramham, 2014a, p. A8).

In contrast, the Hong Kong newspapers did not offer much compassion or admiration for the students. Joshua Wong was often addressed by his formal title “convenor of student activist group Scholarism.” This *SCMP* article gave an impression that Wong’s sincere fight for democracy was somewhat tarnished because of his silence over homophobic remarks that had been made by his father:

The move to link the democracy and gay-rights movements was not universally welcomed. “It is inappropriate to bundle a gay movement with a movement for democracy and freedom,” the Family School Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ordinance Concern Group—an anti-gay-rights group headed by Roger Wong Wai-ming, the father of Scholarism convenor Joshua Wong Chi-fung—said. “In our understanding, the so-called demands made in the ‘equal rights movement for the gay’ are contravening human rights and justice.” When asked to respond to his father’s remarks, Joshua Wong said he was “too busy” to comment (Fung, 2014, p. A3).

The Hong Kong media also expressed public doubts about the students’ insistence on street protests. The effect on “normal people” or “other citizens” lives and businesses was a major concern:

Think about how other citizens suffer. I believe that the intentions of one of the student leaders of the Occupy protest, Joshua Wong Chi-fung, are honest and heartfelt... But I would also be heartbroken that his actions and those of his fellow protesters have hurt a lot of people. These actions are contrary to the core values and meaning of democracy. In a democracy, all voices are respected. Democracy can only thrive in a society with law and order. The Occupy protests have led to rifts within families, businesses losing money, and traffic, including emergency services, and livelihoods have been disrupted (SCMP, 2014a, p. A12).

Additionally, the “faces” of the co-founders of the Occupy Central group who had already gained much publicity in the Hong Kong media prior to the street protests, were relatively rare in the Canadian coverage.

The morality frame, which “puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of religious tenets or moral prescriptions” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, pp. 95–96) was absent in Canadian newspaper coverage. Covering the Umbrella Revolution from a morality frame requires journalists’ insights into the religious attitudes and social prescriptions in Hong Kong. In the Hong Kong media, the discussions of morality generally included three aspects.

The first was constructed around Christian tenets and the role of Christians in the protests. The co-founders of Occupy Central were known for having Christian backgrounds. Their advocacy of civil disobedience was discussed in depth in the context the biblical teaching of obedience to rulers (Kwok, 2015; Aagwo, 2014a).

The second aspect instructed the protesters on how to behave in accordance with social prescriptions. For example, one editorial from the *SCMP* (2014b) expressed the newspaper’s regrets that some college students carried umbrellas while receiving graduation certificates on the stage during “a solemn and dignified ceremony.”

The third aspect occurred as collective frames with the responsibility frame; e.g., how the British government had failed in its “moral obligation” to Hong Kong. A column in the *SCMP* criticized London for failing in its “moral obligation” toward Hong Kong

when the British government questioned the use of tear gas against protesters by the Hong Kong police but would not halt their tear gas sales to Hong Kong (Chugani, 2014).

A further frame—economic consequences—only showed up twice in Canadian opinion pieces. There were no articles that linked the instability in Hong Kong to any direct influence on the Canadian economy at the time of the protests. Only one article by David Bond took the unrest as an argument over a domestic economic issue (Bond, 2014). The English-language *SCMP* exhibited the highest use of the economic consequences frame. The pattern was consistent with the readership survey conducted by the Social Science Research Centre of the University of Hong Kong, which suggested most readers of the *SCMP* were professionals, managers, executives, traders, or proprietors (SCMP, 2017).

It is also worth mentioning that apart from the five common media frames, an *enlightenment frame* was found in Hong Kong media's coverage, especially in *Ming Pao*. The enlightenment frame encompassed quasi-literary and quasi-academic discussions of a series of political subjects pertaining to the Umbrella Revolution such as the art history of civil disobedience (Yang, 2014), the history and strategies of global student movements (An, 2014), and Hannah Arendt's political philosophy (Xu, 2014). These discussions were characterized by their informative and educational nature. The strong presence of the enlightenment frame implied *Ming Pao*'s elite-oriented status and its efforts in providing a public sphere for rational debate. The enlightenment frame was not apparent in any of the Canadian publications (See Appendix H).

The domestication of international news is a mediated process in which journalists consciously or unconsciously produce and reproduce the discourse of international events in a way that is accustomed to the frameworks of their national audience, the structure of their media organizations, and the norms of their society (Lee, Chan, Pan & So, 2002). The extroverted domestication of the Umbrella Revolution connected the local/national concerns and interests with the international events (Olausson, 2014).

The use of editorials and columns from foreign news services inevitably diluted how much Canadian perspective was conveyed in the coverage. In the Canadian

discourse exhibited by the limited quantities of the opinion pieces, three categories of extroverted domestication of the Umbrella Revolution were observed.

The first category of extroverted domestication worked in tandem with the responsibility frame, connecting Hong Kong's democratic future to the responsibility of the Canadian government. For example, the *Toronto Star's* editorial on October 1, 2014 urged Prime Minister Harper's Conservative government to take more action in supporting Hong Kong's universal suffrage:

[I]t would be good to hear something more than platitudes from Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Conservative government. Canada supports the "universal suffrage" that Hong Kong was promised. But Ottawa's response to the protests—and the police batons, tear gas and pepper spray that have been deployed against young demonstrators—has been tepid...Canada should have more to say on this. It was only two weeks ago, after all, that Harper's government issued a stirring statement for Democracy Day affirming that "Canada will continue to support efforts to give citizens a strong voice in shaping the future of their societies" (Toronto Star, 2014a, p. A14).

Almost two years later in *Policy Options*, a column written by Alex Neve, the secretary general of Amnesty International Canada, echoed the call for the Canadian government to step up their support for civil liberties in both Hong Kong and China. This time, the plea was addressed to the Trudeau administration:

In other trips over the years by Liberal and Conservative leaders alike, there has been ample space for frank discussion on trade, investment, immigration and, on occasion, panda bears. The attention given to human rights, however, has generally been much less impressive. Despite China's glaring shortcomings, across a wide array of human rights concerns, those are precisely the cases and issues that have always taken a back seat.

Too sensitive. Too controversial. Too soon. Too embarrassing.

Moves by Beijing to vet and deny some candidates the right to stand for Hong Kong's Legislative Council elections because of their views on independence violate rights to

freedom of opinion and expression. Other concerns include prohibiting discussion of independence in Hong Kong schools and refusing to recognize the Canadian passports of Hong Kong Chinese who have citizenship here. The Prime Minister must make it clear that China's broken promises to uphold human rights in Hong Kong are unacceptable (Neve, 2016).

The domestication of international news is not only a nation-building strategy employed as "a political countermeasure to globalization" but also a process in which international news producers "justify the relevance of their news in terms of audience appeal" (Clausen, 2004, p. 29). Similar to articles in the Canadian news media that showed evidence of the responsibility frame, the criticisms contained in the above excerpts were clearly directed toward Ottawa rather than Beijing because Canada's commitment to promoting democracy and human rights worldwide is both a consensus and a concern among Canadians.

Retrospectively, Canadian media were noted for their concerns for democracy and civil liberties in covering the handover ceremony of Hong Kong in 1997 (Lee, Chan, Pan & So, 2002). In a wider context, the Canadian government helped strengthen democratic institutions in colonial Hong Kong by, for example, offering advice on electoral practice and the drafting of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. Ottawa also maintained parliamentary links with Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Lee, Chan, Pan & So, 2002).

The continuity of the Canadian news media's discourse for promoting democracy and human rights at a global level is in line with Canada's status as a middle power with a foreign policy guided by a "humane internationalist" orientation (Behringer, 2003). A middle power, according to a widely accepted definition, is measured by the international behavior of the country rather than by the objective factors such as population and gross national product figures (Behringer, 2003). A middle power country engages in *middlepowermanship*, which includes "[the] tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, [the] tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and [the] tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide...diplomacy" (Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal, as cited in Behringer, 2003, p. 2).

As a middle power, Canada played a central role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947–1948 (Government of Canada, 2017a). “The promotion of Canadian values—freedom, democracy, democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law” is considered as the core of Canada’s foreign policy (Government of Canada, 2017b). Domesticating the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution into the Canadian discourse of “humane internationalist” foreign policy suggests that a filter exists as to how the Canadian media perceived and justified the relevance of the events. Dominant ideologies and values in Canadian society were reaffirmed in the construction of the discourse revolving around the Umbrella Revolution.

The second category of extroverted domestication is rooted in the Canadian domestic discourses surrounding various issues directly or indirectly related to the events in Hong Kong. For example, the discourse on the Umbrella Revolution became part of the discourse on Canada’s immigration predicament. To assess the potential impact of the instability in Hong Kong on Canada’s immigration system and demographics, Todd’s (2014) front page article in *The Vancouver Sun* interviewed members in Vancouver’s Hong Kong-affiliated community and an expert in East Asian politics. The interviewees were quoted to convey public opinions in Hong Kong and to ease Canadian anxieties of immigration influx:

Jonathan Chan, who has relatives in Hong Kong, said residents of the semi-autonomous region are not feeling the same “paranoia” they did in the early 1990s, immediately following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, about brutal suppression by Beijing’s authoritarian leaders...University of B.C. law professor Pitman Potter, who specializes in East Asian politics and had first-hand experience of Hong Kong residents’ reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre, doesn’t imagine many will soon pull up their roots and careers to move to Canada (p. A1).

The situation in Hong Kong was also utilized as a cautionary tale, for example, to support arguments on domestic matters. In *The Vancouver Sun*, Daphne Bramham’s (2014b) front page

article made an analogous connection between the dominance of well-funded partisan candidates in the municipal elections of British Columbia's cities and the pre-approved slates in Hong Kong:

In Hong Kong, thousands of people have stood up to tear gas and threats as they try to win the right to have some choice in picking who will run for the top job in the city...Here, we have democracy. Yet, we care little enough about it that we abdicated some of the very choices Hong Kong citizens are desperate for...Nowhere has it been done so grossly as at the municipal level, where moneyed elites control our choices with all the aplomb of Beijing's leaders. They do it through murky organizations—some of which are even loath to describe themselves as parties—third-party sponsorships and fundraising...[W]e let it happen because the overwhelming majority of B.C. municipalities are run well enough that citizens don't have problems as much as annoyances. But it matters who governs, as Hong Kongers seem to realize better than we do. So, it shouldn't be too much to ask that we take the time to cast informed votes. Because maybe if we do, our next generation—17-year-olds like Hong Kong leader Joshua Wong—will never have to take to the streets to defend democracy (p. A1).

Also in the *Sun*, Bond (2014) used the unrest in Hong Kong to expostulate on the proposal that Vancouver becoming the next global hub for direct currency exchange to and from the *renminbi*, China's currency:

The current turmoil in that city is proof positive of just how little freedom of action is permitted in what has been characterized as “one nation two systems.” The system is determined by the Communist party hierarchy in Beijing not in Hong Kong. It will be a far distant day when the renminbi becomes an international reserve currency used to settle trade accounts (p. C4).

On a side note, another aspect contained in the two examples above was the use of stereotypes as reduced knowledge (Lippmann, 1998; R. Dyer, 2000). Both sides in the Umbrella Revolution conflict were extracted and relocated into the domestic discourse by

Canadian journalists without giving their readers much context or detail. The Hong Kong street protesters served as an exemplar to encourage Canadians to cast informed votes. Conversely, Beijing's manipulation and incursion into the voting process were adopted as a convenient tool to sound the alarm. Who were the protesters? Why and how were they protesting? Why did their street actions deliver positive messages? How did the election committee in Hong Kong resemble the elite-controlled city councils in British Columbia? How was Beijing manipulating the political system in Hong Kong? Why should the system not be determined by the Communist party cadres in Beijing? How was limited freedom linked to the international settlement of the *renminbi*? All of these questions were not addressed by Canadian journalists. While it is not realistic to expect journalists to cover all facets of this discussion in a single newspaper article, and while using stereotypes as reduced knowledge is not necessarily without basis, the public is more likely to take things for granted and less likely to be equipped with the proper knowledge to engage in critical and meaningful debates if the media are deploying and instilling stereotypes without providing concrete details.

The third category of extroverted domestication did not tie the Umbrella Revolution to any specific domestic issue but served the purpose of nation building through the discursive construction of international events (mishaps). The discourse of the Umbrella Revolution became part of the mega-discourse that builds national pride and increases social cohesion.²² "We're fortunate to be in Canada," the *Toronto Star*'s editorial on Thanksgiving Day in 2014, offered an example:

Merciless wars in Syria and Iraq produce horrific outrages; millions have become refugees; there's escalating risk of terrorist attack; lives are being lost as Russia violates the borders of neighbouring Ukraine; brave Hong Kong protesters confront China's repressive regime; and Ebola ravages West Africa, with more than 4,000 dead so far and no end in sight... Canada remains an island of calm and a beacon of hope compared to almost everywhere else on the planet. We don't often remember that amid the stresses and distractions of the daily news cycle... Our health-care system generally serves us

²² Mega discourse spans over extended time and space. It reflects a long-range interest in the macro-system context (Sutherland, 2005).

well, despite its flaws...The economy is strong and our standard of living remains exceptionally high. We're a small population rooted in a vast land, brimming with untapped wealth. It's a place where the rule of law prevails, where human rights have steadily advanced, and where all nationalities, races and faiths live in relative harmony. No wonder people around the world dream of settling here (Toronto Star, 2014).

The third category of extroverted domestication found its echo in a grand discourse on North American values.²³ In an article published in *The Hill Times* on the same day, Hillary Clinton also used the civil unrest in Hong Kong as a negative example to emphasize the importance of North America serving as “an anchor of ‘peace,’ ‘progress,’ and ‘prosperity’” (as cited in Aiello, 2014, p. 39).

Building on the content and frame analyses, the discourse-historical approach found that Canadian media generally did not engage in critical and cultural interpretations of the Umbrella Revolution. Meaningful elements of the protests were largely absent.

Aroused by Beijing's final decision on August 31, 2014, the street protests in Hong Kong initiated a concurrence of the long-planned academic-led civil disobedience movement Occupy Central and the class boycotts that were launched respectively by the Hong Kong Federation of Students (higher education), Scholarism (secondary school) and other minor student organizations.

At the early stage, as the streets were not yet filled up with protesters, there was no overarching term being used by news media to describe the protests. In all of the samples collected for this study, the word “umbrella” initially appeared in *Ming Pao* on September 14, 2014, two weeks before the protesters used umbrellas to deflect tear gas. Joeng (2014) pleaded to school principals and teachers to support the boycott of classes:

[T]he students believe the school is a safe place where they can study happily. They gathered many classmates and used umbrellas to make a piece of installation art, as an implication that the school can stop wind and rain for them. Certainly! Our schools are

²³ Grand discourse is defined as “an assembly of discourses, ordered and presented as an integrated frame” (Alvesson & Kärreman, as cited in Sutherland, 2005, p. 187).

witnessing a storm! Principals, teachers, parents, we must defend Hong Kong no matter what happens, for the future of our kids! (“藝術初體驗：物件(十一)——雨傘,” para. 7).

The metaphorical and practical values of the umbrellas—shielding against harsh external elements—were embraced by the protesters. Holding an umbrella is also a symbolic act that incorporates a linguistic value. “Hold,” as “撐” (*caang*) in Cantonese, the lingua franca in Hong Kong, means “to support” and has been constantly used as an expression of solidarity in Hong Kong’s movements for various public causes. Hong Kong’s first public petition website was called “撐香港 Support HK,” which has the word in its logo. And the posters of the Umbrella Revolution certainly demonstrated the creative association of the action of holding an umbrella to the public support for Hong Kong.



Figure 2. The logo of Support HK and a poster writes “Hold umbrella Hold (support) Hong Kong.”

However, in the Canadian media, the spirit of solidarity and defence against tyranny that were purposefully embedded in the action of holding umbrellas was not conveyed to Canadian readers. “Umbrella” emerged in the Canadian coverage on September 29, 2014, one day after the street protesters in Hong Kong were seen using them to deflect tear gas. The name “umbrella revolution” was soon picked up by both *The*

Vancouver Sun and the *Toronto Star* on September 30 and became the general code name for the protests in subsequent coverage.

The *Sun*'s article (credited to Simon Parry with the London *Daily Telegraph*) introduced, "[w]earing black T-shirts tagged with yellow ribbons and carrying umbrellas to deflect tear gas that have provided the name for the Umbrella Revolution, the students poured into the centre of Hong Kong in unprecedented numbers (Parry, 2014, p. B3). The *Toronto Star* appropriated the term on the same day in an article supplied by the *Associated Press*: "[W]hile many Hong Kong residents support the calls for greater democracy—dubbed the 'umbrella revolution' by some, although the crowds' demands fall far short of revolution—the unrest worries others" (Watt, 2014, p. A3).

These lines, although not strictly Canadian in origin, suggest that the term "umbrella revolution" was transplanted into Canadian coverage without much thought. The cultural code of holding umbrellas, so meaningful to the people of Hong Kong, was never explained or interpreted in the Canadian news media. Instead, simplified expositions of the code name were typical, such as: "carrying umbrellas...have provided the name" and "dubbed the 'umbrella revolution' by some."

When the Occupy Central group, student organizations, and other demonstrators all took to the streets in protest and converged, the Hong Kong newspapers, on the other hand, explicitly expressed both the protests leaders' and their own preference for the name "umbrella movement." The Hong Kong media believed that "umbrella movement" would not to further agitate the situation, although mixed usage of the code names happened at times (mostly by columnists):

[S]everal Hong Kong scholars claim that the name "umbrella revolution" used in foreign media to describe the protests is not accurate. The student-led democracy movement aims to reconstruct the system rather than to overthrow the regime. The name "umbrella revolution" can cause misjudgement by Beijing, evoking memories of the "colour revolutions"²⁴...And the spontaneous protests seemingly differ from those highly-

²⁴ The "colour revolutions" have been generally associated with a series of events in the 1990s and 2000s which occurred in several Eurasian countries and post-Soviet republics. "These events were characterized by mass popular uprisings which led to the non-violent toppling of the incumbent regime and its replacement with one with ostensibly closer ties to the populace" (Stewart, 2009, p. 645).

organized colour revolutions. It is no wonder that some scholars believe the name “umbrella revolution” will be more of a hindrance than a help to Hong Kong’s situation. It is believed that “umbrella movement” is more appropriate, which will not agitate the central government (Ming Pao, 2014a, “暴民作惡損國際形象爭民主只需善意關心暴民作惡損國際形象爭民主只需善意關心,” para. 8. See Appendix I for the original text).

Tony Burman (2014), former head of CBC News and Al-Jazeera English commended the protesters in a column for the *Toronto Star*, “Hong Kong’s amazing pro-democracy ‘umbrella revolution’ is passionate, inspiring and a marvel to watch. But more sobering, it is the most powerful political challenge to China’s authority since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989” (p. WD3). However, the historical reference was a Western construct because neither the name “umbrella revolution” nor the pictures of “the Tiananmen Square massacre” were embraced by the Hong Kong population in a *revolutionary* sense. In reality, the Tiananmen massacre shattered Hong Kong’s confidence in living under communist rule and stirred a mass migration wave (Tsang, 2004). China’s Cultural Revolution, a distant memory for most, spilled over into leftist riots in Hong Kong causing hundreds of casualties (G. Cheung, 2016). Hence, during the “Umbrella Revolution,” a pragmatic or not-so-revolutionary attitude toward the central government was adopted by both the Hong Kong news media and the protesters.

In an interview with *Ming Pao*, student leader Joshua Wong explicitly expressed his stance: “We are not going to be martyrs nor starting a revolution. We are not starting an umbrella revolution. It is a movement...I do not like the word ‘revolution.’ We are not going to overthrow the regime” (Ming Pao, 2014c, “黃之鋒：人大「開閘」撤離唯一條件,” para. 6. See Appendix I for the original text).

The rejection of the word “revolution” in their political communication (and aspiration) was also present in an open letter from the student leaders to Chinese President Xi Jinping. The students “reiterated that their movement was not a ‘colour revolution’ but a genuine call for universal suffrage and a government that is truly accountable for its actions” (Lau & Nip, 2014, p. A1). Indeed, with a garrison of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the city, and considering Beijing’s hardline stance

and economic leverage, it is not a surprise that the media and protests leaders in Hong Kong wished to distance themselves from the “colour revolutions” in former Soviet countries, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East.²⁵ After all, Hong Kong is noted for its pragmatism and the rule of law. The protests were generally peaceful. There were no deaths. When pressed, the Occupy Central leaders surrendered themselves to the police as a gesture to uphold the rule of law.

As for Beijing’s narrative, China’s Vice-Premier Wang Yang was quick to label the protests as a colour revolution and condemned “external forces.” “The tone and manner in which Chinese officials have been denouncing the Occupy movement are reminiscent of what led to the 1989 crackdown,” reported Albert Cheng (Cheng, 2014, p. A17).

This is crucial. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were also student-led democracy demonstrations that escalated in street protests and, in effect, broke the balance between China’s supreme leader Deng Xiaoping and then reformist Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. Tiananmen changed the course of China’s political reforms by essentially suspending them and punishing those who were thought to be complicit.²⁶ After the significant casualties in the Tiananmen Incident, Beijing made continuous efforts to erase the history of the protest and conducted a shift of focus onto economic development. As a consequence, average mainland Chinese citizens became less interested in politics (Lui, 2000; Zhao, 2009). Hence, the people of Hong Kong did not support an outcome wherein the Umbrella Revolution developed into an actual revolution, or anything echoing Tiananmen.²⁷ In short, Tony Burman and the *Toronto Star* got it wrong.

The term “umbrella revolution” was, therefore, likely a creation of Western news media that was picked up by Canadian news media. Indeed, the actual use of the term in the Canadian media studied for this thesis comes from authors who were neither *in* Hong Kong nor of Hong Kong origin (See Appendix J). However, the fact that the attempts to distinguish or interpret the term were never made in the Canadian media still suggested

²⁵ For example, Beijing suspended tour groups to Hong Kong during the Umbrella Revolution (SCMP Staff Reporters, 2014a).

²⁶ Officials who showed sympathy for or sided with the students were purged after the Tiananmen protests. Zhao Ziyang was put under house arrest for the rest of his life (Zhao, 2009).

²⁷ “Hong Kong faces echoes of Tiananmen,” *Toronto Star*, October 4, 2014, p. WD3.

that journalists were undiscerning toward the use of the term. After all, the free spirit in a revolution and the possible outcome of greater regional autonomy through “revolution” is consistent with a prevailing ideology in Canadian society that supports democracy and greater local autonomy.

Compared to the overwhelmingly dominant narratives of centralization, unification, allegiance, and coercion in China (Callahan, 2004), the history of the Canadian federation was based on the conflicting imperatives of unity and diversity (Gagnon, 2000). The principles of “provincial equality, multi-culturalism and the normative emphasis on individual rights have been consolidated as the main tenets of Canadian political culture” (p. 23). The discourses of Canadian federalism are characterized by debates over language, region, and managing difference. “National unity versus difference, ‘province-building’ versus ‘nation-building,’ ‘national standards’ and common social citizenship versus provincial autonomy and valuing diversity are the fundamental preoccupations that shape the Canadian federalism discourse” (Simeon & Radin, 2010, p. 360). The disturbing thoughts and possible violent consequences that could be evoked by the term “umbrella revolution” are intangible to most Canadians.

Malcolm Gladwell, a Canadian author and journalist, happened to be in Hong Kong during the protests. His views, published in the *SCMP*, were quite representative of the general Canadian position: “I can’t comment on the exact issues because I simply don’t know about it well enough. But I’m drawn to anyone who is agitating a path to democracy. So in a broad sense, I’m in sympathy” (as cited in Zhang, 2014, p. C7).

In sum, the cultural nuances of solidarity, pragmatism, allegiance, and fear that were embedded in the code name were less prominent and eventually lost in cross-cultural communication as soon as the protests were presented as “marvels to watch” in the Canadian news media.

Besides umbrellas, other symbols used in the protests were also meaningful and rich cultural connotation. As Lim (2015) suggests, in East Asian cultures “performances and visual art representations are less abrasive, subtle, and nuanced forms of protests, minimizing destructive confrontations by avoiding physical damage to properties and

individuals, and preserve a face-saving escape route for negotiations and compromise between both protestors and the state” (p. 84).

According to Hong Kong news media, student union members started to give away yellow ribbons on September 1, 2014, as soon as class boycotts were declared (Siu, Zhao, Sun, & Chan, 2014). Overseas Hong Kong communities, such as international students in Australia, quickly jumped on the bandwagon, handing out yellow ribbons in support of the Hong Kong students (Ming Pao, 2014a). Hon’s (2014) article in *Ming Pao* credited the protestors’ inspiration to the song “Tie a Yellow Ribbon Round the Ole Oak Tree” by the American pop music group Tony Orlando and Dawn. The song is told from the first-person narrative of an inmate:

I’m coming home. I’ve done my time
Now I’ve got to know what is and isn’t mine
If you received my letter telling you I’d soon be free
Then you’ll know just what to do
If you still want me
If you still want me
Whoa, tie a yellow ribbon ‘round the ole oak tree
It’s been three long years
Do ya still want me
If I don’t see a ribbon ‘round the ole oak tree
I’ll stay on the bus... (Tony Orlando and Dawn, 1973).

It is up for interpretation whether wearing the yellow ribbons indeed signified wide support by the Hong Kong public, support and pardons for the street protestors if they broke the law and were subject to time in jail. But the yellow ribbons became synonymous with Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. On and off the streets, locals wore yellow ribbons to demonstrate their resolve for a democratic cause (Ming Pao, 2014a).

As a matter of fact, the yellow ribbons and their original symbolic meanings are an American motif. From 19th-century American artist Frederick Remington’s paintings

of the U.S. Calvary to their renewed popularity in the Gulf War, yellow ribbons have been used to signify support for American troops (McCready, 2010). The yellow ribbons were also significant in the American suffrage movement (Coleman, 2014; Woman Suffrage Memorabilia, 2017). In Canada, the yellow ribbons have gained significance in the country's "nation of peacekeepers" narrative, as Canada's own national "Support Our Troops" campaign also used yellow ribbons as its emblem (McCready, 2010).

The use of the yellow ribbons by protesters in Hong Kong was included in Canadian media accounts, but again without an interpretation of local meaning. It is possible that "the yellow ribbons that [had] become ubiquitous in Canada" (McCready, 2010, p. 29) simply created a taken-for-granted interpretive ground, so much so that it was thought to be unnecessary to consider that they might have a different meaning for protesters in Hong Kong. Plus there is a feel-good, nostalgic quality to the yellow ribbon trope. As Noam Chomsky (2002) has commented in the American context, the yellow ribbons were part of the omnipresent but meaningless concepts used in public relations and government propaganda. "...[V]apid, empty concepts like Americanism. Who can be against that? Or harmony. Who can be against that? Or, as in the Persian Gulf War, 'Support our troops.' Who can be against that? Or yellow ribbons. Who can be against that? Anything that's totally vacuous" (p. 18).

Nevertheless, the yellow ribbons should have merited a critical and cultural interpretation for Canadian newsreaders as a matter of journalistic professionalism, as should other cultural nuances such as the protesters' gesture of the crossed arms (See Appendix K), the pro-law enforcement "blue ribbon" rally, and the protest anthem "Do You Hear the People Sing," a song from *Les Misérables*.²⁸ None were interpreted in their local context for Canadian audiences. Many were simply omitted from coverage altogether. Yet these cultural nuances were there for anyone to see, captured and explained in detail by the Hong Kong press and by knowledgeable international news outlets such as Britain's *Daily Telegraph* (Moore, 2014), even if some of the *Telegraph's* Umbrella Revolution-related articles were accessed and reproduced by *The Vancouver Sun* (See Appendix D).

²⁸ The song is called "À la volonté du peuple" in the original French version and "問誰未發聲 (Who haven't spoken out yet)" in the Cantonese version that was adopted by the pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong.

Spontaneous crowds spread beyond the streets of Central, Hong Kong during the height of the “Umbrella Revolution.” But the archetype (in the Hong Kong context) of the street protests was the long-planned academic-led non-violent Occupy Central in Hong Kong’s central district. Prior to the launch of street actions, the discourse of Occupy Central was already in circulation in the Hong Kong media through frequent political debates over topics such as democracy, civil disobedience, and the rule of law (Lam, 2014a). Even after the term “umbrella revolution” was coined and was gaining its popularity in international media, the local media still used “occupy central” to refer to pro-democracy protests, whether organized or spontaneous. “Occupy Central” (officially “Occupy Central with Love and Peace”) is of profound significance in the Umbrella Revolution and in any discussion of Hong Kong’s democratic progress.

However, compared with the publicity Occupy Central and its co-founders received in the local media, they remained relatively unknown in the Canadian news media, and on those occasions when recognition was forthcoming, Canadian newspapers often got it wrong. Noticeably, *The Vancouver Sun* (Bramham, 2014a) mistakenly introduced Martin Lee as “one of Occupy Central’s co-founders” (p. A8). Everyone in Hong Kong would have recognized Lee as the most widely acclaimed advocate for democracy in Hong Kong (Liu, 2008). However, they would also have known that retired legislator was not Occupy Central’s co-founder.

Neither Beijing’s response to the movement, nor the planning and publicity that Occupy Central devoted to the cause was formed in one day. According to the Hong Kong media, Dr. Benny Tai raised the idea of Occupy Central in a newspaper commentary entitled “Civil disobedience is the most powerful weapon” on January 16, 2013. Tai, Reverend Chu Yiu-ming and Dr. Chan Kin-man released Occupy’s manifesto on March 27 of the same year. Tai announced the formal launch of Occupy Central on September 28, 2014 (Lam, 2014a). Martin Lee expressed his plan to attend Occupy Central in response to an interview in *Ming Pao* on September 13, 2014 and took to streets with *Apple Daily*’s founder Jimmy Lai after hearing that tear gas was being used on September 28, 2014 (Ming Pao, 2014c; Ming Pao, 2014d).

In the Hong Kong media, Dr. Benny Tai, Reverend Chu Yiu-ming and Dr. Chan Kin-man were unequivocally regarded as the co-founders of Occupy Central. Tai is an

Associate Professor of Law at the University of Hong Kong, a Protestant. Reverend Chu is the minister of Chai Wan Baptist Church in Hong Kong, a Protestant. Chan is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, a “pro-Christian non-believer.” The Occupy Central’s manifesto was announced in Kowloon Union Church. “[Occupy Central is] led by two and a half Christians,” the Hong Kong media said in jest (Aagwo, 2014a).

There is no question that the leaders of Occupy Central utilized their own position in the Christian community to help prepare, inspire, and mobilize the civil disobedience movement. The theory of public theology emphasizes that “civil society is moulded by religion and culture” (Kwok, 2015, p. 171). Exactly how the Protestant ethnic ethos corresponds to the spirit of capitalism (Weber, 2009) and to the rise of liberal democracy (Bruce, 2004), and how the leaders of Occupy Central politicized Christianity and interacted with the public (Kwok, 2015) could capably form the foundation for an entirely different study. Nevertheless, through rational discussions, theological or political, the co-founders have been collectively recognized in local Hong Kong media accounts as “佔中三子 zim zung saam zi” (literally, occupy central’s three masters/gentlemen). *Zi* (子), in Classical Chinese, can be used as an honorific to refer to a master, a wise and learned man, or the fourth rank in the peerage of Imperial China (W. Ma, 2006), which is roughly equal to a viscount in the English system. The most known usage is seen in the titles of ancient Chinese philosophers such as *Kong zi* (Confucius, Master Kong) and *Sun zi* (Sun Tzu, Master Sun) (Denecke, 2017).

The title “Three Masters/Gentlemen of Occupy Central,” therefore, not only denotes the occupations of the co-founders but also connotes the respect and recognition from Hong Kong society accorded to them for their efforts both in the cause of democracy and in upholding a philosophy of non-violent civil disobedience embedded in their political/theological stance.

Regrettably, in addition to the *Sun*’s factual error, the prestige of the Three Masters, the philosophy of Occupy Central, and the role of Christianity were largely invisible in the Canadian news media. For example, the *Toronto Star* briefly introduced Occupy Central with Love and Peace in the article entitled, “The faces behind the protests,” an article that was credited to *Foreign Policy* without mentioning *all* of the co-

founders and their advocacy positions. Only Reverend Chu was identified, and then only in the context of his experience under the Communist Party's rule:

Occupy Central with Love and Peace is a pro-democracy civil disobedience movement founded as a response to what some in Hong Kong see as Beijing's gradual encroachment upon the city's political freedoms. Occupy Central proposed in January 2013 that if Hong Kong were not granted universal suffrage as outlined by Hong Kong's Basic Law, Occupy Central protesters would shut down Hong Kong's central financial district, effectively crippling the city, which has been known as a safe and stable destination for global business.

Chu Yiu-ming, a church minister and veteran human rights activist, is an Occupy Central co-organizer. Now 70 years old, Chu grew up in mainland China and lived through the Cultural Revolution, a traumatic period of Communist party-led turmoil from 1966 to 1976. He is known for helping several Tiananmen Square protesters flee China in 1989 in an operation called Yellowbird. Involved with Occupy Central since 2013, Chu assumed the position of leader of Occupy Central in January 2014. Chu has stated that although he is "really afraid of the Communist Party," he believes that "if we bow to fate, we will lose everything" (Tsoi & Bethany, 2014, p. A14).

Although the article gave basic information about Occupy Central and one of its co-founders with a steadfast focus on their conflicts with Beijing, it failed to address much detail about their non-violent approach to political disagreements. Tellingly, the article went on to introduce the student leaders in its following paragraphs. A stock photo from Getty Images featuring Joshua Wong and other student protesters was placed above the headline "The faces behind the protests" (See Appendix K).

On the contrary, the advocacy of the Three Masters and their position with respect to protest were evident in the Hong Kong newspapers, as shown in the following four excerpts:

What the Three Masters of Occupy Central said [about love and peace], is a self-controlled Protestant love, "[We] can't attack the police. We tie up our hands. We don't

argue... (G. Chan, 2014, “同場加映：佔中來了，不再一條女,” para. 7. See Appendix I for the original text).

In fact, the Three Masters have always been reluctant to have students join their movement. [You] can say that they care about the students, or they think students are immature and overly radical. The Three Masters never asked students to join their movement (Z. Cheung, 2014, “成龍比范太強,” para. 6. See Appendix I for the original text).

After sporadic appearances, pan-democratic old guards have all but disappeared from the streets. The so-called three gentlemen of Occupy Central are nowhere to be seen. No doubt the rigour of sleeping rough on hard pavements is too much for our high-paid professors and august barristers who prefer issuing media statements and calling press conferences than leading the young and negotiating with officials (Lo, 2014b, p. A2).

They published a detailed “manual of disobedience” for protesters to follow. “The ultimate aim of the campaign,” the manual says, “is to establish a society embracing equality, tolerance, love and care. We fight against the unjust system, not individuals. We are not to destroy or humiliate law enforcers, rather we are to win over their understanding and respect. We need to avoid physical confrontation, and also avoid developing hatred in our hearts (Fung & Lam, 2014, p. A4).

Besides the Three Masters of Occupy Central, Joshua Wong a leader of the secondary school student organization Scholarism, also identifies as Christian. Christian leadership, therefore, certainly played an important role in organizing and mobilizing the protests (See Appendix L). This explains why the role of Christianity was represented and discussed in depth in the Hong Kong news media. As previous research has observed (Kwok, 2015)—and this research reconfirms—theological discussions and debates in the secular Hong Kong media were not rare during the protests. In news coverage, for example, the contradictory opinions of Hong Kong’s leading Christian churches on the approaches taken by the social movements were introduced:

While former Catholic leader Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun warned that voting in the 2017 chief executive under restrictive conditions laid down by Beijing would be meaningless. By contrast Anglican Archbishop the Most Reverend Paul Kwong, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, was criticised in July for urging Christians to “remain silent” in the face of social conflicts as Jesus was silent on the cross. Chu, whose Chai Wan Baptist Church is not affiliated to either diocese, said while it was normal for different churches to express different views “it was a worse thing to cite the Bible and create misunderstanding among the congregation or the society.” “For example, [if you cite the Bible] to say that we must submit to authority, you [could be] reading it too simply...in fact if rulers are disobeying God, we won’t obey them either,” he said (Lam & Cheung, 2014).

In editorial coverage, furthermore, a virtual debate over the protest approach pertaining to political-theological tenets between Reverend Daniel Ng, Reverend Yuen Tin-yau, and the columnist was conducted in an interview published in *Ming Pao*:

[Reverend Daniel Ng:] My position is based on realism. Politics has always been an art of consultation. Experienced *homo politicus* should depart from reality...Continuing the radical confrontation will not change anything but prolong the painful time and waste the opportunity to reconcile with each other...

[Aagwo (columnist):] We are familiar with the narrative that politics is about realism, consultation, and consensus. But we are surprised to hear that from a pastor—does not Christianity always encourage its followers to uphold doctrines and principles?...

[Reverend Yuen Tin-yau:] I believe in a theological concept of “already but not yet.” For example, according to Jesus, God’s kingdom is in my heart, but God’s kingdom has not arrived yet...

[Aagwo:] Reverend Yuen uses the theological concept to suggest the people in Hong Kong should live through the struggling. Embrace the reality but do not give up idealism (Aagwo, 2014a, “果欄：平行世界裏的教會領袖要現實，定要理想？” See Appendix I for the original text).

However, in the Canadian coverage, the role of Christianity in the protests was essentially invisible. Indeed, there were just two references to Christianity in the Canadian accounts of the protests and their origins. The first was in a *Vancouver Sun* interview with a Vancouver resident of Hong Kong origin who happens to be a Christian:

Even though Chan generally supports the ideals of the pro-democracy movement, he said most middle-class and affluent Hong Kong residents, including his relatives, don't really care about the protests, with many finding it annoying. If the Hong Kong student protesters were his children, Chan said, "I'd tell them to go home and study hard for school and find a different way to make the world a better place." Chan is executive director of Vancouver's Company of Disciples, a Christian ministry that includes many of Metro Vancouver's roughly 100,000 Chinese Christians (Todd, 2014, p. A1).

The second time was in the aforementioned *Star* article by Tsoi & Bethany that briefly introduced Chu Yiu-ming, one of the Three Masters, who happens to be a Christian as well. In the Canadian content—both from original and syndicated news sources—journalists and editors seemed oblivious to the central role of Christianity and the prestige of the Three Masters. Judging from the factual errors and the predominantly plain and simplified reports that characterized them with descriptions such as “an Occupy Central co-organizer,” and “the co-founders of Occupy Central movement,” no attempts were made by Canadian journalists to distinguish and interpret the Three Masters’ advocacy. How, or even whether, Christianity was integrated into the protesters’ approach was not questioned nor conveyed.

An explanation for the attitude toward religious influence likely lies in the belief system that permeates Canadian journalism practices. Miljan and Cooper's (2003) survey-based research suggests that English-Canadian journalists who work for major urban media outlets (including the *Toronto Star* and *The Vancouver Sun*) were “more secular than the general public in their outlook” (p. 69). Furthermore, journalists’ attendance in all religious denominations was seen to be declining. In a related study, Underwood and Stamm (2001) found that regardless of religious orientation, American

and Canadian journalists tended to act upon their religious beliefs “in ways that do not compromise their professional integrity” (p. 782). It is not a stretch to consider that the Western regard for secularism, pluralism, liberalism, and professionalism held by most Canadian journalists (Haskell, 2007; Underwood & Stamm, 2001) is structured by, and in doing so, restructures their knowledge and habitus, which generate and organize their practice (Bourdieu, 1993). Hence, Canadian journalists consciously or unconsciously failed to recognize, appreciate, *and/or* interpret the role of Christianity in Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution, especially considering neither the event in Hong Kong nor religion as a general topic was a priority in Canadian urban secular media’s daily agendas and the hierarchical social relations.

An opinion piece by noted Canadian journalist, Gwynne Dyer, published in the *Toronto Star* quoted Martin Lee as a means to situate the confrontation between Beijing and Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesters.

[T]he National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing declared that it will allow only three candidates to run for chief executive, and that all of them must be approved by a nominating committee chosen by the regime. That’s what triggered the current wave of demonstrations. As Martin Lee, founding chairman of the Democratic Party, said at a pro-democracy rally in Hong Kong: “What’s the difference between a rotten orange, a rotten apple and a rotten banana? We want genuine universal suffrage, not democracy with Chinese characteristics” (Dyer, 2014, p. A13).

“A rotten orange, a rotten apple and a rotten banana” might be taken as a metaphorical reflection on the three candidates that Beijing had approved for election. This is a possible interpretation, and the one most likely to make sense for Canadian readers. However, Lee’s words were reproduced and interpreted without reference to the wider context.

Martin Lee, the founding chairman of the Democratic Party, is the flag-bearer of Hong Kong’s pan-democratic camp. His use of the analogy of “a rotten orange, a rotten apple and a rotten banana” should not only be understood as a reference to the three

candidates but also as his objection to the three *election options* that were deemed more feasible by the pro-establishment camp: retaining the small election committee (1,200 members from four functional constituencies),²⁹ incrementally increasing members of the election committee,³⁰ or public voting from a pre-approved slate; i.e., “fake universal suffrage.”

The rhetoric of “the difference between a rotten orange, rotten apple and a rotten banana” and “democracy with Chinese characteristics” was constantly used in the debates over these options, as well as the notion of “pocket it first.”

“*Doi zyu sin*” (袋住先, literally pocket it first) is a Cantonese slogan promoted by the Hong Kong SAR government and the pro-Beijing camp. The slogan suggested that Hong Kong citizens should first accept the existing political reform plan (voting from vetted slates) and seek to improve it later (Mo, 2014). The position was based on a consensus that the reform plan proposed by Beijing was “fake universal suffrage” or at least “imperfect” (Mo, 2014). But Hong Kong had little leverage to force Beijing to make changes. The options on the table were to accept the plan or to keep a much smaller election committee (no suffrage).

The debates over—or predominantly, the critiques of—the notion of “pocket it first” in the local media were frequent, thoughtful and rational. Through the debates, political awareness among Hong Kong citizens gained traction. This is supported by published opinions from the time:

Many people think that we should first pocket the political reform on offer and improve it later. But as Beijing has said, all improvements made should be based on this framework. In other words, there will only be minor changes after we accept the offer. But fine-tuning is surely not enough to make the election genuine (Leung & Ap, 2014, p. A14).

²⁹ Industrial, commercial and financial sectors: 300 members; The professions: 300 members; Labour, social services, religious and other sectors: 300 members; Members of the Legislative Council, representatives of members of the District Councils, representatives of the Heung Yee Kuk, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference: 300 members (The Basic Law, 2015, p. 58).

³⁰ The committee had 400 members in 1997, 800 in 2007, and 1,200 in 2012 (The Basic Law, 2015).

Iran...founded a Guardian Council, which is charged with interpreting the Constitution of Iran, ensuring the compatibility of legislation passed by the Iranian Parliament with the criteria of Islam, and approving of all candidates to the President and the Parliament...Last year in the Iranian presidential election, out of 686 people registered, the Council only approved eight candidates to run in the election without the obligation to explain their act...Fifty million voters in Iran have the right of “one person, one vote,” but everybody knows the only way to oppose the Supreme Leader is not to vote...It is regretful that the Iranians “pocketed” the “pre-approved universal suffrage” method thirty-five years ago, which has been at an impasse ever since (K. Lai, 2014, “出賣香港民意 3 類人兼論「伊朗式普選」陷阱,” para. 11. See Appendix I for the original text).

First, if the political climate remains unchanged, we can't expect a true universal suffrage anyway; Second, retaining a small-circle election won't give us a Chief Executive who is opposing (the central government) either; Third, (if we) “pocket it first,” we won't go backwards to the small-circle election; Fourth, if a moderate Chief Executive who is sincere for Hong Kong's democratic development is elected through the (fake) universal suffrage, the Chief Executive can still negotiate with the central government for a “perfect” universal suffrage in future (W. Lai, 2014, “為什麼泛民應接受袋住先？” para. 10. See Appendix I for the original text).

In contrast to the activities on the street, the debates over the notion of “pocket it first” reflected intellectual engagements in Hong Kong society. Within the samples of this research, neither “pocket it first” nor the debates over its meaning or acceptability were ever mentioned in the Canadian media. Instead of conveying the moderate and rational voices from the pro-establishment camp, only the radical elements of the parties in physical conflict with the pro-democracy protesters, such as the violence of the anti-Occupy mobs and the brutality of the police, were heard or depicted in the Canadian news media.³¹ The absence of the critiques of “pocket it first” became a collateral

³¹ “Angry mobs turn on Hong Kong protesters,” *Toronto Star*, October 14, 2014, p. A20.
“Riot police rough up demonstrators,” *The Vancouver Sun*, October 16, 2014, p. B5.

consequence of the absence of the voices from the Hong Kong government and the pro-establishment camp who promoted this idea.

Having sympathy for the pro-democracy protesters is one thing; leaving out crucial information about the opposition is another. The debates over “pocket it first” and information about the related parties was invaluable for any Canadian reader who sought a deeper understanding of the politics and culture in Hong Kong, or even mainland China. Canadian journalists might not agree that a dichotomous approach to reporting was sufficient for the complexities of Hong Kong; after all, digging into complex and multi-faceted events takes endurance and an ability to convince editors that precious space should be devoted to context. But there are multiple instances where the elision of specific local meaning undermines a fulsome understanding of events on the ground and elsewhere. A further case in point involves the non-interpretation of vernacular Cantonese catchphrases such as “attend a banquet” and “do the shopping.”

During the Umbrella Revolution, vernacular Cantonese catchphrases were widely used by the pro-democracy protesters. A festive and comic side of the street protests was exhibited by the use of the catchphrases such as “attend a banquet” and “do the shopping.”

“Attend a banquet” (去飲, *heoi jam*) was a popular code name used by the Occupy Central group to mobilize its supporters to attend the civil disobedience campaign that was initially planned to launch on October 1, 2014, China’s National Day (Lam, 2014b). Benny Tai, one of Occupy Central’s Three Masters sent out invitations to the “banquet:”

When other people are celebrating the big day for the nation, we are also setting up a banquet in the Central for Hong Kong’s democracy. Welcome, all the people who support democracy and want to fight for democracy to our banquet. For those who just want to observe the ceremony, you are also most welcomed to join us (Ming Pao, 2014e, “戴耀廷暗示國慶「去飲」佔中籲帶3日乾糧,” para. 1. See Appendix I for the original text).

As for “do the shopping” (購物, *gou wu*), its popularity in the protests started when a group of people unknowingly showed up and were absorbed into an organized anti-Occupy rally. An unidentified participant was asked about her motive behind the rally by the local cable TV but responded in Mandarin that she came to Hong Kong to “gou wu;” i.e., do the shopping (SCMP, 2014b). The response happened to have resonance with the Chief Executive’s suggestion that citizens go shopping rather than protesting (Jyun, 2014). In addition, “gou wu” (“do the shopping” in Mandarin) sounds like *gau wu* (“鳩鳴”), an obscene word in Cantonese (literally “c— talk,” meaning talking without making sense). The SCMP (2014b) explained in detail why “do the shopping” became a buzzword:

Occupy Central protesters in Mong Kok have been “shopping”—or *gau wu*—on the streets in the last few nights since police and bailiffs removed barricades and reopened the roads this week. In theory, police cannot arrest them as they are simply wandering along “window-shopping” ... It is a Cantonese transliteration of *gou wu*, the Putonghua pronunciation of “shopping” that translates as “buy objects”.³² *Gou* is distorted into *gau* in Cantonese—tricky, because it means “bird” in a classic Chinese poem but has become a staple in Cantonese foul language (p. C2).

Unsurprisingly, neither “attending the banquet” nor “do the shopping” was ever mentioned in the Canadian coverage. Demanding that Canadian journalists who covered the beat to understand Mandarin or Cantonese may not sound realistic. But these vernacular terms were highly visible in the local media and on the ground of the events. Journalists might also have asked why everyone was laughing when these catchphrases were mentioned. These terms, creatively used by the protesters, carried significant meanings about the peaceful and cheerful approach to the protests that many Hong Kong residents felt. The failure in interpreting the vernacular terms and conveying the contained messages detracted from the richness of the reportage and inevitably reduced the quality of the stories offered to the Canadian public.

³² The *Putonghua* is the Chinese term for Mandarin.

In sum, the Canadian news media that were studied provided a fact-based coverage of the conflicts in the Umbrella Revolution. The news coverage of the Umbrella Revolution in the Canadian news media largely relied on syndicated news services that originated outside Canada. Compared to the Hong Kong newspapers, the Canadian news media made few attempts to convey the cultural and political significances and nuances that were embedded in the events. The domestication of the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution suggested Canadian editors and journalists mostly perceived the events to be relevant to Canadians in the context of Canada's immigration problem in metropolitan areas and the "humane internationalist" foreign policy.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter further mobilizes the findings in Chapter Five to affirm the claim that the Canadian mainstream media's lack of intercultural proficiency was reflected in the coverage of the Umbrella Revolution. The chapter reiterates the importance of the mainstream media's active role in building a well-functioning intercultural nation. Possible correctives are offered with an eye to improving the quality of international news reporting in Canadian mainstream media. Finally, elements of the research methodology and the findings are interrogated with the intention of refining approaches to further research on the topic.

According to the results reflected in the content analysis and the deconstructed timeline of the Umbrella Revolution (See Appendix F), *The Vancouver Sun* and the *Toronto Star* covered the core events on the streets but left out some important events that happened off the streets such as the students' call for a class boycott, the pan-democratic lawmakers' response to veto Beijing's proposal, and the only formal talks that occurred between the Hong Kong government and the students.

In addition to the absence in Canadian newspaper coverage of critical event coverage, the absence of essential cultural details and nuances that bore political and cultural significance is more of an issue. It is hard to give a precise answer to why Canadian metropolitan newspapers overlooked these details and showed little interest in interpreting these intricacies for their readers, especially considering the current demographics in the areas where these newspapers are circulated; that is, the significant East Asian populations in both Vancouver and Toronto. Critical nuances and details such as "unpacking" the rich and significant meaning of "umbrella revolution" or "umbrella movement," the role of Christianity in the protests, the arguments for or against the notion of "pocket it first," and other vernacular language uses were absent in the accounts of the Canadian news media that were studied.

This begs the question as to what *was* important to Canadian editors and journalists who were writing about and commenting on the Hong Kong protests? Clearly, the street actions and open, physical conflicts were given the most prominence. In response to the first research question posed by this thesis then, it can be demonstrated

that Canadian readers in Vancouver or Toronto who only consumed news and commentary in their local mainstream newspapers were unlikely to have obtained a meaningful picture of the Umbrella Revolution even though frequent updates on the conflicts on and off the streets were provided.

The frames presented in the Canadian editorial coverage was significantly more conflict-oriented compared to the local Hong Kong newspapers, which were more inclined to play down antagonistic sentiments and to support settling the unrest through political debates and reconciliation. The local media had a much higher percentage of the responsibility frame in their editorial coverage.

It is understandable that when it comes to reporting international conflicts, the constructive responsibility frame, which assigns responsibilities or offers solutions (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), is not a natural choice for Canadian news media if the international conflicts have few instantaneous domestic ramifications. After all, pointing the finger at a third country's "internal matter" invites diplomatic flak. Editors and journalists in Canada might justifiably have thought there was little Canada could do with respect to a country that had become "an important investor and trade partner" (Toronto Star, 2014c). The economic ties were even evident in the advertisement section (See Appendix M).

Because it was inconvenient or impractical for the Canadian media to tell the government of another country how to behave and the response from the Canadian government was "tepid," the *Sun* chose to publish a letter from Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan's president, reflecting Taiwan's view:

Over the past few days, the situation in Hong Kong has attracted worldwide attention. The government and people of the Republic of China (Taiwan) are deeply concerned about recent developments, and I would like to express our views and expectations... We therefore call on the mainland Chinese authorities to listen carefully to the demands of the Hong Kong people and adopt a peaceful and cautious approach to the current situation. At the same time, we urge Hong Kong residents to express their views in a peaceful and rational manner (Y. Ma, 2014, p. B7).

On the Canadian media scene, apart from general depictions of the conflict on the ground, the domestication of the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution implied that the Canadian news media embraced a primary initiative to back the Canadian government's support for human rights at a global level. The primary initiative shown in the research is consistent with Canada's foreign policy guided by a "humane internationalist" orientation (Behringer, 2003) and is reflective of previous treatments such as the Canadian coverage of the handover ceremony of Hong Kong in 1997 (Lee, Chan, Pan & So, 2002) and the *Globe and Mail's* coverage of Sudan's Darfur Conflict (Kim, Su, & Hong, 2007).³³

In the domestication of the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution, the Canadian news media also used a form of metadiscourse to express their anxieties about displaced Hongkongers flooding Canada's metropolitan areas. Days after the Hong Kong police fired 87 canisters of tear gas, a front-page article by Douglas Todd in *The Vancouver Sun* tried to assure Canadians that a new immigration influx to Canada was unlikely. The article opened with indirect quotes from unspecified sources:

The crackdown on pro-democracy marchers in Hong Kong would have to grow much more severe before Canada would experience another influx of migrants from the region, say B.C. residents with ties to the East Asian financial hub (Todd, 2014, p. A1).

Todd's article was intended to introduce how the Vancouver locals viewed the protesters in Hong Kong, but immediately added a seemingly unrelated quote that talked about a possible immigration wave. The quote, in the context of the article, appeared to be an answer from an interviewee in response to the journalist's question:

But as the grassroots demonstrations spread from the central financial district to other areas of the former British colony, Vancouverites expressed mixed degrees of support for the embattled protesters. "Whether more Hong Kong residents will want to come to Canada depends a lot on how things go. It's a fragile situation that's making a lot of people nervous," said Remy Siu, a co-director of the Vancouver theatre company, Hong Kong Exodus (p. A1).

³³ The *Globe and Mail* is a nationally distributed daily newspaper based in Toronto.

After another interview with a Canadian of Hong Kong origins who was pro-democracy but against the street protests, the article then introduced a source of authority, to further reduce Canadian anxieties about immigration influx:

University of B.C. law professor Pitman Potter, who specializes in East Asian politics and had firsthand experience of Hong Kong residents' reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre, doesn't imagine many will soon pull up their roots and careers to move to Canada. "The students have virtually no support among the governing or business elite in Hong Kong," Potter said. "And a lot of Hong Kong residents don't want to leave. Like most people, they don't want a lot of disruption in their lives" ... Potter urged Chinese authorities to show the "courage" to negotiate with students and civic leaders toward a legitimate electoral process. If that can happen, Potter said, there will be little danger of Hong Kong residents seeking to flee to Canada or elsewhere (p. A1).

In the end, the article inserted two more quotes from Hong Kong Canadians who were expressing conflicting views on their (non)support for the protesters in Hong Kong:

...[Chan] compared the confrontations to last year's Quebec student demonstrations over tuition fee hikes. "Outside of Quebec's students," Chan said, "nobody else really cared" ... However, Milton Lim... says he is doing everything he can "to send out my heart" to the protesters. Sensing there is rising worry among many Chinese in Canada, New Westminster-born Lim has been glad to see Hong Kong's protests make international headlines and go viral on the Internet. "The global support shows people in Hong Kong that the world actually cares" (p. A1).

The Vancouver Sun's article left the responsibility of interpreting the protests and the local ramifications to the interviewees by using quotes. These value-laden quotes formed a sharp contrast with the plain factual narrative of the author. This example of an exposition that deploys quotes to convey information, as well as the disconnection between the two types of texts suggested the existence of a form of metadiscourse, in

which the text producer wishes to remain distant from the quotes and the underlying values they contain. Metadiscourse implies that the text producer was “situated above or outside” the producer’s own discourse, and was “in a position to control and manipulate it” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 122).

The case of metadiscourse-domestication is attuned to a grand-discourse of Canadian anxieties of immigration influx in metropolitan cities especially in Vancouver. The timing and the method of bringing up the narrative of the anxieties suggested a possible oversight in the Canadian coverage of the “umbrella revolution.” This is directly related to a sense of betrayal by the British government that harkens back to the 1997 handover to China. Is it possible that Canadian journalists failed to recognize how deeply the sense of betrayal resonates in the Hong Kong collective psyche? News media in Hong Kong certainly picked up on the theme, with sometimes devastating effect. For example, Michael Chugani a columnist with the *SCMP* criticized the British government after their expression of “moral obligation” to Hong Kong. Chugani (2014) wrote:

Where was this “moral obligation” back in the 1980s when it mattered most? Instead of doing the morally right thing for millions of Hongkongers fearful of their fate under a communist regime, Britain locked them out by downgrading their British passports into worthless Mickey Mouse documents.³⁴ What was it that the late British prime minister Margaret Thatcher said to justify the shameful erosion of the rights of British subjects here? Oh yes, she said she did not want Britain to be “swamped” ... Your moral obligation came and went 30 years ago when Britain made it crystal clear it did not want to be swamped by Hongkongers (p. C2).

Canada did a better job attracting the people from Hong Kong in the past (Segal, 1991) when Britain “locked them out.” For Hongkongers and/or a half-million people of Hong Kong descent who call Canada home, support and solidarity were more urgently needed rather than immediate speculations on a possible immigration wave days after the

³⁴ Chugani was referring to the British National (Overseas) passport, which was created by the Hong Kong Act 1985. Holders of the British National (Overseas) passport do not have the right of abode in the UK.

use of tear gas by Hong Kong police. Because Hong Kong has more people-to-people and commercial ties with Canada, neither a blunt and immediate response nor a “fit-for-all” “humane internationalist” approach was particularly considerate and appropriate when dealing with conflict in Hong Kong and its implication for Canada’s immigration predicament.

The instability in Hong Kong and its implications for Canadian domestic matters were reflected in the domesticated news discourses in which the Canadian media tackled the political, economic, and immigration issues in Canada. The cultural nuances that would have enlightened the Canadian public about the special relationship between Hong Kong and Canada were largely missing from the coverage.

However, compared to the astute analyses of and proposed solutions to the underlying factors that mobilized the Umbrella Revolution in the Hong Kong newspapers, the responsibility frame that was identified in the Canadian media echoed the values of the Canadian government. The academic-literary enlightenment frame that characterized *Ming Pao*’s coverage was absent in the Canadian news media. This might be explained partly by a reluctance on the part of Canadian news outlets to exacerbate a perceived problem contributing to a delicate diplomatic situation, after all, Beijing thrives on the rhetoric of foreign intervention (Callahan, 2004), and Beijing was quick to label the foreign governments and media that were expressing their concerns as the meddling “external forces” during the protests (Cheng, 2014). This addresses the substance of the second research question, which asks how the coverage of the Umbrella Revolution was introduced and sustained in general domestic Canadian discourse, especially in major Canadian newspapers accounts.

In addition, the results of the frame analysis and the discourse-historical approach supported the first hypothesis that Canadian journalists were generally disseminating the barest factual information or focusing on the sensational conflicts between people and authority in covering the Umbrella Revolution, rather than providing active and thoughtful cultural interpretations to enable public debate and to enhance cross-cultural understanding among their readers.

At an institutional level, the most salient journalistic practice was the reliance on syndicated news services, especially the services from American news agencies. Less

than half of the articles were actually written by the Canadian journalists in the Canadian newsrooms. The practice was so evident that even Paul Gauthier a reader of the *Toronto Star* wrote a letter entitled “Too much U.S. perspective” on the problem:

‘Hong Kong has gone crazy,’ Sept. 29 Not only is this headline misleading, but the subheading, “Police fire tear gas on tens of thousands as pro-democracy protests threaten the stability of one of the world’s safest financial enclaves,” is also offensive. Since when is fighting for democracy threatening? This article, along with three others in the same edition, comes from the New York Times. It reflects an American viewpoint, not a Canadian one. While I would never denigrate the New York Times—it is a very well-respected newspaper—I strongly believe that, as a major Canadian newspaper, you should present more of a Canadian viewpoint (Gauthier, 2014, p. A14).

At an individual level, journalists who were in Hong Kong at the time, or had backgrounds associated with Hong Kong, provided more vivid and insightful depictions of the protests and, as a result, appeared to be more widely respected in the Hong Kong-Canadian community. For example, Bramham (2014a) visited Hong Kong and offered a first-person account of the calm atmosphere in the protest camp. Chiang (2014) traced the deep roots of the social movement and interviewed his former media colleagues in Hong Kong for an idea of the factors contributing to public opinion in Hong Kong. Lee-Young (2014) interviewed a crowd of Hong Kong-Canadian in Vancouver and captured their expressions of solidarity for Hong Kong’s democracy. The term “umbrella revolution” was not presented in their articles (See Appendix J) although a factual error of the Occupy co-founders occurred (Bramham, 2014a).

However, Bramham, Chiang, and Lee-Young were the only journalists working for a Canadian media organization (*The Vancouver Sun*) who either went to the protest site in Hong Kong or had personal experiences and networks in Hong Kong that they could draw upon for in-depth information. Other Canadian journalists, who were neither on the ground nor had ties to Hong Kong, were more reliant on recent history (Burman, 2014; G. Dyer, 2014); tackled national/local ramifications (Toronto Star, 2014a; Bond,

2014; Todd, 2014); or used forms of metadiscourse (Todd, 2014; G. Dyer, 2014; The Vancouver Sun, 2014) to justify their reporting and opinion pieces.

As the Canadian news media's coverage of the multi-faceted Umbrella Revolution was largely derived from non-embedded sources, hobbled by a lack of presence on the ground, and dependent on syndicated news services, there was not enough evidence to pin down the exact causes of the absence of critical cultural interpretations in the Canadian media. Within the findings of the discourse-historical approach, Canadian journalists who were in Hong Kong or of Hong Kong origin did *not* exhibit a clear edge over their peers in terms of interpreting the cultural codes. The critical cultural nuances were absent in their coverage as well. This is somewhat perplexing. Therefore, it is not possible to say *exactly* why Canadian journalists were not fully able to grasp and interpret the cultural codes that were embedded in the Umbrella Revolution, but it is fully possible to speculate that newspaper editors reverted to a generalized view of the conflict based on a Western model of conflict coverage. This model was supported by the official line from Ottawa with respect to the relationship between Hong Kong and China.

The research findings give an impression that the Canadian news media generally did not assume the role of a cultural interpreter in their coverage of the complexity of the Umbrella Revolution. For regional newspapers, the cost could be a contributing if not a determining factor. Bramham's (2014a) article on the protest camp was the only Canadian content that was sent from Hong Kong. Bramham had been the *Sun's* Asia-Pacific reporter with experience in covering the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 (University of Regina, 2017). But the sole article on the scene suggested that Bramham was only dispatched to Hong Kong for a short stay during the protests, which allowed her little time to figure out the plethora of actors and their motivations, such as Martin Lee's role in Occupy Central.

This economic explanation for the thinness of reporting on the ground has some merit. Ricchiardi (2006) observed that international news has entered a phase of crisis journalism as the trend of cutting off overseas bureaus and foreign correspondents expanded. Pintak gave a vivid account of the problematic journalistic practice:

Journalists are trained to be quick studies. We know how to parachute in, hit the ground running and come up with some semblance of information and some basic components of the story. But often, the history, the nuance, the culture, much of that is lacking (as cited in Ricchiardi, 2006, p. 47).

Given the fact that Chinese immigrants prefer ethnic media (Lee & Tse, 1994; Veronis & Ahmed, 2015) and the Hong Kong issue is an afterthought for most Canadians, it may be more economically viable using syndicated news services than keeping a specialized staff.

However, the importance of the mainstream media's active role in building a well-functioning intercultural nation should not be so easily dismissed. Ethnic media present a centrifugal force on the structures of social relations (Carey, 1997; 1998b). They are trumped by their narrow definitions of social responsibility, audience tastes, perceived community needs, and accompanying struggles in the capital and human resources (X. Li, 2015). However, if the cohesion of society is the goal, cultural diversity should be celebrated on the basis of deep mutual cultural recognitions and understandings. A well-functioning intercultural nation "must be culture-appreciative rather than culture-blind, must recognize what differences matter and when they need to be considered, and must know when differences ought not to make a difference in how we respond both legally and interpersonally" (Lustig, 2005, p. 378).

Ethnic media certainly should not be immune from the constructions of grand social narratives (Murray, 2015) and intercultural literacy. Mainstream news media, as reflected in this research, should make more efforts to communicate (*with*) intercultural proficiency given their accumulated social, economic, cultural, and symbolic capitals.

Unpacking cultural significance and nuances such as that were embedded in the Umbrella Revolution is not only beneficial for understanding these far-flung international events but also helpful for increasing intercultural literacy between and among civil societies. Mainstream media in Canada should lead the cultural mandate by increasing their efforts in the coverage of international news, to better inform a diverse and changing public in order to both enhance and celebrate the intercultural proficiency of a complex and dynamic society.

In terms of possible correctives to improve the quality of international news in Canadian mainstream media, the most pressing task in newsrooms is to embrace Carey's (2009) ritual view of communication, which considers communication as a symbolic process and a ritualistic practice "whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed" (p. 19). The coverage of international news in a multicultural society should also be "directed not toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs" (p. 15).

In the U.S., both public debates and elite discourse about immigration revolves around how citizens' interests, values, and lifestyles, cultural norms, and social harmony are in harm's way (Simon and Alexander, 1993; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008). Canadians also share the concern. Not only Kellie Leitch a prominent figure in Canadian Tories but also a majority of Canadians favour the idea of imposing a "Canadian values" screening test for immigrants (Joseph, 2017; Radio-Canada, 2017).

It is certainly important for immigrants/minorities to understand and appreciate dominant Canadian values that are reflected in everyday experience; in return, mainstream/majority groups ought to be equipped with proper intercultural literacy for deeper mutual understandings. In this regard, international news offers professional journalistic communicators a platform to interpret the embedded meaning and values *among and between speech communities* (Carey, 1997). Hong Kong and Canada share a common British heritage encompassing (historical) political systems, the rule of law, English language (as part of bilingualism), popular Christian beliefs, etc. A bridge could have been built between contemporary Hong Kong and Canada, between all ethnic groups in Canada through journalists' introductions and interpretations of these common grounds. When language and cultural differences arose, an understanding of the Cantonese/Chinese interpretation of something as simple as "do the shopping" would have benefited cross-cultural communication. The interpretation of "do the shopping" could have brought a far more "normal" face to the protests. Would Canadians need a front-page article to assure them a new immigration influx was unlikely if they understood the pragmatic Hongkongers were just "doing the shopping with peace and love?"

Therefore, raising professional communicators' awareness of a view of communication and intercultural communication as ritual through professional training is a critical and practical option for both newsrooms and journalism schools. Frequent consultation between mainstream media and ethnic media outlets is also viable. If syndicated news services must take the place of foreign correspondents under a market imperative, then more cultural diversification in newsrooms and journalism schools should also be taken into consideration.

This study, undeniably, has its limitation. First, the scope of the research was limited in the Canadian mainstream English-language newspapers and political/diplomatic publications. While French is one of two official languages in Canada, the coverage of the Umbrella Revolution in Canada's French-language news media was not surveyed. Without scrutinizing the French-language news media, the picture of the discursive representation of the Umbrella Revolution in Canadian news media is inevitably incomplete.

Second, the study was limited to the written, published and archived forms of the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution. On one hand, the integrity of the research heavily relies on the integrity of the online archives. On the other hand, audiovisual perspectives of the discourse—that were more likely to have offered visual representation of the signs and symbols in the protests—were not studied, except for a limited number of satirical cartoons in one publication.

Third, as part of the Canadian domestic discourse, Chinese-language media in Canada was not added for comparison due to a lack of archived material.


And finally, the cultural interpretations in the thesis were based on the author's own cultural and contextual knowledge. Ethnocentrism is unavoidable in these interpretations.

This research addressed more *absences* of the cultural interpretations than *misinterpretations* in a relatively small sample volume. The occurrences of cultural misinterpretations were not evidently more frequent among the journalists who were not in Hong Kong or without Hong Kong backgrounds. Future research could probe into national newspapers such as the *National Post* and the *Globe & Mail*, which have better


reputations for reporting international events (Kim, Su, & Hong, 2007). The French-language media and the Chinese-language media in Canada should also be included in future research for maximizing inter-discursivity. It will be fruitful to see a four-way comparison, and how ethnic-Chinese media domesticated the discourse of the Umbrella Revolution for the Chinese communities in Canada.

APPENDICES

Appendix A. The structure of the methodology



Appendix B. Yes-no questions for the measurement of the occurrence of the frames



Appendix C. Searching conditions

Publication	Key Words Used
<i>The Vancouver Sun</i>	(Hong Kong) OR (“umbrella movement” OR “umbrella revolution”) OR (“occupy central” OR “occupy movement”)
<i>Toronto Star</i>	(Hong Kong) OR (“umbrella movement” OR “umbrella revolution”) OR (“occupy central” OR “occupy movement”)
<i>The Hill Times</i>	Hong Kong
<i>Diplomat & International Canada</i>	N/A
<i>Policy Options</i>	N/A
<i>The Government of Canada Press Releases</i>	Hong Kong
<i>Ming Pao (Hong Kong)</i>	“雨傘革命” or “雨傘運動” or “佔領行動” or “佔領運動” or “佔中” or “佔領中環” (<i>trans</i> : “umbrella revolution” or “umbrella movement” or “occupy action” or “occupy movement” or “OC” or “occupy central”)

<i>South China Morning Post</i>	("umbrella movement" OR "umbrella revolution") OR
	("occupy central" OR "occupy movement" OR "occupy action") OR
	("protest" OR "demonstration")

Appendix D. Contents from non-Canadian sources in the Canadian media outlets

Toronto Star

No.	Section	Headline	Source
1	Editorial	Face-saving solution needed	Boston Globe
2	News	Hong Kong decision sparks outcry	The Associated Press
3	News	Hong Kong has gone crazy'	The New York Times
4	News	People will look at police very, very differently'	The New York Times
5	News	Protesters sing throughout the night	The Associated Press
6	News	Hong Kong leader says Beijing won't back down	The Associated Press
7	News	Investors watching China's reaction to demonstrations	Bloomberg
8	News	Hong Kong protesters vow to escalate actions	The Associated Press
9	News	The faces behind the protests	Foreign Policy
10	News	Hong Kong leader rejects demands to quit	The Associated Press
11	News	Angry mobs turn on Hong Kong protesters	The Associated Press
12	News	Protesters' anger directed at police	The Washington Post
13	News	Hong Kong protesters' fervour beginning to waver	New York Times
14	News	Hong Kong protests dwindle as talks begin	The Associated Press
15	News	Murky players emerge from Hong Kong	The Associated

		protests	Press
16	News	Protesters return to streets in Hong Kong	Bloomberg
17	News	Protesters fortify barricades after attack	The Washington Post
18	News	HONG KONG TENSIONS SIMMER	AFP/Getty Images
19	News	China's patience over Hong Kong protests thins	The Associated Press
20	News	Students press demands through hunger strike	The Associated Press
21	News	Some protesters call for end to Hong Kong sit-in	Bloomberg
22	News	Hong Kong police close in on protest camps	New York Times
23	News	Picking up the pieces	AFP/Getty Images
24	Column	How far will Beijing go to stifle Hong Kong protests?	An independent Canadian journalist based in London
25	Editorial	Hong Kong's cry for justice	
26	Editorial	We're fortunate to be in Canada	
27	Column	Hong Kong faces echoes of Tiananmen	
28	Letter	Too much U.S. perspective	
29	Letter	Hong Kong's threat to Chinese order (also named Heard)	
30	News	Students issue letter to Chinese president	Star wire services
31	News	Police, protesters clash for third day	Star wire services
32	News	Hong Kong 'loves' Canadian business	
33	News	Wynne vows China trip will get 'tangible results'	
34	News	Police clash with street occupiers	
35	News	Wynne will proceed with trade mission	

The Vancouver Sun

No.	Section	Headline	Source
1	Column	Protesters may leave mixed legacy	Washington Post
2	News	Activists vow to bring 'a million people' if police try to clear Hong Kong's streets	London Daily Telegraph
3	News	Student leaders refuse to retreat from protest	Bloomberg
4	News	Protesters take down barricades but vow to fight on	London Daily Telegraph
5	News	Demonstrations play out across Great Firewall	Bloomberg
6	News	Massive protests hurt triads' underworld business	Bloomberg
7	News	Activists suspect 'triad gangs' behind attack	London Daily Telegraph
8	News	Face of Protest' can now vote legally	Bloomberg
9	News	Leung preaches history to students as crisis shows few signs of easing	Bloomberg
10	News	Street protest leaders gain freedom but lose control of movement	Bloomberg
11	News	Protesters brace for showdown as police prepare to clear camp	The Washington Post
12	News	Hong Kong protest quietly fades away	Bloomberg
13	Column	Beijing refuses to release its tight hold on Hong Kong	
14	Letter	Taiwan's Hong Kong hopes	
15	Column	B. C. renminbi hub unlikely	
16	Column	Protests getting attention, but the issues are not new	
17	Column	A lesson from Hong Kong	
18	Column	Protest a calm challenge to Beijing	
19	News	Hong Kong's Leung offers to hold talks	Postmedia News

20	News	Canadians keep close eye on Hong Kong strife	Postmedia News
21	News	Local support for Hong Kong protesters	
22	News	Riot police rough up demonstrators	
23	News	Relations with Canada slowly improving	
24	News	Bing Thom's latest project brings him full-circle	
25	News	Students risk jail with Beijing protest	
26	News	Protest site turns chaotic	
27	News	Will Hong Kong crackdown mean new influx to Canada?	
28	News	Shining lights	
29	News	Travellers see few signs of protests in Hong Kong	

Diplomat & International Canada

No.	Section	Headline	Source
1	Cartoons	"Hong Kong against Peking"	Neues Deutschland
2	Cartoons	Protests in Hong Kong	The International New York Times, U.S.
3	Cartoons	Hong Kong Protests	The Khaleej Times, UAE
4	Letters	Letters to the editor	
5	QUESTIONS ASKED	China's man in Canada	

Policy Options

No.	Section	Headline	Source
1	Column	Will Trudeau take a meaningful step in laying the groundwork for an open and durable dialogue with China on human rights?	

The Hill Times

No.	Section	Headline	Source
1	Books	Harper transforming Canada from democratic state into market state, argues Gutstein in <i>Harperism</i>	

Appendix E. Authors of Hong Kong origin or based in Hong Kong

The Vancouver Sun

No.	Author(s)	Section	Headline	Source
1	Chiang, Chuck	Column	Beijing refuses to release its tight hold on Hong Kong; Free elections nixed	
2	Chiang, Chuck	Column	Protests getting attention, but the issues are not new; Finding its place	
3	Ishaan Tharoor	Column	Protesters may leave mixed legacy	Washington Post
4	Lee-Young, Joanne	News	Local support for Hong Kong protesters; Vancouver is one of many cities in which crowds express solidarity for the cause	
5	Tweed, David; Lau, Dominic	News	Massive protests hurt triads' underworld business; Legitimate organizations not the only ones to suffer when pro-democracy movement shut down the city	Bloomberg
6	Chiang, Chuck	News	Relations with Canada slowly improving	
7	Lee-Young, Joanne	News	Bing Thom's latest project brings him full-circle; Renowned Vancouver architect was born in Hong Kong, but his grandfather was an early Chinese immigrant to B.C	
8	Li, Fion; Lau, Dominic	News	Street protest leaders gain freedom but lose control of movement	Bloomberg
9	Chen, Lulu Yilun	News	Demonstrations play out across Great Firewall	Bloomberg

10	Tweed, David; Lau, Dominic	News	Massive protests hurt triads’ underworld business; Legitimate organizations not the only ones to suffer when pro-democracy movement shut down the city	Bloomberg
11	Tweed, David; Li, Fion	News	‘Face of Protest’ can now vote legally; Head of democracy movement, turns 18, plays down his leadership role	Bloomberg
12	Western, Neil; Shi, Ting	News	Leung preaches history to students as crisis shows few signs of easing	Bloomberg
13	Li, Fion; Khan, Natasha; Browning, Jonathan; Liu, Alfred	News	Hong Kong protest quietly fades away	Bloomberg

Toronto Star

No.	Author(s)	Section	Headline	Source
1	Jack Chang, Kelvin Chan	News	Hong Kong decision sparks outrage	The Associated Press
2	Alan Wong, Chris Buckley	News	Hong Kong has gone crazy’	The New York Times
3	Alan Wong, Chris Buckley	News	People will look at police very, very differently’	The New York Times
4	Joanna Chiu	News	Hong Kong leader says Beijing won’t back down	The Associated Press
5	Joanna Chiu, Kelvin	News	Hong Kong protesters vow	The

	Chan		to escalate actions	Associated Press
6	Tsoi, Grace; Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany	News	The faces behind the protests	Foreign Policy
7	Joanna Chui, Wendy Tang	News	Hong Kong leader rejects demands to quit	The Associated Press
8	Joanna Chui, Wendy Tang	News	Angry mobs turn on Hong Kong protesters	The Associated Press
9	Sylvia Hui, Joanna Chiu	News	Hong Kong protests dwindle as talks begin	The Associated Press
10	Cathy Chan	News	Protesters return to streets in Hong Kong	Bloomberg
11	Kelvin Chan, Sylvia Hui	News	China's patience over Hong Kong protests thins	The Associated Press
12	Kelvin Chan	News	Students press demands through hunger strike	The Associated Press

Appendix F. Timeline of the Umbrella Revolution and the related coverage

Event/ Coverage	The Vancouver Sun	Toronto Star	Ming Pao	SCMP
Aug.31 Beijing makes its decision	Sept.8 Beijing refuses to release its tight hold on Hong Kong; Free elections nixed	Sept.1 Hong Kong decision sparks outcry	Sept.1 人大落 3 閘佔中 展抗命	Sept.1 Take it or leave it, NPC tells city as it endorses framework for 2017 poll
Aug.31 The student organizations call for class boycott	/	/	Sept.1 學聯 學民今起宣 傳罷課	Sept.1 Students plan class boycott and rally to push for democracy
Aug.31 Co-founder confirms the Occupy Central plan	Sept.8 Beijing refuses to release its tight hold on Hong Kong; Free elections nixed	Sept.1 Hong Kong decision sparks outcry	Sept.1 學聯 學民今起宣 傳罷課	Sept.1 Protesters join forces for ‘era of disobedience’
Aug.31 Pan-democratic lawmakers threaten to veto Beijing’s plan	/	/	Sept.1 27 泛 民稱否決政 改勢拉倒	Sept.1 Take it or leave it, NPC tells city as it endorses framework for 2017 poll
Sept.22 University students start	/	/	Sept.22 大專 今罷課 400	Sept.23 Thousands join student

class boycott			教師聯署撐	protest as boycott starts
Sept.23 University students move to the government headquarters	/	/	Sept.24 學聯 促梁回應否 則升級	Sept.24 Distrust of Beijing hits post-handover high
Sept.26 Secondary pupils join class boycott & the leader Joshua Wong briefly detained	/	/	Sept.27 罷課 變衝擊黃之 鋒被捕	Sept.27 Class boycott hailed a success amid high turnout
Sept.28 Occupy Central begins & police fire tear gas	Sept.29 Shining lights	Sept.29 Hong Kong has gone crazy'	Sept.28 佔中 啟動由政總 開始	Sept.29 Tear gas fired as thousands join Occupy
Sept.29 More protesters join after tear gas use	/	/	Sept.30 運動 擴散「無統 一訴求易失 焦」	Sept.30 Use of tear gas led many to join protest
Oct.1 Anti- Occupy “Blue Ribbon Movement” launches	/	/	Oct.3 藍絲帶 運動撐警周 六尖沙嘴集 會	Oct.2 Anti- Occupy ‘Blue Ribbon Movement’ launches
Oct.12 Students issue a letter to	/	Oct.12 Students issue	Oct.12 學生 公開信致習	Oct.12 Carrie Lam ‘helpless’

Chinese president		letter to Chinese president	矛頭指梁	over talks deadlock
Oct.13 Student leader Joshua Wong turns 18	Oct.14'Face of Protest' can now vote legally; Head of democracy movement, turns 18, plays down his leadership role	/	Oct.13 之鋒 夠秤日盼年 年無今日	/
Oct.15 Police beat a handcuffed protester	Oct.16 Riot police rough up demonstrators	Oct.16 China's patience over Hong Kong protests thins	Oct.16 7 警 捲圍毆示威 者誓追究	Oct.16 Outrage at police 'brutality' video
Oct.20 Hong Kong CEO says the poor can't vote during interview	/	/	Oct.21 梁： 廣泛代表倘 只計人數政 策傾斜低收 入	Oct.22 CY says the poor can't vote; as we need to protect the rich
Oct.21 The first and only formal talk between the Hong Kong government and the students	/	/	Oct.22 立場 南轅北轍對 話各自表述	Oct.22 Students, officials still far apart
Oct.25 Anti-OC group rallies for	/	/	Oct.25 周融 ：為民主、	Oct.25 Occupy protest and

signature			自由、秩序及法治簽名吧	rally by opponents mark a society split over politics
Oct.31-Nov.14 Students plan Beijing trip	Nov.15 Students risk jail with Beijing protest	/	Oct.31 習：有人想借政改翻天	Nov.5 Students seek help of Hong Kong delegates to arrange Beijing meeting on reform
Nov.15 Beijing blocks students' entry	/	/	Nov.16 學聯三子回鄉證被注銷	Nov.16 Beijing bans mainland trip by student leaders of Occupy protests
Nov.25 The first-round clearance operations in Mong Kok	Nov.26 Protest site turns chaotic	/	Nov.26 清障演變驅散拘捕	Nov.26 Arrests, pepper spray as Occupy clearance starts in Mong Kok
Nov.30 Students attempt to escalate but OC	/	/	Dec.1 三子泛民冷待新行動	Dec.2 Occupy Central organisers heading for a

leaders withdraw				split after failed escalation?
Dec.1 Students start hunger strike	/	Dec.2 Students press demands through hunger strike	Dec.2 雙學認圍政總失敗致歉	Dec.2 C.Y. Leung issues strongest warning yet to Occupy Central protesters
Dec.3 OC leaders surrender to police	Dec.4 Street protest leaders gain freedom but lose control of movement	Dec.3 Some protesters call for end to Hong Kong sit-in	Dec.3 三子今自首籲撤離佔區	Dec.3 Police identify 200 for probe
Dec.11 Police clear the main site in Admiralty	Dec.12 Hong Kong protest quietly fades away; Police clear main demonstration site as students ponder next move	Dec.11 Hong Kong police close in on protest camps	Dec.12 清場 13 小時拘 247 人	Dec.12 Orderly end to 75 days of turmoil
Dec.15 Police clear the last site in Causeway Bay	/	/	Dec.16 警 3 小時清銅拘 17 人九旬黃伯再被捕	Dec.15 Talking Points


Appendix G. Satirical cartoons in Diplomat & International Canada

Oct. 2014 Page 15



"Hong Kong against Peking" by Rainer Hachfeld, *Neues Deutschland*, German

Jan. 2015 Page 16



"Protests in Hong Kong" by Patrick Chappatte, *The International New York Times*, U.S.

Jan. 2015 Page 17



"Hong Kong Protests" by Paresh Nath, *The Khaleej Times*, UAE

Appendix H. Frames in the Canadian opinion pieces

The Vancouver Sun

No.	Author	Section	Headline	Frame	Source
1	Chiang, Chuck	Column	Beijing refuses to release its tight hold on Hong Kong; Free elections nixed	conflict, economic	
2	Ying-Jeou, Ma	Letter	Taiwan's Hong Kong hopes; Universal suffrage there would benefit cross-strait ties, says president	responsibility	
3	Bond, David	Column	B. C. renminbi hub unlikely; China's RMB lacks characteristics to be considered reserve currencies	domestication, economic	
4	Chiang, Chuck	Column	Protests getting attention, but the issues are not new; Finding its place	responsibility	
5	Ishaan Tharoor	Column	Protesters may leave mixed legacy	human, conflict	Washington Post
6	Bramham, Daphne	Column	A lesson from Hong Kong	domestication	
7	Bramham, Daphne	Column	Protest a calm challenge to Beijing; Change in China? There's an uneasy feeling among Hong Kong's orderly, inspiring dissenters	human, conflict	

Toronto Star

No.	Author	Section	Headline	Frame	Source
1	Gwynne Dyer	Column	How far will Beijing go to stifle Hong Kong protests?	conflict	

2		Editorial	Hong Kong's cry for justice	responsibility, domestication	
3	Paul Gauthier	Letter	Too much U.S. perspective	responsibility	
4		Editorial	Face-saving solution needed	conflict, responsibility	Boston Globe
5	Tony Burman	Column	Hong Kong faces echoes of Tiananmen	conflict	
6	Xiao Shu	Letter	Hong Kong's threat to Chinese order	conflict	
7		Editorial	We're fortunate to be in Canada	domestication	

Diplomat & International Canada

No.	Author	Section	Headline	Frame	Source
1	Rainer Hachfeld	Cartoons	"Hong Kong against Peking"	conflict	Neues Deutschland
2	Patrick Chappatte	Cartoons	Protests in Hong Kong	conflict	The International New York Times, U.S.
3	Paresh Nath	Cartoons	Hong Kong Protests	conflict	The Khaleej Times, UAE
4	David Kilgour	Letters	Letters to the editor	conflict	

Policy Options

No.	Author	Section	Headline	Frame	Source
1	Alex Neve	Cartoons	Will Trudeau take a meaningful step in laying the	responsibility, domestication	

			groundwork for an open and durable dialogue with China on human rights?		
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South China Morning Post

No.	Author	Section	Headline	Frame
1	Lo, Alex	Column	More political instability now inevitable in Hong Kong	responsibility frame
2	Editorial	Editorial	Imperfect electoral model is still a step forward	conflict frame
3	Lo, Alex	Column	Are some Hong Kong pan-democrats stepping away from the brink?	human
4	Cliff Buddle	Editorial	Beijing's reform model reflects a very different view of the situation in Hong Kong	responsibility frame
5	Editorial	Editorial	Occupy Central campaign should be called off	responsibility frame
6	Lo, Alex	Column	Are anguished cries a sign of Hong Kong's decline?	responsibility frame
7	Editorial	Editorial	Class boycotts over political reform should be confined to tertiary level	responsibility frame
8	Editorial	Editorial	With electoral reform, baby steps would be better than standstill	responsibility frame
9	Michael Chugani	Column	Public Eye	responsibility frame
10	Lo, Alex	Column	Beijing's problem in Hong Kong is not foreign interference but Western ideas	conflict frame
11	Michael	Column	Loopy logic; Michael Chugani does	responsibility

	Chugani		not see how confronting Beijing will get democrats out of a tight spot when it put them there in the first place	frame
12	Jake Van der Kamp	Column	Rule of law and obeying the law are two different things	enlightenment frame, responsibility frame
13	Alice Wu	Column	Living the dream	responsibility frame
14	Editorial	Editorial	'Two systems' the key concept	conflict, responsibility
15	David Zweig	Column	Foreign fears	conflict frame
16	Robert Precht	Column	Speed up visa reviews for arrested Occupy protesters;	responsibility frame
17	Paul Yip Siu-fai	Column	We must break the deadlock or risk being left behind	responsibility frame
18	Sun Xi	Column	Hong Kong should be thankful that Central is not Tiananmen	conflict frame, economic frame
19	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	responsibility frame
20	Stephen Vines	Column	Democrats should brace themselves for a long struggle	conflict, responsibility
21	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	conflict frame
22	Larry Au	Column	Loud and clear	conflict frame
23	Editorial	Editorial	Protest, yes, but keep it orderly	responsibility frame
24	Peter	Column	Protest route	responsibility

	Kammerer			frame
25	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	conflict, responsibility
26	Keane Shum	Column	Authorities had ample time to avoid Occupy collision	conflict, responsibility
27	Editorial	Editorial	Protests need leadership	responsibility frame
28	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	responsibility frame
29	Richard Wong	Column	One city, two narratives	conflict frame
30	Michael Chugani	Column	Public Eye	conflict frame
31	Kelly Yang	Column	Disruptive force	responsibility frame
32	Sonny Lo	Column	The great divide	conflict, responsibility
33	William Waung Sik- ying	Column	Archives law would give insight into top officials' discussions	responsibility frame
34	Cliff Buddle	Column	Turning point	responsibility frame
35	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	conflict frame
36	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	conflict, responsibility
37	Richard Harris	Column	No economic storm	economic frame
38	Elizabeth Wong	Column	Our young people want a better future	human
39	Albert Cheng	Column	Police must answer for their harsh response to Sunday's peaceful	conflict, responsibility

			protest	
40	Editorial	Editorial	Negotiations the only way forward	responsibility frame
41	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	conflict frame
42	Michael Chugani	Column	Now get real	responsibility frame
43	Jake Van der Kamp	Column	Fearful finance chief misses point about peaceful dissent	economic frame
44	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	responsibility frame
45	George Chen	Column	Stop the blame game; it's time to talk	conflict frame, economic frame
46	Kerry Kennedy	Column	In the face of Hong Kong's discontent, is waiting it out Beijing's best option?	conflict, responsibility
47	Florence Lee	Column	Hongkongers abroad play a key role in Occupy movement	responsibility frame
48	Peter Guy	Column	HK begins its 'march of folly	responsibility frame, economic frame
49	Joseph Wong	Column	Pushed too far	conflict, responsibility
50	Editorial	Editorial	Stop the protests, start dialogue	responsibility frame
51	Howard Winn	Column	Umbrella movement heading; for an unhappy ending	economic frame, responsibility

				frame
52	Rick Tang	Column	Time to retreat	responsibility frame
53	Amy Wu	Column	Wave of anxiety	human
54	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	responsibility frame
55	Richard Wong	Column	Let the restoration begin	responsibility frame
56	Michael Chugani	Column	Public Eye	responsibility frame
57	Lijia Zhang	Column	A world away	conflict frame
58	Kelly Yang	Column	Get Hong Kong businesses on board the push for democracy	economic frame
59	Frank Ching	Column	Global reach	conflict frame
60	Editorial	Editorial	Blockaded roads mean cleaner air	human
61	Howard Winn	Column	Umbrella Movement allows tycoons to occupy Central	conflict frame
62	Michael C. Davis	Column	Basis of trust	responsibility frame
63	Albert Cheng	Column	Allegations of police mishandling and collusion with triads must be probed	conflict frame
64	Perry Lam	Column	Protesting students have much to learn about compromise	responsibility frame
65	Paul Letters	Column	A better tomorrow	conflict, responsibility
66	Sonny Lo	Column	The open road	responsibility frame
67	Regina Ip	Column	Defying Beijing, to what end?	conflict frame
68	Rick	Column	Risky business	economic

	Glofcheski			frame, responsibility frame
69	Alice Wu	Column	Retreat, rethink	responsibility frame
70	Peter Guy	Column	Occupy vs tycoons may be up next	economic frame
71	Peter Kammerer	Column	Island idyll	human
72	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	conflict frame
73	Howard Winn	Column	The price of allowing triads to harass umbrella movement	responsibility frame
74	Cathy Holcombe	Column	Fuzzy forecasting	economic frame
75	Michael Davis	Column	Real threat to rule of law lies in NPC's electoral model	responsibility frame
76	Yun Tang	Column	Peaceful rebellion a reminder of Beijing's political mindset	conflict frame
77	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	conflict frame
78	HOWARD WINN	Column	An inconvenient truth	responsibility frame
79	Richard Wong	Column	Bridging the gap	conflict, responsibility
80	Michael Chugani	Column	Public Eye	conflict frame
81	Editorial	Editorial	One battle does not settle a war	conflict frame
82	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	responsibility frame
83	HOWARD WINN	Column	Umbrella Movement is; frittering away its gains	responsibility frame

84	HOWARD WINN	Column	Leung needs wow factor to defuse umbrella movement	responsibility frame
85	Richard Harris	Column	High time for arbitration	responsibility frame
86	Lam Woon-kwong	Column	Police did their best to bring protests under control	responsibility frame
87	Albert Cheng	Column	Is talk of foreign 'interference' and revolution a story too far for our media?	conflict frame
88	Editorial	Editorial	Colour revolution fears overblown	conflict frame
89	Michael Chugani	Column	Reality bites	conflict, responsibility
90	Stephanie Cheung	Column	The third way	responsibility frame
91	Philip Bowring	Column	History of denial repeats itself	conflict frame, enlightenment frame
92	George Chen	Column	Sincerity is prerequisite for fruitful talks	responsibility frame
93	C. P. Ho	Column	Stand together	responsibility frame
94	Dan Steinbock	Column	Hong Kong faces a stark choice: gradual integration or slow decay	economic frame
95	Peter Guy	Column	Luxury brands out of step in new world	economic frame
96	Editorial	Editorial	Sincerity key for talks to succeed	conflict, responsibility
97	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	responsibility frame

98	Franklin Koo	Column	Now, more than ever, Hong Kong needs communication to heal the social divide	responsibility frame
99	Alex Lo	Column	MY TAKE	responsibility frame
100	Howard Winn	Column	CY says the poor can't vote; as we need to protect the rich	responsibility frame
101	Michael Chugani	Column	Public Eye	responsibility frame
102	Richard Wong	Column	Housing the unrest	economic frame
103	Janet Pau	Column	Generation hope-less	economic frame
104	Editorial	Editorial	Protesters, government should focus on what can be achieved	conflict, responsibility
105	Howard Winn	Column	Could Singapore be one of the 'external forces'?	economic frame
106	Rowse, Mike	Column	A message for the protesters: it's time to leave the streets	conflict, responsibility
107	Howard Winn	Column	'External forces' claim diminishes HK government	responsibility frame
108	Editorial	Editorial	Legislators must work for the greater good	responsibility frame
109	Lo, Alex	Column	Occupy protesters must drop the self-righteousness	responsibility frame
110	Peter Kammerer	Column	Hong Kong cannot do without influence from 'foreign forces'	responsibility frame
111	Editorial	Editorial	Credit police for showing restraint under immense pressure	responsibility frame
112	Yip, Paul	Column	On moving Hong Kong past the	conflict,

			protests, to a better future	responsibility
113	Howard Winn	Column	Laura Cha joins CY Leung school of political analysis	responsibility frame
114	Editorial	Editorial	Above all, Hong Kong society must abide by the rule of law	responsibility frame
115	George Chen	Column	Beijing risks losing an entire generation with Occupy 'win'	conflict frame
116	Howard Winn	Column	Beware of travellers carrying umbrellas on planes	responsibility frame
117	Lo, Alex	Column	Hong Kong protest calls are becoming ever more bizarre	responsibility frame
118	Lo, Alex	Column	Hong Kong's tragedy is lack of leadership as youngsters run the show	conflict frame
119	Editorial	Editorial	The public have spoken - they want the Occupy protest to end	responsibility frame
120	Howard Winn	Column	Big disconnect between HK occupiers and Communist Party	conflict frame
121	Lo, Alex	Column	Hong Kong students don't deserve seats on chief executive nominating committee	responsibility frame
122	Lo, Alex	Column	Former Canto-pop star sings old tune on Hong Kong police and Occupy Central	responsibility frame
123	Lo, Alex	Column	Xi gives Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying a gift over Occupy demands	conflict frame
124	Lo, Alex	Column	Just who among us is building a wall?	responsibility frame
125	Peter	Column	All political funding in Hong Kong	responsibility

	Kammerer		should be open to public scrutiny	frame
126	Editorial	Editorial	All sides of the political divide must adhere to the law to move forward	conflict, responsibility
127	Young, Simon	Column	Letter of law column: Protesters' prosecutions call for a sensible approach	responsibility frame
128	Lo, Alex	Column	Hong Kong Occupy leaders crave arrest and persecution	responsibility frame
129	Guy, Peter	Column	Time for new leadership in Hong Kong	responsibility frame
130	Editorial	Editorial	A peaceful exit is the only option for Occupy Central protesters	conflict, responsibility
131	Lo, Alex	Column	Baptist University president refuses to take graduation protests on the chin	conflict, responsibility
132	Editorial	Editorial	Occupy violence at Legco complex a step too far	conflict, responsibility
133	Howard Winn	Column	Ominous warnings over damage caused to protest-hit Hong Kong	conflict frame
134	Editorial	Editorial	Protest stunts at graduation ceremonies tarnish solemn events	morality frame
135	Lo, Alex	Column	Alex Lo: Patten can speak out but reform is up to Hong Kong	conflict, responsibility
136	Howard Winn	Column	Protests expose vulnerability of an unloved government	responsibility frame
137	Editorial	Editorial	Occupiers must retreat and devise a new strategy to continue momentum	responsibility frame
138	Editorial	Editorial	Violence should never be an option for Occupy protesters	conflict, responsibility
139	Lo, Alex	Column	Hong Kong Occupy 'leaders' set for	human

			another show by turning themselves in to police	
140	Editorial	Editorial	As Occupy spins out of control, the endgame requires a voluntary retreat	conflict frame
141	Cliff Buddle	Column	Hong Kong's rule of law has passed the Occupy test - so far	conflict frame
142	Peter Kammerer	Column	Officials' dire warnings about Occupy protests aren't borne out by the realities	economic frame
143	Chugani, Michael	Column	Public Eye	morality frame, conflict frame
144	Lo, Alex	Column	Let's give innocent Hong Kong shop owners a break after Occupy protests	economic frame
145	Editorial	Editorial	Let's now find a way forward on Hong Kong's political reform	responsibility frame
146	Lo, Alex	Column	Is Hong Kong heading for irrelevance within the country?	responsibility frame

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No.	Author	Section	Headline	Frame
1	黎廣德	Column	出賣香港民意 3類人兼論「伊朗式普選」陷阱	responsibility
2	安裕	Column	安裕周記：一九六九年的國家安全	responsibility
3	張銳輝	Column	師者言：不甘心	responsibility
4	陳嘉文	Column	同場加映：佔中來了，不再一條女	human

5	尹兆堅	Column	是結束，也是新的開始	responsibility
6	梁耀忠、黃潤達、梁志成、周偉雄、梁靜珊	Column	後佔中的香港守衛戰	responsibility
7	葉蔭聰	Column	開卷看天下：為金錢去遊行為何不對？	human, responsibility
8	阿果	Column	果欄：助人以後自救之前	human, responsibility
9	黎佩芬	Column	佔中之前三個關鍵詞	responsibility
10	張文光	Column	國安只是藉口收回普選才是目的	conflict
11		Editorial	人大決定備受議論特首普選命懸一線	conflict, responsibility
12	程翔	Column	程翔：京港關係危矣！「兩制」實質亡矣！	conflict, responsibility
13	許寶強	Letter	許寶強：在「禮義廉」時代思考我城的未來	responsibility
14	梁家傑	Letter	梁家傑：認命與抗命的抉擇	conflict, responsibility
15	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：說好了的「普選」	responsibility
16	龍淵子清源茶舍	Column	首談香港迷失•自殘	responsibility
17	張宗永	Column	成龍比范太強	conflict, responsibility
18		Editorial	若有政界李國能今次政改會否不一樣	conflict, responsibility
19	張志剛	Column	泛民的出路是合作而不是抗爭	conflict, responsibility
20	葉健民	Column	中港互相猜疑情緒總爆發	conflict
21	強世功	Letter	：政治決斷：關於行政長官普選	conflict,

			的人大決定	responsibility
22	黎蝸藤	Letter	黎蝸藤：為什麼泛民應接受袋住先？	conflict, responsibility
23	阮紀宏	Letter	阮紀宏：2016 立法會選舉戰開始	conflict, responsibility
24		Editorial	董建華認政制有問題期望促成破管治困局	responsibility
25	蔡子強	Column	路走到這裏分手：民主回歸派的落幕／文：蔡子強	morality, responsibility
26	蘇鑰機	Letter	蘇鑰機：報章政改報道各見立場	responsibility
27	董建華	Letter	董建華：香港是我家一定要合作	responsibility
28	陳景輝	Letter	陳景輝：或遲或早，抗命是每一代公民的事	responsibility
29	應正亮	Column	佔中認低威＋無厘頭升市	economy
30	葉健民	Letter	葉健民：中央真的有能力收拾殘局嗎？	conflict, responsibility
31	周融	Letter	周融：致 27 位立法會泛民議員的公開信	responsibility
32	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：有票，梗係要……箍！	responsibility
33		Editorial	民主派反制舉措應與激進勢力切割	conflict, responsibility
34	吳康民	Column	「馬路天使」可否改弦更張？／文：吳康民	responsibility
35	黃之鋒	Letter	黃之鋒：把政權的手臂拗下去	conflict, responsibility
36	阿果	Column	果欄：幾代人的民主	responsibility
37	陳健民	Letter	陳健民：抗命時代的開始	conflict, responsibility

38	陳莊勤	Letter	陳莊勤：是溫和泛民好好地網綁在一起的時候了	responsibility
39	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：誰在製造賣友求榮的學子？	conflict
40	應正亮	Column	大仔沙上京排位最重要	responsibility
41		Editorial	舉報罷課介入校政破壞信任撕裂社會	responsibility
42	陳景輝：	Letter	陳景輝：罷課不可怕，周融才可怕	responsibility
43	蔡子強	Column	沉淪於舉報歪風蔓延時／文：蔡子強	morality, responsibility
44	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：避免從分歧到撕裂到暴力衝突	conflict, responsibility
45	周融：	Letter	周融：香港已進入了「造反有理」年代？	responsibility
46	陳舊人	Letter	陳舊人：公安充港警與解散立法會的可能	responsibility
47	健吾	Letter	健吾：前方仍然大霧	responsibility
48	阿果	Column	果欄：關於罷課，變色龍想的其實是……	conflict
49	張信剛	Letter	張信剛：略談民主化進程	responsibility
50	張志剛	Column	拖字訣救不了泛民／文：張志剛	responsibility
51	呂秉權	Letter	呂秉權：「石破天驚」、「霹靂手段」的佔中清場設想	conflict
52	黃均瑜	Letter	黃均瑜：與周永康對談後感	responsibility
53	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：希望寄託在你們身上	responsibility
54	盧子健	Column	香港將進入無法管治的狀態／文	conflict,

			: 盧子健	responsibility
55	陳智傑	Letter	陳智傑：社會抗爭可會遍地開花？	responsibility
56	蔡子強	Column	原來他們都是「黑社會」／文：蔡子強	enlightenment, responsibility
57	呂大樂	Letter	呂大樂：退一步，進兩步	responsibility
58	陳允中	Letter	陳允中：多元參與民主	responsibility
59	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：當罷課只是很小的犧牲	responsibility
60	朱凱迪	Letter	基本法：摧毀民主法治的軍火庫	responsibility
61	張秀賢	Letter	張秀賢：罷課——不合作運動開始	responsibility
62		Editorial	中央與香港互動勿僅靠權力體現	conflict, responsibility
63	Tam Daniel	Column	同場加映：你今日 D 咗「鐵一般的紀律」未呀？	responsibility
64	安裕	Column	安裕周記：馬後桃花馬前雪	enlightenment
65	陳健民	Letter	陳健民：圍觀的力量	responsibility
66	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：女兒，老爸以你為榮！	responsibility
67		Editorial	佔中刻日行動期望和平落幕	morality, responsibility
68	陳景輝	Letter	陳景輝：鐵的紀律以外，無法包辦一切的佔中	responsibility
69		Editorial	金秋蒙上肅殺陰霾艱難過後再享暖日	conflict, responsibility
70	葉國謙	Letter	葉國謙：泛民否決政改方案前要思考的 3 個問題	conflict, responsibility
71	李立峯	Letter	李立峯：「中間派」市民對政改	conflict

			的態度	
72	阿果	Column	果欄：平行世界裏的教會領袖要現實，定要理想？	morality, responsibility
73		Editorial	抗爭失控釀流血衝突香港治亂臨嚴峻挑戰	morality, responsibility
74	陳祖為	Letter	陳祖為：應該如何看待公民抗命者？	morality, responsibility
75	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：以傘擋盾的勇氣	conflict
76		Editorial	衝突暫時平靜下來官民應搭建下台階	conflict, responsibility
77	: 張志剛	Column	「佔中」把香港推上「你輸我贏」的政治豪賭／文：張志剛	responsibility
78	呂秉權	Letter	呂秉權：佔中人的犧牲與信任	conflict
79	陳婉容	Letter	陳婉容：爭取真誠地生活的權利	morality, responsibility
80	歐陽五	Letter	罷課與佔中：摘下不成熟的果子？	responsibility
81	潘小濤	Letter	潘小濤：誰是始作俑者？	responsibility
82	王弼	Column	官員才有資格發「國難財」	conflict
83		Editorial	港局危疑詭譎再等中央發落	responsibility
84		Editorial	政府勿任由佔領燃燒對話應有助紓解危機	conflict, responsibility
85	蔡子強	Column	對北京能作的最後忠告／文：蔡子強	conflict, responsibility
86	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：這樣的政府，不配管治我們	responsibility
87	應正亮	Column	一個人的國慶酒會	conflict

88	曾慶宏	Letter	曾慶宏：為什麼我們那麼在意「領袖」這回事？	conflict
89		Editorial	事態滑向危險邊緣各方萬勿火上加油	conflict, responsibility
90	盧文端	Letter	盧文端：佔中對泛民是「雙刃刀」須見好就收	responsibility
91	王慧麟	Letter	王慧麟：政府要有誠意讓步	responsibility
92	關品方	Letter	關品方：如何挽狂瀾於既倒？	enlightenment, responsibility
93	何灝生	Letter	何灝生：人大框架下開創民主出路	responsibility
94	劉進圖	Column	使人和睦的人有福了	responsibility
95	陳智傑	Letter	陳智傑：鬥長命	responsibility
96	楊志剛	Letter	楊志剛：催淚的硝煙過後	conflict, responsibility
97	程翔	Letter	程翔：珍惜「佔中」成果避免無謂犧牲	responsibility
98		Editorial	佔領演變至街頭暴力社會宛如一個火藥庫	responsibility
99		Editorial	暴民作惡損國際形象爭民主只需善意關心	conflict, responsibility
100	阿史	Column	這一天，香港警察正式變回差人	responsibility
101	葉蔭聰	Column	周日話題：喪屍治港	enlightenment, responsibility
102	呂大樂	Column	周日話題：第三種選擇	conflict, responsibility
103	馬國明	Column	周日話題：遲來的民主回歸	responsibility
104	洪清田	Column	出路：不撤常委決議、撤篩選	responsibility

105	阿果	Column	果欄：一把雨傘，兩岸三地，四點觀察	conflict
106	游靜	Column	超越公民運動的抗爭	morality, responsibility
107	家明	Column	家明雜感：哀莫大於心死	conflict, responsibility
108		Editorial	一國兩制信心新低 30 年勾勒對港變化	enlightenment, responsibility
109	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：用大智慧解開大困局	responsibility
110	黎廣德	Letter	黎廣德：坐順風車不能理直氣壯	responsibility
111	趙耀華	Letter	趙耀華：討論反對人大框架的各種理由	responsibility
112	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：獨有勇徒耗盡佔中道德力量	morality
113	許承恩	Letter	許承恩：請反佔中人士「救救孩子」	responsibility
114	梁文道	Letter	梁文道：他們為什麼害怕佔中	morality, responsibility
115		Editorial	佔領運動階段有成減少擾民應轉陣地	human, responsibility
116	吳靄儀	Letter	議會自主：法庭不覆核議會內進行的程序	responsibility
117	李律仁	Letter	3 個小建議解眼前危局	responsibility
118		Editorial	政府學生盡早對話為困局解套防流血	responsibility
119	那口蟲	Column	音風陣陣：送給撐着雨傘的香港人	responsibility
120	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：切勿掉進建制鷹派的圈	conflict

			套	
121	蔡子強	Column	請相信他們／文：蔡子強	responsibility
122	陳日君	Letter	陳日君：究竟誰有道理	responsibility
123	應正亮	Column	大仔沙唔出聲當幫忙？	responsibility
124	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：佔中爆發政治新生代	responsibility
125	蘇鑰機	Letter	蘇鑰機：數碼傳播推動社會抗爭	responsibility
126	梁文道	Letter	梁文道：北京為什麼擔心？	conflict
127	葉健民	Letter	葉健民：我們要的是尊重，不是革命	responsibility
128	林泉忠	Letter	林泉忠：「普選」談判「三輸」還是「三贏」？	responsibility
129	周融	Letter	周融：自由、平等、法治不能失	human, responsibility
130	羅健熙	Letter	羅健熙：佔領運動的民意戰	responsibility
131		Editorial	佔領運動民意逆轉堵路施壓成負資產	conflict, responsibility
132	盧文端	Column	盧文端：面對「佔中」中央發出哪些重要信息？	responsibility
133		Editorial	建制泛民視為鬥爭工具立會不應調查佔領運動	enlightenment, responsibility
134	呂秉權	Letter	呂秉權：香港鬧文革？謊話要秒殺	conflict, responsibility
135	張秀賢	Letter	張秀賢：對香港人潑了一盆冷水	responsibility
136	吳康民	Column	「佔中」騷亂是怎樣「煉」成的？／吳康民	responsibility
137		Editorial	捲中美角力於港無益國會干涉徒礙民主化	responsibility

138	阿離	Column	生活達人：堅持維護生命	enlightenment, responsibility
139	黑貓	Column	周日話題：勿忘初衷	morality, responsibility
140	安裕	Column	安裕周記：新人類與他者	enlightenment, responsibility
141	珍妮絲	Column	打開娛樂：遮歎中自救	responsibility
142	區龍宇	Column	周日話題：白絲帶與黃絲帶	enlightenment
143	四維出世	Column	論語•電影：未敢想像的未來	enlightenment, responsibility
144	阿果	Column	傘開以後：陪我講出我們現在何以生疏	responsibility
145		Editorial	時代在變新生代冒起朝野互動須從頭塑造	responsibility
146	孔誥烽	Letter	孔誥烽：佔領運動是自主公民社會的成人禮	enlightenment, responsibility
147	黎廣德	Letter	黎廣德：鐵腕鎮壓的真正輸家	conflict, responsibility
148	張宗永	Column	佔中烏雲旁的光環	responsibility
149	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：因壓力退下的，為何不是他？	responsibility
150	林泉忠	Letter	林泉忠：馬英九撐香港的重大意義	responsibility
151	劉勵超	Letter	劉勵超：「民主盛宴」誰埋單？	enlightenment, responsibility
152	陶國璋	Letter	陶國璋、黃曉紅：莊子和金鐘	enlightenment
153	潘小濤	Letter	潘小濤：北京對雨傘運動態度的轉變	enlightenment

154	陳健民	Letter	陳健民：默默陪伴期盼黎明	conflict, responsibility
155	張志剛	Letter	撕裂香港催淚全城／文：張志剛	human
156		Editorial	避免市民武鬥政府當前急務	responsibility
157		Editorial	事緩則圓逐步清場思考應對後續 情勢	responsibility
158	盧子健	Column	期望青年人開創香港未來／文： 盧子健	responsibility
159	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：定性「失控的群眾運 動」包藏禍心	conflict, responsibility
160	區家麟	Letter	區家麟：時代的斷崖上	responsibility
161	阮紀宏	Letter	阮紀宏：港人自視過高累事	responsibility
162		Letter	勿讓成果付東流撐學生光榮撤離	responsibility
163		Editorial	運動失控武力升級警民衝突惡果 難料	responsibility
164	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：卸膊特首完美演繹	responsibility
165	應正亮	Column	香港突然進入唔用腦年代	conflict, responsibility
166	蔡子強	Column	真的要一再把人逼上梁山？／文 ：蔡子強	conflict, responsibility
167		Editorial	政府與學聯對話理想現實的抉擇	responsibility
168	呂大樂	Letter	呂大樂：明日之後	responsibility
169	劉夢熊	Letter	劉夢熊：應當重新審視「8. 31 決 定」	responsibility
170	王慧麟	Letter	王慧麟：應劍指撕裂仇恨的元兇	responsibility
171	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：香港在暗角被拳打腳踢	responsibility
172		Editorial	街頭衝突泛民不合作香港安危陷	human, responsibility

			政治賭注	
173	陳健民	Letter	陳健民：到了那一天，我們會自首	enlightenment, responsibility
174	黃之鋒	Letter	黃之鋒：鷹鴿兩派上演的劇本	conflict, responsibility
175	梁啟智	Letter	梁啟智：利用外國勢力搞亂香港	responsibility
176	關焯照	Letter	關焯照：佔中的社會成本和效益 真相此中尋	enlightenment
177	阿史	Column	這一年，行政長官，在談判間調 兵把一整代後殖民菁英殺掉	enlightenment, responsibility
178	安裕	Column	安裕周記：誰能明白我	enlightenment, responsibility
179		Editorial	重建信任長路仍漫漫改革社會才 可消矛盾	enlightenment, responsibility
180	許寶強	Letter	許寶強：政治問題政治解決	enlightenment
181	陳莊勤	Letter	陳莊勤：如果這仍不算是暴民， 怎樣才算是？	morality, responsibility
182	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：錯判港獨危上加危	responsibility
183	林泉忠	Letter	林泉忠：「普選」談判的妥協點 在哪裏？	responsibility
184	阮穎嫻	Letter	阮穎嫻：誰家孩子被洗腦？	responsibility
185	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：誰把警員逼瘋了？	responsibility
186		Editorial	首次破天荒政改對話政府學聯須 務實以對	responsibility
187	張志剛	Column	由坐山觀虎鬥到引火焚身／文： 張志剛	responsibility
188	李詠怡	Letter	李詠怡：政改對話的空間	responsibility

189	歐陽五	Letter	歐陽五：佔領華爾街為何會無果而終	enlightenment, responsibility
190	陶國璋	Letter	陶國璋：釋迦與金鐘	morality, responsibility
191		Editorial	立場南轅北轍對話各自表述	conflict, responsibility
192	張文光	Column	民主香港才能維護國家安全／文：張文光	conflict, responsibility
193	吳康民	Letter	吳康民：顏色革命？言重了！	responsibility
194	程翔	Letter	程翔：顏色革命？子虛烏有！	conflict, responsibility
195	阮紀宏	Letter	阮紀宏：撐警察撐法治	responsibility
196		Letter	佔中對話項莊舞劍	conflict, responsibility
197	沙發薯	Column	沙發薯：當新聞未能還原真相	responsibility
198	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：香港將陷入長期無法管治的危機	responsibility
199	盧文端	Letter	盧文端：妥善處理佔中須區別對待3種人	conflict
200	蔡思穎	Letter	蔡思穎：「袋住先」將縱容貪風請堅持爭取真普選	enlightenment
201		Editorial	市民務實爭民主佔領進退此中尋	conflict, responsibility
202	蔡子強	Column	「佔領人心」重於「佔領街道」：退場的思量／文：蔡子強	responsibility
203	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：民情報告=拖住先，點撤？	conflict
204	陳景輝	Letter	陳景輝：佔領和自首，從蘇格拉	enlightenment,

			底說起	responsibility
205		Editorial	為政治鬥爭毀司法權威絕不值得	responsibility
206		Letter	政改短期出路：提委會民主化	conflict, responsibility
207	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：眼前 3 個「慎防」	responsibility
208	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：梁振英才是最反對「袋住先」	responsibility
209		Editorial	佔領運動影響經濟實際損害陸續浮現	economic
210	劉夢熊	Letter	劉夢熊：維護人大權威避免憲制災難	responsibility
211	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：思考有尊嚴地退	responsibility
212	周融	Letter	周融：為民主、自由、秩序及法治簽名吧	responsibility
213	健吾	Letter	健吾：A Place called HOME?	responsibility
214	陳智傑	Letter	陳智傑：跟中央玩 Show hand	conflict, responsibility
215	蔡玉萍	Letter	蔡玉萍：撕裂了什麼？	conflict, responsibility
216	珍妮絲	Column	打開娛樂：外國勢力 vs. 強國勢力	conflict
217	王丹	Letter	致學聯同學的公開信	responsibility
218	阿果	Column	傘開以後：小人物睜開眼	responsibility
219	_楊秀卓	Column	藝術初體驗：物件（十四）——雨傘	enlightenment
220	王慧麟	Letter	王慧麟：守法的責任抗命的公民	enlightenment, responsibility
221	王卓祺	Letter	王卓祺：樹欲靜而風不息	enlightenment, conflict

222	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：警惕四大缺失	responsibility
223	劉紹麟	Letter	劉紹麟：他們在搞港獨嗎？	responsibility
224	陳弘毅	Letter	陳弘毅：寫給在今學期在港大上我的課的學生	conflict, responsibility
225	張宗永	Column	佔人心比佔地重要	responsibility
226	呂秉權	Letter	呂秉權：不要柄拳	responsibility
227	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：決策混亂之源	responsibility
228		Editorial	佔領運動狂飈滿月冷靜思量進退得失	human, conflict, responsibility
229	歐陽五	Letter	歐陽五：暴力來源於「佔領」的違法本質	responsibility
230	張志剛	Letter	政治問題，犯法解決；犯法行為，如何解決／文：張志剛	responsibility
231		Editorial	陣地戰轉為運動戰收割佔領最大成果	responsibility
232	盧子健	Column	同學少年風華正茂蒼茫大地誰主沉浮／文：盧子健	responsibility
233	關信基	Letter	關信基：回應徐神父的〈對佔中和爭取民主的反思〉	enlightenment
234	陳健波	Letter	陳健波：佔中的體會	responsibility
235		Editorial	香港情勢危疑詭譎田北俊失政協資格	conflict
236	蔡子強	Column	「走出廣場，走進民間」／文：蔡子強	responsibility
237	陳韜文	Letter	陳韜文：外因化是打壓佔領運動的基本框架	responsibility

238	陳景輝	Letter	陳景輝：精神、階段性或完全勝利	conflict
239	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：得的多，還失的多	conflict
240	應正亮	Column	泱泱大國如此不按本子	conflict, responsibility
241	周舵	Letter	周舵：「佔中」的激進理想為何不可取？	enlightenment, responsibility
242		Editorial	佔領運動爭民主普選中央視為要脫離管轄	conflict, responsibility
243	葉健民	Letter	葉健民：泛民政黨還要躲到何時？	conflict, responsibility
244	王卓祺	Letter	王卓祺：再透視港版「顏色革命」的外部勢力	enlightenment, responsibility
245	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：雨傘滿月檢討	responsibility
246	盧文端	Letter	盧文端：「佔中」久拖不撤清場在所難免	conflict, responsibility
247	朱凱迪	Letter	朱凱迪：一國兩制病了而港府沒有藥	conflict, responsibility
248	張秀賢	Letter	張秀賢：北京誤判港官之責	responsibility
249	何灝生	Letter	何灝生：西方民主形式不等同公義法治	enlightenment
250	黎廣德	Column	周日話題：破立相生	conflict, responsibility
251	任建峰	Letter	禁制與示威	enlightenment, responsibility
252	王慧麟	Column	周日話題：進一步天空海闊	responsibility
253	劉進圖	Letter	劉進圖：顏色革命論脫離現實	conflict, responsibility

254	陳健民	Letter	陳健民：何苦與一代人為敵？	conflict, responsibility
255	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：官方的冷、慢、拖	responsibility
256	陳健波	Letter	陳健波：佔中的體會（二）	responsibility
257	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：辭職公投如例行公事	responsibility
258	林泉忠	Letter	林泉忠：「佔中」如何影響兩岸關係？	conflict
259	徐錦堯	Letter	徐錦堯：徐神父回應關信基教授	morality
260		Editorial	佔領清場非上策政府應尋求對話	responsibility
261	張志剛	Column	老子兒子鬥一番／文：張志剛	conflict, responsibility
262	劉夢熊	Letter	劉夢熊：壓制批評有損民主政治	responsibility
263	潘小濤	Letter	潘小濤：答中國憤青的反佔中奇文（上）	responsibility
264		Editorial	佔領運動民意逆轉現在應是退場時候	responsibility
265	鄧皓文	Letter	鄧皓文：「港獨」指控失實政府應公開面對民意	responsibility
266	關品方	Letter	關品方：佔領之後——香港需要嶄新的青年政策	enlightenment, responsibility
267	吳康民	Letter	吳康民：探討「佔中」騷亂的深層次原因	conflict
268	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：「反梁等於反中央」與田北俊被炒	responsibility
269	梁恩榮、郭春蘭	Letter	梁恩榮、郭春蘭：學生參與「佔中」是否受通識科影響？	enlightenment
270	阮紀宏	Letter	阮紀宏：泛民應負起政治道德責	morality, responsibility

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271		Editorial	斷症勿靠手掌撞腦袋佔領緣由應客觀調查	responsibility
272	程翔	Letter	程翔：梁振英「綁架」了習近平	responsibility
273	黃洪	Letter	黃洪：雨傘運動是什麼？不是什麼	morality
274	教育小卒	Letter	教育小卒：和中學生談「佔領」及「公民抗命」（一）	enlightenment
275	陳景輝	Letter	陳景輝：雨傘公投，就是將決心帶往路障以外	responsibility
276	應正亮	Column	抽水不能止血	responsibility
277		Editorial	學聯務實求見京官望董建華出手襄助	responsibility
278	楊志剛	Column	楊志剛：魔警與俠警	responsibility
279	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：如果這樣，才可退場	responsibility
280	羅健熙	Letter	羅健熙：解讀佔領運動民調	responsibility
281	黃之鋒	Letter	黃之鋒：否決政改不是終點超區公投重啟政改	responsibility
282	梁啟智	Letter	梁啟智：在人大框架之下邁向真普選？	responsibility
283	鄭政恆	Column	時令讀物：佔領的閱讀	enlightenment
284	四維出世	Column	論語•電影：一代人的價值重構——d (R) e-Constructivism 的願景	responsibility
285	陳韜文、李立峯	Letter	陳韜文、李立峯：佔領運動新組織形態初探	enlightenment
286	張宗永	Column	狼來了 2.0	responsibility
287	張志剛	Column	你等我清場我等你退場／文：張	conflict

			志剛	
288	劉進圖	Letter	劉進圖：普選國際標準難迴避	enlightenment
289	潘小濤	Letter	潘小濤：續答中國憤青的反佔中奇文（下）	conflict
290	盧文端	Letter	盧文端：「佔領行動」無以為繼 回歸討論普選方案	conflict, responsibility
291	戴耀廷	Letter	戴耀廷：反思公民抗命與法治	enlightenment, responsibility
292	梁錦松	Letter	梁錦松：對香港幾個社會問題的 思考	responsibility
293	吳康民	Letter	吳康民：論香港的外國勢力	conflict, responsibility
294	區家麟	Letter	區家麟：有中國特色的賞罰分明	responsibility
295	阮紀宏	Letter	阮紀宏：香港多了一個 veto player	conflict, responsibility
296	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：佔領者再不能自我感覺 良好	conflict, responsibility
297	陳景輝	Letter	陳景輝：「誰也不代表誰」的民 主整合危機	responsibility
298	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：當掌權者沒有了關 愛……	responsibility
299	季霆剛	Letter	季霆剛：以接近「直選」提委解 目下僵局	responsibility
300	應正亮	Column	一切為政治服務	conflict, responsibility
301		Editorial	繼續佔領已無意義藉禁令退場保 元氣	conflict, responsibility
302	呂大樂	Letter	呂大樂：中間意見重登社會議程	conflict,

				responsibility
303	高健	Column	高健：一個上海人眼裏的佔中	responsibility
304		Editorial	學聯赴京尋求對話應對有上中下三策	responsibility
305	黃莉莉	Letter	黃莉莉：無牆	responsibility
306	長毛	Letter	自首不如自強	responsibility
307	黃偉豪	Letter	黃偉豪：「唔抗爭，唔正常！」	enlightenment
308	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：弱勢政府萬事假手於人	responsibility
309	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：遠近策略均須思考	responsibility
310	陳健民	Letter	陳健民：公民抗命的邊界與轉化	enlightenment, responsibility
311	歐陽五	Letter	歐陽五：清場緣何成為唯一的結局？	responsibility
312	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：寄語堅持留守者	responsibility
313		Editorial	佔領者主動退場挽人心社區播種民主伺機再起	responsibility
314	梁家傑	Letter	梁家傑：權愈大，破壞法治的能力愈大	responsibility
315	周浩鼎	Letter	周浩鼎：自首同樣對法治造成傷害	responsibility
316	黎廣德	Letter	黎廣德：留守佔領區意義重大	conflict, responsibility
317	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：當權者豈止與一代人為敵	conflict, responsibility
318	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：離開是為了更遠的未來	responsibility
319	季霆剛	Letter	季霆剛：學生藥石亂投顯技窮，停手了，好嗎？	responsibility

320		Editorial	暴力衝擊立會大樓和平佔領光環 褪色	conflict, responsibility
321	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：須防平湖投石變翻波	responsibility
322	劉夢熊	Letter	劉夢熊：「備案」與「批准」豈 能混同？	responsibility
323	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：通識教育與佔中陰謀論	enlightenment, responsibility
324	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：撐傘之後	enlightenment, responsibility
325	周融	Letter	周融：注銷回鄉證的啟示及後遺 症	responsibility
326	鄧日朗	Letter	鄧日朗：萬惡的搞事學生？	responsibility
327	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：勿無限擴大打擊面	responsibility
328	羅健熙	Letter	羅健熙：輸不得的道德力量	morality
329	張超雄	Column	星期日現場：為什麼我要擋在玻 璃門前	responsibility
330	鄧正健	Column	周日話題：例外狀態的抗爭暴力	enlightenment
331	馬國明	Column	周日話題：雨傘運動生產的異質 空間	enlightenment
332	戴耀廷	Letter	周日話題：突破困局衝擊人心	responsibility
333	葉蔭聰	Column	雨傘革命香港民變	enlightenment
334	阿果	Column	生活達人：公民社會撒種以待	responsibility
335		Editorial	後佔中時期應休養生息均衡參與 始能海闊天空	responsibility
336	馬嶽	Letter	馬嶽：從危機到更深的危機	conflict, enlightenment
337	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：落區須放下心頭自我	responsibility
338	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：大規模秋後算帳即將上	conflict

			演？	
339	涂謹申	Letter	涂謹申：反映民情依法真普選	responsibility
340	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：釐清佔領運動 3 核心問題	responsibility
341	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：暴力還有什麼灰色地帶？	morality
342	阮紀宏	Letter	阮紀宏：佔中美國因素消除討論內部因素開始	responsibility
343	周融	Letter	周融：佔中，不是什麼狼來了的故事	human, responsibility
344		Editorial	期望警隊恢復秩序假手外求必見變局	conflict, responsibility
345		Editorial	下一步行動應是爭取落實多方對話平台	conflict, responsibility
346	蔡子強	Column	莫讓運動開至荼蘼／文：蔡子強	responsibility
347	鄧鍵一	Letter	鄧鍵一：誰動員群眾？	enlightenment
348		Letter	「政治協商平台」作為解決佔中僵局出路	responsibility
349	劉夢熊	Letter	劉夢熊：既要還路於民，更要還真普選於民！	responsibility
350	陳景輝	Letter	陳景輝：人民被剝奪主權，該向什麼法庭提訟？	human
351		Editorial	泛民不合作癱瘓政府傷害社會民情或反彈	conflict
352		Letter	「政治協商平台」作為解決佔中僵局的出路	responsibility
353		Letter	後雨傘運動：告別政治冷感的年	enlightenment

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354	盧文端	Letter	盧文端：中央不希望學生受到傷害	conflict, responsibility
355	梁啟智	Letter	梁啟智：假如我是外國勢力	conflict
356	Tam Daniel	Column	星期日現場：游離旺角	conflict
357		Column	周日話題：當運動變為潮流	conflict
358	鄭政恆	Column	時令讀物：佔領再閱讀	enlightenment
359	區龍宇	Column	周日話題：民主是這樣煉成的	conflict, responsibility
360	謝曉軒	Letter	謝曉軒：捕風捉影的「外國勢力論」	responsibility
361		Editorial	「雙學」盲動號召圍攻總暴力衝擊違和平初衷	conflict, responsibility
362	關品方	Letter	關品方：亂局還剛開始，市民仍須忍耐	enlightenment
363		Editorial	三子前往自首走出佔領泥淖	responsibility
364	張志剛	Letter	到還你一個零的時候／文：張志剛	responsibility
365	周舵	Letter	周舵：老師們，負起責任來！	enlightenment, responsibility
366	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：歷史的錯誤簡單地重複？	responsibility
367	阮紀宏	Letter	阮紀宏：劉慧卿應該去攔阻學生	responsibility
368		Editorial	應該再忍耐一陣子透過對話解決佔領	responsibility
369	寅成	Letter	寅成：感謝學生奉勸學生	responsibility
370		Editorial	社評：《明報》調查值得參考年	responsibility

			輕人爭民主不忘理性	
371	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：中英港政爭策略高者勝	conflict
372	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：政治總有說再見的一刻	responsibility
373	健吾	Column	健吾：香港人絕對是中國人	responsibility
374	周融	Letter	周融：龍和道（政總）一役潰敗的觀察及啟示	conflict
375	陳智傑	Letter	陳智傑：唔該，埋單！	responsibility
376	黃莉莉	Letter	黃莉莉：絕食破絕路	responsibility
377	蔡俊威	Column	佔中之後：後佔中時代的中港關係	conflict
378		Column	周日話題：為什麼要堅持勿忘初衷？	conflict, responsibility
379	孔誥烽	Letter	孔誥烽：佔領啟示錄	conflict
380	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：台灣給香港年輕人的啟示	responsibility
381	陶國璋	Letter	陶國璋：兩極化與報復心態	conflict
382	歐陽五	Letter	歐陽五：關於「佔中」收場的遐思	responsibility
383	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：請同學們盡快成熟	responsibility
384	張志剛	Letter	筆陣：既是為泛民也是為香港／文：張志剛	responsibility
385	劉銳紹	Letter	劉銳紹：慎防秋後算帳早登場	responsibility
386	吳志森	Letter	吳志森：三子自首何罪之有	conflict
387		Editorial	社評：和平非暴力或衝突流血考驗港人文明成熟一面	conflict, responsibility
388	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：後佔中重整旗鼓	responsibility
389	蔡子強	Letter	筆陣：佔中小氣候，國內大氣候	responsibility

			／文：蔡子強	
390		Editorial	社評：清場之後若全面算帳政治 反響大不宜盲動	responsibility
391	林沛理	Column	筆陣：道德領導問誰可提供／文 ：林沛理	morality, responsibility
392	曾志豪	Letter	曾志豪：2個過時的觀點	conflict
393	王慧麟	Letter	王慧麟：第三勢力的重要	responsibility
394	陳奕謙	Letter	陳奕謙：撤離不是封印理想	responsibility
395		Editorial	社評：參與第二輪政改諮詢視商 討結果再定取捨	conflict, responsibility
396	袁彌昌	Column	筆陣：不懂轉化，怎轉化運動？	responsibility
397	張秀賢	Letter	香港回不了去	conflict
398	劉銳紹	Letter	佔領運動該如何反思？	conflict, responsibility
399	許寶強	Column	毋忘初衷	enlightenment
400	安徒	Column	佔中以後：「後佔領」時代的絕 望戰鬥	responsibility
401	Tam Daniel	Column	被捕者言：斷裂	responsibility
402	安裕	Column	安裕周記：黑夜星光燦爛	enlightenment
403	區龍宇	Column	周日話題：失敗中的勝利	enlightenment
404	周保松	Column	周日話題：個人自主與民主實踐	enlightenment
405	許寶強	Letter	許寶強：在後佔領時代中思考 （非）暴力	enlightenment
406	林朝暉、吳舒景	Letter	林朝暉、吳舒景：後佔中運動時 期的棋局	conflict, responsibility
407	梁美儀	Letter	梁美儀：暴力抗爭之路不可避？	responsibility
408	馮智政	Letter	馮智政：雨傘心死令外部勢力干	conflict

			預合理化	
409	歐陽五	Letter	歐陽五：「後佔領時期」動盪恐 成香港「新常態」？	economic, responsibility

Appendix I. Original Chinese scripts in Ming Pao

Ming Pao, 2014a, “暴民作惡損國際形象爭民主只需善意關心暴民作惡損國際形象爭民主只需善意關心,” para. 8

.....多位本港學者.....指出目前香港的佔領示威運動被外國傳媒形容為「雨傘革命」並不準確，因為這次是由學生推動的爭取民主社會運動，只求制度建設，並無推翻政權之意，稱呼它為「雨傘革命」，容易引來中央誤解，聯想起「顏色革命」...而這場運動中民眾高度自發參與的特點，似乎也與顏色革命的高度組織化動員有別。無怪乎黃洪等學者認為，西方傳媒冠以「雨傘革命」的稱謂，只會給港人幫倒忙，取名「雨傘運動」相信更為合適，可避免令中央過慮。

Ming Pao, 2014c, “黃之鋒：人大「開閘」撤離唯一條件,” para. 6

「我們不是要做烈士，也不是搞革命，我們不是搞 umbrella revolution（雨傘革命），是 movement（運動）.....我不喜歡 revolution（革命）這個字眼，我們不是要推翻政權。」

G. Chan, 2014, “同場加映：佔中來了，不再一條女,” para. 7

佔中三子所說的，一種自我制約、近乎清教徒式的愛，「不能鬧警察、自己綁住自己雙手、不自辯.....」

Z. Cheung, 2014, “成龍比范太強,” para. 6

其實三子一直頗抗拒學生加入他們的運動，說是愛惜學生也好，說是覺得他們不懂事、過於激進也好，三子是從來沒有主動招引學生加入他們的運動。

Aagwo, 2014a, “果欄：平行世界裏的教會領袖要現實，定要理想？”

[牧師吳宗文:] 「我的立場係 realism。政治從來係協商的藝術，成熟的政治人應該在現實的基礎上繼續行...一路咁樣激化，改變唔到任何嘢，只會延長痛的時間，浪費復和同埋重建的機會。」.....

[專欄作家阿果:] 「政治就是講求現實、協商、共識，這種說法大家都不會陌生。但當這句說話出自牧師之口，又難免令人驚訝——基督教信仰，不是向來鼓勵信徒謹遵教訓，放大原則嗎？.....

[袁天佑牧師:] 「在我的信仰裏面，有個信念叫 *already but not yet*，已臨到但未完成，例如耶穌話天國在我地心中，但天國亦尚未來臨。」.....

[專欄作家阿果:] 袁牧借用神學概念解釋，港人也應該活在這個拉扯當中，現實擺在眼前，但不代表要放棄理想。

K. Lai, 2014, “出賣香港民意 3 類人兼論「伊朗式普選」陷阱,” para. 11

.....伊朗.....成立一個「守衛者委員會」(Guardians Council)，職能是解釋憲法，確保國會通過的法律符合伊斯蘭教義，並有權篩選所有總統及議會參選人.....在去年總統大選中，把六百八十六名參選人篩剩八名而毋須作任何解釋.....伊朗共有五千萬名選民，他們享有一人一票「普選」的權利，但大家心知肚明，要反對最高領袖的唯一方法是拒絕投票.....可惜伊朗人民在三十五年前「袋住先」，接受了「先篩選、後普選」的緊箍咒後便一直無法突破困局。

W. Lai, 2014, “為什麼泛民應接受袋住先？” para. 10

第一，如果政治氣候不變，本來就不指望能真普選特首；第二，否決後繼續維持小圈子選舉也不可能產生反對派的特首；第三，袋住先了，就不可能走回頭路，不會再回到小圈子選舉中去；第四，普選出來的溫和派特首能真心想香港民主向前發展的話，他還可以努力向中央爭取繼續「完善」普選制度。

Ming Pao, 2014e, “戴耀廷暗示國慶「去飲」佔中籲帶 3 日乾糧,” para. 1

「在別人慶祝國家的大日子時，我們也會在中環擺下一場爭取香港民主的盛宴，歡迎所有支持民主並願意為達此目標而有所付出的人來赴宴。即使你只是想來觀禮，也是無任歡迎。」

Appendix J. The usage of “umbrella revolution” in the Canadian articles

Headline	Author	Source
Activists vow to bring ‘a million people’ if police try to clear Hong Kong’s streets	Parry, Simon	London Daily Telegraph
Activists suspect ‘triad gangs’ behind attack	Phillips, Tom	
Hong Kong faces echoes of Tiananmen	Burman, Tony	
Protesters sing throughout the night	Watt, Louise	The Associated Press
Hong Kong protest photos on Instagram blocked in China	Star Staff	
Parliamentary calendar	The Hill Times	

Appendix K. Gesture uninterpreted (Toronto Star, Oct.3, 2014, p. A14)



ANTHONY KWAN/GETTY IMAGES FILE PHOTO

Joshua Wong, centre, was arrested by police for leading protesters to climb a fence of a government building.

The faces behind the protests

High school students to people in their 70s are taking part in calls for democracy

**GRACE TSOI AND
BETHANY ALLEN-EBRAHIMIAN**
FOREIGN POLICY

HONG KONG—Who leads the disparate group of Hong Kong residents who have launched the port city, well known for its stability and investment-friendly environment, into historic civil disobedience?

From a 17-year-old with an already long history of standing up to Beijing, to a 70-year-old reverend with a dream for the city, Foreign Policy explains which movements and leaders to watch.

The Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), founded in 1958 and made up of student unions from eight schools, is known for cultivating social activists from different generations. The HKFS has helped orchestrate Hong Kong's class boycott, which on Sept. 22 included striking students converging upon the Chinese University of Hong Kong wearing matching T-shirts.

Occupy Central With Love and Peace is a pro-democracy civil dis-

obedience movement founded as a response to what some in Hong Kong see as Beijing's gradual encroachment upon the city's political freedoms. Occupy Central proposed in January 2013 that if Hong Kong were not granted universal suffrage as outlined by Hong Kong's Basic Law, Occupy Central protesters would shut down Hong Kong's central financial district, effectively crippling the city, which has been known as a safe and stable destination for global business.

Chu Yiu-ming, a church minister and veteran human rights activist, is an Occupy Central co-organizer. Now 70 years old, Chu grew up in mainland China and lived through the Cultural Revolution, a traumatic period of Communist party-led turmoil from 1966 to 1976. He is known for helping several Tiananmen Square protesters flee China in 1989 in an operation called Yellowbird.

Involved with Occupy Central since 2013, Chu assumed the position of leader of Occupy Central in January 2014. Chu has stated that although he is "really afraid of the Communist Party," he believes that "if we bow to fate, we will lose everything."

Joshua Wong, a 17-year-old high

school student, has faced down Beijing before — and emerged in one piece. The teenager founded the student movement Scholarism in 2012 in response to the Hong Kong government's bid to introduce "patriotic education" to Hong Kong's schools through a Beijing-style curriculum that some residents feared would brainwash the city's students.

After a month of protests, during the movement's peak more than 120,000 people gathered at the government headquarters, with three of the movement's members going on a hunger strike. (The proposal was later shelved.)

Hong Kong police arrested Wong on Sept. 26, after he led a charge for protesters to climb over the fence of a government building, and released him two days later without charge.

Alex Chow is secretary general of the Hong Kong Federation of Students. In a Sept. 15 interview with Harbour Times, a Hong Kong-based bilingual newspaper, the 24-year-old Chow stated that he had been followed and his phone tapped. "They are not reporters, but are public security from China," he told the Times, but he said he wouldn't be deterred by these threats.

Appendix L. Pro-democracy Christian protesters in Hong Kong



Pro-democracy sit-in protest in Mong Kok, Hong Kong, Oct. 2014 (JGOSPEL, 2014).



Pro-democracy Christmas carol, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, December 24, 2014 (Wikimedia, 2014).

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