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Anti-Normativism Evaluated

Title:

Anti-Normativism Evaluated

Hlobil, Ulf (2015) Anti-Normativism Evaluated. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 23 (3). pp. 376-395.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2015.1042398

Abstract

I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy
Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Authors:Hlobil, Ulf
Journal or Publication:International Journal of Philosophical Studies
Date:15 June 2015
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):10.1080/09672559.2015.1042398
Keywords:meaning, content, normativity, normativism, theory of content, semantics
ID Code:983496
Deposited By: ULF HLOBIL
Deposited On:08 Feb 2018 14:51
Last Modified:08 Feb 2018 14:51
Related URLs:

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