Sentimental Phenomena in Kant’s Theory of Morally Worthy Action

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ABSTRACT:

In the past few decades there has been a trend in Kant scholarship of pushing back against the ‘traditional view’ of Kant’s moral philosophy, which is portrayed as holding Kant’s moral philosophy to be rejecting of, or hostile to, all emotion and feeling. Such scholarship argues in various ways that there in fact is a positive role for emotion therein, and more specifically, in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation (sometimes referred to simply as his ‘moral psychology’). In this paper I in turn push back against such arguments. I hold that while there are indeed aspects of the ‘traditional view’ which should be corrected, it remains that there is no positive role for emotion or feeling as we ordinarily understand them in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation.

In this paper I proceed in two steps. First I present an argument for why feeling and emotion as we understand them have no role in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. In support of this I show that, in the original texts, the sentimental-phenomena that importantly are included in Kant’s theory of correct moral deliberation are distinct from emotions as we understand them. Second, I critically assess three scholars’ arguments for the importance of emotion in Kant’s moral philosophy, in the interest of exhibiting the shortcomings of arguments for a role for emotion in his theory of moral deliberation. By this I hope to demonstrate that while there are important sentimental-phenomena within Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, there is no role for emotion in the ordinary sense of the term.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades there has been a trend in Kant scholarship to argue for a larger role for emotion, feeling, desire, and the like in his moral philosophy. These arguments often portray themselves as having as their opponent the “traditional view” of Kant’s moral philosophy, which they depict as holding Kant as positively hostile to any emotion. Some arguments go farther than defending emotion in his moral philosophy, and argue that emotion has a role in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, that is, how Kant prescribes one should deliberate to produce a morally worthy action (often referred to as simply his “moral psychology”).

My thesis is that emotion as is ordinarily understood has no place in Kant’s theory of correct moral deliberation. By Kant’s “theory of moral deliberation,” or his “theory of morally worthy action,” I shall refer to how Kant dictates one must deliberate if the resulting action is to be morally worthy. This does not include the entire psychological state of the agent, nor the entire process that may lead to and instigate the deliberation of an ultimately morally worthy action. It is rather the reasoning or deliberation which will be the reason and justification for a morally worthy action; it is the inference, not the process of inferring. I defend this thesis in a two-step process.

In Section I I provide an argument for my claim by providing my own interpretation of how different sentimental phenomena fit in to Kant’s theory of moral deliberation based on textual evidence. First I clarify the differences between Kant’s and our understanding of “feeling”. This is necessary before discussing “feeling” and Kant, because the way that Kant understands “feeling” is very different from our own understanding. Next I consider in detail the only sentimental phenomena Kant explicitly includes in his theory of moral deliberation, and show that these are distinct from emotion as ordinarily understood, whereby I hope to show emotion as ordinarily understood has no place in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation.
Section II is informed by my stance and argument of Section I, and carries out a critique of arguments that support a positive role for emotion in Kant’s moral philosophy, as exemplified by three accomplished authors: Allen Wood, Christine Korsgaard, and Marcia Baron. This is in the interest of exhibiting the shortcomings of arguments for a role for emotion in Kant’s moral deliberation. I begin with considering examples of such arguments (i.e. not only for a role for emotion in Kant’s moral philosophy but also in his theory of moral deliberation) from Wood and Korsgaard. I find that these arguments share a common flaw. They all face the following dilemma: Either the premises for the arguments do not align with what Kant says, in which case they do not hold. Or, when the argument is looked at closely, we see that, rather than refute the traditional view, it collapses into the traditional view by not introducing evidence not already conceded by it—at least on any version of this traditional view that is not a straw-man. I finish by looking at an argument against the traditional view by Baron, which, I believe, shows what is right about this recent wave of Kant scholarship. Here Baron underlines evidence that has been neglected by the traditional view. While she does not argue that there is emotion in Kant’s moral deliberation, she shows that emotion relates to it in important ways and that emotion is in fact an important part of the good moral life depicted in Kant’s moral philosophy. She shows that Kant is not indifferent, and definitely not hostile, to emotion, even though it is not a part of his theory of moral deliberation.

By illustrating how various sentimental phenomena fits into Kant’s theory of moral deliberation to display how emotion is barred from it, and exhibiting the shortcomings of arguments for a role for emotion in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, I hope to support my claim that there is in fact no positive role for emotion as ordinarily understood in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation.
SECTION I: THE PLACES FOR SENTIMENTAL-PHENOMENA IN KANT’S THEORY OF MORAL DELIBERATION

In this section I will argue that Kant’s theory of morally worthy action or moral deliberation bars “emotion” or “feeling” as ordinarily understood. In order to do this, there are two clarifications that must be made. Firstly, Kant and we have disparate understandings of “emotions”. Thus, before we discuss “emotion” and Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, we must clarify these differences. The second is that Kant’s theory of moral deliberation explicitly includes some (peculiar, a priori, moral) sentimental-phenomena (which I will call ‘pure moral sentiments’). These must be considered if we are to discuss “emotion” in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action because of their sentimental nature.

Put broadly, my argument, which aims to attend to these two points, is this: Kant includes few, specific sentimental-phenomena (the pure moral sentiments) in his account of what makes an action morally worthy, and explicitly bars all others besides these. Emotions as ordinarily understood fall in the category of banned sentimental-phenomena, and the pure moral sentiments are distinct from emotions as ordinarily understood. Therefore, “emotions” as we understand them have no place in Kant’s theory of correct moral deliberation.

There are many intricacies in Kant’s philosophy, however, that must be taken into account. I will begin by explaining the terms “emotion-proper” and “sentimental-phenomena” that I use throughout, where I will also explain what is meant by “‘emotions’ as we understand them”. I will then give an overview of Kant’s understanding of sentimental-phenomena, which will show how our and his conceptions of what counts as “emotions” differ. I will then explain where the pure moral sentiments of his theory of moral deliberation fall in the two conceptions of sentimental-phenomena, and how they function to produce morally worthy actions. This should exhibit that the pure moral sentiments cannot be considered emotion-proper and that “emotions” as we understand them have no place in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action.
I. “Emotion-proper” and “Desire-proper”: Our Understanding of Sentimental-phenomena

My term ‘sentimental-phenomena’ simply refers to subjective, internal, felt experience. It is meant to be neutral with regards to being a posteriori (with some non-cognitive source, as are “emotions/feelings” as we understand them as well as most of Kant’s “feelings”), or a priori (with purely cognitive source, as some of Kant’s are). Thus, ‘sentimental-phenomena’ is an umbrella-term able to encompass all phenomena of both Kant’s and our understanding of “feelings”. It therefore also allows us to use an umbrella-term for all of Kant’s various sentimental categories without, as we may be inclined, saying “emotions/feelings”, which we would want to avoid, firstly because Kant does not use an equivalent term, and secondly because its use would be confusing given the preconceptions that come with it. ‘Sentimental-phenomena’ grasps the fact that both Kant’s and our understandings of sentimental-phenomena are experienced, but avoids (I hope) implying any other similarity between the two.

“Emotion-proper” and “Desire-proper”

Throughout the paper I will use the terms “emotion-proper” and “desire-proper” to refer to how we ordinarily understand “emotion” and “desire”. I think the way we ordinarily understand these terms is simply as they are generically defined: An emotion is “a conscious mental reaction (such as anger or fear) subjectively experienced…usually directed toward a specific object and typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body”, or “the affective aspect of consciousness”. Morally relevant examples are sympathy, animosity, apathy (in the non-Kantian sense), indifference, resentment, hatred. A feeling is “To have the sensation of being; to consider oneself to be in a particular state or exhibiting particular qualities”. Examples are any of the above terms as well as aloofness, warm-heartedness, indignation. I purposely use such generic definitions because of the imprecision in the literature on the topic of “Kant and emotions” on what the author definitively means by “emotions”;
which leaves us to our own devices for comprehending them, which I believe are such definitions as above.\(^6\) It also avoids the debate about what philosophically qualifies as an emotion. I will henceforth refer to both “feelings” and “emotions” as we understand them (as just defined) as ‘emotion-proper’.

I will also introduce the term ‘desire-proper’ because it is useful to have a term to distinguish between how Kant and how we understand “desire”. By ‘desire-proper’ I again mean desire as generically defined: “A strong feeling of wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen.”\(^7\) Examples are desires for vengeance, spite, love, or to reciprocate kindness. Additionally, we see that desire-proper is part of our conception of sentimental-phenomena, as there is an emotive aspect to our conception of desire.

Thus, “emotion” and “desire” as we understand them are subjective, a posteriori, empirical, sentimental experience, \textit{with some non-rational source},\(^8\) but they may or may not include reason. Now that it is clear what is meant when referring to “emotions” in the topic of “emotions and Kant’s moral philosophy” (i.e. emotion-proper), we are now in a position to compare Kant’s and our conceptions of sentimental-phenomena, in the interest of our ultimate goal of showing that emotion-proper is barred from his theory of correct moral deliberation. Here is our current picture of sentimental-phenomena:

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Sentimental-phenomena}
\end{figure}
II. Kant’s Understanding of Sentimental-Phenomena

Kant’s Sentimental-Phenomena: “Kantian-feeling” and “Kantian-desire”

Kant defines the faculty of feeling as the “...capacity for having pleasure or displeasure in a representation...” (MM 6:211, italics added). Thus, a feeling is an instance of pleasure or displeasure in a representation (MM 6:212, footnote), or the relation of a representation of an object to the subject (C2 5:21). I will refer to this as ‘Kantian-feeling’. Examples are hunger, irritation, jealousy, love, awe. The faculty of desire is “the faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, the cause of the objects of these representations” (MM 6:211, italics added). Desire can also be called “sensuous appetite” (A 7:251). I will refer to this as ‘Kantian-desire’. Examples are choice, the will, and wishes, (MM 6:213) but also, when habitual, passions and inclinations (MM 6:212, A 7:252, 265). Thus, Kant’s sentimental-phenomena are Kantian-feeling and (all but one, viz., pure will) Kantian-desires.

How do Kantian-feeling/-desire differ from emotion/-desire-proper? Because Kantian-feeling (the capacity to feel pleasure or displeasure) and Kantian-desire (the ability to be the cause of something coming about) are neutral with regard to being a priori or a posteriori, whereas emotion/-desire-proper are always a posteriori.

Kant divides the faculties of feeling and desire into ‘higher’ (a priori/’pure’) and ‘lower’ (a posteriori/having some non-cognitive source) faculties (C3 Introduction[s]), which produce ‘higher’ feelings/desires and ‘lower’ feelings/desires.

The ‘higher’ faculty of each faculty operates in pure reason, and deals with nothing empirical (C3 5:196-7). Kant writes that the ‘higher’ faculty of feeling is “…independent of concepts and sensations that are related to the determination of the faculty of desire and could thereby be immediately practical...”, and that the ‘higher’ faculty of desire is pure practical reason¹⁰ which is “…practical without the mediation of any sort of pleasure, wherever it might come from, and determines for this faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end...” (C3 5:196-97, italics added). That is, ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling is pure sentiment independent
of empirical matter, and ‘higher’ Kantian-desire is practical reasoning independent of influence from anything other than pure reason.

The distinction of ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ desires has a long tradition in philosophy, e.g. Aristotle, Ibn Sina, Leibniz, Wolff, and thus does not need much explication. Lust (a passion for Kant) is an example of a ‘lower’ Kantian-desire. But, a will to reciprocate a kind act is also ‘lower’ Kantian-desire, because the desire has some empirical source. In contrast, the good will (for Kant: that which decides only by pure practical reason) is the only ‘higher’ Kantian-desire, because it is the only desire that has nothing sensible in its source (C2 5:24).11 Examples of ‘lower’ Kantian-feelings are satiation, delight, gratification. But empathy is also ‘lower’, because while it may be instigated by thought, there was a previous empirical experience that motivated it – say the thought of homeless person; it is this non-a priori representation that is a part of the source of feeling this empathy.

But, what of ‘higher’ feelings? It may seem that a non-empirical, a priori feeling is an oxymoron. However, we must remember that we are dealing with Kantian-feeling, not emotion-proper. (This oxymoron betrays how we understand “emotion”.) To reiterate, Kantian-feeling is the capacity for pleasure or displeasure. Thus, Kantian-feeling can be a priori. Feeling-proper is always preceded by sensible experience, it has some non-cognitive source. Accordingly, ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings would not be considered emotion-proper, just as ‘higher’ Kantian-desire would not be considered desire-proper, as their source is pure thought.

To summarize, Kantian-feeling is the capacity for pleasure and displeasure. If a feeling has any sort of empirical source, it is considered ‘lower’ (e.g. hunger, amusement). There are, however, a very few ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings which are a priori (i.e. the pure moral sentiments and some aesthetic feeling). Kantian-desire is the ability to, by means of one’s representations, be the cause of something coming to be. If there is any empirical determination of
the desire, it is ‘lower’ (e.g. wish, inclination), while if the desire has been rendered by pure reason it is ‘higher’ (i.e. good will).

**Kant’s vs. Our Conception of Sentimental-phenomena**

It is clear that our idea of sentimental-phenomena (emotion-/desire-proper) does not overlap with any ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling/-desire, as the former are empirical and the latter are a priori. But, does this mean that emotion-/desire-proper align with ‘lower’ Kantian-feelings/-desires? No, because, although both are a posteriori, emotion-proper and desire-proper overlap, while Kantian-feeling and Kantian-desire do not. We see this in the definition for desire-proper: “A strong feeling of wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen;” this differs from Kantian-desires, which are simply wanting. For example, I think we would say the feeling of vengefulness is internal to a desire for vengeance. Whereas Kantian-feeling and Kantian-desire are completely separate. They do, of course, interact. In fact, there must be a Kantian-feeling to determine/motivate a Kantian-desire, but this does not mean there is cross-categorization. In the example of vengeance, Kant would consider vengefulness a feeling which would determine a desire for vengeful action.

**III. THE “PURE MORAL SENTIMENTS” OF KANT’S THEORY OF MORAL DELIBERATION**

*What does the foregoing have to do with what I am arguing: that “emotion” as we understand it has no role in Kant’s moral deliberation?* Well, we know how feeling-proper and Kantian-feeling compare: the former is always a posteriori, while the latter may be a posteriori (‘lower’) or a priori (‘higher’). By definition, then, ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings are distinct from emotion-proper. Furthermore, Kant explicitly bars all ‘lower’ feelings (thus also emotion-proper) from his moral deliberation, but he explicitly includes some sentimental-phenomena (the pure moral sentiments). If there is any hope to find emotion-proper to be present, they would be found in the latter. *Thus, to complete my argument I must show that it is*
true that the only sentimental-phenomena in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action are the pure moral sentiments, and that these specific Kantian-feelings are in fact ‘higher’.

**Kant Bars Emotion-proper from His Theory of Morally Worthy Action**

Kant is very clear that all ‘lower’/empirical sentimental-phenomena are banned from correct moral deliberation, thus we need not dwell on this. We can simply look to his own words. Kant writes, “What is essential to any moral worth of actions is that the moral law determine the will immediately. If the determination of the will takes place conformably with the moral law but only by means of a feeling…so that the action is not done for the sake of the law, then the action will contain legality indeed but not morality,” (C2 5:71, original italics); that is, a morally worthy action can never be done from ‘lower’ feeling. He writes that a free will (a will that follows pure practical reason) is “…not only without the cooperation of sensible impulses but even with rejection of all of them and with infringement upon all inclinations insofar as they could be opposed to that law…” (C2 5:72). Here it may seem that since he says inclinations are banned insofar as they are opposed to the law, that inclinations not opposed to the law are allowed. This is right, but it is not that they are allowed in his correct moral deliberation, it is rather that they need not be infringed upon, but they cannot play a motivating role in the morally worthy action. That this is his view is evidenced in the following citation: “…anything which presents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is excluded from the determining ground of the [good will]”, (C2 5:74, original italics). This shows, even if inclinations that are not opposed to the moral law are not infringed upon by it, that does not mean that they are thereby part of Kant’s theory of moral action, because they cannot be part of its deliberation. And he further explains his opposition to the possibility of a morally worthy action based on feeling in writing, “There is no antecedent feeling in the subject that would be attuned to morality: that is impossible, since all feeling is sensible whereas the incentive of the moral disposition must be free from any sensible condition,” (C2 5:75,
original italics). As a last citation, we see that Kant blatantly rejects motivation by anything empirical when he says, “[moral] perfection consists…in the law being by itself alone the incentive, even without the admixture of aims derived from sensibility, and in actions being done not only in conformity with duty but also from duty,” (MM 6:446, original italics). As we see, it is clear that Kant does not allow ‘lower’ feelings and desires into his correct moral deliberation, which means emotion-/desire-proper are not allowed either.

**Pure Moral Sentiments: ‘Higher’ Kantian-feeling**

It is clear that Kant bars emotion-proper from correct moral deliberation for him, but what of the sentimental-phenomena he explicitly includes (the pure moral sentiments)? These (in their sentimental nature) must still be considered, lest we leave any loose ends. Indeed, they are employed in arguments for a role for emotion in his moral theory. These sentimental-phenomena are ‘moral feeling’, ‘respect’, ‘conscience’, and ‘love for human beings’. All are Kantian-feeling rendered by pure practical reason (‘higher’), but only the first two are also motivational (as said, all desires must have a motivating feeling, and the will is a desire). Here is a map of these pure moral sentiments:

![Figure 2](image_url)

In discussing these four pure moral sentiments in their experiential capacities, I will also mention how moral feeling and respect are motivational. This is necessary, as Kant introduces the latter first in his earlier works, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the second *Critique* (1788), before he introduces all four in their predispositional and experiential capacities in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797); but more importantly, they, as motivational, are how pure practical reason can by itself be an incentive to act (C2 5:72).
Four “Moral Predispositions on the Side of Feeling”: ‘Higher’ Kantian-feelings

Moral feeling, respect, conscience, and love of human beings are what Kant calls moral “predispositions on the side of feeling” (MM 6:399). These four “predispositions” are innate capacities of all humans, and without them we cannot reason morally. But, being that they are predispositions, why can they be called “Kantian-feelings”, when the latter should be discrete instances? For the same reason Kantian-feeling is an instance of the faculty of Kantian-feeling. These ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings are instances of the respective predisposition or capacity.¹⁴

The instantiations of these four predispositions are ‘higher’ for two reasons. First, one only becomes aware of their predispositions after one has represented the moral law and used pure practical reason. Kant writes, “Consciousness of [the predispositions] is not of empirical origin; it can…only follow from consciousness of the moral law, as the effect this has on the mind,” (ibid.). Second, the capacity produces the respective pure moral sentiment only with an act of pure practical reason. Thus, it is only after an act of pure practical reason on two accounts that one experiences the sentiment, and in this way, they are a priori and ‘higher’.

a. Respect

Respect (and moral feeling: as we will see, they are conjoined) constitutes the motivating (‘higher’) Kantian-feeling for the (‘higher’) Kantian-desire of the good will. Respect is of the utmost importance for Kant, as it is how the pure moral law can be the sole motivator for a morally worthy action. As Kant describes it, respect for the moral law is “…a feeling that is produced by an intellectual ground, and this feeling is the only one that we can cognize completely a priori and the necessity of which we can have insight into,” (C2 5:73). That is, respect is a ‘higher’ feeling, and thus we can investigate it by ‘higher’ means, i.e. pure reason. One feels respect for the law because it furthers one’s free causality; Kant writes, “….since
this law is...something in itself positive – namely the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom – it is...an object of respect...” (C2 5:73).

To illustrate how respect works in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action, I will use the example of someone deliberating on whether to report a theft they just witnessed. They have the practical facts of the situation, and decide to employ Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, which is the only way to a morally worthy action. Regardless of the agent’s feelings and inclinations, they apply the moral law, which prescribes what their will ought to be, what their obligation is. In applying and thereby representing to oneself the moral law, one respects it, as it “humiliates” all sensible inclinations. Kant writes, “If something represented as a determining ground of our will humiliates us in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself insofar as it is positive and a determining ground,” (C2 5:74).

This ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling is what motivates one to actually will the action prescribed by the moral law they knew they had ought to. Thus, one can act from the pure practical reason (the moral law) alone because their will (good will) and the accompanying feeling (respect) are both ‘higher’. This is the only way a morally worthy action can be done, i.e. by the moral law alone with no empirical sentimental-phenomena, and we see in this illustration how this is possible and how the ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling of respect would work in practice.

Respect as introduced in the Metaphysics of Morals (as a predisposition) is directed towards oneself rather than the law. As we saw, respect is rendered because the moral law pushes away one’s inclinations, and one feels respect at once with the representation of the law, in the law’s furthering of their freedom. Of respect as a predisposition, Kant writes, “...the law within [a human] unavoidably forces from him respect for his own being...,” (MM 6:403). Thus, here respect is for one’s own freedom. In the above example, one would feel this sort of respect when they apply the moral law to the situation and, as before, feel re-
spect for the law in its furthering of their freedom, but they would also feel respect for themselves in having the moral law “within”. In its being rendered by pure practical reason alone, it is ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling.

b. Moral Feeling

Moral feeling is the above respect, but with the disagreeableness and “intellectual contempt” one experiences in one’s inclinations being “humiliated” (C2 5:75). Moral feeling is thus a ‘higher’ feeling whose source is the representation of the moral law’s providing freedom from one’s sensible nature, whereas respect focuses on the freedom to do free actions (i.e. actions from pure practical reason). Kant repeatedly notes that there is no feeling for the law (this would be a posteriori), rather the representation of the moral law (pure practical reason) is subjectively felt by its humiliation; all effect on feeling is tantamount to feeling (ibid.). Respect/moral feeling and the representation of the moral law are rendered at once, with no order of operation (C2 5:76), and moral feeling is ‘higher’ for the same reason respect is: its source is in pure reason and it is thereby a priori.

Stressing its ‘higher’ nature and exhibiting its role as the motivating Kantian-feeling accompanying the good will, Kant says the moral feeling is “…produced solely by reason. It does not serve for appraising actions and certainly not for grounding the objective moral law itself, but only as an incentive to make this law its maxim. But what name could one more suitably apply to this singular feeling which cannot be compared to any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal only of reason, and indeed of practical pure reason.” (C2 5:76).

Here Kant underlines that moral feeling is a ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling of a different category than “pathological”, or ‘lower’, feeling, and whose source is in pure practical reason.

As a “predisposition on the side of feeling”, the moral feeling is the “…susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty,” (MM 6:399). It is a Kantian-feeling that refers to how our action
compares to what the dutiful action is. It is pleasure or displeasure felt when comparing one’s actions to those which duty prescribes, all of which happens in pure practical reason. It focuses on the subject’s actions. In the above example of reporting a theft, one would apply the moral law to the situation. They feel the law’s humiliating their inclinations insofar as an effect on feeling (by pure-reason-humiliation) is analogous to a feeling. Because its source is pure practical reason, it is a ‘higher’ feeling.

c. Conscience

Conscience is the capacity for comparison of one’s actions to those prescribed by the moral law and is the “Consciousness of an internal court in the human being…” (MM 6:438). It is instantiated in “…practical reason holding [one’s]’s duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under the law,” (MM 6:400). Thus, it is felt when one compares their action to that prescribed by the moral law; Kant writes, “…when it comes, or has come, to a deed, conscience speaks involuntarily or unavoidably,” (MM 6:401). It is focused on the subject’s relation to the action. An experience of conscience is a ‘higher’ feeling in having its instigating source in pure practical reason.

In the above example, let us say the person reported the theft when the dutiful action was to not. If one thought of what they did, and thought of the moral law in pure practical reason and realized their ‘mistake’, then one would feel the guilt of not aligning their action with pure practical reason. But, one may object, is this not ‘lower’ since its source includes a previous experience they are recalling? My response is that it is still ‘higher’ because its source is pure practical reason – pure reason that uses practical facts. Similar to how practical reason is pure in its abstraction from the empirical, conscience is ‘higher’ in abstracting from the empirical and using formal pure practical reason and its implications.

d. Love of Human Beings

Love of human beings, or love for humanity, is particularly important to prove ‘higher’ because the connotation of “love” is that it is empirical – one loves something. However, this
love of human beings is different than love of emotion-proper because it is a capacity to love humanity, the center of which is rationality. It is, like the others, a nascent endowment that is only brought to awareness and can be experienced only after the use of the moral law. To be specific, there is a wide duty for beneficence which can manifest as specific duties for beneficent acts. Kant holds that in doing one’s duty (which is found by using pure practical reason) in these cases of beneficence, one “…eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped,” (MM 6:402). Yet, while sentimental (as are all Kantian-feelings), this love is a consequence of only reason – its source is in cognition. Thus, love of human beings is a ‘higher’ feeling in that one only comes to feel love of humanity once one acts through pure practical reason.

Let us alter the above example to show how one can feel this pure moral sentiment. Let us say that the person witnessed someone steal a five-dollar bill from a child’s hand as the child walked into a candy store. The witness somehow knew that this child had just mowed their family’s lawn and their parents gave them the five dollars for their work, and the child decided to get candy that they rarely enjoy in the family’s extreme poverty. The witness may then apply the moral law and, not out of compassion or some other ‘lower’ feeling, but out of the duty of beneficence (a wide duty) prescribed by the moral law, gave the child ten dollars. In doing so, the witness may experience love of human beings, or love for the child’s humanity, by doing the beneficent, dutiful act from the moral law.

These four pure moral sentiments, which instantiate from the four moral predispositions, of Kant’s theory of moral action are ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings because they are all rendered solely by pure practical reason, and it is in the latter’s practicality that these ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings nevertheless are instigated by empirical matters. It was established that ‘higher’ feel-
ings are different than all emotion-proper because the latter is a posteriori. Therefore, the existence of these four moral predispositions in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation does not, as they have been employed to do, support a role for emotion-proper. Instead their explication is the last step of this argument showing that there is no emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, because these four pure moral sentiments were the last opportunity to find emotion-proper therein. Here is a chart representing what I hope to have shown.

![Chart](chart.png)

**Figure 3**

**IV. CONCLUSION**

I hope to have shown that there is no “emotion” as we understand it in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action. I defined “emotion as we understand it” by the generic definitions of “feeling” and “emotion” and came to the technical term of ‘emotion-proper’, which is a posteriori and has some non-cognitive source. We then looked at how Kant conceives of sentimental-phenomena and found that his definition of feeling, which I call ‘Kantian-feeling’, is neutral with regard to being a posteriori or a priori, and that he divides feelings into ‘lower’ and ‘higher’, respectively. Emotion-proper only concerns sentimental-phenomena that are a posteriori, thus ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling is, by definition, not to be considered emotion-proper. But Kant includes sentimental-phenomena in his theory of correct moral deliberation, thus to finish proving our thesis we also had to show that the only sentimental-phenomena included (the pure moral sentiments) were ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings.
To this end, we looked at each of the pure moral sentiments in turn: respect, moral feeling, conscience, and love of human beings. Respect and the moral feeling in their motivational capacities have their source in pure practical reason, and in this way are ‘higher’. The four pure moral sentiments (which include these two) in their experiential capacities (that instantiate from their respective predisposition) were also found to be ‘higher’, for two reasons. First, one only realizes the four capacities after one has reasoned purely with the moral law, and second, one feels instances of each capacity only with the use of pure practical reason. Thus, because the only sentimental-phenomena of Kant’s theory of moral action are ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling, and because we would not consider ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling to be emotion-proper (which is how we understand “emotions”), we can conclude that there is no role for “emotions” as we understand them in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action.

SECTION II: CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FOR A ROLE FOR EMOTION IN KANT’S THEORY OF MORAL DELIBERATION

I just argued that “emotion” as ordinarily understood, or emotion-proper, has absolutely no role in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. But, as mentioned, there has been a recent trend in Kant scholarship that advocates for emotion in Kant’s moral philosophy, and sometimes for emotion in his theory of moral deliberation. In this section I will look at some such arguments, taking examples from Allen Wood, Christine Korsgaard, and Marcia Baron. This critique is in the interest of showing some shortcomings of arguments for a role for emotion in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation (to support that there in fact is no role for it), as well as to display that there is some insight to be preserved in this trend in Kant scholarship. But before beginning this task, I will say something about the “traditional view” which is often the starting point of such arguments.

This “traditional view” is portrayed as seeing Kant as hostile to all emotion. Wood, e.g., summarizes the traditional view as holding
“…that for Kant the only actions that display a good will are those done from duty, so that even beneficent actions done from sympathy must be cases of a will that is not good. They infer that if Kant thinks only actions done from duty have moral worth, then he must regard even actions that otherwise would accord with duty, if done from some motive other than cold duty, as really immoral or at best morally indifferent. They think Kantian ethics must be positively hostile to all natural desires, feelings, and emotions, because it bestows moral approval only on people whose orientation to life is characterized by an unhealthy detachment from this side of their nature.” In the next paragraph Wood continues that it is traditionally thought that “Kantian ethics regards the very existence of feelings and natural desires as a ground of moral reproach,” (Wood 2008, 24-25, italics added)

Thus, the “traditional view” is that Kant’s moral philosophy dictates to never act from or even partly from emotion, and the less emotion is involved in a practical deliberation, the better.

However, this may not be the traditional view historically held by most 18th and 19th century interpreters, as is indicated by Friedrich Schiller’s famous sarcastic remark:

“Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, and then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you,” (Cited from: Gauthier 1997, 513).

This sarcasm implies that it was understood that only a superficial or uncharitable reader would take Kant to dictate all morally worthy action to be emotionless, but instead held Kant as indifferent, rather than hostile, towards emotion. I pause to discuss the “traditional view”, because it seems that the opponent of an argument should be more than a straw-man; thus we should keep in mind the actual historical traditional view when evaluating these arguments, as it is arguably this view that should be these arguments’ opponent.15

I begin with arguments for a positive role for emotion in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, as taken from Wood and Korsgaard. I believe these arguments may be mistaken in one of two ways. Either the arguments given to support this claim are false in the light of Kant’s texts as interpreted in Section I, or, when parsed through, in fact only iterate a more
sophisticated version of the historical traditional view, rather than contradicting it. I then look at an argument for emotion-proper in Kant’s moral philosophy in a way that avoids the shortcomings I find in the previous arguments, as taken from Baron. She defends that (as I read her) while emotion-proper is not a part of Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, that it relates to it in important ways. She seems to add information that the historical view overlooked. Because her argument is successful in pushing back against the traditional view, I think it beneficial to clarify that what she is arguing is not that there is a positive role for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action.¹⁶

My stance regarding the traditional view (stereotypical or historical) which will inform my responses to these arguments, is that it should be corrected on three accounts: (1) insofar as it held that Kant allows no influence of sentimental-phenomena at all, it is incorrect because there are sentimental-phenomena in his theory of morally worthy action (although not emotion-proper);¹⁷ (2) insofar as it held Kant’s whole moral philosophy to be unfriendly to emotions, it is incorrect because he actually encourages the cultivation of certain emotions-proper that are conducive to a virtuous and moral life;¹⁸ (3) insofar as it held Kant holds actions not done from duty to have no moral value, it is wrong because such actions can be praised and have moral value of some kind, just no moral worth (a technical term in Kant).¹⁹ However, insofar as the traditional view held that Kant disallows emotion-proper in his theory of morally worthy action, it is correct (although it may have arrived at this conclusion in the wrong way). Based on Kant’s writings, it remains we cannot sincerely argue that there is emotion-proper in Kant’s actual account of how a morally worthy action can be produced, or his theory of morally worthy action (often simply referred to by scholars as his ‘moral psychology’). Put concisely in a way that abstracts from discussion of any “traditional view”, my stance is that unlike what has recently been argued in Kant scholarship, there is no role for emotion-/desire-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation.
I wish to make clear that while I am here critical of these arguments by these authors, this does not at all entail that I hold all of their many arguments for a larger role for emotion-proper in Kant’s moral philosophy to be unsound. Thus, while I here focus on critique, that is not to say that I disagree with all other arguments of each author.

I. “EMOTION-/DESIRE-PROPER EXIST IN KANT’S THEORY OF MORAL DELIBERATION”

*Allen Wood: “Kantian-feeling = Feeling-proper,” and Pathological Love*

I will look at two arguments from Allen Wood that defend a positive role for emotion in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action. The first argument employs an equivocation of distinct concepts (pure moral sentiment and emotion-proper), and the second makes a claim about a pure moral sentiment (love of human beings) that is not supported by Kant’s own work. The issue with the first, besides the equivocation, is that when it is parsed out, Wood is in fact not contradicting the historical traditional view. The issue with the second is that it misrepresents the pure moral sentiment to make it appear as an emotion-proper.

Here is an instance of arguing for a positive role for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action, which equivocates Kantian-feeling and emotion-proper, found in Wood’s *Kantian Ethics*. Wood writes,

“Because it creates an immediate desire to do the action, the motive of duty is inevitably expressed not merely as an objective reason for wanting something and doing something but also as a feeling. In the First Section of the *Groundwork*, Kant highlights the *feeling of respect*, especially respect for the moral law. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*... he distinguishes four different kinds of feelings. ... These feelings are the direct and natural acknowledgement of moral reasons. Visiting Aunt Maude at the Alzheimer’s ward *from duty* (in the Kantian sense) is being motivated by the care and concern you owe her as your aunt....” (ibid. 160, original italics, bold added).

Wood is underlining the existence of the pure moral sentiment of respect, as well as the four predispositions on the side of feeling (MM 6:399ff). As shown in Section I, these are ‘higher’ *Kantian-feelings*. However, in this citation, Wood refers to these pure moral sentiments
simply as “feelings”. This could be interpreted as referring to feelings-proper, in which case we have an equivocation between Kantian-feeling (i.e. sentimental-phenomena that may be ‘higher’ or ‘lower’) and feeling-proper. This is unwarranted, as the pure moral sentiments are not feelings-proper. Alternatively one could interpret this use of “feeling” as referring to Kantian-feeling, in which case this does not push back against the traditional view.20

Secondly, care and concern are emotions-proper, and in this citation, Wood says we act from them when acting from duty. However, correct moral deliberation for Kant pays no regard to emotion-proper. Kant writes,

“But I assert that in such a case [where one does beneficent acts from sympathy and without any motive of self-interest] an action of this kind, however it may conform with duty and however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing with other inclinations…; for the maxim lacks moral content, namely that of doing such actions not from inclination but from duty.” (G 4:398).21

That is, an act from any inclination (i.e. a habitual desire which has been habituated in virtue of a habitual want to feel some pleasure) cannot be morally worthy. Morally worthy acts are done from duty; ergo, one cannot act from inclination (which presupposes an emotion such as care or concern) for a morally worthy action, although it may have some moral value if in-line with duty.

Thus, to say that acting from duty is to act from care and concern is misleading because this suggests “to act from duty is to act from some emotion-proper”. As will be seen below in discussion of Korsgaard, emotion-proper may indeed be present in the psychology of the agent (although Kant does not advise this: “…it is even hazardous to let any other incentive…so much as cooperate alongside the moral law;” [C2 5:72, original italics]), but it cannot be a part of correct moral deliberation for Kant; one cannot act from emotion-proper, which care and concern fall under, and it is thus misleading to use such terms.

Another example of Wood’s employing the pure moral sentiments to support a role for emotion in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation is found in his paper “The Final Form of
Kant’s Practical Philosophy”. Here Wood employs love of human beings. He writes, “In the *Doctrine of Virtue*, Kant lists four feelings which ‘lie at the ground of morality as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty’ (Ak 6:399). It cannot be a duty to have these feelings, Kant insists, because they are presuppositions of moral agency….,” (Wood 1998, 15). Wood uses this claim that love of human beings cannot be commanded (which we will see is problematic) and the fact that Kant holds pathological love cannot be commanded to argue that love of human beings is *pathological* love, (i.e. sensibly rendered, empirical), rather than the *practical* (a priori) love discussed earlier in the *Groundwork*, (ibid. 16). If it were the case that love of human beings is pathological love, it would clearly prove a role for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action–emotion-proper is pathological.22

Wood writes,

“For what we have been told is that there is a certain kind of *pathological* love for other human beings which is not of empirical origin but is an effect which the moral law has on the mind. This pathological love cannot be commanded, and it cannot be a duty to have it; however, this is not because it is irrelevant to moral motivation. On the contrary, it is because this pathological love is presupposed by morality in such a way that if we had no susceptibility to such feelings, we would not be moral agents at all. The love of human beings must be pathological love, and not practical love. For he is explicitly discussing *feelings which cannot be commanded or obligatory*. Pathological love is the only love that cannot be commanded or obligatory, while practical love is not a feeling, and it can be commanded. Kant reinforces the point that it is pathological rather than practical love that he is talking about when he notes that practical love is only “very inappropriately” called “love” (love, properly speaking, is a *feeling*),” (Wood 1998, 16, original italics, bold added).

Firstly, we should clarify Wood begins with *his* claim that love of human beings is pathological (this is not literally, as Wood writes, “what we have been told”), followed by his argument. The argument is that (1) love of human beings cannot be commanded, (2) pathological love cannot be commanded, (3) “love” is either practical or pathological; therefore, love of human beings must be pathological love, not the practical love discussed in Kant’s earlier works.
There are a few issues with this argument. The first is that, as Wood writes, love of human beings is “not of empirical origin but is an effect which the moral law has on the mind,” but Wood does not comment on how this could be squared with it being pathological love. On the surface this sentence implies love of human beings is not pathological, as it is not of empirical origin. Secondly, Wood freely uses the term “feeling” throughout, but we will put these two issues aside.

The issues I will attend to are that unlike what Wood asserts, (1) Kant does not actually say the pure moral sentiments cannot be commanded and (2) that there is strong evidence that by love of human beings Kant does mean practical love (a ‘higher’ feeling). In terms of (1), what Kant says is there can be no duty for the predispositions to the four pure moral sentiments (i.e. moral feeling, conscience, love of human beings, respect [MM 6:399-403]); he does not say the instances of each pure moral sentiment cannot be commanded. Kant does not say there is no duty for love of human beings, he says there is no duty to have the predisposition of love of human beings.²³ Love of human beings itself can be commanded (MM 6:450). That is, Kant holds human beings naturally have these predispositions, so it is clear one cannot be commanded to have something they naturally have. But, one can be commanded to make the predisposition be manifested. (The next paragraph helps clarify that Kant holds this.) Thus, the first premise as I reconstructed Wood’s argument does not hold: one cannot say there is an affinity between pathological love and love of human beings in virtue of the inability of both to be commanded, as Kant has not asserted the latter.

As for (2), there is abundant evidence that the love of human beings in the Metaphysics of Morals is the same practical love of the Groundwork, and the second Critique. Firstly, in each’s discussion of moral ‘love’, Kant illustrates it by citing the biblical commandment of loving one’s neighbor or God (G 4:399; C2 5:83; MM 6:402, 6:450-452). This is to expound that, as pathological love (of God or one’s neighbor) cannot be commanded,²⁴ what is being
commanded is practical love; what is meant by such commandments is: do good and this ‘love’ will follow. It is true that Kant does not use the term “practical love” (nor “pathological love”) at the point in the Metaphysics of Morals that Wood is referring to, but in using the same explanation I think it is clear Kant refers to the same ‘love’ as in his earlier works, i.e. practical.

More decisive, however, is that at a later point in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant actually calls ‘love of human beings’ practical love. When discussing the duty to love other human beings he writes, “In this context, however, love is not to be understood as feeling…; love is not to be understood as delight [in others] (since others cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of benevolence (practical love) which results in beneficence,“ (MM 6:449, bold added, original italics). And under the heading of “On the duty of love in particular” he writes “Since the love of human beings…we are thinking of here is practical love…it must be taken as…having to do with the maxim of actions.” (MM 6:450).

Thus, I think this argument from Wood which employs the pure moral sentiment of love of human beings to prove the existence of emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, does not actually prove so. This is because the crux of the argument was to show that love of human beings is pathological love. But, on both accounts of how this was to be shown (i.e. that it cannot be commanded and that it was distinct from the practical love discussed in Kant’s earlier works), we found it wanting.

We have two examples of arguments for the existence of emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, which appeals to the existence of the pure moral sentiments, but there were issues with both. In the case of equivocating the pure moral sentiments and feeling-proper, once the equivocation was noticed, the support for the claim of the existence of emotion-proper turned out to be null, as it was merely a rendition of the historical traditional
view. The problem with the second example was that its main claim (love of human beings is pathological love) was not supported by textual evidence. Thus, by these arguments, we have not been shown that there is a positive role for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation.

Christine Korsgaard: “Emotion Alongside = Emotion Inside,” and “Different Perspectives”
Christine Korsgaard defends a role for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation in her works *Sources of Normativity* and “From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble” along similar lines to each other, but to varying degrees of strength.\(^{25}\) We see that she supports a positive role for emotion in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation when she writes, “…there are certain familiar errors people make about this psychological model [her ‘double-aspect theory’ of Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, which will be explained below], which involve the idea that the operation of a principle of choice must somehow infect the original incentive [often an emotion-proper], or change its content, or replace it,” (*Sources of Normativity*, 243). Implicit in this statement is that she holds that the moral law need not replace an emotion-proper as the incentive for a morally worthy action.

Korsgaard’s stronger claim is found in *Sources of Normativity*. Here she says that an action (including morally worthy ones) can be seen from different perspectives; the incentive of a morally worthy action can be emotion-/desire-proper when looked at from one perspective, and from another the moral law. Because they are an incentive to a morally worthy action, emotion-/desire-proper therefore have a role *in* Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. The weaker claim found in “Duty and for the Sake of the Noble” is that there exists emotion-proper *in* Kant’s theory of moral deliberation because he allows that one *has* an empirical inclination to an ultimately morally worthy act.\(^{26}\) I will begin with discussing the weaker.

In “From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble” Korsgaard underlines that Kant never says a morally worthy action must be done without inclination or desire to do the action;
Kant merely says the *reason* for doing a morally worthy action must be from duty alone (212). This boils down to saying that Kant allows inclinations *alongside* correct moral deliberation; but this does not contradict the traditional view. This claim is weaker because the stronger version claims emotion-/desire-proper can be part of what the morally worthy action is done *from*; in the weaker she leaves intact that a morally worthy action for Kant must be done from duty *alone*.

We can look at the argument in two ways. We can see it as merely showing that an inclination or emotion-proper may propose an action to Kantian moral deliberation and be present in the psychology of an agent of morally worthy action, as long as it is not the motivation for it, in which case this does not refute the historical traditional view, which acknowledged Kant allowed that one can be inclined to an act that is ultimately morally worthy in ultimately doing it *from* duty. Or we could take her as arguing that inclination *alongside* motivation from duty proves the existence of emotion-proper inside Kant’s moral deliberation for a morally worthy action, which does not hold. Thus, we should hold it as the former, whereby the weaker argument does not introduce new information with which to argue there to be a role for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action.

Let us therefore turn to Korsgaard’s stronger claim found in *Sources of Normativity*: that emotion-/desire-proper are a part of Kant’s theory of morally worthy action because they can motivate a morally worthy action. She supports this with a “double-aspect theory” of Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. Korsgaard writes, “In a Kantian conception of moral psychology there is an important distinction between the first-order impulse or ‘incentive’ to the performance of an action and the principle of volition under which one chooses to act on that incentive,” (*Sources of Normativity*, 243). That is, there is one aspect that proposes a possible action (“first-order impulse”) and an aspect by which one actually chooses the action (“principle of choice”).
What is added in this stronger version, is that the first-order impulse which proposes can remain part of the motivation of a morally worthy action (rather than just exist alongside motivation from duty), thus the first-order impulse will be part of the theory of moral deliberation. Korsgaard writes, “Neither the incentive [i.e. first-order impulse] nor the principle of choice is, by itself ‘the reason’ for the action; rather, the reason is the incentive as seen from the perspective of the principle of choice,” (ibid.). This means that if I have a sympathetic inclination to help someone, and I then apply the moral law to the situation, my action will be morally worthy as long as part of my motivation is the moral law and duty: I can keep part of the motivation sympathy and say this was my motivation from one ‘perspective’ and that ‘the reason’ or motivation for my action is pure practical reason from the perspective of the moral principle. It seems that this is trying to have the best of both worlds, it allows that Kant’s moral deliberation remain pure practical reason from the perspective of the moral principle, but can include emotion-/desire-proper from the perspective of self-love; emotion-/desire-proper can remain part of the reason or motivation as long as the action it proposes is filtered through the moral law. Being that one can still change perspective back to the motivation as emotion-/desire-proper, Korsgaard defends that emotion-/desire-proper is part of Kant’s theory of moral deliberation.

But, this is not the case for Kant, as seen in his rejection of heteronomous action as morally worthy. He writes, “Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of duties in keeping with them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only does not ground any obligation at all but is instead opposed to the principle of obligation and to the morality of the will,” (C2 5:33, original italics). Kant’s moral deliberation does not allow for different “perspectives”; it dictates one acts only from pure practical reason.

We see more evidence for this when Kant writes, “…the sole principle of morality consists in independence from all matter of the law…and at the same time in determination of
choice through the mere form of giving universal law that a maxim must be capable of,” (C2 5:33). That is, the sole principle of morality (which one must follow to produce a morally worthy action) determines choice solely by pure practical reason. In Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, emotion-/desire-proper cannot at all, from any perspective, remain a reason for action, as one must abstract from all matter when deliberating. It seems, then, this argument is unsupported by text.

One may object and point out that Kant discusses humans’ noumenal and phenomenal capacities of practical reason, and claim that this could be seen as different “perspectives”. But in discussing noumenal and phenomenal practical reason, Kant did not mean to unite the motivations of both and say that a morally worthy action can be motivated by the noumenal and phenomenal selves. He meant to do the opposite, to show that it is possible and necessary that the noumenal self legislate the phenomenal self in morally worthy action – there is only one “perspective”. In the *Groundwork*, when Kant discusses the relation of these two selves, he writes,

“…that [a subject] must represent and think of himself in this twofold way…rests…on consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses and…on consciousness of himself as…independent of sensible impressions in the use of reason.

“So it is that the human being claims for himself a will which lets nothing be put to his account that belongs merely to his desires and inclinations, and on the contrary thinks as possible by means of it – indeed as necessary – actions that can be done only by disregarding all desires and sensible incitements. The causality of such actions lies in him as intelligence and in laws…in accordance with principles of an intelligible world, of which he knows nothing more than that in it [pure reason independent of sensibility] gives the law, and…that since it is…as intelligence only, that he is his proper self, those laws apply to him immediately and categorically, so that what inclinations and impulses incite him to cannot infringe upon the laws of his volition as intelligence;” (G 4:457, bold added).
Kant is explaining that one is both a noumenal and phenomenal being, and because of this, one’s “proper” noumenal self can produce, by pure practical reason, laws for oneself. It is the noumenal self and its pure practical reason that is the causation – the reason – for morally worthy actions. Thus, when employing Kantian moral deliberation, one must identify with the noumenal self, the pure practical reason of which will be the causation or the reason for the morally worthy action performed. It seems Korsgaard’s claim that one’s reason for doing an action can from some perspective remain emotion-/desire-proper does not align with what Kant says.

We have now seen two versions of argument Korsgaard gives for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory moral deliberation. Both held there to be a double-aspect to Kant’s theory of moral deliberation: there is a first-order impulse (emotion-/desire-proper) and a second-order impulse (the principle by which one chooses to act). The weaker version argued that emotion-proper is part of Kant’s moral deliberation because it can propose an action and is allowed to exist within the mind while one acts from Kant’s moral deliberation. However, I do not think this is a successful argument, as existence alongside does not prove existence within. Therefore, this stance in fact aligns with the historical traditional view.

The stronger argument held that a first-order impulse (e.g. emotion-/desire-proper) that proposes an action to pure practical reason can remain, from a perspective, the reason and motivation for doing the action. However, Kant asserts that correct moral deliberation will involve only the noumenal self and pure practical reason, this will be the reason. Thus, after one has removed the premise of the argument that is not supported by Kant’s work (i.e. that an emotion-/desire-proper can be said to be the motivation of a morally worthy action from a different ‘perspective’ than that of the moral law), it seems this version is also not adding more substance to what is already conceded by the traditional view. Thus, I find both
versions to not in fact prove the existence of emotion-proper in Kant’s account of correct moral deliberation.

II. **EMOTION-/DESIRE-PROPER IN KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY**

The previous arguments considered were found to make claims that were not in fact supported by the evidence given or when parsed through did not deviate from the historical traditional view. But there are arguments from this recent wave of Kant scholarship arguing for a larger role for emotion in Kant’s moral philosophy that introduce new information with which to push back against the traditional view. We will look at one such argument from Marcia Baron. This argument, however, does not argue that there is emotion-proper within Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. It is possible that it be conflated with arguing so, and thus successfully arguing for emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. For this reason, I think it useful to clarify that that is not what is being argued and that what is being argued is a plausible and substantial addition to the historical traditional view.

**Marcia Baron: “Emotion-/Desire-proper in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”**

In her paper “Kantian Moral Maturity and the Cultivation of Character”, Baron holds the following tenet to be compatible with Kant’s ethics: to be good it is not enough to follow good principles from duty, one must also have the right attitudes and feelings. Baron points out that Kant’s *Doctrine of Virtue* prescribes obligatory ends: the happiness of others and one’s own perfection. These entail principles of duty, which entail more or less specific duties (Baron 2014, 74). But, because these duties relate to one another and often are “wide” (able to be carried out in different ways and at different times), they in fact, she says, “…call upon us…to shape our characters affectively and attitudinally,” (ibid. 75). Thus, Kant dictates that being virtuous is more than just restraining ourselves to do morally worthy actions (i.e. forcing ourselves to use his moral deliberation). While the latter is sufficient for being moral, one should do more if they want to be virtuous and lead a morally good life, which, one would suppose given his writing the *Doctrine of Virtue*, is what Kant holds should be done.
For example, if I lose my temper quickly, I must cultivate different, more positive re-
actions to things that irritate; or, I must aim to look at circumstances in different lights. This is the attitudinal cultivation in Kant’s virtuous life (ibid.). But we also have duty to cultivate our affective character. Baron supports this in appealing to Kant’s saying “…it is a duty to sympathize actively in [other’s] fate; and to this end it is therefore an indirect duty to cul-
vate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them,” (ibid. 76; MM 6:457). Here Kant is saying we should cultivate (pathological) compassion in the inter-
est of it pointing us towards situations that warrant our (practical) sympathy (here for Kant compassion is receptive and sympathy active and willful).27

Of affective cultivation Baron writes,

“The attitudinal dimension may be more obvious than the affective dimension of character-shaping entailed in obligatory ends, but for beings like us – rational beings who…have an affective nature – it is virtually un-
imaginable that we would be properly attuned and responsive to the moral features of the world if we were affectively a mess. Cultivation of one’s character…thus has to involve cultivation of affect,” (Baron 2014, 76).

That is, in our being emotional creatures, if we allowed our emotions to run wild and did not condition them, our practical reason (let alone pure practical reason) would be at their whims. As Kant’s previous citation shows, Kant picked up on this and accordingly prescribes we cul-
tivated appropriates emotions-/desire-proper. Baron says that “…one reason [why Kant says we have the indirect duty to cultivate feelings] is that this is part of attuning ourselves to oth-
ers’ needs and to ways we might help,” (ibid.). To put this in Korsgaard’s language, this culti-
vation will help us with having morally-aligned first-order impulses. We will thereby be more alert to moral situations, and thus have more opportunity to employ Kant’s moral delib-
eration and perform morally worthy actions. This is consistent with Korsgaard’s weaker view, which, as we saw, in fact did not deviate from the historical traditional view.
So, Baron exhibits that Kant’s moral philosophy actually encourages having emotions-proper. This pushes back upon the “traditional view” that held Kant’s moral philosophy to be hostile to emotion-/desire-proper, but also against the historical traditional view, which seems to have held that Kant’s moral philosophy was indifferent to emotion-proper. But, I want to clarify in light of the success of so arguing, what Baron has shown is not that emotion-proper is positively encouraged in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation.

Yet she says something that seems very troublesome for my arguing that she is not arguing for emotion-proper as part of Kant’s moral deliberation. To underline the apparent trouble, I will remind that I have held that emotion-proper may propose to and be alongside, but not part of, Kant’s correct moral deliberation. In her book Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, Baron writes, “…the motive of duty…operates together with sympathetic concern, deep attachment to another person, and so on. By ‘together’ I do not mean merely ‘alongside’; the motives will typically be interwoven,” (135). It absolutely appears that she holds empirical motives to be mixed in to Kant’s moral deliberation, and thus contrary to my saying that she is not arguing this. However, by the three supporting reasons she gives for this statement, we can glean that she is not arguing that they are mixed in and part of his moral deliberation, but that one’s psychology is complex and that emotions-/desires-proper are mixed in to Kant’s moral life. The reasons she gives that they are “interwoven” are (1) that one’s affective nature enriches one’s awareness of how one ought to conduct oneself; (2) that one has duties to cultivate certain attitudes and dispositions; and (3) that one’s sense of duty supports affective motives by ordering our multiple pursuits (ibid. 135-136). That is, (1) one’s emotions-proper and inclinations will “round-out” their experience of what they formally ought to do; emotion-proper is “interwoven” with correct moral deliberation because of its movement in the phenomenal realm while the noumenal realm is in control. Second, (2) we have duties to cultivate our (affective) character; emotion-proper is “interwoven” into the
morally good life. And third (3), by duty (dictated by Kant’s theory of moral deliberation) we can parse out what actions (towards which we may already be inclined) we ought to do; emotion-proper is “interwoven” because it is acted upon by moral deliberation. In all of these cases, we see by “interwoven” Baron does not mean internal to, but rather interacts with.

Thus, in this citation we see that by “interwoven” Barons ultimately means that the emotions-/desires-proper and pure practical reason communicate, not that they are a part of Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. Baron successfully argues not that there is emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, but rather that there is a positive role for emotion-proper in his moral philosophy. I think such clarification is important because it is easy to read her persuasive argument as saying that emotion-proper is part of Kant’s moral deliberation, which it is not.

When considering Korsgaard’s and Wood’s arguments for emotion-/desire-proper in Kant’s moral deliberation in light of the historical traditional view (extrapolated from Schiller’s quote), the support given for their claims either were problematic or did not contradict the historical traditional view (that Kant does not reject emotion-proper but his moral philosophy was ambivalent towards it), and thus did not actually argue against it. Baron’s argument is different in that she seems to introduce information the traditional view neglected, which could persuade one holding it that there is some greater role for emotion-proper in Kant’s moral philosophy. While (I hold) she does not argue there to be emotion-proper in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, she argued that his moral philosophy encouraged cultivating emotion-proper. She thus showed that Kantian ethics, Kant’s good, moral life, is not ambivalent towards emotion-proper (as the historical traditional view held), it in fact advocates for it insofar as it is appropriate. Baron’s argument exemplifies what is right about this recent trend in Kant scholarship of defending emotion-proper’s place in his moral philosophy, and that it is warranted.
**CONCLUSION**

I hope to have supported that emotion as we understand it has no role in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, or his account morally worthy actions. I first gave an argument for this by giving an interpretation for how different sentimental-phenomena fit in to Kant’s theory of moral deliberation. I argued that the only sentimental-phenomena in Kant’s moral deliberation, are ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling, which is completely distinct from emotion as we understand it because our understanding of emotion is that it has some empirical source, while ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling has none. I then moved to considering arguments for the existence of emotion as we understand it in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, in the interest of exhibiting some shortcomings. This meant to further support that it is mistaken to argue that this is so. However, the context of all of this is the wave of Kant scholarship in recent decades arguing (often against a “traditional view”) for a larger role for emotion in Kant’s moral philosophy. I therefore wanted to end with exhibiting that this wave is warranted and provide an example that shows this; there is in fact evidence the traditional view (stereotypical and historical) neglected which, when considered, shows there is a larger role for emotion in Kant’s moral philosophy. However, it is important to keep in mind that it remains there is so role for emotion in Kant’s theory of moral deliberation, that is, in the way Kant prescribes one should reason to perform a morally worthy action.

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2 I comment on the portrayed “traditional view” portrayed vs. the historical traditional view in the beginning of Section 2.

3 Unlike us with our term “emotion”, Kant rather uses technical terms for different sensible experiences (e.g. “affect”, “passion”, “desire”, “inclination”, “feeling”) consistently throughout his works. Of this list we may consider off-hand all as types (or things partly consisting) of emotion except “desire”. But this underlines the
disparity between Kant’s and our understandings, because in this list Kant considers all to be desires except “af-
fact” and “feeling”.


6 See Sorenson, “Kant’s Taxonomy of Emotions”: “As I will use the term in this paper, ‘emotions’ is a general
term for affects, feelings, some inclinations and desire, and some passions,” (110); DeWitt, “Respect for the
Moral Law, the Emotional Side of Reason”: “Even though our concept of emotion is slightly less expansive
than that of feeling for Kant, I will use the two terms interchangeably,” (33 fn. 3); Baron, “Kantian Moral Ma-
turity and the Cultivation of Character”: “…I use affect to cover desire, emotion, inclination, longings, wishes,
affective responses,…and the like,” (70, fn. 3).


8 One may object that there are phenomena we call emotions that are extremely cognitive and complex, such as
resentment for a deceased loved-one. However, this remains a posteriori, even if it is rendered by thought, be-
cause the matter of the feeling is (previous) experience that instigated such feeling. Being that there is some-
thing in the world that was part of the source of the feeling, this is not an a priori phenomenon.

9 I will use in-text citations for Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (‘G’), Critique of Practical
Reason (‘C2’), and Metaphysics of Morals (MM), which are cited from Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J.
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). I will do the same for Critique of the Power of Judgement
2009); and for Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (‘A’), trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Nijhoff,
1974).

10 “Pure practical reason”: pure reason that can determine the will independently of anything empirical (C2
5:42).

11 While the will is always moved to deliberation by something empirical, it remains that there can be a will de-
void of a posteriori or empirical motives, and that is how it can be ‘higher’. This is because of Kant’s idea of
“pure practical reason”. It is different than pure theoretical reason in its practicality. The reasoning of the good
will is indeed about practical, empirical matters, but it is pure in that one abstracts from the empirical information that influences one’s deliberation, and uses the purely formal moral law rendered in pure practical reason to motivate action.

12 One might wonder whether there is a ‘higher’ analogue to every ‘lower’ Kantian-feeling/-desire. This is not the case because some ‘lower’ Kantian-feelings/desires could not be a priori (e.g. hunger). There is only one ‘higher’ desire (the good will) (C2 5:24), and very few ‘higher’ Kantian-feelings (pure moral sentiments and aesthetic feeling).

13 Although there is feeling without desire, but, Kant says, discussion of this does not belong in practical philosophy (MM 6:212).

14 The distinction between the predispositions and their instantiations is important for my below discussion of Wood.

15 There are, however, contemporary authors who hold this portrayed “traditional view”. See Simon Blackburn, “Königsberg Confidential”: “Kant’s moral psychology is one in which duty is forever at war with blind and slavish inclination, which itself is always a species of self-love. Emotions and desires are the enemy. You score moral points only when duty wins over them, and just because it is duty. In most of Kant’s moral writings, in fact, the less you care about other things and other people, the better,” 35.

16 While I do not have space to discuss her work here, on my reading of her, my view is generally in alignment with Janelle DeWitt’s. That is, she too makes it clear that emotion-/desire-proper do not have a positive role in Kant’s theory of morally worthy action, as ‘higher’ Kantian-feeling is the only (and necessary) sentimental-phenomena (she does not use this term) that does. See “Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason,” Philosophy 89, no. 01 (January 2014): 31–62.

17 This clear by the existence of the pure moral sentiments.


20 Another instance of what could be construed as an equivocation (in this case Kantian-desire and desire-proper) is found when Wood writes, “Acting from duty always involves desire, even a desire to do the action for its own sake. That is precisely why Kant thinks acting from duty is easy to distinguish from actions done for some further end…, but hard to distinguish from actions done from an immediate inclination to do them (G
The difference is whether the desire is rational and actively self-effected or merely empirical, passive impulse,” original italics, bold added, 159-160. As I have argued, we would not call a purely rational desire “desire”.

It should be noted that this example (where the naturally sympathetic man drops into depression and it is only after he no longer is inclined to sympathy that his beneficent acts have moral worth) is often cited by arguments against the traditional view. They point out that Kant uses this stark example simply because it is very clear that the depressed man truly acts only from duty; it is not that Kant holds we should never be inclined to an action if it is to be morally worthy. But, this does not detract from my using this citation. Be as it may that the example is simply hermeneutical, Kant is still clearly asserting his view that if one does an action from any inclination there is no moral worth.

By “pathological” (love) Kant means dependent upon sensibility. Any pathological sentimental-phenomena is an emotion-/desire-proper, cannot be commanded, and is direct. By “practical” (love) Kant means that which lies in the will and principles of action, and not in the propensity of feeling (G 4:399, editor’s footnote j; MM 6:402).

As an analogy, to say one cannot be commanded to have the predisposition to the feeling of hunger, does not mean one cannot be commanded to feel hunger; of course not on the spot, but one can be commanded to refrain from eating which will result in feeling hungry. Similarly, in expanding on love of human beings, Kant says that beneficence is a duty, and “If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped,” and importantly continues, “So saying ‘you ought to love your neighbor as yourself’ does not mean that you ought to immediately (first) love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means...do good to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you....” (6:402, original italics). There are duties to beneficent acts which will induce the pure moral sentiment, which can be felt in virtue of the predisposition (which cannot be commanded) to it. For Kant this is tantamount to having a duty to have the pure moral sentiment: “…beneficence from duty...is practical...love...; and it alone can be commanded,” (G 4:399).

God cannot be pathologically loved at all since it is not of the senses (C2 5:82), but loving it is nonetheless commanded.

I do not mean “weaker” and “stronger” as evaluative terms.

This in fact does not contradict the historical traditional view, as seen in footnote 1.
While cultivating such emotions as compassion enhances our virtuous character, they are not necessary for morally worthy action (as evidenced in the example Kant gives of the man who has become depressed and does beneficent acts only from duty). Rather, for Kant virtue is an eternal, striving process, and cultivating emotions that attune us to morality is a vehicle by which to strive for virtue, and the more virtuous one is, naturally, the more morally worthy actions will be done in being more attuned to morally relevant situations. Kant says virtue is the moral disposition in conflict (C2 5:84), and that it is “...the moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority executing the law,” (MM 6:405, original italics). Thus, morally aligned emotions help point us in the right direction, but are not necessary, and still cannot be part of correct moral deliberation.
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


