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An Account of Willful Ignorance: Blameworthy Willful Ignorance, Praiseworthy Willful Ignorance, and Self-Deception

Title:

An Account of Willful Ignorance: Blameworthy Willful Ignorance, Praiseworthy Willful Ignorance, and Self-Deception

Glowicki, Madeline (2018) An Account of Willful Ignorance: Blameworthy Willful Ignorance, Praiseworthy Willful Ignorance, and Self-Deception. [Graduate Projects (Non-thesis)] (Unpublished)

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Abstract

This paper seeks to give an in-depth account of willful ignorance. In the first section, I define willful ignorance and address a puzzle concerning how willful ignorance is possible. In the second section, I distinguish between willful ignorance that is blameworthy and willful ignorance that is praiseworthy. In the third section, I argue that a distinguishing feature of blameworthy willful ignorance is its close relationship (making it sometimes appear synonymous) with self-deception. Here, I wish to show that blameworthy willful ignorance always involves some self-deception; while praiseworthy willful ignorance never involves self-deception. Finally, the fourth section of this paper will be committed to addressing objections that could be brought against my account. This paper aims to accomplish three major tasks, these are (1) propose an adequate definition of willful ignorance (one that holds for instances of blameworthy and praiseworthy willful ignorance), (2) show that there are (at least) two kinds of willful ignorance, and (3) illuminate the fact that blameworthy willful ignorance always involves a cognitive element, namely, self-deception.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy
Item Type:Graduate Projects (Non-thesis)
Authors:Glowicki, Madeline
Institution:Concordia University
Degree Name:M.A.
Program:Philosophy
Date:7 September 2018
Keywords:epistemology, willful ignorance, self-deception
ID Code:984397
Deposited By: MADELINE GLOWICKI
Deposited On:14 Sep 2018 18:41
Last Modified:14 Sep 2018 18:41

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