Heidegger on Translation:
From the “Untranslatable” to Essential Translation

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Abstract:

This paper is an attempt to clarify one of the rarely mentioned and discussed questions in Heidegger’s thought on translation, the “untranslatable”. Drawing on Heidegger’s views on language and translation as well as on its pertinent secondary literature, I argue that, for Heidegger, the “untranslatable” in a work of thought or poetry is thought of as a manifestation of the claim of language. This claim is a calling to the human being to reconsider our relationship to language, to think its “essence” (Wesen) no longer as a tool of communication at our disposal but as world disclosive. The appearing and disappearing of beings in the world do not occur because of our actions. Rather, it is language that grants being to beings so that they are made present or absent in the world.

In section one, I will show that expressing itself in the irreducible difference between languages, and in its being a remainder, rest or space that is constantly calling for translation, as well as its being more expressive in “words of thought”, the untranslatable offers itself as a moment of the manifestation of the claim of language. In section two, I will argue that one of the moments language claims poets is the moment where they undergo an experience with language in their failure to find the right word for what language already calls them to name. Section three argues that translating a work of thought or poetry, in light of Heidegger’s views on language and translation, needs a radically different approach to which Heidegger refers as “essential translation”.
Introduction

Despite its seeming subordination compared to other questions (i.e., Being, time, language, technology, metaphysics, Art, poetry, thinking, etc.) in Heidegger’s work, the question of translation is in fact at the heart of Heidegger’s thought. It is a vital question that penetrates one way or another almost every philosophical question that Heidegger addresses. The question of translation is so important for Heidegger that he, in a seminar given in 1955 in Cérisy-la-Salle (France), identified it with the tradition of philosophy as he states: “insofar as language or the concept of language (Sprachbegriff) thinks ahead of any thinking, the tradition of philosophy necessarily becomes translation” (Heidegger, cited in Emad, 2010, p. 295). Eliane Escoubas elaborates the centrality of translation in Heidegger’s work in the following words:

Where are the thinking of language and the thinking of the history of being tied to each other in the Heideggerian “text”? Where is the knot that joins the forms of language and the historic modes of the λόγος? Our hypothesis is that this knot is a thinking of “translation.” “Translation” refers at one and the same time to the question of language and Dichtung and to the question of the history of being. “Translation” becomes the name of the history of philosophy. (Escoubas, 1993, p. 341)

Despite this centrality, Heidegger’s views on translation neither form a systematic theory promoting a certain thesis on how to do translation nor can they be found in a formal work that treats the question of translation exclusively and comprehensively. The main reason scholars are interested in Heidegger’s reflections on translation is the question of translating Heidegger’s works in general, and his key words in particular. Heidegger’s German proves so challenging to translate that translators have desperately been seeking guiding clues in Heidegger’s own views on translation. It turns out that these views contain philosophical insights more interesting than to be
simply called upon as mere means to help translate Heidegger’s language. Their conclusion is that translation for Heidegger becomes “a philosophical problem fundamentally implicated in the thinking of Being” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 313).

One evident thesis in Heidegger’s thoughts on translation is his call for a radically different approach to translating works of thinking and poetizing, an approach that is quite distinct from the traditional ways of thinking and doing translation. In Der Satz vom Grund, he states “Translating and translating are not equivalents if in one instance what one is concerned with is a business letter and in another instance a poem. The former is translatable, the other is not.” (Heidegger, 1957, p. 145). Heidegger here references the idea of the untranslatability of the works of thinking and poetry. In this paper, I will argue that the untranslatable in a work of thinking and poetry is key to Heidegger’s thought on translation in the sense that it makes manifest what Heidegger at times calls the claim of language, in this case, the claim language makes on the translator. This claim (Anspruch, Zuspruch, or Zusage) (Heidegger, 1982; 2013) is a calling for a different approach to thinking the nature of language, and it arises, according to Heidegger, from the fact that human beings find themselves always already in a linguistically pre-structured world (Heidegger, 2013, p. 187), a world that is opened up or disclosed, among other things, by language as “the house of being” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 236; 1982, p. 5) (it is in section 2 that the notion of the claim of language will be tackled in more detail). Charles Taylor places Heidegger’s approach to thinking language within what he refers to as the “expressive-constitutive” understanding of language and art that took place in the late eighteenth century in Germany (Taylor, 2005, p. 433). This view arises in reaction to the mainstream doctrine which conceives of language as an instrument of expression in the sense of externalizing what already is there (thoughts, purposes, impressions). In contrast, the “constitutive” view approaches language as constitutive (making and shaping) of
these thoughts and purposes. The originality of Heidegger’s thinking within the “constitutive” tradition lies in his claim that “language speaks” (Heidegger, 1982, 2013), and that our speaking stands only as a response to the speaking of language.

I will argue that, for Heidegger, in hearing and responding to the claim of language manifest in the untranslatable, the translator is no longer in the sphere of conventional translation – whose final objective is to offer a product/text with the closest meaning to the original, heedless to the claim of language – but in the realm of a different kind of translation he refers to as “essential translation [wesentliche Übersetzung]” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 97), and which he himself carries out in his translations of the Pre-Socratics and in the essay “Anaximander’s Saying” in particular. I will do this by showing, in the first section, that the untranslatable in Heidegger’s reflections on translation goes beyond the ordinary definition, as the total lack of an equivalent, deep into its nature as the region where foreign languages essentially meet in a dialogue in which translation as a transposition of meaning between languages becomes possible. What I mean by this is that Heidegger is not so much concerned with the problem of translating untranslatable words in literary works but more with approaching a thinking of the “essence” of translation and of language, through the untranslatable, as that which makes the region of the essential difference between languages, and by consequent, is that which makes a necessary call for translation. In the second section, by providing an exegesis of Heidegger’s views on language, I will argue that the untranslatable does not come in a secondary position to language’s primary purpose as communication, but it is a fundamental element inherent to the “essencing” (Wesen) of language as showing things and disclosive of the world. In Heidegger’s thought, translation and the untranslatable move from the realm of conventional interlingual translation deep into the dynamics of the “essencing” of language as thought and world shaping. In the final section, the aim is to
show that in light of Heidegger’s unconventional thoughts on language, a new approach to translating works of thought (essential translation) proves necessary, since what matters in works and words of thought is not the message the author wants to impart but the way language unfolds itself into these words, an unfolding of language that takes place as an originary, innerlingual translation triggered by the fundamental untranslatable inherent to the “Wesen” of language.

Section 1: The Untranslatable in Heidegger’s Thought on Translation

It is noteworthy that Heidegger’s reflections on translation do not address the question of translation in general, that is, thinking the nature of translation in the ordinary, conventional sense where texts are transferred from one language to another. His focus is rather on the problematic of translating literary texts or works of thought. For him, translating a text whose aim is to convey a formal and objective message is fundamentally different from translating a poem or a philosophical saying. It is my conviction that Heidegger’s statement about the untranslatability of a poem in contrast to the translatability of a business letter perfectly sums up his views on translation since it contains key elements he refers to in different places in his discussion of translation. First, it is clear that Heidegger distinguishes between two distinct kinds of translation, one that concerns texts with objective, informational content, and one that deals with literary and philosophical texts. Second, such distinction between different kinds of translation where each concerns a different kind of text leads us to the unavoidable conclusion that what is at stake here is the presence of two different uses of language. Third, the most striking difference between the two kinds of texts and, thus, the two different uses of language is the inherent untranslatability of the works of thought and poetry. In an interview published in Der Spiegel, Heidegger highlights that neither poems nor works of thought are translatable in contrast to business letters and science reports.
Heidegger’s claim that there are at least two different kinds of translation can be taken as an instance of a heedful response to the claim of language manifest in the language of poems and thinking. Indeed, language has always already been calling our attention to give a second thought to the true “Wesen” of language. A call, once heard, makes the hearer grasp a different “essence” of language distinct from the conventional one that used to take language to be no more than an instrument to articulate information. In this respect, the untranslatability of the work of thought offers itself as a moment of the claim language makes on us; and only in a mindful encounter with the untranslatable that we in general and translators of such works in particular are able to hear the claim that the language of a work of thought is calling for a different kind of translation that Heidegger, in *Der Satz vom Grund*, refers to as “essential translation [*wesentliche Übersetzung*]” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 97).

Still, Heidegger raises the problematic of translating the work of thought to a paradox when he places it between its essential need for translation and its inherent untranslatability (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 315). In *Hölderlin’s Hymn: “The Ister”*, Heidegger points out that “works” that call for interpretation, such as those of Hegel and Kant, are “in accordance with their essence in need of translation”5 (Heidegger, 1996, p. 62). Even though he puts it in less radical words, Benjamin addresses, I believe, the same problematic when he states in “The Task of the Translator”:

Translatability is an essential quality of certain works, which is not to say that it is essential for the works themselves that they be translated; it means, rather, that a specific significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability. (Benjamin, 2002, p. 254)
If the kind of translatability Benjamin depicts in this passage is taken in the sense of the mere possibility for a work of art to be translated to another language, his claim would amount to trivial truism that does not add much to the question of translating works of thought. What he means by such “translatability” as “an essential quality” is something, I would argue, that goes along the lines of what Heidegger sees as the essential need of a work of thought for translation. When Heidegger mentions the works of Hegel and Kant vis-à-vis their need for translation, he means that something new in the source text unfolds itself when it is read in other words, either in the same language or a different one. This translatability by virtue of which new dimensions of meaning unfold cannot be possible unless the translator seriously heeds the untranslatable in the text as the locus of the possibility of translation. The untranslatable word is that which presents itself as the element that contains and displays the essential need for translation.

The untranslatability Heidegger sees immanent in a work of thought does not mean the mere impossibility of transferring a text or a word in a text to another language. It is not about the lack of an appropriate or exact equivalent. As a matter of fact, poems and philosophical texts have always been and will always be translated (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 316). What Heidegger means by the “untranslatability” of works of thought can be best put in Zisselsberger’s words:

To say that works of thought and poetic works are “untranslatable” means first of all that they confront us with the limits of language and therefore force us to experience language differently altogether. (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 316)

It is noteworthy that the untranslatable is no longer viewed as the challenge that hinders the process of transferring a text from one language to another, but as a challenge that invites the translator to experience language differently. According to Vezin, the possibility of a translation
of works of thought lies in taking the “untranslatable” in interlingual translation seriously as an object of thought and a challenge to thinking itself: “preserving the obstacle of the untranslatable without resigning oneself to incommunicability, rather making out of this incommunicability an essential provocation” (Vezin, 1987/88, p. 125). If the translator is not provoked by the challenge of encountering the untranslatable, s/he will miss, and fail to hear, the claim and, thus, fail to respond by reconsidering the usual conception of the nature of language, which is the central claim that language makes on us. The untranslatable shows that language sometime refuses to lend itself to our control. A refusal that should be taken no less than a power (Emad, 1993), sway (De Gennaro, 2000), or some ενέργεια (Maly, 1995) essential to language. The untranslatable thus becomes a showing of language itself.

Key to the moment of language showing itself is the encounter with the limits of language. Limits here should not be thought of in pure negative terms, that is, as weaknesses that hinder language from providing relevant terminology to new, unfamiliar thoughts. In a short review to George Kovacs’ “Heidegger’s Experience with Language”, Trawny clarifies Heidegger’s intention to bring language to its limits:

Heidegger’s experience in writing, in teaching and in conferences leads to an encounter with the limits of the usual, established language, with the barriers and closures of the culturally solidified (especially metaphysical) language, with the determinations of (most of all Western) languages, and even with the internal limits of the mother tongue. But the experience of these limits is not something negative, but positive, liberating, promising, and deeply hermeneutic. (Trawny, 2013, p. 218)

To confront the limits of language is “to liberate words from their common, everyday meaning familiar to us” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 314). A good reading, understanding and translating of a
work of thought rests on an understanding of its words far from the already established and solidified meanings. Unlike the way language is used in a news article, the “essence” of the language of a poem is to free itself from the fetters of an expected clear and to-the-point message, meaning, idea, etc. that the poet tries to externalize and convey to the audience. Of course, there must be something said in a poem, but it is less up to the saying of the poet than it is to the unfolding of language in the poem that meaning, whatever its nature, emerges. The peculiarity of the language of the poem invites us to listen to language itself rather than to the poet. The latter becomes a medium through which language speaks. To liberate language from solidified meanings is to let “words sound in their ambiguity” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 314) by way of, e.g., mobilizing old and forgotten etymological meanings in an attempt to let language manifest its true nature, its ‘essencing’ (what Heidegger calls das Wesen der Sprache). In this way, even native speakers of the language can sense, in its peculiarity, the foreignness of their own language to them. The belief in a relationship of control over language they once took for granted begins to weaken with a new view of language taking over. This is a moment when it becomes possible to hear the claim of language, that “language speaks”.

For Heidegger, to encounter the untranslatable, I would argue, is “to undergo an experience with language […] to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into and submitting to it” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 57) Heidegger goes even further to show what an experience (Erfahrung) is:

To undergo an experience with something – be it a thing, a person, or a god – means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelmns and transforms us. When we talk of “undergoing” an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it
strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 57)

George Kovacs qualifies such experience with language as a break-through, an opening, a new beginning, the disclosure and possibility of a deeper, liberating-ontological, be-ing-disclosing-intimating language and saying (Kovacs, 2011, p. 95-109; Trawny, 2013, p. 218). The fundamental change resulting from this experience with language does not concern the mere relationship of human beings with language as such, i.e., as a zoon logon echon: the animal that is able to speak or the animal that has language. If we take into consideration Heidegger’s claim that “language is the house of Being” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 236; 1982, p. 5), “if it is true that man finds the proper abode of his existence in language – whether he is aware of it or not – then an experience we undergo with language will touch the innermost nexus of our existence” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 57). In relation to the question of translation, the French philosopher and translator Antoine Berman identifies the existential stance of Heidegger’s definition for an experience with language with an encounter with “the foreign”, not as a mere object that needs to be domesticated, but rather, as a thing that compels the translator to put the entirety of her own existence to question (Berman, 1992; Yun, 2013, p. 209) Part of my thesis is that “the foreign” in a language is an essential characteristic of the untranslatable in both interlingual and intralingual translation, and thus, the encounter with the untranslatable becomes itself an encounter with “the foreign”.

For a better understanding of the relation of the untranslatable as one manifestation of the claim of language, an analysis of the nature of the “untranslatable” according to Heidegger is necessary. It is very important to bear in mind the following two points. First, although Heidegger refers to works of thought and poetry as “not translatable” in the same way a business letter is, he never addresses the untranslatable by name; and it is his commentators (Zisselsberger, 2008;
Vezin, 1987; Polt, 2015; Escoubas, 1993; Maly, 1995) who bring up the untranslatable as a key concept in the background of his reflections of translation. Second, the untranslatable should in no way be grasped as the mere impossibility of finding a relevant equivalent for a word in another language because keeping oneself within the boundaries of this basic conception of the untranslatable will obstruct one’s understanding from seeing the originality of Heidegger’s thinking on translation (Emad, 1993, p. 324). The questions that trigger Heidegger’s interest in thinking translation are quite different from those which make up the backbone of traditional theories of translation. The most remarkable difference between the two is that while the very focus of traditional theories converges on the final product, i.e., the validity, correctness, relevance, correspondence, etc. of the text in the target language to the original, Heidegger thinks translation as a way, another possible way to access “the essencing of language [das Wesen der Sprache]”.

In light of this distinction, the untranslatable opens up as something more mysterious and insightful than being thought of in the conventional way.

Emad reconstructs the latter two remarks in relation to Heidegger’s appraisal of the foreignness that rules between languages: “we grasp this [foreignness] best by looking at how Heidegger views the problem of semantic equivalency of translated terms. Heidegger’s opening up of this problem helps us to understand his thinking on translation as such.” (Emad, 1993, p. 324). My point is to show that one of Heidegger’s rationales in juxtaposing the conventional approach to translation with his own views is to warn his readers that what is at stake in his views on translation has nothing to do with the question of semantic equivalency, and in particular of thinking of the untranslatable in terms of a lack of equivalents. On the other hand, the “foreignness” that reigns between languages Heidegger appraises, in Emad’s words, is itself the “foreignness” that unfolds itself as the untranslatable that Heidegger recommends being taken as
an essential provocation to, in Vezin’s words, think anew “das Wesen” of translation as well as that of language. The identity of the untranslatable with the “foreign” in a language comes to the fore even more straightforward in a published dialogue between Parvis Emad and Ivo De Gennaro on the question of translation in Heidegger. Each of the two uses different expressions, namely De Gennaro’s “the uniqueness of the words” and Emad’s “the fundamental otherness”, to emphasize an identity relation between the foreignness of a language and its untranslatability. In an attempt to prove the impossibility to translate the German word Möglichkeit as used by Heidegger in his work into English, De Gennaro argues:

In other words, we are in a situation of strict untransferability, untranslatability. What appears as a loss (namely, the fact that in English we cannot say what is said in Möglichkeit in the same manner as it is said in German) is in fact a trait of refusal (Verweigerung) which belongs to die Sprache als die Sprache, and which is constitutive of the uniqueness of the words wherein the zur Sprache bringen is accomplished. (Emad & De Gennaro, 2009, p. 164)

What could this “uniqueness of words” be other than a basic element of the foreignness that rules between languages? Two pages later, Emad affirms De Gennaro’s use of the “uniqueness of words” by using another expression which is even more approximate to the meaning of “foreignness”, namely, “the fundamental otherness”:

This fundamental otherness [of the German language that came into the world of philosophy with the writings of Heidegger] is extremely important since its emergence confronts us with the demand to come to terms with the task of an interlingual translation of Heidegger’s key words. Because I take this “otherness” and uniqueness seriously I am concerning myself with the issue of transfer and the issue of approximation. (Emad & De Gennaro, 2009, p. 166)
Regardless of their divergent viewpoints vis-à-vis the interpretation of Heidegger’s reflections on translation, and of their choice of terminology, both Emad and De Gennaro agree to identify the untranslatability of philosophical texts with the “foreignness” that reigns between languages. In addition, Kenneth Maly, in a short paper “Reticence and Resonance in the Work of Translating,” attests to this identity relation in his own words as “the irremovable difference between languages” (Maly, 1995, p:149, 150, 155), and which gives, in thinking, a unique possibility to open up the word’s deeper connections in its own language (Maly, 1995, p. 149). Maly views the resonance of the irremovable difference between languages as a call for a transformed relationship to one’s own language, one that allows the deeper interconnections in that language to resonate (Maly, 1995, p. 155). To sum up, there is a consensus among Heidegger scholars regarding an identity relationship between the untranslatable in the language of thought and poetry and the “foreign” that sets languages apart, yet, keeps them in proximity.

In addition to this identity relationship, there is another key characteristic to Heidegger’s “untranslatable”, whose discussion is frequent in the secondary literature. The idea that however relevant or valid a translation of a work of thought could be, there is always a remainder that refuses to yield itself to a coextensive correspondence between the source and the product in the target language. I believe there is some truth to this claim if we take into account what comes in Heidegger’s lecture on Hölderlin: “There is no translation at all in which the words of one language could or should fully cover the words of another languages” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 62).

Zisselsberger refers to this remainder as “the untranslatable ‘rest’ that always remains in the works of Dichten and Denken, [and which is] the showing of language itself”, and a page before he states that “the claim of language arises from what remains “untranslatable” and foreign in
language itself” (Zisselsberger, 2008, p. 315-316). The showing of language, manifest in the encounter with the untranslatable, is the showing of the “Wesen” of language as qualitatively distinct from being a mere tool of communication. This intricate relation between the untranslatable and the claim of language will be analysed in more details in the next section.

For Maly, this remainder or rest is a “space between ‘accuracy’ and the possibility of a ‘different’ translation”, and in this space that the question “what is being said?” resonates (Maly, 1995, p. 148). Maly’s claim comes as a concluding comment to William Richardson’s clarification that his incorporation of Heidegger’s German into his English text is not to support the claim of accuracy of his translation of Heidegger but to draw attention to the fact that the German original might be translated differently. What is of interest in Maly’s claim is that once we distance ourselves from the claim of “accuracy” – especially in translating works of thought – a persistent need to hear what is being said keeps resonating in a space of possibilities. If we do not think the “untranslatable” in terms of always seeking to hear what is being said in a work of thought, then we are thinking it in terms of an obstacle to the accuracy of translating. In addition, the “space” Maly posits in his comment proves necessary to the whole thesis of his paper “Reticence and Resonance in the Work of Translating” for the simple reason that one cannot think of reticence or resonance without presuming a space as their condition of possibility. Second, the paper emphasizes the role of energeia as a “many-faceted dynamic” that allows the deeper interconnections in a language to resonate. Once again, an energeia as a working movement in language is only possible when there is a space. The concept of “accurate” translation in fact implies a coextensive correspondence between words in different languages, a fact that closes the space for the possibility of another different translation, and thus understanding and translating words become “automatic” where dictionaries have the upper hand.
Richard Polt talks about this “remainder” in different terms. He uses words such as “uncertainty, loss, residue, room, gliding” to approach the problem of translating Heidegger’s key word “Ereignis”. First, Polt claim that “in a series of private texts, starting with the 1936-1938 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger returns to this word [Ereignis] that he had neglected since 1919 and gives it a new, greater significance” (Polt, 2015, p. 412). Giving new, greater significance to usual words (in this case, Ereignis) could not be possible if we assume that these words are “hermetically sealed”, that is to say, in coextensive correspondence with their actual meanings where no new “showing” or “saying” of the word is possible to emerge. Giving usual words new meanings implies that “there may be room for a certain ‘gliding’ between fields of ownness” (Polt, 2015, p. 415). By “ownness”, Heidegger means a certain intimate belonging (ownness) manifest in “the broader problem of whether it is possible to find connections to meaning that is not one’s own” (Polt, 2015, p. 415). Second, Polt claims that even if we come up with “a third language, over and above the source and target languages – a neutral, crystal-clear language that would serve as a touchstone for the accuracy of the translation” – the acts of translation between this perfect language and natural languages “are themselves subject to uncertainty and loss” (Polt, 2015, p. 416). It remains the same “uncertainty and loss” that reigns between natural languages. Finally, being so occupied with the problem of how to qualify the untranslatability of Heidegger’s key words, Polt calls upon the word “residue” to name the content that remains untranslatable between German and Asian languages and traditions. Having such diversified terminology in the secondary literature to approach the problem of the untranslatability of works and words of thought is supporting evidence to the thesis that the untranslatable is a space of possibilities, and not a barrier that hinders understanding and transfer. All the terminology that is used to qualify the “remainder” as a key characteristic of the untranslatable are words that
provoke and invite new ways to think language in general and translation in particular differently. It is depicted as both a “space” or “room” for new meanings to emerge and as a “residue, rest, uncertainty” that provokes thinking.

In addition to the two aforementioned key characteristics of Heidegger’s “untranslatable”, there is another characteristic as important as the other two. Heidegger’s “untranslatable” does not lie in ordinary words of the ordinary use of language. It rather lies in a different kind of words, the kind of words that elevates literary works to the status of a work of thought. When reading the Pre-Socratics, Heidegger focuses on words, such as, Logos, Aletheia, Moira, etc. so to hear again their true sayings as they were heard by those philosophers themselves and not as they have been understood, translated and transferred to us by their successors. Not only that, Heidegger makes his own thinking stand on other key words, such as, Being, Dasein, and Ereignis, to name but a few. If there is anything that makes Heidegger’s texts untranslatable, it must be these key words which faces scholars and translators with serious challenges, such as, how to translate German familiar words with unfamiliar meanings of Heidegger’s thought to other European languages. In his article “The Untranslatable word? Reflections on Ereignis”, Richard Polt suggests that

Now the word Ereignis must be thought from the matter itself that has been indicated and must speak as a guiding word in the service of thinking. As a guiding word that is thought in this way, it can no more be translated than can the Greek word logos and the Chinese dao. Here the word Ereignis no longer means what [the Germans] otherwise call any happening, an occurrence. (Polt, 2015, p. 407, my emphasis)

According to Polt, it is Heidegger who first claims that “Ereignis can be translated sowenig wie, literally ‘just as little as,’ logos and dao” (Polt, 2015, p. 408), that is, as “guiding words”. The idea of the untranslatability of words of thought has been referred to by other Heideggerian scholars

This category of key words Heidegger is concerned about does not comprise only words such as *logos, aletheia, ethos, dasein, Ereignis, being*, etc. but every word through which we can still hear the speaking of language, i.e., words that invite us to think their “essence” away from their being designated as reference to some beings. As a matter of fact, these key words as used by Ancient Greek (*logos, aletheia…*) or German (*Sein, Ereignis…*) do have ordinary meanings articulated in everyday life communication, but *only* that these words speak to thinkers (Pre-Socratics and Heidegger in this case) differently. These thinkers are made to hear a saying of the word different from the sayings already consumed in ordinary usage. They *become* words of thought (thoughtful words) because their new saying cannot be accessed unless they are thought (thinking in Heidegger’s sense as different from the calculative, instrumental thinking) in their “essencing” as unfolding into language. This insight can be better understood when we take into account Heidegger’s statement in “The Way to Language”: “This way-making puts language (the essence of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded word)” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 130). Put differently, key words or words of thought as guiding words – unlike ordinary words – are the words where the essence of language as Saying (that is, language’s ‘speaking’ prior to, but through, human speech, thereby ‘claiming’ and ‘addressing’ us) can be *most* spoken by language and heard by thinkers and poets into their response as “spoken” words, that is to say, into a poem or a philosophical saying.

Nevertheless, Heidegger does not seem to discourage us altogether from trying to translate thinker’s key words. What Heidegger seem to tell us is that a good understanding, and thus a
translation, of a work of thought depends essentially on the understanding of its key words as “guiding words” and not as ordinary words with well-determined referents or meanings. Why these key words need to be given a special status than ordinary words, it is because, as Ricoeur puts it:

great primary words…are themselves summaries of long textuality where whole contexts are mirrored [and of] intertextuality which is sometimes equivalent to revival, transformation, refutation of earlier uses by authors who fall within the same tradition of thought or opposing tradition. (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 6)

Put differently, key words of philosophy and poetry do not speak the same way ordinary words do. They do not respect the general linguistic rule that for each word there must be at least one defined referent, be it a determined object or a determined relation between objects, otherwise the word is meaningless. On the contrary, philosophical and poetic key words speak as suggestive reminders of connections in the same language. Polt goes further to claim that these key words are “thickening or condensation” of created or discovered passages along which meaning can be brought together. He adds: “it may be that meanings fully come to life only when they travel along such passages and experience thickening. This is a process of translation” (Polt, 2015, p. 419), and that is because such words, as real, historical words, will inevitably bring with them “half-silent connotations [that] alter the best-defined denotations” (Reicoeur, 2006, p. 6). This goes along the lines of Francois Vezin’s conclusion to his “Translation as Phenomenological Labor” when he states that “Dasein is not a word; Dasein is a thought”. It is more a concern to understand the word than being preoccupied with swapping it with a French word. Vezin inferred this conclusion from a statement Heidegger made at the end of a lecture course in 1935 when he said that “Sein und Zeit is not so much a book as it is a task given to us to accomplish”; and in an interview in 1966,
Heidegger said “as little as one can translate a poem, just as little can one translate a thought” (Vezin, 1987/88 p. 136).

According to Heidegger, what makes a work of thinking untranslatable is the kind of words of which it is made. Words that no longer name objects but provoke and show the way to thinking. There is nothing specific in a “thoughtful word” to translate, yet, “everything depends on our paying heed to the claim arising out of the thoughtful word” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 3). Words such as Logos, Alethea, Dasein, Ereignis are untranslatable not because translators fail to transfer their semantic content to other language, but because we should treat them as untranslatable if we are to give these words their full due. Dealing with words of thought the same way we ordinarily translate other words draws us away from seeing their peculiarity that, instead of informing us, they guide us to think while at the same time keeping their claim on us to reconsider our view of and relation to language.

Section 2: The Nature of the Claim of Language

When the untranslatable is encountered in a work of literature in a procedure of conventional translating, the task of the translator is unproblematic: to render the untranslatable word translatable, that is, to call upon any available conceptual and linguistic tool to overcome the problem by minimizing it into a technical, linguistic predicament. There is no mystery sensed, no claim heard, and no encounter with the “Wesen” of language. This kind of translation is grounded on a long philosophical tradition that makes language “surrender itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 223). But when Heidegger speaks of the untranslatability of works of thought and poetry, he is identifying the encounter with the untranslatable with an experience with language. This experience can only take
place when the untranslatability of a word of thought is taken as a question-provoking mystery revealing the mysterious character of language. For Heidegger, this mystery lies in the fact that “language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of Being” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 223). While Heidegger grasps the “Wesen” of language in its essential ungraspability, philosophers of language and linguists not only are unable to free language from Aristotle’s “zoon logon echon” – where the essence of the human being is defined in terms of having language or having the ability to speak – but they also objectify its being, turn it into a mere instrument. The fundamental difference between Heidegger and the mainstream philosophers of language is his struggle to preserve the “poetical” mysteriousness of language and to save it from being minimized to an object for calculative thinking (that is, rendering language a code of signs and rules to better serve the problem-solving aspect of our thinking).

The kind of thinking that Heidegger believes qualified to pave the way to access a true “Wesen” of language is not the artificial-calculative thinking which preoccupies itself with “explaining from highest causes” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 221) by way of determining the “technical-theoretical exactness of concepts” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 219), i.e., the thinking where “language thereby falls into the service of expediting communication along routes where objectification – the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone – branches out and disregards all limits” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 221); it is rather a thinking that sees and cares for the multidimensionality of “things” as independent from their instrumental utility to us; it is a thinking that “remains purely in the element of Being and lets the simplicity of its manifold dimensions rule” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 219). One aspect of this multidimensionality that Heidegger sees essential to the “Wesen” of language is the ambiguousness inherent to natural languages. This ambiguousness should not be taken in a negative sense, to be viewed as a problem to explain away so that language becomes a
better tool enabling clearer acts of communication – rendering it a predetermined “code of behaviour” (Escoubas, 1993, p. 343) rather than a language as such – but it should be taken rather as a provocation and invitation to re-consider the traditional definition of the essence of language and to start to establish a new relationship with language other than the one that reduces it to our tool. In a letter to W.J. Richardson, which appears as a preface to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, Heidegger wrote:

Every “formula” can be misunderstood. In accord with the manifold (many-faceted) dynamic of being and time, all of the words that say/show this dynamic – like Kehre, Vergessenheit, and Geschick – are also ambiguous. Only a many-faceted thinking reaches all the way into the corresponding of saying/showing of the matter at issue in that dynamic. And then: This manifold/multifaceted thinking does not require a new language, but rather a transformed relationship (a shift in the relationship) to the Wesen of the old one. (Richardson, 1967, p. xxii-xxiii)

Heidegger’s call for a “transformed relationship” to language to meet the manifold/multifaceted thinking – in opposition to the one-dimensional subject-object relationship to language – arises from his view that language is “the proper abode of man’s existence” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 57), i.e., wherever the human being is, language is to be found. “Language belongs to the closest neighborhood of man’s being. We encounter language everywhere” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 187). In other words, in every side of the human being’s existence language has a role to play, in shaping, more or less, an aspect of her world. It is through the lens of our language that we see, interact and extend the world around us, and not that we call upon language to access an already given world. The result is that attempts to think and study language in separation from the being of the human being amounts to an uprooting-like abstraction of language from its natural environment and
exposing it to all kinds of anatomical dissections and analyses of its parts to, ironically speaking, understand its dynamical powers. This scientific approach to the understanding of language considers the findings in linguistics and philosophy of language as universal truths that are applicable to every language. This approach is based on a metaphysical presumption of the existence of a universal essence to every being including language.

According to this view of language, translation in a general sense preoccupies itself with the transfer of meaning as semantic content from one linguistic capsule (the word/term in this case) to another linguistic capsule in another language believing that the relationship between word and meaning is necessarily purely objective, where the word as term has no bearings on its meaning. If this kind of thinking the relation between the word and its semantic content seems unproblematic in translating a business letter, it becomes highly problematic when what is at hand is a work of thought or a poem. The reason is that in the business letter the semantic content is clear since it is already objectively determined (the nature of the transaction/service, name of the product, date, time, place, etc.) whereas words in a work of thought or poetry get pregnant with meaningful dimensions other than those already agreed upon in the public realm, and which are reticent of the thinker’s or poet’s intimate experience with the speaking of language. In words of thought, we have “a picture of language as making possible new purposes, new levels of behaviour, new meanings, and hence as not explicable within a framework picture of human life conceived without language” (Taylor, 2005, p. 434).

In a work of thought or poetry, language manifests a different “Wesen” to the one linguists elicit from our everyday use of language. In “Language”, Heidegger clearly states that “language speaks” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 188). The key move in this statement is that “he inverts the usual relation in which language is seen as our tool, and speaks of language speaking, rather than human
beings” (Taylor, 2005, p. 433). This inversion is not coincidental or rhetorical; it becomes fully intentional and highly meaningful when we pay attention to the *italics* of the very first two sentences with which Heidegger opens “Language”: “*Man speaks. We speak when we are awake and we speak in our dreams.*” For Heidegger, it is no longer humans who speak but language. But what then? What does it mean that language speaks rather than us? And what “*Wesen*” does the speaking of language show?

To understand what Heidegger means by “language speaks”, it is necessary to understand what he is after or what he seeks by the “*Wesen*” of language. One thing for sure is that he is far from taking it as “essence” because it is this metaphysical concept that has been channeling Western thought to suppose that there is some essential/fundamental/basic being that is universal to all languages: “a theoretical grasp or formal definition of language as an entity” (Backman, 2011, p. 64), and on the grounds of a graspable essence as an entity that language has been understood and viewed as a tool or rather a vehicle to carry and convey messages. Still, Heidegger remains doubtful about the implications that an inadequate understanding of the word “*Wesen*” might lead to. It is not coincidental that among his many papers on language, he never titles a paper “What is Language?”, and that is because he is aware that the answer to this metaphysical question will normally be “language is…”, an answer that will automatically identify language as a being with a determined essence graspable in what comes after the “*is*”. In “The Nature of Language”, the English translation of “*Das Wesen der Sprache*,” Heidegger puts the title into question arguing that this latter “sounds rather presumptuous, as though we were about to promulgate reliable information concerning the nature of language” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 70). In rewriting the title into a question “the Nature” – of Language?,” Heidegger questions the meaning of “nature” – or “essence” – itself and warns the reader not to rely on any presupposed understandings of the word
such as those we get from titles such as “The Nature of Art,” “The Nature of Freedom”, etc. In “Language”, Heidegger explains right on the second page why he opts for the single word “language” as a title without any kind of elaboration, claiming that he “does not wish to assault language in order to force it into the grip of ideas already fixed beforehand” or “to reduce the nature of language to a concept” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 188). Other titles such as “Words,” “The Way to Language,” “A Dialogue on Language,” are further examples on how Heidegger is so cautious not to channel his readers to believe in the existence of a fixed and graspable essence or nature of language.

Then, how shall we understand this “Wesen der Sprache”? In the first endnote to “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation”, Emad shows how the German word “Wesen” faces translators with great difficulties and that is because English language does not have a word that “reflects the movement of emerging in its ongoing character which is crucial for this word [Wesen]” (Emad, 1993, p. 338). After criticizing several approaches to the translation of “Wesen” accusing them of stifling the verbal dynamic of the German word, Emad approves of and adopts Kenneth Maly’s expression “root unfolding” for it preserves the movement of emerging in its ongoing character. In light of this understanding of “Wesen”, language in Heidegger’s statement “language speaks” should first and foremost be thought of in its speaking as “doing” rather than in its being as in the beingness of beings.

The question that legitimately arises now is “what is the nature of the speaking of language?” Heidegger points out that this question is “the crux of our reflection on the nature of language” because “it remains quite obscure just how we are to think of essential being, wholly obscure how it speaks, and supremely obscure, therefore, what to speak means” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 95) The obscurity of the claim “language speaks” arises from the fact that “language proves incontestably
to be expression” while “in its essential nature, the speaking of language is not an expressing” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 195). “Language speaks” proves obscure for the calculative mindsets as they could not grasp language apart from its usefulness in the day-to-day communications as imparting information by way of written or verbal expression.

If this speaking of language is not expressing, then in what way does language speak? And where could this speaking be heard if not in the realm where language is mostly used? To the first question, Heidegger answers: “the essential being of language is Saying as Showing” (Das Wesende der Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige), and in an elaboration to this statement, he adds: “the moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning” (Das Regende im Zeigen der Sage ist das Eignen) (Heidegger, 1982, p. 123, 127 respectively). The kind of showing characterizing language is not that which shows things already present in the world through signs, but it is a Showing that makes things present in the world in the first place, a Showing that discloses world by “bringing all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are and where they abide according to their kind” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 127). Heidegger calls this moment Owning or Appropriation (Ereignis12) because “it yields the opening of the clearing in which present beings can persist and from which absent beings can depart while keeping their persistence in the withdrawal” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 127). In other words, the true nature of language lies in its power by virtue of which it grants/gives (gibt) beingness (i.e., stable meaning and identity) and persistence to beings (Backman, 2011, p. 63).

To understand how the speaking of language grants being and persistence to things, we need to answer the second question. To hear the speaking of language, we have to seek it in what is spoken purely rather than to pick just any spoken words at random, and it is in the poem that language speaks purely (Heidegger, 2013, p. 192). Why poems? Because it is there where language
is freed and liberated from the shackles of calculative thinking that calcifies and conceals its disclosive power by objectifying it through the rigor and rigidity of syntactical and semantical rules. In a poem, words are free to speak themselves and offer a chance for a committed reader to experience that to the nature of language, there is far more than being a mere means of communication.

Among the poems Heidegger calls on in his search for “Das Wesen der Sprache” there is Stefan George’s poem “The Word”, which offers to us not only a vivid example of the poet’s poetical experience with language but also a rare opportunity to hear language speak most clearly as it does in the last verse of the poem: “Where word breaks off no thing may be.” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 60) The poem is so telling that Heidegger devotes two exclusive essays, namely, “The Nature of Language” and “Words”, to analyze each moment of George’s encounter with language until the moment where language itself speaks through the poet’s mouth declaring that, in Heidegger’s ventured paraphrasing, “No thing is where the word is lacking” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 61). The poem recounts the experience of the poet who, believing to have brought a rich yet frail prize from a land of dream and wonder to his homeland, discovers that the treasure is no longer in his grasp and that is because he no longer has the word that the Norn (the goddess of destiny) gave him to name it. Taking a hint from the poem’s title “The Word”, the treasure that essentially eludes naming is the word itself in its very nature as language (Backman, 2011, p. 63). The poet’s experience with language shows that the nature of the word experienced here is not itself a thing as a name, i.e., a reference that semantically relates to referent. Rather, it is, as Backman puts it, the functioning of logos, the very articulation of a thing into a determinate meaningful thing […] Language as logos is the dynamic context for discursively constituted beings, the background event that can never itself become a being, resisting all objectification. (Backman, 2011, p. 64)
Backman’s statement is in a similar vein with what De Gennaro grasps from Heidegger’s writing on the disclosive nature of language:

Language, here, is thought in its essence or sway (Wesen) as the showing of world. World, the incessant unfolding and opening of the dimension within which all beings appear, is itself not one of these beings, it retains itself in a difference to that which takes place within it [...] as beings. (De Gennaro, 2000, p. 4)

De Gennaro sees the disclosive character of language in its power to modulate the emerging of world, the initial extension, thanks to its saying, showing, and thus claiming by calling for response, for a naming to grant being and persistence to beings in their presence as in their absence (De Gennaro, 2000, p. 5). But most importantly, in every response to the claim of language, that is, in every spoken word showing a thing in the world, something else is necessarily shown as well, which is language itself. In every word that we speak, language reminds us that it is always already there, even before we come to the spoken word.

Language, through the word as name, bestows being and persistence on beings and make them things as Heidegger compactly states: “The word makes the thing into a thing – it ‘be-things,’ the thing.” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 151) To understand this event of ‘be-thinging’, we have to understand what Heidegger means by ‘name’. Far from being a mere designation, Heidegger suggests that ‘name’ in Goerge’s poem “The Word” could be taken in a sense we are already familiar with in such expressions as “in the name of God” or “in the name of the king”, that is to say, “at the call of...” or “by the command of...” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 61). The poetical nature of naming is essentially a calling, a claim, the claim of language. A calling for what? It is a calling into the word. All the things that are named in G. Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening”, such as the window,
the falling snow, the vesper bell, bread and wine, are called and bidden to come into “a presence sheltered in absence” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 197). The words of the poem do not bring things to the actual physical presence but they make things present in their absence “so that they may bear upon men as things” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 197). Heidegger presents this “bearing-upon” as follows:

The snowfall brings men under the sky that is darkening into night. The tolling of the evening bell brings them, as mortals, before the divine. House and table join mortals to the earth. *The things that were named, thus called, gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities.* The fourfold are united primarily in being toward one another, a fourfold. The things let the fourfold of the four stay with them. This gathering, assembling, letting-stay is the thinging of things. The unitary fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and divinities, which is stayed in the thinging of things, we call – the world. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 197, my emphasis)

If language in poetry proper enfolds its nature in such a manner as be-thinging things and bidding them to come and gather into a world, then what remains of the language of everyday speech? Why does everyday speech fail us to have an experience with language? To this Heidegger offers one more insight that places poetry outside the vast domain of ordinary language use. It is unlike any other kind of ordinary use of language, not even a privileged higher mode of it. The words we speak and write in everyday use are words of a “forgotten, and therefore used-up poem” where no call into the world resounds anymore (Heidegger, 2013, p. 205).

Given Heidegger’s view on language as world disclosing rather than a tool of communication, translation, as an activity that revolves in the closest neighborhood of language, could no longer be seen through the lens of its conventional identifying concepts. There is no denying that any change in our relation to language implies a change in the way we think and do translation. In fact, Heidegger’s views on language hint more or less to some implications on the question of
translation. To begin with, it is in a poem proper where language speaks, making its claim on us to hear the saying and experience its “Wesen” differently, but what is that very moment when language speaks as language? Surprisingly enough, it is not when language grants us with the word on a silver platter, it is rather the moment

when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 59)

Goerge’s poem “The Word” poeticises the moment where the poet could not find the right word for the treasure that concerns him and carries him away. He is quite aware that there is something in his grip, yet it vanishes because he lacks the word for it. In relation to the question of translation, one defining trait of the untranslatable is the moment when the translator fails to find the right word to which he can transfer what he has understood by a word in the source language. Therefore, and in support to my present thesis, the untranslatable offers another opportunity to hear the claim of language. The poet’s failure to find the word for what he believes most important could be interpreted as a failure to translate the knowledge and experiences he believes he gained into words, and thus, it could be qualified as a moment of untranslatability not much different from the one experienced by the translator since both (the poet and the translator) are certain of having something in their grip while unable to find the right word for it. But this does not mean that the poet’s experience with the untranslatable is the same as the translators. One determining distinction between the two is that the translator has an end to accomplish, i.e., to produce a text in the target language. Here, no matter what the untranslatable could speak, claim or say to the translator, and whatever the translator hears in the claim of language, the task of
producing the best possible translation restricts the translator’s response to the speaking of language into treating the untranslatable at one point as a challenge to overcome towards accomplishing the task. The poet’s experience with the untranslatable, on the other hand, drives him into an encounter with the “Wesen” of language where eventually they become one “essence”, or rather in less strong words, the poet becomes a mouthpiece of language. Every poem (in Heidegger’s sense) is the poet’s expression of his personal experience of his failure to find the right word, i.e., an experience with the untranslatable as manifesting a moment when language denies us its essence.

That being said, the essence of the untranslatable, as the poet’s inability to happen upon the right word and as a manifestation of the claim of language, can be understood with a different reading of the last-quoted passage from Heidegger’s “The Nature of Language” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 59). Heidegger maintains that language speaks to us when we cannot find the word for what concerns us and oppresses us. A question arises from this quote as follows: what is this “something” that concerns us and for which we cannot find the right word? Or, what is this “something” that concerns us the most as human beings? The answer is that what concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us the most is language itself. Through this reading it becomes somewhat clear how language speaks its claim through the untranslatable. It claims us when it activates one or more of the manifestations of one of the human being’s modes of being-in-the-world, Care. This twist in reading Heidegger’s quote is supported by Stefan George’s “The Word”. The title of the poem clearly hints that the vanished prize that makes the poet renounce – an expression of being concerned, carried away, oppressed and encouraged, is the word itself. It is the word that vanishes when the poet fails to find the right word to name the word (prize or treasure) in order to grant it being and bring it down among other beings. In refusing to grant its
“Wesen” to the poet, language does speak by showing that its “essence” is fundamentally different from that of other beings. Its “wesen” as “essencing” is what grants and allows the rest of beings to have their essences.

Every poem (where language speaks purely, according to Heidegger) is language’s incessant movement of its own emerging. Every poem is the poet’s response to the claim of language manifested in its denying him the right word. Thus, the poem becomes the very unfolding of the untranslatable in the sense that the poem is the poet’s struggle to access and contain the untranslatable in the right word, an event which never happens because of the very nature of the “Wesen” of language as the incessant movement of its own emerging. This agrees precisely with Novalis’ proposition: “the peculiar property of language, namely that language is concerned exclusively with itself – precisely that is known to one” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 111), with which Heidegger opens “The Way to Language” to point out that “language speaks solely with itself.”

But, what about the emerging and showing of beings as things in the world if language is solely concerned with itself? The answer is that the emerging of beings in the world comes as a by-product of language’s ongoing movement of its own emerging. If the “essencing” of language is understood primarily as a showing of beings, then, we will be misreading Heidegger as if he claims that the being of language depends on the being of beings including human beings, i.e., language exists as the human being’s ability to access other beings. It is in the process of the essential unfolding of language that beings appear and disappear in the world. This is what gives things their transient being. Since language is not essentially concerned about the emergence of beings, the essence of each being is disclosed in different ways according to the way language unfolds itself, thus, generating the ineradicable difference between languages as a ruling foreignness in the form of the untranslatable conventionally understood.
There is no denying that the more we delve into Heidegger’s analysis of the poet’s failure to find the right word for that which concerns him the most as one manifestation of the claim of language, the more we dissociate it from the untranslatable of conventional translation. It is true that the untranslatable (in the poet’s inability to find the right word to name what concerns him) seems to have little to do with Heidegger’s thought on the question of translation and the place of the untranslatable in it. This dissociation vanishes once we consider Heidegger’s conception of translation.

Section 3: From the Claim of Language to Essential Translation

Heidegger does not claim to have an identifiable theory of the question of translation, nor does he claim that his thoughts concern translation in general. He makes it clear that what concerns him is the translation of texts of what he exclusively considers works of thought and poetry. He also makes it clear that his target in thinking translation of such works is the untranslatable rather than the translatable when he points out that poems, unlike business letters, are not translatable; but poems and works of thought can be translated and are in fact being translated, and business letters do sometimes face us with untranslatable content. What Heidegger means by the “untranslatable” or the untranslatability of works of art and thought was the theme of section one and two of this paper, but it is still ambiguous what kind of translation he has in mind when he speaks about translating this kind of written work. In his discussion of translation in various places in his work, Heidegger refers to translation with different adjectives (productive translation, essential translation, originary/innerlingual translation) (Emad, 2010, p. 295; Heidegger, 1992, p. 12; 1991, p. 97, respectively) that, on the one hand, it becomes clear that the kind of translation he addresses is not the ordinary one where dictionaries have a central role, while it becomes, on the other hand,
hard to elicit in what way we are supposed to approach translating works of thought and poetry. A provisional answer to this query is that Heidegger’s aim in thinking translation is not the production of a final text as genuine as possible to the original, but rather to make translation a moment of keeping the original thinking in the work of art going on, to awake its dormant thoughts and develop its potentials into concrete possibilities.

A way to understand Heidegger’s approach to translation is to look at the word translation in German “Übersetzen” and understand the way Heidegger thinks its multiplicity of meaning in German. The word “Übersetzen” means both translation in its usual meaning (as a transfer of a written text from one language to another) and transfer proper (as a transposition of something from one place or domain to another). To make this distinction noticeable, Heidegger emphasises the second part of the German word “Übersetzen” to mean the former while emphasising the first part “Übersetzen” to mean the latter. When Heidegger thinks translation “Übersetzen” of literary works, he thinks it in terms of transfer “Übersetzen”, that is to say, he thinks translation not in terms of a mere transfer of literary text and its key words from one language to another, but in terms of a transfer of the thinking in/of these works from a domain of “truth” to another domain of “truth”, from a historical epoch to another historical epoch. For instance, when we translate Ancient Greek to Modern German by substituting the Greek words and phrases with their equivalents from German with the help of a dictionary, we are engaged in an act of ordinary translation “Übersetzen”. Translation as transfer, on the other hand, is that when we are translating, we are primarily concerned about the historical background (culture, traditions, arts) where the literary work was first written, about the relation of the thinker or poet to her language, and about the relation of language to its word, i.e., the way Ancient Greek unfolds into its spoken word, that is to say, the “Wesen” of Ancient Greek. In terms of the speaking of language, “Übersetzen” is
concerned with transferring the speaking of Ancient Greek words in their calling the elements of the fourfold (earth, sky, divinities and immortals) to gather and appear as things in the Ancient Greek world to the speaking of Modern German words.

That being said, it is still not straightforward what Heidegger exactly means by translation as transfer. Emad’s understands this transfer in terms of Heidegger’s conception of the Greek word “Αλήθεια”, as “unhiddenness”, “unconcealedness”. In his attempt to make sense of Heidegger’s first use of the word translation in a passage from a seminar given at Cérisy-la-Salle which reads: “insofar as language or the concept of language thinks ahead of any thinking, the tradition of philosophy necessarily becomes translation” (Emad, 2010, p. 295), Emad concludes that, given Heidegger’s involvement and understanding of Ancient Greek thought as well as his understanding of its key words, especially “Αλήθεια”, translation as a manifestation of the tradition of philosophy “no longer appears as the rigid domain of the accumulated and preserved philosophical doctrines” (Emad, 2010, p. 300), it rather becomes a transfer from one domain of “Αλήθεια” to another domain of “Αλήθεια”. In other words, Heidegger thinks translation of works of thought as a transfer of these works into a hardly known domain of “Αλήθεια”. “Αλήθεια” as unhiddenness or unconcealedness is thought by Heidegger to be the element that casts light on the determinations of beingness as thought within Platonic-Aristotelian philosophies, namely, constancy, presence, shape and boundary. Heidegger claims that “Αλήθεια” as unhiddenness, which the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition threw into oblivion, is the predominant element of beingness without which the other four will remain hidden, and thus, unable to be shown as determinations of beingness. This throwing of “Αλήθεια” as unhiddenness into oblivion is the result of the nature of the guiding question of Greek thinking τι τὸ ὄν? – what is a being? which emphasises questions like determining what there is and what their determinations of beingness are. It is this question that
guides Greek thinking in their own domain of “Aletheia”. Starting from “Aletheia” as unhiddenness, Heidegger claims that there still a question that grounds for the guiding question τί τὸ ὄν? — what is a being? namely, how does Being sway? or, what is Being? with a verbal sense to -ing. Setting out with this question, we are in another domain of “Aletheia” different from that which is guided by τί τὸ ὄν? In this respect, the transfer Heidegger has in mind when he points out that the tradition of philosophy becomes translation is “when responses in this tradition [Platonic-Aristotelian] given to the question, τί τὸ ὄν? Are transferred into the domain of Aletheia” (Emad, 2010, p. 301). That is to say, to transfer and think Greek responses to the guiding question what is a being? in light of the “yet unquestioned and unthought domain of unhiddenness” (Emad, 2010, p. 301), which Heidegger claims it to be the domain of the grounding question: what is Being? or, how does Being sway?

A clarification is necessary at this point. There is a strict distinction between “domain of Aletheia” and “domain of Aletheia as unhiddenness”. By the first, we understand the process or event where beings show themselves from their hidden shelter into the world as things around us, but this event remains unquestioned and unthought of. In the domain of “Aletheia” as unhiddenness, we question the nature of beings in the world while aware of the question: how do these beings show themselves in our world in the first place? Or, what does it mean for a being to be? Or, what is the nature, the meaning and the truth of Being? For Heidegger, Western tradition since Plato responded to the question: what is a being? within its domain of “Aletheia” while overlooking to question and think “Aletheia” itself as unhiddenness. It is only with him that the domain of “Aletheia” is being thought and questioned on the basis of the grounding question: what is the meaning of Being? which is understood in the form of: how does Being sway? That is to say, how does Being grant beingness to beings to bring them from shelter into their domain of
“Aletheia”. Emad’s exposition of his understanding of translation as transfer in terms of a transfer between different domains of “Aletheia” makes somehow confusing whether Heidegger means a transfer from one domain of “Aletheia” to another, i.e., from one tradition or historical epoch to the next (for instance, the transfer of Greek thought from Platonic-Aristotelian tradition to the Scholastic paradigm), or a transfer of the entire Western philosophical tradition from Plato to Nietzsche – guided by the question: what is a being? – to Heidegger’s domain of “Aletheia” as unhiddenness, that is to say, a shift from what is a being? to what does “being” mean?

Regardless of the soundness of Emad’s reading of Heidegger’s “translation as transfer” in terms of a transposition of thought from one domain of “Aletheia” to another domain of “Aletheia”, an important question arises concerning the practicality of thinking translation in terms of a transfer, namely, how can Heidegger’s “translation as transfer” be applied to the act of translating literary texts from different historical epochs or domains of “Aletheia”? In other words, does Heidegger have a methodology to articulate his “translation as transfer” into practical procedures in the act of interlingual translation? When Heidegger speaks of translation in the ordinary sense, he qualifies it in some places as essential or productive if it is to correspond to his understanding of translation as transfer.

When Heidegger raises the issue of the untranslatability of works of thought and poetry in The Principle of Reason, he soon qualifies the kind of translation that deals with such works as “essential” (wesentliche Übersetzung) (Heidegger, 1991, p. 97). A translation is “essential” if it succeeds to convey these works to the epochs which are ready for them. This conveyance “is not only a matter of what one is translating at the moment” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 97). It is not about saying “the same thing” into another language since, as Benjamin argues in “The Task of the Translator”,

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what does a literary work “say”? What does it communicate? It “tells” very little to those who understand it. Its essential quality is not communication or the imparting of information. Yet any translation that intends to perform a transmitting function cannot transmit anything but communication – hence, something inessential. (Benjamin, 2002, p. 253)

Essential translation is not about which language is being translated into which language. It is much more concerned with the speaking of language in a work of art than with interpreting and transferring its semantic content. Being more concerned in the speaking of language, whose essential substance unfolds as “the unfathomable, the mysterious, the ‘poetic’” (Benjamin, 2002, p. 254), rather than in the speaking of the poet or the thinker whose responsive words remain restricted by the linguistic rules of conceptual language and calculative thinking, essential translation becomes itself an instance of language’s self-showing by unfolding its “Wesen”. This means that essential translation is not mainly concerned with the issue of how to remain faithful to the original. It is supposed, rather, to bring up something new, to heed the unthought in what is thought, to produce rather than to preserve. When asked how to approach a translation to his work, Heidegger relegates the importance of seeking the right word in favor of translating productively what is thought into another language (Emad, 2010, p. 295).

The idea of productive translation seems somehow misleading for it appears at first sight as devaluating terminological accuracy which makes the bedrock of the translation enterprise in general; but Heidegger’s suggestion includes terminological accuracy within essential translation, only that translators of works of thought should not exhaust all their thinking in seeking the right word while overlooking questions that language keeps projecting in every encounter with the untranslatable such as, why these unsurmountable differences between languages? Why does language make it hard for us to move freely between languages? For Heidegger, the most important
step after providing the best possible equivalent is to “measure up the word of the [receiver] language with the word of the [donor] language so that one understands the distinction right away; so that this distinction possibly sprouts as a seed and grows into a small plant.” (Emad, 2010, p. 296) Two points in this statement need elaboration. First, how can we understand the difference between a word and its best possible equivalent if not as “the uniqueness of saying” that belongs to each word, that which remains under full appropriation by the word making it at times untranslatable, that is, unwilling to be appropriated by other words. Second, the sprouting seed that Heidegger wishes to emerge from essential translation is nothing but his hope that translation, instead of solidifying the speaking of language in the work of art by restricting its horizons to a single interpretation, seeks every possibility for the work to live longer, i.e., to allow language in the poem to resonate and be heard in every domain of “Aletheia” that is ready for it.

Last but not least, there is another element to essential translation beside its concern in interlingua translation. A translation within one and the same language is actually taking place. According to Heidegger, “we are also already constantly translating our own language, our native tongue, into its genuine word” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 12). We only fail to realize it while doing it. In his attempt to understand what Heidegger technically has in mind when thinking essential translation, Emad reaches the conclusion that the latter is “the one in which a foreign and essential word gets translated into another language, the one in which interlingual and innerlingual translations intersect (Emad, 1993, p. 333). This intersection takes place when translation of a work of thinking into the words of other language unexpectedly brings us face to face with the translation of our own native tongue. Without innerlingual translation, i.e., without the understanding of the unfolding of words of thought into words of its own language, there is no way-making or way-showing that could be transferred into its translation in the other language.
One example of the intersection of innerlingual and interlingual translations is Kant’s rendition of the Latin word “ratio” into German words “Vernunft” and “Grund”. Heidegger holds that Kant’s translation of “ratio” into two German words is an instance of essential translation because Kant could not arrive to this outcome if he failed to see that “ratio” is not “clearly circumscribed and resides without ambiguity on the other side of the ‘language barrier’” (Emad, 1993, p. 333); an insight that leads Kant to hear the double saying of “ratio” in Latin as the result of his subtle act of innerlingual translation of the word. In the absence of a thoughtful innerlingual translation, interlingual translation of works of thought is liable to circumscribe a word of thought into one and single way of understanding it while silencing other possible sayings of the word for good. Yet, by innerlingual translation, Heidegger does not mean paraphrasing. It is not about substituting synonyms. It is a transporting that takes place without a change in the linguistic expression. What really happens is that “what is to be said has already been transported for us into another truth and clarity – or perhaps obscurity” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 12). In other words, innerlingual translation is the moment when new insights strike us as we happen to read a work of thought we have already read. At each heedful reading of a work of thought, new things appear, and others disappear. The same words of a poem compel us to hear them anew again and again as if for the first time. Innerlingual translation as a key element in essential translation reveals the untranslatable in a word of thought in the fact that even within innerlingual translation, there is no “wholesale transmission” between words (synonyms) in the same language, otherwise why do we need to translate our native tongue into its genuine word, as Heidegger claims? Because of the untranslatable essentially inherent in the “Wesen” of language, and in the uniqueness of the saying of each word, language is able to make a clearing (Lichtung) for new things to appear and thus a world to be disclosed.
Conclusion:

It was my intention to show in this paper that what Heidegger qualifies as the inherent untranslatability of a work of thought or poetry, in comparison to the translatability of, say, a business letter, is in fact an expression of the claim of language manifested in the essential “foreignness” that rules between languages, in the semantic remainder or rest that persists even amongst the most relevant equivalents, and in words of thought without which a work of thought would not differ much from other texts where language is instrumentally used. Thanks to this untranslatable, among other things, that language claims us by calling our attention to hear its speaking as the primordial speaking that comes prior to our speaking which is, as Heidegger claims, a response to the speaking of language in which we are always already immersed. It needs a special encounter with language to hear the speaking, and it is in the poem that language speaks purely and freely; thus, providing us with a chance to experience its “Wesen” as an ongoing “essencing” rather than a static essence that can be grasped easily and made our own. The “essencing” of language is its power to call beings, in the name of the fourfold, into presence and into absence of the world. In light of this “essencing” of language, the concept of translation itself undergoes a change. It is no longer concerned with the transfer of meaning from one language to another. It becomes rather a transfer from one domain of Aletheia to another domain of Aletheia, which means that the translator of works of thought, instead of being preoccupied with the transfer of the meanings of words, she needs rather to transfer herself to the shores of the other language, that is, to understand in what ways that language unfolds into its world, its domain of Aletheia. What Heidegger calls “essential translation” is but the transfer of what is thought in that language as it was thought in that language, and that is exactly what he tries to do in his attempts to translate other philosophers, especially the Pre-Socratics.
When Heidegger speaks of the untranslatability of works of thought and poetry, he does not mean or include each and every piece of writing that is generally qualified as artistic or thoughtful. Heidegger has in mind very specific characteristics of the kind of poetry and thinking he considers as such. As far as language and its speaking is concerned, a true work of poetry, according to Heidegger, is the one where the reader experiences an encounter with language, where it is no longer the author who speaks but language.

The contrast Heidegger makes between a poem and a business letter concerns the untranslatability of their language and not the claim of language. Each and every spoken word is in itself the human being’s response to the claim of language. It is only that the claim of language is not heeded where language is meant to convey information as in business letters while in a poem it comes to the fore in its calling our attention to every word.

It is necessary at this point to note that by translation, Heidegger means both that which takes place between different languages as well as that occurring within the one language.

In these expressions, Kovacs densifies Heidegger’s prominent thoughts concerning the true “Wesen” of language as “liberating-ontological”, that is to say, freeing ontological questions from the fetters of metaphysics by becoming aware of the ontological difference that what matters for ontology is not the kind...
of beings that can be or not be but rather the question of Being itself in the form of “what does it mean to be in the first place?” or “what is the truth of the nature of Being that grants being to beings?” By “being-disclosing-intimating language and saying” we understand that in hearing the claim of language in a genuine experience with it, other dimensions of the being of beings are disclosed to us, other things come forth, other meanings emerge, and that is possible only in adopting an “intimating” relationship to language, that is to say, a relationship that is attuned with “Care” rather than with the metaphysics of subject-object clash where language becomes a tool to control beings as our objects.

7 Way or “Weg” is a word of thought that has a special place in Heidegger’s thinking. One way to understand it is to think it along the lines of Lao Tzu’ “dao” as attempted by Heidegger in “The Nature of Language” in On the Way to Language, 1982.

8 This is a translation that comes in Kenneth Maly’s “Reticence and Resonance in the Work of Translating”, p. 149. It is a bit different from that of William McNeill and Julia Davis (1996), p. 62, where they translate the sentence as follows: “There is no such thing as translation if we mean that a word from one language could, or even should, be made to substitute as the equivalent of a word from another language.” I opted for Maly’s translation because it expresses the idea of the “remain” in translation better than McNeill’s and Jilia’s.

9 Zisselsberger’s quote comes in one paragraph in his paper “The claim and use of language in translation”. While Zisselsberger’s paper unpacks the relation between the claim of language and translation in general, mine puts more emphasis on the untranslatable, not the untranslatable in general as ordinarily understood but as Heidegger conceives of it, especially in its unfolding into a work of thought or poetry. This is one reason I devotes a whole section to identifying Heidegger’s untranslatable drawing on his views on translation and on secondary literature on these views. Second, I ground my thesis on an attempt to seek Heidegger’s untranslatable as identified in section one in his insights on the “true” nature of language as exposed in his reading of Stefan’s poem “The Word” and of Trakl’s “A Winter Evening”.

10 Heidegger devotes an entire book to the thinking of the Pre-Socratics trying to understand their use of such key words. In Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy, we have a detailed analysis of Heraclitus’ Logos and Aletheia, Parmenides’ Moira, and a different reading and translation of Anaximander Fragment.
In his “Heidegger on Language”, C. Taylor states that the ‘enframing’ theory of language which objectifies language as an instrument is grounded on the belief that the study of language can be sequestered from the study of humans because language, according to Steven Pinker, does not necessarily make us a peculiarly unique species of primate with extraordinary talents. Other animals have as highly developed abilities to communicate and survive as humans do, and in the same way we scientifically study other animals’ systems of communicating we should study human language.

Heidegger’s use of the German *Ereignis* faces translators with serious difficulties, and it is still debatable which English word best captures the multidimensional meanings the word *Ereignis* speaks in German. Among the best attempts to translate *Ereignis*, we have “owning”, “appropriation” and “event”.

Although Emad’s understanding of Heidegger’s conception of translation as transfer seems compactly convincing, there is still a significant lacuna in his analysis if we consider the importance of the question of language as it is raised at the beginning of the passage from the seminar at Cérisy-la-Salle. Emad fails to invoke Heidegger’s thought on language even though Heidegger makes it crystal clear that the whole issue of the tradition of philosophy becoming translation is grounded on one condition that “language or the concept of language thinks ahead of any thinking”. Apart from showing that “*Aletheia*” means unhiddenness, Emad does not find it important to explain in more details Heidegger’s understanding of “*Aletheia*” in relation to the question of language.

Emad refers to innerlingual translation sometimes as primary translation or originary translation.

**Bibliography**

**Primary Texts:**


Secondary Texts:


