METHODS AND MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE COLLABORATION AND

RESISTANCE OF SECRET INFORMERS WITH THE SECURITATE IN COMMUNIST

ROMANIA (1945-89)

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ABSTRACT

Methods and Motivations Behind the Collaboration and Resistance of Secret Informers

with the Securitate in Communist Romania (1945-89)

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Working primarily with Securitate files, currently stored at the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (CNSAS), located in Bucharest and Popesti-Leordeni, Romania, this thesis explains the various terror mechanisms the Securitate, Romania's secret police during the country's communist period, employed in order to gain recruits and employ them as part of its surveillance network. Although the thesis discusses the entire communist period in Romania, it places significant emphasis on the last two decades of communism (1965-89), when Nicolae Ceauşescu was in power. This thesis introduces and discusses the following two concepts— *psuchegraphy* and *dossierveillance*—described herein as two terror methods applied by the Securitate to obtain informers and compel them to collaborate.

The former mentioned concept entailed collecting biographical data Securitate's targets that would give one sufficient clues about a person's core beliefs, personality, character, and identity, all with the scope of getting to know that which Securitate referred to in its files as a person's vulnerable points. This thesis shows that this kind of analysis was a precursor to recruitment of the members of the Securitate's surveillance network. The latter aforemetioed method of terror stresses the role of technology and documentation in surveillance practices and their use for recruitment of informers and management of the population by maintaining it in a sense of dread and fear. The 'dossier in *dossierveillance*, loosely defined in this thesis as the

technology that the Securitate employed to place its targets under surveillance, represented one of the Securitate's most effective "disciplinary" tools (Foucault 1975) through which it managed to instill fear in people. This thesis also describes the outcome of enforcing such mechanisms on a nation, amassing to a phenomenon described here as the *banalization of evil*, a term that builds on the work of Hannah Arendt on the banality of evil. Lastly, this thesis revists the subject of lustration and transitional justice and explores how the new scholarship discussed in the thesis may further contribute to understanding and treating the subject of collaboration in a post-communist context in Romania.

Aknowledgements

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Introduction

Two "great truths," Timothy Snyder writes, must be taken into account in rewriting the history of Europe, East and West. First, Snyder points out, "the fact that the center of suffering during the World War II was located in the East." Second, that "for four decades, citizens from Eastern European countries had to bear the yoke of communism,"[1] a burden that permeated itself in the very fiber of the Eastern European consciousness. To be Eastern European at the time of the writing of this work is to have had the experience of communism and/or to have lived in its ruins. It is to try to make sense of and adjust to a new world order wherein the decay of communism in both its material and spiritual dimensions linger on, and even haunt one at times; wherein the nostalgia for the things of the past are met with equally powerful sentiments of tacit gratitude that they are at last long gone.

The memory of communism in the Eastern European consciousness is a mishmash of melancholy, longing for the past, sadness and horror. It implies having an inner sentiment of wonder of how things could have been if communism never set foot on the land Eastern Europeans call home followed by a seemingly contradictory feeling of genuine thankfulness for the happy memories that managed to form surreptitiously during otherwise rather harsh times. These memories, if articulated in words, often seem cloaked by simplicity and innocence. Perhaps that is why Eastern Europeans love music as much as they do. They needed music, as well as words, to tell their labyrinthine story, to explain themselves to the rest of the world, and, most importantly, to themselves. That which words cannot say in their legends, prose and poems

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[1] Cited in Victor Neumann. "The Concept of Totalitarianism in Romanian Socio-Political Languages" in *Key Concepts of Romanian History: Alternative Approaches to Socio-Political Languages*, Victor Neumann and Armin Heinen, eds. (Budapest: Central European University, 2013), p. 403.

can be found in their melancholic songs. That which their music finds it impossible to convey, is told in their silence. Silence too can speak.[2]

This thesis was written with these thoughts in mind. As much as it seeks to tell what it was like for Romanians to live under communism and be under the surveillance of the Securitate, and, thus, why so many of them collaborated with it, my work assumes no capacity to capture the full complexity of this very aspect of Romania's history. The reason is simple: the experience of communism for those who had lived through it is as intricate and nuanced of a subject as it can be. Although this last statement is indeed self-evident, especially for academics, people who perennially vow allegiance to objectivity while being simultaneously fully aware of the subjective nature of one's perception of things, it must be voiced nevertheless. For much of my work in my thesis was carried out under the backdrop of the reflection presented above, a reflection that is synonymous, in this case, to the struggle I face to convey the whole truth while knowing full well that that is among the most impossible of tasks a human being sets out to do.

Key questions addressed in the thesis

Despite being closely connected with the lives of many Romanians who lived under communism, collaboration with the secret police during Romania's communist era is still a taboo subject, even now, more than a quarter of a century later since the fall of the Ceaşuescu regime, catalyzed by the 1989 December revolution that took the lives of more than a thousand of people and culminated with the execution of Nicolae Ceaşuescu couple by a firing squad. In contemporary Romania, most have heard about collaboration under communism, at least from the kitchen talks held in the privacy of one's home while they or those around them were

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[2] I thank my parents, Ana and Vasile Plamadeala, for the series of conversations I had with them in December 2018 about their life under communism. This reflection is a summary of their take on the question of what was like to live under communism.

reminiscing about their years lived behind the Iron Curtain. My thesis seeks to explain how and why Romanians collaborated with the Securitate, the country's secret police in the communist era (1945-89). In my PhD thesis, I seek to explore the mechanisms, processes, methods employed by the Securitate to compel, motivate and/or coerce people to collaborate. How were collaborators primed? What were the methods of and strategies for recruitment? How did the Securitate handle the members of its surveillance network post-recruitment? What did the members of the surveillance network do and how their relationship with the Securitate evolve over time? In the attempt to answer these questions, my thesis examines the whole communist era in Romania (1945-89), with a significantly greater focus on the later decades of communism, during the reign of Nicolae Ceaşuescu (1965-89), when the regime's methods of terror became less overtly violent.

Literature review

In the past two decades or so since the fall of the Iron Curtain, a great deal has been written already on the terror, human rights violations and abuses that were carried our by the communist regime in Romania, most of which were carried by the Securitate, with the help of the members of its surveillance network's pyramid, who provided the necessary information to target its imagined or real opponents. As this thesis shows, Securitate's terror methods changed from overt terror during the Dej era to increasingly more sophisticated yet equally damaging terror methods in the Ceausescu's decades. Marius Oprea, in his *Bastionul Cruzimii: O Istorie a Securităţii (1948-1964)* [The Bastion of Cruelty: A History of the Securitate] offers an exhaustive account of the history of the Securitate, of its establishment and of its violent terror methods and human abuses in the Stalinist years, about which chapter one of this thesis is concerned.

In 1968, the collaborators emerged as a "newly established category"[3] within this notorious surveillance network. By Ceauşescu's arrival in power in 1965, roughly one out of the three adult Romanians "appeared in Securitate's general registry" writes Cristina Vatulescu.[4] New changes and recruiting polices were adopted shortly after, with the scope of increasing the efficiency of the Securitate's surveillance network of such a significant number of individuals, roughly seven million of them. With these changes, however, the Securitate, as mentioned earlier, managed to instill in the hearts of the Romanians an overwhelming fear and suspicion of being under the constant watch of the Securitate and its 'associates.'[5] This, as it will be shown in chapters 2 and 3, was especially true in the later decades of the regime.

In 1989, in a country with a population of roughly 23 million 1989, for example, the Securitate had about 15 000 secret police officers working as full time, and ten times more informers, working part-time.[6] With the help of these informers and collaborators, the Securitate was able to gain access to the private lives of the Romanians living under the Iron Curtain (Cosmineanu and Moldovan 2005; Dobre et al. 2004; Kennel and Filipescu, 2009; Margineanu 2006; Olaru 2005).

From the works cited here, we know more of the consequences of the collaboration on the Securitate's targets, with somewhat less information provided on the circumstances and factors, as well as the actual pathways paved by the Securitate, that have influenced one to become a collaborator. Furthermore, there are currently no detailed accounts on the lives of

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[3] Elis Neagoe-Plesa. "Securitatea: Metode si Actiuni. 1968-Anul Reformării Agenturii Securității," [Securitate: Methods and Activity. The Year 1968, the Year of Reforms among the Securitate's Personnel] in *Caietele CNSAS*, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2008, p. 13.

[4] Cristina Vatulescu. *Police Aesthetics: Literature, Film, and the Secret Police in Soviet Times*, p. 6.

[5] Elis Neagoe-Plesa. "Securitatea: Metode si Actiuni. 1968-Anul Reformării Agenturii Securității," pp. 9-22.

[6] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 64.

collaborators during theirs years of collaboration, with the exception of the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan Corneanu, who publicly admitted to collaboration, but never provided a detailed account, a memoir, for example, of his experience in this capacity.[7] Sorin Antohi is another interesting case, discussed at greater length in chapter 3.

Of great importance are the works on human rights violations and persecution of various religious and cultural minorities during this dark period in Romania's history, such as the persecution of Yoga/Transcendental Meditation movement (Andreescu 2008) and (Jela et al, 2004), of the representatives of the Romanian Catholic (Bucur and Stan, 2005) and the Christian Orthodox Churches (Bardas 2007; Vasile 2005; Aionei and Frusinica 2001; Gillet 1997), of intellectuals (Raduleanu 2013; Arges 2013;) and of political prisoners (Dobrincu, 2008) or of the greater Romanian society (Cesereanu, 2006). Of special consideration, in this respect, is the literature written about the notorious and brutal Piteşti prison experiment from the late 1940s to early 1950s that sought to transform political prisoners, mostly former fascist Iron Guard members,[8] into adherents to the communist ideals. This experiment encouraged the usage of extreme violence which prisoners caused on each other, yet orchestrated by the prison personnel (Stanescu, 2010a & Stanescu, 2010b).[9] The story of the Piteşti prison experiment is narrated in chapter 1.

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[7] "IPS Nicolae, mitropolit 42 de ani şi primul prelat ce a recunoscut colaborarea cu Securitatea" [Nicolae [Corneanu], Metropolitan [for] 42 years and the first to have acknowledge [his] collaboration with the Securitate] in *Gandul Stiri*, available at http://www.gandul.info/stiri/focus-ips-nicolae-mitropolit-42-de-ani-si-primul-prelat-ce-a-recunoscut-colaborarea-cu-securitatea-13354753, last accessed on June 28, 2018.

[8] The Iron Guard, also referred as the Legionary Movement or the Legion was Romanian ultra-nationalist movement, which was founded in 1927 by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. This movement, which was active mostly in the 1930s Romania, and which later was abolished with the establishment of the communist regime in 1945, was anti-Semitic and anti-communist in its activities and propaganda, the members of which were called legionaries (*legionari*, in Romanian). Jack R. Fischel. *The Holocaust* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 73.

[9] Although associated with the Pitesti prison, this gruesome, torturous experiment took place in several prisons in Romania in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The goal of this operation was to change fully the character, values, and personality of the prisoners who were part of this experiment and transform them into adherents to Marxist and communist ideals. Monica Ciobanu. "Piteşti: a project in reeducation and its post-1989 interpretation in Romania" in *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 43, Issue 5, (2015), p. 623;

The writings mentioned above help uncover the stories of civilians and representatives of various religious and other minority groups who were deemed as 'class enemies' of the communist regime (*dușmani de clasă*), targeted for the sake of removing opposition. As it will be shown in this thesis, there was almost nothing genuinely amicable about the way in which Securitate carried its operations internally and abroad. For that, one must refer to the memoirs of Silviu Brucan,[10] Dumitru Popescu[11] or Ion Mihai Pacepa,[12] among others. Pacepa was a Romanian high-ranking diplomat who deflected into the West in the late 1970s. His book, *Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae and Elena Ceașuescus' Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption*[13] is among the first to have revealed to the West the corruptive and criminal nature of the Securitate and the Ceașuescu couple, who stood behind its activity and operation. Similar to Pacepa's *Red Horizon*, there is also the so-called *Mitrokhin Archive*, a series of KGB documents compiled by one of this organization's former employees Vasili Mitrokhin, who deflected to the United Kingdom in 1992 and brought these documents with him. These archival documents were originally published in 1999 by Penguin Press under the title *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West*, and authored by Christopher Andrew and the man who famously smuggled them to the West.

Dennis Deletant. *Ceaușescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989,* pp. 29-40; and Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu. "The Canon of Remembering Romanian Communism: From Autobiographical Recollections to Collective Representations" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe*. Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds. (New York: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 65.

[10] See Silviu Brucan. *Generația irosită. Memorii* [The Wasted Generation. Memoirs] (Bucharest: Ed. Calistrat Hogas, 1992).

[11] See Dumitru Popescu. *Am fost si cioplitior de himere. Un fost lider communist se destainuie* [*I was a Sculptor of Chimeras. A Former Communist Leader Confesses*] (Bucharest: Editura Express, 1993).

[12] Florin Banu. "Câteva considerații privind istoriografia Securității" [Some considerations pertaining to Securitate's historiography" in *Caietele CNSAS*, Bucharest: Editura CNSAS, 2008, Nr. 1, p. 195.

[13] Initially, the book (1987 edition) was entitled as *Red Horizon: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief*. (New York: Regnery Gateway, 1987. David Arbel and Ran Edelist. *Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990: Ten Years that Did not Shake the World* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

In relation to collaboration in communist Romania, quite a lot has been written thus far about the Romanian Orthodox Church's intricate relation with the communist regime. The works of Lavinia Stan, Lucian Turcescu, Cristian Vasile and Lucian Leustean, discussed in this thesis, are among the most influential in this respect. Indeed, with the Romanian Orthodox Church the communist government carried out an intricate and seemingly paradoxical relationship, that of oppression and partnership, of dominance and appeasement. Still, as Lucian Leustean argues, "religion… suffered" greatly under communism. According to Leustean, the regime "used the Orthodox Church as a political tool" via which it tried to implement its policies and reforms,[14] as the great majority of the Romanian population belonged (and still does) to the Christian Orthodox Church. The dynamic between the Church and the communist regime is best described, therefore, as that of collaboration and oppression (Chivu-Duta, 2007; Vasile, 2005). This complex dynamic between Church and State in this period is especially pertinent to the former members of the fascist Iron Guard, referred to as legionaries.

After 1947, while many legionaries were imprisoned or murdered, a significant number of them were also released and later permitted to enter within the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church. Worthy to be mentioned here are Patriarch Iustin Moisescu, Patriarch Teoctist Arapasu, or Metropolitan Valeriu Anania.[15] A similar move to the one of the Romanian Orthodox Church was also made by the Communist Party to reach out to former legionaries and offer them party membership in exchange for a cover-up of their tainted Nazi past. Romanian communist leader Ana Pauker, for example, sought out to offer former legionaries membership in the Communist Party because she "needed party members who were compromised or who, given their previous collaboration with the Antonescu regime [which was an ally of Nazi Germany], could be

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[14] Lucian N. Leustean. *Orthodoxy and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 117.
[15] Lucian Turcescu and Lavinia Stan. "Church Collaboration and Resistance under Communism Revisited: The Case of Patriarch Justinian Marina (1948-1977)" in *Eurostudia*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2015), pp. 75-103.

manipulated and even blackmailed if disobeying the Communist Party."[16] These former legionaries, now turned members of the Orthodox Church hierarchy or of the Communist Party, played an undeniably significant role in the establishment and rise of the communist regime in Romania, serving as both its collaborators and opponents, in various forms and degrees.

As for the literature concerning collaboration among civilians, this subject is less studied than that of the collaboration of the Orthodox Church with the regime. The very few works currently available on this topic explain the motivation behind individuals' agreement to serve as secret spies as being mainly based on the pursuit of some gain, or as a result of being coerced, or blackmailed (Albu 2008). This thesis seeks to further contribute to the greater dialogue on how civilians in communist Romania were lured into collaboration and how informers were primed by the Securitate into members of its surveillance network. What were the mechanisms or even the traps set in place by the Securitate that made them fall for these types of dangerous and life-altering arrangements, this thesis asks?

Sources, methodology and structure of the thesis

Working with Securitate files, currently stored at the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (CNSAS), located in Bucharest and Popesti-Leordeni, Romania, as well a few interviews with a dissident writer, Virgil Tănase, currently residing in France as well as with Traian Sandu, the son of another Romanian dissident who emigrated with his whole family in France, my thesis seeks to accomplish the following:

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[16] *Ibid*, p. 98.

Chapter 1 provides a historical overview of Romania's communist history, from 1945 until 1989, with a focus on the Stalinist years when Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was in power. This chapter seeks to situate Romania's experience with communism into the greater post-World War II Eastern and Central European climate wherein communist governments were established. It also examines the key historical events that took place in the Stalinist period of Romania's communist history. This chapter explores the change in terror methods in communist Romania from ones that were more physically violent and torturous to ones that fostered within anxiety, fear, distrust, and feelings of self-debasement. Such methods were especially evident during the Ceaşuescu regime.

Chapter 2 sheds light on the mechanism, actors and technology employed to recruit Securitate targets, processes that sought to attract their targets to collaboration, mechanisms that, as this chapter shows, exploited one's vulnerabilities. *Firstly*, I analyze a series of Securitate instructional materials and instructive material on the art of espionage that it acquired and translated started with the 1960s from abroad. These materials are part of the CNSAS archives and lay out a four-stage protocol on how to acquire collaborators and informers. *Secondly*, I propose a new method of how to treat and understand the Securitate files written on potential collaborators pending recruitment and beyond. I call this manner of life scrutiny and rewriting: *psuchegraphy.* Such type of work entailed collecting biographical data Securitate's targets that would give one sufficient clues about a person's core beliefs, personality, character, and identity or to use the language of ancient Greeks, one's *psuche* (ψυχή), all with the scope of getting to know that which Securitate referred to in its files as a person's vulnerable points (*punctele*

vulnerabile). I argue that this kind of analysis was a precursor to recruitment of the members of its surveillance network.

Thirdly, I show how the Securitate used as inspiration the instructive materials and spy novels it acquired and translated from abroad in order to establish its own protocol on how to conduct *psuchegraphic* work on its potential recruits. *Fourthly*, I suggest that there was an indirect relationship between the level of violence one may have endured in the process of being recruited due to inflicted *psuchegraphic* work and the interest one nurtured within to collaborate due to the benefits one may was offered in return, such as travel passports, monetary incentives or a promotion, for example.

Chapter 3 explains what happened with informers and other members of the Securitate's surveillance network after recruitment. *Firstly*, this chapter introduces the concept of *dossierveillance* and explains its connection to Securitate's *psuchegraphic* work on its potential recruits. In this chapter I describe Securitate's widespread surveillance practices during the Ceaşuescu's reign (1965-89) as *dossierveillance* to emphasize the role of technology and documentation in surveillance practices and their use for recruitment of informers and management of the population by maintaining it in a sense of dread and fear. The 'dossier in *dossierveillance*, loosely defined in this chapter as the technology that the Securitate employed to place its targets under surveillance, represented one of the Securitate's most effective "disciplinary" tools (Foucault 1975) through which it managed to instill fear in people. *Secondly*, drawing on Hannah Arendt's *On the Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and her *Eichmann on Trial: A Report of the Banality of Evil* (1963) this chapter explores what I refer to as the *banalization of evil*, a type of evil that is both political and social but not only. It is manifested by

the widespread collaboration of Romanians during the Ceaşuescu decades (1965-89). This chapter provides a philosophical reflection on the concept of political evil and Arendt's 'theory of banality of evil' in the context of collaboration of Romanians with the Securitate under the Ceaşuescu regime. *Thirdly*, this chapter examines the logistics, infrastructure, mechanisms undertaken to maintain the surveillance network and manage its members, thereby fostering the phenomenon of the *banalization of evil* described in this chapter.

Chapter 4 covers the history of lustration attempts in post-1989 Romania, the key debates caried around it and the current state of affairs *vis a vis* this topic, as of 2019. In this chapter I explore how concepts such as shame, guilt, stigma, taboo, as well as transitional justice relate to the subject of my work. But most importantly, this chapter seeks to examine how the scholarship brought forth in the previous chapters contributes to further our understanding of collaboration, resistance and how it contributes to the current transitional justice debate.

Purpose

This thesis situates itself into the greater debate on lustration in Romania and other Eastern European countries that were once led by communist regimes. Due to its interdisciplinary nature, it hopes to contribute, as well, to scholarship pertaining to surveillance studies via the discussion and analysis of the surveillance practices of the Securitate as well as its methods of recruitment of its informers. This thesis also contributes to scholarship concerning autobiographical/biographical/life-writing studies, via the concept of *psuchegraphy* discussed at great length in chapter 2.

The primary scope of my thesis, however, is to contribute to the greater dialogue of what happened in Romania under communism. I must stress here that my work in *no way* seeks to downplay the wrong that collaborators caused. What is done is done, as a line from Shakespeare's *Macbeth* goes, and nothing should be swept under the rug, to use another English saying. It is my hope that by taking into account this thesis' content, collaborators would be given a fair trial. The word trial, as used in this context, could refer to both a court trial, with judges, lawyers and a keen peanut gallery, and an abstract one that may have taken or is currently taking place in the hearts of the Securitate's former victims, by carrying silent monologues with themselves about their past with the Securitate and those it employed to victimize them. Perhaps by seeing the perpetrator as a potential victim also, as some of collaborators discussed in this thesis may have been, the road to reconciliation, a precursor to healing, may become slightly easier to pave. This thesis hopes to add a stone to its creation.

Chapter 1: Brief Overview of Romania's Experience with Communism

Introduction

Romania, writes Victor Neumann, "still knows too little about its recent past, about totalitarian ideologies and political systems about fascist and communist work camps, extermination camps, and the perverse interests of the two regimes."[17] This chapter is an attempt to shed some light on this country's recent history. Located in Eastern Europe, a land that historically has been marked by religious divisions, mainly within the Christian faith, and by the cultural legacies left by the former empires that once kept it under their suzerainty— the Ottomans, the Romanovs and the Habsburgs [18] –20th century Romania was often the "object of history," as Milan Kundera describes small nations: "If you are a small nation…you do not make history,"[19] Kundera once said in an interview, in reference to his native Czechoslovakia.

In roughly five years from the end of the Second World War, Romania made an abrupt leap from fascism[20] to communism. The latter regime lingered on for much longer than the former. Both regimes, "born out of the cataclysmic barbarism and unprecedented violence of

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[17] Victor Neumann. "The Concept of Totalitarianism in Romanian Socio-Political Languages" in *Key Concepts of Romanian History: Alternative Approaches to Socio-Political Languages*, Victor Neumann and Armin Heinen, eds. (Budapest: Central European University, 2013), p. 406.

[18] Krishan Kumar. *1989: Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 2.

[19] Cited in Krishan Kumar. *1989: Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 1. Original quote found in Kundera, qt. in Ian McEwan. "An Interview with Milan Kundera," in *Granta*, No. 11 (Spring 1984): p. 27. Quote is partially cited in Christine Kiebuzinska. *Intertextual Loops in Modern Drama* (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2001), p. 147.

[20] Romania's experience with totalitarianism began in the 1920s, with the rise of the Legionary Movement, also known as the Iron Guard. In this particular country, this type of strain of fascism had a particular interest in weaving together nationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic ideas with the Christian Orthodox faith. The terms 'Iron Guard' and the 'Legionary movement' tend to be used interchangeably to refer to the same organization founded in 1927 by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. For more information on the Legionary movement in Romania, see, for example Roland Clark. *Holy legionary youth: Fascist activism in interwar Romania.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). Victor Neumann. "The Concept of Totalitarianism in Romanian Socio-Political Languages", pp. 407-408.

World War I,"[21] left footprints on Romania's national consciousness. The pendulum of history moved from one extreme to another and, for a little while, the West thought that the change was for the better.[22] As Kundera further points out in *Incomprehension*: "the immigrant who had left his Communist country for good found little compassion in Paris. Back then the French believed that Fascism had been by far the greatest evil…It was only by the end of the 1960s and in the course of the 1970s that the French began to think of Communism as another evil."[23]

Fascism, Philip Morgan argues, was a "bolt from the blue, the extraordinary product or outcome of the impacts of the First World War on European society and politics."[24] Its foundation, however, was based on Machiavellian concepts concerning total state rule,[25] some of which were articulated before Machiavelli by Plato and Aristotle,[26] for example, and more recently, by Karl Marx, and Hannah Arendt,[27] among others, for the very tendency of human history to gravitate towards dictatorial rule and the interest this troublesome propensity tends to incite in those concerned with political and philosophical inquiries pertaining to the evolution of human society. Italian Fascism and German National Socialism paralleled the communist

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[21] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 2012), p. 12.

[22] Victor Neumann. "The Concept of Totalitarianism in Romanian Socio-Political Languages" in *Key Concepts of Romanian History: Alternative Approaches to Socio-Political Languages*, Victor Neumann and Armin Heinen, eds. (Budapest: Central European University, 2013), p. 412. David Rousset, a former prisoner in the Nazi camps, authored a book with the same title. As early as 1949, he had denounced the Soviet gulags and was critical of the Soviet repression, for which he was critiqued in the *Lettres Françaises*. Pierre Daix went far as accusing Rousset of working for the Americans and providing false information in respect to the gulag system in the USSR. Andrew Sobanet. *French Writers, the Fatherland, and the Cult of Personality* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2019, p. 20).

[23] Cited in Ulrike Ackerman. "Totalitarian Attempts, Anti-Totalitarian Network: Thoughts on the Taboo of Comparison" in *The Lesser Evil: Moral Approaches to Genocide Practices*, Helmut Dubiel, Gabriel Motzkin, eds, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 169. Original quote derived from Milan Kundera. *Ignorance*. (New York: Harper Collins, 2002).

[24] Philip Morgan. *Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 15.

[25] Joseph V. Femia. *Machiavelli Revisited* (Cardiff, Wales: University of Wales Press, 2004), p. 105.

[26] See for example, Plato's. *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics, a Treatise on Government*.

[27] For Marx's discourse on totalitarianism, see, for example, James Gregor. *Marxism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism: Chapters in the Intellectual History of Radicalism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009). For Arend, see "Totalitarianism and the rational state: Arendt" in Robert Fine. *Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx, Arendt* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 100-121;

systems in Eastern Europe. Both had a supreme charismatic leader and a party that served the regime. The two controlled extensively their citizens, economy, and state culture. Both systems sought to punish and prevent any dissent, with the help of a secret police. François Furet spoke of these parallels by employing the following words: the "dialectical relationship of communism and fascism."[28] Still, there were some differences: while communism advocated for a new world order under revolutionary internationalism banner, fascism pushed for a nationalist agenda. Ultimately, the two totalitarian systems built camps and gulags for innocent human beings, a reality that Albert Camus describes as *l'univers concentrationnaire*.[29] Both murdered millions of innocent civilians under the banner of an ugly and dangerous myth that advocated for the creation of a new, superior man.[30] Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451*, George Orwell's *1984* and *Animal Farm* speak about the horror of living under totalitarian regimes. With the exception of Bradbury's work, all of them were first published in the 1940s.[31]

During the Second World War, Romania joined the German forces in the fight against the Soviet Union. On August 23, 1944, it switched sides and fought alongside the USSR and the Allies against Germany. After the end of the Second World War, Romania, like its neighbours to the East and the West, became communist. This chapter seeks to provide a concise historical account of how communism set foot in this country, developed and ossified. Although it does

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[28] François Furet. "The Dialectical Relationship of Fascism and Communism" in *Fascism and Communism*. François Furet and Ernst Nolte. Catherine Golsan, trans. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), p. 31.

[29] Cited in Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century,* p. 1

[30] George P. Blum. *The Rise of Fascism in Europe* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), pp. 4-6.

[31] Charles E. Ziegler. *The History of Russia*, 2nd ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2009), p. 83. For earlier editions of these books, see: Arthur Koestler. *Darkness at Noon.* (London: Macmillan, 1940); Ray Bradbury. *Fahrenheit 451* (Ballentine Books, 1953); George Orwell's *1984* (Secker & Warburg, 1949) and Goerge Orwell. *Animal Farm* (Secker & Warburg, 1945).

cover the entire communist period in Romania, it places significant emphasis on the first two decades of communism (1945-64), when Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was in power.

Brief history of Communism in Eastern Europe

Communism in Eastern Europe, a geographical territory that Krishan Kumar defines as a "slippery term,"[32] was, for a lack of a more precise word, multifaceted. In the imaginary gallery of men and women who helped create it, build it and/or dismantle it, the faces of Klement Gottwalld and Matyas Rakosi, of Adam Michnik and Vaclav Havel, of Enver Hoxha and Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu would undoubtedly appear, along with the countless stories of bravery of men and women who sought to defy it and of those who felt compelled to acquiesce to its demands and ideology. Communism, thus, cannot be reduced to yet another *ism*. Its seeds flourished not only on the Eastern European soil.[33] They did so also in China, North Korea, Cuba and some parts of the Africa.[34] Communist parties held strong for a while even in the West, in places like Great Britain and France, for example.[35] In the case of Eastern Europe, the human spirit reached a state of *katabasis* for four decades and so following the end of the Second World War. In 1989, its moment of *anabasis* came, at last.

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[32] Krishan Kumar. *1989: Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 1.

[33] Henri de Saint Simon's *Le Nouveau Christianisme* (*The New Christianity*, 1825), Etienne Cabet's *Voyage en Icarie* were among the earlier works preoccupied with utopia and socialist ideals. In the early 19th century America, Cabet's followers, known as Icarians, set up social communes in the American continent. Communism, as a concept, was born in France in the early 19th century among those who adhered to Cabet's views. In 1840, in Paris, a few German nationals formed the League of the Just, which sought to follow the Babouvist school of thought. After the League of the Just was dismantled and went to exist in clandestine, due to its association and involvement with an attempted coup in 1836 against the Jacobins, the spirit of the organization spread to other major West European cities. Mark Sandle. *Communism*, pp. 18-20.

[34] For a history of communism in these regions of the world, see, for example, Donald F. Busky. *Communism in History and Theory: Asia, Africa, and the Americas* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

[35] Mark Sandle. *Communism*, pp. 59-78.

Conceptually, twentieth century communism traces its origins to the 1789 French Revolution and the ideology of François-Noël Babeuf. In the late eighteenth century, Babeuf wrote the following his newspaper *Le Tribun du Peuple*: "in the dust of the feudal[36] archives that I discovered the mysteries of the usurpations of the noble caste."[37]   Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels gave Babeuf's ideas both a hermeneutical interpretation and further elaboration. The industrial development in the West, and, especially in Great Britain and Germany, made Communism sound like a convincing alternative to the capitalist system. But it was in the East that Marx and Engels' ideas moved from mere ideology to a tangible reality, a project that would take almost a hundred years in the making, starting with the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to its very last days, when the revolts on the streets of Timişoara and Bucharest in December 1989, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, and the non-violent protests of the *Solidarnost'* movement in Poland helped to deliver the last blow.[38]

During the Second World War, the people that trace their origins from the Dacians and and/or the Vlachs[39] (the origins of Romanians is still disputed among scholars), experienced colossal human loss and destruction. With the rise of the communist regime in this country, the agony did not end, with mass deportations, arrests, imprisonment and murders of the so-called

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[36] Other translation replaces 'feudal' with 'seignorial.'J.Q.C. Mackrell. *"Feudalism in Juristic Thought" in The Attack on Feudalism in Eighteenth-Century France. The Attack on Feudalism in Eighteenth-Century France.* (New York: Routledge, 1977), p. 66.

[37] Cited in Albert Soboul. *Understanding the French Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1988), p. viii.

[38] The Solidarnost' movement, that began in Gdansk and moved through Szczecin to the Baltic region of Poland in the 1970s, was one of a kind in the history of Eastern European communism. Unlike the 1968 Prague Spring, the Solidarity movement emerged as a grass-roots movement the precursor of which were the 1970s labor strikes fuelled by disappointment in Edward Gierek's policies and leadership. J. F. Brown. "The East European Setting" in *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. J. F. Brown, Pierre Hassner and Josef Joffe. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 16-18; Mark Sandle. *Communism* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 18.

[39] Joseph Held. *Dictionary of East European History since 1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 19.

'enemies of the state.'[40] The 700-page 2006 government-commissioned report that officially denounced the communist regime in Romania, known *Raport final: Comisia Prezidențială Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România* [Final report: The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania], speaks of these tragedies at great length.[41]

In the background of what seems like a dystopian nightmare, their King Mihai, was forced to abdicate by the newly arrived Muscovite-led authorities, an event that marked an abrupt and profound rupture with the country's past. In the villages, all throughout the country, thousands of peasants lost their land to collectivization, a violent attack on the private property of the bourgeois class, a symbol of the capitalist system that the newly formed regime sought to eradicate. As Marx and Engels point out in their *Communist Manifesto*, "the distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property."[42] In the spirit of this statement, in the first decades of communism in Romania, banks, pharmacies, train stations, industrial plants were also confiscated and nationalized. With these drastic changes, incidents of stealing increased as well.[43]

The Communist Manifesto, described by Isaiah Berlin as a "unique masterpiece,"[44] denounces capitalism, the bourgeoisie and nationalism.[45] "The history of all hitherto existing

[40] Victor Neumann. "The Concept of Totalitarianism in Romanian Socio-Political Languages", p. 412.

[41] Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. *Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania* [Final report: The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania]. 2006, last accessed on January 4, 2019.

[42] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. "Manifesto of the Communist Party," February 1948, available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf, last accessed on January 1, 2019, p. 22.

[43] Iulia Cracana. "Infracțiunea împotriva proprietății socialiste—ținta a justiției regimului Democrat-Popular. Cauzele și urmăririle plenariei C.C. al P.M.R. din 9-13 iunie 1958" in *Caietele CNSAS* 2009, Nr. 2(4), p. 148.

[44] Cited in Roman Szporluk. *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 61.

[45] *Ibid*, pp. 61-62.

society is the history of class struggles."[46] The "specter of communism," however, is too powerful to be defeated despite the many forces—"Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies"—that seek to eradicate it.[47] This is how the prologue to this universally famous document begins, an essay that would have profound influence on the fate of millions of people born after its publication, in countries that once made this document as their secular creed.

There is arguably no aspect of human life that was left unshaken by the establishment of the Communist regime in Romania. After the Second World War, Moscow sought to establish a proletariat-led internationalism that promised a superior alternative to nationalism that, according to Marxist and Leninist ideas, was dependent on the bourgeoisie to exist.[48] "Down to the foundation, and then we will build our new world," the Russian version of the *Internationale* states. Echoing Jesus' mysterious parable in Matthew 20:16 (the last shall be first and the first shall be last), this famous poem ends with the following utopian promise: "He who was nothing will become everything."[49]

Although it was Georgi Plekhanov who had founded the Marxist movement in Russia, it was Lenin who helped it to become a revolutionary force in both Russia and globally.[50] Lenin's *What is to be done? Burning Questions of Our Movement*[51] laid the groundwork of what would

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[46] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. "Manifesto of the Communist Party" February 1948, available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf, last accessed on January 1, 2019, p. 14

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Joseph Held. *Dictionary of East European History since 1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 3-5.

[49] Original Russian version of the respective lyrics: *Весь мир насилья мы разрушим/ До основанья, а затем/Мы наш, мы новый мир построим, Кто был ничем - тот станет всем!.* "Интернационал - Вставай,проклятьем заклеймённый" available at https://lyricsworld.ru/Internacional/Vstavayproklyatem-zakleymennyiy-origversiya-1939g-632003.html, last accessed on December 31, 2018. English translation found on the following site: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Internationale, last accessed, on December 31, 2018.

[50] Barbara B. Green. *The Dynamics of Russian Politics: A Short History* (Westport, CT: 1994), pp. 15-16.

[51] The Russian version of this work is *Что делать? Наболевшие вопросы нашего движения.* Lenin wrote it in 1901 ad published it a year later in *Iskra.*

become the Russian version of communism.[52] Lenin, whom Antonio Gramsci equates to St. Paul, "transformed the Marxian salvationist *Weltaschauung* into a global political praxis."[53] While Lenin paved the way for the Bolshevik movement, Stalin, whose baptismal name was Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughasvhil, "was indeed the beneficiary of a system that Lenin had imagined and developed,"[54] Tismaneanu writes. As Lenin's successor, he ruled the USSR till his death in 1953.

As a young man, Stalin found Marxist philosophy appealing and entered the Social Democratic party in his native Caucasus, after having been expelled from seminary where he once pursued courses to become a Christian Orthodox priest.[55] Under Stalin's leadership, life became so difficult to bear for so many people that the adjective that traces its etymological roots to this leader's (nick) name became synonymous to terror, gulags and even death.[56]

In the aftermath of the World War II, the political map showed significant territorial growth on the part of the USSR that gained significant in size territory from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The USSR acquired Ruthenia. From Romania, it annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Germany lost territory to Poland and was partitioned as well, thereby suffering the harshest blow in terms of territorial loss.[57] Furthermore, the German Democratic

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[52] Mark Sandle. *Communism*, pp. 30-31.
[53] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century,* p. 90.
[54] *Ibid*., p. 5.
[55] Like Bukharin, Stalin too was an editor of *Pravda*. But Lenin's admiration for Lenin was not matched by his distrust in Stalin's capacity to serve as successor. Only two years prior to his death, Lenin wrote a testament in which had articulated these concerns. After Stalin's death, Stalin allied with Bukharin to undermine and eventually defeat his to key opponents, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. "Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich" and "Stalin, Josph Vissarionovich" in *The Columbia Encyclopedia*, 6th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press).
[56] On the biography of Stalin, see, for example, Hioaki Kuromiya. *Stalin* (London: Routledge, 2005). Other books worth mentioning here pertaining to Stalin's life and political career, are: Leon Trotsky. *Stalin* (New York, 1967); Martin McCauley. *The Stalin File* (London: B. T. Batsford, 1979) and his recently published third edition of Stalin and Stalinism (Oxon: England, 2013); Miklos Kun. *Stalin: An Unknown Portrait* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003).
[57] J. F. Brown. "The East European Setting" in *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. J. F. Brown, Pierre Hassner and Josef Joffe. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 8-9.

Republic was established on 7 October 1949, emerging from the German territory in the East that remained under the Soviet forces after the war ended.[58] Besides the change in the region's political map, the Eastern European Jewry and ethnic German population living in Eastern Europe decreased significantly after the war, with the tragic murder of six millions Jews during the Holocaust and the expulsion and deportation of German minorities, carried out at the end of the war.[59] The works of the Nobel Prize Laureate and Romanian-born German writer Herta Müller, for example, speak of the hardships ethnic Germans in Romania encountered during the communist period.[60]

The Second World War was catastrophic for humanity, so catastrophic that the word 'genocide,' coined by Raphael Lemkin in his 1944 book entitle *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*[61] had to be invented in order to make sense of its immense atrocities and the unimaginable suffering people had endured while subject to what Primo Levi called in one of his stories as the "force majeure."[62] Communist regimes began to mushroom throughout Eastern Europe shortly after, including, also, in China and North Korea. Greece too flirted for a while with

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[58] Mark Sandle. *Communism*. (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 56.

[59] Many Jews sought to find refuge in the 1920s in Romania, fleeing the Soviet regime recently in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Moldovan SSR by trying to settle in Bessarabia, seen often as a temporary transit en route to Palestine, Canada or the United States. The Romanian authorities suspected some of them of Soviet espionage. See, for example, Vadim Guzun. "Refugiul etnicilor evrei din Uniunea Sovietică în Romania în Perioda 1919-1936" [The Refuge of Ethnic Jews from the Soviet Union in Romania during the years 1919-1936] in *Caietele CNSAS*. 2(6)/2010, 2012, 2010, p. 200-227.

[60] See, for example, *Heute wär ich mir liber nicht begegnet* (1997), translated as *The Appointment* (2001); *Herztier* (1995) translated as *The Land of Green Plums* (1996). Bettina Brandt and Valentina Glajar. "Introduction" in *Politics and Aesthetics*, Bettina Brandt and Valentina Glajar, eds. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2013), p. 5.

[61] Donald Niewyk and Francis Nicosia. *The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 132.

[62] Frederic D. Homer. *Primo Levi and the Politics of Survival* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2010), p. 10.

communism.[63] Italy and France had strong communist parties as well, but communism never grew strong enough roots here as it did in the East.[64]

With the exception of Albania, Yugoslavia and China, wherein communist regimes emerged without the direct support of Moscow, in the rest of the Eastern Bloc, the communist governments that emerged after the War followed closely the leadership and model imposed by Moscow. [65] The Stalinist *Gleichschaltung,* a term appropriated from German and initially employed in the analysis of Nazi regime*,*[66] was imposed all throughout Eastern Europe with the help of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) that oversaw the activities of the communist parties of the satellite states. Cominform's main purpose was to prevent any rebelliousness within. When prevention was no longer possible, punishment was guaranteed to follow against all those who dared to resist. Bulgaria's Traicho Kostov, for example, was sentenced to death. Poland's Wladyslow Gomulka was coerced to resign and sent to forced retirement. Bulgaria's Georgi Dimitrov died in the USSR's capital after being poisoned, some scholars speculate. Dimitrov's ties to the administration of Josip Broz Tito may have played unfavorably in Stalin's eyes.[67]

The story of Tito, of utmost importance in the discussion of Moscow's relation with its satellite states in the 1940s-1950s, including with Romania, is briefly addressed in a later section

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[63] Jon V. Kofas. *Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), pp. 37- 55.

[64] On the communist parties in France and Italy, for example, Alessandro Brogi. *Confronting America: The Cold War Between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

[65] Charles E. Ziegler. *The History of Russia*, 2n ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenworld, 2009), pp. 87-88.

[66] Translated literally, this term means synchronization, an alignment in real time of the German society to the Nazi Party's policies and ideals, a somewhat blind acceptance of the regime's vision for its people, which implied by default the Germans' tacit acceptance of that which it took to bring this vision into reality. For a detailed account on what *Gleichschaltung* entailed in the socio-economic, political, and judicial aspects of the German society, see, for example, Roderick Stackelberg. "Nazi Consolidation of Power" in *Hitler's Germany: Origins, Interpretations, Legacies* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 100-118.

[67] J. F. Brown. "The East European Setting" in *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. J. F. Brown, Pierre Hassner and Josef Joffe. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 10-12.

of this chapter. At the end of May 1945, Tito delivered a bold speech against the Soviets as retaliation to the Trieste crisis. In it, he warned Moscow that he would not tolerate his country to be treated as "small change," a mere territory that found itself "in a policy of spheres of interest," claims for which the Yugoslavs later expressed remorse.[68] The crux of Tito's policies towards Moscow, in a nutshell, can be described by using these very words, derived from his 1945 speech.

The establishment of the Communist regime in Romania

In Romania, the communist power was established in the winter of 1948. The newly adopted Law 363 abolished the country's previous constitutional monarchy, thereby forcing its King Mihai to abdicate,[69] with his and his family property being nationalized. Soon after, the State acquired the land of confessional schools, the property and goods of former sanitary institutions. In December 1948, the properties of the Greek Catholic Church were taken over by the State as well.[70] The newly formed communist government was set up per the guidelines of Moscow and employed the same methods of terror the Soviet regime did in removing opposition.[71]

As it will be shown in this thesis, the methods of terror employed by the Securitate differed in time. During the Stalinist period and until 1965, when Nicolae Ceaușescu came into

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[68] Cited in Leonid Gibianskii. "The Soviet-Yugoslav Split and the Cominform" in *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949*, Norman Naimark and Leonid Giblianskii, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 292.

[69] Steven D. Roper. Romania: *The Unfinished Revolution* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000), p. 19.

[70] Constantin Iordachi and Dorin Dobrincu. "The Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania, 1949-1962" in *The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: Comparison and Entanglements,* Constantin Iordachi and Arnd Bauerkamper, eds. (New York: Central European University, 2014, p. 254.

[71] Cristina Vatulescu. *Police Aesthetics: Literature, Film and the Secret Police in Soviet* Times, p. 24. For more information on the Soviet influence in the establishment of the communist regime in Romania, see for example, Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962*, especially chapter, 1, "The Soviet Imprint" (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2011), pp. 49-87 and Dennis Deletant. *Ceaușescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), chapters 1-2, pp., 1-67.

power, as Lavinia Stan maintains, the Securitate, along with the Communist Party and the country's leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej "engaged in systematic campaigns of human rights infringements that often involved murder, terror and deportation."[72] Things changed significantly during the Ceauşescu years. The physical violence that was widely employed during the Dej era was substituted by mechanisms of terror inducing immense fear among its general population and civic distrust. Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis seek to shed light on these new mechanisms put in place.

Like in other regions of the world, Communism in Romania attracted regular citizens and intellectuals alike.[73] Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, whose story is narrated below, is perhaps one of the most influential intellectuals of his time to have had dedicated his life and career in the name of the Communist cause. Just like for Arthur Koestler, for André Malraux,[74] Communism was synonymous to dignity that humanity of the 20th century so longed for. In his *La Condition Humaine*, translated in English as *Man's Fate*, a Chinese communist, when asked by the Kuomintang to explain why he believes so fervently in the cause of fighting for the establishment of communism, responds in the following manner: "because Communism defends human dignity." When asked to define what dignity may represent, the answer given reminds of an almost universally shared deep-seated human longing for respect and recognition, a concept that has been addressed in the 1948 United Nations Declarations of Human Rights and the works

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[72] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 7.

[73] The works of Maxim Gorky, André Malraux, Manes Sperber, and André Gide show genuine interest in communism as well. Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century,* p. 128.

[74] Malraux was a prominent French writer, and Gaullist Minister, who had dedicated his writing career to wrestling with the tumultuous events of his time and the role and place of the human stranded in those turbulent years. For the life and works of André Malraux, see, for example, Charles D. Blund. *André Malraux: Tragic Humanist* (Columbus: Ohio State, 1963); Herman Lebovics. *Mona Lisa's Escort: André Malraux and the Reinvention of French Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1999) and "Malraux, André" in *Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2. Bernard A. Cook, ed. (New York: Garland, 2001), pp. 823-824.

of Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel and Johan Fichte,[75]for example: "[dignity is] the opposite of humiliation." [76] Louis Althusser once wrote in one of his essays entitled "Marxism and Humanism" in a similar manner about the Soviet slogans:

> Today Socialist 'Humanism' is on the agenda. Why? Because as it enters the period of which will lead it from socialism (to each according to his labour) to communism (to each according to his needs), the Soviet Union has proclaimed the slogan: All for Man, and introduced new themes: the freedom of the individual, respect for legality, the dignity of the person.[77]

"A faith is not acquired by reasoning," writes Arthur Koestler about his initial encounter and belief in communism. "One does not fall in love with a woman, or enter the womb of a church, as a result of logical persuasion. …A faith … grows like a tree. Its crown points to the sky; its roots grow downward into the past and are nourished by the dark sap of the ancestral humus."[78] Faith in Marxist and Communist ideals for many was as fervent as that of the early Christian believers, Koestler suggests. Like the crucified Jesus who cried out *Eli Eli Lama Sabachthani?*[79] prior taking his last breath on that historically significant Friday, many ardent believers in communism who had once trusted wholeheartedly in the Communist movement may have felt, for a lack of better word, deceived and disillusioned. The promise of the New Kingdom on Earth, as the 1989 events in Eastern Europe showed us, remained a broken promise after-all. Many trace their loss of faith in Communism to the gulags and the Stalinist purges that tell of only part

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[75] See, for example, Robert R. Williams. *Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992);

[76] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), p. 22.

[77] Cited in Andrew Wernick. *Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity: The Post-Theistic Program of French Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 233. For the entire text, see, for example Louis Althusser. "Part Seven. Marxism and Humanism" available at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1964/marxism-humanism.htm, last accessed on February 9, 2019. The text was first published in *Cahier de l'I.S.E.A*, June 1964.

[78] Arthur Koestler. "The Initiates" in *The God that Failed*. Louis Fischer, Andre Gide, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender and Richard Wright (authors), Richard Crossman, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 15-16.

[79] Aramaic for "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"

of the tragedy innately linked to the establishment and consolidation of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. [80]

In the case of anti-communist Romanian works written in the Stalinist years, Ion Eremia's *Gulliver in the Land of Lies* (*Gulliver in Țara Minciunilor*) situates itself in the greater narrative about Stalinist repression and Kafkesque absurdity of totalitarian regimes, a theme echoed also in the works Milan Kundera' *The Joke* or Danilo Kiš' *A Tomb for Boris Davidovich*, for example. [81] Like Evgenyi Zamyatin, Marc Chagall, or Vladimir Mayakovsky, [82] Eremia would become disillusioned with the system he once helped build. A former general and communist official turned dissident writer, Eremia was ousted from the Party in 1956 due to disagreements with key officials including Dej. In 1958, the Securitate arrested him after having discovered his manuscript that the author sought to clandestinely send and publish in France. Released in 1964, he was rehabilitated fifteen years later without being granted Party membership. [83]

In Romania, the Communist Party emerged in the 1920s and survived as an underground operation over the next two decades with its leadership at times imprisoned. Such was the case of

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[80] Koestler's later anti-communist voice resonated in the works of writers such as Czeslaw Milosz, George Orwell and Albert Camus. Together with François Furet, Daniel Bell and Margarete Buber-Neumann, Vaclav Havel, Istvan Bihó, Adam Michnik and György Konrad, these individuals embodied the strong intellectual elite of the "age of extremes" generation, to use Eric Hobsbawm's words, that sought to denounce Marxist and communist ideologies and perhaps keep alive the seemingly defeated human spirit in the face of overwhelming destruction that World War II and its aftermath have brought on the Old Continent. A similar disappointment in Marxist ideology is expressed in the works of Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski. Ulrike Ackerman. "Totalitarian Attempts, Anti-Totalitarian Network: Thoughts on the Taboo of Comparison" in *The Lesser Evil: Moral Approaches to Genocide Practices*, Helmut Dubiel and Gabriel Motzkin, eds; Eric Hobsbawm. *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994). Cited in Christopher May. "Editor's Introduction" in *Key Thinkers for the Information Society*, Christopher May, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 3 and Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 2, 45; Stanley Pierson. *Leaving Marxism: Studies in the Dissolution of an Ideology* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 137.

[81] The latter three mentioned works are analyzed in Sorin Radu Cucu. *The Underside of Politics: Global Fictions in the Fog of the Cold War* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), pp. 67-74.

[82] Charles E. Ziegler. *The History of Russia*, 2nd ed. (Santa Baraba, CA: Greenwood, 2009), p. 75.

[83] For the biography of Ion Eremia, see, for example, Alina Ilinca and liviu Marius Bejenaru. "Ion Eremia. Biografia Unui Rebel din P.M.R." [Ion Eremia. The Biography of a Rebel from the Romanian Working Party] in *Caietele CNSAS*. Nr. 2, 2008, pp. 149-163.

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ana Pauker, who met in prison and whose vision for the party was decided behind the bars in the dark and musty walls of Romania's incarceration system.[84] During the interwar Romania, the Communist Party was composed of three factions. The first group operated from prison and was led by Gheorghe-Gheorghiu Dej. Another one was headed by Comintern and was comprised of two smaller sub-entities—the Muscovite subgroup with strong ties to Moscow, led by Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Emil Bodnăraş, and the ethnically Romanian subgroup, headed by Teohari Georgescu. The third faction was led by Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, with Ştefan Foriş and Remus Koffler as his close associates. As we will see next, Pătrăşcanu, an intellectual and a lawyer by training, would be among the first to be purged by Dej in his quest for total control.[85]

In March of 1944, Bodnăraş came to Romania as an emissary of the NKVD to speak to Pătrăşcanu and confirm Moscow's support for him, and gratitude for his efforts in the fight against Ion Antonescu's fascist regime. Bodnăraş also met with Dej in the Târgu Jiu prison in April of 1944. The meeting was an important step in Dej's political career; it foreshadowed his meteoritic rise to power.[86] Shortly after Dej was named general secretary of the Communist Party, Bodnăraş was given an important leadership role within the Army and Gheorghe Pintilie (born Pantelei Bodnarenko) was appointed Minister of Interior. Pauker was made Minister of Foreign Affairs and Luca—Minister of Finance.[87] But as we will see next, the early decades of communism in Romania, as it was the case of the other the newly formed satellite countries, were a vicious struggle for power, wherein the Dej faction, primarily made of Romanian

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[84] Joseph Held. *Dictionary of East European History since 1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 19.

[85] "Pătrăşcanu, Lucreţiu" in *A Dictionary of Political Biography*, Dennis Kavanagh, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 377. George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-54* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), p. 94.

[86] George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-54*, pp. 95-96.

[87] *Ibid*, p. 95. "Pauker, Ana" in *A Dictionary of Political Biography*, Dennis Kavanagh, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 377.

proletariat class, fought to destroy any opposition and dissent. This was a fight fuelled by suspicious and distrust for both the seemingly more elitist Pătrăşcanu group and the Muscovite faction led by Ana Pauker, a Romanian of Jewish heritage.[88] Pauker's[89] allies, Vasile Luca and Emil Bodnăraş, were of Hungarian and Ukrainian ethnic heritage, respectively.[90] The precipitous rise to power of Dej is, in fact, a story of deceit and quest for power at all costs, pursued under the backdrop of a grisly phenomenon that became known in history manuals as the 'Stalinist purges.'

The Stalinist purges and the case of Romania

In 1948, per the orders of Stalin, show trials in the satellite states began. Their goal was to eliminate any Titoist tendencies and sympathizers of the Yugoslavian leader who took the path less taken by liberating itself from Moscow's dominance.[91] It was Stalin who asked Lavrentiy Beriia, the chief of MVD and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, to organize these trials in the satellite states in order to set the record straight—no Titoist movement would be taken lightly.[92] Stalin handpicked Beriia, chief of Soviet Security, to orchestrate purges in satellite countries in the spring of 1948, as a result of the failure of the Soviet ambassador and the MVD representative in Belgrade to replace Tito with Sreten Žujović or Andrija Hebrang,

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[88] A graduate of Moscow's Lenin School, Pauker returned to her native Romania at the end of the war with the Red Army. In 1947 she became the country's Foreign Minster; a year later—the Secretary of Agriculture. Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 104-105. William I. Brustein. "Romania" in *Roots of hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 310-319.

[89] For a detailed biography of Ana Pauker, see, for example, Robert Levy. *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist* (Berkeley, 2001).

[90] George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-54* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), pp. 93- 94.

[91] As a result, on 28 June 1948, Yugoslavia was expulsed from Cominform. Mark Sandle. *Communism*, p. 57.

[92] Years later, Beriia himself was executed as a British spy. George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, pp. 15-25.

both docile sympathizers of the Soviet Union.[93] The issue here, as George Hodos points out, was a matter of friendships, and the little human decency and loyalty that, although heavily scathed in the Stalinist years, was not fully gone. Tito had supporters that Moscow was not able to fully turn against him.[94]

Shortly after Tito's move, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Czechoslovakians witnessed what became known as the Stalinist show trials held in their homelands. These trials were orchestrated by Moscow and often obeyed to the letter by those assigned to carry them in their respective countries. Albania's show trial against its Minister of Interior Koçi Xoxe began in 1949.[95] In Romania, the Stalinist purges were led by Dej. They were both a means to play according to Moscow's tune, as well as a personal pursuit for power by eliminating opposition from within. By shooting two birds with one stone, Dej used the trials to strengthen his political authority.[96]

The show trials in the Satellite states in the late 1940s and early 1950s were *not* a carbon copy of the Stalinist purges from the 1930s. This time around, the attacks came against local communist leaders who had demonstrated courage and loyalty to their respective country and the Communist Party that they had built. Some of them, like Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, had fought to defend their motherland against Nazi regime. The victims of the show trials of the 1940s-1950s

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[93] George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, p. 35.

[94] In Poland, Bierut too sought to slow the purge process, fearing he eventually be next in line with a similar fate. Dimitrov in Bulgaria, a longtime friend of Tito, had to be taken from power before show trials could commence for fear of interference. Hungary, however, proved the most obedient in this respect to Stalin's and Beriia's orders. Rakosi was a fervent follower of Stalin. When in 1948 Rakosi obediently came to Moscow to receive the script of the show trial from Beriia, Laszlo Rajik was chosen as the key victim. George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, pp. 35-36.

[95] Xoxe's fate was not much different from that of Bukharin or of those who were purged in the Soviet Union due to allegiance to Trotsky. The trial of Xoxe, who was also the head of Sigurimi, Albania's version of the Securitate or of the Stasi police, was a warning to all the satellite countries of what a pro-Titoist attitude can bring. Only days after the commencement of Xoxe's trial, arrests commenced in both Bulgaria and Hungary, as well. The Kostov trials in Bulgaria and the Rajk trials in Hungary intended as well to serve as a warning to all those tempted to challenge the Soviet vision of Eastern and Central part of the European world. In East Germany and Poland, however, the purges did not go according to Stalin's plans. After 1953, the year when Stalin died, they were abandoned. George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, pp. 5-93.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

were well known and admired. Romania's Pătrăşcanu, Bulgaria's Traicho Kostov, Albania's Koci Xoxe, Poland's Wladyslaw Gomulka and Hungary's Laszlo Rajk, all made their lifelong goal to construct the regime that eventually turned against them.[97] As we will see throughout this thesis, a theme that keeps surfacing here, like the oil dunked in water, is that of a 'hero made victim' by the very system that once crowned him or her.

From 6-14 April 1954, Pătrăşcanu's trial was held behind closed doors, with Gheorghe Tatarescu, the once leader of Romania's Liberal Party, being forced to falsely claim that at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference the accused was advised by Western powers to remove Romania from the influence of Soviet Union and make it subject to Western control. By that time, Pătrăşcanu's six years of torture in prison had severely affected his mental state. His experience in prison has driven him into temporary states of insanity, Hodos writes.[98] Miraculously, however, the former lawyer managed to provide a lucid response to the accusations brought by Tatarescu. "Such a scum of history they have brought to this trial as a witness against me, a lifelong communist. If such an individual is needed to prove that I am not a communist, it is only evidence of the low level of the Romanian party has to use such elements, evidence of the total lack of proof against me."[99] Like Pătrăşcanu, Ştefan Foriş was later murdered (hanged without a trial) per the orders of Dej; Remus Koffler was asked to abandon the political scene and lay low.[100] He was later imprisoned and sentenced to death in 1954.

Pătrăşcanu's fate is strikingly similar to that of Nikolai Bukharin. Bukharin, described by Lenin as the communist party's 'favorite child,' and 'the favorite of the party'[101] was too tried

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[97] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century,* p. 74.

[98] George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954* p. 99.

[99] Cited in *Ibid.,* 101.

[100] *Ibid.,* pp. 95-101.

[101] Gert Schaefer. "Preface" in *Bukharin in Retrospect*, Theodor Bergmann, Gert Schaefer, Mark Selden, eds. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. xv.

and executed as the 'enemy of the people' in March 1938. Similarly to Nikolai Salmanovich Rubashov in Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* and Pătrăşcanu, Bukharin was tried by the regime he to which he once had sworn his loyalty wholeheartedly. Buhkarin, who had helped write the Stalinist Constitution, was forced to confess to deeds against the state he had never committed.[102] Prior to his death, from his prison cell, he wrote Stalin a moving letter in which he proclaimed his admiration for and loyalty to Stalin, a letter that Stalin kept in his office drawer till his death.[103]

The tone of the letter reminds one of the tone in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, written in the 6th century from prison in surprisingly similar circumstances as Bukharin was: accused of treason and eventually executed by his own government, to which he once had strong ties. The key difference is that Boethius wrote to God with the guidance of Lady Philosophy; Bukharin wrote to Stalin with the guidance of his inner voice and, perhaps, conscience. Both sought to wrestle in their respective writings with their tragic fate, while waiting for their imminent deaths.

In May 1952, the previously unimaginable took place in Romania: three of the most revered members of the Politburo were ousted. The careers of these three party secretaries—Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu— met an abrupt end. By then, rumors of Stalin's frail health began to circulate as well, a hearsay that stirred anxiety among his subordinates both within his close circle and abroad.

Ana Pauker's relations with Stalin turned sour in the early 1950s due to his mistrust in communists with a Jewish heritage.[104] Stalin's attitude towards the Jews was problematic, to say

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[102] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century,* p. 55.
[103] *Ibid.*, p. 56.
[104] George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist, 1948-54* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), p. 100.

the least, as he associated them with the Mensheviks and his most audacious opponents, Leon Trotsky,[105] Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev. Anti-Semitism was an unfortunate reality for the Jews living under communism.[106] Dej used that to his advantage to launch his formal attack against Pauker. That is how the then country's Minister of Foreign Affairs was fired and put under house arrest.[107] The Hungarian-born Vasile Luca, Pauker's close associate, was accused of favoritism towards the bourgeois factions during the interwar period and economic sabotage.

Dej had the audacity to travel himself to Moscow to present formally the accusations he had fabricated against the three. Molotov intervened in Pauker's defense; and Beriia—in Georgescu's. A few months after Slansky's trial in Prague, Dej's formal attacks against them were first publicly voiced. On February 29, 1952, he brought these accusations at a session of the Central committee during which he undermined Luca's incompetence to lead properly the country's Ministry of Finance and the national bank. Pauker and Georgescu were accused of covering up for Luca. The two were also criticized for aristocratic tendencies. Pauker was blamed for alleged failure to support agricultural collectivization.

On 26 May 1952, Luca was arrested. Accused of ties to Israel's foreign intelligence and money laundering in Swiss bank accounts, Pauker lost her job as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Unlike Luca, Pauker was never sent to prison, possibly due to the interventions of Stalin and Molotov. Teohari Georgescu, former Minister of Internal Affairs, was incarcerated as well.[108]

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[105] Trotsky became people's commissar of foreign affairs during Lenin's leadership. Lev Kamenev was Trotsky's brother-in-law. After a heated feud with Stalin, Trotsky was exiled in 1928 to Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, and asked to leave the USSR a year later. After brief sojourns in Turkey, France, and Norway, Trotsky settled with his family in Mexico, where he was assassinated in 1940 by Ramon Mercades, believed to be an agent of Stalin of Spanish citizenship. "Trotsky, Leon" in *The Columbia Encyclopedia,* 6th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press).

[106] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *Devil in History* : *Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* pp. 75-78.

[107] Pauker's husband, Marcel Pauker, secretary of the Romanian Comintern section was purged together with Alexandru Dobrogeanu-Gherea in the 1930s. George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist, 1948-54*, p. 93.

[108] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *Devil in History*, p. 79.

Eight years after her being ousted from power, Pauker died in obscurity. Her former ally, Luca died in prison in the same year as well. His initial punishment, the death penalty, was lessened to life in prison. Dej died in 1964 from cancer. Half a year later after Dej's death the investigations carried out under the reign of the then newly elected leader Ceauşescu led to the rehabilitation of Koffler, Pătrăşcanu, Foriş and Luca.[109] Bukharin too was rehabilitated posthumously, in 1988, with his membership in the Party being granted in that same momentous year, at the acme of Gorbachev's *perestroika* reforms.[110]

One thing must be stressed here, and, namely, that Dej *himself* initiated the purges against his opponents. To make his case against them, Dej presented Luca as Czechoslovakia's Vlado/Vladimir Clementis, who was accused of Titoist favoritism, ousted from power and later executed.[111] Ana Pauker was equated to a Zionist. In the case of Clementis, however, it was Stalin and Beriia who had asked Klement Gottwald to start the purge against Clementis. Along with Rudolf Slansky, Clementis was executed by hanging in December 1952.[112]

Indeed, Dej was cunningly strategic in his move towards gaining political control. When Ceauşescu would come to power in 1965, Dej's deeds would be publicly unveiled. Like his predecessor, Ceauşescu too would perform seemingly noble and brave acts, such as his vociferous opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia during the 1968 Prague Spring, as part of his well-calculated and strategic game to gain popularity and remove opposition in favor of personal gain.[113] *Kto kogo* (*who governs who*)—a Russian phrase that is synonymous to

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[109] George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, pp. 103- 106.

[110] Moshe Lewin. "Foreward" in *Bukharin in Retrospect*, Theodor Bergmann, Gert Schaefer and Mark Selden, eds. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. ix and Gert Schaefer. "Preface" in *Bukharin in Retrospect*, Theodor Bergmann, Gert Schaefer, Mark Selden, eds. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. xix

[111] Donald F. Busky. *Communism in History and Theory: The European Experience* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. xxi.

[112] Andrew A. Michta. *The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), p. 32-33.

[113] George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, pp. 101-102.

the law of the jungle— was the *modus operandi*[114] within the communist party ruling Romania in the first two decades of communism.

Terror in the Dej Years

The collectivization campaign

After the end of the Second World War, Romania had to pay US$300 million to the Allies who won the war. Fifty percent of the reparation pay had to come in the form of petroleum. The remaining half was comprised of timber, ships and grain. The grain would come from the peasants, as part of the collectivization campaign.[115] Collectivization had an especially profound effect on Romania, a primarily agrarian society where the land was tied not only to the economy of a state but also to the very fiber of its society and its cultural identity.[116] Collectivization— the taking by force, through the infliction of violence, of one's lands by the State and their being transferred in State's ownership— had extreme and long-lasting social implications. It rendered villagers as equal concerning land ownership, thereby destroying the sense of status some of them had, or their "visibility" (*a fi vazuţi*), to use the language employed in Romanian. Status meant prestige and for some— a lifelong aspiration.[117]

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[114] Donald R. Kelley. *Soviet Politics from Brezhnev to Gorbachev* (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 55.

[115] Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962*, p. 108.

[116] In 1945, landowners of 50 hectares and more came under attack with their land being confiscated and redistributed among the poorest of the poor, a strategy meant to gain popularity among the Romanian peasants. *Ibid.*, 106.

[117] *Ibid.,* p. 91.

The *kolkhoz*,[118] the collective farm comprised of the acquired land from these peasants,

now in the hands of the State, made this aspiration a sin and those who once owned it sinners.[119]

This was true in the Soviet Union[120] and in the satellite states like Romania.[121] In the years 1946-

47, the Northern and Northeastern part of Romania was affected by a serious drought that was

followed by famine. Some peasants suffered from starvation, as a result. Similarly to the

Kriegsrohstoffabteilung's (War Raw Material Department) measures in Germany during the

World War I,[122] Romania enforced food requisitions and quotas in the same year when drought

and famine began. Like in China and North Vietnam, collectivization in Romania went hand in

hand with famine. By weakening the human spirit, the audacity to resist would lessen too, the

regime hoped.[123]

One could have been murdered for failure to comply with the food quota demands, first

introduced in 1945.[124] In a 1950 Securitate document, the instructions are made very explicit: "he

can be shot on the spot, so everyone who might dare to withhold their quotas can see they would

suffer the same fate."[125] "They came and took everything," is a common statement uttered by

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[118] The *kolhoz* was the collective farm, known in Romanian as *Gospodarie Agricola Colectiva*, a name that was later modified to *Cooperativa Agricola de Producţie* or Agricultural Production Cooperative. The most prevalent of collective land associations was named the *întovărişire,* with the root word *tovarăş*, Romanian for comrade. The confiscated land was made part of the state and collective farms. The former, the Soviet equivalent of which was the *sovkhoz*, was referred to in Romanian as *Gospodarie Agricola de Stat* (The State Agricultural Farm) and the latter as *Interprindere Agricola de Stat* (The State Agricultural Enterprise). *Ibid.* p. 128.

[119] *Ibid*., p. 91.

[120] For a history of collectivization and the resistance against it carried out in Soviet Russia, see, for example, Sheila Fitzpatrck. *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[121] For a an analysis of collectivization campaigns carried out in communist Eastern European countries, see, for example, Constantin Iordachi and Arnd Baukerkamper, eds. *The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: Comparison and Entanglements* (New York: Central European University, 2014).

[122] David McKinnon-Bell. *The First World War* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 40-41.

[123] Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962*, p. 109.

[124] Constantin Iordachi and Dorin Dobrincu. "The Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania, 1949-1962" in *The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: Comparison and Entanglements,* p. 256.

[125] Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962*, 109.

those who had lived through these times.[126] Another way peasants expressed the misery and despair they felt, as a result, translates to something that reminds one of a hard-to-believe horror story: "They took everything. We had nothing left to eat,"[127] statements echoing the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, caused by the collectivization campaign launched by the Bolsheviks with the aim of hindering nationalist tendencies in this region while simultaneously industrialize it at a fast speed. Ever since Robert Conquest published his *Harvest of Sorrow* in 1986, *holodomor* (*голодомо́р*) (derived from Ukrainian words *holod*, famine and *mor*, to exterminate) has been described as a genocide.[128]

Some peasants did fight back, however, with thousands of them being deported or placed under house arrest, as a result.[129] In the village of Vulture in the district of Focşani, roughly one hundred peasants met their death while revolting against the collectivization of their land. Many were arrested and given sentences to up 25 years in prison. The most dramatic of the peasant rebellions was registered in 1957 in the village of Vadu Roşca, located in the Galaţi region. The then young Politburo member Nicolae Ceauşescu was assigned to quell it. Violence against peasants varied from receiving fines to arrests, from imprisonment to deportation. Some were shot because they fought back. Women and children too rebelled against collectivization, with a

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[126] Marin Preda's *Morometii* touches on the issue of food quotas and peasants' attempt to refuse to comply with state's demands. Ibid., pp. 112-113.

[127] Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962*, p. 121.

[128] Norman M. Naimark. *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 70-73. See for example, Robert Conquest. *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). On this topic, see, for example, the edited volume *Hunger by Design: The Great Ukrainian Famine and its Soviet Context*, ed. Halyna Hryn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

[129] Constantin Iordachi and Dorin Dobrincu. "The Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania, 1949-1962" in *The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: Comparison and Entanglements,* Constantin Iordachi and Arnd Bauerkamper, eds., p. 255.

few Romanian female peasants, Kligman and Verdery report, having placed themselves in a martyr-like fashion, waiting to be run over by tractors.[130]

Although the key goal of collectivization was to employ the country's agricultural resources towards industrial expansion, the campaign itself affected not only the country's economy. It had profound social implications by destroying the sense of community within villages, and changed physical boundaries. [131] It is safe to say that collectivization changed Romania's society. The more affluent villagers, the *chiaburs*[132] became *kulaks,*[133] thus enemies of the people.[134] Similar to the original sin, the *chiaburs* would pass on their newly acquired tainted identity to their offspring and the latter, to their progeny as well, and so on.[135] Forced to break ties to their past, their and their children's future looked uncertain. As Alexis de Tocqueville once wrote, "Since the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity."[136]

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[130] Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 132-146.

[131] In the years 1949-53, one tenth of land was already collectivized. By 1962, all the land projected for collectivization was nationalized. Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 88- 103.

[132] The word is pronounced as *kyaboor*. Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 115.

[133] *Kulaks*, writes Norman Naimark, "were subjected to the kind of dehumanization and stereotyping that was common for victims of genocide throughout the twentieth century. They were 'enemies of the people,' to be sure, but also 'swine,' 'dogs,' and 'cockroaches'; they were 'scum,' 'vermin,' 'filth,' and 'garbage,' to be cleansed, crushed, and eliminated. Gorky described them as 'half animals,' while Soviet press and propaganda materials sometimes depicted them as apes," Naimark further writes. Norman M. Naimark. *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 59.

[134] The fate of many *chiaburs* of the affluent landlords, the *boieri*, resembles a bit that of the former bourgeois class in Soviet Union. The *lishentsy* (from the Russian verb *lishyt'/лишыть)* were stripped of voting and other rights, such as employment. The *byvshie, a* term traces its origins from the word to be in Russian, *byt'/быть*, were stripped their social privilege prior to the revolution. The *raskulachenye* or the dekulakized ones were once the more affluent peasants who were forced to cease their land animal stock to the *kolhoz*. Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 90; Ronald Grigor Suny. "The Stalin Revolution" in *The Structure of Soviet History: Essay and Documents*, Ronald Grigor Suny, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 174.

[135] Ronald Grigor Suny. "The Stalin Revolution" in *The Structure of Soviet History: Essay and Documents*, Ronald Grigor Suny, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 174.

[136] Alexis de Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*, p. 371. Cited in Sorin Radu Cucu. *The Underside of Politics: Global Fictions in the Fog of the Cold War* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 60.

The concept of the 'enemy of the people' in the communist context traces its origin to the Cheka, the Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage that was formed only weeks after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and assigned to haunt these 'enemies'.[137] Just like in the Soviet Union, the communist regime in Romania thrived on the idea that some people had to be punished and ostracized so that others can be rewarded and made part of the new world order communism promised to deliver. The communist regime in Romania sought to promote this dangerous duality that left little room for toleration or ambiguity when it came to one's social origins. This system maintained its power (albeit for a while) by fostering distrust and suspicion, emotions necessary to create an 'enemy of the state.'

Similarly to the *soslovie* (estate) order of the Soviet society that Sheila Fitzpatrick describes in her essay "Ascribing Class,"[138] the Romanian society under communism was made of workers, peasants and intelligentsia. Unlike the 1930s Soviet Union's polices towards the *kulaks* that sought to eradicate them, in Romania of the 1940s-1950s, the policies against them were to 'limit' (*îngrădi*) them and intimidate them, so that they would fail to demand for their former social status and, thus, become docile citizens of the state.[139] As in the USSR, the attribute of being a *kulak* (*chiabur*) applied to the entire family, kin, parents and offspring and their relatives. "Children of *kulaks* carried the mark of Cain," writes Norman N. Naimark.[140] "Kulakdom—if you will—was hereditary," writes Naimark.[141]

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[137] Eric D. Weitz. A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 60-62.

[138] David Priestland. *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power and Terror in Inter-War Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 12. Sheila Fitzpatrick. "Ascribing Class" in *Stalinism: New Directions*, Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed. (London: Routlege, 2000), p. 27.

[139] Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery. *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962*, p. 161.

[140] Norman N. Naimark. *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 58.

[141] *Ibid.*, p. 59. Vasilly Grossman's *Life and Fate* is a harsh attack on Stalinist policies. Both his *Life and Fate* and *Forever Flowing* equate the murder and repression of *kulaks* in Soviet Union to Nazi's policies against

For Tismaneanu, the "dehumanization of the enemy" commenced with the doctrines put forth by Lenin.[142] In Romania, 'enemies' were to be found both domestically and abroad. As Tismaneanu further argues, "Paranoia regarding infiltrations, subversion, and treason have been enduring features of all Communist political cultures, from Russia to China to Romania and Yugoslavia."[143] The Romanian state propaganda, including the literature the regime permitted to be produced, sought to convince its population of this myth.[144]

Romania's labour camps and prisons witnessed this dehumanization in an extreme fashion. In these wretched places the State's nationwide project of 're-educating or eradicating the old and creating the new man' was implemented as well. In all the stories about reeducation in communist Romania, nothing comes close to the disturbing, fiendish and even savaged nature of terror as the one experienced by the victims of the Piteşti reeducation experiment that took place in several of Romania's prisons in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The Piteşti experiment[145]

The Piteşti experiment caused public outcry in the West beginning with the late 1960s when literature about this brutal phenomenon was first published by former Romanian political

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those deemed as 'non-Aryans' by the Nazi regime. Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century,* p. 37.

[142] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), p. 13.

[143] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[144] *Ibid*, pp. 38-39.

[145] An earlier draft of the section on the Piteşti experiment is scheduled to first appear in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.

prisoners or dissidents in exile,[146] but also because it remains, justifiably so, one of the most notorious and brutal violations of the human spirit known in the former Eastern European bloc, discussed in academic literature pertaining not only to history, but also to psychology.[147] This experiment exhibits evil in its superlative state; it represents extreme "abuse" of other human beings, to quote Mark Evans, manifested, by the "profoundly inhuman treatment of people as intended by other human beings."[148] In it, its victims and arguably its perpetrators are deprived of their humanity,[149] and the concept of what it is like to be a human is remolded or written via extreme violence so that the victim would become something other than his[150] original self, and would attain an almost subhuman status.

The Piteşti prison experiment was designed based on the controversial educational theories of Anton Makarenko, a Soviet writer whose works aimed to amend juvenile delinquency via harsh discipline and labor. The experiment sought to turn former anti-communists into adherents to Marxist and Soviet ideology by inflicting unto them extreme corporal and psychological torture. As a result, former victims would become perpetrators, thus partaking in a *perpetum mobile* of suffering of the mind, body and soul.

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[146] These individuals were Dumitru Bacu, Virgil Ierunca and Paul Goma. First came Bacu's *Piteşti: Centrul de reeducare* [Piteşti: Centre of Reeducation], published in Spain in 1963, in which the author spoke of his own experience as an inmate subjected to this experiment. Ierunca and Goma's works appeared roughly eighteen years later in France. Ierunca's *Fenomenul Piteşti* [The Phenomenon Piteşti] and Goma's *Patimele dupa Piteşti* [Passions after Piteşti] were published in Paris in 1981.

[147] See, for example, Adrian Neculau. "La violence institutionnelle. Une expérience roumaine dans les années du totalitarisme stalinien : "la rééducation" in *C@hiers de Psychologie politique*, available at http://lodel.irevues.inist.fr/cahierspsychologiepolitique/ index.php?id=1343#tocto1n1, last accessed on January 2, 2019.

[148] Mark Evans. "Doing Evil Justly? The Morality of Justifiable Abomination" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 128.

[149] For more information on the experiment, see, for example, Alin Mureşan's *Piteşti: Cronica unei sinucideri asistate* [Piteşti: The chronicle of an assisted suicide] and Mircea Stanescu's three volume work *Reeducarea in Romania Comunistă (1945-1952) Aiud, Suceava, Piteşti, Braşov* [Reeducation in Communist Romania (1945-1952) Aiud, Suceava, Piteşti, Braşov] (vol 1), *Reeducarea in Romania Comunistă (1948-1955) Târgşor, Gherla* [Reeducation Communist Romania (1945-1952) Targsor, Gherla] (vol. 2) and *Reeducarea in Romania Comunistă (1949-1955) Târgu-Ocna, Ocnele Mari, Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră* [Reeducation in Communist Romania (1945-1952) *Târgu-Ocna, Ocnele Mari, Canalul Dunare-Marea Neagră*] (vol. 3).

[150] The usage of the masculine pronoun is deliberate, as all victims in the experiment were male.

The experiment took place in several prisons in communist Romania in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although the experiment began in the Suceava prison in 1948, it rapidly spread to other prisons, such as Târgu Ocna, Ocnele Mari, Târgşor, Baia Sprie, Aiud, and reached its apex, in terms of the barbarity and brutality it manifested, at the Piteşti prison, from which the reeducation phenomenon obtained its infamous name.[151]

The key objective of this experiment was to change the minds and hearts of those involved, to modify or recreate the human essence of its participants, torturers and their victims alike. As Cristina Petrescu and Dragoş Petrescu explain, this experiment sought to "destroy personalities, wipe out minds, and erase the difference between victims and perpetrators,"[152] where the former group were to eventually become perpetrators, in a vicious cycle of never-ending suffering of the mind, body and soul.

Sometime in 1948, a few prisoners, mostly former Iron Guard members, decided or possibly were encouraged by prison personnel to start a program on other prisoners in order to reeducate them, mostly through physical and psychological violence, so that they would become adherents of Marxist and Soviet ideology. To do so, they were forced via physical and psychological torture to denounce their ties to their families, loved ones and the life they had prior to their entering prison. To successfully carry out this program, Alexandru Bogdanovici and Eugen Țurcanu, two of the key leaders of this experiment, both prisoners and former Iron Guard members, created the so-called Organization of the Detainees with Communist

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[151] Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. *Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania* [Final report: The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania]. 2006, pp. 162, available at http://old.presidency.ro/static/rapoarte/ Raport_final_CPADCR.pdf, last accessed on April 4, 2018.

[152] Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu. "The Canon of Remembering Romanian Communism: From Autobiographical Recollections to Collective Representations" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe*. Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds. (New York: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 65.

Convictions (ODDC),[153] under the aegis of which the experiment was carried out in four stages, one more disturbing and gruesome than the next.[154]

The experiment may be best described by using terms such as 'boundary/limit situation,' (*grenzsituation*) introduced by Karl Jaspers[155] or 'limit event,'[156] by Dominic Lacapra, during which people experiment great suffering, the intensity of which is impossible to fully comprehend if one were not a witness or had first experience with such a "radically transgressive event."[157] Both terms imply an abrupt end, between life as a human may have been used to with its seeming normality, joys and obstacles and the life one is forced to accept or adjust to, lived in situations that touch the realm of the abnormal, the incomprehensible, the inhuman even.

In respect to the experiment's four stages, I doubt whether they can find their essence in the titles attributed to them in scholarly sources. These four stages are named as following: 'external unmasking' (*demascare exterioară*), 'internal unmasking' (*demascare interioară*), 'public moral unmasking' and, the last one, consisting of a 'quasi-initiation into the process of reeducating' during which the former victim becomes himself a torturer. In academic works we use these terms anyways for lack of better ways to try to make sense of these evil events that, if understood in their entirety, with all their details and their effects on the essence of a human, would require more than just utterings to be described.

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[153] Monica Ciobanu. "Pitești: a project in reeducation and its post-1989 interpretation in Romania" in *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 43, Issue 5, (2015), p. 625; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. *Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania* [Final report: The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania]. 2006, pp. 162, available at http://old.presidency.ro/static/rapoarte/Raport_final_CPADCR.pdf, last accessed on April 4, 2018.

[154] Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania, p. 162.

[155] Ludwig B. Lefebre. "Glossary. Translations and Definitions of terms used by Jaspers" in *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed. (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. xxiii; and Calvin O. Schrag. *Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude,* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press), pp. 95-97.

[156] Dominick Lacapra. *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 48.

[157] *Ibid.*

Besides being physically torturous, as the victims were constantly beaten, some of whom lost their lives as a result of such violence,[158] the biggest damage caused by the experiment lied in these victims' sense of self. It is no surprise that one of the official websites set up to commemorate this experiment and fundraise for the creation of a documentary film about this prison program calls it a "genocide of the souls."[159]

As the titles of three of the stages suggest, the key purpose of the experiment was to 'unmask.' This word, if analyzed morphologically, means to uncover or expose something that lies within oneself, to remove the outer layer of one's being, of one's personality, and retrieve or recreate a new one. The 'unmasking' in this context concerned stripping one of who one is, including of one's own memory and the emotions and sentiments that are attached to it: to undo that which one is and make him something he was never meant to be, to 'play God' in some ways, but only with the intentions and goals that are contrary to the divine plan.

This process of 'unmasking' comes close to a type of depersonalization, which the Romanian theologian Antonie Plamadeala metaphorically describes in his semi-autobiographical book *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* [Three Hours in Hell] written about his experience as a political prisoner in communist Romania in the 1950s. In this book Plamadeala alludes to brainwashing techniques inflicted on inmates during this period, wherein the 'reeducated' human is only a partial reminder of one's original self, the other half being fabricated, designed to meet the needs of the regime which initiated this inner and even outer transformation, as it was the case of

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[158] Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. *Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania*, pp. 162.

[159] See, for example, "The Genocide of the Souls. The Pitesti experiment, reeducation through torture," available at http://www.thegenocideofthesouls.org/public/english/messages/, last accessed on January 4, 2019.

Adam-Ghast, the book's main character.[160] We will return to Plamadeala's *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* in Chapter 2, in the discussion concerning the priming of informers.

During the first stage, the prisoner had to divulge anything one may have withheld from the Securitate interrogators to the ODDC leaders. This was done so that the victim would show full allegiance to the ODDC. During the second stage, inmates that were part of the experiment were asked to report to ODDC the people who were most kind to them in prison, while in the third stage, they were asked to publicly reject their own past and insult or denounce their family members and loved ones, including one's faith in God and country.[161]

Everything that one held of some worth one had to publicly reject, including one's own former self. This was done not only oratorically but also in writing. Inmates had to provide hand-written autobiographical accounts wherein they officially denounced their bourgeois or fascist upbringing. "Like the family, the church and its representatives were condemned as degenerate institutions,"[162] Monica Ciobanu writes. "Theology students performed in offensive parody the most cherished of Christian Orthodox practices and ceremonies (confessions, baptism, funerals, Easter and Christmas services). These rituals were acted out in a macabre and degrading fashion that frequently implied obscene sexual practices antithetical to Christian morals."[163] But it was in the final stage that the actual 'metamorphosis' occurred: the former victim now himself a vicious abuser subjected another inmate to the violence and torture he had experienced throughout this brutal experiment.[164] Starved, sleep deprived, beaten to the point that some

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[160] Antonie Plamadeala. *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* (Three Hours in Hell) (Bucuresti: Editura Sophia, 2013).
[161] Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. *Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania*, p. 162.
[162] Monica Ciobanu. "Piteşti: a project in reeducation and its post-1989 interpretation in Romania" in *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 43, Issue 5, (2015), p. 623
[163] *Ibid.*
[164] Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*, p. 34.

contemplated suicide,[165] these inmates were made to deliberately feel pain and humiliation when eating and drinking. At times they were forced to eat, kneeled on the floor, with hands behind their backs, sometimes even forced to eat their excrements along with the food. As Dennis Deletant explains, "eating became a source of humiliation as well as of pain and the sense of taste, smell and touch were repeatedly associated with pain."[166] In this experiment as it was in the case of the Soviet gulags, the human was seen and treated as a creature able of being reformed or reshaped to serve the needs of the regime.

Steven Barnes defines the gulag [167] as a "slave labor system emerging as a result of Stalin's crash industrialization policies." [168] The Piteşti story reminds one of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago*, with its rich and rather shocking account on life in the Soviet gulag system, filled with stories and details that can lead the reader to attain a state of disbelief. The evil that took place during the Piteşti experiment reminds, also, of the profound human rights violations and dehumanization of approximately 6600-6800 people sent from Tomsk to Nazino island in 1933 to die, with some of them resorting to cannibalism. Only one third of them survived. In *Cannibal Island: Death in a Siberian Gulag*,[169] Nicolas Werth, one of the authors of the *Black Book of Communism*, movingly narrates these people's story. [170]

In Romania, as in the rest of the satellite states, human life would attain *slight* normalcy only after Stalin's death. Human rights violations did occur under Khruschev as well, but in the

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[165] *Ibid.*

[166] *Ibid*, p. 35.

[167] On the history of Soviet gulags, see, for example, Oleg V. Khlevniuk. *The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror*. Vadim A. Staklo, trans. (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2004); Lynne Viola. *The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin's Special Settlements* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). The works are listed in Steven A. Barnes. *Death and Redemption: the Gulag and the Shaping of Soviet Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 9-10.

[168] Steven A. Barnes. *Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the Shaping of Soviet Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 7.

[169] Nicolas Werth. *The Cannibal Island: Death in a Siberian Gulag*, Steven Rendall, trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[170] Norman M. Naimark. *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 62.

case of Romania, its people never returned to witness another gruesome Piteşti -like story. After Stalin's death, the Piteşti experiment would cease as well and become a national tragedy. For those who had lived it, it would remain a painful nightmare that perhaps haunted them till their last day.

The Khrushchev Thaw and the Desovietization of the Securitate

Stalin died on 3 March 1953, at age 73, after having suffered two strokes in the days prior to his passing. According to his daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva, leeches were used to treat him.[171] After the death of Stalin, the communist world began experiencing two crises, Mark Sandle writes, one of "faith" in the Marxist ideals and one "systematic,"[172] manifested by doubt in the regime's ability to deliver the great utopian life that it had once promised to bring. Nikita Khrushchev, who had once governed Ukraine while Stalin was in power, took on Stalin's former seat.

On June 26, 1953, only months after Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev requested that Beriia be arrested, along with the key individuals who helped orchestrate the show trials in the satellite states.[173] To note, unlike Stalin's opponents, Khruschhev's adversaries were treated less cruelly.[174] The 'Khrushchev thaw' of the 1950s and 1960s was synonymous to bourgeoning of some scant respect for human life. It was marked by a series of measures that sought to break with the Stalinist past, and, especially, to denounce the purges that were connected with the Soviet Union's previous leader. Linguistically, it may have been announced by the re-appearance of the Russian word *sovest'* (*совесть*/conscious) in the Russian vocabulary.

Orlando Figes writes that the Russian word *sovest'* was temporarily dropped from the Russian vocabulary after 1917.[175] It reemerged years later, perhaps around the time Stalin died,

[171] Charles E. Ziegler. *The History of Russia*, p. 93.

[172] Mark Sandle. *Communism*, p. 97.

[173] Among those were the former State Security Minister Abakunov and General Byelkin. Generals Makarov and Likhachev, MVD advisers in the Rajk trial, were executed by shooting. George Hodos. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), p. 96.

[174] Viacheslav Molotov, who had signed the Nazi Soviet Pact of 1939 and was the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Stalin, was sent to Mongolia as the USSR ambassador; Lazar Kaganovich— to the Urals, to lead the operations of a cement plant, while Gheorgii Malenkov—to Kazakhstan, to lead a power station. All of them kept their pensions and most importantly, their lives were not at stake. Charles E. Ziegler. *The History of Russia*, pp. 96-100.

[175] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* p. 42.

although the latter claim is rather speculative. Undoubtedly, the 'Khrushchev thaw' was signaled in the behavior of Party *apparatchiks* both in the USSR and abroad, who, after Stalin's death, were given more room to be themselves. Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White describe this change in the following manner:

> In 1954 the system began to 'thaw' and members of the Soviet elite appeared at receptions in foreign embassies. The British ambassador to Moscow, Sir William Hayter, recalled what a change this seemed from earlier days. In Stalin's time they had been distantly visible, squat, flat-capped figures, on Lenin's tomb during ceremonial parades, and at wartime banquets they had been glimpsed rather more closely, muttering to each other and obediently drinking toasts when the Leader proposed them. But they could hardly be distinguished except by the presence or absence of moustache or spectacles; they were approximately the same size and shape, short, powerful men, who no one could really tell apart.[176]

The political elites too, as the quote above suggests, were on the verge of losing their own sense of identity. The 'Khrushchev thaw' was a breath of fresh air for both the elite and the regular folk.

Three years after Stalin's death, Khrushchev uttered what would become known as the famous Secret Speech at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress. His four-hour long discourse about the Stalinist horrors and terror methods won him wide popularity and support.[177] On 14 May 1955 Romania, along with seven other countries—the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland— signed the Agreement on Friendship, Coordination and Mutual Assistance. Also known as the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), this association was created to serve Moscow's interests in pursuing its hegemony in the Eastern bloc.[178] The Warsaw Pact was formed in response to the

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[176] Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White. *The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and Its Members, 1917-1991 (*New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. v.

[177] Vladimir Tismaneanu. *Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* p. 24.

[178] The Warsaw Pact mobilized its military forces during the 1956 Hungarian uprising and the 1968 Prague Spring. On 13 September 1968 Albania retrieved its membership in response to the Soviet-led attack of

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, emerging from the former armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. Together with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the Warsaw Pact sought to promote the economic and military stability of the entire Eastern bloc.[179]

Khrushchev sought to "weaken the power base of Stalinists in the Soviet bloc," writes Stephen Fisher-Galati. In respect to Romania, the newly appointed Soviet leader "was anxious to limit Gheorghiu[-Dej]'s powers through interference in the affairs of Rumania at both the party and the state level." [180] Dej fervently resisted Khrushchev's destalinization campaign. In response, the Romania's leader's policies undertaken during the Khrushchev years, both domestically and abroad, were to distance his country from Moscow's influence. History annals call this phenomenon as 'desovietization,' which, in plain language, means getting rid of the Soviet influence and curbing as much as possible Soviet Union's meddling with the internal affairs of the Romanian state. Dej, a Stalinist, wanted to remain as such even after Stalin's death.

With his 1964 April Declaration (*Declarația din Aprilie*), Dej sought to affirm Romania as an equal power among the rest of the communist states. "Every party has the exclusive right to establish its political line, its concrete objectives, and the ways and means of achieving them, independently," Dej affirmed in this speech. "No party has a privileged place nor can it have…the constellation of class forces in one of another country."[181] The fact that in June 1958,

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Czechoslovakia in 1968. Ryszard Sudzinski. "Warsaw Pact (seen from Eastern Europe" in *Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2, Bernard Cook, ed. (New York: Garland, 2001), pp. 1352-53.

[179] J. F. Brown. "The East European Setting" in *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. J. F. Brown, Pierre Hassner and Josef Joffe. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 13-14.

[180] Stephen Fischer-Galati. *Twentieth Century Rumania* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 134.

[181] Cited in Adam Zwass. *From Failed Communism to Underdeveloped Capitalism: Transformation of Eastern Europe, the Post-Soviet Union, and China* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 139.

the Soviet Army withdrew its forces from Romania[182] may have played favorably in Dej's move to affirm his country as an equal member of the Soviet bloc.

Indirectly, Dej's vociferous attempt to distance his country from Moscow foreshadowed his country's gradual opening to the West.[183] The cooling of the Sino-Soviet relations following the famous Secret Speech, as well as the reforms precipitated by the 'Khrushchev thaw,' led to the increase in strive for autonomy from Albania, as well.[184] Similarly to Albania, as it will be shown in the following chapter, Romania under Ceauşescu tried to further distance itself from Moscow, as well.[185]

As it will be further discussed in the next chapter, Romania's courting of the West entailed first and foremost a decrease of the repression and violence, and terror methods that the previous Stalinist years were known for. For that, the principal inflictor of this type of oppression, the Securitate, the country's secret police, had to become more refined in its methods of operation both domestically and abroad. Established in 1907, in response to the peasant revolt that had taken place in that same year, this organization was known until 1948 as the Siguranţa.[186]

Siguranţa's primary function was to monitor the whereabouts and activities of the foreign citizens visiting Romania and accumulate intelligence data for the Romanian state.[187] During the communist period, the Securitate, its successor, would become the regime's very

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[182] Nicolae Ionita. "Politica de cadre in securitate. Schimbarea cadrelor medii de conducere (1958-1967)," [Personnel Policy within the Securitate. Changing mid-level Leadership (1958 – 1967] in *Caietele CNSAS*, 1 (3) 2009, pp. 23-24.

[183] Ciprian Cirniala. "In Miezul Prefacerilor: Ubicuitatea si Obiectul Muncii Militiei R.P.R. in Anii '60", *Caietele CNSAS* 1 (3), p. 2009, p. 72.

[184] J. F. Brown. "The East European Setting" in *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. J. F. Brown, Pierre Hassner and Josef Joffe. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 14.

[185] Joseph Held. *Dictionary of East European History since 1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 3-4.

[186] Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 13.

[187] *Ibid.*

powerful right hand, with the help of which its *fiat*-like orders, similar to the ones uttered by the biblical Elohim god in the first creation account, would become a tangible reality, albeit till Ceauşescu's last days, when the Securitate ceased to obey and turned against him.

Late 1950s-early 1960s structural changes within the Securitate

Although it was under Ceauşescu that the Securitate terror methods became less overtly violent, the seed of these changes was arguably planted in the late 1950s, as a result of a series of investigations within the Ministry of Interior that revealed grave human rights violations, violence, professional incompetence, corruption and abuse of power among Securitate personnel. As early as 1957, things began to change within the structural hierarchy of the Securitate, reforms carried out under Dej's greater agenda to desovietize the Romanian secret police by significantly increasing the number of Securitate personnel with ethnically Romanian origins. Neagu Cozma, former Securitate general, claimed that Dej "appointed Alexandru Drăghici to lead the Securitate without KGB members and against them."[188] As a side-effect, however, these structural changes addressed, as well, the abuse of power, corruption and violent methods through which the Securitate operated.[189] Allow me to elaborate further on how this took place.

In 1956, only a year prior to the Soviet launch of Sputnik into the space,[190] a system of evaluation of Securitate officers was formally introduced in order to assess the quality and work

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[188] Nicolae Ionita. "Politica de cadre in securitate. Schimbarea cadrelor medii de conducere (1958-1967)," in *Caietele CNSAS*, 1 (3) 2009, p. 39.

[189] Securitate officers married to Russian women whom they met while pursuing studies in the USSR were often under close scrutiny, as a result, for suspicion of being agents of the KGB. Nicolae Ionita. "Politica de cadre in securitate. Schimbarea cadrelor medii de conducere (1958-1967)," in *Caietele CNSAS*, 1 (3) 2009, p. 39.

[190] Charles E. Ziegler. *The History of Russia,* 2nd ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2009), p. 104.

performance of its officers.[191] A year later, another investigation was carried out within the Ministry of Interior in order to identify individuals deserving of promotion. The report and recommendations issued, as a result, were signed by Nicolae Ceauşescu and Alexandru Drăghici,[192] whose reputation, as we will see below, Ceauşescu would later seek to undermine in his quest for total power and control.

To note, Alexandru Drăghici was made Interior Minister in 1957, around the same time these alarming Securitate reports began to surface. His career as Interior Minister, and, hence, as head of the Securitate, would end shortly after Dej's death. "When Drăghici was excluded from both Party and his job," writes Katherine Verdery, the competitive relations between the Party and Securitate were decisively resolved in the Party's favor, and the interorganizational environment acquired greater stability."[193]

The 1957 report on Securitate personnel cited above was, for a lack of a more fitting word, alarming, with incidents of corruption, unprofessional and indecent behavior and alcoholism being recorded: "instead of [demonstrating] collaboration and mutual support between department heads (*şefi de servicii*), there is an atmosphere of suspicion and unprofessionalism."[194] This report assigned blame to Alexandru Demeter,[195] the then general major and chief of staff (*şef al direcţiei de cadre*).

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[191] The report entailed the following possible recommendations: keeping the respective employment position, promoting one or demoting one, moving one from one position to another or transferring one into reserves, sending one for further military schooling. Those assigned as reserves were to be used as replacement for those who were fired. Nicolae Ionita. "Politica de cadre in securitate. Schimbarea cadrelor medii de conducere (1958-1967)," in *Caietele CNSAS*, 1 (3) 2009, pp. 31- 32.

[192] Nicolae Ionita. "Politica de cadre in securitate. Schimbarea cadrelor medii de conducere (1958-1967)," in *Caietele CNSAS*, 1 (3) 2009, p. 26.

[193] Katherine Verdery. *Secrets and Truth: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania's Secret Police* (New York: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 15.

[194] Nicolae Ionita. "Politica de cadre in securitate. Schimbarea cadrelor medii de conducere (1958-1967)," in *Caietele CNSAS*, 1 (3) 2009, p. 28.

[195] Demeter, was later replaced by Ioan Patesan, who had a 4th grade level education and had had previous pursued a preparatory course in the USSR. Nicolae Ionita. "Politica de cadre in securitate. Schimbarea cadrelor medii de conducere (1958-1967)," in *Caietele CNSAS*, 1 (3) 2009, pp. 29-30.

In the late 1950s, most of the Securitate officers had insufficient academic training for the job assigned. From the total of 8005 operative worker employees in the year 1957, roughly 77% had 7th grade level education, a little more than 6% of them— 8th-9th grade level education. About 13% (1074 of them) had a tenth-grade level education, with only 4% of them—a university degree. In response, many Securitate regional bureaus were later reduced in staff or simply eliminated. From the 191 regional departments that existed in 1957, 142 of them were dissolved by 1960. Nine hundred sixty Securitate officers were fired with 304 Securitate added on as newly hired employees.[196]

In a series of investigations carried out in the late 1950s and early 1960s, physical violence, or, to use Securitate language, the "usage of beating" (*bătaia*) to recruit informers,[197] corruption, unethical[198] or promiscuous behavior at work were often cited as reasons for demotion, being let go or placed in the reserves.[199] One Securitate captain, for example, placed his target under surveillance for alleged sabotage even though the target lacked a criminal record. "In reality [the victim]… was the boss of the captain's concubine." This information is derived from a report about the operations that had occurred during the January 1959-April 1960 period in the Securitate headquarters of the city of Craiova states.[200] The captain, this document further claims, "arrested in an abusive manner [the target]…and two employees of the same company [where the target worked], and to justify it, took a declaration from his concubine […] in which a

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[196] *Ibid*., p. 28-40.
[197] *Ibid*., p. 48.
[198] Some Securitate reports from the late 1950s and early 1960s commented on the moral character of those assigned to oversee the regional Securitate headquarters, as it was the case of a 1958 Securitate document that makes the following striking claim: "There is tendency, there are people who you see are honest and whom you give high responsibility positions and they do such filthy work that blows your mind. There are people who like to steal and look for various ways to get into tainted circumstances (*circumstanţe attenuate*) and have no qualms of consciences," writes a 1958 Securitate report about two Securitate bureau chiefs who had claimed a five dollar bill as his own. The bill arrived in a confiscated letter, assumingly from outside the country. The respective officer passed it on to his colleague and asked him to purchase him a bag next time the colleague travels abroad. *Ibid*., p. 48.
[199] *Ibid*., p. 44.
[200] *Ibid*.

series of violations were listed that even if they were real, could not serve as basis for arrest. Furthermore, "to have relations [with the target's wife], her house was transformed into a conspiratorial house, and her husband was recruited as a host [of the conspiratorial house]. Besides that [the captain] preoccupied himself with the construction of [his] house, through abuses and loans from the Agricultural Bank, taken in the name of the people."[201]

Securitate chiefs were often relocated in other parts of the country in order to salvage the reputation of the bureau they once led. From 1957-67, many were demoted; others were let go and moved into reserves due to incompetence, indecent relations with subordinates and informers, corruption, abuse of power and copious consumption of alcohol while at work, as the following two examples suggest.[202]

In a 1957 report, this time on a Securitate officer from the Craiova district, the following is written about his lack of professionalism at work: "On the 1st of May [Labour's Day], when all Securitate employees had to be present at work, he organized a party at the Securitate headquarters where they all roasted a ram in an outlaw manner (*haiduceşte*) as one comrade used to say and they all got drunk."[203] In a similarly humorous manner, in a December 1961 report written by Captain Alexandru about his visit to one of the country's regional Securitate headquarters, the following is recorded about his encounter with the office on duty. "When I got there on 19 December, […XX] who was the officer on duty invited me to his office. In this office, on a table, there was a wild boar that had been divided in pieces."[204] Two of the employees at that office had been hunting a few days prior. "In that period, a barrel of wine had

[201] *Ibid.*
[202] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[203] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[204] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

also been brought [to the offices] as if it was the M[onopoly] A[Alcohol] and T[abacco]; all employees were each given 5kg of wine and some complaints arose as some wanted more." [205]

Some officers failed to follow instructions and employed Securitate funds for personal use, as was the case of a Securitate chief officer sent in 1962 to oversee foreign tourists visiting the Black Sea. Instructed to "be careful there, because there is the sea, people go relaxed, in bathing suits…and a lot of temptation," the officer used Securitate funds to dine with foreign tourists.[206] Furthermore, the officer had a romantic relationship with a Swedish woman whom he was assigned to recruit. After recruiting her, he came clean and revealed to her his ties to the secret police. The Swedish tourist, believed to have being spying for the UK, ended up collecting more information on him than he did on her, the report concludes. Once the tourist returned from Sweden, she sent him pictures that were confiscated by the Securitate. From the tone of the writing, it is unlikely that Securitate officers who reported the incident were pleased with his work.[207]

It is safe to assume that the issues the Securitate faced in the 1950s-1960s did not fully cease to linger on even under Ceauşescu. What is more facile to ascertain is that the Romanian word *bătaia*—beating—disappeared from, or became extinct in, the wooded language employed in Securitate dossiers written after mid 1960s. A new method of coercion had to be invented, one that I introduce and further analyze in the following chapters. I call it *psuchegraphy*, translated literally from Greek as the writing of one's soul. This new method required no physical force, and no raising of one's voice. It required no swearing, no insults or any fierce look into the victim's eyes while she received a menacing verbal threat. It caused no physical bruises, but it still bruised nevertheless. The remaining part of this chapter provides a review of

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[205] *Ibid.*
[206] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[207] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

the measures undertaken in the late 1960s under Ceauşescu to further structurally change the Securitate and train its personnel so that, to say it bluntly, the bruising caused on the secret police's targets would only touch one's inner being, or what I describe in chapter 2 as one's *psuche*.

The rise of Ceauşescu

In October 1964, Khrushchev was removed from power, primarily because of his poor leadership style that promoted disunity and discord within the party. Leonid Brezhnev became his first secretary and Alexei Kosygin—premier.[208] In the same year, Dej passed away and Nicolae Ceauşescu became his successor. "While these two men," writes Steven D. Roper, "had many differences, Ceauşescu inherited a regime from Gheorghiu-Dej that provided him some level of autonomy from the Soviet Union and ultimately complete control of the party, state, and society."[209] The changes within the Securitate that occurred under Dej paved the way towards that autonomy that Ceauşescu solidified.

Ceauşescu's succession in 1965 was rather uneventful, although not marked by some contestation from his opponents whom he eventually managed to silence. Smooth was also the transition of Ramiz Alia after Albania's Enver Xoxha passed away in 1985. Around the same time (1985), the fifty-four-year old Mikhail Gorbachev took office in Soviet Union, after a relatively rapid succession of power from Brezhnev, to Andropov, and then Chernenko.[210] It would be during the reign of Chernenko's successor that Ronald Reagan's famous call to tear down the notorious wall would make headlines.

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[208] Mark Sandle. *Communism*. (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 101.
[209] Steven D. Roper. *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000), p. 9.
[210] J. F. Brown. "The East European Setting" in *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*, p. 22.

Ironically, it was Ceauşescu who put forward the idea that the Securitate was the key national institution that carried the responsibility for terror in Romania during Dej's era. Two years after he came to power, under his direct leadership, the Central Committee convened to discuss the repressive actions of the Securitate during the late 1940s-1950s. A detailed report was issued shortly after (1968) about the activity of Securitate, believed to have had acted independently from the Party and subordinated directly to Dej. More interestingly, however, this document contained criticism of the government's leadership, past leadership to be more specific, publicly acknowledging that which was already known 'behind the curtains,' among the Party *nomenkatlura*: The purges of former key Party leaders such Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and Teohari Georgescu in the 1940s and early 1950s, as discussed above, were carried out under false confessions obtained after they were tortured by the Securitate.[211]

In reality, the 'cry for justice' that Ceauşescu had conveyed both internationally and domestically may have all been part of his plan to eliminate his biggest opponent, Alexandru Drăghici, and undermine Dej's legacy. Ceauşescu's intent to criticize the terror committed under his predecessor's watch was subtly transcribed into the plot of a series of novels written in the first years of Ceauşescu's rule. These books, written about the so-called "obsessive decade," the 1950s, began to mushroom in the Romanian bookstores in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[212] One of these books, *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* [Three Hours in Hell] is discussed at greater length in the following chapter.

Their hopeful readers, as well as the rest of the Romanian population, would soon discover, however, that the terror in their country did not really end with the public acknowledgement of the violence and human rights abuses their parents or grandparents had

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[211] Cristina Petrescu. "The Afterlife of the Securitate: On Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania," pp. 389-390.
[212] *Ibid*., p. 392.

witnessed. The wide surveillance of the population, carried out by the Securitate with the help of its collaborators (*colaboratori*), informers (*informatori*), residents (*rezidenți*), and support persons (*persoane de sprijin*), who were lower in rank than the collaborators in the surveillance network (*rețeaua informativă*), would soon replace the brutal violence these novels were addressing, and about which many did not dare to even speak.[213] "Silence became second nature to Romanians whose relatives have been in prison and who wanted to be considered 'normal,'" Cristina Petrescu writes.[214] What appeared 'normal' in the Dej era was more the façade of a survival mechanism used to keep from the public eye the grief, disbelief and the pain of losing someone and the fear of being the next on the list to be targeted. This fear would become part of Romanians' daily life even after Dej, until the days leading up to the 1989 December Revolution; this time, however, one's fear almost always hit home.

The August 1968 Soviet-led attack against Czechoslovakia had immense repercussions on the overall consciousness of Eastern Europe. Adam Michnik described these events—the Prague Spring, the student protests in Poland, the 1970-71 Croatian Spring as the "death of revisionism."[215] The memory of these events, decades later, did not fully dissipate.[216] Domestically, the Ceauşescu "thaw" was only short-lived political tease. Ceauşescu, as it will be shown in the following chapters, would gain notoriety both domestically and abroad for the human rights violations inflicted upon his people. In the late 1970s, as a result the defection of

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[213] This argument is also put forth in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration with the Securitate in 1945-1989".

[214] Cristina Petrescu. "The Afterlife of the Securitate: On Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania," p. 396.

[215] Cited in Vladimir Tismaneanu. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 2012), p. 142.

[216] The events in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s took place against the backdrop of the events that occurred in Czechoslovakia only a decade or so earlier. J. F. Brown. "The East European Setting" in *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*. J. F. Brown, Pierre Hassner and Josef Joffe. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 18.

Ion Pacepa in July of 1978, the Securitate was transferred under his full subordination and control.[217]

The terror employed by the Securitate under Ceauşescu's reign changed from that employed during the Dej years.[218] The change had a lot to do with the hiring of highly educated individuals and improving the caliber of who were part of its surveillance network—the informers, residents, hosts of meeting houses (*gazde de case de întâlniri*) and hosts of 'conspiring houses' (*gazde de case conspirative*).[219] As of 1968, the Securitate began to take under its wing highly "intelligent" and "ambitious," individuals, as Securitate documents confirm.[220] Simultaneously, many deemed incompetent to fulfill the tasks given to them were fired. In total, the number of those involved in the surveillance network at the end of 1968 dropped by roughly 30 percent from the number registered at the beginning of that same year. At the end of 1968, from the total 85,042 members of the surveillance network, roughly half of them (43,498) were informers, with 29,761 collaborators, 2,296 residents and 320 hosts of meeting houses.[221]

It is also around this time, Elis Neagoe-Pleşa points out, that the 'collaborator' was introduced as a "newly established category,"[222] and given "specific tasks" (*sarcini specifice*) both domestically and abroad. Such individuals were recruited after a scrupulous investigation of

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[217] Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania*, 1965-1989, p. 91.

[218] An earlier draft of the section is scheduled to first appear in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019*,* pp. 215-236.

[219] Elis Neagoe-Plesa. "Securitatea: Metode si Actiuni. 1968-Anul Reformării Agenturii Securității" [The Securitate: Methods and Activity. Year 1968—The year of Reforms of the Securitate Agency] in *Caietele CNSAS*, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2008, p. 12.

[220] Cristina Petrescu. "The Afterlife of the Securitate: On Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania," in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe*, Maria Todorova, August Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds. (New York: Central European University, 2010), p. 392.

[221] Elis Neagoe-Plesa. "Securitatea: Metode si Actiuni. 1968-Anul Reformării Agenturii Securității" [The Securitate: Methods and Activity. Year 1968—The year of Reforms of the Securitate Agency] in *Caietele CNSAS*, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2008, p. 11.

[222] *Ibid.*

their background and character. Some of the most intricate tasks were assigned to collaborators. They were selected based on the following key criteria: "[ethnically] Romanian, from urban settings (*orăşean*), preferably an intellectual [holding at least a bachelor's degree], knowledgeable of at least one foreign language and motivated by patriotic sentiments in relation with the Securitate."[223]

The members of the surveillance network were employed to gain access to the most intimate aspects of one's life, such as one's friendships, family dynamics, and life in the workplace. The Piteşti experiment became, to a certain extent, a nation-wide phenomenon in the years following Ceauşescu's coming in power, a reality which Petrescu referred to as the "Piteşti syndrome."[224] The fear of being watched, followed, and spied on, and the "idea that the secret police was the most powerful organization in the country acting on its own and in control of everything, induced the majority of the population into submission."[225] As a result, people lost trust in each other. They lost trust in the society in which they lived. They became disillusioned with the regime as well and the empty promises it made to its people through its catchy slogans, propaganda materials, state-censored films, books and educational material with which it trained its younger generations in the hope of making them the citizens it desired to have.

This collective disillusion echoes the writings of the famous Czech dissident Vaclav Havel, who in his philosophical manifesto "Power of the Powerless" addresses, among other subjects, that of the power of communist ideology on the people trapped in a system which he

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[223] Elis Neagoe-Plesa. "Securitatea: Metode si Actiuni. 1968-Anul Reformării Agenturii Securităţii" [The Securitate: Methods and Activity. Year 1968—The year of Reforms of the Securitate Agency] in *Caietele CNSAS*, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2008, pp. 12-13.

[224] Cited in Monica Ciobanu. "Post-Communist Transitional Justice at 25: Unresolved Dilemmas" in *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series*, Vol. 16 (2014) 2, p. 132.

[225] Cristina Petrescu. "The Afterlife of the Securitate: On Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania," p. 391.

describes as "post-totalitarian," for lack of a more "precise term".[226] The Marxist ideology that originally served as the guiding torch towards communism now became the very source behind a defunct regime's legitimacy.[227] Whereas ideology may have offered some the "illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality,"[228] to quote Havel once again, for many, loyalty to the Party's ideals was not the reason why they agreed to collaborate with the secret police.

"Under Ceaușescu" as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue "there was indeed an elaborate ideology…normally associated with sultanism,"[229] adherence to which implied the following key principles: "focus on collective property, the vanguard role of the party and the articulation of utopian goals."[230] In later years of communism the enthusiasm for and loyalty to Communist Party's ideology dissipated among Romanians. As Daniel Chirot put it, "those who had hope during the 1940s and 1950s, were replaced by those who had had never hope and who had grown up knowing that everything was a lie."[231]

At the same time, in order for the regime to become efficient in its ability to control its population while simultaneously reducing the overt violence it once inflicted under the Dej, it

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[226] Cited in Matt Killingsworth. "Lustration after Totalitarianism: Poland's Attempt to Reconcile with its Communist Past", p. 277. The full version of Havel's "The Power of the Powerless" is available at http://vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val=2_aj_eseje.html&typ=HTM, last accessed on May 1, 2018.

[227] Matt Killingsworth. "Lustration after Totalitarianism: Poland's Attempt to Reconcile with its Communist Past", p. 277.

[228] Vaclav Havel. "The Power of the Powerless", available at http://vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val =2_aj_eseje.html&typ=HTM, last accessed on February 1, 2019.

[229] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan describe modern non-democratic regimes as following: authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism and sultanism. In addition, they identify three types of post-totalitarian regimes: early post-totalitarianism, frozen post-totalitarianism and mature totalitarianism. Todd Landman. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 161. Graeme Gill defines sultanism as following: "Where the president is virtually unconstrained by opposition forces or the parliament, and elections and the parliament are a figleaf covering personal rule. Such rule may extend to a form of patrimonialism whereby the president uses the state and its resources as his own property. There are serious deficiencies in the protection of rights." Graeme Gill. *Democracy and Post-Communism: Political Change in the Post-Communist World* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4.

[230] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 344.

[231] Daniel Chirot. "What Happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?" in *The Revolutions of 1989*. Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed. (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 36.

needed the help of the intellectuals and the sophisticated, with an impressive academic background and impressive acumen. The regime needed those who read and knew a few languages. Some, perhaps, deep down even thought favorably of the West. For the regime to control its people in a seemingly more civilized manner, it needed more sophisticated methods of control. It thus needed the help of those who had the level of academic preparation and education that was remnant of the bourgeois society the regime ironically sought to eradicate. In order for the beating (*bătaie*) to cease to be implemented, to use once again Securitate language, it needed more sophisticated minds to work for the secret police, behind neatly organized desks. Surveillance, in particular the practice of *dossierveillance*, a term I introduce and discuss in chapter 3, became a central role of collaborators in furthering the work of the Securitate. *Dossierveillance*, as I show in chapter, depended heavily on the *psuchegraphic* work done on those whom the Securitate sought to target for recruitment. Chapter 2 and 3 seek to elucidate on how these mechanisms were employed to gain new recruits and maintain them as active informers of the Securitate's surveillance network.

Chapter 2: Priming the Informer: from *bătaie* to doing *psuchegraphic* work[232]

Introduction

As early as 1969-1970, Securitate officers began reading the Romanian version of *L'actuelle guerre secrete* (1967), published in 1969 for internal use as *Războiul din Umbră* [The War from the Shadow].[233] Although the Romanian title does not fully do justice to the original French version, it offers insight into the way the Securitate saw espionage on its enemies—a hazy operation, arcane and dark. Jacques Bergier, a member of the French resistance and a former spy, had written it in 1967 with Pierre Nord (pseudonym for André Brouillard), the author of more than seventy books, the majority of which are spy novels.[234] "The bureau of education (*direcția învățământ*) [of the Securitate]," the preface of *Războiul din Umbră* indicates, "decided to select from the respective book, in regards to publication, everything it considered useful to the Securitate personnel."[235]

A footnote and a few lines in this instructive material about the history and methods of espionage during the Second World War and beyond are especially conspicuous. To elaborate further, I cite below two other texts to remind the reader of the Securitate's methods of operation in the 1960s and 1950s, respectively. One is about an incident that took place in a Securitate office, per the testimony provided by a Securitate officer about one of his colleagues' brutal

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[232] This chapter is an extended version of the essay Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (Summer 2019) (*forthcoming)*.

[233] See figure 6 for the book cover of the Romanian translation of this book.

[234] Franz. G. Blaha. "Detective/Mystery/Spy Fiction" in *Handbook of French Popular Culture*. Pierre L. Horn ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). Pp. 47-48.

[235] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D0017448, Vol. 1,P14, p.5.

techniques of interrogation. The other fragment mentioned below is about Ion Țintaru, beaten to death in 1950 by the Securitate in its Mureș region bureau. Țintaru's story reminds one of thousands of other people who were tortured during the Dej years by the Securitate, being subject to various brutal methods of terror briefly discussed in this footnote.[236] Aurel Florian, his cellmate, survived to tell Țintaru's story. Read together, the last two excerpts help explain why the first is so strikingly different: it calls for the end of torture.

In this chapter, I refer to all the brutal methods accounted in the previous footnote via the Romanian word *bătaie* or beating, to spare the reader from further potential discomfort fuelled by the mind's capacity to imagine and even live vicariously through that which one familiarizes oneself with, while reading this chapter. The *bătaie* is what made all these torturous abuses share a commonality. Most of the torture methods employed by the Securitate during the Dej years involved some twisted variation of *bătaie*. During the Ceaușescu years, doing *psuchegraphic* work on someone replaced the *bătaie* method. The substitution came gradually, however, perhaps influenced by Securitate's exposure and perusal in the mid to late 1960s of works such as the *Războiul din Umbră,* that speak unfavorably of torture. The first of the three excerpts listed below is a case in point.

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[236] In prisons, especially, torturous methods of coercion were employed by the Securitate to interrogate and handle its targets. Some were interrogated with a live cat inside their shirt. Others were beaten with a cable on one's calves or thrown on train tracks in order to simulate suicide. Some prisoners were given food saturated with salt, while being simultaneously deprived of water. Others were shaved without water, using solely the saliva of the one doing the shaving who would spit on them. Some were beaten with whips, bats, sand bags, rubber sticks, or wood. Others were beaten with the boot over their mouths. Incidents of targets being hanged, or placed head down while being interrogated have been also registered. Others were burned with cigarette butts or with the flame of the oxyacetylene. While interrogated, some were made to hear the screams for help of their loved ones (unbeknownst to the victim that it was a recording). Others were interrogated while being dunked in mud or had their eyes exposed to strong projector lights or subject to electrical shocks. Prisoners were also placed in cells filled with rats, made to experience solitary confinement that could last months, or even years. Others were deprived of WC privileges for days at a time. *The Tismaneanu Report*, pp. 179-180.

Excerpt   **1**

Războiul din Umbră, 1969

…Torture is inefficient exactly because it makes someone talk even when one knows nothing. …Very brutal methods [of torture] were almost everywhere abandoned. …[237]

No to torture!

In any case, torture is in our era only an occupation of a few weak interrogators. It is not only odious, but also non-useful in many cases. Those who torture excuse themselves by telling that they were needing to be fast, in order to exploit information, but this is only a way to mask their sadism. The countries that had recently emerged have the disturbing inclination to employ even nowadays methods based on violence. …The police of big countries had renounced it a long time ago.[238]

Excerpt 2. derived from a 1967 *Securitate Report*

…the detained was brought to be interrogated and asked to fully undress, after which being under the threat of being shot if he does not admit his criminal activity [he] was brought to the basement of the prison's kitchen. Here, he was beaten till he began to bleed. I saw the prisoner, when after two hours of torture, was brought back barely holding himself on his feet. Some of his flesh was torn from him, and filled with blood, and he was screaming his lungs out.[239]

Excerpt 3. The testimony of Aurel Florian about Ion Țintaru, who died in 1950

When they brought him [first] for the time [in the cell] following arrest, I just had returned from an interrogation during which the nails from my left hand were removed and I had been also beaten on the testicles. He told me what was going on with him, and that of course there must have been a mistake [concerning his arrest] and that he would be soon freed. Shortly after, they brought him to be interrogated. When they brought him back, he was full of blood and one of his eyes was closed up; he had fainted. They poured water on him and threw him into the cell. I tried to care for him as much as I could. He had told me that he told them that they mistook him for someone else and was arrested by mistake, but the interrogators beat him up. After some time, they took him again [to the interrogation room]. He was stubborn and kept silent; they could not extract a word from him, except screams of pain, nothing else from him! They removed his nails; they had beaten his testicles and they inserted salt into his open wounds. Daily they were taking him; they tied his hands with cuffs...hanged him, they beat him till he fainted. It was clear he would not resist much longer. Only a little over a week passed after his arrest and his body was all a [big] wound. One night, they took him again, this time for the last time. I learned that being drunk the Securitate officers opened one of his testicles with a knife and put salt inside, and then they beat him till they murdered him. I never saw him again. A guard told me about how he died and all the suffering he had endured, who, himself, was scared of how brutal the Securitate officers were.[240]

To become more appealing to the West and stop the international protests against the human rights violations such as those encountered at Piteşti or those similar to the case of Țintaru narrated above, the Ceauşescu regime knew that it had to abandon torture as a way to quell opposition and dissent. Improving his country's international reputation especially was on top of

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[237] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D0017448, Vol. 1,P14, p. 54 (footnote).

[238] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D0017448, Vol. 1,P14, p. 58-59.

[239] Cited in *The Tismaneanu Report*, p. 179.

[240] *Ibid*, p. 180.

Ceauşescu's foreign policy agenda when Romania became a member of the United Nations, in 1968. [241]

By appeasing the West, the Ceauşescu regime had to also try to know it more: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril," writes Sun Tzu in *The Art of War*.[242] Beginning with the 1960s, the Securitate has acquired, translated and distributed for internal use instructive material and other novels about the art of espionage, produced mostly by their counterparts in the West, with this premise in mind as well. As it will be shown in this chapter, many of these books speak of exploring one's vulnerabilities as a way to get recruits. This chapter seeks to explain how the Securitate did *psuchegraphic* work on its targets in order to prime them into becoming members of surveillance network.

Defining psuchegraphy[243]

Psuchegraphy is a type of life scrutiny and rewriting that involves collecting biographical data on someone that provides sufficient clues about a person's vulnerabilities, core beliefs, character, and identity, or, to use the language of ancient Greeks, one's *psuche* (ψυχή).[244] *Psuchegraphy* is a precursor to recruitment and many individuals can be successfully manipulated by this method because it seeks to jeopardize that which is considered of most importance to a human being. This method worked in communist Romania and other parts of the world because most human

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[241] *Ibid.*

[242] Cited in Mark McNeilly. *Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare*, edition expanded. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 86.

[243] The term was first coined in Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (Summer 2019) (*forthcoming)*.

[244] The oldest known texts in which the word *psuche* (ψυχή) is first encountered are close to three thousand years old and belong to Homer. Philo, Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus, Epicurius employ this word in their writings. This word is also encountered in the Old and New Testaments. For a detailed history of this concept, see Bill Jackson. *The Psuche in Psychology and Theology.* Volume: 3 issue: 1, page(s): 3-10. December 1, 1975. [please check this reference; it looks incomplete]

beings have at least something they hold dear and important in their lives.

Another way to describe this phenomenon is to employ the French expression found in the book mentioned above, *L'actuelle guerre secrete*: "faire craquer les nerfs de l'autre."[245] In English this expression translates as 'making someone lose one's nerves.' In plain terms, doing *psuchegraphic* work on someone means trying to find out that which would make one break.

I borrow the word "work", as employed in this context, from the Securitate's own vocabulary, as employed in its files. In the Securitate files, the verb *a lucra* (to work), the adjectival form *lucrat*[246] (worked), the expression *luat in lucru*[247] (taken to be worked), or the noun *lucrare*[248] (work) are often used to indicate that someone was either processed for potential recruitment.[249] To be "worked" implied the possibility of being chiseled or modified, changed in ways that one would become useful for the regime, similarly to the way in which a carpenter may create out of a piece of wood something distinguishable to the human eye, or recreate out of an object something else, that may serve a purpose or function different from its original one.

The root *graphia,* 'record' or 'account' in Greek, in *psuchegraphy,* needs no further explanation, but the lesser known concept, *psuche*, does for its more nuanced connotation due to the various theological and philosophical interpretations offered throughout time. In defining *psuchegraphy*, I lean closer towards the Aristotelian understanding of the term *psuche*, a term

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[245] Securitate translated this book *Războiul din Umbră* [The War from the Shadow] and published in 1969, and deemed for internal use and thus not open to the general public. For the French version of this book, see, for example, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k33378766/f14.image.texteImage. Chapter 8 is entitled: *Technique de l'interrogatoire. Faire craquer les nerfs de l'autre / La seule arme, c'est le dossier / Non à la torture.* [The Method of Interrogation. Make Someone Lose One's Nerves/ The Only Weapon is the Dossier/No to Torture].

[246] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D69/84, p. 128, p. 44, p. 35, pp. 30-31, p. 7.

[247] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 68/84, p. 2.

[248] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/84 p. 184, p. 45.

[249] Cristina Plamadeala. The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" : Summer 2019 (*forthcoming).*

that, according to K. V. Wilkes is "enjoying a revival" in academic scholarship.[250] For Aristotle, the term *psuche* stands for that which makes one that which one is. Here, to note, this ancient Greek philosopher is referring to both inanimate objects and animate beings, famously claiming in his *De Anima* that an axe's *psuche* is that which makes the axe fulfill its chopping ability.[251]

Unlike the plants or animals, that possess the capacities of nutrition and reproduction, and for nutrition, reproduction and perception, respectively, humans, for Aristotle, possess, also, the ability for intellect.[252] The *psuche* of an inanimate or animate being, for Aristotle, is closely connected to the powers and capacities endowed upon them. The *psuche* of a tree would be significantly different from that of a gardener that prunes its branches every spring, making it thus impossible, if we were to use Aristotelian understanding of this term, to define this enigmatic concept as solely soul, mind, or life, and even a combination of either of them or the sum of it all. In this chapter I define this word, as it relates to humans, as what nowadays we would consider as the "self" or, to use the words of F. J. A. Hort, "that which is at once most individual and most permanent in us [humans]."[253]

Humans' *psuche* is thus their "actuality," that which entails a degree or another of interaction with one's fellow human beings.[254] "Man is a political creature, who by nature lives with others," Aristotle writes.[255] A human's *psuche* encompasses also one's actuality as how it relates to the world around, one's social interactions, in other words. One's *psuche*, according to

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[250] K.V. Wilkes. "Psuche versus the Mind" in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 109.

[251] J. L. Ackrill. "Aristotle's Definition of Psuche," in *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 163-178.

[252] Stephen Everson. "Perceptual Change and Material Change" in *Aristotle on Perception*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 56-102.

[253] Bill Jackson. *The Psuche in Psychology and Theology*. Volume: 3 issue: 1, page(s): 3-10 December 1, 1975, p. 5.

[254] Stephen Everson. "Perceptual Change and Material Change" in *Aristotle on Perception*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 64-66.

[255] K.V. Wilkes. "Psuche versus the Mind" in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 109-128.

Aristotle, would entail all the capacities and powers granted to a human being, one's identity, feelings, sentiments, and refer to that very force within humans that makes them who they are.[256]

All *psuchegraphies* are biographical in nature, but not all biographies are *psuchegraphies*. Regardless of the intent of the one writing a *psuchegraphy*, there tends to be a matching component to this *psuchegraphy* writing enterprise: the one writing the *psuchegraphy* on someone else tends to seek to want to match the person about whom the *psuchegraphy* is written with something or someone else. In the case of online dating platforms, the matching is carried out by a third-party platform that aims to match two human beings seeking human connection, after they had answered countless questions on this platform about their lives, hopes, habits, pet peeves. In the case of the Securitate officer, as it will be shown below, the purpose of writing a *psuchegraphy* on a given person may have been to match her target with the best possible conspiratorial task or spying assignment that this person could have potentially successfully delivered.

In most cases, *psuchegraphies* are written without the full knowledge and/or consent of the person in question, even if he or she may even partially contribute to the writing of one's own *psuchegraphy*, such as in the case of some social media users, for instance. Having posted snippets of their lives on their Facebook® profile, these users' data, as recent news have suggested, may have been used to create profiles in order to predict one's voting preferences in elections.[257]

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[256] Stephen Everson. "Perceptual Change and Material Change" in *Aristotle on Perception.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 64-66; and K.V. Wilkes. "Psuche versus the Mind" in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[257] See, for example, Carole Cadwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison. "How Cambridge Analytica turned Facebook® 'likes' into a lucrative political tool" in *The Guardian*. 17 March, 2018. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/17/facebook-cambridge-analytica-kogan-data-algorithm, last accessed on 20 March, 2019.

The bigger the secrecy and disguise on the process of writing a *psuchegraphy* on someone, the larger is the exploitative aim of this whole operation. *Psuchegraphies* are rarely if ever not innocuous, with the exception of cases when they are written for the purpose of introspection and self-exploration, such as personal diaries. Nowadays, the writing of what I refer to as *psuchegraphies* may require rather sophisticated technology, such as intricate computer systems and algorithms to collect, assess the data accumulated on individuals deemed as helpful in identifying one's *psuche*, or, to put in plain language, what makes him or her tick.

I have been thinking about *psuchegraphy* for several few years now, as a result of reading the novel *Trei Ceasuri În Iad* [Three Hours in Hell],[258] authored by Romanian theologian Antonie Plamadeala. To his book I owe the inspiration behind this concept. For a while, I tried to find a way to explain in a single word what *Trei Ceasuri În Iad* is about. I wanted this word to speak of violence, of destruction of one's inner self, of loss, of hopelessness and powerlessness. I wanted it to remind us of how fragile our humanity is, of how easy it may be to cross the invisible line that separates decency and goodness from perversion and evil, given the right tools of coercion— the line that many of us hope we will never cross. But most importantly, I wanted this word to give a voice to those who had experienced some form of this type of tacit violence and found it impossible to describe it, resorting to silence instead, when the writing of one's *psuchegraphy* was done in order to make one compelled to collaborate with a totalitarian regime. Plamadeala, described in the works of some scholars as a collaborator of Romania's regime during the Ceauşescu years, left his novel to speak on his behalf about this type of method of terror, even after his death.

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[258] Antonie Plamadeala. *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* [Three Hours in Hell] (Bucharest: Editura Sophia, 2013).

At the time of the writing of this chapter, Plamadeala has not been officially declared as a collaborator, a task that, as of 2008, belongs solely to the Romanian courts.[259] Unofficially, however, Plamadeala's collaboration with the secret police has been also alluded in the writings of Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu[260] and those of John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander. In Witte and Alexander's *The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics and Human Nature*, for example, the accusation of collaboration is based on the testimony offered by the Romanian Metropolitan Nicolae Corneanu, one of Plamadeala's former colleagues in the Church hierarchy, who labels Plamadeala as one of "the most active promoters of Ceauşescu's antireligious and anti-Orthodox policies."[261]

The case of Plamadeala, a former political prisoner who later became a hierarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church during the communist period and till his death in 2005, haunted me for years not necessarily because of blood ties to this man, but because of his semi-autobiographical book *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* he gave me through my father, at a very young age when my mind could not yet grapple with concepts such as the nature of human soul and essence, evil, fear, carnal and spiritual suffering, totalitarianism and earthly hell, all words I would use to provide a mini-abstract of this book. Little did I know at that time that the crux of my understanding of collaboration would come from this book, written while the young

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[259] Prior to 2008, CNSAS gave the official verdicts on collaboration. However, after this year, due to political opposition from governmental officials with a former communist past, CNSAS became primarily a repository of archives wherein researchers and members of the wider public can consult Securitate files, including their own. Lavinia Stan, *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 96; and Silviu Brucan. *Social Change in Russia and Eastern Europe: From Party Hacks to Nouveaux Riches* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 88; and Cynthia Horne. "Silent Lustration" Public Disclosures as Informal Lustration Mechanisms in Bulgaria and Romania" in *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 62, May (2015), pp. 131-144.

[260] See for example Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu. *Religion and Politics in post-Communist Romania*, p. 49.

[261] John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander. *The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics and Human Nature*- Vol. 1. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 703.

Plamadeala was a political prisoner at Jilava[262] in the 1950s, and after his release. In the 1960s, he lived in dire poverty in Bucharest and later was permitted to work as an unqualified worker (*muncitor necalificat*) after having been defrocked, expelled from his doctorate studies, and stripped of his academic credentials that would have permitted him to obtain a higher paying job. During this time, he was under Securitate's surveillance, his Securitate files from this decade attest.[263]

In this novel, Plamadeala describes his experience with the Securitate in the years 1950s-1960s. The book's main character, Adam-Ghast, through which the author cryptically narrates his story, was subject to a type terror that modified his inner identity, thus making him utterly confused. The human being under communism is "obliged to simulate to the maximum, until he gets to think that he no longer is subject to simulation, but he is authentic,"[264] the young Plamadeala wrote in a 1964 letter addressed to his friends. This type of violence is "so extreme,"

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[262] Built in 1870-1890, with 18 forts, the Jilava prison is located roughly 10 km from Romania's capital. Initially, it was designed to protect Bucharest against Ottoman invasions. Until 1907, its Fort 13 Jilava was employed as a deposit for ammunition. During the Second World War Jilava was a military prison. After 1948, it became a civil prison. During the Dej years, Jilar was employed for "transit or triage of counterrevolutionary detainees" awaiting trial or to be transferred at other prisons or labor camps. Some brought here by Securitate personnel temporary for interrogations. "Jilava" in *Dictionarul Penitenciarelor din Romania Comunista, 1945-1967* (Dictionary of the Penitentiaries in Communist Romania, 1945-1967), Andrei Muraru, Clara Mares et. al. eds (Bucharest: Polirom, 2008), pp. 352-353.

[263] See, for example, Cristina Plamadeala. "The life of Antonie Plamadeala and of his family in the decade (1944-1954) following their refuge to Romania from Bessarabia" in Cosmin Budeanca, Dalia Bathory (eds.) *Histories (Un)Spoken. Strategies of Survival and Social-Professional Integration in Political Prisoners' Families in Communist Central and Eastern Europe in the '50s and '60s*. Munster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 2017, 202-221; Cristina Plamadeala. "Viaţa Mitropolitului Antonie Plămădeală în decursul anilor 1950-1960, aşa cum a fost înfăţişată în romanul său semi-autobiografic *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* şi în scrisorile adresate familiei Ciobanu în această perioadă", [The life of Antonie Plamadeala in the 1950s-1960s, as depicted in his semi-autobiographical novel *Trei Ceasuri în Iad* and in his letters written in this period to the Ciobanu family written in these two decades] in *Marturisitori ai Ortodoxiei in timpul regimului comunist. Studii si evocari.* [Confessors of Orthodoxy during the communist regime. Studies and reflections]. Mihail-Simion Sasaujan. ed. Editura Cuvantul Vietii, the Romanian Patriarchate, 2018, 171-184; and Cristina Plamadeala."Antonie Plamadeala and the Securitate in the years 1940s-1950s" in *Archiva Moldaviae*, Volume VIII, (2016), 215-251.

[264] Antonie Plamadeala. Letter from 20 September, 1964. In T. Aioanei, *Mitropolitul Antonie Plamadeala si amintirea unei prietenii: scrisori inedite* [Metropolitan Antonie Plamadeala and the Memory of a Friendship: unpublished before letters], Vol. 1., (Sibiu: Ed. Andreiana, 2013), p. 234.

he further points out in this letter, "that you [eventually] lose your capacity to understand."[265] His novel describes what the *psuchegraphic* work can do to a human being, and, most importantly, what it feels like when subject to it. The section that follows the narration of this novel's plot explains the four-step process of how the *psuchegraphic* work was carried out, behind Securitate's desks, per the instructions provided in the Securitate manuals discussed in this chapter.

The Plot of the Novel <u>Trei Ceasuri în Iad</u>

Trei Ceasuri în Iad is about a man with three names and three identities: that of Peter Ghast and that of Anton Adam, who ends up feeling like a combination of the two—as Adam-Ghast. Peter Ghast is the identity he is told he has, according to his identification papers he received when dropped in a confused and deplorable state at the train station of the city of R. Anton Adam is the person he feels he is but has no proof of it. Throughout the whole book, its main protagonist struggles to understand himself. The word 'struggle' is an understatement here. The title of the book suggests an internal turmoil that the author equates to living in hell.

This man's sentiments, memories and feelings point towards an identity that no one, even his mother, fiancée and best friend are able to recognize him. Only the so-called crazy Carl, described by everyone in the novel as eccentric because of his audacity to be himself, does. The rest of the characters in the novel wish they could be like Carl but cannot. The city of R., a metaphor for Romania at the time of the writing of this novel, in the 1960s, is a dystopian nightmare: everyone is afraid of everyone else. They are all afraid to speak their truth.

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[265] *Ibid.* Cited also in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in communist Romania: Collaboration with the Securitate" in Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. (2018). *Making Surveillance Societies: Transnational Histories*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 215-236.

The main character is told that he underwent a life-saving brain transplant operation while fighting a war. Dr. Murnau, who carried this operation, replaced his brain with that of a history teacher by the name of Peter Ghast. After a series of humiliations faced in trying to convince his loved ones that he is indeed Anton Adam, the protagonist leaves abruptly the city of R. for the unknown, hopeless and powerless. The reader never finds out where he went. Carl goes after him, looking for answers about this man's past, and what he discovers confirms Adam-Ghast's original convictions about himself. The main protagonist of the novel was always Anton Adam and he had never had a brain surgery. He underwent, instead, such a drastic plastic surgery intervention that he became unrecognizable not only to his loved ones, but also to himself. By the end of the novel, he becomes, as the theologian suggests, a lost soul.

I borrow the word 'soul,' as used here, from the theological language employed in Plamadeala's novel as well as from that used in an informer note handed to a Securitate officer on February 9, 1961. This note, in which a man is described as a peril to the State because of "convictions and *the formation of his soul* (emphasis mine),"[266] suggests that at least some Securitate officers were not unfamiliar with, or uncomfortable to employ, this concept. The informer may have offered this note to the handler either orally or in a handwritten form, with the handler not finding it necessary to censor it by finding a secular linguistic alternative for this word in the process of transcribing and filing the note. There is, also, a possibility that the officer who transcribed the note may have decided to employ this expression in lieu of a statement synonymous to the one provided by the respective informer. This example illustrates, among

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[266] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 003415, p. 131. In Romanian: *prin insasi convingerile si formatia sa sufleteasca.* Cited also in Cristina Plamadeala. The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" : Summer 2019 (*forthcoming*).

other things, the intricacies of interpreting the Securitate files—a subject that is further discussed in a later section of this chapter.

In Plamadeala's novel, Anton Adam most likely "lost his nerves," to use the wording in the French espionage book cited at the beginning of this chapter. He underwent *psuchegraphic* work, as a result of which, his inner sense of self was altered. The translation from French to English of the respective saying, however, is somewhat problematic: in French the verb *craquer* in the expression *faire craquer les nerfs de l'autre* means to crack, to brake, to temper with by not necessarily causing extreme destruction. Doing *psuchegraphic* work on someone did not necessarily render one insane. It left one confused, however, and thus more docile, easier to manipulate and/or coerce. The next section explains how the Securitate carried out its *psuchegraphic* work on its targets. Such a method of life scrutiny and rewriting, as it will be shown next, echoes the writings on how to recruit agents and informers that the Securitate employed as instructive material about the art of espionage it had acquired from the outside, most likely through its emissaries infiltrated abroad.

How the Securitate carried out *psuchegraphic* work on its targets

"The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun" is a line from the Book Ecclesiastes 1:9. Despite the "extremely short point of view" of the writer of this biblical verse, to use the words of Harold J. Morowitz,[267] I refer to it nevertheless in order to emphasize the seemingly obvious: It was *not* the Securitate that invented the art of manipulating a person's vulnerabilities in order to make someone do what one would not be willing to do otherwise. Exploring someone's

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[267] Harold J. Morowitz. *The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 1.

vulnerabilities is innate to being human. It was of great concern even to the writers of the Genesis creation account: the serpent uses Eve's weakness to convince her to eat the forbidden fruit.

What we see in the case of the Securitate, and, especially during the Ceaușescu's regime, is a grand, widespread usage of this method of dealing, or misdealing, to be more exact, with a country's population that required a great deal of paperwork, personnel and other resources to be carried out.   What was (and perhaps continues to be) employed more sparingly in other countries, as it is suggested in the instructive materials that the Securitate took from the West in the 1960s-1970s, was employed extensively and systematically in Romania under Ceaușescu. In Ceaușescu's Romania, this method became the 'bread and butter' means of operation of the Securitate to make an ordinary human being succumb to its demands. These are the four stages of how it was done: 1) identification of potential candidates (*punctarea candidaților*); 2) study and background check of potential candidates; 3) selection of candidates; 4) recruitment of selected candidates.[268]

Step 1: identification of potential candidates (punctarea candidaților)

The term *punctarea candidaților* translates into Romanian as scoring or spotting of candidates. It means looking for potential candidates among a group and finding the ones best for the espionage task. The Romanian word *punctare*, from the Latin word *punctum* (point), comes close to the English noun pinpointing. The best candidates were pinpointed for their "personal

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[268] These stages are discussed, also, in Cristina Plamadeala. "The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy". In another Securitate manual, the protocol for recruitment entails five stages, with the last two—"establishment of concrete means of recruitment" and "recruitment"—representing essentially what the fourth stage of the recruitment protocol entitled "recruitment" entails. For simplicity's sake, we will stick with the four-stage protocol in discussing the recruitment process. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 8.

qualities, possibilities to provide information and guarantee sincere collaboration,"[269] as a Securitate manual on how to recruit informers states. At this stage, the potential candidate is under the Securitate's "gaze," to use Foucauldian language.[270] This gaze came from department chiefs, whose task was to pinpoint and identify those most likely to be up for the task[271] of "attracting to collaboration"[272] someone, to use the exact language in the respective Securitate instructive manual.

Two things must be stressed here. Firstly, at least some of those assigned to look for potential recruits, were exposed to translated literature coming from the West that mention, among other things, how recruitment of informers and agents ought to be done. Secondly, some of them were also trained with and/or read in-house produced instructive material on human psychology. A few examples are to be briefly discussed here in order to further explain the first claim. I will elaborate on the second claim in a later section of this chapter.

What the materials translated by the Securitate and derived from other countries say on how to 'pinpoint' the 'candidates'

"No one is spared of human weaknesses, but there is no domain in which these to have graver consequences and more decisive than in the realm of the secret service"[273] is a statement found in *Din Tainele Serviciilor Secrete* (1976), with the French title *Secrets des services secrets*, written in 1974 by Gert Buchheit, a controversial historian with ties to the Nazi Secret Services. Unlike the rest of the lines on the page wherein they are featured, all underlined by hand in blue ink,

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[269] ACNSAS, Fond documentar D008712, Vol. 1P14, p. 8.
[270] Michel Foucault. *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of the Medical Perception.* A. M. Sheridan Smith, trans. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973); *Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* (London, UK: Penguin, 1991).
[271] ACNSAS, Fond Documentar D008712 Vol. 1P14, p. 16.
[272] ACNSAS, Fond Documentar D008712 Vol. 1P14, p. 10.
[273] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001528, p. 7.

these ones are also marked by three exclamation points on the left side of the page and by the sign of the accolade, on the right. The reader, most likely a Securitate officer, found it worth noting it.

Especially telling in reading this work and the other translated books mentioned in this chapter are the lines that its first readers, the Securitate officers, highlighted in ink, perhaps to identify the most relevant parts of such writings, as seen through their eyes. It is the act of highlighting by hand that convinces me that these works did not leave at least some of these Securitate chiefs indifferent. Most of the texts cited in this chapter that derived from these translated works have been highlighted by hand.[274]

According to *Ce Ştim si Ce Nu Ştim Despre CIA* (1977) [What We Know And Do Not Know About the CIA], the CIA looks to find one's "Achille's heel," and for those "tempted by the intrigues and maneuvers of a clandestine life."[275] Those with "inclinations towards women or for alcohol and drugs" can also be potentially considered.[276] Translated by Vasile Elena and published in 1977, this book's initial title and origin are not divulged to reader. Its preface only mentions that it was written by "two journalists" and that it represents "an act of accusation at the address of the CIA and—*why not*?—a call to its restructuring" as a result of the Watergate scandal.[277] The same book suggests that the CIA looks for those "officially unhappy with the political [orientation] followed by their own country or those who request the help of the USA."[278]

The word in Romanian that the Securitate employed to translate the CIA's version of *punctarea candidaţilor,* the first stage of the *psuchegraphic* work according to the Securitate

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[274] See figure 6 for a series of examples.
[275] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001528, pp. 130-131.
[276] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001458, p. 132.
[277] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001458, p. 3.
[278] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001458, p. 131.

protocol, is *reperare*." [279] In English, *reperare* is somewhat synonymous to "marking" or "identifying," and thus to *punctare*, which I equate to a perverse act. In his *Pervers. Analyse d'un Concept, De Sade A Rome* (2014) [Perversion. Analysis of a Concept, From Sade to Rome], Pierre-Henri Castel equates perversion with the exploitation of one's vulnerabilities. [280] That which makes one weak and fragile is brought to the surface and further made use of, in favor of someone else and at the expense of the target, left worse off, as a result. The process of doing *psuchegraphic* work on someone is a perverse act, and so is its every stage.

"Every communist country has people that suffered as a result of the state and suffer now because of it. In such a situation a light influence will be sufficient, for a large number of individuals to consent to the practice of espionage against the regime that they do not want." [281] These are lines from the *Arta Informațiilor* (1967) [The Art of Informations], the original title of which is *The Craft of Intelligence* by Allen Dulles (1963). This CIA book that covers a wide spectrum of themes within the art of espionage was ghostwritten by several of its employees, who worked under the guidance of Howard Rowman. [282] The preface of the Romanian version has been censored, with its editors cautioning the reader of its "attempt to justify its aggressive political strategy of imperialism and to slander the socialist states." [283] "The paragraphs that contain insults and instigates [against] the socialist states, especially, were eliminated from the [translated] work," its preface further warns. [284]

In *Arta Informațiilor* (1967), for example, one is advised to recruit people based on the "possibility to obtain money," and those "who need money or have obligations that cannot pay

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[279] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001458, p. 130-131.
[280] Pierre-Henri Castel. *Pervers. Analyse d'un Concept Suivi de Sade A Rome* (Ithaque: Paris, 2014).
[281] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001472, p. 200.
[282] Jonathan M. House. *Military Intelligence, 1870-1991: A Research Guide.* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 29. *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945*, Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy, eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), p. 21.
[283] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001472, p. 3.
[284] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001472, p. 3.

back, public debts, etc."[285] "Thinking that they are incapable to find the necessary funds" these targeted people, the book further explains, look for espionage as a way out.[286] "From the list of means of recruitment, we offer priority to the method of ideological and patriotic convictions,"[287] the same book further recommends. In a similar Securitate work translated as *Creierul Serviciul Secrete* (1982) [The Brain of the Secret Service] about the life and espionage activity of Isser Harel,[288] the Securitate officers learn of Harel's insistence on having his recruits join his spying network based on convictions that did not necessitate monetary incentive.[289] "The second rule: morality,"[290] the same book informs. "Isser imposed on his subordinated puritan conceptions concerning family, sexual problems, relations between men and women."[291] The once head of Mossad wanted "his people to be correct, devoted, with strong work ethic and patriotic ideals…Selection [of recruits] was extremely severe."[292] It is likely that the Securitate used, also, as inspiration this type of literature in writing up the protocol for Step 2 of how the *psuchegraphic* work ought to be done on its own turf.

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[285] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001472, p. 202.

[286] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001472, p. 202.

[287] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D001472, p. 200.

[288] Famously known for the capturing of Adolf Eichman in Argentina in 1961, Harrel was born in Vitebsk, Russia. He had arrived in Palestine in 1930 and later joined the Jewish Settlement Police. A close confident of David Ben-Gurion, Isser became the Mossad chief in 1952. As recruits he looked for members of the Stern Gang and Irgun. Richard C. S. Trahair. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations* (Westport, CT: Greewood Press, 2004), pp. 109-110.

[289] Similar to the book on Harel is the autobiography of the Dusan "Dusko" Popov, a Serbian double agent who worked for the British intelligence, as well, during the Second World War. The Romanian title of this book is *Spion-Contraspion,* translated from Spanish by Ioan N. Dumitru n 1985. The original title of this book is *Spy/Counterspy: the Autobiography of Dusko Popov* (1974). "The book is of professional interest for the Securitate personnel, as it brings into evidence with acuity the so-called "classical" methods of the English, German, North-American and Japanese espionage, used to a certain extent by the contemporary espionage bureaus," the preface of this book states. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001466, p. 3.

[290] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001457, p. 34.

[291] *Ibid.*

[292] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001457, p. 35.

Step 2: the study and background check of potential candidates

What the materials translated by the Securitate and derived from other countries say on how to study potential candidates

Once someone was eyed for recruitment, this person had to be studied: one's life history, personality, friends, foes and life goals were under thorough scrutiny. In Securitate files, the expression *a te fixa asupa unei persoane pentru a fi luată în studiu si verificată* (to set eyes on a person for him/her to be studied and verified) indicates that one is eyed to be attracted to collaborate.[293] As much as possible, a human being was examined, as if placed under a microscope. In *Ştim si Ce Nu Ştim Despre CIA* (1977) [What We Know And Do Not Know About the CIA], the Securitate translated CIA's second stage in its recruitment protocol as *apreciere*, which in English would be synonymous to 'evaluation'. The recruiter "engages in a detailed investigation to see whether [the respective candidate] is already or will be one day capable to furnish/provide information deemed of interest," *Ce Ştim si Ce Nu Ştim Despre CIA* claims.[294] Also studied are one's biographical history and "character" (*caracter*), "opinions" (*opinii*) and habits, and "ideological, financial and psychological motivations that can incite one to engage in espionage."[295]

As it will be shown here, the Securitate officers read foreign literature on espionage that spoke the seemingly universal language in the art of espionage— that of looking closely at a human being and finding that which would make one brake. In *Din Tainele Serviciilor Secrete,* this idea is made explicit: "…recruitment is realized through the exploitation of compromising materials in which a candidate finds himself because of personal difficulties, character flaws or

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[293] The exact wording found in the Securitate file: "ne-am fixat asupra a doua persoane pentru a fi luate in studiu si verficate". ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 55.
[294] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol.1P31, p. 132.
[295] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol.1P31, p. 133.

abnormal behaviors."[296] In respect to one's "abnormal behavior," a term I borrow from the document cited above, one's homosexual orientation would fit within this category. As in the case of John Vassall,[297] for example, a person could be subject to blackmail via the usage of "compromising letters and photographs,"[298] the same translated work suggests.

"Our department (*organul*) wants to know everything about the candidate before hiring him…" is written in the *Arta Informațiilor* (1967), the translated work of the CIA's 1963 *The Craft of Intelligence*. Securitate's *Din Tainele Serviciilor Secrete* (1976), the original French title of which is *Secrets des services secrets,* provides further insight into what to look for in a human being, in this regard:

> When the employee of the secret service stops at a candidate, he has, first and foremost, to study him and verify his biography, to establish exactly where he comes from, in what circumstances he lived, with what persons he had ties to. Via discrete and systematic questions, he is obliged to find everything about a potential future agent: the origin, interests, habits, prejudices, weaknesses and that which determines him to stop to collaborate.

A similar example as the one above is found in *Rețelele Informative* (1969)'s discussion of Lavrentiy Beriia's methods of recruitment. To remind the reader, this book is the translation version of *Intelligence Networks* discussed above. Described as a "good psychologist,"[299] Beriia knew how to observe the defects and weaknesses of those around, which were for Beriia "future insurances,"[300] the respective book points out:

> [Beriia] issued with this goal in mind [for recruitment] a strictly confidential order to all NKVD services to let know the 'Headquarters' the names of all employees who knew one or more foreign languages. These lists had to be accompanied by personal files that contained detailed information about: the family situation, social

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[296] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001528, p. 17.

[297] Vassall was a clerk in the British Embassy and was recruited in 1955 by the KGB on the basis of blackmail. The KGB used photographs taken a party in which Vassall was in the company of other men. Working for the Naval Intelligence Division in London, as well as at the Office of the Civil Lord of the Admiralty and the Admiralty Military Branch, Vassall managed to provide the Soviets intelligence on the NATO and British operations. Richard C. S. Trahair. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 370; Jeffrey T. Richelson. *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 270.

[298] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001528, p. 18.

[299] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 8.

[300] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 9.

origin, development, entourage, the general way of behaving [socially] and of spending spare time. There were specific rubrics concerning moral traits of men and women, of scientists, of those with military training or who followed closely political events globally and abroad.[301] …[Beriia] carried with him a notebook where he noted in a methodological manner the obscure aspects of his comrades. He was secretly happy when he had proofs of extra-conjugal relations, homosexual relations or incidents of drunkenness.[302]

The reader is left in the dark about the origins of *Intelligence Networks*, the English translation of *Rețelele Informative* (1969). In its preface, one is told that it was written based on information put forth by the British intelligence office and that it "presents some aspects of the USSR activities of information gathering and counter-information, the way in which it was organized and carried out various Soviet spying networks in capitalist countries."[303]

Besides the biography of Beriia, from the *Rețelele Informative* the Securitate *apparatchiks* also learned how their British counterparts interpreted the stories of well-known spies of the twentieth century, such as that of double agent George Blake,[304] Harry Houghton,[305] Rudolf Abel,[306] Bruno Pontecorvo,[307] Klaus Fuchs,[308] or Kathleen Willsher,[309] among others.

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[301] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 16.

[302] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 9.

[303] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 3.

[304] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 161. George Blake was British MI 6 officer who was recruited by the Soviets during the Korean War, while being imprisoned in a North Korean prison. Because of Blake, the Soviets managed to find out about the Berlin Tunnel and the surveillance operation carried out under the streets of Berlin, by the Allies, that sought to tap into the Soviet communication system. Richard V. Valcourt and Arthur S. Hulnick. *Fixing the Spy Machine: preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 92.

[305] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 123. The KGB recruited Houghton in Warsaw after the end of the Second World War. Together with his mistress Ethel Gee (code name ASYA), who worked for the records office at Great Britain's Naval Base, they managed to provide the Soviets copies of classified documents from the Gee's workplace. After Houghton's wife tipped MI5 that her husband had an affair with Gee, he was put under surveillance by MI5 and eventually his operation with his mistress was uncovered. Richard C. S. Trahair. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations* (Westport, CT: Greewood Press, 2004), p. 87.

[306] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 101. Abel's real name was Vilyam Genrikhovich Fisher. He was born in England of parents who were Russian citizens and sympathizers of the Bolshevik Revolution. Fisher lived in the USA under the following identities: Andrei Kayotis and Emil Goldfus. Beginning with 1949, Abel led a group of agents named VOLUNTEER in the USA. The group was comprised of members such as Morris Cohen, Ted Hall and several other nuclear physicists. Richard C. S. Trahair. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 78.

[307] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 59. Pontecorvo was Italian nuclear physicist who had worked for the British, as part of the Manhattan Project in Montreal, Canada and then deflected to the Soviet Union in 1950. Adam Piette. *The Literary Cold War, 1945 to Vietnam* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p.

John Vassall's case[310] is covered extensively here as well. "He [Vassall] has all the character defects that predestinate for something like this man to became a traitor."[311] This line, highlighted in ink by hand, refers to USSR's usage of blackmail in order to threaten Vassall to expose his homosexual relationships to the British government should he refuse to collaborate.

In respect to the usage of blackmail as a method of recruitment, *Rețelele Informative* explains how Beriia undermined the reputation of Stanislaw Redens,[312] Stalin's brother-in-law by using Redens' "weakness for nice girls, with a nice figure."[313] Beriia orchestrated so that Redens, would be seemingly accidentally found in a compromising situation, in the company of a beautiful woman, "brunette with Asian features."[314] By denigrating Redens' reputation, Beriia ensured his promotion, thereby eliminating his opponent from the race for the highest seat in the NKVD hierarchy.[315] But the most telling of all the commentaries provided about Beriia in this book is perhaps found in the following sentence: "The method through which [Beriia] consolidated his ascension [in power] would serve for the Soviet agents *as a classic example in*

120; Stephen E. Atkins. *Historical Encyclopedia of Atomic Energy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 338-339.

[308] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 48. Fuchs was a German physicist who became a British citizen. Fuchs was an agent for the Soviets, providing them information concerning the nuclear bomb project undertaken by the Allies, for whom Fuchs worked during the Second World War. Stephen E. Atkins. *Historical Encyclopedia of Atomic Energy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 338-339; Kelli Peduzzi. *America in the 20th Century,* Vol. 5, Edition 2nd. (Tarrytown, NY: Marshall Cavendish, 2003), p. 599.

[309] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 32. Willsher worked for the British High Comission. She was part of a group of undercover agents who worked for the Soviets in 1946-47 at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. Richard C. S. Trahair. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 43-44.

[310] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, pp. 175-183.

[311] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001464, p. 175.

[312] Redens was Anna Alliluyeva's husband, shot in 1941 at the orders of Beriia. Stalin, although initially hesitant to declare Redens an 'enemy of the people,' later agreed to Berriia's description of Redens as such. Miklos Kun. *Stalin: An Unknown Portrait* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003), p. 227. Michael Parris. *The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), p. 8; Erik Van Ree. *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth-Century Revolutionary Patriotism* (London: Routledge Courzon, 2002), p. 123.

[313] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 9.

[314] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 9.

[315] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 9.

the recruitment work"[316] (emphasis mine). The Soviets too, like the Securitate, were not novice

in the art of how to do *psuchegraphic* work on someone in order to compel one to do that which

one may have never desired to do otherwise.

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[316] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001464, p. 10.

What the instructive materials written by the Securitate say on how to study potential candidates

The Romanian's secret police expressed, essentially, the same ideas in a series of its own manuals published in the 1970s and 1980s. In deciding whom to recruit, the police looked for two key things: specific personal traits and one's ability to provide intelligence information. In short, the Securitate cared for the candidate's character and entourage.[317]

Conducted by the Securitate officers, with the help of members of the surveillance network who had ties to the candidate,[318] this stage in the recruitment process was meant to establish the "motives" for which one would agree to collaborate, the "place, time and methods of entering into contact with the candidate for recruitment,"[319] as well as the "most suitable tactic" to recruit someone.[320] The informers employed during this stage were especially helpful in uncovering the compromising information on these potential candidates [321] while simultaneously avoiding the recruitment of "hostile elements," "dishonest" or "incapable" individuals, to use the language of the Securitate.[322] In one Securitate document, for example, the expression "exploited for information" (*explotați informativ*) is used to describe the treatment of foreign nationals recruited as informers, some of whom, the same document states, "were contacted directly, under the cover of the passport bureau."[323]

The second stage of the recruitment process entailed a thorough background check on the target, in which the officer sought to know the candidate's' "conception of and attitude towards

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[317] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712, V1, P19, p. 8.
[318] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 20.
[319] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 16.
[320] *Ibid.*
[321] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 21.
[322] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 16.
[323] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 62.

[Romania's] socio-political system." [324]   In this stage, one's "patriotic sentiments, political orientation and political discernment, the spirit of objectivity, possibilities, availabilities and capabilities to gather information of investigative interest, capacity to keep secret one's collaboration, the spirit of analysis (*sesizare*) and initiative, and other qualities deemed as relevant for collaboration" were also under evaluation. [325]   As basis for the evaluation of a candidate, the officer could have used letters of recommendation or personal dossiers previously opened on the respective person. The officer could have also consulted with the candidate's acquaintances about the person in question, [326] especially because they were able to give insight into one's relationships and family dynamics. [327]

One's "social" and "family situation" show the "true reality about a human being," [328] the same manual cited above writes. That is because the manner in which people "live, think and act … have a well determined role in defining the personality of a candidate for recruitment." [329] One's social circle, according to the same manual, must allow one "direct contact with the persons under surveillance, to discuss with them and to observe their hostile actions." [330]

The closer and more intimate the relationship with the targeted individual, the better, the same manual recommends: One's "possibilities to inform (*posibilităţi de informare*) are determined, in essence, by the trust that the candidates for recruitment have from those targeted and from the possibility of the evolution of the respective relationships" with them. [331] The larger the "sphere of possibilities of information" (*sfera posibilităţilor de informare*) one has, the more

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[324] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol. 1, P14, pp. 8-9.
[325] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol. 1, P14, pp. 8-9.
[326] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 21.
[327] *Ibid.*
[328] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 19.
[329] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 17.
[330] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712, V1, P19, p. 8.
[331] *Ibid.*

useful one becomes for the police.[332] A person is especially valuable, in this case, if the potential candidate's "function and ties that one has, through the prestige that one enjoys etc. are of interest to the one [placed] under surveillance."[333]

At this stage, the investigations into one's entourage and history were to be carried out under disguise. [334] Any interaction between Securitate officers with the candidates was camouflaged under the appearance of normal human interactions, mundane even, orchestrated so that they would not disrupt the target's daily routine. As the same manual indicates, "some feel affected (*lezați*) by observing that the Securitate is interested in them and that they can complain [about this]; others begin to worry and seek to consult diverse friends, colleagues, acquaintances, trying to find out what [this] is all about."[335]

The Securitate was investigating both the positive and the negative aspects of one's character,[336] eliminating from the list of potential candidates those with a fiery and passionate personality. That is because a person "whose intensity of reactions … are strong because of high emotional susceptibility (*emotivitate*) … must be considered less apt for [him/her] to become and informer or collaborator,"[337] the same manual points out. Instead, they were looking for people who demonstrated "sincerity, correctness, objectivity in the reproduction of facts, vigilance, courage, discretion … capacity to orient oneself, intuitiveness, self-control …tact, calmness, prudence, perseverance."[338]

For the Securitate, the ideal informer was also thus the ideal citizen. The person who was molded into an informer was, in fact, representative of ideal human characters— a paradox of the

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[332] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712, V1, P19, p. 10.
[333] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712, V1, P19, p. 9.
[334] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, pp. 22-23.
[335] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 20.
[336] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 16.
[337] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 18.
[338] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 10. See figure 3 for illustrations of theories on various body types typologies employed by Securitate agents in order to assess the personality of a human being.

system that, as it will be shown in the following chapter, sought to transform a good citizen into a traitor, by redefining betrayal as 'doing a service to society' or normalizing it under the circumstances that varied from informer to informer, case to case.

The characteristics of potential informers were assessed via the so-called "biographical sketch method" and "observation."[339] While the former method entails a through investigation of one's "personal information family, including one's psychological characteristics," the latter seeks to focus on the "examination of one's behavior in natural settings … without changing one's usual environment." [340] The "biographical sketch method" was preoccupied with establishing "the categories of motives that determine acceptance of collaboration, the method of recruitment, the place, time and methods of getting in contact with the candidate for his/her recruitment, the most fitted tactic [to be employed] in attaining this objective as well as the conspiratorial methods [to be used] in the case when the actions undertaken fail."[341] For that, the Securitate officers looked into "one's aptitude," (*aptitudine*), "temperament" (*temperament),* and "character" (*caracter*), the three "major aspects of one's personality."[342]

A 1983 Securitate manual deemed for employees of Romania's Ministry of Interior sheds light on the theoretical basis of Securitate's assessment of one's personality, temperament and aptitudes, the definitions of which are provided next.[343] Temperament, synonymous to the Romanian word *fire*, is defined in this booklet as the "formal characteristics that refer to the way

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[339] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 15.
[340] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 15. Cristina Plamadeala. "The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" : Summer 2019 *(forthcoming)*.
[341] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 16.
[342] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 16.
[343] See annex 3 for illustrations of body types topologies employed by Securitate agents.

in which the psychological life of an individual occurs," whereas one's aptitudes refers to one's "natural ability to acquire knowledge or skills, general or special."[344]

"We refer to all the characteristics of an individual, regardless whether these characteristics are physiological, purely psychological or socio-moral, with one restriction: the respective characteristics [must] have a relative stability."[345] By citing the French Philosopher Raymond Aron, the authors conclude that a "human personality, first and foremost, is a history,"[346] a complex series of traits, in which a few dominant the rest:[347]

> It would be wrong to think that by putting together a list of 30-40 traits we in fact would characterize an individual. The personality is not only the sum of traits, characteristics and relatively stable, but a specific correction of traits, in which one or several attain a dominant characteristic, whereby subordinating the rest, forming thus a specific, individual [and] unique texture. The real knowledge of the personality ultimately assumes the dominant trait(s) and that of the subordinate system… [of traits, deemed as secondary to the more pronounced ones].[348]

Is the targeted individual intelligent? Does one have good auditory and visual memory? [349] Is the respective person endowed with critical reasoning skills (*logică*), "imagination," "attention to detail," "self-control" or good "retention skills"? Such questions were to be addressed under the section "aptitude." [350] One's aptitudes are one's inborn talents that, if perfected, can render one highly skillful in a given field.[351] Similar to a favorable aptitude profile, one had to have a deemed positive enough "temperament" (*temperament*). Can someone keep being calm in stressful settings? Does she or her have "enthusiasm," "energy",

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[344] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 56.

[345] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 54.

[346] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 55.

[347] Alluding to Napoleon's low stature as a way to explain his ambitious behavior and quest for power and control the authors suggest that one's physical traits do have an impact on one's personality. In the instructions provided on how to understand personality traits, the analysis of Jungian typology of personalities, Alfred Adler's "Study of Inferiority," and the works of J. P. Guilford, H. J. Eyseneck and R. B. Cattell are referenced. The body-type temperament theories of William Herbert Sheldon are favored over those of Ernst Kretchmer, described by the authors as outdated and thus lacking full reliability in predicting one's personality type based on physical traits. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, pp. 7, 56-57, 68-69.

[348] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 58.

[349] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 17.

[350] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 17.

[351] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 56.

"resistance" and a "calm personality"? Such questions were to be explored under the "temperament" category.[352] But it was one's "character," that helped Securitate officers discern the potential motives or reasons that would have compelled one to collaborate, for it [the character] provides insight into the "hierarchy of essential motives, tendencies and aspirations of a person, as well as the possibilities of this person to translate in actions the decisions undertaken in regards to them [aspirations]."[353] Defined as "an ensemble of attitudes taken in regards to society and people,"[354] the Securitate defined one's character as the "fundamental element in deciding whether a candidate ought to be recruited or not."[355]

One thing must be stressed here: in its manuals, the Securitate *did* seek to promote the belief in the malleability of one's character and in its ability to be reformed. "The criminal is not another type of human being, but is formed differently,"[356] states a book on criminal psychology and criminogenesis published for internal use in 1983 on how to spot the "deviant"[357] aspects of one's character and make one learn how to be part of the "norm." [358] "Learning is a change in the probability of the emergence of a reaction," writes B. F. Skinner (1950)— a quote that is also cited in the same book.[359] The usage of Pavlov's dog and of Skinner's box,[360] for example, as well as of J. B. Watson's experiment concerning the acquiring of fear responses for animals

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[352] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, pp. 17-18.

[353] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 18.

[354] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 18.

[355] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, D 008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 18. Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" : Summer 2019 *(forthcoming)*.

[356] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 76.

[357] "Deviance," a 1983 Securitate instructive manual confirms, "refers to forms of behavior that distance themselves subtly (*sensibil*) and less subtly from the dominant norms—morals or legal—in a given culture and subculture. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 11.

[358] A norm is the defined as the "totality of prescriptive and prohibitive rules written or not that regulate the social behavior in a given society." Although a norm "varies in time and space, it exists in every community and has a coercive trait." ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 11.

[359] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 30.

[360] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, pp. 24-25. See figure 2.

among toddlers[361] are referenced in the same manual in order to argue for humans' ability to be reformed.[362]

Ceauşescu, who is incidentally praised in the preface of the same 1983 Securitate book discussed earlier, spoke a similar language. In August of 1983, he delivered in front of Party members and writers, artists and film directors a speech in the same line of thought: "…we need," he told them, "so that the cinematographic industry and theaters paint (*zugrăvi*) the essence and example of the human that we want to forge! Even though we have to embellish a hero, it is advisable that he becomes an example, so that the youth understands and knows that this is how they should be."[363] In that same year, most of the Romanians living beyond the Iron Curtain were experiencing what Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu called the 'Piteşti syndrome,'[364] echoing the notorious and brutal Piteşti prison experiment, discussed in chapter 1.[365] The "Piteşti syndrome," as it will be shown in chapter 3, entailed an element of tacit

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[361] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, p. 52.

[362] The discussions of Orval Hobar Mowrer's learning theories, the works of Maurice Reuchlin, of Abraham Andre Moles on human intention and action, the writings of Maurice Reuchlin, Joseph Nuttin, B. F. Skinner as well as Maslow's theory of needs are referenced in this book to argue for the human's capacity to learn and be motivated to do so, if given the right incentives. The authors find Maslow's theory on needs nonetheless outdated and refer to the writings of Romanian psychologist Catali Mamali that sought to critique Maslow in his 1981 work. Similarly, Karl Lashley's jumping stand in the study of how actions yielding a reward end up being favored and eventually chosen over those that do not yield a similar beneficial result, as well as the experiment on puppies carried out by Richard L. Solomon *et al* are discussed in the same book in order to argue for the possibility of humans to remedy their 'deviant' traits and resist the temptation of falling into the 'old ways.' Indeed, while this book mentions the works on the hereditary influences on deviance by Cesare Lombroso, Earnest A. Hooton, and William Herbert Sheldon, Nikolay P. Dubinin and Sergei L. Rubinstein, it puts significantly more emphasis on the role of one's social circumstances in developing deviant type behavior, that could be eventually amended. A. M. Rose's theory on society's expectations that are tolerated in a community and the degree of deviance manifested by a person is cited in this book to make the case for the connection between societal pressure to conform to specific standards and customs and the level of deviance exhibited by a person, capable to change. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol 1 P47, pp. 9, 11, 18, 21-23, 27-28, 41-42, 45.

[363] Cited in *The Tismaneanu Report*, p. 119.

[364] Cited in Monica Ciobanu. "Post-Communist Transitional Justice at 25: Unresolved Dilemmas" in *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series*, Vol. 16 (2014) 2, p. 132.

[365] Monica Ciobanu. "Piteşti: a project in reeducation and its post-1989 interpretation in Romania" in *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 43, Issue 5, (2015), p. 623; Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989,* pp. 29-40; and Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu. "The Canon of Remembering Romanian Communism: From Autobiographical Recollections to Collective Representations" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in*

reeducation of the wider population in the spirit of Marxist and Soviet ideology. By then, these people also lived in a climate of fear while simultaneously facing numerous scarcities. Almost all of them felt deprived of their rights to self-determination, autonomy and freedom, hence the allusion to the Piteşti prison experiment to describe life under communism during the last two decades of Romania's communism.

Step 3: selection of candidates

In the third stage of the recruitment process, the ones who were deemed as most capable for the collaborative work were selected. Prior to attempting to recruit them, the officer verified whether these individuals were "recruited or placed under surveillance by other organs of the Securitate or by the militia (*miliţie*)."[366] In Securitate files, someone who had successfully passed the first two steps of this process was described as being "in the advanced stage of recruitment" (*recrutare aflată în stadiu avansat*).[367]

At this stage, the Securitate officer was permitted to get in touch with the candidate for further investigations, wherein one could have disclosed or not his/her true identity to the candidate. The choice to reveal this information depended on a "variety of factors connected to the candidate's situation," such as one's employment and family situation, passions and interests, and on the officer's "background and by the necessity to ensure the secrecy of the pursued aim."[368] If the identity of the officer was revealed, the discussions with the candidate were not to be carried out beyond the "parameters of the preoccupations of the organs of the Securitate."[369]

Southeast Europe. Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds. (New York: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 65.
[366] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 21.
[367] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 92.
[368] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 22.
[369] *Ibid.*

In this case, as an excuse to speak to the candidate, the officer could have inquired about the "disappearance of secret documents from the institution or the firm where the candidate works" or to request a consultation related to security matters.[370]

In order to contact a candidate, the officers had to make a plan that was discussed and approved by departmental chiefs.[371] If the officers decided not to reveal their true identity, they could have presented themselves as alleged "employees of institutions in which the candidates could have had interests."[372] These officers, however, were not permitted to officially recruit the candidates or later interact with them once they were part of the surveillance network.[373] Later meetings with the candidates could have taken place under various pretexts, such as "cultural and artistic events," "sports events" or "excursions."[374]

Following these meetings, a report with the proposal to recruit a candidate (*raport cu propuneri de recrutare*) was issued if the candidate was found capable to serve as an informer.[375] This report included the following information: the aim of the recruitment and the candidate's vulnerabilities; the candidate's biographical history, marital status and employment situation; his or her abilities to provide information to the Securitate as well as the warranty that one would collaborate loyally; the way in which the recruitment took place, including the location, date and the manner in which the person was brought to the respective location. Lastly, the report provided suggestions on ways in which the respective informer could be abandoned should the need arise.[376]

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[370] *Ibid.*
[371] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 23.
[372] *Ibid.*
[373] *Ibid.*
[374] *Ibid.*
[375] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 9.
[376] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001 P19, p. 30.

The respective document was then handed for approval to the chief officer, who had the final say in both the recruitment of potential candidates and in the removal of informers from the surveillance network.[377] One's recruitment, which could have be justified in this report as either based on "patriotic sentiments," due to mutual interest and/or based on "compromising information,"[378] could have also been granted, in some instances, in lieu of pardon for one's criminal actions deemed of "reduced social peril."[379]

Step 4: recruitment

The last stage in the recruitment process entailed setting up the meeting(s) with the candidates, convincing them to collaborate and making them sign the proper documentation that formalized the recruitment.[380] Once departmental chiefs approved the report for recruitment, the potential candidate was contacted with the offer.[381] Recruitment could have occurred in one or several stages, as it was the case of priest L.B. "…I sought out to contact the Roman Catholic priest L.B.," writes a Securitate officer about his attempt to recruit him. "[L.B. is] a candidate for recruitment. It resulted that he is interested in being recruited, being necessary to do one or two more contacts [with the priest]," the same report states.[382]

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[377] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 9.

[378] *Ibid.*

[379] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 10.

[380] While Securitate used the word *apreciere* (evaluation) to translate the CIA's version of the equivalent of the third stage in the recruitment process, per the instruction provided in its 1977 translated work *Ştim si Ce Nu Ştim Despre CIA* [What We Know And Do Not Know About the CIA], it employed the word *recrutare* (recruitment) to translate the last stage of the recruitment operation. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001458, pp. 132- 133.

[381] Recruitment of foreign citizens was carried out in order to obtain information, documents, and to undertake other tasks deemed important to "uncovering, preventing and naturalization of spying activities, treason […] terrorist attacks […], economic sabotage […] propaganda" against Romania. Foreign nationals were also recruited to obtain information on other foreigners visiting Romania. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D007929, Vol. 485, p. 3-9, 11.

[382] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 72.

Like in the case of regular citizens, the recruitment of foreign nationals was carried out via the same four stages[383] and based on the same key motives: political convictions, material interests as well as compromising materials that could be used against the target should he or she refuse to collaborate.[384] During the meetings with the candidate, the officer doing the recruitment was asked to be vigilant and attentive to the information that the candidate may have potentially disclosed.[385] This is so that the officer was not caught by surprise in the process of recruitment and no evidence or data would have surfaced unexpectedly, thereby negatively impacting the recruitment outcome.[386] The officer had to also demonstrate "perfect knowledge of the personality of the candidate for recruitment via all the data and information obtained about him at the time of study and verification."[387]

Once the analysis on the candidates was thoroughly done, the location of the meeting had to be selected. Such places could have included but were not limited to "conspiratorial houses, the house or working place of the candidate, a hotel room where he [was]… lodged temporarily."[388] While such meetings could have also been organized at the offices of the Securitate or Militia,[389] they were not permitted to take place in locations that belonged to the "[Communist] party, the U.T.C. [The Union of the Communist Youth], the executive boards of the popular councils, the justice and prosecution [ministry], military centers, unions and other big organizations (*organizații de masă*)."[390]

The same manual cited above stresses the need to choose the "most adequate methods of recruitment" tailored to fit and correspond to the lifestyle, personality, family and employment

[383] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D007929, Vol. 485, pp. 4-9.
[384] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D007929, Vol. 485, p. 11.
[385] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 24.
[386] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 26.
[387] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 2.
[388] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 26.
[389] *Ibid.*
[390] *Ibid.*

circumstances of the potential recruit, methods that would not "affect the personality" of the target.[391] The choice of the date and time of the meeting depended on the working schedule of the candidate, on "his quotidian preoccupations as well as on the volume of the problems that will be addressed" during the meeting.[392] The Securitate protocol allowed, however, for such meetings to take place while the officer walked with the candidate home from work, "with the condition that the candidate [was] … not in someone else's company."[393]

Preferably, the recruitment meeting(s) had to take place during the candidate's free time.[394] The discussion between the officer and the candidate had to give insight into the candidate's life history, family situation, employment, and "factors and events that could have had an influence on [one's] psychological development,"[395] as well as into one's "fundamental relations, attitudes towards people in general, towards work and the social values, as well towards oneself (one's appreciation of one's own qualities and defects, etc)."[396]

The conversation was to be guided so that it covered subjects that were of interest to the potential recruit.[397] During these meetings, expected to be carried out with "sincerity, mutual respect and trust," in order to create from the start conditions that allowed the potential recruits to be interested in being recruited,[398] the officer was asked to act with "tact and attentiveness," to wear proper attire and treat respectfully the candidate. Should the study on the recruit's personality suggest that the person in question enjoyed being flattered, the officer could have employed this information to his advantage in order to convince the target to collaborate, the

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[391] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 29.
[392] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P19, p. 27.
[393] *Ibid.*
[394] *Ibid.*
[395] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 23.
[396] *Ibid.*
[397] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol.001, P19, p. 33.
[398] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 19.

same guidelines indicate.[399] Here lies one of the paradoxes of the system that the Securitate set to create, yielding to what I refer in chapter 3 as the phenomenon of the *banalization of evil*: it looked for seemingly ideal, intelligent citizens in order to turn them into traitors and spies. It looked for angels to act as fallen ones; it looked for civility to eventually turn it into betrayal and distrust.

The discussion between them had to have "such a content so that the candidate himself would be convinced of the danger of the hostile activities and to get to the conclusion himself that he must to the best of his abilities contribute in the prevention of the acts that put in danger the state security." [400] In the context discussed here, the task of convincing someone to collaborate entailed a combination of "cognitive data with affective feelings, accompanied by the individual attitude in respect to the realities one perceives." [401] "The mélange of the cognitive, affective and perceptional [elements] in the structure of convincing," the same manual writes, "is so powerful that it determines the open engagement of the individual in a given activity with all his energy."[402]

In convincing someone to collaborate, the same manual offers as suggestions the possibility of focusing the discussions with the candidate on "political," "ideological" and "cultural" subjects, as well as on "debates carried out on personal topics." [403] Such debates, the Securitate believed, "open new avenues of knowing [each other] and establish a mutually pleasant engagement."[404] As methods of convincing, the same manual advises to explore one's "patriotic sentiments" and to gear the discussion in order to emphasize the need of the state for

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[399] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol.001, P19, p. 33.
[400] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol.001, P19, p. 35.
[401] ACNSAS. Documentar D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 13.
[402] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 13.
[403] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001P19, p. 32.
[404] *Ibid.*

one's collaborative work and of the importance of one's work to ensure the country's safety.[405]

During the recruitment meeting(s) the officer was also advised to obtain from the potential candidate compromising material on those whom the candidate had ties with, information about potential "hostile intentions" of those with whom the targeted individual came in contact as well as information pertaining to one's workplace that may have led to "damages to the national economy."[406] Such information could have been provided in written form, recorded on a magnetophone, or memorized and later transcribed by the officer.[407] The candidates could have also been asked to take tests or questionnaires that provided information about their memory retention abilities, political views, or opinions one may have had about the communist party and the state.[408]

At the end of their meeting(s), the officer had to furnish the candidate a few possible reasons that would help explain one's whereabouts during the time allotted for the meeting(s), should friends or family members demand an explanation. As a potential answer one could have said that he or she met an old schoolmate, had to work longer hours or "went to see a film or visited an [art] exposition."[409] Should the person targeted for recruitment prove to be not suitable for the task or demonstrate unwillingness to collaborate, the officer had to have in handy, as well, a potential plan on how to terminate the operation itself:[410] "To apply the withdrawal option means not to continue—at a given moment—discussions with the candidate," the same manual cited above states, by making sure the candidate never realized the real purpose of the discussion.[411]

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[405] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol.001, P19, p. 35.
[406] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol.001, P19, p. 33.
[407] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol.001, P19, p. 34.
[408] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001, P19, p. 32.
[409] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001P, 19, p. 27.
[410] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001, P19, p. 29.
[411] *Ibid.*

Once recruited, the newly elected recruits were asked to sign a "document of commitment to collaborate" (*angajament de colaborare*).[412] In some instances, the recruits were only asked to sign a written statement attesting that they would keep secret their collaboration with the Securitate.[413]The text of the "document of commitment to collaborate" could have been amended. In the case of the recruited residents, who were Securitate officers that were placed in the reserves,[414] a paragraph was to be added about their responsibility in instructing, conducting background checks and leading the support persons under their supervision. In respect to recruiting hosts of conspiratorial houses, a few lines were added in regards to the host's commitment to serve in this capacity and honor the secrecy it required from them in working for the Securitate.[415]

Shortly after the signing of this document, the officer provided the newly recruit a few instructions on how to carry the first assigned task, stressing once again the need for the recruited individual to keep one's work with the Securitate a secret.[416] During the meeting, the officer instructed the newly recruits how to write an informative note; assigned them conspiratorial

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[412] The "document of commitment to collaborate" (*angajament de colaborare*) contained the following wording:"The undersigned (last name, first name), born at (year, month, day) in (location, district), living at (address), I engage myself to support in a secret, organized and active manner the Securitate organs in the activity that it carries out to prevent, discover and eliminate infractions aimed against state security, to combat any manifestation that affects the interests of our socialist system. In the collaboration with security organs, I agree to: put efforts in searching for information that is of interest to the state security and providing it in due time through the liaison systems that will be given to me; to fight in a consistent manner to learn the truth; to fully abide by the law; to manifest a sense of combativeness (*combativitate*) and firmness to prevent the doing of any infraction; to act in a direct and prompt way in order to stop the occurrence of actions that represent imminent danger for the state security; to manifest vigilance against the enemies of the fatherland; to manifest sincerity and objectivity in the provision of information, correctness in relation with the security organs, to not abuse in any manner this collaboration; to not divulge anything in relation with the secret activity of collaboration, regardless of the person, function, and level of family ties. Inspired by the desire to bring my full contribution to defend the revolutionary conquests of the people, I will do all that is necessary to live by this agreement." ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol 1, P14, pp. 21-22.
[413] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 10.
[414] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001, P14, p. 19.
[415] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol. 001, P14, p. 22.
[416] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol. 001, P19, p. 36.

names and set up an agreed upon time and location for their next follow-up.[417] After the meeting was over, the officer had to issue a report detailing how the recruitment took place. The respective document covered following information: the pretext employed to set up the meeting, the topics of the conversation and the conclusion reached.[418]

The inverview with Virgil Tănase about collaboration

Talking openly about one's collaboration with the Securitate is never an easy endeavor, as it will be discussed in chapter 4. In my case, however, luck struck in the process of writing this thesis, and I was able to find someone who would be willing to do so—the Romanian dissident writer Virgil Tănase, who currently resides in Paris, France. I briefly discuss his story as a dissident against the Ceauşescu's regime in the concluding chapter of this work.

On January 25 2019, I sat down with Virgil Tănase in a café in Paris and I had a frank conversation about collaboration, over a cup of green tea. Below is the transcription of that very fragment on this delicate subject:

CP: I write about collaboration. I try to explain what the Securitate did to make people collaborate with it. What do you think was taking place in the souls of these people? Why people did it?

VT: There are many things…you know…

CP: Philosophically, spiritually, what was happening inside these people?

VT: Some were cornered…(*ii strângeau cu uşa*).

CP: You mean pressured? Coerced?

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[417] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712Vol. 001, P19, p. 37.

[418] The report had to contain a proposal on how to go about in assigning the next tasks to the informer. The officer's report was then analyzed by one's superior, who had the final say on whether to include the newly recruited candidate into the surveillance network or not. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P19, p. 37.

VT: I was also cornered. In 1968, they decided to let me back in the university. [Tănase was expelled from the university in 1967 for what he described in the interview as an act of rebelliousness.] They were not giving me the document for re-matriculation (*ordin de rematriculare*)…At the same time I had received the document that requested that I show up for army duty in 1967….I went… tried to return to the university and was told that to get back to the university 'you have to collaborate with us.'

CP: How was the discussion?

VT: A gentleman…very polite.

CP: He used the word 'collaboration'?

VT: Yes…The Provost of the University of Bucharest had to sign my re-matriculation paper. Did not get the signature from him. Then I went to the military office and they told me to think about it…

CP: About collaboration…

VT: Was told that if I want the document for re-matriculation, I have to sign [the document to collaborate].

[Tănase was assigned to write informer notes on one of his university colleagues. After 1989, this colleague told him that he too was assigned to report on Tanase.]

VT: They knew everything anyways. They wanted to keep us in their hands (*să ne țină în mână*), to humiliate us, to let us know that each and everyone of us was in their hands.

CP: Like marionettes…

VT: A man, if he resists, he resists up to what he finds humanely possible and this margin (*margină*)…everyone knows it for himself. I know people in Romania who collaborated and whom I consider still honest because they resisted as much as they could resist. If I remained in Romania, and they messed with my children, I would have done anything as well [literally: I would have put my pants down] (*mi-aş fi dat pantalonii în jos*).

My findings on how some Romanians were primed for collaboration do indeed eco Tănase's

own testimony on how it all took place for some. The dialogue I had with him was the busola

that I needed in order to continue my labyrinthine road through the archives, based on which I

tell the following two stories:

Reading Securitate files: the case of Ioan and Maria[419]

It is important to differentiate the theoretical framework discussed above from praxis, in the context discussed here. The officers most likely did improvisation of their own, given the resources they had and the circumstances in which they were in at any given time. Essentially, however, the recruitment of most informers embodied the same pathway, discussed at greater length in the first part of this chapter.

In the remaining part of this chapter, I try to narrate how two individuals, whom I call here Ioan and Maria, were subject to *psuchegraphic* work by the Securitate. In order to do so, I had to consult their Securitate files. Prior to telling these individuals' stories, as told by their Securitate files, I briefly list here the key difficulties encountered in trying to tell a story based on these files.

The first challenge is the sheer volume of these files and the inability to consult all of the files on a given person. No one has ever read and will ever read all the files of the Securitate, for many were destroyed prior, during and after the 1989 Revolution. Those that were not destroyed cannot possibly be read in their full entirety because of the large volume currently stored at the Council for the Study of Securitate Archives in Bucharest and Popeşti-Leordeni, Romania. The hardest problem, however, in doing archival research understanding and interpreting these files, for here where lies the perennial struggle of the researcher: to discern the voice of the officer from that her target, of the powerful and of the weak, thereby digging for the truth hidden in these files, or getting as close as possible to it.

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[419] This section is an extended version of a section with the same title, that will appear in Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" *(forthcoming)*.

Doing archival research is a lot like a meditative journey into the unknown. The research collects bits of information that at first hand does not make much sense. In time, however, with the perusal of numerous files, what seemed like, at first hand, solely facts, signatures, hard to comprehend fragments of text, scribbles at times accompanied by the signatures who authored them, and names become part of a story. Like pieces of a puzzle, the pages in these files, often placed in a non-chronological manner, begin to gradually narrate a story that the researcher struggles to understand.

Furthermore, archival work is a bit like archaeology, in the sense of looking through old structures and relics of a past long-gone. Unlike archaeologists, however, the researcher of these files knows full well that that the system and civilization that produced these items can possibly replicate themselves in the future. The researcher's duty is thus not only descriptive but also preventive, somehow. The purpose of this thesis fits within these two categories.

Lastly, besides the linguistic difficulties one encounters in reading these files, challenges that are described in the works of the Russian Formalists and structural linguists, there are also ethical implications in reading and analyzing other people's files. Do I have the right to read these files?— I often asked myself during my first research trip at the CNSAS. What would the victims say if they knew? Some of them have already passed away. Where is their agency in all this? How do I write in an objective manner while knowing full well that I write about these people's suffering? Or, to use the words of the title of the book edited by Martin Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag, I write about "other people's pain."[420]

At last, I come to the story of these two individuals and their experience with being subject to *psuchegraphic* work. Firstly, I begin with the story of Ioan. I had modified this monk's

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[420] Hubert Zapf. "Trauma, Narrative and Ethics in Recent American Fiction" in Martin Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag. *Other People's Pain.* Martin Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag, eds. (Peter Land, 2011), pp. 145-168.

name to Ioan (Romanian for John) in order to protect his identity and chose this name in light of the title of one of the New Testament's four gospels that Ioan, a priest, most likely knew well. In the same spirit, I have assigned the names of Marcu (Romanian for Mark) and Matei (Romanian for Matthew) to the other men mentioned in Ioan's files, with Matei being the principal target of the police.

With Ioan's close ties to Marcu and Marcu's close ties to Matei, the Securitate was preparing a labyrinthine route to accumulate crucial information on Matei. Matei was the key target, but to study him, other key individuals in his social circle had to be studied first. Ioan's long time friend Marcu manifested anti-communist attitude during the Second World War and had written and published prayers against the "Bolshevik enemies without God."[421] Described in the same informer note as "dictatorial and heavy, nervous and even violent" in his leadership style,[422] Marcu was "worked" by the Securitate even prior to 1959, when the name of Ioan, his former pupil (*ucenic*) and personal assistant was highlighted in ink in one of Marcu's files.[423] The suffering of an individual may have been foreshadowed by having one's name highlighted with ink, often blue and sometimes red, in such dossiers. Like in an intriguing novel or a movie filled with suspense, a simple line in red or blue ink traced under a person's name could serve as clues that someone's life would soon hit a turn for the worse.

The phrase "being taken for study" (*luat în studiu*) in these files was a clear sign that the recruitment process on a target had entered second stage. In Ioan's case, we find this phrase in a document dating from 12 February 1960.[424] Being aware that one was "worked" by the Securitate, as it may have been the case of Ioan, was equally harmful as the actual interaction

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[421] ACNSAS. Fond documentar D003415, p. 45. Romanian: "varjmasilor (*sic*) bolşevici fără Dumnezeu."
[422] ACNSAS. Fond documentar D003415, p. 45.
[423] ACNSAS. Fond documentar D003415, p. 96, 46, 38.
[424] ACNSAS. Fond Documenar. D 003415, p. 35.

with Securitate personnel one may have had under seemingly banal pretexts. A great deal of this slow and tacit violence resulted from what I would call the 'first-blow' launched by the Securitate. This 'first blow' could have been felt from a call to be interviewed (*audiat*) at the Securitate's offices, as Ioan was,[425] from a mere suspicion of being followed by a stranger, or caused by the thought that one's friend had turned into informer and the inner conflict one felt in trying to act as if this revelation had never occurred. Like a domino effect, the internal torment that emerged from this 'first-blow' caused further internal torment on the target, without much *further* direct intervention from the Securitate. In such cases, only the victim could tell with full accuracy how agonizing and haunting this whole experience was, an experience in which Securitate could had only to make the 'first move' to win the whole 'game.' By 'winning,' I don't refer here to solely luring a human being into collaboration, but also quelling any resistance within, making him or her docile or a bystander, timid to overtly denounce the regime. Such was, very likely, the case of Ioan, whose story with the Securitate I tell here, based on this Christian Orthodox priest's Securitate files issued between the years 1959-1960.

Ioan's files suggest that the Securitate relied significantly on the informers assigned to spy on him to collect compromising material on him, with the goal of making him "dependent" (*dependent*) on the police, as the report for recruiting him states.[426] In the words of the Securitate officers who had issued this report, the police sought to identify that which "would allow us to constrain him and place him in dependence to our bureau in the process of recruitment."[427] In another similar document, one officer articulated the same idea as follows: "I think that to make him determined to collaborate with our bureau, it will be necessary to use compromising material

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[425] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, 003415, p. 11.
[426] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, p. 9.
[427] *Ibid.*

that would make him dependent on us."[428] To get him "dependent" on the police similar to the way in which the indentured servant was depended to the vassal in the Medieval era, the police had to dig deep into the Ioan's past.

The files on Ioan and on Marcu do offer as well some biographical information, such as the place of their birth, names of parents, education and places of former employment as well as personal traits.[429] One Securitate report describes Ioan as "arrogant" and "in bad relations with neighbors."[430] In another informer note, he is characterized as "very prudent and in discussion with him, if the subject arises, praises the regime." Phrases such as "his goal in life was to take care of himself and of his family;" "is very calculated and does not rush to take a decision" are found in the same informer note, in describing Marcu.[431] In yet another document, Ioan is described as a "careerist" (*careerist*) who had always "pursued his personal goals,"[432] and whose entrepreneurial skills are described in another report as that of someone who "seeks any means to accumulate material gain without much effort."[433]

"Being for 24 years all the time next to …[Marcu, Ioan] … knows all the secrets and all the intimacies of …[Marcu], knows who visited him and visits him, knows with whom …[Marcu] has relations."[434] Described in the three-page long proposal for recruitment as highly equipped to provide the most intimate details of Marcu's past, Ioan appears ideal as a informer. Yet the compromising material on Ioan is insufficient to make oblige him into service. The

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[428] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, 003415, p. 14.
[429] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, pp. 36-38; pp. 7-10.
[430] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, pp. 17-18.
[431] *Ibid.* Romanian: "este foarte prudent si in discutie cu el, daca vine vorba, lauda regimul." "scopul lui in viata a fost de ase aranja pe el si familia lui"; "este foarte calculat si nu se pripeste cand ia o hotarire."
[432] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, pp. 36-38
[433] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D003415, pp. 18-19. Romanian: "cauta pe orice cale sa-si acumuleze mijloace de existent fara eforturi fizice."
[434] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, p. 35. Romanian: "Fiind de 24 ani tot impul pe linga …[Ioan] cunoaste toate secretele si toate intimitatile lui… [Marcu], stie cine l-a vizitat sau il viziteaza, stie cu cine are legaturi…[Marcu]."

document goes on to suggest a circuitous approach, what Securitate referred to as *atragerea treptată*, which translates word per word as gradual attraction.[435] Known for his cantankerous relationships with his neighbors,[436] the Securitate sought to employ this information as a pretext to invite Ioan to their offices and require that he provide reports on his neighbors with whom he was in alleged conflict.[437] However, judging from the document confirming that Ioan was shortly after sentenced to serve a five-year term in jail for engaging in homosexual relations[438] or what another document describes as "inversion" (*inversiune*),[439] Ioan's response was likely not one suggesting that he would acquiesce to Securitate's demands. His story in the respective dossier ends abruptly with his incarceration and an injustice inflicted unto him, perhaps due to his refusal to betray a friend.

A few points must be made here about Ioan, and the *psuchegraphic* work done on Ioan and other individuals like him. Firstly, I must stress that the files granted to me make it impossible to confirm what was Ioan's word per word response to the police's proposal, as I found no corresponding document in the respective dossier. Perhaps this report was never issued, or, if it was issued, I have not yet found it at the time of the writing of this essay. Secondly, it is not to be assumed that all experienced the same type and level of punishment as Ioan did for resisting. Ioan's case narrated here occurred in the Stalinist Dej era. Should he have been approached by the Securitate with the same offer in the later decades, perhaps he would have been treated in a different manner.

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[435] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, pp. 7-10. The proposal is structured in the following three sections: the scope of recruitment (*scopul recruitării*); "information about the candidate" (*date despre candidat*); "usefulness and guarantee that the candidate corresponds to the proposed scope" (*utilitatea şi garanţia că candidatul coresponde scopului propus*).

[436] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D003415, pp. 18-19.

[437] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar, 003415, p. 11-14.

[438] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, p. 15.

[439] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, p. 16.

Thirdly, there was perhaps an indirect relationship between the level of violence endured in the process of being recruited due to inflicted *psuchegraphic* work and the interest in collaborating due to the benefits one may have been offered in return, such as travel passports, for example (Deletant 1995). Unlike the ardent anti-communist resistors who had served years in jail for their anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet activity and rhetoric, those who were motivated by financial and economic gains (Albu 2008) or what Stan refers to as "misplaced patriotism" (2013) may have had experienced little to no *psuchegraphic* work done unto them in order to convince them to collaborate. *Fourthly*, the motives for collaboration evolved over time. What may have motivated someone at the beginning may have not served as a source of motivation throughout one's collaborative work. What may have been the case of someone I shall call 'Maria', the key character in a Securitate file[440] issued in 1988, during the last year of Ceauşescu's reign. In this file, Maria's name was deliberately effaced by the CNSAS' personnel in order to protect her identity.

The file mentioning Maria reads like a report on the establishment of a conspiratorial house (*casă de gazdă* or *casă de intâlniri*[441]) in a publishing house. Like the nicknames of informers and collaborators, conspiratorial houses too had their own assigned nicknames. From this file, it is uncertain when did Maria first join the surveillance network and how her recruitment took place. Maria's motives for collaboration may have been perhaps treated as what Stan refers to as "misplaced patriotism" (2013) and thus perhaps subject to minimal *psuchegraphic* work inflicted on her. Described as "serious, well prepared professionally and

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[440] ACNSAS. IF. D000118, vol. 42.
[441] A meeting house (*casă de intâlnire*) was a house, office or space made available to the Securitate via a written contract with the owner, landlord or renter of the respective facility. It was used to arrange meetings between the Securitate officers and informers and residents belonging to the surveillance network. Those who acquiesced to this kind of arrangement were called 'hosts of the meeting houses' (*gazde de case de întâlniri*). "Index de Termeni si abrevieri cu utilizarea frecventa in Documentele Securitatii" [Index of the Terms and Abbreviations that are Frequently Used in Securitate Documents], p. 2.

politically,"[442] Maria had agreed to serve as the middleman between Securitate's appointed informers,[443] who were to be infiltrated in this *casa de gazdă* as the publishing house's "outside collaborators" stopping by "for various work related issues."[444] These informers were assigned to spy on Maria's colleagues and to report any "eventual inadequate comments,"[445] potential public display of dissatisfaction with life under communism.

Did Maria believe in Marxist and Soviet ideals in 1988, living in a defunct and moribund regime that by that year was on the verge of collapse? It is difficult to answer this question. The prosperity and equality that communism promised failed to deliver by that year to many people a decent living standard. Perhaps Maria was motivated to serve as an informer for reasons other than this report claims. Fear of losing one's job, desire for promotion and even blackmail could have been part of this untold story.

As in the case of resistors, the roles of informers with the Securitate were not static, a fact which speaks more about the enigmatic capacity of a human being to fight back and, at times, come to terms with reality, and repeat again this Sisyphian cycle of life. Through the Securitate's *psuchegraphic* work on its targets carried out on its long-assembly line of file production, the Romanian secret police assigned the three key roles of its charade to those with whom it came into contact: informers, resistors and bystanders. In this case, the latter mentioned category applied to a certain number of the Romanian population, to those who were in close contacts

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[442] *Ibid.*

[443] In this file, these informers are nicknamed as "Aura," "Nuti," "Dora", "Anna", "Barbu", "Brazu" and "Coru". ACNSAS. IF. D000118, vol. 42, p. 4. See Image 2 attached for the list of informers assigned for this *casa de gazdă*.

[444] In this context, the word "collaborator" is synonymous to being a 'professional colleague.' ACNSAS. IF. D000118, vol. 42, p. 3.

[445] I deduced this information from the "instruction note" written by a Securitate officer about another informer, given the task to spy on those working in this publishing house only a year prior to that. These informers were asked to provide reports on the individuals who may have had personal "complaints," most likely in respect to the way in which the publishing house was run, all for the scope of "prevent[ing]" "inadequate manifestations." ACNSAS. Fond Informativ. D000118, vol. 42, p. 12.

with informers and were aware of their activities with and ties to the secret police. Its *psuchegraphic* work helped the Securitate decipher who gets to be a victim and who gets to be his perpetrator in any given moment, who is sent to a psychiatric ward despite being having a sound mind and who gets to travel abroad, who gets to be in prison unjustly, as it was the case of Ioan, and who gets a much hoped-for promotion, as it was the case of Maria and of other members of the surveillance network mentioned in this chapter under their conspiratorial names.

In chapter three, I show that under Ceauşescu was that this life-altering method of terror described in this chapter was *highly* widespread because of a phenomenon that I call *dossierveillance*, to emphasize the role of documentation and technology in surveillance practices and their use for recruitment and control of its population, respectively. I also show that *dossierveillance* in Ceauşescu's Romania depended on the *psuchegraphic* work carried out to recruit its informers to work. Together, these two methods of terror made for an efficient partnership through which the Securitate managed to instill in the hearts of Romanians an overwhelming timorous feeling for the Securitate, the regime, for each other and perhaps for life itself. They also provided fertile ground for the emergence of the phenomenon of *banalization of evil* as well.

Chapter 3: From *Psuchegraphi*c Work and *Dossierveillance* to the *Banalization of Evil*

Introduction

In November 1979, the previously unimaginable took place at the Romanian Twelfth Party Congress. Constantin Pîrvulescu, a loyal Communist veteran and one of founding fathers of the Party, took the floor to speak against the re-election of Ceauşescu to the party leadership. After a brief introductory note about himself and his close to sixty years of experience with the Party, comments that were met by brief and seemingly orchestrated enthusiastic applauses from the crowd, Pîrvulescu, then in his eighties, made the following striking remark: "Why is Ceauşescu withdrawing himself from the control of the Party?" From the audience, a man responded abruptly and vociferously to his inquiry: "Not correct!" "How isn't it correct?" Pîrvulescu replied. "Ceauşescu is elected!" another voice from the crowd made itself heard loud and clear, followed shortly after by roaring screams from the whole auditorium, all in standing ovation and applauding in a crescendo manner in support of the man's refutation of Pîrvulescu's claim *vis a vis* Ceauşescu. It seems to me that all they wanted is to reduce the speaker to silence, to humiliate him even, perhaps. Not one person in the audience sought to support the poor man.

Pirvulescu's speech was detrimental to his life and future. He was ousted from the auditorium, the Party and placed under house arrest. His audacity to speak his truth were met by an overwhelming impulse to refute it from people who would have to wait for another decade before they could do what Pîrvulescu did in 1979. Watching Pîrvulescu's speech how it

unravelled, a recording of which can be found via Youtube®[446], I cannot but compare it to a political masquerade, a tragicomedy that the ancient Greeks could have written perhaps to teach us a lesson about the price a human can pay for demonstrating courage in trying times, a show with thread-less marionettes, dancing to the silent music of fear, acting by a script that they all somehow mastered without ever being given any explicit instructions on the performance expected of them.

This dreadful show at the Twelfth Party Congress described above reminds one of Hannah Arendt's reflection on the fate of humans living under totalitarian regimes: "Nothing…remains but ghostly marionettes with human faces, which all behave like the dog in Pavlov's experience."[447] "Totalitarianism was first and foremost an assault, inspired by ideology, against the integrity of the self," writes Corey Robin in reflection on Arendt's work[448] in which she equated ideology to a "moral narcotic."[449] Arendt's *On the Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and *Eichmann on Trial: A Report of the Banality of Evil* (1963) are employed substantially in this chapter in order to discuss what I refer here as the phenomenon of the *banalization of evil*— a socio-political phenomenon that can be described as both dialectical and paradoxical. This system worked because people thought that they could use the system that employed them as members of its surveillance network in their favor. Under its aegis, evil acts were executed in exchange for goods, benefits and privileges one could not obtain otherwise. Those involved— the agents and the informers—even tried, at times, to outsmart each to other, to turn the system they were part of so that it could serve the needs of those that it once victimized via the *psuchegraphic* work done on them.

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[446] For the video recording of this speech, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pb4MLKZ4z44&t=28s, last accessed on April 24, 2019.

[447] Corey Robin. *Fear. The History of a Political Idea* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 105.

[448] *Ibid*., p. 98.

[449] *Ibid.,* p. 119.

In this chapter, I show that this phenomenon was made possible due to the wide-spread application of two methods of terror employed by the Securitate: doing *psuchegraphic* work on its potential informers, a concept discussed in the previous chapter, and *dossierveillance*, which I introduce and discuss at greater length here. Together, these methods of social control, carried out in a socio-economic environment wherein people faced harsh living conditions and were deprived of their basic rights, made it possible for the phenomenon of *banalization of evil* to emerge. This chapter examines the logistics, infrastructure, and mechanisms undertaken to to manage the members of the surveillance network and the wider public, thereby providing fertile ground for this phenomenon to grow.

On political evil: banality of evil versus banalization of evil

The response of the audience to Pirvulescu's 1979 speech can be employed as a metaphor for the *banalization of evil* phenomenon discussed in this chapter, the primary symptom of which is self-automatization and embracing a group-think mentality: acting without thinking and thinking without acting, doing that which one has to do and failing to do that which one wants but is afraid to do; or simply accepting to act in a certain manner without putting much thought into the reasons why one acts the way one does. The Romanian-French absurdist playwright Eugene Ionesco's play *Rhinoceros*[450] and, namely, the way in which its characters became fanatic members of the Legionary Movement in the 1930s and ended up experiencing a Kafkaesque metamorphosis, is another helpful metaphor in this context as well.[451]

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[450] Eugene Ionesco. *Rhinoceros, and Other Plays*. Derek Prouse, trans. (New York: Grove Press, 1960), pp. 1-107.

[451] In order to describe the rise of fanaticism among Romanian intellectuals for the ideals and principles of this extreme-right movement. In this play, most of its characters experience a Kafkaesque metamorphosis, only that in this theatrical piece people change into rhinoceros and not into a giant insect. These creatures, as Matei Calinescu

The *banalization of evil* is primarily a political phenomenon, although it can have huge repercussions in every aspect of human life. As it will be shown in this chapter, unlike the *banality of evil* phenomenon discussed by Hannah Arendt in relation to Adolf Eichmann, the *banalization of evil phenomenon* in relation the way in which Securitate informers and agents interacted and carried out their work is not static at all. In fact, it is dynamic, ever changing, wherein both parties— the agent and the informer— negotiate power in order to attain what they want. While in both scenarios, the actors involved were not necessarily monsters, their actions were evil nevertheless.

Alain Wolfe defines political evil as the "willful, malevolent, and gratuitous death, destruction, and suffering inflicted upon innocent people by the leaders of the movements and states in their strategic efforts to achieve realizable objectives."[452] Political evil is also connected to the overwhelming lack of justice it creates in a given society, to "foreseeable intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing,"[453] to quote Claudia Card, which, as John Rawls argues, arise in an environment deprived of "necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation."[454] In support of Card's and Rawls' reasoning, Stuart Hampshire points out that this lack of justice in

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argues, present in a disturbing manner the "ideological contagion and the surrender of human individuality and intelligence to herdlike conformity." This collective allegiance to fascist ideology was not limited to academics, poets and writers. In Romania, the fascist Legionary movement had the support of individuals from all walks of life, from both rural and urban settings, promising its members an alluring sense of collective power and identity. This play suggests that the rise of fascism in Romania, as witnessed by the young Ionesco, exhibited subtle elements of magic to the one sensitive enough to notice: gradually people were becoming unlike their original selves. They were transforming in a radical manner, resulting in being unable to think for themselves, a reality consistent with Arendt's observation of Adolf Eichmann's "inability to think, namely to think from the standpoint of somebody else." Matei Calinescu. "Ionesco and Rhinoceros: Personal and Political Backgrounds" in *East European Politics and Societies*, Sept. 1995, Vol. 9 Issue 3, pp. 393-395. Ronald Clark. "Collective Singing in Romanian Fascism" in *Cultural and Social History: The Journal of the Social History Society*, Vol. 10, Issue. 2, 2013, p. 252. Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 49.

[452] Alain Wolfe. *Political Evil: What it is and How to Combat It?* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2011), p. 4.

[453] Cited in Peri Roberts. "Constructivism and Evil" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 48.

[454] Cited in *Ibid*, p. 47.

society fosters the perennial search for political theories to combat it. Political theories, for Hampshire, seek to absolve humanity of the political evil that is ever present in its midst.[455]

For Arendt, however, evil emerges "in connection with a *system* in which all men have become equally *superfluous* (emphasis mine),"[456] and where humans have become stripped of their "individuality" and "spontaneity,"[457] to use Mark Evans' words.[458] The usage of Arendt's reflection on the nature evil in totalitarian regimes in examining the human rights abuses and terror of communist systems is not at all a novel approach,[459] especially when parallels have been drawn between the two.[460]

Applying obediently Arendt's conclusions about the evil of Nazism to that of Communism however, would be misleading: first, because despite being both described as evil, to assume perfect resemblance between the two would be erroneous, assumption which reduces itself to "Cold War slander,"[461] to quote Martin Malia. Second, applying blindly Arendt's understanding of evil to every communist system without consideration of what made it unique would be also misleading. Although every communist system in the former Soviet-bloc region

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[455] Peri Roberts. "Constructivism and Evil," pp. 48-49.

[456] Cited in Mark Evans. "Doing Evil Justly? The Morality of Justifiable Abomination" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 128; and Richard Bernstein. "Is Evil Banal? A Misleading Question" in *Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics*, Jeffrey Katz and Thomas Keenan, eds. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 131-132. The term "radical evil" was first coined by Kant and taken by Arendt in her analysis of the Holocaust, in the *Origins of Totalitarianism.* Kriss Ravetto. *The Unmaking of Fascist Aesthetics.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 240.

[457] Mark Evans. "Doing Evil Justly? The Morality of Justifiable Abomination" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 128.

[458] Michael L. Morgan. *Beyond Auschwitz: Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 17-18.

[459] See for example, Dana R. Villa. *Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), especially chapter 1, entitled "Terror and Radical Evil," pp. 11-38; and Paul Hollander. "Revisiting the Banality of Evil: Contemporary Political Violence and the Milgram Experiments" in *Society*, January, Vol. 53, pp. 56-66.

[460] See, for example, Robert Gellately. *Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007); Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds. *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Ian Kershaw and Moshé Lewin. *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Timothy Snyder. *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

[461] Martin Malia. "Foreword" in *The Black Book of Communism*, Stephanie Courtois, et. al., trans. by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. xvi.

bore striking similarities in the terror techniques used to wipe out opposition and dissent, in the structural components of its governing apparatus, the collectivization practices or the deportations of ethnic minorities or representatives of its predecessor regimes' bourgeois class, each of them had its particularities.[462] Romania, in this case, was no exception.

Despite the numerous critiques of the philosopher's theory concerning the *banality of evil* coming from individuals of all walks of life, such Irving Howe, Mary McCarthy, Marie Syrkin, Giedeon Hausner, to name a few,[463] Arendt's concept remains an important nevertheless in the study of twentieth century totalitarian regimes. Her major insight is that of connecting the concept of 'banality' to the notion of 'evil,' thereby offering her readers a novel and arguably shocking for some explication of how evil may manifest itself in modern times. Although Arendt attributes these conclusions primarily to her study of the Nazi regime, to Adolf Eichmann, to be more specific, they can be applied, as we will discuss below, in the communist context as well.

For Arendt, Eichmann, the Nazi "desk murderer"[464] who was in charge of the deportation of Jews during the World War II, represents a novel type of criminal, unknown to mankind before the Holocaust,[465] a person whose "lack of imagination is compensated by an exaggerated sense of [Kantian][466] duty and obedience."[467] This was a criminal whose intent behind evil actions were driven by shallow ambition, guided by party rhetoric and cliché, to which Eichmann

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[462] For a comparative perspective on communist systems in Central and Eastern Europe, see, for example, *Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe*, Detlef Polack and Jan Wielgohs, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).

[463] Michael Ezra. The Eichmann Polemics: Hannah Arendt and her Critics" in *Democratya* (9), Summer 2007, pp. 141-165.

[464] Peter Baehr. *Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, and the Social Sciences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 168.

[465] David Boucher. "Banal but not Benign: Arendt on Evil," pp. 204-205; and Valerie Harouni. *Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of Thoughtlessness* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), p. 24.

[466] Herein, it refers to Kant's categorical imperative, a central concept in Kant's moral philosophical thought. Valerie Harouni. *Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of Thoughtlessness*, p. 73; John Milbank. "Darkness and Silence: Evil and the Western Legacy" in *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 11-14.

[467] Adam Morton. *On Evil* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 80.

referred to as "officialese,"[468] and which he described as "my only language."[469] He was deprived of introspection, phenomenon that Arendt explains as "inability to think from the point of view of someone else,"[470] and lack of empathy for the sorrow and pain of another human being.[471]

By linking these seemingly oxymoronic concepts, 'banality' and 'evil,' Arendt did not at all try to reduce Eichmann' level of culpability, but to only neutralize the dark, diabolic image of evil some carry in their imaginations, understanding most likely inspired by the religious depiction of the Devil, the source of all evil in the Judeo-Christian tradition. More specifically, she sought to reduce, as Karl Jaspers put it, the "satanic greatness" of evil, which she originally described as "radical" in her *Origins of Totalitarianism*. In response to her initial analysis of evil as being 'radical,' Jaspers responded as following, an answer that is believed to have shaped Arendt's later change of heart in respect to what evil is. Below is an excerpt from his response:

> I'm not altogether comfortable with your view [on evil being radical]," Jasper wrote Arendt, "because guilt that goes beyond all criminal guilt inevitably takes on a streak of "greatness"—of satanic greatness—which is, for me, inappropriate for the Nazis as all the talk about the "demonic" element in Hitler and so forth. It seems to me that we have to see these things in their total banality, in their prosaic triviality, because that's what truly characterizes them. Bacteria can cause epidemics that wipe out nations, but they remain merely bacteria.[472]

Jaspers' reflection on the behavior of bacteria, of its predictability in its vital functions, of its infinitesimal structure if examined by itself and yet of its potentiality for massive destruction if part of many living in auspicious conditions, echoes Max Weber's reflection on the dangerous emergence of the *bildungsbürgertum,* the civil servant bureaucrats with the rise of modernity.[473]

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[468] Valerie Harouni. *Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of Thoughtlessness*, p. 81.
[469] *Ibid,* 72.
[470] Hannah Arendt. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 49.
[471] Valerie Harouni. *Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of Thoughtlessness*, pp. 73, 82.
[472] Cited in *Ibid*, p. 39.
[473] Bryan S. Turner. *Max Weber: From History to Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 218.

These civil servants were, as he argues, "vested in [their]… ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with [their]… own conviction. …even if the order appear[ed] wrong to [them]…"[474] In a culture of blind obedience to higher authority the civil servant may be harmless by oneself yet ruinous if in the company of others in a similar position, following the same predetermined deleterious behavior as s/he does.

Eichmann was a civil servant whose behavior in the workplace reflected closely, as Arendt confirms, Weber's analysis above. He was a criminal with a surprisingly ordinary appearance, which the Canadian artist Leonard Cohen described at great length in his 1964 poem "All There Is to Know about Adolph Eichmann." In this poem, Cohen portrays Eichmann as an ordinary human being, both physically and intellectually, ending his poem with the following rhetorical questions that humorously reinforce this idea: "What did you expect? Talons? Oversize incisors? Green saliva? Madness?"[475] Eichmann had none of that: only a profound inability or unwillingness to consciously reflect on the consequences of his actions, which made him out of touch with the grim and disastrous reality around him, the apogee of which was embodied by the gas chambers of Auschwitz.

It is important to stress here that the case of Eichman discussed above in relation to Arendt's analysis of the banality of evil is somewhat unrepresentative of the phenomenon of the *banalization of evil*. The latter mentioned phenomenon, unlike the former, has dialectic and paradoxical traits. The *banalization of evil* described here is a social movement that can turn against itself— a game with no true winners or losers, where both players, the Securitate officers and the informers, needed each other to get ahead. This phenomenon was a 'cat and mouse'

[474] Cited in Derek Sayer. *Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber* (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 137.

[475] Cited in David Boucher. "Banal but not Benign: Arendt on Evil," pp. 204-205. For the full version of the poem, see Leonard Cohen. "All there is to Know about Adolph Eichmann," available at http://april-is.tumblr.com/post/87898894/april-13-2007-all-there-is-to-know-about-adolph, last accessed on April 2, 2019.

game wherein both players could have changed roles at any given moment and needed each other to maintain the game from which both could benefit. In both scenarios, however, the evil was inflicted by individuals that were hardly diabolic or monstruous, a key point that Arendt makes in her argument concerning Eichmann's motivations to manage the logistics involved in the deportations of innocent Jews to ghettos and extermination camps.

In the case of the Securitate, the phenomenon of the *banalization of evil* began on the top and moved slowly to the bottom, resulting into what I call a pack mentality or groupthink of those who were caught into its web. This movement's slogan, universally understood without ever having to have pronounced out loud, was something along these lines: *Because it is so widespread it may not be that bad.* "It" stands for collaboration; "that bad" is deliberately emphasized to suggest that the Securitate, through its methods of attraction, priming and then handling their collaborators managed to create the necessary slippery slope within the moral and ethical compass of its targets so that what was once perceived as unquestionably wrong— betrayal— began to be treated as something excusable and even justified as a necessary evil. Others may have even convinced themselves of the harmless nature of their work: *It's just a few details and names I write in a note to the police, what's the big deal,* they may have said to themselves to justify their actions. *If I don't do it, someone else will, so I might as well partake into this game that can help me get ahead*, they may have also told themselves. In the process, while reminiscing about the brutalities and terror their grandparents or parents experienced under Dej, some of them, perhaps, even justified their collaborative work as helping to pacify regime.

The key symptoms of this phenomenon was attempting to distance onself from one's collaborative work and/or finding oneself into a seemingly cognitively sedating state towards what one does in relation to one's clandestine active with the Securitate: not fully dormant, but

not consciously alert to one's surroundings and one's own actions that perpetuate the somber social climate that brought one to that wretched state. This is what I mean when I argue that communism destroyed the morale of a nation. By poisoning it with convictions that morally sedate the human subject, the human sets oneself on the road to self-doubt, self-abasement, and self-destruction.

As it will be shown below, to keep a nation in fear the Securitate needed, paradoxically, very few tangible things: pens, ink and paper, files, desks, chairs and offices, telephones and other surveillance-related tools. It needed people to sit at those desks and write down information per the orders of their superiors who themselves wrote down what others higher than them in the Securitate hierarchical structure told them to do. And yet magically, with *all* these seemingly trivial objects the police attained an omniscient and omnipotent aura that helped it instill immense freight in those with direct or indirect ties to the secret police.

One thing must be stressed here: most Romanians living under the Ceauşescu regime—the Securitate personnel, members of the surveillance network and regular folk—all played their part into maintaining this phenomenon, as active participants or bystanders. The former group was taught in an explicit manner how to engage in this kind phenomenon. Once deemed fit for their job as members of the surveillance network, the informers were teaching a nation to live in fear by spying on them, thereby helping create what Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu called the 'Piteşti syndrome,'[476] echoing the notorious and brutal Piteşti prison experiment, discussed in chapter 1.[477] The bystanders learned tacitly as well how to adjust to it or self-distance themselves

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[476] Cited in Monica Ciobanu. "Post-Communist Transitional Justice at 25: Unresolved Dilemmas" in *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series*, Vol. 16 (2014) 2, p. 132.

[477] Monica Ciobanu. "Piteşti: a project in reeducation and its post-1989 interpretation in Romania" in *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 43, Issue 5, (2015), p. 623; Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989,* pp. 29-40; and Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu. "The Canon of Remembering Romanian Communism: From Autobiographical Recollections to Collective Representations" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in*

from it:[478] almost no one was left unscathed.[479] As stated earlier, the category of bystanders did not apply to every Romanian, but to a certain number of individuals with close ties to informers. They were people who were aware of these informers' ties to the police yet chose to remain idle. Some of these bystanders were aware of the fact that people close to them or in their midst were victims of the Securitate, yet they failed to take a stand against it.

Inspired by Petrescu and Petrescu's work cited above, I propose here to think of Romania under Ceauşescu as a prison-like structure without the structure of a prison as we know it and of most of its individuals as prisoners without wearing any jumpsuits, made or forced to believe that (or act as if) they were free when they were not. Food was scarce. Life, for a lack of a better word, was difficult for most Romanians. Very few could have gotten out of its frontiers and the Securitate spent a great deal of effort in preventing any escapes.[480] Still, one has to imagine this

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Southeast Europe. Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds. (New York: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 65.

[478] Erwin Staub argues that s*elf-distancing* entails self-detachment, both physical and psychological, from a certain situation. As a result, that which is witnessed becomes to the observant invisible or, somehow, non-existent. In addition to the *self-distancing* mechanism, Staub suggests that people, in order to justify their complicity to a certain evil event, tend to embrace two other approaches: the *just world thinking* and *resocialization* mechanisms. The former implies that people acquiesce to that which they witnessed as these acts are learned to be seen as necessary for the greater good of the society; the latter—that people modify their thinking and actions to reflect the values of the times in which they live, learning to accept the crimes of the perpetrators as reflective of some sort of normalcy. Victoria Barnett. *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust*, p. 29.

[479] According to psychologists Bibb Latone and John Darley, bystanders undergo a series of steps in the process of deciding whether they should take action or not in a situation wherein someone is in need of assistance. First, they must take note of that which is taking place. Secondly, that which is noticed must be identified as emergency. Once recognized as such, the bystanders must discern whether they have or not any responsibility to be involved. Once the decision to be involved is taken, they must decide on the type of action. And even when some of them identified the crimes witnessed as emergency, the presence of other onlookers at the scene of these crimes may have helped "diffuse responsibility." This phenomenon is referred to as the *bystander effect*. The more people are present at a given scene wherein someone needs help, the less likely the people witnessing it will attempt to provide assistance to the respective person in need of support. John E. Roeckelein. *Dictionary of Theories, Laws, and Concepts in Psychology* (Westport, CT: Greeonwood Press, 1998), p. 86.

[480] I have encountered countless files of individuals being under surveillance for planning to escape or having ties to those who managed to escape Romania under Ceauşescu. One informer speaks in his note about his former colleague, a medical doctor managed to escape to the GDR during his studies at a university in Timişoara who created a "canal" through which tens of Romanians left the country, doing the following: "First the Romanian managed to get a passport and a visa for an excursion to Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Having arrived there, they met with this medical doctor who took them to the FGR embassy or that of Austria, requesting from them a temporary visa to enter these countries. Once in the West, the same medical doctor helped them get jobs. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 141. In another note, one finds out about a doctor's relation to his son living in

country as a place where people tried to make the best of their lives, live in dignity as much as life permitted it, while, as the saying goes, playing the hand (cards) they got. In December of 1989, its inhabitants finally revolted and tore down this prison's walls, [481] already in crumbles due to pressures domestically and abroad.

Managing, educating and spying on the Securitate personnel and members of the surveillance network[482]

An old saying—*a fish starts to rot from the head down*—is helpful in introducing here the point that the *banalization of evil* began with the Securitate and its surveillance network (*rețeaua informativă*), made of collaborators (*colaboratori*), [483] informers (*informatori*), [484] residents

France, with ties to the famous writer and Romanian dissident Paul Goma. The doctor too is suspected for waiting to leave Romania. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, pp. 129-130. In another note, an informer by the name of "Elena" provided information on a man's interest and that of his friend's desire to leave Romania. This man's lack of satisfaction with his salary and life in Romania compelled him to want to marry his friend in Germany to leave Romania legally. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 226, p. 2. Another note speaks of a man who "lately looks worried, permanently preoccupied to solve problems and personal issues [and is] extremely introverted." The informer believes it is because of his interest to leave Romania given that his wife had recently quit her job. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420 Vol. 002, p. 36.

[481] On the timeline of, and events leading up to the, 1989 December Revolution in Romania, see, for example, Alexandru Dutu. *Revoluția din decembrie 1989. Cronologie* [The 1989 December Revolution. A Chronology] (Craiova: Sitech Publishing, 2010), available at http://irrd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/cronologia2.pdf, last accessed on August 11, 2019. The revolution began in Timișoara, with local protests surrounding the authorities' decision to remove Laszlo Tokes, a Calvinist minister, from the city due to his anti-communist activity and rhetoric. The intrepid minister refused to leave the city, a decision that was supported by his followers as well as the greater Timișoara community. The protests in Timișoara in support of Tokes rapidly spread in other cities in Romania, including Bucharest. Beginning with December 17, they turned bloody and intensified shortly after Ceaușescu's last speech from the balcony from the then headquartes of Romania's communist party building. Joseph Held. *Dictionary of East European History since 1945*, p. 434. Smaranda Vultur. "Daily Life and Constraints in Communist Romania in the Late 1980s: From the Semiotics of Food to the Semiotics of Power" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe*, Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou et al., p. 178.

[482] A few paragraphs in this section have first appeared in the essay: Cristina Plamadeala. "The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (Summer 2019) (*forthcoming)*.

[483] The collaborator was recruited to provide information needed in various Securitate investigations. The collaborator could be promoted to a higher or lower level in the hierarchy of the surveillance network, in dependence of the quality and efficiency of the work s/he performed. "Index de Termeni si abrevieri cu utilizarea frecventa in Documentele Securitatii" [Index of the Terms and Abbreviations that are Frequently Used in Securitate Documents], p. 3, available at http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/arhiva/Dictionar%20termeni.pdf, last accessed on April 5, 2019.

(*rezidenți*),[485] and support persons (*persoane de sprijin*), hereinafter referred to by the name of informers. Besides the members of the surveillance network, the Securitate could have also employed official sources (*surse oficiale*), individuals working in various organizations from whom the police could have obtain information on a case by case basis, as well as trusted people (*persoane de încredere)*, who were "honest citizens, well informed, sincere, objective, and discrete," occasionally employed by the Securitate, as one of its manuals indicates.[486]

The Romanian secret police engaged in what one of its manuals describes as informative surveillance (*urmarire informativă*), operations that sought to investigate a given issue deemed as a peril to the Romanian society, or, as the same manual puts it, "with the aim of prevention of the application of the intentions or plans of hostile actions and putting an end to them prior to the rise of consequences …[on] the Security of the state."[487] In short, the secret police was on the

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[484] Working under the guidance of the assigned Securitate officer or the resident, the informer gathered information, per the request of the Securitate officer assigned to coordinate the informer's investigations. The hiring of informers took place after thorough investigation of the informers' background and biography. In the first decade following the establishment of the Securitate, informers were also classified as 'qualified' and 'unqualified,' based on their overall preparation and aptitude to carry out the tasks assigned. "Index de Termeni si abrevieri cu utilizarea frecventa in Documentele Securitatii" [Index of the Terms and Abbreviations that are Frequently Used in Securitate Documents], p. 6.

[485] The residents, often members of the Communist Party, were not involved in the recruiting process. They were in charge of managing informants, support persons (*persoane de sprijin*) and lower-level collaborators. Sometimes, the residents were undertaking some of responsibilities assigned to the Securitate liaison officer. "Index de Termeni si abrevieri cu utilizarea frecventa in Documentele Securitatii" [Index of the Terms and Abbreviations that are Frequently Used in Securitate Documents], p. 7.

[486] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P34, p. 19.

[487] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1, P13, p. 10.

look out for people, places, events pending to happen or those that had occurred.[488] It sought

information about social movements that were deemed as dangerous domestically and abroad.[489]

As it will be shown here, under Ceauşescu, the Securitate ended up creating an elaborate

and multi-level surveillance scheme, with those on top watching those on the bottom of the

hierarchy, all made to think that they were watched by those in their midst, somehow. The secret

police educated its informers and the informers helped educate those in their midst to leave in

fear. Fear was the most powerful of sentiments, through which everyone, including the

seemingly highest of the officials, lived and by which they operated.

To do this kind of work, the Securitate needed informers with "possibilities to decipher

the clandestine activity of some elements,"[490] as a Securitate document puts it. Informers were

assigned to engage in counterespionage, to infiltrate[491] directly or indirectly[492] in ports, airports,

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[488] According to a Securitate instructive material, in regards to *places*, the Securitate wanted to know the location, its neighbors, ways to get inside these place, any alarm systems installed in them, its various installations and hiding spots, whether there were animals, and whether something was planned there. In respect to *events*, it wanted to know the place, time and the way in which the event took place or was planned to take place, the people involved or suspected of involvement and witnesses. In regards to *movements*, the Securitate sought to know about manifestations that were deemed hostile to the country's domestic and international affairs, the influence of foreign radio stations may have had on people, as well as on what it seen as "national-irredentist" manifestations, and movements that it considered mystical and religious and other movements that may have caused social turmoil. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P34, pp. 22-23.
[489] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P34, pp. 22-23.
[490] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, p. 35.
[491] A 1979 Securitate manual on how to infiltrate informers provides the following instructions. The manual's title is *Infiltration. Cases and Ways of Usage of this Offensive Work to Know, Prevent, and Combat Actions Against the Security of the State* (*Infiltrarea Cazuri de Folosire a Acestei Metode Ofensive de Munca Pentru Cunoasterea, Prevenirea, si Contracararea Actiunilor Indreptate Impotriva Securitatii Statului):* "The role of the "interest" of the person under surveillance in the carrying of the infiltration can be increased if the informer manages to make himself likable, sympathized… [by the target]," the instructions in this manual state. The manual suggests that the handler should inquire firsthand the opinion of the informer about the person in whose entourage one would be infiltrated. In the case when the informer does not know of the person firsthand, he or she is briefed about his or her biography, age, profession, employment history and personality. The informer is usually not provided information about the "hostile activity" of the target in order not to bias his or her perception, or to prevent the development of "preconceived" ideas. The informer is also instructed on how to behave oneself, the "procedures that he/she must use in order to get to know or restart relations with the one under surveillance, how to ensure permanent ties with him [the target], gain his trust, taking into consideration the probable reactions of this one [the target]." The conduct of the informer, the same manual states, must reflect his/her innate personality so that the target would not become suspicious. The conduct of the informer must reflect his/her vulnerable points. "In this manner, from one case to another, the [informer] could pass as someone that could mention in discussions [with the target] about his professional activity…interested to go abroad to study…preoccupied to find a possibility to buy

embassies, and economic and cultural institutions with ties to the outside world, to spy on people or to engage in what one of its manuals refers to as "counter-information," in defending the country's "material, spiritual and human" values[493] and those who were seen as hindering them.

Securitate files, similarly to the Bolshevik files, refer to these unwanted individuals as "elements" (*elemente*),[494] people with religious, socio-cultural background, political beliefs that were deemed as unfit for much-worked-for new world order Securitate was assigned to help create. As the word itself suggests, there was nothing flattering about being called an "element." In Securitate files "elements" are described as "counter-revolutionary" (*contra-revolutionare*)[495] or "constituted of contra-revolutionary groups" (*constituite în bande contrarevolutionare*)[496], "hostile" (*ostile*), "spiteful" (*dusmanoase*),[497] "racketeer"[498] (*afacerist*), "fanatic"[499] "or

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costly medication from abroad, wishful to be …flattered, etc." The informer is taught to act in ways so that one would not instigate suspicion. The first contact with the target, the same manual writes, must be as natural as possible, in order to ensure the target is not suspicious of the informer's intentions. For that, the informer could have been sent to visit a common acquaintance where the target was also present, or the informer was to organize a party where the target could have been invited. The informer could have approached him to request a favor, bring some news to the target from a common acquaintance, organize an investigation at the target's workplace, or ask the target to join a meeting together with other people. The handler oversees the operation and ensures that the informer respected the instructions given. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1, P 21, pp. 8, 11-13, 14, 16-21.

[492] Should the person targeted be seen as more prudent, the infiltration of the informer was recommended via the help of a colleague, relative or acquaintance of the person placed under surveillance. Direct infiltration was recommended when the person under surveillance was deemed as sociable and did not "manifest an exaggerated prudence." The infiltration of an informer through the help of another informer was used when the direct infiltration was seen as impossible. Should the infiltration of an informer through the help of another take place, the real identity of the "less valuable" informer was to be revealed. The "bilateral de-conspiration" (*deconspirare bilaterală*) only was to occur in exceptional cases, and when no other "possibilities" for infiltration existed. At times, the officer him/herself was infiltrated as well, often done to "influence" the target or "change one's mind" or a given issue. In this case, the officer had to "mislead the target" or "create conditions to catch [the target] in flagrant, or do work aimed at recruiting the target." ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P21, p. 22-27.

[493] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P17, p. 13-14.

[494] P. Holquist (1997). "Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Perspective. *Journal of Modern History 69* (3), 415-450. P. Holquist. *To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia.* Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Eds). *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 110-143.

[495] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 66, p. 127.

[496] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 66, p. 100.

[497] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 66, pp. 59, 127, 102.

[498] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, p. 39.

[499] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, p. 28.

"criminal" (*criminale*)[500]. Only in very few instances did I encounter a few seemingly complementary descriptions of an "element," portrayed as "honest"[501] (*cinstit*), and in another instance as "intelligent" (*inteligent*).[502]

Who were these "elements" in the greater scheme of the Securitate's operation? Although it is likely that the Securitate agents did not believe in everything they wrote in their reports and other official documents they wrote on their targets, informers and collaborators, the documents they produced resonate with the mythic *hero's journey* structure proposed by Joseph Campbell in his *Hero with a Thousand Faces*, first published only a decade or so prior to the time when most of the files mentioned in this essay were produced. The Hero, in this case, is the Securitate; the "elements" are the obstacles the Hero has to face while the members of the surveillance network—the helpers that come to the rescue on the journey towards the new world order that the Securitate was 'called' to establish. This also suggests the life of the file represents the many-sided personality of the state via the number of writers contributing to this heroic pursuit of knowledge.

As for the 'helpers', in dependence of the quality of information provided and the efficiency of their work, the members of the informative network could have been promoted or demoted within the hierarchy of the surveillance network. But their work was far from harmless both to themselves and those about whom they submitted informative notes (*note informative*) to Securitate agents. At times, such notes disclosed some of the most intimate details of one's life. That is because the people who revealed such information to the secret police could have been the victims' teachers, university professors, lovers, childhood sweethearts, spouses or even best friends. Some informer notes and Securitate reports were based on the information provided by informers and collaborators speak about their targets' love interests (*relații sentimentale*), their lives at home (*domiciliu*) or relations with their neighbors, with whom, as one report states, a woman mentioned in the cited document "limits[ing] herself with only a hello" (*limitându-se în relații cu ei numai la salut*).[503] To note, a person's relations' with one's neighbors is a

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[500] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 66, p. 50.
[501] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D. 66, p. 113.
[502] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D. 003415, p. 60. This and the following two paragraphs first appeared in the essay Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (*forthcoming)*.
[503] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, p. 4

rather frequent theme in Securitate files. So is one's wealth status, houses or portion of land a person may have owned.[504]

Some informers were assigned to partake in physical surveillance referred to in Romanian as *filaj*[505] and to accumulate information of interest to the police on their respective targets.[506] In order for these informers to become efficient, the Securitate trained and monitored them closely. Here how it was done: *Firstly*, all informers were assigned paperwork, a tangible proof officiating their ties to the police. *Secondly,* they were instructed and evaluated. *Thirdly*, they were managed. In short, informers were under constant surveillance and/or made to believe that they were.

While they were spying on someone, their handler was spying on them through the help of another informer who too was spied on by someone else. As discussed in this chapter, all informers had a paper trail under their belt, were periodically instructed in the art of espionage and "verified," to use the language of the Securitate, as employed in its files— the three necessary ingredients necessary to drag individuals into this well planned charade.[507] In a later section of this chapter, we will briefly touch on the subject of ambition and careerism as factors fueling this phenomenon as well.

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[504] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D003415, p. 349, 366.

[505] There were several types of physical surveillance: continued surveillance (*filaj cotinuu*), carried out day and night, for five consecutive days; intermittent surveillance (*filaj cu intermitenta*), surveillance carried out with some interruptions, for seven days maximum; surveillance for a short period of time (*filaj pe momente operative*), carried out for a few hours; and surveillance for study (*filaj de studiu*). ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P34, pp. 12-13.

[506] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P17, p. 13-14.

[507] In *Ce Stim si Ce Nu Stim despre CIA* [In What we Know and Do Not Know About the CIA], the process of ongoing evaluation of an informer is translated by the Securitate as "verificare" (verification) while the educative aspect or training part of the informer is translated as "*formare*" (formation). ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D001458, pp. 136-137.

The informer and the paperwork

Once recruited, all informers received personal dossiers (*dosare personale*)[508] the existence of which they were well aware, as they did have to sign documents, as discussed in the previous chapter, confirming their agreement to collaborate.[509] Each personal dossier had an annexed folder (*mapă-anexă*)[510] that contained the totality of information produced by the respective informer, the information concerning the meetings that took place between the handler and the informer, the type of information collected and the manner in which it was provided and/or recorded.[511] One's personal dossier[512] (*dosar personal*) and annexed folder (*mapă anexă*) were

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[508] The dossier of the resident contained the list of the support persons led by the resident as well as the addresses of the locations where the meetings with these individuals took place. The dossiers of the houses meant for work (*case de lucru*) as well as the dossiers of the hosts of conspiratorial houses contained the map of the respective location, the list of individuals with access to these locations as well as the evaluations that were done on these places on an ongoing basis. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P14, p. 17.

[509] Each of the recruits obtained a file that contained their personal information: name, parents' names, ethnic identity, profession, studies, personal and work address. A section was reserved on the scope of recruitment, personal characteristics, information about family members and possibilities to provide information on various people, date of recruitment as well as the name of the officer who did the recruitment and the way in which the newly acquired person would report information to the Securitate. Each dossier contained annual reports on the surveillance activity carried out by the recruit as well as the recompense offered (monetary mostly) as well as the list of officers and residents with whom the respective informer came into contact. Each of the dossiers had a content page that indicated the pages wherein each of the sections of the dossier could have been found. The dossier contained a page with the lists of the people who were aware of the respective person's work for the Securitate and a table listing the recompenses offered along with the name and title of the officer granting the recompense. In the case of hosts of conspiratorial houses, a list of individuals, names and titles, as well as their conspiratorial names, date when they were introduced and removed as well as the reason for removal, if applicable, were also provided. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 1, P14, pp. 23-29.

[510] The hosts of conspiratorial houses were also assigned files on the house (*dosare de casa*). Pupils, students and members of the military did not receive personal files, but *fise-tip* (type folders) that were kept along with the engagement to collaborate document (*angajamentul de colaborare)* and the notes they provided during their collaborate work. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P14, p. 17.

[511] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 17.

[512] Access to these personal files of the members of the surveillance network was permitted only by those who oversaw their work and these officers' superiors. Only in exceptional cases, and with the approval of the departmental chiefs that approved the recruitment that access to these files was allowed by Securitate personal with no direct ties to the informers. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 18.

then transferred to an assigned Securitate officer, as it was the case of the informer "Emil,"[513] for example.[514]

The keeping track of information provided by members of the surveillance network was carried out via a personal file, referred to in Romanian as *fişă personală*.[515] One's *fişă personală*, which reads like a *who's who* document, provided a detailed account of one's biography, with details such as one's name, address, date and place of birth, marital status, employment and education background, as well as wealth status, [516] family history and connections, relatives domestically and abroad.[517]

The *fişă personală* of a Roman Catholic priest, for example, contains, besides his biographical information, the list of his relatives in Romania and abroad. This informer was "introduced in the surveillance network" in 1972, when he was still a pupil. "In the process of collaboration, he proved himself as a punctual and receptive to the problems discussed, manifesting seriousness and passion in resolving the tasks [assigned]."[518] Furthermore, he "ha[d] possibilities to provide information, in addition to [ties to] a wide number of people that [were]… of interest to our organs."[519]

The Securitate expected from this priest, as well as from the rest of its informers, to provide information in the shape of *informer notes* (note informative)[520] that were sent to the

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[513] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 226, p. 659.

[514] Should the informers relocated to a new home address or took on a different job, their personal files was transferred within 30 days from the move to the nearest Securitate offices where their new place of work and/or home address were. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 18.

[515] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P14, p. 19. See annex 7 for example of a *fişă personală*.

[516] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, pp. 279-280.

[517] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, pp. 10-12.

[518] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069, Vol. 084, p. 11.

[519] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069, Vol. 084, p. 11.

[520] To keep track of the informer notes and dates when they are delivered to the respective handler, a special page for this purpose was also made available in the newly formed dossier of the informer. This page had the following sections: the date of the meeting, the number of informer notes, the key points in each of the informer notes, how this information will be used, the page number of the note in the dossier (*mapa-anexa*) and a rubric on the observations provided by the recipient of the notes. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 30.

department chiefs for analysis. They oversaw the whole operation: the work of informers and that of the officers who kept an eye on them.[521]

The informer notes tended to follow the format of who did what, why, and how, and was signed by both the informer, using one's assigned conspiratorial name as well as the officer who received it.[522] They could have been provided in written form or typed by the handler during the meeting. In some cases, the meetings were registered on a tape-recorder and later typewritten.[523] While the note was delivered, the officer could have asked further questions and details regarding the information provided to ensure all information was collected and nothing was remiss.

In regards to the conspiratorial assigned to informers and other members of the surveillance network, such names were often provided at the bottom of their notes within quotation marks, with seemingly no specific rule in the way in which these names were picked. The gender of the informer, however, tended to be respected. Someone given the name of "Maria" most likely was a woman and someone named "Mihai"[524]— a man. While some of these *conspiratorial* names, such as "Jean,"[525] "Wilhelm,"[526] "Buick"[527], "Adolf,"[528] "Ludovic"[529] or "Coleman"[530] are Western sounding, a significant number of them represent more widely used Romanian forenames and surnames, such as "Andrei"[531], "Petrescu,"[532] or "Radu,"[533] with a few

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[521] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 30.
[522] On the left hand side of the note one also wrote the name of the conspiratorial house or the place where the note was taken, and the date when it was written. On the bottom of the note, the officer offered a summary of the key ideas of the note, conclusions, next steps assigned and other observations. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 30.
[523] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 27.
[524] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/ 43, p. 1.
[525] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/ 43, p. 8.
[526] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/43, p. 3.
[527] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/ 43, p. 8.
[528] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/43, p. 1.
[529] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/ 43, p. 2.
[530] *Ibid.*
[531] *Ibid.*

of them even sounding rather endearing, representing the diminutive version of first names often used for children, such as "Costel" and "Mitică."[534] Like in Spanish, French or Russian, in Romanian the diminutive component of a word is added to the word's root as a suffix. But among all the conspiratorial I have encountered in my archival research thus far, one of them— "Kiss", written in English as indicated and not in its Romanian form (*sărut*)[535]—stands out for its sentimental connotation. Even in Securitate files, one's longing for romance and human connection or, perhaps, sense of humour, was seemingly not dead. I must point out, however, that Kiss is also a common Hungarian last name. Thus, it is impossible to know which linguistic interpretation of this conspiratorial name the respective informer undertook. Perhaps it was both; or maybe solely the latter, an example that illustrates, among other things, how difficult it is to discern and interpret these files and the intentions of those mentioned in them.[536]

In their notes,[537] informers too, like the handlers who oversaw their work, were able to provide *psuchegraphic* profiles on their targets, perhaps because of the instructions some of them have received on how to do so. Take, for example, the note written by "Cecille" about the person she was spying on: "In relation to [XX], from the discussion that I had with him I concluded that he is an introvert (*închis*), thinks of himself as superior, in the sense that he knows a lot about life and the world. He told me that he has friends in the USA and that they wait for him [to come to the USA] anytime."[538] Another note provides a list of books deemed as subversive and that offer propaganda against socialism and Romania, such as *Fleuve Noir*, John Mariotti's *Chinese*

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[532] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/84, p. 24.

[533] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/ 43, p. 8.

[534] *Ibid.*

[535] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/84, p. 51; ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/43, p. 3.

[536] This paragraph first appeared in the essay Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (Summer 2019) (*forthcoming).*

[537] Informers were asked to refrain from writing their notes in places other than the meeting place. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 29.

[538] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 124.

Conspiracy, *Dossier Kennedy* and *Le Bal de la Comtesse Adler,* both authored by Gérard de Villiers.[539] Many notes I had encountered in the files consulted speak about people's intentions to escape, such as that of a woman who "intends to go to RFG and not return in the country, following which to also bring her husband,"[540] of that of a man seeking "embark on a ship with the scope of staying permanently abroad; "[541] or that of on a medical assistant who in 1983 left for 30 days with his wife in Italy and failed to return.[542]

A few notes give a glimpse about what it was like to live in Romania in the 1980s such as this one, written by informer "Georgescu" in 1987, in which he writes about on a man who is "unhappy that he has no heating, waits in queues hours at a time and cannot buy anything."[543] Another note reports on a Catholic official from the Vatican, who, in his October 1982 visit in Romania, spoke about the rumors that "there is real a lack of foodstuffs… [such as] meat, oil, sugar, flour," in Romania."[544] Indeed, both statements were unfortunately right.

Other notes, however, read like informative exposés: Informer "Stefanescu" writes about his October 1987 visit at Paltiniş, philosopher Constantin Noica's place, with whom the informer had "a long visit."[545] "Stefanescu" tried to change Noica's "misleading ideas" in regards to Transylvania, alluding to the philosopher's (rightful) belief in this region's close ties to the Hungarian culture and identity.[546] This note also mentions the well-known American historian Keith Hitchins, who sent Noica an invitation to attend a symposium in Budapest and Katherine Verdery, who was in Romania at that time doing field research as part of her doctoral work.

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[539] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 216.
[540] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 237.
[541] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 370.
[542] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 226, p. 73.
[543] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 239.
[544] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 136.
[545] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420, Vol. 002, p. 180.
[546] *Ibid.*

Decades later, in 2018, to be more exact, Verdery released an insightful book concerning her analysis of her own Securitate file, tellingly entitled *My Life as a Spy*. As she points out in her book, while living in Romania during the Ceauşescu decades she was secretly photographed by the Securitate while in her room, in her undergarments. Incidentally, this picture is featured on this book's cover[547]—a yet another symbol of how invasively far the Securitate officers and its surveillance network were willing to go to know someone and create a *psuchegraphic* profile on them, making the target feel naked spiritually, emotionally, cognitively, and physically even, as it was Verdery's case.

Verdery's 2,781-page file, produced while she conducted ethnographic research in communist Romania starting as early as the 1970s, depicts her as a threat to the Romanian state. "Nothing compares with the reading of your own Securitate file. It makes you question who you are really," says Verdery in a recent interview provided in Romanian to Otilia Andrei. "Page by page, all your activities and motives are subject to a reading undertaken from a different point of view, chained into a logic different from everything you recognize."[548] Under the "logic of totalitarianism," as Juan Mendez argues, human actions "may have been morally reprehensible but not necessarily criminal when they were committed."[549] Often during the communist period, as Romanian writer Nicolae Steinhardt, formerly a political prisoner in Romania's communist prisons, points out, "you [were]...not accused [by the communist regime] for what you have done, but for who you [were]."[550] Allegations, according to Verdery, often "evolved over time."

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[547] See annex 1 for the book cover.

[548] Katherine Verdery. Interview with Otilia Andrei entitled "Cum te simti sa fii spionat. Katherine Verdery cauta raspunsuri in cartea "Viata mea ca spiona." [How do you feel when you are spied on. Katherine Verdery seeks foranswers in her book *My Life as a Spy*" 6 July 2018. Available at https://adevarul.ro/cultura/carti/cum-simti-spionata-katherine-verdery-cauta-raspunsuri-cartea-viata-spioana-1_5b3f492bdf52022f75eb49c6/index.html, last accessed on April 17, 2019.

[549] Juan E Mendez. "In Defense of Transitional Justice" in *Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies*, p. 7.

[550] Cited in Cristina Vatulescu. *Police Aesthetics: Literature, Film, and the Secret Police in Soviet Times*

In Verdery's case, for example, she was suspected of being a CIA agent while she conducted her research in Romania.[551]

The Romanian philosopher and former political prisoner Constantin Noica mentioned in the informer same note discussed above had an ambiguous relation with the Securitate. As Securitate documents reveal, Noica served as a collaborator while overtly professing cultural resistance by being the leader of this school, comprised of some of the finest minds of Romania of that time, who were convening periodically in the 1980s in a reclusive dwelling in the Romanian mountains of Transylvania to read and discuss various philosophical works by Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. Having signed an agreement to collaborate with the Securitate shortly prior to his release from prison in the 1960s, some scholars believe that it was that very agreement that permitted Noica to organize such intellectual activities, under the façade of apparent tolerance from the part of the Securitate for such literary gatherings.[552]

The case of Noica, whose funeral eulogy was delivered by Antonie Plamadeala (mentioned in chapter 2) on December 6 1987,[553] reminds one of the Ketman in Czesław Miłosz's *The Captive Mind*. This is a term he appropriated from the Islamic legislation (from *kitman*) that permits one to hide one's support for a religious minority group subjected to discriminatory treatment. In a communist context, the actions of Miłosz's Ketman did not reflect their thoughts and feelings, having adjusted to the regime's requirements while simultaneously maintaining within what Miłosz describes as an "autonomy of a free thinker—or at any rate a

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 183. This quote is also cited in Katherine Verdery. *Secrets and Truth* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 54.

[551] Katherine Verdery. *Secrets and Truth*, p. 54. This paragraph first appeared in the essay Cristina Plamadeala. "The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (*forthcoming*).

[552] Turcescu, L. & Stan, L. "Collaboration and resistance: Some definitional difficulties." in L. Stan & L. Turcescu (Eds.) *Justice, Memory and Redress in Romania: New Insights.* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), pp. 24-44.

[553] The eulogy is available online, at http://www.dspace.bjastrasibiu.ro/bitstream/123456789/231/1/012. Plamadeala.pdf, last accessed on July 9, 2019.

thinker who has freely chosen to subordinate himself to the ideas and dictates of others."[554] It is possible that the Ketman in Noica may have worked on both fronts, with "Lady Philosophy," to use Boethius' language in his *Consolations of Philosophy*, serving as the artful mediator between the two.[555]

Instructing and verifying the informer

The Securitate was especially afraid of betrayal and insincerity, of receiving misleading information, intentionally or not.[556] Verification was especially crucial in the case of informers sent out for spying missions abroad. In this case, the guarantee that the individual sent abroad would return back home was highly important.[557] In such cases, things like one's bank deposits and the people one was travelling with were thoroughly checked.[558]

"Some informers within the Roman-Catholic community, as a 13 June 1979 report states, were used to "influence and discourage hostile elements in the country and abroad, including via the visits to the Vatican and to various other Western countries."[559] Sent abroad, they were under surveillance as well, as it was the case of a Roman-Catholic priest, who, as a 1983 document states, was watched at all times during this trip by informer "Bucur." For this priest to

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[554] Cited in *Ibid*, p. 36

[555] This paragraph and the paragraph above first appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.

[556] The verifications of informers took place at least once a year and concerned both the informers and their officers. The evaluation looked at the quality of the information provided, sincerity of the information, secretive or not nature of the work, the qualities of the work done by the officer and instructing and verifying informers. The conclusions were written in a report (*nota report*). ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, pp. 31-34.

[557] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 35.

[558] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 36. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 984, p. 50.

[559] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069, Vol. 084, p. 108.

obtain the permission to exit Romania, three other informers had to provide positive evaluations attesting that he would not remain abroad.[560]

The expression "*prelucrat contrainformativ*" (counter-informationally processed) was employed in Securitate files to convey that an informer sent oversees was instructed to speak favorably of Romania's regime and policies and provide arguments that would attempt to refute any unfavorable opinions about Ceauşescu's regime.[561] This was the case of informer "Dănescu" who, in October 1982, was "invited and participated at a theological conference in Nurenberg, FRG." "As a result of the instructions [given], the informer spoke about the religious liberties from our country."[562] Like "Dănescu," informers "Pavelescu" and "Balint" were sent in 1982 to the Vatican, France and Italy, where they were asked about the situation of the Greek-Catholic priests in Romania and the attitude of the state towards them.[563] Given that they were "counter-informationally processed" (*prelucrați contrainformativ*), to use the language of the Securitate, it is safe to assume that they spoke favorably about the situation at home, although the truth was much more nuanced than they presented it to those they met abroad.

The handlers instructed periodically their informers. A manual on this very subject stressed the need for officers and residents to talk with their informers about cultural topics, sports, family issues, personal matters, the arts or political and ideological subjects. Theoretically, the officer had to have a supportive role to play, being permitted to offer advice when needed and to even solve the personal issues of the informers.[564] The informers, the same manual states, had to be offered a stimulus, a word of encouragement or appreciation and respect. "Each time the informers and collaborators come in contact…it is necessary that the

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[560] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, p. 73.
[561] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, p. 31.
[562] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, p. 31.
[563] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, pp. 57-58.
[564] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P17, pp. 9-10.

officers prove that they are good interlocutors…that they know how to make themselves pleasant, [they must]… convey optimism, because only this type of behavior ensures the consolidation of the soulful bridge (*puntea sufletească*) necessary for a good unraveling of the collaborative work."[565] As a source of motivation, some informers received financial recompense as well, such as money or gifts.[566]

The informers were subject to what the Securitate refers to as "general" and "specific" instructions, with the former being attributed to everyone in the surveillance network and the latter— given on a case-by-case basis, in dependence of the task assigned.[567] "Officers must make the informers and collaborators get used to the idea of being sincere, open, correct and not to hide the mistakes made, regardless of their causes and consequences,"[568] the same Securitate manual cited above states. By knowing full well the personality, history and character of the informer, the officer thus could have "intervene[d] with efficient instructive measures."[569]

In regards to the members of the surveillance network, as part of the instructions given, the officers had to ensure that their informers did not fall under the negative influence of "hostile persons," both domestically and abroad.[570] Informers were also taught strategies and tactics on how to discern if violations took place at their workplace, how to prevent any violations, how to get in touch with those they had to spy on, how to earn their trust, what pretexts to employ to get

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[565] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P17, p. 11.

[566] Some spying missions required monetary funds. A document signed on May 27 1983 indicates that 500 lei (Romanian currency) were allocated for the operation *Struțul* (Ostrich) carried out in the Sinaia region. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069, Vol. 084, p. 3. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P17, p. 10. According to Lucian Turcescu, in the 1980s Romania, the average salary was 2500 lei. Information derived from an email communication with Lucian Turcescu held on July 3, 2019.

[567] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 11.

[568] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 8.

[569] The Securitate officers were too trained. These training included methods of 'expunere' translated as oral presentations of information learned. "Algoritmization" was another method of learning, a term I borrow from a Securitate manual. This term refers to the learning of series of rules of assessment and evaluation that one must follow in order to deal with a given problem. Instructions with simulated devices were also employed as a method of instruction of the Securitate personnel. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P13, p. 77, 80. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, pp. 8-9.

[570] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 8.

in touch with their targets, and how to observe or pay attention to details.[571] The tactics taught sought to ensure that no one blew their cover (*a fi deconspirat*) and became a liability to the secret police.[572] In some instances, the disloyal informer[573] was too placed under surveillance.[574] Should informers have fallen sick or be incapable to further carry out their work, they were removed from the surveillance network as well.[575]

At times informers could have been "abandoned"[576] when they did not did not yield the expected quota of information or demonstrated bad work ethic (*rea voinţă*).[577] A report with the proposal to abandon someone had to be issued to justify why someone was let go.[578] Informer "Vanda Stefanescu," for example, was on the verge of being abandoned because she revealed her ties to the Securitate to her lover, a former Securitate officer. At first she had promised to never repeat her mistake again, yet she had failed to keep her promise and was eventually deemed as dishonest and permanently let go.[579] Should the informers prove disloyal and insincere, the conspiratorial houses where they were once infiltrated were to be abandoned.[580] In some instances, should the identity of the informer be revealed accidentally to a single person, such as a family member or colleague, one could have been kept in the surveillance network, only after a

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[571] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P17, p. 21.
[572] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P17, p. 26.
[573] At times, should informers become disloyal, sympathizers or even protectors of the person targeted, they were excluded from the surveillance network while they were still made to believe that they were part of it. With them, the Securitate maintained a fake relationship (*legătură fictivă*). This is to ensure that the informers were not aware the Securitate uncovered the betrayal, thereby minimizing the damage this type of situation could have caused. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, pp. 41-42
[574] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 42.
[575] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 43.
[576] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 34. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 15.
[577] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, p. 27.
[578] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D010378, pp. 35, 37.
[579] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D010378, pp. 6, 35.
[580] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 15.

thorough discussion with the informer during which one was asked to guarantee that such an incident would never occur again.[581]

Being a resistor and a collaborator was, thus, not mutually exclusive. There lies the dialectic nature of evil in the *banalization of evil*, of give and take, of micro-negotiations between the agent and the informers on how the job of getting a certain information would get done, so both parties did what was asked of them and thus continued to partake into this intricate charade. Thus, it is important to stress that not all informers and collaborators of the Securitate collaborated at all times and not all resistors resisted at all times. That is, to use the words of Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu, "a person's relationship with the Securitate could easily change from torturer to tortured, then back again."[582] One week one could have been a perpetrator, and then next—a victim and/or both, and perhaps another day even a resistor, to a certain extent. In such cases, informers were abandoned, either for their inability to inform, or lack of "will to work"[583] in this capacity. Others were let go for lack of information on a given target, or because they were transferred to a new location,[584] with a few of them being fired for lacking "sincerity" (*nu era sincer*) in their work.[585] Some informers even failed to show up for their meetings with their handlers,[586] with others being able to provide good information in their collaborative work, but up to a certain point, amassing to what I would call the phenomenon of resistance in the collaboration that could not thus be understood in Manichaean terms.

Take, for example, the case of the informer that I shall call 'Andrei' in order to preserve his real identity, who, as one note states, was "studied, contacted and in the year 1977 recruited

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[581] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P17, p. 40.
[582] Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu. *Religion and Politics in post-Communist Romania.* (New York: Oxford University Press 2007), p. 66.
[583] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/43 pp. 5-7.
[584] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/43 pp. 5-7.
[585] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 69/43 pp. 5-7. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D. 69, 84.
[586] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 66, p. 107.

as an informer." [587] Although his performance as an informer is described as satisfactory, 'Andrei,' a priest, "has nevertheless reservations" in his provision of information "when it comes to those whom he supports materially and morally,"[588] a report on him concludes. Although the *hero journey* scheme proposed in this chapter is helpful in understanding how the members of the surveillance network fit within the greater scheme of the Securitate's operations, one ought not to assume that things always worked smoothly for the Securitate, when it came to its dealings with the members of its surveillance network, or, to use the *hero's journey* analogy, one ought not to assume that all Hero's 'helpers' were indeed helpful at all costs and at all times, even when they obtained some perks that, as discussed in chapter 2, were not always financial.[589] But even those who have received some meager benefits in lieu of collaboration were not spared of agony, at some point in their collaborative work. A great deal of this kind of tacit yet terrorizing violence, as already discussed above, was generated by the bureaucratic processes involved in Securitate's accumulation of biographic data on its targets, some of whom, once spied on, became spies themselves.[590]

Meeting the informer

The liaison with informers could have been direct or indirect, or, to use the language of the Securitate, "personal" or "impersonal," with the latter involving the usage of mailboxes where information was being coded or cryptically presented to the recipient.[591] Meetings with members

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[587] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D69/84, p. 146.

[588] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D69/84, p. 146.

[589] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 66.

[590] This paragraph first appeared in the essay Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (Summer 2019) (*forthcoming)*.

[591] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D012636 Vol. 001, pp. 227-228.

of the surveillance network took place in conspiratorial houses[592] or houses for work/working houses (*case de lucru*),[593] hiding places or spots[594] known only by those who used them, where the hander and the informer placed materials that they wanted to send reciprocally.[595] These meetings could have also taken place at the home or workplace of the informer, or in the handler's car.[596] Meetings with the residents took place at the office where the residents worked, at their homes, or, at times, in conspiratorial houses, with the approval of the officer overseeing the resident.[597] The residents took the information provided by informers and support persons, analyzed it, and then passed it on to the officer for further assessment.[598]

A 1976 manual on this very subject provides the following instructions: "Meetings are organized in such a manner so that the person from the [surveillance] network are not stopped from doing their work or the obligations that they have."[599] The decision on a time and a place to meet had to be a mutual one. Should one of them have failed to make the respective appointment, a new one had to be rescheduled one or two days after the initial one, and preferably at the same location and time.[600] If the handler required an immediate meeting with the informer or *vice-versa*, they could have done so by leaving a predetermined sign/object in a

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[592] See annex 8 for legends of conspiratorial houses.

[593] A conspiratorial house was selected based on several criteria, some of which were for practical reasons: access to highways and roads, the types of neighbors, interior aspect of the house and of course, the loyalty of host. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 12.ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, p. 13.

[594] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D012636 Vol. 001, pp. 230-233.

[595] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 16.

[596] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 11.

[597] Residents facilitated the management of informers. Securitate officer could have had under one's supervision maximum of ten residents and, in some cases, informers too. The residents were selected from among the reserves, informers or support persons deemed with experience. Residents that were once Securitate officers were allowed to take under their wing up to 30 support persons with no criminal record. Should a lot of the informers be female, the resident assigned was of the same gender. When informers were no longer of use, they could have been maintained as "support persons," residents or host of conspiratorial houses. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 19. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P14, pp. 7, 19, 21.

[598] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 24.

[599] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 10.

[600] *Ibid.*

given location, or they could have passed by each other and exchange a certain sign that they both could have recognized as synonymous to the need for a pending meeting between the two.[601]

Meetings in conspiratorial houses tended not to be on a fixed schedule, with the goal of not raising suspicion among family members or neighbors.[602] Should the house be unavailable on a given time or period, it was the job of the host to let the officer know of any eventual disturbances.[603] Prior to any meeting held a conspiratorial house, the officer verified the premises, making sure that the conditions were "optimum for a meeting to take place."[604] The handler then placed a certain sign that would indicate to the informer that one was allowed to enter.[605]

Banalization of evil and the bureaucratic and paperwork it necessitated

The *banalization of evil* in the context discussed here thrived on what I refere to as the red-tape craze, a paper-mania that defined the work of the Securitate agents, who, in turn, depended on the informers to maintain their professional careers. As it will be shown in this section, this phenomenon was both a paradoxical and dialectic process of give and take. Both the informer and the agent needed each other, and thus both parties attempted to outwit the other in the process of working together in writing the dossiers.

Working as an informer was like being part of an underground operation in the sense that it was a tacit, secretive endeavor. It was similar to engaging into a black market in which one

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[601] *Ibid.*
[602] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 16.
[603] *Ibid.*
[604] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P16, p. 18.
[605] *Ibid.*

traded information in exchange for some meager benefits, promotions or right to see the world. It was a black market similar to a secret society, where one was often accepted after being subject to *psuchegraphic* work, and thus convinced or coerced to join.

Yet, it is important to stress that those who were convinced to collaborate via the *psuchegraphic* work done on them were *not* completely deprived of agency and some freedom of choice. Securitate files refer to this process of recruitment as "through convincing" (*prin convingere*).[606] The term "participatory dictatorship" (Fulbrook, 2005) comes to mind when attempting to contextualize this phenomenon of collaboration "through convincing" within the greater socio-political milieu within which it was carried out. The term "participatory," as used here, does not necessarily mean either free or fully willing to engage in the respective agreement.[607]

Being "convinced" in this case most likely meant being given something that looked advantageous, like the cheese in the mousetrap: tantalizing, enticing, and even necessary for survival, yet potentially deleterious nevertheless. Similar to the mouse's incapacity to comprehend the peril that comes with attempting to get the much-desired bait, the one convinced to collaborate could not possibly comprehend the intricacies of the dynamic s/he was entering, or the potential repercussions such a scheme would have in his or her life, or the lives of those it involved. For that, one must be endowed with a bird's eye view on a given situation, something that even historians cannot fully attain by contemplating in retrospect on the recent past.[608]

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[606] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D00066, pp. 114-15.

[607] G. Bruce. The people's state: East German society from Hitler to Honecker [Review of *The people's state: East German society from Hitler to Honecker*, by M. Fulbrook]. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *12*(3), (2005), pp. 137-140.

[608] This paragraph and the paragraph above first appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.

In exchange for collaboration, some were granted the opportunity to relocate from rural to urban settings or to travel abroad, for example.[609] But even the right to see the world was not granted gratuitously. Often, those permitted to travel abroad were assigned specific tasks, as it was the case of the informer "Cornel" who went on a tourist trip with his wife by car to Switzerland and was assigned to verify whether a given physical address existed or was a fake one.[610]

At times, one's promotion and career depended on one's collaboration with the Securitate. Here is an example from a Securitate document attesting to that. "In the year 1976, the Securitate informer …was proposed at the Department of Religious Faiths (*Departamentul Cultelor*) by the archbishop of Vatican…for the function of bishop and chief of the Roman-Catholic archdioceses of Bucharest-Iasi, a motif for which [he] was taken for study, contacted and in 1977 recruited as an informer. […] has however reservations, especially in regards to some Greco-Catholic priests…there are suspicions that he may be part of the Jesuit order. For these reasons, as a whole, he was eliminated from the list of candidates for the function of bishop or archbishop."[611]

Informing for the Securitate, and thus partaking into the phenomenon of the banalization of evil under Ceauşescu, was made to appear normalized by the very system that laid the carpet for these informers to enter into this dangerous game. The evil in their actions became banal when the informers began to see their espionage tasks as commonplace, mundane, routinized, and insignificant even. These informers' actions became similar to the activities related in a letter that a Securitate officer confiscated and summarized in the following manner: after the salutation

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[609] Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania*, 1965-1989. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

[610] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013434 Vol. 028, p. 27.

[611] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 146.

address, the following brief note was provided: "*the banal text follows* (emphasis mine),"[612] a rare yet precious archival hint into the way in which at least some Securitate agents attempted to self-distance themselves from the job they carried.

The actions of the informers were perceived by them just as ordinary and banal as the platitudinous details described in the letter mentioned above that the police summarized. The actual letter was missing from the respective file. The trivial things of life encompassed, such as buying a suit for one's spouse, for example, became equally commonplace and ordinary as writing down on a piece of paper that which one's neighbor spoke at a dinner table and reporting it to the police. Perhaps, this is what informer "Octav" was thinking when he was reporting to the Securitate about another doctor's voicing of his opinion about the state of affairs in Romania to a hospital driver, to whom he expressed his disapproval of the poverty in Romania and his inability "to feed his children."[613] The same doctor, according to this note, described his nation as coward because "it does not have the courage to establish non-official unions as the Polish people [do]."[614]

The paperwork involved in this operation was crucial, I argue, in conveying the message that being an informer was a perfectly acceptable thing to do when the forms necessary to deal and monitor informers became standardized. The *banalization of evil* in the context discussed here emerged when the paperwork and technology that supported this grand operation involved standardized procedures and forms. The human in charge or assigned to handle them no longer had to think much, but fill out forms, follow rules, and protocols. Reflection and introspection were no longer that necessary to get the job done.

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[612] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013434 Vol. 028, p. 45.
[613] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723, Vol. 208, p. 171.
[614] *Ibid.*

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The request for payments for informers, for example, became a standardized form that officers filled out occasionally, making the practice look commonplace.[615] Systematized was also the document one signed in order to confirm receipt of the respective money.[616] Standardized were also the documents one signed in order to confirm receipt of the respective money,[617] the note of relations (*notă de relații*) that provided the list of people deemed of interest who had ties to friends and relatives living both domestically and abroad,[618] or the 'request for investigations' form that inquired for a background check on an individual.[619] Similar to the way in which the doctor prescribed to her patient a potion or instructions regarding her newly dietary restrictions, the officer prescribed his informer a new task. Similar to the way in which the informer's workplace paid him his monthly salary, the officer gave him money for his work.

While the *banalization of evil*, in this case, was paved by making evil acts seem like a norm, it reaches its full glory when those who partake fail to resist, embrace it, obey to the letter the procedures, language, and protocols it asks of them, and at times even find the whole process alluring and glamorous. This observation reminds one of what a priest in a Roman Catholic Eastern vigil often asks the church goers: "Do you reject the glamour of evil?"[620]

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[615] In the late 1980s, for example, informers "Neagoe" and "Octav" were remunerated for their work: In 1986, requests for approval of having an informer remunerated were issued for informer "Neagoe" –800 lei for his work. On 4 August 1982, a similar request was issued for informer "Octav" for 468 lei. Source "Octav" received 546 lei on 8 June 1982. On 8 May 1982, a request for approval to remunerate "Octav" was issued for him to receive 510 lei for his work for the Securitate, including for buying two bottles of Wisky for those with whom he had to get in touch with as part of his surveillance work. Informer "Ulmeanu" received 199,90 lei on 31 December 1975, "with the occasion of his birthday." Such examples are numerous in these files. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723, Vol. 226, pp. 370, 385, 369, 492. According to Lucian Turcescu, in the 1980s Romania, the average salary was 2500 lei. Information derived from an email communication with Lucian Turcescu held on July 3, 2019.

[616] At times, the receipt (*chitanța*) was written fully by hand by the recipient ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723, Vol. 226, pp. 404, 235, 511.

[617] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723, Vol. 226, p. 404.

[618] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420 Vol. 002, pp. 157, 158, 168, 182,

[619] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D012397, Vol. 088, p. 62.

[620] John Horton. "The Glamour of Evil: Dostoyevsky and the Politics of Transgression," p. 161.

As Arendt puts it, it is the human ambition that permits for regimes of fear to flourish,[621] depending on careerist and social climbers[622] that, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues "allow themselves to be oppressed to the degree that they are carried away by blind ambition."[623] On a similar note, as Corey Robin puts it, "Much of Eichman in Jerusalem …speaks to the aspirational dimensions of political fear—that its perpetrators and collaborators seek not only to live, but also to live well…"[624]

Perhaps this explains why in a 1986 Securitate instructive manual grandiose and laudatory comments towards Ceaşuescu and about life in Romania are found, at a time when most of the country's population was dealing with severe hardships: "In the ample process of creation of the grandiose Program of the Communist Romanian Party of the creation of the socialist multi-laterally developed society and the advances of Romania towards communism, the employees of the Securitate, together with the proletariat (*oamenii muncii*) gathered in an united manner around the party, of its General Secretary comrade NICOLAE CEAUŞESCU (sic)."[625] Similarly laudatory claims are found in The Plan of Work brochure (*Planul de Muncă*) of the Securitate document for the October-December 1986 period, published only three years before Securitate would turn against the very man to whom the highest of praises were written only a few years earlier.[626]

Similar lines are found in an another Securitate manual published at a time when people were waiting in long queues for bread and other basic food stuffs: "The scientific analysis of the contemporary development demonstrates that the world traverses a period of revolutionary

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[621] Corey Robin. *Fear. The History of a Political Idea* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 119.
[622] *Ibid.,* p. 115.
[623] *Ibid.,* 116.
[624] *Ibid.*
[625] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P40, p. 49.
[626] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013350 Vol. 023, pp. 5-7.

transformations, social and national, the principal sense of which constitutes the historical, lawful, irreversible process of the passing of humanity from socialism—the only society capable to eliminate the social inequality and inequity, the exploitation and oppression of the masses, to put forth the good of the human, to the flourishing of the human personality the whole development of the forces of [economic] production."[627]

Thus, for the *banalization of evil* to occur, the system that permitted its emergence and growth required a certain degree of overtly expressed asininity or moral turpitude for at least some of the Securitate files to be produced. Phrases such as the "so-called disrespect of the rights and religious liberties in our country,"[628] or "so-called lack of religious liberty" (*asa-zisei lipse de libertăţi religioase*),[629] "psychosis of emigration"[630] are often found in files dating from the 1980s, lines that seek to deny the ugly truth of that which was taking place in Romania at that time, are a case in point.

Yet, paradoxically, and as shown in the previous chapter, those hired to work as Securitate agents and the informers who worked under their supervision were far from uncivil or unintelligent. The question to be raised here is how can one explain the absurdity in the files if those who helped produce them had an intelligence quotient that was often more than of an average level? It is likely the system described here had to be intuitively percieved by those within it as a charade, where, at times, those involved from both sides of the table— the agent and the informer—tried to outsmart each other to get ahead, to get the job done or to simply protect someone as it may have been the case of Sorin Antohi, discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

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[627] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P40, p. 7.
[628] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 36.
[629] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 41.
[630] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 57.

In regards to the seeming absurdity of the files, one 1998 Securitate file, in particular, stands out in this regard. This roughly 300 pages long, goes on into identifying "hostile elements" in the Romanian society,[631] or "problems" pertaining, among other, to: legionaries,[632] "'former bourgeois parties' and of former inmates of crimes against state's security," [633] "Hungarian national-irredentists,"[634] "German nationals,"[635] "persons with intentions to cross the state's borders illegally,"[636] "hostile elements among religious cults and sects"[637]as well as those belonging to the so-called "problem of art and culture, press, radio-television and publishing houses."[638]The scope of this plan, as this file suggests, is to monitor closely the "activities with fascist, national irredentist characters and those who carry out propaganda against the social order or that… can affect…the independence, sovereignty of the Romanian state, the existent political climate, and the relations Romania maintains with other countries."[639]

In reality, this ambitious plan sought to destroy that which is largely considered a nation's strength, its socio-cultural and religious diversity. Fortunately, this dossier's meticulously written projects never fully realized; its big 'plan of action' turned out to be mostly 'empty talk.' In less than nine months, the Securitate officers who wrote it, and whose names will not be revealed here in order to protect their privacy, would face an abrupt end in their careers, marked by a new regime change, from communism to democracy. The writing and editing of the file, and all the long meetings and red tape that was needed to discuss and approve

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[631] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, pp. 74-111.
[632] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 77-78.
[633] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 79-80.
[634] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 80-83.
[635] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 84-85.
[636] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 92-93.
[637] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 94-95.
[638] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 99-104.
[639] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 74.

it, went all in vain for something that turned out to be a "lie," [640] to quote Daniel Chirot, in the spirit of keeping alive a defunct system and its faded ideology that may have offered once to many the "illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality,"[641] to quote Vaclav Havel.

But more telling about this file is not what is written in it, but what went on, both domestically and internationally, at the time of the writing of this file, and especially in the neighboring countries where signs of communism's dooming end, catalyzed, ironically, by the Gorbachev's *perestroika* policies that sought to revive it, were just around the corner. The wording and plans of actions to persecute innocent religious protestant groups convey, however, a different story altogether. As if stuck in time, unaware with the grim reality outside of their windows, the food scarcities, and the "misery" many Romanians experienced in the late 1980s, to put it in the words employed in the *The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania*,[642] the Securitate officers who wrote this file spoke in a language, with its various clichés and 'Party talk,' out touch with the world in which they lived. Their obliviousness, as depicted in this file, resonates considerably to Eichmann's "sheer thoughtlessness,"[643] lack of introspection and "inability to think namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else,"[644] to quote Arendt. According to this philosopher, these are character flaws linked to the "banality" that drives one to commit disastrous acts without much ill intent behind it.

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[640] Daniel Chirot. "What Happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?" in *The Revolutions of 1989*. Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed. (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 36.

[641] Vaclav Havel. "The Power of the Powerless", available at http://vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val =2_aj_eseje.html&typ=HTM, last accessed on April 1, 2019.

[642] Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. *Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania*, pp. 604-608.

[643] Cited in Valerie Hartouni. *Visualizing Atrocity: Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of Thoughtlessness*, p. 77.

[644] Cited in Joseph Beatty. "Thinking and Moral Considerations: Socrates and Arendt's Eichmann" in *Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays*, Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 65.

The Securitate officer engaging in the phenomenon of the *banalization of evil* sat comfortably behind neatly organized desks, claimed by individuals whose intelligent quotient was at least undistinguished, and most often, higher than that. Similarly to Eichmann's "thoughtlessness" although *definitely not* like Eichmann in the consequences of their actions, these Securitate officers thought they were defending the Romanian society labeling as 'criminal,' 'hostile,' 'dangerous,' innocent men and women, such as peaceful practitioners of Yoga and Transcendental Meditation,[645] for example, who needed more their mercy rather than their persecution, compassion rather than their lack of tolerance and disrespect.

The act of engaging into the phenomenon of *banalization of evil* boiled down, for some, for their refusal or pretending to refuse to think in a critical manner and for themselves,[646] which, according to Arendt, could have only be possibly if they were conducted a "silent, solitary dialogue" with themselves.[647] For those who *did* think but could not speak their mind, they had to play their part while knowing full well that it was all a charade, thereby self-distancing themselves from this make believe, dialectic show, of give and take, of lose and win, wherein both parties, the agent and her informer, sought to outwit each-other in the process, in quest for some meager gain.

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[645] ACNSAS. Fond Operativ. D000003, vol. 5, p. 157.

[646] Mark Evans. "Doing Evil Justly? The Morality of Justifiable Abomination" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 127; and Valerie Hartouni. *Visualizing Atrocity: Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of Thoughtlessness*, p. 115.

[647] Valerie Hartouni. *Visualizing Atrocity: Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of Thoughtlessness*, pp. 74, 82.

On dossierveillance and its relation to the phenomenon of the banalization of evil[648]

There is no all-encompassing definition of the concept of evil, not because of lack of scholarly attempts to define and explain it.[649] The reason for this lies in the boundless ways in which evil can manifest itself, idea which the Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel astutely conveyed as following: "Evil more than good suggests infinity." [650] The *Merriam-Webster* dictionary describes it as "morally bad," and "causing harm or injury to someone,"[651] a definition that, as we will see below, is insufficient to explain or evaluate the usage of terror against innocent people in a totalitarian regime. At best, the scholarly efforts to reflect on this concept have provided compelling attributes and descriptions of its manifestations and not a conclusive interpretation that would quell altogether the ongoing scholarly disputes on the nature, origin and essence of evil.

Despite the ambiguity that is rightfully attached to this concept, incertitude which Peri Roberts explains as following— "evil like beauty is in eye of the beholder"— evil, as we will see below, is also paradoxical, described by some as both repulsive and alluring, atrocious and enticing.[652] I am thus yet to find a notion more intriguing and contradictory, and yet which can

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[648] An earlier draft of this section appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.

[649] On the subject of evil, see for example, Maria Pia Lara, ed. *Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) and Ervin Staub. *The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For an interdisciplinary approach to evil, see, for example, Margaret Sönser Breen, ed. *Understanding Evil: An Interdisciplinary Approach* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003) and Ruth W. Grant, ed. *Naming Evil, Judging Evil* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

[650] Cited in Norman Geras. Th*e Contract of Mutual Indifference: Political Philosophy after the Holocaust* (London: Verso: 1998), 135.

[651] "Evil" in *Merriam-Webster* Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/evil, last accessed on April 13, 2019.

[652] Take, for example, Fyodor Dostoyevsky's works. On the 'attractive' elements of human evil in Dostoyevsky's works, see for example John Horton. "The Glamour of Evil: Dostoyevsky and the Politics of Transgression" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, pp. 156-176.

also be so easily discerned by mankind. Corruption, domestic violence,[653] genocide, and totalitarian regimes have been linked to the notion of evil,[654] but so were earthquakes[655] or what Eve did in the act of biting from the forbidden fruit of knowledge in the Garden of Eden.[656] Evil, it seems, has been part of the human existence since the inception of humanity. Or, if we were to use the Christian doctrine of original sin, there has been/is a little of bit of evil or a tendency to do evil acts in each human that has ever walked on the face of the earth or lives nowadays.[657]

Other scholars, on the other hand, have linked evil to the term of 'acts that shock,' a "normative category"[658] which appears in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[659] The Piteşti experiment described in chapter 1, as well as the torture cases narrated in chapter 2, rightfully fit in this category. This term has been successfully applied in various international narratives pertaining to human rights abuses and violations, in response to "vast acts of violence, such as genocide, or the development of new technologies that bring indiscriminate or grotesque suffering and death."[660] Eichmann's acts had elements of all these features, 'banal' in intent; 'glamorous' in the daily routine of being a highly ranked SS officer

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[653] Arthur G. Miller. *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil* (New York: Guilford Press, 2004), p. 91.

[654] On evil and corruption, see, for example, Richard J. Bernstein. *The Abuse of Evil. The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). On evil and genocide, see, for example, James Waller. *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[655] David Boucher. "Banal but not Benign: Arendt on Evil" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, pp. 205-206.

[656] Nel Noddings. *Women and Evil* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 35, 53.

[657] On the doctrine of original sin in Christianity, see, for example, Ian A. MacFarland. *In Adam's Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin* (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2010).

[658] Peter Sutch. "Evil in Contemporary International Political Theory: Acts that Shock the Conscience of Mankind" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 103.

[659] This term is an "expression of the Marten's clause," clause named in honor of Fyodor Fydorovich Martens, Russia's representative at the 1899 Hague Peace Conferences. The clause states: "Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience." Cited in Peter Sutch. "Evil in Contemporary International Political Theory: Acts that Shock the Conscience of Mankind" in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, eds. *Evil in Contemporary Political Theory*, p. 107.

[660] *Ibid*, p. 108.

and the aura that came with it, especially to those who surrounded him and were on a social hierarchical level lower than him; but also 'shocking,' especially when examined with the eyes of an outsider, of someone who was not indoctrinated with the Nazi ideology or has been spared to live in the times when earning a living meant in some way being part of a totalitarian system, fascist or communist alike. The evil I am about to describe in this section I call it *dossierveillance,* a method of terror employed by the Securitate with the help of the informers to manage, educate and spy on the Romanian population through the help of the members of the surveillance network.

Dossierveillance, I argue, marks the shift from the overt terror of the Stalinist era when Dej was in power to the more tacit but equally harmful and perhaps more painful terror experienced under the Nicolae Ceaşuescu decades, a shift discussed in both the works of Lavinia Stan and Dennis Deletant,[661] which briefly analyzed in chapter 1. Some of those involved in this type of method of social control even believed that they were helping pacify the regime. Although less bloody, the pain the suffering that the Securitate inflicted on its targets via *dossierveillance* and *psuchegraphic work* done on its targets were for some equally powerful and even more so that the one only a few generations earlier felt during the Dej era.

This method of terror is a type of surveillance, morphologically and semantically similar to the concept of "dossier society" coined by Kenneth Laudon in 1986. The "dossier" in *dossierveillance*, like the one in the "dossier society," represents "thousands of officially selected moments in your past to confront you with the threads of an intricate web, revealing your 'official life,' the one you must line with and explain to whatever authority chooses to demand an explanation"[662] Unlike its seemingly more benign counterpart in the "dossier society," the dossier in *dossierveillance* helps accumulate information on a given person with deliberate intent to cause harm, incriminate,

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[661] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 7. See, also, Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania*, 1965-1989, chapters 1-3, pp. 1-106.

[662] K. Laudon. Dossier Society: *Value Choices in the Design of National Information Systems* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 4.

and even punish. Its targets, often referred to as "elements," as discussed above, tend to be depicted needing to be reformed, penalized, and monitored for their potential to cause real or imagined harm to the regime that stands behind this type of surveillance activity.

But there is more than paperwork in what I refer here as dossier in the *dossierveillance* operation. The dossier in *dossierveillance* is comprised of "surveillant assemblages"[663] that the Securitate used to get to know everything it wanted to know on its targets. The omnipresence of this 'dossier' in the lives of individuals was both "capillary[664] and "rhizomatic,"[665]wherein the 'capillary' and the 'rhizome' are both metaphors for the way in which the 'dossier' was able to expand itself in the quotidian and mundane of people's lives. The dossier began in on the desks of Securitate officer, in the shape of a file, for example, and could have ended in the kitchens, bedrooms, workplaces of its targets, in the most intimate of corners in a human's being's life, all with the help of its informers who made the 'dossier' spread far and wide.

Thus, I embrace a rather fluid understanding of the concept of "dossier" in discussing *dossierveillance*. The word "dossier" also stands for the technology and apparatus that kept a record on who did what in the process of victimizing someone else and made it happen for the Securitate to place people under its surveillance. What stood behind the dossier were the individuals who compiled documents, installed telephone wires to bug someone's apartment, took photographs while spying on them, etc. The dossier, metaphorically speaking, was thus the canvass on which the intentions and cunning plans of these individuals were able to manifest. The dossier was therefore everything that the Securitate used to get to do what the Securitate sought to accomplish: to know as much as possible about those it sought to watch day and night.

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[663] Haggerty, K.D. and Ericson,R.V. "The Surveillant Assemblage." *British Journal of Sociology.* (December 2000). Vol. 51, No. 4. pp. 605-622, cited in Elia Zureik. "Theorizing Surveillance. The Case of the Workplace" in *Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination,* p. 40.

[664] S. Clegg. "Foucault, Power and Organizations," in A. McKinlay and K. Starkey (eds) *Foucault, Management and Organization Theory* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1988), cited in Elia Zureik. "Theorizing Surveillance. The Case of the Workplace" in *Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination,* David Lyon, ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 38.

[665] Elia Zureik. "Theorizing Surveillance. The Case of the Workplace" in *Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination,* David Lyon, ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 42.

Part of what I refer here as the 'dossier' entailed the technology needed to conduct secret searches, secret entrances, carry out its missions of disinformation (provision of false information with the scope of misleading someone), or preparing and implementing what it referred to in its manuals as 'operative games' (*jocuri operative*), the totality of tactics and methods of surveillance employed mostly in the dealing with secret services abroad and terrorist organizations.[666] At times, the Securitate employed "procedures and methods made available by physics, chemistry, mathematics, electronics, cybernetics, criminal studies or call on the support of specialists from these domains," in order to carry out its work, one of its manuals state.[667] This type of scientific technology was too part of the 'dossier'.

Hence, what I describe here as a 'dossier' and its ghost-like presence in the lives of Romanians under Ceaşuescu's regime is thus not the same as the actual dossier we researchers nowadays receive at the CNSAS reading room—a dusty file, compiled and recompiled in ways that does not do justice to its initial structure, as intended by the officers who first created it. The 'dossier' in *dossierveillance* is the closest word I can find to that concept which indicated a *tangible* proof that the Securitate was present in the lives of people.[668] For the Securitate—a rather abstract yet immensely powerful entity— to be physically present in someone's life, required transforming intimate relations into members of its surveillance network. What I refer here as the dossier in the *dossierveillance* operation officiated this metamorphosis. It served as the witness and proof of this transformation. Hence, the fear the dossier instilled in people was

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[666] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1, P13, p. 7.
[667] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1, P40, p. 39.
[668] I thank Lavinia Stan for her insightful comments in respect to this concept.

actually the fear of belatedly understanding how intimate relations have been transformed to cause harm.[669]

The 'dossier' in *dossierveillance* comprised, also, the tools necessary to secretly enter into man's apartment to see/read the external correspondence he received as well as the tool necessary to bugg his phone;[670] the Securitate's interception into one's radio signals;[671] the Securitate's monitoring of the telephone communication between Romania and other countries, such as USA or Canada, in order to listen to the communication carried out between Romanians and those living abroad;[672] the Securitate's listening to the Morse code emissions, as related in a document dating from the year 1986, that states that "the emission [of the Morse code] ceases when in front of the building [under surveillance] there are cars."[673]

Incidences of *dossierveillance* in Securitate files are numerous. Here are a few more examples: the confiscation and reading of postcards letters Securitate;[674] the taking of photos and videos during Securitate's spying operations;[675] the confiscation and reading of the letter addressed to Ronald Reagan sent by an American couple requesting that their niece, a doctor, be granted permission to immigrate to the USA, therby appealing to the President's intervention in her case;[676] the confiscation of a package sent from Switzerland that had foodstuff and sweets;[677] the searching through another package sent by a man from RFG to a Romanian that contained a thermometer, a photo and a piece of paper, with the later two objects being

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[669] This paragraph first appeared the essay Cristina Plamadeala."The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy" in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" (Summer 2019) (*forthcoming*).

[670] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013434, Vol. 028, p. 36.

[671] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 339.

[672] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420 Vol. 002, p. 132.

[673] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, pp. 341, 346.

[674] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723, Vol. 226, pp. 48, 62, 96, 133, 433.

[675] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P34, p. 15.

[676] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420, Vol. 002, p. 96.

[677] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420, Vol. 002, p. 35.

underlined by the officer who received the note; [678] the retention of the letter addressed to a Romanian scientist about his attempt join the American Association for the Advancement of Science; [679] the investigation of a Romanian's connections to another person living in Bloomington, Indiana by confiscating and reading letters exchanged between them.[680]

Collaboration, the precursor to the phenomenon of the *banalization of evil* described above, was, in most cases, the dossier's key necessary ingredient. Without it, this type of dossier could not have possibly attained the level of importance and power it had in carrying out this type of surveillance activity, a power arising from the quality of information it can collect. A symbiotic relationship arose, I argue, or possibly even one of mutual dependency, between collaboration and the dossier that formed around it. The dossier granted legitimacy to collaboration, ultimately, represented the tangible proof of something that, without it, remained a rather abstract phenomenon, embodied at best by fleeting human interactions and handshakes. Similarly, without collaboration, the totality of technology that embodied the dossier — objects, paper, files, pens, bugging devices involved in surveillance operations, etc.— had no power. They were just things. The result, I argue, is a chicken-or-egg causal dilemma in respect to the Securitate dossier and collaboration work carried out around it, the story of which this dossier, in turn, narrates.

Metaphorically speaking, the dossier in *dossierveillance* thus comes close to the Foucauldian *panopticon*. In this case, the dossier represented one of the Securitate's most effective "disciplinary" tools (Foucault 1975) through which it managed to instill fear in people and thus transform them into docile citizens. Despite recent critiques brought against the

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[678] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420, Vol. 002, p. 5.
[679] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013420, Vol. 002, pp. 172-174.
[680] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723, Vol. 208, pp. 105-108.

panopticon theoretical paradigm,[681] Foucault's analogy of the surveillance practices of the modern state to that of the *panopticon*'s guards, the former being able to see everything and the latter, to act accordingly due to the knowledge that they are watched at all times, is paramount to understanding Securitate's surveillance practices. In *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Foucault connects the rise of surveillance practices to the rise of 'disciplinary societies' and the shift in the means employed by the state to enforce 'disciplinary' measures on its citizens. Whereas physical torture served in this capacity in the feudal times, with modernity, the state's 'disciplinary' tools took on a kinder tone. To put it bluntly, one no longer needed to be tortured to transform one into a docile citizen. Obedience to the state was now attainable via an alternative mechanism, which Foucault describes by employing as a metaphor the *panopticon*, a conceptual design of a prison created by English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham.

The panopticon carceral society descried by Foucault is a centralized structure: the watcher is at the center, watching her subjects. The subjects know that they are watched and, thus, behave accordingly, thereby feeling somewhat powerless and obedient under the watcher's gaze. In the context of *dossierveillance*, the watcher is paradoxically watched and the watched is simultaneously a watcher, resulting into a seemingly logical impossibility. Both are simultaneously abusers and victims, trespassers and being trespassed. The watchers can even victimize those with the power to victimize them back. The watchers can also be victims in the hands of someone else, who, in turn, can be watched by someone else. This is a scenario that results in a never-ending chain of victims and victimizers mushrooming without a stop.

What happens here reminds one of wizardry, as the line between the victim and the victimizer eventually dissipates. As if belonging to the quantum realm, the watcher and the

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[681] David Lyon. "The Search for Surveillance Theories" in *Theorizing Surveillance* (Portland, OR: Willan Publishing 2006), p. 4.

watched can sit simultaneously in both positions. Being uncertain from where the menacing gaze could have come, the watcher takes on the persona of the watched as well. And yet, unlike in a prisoner dilemma scenario, the two do not know that in fact are *both* victims of the same dark game. Theoretically, this lack of awareness of sharing equal footing makes it impossible to even conceive of cooperating with each other, as the prisoner dilemma situation would recommend. The only exit from this desolate state is rebelliousness itself. Under *dossierveillance*, all involved are convinced and convince themselves that they are victors—the perfect ruse that allows *dossierveillance* to gain its momentum and ensures its seemingly *perpetuum mobile* operation that yields a frightening charade.

Managing, educating and spying on the Romanian population through the help of the members of the surveillance network

Dossierveillance can explain not only why people collaborated with the Securtate but also why many failed to resist. The *widespread collaboration* under communism in Romania, but also the *lack of resistance* represent the 'two sides of the same (*dossierveillance*) coin,' so-to-speak. As it will be shown in this section, in time the mere thought of having a dossier, or of doing something that may bring out to the attention of the Securitate or add to one's dossier and incriminate one was sufficient, to make one not dare resist against the regime. The ghost-like, ubiquitous presence of the Securitate 'dossier' in the lives of Romanians was one of the regime's most powerful and effective "disciplinary" tools, to quote Michel Foucault (1991), to create docile, submissive citizens of a state.

Hence, under the aegis of *dossierveillance*, Romania's communist regime managed to transform many of its citizens into collaborators while simultaneously quelling the 'resistance streak' within the hearts and minds of many more. Keeping its citizens under a generalized sense of fear, the state's sponsorship of *dossierveillance* led to the legitimization of this widespread fear, felt by many, especially, under Ceauşescu's oppressive regime.

As already discussed in the previous chapters, the Securitate sought to partake into the utopian plan of the regime to create what turned out to be impossible, the so-called "new man," by simultaneously combing through all strata of society anyone who could have blocked the

implementation of this much-awaited new world order. "The making of the new man," said Ceaşuescu in a June 2-4 1976 speech held at the Congress for Political Education and of Socialist Culture, "the conscious builder of the most just of social orders, constitutes the largest and most complex task, the most noble of responsibilities, the revolutionary duty of honor of our Communist Party."[682]

The attempt to create this "new man" during the Ceaşuescu decades was partially implemented via *dossierveillance.* This method of terror sought to make Romanians act, think and live according to the regime's agenda, and accept that which the system offered without daring to resist, oppose, defy or escape. As the goal of the Securitate was to counteract (*contracarare*) and neutralize (*neutralizare*) of that which was deemed as a peril for the society,[683] as a Securitate manual state, it was through *dossierveillance* that it sought to implement these very goals, thereby transforming a nation into a timorous state. The role of the informers was to assist the Securitate into this deleterious endeavor.

Under Ceaşuescu, the Securitate's *modus operandi* was to "prevent" and "neutralize" any potential peril against the state.[684] Thus, the potentiality for opposition was to be met with an abrupt halt before it even had the chance to bud. These very ideas are expressed in a 1986 Securitate manual on this very subject: "The work of prevention founded on a solid, scientific knowledge of the operative problem of the Securitate is carried out primarily via the surveillance network...with the goal of knowing and preventing any intentions, actions, situations or circumstances able to undermine the security interests of our state."[685]

"Preventive" measures were those of "influencing" and "discouraging" (*influienţare, descurajare*), to use the language of the Securitate, from further pursuing the activity deemed dangerous by the regime. To prevent any rebelliousness, the police monitored closely the

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[682] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 1P14, p. 3.
[683] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. P13, pp. 158.
[684] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 121.
[685] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P40, p. 37.

intentions of its people or the "state of the spirit" (*starea de spirit*) through its informers, as it was the case of a 1987 informer note that provided information on the state of the spirit in a hospital. The respective document spoke unfavorably about the way in which patients were treated and fed.[686]

Should someone be found potentially harmful, one was "warned" (*avertizaţi*), others were given a verbal warning (*atenţionaţi*), made subject to discussion of those in one's entourage (*puşi în discuţie*), or their ties to other people deemed dangerous were somehow destroyed (*destrămare de anturaj*).[687] This was the case of a Greek-Catholic priest who was "warned" for anti-communist rhetoric and activity, because he had refused to provide religious services "weddings, baptisms and funerals to those who fail to attend the mass services." The priest later signed a document in which he promised to not further engage in "hostile manifestations" against the regime.[688] He was also later moved to a different parish and placed under surveillance so that the Securitate knew of his "reaction after being warned."[689]

Those who were *atenţionaţi* were warned in a verbal manner. Those who were *avertizaţi* were asked to sign a document (*angajament*) wherein they promised to never repeat again the actions that led them astray.[690] A thirty-three-year-old economist, for example, was warned (*avertizat)* for "hostile manifestations" because of "preoccupations with write literary works and works in economics" deemed unacceptable by the regime. He had also attempted to "infiltrate himself into the Baptist group," trying to bring outside the country literature that was critical of Romania.[691] "Warned" (*avertizaţi*) were also, for example, visitors from abroad, as it was the

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[686] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D011723 Vol. 208, p. 243.
[687] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, pp. 38-39.
[688] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 8.
[689] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 9.
[690] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712 Vol. 001, P13, pp. 14-15.
[691] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, pp. 59-60.

case of an American citizen of Romanian origins, of Baptist faith, who had brought religious literature for distribution.[692]

One Greek Catholic priest who engaged in "religious proselytism" was warned by the Securitate as well. This priest was "signaled for hostile manifestations [and] improper behavior towards citizens." At the funeral service of a village mayor, he had "manifested his hostility towards the dead, because he was a communist, [and] that he married his children by the Orthodox rite, not allowing his family and citizens of the village to burry him by the place's [Catholic] tradition. He had also tried to attract children to the church's yard by organizing games, offering them candy with the attention to determine them to come to masses of the Catholic Church."[693]

In another incident a student was warned after attempting to send a letter requesting a musical dedication to Free Europe in Paris through the assistance of a Libyan student whom he met at a summer camp.[694] Another similar document reports on a pupil, who, together with eight more colleagues of his, spoke badly of the situation of youth in Romania after having listened to Free Europe.[695] As a result, the adolescent was warned "in the presence of the school and parents"—an act that perhaps sought to induce feelings of shame as well as fear, as the pupil, following the receipt of the warning, "recognized the acts committed and promised that in the

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[692] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 32.

[693] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 7.

[694] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D0012397 Vol. 088, p. 7.

[695] The Securitate was concerned of the way in which Free Europe, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle and B.B.C. reported and interpreted the situation in Romania. The secret police wanted to keep an alluring image abroad. In regards to them, it sought also the same strategy: "prevent, know and neutralize hostile actions" via "influencing" or "disinformation" of its surveillance network and techniques to infiltrate abroad. Those with legal training were of interest to the Securitate to be sent for such "disinformation" or "neutralization" missions abroad. ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D012636, Vol. 1, pp. 1, 15-17.

future [he] will not do anything that would go against the laws of our state," the document on him states.[696]

In the language of the Securitate, the student was made subject to "positive influence" through help of his family and teachers. In some instances, this type of "positive influence" was done by the Securitate officer as well, a type of indoctrination to change one's thinking so that it would align to the values and principles of the regime.[697] Others, as a Securitate manual states, were placed into public debate (*punerea în dezbatere publică*), had their entourage destroyed (*destramarea anturajului*), as it was the case of the priest discussed above who was relocated to a different parish, and made to pay fees, for his alleged misdemeanor. Foreign visitors had their stays in Romania cut short or declared persona non-grata, or even subject to lawsuits.[698] The goal was to make people adjust their behavior accordingly (*revizuiască comportarea*), by employing methods of intimidation that sought to quell any desire to rebel.

This was the case of a Catholic priest who, in 1983, was listening to the Free Europe radio station. "Taking in consideration these aspects, he was demanded to review/adjust his behavior (*revizuiască comportarea*), given that in new cases of similar manifestations he will suffer legal consequences," the document on him further points out. The report also stated that the police obtained from him a declaration engagement. In the process of being "warned" the priest recognized that he indeed did listen to the Free Europe Radio and was visited by other Romanian Catholic priests. The same report ended with the following note: "we are continuing the measures of surveillance to know the behavior of the subject and [his] reactions after the warning."[699]

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[696] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D012397 Vol. 088, p. 92.
[697] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001, P13, p. 14.
[698] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D008712, Vol. 001, P13, p. 14.
[699] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069 Vol. 084, p. 7.

The power of Securitate, under the aegis of *dossierveillance*, was thus nurtured by the make-believe spectacle the Securitate managed to put together for a while: the secrete police knew only *x* on a target, but the target thought it knew *10x,* where *x* stands for compromising material on that respective person, such as the fact that one was listening to the Free Europe Radio Station, for instance. Under this assumption, the target was more afraid and docile than one had to be and the Securitate more efficient than it could have been than if the cards were revealed to all the players involved in this harmful and dangerous game.

And that is why people living during the Ceaşuescu regime lived in fear: it was because of *dossierveillance*, the experience of which was for many Romanians a frightening existence, filled with uncertainty. Through the Securitate dossier, as broadly discussed and defined in this chapter, this fear was successfully instilled in the hearts and minds of many of the communist regime's targets, who, as a result was tacitly reeducated as well. If these individuals were not always transformed into adherents to Marxist and communist ideals, *dossierveillance* often crafted them gradually into docile and submissive citizens of the state.

The "morbid fear", to quote Lavinia Stan,[700] that many of Romanians have felt in the communist era, and, especially, during the last decades of communism, when Ceaşuescu was in power, caused some to experience paranoia and internal torment. In a world wherein everyone could have been a Securitate informer, friendships and relationships, in general, were questioned at times. Fear became legitimized. Questioned were also the motives behind any gesture of humanity and civility. Any gesture of affection from a neighbor or acquaintance, a kind word, an invitation to a dinner party may have been potentially subject to one's scrupulous internal monologue driven by a pressing question whether the given noble act of kindness was driven by

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[700] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p . 9.

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motives beyond one's longing to belong and to connect to another human being, and more, by a devilish plan orchestrated by the Securitate and meticulously laid out in its files.

Lastly, I would like to end this chapter by briefly analyzing the concepts of 'legitimacy' and 'fear.' Both are rather abstract notions, yet somehow easily comprehensible, with the former tracing its etymological roots to the Latin word *lex*, or law and being closely connected to processes that are deemed legal, legit, hence acceptable and eventually normalized, to use Foucauldian language once more. The latter concept, fear, is a primordial feeling, a sentiment that is inherent in all humanity, that which connects us to the members of the entire animal kingdom, to life itself. Meant to protect us, fear indicates to us when something is wrong, prone to cause us harm and warns of the need to take measures to avoid the circumstance that instigates to use such a feeling. But what happens when the environment that triggers the very feeling that calls upon us to take measures to avoid it is made legitimate and made to become even a (new) 'norm'? At best, a dissonance emerges, between one's inner longing to escape that which can not be fully escaped and one's attempt to overtly hide this inner longing by acting as if one's surrounding are not reflective of the peril one was feeling within. At worst, one's sense of reality was distorted, with some, perhaps, even feeling utter despair and/or compelled to cross the country's borders illegally, risking even one's own life. Many in such circumstances felt powerless, perhaps, unable to revolt or to respond to that which was happening in their midst.

The word responsibility comes from the Latin word *respondere*, which means to respond.[701] To respond, one must be given a voice and a milieu to express it. When one's opinion and one's right to utter it are silenced and respectively deprived of, one's individual responsibility for something bigger than oneself, by default, collapses as well. By quieting one's

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[701] "Respond" in *Online Etymology Dictionary*, available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=respond, last accessed on April 1, 2019.

voice, one's individuality, in other words, one also quiets down one's dialogue with the other, as to respond often implies engaging in some form of dialogue with someone other than oneself. Hence, when one's individuality is no longer recognized, one is left to a certain degree devoid of the ability to speak to, and for the wellbeing of, the other. In doing so, at most, one is left carrying out a silent monologue with oneself. "Silence became second nature to Romanians whose relatives have been in prison and who wanted to be considered 'normal,'" Cristina Petrescu writes.[702] What appeared 'normal' in the Dej era was more the façade of a survival mechanism used to keep from the public eye the grief, disbelief and the pain of losing someone and the fear of being the next on the list to be targeted. This fear would become part of Romanians' daily life even after Dej, until the days leading up to the 1989 December Revolution. That is because, as shown in this chapter, due to the *psuchegraphic work* done on potential recruits, the Securitate gained a mass number of informers, who helped launch and maintain its *dossierveillance* operation, conducive to what I refer here as the *banalization of evil* phenomenon spread wide into the very fiber of Romanian society till 1989.

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[702] Cristina Petrescu. "The Afterlife of the Securitate: On Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania," p. 396.

Chapter 4: Lustration Revisited

Introduction

In 2015 I took part in a conference in Romania where I spoke about Antonie Plamadeala's experience with the Securitate. My presentation touched on the decades (1950s-60s) during which he wrote *Three Hours in Hell*, the novel discussed in chapter 2. Nothing was said about his later years, as I know very little about it even today, four years after the fact. But during the question-answer period, a Romanian scholar in the audience asked me the following question: do you *really* know who Antonie Plamadeala *really* was (emphasis mine)? Loaded with a plethora of implications, the question left me perplexed. *The truth is always nuanced*, I wish I had responded, *and perhaps only God may serve as the ultimate judge*. But how do you respond when such subtle yet bold accusations hit home while simultaneously being expected to provide an objective answer because you carry the hat of an academic? I said nothing. I resorted to silence because I was too afraid to say something that, like in the Miranda Rights warning, could have been taken against me, somehow. To give the reader more insight into my hesitance to answer this scholar's question, perhaps a bit of background information is needed.

In 2007, the name of Antonie Plamadeala came to the attention of the Romanian mass media and the wider Romanian society through the publication of a controversial declaration issued by Romanian journalist Mircea Dinescu. In his statement, Dinescu claimed that he had found an official archival document wherein Plamadeala requests no other than the infamous Nicolae Ceaşuescu to be promoted to the military level of a general. The document in question infers, as Dinescu pointed out, that Plamadeala was a collaborator with the Securitate, an accusation sufficient to taint the life of any individual, and especially of those who were or are

representatives of the Church. These individuals, especially, are expected by their followers and the society at large to serve as exemplary models of Christian principles of love for one's neighbor, justice and honesty.[703]

This accusation caused quite a stir among the representatives of Plamadeala's immediate family as well as of the Romanian Patriarchate. As a result, both parties requested the CNSAS, the organization that currently stores and manages the former Securitate archives, to officially investigate this allegation. As of today, CNSAS or the courts never issued an official confirmation in regards to this accusation, most probably, as Dinescu confirmed, because the document based upon which he accused Plamadeala of collaboration is not part of the CNSAS archives. Its origins remain a mystery to me to this day.

Shortly after his controversial announcement, the Romanian Patriarchate attempted to send Dinescu to court for alleged "defamation of [Plamadeala's] reputation" and even "threatened [him] to be sent to jail" for such claims.[704] As one can see here, collaboration is a heated, and divisive topic and the Orthodox Church does not take lightly such accusations.

Perhaps Plamadeala himself already had the answer prepared in 1991, when in an interview with *Newspaper 22* (Revista 22), he uttered the following statement in respect to the lack of resistance against the communist regime: "We did not have the courage to be martyrs."[705]

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[703] See, for example, Cristina Darmina Iarmani. "Fratii mitropolitului Antonie Plamadeala solicita CNSAS dosarul raposatului" [The brothers of Antonie Plamadeala solicit the [Securitate] file of the deceased (Antonie Plamadeala)] in *Romania Libera*, available at http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/fratii-mitropolitului-antonie-plamadeala-solicita-cnsas-dosarul-raposatului-104222, last accessed on June 28, 2018; or Mircea Preda. "Fratii IPS Antonie Plamadeala cer CNSAS acces la intregul dosar al ierarhului" [The brothers of Antonie Plamadeala demand CNSAS the access to the entire [Securitate] files of the hierarch] in *Mediafax.ro*, available at http://www.mediafax.ro/social/fratii-ips-antonie-plamadeala-cer-cnsas-acces-la-intregul-dosar-al-ierarhului-888158, last accessed on June 28, 2018.

[704] "Grade sub Sutane" [Ranks under Sutanas], Mytex.Ro, available at http://www.mytex.ro/component/content/article/546-expres/399282-grade-sub-sutane-patriarhia-vrea-ca-dinescu-sa-fie-trimis-in-judecata.html, last accessed on August 20, 2018.

[705] "We did not have the courage to be martyrs" [Nu am avut curajul să fim martiri] in *Revista 22*, year 1, Nr. 1, 20 January 1990, p. 14, available at https://revista22.ro/storage/arhivapdf/1_1990.pdf, last accessed on May 9, 2019.

But how many are endowed by nature with martyr-like abilities anyways, I should have also responded when asked that unforgettable for me question during the question-answer period. *Who are we to judge?* should have also been part of my answer. Since then, I have been confronted with a similar question by several individuals in Romania. I have always kept silent or pretended that I did not understand. I finally decided to speak, and the first thing I would say is that *the truth is always nuanced*, as I had initially felt compelled to say back in 2015.

This chapter is written partially to respond to this question. It is written for both victims and perpetrators, some of who are no longer alive; some of them were once victims themselves, as this thesis shows. It is for their children and grandchildren who perhaps are asking themselves questions about their ancestors' past. Some may be curious to check the Securitate files of their immediate family members and ask who were they? If they were informers, why did they do the things they did? Was it hard to walk in their shoes? But most importantly, what I am writing here is for a nation that endured a lot during the communist period, as the countless of books that have been published before and after the 1989 Revolution tell us. Perhaps this work can put some of that suffering that these people felt at rest.

The question I was asked at the 2015 conference spoke symbolically of how Romanians today treat collaboration, a subject that is painful and shameful even for some. This question showed me how things about this controversial subject are hushed yet cryptically talked about in ways that tell us that there is still a lot to be said, faced openly, discussed face to face, so that collaboration need not longer be a taboo, the giant elephant in the room that many see and very few dare to speak about. My hope is that this work would desensitize people a bit when talking about this subject. It is time to look critically, honestly, empathetically, humanely and decently at this topic without rushing to pointing fingers and perhaps let those who served as informers, the

files that were written on them and the manuals that trained those who manipulated and tortured them physically and psychologically speak. It is time to let the victims heal as well, and hearing the perpetrators' stories may help a bit.

Most of the talk about collaboration was and is carried out as part of the greater dialogue about lustration. This chapter covers the history of lustration attempts in post-1989 Romania, the key debates around it and the current state of affairs *vis a vis* this topic, as of 2019. In this chapter I also explore how concepts such as prejudice, shame, guilt, stigma and transitional justice relate to the subject of my work. This chapter also seeks to examine how the scholarship brought forth in the previous chapters contributes to further our understanding of collaboration and resistasnce in communist Romania.

History of lustration in Romania

British historian Timothy Garton Ash described the end of the communist era in Eastern Europe as an "extraordinary mishmash, a profound fragmentation and cacophony of interests, attitudes, views, ideals, traditions: what in Polish is called a *miazga*."[706] This quote could not be more descriptive of the post-communist reality in Romania, where the efforts to address the communist regime's repression were met with strong opposition, especially from political groups with ties to the previous regime, and whose ambitions were eyeing Romania's political future. In the cacophonous dialogue on what lustration in post-communist Romania may look like, one thing remains constant: the belief that informers did some bad and even awful things, to put it bluntly. This thesis does not refute this claim, but only endorses it. This work takes it as its

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[706] Cited in Grzegorz Ekiert. "Pecularities of Post-communist Politics: the Case of Poland" in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. XXV, No. 4, December 1992, p. 341. Original quote found in Timothy Garton Ash. "Eastern Europe: Apres le Deluge, Nous," *The New York Review of Books,* August 16, 1990, p. 52.

primary underlying premise based on each it builds its entire discourse. In fact, this chapter asks the question how do we go about dealing with collaboration given that a) their actions were far from laudatory b) many of them were subject to *dossierveillance* and *psuchegraphic* work?

Lustration is a complex concept. There is no single agreed-upon definition of lustration in Romania or the neighbouring Central European countries.[707] Disagreement also exists on how to treat and interpret a country's communist past.[708] Etymologically, the term traces its origin to the Latin noun *lustrum*, which implies a call to make pure something that is soiled, tainted and dark; it is a call for cleansing of something that is somewhat universally agreed as needing of such treatment. So while scholars and politicians alike do not concur on what this cleaning process entails and looks like, most tend to agree on the need to brake with the 'impure' past, even if this brake is purely symbolic.

Besides Romania, many other countries around the world, including Greece, South Africa, and moving on to Argentina, Chile, or Uruguay have attempted to deal with the human rights abuses of their previous despotic regimes.[709] Whereas some of them, such as Spain, sought to 'draw a clean slate',[710] or embrace a 'thick-line' approach[711] advocating for the need to forget the abuses of the previous regime, others, such as South Africa established 'truth commissions.' Although initially met by skepticism from academics and the general public

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[707] Lavinia Stan, "Lustration," in Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky, eds., *The Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1: p. 84.

[708] While the Baltic States have generally demonstrated a strong anti-communist attitude, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine too held their own heated debates on this subject. Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Albania treated this topic less effervescently. Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation have yet to fully and officially denounce communism Cristian Tileaga. *Representing Communism After the Fall. Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 48.

[709] For a detailed account on the history of transitional justice in some of the former Soviet block countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Russia and Lithuania), Latin American countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile) as well as in other European countries as well as Uganda, see, Neil J. Kritz, ed. *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes*, Vols. 1 and 2 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995).

[710] Juan E Mendez. "In Defense of Transitional Justice" in *Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies*, p. 1.

[711] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

alike, these 'truth commissions' managed to provide a somewhat comforting, symbolic "break with the past"[712] wherein uncovering the truth was deemed as more important than delivering justice.[713] The works of Monica Ciobanu,[714] Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu[715] and Cristian Tileaga,[716] forexample, have wrestled with transitional-justice issues *vis a vis* Romania. Their works are employed extensively in this chapter.

Despite the 1989 revolutionary attempts to overthrow the country's communist government, the political events that followed showed, as Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez argued, the "resilience of the ruling elite,"[717] which, according to Monica Ciobanu "attempted to manufacture a narrative of the December 1989 revolution as a complete break with the past…consciously or unconsciously provid[ing] the basis for collective amnesia."[718] Simultaneously, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, survivors of the communist repression and dissidents of the regime, argued for what Ciobanu referred to as the "unfinished revolution,"[719] a phrase also employed by Steven D. Roper in the title of his book on Romanian communist and post-communist history.[720] At the center of this debate lay the following question: whether the revolution culminating with the trial and execution of the

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[712] *Ibid.,* p. 2.

[713] *Ibid.,* p. 2-3.

[714] Monica Ciobanu. "Post-Communist Transitional Justice at 25: Unresolved Dilemmas" in *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series*, Vol. 16 (2014) 2, p. 122.

[715] Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu. *Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 200.

[716] Cristian Tileaga. *Representing Communism After the Fall*: *Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

[717] Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez. "De-Communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe" in *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies,* Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez and Paloma Aguilar, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 218.

[718] Monica Ciobanu. "Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989" in Post-Communist Transitional Justice at 25: Unresolved Dilemmas. In: *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series* 16 (2014), 2, p. 126.

[719] *Ibid*, p. 127.

[720] See Steven D. Roper. *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (Amsterdam: Hardwood Academic, 2000).

Ceaşuescu couple was sufficient to put to rest and reconcile with the communist past.[721] This is a simplistic question, to say the least, an inquiry that ignored the complex and painful reality of generations of Romanians who lived through the terror of communism and whose suffering could not have been possibly wiped out or made even by a regime change.

The Securitate had officially closed its operations in January 1990. At that time, it had roughly 38,000 members and 400,000 informers.[722] Almost a year after the Revolution, the Socialist Labour Party (*Partidul Socialist al Muncii*)[723] emerged from the ruins of the former Communist Party. The Socialist Labour Party was comprised of former high officials of the Communist Party,[724] and won only 3 percent of the vote in the 1992 elections. Sixty-six percent of the vote went to the National Salvation Front (*Frontul Salvării Naţionale*),[725] hereinafter referred to as NSF. The party, comprised of primarily former communist party members and military officials, won sixty-six percent of the vote.[726]

NSF was led by Ion Iliescu whose reputation as a "moderate reformer"[727] gained him the support of military and other former communist officials.[728] Iliescu, a former minster for youth and a high-ranking official of the Communist Party during the communist period, became the

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[721] For a detailed account on the trial and execution of the Ceauşescu couple, see, for example, Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, pp. 41-46.

[722] Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez. "De-Communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe" in *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies,* Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez and Paloma Aguilar, eds. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 236.

[723] *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

[724] Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez. "De-Communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe", p. 235.

[725] Steven D. Roper. *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. xiii.

[726] Anna M. Grzymala-Busse. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 269.

[727] Scott Burris. "Revolution of 1989" in *Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2, Bernard Cook, ed. (New York: Garland, 2001), p. 1080.

[728] In 1992, NSF broke apart, with the more conservative group led by Iliescu becoming the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (*Partidul Democratiei Sociale din Romania* or PDSR). PDSR was not quick to embrace a pro-democratic agenda and was in power until 1997. Anna M. Grzymala-Busse. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*, p. 270.

President of Romania in 1990-96, after securing eighty-five percent of the vote.[729] NSF's strategy to seek out justice for the wrongdoings of the previous regime was by organizing "highly publicized trials"[730] for the Ceauşescu family, including the family's children and a number of former officials of the Communist Party for their part in ordering to fire against the 1989 revolution demonstrations.[731]

Nicu Ceauşescu, the son of the Ceauşescu couple, known for his lavish and luxurious lifestyle, was incarcerated for twenty years. Due to a liver health issue, he was released before the term. His sister Zoë was too jailed, but like her brother released shortly after.[732] Seventeen former high officials of the Communist Party and twenty-one former Securitate officers were tried and accused of complicity in genocide for the crimes committed during the Timişoara events. Like Nicu Ceauşescu, they were all released from jail due to health problems. Iliescu granted them all pardon as well.[733]

Similar "spectacular gestures of breaking with the past,"[734] to quote Gonzalez Enriquez, like the ones organized by NSF, were encountered in Bulgaria, with the imprisonment of Todor Zhivkov (1911-98).[735] Zhivkov was the secretary general of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the country's leader from 1954 until the regime's collapse. Incidentally, in both Bulgaria and Romania, rejection of communism after 1989 was relatively feebler in comparison to other

[729] Anna M. Grzymala-Busse. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*, p. 269.

[730] Edwin Rekosh. "Romania: A Persistent Culture of Impunity" in *Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice*, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 132.

[731] Scott Burris. "Political Parties (1989-97)" in *Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2, Bernard Cook, ed. (New York: Garland, 2001), pp. 1081-1082; and Monica Ciobanu. "Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989", p. 127.

[732] Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez. "De-Communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe" in *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies,* Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez and Paloma Aguilar, eds. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 236.

[733] *Ibid.*

[734] Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez. "De-Communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe," p. 221.

[735] Boian Koulov. "Communist Party of Bulgaria" in *Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe: From the Congress of Vienna to the Fall of Communism*, Richard Frucht, ed. (New York: Garland, 2000), p. 149.

former Soviet-block states.[736] At least for Romania, this is partially explained by the wide membership of Romanians in the Communist Party prior to 1989 and the lack of a strong dissident force that would have continuously nurtured the anti-communist debate in the post-1989 climate.[737]

The trials against the Ceaşuescu family and a few other Party officials, described by Ciobanu as a "cathartic scapegoat mechanism,"[738] did more harm than good, as they led to a "distinctive tone of forgetfulness by avoiding or postponing a real debate over guilt and responsibility for former abuses."[739] For the next decade or so, the lustration debate was almost non-existent in the political arena. The few transitional justice attempts registered until 2005 were, as Ciobanu put it, "minimal" and "symbolic."[740] Article 8 of the Timişoara Declaration of 11 March 1990, for example, requested that the Communist Party leaders and other officials of the former communist regime be banned for a total of twelve years from participating in national elections.[741] Although signed by roughly 4 million people, Article 8 did not lead to any tangible results, except for, as Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher concluded, contributing to the "zero-sum mentality" among the Romanian people, which came about after the regime's collapse.[742]

A similar call for lustration was made by the Civic Alliance (*Alianţa Civică*), roughly a year later. The Civic Alliance's Declaration of National Reconciliation demanded that the former members of the Party's Central Committee, Securitate agents and other individuals who worked

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[736] Roughly 20% of the Romanian population held membership in the Communist Party, which had close to 4 million members. *Ibid.*

[737] Monica Ciobanu. "Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989", p. 128.

[738] *Ibid*, p. 129.

[739] *Ibid*.

[740] *Ibid*, p. 130.

[741] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 91.

[742] Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher. *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans* (London, UK: Routledge, 2000), p. 174.

for the Party in promoting its political and ideological ideals and were remunerated for their work not be granted positions of power in the post-communist state.[743]

The organization later metamorphosed into the Democratic Convention of Romania, led in 1995 by Corneliu Coposu (1914-1995),[744] a former leader of the National Peasant Party[745] who served 17 years in prison[746] during the communist period and was once secretary of Iuliu Maniu (1873-1953).[747] Maniu was Romania's premier in the late 1920s and early 1930s; he was imprisoned by the Communist regime, on treason charges.[748] A year later, Emil Constatinescu took the torch from Coposu and, in 1996, became the country's president. [749]

For the following six years, the lustration debate went somewhat dormant, only to be briefly revived with Emil Constantinescu's 1996 presidential election campaign, which was

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[743] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 91.

[744] *Amintirile Mitropolutului Antonie Plamadeala*. [Memoirs of the Metropolitan Antonie Plamadeala], pp. 170-177.

[745] The National Peasant party emerged din 1926 as a result of the merging of the National Party and the Peasant Party. Lavinia Stan. "From Riches to Rags: The Romanian Christian Democrat Peasant Party" in *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 39, Issue 2, Summer 2005, p. 179.

[746] Robert Levy. *The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), p. 284; Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu. "Mastering vs. Coming to Terms with the Past: A Critical Analysis of Post-Communist Romanian Historiography" in *Narratives Unbound: Historical Studies in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Sorin Antohi, Balazs Trencsenyi, et al. (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007), p. 359; Alan J. Day, Roger East and Richard Thomas. *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe* (London: Europa Publications, 2002), p. 111.

[747] Cristina Petrescu. "The Afterlife of the Securitate: On Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe*, Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou et al. (New York: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 404.

[748] Iuliu Maniu was also the leader of the National Party. The party played a major role in the unification of Transylvania with Romania in 1918. Once leader of the National Party in Transylvania and, later, of the National Peasant Party, Maniu was a very popular figure. During the 1928-1931 years, he was the country's prime minister and played a crucial role in helping the Prince Carol regain his power as a monarch. Maniu supported King Michael's coup against Antonescu in August 1944. With the coming of the communist regime, Maniu was arrested and sentenced to life in prison due to his ties to the Allies during the Second World War. Lavinia Stan. "From Riches to Rags: The Romanian Christian Democrat Peasant Party" in *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 39, Issue 2, Summer 2005, p. 179; Charles King. "Maniu, Iuliu (1873-1953) in *Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2, Bernard Cook, ed. (New York: Garland, 2001), pp. 827-828; and Martin Ebon. *World Communism Today* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 93.

[749] Ben Fowkes. *Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Communist World* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 115

filled with anti-communist rhetoric.[750] In his campaign speeches, Constantinescu, pledged to clean the political elite of former collaborators, only to have changed his mind after the elections were over and his main adversaries, the Social Democrats, defeated.[751]

As Stan explains, after his victory, President Constantinescu claimed that "the very results of the 1996 elections—the alternation in government from the Social Democrats to the Democratic Convention [Constantinescu's Party]—had rendered Article 8 of the Timişoara Declaration obsolete and lustration redundant."[752] The pursuit of lustration, under the new circumstances, would give a bad image to the representatives of the winning party (the Democratic Convention), demonstrating their "weakness, incompetence, and incapacity to use the power given to [them] by the people."[753]

In 1999, the Law 187/1999 on Access to the Securitate Files and the Unveiling of the Securitate as a Political Police, also known as the Ticu Law, was adopted. This law carries the name of Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu,[754] its most intrepid supporter, who first introduced it two years earlier.[755] Albeit without much legal effect in its application, the Ticu Law granted for the first time access to Securitate files to Romanian citizens and citizens of the former Romanian Kingdom. However, since these documents remained in the ownership of the Romanian Intelligence Service, very few if any incriminating files were made public. Solely documents that

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[750] Constantinescu won this election with roughly 55 percent of the vote, with Iliescu securing less than 46 percent. Ian Jeffries. *East Europe at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to the Economies in Transition* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 42.

[751] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 92.

[752] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[753] Cited in *Ibid.*

[754] This law was first published in "Monitorul Official" Part I, Nr. 603, issued on December 9, 1999. The content of law is available online, at http://www.cdep.ro/legislatie/eng/vol44eng.pdf, last accessed on May 4, 2019. *A Political Chronology of Europe*, first ed. Europa publishers, eds. (London: Europa Publishers, 2001), p. 254.

[755] Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu was at that time the president of Association of Former Political Prisoners, as well as a senator in Romania's parliament. Edwin Rekosh. "Romania: A Persistent Culture of Impunity" in *Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice*, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 139-140.

presented no threat to the 'national security' were disclosed, a strategy deliberately put in place to protect the political officials with a tainted communist past.[756]

With the release of Securitate documents to the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS), however, compromising information, mostly about members of the anti-communist National Liberal Party (Partidul National Liberal),[757] such as Alexandru Paleologu,[758] were first revealed to the public. Paleologu was a member of the famous Noica-Pilat group, comprised of Romanian intellectuals. To remind the reader, Noica is the philosopher discussed at greater length in chapter 3.

Paleologu was imprisoned for his connection to the group. The alleged motif for his arrest was his connection with a book written by the historian of religions Mircea Eliade, who was then residing in Chicago. Paleologu also signed a letter written in 1989 by several other intellectuals, in which criticism was voiced against Ceaşuescu's cultural policies. Radio Free Europe broadcasted the content of the in March of 1989. In the book that Palelogu co-authored with Stelian Tanase, he confirms his collaboration with the Securitate, after his release from prison.[759]

But it was not until 2006 that communism itself came on "trial" in Romania, to quote Ticu Dumitrescu.[760] A Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship

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[756] Monica Ciobanu. "Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989", p. 130.

[757] The National Liberal Party dates from 1848 but was dissolved in 1947, with the establishment of the communist regime. It was brought back in Romania's political sphere in January of 1990. Alan J. Day, Roger East and Richard Thomas. *A Political and Economic History of Eastern Europe* (London: Europa Publications, 2002), p. 402.

[758] See Alexandru Paleologu and Stelian Tanase. *Sfidarea Memoriei* (Bucharest: Du style, 1996). Cristina Petrescu. "The Afterlife of the Securitate: on Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe*, Maria Todorova, August Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds. (New York: Central European University, 2010), p. 395.

[759] Monica Ciobanu. "Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989", p. 130.

[760] In a note to the parliament, Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu articulated his justification for his fight in the following manner: "The trial of communism, in its correct and complete sense, pursues restoration of the historic truth, the recuperation of the memory of our past, of the sense of social justice with a view to the moral curing and civil and political emancipation of our people. The trial of communism is, in fact, a condition of democratization,

(*Comisia Prezidenţială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România*) in Romania was convened to assess the gravity of the regime the 1989 revolution sought to overthrow.[761] A definite catalyst in its production was Romania's entry into the European Union in the following year, the pursuit of which brought the task of coming to terms with communism to high immediacy.[762] President Traian Basescu's Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship issued an extensive close to 700 pages long report on the crimes and abuses of Romania's communism. The report officially declared communism as "illegal, illegitimate and criminal."[763]

"The formal (official) condemnation of communism in Romania," writes Tileaga, "primarily based on researching physical archives of the communist regime, has offered only a limited framework for driving historical redress and social justice forward."[764] Despite the veracity behind the voluminous document the Commission produced, with the help of the foremost scholars on the subject of Romanian communism,[765] this document as Ciobanu argues, "provoked virulent political reactions and generally poisoned the political climate."[766] A year later, it was declared unconstitutional.[767]

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the Romanian revolution's last chance." Cited in Edwin Rekosh. "Romania: A Persistent Culture of Impunity" in *Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice*, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 139-140.

[761] *Comisia Prezientiala pentru Analiza dictaturii Comuniste din Romania* [Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship] (Bucharest:Humanitas 2006).

[762] In 2006, Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism was also established. One of its functions is to conduct judicial proceedings against former Securitate collaborators. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[763] Monica Ciobanu. "Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989", p. 132. The report, led by historian Vladimir Tismaneanu, may be accessed online, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-tismaneanu-commission-presents-the-final-report-romanian-communism, last accessed on May 4, 2019.

[764] Cristian Tileaga. *Representing Communism After the Fall*: *Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 117.

[765] The members of the commission who produced the report were: Sorin Alexandrescu, Mihnea Berindei, Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, Radu Filipescu, Virgil Ierunca, Sorin Ilieşiu, Gail Kligman, Monica Lovinescu, Nicolae Manolescu, Marius Oprea, H.-R. Patapievici, Dragoş Petrescu, Andrei Pippidi, Romulus Rusan, Levente Salat, Stelian Tănase, Cristian Vasile, Alexandru Zub. *Ibid.*

[766] Monica Ciobanu. "Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989", p. 132.

[767] *Ibid.*

The attacks were especially vociferous from the part of the right-wing Greater Romania Party, led by Corneliu Vadim Tudor,[768] who had once described Ceauşescu as a "god."[769] Described by William Crowther as a "tenacious politician and a skilled agitator,"[770] Vadim Tudor's "extremist"[771] approach to politics gained him also the notorious titles of being both the "Jean-Marie Le Pen of Romania" as well as the "emblematic representative of Romanian anti-Semitism."[772] As Stan explains, "Post-communist Romania experienced elite reproduction, not replacement."[773] With close to half of the country's post-1989 legal representatives having had political roles in the communist government, their resistance to change or to lustration, as it was the case for Vadim Tudor, can be explained, by their personal interest in covering their own ties to the former communist regime.

In this respect, Mona Musca's story, however, is an exception. In 2005, as a member of the Romanian Parliament, she initiated a draft of the Lustration Law, similar in scope and intent to the Timişoara Declaration. Her case is an interesting one not because the draft was later blocked in Parliament, but because she initiated a law that, if it would have been ratified, would have definitely ended her own political career, from which she, in an unexpected turn of events, resigned after CNSAS declared her a collaborator during the communist regime.[774] "Though a

[768] *Ibid*. Peter H. Maerkl and Leonard Weinberg. "Introduction" in *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 7.

[769] Dennis Deletant. Ceauşescu *and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 204.

[770] William Crowther. "The European Union and Romania" in *The European Union and Democratization*, Paul J. Kubicek, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 102.

[771] Milada Anna Vachudova. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 166.

[772] Szilvia Peremiczky. "The Rising Ghosts of a Calamitous Inheritance in Hungary and Romania" *Resurgent Antisemitism: Global Perspectives*, Alvin H. Rosenfield, ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), p. 187.

[773] Lavinia Stan. "Witch-hunt or Moral Rebirth? Romanian Parliamentary Debates on Lustration" in *East European Politics and Societies*, 26 (2012), p. 276.

[774] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, pp. 79-80; and Andreea Maierean. "The Unbearable Burden of Forgetting. Lustration in Post-Communist Romania" in *Perspectives on Memory and Identity*, ed. B. Marrin and K. Hammerstein, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, Vol. 28, available at,

formal connection between Musca and the secret police existed, the media could not prove that she provided consequential or harmful information," write Maria Bucur and Mihaela Miroiu. "The same outlets failed to go after male public figures who undisputedly informed and sometimes even lied to the secret police," Bucur and Miroiu further point out.[775]

In 2006, CNSAS came under fire, most likely for its role in uncovering the past of political elites like Musca. The mastermind behind the attempts to shut it down was the media mogul Dan Voiculescu, a former Securitate informer and leader of the Conservative Party.[776] "The National Council for the Supervision [Study] of the Securitate Archives," writes Tom Gallagher, was effectively disabled by Parliament in 2008 after it had ruled that Dan Voiculescu, who owns the most influential media trust in the country and is a parliamentary deputy, was an informer before 1989."[777]

Despite Voiculescu's attempts to dissolve it, CNSAS' future was salvaged, but not without amending its role. Under new legislation, CNSAS would continue to administer and grant access to files to Romanian citizens and independent scholars. However, it would have no say in officially setting verdicts concerning one's collaboration with the Securitate. This task would be transferred to the courts. Thus, after 2008, CNSAS became primarily a repository of

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http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxviii/andreea-maierean/, last accessed on May 4, 2019.

[775] Maria Bucur and Mihaela Miroiu. *Birth of Democratic Citizenship: Women and Power in Modern Romania* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2018), p. 160.

[776] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 96; Peter Bajomi-Lazar. *Party Colonisation of the Media in Central and Eastern Europe* (New York: Central European University Press, 2014), p. 161.

[777] Tom Gallagher. "Incredible Voyage: Romania's Communist Heirs Adapt and Survive After 1989" in *The End and the Beginning: The Revolution of 1989 and the Resurgence of History*, Vladimir Tismaneanu and Bogdan C. Iacob, eds (New York: Central European University Press, 2012), p. 528.

archives with mostly administrative duties,[778] while maintaining its right to reveal to the public findings concerning collaboration in the communist era.[779]

Furthermore, CNSAS' cultural initiatives to shed light on the country's communist history[780] as well as the access to files by the general, overseen by CNSAS, led to what Horne referred to as "silent" or "informal" lustration.[781] Carried out in a political climate largely unfriendly to initiatives with this scope in mind,[782] this "informal" lustration resonates closely to what Michael De Certeau described as a "tactic." A "tactic," the way De Certeau describes it, is a means to confront power by the seemingly disadvantaged via the usage of trickery, or what he referred to as "ruse": "It [the tactic] must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers… It is a guileful ruse."[783] Unlike official "strategies," which de Certeau implies are a "subject of will and power,"[784] and which in the case of Romania would have been initiated by its post 1989 political elite, these "tactics," originate primarily from the part of civic organizations, former dissidents and political prisoners, CNSAS, as well as from Romanian citizens who accessed their own Securitate files in search for answers about their past. Such "tactics" have brought Romania a step closer to uncovering its own communist past.

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[778] Lavinia Stan, *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania*, p. 96; and Silviu Brucan. *Social Change in Russia and Eastern Europe: From Party Hacks to Nouveaux Riches* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 88.

[779] Cynthia Horne. "Silent Lustration" Public Disclosures as Informal Lustration Mechanisms in Bulgaria and Romania" in *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 62, May (2015), pp. 131-144.

[780] CNSAS's efforts to increase awareness of the abuses and crimes of Romania's communist regime include: the organization of annual national conferences and exhibitions on Romania's communist era; its Oral History Centre, established 2010, and its digitization of files pertaining to Romania's communist gulags. Cynthia Horne. "Silent Lustration" Public Disclosures as Informal Lustration Mechanisms in Bulgaria and Romania," pp. 131-144.

[781] *Ibid.*, pp. 131-144.

[782] *Ibid.*

[783] Cited in Jeff Smith. *Film Criticism, the Cold War, and the Blacklist: Reading the Hollywood Reds* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2014), p. 192.

[784] Cited in Michelle Ballif. *Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman with the Rhetorical Figure* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2001), p. 13.

On 28 February 2012, Romania's Chamber of Deputies passed a new draft law on lustration,[785] "twenty-two years too late,"[786] as an article in *VoxEurop* put it. By then, a majority of those who would have been affected by this law had reached or were about to attain retirement,[787] making this legislation practically "anachronistic,"[788] at best an attempt at "moral rebirth"[789] to quote Stan. As of 2019, Romania has no lustration law in place. As shown here, the country's circuitous and agonizing pursuit for lustration came with a series of fallbacks and heated debates concerning its legitimacy, relevance and constitutionality in the post-Communist climate. We will now examine the arguments for and against lustration that fuelled these debates.

The lustration debate

Lustration, democratization and de-victimization

When it comes to former Soviet bloc countries, the vetting of public officials holding power in a post-communist context is often described as intrinsically linked with "post-Communist democratization" [790] thereby ensuring "political legitimacy" or "public trust" in the post-communist regime. [791] For Matt Killingsworth, "failure to lustrate is bound to corrupt the foundations of the newly established democratic system." For Mendez, the "obligation to punish" may jeopardize the very feeble foundations of the democratic system it seeks to protect,

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[785] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe*, p. 96.
[786] "Lustration act adopted—22 years too late" in VoxEurop, available at http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/1563541-lustration-act-adopted-22-years-too-late, last accessed on May 5, 2016.
[787] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe*, p. 96.
[788] Andreea Nicolae, Elena Vijulie and Dan Alexe. "Lustration comes to Romania –but will the law be applied?" in *Euobserver*, available at https://euobserver.com/news/30175, last accessed on May 5, 2019.
[789] Lavinia Stan. "Witch-hunt or Moral Rebirth? Romanian Parliamentary Debates on Lustration" in *East European Politics and Societies* (6 April 2011), available at http://eep.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/04/05/08 88325411403922.abstract, last accessed on May 5, 2019.
[790] Matt Killingsworth. "Lustration after Totalitarianism: Poland's Attempt to Reconcile with its Communist Past", p. 279.
[791] *Ibid.*

thus "put[ting] at risk the existence of democracy itself or prevent[ing] the possibility of a genuine reconciliation between old enemies."[792]

A regime change brings with it a renewed collective understanding, or, at least, an apparent agreement on what these 'old enemies' represent. Former foes become now, literally overnight, a nation's new heroes, and former heroes— its new foes. Moreover, former enemies of a regime, as it is the case of communist Romania, are identified now as its long forgotten victims. Lustration, in this case, is argued for as a way to honor the former regime's victims, to speak on their behalf and tell their story, thereby bringing them justice, albeit symbolically. Thus, lustration, as Mendez argues, can serve as a means to "uphold the rule of law and to remain faithful to the principle that criminal law in a democracy protects the innocent and the powerless," hence demonstrating to the "victims of state-sponsored abuses …that their plight has not gone unheeded."[793]

This argument is often met by a refuting claim questioning whether justice can be brought to victims and their suffering, be alleviated, by merely removing officials from power for having had caused them to suffer. Suffering is not tangible or self-evident; it is a private affair, involving various mental and emotional states of which probably only the most adroit of psychiatrists or philosophers can speak with some sense of certitude. *The Report of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania* claims that roughly two million Romanians have been imprisoned, deported, confined into labor camps during its communist period.[794] Many more suffered as a result of their imprisonment, because

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[792] Juan E Mendez. "In Defense of Transitional Justice" in *Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies*, p. 6.

[793] *Ibid.*

[794] Vladimir Tismaneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile et al, eds. *Raport final: Comisia Prezidentiala Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Romania*, [Final report: The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania], available at http://old.presidency.ro/static/rapoarte/Raport_final_CPADCR.pdf, last accessed on May 10, 2018, p. 160.

most of them must have had at least a family member, friend or neighbor who waited in agony for their return and/or were under the surveillance of the Securitate.

As suggested earlier, I am not trying to quantify suffering here, which would be both misleading and also grossly inappropriate, but only to show the degree in which communist repression and collaboration affected Romanians (and not only). Political prisoners, for example, could have ended up in jail as a result of a denunciation from a neighbor or an informer assigned to spy on them.[795]

The fact that trauma is a highly subjective concept makes it close to impossible to pinpoint with full certainty the impact one's deleterious actions may have onto another human being, especially when one's action was part of a chain of events implicating other people, in the process. Furthermore, if lustration is also argued for not only to defend a former regime's victims, but also to deter future abuses of power by other state officials, two important questions are often raised: first, whether this type of punishment is necessarily conducive to prevent future abuses of power, and second, whether victims ought to demand retribution if their voice is not reflective of that of the majority. Those in favor of punishment for the sake of deterrence, tend to argue that although victims should be recognized and defended, in the case where they represent a mere minority, they should not receive "an effective veto power," to use the words of Juan Mendez, over the decision of the majority on how it may want to reckon with its past.[796]

Lustration and cleansing of the state from the communist political elite

Lustration is also cited as a means to prevent the former elite from holding positions of power in the post-communist government, something that Stan referred to as an "elite replacement

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[795] See, for example, the memoir of Galina Raduleanu. *Repetitie la moarte…din spatele gratiilor* [Repetition at Death…from Behind Bars], (Pitesti: Fundatia Sfintii Inchisori, 2013).

[796] Juan E Mendez. "In Defense of Transitional Justice" in *Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies*, p. 6

tool."[797] The issue with this approach is the potential damage it may bring to a nascent democratic regime in dire need for the professional skills of the former Soviet *nomenklatura*, skills that may not be able to be put to good use in bringing about a smooth regime change if lustration is implemented.[798] Following the same logic, Verginia Vedinas, a Romanian Law Professor, argues that many of these former communist officials were "valuable individuals, perceptive intellectuals and great patriots;" not granting them the right to hold positions of power in a post-communist environment would be against the country's constitutional values.[799]

But there is more than the constitutional principles lustration would go against, according Vedinas. Lustration, according to her, would sentence to punishment "an entire historical period of Romania" when in fact "history is our past, and we must assume it, with all its good and bad features."[800] Vedinas further maintains that "nobody has the moral standing to condemn the communist leaders and deny the right to a future."[801] Only history can assess their culpability, making lustration an "impractical" attempt to bring about justice, attempt which "runs against the European spirit of diversity, including ideological diversity."[802]

Vedinas' arguments remind one of the words of Egon Krenz, the last communist leader of the GDR, who described his trial as an attempt to "settle the historic conflict between capitalism and socialism."[803] By doing so, he may have implied that lustration is an ineffective quest to bring justice from a point of view of a system of values that does not reflect the times

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[797] Lavinia Stan. "Witch-hunt or Moral Rebirth? Romanian Parliamentary Debates on Lustration" in *East European Politics and Societies*, 26 (2012), p. 285.

[798] Cited in Padraig McAuliffe. "Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect Couple or Awkward Bedfellows?" in *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 2 (2) 2010, p. 134 .

[799] Cited in Lavinia Stan. "Witch-hunt or Moral Rebirth? Romanian Parliamentary Debates on Lustration," p. 285.

[800] Cited in *Ibid.*, p 288.

[801] Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 290.

[802] Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 289.

[803] Juan E Mendez. "In Defense of Transitional Justice" in *Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies*, p. 21.

during which the crimes in question occurred. By this token, following Krenz' point of view, courts are incapable to 'settle' such 'historical conflicts.'

True, at best, courts can facilitate the pursuit for truth, but they cannot settle the debate on what a nation's historical truth represents. As Mendez puts it, courts "can help advance a more enlightened debate about a historic conflict if they limit their task to deciding the veracity of facts that constitute crimes and individual responsibility for criminal conduct."[804] However, even if the courts rightfully identify the culprits, the removal of former political elite resembles, as Polish historian Adam Michnik argues, to a purge, similar to the ways in which the Bolsheviks had dealt with the Tsar and the bourgeois layer of society:

> This philosophy of de-communizing [lustration] was drawing directly on the Bolshevik principle according to which so-called representatives of the bourgeois order and the Tsarist regime would be deprived of citizens' rights. In other words, the only ones entitled to run for a seat in parliament were those permitted to do so by the new rulers.[805]

Lustration and post-communist social and economic stability

On a more tangible dimension, at least for Romania, lustration is argued for as a means to avoid social unrest. Romanian politician Eugen Nicolaescu, for example, pointed out that the revolt of Valea Jiului miners in 1990[806] could have been prevented if "Romania had a lustration law."[807] The quest for total answerability, with the intention of preventing social unrest, leads, however, to more turmoil rather than less. As former Argentine President Alfosin summed it up: "It would be irrational to impose a punishment when the consequences of doing so, far from preventing

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[804] *Ibid.*, p. 20

[805] Cited in Adam Czarnota. "Human rights and Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe" in *Towards Recognition of Minority Groups: Legal and Communication Strategies,*" Marie Zirk-Sadowski, Bartosz Wojciechowski, and Karolina M. Cern (London: Routldege, 2014), p. 204.

[806] In June of 1990, thousands of Valea Jiului miners came to Bucharest, in support of the newly elected government, led by Iliescu. There, the miners carried out vandalizing attacks against representatives of the opposition, as well as terrorized citizens on the streets of Romania's capital. Liliana Pop. *Democratising Capitalism? The Political economy of post-communist transformations in Romania, 1989-2001* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 33.

[807] Lavinia Stan. "Witch-hunt or Moral Rebirth? Romanian Parliamentary Debates on Lustration," p. 283.

future crimes, may cause greater social harm than that caused by the crime itself or by the absence of punishment."[808]

Some have brought up the economic advantage component in arguing for the need for lustration, alluding to the fact that passing a lustration law may have had expedited the process of integration into the European Union (EU) for other former Soviet bloc countries that obtained entrance into the EU before Romania obtained hers (2007). Others have instead pointed that Romania is facing more pressing economic issues, including corruption, to make lustration a national priority. As Vadim Tudor famously put it, "anticommunism is useless to hungry people,"[809] thus indirectly alluding to Maslow's understanding of human needs and the inherent priority the necessity to satisfy one's basic concerns for survival has over that of the pursuit of matters of the heart.

Lustration, forgiveness and reconciliation

But on a more humane level, lustration can be seen as a way to break the silence that comes with enduring the emotional trauma obtained from being a victim of a dictatorial regime. As Kora Andrieu argues, "silence is in fact a major danger in the aftermath of mass atrocity as democracies can only be founded on unfettered communication and a public domain intent on rationale discourse."[810] To reach any kind of rapprochement, the involved parties, both the perpetrators and the victims, ought to engage in some sort of a dialogue, in a milieu reflective of shared language or space. Lustration may not heal all the social wounds, but it may, at least, recognize them, thereby helping commence the healing process. As Jacques Derrida argues,

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[808] Cited in *Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect Couple?,* p. 133.
[809] Cited in Lavinia Stan. "Witch-hunt or Moral Rebirth? Romanian Parliamentary Debates on Lustration," p. 289.
[810] Kora Andrieu. "Political liberalism after mass violence: John Rawls and a theory of 'transitional justice'", in *Transitional Justice Theories*, Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck and Christian Braun (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 98.

"Even if I say 'I don't forgive you,' to someone who asks my forgiveness, but whom I understand and who understands me, then the process of reconciliation has started."[811]

A post-lustration era?

At the time of the writing of this work, it is a bit too late now to talk about a possible lustration law to be adopted in Romania. Thirty years have passed since the outbreak of the bloody 1989 December revolution that took the lives of more than a thousand people and culminated with the execution of Ceaşuescu and his wife by a firing squad after a brief televised show trial. Since then, many things have changed in Romania and many remained the same. Many of the former regime's perpetrators have passed away or are long retired. So are many of its victims.

In December 1989, when Romanians rushed to the streets to protest against Ceaşuescu's dictatorship, they took a stand not only against the dire economic situation in which they lived but also against the very system that deprived them of basic rights and freedoms. This revolt, however, was only a stepping-stone towards actual retribution, the road to which Romania has not yet fully traversed. Post-communist Romania was left not only with the task of transitioning towards democracy, a process entailing numerous economic, judicial and political challenges and reforms. It was also left with a nation struggling to reckon with its communist past and the human rights violations it caused upon generations of Romanians who lived behind the Iron Curtain. Yet, although a lustration law is a bit too late, measures to heal those who have suffered from the former regime ought to be still taken aggressively. Things should not be placed under the rug.[812]

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[811] Cited in *Ibid.*

[812] This paragraph first appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. The Securitate File as a Record of Psuchegraphy"

Romania is in a *post-lustration* phase, I argue. *Post-lustration* is a period that comes after a time when a lustration law would be too anachronistic to be set in place. *Post-lustration* means that things can still be salvaged somehow and bold measures can be still taken with this aim in mind. This work can be one of such undertakings. In the previous chapters, I provided the history of communism in this country, as well as the roadmap of how ordinary people were transformed into informers and a society was kept under fear. Securitate's *psuchegraphic* work on its targets and *dossierveillance* were like a poison dumped into a nation. Given in small doses, this cocktail can, perhaps, bring some order to chaos. In large doses, however, it became deleterious and fatal, literally, for some who had risked their lives in trying to escape or had committed suicide.

One of the stories in Slavenka Drakulic's *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* is about a woman in former Yugoslavia who had taken her of life out of despair.[813] "There are so many ways of escaping," writes Domnica Radulescu in her semi-autobiographical account *Train to Trieste* about her escape from Romania during Ceaşuescu's reign. "People escape all the time. I'll have to find a way, too, by sea, by train, by plane. Walking, swimming, riding, crawling across the border. Anything. At least in that respect the choices seem numerous."[814]

Ceaşuescu's world was in some ways an absurd world, similar to that of Ludvik Jahn from Kundera's *The Joke* and that encountered by a young Canadian of 18 years old visiting Romania in 1971. This young man had asked his Romanian acquaintance the following intriguing question that caught the attention of the Securitate: "what would happen to him if he would scream out loud the slogan "Down with Ceaşuescu in a public piazza, to which he [the

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in *Journal of Biography, Vol. 42, Nr. 3,* special issue on "Biographic Mediation: The Uses of Disclosure in Bureaucracy and Politics" : Summer 2019 (*forthcoming*).
[813] Slavenka Drakulic. *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed.* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992).
[814] Domnica Radulescu. *Train to Trieste*. (Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), p. 122.

acquaintance] responded that the competent organs would take him and place him in hospital telling that he suffers from a mental illness,"[815] a Securitate document states. Similar to the man in the piazza, in his trial, the Ludvik Jahns of Romania under Ceaşuescu lived in a Kafkaesquian world, and who encountered the same absurdity and confusion that K. does in Kafka's *The Trial*.

For Ludvik, it was the innocent note written on a postcard addressed to Marketa that transformed him into an enemy of the state. "Optimism is the opium of the People!" is the first line from this note that echoes Marx's description of the role of religion in society. "A healthy atmosphere stinks of stupidity!" the joke continues. "Long Live Trotsky! Ludvik!"[816] The innocent exchange became a grave *faux pas* in the eyes of the regime, whose *modus operandi* is clothed in secrecy. Ludvik's life is forever changed because of a few witty lines that were meant to remain private.[817]

Hence, when we think about how to treat the informers of the Securitate, one ought to keep these two examples in mind as well. Perhaps it is time to make a safe space for former informers like Sorin Antohi, whose case is discussed next, to come forward without fear, to tell their story, that now can be understood hopefully slightly better given the reader's awareness of how the Securitate managed to succesfully create its vast surveillance network, as described in chapters 2 and 3.

The case of Sorin Antohi

In 2006, Antohi, a well-known historian and essayist had officially confirmed that he had been a collaborator with the Securitate, having had worked under the nickname "Valentin." Antohi's

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[815] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D013434 Vol. 028, p. 63.
[816] Milan Kundera. *The Joke.* Michael Henry Heim, trans. (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1983), p. 26. Cited in Richard Clark Stern. *Dark Mirror: The Sense of Injustice In Modern European and American Literature* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), p. 206.
[817] Sorin Radu Cucu. *The Underside of Politics: Global Fictions in the Fog of the Cold War* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), pp. 82-86.

experience with the Securitate was far from a simple one. One Romanian article cites him having made the following comment about the way in which he operated under this nickname: "I reported on them, at times, with death in my soul, but I never betrayed them" (*i-am turnat, uneori, cu moartea în suflet, dar nu i-am trădat niciodată*).[818]

This is a powerful statement indeed that sheds light on the way in which some collaborators have sought to justify their own actions in times when the line between the wrong and the right were indeed blurry, or, it may have even dissolved itself altogether into the abyss of moral ambiguity that some have embraced as a mere survival mechanism. Cristian Tileaga, in *Representing Communism After the Fall. Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress* provides the full account of his confession:

> I have signed an engagement of collaboration with the Securitate on 29th March 1976, when I was a pupil in my last high-school year (I was born on 20th Aug 1957), as a result of about three weeks of pressures [likely psuchegraphic work done on Antohi]. Approximately between 1976 and 1982, with irregular intermittences, of which one of over one year and a half, I provided the Securitate information notes under the conspiratorial name of 'Valentin'. I informed in writing to the Securitate about some of [my] friends and some of my acquaintances, without warning them, without confessing to them *post-festum* until my writing of this text, without apologizing, without assuming publicly this shameful and painful past. I informed on them sometimes, with death in my soul, but I never betrayed them: I have not been an agent provocateur; I have not received missions of any kind; I have not been promised and there have not been advantages created for me; none of my information notes has gone beyond generalities and information which I considered already known; during all this time I remained hostile to the Securitate and the party-state; they responded likewise. Between 1974 and 1989, the Securitate received information on me from other informers, and at specific junctures they opened "Information Surveillance Dossiers" (dosare de urmărire informativă—D.U.I). So, for fifteen years, I went through the first and the last of the three situations in which a citizen of he RSR could find himself in as far as the Securitate was concerned (if the individual was not a direct part of its apparatus): (1) informed on (2) informer (3) informer-informed on—this sketchy typology of the informer will be detailed as one goes along. In these pages, I will briefly tell my story and I will reconstitute schematically several relevant episodes, relying on memory, personal notes from the time and of some archival documents hosted by the CNSAS and requested by me in August 2002. Until the present moment, after the more recent reception by the CNSAS of an enormous quantity of dossiers, these are the only available documents regarding me. Ethically and morally, confession and repentance are coming too late: to the gravity of my deeds from 25-30 years ago, one can add the indefeasible gravity of silence, of life lived in lie and duplicity. Only psychologically and historically (from ego-history, through micro-history, to history) it is better *too* late than never.[819]

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[818] George Onofrei. "Cazul 'Antohi'—de la iertare la falimentul ideii morale" in Suplimentul de Cultura, available at http://suplimentuldecultura.ro/329/cazul-antohi-de-la-iertare-la-falimentul-ideii-morale/, last accessed on January 20, 2019.

[819] Cited in Cristian Tileaga. *Representing Communism After the Fall. Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress*, pp. 132-133.

Responses to Antohi's confession varied greatly. Below are a few of them: Some responses, like

the ones below, condemn communism and are supportive of Antohi:

1. "This biographical draft expresses the extreme pathology of a world (communist and post-communist) more than a personal weakness."[820]

2. "Sorin Antohi's confession contributes to that moral clarity that I have constantly championed."[821]

3. "We must know the entrails of the dictatorial system and understand its enormity in order to establish the right measure of guilt."[822]

4. "Choosing, at last, to talk about his own degradation, Sorin Antohi is on the road to a too long postponed redemption."[823]

5. "It seems to me that the merit of soring Antohi's confession is that gives us the possibility to nuance things. We would have proceeded with axe in hand: those are bad, those are good!"[824]

Others responses call on refraining to judge:

6. "Early? Late? How can we measure the time of pain, fear, shame?...Those who know the answer should throw the stone, 'cos [sic] the hand needs a justification!...as with regards to mistakes? Who is without?"[825]

7. "We, the moralist and moralizing people, I don't think we quite have our hands clean to accuse. Of course we can observe, we can know and we can evaluate, we can demand and we can draw conclusions. Maybe we could look at ourselves and show more decency."[826]

8. "It's been 24 hours since I received Sorin's letter, I cannot quite come to my senses. I knew he had "file problems," a few months ago I was even certain, but I was shocked of what he went through…"[827]

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[820] *Ibid.,* p. 196.
[821] *Ibid.,*
[822] *Ibid.,* p. 195.
[823] *Ibid.,* p. 194.
[824] *Ibid.,*
[825] *Ibid.,* p. 194.
[826] *Ibid.*
[827] *Ibid.,* p. 189.

9. "I am perplexed and saddened. At the moment I am too shocked to comment coherently…It's good he had the strength to do it, even if so late."[828]

While some provided a harsh and disparaging treatment of Antohi:

10. "…the so-called 'confession of the great intellectual' spilled melodramatically in the media, now, that his uncovering was imminent, it is just the most recent indication of the hypocrisy with which Sorin Antohi treats his public, his friends himself."[829]

11. "Why is it so hard to understand that Sorin Antohi is an opportunist through and through, raised with communist morals and models. Once a traitor, always a traitor…he knew that his day of reckoning was near when people find out what human stuff he is made of?"[830]

The goal of this chapter is not to attempt to reconcile these voices. It is neither to change one's mind. Everyone has one's right to one's interpretation. My goal is to explain how the scholarship provided in this thesis may help see this subject in a more nuanced manner. But, in the end, it is up to the reader to decide which road to take.

My hope is that each and everyone who reads this and, especially those who lived some of the things described in this thesis, may come to term with their *own* past. I do not believe it is possible to come to terms with *the* past, for there is no *one* past to look at. *The* past is always an illusion: that is the beauty of doing history and the greatest of challenges in doing so. "As [Lavinia] Stan has shown," Tileaga writes, "one of the most enduring myths of transitional justice continues to be the idea that the 'past belongs to historians.'"[831] The past belongs first and foremost to those who lived it. They hold their own truth on what took place. Those who try to interpret it and never lived that past aim to get as close as possible to the truth. Some get closer than others, in this sense.

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[828] *Ibid.,*
[829] *Ibid.,* p. 190.
[830] *Ibid.,*
[831] *Ibid.,* p. 277.

How does the scholarship the scholarship introduced in chapters 2 and 3 shed more light on collaboration and resistance?

A new definitional understanding of collaboration and resistance

The scholarship on the *psuchegraphic* work carried out by the Securitate and *dossierveillance* presented in this thesis demands first and foremost for a new and more complex definition of collaboration. In Romania, collaboration is, as of 2008, determined by the courts, based on information in Securitate files and interviews carried with the persons who are accused of collaboration.[832] To be considered a collaborator, one's collaborative work with the Securitate, as Horne puts it, must be a function of "individual deeds and proof beyond a reasonable doubt concerning the infringement of fundamental rights and liberties." [833]

Evidence alone of one's association with the Securitate would not necessarily make one a collaborator.[834] In addition, for one to be classified as a collaborator, written proof must be provided that one was remunerated, often financially, from collaboration, and has agreed to collaborate without being coerced to do so. According CNSAS Vice President Adrian Cioflânca, in Romania, the application of these three criteria would render roughly half of the individuals with a Securitate file as having *not* collaborated with the secret police. [835]

The criteria used to ascertain whether one collaborated depict, however, a rather narrow image of what collaboration actually entailed, thus, failing to put into evidence the complexities of this phenomenon. These criteria, as shown in this thesis, wrongly assume: that all collaborators were consciously aware of the level and degree of harm their actions may have caused unto others; that they acted with deliberate intent to do harm, and that their work was conducted out of free will and for the sake of personal gain. Furthermore, collaboration, in this case, is wrongly treated similarly to an employment position, amounting to a win-win situation of some sort, a mere exchange

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[832] Lavinia Stan. *Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania* p. 98.
[833] Cynthia Horne. "Silent Lustration" Public Disclosures as Informal Lustration Mechanisms in Bulgaria and Romania" in *Problems of Post-Communism*, p. 136.
[834] *Ibid.*
[835] *Ibid.*

wherein one reaped the benefits of the service(s) provided while the other obtained financial remuneration or some social or professional benefit for oneself or one's loved ones. While at a given instance, the engagement between the agent and the informer may look like a win-win situation, from which both obtained some gain, this type of association, as shown in this chapter, did not always commence on equal footing. In many instances, and as shown in this thesis, the reality behind collaboration with the Securitate was considerably more complex.[836]

The word *collaboration*, I propose here, should stand for the totality of actions of all the individuals belonging to this surveillance network, actions connected to their *active* and *conscious* engagement, carried out in a coerced or voluntary capacity, or a mix of both, done while subject to *psuchegraphic* work inflicted by the Securitate. Resistance, then, ought to imply as well the refusal to succumb to any type of *psuchegraphic* work inflicted by the Securitate, and, during the Ceaușescu era, refusal to succumb to the potentially tormenting effects of *dossierveillance*, while actively denouncing communism.

Still, by defining these phenomena as such, I acknowledge the linguistic limitations in doing so. We, scholars, are yet to find the accurate wording for such complex phenomena: "Everything we [philosophers] do consists in trying to find the liberating word (*erloesende Wort*),"[837] once uttered Ludwig Wittgenstein in a dialogue carried out with Mortiz Schlick. Historians concerned with these topics may agree with Wittgenstein's point. When it comes to understanding these topics by taking into account the "complexities"[838] of life under dictatorships, to quote Dominique LaCapra, its "limit events,"[839] we, historians, are still searching for the 'liberating word(s),' as the

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[836] An earlier version of this paragraph first appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.

[837] Matthew B. Ostrow. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Dialectical Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 1.

[838] Dominic LaCapra. *History and Memory after Auschwitz,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 42.

[839] *Ibid.*

one we use now may be in fact more limiting rather than offering some liberation or certainty to the one aiming to understand them.

Collaborator should no longer be a dirty word

Moreover, the new scholarship provided in chapters 2 and 3 should refrain one from treating the term collaboration as a 'dirty word," to quote Gareth Pritchard and Disislava Gancheva's article "Collaborator. No longer a dirty word?" Dirty things were certainly done while carrying the hat of a collaborator. My work does not deny this fact.

In "Collaborator. No longer a dirty word?" the authors portray a somewhat nuanced interpretation of this concept. Consider, for example, Stepan Bandera, who was a collaborator with the Nazis in the 1940s as well as an anti-Soviet freedom fighter, or the case of Belgium's Flemish wartime collaborators, who worked hand in hand with the Nazi regime. In both Ukraine and Belgium, the authors of this article show how some pro-nationalist groups advocate for these collaborators' rehabilitation despite their controversial past.[840] Collaboration, in the case of the Flemish wartime collaborators, for example, may be seen as driven by the intent to embrace a so-called 'lesser evil' approach, the same authors point out. It was still a pact with the 'devil,' to follow the language employed here, but possibly because there were few or no other 'angels' around to engage in more ethical collaborative work. Others, however, believe that there were no 'angels' at all to choose from:

> The most important tactic of those who seek to rehabilitate collaborators is to argue that Communism and Nazism were both totalitarian and genocidal systems, the crimes of which were equally evil. From this perspective, choosing to fight with the Nazis against the Communists was not necessarily morally worse than choosing (as Roosevelt and Churchill did) to fight with Stalin against Hitler. Under some circumstances, claim revisionists, the decision to make a temporary alliance with the Nazis against the threat of Communism was understandable, even commendable.[841]

Securitate archives do not tell the whole truth but they tell a lot about collaboration

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[840] Gareth Pritchard and Disislava Gancheva. "Collaborator. No longer a dirty word?" in *History Today*, vol 64, no. 12, available at http://defendinghistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Pritchard.HistoryToday-1.pdf, last accessed on May 4, 2019, pp. 1-3.

[841] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

There is a great deal of scholarship on the fact that archival files do not necessarily always tell the truth.[842] But as I show in this thesis, the Securitate archives tell a lot nonetheless. As Stan and Nadia Nedelsky argue, "file access's effectiveness as a tool of truth revelation depends on the authenticity, completeness, and reliability of the secret archives, none of which should be taken for granted." [843] In some cases, Securitate officers "branded innocent individuals" as collaborators for the sake of being promoted or for meeting required quotas, as established by their superiors.[844] Others may have even destroyed some of the files, when the regime came to an end. According to Stan, more than 100,000 Securitate files were declared as "lost" or "misplaced" or were destroyed altogether, [845] making files, at best, as incomplete sources, wherein truth was artfully blended with lies.

Historically, archives emerged out of the need to keep records, to administer territories, reign over lands, subjugate, control and conquer.[846] The list of functions of archives is larger than the one presented here. But in all its purposes, the archives, implied in the past and continues to do so, a disproportionate distribution of power of those involved in its creation, maintenance, and why not interpretation of its content, once they are declared 'open' to researchers or better said, its files are 'declassified.'[847]

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[842] Lavinia Stan and Nadia Nedelsky. "Access to Secret Files" in *Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), vol. 1, p. 3.

[843] *Ibid.*

[844] Raluca Ursache. "Archival Records as Evidence" in *Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice*, Vol. 1, p. 114.

[845] Lavinia Stan and Nadia Nedelsky. "Access to Secret Files" in *Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), vol. 1, p. 3.

[846] Elizabeth Yale. "The History of Archives: the State of the Discipline" in *Book History*, Vol. 18, 2015, p. 332.

[847] On the historical connection between power and archives, see for example, Elizabeth Yale. "The History of Archives: the State of the Discipline", pp. 346-348, where she provides a succinct review of Randall C. Jimerson's *Archives Power: Memory, Accountability and Social Justice*. On this subject, see, also, Rodney G. S. Carter. "Of Things Said and Unsaid: Power, Archival Silences, and Power in Silence," in *Archivaria: Special Section on Archives, Space and Power*, 61 (Spring 2006), pp. 215-233.

In this thesis, I show how the CNSAS archive, and especially the Securitate manuals and the other instructive materials that it contains and which are discussed in these chapters, demonstrate that collaboration is to be treated as a social malaise the etiology of which must be traced to the very system that designed it and put it in place to operate. Analyzing these Securitate manuals, manuals that are part of the CNSAS archive, and which lay the protocol on how to acquire collaborators and informers, as well as actual files on individuals who were turned collaborators, is the method employed in this thesis to describe this malaise.

Tileaga defines archives as "public sites for creating, and disseminating, psychologically relevant knowledge about human accountability."[848] An archive, for Foucault, as he discusses it in *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, is neither the totality of tangible items, papers, or documents stored by a formal establishment, nor the literary works, academic or not, concerned with the history of a certain subject. Instead, it is, as Elizabeth Yale puts it, the "system underlying the discourse, that which allows things to be said and done in any given episteme,"[849] or products of so-called "truth-regimes,"[850] that select whom to keep and whom to exclude,[851] who holds the power and who does not, and, subsequently, who determines that which is perceived as true from that which is not.

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[848] Cristian Tileaga. *Representing Communism After the Fall*: *Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 175.

[849] Elizabeth Yale. "The History of Archives: the State of the Discipline", p. 334.

[850] C. G. Prado. *Starting with Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 112; and Sara Mills. Chapter 4 "Power/Knowledge" in *Michel Foucault*, (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 67-80.

[851] Foucault addresses this theme in his book *Madness and Civilization* (1971). In it, Foucault traces the origins of the notion of insanity, a socially constructed concept which emerged parallel to the notion of that which became to be socially accepted as 'normal.' The two terms, 'madness' and 'normality' depend on each other for legitimacy. For Foucault, for someone to be deemed 'insane,' a set of criteria are necessary to be constructed that would decide that which is within the realm of 'normalcy,' thereby proving the highly subjective nature of terms such as 'insane' or 'normal,' the definitions of which may seem at first glance somewhat indisputable and which are, according to Foucault. Patrick H. Hutton. "Foucault, Freud and the Technologies of the Self" in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, Luther H. Martin et al. eds. (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, 1988), pp. 126-127; and Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen. *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault*, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann (Bristol, New England: Policy Press, 2003), pp. 3-6.

Hence, following Foucault's logic, archives may be described as repositories, tangible or abstract, of knowledge, or "repositories of [perceived] truth," to quote Katherine Verdery,[852] awaiting to be uncovered; doing archival work is then uncovering how the human society evolved, who had a say in its evolution, whose voice was silenced and how.[853] Both the manuals and the actual files cited and analyzed in these chapters shed light on these nuances.

In his memoirs, Romania political prisoner Herbert Zilber describes the creation of the files as an "industry" of distorted truth, molded, defined, and crafted by those who meticulously produced these files. [854] These were individuals endowed with the power to identify what constituted facts and lies, similarly to the way in which Foucault's 'regimes of truth' decide on the:

> types of disclosure which it [the society] accepts and makes function as true; mechanisms and incidences which enable one to make true and false statements; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.[855]

In communist Romania, "Real people [were]… but the reflection of their files,"[856] Zilber writes, or, if we follow Foucault's thesis on 'regimes of truth,' they were what the regime decided it was true about them. Hence, reconstructing these people's life stories based on these files, without taking into account the *psuchegraphic* work that these individuals were subject to and the ambiance of *dossierveillance* in which they lived, may lead us to indirectly revive the twisted 'logic' and values of the regime lustration attempts to put to rest.

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[852] Katherine Verdery. *Secrets and Truths. Ethnography in the Archive of Romania's Secret Police.* Budapest: Central European University Press. 2014, p. 72.

[853] Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen. *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault,* Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann (Bristol, New England: Policy Press, 2003); pp. 1-32.

[854] Cited in Kora Andrieu. "Political liberalism after mass violence: John Rawls and a theory of 'transitional justice'", in *Transitional Justice Theories*, Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck and Christian Braun (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 148.

[855] *Ibid.*

[856] Katherine Verdery. "What was socialism and why did it fail" in *The Revolution of 1989*, Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed. (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 68.

Someone on the BBC news was once asked to define the Securitate archive. The answer was the following: "an evil library… a story about human guilt, human weakness."[857] I would challenge the word weakness in this definition, and employ the term fragility instead. Humans are fragile in the face of evil, fragile while partaking in doing evil and even fighting it. Humans are fragile at their core, as the concept *psuchegraphy* discussed in chapter 2 implies. Very few if any are immune to evil, in fact. In *Ascent*, Solzhenitsyn reaches the same conclusion: "Gradually," he writes, it was disclosed to me that the line separating good and evil passes not through states, not between classes, nor between political parties either—but right through every human heart—and through all human hearts. The line shifts. Inside us, it oscillates with the years. And even within hearts overwhelmed by evil, one small bridgehead of good is retained. And even I the best of all hearts, there remains…an uprooted small corner of evil."[858] The treatment of collaborators as part of transitional justice endeavors, I argue, ought to take into account this very truth about humanity's propensity towards evil and its fragility in the face of it.

On the conflicted memory of communism, shame, stigma and prejudice felt in relation to collaboration

As suggested in the introductory section of this chapter, there is great prejudice[859] shame, and

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[857] Cristian Tileaga. *Representing Communism After the Fall. Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 32.

[858] Cited in Daniel J. Mahoney. "The Experience of Totalitarianism and the Recovery of Nature: Reflections on Philosophy and Community in the Thought of Solzhenitsyn, Havel and Strauss" in *Community and Political Thought Today*, Peter Augustine and Dale McConkey, eds. (Wesport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1998), p. 216.

[859] On the concept of prejudice, see, for example, Julien A. Deonna, Rafaela Rodogno and Fabrice Teroni. *In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); D. P. Ausubel (1955). "Relationship Between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process" in *Psychological Review*, 62:5, pp. 378-390; A. S. Book (1999). "Shame on You: An Analysis of Modern Shame Punishment as an Alternative to Incarceration" in *William and Mary Law Review* 40, pp. 653-686; J. Braithwaite. *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J. Braithwaite (1999). "Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts" in *Crime and Justice*, 25, pp. 1-127; D. J. Combs, Jackson Cambelle and R. H. Smith (2010). "Exploring the Nature and Consequences of Humiliating a Moral Transgressor" in *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 32, pp. 128-143.

stigma attached to being called a collaborator. In Romania, because of the lack of a lustration law that could have officially declared and punished collaborators with the former regime, some individuals have undertaken other means, such as social media tools, to identify former collaborators, thereby causing them to feel shame and/or feel stigmatized. Shame, a "social emotion"[860] is also defined as a "painful mental feeling aroused by a sense of having done something wrong or dishonorable or improper."[861] It is the way one may feel when one does something that may result in being treated in a disparaging manner by others.[862] Shame is an embrace of an "external perspective upon ourselves."[863]

There is even "courtesy stigma"[864] to use Erving Goffman's words, attributed to those with ties to collaborators.[865] Goffman also maintains that "by definition…we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human,"[866] making one prone to carry a sense of guilt. But, as shown in this thesis, given the rather diverse number of motives for which one may have become a

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[860] Julien A. Deonna. Raffaelle Rodogno and Fabriece Teroni. *In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 22.

[861] Stephen P. Hinshaw. *The Mark of Shame: Stigma of Mental Illness*, p. 36.

[862] Julien A. Deonna. Raffaelle Rodogno and Fabriece Teroni. *In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion*, p. 30.

[863] *Ibid*., p. 32.

[864] Cited in Stephen P. Hinshaw. *The Mark of Shame: Stigma of Mental Illness and an Agenda of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 27.

[865] According to Erving Goffman, there are three types of stigmas: "tribal" (communal); "blemishes of individual character," and "abominations of the body." According Goffman, stigma represents "bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier: The signs were cut or burns into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor—a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places. Originating from the ancient Greek culture, stigma referred to physical markers of the body to indicate notoriety and being ostracized. Nowadays, the word stigma lost its former physical connotation. Cited in Stephen P. Hinshaw. *The Mark of Shame: Stigma of Mental Illness*, p. 23.
Irwin Katz. S*tigma: A Social Psychological Analysis* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), p. 2.
Cited in Brenda Major and Collette P. Eccleston. "Stigma and Social Exclusion" in Dominic Abrams, Michael A. Hogg, and Jose M. Marques, eds. *The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion* (New York: Psychology Press, 2005), pp. 63-88; O. Bruun and F. Teroni (2011). "Shame, Guilt and Morality" in *The Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 8.2., pp. 223-245; C. Calhoun (2004). "An Apology for Moral Shame" in *Journal of Political Philosophy,* 11, pp. 1-20; J. A. Deonna and F. Teroni (2011). "Is Shame a Social Emotion?" in A. Konzelmann-Ziv, K. Lehrer and H.-B. Schmid (eds). *Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Internationality* (Heidelberg: Springer 2011), pp. 193-212; J. Elison and S. Harter (2007). "Humiliation: Causes, Correlates and Consequences" in J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins and J. P. Tangney (eds). *The Self-Conscious Emotions* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2007), pp. 310-329.

[866] Cited in Stephen P. Hinshaw. *The Mark of Shame: Stigma of Mental Illness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 24.

collaborator, applying the same punitive measure (lustration) against them may render them all, by default, as guilty of the same crime, and thus the bearers of the same level of culpability. Adding to that the highly subjective nature of causality, especially in a chain of events conducive to a certain outcome and involving not one, but a series of agents, discerning the actual role and responsibility of any one of them in the final outcome of a certain series of events may be close to impossible to pinpoint.

In a post-communist world, shame, stigma and prejudice[867] are like the three musketeers, always inseparable, when it comes to what one may feel in being identified as a collaborator. Antohi's confession is a case in point. That is because, in the words of Stephen P. Hinshaw stigma "connotes a deep mark of shame and degradation carried by a person as a function of being a member of a devalued social group."[868] As some of the responses to Antohi's confession suggest, being a collaborator renders one as a representative of such a group.

"Those who are searching for indicators of prejudice and stigma must examine a culture's underlying messages, which have typically become embedded in everyday practices and which, as a result, may be relatively hidden to casual observation," writes Hinshaw.[869] When it comes to post-communist Romania, what are these messages or beliefs, defined by American

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[867] In *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954), Allport argues that prejudice is a "natural human phenomenon, a by-produce of categorical, natural thinking and information processing." Prejudice is also defined as a "negative attitude toward a group or toward members of the group," and an evolutionary trait, as "we like those who we see as similar and thus more likely to be helpful and benign, stigmatizing and avoiding those who appear to be poorer partners for social exchange, who may be likely to be diseased, or who threaten important group values," Charles Stangor points out. Cited in Cristian Tileaga. *Nature of Prejudice. Society, discrimination and moral exclusion* (Routledge, 2016), p. 32.
Charles Stangor "The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination Within Social Psychology. A Quick History of Theory and Research" in Tod D. Nelson. *Handbook of Prejudice. Stereotyping and Discrimination.* (New York: Psychology Press, 2009), pp. 4, 13.
[868] Stephen P. Hinshaw. *The Mark of Shame: Stigma of Mental Illness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 26.
[869] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

philosopher Robert Brandom as "cognitive commitments" in *Making it Explicit* (1994)?[870] The

key message is simple: it is rightfully unacceptable to be a traitor. And many of the informers

indeed were as such.

But as this thesis sought to show, there is more to the story of collaboration, something

that Soljenitsyn in *Gulag Archipelago* insightful describes about his fellow men and women:

> These people we labeled traitors, but a remarkable slip of the tongue occurred—on the part of the judges, prosecutors, and interrogators. And the convicted prisoners, the entire nation, and the newspapers repeated and reinforced this mistake, involuntarily letting the truth out of the bag. They intend to declare them "traitors to the Motherland." But they were universally referred to, in speech and in writing, even in the court documents, as "traitors of the Motherland." You said it! They were not traitors to her. They were her traitors. It was not they, the unfortunates, who had betrayed the Motherland, but their calculating Motherland who had betrayed them, and not just once by thrice.[871]

At the same time, one ought not to discard or downplay the immense trauma that the victims of

the Securitate suffered.[872] Like trauma, memory of communism itself is a subjective experience

as well. [873] That is why "the occasional resurgence of debates around truth, memory,

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[870] Timothy van Gelder. "Beyond the Mind-Body Problem" in *The Mind as a Scientific Object*, Christina E. Erneling, David Martel, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 461.

[871] Aleksandr Soljenitsyn. *Gulag Archipelago.* Thomas P. Whitney, trans. (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 2007), p. 65.

[872] Initially found solely in medical books about broken bones and limbs, the word 'trauma,' derived from Greek (trauma), began as of 1960s to refer to broken hearts and minds, as well—to the emotional shock and immense pain that tends to linger on for years after a terrible event occurred in the life of a human being. In the words of Nikolas Rose, we now measure traumas not "in terms of the damage they do, not to the limbs, the head or even the brain, but to the psyche, to personality, to development, to self-esteem." As a result of such tragedies, anxiety, despair, feelings of fear and powerlessness, conducive to disruptive effects on one's life and sense of self, flow like the gushing waters of a seemingly never-ending flood. Nikolas Rose. "Assembling the Modern Life" in *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present,* Roy Porter, ed. (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 236;Hubert Zapf. "Trauma, Narrative and Ethics in Recent American Fiction" in Martin Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag. *Other People's Pain.* Martin Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag, eds. (Peter Land, 2011), pp. 145-168.

[873] "How grand my God is this force of memory, how exceedingly great! It is like a vast and boundless subterranean shrine. Who has ever reached the bottom of it?" writes the North African Bishop of Hippo. Whereas for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as James Olney argues in *Memory and Narrative* (1998), memory and the self amalgamate into *feeling*, for Augustine, memory is part of a *triune* structure comprised of God and the self, as well. As for Samuel Beckett, tapping into one's memory is a *never-ending struggle*, an almost futile attempt. In the words of John Dupuy, one struggles "to try to tell from memory, and to try to remember the attempt at feeling in memory the trying to tell and trying to remember—and then musing at the consistently failed attempts." Perhaps, for Beckett, one's dive into one's memory is similar to the human quest for meaning, as understood by the German theologian Karl Rahner. In both cases—Beckett's understanding of tapping into memory and Rahner's understanding of the quest for the God's "horizon of being"— one never fully grasps that which one is after, yet is dependent on one's

victimization, and collaboration in former communist countries still creates marked moral uneasiness among politicians and the general public,"[874] Tileaga writes. The question to be asked here is how do we move forward in this mishmash of reflections on and individual understandings of the complexities of collaboration, memory, truth and what reconciliation may look like if we may not even agree on what a nation's past was and came to be? How one can reconcile the trauma that communism inflicted on countless of people and the memory of communism nowadays that contains, also, an element of nostalgia, with "positive public perceptions of communism" being perceived as "paradoxical," "bewildering," "mind boggling," "bizarre" and "ambivalent,"[875] to use the words of Tileaga once again. How this nuanced and somewhat paradoxical understanding of a nation's recent history impacts the way in which collaboration ought to be treated, as a result? And how are we to deal with the subjectivity of memory of communism in attempting to revisit and analyze the Romania's experience with communism?

At this moment in time, the way to move forward it to let each everyone come to terms on one's own, I argue. Each and everyone have their own path to take. This thesis may be a helpful guide. Because of the *psuchegraphic* work inflicted of thousands and thousands of informers, and because of the *dossierveillance* that a great deal of Romanians felt during the Ceaşuescu regime, almost everyone who had experienced these methods of terror merits an apology, I argue: the victim who became a perpetrator via *psuchegraphic* work inflicted by the Securitate; the traitor who was once betrayed; the victim who remained a victim and the torturer

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mere pursuit of these abstract concepts for establishing an identity and, respectively, a purpose in life. Cited in Edward J. Dupuy. "Memory" in *The Encyclopedia of the Novel*, Volume 2, p. 510. James Olney. *Memory and Narrative*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; Edward J. Dupuy. "Memory" in *The Encyclopedia of the Novel*, Volume 2, p. 513.

[874] Cristian Tileaga's *Representing Communism After the Fall*: *Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 6.

[875] Cristian Tileaga. *Representing Communism After the Fall*: *Discourse, Memory, and Historical Redress*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 51.

who was once tortured as well, as well as the bystanders and intrepid resistors for having lived in a system that deprived them of basic rights or a sense of normalcy.

The goal of my work is not to find the perfect apology for there is no such thing.[876] Let this work be a symbolic apology, nevertheless, for all those who never received it. Let this work be also a manifesto *against* the two tools that I analyze in chapters 2 and 3— *dossierveillance* and *psuchegraphic* work— tools that can become a deleterious cocktail with socio-political implications, and conducive to widespread *banalization of evil*. Let this thesis be also a warning of how these tools can transform ordinary human beings into perpetrators. In understanding and accepting this rather disturbing truth about the fragility of our humanity, some collaborators too may perhaps receive a bit of mercy as well. As someone who carries within herself courtesy stigma in respect to this phenomenon, as the example provided at the beginning of this chapter suggests, I treat this thesis not only as an academic pursuit but also as a duty to humanity. It is also a need to perhaps liberate myself from the quiet burden I share, as a result.

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[876] The meaning of apology differs from culture to culture. I would go as far as arguing that it differs from person to person in dependence of the offence inflicted and the damaged caused. Wagatsuma and Rosett (1986), for example, argue that the way an apology is delivered in the Japanese culture differs from that socially acceptable in the American culture. In America, an apology goes along these lines: "I have done something wrong. That wrong has caused you harm. I accept that responsibility and I feel remorse." In Japan, it is delivered as following: "I willingly submit to your authority. I humble myself to you and ask submissively that you not use your authority to harm me. I value our relationship and recognize your superiority." In the latter version, shame may be a side effect emotion, as it entails "self-abasement." Julien A. Deonna. Raffaelle Rodogno and Fabriece Teroni. *In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 210-211.

Conclusion

During my doctoral studies, I have been asked a few times, by fellow students and professors alike, to explain what I am doing with the dusty files I had read at the CNSAS. At times, the question *so what?* sneaked stealthily in these types of conversations. The *why* behind one's research work must yield a sturdy answer that will stand as a rock even when the researcher is plagued by questions and very few answers to back them up. This thesis helped clarify this '*so what*?' question. Each and every chapter aimed to indirectly provide bits and pieces of the answer. Reiterating it is the key aim of this concluding chapter.

In a nutshell, this work sought to explain how ordinary human beings became informers of the Securitate and how Romania's secret police in the communist period managed to quell resistance from the wider public. This is a question that Dennis Deletant, one of the most prominent contemporary scholars on Romanian history, sought to answer as well in his book chapter *Romania 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent*. In it, he gave the following four reasons: 1) the lack of a "focal point for opposition," to use his own words— a centralized underground operation, for example, that would seek to undermine the power of the regime; 2) the "timorous and passive" nature of the Romanian nation due to its previous experience of being under the subjugation of various empires; 3) the very credence propagated by the Orthodox faith to which roughly 80 percent of the population belongs, a religion that asks its believers to endure suffering and find meaning in it, the rewards for which one would only attain after one's physical death; 4) the power of the Securitate, which, as Deletant argues, "should not be

underestimated."[877] This thesis took a closer look at the last of these explanations. In doing so, it scavenged and dived through the Securitate archives to show the meticulous process that the Securitate personnel followed in order to build its enormous surveillance network and the methods of terror it employed to keep a nation in fear.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, when the Revolution 1989 broke out, the Securitate had roughly 38,000 members and 400,000 informers[878] scattered throughout the country. Some of these informers may too have rushed on the streets of Timişoara, Bucharest or Iaşi to chant national songs and express their desire for change. Indeed, Romania had none of the equivalents of to the 1968 Prague Spring, the 1956 uprising in Hungary or the famous *Solidarnost'* movement in Poland in the 1980s, briefly mentioned in chapter 1. But before I conclude this work, I should not leave the reader thinking that incidents of dissidence and resistance were non-existent in this country. In honor of those brave men and women, young and old, the following section briefly mentions a few of these individuals and their stories that sought to defy the climate of fear in which they lived.

"Fear," writes Drakulic, "is like a beast that gnaws at you, eating you up bit by bit, until you totally surrender to its teeth, and you don't even think that there must still be a chance."[879] These resisters actively opposed the regime, even when in the face censorship, the possibility of being incarcerated, of being sent to a psychiatric hospital against one's will, and hunger. Some resisted the *psuchegraphic* work done unto them or the agony caused by *dossierveillance* in the later decades of the regime of a country where an innocent statement such as this one—"liberty

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[877] Dennis Deletant. "Romania 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent" in *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*, Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, eds. (New York: Berg, 2006), p. 81.
[878] Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez. "De-Communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe" in *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies,* Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez and Paloma Aguilar, eds. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 236.
[879] Slovenka Drakulic. *How we Survived Communism and Even Laughed.* (Harper Perennial, 2016), p. 177.

is something abstract"— once voiced by a priest, was identified in a Securiate report as perilous rhetoric[880] worthy of making the messenger of this philosophical truth a peril of the state.

Resistance in the Dej and Ceaşuescu decades

The shift in terror tactics during the whole communist period, discussed in chapter 1, influenced the motives behind individuals' resistance against the Securitate. Generally speaking, these motives changed from being driven by the intent of overthrowing the regime during the early decades to that of rejecting the cultural and religious values promoted by it, and by the quest for 'self-removal' from the communist culture and society, by adhering to, or embracing cultural, religious, spiritual organizations or beliefs and practices prohibited by the regime.

In the Ceaşuescu years, a phenomenon referred to in current scholarship as "resistance through culture"[881] emerged, a movement that involved people of all walks of life, and especially intellectuals, who found a refuge of some sort in cultural and religious practices that were deemed as 'dangerous' by the communist system. Such activities included but did not limit to listening to and playing Western music, such as rock-and-roll and jazz, or reading literature originating from the now capitalist West, as it was the case of the *Paltiniş school*, discussed in the previous chapter.

To remind the reader, this school represented a group of intellectuals led by philosopher Constantin Noica who would gather periodically in the 1980s in a recluse dwelling in the Romanian mountains of Transylvania to read and discuss various philosophical works by Plato,

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[880] ACNSAS. D69/43, p. 64.
[881] Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu. (2017). *Justice, Memory and Redress in Romania, New Insights.* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing), pp. 38-40.

Kant, Hegel and Heidegger.[882] One of the frequent visitors of this school was Gabriel Liiceanu.

The Journal from Paltiniş is a diary about Liiceanu's experience at Paltiniş, the place where

Noica resided and whom Liiceanu describes as the "friend and generational colleague of Eugene

Ionesco, Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran." Noica, Liiceanu further comments, "chose, unlike

these ones, to stay, after the war, in the country. If he would have established himself in France,

his name would have not demanded, as these others' names do not demand, supplementary

explanations."[883]

Other Romanian scholars have argued for the emergence of the "resistance through

spirituality," both within the Christian Orthodox tradition, the country's largest religious

denomination, and beyond, including the Yoga and Transcendental Meditation movements that

mushroomed in the 1980s Romania, mostly among urban intellectuals.[884] Mystical in nature,

such spiritual and religious gatherings and practices were of an especial concern for the

Securitate until the regime's last days.[885] Most probably, the regime identified such practices as

threatening due to the mental, emotional and metaphysical liberty that they may have offered or

promised to offer to those eager to explore such spiritual avenues.

During the Dej era, the bands in the Carpathian Mountains, comprised of representatives

of all social classes— lawyers, students, medical doctoral and military officials— led the

resistance against the newly established regime. They had little ammunition to fight with and

relied on the help of the villagers from the surrounding area to feed them during their short-lived

revolts in the 1940s-1950s. Among the most known of these groups were the *Haiducii*

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[882] *Ibid.*

[883] Gabriel Liiceanu. *Jurnalul de la Paltiniş* [The Journal from Paltiniş] (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1991), p. 8.

[884] Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu. (2017). *Justice, Memory and Redress in Romania, New Insights.* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing), pp. 38-40; Gabriel Andreescu. *Reprimarea Miscarii Yoga in anii 80* [The Persecution of the Yoga Movement in the 1980s]. (Iasi: Polirom, 2008). ACNSAS. Fond documentar. D000003, vol. 5, p. 157.

[885] ACNSAS. Fond documentar. D000003, vol. 5, pp. 164-171.

Muscelului [The Outlaws of Muscel].[886] Another of such groups activated in the Făgăraş Mountains, and was led by Ion Gavrilă-Ogoranu. Then a university student, he and a few of his university colleagues "tied up several companies of Securitate troops before they were captured and sentenced to death," writes Deletant. Gavrilă-Ogoranu, the leader of the group, managed to escape the death penalty and lived to witness the 1989 Revolution and the regime's collapse.[887]

The waters were not fully calm in Romania during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as well. The fever of the Hungarian crisis was felt in Bucharest, Iaşi, Cluj and Timişoara, with people marching on the streets of these cities in solidarity with their neighbors to the West. Dej had to cut short his visit in Yugoslavia in late October 1956 to handle the chaos brewing at home. Whereas protests from railway men from Griviţa yard in Bucharest and workers in Iaşi asked for better working and living conditions, the students demanded that the Russian language be removed from the school and university curricula.[888] Like their Hungarian neighbors, they too wanted change.

The largest number of resisters during the Dej era were either murdered or incarcerated in prison in the early decades of the regime due to anti-communist rhetoric or activity or ties to the former fascist Iron Guard. In this context, the case of the controversial Vladimireşti Monastery in the early 1950s is an interesting one and worthy of brief discussion. This monastery's story combines defiance against the communist regime and the Orthodox Church with heretical tendencies, lawlessness, anti-Semitism, anarchism and even vandalism. A pilgrimage site for faithful believers who gathered here periodically in sign of protest against the communist regime in the 1940s and 1950s, until its shutdown in 1954, the monastery was a target of both the

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[886] Denis Deletant. "Romania, 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent" in *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*, Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, eds. (New York: Berg, 2006), p. 84.

[887] Cited in Denis Deletant. "Romania, 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent", p. 86.

[888] *Ibid.*

Orthodox Christian Patriarchate as well as of the entire regime, that saw in it a powerful hotbed

for anti-communist resistance threatening the very foundation of the regime and the communist

system it sought to create.[889]

This nunnery's case reflects the various complexities that may have stood behind its acts

of resistance against communism, showing that resistance under communism in Romania, as it

was the case of this nunnery, was not at all morally and ethically impeccable, echoing what the

existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre attempted to explore in his play "Dirty Hands" (*Mains*

Sales) (1955). This term seeks to convey the ambiguity of any seemingly positive at first action

that may be carried out under circumstances that are morally and ethically questionable. Just like

collaboration, resistance under communism was not free from unambiguity.[890]

In the 1970s and 1980s, the city of Braşov faced a series of strikes and revolts. In 1977,

the miners from the Jiu Valley, located in southwestern Transylvania, protested, among other

things, against the new laws that that pushed retirement age from 50 to 55 years old. Ceaşuescu

himself had to come to appease the crowds.[891] In response to what Deletant calls Ceaşuescu's

"draconian measures designed to reduce food and energy consumption, and wage reductions," in

order to repay the country's foreign debt, workers in Braşov went on strike in November of

1987. At the *Steagul Roşu* (Red Flag) plant, thousands of employees rushed to the streets with

slogans such as "We want bread" and "Down with the Dictatorship."[892] Only a few

representatives of the Romanian intelligentsia responded in solidarity with the workers, such as

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[889] This paragraph first appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.

[890] This paragraph first appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.

[891] Denis Deletant. "Romania, 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent" in *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*, Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, eds. (New York: Berg, 2006), p. 87.

[892] *Ibid.*, 89.

Mihai Botez, Silviu Brucan and Doina Cornea.[893] In the 1980s, the Radio Free Europe station broadcasted Botez's work "The Second World" in which he criticized Romania's communist system. Brucan was once Romania's ambassador to the USA during the Dej era. Under Ceaşuescu, however, Brucan's political career was not near as galactic due to the strained relations with the country's leader.[894]

Cornea, who taught French at the Transylvanian city of Cluj, openly protested against Ceaşuescu's repressive measures.[895] Andras Bozoki identifies Cornea, along with the Romanian-born pastor Laszlo Tokes, as the "symbolic" and "moral leaders" or Romania, similar to Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel and Jan Patočka, or East Germany's Jens Reich and Stefan Heym.[896] Verdery puts Cornea in the same category as Poland's Adam Michnik and Hungary's Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan S. Szelenyi.[897]

Only a month prior to the 1989 Revolution, Cornea wrote a letter against her university colleagues and other Romanian intellectuals where she publicly accused them of passivity and docility to Ceaşuescu's oppressive measures and the regime's violations of human rights.[898] After the Revolution, she openly criticized Iliescu's method of hijacking the revolution and asked the West to cease providing financial aid to Romania until the country fully embraces

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[893] *Ibid.,* 88-90.

[894] Cristina Petrescu and Dragos Petrescu. "Mastering vs. Coming to Terms with the Past: A Critical Analysis of Post-Communist Romanian Historiography" in *Narratives Unbound: Historical Studies in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Sorin Antohi, Balazs Trencsenyi, Peter Abor, eds. (Budapest: Central European University, 2007), pp. 363-364.

[895] Minton F. Goldman. *Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Political, Economic and Social Challenges* (Armonk, NYL M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 276. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi "Romanian Intellectuals Before and After the Revolution" in *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe*, Andras Bozoki ed. (Budapest: Central European University, 1999), 85.

[896] Andras Bozoki. "Introduction" in *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe* (Budapest: Central European University, 1999). 6.

[897] Katherine Verdery. *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 108.

[898] David. P. Forsythe. *Human Rights and Peace: International and National Dimensions* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 141.

democratic measures.[899] Along with Cornea, there were many others who actively sought to denounce the regime as she did.

One of them was Gheorghe Ursu, who was taken into custody by the Securitate on 21 September 1985 for having written a diary and letters critical of Ceaşuescu. Ursu died a month later at the hospital of Jilava prison for "repeated blows with a heavy object to his abdomen."[900] Radu Filipescu, an engineer, spread leaflets against Ceaşuescu and was imprisoned in the 1980s for this.[901] His story is narrated in Herma Kopernik Kennel's *Jogging cu Securitate: Rezistenţa tânărului Radu Filipescu* [Jogging with the Securitate: The Resistance of the Young [man] Radu Filipescu].[902] Vasile Paraschiv, a worker from Ploieşti, sought to create in 1979 a trade union by gathering signatures. Paraschiv was arrested and sent to a psychiatric hospital against his will. Some of those who signed Paraschiv's petition were incarcerated.[903]

Dorin Tudoran sent his anti-communist texts to be broadcasted by the Free Europe radio station in the early 1980s. In 1981, he was elected as member of the Council of the Writers' Union but soon expelled for criticizing the fact that the leadership of Union was dictated by representatives of the communist regime and not selected by the Council itself. In an article sent to the Free Europe Radio Station, he made the following statement in regards to resistance: "I believe that being a dissident in Romania represents only a gesture of internal liberty…which

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[899] Milada Anna Vachudova. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 101.

[900] Dennis Deletant. Ceauşescu *and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 331.

[901] Denis Deletant. "Romania, 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent" in *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*, Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, eds. (New York: Berg, 2006), p. 93.

[902] Cristina Petrescu "The Afterlife of the Securitate: On Moral Correctness in Postcommunist Romania" in *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe*, Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou and Stefan Troebst, eds. (New York: Central European University, 2014), p. 405.

[903] Stefano Bottoni. *Long Awaited West: Eastern Europe since 1944*, Sean Lambert, trans. (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 2017), p. 152.

does not necessarily become, unlike elsewhere—for example, Poland—dissidence, but loneliness…That is, [a] personal experience, probably insignificant, maybe even absurd." [904]

In August of 1988, Gabriel Andreescu sent a letter to the organizing committee of a conference taking place in Cracow, in which he called on Romanians to denounce and refuse to cooperate with his country's regime.[905] After the fall of communism, Andreescu also demanded CNSAS to divulge the name of former collaborators tied to the Romanian Orthodox Church, a move that the Patriarchate did not take lightly.[906]

Nicolae Steinhard, the author of the *Happiness Journal* (*Jurnalul Fericirii*), ought to be mentioned here as well. In the 1970s, he wrote a memoir about his experience in prison, confiscated by the Securitate in 1972. In the 1980s, the Radio Free Europe station made public the content of the manuscript. [907] The names of Marian Celac, who criticized Ceaşuescu's plans in regards to reconstruction of the country's capital and the regime's rural and urban resettlement campaigns,[908] and of Ion Fistioc and Nicolae Stancescu, who sought to send letters to Gorbachev via the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, where they asked to restructure the leadership of the Romanian communist party, ought not to be forgotten as well. Both Fistioc and Stancescu were members of the Party and wanted to bring positive change to an already defunct system. [909] The authors of the samizdat *Ellenpontok* (Counterpoints in Hungarian) that circulated in the early

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[904] Cited in Irina Culic. "The Strategies of Intellectuals: Romania under Communist Rule in Comparative Perspective" in *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe*, Andras Bozoki, ed. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), p. 69.

[905] Dennis Deletant. Ceauşescu *and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 255.

[906] Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu. *Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 85.

[907] Cristina Vatulescu. *Police Aesthetics: Literature, Film and the Secret Police in Soviet Times* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 165-174.

[908] Dennis Deletant. *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*, p. 331. Denis Deletant. "Romania, 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent" in *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*, Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, eds. (New York: Berg, 2006), p. 93.

[909] Dennis Deletant. Ceauşescu *and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*), p. 255.

1980s are among Romania's resisters as well. This document described the oppressive and discriminatory measures taken against the Magyar minority in Romania by the communist regime. [910]

But among the most known of the resisters, the names of Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa (Calciu) and Paul Goma are perhaps the most internationally renown. Calciu, a former Legionary, was once one of the most feared torturers of the Piteşti prison experiment discussed in chapter 1. In 1979, Calciu was arrested for his anti-communist rhetoric. His public criticism of the regime's demolition of the Ene Orthodox church, in Bucharest, was 'the last straw that broke the camel's back,' as a well known saying goes.[911] Freed from prison in 1984, after international pressure from Romanian expatriates such as Eliade, playwright Eugene Ionesco and President Ronald Reagan, Calciu and his family settled in Virginia. "Calciu's case," as Dennis Deletant writes, is a special one, for it illustrates how indomitable the human spirit can be; despite suffering the utmost degradation and perversion, it can reassert itself and acquire true dignity. At the same time, Calciu's experience provided him with an inner strength which gave him the courage to defy Ceauşescu later."[912]

Another well-known resister was Paul Goma, a dissident writer who was forced to leave Romania for France in 1977. Goma asked Ceauşescu to sign the Charter 77,[913] as a way to demonstrate Romanians and the world his promises delivered nine years earlier when the Soviet Union, with the help of four other members of the Warsaw Pact, attacked Czechoslovakia. The support for Goma came in a few hundreds of signatures, some of who saw it as a way to get a

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[910] Stefano Bottoni. *Long Awaited West: Eastern Europe since 1944*, Sean Lambert, trans. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2017), p. 152.

[911] Dennis Deletant. Ceauşescu *and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*, p. 39.

[912] *Ibid.*

[913] Stefano Bottoni. *Long Awaited West: Eastern Europe since 1944*, Sean Lambert, trans. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2017), p. 152.

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passport and leave the country for the West. Among the most loyal of supporters were psychiatrist Ion Vianu and literary critic Ion Negoitescu. Ion Ladea and Gheorghe Sandu, who also openly supported Goma, were beaten by the Securitate personnel. [914] On May 16, 2019 I personally spoke with one of Gheorghe Sandu's sons, Traian Sandu who currently resides in France. Figure 9 contains his detailed account about about his life in Romania, his parents, and their escape to the West.

On March of 1977, Goma too was beaten by Horst Stumf, a former boxer, and later imprisoned. By then, the fate of this writer got the attention of Eugene Ionesco and Jean-Paul Sartre. On May 6, 1977, Ceaşuescu, obliged to salvage his international reputation, freed Goma. On November of 1977, he and his family were permitted to emigrate to France. [915] Attacks on Goma's life were a few: one, in February of 1981, when a parcel bomb was sent to him from Madrid; another, a year later, when a Securitate agent based in France by the name of Matei Pavel Haiducu was given orders by Nicolai Pleşiţă, then the head of Romania's Foreign Intelligence Service of the Securitate, to murder both Goma and Virgil Tănase, the dissident writer mentioned in chapter 2, who, like Goma, publicly criticized Ceaşuescu in French publications.

Like Gerd Wiesler, the key character od the 2006 film *The Lives of Others* that takes place in the 1980s German Democratic Republic (GDR), Haiducu had a change of heart; he turned himself in to the French authorities and revealed his true identity and the Securitate's orders to murder the two writers. The French secret service masterminded, as a result, a plot of the false abduction of Tănase and failure to deliver the lethal poison to Goma. In the eyes of the

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[914] Denis Deletant. "Romania, 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent", pp. 90-93.
[915] Denis Deletant. "Romania, 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent" in *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*, Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, eds. (New York: Berg, 2006), pp. 91-93.

Securitate, Haiducu had to look like he was still loyal to the regime at home. This intriguing story of abduction and espionage involving France and Romania is featured in a documentary entitled *The Tanase Affair* and available via the Youtube® website.[916]

In speaking with Tănase about collaboration, as already discussed in chapter 2, I could not but be reminded of Domnica Rădulescu's story of her escape from communist Romania, narrated in *Train to Trieste*, and, especially of the following paragraph in which she talks about her father.

> They talk about Ceaşuescu and the bad things he does, like censorship and following people so they can't talk, sending their friends to the secret police, who are called Securitate, punishing people who are good and just want to talk a lot. 'They know everything; they know what you say, and you eat…It's going to get worse soon you just wait!' my father tells everyone and drinks another shot of *ţuică* [alcoholic drink]. 'They just want to intimidate us all into silence, they want us to believe they are listening to us all the time, but I don't think they actually are.'[917]

In the 1980s, Romanians invented an anecdote about the Securitate, most probably to deal with the overwhelming fear, humiliation and despair it managed to make them feel. The joke goes as following: "Around midnight, a man hears loud knocks on his door. Awaken from his sleep, he asks: who's there? From the other side of the door, a scary voice answers: "Death!" Breathing relieved, the man responds: "Thank God! I thought it was the Securitate!"' [918]

This joke humorously highlights the truth that was too difficult to vocalize or admit. Laughter was chosen instead to highlight that which otherwise would have made many weep. Many may have found in it a collective refuge. The social isolation they may have felt due to the suspicion and fear they may have felt for being under the constant watch of the Securitate may have been temporarily eased by anecdotes like this one, which reflected the truth about their own lives that they wished they could have confined in each other but could not: like a public

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[916] "Afacerea Tanase," available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ljoSyswcuO0&t=115s last accessed on May 21, 2019.

[917] Domnica Radulescu. *Train to Trieste*, p. 33.

[918] Florin Banu. "Câteva consideraţii privind istoriografia Securităţii" [Some considerations pertaining to Securitate's historiography" in Caietele CNSAS, Bucharest: Editura CNSAS, 2008, Nr. 1, p. 204.

confession where they were simultaneously heard by everyone and not heard at all at the same time. And that is the irony of dictatorships. They can destroy a lot, but they cannot fully destroy the human spirit, as this concluding chapter sought to show.[919]

Despite that, the morale of Romanians was indeed somewhat damaged by the hands of the Securitate, that acquired its informers via its *psuchegraphic* work done on them. Via *dossierveillance*, the Securitate kept a nation in a timorous state, a nation where many acted, as a result, in ways that amassed to what I refer to in chapter 3 as the phenomenon of *banalization of evil*. In chapter 4 of this work, I suggest that Romania is in a *post-lustration* stage and one of the ways to move forward and reconcile with the painful communist past is to let and everyone deal with it on their own, with the hope that this thesis may serve as a helpful guide in this sense.

In regards to forgiveness, I end this concluding essay with the words of Timothy Garton Ash about the victims of Stasi informers: " Do not forgive," writes the Polish poet Zbigniew Herbert, Do not forgive, for truly it is not in your power to forgive/In the name of those who were betrayed at dawn."…. The Stasi officers and informers had victims. Only their victims have the right to forgive."[920] I thus resort to Garton-Ash's words to say the last things I want to say: *only the Securitate's victims have the right to forgive.* May this work be helpful, in this sense, once the victims realize that many of their perpetrators, as Virgil Tănase shared in the interview provided in chapter 2, were once "cornered" (*îi strângeau cu uşa*). This thesis explained how the 'cornering' was planned, organized, orchestrated and executed and how this life-altering process impacted its targets and how, as a result, a whole nation was made to live in fear for fear's sake.

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[919] This paragraph first appeared in Cristina Plamadeala. "Dossierveillance in Communist Romania: Collaboration With the Securitate, 1945-1989" in *Histories of Surveillance Societies* Rob Heynen and Emily van der Meulen, eds. *Making Surveillance States: Transnational Histories,* University of Toronto Press, 2019, pp. 215-236.
[920] Timothy Garton Ash. *The File: A Personal History* (New York: Random House, 1997), p. 252.

List of Figures

FIGURE 1[921]

MY LIFE AS A SPY

INVESTIGATIONS IN A SECRET POLICE FILE

Katherine Verdery

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[921] Book cover of Katherine Verdery's *My life as a Spy*, available at https://www.dukeupress.edu/my-life-as-a-spy, last accessed on June 3, 2019.

FIGURE 2[922]
Pavlov's dog and Skinner's box

Fig. 5 — Situaţia experimentală creată de I. P. Pavlov pentru elaborarea reflexelor condiţionate (clasice) la câini.

Elaborarea reflexelor condiţionate poate fi concepută ca una din formele de bază ale învăţării. Câinele, fiind hrănit concomitent cu aplicarea unui stimul condiţionat (sunet, lumină), învaţă să reacţioneze (să saliveze) faţă de noul stimul adăugat (sunet etc.), ca şi faţă de stimulul natural (hrană).

Fig. 6 — Boxa lui Skinner.

Boxa, iluminată tot timpul cu un bec electric pentru a da o vizibilitate optimă şoarecelui, are pereţele vertical din stînga dublat, astfel încît permite să se stocheze în interval hrană (caşcaval). Canalul de glisaj, cutia de hrană şi maneta din boxă nu servesc numai mecanismele de declanşare a hranei, ci, fiind toate concomitent în cîmpul vizual şi acţional al animalului, îi oferă oportunităţi de acţiune cu rezultate variabile. Dintre toate aceste posibilităţi (împingerea cutiuţei, împingerea canalului de glisaj), numai o singură acţiune (apăsarea pe manetă) este recompensată (întărită) cu hrană.

Depozit de hrană
Lumină
Cutia în care cade hrana
Canalul de glisaj al hranei
Maneta de declanşare

Alături de învăţarea de tip pavlovian şi cel skinnerian, mai există şi învăţarea prin imitaţie. Această formă de achiziţie de reacţie nouă (comportament nou) presupune nu numai un „model" şi un „imitator", ci şi capacităţi similare dintre model şi imitator. Astfel, oricît ar dori

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922 ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712, Vol1, P47, p. 25.

FIGURE 3[923]
Body types typologies

Fig. 21 — Tipologia constituțională a lui W. Sheldon (după W. Sheldon și Stevens, 1942).

1 — Tipul constituțional endomorfic (corespunzător picnicului lui Kretschmer); dezvoltarea cu precădere a viscerelor (în stadiul embrionar al organismului se dezvoltă cu preponderență endoteliul) îi conferă caracteristica de a iubi mult confortul fizic, de a fi mîncău, sociabil și afectiv, cu reacții lente și amator de ceremoniale; în plan temperamental, îi corespunde viscerotonul. 2 — Tipul constituțional ectomorfic sau muscular (corespunde atleticului lui Kretschmer) se caracterizează printr-o continuă activitate musculară (în stadiul embrionar al organismului se dezvoltă predominant mezoteliul) și prin necesitatea de a se afirma cu vigoare; în plan temperamental, îi corespunde somatotonul. 3 — Tipul constituțional mezomorfic (corespunzător leptosomului lui Kretschmer) are o activitate cu precădere intelectuală (în stadiul embrionar al organismului se dezvoltă predominant ectoteliul), iubește solitudinea, evită compania altora, fiind sensibil și conștient de propriile forțe; în plan temperamental, îi corespunde cerebrotonul. 4 — Tipul constituțional cordoblastic sau normal, echilibrat, la care nu există tendința de dezvoltare înspre tipurile somatice (nici temperamentale) caracterizate mai sus.

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[923] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712, Vol1, P47, p. 68

FIGURE 4[924]
Body types typologies

Fig. 20 a

Fig. 20 — Tipurile constituționale ale lui E. Kretschmer.

Psihiatrul german E. Kretschmer, prin observații îndelungate efectuate în clinică a constatat existența unei corelații între tipurile constituționale anatomo-morfologice și frecvența unor îmbolnăviri de natură psihică. După cercetările sale, cel cu constituție picnică, în caz de îmbolnăvire psihică, înclină mai mult spre forme maniaco-depresive, pe cită vreme leptosomii se îmbolnăvesc mai frecvent de schizofrenie.

Pornind de la aceste date clinice, Kretschmer a alcătuit o tipologie mult controversată, considerând că cei picnici aparțin așa-zisului tip ciclotimic, iar cei leptosomi tipului schizotimic.

Tipologia kretschmeriană, care consideră că baza personalității este de esență biologică, este respinsă ca insuficient fondată de cei mai mulți oameni de știință.

Fig. 20 b

Fig. 20 c

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[924] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D008712, Vol1, P47, p. 66.

FIGURE 5
Securitate manuals read carefully by its employees

ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D001528, p. 36.

ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 001472, pp. 16-17.

cesului de gîndire, la care se adaugă gradul crescut de impresionabilitate.

Pe măsură ce minorul trece granița celor 14 ani, gîndirea lui devine mai matură, informațiile recepționate se fixează mai solid în memorie, iar influențele și sugestiile afectează într-o mai mică măsură ceea ce el relatează.

În altă ordine de idei, trebuie să se știe că minorul are și un spirit de observație bine dezvoltat, el fiind deosebit de atent chiar atunci cînd dă impresia că nu-l interesează ceea ce se petrece în jurul lui.

Cu toate acestea, trebuie avut în vedere că lipsa experienței de muncă și de viață, imposibilitatea de a aprofunda suficient cele ce se petrec în anturajul său fac din minor o persoană care, deși posesoare a unui spirit de observație ascuțit, nu poate totuși să rețină și să redea toate problemele esențiale pentru cercetare.

Pe de altă parte, reacțiile pe care le are, manifestările lui mai puțin controlate decît ale unui adult pot constitui indicii referitoare la poziția pe care minorul o adoptă față de faptele cercetate.

După vîrsta de 14 ani, personalitatea minorului fiind mai bine conturată, apar anumite sentimente, porniri spre admirație, simpatie, dragoste și repulsie. În această perioadă, ca urmare a instalării pubertății, adesea apar manifestări de nesupunere a minorului, care, din tendința de a brava, este expus pericolului de a comite unele fapte ilicite.

Mai mult, în practica lucrătorilor de miliție sînt cunoscute cazurile așa-numiților minori „problemă", adică ale acelora care, fiind scăpați de sub supravegherea părinților, educatorilor etc., săvîrșesc în mod repetat fapte penale. Caracteristicile generale ale acestei categorii de minori sînt, în primul rînd, precocitatea în gîndire, neîncrederea în persoanele adulte, spiritul practic mai dezvoltat și tendința sporită spre minciună și simulare.

Existența unei mari diversități a particularităților de natură psihologică ale minorilor ridică unele probleme specifice și în domeniul tacticii ascultării lor. De asemenea, cu cît este mai mică vîrsta minorului cu atît ascultarea lui este mai dificilă sub aspect tactic.

Datorită considerentelor arătate, la ascultarea minorului trebuie avute în vedere următoarele : vîrsta lui ; gradul său

de dezvoltare psiho-intelectuală ; mediul social din care provine și anturajul sub a cărui influență se află (familie dezorganizată, părinți bețivi, recalcitranți, infractori etc.) ; antecedentele penale sau comportamentul lui general anterior ; împrejurările concrete în care a săvîrșit fapta ilicită.

De aceea, este necesar ca în toate cazurile, indiferent de calitatea procesuală a minorilor, lucrătorul de miliție să se pregătească temeinic pentru ascultare și să manifeste o grijă deosebită începînd de la invitarea lor pentru ascultare și pînă la terminarea acestei importante activități.

De un real folos pentru pregătirea ascultării minorilor și cunoașterea persoanei acestora sînt datele anchetei sociale[1], precum și cele culese de către lucrătorul de miliție printre vecini, colegi, prieteni etc., pe care însă trebuie să le folosească cu mult discernămînt în procesul ascultării.

În primul rînd, trebuie reținut că, potrivit legii, ascultarea minorului învinuit sau inculpat care nu a împlinit 16 ani se va efectua — dacă organul de urmărire penală consideră necesar — în prezența delegatului autorității tutelare și a părinților, iar cînd este cazul — a tutorelui, curatorului sau a persoanei în îngrijirea ori supravegherea căreia se află minorul[2].

Practica arată că, la ascultare, minorii învinuiți sau inculpați pot adopta atitudini diferite — în funcție de particularitățile lor psihologice individuale — ceea ce impune folosirea de către lucrătorul de miliție a unor metode și procedee tactice adecvate fiecărui caz.

Există astfel minori care, la început, apar timorați și puțin vorbăreți, situație ce poate fi generată de mai multe cauze. Spre exemplu, unii dintre aceștia, înainte de a fi aduși la ascultare, pot fi bruscați sau loviți de părinți ori pregătiți de anumite persoane să ascundă adevărul la cercetări. De multe ori, un efect de intimidare exercită asupra lor însăși uniforma celui care îi ascultă și atmosfera „rece" a încăperii unde se efectuează cercetarea.

Evident, aflat în fața unor situații ca cele de mai sus, lucrătorul de miliție trebuie, mai întîi, să stabilească cauzele lor și, în funcție de acestea, să adopte atitudinea cea mai potrivită în „dialogul" ce-l poartă cu minorii respectivi.

[1] Art. 482 C. proc. pen.
[2] Art. 481 C. proc. pen.

ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D 008712, Vol. 1P38, pp. 40-41.

FIGURE 6[925]
Front cover of *Razboiul din Umbră*.

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[925] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D017448, Vol. 14.

FIGURE 7[926]

Example of *fişă personală*

[926] ACNSAS. Fond Documentar. D000069. Vol. 084, pp. 10-12.

FIGURE 8
Legend of conspiratorial house "Dana"

ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D 000118, Vol. 42, p. 48.

Legend of conspiratorial house "Rudi"

ACNSAS. Fond Documentar D 000118, Vol. 42, p. 2.

FIGURE 9

Interview with Traian Sandu
I had a pretty happy childhood in Romania in the years 1967-1975, when my parents decided to withdraw us [him and his brother] from school in order to not get communist indoctrination. Both were architects or technicians, in fact making plans and calculating the strength and cost of buildings or of various community projects. It was, therefore, a high-skilled job. … Both of them came from very modest families, especially my dad, who was from the Giulesti district of Bucharest. My mother was from Husi. [….]

My dad became a dissident in 1975. One day in that year my twin brother and I returned home with red neckties after the pioneer induction ceremony at the age of eight. He brought us together and told us what he thought represented the communist regime, a dictatorship and a socially inegalitarian regime. He asked us if we were ready to go into opposition and leave Romania and we, of course, answered "yes".   The regime then sued us because our parents applied for a passport to leave Romania permanently and removed us from school to avoid indoctrination.

On February 25, 1977, we accompanied our parents to [the residence of] Paul Goma, where they signed his open letter to Ceaşuescu. After that, the Securitate followed us constantly, and our parents kept us in our apartment to avoid arrest and abduction of their children. The Radio Free Europe station mentioned our case and read an open letter to Ceaşuescu written by my parents, where they expressed support for the Charter 77 of Czechoslovakia; they called for freedom and social equality in Romania, and the right to emigrate. My father was then asked to surrender their passports; he was arrested and ill-treated by the Securitate. After the earthquake of March 4, 1977, during which we lived on the eighth floor of our building, we received the passports and the right to leave for Austria. At the airport, the Securitate tried one last time to stop us, but my father pretended to communicate with a complete stranger, who told the Securitate officers that he would convey the news of our arrest. […] However, the Americans, who wanted to spare Ceaşuescu, did not give us political asylum, as they should have, and when my father protested, they violently arrested him and locked him up in an psychiatric asylum. The Romanian refugees therefore did not receive political asylum if they asked the United States - things were different in Europe - and [the system set in place for refugees from Romania] failed, for dozens of them, in the Austrian *Treiskirchen* camp where the authorities brutally muzzled their grievances.[927]

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[927] Interview with Traian Sandu, May 16, 2019, Paris, France.

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