

‘Hell Is Waiting Where the Ocean Meets the Sand’: The Legacy of the Gallipoli Campaign in
Ireland, 1915-2015

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Abstract

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The treatment of Great War remembrance and commemoration in the southern counties of Ireland has been overwhelmingly attributed to concepts of historical amnesia within nationalist memory of the war. Scholarship focuses primarily on Northern Ireland, the Battle of the Somme, and divisions between unionist and nationalist units. My study challenges this notion of amnesia by turning its focus to the Gallipoli campaign, the effects it had on life in Ireland, and its ongoing historical legacy in nationalist memory. Through an examination of Gallipoli’s remembrance and commemoration, it becomes clear that the experience of Irish soldiers at Gallipoli had a profound impact at home, adding to existing political tension. Through analyses of popular print media representations of the campaign, the influence of memory studies, and the intrinsic connection between commemoration and politics, this research examines why Gallipoli remains outside of the linear Irish historical narrative, despite efforts in the late-1990s and 2000s to revive Great War memory in Ireland. Additionally, the Decade of Centenaries project undertaken by the Irish government is centrally explored as a missed opportunity for Irish war commemoration to place Gallipoli within the narrative, next to events deemed more important like the Easter Rising, instead of keeping it on the fringes.

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‘Hell Is Waiting Where the Ocean Meets the Sand’: The Legacy of the Gallipoli Campaign in Ireland, 1915-2015¹

Introduction

In 1918, Major Bryan Cooper’s history of the 10th (Irish) Division’s experiences at Gallipoli in 1915 was published, ending with the declaration that, “Ireland will not easily forget the deeds of the 10th Division.”² This promising assertion now stands starkly against the intricate and complex one-hundred-year labyrinth that the remembrance of Ireland’s Great War soldiers has had to navigate in the twenty-six counties that now form the Republic of Ireland.³ Though an estimated 200,000 Irish soldiers fought in the war, the circumstances under which they enlisted, fought, and were killed or returned home, made official remembrance of them, and their service in the British Army, highly contentious.⁴ This contention pushed Irish remembrance of Gallipoli, and the Great War, to the fringes – not only of the city of Dublin with the construction of the National War Memorial Gardens at Islandbridge in the 1930s – but of the national consciousness. While nationalist remembrance of the war did not disappear, the Irish government’s treatment of it moved through what I have identified as three distinct phases. The first emerged in the immediate aftermath of the war and lasted until the establishment of the Republic of Ireland in 1949 when the government’s position was one of “official tolerance.”⁵ The second was a continuation of this tolerance that, combined with frequent disregard and exclusion, has often been referred to as

¹ The chapter titles used in this work have been inspired by the song “Cliffs of Gallipoli,” by Sabaton. For more details, see the concluding chapter of this thesis.

² Bryan Cooper, *The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli* (Bristol: The Burleigh Press, 1918), 256.

³ This study focuses on nationalist memory in the twenty-six southern counties that, post-partition, make up the southern Irish state, and the Irish government refers to the Dublin-based political entities that have governed here. Any mentions of Northern Ireland refer directly to the six northern counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Derry, and Tyrone, and their existence within the British Empire, and later the United Kingdom.

⁴ This is the total number of Irish soldiers who fought in the war from across the island, north and south.

⁵ David Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State: a chronicle of embarrassment,” in *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, ed. Ian McBride (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 195.

Ireland's "national amnesia," which lasted into the 1970s.⁶ The third phase came in two waves. The first wave began in the 1980s, as the milieu of academic history began to incorporate and employ theories emerging from the new field of memory studies and as new technologies changed the way history existed within the public realm. The second wave, beginning in the mid-1990s, firmly established the third phase as one that used the remembrance of Gallipoli, and the Irish who fought in the Great War, as a political tool to help shape narratives of shared history between the northern and southern parts of the island. This wave continued into the centenary years of the war, from 2014-2018, when Great War remembrance reached new global heights. These three phases of remembrance shape the core of this research. While many scholars have looked at the Irish at Gallipoli, the link between these three distinct phases of its remembrance within the nationalist commemorative landscape and the relationship they have had with Irish politics, remembrance, and commemoration, has been underexplored. As Ireland enters the final stages of the Decade of Centenaries programme, which they embarked on in 2012 to commemorate historical events of the 1912-1922 decade that led to Irish independence, a deeper look at Ireland's relationship with Gallipoli is fitting now that the centenaries events marking the Great War are over.

Of the 200,000 Irish soldiers who fought in the war, only about 30,000 of them were career soldiers in the British Army prior to the outbreak of war. The additional 170,000 soldiers were volunteers, and approximately a tenth of those volunteers went on to form the 10th (Irish) Division that Cooper wrote about. Cooper was a Major General who served with the 5th Service Battalion of the Connaught Rangers, one of the regiments that made up the 10th (Irish) Division. They landed on the Gallipoli peninsula in August 1915, joining Irish soldiers from the Dublin and Munster

⁶ This concept of amnesia does not apply to the ways in which unionists across the island, north and south, treated the remembrance of the war. Keith Jeffery, "Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration," in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 117.

Fusiliers, who had been part of the first landing months earlier, on 25 April 1915. In the land battles that raged between April and the final evacuations in January 1916, approximately 4,000 Irish soldiers had died and thousands more were wounded, missing, or had been overtaken by illness or dehydration. The 10th (Irish) Division, the first to ever fight in a division that distinctly identified them as Irish, sent 17,000 soldiers to Gallipoli, and within a month of their landing at Suvla Bay in August 1915, almost half of them had died, were injured, sick, or missing.⁷

When war broke out in 1914, Ireland was preparing for the enactment of the Third Home Rule Bill, which, once enacted, would see the return of an Irish parliament to Dublin and would grant the country self-governance, though this was vehemently opposed by unionists. The Home Government Association had been established in 1870, giving strength to the nationalist cause, which had been agitating for self-government since the eighteenth-century. Following Britain's declaration of war on Germany on 4 August 1914, the bill was postponed indefinitely in September, though there existed a general belief amongst nationalists that it would quickly be enacted once the war was over. By summer 1915, it was becoming clear that the war was going to be long, and costly, making Home Rule a distant hope. This had a profound impact on nationalist attitudes in Ireland, as newspapers printed casualty lists, and against the wishes of the British government, first-person accounts from Gallipoli. In her memoir, Irish poet and novelist Katharine Tynan wrote of life in Ireland after the August 1915 landings at Gallipoli,

...there had been Suvla Bay, when blow after blow fell day after day on one's heart. So many of our friends had gone out in the 10th Division to perish at Suvla. For the first time came bitterness, for we felt that their lives had been thrown away and that their heroism had gone unrecognised. ... Dublin was full of mourning, and on the faces one met there was a hard brightness of pain as though the people's hearts burnt in the fire and were not consumed. ... One met the mourners everywhere. ... One got to know the look of the new widows — hard, bright eyes, burning for the relief

⁷ Stuart Ward, "Parallel Lives, Poles Apart: Commemorating Gallipoli in Ireland and Australia," in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 31.

of tears, a high, feverish flush in the cheeks, hands that trembled, and occasionally an uncertain movement of the young head.⁸

Tynan's experience echoes the sentiments that had become increasingly common throughout Ireland. As 1915 came to an end, and it had become clear that the Gallipoli campaign had been a failure, bitterness turned to anger. Many felt that the pain and mourning felt in the country was for naught. Moreover, as rumours of incompetence at the British military command level circulated, this anger was increasingly directed at the British Empire. Just three months after the last soldiers were evacuated from Gallipoli and reassigned to the Balkans, this anger towards the British erupted on Easter weekend 1916, in an attempted coup to overthrow the British government and finally establish an Irish republic. While the Easter Rising was not a direct response to the casualties suffered by Irish troops in 1915, the sentiments that were stirred up in reaction to what had occurred on the beaches of Gallipoli influenced how the Irish public perceived the British reaction in 1916 and its treatment of those involved.

This study begins here in the summer of 1915 and presents a detailed study of Ireland's relationship with the remembrance of Gallipoli from 1915-2015 by bringing together research from multiple disciplines, allowing for a deeper understanding of how the Irish role in the Gallipoli campaign profoundly influenced Ireland's history. Through this exploration, I will highlight how the Gallipoli campaign's impact on the home front played an important role in changing public attitudes towards the war, Home Rule, British imperialism, and Irish nationalism. Given the political landscape in Ireland during the Great War, the overshadowing of Gallipoli by the Easter Rising in Ireland's commemorative landscape is a direct result of the nationalist Irish government's creation of a national myth.⁹ Further, through an examination of the rise of memory studies from

⁸ Katharine Tynan, *The Years of the Shadow* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), 178.

⁹ It is important to note that the Easter Rising did not overtake the war's memory for unionists in both the north and south of the island, as the war remained firmly engrained in their broader remembrance culture.

the 1980s onward, the resurgence of Gallipoli in nationalist Irish remembrance as a way to inject unity into the narrative that remained divided since the beginning of the Republican movement and the later partition of the island into north and south in 1921, will be explored. Highly influenced by the Irish Peace Process that brought the end of the Troubles in the 1990s that has been argued to have “conspired ... to raise [Great War memories] anew,” it will be shown how the campaign became politically central to the Irish state in the lead up to the Decade of Centenaries programme and the centenary events around the war.¹⁰ Finally, these elements together will reveal how Ireland’s treatment of Gallipoli’s remembrance has underscored the very divisions they claimed they sought to deconstruct, and when the opportunity presented itself in 2015, these divisions were not bridged, keeping the campaign out of the linear historical narrative.

Methodology and Terminology

At the core of this thesis is an examination of the intersection of history and memory studies and their influence on official remembrance and commemoration. There are three important terminological distinctions that I must highlight as I broach the convergence of these two fields. Here, I use ‘remembrance’ to refer to representations of memory in the public sphere while I employ ‘memory’, and ‘historical memory’, to define the narratives that are used within these representations. I use ‘commemoration’ to refer to specific instances and/or events in which remembrance and politics merge to perform choreographed interpretations of historical memory.¹¹ At times, I use ‘official remembrance’ or ‘state remembrance’ to denote how the government has been active in its public performance. Additionally, I use the remembrance, or commemorative, landscape in reference to the overall environment in which this public performance exists. While

¹⁰ Jonathan Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme: Commemoration and Culture War in Northern Ireland* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2018), 10.

¹¹ For more on memory choreography, see Brian Conway, *Commemoration and Bloody Sunday: Pathways of Memory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

remembrance and commemoration both rely on memory to inform them, commemoration is inextricably linked to the political and is largely funded by, designed by, and/or executed by, the state, though this is not to say that remembrance cannot exist in politically neutral arenas. To put it more simply, memory is something that one has, while remembrance and commemoration are things that one does.¹² Critically, this delineation is essential to the overarching theme of this study, which emphasises the role of agency in the treatment of Gallipoli's historical memory in the Irish republic.

This study looks at the Gallipoli campaign, and though it is sometimes referred to in other scholarship as the Battle of Gallipoli, it is important here to note the difference between a military campaign and a battle. While battles are tactical manoeuvres designed to achieve their goals within a short period of time, campaigns are “designed to link [these] tactical actions to strategic purposes,” which are often larger in scope than a single battle, and usually last far longer.¹³ The use of the term Great War is used here to refer to the war of 1914-1918, instead of the more frequently used First World War. The emergence of remembrance in the direct aftermath of the war is directly related to, and was shaped by, the associations of meaning and morality ascribed to the term *great*. This will be explored in greater detail in the second chapter of this thesis. Moreover, while Northern Ireland is outside the scope of this research, brief references to ways in which remembrance of the Great War has functioned there are occasionally used as cursory elements in the broader exploration of Irish war commemoration.

¹² Jonathan Evershed explains this in his critique of collective memory, arguing that this distinction has been underappreciated in studies of commemoration. Though beyond the scope of my study, this also raises important questions about whether or not a state can *have* a memory. Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 24.

¹³ There were many battles as part of the Gallipoli campaign which will not be explored here. For more of those details, see Edward J. Erickson, *Gallipoli: Command Under Fire* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing), 12.

Due to the extenuating circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, travel restrictions prevented me from accessing archives in Dublin and London, and the shutdown of many libraries created roadblocks that hindered access to other materials. As a result, my research relies heavily on the use of digital archives to provide primary source material when available, as well as careful consideration of primary sources published in secondary scholarship on the topic. As *The Irish Times* was the most widely circulated newspaper at the time and continues to be one of the most-read news sources in the country, I have relied on their digital archive to analyse information that was being presented to the public, as well as in some cases, public responses through letters submitted by readers. As the blending of professional academic history and public history are important topics in this study, several articles from the popular magazine *History Ireland* have been used to reflect historical opinions that have been made accessible to the public via this medium. Letters to the editor are also used to reflect how disagreements between academics were increasingly present in popular discussions of history in Ireland.

Historiography

This study examines the relationship between the remembrance and commemoration of the Gallipoli campaign in Ireland from the initial landings on the peninsula in April 1915 to the centenary events that were part of the Decade of Centenaries programme in 2015. Though this study spans one-hundred years, its central focus is the intersection of Gallipoli's remembrance and commemoration within the southern twenty-six counties as of 1915, which later formed the Irish Free State, and eventually the Republic of Ireland. The following chapters will explain why it took Ireland so long to bring Gallipoli into their remembrance landscape. I argue that, despite its treatment, the revolutionary period in Ireland cannot be understood without correctly placing the

Gallipoli campaign into the linear historical narrative in order to understand how remembrance and commemoration has been choreographed, performed, and consumed.

This study places Gallipoli as a catalyst for increased anti-imperialist and pro-republican sentiment in Ireland in 1915. I do not mean to imply that Gallipoli was *the* catalyst for republican violence, but that it was *a* catalyst – albeit a very important one - that has been misplaced in the Irish historical narrative. Moreover, I do not mean to imply that Gallipoli created nationalists and republicans in Ireland, only that it helped to fuel increases in sentiments that reflected these values.

The history of the Gallipoli campaign has gone through several phases in western historiographical study. Military historian Edward Erickson has categorised them into four distinct generations. The first emerged directly after the war and focused on investigations of military tactics, resulting largely in “an apologia for defeat,” despite suggestions that British success had been possible on several occasions.¹⁴ The second generation, he argues, emerged in the 1950s using new archival material, reanalysing the tactical, while evaluating and assigning blame to incompetent British leadership.¹⁵ He places the emergence of the third generation in the late 1970s, when a younger generation of historians used new archives and technologies to explore the human war experience and legacies, though these were largely limited to English-language sources.¹⁶ The fourth, or current generation, he argues, came at the end of the twentieth-century. This generation has moved away from the British-centric military history, and English-language experiences as Ottoman and Turkish perspectives have been brought into the conversation with the opening of their archives, and arguments have begun to centre around the superiority of Ottoman leadership as the cause of allied defeat.¹⁷

¹⁴ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 14-15.

¹⁵ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 15-16.

¹⁶ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 16.

¹⁷ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 17.

In the western historiographical canon, Erickson's categorisations provide a satisfactory overview of Gallipoli's treatment, and he importantly identifies that a large portion of the primary research has been pioneered by British and Australian historians. Though the Irish made up a large portion of the soldiers who fought and died at Gallipoli, their presence in the canon, and within Erickson's four generations of historiography, is lacking. There were important Irish contributions made to the first generation of Gallipoli's history, such as Cooper's history of the 10th Division, in the immediate aftermath of the war. However, while the British, Australian and New Zealand troops returned home to recover from four years of mechanized warfare, the Irish returned home to five more years of violence.¹⁸ While the island rebuilt, violence on the European continent erupted again in 1939, and though the Dublin-based Irish state remained neutral during the Second World War, tens of thousands of Irishmen from north and south fought for the allies, and Belfast was the target of several air raids.¹⁹ In 1948, the Republic of Ireland Act was ratified, removing the last British ties to the country and by the 1950s, as the country entered the post-Commonwealth period, the focus was primarily on stabilising itself to become a firmly established European nation. It was less than two decades later than the island saw the more violence, as the Troubles erupted in the north in 1968.

These circumstances cannot be overlooked when one looks at the contribution made by Irish scholars to the historical study of Gallipoli. As nationalist Ireland tried to establish itself, its historical focus remained largely on the Easter Rising and reviving the traditions of Gaelic Ireland.

¹⁸ Many British veterans of the war did go on to join paramilitary forces that would be stationed throughout the island of Ireland to attempt to suppress the actions of the Irish Republican Army in the years following the war. These forces included the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries or rejoined the Ulster Volunteer Force, becoming involved in the violence in Ireland. While continued conflict was experienced by these groups, it was experienced largely outside of the British home front.

¹⁹ In Ireland, the Second World War is known as "the Emergency," echoing the government's enactment of the Emergency Powers Act on 2 September 1939.

My research fits between Erickson's third and fourth generations of Gallipoli's historiography, through a combination of human experience, legacy, and by moving away from a British-centric narrative, placing Ireland, Irish nationalist perceptions, remembrance, and commemoration, at its centre.

To do this, Cooper's 1918 book is a pivotal starting point. Focused on the formation of this division, their experiences at Gallipoli, and their evacuation in October 1915 when they were sent to Macedonia, he provides insight into the daily lives, and thoughts, of the soldiers. However, as it is largely based on Cooper's memory, and accounts given to him by other soldiers, it is fairly limited in scope. Yet, as the first divisional history to appear in print in Ireland, it was a watershed moment in this history and the author's certainty that the 10th (Irish) Division would not be forgotten shapes the framework of my study.

This research can be understood as part of a larger stream of historical investigation that places the Irish presence in the Great War at its centre. Much of the scholarship that exists today has been born of the resurgence of discussions around the war in Ireland that this study analyses. Much of it was published following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, ending the Troubles in the north. For the most part, this scholarship focuses on broad studies of Irish participation and experience in the war, and much attention has been afforded to the Irish at the Somme and that particular battle's place in unionist historical memory and commemoration.

In shaping the focus of this study, Keith Jeffery's 2000 book, *Ireland and the Great War*, has been invaluable. This monograph was the first to present an exploration of Ireland and the war that incorporated experiences from all sides of the political and religious spectrum, bringing in perspectives from nationalists, unionists, pro-Home Rulers, republicans, and both Protestants and Catholics, highlighting the many different allegiances and beliefs that existed on the island. It was

also the first to go beyond the military to explore cultural, social, and economic aspects of the war, spending considerable effort to address the home front and civilian life. I expand on his theory that one must look at the Great War and the Easter Rising as part of the same historical narrative, which makes the war “the single most central experience of twentieth-century Ireland.”²⁰ I posit that Jeffery’s claim, though accurate, can be expanded upon to correctly identify Gallipoli as the major turning point in Irish war support that went on to influence the emotions and perceptions that would influence events that contributed to the Irish nationalist push for independence. Edward Madigan has echoed Jeffery’s argument connecting these events, and the collection of works he edited with John Horne, *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, informs the treatment the campaign has had in Ireland.²¹ As such, my project is not a study of Irish participation at Gallipoli, but one that analyses Irish perceptions of the Gallipoli campaign and its legacy.

In approaching this topic, political speeches are drawn upon to underscore how legitimacy has been lent to specific narratives about Ireland and the war. Alongside reliance on *The Irish Times* for insight into what information was being presented to the public, and in some cases, public responses through letters submitted by readers is Padraig Yeates’ book, *A City in Wartime: Dublin 1914-1918*. Yeates’ work helps in analysing public perceptions and understandings of the Irish soldier’s experience and treatment on the home front during the Gallipoli campaign.

In exploring remembrance and commemoration of Gallipoli, and the war, in Ireland, several important contributions are essential to this study. Mandy Link’s recent book *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State, 1914-1937: Specters of Empire*, is placed in conversation with David Fitzpatrick’s chapter “Commemoration in the Irish Free State: a

²⁰ Keith Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2.

²¹ Edward Madigan, “Introduction,” in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 1-12.

chronicle of embarrassment,” to inform how the politics of the Irish Free State were instrumental in shaping the exclusion of Gallipoli from Ireland’s remembrance landscape.²² Additionally, chapters from Madigan and Horne’s collection provide insight into Irish war commemoration, including Jeffery’s exploration of different types of war commemoration, and Stuart Ward’s comparison of Irish and Australian commemoration of Gallipoli.²³ Heather Jones’s insight into the private sphere of remembrance is employed alongside Jane Leonard’s chapter “The Twinge of Memory: Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday in Dublin since 1919,” to underscore how war remembrance existed and functioned in Ireland despite the government’s attitude of “official tolerance.”²⁴ Madigan’s introduction to this collection provides essential framework, while Anne Dolan’s chapter questioning who to commemorate highlights the roles historians and politicians play in the creation of commemorative events.²⁵

Jenny Macleod’s extensive research on Gallipoli provides an important look at the ways in which this singular campaign has been represented in the five countries that played a major role in the campaign: Ireland, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey.²⁶ Macleod’s work, paired with Ward’s chapter, allows me to provide a brief, but important, comparison, giving context to Ireland’s treatment of Gallipoli’s remembrance. Though this brief comparison is important, this

²² Nuala C. Johnson’s book helps to give insight into the ways that geography was important to how war remembrance had to fight for visibility against a physical landscape dominated by the Easter Rising. Nuala C. Johnson, *Ireland, the Great War, and the Geography of Remembrance*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

²³ Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Commemoration.”; Ward, “Parallel Lives, Poles Apart,” 29-37.

²⁴ Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State.”; Heather Jones, “Church of Ireland Great War Remembrance in the South of Ireland: a Personal Reflection,” in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 74-82.; Jane Leonard, “The Twinge of Memory: Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday in Dublin since 1919,” in *Unionism in Modern Ireland: New Perspectives on Politics and Culture*, eds. Graham Walker and Richard English (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 99-114.

²⁵ Anne Dolan also served as part of the Advisory Committee for the Decade of Centenaries project. Anne Dolan, “Divisions and Divisions and Divisions: Who to Commemorate?” in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolutions, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 145-153.

²⁶ Jenny Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

thesis is not a comparative study. These are compared to provide broader context to Gallipoli's legacy in Ireland.

Expanding on this legacy, this study challenges popular notions put forth by F.X Martin, Myles Dungan, and others, that a “national amnesia” existed in Ireland in regard to the Great War.²⁷ Drawing on articles from Leonard, who argues that it was not amnesia but embarrassment and resentment that existed in the southern Irish state,²⁸ Link, who demonstrates how Great War remembrance functioned in the Irish Free State, and Fitzpatrick, who echoes Leonard's claims of embarrassment in an examination of Irish war remembrance, I assert that this has been too broadly applied, and at times, has been misunderstood. Historian and popular journalist Myles Dungan wrote in *The Irish Times* in 2006 that Ireland's amnesia was “an elimination of memory.”²⁹ This muddles the definition of amnesia – the loss of memory – with deliberate action. I unpack this using important contributions by Jane McGaughey and Nuala C. Johnson to explore the undervalued role of agency in Ireland's commemoration of Gallipoli.

This is presented in two parts: first, through an understanding of the rise of memory studies and its influence on Irish war remembrance, followed by an exploration of the intersection of war commemoration and politics. Through an exploration of what Jay Winter has called the second ‘memory boom,’ his important contributions to the evolution of the study of memory as a distinct academic field is placed in discussion with Astrid Erll's book *Memory in Culture*.³⁰ Additionally, pioneering research by Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora in the realm of memory studies is

²⁷ Jeffery, "Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration," 117.

²⁸ Leonard, "The Twinge of Memory," 100.

²⁹ *The Irish Times*, 19 September 2006.

³⁰ Jay Winter, “Notes on the Memory Boom: War, Remembrance and the Uses of the Past,” in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present*, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 54-73.

presented as the initial framework behind newer theories in the study of group memory and remembrance that are integral to this research.³¹

Shaping the core of the memory debate here are works taken from *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, edited by T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper. Addressing how the political informs commemoration, the chapter written by the three editors and Jo Stanley's chapter on trauma and war commemoration, help to inform connections made between the Irish government and Gallipoli's legacy.³² Though Jonathan Evershed's in-depth study of Irish commemoration, *Ghosts of the Somme: Commemoration and Culture War in Northern Ireland*, focuses on Northern Ireland's relationship with the Battle of the Somme as part of the Decade of Centenaries, it provides instrumental insight into how Great War remembrance has been constructed on the island. Moreover, it adds much-needed insight into how Great War remembrance has influenced, and has been influenced by, the Irish Peace Process and the post-Good Friday Agreement environment. Unlike Evershed's book, no study of a similar kind exists about Gallipoli and its similar trajectory in the south. This research is the stepping-stone to this type of in-depth analysis.

Also informing Ireland's relationship with the past is Guy Beiner's theory of 'deep memory,' which explores the nature of historical memory in Ireland.³³ His comments on the symbiotic relationship between remembering and forgetting informs the discussion presented about the function of remembrance, and the role of meaning ascribed to it.³⁴ An important

³¹ Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1980 [first published 1950]); Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations* no. 28 (1989): 7-24.

³² T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, eds., *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, (London: Routledge, 2000).

³³ Guy Beiner, "Between Trauma and Triumphalism: The Easter Rising, the Somme, and the Crux of Deep Memory in Modern Ireland," *Journal of British Studies* 46, no. 2 (April 2007): 366-389.

³⁴ Guy Beiner, *Forgetful Remembrance: Social Forgetting and Vernacular Historiography of a Rebellion in Ulster* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

influence on the discussion about meaning is David Rieff's 2016 book *In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies*, in which he explores ideas of morality in regards to historical remembrance and forgetting. Kerwin L. Klein's article "On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse" provides insight here on how memory has been used as a tool in relation to public acts of remembrance and commemoration, explaining the differences in the general understanding of memory and history. Expanding on this, Geoffrey Cubitt's work on the collective past is essential to understanding the role meaning plays in remembrance.³⁵

This is placed in conversation with Jay Winter's studies of meaning and mourning around Great War memorials and monuments. Winter's contribution to Great War remembrance helps to highlight how initial ideas of mourning have evolved into contemporary associations that have removed historical context.³⁶ Additionally, Joanna Bourke's influential insights into the selectivity of war remembrance and commemoration weaves throughout this thesis, allowing for deeper understanding of the agency presented in McGaughey's analysis of Ireland's "selective amnesia" and Gallipoli.³⁷

The agency associated with Gallipoli's legacy in Ireland is inextricably linked to the role of historians and politicians in the creation and dissemination of commemoration. This is essential to my research, and alongside Dolan, both Macleod and Fitzpatrick have provided essential insight

³⁵ Geoffrey Cubitt, "Social memory and the collective past," in *History and Memory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 199-257.

³⁶ Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European cultural history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, "Setting the Framework," in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6-39.

³⁷ Jane McGaughey, "Men of Suvla: Empire, Masculinities, and Gallipoli's Legacy in Ireland and Newfoundland," in *The Great War: From Memory to History*, eds. Kellen Kurschinski, Steve Marti, Alicia Robinet, Matt Symes and Jonathan Vance (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2015), 128.; Joanna Bourke, "Introduction: 'Remembering' War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, no. 4 (2004): 473-485.; Joanna Bourke, "Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: The Sufferings of 'Shell-Shocked' Men in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-39," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 1 (2000): 57-69.

into this. Moreover, Richard S. Grayson's research on Irish war remembrance provides important background information on the importance of Great War remembrance in Northern Ireland to juxtapose Ireland's lack thereof. More importantly, his research on the rise of public history lends itself to a discussion of how the 'memory boom,' in conjunction with advances in technology, shifted attitudes around war remembrance in Ireland.³⁸

Chapter Outlines

In chapter one, I analyse perceptions and representations of the Gallipoli campaign in Ireland, and their impact on public opinion of the war and of British imperialism. Then, through an examination of Irish war remembrance, I posit that Ireland's neglect of the Gallipoli campaign was deliberately choreographed, providing context with a brief comparison of Gallipoli's commemoration in other countries. Chapter two explores the ways in which the 'memory boom' influenced the revival of Gallipoli's historical memory in Ireland as a political tool in the 1990s through an examination of the growth of public history and the role of political agency in commemoration. Finally, chapter three examines Ireland's determination to use the Gallipoli campaign to forge a narrative of shared history and identity through careful choreography and rituals performed by Irish officials. Moreover, this chapter argues that because Gallipoli has continuously been placed outside of the historical narrative due to the focus on the Easter Rising, the centenary events in 2015 were a missed opportunity for Gallipoli to find a permanent place in Ireland's historical narrative. This suggests that now, with centenary events dedicated to the Great War complete, Gallipoli's legacy in Ireland will fade once more.

³⁸ Richard S. Grayson, "From Genealogy to Reconciliation: Public Engagement with Remembrance of the First World War in Ireland," *Nordic Irish Studies* 13, no. 2 (2014): 99-113.

Overall, this study takes the Gallipoli campaign from the margins of Irish history and correctly positions it into the Irish historical narrative as an important event on the road to independence. In so doing, through an examination of the campaign's legacy in Ireland, it demonstrates how, and why, this has not happened within Ireland's commemorative landscape, citing the Decade of Centenaries Gallipoli events as a missed opportunity in effectuating this.

Chapter One: ‘How many wasted lives?’: Perception, Impact, and Remembrance of the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915-1965

On 10 September 1988, crowds gathered on the western outskirts of Dublin for the opening of the Irish National War Memorial Gardens at Islandbridge in commemoration of the almost 50,000 Irishmen who died in the Great War.³⁹ In attendance were the mayor of Dublin, the British ambassador to Ireland, a representative from the Turkish Embassy, and clergy from the Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches, all of whom gave a blessing to the park.⁴⁰ However, it was glaringly obvious that a representative of the Irish national government was not present, and protestors attempted to overtake the ceremony. Protests at Great War commemorative events held at this memorial park were common and seven years passed before a Taoiseach attended a public ceremony here, when John Burton commemorated the Irish involved in the Second World War. In 2006, a ceremony dedicated to the fallen of the Battle of the Somme was attended by President Mary McAleese and Taoiseach Bertie Ahern marking the first-time official representatives attended a ceremony dedicated to the Great War at the park. Yet the construction of the war memorial at Islandbridge was completed in 1937, meaning more than fifty years passed before the park saw a proper opening ceremony, fifty-eight years before a government official attended an event there and sixty-nine years before officials attended a ceremony dedicated to the Great War.

If the war was indeed *great*, why did it take so long for the Irish government to commemorate the almost 200,000 Irish soldiers who had fought, and the almost 50,000 who died?⁴¹ To understand the relationship between Ireland and the memory of the Great War, it is imperative to understand the political tensions that existed, the war experiences of the Irish people,

³⁹ *The Irish Times*, 12 September 1988.

⁴⁰ *The Irish Times*, 12 September 1988.

⁴¹ Keith Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 7.

and the treatment of unofficial remembrance events in Ireland during, and immediately following the war of 1914-1918. It is through this framework that this this chapter will reveal how official remembrance of the Gallipoli campaign in Ireland was eclipsed by the Easter Rising despite its role in the same historical narrative. Though most of the existing scholarship has focused on the Easter Rising and the Battle of the Somme as the incendiary events that led to the violence that erupted in Ireland following the war, this study posits that it was reactions to the Gallipoli campaign that created the environment in which the revolutionary period became possible, and its absence from Irish commemoration has been deliberate. First, I will briefly explain the Irish experience at Gallipoli and its representation and perception at home. Then, I will show that despite the commonly cited trend of amnesia, unofficial remembrance events were common in Ireland in the interwar years, with the Irish Free State adopting an attitude of “official tolerance.”⁴² Next, Irish remembrance of Gallipoli will be juxtaposed with that of others involved in the campaign, namely Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey, to highlight the disparate treatment of its historical memory. Finally, I will highlight how Ireland’s attitude towards war remembrance and their neglect of Gallipoli’s influence on Irish history was deliberately choreographed to be forgotten.

Ireland and the war

When war broke out in August 1914, many in Ireland were celebrating the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, or the Third Home Rule Bill, which had been introduced two years earlier. This bill would grant Ireland self-government and the return of its parliament to Dublin. However, opposition to the bill in Ulster led to the Home Rule Crisis when Ulster unionists across the island created the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a paramilitary force to resist enforcement of the bill, prompting Irish nationalists to retaliate by creating the Irish Volunteer

⁴² Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State,” 195.

Force (IVF).⁴³ This event marks the beginning of the Irish revolutionary period, yet when the bill was suspended after the British declaration of war against Germany on 4 August 1914, Ireland found itself at the beginning of a global conflict that would catapult them into catastrophe. Instead of preparing to elect their own leaders, 200,000 Irishmen ended up in a war that would last four long years dressed in British khaki, where a quarter of them were be killed.⁴⁴

Of the Irish soldiers that enlisted, a large percentage of them were volunteers who rushed to sign up in the first few months following the declaration of war on 4 August 1914.⁴⁵ Many motivations existed amongst the individuals that signed up, but one major influence has been referred to as “economic conscription” by historian Keith Jeffery, which he attributes to the high unemployment rate in Ireland at the time, coupled with the separation allowances given to wives of soldiers during their deployment.⁴⁶ Enlistment was encouraged by parliamentary nationalist John Redmond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), who argued that the interests of all of Ireland were under threat, and he called on Irishmen to “go on drilling and make yourself efficient for the work, and then account yourselves as men, not only for Ireland itself, but wherever the fighting line extends, in defence of right, of freedom and religion in this war.”⁴⁷ Redmond’s encouragement was later represented on a recruitment poster, his cartooned image pointing a finger at the reader with text that exclaims, “Your first duty is to take your part in ending the war.”⁴⁸ This

⁴³ The Irish Volunteer Force was formed in 1913 by Irish nationalists who sought to prohibit the UVF from blocking Home Rule. Their statement of purpose boasted that their purpose was to “secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland.” “Manifesto of the Irish Volunteers,” *The Irish Review* 3, no. 34 (December 1913): 505.

⁴⁴ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 7.

⁴⁵ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 7.

⁴⁶ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 18-19.

⁴⁷ John Redmond, “Speech at Woodenbridge (1914),” in *Handbook of the Irish Revival: An Anthology of Irish Cultural and Political Writings 1891-1922*, eds. Declan Kiberd and Patrick J. Mathews (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016), 374.

⁴⁸ Redmond, John Edward, and Central Council for the Organization of Recruiting in Ireland, “Your First Duty Is to Take Your Part in Ending the War,” Mr. J.E. Redmond, M.P. At Waterford, 23rd August, 1915: Join an Irish

encouragement was Redmond's public-facing attitude towards the war effort and it captured the attention of many parliamentary nationalists, who believed that fighting for Britain would guarantee Home Rule, though Redmond privately feared that if that were not to happen, the people of Ireland would feel betrayed.⁴⁹ While economic and political reasons were motive enough for some, others sought the romanticised adventure of a foreign war, as no major continental European war had occurred in almost a century. Though examinations of Irish participation in the war frequently divide soldiers into nationalist and unionist camps, this is far too simplified for the 200,000 individuals who each made the decision to fight, and many did so for an abundance of reasons not listed here.⁵⁰ Not everyone in Ireland was enthusiastic about the war, and a substantial number of nationalists expressed their opposition from the very beginning. While Redmond and the IPP expressed their support for the war, nationalist groups such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Cumann na mBann, and the Irish Citizen Army, openly opposed the war and any attempts to encourage Irish recruitment. Internally, attitudes towards the war caused divisions within the IVF, which at this point had almost 200,000 members, causing a split within the organization following Redmond's Woodenbridge speech. The split created a unit of 10,000 who retained the Irish Volunteers name and devoted themselves to militant nationalism.⁵¹

Only two years into the four-year conflict, Irish troops had suffered more than 8,000 deaths between the Gallipoli campaign (April 1915-January 1916) and the Battle of the Somme (July 1916-November 1916); thousands more were injured, permanently maimed, and psychologically

Regiment To-day, (Dublin: John Shuley & Co. [printer] for Central Council for the Organization of Recruiting in Ireland, 9151915), accessed 20 September 2021, <http://catalogue.nli.ie/Record/vtls000019673>.

⁴⁹ Ronan McGreevy, "John Redmond and the First World War," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 107, no. 428 (2018/19): 409.

⁵⁰ There were also approximately 30,000 Irish career soldiers in the British Army when war broke out, and many Irish men living in British-ruled places enlisted as well. Madigan, "Introduction," 5.

⁵¹ "Manifesto of the Irish Volunteers," *The Irish Review* 4, no. 42 (September-November 1914): 281-286.

scarred. These two events were the most catastrophic for Irish units throughout the entire war, and by its end, almost 50,000 Irishmen had died.⁵² This equals about 25% of those who fought and approximately 6% of the eligible male population.⁵³ This had a powerful impact at home in Ireland. Newspapers had taken to printing casualty lists daily, underlining the devastating human cost of the war. This added to the disenchantment being felt for a conflict that, by mid-1915, had already become widely unpopular. By the summer of 1915, politicians were agitating for the Home Rule Bill to be passed, once and for all, when in July, a “maverick nationalist councillor” for the city of Dublin proposed a motion that Redmond responded to by arguing the war took precedent over all else.⁵⁴

By January 1916, the last evacuations of soldiers at Gallipoli by the British Army “exposed a very painful reality,” as thousands of Irishmen had been killed in a failed campaign, some before they had even reached the beach.⁵⁵ At the same time, political tensions in Ireland were reaching their peak as the republican movement that began growing with increasing fervor prior to the outbreak of war plotted a coup against British rule in Ireland. The eruption came in April, when an armed revolt broke out over Easter weekend, creating shockwaves that would reverberate within the country for decades. Called the Easter Rising, this failed attempt to overthrow British rule left five-hundred dead in Dublin and led to a stringent crackdown on the island by the British government. Using deadly force to put down the Rising, the British executed its leaders at Kilmainham Gaol by firing squad over a ten-day period in May 1916, including prominent

⁵² A recently opened digital archive, the IMR (Ireland’s Memorial Records) through the Flanders Field Museum, calculates approximately 50,000 Irish dead. In Flanders Field Museum, “Ireland’s Memorial Records,” accessed 8 April 2019, <http://imr.inflandersfields.be/index.html>.

⁵³ An Phríomh-Oifig Staidrimh (Central Statistics Office Ireland), “Life in 1916 Ireland: Stories from statistics,” accessed 8 April 2019, <https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-1916/1916irl/people/population/>.

⁵⁴ Pdraig Yeates, *A City in Wartime: Dublin 1914-1918* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2012), pagination unavailable.

⁵⁵ Gavin Hughes, *The Fighting Irish: The Irish Regiments in the First World War*, (Sallins: Merrion Press, 2015), 90.

nationalists Patrick Pearse and James Connolly, who despite their different views on the war, strongly agitated for an independent Irish. The Irish public lined the streets outside the prison, hearing the gunshots and growing increasingly hostile towards the British and sympathetic towards the rebels and their cause. Many were forced to reckon with their beliefs and the mixed feelings they held towards violent republicanism. Although the Easter Rising failed, the British reaction to this attempted coup combined with reactions to the disaster at Gallipoli had exacerbated anti-British attitudes at the same time that the republican movement reorganized, dominating and growing the Sinn Féin party into a more militant, nationalist republican party.⁵⁶ The Battle of the Somme two months later brought a new flood of death notices that engulfed the country, fanning the flames of the emotional fire that had sparked in 1915.

Unlike Gallipoli, the Battle of the Somme became quickly associated with the heroism of the 36th (Ulster) Division and has been widely commemorated in the north. Unionist and loyalist service in the Great War, and more broadly in the British Army, formed “a central element of their British identity.”⁵⁷ As the war raged across the European continent, the Irish troops in France that went into battle on 1 July 1916, unknowingly took part in a military campaign that resulted in higher casualty rates than any previously seen in British military history.⁵⁸

Histories of the Somme began to be published almost immediately. Though the first, Michael MacDonagh’s 1917 book, *The Irish at the Somme*, sought to push a nationalist agenda, others soon followed, including *The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division* by Cyril Falls in 1922,

⁵⁶ Originally founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905, the Sinn Féin party originally advocated for parliamentary abstentionism and “passive resistance to British rule in Ireland.” Sinn Féin, “Resolutions passed on 28 Nov. 1905, at the public meeting which followed the first annual convention of the national council of Sinn Féin,” in *Irish Historical Documents 1172-1922*, eds. Edmund Curtis and R.B. McDowell (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), 314.

⁵⁷ Richard S. Grayson, *Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died together in the First World War*, (London: Continuum Books, 2009), xv.

⁵⁸ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 2.

which gives an in-depth history of this division from their inception in 1914 to the end of the war. Despite several different Irish units being involved, the Somme was quickly embraced by groups in the north, linking their service in the British Army to their loyalty to the empire. In the south, attitudes were much different, and it is from a soldier of the Somme that comes one of the most prevalent quotes regarding the treatment of veterans upon their return to Ireland, when Thomas Kettle in discussing the Easter Rising wrote, “These men will go down to history as heroes and martyrs and I will go down – if I go down at all – as a bloody British officer.”⁵⁹

Recent scholarship on the war in what would become Northern Ireland post-partition has remained focused largely on the 36th (Ulster) Division and their involvement at the Somme, oftentimes eclipsing other major battles fought by units from the north and ignoring the role of Ulstermen in who fought in divisions raised in other parts of the island. Richard Grayson’s work attempts to rectify the gaps by looking at the relationship between soldiers from Northern Ireland and the war, beyond their specific units. His 2009 book, *Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died together in the First World War*, uses a ‘military history from the street’ approach to show how Irishmen from all walks of life fought in the war.⁶⁰ Importantly, in stating that remembrance in the north has largely focused around a narrative that glorifies the unionist experience at the Somme, he points out the role that this narrative has played in creating divides between the major 1916 events, emphasising how widespread the notions of the heroic Ulstermen at the Somme, and the rebellious Irish at the Easter Rising have become.⁶¹

Regardless of which units they fought in, by war’s end in 1918, the Irish soldiers who had survived and returned home were not returning to the same Ireland they had left four years earlier.

⁵⁹ Mandy Link, *1914-1937: Specters of Empire* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019), 41.

⁶⁰ Grayson, *Belfast Boys*, xv.

⁶¹ Grayson, *Belfast Boys*, 171.

Just months prior to the armistice, the British government attempted to enforce conscription in Ireland as it had in other areas of its empire; it had almost failed to pass in Canada and Australia, and was never introduced in South Africa.⁶² Voluntary enlistment in Ireland had fallen drastically by 1918 largely due to disillusionment, not just with the British Empire, but with the brutality and seeming endlessness of the conflict. The opposition to conscription by Sinn Féin, the IPP, the Catholic Church, the Labour Party, and others, came just as the IPP was struggling to rebuild and only a month after the death of its leader, John Redmond. Ronan McGreevy has highlighted that it was the conscription crisis that gave Sinn Féin the boost they needed to dominate the 1918 General Election and saw the “destruction of [the IPP].”⁶³ Sinn Féin, a fiercely republican party, had been anti-war and anti-recruitment since the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. In the December 1918 election, they went from a handful of seats won through small by-elections, to an overwhelming majority.⁶⁴ In January 1919, Sinn Féin candidates refused to take their seats in British Parliament and instead met in Dublin to constitute the First Dáil Éireann. This government declared Irish independence and ratified the 1916 Proclamation of the Irish Republic issued by the leaders of the Easter Rising. This took place on the same day that Irish Volunteers ambushed officers of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which has been seen as the first violent event in the Irish War of Independence, although this ambush had not been sanctioned by the Dáil Éireann.

After four years of bloody conflict abroad, Ireland was still at war, but this time they were fighting for their freedom from colonisation and British rule.⁶⁵ Those who survived the catastrophe

⁶² Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State, 1914-1937*, 48.

⁶³ McGreevy, “John Redmond and the First World War,” 416.

⁶⁴ With the enactment of the Representation of the People Act in February 1918, the Irish electorate grew substantially.

⁶⁵ Anti-imperialist sentiment and violence against colonizers erupted in small countries all over Europe following the war as the process of decolonisation began. That said, the idea of Ireland as a British colony espoused in this thesis was not held by unionists and loyalists across the island and continues to be a point of contention for present-day unionists. For more on the complex history of colonisation and empire in Ireland, see Kevin Kenny, ed., *Ireland and the British Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

at Gallipoli had often seen further battles in the Balkans and on the Western Front. Many, if not most, were injured and/or suffered from what was then called shellshock, now known as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which left them incapacitated and unable to return to daily life or to hold a steady job. At the same time, as Ireland entered a period of even more violence, the sentiments that had been evoked with the high death toll of the war, the execution of the Easter Rising's leaders, and the vehemently opposed attempt by the British to conscript more Irish men into battle, meant that only a fully independent Irish republic would satisfy most Irish citizens.

Looking at the war for its catalytic effect on the Easter Rising, Jeffery argues that the Great War "becomes the single most central experience of twentieth-century Ireland, not just, nor least, for what happened at the time, but in its longer-term legacy and the meaning which we can draw from it today."⁶⁶ A pioneer in the study of Irish Great War experience, Jeffery markedly demonstrates how these two historical events are inextricably tied together. This is often overlooked in discussions of the war and the Easter Rising given the contemptuous relationship Ireland has had with their role in the often-called "British war."⁶⁷ The political tensions that influenced the controversy surrounding the remembrance of Irish soldiers who died in the war since 1915 cannot be understood without looking at the shift in support for the war because of the catastrophe that happened at Gallipoli.

The Gallipoli campaign

In February 1915, a naval campaign was launched by allied forces in attempt to gain control of the waterways around the Gallipoli peninsula on the eastern edge of the Ottoman Empire, bordered by the Aegean Sea and Dardanelles Strait. In late March it became clear that the naval

⁶⁶ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 2.

⁶⁷ Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 2.

bombardment would not be sufficient and that “large-scale military operations were required” to secure the peninsula.⁶⁸ Plans were immediately put in motion to prepare and send troops to land on the beaches of Gallipoli. The Irish units deployed were largely made up of men from the southern counties and for the first time, though they wore British uniforms, they fought in divisions that identified them as Irish. Cooper’s history of the 10th (Irish) Division argues

In the 10th Division the bonds uniting all ranks were unusually strong. In the first place came love of Ireland shared in equal degree by officers and men. Second to this, and only second, was pride of regiment, happiness at forming part of a unit which had had so many glorious deeds recorded of it and resolution to be worthy of its fame. The names of the battalion, Dublins, Munsters, Inniskillings, Connaught Rangers, spoke not only of home, but also of splendid achievements performed in the past and nerved us to courage and endurance in the future. ... It was the first Irish Division to take the field in war. Irish Brigades there had often been ... But never before in Ireland’s history had she sent forth a whole division (but for one battalion) of her sons to the battle-field.⁶⁹

Though the landing at Gallipoli was originally planned for 23 April 1915, weather conditions and geographical confusion delayed them until troops finally arrived on 25 April 1915 to face an enemy that had been preparing for such an invasion for some time.⁷⁰ The uncertainty, delays, and the lost element of surprise, were indicative of what was to come. Soldiers spent months fighting on the beaches of Gallipoli, being killed in battle and dying from widespread illness and dehydration, given the failure of a sufficient water supply; often “the attention of officers was given more to the details of water supply than to the movements of the enemy.”⁷¹ The campaign ultimately ended in defeat, evacuation, and disillusion, but not before thousands of soldiers, including thousands of Irishmen, had lost their lives.

⁶⁸ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 106.

⁶⁹ Cooper, *The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli*, 246.

⁷⁰ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 115-116.

⁷¹ Cooper, *The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli*, 149.

When war broke out in 1914, the Irish public was initially supportive of the war effort, though like Connolly and Pearse, many nationalists disagreed on what level the Ireland should, or should not, support the war effort.⁷² For those that were supportive, their reasons varied greatly; for some there was a hope that Irish participation would ensure the re-enactment of Home Rule, others felt a duty to fight to keep Ireland safe from the threat of German imperialism, and “many Irish women mobilized to assist their soldiers ... from across religious and political divides.”⁷³ However, once Irish troops landed on the beaches of the Ottoman Empire and death notices began to arrive home, the attitude towards the war and the British Army changed dramatically. This was Ireland’s first experience with the devastating toll of modern warfare. As historian Mandy Link highlights in her recent book on war remembrance in Ireland, “entire neighbourhoods experienced the sorrow of loss, “and after the landings at Gallipoli “black crepe hung from every door in the Coombe in Dublin.”⁷⁴ This combination of private mourning and the public display of loss contributed to a growing conversation about the war and the role the Irish had within it. With the 1914 Suspensory Act keeping Home Rule on hold, the war that many thought would be over by Christmas had been raging for a full year, and many citizens wondered what the fighting was for.

As the deaths continued and the army still failed to see any advances against the Ottomans, it was becoming clear that victory at Gallipoli was improbable. It has been argued that the campaign was clearly a failure in May, when the 10th (Irish) Division left Ireland for their last

⁷² Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 25.

⁷³ Fitzpatrick has argued that this war support was fickle and was tied more to concerns about Irish interests than it was to a desire to engage in the conflict. See David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921*, (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998 [originally published 1977]). There were women’s groups who were opposed to the war, such as Cumann na mBan, and the question of war support split the Irish Women’s Franchise League. Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 25.

⁷⁴ Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 31.

weeks of training in England.⁷⁵ In November 1915, when Lord Kitchener visited the peninsula and the decision was made to withdraw, it had become quite obvious that the land campaign had been a likely disaster from its conception. The decision to evacuate was not only devastating to the families of those whose sons, husbands, and fathers had died, but also forced a larger conversation about why the Irish (as well as other colonial divisions) had been sent, only to lose their lives in a fight that would ultimately be abandoned. In Ireland, these actions by the British military were seen as exemplifying a complete lack of regard for Irish life.⁷⁶ Following receipt of a report in September 1915 that showed the massive casualties endured by Irish soldiers at Gallipoli were due to a lack of preparation and inadequate equipment, Redmond wrote to Kitchener “to see that our Irish soldiers receive fair play and proper recognition.”⁷⁷ This echoed a “widely – and passionately – held belief in Ireland that Irish soldiers had been ill-used.”⁷⁸

It is important to take a moment here to look at how this belief developed in Ireland. By the time the 10th (Irish) Division joined other Irish units on the Gallipoli peninsula in August 1915, *The Irish Times* had started to manoeuvre around obstacles that hindered them from publishing what was happening to the Irish at Gallipoli. While *The Irish Times* was a unionist-leaning newspaper that was both pro-war and anti-Home Rule, its value lies in the increasing presence of war coverage that brought into question whether or not the Irish public was being given the truth about Gallipoli. As such, *The Irish Times* highlights how the conversation about the war in Ireland

⁷⁵ Hughes, *The Fighting Irish*, 81.

⁷⁶ Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 31.

⁷⁷ John Redmond, “1915 Letter to Lord Kitchener,” in Denis Gwynn, *The Life of John Redmond* (London: G.G. Harrap & Co., 1932), p. 439, quoted in Keith Jeffery, “Gallipoli and Ireland,” in *Gallipoli: Making History*, ed. Jenny Macleod (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 106.

⁷⁸ Jeffery, “Gallipoli and Ireland,” 106.

was changing.⁷⁹ Shortly before the landing, they published this account from an anonymous soldier in the Royal Munster Fusiliers written on 1 May:

At 7.30am the Dublins set off in open boats to their landing place which was the same as ours. As each boat got near the shore, snipers shot down the oarsmen. ... You could see the men dropping everywhere, and of the first boat load of 40 men, only three reached the shore, all wounded. ... I cannot tell you how many were killed and drowned, but the place was a regular death trap. ... Then the wounded began crawling back, the Turks sniping at them the whole time.⁸⁰

Prior to the decision to begin printing private correspondence, newspapers in Ireland had been dominated by either the heroic stories of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZACs), or no stories at all. Link highlights that because *The Irish Times* relied heavily on articles picked up from English papers, much of what was written on Gallipoli came from Australian war correspondent, C.E.W. Bean.⁸¹ At the same time, *The Irish Independent*, a more nationalist-leaning paper, did not publish frequently about the war, even after the 10th (Irish) Division landed.⁸² Between Bean's journalism and the reliance on the British War Office Press Bureau as a result of the "Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) which gave the British government extensive powers to requisition buildings and supplies in support of the war effort, create offenses by decree and other authoritarian measures, including extensive censorship," the story of Gallipoli was being passed on within communities.⁸³ By now, wounded soldiers had already begun arriving home, bringing with them horrific tales of their experiences. Though the truth about Gallipoli was slow in coming, once the 10th (Irish) Division had landed, it was much clearer that the Irish at

⁷⁹ Founded in 1859, *The Irish Times* was widely known for its Protestant beginnings and unionist leanings, but since the 1970s has fought to establish itself as a source of journalism that is free off "personal or party political, commercial, religions or other sectional control." See Paul O'Neill, "Message From the Editor," *The Irish Times*, accessed 6 April 2021, <https://www.irishtimes.com/about-us/the-irish-times-trust#editor>.

⁸⁰ *Irish Times*, 3 July 1915.

⁸¹ Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 32.

⁸² Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 33.

⁸³ Ronan McGreevy, *'Twas Better to Die: The Irish Times and Gallipoli 1915-2015*, (Dublin: Irish Times eBooks, 2015), 25.

Gallipoli were being slaughtered. On 24 August, the severity of the losses sustained at Gallipoli began to feature more prominently in the press, along with news that Home Rule would likely be suspended until after the war ended.⁸⁴ To add insult to injury, the following day a photo of twenty-five officers, taken right before they deployed to Gallipoli, had been published, with eighteen of them being listed as dead or wounded.⁸⁵ Two days later, pieces of a dispatch written by General Sir Ian Hamilton, the commander-in-chief, were printed, where he maintained that “[t]he young troops of the new divisions did not get on fast enough, and the first advantage of surprise was lost,” he wrote, citing this as the reason that gains made by veteran New Zealanders had to be given up.⁸⁶ For many bereaved at home, this read as though their dead loved ones were being blamed for the failure at Suvla Bay. Days later, six-hundred and eleven wounded Irish soldiers docked in Dublin to be transported to hospital, putting the city dwellers face to face with more of the war’s horrors.⁸⁷

These factors were met with increasingly publicised talks in the House of Commons in London in October about abandoning the fight at Gallipoli, and Hamilton’s dismissal as from his position as commander-in-chief.⁸⁸ Days after the abandonment debate was printed, the weekly paper published a piece that assigned blame to the British in charge of the campaign, arguing that a poor decision was made when it was left in the hands of “the not very trustworthy genius of Mr. Winston Churchill.”⁸⁹ Resentment towards British officials reached new heights as the Irish public grappled with the catastrophic deaths of their loved ones, the blame assigned to them by a leader who was found to be inept, and the slow realisation that Ireland was not being assigned the same accolades that were being bestowed on the ANZACs. Censorship accusations had reached a new

⁸⁴ Yeates, *A City in Wartime*, pagination unavailable.

⁸⁵ Yeates, *A City in Wartime*, pagination unavailable.

⁸⁶ Yeates, *A City in Wartime*, pagination unavailable.

⁸⁷ Yeates, *A City in Wartime*, pagination unavailable.

⁸⁸ *The Weekly Irish Times*, 23 October 1915.

⁸⁹ *The Weekly Irish Times*, 30 October 1915.

height as well, and Redmond placed blame firmly in the hands of British officials for the drop in support for the war effort when he declared “[t]he obstinate refusal to allow the Irish people to learn officially of the achievements of Irish regiments, and the total absence of official recognition of their gallantry, did more to harm recruiting in Ireland than anyone could possibly conceive.”⁹⁰ While approximately 44,000 Irishmen enlisted from across the island in 1914, and about 46,000 enlisted in 1915, by 1916 that number had fallen to 19,000, decreasing continually to 14,000 in 1917 and less than 11,000 in 1918.⁹¹ At the outbreak of war, many nationalists were motivated to enlist with the beliefs that “[t]he future freedom, welfare and happiness of the Irish people depend on the part Ireland plays in the war.”⁹² This was expressed by William Redmond, John Redmond’s brother, in a 1914 letter where he also argued that all of Ireland had a duty to fight to ensure that they would not be a victim of German imperialism the way that Belgium had, and to show their loyalty to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as they “have been our loyal friends in our hour of strife [and] [t]heir parliaments ... have ever pleaded for our rights.”⁹³ As can be seen by the decreasing number of Irish recruits by 1916, Irish people had ultimately begun to feel like they had been blatantly lied to about what was happening at Gallipoli, and that Irish lives were being wasted. One month after John Redmond’s words were printed publicly, *The Irish Times* published this letter from Henry Hanna, a member of the King’s Council who went on to become a High Court judge, demanding the history of the 10th (Irish) Division be written immediately. He argued,

We all know, of course, that the sacrifices of the 10th Division were not rewarded with any substantial victory, and we all know the reason. The plans of some higher command were faulty; generals either had no proper instructions or did not fulfil their instructions. The men were splendid, but somebody failed; and, in order to

⁹⁰ *The Irish Times*, 3 November 1915.

⁹¹ David Fitzpatrick, “Militarism in Ireland, 1900-1922,” in *A Military History of Ireland*, eds. Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 388.

⁹² William Redmond, “Extract from 1914 letter to Patrick Linnane,” in Terence Denman, *A Lonely Grave: The Life and Death of William Redmond* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995): 85.

⁹³ Redmond, “Extract from 1914 letter to Patrick Linnane,” 85.

save a few individual reputations, a grave injustice was done to the achievements and traditions of a whole people.⁹⁴

By the end of 1915, Gallipoli had profoundly weakened the war effort, and the conclusion drawn by many was that the war would not be over any time soon, that casualty rates would remain high, and the question of Home Rule would be left dangling at its end. Republican newspapers pushed these narratives even further. In September, *The Workers' Republic* – the official publication of the Irish Socialist Republican Party founded by James Connolly – printed a protest piece against the Defence of the Realm Act in which the author argues that the Irish have been called upon to

kill Germans and get killed by Germans without any reason for killing on either side, telling the poor dupes as they go to the slaughter that they are fighting for civilization and small nationalities. The false pretences are clumsy and ... are all based on the assumption that the Irish people have lost their senses. Irishmen are calmly asked to believe that they can better serve Ireland by enriching the soil of Flanders or Gallipoli with their dead bodies than by staying home in Ireland minding their own business and drilling and arming for the Defence of their own country.⁹⁵

Connolly echoed this again when he gave a speech a little over two weeks before the Easter Rising erupted in April 1916, arguing that

for generations the shamrock was banned as a national emblem of Ireland, but in her extremity England uses the shamrock as a means for exciting in foolish Irishmen loyalty to England. For centuries the green flag of Ireland was a thing accursed and hated by the English garrison in Ireland, as it is still in their inmost hearts. But in India, in Egypt, in Flanders, in Gallipoli, the green flag is used by our rulers to encourage Irish soldiers of England to give up their lives for the power that denies their country the right of nationhood.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ *The Irish Times*, 7 December 1915.

⁹⁵ *The Workers' Republic*, 18 September 1915.

⁹⁶ James Connolly, "The Irish Flag" Speech, 8 April 1916, accessed 28 September 2020, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1916/04/irshflag.htm>.

This argument brought into question the decision to name the 10th Division ‘Irish’ and questions of national identity were increasingly broached as previous understandings of the co-existence between Irish and British identities began to fragment.⁹⁷ Consequently, the first hints of how Gallipoli, and the war as a whole, would be remembered, was previewed by the treatment of soldiers and veterans of the war. It is clear through Cooper’s writings that those who survived to return home faced many difficult issues. He argues that nationalist and unionist identity followed soldiers from Ireland into battle, but the violence they faced eroded those attitudes and they “fought and died side by side like brothers,” despite political or religious affiliation.⁹⁸ Brothers at war, perhaps, but at home in Ireland, these affiliations would define what their role was to be, and accordingly, how they would be treated, and their service remembered.

The profound impact that the devastating losses the Irish endured at Gallipoli had at home, taken together with the Easter Rising, shape a critical moment in Ireland’s history. Echoing Jeffery’s argument that these “constitute a seamless robe of Irish experience,”⁹⁹ Edward Madigan attests that unless they are “place[d] in the context of a world war in which the British state was deeply invested, we cannot properly comprehend the British response to the Rising, the subsequent rise in republicanism, the success of the Sinn Féin party in 1918, the First Dáil, partition and the War of Independence. These events, these phenomena, gave birth to modern Ireland and they were all either part of or inextricably linked to the First World War.”¹⁰⁰ Though Jeffery and Madigan are not the only ones to explore this connection, the two are commonly separated by assigning identity, and using it as a tool to divide the individual soldiers who were involved into separate

⁹⁷ Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 21.

⁹⁸ Cooper, *The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli*, 253.

⁹⁹ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, book abstract, no page number.

¹⁰⁰ Edward Madigan, “‘A Seamless Robe of Irish Experience’: The First World War, the Irish Revolution and Centenary Commemoration,” *History Ireland* 22, no. 4 (2014): 14-15.

unionist and nationalist camps. Those who had enlisted in the British Army were seen as existing in direct opposition to the Irish republican struggle, despite the many ex-servicemen who went on to join the IRA.¹⁰¹ This is because the Great War and the Easter Rising produced an environment in which divisions became deeper and the duality of Irish-British identity was replaced with a singular identity tied directly to one's political loyalty.¹⁰² As the fight to rid the country of colonial oppression continued in Ireland, and the War of Independence broke out, the divisions that had emerged from the Easter Rising were deeply solidified. The Easter Rising quickly eclipsed Gallipoli, and the Great War, as the fundamental moment that changed the course of Irish history. I do not mean to imply that the Easter Rising is not an important historical moment in Ireland, only that it cannot be taken *ex nihilo* and must be considered in the larger context of the Great War.

Irish remembrance of Gallipoli

The way that Irish remembrance has treated the war has reflected these very same divisions. As the rest of Europe entered what would become known as the interwar years, Ireland's experience was very different. It was not until 1923 that Ireland saw the end of the violence that began in 1916 and all remembrance of Gallipoli and the war between these years was marred by partition, the War of Independence, and the Irish Civil War. The establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 dramatically shaped the way this took place.

Much of the conversation around the remembrance of Gallipoli in Ireland often refers to the concept of *amnesia* - a loss of memory. In a new introduction to his ground-breaking book *Irish Voices of the Great War*, Myles Dungan identifies that at its first printing in 1995, "[t]he experience of Irish veterans of the 1914–18 war was the subject [] of a culpable amnesia."¹⁰³ An

¹⁰¹ Madigan, "Introduction," 2.

¹⁰² Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 49.

¹⁰³ Myles Dungan, *Irish Voices from the Great War*, (Sallins: Merrion Press, 2014 [first published 1995]), xi.

in-depth analysis of Irish amnesia will follow in chapter two, but it bears keeping in mind as we turn to remembrance of the war in Ireland. Though there was a noticeable absence of official remembrance and commemoration, the implication that Ireland was a victim of “national amnesia” has been too broadly applied.¹⁰⁴

Less than a year after the war ended, the first proposal for a national war memorial was presented. Though it would take a decade for officials to agree on a permanent location and another decade for the park to be constructed, temporary cenotaphs were moved between College Green, St. Stephen’s Green, and Phoenix Park annually to mark Remembrance Day.¹⁰⁵ The construction of the National War Memorial Gardens at Islandbridge was took place in an environment that made its construction a highly contentious issue. Irish military historian Jane Leonard argues that it was not from forgetting that Ireland suffered, but “embarrassment and resentment” as a result of public violence surrounding commemorative war ceremonies in the 1920s.¹⁰⁶ She has shown that commemorative efforts on Remembrance Day in Dublin in the early 1920s were often impaired by violent clashes, especially between students from University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin.¹⁰⁷ In 1929, the violence pushed Remembrance Day ceremonies from the centre of the city to Phoenix Park until they were finally moved to the Irish National War Memorial Gardens in 1939.

With the public divided, pushing the events outside of the city centre was a way for the government to bury the issue and focus on commemorating the Easter Rising as the origin of the new independent Irish state. This distance was a priority for the Irish Free State. In 1927, Minister for Justice Kevin O’Higgins argued at a Dáil Éireann debate that should a war memorial be erected

¹⁰⁴ Jeffery, "Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration," 117.

¹⁰⁵ Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 90.; Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 115-116.

¹⁰⁶ Leonard, "The Twinge of Memory," 100.

¹⁰⁷ Leonard, "The Twinge of Memory," 100-101.

in central Dublin it would only serve to undermine the true origins of the state and although worthy of remembrance, he stated that “it is not on [the] sacrifice [of World War One soldiers] that this State is based, and I have no desire to see it suggested that it is.”¹⁰⁸

This argument is pivotal to understanding how Ireland’s remembrance of those who died at Gallipoli was cast aside due to imperialist associations in favour of commemorations that would illustrate a nationalist narrative. For this reason, placing the war memorial at Islandbridge on the outskirts of the city “combined the desirable qualities of monumentality, utility and for the perceived public good of the independent Irish state, a certain degree of invisibility.”¹⁰⁹ Nuala C. Johnson argues in a study on the geographical landscape of Great War remembrance in Ireland that because it was forced to compete with “a pre-existing landscape where nationalist leaders and rebels were already celebrated,” a clear delineation was made between *remembrance* and *commemoration*, the former finding its place in personal and private acts while the latter was embedded in the public and the political.¹¹⁰ The intended invisibility of the war memorial may have proved effective for the state, but it did not mean that the fallen were suddenly forgotten.

Personal remembrance, though, cannot be extracted from public remembrance and is never a solely private experience. As Fitzpatrick argues, personal remembrance and grief are often articulated within larger social structures and are performed as part of collective and public ceremonies.¹¹¹ Though the Irish Free State did not have an official protocol to commemorate the Great War, it did not mean that it simply disappeared from Irish public life. It is important to bear

¹⁰⁸ This quote is often used to characterize O’Higgins as anti-war memorial, but having lost a brother in the conflict, O’Higgins sought to separate the war from the origins of the newly independent Ireland. It has also been suggested that it is for this reason, his having lost a brother, that the government made him spokesperson on this issue, thinking it would soften the public’s opinion of the government’s stance. Kevin O’Higgins, “Dáil Éireann debate – Tuesday, 29 March 1927,” *Tithe an Oireachtas/House of the Oireachtas*, accessed 21 April 2019, <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1927-03-29/9/>.

¹⁰⁹ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 118.

¹¹⁰ Johnson, *Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance*, 165, 57.

¹¹¹ Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State,” 184.

in mind that Ireland had existed for centuries under the colonial rule of Britain and the physical landscape reflected this imbalance, with British memorials dominating. Ireland's relationship with historical memory was one of oral history, folklore, and natural landmarks, and had always relied on social groups to pass these stories on.¹¹² Joep Leerssen aptly argues that "[r]emembrancing for Catholic, anti-British Ireland had for a long time been an informal communitarian concern, often in oral face-to-face transmission by way of balladry and folktale."¹¹³ Though memorials to pivotal events such as the 1798 Rebellion and the Great Famine were erected, the presence of Catholic and nationalist memorial sites grew exponentially after 1916. These traditional aspects of Irish memory did not disappear, but the geographical landscape now controlled by the independent Irish state became emblematic of the new state and its new, nationalist martyrs. Gallipoli was already being overshadowed by the Easter Rising, as reflected in the Irish folk ballad from 1919, "The Foggy Dew," which proclaims "Twas better to die 'neath an Irish sky than at Suvla or Sedd El Bahr."¹¹⁴

Due to the prevalent association of war veterans and memorials with British imperialism and pro-British sentiments, churches became instrumental settings that blended public and personal remembrance.¹¹⁵ Heather Jones argues that as a result of partition, the creation of Northern Ireland alienated Protestants in the southern counties, forcing them into private mourning

¹¹² For more information on the convergence of Irish history and mythology, see T.W. Moody, "Irish History and Irish Mythology," in *Interpreting Irish History: The Debate over Historical Revisionism 1938–1994*, ed. Ciaran Brady (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994), 71–86 and Guy Beiner, "Recycling the Dustbin of Irish History: the radical challenge of 'folk memory'," *History Ireland* 14, no. 1 (2006): 42–47.

¹¹³ Joep Leerssen, "Monument and trauma: varieties of remembrance," in *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, ed. Ian McBride (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 214.

¹¹⁴ Ward, "Parallel Lives, Poles Apart," 35.;

¹¹⁵ John Turpin, "Monumental Commemoration of the Fallen in Ireland, North and South, 1920–60," *New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua* 11, no. 4, 2007: 107.; Seamus Taaffe, "Commemorating the Fallen: Public Memorials to the Irish Dead of the Great War," *Archaeology Ireland* 13, no. 3, 1999: 22.; Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 87.

at their homes and in their churches, as they feared violent retaliation from nationalist Catholics.¹¹⁶ This still allowed for a communal memory to exist, but given the government's stance on public commemoration and the privacy surrounding these religious services, it meant that, within Catholic Ireland, it became difficult to express war-related grief, not only for those who had died in the war, but also for those volunteers who had fought, and survived.¹¹⁷ This also precipitated a community of veterans who were averse to discussing their experiences.¹¹⁸ Following the war, the experience of veterans in the 1920s was one wrought with fear. Many ex-soldiers returned home with grave injuries and the psychological trauma associated with PTSD. This condition, combined with the violent conflict raging on the streets of Ireland during the revolutionary period, added to their existing trauma and "was exacerbated by the realization that their actions in wartime were not in fact appreciated."¹¹⁹

From the violence on the streets of Dublin during remembrance ceremonies in the 1920s, the common occurrence of poppy-snatching, to the state's opposition to war commemoration, it seemed it was only a matter of time before veterans withdrew from discussing their war experiences. In some cases, they were kept out of the public realm altogether. Journalist Suzanne Lynch tells the story of Bill Hand, a soldier from Dublin who fought at Gallipoli and Ypres, where he was injured. "After the war, [Bill] suffered from shellshock and was committed to a mental institution. His children told his grandchildren that he had died in the war. He in fact lived for another 45 years, dying behind closed doors in the institution in 1963," she recounts.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Jones, "Church of Ireland Great War Remembrance in the South of Ireland," 74.

¹¹⁷ Jones, "Church of Ireland Great War Remembrance in the South of Ireland," 77.

¹¹⁸ Jones, "Church of Ireland Great War Remembrance in the South of Ireland," 74.

¹¹⁹ Bourke, "Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma," 62.

¹²⁰ *The Irish Times*, 19 June 2014.

Soon, remembrance of the Irish in the Great War became embraced only by those who had a personal connection to the conflict, and from the late 1930s onwards, it had all but faded in Éire and, later, the Republic of Ireland, with the government's role becoming one of "official tolerance."¹²¹ Although Gallipoli did find a place in the British commemorative landscape, other battles took precedence there. For both Britain and Northern Ireland, the Somme dominated, serving as a way for unionists in the north to reassert their British identity.¹²² Much has been written about Great War commemoration in Northern Ireland, but Gallipoli rarely figured prominently in these discussions, though there were soldiers from those units that fought at Gallipoli.

Remembrance of Gallipoli in Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey

This was not the case for the other groups that fought on the beaches of Gallipoli. Alongside the British, colonial units were sent to Gallipoli from Ireland, Newfoundland, India, Australia, and New Zealand where they fought alongside the French. For Australia and New Zealand, Gallipoli serves as a foundational story that has permeated the national consciousness. In a comparison of commemorative trends in Ireland and Australia, historian Stuart Ward highlights how the stark differences between the two nations requires closer analysis of the Gallipoli campaign's historical timing. While Ireland was in the midst of wrestling independence from Britain, Australia stood ready to embrace a new national identity, having federated – their own version of Home Rule – less than two decades before the war.¹²³ Fighting for the first time under their own national label, the ANZACs were mythologized, in striking contrast to those from Ireland who were hastily forgotten. Since 25 April 1915 when the groups landed on the shore of Gallipoli, Australia and

¹²¹ Fitzpatrick, "Commemoration in the Irish Free State," 195.

¹²² Turpin, "Monumental Commemoration of the Fallen in Ireland," 107.

¹²³ Ward, "Parallel Lives, Poles Apart," 33.

New Zealand have marked with ANZAC Day, which in the 1920s became a national day of remembrance.¹²⁴ Despite some criticisms there that war should not be celebrated with commemorative ceremonies, April 1916 marked the first dawn service in Australia and New Zealand, which continues to this day, solidifying the ANZAC myth as part of each country's national story.¹²⁵ Although popularity for the dawn service faded across the two nations somewhat in the 1960s and 1970s, it was revived in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the new perceived crisis that the last living veterans of the campaign would die without telling their stories.

In 1981, Australian director Peter Weir released the award-winning film *Gallipoli*, bringing the story of the campaign to an international audience. Weir's telling of the campaign focused almost exclusively on the ANZACs, reviving the myth, and adorning it with a romantic heroism that excluded the Irish, and other allied units.¹²⁶ There was a popular belief in Australia and New Zealand that the Gallipoli peninsula was 'theirs' as a result of the loss of life that had been sustained there and pilgrimages to this "sacred soil" were common with memorials being erected in honour of the ANZACS immediately following the war.¹²⁷ This feeling was heightened by words famously attributed to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first Turkish president, directed to the bereaved mothers of soldiers who were killed at Gallipoli, which stated

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehments to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears. Your sons are not lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land, they have become our sons as well.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 80-81.

¹²⁵ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 85, 107, 113.

¹²⁶ This film sparked a new wave of battlefield tourism, which impacted how Australia and New Zealand interacted with their remembrance of Gallipoli. Jeffery, "Gallipoli and Ireland," 108-109.

¹²⁷ John McQuilton, "Gallipoli as Contested Commemorative Space," in *Gallipoli: Making History*, ed. Jenny Macleod (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 151.

¹²⁸ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 166.

Pilgrimages to the peninsula increased with the revival of Gallipoli's memory post-1980s. The campaign had become so engrained in the Australian vernacular that Prime Minister John Howard nominated ANZAC Cove – the area of the Gallipoli peninsula named after the ANZAC units who landed there in April 1915 – to be deemed an Australian National Heritage Site.¹²⁹ The boldness of an Australian politician arguing for foreign sovereign land to be assigned Australian cannot be overlooked. However, it is not exactly a unique request. In 1984 *The Irish Times* announced that the Australian government was preparing to petition the Turkish Government to give the landing site the name ANZAC Cove.¹³⁰ While the name request was granted under the agreement that Australia would name the waterway in the port city of Albany 'Atatürk Channel', the request for ANZAC Cove to become a National Heritage Site was denied.¹³¹ The idea that Gallipoli belongs to the ANZACs, as a physical environment as well as a mythological site, finds echoes in John McQuilton's 2004 chapter exploring the contestation of the peninsula, underscoring the importance of understanding that the Australian interpretation is only one side of a larger story. In fact, as McQuilton points out, many Australians traveling to Gallipoli are often shocked to see that there are not only ANZAC memorials along the beaches, but Turkish ones as well, "to honour [the Turkish] dead and their successful resistance of foreign invasion."¹³² What is remarkable about the ANZAC myth that is so tightly embraced in Australia and New Zealand, is the fact that "such a powerful story could be fashioned from what was essentially an embarrassing defeat."¹³³

¹²⁹ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 94.

¹³⁰ *The Irish Times*, 26 April 1984.

¹³¹ Bart Ziino, "Who Owns Gallipoli? Australia's Gallipoli anxieties 1915–2005," *Journal of Australian Studies*, 30, no. 88 (2006): 5.; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 April 2017.

¹³² McQuilton, "Gallipoli as Contested Commemorative Space," 152.

¹³³ Jenny Macleod, "Introduction," in *Gallipoli: Making History*, ed. Jenny Macleod (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 11.

The legacy of Gallipoli in Turkey is often overlooked when examining the memory of this campaign, with the ANZACs (and to a lesser extent, the British) dominating much of the narrative. For Turkey, Gallipoli came at a pivotal time in their history and has also been remembered for its role in nation-building. With the fear of Russia overtaking the Dardanelles Strait, the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany, and by the time the Republic of Turkey was established on 29 October 1923, the region had been at war for twelve years. Like Ireland, the fighting did not stop in 1918, and they had both been fighting for three times longer than the other nations involved in the war.¹³⁴ The victory at Gallipoli became an important event in the beginning of the fight that would establish this new Turkish republic. Unlike in Ireland, it was the Turkish government who helped to ensure that this narrative solidified Gallipoli's place in the national remembrance narrative.¹³⁵ Veysel Şimşek argues that the Turkish did this by ensuring that history textbooks distributed to students at the high school level told the most desirable narrative – that those who fought at Gallipoli were fighting for the new Turkish nation state.¹³⁶ Though this may be true, Macleod's research has shown that this narrative took decades to build, as Turkey originally reached much further back in their history to create their national narrative, "tracing Turkishness back to the Sumerians and Hittites of Anatolia."¹³⁷ In the first few decades following the war, the Gallipoli peninsula was largely dominated by memorials established by the ANZACs. Turkish memorials here were "modestly proportioned" and it is rumoured that the only memorial dedicated to those who fell in the Ottoman Army had been destroyed during Greek occupation in the

¹³⁴ Altay Çengizer, "The Road to Gallipoli - a Turkish perspective," *History Ireland* 23, no. 2 (2015): 35, 38.

¹³⁵ Veysel Şimşek, "'Backstabbing Arabs' and 'Shirking Kurds': History, Nationalism, and Turkish Memory of the First World War," in *The Great War: From Memory to History*, eds. Kellen Kurschinski, Steven Marti, Alicia Robinet, Matt Symes and Jonathan Vance (Waterloo: Wilfred University Press, 2015), 99-126.

¹³⁶ Şimşek, "'Backstabbing Arabs' and 'Shirking Kurds'", 114.

¹³⁷ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 160.

1920s.¹³⁸ It was not until 1954 that a new memorial would be proposed, and in 1958 the Çanakkale Martyrs' Memorial was erected.¹³⁹

The most popular Turkish remembrance trend about Gallipoli that has found a place in the western canon is a passage from a speech attributed to Atatürk, highlighted earlier for its impact on Australian attitudes about Gallipoli. The translation used here is reprinted in Macleod's book but is uncited. This is fitting given the controversy that now surrounds this speech. Macleod explains that "these words were written within twenty years of the campaign, in a generous and magnanimous spirit towards men who might otherwise have been seen as imperialist invaders," perhaps in an attempt to embrace these dead soldiers for their role in helping to create a new Turkish nation-state.¹⁴⁰ It has come to light more recently, however, that these may not be the words of the famed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In a 2015 article by historian Cengiz Özakıncı, who examines the writings of Atatürk, and the speech that these words are supposedly taken from, finding no such statement was ever written, or publicly made by him.¹⁴¹ As Özakıncı's article was published a month before the centenary of the Gallipoli landings, the Australian media was quick to comment. From this, a change.org petition was organized in Melbourne to have the words removed from commemorative memorials based on the argument that "memorials are not the place for unverified quotes."¹⁴² As of this writing, the petition was closed and had garnered 501

¹³⁸ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 170.

¹³⁹ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 170.

¹⁴⁰ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 166.

¹⁴¹ Translations of these articles from Turkish were provided to researchers at Honest History by the author, <http://honesthistory.net.au/wp/tracking-aturk-honest-history-research-note/>. Cengiz Özakıncı, The Words "There is No Difference Between The Mehments and the Johnnies" Engraved on the 1915 Gallipoli Monuments Do Not Belong to Atatürk, Part I" *Butun Dunya*, (March 2015): 23-29.; Cengiz Özakıncı, The Words "There is No Difference Between The Mehments and the Johnnies" Engraved on the 1915 Gallipoli Monuments Do Not Belong to Atatürk, Part II" *Butun Dunya*, (April 2015): 9-15.

¹⁴² Greek Genocide Resource Center Melbourne, "Petition to RSL Victorian Branch, City of Melbourne: Remove the Misleading Quote on the Turkish-Australian Friendship Memorial in Melbourne," accessed 20 January 2021, <https://www.change.org/p/rsl-victorian-branch-city-of-melbourne-remove-the-misleading-quote-on-the-turkish-australian-friendship-memorial-in-melbourne>.

supporters. In 2017 it came to light through a social media post that a 1985 memorial at ANZAC Cove had seen Atatürk's words removed during restoration, and theories regarding the reasons abound.¹⁴³ Cengiz Özakıncı's article has been criticized by the Atatürk Society of America, but the debate seems to have stayed out of academic discourse. Despite this controversy, this speech became quite central to the remembrance of Gallipoli in Ireland in the late 1990s, when Irish presidents became key figures in the performance of Great War memory.¹⁴⁴ The speech has been used as an example of shared history between enemies, with the Irish and the Turks being illustrated as victims of imperial greed. It is also used to highlight how two divided sides can bridge their divisions through mutual remembrance of their common experiences, underscoring how Gallipoli's legacy evolved in Ireland. As will be explored in chapter three, this theme is reiterated as shared history narratives in commemoration are prioritised over historical accuracy.

Conclusion

What this brief exploration of Gallipoli's commemoration in Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey, shows is how differently one single event can be interpreted and commemorated.¹⁴⁵ It is important to understand the origins of these interpretations when looking at remembrance and commemoration. In an exploration of Gallipoli's legacy in Ireland and in Newfoundland, historian Jane McGaughey highlights the importance of agency behind these trends. Battles gain cultural power, she argues, not simply as a matter of "historical determinism, but through the choices made by individuals and collective communities in how they applied historical memory."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ *The Guardian*, 16 June 2017.

¹⁴⁴ This will figure prominently in the discussion of Irish war remembrance in chapter three.

¹⁴⁵ The French also fought at Gallipoli. However, with fighting ravaging the Western Front, much of French commemoration focuses on that theatre of war, French cemetery does stand at Gallipoli, with a striking monument dominating the space. Jay Winter, "Beyond Glory? Cultural Divergences in Remembering the Great War in Ireland, Britain and France," in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 138.

¹⁴⁶ McGaughey, "Men of Suvla," 129.

The Irish commemorative trends that followed Gallipoli, the Easter Rising, the end of the Great War, and the formation of the Republic of Ireland are manifold. As this chapter has shown, they have ebbed and flowed in different directions over the decades prior to the fiftieth anniversary of the campaign in 1965. It was here, from the 1960s to the 1980s where a shift in the employment of historical memory occurred, that changed how Gallipoli was discussed in Ireland. This shift, which Jay Winter calls “the second ‘memory boom,’” has profoundly impacted Irish remembrance of Gallipoli, giving it new life as Ireland entered the Celtic Tiger era.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Jay Winter, “Notes on the Memory Boom,” 55.

Chapter Two: ‘Voices from the other side’: Amnesia, Agency, and the ‘Memory Boom’ Effect, 1965-1995

“Irish culture is obsessed with the past,” wrote Emilie Pine in her 2011 history of the intersection of politics and remembrance in Ireland.¹⁴⁸ A memory studies scholar, Pine argues that this obsession has led to the act of remembering being pervaded with a sense of urgency, necessity, and morality.¹⁴⁹ The need to remember is not unique to Ireland; mass remembrance has become widely promoted and funded by nations around the world. Through the creation of national days of remembrance, such as the National Day of Commemoration, Remembrance Day, and ANZAC Day, and through commonly used phrases, such as ‘Lest We Forget’, the onus is put upon citizens to remember events of which they have no firsthand knowledge. An urgency to remember combines with the fear associated with the idea that we might forget. This is then adopted by different groups and institutions to carefully cultivate a fixed narrative, affording importance to certain historical events at the expense of others in the commemorative landscape. In this way remembering and forgetting are presented as opposites, with disregard to the symbiotic relationship that they share.

The historical memory narrative that has been cultivated in Ireland has been transformed many times following the outbreak of war in 1914. In relation to Gallipoli and the Great War, it has often been discussed as one that embraced a sort of ‘amnesia’. In a study of the many facets of Irish remembrance of the war, Jeffery traces the concept of amnesia back to an article first published in 1967 by F.X. Martin, where Martin introduces the concept of a ‘Great Oblivion’.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Emilie Pine, *The Politics of Irish Memory: Performing Remembrance in Contemporary Irish Culture* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3.

¹⁴⁹ Pine, *The Politics of Irish Memory*, 17.

¹⁵⁰ F.X. Martin, "1916: Myth, Fact, and Mystery," *Studia Hibernica*, no. 7 (1967): 68.; Keith Jeffery, "Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration," in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolution, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 117.

Martin discusses this concept in relation to Irish remembrance of the war in the wake of the 1916 Rising, arguing that it was a lack of remembrance that was most apparent.¹⁵¹ As Martin was writing just after the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising, when the Irish government assertively embraced commemoration of the Rising, a ‘Great Oblivion’ may have taken hold, but as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter through the studies of Jones, Leonard, and Jeffery, the interwar years of 1918-1939 saw a wide variety of acts of remembrance centered on the war, both public and private. The element of amnesia only became evident from the 1960s until the 1980s, when, as a result of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the public withdrew from all public commemoration, including that of the Easter Rising, as “the practice of war commemoration was perceived to have become highly politicised.”¹⁵² It was not the Troubles that suddenly added politicisation to the mix as the previous chapter has highlighted, but the increased political tension and outbreaks of violence created a backdrop that spurred another shift in the remembrance landscape of Ireland, especially in regards to Gallipoli, and the war.¹⁵³

This chapter will argue that because Gallipoli had not been absorbed by a specific political faction, it became a popular tool in Ireland’s commemorative landscape as a result of the ‘memory boom’ and the rise of public involvement with history and remembrance. With the firm establishment of memory studies as a distinct academic field, the increased presence of history in the home and the desire for an end to the Troubles in the north, Gallipoli was finally adopted by politics – not by Orange or Green – but as a unifying tale that proselytized a single Irish identity

¹⁵¹ Martin, “1916: Myth, Fact, and Mystery,” 68.; Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 117.

¹⁵² Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 118.

¹⁵³ The Troubles, sometimes referred to as the Northern Ireland conflict, was a period of violence in Northern Ireland that lasted from 1966 to 1994, when ceasefires brought about a negotiation of peace. This was spurred on by sectarian issues that had been ignored for decades reaching a feverish peak, resulting in chaos, brutality, and death on all sides – Catholic, Protestant, Nationalist and Unionist. See David McKittrick and David McVea, *Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2012 [originally published 2002]).

in an attempt to bridge the divides that existed between north and south, Catholic and Protestant, nationalist and unionist. To do this, it is critical to further explore the role of agency in acts of commemoration, and their inherent political nature. First, I will look at the establishment of memory studies and the concept of amnesia before exploring how public history helped cultivate Gallipoli and the Great War to create the perfect environment for its revival in Irish popular memory.

The growth of memory studies

Although the study of historical memory was not new, the wave of scholars publishing on the topic in the 1980s and 1990s turned the subject into a contemporary phenomenon, helping to establish it as a distinct academic field. There is not one monocausal reason for this, but critical elements that helped created the environment that facilitated it have been explained by two prominent memory studies scholars. Following the first ‘memory boom,’¹⁵⁴ Winter argues that the second was born in the 1970s and 1980s when “memory [became seen as] a way out of the confusion bred by the fragmentation of the very identities forged by and during the first ‘memory boom.’”¹⁵⁵ This is echoed by Astrid Erll, who postulates its emergence as the result of several important contributing factors: the fear of losing eyewitnesses of traumatic historical events, the increased presence of narratives from communities throwing off colonial oppressors, increased globalization from technological advancement, the introduction of the Internet as “a kind of global mega-archive,” and the increased study of, in a sense, the history of history.¹⁵⁶ Though the second boom only emerged between the 1970s and 1980s, the Holocaust was a key turning-point for how

¹⁵⁴ Winter places the first ‘memory boom’ between the 1890s and the 1920s, when the “cult of memory” was formed as a result of memory being seen as an important tool in the creation and dissemination of national identity within the imperial framework of the day. Winter, “Notes on the Memory Boom,” 55.

¹⁵⁵ Winter, “Notes on the Memory Boom,” 55.

¹⁵⁶ Astrid Erll, *Memory in Culture*, trans. Sara B. Young (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 4-5.

the study of historical memory would turn more toward the cultural and social. Victims and eyewitnesses began to come forward at the same time that new technologies were bringing these accounts to a broader audience in a more intimate way.¹⁵⁷ By the late-1980s, these elements combined to create an environment where memory studies was able to flourish. In 1989, the academic journal *History & Memory* was established – the same year that the *Representations* journal published Pierre Nora’s “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire” – an article exploring Nora’s theory that memory exists wherever historical significance has been applied to it by a collective.¹⁵⁸ Bringing forward the theory of collective memory postulated by Maurice Halbwachs decades earlier, Nora established himself as a key figure in the memory studies realm while at the same time, *History & Memory* created a formal arena for these topics to be discussed.¹⁵⁹ Though we can look back to Plato, John Locke, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and others, for fundamental ideologies relating to the study of memory, it was in the late twentieth century that this established academic field brought together an interdisciplinary approach that began to be applied to historical events more broadly. Kerwin Lee Klein argues that the rise in memory studies has seen the term memory come to serve “as a metahistorical category” which encompasses, and in some instances replaces, previously accepted classifications in historical research, such as “folk history,” “popular history,” “oral history,” “public history,” and “myth.”¹⁶⁰ As these boundaries began to blur, the study of historical memory moved away from formal History with a capital “H”, into plural histories that are informal and constantly in motion.

¹⁵⁷ Winter highlights that it took almost three decades following the Holocaust for the second ‘memory boom’ to begin because the focus on war stories in the immediate aftermath focused on the heroism of the Resistance as a way for countries to grapple with occupation and collaboration. Winter, “Notes on the Memory Boom,” 60-61.

¹⁵⁸ Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 7-24.

¹⁵⁹ Maurice Halbwachs argues that collective memory is memory that exists within a group or collective, is reliant on the group to maintain its existence as it cannot exist without that social structure and individual memories cannot be understood outside of the group. See Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*.

¹⁶⁰ Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse,” *Representations*, no. 69 (2000): 128.

More recently, scholars have connected the memory studies boom with the rise of the nation-state, pushing forward the theory argued by Ernest Renan in the 1880s that it is not only memory itself that helps establish a nation, but its companion – forgetting.¹⁶¹ Renan importantly points out that national memory relies on the element of commonality; that the individuals within a nation must remember, and forget, the same events and constructs.¹⁶² Sociologist Barbara Misztal has argued that because democratic governments globally promote the idea that “democracy’s health depends upon a social remembering of the past,” they strengthen the connections between historical memory and the state.¹⁶³ This helps to legitimize state-led commemoration in the eyes of the public. The danger of this is that it allows the public to conflate commemorative memory with the historical record without the acknowledgement that “forgetting is the very condition of remembering.”¹⁶⁴ While remembrance of the past may help to shape the nation, it is what is forgotten that shapes its landscape. This was the case in Ireland, as the memory of Gallipoli was pushed away, forgotten *en lieu* of the Easter Rising. Fitzpatrick highlights this in his analysis of Great War memory in the Irish Free State from 1922-1937, calling the omission of Irish involvement in the war from state commemoration an “embarrassment.”¹⁶⁵ By pushing the Irish who fought in the war to the periphery of state-led commemoration, the government’s attitude implied that they were insignificant to the Irish nation, and eventually, the popular narrative began to be influenced by these narratives, especially as Great War veterans withdrew from public discussions of the war and as the years went on, they died.

¹⁶¹ See Ernest Renan, “What is a nation?”, trans. Martin Thom, in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 8-22.

¹⁶² Renan, “What is a nation?”, 11.

¹⁶³ Barbara A. Misztal, “Memory and History,” in *Memory Ireland: Volume I: History and Modernity*, ed. Oona Frawley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 3.

¹⁶⁴ Erl, *Memory in Culture*, 8.

¹⁶⁵ Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State,” 203.

The memory of the Great War is an interesting case due to the inherent grandiosity associated with the term 'great'. Winter argues that since the war's outbreak in 1914, there has been great reliance on its historical memory and its dedicated public memorials to instill meaning on such a catastrophic event.¹⁶⁶ Often, this meaning is attached to the men who volunteered to put on a uniform to fight for their country, and in a broader and often misunderstood sense, freedom, while overlooking the imperialistic aims that started the war in the first place. In this way, *Great* was used by the allies not only to highlight the scale of the war and the importance of victory, but also to attach morality to the conflict, promoting the idea that they were fighting against an evil German military complex.¹⁶⁷ The politics of empire, inherent in the very nature of the conflict, is a crucial element for understanding its memory, as while the allies fought against foreign imperialism, they fought for their own empires, encouraging the enlistment of (and in some cases conscripting) men from the colonies they forcibly occupied to form their armies. This hypocrisy is almost always overlooked in national remembrance ceremonies, as there exists "a long-standing practice of attaching oversimplified singular identities to these men."¹⁶⁸ That the identities of colonial soldiers went beyond the imperialist ones ascribed to them, "mirroring the nature of the conflict in which they were fighting," at once "national, imperial and local, while also being informed by the distinct cultures of the military units in which they served," is consistently disregarded.¹⁶⁹ The lack of recognition of the broader impact of the war beyond the Western Front by the allies necessitates this approach to the role of colonial troops, and the imperialist associations put upon individual identity shaped the way Ireland commemorated the war.

¹⁶⁶ Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, 78.

¹⁶⁷ The Imperial War Museum has digitised many Great War propaganda posters referring to the Germans as "Huns."

¹⁶⁸ Claire Eldridge, "'The Forgotten of This Tribute': Settler Soldiers, Colonial Categories and the Centenary of the First World War," *History & Memory* 31, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2019): 3.

¹⁶⁹ Eldridge, "'The Forgotten of This Tribute,'" 6.

As the Irish donned khaki uniforms and boarded ships destined for foreign battlefields, motivated by a plethora of personal reasons, they joined a larger conflict that pinned imperialism against imperialism, while being widely promoted as a war to secure the future of small nations. After a new constitution was adopted in 1937, the new Irish nation (that would become the Irish Republic in 1948), was reticent when it came to linking themselves to anything that might demonstrate ties to Britain. The commemorative landscape had changed in the many decades since the war, but as the Troubles began in the north, this landscape continued to change, and by the 1980s Gallipoli began to rise from the annals of history to play a more prominent role, one that demonstrates the reality of Jay Winter's theory that "language frames memory," as "different linguistic forms and conventions provide cultural boundaries separating to some degree acts of remembrance concerning the war in different countries."¹⁷⁰

Ireland's 'amnesia'

With that theory in mind, the commonly expressed idea that Ireland fell victim to historical amnesia in regard to Gallipoli and the Great War is curious, especially when paired against Pine's argument with which I began this chapter, that "Irish culture is obsessed with the past."¹⁷¹ Ian McBride explores this obsession in his introductory chapter to his edited collection *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, where he correctly argues that claims about this obsession often ignore the selectivity involved within the realm of Irish remembrance and commemoration.¹⁷² As previously mentioned, Jeffery's assertion that the concept of amnesia emerged in the 1960s with Martin's phrase the "Great Oblivion" was not an accidental phenomenon and is a result of this exact selectivity. With the Irish Free State actively moving away from Great War commemoration,

¹⁷⁰ Winter, "Beyond Glory?," 140.

¹⁷¹ Pine, *The Politics of Memory*, 3.

¹⁷² See Ian McBride, "Introduction," in *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, ed. Ian McBride (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-42.

that trend continued with subsequent governments, and it became increasingly evident in public spaces that nationalist narratives were to dominate. Subtle changes were made in public arenas that pushed Gallipoli further from the minds of the Irish population. Often highlighted is the renaming of ‘Hill 60’ at Dublin’s Croke Park, which had been named after a major offensive led by Irish troops at Gallipoli (also known as Chocolate Hill), to ‘Hill 16’ as a nod to the Easter Rising.¹⁷³ Although subtle, these small changes had much larger influences on remembrance culture. Addressing this, Stuart Ward denotes the cultural shift, stating “[t]oday, virtually no one attending GAA events would associate this sacred cauldron of Irish nationalism with the long-lost legend of Gallipoli.”¹⁷⁴

This event presents only one small change, but it speaks to the ways in which historical memory exists in a spatial sense and creates ways in which remembering and forgetting are imposed upon society in subliminal ways. In Ireland, it was these types of events that allowed the idea of a Great War amnesia to proliferate. In Dungan’s aforementioned 2006 article in *The Irish Times*, he argues that Eamon de Valera’s government pushed remembrance of Irish Great War dead to the fringes, which resulted in “... amnesia. The elimination of memory.”¹⁷⁵ Here, Dungan has confused amnesia, the loss of memory, with the removal of memory. Addressing the more recent inclusion of Gallipoli and the Great War in Irish memory narratives, McGaughey adds much needed agency to this concept when she writes of the “selective amnesia that pervaded the country for eighty years regarding Irishmen fighting in British uniform.”¹⁷⁶ This is elaborated upon by Johnson who argues that commemoration and the idea of historical amnesia are closely

¹⁷³ Croke Park is the national stadium of Ireland and is the headquarters of the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Ward, “Parallel Lives, Poles Apart,” 35.

¹⁷⁴ The name ‘Hill 16’ remains in place as of this writing. Ward, “Parallel Lives, Poles Apart,” 35.

¹⁷⁵ *The Irish Times*, 19 September 2006.

¹⁷⁶ McGaughey, “Men of Suvla,” 128.

interrelated, as “the use of public space to articulate a version of the past” was hotly contested across the island.¹⁷⁷ Here, both McGaughey and Johnson point out key elements that are overlooked when discussing the amnesia theory – primarily that choices were made to fill limited public space with a specific narrative, while other elements were excluded. The importance of agency, selectivity, and intervention in the study of Great War commemoration in Ireland is a critical, but often absent component.

The idea that the Irish suffered from amnesia or oblivion is too simplistic to explain the ways in which the memory of Gallipoli, and the war, was treated in the Irish Republic. Beiner explains that although alluring, the idea “that memory can be turned off on command ... derives from a simplistically conceived notion of collective memory, which assumes that if memory is constructed and malleable it can be easily annulled.”¹⁷⁸ This echoes what has been presented in the previous chapter - that regardless of how public or official commemoration treated Gallipoli, it remained in the memories of those who were connected to them as private memory exists within its own sphere. Although influenced by concepts of grief, mourning and remembrance shared amongst communal groups, those with personal connections to Gallipoli, continued to remember behind closed doors. The concept of historical amnesia is often attributed to a society at large, implying that the individuals within it have forgotten and it is here that a separation must be made. “Social forgetting is not ‘total oblivion,’” explains Beiner, who elaborates that “it is to be found in the interface of public silence and more private remembrance, which sustains subdued memories.”¹⁷⁹ Yet the delineation between the two is rarely expressed as they do not hold the same cultural weight. David Rieff has pointed out that, “[t]he fact that individuals forget, whether

¹⁷⁷ Johnson, *Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance*, 80.

¹⁷⁸ Beiner, *Forgetful Remembrance*, 24-25.

¹⁷⁹ Beiner, *Forgetful Remembrance*, 27-28.

through the sad cognitive deficits that come with age or, conversely, some happy remission in their private life (such as fading of the memory of the lover who broke one's heart), is not thought to pose a threat to society as a whole. In contrast, a collective failure of remembrance is often presented as if it were an invitation to moral or political disaster."¹⁸⁰ As a result, the fear that disaster should ensue should a nation forget its history has created a commemorative obsession, with governments funding projects that ensure an appropriate narrative is constructed, one that will prioritize a noncontroversial view of the state.

Commemoration and the state

The idea of appropriateness in acts of commemoration is a pertinent one, as it highlights the links between commemoration and the political landscape in which it is created. Commemoration reflects general ideologies of the government, or group, in charge of its construction far more than it does the ideas that were prevalent at the time of the historical event being memorialized. In this way, historical events are co-opted by governments, political groups, or public interest groups, to be used to promote narratives that are deemed acceptable in the present. The inherent politicisation of commemoration is incontestable. In Ireland, the politicisation of Great War remembrance was clear from the onset of the war, and it structures the very core of its commemoration. In an introduction to a collection of works on war commemoration, the authors aptly explain how commemoration functions, writing

it has been the nation which has been the prime arena for the articulation of war memories and the mobilization of commemoration, since war has been central to its identity and symbolic continuity... Existing elites strive to re-work dominant national narratives when necessary to accommodate memories of new wars, while managing and/or repressing sectional memories which are (or threaten to become) oppositional.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 55.

¹⁸¹ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, "The politics of war memory and commemoration," 22.

The role of politics in the creation and dissemination of popular memory narratives is abundantly clear when looking at the different treatments of the two Great War events with the largest Irish involvement – Gallipoli and the Somme. While the Somme was quickly incorporated by the unionists in the north to become their central event of the war, Gallipoli was never adopted by a specific political faction, and for that reason, it was much easier to forget.¹⁸² Interestingly, the war memories that could be perceived as a threat to the Irish state were the same memories employed by the Northern Irish government in defence of their national consciousness. This has also been influenced by the canonization of the Western Front as the main, and most important, theatre of war while the Eastern Front is frequently diminished. With a focus on the battlefields of France and Belgium elsewhere, and without an established connection to the Irish nation with the south remaining focused on commemorating the Easter Rising and independence, Gallipoli would have to wait almost a century before it found a place in national commemoration. This, in large part, was due to the political climate in Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the growth of public history and the digitization of historical archives on the internet. Combined, these two elements created a new commemorative landscape in Ireland, one that was increasingly accessible not only to Irish citizens, but to the wider Irish diaspora around the globe with the growing usage of the internet in the home. Notably, the commemorations of the sesquicentennial of the Great Famine beginning in 1995, and the bicentennial of the 1798 Rising in 1998, shaped the way the Irish state would embark on remembrance projects, “recycl[ing historical memory] into spectator sport and tourist attraction.”¹⁸³

Gallipoli in public discourse

¹⁸² McGaughey, “Men of Suvla,” 133-134.

¹⁸³ Roy Foster, “Remembering 1798,” in *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, ed. Ian McBride (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67.

From the fiftieth anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign in 1965 to the early 1980s, it was rare to see Gallipoli covered in Irish popular news media. Usually referred to only for its importance in Australia and New Zealand, it received very little attention in *The Irish Times*, the country's most popular and widely read newspaper.¹⁸⁴ In 1965, an article titled "50 Years Ago – Gallipoli" was published for the anniversary, recapping the details of the campaign. Here, Captain J.H. Murphy argued that Gallipoli was a missed opportunity, and made the grandiose statement that, had it succeeded, the war "could have been ended much sooner, the Russian Revolution might never have taken place, and the Second World War would probably never have occurred."¹⁸⁵ No additional information is provided about the author, nor about why he is making such a claim. The quoted sentence concludes the article in an issue otherwise lacking any notice of the anniversary, other than a short article describing the commemoration of Gallipoli at ANZAC Cove by Australian and New Zealand veterans. There is no mention of Irish involvement, or the great loss Irish troops suffered in the failed campaign.

Ten years later, on the sixtieth anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, not a single mention of the event is present in the paper's issue. A decade after that, six articles were published on the seventieth anniversary, including an overview of the event by Kevin Myers, which was the only article to make explicit reference to the Irish who fought there, "for a generation in Ireland, the name of Sedd El-Bahr was synonymous to many with slaughter."¹⁸⁶ Slaughter that did not find itself deserving of wider public recognition, it seemed.

The increased discussion of Gallipoli in the 1980s is, in part, tied to the international success of Peter Weir's 1981 eponymous film starring Mel Gibson. A Turkish student studying in

¹⁸⁵ *The Irish Times*, 26 April 1965.

¹⁸⁶ *The Irish Times*, 25 April 1985.

Dublin notes the release of the film in a letter to *The Irish Times* in May 1982, highlighting it as the reason he felt compelled to write. It was only after openly discussing the film that he learned “that there were Irish soldiers in the Dardanelles War.”¹⁸⁷ Weir’s film does not address the Irish presence specifically, but it was through the conversations spurred by the movie, as highlighted in the letter above, that many learned that Gallipoli was not solely an ANZAC endeavour. The timing of the film’s release coincided with an inevitable event faced by Great War commemoration globally: veterans were dying. By the seventieth anniversary in 1985, those who had enlisted to fight at age eighteen were now almost ninety-years-old. The inescapable fact that those who had experienced the fighting firsthand would not be around to tell their stories forever spawned an overwhelming fear that, without them, forgetting was imminent. This added to the moral obligation for remembrance that continued to grow in national consciousnesses globally. In a study of the Great War’s impact on fiction, Brian Kennedy argues that these two elements combined created an environment in which the desire to fill the gaps of history with dramatic stories became pervasive.¹⁸⁸ While the fear grew that these stories would be lost forever, so did public discussions of the war. Jeffery argues that public commentary, notably that by Kevin Myers in Dublin in the late 1980s, became extremely important in bringing the Irish role in the Great War forward as Myers openly addressed “its widespread neglect in popular memory.”¹⁸⁹ This was the beginning of a new realm of discourse, both public and academic, that emerged in Ireland about the role played by the Irish in the Great War. With the opening of the Irish National War Memorial Gardens at Islandbridge in 1988, the end of the decade marked a new era in Ireland’s recognition of its involvement in the war and at Gallipoli in public history and commemoration.

¹⁸⁷ *The Irish Times*, 2 May 1982.

¹⁸⁸ Brian Kennedy, *Mixing Memory & Desire: Why Literature Can’t Forget the Great War* (Edmonton: Folklore Publishing, 2017), 16-17.

¹⁸⁹ Keith Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 121.

Although it was clear that Ireland was opening up to public discourse about the war, albeit contentiously, Jeffery explains that with the backdrop of the Troubles, public commemorative events and war memorials were often associated with anti-republican and anti-nationalist sentiment, making them targets for vandalism and violence.¹⁹⁰ The most notorious of these was the fatal bombing of a Remembrance Sunday ceremony by a unit of the Provisional IRA at the war memorial in Enniskillen, Co. Fermanagh, in Northern Ireland on 8 November 1987, where eleven people were killed.¹⁹¹ This came to be widely known as the Poppy Day Bombing. Jeffery highlights that following this tragic event, Remembrance Sunday events saw increased attendance and the number of poppies being sold and worn in the south climbed exponentially, from approximately twenty-five thousand annually in 1971 (when street sales were stopped) to forty-five thousand when such sales returned in 1988.¹⁹² While this heightened participation in commemorative events demonstrates a shift in how broadly the war was being discussed and remembered, it would be curious to know how much of this was subtle (albeit ironic) protest against the violence being proliferated in the north, which had been ongoing for twenty years at this point. Leonard contemplates this irony, arguing that “the bombing which aimed to obliterate those remembering in a northern Irish town subsequently propelled some southern towns into a cultural and practical reclamation of their own forgotten communities.”¹⁹³

Nevertheless, interest in the war was being revived in many different ways, and public discussions, created new interests in family histories as new generations sought information about their family’s war experiences. This created a new demand for war stories that were, in many cases, easily satisfied. Not only was the Great War the “first mass national war,” but participation rates

¹⁹⁰ Keith Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 121.

¹⁹¹ Keith Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 121.

¹⁹² Keith Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 121.

¹⁹³ Leonard, “The Twinge of Memory,” 110.

were high, including sizeable numbers of rank-and-file volunteer soldiers whose roles were heavily documented, making their stories “irresistibly fascinating.”¹⁹⁴ The desire for war stories was not a unique phenomenon. Storytelling has a long and rich history in Ireland, but in the late-1980s and 1990s, storytelling itself underwent a monumental transformation. The introduction of the internet into the home as an everyday tool changed how stories were told. Most importantly, though, it changed who the storytellers were.

The rise of public history

As a global conflict so widely documented, there existed immense potential for individuals to find out where their families had been and what they had done during those four years. Popular interest in genealogy was grown exponentially as the internet gave the public a new way in which to find and organize the past. This new phenomenon has been frequently written about by Grayson, who has demonstrated that although family history societies already existed and published their own research, the “growth of genealogical material available on the Internet” is what opened up access to the past to the amateur family historian.¹⁹⁵ He adds that genealogy was an important catalyst for the rise in popular memory surrounding the Great War because of the military’s reliance on recordkeeping and the availability of their data stores to those interested in this research outside of academia.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, there existed reams of letters, poems and diaries from the frontlines as the Great War soldier was “not merely literate, but vigorously literary, for the Great War occurred at a special historical moment when ... the belief in the educative powers of classical

¹⁹⁴ Keith Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 121.

¹⁹⁵ These groups include The Irish Family History Society (established 1984) and the Genealogical Society of Ireland (established 1990.) Grayson, “From Genealogy to Reconciliation,” 99.

¹⁹⁶ Grayson, “From Genealogy to Reconciliation,” 99-100.

and English literature was still extremely strong ... [and] ... the appeal of popular education and “self-improvement” was at its peak.”¹⁹⁷

This meant that literacy was not reserved for the upper ranks and many ordinary soldiers kept written records of their experiences. The war was fought before radio became a dominant means of communication and long before televisions would become a staple in every home. Consequently, a massive amount of writing existed and with the internet moving into the household, digitization projects made these items accessible from the comfort of home instead of having to travel to distant archives to request specific files. These projects were primarily undertaken with funding from large universities with the aim of making primary source material more accessible to scholars, but quickly moved to make large swaths of archival material available with the knowledge that they would be sought out and interpreted by the general public.¹⁹⁸ Although often hidden behind a paywall, many were willing to pay subscription fees to access these treasure troves and interpret them in their own way.

Meanwhile, the Great War was being openly discussed in the new magazine *History Ireland*. Established in Dublin in 1993, the aim of this magazine (as stated in the first editorial) “is to bring Irish history out of the ivory tower and to make the latest research accessible to the widest possible audience [while] provid[ing] a forum for the local historian.”¹⁹⁹ It is also suggested here that this magazine was born out of, and in opposition to, the commemoration mania that had begun to grow out of the 1980s, with the editors posing the question “are we to resign ourselves to the trite commercialism of heritage entrepreneurs?”²⁰⁰ Funded solely by subscriptions and public

¹⁹⁷ Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 [first published 1975]), 157.

¹⁹⁸ Mike Cronin, “Irish History Online and in Real Time: Century Ireland and the Decade of Centenaries,” *Éire-Ireland* 52, no. 1 (2017): 274.

¹⁹⁹ Hiram Morgan and Tommy Graham, “Editorial,” *History Ireland* 1, no. 1 (1993): 3.

²⁰⁰ Morgan and Graham, “Editorial,” 3.

donations, the magazine aims to take on a host of controversial topics that address the history of Ireland as a whole – north and south – to encourage public discourse about Irish history beyond that presented by academia and the state. In the second volume published in Autumn 1994, historian George Boyce’s piece “Ireland and the Great War” was followed by two heated responses in the ‘Letters’ section. The first reply came from historian Timothy Bowman claiming that several of Boyce’s claims were erroneous, including his statement that “[t]he 10th and 16th Irish Divisions were almost exclusively Catholic.”²⁰¹ Bowman then cites fellow historian Terence Denman’s book to correct this error, quoting Denman’s book *Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War, 1914-18*, where it is stated that part of these divisions were also made up of men from the Guernsey Militia, which Bowman argues shows that the divisions were not exclusively Irish.²⁰² This received a reply from Denman himself, who writes “As I said in my book ... the formation’s infantry, (as distinct from its supporting arms) was always largely Catholic Irish. Bowman should not cite my book selectively to imply that I ever said anything different.”²⁰³ I highlight this specific instance of a publicised disagreement between professional historians to show that although war commemoration was moving towards a more uncomplicated, shared history narrative in Ireland, historians were still hotly debating many aspects of each other’s research. What was unique, however, was that *History Ireland* was bringing these disagreements to a broader, non-academic audience.

Representations of war experience in commemoration

This coincided with a shift in the historical discipline that saw historical inquiry moving further away “from victors and triumphant elites to the downtrodden, the persecuted, the

²⁰¹ George Boyce, “Ireland and the First World War,” *History Ireland* 2, no. 3 (1994): 49.; Timothy Bowman, “Letters: Ireland and the First World War,” *History Ireland* 2, no. 4 (1994): 9-10.

²⁰² Bowman, “Letters: Ireland and the First World War,” 9-10.

²⁰³ Terence Denman, “Letters: Ireland and the First World War,” *History Ireland* 3, no. 1 (1995): 10.

victimised.”²⁰⁴ Leerssen argues that it is this shift that has seen specific groups of people become “politically meaningful categories ... partly [through] a search for historical roots – roots which had to be painstakingly reconstructed from dispersed archival fragments and community remembrance because they had not been taken into account of ‘official’ history and ‘official’ commemoration.”²⁰⁵ This shift had an immense impact on commemoration as these groups brought new direction, moving away from pre-existing notions of understanding war as a broad phenomenon to the creation of channels in which individual war experiences became sought after. The creation of associations devoted to regimental histories in the early-1990s helped this process, as they became accessible resources where stories of personal war experiences were documented and available to the public. In 1992 the Royal Munster Fusiliers Association was established in Limerick, followed by the Royal Dublin Fusiliers Association in 1996, despite both regiments (along with the four other southern Irish regiments) having been disbanded just before Irish independence was declared in 1922.²⁰⁶ Both of these regiments were amongst the groups that landed at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. Organized almost eighty-years later, these associations were created out of a desire to cultivate and maintain historical memory through community awareness, while gathering and preserving first-person accounts from veterans who were still alive. Importantly, by turning to individual experiences, these groups moved away from previous traditions of war remembrance. By focusing on firsthand accounts, the emphasis shifted to narratives that focused on “the shared futility of war” beyond the commonly espoused political party lines that prioritized a “victory culture.”²⁰⁷ In this way, veterans were prescribed “a role [of]

²⁰⁴ Leerssen, “Monument and trauma,” 218.

²⁰⁵ Leerssen, “Monument and trauma,” 218.

²⁰⁶ Keith Jeffery, “Irish Varieties of Great War Commemoration,” 121.; Royal Munster Fusiliers: <https://www.rmfa92.org/>; Royal Dublin Fusiliers: <http://royaldublinfusiliers.com>.

²⁰⁷ Brad West, “War commemoration and the expansion of the past,” in *War Memory and Commemoration*, ed. Brad West (New York: Routledge, 2017), 6-7.

truthsayer” despite the clarity or validity of their memories and with indifference to how their stories were influenced by “cultural conditions that ... reshape[] our ... dramatic reimagining of war over the years.”²⁰⁸

In a study of the relationship between post-traumatic stress disorder and war commemoration, Jo Stanley points out that official commemoration rarely makes room for first-person accounts of war, focusing instead on honour, glory, and voluntary sacrifice.²⁰⁹ Interviewing nurses charged with caring for PTSD patients, Stanley highlights a conversation with one nurse, Judith Jones, who points out that “[t]here is no place in official remembrance for looking at the justification for wars. Some clients have been searching for some justification for certain actions for fifty or more years.”²¹⁰ The community organizations that were established at the end of the twentieth-century sought to create public spaces for the conversations that were missing in official accounts. However, given that they were established eighty-years on, fewer and fewer veterans were alive to partake in these dialogues. As with most instances of war commemoration, it also meant that these individuals were unable to see their experiences and suffering reflected because they were not compatible with larger political and social goals.²¹¹

Community organizers and historians, both professional and amateur, catalogued and interpreted the firsthand accounts they were able to access. As veterans of Gallipoli (and the specific regiments the groups were formed for) died, membership in these associations was sought out by their relatives and became attractive venues for the aforementioned amateur family historian. For many, it was important that their family stories be told in a way that would not

²⁰⁸ West, “War commemoration and the expansion of the past,” 6-7.

²⁰⁹ Jo Stanley, “Involuntary commemorations: post-traumatic stress disorder and its relationship to war commemoration,” in *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, eds. T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper (London: Routledge, 2000), 250.

²¹⁰ Stanley, “Involuntary commemorations,” 250.

²¹¹ Bourke, “Introduction: ‘Remembering’ War,” 473.

denigrate the experiences of their relative. This helped to propel heroic myths of soldiering in the Great War, as discussions of the futility of war moved to the background. The meaning of that so many veterans sought after, was now distorted into valorous allegory. Swaths of information became digitized through these interchanges, funded by community donations and grants made available through universities and state departments devoted to historical preservation. By the early-2000s, all of this material had moved away from the sphere of living memory. It now existed in a broader milieu of “reinterpretation, negotiation, and contestation,” and without any living veterans left, the possibility that these elucidations would be challenged by witnesses had disappeared.²¹²

Popular representations of the Great War in Ireland

This influenced how the public interacted with physical representations of Great War commemoration. Attendance and visits to memorials, cenotaphs, cemeteries and a rise in international war tourism and battlefield visits surged. In an influential study of popular remembrance of the Great War published in 1995, Winter explains that contemporary engagement with public war monuments lacks historical context, arguing

[The] sense of [] meaning ascribed to war memorials at the time they were constructed [is missing]. That meaning was highly personal. It used collective expression, in stone and ceremony, to help individual people – mothers, fathers, wives, sons, daughters, and comrade-in-arms – to accept the brutal facts of death in war.²¹³

Now, there is a focus on them “as sites of symbolic exchange, where the living admit a certain degree of indebtedness to the fallen.”²¹⁴ This idea of symbolic exchange is one that can be seen in

²¹² The last Irish veteran of the Great War, Thomas Shaw of Belfast, died in March 2002. He served in the Royal Irish Rifles and fought in France and Belgium. Unfortunately, records of the death of the last surviving Irish veteran from Gallipoli are unable to be found, which was confirmed with the author via researcher Ronan McGreevy. *The Irish Times*, 6 March 2002.; Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*,” 3.

²¹³ Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, 94.

²¹⁴ Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, 94.

many aspects of war commemoration, not only through attendance at physical memorials or ceremonies, but in the ways in which the war is represented in museums and popular media.

With the shift to open discussions of the war through the creation of veteran's associations, public access to historical research and the repositioning of the common soldier's war experience, attitudes towards Irish participation at Gallipoli changed. However, as Ireland moved into the 1990s, and veterans of the conflict died, the discourse surrounding the "shared futility of war"²¹⁵ that had emerged became confounded with the emotion attached to the "symbolic exchange ... of indebtedness."²¹⁶ The result was a reversion to an emphasis on honour and duty, which were key elements in recruitment and commemoration during, and immediately following the war.

The unprecedented scale of violence and death of the Great War forced governments to modify the way they represented the conflict. By the time the world went to war in 1914, it had been more than forty years since the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) which claimed approximately 200,000 lives, drastically less than the twenty million that died by November 1918.²¹⁷ This resulted in "The Myth of the War Experience," a theory introduced by historian George L. Mosse in 1990 in his influential book *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*. This myth, he argues, "looked back upon the war as a meaningful and even sacred event ... designed to mask war and to legitimize the war experience [while] displac[ing] the reality

²¹⁵ West, "War commemoration and the expansion of the past," 6-7.

²¹⁶ Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, 94.

²¹⁷ Mosse cites 13 million dead, but an analysis by REPERES published by the Centre européen Robert Schuman (CERS) in 2011 estimates that more than 20 million people died during the war, and about the same number were wounded. These numbers include combat related deaths, deaths of the civilian population, as well as military deaths caused by accident and disease. (Deaths from the Spanish Flu were omitted as much as possible. George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3-4.; Nadège Mougel, "World War I casualties," *REPERES*, trans. Julie Gratz, Centre européen Robert Schuman, 2011, accessed May 2021, <http://www.centre-robert-schuman.org/userfiles/files/REPERES%20%E2%80%93%20module%201-1%20-%20explanatory%20notes%20%E2%80%93%20World%20War%20I%20casualties%20%E2%80%93%20EN.pdf>.

of war.”²¹⁸ This new phenomenon was, according to Paul Fussell, “the first time in history that official policy produced events so shocking, bizarre, and stomach-turning that the events had to be tidied up for presentation to a highly literate mass population.”²¹⁹ The Second World War also had a profound effect on how the meaning ascribed to the Great War was punctuated from the 1970s onward. Winter argues that post-Great War, commemoration focused on narratives that presented “the loss of life ... [as] sacrifices [that] were redemptive, ... prepar[ing] the ground for a better world, one in which such staggering loss of life would not recur.”²²⁰ It was to be the war to end all wars, after all. Following 1945 and the atrocity of the Holocaust, it was impossible to associate any meaning with this “giant black hole in the midst of our universe of reason.”²²¹ Consequently, the focus on Great War commemoration began to minimize the narrative of war as a measure to prevent future wars, and placed focus instead on heroism and sacrifice.

In Ireland, because Irish involvement in Gallipoli was usurped by the Easter Rising and the War of Independence, the dialogue about Irish experiences during the campaign was short lived, and Mosse’s theory became deeply ingrained in the commemorative efforts that followed. The horror of the conflict was continually countered with the same sanitisation that was prevalent in the initial post-war years, and the emphasis on remembrance was once again centered around honour and duty. This only occurred when not being countered by rhetoric arguing that the Irish at Gallipoli had, as declared in the popular song of the same name by Irish band The Fureys, “Fought for the wrong country, you died for the wrong cause/And your ma often said that it was

²¹⁸ Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 7.

²¹⁹ Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, 178.

²²⁰ Winter, “Notes on the Memory Boom,” 64.

²²¹ Winter, “Notes on the Memory Boom,” 64.

Ireland's great loss/All those fine young men who marched to foreign shores to fight the wars/When the greatest war of all was at home."²²²

Other popular understandings of the war had shifted as well, as the nation-state was now widely presupposed as "the 'natural' political entity throughout Europe."²²³ Instead of being presented as the paradox that it was, the imperialistic aims of the belligerents were re-interpreted so that, despite the war ending in an armistice, the allies were presented as victors against evil German imperialism. The simple fact that had either side actually won the war, a victory would have circumvented the national desires of small, independent nations has been utterly neglected.²²⁴

War commemoration and the Irish Peace Process

These elements all came together at a pivotal time in Ireland. In the four years between the creation of the Royal Munster Fusiliers Association and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers Association, paramilitary ceasefires began in 1994, marking the beginning of the Irish Peace Process that ultimately led to the end of the Troubles with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998.²²⁵ This momentous event, combined with the opening of Great War commemoration dialogue in the south, spawned a new era of commemoration – one marked by the creation of a shared history narrative. This can be seen in the 1998 bicentennial commemoration of the 1798

²²² This song was originally written by Mike Swan and Daire Doyle, members of the band The Memories, in the 1970s, and was later popularized by The Fureys. The Fureys, *Gallipoli*, accessed 1 July 2021, <https://genius.com/The-fureys-gallipoli-lyrics#lyrics>.

²²³ Nils Arne Sørensen, "Commemorating the Great War in Ireland and the Trentino: An Essay in Comparative History," *Nordic Irish Studies* 2 (2003): 121.

²²⁴ Sørensen, "Commemorating the Great War in Ireland and the Trentino," 121.

²²⁵ The Northern Ireland Peace Process refers to the period leading up to the 1994 ceasefires in the North to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The focus is often on the negotiations between the governments of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (and Britain), as well as with the Provisional IRA. Many will argue that the process is ongoing, as it is argued, the outcome of the Peace Process was not reconciliatory. See Feargal Cochrane, *Northern Ireland: The Fragile Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021 [first published 2013]); The Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, was signed by the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom on 10 April 1998, ending largescale violence in the North and creating a more inclusive system of government. "Good Friday Agreement", accessed 1 July, 2021, <https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-agreement.pdf>.

Rebellion when attempts were made to “skim[] over ... sectarianism in Wexford in 1798,” through the creation of a one-size-fits-all script that all sides of the political spectrum could theoretically espouse.²²⁶ This narrative was present several years earlier, as well, when President Mary Robinson addressed the beginning of Great Famine commemorations in 1995, stating, “[t]his year we begin to commemoration the Irish famine[.] ... All parts of this island – north and south, east, and west – will see their losses noted and remembered.”²²⁷ This shared history through memory made it so that for the first time, remembrance of the Great War was not limited to silence in the south and glorification of the Somme in the north. It was now taking a cross-border approach that saw each side addressing the broader legacy of Irish involvement. For example, the Somme Heritage Center, established in County Down in 1994, commemorates not only the 36th (Ulster) Division that fought at the Somme, but also divisions from the south who fought there and those who fought at Gallipoli.²²⁸

Given that almost no living memory remained from the war, those behind the planning and execution of public memory had little choice but to rely on the historical record. These reinterpretations of Irish war experience often focused on divisions between unionist and nationalist sentiment, individual recollections left behind by veterans, and public statements made in newspapers. However, the danger of this method of investigation (especially by those who are not trained historians, though some historians fall prey to this as well) is that there are limits to what one can learn from written documents. Social anthropologist Paul Connerton explains that “few people bother to write down what they take for granted. ... Much [is] built up about ‘what

²²⁶ Foster, “Remembering 1798,” 87-88.

²²⁷ Mary Robinson, “Cherishing the Irish Diaspora: President Mary Robinson on a Matter of Public Importance,” 02 February 1995, accessed 12 January 2022, <https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/cherishing-the-irish-diaspora>.

²²⁸ Pine, “*The Politics of Irish Memory*,” 128.

goes without saying.”²²⁹ While Connerton links this to political action, it is also quite compelling when looking at the creation of commemorative narratives and how they are publicly presented. Commemoration relies on two important factors. First, that its consumers have enough prior knowledge to make sense of the event being memorialised. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it bargains that the consumer will not have too much prior knowledge, so that the narratives presented will not be contested. Through an exploration of what he calls “deep memory,” Beiner asserts that “remembrance ... is not simply a metaphorical extrapolation of individual memory but a complex social construction which ... inherently has a history.”²³⁰ “Deep memory” then, is the essence of the prior knowledge that commemorative events bank on the public having. This is not merely shaped by cultural upbringing and generational knowledge but is influenced by a “commemorative calendar [that] follows a familiar pattern of selecting [certain] historical events to create a cycle of celebratory holidays,” officially assigning importance to select parts of the past.²³¹ The assumption that the public will have enough knowledge of their place in the larger history of the people with which they identify hinges on the expectation that this knowledge will be distanced enough from the historical record, so to not invite criticism, contestation, or protest. In this way, commemoration focuses on evocation by representing “detail[s] ... [which] allude[] to something larger, but not necessarily precisely defined,” but is only effective when the consumers have “some idea of the kinds of things that [the] representation[] of detail allude to.”²³²

The influence of the Peace Process on the transformation of Great War commemoration in Ireland has been discussed by many scholars, but it is important to note here how vital public

²²⁹ Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18.

²³⁰ Beiner, “Between Trauma and Triumphalism,” 369.

²³¹ Beiner, “Between Trauma and Triumphalism,” 373.

²³² Cubitt, “Social memory and the collective past,” 203-204.

remembrance by government officials was to the creation of the shared history narrative. Seven months following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, Irish President Mary McAleese, and Queen Elizabeth II of Britain, traveled to Messines, Belgium, to inaugurate the Island of Ireland Peace Park on 11 November 1998. Conceptualized in 1996, the site housed the newly unveiled Irish Round Tower, erected near to where the 36th (Ulster) and 16th (Irish) Divisions fought the Germans alongside each other at the Battle of Messines in 1917.²³³ Most notably, however, was the attendance of both President McAleese and Queen Elizabeth II, and much has been made of the symbolism of the moment. Messines was an important locale for this to take place. Much was made about the two Irish divisions, north and south, serving side-by-side as comrades, espousing the idea of one grandiose Irish historical narrative. Catriona Pennell raises an important point, highlighting how this is just one example of how some of the most important instances of Irish Great War commemoration have taken place outside of Ireland, “using foreign locations as ‘safe’ spaces” whereby this kind of outward demonstration could exist, free of the threat of violence.”²³⁴

Conclusion

This remarkable event emerged from the new attitude towards Great War remembrance in Ireland, and public involvement as government officials began attending commemorative events more openly. In 1993, President Mary Robinson attended a Remembrance Day event in Dublin which paved the way for President McAleese’s attendance alongside Queen Elizabeth II in Messines to be more predictable, rather than shocking.²³⁵ The day after the opening of the Peace Park at Messines, *The Irish Times* printed President McAleese’s speech in full alongside a photograph of her standing next to Queen Elizabeth II. The Northern Irish-born Catholic president

²³³ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 66.

²³⁴ Catriona Pennell, “‘Choreographed by the angels?’: Ireland and the centenary of the First World War,” *War & Society* 36, no. 4 (2017): 263.

²³⁵ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 150-152.

of the Republic of Ireland addressed the shift in historical narrative on the island of Ireland as a whole, stating

Today's ceremony at the Peace Park was not just another journey down a well-travelled path. For much of the past eighty years, the very idea of such a ceremony would probably have been unthinkable. Those whom we commemorate here were doubly tragic. They fell victim to a war against oppression in Europe. Their memory too fell victim to a war for independence at home in Ireland. ... Today we are keenly aware that if we are to build the culture of consensus promised by the Good Friday Agreement then we need to create mutually respectful space for differing traditions, differing loyalties, for all our heroes and heroines. ... None of us has the power to change what is past but we do have the power to use today well to shape a better future. The Peace Park does not invite us to forget the past but to remember it differently. We are asked to look with sorrow and respect on the memory of our countrymen who died with such courage far from the common homeland they loved deeply. Their vitality, genius, youth, and commitment was lost to Ireland. In this generation we redeem their memory, acknowledging their sacrifice and the pain of those who loved them. We pray that just as this park has changed the landscape of Belgium, so too it will help to change the landscape of our memory.²³⁶

Here, McAleese openly expressed that the way that Ireland had commemorated their role in the Great War needed to change to encompass the Irishness that is shared across all of the island, north and south. This is a fascinating example which illuminates just how fickle the notion of collective or official memory is. We have moved away from theoretical concepts originally introduced by Halbwachs and Nora, into a new realm of interpretive memory. That is, the remembering of memories (not events) in a manner that allows for the deliberate exploitation of their malleability. In today's commemorative landscape, Halbwachs's concept of collective memory as something that can only exist within the orbit of a group's living memory, or "a current of continuous thought whose continuity is not at all artificial, [] retain[ing] from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive" has been made redundant.²³⁷ Where living memory has ceased to exist, interpretive memory has taken over.

²³⁶ *The Irish Times*, 12 November 1998.

²³⁷ Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 80.

Memories are no longer kept alive but rewritten. As Misztal has highlighted, Halbwachs's collective memory "[i]n today's societies ... refers not so much to living memory as to organized cultural practices that supply ways of understanding the world and provide people with beliefs and opinions that guide their action."²³⁸ This transformation has drastically altered the role of memory and its function within commemoration, and the contribution that History, with a capital "H," plays in it. Halbwachs has argued that unlike his theory of collective memory, "History ... gives the impression that everything - the interplay of interests, general orientations, modes of studying men and events, traditions, and perspectives on the future - is transformed from one period to another."²³⁹ Yet, as we have seen through this examination of the memory of Gallipoli and the Great War in Ireland, it has indeed been transformed from period to period. It is within this environment that the memory of Gallipoli and the Great War has emerged as an archetype of interpretive memory. As we turn to the rise of the Decade of Centenaries in Ireland in the next chapter, this will become much clearer, as the interpretive memory of Gallipoli and the Great War leads us to what Jonathan Evershed has rightfully called an "ethical paradox."²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Misztal, "Memory and History," 5.

²³⁹ Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 80.

²⁴⁰ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 85.

Chapter Three: ‘There is no enemy, there is no victory’: Commemoration of Gallipoli as a Political Tool, 1995-2015

“Peace Reigns at Last as Thousands Pay Solemn Tribute to Slaughtered Soldiers,” headlined the second page of *The Irish Times* a few days after Irish President Michael D. Higgins stood alongside dignitaries from Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, and members of the British Royal Family at Gallipoli to mark the centenary of the 25 April 1915 landings.²⁴¹ This title reflected the journey that remembrance of Gallipoli, and the Great War, has undergone in Ireland, finally culminating in the recognition of and openness towards the role the Irish played in the conflict. What it ignores, however, is the role that the conflict played in Ireland. This chapter will argue that Ireland’s determination to contrive a shared historical narrative resulted in a missed opportunity for the public record rightfully to reflect Gallipoli’s role as a catalyst for changing opinion toward British rule in Ireland and increasing republican sentiment within the nationalist cause. Through an analysis of Gallipoli’s remembrance in Ireland post-Good Friday Agreement, this chapter explores how the memory of Gallipoli, and the war has been selectively revived. First, it will highlight the misrepresentation of the war experience and its aftermath before illustrating how Ireland’s revival of Gallipoli’s memory on a national scale in the decade-and-a-half following the Good Friday Agreement was carefully choreographed and performed to solidify the shared history narrative that would be presented through the Decade of Centenaries. Finally, I will show how the commemoration presented through multiple Decade of Centenaries events was the closing act in reviving Gallipoli’s memory. To do this, I will underscore trends indicating that, although no longer a taboo topic, Gallipoli’s place in Irish historical memory remains outside of the

²⁴¹ *The Irish Times*, 27 April 2015.

country's national myth. Accordingly, with the centenary year over, the campaign will be pushed back into annals of academia.

Many nations of the former British empire hold an annual day of remembrance in honour of their fallen soldiers. In many places, these ceremonies were established between the end of the Great War and the beginning of the Second World War. Commonly, students being to learn in primary school of the importance of national remembrance through narratives of honour and sacrifice, and the moral failure that would result from forgetting. Absent in these lessons are concepts of nationalism, the complexity of war, and the devastating aftermath of industrialised violence. While the nation is taught as something that needs defending, these lessons rarely, if ever, teach critical thinking about nationalism. This is an essential exclusion when teaching war remembrance to ensure that the state's involvement is not called into question.²⁴² Dominic Bryan explains it well, writing “[t]he states know that it is vital that a reading of the violence of the past as senseless or waste not be allowed to predominate. Soldiers must be memorialized in validatory ways in order to legitimate the contemporary state.”²⁴³ With this type of war commemoration being organised by the state, or cultural interest groups often using government financial support, it is necessary to examine why, and how, these commemorations are being carried out. Most importantly, the ascribed meaning behind these rituals must be analysed closely.

In his in-depth study of the commemoration of the Battle of the Somme in Northern Ireland, Evershed aptly highlights the way in which the Great War continues to be manipulated to serve grand narratives. He argues that “emergent narratives on a cross-communal or shared sacrifice for freedom have also resulted in somewhat of an ethical paradox. An imperial conflict that claimed

²⁴² Dominic Bryan, Mike Cronin, Tina O’Toole, and Catriona Pennell, “Ireland’s Decade of Commemorations: A Roundtable,” *New Hibernia Review/Iris Éireannach Nua* 17, no. 3 (2013): 66-67.

²⁴³ Bryan, Cronin, O’Toole, and Pennell, “Ireland’s Decade of Commemorations,” 67.

the lives of some 18 million people,²⁴⁴ and one of the bloodiest wars in human history, has come to be celebrated by the proponents and architects of the propaganda of peace, ... as a “war that stopped a war” between Unionists and Nationalists in Ireland.”²⁴⁵ Too much is made of this narrative with politicians such as former British secretary of state for education Michael Gove, arguing that “despite (leftist) deviations in its historiography, the First World War had been a good war.”²⁴⁶ Not only is the ‘good war’ narrative often defended with rhetoric filled with heroism and the war’s supposed desire to defend the freedom of small nations, it ignores the ongoing global effects that were caused by the conflict, as the major powers began carving up parts of the globe for their own self interests. This masterfully rendered story also ignores the personal experiences of many veterans, whose accounts do not align. Using interviews with ex-soldiers, Bourke has highlighted that their stories reflect a common trend: “Patrol went up the mountain. One man came back. He died before he could tell us what happened.”²⁴⁷ Elaborating on the detached tone of this account, another former soldier explained, “[i]ts purpose is not to enlighten but to exclude; its message is not its content but putting the listener in his place. I suffered, I was there. You were not. Only those facts matter. Everything else is beyond words to tell.”²⁴⁸ With these firsthand accounts of war accessible, why are public representations of war remembrance commemorative events, so far removed from the harrowing experiences and psychological trauma inherent to war? The short answer is, of course, politics. The intersection of politics and war remembrance began before the Great War had even come to an end. With the war effort reliant on volunteer enlistment, commemoration focused almost exclusively on the fallen and the bereaved, offering consolation

²⁴⁴ As mentioned in the previous chapter, the number of people who died as a result of the Great War is much higher when illness and civilian deaths are accounted for. See chapter two, p. 20-21.

²⁴⁵ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 85.

²⁴⁶ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 85.

²⁴⁷ Bourke, “Introduction: ‘Remembering’ War,” 477.

²⁴⁸ Bourke, “Introduction: ‘Remembering’ War,” 477.

and providing public monuments for them to grieve their lost loved ones whose bodies were unable to be recovered. Those who had survived to return home were largely ignored.

By focusing on the dead, politicians were able to shape narratives that would go unchallenged. They relied heavily on the fact that dead soldiers cannot speak. This was an essential step in the myth-making that occurred in the aftermath of both world wars, as previously highlighted through Mosse's "Myth of the War Experience."²⁴⁹ War commemoration became, and continues to be, centralised around the dead and the creation of places for their families to mourn them: cenotaphs, monuments, statues and in some cases, entire parks, and cemeteries. As Bourke explains, "[i]n rites of remembrance, the dead were given life in order, ironically, that they would eventually cease to distress the living."²⁵⁰

Gallipoli: commemorating defeat

The focus on the dead, and the ascription of honour and heroism on them allowed the powers involved, namely Britain, to restructure the war's story. Factually, that the war ended on 11 November 1918 at 11:11AM in an armistice is well-known, but rarely is the concept of an armistice addressed. Instead, the end of the war is fast-forwarded past the 1919-1920 Paris Peace Conference, where the allies became the de facto victors in their own stories as Germany was forced to accept Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles.²⁵¹ In 2010, historian Margaret MacMillan (the great-granddaughter of David Lloyd George), published an opinion piece in *The New York Times* stating, "[n]ot many people noticed at the time, but World War I ended this year."²⁵² Article 231 had continued to affect Germany's relationship with Britain and France, and she argues that

²⁴⁹ See chapter two, p. 20-21.

²⁵⁰ Bourke, "Introduction: 'Remembering' War," 481.

²⁵¹ Also known as the War Guilt Clause, Article 231, this article held Germany and her allies responsible for the Great War.

²⁵² *The New York Times*, 25 December 2010.

Germany's final reparation payment, made on 3 October 2010, was the final act in the conflict.²⁵³ The allied victory narrative is one that remains pervasive today, echoing the opening words of MacMillan's article: "[n]ot many people noticed" the armistice's manipulation. In a 2014 publication by the British Council for the centenary of the war, the foreword, written by Dan Snow (the great-great-grandson of Lloyd George, and MacMillan's nephew) touts the war as having changed the empires on the winning side.²⁵⁴ This ignorance towards the armistice that ended the war is not miscalculated. As I have underlined earlier, it would be very difficult for any government to admit that a war in which they relied so heavily on volunteers was fought in vain. This would strip them of their official legitimacy in the eyes of the public. At a memorial service marking the centenary of the war's outbreak in Belgium, German president Joachim Gauck apologised for Germany's role in the war, and Irish president Michael D. Higgins argued the pointlessness of the war.²⁵⁵ At the same event, British Prime Minister David Cameron defended his country's decision to go to war one-hundred years earlier, arguing it was necessary to defend democracy at the time, without acknowledging the imperial ramifications behind Britain forcing its colonies into battle.²⁵⁶

While the armistice is often lauded as victory by the allies, this approach cannot be applied to the Gallipoli campaign. The soldiers en route to the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915 were unaware that the British military establishment had grossly underestimated the rebuilding process undertaken by the Ottoman Army following the First Balkan War of 1912-13.²⁵⁷ Still under the impression that the Ottoman Empire was the 'Sick Man of Europe,' the British Army was

²⁵³ *The New York Times*, 25 December 2010.

²⁵⁴ "Foreword," in Anne Bostanci and John Dubber, "Remember the World as Well as the War," *British Council*, 2014, accessed 22 July 2021. <https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/remember-the-world-report-v5.pdf>, 2.

²⁵⁵ *The Irish Times*, 9 August 2014.

²⁵⁶ *The Irish Times*, 9 August 2014.

²⁵⁷ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 22.

unprepared for the readiness of their army and the slaughter that awaited them.²⁵⁸ Post-evacuation, there was no way to paint the Gallipoli campaign any other way than what it was: a disastrous defeat.²⁵⁹ While the soldiers who fought and died there have been long hailed heroes in Australia and New Zealand, the language of Great War heroism is new to Ireland, a product of careful performances of interpretive memory.

Failed campaigns and lost battles are written as necessary tragedies within the allied victory narrative. Here you will be hard-pressed to find any prominent mention of the enemy's victory, such as the Ottoman victory at Gallipoli. Instead, they are 'The Turks', a group relegated to the other side of history, or their involvement is reduced to Atatürk's apocryphal speech. This is not only a result of the Ottoman Empire being aligned with Germany, but an important tool in how war is remembered. Jenny Macleod explains that war remembrance is used to carefully curate ideas of national identity, where "the enemy, 'the other', is clearly identified, [so] societies can define themselves in opposition to them."²⁶⁰ Through this process of othering, Gallipoli was reframed from a colossal disaster to an unfortunate tragedy in the fight against the enemy. Writing about defeat and memory in the modern era, John Horne underlines how as "military defeat [was] recast as martyrdom, [and] became an instrument of nationalist mobilization."²⁶¹ While this was true for the ANZACs, and even more so for remembrance of the Great War in Northern Ireland, it was difficult to recast the dead at Gallipoli as heroes for the nationalist movement in 1915 Ireland. However, the catastrophic loss of lives in this failed campaign changed Irish attitudes towards the

²⁵⁸ This saying, often wrongly attributed to Tsar Nicholas I in the mid-nineteenth century lead up to the Crimean War, has gone through several iterations. The first use of the exact phrasing "Sick Man of Europe" was printed in the *New York Times* in 1860, but post-1918, the "sick man" trope has been assigned to many pre-war political units. *The New York Times*, 12 May 1860.

²⁵⁹ Erickson, *Gallipoli*, 14.

²⁶⁰ Macleod, "Introduction," 6.

²⁶¹ John Horne, "Defeat and Memory in Modern History," in *Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era*, ed. Jenny Macleod. (United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 17.

war, towards Home Rule, and towards the British, as many began to agree with Connolly's argument that the Irish were "ill-used" at Gallipoli.²⁶² The transformation of Gallipoli's story in Ireland took almost a full century and still remains divorced from the nationalist origins of the state.

Romanticising dead soldiers

Recrafting dead soldiers into martyrs has also been an important device in how the Great War has been romanticised. This happened through decades of cultural construction through popular media, mostly notably literature and film. Popular post-war novels such as Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929) and Ernest Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms* (1929) continue to be read, and new contributions to the genre are continually being made, such as Irish novelist Tom Phelan's *Canal Bridge* (2016).²⁶³ The creation of new fictional war stories reveals how emotions surrounding the war have shifted "from individual mourning to an amorphous cultural melancholy."²⁶⁴ This shift is a direct result of how meaning has been inscribed onto the war, with grandiose statements such as the one made by Cameron about the necessity of the war for democracy being incorporated, widely regurgitated, and believed. The martyring of soldiers, romanticisation of war and mythologization of individual experiences does not attract much condemnation. While the war is regarded, as President Higgins argued, as futile, its futility is not questioned, but pushed aside *en lieu* of remembrance and commemoration.

In April 2015, two think pieces appeared in *The Irish Times* regarding the commemorations being held in Ireland and abroad to mark the centenary of the Gallipoli landings. On the anniversary, Dublin-based journalist Fintan O'Toole's piece entitled "Please, no more heroes:

²⁶² Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 13-14.; Connolly, "The Irish Flag" Speech.

²⁶³ Irish novelist Sebastian Barry has also written several important novels about the war.

²⁶⁴ Kennedy, *Mixing Memory & Desire*, 23.

Let's Not Turn Obscenity into Glory," addressed these events, arguing that "much of the discussion of Irish participation in the war in recent years has assumed that the worst response to a historical trauma is amnesia. ... Amnesia is indeed a bad thing, but there is something far worse: the distortion of obscenity into glory."²⁶⁵ Turning war experience into anything more than the systematic massacre of millions of human beings is fabrication. Using Gallipoli as reference, O'Toole continues, writing "Gallipoli itself is a stark case in point: what's heroic about being mown down as you wade towards a beach before you've even had a chance to fire a shot? What could ever be heroic about the racist folly of that Dardanelles campaign anyway, based as it was on the belief that "Johnny Turk," being a lesser breed, would never stand up to real Europeans?"²⁶⁶

Romanticising the war through the ascription of virtuous motives on dead soldiers is trivial. O'Toole quotes Robert Graves, son of famed Irish poet Arthur Perceval Graves, who wrote his autobiography after fighting on the Western Front in the British Army that, "Patriotism, in the trenches, was too remote a sentiment, and at once rejected as fit only for civilians, or prisoners."²⁶⁷

The passage from which O'Toole draws gives deeper insight into the hierarchy of war

A new arrival who talked patriotism would soon be told to cut it out. As 'Blighty', a geographical concept, Great Britain was a quiet, easy place for getting back to out of the present foreign misery; but as a nation it included not only the trench-soldiers themselves and those who had gone home wounded, but the staff, Army Service Corps, lines of communication troops, base units, home-service units, and all civilians down to the detested grades of journalists, profiteers, 'starred' men exempted from enlistment, conscientious objectors, and members of the Government. The trench-soldier, with this carefully graded caste-system of honour, never considered that the Germans opposite might have built up exactly the same system themselves.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ *The Irish Times*, 25 April 2015.

²⁶⁶ *The Irish Times*, 25 April 2015.

²⁶⁷ *The Irish Times*, 25 April 2015.

²⁶⁸ Robert Graves, *Good-bye to All That*, (London: Penguin Books, 2000 [first published 1929]), 158.

Graves makes it clear that despite individual reasons for enlisting, ideas of patriotism or grandiose notions of honor and sacrifice were quickly dispelled in the face of non-stop shelling. The use of language of heroism and honour are oddly misplaced, and somewhat disrespectful, when placed against first-person accounts of the industrialised bloodshed of the Great War. Part of this is due to the ways that military history has traditionally been approached. Bourke explains that as “[t]he often-intimate institutional and financial relationship between military historians and the very institution they claim to study (the armed forces) creates a situation of historical dependency in the writing of military history.”²⁶⁹ This often results in narratives that overlook the violence on one side to allow for the demonization of the other. She argues that because of this, “historians are complicit in constructing a collective memory of war that elides 'our' violence [and] [h]istorical memory conducive to nationalist myths of honour and chivalry is created thus.”²⁷⁰

The romantic heroism that developed in Ireland often turns to Francis Ledwidge’s poem *The Irish at Gallipoli*. An Irish poet who landed at Suvla Bay with the 10th (Irish) Division in 1915, Ledwidge was a nationalist supporter of Home Rule, and his poetry reflected his love for Ireland. He is often used as an example of an Irish nationalist who put on a British uniform for Ireland’s best interests. In this poem, he writes “We but war when war / Serves Liberty and Justice, Love and Peace,” before adding “Let Ireland weep but not for sorrow. Weep / That by her sons a land is sanctified.”²⁷¹ Ledwidge was killed at Passchendaele in 1917, so it impossible to know what he would have made of the war had he survived, but his poem is often used to reinforce the heroic narrative. However, O’Toole highlights in his article that this altruistic reasoning for enlisting in

²⁶⁹ Bourke, “Introduction: ‘Remembering’ War,” 484.

²⁷⁰ Bourke, “Introduction: ‘Remembering’ War,” 484.

²⁷¹ Francis Ledwidge, “The Irish in Gallipoli,” in *the Complete Poems of Francis Ledwidge*, ed. Alice Curtayne (London: Martin Brian & O’Keeffe Ltd., 1974), 174.

the war is far rarer than it is common, and it is impossible to find honour in death during the Great War, as it is simply “not available in the industrial slaughter” that was novel to this conflict.²⁷²

O’Toole was not the only journalist to raise these issues. Five days after his piece was published, Derry-based journalist Eamonn McCann’s article, “Rage Not Reverence should Mark First World War” was printed, addressing the firing of Australian sportscaster Scott McIntyre after he made comments about ANZAC Day that McCann has called “acerbic.”²⁷³ He quotes McIntyre, who said “‘The cultification of an imperialist invasion of a foreign nation that Australia had no quarrel with is against all ideals of modern society.’ ... Australians should rather be ‘remembering the summary execution, widespread rape and theft committed by these ‘brave’ Anzacs.’”²⁷⁴ Given the prominence of the ANZAC myth in Australia, the uproar over these statements was swift and fierce. Though there is no equal myth in Ireland, McCann argued that “the sentimentalization of slaughter which McIntyre lost his job for exposing is evident, too, in the memorialising of the Irish [who were] misled into following England’s flag.”²⁷⁵ Both McIntyre and McCann raise a salient point that is erased from war commemoration: culpability.

Commemoration should not simply give one-sided versions of historical events, divorced from their larger context. As Fitzpatrick aptly argues, they should add insight into why the events happened and what compelled “people to commit terrible as well as courageous acts.”²⁷⁶ Instead, they tend to be “bland recitation[s] of general blamelessness.”²⁷⁷ Even when the slaughter of allied troops is raised as tragedy, the fact that they too, slaughtered millions of other human beings, is

²⁷² *The Irish Times*, 25 April 2015.

²⁷³ *The Irish Times*, 30 April 2015.

²⁷⁴ *The Irish Times*, 30 April 2015.

²⁷⁵ *The Irish Times*, 30 April 2015.

²⁷⁶ David Fitzpatrick, “Historians and the Commemoration of Irish Conflicts, 1912-1923,” in *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in War and Revolutions, 1912-1923*, eds. Edward Madigan and John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013), 127.

²⁷⁷ Fitzpatrick, “Historians and the Commemoration of Irish Conflicts,” 127.

omitted. So too is the fact that surviving veterans often suffered tremendously because of this omission and by seeing the violence they committed celebrated as victory. Bourke argues that surviving veterans on the side of the victors “suffered more guilt ... because they killed, and killed relentlessly, yet were rewarded for it.”²⁷⁸ Gallipoli is a significant campaign through which to examine this and McCann highlights it well, stating that “it can be seen as the moment when Britain and France stepped decisively into the Middle East to replace the Ottomans as imperial rulers, then to draw the boundaries of invented nations, the better to divvy up the resources of the region between them.”²⁷⁹ As motives of fighting for the future of small nations (arguably a misuse of Wilsonian rhetoric) and an independent, decolonised Ireland were ascribed to Irish war dead, their role in an imperialist war that was, by its very design, an effort to strengthen colonial empires, is convoluted by those who employ these narratives without addressing the nature of the conflict.

Both O’Toole and McCann agree that the dead should be remembered, but they should be remembered, as McCann explains, “with rage against the obviously predictable futility of the enterprise and of the crime which it represented against humanity, not with reverence for a sacrifice well made.”²⁸⁰ In this same vein, he asks, “[h]ow can there be commemorations of the 1914-1918 war which are not also anti-war demonstrations?”²⁸¹ The anti-war sentiment expressed by these two journalists is seldomly present because of the meaning that has been inscribed on the war in Western culture. When this sentiment does arise, such as through the creation of the white poppy, a topic to which an entire project could be devoted, it is protested and ridiculed.²⁸² Much of this stems from the heroic, and sometimes sacred, meaning that was ascribed to the ‘Great’ War as

²⁷⁸ Bourke, “Introduction: ‘Remembering’ War,” 477.

²⁷⁹ *The Irish Times*, 30 April 2015.

²⁸⁰ *The Irish Times*, 30 April 2015.

²⁸¹ *The Irish Times*, 30 April 2015.

²⁸² See James Fox, “Poppy Politics: Remembrance of Things Present,” in *Cultural Heritage Ethics: Between Theory and Practice*, ed. Constantine Sandis (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2014): 21-30.

explored in the previous chapter. This created a trend that continues today: a singular experience of glory through death for the honour of one's country. Without any veterans of the war left to challenge the manipulation of the war's memory, commemorative committees have given themselves a quasi-*carte blanche* to design their programmes. Unless, of course, their statements echo those made by Scott McIntyre about Gallipoli. We must ask, then, why has meaning become so important in the commemorations surrounding the Great War?

War commemoration and meaning

To answer this, we must begin with Geoffrey Cubitt's work addressing the collective past and its role in social memory. To have a past that society remains interested in, he argues, it must be linked to social continuity and made important through identity, which is often presented as "the past in question is *our* past, the past that gives meaning and value to *our* continuing existence as a collectivity" (my emphasis).²⁸³ This is the structure behind the commonly espoused ideas that they died for our freedom and we, as a result, owe them, and what is owed changes depending on political or societal needs. Cubitt explains this, arguing that "representations of the collective past hinge ... on backward projections of current perceptions of identity."²⁸⁴ As the nation-state is increasingly taken for granted as the default form of political organization, national identity is linked to the successes of the past, and is taught in ways that tell the individual citizen that they must honour their nation through remembrance of that past. Applying this duty and meaning to collective remembrance is important if it is to function, because, as David Rieff explains, "the authority of collective memory depends, as Renan understood, on our not inquiring too insistently about its factuality and not worrying over much about its contingency, but instead allowing

²⁸³ Cubitt, "Social memory and the collective past," 199.

²⁸⁴ Cubitt, "Social memory and the collective past," 200.

ourselves to be swept away by a strong emotional dressed up in the motley of historical fact.”²⁸⁵ The function of collective remembrance is only “valuable insofar as it is of service to society,” and so it reflects myth and propaganda far more than it does fact-based history.²⁸⁶ This helps to add nuance and significance to carefully choreographed narratives about the historical past that cherry-pick specific elements of the past to use. This is an effective methodology for collective remembrance because having a sense of a historical past is often “a vaguer and more impressionistic experience, at once elusive and allusive – less a matter of having the past precisely plotted than of possessing a few relatively central symbolic references ... around which broader associations of meaning can be flexibly organized.”²⁸⁷ By having some sense of what has happened, whether it is the whole truth, or a partial one, creates the impression of belonging to a community, one that shares the same memories that they are asked to call upon at given times, such as annual remembrance days. Moreover, as opposed to history, memory draws people in by “project[ing] an immediacy we feel has been lost from history.”²⁸⁸ It does this by both standing in opposition to history, in its function as an academic discipline, while standing alongside history as representation of the past that is both collective and individualistic. Klein explains, “[i]f history is objective in the coldest, hardest sense of the word, memory is subjective in the warmest, most inviting sense of that word. In contrast with history, memory fairly vibrates with the fullness of being.”²⁸⁹ The warmth of memory is attractive because having memories, or being able to remember, is commonly understood as innate to all human beings. Where memory and meaning become socially and politically central is during a “historiographic crisis” as “it figures as a

²⁸⁵ Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting*, 35.

²⁸⁶ Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting*, 22.

²⁸⁷ Cubitt, “Social memory and the collective past,” 203.

²⁸⁸ Klein, “On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse,” 129.

²⁸⁹ Klein, “On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse,” 130.

therapeutic alternative to historical discourse,” playing on emotions rather than logic or reason.²⁹⁰ While the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and the Peace Process may not have been Ireland’s major historiographic crisis, they were both monumental moments which saw the Irish government shift its attitude towards Great War remembrance in the same vein, playing on the emotional, emphasising meaningful remembrance.

It is important to note that the meanings associated with war remembrance differs based on geography and proximity to the conflict and its consequences. In a 2013 survey of about 7,500 people from seven different countries involved in the Great War, historical awareness and perceptions of its lasting implications varied greatly.²⁹¹ The overarching theme of responses echoed how it is called “‘the First World War’ out of habit. ... We all understand the ‘war’ bit. We use the word ‘first’ thanks to the superior knowledge of hindsight after the experience of a ‘second’ world war. But we often neglect the middle bit: the world.”²⁹² Consequently, the lasting global impacts are ignored, overwritten with “standardized ... representations” which in the Western world, are often black-and-white images of battlefields in France or Belgium, romanticised alongside propaganda posters that are heralded as past representations of popular culture.²⁹³

Ireland’s Great War commemoration

In Ireland, representations of the war reflect these standardisations, still carefully placed outside of the state’s nationalist origins, much like O’Higgins desired in 1929 when he argued that a war memorial had no place in central Dublin. While the global impact of the war has been

²⁹⁰ Klein, “On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse,” 145.

²⁹¹ These were: United Kingdom (1,215 participants); Turkey (1,052); Russia (1,019); India (1,022); Germany (1,070); France (1,029); and Egypt (1,081). Bostanci, Anne, and John Dubber. “Remember the World as Well as the War.

²⁹² Bostanci, Anne, and John Dubber. “Remember the World as Well as the War,” 4.

²⁹³ Bostanci, Anne, and John Dubber, “Remember the World as Well as the War,” 7.

overlooked by a large part of the general western population, Ireland is part of a different group of remembrancers: the colonised. As the war was largely controlled by empires, the armies involved in the conflict are recognised as such – British, French, German and Russian, etc., without much regard for the people who made up the bulk of these forces. At the time, European empires controlled 84% of the global landmass, and their colonies were forced into an imperial bloodbath, “whether they liked it or not.”²⁹⁴ Ireland was one of these colonies, and many nationalist volunteers enlisted in divisions named for their Irishness in the hopes that their support would secure Ireland’s future of self-governance. For this reason, the way that Great War commemoration has been choreographed in Ireland following the Peace Process is the result of careful manipulation of historical fact to meld together two competing narratives into one digestible story that encompasses an Irishness that transcends nationalist and unionist divides.

Before we turn to the choreography of Ireland’s war remembrance post-Good Friday Agreement, we must look at the terminology associated with the acts of remembrance undertaken by the state. Perhaps due to associations with national days of remembrance, commemoration is often confused with remembrance as though they are interchangeable. Winter and Sivan provide an important reminder in their chapter dedicated to the framework of war remembrance. Their exploration “depart[s] from those who define it as the property of dominant forces in the state” and focuses instead on “collective remembrance,” which they argue is “the act of gathering bits and pieces of the past, and joining them together in public” with the public being “the group that produces, expresses, and consumes it.”²⁹⁵ These elements of war remembrance are the stepping stones to commemoration, which at its very core, is a reflection of political and cultural concerns

²⁹⁴ The European empires referred to here are Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Bostanci, Anne, and John Dubber, “Remember the World as Well as the War,” 15.

²⁹⁵ Winter and Sivan, “Setting the Framework,” 9, 6.

at the time the event is choreographed and performed. War commemoration fuses these concerns with the performative element of mourning as “attempts to make good the psychological and physical damage of war.”²⁹⁶ And while remembrance is not, as Winter and Sivan point out, the property of government, commemoration is closely bound to the political world in which it occurs. Put simply, the basis of remembrance is memory, something one has, whereas commemoration requires action, something one does.²⁹⁷ This is not to say that commemoration is linked solely to the ruling entity of the time but that, “state formations, political parties or movements, and other social agents are all involved in constructing versions of the national past and national identity, selecting from or reworking the repertoire of national stories and symbols to fashion effectively useable public memories for their particular ends and purposes.”²⁹⁸

The politics at play when commemoration and war memory merge is the struggle between narratives as groups “give public articulation [] and [seek to] gain recognition for certain memories.”²⁹⁹ Which version of memory gets highlighted and funded is greatly influenced by the politics of the day and as I have highlighted earlier, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper explain, that “existing elites strive to re-work dominant national narratives ... while managing and/or repressing sectional memories which are (or threaten to become) oppositional,” but they also note that “this [allows us to] trace the articulation of memory in the opposite direction, from the top down, observing how the promoting of official narratives and the marginalizing or repressing of alternatives may have the effect of accommodating, constraining, reshaping or silencing sectional,

²⁹⁶ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, “The politics of war memory and commemoration,” 9.

²⁹⁷ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 24.

²⁹⁸ Even remembrance events undertaken by unofficial groups, such as heritage societies, family groups, etc., often ascribe to a certain political correctness. Those that push against the status quo often do so deliberately, to challenge the state, thus still making them inextricably linked to the politics of the time. Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, “The politics of war memory and commemoration,” 16.

²⁹⁹ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, “The politics of war memory and commemoration,” 16.

shared/common and even individual memories.”³⁰⁰ Their success, they argue, depends largely on “the degree of pre-existing internal division and conflict, and on the nature of the war concerned.”³⁰¹

As we turn to the commemorative landscape in Ireland, the focus on the commemoration of an entire decade has its own unique strands, with commemorations in the north focused on the Somme, while the south fixated on the Easter Rising. Designed to commemorate the decade from roughly 1912-1922, the Decade of Centenaries programme launched in 2012 to highlight the seminal events that helped shape the Irish state from the Third Home Rule Bill to the end of the Irish Civil War, and establishment of the Irish Free State³⁰² However, as Madigan outlines in his 2013 introduction to *Towards Commemoration: Ireland in war and revolution 1912-1923*, commemoration in Ireland is somewhat antithetical, as the “stated desire for a pluralistic, inclusive version” of this decade has often resulted in “historical actors [being] pushed into categories that deny their complexity.”³⁰³ The collection that follows his introduction focuses on questioning commemorative approaches in Ireland, where the past is often framed through division and difference. The initial statement put forth by the expert advisory group on the Centenary Commemorations attempts to answer this in the following outline of its commemorative aims:

1. Should illustrate how events in Ireland were rooted in continuing traditions and also were part of the wider international story
2. Will be measured and reflective ... informed by a full acknowledgement of the complexity of historical events, ...the multiple readings of history, and of the multiple identities and traditions which are part of the Irish historical experience
3. Must within reason be inclusive and non-partisan, but the State should not be expected to be neutral about its own existence. Should ... broaden sympathies, without ... abandon[ing] loyalties

³⁰⁰ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, “The politics of war memory and commemoration,” 22.

³⁰¹ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, “The politics of war memory and commemoration,” 22-23.

³⁰² Though the programme is commonly cited as being devoted to the decade of 1912-1922, the programme is slated in to end in 2023 with the commemoration of the Irish Civil War and September 1923 admission of the Irish Free State to the League of Nations.

³⁰³ Madigan, “Introduction,” 2.

4. Should not ignore differences and divisions. ... Inclusiveness is best achieved ... by encouraging multiple and plural commemorations which remember the past [without] reignit[ing] old tensions
5. Should reflect or explore history with a true integrity, and ...should enable the acknowledgement by different traditions, without recrimination, of a shared history³⁰⁴

While these aims seem rather standard as an avenue to a compendious programme, the complexities and hypocrisies are evident in the desire for commemorations that are inclusive in a way that allows the commemoration of divisive elements of the past, even if it means requiring separate commemorative events for these different traditions that do not attempt to provide any contextualization to their linear historical connections. Madigan explains that this hypocrisy has been ignored by relying on performative memory as “the grand gesture has allowed governments and politicians to circumvent some of the messiness of history in the name of progress and reconciliation.”³⁰⁵ This is the result of a decade-and-a-half of careful performance of interpretive memory by Ireland’s elites in the leadup to the Decade of Centenaries, where grand gestures were ubiquitously used to forge that path.

The decision to embark on a largescale commemorative project was made when Ireland was facing a period of financial downturn following the height of the economic boom during the Celtic Tiger period, and on the heels of the Great Famine sesquicentennial and the bicentennial of 1798.³⁰⁶ This period, from the mid-1990s to the late-2000s, was an important historical shift in Ireland as the country’s international reputation was transformed. Eberhard Bort explains that this was the precise moment when “Ireland – the ‘poor old woman’ – metamorphoses into the ‘Celtic Tiger,’ shedding its image of ‘living in the past’ and showing signs of buoyant confidence,

³⁰⁴ Advisory Group on Centenary Commemorations, "Initial Statement," accessed 30 September 2021, <https://www.decadeofcentenaries.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/Initial/Initial/index.html>.

³⁰⁵ Madigan, “Introduction,” 2.

³⁰⁶ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 151.

exporting its culture to the world.”³⁰⁷ Bort wrote this several years prior to the post-2008 economic downturn, and it is somewhat ironic that the country turned to the past in the post-Celtic Tiger era, with both sides of the island agreeing on the programme’s tourism and profit-making potential.³⁰⁸ He opens the chapter with a 2001 quote from *The Sunday Herald*, which maintains that “[t]his is the age of anniversary. We seem to be in a constant state of commemoration, celebrating the good, the bad, the indifferent – and that which is better forgotten.”³⁰⁹ This is a result of the growth of memory studies and the plethora of research published in that domain. It is also linked to the concept of reconciliation that emerged following the Second World War, as commissions were established to find ways for former enemies to move forward by “put[ting] the terrible events of the war in[to] shared historical perspective.”³¹⁰ This was a catalyst for many commemorative trends that continue today, a “blurring of history to a series of agreed aspirations and nostrums [] felt necessary to achieve progress.”³¹¹ In Ireland, reconciliation through shared history became the unofficial motto of Great War commemoration.

At its core is what has been often termed “the two histories”: professional history and public history.³¹² John Regan explains them as “historical research written by professionals and some independent scholars [which] follows recognised procedures in the use of evidence and purports to say something truthful about the past,” and “public history ... produced for mass consumption ... [for] general audiences [which] attempts to educate – and entertain – and promotes

³⁰⁷ Eberhard Bort, “Commemorating Ireland: towards a culture of inclusive commemoration? An introduction,” in *Commemorating Ireland: History, Politics, Culture*, ed. Eberhard Bort (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2004), 2.

³⁰⁸ Jonathan Evershed, “From Past Conflict to Shared Future?: Commemoration, peacebuilding, and the politics of Loyalism during Northern Ireland’s ‘Decade of Centenaries,’” *International Political Anthropology Journal* 8, no. 2 (2015): 30.

³⁰⁹ Bort, “Commemorating Ireland,” 1.

³¹⁰ Tom Dunne, “Commemorations and ‘Shared History’: A Different Role for Historians?” *History Ireland* 21, no. 1 (2013): 11.

³¹¹ Dunne, “Commemorations and ‘Shared History,’” 11.

³¹² John Regan, “Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: ‘the two histories,’” *History Ireland* 20, no. 1 (January/February 2012): 11.

ideas of ‘national identity’ and ‘heritage.’”³¹³ The delineation between the two has been the topic of much research, but the latter has become increasingly important as amateur historians “have demanded equal recognition for their contribution to understanding the past” and their inclusion in the historical field has brought into question the role of professional historians.³¹⁴

Irish presidents and the performance of historical memory

At the centre of paving the way towards the centenary of the Gallipoli landings in Ireland were not professional historians, or even amateur historians for that matter. Fostering the reconciliatory shared history narrative that was put on a national pedestal following the Peace Process were politicians, with Irish presidents taking the charge in the 1990s when President Mary Robinson attended a Remembrance Day ceremony in Dublin in 1993.³¹⁵ Attitudes in Ireland had shifted after the bombing at Enniskillen in 1987, making these appearances less controversial. Even those who had publicly supported the IRA saw the bombing at the Remembrance Sunday service as a turning point. Christy Moore, an Irish singer, said in a 1991 interview that after Enniskillen, “I find I’ve reached a point where I can’t fucking take it anymore. ... It’s an armed struggle where too many little people are being blown away.”³¹⁶ The repudiation of the violence happening in the north made it possible for Ireland to begin broaching the topic of reconciliation, and it was in this vein that President Robinson attended the 1993 ceremony.

Following this were four major events that solidified Ireland’s newfound dedication to Great War remembrance. Firstly, the inauguration of President Mary McAleese on 11 November 1997 was the beginning of a presidency that she announced, would be built on the theme of

³¹³ Regan, “Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde,” 11.

³¹⁴ Beiner, *Forgetful Remembrance*, 11.

³¹⁵ Macleod, *Gallipoli: Great Battles*, 151.

³¹⁶ Brian Hanley, “‘But then they started all this killing’: attitudes to the I.R.A. in the Irish Republic since 1969,” *Irish Historical Studies* 38, no. 151 (2013): 451.

“Building Bridges” as “the greatest salute to the memory of all our dead and the living whom they loved, would be the achievement of agreement and peace.”³¹⁷ The symbolism of being inaugurated on the anniversary of the armistice did not go unnoticed and she was both applauded, and criticised, for not wearing a poppy.³¹⁸ The second major event came in 1998 when she joined Queen Elizabeth II in Belgium to unveil the Peace Tower at the Island of Ireland Peace Park, in commemoration of the Irish who died in the war. Here, McAleese used the opportunity to emphasise her presidential theme, saying “[t]oday we are keenly aware that if we are to build the culture of consensus promised by the Good Friday Agreement then we need to create mutually respectful space for differing traditions, differing loyalties, for all our heroes and heroines.”³¹⁹ As discussed in the previous chapter, this neutral location was an important step in testing the waters of Great War commemoration in Ireland, and the designation of the memorial as the *Island of Ireland Peace Park* was a deliberate way of joining north and south in its remembrance.

The third major event came more than a decade later, in 2010, when President McAleese travelled to Gallipoli, marking the first official visit by an Irish leader to the peninsula. There, she spoke of the tragic losses on both sides of the conflict, noting “[t]he Irish who fought for the British Empire here were not only destined to be overwhelmed by those who opposed them but to have their memory doubly overwhelmed, for they fought in a campaign that was lost and so long overlooked and back home fellow citizens were taking on the might of that same Empire to secure

³¹⁷ Mary McAleese, "Inauguration Address," 11 November 1997, accessed 5 October 2021, <https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/inauguration-address-by-president-mary-mcaleese>.

³¹⁸ Edward Madigan, “Commemoration and Conciliation during the Royal Visit,” *History Ireland* 19, no. 4 (2014): 11.

³¹⁹ Mary McAleese, "Remarks at the Inauguration of the Messines Peace Tower," 11 November 1998, accessed 5 October 2021, <https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/remarks-by-president-mary-mcaleese-at-the-inauguration-reof-the-messines-pe>.

Irish independence.”³²⁰ She urged remembrance of “our Irish dead, those who fought in British uniforms, those who fought in ANZAC uniforms, and to honour those whom they fought, the young Turkish men who defended their homeland.”³²¹ To mark the ninety-fifth anniversary of the campaign, McAleese unveiled a memorial plinth here, dedicated to the 10th (Irish) Division, while four myrtle trees were planted by HRH The Duke of Gloucester, president of the Somme Association.³²² Not long after, the memorial unveiled by McAleese was removed, “trapped in the bureaucratic processes of war commemoration,” which McGaughey argues is “both ironic and unfortunate,” given how long it took for the Irish government to acknowledge the soldiers that died there.³²³ The Commonwealth War Graves Commission was unable to verify if the plinth has since been returned to Green Hill Cemetery.³²⁴

The fourth event, and perhaps the most symbolic of all, was Queen Elizabeth II’s first official visit to Ireland in 2011. Although there were several small protests, the Queen’s visit was met overwhelmingly with a sense of Irish pride as the British monarch took her place beside the Irish president. The visit was a central focus of mainstream media across Ireland and Britain, and was carefully choreographed through a variety of “memory spaces around which a rapprochement with the ‘wounds of the past’ [were] performed and consumed.”³²⁵ In a news article provocatively titled “The week that Anglophobia died,” O’Toole writes that the visit to the Garden of Remembrance was emblematic of the change that had already occurred within Ireland as the Queen laid a wreath in a “simple acknowledgement that Ireland is a different place, with its own history

³²⁰ Mary McAleese, “Remarks at Green Hill Cemetery Çanakkale,” 24 March 2010, accessed 5 October 2021, <https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/remarks-by-president-mcaleese-at-green-hill-cemetery-canakkale-wednesday-24>.

³²¹ McAleese, “Remarks at Green Hill Cemetery Çanakkale.”

³²² McGaughey, “Men of Suvla,” 128.

³²³ McGaughey, “Men of Suvla,” 128.

³²⁴ Email with the author.

³²⁵ Nuala C. Johnson, “A Royal Encounter: Space, Spectacle and the Queen’s Visit to Ireland 2011,” *The Geographical Journal* 178, no. 3 (2012): 194.

and mythology, its own encoded meanings. Different, that is, but equal.”³²⁶ The Queen’s acknowledgement of those who died in the Easter Rising before heading to the National War Memorial Garden the following day was also representative of the positions the Easter Rising and the Great War have in Irish consciousness.

These four events stand out as significant examples of Madigan’s grand gestures which emphasised Ireland’s commitment to, and reinforcement of, the shared history narrative they had built around the Great War’s memory. At centre stage was President McAleese, adding an aura of legitimacy to the events through the prestige granted to her through her role as Irish president. Though largely a figurehead, the role of the Irish president as the head of state and Supreme Commander of the Irish Defence Forces, is a highly esteemed position. Her many public appearances and speeches served “to establish political legitimacy over historical events and episodes while also elevating a specific version of history.”³²⁷ They also allowed for McAleese to stand as the voice of Ireland while acknowledging, and in some cases countering, different historical narratives.³²⁸ All four events came at pivotal moments in Ireland’s economic and political growth and were used to bolster Ireland’s position as a strong and independent European nation.

Great War commemoration as a political tool

McAleese’s 1997 inauguration came just months before the Good Friday Agreement was signed. A week prior, Mary Holland, then the Northern Ireland correspondent for *The Irish Times*, wrote a piece entitled “McAleese shows political intelligence,” arguing the unfortunate circumstance under which the poppy became “a test of her commitment to follow through on her

³²⁶ *The Irish Times*, 21 May 2011.

³²⁷ Kevin Rafter, “The Political Communication of the Decade of Commemoration,” *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 105, no. 420 (2016): 455.

³²⁸ Rafter, “The Political Communication of the Decade of Commemoration,” 455.

promise to build bridges between the people of this State and the unionist community in Northern Ireland.”³²⁹ In response, a letter to the editor argued that Holland had reinforced the Protestant-only or British symbolism that has surrounded the poppy in Ireland for decades, and had McAleese opted to wear one, she would have changed the nature of the symbol, which the author argued remains static, which “by definition, cannot ‘build bridges.’”³³⁰ While this may appear to be a cut and dried approach to cross-community rapprochement, McAleese remaining at the forefront of Irish Great War remembrance *sans* poppy was a symbolic reminder to the Irish people, and to the world, that the Irish role in the Great War was exactly that – an Irish one.

McAleese did not stray from this narrative one year later when she stood in Messines alongside poppy-adorned Queen Elizabeth II. This was the first meeting between the two, on the foreign battlefield’s neutral territory. Queen Elizabeth II looked on as McAleese unveiled the Irish round tower, surrounded by four gardens representing the four Irish provinces, symbolising Irish identity as one that belongs to the entire island regardless of political borders.³³¹ The tower itself is a physical representation of the shared history narrative that was being cultivated, emphasising the commonality between all Irish people, beyond political or religious affiliation. Its conception was centred around erasing the divisions that had befallen the Irish war dead at home, in history books and in Irish memory across the island.³³² The round tower design was chosen for its link to Early Celtic Ireland, and it was built by Irish people from across the island using Irish stone, three which were engraved to represent the Irish divisions that fought in the war.³³³ This was not only a

³²⁹ *The Irish Times*, 6 November 1997.

³³⁰ *The Irish Times*, 11 November 1997.

³³¹ See chapter two, p. 23-24.; *The Irish Times*, 12 November 1998.; *The Irish Times*, 11 November 1998.

³³² This memorial park was part of a project started by the Journey of Reconciliation Trust in 1996 and was spearheaded by Glenn Barr (a Loyalist from Derry) and Paddy Harte (a Fine Gael TD for Donegal). Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 66.

³³³ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 66-67.

pivotal moment in Ireland's history, but it was a highly performative and sensationalised demonstration of Ireland's place as a strong, independent European nation that could hold its own next to the British monarch. Beyond the steps taken to commemorate the Irish war dead, many, including then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, heralded this moment as "an important moment of reconciliation."³³⁴ McAleese herself called it "a historic day for Ireland, north and south; for the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain and Northern Ireland,"³³⁵ while the EU Social Affairs Commissioner Pádraig Flynn was "delighted" for Irish nationalists to be in attendance as he argued, "peace and reconciliation are driving Irish nationalism now."³³⁶ These events are important examples of how Great War commemoration has been performed to address the political goals of the country.

With attendance at Great War commemorative events becoming more common for Irish politicians, it was unsurprising to see the war's memory employed as an instrument of solidarity within Ireland's relationships with Britain and Turkey. President McAleese's 2010 trip to Gallipoli coincided with Ahmet Davutoglu's appointment as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. He quickly began to outline his approach, voicing strong support for Turkey's acceptance into the European Union (EU).³³⁷ His first official visit to Ireland came just weeks before McAleese visited Turkey and while there, he penned an opinion piece for *The Irish Times*, writing "...It is time for a reinvigorated relationship between Turkey and Ireland. ... At Gallipoli, the Turks and the Irish came to recognise each other as valiant fighters. The Dáil, for its part, recognised early on the righteousness of the Turkish national struggle, which led to the proclamation of the Turkish

³³⁴ *The Irish Times*, 11 November 1998.

³³⁵ *The Irish Times*, 12 November 1998.

³³⁶ *The Irish Times*, 12 November 1998.

³³⁷ Ahmet Davutoglu became the 26th Prime Minister of Turkey in 2014, but ultimately resigned in 2016.

Republic in 1923.”³³⁸ By emphasising the parallels between the two countries and their struggles for independence, and attributing Ireland’s recognition of Turkey’s struggle having had great influence on Turkish independence, Davutoglu emphasised that Turkey needed Ireland’s voice once again as they worked towards EU membership.³³⁹ The comparison of both countries as brave soldiers who were sent to fight in “the so called Great War” were echoed by President McAleese as she opened her speech at Green Hill Cemetery with the so-often quoted words attributed to Atatürk, “There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehments where they lie side by side here in this country of ours.”³⁴⁰ Using Irish-Turkish relations to highlight the role that Gallipoli, and the Great War, played in the independence of each of these countries saw President McAleese use the notion of a shared struggle to demonstrate Ireland’s strength as a member of the EU. She went on to openly state that Ireland “strongly support every effort the Turkish government is making to meet the accession requirements [for the EU].”³⁴¹ Ireland as the ‘poor old woman’ and Turkey as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ were no more.

It was also here that when asked about how she hoped Ireland would commemorate the centenary of the 1914-1918 war, she answered, “[b]y restoring to memory a generation who, of their time and in their circumstances, made sacrifices that they believed to be important ... [restoring] in such a way that those memories no longer divide us in the way that they have done historically but allow us a shared commemoration.”³⁴² Just months later the link between the two countries was made once more by the Turkish Ambassador to Ireland, Altay Cengizer, as he prepared to give lecture at Collins Barracks. Themed “diplomacy of the choiceless,” he said that

³³⁸ *The Irish Times*, 9 March 2010.

³³⁹ Since joining the EU in 1973, Ireland has been a vocal and active member, disproportionately so compared to United Kingdom prior to Brexit. *The Irish Times*, 9 March 2010.

³⁴⁰ McAleese, “Remarks at Green Hill Cemetery Çanakkale.”

³⁴¹ *The Irish Times*, 24 March 2010.

³⁴² *The Irish Times*, 25 March 2010.

the catastrophe at Gallipoli could have been avoided had Turkey's offer to join the allies been accepted by Britain and that historical arguments have wrongly portrayed the country as eager to side with the Central Powers, when the decision was made as a last-ditch effort to avoid being "partitioned by the Entente."³⁴³ Placing the blame on Britain for the heavy loss of lives in 1915 put Ireland and Turkey side-by-side as independent nations that emerged from the Great War despite both having been victimised by British imperialism.

Four months later, in a monumental moment for both Ireland and McAleese's presidency, the independent nation that had emerged against British imperialism in the years following the war made the ultimate grand gesture, inviting Queen Elizabeth II to visit Ireland. Though President McAleese was asked at the 1998 unveiling of the Island of Irish Peace Park if Ireland was extending an invitation to the Queen, she replied, "It doesn't quite happen like that. There's quite a lot of preparatory work goes on between the two governments first of all, and in a sense the invitation process comes at a stage further down line."³⁴⁴ It would take thirteen years for that invitation to come. This visit marked another centenary event as it had been one-hundred years since King George V had visited in 1911 when Ireland was still under British rule, the last monarch to do so.³⁴⁵ His granddaughter's visit had been in discussion for years by the time Queen Elizabeth II stepped off of a plane at Casement Aerodrome dressed in green.³⁴⁶ Much was made of the symbolism that surrounded the four-day visit, from the aerodrome's association with Roger Casement, to the Queen's wardrobe choices, to the first major public appearance at the Garden of Remembrance coming before the National War Memorial Gardens. Despite several protests, the

³⁴³ *The Irish Times*, 13 November 2010.

³⁴⁴ *The Irish Times*, 12 November 1998.

³⁴⁵ Queen Elizabeth II had visited Northern Ireland several times prior to this. *Belfast Telegraph*, 18 May 2011.

³⁴⁶ *Belfast Telegraph*, 18 May 2011

visit was largely celebrated as a turning point for Anglo-Irish relations in both north and south.³⁴⁷ The event was the exclamation mark at the end of McAleese's presidency, as the visit "dramatized what has already happened. They were not making history so much as marking it."³⁴⁸ Ireland's position as a major European nation combined with acknowledgement of their role in British Army during the Great War and later Irish independence, created the environment in which a visit from a British monarch could be perceived not only as a historic moment for the country, but equally for demonstrating that "post-imperial Britain [may be] coming to terms with the idea that [they are] ... an ordinary country with no claims to superiority."³⁴⁹ Though Britain may not ever arrive at that conclusion, the Queen's visit highlights how "memory can be eventually mobilised to an 'ethico-political' level where the acknowledgement of the pain and suffering of others is recognised."³⁵⁰ This was one of President McAleese's last major endeavours before her presidency ended, laying the final stone in her path towards 'building bridges' by encompassing all variations of Irish identity and history.

A decade of commemoration

With McAleese having served two terms as president, the Decade of Centenaries would take place under newly elected President Michael D. Higgins, who was inaugurated on 11 November 2011. His decision to forgo wearing a poppy did not stir up the same kind of controversy that his predecessor faced fourteen years earlier. In fact, he did not address the occasion in his inaugural speech, focusing instead on his plan for Ireland as the country embarked upon ten years of centenary events. This period would be, he stated, "a decade that will require us to honestly explore and reflect on key episodes in our modern history as a nation; that will require us to draw

³⁴⁷ *Belfast Telegraph*, 18 May 2011.

³⁴⁸ *The Irish Times*, 21 May 2011.

³⁴⁹ *The Irish Times*, 21 May 2011.

³⁵⁰ Johnson, "A Royal Encounter," 196.

on the ethics and politics of memory in such a way as will enable us not only to be sensitive to differing and incomplete versions of that history, but also to remain open to the making of reconciliation or to the acceptance of different versions of aspects and events of memory if required. A common shared future ... is achievable and I believe we can achieve it together.”³⁵¹ In pushing forward the desire for a shared future, Higgins took the shared history narrative that had been prominent since 1998 and transformed it from representing the past, to a movement which could help shape a new future for Ireland. The combination of the two narratives is a good summation of what the Decade of Centenaries programme planned to do – use shared history to forge a shared future. This is the essence of a centenary event. “The centenary,” Beiner argues, “is essentially an exercise of mass-politicisation” which only functions if “individuals ... [are] able to recognise their own pasts in the group’s shared memory.”³⁵² The mammoth task of commemorating all of the seminal events that led to Irish independence for their one-hundredth anniversaries begs the question: why?

Essential to a state’s survival is the creation of “a master narrative” which is “repeat[ed] ... consciously” allowing the state to “find significance to celebrated recurrence.”³⁵³ Anniversaries and their rituals “are designed to provide the impression of continuity,” and while the result is often the “paradoxical[] allow[ance of] the original [historical] events to become overlaid with contemporary preoccupations”, the sense of continuity is at the centre of centenary commemorations.³⁵⁴ The Decade of Centenaries is the manifestation of contemporary

³⁵¹ Michael D. Higgins, “Inaugural Speech,” 11 November 2011, accessed 5 October 2021, <https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/inaugural-speech-of-president-michael-d.-higgins>.

³⁵² Guy Beiner, “Negotiations of Memory: Rethinking 1798 Commemoration,” *The Irish Review* no. 26 (Autumn 2000): 60-61.

³⁵³ George D. Boyce, “‘No lack of ghosts’: memory, commemoration, and the state in Ireland,” in *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, ed. Ian McBride (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 266.

³⁵⁴ Ian McBride, “Introduction,” 26.

preoccupation with the past as a political tool to reinforce political legitimacy and ideas of identity as it pertains to heritage. As the centenaries of the many events that shaped this decade approached, it was commonly understood that they would be remembered in some way, whether that be by local societies, descendants of those involved, or family heritage groups; the contemporary preoccupation with the past subsists at all societal levels. By deciding to embark on this ten-year period of remembrance, the Irish state made the decision to put itself at the forefront, in a position that would allow them some control over the narratives that were told. In examining the “cult of centenary,” Evershed argues that “the decimalization of historical consciousness in this period served to frame the centenary as a neutral or even natural position from which to comprehend the events of the past, such that the special significance of hundredth anniversaries now seems intuitive.”³⁵⁵ The historical events themselves are important only in the ways in which they can be manipulated to serve contemporary political needs, and in that sense, their importance bombastically constructed. As Beiner explained in a 2020 keynote address, the programme would be better termed the Decade of Commemorations, as the historical events at its core are of lesser importance to the state than the commemorations themselves.³⁵⁶

As expressed above in the statement made by the Decade of Centenaries advisory group, the desire to “reflect or explore history with a true integrity” meant that historians should have been placed front-and-centre, though the committee was chaired and vice-chaired by politicians.³⁵⁷ One historian on the committee, Anne Dolan, argued in 2013, that it is far more likely for the historical record to unveil “hatred in its many expressions” than anything that would echo the

³⁵⁵ Evershed, *Ghosts of the Somme*, 3.

³⁵⁶ Guy Beiner, “Keynote Address,” *Forgotten Pasts and Social Futures: The Fourth Annual Concordia Graduate Conference in Irish Studies*, Concordia University, 31 January 2020.

³⁵⁷ Advisory Group on Centenary Commemorations. “Initial Statement.”

shared history tale that politicians have worked so hard to try to uncover.³⁵⁸ As the Decade of Centenaries mandate was an inclusive history despite division, Dolan argues that finding a place to express these divides that would inevitably be uncovered was unlikely, asserting that “[t]here is, or maybe there should be, a clear division between the historians’ view of this period and the political expectations or aspirations for these commemorations.”³⁵⁹ While the job of the professional historian is to “try to establish what happened, how and why (no matter how painful and depressing their findings may be),” commemorators are less concerned with the messiness of the past, overwriting divisions in the historical record with “simplistic and misleading dichotomies.”³⁶⁰ The role of politicians in this arena is quite the opposite of that held by historians. Dolan argues that “[p]oliticians using the past to justify their present actions are probably just good politicians. Their job is to get re-elected, to keep the peace, and if the past works just as well as promises on the economy, on education, on anything and everything else, then so be it. It is not their job to be accurate or maybe even ethical about the past.”³⁶¹ Unfortunately, the public tends to rely on politicians for accuracy, and are not taught to question what their role is within the commemorative realm.

The Decade of Centenaries programme bases itself on the notion that the way the past has been memorialized thus far has indeed been divisive, but if it is examined properly, “‘history’ in its truest or most objective sense is actually shared.”³⁶² This reductive view of the past belittles the struggles that individuals faced during periods of violence and political strife, ascribing a sense of neutrality to the past with little room for proper historical analysis. Not only is this misleading, but

³⁵⁸ Dolan, “Divisions and Divisions and Divisions,” 146.

³⁵⁹ Dolan, “Divisions and Divisions and Divisions,” 146-147.

³⁶⁰ Fitzpatrick, “Historians and the Commemoration of Irish Conflicts, 1912-1923,” 132, 126.

³⁶¹ Dolan, “Divisions and Divisions and Divisions,” 148.

³⁶² Jonathan Evershed, “From Past Conflict to Shared Future?” 30.

it also results in a “morally neutral commemoration” which can be a slippery slope that invites attention from those who may “seek to exonerate those responsible” for historical misdoings.³⁶³ Stripping the historical record of divisions, or attempting to rewrite them, has been a prevalent tactic in reviving the memory of the Great War in Ireland. The fact that some Irish nationalists joined the British Army to fight in the war is often used to espouse the narrative that “there was no ‘Orange and Green’ in the trenches.”³⁶⁴ This again, attributes motives and identities to individuals who have no voice to confirm or deny them. This “reductive interpretation,” Evershed argues, “is ... rooted in a particular moral and political paradigm; one which locates the foundations of a shared future on the battlefields of the past,” insinuating “that the fact of their ancestors having fought ‘side-by-side’ in the trenches should function to mitigate political differences between Unionists and Nationalists in the present.”³⁶⁵ This is precisely the way that the Great War, and Gallipoli, have been represented within the Decade of Centenaries.

When the programme began in 2012, the internet quickly became an essential location for its transmission, establishing relevance with a generation accustomed to digital storytelling.³⁶⁶ The Decade of Centenaries’ official website launched in November 2013 as an online portal for commemorative events across the island.³⁶⁷ Several months earlier, the Century Ireland website launched as well, a joint effort between RTÉ and Boston College, designed as an online newspaper to provide daily archival material that documented life in Ireland from 1912-1922.³⁶⁸ Bringing

³⁶³ Fitzpatrick, “Historians and the Commemoration of Irish Conflicts, 1912-1923,” 126, 127.

³⁶⁴ Evershed, “From Past Conflict to Shared Future?” 30.

³⁶⁵ Evershed “From Past Conflict to Shared Future?” 31.

³⁶⁶ Cronin, “Irish History Online and in Real Time,” 272.

³⁶⁷ The website includes a “Submit Your Event Here” button which allows commemorative events to be submitted for approval and posting. An announcement made for the website’s launch says that it will provide “notices of commemorative initiatives brought forward by government, local authorities, national cultural institutions, colleges, military and local history associations, ex-service organisations and community groups in Ireland and abroad,” as well as official Decade of Centenaries events. www.decadeofcentenaries.com. John Gibney, “Decade of Centenaries’ Website Launched,” *History Ireland* 22, no. 1 (2014): 8.

³⁶⁸ Century Ireland, <https://www.rte.ie/centuryireland/>.

commemoration into the digital realm has brought it into the private sphere in ways that have changed how individuals interact with historical memory. As a result, rituals of engagement have changed, and online communities devoted to specific campaigns and battles have sprung up on social media platforms, including many dedicated to Gallipoli.

In 2014, the centenary year of the outbreak of the war, more than ninety announcements are listed on the Decade of Centenaries website for events pertaining to its commemoration across the island. These events vary in scope, including, lectures, film screenings, online events, television and radio broadcasts, museum exhibitions and theatre productions, conferences, book launches, etc. While this broad range of affairs incorporates both professional and public history, it must be noted that there exists an invisible barrier between these two worlds. While public lectures, conferences, and book launches, often presented by historians, are publicly accessible, it is likely that, despite levels of interest, only those comfortable with academic presentations of knowledge attend these events. Other modes of historical representation, such as television shows, online events and films are far more likely to be consumed by a wider audience. Historian Catriona Pennell raises an important point about the Decade of Centenaries, arguing that not only is there a propensity for certain historians to be heard above others, but the associated television programmes are largely produced by state broadcasters “whether the BBC or RTÉ – [who] are the conduit for government opinion and interpretation,” and “provide programming that their audience wants to view or hear.”³⁶⁹ Accordingly, though historians should be at the forefront of such a large historiographic undertaking, the information being consumed by the general public is largely in the control of politicians and civil servants.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁹ Bryan, Cronin, O’Toole, and Pennell, “Ireland’s Decade of Commemorations,” 79-80.

³⁷⁰ Bryan, Cronin, O’Toole, and Pennell, “Ireland’s Decade of Commemorations,” 79.

At the centre of the media's attention in 2014 were politicians lending legitimacy to the events, marking them as official state commemorations. Two of the larger events included the unveiling of the Cross of Sacrifice at Glasnevin Cemetery on 31 July 2014 by President Higgins and his subsequent visit to Belgium four days later to mark the war's outbreak.³⁷¹ The Cross of Sacrifice was erected as a joint venture between the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the Glasnevin Trust in remembrance of those buried at the cemetery who died fighting in the two world wars, including one-hundred and sixty-six in the Great War.³⁷² The speech given by President Higgins differed from those previously given by former president McAleese at these types of events. Instead of continuing with the rhetoric of shared history and brotherhood in the trenches, he argued that what should be focused on in Great War remembrance is the human cost and futility of the war. He said, "we honour them all now, even if at a distance, and we do not ask, nor would it be appropriate to interrogate, their reasons for enlisting. If they could come back no doubt they would have questions to ask as to why it was, and how it came to be that their lives were taken."³⁷³ He emphasised that individual motives should not be questioned, and "whether it was a true belief in ideals; unionist or nationalist feelings, and within that, many different versions of each; escape from poverty; the search for adventure; a friendship network, or the continuation of a family tradition— it is not for us to judge."³⁷⁴

While this message moves away from the shared history pushed by McAleese that focused on a broader sense of Irishness, it calls for its more distant relative: commemoration of the

³⁷¹ The participation by Irish government officials at First World War commemorations across the island saw a noticeable increase following the launch of the Decade of Centenaries programme in 2012, with TD Heather Humphreys, who served as Minister for Arts, Heritage, and the Gaeltacht from 2014-2017, playing a prominent role.

³⁷² "31 July 2014: Dedication of Cross of Sacrifice, Glasnevin Cemetery," accessed 5 October 2021, <https://www.decadeofcentenaries.com/31-july-2014-dedication-of-cross-of-sacrifice-glasnevin-cemetery/>.

³⁷³ Michael D. Higgins, "Speech at the Dedication of the Cross of Sacrifice," 31 July 2014, accessed 5 October 2021, <https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/president-hrh-duke-of-kent-unveil-cross-of-sacrifice-1>.

³⁷⁴ Higgins, "Speech at the Dedication of the Cross of Sacrifice."

senseless death suffered by all involved. It also echoes the words he delivered at his inauguration in 2011, when he called for an openness to “differing and incomplete versions” of the past.³⁷⁵ This approach to the war’s remembrance would not be possible had it not been for McAleese’s dedication to creating a digestible narrative that helped remove the stigma from discussions of Irish involvement in the war. Still, a group of more than twenty-five protestors showed up outside the cemetery gates at the unveiling, cursing British officials in attendance, and one voice was heard yelling, “Higgins, you traitor!”³⁷⁶ Notably, four days later at the ceremony in Belgium, Higgins was not the only one to pay tribute to the Irish, as Prince Harry offered a tribute by reading a letter from Private Michael Lennon of the Dublin Fusiliers to his brother, written the day before he was killed at Gallipoli.³⁷⁷

From his inauguration onward, President Higgins has maintained the need for historical accuracy within the decade’s commemorations. In an interview with *The Irish Times* days after the unveiling, he was asked about the accusation hurled at him, to which he replied, “I don’t see how the very best version of republicanism is in the slightest contradicted by the kind of inclusive versions of memory that I hold. ... Part of my argument is that a real republicanism has a glowing centre of egalitarianism and how could it be very republican to ignore the deaths, the injuries and the families of the working people of Ireland and Britain who were sucked into a war that was not a war of their making or did not advance their welfare in any significant way.”³⁷⁸ His call for historical accuracy in the commemoration of the Great War seems to be able to be reduced to removing politics and religion from the trenches, and allowing remembrance to focus on the human cost of a pointless war.

³⁷⁵ Higgins, “Inaugural Speech.”

³⁷⁶ *The Irish Times*, 1 August 2014.

³⁷⁷ *The Irish Times*, 9 August 2014.

³⁷⁸ *The Irish Times*, 5 August 2014.

The Decade of Centenaries and Gallipoli

The commemorations devoted to the Great War in 2014 were surrounded by events devoted to the Easter Rising, which the Decade of Centenaries had began building towards from the very beginning of the programme. This was even more noticeable as the Decade of Centenaries approached the centenary of the Gallipoli landings. Predating the Rising by a year, the 25 April 2015 anniversary has always been overshadowed by the anniversary of the Rising, despite the difficulty the state has occasionally had in remembering revolutionary violence. Despite shifting attitudes towards the war in Ireland, Gallipoli's commemorations were sandwiched between ninety-ninth anniversary commemorations of the Rising. The centenary of the Gallipoli landings was marked with the standard annual ANZAC Day dawn service at Grangegorman Military Cemetery in Dublin, held since 2006. A Commonwealth and Ireland commemorative service was held at Cape Helles on the Gallipoli peninsula, and was attended by President Higgins, who also attended the Australian memorial service at Lone Pine and the New Zealand service at Chunuk Bair during his visit.³⁷⁹ While other academically-focused events and public exhibitions took place across the island, it was President Higgins' visit to Gallipoli, the launching of Century Ireland's Irish at Gallipoli website, and the theatre production *PALS – The Irish at Gallipoli*, that dominated the public commemorative landscape.

The visit made by Higgins to Gallipoli was the second official visit since McAleese's in March 2010. While ANZAC Day is regularly marked in Turkey with ceremonies attended by Turkish, Australian and New Zealand government officials, the attendance of President Higgins reflected the changes that had occurred in Ireland as he stood next to the British Royals, Prince

³⁷⁹ *The Irish Times*, 27 April 2015.

Charles and Prince Harry.³⁸⁰ They were part of the 10,000 attendees at the dawn service at Gallipoli, while at home in Dublin, more than 600 people attended the ceremony at Grangegorman, three times the usual crowd.³⁸¹ While newspaper coverage of these events in Ireland have been applauded for leaving “decades of amnesia” in the past, that strand of praise overlooks the selectivity that still surrounds these dialogues.³⁸²

While Higgins called for remembrance to mourn human loss without ignoring the historical record, and former president McAleese called for inclusivity and shared history in Great War remembrance, the outcome has ultimately been a blurring of the two. While Gallipoli’s April anniversary is wedged between commemorations of the Easter Rising, even in its centenary year, the overarching narrative that “lives lost on O’Connell Street have more historic value to the national tale than the lives wasted at Suvla Bay” remains.³⁸³ While the veracity of that statement can be endlessly debated, the lack of connection between Gallipoli and the Easter Rising in official commemorations takes the notion of shared history, adds a dash of historical accuracy, and results in separate commemorations that are “needlessly divisive.”³⁸⁴ The catalytic effect of Gallipoli on the shifting attitudes in Ireland and the political tensions and violence that followed three short months after the peninsula was evacuated still remains somewhat of a taboo topic. Though Jeffery has argued that the Great War and the Easter Rising are “an integral part of essentially the same story,” that memo seems not to have reached the desks of those in charge of the commemorations.³⁸⁵

³⁸⁰ Jenny Macleod, “The Gallipoli centenary: an international perspective,” in *War Memory and Commemoration*, ed. Brad West, (New York: Routledge, 2017), 96.

³⁸¹ *The Irish Times*, 27 April 2015.; *The Irish Times*, 27 April 2015.

³⁸² Macleod, “The Gallipoli centenary,” 96-97.

³⁸³ Bryan, Cronin, O’Toole, and Pennell, “Ireland’s Decade of Commemorations,” 70.

³⁸⁴ Madigan, “A Seamless Robe of Irish Experience,””.

³⁸⁵ Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, 2.

The Century Ireland website *Gallipoli* followed the same storyline. Funded by the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht and produced by Boston College in collaboration with RTÉ, the site was designed to give an overview of the Gallipoli campaign, explore what happened there, and to tell the stories of the thousands of Irish people. Through a daily news tracker, eyewitness accounts, diaries, death notices, and photo galleries, the website posted day-by-day accounts of the campaign and life at home from the landings to the evacuations, allowing users to watch “history unfold. ... [teaching] the user the idea that history is not inevitable.”³⁸⁶ However, the website stops short at the January 1916 evacuations. The digital approach to the Decade of Centenaries is an important one, but much like the on-the-ground commemorative services, they too treat the historical events that are supposedly all part of a continuous historically charged decade, as individual moments in this historical narrative. The award-winning *Gallipoli* site is part of the digital Century Ireland project, which brought in more than 1.17 million page views in its first four years.³⁸⁷ With this influx of public users on a regular basis, this was a prime opportunity to place Gallipoli alongside the Easter Rising as an incendiary moment on the road to independence, whether that be through the stories of soldiers like Tom Barry, who enlisted in 1915 and was sent to Mesopotamia to join units that had been moved there following their evacuation from Gallipoli, and then returned to join the IRA, or through the “common experience of familial grief” endured by Irish families who lost loved ones in both conflicts.³⁸⁸ Dividing the experiences of Irish people from 1914-1918 denies the complexities of their lived experiences and wrongly

³⁸⁶ Cronin, “Irish History Online and in Real Time,” 278.

³⁸⁷ The four-year period from the site’s launch in 2013-2017 is taken from Mike Cronin’s article published in 2017. The Gallipoli site won the eirSpider award for a website devoted to news, publishing and entertainment and the Realex Payments award for the best arts and culture website in 2015. Cronin, “Irish History Online and in Real Time,” 280.

³⁸⁸ Madigan, “A Seamless Robe of Irish Experience,” 17.

emphasises some lives as more valuable than others. Madigan highlights this by telling the story of two Irish families,

For a lot of Irish people Éamonn Ceannt, one of the seven signatories of the proclamation of the Irish Republic, is a reasonably well-known figure of the Easter Rising. He led the unit of volunteers that held the South Dublin Union throughout Easter week and was executed for his part in the rebellion on 8 May 1916. Readers may be less familiar with his brother, William Kent, a company sergeant-major with the Royal Dublin Fusiliers who was mortally wounded during the Battle of Arras on 24 April 1917, exactly a year to the day after the Rising broke out in Dublin. Some of the heaviest fighting of the Rising took place around Mount Street bridge, where the Sherwood Foresters suffered over 200 casualties as they attempted to cross the Grand Canal. An insurgent officer named Michael Malone was killed when British units finally overwhelmed the rebel positions. Michael's brother, William, had been killed just over a year earlier while serving as a sergeant with the Royal Dublin Fusiliers during the Second Battle of Ypres.³⁸⁹

Madigan then poses a question that would have been worth bearing in mind as the war's commemorative events were planned. "Are the Kent and Malone families likely," he asks, "to have been less bereaved by the loss of any of these men because of the circumstances in which they were killed? ... [B]ut it is certainly inappropriate for us, 100 years later, to suggest that the lives of two of these long-dead Irishmen were somehow worth more than the other two."³⁹⁰

The Great War was sold to Irish nationalists as a war in which the future of Ireland was at stake, as a guarantee for gain Home Rule, and in 1914, Irish public opinion was in favour of the war, but the shipping of Irish soldiers almost 4,000 kilometers to a foreign battlefield where so many were slaughtered in a failed attempt to take the beaches of Gallipoli had a profound impact at home.³⁹¹ Madigan echoes arguments made by Jeffery connecting the war and the Rising, stating "[t]he Rising - an undeniably foundational, nation-making event - would not have occurred and cannot be fully understood outside the context of the First World War. ... Unless we place them

³⁸⁹ Madigan, "A Seamless Robe of Irish Experience," 16-17.

³⁹⁰ Madigan, "A Seamless Robe of Irish Experience," 17.

³⁹¹ Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State*, 23.

in the context of a world war in which the British state was deeply invested, we cannot properly comprehend the British response to the Rising, the subsequent rise in republicanism, the success of the Sinn Féin party in 1918, the First Dáil, partition and the War of Independence.³⁹² The website devoted to the Irish experience at Gallipoli was an ideal place to employ the digital medium in an exploration of this connection between the tragic loss of Irish life in Turkey and the change in Irish attitudes towards the war and towards the British. Instead, it shows once again how the calls for shared history and historical accuracy were blurred, presenting Gallipoli's history in a vacuum. The shared history narrative born of the Peace Process was simply a means in which to placate Northern Ireland and solidify Ireland's relationship with Britain, not to reconcile the historical divide that has always existed between the Great War and the Easter Rising through examination of their historical complexities.

The third major public event around the Gallipoli campaign brought a new and immersive form of commemoration to the public. The theatre production *Pals: The Irish at Gallipoli*, produced by Dublin-based company ANU Productions, represented the story of the D Company unit of the 7th Battalion of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, who were trained at Collins Barracks before being sent to Gallipoli as part of the 10th (Irish) Division.³⁹³ Made up of mostly young friends and colleagues, or “pals,” who hailed mostly from “a rugby-playing social class,” this unit was designed to keep these men together, with the hope that their strong bonds would make them fight harder for one another, though this was tested harshly against the “furnace of the industrial killing” of the war.³⁹⁴ Within a week of landing at Gallipoli, more than half of its two-hundred and twenty athlete-turned-soldiers were dead or wounded.³⁹⁵ This is the story that ANU Productions told

³⁹² Madigan, “A Seamless Robe of Irish Experience,” 14.

³⁹³ John Gibney, “Review: *Pals* – The Irish at Gallipoli,” *History Ireland* 23, no. 3 (2015): 50.

³⁹⁴ Gibney, “*Pals*,” 50.

³⁹⁵ Gibney, “*Pals*,” 50.

through an interactive theatre piece at Collins Barracks 2 February 2015 until 30 April 2015. Now housing the Decorative Arts and History Museums of Ireland, the location of Collins Barracks heightened the theatre experience for attendees, placing them in the exact spots that the D Company had stood one-hundred years before. Reviews of the production raved about this new approach to history and the emotional response seen from the crowd. Created using letters written by the soldiers in the D Company, a reviewer for *The Irish Times* wrote, “*Pals* is not an exhibition, an excavation nor even a recreation. It’s something rarer; an imaginative and sensitive summoning.”³⁹⁶ The production is not a typical theatre piece in which the audience is ushered to an assigned seat to passively watch the story unfold onstage. *Pals* begins in the courtyard where attendees are given a speech about the many different reasons these men enlisted before the performance begins around them, moving with the audience into another section of the building.³⁹⁷ More than once, the actors seek out the audience and in one instance, an actor seeks approaches one audience member and requests her assistance with his uniform, asking “Do I look like a soldier?”³⁹⁸

In its first month, visitors to Collins Barracks had gone up forty-two percent, and the production was so well-received, it returned for an additional month in August 2015 due to popular demand. Historian Diarmaid Ferriter, a member of the Decade of Centenaries advisory committee, wrote in his review that *Pals* “is an exercise in history from below and is a reminder of what can be achieved by being creative and imaginative with archival material to give meaning to what is a relatively new approach to the history of this era; giving a sense, not just of what happened, but what it felt like for those involved.”³⁹⁹ As discussed earlier, the importance of evoking emotion

³⁹⁶ *The Irish Times*, 16 February 2015.

³⁹⁷ *The Irish Times*, 16 February 2015.; Gibney, “*Pals*,” 50.

³⁹⁸ *The Irish Times*, 16 February 2015.

³⁹⁹ *The Irish Times*, 21 February 2015.

and giving meaning to historical events is a critical part of the commemorative machine. No event about the Gallipoli campaign was more haunting than this one. ANU's evocative presentation of the disaster that befell the Irish at Gallipoli and its impact at home was most emotionally evident by a young soldier's character, whose moving question opens a review in *The Irish Times*, when he asked his friend "amid the carnage of Gallipoli, in a voice hollow and shocked, ... 'Do you think Ireland is proud of us?'"⁴⁰⁰ Playing on the audience's emotions, it is no wonder that ANU was asked to bring *Pals* back to Collins Barracks. The whole experience served as a type of once-in-a-lifetime living memorial and allowed the audience to feel as if they had witnessed history firsthand. And although "historical facts do not, in and of themselves, have the political power to transform ... the values and meanings derived from interpreting those facts through processes of public commemoration may."⁴⁰¹ By not connecting the many Irish experiences directly related to the catastrophe at Gallipoli to the larger Irish story, any meaning taken from this interactive experience did not transcend the divisions that continue to separate this event from the rest of history.

Conclusion

The entire journey that the memory, remembrance, and commemoration of the Gallipoli campaign in Ireland has undergone since the evacuation of the peninsula in 1916 has been overlaid with political preoccupation. Despite the stated presidential desires for shared history and historical accuracy, the Decade of Centenaries' approach to the Great War and the Gallipoli campaign has shown that this historical event will always remain divorced from the events that have been designated as Ireland's watershed moments of the 1912-1922 decade. What will be interesting to

⁴⁰⁰ *The Irish Times*, 16 February 2015.

⁴⁰¹ Evershed, "From Past Conflict to Shared Future?" 38.

see, is where the story of the Irish at Gallipoli will go from here. With the digitization projects undertaken by Century Ireland “constitut[ing] a major historical record: an archive of events from the early twentieth century, an account of the context and meanings that those events were given in the early twenty-first century, and an example of what digital history looked like,” there remains much research to be done.⁴⁰² What can almost be certain, though, from a quick examination of the Irish senior history curriculum, is that Gallipoli’s story is likely to fade, with that era of history focusing on the terms laid out within the curriculum: “Sovereignty; partition; Ulster Unionism; allegiance; physical force; IRB/IRA; “blood sacrifice”; dominion status; republic; free trade; protectionism; neutrality; discrimination; conformity/censorship.”⁴⁰³ Moreover, only one year after the centenary events, the ANZAC Day dawn service at Grangegorman was once again, the sole event dedicated to the Gallipoli campaign, while the Somme’s centenary was the major focus of the Decade of Centenaries programme in the north. While this research has made it evident that the present has had immeasurable influence on how the past has been represented through commemoration, this should not make us forget “the extent to which the past has shaped the present.”⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰² Cronin, “Irish History Online and in Real Time,” 282.

⁴⁰³ An Chomhairle Náisiúnta Curaclaim agus Measúnachta (National Council for Curriculum and Assessment). Ordinary and Higher Levels History Syllabus in the Irish School Curriculum. Accessed 24 August 2021. https://curriculumonline.ie/getmedia/da556505-f5fb-4921-869f-e0983fd80e50/SCSEC20_History_syllabus_eng.pdf.

⁴⁰⁴ Macleod, “Introduction,” 3.

**Conclusion: ‘Left their letters in the sand’:
Gallipoli’s Legacy and the Future of Great War Commemoration in Ireland**

If there is anything to be learned from Gallipoli’s one-hundred-year legacy in Ireland, it is that the commemoration of war, by its very nature, is averse to historical accuracy. In fact, it relies on this aversion – not only in the creation of remembrance events - but that it will keep the general public distant enough from the historical record that they will not question the legitimacy of commemorative rhetoric. With the Decade of Centenaries preparing to come to a close in 2022, the remembrance of the Great War in Ireland has gone from being disregarded, then revived for its temporary political usefulness, to its current position as a postscript to other events deemed more important. Yes, President Higgins continues to call for “ethical remembering,” of Ireland’s past, but with only four years left in his presidency, it remains to be seen what attitudes the country will take towards the war’s remembrance after the Decade of Centenaries ends.⁴⁰⁵

Additionally, claims of amnesia have returned to Ireland in popular media, now being cited as “political amnesia,” a result of, and “a debilitating side effect of Brexit,” with the British government deciding to withdraw from the European Union, bringing into question promises made in the Good Friday Agreement.⁴⁰⁶ With this political question looming over the island, and as President Higgins recently declined an invitation to attend an October 2021 centenary event in Armagh to mark the partition of the island, and the resulting creation of Northern Ireland, due to its “politicisation,” begs the question: what of the shared history narrative McAleese worked to foster during her presidency?⁴⁰⁷ Again, this alludes to the selectivity that is inherent to the commemorative process. While Higgins has recently argued that “[a] feigned amnesia around the uncomfortable aspects of our shared history will not help us to forge a better future together,” it is

⁴⁰⁵ *The Irish Times*, 11 February 2021.

⁴⁰⁶ *The Irish Times*, 10 November 2021.

⁴⁰⁷ *The Irish Times*, 17 September 2021.

unclear what that future will look like, and how the concept of shared history will function.⁴⁰⁸ With the digitisation of historical records becoming the default mode of archival storage, and with reams of information at one's fingertips, grand historical narratives are becoming much more difficult for the public to accept. Most recently, a digital archive twenty years in the making has been opened to the public, documenting the Irishmen who died in the Great War from the twenty-six counties in the Republic, and work is ongoing to add the records of the soldiers who died in the war from the six counties of Northern Ireland.⁴⁰⁹ This archive is an example of how academic research continues to merge with public history. However, how this archive will be engaged with by the public, and how it will be used for commemorative purposes, remains to be seen. The time for broad public interest in the conflict may have come to an end, and as per the Irish senior history curriculum, it does not indicate that this interest will be encouraged. In the study modules, the Great War is taught under the topic "the pursuit of sovereignty and the impact of partition, 1912-1949," and while the conflict is on the syllabus, the emphasised case studies for this period begins in 1921 with the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations.⁴¹⁰

In popular culture, 'the war to end all wars' has evolved into a sardonic idiom, used in discussions of the Great War to underscore the hollowness of its original sentiment. This narrative emphasising the futility of the war is beginning to replace narratives of heroism and sacrifice, an important and necessary shift, according to Higgins. In fact, Swedish heavy metal band Sabaton, from whom the 2008 song "Cliffs of Gallipoli" comes, will release a new Great War concept album

⁴⁰⁸ *The Irish Times*, 11 February 2021.

⁴⁰⁹ This project was undertaken by military historian Tom Burnell in collaboration with Comhairle Contae Thiobraid Árann/Tipperary County Council. The archive is live at www.irelandsgreatwaredead.ie and was announced in *The Irish Times* on 11 November 2021.

⁴¹⁰ An Chomhairle Náisiúnta Curaclaim agus Measúnachta (National Council for Curriculum and Assessment). Ordinary and Higher Levels History Syllabus in the Irish School Curriculum, accessed 24 August 2021, https://curriculumonline.ie/getmedia/da556505-f5fb-4921-869f-e0983fd80e50/SCSEC20_History_syllabus_eng.pdf.

entitled *The War to End All Wars* in early 2022. “Cliffs of Gallipoli,” which has inspired the titles used in this thesis, joins a growing chorus of songs written about the Gallipoli campaign. Reminiscent of the lyrics “Your ma was quietly weeping, there was a tear in my eye / As they sent you to Gallipoli to die,” from the popular song “Gallipoli,” by The Fureys, Sabaton’s “Cliffs of Gallipoli” lyrics say

And they knew they’d die
Gallipoli
Left their letters in the sand
Such waste of life
Gallipoli
Dreams of freedom turned to dust
Hell is waiting where the ocean meets the sand
Cliffs of burden
where the soldiers rushed into a certain death.⁴¹¹

Both songs highlight the pointlessness of the campaign, with young men deliberately sent to their deaths in this ‘war to end all wars’ that did not manage to prevent another war from happening just two decades later. These popular representations of the futility of the Great War reflect the same as the message put forth by President Higgins from his 2011 inauguration onward and encapsulate the growing commonness of this sentiment as it pertains to the Great War.

The Gallipoli campaign’s place on the periphery of the nation’s story may never change, but the digitisation projects undertaken by Century Ireland, the Decade of Centenaries, and projects like the newly opened archive mentioned above, the Irish Memorial Records digitally available at the Flanders Field Museum, and the many other repositories of their kind, will allow for better understanding of the Irish experience there. That is, if these databases are sought out. In our current age, with hordes of information readily available and openly accessible, we have what some have

⁴¹¹ The Fureys, *Gallipoli*, accessed 1 July 2021, <https://genius.com/The-fureys-gallipoli-lyrics#lyrics>.; Sabaton, *Cliffs of Gallipoli*, accessed 1 November 2021, <https://www.sabaton.net/discography/the-art-of-war/cliffs-of-gallipoli/>.

called “a wealth of information [which has] create[d] a poverty of attention.”⁴¹² This idea was originally posited in the 1970s, when technology was on the cusp of becoming an everyday tool. Placing this in contemporary context, Julian De Medeiros, a popular educator on TikTok, has reframed it, arguing that the wealth of information available to us has created “a poverty of understanding,” or “a poverty of knowledge.”⁴¹³ Unless an emphasis is put on teaching critical thinking, and how to navigate mass swaths of information, all of these combined – poverties of attention, understanding, and knowledge - pose a threat to the type of historical accuracy President Higgins advocated for within the Decade of Centenaries. It may, however, play a beneficial role in the future of commemoration. While global events continue to influence and strengthen anti-war movements and rhetoric, the habit of overlooking one’s own violence while condemning that perpetrated by others, as I have highlighted through works by Bourke, and Macleod, is still prevalent.⁴¹⁴

Fitzpatrick has argued that Great War remembrance during the Irish Free State could have been employed to foster reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants, especially as they had both enlisted to fight in approximately the similar numbers.⁴¹⁵ Given the political preoccupations of the time, it is unclear if this idea even existed as a sort of chimera within Sinn Féin’s denunciation of the war and its Irish veterans. Adopting Great War remembrance as a political tool to create narratives that embraced reconciliation was only made possible in Ireland through the growth of memory studies and the end of the Troubles in the north. Had this been combined with the current president’s call for historical accuracy, it is possible that Gallipoli would have finally

⁴¹² Herbert A. Simon, “Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World,” in *Computers, communications, and the public interest*, ed. M. Greenberger (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), 40.

⁴¹³ Julian de Medeiros (@juliandemedeiros), “We have a wealth of information and a poverty of knowledge [Video],” 17 October 2021, TikTok, accessed 17 October 2021, <https://vm.tiktok.com/ZM84RMfSu/>.

⁴¹⁴ See chapter three.

⁴¹⁵ Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State,” 191.

been situated within the Irish story as part of its continuity, instead of remaining on the fringes and treated within a vacuum. While McGaughey and Johnson have underlined the importance of considering the role agency plays in the choreography of remembrance and commemoration, it bears keeping in mind its role in the consumption of these narratives. If individuals are neither taught the skills necessary to think critically, nor are they presented with commemorations that encourage historical investigation, their agency in consuming war remembrance is illusory. Then again, that just might be exactly how those in charge of organising state commemorations prefer it.

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