Women for (Populist) Women?

The radical-right gender gap under women leaders in Norway and Denmark

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ABSTRACT

Women for (Populist) Women? The radical-right gender gap under women leaders in Norway and Denmark

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The radical-right gender gap, i.e., the fact that women vote for populist radical-right parties less than men, is a well-studied phenomenon across Western democracies. However, no conclusive answer has been reached as to why the radical-right gender gap exists. We ask whether the gender of the leader may affect the gap. We hypothesize that when populist radical-right parties are led by women, female voters may vote for these parties in greater numbers, thus reducing or eliminating the radical-right gender gap. We take a women-centered approach that considers women as full political agency and who may make electoral decisions for reasons that differ from men. Using binomial and multinomial logistic regressions, we reproduce and improve upon existing research by Nonna Mayer (2015) by applying it to the cases of populist radical-right parties in Norway and Denmark. We find no support for our hypotheses: the radical-right gender gap is neither reduced nor eliminated under female leadership of populist radical-right parties, and it is sometimes greater under female leadership than under male leadership.

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DEDICATION

À mes parents, Nicole et Guy, pour leur soutien infini

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DF	*Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish People's Party)
FN	*Front national* (National Front [France])[1]
FrP	*Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party [Norway])
PRR	Populist radical right
PRRP	Populist radical-right party
RRGG	Radical-right gender gap
RWA	Right-wing authoritarianism (in reference to the right-wing authoritarianism scale, or RWA scale)

[1] Though the *Front national* is now called *Rassemblement national* (National Rally), we use the name *Front national* throughout the text, as that was the name of the party when Mayer conducted her study. Any further references to the party will also use the name *Front national* or the abbreviation FN for the sake of consistency and intelligibility.

NOTE

All translations in the text are the author’s own unless otherwise stated.

INTRODUCTION

The populist radical right (PRR) has risen to prominence in recent years across the globe. Yet many authors have argued that the populist radical right is dangerous for democracy. Such is the case of Cas Mudde, who is widely regarded as the preeminent specialist on the PRR: for him, populist radical-right parties (PRRP) are at odds with certain aspects of liberal democracy (Mudde 2007, 157), such that the two coexist with difficulty. Jan-Werner Müller, author of *What Is Populism?*, similarly considers populists "protoauthoritarians" whose agenda is incompatible with the rights of minorities so fundamental to liberal democracy (Müller 2016). As we will see in the section defining the populist radical right, PRRPs when in power tend to reorient the system away from liberal democracy and towards a more authoritarian and plebiscitary, will-of-the-majority-at-all-costs type of democracy. Thus, understanding the populist radical right may be essential to the very survival of democracy as we know it.

Though research on the populist radical right has exploded in the last few years, much of it is very male-centric. Indeed, PRRPs are often understood as *Männerparteien*[2]—parties for men by men—with women often completely left out of the equation, or treated like an extension of men. As Blee (1996, 680-1) wrote in 1996 of women in racist movements, "Women are seen as apolitical in their own right, attached to the racist movement only through the political affiliations of their husbands, boyfriends, or fathers. The logic is circular: Organized racism is a male province. Women who join must be the ideological appendages of racist men. *Thus, women's attitudes, actions, and motivations are derivative, incidental, and not worthy of scholarly consideration.* What is important about organized racism is knowable by studying men" (emphasis added). We find a similar situation in the study of the populist radical right. Research remains insufficient on the role of women in populist radical right parties (Donà 2020), and much of what exists is "flawed" (Mudde 2007). This is why we want to contribute to this research in a way that is female-centric, that views women as the full political agents that they are.

One phenomenon pertaining to women in PRRPs that has been more widely studied is the radical-right gender gap (RRGG). Indeed, it is now a well-established fact that women vote for the populist radical right much less than do men, as will be made clear in the literature review. Yet an interesting piece of research out of France showed this fact not to be as ubiquitous as once thought: researcher Nonna Mayer found that when Marine Le Pen took over the *Front national* from her father, women started voting for the party as much as men did. Mayer suggested some potential explanations for the change, but we wondered whether Mayer's gender itself may have been the driver of this change. We therefore ask the question, *Does the leader's gender affect the size of the radical-right gender gap?* We hypothesize that having a woman at the helm of a PRRP may either lead to a reduction in the size or an outright elimination of the RRGG. In order to ascertain this, the present research will reproduce Nonna Mayer's model in two other countries where PRRPs have been led by both women and men, namely, Norway and Denmark, to see whether the strategy of putting a woman at the head of such parties succeeds in attracting more women voters. We will assess the radical-right gender gap under a male and female leader for each country in separate binomial regressions first before combining our datasets, which will allow us to assess the

[2] "Men's parties." See Mudde (2007).

combined effect of a woman leader for a woman voter across time using multinomial logistic regressions.

We chose to focus on the radical-right gender gap rather than gender gaps in voting in general because women used to vote *more* for centre-right parties than men (Mudde 2007), which would seem to indicate that the issue is not one of ideology, of women being less right-wing than men, as will be made clear in the literature review. This was known as the traditional gender gap. It held true until the '90s, but things have changed slightly in recent years: women now vote less for centre-right parties than men and more for left-wing parties, a phenomenon known as the modern gender gap (Norris 2005, 144). Yet the fact that women used to vote more for the centre-right than men shows that dissonance of values is not the reason for the RRGG, or that it can at best be only part of the answer. As the literature review will demonstrate, women do not significantly differ from men in the attitudes associated with PRRPs, whether it be opposition to immigration, nativism, authoritarianism, or populism. Therefore, a phenomenon specific to PRRPs must be at play that differs from any other gender gap in voting.

It is also important to note that the present research has implications beyond Denmark and Norway: as Rippeyoung writes (2007, 380), "the party platforms in Western Europe have many similarities to the views advocated by the right wing in North America and can, therefore, provide more general insights into why women support the far right." In addition, we will contribute to the research on descriptive representation in Europe, which is currently minimal, as will be explained later.

DEFINITIONS

What is the populist radical right?

A multiplicity of terms has been used in recent years to identify the new type of parties on the far right of the political spectrum whose rise has caused such anguish (Mudde 2007). Though authors generally agree on the broad lines of the phenomenon, they differ in their definitions and criteria for inclusion, leading some to include certain parties under the umbrella while others exclude them. In order to move forward with this research, we must therefore establish the definition we will use, which will affect our choice of cases. We have selected the definition offered by Cas Mudde in *Populist Radical Right in Europe* (2007), which is considered "one of the most comprehensive – if not the most comprehensive – studies within the literature on the recent rise of right-wing political parties" (Zaslove 2009, 309). We will first identify the core ideological features of populist radical right parties. We will then look at how the term "populist radical right" reflects these three features.

Ideological features

Mudde identifies three key features of modern PRRPs: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. The ideology of nativism "holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (Mudde 2007, 22). According to Betz and Johnson, PRRPs are "exclusionary" and "openly discriminatory," and they "seek to transform liberal democracy into an ethnocratic regime" (2004, 311-2) They consider that only certain segments of the population constitute the "real" people and, as such, true democracy should exclude certain groups from representation (316). PRRPs consider Islam in particular to be fundamentally incompatible with the values of Western liberal democracy, threatening to destroy not only Western values but the "local culture" as well (320). Ironically, though PRRPs position themselves as staunch defenders of the West and its values, they do so by promoting the exclusion of entire groups, especially immigrants (319). Modern PRRPs offer the following choice to immigrants: assimilate or leave (320). As such, Müller (2016) considers the populist radical right to be a danger to Western democracies, as their ideology is incompatible with minority rights, which are a core feature of liberal democratic regimes.

The second key feature of PRRPs is authoritarianism. Mudde adopts a definition of authoritarianism that is in line with the social psychology literature as well as the social theory of the Frankfurter Schule. As per Adorno *et al.* (1969, 228, as cited in Mudde 2007, 22), adherents of the populist radical right have "a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority." Mudde (2007, 23), however, suggests that authoritarians are not *entirely* subservient and uncritical and that they may, in fact, rebel under certain circumstances. Adding insight from Altemeyer's definition of right-wing authoritarianism based on three features of his famous F-scale,[3] Mudde thus defines authoritarianism as "the belief

[3] Authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer 1981); see the literature review for more on Altemeyer's RWA scale.

in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely" (2007, 23). As Mudde notes, authoritarianism "does not necessarily mean an antidemocratic attitude, but neither does it preclude one" (23).

The third and final key feature of PRRPs is populism. Mudde follows his previously established definition of populism as a "thin-centred ideology"—in that it can be combined with ideas from the left, right, or center (Mudde 2004, 544)—that "considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2007, 23). Betz and Johnson (2004, 313) explain that populism presents an image of modern democracy as a fundamentally flawed system in which a "self-serving political and cultural elite" pushes for and obtains its favored agenda while the average voter's concerns are ignored. Democracy is painted as nothing more than a "farce" in which the average Joe is tricked into thinking that his vote matters (315). This populist claim is "distinctly *moral*" in that it presents "the people" as righteous while the elite is "immoral [and] corrupt" (Müller 2016, 3; emphasis in original). Because populists understand "the people" to be a homogeneous group and exclude as "immoral" anyone who disagrees, the populist claim to represent voters is not subject to falsification through election results, as it "is of a moral and symbolic—and not empirical—nature" (39).

The populist radical right

Now that we have established the three core ideological features of the populist radical right, we can turn to the specific words of the label and what they highlight about PRRPs. The word "populist" denotes the populism of the parties as laid out above. The term "radical," for its part, is defined in contrast to the term "extremist," which is also often used in definitions of this party family. While "extremist" denotes an opposition to the constitutional system as a whole, "radical" instead indicates "opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities" (25). Radical parties can and do integrate into the existing political system without seeking to destroy it. However, their opposition to minority rights and their emphasis on the general will of the majority position them at odds with many aspects of liberal democracy, such that when they do come to power, they have a tendency to undermine the liberalism of the system and shift towards a more authoritarian and plebiscitary democracy (155-6). This reflects both the nativism as well as the authoritarian bent of PRRPs.

PRRPs are not right-wing in the socioeconomic sense, as they often favour a strong welfare state—albeit a chauvinist one (Mudde 2007, 25). They are right-wing in the sense theorized by Norberto Bobbio (as cited in Mudde 2007, 26), i.e., because they believe that inequalities between people are "natural," part of the "order" of things, and therefore not something to overcome, while the left believes inequalities are artificial and man-made, and they can therefore be undone through government action. This belief in a natural hierarchy is central to nativism: it allows someone to believe that her (homogeneous) people and its values are superior to other peoples and their values, and as such must be protected from the encroachment of other cultures. Furthermore, the word "right" in "populist radical right" reflects PRRPs' authoritarianism defined as deference to authority and focus on strict law and order.

It is important to note that we will be speaking of populist radical-right parties (PRRPs), not radical-right populist parties. The order of the words is important: as Mudde explains, though "radical right populism" was a more commonly used term than "populist radical right" at the time his book was published, the former puts the emphasis on populism, with radical right serving as a descriptor of this specific type of populism; by contrast, "populist radical right" emphasizes the radical right nature of this party family, with populist shifting to the position of descriptor of this subtype of the radical right (2007, 26). As Mudde writes, "[g]iven that nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology of this party family, radical right should be the primary term in the concept" (26). Mudde thus opts for the label populist radical-right parties, which he defines as "political parties with a core ideology that is a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism" (26). The present thesis follows Mudde's definition and denomination.

Gender

We follow Norocel in adopting a conception of gender that is based on the feminist critique of "biological determinism" (Norocel 2013, 54). The definition of gender—as opposed to sex—comes from the seminal work of Ann Oakley (1985, 16): "'Sex' is a word that refers to the biological differences between male and female: the visible difference in genitalia, the related difference in procreative function. 'Gender' however is a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification into 'masculine' and 'feminine'." Though this stance has been questioned,[4] we opt for the term "gender" rather than "sex" because we are concerned with (voting) behaviour, and behaviour is affected by gender as construed by society a lot more than it is affected by biological sex.[5] Indeed, there would be no reason to expect a transgender woman who has been presenting as a woman from a young age—socialized as a man for only a few years but as a woman for the decades since—to display voting behaviours associated with men rather than women simply because of her biology. There is no logical reason to expect one's reproductive organs to play a causal role in determining vote choice, whereas it is widely believed that gender-distinct socialization influences voting behaviour, as will be made evident in the literature review. As Norocel (2013, 54) points out, "gender has been conceptualised to account for the differences between men and women that are socially conditioned, and thus vary across time, and from one culture and national setting to another." Moreover, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) itself, which will be the dataset used in this research, identifies this variable as "gender of respondent" rather than sex. There is no legitimate basis to assume that respondents would answer a question about gender with their biological sex rather than self-identified gender.

We must also point out that the present research unfortunately does not include individuals who identify outside of the traditional gender binary of male and female. Module 3 of the CSES

[4] See Spierings et al. 2015.

[5] See Oakley (1985, 50): "Men and women *are* temperamentally different. But what does this 'fact' mean? It means that personality differences between male and female exist within Western society with a certain constancy and stability. But it does not mean that these differences are moulded by biology—indeed, it says nothing at all about how much of the difference is due to biology and how much to culture" (emphasis in original). Oakley goes on to explain how certain tribes isolated from Western society have developed conceptions of men and women opposite to ours (e.g., women are strong and work in agriculture while men must be pretty to attract women to take care of them), showing that there is nothing innate or biological about the gender roles we have assigned to men and women.

did not account for any other gender identity; the only possible answers aside from "male" and "female" for the gender question were "volunteered: refused" or "missing [value]." Module 5 of the CSES did include another option in addition to the four above, but it was only actually provided as an option to respondents in a handful of countries.[6] Neither of the countries under study here chose to include it, such that we are forced to treat gender as a male-female binary. This is in no way a statement on the existence of the gender spectrum, but rather a result of the limitations of the dataset used; in other words, it is a reflection of the binary nature of gender data in the CSES dataset, not a normative assertion. Note that this is why the present text will sometimes present gender as a binary (e.g., "one gender" v. "the other"); again, this reflects the nature of the gender variable in the CSES and is in no way an attempt at denying the existence of individuals who fall elsewhere on the gender spectrum.

[6] Australia, Canada, Finland, and the United States labeled this option "Other" while New Zealand labeled it "Gender diverse" ("CSES MODULE 5 FOURTH ADVANCE RELEASE [Dataset and Documentation]" 2022).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The radical-right gender gap

Research has consistently found that men vote for populist radical-right parties more than women do across Western democracies (H.-G. Betz 1994; Givens 2004; Gidengil et al. 2005; Norris 2005; Fontana, Sidler, and Hardmeier 2006; Rippeyoung 2007; de Bruijn and Veenbrink 2012; Harteveld et al. 2015; Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe 2015; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2018; Coffé 2019; Harteveld et al. 2019; Donovan 2022). This phenomenon has been termed the "radical-right gender gap" (Givens 2004). Though it is nearly ubiquitous, academics have struggled to identify the cause of the gap. A variety of explanations have been advanced. They can be grouped into the following categories: occupational, structural, attitudinal, societal, and ideological.

Occupational

Occupation is considered central to the radical-right populist story. Studies have shown that blue-collar workers have a much greater likelihood of voting for a populist radical-right party than other workers (see Betz 1993, 423; Perrineau 1997, 108-9; Givens 2004, 50; Mayer 2005, 5-6; Mudde 2007, 111; Mayer 2013, 172). Betz (1994) calls it the "proletarization" of the radical right. It is presumed to stem in large part from the "losers of modernization" (*Modernisierungsverlierer*) thesis (Mudde 2007, 203). This is the most common explanation for the rise of radical-right populism in Western democracies (R. Inglehart and Norris 2016, 2; Mudde 2007, 203). The thesis holds that the rise of populism is a consequence of the increasing inequality and decreasing job prospects and stability experienced by large swaths of Western populations (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 2). A multitude of occupations have been outsourced, automated, or taken up by lower-paid immigrants; as a consequence, "the less-skilled" turned into "losers—be it as unemployed, or as low-paid workers" (Esping-Andersen 1999, 99). Evidence indeed suggests that native workers have sometimes been displaced from certain industries due to the influx of immigrant labor (Altonji and Card 1991, 202). Similarly, the wages of native workers have often been negatively affected by increased immigrant labor, though the extent of this negative effect varies across industries (Altonji and Card 1991, 202; Finseraas, Røed, and Schøne 2017, 369; Borjas 2003). Anti-immigrant attitudes, then, are largely the result of threat perception: those occupations for which low growth is forecasted and whose workers are less educated are most prone to anti-immigrant attitudes (Kunovich 2013). Sectors in which the ratio of immigrants to natives is higher likewise face greater opposition to immigration (Mayda 2006). Overall, blue-collar workers have been found to display more anti-immigration sentiments than workers from other sectors (Givens 2004, 50). Therefore, PRR parties, perceived as "opponents of modernization" (Mudde 2007, 203; see also Decker 2004) and often promoting anti-immigration agendas[7] (Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002), become an appealing option for these workers.

[7] Note that this anti-immigration stance is expressed differently depending on national contexts. Scandinavian countries have an "official ideology … of tolerance and humanism" (Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002, 109), which means that anti-immigration agendas can only be expressed "within socially acceptable limits" (112). This is in stark contrast with Jean-Marie Le Pen, the former leader of the French *Front national*, who was overtly racist (112): among other things, he proclaimed in 1996 that he "believe[s] in racial inequality" (*Jean-Marie Le Pen "Je*

The issue of modernization at the macro level leads to insecurity at the individual level (Mudde 2007, 223). The upheaval caused by the forces of modernization is said to cause significant insecurity, both economically and culturally, in those affected by these changes (Mudde 2007, 223; see also Lipset 1959). "Embedded liberalism" promised everyone a social safety net to compensate for the potential losses of employment or income that would occur as a result of globalization or automation after the Second World War, but the system proved inadequate (Colantone and Stanig 2019, 130). Thus, workers in unskilled and less-skilled jobs, threatened by automation, outsourcing, and immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Im et al. 2019), have resorted to nativism, which has been a large driver of the increasing vote share of PRR parties (Finseraas, Røed, and Schøne 2017, 369). PRRPs promise them "a clear identity and protection against the changing world" (Mudde 2007, 223). These parties criticize free market liberalism and promote protectionism and nationalism (Decker 2004, 197-8; Minkenberg 1997, 141). In this, they are at odds with mainstream parties, most of whom advocate for economic liberalism and fail to recognize that it has not been positive for everyone (Colantone and Stanig 2019, 130, 136). Votes for PRRPs, then, are "products of the insoluble frustrations of those who feel cut off from the main trends of modern society" (Lipset 1959, 172).

Yet occupation does not have the same effect on women voters. Women are less involved in the workforce generally (Betz 1994, 145; Givens 2004, 31), and those who do work are less likely to hold blue-collar jobs (Givens 2004, 31; Rippeyoung 2007). Thus, women would be less inclined to vote for PRR parties because of the type of occupations they typically hold. However, more recent work has brought a nuance to this understanding of the radical-right gender gap. Research found that employment in the service industry rather than blue-collar work seems to predict women's vote for a PRR party (Allen and Goodman 2021). The rationale is straightforward: unskilled service workers face the same threat from immigration as blue-collar workers do, which means that they also stand to be "globalisation losers" (Mayer 2013, 173). Interestingly, and in contradiction with the immigration explanation, blue-collar and trade women are no more likely to vote for a PRR party, unlike their male counterparts[8] (Allen and Goodman 2021, 144-5), though blue-collar occupations did not make women *less* likely to vote for a PRRP either (Givens 2004, 50). Additionally, "sociocultural and technical professionals" of both genders have a lower likelihood of voting for a PRR party than either blue-collar or service workers (Allen

crois à l'inégalité des races" 1996), and in 2013 he called the presence of Roma people in Nice "hives-inducing" ("*urticante*") and "smelly" ("*odorante*") (Becker 2017).

[8] This highlights an important issue in the literature around PRR voting: most research has focused on why *men* vote for such parties and extrapolated that the same reasons were driving the women's vote. If women voted for PRR parties in smaller numbers, it had to be because women did not have the characteristics that made men vote for such parties, or they did not belong to the same sociodemographic groups that are correlated with such votes. However, a consciousness has emerged that women may have distinct reasons to vote (or not vote) for PRR parties (Allen and Goodman 2021, 138). We already pointed out above the "difference in occupational profile" in male and female PRR voters (145): the occupations that lead to voting for populist radical-right parties are not the same for men and women, and the same occupation (blue-collar work) does not have the same implication for PRR voting for men and women. Indeed, blue-collar women do not react the way men do to what should be the same "vulnerab[ility] to economic competition," which implies that "employment (and unemployment) are gendered experiences" (Ralph-Morrow 2022, 28). Moreover, some attitudinal characteristics that have been associated with PRR voting explain male PRR voting patterns better than the female pattern (de Bruijn and Veenbrink 2012), while demographic characteristics like age or religion have been found to only apply to men (Fontana, Sidler, and Hardmeier 2006, 263). This shows that findings presented as "gender-neutral" are in fact far from it (263), and research is insufficient regarding why women specifically vote for PRR parties.

and Goodman 2021, 144). “Sociocultural professionals” are “mainly women” while men are “over-represented in the manual worker category,” which could at least in part explain why women vote for PRRPs less than men do (Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe 2015, 275). Yet other research undermines the idea that occupational differences may be the driving force behind the radical right gender gap. Using data from France, Denmark, and Austria, Givens (2017) found no support for the hypothesis that occupational structure (gender differences in sector of employment) could explain the RRGG. Research on Canada’s “New Right” similarly found occupation lacking in explanatory power for the gender gap (Gidengil et al. 2005, 1187).

Structural

Some structural explanations have been advanced to explain radical-right voting, the two main ones being education and religion. These same structural explanations have been applied to the explanation of the RRGG: because men and women differ in these structures, the argument goes, they don’t vote for PRR parties to the same extent.

Education is hypothesized to affect PRR voting because of its effect on attitudes and values. Indeed, lower levels of education are associated with greater anti-immigrant attitudes (Perrineau 1997, 111; Givens 2004, 48; Mayer 2013, 169). It has been hypothesized that “humanistic values learned through education” are responsible for this difference (Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002, 125). Education would allow us better to navigate the changes that society goes through, as it provides us with a wider, more complex frame of reference with which to understand society (Mayer 2013, 169). Without this frame, individuals are more susceptible to accept the xenophobic rhetoric of PRRPs, which assigns blame to immigrants (Perrineau 1997, 111). Education is also inextricably linked to the “losers of modernization” thesis: “educated and qualified workers … benefit from globalisation” while less educated workers are more vulnerable to job loss due to outsourcing, automation, or competition from immigrants (Mayer 2013, 162). Education is believed to affect the RRGG because, for a few decades now, women have become on average more educated than men. They represent a majority of university students for example (Vincent-Lancrin 2008, 266; Parker 2021). Confirming this theoretical effect, level of education has indeed been found to affect the radical-right gender gap (Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe 2015, 275). However, it is important to note that the same research that found that education was inversely correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes did not find women to display these attitudes any less than men (Givens 2004, 48), so how exactly higher levels of education among women may lead them to vote less for PRRPs is uncertain.

As for religion, while center-right voting is associated with increased religiosity, radical-right voting is not (Betz 1994). Indeed, radical-right voting is associated with increased secularism in the form of low to no church attendance (Betz 1994, 145; see also Mudde 2007, 115). Because women generally attend church more frequently than men, it has been hypothesized that religiosity could explain the difference in radical-right voting between men and women. While church attendance may increase conservatism (see, e.g., De Vaus and McAllister 1989), it may also offer a protective effect against the xenophobia and anti-immigrant ideology exhibited by PRR parties. As Coffé (2018, 296-297) writes, “Churches in Europe have traditionally condemned the anti-immigrant discourse of the radical right” such that “regular churchgoers are significantly more positive toward immigrants and less likely to support radical right parties compared with those

who do not regularly attend church." However, other research finds no such relationship (see Rippeyoung 2007). Furthermore, the characteristics that made religion incompatible with PRRPs as outlined above may be changing: religious groups are increasingly "ethnocentric" (298) while many PRR parties have set aside secularism to portray themselves as "the safeguards of the 'Judeo-Christian societies' that defend the people from the Islamic threat" (Immerzeel, Jaspers, and Lubbers 2013, 946). Thus, religion's hypothesized protective role against intolerance may no longer hold true, and religion may now in fact promote intolerance and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Attitudinal

On the topic of anti-immigrant attitudes, another strand of scholarship attributes the radical-right gender gap to political attitudes and their differential likelihood in men and women. Indeed, PRR voting has been linked to such political attitudes as opposition to immigration, nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. If such attitudes turned out to be more commonly held by members of one gender rather than the other, they could explain the RRGG. Well into the '90s, the mainstream view held that if women voted less for the populist radical-right parties, it had to be because their attitudes differed from those of men: "the innate mother instinct makes women more caring than men; as victims of (male) oppression themselves, women sympathize with other marginalized groups; women are more social and less competitive (either by nature or nurture), etc." (Mudde 2007, 113). Feminist scholars at the time went so far as to ascribe to women "a certain resistance towards the radical right ideology" (Dobberthien, cited in Mudde 2007, 113).

The political attitude most often attributed to PRR voters is opposition to immigration. As Rippeyoung (2007) writes, "All authors from all streams of research seem to agree that supporters of the far right are anti-immigrant" (384). Opposition to immigration as an explanation of the RRGG is tied to the *Modernisierungsverlierer* thesis presented above. Women are believed to hold less anti-immigrant sentiments than men because they are less likely to work, and if they do work, they are less likely to hold blue-collar jobs; thus, they are less likely to fear for their job security because of immigration or automation, which means that they are also less likely to hold anti-immigrant views (Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe 2015, 266). Unlike the losers of globalization hypothesis, which holds that the feeling of their employment being threatened by immigration leads people to vote for PRRPs, this hypothesis holds that it is the anti-immigrant attitudes that matter—work just happens to be the place where these attitudes are most frequently developed. The hypothesis according to which variations in anti-immigration values causes the RRGG is not borne out by evidence: women are no less likely to hold anti-immigrant views then men (Givens 2004; Gidengil et al. 2005, 1184; Rippeyoung 2007, 392).[9]

A related explanation sometimes proposed for the RRGG is nativism, which has been called "the best predictor of radical right voting" (Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe 2015, 276). Nativism is strongly linked with anti-immigrant attitudes, but it has broader implications.

[9] Allen and Goodman (2021) find that other socially illiberal attitudes such as opposition to gay marriage are more common among men and can predict male support for PRR parties. Women are more likely to support PRR parties that are more tolerant towards gay marriage and that generally display more liberal attitudes; for this reason, the authors conclude that any "right-wing noneconomic attitudes" leading them to vote for such parties are tied to opposition to immigration (145-6). Though it remains an important explanation of PRR voting in general, if the likelihood of opposition to immigration does not differ between genders, it cannot explain the RRGG.

Nativism exists at the confluence of xenophobia and nationalism: “nativism is … an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde 2007, 19). It can be racist or not (19). In *Strangers in the Land*, his seminal work on American nativism, John Higham (1955) wrote that “Nativism … should be defined as intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections. … While drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into a zeal to destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life” (4). Yet nativism in general, like anti-immigrant attitudes specifically, is not the purview of men. Reviewing the literature on nativism as the source of the RRGG, Mudde (2007) concludes that the difference between men and women in terms of nativist attitudes is minimal, “if at all present” (113). Data from certain European countries show men having slightly more nativist attitudes, while data from other European countries show the opposite (113). Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe (2015) did find a gender differential in levels of nativism; however, even when including nativism in their model, the gender gap in radical-right voting remained (275). They concluded that any difference in nativist attitudes between men and women could not explain the radical-right gender gap in voting.

Authoritarianism is another trait often ascribed to PRR voters (Minkenberg 2000, 185). PRR parties often put a “strong emphasis on law and order” (Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe 2015; see also Immerzeel, Lubbers, and Coffé 2016). People who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale are “higher in prejudice and ethnocentrism, more socially conservative, nationalistic, and politically right wing” (Bizumic and Duckitt 2018, 130), traits often associated with PRR parties (Immerzeel, Lubbers, and Coffé 2016). Since these traits are neither pro-social nor favorable to the marginalized, the conventional wisdom regarding women’s attitudes highlighted earlier would predict that women are much less authoritarian than men. Indeed, Gilligan (1982) emphasizes the distinct ways in which men and women approach problems: while men tend towards the “justice approach” based in concerns of fairness, women tend to prefer an “ethic of care” based in relationships and a notion of responsibility (73). She adds that women’s lives are “less violent” because women realize much earlier than men their interdependence with the people around them (172). Howell and Day (2000) reinforced this view: they found that women have more “egalitarian attitudes” that center around “helping others” (871). This is due to their socialization, which teaches them to be “noncompetitive, caregiving, and cooperative” (871). Additionally, according to Gidengil et al. (2005, 1184), men tend to take a “tougher stance” on questions of law and order. Congruent with these findings, Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe (2015) found that men do display more authoritarian attitudes than women. Yet they also found that this difference could not explain the RRGG, as the gap remained present in their model even after controlling for political attitudes (281). Other studies, by contrast, found no gender differences in levels of authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981; Lippa and Arad 1999). Bob Altemeyer, the creator of the RWA (Altemeyer 1981), indicated that “The high end [i.e., most authoritarian] of the RWA scale distribution is filled with women and men equally” (Altemeyer 2004). Some authors even found that women scored *higher* than men on scales of authoritarianism (Brandt and Henry 2012). If women are at least as authoritarian as men if not more, the authoritarian character of PRR parties cannot explain why women vote for them less than men.

Finally, populism is evidently at the core of populist radical-right parties. While the attitudinal explanations assessed above all had to do with the radical right nature of PRR parties, other authors claimed instead that it was the parties' populism that drove women away. Spierings and Zaslove (2017) found "a positive effect of holding more populist attitudes on voting for the PRR" (834). They also found a "modest" gender gap in holding populist attitudes, with men being more likely to hold such views than women (834). If men are more populist than women and being populist leads to voting for PRR parties, it stands to reason that men vote for these parties at a greater rate than women. But the effect they found is very small: the coefficient associated with the respondent's gender decreases by only 9 per cent when a variable for populist attitudes is added to the model (834). Likewise, Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe (2015) hypothesized that populist discourse is "typically masculine and therefore keeps women from voting for" a PRRP (265). Yet they could find no evidence of an effect of populist discourse on women's vote (281).

Societal

An interesting hypothesis regarding the source of the radical-right gender gap stems from the cultural backlash explanation of support for populism. The cultural backlash hypothesis holds that the "silent revolution" from materialist to postmaterialist values that Western countries have witnessed in the last decades has unsettled some segments of the population, namely "the older generation, white men, and [the] less educated" (R. Inglehart and Norris 2016, 3). This value change, said Ignazi (2003, 201), ignited a "silent counter-revolution" driven by "the erosion of traditional social bonds, the perceived collapse of conventional moral standards and sexual mores, and the waning of an ordered, hierarchical, homogeneous, and safe society." Men, especially those, such as manual and blue-collar workers, whose social status was most affected by the value change towards postmaterialist concerns (R. Inglehart and Norris 2016, 3), felt "alienation" and "resentment" (Ignazi 2003, 202). Then, as Ignazi explains, "[t]hese sentiments were transferred politically into the issues of tough law and order, national identity and pride, traditional moral standards, and state enforcement, all of which reflect the need for recasting a symbolic belonging" (202). Men—especially white men—used to be on top of the social hierarchy, and many long for a return to this state of affairs, hence their voting for parties that promote a return to the traditional family, social, and racial structures. Supporting this view, Donovan (2022, 5) found evidence of what he named the "gender threat" hypothesis: men have a greater incentive to vote for PRRPs in countries where there is a greater level of gender equality because they feel that their status in society is under threat (2). Given that many populist radical-right parties promote traditional gender roles (Löffler, Luyt, and Starck 2020) and hold masculine discourses that emphasize the subordination of women (Perrineau 1997; Ralph-Morrow 2022), it stands to reason that they would appeal to "men who are challenged by social equality of women" (Donovan 2022, 2-3; see also Perrineau 1997).

Yet this explanation is unsatisfying. For one, PRRPs do not necessarily hold strictly traditional gender views. Mudde (2007, 93) finds that many PRR parties rather hold "modern traditional" views on gender roles. The modern traditional view holds that the home and the family remain the responsibility of women more than men (93), but women can still work outside the home and find fulfillment in professional endeavours rather than only as housewives and mothers (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). Furthermore, traditional right-wing parties frequently display the same attributes that, according to the cultural backlash hypothesis, should lead men to vote for

PRR parties: they emphasize law and order, want to curtail immigration, and have a nationalist bent (Kruse, Orren, and Angenendt 2003; Bale 2008; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008; Gudbrandsen 2010; Bale 2013; Immerzeel, Lubbers, and Coffé 2016; McKeever 2020). Right-wing parties often being either explicitly religious or allied with religious groups, they also promote conservative and traditional views of social life, especially regarding the traditional nuclear family and its fixed gender roles and hierarchy (Erel 2018; Hennig 2018; Leimgruber 2020; Trappolin 2022). If radical-right and mainstream right-wing parties promote similar values, the cultural backlash thesis cannot adequately explain why men vote for PRRPs so much more than women do.

Another societal factor frequently brought up as a source of the RRGG is the different socialization of men and women. The two main gender differences in socialization advanced to explain the RRGG are political efficacy and political interest. Indeed, it is often argued that women have lower levels of political efficacy (Fraile and de Miguel Moyer 2022; Marshall, Thomas, and Gidengil 2007). This finding remains true even at similar socioeconomic levels and educational backgrounds (Wen, Xiaoming, and George 2013). Because having the sense that one can effect change in the political realm is vital to political participation (Gidengil, Giles, and Thomas 2008), a gender gap in political efficacy will lead to a gender gap in voting. As Bjørklund and Goul Andersen (2002) wrote, "discontented young men are more likely to vote for the radical right, while discontented young women are more likely to abstain from voting." However, other research found no gender difference in political efficacy (Hayes and Bean 1993). Women have also been found to have lower levels of political interest (M. L. Inglehart 1981; Betz 1994; Randall 1987; Coffé 2018). Analyzing European studies, Mudde (2007, 116) concurs that women show lower levels of political interest and, as such, generally prefer to vote for "established parties" (see also Betz 1994). Yet Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van Der Lippe (2015, 268) found no support for the hypothesis that women would increasingly vote for PRR parties as they became more established and lost their "newcomer" status, which undermines the hypothesized link between political efficacy and interest and the RRGG. Likewise, Harteveld et al. (2019) found no evidence for the idea that women were more likely to vote for "larger"—hence, "socially endorsed"—parties.

Newer explanations based in issues of socialization have been advanced in recent years. For example, Oshri et al. (2022) find that women vote for PRR parties less than men because of the risks involved in doing so: there are risks associated with the vote being "lost" if the party cannot make it into parliament because of its fringe status, as well as potential social risks due to the extreme nature of these parties (15). Because women are more risk averse and perceive situations as riskier than men do (8), they are less willing to run these risks and, thus, they vote for PRRPs less (15). Some argue that women's unwillingness to take risks in the political realm stems in fact from their low sense of political efficacy (Fraile and de Miguel Moyer 2022). Men are also said to be less sensitive to social cues, which makes them more likely to vote for fringe parties, even if these parties are heavily stigmatized (Harteveld et al. 2019). Relatedly, women have a "higher prevalence of internal motivation to control prejudice" than men do, which leads women to avoid parties that are too openly prejudiced, for example against migrants, even if they share their xenophobic views (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2018, 369, 381). Though these accounts are compelling, much more research would be needed to ascertain the extent to which any of them can explain the RRGG. Moreover, such issues of socialization may have less explanatory power in the

more egalitarian societies of Scandinavia, though research would be needed to investigate this possibility.

Ideological

A final strand of scholarship ascribes the radical-right gender gap to a hypothesized incompatibility between the populist radical right and women's interests (Betz 1994, 144): PRR parties are masculine—even masculinist—in their discourses, frequently take antifeminist stances, and only pay lip service to gender equality.[10]

Masculinity as defined by Ralph-Morrow (2022, 27; see also de Geus and Ralph-Morrow 2021) involves "the dominance of men over women, and the dominance of some men over other men." Ralph-Morrow identified this trait among PRR parties, whose discourses are masculinist (Kantola and Lombardo 2019) and appeal to people who "wish to feel like men" (Ralph-Morrow 2022, 28; see also Kimmel 2018). Kantola and Lombardo (2019) spoke of "hegemonic masculinity" among both left and right populist parties. The rhetoric of PRR parties displays a "*virilité agressive*" (aggressive virility) that seeks to combat changing gender roles (Perrineau 1997, 150; more on gender roles below). PRRPs embody and promote toxic masculinity among both leadership and rank-and-file: homophobia, acceptance of the harassment of women and minorities, as well as a belief that masculinity is under threat (Daddow and Hertner 2021). Because of this masculine character, PRRPs are presumed much less attractive to the average woman.

PRRPs often take positions on gender issues that are at odds with feminist politics, which seek the empowerment of women (Kantola and Lombardo 2019). For example, many populist radical-right parties resist the notion of gender equality (Norocel 2013; Kantola and Lombardo 2021). Instead, they believe in immutable "natural differences" between men and women (Mudde 2007, 92; see also Rippeyoung 2007, 382). The proper way of life—which is under threat because of feminism and multiculturalism (Keskinen 2013)—is patriarchal, with men as the main breadwinners and heads of households (Rippeyoung 2007, 381; see also Norocel 2013). Even among those PRRPs who do not oppose gender equality, there often remains opposition to positive discrimination and measures that seek to alleviate the existing inequalities between men and women. Being antistatist (Betz 1993, 418; Norris 2005, 146), these parties claim that inequalities are impossible under a system free from government interference (Siim and Mokre 2013); discrimination in employment, for example, is unthinkable because businesses want the best candidates regardless of gender (or race, or ethnicity, etc.) (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007). Still other PRR parties not only do not deny gender inequality but actively support measures to address it. Yet this does not mean that these parties are feminist; rather, they instrumentalize gender equality in their fight against Islam, in an attempt to vilify it (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Akkerman 2015; de Lange and Mügge 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015b; Coffé 2018; Daddow and Hertner 2021). By supporting values like gender equality, PRRPs can paint Islam as a "fundamental threat" to "liberal democratic values" (de Lange and Mügge 2015, 64). Therefore,

[10] Though this scholarship relies on some of the same observations identified in the cultural backlash hypothesis above, the dynamic is reversed: while the cultural backlash hypothesis seeks to explain why men may be driven to vote for PRRPs, the hypothesis around women's interests seeks instead to explain what drives women *not* to vote for these parties.

whether PRRPs believe in gender inequality or not, and whether they support measures to promote gender equality or not, they are not acting in the optic of furthering women's interests.

Another issue regarding which PRRPs oppose feminist views is gender roles. As mentioned earlier, many PRR parties explicitly oppose modern gender roles (Spierings and Zaslove 2015b; Coffé 2018; Kantola and Lombardo 2019). They believe that women should stay home lest they take a man's job (Venner 1993, 46); besides, they need to stay home to raise their family (Rippeyoung 2007, 382). Though PRR parties in certain countries support women wanting to work and find fulfillment outside the home, they maintain that children and making a home for the family remain the woman's purview, not the man's (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). This view of women as first and foremost mothers is intimately tied to PRRPs' nationalist and ethnocentrist idea of the nation: in order to protect the "purity" (read: whiteness, as explained by Keskinen 2013) of the nation and avoid being overtaken by ethnic minorities, white natives must increase their birth rate (Mostov 2021; see also Rippeyoung 2007); women, as the sole source of births, must be "protected" (Mudde 2007, 92), from both immigrant men and feminist ideology (Keskinen 2013; Kantola and Lombardo 2019). Women must raise the right type of child (white) with the right type of values (Western, traditional) and with the right partner (nonimmigrant) (Norocel 2013). Women's bodies become an "object of control" (Mostov 2021, 2). Furthermore, the appeal to a unique, racially homogeneous "people" obscures the discrimination women face (Caravantes 2021). Thus, because of their views on gender roles and their stance on gender issues more generally, PRRPs are often considered incompatible with women's interests.

The issue with this hypothesis that the values and policies of PRRPs are simply irreconcilable with women's interests is that it rests on the erroneous assumption that all women hold feminist values. In fact, any political analysis based on "women's interest" must contend with its inherent variety, from liberal to conservative and from feminist to antifeminist (Celis and Childs 2012; see also Schreiber 2002). Indeed, women have been the "backbone" of traditional, conservative parties in Europe since the Second World War (Mudde 2007, 114; see also Givens 2004). Such parties, though not as extreme as PRR parties, generally promote traditional views of gender and gender roles, as we saw in the previous section. Women voters who support them thus either agree with these views or do not consider such issues sufficiently salient to affect their vote; either way, it implies that antifeminist views on the part of PRR parties are not necessarily a dealbreaker for many women. As Mudde (2007, 114) points out, the antifeminist rhetoric espoused by these parties is most likely to repel left-wing women who already had no ideological kinship with PRRPs. But PRR parties could still be said to represent women's concerns, insofar as we admit that some women hold "gender-traditional and anti-feminist" views of their interests (Spierings and Zaslove 2017, 839). As Gwiazda (2021, 591) writes, "Women's substantive representation is not exclusively feminist" (see also Celis and Childs 2012; Spierings et al. 2015; Schreiber 2016). Many women oppose modern, feminist gender roles. Some, for example, "oppose abortion to defend the social status, lifestyle, and worldviews of mothers and homemakers," as they perceive traditional gender roles to be threatened by women's emancipation, especially the right to abortion (Blee 1996, 683). In fact, a new view of gender roles dubbed "egalitarian essentialism" combines aspects of feminism—especially as pertain to the workplace—with traditional gender roles in the home, where motherhood is central to the woman's role (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011). Thus, the hypothesis that women do not vote for PRR parties because that would be voting against their own interests rests on a faulty assumption and cannot

adequately explain the RRGG. One thing that could, however, explain the RRGG is representation, as we will argue in the next section.

The disappearance of the radical-right gender gap in France

In 2015, Nonna Mayer (2015) discovered that the radical-right gender gap had disappeared with respect to the *Front national*. Interestingly, it had disappeared in the transition from the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen to that of his daughter, Marine Le Pen. Mayer investigated the cause of the disappearance of the gap. She evaluated the role of age, level of education, occupation, religion (as well as religiosity in the case of Catholics, the dominant religious group in France), left-right political self-placement, sympathy for Marine Le Pen, as well as three cultural attitudes, namely, cultural liberalism, ethnocentrism, and anti-EU sentiment.

Though many of these are the same explanations usually provided for the *existence* of the RRGG, Mayer hypothesized that they could explain its disappearance: she argued that the very factors that had brought about the RRGG in earlier years were no longer as prominent as they had once been, "because of changes on the supply side as well as on the demand side of French electoral politics, in a context of economic crisis and political disaffection" (397)—hence the RRGG's disappearance. For instance, Mayer hypothesized that occupation could make women just as likely as men to vote for the *Front national*, because though women were underrepresented in manual occupations, they were overrepresented in low-skilled service work, which can be just as precarious (if not more) as blue-collar work (Hypothesis 1). Mayer even talked of a "service proletariat" (397). The service sector is also an important sector for the employment of immigrants, so any feeling of threat from immigrants in blue-collar work would be likely to exist in service work as well.

In the case of religion, Mayer reversed the usual hypothesis: she had found in previous research that religion no longer had the protective effect against intolerance that it used to (Mayer and Michelat 2007, 135). Quite the opposite: intolerance "rose with the level of religious practice" (Mayer 2015, 399) and Catholics were found to be more ethnocentric than others for the first time (Mayer and Michelat 2007, 135). Thus, Mayer's second hypothesis (2015, 402) stated that "[r]eligion in a context of rising anti-Islam intolerance protects less than before against far right anti-immigrant ideas."

Mayer (2015, 402) chose to look at sympathy for Marine Le Pen as well the three cultural attitudes in order to assess two further hypotheses: that "Marine Le Pen appears more women-friendly than her father" (Hypothesis 3) and that "[h]er strategy of normalization makes the party look less extreme, and more socially acceptable" (Hypothesis 4). Mayer called these hypotheses the "Marine Le Pen effect" (403). As Marine Le Pen tried to promote a less extreme image than her father, Mayer suspected that liberal attitudes around the role of women as mothers and the right of gay and lesbian couples to adopt may explain why women had suddenly started voting for the FN as much as men did. She also tested for ethnocentrism and anti-EU sentiment as these are more traditional drivers of the radical-right populist vote, and by testing them separately for men and women, she could assess the role these factors played in the increased female vote.

Mayer found no support for hypotheses 3 and 4. The scale of cultural liberalism was not a statistically significant predictor of the Le Pen vote. This suggests that Marine Le Pen's support of more progressive, sometimes even feminist ideas is not what drove women to vote for her. Rather, Mayer found that rejection of the European Union was a primary driver for women, while left-right ideology was significant for men. Left-right ideology did not play the same role for women: half of women who self-situated at the extreme right did not dare vote for the FN, whereas almost 80 per cent of men in that position did. Sympathy for Marine Le Pen was also highly significant for both, so much so that when women held anti-EU views and had a high level of sympathy for Marine Le Pen, the radical-right gender gap reversed itself and women were slightly more likely than men to vote for the FN. Mayer concluded that "the personality of the new FN's leader made the difference" in making women vote for the party (405).

Mayer concluded that Marine Le Pen's personality was responsible for the women's vote since her more progressive, women-friendly views could not account for the change. We suggest that Mayer ignored another potential factor: Marine Le Pen's gender itself. Perhaps women with an existing ideological affinity for the radical right finally felt represented by a woman leader and chose to vote for the FN because of it. This hypothesis is grounded in the extensive literature on descriptive representation as a driver of voting behavior, which we will now turn to.

Descriptive representation and voting behavior

Representation is said to influence voting for one of two reasons: descriptively or substantively. The former holds that by simple virtue of seeing yourself represented in a political actor, you are more likely to vote for them. This is the descriptive representation hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that women are more likely to vote for women candidates, BIPOC[11] are more likely to vote for candidates who are also BIPOC, etc. As explained by Hanna Pitkin in her seminal work *The Concept of Representation* (1967, 61), "representing [descriptively] is not acting with authority, or acting before being held to account, or any kind of acting at all. Rather, it depends on the representative's characteristics, what he *is* or is *like*, on being something rather than doing something. The representative does not act for others; he 'stands for' them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a resemblance or reflection" (emphasis in original). Being able to identify with a candidate makes you feel seen and heard (63), which would lead to increased support for said candidate. Descriptive representation is akin to a mirror (82): you see yourself reflected in the candidate, and as such, you expect the candidate to act like you would, i.e., to share your concerns and values. The assumption is that because a candidate belongs to the same social group that you do, they will better understand and represent your group's interests. And indeed, the logic of descriptive representation is borne out by evidence: for example, a survey conducted in Oklahoma found that "most women indicated that a female candidate would be 'somewhat' or 'much more' likely to win their vote and share the same concerns on issues" (Rosenthal 1995, 605). The study found gender to be a "significant predictor" of the preference for a woman candidate (605). Newman (1996, 12) similarly found that women were "slightly more likely" than men to vote for a woman.

[11] Black, Indigenous, and other people of color.

Descriptive representation stands in contrast to substantive representation, whereby a candidate's belonging to a specific group does not matter; what matters is that they share your values and can represent your interests. As per Pitkin, "representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them. … He [the representative] must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest" (209-10).

Another point to consider is that, rather than a candidate's gender helping her garner more support among women, it may by the same logic reduce her support among male voters. It is a common misconception that "solely women" are "gendered beings," but it is important to consider that gendered socialization and a gendered experience of the world are very much present in men as well. In the present context, this means that a reduction in the gender gap may arise from men being less likely to vote for women candidates (Newman 1996). Interestingly, Mo (2015) argued that a lot of the existing research on gender bias in voting may underestimate the extent to which men may be reluctant to vote for women candidates due to studies' reliance on explicit bias. Mo found that implicit as well as explicit gender biases play a role in voting for women candidates, and the type of bias present affects how men and women respond to information regarding the competence of the candidate. Kahn (1992, 497) found that "[m]ale and female candidates are covered differently in the news and these differences often produce negative assessments of women candidates." In addition, Sigelman and Sigelman (1982) found the existence of a "pro-white male bias among white males" as well as an "*anti*-female bias" among this same group (266, emphasis in original). Indeed, it would be erroneous to focus strictly on women's propensity to vote for candidates of the same gender; the preference for descriptive representation is highly likely to exist in men as well. This is known more widely as the gender affinity effect: women tend to vote for other women while men tend to vote for other men. The evidence of a gender affinity effect in vote choice is mixed. Whereas Sigelman and Sigelman (1982) found evidence of a gender affinity effect among both men and women, in addition to an anti-female bias among men, Badas and Stauffer (2019) found evidence of a gender affinity effect only in nonpartisan judicial elections races.[12] Erkel (2019), for his part, found that women vote for women, but men don't vote for men; if anything, some men may be more inclined to vote for women for "symbolic" reasons because they feel that women are underrepresented (84).

There is an obvious caveat to the descriptive representation hypothesis: it is not generally believed to supersede left-right ideological placement. For example, a conservative woman is likely to prefer a woman conservative candidate to a man candidate of the same party, but she is unlikely to prefer a left-wing woman candidate to a conservative man. She simply has no reason to believe that the left-wing woman sees women's interests the same way she does; as we explained above, what women themselves perceive as women's interests can vary with ideology. As mentioned above, Badas and Stauffer's study (2019) led them to conclude that women vote for women and men for men only in races that are nonpartisan; otherwise, the partisan effect is too great. In her famous study of descriptive representation and its role in electing women candidate,

[12] This highlights one potential issue that could explain the mixed results obtained so far regarding descriptive representation and the gender affinity effect: much of the research has been done in the US, where partisanship is extremely strong. More research on descriptive representation in less-partisan countries—Canada, European countries, Australia, etc.—is imperative.

Kathleen Dolan (2018, 160) found that the "impact [of descriptive representation] is small compared to more traditional political influences, such as political party and incumbency." The impact does exist, however: indeed, survey data based on a fictitious presidential election with a woman candidate[13] shows that sex is statistically significant—i.e., women vote for women more—and that its significance had been increasing from the 1970s to the early 2000s at the time the book was originally published[14] (96).

But why should descriptive representation matter in vote choice? On the part of voters, it matters as a useful heuristic; and as per political scientists, it matters due to its potential impact on policy outcomes through critical mass theory. Indeed, voters use descriptive representation as a heuristic device to determine the types of policies that a certain MP or party is likely to promote: women will be presumed to promote women-friendly policies, BIPOC candidates will be presumed to pursue affirmative action and other anti-racist policies, and so on. In the same vein, white men who vote for white men subconsciously know that such candidates have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, in which white men benefit from an elevated status compared to women and BIPOC.

Yet a single woman candidate would likely be unable to effect legislative change in favor of women's interests. This is where critical mass theory comes in. Critical mass theory holds that in order for women to be able to enact change within a legislature, their number needs to reach a certain level, a critical threshold usually set at 30 per cent (Dahlerup 2006, 514). The first foundational text of critical mass theory is Rosabeth Moss Kanter's work on tokenism in corporations. Kanter (1977) found that when there are too few women in a group, their efficacy as well as their sense of belonging are hindered by their tokenism: they face "performance pressures" as representatives of their minority group (972); they are either isolated as outsiders or become insiders as "women-prejudiced-against-women" (980); or they must conform to some female stereotype such as that of mother or "seductress" (981). Kanter found, however, that once women reached a certain level of representation within the corporation, they were able to form coalitions and could even influence the group's culture (966).

Working from these insights, critical mass theory hypothesized that a critical mass of female legislators would be able to form a coalition, which would be better able to pursue women's issues and interests than token female legislators. In 1988, Drude Dahlerup set out to analyze the role of women in Scandinavian politics. Dahlerup (1988) sought to apply the insights of critical mass theory to the specific case of Scandinavian female politicians, who had by then already reached the supposed critical mass of 30 per cent representation. Dahlerup found that the concept of critical mass was slightly inaccurate: an increased proportion of women within these legislatures did lead to changes in social conventions and political culture as well as the introduction of women-friendly policies, but there was no support for the idea of 30 per cent as a specific threshold beyond which women suddenly became more effective in their pursuit of women's interests. Critical mass theory also set aside the other consequence of increased female presence that Kanter had highlighted (Childs and Krook 2006, 523), namely, that women can then become differentiated and no longer have to stand in for the group (Kanter 1977, 966); this individualization means that each woman legislator potentially feels less burdened to represent women's interests generally and

[13] Question phrasing: "If your party nominated a woman for President ..."
[14] The book was first published in 2004.

may strive to achieve personal goals instead. Following this insight, we adopt here the view proposed by Grey (2006) according to which "critical mass is only useful if we discard the belief that a single proportion holds the key to all representation needs of women and if we discard notions that numbers alone bring about substantive changes in policy processes and outcomes" (492). From this standpoint, a single woman—in this case, the leader—has the potential to better represent women's interest.

Evidence supporting the descriptive representation hypothesis

Much of the research on the impact of descriptive representation on voting behavior was conducted in the United States (Campbell and Heath 2017) and found mixed results. Dolan (1998) found that women were more likely to vote for a woman candidate in House races but not in Senate races. King and Matland (2003) found that Republican women were less likely to vote for a woman candidate, but the inverse was true for Democratic and Independent women. By contrast, Brians (2005) found support for the idea that women are more likely to support a woman candidate, though Republican women were more likely to cross party lines to do so than either Democratic or Independent women. Stambough and O'Regan (2003) likewise found that only Republican women responded to female descriptive representation in their vote choice. Working from a sample of Ohio residents, Sanbonmatsu (2002) found that women are more likely to vote for women candidates. She also found that "gender stereotypes about candidate traits" could help or hurt women's chances when running for office: women candidates were often assumed to share the survey respondent's beliefs about abortion, but many respondents also expressed the belief that men are more suited for office emotionally. Finally, Sigelman and Sigelman (1982) found a "pro-female bias among women" undergraduate students at the University of Kentucky.

There has been little to no research conducted in Europe so far on the topic.[15] In one study examining the case of Britain, Campbell and Heath (2017) found that women who care about descriptive representation are indeed more likely to vote for women candidates than women who are not concerned with descriptive representation. In a study conducted in Finland, the researchers found that men had a pro-male bias when choosing for which candidate to vote on an open list, while women were equally likely to choose a man or a woman (Giger et al. 2014). Most other research found on the topic of gender-focused representation in Europe dealt either with its impact on policy or its role in increasing women's participation in politics rather than with its direct impact on voting for a woman candidate, which adds to the current research's importance in examining descriptive representation in Norway and Denmark, where such research is scarce.

[15] At least in English—it is possible that some research was published in other languages and therefore does not show up in searches and is not referenced in articles on the topic written in English.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

As we saw, Mayer (2015) found that sympathy for Marine Le Pen was a significant predictor of the FN vote. She hypothesized that this was due to Le Pen being "women-friendly" (402) and her strategy of "*dédiabolisation*"[16] (401). But what if it was not about her being "women-*friendly*," but rather about her being a *woman herself* that drove this change? Through the present research, we are thus attempting to answer the following question: *Does the leader's gender affect the size of the radical-right gender gap?* Mayer failed to account for the role of leader gender in the disappearance of the RRGG in the *Front national* vote in the 2012 presidential election. Yet this is a plausible causal mechanism for the change given what we know about the role of descriptive representation.

With a focus on a single country, Mayer simply did not have the comparative basis necessary to assess whether women leaders inherently attract a greater proportion of the female vote. The present research thus seeks to fill this gap by replicating Mayer's study in Denmark and Norway, two countries where women have led populist radical-right parties, in order to evaluate the role of gender representation in explaining the vote for populist parties. And there is reason to believe that substantive representation matters for the populist radical right: a recent article by Catalano Weeks et al. (2023, 421) found that PRRPs "struggling with large gender gaps" do in fact increase their proportion of female MPs in order to attract women voters.

Based on the aforementioned concept of representation and the literature presented above, we formulated the following hypotheses in order to answer our research question:

> *H_1:* The radical-right gender gap disappeared in Norway and/or Denmark when a woman was leader of the populist radical-right party.
>
> > *$H_{1.1}$:* The radical-right gender gap disappeared in Norway and/or Denmark under a woman leader because women voted for the party in greater numbers.
> >
> > *$H_{1.2}$:* The radical-right gender gap disappeared in Norway and/or Denmark under a woman leader because men became less inclined to vote for the party.
>
> *H_2:* The radical-right gender gap was reduced in Norway and/or Denmark under female leadership of a PRR party, but it did not disappear fully.
>
> > *$H_{2.1}$:* The radical-right gender gap was reduced in Norway and/or Denmark under a woman leader because women voted for the party in greater numbers.
> >
> > *$H_{2.2}$:* The radical-right gender gap was reduced in Norway and/or Denmark under a woman leader because men became less inclined to vote for the party.

The proposed research will contribute to our understanding of the populist vote regardless of the result obtained. If women are indeed found more inclined to vote for populist radical right parties when they are led by women, it can reframe our understanding of PRR voting as perhaps not as ideologically driven as is usually assumed. It would also open up new avenues for research in terms of the importance of descriptive representation and their potential enabling role in populist radical-right voting. If, on the other hand, women are not found to be more likely to vote for a PRR party when its leader is a woman, it can help focus research on other factors that may affect the

[16] "Un-demonization"

RRGG, such as those presented by Mayer (employment, religiosity, leadership personality, etc.). Thus, this research is exploratory and, as such, will contribute to pointing future research in one direction or another. It will also contribute to the currently minimal literature on the importance of gender in descriptive representation in Europe.

The question of the role of leader gender in the size of the radical-right gender gap matters for many reasons. As mentioned above, as it investigates the dynamics of PRRP voting, it will help point research towards specific avenues of research, whether that be the role of representation or not. More importantly, we aim to emphasize the need for gender-differentiated research as well as contribute to it. Much political science research works from the assumption that what is true for men is also true for women. As per the title of Dr. Nieca Goldberg's ground-breaking book on heart disease in women and why it is so often overlooked, "Women Are Not Small Men." Just like the biology of men and women are different, their socialization and experience of the world likewise differ greatly. It is time we stopped assuming that what drives social processes such as voting in men can automatically be extended to women.

It is also important to explain why we chose to look at populist radical-right parties only rather than broadening our scope to look at all right-wing parties for example. Indeed, many authors consider that there exists nowadays a gender gap wherein women vote for left-wing parties more than men do (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Bergh 2007; Giger 2009; Koeppl-Turyna 2021). This is the modern gender gap, which stands in opposition to the traditional gender gap, wherein women voted for right-wing parties more than men did. As per the "gender-generation gap" theory initially advanced by Pippa Norris (1999), the switch from the traditional gender gap to the modern gender gap is believed to have occurred around the 1980s. This literature is not uncontested, however; many articles find that men and women don't actually differ much ideologically, if at all (Jelen, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994; Norrander and Wilcox 2008). In fact, some countries display no true gender gap in vote choice at all: such is the case in Britain (Campbell 2006). Moreover, the gender gap in vote choice, where it exists, can vary in size significantly from one country to the next (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014; Dassonneville 2021). This murky picture stands in stark contrast to PRRPs, for whom a gender gap has always existed historically, as Betz argued already in 1994: "… radical right-wing populist parties have consistently attracted a considerably higher number of male than female voters." Recent research also suggests that there are certain specificities when it comes to PRRPs and gender: Catalano Weeks et al. (2023) found that PRRPs—but not their right-wing counterparts—increase their number of women MPs when they face a significant gender gap, which suggests that PRRPs themselves believe that female representation matters for their electorate. Ultimately, we are investigating whether the strategy of putting a female leader at the helm of a PRRP works in attracting a greater proportion of the female vote to these parties. Whether this insight applies to other types of parties could be investigated in future research.

CASE SELECTION

Why Norway and Denmark

The choice of Norway and Denmark as comparisons for the French case presented by Mayer is based on concrete considerations: they are all countries in which a populist radical-right party is led or has been led by a woman. Historically, women leaders of PRRPs have been rare, as the parties tend to be masculinist by nature (Ralph-Morrow 2022). However, an increasing number of women have found their way to the leadership of these parties in recent years across Western Europe. Finland currently has a woman leader of a populist radical-right party: Riikka Purra is at the head of the *Perussuomalaiset* (Finns Party). However, she only became leader in 2021 and has not yet faced an election in her new status as leader of the party. Similarly, a new radical-right party has recently come on the scene in Denmark: the *Nye Borgerlige* or New Right. It was founded and led until February 2023 by a woman, Pernille Vermund. Because the party only just fell under male leadership and has not since faced an election, there is no data yet regarding the female vote for the party under a male leader, and the party can thus not be included in the analysis. In Southern Europe, Giorgia Meloni is the leader of the *Fratelli d'Italia* (Brothers of Italy) party and current prime minister of the country. Her party is on the far right and has possible ties to fascism (Kirby 2022). However, whether the party qualifies as radical right or extreme right is debatable (Speak 2022). Furthermore, we chose to set aside the case of the *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany, which has had a woman at its helm more than once, due to its co-leadership situation: indeed, women have always been co-leaders of the party with men, such that a vote for the AfD did not necessarily represent a vote for a woman leader. The Norwegian FrP and Danish FR are, by contrast, long-established, clear examples of PRRPs with straightforward leadership structures and which have had both men and women lead the party and face elections.

Norway and Denmark also represent similar cases to France given their geographical proximity and shared European culture. Furthermore, Marine Le Pen, Siv Jensen, and Pia Kjærsgaard are often compared in analyses of female leadership of PRR parties (see, e.g., Meret 2015; Meret, Siim, and Pingaud 2016; Campus 2020; Löffler, Luyt, and Starck 2020). The present research thus falls within this existing analytical framework of women leaders of populist radical-right parties. But are the *Fremskrittspartiet* and *Dansk Folkeparti* true examples of populist radical-right parties? That is the question we turn to below.

Norway

Our first case is that of the Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party, FrP). The FrP was led by a woman, Siv Jensen, from 2006 to 2021 after Carl I. Hagen stepped down. The CSES dataset, which is used in this research, covers the Norwegian parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2009, which are, respectively, the last election with Hagen at the helm of the FrP and the first with Jensen. As such, the Norwegian FrP is an ideal case for comparing male and female leadership and their effect on female voters.

Which parties can rightfully be qualified as PRRPs is the subject of fraught debate (Mudde 2007, 32-3). In order to confirm that the *Fremskrittspartiet* belongs in this category, we will proceed in two steps: first, we will determine whether the FrP fits the definition of the PRR

established earlier; then, we will use CSES data to show that the FrP is perceived by experts as a populist radical-right party.

From a qualitative perspective, the *Fremskrittspartiet* fits the definition of PRRPs that we proposed in the previous section. The FrP is widely recognized as a populist party (see, e.g., Anderson 1996; Hagelund 2003; Mudde 2007; Allern 2013; Bjerkem 2016; Jupskås 2016). We follow an established strand of scholarship in considering the *Fremskrittspartiet* a radical-right party (see, e.g., Betz 1993; Kitschelt and McGann 1996; Kestilä and Söderlund 2007; Spierings et al. 2015; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2016). It is sometimes not considered as nativist or authoritarian as other parties of the family (Mudde 2007) because of the different factions that compose the FrP: libertarians, nationalists, Christian-conservatives, and authoritarian social democrats (Jupskås 2016, 160-1). However, we argue that nativism is indeed a core feature of the party, owing to the fact that "[a]nti-immigration is … the most important issue for its candidates and voters" (161). Moreover, an expert survey revealed that the FrP is as nativist as the other parties that usually fall under the PRR umbrella (Van Spanje et al. 2006, cited in Art 2011, 25-6). As for authoritarianism, the presence of an authoritarian subgroup that represents over a quarter of all party members (26 per cent) evidences a strong authoritarian bent in the party (161). Furthermore, the former vice leader of the party, Per Sandberg, was "seen as the main representative of the authoritarian social democrats and the nationalists" (161), highlighting the centrality of both nativism and authoritarianism within the party. Thus, we can conclude that the *Fremskrittspartiet* is indeed a populist radical-right party, and having had a woman leader, it is an appropriate case for our investigation.

The CSES data likewise allow us to categorize the FrP as a populist radical-right party. The researchers who conducted the Norway portion of the CSES already highlight the populist nature of the FrP in the codebook ("CSES MODULE 3 FULL RELEASE [Dataset and Documentation]" 2015). As for its left-right ideological positioning, we used variables included in the dataset, which we split by election-year. For the year 2005, on a left-right scale[17] in which 0 is "Left" and 10 is "Right," the survey experts gave the party an 8, making it right-wing, though not extremely so.[18] For the year 2009, survey collaborators still ranked the FrP at an 8 on the 0-10 left-right scale. Based on the above assessment, we can thus categorize the *Fremskrittspartiet* as a populist radical-right party.

Denmark

The second case is that of the *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish People's Party, DF). It was founded in 1995 by Pia Kjærsgaard and Kristian Thulesen Dahl. Kjærsgaard, a woman, was elected as the party's first chairman and led the DF until her resignation in 2012, at which point Thulesen Dahl, a man, took over. The CSES dataset Module 3 covers the Danish election of 2007, while

[17] Question Q6a in the codebook; variable C5017_B in the dataset.

[18] In the absence of a specific radicalism variable, we use the far end of the left-right scale as a proxy for radical right. As explained in the previous section, the term radical right refers to an ideological positioning on the far right, as opposed to an *extreme* right ideology, which is by nature anti-constitutional and anti-system. We simply need to ascertain that the parties are positioned at the far end of the scale on the right, and not whether they oppose the system; thus, this operationalization is adequate.

Module 5 covers that of 2019.[19] This will allow us to compare DF female support under female and male leadership. In order to ascertain the *Dansk Folkerparti*'s belonging in the PRRP category, we will proceed with the same two steps used in the case of the FrP.

We can draw the same conclusion from qualitative data based on the aforementioned three core features of PRRPs, namely, populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. The party is often explicitly referred to as a populist party, as in Pedersen's (2006) article "Driving a Populist Party: The Danish People's Party." The nativism of the *Dansk Folkeparti* is also clear: the party is "nationalistic and anti-immigration" according to Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen (2012). As for its authoritarianism, there is little doubt: the DF combines "EU-scepticism with an authoritarian position on the socio-cultural dimension" (Rydgren 2004, 488) while Meret (2010, 39) assigns the success of the DF to a switch from libertarian and post-materialist values to an authoritarian agenda. Literature on PRRPs confirms our analysis. The DF is "unequivocally populist radical right" according to Mudde (2007, 43). Inglehart and Norris (2017), two of the foremost scholars of PRRPs, describe the DF as both populist and authoritarian.Other authors likewise affirm the party's nature as a PRRP (see, e.g., Arter 2010; Rydgren 2010; Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2016). Though the DF has participated in coalition governments, it has "maintained radical sociocultural core positions" (Christiansen 2016, 98). We can therefore conclude that the *Dansk Folkeparti* is an appropriate case of a PRRP that has had a woman leader.

In terms of CSES data, we can see that the *Dansk Folkeparti* is perceived as a populist radical-right party. In 2007, the CSES collaborators assigned the party a score of 9 on the 0-10 left-right scale mentioned earlier.[20] A change occurs by the 2019 election, however: in Module 5 of the CSES, for the question on the party's position on the left-right scale,[21] the experts assign the DF a score of 10, which means that they perceived the party move further towards the right during those 12 years. Considering this expert assessment, we can consider the DF a radical right-wing party.

There is no mention of the populism of the DF or lack thereof in Module 3 of the CSES; however, a populism scale appears in Module 5. The Danish CSES collaborators gave the party a score of 9 on this 0-10 scale where 0 is "Not at all populist" and 10 is "Very populist."[22] From an expert perception perspective, we can therefore categorize the *Dansk Folkeparti* as a populist radical-right party.

[19] The CSES dataset does not cover the intervening elections, which took place in 2011 and 2015. The survey was not conducted in Denmark during the compilation of Module 4, which covers the years 2011 to 2016.
[20] Question Q6a in the codebook; variable C5017_C in the dataset.
[21] Question M06a1 in the codebook; variable E5018_C in the dataset.
[22] Question M06c in the codebook; variable E5020_C in the dataset.

METHODOLOGY

Our approach

The present research will feature a quantitative analysis based on binomial and multinomial logistic regressions. We will first reproduce Mayer's model as closely as possible and apply it to Norway and Denmark. We will then improve on Mayer by altering some elements of the model. (Our exact methodology is explained below.) We will also merge our individual country-year data into a combined dataset in order to assess variation across time. This is not something Mayer needed to do in order to answer the question of whether the RRGG remained or disappeared, but as we want to move into an explanation over time (the change from one leader to another), combined datasets are necessary for the creation of an interaction variable that will allow us to produce a reliable answer.

Quantitative analysis

Datasets

The datasets chosen for this research are from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project. We used Modules 3 and 5 of the CSES. Remember that the goal is to study the difference—or lack thereof—in the gender gap in voting for radical right parties. As such, we must conduct our regressions on two datasets for each country: one dataset dating to an election where the leader of the radical-right party was a woman, and one for an election under male leadership. This means four elections to assess in total (two in each country).

In the case of Denmark, the *Dansk Folkeparti* was under female leadership from its inception in 1995 until 2012 when Pia Kjærsgaard stepped down and was replaced by Kristian Thulesen Dahl. We must therefore evaluate the gender gap in voting for the DF before and after 2012. We thus used Modules 3 and 5 of the CSES. Module 3 covered the 2007 Danish general election while Module 5 covered that of 2019.[23] During the 2007 election, the *Dansk Folkeparti* was under the female leadership of Kjærsgaard while the 2019 election saw the DF under the male leadership of Dahl, which will allow us to assess the hypothesized difference in the radical-right gender gap under male and female leaders.

We used the same methodology for the Norwegian case. The Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet* was under the female leadership of Siv Jensen from 2006 to 2021. We must therefore assess the difference in radical-right gender gap in voting for the FrP before and after 2006. We used Module 3 of the CSES, in which the 2005 and 2009 Norwegian federal elections were recorded. The 2005 election predates Siv Jensen's leadership; at the time, Carl I. Hagen was party leader. Comparing the 2005 election under Hagen with the 2009 election under Jensen thus allows us to compare the radical-right gender gap in Norway under male (Hagen) and female (Jensen) leadership of the PRRP.

[23] There is a wide gap (12 years) between the two elections. The CSES was not conducted in Denmark for any of the intervening elections. We could therefore not assess elections that were any closer in time.

Table 1: Leader gender by election year in Norway and Denmark

Country	Party	Election year	Leader gender
Norway	*Fremskrittspartiet*	2005	Man leader
		2009	Woman leader
Denmark	*Dansk Folkeparti*	2007	Woman leader
		2019	Man leader

We chose the CSES dataset for this research as its surveys are electoral studies conducted at election time in each country. Other datasets such as the European Social Survey (ESS) require respondents to recall their vote from the last election, which can have happened months or years prior to the survey. As such, these datasets come "with the risk of giving a distorted image of the respondent's electoral behaviour" (Mayer 2015, 394).

We initially use individual country-years from the CSES datasets in order to reproduce Mayer's models. As we moved to our multinomial regressions, however, we combined the two years for each country together, such that we obtained one combined dataset for Norway covering two elections and another for Denmark, also covering two elections. For Norway, no manipulation was necessary as both elections already belonged to the same CSES dataset (Module 3). For Denmark however, one election was in Module 3 of the CSES while the other was in Module 5. We thus manually merged the two country-years into a combined dataset.

Quantitative methodology

Mayer uses binomial logistics regressions to assess the existence of the gender gap in France under Marine Le Pen and her father. Her outcome measure is a dichotomous variable reflecting the vote for the FN v. the vote for all other parties. This is limiting, as it lumps together all other parties as if they were virtually the same. Indeed, assessing votes for the PRRP vs. all others presupposes a commonality to all the other parties, or a significant specificity of the PRRP that allows all other votes to be lumped together. But that is far from accurate: though PRRPs are distinct from other parties in the specific ways mentioned in the definitions section that earn them the label of populist radical-right parties, they are still political parties that function within the same system as others and promote policy platforms that do not necessarily diverge that greatly from other right-wing parties. As for the other parties, it is a significant stretch to group together parties ranging from the conservative right to the socialist left, as if they were somehow more similar to each other than the PRRPs are to any of them. For this reason, a multinomial logistic regression that accounts for the votes of all parties is much more reflective of reality. Thus, we will create binomial models that accurately replicate Mayer's methodology but also multinomial models that offer a more accurate portrait of the situation.

Moreover, we believe that the sympathy variable included by Mayer is over-control. Indeed, how much one likes a specific leader is often highly correlated to one's choice to vote for the party or not: we are unlikely to vote for a party whose leader we hate, and we are also more likely to see a leader positively if we agree from the get-go with what their party stands for. As

such, we decided to exclude this variable from our improved models. We kept the variable "Sympathy for the leader" in the binomial models because it is the one that reproduces Mayer, but it was dropped for the multinomial models.

Data accuracy and weighting

For the case of the 2005 Norwegian election, the CSES reports 310 votes for the *Fremskrittspartiet* out of 1,661 in 2005. That represents a proportion of 18.7 per cent of votes. However, official data from Statistics Norway reports a proportion of 22.1 per cent of valid votes cast for the FrP ("08092: Storting Election. Valid Votes, by Political Parties, Contents and Every 4th Year. Statbank Norway" n.d.). This discrepancy is not due to improper weighting of data, as the 2005 Norwegian survey is considered "self-weighting"[24] ("CSES MODULE 3 FULL RELEASE [Dataset and Documentation]" 2015). Rather, it is most likely the result of conservative underreporting due to social desirability bias. Indeed, Allen L. Edwards (1954) showed that survey respondents will overstate their endorsement of socially desirable personality traits. Social desirability bias has been shown to lead to underreporting of conservative attitudes (Krysan 1998; Janus 2010) and votes (Stout, Baker, and Baker 2021; Brown-Iannuzzi, Najle, and Gervais 2019). This phenomenon is thought to explain at least in part the failure of public opinion polls to predict Donald Trump's victory in 2016, for example, as a Trump vote was often perceived as "socially undesirable" (Klar, Weber, and Krupnikov 2016; see also Brownback and Novotny 2018). A certain amount of deviation from reported outcomes is thus to be expected.

The 2009 Norwegian election data presents the same issue: 297 respondents indicated having voted for the FrP out of 1,541 total reported votes. This represents a proportion of 19.3 per cent. Official data, by contrast, reports a proportion of 22.9 per cent ("Count for Norway Parliamentary Election 2009" n.d.). Again, this is not an issue of statistical weight, as the data is self-weighting ("CSES MODULE 3 FULL RELEASE [Dataset and Documentation]" 2015).

For the case of Denmark in 2007, the unweighted CSES data does not quite match electoral results: out of 1,370 reported votes, only 146 were reportedly cast for the DF. That is a proportion of 10.66 per cent. Official electoral data for the 2007 Danish election, by contrast, report 13.86 per cent of valid votes cast for the *Dansk Folkeparti* ("IPU PARLINE Database: DENMARK (Folketinget) ELECTIONS IN 2007" n.d.). Module 3 of the CSES does include a sampling weight to help correct for "unequal selection probabilities resulting from 'booster' samples, procedures for selection within the household, non-response, as well as other features of the sample design" ("CSES MODULE 3 FULL RELEASE [Dataset and Documentation]" 2015), which should bring our results closer to real-world electoral outcomes. However, as mentioned earlier, discrepancies between reported votes for PRRPs and actual results cannot be fully corrected due to the existence of social desirability bias.

As for the 2019 Danish election, the CSES dataset reports 90 votes for the DF out of 1,287, which represents 7 per cent of reported votes. This falls just short of the 8.7 per cent recorded in official data ("Results of the Danish Election" 2019). Module 5, however, includes a combined

[24] As per the Module 3 codebook Part 1 (introduction), Election Summaries and General Notes - Norway (2005): "The sampling fraction at the second stage is proportional with the inverse selection probability at the first stage. The final sample then is self-weighting when both stages are taken into consideration."

demographic and political weight, which should adjust the sample to reflect the proportions of demographic characteristics as well as vote choice in the election. The inclusion of a weight that reflects vote choice should make data for this election even more accurate than the data for the other three.

Coding decisions

The independent variables for age, occupation, and degree could be approximated to resemble Mayer.[25] However, her attitudinal scales could not be included, and the religion and religiosity variables are only included in one case.

Religion and religiosity

Though both of these concepts have relevant questions in the CSES questionnaire, they were not asked in Norway or Denmark during data collection for Module 3. This means that these data are unavailable for the Norway elections as well as for Denmark 2007. The questions were, however, asked during data collection for Module 5, which means that our regression for Denmark 2019 will be able to account for religion and religiosity, unlike the other three regressions.

It is important to note that Mayer's religion variable is in fact a combination of religion and religiosity. The values of her variable are: regularly practicing Catholic, irregularly practicing Catholic, non-practicing Catholic, other religion, and no religion. Based on existing research, she works from the premise that Catholics become increasingly intolerant (and thus increasingly supportive of the populist radical right) the more religious they are—hence her combination of Catholicism and religiosity. In addition to including religion and religiosity, I will therefore include interaction terms of the two.

Though Mayer looks at the combination of religiosity and Catholicism, I am choosing to do it with Lutherans instead. Part of the reason why Mayer seems to have selected Catholics is because they are "the dominant religious group in France." In Denmark, the dominant religious group is Lutheran. To put things into perspective, 973 respondents in Module 5 of the CSES identified as Lutheran, while only 19 identified as Roman Catholic ("CSES MODULE 5 FOURTH ADVANCE RELEASE [Dataset and Documentation]" 2022). Moreover, there is reason to believe that Lutheran religiosity, like its Catholic counterpart, increases intolerance: Danes perceive Lutheranism as part of a modern religion fully compatible with individualism, while Islam is perceived "as an overly serious, un-modern religion" tied to "authority and inequality" (Mouritsen 2006, 76). Furthermore, studies conducted in Scandinavian countries show that, overall, Danes display "relatively high levels of skepticism of foreigners, and … religion plays a crucial role [for Danes] in defining 'the other'" (Haugen 2011, 478). Indeed, "Danish mentality and Danishness are closely connected with our religious background" (Rasmussen 2007, quoted and translated in Haugen 2011, 479). Additionally, Lutheranism is a branch of Protestantism, and Protestants in the United States have been found to be consistently less tolerant than Catholics (Eisenstein, Clark, and Jelen 2017, 410). We hypothesize that a similar intolerance exists among European Protestants, more specifically European Lutherans in this case.

[25] See Appendix A for details on coding.

All this being said, religion and religiosity could not be assessed for Norway in either year or for Denmark in 2007. Indeed, though the CSES technically includes a question for each of these concepts, neither was asked in Norway or Denmark for Module 3 of the dataset. The questions on religion and religiosity were, however, asked during data collection for Module 5, such that this data is available for the 2019 Danish electorate. For this reason, the regressions done on Denmark 2019 data do include the questions on religion and religiosity, while the regressions done on all three other country-years, as well as those performed on combined data for both years in Denmark, leave out these variables.

Attitudinal scales

The attitudinal scales for cultural liberalism, Euroscepticism, and ethnocentrism were not included because the CSES, which was otherwise the most appropriate dataset to reproduce Mayer's methodology, did not include variables that could allow for the assessment of these attitudes. Mayer uses the attitudinal scales to test for what she terms the "Marine Le Pen effect," i.e., the fact that Le Pen is much more culturally liberal than her father was, though she remains a Eurosceptic and ethnocentrist. Though these values are not what we are concerned with here., it would have been useful to include if only to control for how women leaders promote a certain liberalism in values in PRR parties. However, we could not do so due to the dataset. This is a limitation of this work with which we will have to contend.

Occupation

The reader will notice that the variable occupation is not present in the regressions based on the combined dataset for Denmark. Indeed, this variable could not be included in this specific case because data for this question was not available for 2019. Instead, we had to rely on the variable for socio-economic status, which is a limited proxy at best. In 2007, the occupation variable was coded using an extensive and detailed system containing 33 distinct occupational categories. By contrast, in 2019, we ended up with 4 socio-economic categories, which we reduced to 3 in order to resemble Mayer more closely.[26] Conceptually, it would have been nonsensical to try and combine these two variables. We thus chose not to include occupation in the combined dataset for Denmark.

[26] The dataset had farmers as a separate category, but we included it in the self-employed category.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We will now present the results of our regressions, first in a way that reproduces Mayer as closely as possible, and then using an improved version of Mayer's models that better suits our purposes and will allow us to highlight some of the limitations of Mayer's analysis.

Norway

As we can see from Table 1, though there was the appearance of a radical-right gender gap in Norway in 2005 under a male leader of the *Fremskrittspartiet*, this gender gap disappeared once left-right ideological self-placement was taken into account. Table 2 shows that in 2009, under female leadership of the FrP, we see an RRGG that is more robust and maintains statistical significance across all four models at the $p < 0.05$ level. These results are opposite of our expectations: the RRGG remained significant across models under a woman leader but not under a male leader.

The two aforementioned tables follow the exact model laid out by Mayer. However, this method of evaluation, though it can establish the existence of an RRGG or the lack thereof, cannot tell us whether any difference we see has to do with the switch from a male leader to a female leader. In order to assess our hypotheses appropriately, we must modify Mayer's model in three ways: first, we change the dependent variable to reflect votes for all parties rather than votes for the PRRP vs. all others; second, we combine the datasets, which allows us to create an interaction term between the gender of the respondent and the gender of the leader of the party in a given election year; finally, we get rid of the variable assessing sympathy for the leader. The first change transforms Mayer's binomial regression into a multinomial one for the reasons outlined in the methodology section. The second change, namely, the combination of the datasets, allows us to create an interaction term that can accurately reflect the change from a male leader to a female leader (or vice versa) in the subsequent election. This interaction term is created by combining the variable gender with a new variable called "WomanYear," which is coded 1 for the election year in which the leader of the party is a woman and 0 for the election year in which the party is led by a man. (In the tables below, this interactive variable is labeled WYxG, for "WomanYear x Gender.") The interactive variable is thus coded 1 when both the leader of the party and the respondent are women and 0 when either or both are men. In this way, we can assess whether the gender of the leader does indeed matter specifically for women in a way that reduces the RRGG, as we hypothesized.

The third and final change concerns the sympathy for the leader variable that Mayer had included and which she had found to be highly correlated with women voting for the party. We are choosing to exclude this variable from our improved analysis, as it is overcontrol. We can see this in the Norway data for both 2005 and 2009: the 2005 data exhibit a Cronbach's alpha of 0.649 for the variables representing sympathy for the leader of the PRRP and voting for the party, while the latter year returns an alpha of 0.728 for the two variables. The covariance in 2009 would be considered sufficient to support combining both into a composite variable; as such, it is much too high for the sympathy variable to be used as a control. With this third change in place, we therefore move on to our multinomial logistic regression analysis.

Table 2: Binomial logistic regression on votes for the FrP in 2005 under a male leader, odds ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender	-0.383*	-0.388*	-0.113	0.169
	(0.165)	(0.192)	(0.212)	(0.256)
18-24		0.510	0.338	0.788
		(0.600)	(0.678)	(0.869)
25-34		-0.0972	-0.250	-0.137
		(0.561)	(0.629)	(0.811)
35-49		-0.207	-0.453	-0.362
		(0.541)	(0.606)	(0.782)
50-64		-0.757	-0.804	-0.915
		(0.552)	(0.616)	(0.792)
65+		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Primary school		1.011**	1.181***	0.932*
		(0.314)	(0.346)	(0.399)
Secondary school		0.613**	0.585*	0.346
		(0.214)	(0.229)	(0.261)
University		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Higher management		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Lower management		0.0747	0.307	0.248
		(0.240)	(0.259)	(0.297)
Office employees		0.589	0.916*	0.197
		(0.370)	(0.417)	(0.482)
Sales, services		0.560*	0.879**	0.439
		(0.283)	(0.315)	(0.371)
Blue collar		0.388	0.830**	0.359
		(0.268)	(0.293)	(0.343)
Left-right self-placement			0.613***	0.285***
			(0.0552)	(0.0635)
Sympathy for the leader				0.695***
				(0.0633)
Constant	-1.425***	-1.759**	-5.637***	-7.848***
	(0.102)	(0.546)	(0.719)	(0.958)
N	1104	1104	1104	1104
χ2 (DF)	5.49 (1)*	64.70 (11)***	240.87 (12)***	435.23 (13)***
Pseudo R^2	0.0054	0.0642	0.2390	0.4319

Standard error in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3: Binomial logistic regression on votes for the FrP in 2009 under a female leader, odds ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender	-0.720***	-0.610***	-0.477*	-0.591*
	(0.150)	(0.172)	(0.193)	(0.241)
18-24		0.846*	1.094**	1.364**
		(0.369)	(0.419)	(0.500)
25-34		-0.000304	0.0612	0.101
		(0.289)	(0.321)	(0.388)
35-49		-0.0610	0.0762	0.207
		(0.225)	(0.253)	(0.304)
50-64		-0.194	-0.0137	0.0557
		(0.221)	(0.251)	(0.301)
65+		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Primary school		1.268***	1.327***	0.916*
		(0.282)	(0.324)	(0.402)
Secondary school		1.178***	0.930***	0.709**
		(0.204)	(0.225)	(0.273)
University		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Higher management		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Lower management		0.0161	0.180	0.154
		(0.216)	(0.238)	(0.284)
Office employees		-0.254	-0.143	-0.281
		(0.371)	(0.419)	(0.504)
Sales, services		-0.111	0.292	0.172
		(0.257)	(0.289)	(0.355)
Blue collar		0.187	0.617*	0.313
		(0.232)	(0.266)	(0.331)
Left-right self-placement			0.639***	0.233***
			(0.0509)	(0.0625)
Sympathy for the leader				0.839***
				(0.0660)
Constant	-1.164***	-1.927***	-6.278***	-8.805***
	(0.0886)	(0.245)	(0.468)	(0.662)
N	1301	1301	1301	1301
$\chi 2$ (DF)	24.24 (1)***	102.82 (11)***	333.19 (12)***	636.10 (13)***
Pseudo R^2	0.0192	0.0815	0.2641	0.5042

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4: Multinomial logistic regression on votes for the FrP in 2005 and 2009 (combined) with interaction term, relative risk ratios[27]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
4 (Liberal Party)			
Gender	1.220	1.049	1.007
	(0.349)	(0.319)	(0.310)
Year with woman leader of FrP	0.439**	0.379***	0.437**
	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.129)
WYxG	2.001	2.448*	2.510*
	(0.826)	(1.036)	(1.075)
18-24		0.149*	0.152*
		(0.120)	(0.123)
25-34		0.443*	0.470
		(0.182)	(0.195)
35-49		0.482*	0.502
		(0.173)	(0.183)
50-64		0.567	0.548
		(0.209)	(0.204)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.125***	0.131***
		(0.0676)	(0.0707)
Secondary school		0.218***	0.236***
		(0.0627)	(0.0682)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		0.727	0.690
		(0.187)	(0.179)
Office employees		0.489	0.451
		(0.287)	(0.267)
Sales, services		0.573	0.543
		(0.235)	(0.224)
Blue collar		0.528	0.477
		(0.210)	(0.190)
8 (*Fremskrittspartiet*, baseline category)			
N	2397	2397	2397
χ2 (DF)	96.47 (18)***	483.14 (78)***	1551.71 (84)***
Pseudo R^2	0.0117	0.0587	0.1886

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

[27] Only the results for the Liberal Party are reported here, as the gender-related variables were statistically insignificant for every other party. For a full table of results, see Appendix B.

As we can see in Table 3, the year with a woman leader remains statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level in Model 3 for the Liberal Party. This means that, despite the interaction term, the year in which the FrP had a woman leader is a statistically significant predictor of voting for the Liberal Party instead of the FrP. The relative risk ratio tells us that respondents had a 0.437 times smaller chance of voting for the Liberal Party instead of the FrP in the year that the FrP had a woman leader. Contrary to our hypothesis, this would seem to indicate that respondents voted for the FrP *more* when its leader was a woman than when it was a man, at least when compared to the Liberal Party.

As for the interaction term, we cannot use its statistical significance as established in Table 3 to determine the role it plays; rather, we have to turn to predicted probabilities in order to ascertain its statistical and substantive significance (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Figure 5 gives us the predicted probability of a survey respondent having voted for the FrP based on whether the leader of the party that year was male or female. The results are divided by gender. We can see that there is no support for our hypotheses: indeed, the predicted probability of voting for the FrP is higher for both men and women when the leader is a woman than when it is a man. This is congruent with the results of our multinomial regression, as stated above. For the case of Norway, our analysis undermines hypotheses 1 and 2 as well as their sub-hypotheses.

Figure 1: Predicted probability of FrP vote based on leader gender with 95 % confidence intervals, by respondent gender



Yet this points to an interesting possibility: that women leaders are better than men at "normalizing" and mainstreaming their otherwise radical parties. That is indeed what Mayer had hypothesized regarding the disappearance of the RRGG under Marine Le Pen: the latter had launched a plan for the normalization of her party, which she termed "*dédiabolisation*" (Mayer 2015, 401). Meret (2015, 101) argues that all three leaders—Le Pen, Jensen, and Kjærsgaard—led "modernizing" efforts that attempted to mainstream their parties. The former two did so through their leadership style, which was drastically different from that of their male forebears (Meret and Siim 2017). Indeed, Jensen's rhetoric was much toned down compared to her predecessor: she was considered "more likable and less confrontational" (Bergmann 2017, 149). At least partly thanks to this more restrained rhetoric, Jensen is the one who managed to move her party from the fringes of the system into the mainstream (149). Jensen succeeded in "institutionaliz[ing]" the FrP to the point that it became "coalitionable" and entered a right-wing government (Jupskås 2016, 165). This may be what drove not only women but also men to vote for the party in greater numbers under Jensen, as evidenced by the predicted probabilities in Figure 5. Meret and Siim (2017, 9) go so far as to assert that "Being a woman is

portrayed as an advantage, when following a charismatic and authoritarian rightwing party leader." Our data seem to support this view. However, it is important to note a crucial distinction: Mayer had hypothesized that Marine Le Pen's "*dédiabolisation*" efforts had led *women* to vote for the party in greater numbers, thus leading to the disappearance of the radical-right gender gap. Our data, by contrast, support the view that *both men and women* were positively influenced by the process of normalization undertaken by Jensen. As such, it undermines Mayer's claim that "*dédiabolisation*" can explain the radical-right gender gap.

In order to check the robustness of our findings, we assessed survey respondents' perception of the radicalism of the party. Indeed, though voting for the party is the only way to give it legislative power, votes cannot accurately reflect the support that a party's ideas receive in society or how radical or mainstream the party is perceived to be. This becomes especially important for our discussion of "*dédiabolisation*," which is a form of mainstreaming. Figures 2 and 3 represent survey respondents' perception of the radicalism (or lack thereof) of the *Fremskrittspartiet*. The graphs for each year are divided by gender. We can first notice that women always perceive the party as more radical than men do. In 2005, 42 % of women ranked the party at 10 on the left-right scale, against 34 % of men. Likewise for 2009: 47 % of women gave the party a 10, against 41 % of men. These numbers highlight a second reality: that both men and women perceived the party as more radical in 2009 than they did in 2005, which runs counter to the "*dédiabolisation*"/mainstreaming through gender argument; indeed, the FrP was led by a woman in 2009, yet it was also perceived as more radical then than it had been under a male leader. The data thus shows that the gender of the leader is not sufficient to normalize a party's rhetoric, unlike we had hypothesized above. One final observation of note: in both years, a plurality of men and women ranked the party as being as right-wing as possible, while for both years the experts who ran the CSES assessed the party at 8 on the left-right scale. This highlights an interesting discrepancy, namely, that the party has a more radical image among the general population than a closer study of its platform would warrant, or that the average person has a lower threshold for what they consider right-wing than do specialists of the field. As for the meaning of these findings for our original hypotheses, they are congruent with our initial findings, i.e., that women leaders do not drive more women to the party. Indeed, it seems that the FrP was perceived as *more* radical under a woman leader than under a man leader, and we know from the literature review that women are less likely to vote for parties that they perceive as too prejudiced or stigmatized—in other words, too radical.

However, an important thing to note is that, though we found no evidence to support our hypotheses using the Norway data, they are not automatically falsified: another factor may be at play, such that our hypotheses require further specification. Indeed, though the Norwegian and French cases are similar and oft-compared, they are not perfect mirrors of each other. One important difference between the Norwegian and French cases is their respective electoral systems. In the case of France, Nonna Mayer only looked at presidential election results, which is when voters could express support directly for Marine Le Pen and, previously, for her father. Norway does not have a president, so our replication of Mayer had to rely on the results of the parliamentary (*Stortinget*) elections for our assessment. Norway's electoral system is one of "direct election and proportional representation in multi-member electoral divisions," i.e., electors vote for their constituency representative by voting for a party list, and the rest of the seats for the constituency



Figure 2: Survey respondents' assessment of the ideological position (left-right) of the Fremskrittspartiet *in 2005 divided by respondent gender*

Source: variable C3011_B, Norway 2005 data.



Figure 3: Survey respondents' assessment of the ideological position (left-right) of the Fremskrittspartiet *in 2009 divided by respondent gender*

Source: variable C3011_B, Norway 2009 data

are allocated based on the percentage of votes received by each party ("The Main Features of the Norwegian Electoral System – Summary" 2009). The King of Norway is formally responsible for appointing the prime minister, but in practice, the political parties usually discuss this amongst themselves and, once they have come to an agreement, the King appoints "the government that the *Storting* is willing to accept" ("The Formation of a New Government" 2021). This means that a vote for a party does not equate to a direct vote for its leader as prime minister; this may lead to a different dynamic wherein a change in party leadership does not affect voters in a way that is as direct in Norway as it is in France, hence the lack of effect of leadership gender. It is possible that our hypotheses should be further specified to only apply to presidential systems. Further research would be required to assess this.

These insights highlight an issue within PRRP and especially RRGG research: most of the literature on these topics is based on demand-side explanations, with some supply-side explanations here and there. But this electoral difference between Norway and France may point to a need for institutional explanations: In which electoral contexts do PRR parties succeed in attracting women voters? Do institutions affect the size and maybe even the existence of the RRGG? These are important questions to consider and we suggest that future research should focus on this area.

Denmark

Moving to the results for Denmark, Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the binomial regressions that follow Mayer's methodology. Contrary to the literature presented earlier on the radical-right gender gap, we cannot find a gender gap in voting for the DF in either 2007 or 2019, as gender is not statistically significant in Model 1 for either year. There is no evidence of an RRGG, whether under a male or female leader, which goes against our hypotheses.

As we did for Norway, we modified Mayer's model for Denmark to make it multinomial (reflecting all votes rather than PRRP vs. all others) and combined (allowing the creation of the interaction term WYxG), and we removed the sympathy variable (to prevent overcontrol).[28] However, here again as with the two binomial models, gender is not statistically significant, no matter

Figure 4: Predicted probability of DF vote based on leader gender with 95 % confidence intervals, by respondent gender



[28] The table of results for the multinomial regression is omitted from the main text, as gender was not statistically significant in voting for any other party relative to the DF. For the table of results, see Appendix B.

Table 5: Binomial logistic regression on votes for the DF in 2007 under a female leader, odds ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender	-0.0935	0.213	0.365	0.374
	(0.372)	(0.473)	(0.480)	(0.432)
18-24		1.242	1.529	1.144
		(1.550)	(1.495)	(1.416)
25-34		1.610	2.072	1.528
		(1.192)	(1.266)	(1.095)
35-49		1.290	1.455	0.826
		(1.155)	(1.214)	(1.038)
50-64		1.503	1.876	1.380
		(1.138)	(1.227)	(1.046)
65+		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.915	1.183	1.096
		(0.689)	(0.677)	(0.686)
Secondary school		-0.0731	0.0563	0.0000771
		(1.314)	(1.284)	(1.353)
Higher ed., short		0.635	0.581	0.287
		(0.464)	(0.454)	(0.508)
Higher ed., middle		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Higher management		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Lower management		0.153	0.00174	-0.205
		(0.580)	(0.599)	(0.638)
Office, sale, service		0.345	0.352	0.194
		(0.571)	(0.573)	(0.562)
Blue collar		1.097*	1.183*	0.532
		(0.534)	(0.537)	(0.482)
Left-right self-placement			0.365***	0.185*
			(0.0866)	(0.0757)
Sympathy for the leader				0.591***
				(0.121)
Constant	-2.195***	-4.782***	-7.405***	-8.915***
	(0.243)	(1.240)	(1.502)	(1.498)
N	699	699	699	699
χ2 (DF)	0.06 (1)	18.60 (11)	31.34 (12)**	40.97 (13)***
Pseudo R^2	0.0003	0.0526	0.1376	0.3354

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 6: Binomial logistic regression on votes for the DF in 2019 under a male leader, odds ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender	-0.452	-0.0922	-0.0209	0.290
	(0.337)	(0.373)	(0.382)	(0.418)
25-34[29]		-0.106	0.0235	0.717
		(0.765)	(0.781)	(0.760)
35-49		0.237	0.406	0.264
		(0.524)	(0.520)	(0.591)
50-64		0.527	0.594	0.850
		(0.463)	(0.453)	(0.533)
65+		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Primary school		2.624***	2.540***	1.616*
		(0.672)	(0.685)	(0.765)
Secondary school		1.469**	1.402*	1.071
		(0.553)	(0.575)	(0.569)
Higher ed., short		1.543*	1.498*	0.925
		(0.662)	(0.678)	(0.671)
Higher ed., middle		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		-0.367	-0.351	-0.530
		(0.714)	(0.720)	(0.789)
White collar		0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Worker		0.744*	0.846*	0.816*
		(0.370)	(0.389)	(0.415)
Self-employed		0.584	0.519	0.851
		(0.588)	(0.571)	(0.656)
Religion		-0.312	-0.305	0.0200
		(0.204)	(0.214)	(0.270)
Religiosity		1.034	1.083	0.341
		(0.622)	(0.700)	(0.602)
LUTxR		-1.154	-1.203	-0.362
		(0.652)	(0.725)	(0.672)
Left-right self-placement			0.149*	0.0266
			(0.0679)	(0.101)
Sympathy for the leader				0.662***
				(0.136)
Constant	-2.156***	-3.404***	-4.369***	-8.345***
	(0.198)	(1.026)	(1.099)	(1.395)
N	867	867	867	867
χ2 (DF)	1.81 (1)	47.82 (13)***	50.57 (14)***	84.81 (15)***
Pseudo R^2	0.0065	0.1428	0.1596	0.4105

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

[29] The age category 18-24 is being ignored, as only one respondent from that group said they had voted for the DF.

which party is being assessed in comparison to the DF, suggesting the absence of a gender gap. This could simply be due to the interactive variable exhibiting the gender gap instead of the gender variable itself, which would be the case if our hypotheses were correct. Yet that is not the case, as evidenced in Figure 4 above: the confidence intervals for men and women largely overlap, suggesting a lack of statistical significance for the difference in voting for the DF between men and women. In addition to disconfirming the gender gap, Figure 4 undermines our two hypotheses and their respective sub-hypotheses, as we can see that the model predicts that women are no more likely to vote for the party under a female leader, while men are no less likely to vote for it in that circumstance. Overall, our analysis allows us to establish that the gender of the party leader is not responsible for the radical-right gender gap in either country, and it calls into question whether the RRGG even exists in Denmark.

Moving on to our robustness check, we can see in Figures 5 and 6 that the DF, like the FrP, is perceived as more radical by women than by men: in 2007, 38 % of women ranked the party at 10 on a 0-10 Left-Right scale, against 35 % of men. But much more significantly, the party was perceived as much less radical in 2019 under a male leader than in 2007 under a female leader. The percentage of women ranking the party at 10 dropped from 38 % to 21 % while scores of 6 and 7 jumped from 5 % to 10 % and from 8 % to 14 %, respectively. Likewise for men: scores of 10 dropped from 35 % to 17 %, while scores of 6 and 7 jumped from 8 % and 10 % to 11 % and 17 %, respectively. This is consistent with our analysis of the votes and with our robustness check for Norway, and it undermines the alternative explanation that we proposed earlier: indeed, neither women nor men are more likely to vote for the DF under a female leader, nor do they perceive the party as any less radical when female-led. Yet Danish data could still be consistent with our previous analysis: though Kjærsgaard did seek to enhance her party's mainstream appeal, she maintained the authoritarian style that is so frequent among PRRPs under male leaders. Meret and Siim (2017, 10) describe Pia Kjærsgaard's style as "stubborn," "aggressive" and "authoritarian." The media portrayed her "as a dictating, organizing, ever controlling leader" (10). As Spierings and Zaslove (2015a, 170) note, "female leaders are no guarantee of a more feminine and less masculine style of politics." Kjærsgaard maintained a "hard core and despotic leadership (masculine) style in the public political sphere" (Meret 2015, 101). Maybe Kjærsgaard, by not adopting a "feminized" rhetoric and political style, failed to reap the benefits of her gender and the perception of it in the political realm. To go back to Meret and Siim's statement—"Being a woman is portrayed as an advantage, when following a charismatic and authoritarian rightwing party leader"—perhaps being a woman is not an advantage if the woman herself is the "charismatic and authoritarian rightwing party leader." Moreover, we must note that any mainstreaming efforts pursued by Kjærsgaard may have affected some of the intervening elections, which is something we cannot ascertain using this data. This is obviously mere speculation, but it points to an interesting avenue for further research. If we put these results in the context of our research question, they suggest that the gender of the leader does not directly affect the size of the radical-right gender gap; however, it may well indirectly affect it through gendered expectations in terms of rhetoric and style, but a lot more research is needed to confirm this theory.

A final important thing to note in our robustness check has to do with the expert evaluations of the party we presented in the Case Selection section of this research: by 2019, experts were giving the party a 10 on the Left-Right scale, as opposed to an 8 in 2007, which indicates that experts perceived the party as having moved further to the right during those 12 years. Yet the op-



Figure 5: Survey respondents' assessment of the ideological position (left-right) of the Dansk Folkeparti *in 2007 divided by respondent gender*

Source: variable C3011_C, Denmark 2007 data.



Figure 6: Survey respondents' assessment of the ideological position (left-right) of the Dansk Folkeparti *in 2019 divided by respondent gender*

Source: variable E3019_C, Denmark 2019 data.

posite happened for survey respondents: they ranked the party as much less radical—i.e., more center-right than right—in 2019 than they had 12 years earlier. This indicates a major shift in public perception of the party, wherein its discourse and issue positions have seemingly become normalized and do not appear as radical as before to the average voter. This is particularly interesting considering that experts perceived the party as having become *more* radical. Here again, like in Norway, there is a discrepancy between public perception and expert assessment of the party that would warrant further investigation.

Overall, our results do not allow us to exclude in either country the null hypothesis, namely, that leader gender plays no role in the radical-right gender gap. Yet our research remains valuable as it investigated a potential alternative explanation, i.e., the role of leader representation, that was worthy of exploration. Moreover, though the results we obtained do not support our hypotheses, they do not outright falsify them either, as we pointed out in the section on Norway. Denmark, like Norway, has a parliamentary rather than presidential system (Folketinget 2011), so a vote for a party does not directly translate into a vote for its leader as prime minister. This institutional frame may be a mitigating factor, as we hypothesized in the case of Norway. Furthermore, according to multiple indices, Denmark is a more equal society than France from a gender perspective (United Nations n.d.; European Institute for Gender Equality 2023). This may explain why the usual dynamics that lead to the existence of an RRGG in other countries do not apply in Denmark, such that we find no gender gap. This hypothesis does, however, raise questions regarding existing scholarship: as mentioned at the beginning of this research, a significant body of literature finds an RRGG in Denmark, which led to our choice to include Denmark as a comparative case for France. Yet our own research now points in the opposite direction. What can account for this difference? Were different methods used to establish the existence of the gender gap? And if that is the case, which method is more accurate? These are some of the questions raised by our findings, and future research should look into these inconsistencies.

CONCLUSION

Our findings did not support the idea that female leadership of PRRPs eliminates the radical-right gender gap (H_1), nor that it reduces it (H_2). Findings from Norway showed that both men and women were actually *more* likely to vote for the FrP under its female leader than under a male leader. Findings from Denmark, meanwhile, showed a complete absence of RRGG. Though our hypotheses were not borne out by the evidence, our contribution remains valuable as it addressed a potentially valid explanation of the RRGG grounded in the existing scholarship on representation. Our inability to falsify the null hypothesis teaches us that representation is probably not meaningful in terms of the RRGG, though research is needed to assess whether further specification of the model, e.g., applying it only to presidential systems, would yield a different result.

Though we could not falsify the null hypothesis that leader gender plays no role in the radical-right gender gap, the present research makes further meaningful contributions to the research on the RRGG and on PRRPs in general. As mentioned in the discussion, our findings point to institutional explanations of the RRGG and of PRR voting as particularly worthy of further exploration, especially considering how sparse current research on this angle is.

Importantly, this research contributes to feminist scholarship on the RRGG. As Rippeyoung (2007, 392) explains, much academic literature in political science suffers from a narrow view of women as "one-dimensional, and wholly interested in 'female' issues such as the family." In this work, we approached women as the full-fledged political actors that they are, with views on immigration and law and order issues that makes them potential voters of the populist radical right. Though our focus was on the role of gender and descriptive representation, we did not fall into the trap of portraying women as solely interested in gender issues. Instead, we promoted a view of women as "full political participants" with "agency" (393). Moreover, we approached women's PRR voting as a phenomenon worthy of its own exploration rather than assuming that women are simply small men who vote for PRRPs for the same reason their male counterparts do. As mentioned earlier, it is much too strong an assumption to believe that if women do not vote for PRRPs as much as men do, it must be because they do not hold the same attitudes that make men vote for such parties, or because they do not belong to the same demographic that is known to vote for them. Women, as political agents in their own right, may have entirely different rationales and reasons for voting or not voting for PRRPs, and these are worthy of independent investigation. Though our results were inconclusive, we hope to have succeeded in promoting a more feminist approach to PRRP and RRGG scholarship.

Our research also undermined some existing scholarship on the radical-right gender gap by putting into question the existence of the RRGG in Denmark. As mentioned in the case selection section of this work, a significant body of literature finds an RRGG in Denmark. The present research, however, found no statistically significant difference between genders. This divergence brings forth many questions regarding statistical modelling and the inclusion or exclusion of variables: for example, did research who identified the existence of a Danish RRGG fail to take some important variables into account? Or perhaps these analyses relied on surveys conducted outside election time, which require recalling one's vote and, as such, offer an inherently less reliable picture of the votes cast.

Limitations

Limitations of Mayer's work

In our results section, we already pointed out two limitations of Nonna Mayer's work on which this research is based: the binomial nature of her logistic regressions and her use of the variable regarding sympathetic feelings towards the leader of the PRR party. As we explained earlier, running these regressions as binomial—i.e., the dependent variable reflects votes for the PRRP vs. votes for all other parties lumped together—relies on two very strong and inaccurate assumptions, namely, that the PRRP is a vastly different party from all others, and that all other parties share a certain level of commonality that the PRRP does not share. Neither of these assumptions holds under closer scrutiny: PRRPs, though they represent a right-wing radicalism and a level of authoritarianism and populism not found in other parties, are still parties that seek to function within the existing system. Unlike extremist parties, PRRPs do not seek the destruction of the democratic order. This already makes them very similar to other standard parties. Moreover, in terms of left-right ideology, PRRPs are not necessarily very far from other right-wing parties on many issues. In other words, PRRPs represent a specific subset of right-wing parties rather than a different breed entirely.

As for the second assumption, it is likewise inaccurate: other parties run the gamut from the conservative, nationalist, or religious right to the socialist or even Marxist left. To suggest that such parties are closer to each other than any of them are to PRRPs is blatantly false. For these reasons, comparing the votes garnered by a PRRP to those for all other parties together lacks conceptual validity and may lead to false inferences. We also mentioned how the sympathy for the leader variable was over-control. Indeed, as assessed using the datasets, sympathy for the leader is closely and positively correlated to the outcome measure, namely, voting for the party. As such, sympathy for the leader should not be used as a control.

Another potential issue regards the outcome measure—the party vote. Only looking at people who actually voted for a PRRP may underestimate the actual support of these parties in the sense of agreeing with them and with the values they project, as it neglects those who may have had a propensity to vote for them but did not for some reason or other. Supporting a party despite not voting for it may be meaningful in terms of its impact on society: it may help promote its views such as opposition to immigration and render radical views more acceptable and mainstream. However, it is important to note that support without vote is not meaningful in terms of enacting political change, for if you do not vote for them, you do not give them weight in parliament (Spierings and Zaslove 2015b, 144). This is why, though looking simply at PRRP votes may underestimate their actual support within society, we chose not to change the outcome measure when improving on Mayer's model.

Limitations of this work

Mayer's work is not alone, however, in having limitations. There are certain limitations to keep in mind when assessing the findings of our own research. An important limitation to keep in mind is that our data for Denmark jumps from 2007 to 2019. A 12-year gap is not negligible. However, this was unavoidable, as the CSES was not run in Denmark during any of the intervening

elections. A lot can have changed during that time besides the gender of the PRRP leader. We considered other datasets for this reason, but they lacked too many of the other variables, or had a similarly large gap in data for one or the other of the two countries. Our results for Denmark must thus be taken with a grain of salt, as it is possible that an analysis of data that is closer in time may show a different result.

Another important limitation concerns our N. The N for PRRP votes is almost always unavoidably small, as PRRPs are fringe parties that do not garner a large proportion of votes. As such, any reliable survey will only include a few hundred PRRP voters at most. This makes quantitative analysis inherently less reliable. Yet we believe that there is still value in using quantitative analysis in such cases. Short of being able to interview hundreds of PRRP voters, quantitative analysis remains our best option for assessing the motivation of entire groups of voters, in this case male and female voters.

As with Mayer's work, a limitation of this work regards the outcome measure, namely, looking at PRRP votes rather than general support and agreement with PRRP views. However, as explained above, support short of a vote does not give the party any weight in parliament, such that it cannot push its agenda legislatively. For this reason, we kept Mayer's outcome measure in our updated models. Nevertheless, this opens up an interesting avenue for future research: if women hold views congruent with PRRPs to the same extent that men do, what prevents them from actually voting for these parties? Why do women's views and how they vote not align more?

One limitation that is specific to this work has to do with Mayer's control variables. Though the CSES dataset does include questions related to religion and levels of religiosity, these questions were not asked in Norway in 2005 or 2009, nor in Denmark in 2007. They were asked in Denmark in 2019, so they could only be included in the binomial regression for that year but not in the multinomial regression using the combined dataset. Similarly, and as mentioned earlier, we could not include the three attitudinal scales that reflect cultural liberalism, ethnocentrism, and anti-EU sentiment. The CSES simply did not have the required variables. Therefore, we could not control for how women leaders may influence the positioning of the party (or the perception thereof by female voters) on such issues. As such, our models could not fully reproduce Mayer's.

Another limitation concerns our reporting of the votes for each party. Certain parties had to be eliminated from analysis: less than 2 percent of respondents reported voting for them, which was hindering the multinomial logistic regression due to insufficient frequency. For Norway in 2005 and 2009 as well as Denmark in 2007, this is not a big issue, as it led to the elimination of a single party each, with less than 1.5 percent of the vote. However, for Denmark in 2019, it led to the elimination of 5 parties, which had between 0.3 and 2.5 percent of the reported votes. Their removal amounts to almost 7 percent of reported votes being thrown out of the analysis. Yet this was unavoidable, as with the inclusion of these parties, the regression could simply not be run.

Implications and avenues for future research

Overall, it seems that putting a woman at the helm of a PRR party is not an effective strategy if the aim is to attract more women voters. Our findings also reveal that lack of female

representation, or the identity of PRRPs as *Männerparteien*, is not a major driver of the radical-right gender gap, which means that future research should look elsewhere for answers.

As mentioned above, one avenue for future research concerns the discrepancy between women's views and their voting behaviour. Indeed, we know from the literature review that women hold views of immigration for example that are very similar to those of men, yet they do not vote for PRR parties to the same extent. Perhaps the RRGG would disappear if we redid this assessment using support for PRRPs as our outcome measure instead of votes. Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate whether gender plays a role in how much people like the party: do men and women agree with and like the party to a lesser extent when the leader is a woman?

Another avenue concerns normalization. As Mayer found and as our findings seem to support, normalization does seem to lead women to vote for the party more. However, it understandably also seems to lead men to vote for the party in greater numbers, such that it is unclear whether normalization or the lack thereof could be an explanation for the RRGG. More research is needed to assess this.

We mentioned earlier how our hypothesis may need to be further specified to apply only to presidential systems in which you vote for a party leader as president directly. Relatedly, there is a definite need for more research into institutional explanations of the RRGG. Most of the research so far has focused on supply or demand explanations of the RRGG and of PRRP voting in general, but it is likely that the system affects how people vote.

We may also want to look at the impact of gender from the perspective of rhetoric and general attitude. Indeed, any changes in the RRGG attributed to a leader's gender may in fact be due to *gendered expectations* instead: we expect women to have a more feminine rhetoric and attitude, to come across as less confrontational, more caring and family-oriented. When women do not conform to such expectations, they do not reap the rewards of their gender. This could explain why Pia Kjærsgaard did not attract more women to her party: masculine-style women leaders may be perceived no differently by women voters than men leaders.

Another important insight of this research concerns the discrepancy between public perception of the radicalism of a party as opposed to expert evaluations of it. It would be interesting to delve deeper into the possible reasons behind this discrepancy, especially in the case of Denmark, where experts and public opinion perceived the DF as moving in opposite directions on the Left-Right scale.

Finally, we noted earlier the inconsistency of findings regarding the RRGG in Denmark: many studies found one, while others, such as ours, did not. There may be a need for a meta-analysis assessing the methods used in the literature to see which are valid and which are not. This could help us determine whether the RRGG truly exists in Denmark.

APPENDIX A

Coding Decisions

Age

Though age was initially available in the CSES dataset as a continuous variable, we elected to create age groups so as to more accurately follow Mayer's methodology. The age categories created are the same as those used by Mayer: 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64, and 65 and over.

It should also be noted that we eliminated 7 respondents from the Norway 2005 dataset because they were identified as being 17 years of age at the time of the questionnaire. The voting age in Norway is 18 years old, so either these persons were wrongly identified as being 17 years old, or they should not have answered the questionnaire as they were not eligible voters.

The dataset used for the Denmark 2019 election,[30] unlike its predecessors, did not have a direct "age" variable. Instead, it asked respondents their year and month of birth. Therefore, age was determined using the following formula: *age = (year of the election) – (birth year)*. For the sake of simplicity, we did not account for the birth month, so some respondents' age may be off by a year. We do not expect this to unduly affect results considering that age was turned into categories, such that only respondents at one end or the other of a category may have actually belonged in a different category. It must also be noted that the age range 18 to 24 was removed from the Denmark 2019 dataset because only one person of that age group reported voting for the PRRP out of 109 respondents, which hindered the regression.

Degree

For her "Degree" variable, Mayer uses the following categories: None, primary school; Secondary general; Secondary vocational; Bac; Bac+2; University. "Secondary school" refers to the French "collège" (middle school) which children attend from the ages of 11 to 15. "Bac" refers to the "baccalauréat" at the end of the "lycée" (high school), which is equivalent to a Canadian secondary/high school degree. "Bac+2" usually refers to a post-secondary technical diploma, roughly equivalent to a diploma from a technical college in Canada. Though Mayer does not specify it, we are assuming that the category "University" encompasses all French university degrees ("license" or undergraduate degree, master's degree, and "doctorat" or PhD).

In the CSES Module 1, there are only three categories for the education variable[31]: primary completed; secondary completed; University undergraduate completed. For Norway in 2005 and 2009 as well as for Denmark in 2007, we cannot have a breakdown of educational credentials as detailed as that of Mayer, as the education question asked in Module 3 of the CSES was not as

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[30] CSES Module 5 for 2019 Danish election.

[31] Note that in the CSES questionnaire, this variable is called "Education" rather than "Degree." However, the distinction is not meaningful, as the values of the variable reflect only *completed* levels of education and, as such, imply the awarding of a degree. Primary school understandably does not confer a degree, but in this it is exactly equivalent to Mayer's categorization ("None, primary school").

detailed as that used by Mayer. However, we can still at least partially account for the role of education in voting for the radical right in those years by using this less-precise variable.

As for Module 5 (Denmark 2019), the education question is much closer to that used by Mayer. The possible answers are: Primary school (up to and including 6th grade); Primary school (7th-10th grade); General upper secondary education (e.g. HF, upper secondary school leaving examination), vocational high school education (e.g. HTX, HHX), vocational training (e.g., EUD, SOSU, trade and office, construction or agricultural education); Short-cycle higher education (under three years, e.g. laboratory technician, dental hygienist); Medium-term higher education (3 to 4 years, e.g. bachelor, HD, HA, nurse or teacher); Long-term higher education (5 years or more, e.g. master's degree or MBA); Researcher education (e.g. Ph.d.); No education. In order to more closely resemble Mayer, the variable was recoded as follows: "No education" and "Primary school" (all grades up to 10th) were grouped together; "short-cycle higher education" was kept as a separate category, as it is equivalent to Bac+2. However, secondary general and vocational could not be differentiated since they were coded together, so this distinction is not available, unlike in Mayer. Another distinction is that we chose to maintain the various university degrees separate rather than grouping them like Mayer did; since the distinction between undergraduate degrees, master's degrees, and PhDs was available, it made sense to keep it in order to increase accuracy. However, after starting our coding, we decided to combine PhDs with master's degrees, as there were not enough PhDs to sustain a separate category. Our categories are therefore: None, primary school up to 10th grade; Secondary (general or vocational + vocational training); Short-cycle higher education; Undergraduate; and Master's/PhD.

Occupation

Mayer uses the following categories to define each respondent's occupation: Never worked; Self-employed; Lower-grade managers/administrators/professional; Office employees; Sales/personal services employees; Skilled/unskilled blue collars; Higher-grade managers/administrators/professional. This categorization cannot be fully replicated, as "Self-employed" and "Never worked" are not available values for the "Occupation" variable of the CSES. "Self-employed" is part of a different variable in the dataset, but it includes all sorts of professional occupations such as lawyers for example. There would thus be inevitable overlap between the "Self-employed" category and some values of the "Occupation" variable of the CSES, so we cannot create a separate self-employed variable to approximate Mayer. As for "Never worked," it is not covered in any question of the CSES. One question asks about employment status, but though it can tell whether someone is currently unemployed, it does not allow us to know whether someone has ever worked or not.

Also note that we chose to exclude the Armed Forces from the "Occupation" variable. This category is not present in Mayer, and it is not possible to know in which other category it would fall. The person may be an unskilled service(wo)man as much as they could be a highly ranked officer in charge of administration or personnel management.

Under the "Occupation" variable, "office employees" and "sales/services employees" had to be combined into the same category, as they each had few respondents, which was preventing the multinomial logistic regressions from running properly. We made the decision to combine

them, as it made logical sense: the two categories encompass low-level employees (i.e., not managers and not self-employed), and both are working-class jobs without being blue collar.

The above is true for data for all three elections that use Module 3 of the CSES (both Norway elections along with Denmark 2007). However, data for the question on occupation are unavailable in Module 5 of the CSES (used for Denmark 2019). We therefore substituted a question on socioeconomic status for the one on occupation. The former does partially reflect types of occupations. Its values are: white collar (salaried, non-manual labor, whether with responsibilities or not), worker (manual labor), and self-employed (including farmers). It is at best an imperfect proxy, but it can at least allow us to account for some of the variation due to occupation. For the regression with interaction variable that combined the two Denmark datasets, occupation had to be completely removed as a variable: there was simply no legitimate way to combine a true occupation variable with a socioeconomic status proxy.

APPENDIX B

Table 7: Multinomial logistic regression on votes for the FrP in 2005 and 2009 (combined) with interaction term, relative risk ratios (complete table)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
2 (Socialist Left Party)			
Gender	2.803***	2.172**	1.650
	(0.666)	(0.554)	(0.498)
Year with woman leader of FrP	0.577*	0.584*	0.775
	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.234)
WYxG	1.206	1.324	1.465
	(0.408)	(0.462)	(0.600)
18-24		0.702	1.066
		(0.361)	(0.653)
25-34		0.889	1.446
		(0.353)	(0.684)
35-49		0.968	1.305
		(0.350)	(0.563)
50-64		1.686	1.870
		(0.608)	(0.801)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.0722***	0.0548***
		(0.0350)	(0.0300)
Secondary school		0.222***	0.269***
		(0.0518)	(0.0739)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		1.048	0.954
		(0.228)	(0.242)
Office employees		0.643	0.442
		(0.283)	(0.225)
Sales, services		1.327	1.132
		(0.387)	(0.396)
Blue collar		0.417*	0.323**
		(0.160)	(0.139)
Left-right self-placement			0.262***
			(0.0168)
3 (Labour Party)			
Gender	1.754**	1.544*	1.241
	(0.324)	(0.305)	(0.269)

Year with woman leader of FrP	0.872	0.861	1.072
	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.193)
WYxG	1.241	1.310	1.378
	(0.305)	(0.328)	(0.382)
18-24		0.442*	0.457*
		(0.146)	(0.171)
25-34		1.082	1.223
		(0.279)	(0.351)
35-49		1.104	1.214
		(0.248)	(0.304)
50-64		1.605*	1.509
		(0.359)	(0.377)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.587*	0.609
		(0.133)	(0.155)
Secondary school		0.485***	0.561**
		(0.0795)	(0.101)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		1.125	1.023
		(0.197)	(0.194)
Office employees		1.226	1.038
		(0.342)	(0.325)
Sales, services		1.018	0.905
		(0.214)	(0.212)
Blue collar		0.877	0.689
		(0.174)	(0.152)
Left-right self-placement			0.505***
			(0.0170)
4 (Liberal Party)			
Gender	1.220	1.049	1.007
	(0.349)	(0.319)	(0.310)
Year with woman leader of FrP	0.439**	0.379***	0.437**
	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.129)
WYxG	2.001	2.448*	2.510*
	(0.826)	(1.036)	(1.075)
18-24		0.149*	0.152*
		(0.120)	(0.123)
25-34		0.443*	0.470
		(0.182)	(0.195)
35-49		0.482*	0.502
		(0.173)	(0.183)

50-64		0.567	0.548
		(0.209)	(0.204)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.125***	0.131***
		(0.0676)	(0.0707)
Secondary school		0.218***	0.236***
		(0.0627)	(0.0682)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		0.727	0.690
		(0.187)	(0.179)
Office employees		0.489	0.451
		(0.287)	(0.267)
Sales, services		0.573	0.543
		(0.235)	(0.224)
Blue collar		0.528	0.477
		(0.210)	(0.190)
Left-right self-placement			0.763***
			(0.0422)
5 (Christian People's Party)			
Gender	1.092	1.081	1.121
	(0.360)	(0.376)	(0.390)
Year with woman leader of FrP	0.646	0.630	0.656
	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.196)
WYxG	1.942	2.007	2.050
	(0.861)	(0.901)	(0.926)
18-24		0.366	0.366
		(0.263)	(0.263)
25-34		0.702	0.730
		(0.343)	(0.358)
35-49		0.842	0.869
		(0.357)	(0.370)
50-64		1.511	1.492
		(0.630)	(0.624)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.216**	0.219**
		(0.111)	(0.112)
Secondary school		0.520*	0.522*
		(0.146)	(0.146)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)

Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		0.968	0.950
		(0.278)	(0.273)
Office employees		0.631	0.593
		(0.349)	(0.328)
Sales, services		0.700	0.671
		(0.277)	(0.265)
Blue collar		0.812	0.817
		(0.296)	(0.297)
Left-right self-placement			0.996
			(0.00980)
6 (Center Party)			
Gender	0.792	1.113	0.903
	(0.217)	(0.329)	(0.279)
Year with woman leader of FrP	0.635*	0.655	0.825
	(0.140)	(0.150)	(0.199)
WYxG	1.432	1.420	1.464
	(0.541)	(0.544)	(0.587)
18-24		0.615	0.656
		(0.322)	(0.361)
25-34		0.933	1.084
		(0.401)	(0.485)
35-49		1.280	1.476
		(0.473)	(0.569)
50-64		1.835	1.765
		(0.676)	(0.680)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.274***	0.275***
		(0.0977)	(0.104)
Secondary school		0.397***	0.453**
		(0.100)	(0.120)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		1.236	1.126
		(0.339)	(0.319)
Office employees		0.310	0.262
		(0.240)	(0.206)
Sales, services		1.401	1.264
		(0.485)	(0.458)
Blue collar		3.295***	2.625**
		(0.976)	(0.817)

Left-right self-placement			0.515***
			(0.0261)
7 (Conservative Party)			
Gender	1.040	0.860	0.914
	(0.216)	(0.192)	(0.206)
Year with woman leader of FrP	0.834	0.803	0.852
	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.155)
WYxG	1.582	1.810*	1.839*
	(0.434)	(0.514)	(0.532)
18-24		0.421*	0.421*
		(0.165)	(0.166)
25-34		0.686	0.717
		(0.196)	(0.207)
35-49		0.898	0.926
		(0.221)	(0.231)
50-64		0.939	0.922
		(0.236)	(0.235)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.169***	0.165***
		(0.0546)	(0.0533)
Secondary school		0.421***	0.420***
		(0.0738)	(0.0732)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		0.756	0.742
		(0.138)	(0.136)
Office employees		0.680	0.652
		(0.217)	(0.209)
Sales, services		0.445**	0.425***
		(0.110)	(0.106)
Blue collar		0.323***	0.324***
		(0.0765)	(0.0766)
Left-right self-placement			0.998
			(0.00563)
8 (*Fremskrittspartiet*)			
Gender	1	1	1
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Year with woman leader of FrP	1	1	1
	(.)	(.)	(.)
WYxG	1	1	1
	(.)	(.)	(.)

18-24		1	1
		(.)	(.)
25-34		1	1
		(.)	(.)
35-49		1	1
		(.)	(.)
50-64		1	1
		(.)	(.)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Secondary school		1	1
		(.)	(.)
University		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Lower management		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Office employees		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Sales, services		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Blue collar		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Left-right self-placement			1
			(.)
N	2397	2397	2397
χ2 (DF)	96.47 (18)***	483.14 (78)***	1551.71 (84)***
Pseudo R^2	0.0117	0.0587	0.1886

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8: Multinomial logistic regression on votes for the DF in 2007 and 2019 (combined) with interaction term, relative risk ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1 (Social Democrats)			
Gender	1.862*	1.624	1.492
	(0.523)	(0.463)	(0.450)
Year with woman leader of DF	0.840	0.905	0.971
	(0.197)	(0.258)	(0.296)
WYxG	0.547	0.611	0.673
	(0.194)	(0.221)	(0.258)
18-24		3.853*	2.676
		(2.163)	(1.547)
25-34		1.682	1.130
		(0.511)	(0.365)
35-49		1.451	1.003
		(0.359)	(0.265)
50-64		1.352	0.983
		(0.290)	(0.228)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.396**	0.409**
		(0.113)	(0.125)
Secondary school		0.544*	0.604
		(0.167)	(0.195)
Higher ed., short		0.524*	0.542*
		(0.139)	(0.151)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		1.368	1.503
		(0.803)	(0.899)
Left-right self-placement			0.571***
			(0.0268)
2 (Radical Left, Social Liberal Party)			
Gender	1.449	1.070	0.973
	(0.438)	(0.344)	(0.324)
Year with woman leader of DF	0.273***	0.530	0.574
	(0.0807)	(0.197)	(0.221)
WYxG	0.986	1.158	1.225
	(0.422)	(0.521)	(0.569)
18-24		28.33***	20.98***
		(17.00)	(12.90)
25-34		3.361**	2.415*

		(1.253)	(0.935)
35-49		3.854***	2.757**
		(1.202)	(0.894)
50-64		1.195	0.938
		(0.369)	(0.300)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.0592***	0.0594***
		(0.0274)	(0.0282)
Secondary school		0.232***	0.244***
		(0.0845)	(0.0918)
Higher ed., short		0.190***	0.197***
		(0.0630)	(0.0671)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		5.138**	5.352**
		(2.997)	(3.172)
Left-right self-placement			0.595***
			(0.0335)
3 (Conservative People's Party)			
Gender	1.233	1.038	1.079
	(0.405)	(0.351)	(0.369)
Year with woman leader of DF	0.847	0.965	0.930
	(0.230)	(0.334)	(0.327)
WYxG	0.722	0.865	0.842
	(0.301)	(0.371)	(0.365)
18-24		5.845**	6.685**
		(3.554)	(4.102)
25-34		1.046	1.122
		(0.379)	(0.414)
35-49		1.310	1.433
		(0.376)	(0.420)
50-64		0.876	0.890
		(0.228)	(0.237)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.0887***	0.0822***
		(0.0376)	(0.0353)
Secondary school		0.317**	0.312**
		(0.117)	(0.116)

Higher ed., short		0.496*	0.488*
		(0.149)	(0.147)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		2.941	3.038
		(1.775)	(1.840)
Left-right self-placement			1.212***
			(0.0673)
4 (Socialist People's Party)			
Gender	2.736**	2.266*	1.821
	(0.845)	(0.731)	(0.634)
Year with woman leader of DF	1.110	1.982*	2.139*
	(0.299)	(0.670)	(0.793)
WYxG	0.659	0.734	0.895
	(0.254)	(0.295)	(0.393)
18-24		13.16***	8.679***
		(7.676)	(5.371)
25-34		2.483**	1.570
		(0.845)	(0.587)
35-49		2.772***	1.741
		(0.784)	(0.546)
50-64		2.384***	1.585
		(0.608)	(0.454)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.0932***	0.0861***
		(0.0335)	(0.0343)
Secondary school		0.367**	0.400*
		(0.125)	(0.149)
Higher ed., short		0.304***	0.308***
		(0.0834)	(0.0931)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		4.951**	6.114**
		(2.901)	(3.719)
Left-right self-placement			0.400***
			(0.0228)
6 (*Dansk Folkeparti*)			
Gender	1	1	1

	(.)	(.)	(.)
Year with woman leader of DF	1	1	1
	(.)	(.)	(.)
WYxG	1	1	1
	(.)	(.)	(.)
18-24		1	1
		(.)	(.)
25-34		1	1
		(.)	(.)
35-49		1	1
		(.)	(.)
50-64		1	1
		(.)	(.)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Secondary school		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., short		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Left-right self-placement			1
			(.)
7 (Left, Liberal Party)			
Gender	1.243	1.047	1.075
	(0.351)	(0.302)	(0.312)
Year with woman leader of DF	1.014	0.995	0.972
	(0.230)	(0.281)	(0.278)
WYxG	0.603	0.732	0.725
	(0.213)	(0.264)	(0.263)
18-24		3.469*	3.646*
		(1.949)	(2.060)
25-34		1.067	1.100
		(0.325)	(0.339)
35-49		1.566	1.614*
		(0.374)	(0.392)
50-64		0.919	0.917
		(0.196)	(0.199)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)

Primary school		0.194***	0.189***
		(0.0579)	(0.0567)
Secondary school		0.517*	0.519*
		(0.158)	(0.160)
Higher ed., short		0.615	0.617
		(0.161)	(0.162)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		1.567	1.612
		(0.911)	(0.939)
Left-right self-placement			1.097*
			(0.0483)
8 (New Alliance)			
Gender	1.080	0.764	0.766
	(0.529)	(0.384)	(0.388)
Year with woman leader of DF	1.150	1.451	1.441
	(0.444)	(0.728)	(0.731)
WYxG	0.767	1.035	1.112
	(0.464)	(0.642)	(0.697)
18-24		40.54***	41.85***
		(30.57)	(31.76)
25-34		5.767**	5.697**
		(3.239)	(3.225)
35-49		6.455***	6.529***
		(3.253)	(3.323)
50-64		1.622	1.554
		(0.878)	(0.846)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.0799***	0.0810***
		(0.0546)	(0.0559)
Secondary school		0.377	0.422
		(0.195)	(0.222)
Higher ed., short		0.374*	0.382*
		(0.150)	(0.153)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		3.962	4.421*
		(2.913)	(3.267)
Left-right self-placement			1.079
			(0.0845)

9 (United List, The Red-Greens)			
Gender	3.290***	2.423*	1.835
	(1.118)	(0.850)	(0.723)
Year with woman leader of DF	0.543	0.686	0.859
	(0.189)	(0.285)	(0.404)
WYxG	0.290*	0.348*	0.435
	(0.143)	(0.176)	(0.245)
18-24		7.359**	5.243*
		(5.092)	(3.939)
25-34		2.925**	1.951
		(1.217)	(0.918)
35-49		2.992**	1.898
		(1.040)	(0.750)
50-64		1.449	0.912
		(0.486)	(0.348)
65+		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Primary school		0.0965***	0.0701***
		(0.0464)	(0.0380)
Secondary school		0.223***	0.239**
		(0.0862)	(0.104)
Higher ed., short		0.199***	0.165***
		(0.0728)	(0.0664)
Higher ed., middle		1	1
		(.)	(.)
Higher ed., long		1.544	2.271
		(0.960)	(1.494)
Left-right self-placement			0.270***
			(0.0223)
N	2222	2222	2222
χ2 (DF)	140.71 (21)***	515.54 (77)***	1756.54 (84)***
Pseudo R^2	0.0167	0.0611	0.2083

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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