The Evolution of Apocalyptic Determinism

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Abstract
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That determinism occupies an integral place within apocalypticism's notional architecture is routinely acknowledged in scholarship. However, examinations of determinism's conceptual structure and function within Jewish and early Christian apocalypticism are lacking. Moreover, where determinism has been treated within this context, it is frequently framed by the language and definitional constructs of contemporary philosophical and popular discourse. The effect of this approach is to obscure the conceptual coherence which underlies the texts.

In light of this gap in scholarship, I examine determinism and human moral agency within four Jewish historical apocalypses: the biblical book of Daniel chaps. 7-12, *The Animal Apocalypse*, *4 Ezra*, and *2 Baruch.* This analysis eschews the framework of contemporary philosophical and popular discourse in an effort to understand the way in which apocalyptic determinism coheres with conceptualizations of human moral agency within the texts themselves. From this analysis, it is my contention that: 1) a stable, conceptual core of an "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism" persists across the four apocalypses, which together correspond to a period of approximately 300 years; 2) *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch* reflect two distinct developmental directions for "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism;" and 3) across the four apocalypses, "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism" contributes to the texts' social function in a consistent manner.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. The Evolution of Apocalyptic Determinism

Mladen Popović writes that "apocalyptic literature expresses the idea that everything that happens in time and space is determined… Scholars associate determinism with apocalypticism because apocalyptic texts adduce a particular view of history and in some cases refer to a special means of revelation through heavenly tablets to reinforce this view of history" (2014, 258). Popović's comments reflect a general consensus within scholarship on apocalypses and apocalypticism: determinism is an intrinsic feature of early Jewish apocalyptic thought and literature (cf. Collins 2020, 22-23; DiTommaso 2007a, 386; 2021a, 61-65).[1] However, despite this general association of apocalypticism with determinism, relatively little has been done to examine the contours of deterministic thought within apocalypticism's conceptual framework.[2] With this thesis, I aim to help fill this gap in scholarship.

I seek to trace the evolution of apocalyptic determinism over its initial 300-year history (ca. 200 – 70 BCE). To do so, I will compare the deterministic outlooks of four historical apocalypses:[3] the biblical book of Daniel chaps. 7-12, *The Animal Apocalypse*, *4 Ezra,* and *2 Baruch.* In tracing the development of early apocalyptic determinism, I have three objectives: 1), to outline the conceptual structure of an "early apocalyptic determinism;" 2), to delineate two specific paths of its development as evidenced by *2 Baruch* and *4 Ezra*; and 3), to examine the ways in which apocalyptic determinism is adapted to a text's specific social function.

In this introductory chapter, I situate this project within the context of contemporary scholarship, define key terms, lay out my methodology, and provide a brief account of the texts under investigation.

1.2. Contemporary Scholarship on Apocalypses and Apocalypticism

Scholarly approaches to apocalyptic literature are largely a question of interpretive or heuristic lens.[4] It is through one's approach that one both comes to a diagnostic conclusion to classify the object under investigation as apocalyptic, and proceeds to analyze apocalyptic content (cf.

[1] "Apocalyptic eschatology is permeated by the expectation of the imminent end and, for it, the advent of the end does not depend upon human action" (Stone 1984, 383).

[2] "Apocalypses are often preoccupied with history, and apocalypticism with the meaning of history. It is occluded because apocalyptic historiography, the study of which includes enquiries into conceptions of time, theologies of history, and views of determinism and free will and their relations to the question of theodicy, remains incompletely understood" (DiTommaso 2007a, 384).

[3] See §1.2.

[4] "In biblical studies, apocalyptic is often mediated by scholarly approaches to the subject. These function like models or, better still, maps. It is often said that "map is not the territory," but it is also the case that different kinds of maps model the same terrain in different ways. This is true with approaches to apocalyptic" (DiTommaso 2023, 87). L. DiTommaso notes that the approaches of Christopher Rowland and John J. Collins are the most influential (2023, 87).

DiTommaso 2023, 89). In contemporary scholarship, approaches to Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic literature generally fall into three heuristic categories: "apocalypse" (genre), "apocalyptic" (revelation), and "apocalypticism" (worldview). Of these three, I employ the third approach.

1.2.1. The Genre "Apocalypse"

In 1979, John Collins and the SBL Genres Project sought to address the terminological confusion that afflicted scholarship on apocalyptic literature at the time.[5] In the *Semeia 14* publication (Collins 1979), the following definition of "apocalypse" as a literary genre was proposed: "'apocalypse' is a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldy being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world" (9).

Collins underscores that while this definition is essentially etic in character (2; 4), it was formulated through a comparative methodology which engaged individual texts directly. It classified reoccurring characteristics (5) and focused on those features which were considered essential in both form and content (9). He notes that its purpose was purely literary, aiming at clarity such that "the single name 'apocalypse' should refer to a single coherent and recognizable type of writing" (3). In light of this focus, the issues of social setting and function were not addressed, regarded as considerations subsequent to genre (4).[6] Although *Semeia 14* included an extensive list of multiple genre sub-types (28), Collins subsequently emphasizes the prominence of two main sub-types: historical and otherworldly journeys. The former is distinguished by an interest in the development of history, while the latter is distinguished by cosmological speculation (2016, 7-8).

Although this approach is still widely influential within scholarship, it has not gone without challenge. Criticisms of this approach generally fall into three kinds: challenges to the capacity of genre classification *per se* (cf. Tigchelaar 1996; Sacchi 1996; Grabbe 2003); challenges to the genre model employed by *Semeia 14* (Vines 2007; Samely 2023); and charges of insufficiency with respect to specific parts of the genre definition. Critiques of this kind are made especially with reference to textual examples of apocalypse, or conversely, apocalyptic speculation in writings that do not conform to the generic definition (Stone 1984; Fletcher-Louis 2011; Lange 2023).[7]

[5] See J. Collins 1979, 3-4 for his discussion of the project's context.

[6] Collins (1997) later accepts the following amendment to the *Semeia 14* definition, which was proposed in *Semeia 36*: "an apocalypse is intended to interpret present earthly circumstances in light of the supernatural world and of the future, and to influence both the understanding and behavior of the audience by means of divine authority" (33).

[7] L. DiTommaso notes that "the weakness of the generic approach is the nature of the evidence. Formal apocalypses make up only a small percentage of the corpus of early Jewish apocalyptic writings" (2023, 88). See J. Collins 2015, 1-20 for a concise response to many of these critiques outlined above.

Despites these criticisms, the *Semeia 14* definition continues to be a prominent starting point for scholarship on Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic literature. In large part, this is the result of its utility in providing a concrete and coherent way of referring to a group of texts which are related in both form and content (cf. DiTommaso 2007b, 239-240; 2023, 88; Goff 2017a, 19).

1.2.2. Apocalyptic

One prominent and influential alternative to the *Semeia 14* approach has been the definition of "apocalyptic" proposed by Christopher Rowland. Rowland (1982) offers an essentialist definition that focuses on the concept of revelation. "Apocalyptic seems essentially to be about the revelation of the divine mysteries through visions or some other form of immediate disclosure of heavenly truths" (70).

In *The Mystery of God* (2009), Rowland builds along the trajectory which he lays out in *The Open Heaven* (1982). He contends that "apocalypses are not always the best witnesses to the religious outlook which is often designated 'apocalyptic', when that outlook is deemed to be primarily eschatological in orientation. The distinction between the apocalypse as a literary genre and apocalypticism as a type of eschatological thought has, to put it mildly, led to considerable confusion" (2009, 17). By contrast, Rowland contends that the contents of apocalypses span a wide range of revealed subjects (2009, 18). While Rowland affirms that apocalyptic does not have its origin in biblical prophecy or wisdom, he argues that both contribute "to an outlook which set great store by the need to understand the ways of God. The apocalyptic visionary approaches the Scripture with the conviction that the God who is revealed in the pages of sacred writings may be known too by vision and revelation" (2009, 22).

As such, Rowland posits a close connection between apocalyptic and mysticism. He proposes that the term "apocalyptic" be used to "describe the distinctive religious outlook of the apocalypses themselves, with their distinctive 'mystical' concern to offer the apprehension of divine mysteries by means of revelation, whether through dream, vision, audition or inspired utterance" (2009, 17). In this way, Rowland understands "apocalyptic" in terms of means (revelation) and mood (mystical) such that apocalyptic is marked by a great deal of continuity with both prophecy, wisdom, and mysticism.[8]

The strength of this approach lies in its conceptual flexibility, such that it can analytically integrate different kinds of texts. However, like the *Semeia 14* definition, Rowland's approach has not gone without criticism. For example, Lorenzo DiTommaso notes the failure of this definition to distinguish itself from other forms of revelation which are definitively not apocalyptic (2007b, 243; 2021b, 221; 2023, 87-88); a failure which poses no small problem for this approach.

1.2.3. Apocalypticism

[8] For examples of approaches which emphasize revelation or continuity with respect to apocalyptic, prophecy and, mysticism, see A. DeConick 2006; F. Flannery-Daily 2006; C. Fletcher-Louis 2011; and M. Sweeney 2020. For Rowland's influence particularly in relation to Christianity and apocalyptic, see B. Reynolds and L. Stuckenbruck (eds.) 2017.

The third approach takes ideology or worldview as its starting point. Five years after the *Semeia 14* publication, Michael Stone (1984) highlights an ongoing terminological ambiguity in scholarship, suggesting that a clear distinction between "apocalypse" and "apocalypticism" could provide a solution (392). For Stone, "apocalypse" refers to genre, while "apocalypticism" refers to an ideology with particular eschatological orientations (392-393).[9]

In more recent scholarship, Lorenzo DiTommaso has been a leading voice for this approach. For DiTommaso, "worldview is the *primum mobile*: apocalypses derive from apocalypticism, not the other way around' (2011a, 502). DiTommaso contends that apocalypticism must be understood as a 'suite of axiomatic propositions' which are integrally related and unintelligible apart from the others (2021a, 56). In other words, there is not a singular quality which demarks apocalypticism out from other worldviews. Rather, it is the ensemble of its axioms working together (cf. 2021b, 222). DiTommaso defines these axioms in terms of space (an ontological dualism between the transcendent and mundane), time (linear, unidirectional, and finite), and the historical conflict between good and evil, culminating in a final transtemporal judgement (2021b, 222-223).[10]

DiTommaso also argues that apocalypticism is expressed in two primary modes: historiologic and sapiential. These modes respectively correspond to the historical and otherworldly journey sub-types of the literary genre of apocalypse (2011a 503-504; cf. Collins 2016, 7-8). Sapiential apocalypticism discloses knowledge of an essentially timeless character, whereas the subject of historiologic apocalypticism is history (2011a, 504). Of both modes of expression, DiTommaso emphasizes an intrinsic eschatological orientation (2021a, 59). While apocalyptic eschatology does not exhaust the content of apocalyptic revelation for either mode of expression, 'in the final analysis, every apocalyptic text has an eschatological dimension. No type, kind, or category of apocalyptic writing is without an eschatological component' (2023, 106).[11]

I follow DiTommaso in understanding apocalypticism in terms of a worldview and take this approach as the primary heuristic lens for my analysis of both apocalyptic literature and apocalyptic determinism. As such, with this thesis, I aim to clarify the way in which we understand apocalyptic determinism, its development, and its function within the context of early Jewish apocalypticism.

1.3. Definitions

[9] J. Collins argues that apocalypses entail an apocalyptic worldview (2016, 9).

[10] Elsewhere, DiTommaso defines the ensemble of these propositions in the following way: "apocalypticism asserts that a transcendent reality, concealed from casual observation yet operative on a grand scale, defines and informs existence beyond human understanding and the normal pale of worldly experience. It reveals a cosmos that is structured by two forces, good and evil, which have been in conflict since the dawn of history. It discloses the necessity and imminence of the final resolution of the conflict at the end of time, and the truth about human destiny" (2011b, 221; cf. DiTommaso 2021b, 222-223).

[11] See J. Collins 2020 and L. Stuckenbruck 2016 for their articulation of apocalypticism as a worldview.

The texts under investigation often articulate their distinctive apocalyptic framework in contrast to rival conceptual constructs. More specifically, within these texts apocalypticism functions as a theological historiography which is frequently presented in contradistinction to a Deuteronomistic historiography.[12] It is necessary, therefore, to define the following key terms: the Deuteronomic pattern (DP), apocalyptic historiography, and determinism.

1.3.1. The Deuteronomic Pattern (DP)

Jewish apocalypticism emerged as a novel worldview in the context of the Maccabean Revolt (167-164 BCE; cf. DiTommaso 2021c, 237-238; Portier-Young 2011, *xxi*). Under the domestic policies of Antiochus Epiphanes IV, fidelity to God's covenant was understood as the cause of Jewish suffering, something for which a Deuteronomistic historiography struggles to account.

George Nickelsburg (2006, 222) summarizes this Deuteronomistic historiography in terms of a Deuteronomic pattern (DP), specifically in relation to second temple Jewish texts.[13] This historiographical pattern[14] is framed by the conceptual touchpoints of election, covenant, reward/punishment, and resolution.[15] In this view, because God's acts in history in response to Israel's covenantal conduct, human agency is the mechanism which drives history forward. As such, history is conceptualized as a cyclical pattern of obedience, disobedience, and restoration, where the nation's fortunes change in accordance with its conduct. When present circumstances are interpreted through the lens of this historiography, certain things must be the case with

[12] S. McKenzie (2010) summarizes Martin Noth's insight into one of the main theological convictions of the Deuteronomistic historian. "Dtr's purpose in writing, Noth believed, was to explain why Israel and Judah had come to ruin… Such ruin had been forecast in the book of Deuteronomy as the inevitable result of sin. Indeed, Deuteronomy in an early form was a formative source for Dtr. He placed the Deuteronomic laws at the head of his work as the criteria for the evaluation of Israel's history. Above all, the doctrine that prosperity and disaster were the inevitable results of righteousness and sin, respectively, served as the template for Dtr's unfolding of Israel's history" (535). J. J. Collins (2018) summarizes Deuteronomy's influential theology in similar terms. "Those who kept the law would prosper and live long in the land" (111).

[13] The pattern… is drawn from Deuteronomy 28-32. Within the structure of the Sinaitic covenant, God lays out the stipulations of the Torah. Obedience brings blessings of the covenant and disobedience its curses. When Israel repents of its sins, the curses are removed and divine blessing returns to Israel" (2006, 222).

[14] That the DP functions as a historiography in contradistinction to apocalypticism, see both J. Collins 1993, 360 and L. DiTommaso 2005, 120-126; 2021a, 63-65 for their comments on Daniel 9. See G. Boccaccini 2002, 181-188 for an alternative view. See in particular DiTommaso 2005, 120-126 for a detailed analysis of Boccaccini's proposals.

[15] Elsewhere, Nickelsburg (2003) provides a more complete definition of the biblical notion of covenant; the notion for which the DP serves as shorthand. "The God who lays commandments and obligations upon Israel first chose Israel from among the nations and invited this people into a special relationship… Within this relationship Israel's God presented commandments and ordinances that Israel was to observe faithfully. To the extent that Israel was faithful to its obligations, the people would experience God's blessings—long life, health and safety, and fertility in one's family and on the land (Deut 28:1-14). Disobedience, on the other hand, would bring the curses of the covenant upon the people—a shortened life, sickness, drought, famine and barrenness, invasion and captivity (28:15-29). The cause-and-effect relationship of disobedience and curse could be broken, however. If the nation repented and turned to God—that is, if they began rightly to obey the Torah—they would experience the covenantal blessings (30:1-10)" (32). This view is similar to E.P. Sander's articulation of covenantal nomism, which Nickelsburg cites with a nuanced approval (Sanders 1977, 422; Nickelsburg 2003, 209n.10).

respect to both the past and the future. In circumstances of suffering, a past history of sin is entailed. In covenantal fidelity, future prosperity is expected. The distant future remains alterable (cf. Collins 2020, 22).

On these terms, the DP struggles to account for that suffering which is caused by covenantal fidelity; the kind of suffering which was considered characteristic of the Maccabean crisis. In this context, apocalypticism arose to provide its own alternative historiographical framework.

1.3.2. Apocalyptic Historiography

As a historiography, apocalypticism is oriented by a transtemporal eschatological horizon (cf. DiTommaso 2021a, 60).[16] "Apocalyptic time is linear, unidirectional, and finite" (DiTommaso 2021a, 60). Temporal finitude is understood in terms of God's eschatological intervention which brings "time and history to a climax" (DiTommaso 2021a, 61). Here, divine justice is reconceptualized as pertaining to the world to come, "beyond the limits of human history" (DiTommaso 2021a, 62). Accordingly, reward and punishment are re-envisioned as post-historical or post-mortem realities (cf. Collins 2020, 29-31; DiTommaso 2021a, 61-62). As such, present circumstances no longer entail a specific history, as is the case within the DP. Rather, God's end-time intervention sets the agenda for time's linear and unidirectional progression. The end, therefore, also operates as history's *telos* (DiTommaso 2021a, 61) such that the divine plan which dictates this end, and not human agency, functions as history's driving mechanism (cf. DiTommaso 2021a, 61-62). In this outlook, the future is not alterable (cf. Collins 2020, 22).

In this view, then, righteous suffering is reconceptualized as part and parcel of the divine plan which animates history. It is not simply the necessary effect of sin or covenantal infidelity. It is, instead, something which the righteous must endure before they receive their reward in a transtemporal transcendence of death (cf. Collins 1997, 91; 97).

1.3.3. Determinism

In contemporary philosophical discourse, determinism is frequently set against the backdrop of particular conceptualizations of human "free will." Indeed, deterministic thought entails a necessary and corresponding framing of human agency. For example, Meghan Griffith writes the following (2017, 1):

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[16] See J. Collins 1974, where he argues that apocalyptic eschatology is distinguished from prophetic eschatology by its emphasis on an individual transcendence of death (cf. Collins 2020, 29-31). Elsewhere, Collins writes that Jewish post-exilic hope "cannot be understood as the expectation of a purely future event, and, despite the etymology of the word eschatology, it is not primarily concerned with the end of anything. Rather, it is concerned with the transcendence of death by the attainment of a higher, angelic form of life" (1997, 97). For Collins, "transcendence of death" provides coherence to an apocalyptic view of the universe as two-storeyed. "If we regard the world view of apocalypticism as a two-storey universe rather than as a theory of two world ages, we can see that revelations of heavenly secrets, such as we get in the heavenly journeys of Enoch and again in *1 Enoch* chaps. 72-82, are not irrelevant to the eschatology of these works. If the future hope of the apocalypticist was to be elevated to a heavenly life, then any information about the heavenly regions where such life is most fully lived is relevant to that hope. In this way, it is possible to find a coherent world view in the apocalyptic writings" (1997, 91). See M. Stone 1985 for his discussion of the development of history and meta-history within Judaism.

> If determinism turns out to be true—that is, if the laws of nature and history of the world dictate exactly what must occur, including all events associated with our actions—then we might wonder whether free will is possible. Incompatibilists believe that determinism would rule out free will. Compatibilists think that it would not… What kind of conditions are central such that determinism is or is not a threat? How do such conditions map onto the intuitions and practices surrounding free will? How ought we to understand the concept of free will?[17]

However, both Sophie Botros (1985) and Mladen Popović (2014), of Stoicism and second temple Judaism respectively, have argued against reading ancient texts in terms of this contemporary philosophical discourse. In part, they contend that contemporary notions of "free will" or "human freedom" do not correspond to the way in which freedom was conceptualized by ancient authors (Botros 1985, 280-290; Popović 2014, 256-257). To do so, therefore, would be anachronistic.

A general anachronism does seem to mark the language of scholarly discourse as it concerns apocalypticism and determinism. In scholarship, determinism is often contrasted to notions of "human freedom" or "free will." For example, John Collins writes the following in his comments on Daniel:

> The apocalyptic books were not intended for some distant time in the future, but for the immediate situation. The attribution to an ancient sage was designed to add persuasiveness to the predictions. While it is true that no human decision could change the course of events, the fate of the individual was not predetermined. In Daniel, it is possible to either hold fast to the covenant or to betray it, and the people can be led to justice. The wise can be tested by God, *and the testing implies that they are free to decide* (1977, 88; emphasis added).

So too, of *4 Ezra* 8:56-58*,* Michael Stone (1990) comments that "freedom is related to the idea of free will which is strongly expressed by the angel" (288). Of 9:11, he writes that "the verse clearly implies that human beings have freedom of choice and bear responsibility for their actions" (297).[18] Such language is reflective of the contemporary philosophical discourse where determinism is framed by its relation not to human agency generally, but to a particular kind of human agency that is defined as "human freedom" or "free will."[19]

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[17] S. Botros (1985) cites P. Van Inwagen's comments as representative of contemporary views on free will: "it seems to be generally agreed that the concept of free will should be understood in terms of the power or ability of agents to act otherwise than they in fact do" (280, n.20). See also Van Inwagen 1999 and B. Reichenbach 1990, 45 for their definitions of determinism, compatibilism, and free will. For a range of views on this subject, see Timpe, Griffith, and Levy (eds.) 2017.

[18] Both K. Berthelot (2011, 76; 81) and L. DiTommaso (2013, 123) use similar terminology.

[19] Such notions are often underdefined and imprecise, which complicates the matter. L. DiTommaso (2013) offers more precision. He distinguishes between two different contextual referents for divine will and free will. "Divine will" concerns "historic events" and "focuses on the preordained fates of groups of people" (123). By contrast, "free will operates on the level of individuals… as the decision to persevere in the good or persist in evil" (123).

One cannot fault scholars for using contemporary language to render an ancient author's thought accessible to a modern audience. This cannot be avoided. But this particular language is problematic, for the following reason: where determinism is offset by notions like "freedom" or "free will," and where such terms are equated to human choice, at the very least, an incoherence is suggested between determinism on the one hand, and human choice on the other. However, as both determinism and human choice appear alongside one another in apocalyptic texts, it would appear that, in terms of the authors' own understanding, there is no incoherence between determinism and human choice.[20] In other words, the term "free will" suggests incoherence in the authors' thought where there might instead be an underlying coherence. This is precisely what must be examined—and in this case, it is preferable to avoid terms like "free will" or "human freedom," which can skew conclusions to one side.

Determinism necessarily involves a corresponding account of human agency and action. In my examination of apocalyptic determinism, I am very much interested in the authors' accounting for individual action. But because of the problems associated with the language of "free will" or "human freedom," the issue must be approached differently. As such, I avoid the use of these terms. Instead, I focus on the issue of human moral agency.[21] To hold someone accountable for action is to necessarily treat them as an agent. Thus, I approach this issue in terms of the following inquiry: on what grounds are humans considered accountable for their actions? Does this notion cohere with the author's articulation of determinism?

Of determinism specifically, I avoid applying its dominant contemporary framing as "causal determinism." For example, Emanuel Severino (2019) defines determinism in the following way:

> The deterministic perspective argues that events are *totally determined* by the previous state of the world. Such *determination* actually produces them; that is, the former state of the world is their cause, which *necessarily* produces them. Determination is *total* in the sense that it is also sufficient to produce the events. The deterministic perspective is the most radical statement of the 'principle of causality' (56).[22]

[20] Of ancient literature generally, and *4 Ezra* specifically, M. Stone writes that "the preliminary hypothesis must always be that the author's thought was coherent… If so, then when analysis of a term uncovers *prima facie* contradictions or inconsistency, it is possible that the meaning assigned to it is not exact" (1983, 242). Although Stone writes of an author's use of a particular term, I think this is also true of the way in which the author's ideas fit together. After analysis, however, it is entirely possible to conclude that the author's thought is essentially incoherent or contradictory. This is certainly more likely when the text in question involves multiple authorship.

[21] See C. Newsom (2018) for her definition of moral agency in her treatment of the issue in relation to predeterminism in the Hodayot. Newsom defines moral agency as "a self who has (1) personal awareness and knowledge, coupled with (2) emotional investment (desire/aversion), which can be directed toward (3) intentional, purposeful action. Agency is 'moral' in that the person is held accountable for his or her understanding, affect, and action" (194).

[22] For other formulations of causal determinism, see K. Timpe 2008, 12-13; J. Koperski 2020, 110-111; H. White 2020, 4; K. Vihvelin 2013, 3-5; M. Popović 2014, 255; and S. Maitzen 2022, 22-24.

Such formulations, however, exclude deterministic notions that do not entail a cause-and-effect relationship between past and future states of the world. For instance, where one's deterministic views include belief in God, God can be understood as intervening in history in such a way that the past has no necessary or causal relationship to the future. Indeed, it might instead entail a *fissure* where normal cause-and-effect relations do not obtain.

It seems to me that Bernard Berofsky (1971) has accurately highlighted the core of every deterministic system. "At any particular time *t*, what occurs in the world at *t*—or, perhaps, what occurs at or prior to *t*—restricts the future possibilities to one" (5). Leaving aside Berofsky's causal connection between the past and the future, in determinism, the future is only ever conceptualized as a possibility of one. That is, at their most basic level, deterministic systems reject any real possibility for alternate states of affairs. As such, as I seek to trace the evolution of apocalyptic determinism, my focus will be on those passages which seem to deny any real possibility for alternate states of affairs.

1.4. Methodology

My examination of early apocalyptic determinism has three objectives: 1) to outline the conceptual structure of an "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism;" 2) to delineate specific paths of its development; and 3) to examine the ways in which apocalyptic determinism is adapted to a text's specific social function.

The objects under investigation are four early Jewish historical apocalypses: the biblical book of Daniel chaps. 7-12, *The Animal Apocalypse*, *4 Ezra*, and *2 Baruch*. As such, I proceed exegetically, focusing on a literary and linguistic analysis of the texts within their particular historical and social contexts. For each text, to identify the deterministic elements of the author's thought, I focus on those features which seem to fundamentally deny any real possibility for alternate states of reality.[23] I then examine how the author's determinism can be qualified as apocalyptic.[24] I also examine what each text reflects regarding the author's conceptualization of human moral agency to analyze if and how this element is coherent with the author's apocalyptic determinism.[25] Lastly, I examine what apocalyptic determinism contributes to the text's overall social function. I examine each text separately such that each examination constitutes its own chapter.

In the concluding chapter, I contend that, by comparing my analysis of each respective work, the following three things become clear. First, a stable conceptual core persists across each apocalypse. This persistent conceptual core is reflective of what I term an "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism." Second, *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch* reflect two distinct directions in which early Jewish apocalyptic determinism develops. *4 Ezra* follows the lead of its predecessors Daniel and *The Animal Apocalypse*, by affirming an ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked." By contrast, *2 Baruch* explicitly rejects this distinction and instead,

[23] See §1.3.3.

[24] See §1.2.3; §1.3.2.

[25] See §1.3.3.

uniquely emphasizes the role of divine knowledge in relation to both an unalterable future and human action. Third, the texts in question consistently reflect two elements in relation to social function: 1) apocalyptic determinism is essential to the authors' goal of persuasion by providing a coherent structure upon which salvation and God's justice are reconfigured in reference to "the end," such that both are affirmed; and 2) apocalyptic determinism refers the efficacy of individual action back to the bounded dynamics of apocalypticism's conceptual structure such that individual action is best understood as a performative symbol of collective identity.

1.5. The Texts[26]

1.5.1. Daniel chaps. 7-12[27]

The biblical book of Daniel is a composite text. Chaps. 1-6 are court-tales, composed in Aramaic (with the exception of chapter one), in a post-exilic Hellenistic context prior to the Maccabean Revolt. Chaps. 7-12 are distinct from the first six chapters, composed in Hebrew (with the exception of chapter seven), in the genre of historical apocalypse,[28] and are products of the Maccabean Revolt (DiTommaso 2021a, 83). Daniel, a celebrated post-exilic figure of wisdom and sub-altern fidelity (cf. DiTommaso 2005, 219), is the pseudonymous narrative voice of chapters 7-12. His visions locate the difficulties experienced under Antiochus Epiphanes IV within a predetermined history which leads to eschatological triumph for "the wise" and judgement for "the wicked." Daniel 12 contains the only clear reference to resurrection in the Hebrew Bible.

1.5.2. The Animal Apocalypse[29]

The Animal Apocalypse, a product of the Maccabean Revolt (DiTommaso 2021a, 83), is a historical apocalypse. It is part of the *1 Enoch* material (*1 Enoch* 85-90). The biblical figure of Enoch serves as the pseudonymous narrative voice for this text. Like Daniel, this vision locates the Maccabean resistance movement within a predetermined historical schema. This history leads to both an eschatological judgement of hostile foreign powers and to Israel's renewed flourishing.

1.5.3. 4 Ezra[30]

4 Ezra is an historical apocalypse composed in response to the Roman destruction of Jerusalem and its temple in 70 CE. Its narrative context is set during Israel's exile in Babylon, after the destruction of the first temple, and prior to the second temple's construction. The biblical figure

[26] See each text's respective chapter for more detailed treatment of important contextual and textual issues.

[27] Cf. Collins 1993, 1-123.

[28] See §1.2.1.

[29] Cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 1-125; esp. 8; 32-33; 47.

[30] Cf. Stone 1990, 1-47; Stone and Henze 2013, 2-8.

of Ezra, a post-exilic scribe and priest, is the pseudonymous narrative voice. Throughout the course the work, Ezra addresses issues related to theodicy, raised in the context of Jewish suffering at the second temple's destruction. Ultimately, suffering is located within a predetermined historical schema that promises the future salvation and consolation of the righteous, along with an eschatological judgement of the wicked.

1.5.4. 2 Baruch[31]

Like *4 Ezra, 2 Baruch* is an historical apocalypse composed in response to the Roman destruction of Jerusalem and its temple in 70 CE but is set within the same narrative context as *4 Ezra*. The pseudonymous narrative voice is the biblical figure of Baruch, a scribe connected to the activity of the biblical prophet Jeremiah. This work situates Israel's suffering within a predetermined history and understands it in the context of God's righteous judgement. It points forward to eschatological triumph for the righteous, and a correlated punishment of the wicked, while maintaining a particular emphasis on covenantal fidelity to the Torah.

[31] Cf. Stone and Henze 2013, 9-16.

Chapter 2: The Biblical Book of Daniel Chaps. 7-12

2.1. Contextual and Textual Considerations

2.1.1. Authorship

It is clear that, in its ensemble, the biblical book of Daniel is a composite composition (cf. Merrill Willis 2018, 109-111). This is most clearly evidenced in the work's bi-lingual form (cf. Collins 1993, 12-24), in the progressively expanding scope and detail of the historical period surveyed by the apocalyptic visions (cf. Collins 1977, 154),[32] in the diversity of textual materials which suggest that different literary editions of Daniel were in circulation,[33] and in the differences in both form and content which characterize, respectively, chaps. 1-6, and chaps. 7-12 (cf. DiTommaso 2005, 2).[34] The composite nature of Daniel raises the question of the book's authorial unity and how it should be understood.

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[32] "There is a wide consensus that the different dates should be understood as revisions due to the delay of the expected event. When each predicted date passed, a new one was calculated. Some of these calculations may have been added later, by someone other than the original author. In any case, the point to note is that the visions were not thought to be disproved by the nonfulfillment of the predictions. Further, it was not even thought necessary to delete the incorrect figures. The different calculations could stand juxtaposed in consecutive verses. The attitude of Josephus is significant. Daniel was still read and cherished in the first century A.D. because of his precise predictions, which could be re-calculated to fit any period. Ultimately the chronological predictions were regarded as cryptic signs, similar to the mythic symbolism of the visions. They could not be taken as clear definitive indications of the timing of an event" (Collins 1977, 154).

[33] At least some of this textual diversity cannot be simply attributed to translation differences or singular redaction. "The relationship between the MT and the OG is not consistent throughout chaps 4-6. In chap. 4 the order is different and the OG is expansionistic. In chap. 5, in contrast, the Greek is considerably shorter, and in some cases the longer Aramaic text can be attributed to redactional expansion. Chapter 6 has no major structural differences, but the Greek is paraphrastic and shows many differences in detail. The differences between the two texts in these chapters cannot be attributed to a single redactor or translator. In each chapter there are some redactional additions in the Aramaic, which are not found in the OG, and there are also secondary alterations in the Greek" (Collins 1993, 7). So too, M. Segal writes that "the primary textual witnesses to Daniel consist of: (1) the Masoretic text (MT); (2) the Old Greek translation (OG); and (3) the Greek translation attributed to Theodotian. In addition to minor textual variants that may be identified between almost all ancient textual witnesses, these three textual traditions preserve far-reaching differences, especially for the stories found in the first half of the book. These differences are significant enough to lead to the conclusion that the three versions in fact reflect different literary editions of the book (or at least of its first half)" (2016, 4-5). See Collins 1977, 5-6 for his comments the Qumran materials. He observes that "since the tales such as 4QPrNab and Bel and the Dragon seem to have circulated independently, we must allow for the possibility that some of the tales in Daniel 1-6 were also originally independent" (1977, 6; cf. Collins 1993, 72-75).

[34] J. Collins succinctly summarizes the theological differences which distinguish these two sections: "In Daniel 2, Nebuchadnezzar is flattered as the 'head of gold'--hardly the image of Antiochus suggested by ch. 7. In Daniel 6, Darius is a benevolent king who is sympathetic to Daniel. Even the arrogant Nebuchadnezzar of Daniel 3 and 4 repents and converts to the Most High God, and at the end of ch. 4 is raised to new heights of greatness. Daniel 7-12 never envisages the possibility of such reconciliation with Antiochus Epiphanes. Again, Daniel 2, which is allegedly similar to Daniel 7, passes over the fourth, Greek, kingdom without any real condemnation. While that kingdom is said to be strong as iron, and to crush the other kingdoms (2:40), its fall is not brought about by any offence against God but by the relatively innocuous cause of intermarriage, by which it is weakened. Obviously this portrayal of the Greek kingdom is far removed from the "little horn" which blasphemes against God in Dan 7:8. Finally we may note

Any notion of authorial unity must ultimately be found in the concept of a final redactor or redactional stage with reference to the work's canonical form, realized in the Maccabean context (cf. Collins 1993, 38; cf. Grabbe 2021, 91). This entails that certain portions of the text can be read on two levels. The first corresponds to the initial historical and social context of the materials' composition (cf. Collins 1993, 47; 51-52). The second corresponds to how the historical and social contexts of later materials impact the interpretation of earlier materials. Thus, John Collins observes that:

> It is reasonable to assume that the tales in Daniel 1—6 took on new meaning in the setting of the persecution. The kingdom prophesied in chap. 2 was presumably understood in the light of chap. 7. The stories in Daniel 3 and 6 may have been understood as allegories for resurrection, as they were in later tradition (1993, 60).[35]

What is most important for the purposes of the present inquiry is not if the book of Daniel, as a whole, can be read in terms of an authorial unity, but whether or not this is possible for chaps. 7-12. Indeed, in general terms, the expanding scope and detail of the historical period, which is covered by successive apocalyptic visions,[36] along with recalculations of the time which must pass before the end[37] suggest more than one textual layer.

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that neither Daniel nor his friends actually undergoes martyrdom. If these stories had been composed to console the faithful during the persecution of Antiochus, we should expect that they be modelled more closely on the Maccabean martyrs. Significantly, the righteous in Daniel 11 are not preserved from death but are restored to life by resurrection. The court-tales, however, show no belief in resurrection, and no experience of the problem of martyrdom which gave rise to that belief" (1977, 10; cf. Collins 1993, 33).

[35] Elsewhere, J. Collins (1977) writes that "chapters 1-6 are certainly included for a purpose, and are important for the meaning of the whole book, but their significance here is not identical with the purpose for which they were composed" (11). For a more detailed explanation of how Collins conceptualizes the authorial unity of Daniel as a whole, see 1977, 11-19. See A. Portier-Young (2011) writes that, "within the Hebrew and Aramaic book of Daniel, the [court] tales take on new meaning. Although the situation of the tales' heroes and of the *maskilim* are not identical, they are partly analogous. For Paul Ricoeur, it is because of this analogy that Daniel and his friends are an appropriate vehicle to 'express the spirit of resistance to the present persecution.' Thus, the narrative presentations of Daniel, Shadrak, Meshak, and Abednego in exile serve as models or types for persecuted Judeans, and in particular for the *maskilim*, or wise teachers of the second century BCE. They share a responsibility to impart knowledge of God and to remain faithful in the face of domination and death. The heroes in exile embody the ideals of the writers, and their actions constitute a pattern of behavior grounded in faith that the writers urge their audience to adapt" (233-234).

[36] "It is unlikely that the four revelations were produced simultaneously or were affixed *en bloc* to the court tales, since each is designed in part to update its predecessors" (DiTommaso 2010, 514).

[37] Of Daniel 11:12-13 and the conflicting time predications, J. Collins writes the following: "It is not enough… to say that this figure 'is an attempt to make more precise the nature of the three-and-a-half year period,' as if the author were doing multiple calculations for their own sake. By far, the most convincing explanation was provided by Gunkel in 1895. When one predicted number of days had elapsed, a glossator revised the prediction with a higher number. It is a well-known fact that groups who make exact predictions do not just give up when the prediction fails to be fulfilled. Instead they find ways to explain the delay. One such way was to make a revised (presumably more precise) calculation. The recalculation, however, had to elicited by something, most probably by the uneventful passage of the first predicted date" (1993, 400-401; cf. Grabbe 2021, 93).

In response, the following two points are relevant: 1) a composite document, or indeed, multiple authorship, does not, by necessity, entail ideological contradiction or incoherence; and 2) Daniel's extant form infers a final redactor or redactional stage. This suggests a unity of intention and purpose in how the materials stand together. Therefore, while different textual layers may be reflected within the material of Daniel 7-12, my baseline assumption is of a unity in intention and purpose. As such, I assume that a general coherence underlies the materials, except where the textual evidence renders such coherence implausible. Throughout this chapter, I use the shorthand "author" in reference to the text's final redactor or redactional stage.

With reference to the authorial unity of Daniel chaps. 7-12, Daniel 9, perhaps, presents the biggest obstacle. That Daniel 7-12 is a generic historical apocalypse, and that its thought generally reflects the apocalyptic worldview, is not a matter of debate in contemporary scholarship. The particular status of Daniel 9, however, has been the subject of some contention.[38]

John Collins summarizes:

> Perhaps the central issue in the contemporary interpretation of Daniel 9 concerns the relationship between Daniel's prayer and the context in which it is placed. The theology of the prayer is strongly Deuteronomic. Israel is punished for its own sin and appeals to God for mercy. In the visions of Daniel, however, the primary sin is that of the gentile king, and the course of history is arranged in advance (1993, 359).

In other words, Daniel seems to pray in terms of the DP, where human agency is history's driving mechanism and God acts in history *in response* to Israel's covenantal conduct. But this conflicts with the overall apocalyptic historiography that is characteristic of not only chaps. 7-12, but the angelic discourse that follows Daniel's prayer in chap. 9 itself. The question, then, is how Daniel's prayer relates to the theological perspectives of both the angelic discourse in ch. 9 and chaps. 7-12 more generally.

John Collins argues that the theological outlook of Daniel's prayer is substantially, and purposefully, distinct from the author's apocalyptic worldview. "The deliverance promised by the angel is in no sense a response to Daniel's prayer… The end will come at the appointed time because it is decreed, not because of prayer or the repentance of the people" (1993, 360). In Collins' view, "there is an implicit rejection of the Deuteronomic theology of history in Daniel 9" (1993, 360).[39]

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[38] See Collins 1993, 347-348 for a discussion of the authenticity of Daniel's prayer in chap. 9. He observes that "it is best to conclude that, although the prayer was not composed for the present context, it was included purposefully by the author of Daniel 9 and was not a secondary addition" (1993, 348).

[39] L. DiTommaso agrees with this view. "Whatever the case, the function of the prayer in the final form of Daniel 9 is clear: it outlines the Deuteronomic theology of history that is rejected in favour of the Danielic theology of history of 9:24–27 and of Daniel 2 and 7–12. To take this one step farther, the broadly determinist theology of history of the Book of Daniel is deliberately promoted at the expense of the Deuteronomic theology of history under which Israel

Gabrielle Boccaccini (2002, 181-188) takes a different view, contending that Daniel's prayer entails no contradiction with the angelic discourse.[40] For Boccaccini, Daniel's prayer is part of the text's original composition (188). As such, because Daniel's prayer cannot be artificially separated from the text, it should be understood in terms of answering "the call for meaning in history" (188). In doing so, Boccaccini argues that the prayer articulates "a foundational concept of Zadokite covenantal theology – 'the curse and the oath written in the law of Moses' against those who would break the covenant" (188).[41] In Boccaccini's view, Daniel's prayer and the angelic discourse reflect a fundamental coherence and together, represent the author's own outlook. Collins' view is to be rejected, Boccaccini argues, because such a reading renders Daniel's prayer only a literary *topos* (182). "Why should the author of Daniel have wanted to waste such an important spot to accommodate a literary topos, one that was not even consistent with his own thought" (183).[42]

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has operated for so long. The focus of Daniel's prayer and Gabriel's response is the prophecy of 'seventy years,' but the new interpretation of its meaning in the latter carries with it a new way of conceptualising God's role in history. Daniel 9 is therefore an explicit, purposeful rejection of the Deuteronomic theology of history, and not merely an implicit rejection, as Collins states" (2005, 122).

[40] See also M. Segal 2016, 157-179. He concludes that: "Daniel 9 is a literary work that portrays Daniel as fulfilling and enacting Jeremiah's prophecy of seventy years. Following the fall of the Babylonian empire, Daniel reads the letters sent by Jeremiah, and turns to God in prayer. Daniel is rewarded with a new prophecy, sevenfold the original Jeremianic prophecy. The seventy years of Jeremiah, however, do not overlap with Daniel's 490 years, but rather begin a new prophetic era looking towards a different stage of redemption; therefore this longer period is not a reinterpretation of the shorter one, but rather a new, sevenfold prophecy" (178). In a similar vein, A. Portier-Young (2011) writes that "even though the angel will give a different meaning to the desolations the book's audience experience, the prayer's theological assertions are neither incidental nor wholly negated. They are rather actualized, subsumed, and, as Choon-Leong Seow puts it, recontextualized within a new revelatory frame… The revelations provide a further framework, directing Daniel and the book's audience to perceive and understand further dimensions of the reality in which they find themselves and the future that will unfold. While the theology of the prayer and the theology of the revelations may seem incompatible, Pieter Venter describes this literary combination of two seemingly antithetical positions as 'a typical *montage* technique where two ideas are put in a synchronic relationship with each other to form a semantic frame for a new meaning that is 'beyond the sum of the independent meanings." The penitential prayer and the apocalyptic revelation of future-history that follows each take on deeper meaning in light of the other" (253). Portier-Young's comments, however, gloss over the conceptual incompatibility of the two theories of history which are being invoked. True, apocalyptic historiography does not invalidate certain notions which are integral to the DP framework, such as election, covenant, or human agency. But *they are reframed*. Apocalyptic historiography entails a transformation of those concepts that are shared by the DP.

[41] G. Boccaccini (2002) argues that the Zadokite Judaism was "the form of Judaism that was predominant up to the Maccabean Revolt" (72; cf. 43-72). In terms of worldview, Boccaccini contends that "in the Zadokite reinterpretation of the Mosaic covenant, people's accountability is enhanced and God's discretion limited. Generation after generation, people can only blame themselves for their physical and moral failures, and God can no longer miss or delay the chance of punishing the wicked and rewarding the righteous. The Zadokite sense of order was fully satisfied; misfortune always follows transgression and well-being always a sign of obedience" (80). As it pertains to historiography, then, Boccaccini's Zadokite covenant theology is roughly equivalent to the DP.

[42] See L. DiTommaso 2005, 123-126 for a critique of Boccaccini's proposal.

While I am persuaded by Collins' view, Boccaccini poses an interesting question regarding the function of Daniel's prayer. Why would the author take the time to present their apocalyptic historiography (*i.e.* the angelic discourse) in a specific contrast to a rival framework?

A few points might be made in response. First, the prayer helps to explain part of the distress that has been consistently described of Daniel up to this point in the text (cf. 7:15; 7:28; 8:27). While Collins connects this distress to traditional motifs in Jewish literature (Collins 1993, 311; 342), this does not account for the whole of it. 7:28 makes it clear that the contents of the initial vision occupied Daniel's thoughts,[43] and 8:27 makes it clear that Daniel still does not really understand these visions. By contrast, immediately following the episode in chap. 9, Daniel's understanding is a point of emphasis (10:1). The distress which the visions provoke are connected, at least in part, to Daniel's lack of understanding.

Second, chap. 9 begins with Daniel reading the prophet Jeremiah and concluding that the end of Israel's suffering is connected to Jeremiah's prophecy of seventy years (9:2). Thus, as Daniel prays, he does not seek understanding because he believes that he *already* understands (cf. Portier-Young 2011, 248). In Daniel's perception, a major contributor to his distress is thus resolved. But Daniel's understanding at this point is still contextualized by the DP. He believes God acts in history in response to Israel's covenantal conduct, and thus, for Daniel, human agency operates as history's driving mechanism. Israel has sinned, and so, the nation suffers. In Daniel's "understanding," the period of exile prophesied by Jeremiah is coming to a close. Accordingly, he offers a prayer of repentance in an effort to secure a change in Israel's fortunes.[44]

Third, the subsequent angelic discourse rejects the DP historiography which is reflected in Daniel's prayer. The angel, in fact, comes to give Daniel understanding because he has not yet understood (9:22-23). The time of Israel's suffering is both different from Daniel's calculation and has already been predetermined. That Jeremiah's prophecy is still in view in the angelic discourse suggests that Daniel's prayer has, in no way, altered the historical progression that was, by necessity, determined prior to Daniel's prayer. Moreover, the sin in question is not Jewish infidelity with reference to the covenant, but a wicked and oppressive foreign rule (9:24-27). "The end" will abolish this wicked rule that, presumably, results in relief for God's people (9:27). Indeed, because this foreign rule opposes the covenant, it is inferred that covenantal fidelity becomes a source of Jewish suffering; something which is very much at odds within the DP's view of history.

This affirmation of apocalyptic historiography in specific contrast to a rival DP historiography is not surprising given both the DP's prominence in Second Temple Judaism (cf. Nickelsburg

[43] *καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐν καρδίᾳ μου ἐστήριξα.* Citations of the Greek text of Daniel reference the *LXX*. English citations refer to the NRSV unless I indicate otherwise.

[44] M. Segal connects Daniel's prayerful response to Jeremiah's prophecy to Jer. 29:12-14 (2016, 164; cf. Portier-Young 2011, 249).

2006),[45] and the overarching social function of Daniel's apocalyptic visions.[46] Daniel's prayer, therefore, likely reflects a relatively common perception relative to the kind of suffering which was considered characteristic of the Maccabean crisis and the kind of questions it could engender. If the nation suffers because of its sin, how is it to understand suffering when, under the domestic policies of Antiochus Epiphanes IV, it is instead occasioned by covenantal fidelity? Is this context, where does one find comfort, relief, and reprieve? The author contends that no comfort is available to those who seek refuge in the historiography of the DP. As such, underscoring the DP's inability to reckon with righteous suffering[47] serves the author's goal of highlighting apocalypticism as both the key to understanding Israel's present circumstances, and its superiority (in the author's view) in providing relief.[48] The prayer of Daniel 9, then, is definitively not a simple literary *topos*. Lorenzo DiTommaso has the right of it when he states the following:

> The function of the prayer in the final form of Daniel 9 is clear: it outlines the Deuteronomic theology of history that is rejected in favour of the Danielic theology of history of 9:24–27 and of Daniel 2 and 7–12. To take this one step farther, the broadly determinist theology of history of the Book of Daniel is deliberately promoted at the expense of the Deuteronomic theology of history under which Israel has operated for so long. The focus of Daniel's prayer and Gabriel's response is the prophecy of "seventy years," but the new interpretation of its meaning in the latter carries with it a new way of conceptualising God's role in history. Daniel 9 is therefore *an explicit, purposeful rejection of the Deuteronomic theology of history* (2005, 122; emphasis mine).

Thus, although Daniel's prayer articulates a theology which the author does not ultimately affirm, its location and its content are purposeful. As such, Daniel's prayer poses no obstacle to the unity of intention and purpose which characterizes chaps. 7-12.

2.1.2. Date

John Collins details the complications involved in reconstructing the process of Daniel's composition and surveys the resultant divergence in positions (1993, 24-38). While I follow Collins' own proposed relative chronology for Daniel's Hebrew-Aramaic composition (1993,

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[45] Leaving aside G. Boccaccini's specific sociological reconstruction of Second Temple Judaism in *Roots of Rabbinic Judaism* (2002), that he understands Zadokite Judaism as the predominant form of Judaism up to the Maccabean Revolt" (72; cf. 43-72) entails that their covenantal worldview, roughly equivalent to the DP in historiography (see n. 41), was also prominent.

[46] See § 2.1.3.

[47] I disagree with J. Collins where he says that the author does not "polemicize" against the prayer's Deuteronomic theology (1993, 360).

[48] This is no way invalidates the appropriateness of Daniel's attitude of humbly seeking God in prayer. This is similar to the way in which Ezra is commended for his grief at Jerusalem's suffering in *4 Ezra* 10:39, even though the book generally depicts Ezra's conversion from the DP to apocalypticism, which entails a necessary shift in outlook (cf. Stone 1990, 32-33; DiTommaso 2013).

38),[49] for the purposes of the present project, it is sufficient to note only the general consensus of scholarship: chaps. 1-6 were composed in an earlier time and setting than chaps. 7-12 (cf. Grabbe 2021, 100; 109-111; Portier-Young 2011, 233). The Maccabean Revolt (167-164 BCE) and its resistance to the domestic policies of Antiochus Epiphanes IV provide the primary historical and social context for Daniel's apocalyptic visions, and by extension, the book's final form.[50]

2.1.3. Social Function[51]

Regarding the social function of Daniel's apocalyptic visions, John Collins writes the following:

> What we find in the visions is not just a reaction to the events of the Maccabean period but a way of perceiving those events that is quite different from what we find in the book of Maccabees. The persecution is not just the policy of the king and his agents but the action of the last great beast from the sea and part of the assault on the host of heaven. Behind the wars of the Hellenistic princes lies the heavenly combat between the angelic princes. While the language is imaginative and symbolic, it points to a dimension of reality that is crucial for Daniel. *The first objective of the book is to persuade its readers of the reality of this supernatural dimension*. The struggle is not ultimately between human powers or human control. The situation is not, however, chaotic but rather fits a pattern… The very fact that the situation is beyond human control is, in the end, reassuring, for it is in the hands of God, the holy ones, and the angelic prince, Michael (1993, 61; emphasis mine).

In Collins view, the major objective in the apocalyptic discourses is to persuade its audience toward an apocalyptic outlook.[52]

Anathea Portier-Young (2011) understands the book of Daniel as resistance literature.

> Antiochus IV asserted power in Judea by his edict, his army, and his program of terror and de-creation. The writers of Daniel resisted with language and symbol, limiting and even negating the power of Antiochus by writing, proclaiming, and teaching an alternative vision of reality. Weaving together story, vision, liturgical prayer, and revelatory discourse, they crafted a composite work of powerfully

[49] See J. Collins 1993, 24-38 for a detailed discussion of divergent views and the issues involved in dating the composition of Daniel.

[50] See C. Newsom 2014, 23-28 for an overview of the historical context from Alexander's conquest of Jerusalem to Antiochus Epiphanes IV.

[51] See A. Merrill Willis 2018, 114-117.

[52] Similarly, C. Newsom (2014) writes that "the apocalypses in Daniel are manifestly persuasive documents in attempting to convince their audience of the truth claims that they make about the intentions of God for the course of history, and especially about the resolution of the Antiochene crisis. To do this, they construct a palpable sense of reality, cause the reader to desire access to that reality, and construct the seer as a figure of authority who mediates that access. They also construct the audience as persons who are like the seer himself in important respects" (19).

> resistant counterdiscourse to Seleucid hegemony. They also presented their readers with a program of active nonviolent resistance. The writers of Daniel belonged to a group of "wise teachers," or *maskilim*, who formed a primary audience for the book. While the *maskilim* apparently belonged to Jerusalem's scribal elite, they had a mission to "the many" (i.e. the people of Judea, who formed a secondary audience for the book); the writers aimed at their conversion to wisdom and righteousness. They may have aimed to persuade other members of Jerusalem's scribal elite to forsake collaboration with the Seleucid regime (277).[53]

In Portier-Young's view, the primary antagonist to Daniel's proposed system of (nonviolent) resistance was the imperial Seleucid program. The primary target of Daniel's counter-narrative was not the empire itself, but the Jewish elite, and in a secondary way, the general Judean public.

Regarding Daniel's program of resistance, Portier-Young rightly emphasizes distinct approaches in chaps. 1-6 and chaps. 7-12. In her view, the earlier tales of chaps. 1-6 "entail resistance, but also accommodation" (226). For Judeans who lived under Persian and early Hellenistic hegemony, Judeans could embrace an ethic of "'limited co-operation' (and resistance), as long as the law of the king also allowed Judeans to follow the law of their God. The tales in Daniel 3 and 6 portray the potential for conflict between the two laws, and communicate clearly that when there is a choice, faithful Judeans must choose only the law of God" (227). She notes, however, that this situation changed under Antiochus Epiphanes IV. "From this point forward, resistance was the *only* faithful response to the empire" (227). That is, a limited "co-operation" with foreign hegemony falls out of view.

This shift in view is, perhaps, most apparent in light of Daniel's differing approach to the issue of hybridity. According to John Collins (2015), in chaps. 1-6, "Daniel is unimpeachable as a servant of the king, except in the matter of the law of his God. Herein lies his *hybridity*: loyal subject and servant, except when a crucial issue is involved" (296). In chaps. 7-12, however, a very different attitude toward hybridity is reflected.

Daniel Smith-Christopher (2014) offers an analysis of apocalyptic monsters in light of Monster Theory, giving particular attention to Daniel 7. He contends that the mixed monsters of apocalyptic literature reflect a particularly negative attitude toward hybrid identities:

> [Mixed monsters] represent the threat of hybrid identities of exiles (diasporas abroad) and overwhelmed Judeans in their homelands under Hellenistic and Roman overlords. We know from a careful reading of Maccabean literature that the conflict was as much of a civil war at it was a conflict with foreigners—it was a conflict with other Jews who were "mixing" (with Greek thought as well as Greek or Hellenistic Jewish women!). The mixed monster is thus a message of warning to the Jews themselves—"this could be you!" Yet reality dictates that one lives in the world as it is—complete with the temptations of Greek thought, global

[53] See R. Horsley 2010 81-104 for a different take on Daniel's relationship to empire. See J. Collins 2015, 289-307 for a critique of Horsely's view.

> economies, and diaspora opportunities… In sum—the mixed monsters show us not only what frightened apocalyptic writers, but what tempted the apocalyptic writers. Surely not far away from this issue is the temptation of "mixed marriages" and "mixed" identities.

As such, the primary antagonist of Daniel's apocalyptic narrative should not be understood simply in terms of a Seleucid imperial program or regime. The monstrous depiction of hybridity suggests that alternative Jewish systems of thought which include some form of accommodation to empire are included among Daniel's antagonists. That is, Daniel's counter-narrative is not simply aimed at empire as such, but Jewish modes of thought which are understood to co-operate with empire. Consequently, the political and theological in Daniel are thoroughly entangled. Indeed, Daniel's program of resistance is conducted primarily on theological grounds whereby its apocalyptic vision of history counters claims to imperial power as they were reflected or accommodated within Jewish theological rivals.[54]

Regarding the kind of resistance which Daniel promotes, both Collins (2015, 301) and Portier-Young (2011, 277-278) agree that it is nonviolent in nature.[55] Portier-Young also argues that in light of chaps. 7-12, the earlier tales are reinterpreted as resistance practices without a "co-operative" element. "The heroes in exile embody the ideals of the writers, and their actions constitute a pattern of behavior grounded in faith that the writers urge their audience to adapt" (234).

In light of the above, I understand the social function of Daniel chaps. 7-12 to be two-fold. First, the text is intended for persuasion. The author seeks to persuade their audience toward a certain perception of the world. As such, the author seeks to "convert" their audience to an apocalyptic worldview, which understands mundane reality in terms of an overarching and overriding transcendent reality (cf. Collins 1997, 91; 97; DiTommaso 2011b, 221). They are aimed at an audience which can be generally characterized as Jewish as opposed to Gentile, and they assume familiarity with traditional forms of Jewish thought. Second, where "conversion" is achieved or has already taken place, the author seeks to encourage, comfort, and console the righteous in view of contemporary hardships.

2.2. Determinism

That the overall schema of Daniel chaps. 7-12 expresses a form of determinism is evidenced in its portrayal of the future as fixed and as known. That is, the future is presented as a possibility of

[54] Thus, of both apocalyptic literature generally and Daniel chaps. 7-12 specifically, in contrast to R. Horsely (2010), J. Collins writes that "while the apocalyptic writers sought relief and deliverance from state terror and economic exploitation, they were often more concerned with defilement and right worship. The solution they sought might include a restored earth, but it also looked for life beyond this world in the company of angels. Rightly or not, they did not see the world in Marxist terms. In their view of the world, human welfare was inextricably bound up with right worship, and this took precedence over material concerns, although the latter were by no means negligible" (306-307).

[55] J. Collins notes the general view of scholarship that the Maccabees are identified in 11:34 as those who contribute only "little help" to the wise (1993, 66).

only one. The way in which this determinism is expressed can be succinctly summarized as the motif of "the divine plan," although no such term is employed in the text itself. The "divine plan" is communicated through two primary themes. First, history proceeds in an ordered and determined manner such that its movements follow a design or plan. Second, it is clear that this "plan" is sourced in the agency and power of God. Thus, it can be accurately qualified as "divine."

2.2.1. The Divine "Plan"

That history proceeds in an ordered and determined manner, such that it can be conceptualized as "planned," is conveyed primarily by four elements. First, history follows a predetermined chronology. Thus, the sequence of empires and kings progresses along predetermined sets of numbers (7:2-24; 8:20-23; 11); the reign and ruin of kings follow a predetermined chronology (11);[56] passages such like 8:17, which refer to a distinct "time," suggest a coming but certain historical moment (8:17; cf. 8:19-27);[57] and the period of righteous suffering is conceptualized as an allotted, predetermined time span (7:25; 8:13-14; 9:24; 12:7; 12:11-13).

Second, the mythological imagery which is employed in chap. 7, and which continues to influence the imagery of the subsequent visions of kings and kingdoms, reinforces the notion of an ordered history. John Collins argues that the imagery of Daniel's initial apocalyptic vision in chap. 7 is, in part, adapted from Canaanite myth and continuous with the way this mythology is employed in other biblical texts (1993, 286-291).[58] Collins (1977) elaborates on how the use of mythological imagery in chap. 7 is significant:

> The allegorical language of Daniel 7 similarly gives meaning and significance to the events it describes by assimilating them to a primordial pattern. The four kings/kingdoms are presented in Daniel 7 as manifestations of the ancient chaos monster. It should be quite clear that we are not dealing here with a code which can be discarded when it is deciphered. We cannot say that the statement in Dan 7:3, "four great beasts came up out of the sea," is adequately paraphrased in Dan

[56] *καὶ ἐπιστρέψει ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ εἰς καιρόν* (11:28-29). As in 8:17, *καιρός* only makes sense here as a reference to a predetermined progression and outcome. Collins notes that this "conflict cannot be resolved at this point because it must run its predetermined course" (1993, 383).

[57] *ἔτι γὰρ εἰς ὥραν καιροῦ τοῦτο τὸ ὅραμα.* The sense of *καιρός* here only makes sense as a reference to a timeframe which is coming with certainty, and thus, a reference to a predetermined outcome. John Collins comments on the Hebrew text, that קֵץ refers to the end of wrath in 8:19, and is roughly equivalent to "the final period of tribulation" (1993, 338).

[58] Specifically of the beast which emerge from the sea, Collins writes the following: "to say that beasts arise from the sea is not simply to say that kings will arise on the earth, despite the interpretation in Dan. 7:17. The imagery implies that the kings have a metaphysical status. They are embodiments of the primeval power of chaos symbolized by the sea in Hebrew and Canaanite tradition (1993, 289). Regarding this adaptation of Canaanite mythology generally, Collins writes that "what is important is the pattern of relationships: the opposition between the sea and the rider of the clouds, the presence of two godlike figures, and the fact that one who comes with the clouds receives everlasting dominion. These are the relationships which determine the structure of the vision in Daniel 7. No other material now extant provides as good an explanation of the configuration of imagery in Daniel's dream" (1993, 291).

> 7:17, "these four great beasts are four kings who shall arise out of the earth." Even a reader who is ignorant of, or chooses to ignore the echoes of Canaanite mythology and of the biblical Leviathan in the beasts which rise from the sea must concede that the vision has an evocative power, which is lacking in the interpretation. In fact, the interpretation only offers two terse verses as against thirteen verses of the vision, and in many respects it fails to clarify. So, for example, the sea is not even mentioned, and the 'saints of the Most High' are mentioned without clarification in both vision and interpretation. We need not conclude with Ginsberg and others that we are dealing with distinct layers in Daniel 7. Even if this were true, we should still have to ask why the redactor only partially interprets the vision. Whether the interpretation was written by the author of the vision or not, it is not intended to replace the vision or to provide an adequate substitute for it. It tells us only enough to make clear that Daniel was not witnessing a mythical drama unrelated to particular earthly events but an interpretation of contemporary history. That interpretation is provided by showing that the events in question conform to a mythic pattern.

In this way, the imagery of chap. 7, which sets contemporary historical events into a mythological pattern, involves the subordination of the mundane sphere of history to a supra-natural transcendent reality.[59] Whereas in the mundane, phenomenological domain of experience, order and purpose often seem like victims to chaos, Daniel's vision asserts a contrary viewpoint. In this view, the chaos which seems to mark history can only be expressed as part of an overarching and overriding order, such that chaos' end is ultimately guaranteed. That the mundane sphere is subordinated to a heavenly or transcendent sphere is later reinforced by the depiction of heavenly conflict as underlaying human history in chap. 10.

This pattern, moreover, is evocative of the Hebrew Bible's creation motifs which adopt and adapt the mythological opposition of order to chaos (cf. Collins 1993, 288).[60] The evocation of these creation motifs suggests that, while the immediate context of the pattern in Daniel chap. 7 concerns historical Hellenistic hegemony, the pattern which guides history to the end of this hegemony has been in effect since the very moment of creation.

Third, the conceptualization of "the end" functions as history's *telos*. While "the end" can simply refer to an end of Antiochian oppression in Daniel chaps. 7-12, its ultimate conceptualization is

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[59] Where I use terms like "supra-natural," I refer to that part or those spheres of the cosmic order which can be contrast to what is considered mundane. Thus, heaven and not earth, or the angelic and not the human. The structure of apocalyptic dualism keeps such elements distinct, even though there are moments where this distinction becomes blurred (see J. Frey 2014 on apocalyptic dualism; see F. Flannery-Dailey for how dream-visions represent an overcoming of such dualisms). The author very likely viewed these "supra-natural" elements as part of a "natural" cosmic order. Nevertheless, distinct parts or spheres of this cosmic order are distinguishable.

[60] See A. Mandell 2022, especially 134-137 for her comments on Genesis' creation account. See Carr 2020, 1-14 for his comparison of Genesis 1 to the *Enuma Elish.* He writes that "Genesis 1 shows multiple and specific connections the Enuma Elish epic—connections that provide more substantiation of a likely genetic intertextual link than one usually finds between biblical and nonbiblical traditions. This range of connections grounds a reading of Genesis 1 as, in part, a likely response to the Enuma Elish" (14). Accordingly, he frames Genesis' possible references to the chaos-monster Tiamat in terms of a resistant counter-presentation to the *Enuma Elish* (13-14).

as the transcendence of death in 12:1-3 (cf. Collins 1993, 390).[61] What bridges its distinct contextual usages throughout chaps. 7-12 is the idea of an "end" to the suffering of God's people. "The end" of righteous suffering, in its final conceptualization as the transcendence of death and angelic immortality (12:1-3; cf. Collins 1993, 393-394), entails a *fissure* from historical space and time. This final "end," in turn, fills the predestined historiological chronology with purpose. What does it matter that history follows a predetermined path if God's people continue to suffer? That this is a major concern for the author is evidenced by Daniel's prayer in chap. 9 where Daniel petitions God in an (mistaken) effort to secure a change in fortunes for his people. In other words, "the end" *makes* sense of historical suffering; it renders suffering meaningful through its transtemporal distribution of reward and justice. In this way, "the end" signifies both the endpoint of history, and history's underlying rationale (*pace* Collins 1977, 178). "The end" supplies history with a particular *telos*.

Fourth, the certainty of this future is communicated through the detail in which the past (with reference to the author's contemporary audience) is presented as assured future events. This kind of *ex eventu* prophecy is characteristic of historical apocalypses (cf. Collins 1993, 54-55; 377).

Together, these features convey the overall sense that history follows a predetermined course which is ultimately aimed at the *telos* of transcending death such that it is aptly qualified as constituting a "plan."

2.2.2. The "Divine" Plan

That God is the source of this plan, such that it can be qualified as "divine," is primarily conveyed through the theme of kingship.

Kingship is a major theme which permeates the visions of chaps. 7-12 (cf. Collins 1977, 109-110). In general terms, the narrative of the apocalyptic visions is a narrative of the rise and fall of both kingdoms and kings (7; 11). Where "the end" is consistently a reference to the end of righteous suffering, it can also specifically reference the end of a particular ruler who facilitates such suffering (cf. 8:19-25; 9:27).

The ultimate triumph of God's order is also conveyed in terms of kingdom or kingship. Thus, in chap. 7, salvation is presented as both the loss of dominion or authority with respect to the beasts from the sea (7:12),[62] and the bestowal of an everlasting dominion and kingship to the one like a son of man (7:13-14).[63]

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[61] The *LXX* makes it clear that 12:1 (*καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὥραν*) refers to the earlier referenced appointed hour which, in the Hebrew text, is referenced as "the end" (11:40 [*καὶ καθ' ὥραν συντελείας*]; cf. 8:17 [*ἔτι γὰρ εἰς ὥραν καιροῦ τοῦτο τὸ ὅραμα*]). Different contextual referents for "the end" might reflect distinct textual layers, but they do not entail a necessary ideological contradiction. See Collins 1993, 382-383 for his comments on use of the term "the end" in chaps. 7-12.

[62] *καὶ τοὺς κύκλῳ αὐτοῦ ἀπέστησε τῆς ἐξουσίας αὐτῶν*.

[63] In 7:14, both the *LXX* and the Hebrew text are clear that what was lost to the beasts is accorded in even greater measure to the one like a son of man (*καὶ ἐδόθη αὐτῷ ἐξουσία*; cf. 7:12 [n. 57]).

In this theme of kingship, it is implicit that earthly kings exercise sovereignty only as it has been allotted to them to do so. Often no explanation is given for the specific outcomes of their designs, only that they will succeed or fail. In one particular case, however, Antiochus' downfall is said to be occasioned "not by human hands" (8:25). By inference, divine agency is understood to bring about Antiochus' end.[64]

By this inference, the author activates the narrative dynamic of 7:12-14. As previously mentioned, here, the beasts lose dominion and authority while an everlasting dominion and authority is conferred on the one like a son of man. Who, then, is responsible for the removing and bestowing of authority and power? The removal of the beasts' power follows the Ancient of Days heavenly judgement council.[65] It is to the Ancient of Days that the son of man comes on the clouds. So too, it is by God's judgement that the holy ones possess the kingdom (7:22). In this way, God is explicitly identified as the source of dominion and kingship.

The presentation of God as the source of dominion and kingship in chap. 7 should be understood to carry through the rest of the apocalyptic narratives. Where kings meet success and ruin in accordance with predetermined times and chronological schemas, the inference to God as the source of this plan, which is specifically referenced in 8:25 (cf. 11:36; 11:45),[66] should also be understood to ground the historical progression.

In this way, the plan of history which concerns the rise and fall of both kingdoms and kings, and which is ultimately animated by the *telos* of the transcendence of death, is understood to be sourced in God. Kingdoms and kings rise and fall as God has determined they would. In this sense, the plan of history can be accurately qualified as "divine."

2.2.3. The Sociology of the Divine Plan

The "divine plan" defines humanity in terms of binary collectives.[67] On the one hand, there are "the wicked". In most of the chaps. 7-12, "the wicked" are construed simply as hostile hegemonic forces, with specific rulers singled out. Over the course of the narrative, the wickedness of these hostile forces culminates in the person of Antiochus, who is characterized as arrogant, violent, destructive, and hostile to both God's people and God's covenant (8:23-25; 9:27; 11). It also becomes clear that there are those who participate with Antiochus in his wickedness (11:30-32). In 12:1-3, some of "the wicked" rise to everlasting contempt. That the ruin of the wicked is conceptualized as "just," in both historical and transtemporal terms, is made

[64] John Collins comments that "the point here is ideological or theological. Epiphanes' downfall will come because of his effrontery to God and by divine power. Compare Zech 4:6: 'not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit'" (1993, 341).

[65] This is clear in the *LXX*: ἀπέστησε refers back to παλαιὸς ἡμερῶν in v. 9.

[66] With reference to Antiochus' downfall, the inference to God's agency is clear in the *LXX* in 11:45: *καὶ ἥξει ὥρα τῆς συντελείας αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ὁ βοηθῶν αὐτῷ*.

[67] See DiTommaso 2011b for an extended examination of the dynamics involved in apocalyptic sociology.

clear by those passages which contextualize this ruin as coming only after "the transgressions have reached their full measure" (8:23).[68]

By contrast, God's people stand as the wicked collective's correlated opposite. In some places, such as 9:24, it is clear that the nation of Israel is still generally in view. In other places, it is clear that the promise of "the end," where righteous suffering is resolved, has in view a more narrowly defined group within Israel. Thus, in 11:30-35, clearly some Jews have joined Antiochus, while the beneficiaries of salvation are qualified as "the wise among the people" who give understanding to many and, in turn, as those who become wise through understanding what "the wise" teach.[69] In 12:1-3, some of "the wise," "who lead many to righteousness," are resurrected and receive an angelic immortality. "The wise" are distinguished by their understanding and their leadership in imparting their understanding to the righteous (11:30-35; 12:1-3). Implicitly, this understanding pertains to a knowledge of the apocalyptic historiography. This understanding results in both their refusal to participate with Antiochus Epiphanes IV in his impiety, and a willingness to suffer death rather than compromise the covenant.

In sum, the "divine plan" motif in chaps. 7-12 divides humanity into two groups: "the wicked" and "the wise." Ruin and failure are determined for the former, consolation and comfort are destined for the latter. For some of both these groups, transtemporal reward and punishment await. Regarding transtemporal destinies, again, the wicked receive ruin while the wise receive angelic immortality. Although transtemporal destinies are depicted as applying to individuals, they are allotted on the basis of an individual's association to one of these binary collectives. An individual can thus participate in only one of two collective destinies.

2.2.4. *"Apocalyptic" Determinism*

The above exploration of the "divine plan" motif in the determinism of Daniel chap. 7-12 may be qualified as "apocalyptic"[70] in the following ways: first, dualism pervades its thought. This dualism is expressed in terms of ontology, space, time, epistemology, and ethics. Regarding ontology, reality is divided into a mundane, phenomenological, historical sphere, and an overarching and overriding supra-natural, transcendent sphere. Regarding space, earthly history and its politics of kings and kingdoms follows the lead of a heavenly space, such that it does not simply mirror, but is determined by heavenly action (cf. 10). Regarding time, the *telos* of history as the transcendence of death involves an implicit *fissure* between the present historical world and a future transtemporal, or transhistorical, existence, at least as it concerns those who are resurrected post-mortem. Regarding epistemology, the understanding which distinguishes the wise is accessible only through the mediation of a knowledge which originates from the transcendent sphere of reality. Mundane, earthly knowledge, in itself, is not sufficient to break through to understanding the transcendent. Regarding ethics, social reality is defined binarily: there are the righteous wise, and their correlated wicked opposite. There is no conceptualization

[68] At 8:23, Collins references the traditional background of this notion and its implicit determinism, but not its association with justice (1993, 339).

[69] See Collins 1993, 385-386 for his comments on "the wise."

[70] See § 1.2.3. and § 1.3.2.

of an ethical middle-ground. Moreover, in light of history's *telos* as the transcendence of death where reward and punishment are respectively distributed to the wise and the wicked, justice is ultimately reframed as applying to the future transtemporal state.

Second, the "divine plan," and not human agency, functions as history's driving mechanism. History proceeds along a predetermined trajectory which *must* lead to "the end." This "end," therefore, orients all that happens in history. Righteous suffering is only rendered meaningful, and in turn, the predetermined movements of history are only rendered purposeful, in light of this "end." Although apocalyptic ontology and space set the movements of history within a mythological pattern, time is not cyclical. The *telos* of "the end" renders time linear and unidirectional.

2.3. Human Moral Agency

The inverse of every deterministic system is its correlated view of human agency.[71] That the author believes that humans are morally responsible for their actions is relatively straight-forward. The apocalyptic narratives consistently portray antagonist figures such as the beasts, Antiochus Epiphanes IV, and those of their party, to be wicked, violent, and destructive. Their ultimate ruin is thus depicted by the author as a form of justice. Their correlated opposites, the wise and those associated with them, are consistently presented as ethical opposites to these antagonists. The wise are thus understood to be righteous and faithful. Their reward, which is ultimately cast in terms of the transcendence of death, is bestowed in lieu of the suffering which they had to endure in life (11:33-35). This too, is a form of justice. As such, individual final destinies are distributed in a manner which, in the author's view, is considered fitting to the ethical character of one's life; a character which is correlated to the destiny of one of the two collective groups that define humanity as a whole.[72]

While it is clear that the author believes that humans are morally responsible for their actions, it remains to be seen how human moral responsibility is conceptualized. On what grounds does the author predicate human moral responsibility?

On this question, Daniel chap. 11 is perhaps the most relevant portion of chaps. 7-12. It involves a detailed *ex eventu* prophecy which chronicles the actions of several Hellenistic kings. As the author describes royal decision-making and action, it is possible to infer a general conceptualization of human action such that certain factors can be considered the grounds of human moral responsibility.

Although the action in chap. 11 is set within a predetermined historical chronology, there is no sense in which persons act outside of themselves or contrary to themselves. Thus, at 11:3, Alexander rules and "acts as he pleases" (cf. Collins 1993, 377). Alexander is the subject of the

[71] See § 1.3.3.

[72] See § 2.2.3.

verbs "to rule" and "to act," just as human actors are always cast as the subjects of their own actions.[73] In the author's view, human action is essentially self-authored.

The actors in chap. 11, furthermore, are consistently depicted as acting according to their intentions (cf. 11:3). Thus, as already seen, Alexander acts just as he intends (*καθὼς ἂν βούληται*; 11:3). So too, both Antiochus the Great and Antiochus Epiphanes IV act according to their intent or desire (*κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ*; 11:16; 11:36; cf. Collins 1993, 380). Through intent, human action is portrayed as self-propelled.

One further element might be added. Where the covenant is referenced as being forsaken (11:30), an element of knowledge which informs human action can be inferred. Those who forsake the covenant possess a knowledge which qualifies their actions against the covenant as wicked. That is, they knowingly participate in wickedness. It also seems likely that the author understands Antiochus Epiphanes IV to be knowingly wicked. Where he is depicted as a horn who speaks arrogantly against God and his people (7:20; 25), as casting truth to the ground (8:12), as operating in deceit (8:25), and as contravening conventional moral sense in becoming godless even with reference to his own ancestral traditions (11:36-39), Antiochus Epiphanes IV is portrayed as someone who acts against that which is self-evidently true. He knows, or at least should know, that what he does is wrong.

In sum, within the larger framework of a predetermined historical chronology, the author understands that humans really act, that they act with reference to what they intend, and that, certainly in the case of apostate Jews and probably in the specific case of Antiochus Epiphanes IV, their wickedness is an informed wickedness. In other words, "the wicked" understand that what they do is wicked. Thus, one can infer that humans are morally responsible because, through intent, human action is both self-authored and self-propelled; moreover, through knowledge, human action is morally informed.

The above, however, still leaves unanswered the question of how the author's determinism might impact the dynamics of human action. Is there a sense in which the "divine plan" limits human action?

In chaps. 7-12, the "divine plan" does not generally seem to limit the intents or actions of either "the wise" or "the wicked." Where "the end" is invoked conceptually, however, an abrupt closure is brought to bear upon the capacity of "the wicked" to continue in their course. Where this occurs, there is thus an implied *fissure* in terms of the kind of action which precedes God's intervention, and that which proceeds from it (7:9-14; 7:26-27; 8:25; 9:27; 11:45).

Before "the end," the clearest interaction between determinism and human action is portrayed in chap. 11. As I have already argued, human action is consistently depicted as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed.[74] However, the deterministic framework seems to limit the *effects* of

[73] *καὶ στήσεται βασιλεὺς δυνατὸς καὶ κυριεύσει κυριείας πολλῆς καὶ ποιήσει καθὼς ἂν βούληται* (11:3).

[74] I think this is very close to the way in which C. Newsom (2018) defines moral agency in her treatment of predeterminism and moral agency in the Hodayot: "a self who has (1) personal awareness and knowledge, coupled

human action. While humans intend and act, the success or failure of human design does not follow from these actions in a straightforward fashion. Rather, the results of human action frequently diverge from their intended effect. Thus, Alexander's kingdom, in contrast to the power which characterized his rise and rule, will be divided and will not go to his posterity (11:4). Indeed, the results which follow royal action are often contrasted to their intentions (11:6; 11:14; 11:17-19; 11:27; 11:41; 11:45).

At 11:27 (cf. 8:25), the relative success or failure of human designs is specifically related to the "divine plan," which orients history's trajectory to the *telos* of "the end." Here, the "divine plan" dictates results. Although it is only referenced once in this way in chap. 11, this orientation of successful human action toward the "divine plan" and "the end" should be understood to ground the whole predetermined historical chronology. In other words, while humans act in a self-authored, self-propelled, and informed manner, the relative success or failure of their actions is determined only by the "divine plan," which guarantees the progression of history toward the *telos* of "the end."

One further element is worthy of note. In 12:1-13, there is an implied ontological distinction between "the wise" and "the wicked." "The wise" who will ultimately be delivered have already had their names recorded in the book (12:1; cf. Collins 1993, 391). Moreover, "the wicked" continue to act wickedly with no prospect for change; they do not have the capacity for the understanding that qualifies "the wise" (12:10). Accordingly, "the wise," by virtue of their identity as "the wise," shall understand (12:10; cf. Collins 1993, 400). No conceptual middle ground is possible. Present loyalties thus seem to be unalterably and ontologically fixed. As such, a fundamental, ontological, but underdefined distinction between "the wicked" and "the wise" is suggested.

This is not insignificant. For example, in answer to the question of how the action of "the wise" can be self-authored while at the same time the future is guaranteed, the author of Daniel could respond simply that "'the wise' are wise." Simply put, the nature of "the wise" sufficiently explains their action.[75] In a loose, analogous sense, if one were asked to explain why sharks seek out flesh, at one level it is sufficient to say simply that "they are sharks; it is their nature." More, of course, could be said, just as the author of Daniel chaps. 7-12 might have provided further detail on how the identity of "the wise" is sufficient to explain their action. But evidently, the author felt that for their purposes, no further explanation was necessary. Instead, they establish simply that "the wise" are different from "the wicked" such that they *will,* in accordance with their nature, act and choose wisely.[76] This (underdefined) ontological distinction thus bridges the author's deterministic historiography to their conceptualization of human agency. Human nature,

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with (2) emotional investment (desire/aversion), which can be directed toward (3) intentional, purposeful action. Agency is 'moral' in that the person is held accountable for his or her understanding, affect, and action" (194).

[75] The same is true of "the wicked. This (underdefined) distinction serves to establish why "the wise" intend and act in one direction, and why "the wicked" intend and act in another. It does not have any bearing upon the fact *that* both intend, and thus poses no contradiction to the conceptualization of human moral agency as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

[76] There seems to be some clear implications for God's knowledge here, but this is not developed.

expressed in two mutually opposed, morally qualified collective identities, suffices to establish the self-authored nature of human action in relation to the future, which is always conceived as a possibility of one.

2.4. Summary

The author's understanding of determinism and moral responsibility can be summarized as follows:

1. The "divine plan," which finds its source in God, is history's driving mechanism. "The end," ultimately understood in terms of the transcendence of death, orients the "divine plan," and supplies history with a particular *telos*.
2. The "divine plan" determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is defined in terms of "the wise" (*i.e.* the righteous) and "the wicked." With reference to "the end," "the wise" transcend death, while "the wicked" are punished.
3. The individual can participate in only one of these two collective destinies.
4. "The wise" and "the wicked" possess" distinctive ontological, but underdefined, natures. This ontological distinction bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism to their conceptualization of human moral agency.
5. Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action.
6. Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.
7. The relative success or failure of human action is determined by the "divine plan" which orients history to the *telos* of "the end."

There are no fundamental contradictions between the above propositions. Thus, one may reasonably affirm that the author's conceptualization of both apocalyptic determinism and human moral agency is logically coherent.

This conceptualization, however, does raise the question of how individual human action or choice relates to its setting within the framework of apocalyptic determinism. The pertinence of this question is underscored by the ontological distinction made between "the wise" and "the wicked," the setting of human history into a mythological pattern of order vs. chaos, and the way in which human history follows the drama of heavenly action (cf. Dan. 10). In what sense is human action or choice efficacious?

Ultimately, the author presents the names of "the wise" as already written in "the book" (12:1). Thus, individual action or choice would not seem to alter the book's content. From the transtemporal context, which is already known in heaven and revealed to Daniel, salvation is already effected for "the wise," and their names are known. Those who become wise in the phenomenological present would not alter this list. Similarly, this list would remain unchanged even at the appearance of apostate individuals who forsake the covenant. In this sense, individual action or choice does not determine salvation.

But, for both the author and their readers, life must be lived in the phenomenological sphere of the present, where history is still being worked out toward its *telos*. In the phenomenological sphere, individual action or choice is the only means by which one may distinguish to whom God's promise of deliverance actually obtains. It is the only means by which one's individual destiny may be accurately and securely connected to collective destiny. So too, it is the only means by which one may identify their real suffering as meaningful, relating it to the kind of suffering through which "the wise" must pass in the attainment of history's *telos*, and thus, their consolation. In this sense, while individual action or choice may not determine salvation when considered in the context of the transtemporal sphere, it remains an absolutely necessary marker of identity for the phenomenological present. In the end, it is only "the wise" who are saved, "the wise" who are revealed as such through their understanding, fidelity, and perseverance under suffering. That the author employs language particular to the phenomenological present to emphasize the importance of being wise in conjunction to particular actions, choices, or qualities (*i.e.* perseverance under suffering; 11:33-35) is thus no surprise; nor does it entail contradiction with the larger framework of apocalyptic determinism.

This suggests that, in the context of apocalyptic determinism, individual action is more important for its symbolic significance than, perhaps, its "real" moral quality.[77] This becomes clearer as one thinks about individual action at the intersection of the transtemporal imaginary and the phenomenological present. In Daniel, the collective category of "the wise" makes sense of individual action, such that individual action can be qualified as wise. For example, perseverance in Daniel is rendered meaningful by virtue of its connection to "the wise" and their transtemporal destiny. Absent this connection, "the wisdom" of perseverance is not clearly seen. In other words, the transtemporal imaginary, for which apocalyptic determinism provides a structural coherence, makes sense of individual action in the phenomenological present.

In this context, terms like "the wise" or actions like perseverance function as symbols which transcend their literal meaning. Indeed, it is precisely in this sense that John Collins (2015) references Carol Newsom's notion of the "socially multiaccentual" nature of terms and their function as ideological signs. Collins argues that the reference to the "covenant" in Dan. 11:32 does not entail its Deuteronomic sense (298). He then cites Newsom favourably:

> In second century Judaism terms such as "torah," "Israel," "covenant," "righteousness," "what is good in his eyes," and many others were precisely the sort of terms that became ideological signs. But as each group used those terms they did so with a different "accentuation." "Torah" has a different flavor in the Maccabean slogan than it does when the Qumran community speaks of "those who do torah"… Simply put, every ideological sign is the site of intersecting accents. It is "socially multiaccentual" (298).

[77] It seems to me that, in the apocalyptic texts under investigation, morality does not exist as an abstracted category. Action is not connected to "goodness" or "righteousness" as abstracted, self-sufficient categories. Rather, they are always socially and symbolically bound to both the texts' implied community and the apocalypticism's conceptual boundaries.

In this sense, then, the transtemporal imaginary of Daniel renders individual action meaningful by interpreting it and enclosing it within a symbolic loop.[78] Terms like "the wise," or "Israel," or "the covenant," become ideological signifiers for the community,[79] which is itself conceptually bounded by apocalypticism's notional architecture. That is, "the wise" are those who adhere specifically to Daniel's conceptual framework in contrast to alternative frameworks like the DP.[80] Moreover, where individual action is perceived and affirmed to be meaningful within this symbolic structure, the conceptual boundaries of the community are strengthened and reinforced; thus, completing the loop. In this way, individual action is both interpreted by, and reinforces, the community's conceptual boundaries such that individual identity with the collective is both signified and validated. It is precisely at this intersection that one may pinpoint the conceptual efficacy and importance of individual action. Individual action is a performative symbol of collective identity.

2.5. The Social Function of Apocalyptic Determinism

The author's apocalyptic determinism makes important contributions to the text's social function which, as I have already argued,[81] can be expressed as an effort to persuade and console.

First, the initial portrayal of hegemonic forces as mixed monsters and their location within the mythological pattern provides an *a priori* theological reason for adopting the author's conceptual outlook. The refusal to adopt the author's vision of history is also a refusal to identify oneself with the ultimately triumphant force of order. It is to become complicit with the forces of chaos which will inevitably be destroyed. No middle-ground, or mixture of identities, is considered possible. This deterministic and dualistic vision of history powerfully capitalizes on affects like fear and the longing for consolation which, in the context of the Maccabean crisis and its immediate aftermath, would likely have already been present within the audience.

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[78] Cohen (1985) writes the following about community: "community is… a boundary-expressing symbol. As a symbol, it is held in common by its members; but its meaning varies with its members' unique orientations to it. In the face of this variability of meaning, the consciousness of community has to be kept alive through manipulation of its symbols. The reality and efficacy of the community's boundary – and, therefore, of the community itself – depends upon its symbolic construction and embellishment" (15). So too, "behavior does not 'contain' meaning intrinsically, rather, it is found to be meaningful by an act of interpretation: we 'make sense' of what we observe" (17). "It is that the community itself and everything within it, conceptual as well as material, has a symbolic dimension, and, further, that this dimension does not exist as some kind of consensus of sentiment. Rather, it exists as something for people 'to think with'. The symbols of community are mental constructs: they provide people with the means to make meaning. In so doing, they also provide them with the means to express the particular meanings which the community has for them" (19).

[79] By community, I refer to the text's implied community. The community is evidently referred to in the term *maskilim*, but I do not make definitional claims beyond this. "The *maskilim* of Daniel… seem to have constituted a distinct group and to have been active in some way in the resistance Antiochus Epiphanes" (Collins 1993, 69).

[80] In this way, it is very possible for such a conceptually bounded community to exist in spatial proximity to other Jewish groups. In other words, it is perfectly feasible that Daniel's "apocalyptic community" was not physically separated from or spatially distinct to other groups like some sectarian groups could be.

[81] See § 2.1.3.

Second, in their effort to persuade and console, the author seeks to re-contextualize suffering such that righteous suffering is rendered meaningful which, in turn, galvanizes the righteous in their perseverance through suffering. Moreover, a nonviolent resistance to hegemonic forces is impossible without a coherent way to contextualize faithful suffering. That righteous suffering and nonviolent resistance is in view is clear from passages like Daniel 11:33-35 (cf. Collins 1993, 385-386). The author's determinism is essential to their strategy.

In contrast to the DP, where suffering is understood in terms of punishment, righteous suffering is rendered purposeful through its integration into the "divine plan." It is something through which "the wise" must pass in the attainment of righteous reward. But the coherence of righteous suffering is not simply the result of its integration into the "divine plan" as instrumental to righteous reward. The transtemporal context of reward and punishment, the *telos* toward which the "divine plan" animates history, supplies history with a sense of justice that would otherwise be lacking. It satisfies a sense of "rightness." That reward will ultimately follow righteousness and not wickedness, and that punishment will ultimately follow wickedness and not righteousness, counters the apparent inequities of the present moment. It helps supply the actions of the present moment with purpose and thus, is no small motivator for fidelity in hostile circumstances. The hope of future consolation supplies its own measure of real consolation for the present.

Third, the deterministic thought of the author also provides the community with an incontrovertible method of self-validation. The "divine plan" guarantees both the perseverance of "the wise" in their understanding, and the persistence of "the wicked" in their rejection of this understanding. Both responses are integrated into the "divine plan" for history, and thus, both kinds of response serve to validate the system's truth to the community. It is hard to overestimate the conceptual power of a system when all kinds of evidence serve to reinforce its truth claims.

In sum, apocalyptic determinism is essential to the way in which the author of Daniel chaps. 7-12 seeks to persuade and console their audience. It offers the community a conceptually coherent way to think about suffering and justice, it supplies the community with consolation and motivates it to persist amid hostilities, and it provides the community with a powerful self-validating effect.

Chapter 3: *The Animal Apocalypse*[82]

3.1. Contextual and Textual Considerations

3.1.1. Authorship

The Animal Apocalypse (*AA*) is part of a composite work known as *1 Enoch* (cf. Collins 2016, 54).[83] In its present form, *1 Enoch* is "a compilation of five books, each of which appears with its own title and usually its own conclusion" (Stone 1984, 396).[84] The *AA* constitutes chapters 85-90 of the larger work. Here, the pre-diluvian figure Enoch narrates to his son Methuselah a dream-vision which he experienced in his youth. While there is some suggestion of distinct textual strata or interpolation (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 400), the dream-vision represents a complete and coherent narrative, employing allegorical imagery in a consistent and generally clear manner such that no interpretation, angelic or otherwise, is offered to either Enoch or the reader (cf. VanderKam 2004, 279). In this way, despite those places in which different textual strata may be reflected, the *AA* is reflective of an underlying unity of purpose and thought (cf. Assefa 2007, 55; 55n1).[85] I use "the author" as a shorthand to refer to the text's present form and its underlying unity of purpose and thought.[86]

3.1.2. Date

The general consensus of scholarship is that the text in its present form, on internal evidence (particularly 90:9-16), should be dated to the years of the Maccabean Revolt (165-160 BCE; cf. Fröhlich 1990, 629; Tiller 1993, 62-79; Nickelsburg 2001, 361; Portier-Young 2011, 347-348n2; Olson 2013, 1).[87] I follow this view.

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[82] I work primarily with the George Nickelsburg's and James VanderKam's Hermeneia translation of *1 Enoch* (2012).

[83] Les 108 chapitres des livres de 1 Hénoch ne forment pas un tout homogène. On observe aujourd'hui un consensus sur cinq parties autonomes : le *livre des Veilleurs* (ch. 1-36), le *livre des Paraboles* (ch. 37-71), le *livre des Luminaires* (ch. 72-82), le *livre des Songes* (ch. 83-90) et l'*Épitre d'Hénoch* (ch. 72-82). L'*Épitre d'Hénoch* contient *l'Apocalypse des Semaines* (ch. 91,11-17 et 93,3-10). Ces parties ne sont pas composées à une même époque" (Assefa 2007, 2).

[84] See G. Nickelsburg 2001, 7-6 for the specific divisions of *1 Enoch* and the dates of their compositions. See 25-26 for a relative chronology regarding the development of *1 Enoch's* parts.

[85] See Assefa 2007, 55-99 for his analysis on the text's literary unity, itself reflective of an authorial unity.

[86] In his commentary, G. Nickelsburg (2001) frequently refers to a singular "author" for this text. See 360-362 for his discussion of some general features which characterize the community whom the author represents. D. Olson (2013) writes that *The Animal Apocalypse* "was written by a Jew during the opening years of the Maccabean revolt" (1). See Portier-Young 2011, 347-348n2 for a list of those scholars who argue for or assume both the authorial integrity of the book, and its date to the Maccabean revolt.

[87] See G. Nickelsburg 2001, 360-361 for an examination of the issues related to dating the composition of *The Animal Apocalypse.*

3.1.3. Textual Considerations

That the *AA* is both an historical review and reflects an apocalyptic outlook is not seriously questioned (*pace* Horsely 2010, 64-65),[88] although it is not always identified as a generic historical apocalypse. For example, George Nickelsburg (2001) notes several generic affinities to Daniel chaps. 2, 7, 8, and 10-12. But he does not specifically identify the text as a generic historical apocalypse (357). For Nickelsburg, there are three main differences between the *AA* and Daniel's apocalyptic visions which complicate the former's generic identification with the latter: the absence of a divine interpreter for the dream-vision, the comprehensive scope of the historical survey which extends from creation to the eschaton, and the allegorical nature of the imagery which involves a one-to-one relation of symbol to symbolized (357). The most important of these, in my view, seems to be the lack of divine interpreter. However, the dualistic and apocalyptic epistemology (*i.e.* heavenly knowledge from the transcendent sphere vs. earthly/human/mundane knowledge) that underlies the convention of the divine interpreter, regardless of whether it is a purely literary device or connected to some genuine experiential phenomenon, is still present in the manner by which Enoch's dream-vision is relayed. The content of Enoch's message is not accessible to human faculty except by means of heavenly revelation. I, therefore, see no major obstacle in understanding the *AA* in terms of an historical apocalypse, especially in light of John Collins advocation of understanding genre in terms of a prototype (cf. Collins 2015, 12-13).

More importantly, and potentially more problematic for understanding the work's thought, the *AA* seems to share some affinity to the theological outlook of the DP. For instance, George Nickelsburg (2001) observes that within the *AA*, "the author has selected and structured the material according to a scheme of sin, punishment, repentance, and restoration that has much in common with Deuteronomic theology" (359).[89] Although Nickelsburg does affirm that the author's theological outlook differs from Deuteronomic theology (359), there is nevertheless a need to examine the degree to which the author might affirm the DP.

Where 89:10-58 allegorizes the nation's historical chronology from Abraham to the exile, the nation's sin creates suffering; a suffering that includes divine retribution. In this portion of the text, suffering is explained through the covenantal matrix of sin and punishment, and human agency appears to function as history's driving mechanism. Both of these features are consistent with the DP (see § 1.3.3). However, the narrative sets this vision's reception within a pre-diluvian context (Enoch is its recipient). This narrative setting thus contextualizes the entirety of this

[88] Of historical apocalypses and, more generally, of the distinction between apocalypticism, Deuteronomic theology, and prophecy, Horsley writes that "it is not clear how the historical surveys of "Enoch" or "Daniel" differ from the attribution of the prophecies in Isaiah 26–29, 40–55, and 56–66 to Isaiah, or the prophecies of future restoration to Amos, Hosea, and Micah. It is difficult to see how these features make the foreknowledge of 'Daniel' or 'Enoch' or 'Moses' any more deterministic than the oracles of Micaiah ben Imlah, Isaiah, or Zechariah, where historical events are already known in the heavenly council of Yahweh and declared as 'the word of Yahweh,' often as the judgment of Yahweh on oppressive rulers" (65). In his analysis, Horsley fails to distinguish the distinct historiological dynamics at play within, respectively, apocalypticism and Deuteronomic theology (DP). See § 1.3.1 and § 1.3.2.

[89] On this proposed affinity to Deuteronomic theology, D. Olson (2013) comments that "Nickelsburg is dealing with the macro-structure of the allegory, but even with regard to smaller segments the deuteronomic pattern or cycle is difficult to find, and in fact there is much that is against it" (58).

section as a predetermined and fixed progression. That is, in the vision's conceptual and contextual future, which is inclusive of the primordial flood and all that follows, the future is only ever viewed as a possibility of one.[90] By contrast, the DP conceptualizes the future in terms of two possibilities, which are always open and alterable, dependent upon the nation's covenantal conduct (see § 1.3.3). Thus, in this section, although divine retribution is portrayed as a response to Israel's sin, it does not follow that the DP's conceptual historiography is operative.[91] Rather, the DP's historiographical form is imitated, or better, adapted to the author's differing conceptual framework. Moreover, where this section portrays episodes of "restoration" which follow suffering, there is no clear connection to a biblically framed notion of repentance (cf. Lev. 26:40-45, 2 Chron. 7:14; *pace* Nickelsburg 2001, 359; 382).[92] By contrast, in the DP framework restoration *must* follow repentance.[93]

Another strong indicator that the author's theological outlook differs from the DP is found at 89:59. Here, the author presents the nation's history from the exile up to the contemporary present of the Maccabean Revolt. At this point, the nation's history is overlayed by a supra-natural sphere and is dominated by supra-human agents.[94] God installs seventy celestial shepherd-figures over the nation to accomplish a limited measure of destruction for a limited duration of time. Divine intervention, and thus reprieve from suffering, is delayed until this limited or predetermined interval of time has elapsed, to the point that even heavenly intercession is rendered futile (89:76; cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 395). Here, human agency is

[90] This is reinforced at the close of the vision. "For everything will come to pass and be fulfilled, and every deed of humanity was shown to me in its order" (90:41).

[91] It should also be noted that human sin can still operate as a kind of instrumental cause for suffering within a larger deterministic framework, where human agency does not function as history's driving mechanism.

[92] By contrast, Daniel's petitionary prayer (Dan. 9:1-19) does follow these biblical notions (cf. Collins 1993, 347-348).

[93] This is a complicated matter, complicated further by the fact that neither G. Nickelsburg (2001) nor D. Olson (2013) define repentance when they address the issue in their commentaries. Yet, both make it a point of emphasis in their comments on 89:41. In this verse, the author succinctly summarizes the biblical book of Judges as a cyclical pattern of blindness and sight. G. Nickelsburg (2001) comments that "the first half of [89:41] is a pithy summary of the Book of Judges that focuses on the major theme of that work—Israel's apostasy and the repentance that takes place in connection with the rise of new leaders" (382). D. Olson writes that "the opening verse puts the eye-opening *after* the repentance" (2013, 181). Regarding repentance, the biblical notion seems to refer to a re-actualized obedience to the Mosaic law (Deut. 30:9), which involves sorrow for and the confession of sin, often in prayer, to which God responds affirmatively with a change of fortune (Lev. 26:40-45; Jud. 3:9; 2 Chron. 7:14; Dan. 9:1-19). This is consistent with cultic practices which necessitate the confession of sin on behalf of the nation as a requirement for national atonement (Lev. 16:20-22). Respectfully, in *1 Enoch* 89:41, there is no clear reference to repentance. All that is mentioned is the cyclical pattern of blindness and sight. Moreover, where blindness and sight are referential of conduct, it is ambiguous as to whether "sight" precedes, follows, or is co-terminus with practice. Rather, they are clearly connected to leadership or the lack thereof, just as the biblical book of Judges identifies the root of Israel's problem sin as "there was no king in Israel" (Jud. 17:9; 18:1; 19:1; 21:25). See § 3.3.

[94] I use the terms "supra-natural" or "supra-human" with reference to the author's conceptualized universe, where heavenly space is separated from mundane space (angels descend to earth from heaven [86:3], and where angelic ontology differs from human ontology (angels are never represented as animals; thus stars descend to earth from heaven [86:3]). While the author likely viewed both elements as part of a "natural" cosmic order, they remain distinguishable.

explicitly not history's driving mechanism; human agency cannot change the duration of the predetermined period of the shepherds' rule. The divine intervention which does finally end the shepherds' rule, an event which also signals the onset of the eschaton as a *fissure* from the historical era, is, for Nickelsburg, the main feature which distinguishes the author's thought from a Deuteronomic theology (Nickelsburg 2001, 359). As I shall argue, it is this "end" which gives meaning to the course of history as a whole, comprehensive of not only Israel's national history, but of earthly history stretching right back to human beginnings. Consequently, despite the way in which the author employs the traditional historical chronology of the DP's framework, their underlaying theological outlook is quite different. Human agency is ultimately not history's driving mechanism.

As such, given the way in which the author's theological outlook differs from the Deuteronomic theology, one might wonder why the author would bother to employ both a historical chronology which is typically associated with the DP, and why they choose to mimic the DP framework in those places where God intervenes in history in response to the nation's conduct such that suffering clearly follows sin. At one level, of course, this is a question which can be answered by referring to the author's source material (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 357-360). Yet, while this answer is surely not wrong, it is not sufficient to account for why the author chose to write their vision of history in this manner and not another.

Beyond the fact of sources and traditional inheritance, the author's employment of the historical chronology, which is typically associated with Deuteronomic theology, along with their mimicry of the DP's dynamics in their description of the judges and the monarchy, accomplishes at least two things. First, it is a useful tool for the validation of the author's own schema. Where the audience has affirmed this historical chronology in other traditional venues, they cannot deny it when it is employed here. Second, the resolution to the problem of sin and suffering which occurs at God's intervention, and which clearly does not fit the DP framework (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 359), highlights a sense of futility regarding the cycle which characterizes Israel's history in both the period of the judges and the monarchy (ex. 89:41).

In one sense, God's installation of the seventy destructive shepherds over the nation of Israel is a refusal to perpetuate the cycle of sight, blindness, and suffering *ad infinitum* (89:59). At this point in the narrative, God explicitly refuses to accord human agency a central place in the dynamics which drive history forward.[95] Instead, God uses the suffering of the sheep (who are blind, with the eventual exception of the lambs in 90:6-7) to build up a case against a wicked heavenly contingent so that, with one broad stroke, he can resolve the problem of wickedness in both humanity and the cosmos as a whole. This break highlights the fact that, had God simply allowed the cycle to continue, both the nation and the cosmos would be locked in a system where sin and suffering are perpetuated *sans fin*. In this way, by mimicking the DP in the account of Israel's history during the periods of the judges and the monarchy, while also so clearly breaking from it at the start of Israel's exile, the author underscores how the DP is inadequate in addressing the problem of sin and suffering in its cosmic scope. This function, it seems to me,

[95] I have already argued that, ultimately, human agency cannot be history's driving force in the *AA*. See also § 3.2.1.

bears remarkable similarity to the way in which Daniel's prayer functions in Daniel chap. 9 (see § 2.1.1.).[96]

3.1.4. Social Function

John Collins (2016) summarizes the function of the *AA* in the following way:

> The work is addressed to the crisis that led to the Maccabean revolt. This crisis is put in perspective by being located in an overview of all history. The history is treated allegorically, so the emphasis is on the typical rather than the particular. It is also measured out and said to be under supernatural control. The eschatological finale is integrated into the sequence of history and so gains credibility from the accurate detail of the preceding "prophecy." The message is ultimately that the judgment is at hand and that the heavenly angels will dispose of the Gentile rulers as they originally disposed of the Watchers. Unlike what we will find in Daniel, this apocalypse affirms a militant role for the righteous. Yet the victory is in the hands of God and his angels, and the resolution involves a resurrection beyond this life, even if it is located on earth. The Animal Apocalypse then provides the "elect" with an understanding of their situation which not only can relieve anxiety but also can be an effective support for their action (88-89).

For his part, George Nickelsburg (2001) summarizes the message of the *AA* as follows:

> The Vision is a major work of theodicy, but not simply because it declares God's dealings with human beings to be just. Through its panoramic scope, Enoch's vision admits God's false starts but then asserts God's final triumph in the new creation. In spite of angelic rebellions and human sin, the divine purpose will be accomplished. The coming deliverance of a decimated Israel portends the salvation of all humanity (357).

Regarding the community concerned by this work, Nickelsburg argues that "the author of the Vision belonged to a circle that constituted itself around an eschatological revelation that it attempted to promulgate in Israel" (2001, 361). He notes that "a militant ideology is a significant component in the profile of the author's group" (2001, 362), but also contends that "they are not a closed sect; rather they posit for themselves a double public function—to reform an apostate Israel and to exact divine judgement on the nation's Gentile oppressors" (2001, 362; cf. Tiller 1993, 126).

Anathea Portier-Young (2011) understands the purpose of the *AA* in terms of resistance to imperial power. In her view, the author provides a program of resistance through "the vision's description of the lambs' resistance" (379). Thus, the *AA* "envisioned resistance to imperial hegemony through the transmission of revelatory traditions and through prophetic preaching that called and empowered God's people to open their eyes. Lament and intercessory prayer opposed

[96] There is also a strong similarity here to the way in which the DP is employed for its critique in *4 Ezra* (see § 4.1.1).

the destructive power of Antiochus and the temptation to comply with his edict" (379). She also references praise and the practice of Israel's "ancestral religion" (379) as features of this resistance.[97]

In light of the above, I understand the social function of the *AA* in the following way: the author's vision situates their group's present situation within a comprehensive historical vision such that their group's suffering, Israel's historical suffering, and their group's ongoing resistance are contextualized (cf. Tiller 1993, 18). Through this contextualization, the author affirms that a violent opposition to sin has been both necessary in the past, and continues to be necessary in the present.[98] The present instance of Maccabean resistance is both the latest and final example of a historical pattern that occasions the onset of God's decisive intervention. As such, the author seeks to persuade their audience of God's ultimate and imminent triumph over evil and, particularly, that their group is associated with this victory. This latter aspect reflects an intention to console, encourage, and perhaps, convert.

3.2. Determinism

That the *AA* reflects a deterministic framework in its view of history is demonstrated by the fact that the future is depicted as both fixed and known. The future is understood in terms of a possibility of one; no alternative is possible (90:41). Moreover, the narrative context sets the vast majority of humanity history in "the future." Enoch, a pre-diluvian figure, is the recipient of this revelation. Implicitly then, the course of human history, in its entirety, has been set since before humanity's first movements.

The way in which this determinism is expressed can be succinctly summarized in the motif of "the divine plan," although no such term is employed in the text itself. History proceeds along a predetermined trajectory such that history's course, when viewed from the perspective of "the end," possesses a rationale. In this way, history can be qualified as "planned." Moreover, because God is the source of this plan, it can be qualified as "divine".

3.2.1. The Divine "Plan"

The sense of history's "plan," such that an overall and underlying rationale can be discerned in history's progression, is conveyed by three principal elements: 1) time is conceptualized as a set of predetermined intervals; 2) human action is, to some degree, predetermined; and 3) "the end" supplies history with a particular *telos*.

First, the conceptualization of time as a set of predetermined intervals is made clear once the narrative arrives at the period of Israel's exile (89:59-64). From this point on, until the moment

[97] While lament and intercessory prayer might be "right" in terms of attitude with respect to the nation's suffering and apparent doom (both Daniel and Ezra in *4 Ezra* display similar sensibilities), and while they would also be effective practices for cultivating an attitude which resists imperial claims to power, conceptually, these practices are not effective in procuring a change in fortune in the *AA*. Although God responds to the nation's cries as they suffer under Egypt (this is not technically intercession; 89:15-16), both Enoch, and the angel who records the deeds of the destructive shepherds, appeal to God for intervention. Both appeals go unanswered (89:57-58; 76-77).

[98] I am not arguing that this resistance operates *only* in militaristic terms.

of God's end-time intervention, the governance of Israel is handed over to a series of seventy celestial beings to wreak havoc on the nation (Nickelsburg 2001, 390-391). While God knows that these beings will transgress the limits of destruction which he has set for them, their destructive power is not unlimited. Rather, their power is limited in both quantity (there are seventy "shepherds") and scope—each "shepherd" possesses the power to destroy only within the predetermined time or duration of their rule (89:68). *In toto*, the predetermined duration of the shepherds' rule is represented as a sequence of hours: 12, 23, 23, and 12 respectively (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 392). Moreover, G. Nickelsburg (2001) identifies a clear three-era structure to this vision's history, where the first and second eras follow the pattern of creative beginning, disintegration due to sin, and termination by divine judgement (354). This parallel structure contributes to the sense of order which is emphatically conveyed by the temporal periodization of hours.[99]

Second, the way in which different figures are allegorized in the text suggests that human action is predetermined in accordance with an underlying ontology. The author uses both colour and specific animal species to indicate what kind of actions will follow from the allegorized figures. For example, the colour white is employed to signal righteousness, while black is employed to signal wickedness (ex. 85:3).[100] In function, colour serves to qualify action rather than the inverse. Thus, the figures are often introduced in reference to their colour before action is depicted. In this way, colour provides a morally qualified precursor which creates expectations in the audience regarding the actions to follow.

Similarly, various animal species are employed to indicate the nature of the figures they represent. For example, humans are invariably represented by some kind of animal species. In the primordial period, these are different kinds of cattle. In the patriarchal period, through to the author's contemporary present, the nation of Israel is represented as sheep, their kings, rams, while the nations are represented as different kinds of predators or unclean animals: lions, leopards, wolves, pigs, eagles, etc. (ex. 86:10). Conversely, angels in the primordial period are represented as stars, while their giant hybrid offspring, whom they bear *via* human women, are represented as different kinds of "mixed" or unclean species: elephants, camels, and asses (ex.

[99] "Time on earth is divided into three ages: the remote past, the present, and the ideal future. Each age begins with a single patriarch represented by a white bull" (Tiller 1993, 15). "The author views human history as the account of progressive deterioration, with evil and violence (both human and demonic) progressively increasing… the first age is that of the remote, mythical past and consists exclusively of the account of Adam and Eve and their children and the fall and judgement of the Watchers (including the Deluge). The second encompasses the author's own present and corresponds to reality as he experiences it. The author uses the mythical events of the first age to interpret the negative conditions of life in the second. Whatever characterizes the first age also characterizes the second and serves as the model by which the second age can be understood" (Tiller 1993, 18).

[100] "The colour of the animal indicates the character of the given human figure: white bulls and cows stand for the elect, like Adam (*1 En.* 85, 10-8). People considered as sinners—like Cain and his descendants—are symbolized by black bulls and cows. Red bulls stand for Abel and Ham, second son of Noah (89, 9); this colour has a neutral significance, and figures symbolized by red play no important role in the narrative" (Fröhlich 1990, 630; cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 371).

86:5; cf. Lev. 11).[101] This difference in imagery with respect to celestial beings suggest that the imagery indeed expresses an underlying ontological distinction. Celestial beings are not depicted as animals because they are not human. Figures that transcend normal human existence do not simply become different animal species, but men in the manner of celestial beings. That is, persons like Noah and Moses (89:1; 36) come to participate in an angelic life.

The colour-coded and species-specific imagery, where some distinction in ontology is being made, suggests that action follows nature.[102] What a person is explains, to some degree, what that person does. White cattle are always good. Black cattle are always wicked. Wild, unclean, and predatory species are always violent and wicked. Sheep are neither inherently good nor wicked.[103] While the text leaves unexplained what precisely is responsible for these distinct natures, the transformation of all species into cattle at the eschaton, which signifies an absolute end to wickedness, reinforces the impression that action follows nature (90:38). After this transformation, a lapse into wickedness is no longer imaginable.

In response to the way in which the transformation of human nature is not only depicted as possible but a future certainty, one might wonder why this transformation is delayed in the narrative. Is there a purpose for this delay? Of course, one answer concerns the socio-historical circumstances of the author's present, where human nature was definitively not transformed, and thus, such a phenomenon must be located in the future. But this is not the most interesting answer, and it does explain the conceptual integrity of its location within the narrative. Is there a notional or conceptual construct in the text itself that provides a coherent explanation for this delay? This question is not simply a parenthetical literary or textual curiously. Rather, it helps to highlight the third major deterministic feature in the text: "the end" functions to provide history with an overarching and underlying rationale such that history advances according to a particular *telos*.[104]

Just prior to God's end-time intervention at 90:18-19, the record of the celestial shepherds' transgressions is presented to God. Then, in one fell swoop, the forces arrayed against and assaulting the sheep are destroyed (90:17-19). From there, the scene shifts to a throne which is constructed in the land of the sheep for the Lord of the sheep. Books are opened. Judgement is executed against the angels of the primordial period who copulated with human women, against the blinded sheep, and against the seventy celestial shepherds. They are all found guilty of being

[101] "The appearance of new species suggests the bastardly mixture mentioned in [*1 En.*] 9:9 and 10:15, and at least the elephants and camels conjure up an image of grotesqueness" (Nickelsburg 2001, 373-374).

[102] I use the term "nature" as a loose shorthand to indicate that some underlying ontological facet explains action. Because the author does not indicate how such a nature is determined (for example, it is not clear why Eve brought forth "many black bulls and cows" [85:8; cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 372; Olson 2013, 149]), the term cannot be more precise. That an ontological feature is being indicated by the species-specific and colour-coded imagery is indicated by the differing imagery used to represent celestial beings, and the way in which all species are transformed into white cattle at the eschaton.

[103] With respect to action as it concerns the sheep, the imagery shifts to either blindness or sight. See § 3.3.

[104] The sequence of God's intervention, judgement, and the establishment of the new era is what I refer to as "the end" in the *AA*.

sinners and are punished (90:20-27). This judgement then gives way to a new era where all of humanity is transformed and where wickedness can no longer be found (90:28-37).

In this fashion, with a series of swift actions, God comprehensively remedies all that ails the cosmos. This cosmic remedy helps to explain both the necessity of Israel's suffering in exile, as well as the evil which has marked humankind throughout this vision of history. When Israel goes into exile, God knows full well that the celestial "shepherds" intend to surpass the limits of the destruction which he has entrusted to them. As a result, God also commissions a celestial scribe to record in exact detail how these shepherds transgress (89:61-63). This does not suggest divine ignorance with reference to the shepherds' activity (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 390). Rather, it is a strategy by which God provides for himself a detailed record of transgression to justify divine retribution (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 390). In other words, God requires justice in retribution; this record secures that justice. In this way, the nation's suffering in exile, through to the author's contemporary present, takes on a purpose which transcends mundane concerns. Israel's history, which includes suffering, and includes the evil that has pervaded humankind throughout this vision's history, is part of God's strategy to remedy cosmic wickedness. "The end," which distributes a transtemporal justice to sinners both celestial and human, and which results in the transcendence of death for the righteous, is the cosmic remedy for which human history has been intended; for which human suffering has been instrumental. "The end," therefore, makes sense of human history; it provides history with a rationale.

George Nickelsburg (2001) writes that "the beginning of the final era is a return to the primordial beginning" (354; 404). But this is not exactly right. The vision's narrative setting at a time which predates the deluge suggests that this plan to remedy cosmic ills had been in operation since before the deluge. This contextual setting, in combination with the way in which human history is intended for "the end," reverses the flow which is implicit in Nickelsburg's statement. That is, because "the end" is known to God from the outset of human history, the end is not a return to the beginning. Rather, "the end" provides a pattern for the beginning, which is ultimately brought to completion in "the end."

It should be noted here that this vision does not narrate all of cosmic history. Its beginning is the beginning of human history. When cosmic forces enter the narrative, and where these forces are depicted as wicked, both their existence and their wickedness are taken as a given. Conceptually, then, the cosmic problem of wickedness overlays the human problem with wickedness. It is not insignificant that two of the three groups which are judged at "the end" are groups of celestial sinners. Thus, to remedy wickedness comprehensively, it must be addressed at the cosmic level.[105] The purpose of human history, then, from its beginning, is God's action plan regarding this cosmic plight. Indeed, the vision makes it clear that it is only through human history that this cosmic problem is finally resolved. In this sense then, history is structured in just such a way that "the end" does not simply recall prior epochs. "The end" does not so much as point backwards as the beginning reaches forward. The primordial or patriarchal bulls, the judgement at the flood,

[105] This might seem to give further credence to G. Nickelsburg's (2001) proposal for understanding a demonic agency behind some of the instances of human sin which are underexplained in the narrative, such as in the case of Cain (371) or the cases of Israel's blinding (381). The reference to the shepherds blinding in 89:74, however, seems problematic for this viewpoint.

and the first house of the Lord (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 404-405), are all examples of the way in which the author's allegorical references to the past (for the audience) reach forward to "the end," where human history ultimately finds its rationale. There is thus a dynamic flow between "the end" and the beginning of human history. In one sense, history's temporal progression is linear and unidirectional in its march forward toward "the end." In another sense, "the end" exerts a backwards force on history such that it unalterably pulls the present toward itself, creating a kind of closed causal loop.

It is now time to return to the initial inquiry regarding the delayed transformation of human nature in the narrative. Does this delay serve a purpose? The delay is necessary in the sense that human history, which includes the cycle of sin and punishment, and which in turn necessitates Israel's eventual suffering under the celestial shepherds, is designed in just this way to effect divine retribution on cosmic wickedness. In this conceptualization, the cosmic remedy would not be possible without this delay, and thus, would not be possible without some degree of predetermined human action to render this remedy certain.

Importantly, just as was the case with Daniel, this ontological (underdefined) distinction seems to bridge the author's deterministic historiography and their conceptualization of human moral agency.[106] On the question of how human action can be self-authored while the future, at the same time, can be absolutely guaranteed, the identity or nature of "the righteous" is considered sufficient to explain the actions of "the righteous." "The righteous," in accordance with their nature, *will* act righteously; "the wicked" *will* act wickedly. It seems to me that there are clear implications here for conceptualizations of God's knowledge (for example, God knows how the celestial shepherds are going to transgress his commands). But this is not explicitly developed (see § 2.3 for a more complete explanation).

In sum, the author's determinism is conveyed through the conceptualization of time in predetermined periods and patterns, and through a depiction of human action as predetermined in accordance with an underlying ontology. Both of these elements serve to underscore how "the end" supplies history with a particular *telos*, such that human history possesses an overarching and underlying rationale. In this sense, one can speak of the author's determinism as conveying a kind of "plan."

3.2.2. The "Divine" Plan

Where the author's deterministic historiography can be aptly qualified as a "plan," because God is identified as the source or primary agency behind this plan, it may also be aptly qualified as "divine."

That God is the source of this plan is relatively straightforward. Where the vision shifts its focus to the Jewish exile, God is unambiguously identified as authorizing the governance of the seventy celestial shepherds over Israel (89:59-64). But God is also portrayed as the author of the shepherds' judgement and the process which leads to this event. When the records of celestial

[106] Because the ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "sinner" occurs here in my argumentation, I must anticipate my conclusions in § 3.3.

transgression are finally presented to God (90:13-19), God carries out judgement as he intended from the outset of the shepherds' rule.

Because the rule of the seventy shepherds, along with their inevitable downfall which their governance enables, is portrayed as the unalterable result of history's trajectory, God is implicitly cast as the author of the entire trajectory which leads to the shepherds' judgement. That is, God's agency and intention underlay the entire progression and chronology of human history. As such, when various figures are described as being summoned or sent to the sheep, such that the course of history shifts (89:17; 29; 42; 45; 51-53), God is understood to be moving history forward (even if the nation does not respond positively).

One further textual point might underscore this sense of God's intention and agency. At 89:58, as God abandons the first temple and hands the nation over to devastation and exile, God is said to rejoice "because they were devoured and swallowed and carried off." P. Tiller (1993) argues that God's rejoicing here should be understood as asserting "the rightness of God's action" (322).[107] While this may not be completely wrong, it does seem odd, particularly when compared to the grief which both Enoch and the celestial scribe express at the suffering of the Jewish nation (89:57; 76; 90:3).

The vision's next reference to God's rejoicing, perhaps, helps to nuance or clarify the earlier instance. In the eschaton, all of the sheep that had been destroyed and dispersed are gathered in God's eschatological house. Here, God, as "the Lord of the sheep," rejoices in their goodness and their return to the house (90:32-36). While G. Nickelsburg understands a possible reference to a literal resurrection here,[108] he notes a connection between God's joy in this passage with 89:58, the verse which referenced God's joy at the sheep's destruction. "The Lord's previous wrath at the unjust destruction is now replaced with divine joy that the sheep are all good and have returned to the house (contrast 89:58)" (2001 406). Curiously, Nickelsburg does not refer to God's earlier joy in the sheep's destruction.

It might seem odd that God rejoices at both the sheep's destruction and their salvation, but perhaps these two instances of joy are not so disparate. If we approach God's joy in 89:58 from the perspective of "the end," Israel's judgement secures God's cosmic triumph over evil. Thus, while both Enoch and the celestial scribe are, not inappropriately, struck with grief at the nation's suffering, God's joy in the nation's devastation is not simply a celebration of the rightness of judgement. It is a joy that could only be articulated by one who knows "the end" from the beginning. In the vision's narrative context, Enoch, the celestial scribe, the sheep, as well as the celestial subjects of eschatological judgement, do not yet know the plan for "the end." Thus, Enoch and the scribe cannot rejoice in the nation's suffering. By contrast, God, the author of this cosmic remedy, is the only one who knows "the end." Therefore, God is the only one who can and does rejoice at the nation's suffering.[109] God's rejoicing in 89:58, when viewed from the

[107] On this verse, G. Nickelsburg (2001) references Tiller in a footnote (386n82).

[108] Tiller (1993) writes unambiguously that "this is a reference to the resurrection of the dead" (380).

[109] This is certainly a subaltern twist on the way in which suffering under foreign hegemonic powers is perceived. Suffering is recontextualized as triumph.

perspective of "the end," underscores the way in which his intention and agency have been at work such that human history as a whole secures God's remedy to the cosmic problem of evil.

In sum, because God's intention and agency are depicted as underlying human history's unalterable progression and trajectory, the "plan" can be aptly qualified as "divine." It is this "divine plan," as it supplies history with a both an underlying rationale and an overarching *telos*, that functions as history's driving mechanism.

3.2.3. The Sociology of the Divine Plan

In the allegorical imagery of the *AA*, humans are depicted in the guise of a wide range of animal species. The imagery ranges from cattle, to sheep, to various predatory and unclean animal species. The animalistic imagery differs from the imagery used of celestial beings. These are depicted as men. Moreover, where the Jewish nation is depicted as sheep, some celestial beings are depicted as shepherds. This does not simply suggest ontological distinction, but ontological hierarchy.

Despite this varied imagery, a fundamental distinction is made throughout the text; one that is most readily seen at the final judgement (90:20-27). Here, sinners, both celestial and human, are judged. Following this, the remaining sheep are characterized as "good," and as seeing "good things" (90:33-35). The remaining beasts and birds express obeisance to the sheep, in contrast to the hostility which previously characterized these species (90:30). In the eschaton, at the birth of an eschatological white bull, these beasts (*i.e.* nations) are all transformed into cattle. This transformation represents a change of nature. It also secures the eschaton against the kind of degeneration and failing which marked the historical epochs (90:37; cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 407). Here, just as God rejoiced over the both the goodness of his resurrected sheep and their return to his house, so too, the Lord of the sheep rejoices over the white cattle. In this context, violence and death are understood to exist only as distant memories.

In this way, "the end" and the eschaton neatly divide all of humanity along a collectively defined ethical binary: "sinners," who are judged in a transtemporal and transhistorical future, and "the good," who flourish such that death is transcended.[110] These are the only possible outcomes for human life. Moreover, once this collectively defined ethical binary is perceived, it can be traced backwards through the vision's portrayal of human history.[111] In sum, humanity is fundamentally defined in terms of two collective groups: a violent, sinful collective, and a good, obedient collective.[112] The destinies of both groups are fixed and distributed in the eschaton.

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[110] The transcendence of death is understood in terms of both resurrection (90:33; cf. Tiller 1993, 380), and in death's absence. Over the course of the narrative, death is always connected to either violence or retribution. Both of these elements vanish in the transtemporal, transhistorical future.

[111] This ethical binary also applies to celestial beings. Some are judged as sinners; others work obediently to fulfill God's design.

[112] It is unclear whether the transformation of the nations into cattle preserves a distinction between the nations, as cattle, and Israel, as sheep. It is probably more significant that the imagery of Adam as a white bull, in his identity as the progenitor of both Israel *and* the nations, points forward to the eschatological bull-figure, whose appearance

3.2.4. "Apocalyptic" Determinism

The author's deterministic historiography can be accurately qualified as apocalyptic in the following ways. First, it is pervaded by dualism. With reference to temporality, the historical epochs are contrast to a transtemporal and transhistorical eschaton. With reference to space, the celestial sphere is set against the earthly/mundane sphere. With reference to ontology, celestial beings are contrasted with and set over humankind. With reference to epistemology, transcendent revelation is set over against what is accessible to mundane epistemic faculties such that, without revelation, even celestial beings do not yet know "the end" of the "divine plan." Regarding sociology, the collective "good" are contrast to the collective group of "sinners" such that every being is ultimately related to one of these two ethical spheres. The eschaton represents a blurring of the cosmos' dualistic structure, where wickedness disappears from view.

Second, "the end" orients everything. The dynamic flow between "the end" and the beginning entails a linear and unidirectional progression such that "the end" is history's *telos*. Moreover, because "the end" is history's *telos*, it supplies history with an underlying rationale, perceptible only through revelation. In relation to "the end," and only in relation to "the end," human history makes sense—or rather, "the end" *makes* sense of human history. In this way, because God's agency and intention lie at the source of this "end," such that history moves unalterably toward its *telos*, the "divine plan," and not human agency, functions as history's driving mechanism.

3.3. Human Moral Agency

It is clear that the author considers humans responsible or accountable for their actions. The retribution which the nation of Israel experiences in response to their sin, and the judgement of the blind sheep in the eschaton both exemplify this reality (89: 54-58; 90:24-27). On what grounds, then, does the author predicate human moral responsibility?

One of the clearest passages which addresses this issue has to do with the celestial shepherds. At the final judgement, they are tried and found to be sinners (90:24-27). How, then, is their sinfulness characterized in the text?

First, God is primarily concerned with action. God keeps track of the shepherds' "deeds," and this becomes the basis for final retribution (89:63). Where the shepherds act, they are considered the authors of their deeds. Action is self-authored. Second, the shepherds are told to destroy only those whom God tells them to destroy (89:59-60). Accordingly, they are tried with specific reference to how they have exceeded this mandate (89:62). The assumption here is that they had an appropriate knowledge and understanding which qualified their actions as obedient or disobedient (or other roughly synonymous categories); their action is informed. Third, it is clear

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precipitates the transformation of the beasts into white cattle (90:37-38). This transformation signifies a reversal in the degeneration which occurred in human history, where white bulls began to bring forth varied species and colours, which are associated with violence and wickedness (85:8). Beyond a possible distinction between white cattle and sheep, it is more important that "the Lord of the sheep" is said to rejoice over both the sheep and the white cattle. This joy over both groups mitigates against hard and fast differentiation (90:33; 38). See P. Tiller 1993, 388; G. Nickelsburg 2001, 407.

from the text that the shepherds are not acting under compulsion or contrary to either their nature or desire. That is, they do as they intend such that their action is self-propelled (cf. 89:65). Thus, as the celestial beings are tried, they are considered responsible for their actions because action is conceptualized as being essentially self-authored, self-propelled, and informed.

Is this metric of moral responsibility transferable to humans? At the final judgement, no distinction is made between the celestial beings and humans. Both are judged without distinction in their identity as "sinners." Thus, it follows that, for the author, there is likely a similar set of parameters which define human moral responsibility. Humans are considered responsible for their actions because action is conceptualized as being essentially self-authored, self-propelled, and informed.[113]

In relation to this matter, the author's use of the imagery of blindness and sight raises questions relative to human capacity. Whereas in real life, blindness refers to a certain incapacity relative to sight, is this imagery used by the author to express a similar limitation on certain faculties?[114]

In response to this, it must be clearly stated at the outset that "blindness," as it is employed by the author, does not abrogate moral responsibility for either celestial beings or humans. The shepherds who are judged are said to have been blinded (89:74) and the only sheep to be judged at "the end" are those who are described as having been blinded (90:26). Therefore, if blindness does suggest some facultative limitation, it does not, in virtue of this limitation, abrogate moral responsibility.

It also should be noted that blindness is not simply a feature limited to the sheep (*i.e.* the Jewish nation). The Egyptians, as wolves, are said to have been blinded (89:21), along with the aforementioned celestial shepherds.

Three other elements are connected to the motif of blindness. First, with reference to the Jewish people, blindness is always connected to failings with respect to cultic practice.[115] Blindness is referenced in the golden calf episode (89:32-35), in the period of the judges (89:41), in the abandonment of the first temple (89:54), in the author's conceptualization of the innate pollution of the second temple (89:74), and in the resistance to advocates for religious reform in the context of the Maccabean crisis (90:7). Second, national blindness corresponds to an absence of (good) leadership. Thus, the nation is blinded as Moses leaves the people to their own devices in his ascent of the mountain, in the sequence of judges,[116] and during the governance of the

[113] Part of the difficulty in evaluating this issue is the nature of the text itself. As a vision-allegory, the narrative is selective and the details sparse. It assumes a great deal of familiarity with the larger matrix of traditional Jewish thinking.

[114] See G. Nickelsburg 2001, 380-381; D. Olson 2013, 61-84; and J. VanderKam 2004. Olson's take is interesting, but his proposal is hampered by the assumption that freedom is synonymous with human choice, and that determinism is not coherent with freedom (2013, 80).

[115] See Nickelsburg 2001, 380.

[116] Indeed, the author uses this motif efficiently to communicate a major theme in the biblical book of Judges, that the nation strayed because "there was no king in Israel" (Judg. 17:6; 18:1; 19:1; 21:25).

seventy celestial shepherds. Third, blindness is absolutely a determinative quality with respect to action. Blindness always correlates to wicked action; sight always correlates to good action. Indeed, one of the primary characteristics of "the good" in the eschaton is that the sheep have their eyes opened to see good things, and there were none who did not see (90:35).

The text does not explain exactly how one's vision is blinded or opened. Rather, it is unexplained and most often expressed as something which happens to the figures in question (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 381). George Nickelsburg speculates as to whether there might be a demonic agency behind the blindness (2001, 380-381), something that is not explicit in the text but certainly possible. The more important question is whether it is possible to locate precisely to what the imagery of sight and blindness refers. George Nickelsburg suggests that sight concerns the law revealed by Moses (2001, 381; cf. Tiller 1993, 294; Assefa 2007, 255-262).[117] But this is unlikely as blindness afflicts both the Egyptians and the celestial shepherds. Daniel Olson suggest that sight concerns the experience of the glory of God (2013, 72), but this doesn't explain how blindness is connected to the celestial shepherds who, presumably, have experienced the glory of God. It seems to me that the only answer which does justice to the way in which this motif is utilized is to understand blindness and sight in terms of a more generalized conception of Enochic revelation; that is, the revelation which is associated with the figure of Enoch, and which is referential of the larger Enochic material available to the author (cf. Nickelsburg 2001, 50-51). Indeed, the motif of blindness and sight are likely connected to the vision itself. At 85:3, Enoch presents the vision in terms of sight: "I *saw* a vision on my bed" (emphasis mine). At 90:39 at the vision's close, Enoch again highlights sight: "I *saw* everything, and this is the vision that I *saw* while I slept" [emphasis added]. As a result, all those figures who are blinded in the vision are explicitly contrasted to the figure of Enoch, who has sight even as he sleeps.[118] In this sense, both the Egyptians and the celestial shepherds are blind because they do not perceive God's grand design and thus bring destruction upon themselves through their own actions. Moreover, the sheep are blind because both the nation and their leadership stray from proper cultic practice as it has been revealed to Enoch (which is correlated to Moses' revelation in this vision).

[117] See G. Nickelsburg's comments at 2001, 50, which seem to nuance his proposal of viewing Israel's sight in terms of the Mosaic law. Assefa writes that "le péché d'Israël, symbolisé par l'aveuglement se réfère toujours à la rupture de l'Alliance du Sinaï, à l'idolâtrie. Autrement dit, la bonne relation entre Dieu et Israël est directement lié à l'observation de l'Alliance et de la Loi" (2007, 256). But Assefa does not really consider the nuanced way in which the Enochic material, including the *AA,* intersects with traditional Jewish thought. He is right to reference idolatry and its connection to the blindness motif. But it is not quite right to relate idolatry back specifically to Mosaic law in a straightforward fashion, especially in light of the way in which the Enochic material itself challenges aspects of it; or in some parts, seems indifferent to it. Assefa himself admits that "le terme «Alliance» peut avoir un sens différent de celui connu habituellement (celui de l'Exode dans la perspective deutéronomique, par exemple) dans un contexte différent" (2007, 258). It is strange, therefore, that he does not consider how the author might be using traditional Deuteronomic history in a way which does not exactly correspond to Deuteronomic theology. It clearly differs from it elsewhere.

[118] P. Tiller comments on some redactional details where Enoch's reference to sight is strange or somewhat out of order at 90:39. But for all this, he misses the emphasis on Enoch's sight (1993, 391). Enoch's "sight" in this verse, and at 85:3 passes without comment in G. Nickelsburg's commentary.

As a motif, then, blindness and sight present a certain flexibility. With reference to God's plan for history, blindness suggests an incapacity relative to perception. With reference to revealed cultic practice, it suggests intentional lapse. Thus, Israel's blindness at Sinai is synonymous with straying from the path that Moses had shown to them (89:32), as well as being synonymous with Israel's abandonment of the first temple (89:54). In these two instances, the language of "straying" and "abandoning" suggests informed intent. Here, the conceptualization of action as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed is preserved. By contrast, sight only becomes a universal characteristic of the nation, and presumably the transformed nations, when the ideal cultic reality of fellowship between God and humanity is realized in the eschaton and as God's grand design for history is finally made clear to all.

In sum, humans (and sinners more generally) are considered responsible for their actions because moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action. Blindness, while generally a phenomenon described as happening to figures, does not abrogate moral responsibility. It does seem to concern those features more generally associated with Enochic revelation. In some cases, blindness can thus refer to the revelation of God's design for history. In other places, it involves a straying from a revealed cultic practice. In the overarching context of the "divine plan," such blindness is portrayed as necessary, just as Israel's historical suffering is necessary, in order to realize God's remedy to the cosmic problem of evil.

3.4. Summary

The author's apocalyptic determinism and its correlated conception of human moral agency can be summarized in the following way.

1. The "divine plan," which finds its source in God's intention and agency, is history's driving mechanism. "The end" orients the "divine plan," in that it provides history with an underlying rationale and an overarching *telos.* The "divine plan" contextualizes human history as God's remedy to the cosmic problem of evil.
2. The "divine plan" determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is defined in terms of "the good" (*i.e.* the righteous) and "sinners" (*i.e.* the wicked). With reference to "the end," "the good" transcend death in the transtemporal eschaton, while "sinners" are punished.
3. The individual can participate in only one of the two collective destinies.
4. Human action is predetermined such that action follows from nature. How these natures are themselves determined is left unexplained. This ontological distinction bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism to their conceptualization of human moral agency.
5. Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action.
6. Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

It may seem that propositions 4 and 6 contradict each other. They do not. While action follows from nature, it poses no contradiction to the conceptualization of action as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed. Where nature might affect the direction in which action is propelled, it does not change the fact that action is self-propelled. There is thus no logical incoherence

between the above propositions. As such, one can reasonably affirm that the author's apocalyptic determinism is coherent with their conceptualization of human moral responsibility, even where aspects of their account are left unexplained or underdeveloped.

This conceptualization does, however, raise questions about the way in which individual action is conceptualized within the text's implied community. If human action is predetermined such that action follows from nature, to what end is individual action conceptualized as efficacious? It seems to me that what I argued for Daniel chaps. 7-12 is likely at work here as well. As such, I summarize in brief my earlier argument (see § 2.4 for the full argument).

From the transtemporal perspective of "the end," salvation has already been accomplished, judgement has already been meted out, trajectories toward final ends have already been actualized, and thus, individual action does not determine salvation. But, for both the author and their audience, life must be lived in the phenomenological sphere of the present, where history is still being worked out toward its *telos*. In the phenomenological sphere, individual action or choice is the only means by which one may distinguish to whom God's promise of deliverance actually obtains. It is the only means by which one's individual destiny may be accurately and securely connected to collective destiny. In this sense, while individual action or choice may not determine salvation when considered from the context of the transtemporal sphere, it remains an absolutely necessary marker of identity for the phenomenological present.

At the intersection of these two contexts, the transtemporal imaginary contextualizes and interprets the phenomenological present so that individual action is enclosed within a symbolic loop. Individual action is rendered meaningful as it is referred to the conceptual boundaries of the community (where terms like "the good" function as symbols). But where individuals perceive and affirm their action to be meaningful within this context, the community's boundaries are also reinforced and perpetuated such that the individual's identity with the collective is both signified and validated. Individual action is thus a performative symbol of collective identity.

Moreover, in the more militaristic tone of the *AA*, one cannot be connected to the collective destiny of "the good" without also being opposed to "sinners." This dynamic also helps to underscore the "rightness," not only of particular forms of political resistance, but of the more generalized way apocalyptic determinism functions to validate group's sense of identity. In the context of apocalyptic determinism, both affirmation and rejection are guaranteed. Thus, where the group resists and this resistance is affirmed, the system's truth is self-validating. "The good" will always be on their side. Where the group is resisted, because sinners are always in conflict with "the good," the system's truth is also self-validating. It is hard to underestimate the power of a system which is validated in both its rejection and affirmation.

3.5. The Social Function of Apocalyptic Determinism

Where the author seeks to provide their audience with a particular means of perception so that the text's implied community might truly "see" their contemporary situation, apocalyptic determinism is essential to their task. The author's employs apocalyptic determinism to locate the text's implied community within a larger story, where God has aimed the whole of human

history toward remedying the problem of cosmic evil; an evil of which the Seleucid forces are but the latest and final manifestation. In this setting, the (violent) clash between "the good" and "sinners" is not simply foreseen but is inevitable. Indeed, the present clash represents the beginning of "the end" where victory and vindication are assured, just as God's past violent retribution on primordial "stars" signaled a transition from one age to the next.

In this way, it seems to me that the *AA*'s apocalyptic determinism functions less as a call to arms than as a buttressing of those who are already entangled in movements of resistance (although I do not deny a certain potential to convert).[119] For the implied community, this framework reframes suffering as victory and evil as necessary. Both elements are, lamentably, pieces of God's plan to right the cosmos. It also serves to vindicate the community in their position of resistance. In their fighting, suffering, and where others either join or resist their cause, the vision's historical trajectory, along with the group's identity is validated as authentic. It is thus less of a call to repentance than it is a call to endurance.

But this call to endurance is not simply a promise of victory. It is a promise of peace where violence is forever ended in the eschaton; where violence and death are transcended. Within the "divine plan," the Jewish people are ultimately repositioned in their relation to other nations. In the eschaton, historic hostilities become relics of past history and foreign hegemony is turned on its head. The text's implied community is thus accorded an identity with a kind of universal or global significance. This group is not simply defined by their contemporary resistance to hostile powers. This resistance is intended for peace, where both the Jewish people and the transformed nations live under God's joy. This group is thus also defined by its future identity, which is synonymous with a universally transformed human nature. The framework of apocalyptic determinism thus contextualizes the vision's message as more of a victory speech than it is a proposal for reform.

In sum, where the author seeks to encourage, reinforce, validate, and vindicate their implied community through a particular means of "seeing" their contemporary circumstances, apocalyptic determinism is essential to this aim.

[119] I am not arguing that the *AA* envisions resistance in exclusively militaristic terms. Its militaristic tone, however, is one of the more significant differences when compared to Daniel chaps. 7-12.

Chapter 4: *4 Ezra*[120]

4.1. Contextual and Textual Considerations

4.1.1. Authorship

Michael Stone (1990) argues that *4 Ezra* is the work of a single author (21). He considers the work "a literary unity incorporating certain preexistent materials, both oral and written" (23).[121] I follow Stone and those who read *4 Ezra* in terms of an authorial unity (cf. Breech 1973; Hogan 2008; Berthelot 2011; DiTommaso 2013; Collins 2016, 245).

Beyond the issue of authorial unity, one of the more difficult problems that faces the reader is identifying the author's voice within the work. Because the figure of Ezra enters into contentious dialogue with the angel Uriel, "it is not clear if one, or both, or neither of them represents the author's own views" (Hogan 2008, 2).

Regarding this issue, Michael Stone (1990) argues that the thread which ties *4 Ezra* together is the "Odyssey of Ezra's soul" (32). He elaborates:

> Throughout the first three visions… Ezra is in dialogue, nay dispute, with the angel. The dispute that commenced because of the destruction of the Temple pushed Ezra beyond the basic assumption of the justice of God. Ezra does not accept his own doubts, however, but struggles with them by means of the angel, who represents that part of himself which wishes to accept but is forced to doubt by the impact of events of the history of Israel and the world. Thus it is in the first three visions. Ezra and the angel are both the author but are Janus faces of the author's self (32).

Stone understands Ezra's encounter with the weeping woman-city to be a conversion experience. "In comforting her, the seer undergoes a dramatic change, a shift, a conversion. That which had been outside him as 'God' or 'the angel,' suddenly become dominant; instead, he sees his pain and distress as externalized" (32).[122] For Stone, this conversion reflects the author's own

[120] For the text of *4 Ezra*, the NRSV is cited unless I indicate otherwise. Citations of the Latin text refer to the *Vulgate*.

[121] See M. Stone 1990, 11-23 for his discussion of source theory and alternative views on the authorship of *4 Ezra* (cf. Hogan 2008, 9-35). K. Hogan (2008) writes that "the majority of scholars now regard 4 Ezra as a unified literary composition, albeit one that draws on older and sometimes conflicting traditions" (3).

[122] While L. Stuckenbruck (2013) rightly highlights the way in which Ezra's grief is emphasized in the text (cf. 10:39), he overlooks a major aspect of Ezra's conversion when he writes that Ezra is characterized all along by "his sincere lament and grief at the destruction of Jerusalem (which extended to his attempt to console the woman in mourning), on the one hand, *and the anticipation of the eschatological moment when God's purposes for Israel will be realized*" (149; emphasis mine). The "eschatological moment" is something which Ezra comes to adopt. It is not affirmed by Ezra all along.

experience (33) and makes sense of the text as a whole. Ultimately, the angel Uriel, God, and the post-conversion Ezra all articulate the author's own views.[123]

Karina Hogan (2008) affirms *4 Ezra's* authorial unity but differs from Stone in her location of the author's voice. Hogan summarizes her view in the following way:

> The dialogues, I believe, are meant to demonstrate to the wise that while both the covenantal and the eschatological wisdom traditions have something to learn from the other, neither has an adequate theological response to the crisis of faith brought about by the Destruction. The inconclusive outcome of the dialogues implies that debates among the sages, while potentially instructive to them, will never yield a satisfactory response to this crisis, because some questions do not admit of rational answers. The visions and epilogue offer a way out of this intellectual quandary, showing that despair can be overcome by belief in divine revelation (40).

Essentially, Hogan contends that there are three different voices in the text. Ezra and the angel Uriel represent two different wisdom schools whose approaches are ultimately rejected. A third, the authorial voice, is located within "the visions and the epilogue" (40; *4 Ezra* 11-14). This voice articulates the author's apocalyptic solution to the "wisdom" debate conducted by Ezra and Uriel. Its approach is rooted in revelation in contrast to wisdom's rationality (cf. 231).

For his part, Lorenzo DiTommaso (2013) has argued persuasively against Hogan's proposal. Whereas Hogan's view involves a distinction between those positions articulated by the angel Uriel and the book's later visions, DiTommaso shows that both are coherent; both are apocalyptic (121-124). He also challenges Hogan's contrast of apocalyptic revelation with sapiential rationality (124-126). Building on Stone's view, DiTommaso instead proposes that Ezra's conversion be understood in terms of worldview. Ezra moves from the Deuteronomic worldview to the apocalyptic (127-133).

DiTommaso's proposal makes sense of important textual dynamics. For example, there is not simply one kind of determinism at work within *4 Ezra*. Indeed, Ezra's thought in both pre-conversion and post-conversion modes is fundamentally deterministic. However, what distinguishes Ezra pre-conversion thought from his post-conversion perspective, is the DP (see § 1.3.1) framework which characterizes the former, and apocalypticism (§ 1.3.2), which characterizes the latter.[124]

A brief analysis of Ezra's first complaint demonstrates how Ezra's pre-conversion thought is framed by the DP. More examples could be provided, but this first instance is representative of Ezra's pre-conversion perspective. At 3:28-36, upon reflection on Israel's exile in Babylon, and

[123] See K. Berthelot 2011 for her analysis of how the first three visions in *4 Ezra* flow together, which differs somewhat from Stone's formulation (1990, 24).

[124] I argue for this in § 4.2.4. For the sake of the present argument, I must reference this conclusion before it has been established.

after comparing the two nations, Ezra questions the fairness of the covenant.[125] Israel is being punished for disobedience, but God tolerates the wickedness of Babylon (cf. Stone 1990, 76).

The DP grounds Ezra's complaint in three ways. First, it assumes a distinct relationship between God and Israel by which Israel enjoys both privilege and duty (*i.e.* election and covenant). Second, for Ezra, Israel's present suffering entails a past history of sin because suffering follows disobedience (*i.e.* reward/punishment). That is, the present gives meaning to the past through an interpretive grid of covenantal conduct and consequence. Third, Ezra assumes that God governs the fate of Israel in response to the nation's conduct. Had the nation acted differently, the nation's present circumstances would accordingly differ. Here, human action is history's driving mechanism.

Ezra does not question the truth of the points above. Instead, assuming their truth, he questions how the present reality relative to the Jewish people is just. It is not fair that God punishes Israel through other nations, or that God tolerates the wickedness of other nations, because only Israel relates to God through covenant (3:32-36). As such, Ezra's first complaint is contextualized by the DP. Moreover, it is representative of how the DP provides a framework for Ezra's complaints up until his conversion (cf. DiTommaso 2013, 127-128).

Accordingly, where Ezra maintains that human action is determined in his pre-conversion thought, it is still framed by the DP (3:20-27; 7:45-48; 7:66-69; 7:116-126).[126] In this context, Ezra's view of predetermined human action is consistent: 1) Adam's sin has created a tragic inheritance for humanity such that, 2) all humans possess an evil heart which,[127] 3) results in an inability to avoid transgression.[128]

This view of predetermined human failing is problematic because, according to the DP, human action functions as history's driving mechanism. On Ezra's account, where reward and punishment are predicated upon human conduct, and where the "evil heart" conditions human action toward sin, the covenant can guarantee *only* retribution (cf. 8:35-36).[129] Thus, Carol

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[125] See M. Stone (1990, 63) for his summary of the way in which Ezra questions God's justice in this first discourse.

[126] 8:35-36; 8:42-45; and 9:32-37 do not carry a necessary deterministic sense grammatically. However, on the basis of the Ezra's prior statements concerning Adam and the effects of his transgression, I think that this is likely the case.

[127] See M. Stone 1990, 63-67 for his excursus on the "evil heart" in *4 Ezra* and the wider body of Jewish literature.

[128] See 7:118-126. In this passage, Ezra has accepted Uriel's account of God's promises as referring to a coming transtemporal, eschatological horizon. M. Stone (1990) comments that here, "the 'immortal age' is the age to come in which 'corruption will be overcome' (6:28)" (259). The dynamic of the DP, however, where human agency is the driving mechanism of history, is still in force. It is not until the vision of the woman-city that Ezra fully adopts the apocalyptic outlook.

[129] *in ueritate enim nemo de genitis est qui non impie gessit et de confitentibus qui non deliquit in hoc enim adnuntiabitur iustitia tua et bonitas tua Domine cum misertus fueris eis qui non habent substantiam operum bonorum.*

Newsom (2021) describes Ezra's anguish in 7.62-68 in terms of "a consciousness that perceives both its moral responsibility and its inability to fulfill this responsibility" (98).

In sum, a pre-conversion Ezra criticizes the DP as a system because, on his account of predetermined human action, God's promises avail Israel nothing. For Ezra's, God's justice is therefore questionable (cf. Berthelot 2011, 76). In response, instead of defending the DP, the angel Uriel articulates an apocalyptic perspective (cf. DiTommaso 2013).[130] When Ezra finally internalizes and adopts the angel Uriel's way of thinking such that he converts to the apocalyptic worldview,[131] his thought remains deterministic, and the destruction of most of humanity is still guaranteed (cf. 7:60-61).[132] But in this apocalyptic context, Ezra's distress is resolved.[133]

Here, DiTommaso's framing of Ezra's conversion in terms of worldview, from the Deuteronomic to apocalypticism, makes good sense of the text. In this vein, the dynamics which underlie Ezra's dialogues with Uriel resemble very much those of Daniel 9 (see § 2.1.1) and *The AA* (see § 3.1.3).[134] The author intentionally contrasts apocalypticism with the DP, highlighting apocalypticism's capacity to console and comfort where the DP struggles, in an effort to both present Ezra's conversion in a reasonable light, and encourage a similar one among their audience (see § 4.1.3). By contrast, Hogan's (2008) proposal of a third way imposes unnecessary complications and potential incoherencies onto the text. For example, Hogan's view makes little sense of Uriel's role in the work as a whole. On the one hand, he is a heavenly dialogue partner whose views must be corrected. On the other hand, she still understands Uriel to function as the *angelus interpres* for the work's final visions (2008, 168; cf. Stone 1990, 31-32). In this scenario, Uriel is an angel who is both unreliable *and* a trustworthy mediator/interpreter of divine revelation; two things which are at odds (cf. DiTommaso 2013, 126-127). In *The Apocalyptic*

[130] M. Stone (1990) writes that "it is quite clear that the change in Ezra involves at least two elements, a gradual acceptance of some of the angel's teachings during the course of the first three visions and then, in the fourth vision, a powerful religious experience during which these teachings are internalized. At a deeper level, one might say that in the first three visions the author externalizes his convictions in the figure of the angel, while in the fourth, he internalizes those convictions and externalizes his grief and hope in the form of the woman-city. Once this basic dynamic is grasped, the functioning both of the Ezra figure and of the angel becomes quite clear. For this reason the angel, after the conversion experience, returns to the traditional role of *angels interpres*" (31-32). Stone articulates the conceptual core of the angel's teaching as: "God's workings are a mystery and beyond human comprehension; God loves Israel and will vindicate Israel in the end; God rejoices over the few saved and is not concerned over the many damned; God's mercy works in this world, while his justice is fully active only in the world to come" (1990, 36). See Stone 1990, 37 for 4 Ezra's relation to the book of Daniel.

[131] Of Ezra's encounter with the weeping woman-city, M. Stone (1990) writes that "Ezra used the same literary means that the angel had earlier employed in his discussion with Ezra… This reversal of roles is possible, since Ezra has now accepted the implications of what the angel has said to him in the previous visions" (319). Thus, Ezra's conversion is an adoption of Uriel's framework of thought which has been in evidence from the first visionary dialogue. L. DiTommaso (2013) argues persuasively that Uriel's thought is indeed apocalyptic (121-124; 126-127).

[132] I argue in § 4.2.4 that the author's affirmative deterministic perspective is indeed apocalyptic.

[133] This aspect of resolution will be addressed in § 4.5. Briefly put, in the author's view, apocalypticism provides a way to affirm God's fidelity in relation his promises to Israel such that his justice is not contravened.

[134] J. Collins (1993, 360) makes a connection between the grief which Daniel articulates in Dan. 9 and the grief which Ezra experiences in *4 Ezra*. Both are affirmed in their experience of grief, but both have their views corrected.

Imagination (2016), John Collins writes that "the apocalyptic revelations of chaps. 11–13 *must* be seen as the culmination of a movement that begins with the probings of chap. 3" (248; emphasis mine). This culmination makes the most sense if it is viewed as a conversion in the sense articulated by Stone and DiTommaso. As a result, I follow both Stone and DiTommaso in their understanding of *4 Ezra's* authorial unity and authorial voice. The author's affirmative views can be identified in the voices of the angel Uriel, God, and the post-conversion Ezra.

4.1.2. Date

Scholarship generally views the work as having been composed ca. 100 CE, in response to the the Roman destruction of the second Jewish temple in 70 CE (cf. Stone 1990, 9-10; Berthelot 2011, 73; Grabbe 2013; Collins 2016, 242). I follow this view.

4.1.3. Social Function

Michael Stone (1990) summarizes the social function of *4 Ezra* as follows:

> In spite of the individual character of 4 Ezra, the author seems clearly to have been rooted in a social context and tradition of apocalyptic teaching. His role was recognized and confirmed by that social context. At the heart of the aspirations of that social group were the destruction of Rome and the vindication of Israel, but their hope was centered chiefly on the day of judgement and less stressedly on the Messiah or a royal restoration (42).[135]

Lorenzo DiTommaso (2013) extends Michael Stone's contention that Ezra's conversion represents the author's own experience to the text's social function:

> The first function of the book is to impart to its audience the author's new insight about God's saving activity in history. *4 Ezra* aims to console its intended readers in view of their catastrophic loss by assuring them that salvation is imminent, justice remains operative, and existence still has a purpose. But these messages can only be received and accepted if the audience follows Ezra in accepting Uriel's perspective, i.e., the apocalyptic worldview. The figure of Ezra personifies both the nation of Israel and each member individually. Just as Ezra's conversion reflects the personal transformation of the author of *4 Ezra*, so too does it guide the book's intended readers through their own process of conversion. Just as the book answers Ezra's questions about salvation and justice on national and personal levels, so too does it answer the audience's questions. Just as Ezra is furious at the mourning woman's despair and lack of faith in God's plan for Israel, so too is the audience expected to be outraged, vicariously participating in Ezra's

[135] See also L. Grabbe 2013.

> conversion event and having been rationally and emotionally prepared for it by the revelatory dialogues (132).[136]

In light of the above, I understand the social function of *4 Ezra* in terms of conversion and consolation. The author dramatizes their own conversion to apocalypticism in a way which highlights how the DP struggles to account for the crisis which the destruction of the second temple represents. In doing so, the author also highlights apocalypticism's internal rationality; how it makes sense of God's justice, of his promises to Israel, and of national destiny. Moreover, by dramatizing Ezra's consolation, the author offers to their audience a similar consolation. Should the audience imitate Ezra in his conversion, they will also imitate him in finding consolation.

4.2. Determinism

The author's affirmative thought, articulated through the voice of Uriel, God, and the post-conversion Ezra, is fundamentally deterministic in orientation. This is clear from the way the future is presented as only ever being a possibility of one. Thus, for example, the certainty of future events is communicated through the specificity of their detail, formulaic phrases,[137] and a preference for the future indicative in a way which leaves no room for alternatives.[138] Moreover, where the divine voice articulates a pre-creation-event perspective, such that "the end"[139] is portrayed as having being planned before the act of creation (cf. 7:70), conceptually, "the future" concerns all that proceeds from God's intention prior to the creation-event. That is, because "the end" was planned before human beginnings, the course of human history has only ever had a singular path which leads to a singular future. Indeed, the author's deterministic historiography is neatly summarized toward the end of the work where Ezra praises God for "the wonders that he does from time to time, and because *he governs the times and whatever things come to pass in their seasons*" (13:57-58; emphasis added).

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[136] Along similar lines, J. Collins (2016) writes that "it is probable that the story of Ezra represents the author's own spiritual journey. As a literary work, the book stands as a guide to the perplexed. By identifying with Ezra, the reader can acknowledge the dilemmas of history, but come to experience the 'apocalyptic cure' by turning his attention to the transcendent perspective provided by the angel and the dream visions" (262). See K. Hogan 2008, 230-231. Although Hogan (mistakenly) positions apocalypticism in an adversarial relationship to wisdom schools (apocalypticism's conceptual adversary in the text is more properly identified as the DP), she identifies the goal of providing apocalyptic instruction to the wise.

[137] *ecce dies ueniunt*... Cf. 5:1; 12:13.

[138] This is specifically in reference to the Latin text of the *Vulgate.* Of course, the most natural way to refer to the future is through the future indicative. The point, however, is that in the way in which the future is described, no alternatives are considered possible.

[139] See Stone 1983 for the meaning of "the end" in *4 Ezra.* "The analysis of the term 'the end' (*finis* and equivalents) showed a number of options at play. From its use in the book, it was concluded to denote 'the crucial turning point of the eschatological process.' The exact identification of that point, where such existed, was determined firstly by context and purpose, and secondly by the associational complex involved." (243). The term's coherency as defined by Stone underscores the temporal dualism of apocalyptic eschatology, where the idea of a distinct break between the present and the future is inherent to its use.

The certainty of the future is further reinforced by the way in which Ezra receives the interpretation of his dream-visions subsequent to his encounter with the weeping woman-city. They are interpreted with divine authority by both God and the angel Uriel (cf. DiTommaso 2013, 127). As such, Ezra does not question their veracity. Rather, he seeks clarity. This dynamic illustrates the binary apocalyptic epistemology which is referenced earlier in the work: "those who inhabit the earth can understand only what is on the earth, and he who is above the heavens can understand what is above the height of the heavens" (4:21; cf. DiTommaso 2013, 128).[140]

Beyond this,[141] the deterministic elements of the author's thought are centered on the notion of a "divine plan," although it is not expressed in so succinct a term. Human history may be qualified as a "plan" because it is conceptualized in a manner that is intentional, ordered, and planned. Because God is explicitly identified as the source of the intent that guides this plan, it is also aptly qualified as "divine."

4.2.1. The Divine "Plan"

The sense that history proceeds in an ordered and intentional manner such that it is "planned," is conveyed through the following elements: 1) the periodization of time; 2) the present *saeculum* functions according to a given set of parameters; 3) a specific intent underlies the creation-event, "the end," and the present and future *saecula*; 4) and "the end" supplies history with a particular *telos*.

First, in the later visions presented in the work, history is schematized into predetermined periods of time. Thus, time is periodized into a four-kingdom motif (11:39-40; 12:10-12), predetermined numbers of kings (12:16-22), and, with particular reference to the present *saeculum*, into 12 predetermined parts (14:11-12; cf. Popović 2014, 259-260). This schematization of time imbues history with a sense of order and intention such that it progresses along a predetermined chronology. This sense of order and intention is further reinforced by passages like 7:74, where God's patience with humanity is not for humanity's sake, but "because of the time that [God] has foreordained."[142] Similarly, just as time is conceptualized as predetermined numerical sets, so too, both the righteous who will be saved and the present *saeculum* are conceptualized as a predetermined measures which must be balanced before God's intervention (4:35-37).

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[140] … et *qui super terram inhabitant quae sunt super terram intellegere solummodo possunt et qui super caelos super altitudinem caelorum*.

[141] Specific elements of the predetermined future include: the end of Zion's humiliation (6:19); a transformation in the heart for those who will be saved (6:26); the revelation of the Messiah with his entourage, the period of his dwelling on earth, and his death (7:28-29); the nature of post-mortem existence for both the righteous and the wicked (7:78-101); the rise of Rome, its fall with the coming of the Messiah, and the deliverance of the remnant until the day of judgement (12:13-36); a final conflict between the wicked nations and the Messiah, who defeats them such that both Zion and the righteous are preserved (13:21-36); and the gathering of the lost tribes of Israel (13:37-53).

[142] *quantum enim tempus ex quo longanimitatem habuit Altissimus his qui inhabitant saeculum et non propter eos sed propter ea quae prouidit tempora.*

Second, 4:28-32 and 5:44-47 portray the present *saeculum* as functioning within a given set of parameters. The first passage describes evil in the world as proceeding from Adam and necessitating a harvest, like a seed that is sown. As a result, cause and effect take on a moral quality. Good and evil actions create unavoidable effects that follow the moral quality of their cause—the present *saeculum* is not simply ordered, but follows a particular moral ordering. The second passage likens the world to a woman's womb, which cannot produce offspring contrary to its natural capacity. As such, the world is organized with particular natural capacities that cannot be altered before the eschaton.[143] These two passages thus convey the overall sense that God has made the world to function in an orderly and unalterable manner before the end-time judgement (cf. 6:11-20).

Third, the author highlights a specific intention and purpose in the creation-event. For example, at 6:1-6 (cf. 7:10-16; 7:70), Uriel lists a series of phenomena before which (*antequam*) God planned (*cogitaui*) the creation such that all of creation can *only* be attributable to God's intent and power.[144] In context, Uriel underscores God's unique agency and intention at creation to provide a "just as, therefore" kind of argument regarding God's end-time visitation to creation (cf. Stone 1990, 155). As the creation illustrates the unopposable potency of God's intention and agency, so too, the end of God's visitation will be characterized by the same quality of God's agency. However this "end" is characterized, God's agency guarantees its realization. Moreover, the effect of highlighting God's agency and intention at the juxtaposition of the beginning and end of the world is to also include all things in-between. The intent or plan which underlies creation, effected at the beginning, and still operative at "the end", entails its activity during the interim.

Elsewhere, Uriel emphasizes that both the present and future *saecula* are imbued with this same sense of intent and purpose. At 7:10-16, Uriel describes the nature of the present world as a kind of trial whereby the "living" (*qui uiuunt*; 7:14) receive their inheritance by passing through suffering (*angusta et uana haec*; 7:14; cf. 7:127; 8:2).[145] But Uriel also affirms that a future

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[143] *quemadmodum enim infans non parit nec ea quae senuit adhuc sic ego disposui a me creatum saeculum* (5.49).

[144] *tunc cogitaui et facta sunt haec per me solum et non per alium ut et finis per me et non per alium* (6:6).

[145] Uriel affirms that God has made the *saeculum* for Israel. But Uriel also affirms that the creation was judged after Adam's transgression (*propter eos enim feci saeculum et quando transgressus est Adam constitutiones meas iudicatum est quod factum est*; 7:11). In this way, Uriel could be suggesting that God changed his plan, along with the nature of the world, in response to Adam's sin. However, given the emphatic statement about God's plans for judgement which were in effect prior to creation at 7:70, as well as certain ambiguities in the text itself, two other options seem preferable. Uriel's reference to the *saeculum* which was created for Israel is rendered ambiguous by the way he goes on to contrast the entrances of *huius saeculi* (7:12) and the entrances of *maioris saeculi* (7:13). Because the author does not initially specify which *saeculum* pertains to Israel, one could understand it to refer to either "this world" or the "greater world". If one opts for the latter, God has not altered his plan by judging the creation for Adam's transgression. If one opts for the former, given that Uriel goes on to state that judgement was planned before creation, one might nuance the sense in which this *saeculum* was created for Israel. It was created for Israel as a trial for receiving the *maius saeculum* (cf. 7:127; 8:2). This second option seems more likely given the comparison that Uriel makes between the heir of a city who comes into their inheritance by passing through its narrow gates, such that Uriel states "*sic est et Israhel pars*" (7:10). Moreover, this reading is underscored by 7:74, where God's patience with humanity is not for humanity's sake, but "because of the time that he has foreordained" (*quantum enim tempus ex quo longanimitatem habuit Altissimus his qui inhabitant saeculum et non propter eos sed*

saeculum has been created specifically for the righteous. Indeed, "the Most High has made not one world but two" (7:50).[146] Both the present and future *saecula* are, therefore, imbued with a sense of intent and purpose. In this present *saeculum*, the righteous must suffer before inheriting the future *saeculum*, which has been intended for them from the beginning (7:50; 8:1). As such, the intent which underlies the creation-event, "the end," and the two *saecula* reinforces the notion that history is both planned and ordered.

Fourth, in passages like 7:70 (cf. 6:1-6; 9:4), "the end" is portrayed as having been planned or intended prior to the creation. Of this verse, Michael Stone (1990) comments that here, "the word 'prepared' is to be noted as a technical term describing the precreation of the eschatological things" (234). As such, "the end" clearly belongs to a transtemporal and transhistorical context—it not only preexists history but also represents the end of the present historical *saeculum* and a transition to the future *saeculum* (cf. 7:50; 14:34-36; Stone 1983). Conceptually, then, the author locates the transtemporal "end" in a causal and determinative position to the creation-event. In other words, much like a set of blueprints determines the way in which construction must proceed, God planned out "the end" prior to the creation-event. In turn, this "end" determines the beginning and keeps history progressing along an unalterable trajectory toward its realization. Thus, just as was the case in the *AA*, "the end" functions as an omni-orienting transtemporal, eschatological horizon within *4 Ezra*. Accordingly, it supplies history with a particular *telos*, inexorably pulling history forward along a singular path toward its realization.

In sum, the author portrays history as a progression which is ordered, intentional, and planned. As a result, the author's deterministic historiography may be aptly qualified as a "plan."

4.2.2. The "Divine" Plan

That this "plan" may also be qualified as "divine" is relatively straightforward. God is regularly identified as the agency responsible for the intent and purpose which underlies history. While many passages could be cited, one is particularly representative of the author's thought. At 6:1-6, God (through the voice of Uriel) emphatically highlights the point that creation can *only* be attributable to God's intent and agency: *tunc cogitaui et facta sunt haec per me solum et non per alium* (6:1-6). God's unique agency and intent is highlighted here in service to the point that the author wishes to make concerning God's end-time visitation: *ut et finis per me et non per alium* (6:6). Just as creation is realized by God's singular and unique agency, God's end-time visitation

propter ea quae prouidit tempora). M. Stone (1990, 234) comments that "what seems like a delay of the eschaton caused by divine long-suffering is in fact only the predetermined order of events. The result of this is to set long-suffering itself into the predetermined divine plan." J. Zurwaski (2014) contends that at 7:10-16, the world to come is the one which was promised to Israel. He argues that where the Latin text reads "*quod factum est,*" it should be translated as 'that which happened' as opposed to 'that which was made' (102-104). He also argues that the causal sense of *4 Ezra* 7:12 refers back to the first part of 7:11 where God made the world (to come) for Israel's sake, and not back to Adam's transgression. With regard to the first point of his argument, I do not think that this reading resolves the textual ambiguity.

[146] *non fecit Altissimus unum saeculum sed duo*.

will be realized in the same way such that God's singular agency acts as a guarantee.[147] As mentioned previously, the effect of highlighting God's agency and intention at the juxtaposition of the beginning and end of the world is to also include all things in-between. In other words, where history is portrayed as intended, purposeful, and planned, God is specifically identified as the source from whom this intent, purpose, and plan originate. In this way, where the author's deterministic historiography may be qualified as a "plan," it may also be qualified as "divine."

4.2.3. The Sociology of the Divine Plan

The divine plan keeps humanity divided into a collectively defined binary of "the righteous" and "the wicked." This binary division begins with Adam's transgression (4:28-32), is maintained through the characterization of this world as a moral trial (7:9-14; 7:127-131), and is guaranteed by God's judgement at the end of history where a righteous few transcend death in contrast to the torment of the wicked multitude (cf. 7:50; 7:59-99; 14:34-36).[148] No alternatives to this definitional binary, neither in terms of trajectory nor end, are considered possible. The overwhelming emphasis of the divine plan with respect to human destiny is articulated in collective terms.[149]

4.2.4. Apocalyptic Determinism

The author's affirmative determinism, articulated in terms of the "divine plan," is thoroughly contextualized by apocalypticism's notional architecture (see § 1.3.2.). Conceptually, dualism pervades its temporality, epistemology, and sociology. Regarding temporality, the present *saeculum* is contrast to the future *saeculum.* Regarding epistemology, heavenly knowledge is contrasted to earthly or mundane knowledge, implying both a spatial and ontological dualism (cf. Stone 2014, 128). In terms of sociology, humanity is defined as an antithetical collective binary of "the righteous" and "the wicked."

Moreover, history's trajectory is unalterable precisely because "the end" orients everything (cf. 6:1-6; 7:10-16; 7:70). As such, this transtemporal, eschatological horizon supplies history with a

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[147] God's agency in bringing about "the end" is also emphasized through the use of personal pronouns. So, for example, the Messiah is referred as "my Messiah" (7:28). Furthermore, it is rendered explicit in passages such as 9:2, where the end is characterized as God's visitation to his creation. Additionally, 7:78, describes death as one area of God's jurisdiction such that God sends out a decree concerning the time in which a person must die. The image here is of God as a governor whose jurisdiction extends even to authorizing individual deaths; something from which there is no process of appeal.

[148] Reward and punishment are distinctively post-mortem or transtemporal realities in 7:31-44.

[149] The post-mortem, or transtemporal, realities of reward and punishment are also depicted as applying to individuals. So, for example, Uriel states that "no one shall ever pray for another on that day, neither shall anyone lay a burden on another; for then all shall bear their own righteousness and unrighteousness" (7:105). However, human destiny is primarily constructed in collective terms such that the number of righteous souls has been predetermined (4:35-36). Individual choice does not affect the number of righteous souls which have been predetermined. Thus, individual destiny concerns an individual's identification with a greater collective such that individual destiny is necessarily connected to and referential of collective destiny. See L. DiTommaso 2013, 122-123. See E. Breech 1973 for the emphasis on community in *4 Ezra.*

teleological force such that the divine plan, and not human agency, functions as history's driving mechanism. Indeed, God "governs the times and whatever comes to pass in their seasons" (13:57-58).

4.3. Human Moral Agency

One of the clearest passages which addresses the issue of human moral agency is 7:72-73. It is representative of other relevant passages within *4 Ezra*:[150]

> For this reason, therefore, those who live on earth shall be tormented, because though they had understanding, they committed iniquity; and though they received the commandments, they did not keep them; and though they obtained the law, they dealt unfaithfully with what they received.[151] What, then, will they have to say in the judgment, or how will they answer in the last times? How long the Most High has been patient with those who inhabit the world!—and not for their sake, but because of the times that he has foreordained.

This passage articulates three elements which reflect the author's conceptualization of human moral agency. First, moral agency is primarily concerned with action; people are judged for their actions because they are considered the source of their actions. Second, humans understand God's commands. Humans are accountable because they understand the moral framework that qualifies action. Third, humans are accountable because of intent. Reception of God's commandments/law is contrasted to not keeping them and dealing with them unfaithfully. This characterization of a behavior which is fraudulent, deceptive, or cheating (*fraudauerunt*) suggests something which goes beyond simple failure. The wickedness which was performed was not simply a failure to do good, but an intention to do wickedness.[152]

4 Ezra thus frames human moral agency in terms of action, understanding, and intent. In other words, human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

This does not, however, answer the question of how the author's determinism impacts human action. 9:17-22 provides two additional nuances. First, God's seems to employ a policy of non-intervention toward the wicked before the eschaton. (9:22; cf. 3:8). Second, God exercises a positive agency on behalf of the righteous. With great difficulty (*uix ualde*), God "spared some… and saved for [himself] one grape out of a cluster" (9:21). This echoes what Ezra was told

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[150] See also 7:37-38; 7:127-131; 8:55-62; 9:17-22.

[151] *qui ergo commorantes sunt in terra hinc cruciabuntur quoniam sensum habentes iniquitatem fecerunt et mandata accipientes non seruauerunt ea et legem consecuti fraudauerunt eam quam acceperunt…*

[152] *Libertas* is employed in few places which reference moral agency (8:56; 9:11-12). In my view, these references to *libertas* are contrasted specifically to *cruciatus*. Because torture is an act of subjugation and a means of external control (cf. 9:11-12), it seems to me that the author's invocation of *libertas* remains closely resonant of its meaning as political freedom (cf. 2 Macc. 7:1, where *cruciatus* is specifically identified as means of compulsion [*conpello*]). See Wirszubski 1960, 1; 7-8 and Hammond 1963 for *libertas* as political freedom.

earlier: "the root of evil is sealed up from you [*uobis*], illness is banished from you [*uobis*], and death is hidden; Hades has fled and corruption has been forgotten; sorrows have passed away, and in the end the treasure of immortality is made manifest" (8:53). As such, in an underdefined sense,[153] God exercises a positive agency toward the righteous, whereas he remains non-interventionist toward the wicked before the end-time judgement.

Here, as was the case in the ontological distinction between "the wise/righteous" and "the wicked/sinners" in both Daniel and the *AA*, the positive agency that mitigates the effect of the "evil heart" seems to bridge the author's deterministic historiography to their conceptualization of moral agency (see § 2.3).[154] How is that the "the righteous" act in a self-authored way while, *at the same time*, the future is guaranteed? The nature of "the righteous" is considered sufficient to explain the actions of "the righteous." "The righteous" act righteously because they are righteous; they are preserved from the effects of the "evil heart." Once again, there seems to be clear implications for God's knowledge here, but this is not developed by the author.

4.4. Summary

The author's apocalyptic determinism and their conceptualization of human moral agency can be summarized as follows:

1. The divine plan, which is driven by God's intent and agency and animated by the teleological force supplied by "the end," is history's driving mechanism. It reduces the future, as it is defined at any time, to a possibility of one.
2. The divine plan determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is binarily defined in terms of "the righteous" and "the wicked." In the transtemporal, eschatological "end," "the righteous" transcend death while "the wicked" are tormented.
3. The individual can participate in only one of these two collective destinies.
4. Human action may be predisposed to wickedness because of the "evil heart;"[155] but "the righteous" are protected (in an undefined way) from this predisposition. This distinction bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism to their conceptualization of human moral agency.
5. Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action.
6. Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.
7. Within the divine plan, before the eschaton, God generally does not intervene to curb the actions of the wicked multitude.

[153] It is not clear how the evil root is sealed up in the righteous, only that there is a clear distinction being made regarding the respective natures of the righteous and the wicked.

[154] Where the "evil heart" might play a role in predisposing the way in which one intends and acts, it does not change the fact *that* one intends and acts. In this way, there is no logical incoherence between a predisposed inclination and the conceptualization of human moral agency as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

[155] Although this notion is articulated by Ezra in his pre-conversion thought, Uriel does not explicitly correct this view. Indeed, it is implicit in 8:53, at least as it concerns the wicked.

8. Within the divine plan, God expresses a positive agency in the case of the righteous few. The exact nature of this agency is left undefined.

There are no inherent contradictions between the above propositions. Thus, it is reasonable to affirm that the author's apocalyptic determinism is logically coherent with their conceptualization of human moral agency. These propositions do, however, raise the important question of the end to which individual choice is efficacious.

It seems to me that my argument in response to this question in relation to both Daniel chaps. 7-12 and *The Animal Apocalypse* is applicable here as well. As such, I summarize in brief my earlier argument (see § 2.4 for the full argument).

From the transtemporal perspective of "the end," salvation has already been accomplished, judgement has already been meted out, and trajectories toward final ends have already been actualized; and thus, individual action does not determine salvation. Neither conversion nor apostasy affect the final tally of the righteous; it is already known to God. But for both the author and their audience, life must be lived in the phenomenological sphere of the present, where history is still being worked out toward its *telos*. In the phenomenological sphere, individual action or choice is the only means by which one may distinguish to whom God's promise of deliverance actually obtains. It is the only means by which one's individual destiny may be accurately and securely connected to collective destiny. In this sense, while individual action or choice may not determine salvation when considered from the context of the transtemporal sphere, it remains an absolutely necessary marker of identity. The phenomenological present connects the individual to eschatological collective destiny.

At the intersection of these two contexts, the transtemporal imaginary contextualizes and interprets the phenomenological present so that individual action is enclosed within a symbolic loop. Individual action is rendered meaningful as it is referred to the conceptual boundaries of the community (where terms like "the righteous" function as symbols). But where individuals perceive and affirm their action to be meaningful within this context, the community's boundaries are also reinforced and perpetuated such that the individual's identity with the collective is both signified and validated. Thus, just as was the case with both Daniel and the *AA*, the efficacity of individual action is best viewed in terms of a performative symbol of collective identity.

4.5. The Social Function of Apocalyptic Determinism

Ultimately, "*4 Ezra* aims to console its intended readers in view of the catastrophic loss by assuring them that salvation is imminent, justice remains operative, and existence still has a purpose" (DiTommaso 2013, 132). The author's articulation of apocalyptic determinism, in contrast to Ezra's pre-conversion thought (see § 4.1.1.), is essential to this aim. On the one hand, it allows the author to coherently affirm that God is just in relation to his promises and that salvation is certain for the righteous. Whereas the pre-conversion Ezra was distressed under the DP, it is only an apocalyptic and deterministic historiography that allows Ezra to hold onto the notion of God's justice and fidelity. The righteous few have always been intended for a future *saeculum*. Furthermore, it is to these few and to this future that God's promises have always

applied. By dramatizing Ezra's distress, the author has found a way to express both their problems with the DP and the answers which a deterministic and apocalyptic historiography can provide (cf. DiTommaso 2013, 132-133). In this way, the author demonstrates apocalypticism's internal logic, providing coherence in lieu of (in the author's view) incoherence such that grief finds consolation.

The author's notion of human moral agency, on the other hand, underscores the necessity and importance of individual action to being a participant in a collective righteous destiny. For the text's implied community, this not only provides a manner by which the community's boundaries are defined and reinforced but also offers a system of self-validation. Where members of the community continue to affirm this apocalyptic historiography, and where new members join themselves to this framework, the framework's inherent truth is validated to the community. But even where it is rejected or resisted, once again, the inherent truth of the framework is validated to the community. In this way, apocalyptic determinism provides the community with a powerful tool for self-definition and self-validation.

Chapter 5: *2 Baruch*[156]

5.1. Contextual and Textual Considerations

5.1.1. Authorship

The general consensus of contemporary scholarship is that, because *2 Baruch* presents a structural unity in the form of several ordered episodes, as well as a thematic unity in the movement from grief to consolation, it should be viewed in terms of an authorial unity (cf. Stone 1984, 409; Lied 2008; 24-26; 2011 243-246; 249-251; 261-264; Henze 2011, 32-34; 2013, 9; Collins 2016, 266-269).[157] Thus, Matthias Henze (2011) writes that "*Second Baruch* is a Jewish text. It was written by an intellectual living in a generation or two after the Jewish War of 68-73 CE.[158] We know almost nothing about its author, other than the author was a critical thinker with

[156] Citations of the text refer to the translation of M. Stone and M. Henze (2013).

[157] It should be noted, however, that there is no consensus regarding the particular breakdown of *2 Baruch*'s structural unity. Thus, although he affirms a compositional unity, M. Henze writes that "while *2Bar*'s composition does not adhere to a single organizing principle, there are some structural patterns that repeat themselves. Baruch's prayers are always followed by revelations that can take the form of the dialogue (13.1-20.6; 22.1-30.5), the dream interpretation (39.1-43.3 and 55.1-76.5), or the vision (36.1-43.3). Baruch's first and second public addresses are both followed by a prayer (35.1-5 and 48.1-25) and a vision (36.1-43.3 and 52.8-76.5), though in the latter case the author inserts a dialogue scene before the vision in 48.26-52.7. Baruch's two lengthy vision reports (36.1-43.3 and 52.8-76.5) follow the same tripartide structure of vision, prayer, and interpretation (36.1-37.1 + 38,1-4 + 39.1-43.3; 53.1-12 + 54.1-22 + 55.1-76.5)" (42).

[158] See M. Henze 2012 (cf. 2011, 148-186) for his proposal on the composition of both *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch*. He contends that "(a) neither *4 Ezra* nor *2 Baruch* was composed ad hoc by an individual author, but they were both produced over a period of time, during which they went through the typical stages involved in the production of a text, such as composition, revision, and transmission; and (b) the parallels between *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch* are not the result of one author responding to the other text in its redacted form, but the parallels originated during the preredactional phase" (197). It seems to me that his argument falls short of showing that the most plausible explanation for these two texts' interrelation "is to assume that their parallels originally stem from the earliest period in their formation, the time when their narrative traditions began to form," only to develop independently at a later stage (198). The actual evidence Henze provides (195-197) shows that a shared traditional matrix is likely, but not necessarily an *independent* development of two different traditions. It is equally plausible that these traditions developed, not independently, but in contradistinction to and in explicit debate with one another. It is also equally plausible that the extant form of the texts is the result of one text directly responding to the other. Moreover, it is equally plausible that both texts were composed by an individual, at one punctual moment, in a way which represents a composition *de novo* with respect to their form. It is, furthermore, equally plausible that the one or both of the texts was composed by an individual in response to a traditional rival over a longer period of time, gradually incorporating pieces of traditional materials into their composition and not just in "one sitting" (26). It is unclear to me how Henze's proposal solves the question of *4 Ezra*'s and *2 Baruch*'s interrelation. Indeed, both the content and the tone of *2 Baruch* makes very good sense if it is read as responding to *4 Ezra* (see Charlesworth 2014, 162-170; I disagree with Charlesworth where he contends that *4 Ezra* is a theodicy which provides no answers). This does not mean, however, that *2 Baruch* cannot stand or be evaluated on its own terms. The evidence, sparse as it is, simply cannot bear the weight of Henze's contention. Moreover, Henze's comparison of this debate to the debate on Homeric composition is misleading. Henze suggest that his view of the compositional process of *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch* occupies a space similar to Milman Parry's and Albert Lord's theory of oral composition in performance with reference to Homeric epic poetry (2015, 182n2). There is perhaps an analogous link in that, in Henze's formulation, both debates are characterized by three broad methodological approaches where orality plays a

an exceptionally creative mind, an accomplished writer, well versed in the Jewish bible, nonpartisan, and intimately familiar with a wide range of early Jewish traditions, of which he made careful and deliberate use in composing his own work" (32-33).[159] I follow the general scholarly consensus, which views *2 Baruch* in terms of an authorial unity.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle to this view are those places in the text which seem to reflect varying measures of incoherence or contradiction within the author's thought, or at least, among the traditional materials which the author employs.[160] A presumed, underlying incoherence is subtly reflected in the way M. Henze (2011) envisions the work's authorship and compositional process.[161] On the one hand, he argues that the author is an "intellectual" and a "critical thinker" with "an exceptionally creative mind" (32-33), such that *2 Baruch* "is a coherent work that was carefully put together" (37). On the other hand, he states that in *2 Baruch*'s compositional process, "the ancient compliers/authors absorbed diverse eschatological materials, all the while *showing little concern about the intra-textual tensions that were the result of their compilations*" (183; emphasis added).[162] Thus, for Henze, *2 Baruch* is a text which paradoxically shows coherence and care, but "little concern" for the way in which diverse materials stand together. However, the only evidence for the compositional process of *2 Baruch* is the extant text of *2 Baruch* itself. Thus, either *2 Baruch* is carefully put together and is coherent, or it is not. That Henze feels the need to underline a lack of concern relative to intra-textual tensions suggests that a degree of incoherence within the text is felt, however much it might be denied.

This implicit, or perhaps apparent, authorial incoherence becomes evident as Henze writes of *2 Baruch*'s apocalyptic thought and its adaptation of Deuteronomic theology. Of the former, Henze states that "apocalyptic thought is predicated on the belief that at the beginning of time God set into motion a universal plan of salvation and that this plan is about to reach a crucial moment in

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significant role in the third (it is not clear to me what "orality" resolves or clarifies in Henze's approach). But the connection breaks down if pressed further. Simply put, the composition of epic, metred poetry in an illiterate society is very different from the composition of texts which are unmetered, within an oral, but still very literate, scribal culture—these compositional contexts are simply too disparate to be analogous. Indeed, the compositional contexts of later epic poets, such as Apollonius of Rhodes or Virgil, themselves active in an oral, but very literate context, do not correspond to the compositional dynamics of Homeric epic poetry. Moreover, the theory of oral composition in performance works in the case of Homeric epic because the evidence for the synchronic process of oral composition is the language of Homeric poetry itself (cf. Janko 1982). The same cannot be said of *4 Ezra* or *2 Baruch.* Henze himself notes caution in taking such an analogous approach (2011, 182n161).

[159] R. Nir (2003) is one of the few exceptions who argues that *2 Baruch* has a Christian provenance. See L. Lied 2005 and M. Henze 2011, 69-70 for a critique of her arguments.

[160] See J. Collins 2016, 267-269 for his treatment of the apparent contradiction of different eschatologies within *2 Baruch*.

[161] Although J. Collins affirms that there is no contradiction in terms of the author's eschatology, the following statement suggests that the text reflects some degree of incoherence within the author's thought: "we should bear in mind, however, that an apocalypse does not aspire to formulate doctrine in a consistent way, but to suggest the future hope by means of symbols" (2016, 268).

[162] By contrast, the diachronic development of the Homeric epic tradition is readily apparent in the synchronic form of Homer's linguistically diverse and unique verse (cf. Parry 1971; Janko 1982; 2012; Haug 2007).

which history will come to an end and a new era will be ushered in" (254). He later clarifies that the function of this predetermination of history is twofold: "first, to underscore God's undisputed rule over history and all of its actors and, second, to emphasize the inevitability of the events that accompany the end, including the messianic woes with all of their cataclysmic signs. *These are sure to come regardless of any human action*, as the moment of their advent was preordained at the beginning of time" (280; emphasis mine).

By contrast, Henze also understands the author of *2 Baruch* to endorse the Deuteronomic pattern (218; see § 1.3.1).[163] Thus, of the author's contemporary context where the nation suffers, Henze writes that "if the faithful set things right and restore their hearts, then the curses will turn into blessings, and Israel will experience a full restoration – the restoration of everything that has been lost, and, indeed, of much more" (223). In other words, the future is contingent on the nation's covenantal conduct. In this way, Henze affirms the operation of the DP framework within *2 Baruch.* But, unless the author is at odds with themselves, Henze cannot have it both ways.[164] The future cannot both be inevitable and contingent on Israel's behavior such that the promised future hangs in the balance. Apocalyptic historiography is not compatible with the DP.[165]

The question of the extent to which the author of *2 Baruch* embraces both apocalypticism and the DP, and thus the question of an underlying incoherence in the author's thought, needs to be addressed.[166] My response is fivefold.

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[163] See Henze 2011, 218-227 for his examination of *2 Baruch*'s relation to Deuteronomic theology.

[164] Henze's particular framing of the issue creates problems which cannot be resolved by the text because the categories involved in his framing are foreign to the text itself. Thus, Henze writes that "historical predetermination does not imply the predestination of the individual. *Second Baruch*'s author is careful not to promote a fatalistic concept of history according to which the fate of the individual and the community has already been determined. To the contrary, he never fails to stress the central importance of human free will and uses the inevitability of the end as an additional incentive for the reader to act" (2011, 280). This is a good example of how contemporary categories can skew or obscure a text's underlying coherence. In this case, whereas determinism is contrasted to "free-will" in contemporary philosophical and popular discourse, and whereas "free-will" is often synonymous with "choice" within this context, these categories are not necessarily those with which the author is working. Human action and human choice, as I hope to have shown in the previous chapters, are not antithetical to determinism (see § 1.3.3). Nor should determinism be equated to fatalism in the sense that human choice is, in its every reference point, ineffectual or irrelevant (cf. Salles 2016, 13; 16). Indeed, in each work that has been investigated so far, the importance of human action, particularly with regard to how ultimate destinies match the moral quality of the lives in question, has been affirmed without ambiguity. But if one reads the text in light of contemporary categories, where determinism is understood in contrast to "free-will," and where "free-will" is understood as human choice, one will be hard-pressed to find a resolution to these tensions. The text takes no interest in tensions created by categories which are foreign to it.

[165] So too, L. Lied (2008) writes that "the choice Israel makes *here and now* therefore creates Land in the afterlife" (303). That is, Israel's future is construed in terms of possibilities and not a possibility of one. Similarly, J. Hobbins (1998) writes that "the promised reversal of Israel's fortunes is not portrayed as coming about ineluctably. The nexus connecting behavior in the present with realizations in the future is made as tight as possible" (63).

[166] I choose to examine this issue here at the beginning of this chapter to expediate the flow of my later argumentation.

First, Henze's own comments on *2 Baruch* with reference to E. P. Sanders's category "covenantal nomism" are useful. "The biblical categories of 'covenant' and 'law' cannot be taken out of, let alone understood apart from, their present apocalyptic context" (228). That is, one must attend to the "socially multiaccentual" nature of the terms which are employed in any given work (Collins 2015, 298; citing C. Newsom). The invocation of Deuteronomic language and Deuteronomic forms does not entail a straightforward endorsement of Deuteronomic theology (cf. Collins 2016, 276).

Second, a major distinguishing feature of apocalyptic historiography, in contrast to the DP, is that the future is only ever envisioned as a possibility of one (see § 1.3.1; 1.3.2; 1.3.3). If we were to pose to the author of *2 Baruch* the question of whether the future is alterable and open, or whether it is fixed and inevitable, they would invariably respond affirmatively to the latter. Baruch's vision of the 12 waters (53-74) answers this question unambiguously. In this dream-vision and its interpretation, all of history, from creation to the eschaton, is laid bare. History has only ever had, and will only ever have, a singular path. Moreover, this path is not determined by human agency (cf. Collins 2016, 274).

Third, this absolutely does mean that human destiny is predetermined at an individual level (*contra* Collins 2016, 273; Henze 2011, 280). Indeed, God's promises for the future in *2 Baruch* fail to make sense otherwise. A provide a few examples to illustrate. At 40:1-2, the Messiah kills the last ruler of Rome in the schematized four-kingdom vision of history. This predetermined fate necessarily concerns an individual. In a passage which predicts a period of tribulation (48:29-41) specific failings are depicted as certainly and inevitably coming to pass; something which necessarily includes the actions of individuals. At 23:3, God states that "for as you have not forgotten those who live now and those who have passed, so I remember those who are remembered and those who are yet to come." In other words, God knows individuals in the future as clearly as he knows individuals in the past, a knowledge which must include their respective ultimate ends. One last example: in dialogue with Baruch concerning a dream-vision, the angel Remiel states the following: "surely the Mighty One makes known to you the courses of times—*of those that have passed and of those that are yet to pass in his world* [or: age] since the beginning of his creation and until its consummation, *of those that are deceitful and of those that are in truth*" (56:2; emphasis mine). Here, individual fates are clearly inseparable from the deterministic historiography.

Fourth, the predetermination of individual destiny does not mean that humans do not act or choose. Indeed, just as has been seen in the other apocalypses which have been examined, ultimate ends are absolutely connected to moral conduct in this life. In *2 Baruch*, this is regularly connected to faithfully obeying the Torah (*ex.* 51:3). It must be said, however, that the sense of "Torah" is never explicitly defined in *2 Baruch*, nor does it convey exactly the same sense that one might find in another work like Deuteronomy. Rebecca Harris (2019) helpfully summarizes this point in the following way:

> In *2 Baruch*, the Torah is never related explicitly to a book, a specific text, or a collection of texts. While the phrase "Torah of Moses" (תורת משה) appears multiple times in the texts of the Hebrew Bible (cf. Josh 8:32; 1 Kgs 2:3; 2 Kgs 23:25; 2 Chr 23:18; Ezra 3:2; Dan 9:11) and this Torah is occasionally identified

> as a book (ספר ; cf. Josh 8:31; 2 Kgs 14:6; 2 Chr 25:4; Neh 8:1), the Torah in 2 Baruch is associated with Moses, but not with a particular group of written texts. *In fact, the author seems to intentionally avoid such an association in favor of a more elusive understanding of Torah as divine teaching that produces certain moral-ethical behavior*. So although there is evidence that some early Jewish writers understood the Torah of Moses as a reference to a particular written text or collection of texts, this does not seem to be the sense in which the author of *2 Baruch* uses the term Torah… The author of 2 Baruch appears to blend traditions regarding the origin and nature of Torah, maintaining on the one hand that the Torah is associated with Moses, while on the other hand asserting that Torah has a cosmic dimension and predates Moses (113n25; emphasis mine).

That the author of *2 Baruch* maintains a connection between human action, moral behavior, and ultimate destiny is clear. It is, however, very unlikely that the author endorses the DP framework alongside an apocalyptic historiography. The future cannot both be a possibility of only one and a possibility of more than one. The other three apocalypses that have been examined bridged apocalyptic determinism to moral agency by positing an ontological distinction between "the righteous" and the "wicked" (see § 2.3). Is there a similar bridging mechanism at work in *2 Baruch*? This question brings us to a fifth point.

The author's deterministic historiography on the one hand, and their emphasis on the connection between ultimate ends and moral action on the other, is bridged by an emphasis on God's knowledge.[167] God's knowledge is indeed a significant theme within *2 Baruch* generally (14:5; 21:10-18; 23:2-3; 54:1-3). That it also bridges the author's deterministic historiography to their conceptualization of human agency as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed, is most clearly expressed in 60:1-4.[168] This passage is part of the angel Remiel's interpretation of Baruch's dream-vision of 12 waters. Here, Remiel explains some of the rationale behind God's governance over time and history.

> For the last waters that you saw that were blacker than all those that were before them, those that were after [the waters whose] number is twelve when taken altogether: they belong to the whole age. For the Most High divided [them] from the beginning, because he alone knows what will befall in the future. For with regard to the evils of the wickedness that would be wrought before him, he foresaw six kinds. And with regard to the good works of the righteous that would be accomplished before him, he foresaw six kinds, apart from those which he will work himself at the consummation of the world [or: age].

Two elements are noteworthy with respect to the present issue. 1) God's knowledge is comprehensive. He knows the end from before the beginning such that time does not seem to be

[167] In previous sections, I have noted that the authors' formulation of the ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked" suggested implications for God's knowledge. It seems to me that, uniquely among the apocalypses examined, the author of *2 Baruch* develops these implications even as they deny the ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked."

[168] In the context of the present argument, I must anticipate my conclusions in § 5.3.

a relevant category with respect to God's knowledge. In other words, God's knowledge is of everything simultaneously (cf. 48:2).[169] 2) God chooses to structure history and to intervene at its end, along with the manner of his intervention, knowing how humans will act. In this way, human action is self-authored and self-propelled because God is non-interventionist with respect to what and how humans choose. But this does *not* mean that the future is alterable. Again, from the beginning, God has always known how individuals will act and choose.[170] Conceptually, God chooses to actualize the entirety of human history and the eschaton as a whole, knowing it comprehensively. As such, divine agency, and not human agency, continues to serve as history's driving mechanism even though, at places, *2 Baruch* bears a resemblance to the DP framework.

In sum, uniquely among the apocalypses which are under investigation here, God's knowledge in *2 Baruch* serves as the bridge between the author's deterministic historiography and their conceptualization of human moral agency (see § 2.3). God knows comprehensively. As a result of God's comprehensive knowing, the act of creation was not an actualization of possibilities. Rather, it was an actualization of history in its entirety, from creation through to the eschaton, such that it can take only one path. God knows how individuals will act and choose. Of his own accord, God chose to impose a structure on history, and chose the time and manner of his own emphatic and final intervention. Accordingly, because God is non-interventionist in the sense that he does not interfere with human action, human action is self-authored. But it is also predetermined because God's actualization of history as a whole at creation renders the future unalterable. The exhortations to Torah-obedience in order to enter into the coming world thus do not ring false. Ultimate human destiny is connected to moral action on earth in the phenomenological present. The *enjeu*, however, is not a matter of a future which hangs in the balance. The future, and there has only ever been one, is certain and it is imminent.

The injunction to Torah practice is, thus, a matter of participation in God's promise relative to the future coming world.[171] If the future was not certain, it would be difficult to account for the work's general tone of urgency. Rebecca Harris (2019) phrases it nicely: "Indirectly, yet perhaps most persuasively, the author argues that Torah observance is necessary for eschatological elevation because only those who possess the same qualities as the Torah (i.e. light, wisdom, understanding, and righteousness) will be *allowed to participate* in the new age" (112; emphasis mine). The *enjeu* is not whether the future is coming. Rather, it is a matter of participation in the coming world; but again, this participation is a matter which is already known to God. To articulate the matter in terms familiar to *2 Baruch*: "there is one, through one Torah, one world [or: age], and an end for all who are in it. Then he lets those live whom he finds and forgives them, and at the same time, he will destroy those who are polluted with sins (84:14-15).

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[169] See M. Henze 2011, 292-293 for the distinction between Baruch's linear experience of time, and the divine perspective on time, which is "multidimensional and combines linearity with simultaneity" (292).

[170] It seems to me that this is the rationale behind the certainty of Baruch's statement in 45:1-2: "you, therefore, as much as you are able, instruct the people, because this is our work, *for when you teach them you will quicken them*" (emphasis mine).

[171] All of the injunctions to Torah-obedience in *2 Baruch* are coherently read in this fashion (*ex.* 44:7; 77:6; 78:7; 84:2; 85:4).

In the final analysis, scholars are right to affirm that in *2 Baruch*, history is predestined and human agency is not a fiction. However, when Deuteronomic motifs are taken as an endorsement of the DP historiography, or when predestination is understood in terms of contemporary discourse such that determinism is understood to be the *de facto* antithesis to human choice, the underlying coherence of the author's thought is obscured.

5.1.2. Date

The general consensus of contemporary scholarship is that *2 Baruch* in its present form was composed between 70 CE and 132-135 CE (cf. Stone 1984, 410; Lied 2008; 26-29; 2011, 245-246; 261-264; Henze 2011, 26-32; Grabbe 2013; Collins 2016, 264).[172] I follow this consensus.

5.1.3. Social Function

John Collins (2016) succinctly summarizes the social function of *2 Baruch* in the following way: The central message of *2 Baruch* is quite clearly the need to observe the law. The eschatological revelations are clearly subordinated to this end" (275).[173] Matthias Henze (2011) frames this imperative in terms of a need to understand, and a resultant dual impulse.

> The author of *2Bar* was driven by a desire to understand why God allowed a Gentile nation to destroy the Holy City, demolish its religious symbols, and strip Israel of land and autonomy. At the same he wanted to re/envision Judaism in new ways, ever mindful of the disastrous outcome of the failed Jewish revolt against the Romans, and to propose a course of action for the Jewish community to move forward… The program that underlies *2Bar* rests mainly on two pillars. The first is the call on the faithful to follow the Mosaic Torah… He calls the members of the community back to the Torah and, like Moses, urges them to choose life over death. The second pillar is the apocalyptic belief that a full recovery from Roman aggression within the boundaries of history as we know it may be too much to hope for, that the restoration of Israel is only possible in the eschatological end time, which is thought to be imminent (cf. Grabbe 2013).[174]

So too, Rebecca Harris (2019) describes the social function of *2 Baruch* as follows:

> While the narrative setting of *2 Baruch* is the destruction of Solomon's Temple and the Babylonian invasion, the author reaches even further back in the nation's history, to a period before the monarchy, and encourages this people now bereft of

[172] M. Goodman (2014) advocates a skepticism about this consensus in favour of considering an earlier date. However, he offers no substantial argument for an earlier date.

[173] Collins, however, does not understand "the law" to refer the DP historiology. See 2016, 276.

[174] See Harris 2019 for her examination of the way in which the Torah is presented in *2 Baruch*

> temple and leadership to hold fast to the Torah they received from Moses.[175] Torah is the rallying cry of *2 Baruch*. Before the establishment of the monarchy and the building of the First Temple, there was Torah. Now, in the aftermath of the Roman destruction and the leveling of the Second Temple, Torah alone remains. This singularity of Torah is not lamented by the author, but celebrated, since it alone is able to unite the people without a kingdom, preserve the religion without a temple, and guarantee participation in the new age.

As such, I understand *2 Baruch*'s social function in terms of understanding and exhortation. The author provides their audience with a particular way of locating their present suffering within a more comprehensive vision of history's trajectory. In this plan, God's promises for the future are sure and Israel's salvation is assured by God's own intervention. Moreover, this future is imminent. The imminence of this certain and inevitable future thus supplies a moral urgency to the work's implied community. Participation in God's promises for the future is very much connected to Torah-fidelity—a broadly ethical conduct (Harris 2019, 113n25) framed by Israel's traditional heritage in Moses—that is largely referential of the text's implied community (see § 5.3).

5.2. Determinism

That *2 Baruch* affirms a deterministic historiography is evident from passages like 60:1-4, where history is viewed as a comprehensive whole from the creation to the eschaton. In this context, history is shown to follow a singular and linear path in its progression to "the end,"[176] such that the future is only ever considered to be a possibility of one.

More specifically, the author's deterministic historiography can be summed up in the motif of the "divine plan," although it is not expressed in so succinct a term. Where history is portrayed as intended and ordered, it may be qualified as constituting a "plan." Where God is identified as the primary agency behind this order and intent, it may be qualified as "divine."

5.2.1. The Divine "Plan"

The author's deterministic historiography is portrayed in a sense which is ordered and intended such that it may be aptly qualified as a "plan." This is communicated chiefly through the following elements: 1) the periodization of time; 2) the present and the future worlds possess a specific purpose; and 3) "the end" functions to supply history with an overarching rationale and *telos*.

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[175] Again, it must be noted that the Torah in *2 Baruch* does not reach back to the Deuteronomic understanding of Torah in a straightforward fashion. See Harris 2019, 113n25.

[176] By "the end," I refer to the sequence of events which begins with God's intervention in the coming of the Messiah, which moves to a liminal period of the Messiah's rule on earth, and which culminates in the final judgement where the righteous transcend death and the wicked are tormented. I agree with M. Henze (2011) where he argues that in *2 Baruch*, "the promised time is not a single event but a sequence of eschatological events viewed together. 'The end' is a period of undisclosed length that covers the transition from this world to the next" (291).

First, history is conceptualized as possessing a periodized structure. Thus, history is depicted in terms of a four-kingdom schema (36-40), the time of trial which precedes "the end" is envisioned as a 12-part and purposeful structure (25-28:2), while all of history, from creation to the eschaton, is conceptualized within a 12-fold structure of alternating dark and bright waters which correspond to six acts of righteousness and six acts of wickedness (55-74).[177] In this way, history is structured in a way which reflects both intent and a (moral) ordering. This sense is reinforced by passages which describe time in terms of predetermined purposeful limits. Thus, for example, at 32:1-6 (cf. 6:8-9), the time relative to the sequence of Zion's shaking, rebuilding, desolation, and subsequent renewal is both limited and intentional.[178]

Second, both the present world and the future coming world are portrayed in terms of purpose. Thus, in 15:5-8, the present world is described as a struggle and a labour for the righteous; the sense is that this world functions very much in terms of a test or trial which precedes the reward that is the future world (cf. *4 Ezra* 7:14; 7:127; 8:2). Accordingly, the world to come, which is no mere afterthought, is described as having been intended for and promised to the righteous from the very beginning; from Adam through to both Abraham and Moses (cf. 4:1-7; 59). Indeed, it is clear that, for the author, God's promises have only ever had in view the future coming world.

Third, closely related to the last point, "the end" functions to supply history with an overarching rationale and *telos.* Thus, the present world, which is distinguished by corruptibility and suffering, only makes sense in light of the future world (cf. 83:9-23). Baruch illustrates as he speaks to God in the following way:

> For if there were this life only which is here for everyone, nothing could be more bitter than this. For what benefit is strength that turns into weakness, or food of plenty that turns into famine, or comeliness that turns into ugliness. For human nature changes all the time: what we formerly were is not what we are now, and what we are now is not how we will remain after this. For if there was not to be a consummation of all, their beginning would have been in vain (21:13-17).

Baruch's address to God expresses a very clear logic. Without the "consummation of all," all would be vanity. But conversely, because there is a "consummation of all," human life does makes sense.[179] This notion is a clear rejoinder to the kind of thought expressed in Qoheleth where death renders everything vain and futile (Ecc. 2:14-17; cf. Henze 2008). Here, because "the end" distributes justice in a transtemporal context such that the righteous transcend death

[177] J. Collins (2016) describes this vision as the work's "climactic revelation" (273).

[178] 19:5-20:1 even reframes the second temple destruction in terms of God hastening time itself to more quickly arrive at the chosen point of his final and definitive intervention. Thus, while there is no mistaking the emphasis on some suffering being the result of sin in *2 Baruch*, it is clear that not all suffering is; or that some suffering has more than one explanation.

[179] J. Hobbins (1998) is correct when he writes that "for the righteous, 'the world' to come means 'struggle, exertion, and much trouble. But that which is to come, a crown of great glory' (15.8). The struggle of the righteous in this world will be accorded its due in the world to come. The world to come is the necessary complement to the world that is" (58).

and the wicked are punished (50:2-51:16; cf. Henze 2021, 133),[180] "the end" makes sense of human life on earth; it makes sense of conduct. In light of "the end" human conduct, and thus human history more generally, finds a rationale.

Moreover, "the end" has always been the *telos* for which human life and human history has been intended. I have already discussed 60:1-4, where all of human history, from the creation to the eschaton, is actualized at the creation through the mechanism of God's timeless, simultaneous, and comprehensive knowledge (see § 5.1.1). In this context, "the end" stands as the point toward which all of history progresses and where, as God intervenes, historical schematizations cease. "The end" is history's *telos* in the sense that history is aimed at this point like an archer aims an arrow at their target. But this is also indicated in other passages in other ways. Thus, at 4:1-6, God says to Baruch the following:

> This city is delivered up for a time, and the people are chastised during a time, and the world [or: age] is not forgotten. Or do you perhaps think that this is the city about which I said: On the palms of my hands I have inscribed you. This building that is now built in your midst is not the one revealed with me, the one already prepared here when I intended to make Paradise. And I showed it to Adam before he sinned, but when he transgressed the commandment, it was taken away from him, as was also Paradise. And after these [things], I showed it to my servant Abraham, by night, between the halves of the sacrifices. And furthermore, I also showed it to Moses on Mount Sinai when I showed him the likeness of the tabernacle and of all its implements. And now, see, it is preserved with me, as is also Paradise (cf. 56:2-4).

God tells Baruch that his promises have always had in view the heavenly city, not the Jerusalem of this present world. Furthermore, this heavenly city preexisted Adam's transgression. It has been the point toward which God has always directed human life, whether it be Adam, Abraham, or Moses. It is a conceptual part of those preexistent but presently invisible realities that will be revealed to the righteous as part of their entry into a world of beauty, bliss, and splendour when they transcend death and take on angelic immortality at the eschaton (51:7-16). For the author, "the end" is, and has always been, the orienting horizon for human life. Human life is meant to be lived in reference to this "end."

This sense is further reinforced by the way in which *2 Baruch* presents the Torah in the same terms which characterize the life of the righteous in the eschaton. Rebecca Harris (2019) summarizes this point nicely:

> Images of the righteous before, during, and at the culmination of their transformation draw on the same light imagery that describes the Torah

[180] That "the end" signifies a clear break from the present world is indicated most basically in the author's portrayal of the present world in specific contrast to the future world such that the former world won't even be remembered (cf. 44:11-45:2; 83:9-23). M. Henze (2011) writes that "the main difference between this world and the next is that this world is plagued by decay, transience, and death; it is 'the world that passes by and in which you live' (48.50), 'this world of tribulation' (51.14), whereas the world to come is 'a time that does not pass by' (44.11) and promises life eternal and everlasting bliss" (281). See Henze 2011, 305-317 for the resurrection of the dead in *2 Baruch*).

> throughout *2 Baruch*. The splendor that they possess because of their adherence to the Torah becomes further glorified through transformations: the shape of their faces is turned into the light of their beauty (51:3), they will be equal to the stars, and they may "change themselves into any shape they wish, from comeliness into beauty and from light into glorious splendor" (51:10). The light of Torah that becomes internalized in the righteous during the earthly period continues to express itself throughout their transformation into beings fit to inhabit the incorruptible world. The righteous in *2 Baruch*, like the Torah, are characterized by light (111).

Harris' analysis above is very helpful in showing how the Torah is connected to the life of the righteous in "the end" through the language of light. However, given what *2 Baruch* communicates about the nature of eschatological realities as preexistent and invisible, I think the flow between the two is more accurately articulated when it is reversed. That is, it is less that the internalized light of Torah continues to express itself throughout the transformation of the righteous in the eschaton, and more that the light of the Torah is the light of "the end" refracted into individual lives on earth within human history. Torah is itself oriented toward the horizon of "the end." In other words, "the end" is the *telos*; Torah is the trajectory.[181]

In sum, the author's deterministic historiography is portrayed such that history is conceptualized as reflecting both order and intent. As a result, it is aptly qualified as a "plan."

5.2.2. The "Divine" Plan

Where the author's deterministic historiography can be qualified as a "plan" in that history is ordered and intended, God is consistently identified as the source of this intent such that the "plan" is also aptly qualified as "divine." This point is straightforward and need not be belaboured. It is as an evident feature of the author's thought throughout this work. Passages like 60:1-4 (see § 5.1.1) clearly identify God as the agent behind history's plan and progression.

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[181] J. Hobbins (1998) is correct when he affirms that *2 Baruch*'s view of history "is profoundly teleological. Events are accounted for in terms of their contribution to the attainment of not-yet-realized goals of the whole to which they are presumed to belong" (71). He is also right to point out the two-world schema in *2 Baruch* does not destroy all sense of continuity between the two worlds. It seems to me, however, that he misunderstands the significance of the future coming world as a break from the present realities. Thus, he writes that "a world beyond death is clearly an essential element in 2 Baruch's cosmology, but continuity, not just discontinuity, is posited between life now and life in the hereafter. 2 Baruch exhibits a profound concern for the process of history, for the rise and fall of nations and the exercise of world dominion. The work foresees a geopolitical transformation involving an ingathering of the diaspora Jews, a surpassing restoration of Zion, and the reestablishment of the land as a safe haven for the people. The messianic era on earth is a key component of 2 Baruch's expectations of consummation. The book's future hope lies within history, not just beyond it" (71). But this "concern" is not unique to *2 Baruch*. All of the apocalypses which have been investigated have shown this same concern for history. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the messianic age in *2 Baruch* does not represent the fulfillment of God's promise of reward and punishment as it concerns individuals; this is reserved for the eschaton where the righteous transcend death in angelic immortality in return for their suffering on earth, and where all the vestiges of corruptibility which mark this present age decidedly disappear – this is an ontological difference. The messianic age does not represent the culmination of God's promises to the righteous in and of itself. It is a liminal transition point between the present and future worlds.

5.2.3. The Sociology of the Divine Plan

2 Baruch, like the other apocalypses that have been examined, defines humanity in terms of a collectively framed moral binary. Individuals are associated with one of two collective groups. On one side, there are the "Torah-faithful." This group is defined as following the Torah faithfully. They have suffered in life and will transcend of death in the transtemporal distribution of justice (cf. 54:19-21; 44:2-45:2).[182] On the other side, there are "the wicked" who reject Torah. In so doing, they are depicted as rejecting morality in a very general sense (cf.15:5-8; 55:2). They will be tormented in the transtemporal distribution of justice (cf. 54:12-22).[183] This binary is depicted as stretching back to Adam and extending into the eschaton (cf. 54:12-22).

5.2.4. "Apocalyptic" Determinism

The author's deterministic historiography, which can be summed up in the motif of the "divine plan," is thoroughly contextualized by apocalypticism's notional architecture.

First, dualism pervades its conceptualization of time, ontology, space, epistemology, and sociology. Regarding time, the present world is consistently contrasted to a future coming world. "The end" represents a breaking off from the present world, and a transition into the coming world. Moreover, the two worlds are depicted as belonging to qualitatively different kinds of life, suggesting an ontological break in addition to the temporal break (cf. 44:9-45:2).[184] Regarding space, the present visible world is consistently contrasted to the future coming world. Aspects of the future world preexist the present one, such that it exists in parallel to the present world, although it is, at the same time, both invisible and inaccessible (implying an ontological dualism; cf. 51:8). Conceptually, one seems to inhabit one space or the other. Thus, when the righteous inhabit the future world's space, the space of the present world is no more. In regard to epistemology, God's knowledge and the heavenly knowledge of which Baruch's visionary encounters are a part are consistently contrasted to earthly or mundane means of knowing. Human knowledge is unable to penetrate heavenly knowledge without assistance (cf. 23:2-3;

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[182] See Harris 2019, 113n25 for understanding the Torah in terms of a more general sense of morality than a reference to a particular text.

[183] There are other places which preserve a distinction between Israel and the nations generally (cf. 72). However, the collective moral binary which defines humanity in terms of Torah-fidelity or rejection is conceptualized as stretching back to Adam and reaches into the final distribution of justice at the eschaton. As such, this distinction is more fundamental than the distinction between Israel and the nations. Henze (2011) writes that "the division between the righteous and the wicked is strictly reinforced throughout the apocalypse and has a finite quality to it, so much so that the text leaves no room even for the craftiest of modern interpreters to remove the uncomfortable apocalyptic wedge" (282-283). He rightly underscores the paraenetic intention of *2 Baruch*, but oddly denies its condemnatory aspect. Thus, "Baruch's intentions are paraenetic, *not* condemnatory. He wants to persuade his audience to act now – to be wise, full of understanding, to adhere to Torah in this life and to desire what is promised for the world to come – so that they will be counted among the righteous and be amply rewarded in the world to come" (285; emphasis mine). *Pace* Henze, the paraenetic quality of *2 Baruch* is directly tied to its condemnation of the wicked. Without this condemnation, it seems that both the urgency and the effect of this message would change significantly.

[184] "The term 'the end' carries as much of an *ontological* meaning as it provides some *chronological* information about the final consummation of time" (Henze 2011, 291).

38:1-3; 48:1-3; 54:1-7). Viewed sociologically, humanity is defined in terms of a collectively defined moral binary.

Second, "the end" supplies human life and history with a particular *telos*. It is in reference to this *telos* that human life is to be lived and human history progresses along a singular trajectory. Indeed, human history is depicted as having been actualized by God, in virtue of his exhaustive and simultaneous knowledge, as a conceptual whole (cf. 60:1-4). It cannot be understood apart from "the end," nor cannot it deviate from the trajectory which leads to "the end." Thus, however much *2 Baruch* uses Deuteronomic language, its historiography is apocalyptic. That is, because "the end" serves as an omni-orienting reference point or *telos*, the "divine plan" and not human agency functions as history's driving mechanism.

5.3. Human Moral Agency

The author of *2 Baruch* places particular emphasis on human moral agency. One of the clearest passages among the many that deal with this issue is 54:12-22. What is reflected here is generally consistent with and representative of what is found elsewhere in *2 Baruch.*

> For who is like [you] in your marvelous deeds, O God, or who comprehends your deep thought of life? For with your mind you guide all creatures, whom your right hand created, and you have established every source of light beside you, and you have prepared the reservoirs of wisdom under your throne. Justly do they perish, those who have not loved your Torah, and the torment of judgment receives those who have not subjected themselves to your power. For even though Adam was first to sin and brought death upon all who were not in his time but rather [upon all] those who were born of him, each one of them has prepared for himself the torment to come, and, furthermore, each of them has chosen for himself the praises to come. For truly he who believes will receive a reward. Now, then, turn to desolation, you evildoers of now, because you will be visited quickly, for at the time you rejected the understanding of the Most High. For his works have not taught you, nor has the craftsmanship of his creation persuaded you that is at all times. Adam is therefore not the cause, except only for himself, but each of us has become our own Adam. But you, Lord, interpret for me these [things] that you have revealed to me, and make known to me what I inquired from you. For at the consummation of the age, those who have acted wickedly will be prosecuted according to their wickedness, and you will praise the faithful according to their faith. For those who are among your own you guide, and those who sin you wipe out from among your own.

This passage highlights three elements relevant to the present issue. First, humans are very clearly viewed as the source of their own actions. Each person is their own Adam—that is, each person is absolutely the author of their own actions and is responsible for the ensuing consequences. Thus, each individual prepares for themselves their own destiny. Second, human action is viewed as being consistent with, or at least connected to, dispositions and affect. Thus, the wicked can be qualified as not *loving* God's Torah, or as refusing to be subjugated. Human action is connected to motivation such that human action possesses an internal motor which

helps to explain action. In other words, human action is self-propelled. Third, human action is informed. God is depicted as having provided humanity with all the necessary moral framework that informs action. That the wicked are not persuaded by and reject this framework is not due to ignorance or conscientious dissension. It is a condemnation of a pride which refuses to live in accordance with a self-evidently true (in the author's view) moral framework (cf. 15:5-8).

In sum, the author conceptualizes human moral agency as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

The author's conceptualization of human moral agency is generally consistent with the other apocalypses that have been examined. But in at least one respect, it seems to launch itself in a new direction. Particularly when compared to *4 Ezra*, *2 Baruch* takes a very different position on the way in which Adam is envisioned as functioning *vis-à-vis* the human race. Adam's sin creates no heritage of an "evil heart" for his descendants. Moreover, there does not seem to be, at least initially, any *a priori* ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked" in *2 Baruch.*[185]

The other apocalypses bridged apocalyptic determinism and human moral agency through ontology (see § 2.3). Human action is self-authored and the future is guaranteed because action follows nature.[186] It is not hard to see how this construction might not satisfy everyone's conceptualization of justice. The author of *2 Baruch* clearly does away with this ontology. Instead, the righteous intend and act differently from the wicked because, simply put, they have chosen Torah. Nature follows action. But this is still a part of God's plan for the world because when he chose to create, God knew "the end," the beginning, and everything in between. God chose to actualize it all as a whole. Thus, the future, God's plan, history's trajectory, and future decisions all remain unalterable because they were part of the whole which was actualized at creation. Here, God's knowledge bridges apocalyptic determinism and human moral agency (see § 5.1.1).

As a result of this distinction, *2 Baruch* seems to attribute greater efficacity to human action with respect to salvation. Yet, it must be remembered that the distinction between *2 Baruch* and the other apocalypses does not concern human agency *per se*. Every work that has been examined has affirmed human agency and the importance of individual action. Moreover, even in the case of *2 Baruch*, because the act of creation is the actualization of human history in its entirety, the final tallies of "the righteous" or "the wicked," as God knows them, never change. Conversion does not increase the end tally of "the righteous," nor does apostasy diminish it. This was also true of the other apocalypses. Despite, then, *2 Baruch*'s emphasis on God's knowledge, despite its alternative view of Adam's role *vis-à-vis* humanity and rejection of an *a priori* ontology that distinguishes the righteous and the wicked, it remains conceptually very similar to the other

[185] It also reinterprets the cosmic problem of sin as seen in texts like *The Animal Apocalypse.* Whereas the *AA* interprets the human problem with sin in reference to a prior cosmic problem of sin, here, the cosmic problem of sin *is* the human problem with sin. Adam's sin adversely influences some of the angels (56:5-16). The author of *2 Baruch* thus resists any impulse which might shuffle moral responsibility away from the individual.

[186] Again, although there seem to be some clear implications for God's knowledge here, the other authors do not develop in this direction.

apocalypses. Indeed, upon closer inspection, even the author's exhortation to Torah-fidelity underscores the efficacy of individual action in terms of a performative symbol of collective identity.

An emphasis on Torah-fidelity is far more prominent in *2 Baruch* than has been seen in the other apocalypses examined here. This does not mean, however, that *2 Baruch* is precise about the particulars of Torah practice. Indeed, no particulars are defined beyond conveying a very broad ethical or moral sense, which is, in turn, very broadly connected to a traditional Jewish identity through Moses and a general reference to observance of both the Sabbath and festivals (cf. 84:7-9). Rebecca Harris (2019) writes that "the only really tangible measure of Torah observance in *2 Baruch* is that it should lead to good works (63:3; 85:1–3). This lack of specificity in defining the content of Torah is likely an intentional move by the author, as it serves to make Torah observance more attainable for a wider population" (113). It is also clear that, for the author, Torah is broadly synonymous with the whole of the revelation that has been entrusted to Baruch, including its eschatological elements (cf. 4:5; 57:2; 59).

As a result, it seems to me that in *2 Baruch*, the Torah functions symbolically in reference to the revelation or teaching that defines both the figure of Baruch in the text and the community it implies. It also connects the implied community to an imagined community of an idealized Jewish past through the figures of Abraham and Moses, heroes who are depicted as having received these same revelations and thus lend the community credibility. Here, the Torah has little to do with any potential halakhic function—too little attention is given to this area within the text itself (in contrast, for example, to the book of *Jubilees*). Rather, it has everything to do with connecting *2 Baruch*'s implied community to an idealized Jewish history whose validity in no way depends on an earthly temple. In *2 Baruch*, the Torah is bounded by the content and context of apocalyptic revelation. It represents the integrity of the community's identity through the links it provides to an idealized Jewish past, as well as to an angelic future.[187]

Thus, in *2 Baruch*, to practice Torah is, simply put, nothing less and nothing more than being identified as a legitimate member of the text's implied community in conjunction with the community's conceptual boundaries.[188] As such, where Torah defines action, or demands its right (48:27), it is the bounded community that defines and demands. To act in reference to Torah is to act in reference to the community, and the conceptual boundaries that define it. In this way, then, although the author has done away with the ontological distinction that separates "the righteous" from "the wicked," individual action is still very much a performative symbol of collective identity.

[187] This is similar to the way in which R. Harris (2019) articulates the function of the light of Torah: "1) identifying the righteous as righteous in the present age and at the eschatological judgement, and 2) enabling them to undergo future transformation into more glorified beings fit to dwell in the heavenly spaces" (112). Both points seem to address the integrity of identity.

[188] No other precision as it relates to practice, beyond the affirmation of a very broad ethical framework within a comparatively more detailed conceptualization of Jewish apocalypticism, can be made. Where action in *2 Baruch* is contextualized by the Torah, the Torah is, in turn, contextualized by the community's conceptual boundaries. Symbolically, then, the Torah stands for the integrity of the community's identity, extended backwards to the past and forward into the eschaton.

Shifting focus slightly, Matthias Henze (2011) argues that "Baruch's intentions are paraenetic, not condemnatory. He wants to persuade his audience to act now – to be wise, full of understanding, to adhere to Torah in this life and to desire what is promised for the world to come – so that they will be counted among the righteous and be amply rewarded in the world to come" (285). What I have argued above, I think, complicates this notion. Adhering to "Torah in this life" is not a simple matter of adhering to a Deuteronomic sense of Torah. Here, the Torah is an apocalyptically bounded gathering point around which the community's identity is perpetuated and reinforced, by which individual identities are solidified. As such, the paraenetic action to which Henze refers is simply the same choice that the author of *4 Ezra* sets before their audience: to become part of the apocalyptically bounded community.

5.4. Summary

The author's conceptualization of apocalyptic determinism and human moral agency can be summarized in the following way:

1. The "divine plan," which is driven by God's intent and agency, for which "the end" supplies a particular and overarching *telos*, functions as history's driving mechanism. It reduces the future, as it is defined at any time, to a possibility of one.
2. The "divine plan" determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is binarily defined in terms of the "the righteous" and "the wicked." In the transtemporal "end," the righteous transcend death while the wicked are tormented.
3. The individual can participate in only one of these two collective destinies.
4. At creation, by virtue of his comprehensive knowledge, God actualized the creation from beginning to end *as a whole*. God's knowledge bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism and their conceptualization of human moral agency. Even though each person is their own Adam, God's knowledge secures the future as unalterable.
5. Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action, and framed with particular reference to the Torah.
6. Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

As has been the case in the other works examined here, there is no logical contradiction between the propositions above. Thus it is reasonable to affirm that the author's apocalyptic determinism is coherent with their conceptualization of human moral agency. Proposition four (see § 5.1.1) represents a significant departure from the other apocalypses that have been examined. The author abandons any *a priori* ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked," and instead emphasizes the function of God's knowledge in relation to both human action and a singular, certain future.

5.5. The Social Function of Apocalyptic Determinism

Ultimately, the author of *2 Baruch* seeks to provide their audience with a means of understanding their present situation in terms of God's plan, in the hopes of facilitating conversions to

apocalypticism (see § 5.1.3, 5.3), and encouraging current community members in their hope of the future, coming world.

In terms of both understanding and conversion, it is absolutely essential for the author to offer a coherent way of conceptualizing the certainty of salvation in conjunction to God's justice such that the author's proposal makes sense of the community's present situation. Apocalyptic determinism is essential to the author's aim of making sense. It provides a context whereby both the future is rendered unalterable, and God's promises have only ever applied to the future coming world. As such, one is provided with a coherent way of affirming both present suffering *and* the ongoing relevance of God's promises for Israel, *and* the absolute certainty of the nation's destiny.

Where the author relates the unalterable future to God's knowledge, it is possible that an attractive and coherent alternative presents itself to those who bristled under the conceptualization of God's justice that *4 Ezra represents*. In this case, there is potentially a clearer emphasis on God's impartiality. Moreover, where this emphasis on God's knowledge is accompanied by an emphatic rejection of any ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked," except as it concerns an evaluation of their respective actions, an emphasis on God's impartiality becomes clearer and even possibly compelling. The rhetorical force of removing an *a priori* ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked" also helps to underscore the urgency of action. The future is coming and will hasten in accordance with God's plan—only those whose actions can be associated with the Torah, whose identity can be unambiguously related to the text's implied community, are assured a place in God's promised future world. *2 Baruch* thus represents a parallel apocalyptic option to the tradition which *4 Ezra* represents.

Conceptually, just as was the case in the other works examined, apocalyptic determinism also provides the community with a self-validating effect. In God's plan, those who are faithful to the Torah will always join themselves to the community, such that the truth of the community's conceptual system is validated as they do so. Likewise, those who reject the Torah will always reject or find themselves at odds with the community, such that the truth of the community's conceptual system is validated even in rejection and resistance. Once again, it is difficult to underestimate the power of a system that is validated in both its affirmation and rejection.

In sum, where the author aims to persuade and convert their audience, apocalyptic determinism contributes a structural, and absolutely necessary, coherence to their thought.

Chapter 6: Early Apocalyptic Determinism and Its Development

For each apocalypse examined, I offered a summary of both the author's apocalyptic determinism and their corresponding conceptualization of human moral agency. I have set out these summaries side by side in Table 6.1.

Before offering a summary of what, in my view, Table 6.1 represents, I offer several points for clarification. First, in the summaries I have offered for each apocalypse, I have tried to preserve a similar analytical structure to facilitate comparison. In doing so, I have sought to accurately summarize the essential structure of apocalyptic determinism and moral agency as they are reflected in the texts, choosing to leave aside details or elements that, in my judgement, contribute little to the overall conceptual structure. If, however, Table 6.1 seems problematic for its similarity, one may revisit the individual chapters that correspond to each apocalypse to review my full arguments.

Second, the propositions in the table are related more precisely to either apocalyptic determinism or human moral agency. Propositions one to three correspond specifically to apocalyptic determinism. Proposition four represents a conceptual bridge which links apocalyptic determinism to human moral agency. Propositions five and following correspond specifically to human moral agency. This distinction is necessary because, conceptually, a text could affirm apocalyptic determinism on the one hand, but formulate human moral agency differently on the other.

Third, in chapter one, I laid out three objectives for this project: 1), to outline the conceptual structure of an "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism;" 2), to delineate specific paths of its development; and 3), to examine the ways in which apocalyptic determinism is adapted to a text's specific social function. As Table 6.1 summarizes my analyses, examining its data in relation to these questions should provide clear answers, or at least clear directions for exploration.

6.1. The Conceptual Structure of "Early Jewish Apocalyptic Determinism"

In Table 6.1, propositions one to three correspond most properly to apocalyptic determinism. Surprisingly, across all of the apocalypses I examined, these three propositions remain quite similar. Indeed, their similarity allows them to be summarized in a way which does not misconstrue their relevance to their respective texts. Their stability across the apocalypses also indicates that apocalyptic determinism was conceptually solidified at least by the Maccabean period and persisted at least until the end of the first century CE. Both the similarity and the stability of these propositions justifies identifying the following three propositions as the conceptual core of an "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism."

Table 6.1: Summary of Apocalyptic Determinism and Human Moral Agency in the Apocalypses

	Daniel 7-12	The *AA*	*4 Ezra*	*2 Baruch*
1	The "divine plan," which finds its source in God, is history's driving mechanism. "The end," ultimately understood in terms of the transcendence of death, orients the "divine plan," and supplis history with a particular *telos*.	The "divine plan," which finds its source in God's intention and agency, is history's driving mechanism. "The end" orients the "divine plan," in that it provides history with an underlying rationale and an overarching *telos*. The "divine plan" contextualizes human history as God's remedy to the cosmic problem of evil.	The "divine plan," which is driven by God's intent and agency and animated by the teleological force supplied by "the end," is history's driving mechanism. It reduces the future, as it is defined at any time, to a possibility of one.	The "divine plan," which is driven by God's intent and agency, for which "the end" supplies a particular and overarching *telos*, functions as history's driving mechanism. It reduces the future, as it is defined at any time, to a possibility of one.
2	The "divine plan" determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is binarily defined in terms of "the wise" (*i.e.* the righteous) and "the wicked." With reference to "the end," "the wise" transcend death, while "the wicked" are punished.	The "divine plan" determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is binarily defined in terms of "the good" (*i.e.* the righteous) and "sinners" (*i.e.* the wicked). With reference to "the end," "the good" transcend death, while "sinners" are punished.	The "divine plan" determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is binarily defined in terms of "the righteous" and "the wicked." With reference to "the end," "the righteous" transcend death, while "the wicked" are tormented.	The "divine plan" determines human destiny at a collective level, where humanity is binarily defined in terms of the "the righteous" and "the wicked." In the transtemporal "end," "the righteous" transcend death while "the wicked" are tormented.
3	The individual can participate in only one of these two collective destinies.	The individual can participate in only one of the two collective destinies.	The individual can participate in only one of these two collective destinies.	The individual can participate in only one of these two collective destinies.
4	"The wise" and "the wicked" possess distinctive ontological, but underdefined, natures. This ontological distinction serves bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism to their conceptualization of human moral agency.	Human action is predetermined such that action follows from nature. How these natures are themselves determined is left unexplained. This ontological distinction bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism to their conceptualization of human moral agency.	Human action may be predisposed to wickedness because of the "evil heart;" but "the righteous" are protected (in an undefined way) from this predisposition. This distinction bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism to their conceptualization of human moral agency.	At creation, by virtue of his comprehensive knowledge, God actualized the creation from beginning to end *as a whole*. God's knowledge bridges the author's apocalyptic determinism to their conceptualization of human moral agency. Even though each person is their own Adam, God's knowledge secures the future as unalterable.
5	Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action.	Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action.	Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action.	Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's moral quality as it is reflected through individual action, and framed with particular reference to the Torah.
6	Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.	Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.	Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.	Human moral agency is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.
7	The relative success or failure of human action is determined by the "divine plan" which orients history to the *telos* of "the end."		Within the divine plan, before the eschaton, God generally does not intervene to curb the actions of the wicked multitude.	
8			Within the divine plan, God expresses a positive agency in the case of the righteous few. The exact nature of this agency is left undefined.	

1. The "divine plan," which is animated by the teleological force of "the end," is history's driving mechanism.[189]
2. The "divine plan" determines destiny at a collective level. At the transtemporal "end," the righteous transcend death while the wicked are punished.
3. Individuals can participate in only one of these collective destinies.

Moreover, the apocalypses also reflect a consistent formulation of human moral agency in the context of apocalyptic determinism. Indeed, propositions five and six remain virtually unchanged through all four apocalypses. The authors' conceptualization of human moral agency can be summarized as follows:

5. Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's particular moral quality as it is reflected through action in life.
6. Human moral responsibility is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

As a result of this consistency reflected in the authors' thought, one might include the two propositions above within the conceptual core of apocalyptic determinism. However, because it is conceptually possible to affirm the first three propositions while denying the last two, I prefer to keep them separate. I think it would be interesting to examine other examples of early Jewish apocalyptic literature, such as the Dead Sea Scrolls *corpus*, or the New Testament literature, to see if this conceptualization of human moral agency persists.

6.2. Divergent Development

In Table 6.1, proposition four represents the focal point for the way in which early Jewish apocalyptic determinism develops. In Daniel 7-12 and the *AA*, an ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked" serves to bridge the deterministic historiography with human moral responsibility (see § 2.3). How does the action of "the righteous" remain self-authored such that the future is also guaranteed? The nature of "the righteous" is sufficient to explain the action of "the righteous." In accordance with their nature, "the righteous" will act righteously. As the analysis shifts to *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch*, the way in which apocalyptic determinism develops is highlighted.

4 Ezra, with the notion of the "evil heart," builds upon the *status quo* which was established by its predecessors. This *status quo* can be summarized as follows:

4(a). Human action follows from nature. As such, human action is self-authored and the future is guaranteed.

Although this particular formulation seems to possess clear implications for God's knowledge (the implicit idea is that action is perfectly predictable), none of these three apocalypses develop their thought, or at least articulate their thought, along these lines.

[189] There may be an implicit linear view of time here, particularly as it pertains to history's progression in relation to "the end."

By contrast, *2 Baruch* capitalizes on the potential of God's knowledge as way to bridge human action with a guaranteed future. By virtue of God's knowledge, at creation, God actualizes human history from the beginning to the end *as a whole*. Thus, human action is self-authored and exhaustively predetermined by virtue of God's comprehensive knowing. Moreover, perhaps in response to the way in which *4 Ezra*'s formulation of the "evil heart" could be understood to render God the author of evil, the author of *2 Baruch* does away with any *a priori* ontological distinction between "the righteous" and "the wicked." Their view can be summarized as follows:

4(b). God's knowing is comprehensive. As such, human action is self-authored and the future is guaranteed.

Thus, early Jewish apocalyptic determinism takes two distinct paths of development. This development leaves the conceptual core of apocalyptic determinism untouched, and instead, focuses on the mechanism that bridges human moral agency to a single, guaranteed future. It is possible that this development, evident some 200 years after the composition of the first historical apocalypses, reflects a maturation of thought. Both Daniel and the *AA* articulate ideas that express concern for issues related to suffering and theodicy. However, it is evident that the two apocalypses which were written in the Roman period treat these subjects with considerably more focus and depth. In their divergence, it is clear that, within apocalyptic determinism, more than one option was available to connect God's justice to future salvation and human action. As before, it would be interesting to examine this issue in the context of other examples of early Jewish apocalyptic literature. Are both lines of thought reflected in these works, is one more prominent, and are there other ways in which apocalyptically minded authors connect God's justice to both human action and future salvation?

6.3. A Normative Social Function?

On the question of a possible normative social function for apocalyptic determinism, Table 6.1 is not as useful. Across the four apocalypses which were examined, however, apocalyptic determinism does seem contribute to the texts' social function in a consistent way.

First, apocalyptic determinism was essential to the authors' aim of facilitating a certain form of perception. Where the authors seek to make sense of the present, apocalyptic determinism provides a coherent way of conceptualizing history on a larger scale so that traditional elements of Jewish thought, such as God's promises and his justice, can be reconfigured in terms of "the end." Through apocalyptic determinism, "the end" is afforded an omni-orienting power. The past is made sensible through "the end;" "the end" makes sense of the present; indeed, all of history is set on a singular trajectory toward "the end." "The end" supplies history with an overarching *telos* and rationale. It should not be lost, however, that the omni-orienting function of "the end" is the result of an effort to reconceptualize or reconfigure *the present*.

Second, apocalyptic determinism seems to play a particularly important role in relating the efficacy of individual action back to an enclosed symbolic loop with reference to the text's implied community. Conceptually, because the future is fixed, individual action is not directly efficacious for salvation, at least when viewed from the transtemporal context. In contrast, it is

only through action that an individual can be connected to the collective destiny of the community in the phenomenological present. Moreover, at the intersection of these two contexts, the transtemporal imaginary contextualizes and interprets the phenomenological present. Individual action is rendered meaningful as it is referred to the conceptual boundaries of the community (where terms like "the righteous" function as symbols). But where individuals perceive and affirm their action to be meaningful within this context, the community's boundaries are also reinforced and perpetuated such that the individual's identity with the collective is both signified and validated. Individual action is thus a performative symbol of collective identity.

Third, apocalyptic determinism has also frequently provided the texts' implied community with a set of identity-validating tools. Where the future guarantees both rejection and reception, the experience of both provides an implicit and incontrovertible validation of the community's identity. It is difficult to underestimate the importance of a tool when, in both acceptance and rejection, the community's identity does not fail to be validated.

I hesitate to frame these three elements in terms of a normative social function for apocalyptic determinism. Part of the issue is that these elements are related to the social functions of particular texts which, admittedly, have similar aims. What this consistency does show is that apocalyptic determinism provides a structural coherence which is useful for dealing with issues related to theodicy and in applications for persuasion with respect to perception. Moreover, it is helpful to see how, conceptually, apocalyptic determinism grounds the transtemporal imaginary such that individual action takes on a symbolic efficacy in relation to identity, even when, with respect to salvation, the efficacy of individual action is contestable. I think it would be fruitful to explore how the performative symbolism of individual action operates in contemporary apocalyptic communities.

6.4. Conclusion

To date, the structure and function of determinism within Jewish and early Christian apocalypticism has been little explored. In an effort to help fill this gap in scholarship, I have examined the structure and function of determinism in four Jewish apocalypses: the biblical book of Daniel chaps. 7-12, *The Animal Apocalypse, 4 Ezra*, and *2 Baruch*.

I contend that my analysis shows three things. First, all four apocalypses, which together represent a period spanning approximately 300 years, reflect a stable conceptual core such that a notional "early Jewish apocalyptic determinism" can be identified. I summarize this conceptual core as follows:

1. The "divine plan," which is animated by the teleological force of "the end," is history's driving mechanism.
2. The "divine plan" determines destiny at a collective level. At the transtemporal "end," the righteous transcend death while the wicked are punished.
3. Individuals can participate in only one of these collective destinies.

Moreover, the texts reflect a consistent conceptualization of human moral agency.

5. Individual destiny is conceptualized as befitting one's particular moral quality as it is reflected through action in life.
6. Human moral responsibility is conceptualized as self-authored, self-propelled, and informed action.

Second, *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch* demonstrate that, at least by the end of the first century CE, early Jewish apocalyptic determinism developed in two distinct directions. This development is specifically related to the way apocalyptic determinism is conceptually bridged to human moral agency. I summarize these two directions as follows:

4(a). Human action follows from nature. As such, human action is self-authored and the future is guaranteed.
4(b). God's knowing is comprehensive. As such, human action is self-authored and the future is guaranteed.

Third, early Jewish apocalyptic determinism contributes to the texts' social function in a consistent way. It grounds the transtemporal imaginary such that key conceptual categories like God's justice and promises can be coherently reconfigured and reframed. This is vital to the authors' goal of persuading their audience toward a certain mode of perception. Within this context, individual action becomes a symbolic performance of collective identity such that the individual's identity is validated with reference to both the texts' implied community and their eschatological destiny. Moreover, early Jewish apocalyptic determinism provides the community with powerful tools for self-validation. In both affirmation and rejection, the community's identity is affirmed.

I hope I have demonstrated how, in certain instances, the categories of contemporary philosophical discourse or inattention to the particular notional architectures of apocalyptic historiography and rival conceptual frameworks can obscure the underlying coherence of ancient texts. Conversely, I also hope to have demonstrated how, when appreciated on their own terms, apocalyptic texts reflect a profound conceptual coherence.

To my mind, similar lines of inquiry employing a similar methodological approach could be fruitfully applied to other relevant groups of texts such as the New Testament literature or the Dead Sea Scrolls *corpus*. Furthermore, an examination of apocalyptic determinism and its development within the apocalyptic literature (*i.e.* non-generic apocalypses) of the Second Temple literature more generally seems to be a natural extension of the present project. As such, I hope that this research provides a solid foundation for other lines of inquiry into apocalyptic determinism and its distinctive paths of development.

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