Critiquing Rational Psychology: Meier and Kant on the Immortality of the Soul

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Abstract

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In this paper, I aim to enrich scholarship on Georg Fredrich Meier and extend scholarship on Immanuel Kant's critique of speculative metaphysics. Meier is a relatively underexamined philosopher who worked within the eighteenth-century Wolffian tradition of Rationalism and influenced Kant's critical philosophy. Meier was critical of the metaphysical claims of the Rationalist school, particularly in his essay *Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death*. Meier aimed his critique at Rational Psychology, which boasted proofs for the existence of the immortal soul and claims of certainty regarding its substantiality, simplicity, and maintenance of personality after death. Famously, in the Paralogisms section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant also critiques speculative metaphysics and claims about the qualities of the soul. In the Paralogisms, Kant directs his critique toward Rational Psychology but does not refer directly to the fallacious arguments of the Wolffian tradition of Rational Psychology. Kant's avoidance of mentioning the Wolffian tradition has led to some degree of scholarly neglect for this essential context. I will argue that both Kant and Meier are critics of Rational Psychology who levy the same kind of argument against the claims of Rational Psychology: both argue that proof of the claims about the soul are beyond the capacities of human reason to obtain. In targeting the ground of these claims, the capacities of human reason itself, both Kant and Meier make room for faith, despite differing on the degree to which that faith is necessary for morality.

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1. Introduction

In his introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant famously claimed that he had to "deny reason to make room for faith."[1] This passage summarizes one of the central arguments of the *Critique*: namely, his arguments against speculative metaphysics and its claims of certain knowledge about the existence and qualities of the immortal soul. This form of knowledge, which Kant denies, is knowledge that reaches beyond the limits of human reason. Kant's claims that human reason is limited, that speculative claims ought to be checked, and that faith sometimes ought to supersede reason, have important and often overlooked historical context. Specifically, the Wolffian tradition in eighteenth-century German philosophy informed much of what Kant argues against in the *Critique*. Just as Kant was a local of Königsberg, so too was he operating within a local tradition of philosophy and responding to it. Georg Fredrich Meier, whose works on logic Kant taught at the University of Königsberg, was a key and overlooked figure in the Wolffian school and an influence on Kant's work.[2] Meier anticipated much of what Kant would go on to argue in the first *Critique* against speculative metaphysics and the certainty of claims regarding the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.

In the Wolffian tradition, Rational Psychology was the subdiscipline of Rationalism that was concerned with arguing for the existence of an immortal soul and determining its qualities—particularly, its substantiality, personality, and immortality. Broadly, Rational Psychologists prior to Kant held that one can prove *a priori* that the soul is a substance that retains its personality after the death of the human body. Kant's critique of these claims will be at the heart of my discussion going forward. In short, Kant's argumentative strategy is to target the validity of the foundational claims of Rational Psychology, thus undermining their conclusions about the soul. Kant argues that one cannot prove the immortality of the soul *a priori* because such entities are beyond the

realm of possible experience. Thus, claims derived from these proofs cannot be called certain; rather, they are matters of belief, or faith. Strictly speaking, faith does not constitute knowledge for Kant, and in his view its objects lie beyond the scope of human reason. As Kant argues, pushing claims past the bounds of human reason leads one into error and illusion. This criticism, shared by Meier, unites their work. Before Kant, Meier less famously claimed that belief in the immortal soul "supplements the deficiency of reason, advances beyond where reason stops, and provides a needed light for us where reason leaves us in a pernicious darkness," acknowledging that human reason has boundaries, and to push past them leads it to error.[3]

In what follows, I argue that Kant and Meier criticize Rational Psychology following a similar argumentative strategy. Meier, like Kant, was a critic of Rational Psychology, targeting it on the grounds that its claims about the qualities of the soul exceed the limits of reason. I will argue that Meier's views on the immortality of the soul and existence of God did influence Kant in a crucial way; namely, for Meier, they provide the subject with moral motivation. For both, we can never have any theoretical certainty regarding noumenal entities, yet we can have "moral certainty" or "rational belief" in the immortal soul.[4] Essentially, their shared move against the claims of speculative metaphysics, at least regarding proofs for the immortality of the soul, is to relegate them to the realm of belief.[5] My other core aim will be to further study the connection between Kant and his local philosophical tradition, particularly in relation to Meier. Reading Meier and Kant together illuminates both their projects because they mirror each other in several key ways; namely, they have similar understandings of central concepts like belief and certainty, they levy the same kinds of charges against their contemporaries, and they hold the immortality of the soul in similar esteem.[6]

2. Kant's Context: An Overview of Rational Psychology

Generally, readings of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* neglect the tradition of Rational Psychology that he was working within during his pre-critical years and responding to during his critical period. Rational Psychology has its origins in Descartes' attempts to demonstrate that the soul is a purely immaterial, thinking substance that can exist distinctly from the body.[7] The Wolffian tradition of Rational Psychology, as Corey Dyck claims in *Kant and Rational Psychology* (2014), is overlooked in favour of the narrative of Kant responding exclusively to the likes of Descartes and Leibniz, particularly in the Paralogisms.[8]

Rational Psychology in the Wolffian tradition draws its inspiration from Leibniz and attempts to incorporate key empiricist ideas from Locke. As Dyck explains, Wolff understood Empirical Psychology as only saying as much about the soul as observation would allow, and that Rational Psychology extends beyond that by considering the essence of the soul and what can be derived from that essence. As such, Rational Psychology aims to explain the relationship between the soul and body. For Wolff, the discipline of Rational Psychology takes Empirical Psychology as the basis for its theories about the soul.[9] Locke, the principal Empirical Psychologist, is primarily responding to Descartes and his claims that the mind is an immaterial substance, with thought as its primary attribute. Moreover, Descartes held that the mind is immortal, and capable of existing independently of the body. The arguments of Descartes influenced Locke's work in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke viewed the immateriality and immortality of the soul as relevant for understanding the issues of personal identity and of the moral significance of the soul.[10]

Beginning with immateriality and immortality, Locke aimed to defend the claim that the materialist account of human nature is compatible with the personal immortality of the soul; in

other words, that the death of the human body does not prevent the resurrection of the human soul in its same body. Locke's argument for the compatibility of the materialist position is both philosophical and scriptural, as Locke had additional theological ambitions. Locke, according to Nicholas Jolley, argues that the soul's status as an immaterial substance is not relevant to personal identity because scripture refers to the resurrection of the dead as the resurrection of the same persons, not the same body, as it will be persons that are rewarded or punished, and that the body need not be the same as their original.[11]

The core issues in Locke's work that are relevant to my discussion are his theory of personal identity and of the moral importance of an immortal soul. What is essential here is that Locke is concerned with the ground upon which a moral judgment of punishment or reward is determined. Beginning with personal identity, Locke is primarily objecting to Descartes' argument that the mind always thinks because its primary attribute is thought. For Descartes, as Jolley explains, there can be no gaps in personhood, as Descartes takes it as a certainty that the immortal substance of the mind (soul) thinks continuously. Locke attacks Descartes' assertion that the mind always thinks, arguing that consciousness is "gappy" and that the mind does not always think, such as when we are asleep, and thus, for Locke, persons can be "gappy" entities. This theory of persons, as Locke puts it "'is a Forensick term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of Law, and Happiness and Misery' (E II.xxvii.26)."[12] Locke's aim here is to establish the person as the locus of moral assessment and as the recipient of divine justice, and establish that the person is not merely identical to the body. According to Gideon Yaffe, Locke claims that it is our consciousness, our recognition of our own thoughts, and our memory are what makes us the same person. Consequently, should one forget a past action to the extent that it is impossible to retrieve it, then they are no longer the same person, merely the same human being.

As such, memory is essential to the moral dimension of personal identity. One must be able to recognize that they performed the past action, thereby mediating that memory through one's present self, to be morally accountable.[13]

Wolff was the principal Rational Psychologist of the eighteenth-century German tradition that Kant would come to critique. Wolff held that the soul survived separately from the body (both prior to the existence of the body and after the death of the body).[14] Death, for Wolff, is merely the cessation of physiological functions, and death brings the soul into a greater state of "essential" perfection.[15] As Dyck (2018) explains, the soul must be immaterial because the power of thinking cannot belong to body. Rather, only an immaterial and incorruptible substance can be endowed with moral and intellectual faculties.[16] For Wolff, the continuity of the personal identity of the soul renders it susceptible to punishment or reward after death.[17] In this view, all that is required for proving the immortality of the soul is proof of the capacity of distinct cognition and the continuance of personality after death.[18]

One individual following Wolff in the school of Rational Psychology was Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, a figure of importance to Meier and Kant. Kant taught both Baumgarten's and Meier's works for decades at the University of Königsberg.[19] Baumgarten drew a sharper distinction between Empirical and Rational Psychology than Wolff.[20] Baumgarten limits the observations of Empirical Psychology to "the *I* (*ego*), or *my* soul, in particular."[21] As such, the study of the *I* and its relation to the body are the subject of Empirical Psychology for Baumgarten. Meier, a student of Baumgarten, disputes the validity of all attempted demonstrations of the survival of the soul and its intellectual faculties after death in his *Thoughts on the State of the Soul After Death*. Meier attacks the proofs of Wolff and the school of Rational Psychology, claiming that we cannot know that the soul is immortal with mathematical certainty. For Meier, we can,

however, hold that the soul is immortal with a high degree of "moral" certainty.[22] Meier strikes at the validity of the proofs of Rational Psychology, suggesting that its metaphysical claims are uncertain because of the limits of reason. It is in this context of the eighteenth-century German tradition that Kant's pre-critical work emerges. His later work in the *Critique of Pure Reason* would go on to criticize and challenge speculative metaphysics in a similar vein to Meier's critique.

3. Interpretive Overview: Kant's Postulate of the Immortality of the Soul

In both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant identifies a set of necessary assumptions for his moral theory. One of these assumptions, the postulate of the immortality of the soul, is essential to Kant's discussion of personal identity and morality. As I will explain, the postulates in general are essential for Kant's ethics because of their motivational strength and their logical (rational) necessity. Jessica Tizzard credits the motivational (empiricist) interpretation of the postulates to Paul Guyer (2000), and rationalist interpretation to Allen Wood (1970).[23] She amalgamates these competing interpretations into her own cognitivist interpretation of the necessity of the postulates. Her view accounts for our sense dependent rationality as well as the potential motivational force of the postulates. I will provide an overview of Guyer, Wood, and Tizzard's understandings of the necessity of the postulates below. Afterward, I will outline my own interpretation of their necessity, one that is compatible with Tizzard's cognitivist view.

Before discussing Guyer, Wood, and Tizzard's views on the importance of the postulates, a general understanding of them is required. Kant explains in the *Critique of Practical Reason* that the postulates are the necessary practical assumptions that underlie morality, serving to give "objective reality to ideas of speculative reason" and justification for belief in concepts that speculative reason cannot know.[24] The postulates are theoretical propositions that are treated as

practical assumptions to give objective validity to practical reason. As Tizzard puts it, the concepts of "freedom, immortality, and God are supersensible ideas that could not be presented in sensible intuition as objects of theoretical reason," and, consequently, we "cannot know how any of these ideas are theoretically possible, but we can and must assume their reality on practical grounds."[25] As such, the postulates are objects of belief rather than objects of experience.

Belief, for Kant ordinarily pertains only to the practical, rather than the theoretical, barring the key exception of the postulates. Belief in the postulates is a particular form of pragmatic belief, namely "doctrinal belief" that applies to merely theoretical propositions which lack objectively sufficient grounds for assent. The proposition that the soul is immortal is not one that we have objective grounds to assent to, insofar as it is beyond the scope of human understanding. However, the postulates can be upheld with subjective sufficiency, to the extent that an agent can take them to be true. This is the nature of doctrinal belief, that an agent takes something to be true for the sake of a practically necessary end.[26] Belief in the postulates is essential because the postulates facilitate the agent's recognition of the highest good as the necessary (and possible) end of morality by allowing the agent to suppose that they have continuity of personality sufficient to fulfil that end after death.[27]

Paul Guyer (2000),[28] regards the postulates as essential exclusively for moral motivation, steering individuals toward virtue without corrupting them. Belief in the postulates, for Guyer, affords the agent psychological assistance in their performance of the moral law; in short, as practical propositions, the postulates provide a motivational force for the agent to act virtuously.[29] Humans, as beings with both rational and sensible natures, in Kant's view, must act in accordance with the moral law. Belief in the possibility of a future life appeals to the sensible nature of the human being, bolstering their capacity for choice (*Willkür*) through providing sufficient subjective

incentives for action in accordance with the moral law, thus creating a "friendly environment" for moral conduct.[30] In Guyer's view, we cannot have a duty to believe in the postulates, yet we do have duties that demand that we act in given ways that uphold the moral law. As such, "the significance of the postulates is exhausted in their contribution to the fulfillment of [those duties]."[31] Essentially, what we do with the postulates is adopt them freely and form practical moral intentions from there, thus advancing towards the highest good.[32] For Guyer, the postulates motivate action without corrupting the will because belief in them is freely adopted, not instrumentally towards some future gain, but towards the highest good.[33]

On the other hand, the rationalist interpretation defended by Allen Wood (1970) takes the postulates to the opposite extreme, as being of strictly logical necessity. Wood views denial of the postulates as an "*absurdum practicum*."[34] If the highest good, as Wood understands it, is unable to be attained, then the moral law is false because it sets an imaginary end. As such, for the moral law to be properly valid, its end must be realizable, and thus Kant employs an argument of necessary belief in the concepts of God and immortality. Essentially, the argument is that if to obey the command of the moral law (to strive towards the highest good), I must pursue an end which cannot be attained, then that command is invalid and there is no obligation to obey that command. This, in Wood's view, means that if a human agent is to follow the moral law, then the highest good must be attainable, because if it was not, then the moral law would not be valid. The moral law, as condition for all duty, is unconditionally binding. Clearly, the highest good not being attainable by us poses a problem for the possibility of morality itself. Denial of the postulates means denying the moral law itself. Moreover, should one deny the postulates and still attempt to act in accordance with the moral law, then the individual is acting illogically and irrationally, insofar as they do not act according to their own beliefs.[35] Therefore, if one denies the postulates

they are open to abandoning the moral law, should they find persuasive logical grounds to do so. As such, one must believe in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul to preserve the possibility of the attainment of the highest good.[36] Tizzard identifies Wood's view as foregoing the subjective necessity of the moral law in favour of viewing it as a primarily of logical, rather than motivational, necessity.[37]

Tizzard's cognitivist view treats the postulates as subjectively necessary in virtue of both their motivational effect on the agent and their logical necessity. Her cognitivist interpretation does not view these two elements as mutually exclusive; rather, they are mutually supportive insofar as the rationalist element helps the agent understand their own practical rationality and the motivational element strengthens the moral disposition that Wood's rationalist reading of the postulates purports to guarantee. In her cognitivist view, belief in the postulates both bolsters the certainty of the agent's "moral vocation" of promoting the highest good and motivates the agent's moral disposition towards acting virtuously.[38] Tizzard's view is a fuller interpretation that encompasses both the empiricist and rationalist perspectives held by Guyer and Wood, and it informs my own reading of Kant's postulates and their systematic, as well as moral, significance (and, in my view, is closer to what Kant likely intended, rather than Guyer and Wood's competing interpretations).

Tizzard, articulating her cognitivist view, explains that the postulate of the immortality of the soul enables us to grasp the possibility of our having a complete, moral disposition (holiness), which is something that ordinarily unfolds gradually over a long period of time.[39] In this sense, postulating the immortality of the soul is a rational necessity because we are able to represent our moral disposition as a complete whole and overcome our limitations of non-holiness and of our finite duration. The motivational content of the postulates, on Tizzard's view, is not separable from

their conceptual content. Theoretical human reason is constrained to the realm of possible experience, and so we need further resources, gained by belief in the reality of the postulates, to realize the highest good and strengthen our moral disposition. The motivational element of the cognitivist view is straightforward insofar as without the cognitive (rational) force of the postulates, the agent is susceptible to moral despair in the face of an end that is morally required and impossible to fulfil.[40]

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant explains why the soul is an essential component of his ethical system. As discussed earlier, Tizzard frames *belief* in the postulates as essential beliefs for Kant and Kantians, outlining why these are necessary for the subject. My view, put simply, is that the postulates are necessary for the systematic cohesion of Kant's moral philosophy. In particular, the postulate of the immortality of the soul is essential insofar as it comes bundled with a theory of personality over time. That the personality of an individual persists after death is necessary to properly determine their moral character over time, rather than specifically on an act-by-act basis. The immortality of the soul "is a **postulate** of pure practical reason (by which I understand a *theoretical* proposition, though one not demonstratable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid *practical* law)."[41] This postulate makes it possible for an agent to, at best, hope for the continuance of their personality so that they may continue to strive towards conformity with the moral law and "to be fully adequate to God's will […]; he can hope to be so only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone can survey)."[42] As such, the postulate of immortality is essential for Kant's ethics insofar as it offers an answer to the question of what the moral agent might hope for. That there is a horizon that an agent ought to strive toward is foundational for Kant's ethics.

The soul and the personality of an individual are, for Kant, inextricably linked. As Dyck (2014) identifies, Kant ties the personality of the soul to the ability to think and have a concept of the "I"—that is, to have an inner sense of oneself as an intelligence.[43] All this is to say that one's capacity for thought—their mind, their identity, and so on—are tied to the soul. In other words, the concept "I think" grounds the idea of the soul and distinguishes it, as Kant writes: "**I think** […] serves only to introduce all thinking as belonging to consciousness. Meanwhile […], it still serves to distinguish two kinds of objects through the nature of our power of representation. **I**, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul.'"[44] While the "I think" is not to be identified as the "I" or soul, it is a proposition containing the condition that accompanies all thinking.[45] The concept of the self, or the I, as the ground of all the individual's representations is essential for other concepts within Kant's ethical work, and the soul, at least insofar as it comes bundled with a theory of identity, is necessary for his system writ large, as it serves as a systematic ground for concepts like autonomy and the will.[46] The Paralogisms section, however, is tied directly to Kant's views on belief, certainty, and, in general, his critique of Rational Psychology. Consequently, Kant's criticisms of Rational Psychology and views on belief and certainty inform my discussion of why belief in the postulates is systematically necessary. As such, rather than discuss the paralogisms in the current context, I will shift my focus to Kant's criticisms of Rational Psychology to have a richer view of them and to facilitate my discussion of Meier's influence on Kant.

4. Meier and Kant: Belief, Certainty, and Critiques of Rational Psychology

Meier and Kant share starkly similar views on belief and certainty. In this section, my aim for analyzing Meier and Kant's views on certainty and belief will be to show that Meier, like Kant,

criticized the claims of Rational Psychology using the same argumentative strategy. I will begin by presenting Kant as a critic of Rational Psychology and its essential thesis (namely, the immortality of the soul). I will discuss Kant before Meier because Kant is already well known as a critic of Rational Psychology. As such, I will present Kant's critique of Rational Psychology and use it as the framework from which to examine Meier as a preceding critic of Rational Psychology. In the process, I will discuss Kant's Paralogisms section to show that the arguments presented there are crucial for understanding his general critique of speculative metaphysics. This will have the additional purpose of facilitating a richer understanding of Meier's understanding of belief and certainty than might otherwise be possible if Meier was considered alone and without the additional context of Kant's work.

4.1. Kant

For Kant, speculative metaphysics is in error when it takes reason alone, without sensibility, to constitute knowledge.[47] Kant's critique of Rational Psychology is contained primarily within the Paralogisms section of the Transcendental Dialectic.[48] Paralogisms, generally, are fallacies of equivocation. The specific paralogisms that Kant critiques are mistaken in that they take the concept of "I" (regarding the qualities of the soul) to apply to an object.[49] At the core of Kant's critique of Rational Psychology is this false equivocation of the self with the soul as an object. Kant's aim with the Paralogisms section is to identify the missteps of Rational Psychology that lead reason into illusion. Kant argues that the concept of the "I," or self, is simply that, a concept that serves as the amalgamation of the agent's various representations over time. What the "I" does not constitute is certain knowledge of the soul as an object, nor of the soul as having the properties of simplicity, substance, immortality, and so on. In all this, he attacks the core

assumptions of Rational Psychology, and thus undermines their claims about the soul. In what follows, I will address the first three paralogisms in order. From there, I will turn to his understanding of belief and certainty, and their relationship to his system writ large, thus closing out my discussion of why belief in the immortal soul is necessary for Kant's system.

In the first paralogism, of the substantiality of the soul, Kant targets Descartes as well as Rational Psychology. Summarizing arguments for the substantiality of the soul, Kant writes:

> That the representation of which is the **absolute subject** of our judgments, and hence cannot be used as the determination of another thing, **is substance**.
>
> I, as a thinking being, am the **absolute subject** of all my possible judgments, and this representation of Myself cannot be used as the predicate of any other thing.
>
> Thus I, as a thinking being (soul), am **substance**.[50]

The error here, as Kant understands it, is in the false equivocation of the subject and substance. The first premise states that substance is neither the predicate nor property of anything sense. The second claims that I, as the subject, cannot be the predicate of anything else. From this, Rational Psychology takes as certain that the soul is a substance. Where Rational Psychology has gone wrong, for Kant, is in the assumption that this refers to some empirical object, thus extending the "I" beyond a purely logical use of the term, to a metaphysical use. It is purely an idea of a substance and thus claims regarding neither "the everlasting duration of the soul through all alterations, [nor] even the human being's death" can follow from it.[51] Kant's criticism of the first paralogism is that just because the "I" represents the self to the individual, does not mean that the "I," or soul, is itself an object (substance). At best, it can signify that the soul is a substance in idea—that is, in a purely rational sense—rather than in any reality. It is from here that Kant identifies Rational Psychology as going astray by making claims of certainty about the reality of soul and its qualities; namely, in taking that which is merely a concept and deriving a supposedly real object from it.

Kant critiques the assumptions that Rational Psychology makes about the qualities of the soul, beyond its substantiality, in the second paralogism. The second paralogism is as follows:

> That thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of the many acting things, is **simple**.
>
> Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing.
>
> Thus etc.[52]

Following the second paralogism, the soul can never be regarded as multiple things working together, and that it can only be regarded as simple. What this means is that one's thoughts cannot be thought by another. Propositions that begin with "I think" are merely representations of the self, unconnected to any object that is given to me by experience. Kant explains that simply because my idea or concept of something is simple does not mean the object that would fall under that concept is simple (especially when that object is inaccessible to me).[53] The error of false equivocation is taking the notion that the "I" or the self is a simple concept to mean that the soul is a simple, immortal, and indestructible substance.

A similar issue arises with the third paralogism, which involves the personality of the soul and the identity of the self through time. The paralogism reads as follows:

> What is conscious of the numerical identity of its Self in different times, is to that extent a **person**.
>
> Now the soul is etc.
>
> Thus it is a person.[54]

Kant criticizes Rational Psychology for taking the unity of one's representations and determinations over time in the "I" to mean that the soul retains the same identity after death. Rational Psychology oversteps, insofar as it takes the formal connection of one's thoughts to prove the numerical identity of the soul after death. Again, the error of Rational Psychology here is to mistake a logical concept for the necessary grounds to make a claim about the quality of immortality in the soul. While the numerical identity and personality of the individual are all able

to be inferred from the unity of apperception (that is, the synthesization of all one's experiences and representations), the paralogistic reasoning of Rational Psychology lies in taking the unity of apperception to prove the permanence of personality (the numerical identity) after death. Thus, Rational Psychology makes assumptions about the qualities of the soul—in this case, its immortality and its continued personality after death—and reason is again led into illusion.

The first three paralogisms are a kind of stacking critique of Rational Psychology insofar as the first faulty assumption supports the second, and so on. From the claim that the soul is a substance, they then make further faulty assumptions of qualities that the soul possesses (all of which originate in valid theoretical concepts). The issue is that they take logically valid claims about the self to imply further truths about the soul that are beyond the scope of human reason. Kant's argumentative strategy against Rational Psychology in the Paralogisms section is to identify the mistaken assumption that what is true for theoretical concepts must therefore be true for objects.[55]

As Kant explains, the illusory grounds of Rational Psychology lie in mistaken assumptions that are natural to reason. As I understand it, Kant's aim throughout these refutations has been to demonstrate the errors of the speculative metaphysics of his predecessors and contemporaries, as characterized by the above arguments for a metaphysical self. While these are natural lines of questioning, he shows that they never yield any objects that are actually given to us and that they never yield any grounds for certainty of the existence of an immortal soul.[56] Yet, Kant still holds a place in his system for the immortality of the soul a postulate underlying his moral theory. This is a matter for practical, rather than theoretical, reason. He explains: "Since there are practical laws that are absolutely necessary (the moral laws), then if these necessarily presuppose any existence as the condition of the possibility of their **binding** force, this existence has to be

postulated."[57] In other words, because moral laws are necessary, and yet, there is no theoretical certainty of an unconditioned ground that actually exists, then that existence must be assumed as something that "**ought to exist**."[58] So, while the immortality of the soul is undecidable in terms of theoretical reason, it remains necessary for practical reason and as the primary ground for moral laws.

As such, Kant holds that we must have what he calls, in the Canon of Pure Reason, "moral belief."[59] Kant offers some explanation of this in the Canon, where he outlines a hierarchy of true and valid judgments. For Kant, there are three stages of conviction: "**having an opinion, believing,** and **knowing.**" Each, in Kant's view, must meet a criterion of objective or subjective sufficiency. Opinion requires neither. Belief requires the fulfillment of subjective sufficiency (conviction) only and does not require the fulfillment of some epistemic standard (i.e., direct experience of the thing itself). As Lawerence Pasternack identifies, conviction is a psychological state characterized by "a strong *feeling* of confidence that a proposition is true and a *commitment* to [that] proposition."[60] Knowledge, on the other hand, demands the fulfillment of objective and subjective sufficiency, and it can be held by everyone. As such, knowledge is held with conviction and with certainty.[61] As we know from Kant's critique of speculative metaphysics, our conviction is not sufficient for us to possess knowledge of the immortality of the soul. One may believe in something that may not be properly known and, consequently, take it to be true without any certainty. There is, however, more to belief than just holding a conviction to be true. It requires a "practical relation" with the "absolutely necessary ends" of morality.[62] Because of these necessary ends, a doctrinal belief of this kind may be held with "moral certainty." For Kant, moral certainty, which is derived from moral belief, is taking the believed concept to be necessary for the sake of some practical ends. In this case, that there is an immortal soul is a morally necessary belief

because, in Kant's view, should one reject the postulates they would subvert their own moral principles.[63] As such, this belief is a morally certain one, but only on subjective grounds. As Kant explains, "no one will be able to boast that he **knows** that there is a God and a future life; […] the conviction is not **logical** but **moral** certainty, and, since it depends on subjective grounds (of moral disposition) I must not even say '**It is** morally certain that there is a God,' etc., but rather '**I am** morally certain.'"[64] In this sense, moral certainty is a kind of certainty that stems from a necessary moral belief rather than from the universal validity of the moral law.

Regarding the postulate of the immortality of the soul, Kant claims that the continuance of personality after death is necessary for his conception of morality and, more specifically, conformity with the demands of the moral law. He explains that complete conformity of the agent's will with the moral law, what he calls "*holiness*," is "a perfection of which no rational being […] is capable [of] at any moment of his existence […], it can only be found in an *endless progress* toward that complete conformity."[65] This conformity "is possible only on the presupposition of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being continuing *endlessly* (which is called the immortality of the soul)."[66] This is one of the core moral insights of Kant, namely, that an agent cannot (in their lifetime) conform wholly to the demands of morality. This postulate makes it possible for an agent to, at best, hope for the continuance of their personality so that they may continue to strive towards the horizon of conformity with the moral law.[67]

From this, Kant's argumentative strategy against Rational Psychology and other proponents of speculative metaphysics should be apparent. Kant is arguing that claims about the nature of the immortal soul are rooted in the mistaken, natural tendency of reason to stray into illusion. What Kant is doing in his critique of Rational Psychology is undermining its conclusions about the properties of the soul on two fronts. First, he demonstrates that the grounds upon which

Rational Psychology makes its claims are false, because, for example, that the "I" or self serves as the logical representation of oneself and all of their determinations and stands in as a representation of oneself over time, does not entail that the soul is necessarily the same personality over time. These are, as discussed, fallacies of equivocation. Rational Psychology is mistaken by taking something that is valid on a strictly logical basis (that "I," or the concept of the self, stands in for my personal identity over time) to imply the certainty that the soul retains its personality after death. This, as Kant points out, is an illusory claim in which the exercise of reason has strayed far beyond its domain and into conclusions that are far beyond a human's ability to make. His second thrust against Rational Psychology is to relegate claims of the existence of the soul, and its qualities, to the realm of doctrinal belief.

4.2. Meier

Meier, like Kant three decades after him, is critical of speculative metaphysics and its claims of certainty regarding the reality of an immortal soul. Meier's criticisms, unlike those of Kant, are much sharper and more hostile to the claims of mathematical certainty for the immortality of the soul. In *Thoughts*, Meier is critical of ordinary reasoning about these metaphysical claims, noting that most proceed from "belief to complete conviction" regarding the state of the soul after death.[68] Meier holds that reason can say little about the topics of speculative metaphysics, such the existence of an immortal soul, and in his words: "yet at the same time the vast majority speak as confidently of these things as if they had already been dead once."[69] Meier views claims of certainty regarding the supposed knowledge of the immortality of the soul as clearly falling beyond human reason.[70] Meier charges his contemporaries with "logical egoism," or having "too much confidence in one's own opinion."[71] "Opinion" is a term with some weight for Meier, as he uses

the term to refer to a kind of belief. Regarding "belief," Dyck notes that "for Meier [belief] does not correspond to a distinct epistemic attitude, but rather designates a *source* of the certainty of cognition, one which he contrasts with experience and reason, and which can likewise admit a wide range of certainty, depending on the credibility of the witnesses who are its source."[72] Essentially, those charged with logical egoism prejudice their assessment of their own proofs with their own beliefs (in this case, theological), leading to an overestimation of the efficacy of those proofs.

The constructive aims of Meier's critique of Rational Psychology are to show that human reason cannot prove the immortality of the soul with mathematical certainty and to prove that the immortality of the soul is probable, and thus "morally certain."[73] That it can be shown to be probable is a key distinction from Kant's views, where moral certainty is a kind of certainty for the sake of necessary ends. Through this, Meier also defends the notion that human reason itself has limits. He writes: "Moreover, reason only brings much in the way of harm along with it when one pushes it beyond its boundaries but also causes many errors. […] The happiness of humanity requires not only the knowledge of the perfections that we possess but also of those we lack."[74] In line with his earlier criticisms of his contemporaries, Meier—like Kant after him—asserts that philosophers ought to constrain their proofs to those subjects in which reason can attain certainty, and not stretch its boundaries to truths they do not have access to (like that of the immortality of the soul). Meier explains that the immortality of the soul is not only a concept supporting religion, but ethics as well. While the immortality of the soul may be a support to ethics, Meier is careful to explain that it is not essential to be able to prove its existence with certainty. Denying the certainty of proofs for the existence of an immortal soul is not mutually exclusive from having the capacity for virtue.[75] The moral certainty of the immortality of the soul bolsters ethics—though Meier is

quite clear, and careful, to say that virtue for the sake of a reward in the afterlife is not sufficient for morality—and that faith creates that certainty to some extent.

Moral certainty, however, is a notion that requires some further definition. Meier understands moral certainty as a form of probable knowledge that lacks the grounds to support complete certainty. On Meier's view, an agent could hold that the immortal soul probably exists, which is sufficient for moral certainty. This is sufficient probabilistically: if all probabilities suggest that the immortality of the soul is the most likely, more than the reverse, then that proposition can be held. The breadth of proofs for the existence of the immortal soul, in Meier's view, suggests that it is probably the case that it does indeed exist. In Dyck's words, "moral certainty is as good as, or even better than, perfect [mathematical] certainty when it comes to action (since the lack of perfect certainty can prevent us from acting)."[76] For Meier, the soul's immortality is important on the grounds that it can be used to support moral behaviour because it incentivizes agents to behave virtuously, and thus recommends belief in the immortality of the soul. Indeed, because one cannot prove through reason neither the existence nor nonexistence of an immortal soul, yet one can show that it is probably the case that they exist, Meier yields to probabilism on this matter to ensure the stability of faith for the purposes of supporting virtue.[77] This is most clearly noted in his concluding arguments against claims of certainty that the soul retains its personality after death. Essentially, Meier contends that we cannot be certain whether the soul is destroyed after death or if God would not will that the soul continue after death. Meier rejects the continuity of personality argument for the immortality of the soul on the grounds that, while it is "much more natural that after death the soul would recall its previous life, than that it should be supposed to forget it utterly," it cannot be demonstrated by reason that the conditions maintaining the personality of the soul after death are certain.[78] For these reasons at least, Meier holds that the

continuity of the soul after death is uncertain (and only probable) because we do not have access to the knowledge required for complete certainty.

Regarding the immortality of the soul, Meier argues that it cannot be proven to exist or not exist by reason alone. Rather than tackling any direct proof for the soul's indestructability, Meier shifts the argument from proving that the soul will live on after death to whether the soul will not be annihilated after the death of the body. For the soul to be destroyed, Meier argues, that destruction would have to come at the hands of God himself.[79] This would render the soul merely "hypothetically immortal," in Meier's terms. "Hypothetical immortality" means that the immortal soul may have an infinite duration but can be destroyed in some way. As such, should one want to prove that the soul will not die they must prove that God has "decided in favour of its eternal and unceasing life" or that God "decided upon the death of the soul."[80] From this, Meier engages in the main thrust of his argument: that neither of these can be proven by means of reason. In the case of the annihilation of the soul, it is not possible for reason to prove *a priori* that any future contingent event may or may not happen, and, as such, that we cannot determine through reason alone that God has determined that the soul should live or die. Since the determinations of God are beyond the scope of human knowledge, there is no way in which reason alone can prove with mathematical certainty that the soul is immortal, nor can it be disproven. Essentially, this is Meier's method of critique for the physical state of the soul after the death of the body as well, ultimately concluding that without certain knowledge of God's determinations we cannot prove the soul to be immortal.

The immortality of the soul is probable, in Meier's view, on three related grounds. First, that there is scripture, in Meier's view, is a support to the probability of the soul and God existing. Second, the number of rational proofs that arrive at the existence of the immortality of the soul

supports its probable existence. For Meier, the key support of the probability of the existence of the immortality of the soul comes from the wide number of rational proofs that claim mathematical certainty of its existence.[81] Third, the inability of reason to disprove the existence of the immortal soul supports its probability. Just as reason is unable to prove the existence of the immortal soul to a mathematical certainty, nor is it able to disprove its existence, in Meier's view.

Meier covers the various rational proofs of the existence of the immortality of the soul. The first, and most essential one for my discussion, is the notion that belief in the immortal soul motivates virtue. As Meier explains: "Left to its own devices, reason cannot, in my estimation, incite any doubt concerning the immortality of the soul and its truth, but can […] very well raise irrefutable doubts regarding the perfect [moral] certainty of this truth."[82] That these concepts are morally certain, and not strictly provable or disprovable, is supported by reason itself. Meier's first support to this claim is that the belief in the immortality of the soul supports virtue, and that reason itself supports the pursuit of virtue.[83] His second support for the moral certainty of these concepts is his argument against the proof or disproof of the annihilation of the soul, its physical state after death, as well as its moral state. His arguments that reason can neither prove nor disprove these concepts takes a similar form throughout.

While belief in these concepts is supportive of virtue, that belief is not essential for one to be virtuous. Meier writes: "I would go further and claim that even if the soul were not immortal, or if its immortality were denied, there would be motives sufficient for virtue and decent morals. […] Virtue is something so splendid in itself that one has to love it even if one does not look to its rewards after death."[84]As such, the immortality of the soul is not strictly necessary for one to be virtuous, and persons can and do have motives for being virtuous other than for the sake of an afterlife. The immortality of the soul is not a determining factor in why one is a decent person, nor

is a lack of certainty in this concept necessarily going to suggest that one is not virtuous, either. For Meier, it is not the primary driver of virtue. Of this, he writes: "I only contend that even if everyone were to believe that everything was over with death, they would nonetheless not altogether be thieves, murderers, adulterers, and swindlers, having lost all sentiment for virtue […] there is no cause to be concerned about a complete deterioration of morals even if everyone were to deny the immortality of the soul."[85] In Meier's view, one does not need to believe in the immortality of the soul to be virtuous, and neither is it the case that disbelief in that concept marks one out as being a vicious person. What is pertinent, here, is that morality does not need the concept of an immortal soul. Meier holds that the possibility of virtuousness is not grounded on belief in the immortality of the soul; though, simultaneously, that belief can still motivate people to be more virtuous than they are naturally inclined to be.

This, I think, is a fair summation of Meier's views in *Thoughts* for my purposes. Meier holds that there can be no mathematical certainty in rational proofs of the immortality of the soul (and other like concepts) because they are beyond the sphere of human reason. Consequently, views on these concepts belong to the realm of opinion or belief. Furthermore, Meier's contention that the immortality of the soul is not essential for morality separates his views from Kant's. Meier's view of moral certainty further sets him apart from Kant, insofar as it is a form of probable knowledge that has rational grounds sufficient for one to take something to be true, but lacks sufficient grounds for them to hold it with complete certainty.[86] While Meier's view of moral certainty of the immortal soul is sufficient to motivate action and direct one towards virtue—like with the motivational capacity of the postulates for Kant—the belief in the immortal soul does not, for Meier, serve as the grounding assumption for morality itself. Meier concedes that anyone can be virtuous, even without belief in the immortality of the soul.[87] Crucially, Meier suggests that

faith is what drives one's certainty in the immortality of the soul, and that faith should not be discounted. The notion that individuals, and philosophers more specifically, should recognize both the limits of reason and the role of faith is one that should ring familiar, considering Kant's critique of Rational Psychology and his aims in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

5. Conclusion

That Meier holds the immortality of the soul as certain on probabilistic grounds contrasts with Kant's view of the postulates as necessary for morality. Meier's view is not that the immortal soul is necessary for morality, or a rationally necessary belief, but is instead merely a belief that is likely true and one that is helpful to morality in its motivational quality. The immortality of the soul, as a religious doctrine, is merely a support to ethics. [88] Meier's *Thoughts* is not a systematic philosophy, and Meier only aims to make a critical argument against some of the claims of his contemporaries. While Meier's work does not have the same constructive ends as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is my view that it provides necessary context for some of Kant's most essential claims about belief and speculative metaphysics.

Taking the immortality of the soul as a postulate, rather than as something that is probabilistically likely, is where Kant departs from Meier by making a stronger claim. As a rational belief with the force of necessity behind it, Kant makes the immortal soul an indispensable concept for his ethical system because of its rational necessity and its motivational capacity. The immortal soul is a necessary concept of rational belief because it allows the agent to posit that their personality persists over time in their natural life and after death. Kant follows Meier in holding the immortality of the soul as essential insofar as it offers motivational force to the agent. This motivational force is not for the sake of some reward or instrumental end; rather, it is motivational

in its rational necessity, allowing the agent to posit the infinite duration of their personality. In this, the agent's capacity for choice (*Willkür*) is strengthened and they are more readily able to view the highest good as accomplishable. While Meier leaves his discussion at the notion that the promise of a future life may motivate agents to act virtuously when they may otherwise be inclined not to, Kant's view of the postulates motivates the agent towards the fulfillment of the highest end of morality.

In my view, Kant's concept of the immortal soul comes bundled with a theory of personality over time, following from his philosophical context. This concept is a necessary one for the coherence of his ethical system because it allows for the individual to be the locus of moral assessment over time. The notion of the agent being the self-same personality over the course of their lives is crucial for viewing an agent as properly autonomous throughout the course of their existence. That the agent is the same individual personality means that by viewing their actions over time the principles behind those actions can be revealed, as well as the quality of their will, and whether adherence to the moral law (duty) is their guiding incentive for action. For an agent to be properly morally assessable they must be able to be taken as the same entity over time.

Meier's view of virtue is much more sparse than Kant's. Meier, through the course of his discussion on proofs for the immortality of the soul, links belief in the immortal soul to moral motivation. Where Kant makes the postulates necessary as beliefs, Meier does not make belief in the immortal soul necessary. Despite that, however, the immortality of the soul is important for Meier along similar lines as for Kant. Belief in the immortal soul, in Meier's view, also staves off moral despair for the agent in the face of rewards and punishments for virtuous and vicious actions not being meted out in our lifetimes.[89] This is a crucial point of comparison between Meier's views and the cognitivist view of the postulates, which themselves motivate the agent against moral

despair, albeit for different reasons. In Meier's view, belief in the immortal soul motivates the agent on the grounds of some possible future reward. This is, of course, a notion that Kant explicitly departs from in his ethical system.[90]

Importantly, Kant's moral system takes ethics to, strictly speaking, a rational pursuit. Famously, Kant argues that morality involves the formulation of rational principles which the agent then acts in accordance with. Morality, in his view, is derived from reason. Without getting too deeply into Kant's moral system, an agent is only properly understood as ethical or virtuous when they act according to moral principles that meet certain requirements. Most famously, in the first formulation of the categorical imperative, which demands that the principle (maxim) and attached action meet a universalizability criterion to determine their rational coherence. That the postulates are rationally necessary beliefs is consistent with the character of Kant's broader moral philosophy. However, Kant is explicit in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* that it is not the promise of some reward after death that ought to motivate the agent towards moral behaviours. Rather, for the Kantian agent to be properly virtuous they must be understood to be acting on a good will, which is, in simple terms, acting with the respect for the moral law as their primary incentive for action.[91] In this sense, the postulates motivate one towards good action by directing the agent towards the highest end of morality, and belief in them affords the agent belief that they can be fulfilled. It is not strictly speaking the case that there is, with certainty, a future life, merely that the agent may be able to posit one. Hence, the postulates provide an answer to the question "What might I hope for?" and not "What can I know?"

Both Meier and Kant approach their critique of Rational Psychology similarly, insofar as the thrust of their arguments are to determine that human reason cannot adequately prove that concepts like the immortality of the soul exist (nor can reason deny their existence). They both

undermine Rational Psychology in the same way, by attacking the grounds upon which its claims about the qualities of the soul rest: the capacities of human reason itself. They maintain support for these concepts as matters of belief, advocating for the constraint of reason to its own domain, rather than beyond, to avoid erroneous and illusory claims to which human reason has no ownership. Despite their respective criticisms of Rational Psychology, both Meier and Kant recognized the significance of these beliefs, not only because they give an individual something to hope for, but also that they may motivate an agent towards virtue. In reading Kant in relation to Meier, I hope to have shown that doing so allows for a better understanding of the context in which Kant's work arose, as well as for a better understanding of Meier's own arguments. What can be said with certainty is that Meier's attack on Rational Psychology set the ground for Kant's own system.

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Notes

[1] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 2016), Bxxx.
[2] See Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Thinker* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 4, and Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 358.
[3] Georg Fredrich Meier, *Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death*, in *Early Modern German Philosophy (1690-1750)*, trans. Corey W. Dyck (Oxford University Press, 2019), 233.
[4] Corey W. Dyck, "G. F. Meier and Kant on the Belief in the Immortality of the Soul," in *Kant and His German Contemporaries* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 91–92.
[5] Kant, *CPR*, A823-824/B851-852, A822/B850-A829/B857, and Lawrence Pasternack, "The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief: The Highest Good, The Practical Postulates and The Fact of Reason" *Kant-Studien* 102, no. 3 (2011): 292–93.
[6] Riccardo Pozzo, "Prejudices and Horizons: G. F. Meier's *Vernunftlehre* and Its Relation to Kant," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 43, no. 2 (2005): 188.
[7] Corey Dyck, *Kant and Rational Psychology* (Oxford University Press UK, 2014), 1, and Nicholas Jolley, *Locke's Touchy Subjects: Materialism and Immortality* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 4.
[8] Dyck, *Rational Psychology*, 1.
[9] Dyck, *Rational Psychology*, 4, 10, 28n19-30, 32, 43.
[10] Kant knew of Locke through two individuals close to him. Primarily, Kant's teacher Martin Knutzen, who is often misidentified as a Wolffian, was a Lockean according to Manfred Kuehn. Additionally, Kuehn notes that Georg David Kypke, a member of Kant's cohort at the *Collegium Fridericianum* and the University of Königsberg, translated Locke's *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* into German, a text which Kant was likely familiar with. See Kuehn, *Kant*, 79–80, 111.
[11] Jolley, *Touchy Subjects*, n4, 2, 3.
[12] Jolley, *Touchy Subjects*, 101.
[13] Gideon Yaffe, "Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity," in *The Cambridge Companion to Locke's* "*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*," ed. Lex Newman (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 213–15, 220, 222.
[14] Dyck, *Rational Psychology*, 20, 22, 146.
[15] Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, "Immortal Animals, Subtle Bodies, or Separated Souls: The Afterlife in Leibniz, Wolff, and Their Followers," *Intellectual History Review* 33, no.4 (2022): 652, 656–57.
[16] Corey W. Dyck and Georg Friedrich Meier, "Introductory Essay" in *Über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (Hildesheim: Olms, 2018), 1–2. See also Favaretti Camposampiero, "Immortal Animals," 652.
[17] Dyck, "Introductory Essay," 2.
[18] Corey Dyck, "Beyond the Paralogisms: The Proofs of Immortality in the Lectures on Metaphysics," in *Reading Kant's Lectures*, ed. Robert Clewis (De Gruyter, 2015), 116. See also Dyck, "Introductory Essay," 2.
[19] See Kitcher, *Kant's Thinker*, 4, and Kuehn, *Kant*, 358.
[20] Dyck, *Rational Psychology*, 45.
[21] Dyck, *Rational Psychology*, 46. Author's emphasis.
[22] Meier, *Thoughts*, 23.
[23] Paul Guyer, "From a Practical Point of View: Kant's Conception of a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason," in *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 367.
[24] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 5:132.
[25] Jessica Tizzard, "Why Does Kant Think We Must Believe in the Immortal Soul?," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 50, no. 1 (2020): 120.
[26] Andrew Chignell, "Belief in Kant," *The Philosophical Review* 116, no. 3 (2007): 345, and Pasternack, "The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief," 300–301.
[27] Kant, *CPrR*, 5:123.
[28] Guyer, "From a Practical Point of View," 367.
[29] As I will discuss in §3.1, opinion and belief are related, but distinct, concepts in Kant's critical work. Holding an opinion does not require fulfillment of what Kant terms "objective sufficiency" and "subjective sufficiency." This

means that an opinion requires neither the fulfillment of some epistemic standard, nor does it require that one have a strong feeling of confidence or commitment to the proposition. Something that is believed, on the other hand, has fulfilled the standard of subjective sufficiency, but not the standard of objective sufficiency. In short, for a belief to be held, one is required to have genuine conviction in it but is not required to prove its truth.
[30] Guyer, "From a Practical Point of View," 361, 363, 365, 367, 369.
[31] Guyer, "From a Practical Point of View," 363.
[32] Guyer, "From a Practical Point of View," 363–64.
[33] Guyer, "From a Practical Point of View," 367–68, and Tizzard, "Immortal Soul?," 116.
[34] A. W. Wood, *Kant's Moral Religion* (Cornell University Press, 1970), 29. Emphasis in original.
[35] Wood, *Moral Religion*, 29–30.
[36] Wood, *Moral Religion*, 27–28.
[37] Tizzard, "Immortal Soul?," 117–18.
[38] Tizzard, "Immortal Soul?," 120.
[39] See Kant, *CPrR*, 5:135, and Tizzard, "Immortal Soul?," 12.
[40] Tizzard, "Immortal Soul?," 118.
[41] Kant, *CPrR*, 5:122. Emphasis in original.
[42] Kant, *CPrR*, 5:123–24.
[43] Dyck, *Rational Psychology*, 155.
[44] Kant, *CPR*, A342/B400. Emphasis in original.
[45] Kant's views on the "I" or soul are more expansive than this, of course, but for the moment the "I" and soul being one is sufficient for my purposes.
[46] Certainly, one could take for granted that there is a concept of the self and comprehend these concepts apart from their epistemological groundwork. But, on the view that Kant's critical work constitutes a systematic philosophy, that the soul and a theory of personality are connected is pertinent.
[47] Kant, *CPR*, A308-309/B365-366.
[48] Paul Guyer, *Kant* (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014),153.
[49] Kant, *CPR*, A398.
[50] Kant, *CPR*, A348.
[51] Kant, *CPR*, A349–51.
[52] Kant, *CPR*, A351.
[53] Kant, *CPR*, A351–55.
[54] Kant, *CPR*, A362.
[55] Kant, *CPR*, B410.
[56] Kant, *CPR*, A592/B620.
[57] Kant, *CPR*, A634/B662. Emphasis in original.
[58] Kant, *CPR*, A634/B662. Emphasis in original.
[59] Kant, *CPR*, A828/B856. Emphasis in original.
[60] Pasternack, "The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief," 292–293. Emphasis in original.
[61] Kant, *CPR*, A822/B850. Emphasis in original.
[62] Kant, *CPR*, A823–24/B851–52. Emphasis in original.
[63] Recall my discussion of Guyer's and Wood's competing empiricist and rationalist interpretations of the belief in the postulates, as well as Tizzard's cognitivist view.
[64] Kant, *CPR*, A829/B857. Emphasis in original.
[65] Kant*, CPrR*, 5:122. Emphasis in original.
[66] Kant, *CPrR*, 5:122. Emphasis in original.
[67] Kant, *CPrR,* 5:123–24.
[68] Meier, *Thoughts*, 229
[69] Meier, *Thoughts*, 229.
[70] Dyck, "G. F. Meier and Kant on the Belief in the Immortality of the Soul," 79.
[71] Pozzo, "Prejudices and Horizons," 188.
[72] Dyck, "G. F. Meier and Kant on the Belief in the Immortality of the Soul," 89. Emphasis in original.
[73] Meier, *Thoughts*, 231–32.
[74] Meier, *Thoughts*, 233.
[75] Meier, *Thoughts*, 234–35.
[76] Dyck, "G. F. Meier and Kant on the Belief in the Immortality of the Soul," 84.
[77] Meier, *Thoughts*, 256, 258.

[78] See Dyck, *Rational Psychology*, 154, and Meier, *Thoughts*, 251.
[79] Meier, *Thoughts*, 240–43.
[80] Meier, *Thoughts*, 243.
[81] Meier, *Thoughts*, 229–31.
[82] Meier, *Thoughts*, 232.
[83] Meier, *Thoughts*, 236–37.
[84] Meier, *Thoughts*, 236.
[85] Meier, *Thoughts*, 236.
[86] Dyck "G. F. Meier and Kant on the Belief in the Immortality of the Soul," 84.
[87] Meier, *Thoughts*, 236.
[88] Meier, *Thoughts*, 234.
[89] Dyck, "Meier and Kant on the Belief," 85.
[90] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 4:393–94, 396–97, 400–401.
[91] Immanuel Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (HarperOne, 2008), 22–23.