

*White Heat: Hawai'i's Territorial Elites and the Reforms of the Honolulu City and
County Police Department*

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Abstract

White Heat: Hawai'i's Territorial Elites and the Reforms of the Honolulu City and County Police Department

Étienne Bastien Corbeil

My thesis looks to highlight elites' use of policing ideology in their quest for continued access to state power. The reforms of the Police Act of February 1, 1932, were introduced by Republican lawmakers to safeguard the oligarchic rule of the Big Five sugar companies in the wake of the United States' Federal Government's scrutiny of the territory's system of law enforcement after the Ala Moana trial and the murder of Joseph Kahahawai. The reforms represented the culmination of more than a decade of advocacy and public inquiries by civic leaders, progressive women, and the territory's English language press. In times of crisis, Honolulu's elites turned to the international network of policing experts to reform the Honolulu City and County Police Department and affirmed its status as the protector of the ruling class. In the first chapter, I look at how the police proved instrumental in defining the notion "security" for haole elites who understood the growing presence of racialized people outside of the plantation and in Honolulu's urban landscape as a threat to the sugar planter's oligarchy's social order. I examine three key moments in Honolulu's history where elites agitated for an increase in police repression of racialized people: the 1920 Sugar Workers' Strike, the Kaka'ako case of 1923, and the 1924 Filipino Sugar Workers' Strike. In the second chapter, I dig into the ideological and legislative origins of the Police Act of February 1, 1932. I identify August Vollmer as an *imperial importer* (Go, 2020) of militarized technologies whose Berkeley Police Department served as the principal reference for the reforms envisaged by Honolulu's lawmakers. The principles of professional policing promulgated by Vollmer provided elites with

the justification and the means to insulate their system of oligarchic control from the interference of the federal government and the majority Native Hawaiian and Asian population. The changes put in motion by the Hawaiian territorial legislative house in 1932 were cemented during the 14-year tenure of Honolulu's second police chief William A. Gabrielson. Gabrielson, a former Berkeley Police Department officer, transformed the Honolulu City and County Police Department into a state-of-the-art police force proficient in the type of surveillance operations the FBI and the U.S. military would require the police department to conduct during the Second World War.

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Introduction

At an emergency meeting of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce held on January 12, 1932, the real estate magnate, Walter F. Dillingham urged his fellow men of industry to claim the political power that was rightfully theirs, “You businessmen represented by the chamber pay 90 percent of the taxes, and the time has come for you to demand 90 percent voice in the control of the government.”¹ Dillingham’s forceful address came as a response to the territory of Hawai‘i’s system of law enforcement’s failure to convict a “gang” of five non-white and working class youths for the alleged kidnapping and rape of Thalia Massie Fortescue, a young haole woman married to a navy lieutenant.² For Dillingham and Republican haole elites, the Massie Affair’s Ala Moana trial and the subsequent killing of Joseph Kahahawai, one the accused, by Massie’s husband and mother in law threatened to put an end to more than 30 years of oligarchic rule. Indeed, over the course of the last few months, members of the U.S. Congress had grown increasingly concerned that the haole ruling class were not up to the task of dealing with what the *New York Times* dubbed at the time as “the Hawaii crime wave.”³ Upon the Navy’s insistence, the Federal Government put a plan in motion to take over the strategic naval outpost’s

¹ As quoted in John Reinecke, *The Navy and the Massie-Kahahawai Case*, (Honolulu: Honolulu Record Publishing Co., LTD, 1951), 29. Like his fellow haole elites, as president of both the Oahu Railway and Land company and the Dredging Company, Dillingham exerted his power over people and nature. For the past quarter century, Dillingham had been involved in practically all the land reclamation projects and the construction and improvement of all harbors of significance in the territory including Pearl Harbor. Ed. George F. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: A Biographical Record of Men of Substantial Achievement in the Hawaiian Islands Volume IV* (Territory of Hawaii: The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1930), 161.

² In the Hawai‘ian language, the word haole refers to foreigners and became synonymous with white Europeans and Americans. Not all Europeans were considered haoles. Portuguese immigrants who came from the Azores and Madeira islands were mostly illiterate peasants and were not considered haoles who were generally middle class or higher. Haole as used in this text is both a marker of race and class. Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Raced to Death in 1920s Hawai‘i: Injustice and Revenge in the Fukunaga Case* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019), 4-5.

³ “Richardson in Hawaii to Begin his Inquiry,” *New York Times*, (February 5th, 1932), 30. According to David Stannard, an historian who has written extensively about the Massie case, although, the New York Times published more than 200 articles about the murder and facts related to it at the time, little has been written about Kahahawai outside of Hawai‘i. Michael Hannon, *The Massie Case: Territory of Hawaii v. Ahakuelo, et. al. (1931) Territory of Hawaii v. Grace Fortescue, et. al (1932)*, Minneapolis: The Minnesota Law Library (2010), 2.

governance and install a commission form of government for the territory.⁴ To preserve their independence, haole elites agreed to reform and modernize the Honolulu City and County Police Department. As Dillingham put it, the choice was clear, “If you cannot force the legislature and the governor to accept your program for reorganising the police department, you must be prepared to go to Washington and obtain commission rule for Hawaii.”⁵ Ten days later, during a special legislative session, Governor Lawrence M. Judd signed into effect what would become the Police Act of February 1st, 1932. The bill introduced a complete overhaul of the Honolulu City and County Police Department and granted the powers of police administration to a newly created police commission. Judd promptly appointed five of Honolulu’s most prominent businessmen to its board.

My thesis sheds light on the relationship between policing and state power. During the interwar period, the Honolulu City and County Police Department became an important conduit by which local elites protected their access to legislative power from encroachment by the U.S. Navy and the Federal government. Police reforms not only worked to keep outsiders from intervening in local affairs but reaffirmed oligarchic control of public institutions. Haole elites understood the HPD as being the first line of defense in their struggle to preserve their minority rule.⁶ The reforms ushered in by the Police Act of February 1, 1932, were long gestating and not simply in reaction to the fallout from the Ala Moana case. They were the culmination of more

⁴ During the 1920s and 30s, Hawai’i’s first families tightened their control over the corporations of the territory. Often times, the same haoles sat on the board of even rival enterprises. By 1935, a third of the directors and members of Hawai’i’s sugar plantations were direct descendants of the missionaries who first settled in the islands a century before. Lawrence H. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono: A Social History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), 249.

⁵ Reinecke, *The Navy and the Massie-Kahahawai Case*, 29.

⁶ In the study of Hawai’i during the territorial period, the word oligarchy is commonly used to describe elites of the territorial government and the sugar planters. As Gary Okihiro as stated, the word “denotes the unitary rule of the planters and the territorial government, indicative of the concentration of capital and power in the hands of a few.” Gary Y. Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945* (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1992), xvi.

than a decade of debate and activism by civic leaders, progressive women and the English language press who at times of crisis, called on police experts to reform the Honolulu City and County Police Department and affirm the status of the HPD as the protectors of the ruling class.⁷

In my analysis of police, I take inspiration from the work of Micol Seigel who identified police as “violence workers” who actualize, make real, the core power of the state and, as such, represent the “human-scale expression” of the bureaucratic state.⁸ As Seigel defined it, violence workers can include not just the police, but any person that acts as “channels for violence condoned by the state.” In Hawai’i, I understand the analytical category of violence workers to apply to elites and the organisations that upheld their interests such as the Republican and Democratic parties, various women’s civic organisations, the sugar corporations and their auxiliaries, and the English language press. In this sense, the term violence workers’ intrinsic expansive nature resist understanding the project of police as independent from its capitalistic and colonial context.⁹ To see police as social control agents who make real the power of the state

⁷ For the venerable Ruth Wilson Gilmore, throughout its history, the U.S. state dealt with crisis through the “relentless identification, coercive control, and violent elimination of foreign and domestic enemies.” Times of crisis or surplus posed the same problem for elites as the changing economic conditions prevented the current social order from reproducing itself as it had done in the past. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “Globalisation and US Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to Post-Keynesianism Militarism,” *Race and Class*, 40, 2/3 (1998/1999), 178. In the early 1930s, the territory’s economy faced difficult circumstances. 1931 proved to be a disastrous year for both the sugar planters and the pineapple growers. While the sugar harvest of 1931 represented a new record in terms of yield, on May 31st, the New York price of sugar reached its lowest ever figure, 2.57 cents per pound. The pineapple industry also saw a great increase in production that year but much of its stock went unsold due to the saturation of the canned goods market and the Great Depression’s contraction of consumer spending power. Thomas G. Thrum, *The Hawaiian Annual for 1933: The Reference Book of Information and Statistics*, (Honolulu: The Printshop Company LTD., 1932), 138-139. And Gary Y. Okihiro, *Canes Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945* (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1991), 161.

⁸ Micol Seigel, *Violence Work: State Power and the Limits of Police* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018), 9-10.

⁹ In the words of Manu Karuka: “There is no “national” U.S. political economy, only an imperial one, which continues to be maintained not through the rule of law, contract, or competition, but through the renewal of colonial occupation.” I sometimes use the term “continental empire” when describing the United States’ mainland to better emphasized how U.S. nationhood is always renewed through “annexation, violence, and reaction,” the principal tenets of the policy of countersovereignty espoused by the U.S. government. Karuka defines countersovereignty as the United States response to the resistance and resilience of Indigenous networks of relationship between humans and nonhuman lifeforms. Karuka’s insights inform my understanding of the modernization of the Honolulu City and County Police Department as an act of renewal of colonial occupation. Manu Karuka, *Empire’s Tracks: Indigenous*

through violence allows us to dispense with the notion promulgated by many earlier works of history and criminology that presumed police to be a “natural” response to nineteenth century and early twentieth century urban crime.¹⁰ Rather than treat the police as an isolated and reactive entity spurned to modernize by the changing nature of crime, I follow in the footsteps of scholars who theorized the intimate connection between police repression, bureaucratic administration, and capital.¹¹

For haole elites the ideas and technologies of the reform era of policing were ideally suited to the task of safeguarding minority rule in the territory because of their imperial origins. Early 20th century policing was characterized by centralization, professionalization, and the introduction of new training methods inspired by the United States’ imperial campaigns. As Julian Go has identified, the phenomenon of “police militarization,” the adoption of military technologies and signifiers by local American police departments was widespread during this period.¹² Go theorized the importance of *imperial importers* in bringing the instruments of foreign repression home.¹³ According to Go, typically military veterans, imperial importers saw the domestic populations of racialized minorities as a “threat to order” therefore rationalizing that if militarized methods were appropriate for counterinsurgency in the colonial theatre, they were also appropriate for domestic law enforcement.¹⁴ Go identified the Berkeley police chief

Nations, Chinese Workers, and the Transcontinental Railroad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019), xii and 183.

¹⁰ Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 10. and Eric H. Monkkenon, *Police in Urban America, 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 7.

¹¹ I understand police as an activity rather than a single institution. This way of thinking is like many of the most revealing scholarship on policing inspired or at least somewhat influenced by Michel Foucault’s simple but still prescient understanding of the word police as an active verb rather than a noun and its implication of a society wide disciplinary project. Seigel, *Violence Work*, 6. And See Michel Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

¹² Julian Go, “The Imperial Origins of American Policing: Militarization and Imperial Feedback,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 125 No. 5 (March 2020), 1197.

¹³ Go, “The Imperial Origins of American Policing,” 1197.

¹⁴ Ibid, 1212. Alfred McCoy has outlined how the Philippines were a “colonial laboratory,” where innovations in intelligence and counter-intelligence made real the “repressive potential” of the United States’ information

August Vollmer as one of the pre-eminent imperial importers of militarized technologies to the United States.¹⁵

A veteran of the American counterinsurgency in the Philippines where his unit was assigned to police the streets of Manila, Vollmer offered haoles the tools of repression the law alone could not provide. While the law had been a great help in instauring haole control of the territory at the expense of its indigenous population, the Honolulu City and County Police Department was seen as an ineffective enforcer of the statutes meant to ensure the safety of haole citizens due to its leadership being beholden to local elections and the majority Native Hawaiian electorate.¹⁶ Thus, the Federal Government, haole elites, and police reformers all argued for a HPD “removed from politics.” This meant a police department free from public scrutiny and able to repress what elites considered the “antisocial” behavior of the territory’s lower classes in the name of security.¹⁷ In my research I use Mark Neocleous’s definition of the concept of security

revolution. McCoy’s examination of the technological and bureaucratic developments of the U.S. colonial regime in the Philippines purported that the policing operations in the Philippines shaped the Filipino state while also transforming the American federal government when, as he puts it, the state “repatriated these coercive innovations.” Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 8-18.

¹⁵ Vollmer was one of the most prominent advocates of police professionalization and instituted the first formal police officer school and the first scientific crime laboratory in the country at the University of California at Berkeley. Gene E. Carte and Elaine H. Carte, *Police Reform in the United States: The Era of August Vollmer, 1905-1932* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 27.

¹⁶ In addition to the police, the territory’s legal system was also scrutinized by the Federal Government. In 1932, Federal investigators found that “inefficient” law enforcement had “given rise to a feeling of personal unsafety among a substantial portion of the citizens.” United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii: Letter from the Attorney General Transmitting in Response to Senate Resolution NO. 134 Certain Information Relative to Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1932), VII. The law had initially been an important weapon in the missionary settlers’ usurpation of the Hawaiian Kingdom during the 19th century. According to Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio, the law itself and the legal changes brought upon by white settlers over the course of the 19th century worked to enable and validate the dispossession of the kānaka when after years of advocacy, the missionaries’ descendants were finally able to convince King Kamehameha III to introduce a system of private land ownership and divide the communal land holdings of the Hawai’ian Kingdom in what became known as the Great *Mahele* of 1848. Osorio, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole, *Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 252.

¹⁷ Vollmer defined “antisocial living” what he considered to be the “juvenile transient movement” of 1,500,000 unemployed young men who wandered around the United States forming gangs and engaging in criminal behavior. August Vollmer, *The Police and Modern Society* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1936), 5.

as the fabrication of order achieved through police; the “supreme concept of bourgeois society” as it guarantees the pursuit of property.¹⁸ Honolulu’s police reformers aspired for the modernized HPD to define the law for itself and implement, in the words of Walter Benjamin, “the law of the police.” Benjamin explained his thinking like this: “the “law” of the police really marks the point at which the state, whether from impotence, or because of the imminent connections within any legal system, can no longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain. Therefore, the police intervene “for security reasons” in countless cases where no clear legal situation exists, when they are not merely, without the slightest relation to legal ends, accompanying the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life regulated by ordinances, or simply supervising him.”¹⁹ Police reforms affirmed the supremacy of haole interests over those of other racial groups, without the territorial legislature resorting to purposely explicit discriminatory laws, therefore preserving the territory’s image of a prosperous multi-racial paradise.²⁰

By implementing reforms based on Vollmer’s theories of “professional policing” and “policing without politics” elites looked to progressive science to justify the racial management of Honolulu’s population.²¹ The adoption of a scientific approach to the prevention of crime meant that police reform advocates could count on a vast knowledge network of police veterans

¹⁸ Neocleous traces back the ‘raison d’être’ of policing to the end of feudalism and the nascent bourgeois order’s need to protect itself. Mark Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 5-43.

¹⁹ Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” *Selected Writings: Volume. 1 1913-1926* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 243.

²⁰ For Giorgio Agamben, police embody the concept of sovereignty, Agamben calls it the “embarrassing contiguity between sovereign and police function.” Giorgio Agamben, *Means Without End: Notes on Politics* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press), 104.

²¹ This is Gene Carte’s definition of professional policing: “This model centered around the concept of an idealized policeman who was a skilled and dedicated crime fighter, rigorously trained to perform a difficult job; who was aggressive in using science and technology in all phases of policing; and who was deeply involved in the community he served. Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 2-3. Vollmer wished for police departments to become “scientifically-operated” organisations instead of “politically controlled.” August Vollmer, “Police Progress in the Past Twenty-Five Years,” *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (1931-1951) 24, no. 1 (1933), 161.

and academics as well as the support of the crime obsessed press.²² Prestigious academic publications and local studies provided the intellectual reasoning for the increased surveillance of Honolulu's working classes by establishing clear links between race and criminality. Through the language of data and information, reformers shaped the Honolulu City and County Police Department as an always evolving arbiter of threats which reserved the right to exert whatever authority was required to prevent future "disorder." Stuart Schrader has described this as police's discretion, its self-understanding or "productive ability to transform uncertainty into risk, which is quantifiable, measurable, predictable, manageable, and profitable."²³ Indeed, police experts continuously called for the HPD's resources to increase to counter the likewise ever-expanding criminal class. Whether it acted against urban "gangs," sugar workers on strike or a Japanese fifth column, the HPD was always subject to further appropriations from territorial officials.

In my research, I also look to untangle the relationship between the police and the military. Kānaka maoli, Native Hawaiian, scholar and activist Haunani Kay Trask has described the territorial period of Hawai'i's history, from 1900 to 1959, as the site of a dual process of colonisation. While the U.S. military increased its footprint through land confiscation, the Americanization policies of the territorial government "created racist, political, educational, and economic institutions."²⁴ Micol Seigel has further demystified police's true nature as an imperial occupying force by arguing that the notion of police legitimacy is upheld by a fiction in three parts: police are civilian, not military; they are public, not private, that is, state rather than market

²² Gene Carte has characterized August Vollmer as a "skillful publicist" who slowly but surely built the Berkeley police department's reputation for effectiveness through the press. Gene E. Carte, *August Vollmer and the Origins of Professional Policing: Doctoral Dissertation* (Berkeley: School of Criminology University of California 1972), 61-62.

²³ Stuart Schrader, *Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), 16.

²⁴ According to Trask, the conditions of all people in the Pacific region can be determined to be of "captivity" and the United States is a police state intent on "protecting itself and its white citizens." Haunani Kay Trask, "The Color of Violence," *Social Justice*, vol. 31, no. 4 (98) (2004), 11-14.

agents; and they are local, they don't work for governmental bodies any higher than municipal or state levels in scale, and they certainly don't leave the U.S. national territory."²⁵ The police reforms of 1932 explicitly trampled on the sanctity of those myths. The transformation of the HPD was undertaken under intense pressure from the U.S. Navy who constantly raised the spectre of a possible Japanese insurgency in the territory if war in the Pacific was declared. Private industry appointed the chief of police under the guise of the appointed police commission. Lastly, the changes to the Honolulu police department were led by American cops who had cut their teeth in California and the Philippines.

Scholarly interest in the Honolulu City and County Police Department has so far been the peripheral result of interest in the Massie affair and the period of martial law during the Second World War. Until the 1950s, the Massie affair was seldom studied. It was Hawai'i's radical left movement that began to use the details of the Ala Moana trial's fallout to demonstrate how haole elites, the Federal Government, and the Navy collectively undermined the efforts of the territory's working class. Union activist and professor of creole languages at the University of Hawai'i John Reinecke, later put on trial as a communist agitator under the Smith Act and convicted as part of the Hawai'i Seven, anonymously published an influential pamphlet in 1951: *The Navy and the Massie Kahahawai Case: A Timely Account of a Dark Page in Hawaii's History Worthy of Study*.²⁶ Reinecke put forth an eloquent and urgent appeal to his readers on how haole planters and the navy had conspired to distort the facts of the Massie affair and use its

²⁵ Seigel, *Violence Work*, 13. Seigel also says: "The police have not militarized or privatized, for they have always already been military and private in essence. They have simply grown more deadly (...), in tandem with rising inequality and thanks to technological changes." Ibid, 187

²⁶ John Reinecke, *The Navy and the Massie Kahahawai Case: A Timely Account of a Dark Page in Hawaii's History Worthy of Study*, (Honolulu: Honolulu Record Publishing Co., 1951). The Hawaii Seven were seven union activists who advocated for being paid the same wages as their counterparts on the West Coast of the United States. The English language press discredited union leadership by accusing them of being communists controlled by the Soviet Union.

momentum to further their hold on the territory's non white residents working class. Reinecke used as a source the long-suppressed Pinkerton Report that absolved Kahahawai and his alleged co-conspirators of any wrongdoing.²⁷

More recent works have used the Massie affair to more closely examine how empire and capital shaped the territorial period. David Stannard's *Honor Killing*,²⁸ is a meticulous account of the Ala Moana trial and the fight between the oligarchy and the Federal Government over the future of the archipelago. In *Local Story: The Massie Kahahawai Case and the Culture of History*,²⁹ John P. Rosa looks beyond the 'national' character of Massie story and instead delves into the perspectives of kānaka maoli and Asian residents to show how non-haoles have remembered the case and its ramifications. For their part, scholars of Hawai'i and Asian America such as Gary Y. Okihiro and Franklin Odo have described the Massie and Kahahawai trials as a flashpoint in the pre-war period's rampant repression of Japanese identity. In their work on the period of martial law, Harry N. Scheiber and Jane L. Scheiber have demonstrated how the HPD were an integral part of the surveillance operations of the federal government during the war. Kelli Y. Nakamura has given us valuable insight into the HPD's effort to obtain collaboration from the Japanese community during the period of martial law. In my research, I look to bring into focus how police experts and the Honolulu City and County Police Department were instrumental in shaping attitudes about race and labor in the territory by putting scholarship on reform-era policing and its imperial origins in conversations with historians' already compelling work on Hawai'i's plantation political economy.

²⁷ John P. Rosa, *Local Story: The Massie-Kahahawai Case and the Culture of History*, (Hawaii Scholarship Online, 2016), 84.

²⁸ David Stannard, *Honor Killing: How the Infamous Massie Affair Transformed Hawai'i*, (New York: Viking Penguin, 2005).

²⁹ John P. Rosa, *Local Story: The Massie-Kahahawai Case and the Culture of History*, (Hawaii Scholarship Online, 2016).

In the first chapter, I organised my analysis around my reading of three inextricably linked moments in Honolulu history where multi-racial groups of young men were identified as partaking in “criminal behavior” by haoles. I begin with the 1920 strike of Japanese and Filipino sugar workers and their refusal to subjugate themselves to the draconian rules and pittance wages of the plantation community. By organising protest demonstrations outside of the plantation environment and in downtown Honolulu, Asian workers defied the planter’s paternal authority and signalled their willingness to implicate themselves in the governance of the territory. As Jonathan Y. Okamura has outlined, race in Hawai‘i “operated to maintain Haole domination over non-Haoles” and was “the primary principle of social-organisation.”³⁰ To haole elites and the English language press the revindication of social and political rights by Asian sugar workers represented an auspicious threat to not only the plantation economy but to oligarchic rule itself.

I then turn my attention toward the Kakka’ako case and the advocacy of Honolulu’s elite women for police reforms. The uproar over the alleged rape of a young Portuguese girl by a group of nine boys of racialized origins was engineered by the English language press into a moral panic. In the haole public’s imagination the Kakka’ako case became emblematic of a more widespread wave of criminality emanating from Honolulu’s non-white and working-class neighborhoods. After an elite haole woman was assaulted in one of Honolulu’s upper-class enclaves, progressive women organised under the banner of the League of Women Voters and the Vigilance Committee for the transformation of the system of law enforcement in the territory into a more coercive system of racial management. In their activism, women reformers explicitly called on the expertise of police expert August Vollmer and utilized the language of the social sciences to justify their agenda.

³⁰ Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Raced to Death in 1920s Hawai‘i: Injustice and Revenge in the Fukunaga Case* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019), 17.

Finally, I look at the election of 1923 and the three-year tenure of Sheriff David K. Trask, an important precursor to the modern Honolulu City and County Police Department that emerged as a result of the Massie Affair. As a former municipal employee with no police experience, David K. Trask was elected Sheriff of the Honolulu City and County Police Department on the promise that he'd do away with the political corruption that women activists claimed plagued the HPD. While in office, Trask implemented many of Vollmer's military inspired innovations. Trask's violent repression of Filipino sugar workers during the 1924 Sugar Strike represented the culmination of the advocacy of elite reformers on the Honolulu City and County Police Department.

In the second chapter, I examine the origins and the consequences of the Police Act of February 1, 1932. Haole civic leaders only truly latched on to the idea of police after the Fukunaga case exposed the limited capabilities of the Honolulu City and County Police Department. In 1929, the kidnapping and murder of ten-year-old George Gill Jamieson, the son of Frederick Jamieson an executive of the Hawaiian Trust Company, by 19-year-old nisei Myles Yukata Fukunaga emboldened haole elites to modernize Honolulu's police force to ward off future threats of non-white insubordination.³¹ Soon after the kidnapping, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce put together a sub-committee to study the organisation of the HPD and make recommendations to Governor Lawrence M. Judd. Meanwhile, Judd launched his own advisory commission on crime. During its investigation, the territorial crime commission gathered the opinions of haole elites and consulted with mainland experts. The recommendations contained in the reports of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce's sub-committee and Judd's territorial commission would ultimately form the bulk of the transformative police bill of 1932.

³¹ Jonathan Y. Okamura has characterized the Fukunaga case as a "major component of in a trajectory of racial injustice against other non-Haoles who had defied Haole domination." Okamura, *Raced to Death*, 167.

Intense lobbying by Walter F. Dillingham and the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce pushed Judd to approve the resolutions of the Police Act of February 1, 1932, during a special legislative session of the territorial house held in the wake of the murder of Joseph Kahahawai. Among the changes set forth by the territorial bill, the Honolulu City and County Police Department was dissociated from the Sheriff's office and placed under the command of an appointed chief of police. This meant that the head of the police department ceased to be an elected official and instead became the prerogative of a five-man police commission made up of 'civic leaders' appointed by the Governor.

To lead the new and improved Honolulu City and County Police Department, the businessmen of the police commission looked to veterans of Vollmer's Berkeley police department. After initially coming to the territory as a police instructor, Lieutenant William A. Gabrielson was chosen as the new police chief. As a disciple of Vollmer, Gabrielson instituted many of the principles of professional policing and completely transformed the department through the integration of new record keeping technologies, the acquisition of military-grade weapons, and the recruitment of college educated men. By implementing the latest developments in policing technology, the Honolulu police department laid the groundwork for the surveillance operations the department would be tasked with in the aftermath of the bombing of U.S. military's naval base at Pearl Harbor. Without Gabrielson's influence, the Honolulu City and County Police Department's cooperation with the FBI and the military government of the war years would not have been as seamless. The technological and institutional changes Gabrielson brought to the HPD worked to make the department especially suited for the types of duties required under a military governorship and aptly demonstrated the validity of Stuart Schrader's

term the “police-military continuum.”³² In his published writings, Gabrielson positioned the HPD on the frontlines of a global battle for the preservation of law and order. Gabrielson’s words echoed those of haole elites and military officials who for years had warned that the majority Asian population of the territory and its strategic importance as a naval outpost in the Pacific warranted the curtailment of civil liberties.³³

To convey the intricacies of elite discourse I make use of a combination of governmental records, newspaper articles, and the publications of certain important actors. I primarily track the development of elite reaction to crime through newspaper reports contained in the pages of Honolulu’s English language press. The *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* and the *Honolulu Advertiser* closely chronicled instances of criminal behavior in the territory. The editorials pages of both papers were instrumental in shaping public opinion and can be interpreted as a direct line to the thinking of haole elites.³⁴ I supplement my reading of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* and the *Honolulu Advertiser* with the report of Assistant Attorney General Seth W. Richardson on the “crime” conditions of the territory.³⁵ Richardson’s interviews conducted in the spring of 1932 convey in great detail the concerns of haole elites as they dealt with the prying investigation of

³² Instead of the commonly used police “militarization,” the “police-military continuum” accurately expresses how both the military and police work in conjunction, especially in situations of urban warfare. For more see: Schrader, Stuart. “Global Counterinsurgency and the Police-Military Continuum: Introduction to the Special Issue.” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 33 no. 4-5 (2022): 553-580.

³³ The most vociferous of those who argued for the prevalence of national security over liberal institutions was Admiral Yates Stirling Jr, Commander of the 14th Naval District and Commander of the Naval Operating Base at Pearl Harbor. Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 161.

³⁴ Wallace Rider Farrington, Hawai‘i’s Governor between 1921 and 1929 was also the publisher of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* at the time. Farrington saw no conflict between his public office and his private holdings. Walter Dillingham was a major shareholder of the *Honolulu Advertiser* and utilized his influence with the paper to sway public opinion toward approving his profitable land reclamations projects. Helen Geracimos Chapin, *Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 146-149.

³⁵ Originally from North Dakota, Richardson was a self-described progressive who was appointed Assistant Attorney General in charge of Indian Affairs in 1929. After the completion of his report on the crime conditions in Hawai‘i went on to serve as chief counsel of the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Chairman of President Harry Truman’s Loyalty Review Board, and Chairman of the anti-communist Subversive Activities Control Board. Cabel Philips, “The Inquisitive Seth Richardson,” *The New York Times* (December 3, 1950), 14-54.

federal officials at a time of crisis. Richardson's report was meant to provide clarification as to the organisation and effectiveness of the police system, the courts, the territory's prosecutors, the jury system as well as the prison and parole system. In their questioning, Richardson and his subordinates probed to great length the opinions of politicians, judges, lawyers, planters, businessmen, activist women, and individuals of all races on the vitality of the Hawai'i's institutions and the role of the police in territorial society.

I also draw from transcripts of committee hearings where the particularities of the changes to police administration and police techniques were discussed by territorial officials who sought to keep further scrutiny by the federal government at bay. The examination of these documents is worthwhile because they show how haole police commission members interpreted the changes themselves. By comparing the committee transcripts, Richardson's interviews and Richardson's own conclusions, I am able to obtain a more accurate image of the various discussions and determinations of the important actors of police reform.

I use the published work of the figureheads of the reforms, notably August Vollmer and William Gabrielson to understand the ideological origins of the police professionalization movement. Gabrielson and Vollmer were prolific writers, conscious of the importance of public communication. They have left behind, especially in the case of Vollmer, copious amount of literature providing justification for their particular management strategies. Their words are important in helping me situate their actions in the larger imperial network of global policing.



Fig. 1. The defendants in the Ala Moana trial, from left to right: Joseph Kahahawai, Horace Ida, David Takai, Henry Chang, and Ben Ahakuelo.³⁶

³⁶ “The Men Accused of Assaulting Thalia Massie,” PBS, effective December 17, 2024, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/island-murder-five-men-accused-assaulting-thalia-massie>.

Chapter 1

“An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Ton of Cure”: The Honolulu City and County Police Department, the Vigilance Committee and Urban Gangs

When the latest victim of Honolulu’s “urban crime wave,” was announced as one of their own, Hawai‘i’s elite haole women banded together and pressured the city and the territory’s political establishment to bring significant changes to the organisation of the Honolulu City and County Police Department. On the afternoon of May 18, 1923, Mrs. James P. Morgan, nee Rosamond Swanzy Morgan, a prominent member of haole society, was attacked and robbed by Sam WaiLehua, a twenty-one-year-old Hawaiian convict on parole. The incident occurred on the scenic Roundtop to Tantalus Road one mile from downtown Honolulu.³⁷ On the following Monday morning, the board of directors of the Housewives’ League called upon a “mass meeting of women in Honolulu.” The women were determined to force Honolulu’s City and County Board of Supervisors into providing what the league deemed “the protection we so badly need.”³⁸ Due to a spate of similar attacks that had recently occurred in the upscale neighborhood of Pacific Heights in which the victims had declined to notify the police for fear of attracting unwanted attention, the Housewives’ League declared the city to be in a state of crisis. Acting president of the league, Ellen Fullard-Leo, urged her upper-class peers to take action, “The time has come where it seems to be up to the women of Honolulu to demand better protection.”³⁹

³⁷ Mrs. Morgan was a member of the City and County Recreation Commission and a founding member of the Hawai‘i’s League of Women Voters along with Louise Olga Gaylord, the wife of Walter F. Dillingham. While incarcerated, Sam WaiLehua had been assigned to work on the same patch of road where the assault occurred. The Tantalus neighborhood was where Honolulu elites built their summer homes, high above the city to escape the heat. Several influential families possessed mountain retreats there. “Oahu’s Only State and National Historic Road,” Tantalus Oahu, Accessed September 20, 2024, <https://tantalusoahu.com/about/national-historic-road/>.

³⁸ “Women to Act for Defense from Attacks,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 21, 1923), 1.

The Housewives’ League was led at the time by Ellen Fullard-Leo, a founder of the U.S. Olympic Association. Only a week after his arrest, Sam WaiLehua received a thirty-five-year sentence. “Paroles May be Suspended for Several Months,” *Hawaii Tribune-Herald* (May 29, 1923), 1.

³⁹ “Women to Act for Defense from Attacks,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 21, 1923), 1.

In this chapter, I examine the genealogy of elite discourse as it relates to crime and police reform in the territory of Hawai‘i. I demonstrate that for Honolulu elites, police became an essential concept in the management of the growing population of young non-white working-class men outside of the plantation. Elite women portrayed themselves and the haole enclaves of Honolulu as under assault by roving gangs of criminals emerging from the city’s poorer neighborhoods. Progressive elite women’s fears over their own personal safety justified the transformation of the Honolulu City and County Police Department into what Matthew Guariglia has defined in his own research on the early 20th century New York Police Department as an “engine of racial management and racemaking.”⁴⁰ Haole high society women pleaded with territorial and city officials for the modernization of the HPD as outlined by the latest discoveries of mainland police experts. The League of Women Voters and the Vigilance Committee produced a number of reports on the conditions of law enforcement in Honolulu to provide the scientific evidence substantiating this turn toward an ideology of “security.”⁴¹ The ideas first promulgated by the League of Women Voters and the Vigilance Committee in 1923 would come to shape elite discourse throughout the 1920s and beyond.

Years before civilian oversight was first introduced to the Honolulu City and County Police Department in the months that followed the Ala Moana trial, progressive reformers led a virulent public campaign against police inefficiency and played an important role in the 1923 election for Sheriff of the City and County of Honolulu. Like their fellow U.S. progressives, haole women criticized the police for its failure to enforce the laws that regulated vice, implicitly

⁴⁰ Matthew Guariglia, *Police in the Empire City: Race and the Origins of Modern Policing in New York* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2023), 4. In Hawai‘i, police presumed the criminality of some races, notably Filipinos due to their perceived inability to take on the moral and cultural norms of white Americans.

⁴¹ Here I use the term security as Mark Neocleous defines to evoke its expansive nature rather than its conception as a tangible and measurable phenomenon. Neocleous says: “Security functions as knowledge, relies on knowledge, produces knowledge, and uses its claim to knowledge to render all aspects of life transparent.” Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order*, 139.

attacking the constituencies that did not wish to see these laws enforced, the members of the so-called “political machine.”⁴² For haole women reformers, criminality, race, and class were intertwined and justified their feelings of insecurity in a city where whites were the minority.⁴³

Women activists were able to influence the election of 1923 for Sheriff of the City and County of Honolulu because of the support of fellow violence workers, the English language press. Contrary to the claims of state and federal officials who portrayed Hawai‘i as a “melting pot” and “racial paradise,” the mouthpieces of elite discourse, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser, created a moral panic over the spread of gangs of non-haole young men and their threat to women’s safety.⁴⁴ This was not the first time the press created such uproar. Ten years prior, in 1912, another moral panic had been fostered by the newspapers over another “crime wave” that had erupted over the discovery of a series of sexual crimes committed by Asian men against young girls in Honolulu’s poorer neighborhoods.⁴⁵ The press had feverishly chronicled the debates of haoles who aimed to protect womanhood by imposing severe punishments upon past and future perpetrators of such offenses, whether it be the sterilization of criminals or the imposition of whipping.⁴⁶ As in 1912, the necessary consensus among elites to

⁴² Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 12.

⁴³ According to the Hawaiian Annual for 1924, in Honolulu, out of a population of 83,327, there were 36,750 women of which 5,079 were white women. Thos G. Thrum, *Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1924: The Reference Book of Information and Statistics Relating to the Territory of Hawaii* (Honolulu: Thos G. Thrum, 1923), 12. Among progressives, the publication of the 42 volume Dillingham Report on immigration in 1911 had cemented the ideas that race and criminality were two sides of the same coin. Historians have argued that the demographic information and statistical facts in the report were manipulated “to promote restrictions and exaggerate the racial inferiority of certain groups. Leslie A. Hahner, *To Become an American: Immigrants and Americanization Campaigns of the Early Twentieth Century* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2017), 4.

⁴⁴ The 1920s was the first decade in which the territory was presented to the larger American public as a “racial paradise” by sociologists of the University of Hawai‘i and the English language press. Hawai‘i’s promise of benevolent “multiculturalism” was in fact an obfuscation of the plantation racial order that persisted and still persists. Okamura, *Raced to Death*, 3.

⁴⁵ During a 6 months period, the *Honolulu Advertiser* published 110 articles, letters, and editorials on the subject.

⁴⁶ While some haoles argued that rapists should be castrated, here sterilization means the forced vasectomy of incarcerated men. During the panic, eugenics were a frequent topic of discussion and informed haole stances on the sterilization of criminals. Eugenists described the criminals of 1912 as “defective” and “not normal men.” Haoles would use similar terms for the gangs of 1923. For more on the panic of 1912, see: Peter James Nelligan, *Social Change and Rape Law in Hawaii* (University of Hawaii, PhD Dissertation, 1983), 165-189.

achieve legislative changes to the criminal justice system proved difficult to reach, thus, the ballot box represented the best option for protection in 1923.⁴⁷ By banding together under the standard of burgeoning political organisations for civic reform, society women made use of their newly granted voting rights to influence municipal affairs.

In this chapter, I look at three crucial moments in the history of Honolulu that shaped the future of policing in the territory. First, in 1920, a momentous strike, where young Japanese sugar workers voiced their displeasure at the conditions of the plantations in the streets of downtown Honolulu, attracted the ire of the haole elites who accused them of wanting to take over the islands' sugar industry. Haoles' reactions to the strike laid the foundations for the justification of increased cooperation between the HSPA, the Hawai'i Sugar Planters Association, the Military, and the police in the surveillance of the territory's Asian population. Secondly, in 1923, elites used the Kaka'ako case and other alleged incidents of violence committed by racialized persons to transform the Honolulu City and County Police Department. With the steadfast support of English language newspapers, elite Honolulu women organised to reform police through the lobbying of officials and the production of scientific knowledge. Women's civic organisations succeeded in electing the progressive disciplinarian David Kaukaohu Trask as Sheriff of the HPD. Lastly, as Sheriff from 1924 to 1926, Trask implemented reforms inspired by the professional model of policing advocated by August Vollmer and pre-empted many of the ideas that would later form the core of the Police Act of February 1, 1932, in response to the Sugar Workers Strike of 1924. During those four years, in order to protect their

⁴⁷ Out of all that was written and discussed, only one bill emerged from the panic of 1912. Characterized as a halfway bill by the *Honolulu Advertiser*, the bill primarily increased penalties for statutory rape with the maximum sentence increasing from 5 to 10 years. Nelligan, *Social Change and Rape Law in Hawaii*, 185.

hegemony over Honolulu's urban environment, haole society looked to the Honolulu City and County Police Department and the military-police continuum.

“Gangs” and the Urban Environment in the Richardson Report

Annexation of the Republic of Hawai'i to the United States in 1898 meant the end of a system of contract labor that kept workers in bondage. Freed from their contracts by the provisions of the Organic Act of 1900 and U.S. law, workers left the plantation in droves.⁴⁸ After their contracts with the plantations expired, almost all Chinese and Japanese laborers who did not return home or continue on to the U.S. west coast moved to Honolulu where a majority ended up in the city's poor and densely populated Chinatown.⁴⁹ When the neighborhood experienced an outbreak of bubonic plague in 1899, the territorial government utilized fire to combat the spread of disease. One of the “sanitary fires” started by authorities burned down a dozen square blocks forcing more than 4,000 displaced Chinese, Japanese, and Native Hawaiian residents to establish encampments and tenement houses in the districts of A'ala and Palama. Haole newspapers were ecstatic with the *Honolulu Advertiser* exclaiming: “Almost a Clean Sweep.”⁵⁰ The five suspects in the Ala Moana trial were from the working-class neighborhoods of Iwilei and Kalihi-Palama. The Kaka'ako neighborhood where part of this chapter takes place, notorious among haoles for

⁴⁸ While many sought better opportunities elsewhere, many were evicted from plantation housing by planters who used the housing shortage in the territory to maintain an upper hand in labor negotiations. Okiihiro, *Cane Fires*, 36. The Organic Act also reallocated rights to land and facilitated the privatization of once Hawaiian communal lands. As planters accumulated land holdings in service of sugar production, Native Hawaiians were driven out of rural areas and established themselves in Honolulu in high numbers. While a third of the territory's population resided in the capital city, more than half of part Hawaiians and 36 percent of full Hawaiians lived there. Judith Schachter, “From “Squatter” to Homesteader: Being Hawaiian in an American City,” *City & Society*, vol. 28, issue 1 (2016), 25-27.

⁴⁹ Stannard, *Honor Killing*, 70. During the 1910s, Honolulu's population grew by more than fifty percent to 83, 327 with Japanese and Filipinos being the two racial groups with the biggest increase relative to the overall population in the territory. In ten years, the territory's Japanese and Filipino populations increased by 37 percent and by 790 percent respectively. Thos G. Thrum, *Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1923* (Honolulu: Thos G. Thrum, 1922), 11-13.

⁵⁰ Stannard, *Honor Killing*, 71-72.

its “gang” violence, was also one of Honolulu’s earliest multi-racial and working-class residential districts.⁵¹

When considering the actions of the Vigilance Committee and other elite reformers who gained considerable influence decrying the proliferation of street gangs in Honolulu, it is important to nuance their stories and opinions with the testimonies of the people who grew up in the districts they routinely lambasted. In oral history interviews conducted by researchers affiliated with the University of Hawai‘i, Wallace S. Amioka, a child of Japanese parents who was born in Hawai‘i in 1914 and grew up in the Kaka‘ako district, gives another version of the facts. When questioned about whether there was any truth behind Kaka‘ako’s reputation as a rough district, Amioka admitted fighting did occur between rival groups from different parts of the city, but they were concentrated around sports games. More importantly, Amioka told the project that the soldiers from nearby Fort Armstrong were often the ones who harassed local girls which led to fights.⁵² According to Gloria Felix, born in 1911 to Portuguese parents, fights were common at local dances as Kaka‘ako boys would get into fights with haole boys who had come down from other parts of the city.⁵³ Other former residents described their experiences with ‘gangs’ as nothing more than ordinary camaraderie. Charles Frazier who lived in Kaka‘ako from 1912 until 1928 recalled that as a young man, his “gang” would help him finish his chores sooner so that they could go play baseball against other “gangs” of kids who lived two blocks down.⁵⁴ If, as Judith Schlachter has described, municipal authorities adopted the term “squatter” to refer to the displaced populations of kānaka maoli who established themselves in urban centers after

⁵¹ Center for Oral History Social Science Research Institute, *Remembering Kaka‘ako: 1910-1950 Volume 1* (University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, 1978), ix.

⁵² Center for Oral History, *Remembering Kaka‘ako*, 50.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 203.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 326.

eviction from their ancestral lands, we can find some semiotic equivalency in haole elites' usage of the term "gang" and "gangster" in the context of groups of non-white youths who were deemed to be illegitimate in their usage of Honolulu's public spaces.⁵⁵



Fig. 2. The Kaka'ako neighborhood over the years. From left to right: In 1885, the area was renowned for its wetlands and fishponds. During that time mostly Native Hawaiian squatters established camps there until they were forcibly removed by municipal authorities in 1920. Dredging filled the wetlands to create "useable land" at the turn of the century. Finally, in 1930, a second incinerator was constructed in the district whose coastal lands were used as an enormous garbage dump.⁵⁶

In his report on the conditions of law enforcement in the territory of Hawai'i in 1932, Assistant Attorney General Seth Richardson demonstrated that haole concerns regarding the phenomenon of urban gangs was not only confined to the moral panic of 1923 but continued to shape elite mentalities well into the 1930s. Haoles who were present in 1923 and 1932 were alarmed at the criminal potential deriving from the close cohabitation of racial groups in the territory and advocated for the forceful repression of unlawful behavior to stem the spread of criminality. In his interview with Richardson, Dr. Romanzo Adams, a sociologist at the University of Hawai'i, described Native Hawaiians as "harmless and kindly" and as a people

⁵⁵ Schachter tells us that the term "squatter" "reflected a western notion of "real property" that did not fit either the 1848 division or the 1900 transformation into trust land." When Native Hawaiians were expropriated from their communal lands in the 19th century and then by the plantations in the 20th century, many established themselves in Honolulu. Living in shacks in the city's industrial sectors, haoles characterized Native Hawaiians as "squatters." Schachter, "From "Squatter" to Homesteader," 27.

⁵⁶ "Fishponds, Factories, and Families: 200 Years of Change in Kaka'ako," Ka Wai Ola News, effective December 17, 2024, <https://kawaiola.news/aina/fishponds-factories-and-families-200-years-of-change-in-kakaako>.

who lacked initiative.⁵⁷ Adams attributed criminal activity in Honolulu to the “social intermixture of the races” because gangs, such as the one that had allegedly attacked Thalia Massie, were usually made up of “at least three different races.”⁵⁸ In his interview with Richardson, the industrialist Walter F. Dillingham echoed Adams’ diagnosis and foreshadowed the Richardson report’s conclusions when he pointed out that, although, supposedly good-natured Native Hawaiians had been involved in the Massie case, they did so as part of a racially mixed group and as a rule, the leaders of these gangs were never Hawaiians but of some other race.⁵⁹ Dillingham concluded his interview with the Assistant Attorney General with a recommendation that, once again, anticipated what Richardson would later write in his report: “The importance of taking a strong hand incruising out these recent outrages is vital to the community as by such drastic action as we are now taking we can and will, I believe, prevent such crimes becoming epidemic.”⁶⁰

Richardson favored Dillingham and Adams’ racial analysis and believed a majority of the serious crimes committed in the territory in the years that led up to the Massie Affair could be traced to the gangs of young men who were known to frequent Honolulu’s street corners. The

⁵⁷ Seth W. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Concerning Law Enforcement and Crime Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii Richardson Transcript Volume 8* (Hawaii: The Department, 1932), 1435-1436.

⁵⁸ Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume VIII*, 1435. In his own study on interracial marriage in the territory, Adams noted the deterioration of the moral order of immigrant groups as they became disconnected from their homeland. According to the doctor, in Hawai‘i, as in many other parts of the United States, “it has become necessary to depend more on police, the courts, the jails and the prison as the peoples have been emancipated from their traditional moral control.” Romanzo Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii: A Study of the Mutually Conditioned Process of Acculturation and Amalgamation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), 305.

⁵⁹ Seth W. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Concerning Law Enforcement and Crime Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii Richardson Transcript Volume IV* (Hawaii: The Department, 1932), 767.

⁶⁰ Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume IV*, 777. Although, Richardson and Dillingham were aligned in their analysis of the criminal situation, Richardson was adamant that the industrial class of the territory had proven to be unsatisfactory in their dealings. United States Senate, *United States Senate, Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii: Letter from the Attorney General Transmitting in Response to Senate Resolution NO. 134 Certain Information Relative to Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii* (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1932), 17-18.

Assistant Attorney General's succinct description of gangs and their activities is a frank admittance of how gangs and gangsters were emblematic of the many problems facing Honolulu in the eyes of haole elites. In his report, Richardson determined: "These gangs of loafers, usually young in years, hang around the streets, alleys, and public places in various parts of the city. Usually, some one of the gang is provided with some old, dilapidated automobile which serves as a means of conveyance for the crowd. Passing girls and women are subjected to insulting remarks and the entire gang contributes to lawlessness and breaches of the peace."⁶¹ Richardson's account can be distilled to these main points: gangs were groups of young men who were out of work or unemployed, they were familiar with the urban environment and could evade authorities by moving freely from district to district, posing a threat to womanhood everywhere they went.

In his report, Richardson supposed the current conditions in unemployment, immigration, and education had created the adequate climate for the existence of these youth gangs, but the Assistant General Attorney insisted police ineptitude was the chief explanation for the proliferation of the phenomenon.⁶² Richardson reasoned that police incompetence had left gangs "practically free to congregate at will."⁶³ Richardson believed law enforcement in the territory should be actively monitoring and restricting who could assemble, socialize, and live in urban Honolulu, an American city just like any other according to the Federal government. In his 1932 report, the Assistant Attorney General praised a 1924 law against loitering passed at the behest of former Honolulu Sheriff David K. Trask which conferred to police officers "ample power to

⁶¹ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 34.

⁶² Richardson identified the territory's "unemployment condition" as of the utmost concern for the future of law enforcement. As Richardson put it in the summary of his report: "I regard the question of employment and unemployment, in the light of future conditions of law enforcement, as being perhaps the most vitally important civil matter which confronts the people of the territory." Ibid, 37.

⁶³ Ibid, 34.

break up the evil features of such gang.”⁶⁴ For Richardson, the end of police ineptitude meant the expansion of police’s power to intervene in the lives of the city’s working-class.

In interwar Hawai’i, the term “gang” was readily used by elites to describe groups of Asian and native Hawaiian youths who openly socialized in the streets of Honolulu. Sheriff Trask made plain the significance of the term when he recalled his time in office less than a decade prior: “There were no real gangsters, but they were loiterers—young boys. The medicine worked”⁶⁵ The “medicine” Trask refers to here is the use of corporal punishment for youths who disobeyed the city’s ordinances.⁶⁶ Young working class men were subject to the threat of violence because of the territory’s convoluted schooling and labour rules. In fact, enrollment in school was compulsory until the age of 14 but young people could not be legally hired for work until they reached 16 years of age. With education for non haoles geared toward agricultural skills and the requirements of the plantation, many did not seek further erudition beyond the territorial minimums. Even Sheriff Patrick K. Gleason, the Honolulu City and County Sheriff at the time of the Massie Affair, told Richardson that legislation should be introduced to keep young men in schools as long as they could not work because of its almost imposed period of idleness.⁶⁷ In the eyes of officials, the boulevards and narrow alleyways of the capital city were a

⁶⁴ In 1924, the revised laws of Hawai’i defined an unlawful assembly as “Where three or more persons are, of their own authority, assembled together with disturbance, tumult and violence, and striking terror or tending to strike terrors into others (...).” Attorney General of Hawaii, *Opinions of the Attorney General of Hawaii: January 1, 1922 to June 30, 1924* (Honolulu: Paradise of the Pacific Press), 508. United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 34.

⁶⁵ Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume IV*, 712.

⁶⁶ In a seemingly nostalgic and ironic aside, Richardson noted that before some citizens of the community managed to put an end to the practice, Sheriff David K. Trask had introduced whipping to “dispel such gangs.” United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 34.

⁶⁷ According to Gleason, a typical young man would be: “(...) loafing in the streets if he quits school at the age of 14.” Seth W. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Concerning Law Enforcement and Crime Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii Richardson Transcript Volume X* (Hawaii: The Department, 1932), 2150.

breeding ground for criminality but for many young men there was little else to do but to roam around in search of distraction.

Between 1900 and 1920, Hawai'i's urban Japanese population had doubled, a process that continued well into the 1930s as the number of Japanese residents of Honolulu expanded twofold before the Second World War.⁶⁸ For elites who profited from the plantation and its ancillary commercial opportunities, the new generation of Japanese Americans' disdain for work in the sugar fields threatened the future stability of the territory.⁶⁹ Critics warned that in wanting better economic opportunity for their children, the isei, the first generation of Japanese immigrants, had led the nisei, the isei's sons and daughters, toward a dangerous serpentine path of idleness and urban criminality. In his interview with the federal judge Frank Masse,⁷⁰ Richardson and Masse both described this intolerable situation as "A deadly circle."⁷¹ Masse argued that today's youth had been brought up to not only resent manual work and the plantation environment but to be ashamed of it. Worse, young people had turned their backs to the

⁶⁸ Shiho Imai, *Creating the Nisei Market: Race and Citizenship in Hawaii's Japanese American Consumer Culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010), 6.

⁶⁹ To force the nisei to eventually replace the issei as the workforce on the plantations, in 1920, the haole leaders of the territory created a segregated school system where white students mostly attended "English Standard Schools," while the Asian school age population was mainly enrolled in Industrial Schools, agricultural vocational school. Okiihiro, *Cane Fires*, 138-140. By 1924, over half of the student population in the public school system were of Japanese ancestry. Unlike their parents, who could never aspire to become naturalized U.S. citizens, the nisei were born U.S. citizens. Even those isei who were naturalized because of their service in the U.S. military during WWI were stripped of their citizenship in 1927. Franklin Odo, *No Sword to Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawai'i During World War II*, (Philadelphia: Temple University, 2004), 36-37.

⁷⁰ Masse was an instructor in the army who served in the Spanish American war and later in the Philippines before completing a law degree. From then on, he served as a Judge Advocate in Hawai'i, at the U.S. Mexico border, and in France. In 1932, he had been on the Federal bench for eleven years. Seth W. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Concerning Law Enforcement and Crime Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii Richardson Transcript Volume II* (Hawaii: The Department, 1932), 343-345.

⁷¹ Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume II*, 354. Planters and other elites wary of losing access to the most populous labor force in the archipelago organised educational campaigns promoting the idea of work training centered on a "back to the soil" ideology. When consent strategies failed, haole elites used coercive methods and warned Japanese Americans that if they rejected the rough labor of plantation work, emigration would be their only option. In 1933, the Hawai'ian legislature took aim at public education and introduced high school tuition and book fees in the hopes of stymieing the ambitions of plantation children. Carol A. MacLennan, *Sovereign Sugar: Industry and Environment in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), 193.

paternalist customs of plantation life and instead flocked to cosmopolitan Honolulu where opportunities for an American lifestyle beckoned. As one nisei commentator explained the youth's disdain for the plantation in favor of city life: "The general consensus of opinion seemed to be that wages on (the) plantation are entirely incompatible with American standard of living, (...) The young people's taste for Occidental things are increased while the means of securing them is not. Until this situation is remedied, the exodus to the congested centers will continue."⁷²

To the consternation of Richardson and his interviewees, young people in Hawai'i modeled their behavior on the rambunctious insolence of American youth culture and were avid fans of American gangster pictures.⁷³ Again, Richardson adopted a paternalist attitude towards non-white youths when in his report, the Assistant Attorney General justified the censorship of the motion pictures shown in the territory by claiming that for the sake of the "Polynesian and oriental races," "the moving-picture houses in the Territory are filled with sex gang and underworld pictures featuring white men and women, thus contributing an extraordinary effect upon ideals and morals of such racial groups."⁷⁴ Judge Masse was keen to stress how the sight of a diverse group of young people who had adopted the clothing and mannerisms of Hollywood pictures could be interpreted as a threat to the peacefulness of haole Honolulu: "(...) people today will see a cut-down Ford with five or six boys of different shades in it, and immediately they are apprehensive. As a matter of fact, it is impossible from their looks for one to say whether they are gangsters or University of Hawaii students, (...)." ⁷⁵ By associating freely outside of the bounds of race and imitating their American peers, the new generation of urban

⁷² Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 145.

⁷³ It was a widely held view in the 1920s that young people were being corrupted by the movies and the immorality they portrayed on the screen. For more, on the social and moral panics surrounding cinema and the campaigns to censure the film industry see: Lee Grieveson, *Policing Cinema: Movies and Censorship in Early-Twentieth-Century America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004).

⁷⁴ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 20.

⁷⁵ Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume II*, 352-353.

youths threatened the segregated nature of territorial society. Whereas on the plantation, workers had been divided along racial lines, in Honolulu's multi-racial mythical poor districts such as Hell's Half Acre, Buckle Lane, Tin Can Alley, etc. young people studied, worked, and played together.

The 1920 Strike

Planters initially imagined the ideal workforce for their sugar fields to be a composed of a panoply of different races and ethnicities so that the potential for the emergence of a mutually shared sentiment of class solidarity would be undermined by the racial and ethnic antagonism fostered by the hierarchical structure of the plantation.⁷⁶ According to Gary Okihiro, the planters never could reach their "ethnic ideal" because the realities of the market dictated their options when it came to the import of migrant labour.⁷⁷ Labourers often came from a single group at a time as with the arrival of Japanese *en masse* during the early years of the plantation economy. For the first two decades of labor importation, the planters were totally reliant on Japanese emigres for their workforce. As their contracts with the planters came to an end, workers left the confines of the plantation and went on to settle across the territory, often becoming small business owners or craftsmen.⁷⁸ The existence of permanent and resilient communities of Asian people spread out across the Hawaiian Islands alarmed the oligarchy who feared the growth of an "alien, unassimilable, and substantial body within the population."⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Life on large scale plantations was a "race-making experience." Jobs and living situations were assigned based on race. Haole management lived in separate areas in luxurious housings usually near the offices of the plantation. Skilled workers such as Native Hawaiians or Portuguese were "afforded white status" and lived in cottages. Asian workers lived in scattered camps close to the fields where they worked. MacLennan, *Sovereign Sugar*, 198. During the period of 'migrant labor,' from 1865 to 1909, the plantation system was designed to "control and exploit the productive labor of Asians and then to expel them when their utility had ended." Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 57.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 59.

⁷⁸ Odo, *No Sword to Bury*, 24.

⁷⁹ Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 57.

On the plantations, planter paternalism was the method of choice to keep workers in check. Camp police enforced draconian rules and treated the mostly male Japanese worker population as children whose eating and sleeping habits should be constantly monitored. After the 1909 strikes by Japanese Workers on six of O'ahu's plantations, planters doubled down on paternalism as a method of managing the potential of the worker labour movement to unsettle their exploitation.⁸⁰ Inspired by the welfare capitalism of U.S. company towns, plantation paternalism was designed to keep workers away from the leisurely activities to be found in urban centers and on the plantation where they could attend to their duties without cutting their hours short. The planters introduced a contentious bonus system by which workers could earn extra if they worked a minimum number of days in a month and during the year without taking sick days or leave. Planters also improved on site housing, medical care, and established stores, religious temples, recreational activities, and schools for children.⁸¹

Despite somewhat improving the workers' living conditions, the planters put together a contingency plan in case of a reprise in revendications by the Japanese labour movement. In 1909, the HSPA, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, resolved to bring in Filipino laborers to the territory by the thousands as a surplus workforce to mitigate the effects of a possible Japanese labor strike and as a workaround to the newly consecrated anti-Japanese immigration

⁸⁰ In 1909, 7,000 Japanese workers on all major O'ahu plantations organised a strike for higher wages and equality in the workplace. Organised by the Japanese intelligentsia in Hawai'i, labour leaders were intimidated by plantation police who threatened to shoot them if they stepped foot in the plantation. Like future strikers, labour activists in 1909 were evicted from their homes on the plantations and established camps in Honolulu in the districts of Kaka'ako, Moiliili, and Palama. Okihiko, *Cane Fires*, 45-53.

⁸¹ Jonathan Y. Okamura, *From Race to Ethnicity: Interpreting Japanese Experiences in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), 28. All plantations were not equal. Some laborers' quarters were better constructed than others. For further details about workers' complaints about the bonus system and housing, see The Federation of Japanese Labor in Hawaii, *The Voice of Labor in Hawaii* (Honolulu: Nippu Jiji Print, 1920) and Hawaii's Laborers Association, *Facts About the Strike on Sugar Plantations in Hawaii* (Honolulu: Nippu Jiji Print, 1920).

American federal policy.⁸² According to Dr. Romanzo Adams, from 1907 to 1924 a total of 31,229 Filipino men and 5,790 Filipino women immigrated to Hawai'i and more than twenty thousand were employed on the various plantations of the territory in 1923.⁸³ The arrival of Filipino workers presented new difficulties for planters wary of the occurrence of further disruptions to the year round cultivation of sugar.⁸⁴ As U.S. nationals, Filipinos could seek passage to the mainland without requiring a visa unlike Japanese and Chinese workers. Low pay and the difficult working conditions of the plantations motivated many to leave and seek other opportunities on the American West Coast. In 1922, the planters obtained from their close ally, the territorial government, strict legislation, inspired by the laws adopted by southern states after reconstruction to limit the number of black people fleeing Jim Crow, to ward off labor recruiters from California.⁸⁵

Before the consolidation of the sugar and pineapple industry in the mid-1920s, many Filipino workers moved between sugar and pineapple plantations. As opposed to sugar, pineapple was not cultivated year-round in Hawai'i. To the dismay of sugar planters, during the pineapple cultivations season, many Filipinos would leave their work at the sugar plantations and seek better wages, less arduous work, and the proximity to urban centers offered by the pineapple

⁸² Japan had ceased to issue passports to labourers as part of the Gentlemen Agreement of 1907-08 with the United States making the import of more Japanese workers impossible. Until the strike of 1909, people of Japanese ancestry made up 65 percent the plantation labor force. By 1932, Filipinos constituted an overwhelming majority of plantation workers at 69.9 percent while people of Japanese ancestry made up only 18.8 percent. Edward D. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii: A Labour History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 146. And Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 59.

⁸³ John E. Reinecke, *The Filipino Piecemeal Strike of 1924-1925* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Social Science Research Institute, 1996), 2. And Department of the Interior, *Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the secretary of the Interior 1923* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), 40.

⁸⁴ In 1920, 3 out of 5 Filipinos recruited to come to Hawai'i would be returned to the Philippines due to their lack of English proficiency. Reinecke, *The Filipino Piecemeal Strike of 1924-1925*, 2.

⁸⁵ Labor recruiters were made to acquire a licence and pay a bond of 25 000\$ as security for all possible violations of the law. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 187.

plantations.⁸⁶ Unlike the well organised Japanese labor, Filipinos were assigned the least desirable housing accommodations on plantations. Filipinos enjoyed none of the amenities given to the Japanese workers like religious temples and stores. Turnover of Filipino workers on plantations was high, reaching 83 percent in 1923.⁸⁷ As workers at the bottom rung of the racial ladder, Filipinos were subject to vile stereotypes and defamatory propaganda by haoles and elements of the Japanese community who portrayed them as “hotheaded, knife-wielding, overdressed, sex-hungry young men.”⁸⁸ The Honolulu dailies routinely highlighted the ethnic identity of Filipinos when arrested, convicted or executed for crimes in the territory.⁸⁹ Filipinos were also grossly overrepresented in the demographics of the prison population of the territory. In 1923, 32 percent of prisoners at the territorial prison were Filipino while they represented only 12 percent of the total population of Hawai’i.⁹⁰

Organised by mostly Japanese workers and some Filipinos, the sugar workers’ strike of 1920 was led by a generation of young people who claimed their fair share of the wealth they produced.⁹¹ For the more numerous and powerful Japanese workers’ movement, the impetus for a strike grew out of the many debates held by young workers in the temples of the Young Men’s Buddhist Associations. Workers discussed wage increases, the betterment of working conditions, and, above all, dignity as their objectives. In December of 1919, representatives of individual

⁸⁶ Pineapple only became a major industry in Hawai’i at the beginning of the twentieth century. Initially cultivated by a small group of mostly Japanese producers, from 1915 onwards, the large sugar plantations carved their share of the market through their control of the technological infrastructure necessary for international export such as canning and shipping. See Jessica Wang, “Agricultural Expertise, Race, and Economic Development: Small Producer Ideology and Settler Colonialism in the Territory of Hawai’i, 1900–1917,” in *History and Technology* 2020. Vol. 36. Nos. 3–4, 321–323.

⁸⁷ Reinecke, *The Filipino Piecemeal Strike of 1924–1925*, 3.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 3.

⁸⁹ Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Ethnicity and Inequality in Hawaii* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 162.

⁹⁰ Comparatively, Americans who numbered around the same as Filipinos vis a vis the territory’s total population amounted to under 8 percent of incarcerated persons. Filipinos were also the single ethnic group with female inmates at the prison with two women serving sentences there. Department of the Interior, *Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior: 1923* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), 79–82.

⁹¹ Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 69.

plantation unions came together to form the Federation of Japanese Labor. The FJL, later renamed the Hawaii Laborers' Association in an attempt to stem the flow of anti-Japanese propaganda from the HSPA, asked in part for a 62 percent raise for both men and women, an eight-hour day for field and mill laborers, an eight-week paid maternity leave, double pay on Sundays, the recognition of legal holidays and overtime, and the construction of improved health care and recreational facilities for workers. Planters made half-hearted concessions in the hopes of averting a strike but were unwilling to negotiate the larger points of the FJL's demands.⁹²

Against the wishes of the Filipino labor leader Pablo Manlapit on January 20, 1920, 2,600 Filipinos along with 300 Puerto Rican and Spanish workers walked off the plantations of O'ahu. They were soon joined by the FJL who although were caught off-guard, seized the opportunity.⁹³ By February, 8,300 laborers on six of O'ahu's plantations were on strike, representing 77 percent of the island's total workforce.⁹⁴ The planters were ruthless in their response to the labor action. The HSPA paid over 2000 strike breakers at double or triple the rates requested by the strikers and evicted all striking workers and their families, over 12,000 people, from their homes on the plantations during an influenza epidemic.⁹⁵ As many as 6,000 displaced members of the Japanese Federation of Labor and the Filipino Federation of Labor found temporary shelter in Honolulu and according to the JFL, 1200 died of the flu.⁹⁶

To boost morale, strike leaders organised a march through the streets of downtown Honolulu on the eve of the centennial celebrations of the first arrival of Christian missionaries to

⁹² In 1919, the HSPA had increased the bonus system's monthly payments to workers and established a Social Welfare Bureau in response to the workers' complaints of camp conditions. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 201.

⁹³ Ibid, 202.

⁹⁴ "CLEAR Timeline of Hawai'i Labor History," Center for Labor Education & Research University of Hawai'i- West O'ahu. Accessed September 21, 2024, <https://www.hawaii.edu/uhwo/clear/home/Timeline.html#1920>.

⁹⁵ Okihiro, *Canes Fires*, 72.

⁹⁶ Hawaii's Laborers Association, *Facts About the Strike on Sugar Plantations in Hawaii*, 15.

Hawai'i.⁹⁷ During the 77 cent parade, named after the daily wage of male laborers, 3,000 Japanese and Filipino men, women, and children walked around Aala Park and then up King Street in the heart of downtown Honolulu while holding signs that read: "We Want to Live Like Americans," "We Deeply Desire Prosperity for Hawaii," "God Has Created Us Equal," and "We Believe in Lincoln's Ideas."⁹⁸ Strike leaders believed news of the parade would weaken the capitalists' cause by exposing their "underhanded attitudes."⁹⁹

From the beginning, planter propaganda deemed the strike to be "anti-American" in nature and an attempt by people of Japanese descent to take over Hawai'i's sugar industry.¹⁰⁰ Haole newspapers routinely reinforced this message and issued strong condemnations of the strikers and their slogans.¹⁰¹ After the 77 cent parade, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin proclaimed: "Americans do not take kindly to the spectacle of several thousand alien "Asiatics" parading through the streets with banners flaunting their hatred of Americanism and American institutions and insulting the memory of the greatest president since Washington."¹⁰² The Honolulu

⁹⁷ Masayo Umezawa Duus, *The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 120.

⁹⁸ Okiihiro, *Cane Fires*, 74.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 74. The strikers' use of the language of American patriotism to fight for their cause brings to mind Leslie A. Hahner's interpretation of campaigns for Americanization as both successes and failures. As she puts it, while Americanization discourse and practices created a visual logic, a symbolic endeavor "that fixed or adjusted the meaning of Americanism," and promoted Americanism as a "recognizable public good," "evaluations of who could become an American largely rested largely on visual inspection," and the subject of state produced documentation that regulated those metrics. Hahner, *To Become an American*, 174.

¹⁰⁰ Hawai'i Laborers' Association resisted planters' accusations and insisted that they presented their demands for higher wages: "simply as laborers, without regard for race and color." They described the accusations of wanting to take over the sugar industry as "absurd" and "A very clever fabrication!" Hawaii's Laborers Association, *Facts About the Strike on Sugar Plantations in Hawaii*, 19-20.

¹⁰¹ According to Eiko Kosasa, Hawai'i English language newspapers were producers of ideological beliefs and attempted to educate their readers about what it meant to be "anti-American." For example: Lorrin A. Thurston, the publisher of the daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser and one of the principal figures in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, utilized essay contests for children on the subject of work and Americanism to create resentment between young readers and their would-be striker parents. Eiko Kosasa, "Ideological Images: U.S. Nationalism in Japanese Settler Photographs" in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 216

¹⁰² Reprinted from Okiihiro, *Canes Fires*, 74.

Advertiser went even further and published an incandescent editorial entitled: “A Lie on Parade”¹⁰³ in which Edward P. Irwin, the paper’s editor, accused the strikers of misleading the public about their wages and objectives in the hopes of distilling the struggle as one between Japanese and American values. Irwin wrote: “The strikers are not striking for living wages, as their banners said. They are striking because they have been deceived by an unscrupulous gang of Japanese editors, priests, and language school teachers, men who hate America, Americans and American institutions and who set out to try to obtain economic dominance of the Hawaiian sugar industry.” As Irwin went on, his rhetoric reached a fever pitch: “But the strikers are not confining themselves to peaceful measures. They have instituted a campaign of violence and terrorism. Assaults, kidnappings, mysterious disappearances that may or may not indicate murder—these are the new weapons of the agitators, driven to desperation by the failure of the strike to make the planters yield.” Irwin concluded with a warning: “We are not afraid of them, any more than the American government is afraid of Japan. If they want to remain among us, it behooves them to respect not only our laws but our institutions and beliefs. If they can’t do that, the quicker they get out, the better. We don’t need them, we don’t want them and we’re getting so we don’t like them. (...) This is an American territory and it’s going to remain an American territory, if we have to ship every alien Japanese to his native land.”¹⁰⁴ Irwin made clear in his diatribe that the laws and institutions of the territory were created and upheld in the interest of preserving haole supremacy. The legal status of non-haoles was always conditional on their actions and speech conforming to the requirements of the oligarchy regardless of nationality at birth.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Edward P. Irwin, “A Lie on Parade,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (April 5, 1920), 4.

¹⁰⁴ Irwin, “A Lie on Parade,” 4.

¹⁰⁵ Irwin would continue to favor conspiracy theories when it came to Japanese Americans telling Richardson in 1932 that the nisei were deliberately holding off on voting as a bloc until they could control politics in the territory.

The perception of the 1920 strike by elites as a racial and international conflict led them to assess and strengthen the territory's security apparatus and resulted in a more robust security state.¹⁰⁶ The HSPA along with the railroad magnate Walter F. Dillingham alleged that the Japanese language newspapers had instigated the strikes and endorsed the rumor that the government of Japan was pulling the strings behind the scenes. In order to suppress the strikes, the planters requested acting Governor Curtis Iaukea give the go ahead to the use of the local army garrison along with authorizing the unprecedented call up of a territorial police force.¹⁰⁷ U.S. military officials were so alarmed by the large-scale protests that they not only recommended a commission form of government but contacted the plantations directly and asked them to keep them abreast of any "emergency arising from the strike."¹⁰⁸ Elites rallied behind Irwin's and the HSPA's accusations of a Japanese conspiracy to take over the sugar industry through violent means and partnered with army intelligence and the Bureau of Investigation. This intelligence network of industrial spies, army personnel, and law enforcement officials would prevail through the territory's period under martial law during the Second World War.¹⁰⁹

Planters and their acolytes also used fears of a "Japanese conspiracy" in an attempt to secure an inexhaustible supply of indolent workers to furnish their fields and mills. In 1921, Dillingham, president of the Oahu railway and Land corporation, spearheaded efforts by the

Seth W. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Concerning Law Enforcement and Crime Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii Richardson Transcript Volume VII* (Hawaii: The Department, 1932), 1279.

¹⁰⁶ Moon-Ho Jung tells us that in laying bare the state's unwillingness to grant Japanese and Filipino workers equal rights and benefits, the strikers engaged in "counter-conducts" that "redistributed, reversed, nullified, and partially or totally discredited state domination." As a result, the states' capacity to monitor and criminalize revolutionary movements expanded tremendously. Moon-Ho Jung, *Menace to Empire, Anticolonial Solidarities and the Transpacific Origins of the U.S. Security State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2022), 149-150.

¹⁰⁷ Although, the organic act of 1900 provided for the organisation of a territorial police force, it was never enacted until the Massie affair. Umezawa Duus, *The Japanese Conspiracy*, 74.

¹⁰⁸ Okihiko, *Cane Fires*, 77.

¹⁰⁹ Harry N. Scheiber and Jane L. Scheiber, *Bayonets in Paradise: Martial Law in Hawai'i During World War II* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016), 13.

Hawaii Labor Commission to lobby Congress for the authorization to sidestep the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and allow for the import of 5,000 Chinese manual labourers to Hawaii for three years at a time, after which they would be sent back to their port of origin and another 5,000 souls would be summoned to take their place. In the eventuality that these men would dare to stray from the agricultural or domestic service industry or in Dillingham's words: "stray from within the limits of this opportunity," they would be deported.¹¹⁰ In a letter to Wallace Rider Farrington, Hawai'i's governor at the time and the president and publisher of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Dillingham admitted that Congress would never authorize the import of such a large number of Asian workers on purely economic grounds. Instead, Dillingham argued, lobbying efforts should emphasize the "Japanese menace" to U.S. control of the territory. Dillingham's cause found tremendous support within California's elite circles. The Los Angeles and San Francisco Chambers of Commerce, California's Manufacturers' Association, and the Foreign Trade Club all endorsed Dillingham's commission with the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce even sending a delegation of support to the territory led by the ardent anti-Asian newspaper publisher Valentine Stuart McClatchy.¹¹¹ Although, the bill failed to gain the approval of Congress, Dillingham credited his campaign for ending dual citizenship privilege for the nisei and outlawing the immigration of Japanese picture brides.¹¹² In the aftermath of the strike of 1920, Dillingham demonstrated how haole elites could use racial antagonism and fears of a workers' uprising in the territory to obtain greater political leverage with federal authorities.

¹¹⁰ Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume IV*, 765.

¹¹¹ Okihiro, *Cane fires*, 89.

¹¹² Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume IV*, 76.

The Kaka'ako case

Eight years before the Massie Affair and the murder of Joseph Kahahawai, another case of sexual assault in Downtown Honolulu shocked the territory's haole elites into transformative action, the Kaka'ako case.¹¹³ On January 13th, 1923, a seventeen-year-old girl of Portuguese ancestry and a male friend were walking in the Kaka'ako district when a rainstorm forced them to take refuge in a nearby schoolhouse. According to press reports, there, the "Kakaako gang," as the assailants became known, numbering as many as twenty, set upon them, beating and chasing away the friend and raping the girl.¹¹⁴ After a lengthy investigation, police indicted nine members of the gang on the charge of rape. While in police custody, some of the boys confessed to the crime but were later allowed to recant their guilty pleas "on the grounds that they had not understood the charges when they pled guilty."¹¹⁵ In fact, two of the boys testified that they had been misled by Detective Sergeant John Kellet and made to confess under duress by police officers anxious to close the case. Minoru Kimura told judge Ray J. O'Brien that several witnesses could corroborate his whereabouts on the evening of the assault and that he had been arrested without being informed as to the reason why. Kimura and Paacho Gilman, the other defendant who was allowed to recant his guilty plea, both alleged that Kellet made them sign a written confession under duress.¹¹⁶ Another defendant, David Kaleikilo asserted that the Honolulu City and County Police Department chief of detectives, Arthur McDuffie had

¹¹³ The Kaka'ako case proved an important point in the collective memory of haole elites who regarded it as the first sign of the changing nature of their society. Recalling a decade of experience on the federal bench, judge Masse told Seth Richardson that he had witnessed an increase in "gangsterism" in the years that followed. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume II*, 352.

¹¹⁴ The press always referred to them as a "gang" or "gangsters." "Confessions Are Made of Brutal Attack on Girl," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 26, 1923), 1.

¹¹⁵ Nelligan, *Social Change and Rape Law in Hawaii*, 193.

¹¹⁶ "Confessions' Repudiated in Kakaako Trial," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (March 2, 1923), 1-3.

threatened to beat him up if he did not confess while also being forcibly imprisoned in a “dark cell” before his undue confession.¹¹⁷



Fig. 3. Chief Detective Arthur McDuffie and the Kaka'ako case defendants. Their names from left to right as they appear in the Honolulu Advertiser. Top row: John Lymon, alias “Cowboy,” Edward Joseph, alias “Small Ip,” John Pavao, alias “Pavaco,” Eddie Fuller, alias “Small Fuller,” and David Kaleikilo, alias “Flats.” Bottom row: Louis Gomes, alias “Monabeel,” Minoru Kimura, alias “C.B.,” Paahao Gilman, alias “Paahao,” and George Hoopii, alias “George.”¹¹⁸

Along with the sordid details of the Kaka'ako case and the myriad allegations of police abuse, other unrelated incidents of sexual violence against women were given top billing by the English language press at the time. The alleged deeds of the Kaka'ako gang had undoubtedly

¹¹⁷ “Detectives Deny Making Threats to Gangsters,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (March 12, 1923), 1. A few weeks later, McDuffie became the subject of a notorious investigation by the city’s Civil Service Commission for allegedly accepting bribes in exchange for failing to report to the Pinkertons the location of a person of interest hiding out in the territory. McDuffie was a staunch racist who believed non white young people should be confined to manual labor. McDuffie came to the territory in 1901 as a dredge operator and got a job in the police department because as he puts it the Sheriff at the time: “wanted to build up the department and get a few white men in it (...)” Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume X*, 2286-2291.

¹¹⁸ “Seven Gangsters Plead Guilty in Assault Case; Two Reserve Pleas,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (February 6, 1923), 1.

lodged themselves in the imagination of haoles who feared the case would lead to widespread social contagion. After a Japanese servant girl was attacked in Nuuanu, an upper-class district of Honolulu, her employer, an unidentified well-known businessman told the press: “Something has got to be done to give adequate police protection to our residence district. (...) I am reporting it to the police. This section of the city is being visited far too much by wandering young rowdies.”¹¹⁹ When two female rural schoolteachers were attacked on the island of Kaua‘i, superintendent MacCaughey urged the department of education to allow for teachers to carry a revolver in the classroom and described the incident as: “only another phase of the Kakaako gang affair.”¹²⁰

Since news of the Kaka‘ako case first made headlines in January of 1923, the origins of Honolulu’s “gang problem” and how to put a stop to it had been a frequent topic of discussion in the papers’ editorial pages. One letter to the press speculated that the closing of Chinatown’s red-light district in 1917, the segregated Iwilei district, had resulted in the “spread of social disease” to other parts of the city.¹²¹ Since the turn of the century, sandwiched between a slaughterhouse, a fertilizer plant, and the O‘ahu prison, 140 mostly Japanese sex workers had worked in the restricted district regulated by the HPD. When the district was closed down by a Grand Jury investigation, a report was circulated to U.S. District Attorney S.C. Huber that many of the sex workers who had stayed in the territory despite the threat of arrest were planning to continue operations and buy a house in the upscale haole neighborhood of Manoa.¹²²

¹¹⁹ “Young Girl Fights Off 4 Hoodlums,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (February 7, 1923), 1.

¹²⁰ “Arm Teachers Against Thugs, Is School Plan,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (February 23, 1923), 1.

¹²¹ “The Result,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (February 7, 1923), 6. Ironically, in the early twentieth century, progressive reformers across the United States had pushed for the abolition of segregated districts because they endangered the virtue of white women and the white American family. Anne Gray Fischer, *White Purity and the Progressive Origins of Police Power* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2022), 21

¹²² Richard A. Greer, “Collarbone and Social Evil,” (Honolulu, Hawaiian Historical Society, 1973), 15.

Some haoles responded to the threat of gangs in the city with the language of punitive violence. Speaking after the nine defendants of the Kaka‘ako case were initially indicted, the Deputy City and County Attorney, John C. Kelley did not mince words when it came to dealing with gangs: “I favor imposing the heaviest possible sentences on all members of gangs or individuals who are connected with assaults on young girls or women. The gangs in Honolulu are a menace, and every effort should be made to break them up.”¹²³ In a letter to the editor of the *Honolulu Advertiser*, its author, who wished to preserve their anonymity and only signed “A WOMAN,” argued that the only way to stop the occurrence of such crimes as those associated with the “Kakaako and Nuuanu gangs” is by “flogging followed by a long prison term with hard labor.”¹²⁴ Speaking for the “Indignant Nuuanuite voices” another anonymous letter writer insisted current laws rendered the police powerless to stop the gangs that “lurk on all the corners in the residential districts” and “infest the city at night.” The writer proposed the police be protected from the scrutiny of the courts and allowed to use batons to violently disperse the gangs before the occurrence of crime.¹²⁵

On March 18, only two months after the assault first made headlines, the nine “Kakaako gangsters,” as the nine defendants became known, were each given maximum prison terms of between five and fifty years to be served at O‘ahu’s territorial prison. Judge O’Brien expressed regret over the fact that the law did not permit him to hand down more severe sentences.¹²⁶ Various women’s organisations unsuccessfully also petitioned the territorial government for harsher treatment of those convicted of sexual assault in the aftermath of the Kaka‘ako case. The

¹²³ “Pleas of Guilty Are Looked for From Gangsters,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (February 2, 1923), 1.

¹²⁴ “The Kakaako Gang,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (February 10, 1923), 12.

¹²⁵ “Suggests More Latitude for Police in Breaking Up Gangs,” *Honolulu Star Advertiser* (February 9, 1923), 12.

¹²⁶ Seth W. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Concerning Law Enforcement and Crime Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii Richardson Transcript Volume I* (Hawaii: The Department, 1932), 1005. The defendants were eventually released on parole within three years of their sentencing.

Good Government League of the Mothers of Hawai'i wished for flogging to replace sentences of sterilization or "asexualization" as the punishment for those convicted of rape. The Hawaiian Republican Women's Auxiliary Clubs backed a resolution in the territorial senate for the "unsexing of rapists by a surgeon," and another proposed measure to raise the minimum sentence to twenty years for conviction of rape failed to pass in the Hawaiian legislative house.¹²⁷

While some elites insisted on the need for punitive violence as a deterrent to gangs, others viewed the Kaka'ako case as proof that criminality was a consequence of social conditions and prized solutions born out of the effervescent fields of social work, psychology, and sociology. Mere days after news of the assault first came to light, the Honolulu Advertiser published an editorial arguing for greater investment in public recreational infrastructure for children as a less costly investment than the channeling of further funds to the criminal justice system. A month later, in an editorial titled: "Honolulu's Hoodlum Problem,"¹²⁸ Albert W. Palmer, a pastor to the elite Central Union Church, reasoned that lynch law or the courts were not equipped to deal with the current problem. Palmer advocated for the adoption of a "scientific" method of crime prevention and was inspired by the territory's industrial culture: "We have learned how to grow a good quality of sugar cane in place of a poor quality, and, when we turn the same scientific interest on our social problems and are willing to spend the necessary money to secure trained leadership and proper conditions, we can have equally improved quality of humanity."¹²⁹ Palmer suggested mental tests should be administered to gang members with those that proved to be "feeble-minded" segregated, sterilized, and sent to care homes. With its "crowded tenements and its narrow alleys," Palmer reasoned that Honolulu was not suited to the

¹²⁷ Nelligan, *Social Change and Rape Law in Hawaii*, 197-198.

¹²⁸ "Honolulu's Hoodlum Problem," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (February 26, 1923), 1.

¹²⁹ "Honolulu's Hoodlum Problem," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (February 26, 1923), 2.

development of healthy children. As a former member of the Oakland Recreation Commission, Palmer vaunted the progress of California innovators and hoped for similar investment in recreational spaces and programs in Hawai‘i.

As Peter James Nelligan has noted, disagreements among elites on the causes of the “gang” situation in Honolulu and whether to respond by the whipping post or improvements to urban public infrastructure stymied any attempts at legislative reforms from garnering sufficient support.¹³⁰ The Kaka‘ako case and other similar incidents validated the general understanding among politicians and social scientists that policing in its current state was flawed, not because of inherent defects in police organisation, but because of the racial diversity of the American population.¹³¹ Over the next few months, women progressive reformers would organise into a powerful coalition of local social organisations to produce and disseminate the knowledge necessary to transform the HPD into a modern police force capable in the management of Honolulu’s multiracial population. The hallmarks of the racial order of the plantation community would remain a pungent influence on the scientific remedies advocated by reformers and social scientists.

The Vigilance Committee

Like many of Honolulu’s elite women, Rosamond Swanzy Morgan could trace her roots in the archipelago to the days when the Hawaiian Islands had been known as the Sandwich Islands. Rosamond’s marriage to James Placidus Morgan,¹³² a Welsh businessman who worked

¹³⁰ Nelligan, *Social Change and Rape Law in Hawaii*, 197.

¹³¹ Guariglia, *Police and the Empire City*, 3.

¹³² In the Richardson Report, educated at Harvard and the University of California, James P. Morgan is described as the president of the Royal Hawaiian Corporation and the Graystone Corporation as well as being the chairman of the Board of the Industrial Schools. Industrial schools were public schools where mostly racialized youths were enrolled in vocational programs where boys received courses on cane and pineapple cultivation while girls were instructed in homemaking. Michelle Morgan, “Americanizing the Teachers: Identity, Citizenship, and the Teaching Corps in Hawai‘i, 1900-1941,” *Western Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Summer 2014), 164.

for the Big Five firm of Theo H. Davies & Co, as well as her mother's own marriage to the former director of the same firm and the two term president of the HSPA, the Irish born Francis Mills Swanzy, obscured her own patrician roots.¹³³ In fact, Rosamund through her mother's side was a Judd, one of the most powerful and influential families in Hawai'i. Her grandmother had been Juliet Judd, the granddaughter of Gerrit P. Judd a physician and a missionary, who after arriving in Hawai'i in 1828 renounced his American citizenship, became a trusted advisor to King Kamehameha III, and an architect of the Great Mahele of 1848.¹³⁴ Gerrit's son, Charles Hasting Judd, the colonel and chamberlain to the penultimate monarch of Hawai'i, King Kalākaua, and his brother, the longtime chief supreme court justice of the kingdom, Albert Francis Judd, were instrumental in fostering the Hawaiian Kingdom's rapprochement with the West during the 19th century. Mrs. J.P. Morgan's cousin, Lawrence M. Judd, would be appointed Governor of the territory in 1929 by President Herbert Hoover. In 1932, Governor Judd would be the one to sign the Police Act of February 1, 1932, into law.

After the assault of Mrs. J.P. Morgan by Sam WaiLehua on May 18, 1923, Honolulu's other women led civic organisations answered the call of the Housewives League for the city's authorities to provide better protection for women. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin indicated that "virtually every women's club and organisation in the city today voiced approval of the movement launched by the Housewives (...)." ¹³⁵ These included: the Central Grammar Parent-Teachers' Association, the League of Women Voters, the Outdoor Circle, the Business and Professional Women's Club, the Free Kindergarten and Children's aid Association, the Sons and

¹³³ Ed. John William Siddall, *Men of Hawaii: A Biographical Reference Library, Complete and Authentic, of the Men of Note and Substantial Achievement in the Hawaiian Islands, Volume II* (Territory of Hawaii: Honolulu Star-Bulletin Limited, 1921), 287.

¹³⁴ Historian Lilikalā Kame'eleihiwa has characterized Gerrit P. Judd as an essential proponent of the "passage of laws and the institution of a western economic system that ultimately dispossessed the Natives of land, identity, and nationhood." Osorio, *Dismembering Lahui*, 13.

¹³⁵ "Women Backing Movement for War on Thugs," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 22, 1923), 1.

Daughters of Hawaiian Warriors, the Punahou Parent-Teachers' Association, and the College Club. For many of the members of these organisations, the Kaka'ako case still loomed large. In anticipation of the meeting organised by the Housewives League, Mrs. A.P. Taylor of the Sons and Daughters of Hawaiian Warriors demanded that something be done right away because she had heard that "several of the Kakaako gangsters recently sentenced" had been working on Tantalus Road where Mrs. Morgan was attacked.¹³⁶ With local elections for Sheriff on the horizon in the fall, Honolulu's haole newspapers lent their support to the women's cause and published stern editorials admonishing those who in the past had favored a more lenient parole system.¹³⁷ The editors of the Honolulu Advertiser warned that "decent Honolulu" had had enough of a corrupt police force and that "a revolution is impending."¹³⁸

On Tuesday May 29, 1923, 400 women from fifty different local organisations convened at the chic Alexander Young Hotel in downtown Honolulu. Together, they unanimously voted to appoint a Vigilance Committee to work under the umbrella of the League of Women Voters and lead an investigation into the Honolulu City and County Police Department in order to obtain "better police protection and improved law enforcement."¹³⁹ With Honolulu Mayor John Henry Wilson and Honolulu City and County Sheriff Charles S. Rose in attendance, the Vigilance Committee members wasted no time in pressuring local officials for change.¹⁴⁰ Mrs. Walter F. Dillingham inquired about how much training was given to new police recruits to which Sheriff Rose replied: "No training whatsoever." Mrs. Dillingham also wished to know if in the

¹³⁶ "Women Backing Movement for War on Thugs," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 22, 1923), 15.

¹³⁷ An editorial in the Honolulu Advertiser characterized the actions of parole reform advocates as having created a "social hell." "Parole System at Fault," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 23, 1923), 14.

¹³⁸ "Awakening From Long Sleep," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 23, 1923), 14.

¹³⁹ Not to be confused with the Vigilance Committee of the National Advertising Club which investigated fraudulent business propositions all over the United States. "Women in Move for Better Law Enforcement," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 29, 1923), 1.

¹⁴⁰ Charles S. Rose served from 1915 to 1923 as Sheriff of the Honolulu City and County police department.

immediate aftermath of the attack on Mrs. Morgan it was possible to re-assign police officers from the lower income neighborhoods, the “congested districts,” as she described them, to the haole neighborhoods of Tantalus, Pacific Heights and Alewa Heights.¹⁴¹ The women asked about the status of the territory’s prisons and if any attempts had been made to “reform” prisoners “along modern enlightened lines.”¹⁴² The women’s crusade garnered enough attention that it forced the land’s highest official to offer a recognition of their quickly increasing political capital. The next day, a report appeared in the pages of the *Hawaii Tribune-Herald* suggesting Governor Wallace R. Farrington was openly mulling over the possibility of suspending all paroles from Oahu prison for a period of six months.¹⁴³ Farrington’s wife had been in attendance at the Vigilance Committee meeting.

At this critical juncture, the women of the Vigilance Committee campaigned for the HPD to hire more officers and to increase the number of patrols it conducted in Honolulu’s streets. Agnes Judd, the sister of soon-to-be Governor Judd, pointedly asked Sheriff Rose: “If you have more police, will Honolulu be made safe for decent people?” Rose assured her that would be the case.¹⁴⁴ According to reports, a visibly nervous Sheriff Rose told the dozens of members of the committee that his hands were tied because the department could only call on thirty patrol officers for a population of more than 83,000.¹⁴⁵ When Mayor Wilson announced to the crowd that city funds had already been earmarked for other expenses, the crowd collectively pondered whether some of the city’s engineers and clerks could be dispensed with in favor of more officers. Nonetheless, the extensive press coverage of the assault of Mrs. Morgan coupled with

¹⁴¹ “Women of Honolulu Demand Increased Police Protection,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 29, 1923), 6.

¹⁴² “Women of Honolulu Demand Increased Police Protection,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 29, 1923), 6.

¹⁴³ As I understand it, this proposition never went further than the press reports here. “Paroles May be Suspended for Several Months,” *Hawaii Tribune-Herald* (May 29, 1923), 1.

¹⁴⁴ “Women of Honolulu Demand Increased Police Protection,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 29, 1923), 6.

¹⁴⁵ “Women of Honolulu Demand Increased Police Protection,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 29, 1923), 6.

the quick organising of her fellow society women resulted in the marshaling of Honolulu's City and County Board of Supervisors to their cause. The board demanded that Sheriff Rose immediately put a plan together for the hiring of at least an additional twenty men with the specific order that they be prevented from doing clerical work and be added to the police department's regular patrols. The board described the decision to bolster police ranks as: "the most timely suggestion made to this board in a long time."¹⁴⁶

It is important to note that the haole men of Honolulu also conspired to take to the streets in numbers in reaction to the HPD's lack of effectives.¹⁴⁷ Soon after the incident involving Mrs. Morgan made headlines, Honolulu's local American Legion department announced the "appointment of 50 legionnaires to be known as "Minute Men" to assist the local authorities in whatever way they may designate." This impromptu force was led by Bruce Cartwright Jr. and George K. Larrison, both prominent society men.¹⁴⁸ Cartwright Jr. and Larrison presented themselves as "veterans and as citizens in the preservation of law and order" and stressed that the Civil Service Commission investigation into Arthur McDuffie, the Kaka'ako case's lead detective, had created "An acute and dangerous situation."¹⁴⁹ They believed that the "Criminal and lawless element" feared McDuffie and his unsavory tactics and that without him "there is danger of a serious uprising."¹⁵⁰ At a later Vigilance Committee meeting, Larrison obtained the

¹⁴⁶The Police Committee of the Board of Supervisors recommended 12 additional officers, Sheriff Rose asked for 47. "Supervisors Move to Increase Police Force by 20 Men," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 22, 1923), 1.

¹⁴⁷There is a long history in Hawai'i of haole militias organising at times of crisis. From the Honolulu Rifles during the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani in 1893 to the Emergency Police Reserve created in anticipation of the U.S. joining the Second World War in the spring of 1941.

¹⁴⁸ As well as being a member of the Hawaiian Historical Society, Cartwright was the inheritor and chief executive of the insurance company and trust Cartwright and Co. Ltd. Larrison was an engineer who worked on railroads and hydraulics projects on the U.S. Mexico border and in the Philippines, before settling in Hawai'i where he became an expert one of the leading authorities on water supply and artesian wells. Ed. George F. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii Volume III: The Story of Hawaii and its Builders* (Territory of Hawaii: The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1925), 331 and 585.

¹⁴⁹ "Minute Men Organised at Meeting of Legion," *Honolulu Advertiser* (May 22, 1923), 1.

¹⁵⁰ "Minute Men Organised at Meeting of Legion," *Honolulu Advertiser* (May 22, 1923), 1.

support of Governor Farrington and Sheriff Rose and promised that by the end of the week, 300 Minute Men would be out in the streets, supplementing police patrols, and at the disposals of the citizens of Honolulu.¹⁵¹ With half of the volunteers having previously served in the military, they planned to organise into thirty-two groups of at least fifteen men to patrol the haole neighborhoods of Pacific Heights, Makiki Heights, Alewa Heights, and Kahala among others.¹⁵²

In their public criticism of the Honolulu City and County Police Department, progressive women were especially frustrated with the police's failure to allocate the resources needed to enforce the 18th amendment and prevent the spread of vice from reaching the city's haole neighborhoods. The Vigilance Committee members were frank in their displeasure with Sheriff Rose and his men: "Is it a matter of public knowledge that there are public blind pigs, open bootleggers, open gambling houses and houses of ill fame in Honolulu? Who permits them to exist? What has your department done to put an end to them? What does your department propose to do?"¹⁵³ Mrs. J. P. Morgan decried the large number of "passive men," as in clerks and other salaried police department employees who "did not come in direct connection with arrests."¹⁵⁴ Mrs. E.M. Watson complained of "the terror in which residents of certain districts have been placed by constant marauders and petty burglaries" and urged the police to cooperate with vigilante groups like the newly assembled Minute Men.

In attendance at the meetings of the Vigilance Committee was Dr. Ernest B. Hoag, described at the time by the *Honolulu Advertiser* as an instructor in criminology at the University of California. Hoag was a familiar face on O'ahu as he had first been summoned to the territory

¹⁵¹ "Men Seeking Place in Ranks of Minute Men," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 6, 1923), 5.

¹⁵² "Minute Men Now Number 150; To Double it Soon," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 4, 1923), 1.

¹⁵³ Sheriff Rose and sergeant McDuffie did weekly rounds at Iwilei, Honolulu's red-light district, checking the venereal diseases certificates of sex workers. Greer, "Collarbone and Social Evil," 13.

¹⁵⁴ "Women of Honolulu Demand Increased Police Protection," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 29, 1923), 6.

in 1920 by the Department of Education for the purpose of drafting a survey of “psychological and child welfare work” in the island’s public schools.¹⁵⁵ Since then, his opinions on matters of juvenile delinquency and the benefits of child labor had routinely been sought by territorial officials and the Honolulu press who worried about where the new generation of plantation workers would come from. Hoag offered scientific solutions to the problem of gang criminality. He warned that the “crisis” at hand could not be easily solved by simply increasing police manpower. Hoag contended appeals for more police officers, although, he conceded, a popular demand across the continental empire, was a “fallacious axiom.” Hoag proposed instead an explanation that could have been taken from the latest issue of Northwestern University’s *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*: “A crime is a symptom” and “Putting a man in jail is not a crime cure. In the main a criminal is not a normal man.”¹⁵⁶ Hoag urged the women of the Vigilance Committee to bring to Honolulu current LAPD chief August Vollmer so that he could study the police system and make recommendations.¹⁵⁷ Under Hoag’s advice, it was later agreed that each delegate from the various organisations present

¹⁵⁵ At the time of his arrival in Hawai’i, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin listed Hoag as the medical director of the Los Angeles Juvenile Court, the public director of child welfare in Pasadena, a lecturer in mental hygiene and delinquency at the University of California, organiser of the child welfare department of the Pasadena public schools, and the author of various books on child welfare, mental tests, and delinquency. “Maccaughey Wants Noted Child Expert to Conduct a Survey Here,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin (April 3, 1920), 1.

¹⁵⁶ “Women of Honolulu Demand Increased Police Protection,” The Honolulu Advertiser (May 29, 1923), 6. First published in 1911, after the first national conference on criminal and criminology which marked the founding of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. The institute and the journal endeavored to bring scientists and lawyers together to reform the law enforcement. Many of its contributors embraced eugenics and incorporated its ideas into police methods. For more see Jennifer Devroye, “The Rise and Fall of the American Institute of Criminal and Criminology,” *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 100, No. 1 (Winter 2010): pp. 7-32.

¹⁵⁷ “Women of Honolulu Demand Increased Police Protection,” The Honolulu Advertiser (May 29, 1923), 6. The situation in Los Angeles had much in common with the one in Honolulu. In the early 1920s, Los Angeles’ racialized population also increased rapidly, the number of Italians in the city doubled and they were blamed for the perceived rise in criminal behavior. City elites invited Vollmer to reform the police department. Go, “The Imperial Origins of American Policing,” 1221.

would contribute the sum of ten dollars to a fund to pay for the visit of Vollmer to Honolulu with Hoag tasked with making the necessary arrangements.

When Hoag addressed the Vigilance Committee a second time, he fleshed out the details of his radical ideas for the improvement of the crime conditions in the territory. Hoag utilized the language of industry to make his point. Echoing the words of Assistant Attorney General Seth Richardson a decade later, Hoag lamented the lack of involvement on the part of the territorial government in the management of the daily lives of incarcerated people. Hoag wished for prisoners to be put to work and made “self-supporting,” in other words, Hoag wanted incarcerated people to pay for the cost of their imprisonment by engaging in meagerly remunerated labor during the whole duration of their sentence. According to the newspaper report, this proposal was heartedly applauded by the audience of elite women. Hoag argued that the police required the same “executive ability as a sugar plantation or a bank (...)” and proposed for the police system to be placed “on a business basis” so that it could reject candidates even though they passed the civil service examination which he deemed to be insufficiently arduous. In a clear nod to the large number of Native Hawaiians on the police force, Hoag admonished the civil service test for proving so easy as to let childlike adults into government.¹⁵⁸ Hoag further spelled out the capitalistic principles at the heart of the movement for scientific police reform by praising Vollmer’s transformation of the Berkeley police department as “the logical result of plain common business sense.”

The momentum for the women’s cause increased further when municipal authorities refrained from punishing the Honolulu City and County’s chief of detectives Arthur McDuffie,

¹⁵⁸ In 1927, Hawaiians held forty-six percent of appointive executive positions, fifty-five percent of other clerical jobs in the territory and more than half the judgeships and elective offices. By 1932, sixty-five percent of the officers in the Honolulu City and County Police Department were Native Hawaiian. More on this in the second chapter. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, 161

after a lengthy public investigation. While the Vigilance Committee met for the second time, on the morning of June 4, 1923, news filtered in that the majority of the board of the Civil Service Commission had exonerated McDuffie for allegedly taking bribes in exchange for lying to the Pinkertons about the whereabouts of a wanted man. The controversy which had unfolded on the front page of the city's newspaper alongside the unabating coverage of 'gangsterism' stirred great interest among the general public and even provoked a near-riot when an excess of spectators were prevented from entering the courtroom during one of the sessions of the inquiry.¹⁵⁹ The members of the Vigilance Committee gathered at the Young hotel were appalled at the result of the Civil Service Commission's investigation and immediately set to preparing a list of questions to understand the unsatisfactory decision from local officials. The members of the committee resolved to ask Judge Heen, the Honolulu City and County Attorney who had adamantly refused to issue warrants for the arrest of McDuffie, how was it possible that the damning testimony of McDuffie's co-conspirator during the trial had not led to a grand jury investigation into the whole of the Honolulu City and County Police Department?¹⁶⁰

In anticipation of the upcoming election for the positions of Mayor and Sheriff in the fall of 1923, the League of Women Voters set out to leverage their newfound political power. The Vigilance Committee conducted an independent investigation of Honolulu's system of law enforcement and unveiled their findings just as another two-year election cycle for municipal

¹⁵⁹ "Throng Crowds Street Before Police Station," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 23, 1923), 1.

¹⁶⁰ "Will Ask Heen if Jury Action is Possibility," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 4, 1923), 1-5. John Austin, the owner of a jewellery business became friends with McDuffie after arriving in 1922. A year later, McDuffie received a radiogram from the Los Angeles office of the Pinkerton Agency which requested that the HPD detective secure from the exact date and time of arrival of a man named Austin. McDuffie and Austin wrote a response together which contained several falsehoods. McDuffie then received a large diamond and a platinum barpin set with diamonds among other items. "Trask Dissenting Opinion," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 4, 1923), 1.

office came to a close.¹⁶¹ According to the women of the prison committee, the prison system on O‘ahu was completely inadequate. Due to a lack of work opportunities available, prisoners were condemned to sit around and wallow in “demoralizing idleness,” but with Mrs. Morgan’s assault still fresh in their minds, the committee was against prisoners being assigned to outside road work.¹⁶² As a solution, the women of the committee recommended for the development of manufacturing capacities within prison walls. Inmates should begin to manufacture “jute sugar bags or other commodities needed in the territory” which would also have the added benefit of making the prison financially independent. The committee also demanded the appointment of a psychiatrist to determine whether incarcerated men could ever be eligible for parole. According to them, new arrivals to the prison were not submitted to a “mental examination” and it was a well-known fact that “a large percentage of delinquents are feeble minded or entirely insane.”¹⁶³ Using the example of the Kaka‘ako case, the report insinuated that the indeterminate sentencing law of 1909 gave authorities the opportunity to be too lenient and proof that the “powers that be” fostered an environment conducive to the recurrence of crimes against girls and women.¹⁶⁴

As chair of the police committee, Mrs. Morgan studied the practices of mainland police organisations as part of their investigation into the organisation of the HPD.¹⁶⁵ The police committee interviewed Sheriff Rose about the inner workings of the department and inquired

¹⁶¹ An editorial in the Star-Advertiser praised the report. ‘Their vigilance is not to be slackened with the reading of the report, but it is but a beginning to more and better work which they hope to accomplish with the aid of their new political power.’ “The Slogan of Women Voters,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (October 1, 1923), 12.

¹⁶² “Supply Work for Convicts, Women Urge,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 28, 1923), 1.

¹⁶³ “Supply Work for Convicts, Women Urge,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 28, 1923), 1.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 1. Looking at the statistics of the Oahu Territorial Prison from Governor Farrington’s report to the Secretary of the Interior of the United States, provides us with another perspective than the one promulgated by the prison committee in regard to leniency. As of June 30, 1923, the Oahu prison held 382 persons with another 390 out on parole, an increase of 71 and 32, respectively, compared to the previous year with 313 of those incarcerated admitted as first time offenders. Department of the Interior, *Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the secretary of the Interior 1923*, 79.

¹⁶⁵ “Women Voters to Begin Their Police Probe,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (October 6, 1923), 1.

about the number of men it employed, the distribution of officers in each neighborhood, and the length of time each officer spent on duty.¹⁶⁶ Of particular interest to the women of the committee was why so many cases were handled by detective McDuffie and why the Sheriff spent so much of his time filling the fingerprint records and the Bertillon measurements of arrestees all by himself. Lack of resources was the answer given by Rose on both counts. All cases involving non-English or Hawaiian speaking suspects were assigned to McDuffie's unit as it possessed the only translators on the force while Sheriff Rose simply did not have the necessary funds to hire someone solely devoted to record keeping.

After assessing the Honolulu City and County police department's organisational structure, the Vigilance Committee imposed on the prospective candidates for Mayor and Sheriff a probing questionnaire meant to suss out their vision for the future of the HPD. The publicly available questionnaire asked among other things: the educational qualifications of the candidates, their plan for breaking up the "street gangs" of Honolulu, and whether they would welcome the advice of experts on the subject of policing.¹⁶⁷ The committee wanted to "place persons in office who convince us that they will conduct their work with intelligence, with efficiency, with reasonable economy and with a sincere regard for the spirit of the law as well as its letter."¹⁶⁸ By insisting on the importance of the "spirit of the law," the Vigilance Committee made clear, once more, its displeasure with the territory's too lenient legal system.

The Vigilance Committee members not only recognized the police could act beyond the limits the law but explicitly demanded it in the context of an urban "crime wave" that they

¹⁶⁶ "Rose Questioned in Regard to Police by Women's Committee," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (October 9, 1923, 3:30 edition), 1.

¹⁶⁷ "Better Enforcement of Law is Sought by Women Voters," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 28, 1923), 1-3.

¹⁶⁸ "Better Enforcement of Law is Sought by Women Voters," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 28, 1923), 3.

imagined targeted society women.¹⁶⁹ Without mentioning race explicitly, those that pressed for the reforms demanded the police provide security from “constant marauders,” “an uprising,” and the “feeble minded.” In wishing for an increase in police presence in haole neighborhoods, progressive women effectively demanded police enforced segregation. The plantation and its racial management of its workforce remained a constant source of inspiration for the reformers and their expert consultants.

The Election of Sheriff Trask

Prior to the 1923 election for Sheriff and the start of a new regime in 1924, the Honolulu City and County Police Department was understood by many to be old-fashioned and under the thumb of the political establishment. Leon Straus, a former Assistant Chief of Police who after a thirty-year career in the department wrote a glorified history of the HPD, tells it this way: “The force was a viable political machine, and it was so recognized by the community at large. Politicians were in control and political demands and favors were accepted as part of the system. The Sheriff being an elected official it can be readily understood why this was so.”¹⁷⁰ Straus claimed that the police’s inability to effectively respond to the preponderance of gangs and gang related violence eroded whatever confidence Honolulu white residents still held in their department. This version of the facts is corroborated by what we’ve seen so far, the status quo in police administration proved untenable for elite women who felt the city’s streets had become unhospitable for them. By campaigning for police reform during the 1923 election for Sheriff, progressive women challenged local officials to adopt more repressive means to deal with racialized young men outside of the plantation.

¹⁶⁹ The Vigilance Committee attitude reflects Walter Benjamin’s concept of police discretion. I’m referring to Benjamin elaboration of the justification for the intervention of police as being “for security reasons” when no explicit “legal ends” exist. Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 243.

¹⁷⁰ Leon Straus, *The Honolulu Police Department: A Brief History* (The 200 Club: Honolulu, 1978), 23.

David Kaukaohu Trask, the Democratic Party Candidate for Sheriff of the Honolulu City and County Police Department, was elected because his reputation as a hard-nosed crusader for good government appealed to the elite women who took on the Honolulu political establishment in 1923.¹⁷¹ As the former chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Trask made his name investigating police corruption. At the beginning of the year, Trask headed the investigation into officer Manuel Bardoza who was discharged from the force after being suspected of stealing and concealing opium during an arrest.¹⁷² A few months later, during the McDuffie inquiry, Trask's very public war of words with Mayor Wilson and his fellow members of the board of the Civil Service Commission cemented his status as an outsider reformer. Despite his colleagues' insistence that they should all quickly move on and dismiss the bribery allegations, Trask refused to throw out the case. When the other board members voted in favor of finding McDuffie not guilty, Trask vehemently dissented on the front page of the territory's newspapers.¹⁷³ Even with McDuffie exonerated, Trask, still, did not relent as he tendered his resignation and threatened to not only reopen the case but to bring a slew of charges to the whole of the police department.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Born in 1890, on the island of Kauai, Trask arrived in Honolulu in 1900 as an orphan who only spoke Japanese and Hawaiian. During his youth he sold papers and shined shoes on the city's streets before becoming a day laborer on the Pearl Harbor naval base project. He later became an engineer and received a civil service appointment as a rodman. Before serving on the Civil Service Commission, Trask was an assistant building inspector for the city of Honolulu. In 1910, Trask married Anna Elizabeth Travis. Described as being of Irish-Hawaiian descent, Travis was the niece of Honolulu's Mayor John H. Wilson's wife. George F. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii Volume III*, 813. "David K. Trask Dies in the Maluhia Hospital; Long Ill," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (October 12, 1950), 1-10. And "Rites Today for Mrs. Trask," *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (January 16, 1948), 1-5.

¹⁷² Bardoza was dismissed from the HPD but not criminally prosecuted by the U.S. District Attorney as Trask's civil service commission did not make a recommendation to that effect. Trask also oversaw the dismissal of another officer for taking money during the perquisition of a gambling ring. "Action Closed in Dope Probe, Trask Says," *The Honolulu Advertiser* (February 24, 1923), 7.

¹⁷³ Trask opined that McDuffie was "wholly unfit to exercise the duties and the functions of a police officer and he therefore should be discharged forthwith from further service." "Trask's Dissenting Opinion," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 4, 1923), 1.

¹⁷⁴ Trask finally resigned after a fourth attempt as Honolulu Mayor Wilson refused to accept it the first three times. "Entirely New Commission is Trask's Plan," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 14, 1923), 1.

After resigning from the Civil Service Commission, Trask's name was floated as a potential challenger for the democratic ticket over the incumbent, Sheriff Rose.

Trask's potential strength as a challenger came from the belief that "the new women voters" would back the pugnacious former municipal official in the forthcoming election as they saw him as the candidate most likely to reform the police department.¹⁷⁵ After a campaign in which he pledged to "attack the present police administration," Trask won the nomination for Democratic candidate for Sheriff over the incumbent Sheriff Rose. Trask also proved victorious in the general election against his Republican adversary, Edward Hopkins who had received the support of the HPD after Rose's defeat.¹⁷⁶ While Honolulu's population amounted to 83,000, only 18,375 people were registered to vote. The 1923 election attracted an immense turnout and the women vote proved to be the difference maker as Trask won the election with 9,158 votes compared to 7,132 for the Republican candidate for Sheriff Hopkins. As Sheriff-elect, Trask expressed particular gratitude to the League of Women Voters "who worked so hard in my behalf."¹⁷⁷

As Sheriff of the Honolulu City and County Police Department, Trask was influenced by the ideas of mainland police reformers including August Vollmer. The day after the results of the election were made official, Trask announced that he would be travelling to see Vollmer in Los

¹⁷⁵ Sheriff Rose, a democrat, was rumored to be angling to join the ticket of the Republican candidate for mayor Pat Gleeson, also a future Sheriff. This opened the door for Trask's candidacy. "Rose-Gleeson Combine Seen by Politicians," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (July 20, 1923), 1-3.

¹⁷⁶ "Democrats Decide on Assessments of Primary Election," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 26, 1923), 3. "Election Day Quiet; Weather Checks Voting," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (November 6, 1923), 1. And "Defeated Candidates Dissect Vote Casting," *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (November 8, 1923), 2.

¹⁷⁷ "Winners Express Thanks," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (November 7, 1923), 1. Early in his tenure, Trask repaid the favor and attended a meeting of the League of Women Voters where he gladly listened to their recommendations and sought their help in the matter of unemployment which contributed to a problem of delinquency among young girls. "Police Woman Declared to be Necessary Here," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 25, 1924), 1.

Angeles to study his “crime suppression methods.”¹⁷⁸ The new Sheriff was keen to implement the practicalities of Vollmer’s progressive motto of “policing without politics” and could count on the support of the English language press who extensively covered his every move. The *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* proclaimed that Trask would bring radical changes to the whole of the police system on O‘ahu and complimented his “straight from the shoulder talk.”¹⁷⁹ During his inaugural address to the department, Trask attempted to distance the police from its reputation as a force for hire and present his department as a fair arbiter of the law. Trask preached the “Same Law for All” whether they were “a Chinaman, a Japanese or a Portuguese.”¹⁸⁰ Trask’s first order of business was to inform his officers that from now on, no discussions of politics would be tolerated while on duty.¹⁸¹ Police men should not only refrain from imparting to the public their political opinions but completely abstain from engaging in unnecessary dialogue during arrests. Above all, to maintain their independence from outside interests, Trask required his men to be loyal to him and only him. Even the well-connected should look to hard work as the paths toward promotion while those eager for an extra buck should stop fraternising with manipulative defense attorneys.

Trask was determined to wage war on Honolulu’s vice industry and endeavored to make the HPD a modern military style police force. Trask’s department favored meticulous record keeping and intended to enforce discipline by tracking the every move of police officers while they were on duty. Sheriff Trask created a school for police officers directly inspired by the ones he saw while on tour in California where new recruits were inculcated in: “Military drills,

¹⁷⁸ “Trask Leaves for Mainland Next Friday,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (November 7, 1923), 1. Trask travelled to San Francisco as well where he studied the methods of SFPD police chief Daniel J. O’Brien “Trask to Return to Maui on December 18,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (December 5, 1923), 5.

¹⁷⁹ “Police Will Go to School; Trask Puts Ban on Politics; Racial Considerations Ended,” *Honolulu Advertiser* (January 4, 1924), 1.

¹⁸⁰ “Trask Tells Police How He Will Run Department,” *Honolulu Advertiser* (January 4, 1924), 3.

¹⁸¹ “No Politics on Duty, Policemen Warned by Trask,” *Honolulu Star-bulletin* (January 3, 1924), 1.

calisthenics, target practice, and proper methods of making arrests and obtaining evidence (...).”¹⁸² Police now patrolled the streets day and night with officers held responsible for failing to close down the “disorderly houses” known to operate in their assigned districts. In the city’s streets, men deemed idle or unemployed were targeted by police repression.¹⁸³ Strongarm tactics were the rigueur from now on. In his interview with Richardson, Trask proudly recalled the use of the whipping post to rid the streets of “gangsters.”¹⁸⁴ Trask wasted no time in applying his methods. During his first weekend at the head of the department, no less than sixty-one persons were arrested on gambling charges.¹⁸⁵

In the middle of his tenure, in 1925, Sheriff Trask spoke at the Fifth Territorial Conference of Social Work organised by many of the same elite women of the League of Women Voters. In his address titled: “Problems of Law Enforcement,” Trask claimed that the Honolulu City and County Police Department’s problems differed materially from those of the police department of the mainland because due to the “cosmopolitan composition of our population,” “it becomes absolutely necessary to employ Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Porto

¹⁸² “Police School Will Include Many Angles,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 4, 1924), 1. For more on the SFPD’s training curriculum in the 1920s see: Daniel J. O’Brien, “Singing Important Police Recruit Training Men Given Stringent Examination and Tests,” *San Francisco Bulletin* (September 8, 1925). As reprinted in The Museum of the City of San Francisco website. “Singing Important Police Recruit Training Men Given Stringent Examinations and Tests,” The Museum of the City of San Francisco, Accessed August 2, 2024), <https://sfmuseum.org/hist3/singing.html>.

¹⁸³ Trask said: “Young men who loaf on the streets and in pool halls during the day when they should be working will be rounded up and charges of vagrancy will be placed against them.” “War on Vice Being Waged and Sheriff Warns Dive Owners,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 17, 1924), 3. Trask also sought help from the women of the Vigilance Committee to alleviate the crisis of unemployment in Honolulu. “Police Woman Declared Big Need in City,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 25, 1924), 1.

¹⁸⁴ Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume IV*, 712. Trask’s advocacy for whipping as a punishment for young people led to the death of a young man who killed himself after being whipped by his father in the police station on the recommendation of Trask. “Coroner’s Jury Finds Freitas Died of Poison,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (August 1, 1924), 1. Trask believed that juvenile criminals were the product of the “crowded community, such as Palama, Buckle Lane, and on either sides of River Street.” Trask also argued for the scientific study of criminal young men and wished for the hiring of a psychiatrist. The Sheriff pleaded for more resources so that the police could provide some surveillance of these particular individuals at all times. *Fifth Territorial Conference of Social Work* (Honolulu: Honolulu Star Bulletin, 1925), 28.

¹⁸⁵ “Sheriff Trask Arrests 61 Over Week-End on Charges of Gambling,” *Honolulu Tribune-Herald* (January 7, 1924), 1.

Rican officers and interpreters on the police force.” As a Native Hawaiian orphan that climbed his way through the ranks of the civil service to become Sheriff for the county and city of Honolulu it is not surprising to hear Trask show the same paternalistic attitudes towards racialized people as his haoles benefactors. Since the days of the missionaries, Native Hawaiians had been understood by haoles to be assimilable into colonial society as opposed to the “Asiatic” alien. While haoles still regarded Hawaiians as childlike, naïve, and idle, they “were assimilated into the category of “us” by the economically and politically dominant whites.”¹⁸⁶

Trask’s tenure as Honolulu City and County Sheriff was marked by the Filipino labor strike of 1924. After the recession of 1921 where wages on plantations were diminished, Pablo Manlapit organised the High Wages Movement in 1922. The former leader of the Filipino Labor Union, revendicated many of the same things the Japanese Federation of Labor did during the strike of 1920: doubling the basic minimum wage, an eight-hour day, equal pay for men and women engaged in the same kind of work, etc. Although, the movement could count on ten thousand mostly Filipino adherents, it received no support from Japanese labour leaders and workers.¹⁸⁷ During the strike, the Honolulu City and County Police Department served as O’ahu’s planters’ private police force. Edward D. Beechert has characterized the conditions of the strikes as such: “In the plantation world of 1924, civil liberties did not extend to workers or their supporters. The instruments of government-the police, the courts, the legal profession were entirely at the disposal of the elite.”¹⁸⁸ To provide security to the planters and their assets, Trask

¹⁸⁶ J. Kehaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 91.

¹⁸⁷ Manlapit’s movement only assembled half of Filipino sugar workers and only a quarter of the male sugar workforce. Reinecke, *The Filipino Piecemeal Strike of 1924-1925*, 27-28. After 1920, the balance of workers on plantations changed tremendously. While there existed parity in the number of contract workers and day labourers previously, by 1924, day workers only numbered at 2,298 while contract workers had grown to 37,601. Japanese were mostly contract workers and were not hit as hard by the slashing of wages that occurred during the 1921 recession making solidarity between the two groups hard to come by. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 217.

¹⁸⁸ Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 225.

was furnished with more than 130 additional special officers who were armed and paid for by the HSPA.¹⁸⁹

During the 16-month long territory-wide strike, the police used a variety of criminal laws to undermine the plight of the workers. As well as laws against unlawful assembly, vagrancy, and sanitary regulations, police could count on the anti-picketing act of 1923 which had been passed in the territory's legislative house in anticipation of the workers' uprising. A week after the strike began on O'ahu, on April 8, 1924, 300 striking Filipino workers were evicted from the Waipahu plantation. Under the supervision of the HPD, the strikers and their families were put on Honolulu bound trains. As legal justification for the expulsions of strikers, planters argued that as employees and not tenants, the workers who lived in plantation housing had no legal protection. Filipino sugar workers and their families sought refuge in the city's working-class districts: Iwilei, Palama, Watertown, and Kalihi.¹⁹⁰ By resorting to a strategy of displacement enforced by the police, planters turned the fruits of planter paternalism against workers.

Just as during the 1920 sugar workers strike, the arrival of Filipino plantation labourers in Honolulu stirred the most violent and vindictive impulses within the haole ruling class and their lackeys. Sheriff Trask's martial tactics were at the front and center of the repression of workers organising in Honolulu during the following months. During what the staunchly anti-labor *Honolulu Advertiser* described as the "sprightliest thrill of the year," every available police officer was dispatched to the site of a former jelly factory in the Kalihi district, approximately two and a half miles from downtown, where strikers had established an encampment after being evicted from the Kahuku and Waipahu plantations. According to press reports, the police, armed

¹⁸⁹"More Filipinos Bound for City from Waipahu," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 8, 1924), 1. In Honolulu, special police received five dollars a day and a free uniform incurring great cost to the local authorities. Reinecke, *The Filipino Piecemeal Strike of 1924-1925*, 36-37.

¹⁹⁰"462 Filipinos Now Camping in Kalihi District," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 10, 1924), 1.

with Winchester rifles, were summoned by a group of strikers who feared a violent reprisal after expressing their desire to leave the camp because they had found work on the islands of Maui and Kaua‘i.¹⁹¹ To the disappointment of the *Advertiser*, no violence ensued as the departing strikers and the men of “Field Marshal Trask” withdrew to jeers.¹⁹² During the standoff, HPD officer Henry Andrews refused to arm himself with a rifle and was promptly dismissed from the force by the Civil Service Commission. When officer Andrews spoke at a rally in support of the Filipino strikers on behalf of the Honolulu Central Labor Council, he accused Trask of curtailing free speech by restricting strikers right of assembly in downtown’s Aala Park. Andrews was immediately forcibly ejected by Trask’s men who stormed the stage.¹⁹³ In another instance of Trask’s propensity to go beyond what the law requires, Gregario de la Cruz, a Filipino striker, was incarcerated for forty days without charges being made against him in what Attorney General John A. Matthewman called at the time “an almost unbelievable story.”¹⁹⁴ When confronted on the matter, Trask pleaded ignorance. Over the course of the Filipino strike of 1924, Trask methods were praised by the newspapers who saw him as a vanguard of law and order.¹⁹⁵

Although Sheriff Trask decried Honolulu gangs as the principal foes of law and order, throughout his tenure, Army and Navy men stationed in the city’s garrisons and barracks were the one most often guilty of public displays of violence. After private Lee Tilley was allegedly beaten up by “hoodlums” and “ruffians” in front of the Star Theatre, hundreds of fellow soldiers

¹⁹¹ “City Thrilled by Near-Riot of Strikers,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 20, 1924), 1.

¹⁹² “City Thrilled by Near-Riot of Strikers,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (May 20, 1924), 1.

¹⁹³ “Small Riot Develops at Aala Park as Trask Stops Strike Meeting,” *The Honolulu Advertiser* (August 11, 1924), 1.

¹⁹⁴ “Filipino Locked in Jail 40 Days Without Charge,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (August 14, 1924), 1-3.

¹⁹⁵ The Honolulu Star-Bulletin showed their support for Trask’s handling of the Kalihi camp at least twice. “Stopping Trouble Before It Gets Serious,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 21, 1924), 20. “Time to Line Up for Law and Order,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 11, 1924), 20. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin also praised Trask for dismissing officer Andrews and insisted that for every critic, the Sheriff could count on a dozen supporters. “Dealing With Disobedience,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 22, 1924), 22.

from nearby Fort Shafter marched through Kalihi armed with rocks, clubs, and pistols. According to witnesses, the soldiers attacked every civilian who appeared on the street. Four individuals ended up in the hospital including three Japanese persons and a soldier in civilian garb mistakenly attacked by the mob.¹⁹⁶ In spite of this, Trask still argued that the “gangs” of Kalihi and Palama were the city’s greatest threat. During the summer of 1924, Trask lobbied legislative officials for an additional 26 men and a law “making the congregating of gangs a felony” arguing that “an ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure.”¹⁹⁷ Trask’s three years as Sheriff of the HPD were considered a high point in the history of law enforcement in the territory. In his interview with Richardson in 1932, former Honolulu Mayor Wilson praised Trask for the high percentage of convictions in relation to arrests obtained during his tenure. According to an analysis of police efficiency conducted by Wilson, Trask obtained a 78 percent conviction rate while his successors, Sheriff Desha and the much-maligned Sheriff Gleeson could only muster 24 percent.¹⁹⁸

Conclusion

The Sugar Workers strike of 1920 marked the beginning of a new era for the haole ruling elite. Honolulu’s elites were appalled by non-white young people leaving the suffocating environment of the plantation community and insinuating themselves into the city’s urban landscape. By simply living and congregating in the streets of the burgeoning city, non-white youths attracted the ire of elites who understood the amalgamation of races as a potential threat

¹⁹⁶ Arthur K. Powlison, who worked for the Honolulu YMCA and witnessed the attack described it as: “cowardly and disgraceful.” “Raiders Seek Vengeance in Swift Attack,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (August 20, 1924), 1.

¹⁹⁷ “Urges Inclusion of Gangsterism Under Felonies,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 2, 1924), 1. A week earlier, an editorial titled: “An Ounce of Prevention” in the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* had reaffirmed public support for Trask and his war against gangsters and argued for him to get the resources he desired using the same phrase. “An Ounce of Prevention,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (August 25, 1924), 6.

¹⁹⁸ Trask and Wilson were interviewed together in 1932. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume IV*, 712.

to the social and economic order in place. Haoles turned to the Honolulu City and County Police Department to preserve the territory's long-established racial hierarchy. Through the turmoil of a moral panic instigated by Honolulu's English language press, young, racialized men were subject to the criminalization of their movement within the city. For women reformers, the municipal officials who not only tolerated but profited off of the spread of vice in the city threatened the foundations of American democratic society. In the name of security, women reformers mobilized to transform the territory's police system and prison system along progressive lines. According to them, the HPD had allowed for the proliferation of prostitution, gambling, and bootlegging beyond the confines of the outskirts and into the heart of Honolulu's haole enclaves.

The Kaka'ako case and other instances of crimes against women attracted such vitriolic responses by elites because they saw their own government as complicit in the multiplication of problems facing the territory, i.e.: the growth in numbers of non-white communities, the frequent and damaging labor strikes, and the spread of vice and violence from multi-racial quarters to haole neighborhoods. The advocacy of the members of the League of Women Voters and the Vigilance Committee established police reform as an important political issue in an election year. The support of the Vigilance Committee proved instrumental in David K. Trask being elected. As head of the HPD, Trask implemented the militaristic techniques of police training and organisation favored by police reformer August Vollmer. Trask's martial campaign against Filipino strikers in 1924 illustrated to what extent the newspapers' moral panic and the political campaign of the Vigilance Committee had given police the tools and purview to violently exert repressive means upon the daily existence of non-haoles in Honolulu. Whether they were deemed labor agitators, gang members, or associated with Honolulu's many industries of vice,

Japanese, Filipino, Chinese and native Hawaiians were subject to supervision by the police in the urban environment.

The Vigilance Committee's quest to reform the Honolulu City and County Police Department was just one way in which elites transformed the city in the 1920s. Through the creation of commissions and committees meant to oversee municipal projects, business elites bypassed the meanderings of the civil service and enacted the changes they wanted to see foreshadowing what would happen to the HPD after the adoption of the Police Act of February 1, 1932. In 1924, the Chamber of Commerce's Municipal Affairs Committee led by John K. Butler, who directly supervised the importation of Filipino labourers as the secretary and treasurer of the HSPA, concluded in a report that uncertainty over the administration of the water supply restricted the construction of new residential development in the city.¹⁹⁹ The committee recommended that the management of Honolulu's water supply system be taken out of the hands of city officials and placed under the guardianship of a "purely non-political board."²⁰⁰ The next year the Sewer and Water Commission was established to speed up the process. Governor Farrington appointed as first chairman the former president of Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, George Stanley McKenzie. Honolulu elites "improved" the city in other ways as well. In partnership with the former governor Lucius E. Pinkham, Mr. Dillingham's Hawaiian Dredging Company oversaw the gigantic Waikiki Reclamation Project.²⁰¹ Dillingham and Pinkham intended to create new tracts of commercial and residential lands as part of a "healthful, sanitary, and beautiful city" by draining Waikiki's so-called swamps which at the time were thriving

¹⁹⁹ Clarence Lewis Hodge and Peggy Ferris, *Building Honolulu: A Century of Community Service* (Honolulu: Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, 1950), 37.

²⁰⁰ Hodge and Ferris, *Building Honolulu*, 37.

²⁰¹ Dillingham also built his Florentine villa style home: La Pietra on the slopes of Leahi, the dormant volcano also known as Diamond Head. The volcano now part of the upscale Diamond Head neighborhood that sits at the edge of Waikiki. Gaye Chan and Andrea Fraser, *Waikiki: A History of Forgetting and Remembering* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 22.

wetlands where k̄naka maoli and Asian immigrants practice agriculture and aquaculture.²⁰²

Instead, they created the Alai Wai Canal which to this day, collects hazardous toxins and trash and dumps them into the sea.²⁰³

²⁰² Thrum, *Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1923*, 66.

²⁰³ Chan and Fraser, *Waikiki*, 37.

Chapter 2

A Police Department Under Fire: The Honolulu City and County Police Department and the Tenets of Professional Policing

In a series of editorials published in the pages of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* on January 25, 1932, the newspaper's editor, Riley H. Allen, heralded the forthcoming adoption of the Police Act of February 1st, 1932 by Governor Lawrence M. Judd as one of the most significant reforms in municipal administration since the city and county government of Honolulu was created.²⁰⁴ The Police Act removed the elected offices of the Honolulu's City and County's Civil Service Commission and Sheriff from overseeing police matters and replaced them with an appointed five-man police commission and a police chief.²⁰⁵ The members of the police commission would initially be selected by the Governor and be tasked with the appointment of a chief of police to lead the HPD. Most importantly, the paper argued, the bill signified the territory's strongest rebuke to its characterization by the American press and Navy officials as a lawless and degenerate outpost that should be brought under the control of the Federal government. The paper's editor exclaimed: "Coming at the present crisis, it represents Hawaii's best answer to the attacks from the mainland from those who are seeking to destroy self-government. On it the hopes of the future must be placed."²⁰⁶

Governor Judd's police bill of February 1932 sought to expand haole control of law enforcement and appease the fears of Federal officials through the disenfranchisement of

²⁰⁴ The County of Oahu was inaugurated in 1905. Two years later, it was renamed the City and County of Honolulu. Born in Texas, Riley Harris Allen was a member of Honolulu's Chamber of Commerce, a member of the Governor's advisory committee on education and the chairman of the vocational committee among other associations and clubs. He had been editor of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* for the better part of the last 20 years. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: Volume IV*, 21.

²⁰⁵ The first police commission would be appointed by the Governor with the subsequent appointments to its ranks made by Honolulu's mayor with the approval of the board of supervisors. United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, VIII.

²⁰⁶ "Where Credit is Due," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 25, 1932), 6.

Hawai'i majority native Hawaiian electorate.²⁰⁷ Since annexation in 1898, Native Hawaiians political leaders had entered into a marriage of convenience with haole elites and their proxy, the reigning territorial Republican party.²⁰⁸ By agreeing to support the interests of the sugar industry and the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, Hawaiian leadership secured access to public service jobs for their kin.²⁰⁹ During the 1920s and 1930s, Native Hawaiians were the dominant electorate in the territory. In every election during this period, Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians represented more than half of the candidates for office and Hawaiian voter turnout was always higher than for any other racial group.²¹⁰ In 1927, Hawaiians held forty-six percent of appointive executive positions, fifty-five percent of other clerical jobs in the territory and more than half the judgeships and elective offices.²¹¹ By 1932, sixty-five percent of the officers in the Honolulu City and County Police Department were kānaka maoli. By then, haole elites had grown more resentful of other races than ever before and in 1933, prominent haoles endorsed an ultimately unsuccessful measure to amend the Organic Act to restrict the right to vote on a racial basis.²¹²

²⁰⁷ In his first address as Governor, Lawrence M. Judd, the descendant of missionaries, praised the sugar industry and promised to set the appropriate policies for business to prosper. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, 188.

²⁰⁸ The Republicans were the dominant party in the territory's legislature all throughout the pre-war period. Between 1910 and 1940, more than 80 percent of legislators elected were Republicans who had the interests of the sugar industry at heart. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, 155.

²⁰⁹ During this period, Native Hawaiians held half the elective judicial, teaching, and government clerical jobs in the territory. When the republic of Hawai'i was made a territory of the United States in 1900, as the American constitution would have it, all adult male kānaka maoli became American citizens. While the position of governor of the territory remained an appointed position by the president of the United States, all other public offices became subject to the democratic process. Unfortunately for planters, at the time, native Hawaiians outnumbered haoles 3 to 1 and were generally recognized as experienced in the workings of government and politically gifted. After the first elections were held, the Hawaiian Home Rule Party swept into power. In order to preserve their hold over Hawai'i's all-important position of Congressional Delegate and its territorial institutions in spite of their disadvantageous demographic position, the haole planter class leverage its control of the Hawaiian Governorship and made a deal in 1901. From then on and unto the 1930s, in exchange for running candidates more in line with haole interests, most civil service positions would be given to Hawaiians. Stannard, *Honor Killing*, 70. And Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, 160-174.

²¹⁰ Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, 161.

²¹¹ Ibid, 161.

²¹² Ibid, 178. Out of a total of 234 people in the employ of the HPD in 1932, 97 were classified as "part-Hawaiians" and 55 as Hawaiians compared to only sixteen Caucasians. United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 256.

The law enforcement reforms of the Police Act of February 1, 1932, undermined further the already waning kānaka-Republican political alliance.

In this chapter I examine how the Police Act of 1932 represented the culmination of a more than decade long movement for the reform of police administration in the territory. I begin by fleshing out August Vollmer's principles of professional policing and how they proved attractive to the Honolulu elites who looked for the means to insulate their system of oligarchic control from the interference of the federal government and democratic elections. I then dive into the longer legislative history of police reforms. Long before the Massie Affair triggered a political crisis in September of 1931, Honolulu's haole Republican civic leaders, members of both the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and the territorial legislature, took up the mantle of police reform from the progressive women of the League of Women Voters and the Vigilance Committee. After the kidnapping and murder of the son of Frederick Jamieson an executive of the Hawaiian Trust Company by 19-year-old nisei Myles Yukata Fukunaga, elites and the English language press came to the conclusion that the HPD was not up to the task of ensuring the safety of haoles on O'ahu. Through the elaboration of committees and commissions, haole Republican elites set out to gather the necessary scientific data to justify an increase in police activity within the city and the retrenchment of racialized people from the territory's law enforcement institutions. Finally, I consider how the changes put in motion by the Hawaiian territorial legislative house in 1932 were cemented during the 14-year tenure of Honolulu's second police chief William A. Gabrielson. Gabrielson transformed the Honolulu City and County Police Department into a state-of-the-art police force proficient in the type of surveillance operations the FBI and the U.S. military would ask them to conduct during the Second World War.

August Vollmer and Professional Policing

August Vollmer's technocratic form of police administration was ideally suited to the needs of Honolulu's elites who desired to distance themselves from Federal officials' allegations of "laxity" and "oriental" moral corruption.²¹³ The tenets of professional policing were designed to assuage the concerns of early twentieth century urban middle-class citizens, business leaders, and old school policemen who distrusted new immigrant groups and the traditional American political process.²¹⁴ Vollmer believed that, while subservient to the whims of political pressure groups, such as prohibitionists, American police departments had been made to enforce wrongheaded moralist creeds which had antagonized the working classes and turned the police into a symbol of unpopular governance. Vollmer and other reformers rallied against the association of the police with political factions and instead argued for continuity in policing administration, "policing without politics," effectively.²¹⁵ In Vollmer's life's work, haole elites saw the designs of a system of technocratic governance, impervious to demographic pressures that could preserve the racial hierarchy of the plantation's political economy.

Vollmer was a central figure in the knowledge network of law enforcement experts determined to bring the innovations of European police savants to the United States. Matthew Guariglia has described the intellectual sphere within which Vollmer operated as a "growing system of policing collaboration" that "crystalized a global move toward disciplinary

²¹³ In his report, Assistant Attorney General Seth Richardson referred to law enforcement in the territory of Hawai'i as plagued by laxity a phenomenon he attributed to the Hawaiian Islands native and oriental populations. United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, VII-XII.

²¹⁴ Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 2-3.

²¹⁵ Vollmer decried the rules and regulations of legislative bodies toward police practices as "absolutely ill-advised and absolutely unenforceable." August Vollmer, "Abstract of the "Wickersham" Police Report," *Journal of Law and Criminology* (1931-1951), Jan 1932, Vol. 22, No. 5, 716.

technocracy, a system of police governance guided by the formalized discourse of expertise rather than knowledge collected through the everyday lived expertise of officers.”²¹⁶ As head of the police section of the Wickersham Report published in 1931 by President Hoover’s National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Vollmer cemented his status as the preeminent American expert on policing and dispensed advice at the highest level of government.²¹⁷ Vollmer and others like him sought legitimacy for their systems of administration through academic affiliation and promulgated the collection of data as a universalizing method of policing. With the support of the Washington establishment and a highly organised network of law enforcement professionals and theorists, Vollmer and his three underlings who came to Hawai’i in the wake of the Massie Affair, J.A. Greening, William A. Gabrielson, and C.I. Howell, were the perfect candidates to provide haole elites with the credibility needed to stave off overeager Federal lawmakers.²¹⁸

During the reform era of policing, American businessmen used their money and influence to root out the sway of organised crime over the administration and operations of police.²¹⁹ In order to obtain law enforcement divorced from corrupt “political control,” business elites sought

²¹⁶ Guariglia writes that police gladly partnered with social scientists as they “also needed to have their daily experience turned into usable data by having scholars and scientists launder and legitimize their observations.” Guariglia, *Police in the Empire City*, 178.

²¹⁷ Since 1918, Vollmer had been on the board of the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, he was professor of police administration at the University of Chicago between 1929 and 1931, and for 16 years, he taught summer courses at the University of California at Berkeley which were attended by police officials from all over the West coast. O.W. Wilson, “August Vollmer,” *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Volume 44, Issue 1 (1953-1954), 101-102.

²¹⁸ From the beginning of Vollmer’s career in law enforcement, the Spanish-American war veteran cultivated the support of the wealthy and powerful. Friend Richardson, the Berkeley Gazette editor and later Governor of California, championed Vollmer’s candidacy in 1905 through beatifying editorials. Four years after first being elected town Marshall, the city of Berkeley enacted a new charter that created the position of chief of police to be appointed by the mayor. Vollmer remained in charge of the Berkeley police department for the next 23 years, until 1932. Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 18-19.

²¹⁹ In 1925, President Calvin Coolidge appointed a national crime commission, which was described by one participant as “the crusade of organised business against organised crime.” Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 16.

the legitimatizing power of public investigations.²²⁰ From Chicago to Washington, they called on experts to improve the police efficiency in their roles as protectors of personal safety and property.²²¹ The findings and recommendations of these commissions formed the bulk of bills to reform law enforcement at every level of government. Vollmer was especially sympathetic to the plight of America's industrialists. According to the Berkeley police chief, police inefficiency combined with the constant assault of "antisocial forces" upon the "civilized" had led to losses of more than 3 billion dollars for American businesses. Police departments were overmatched. Not only did they deal with such major crimes as homicides, robberies, burglaries, etc., but "preying upon the American social structure" were new kinds of criminal behaviors: "The strangling of business by racketeers, kidnapping and holding children and adults for ransom, gang wars by human gorillas for under-world supremacy, state-wide and national subversive activities, and other conditions which incite to riots (...)." ²²² Vollmer provided elites with the diagnoses and the medicine they were looking for.

A veteran of the American counterinsurgency in the Philippines where his unit was assigned to police the streets of Manilla, Vollmer promoted to American police departments the adoption of new technologies directly inspired by his military service.²²³ He thought it wise for police departments to incorporate a panoply of modern equipment such as wireless telephony,

²²⁰ The businessmen behind the long-lasting Chicago Crime Commission claimed political impartiality and to be only concerned with "applying modern business methods to correct a system which has, through inertia, been allowed to grow up in the departments of state and municipal government (...)." Henry Barrett Chamberlin, "The Chicago Crime Commission: How the Business Men of Chicago Are Fighting Crime." *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology* 11, no. 3 (1920), 396.

²²¹ Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 16.

²²² Vollmer, *The Police and Modern Society*, 1-2.

²²³ Guariglia, *Police in the Empire City*, 84. According to Vollmer's friend and fellow police reformer, O.W. Wilson, Vollmer also served on the gunboat Laguna de Bay patrolling the rivers of the Philippines. Wilson, "August Vollmer," 93.

telegraphy, automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles, gas bombs, and laboratory apparatus.²²⁴ Notably, inspired by the mobile units of soldiers in the Philippines who responded to insurgents on horses and small boats, the Berkeley police department was the first department in the United States to introduce automotive police patrols in 1913.²²⁵

Vollmer's dream of developing a sophisticated surveillance apparatus to aid local law enforcement can be understood as a clear continuation of the work he did in the Philippines. Vollmer intended to centralize and categorize the information gathered by officers in the field to create a textual portrait of the urban environment to be read by trained police experts. Vollmer called for the creation of new police divisions to make use of novel record keeping methods to create profiles of criminals and identify areas of high criminality.²²⁶ Using the principles of military science police, a new crop of officers would be able to dedicate themselves solely to the tasks of intelligence gathering, analysis, and prediction.²²⁷ The identification and surveillance of unsavory elements of society lay at the heart of the project of developing new record keeping technologies. At Berkeley, Vollmer promoted the idea of universal fingerprinting and organised an "educational program on the value of fingerprinting citizens." J.A. Greening, who took over the Berkeley police department after Vollmer and who helped implement the program, explained how the nascent technology of fingerprinting could root out undesirables in a community:

²²⁴ August Vollmer, "Aims and Ideals of the Police," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (August 1922), 253.

²²⁵ Vollmer first provided his men in Berkeley with bicycles in 1910, then with motorcycles in 1912, and finally with model T fords in 1913. Alfred E. Parker, *The Berkeley Police Story* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles E. Thomas Publisher, 1972), 24. In Los Angeles, Vollmer created a police unit who patrolled on horseback. According to Raymond B. Fosdick, the former NYPD commissioner of accounts and the author of *European Police Systems* and *American Police Systems*, every patrolman in Vollmer's Berkeley police department was equipped with an automobile. Go, "The Imperial Origins of American Policing," 1208-1209.

²²⁶ In 1907, as president of the California Police Chiefs Association, Vollmer asked the California state legislature to create a state bureau of criminal identification. In 1917, The California State Bureau was inaugurated. A similar project was developed at the national level by the International Association of Police Chiefs of which Vollmer was once its president. Wilson, "August Vollmer," 98-99.

²²⁷ Go, "The Imperial Origins of American Policing," 1209.

“Universal fingerprinting has many benefits. It helps stop aliens from illegally staying in this country; carrying a fingerprint card helps a stranger in a city who might be stopped by police; it helps business executives in the selection and placing of personnel; it helps the credit standing of personnel; and it could stop worthless check passers.”²²⁸

While some law enforcement commentators reasoned that police unionism was the solution to raising the standards of policing in the country, Vollmer, instead, envisioned a new breed of policemen that possessed highly specialized skills and a sense of “higher purpose.”²²⁹ Vollmer fetishized higher education and wanted to develop a new generation of college educated police officers trained in criminal law, medicine, and battlefield tactics. Through practical erudition, these men would be impervious to the character flaws of the lower classes.²³⁰ Once again, Vollmer looked to the army to provide him with the tools required to create his legion of *Übermensch*. For Vollmer, the army recruitment tests devised during the First World War were suited to his task due to their capacity to discern the underserving, to identify “the stupid, hot headed, sullen, cranky, slow, lazy, slovenly, unreliable and brutal.”²³¹ Vollmer intended to adapt the army’s recruitment methods to the selection of candidates for every position within American police departments, from clerks to investigators.²³² In his report, Assistant Attorney General Seth Richardson would use the Army Alpha tests results of the personnel of the Honolulu City and

²²⁸ According to Alfred E. Parker, by 1936, 16,000 Berkeleyans had their fingerprints on file, not only in the offices of the Berkeley police department but also, at the Department of Justice in Washington D.C. Parker, *The Berkeley Police Story*, 171-172.

²²⁹ Vollmer theorized police could not share the struggle of the working class whose only objectives were securing decent pay and adequate conditions. Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 42.

²³⁰ Vollmer, “Abstract of the “Wickersham” Police Report,” 720.

²³¹ Vollmer praised the creators of Army Alpha tests as “the greatest minds in the fields of medicine and psychology in this county.” “Examining and testing large bodies of men has been standardized by the Army and if the Army plan was adopted by civil service examiners for selecting police candidates, we could be certain that such misfits as the stupid, hot headed, sullen, cranky, slow, lazy, slovenly, unreliable and brutal would never get into the service.” August Vollmer, “A Practical Method for Selecting Policemen,” *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (February 1921), 575.

²³² Vollmer, “A Practical Method for Selecting Policemen,” 575-576.

County Police Department to discredit the Native Hawaiian contingent of police officers and to highlight the dearth of qualified personnel in the department.²³³

The Pell and Vitousek Investigations

After Sheriff David K. Trask's election lost in 1926, the administrations of David L. Desha and Patrick K. Gleeson were plagued by internal turmoil. The high-profile nature of the Fukunaga kidnapping and other reports of criminal activity perpetrated by racialized people exacerbated haole elites' feelings of insecurity in the city of Honolulu.²³⁴ In September of 1928 19-year-old nisei Myles Yukata Fukunaga kidnapped and killed ten-year-old George Gill Jamieson, the son of Frederick Jamieson an executive of the Hawaiian Trust Company.²³⁵ Kelli Y. Nakamura has described the effect of the murder inspired by the famous Leopold and Loeb case as such: "The case of Myles Fukunaga not only shattered the illusion of racial peace and aloha within Hawai'i's multi-ethnic community but also revealed the existence of a dual system of justice in Hawai'i. (...)"²³⁶ While the case reinforced haoles' fears of racial and class antagonism leading to violence, the police's inability to break the case and identify the murderer despite the mobilization of the thousands of hours of manpower and considerable resources was proof of the generalized incompetence of the HPD.²³⁷

²³³ The test was administered by Berkeley police department captain J.A. Greening during his survey of the police administration in the territory. United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 87-88.

²³⁴ Trask and Desha were, after leaving office, indicted on charges of conspiracy but both were eventually cleared of any wrongdoing. United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 66. Patrick K. Gleason was a law enforcement veteran. Before becoming Sheriff in 1927 when he was appointed by the Civil Service Commission to replace Desha after only seven months on the job, Gleason had been in public service for 30 years, first as a clerk in the Oahu penitentiary and then as deputy High Sheriff of the territory and as Prohibition Administrator. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: Volume IV*, 205-206.

²³⁵ The son of a Japanese plantation worker, Fukunaga kidnapped the young Jamieson to obtain money through ransom to help support his parents who were threatened with eviction for failure to pay rent by the Hawaiian Trust Company. After a two-day trial under judge Alva E. Steadman, Fukunaga was found guilty by the jury. He was hanged on November 19, 1929. Kelli Y. Nakamura, *Murder, Rape, and Martial Law: A Dual-System of Justice for Hawai'i's Japanese, 1928-1944* (Master's Thesis, Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2003), 10-27.

²³⁶ Nakamura, *Murder, Rape, and Martial Law*, 27.

²³⁷ Ibid, 27.

In many ways, elite reactions to Fukunaga's crime presaged what would come in the aftermath of the Massie affair a few years later. After the kidnapping of one of their own, the members of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce responded by asking Governor Wallace Rider Farrington to place the entire island of O'ahu under martial law. According to Nakamura, by willingly offering to relinquish their civil rights, and those of non haoles along with them, the haole community demonstrated to what extent they had been consumed by panic. Governor Farrington denied their request for a military takeover, insisting that the investigation remained a police matter. As a compromise, Farrington did allow the board to appoint a special committee of civic leaders that included the secretary of the HSPA, J.K. Butler and the editor of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, Riley Allen, to work with Sheriff Gleason. Butler along with several politicians and the press claimed that the rising crime rate in Honolulu was a likely factor in the disappearance of Jamieson. According to them, the kidnapping demonstrated the "evil conditions" that existed in the city.²³⁸ The Chamber of Commerce aided in the search for the kidnapper by organising a group of 200 civilian deputies. Members of the Chamber of Commerce insisted the deputies should be haoles in order to prevent any acts of sabotage.²³⁹

After the debacle of the Fukunaga case, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce spearheaded efforts to *Vollmerize* the HPD. In 1929, the directors of the Chamber of Commerce placed themselves on the record as being for the creation of an appointed office of chief of police to oversee the HPD.²⁴⁰ In 1930, Philip Pell was appointed chairman of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce's sub-committee on the efficiency of the Honolulu City and County Police Department with the mission to investigate what form an eventual reorganization of the force

²³⁸ Okamura, *Raced to Death*, 44.

²³⁹ Sheriff Gleason opposed the chamber of commerce's request and eventually prevailed on the matter. Ibid, 44.

²⁴⁰ "Directors of Chamber for Police Chief," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 10, 1929), 1.

could take.²⁴¹ Pell had been a member of the Civil Service Commission in 1927 and 1928 where he oversaw the administration of Sheriff Gleason.²⁴² Pell was an outspoken detractor of Gleason's methods and believed him to be an incompetent political operator. In the transcript of Pell's interview with Richardson, Pell made it plain that at the time, the HPD leadership was undermined by political conflicts between senior officers of the department, Sheriff Gleason was uninterested in any sort of police training, and unwilling to cooperate with other government agencies, i.e. all things professional policing offered to fix. Furthermore, Gleason's failure to deal with the notorious gang problem and to solve recent murder cases were also cited by Pell as signs that the department under Gleason was not worthy of the public's trust.²⁴³

As chairman of the Chamber of Commerce's sub-committee on the efficiency of the Honolulu City and County Police Department, Pell laid the foundations on which any future talk of reform of police administration would be based. After conducting his research into the practices of the department and communicating with mainland police experts such as Vollmer, Pell's report, co-signed by Mrs. Morgan's husband James Placidus Morgan, took aim at the present "system" of police administration and its reliance on political appointments.²⁴⁴ Pell wanted the HPD to be led by a police chief appointed by a three-man police commission itself appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city Board of Supervisors in order to "remove the office from the influence of elective politics (...)." ²⁴⁵ Pell desired the instauration of fixed policies and continuity in police matters without investing one party or another with supreme

²⁴¹ The Honolulu Chamber of Commerce possessed a law enforcement committee headed by Ralph E. Clark, an insurance company manager born in California, which published an annual report.

²⁴² Born in California, Pell was also the Hawaiian Republican Party chairman. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: Volume IV*, 390-391.

²⁴³ Seth W. Richardson, *Department of Justice Investigation Volume X*, 2268.

²⁴⁴ In the Richardson's report, the assistant attorney general remarked that under Gleason there existed scant evidence of promotions being awarded on the basis of merit or efficiency rather, only political and personal considerations were the factors at play. United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 92.

²⁴⁵ "Police Chief is Needed Here, Report Says," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 17, 1930), 1.

executive power. Pell devised a plan by which commission members would serve on a rolling basis so that newly elected mayors would always be able to appoint no more than one commissioner during their two year term.²⁴⁶ Pell also outlined a convoluted system of “merit markings” by which officers would be assigned a certain number of points for making arrests or performing other tasks by their police chief, subject to confirmation by the police commission.²⁴⁷ The Honolulu Star-Bulletin praised the “Pell Plan” and its aim to elevate the HPD’s standards of discipline and recruitment.²⁴⁸ In December of 1930, Pell commissioned the law firm of Smith & Wild to draw up a bill formalizing the proposals of his report to be presented to the territorial legislature.²⁴⁹

The territory’s English language press had been steadfast in its support of Pell and his cause as they too had begun to campaign for serious changes in the administration of police. Newspaper editorials spoke of a “community confronting serious troubles in relation to lawlessness,” and an urgent need for a “police chief free from politics.”²⁵⁰ While Pell still chaired the Civil Service commission, the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* had urged the legislature to bring about an appointed police chief divorced from the duties of sheriff.²⁵¹ Honolulu’s newspapers could hardly dissimulate their contempt electoral politics. Ever since Honolulu’s population had increased and taken on what the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* described as the “responsibilities and difficulties of a metropolis,” the paper argued the electorate had always chosen the least qualified candidate when it came to the position of Sheriff.²⁵²

²⁴⁶ “Police Chief is Needed Here, Report Says,” 1.

²⁴⁷ For example, Pell’s plan put forward that police officers “making an exceptionally good arrest” would receive between 5 and 25 points while an infraction would require the adjudication of 10 to 50 demerit points. “Chamber for an Appointive Chief of Police,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (July 16, 1930), 1-5.

²⁴⁸ “Merit in the ‘Pell Plan,’” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (July 18, 1930), 6.

²⁴⁹ “Police Chief Measure is Under Way,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (December 17, 1930), 1.

²⁵⁰ “A Chief for Sheriff,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 20, 1930), 6.

²⁵¹ “The Police Chief System,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (December 13, 1928, Last Edition), 6.

²⁵² “A Chief for Sheriff,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, 6.

The press feverishly chronicled urban crime, especially gangs. In 1929, the ghosts of old debates resurfaced after reports of a series of sexual crimes committed by the “Vineyard Street Gang” terrorized the haole community. After thirteen boys allegedly committed an assault upon a 17-year-old girl in the Kalihi-Palama district, authorities called for the use of the whipping post. The HPD described the Vineyard Street Gang as being composed of thirty-two members of Hawaiian, Japanese, Chinese, and part-Hawaiian ancestry and warned that they roamed the streets of Honolulu looking for the next victim.²⁵³ Concerned with the “current gangster situation,” prominent haole women organised a meeting at the local Y.M.C.A. in support of increasing the penalties for crimes committed against women and referred to the leniency afforded to the “Kakaako gangsters” as an example of the failure of the criminal system to protect women.²⁵⁴ An editorial characterized the boys of the gang as “ravening wolves” and called for gangs to be “suppressed ruthlessly by force if it takes the entire police force backed by every decent man in Honolulu to do it.”²⁵⁵ The pastor G.R. Weaver cited the words of Vollmer in a sermon in opposition to the use of the whipping post and argued for the need of experts and scientific minds to lead the way in the city’s response to the criminals.²⁵⁶

Alongside the Pell sub-committee, the territorial government also planned to launch its own investigation into law enforcement in the territory.²⁵⁷ Less than a year after his appointment

²⁵³ “Gang Attacked 3 Other Girls, Official Told,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (March 30, 1929), 1. A nineteen-year-old Ben Ahakuelo, one of the future defendants in the Massie trial was named by the police court as being a member of the gang. Representing him was former Sheriff David K. Trask. “Six Alleged Gangsters to Appear for Hearing Before Steiner Tuesday,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 1, 1929), 1.

²⁵⁴ “Punishment on Whipping Post Urged,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (April 7, 1929), 1-7.

²⁵⁵ “Clean Up the Gangs,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (March 31, 1929), 18.

²⁵⁶ Weaver called for: “The politician amateur must give way to professionally trained leadership.” “Society Helps Make Criminal, Must Provide Cure, Says Pastor,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 29, 1929, Last Edition), 6.

²⁵⁷ As you’ll remember from chapter one, Governor Judd’s sister had been at one of the very first meeting of the Vigilance Committee in 1923. United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii: Hearing Before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, United States Senate Seventy-Second Congress Second Session on S.4309, S.4310, S.4311, S.4312, S. 4314, S.4315, and S.4375 Bills Relative to the Administration in Hawaii, January 16, 1933* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933), 48.

in 1929 by the Hoover administration, Governor Judd created an eleven member Commission on Crime and appointed Royal Arnold Vitousek commonly known as Roy Vitousek, as chairman.²⁵⁸ Born and raised in California, Vitousek was a prominent figure in territorial politics combining his work in corporate law with multiple stints in public office. At one time or another, Vitousek, the Republican representative of the 4th district and a lieutenant commander in the naval reserve, was a member of the Recreation Commission, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, chairman of the Civil Service Committee and the Finance Committee before becoming speaker of the House of Representatives in 1931.

In his interview with Richardson on the activities of the Crime Commission and the present state of affairs, Vitousek's close ties with Honolulu's business community and his relaxed view of police violence were evident. Vitousek told Richardson that years ago, he had investigated the territorial school system and found that the schools were not instilling within their pupils a sense of appreciation for manual labor and plantation life, a task which he considered the "duty" of the public school system.²⁵⁹ Thereafter, on the basis of his investigation, the Hawaiian legislature had passed a bill changing the whole system of education in the territory. Vitousek's bill gave "A group of businessmen" control over the education system so that they could work with "the industries and with the schools" to respond to the labor demands of the planters.²⁶⁰ Vitousek singled out former Sheriff David K. Trask's tenure as the sole bright spot in the recent history of the HPD. The Republican lawmaker praised Trask's for instating

²⁵⁸ Vitousek was appointed in January of 1930. Richardson, *Richardson Report Volume I*, 21.

²⁵⁹ I believe Vitousek is referencing the joint committee between the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association and the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce which was formed in 1923 to inspect the budget of the Department of Public Instruction and concluded that the department was spending too much taxpayer money on educating children meant to work in the fields of the sugar industry. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, 281.

²⁶⁰ The Republican politician offered Richardson proof that intervention had been successful by relating that due to having close personal friends managing the Honolulu Sugar Plantation, he knew that "a large number of graduates" had gone to work there in the last year and liked it. Richardson, *Richardson Report Volume I*, 227-228.

much needed discipline within the ranks of the police and for his use of the “horsewhip” to punish suspected members of “hoodlum gangs.”²⁶¹

Vitousek’s investigative commission was meant to study delinquency, crime, and punishment and “get at the bottom of the so-called juvenile crime situation in Honolulu.”²⁶² The commission’s primary activities were the organisation, in partnership with the University of Hawai‘i of a case study of “selected inmates of the Territorial Prison and of Waialeale and Naunawili Training Schools” and the elaboration of a survey of law enforcement officials, plantation managers, judges, social workers, and public and private school officials.²⁶³ Judd’s advisory committee included the likes of Walter F. Frear, the former Governor and Chief Justice of the territory, now president of the Bishop Trust Co., one of the biggest land owner in territory and one of its biggest bank and Dr. Stanley David Porteus, the founder of the psychological and psychopathic clinic of the University of Hawai‘i where he developed theories of racial hierarchies of intelligence and the superiority of the white race.²⁶⁴

Like the Pell commission before it, Vitousek’s panel of civic leaders sought the guiding hand of officials who had served on crime commissions on the mainland.²⁶⁵ The medical doctor Edward H. Ochsner who served on the Chicago Crime Commission for eleven years stayed in Honolulu for one month in February of 1930.²⁶⁶ During his stay in the territory, Ochsner vaunted

²⁶¹ Ibid, 226.

²⁶² “11 Members of Crime Inquiry Board Named,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 6, 1930), 1.

²⁶³ Richardson, *Richardson Report Volume I*, 22.

²⁶⁴ In addition, the other members of the board were: Mrs. Gertrude M. Damon, Dr. Francis K. Sylva, Senator William H. Heen, Mrs. Bernice P. Irwin, Dr. Harry I. Kurisaki, Harry R. Hewitt, Miss. Margaret Bergen, Attorney General M. Robertson. Mrs. Damon was one of the women who called for the use of the whipping post for the Vineyard Street gangsters. “Police Chief Plan Recommended by Crime Commission,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (February 12, 1931), 1-12.

²⁶⁵ As well as inviting Edward H. Ochsner, the commission hosted Judge Darby, the chairman of the Ohio Commission on Criminal Procedure and J. Prentiss Murphy, the Executive Secretary of the Children’s Bureau of Philadelphia. Richardson, *Richardson Report Volume I*, 23.

²⁶⁶ Ochsner was a prominent Chicago surgeon who at some point was president of the Chicago Medical Society. Ochsner was opposed to compulsory health insurance and economic assistance for the poor. In 1934, in the middle of the Great Depression, Ochsner wrote that “human parasitism” like social services aimed at the needy were to

the merits of the passage of a law in Chicago “providing that persons mentally defective to a degree whereby they become a menace to society shall, after trial in open court, be committed to an institution for the feeble minded until the mental defect is eradicated, if at all.” Ochsner argued that the “mentally feeble” were easily swayed by “clever criminals” and gangs were generally composed of such persons. The newspaper attempted to sway public opinion and made clear the difference in attitudes between past reformers and present experts versed in the latest sociological theories when it reported that doctor Ochsner opposed the practice of sterilization as had been advocated some time ago “in the excitement following an epidemic of sex crimes.” “Segregation is the only cure from crime,” Ochsner proclaimed. In the future, Ochsner planned for the forced segregation of 10,000 persons of deficient mental capacity in the state of Illinois.²⁶⁷

With this sort of cynical science providing the impetus, Judd’s Commission on Crime found that in addition to the causes of crime that were agreed to exist everywhere such as individual characteristics and familial and social factors, in Hawai‘i there existed certain special conditions as they related to: “certain races alien to our culture and not thoroughly in accord with our standards of morality.”²⁶⁸ Filipinos were especially considered to have irreconcilable and prejudicious views of the laws of the territory. Vitousek’s commission concluded that the adoption of supplemental legal statutes would have little effect in ameliorating the situation and instead moralized that the respect of the law could only be accomplished “through a gradual process of education whereby the intelligence and moral fiber of the people of the community

blame for the fall of Rome, the Great Depression, and the rise of Hitler’s dictatorship. Peter A. Swenson, *Disorder: A history of Reform, Reaction, and Money in American Medicine* (Yale University Press, 2021), 333-346.

²⁶⁷ “Doctor Ochsner, Member of Chicago Crime Commission, Discusses Prevention Plan,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (February 21, 1930), 3.

²⁶⁸ The report specifically mentioned Filipinos disproportionately incarcerated due to the “excess of males over females in these racial groups.” Together, with these factors “tends towards the commission of a certain form of sex offense.” Richardson, *Richardson Report Volume I*, 24.

shall be brought to a higher standard.”²⁶⁹ To this end, the commission insisted on the fact that the educational curriculum on plantations and in schools be made to include lessons on the criminal laws of the territory. As the adoption of new laws was deemed futile, the commission determined to act upon the “human element.” Undoubtedly, by this point, well versed in the ideals of Vollmer, Vitousek purported that police officers and their ability to detect crime, to apprehend criminals, and to secure evidence efficiently were the cornerstone of effective and impartial law enforcement.²⁷⁰

Building upon Pell’s foundations, Vitousek’s recommendations culminated in the Chief of Police Bill of 1931. Although, it secured important backing from members on the other side of the aisle which signalled the growing momentum of the police reform movement, the twelve legislative delegates from the island of Oahu were split evenly on the measure and supporters of the bill were outnumbered by four votes.²⁷¹ After losing a crucial vote at the last minute, Vitousek blamed the other side and their recourse to “not very honorable” methods.²⁷² As the Honolulu Star-Bulletin put it, the bill was impeded not because it lacked merit but due to the strong opposition of Sheriff Gleason and his adjuvants.²⁷³ Even though, nobody could foresee how the events of the forthcoming Massie Affair would influence things, with the adamant support of the press and of a growing number of Democrats, Republican reformers were closing

²⁶⁹ Ibid, 24

²⁷⁰ Although, in their survey of law enforcement officials, the Commission members learned that there existed no crime wave in the territory, they admitted that the poor state of record keeping prevented them from assessing the true condition of crime. Richardson, *Richardson Report Volume I*, 27.

²⁷¹ After the publication of Pell and Vitousek reports, representatives of both sides of the aisle began to foresee changes to the Honolulu police department as necessary. The widely popular Democratic member of the Honolulu City and County Board of Supervisor Manuel C. Pacheco welcomed the findings of the report of the sub-committee of the Chamber of Commerce. The son of Portuguese immigrants, Manuel C. Pacheco was one of the founders of the Portuguese Political Club. He was elected multiple times to the Honolulu City and County Board of Supervisors as well as serving a term on the Territorial Senate. In 1928, Pacheco became the only Board of Supervisors member ever elected due to an outright overwhelming majority only after the primary. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: Volume IV*, 385-386.

²⁷² “Chief of Police Bill Killed in House 17 to 13), *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 21, 1931, Last Edition), 1-3.

²⁷³ “Harmony Move Instituted by Mayor Wright,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (August 15, 1931), 1.

in on repatriating the leadership of the Honolulu City and County Police Department from the hands of the electorate. With the Pell plan and the Vitousek commission, haole elites enshrined in future reform bills the principles of professional policing. By doing so, Republican lawmakers almost guaranteed that the first Honolulu chief of police would be not only cognizant of Vollmer's eruditions but someone from outside of the territory as no local candidate could claim to be credibly trained in the Berkeley savant's methods.

The Police Commission

The Honolulu City and County Police Department received the blunt of the blame for the outcome of the Ala Moana trial. To the dismay of Thalia Massie's family and Hawai'i's oligarchic haole elites, the trial of Joseph Kahahawai, Horace Ida, Ben Ahakuelo, David Takai, and Henry Chang had ended in a hung jury and the five non-haole young men walked free on bail awaiting a re-trial. For Walter Dillingham, the most powerful person in the territory, and his fellow business elites the Honolulu city and county Police Department had bungled the case by unwittingly destroying precious evidence and left the otherwise useful judge Alva E. Steadman unable to bend the jury to his will.²⁷⁴ Spurned by the courts and incensed by whispered accounts of a relationship between Thalia and one of the other defendants, Massie's husband, Tommie Hedges Massie and her mother, Grace Hubbard Fortescue, along with two fellow naval officers, Edward Lord and Albert 'Deacon' Jones banded together and set out to obtain a confession from Kahahawai by kidnapping him. Ultimately, the kidnappers could not get Kahahawai to confess and shot and killed him. Dubbed by Clarence Darrow, the famed defense attorney who

²⁷⁴ Steadman had been the judge in the infamous Fukunaga case whose conclusion, the hanging of Myles Fukunaga had created deep resentment of the Japanese community towards the haole justice system. Steadman also had close relationships with Hawai'i's business community as before he took charge of the Ala Moana case, he announced that this would be his last time behind the bench and that he would be taking a job with Castle & Cook, one of the infamous 'Big Five' sugar firms. Hannon, *The Massie Case*, 16.

represented the Massies', an "honor killing," the murder of Kahahawai was deemed by some haoles to be a necessary act of revenge for non-white transgression.²⁷⁵ As Grace Fortescue later explained, the vigilantes were "endeavoring to aid the law" in the face of a gang of dark skinned and working-class youth who had defied the courts and, as such, "mocked one of the white man's most sacred tenets."²⁷⁶ In the aftermath, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce appointed Dillingham as head of an emergency committee whose principal mission became the reorganisation of the police force.²⁷⁷

During the Massie saga, the Hawaiian and American press willfully raised the stakes with inflammatory editorials, interviews, and cartoons. The historian Helen Geracimos Chapin has described the relentless propaganda of haole newspapers in the territory as: "an invitation to lynch law."²⁷⁸ Talk of territory at the mercy of an epidemic of sexual crimes was rampant within haole circles. As a member of the emergency committee and the founder of the *Honolulu Times*, Edward P. Irwin printed and sent free of charge to many of Oahu's Army and Navy barracks 3,500 copies of a fear mongering editorial about the danger posed by kānaka maoli men toward white women. In a message enclosed within the menacing editorial, Irwin urged his readers to forward their copies home to their relatives in the continental empire. From coast to coast, Irwin's propaganda appeared in the sensationalist headlines of Hearst newspapers and the lurid

²⁷⁵ With the support of a number of editorials in the Honolulu Advertiser, in the days after the trial ended, Grace Fortescue, Thalia's mother, would go on to plead, unsuccessfully, with Judge Steadman, Admiral Stirling, and the Governor for the defendants to be put in jail while a second trial could be arranged. Tommie Massie and Grace Fortescue's sought out Joseph Kahahawai after hearing that another group of vigilantes had tortured Horace Ida and obtained a confession. In reality, Ida was beaten to a pulp by navy men but never confessed. Stannard, *Honor Killing*, 218.

²⁷⁶ Hannon, *The Massie Case*, 80.

²⁷⁷ During the trial, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce quietly put together a 5,000-dollar fund to be used to: "coax confessions from the defendants, among other purposes." After the decision of a hung jury was declared, the Chamber of Commerce publicly announced the existence of the fund and doubled it. Stannard, *Honor Killing*, 220. These tactics had been used before, by the HSPA during trials against the Japanese Federation of Labor and the Filipino Labor Leader Pablo Manlapit and during the Fukunaga case.

²⁷⁸ Chapin, *Shaping History*, 154.

cartoons of the New York tabloids. The images of k  naka maoli men portrayed as savage brutes summoned from the far reaches of the empire the specter of a national crisis.²⁷⁹



Fig. 4. Cartoon titled “The New Menace” printed on the front page of a New York tabloid on February 1, 1932.²⁸⁰

After the disappointing conclusion of the initial trial, on January 12, 1932, Walter Dillingham and the special committee of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce presented Governor Judd with a resolution urging for the Honolulu City and County Police Department to be put under the supervision of a police commission and the creation of the office of an appointed Chief of Police. Dillingham emphasized that the fallout from the alleged assault upon Thalia Massie represented the most perilous situation he could recall.²⁸¹ With the coming of a

²⁷⁹ Ahakuelo and Kahahawai were well-known athletes. Ahakuelo had represented the territory in a boxing match at Madison Square Garden only a few months prior. Newspaper often cast the two young defendants as “hoodlums” who used their physical gifts to assault service men and white women. Rosa, *Local Story*, 16. The New York Daily News predicted a race war in the territory while the Hearst papers argued for the imposition of martial law for the sake of Hawai’i’s white women. Reinecke, *The Navy and the Massie Kahahawai Case*, 21.

²⁸⁰ “The New Menace” c.1932, The Clarence Darrow Digital Collection at the Law Library of the University of Minnesota.

²⁸¹ The lynching of Kahahawai also caused the organisation of another emergency meeting, this time by the just recently founded Honolulu’s Citizens for Good Government. No tears were shed for Kahahawai at the Alexander Young Hotel as the president of Honolulu’s Citizens for Good Government, the notoriously anti-Japanese Mrs. Kluegel cried out that recent events had demonstrated that womanhood, the Christian faith, and the American

Federal investigator, action was desperately needed now in order to avoid significant intervention on the part of Washington and to ensure “continued safety for the community.”²⁸² While Dillingham wanted the Governor to know he had the backing of “the territory’s business community,” the industrialist wanted clear assurance that something would be done. For years, he said, him and his fellow haole businessmen had been financing the election of various candidates without having their say. Now, it was up to the Chamber of Commerce to “put its house in order.” Dillingham and his fellow businessmen warned the legislature that unless it proceeded with haste with the changes recommended by the Chamber of Commerce, it would take the matter up with Congress.²⁸³

A cartoon that accompanied Governor Judd’s announcement of the nomination of individuals for the police commission succinctly illustrated how haole elites interpreted the reorganisation of the system of law enforcement in the territory as a test of their resolve to safeguard their independence from Washington legislators.²⁸⁴ In the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*’s cartoon, a sturdy workman identified as the territory of Hawai‘i is shown building some sort of structure, either foundations or a wall.²⁸⁵ A cement block already in its place atop the structure reads “Police Chief,” while another that awaits placement reads “Public Prosecution.” The figure of Uncle Sam, representing the continental empire, asks the builder whether he needs any help, to which the worker replies: “No, thank you uncle. I can do this job.”

principles of government were under threat in the territory. Mrs. Kluegel explained that the recently created organisation’s primary goal was the implementation of “rigid law enforcement.” “Citizen’s Organisation,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 9, 1932), 5.

²⁸² When talking to the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, Dillingham only used the word “community” when refereeing to Honolulu’s “business community.”

²⁸³ “Chamber Group Wants Prompt Action,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 13, 1932), 1.

²⁸⁴ The League of Women Voters, briefly led by Mrs. Damon, also expressed their opposition to Washington’s ambitions to curb home rule by introducing bills inspired by the Richardson report through a resolution sent to the national organisation. “Women Protest Legislation to Curb Home Rule,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (December 7, 1932), 14.

²⁸⁵ Nash Wittem, “The Cartoonist Reviews the News of the Week,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 23, 1932), 3.




Fig. 5. "The Cartoonist Reviews the News of the Week."²⁸⁶

The first police commission members appointed by Governor Judd were elite men who had been loyal servants of the oligarchy.²⁸⁷ As chairman of the police commission, Judd selected Frederick D. Lowrey, the former speaker of the territorial house of representatives and the then vice president and manager of Lewers and Cooke, a lumber company that furnished the plantations with building materials. The other members were former representative of the territorial legislature and the then president and manager of the Union Trust Co. as well as several other companies, Antonio D. Castro. Edward E. Bodge, a former member of the

²⁸⁶ "The Cartoonist Reviews the News of the Week," c. 1932, Nash Wittem in the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*.

²⁸⁷ All of the men on the board were either employed by the sugar industry or leased land to plantations. In spite of all this, The Honolulu Annual of 1933 compiled by local historian Thomas G. Thrum described the commission as "non-political." Thrum, *The Hawaiian Annual for 1933*, 136.

Honolulu Board of Supervisor and the Territorial Board of Harbor Commissions while also being the vice president of Von Hamm Young, the largest company in the territory. George I. Brown, the manager and treasurer of the John I. Brown estate and Ernest E. Greene, the manager of the Oahu Sugar Co., the largest sugar producing company in the territory.²⁸⁸

The Richardson Report and Bill S.4310

In the days that preceded the passage of the Police Act of February 1, 1932, Assistant Attorney General Seth W. Richardson and his subordinates were assigned by Congress to produce a report on the ‘crime conditions’ present in the territory and issue recommendations on the viability of the structure of the territorial government. In his 3,380-page report, the result of more than 400 interviews, Richardson arrived at similar conclusions then those provided by the Pell committee and the Vitousek commission. Richardson found that the widespread laxity in the administration of government and in the imposition of the rule of law had increased the likelihood of crime. To the consternation of haole elites, Richardson went one step further than the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and the territory’s legislature in his analysis and questioned the haole community’s competence to resolve the situation and ensure the security of the strategic naval outpost.

Although, according to Richardson’s survey, there existed no “crime wave” to speak of, as the press alleged, in fact, crimes occurred at the same rate in Honolulu as in the major cities of the continental empire, and no organised criminal syndicate operated in the territory; Hawai’i was, just as Vitousek had found, afflicted with unique and potentially perilous characteristics which required the immediate improvement of its law enforcement capabilities.²⁸⁹ Richardson’s

²⁸⁸ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 97.

²⁸⁹ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, VII. Before coming to the territory, Richardson consulted with the former Berkeley police chief August Vollmer about American police methods. “Richardson Confers with Coast Officials,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (January 29, 1932), 6.

report put forth that the carelessness with which government and the police went about their business combined with the “unusual conditions of race, society, and industry” in Hawai‘i created a situation “fraught with social and political danger.”²⁹⁰

In his report, Richardson used the trope of the helpless native at the mercy of malicious foreigners to justify his agenda of police reforms. While all kānaka maoli could not be indeterminately relegated to the criminal class, contrary to the “old condition of affairs,” present-day Hawaiians did in fact, sometimes, commit crimes of a sexual nature.²⁹¹ But, Richardson stressed, “the record” showed that modern Hawaiians did not possess “as much tendency toward such crimes” at the rate of other racial groups such as Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, and the Portuguese.²⁹² Not only did Hawaiians risk being corrupted by the incompatible nature of “the orientals” and their natural inclination to “let administrative things “go slack,” without the application of wholesale reform to the system of law enforcement of the territory, catastrophe might strike sooner rather than later. In Richardson’s words, the worst was yet to come: “But with the racial mixture of Polynesian and oriental bloods and with the coming of serious racial resentments or antagonisms, any prolongation of the laxity or apathy in the enforcement of law and order might cause speedy disaster.”²⁹³

²⁹⁰ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, VII. Navy Rear Admiral Yates Stirling was intent on Congress authorizing a commission government under the supervision of the Navy Department and sent hysterical reports to Washington describing “(...) dark gangs of prowlers, lusting after white women, Japanese annoyances directed at Navy personnel, and riots caused by fighting between natives and Orientals against whites.” Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, 190.

²⁹¹ “The Hawaiians can not be thus disposed as an absolute class. There are among the members of the Hawaiian race in Hawaii men of the very highest character, education and attainments, who are the equal, in all respects of any member of the white race in the Territory.” United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 15.

²⁹² Richardson also provided 29 charts as to the “racial proclivity to crime in the Territory.” United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 15-16.

²⁹³ Richardson cannot stress enough the general “laxity” with which things are done in Hawai‘i. An “oriental” characteristic also exacerbated by the climate and landscape of the archipelago. Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 16.

Richardson sounded the alarm over the perceived lack of sound white leadership atop the territory's institutions as he decried: "The political pictures bears no marks of the unusual intelligence which distinguishes the industrial picture."²⁹⁴ Forced to cater to a large Hawaiian vote, Richardson opined that haoles had been unwilling or even possibly afraid to change the system of governance in the islands and as a result, their "Caucasians (...) ideas and ideals of government" as well their morals had been eroded by exposure to the "Polynesian and Oriental" races. In the opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, due to the influence of Native Hawaiians, haoles had grown politically complacent and dismissive of outsiders. Public institutions were staffed with inexperienced men of Hawaiian ancestry which resulted in an "inefficient"²⁹⁵ and lax system of law enforcement.²⁹⁶ The Honolulu City and County Police Department was particularly guilty of this abdication of white responsibility because of the multi-racial disposition of its ranks. This, he argued, rendered the need for strong, haole, leadership all the more crucial to "establish and preserve the loyalty and discipline" of the men.²⁹⁷

The report cited Hawai'i as an important naval outpost that required a "higher degree of law enforcement in order to avoid embarrassment of the military and naval force."²⁹⁸ The department of Justice lawyer believed that in the event of a national emergency a police department led by an elected Sheriff beholden to a racially diverse population constituted a

²⁹⁴ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 17.

²⁹⁵ The historian Mark H. Haller defines "efficiency" for law enforcement reformers as "the idea that the criminal justice system should be uniform and impartial in the enforcement of law and the punishment of criminals." Mark H. Haller, "Urban Crime and Criminal Justice: The Chicago Case," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (December 1970), 625

²⁹⁶ For example, Richardson reported that the city and county Attorney General had picked his deputies on the basis of race, for "political reasons." United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 19.

²⁹⁷ Richardson wrote: "Moreover, the racial division of the population being as it is, it follows that the personnel of the police department itself must be composed of many different races. Such a situation requires exceptionally strong leadership in order to establish and preserve loyalty and discipline." United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 67. As noted before, Native Hawaiians represented 65 percent of the officers of the Honolulu police department at the time of the Ala Moana trial. Stannard, *Honor Killing*, 70.

²⁹⁸ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, VII.

potential danger.²⁹⁹ Richardson argued that in Hawai‘i there existed an “unusually large proportion of young male persons of low intellectual grade and uncertain moral standards” and that in the event of a war in the Pacific, the size of the population of Asian origins, by then two thirds of the total population, warranted not only the repatriation of the position of Sheriff from local control, but the instauration of a Federally appointed commission form of government. As an added benefit, Richardson mused that a commission form of government would neutralize the “rigid industrial control” exercised by the sugar and pineapple interests over the territory’s populace.³⁰⁰ Richardson used the Navy’s growing concerns about the possibility of war in the Pacific to press Federal officials for a desperately needed injection of new blood into territorial administration which he characterized as plagued by “a condition of political inbreeding.”

Richardson concluded that the Honolulu City and County Police Department was in desperate need of an overhaul. Richardson summarized his findings as such: “During the greater portion of the last decade, if not prior thereto, the Honolulu police department has been operating at a low degree of efficiency and discipline. Its organisation has been loose and unscientific, its leaders have lacked executive ability and police skill, and its personnel has been largely untrained, incompetent, and often unintelligent. As a result, the confidence of the general public in the efficiency and integrity of the police has dwindled almost to the vanishing point.”³⁰¹

After the completion of Richardson’s exhaustive chronicle of the territory’s dire state of affairs, the Assistant Attorney General drafted a number of bills for the purpose of amending the provisions of the Organic Act of 1900 which laid out the territory’s principals of self-government

²⁹⁹ Ibid, VIII.

³⁰⁰ While Richardson praised the ingenuity of the territory’s industrialists, he was staunchly opposed to their preference for harboring a sizable immigrant population to work their fields. As Richardson saw it, immigrant labor would always be keen to leave behind manual labor and enter into other industries or worse, become chronically unemployed. Ibid, 17 and 38-40.

³⁰¹ Ibid, 60.

after annexation. These bills were introduced before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs and its chairman Connecticut Senator Hiram Bingham in 1933. Among the bills debated by the committee and the territory of Hawai‘i’s congressional delegate, Victor S. K. Houston,³⁰² was bill S.4310 which provided for the creation of a federally appointed High Sheriff to oversee all police matters in the territory.³⁰³ As Richardson intended it, the High Sheriff would not be subject to the residency requirement of five years. The High Sheriff would take over the duties of not only the Honolulu City and County Sheriff but of the Civil Service Commission and be tasked with such police administrative matters such as hiring, firing, and the setting of salaries for the whole of Hawai‘i’s police forces.³⁰⁴

For the territory’s elites, the prospect of welcoming another Federal interloper proved an inadmissible concession of authority in their own backyard. Governor Lawrence M. Judd led the charge. In his rebuttal, Judd bombastically equated Bingham’s proposed legislation to colonial rule and the occupation of the defeated Southern States by the North in the aftermath of the Civil War: “S.4310 would impose on Hawaii a system of police administration without parallel. It proposes that the people of Hawaii be dealt with like colonists, their status as American citizens administering the affairs of a self-governing integral part of the United States be ignored. If there be any precedents for such actions, they can only be found in the dark pages of American history just following the Civil War or the tactics of foreign powers dealing in so-called inferior people. To subject Hawaii to a Federal police force under “carpetbag” control would be to invite the

³⁰² Born in California from a mother descended from a “old Hawaiian family,” Victor Steuart Kaleoaha Houston was a navy career man before being elected as Delegate to Congress as a Republican in 1926, 1928, and 1930. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: Volume IV*, 253.

³⁰³ Richardson’s bill intended for the new High Sheriff to receive a salary of 9,000\$ a year paid for by the U.S. government.

³⁰⁴ Houston strongly argued against the bill and on the grounds that it would violate the doctrine of “home rule” in Hawai‘i, and furthermore, render law enforcement officials vulnerable to “national political patronage.” United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii*, 73.

same resentment and distrust which has always been provoked by such policies in the country.”³⁰⁵ From Judd’s point of view, history repeated itself as the Hawaiian descendants of the New England missionaries shared in the outrage of the defeated confederacy on which was imposed the reconstruction amendments. Hawai‘i was not a mere colony or even a territory, but a state in all but name, where haole Americans citizens had the constitutional right to self-government without undue encroachment from Washington which he characterized as “a power completely removed from the people.”³⁰⁶ It is safe to assume that Judd and other elites understood federal oversight of policing, if it came to pass, as the first step of a larger intervention by lawmakers in the dismantling of at least some of the exploitative principles of the plantation economy.

Judd himself had been appointed by President Herbert Hoover in 1929, so one could ask why was the Governor so unequivocally opposed to another Federal appointment to solve Hawai‘i’s police problem? But, Judd, the former director of the corporation Theo H. Davies, was no “carpetbagger,”³⁰⁷ in fact, Judd was the opposite, an insider whose family had steered the archipelago’s political and economic life for the last four generations.³⁰⁸ Just like Lawrence, his ancestors had always toed the fine line between rapprochement with the Washington and total

³⁰⁵ In addition to this, the undoubtedly incensed Judd also compared the appointment of law enforcement officials by the Federal government to the Revolutionary war’s casus belli of “taxation without representation.” United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii*, 46-55.

³⁰⁶ United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii*, 47. This view had been promulgated by the League of Women Voters in a resolution published in December of 1932, a month before the hearings in Congress “Women Protest Legislation to Curb Home Rule,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (December 7, 1932), 14.

³⁰⁷ A potential federal appointee for the position of Honolulu Sheriff horrified territorial lawmakers who feared the appointment of another “Jeff McCarn.” McCarn was a democrat from Nashville who was appointed as District Attorney for the Territory of Hawai‘i by the Woodrow administration in 1913. McCarn was particularly critical of Hawai‘i’s haole elites and their exploitation of native Hawaiians labor.

³⁰⁸ After attending the University of Pennsylvania, Lawrence McCully Judd began his business career at Carnegie Steel. Upon his return to Hawai‘i in 1909, Judd joined the Big Five sugar firm of Alexander & Baldwin before moving to another one, the Theo H. Davies company. Judd also held many positions with the Hawaiian Republican party, the army, and local associations such as the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce. Judd became a member of the Hawaiian Senate in 1920, an office he held until a brief stint on the Honolulu Board of Supervisors just before he was made Governor. Siddall, *Men of Hawaii Volume II*, 269 and Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: Volume IV*, 226-227.

subjugation. By modernizing Hawai‘i institutions according to Western standards, his grandfather, father, and uncle had assured the legitimacy of its government and kept euro-American control somewhat at bay.³⁰⁹ Of course, the family’s mission to preserve Hawaiian independence could also be interpreted as a total failure. By forging strong economic and military ties with the U.S., the Judds all but assured the eventual overthrow of the monarchy and the annexation of the usurped republic. In the same way, Judd’s mission to minimize Federal encroachment by instituting police reforms only stemmed the tide for a while and in the end, facilitated the takeover of the territory’s institutions by the Army’s martial government after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

As evidence for the sound leadership of haole elites, Judd extolled to Congress the virtues of the Police Act of February 1st, 1932, framing the piece of legislation as a miracle cure for the once ailing archipelago. Police reforms had reinvigorated the Honolulu City and County Police Department.³¹⁰ Public confidence in the police had been restored and the morale of officers had never been higher due to the removal of politics from considerations of advancements. As a result, crime statistics now compared favorably with those of the cities of the continental empire.³¹¹ As unequivocal proof of Honolulu’s progress in the last year, Judd provided Congress

³⁰⁹ In “Who Owns the Crown Lands,” the legal scholar John M. Van Dyke related that the historian of 19th century Hawai‘i Kuykendall speculated that during the Mahele, Gerrit P. Judd could have changed his position regarding the Alien Land Ownership Act of July 10, 1850, granting foreigners the right to own land, which he previously opposed, in exchange of a “suitable quid pro quo, such as a guarantee of independence, could have been obtained from the United States.” John M. Van Dyke, *Who Owns the Crown Lands of Hawai‘i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 51.

³¹⁰ Judd claimed that the reorganisation and modernization of the department had been made possible by the “cooperation of practically all elements of the community.” United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii*, 52.

³¹¹ Judd pointed out that in regard to the statistics on rape, Honolulu’s figure, even though it was still lower than the one attributed to mainland cities, was inflated because of the legal age of consent in Hawai‘i being 16, “while women of some of the races present in Hawaii are physiologically mature and competent to marry at such a young age.” On every category of crime, statistics showed Honolulu to have a lower rate per 100,000 than cities on the mainland except for “manslaughter by negligency.” Ibid, 52.

with a letter from August Vollmer himself praising the police department's reforms as modern and meeting the needs of O'ahu's citizens.³¹²

William A. Gabrielson

Even before the new chief of police bill came into effect on February 1, 1932, it was clear that August Vollmer would have a significant influence on the reorganisation of the HPD.³¹³ Chairman Lowrey had initially asked Vollmer to come to the territory for two weeks to assess the HPD, but the former chief refused on the grounds that his duties at the University of California at Berkeley took precedence. In his place, he sent his assistant, Captain J.A. Greening, the then acting Chief of Police for the Berkley Police Department. Furthermore, by appointing Dillingham's secretary, Charles F. Weeber, a man with no police experience, as interim chief of police to replace the departing Sheriff Gleason, Lowrey and his fellow commission members assured that Vollmer and his fellow Berkeley cops would have complete control the remaking of the HPD.³¹⁴ In fact, Weeber's only significant move beside commissioning a report from Greening on the state of the HPD was the reappointment of every member of the department to their respective positions on probationary status for a period of one year.³¹⁵

The Federal Government also trusted the expertise of Vollmer and his underlings. In his report on the state of the Honolulu City and County Police Department, J.A. Greening concluded

³¹² Ibid, 53.

³¹³ Mrs. Harry Kluegel, the chairman of the newly organised advocacy group Citizens' Organisation for Good Government, was actually the first person to ask Vollmer to come to the territory to conduct a crime survey in 1932. Although, they did not fight for it at the time, the group wished to see Governor Judd include in the chief of police bill a provision for the appointment of policewomen and the creation within the police department of a women's bureau. "Citizen League not Demanding Policewomen," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 22, 1932, Last Edition), 8.

³¹⁴ Weeber occupied a number of influential positions in Hawai'i prior to being named police chief. After leaving his role as chief clerk of the Hawaiian Department of the U.S. army, Weeber became Dillingham's secretary, as well as a director of the Hawaiian Dredging Co. and a director of the Dillingham transportation. As secretary of the Hawaii Emergency Labor Commission, Weeber lobbied Congress for it to declare a labor emergency and allow the importation of 50,000 Chinese labourers in the early 1920s. Nelligan, *Social Change and Rape Law in Hawaii*, 253. Nellist, *Men of Hawaii: Volume IV*, 531.

³¹⁵ United States Senate, *Law Enforcement in the Territory of Hawaii*, 98.

that the criminal situation in Honolulu was typical of those of mainland cities where “many races and racial admixtures” existed in proximity to each other. Greening found that the groups of “young hoodlums” who terrorized haoles were not gangsters after all. Although there existed an above average level of vice “in all its ramifications,” a lack of a proper record system for categorizing criminal reports hampered any clear analysis of the situation.³¹⁶ The Assistant Attorney General Seth Richardson wholeheartedly endorsed Greening’s diagnostic and prescriptions for the ills that plagued the HPD. In his own survey, Richardson was magnanimous toward the Berkeley police captain’s 52 recommendations for the department: “A perusal of these recommendations leaves little doubt that Honolulu will possess a vastly improved police department if the majority of them are carried into effect.”³¹⁷ Upon the completion of Greening’s study, Vollmer released from their duties two of his most trusted subordinates so that they could serve as instructors for the forthcoming police school: William A. Gabrielson, a police Lieutenant in charge of all record keeping for the Californian police department and C.I. Howell, an inspector for the vice squad.³¹⁸

When August Vollmer finally set foot in Hawai‘i on November 10, 1932, he received a hero’s welcome.³¹⁹ The territorial press enthusiastically reprinted Vollmer’s words on its front page as if it were their own motto: “A police department must set high standards of conduct, be

³¹⁶ Ibid, 257.

³¹⁷ Ibid, 98.

³¹⁸ “Berkeley Men to Instruct Local Police,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (March 16, 1932), 1-2.

³¹⁹ Although, his expertise had been requested many times by those who sought to reform the HPD, this was Vollmer’s first time in Hawai‘i. While Vollmer himself did not come to Honolulu during the 1920s, he was scheduled to speak at a conference of social workers in 1926 but cancelled at the last minute. HPD personnel were his frequent guests at Berkeley. As reported in chapter 1, Trask went to see Vollmer before the start of his tenure in 1924, while two members of his department also made separate visits to the famous police chief in 1925. Trask went back to Berkeley in 1926 after Vollmer could not come to the islands. “Detective St. Johns Was Busy Sleuthing to Find Landmarks,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 24, 1925), 8. “Capt. Twomey is Back from Trip,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (October 6, 1925), 19. “Vollmer Will Not Come to Territory,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (February 8, 1926), 13.

thoroughly divorced from politics and be manned by men of education and intelligence, if it is to function properly in maintaining a maximum of safety for the community.”³²⁰ Before embarking on busy tour of the island of O‘ahu, where he would conduct police reviews at the military sites of the Wahiawa and Schofield barracks, meet with Governor Judd, and have lunch at the Alexander Young hotel with the members of the police commission, Vollmer was greeted by his old friend, the former Berkeley police sergeant and the newly minted HPD chief of police, William A. Gabrielson.³²¹

A veteran of west coast police departments, William Gabrielson was a central figure in the modernization of Californian police. Gabrielson began his career in law enforcement as the secretary to the San Diego Chief of Police in 1908 but rapidly rose through the ranks due to his commitment to implementing the latest European advancements in investigative methods. As the official head of the “Bertillon Identification Bureau” of the San Diego police department, Gabrielson was tasked with taking the measurements of arrestees, registering fingerprints and footprints, and photographing prisoners. The *San Diego Union* noted in 1910 that among the many innovative measures Gabrielson had brought to the department in recent years, the young policeman had persuaded the chief of police to purchase a camera and filing cabinets for the photographing and the cataloging of criminals and arranged for the San Diego police to take part in an exchange of monthly reports of identification data with the police departments of Berkeley, Oakland, Alameda, San Jose, Los Angeles, and the bureau of criminal records at Leavenworth, Kansas.³²²

³²⁰ “Vollmer Here for Day; Sees County Police,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (November 10, 1932, Last Edition), 1.

³²¹ Six months after first being appointed, Weeber stepped down and William Gabrielson was named the new Honolulu police chief. “Gabrielson to Become Police Chief August 9,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (July 22, 1932), 1.

³²² “Bertillon Expert’s Library Catalogue of Evil Doers of Country,” *The San Diego Union* (January 23, 1911), 9.

Gabrielson eventually left the San Diego PD and continued to refine his expertise as he moved from one department to another. After a stint on the East Coast where, according to newspaper reports, Gabrielson further studied the subject of criminal identification, the budding expert came back to California to be the assistant superintendent of the State Bureau of Criminal Identification only to join Vollmer's Berkeley police department a couple of months later in 1918. While at Berkeley, Gabrielson became an esteemed member of the department and was given the opportunity to bring Vollmer's methods to other golden state stations.³²³ Indeed, the Berkeley Police Department under Vollmer was known to have a "travelling tradition." According to Alfred E. Parker, Vollmer's student at the Berkeley criminology department and his co-author on many books, at the request of local officials, Vollmer himself surveyed the police departments of Havana, Cuba, Detroit, Chicago, Kansas City, Missouri, Minneapolis, Syracuse, Dallas, and Portland, Oregon.³²⁴ In 1925, on the back of Vollmer's endorsement, Gabrielson was chosen as Police Chief for the neighboring city of Monterrey, California. After a brief stint reorganising Monterey's police department, Gabrielson returned to Berkeley where he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant.³²⁵

W.A. Gabrielson arrived in Honolulu on April 7, 1932, to be an instructor for the new police school along with C.I. Howell, himself the former Chief of Police of Coronado, California. Furnished with a salary of 400\$ per months, the Berkeley men anticipated staying in Hawai'i for a year to handle the details of the reorganisation of the HPD.³²⁶ Throughout the


³²³ On the occasion of his promotion to the rank of Sergeant, Chief Vollmer described Gabrielson as a "recognised criminal identification expert with special aptitude for all branches of office work of a police department. Vollmer also praised Gabrielson for his uncanny ability to commit to memory the faces of criminals. Gabrielson had previously gained some notoriety during the San Diego exposition of 1915 when his special squad made use of his techniques to arrest known pickpockets and "bunco men." "Sergeant of Berkeley Police Force Chosen Local Chief of Police," *Peninsula Daily Herald* (July 9, 1925), 1.

³²⁴ Parker, *The Berkeley Police Story*, 29.

³²⁵ "Sergeant of Berkeley Police Force Chosen Local Chief of Police," *Peninsula Daily Herald* (July 9, 1925), 4.

³²⁶ "Two Berkeley Experts Here for New Duty," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 7, 1932, Last Edition), 1.

course of their engagement in Honolulu, it became clear to whoever listened that the next chief of the HPD would not come from the territory. Greening's numerous and rigorous recommendations for the improvement of the department made evident that no man was better placed to implement the pillars of Vollmer's doctrine than one of his disciples. On April 29, while the territory and the world awaited the verdict of the jury in the trial of Lieutenant Thomas Massie and his co-conspirators for the kidnapping and murder of Joseph Kahahawai, the associated press reported that Honolulu's "business interests" had proposed to eliminate the residency clause contained in the Chief of Police bill in order to pave the way for Gabrielson to be installed as the new chief of the HPD at some point this year.³²⁷ A few months later, the residency clause was officially dispensed with and the police commission anointed Gabrielson as Chief of Police on July 22.³²⁸



³²⁷ The bill originally mandated that the chief of police of the HPD be a resident in the territory for a period of 5 years prior to his appointment. "Honolulu Seeks to Change Police Chief," *Albany Times-Union* (April 29, 1932), 2.

³²⁸ Gabrielson officially assumed his duties on August 9, 1932. "Gabrielson to Become Police Chief August 9," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (July 22, 1932), 1.

Fig. 6. William A. Gabrielson and C. I. Howell arrive in Honolulu as reported by the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*.³²⁹

Gabrielson's emphasized three of Vollmer's tenets during his tenure as head of the HPD between 1932 and 1946: the adoption of new technologies in order to facilitate surveillance operations and crime prevention, the scrutinized selection and scrupulous instructions of new recruits, and the fostering of close cooperation between the various institutions of the state. In the pages of the 1934 Hawaiian Annual, the HPD chief boasted about the progress that had been made in reorganising and modernizing the department in the last two years. Gabrielson contended that his HPD was unrecognizable from the "politics ridden" department that existed prior to his arrival. Now, the chief exclaimed, the police force functioned as a cohesive unit in service of "the good people" of Honolulu.³³⁰ In Williamson's second year in charge, in 1934 alone, there were 2047 arrests of Filipinos on O'ahu of which 1148 took place in Honolulu proper.³³¹

Vollmer's passionate plea for the inclusion of the latest scientific instruments in modern policing practices was embraced by Gabrielson's HPD. In this new age of policing, information was not merely a tool of law enforcement but the goal of many of the police's operations. To prevent crime to the best of their abilities, the police department should endeavor to know as much about the people of the city as it could. Since May 1932, officers were now required to complete and submit reports of their investigations, no matter how trivial the details, to the Record Bureau to be "numbered, indexed coded, consolidated and filed" in order to create "an

³²⁹ "Here to Work for a Year" c.1932. In the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*.

³³⁰ In his text, Gabrielson drew a clear demarcation between "the people" who had left the HPD fall into political control and inefficiency and the "good people of the community" who had realized they needed to act. The Printshop Company, LTD., *The Hawaiian Annual For 1934: The Reference Book for Information and Statistics* (Honolulu: The Printshop Company LTD.), 40.

³³¹ Most arrests were for gambling and assaults. At the time, only a quarter of the total Filipino population in the territory resided on O'ahu but they were the recipients of three quarters of the total number of arrests for that racial group. Inter-Church Federation of Honolulu, *Filipino Life in Honolulu* (Honolulu, 1936), Chapter IX.

accurate accounting of police work for which the public is paying.” Lowrey, the police commission chairman, stated to Congress that the implementation of a modern record division was already proving worthwhile as the city and county department could now show the location and time of previous offenses along with the perpetrator’s nationality, sex, and age.³³² Police also forged a partnership with the Hawaiian Academy of Criminology to aid “in the scientific detection of criminals and the solving of crimes.” Information under Gabrielson became an indispensable tool in the planification of the deployment of the department’s resources.

The HPD could also count on a number of news tools such as the recent acquisitions of one of Vollmer’s objects of fascination, a lie detector.³³³ The HPD centralized its police telephone service, instituted a radio broadcasting service for patrol cars, and a flash-light recall system to summon any officer out in the streets to the nearest telephone box.³³⁴ For the first time, as per the recommendations of Greening, the island of Oahu was now divided in districts and beats with the “business section of Honolulu” patrolled by officers on foot while the country districts were supervised by motorized units equipped with radio transmitters.

Officers of the HPD were also the beneficiaries of a slew of state of the weapons that would not have looked out of place in the hands of a U.S. army division. The “Condemned ammunition and antiquated and assorted weapons of varying calibres” utilized by the previous administrations were replaced by standardized riot equipment that included riot guns, tear gas bombs, and smoke candles. The men also received .38 caliber police type revolvers, new olive-coloured uniforms, and standardized handcuffs and batons. Gabrielson called on Army officers to

³³² United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii*, 92.

³³³ Carte and Carte described the lie detector or polygraph as the best example of “what may be called Vollmer’s love of “gadgets.”” Vollmer had great hopes for the device and believed in it even though it had many detractors who questioned its place in law enforcement. Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 49-50.

³³⁴ United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii*, 92.

train his department in the use of their fearsome modern equipment.³³⁵ In another move inspired by military procedure, Honolulu's policemen were now divided into nine divisions under the supervision of commanding officers who met weekly with the chief himself.

New standards of recruitment were implemented after the less-than-optimal showing of the previous regime's crop of officers on the Army Alpha Test.³³⁶ Applicants were now required to be "between the age of 21 and 30; at least five feet, nine inches in height, a graduate of high school; a resident of the territory for at least one year prior to his appointment; and of high moral character." The new patrolmen were subjected to a rigorous training course to instill in them the skills required to fulfill Vollmer's vision of a new breed of super cops. Recruits were instructed in criminal law, public speaking and a number of more practical lessons with distinct military overtones such as: "the Use of Firearms and Gas," "Infantry Drill," and "Riot Duty."³³⁷

Gabrielson was extremely proud of the fact that many of the new hires were graduates or had at least attended universities in the past. By January of 1933, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin reported that the HPD could already count on fourteen college graduates with Wendell Brooks, the son of local Judge Francis M. Brooks, being the latest recruit. Of the fourteen college men in the employ by the HPD, ten had been educated on the mainland.³³⁸ In only a year, Gabrielson doubled the number of white men in the ranks of the HPD with 12 of the 18 new hires described as Caucasians.³³⁹

³³⁵ Ibid, 92.

³³⁶ Again, when the police commission took over the administration of the HPD in 1932, it opted not to dismiss anyone immediately, and instead, put all of the department's staff on probation for one year so that they could undergo the proper training given by Gabrielson and Howell.

³³⁷ The Printshop Company, LTD., *The Hawaiian Annual For 1934*, 43.

³³⁸ "Wendell Brooks the 14th Collegian on the Police Force," Honolulu Star-Bulletin (January 9, 1933, Last Edition), 4.

³³⁹ United States Senate, *Administration in Hawaii*, 94.

For all the talk of the dawn of a new era in the history of the Honolulu City and County Police Department, Gabrielson's forces dealt with many of the same problems former Sheriff David K. Trask faced more than a decade before. In an editorial in the pages of the *Honolulu Star-Advertiser*, Gabrielson was quoted as stating that four out of every nine arrests in Honolulu were for felonies committed by juveniles.³⁴⁰ The Honolulu city and county police chief rationalized the high rate of juvenile arrests as: "Too much leisure, too much idleness, too much time for the young mind to think of ways and means of getting into mischief." Although flushed with money and armed with the latest military technologies, Gabrielson's solution to the problem of juvenile delinquency was eerily similar to the one discussed ad nauseam by haole elites. For Gabrielson, sugar planter paternalism of sugar plantations had proven to be the sole bright spot in the war against crime. The police chief proclaimed that on the plantations "every effort is put forth to keep the youth either at work, or busy with athletics or some other wholesome and healthful diversion (...)." ³⁴¹

Martial Law and Crime

William A. Gabrielson's tenure as police chief of the Honolulu City and County Police Department was bookended by two crises, the Massie Affair in 1932 and the Japanese bombing of the naval base at Pearl Harbor in 1941. The attack of December 7, 1941, compelled the Federal government to institute a military government and impose martial law in the territory for a period of three years, until 1944.³⁴² During this time, the Honolulu Police Department became the purview of the Military Governor. In an article in the *Journal of Criminal Law and*

³⁴⁰ "Our Juvenile Behavior," *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (August 18, 1936), 12.

³⁴¹ "Our Juvenile Behavior," 12.

³⁴² Under martial law, civilian courts were replaced by military provost courts. In the words of Gabrielson: "These allowed for few continuances and made for swift trial and substantial punishment." A curfew and "blackout" hours were imposed to conceal infrastructure at night. William A. Gabrielson "Martial Law and Crime," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 33 No. 5 (1942-1943), 382.

Criminology titled, “A Police Department Under Fire,” Gabrielson framed the HPD as being on the frontlines of a war that might soon reach the police departments of the cities of the continental empire.³⁴³ Since his appointment in 1932 by the police commission, Gabrielson believed things had come full circle. The HPD was now an example for other American police departments to follow. The promises of Vollmer’s reforms had bore fruit at the most crucial of times.

Gabrielson was particularly proud of having assembled the “Police Emergency Reserve” in the spring of 1941. In a move that recalled Vollmer’s own actions at a time of crisis, and those of the American legion members who organised to patrol the streets in the wake of the Kaka‘ako case, Gabrielson deputized and trained “150 leading business men, lawyers, executives, legislators, and others,” to patrol the streets of Honolulu when called upon.³⁴⁴ Beginning in July of 1941, the mostly haole reserves took part in weekly classes on the laws of arrest, the duties of a police officer, first aid, self-defence, and the handling of firearms.³⁴⁵ If elites had politically mobilized to overhaul policing in 1932 in order to prevent greater federal oversight, in 1941, they were physically called upon to shore up the ranks of the Honolulu Police Department. Gabrielson’s “Police Emergency Reserve” was quite literally haole elites taking matters into their own hands.³⁴⁶

³⁴³ W.A. Gabrielson, “A Department Under Fire,” *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 33 No. 1 (May-June 1942), 77.

³⁴⁴ Gabrielson, “A Department Under Fire,” 77. In the aftermath of the great San Francisco earthquake of 1906, Vollmer advertised for veterans of the Spanish American war and eventually deputized over a thousand citizens to keep order and manage supplies. Carte and Carte, *Police Reform in the United States*, 24.

³⁴⁵ Of the 23 recruits named by the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, only one was not haole. “Business Men Pound Beats in Police Course,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 1941), 10.

³⁴⁶ The Army had its own plan for an auxiliary force. Beginning in 1935, the U.S. military had devised a plan for a civilian battalion in case of war against Japan under the auspices of the Army Service Command. In July 1940, the Provisional Police was established. Led by plantation manager T.G.S. Walker, the force consisted of plantation employees, members of the American Legion, and utility workers. Kelli Y. Nakamura, “Internal Surveillance of O‘ahu’s Japanese Population During World War II: The Honolulu Police Department’s Special Detail Unit and Contact Group,” *The Hawaiian Journal of History*, Vol. 47 (2013), 215.

Gabrielson's elite deputies were educated in the surveillance operations that became a crucial part of the HPD's mission during the war.³⁴⁷ The surveillance and incarceration of Hawai'i people of Japanese ancestry was one domain that coalesced the efforts of the military, the sugar planters, and the police. In fact, since at least 1940, the FBI had asked the Honolulu police department to form its own espionage unit. The unit was tasked by the FBI and military intelligence with spying on individuals of Japanese ancestry on whether in the event of war with Japan those persons of interests would side with the enemy.³⁴⁸ Gabrielson wrote: "One of the most important tasks which the Police Department had to perform was aiding the Federal Bureau of Investigation in rounding up enemy aliens suspected of espionage."³⁴⁹ It seemed that during their training elite recruits were prepared to do exactly that as they "walked or rode a beat with a police officer one night a week learning the location of persons living in that area."³⁵⁰ Since the strikes of the 1920s, where Japanese plantation workers organised alongside Filipino labourers the military had made use of the network of industrial spies employed by the sugar barons to seek out agitators.³⁵¹ Now that the war had done away with the need for the oligarchy's pretense of good intentions toward the majority Japanese population of the archipelago, haole elites were at ease in their role as enforcers of draconian measures.

³⁴⁷ In total, 1,569 persons would be detained on suspicion of disloyalty during the war with 1,466 of those held by police of Japanese descent. Scheiber and Scheiber, *Bayonets in Paradise*, 42.

³⁴⁸ Scheiber and Scheiber, *Bayonets in Paradise*, 23. The patrols were directed at neighborhoods like Kaka'ako, Kalihi. Officers explained that their principal purposes for patrolling those districts was "because of the numerous Japanese residents." Nakamura, "Internal Surveillance of O'ahu's Japanese Population During World War II," 220.

³⁴⁹ Gabrielson, "A Department Under Fire," 78. This is an obfuscation of the facts. Although, in the initial spur of arrests eighty-five German and Italian aliens were detained, most of the persons apprehended were part of the first generation of Japanese migrants, issei, who were not in Hawaii illegally but as alien residents. Furthermore, twenty of the initial group of arrestees were citizens of the United States of Japanese ancestry, nisei. Later on, that number would increase. Scheiber and Scheiber, *Bayonets in Paradise*, 45. During this period, martial law regulations were used as justification by HPD officers to enter and investigate the homes of Japanese residents. Nakamura, "Internal Surveillance of O'ahu's Japanese Population During World War II," 220.

³⁵⁰ Gabrielson, "A Department Under Fire," 77.

³⁵¹ Scheiber and Scheiber, *Bayonets in Paradise*, 13.

Through their participation in policing, elites were able to retain their access to power even when military rule had suspended the civil institutions, they traditionally controlled. British plantation owner Major Douglas G. King, a retired cavalry officer was named head of the police reserve.³⁵² Roy Vitousek, who incredibly, at the time of the attack, was flying in a private plane in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor and was fired upon by the Japanese squadron after which he immediately went to police headquarters to report what he saw was ““drafted” into service” as the HPD’s legal interpreter of the military government’s orders.³⁵³ Because of their role as auxiliaries to the HPD, King, Vitousek, and other elites were exempted from many of the restrictions of military rule unlike their fellow residents.

Gabrielson welcomed the imposition of martial law in the territory as it reduced the preponderance of criminal activity. With the added manpower of the emergency reserves and a significant number of additional officers granted by the military government, the HPD was able to introduce “intensified control over areas where crime was likely to be prevalent.”³⁵⁴ Curfews and the harsh punishments of military courts were especially strong deterrents, but the increased labour demand of the war industry had the most significant effect as everyone including the “bums, vagrants, and professional idlers were made to get busy contributing to the war effort.”³⁵⁵ Martial law proved to be an opportunity for haole elites and the HPD to settle old scores.

³⁵² King who, for years spent his winters in Hawai‘i, only bought a house in the territory in 1940. King owed his fortunes to the tea plantations he owned in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka. Even after the end of martial law, King argued for the continuation of the imposition of a curfew. “Maj. King to Direct Provisional Police,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 7, 1941), 1.

³⁵³ Gabrielson, “A Department Under Fire,” 81.

³⁵⁴ Gabrielson “Martial Law and Crime,” 381.

³⁵⁵ Ibid, 382. In 1942, the department initiated a drive to arrest all men found to be not working. “Police Will Grab Loafers,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (July 31, 1942), 2.

Conclusion

Because of the scrutiny of the national press and the dire prognosis of Assistant Attorney General Seth Richardson's report on the system of law enforcement in the territory, haole elites understood very well that the Federal Government desired to see substantial changes brought to the system administration of police in Honolulu. With his work in Berkeley and Washington, August Vollmer had made professional policing and the idea of generalized surveillance more palatable to middle class citizens by promoting these innovations as the solutions to political corruption and urban crime. Vollmer's explicit distaste of electoral politics found sympathetic ears among the oligarchy wary of the demographic tyranny of Native Hawaiians. Vollmer and his Berkeley acolytes' brand of professional policing offered ready-made solutions to the entrenchment of "lax" police practices within the HPD.

The chief of police bill of January 1932 represented the confluence of two of the most powerful forces in the territory: the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and the territorial Legislature. When the Honolulu Star-Bulletin published an editorial titled: "Where Credit is Due," in celebration of the long-awaited legislative go ahead for reforms, the paper highlighted the work of Philip S. Pell and Roy A. Vitousek.³⁵⁶ Pell was described as a "pioneer" who thoroughly understood the "police problem" and whose advocacy should have won him a place on the newly created police commission. The Star-Bulletin praised Vitousek as the person who truly galvanised support for reform through the work of his governmental commission. Although, the bill was defeated upon first being presented to the territorial legislature in 1931 because of the opposition of the incumbent Sheriff Patrick K. Gleason and his "political machine," Vitousek's vigorous campaigning was credited as the reason for its success a year later.

³⁵⁶ "Where Credit is Due," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 25, 1932), 6.

As head of the Honolulu City and County Police Department, William A. Gabrielson put Vollmer's ideas into practice. His department utilized new technologies to increase the police presences in Honolulu streets. With the adoption of military equipment and signifiers, and the recruitment of mostly white, college educate recruits, the HPD positioned itself as an occupying force in Honolulu's multi-racial neighborhoods. The police department's militarization made it a natural ally to the FBI and the American military's intelligence operations against isei and nisei residents of the territory before and during the Second World War. Gabrielson's recruitment of haole businessmen to serve as police auxiliaries only worked to make the racial hierarchies of power more visible at a time of crisis.

As in 1923, when the League of Women Voters' campaign for law enforcement reform was part and parcel of a larger elite movement to transform the immigration and education system,³⁵⁷ the calls for the reform of the HPD in the late 1920s were also associated with other instances of upper-class organising for anti-democratic measures and greater haole control of the public institutions of the territory. In 1930, Governor Judd and many of the haole elites who backed the creation of an appointive position of police chief called for the centralization of ten of the territory's welfare institutions under the umbrella of a Department of Institutions which would be governed by an appointed committee of seven citizens. Under the plan, these seven executives would have overseen important institutions that had previously been under the purview of the board of health, the board of industrial schools, the attorney general, and the board of commissioners of the Waimamo Home.³⁵⁸ Governor Judd justified the consolidation in

³⁵⁷ Here I am referring to Dillingham's campaign to introduce a rotating immigration scheme in the aftermath of the 1920 strikes and the territorial government's legislative agenda to limit the number of students eligible to attend Japanese Language schools. For more see Odo, *No Sword to Bury*, 38-39.

³⁵⁸ The ten institutions were: the Territorial Hospital at Kaneohe, the Puumale Home at Hilo, the leper settlement at Kalaupapa, the Kalihi Receiving Hospital at Honolulu, Kapiolani Girls Home in Honolulu, the Kalihi Boys Home in Honolulu, the Maunawili training school for girls, the Waielee training school for boys, the Oahu prison, and the

much the same way police reforms were advocated for, characterizing the plan for the Department of Institutions as “in line with economic business procedures” and as incorporating “more scientific methods” in the administration of public services.³⁵⁹ The department of institutions bill garnered the support of Honolulu Mayor John Wilson, Democratic Supervisor Manuel C. Pacheco, and Frank C. Atherton, the president of Castle and Cooke Ltd.³⁶⁰ Although, the bill ultimately failed to gain approval in the territorial legislature, it signified the breath of the ambitions of Republican lawmakers for increasing oligarchic control of public institutions.³⁶¹

Waimamo Home in Pearl City. “Community Leaders for Judd’s Unification Plan,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (June 3, 1930), 1-4.

³⁵⁹ “Judd Outlines Plans for Welfare Combine,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (January 9, 1931), 9.

³⁶⁰ Atherton had doubts about what he considered to be an insufficient salary offer for the prospective executives but, nonetheless, was in favor of Governor Judd’s plan. “Community Leaders for Judd’s Unification Plan,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (June 3, 1930), 1-4.

³⁶¹ Due to fears from members of the territorial senate Ways and Means Committee that the initiative would increase expenditures instead of reducing them, the plan was rejected. “Institutions Department Seems Dead,” *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* (April 28, 1931), 1.

Conclusion

On April 12, 1946, William A. Gabrielson tendered his resignation from the Honolulu City and County Police Department.³⁶² The next day, the territory's Public Prosecutor made headlines when he unveiled that several members of the HPD's Vice Squad had been involved in a protection scheme with many of Honolulu's houses of prostitution and gambling dens. For years, these illegal enterprises had been making weekly payments to the officers of the City and County Police Department in exchange for protection from police raids and other criminals.³⁶³ Gabrielson's department had been collecting at least half a million dollars annually in the form of payoff from Chinatown's clubs and downtown hotels.³⁶⁴ Gabrielson was not charged and denied any involvement in the matters alleged by the Public Prosecutor's office.³⁶⁵ In a statement, Gabrielson claimed that he could never have contemplated or even committed such crimes because of the trust put in him all those years ago by August Vollmer and the members of the first Police Commission.³⁶⁶

Gabrielson's time as head of the Honolulu City and County Police Department may have ended in scandal but this was not the conclusion to the chief's career in law enforcement. A month after making public his resignation, Gabrielson announced that he had accepted a job as a

³⁶² Gabrielson explained his decision by announcing that his wife needed a "major operation" and would be required to stay on the mainland for "an extended period of time." "Change in Police as Chief Quits," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 12, 1946), 1.

³⁶³ "Payoff to Police in Millions Here, Insiders Charge," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (April 13, 1946), 1.

³⁶⁴ The houses of prostitution were originally located downtown but relocated to Chinatown after the influx of soldiers in the wake of the entry of the United States in the Second World War. Ted Chernin, "My Experiences in the Honolulu Chinatown Red-Light District," *The Hawaiian Journal of History*, Vol. 34 (2000), 208-210. Jean Ohara, a former Honolulu madame, described Gabrielson as a prison warden where sex workers were inmates and the Honolulu City Government as worse than the dictatorship of the Axis. Jean O'Hara, *Honolulu Harlot: An Expose of Honolulu Vice Conditions* (Hawaii: 1944), 17.

³⁶⁵ "Gabrielson Denies Charges of Graft," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (June 21, 1947), 1.

³⁶⁶ Later on, Gabrielson was accused with 13 counts of embezzlement, but the charges did not stick. "Gabrielson Freed on All Charges," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (October 9, 1947), 1.

Police Administrator in Tokyo, Japan under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of the allied powers.³⁶⁷ Gabrielson was offered the position by another famous department chief, Louis J. Valentine, the former New York Police Commissioner, who had been hired by the American Military Government to reorganise Tokyo's police, fire, and prison system.³⁶⁸ As such, the circle of imperial feedback of policing and military disciplinary technologies was complete. Where once imperial importers like August Vollmer had brought back with him the future of American policing from the United States' counterinsurgency in the Philippines, these repressive innovations now made their way across the pacific to be used on another people under military occupation.

While police reforms intimated the dominance of U.S. interests abroad, at home it served to shore up the sovereignty of haoles in the Hawaiian territory. As the convenient political alliance Republicans engineered with Native Hawaiian leaders to preserved legislative authority in the wake of annexation to the United States demonstrated, planters had no use for democracy or mass movements. For the first quarter century, the oligarchy used the tools of Americanization and welfare capitalism to preserve minority rule, but the planters' reliance on Asian labor went against federal immigration restriction that believed Japanese and Filipinos could never be conveniently assimilated. By the 1930s, the very foundations of the plantation economy threatened oligarchic rule. With their supply of indolent workers threatened and their unwillingness to ameliorate the conditions of the working class, elites turned to the coercive power of police for safekeeping.

³⁶⁷ In Gabrielson's words he was there "to assist in organising the Japanese police into a democratic police system" and advocated for centralising the Japanese police system. "Japanese Solving Own Postwar Problems, Gabrielson Says," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 20, 1947), 3.

³⁶⁸ "Retiring Chief Gabrielson Will Tackle Police Job in Tokyo," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (May 13, 1946), 1.

The women reformers of 1923's campaign to reform the Honolulu City and County Police Department first signalled the coming disturbances to planter hegemony. Urban crime offered Honolulu progressives women, who believed themselves the standard bearers of Americanism, the language to critique the planter model of territorial administration. Focus on new land developments to accommodate the growing tourism industry and the haole upper classes, territorial officials had been unconcerned with the spread of the vice industry and the proliferation of slum conditions in proximity to Honolulu's Downtown area. As the extremely close result of the 1923 election for Sheriff exposed, resentment toward the status quo was bubbling underneath the planters' status quo. David K. Trask's win against the incumbent Sheriff and a Republican opponent was a significant achievement for a Native Hawaiian political outsider with no formal law enforcement experience. The language of progressive reforms offered a lifeline to the plantation political economy in the same way scientific advancements had kept the yields of sugar cultivation increasing even under deteriorating environmental conditions.

The Vigilance Committee and Trask's embrace of the militarized repressive tactics of police reformer August Vollmer set territorial politics on a new path. The racial hierarchy of the plantation could be interpreted through the lens of criminality. Statistics on crime validated the political and economic subservience of the "feeble minded" and "unassimilable." The new urban phenomenon of gangs required the integration of technologies that had already proven useful to authorities regulating the multi-racial cities on the mainland. The policing innovations of August Vollmer borne out of the crucible of the American empire in the Pacific had been laundered through an international network of police officers who utilized their academic credentials to influence municipal and national politics. The oligarchy saw right through Vollmer's pseudo-

scientific prose and recognized in his creed their own project of class warfare. It is no surprise Judd credited Vollmer's and Gabrielson's modernization of the HPD with restoring public morale. Over the course of a decade, the various segments of elite society had been converted to the church of Vollmer.

Today, the Atlanta Police Department's "Atlanta Public Safety Training Center" more commonly known as "Cop City" has become the most notorious project of police modernization in the United States. Cop City is in the process of being erected on more than 300 acres of land that once belonged to the Muscogee Creek peoples, the Weelaunee forest, currently owned by the city of Atlanta. First announced in 2021 by Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms, the training center will eventually include entire mock villages and gun ranges for the benefit of training officers in urban tactical exercises.³⁶⁹ To date, public funds have been earmarked for the sum of 67 million dollars, double what the city initially disclosed.³⁷⁰

The project is backed by the Atlanta Public Foundation, a private organisation raising millions of dollars for the purpose of keeping Atlanta's "law enforcement agency on the forefront of policing and public safety practices."³⁷¹ On its website, the APF describes "Technology,"

³⁶⁹ This is reminiscent of the military training bases where fake Iraqi towns were constructed in the United States and Canada to prepare troops for the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Oliver Wainwright, "'We've got drone swarms, dirty bombs, radar-jamming': the fake town where America practises for war," *The Guardian*, May 15, 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/may/15/weve-got-drone-swarms-dirty-bombs-radar-jamming-the-fake-town-where-america-practises-for-war>.

³⁷⁰ On top of the initial 30 million dollars promised by the city in 2021, another 30 million was "buried in amendments" of the 2021 agreement that gave the go-ahead to the project. Timothy Pratt, "Real cost of 'Cop City' under question after Atlanta approves \$67m for project," *The Guardian*, June 3, 2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/09/cop-city-cost-atlanta-city-council>.

³⁷¹ "About Us," The Atlanta Police Foundation, Accessed on October 20, 2024. <https://atlantapolicefoundation.org/about-the-atlanta-police-foundation/>. The APF also work to advise the city on police programs while also liaising with technology companies interested in city contracts. The APF longtime CEO, David Wilkinson has chaired the Atlanta Repeat Offenders Commission a "collaborative effort by city, county, state, and federal agencies, as well as private sector organizations, to reduce Repeat Offender crime." Michael Seiden, "New Report Offers Insight on Repeat Offenders Across Metro Atlanta," WSB-TV Atlanta, Accessed on October 20, 2024. <https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/atlanta/new-report-offers-insight-repeat-offenders-across-metro-atlanta/XZFUB3TUEJDSXNJ727MQAFTXUM/>. The APF has recently recommended that the technology company Tailtrix received a government contract, an electronic monitoring company that promises to use geo-fencing tools to track and monitor people on pretrial release or probation and produce a "Tailtrix score" that law enforcement could

“Increased Enforcement,” “Training,” “More Officers,” and “Regional Collaboration” as its ideological “Pillars.” Sitting on the board of the organisation are the representatives of some of the biggest companies headquartered in Atlanta such as Delta, Home Depot, Equifax, Invesco, Georgia-Pacific, Waffle House and the real estate firms of Carter and Loudermilk Companies.

Public officials and police have gone to great length to squash the ever-growing coalition of local and national actors opposed to the construction of militarized police training centers in their communities. In January of 2023, police killed environmental activist Manuel Paez Teran, also known as “Tortugueta” after firing 57 shots at while they had their arms raised.³⁷² Later that year, the city of Atlanta indicted 61 people opposed to the project on racketeering charges, a tactic prosecutors usually reserve for members of organised crime. The Atlanta Police Department has also engaged in a broad surveillance operation compiling at least 76 intelligence reports on 155 events held by Atlanta residents opposed to Cop City.³⁷³

While the reforms of the Police Act of February 1, 1932, and the Cop City project stand more than a 100 years apart, the tactics of proponents of police militarization are eerily similar.³⁷⁴ Police experts and elites have done their utmost to divorce discussions on public safety from the concerns of local communities, choosing to only consider the interests of private business. Police professionalization as preached by August Vollmer and William A. Gabrielson

use to determine to incarcerate someone. Atlanta Community Press Collective, “Atlanta Police Foundation Pushed ‘Unprecedented’ Surveillance Plan,” It’s Going Down, Accessed on October 20, 2024. <https://itsgoingdown.org/atlanta-police-foundation-pushed-unprecedented-surveillance-plan/>.

³⁷² Chloe Kim, “‘Cop City’ activist Manuel Paez Terán shot 57 times in Atlanta, autopsy says,” BBC News, Accessed on October 20, 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65340456>.

³⁷³ The reports contain information about activists’ social media posts as well as the monitoring of such events as a “pizza night” organised by the group “Women on the Rise” where attendees were invited to take a moment to reflect on community safety. Spencer Reynolds and José Guillermo Gutiérrez, “Internal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of ‘Cop City’ Opponents’ Political Activity,” The Brennan Center, Accessed October 20, 2024. <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/internal-atlanta-police-records-reveal-monitoring-cop-city-opponents>.

³⁷⁴ The process by which the budget for cop city was doubled has been called anti-democratic by opposition groups. Pratt, “Real cost of ‘Cop City,’ The Guardian.

was foremost about loyalty, loyalty to a legal system that upholds the domination of a privileged class upon the many. By importing the training methods and the weapons of the U.S. military, reformers wanted to reestablish the chain of command not only within the Honolulu City and County Police Department but within territorial society. Projects like Cop City serve to reinforce the same message the HPD sent to racialized people in Honolulu in the 1920s and 1930s about public space and who has the right to make use of it. Whatever you may call it, police reorganisation, modernization or reforms only work to prolong and protect the occupation of indigenous lands by the United States, whether it be on the land of the Muscogee Creek peoples or the kānaka maoli.

It is no surprise that we have seen the proliferation of similar projects after the nationwide protests against police brutality and racism organised in the wake of the killing of George Floyd in June of 2020 by a police officer. As we speak, more than 80 similar projects to Cop City are in the works across the United States with Wyoming the only state where no such center in development.³⁷⁵ As with the Honolulu City and County Police Department in the 1920s and the 1930s, elites welcomed police modernization projects after the people took to the city's streets to voice their indignation at the policies of the oligarchy. And so, the future of policing in the United States and undoubtedly the world looks very much like its past where elites utilized the police to insulate themselves from public scrutiny in the name of security.

³⁷⁵ “Cop Cities, USA,” *Is Your Life Better*, Accessed on October 20, 2024. <https://isyourlifebetter.net/cop-cities-usa/>.

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