

Hegel's Speculative Idealism and the Truth of Freedom

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Abstract:

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This paper attempts to articulate the speculative nature of freedom within Hegel's philosophical system. I begin with addressing how Hegel's philosophy lives up to the speculative title through an articulation of his identity theory adapted from Fichtean Absolute Subjectivism. I then relate the speculative aspect with the practical by forwarding a reading of freedom within Hegel's philosophy as split between the freedom of thought as the Notion in its ideal ends, alongside and in relation to, the freedom of the will within a contingent historical era within empirical reality. A consequence of this speculative formulation of freedom is that it enables an approach to Hegelian philosophy to avoid the charge of positivism and totalitarianism, as was widely associated with his philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. An aspect of Hegel's thinking that enables the overcoming of the charge of totalitarianism, as I attempt to show, is affirming the necessity of the individual in order to give validity to the authority of the Absolute Subject of a given historical era, in so doing, pointing to the requirement of individuals within the totality of Hegel's claim that the "Truth is the whole." Thus, the results of this approach reject the claim that Hegel's system liquidates the individual in favour of the validity of any historical moment within civil society.

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1. Introduction

Within this paper I will draw out a genuinely dialectical conception of freedom, borne out through Hegel's articulation of the "new era" ushered in concretely by the French Revolution. I will show how the idea of freedom emerging from the new bourgeois society is grounded in the speculative identity theory ("I=I") that Hegel develops out of Fichte's intervention on Kant's critical philosophy. The I=I relationship, within Hegel's mature philosophy, ought to be thought of as the simultaneous splitting of the transcendental/universal and empirical/particular poles of the dialectic within self-consciousness, alongside the recognition of their indispensable relation to the other end of the pole. This speculative identity¹ serves as a way to engage with and mend the fracturing of this 'new era' insofar as the new era is marked, for Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, by the constant struggling of the shape of self-consciousness he calls the Unhappy Consciousness.²

To outline a brief summary of the progressions of Consciousness: Once consciousness has progressed to the level of the Unhappy Consciousness, it encounters the feeling of the unity of the particular and the universal. However, insofar as this unity is recognized only in feeling, as opposed to the actively self-conscious taking up of the Absolute Standpoint³ self-consciousness remains in this dissatisfied state. For the sake of our inquiry: Consciousness has now been revealed to be split or fractured between the universal and the particular poles of the I=I relationship. Thus, for Hegel, if it were to remain at this level, a philosophy that only affirms the givenness of the world, the contingent historical situation, not only drastically limits the particular subjective freedoms of individuals, but at the same time forecloses the ability of those individuals to concretely construct a self-consciousness beyond the dissatisfaction of the

Unhappy Consciousness.⁴ Remaining at this level of the subject split between the objective and ubiquitous affirmation of the givenness of their particular reality and their individual subjective determination of the truth of thought, therefore, cuts off the possibility of a widespread sense of the need for further Notional determinations of freedom within historical, social, and political developments.

The central problem I want to address in this thesis is simply how we ought to draw out the functions of freedom within Hegelian philosophy. In order to do this, I will start by attempting to articulate the methodology and logic of dialectical and speculative philosophy. Doing this will draw a few interesting conclusions. First, the Notion within Hegel's philosophy will be shown to serve as the standpoint of the Absolute. The truth emerges in the process of its development, through an undetermined teleology, which leaves room for the open space of freedom to develop within it. Therefore, it can be seen as teleological without ever being telic. Freedom will be shown to be split in two; divided into the will, the specificities of the individual person in relation to the actually existing institutions of the day, the context, on the one hand. While on the other, into thought, the Notion of freedom in its ideal, which is always able to articulate what is not yet concretely in line with it, the form. These two aspects, the will and thought, are identical, merely pointing at various aspects of the functions of freedom. All thinking is willing and all willing is thought. These two aspects are united in the speculative moment of judgement, which allows for the individual to grasp the Absolute, and through their own self-determination and the determination of others, how this freedom will develop concretely.

This construction of Hegel's idea of the role of freedom, both as Notion⁵ and as actually existing reality, as the defining characteristic of the new age reveals how the 20th century

reaction to Hegelian philosophy, particularly that of early Frankfurt School figures Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, can be seen as already anticipated within Hegel's own system. This construction is prone to misapprehension with regards to the form and function of freedom within modern social life,⁶ while at the same time relieving Hegel of the charge of supporting a totalitarian vision of society in what Adorno calls his so-called "final analysis."⁷ Hegel's speculative philosophical system will be shown to be one that enables self-consciousness to hold both ends of the I=I relationship simultaneously, providing a vehicle for historical, social and cultural developments to flow out of. Freedom in its essence, understood as a faculty of self determination, within Hegel's philosophy can therefore be seen as existing in its genuine truth as posited by the transcendental "I" in its ideal form, with the possibility of constantly being worked toward within the manifold world of the empirical "I," through the processes of social labour; this latter is what Hegel calls the labour of the negative.⁸ These definitions are key as they demand agreement with the goal of having reality accord further and further with the truth of thought.

2. Kantian & Fichtean Background of Speculative Philosophy

Through an examination of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, alongside references to Robert Pippin's work *Hegel's Idealism: Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, I will draw out the role of idealism within Hegel's speculative philosophy, and as well the historical development of a Hegelian identity theory will be constructed with references to Kantian and Fichtean philosophy as its intellectual origins.

I will briefly demonstrate the development of the speculative identity theory, which first

stems from Hegel's rejection of Kant's division of the phenomenal and the noumenal. Hegel rejected this division for its transcendental scepticism, "rather as fear of the truth."⁹ The Kantian unity of apperception is as Pippin writes, "excessively formal" citing Hegel's work *The Berlin Phenomenology*, "the I is construed not as the Notion, but as formal identity"¹⁰ Hegel seeks to take this mere formalism and integrate it into the Life of Spirit which only becomes possible due to the concern for the ends of the Notional being taken up and worked towards in actuality, and it thus plays a central role in Hegel's philosophical system.

In order to demonstrate this development within Hegel's speculative philosophy we must first engage with Kant's critical philosophy directly. Kant's philosophy establishes a strict divide between the noumena, things in themselves, transcendental apodictic truths, and the phenomena, within the manifold of appearances that make up empirical reality, what is later critiqued by Hegel as a transcendental scepticism. However, this transcendental scepticism finds the means of its own sublation within Kantian philosophy itself. Now to demonstrate the possibility for the unity of the transcendental and empirical aspects of self-consciousness we must draw out Kant's view of the faculty of judgement, as well as its role in overcoming its own limitations.

Kant distinguishes between two kinds of judgement, the objective or determinative judgement and the subjective or reflective judgement. The objective judgements of the cognitive and moral spheres of our thinking are those seen in the statements such as "this object is round" and "this action is right" respectively. These judgements are determinative, insofar as they are determining that some particular is bound within the limits of what it means to be subsumed under some universal, or what can also be called a concept, of which that particular is judged to be a part. This objective determination is in contrast to the realm of aesthetic judgements. The

aesthetic judgement forwards claims such as, “this scenery is beautiful” or ‘this flower is beautiful’. These aesthetic or reflective judgements take on a purely subjective role, thus providing no objective grounds which would demand universal assent. That which falls under objective judgements are all perfectly determinable under a concept, while those of the aesthetic judgement are merely reflective, free and autonomous insofar as they are indeterminable in to any concept whatsoever, while aesthetic judgements can only act “as if” their judgement ought to be treated to be a demand for universal assent, therefore making it what Kant thought of as a subjective universal judgement.

These reflective judgements fall into what Kant calls purposiveness without a purpose, meaning that which evokes in our subjectivity an end or purpose, without actually containing any end within the object itself. As can be seen in Kant’s third critique, the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, where he writes, “by an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., **concept**, to be adequate to it, which, consequently no language fully attains or can make intelligible.”¹¹ This means that the person advancing an aesthetic judgement would expect anyone in their position to have the same feeling, same mental state, brought forth within their subjectivity as well. This distinction between subjective and objective judgements is taken forward in the critical philosophy of Germany that is proceeding at the time, specifically within the philosophy of Fichte, ultimately realizing the unity of objective and subjective aspects of life and philosophy again within the Hegelian system.

The value of Fichte in regards to his contribution to the development of speculative philosophy lies in what Pippin describes as his, “claim to have noticed the underdeveloped nature of Kant’s central claim about transcendental apperception, and... the claim that such

apperception must be spontaneous or self-positing.”¹² Working directly after Kant’s contribution to philosophy, Fichte takes up the critical philosophy of his age and articulates an identity theory he finds as a kernel within Kant’s own thinking, through Kant’s focus on reflective or aesthetic judgements. The I=I relationship thus begins to come into view, which Fichte draws out within his work *The Science of Knowledge*. Fichte’s major intervention into Kantian critical philosophy, therefore, is in regards to the ground or unconditioned first principle, claiming to start where Kant arrives, solidifying the identity of the “I” as the foundation for both reflective and determinative judgements, and as such serving as the source of their spontaneous unity.

Fichte expresses the “I” as the fundamental grounding principle of transcendental idealism, initially through reference to the positivity of any identity claim, A is A, where ‘is’ is the necessary connection that justified the abstract truth of the identity claim. As he writes, “within the self—whether it be specifically positing, or judging... there is something that is permanently uniform... and hence the X [the necessary connection signified by the copula ‘is’] that is absolutely posited can also be expressed as I = I; I am I.”¹³ Through this I=I relationship Fichte derives his principles, that of identity and non-identity which together provide the unity of experience. This unity of experience is what could be called the F/Act, or Fact/Act (*Tathandlung*). This F/Act is, according to Fichte, the necessary component of all positing the individual is capable of, as the X, the necessary connection between any identity claims, is equivalent, within Fichte’s formulation, to the claim “I am.” For Fichte, this leads to his claims that all critical philosophy is necessarily immanent due to all its content and form being posited in the I. Within the realm of critical philosophy, therefore, all possible knowledge, at this stage in the historical development of German Idealism, is immanently unfolding from the subjectivity which cannot help but posit all its content within the transcendental I.

In this way the “I” serves as not only the ground for all claims about the manifold of appearances, whether reflective or determinative, but also as the ground for itself, in the *a priori* sense as a condition for any possible experience at all. The F/Act can be articulated as an instantaneous two step movement between objective determinations and aesthetic reflections. Starting from what appears to be the first moment, the act is an absolutely subjectless and objectless positing, followed by the second moment, the fact, which grasps the act in pure reflection as posited or aesthetic in the Kantian sense. With each side of instantaneous moment mediated by the copula ‘is’ within the positing I and posited I of the ‘I is I’ which, as such, appears as an infinite task of mediation. As German Romantic Friedrich Schlegel writes in reference to development of post-Kantian philosophy, “Kant discovered the table of categories and there was light in the spirit of man: I mean by this a real language, so that we can stop rummaging about for words and pay attention to the power and source of all activity.”¹⁴ This ‘power and source of all activity’ is, for Schlegel’s reading of Fichte, nothing other than the isolated Absolute subjectivity itself, the ‘I=I’ relationship, the necessary and contentious relationship between the transcendental I and the empirical I. Thus, Fichte takes the division of judgement found in Kant’s third critique and reunites them within the grounding of the I.

Out of the philosophy of Kant, emerged the possibility for Fichte’s alteration of Kantian philosophy, as Schlegel writes, “Fichte’s theory of knowledge is a philosophy about the subject matter of Kant’s philosophy... it might very well be that even formally he [Fichte] is a Kant raised to the second power, and the theory of knowledge is more critical than it seems to be.”¹⁵ What I take from this articulation of Schlegel is the raising up of Kant’s formulation of aesthetic judgement to become all encompassing within Fichte’s Absolute Subjectivism, serving as its grounding, after the articulation of the “I am.” Thus, in turn, the door for the speculative

philosophy of Hegel to be articulated in the way I am forwarding within this essay, as the antinomical relationship between the transcendental & empirical I within self-consciousness and the Life of Spirit, is opened up through an engagement with the philosophy that motivated Hegel's own system. As Pippin writes, "the marks of Fichte's formulations remain everywhere in Hegel's mature reflections on Kant."¹⁶ The relationship of self-consciousness to itself is antinomical insofar as each side of the I=I relationship finds the other necessary while at the same time incompatible with the other, in a manner that can be seen taken up by Hegel's focus on negativity as the path for Notional development. The transcendental aspect of self-consciousness in unity with its opposition, the empirical aspect of self-consciousness, each finds in the other its own truth and its own negation. For this reason, of mutual necessity and mutual incompatibility, Hegel's speculative philosophical system repeatedly shows that it rests atop a foundational antinomy.

3. The New Era & Freedom

In order to outline the framework within which the modern conception of freedom is constructed; it would be beneficial to draw out why and how Hegel asserts the emergence of the new era. The 'new era' within Hegel's project can be defined as the era in which the bourgeois self-consciousness ushered in by the French Revolution has concretely taken shape and is ubiquitous within civil society. To draw out the rationale that motivates calling the age in which Hegel reached his intellectual maturity the beginning of a new era, the Life of Spirit and its relation to the Notional development of freedom, also will be elaborated. Hegel begins *The Phenomenology of Spirit* by asserting that the old world has been supplanted by a new era, meaning a new height within self-consciousness and a new shape in the Life of Spirit have taken the stage. This point is illustrated when he writes:

it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation...

The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world.¹⁷

This gradual crumbling of the past into the new era of the Life of Spirit, marks modernity as a time where philosophy has become worldly and instantiated within and through the institutions of the time, what Jean Hyppolite describes as a church¹⁸. These institutions are placed through the ascent of civil society as central to the universal will of the age. The liberal institutions of bourgeois society, through their being accepted and naturalized within civil life, become the contingent yet, absolutely universal, will of the era. When the form, the currently established boundaries and limitations of civil society, and the content, the universally posited ends of that society, are taken up in a self-conscious unity, then only does the philosophical idea become a concrete reality.

The Life of Spirit as it has existed concretely within and through self-consciousness, is nothing other than the current contingently actual development of the active and self-conscious taking up of freedom within civil society through the actuality of its institutions. The truth of the current historical moment and the direction with which it must develop to be in line with the truth of the abstract universal, can be seen when Hegel writes, within the Preface to his work, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*., “it is only when actuality has reached its maturity that the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world, which it has grasped as its substance, in the shape of an intellectual realm.”¹⁹ This reconstructing of the world is what occurred when the era advanced to the age of modernity through the French Revolution and the

bourgeois consciousness that propped it up and gave it concrete meaning within the Life of Spirit. The new era marks the newly established maturity of self-consciousness within bourgeois society. As well, the passage points us in the direction of and signifies how exactly Notional development occurs, as the immanent unfolding which, with the ideal of freedom as its posited end, pushes the Life of Spirit forward, into its further and further determinations.

The central Notion within this new era is that of freedom. Freedom within Hegel's thinking can be cashed out as the capacity for self-determination. As Hyppolite articulates, "To be free is not to be either master or slave, not to discover oneself in this or that situation in the midst of life; it is to behave as a thinking being in all circumstances. In its highest form, thought is will because it is the self-positing of self. And will is thought because it is knowledge of itself in its object."²⁰ Therefore, when speaking about Notional development and the historically contingent nature of its currently established shape, what is being pointed out is how and in what ways the universal will of a given historical and political climate has determined itself, through the determinate negation of what does not accord with it. Therefore, regarding what it means for a Notion to develop, it is not about freedom developing into something that is not freedom, but rather allowing for further determinations regarding what freedom is, through a negative determination of what it is not.

The self-determination of this Notion of modern freedom is thus grounded in the individual and intersubjective make-up of those who contribute to the Notion's ever developing determinations within concrete reality. This distinction between freedom in actuality, and the Notion of freedom, is drawn out by Hegel himself, where he writes, "Freedom in thought has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking the fullness of life. Hence freedom in thought, too, is only the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself."²¹ This is how Hegel

divides up the freedom of thought as the Notion of freedom, in constant relation to the actually established freedom as a living reality within the institutions of civil society. Hegel writes further, within his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Right*,^[OBJ] ^[OBJ]With these two ways of speaking about freedom forwarded, the Notion of freedom in its ideal and the concrete reality within which freedom has taken its current shape within the Life of Spirit, the goal of revealing the unity the mutual identity of thought with reality becomes a clearer objective of the Hegelian system overall.

Within Hegel's philosophy, he further establishes this initial division between what he calls thought and will, which he contends are two sides of the same faculty. The division of a thoughtful and theoretical attitude is coupled with the willful or practical attitude. That is, in their unity, theoretical and practical cognition are divided, which again points toward the unity of freedom as a faculty of the I=I relationship, which grounds the Hegelian system in speculative philosophy. This unity which places both the theoretical and practical attitudes into necessary relations opens the door to seeing these two aspects, as both being foundational for making claims about the other attitude. As Hegel writes, "these distinct attitudes are therefore inseparable: they are one, and the same thing and both moments can be found in every activity, of thinking and willing alike."²² Insofar as thinking and willing are merely different attitudes freely taken up within concrete life, they each express a mode of freedom within actual reality. Each having a different focus, whether it be theoretical or practical ends, as far as these ends can be separated, they are separated merely for the further explanation that they are two sides of the same faculty. Hegel writes, "the will is a particular way of thinking—thinking translating itself into existence [*Dasein*], thinking as the drive to give itself existence."²³ This is where Hegel secures an advance on Fichte's²⁴ as can be seen when Allen Wood draws out the distinction

between Hegel's speculative philosophy and Fichte's Absolute Idealism, writing, "Hegel's position is that self-consciousness and consciousness of a not-self are not two successive principles, but are inseparable from one another."²⁵

The freedom of civil society to become what is non-identical to itself is thus the heart of speculative idealism, in opposition to the supposed positivist Hegel that would declare in isolation that, "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."²⁶ That is, without at the same time giving attention to where disunity between the two poles of the I=I relationship occurs that creates space for further Notional development. Hegel's conception of the historical development of Notional determinations indicates that the Absolute Subject—the unity of individual and universal will—is, at all times, given its content by the intersubjective experience of the individuals who make it up, driven by their shared social labour, the labour of the negative.

The Absolute Subject of Hegel's philosophy can therefore be seen as necessarily dependent on the particular individual subjects, to give it concrete embodiment and to represent its Notional content within actual concrete reality. However, what is still lacking within the Absolute Subject is a genuine reconciliation of the current contingent historical moment taking place within the unfree society, as articulated by Marcuse. Thus we see, as with Marcuse what is prone to misapprehension, giving way to the negative dialectical critique of the present in favour of a vision of a reconciled future state of affairs, which can be seen as well in the work of Adorno.²⁷

The concerns raised through the reception and critique of Hegel within the second half of the 20th century can now come clearer into view. Specifically, the concern over freedom not yet present within the consciousness of the Absolute Subject, can take the stage, this concern over

what is not yet concrete, provides the space for further Notional determinations to occur within civil society and self-consciousness. The relationship between the Notion of freedom and the actual developments of freedom within concrete reality, mirror the theoretical and practical attitudes of the $I=I$ relationship, and provide Hegel's speculative philosophy with a foundation which accepts the truth of each moment without glossing over the contradictions, which emerge through holding both moments to contain truth. Rather, the contradiction points towards the further necessary developments required to create the unity of the transcendental/theoretical and empirical/practical aspects of the will's activity within the realm of concrete reality.

Therefore, the new era, ushered in through the self-conscious developments within the Life of Spirit, provides a ground not only for assessing the genuineness of the truth of the existing social and political situation of an age, but also the necessary activity, labouring upon the negative, which enables further Notional development within a time of contradiction and crisis, enabling a horizon to emerge for those developments to move self-consciousness beyond that crisis, toward a reality that is in accordance with the truth of thought. The contradiction and crisis of the new era is marked and identified by the splitting of the universal and the particular within self-consciousness, as mutually incompatible yet mutually necessary, what Hegel calls the Unhappy Consciousness, as Hyppolite explicates.²⁸ The tension raised by such a splitting in self consciousness will be central to the development of a rearticulated unity between the two poles of the speculative identity theory $I=I$, between the universal and the particular aspects of life within civil society.

At this stage the direction that emerges within this project is one where it has be shown that through a return to the importance of the moment of the transcendental "I," advancements within the realm of the empirical "I" can be made that do not obscure the ends of those

advancements as the teleological ends, found within the truth of thought, which lay the bricks for the ideal of freedom to be continually established within actually existing civil society. The posited ends of freedom have been shown through reconstructing Hegel's dialectic with a focus on its speculative foundations within the I=I relationship, and the relationship between the Notion of freedom and its concrete actuality.

4. Unhappy Consciousness: The Historical and Logical Necessity of the Individual

Now the Unhappy Consciousness, elaborated through Jean Hyppolite's work *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, can be mended and reconciled in a liberatory unity which does not, as Adorno claims, "liquidate" the individual²⁹ in favour of the philosophical system, nor the "destruction of specific consciousness"³⁰ that Hyppolite claims is a necessary aspect in the construction of the figure of the institutions within civil society. In opposition to the view that the truth of the Absolute Subjects requires a diminishing or nullification of the individual, I will draw out Hegel's role of the individual within the Absolute Subject.³¹ For Hegel, the specific consciousness finds its truth in those institutions Hyppolite correctly finds universality within; as Hegel writes, "the surrender of one's own will is only from one aspect negative; in principle... it is at the same time positive, viz. the positing of will as the will of an 'other', and specifically of will, not as a particular but as a universal will."³² Hegel will be shown to grasp that this universal will of the institution is validated by the specific individual consciousness, as true, only in correspondence with the contingent historical situation. However, it is not true in the sense that it fulfills the unity of the actual reality of freedom with the ideal ends of its Notion. Therefore, this contingently established freedom is not set in stone; Notional development is still required in order to build towards the potentially infinite project of

constructing the ideal of freedom in actuality, through social labour or the labour of the negative, if the split subjectivity of the new era is to be reconciled with its dual aspects, I=I, self consciously.

The universal truth of freedom that Hegel concerns himself with could be seen as playing the role of a spectre haunting the stage within his project; regardless of the tensions at play during any given moment of the Notional and Spiritual development of civil society. The Notion of freedom, during the new era, is the direction and motivation that those tensions attempt to develop towards, enabling a continual renewal of freedom's content in relation to the already established form of freedom in the life of civil society.

With the goal of defending Hegel against the accusation of positivism³³ I articulate how the openness of Hegel's living system allows for these Notional developments to be self consciously taken up and directed towards the ends of freedom, as opposed to a simple and one dimensional taking up of the current level of Notional development as if it were complete. The unity of the Hegelian system can be described as a dynamic and organic totality³⁴ due to the development of Notional conceptions throughout the history of self-consciousness; the Life of Spirit, or the living unity of the I=I relationship. As Hegel writes, "These forms [each side of the dialectical antinomy] ...supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole."³⁵ When self-consciousness can take up the demands of the openness of the organic unity of the I=I antinomical relationship, what Hyppolite calls 'the reign of Spirit' is set to emerge on the stage. Within this reign of Spirit, Hyppolite claims that, "Unhappy consciousness must develop to the point of complete self-negation in order that

through that negation it may discover its universality.”³⁶

At this stage, the Unhappy Consciousness is still yet to be overcome, but the means of its sublation have been set on the stage, specifically through the realization of its own universality coming from the sacrifice of their individual specificities, which do not accord with that of the other and therefore cannot be in accord with the universal will of the Absolute Subject, at a given moment in historical development. However, at the same time, self-consciousness, in reference to the universality of the Absolute Subject, maintains its established developments and continues their development into the future, leaving room for what was once not in accord with the universal will to ascend to that status. The Absolute Subject holds onto everything that can be said to accord with the universality of its collective will, in a throughgoing and infinite dialogue between actually existing society and the truth of the Notion of freedom, propped atop the backs of the individuals which make it up within the institutions of civil society. The Absolute Subject is the currently established and continually unfolding development of the life of the Notion, which propels the whole of the history of societies and their institutions; this propulsion when grasped in thought reveals the progression and emergence of a genuine self-consciousness moving toward its absolute freedom in the figure of Spirit. Put simply, the advancements of the Absolute Subject are predicated on an individual's genuine recognition of their position within the civil society they have been thrown into, in reference to its institutions and norms.

This intersubjectivity, which is necessary for the Life of Spirit, to point to the open horizon of the future, thus enables further developments within civil society as being justified, with reference to the satisfactions of self-consciousness through the positing of the theoretical attitude along with its transcendental and ideal ends, as over and above the logic of the mere willful attitude. The theoretical attitude, at the same time, goes hand in hand with the willful and

practical attitude which enables such satisfactions to be possible within the concretely established society. Self-consciousness, at this point, does not yet embody Spirit, instead remaining still within the process of becoming Spirit. This can be seen when Hegel claims, “Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.”³⁷ This raising to truth can only occur within Hegel’s system when self-consciousness takes up split subjectivity, as pointing to the antinomical foundation of speculative philosophy. What this means is, that the truth of each aspect of self-consciousness, both the theoretical/transcendental attitude, simultaneously with the practical/empirical attitude of the self-positing I, create the grounds for a truth that exists with reference to the Life of Spirit in its ideal and its concrete instantiations.

The split subject can be taken to be simultaneously split between itself as an object and as a subject, as well as both moments of non-identity and identity; ultimately serving to undercut the Fichtean conception of the Absolute Subjectivism of the “I=I” and lay the foundations for the move into Hegelian philosophy. The speculative philosophy of Hegel begins to emerge, through the concrete establishment of this new split subjectivity, which when set into relation with an Other opens the potential for unforeseen Notional development to occur. Therefore, we must agree, the process thus enables the gap within self-consciousness, between the truth of thought and the truth of reality, to be filled through constant reference to that Other, as well as the institutions intersubjectively built along that Other.

The subject experiencing the era of the Unhappy Consciousness is one that is split between the recognition of their simultaneous finitude or their *this*-ness, alongside their infinitude or their universality, without being able to grasp the unity of each moment within concrete reality, but as yet only in thought. As Hyppolite puts it, “split consciousness appeared to

us as itself the unity of the two extremes. As a result, the object of unhappy consciousness—what, for it, is essence—is no longer the formless immutable but, on the contrary, the unity of the immutable and the unique.”³⁸ This separation of consciousness from itself is therefore only the misperception of a consciousness unable to fully grasp the unity of the Notion which is always already mixed up within the specificities of the concrete Life of Spirit. This misperception is caused by the incompleteness of the development within self-consciousness, causing it to be unable to fully grasp that its truth is necessarily found in the unity of its thoughtful and willful activity, in the unity of the contingent with the eternal. This restlessness, borne of the antinomical and speculative foundation, discovered through Hegel’s philosophy, causes the misery and dissatisfaction of the Unhappy Consciousness. Aligning with Hyppolite’s articulation that, “Unhappy consciousness must develop to the point of complete self-negation in order that through that negation it may discover its universality.”³⁹ The essence of self-consciousness is therefore found in the mediation between self and other, between the specific existence and its immutable, unchangeable nature. The pathway out of this split subjectivity is found with the necessity of the individual’s activity coupled with the recognition of the truth of the other, which in their unity creates the justification for the truth of the Absolute Subject and Absolute Standpoint.

The reign of Spirit reaches its highest point thus far, actualizing the universal will within the Absolute Subject, when, as Hyppolite writes, “The content of the mediating action is the destruction of specific consciousness as such and, simultaneously, its advance to universality.”⁴⁰

This recognition of a justified claim upon universality becomes available through what Hyppolite calls a church⁴¹, an external object that within it holds the will as universal. The universality of the church or institution will be shown as valid within Hegel’s system. However,

that universality is a contingent and incomplete universality of a contingent historical moment, which requires continual labour in order to accord with thought more completely. As such, the universality of the existing institutions cannot be taken in a positivist or one-dimensional manner that encourages the mere “destruction of specific consciousness” that Hyppolite apparently asserts.

According to Hegel, the individual subject grasps this universal will within their specific consciousness, which in turn is validated through reference to the other and the existing institutions around them. However, this universal will is valid only when viewed as the truth in correspondence with a contingent historical instantiation of the institution Hyppolite articulates, as opposed to being the Absolute in its ideal form in unity with the ends of the Notion. This reveals that the institutions which hold the authority of a universal will are at all times still reliant on the ascent of specific consciousness *en masse*. As opposed to the mere destruction of the individual consciousness, the church or institution relies on the service and recognition of the function and the freedom of the individuals which make it up and give it content. The specific and individual consciousnesses are a fundamental element in the construction of the claim that the truth is the whole, therefore, the framing of a complete negation of the individual specific consciousness, is inadequate to the totality of whatever historical moment and the norms established by that moment's institutions, as they are built solely atop the sum total of all specific consciousness within that era. It is through the conscious taking up of this advancement that self-consciousness can finally find its satisfaction, regardless of its contingent and historical character. As Hegel writes, “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”⁴²

This recognition of a valid and justified universality is available through the church or the

institutions of civil society, which stand alongside the specific individuals of a given historical age as an external object that within it holds the Absolute will of the given era as universal. The Absolute will functions as genuinely universal regardless of the persistence of the continual development of that externalized community within and through the figure of the institution. This unending renewal of Notional development is articulated clearly by Pippin when he writes,

such an identity between reason and reality *would be* the only resolution of the problems created by a “Spirit opposed to itself,” that Spirit ultimately comes to understand that all its institutions are products of its own activity, including modern political, scientific, and philosophic institutions, and thus continually creates for itself forms of the unhappy consciousness, a dissatisfaction with the merely “produced” character of such institutions, unless Spirit understands its products as “in themselves all reality.”⁴³

As such, it is now evident what is meant by framing this movement of Spirit as a continual progression towards the Absolute will and its truth, which is itself ever developing through its embodiment within the institution of civil society. The Life of Spirit continually develops the truth of specific existence closer and closer (asymptotically) to the truth adopted within the Absolute Standpoint, regardless of their apprehension as unity. This continual dissatisfaction is therefore the truth of the modern subject within Hegel’s philosophy, occasionally grasping the truth of universal will in its thought while always recognizing its fleeting and contingent aspects.

5. Source of Anticipation of a Negative Dialectical Critique Within Hegel’s System

Now that Hegel’s dialectical conception of freedom has been drawn out and grounded in his articulation of a speculative philosophical system, we can engage with the

20th century interpretation and potential consequences foreshadowed by that systematization. Specifically, the critique forwarded by the early Frankfurt School philosophers Adorno and Marcuse, will be explicated and responded to. Alongside an attempt to reign in their reading of Hegel's philosophy and its consequences all with the goal of demonstrating that the move to a negative dialectical critique is already anticipated and present within Hegel's own thinking. The primary critique of Hegel's totalization of philosophy forwarded by the originary Frankfurt School thinkers is centered around the claim that Hegel's philosophy gives way to justifications for totalitarian politics and social life. I will demonstrate how the speculative philosophy articulated within the work of Adorno, due to the function of speculative philosophy's negative aspect as an avenue for overcoming totalitarian politics and philosophy, is already a central feature of the philosophy of Hegel himself. The fundamental insight of the negative dialectical critique is that it points to a feature within Hegel's speculative philosophy. Specifically, its focus on how purely practical and empirical advancements within social and political life, without an ever-present and constantly renewing relation to the posited and universal ends of freedom, enclose the laborious activity of social labour, or the labour of the negative, into a reified and ideological form that Adorno refers to as the untruth of the whole,⁴⁴ or what Herbert Marcuse called the unfree society.⁴⁵

Adorno begins with the claim that there is a retreat in Hegel's "final analysis" away from the implications of his early views in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This final analysis, according to Adorno's reading, concludes with the systemization of Hegel's thinking in his *Philosophy of Right* with the claim that, "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."⁴⁶ This articulation of the truth of what is actually existing in empirical reality,

when coupled with Hegel's claim that, "The Truth is the whole"⁴⁷ becomes for Adorno the justification for readings of Hegel which give way to totalitarian, positivistic, and affirmative thinking.⁴⁸ Positivism, within the work of the early Frankfurt School, was taken up to refer to a philosophical practice in which "operational" concepts dominate, meaning that what is considered a worthy philosophical inquiry is limited to what is seen to have immediate utility within the already existing social and political climate of a given historical period. This positivistic and affirmational attitude around the simple and immediate utility of concepts can be seen in Marcuse's work *One-Dimensional Man*. Therefore, the negative critique becomes directed at the narrow capacity of operational concepts characteristic of positivist and affirmative philosophy within the totalitarian society. The totalitarian society is one in which, "operational concepts... cannot encompass the real meaning of the concept in its multi-dimensional totality, that is, what it can become, *potentially*."⁴⁹ As such, the positivistic philosophy and affirmative society, is one in which the open field of freedom is limited within the horizon of the already established norms of existing civil society, without any pretence of a continual Notional development. Thought, within the totalitarian society, is posited as already perfectly in sync with reality.

Through the simplistic focus on the positive identity of the whole, Adorno sees the liquidation of the particular individual subject on behalf of the posited identity of the Absolute or universal subject, regardless of its historically contingent character. Adorno's project is one that, "sets itself an ironic task: that of developing a dialectical method, with its connections to a self reflective subject, in a context defined as one in which the subject has been liquidated by its own attempt to liquidate everything outside of itself."⁵⁰ This liquidation of the subject is where Adorno sees Hegel abandoning his own aim of reconciliation in favour of his system and the

simple truth of the given moment of Notional and Spiritual development. As Adorno claims, “a seamless system and an achieved reconciliation are not one and the same...the unity of the system derives from unreconcilable violence.”⁵¹ This recognition of the unreconciled violence within modern life is the motivation for Adorno to distance himself from the rationality of the whole and therefore at the same time the widely affirmed truth of the currently established institutions and norms of modern life. Adorno, therefore, wants to deny the reality of currently existing social relations and institutions, by which he sees as the only route to emphasizing the ends of freedom posited in the Notion as the not yet existent truth of empirical reality. As such, what Adorno reads in Hegel’s supposed final analysis is the reification of the existing institutions of civil society, at the expense of the individual’s dissent from the norms enforced by those institutions.

The cost of the totalitarian limitation on freedom is the lack of, or disbelief in the ability of a particular historical era's collective social will, built upon the desires and wills of specific individuals. Without this, there could be no genuinely posited the ends of the Notion of freedom, nor could their individuals recognize the existing freedom of civil society; both of which are both necessary elements in any attempt to genuinely align reality with thought. As such, the horizon for the ends of freedom to become more and more established within reality, is drastically limited when positivistic and affirmative philosophy becomes widespread within the logic of civil society. This insight can be seen within Marcuse’s thinking when he writes, “[when] Philosophic thought turns into affirmative thought; the philosophic critique criticizes within the societal framework and stigmatizes non-positive notions as mere speculation, dreams or fantasies.”⁵² The logic of positivist philosophy and totalitarian society each supports the perpetuation of the other, while it diminishes the insights of speculative philosophy. Positivist

philosophy is therefore completely opposed to the negative, critical philosophy of the early Frankfurt school, as well as Hegel himself. As the positivist philosophy swallows up all critique that distances itself from the given certainty of existing social relations and the utility of operational concepts. The philosophical and social project of this positivistic and affirmative project takes up the idealism of Hegelian philosophy, the truth of the Absolute Subject at a given point in historical development, while shedding it of its speculative and dialectical attitude, which would necessitate a critical attitude to the currently established Absolute Subject and the institutions of the day. Positivism, therefore, leaves no room within its boundaries for inquiry to engage with and fulfill the speculative project that Hegel outlines. Instead, simply taking the established order, political and philosophical, as the ends of thought manifested within reality, reducing the world to only that which supports the existing ideology of the political regime. As if thought and reality had already been united in a genuine fashion, with no contradiction and no source for further Notional development.

It is at this point, after the development of the critique of positivism, where Adorno would ascend to, from his negative dialectical position, the claim that, “true freedom would consist in the renewable negation of unfreedom”⁵³ Within recent literature the concept of truth within Adorno’s philosophical work has been articulated as a “dynamic constellation” by both Allison Stone⁵⁴ and Lambert Zuidervaart.⁵⁵ Adorno’s conception of a dynamic constellation of truth, from his perspective, sets his speculative philosophy in opposition to Hegel’s truth as the positive identity of “The Truth is the whole.”⁵⁶ The relevance of the dynamic constellation conception of truth, is that its explicit aim is to recognize that there is always something in excess that has not yet been or cannot be determined into the universal standpoint of the Absolute Subject, and as such recognizes that the Notional development central to speculative

thinking is never fully exhausted.

Adorno himself sees a dynamic constellation of truth as implicit and unconscious within Hegel's own systematic philosophical project. As Adorno writes, "Hegelian dialectic finds its ultimate truth, that of its own impossibility, in its unresolved and vulnerable quality, even if, as the theodicy of self-consciousness, it has no awareness of this."⁵⁷ Truth in the manner of a dynamic constellation is one that recognizes the "process and result in one."⁵⁸ This unity of the truth as a simultaneous process and result, can be seen as further evidence of the unity of the positive, transcendental "I" with the negative, empirical "I" within the speculative identity theory of Hegel's philosophical system. Adorno and Hegel could be read as each serving as the opposing pole for the other, Adorno with his emphasis on the nonidentical within any posited identity which forces historical and Notional development forward, while Hegel is willing to positively identify the ways in which the current historical moment aligns with the ideal Notion of freedom.

Hegel, however, ought to be read as already addressing Adorno's concerns regarding the nonidentity of the whole, as the source of all Notional development, through his articulation of the labour of the negative. As Simon Jarvis articulates, Adorno's position is one in which, "[idealism] is not only the empire of the subject but also the evacuation of the subject and that the latter is the price for the former."⁵⁹ With this the speculative identity and nonidentity of Hegelian philosophy can be established further. At each moment, the empire and evacuation of the individual subject, simultaneously articulates a truth that finds itself at odds with the truth of the corresponding moment; thus, the antinomy of the I=I relationship is all but impossible to avoid within a thorough articulation of Hegel's philosophical project and the system established on top of it. The dynamic and historical character of truth, for Adorno, can therefore serve to

reveal an analogous meaning within the work of Hegel, which frees him of the accusation of a merely one-dimensional support for the truth of the reality of the given historical moment. Rocío Zambrana, in reference to the intelligibility of Hegel's speculative philosophy writes, "Form [empirical reality] should be understood as the inner negativity of content [the truth of thought], and content as the conditions that establish concretely the work of negativity."⁶⁰ With this Hegel's philosophical system avoids the worst excesses of a totalitarian and one-dimensional reading. Through a continual focus on Notional development, which speculative and dialectical philosophy opens for Hegel, the labour of the negative would refute any reading of Hegel as abandoning his commitments within the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, or his *Science of Logic*.

So long as Hegel is read with this speculative attitude, that of an unfinished project which has yet to complete and may never complete its task, the openness of the system will be capable of genuinely overcoming the critique of positivism and totalitarianism. Reconciling the division between the empirical and transcendental "I" becomes the moment where an emphasis must be made on Hegel's recognition that this antinomy of the speculative identity thesis is grounded in the activity of social labour, or what Hegel calls the labour of the negative.⁶¹ Through a reorientation of speculative philosophy around the unity of the I=I relationship I have attempted to provide an escape from the attack of a one-dimensional or undialectical support for the contingent political and ideological certainties of the day. Therefore, freeing Hegel's philosophical project from the charge of merely justifying totalitarianism; thus, revealing that Hegel's philosophy itself avoids the totalitarian association which claimed to be taking Hegel's project up within the authoritarian societies of the 20th century.

Concluding Remarks:

Within this paper, I have attempted to draw out the origins of speculative philosophy through Hegel's interpretation of Kantian and Fichtean philosophy, with the goals of establishing an antinomical relationship between the simultaneously necessarily interconnected yet mutually exclusive nature of the truth of thought with the truth of reality. I have also drawn out the widespread social and political understanding of the speculative nature of the new bourgeois society which had emerged during Hegel's own lifetime. These developments within social and philosophic life further enabled the development of the Notion of freedom as a speculative concept. This, in order to assess the validity of any claim on freedom, requires both moments of the antinomical relationship of thought and reality to be grasped together in their unity.

The Unhappy Consciousness emerges at this point in the construction of Hegel's philosophy as the point where the individual consciousness self-consciously takes up the demands of speculative philosophy; recognizing their inability to individually move further beyond the given social contradictions of their historical era, without the agreement of a large scale of the individuals which make up the Absolute Subject, that in turn naturalises and reifies the development of self-consciousness. The process of naturalizing or reifying historically contingent moments of Notional development, imposed by affirmative and positivist philosophy, gives way to the accusation of totalitarian elements within the Hegelian system, as the historical era loses its appearance as contingent and reliant on prior Notional development. However, as I have argued, the speculative aspect of Hegel's system is never abandoned, instead what occurs is a thorough examination of both aspects, the content of transcendental idealism and the form reality takes on at any given moment within the empirical world. Each end of the speculative pole gains its meaning and takes on its freedom to further determine itself self-consciously within individuals and institutions in constant reference to the recognition and ascent of the

Other. The critique of positivism and totalitarianism gains its validity only when the contingent historical moment of the Absolute Subject, consisting of the institutions and individuals of the day, has abandoned its referent to the other as the source of its development; when the current developments of the era are seen as the final developments necessary to make up the genuine and totalizing truth of freedom. Speculative philosophy, within the Hegelian tradition, must be taken as a philosophical project in which freedom is always in a process of continual renewal, always developing or regressing in relation to the established self-consciousness of the given era.

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Endnotes:

¹ The speculative identity which props up Hegel's system is constructed from the very beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, within the Preface he refers to the 'speculative proposition' (M61) to draw out the identity and unity of the subject-predicate relationship, as a new formulation regarding the logic of judgements. I am emphasizing its role in order to show the lineage traced back to Kant and Fichtean formulations as well as the interconnectedness of traditionally purely opposed philosophical concepts and categories, such as idealism and empiricism, subject and object, etc. Thus, these conceptions can be conceived of in their genuine unity as is the motivation of focusing on the I=I construction.

² Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M206-M230. I am utilizing paragraph numbers within the *Phenomenology of Spirit* indicated by the notation 'M' and then the paragraph, as broken down by A.V. Miller.

³ Within this paper the articulation of the Absolute Standpoint is inspired by Robert Pippin's explication within his text *Hegel's Idealism*, where the Absolute Standpoint is characterized as the consciousness within modern life advancing further into recognizing its freedom as self-determination. Freedom in this sense operates as a historical process whereby consciousness comes to know itself as imposing limitations on itself, therefore, the 'particular will' advances to become the 'universal will' through its own Reason.

⁴ I am pointing toward the Unhappy Consciousness in order to demonstrate that this era of dissatisfaction that consciousness has been thrust into could be a motivation for the misapprehension of Hegel's philosophical system as enabling totalitarian and positivist logic in support of the given historical situation. The misapprehension, as I want to emphasize, may lead to the reification and naturalization of the truth of that era in opposition to the truth of the

Notion, disregarding their necessary interconnectedness.

⁵I am aware of the debates around the translation of *Begriff*, within this paper I have utilized Notion simply due to my indebtedness to A.V. Miller's translation.

⁶The philosophical remedies forwarded by these thinkers can already be seen within Hegel's own work, such as the dependence of Notional development on social labour as the source of all movement, which I equate with Hegel's articulation of the labour of the negative, as well as the commitment to the moment of nonidentity and negation, against one-dimensional readings of the historical moment.

⁷A consequence of the reading of the Hegelian system I am forwarding within this paper is that the epistemological break Adorno sees in the young Hegel of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the mature Hegel of the *Philosophy of Right*, which motivate his claims of Hegel's as turning into a totalitarian philosopher of the Prussian state, undercuts the speculative philosophy Hegel's system is grounded upon, and thus, becomes an inadequate approach to Hegel's philosophy, if taken in isolation.

⁸Within this project I will be taking Adorno's formulation of social labour and Hegel's conception of the labour of the negative to be two sides of the same coin, each labouring within the realm of the Empirical "I" as the source of a dialectic that advancing Notional development through recognition of what in actuality is incompatible with the truth in the ideal. ⁹Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M74.

¹⁰The Life of Spirit within Hegel is characterized as the totality of the process of negation undergone within the social world that advances Notions forward into the future, as Hegel writes, "It is this power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative... on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it."

(M32)

¹¹ Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, Section 49, 5:314. ¹²

Pippin, Robert. *Hegel's Idealism; The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness*, 51. ¹³

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *The Science of Knowledge*. (I, 94), 95-96.

¹⁴ Schlegel, Friedrich. *Lucinde & the Fragments*. - *On Incomprehensibility*, 260.

¹⁵ Schlegel, Friedrich. *Lucinde & the Fragments* - *Athenaeum* Fragment 281,

202. ¹⁶ Pippin, Robert. *Hegel's Idealism; The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness*,

25. ¹⁷ Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M11.

¹⁸ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 213.

¹⁹ Hegel, G.W.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 23.

²⁰ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 180-181.

²¹ Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M200.

²² Hegel, G.W.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 36.

²³ Hegel, G.W.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 35.

²⁵ Hegel, G.W.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 398.

²⁶ Hegel, G.W.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 20.

²⁷ These reactions of the early Frankfurt School, Marcuse and Adorno, as well as Hegel's anticipation and overcoming of them will be elaborated within the concluding sections of this essay.

²⁸ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 190-215 ²⁹ In this project the individual, following Hegel, will be defined as the unity of universal and particular. A universal insofar as the individual is a human, a member of a kind, and at the same time a

particular insofar as that same individual can be thought of as a specific *this*-here unique instance of that universal kind.

³⁰ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 214. ³¹

Within this paper, I use the term Absolute Subject to point toward the unity of a given historical moment within the development of consciousness within civil society. ³²

Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M230.

³³ A euphemism, as I want to claim, within the early Frankfurt School for support of totalitarian philosophy and politics.

³⁴ Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M34.

³⁵ Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M2.

³⁶ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 214.

³⁷ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 263.

³⁸ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 206.

³⁹ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 214.

⁴⁰ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis & Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 214.

⁴¹ Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*,

215. ⁴² Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M178.

⁴³ Pippin, Robert. *Hegel's Idealism; The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, 166.

⁴⁴ Adorno, Theodor. *Hegel: Three Studies*.

⁴⁵ Herbert Marcuse, *The End of Utopia*.

⁴⁶ Hegel, G.W.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 20.

- ⁴⁷ Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, M20.
- ⁴⁸ Adorno, *Hegel: Three Studies*, 28.
- ⁴⁹ Sørensen, Asger. *The Role of Dialectics in Marcuse*. 44.
- ⁵⁰ Adorno, Theodor. *Hegel: Three Studies*. xiv.
- ⁵¹ Adorno, Theodor. *Hegel: Three Studies*. 27.
- ⁵² Marcuse, Herbert. *One-Dimensional Man*, 172.
- ⁵³ Macdonald, Iain. *Philosophy of History*. 194.
- ⁵⁴ Stone, Allison. *Adorno, Hegel, and Dialectic*.
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