

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

Sartre's Early Moral Theory

Pierre Daigneault

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

Philosophy

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

July 2000

© Pierre Daigneault, 2000



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-54271-8

Canada

ABSTRACT

Sartre's Early Moral Theory

Pierre Daigneault

During the 1940's, Jean-Paul Sartre published a multitude of philosophical works dealing with human understanding. At the end of *Being and Nothingness*, his magnum opus, Sartre promised a moral theory. By 1947, he had filled a dozen notebooks bearing on moral theory, but because he was unsatisfied with his work they were never published during his lifetime. By using the ontology *Being and Nothingness* and *Notebooks for an Ethics*, combined with the help of Sartre's other philosophical works of the same period, I demonstrate that a moral theory based on Sartre's philosophy is possible; unlike what many of his critics have claimed. In order to do so, I look at the influence made by German philosophers on Sartre's early work; some of the most important elements of his philosophy in relation to his moral theory; a critical assessment of criticism held against a Sartrean moral theory; and finally how such a model could function.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people, for without their help and contribution this thesis would not have been possible. First, my thesis supervisor Professor Christopher B. Gray who introduced me to Sartre's work during the course of a tutorial on *Being and Nothingness*. Professor Gray who showed me that university should be enjoyed and not frowned upon. Second, Associate Professor Vladimir Zeman without whom I would never have discovered the depth and the pleasure of continental philosophy. Third, Associate Professor Andrew Wayne, who supported me financially as his research assistant and as a source of encouragement during my graduate studies. Finally, but none the less, the one person that no one can do without, when studying philosophy at Concordia, Mrs. Eudene Whittaker.

I must also give thanks to my immediate family who encouraged throughout my studies, and without whom this thesis would not have been possible. Mr. Marc Anderson who provided me with many valuable comments both positive and negative. I am also indebted to Tara Singh who has stood by my side for the past four years, especially during the writing of my thesis. Moreover, Miss Singh did an excellent job of typing the entire thesis. However, should there be any mistakes in the writing of this thesis, I take full responsibility, whether they be in style, writing, or philosophical content.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS' INFLUENCE ON SARTRE'S MORAL THEORY ..	8
INTRODUCTION	9
KANT: GOD AND UNIVERSALITY	9
HEGEL: CULTURAL SPIRIT AND ACTION	17
HEIDEGGER: OTHER AND AUTHENTICITY	23
CONCLUSION	30
CHAPTER 2: THE BASICS FOR A SARTREAN MORAL THEORY	33
INTRODUCTION	34
FOUR IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY:.....	34
<i>The Role of God</i>	34
<i>Bad Faith</i>	36
<i>Facticity</i>	39
<i>Action</i>	41
THE OTHER	42
<i>Look</i>	45
<i>Shame</i>	46
MORALITY AS PERSONAL	48
CONCLUSION	52
CHAPTER 3: SARTRE'S CRITICS	54
ON FREEDOM.....	55
<i>Does the Look Weaken our Freedom</i>	55
<i>Is Freedom Unlimited</i>	59

<i>Why Choose Freedom</i>	63
ON CHOICE.....	68
<i>Inconsistency</i>	68
<i>Are Not All Choices Moral</i>	71
<i>Am I Ever Wrong?</i>	73
<i>Consistency</i>	74
<i>Can Others Prevent Me From Bad Faith</i>	78
SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY: CAN IT LEAD TO A MORAL THEORY.....	81
<i>The Probability Theory</i>	84
<i>Sartre's Literary Work Used Against His Philosophy</i>	86
<i>Conclusion</i>	89
CHAPTER 4: A MODEL OF A SARTREAN MORAL THEORY	91
MATERIAL FOR MORAL THEORY	92
MORAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM.....	98
SHAME AND CHOICE	101
MORAL SITUATIONS.....	104
CONCLUSION	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	116
LEXICON.....	118

Introduction

“Je vous dis que tout était prévu” (Sartre, 1947 93). In the last scene of *Huis Clos*, Garcin pronounced these words which reflect Jean-Paul Sartre’s disenchantment with the determinism of traditional philosophical thought. In the first half of the 20th century the major part of western thought was still in the clutches of determinism. The enlightenment had come but was starting its decline and so had the view of free will. Christianity was still highly influential upon civilization and along with Christian influence, western universities promoted a form of determinism, claiming that we are all part of God’s plan, whatever that may be, or at least God knew and as such predicted our every move. Kantianism, though far from a determinist philosophy, as we shall see in the first chapter, was not a philosophy of freedom, but of reason. Hegel, following Kant and the poetry of Hölderlin, took away the noumena and introduced the *Spirit*, which again makes human kind dependent on an outside force. Hegel also re-introduced historicism, which Marx pushed to the point of near prophecy. If we can know that the proletariat is going to revolt and destroy the bourgeoisie, then are we not determined to a communist future? In the 1930s, Marxists seemed to be on the right track, but by now it is obvious that they were mistaken.

As we can see, for some who like Sartre believed that we are completely free, even the project of the enlightenment sounds deterministic, or to be less forceful, flawed. After *Being and Nothingness* in 1943, Sartre promised to write a moral theory, something which he would attempt in 1946-7, again in the mid 1960s, and shortly before his death in the late 1970’s; each time he failed to complete his work. Most critics believed that Sartre’s failure resides in his desire to have a complete undeterministic freedom. How can you have a moral theory without restraint? If one grants the possibility of exterior restraint then he or she must surely admit to some

form of determinism or another. Whether it be God (Christianity), good will (Kantianism), Spirit (Hegelism), or even happiness (Utilitarianism) all of these provide us with a goal which we need to strive for in order to be morally righteous; we are determined to achieve it, unless we choose not to be moral, but then we are determined to fail. Sartre, as I will show, argues that we choose our position and that we, as individuals, alone realize our moral position. My destiny is mine alone, not that of a God, *Spirit*, good will, or happiness. If I choose one of these (i.e., God, Spirit, etc.) it is my 'choice', but not an absolute *choice*, each is as valid as I make it to be.

In the last few years philosophers have abandoned the existentialist position of personal morality, namely Rawls and Habermas who have argued for a collective "entente" each disagreeing on which methods to use, but agreeing that it has to be universal. Moral theory is closely linked with political theory. This is why I want to show the feasibility of a Sartrean model of moral theory, to show that we can be moral on a personal level. Should the case arise that all humans follow the model then we would have a universal morality; but this last point is not essential, in fact it is utopian. Though my depiction of Sartre might sound pragmatic, the reader should be reminded that Sartre believed in transcendence, developed an ontology and presented existentialism as the philosophy of *being*, none of which a pragmatist would acquiesce.

My main goal is to show that a Sartrean model of a moral theory is plausible. To show this I will have to demonstrate that a) Sartre left us enough information to construct a model, and b) his ontology does not ruin such a moral theory. The latter is very important because as we shall see in the third chapter, most of the criticism held against Sartre's early attempts was aimed at the weakness of his ontology, that

it ruined any chance of building a moral theory. There are not many philosophical works available that deal with Sartre's early attempt with the exception of numerous articles written mostly in the 1970s. In the English speaking world there are series of works written in the 1960's by Barnes, Warnock, Greene and more recently Anderson and Bell. I shall make extensive use of Anderson, and articles published in the last thirty years in order to support my claim that it is possible to have a moral theory based on Sartre's early philosophical work.

Though my thesis is written in English, and so are my secondary sources – in fact we find little work worth mentioning in French except for Francis Jensen's excellent book published in 1947 and prefaced by Sartre. Quotes from Sartre's works will be in their original French. I do so for two reasons: First, in mentioning the quotes in their original French we do not lose any of their intended meaning; secondly we do not have the problem of mistranslation. For this reason my quotation will use the French texts. Furthermore, I believe that most readers are well acquainted with French so that it does not pose a problem. For the most part I shall paraphrase, only when needed will I use quotes. As for the German philosophers I am going to use the standard translation when available and standard pagination. This means that for Kant I will use the German Academic pagination, for Hegel the paragraph numbers, and for Heidegger the German pagination of *Being and Time*. For Sartre I will use French pagination with the exception of *Being and Nothingness* where I introduce a system of reference as follows: The first Roman numeral refers to the Part of the book, then comes the first Arabic numbers which refer to the chapter, followed by the second Roman numeral which is the section, and finally the paragraph in Arabic numbers. Two numbers will be given to the latter as the French and English editors used different paragraphs. In addition, I have included in

parentheses the page number of the edition used throughout this paper. I did not find it necessary to do this with Sartre's other works as they are not referred to extensively, with the exception of *Notebooks for an Ethics*. In the case of the latter because they are notes, Sartre did not subdivide them as if it were a book and a system as I proposed for *Being and Nothingness* would be futile.

The thesis is subdivided into four chapters. The first chapter covers three important German philosophers: Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. Each of these great thinkers influenced Sartre at only one time or another, with perhaps the exception of Kant, since Sartre refers to Kant throughout his philosophical career. In addition to these three thinkers I could have included Descartes and Husserl, but I chose not to for the following reasons: First, both influenced Sartre's earlier studies which dealt with the consciousness, imagination and psychology as a whole (Henri Bergson also re-occurs on occasion in the early works of Sartre). Secondly, Husserl's influence had little to do with moral theory and by the end of the second World War we see Sartre referring less and less to Husserl. Moreover, the two thinkers disagreed on numerous points (e.g., phenomenological reduction should bracket existence in order to show the essence [Husserl], rather than show the existential [Sartre]) as shown by Joseph Catalano in his book *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*. As for Descartes, like all French philosophers Sartre was influenced by him, in fact he considered Descartes to be his only French influence (Renaut, 1993 179). The second chapter pertains to the elements of Sartre's ontology, which is considered to be essential to his moral theory. These are the role of God, *bad faith*, *facticity*, and action. In a second section of chapter two I show the relation between the I and the other, namely concerning what Sartre calls the *look*. In

the final section I explain why we need a personal moral theory and not a universal one as argued by the enlightenment.

With the influences on Sartre and the basic elements exposed it is possible to move to the moral theory itself. In the third chapter I defend a Sartrean moral theory in relation to three areas of criticism; freedom, choice, and the feasibility of a moral theory in the face of his philosophical and literary works of the same period.

Extensive reference to the previous chapters is to be expected by the reader.

In the fourth and final chapter, I present a concise, but essential analysis of a Sartrean model of a moral theory. Divided into four sections, the first one demonstrates that Sartre left us with the necessary tools – found in the second chapter – to work out a model. The following section deals briefly with the possible relationship between the judicial system and the moral theory. The third section explains why choices are related to *shame* and why they do not involve judging. As for the fourth section I demonstrate how a Sartrean model would function by using three examples of moral implications.

Before setting upon the thesis itself, it is necessary to explain what is meant by freedom, freedom of action, and freedom of the will. When dealing with Sartre, it is difficult to say which one he is referring to as he uses the word “liberté” constantly. On some occasions he is referring to freedom of the will, while in others it is freedom of action. With Kant and Hegel the distinction is much clearer, while Heidegger does not use the term freedom in his early philosophy. As for the meaning of freedom in the thesis, it is a combination of freedom of will and action. One without the other is of very little use. If we have free will but we are not free to act (whether morally or not), then how can we claim to have free will? If we claim to act freely but we have not freedom of will, then freedom of action is a myth. Freedom of action and free will

are co-dependent. Consequently, I define freedom as the capacity to do what one wills within the boundaries of possibility (i.e., facticity). I use the term boundaries because freedom limits itself as shall be shown throughout this thesis.

Two more matters need settling before moving on. The first concerns Simone de Beauvoir's work entitled *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguïté*. I intend to use this work as if it was that of Sartre's with some reservation. I am not the first to do so since Thomas Anderson used the same approach in his 1979 book (Anderson, 1979 4). Anderson took this approach twenty years ago because there was no moral work published by Sartre and de Beauvoir conceded that she wrote her book based on Sartre's ontology (de Beauvoir, 1963 99). Alain Renaut reprised this view in 1993 by showing the links between the two authors (Renaut, 1993 206). It should be pointed out that Anderson did not use this approach in his latest book since by then some of Sartre's notes on moral theory had been published (Anderson, 1993 XI). Why do I use *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguïté*? Because it complements Sartre's unfinished work, and what held true in 1979 concerning the relevance of de Beauvoir's work to that of Sartre still holds true today.

Finally, technical terms are italicized and a short description of their meanings can be found in a lexicon at the end of the thesis. There is however one exception concerning 'choice'. When in single quotes 'choices' refers specifically to what Sartre calls secondary 'choices', as opposed to the *original choice*.

Chapter 1:

German Philosophers' Influence on Sartre's Moral Theory

Introduction

In this first chapter, I am going to look at three of Germany's most important philosophers, Immanuel Kant, G.W. Hegel, and Martin Heidegger. This might come as a surprise since I am presenting the model for a moral theory of a French philosopher and not a German one. The reason for looking at these three giants of German thought is to show the evolution of moral theory in that country during the span of two centuries, which influenced Sartre's thought during his short stay at the French Berlin Institute. Those who might question the intrusion of Kant in any review of Sartre should be aware that scholars have attempted to equate Sartre's vague notion of a moral theory with Kant's concept of 'hypothetical imperative' (Bell, 1989 52-53). Moreover, while Kant's direct influence on Sartre was minimal, it was nonetheless present. In addition, it played a major role among the views of the other two thinkers who influenced Sartre's moral theory. As for Hegel, his work became prominent in Sartre's writing after the publication of *Being and Nothingness*, while that of Heidegger played a role throughout the 1940's.

Kant: God and Universality

Western philosophers and culture in general, of the past two centuries owe a debt of gratitude to Kant in all fields of thought. Though many of his ideas have either been rejected or improved upon, they serve as a starting point and as a source of undeniable expertise for moral theorists. Kant influenced existentialism by looking at the moral will to act, not the moral being (Sartre, 1943 (475) IV-intro-0-1/1) and by placing freedom at the forefront of moral theory which allows for a humanistic approach (de Beauvoir, 1947 25). Kant places free will ahead of both God and the

state's welfare. In fact, Kant, unlike Hegel, has little to say about the state; he is more interested in a global vision. Unfortunately, for the sake of universality and compliance with the first *Critique*, Kant sacrificed too much freedom that he had so strongly defended.

For Kant, we constantly have to question ourselves and see if we are acting within the boundaries of the *categorical imperative* that applies itself universally. Furthermore, freedom of action for Kant is secondary, since each time we intend to do something we must ponder whether I 'ought' to do or not do what I am about to do, thus we have to distinguish between free will and freedom of action. What is more, Kant provided us with an initiative to follow the *categorical imperative* in order to do what is morally right, which is the *kingdom of ends*. In this first section, we are going to see how both Kant's desire for universality and the inclusion of God in moral theory fails to allow for freedom of action, and how it influenced Sartre's thought.

Most modern thinkers since Rousseau came to the realization that freedom originates out of nature and out of political order, or civilization. Nature alone cannot provide freedom, since to be free a *being* needs to be rational, hence only humans can be free. Thomas Hobbes perceived freedom of action as freedom from natural law, while Rousseau believed that freedom depends on morality. That is to say, that humans are, for better or for worse, civilized, and that only through a reformation of moral laws can humans be freed from the chains of civilization. For Rousseau a social contract is required for each society in order to allow people to have freedom. Kant went a step further by eliminating the social contract and introducing the *categorical imperative*, which confirms his belief in the role of nature and rationality when it comes to freedom of action. The *categorical imperative* maxim comes about through rational thinking, and confirms the universality of human beings. Universality

can only be possible if freedom comes out of rational thought, for how could we explain that all human beings irrespective of one's culture are free. Thus, for Hobbesians, humans impose limits on freedom of action because freedom comes out of natural law. However for Kantians freedom originates both from human law and that of nature.

For Sartre it was obvious that nature could only halt our freedom of action, since for him humans had to come to the realization that they could only survive if they kept nature under control; tools, huts, weapons, became the keys to survival. Sartre's view is opposed to both that of Rousseau and Kant, he sees civilization stripping away human freedom. We see an example of what Sartre means in *la Nausée*, when Roquentin decides to leave Bouville, he does so partly because Paris offers more freedom, freedom that can only be found in the safety of human made surroundings (Sartre, 1938 220). Concerning nature, it could be said that Kant felt victim to the views of his time. In the first case, he was influenced by Hobbes, and in the second case, by Rousseau's own fascination with the reports of the New World and how the natives were free from the bounds of civilization. However, these two mishaps by Kant are clearly not enough to weaken the role of freedom of action in Kant's moral theory, at best they show the influences of one's epoch. Kant could easily escape such criticism by pointing out that morality and reason serve as our tool against the wilderness of freedom of action.

One position held by Kant that is detrimental to freedom of action is the place taken by God. Kant showed in the *Critique of Judgment* and in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that we cannot prove God's existence through reason or teleology because they both require empirical proof. However, in all three of his *Critiques* he does point out the rationale behind the existence of God. God is needed if there is to be

supreme good, and this is the good which Kant believes is the ultimate 'end' of all humans (Kant, 1997 105). Kant pointed out that the Greeks failed in creating a moral theory because they did not take into consideration the notion of God (i.e., the Judeo-Christian God), however, their moral laws according to Kant effective (Kant, 1997 126). In all of his works, Kant made the effort to expose the importance of 'ends' to be achieved through the proper 'means'. Those 'means' do not justify the 'end', nor do the 'ends' justify the 'means'. Hence, if I act as 'I ought to', then I shall be using the proper 'means' for an 'end'. If the proper 'means' are used, then good triumphs in the 'end'. What we are to strive for then, is perfection, not that we can achieve it, but merely our striving for it is enough to obtain grace. We need to constantly strive to better ourselves (Kant, 1990 47). Thus, the ultimate 'end' result is perfection, or as Sartre would call it God. For this reason, God for Kant is just one of many aspect of his moral theory which cannot succeed without it. The reason why the inclusion of God in moral theory leads to failure is that if I am not completely free to act, then I will act in order to satisfy the 'end' result which is the *kingdom of ends*. Whether I believe in a God or not I will strive to be like God in order to partake in the *kingdom of ends*.

Therefore, what role if any is left for a moral theory other than the one presented by the theologians? Granted, Kant argues that moral rationality is prior to religion, but if to be morally righteous is sought in the attainment of perfection (i.e., be able to follow the *categorical imperative* at all time), then our behavior should be modeled after God. Kant does not impose the law of God on humanity, but does it matter if moral law was achieved by a group of ecclesiastics, or if it was achieved by secularists? We could agree with Kant on the basis of rationality, and with the laws of the church for reasons of faith. The difference between the laws of the church and

those obtained by Kant's *categorical imperative*, is that Kant gives each and every one of us the capacity to judge for ourselves if the laws obtained from the *categorical imperative* are universally applicable or not. Throughout *Being and Nothingness* Sartre wants us to realize that we are free, and as long as we do not accept this we are going to be trapped in our desire to be a god. Kant fails to give us this recognition, and in the 'end' we still strive to be perfect or godlike, only then will we have reached the 'kingdom of ends'. Both God and *bad faith* shall be discussed in relation to Sartre in the next chapter.

The other downfall of freedom in Kant's moral theory is the majestic role taken by universality. This position was akin to the whole of the enlightenment, and was one of the negative motivations behind the Romantics and the Idealist reactionary movement in Germany. Kant's devotion to the quest for universality did not begin with his moral theory, nor did it end there. In the first and third *Critique*, he wants to show how understanding is universal. More specifically Kant needed universality for three reasons in his moral theory; first to fall in line with his earlier work; second, for a basis on how to act; third, for the good of humanity. (1) In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant demonstrated how understanding is universal to all human beings. In the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* he showed that human will is universal, and as such so is our rational desire to act morally well (Kant, 1990 448). (2) Our action needs justification, or at least a reason for why I 'ought' to act.

In a previous paragraph, we saw that the ultimate 'end' result was the *kingdom of ends*, but for its immediate impact Kant turned towards universal well being. I 'ought to' do such and such, or else I am inflicting wounds on my fellow humans and in turn upon myself. We may wonder why Kant needs God to justify the

kingdom of ends. One possible answer is that universality only offers us a 'means' to an 'end' or rather it tells us what 'means' should be used to achieve that 'end', namely that the 'end' reflects the consistency of one's reason. In his explanation of the 'us-object' Sartre remarks that the 'us-object', which we can take to be universality, requires God (Sartre, 1943 (463) III-3-III-9/18). Hegel does the same but he substituted *Spirit* for God.

Universality is also needed (3) for the good of humanity, and this point is a little bit harder to dismiss in moral theory, because after all a moral theory is supposed to direct us on how to act or at least to have the will to act in accordance to what is good. Such a point becomes an important argument against a Sartrean moral theory, but we will leave this for now and pursue our overview of Kant's influence on Sartre. Universality prevents us from putting our interest into conflict with the interests of others. If we adhere to this view, then we will not morally injure others. Though there is little to say against this last point, the same argument we used earlier applies to it. With universality, my freedom of action is constrained for the good of others and therefore we have an 'alien' (i.e., other than one's own) restraint entering into our moral theory.

A moral theory that adheres to universality is not unique to Kant, as the majority of moral theorists have taken more or less the same path. For Sartre the universal route cannot succeed for the reason given above combined with those given in *Being and Nothingness* and in *Notebooks for an Ethics*. In his first major philosophical work, Sartre wrote a chapter on 'we' and 'us' where he showed that there are no such thing. We are a 'we' because of some aspect of our lives that we share with others and we are an 'us' only through the eyes of another. For example, a group of workers see themselves as a 'we' when they demand some improvement

in their working conditions. Once they go home they live their own lives and are no longer part of the 'we' -- this is even more true in our individualist society. As for an example of the 'us', we see it in the socio-economic strata where the poor, the well to do, and the rich create a false state of unification. Some may argue that there is an 'us' as human beings, but that is purely part of our biological structure, not part of who we are as a whole. When we look at Heidegger, we shall see that to be *authentic* is to realize ourselves outside the *das Man*¹. In *Notebooks for an Ethics* Sartre calls man a "false-universal" (Sartre, 1983 73). When we say all human beings are evil or good we are generalizing, what we should say is *most* humans are either good or bad *most* of the time. In any case, we need to look at humans as individuals and not as an 'us', nor 'we'; in other words, there is no such thing as universality for Sartre.

Our discussion on universality brings us to a dilemma that has been present since the enlightenment, that of the original sin. Prior to the enlightenment, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the original sin was the acceptance that all humans are born evil and must repent. The enlightenment threw out this view and replaced it with a system that says we are good by nature and that moral judgment should be based on each and every individual act. Kant asks of us that we judge our acts by using the *categorical imperative* maxims that he devised (Kant, 1990 441; Sartre, 1983 52). This claim that we should not judge people based on their mere existence, but rather on their acts still prevails today. The problem remains, in that we believe that we are more apt at judging others rather than ourselves. A person other than the one doing

¹ The term *das Man* is more or less equivalent to the English 'they', however it implies some disconnection between the I and others as such, it is closer to the French 'on'.

the act can calculate beforehand whether the act will be morally acceptable or not. This allows the spectator to judge if the individual doing the act did so within the bounds of morality.

In his lecture on *Existentialism and Humanism*, Sartre gave the example of a student who must decide between helping his fellow Frenchmen against the German invader, or staying home and helping his mother who has no family besides him. The majority of people would take this student's request for help as an appeal for a prescriptive orientation. In other words, tell that student to do such and such. Instead, Sartre remarks that the student made his own decision before coming to him (Sartre, 1946 46). No moral theory can help you decide prior to your act since it is the act itself, which Kant had shown, that is morally right or wrong. I can will to do good, but if my act differs from my will, then my act was bad even though my will was good. While if I cannot act, for some unknown reason, then good will is enough for Kant, however, willing does not constitute moral action.

If the student had asked a priest who was a French nationalist he would have told him to fight against the Germans; if he would have asked another who felt strongly about family ties he would have said "take care of your poor mother". If we were to follow Kant in this example and say "do not treat any one as a 'means'", then we cannot resolve this problem. Either the student treats his mother as a 'means', should he decide to go to England, or his fellow Frenchmen, if he takes care of his mother (Sartre, 1946 43). No law, or maxim can help that student except his own freedom of 'choice' (Sartre, 1946 71).

This short and somewhat unfair critique of Kant's moral theory should not be perceived by the reader as being completely negative. On the one hand, Kant's praise of nature, inclusion of God, and desperate requirement for universality does

weaken his theory. On the other hand, Kant gave moralists a unique approach to moral problems in that they should look at the will of the act and not the *being* who does the act, and that freedom of the will inevitably leads to freedom of action. We (i.e., the individual I) act in a certain way because to do otherwise seems wrong to us. Hence, we come to terms with our existence by way of negation. Roquentin's nausea is caused by this realization, so is the student's need for justification in the example above. This '*négalité*' leads us to seek *plenitude* or what Sartre calls *being-in-itself* and the only *being* that could possibly be pure *in-itself* is God. For Kant we could not know the *being-in-itself* (noumena), but we need to keep striving to discover it. As we shall see in the second chapter, Sartre takes the opposite stance.

Nevertheless, Kant opened the door to an individualist moral theory, and to a theory based on freedom of action. This is a door whose opening we must face and that we can no longer close. We not only have a free will, but we are also free in our action and as such, we are nothing more than individuals. A moral theory needs to take these two realities and deliver human kind from its desire to be God.

Hegel: Cultural Spirit and Action

The horrors of the French revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and the idea of a unified German state appeared in the short years separating Kant's work on moral theory and Hegel's own work in 1821. Though the *Philosophy of Right* serves as the main piece of Hegel's moral theory, Sartre was far more interested in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In my overview of Hegel, both texts are going to be treated as equally important since we are interested in the role of freedom of action in Hegel's moral theory. While Kant's main preoccupation was with the universal application of a moral theory, after the historical events of the French revolution,

Hegel's preoccupation became that of the German culture. Also, contrary to Kant who professed a morality based on what 'I ought to', Hegel argued against a prescriptive moral theory. Rather, Hegel argues, we need to look for the underlying principles that should be used in order to help people make their action morally right. These principles are to be found in the *Spirit* of a culture. Beside Hegel's unique definition of freedom, I am going to look at the role of others, *Spirit* (culture), and action.

To understand Hegel's definition of freedom of action we need to acquaint ourselves with the relation between freedom and *ethical life*. *Ethical life* depends on free will, or what Hegel calls the absolute will, which is an "objective, a circle of necessity whose moments are the ethical powers which regulate the life of the individual" (Hegel, 1965 145). Since the *ethical life* depends on free will, we can assume that Hegel, as is the case with most modern thinkers, considers freedom of will to be an intricate part of moral theory. In addition, we can assume that freedom of action cannot be far behind and that it too has a place in his moral theory. As Hegel explained in the first part of the *Phenomenology*, we come to know things by what they are not. Concerning freedom of action Hegel tells us that freedom is not the freedom to do what one pleases to do, such freedom reeks of immaturity (Hegel, 1965 15r). We turn to free will and become aware of the freedom of 'right', the right to do such and such. However, free will gives us the possibility to have such things as 'right'. (Hegel, 1965 4, 128, 2a). Laws are nothing more than 'alien' intervention within the *ethical life* that leaves the individual high and dry (Hegel, 1977 484). Not surprisingly, Hegel has little sympathy for the Kantian use of *categorical imperative*, or the laws of God as ordained by religion. For Hegel laws are too restrictive and serve no purpose within moral theory. In his *War Diaries* Sartre confirms his

understanding of Hegel's meaning of freedom: that it does imply the freedom to will what we choose, and that once we grasp such freedom we can become a "grand homme" (Sartre, 1995 271). Sartre does criticize Hegel for providing merely a negative definition of freedom. In so doing Hegel follows in the footsteps of other moralists who define morality as abstaining from that which must not be done, to which Sartre replies that it can only lead to an indeterminate theory of morality because moral acts, which arise out of freedom, have a specific purpose and ends (Sartre, 1983 173-178).

The term *Spirit* plays an important role in Hegel's philosophy as a whole; unfortunately he did not give a precise meaning of what it refers to. Those who believe that Hegel was Christian equate the term with God; those who believe that he was an atheist associate *Spirit* with the spirit of the culture (i.e., *Volk*). More recently H.S. Harris, argued that *Spirit* refers to God for the sake of giving it a name, while at the same time it refers to the unified consciousness of the *Volk* (Harris, 1995 61). If we follow the lead of Harris, or even the atheist proponents, then the *Volk* is essential to the *ethical life* and as such freedom of action. Hence; we can conclude that Hegel, unlike Kant, saw the notion of freedom not as a product of nature, but of civilization; and placed its realization squarely on civilization.

Freedom of action is only possible insofar as we interact with others, while on its own it is meaningless (Hegel, 1965 15). The *Spirit* dictates what the *ethical life* should be, and in saying so Hegel escapes the need for laws. The *ethical life* therefore, is achieved through a societal will; the *Volk* through their generations compose what should or should not be moral. Thus, an American citizen cannot be expected to comprehend the moral theory of a Chinese citizen; at best, the American could understand its code, but not its meaning. In the same vein, the American is not

allowed to judge the Chinese's action, or vice-versa. On the one hand, such an approach gives the advantage of the *Volk* to choose freely its cultural morals. With Kant's *categorical imperative* all rational beings can judge and be judged as to whether their behavior is morally righteous or not, and therefore we risk falling under the moral law of the strongest². On the other hand, Hegel's view confirms Sartre's position that others make us who we are, and that no matter how much effort one places in trying to be *authentic* he or she is bound to failure. I am what others perceive me to be (Sartre, 1943 (568) IV-2-II-58/78; Sartre, 1954 93). I cannot be an individual if I am part of a group of some sort. When in a group I am judged, or compared to the other members, thus I always stand next to another (Hegel, 1977 491). We simply have to remember back in primary school when the class clown was expected by all, including the teacher, to make a joke, or the bully to be a bully.

Even if there are no laws per se, the *Spirit*, as defined by Harris, constructs the *ethical life* of Hegel's world. The term *ethical life* has not been defined so far for the simple reason that it does not require a definition, since it means exactly what it is, life order for an ethic similar to an organization where the *Volk's* ethical stance sits at the top. We are unaware of the order, but we live by it day in and day out. The order comes the *Volk's* historical background, and how things are viewed according to the culture. We do not need to see the rules, nor to judge these as a maxim, rather they morally exist (Solomon, 1983 533). In other words, what is morally acceptable is what is commonly accepted by the *Volk* (Hegel, 1965 85). This differs from a law in that once a law has been implemented it cannot allow for changes in

² Kant could claim that we are all equal as rational *beings*; however, the *categorical imperative* still leaves room for interpretation, which could be abused by a person with power in any given culture.

views, cultural evolution – even British common law cannot account for the *Spirit*. If we follow the British legal system we have to go through legislation and the like, and we revert back to the original problem that Hegel saw with laws, that they do not reflect the *Spirit*. There is a law of humanity, as there is one of nature, and of the animal kingdom. Such a law belongs to human kind, and as such, the law of humanity, not that of God or of any individual, precedes ethics. To become ethical a law has to go through the transformation of the *Spirit*; however, any transformation of a law in line with the *Spirit* simply reflects the will of the *Volk* who have consumed the *Spirit* since birth, and not some extraordinary source of moral power.

The *Spirit* supersedes nature once the *Volk* allows it to, as it consists of the *Spirit* (de Beauvoir, 1947 13). Hence, for Hegel the world consists of a series of different cultures that possess an absolute *Spirit*. The *Spirit* is composed of a commonly shared consciousness based on the *Volk* of the particular culture. Hegel is correct for one thing, in that we cannot formulate a law with everything that is embodied by the *Spirit*, nor can we follow every single law we encounter. When driving a car, we cannot analyze each and every sign we encounter, nor recognize actively what they stand for; a certain amount of passivity is required. Instead, we follow those which are appropriate at the time and place which we find ourselves, and ignore those which do not apply (Sartre, 1943 (556) IV-1-II-37/58). Consequently, it is up to the individual to follow the will of the *Spirit*; however, at the time of someone's birth the individual has been conditioned by the *Spirit* in which the agent finds himself or herself³.

³ It is unclear how Hegel would have reacted to our modern multicultural society, and with those who travel extensively for long periods of time.

To conclude, Hegel argued that a philosophy of passive action would be erroneous. Throughout the *Phenomenology*, Hegel demonstrates how activity allows the individual to see his or her role in the *Volk*. In the now famous parable entitled "Lordship and Bondage"; Hegel wants the reader to comprehend that the bondsman is freer than the lord because his work is valorized, while that of the lord is not. Unfortunately, Marx misunderstood this passage and took it to be a description of social ranking rather than a parable reflecting Hegel's view of consciousness. Instead of the social status of work, Hegel was reprising what he had said in the chapters on 'Consciousness', that work (i.e., activity) makes one aware of oneself and in turn of one's freedom. Sartre reacted to the "Lordship and Bondage" chapter the same way that Marx previously had, probably due to the fact that at the time that he wrote the *Notebooks for an Ethics* Sartre was reading and working extensively with Marxism. Thus, for Sartre Hegel's parable did not hold true because we cannot be free if we are enslaved. It would seem that Hegel was correct, that work made you aware and valorized. Since the advent of mass production workers have performed repetitive, meaningless work, and have become unaware of the result of their labor (Sartre, 1983 79, 277 & 468). This last point was important already for Hegel, since the 'end' meaning was what differentiated the bondsman from the lord, in that the bondsman knew what his work meant. Though Sartre misunderstood part of the parable that dealt with freedom, he was aware that it is in the other (i.e., the lord) that the bondsman realizes himself (Sartre, 1983 398). He also saw the importance of action.

There were many philosophers who philosophically and chronologically came immediately after Kant, among whom are Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling, even the poets Goethe and Hölderlin. While at the time all of them were more famous than Hegel,

with the *Phenomenology* Hegel came into his own. Hegel realized that Kant's mistake was more than the dualism of the first *Critique*; the *categorical imperative* was also too restrictive, and universality was unattainable. Under the *categorical imperative* the individual is expected to know what is morally right or wrong, but the most we can hope from moral theory is that it orients us in the right direction (Hegel, 1977 425-426). By pursuing universality Kant made moral theory inapplicable, or at least limited; Hegel improved upon moral theory by making it concrete. Hegel's *ethical life* is possible in our everyday lives; the *Spirit* of the *Volk* is within each and every one of us and as such we are able to behave morally in any given situation (Walsh, 1969 47). Sartre's objections to Kant, namely the imposing of God and universality, have found a resolution in Hegel; however, the concept of *Spirit* has no place for individuality as was allowed by Kant. What is needed is for the individual to remove himself or herself from the other, without becoming solipsistic; the answer may lie in Heidegger's view of *authenticity* as defined in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger: Other and Authenticity

Heidegger's broad educational background spans from theology, to the neo-Kantian school at Marburg and finally to Husserl's phenomenology at Freiburg. In addition to having worked in these areas, Heidegger was considered by Sartre as a foremost existentialist, though Heidegger denounced any existentialist association with Sartre or Jaspers. As with Kant and Hegel, Heidegger is one of Germany's most original thinkers and, considering his influence on Sartre, I cannot omit him from this study. Heidegger published works on both Kant and Hegel, however, I will only concentrate on his first, and most influential work, *Being and Time*. In his *War Diaries*, Sartre admits to having read *Being and Time* without the attention that it

required, therefore, errors in interpretation are to be expected on Sartre's part. In what follows I am going to move away from Hegel's cultural *Spirit* towards the individual. Heidegger's goal was to return to the roots of philosophical investigation, and attempt to understand *being*, and not only define it. Even if *Being and Time* does not concern itself with moral theory, it does provide some insight as to how our structure as *Dasein* affects us, and in turn how it affects our moral action. Our discussion will be concentrated on the quest for *authenticity* and the role of the other. *Authenticity* is an important concept as it applies to all human beings; no matter where one is born and reared, or how he or she views life, *authenticity* is universal and yet it belongs to the individual (Sartre, 1995 3 21). As was the case with Kant and Hegel, this overview of Heidegger will be brief, but unlike the first two thinkers, it will be dense.

The first impression a student of philosophy might get from reading Heidegger, is that he is preaching solipsism. Once we start digesting *Being and Time* it becomes obvious that our *being* depends on that of others and its definition implies that it is in a constant relation with another (I am a *being-in-the-world*). *Being* 'is' and as such it 'is' always with someone or something (Heidegger, 1994 5). We also encounter the other even if his or her presence is not there with us. The other's presence is felt as long as we are surrounded by humanly made objects, or natural objects that have received a unique definition in order to be used by humans (Heidegger, 1994 118). As long as we are 'in' the world the other 'is' there around us. *Dasein* (being with others) is a *with-world* (Heidegger, 1994 118). *Dasein's* knowledge of the world arises out of the other. A hammer has a specific use, which is hammering. I could use a hammer to serve other purposes, but it would lead to failure or at best it would be clumsy. For Heidegger, each thing serves a specific

purpose through its design, and things are either humanly made, or natural. In the case of the latter a person gave it meaning, while for the former someone designed it for a specific purpose (Heidegger, 1994 62). Before we attempt to understand our *being*, we first must understand how it is a *being-in-the-world*. The ontic (the inquiry into the world of entities) divulges the ontological (the inquiry onto the world of *being*), and not the other way around. Sartre took the same approach in *Being and Nothingness*, by first defining the everyday of our *being*. Thus, *Dasein* is *ontically* with others even if it is ontologically an entity *in-itself*. Our relation to others according to Heidegger, is dependent on our interaction with them, hence our abilities to communicate are essential. In *Huis Clos*, the three characters discover the importance of communication, as they are about to spend eternity with each other, without any means of sheltering oneself from the others. That is life for Heidegger; the other is always there lurking around the corner, and right beside each or every one of us.

We must be wary of communication since it can also lead to our downfall or as Heidegger calls it our falling into the *das Man*. If we are not careful, communication can lead to *idle talk*, or as we would now call it 'gossip'. *Idle talk* is something that one claims to understand, while making it his or her own, when in fact it is neither (Heidegger, 1994 168). We are also thrown into the *das Man* by our *curiosity*. *Curiosity* is *Dasein's* desire for the unattainable, and if *Dasein* should attain it, then *Dasein* moves on to another 'desire' (Heidegger, 1994 172). *Curiosity* is often ignited by *idle talk*. For example, a television commercial claims that product XYZ will "miraculously make you lose 10 pounds in a week". The advertisement is the *idle talk*, and the *curiosity* is the desire to lose the ten pounds within a week. When *idle talk* and *curiosity* are brought together, as in our example, we have what Heidegger

calls *ambiguity*. *Ambiguity* occurs when on the 'surface' of things everything appears genuine, while in reality it is not, or vice-versa (Heidegger, 1994 173). Thus, *Dasein* is confused by *idle talk* and *curiosity* by throwing *Dasein* into the *das Man*. At this point, *Dasein* is defined by Heidegger as having fallen into the *das Man*, or as having fallen victim to the 'gossip' of others and one's own curiosity. *Dasein's* fall is not imposed on it by the others, on the contrary, it is desired on the part of *Dasein*. "C'est-à-dire qu'il veut être «comme tout le monde» pour réaliser par lui-même l'unité de l'Esprit" (Sartre, 1983 25). The fall into the *das Man* removes *Dasein's* fears and *Angst* (Heidegger, 1994 141). The *das Man* is the public eye, which watches out for us and regulates our behavior.

Clearly we have to accept that we cannot escape *being-with-others*, yet we must become *authentic* if we do not want to fall victim to the *das Man* (Sartre, 1943 (306-307) III-1-IV-26/27). *Authenticity* is achieved when *Dasein* realizes that it is its own possibility, while it is *inauthentic* when *Dasein* is distracted, busy, excited, and so on (Heidegger, 1994 42-43). Therefore, Hegel's argument in favor of moral theory in which the *Spirit* guides the people can only lead to the *inauthenticity* of *Dasein*. The same is true, to a lesser degree, about Kant's 'maxim'. For Kant every individual must concur in his or her moral action based on what 'ought' to be, and what 'ought' not to be done. Indirectly, as with Hegel, Kant's notion of universal reflects the *inauthenticity* of *Dasein* and as such relinquishes the freedom of action of the individual to that of the group.

How can we free ourselves from the *das Man* (i.e., become *authentic*) if we are always *with-others*? Heidegger contends that the answer is *Angst*, borrowing the notion from Kierkegaard. *Angst*, unlike fear, is not about another entity(ies) *within-the-world*, rather it stems from *Dasein* as a *being-in-the-world* (Heidegger, 1994 187).

Our *Angst* exposes the world as ours, but it does not conceptualize it, and in so doing it leaves *Dasein* feeling uncanny (Heidegger, 1994 188). In *Angst*, we are made aware of *Dasein* as an 'I myself' and of its own possibility by pulling us out of the *das Man* (Heidegger, 1994 189). For Sartre it is in *Angst* that I become aware of my freedom, and the result is the same one of unwantedness. However, in his *War Diaries* Sartre offers an alternative to *Angst*, that of desperateness (Sartre, 1995 67). This second option only occurs in one entry of the diary and never in his published work; in the last few years of his life during an interview Sartre does confess to never having been in a state of *Angst* (Sartre, 1980, 398). A third option, also offered by Sartre, is the fear of dying in the face of war (Sartre, 1995 90-91). However, this third option confirms Heidegger's argument that we are about to look at. In the entry following the one about desperateness, Sartre remarks that we may become *authentic* when doing something, or think about something, as Roquentin does throughout *la Nausée* (Sartre, 1995 68). As for Heidegger, our *Angst* announces the possibility, even if only for a brief flash⁴, of our *authenticity*.

How can we obtain the feeling of *Angst*? On the one hand, Sartre finds it in many situations, while walking on the edge of a cliff, breaking a self made promise, and in any situation which we must face alone, and where the *das Man* cannot come to our rescue. On the other hand, Heidegger contends that the *Angst* that is needed to reach *authenticity* occurs when we confront the phenomenon of one's *death*. Before we discuss any further the phenomenon of *death*, we have to understand the structure of *Dasein* in relation to *Angst*. In one word, *Dasein's* structure is *care*.

⁴ Because 'moment' refers to a period of time, and the ontological structure is not temporal, the term 'flash' is more appropriate in this case.

Because *Dasein* is a *being-in-the-world*, when in *Angst* it realizes not only its own possibility, but also that it is *ahead-of-itself-already-in-the-world as being-alongside*, as such *Dasein* cannot be *care free* (Heidegger, 1994 192). Simply put, *Dasein* cannot help but *care*, it cannot be indifferent in any circumstances, whether it be for someone, something, or one's own *death*.

Unlike most philosophers, and non-philosophers, for Heidegger *death* is not an event, but a phenomenon of life. While our *Angst* arises out of *Dasein* facing its own *death*, the latter makes us aware of the structure of *care*. Once this awareness has been accomplished, we can now set our sights on the path towards *authenticity*. *Dasein* is no longer a 'there', it is 'here' as its *death* reveals it to be. The experience of the phenomenon of *death* is limited to the *Dasein* which experiences the *Angst* about its own *death*. Sartre disagrees with Heidegger on this point, as he observed we have all experienced the *Angst* associated with the *death* of a dear one (Sartre, 1943 (578-579) IV-1-II-59/96). Of course, it is difficult to see how the *death* of another can compare facing one's own demise, which was the argument put forward by Heidegger. *Death* consists of "*coming-to-its-end of what is-not-yet-at-an-end*" (Heidegger, 1994 242). The *Angst* of *death* is not a falling (i.e., *Dasein* as thrown into the *das Man*) which we learn about because "[a]s soon as man comes to, he is at once old enough to die" (Heidegger, 1994 245n). *Death* allows *Dasein* to be its 'ownmost' possibility in that it gives *Dasein* the possibility "... of existing as a *whole-potentiality-for-being*" (Heidegger, 1994 264). Yet, *Dasein*, rightfully, does not enjoy the feeling of *Angst* incurred by coming upon *death*, and finds a tranquilizing effect by escaping into the *das Man* (Heidegger, 1994 253). It should be noted again, since we are concerned with the influence on Sartre, that Sartre replaces *death* with freedom. Freedom makes us aware of ourselves, and releases us from the safety-

blanket of the other or that of God and in being free I realize my own possibility (Sartre, 1995 343).

Authenticity is thus achieved when *Dasein* feels the *Angst* of death, and violence is done existentially to the *das Man* and its tranquilizing effect (Heidegger, 1994 310). However, *Dasein* needs to be aware of its possibility. In other words, if *Dasein* feels the *Angst* of death but does not know that it is in a state of *authenticity*, then it fails to be *authentic*. In order to be aware, *Dasein* has to be summoned or *called* to. The *call* is not 'alien', nor from *Dasein*, but from within, a *call* to conscience. This *call* to conscience should not be considered as the high court of moral judgment, as Kant sees it. Conscience is still within the grasp of the *das Man*, unless *Dasein* is able to pull itself out of it, for only a flash, with the help of the phenomena of *death*. Once the *Angst* is felt and the *call* answered, then *Dasein* enters a realm of resoluteness, which allows it to be *authentic*. One problem remains, and this problem is that in order to answer the *call* *Dasein* has to be active, but to receive the *call* it must be passive. The active part is the self-acceptance of one's own *death* through *Angst*, while the passive is the *call* itself which results from the whole structure of *Dasein* (i.e., *care*) (Heidegger, 1994 300). The *call* raises an important question: how can we be *authentic* if the *das Man* will not allow us. Though I may be aware of my *call*, I still may refuse to answer it out of fear of reappraisal from my fellow humans. Sartre gives the example of Jews and anti-Semites, Jews are not able to be *authentic*, for if they do, then they feel the wrath of others (i.e., anti-Semite) (Sartre, 1954 165-167). Thus, resoluteness should be defined as "[o]nly that *authenticity* which, in *care*, is the object of *care*, and which is possible as *care* – the *authenticity* of *care* itself" (Heidegger, 1994 301). Taking a Sartrean approach, we can see how freedom plays a role, which was not recognized by Heidegger. *Dasein*

must accept the *call* freely, or refuse it, but either way it is based on *Dasein's* freedom (Sartre, 1954 109).

This exposition of Heidegger barely dealt with moral theory as such, but it nonetheless provided some valuable information pertaining to Sartre's position on the relation between the self and the other, as well as the importance of the individual. We should keep in mind the following three points as we embark on our journey towards Sartre's own moral theory. First, moral action should not depend on the other. Second, through phenomenological reduction, learned from Husserl, Heidegger demonstrated that the structure of *Dasein* is *care*. From the same reduction, we learned that Kant was wrong to derive his moral theory from the *categorical imperative* and that it is within the person's *authentic being* that judgment should arise. As for Hegel his concept of *Spirit* leads us directly into the hands of the *das Man*. Sartre recognized Heidegger's position as superior to that of Hegel in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre, 1943 (285) III-1-III-14/21). Finally, Heidegger's notion of *authenticity* makes it nearly impossible to fulfil, or if it is, it is only for a flash and as such, it is not long enough to dictate our moral action. What *authenticity* does point out is the importance of freedom of action, and how it makes us aware of our responsibility for our choices. Unlike Kant, who based his moral theory on universal reason, or Hegel, who based his on cultural indoctrination, Heidegger looked towards the individual and Sartre came to the same conclusion.

Conclusion

At the risk of repetition, the reader should be reminded that the three German thinkers that we have looked at were covered, briefly, incompletely, and to some extent from a specific view point, that of Sartre. To give them their proper due, would

have exceeded the scope of the current thesis. The main reason for looking at Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, was to make us aware of the influence they had on Sartre's work concerning the development of a moral theory. Our second reason for this brief analysis was to see the evolution in the understanding of how a moral theory should be approached (viz., freedom of action).

Kant introduced freedom as the main stimuli behind his theory; he removed the dogmatic rule of the monarchy and the church in favor of a theory which exemplified the universality of rationality. If all humans are rational, and they are, then they 'ought' to do so and so. Kant also used God as a convenient reason for following the maxim for those who would object to his transcendental position. However, we could forgive Kant for using God, and the *kingdom of ends*, as he was probably compelled to by the time and the environment in which he lived in. Moreover, Kant must have recognized the weakness of his theory, since he allows for God to stand as the ultimate perfection to which humans must strive for, rather than mere human reason. According to Sartre, Kant's theory felt short as it tied down the individual to a series of rules and duty which at best would be used in extreme cases, as are the ten commandments (e.g., thou shalt not kill). What Sartre forgot was that Kant lets the individual 'choose' his own destiny, and that morally right or wrong is different from what I judge to be good or bad. Following Kant, Hegel set out to justify his moral theory based on the *Spirit*, representing God, and the culture. For Hegel, a moral theory should not be prescriptive (i.e., rules are a mere restraint and have no purpose in moral theory) and Sartre took him as so, yet when reading Hegel it is clear that he does propose a prescriptive ethic. The *Spirit* allowed the *Volk* to follow the ways of their fellow humans in acting in a morally correct manner through indoctrination, unbeknownst to the individual. Rather than maxims, Hegel offered

cultural mores. Like Kant, for Sartre, Hegel was restrictive, and because the meaning of *Spirit* is unclear there still is the possibility that Hegel meant God; if so, then it clearly had no place in any moral theory for an atheist such as Sartre. Finally Heidegger, while not particularly interested in moral theory, nevertheless provided the basis for a moral theory, and often his discourse takes on the sense of a moral theory. With Heidegger, Sartre confirmed his commitment to a theoretical definition of morality based on freedom. Unlike Heidegger who based his existentialism on the meaning of *being*, Sartre's based his on Descartes' ego and Husserl's phenomenology (i.e., it does not go beyond the consciousness of the I, while Heidegger argued in favor of going beyond the I)⁵.

⁵ See Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism".

Chapter 2:

The Basics for A Sartrean Moral Theory

Introduction

We saw how freedom had been depicted in relation to moral theory by some of Sartre's precursors in Germany. Since Sartre never published a moral theory during his life time, and because *Notebooks for an Ethics* is neither clear nor systematic; it is difficult to present Sartre's moral theory as he would have wished it. I am going to take a look at some of the characteristics of Sartre's philosophy, which help define a possible moral theory. This chapter has three sections. First, an analysis of four important concepts of Sartre's philosophy: the role of God, *facticity*, *bad faith*, and of action. These four concepts were chosen because they re-occur throughout our discussion of Sartre's moral theory and in Sartre's own philosophy. In the second section we will look at the importance of the other, as it relates to freedom, including the role of the *look* and *shame*. Thirdly, I am going to answer the following question: why postulate a moral theory based on the individual and individual 'choices'? By the end of this chapter the reader should be well acquainted with Sartre's concept of a moral theory, and accept the idea that there is such a thing as a Sartrean moral theory. In any case, we will be well armed to counter the main criticism held against a Sartrean moral theory in the next chapter.

Four Important Characteristics of Sartre's Philosophy:

The Role of God

It is commonly known that Sartre was an atheist, but could he develop a moral theory while excluding God from it? "If God is dead, everything is permitted" and if so, how can there be any moral theory, or even such a thing as morality?

Sartre wants us to understand that Dostoevsky was not mistaken when he said, "everything is permitted." Rather, we need to stop believing that we are moral beings at the mercy of God, and instead we have to learn that moral action is a human activity that has no bearing on God (Sartre, 1983 11). The eradication of God allows us to be human, in that it prevents us from comparing our acts to those of God. Kant encouraged the inclusion of God in moral theory as it allowed us to strive to become morally righteous. As for Hegel and Heidegger, it is not clear if they had a place for God in their moral theory. Nevertheless, Sartre saw Kant's approach as having been unrealistic for it aimed too high. Furthermore, once God is removed from moral theory, then we can no longer say that humans are evil by nature (original sin), since there is no perfection to compare ourselves, nor to expect for ourselves (de Beauvoir, 1947 15-16). Without God, we are free and with freedom comes the *Angst* that makes us aware of our fall into the world of others (*das Man*) as was shown by Heidegger. This is why Sartre says that we must accept our being as free and renounce the idea of becoming a 'pseudo-god'.

In addition humans need to understand that their actions are aimed at others and not at a God: "Il comprendra qu'il ne s'agit pas pour lui d'avoir raison aux yeux d'un Dieu mais d'avoir raison à ses propres yeux" (de Beauvoir, 1947 21). Without God we cannot be forgiven, or be absolved of our responsibility, or ignore the state humanity is in. (de Beauvoir, 1947 23-24). However, there is a cost in removing God from our existence; we lose the justification not only for our acts, but also for our existence (Anderson, 1979 17). Sartre would respond that we exist in order that we may be human, that we need to abandon our desire to be God, but not that of *being* human. Sartre does not believe that we can exist without the need to be; after all, we are a *transcendent beings* and not a *plenitude*. The discussion of *nothingness* in

Being and Nothingness is meant to prove that we are not a *being-in-itself*, but nonetheless we seek to become one. Humans need God only insofar as they need to be innocent, and not free; once we discover our freedom to act and be, then we cannot help but feel guilty for our actions which we disapprove. Besides making us aware of our free selves, and the responsibility it requires, the removal of our desire to be God ends the quarrel between every human who has the same desire. If we accept the existence of God, then all humans aspire to be a god in order to fulfil God's requirement for morality; as such we cannot expect a moral theory for and by humans (Anderson, 1979 74-75). To be God would mean that we are a *being-in-itself-for-itself*, which is not possible.

Bad Faith

Before discussing *bad faith* I would like to point out the distinction between *good faith* and *authenticity*. *Good faith* is a pre-reflective state, which we cannot be in as this would require us to be only an *being-in-itself*. As for *authenticity*, it consists of our moral goal. *Authenticity* is achieved by way of conversion or salvation (Sartre, 1943 (453 note) III-3-III-1/1). Why did Sartre claim that *authenticity* is our moral goal (Sartre, 1943 (106 note) I-2-III-3/6)? Because we are in a state of *bad faith* and only by recognizing ourselves as such can we become *authentic* (Anderson, 1993 16). In other words, *good faith* is the opposite of *bad faith*, but since we are *being-for-itself* we cannot be in *good faith*, while *authenticity* is the conversion, a self-recognition of our *being*.⁶ Moreover, Sartre in *Notebooks for an Ethics* confirms the footnote at the end of the chapter on *bad faith* in *Being and Nothingness*, in saying that *Being and*

⁶ This will shortly be explained.

Nothingness is an ontology before the conversion (Sartre, 1983 13). To see what Sartre meant about *authenticity* we have to turn to his writing after *Being and Nothingness* namely *Anti-Semite and Jew*: “L’authenticité, cela va de soi, consiste à prendre une conscience lucide et véridique de la situation...” (Sartre, 1954 109). The *Notebooks for an Ethics* are clearer on the meaning of *authenticity*, where Sartre adds that we become aware of ourselves through an action. To be *authentic* is to give meaning to the world, and as we shall see later, this is achieved through the emancipation of freedom and an understanding of our *facticity*.

We saw Heidegger’s meaning of *authenticity*, and how it is achieved, for Sartre the same can be said about his retention of *authenticity* with a few distinctions. As with Heidegger, *authenticity* implies our awareness of who we are; in addition, Sartre wants us to recognize that all humans are free *beings*. Yet, while Heidegger was clear on the difference between what it is and what it is not to be *authentic*, Sartre is more ambiguous about this distinction. *Authenticity* implies both our *facticity*, or who I truly am (*my being*, or in Heideggerian terms *Dasein*) and my transcendence, who I am not (nothingness and freedom) (Jeanson, 1947 214). All three characteristics are part of my consciousness. Renouncing any of them at any time brings us into *bad faith*. Hence, those who contend that *bad faith* for Sartre is equivalent to in-sincerity (e.g. Santoni) are mistaken, as *bad faith* also implies the recognition of human freedom and of transcendence (Santoni, 1971 150). Santoni is also mistaken insofar as sincerity phenomenologically requires the individual to recognize himself or herself, even though who I am is unclear, as I am many things, a worker, a parent, a child, a friend, and so on. At best, we are as sincere as we can be. This means that I can reflect sincerely only that which I am aware of (conscious of). However, as situations change, so might my sincerity, thus, sincerity is context

dependent, something which *bad faith* is not. *Bad faith* is more than mere context dependence; it is the state of our *being*.

Can we be in *authenticity*? In *Being and Nothingness* we have the example of a busboy, who acts out as a busboy should, and in so doing he is in *bad faith* (Sartre, 1943 (94) I-2-II-6/9). His *plenitude*, or his *facticity* does not allow him to accept the role of a busboy, and his transcendence does not allow him to be his *facticity*. The same goes for the homosexual who desires to be free from the labeling of his or her own sexual orientation by denying it (transcendence), but the individual is incapable of escaping his or her *facticity* and as such confesses his or her sexual orientation (Sartre, 1943 (98-99) I-2-II-11/18). Why are both options considered *bad faith*? Because in the eyes of the other I am either ashamed or proud, but never non-reflective (i.e., in *good faith*) (Sartre, 1943 (330) III-1-IV-42/73). When we look at the place of the other in the next section, we will see the importance it has for the I. The following might give the impression that they allow us to be *authentic*, but in fact they all lead to *bad faith*: to seek *authenticity* is not to be *authentic* (Sartre, 1983 12); nor does oppressing, in order to exploit one's freedom to its maximum (de Beauvoir, 1947 135), nor a state of permanent revolution as it soon turns into a habit (Sartre, 1983 12). *Bad faith* affects all human projects; as humans consist of a continuous series of projects and if one is affected by *bad faith*, then the others will be affected also, unless a change to *authenticity* is performed. Moreover, we need to be active in order to define ourselves and become *authentic* (Sartre, 1946 53). To answer our question, we can only be in *authenticity* if we do not seek it, and if we allow ourselves to transcend our *facticity*, which requires us to recognize ourselves as free *beings* and also that others are free. In other words, we have to realize that our

desire to become a god is absurd, and that we are free *beings* within the constraint of our *facticity*. Any other way of existing is a lie (Anderson, 1993 15).

Facticity

Facticity was not taken to be a limit on freedom at the time of *Being and Nothingness* by Sartre. In his latest book on Sartre, Thomas Anderson gives three arguments as given by Sartre, as to why *facticity* did not impose limits on freedom (Anderson, 1993 22-23). This is a strange position to take when we consider the content and the role of *facticity*. In any case, as Anderson tactfully notes, Sartre corrected himself by 1946 and admitted that his view on *freedom* was extremist (Anderson, 1993 50). For the purpose of this thesis, I take the view of 1946 to be Sartre's position, as it was presented in his attempt at writing a moral theory.

One major strength of Sartre's philosophy is that he recognizes our *facticity*. If I cannot aspire to be God, it is because I have limits set upon who I am. My *facticity* is revealed through my freedom of action. *Facticity* consists of four elements, one's situation, past, *being-in-itself*, birth/death. I would like to be rich, or as intelligent as Einstein and so on. I must realize that I have limits. I cannot be on the beach in the South of France when I am in fact in Montreal. Without the free possibility to be on the beach in the South of France, or be rich, then I would not be aware of my *facticity* (i.e. my situation). "[L]a facticité est la seule réalité que la liberté peut découvrir, la seule à partir de laquelle cela ait un sens de poser une fin" (Sartre, 1943 (539) IV-1-II-15/25). When we use the term freedom, it does not imply that these acts or wishes are possible, The term freedom simply means that other humans are capable of these acts and I freely project their possible acts on to them (Sartre, 1943 (526) IV-1-I-55/83).

My free projection into who and what I want are constrained by my *facticity*, which builds itself up as I accumulate my past. My *facticity*, as it is the case with my past, consists of my *in-itself* (Sartre, 1943 (154) II-2-I-17/26). If I am a good person, and I desire to be evil, my attempt is bound to failure since it does not constitute my *facticity* (Sartre, 1943 (313) III-1-IV-27/41). My freedom is not infringed upon, it is simply constrained by my *plenitude*, my *in-itself*. Similarly the evil doer cannot hope to do good, unless some ulterior motive favorable to his or her action results from the good act. This does not mean we cannot change who we are, because we can (*viz.*, conversion); but such a change is drastic, and occurs rarely if ever. In the last section we are going to see how change comes into to play with the *original choice*.

One objection held against Sartre after *Being and Nothingness* concerning *facticity* and freedom, was that of birth. "I did not ask to be born, nor partake in a war which was instigated by my elders". If I did not ask to be born, I was nonetheless born and as such I was plunged into the war, I may reject the side of my countrymen, or reject the conflict altogether, but either way I am involved (Sartre, 1983 144). In our example, the *being* is I facing the war, the *nothingness* is our 'choice', and our birth is our *facticity*. Hence, our *facticity* is our *being-in-itself* (Sartre, 1983 167). Therefore, we make a decision once our *facticity* is revealed, as shown in *Being and Nothingness*, and our *facticity* constrains us from acting freely. We are not free not to be free; this means that my *facticity* does not allow me to be free to do all that I please. We can easily fall back into the arms of the other, or God if we allow our transcendence to take the better of us (Jeanson, 1947 315). At all times, we need to remind ourselves of our freedom, and be *authentic*.

Action

It should be clear that freedom of action is the key for a moral theory according to Sartre. In the Introduction of this thesis, we defined what was meant by freedom of action, but as of yet we have not looked at the position taken by action in Sartre's moral theory. First, freedom precedes action, without freedom there can be no action. Second, the essence of action follows freedom, as freedom is the existential (Sartre, 1943 (482) IV-1-I-3/9). Out of freedom comes the projected possibility that my action might conclude itself according to my wishes or not. Yet, I must take action, if I do not then my freedom is to no avail. Thus for the existentialist the coward fails in that he renounces his or her freedom, while the hero recognizes his or her freedom, and as such receives approval (Sartre, 1946 55-56). Unfortunately, Sartre did not make this clear in *Being and Nothingness*, as we can see from Jeanson's misinterpretation of freedom of action: "l'activité véritable ne s'instaurerait que sur le fond d'une passivité toujours requise, la conscience, au sens plein, n'interviendrait qu'à partir d'une base d'inconscience" (Jeanson, 1947 303). Jeanson's mistake is twofold, first Sartre rejects the notion of unconsciousness, and second he partly denounces passivity.

Sartre does not reject the notion of passivity outright, as he does with the unconsciousness; instead he warns us against passivity. If I become passive, then I will be trapped in the freedom of the other, Heidegger had shown this prior to Sartre. Also, if I am passive, then I have renounced my freedom and in turn, I am in *bad faith*. In other words passivity gives us the impression that we have escaped our freedom, when in fact we have merely repressed it. Freedom is only possible through our "engagement" in the world, we must partake in the world actively (de Beauvoir, 1947 110). Nevertheless, Jeanson was correct in saying that passivity is "le

fond" of the action. We cannot escape *bad faith* (i.e., be in *good faith*), hence we are always in a state of passivity, unless we take action in order to achieve *authenticity*. Sartre expects us to be active when needed, especially to come to the defense of freedom. Nevertheless, someone must take action, if not me then the other, for without action there can be no reality (Sartre, 1946 51). For example, I am sitting inside looking out the window doing nothing, but the world outside is active as I can see through the window people walking, cars going by, and so on. To use non-Sartrean terminology, if everyone and everything stops, then in effect the world would be frozen, without action, there is no motion, and without motion there is no reality.

If reality requires action, we can assume that there is no morality without moral action. Since we cannot have action without freedom, there cannot be morality without freedom. Even refraining from acting is only possible if we have freedom of action, hence should I refuse to act in a situation I may still be morally righteous. Thus, without freedom of action, we have no moral theory. Moral theory needs to be based on freedom, and as such we must protect freedom of action. However, how can freedom of action, *be* and be protected at the same time since "rights" require limits. The "right" to freedom of action requires that others be limited in their freedom of action, but then Sartre's moral theory would collapse. Before going any further, it is necessary that we analyze the role of the other for Sartre.

The Other

The other is the reason for my being, and for my acts. If the other was not there, then my acts would be similar to those of a 'pseudo-god', since they would be for me, affect only me, and serve only me (Sartre, 1943 (77) I-2-V-26/37). Because we

are for others, we are slaves insofar as my action depends on the other (Sartre, 1943 (306) III-1-IV- 21/34). We should not jump to any conclusion in seeing the term slave. The term slave is used in the sense that I cannot be without the other, slave as in "I am not free not to be free"; for freedom to have any meaning it requires another to enact it. It follows, that if I want to be free then everyone else must be free, freedom is mutual (Sartre, 1954 185). Oppression, discrimination, anti-Semitism etc. only lead to failure, as they simultaneously constrain the oppressor in his *bad faith* along with the oppressed (de Beauvoir, 1947 100-1; Sartre, 1943 (568-9) IV-2-II-58/78; Sartre, 1954 105). The oppressed is in *bad faith* as he or she cannot be who they are, nor be free, while the oppressor is in *bad faith* since he or she perceives himself or herself as superior to the other, as if they were a 'god'. Therefore, we should not portray the other to be an object, because as with I, the other is free and my freedom reflects itself in that of the other (Sartre, 1943 (310) III-1-IV-21/34). The other is as free as I am.

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre paints a grim picture of the relationship between the I and the other, notably when it comes to love. Because the other has the same freedom of action as I, I must confront him or her as a free subject and not as an object. Furthermore, I am revealed in the other, this revelation includes my good and bad points. It is as if the other is pointing out myself as having fallen in the original sin. We arrive at the struggle between I-subject and other-subject, the struggle for freedom. What is good for the other is good for me, what the other wants, I want, including freedom of action (Sartre, 1943 (407) III-3-I-5/8). To defeat the other I can attempt to deny his or her freedom, but we saw how that fails; I could objectify him or her, but again this would only lead to *bad faith* for both parties; I might assimilate myself in the other, but because we are two transcendence, we

would both be searching for God instead. Love, or any relationship with another as such leads to failure. Either I am loved by the other which is similar to our last case, or the other is loved by me which allows him or herself to be loved by me (our second case). Self-objectifying or objectifying the other as in masochism and sadomasochism is merely a case of removing freedom on the part of either individual, which also leads to *bad faith* and lack of freedom, hence failure.

In *Notebooks for an Ethics*, we are made aware of some behavior in which we abandon our freedom to that of the other. In *Being and Nothingness* we saw that when two lovers come together a struggle ensues, and at the same time Sartre contended that a winner had to arise. In other words, better to be the winner than to be the loser. However, by the time of *Notebooks for an Ethics* Sartre sought for the status quo concerning freedom. "Sadisme et Masochisme sont la révélation de l'Autre. Ils ont de sens – comme d'ailleurs la lutte des consciences – qu'avant la conversion" (Sartre, 1983 26). Thus, I should not demand, nor order the other, nor lower 'myself' to him or her (Sartre, 1983 277). In all three cases I do so for the other, and we revert back to the same situation as in the example of the sadomasochist in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre adds in *Notebooks for an Ethics* that to seek importance also falls into the same category, for it sacrifices one's freedom, in favor of security; we fall back into Heidegger's *das Man* (Sartre, 1983 336). Even if these are my wishes (*volonté*), they are not being fulfilled. Heidegger once again showed that *curiosity* (i.e. desires) are never satisfied, and as such we are *inauthentic* or in *bad faith*. This point is important as it formulates one of the criticisms held against Sartre.

Look

The relationship between the I and the other is more than the mere presence that Heidegger spoke of; it involves the *look*. When we sit on a bench, in a bus, at work in an office, go to a sports event, and so on we often get the feeling that someone is *looking* at us. When we go about our daily ritual, we do not notice this *look* as long as we do what is expected of us. The *look* does not bother us, but if we deviate from those expectations then a sense of *shame* arises when we are stared at. In the *look* we discover our presence in the *das Man* that Heidegger spoke of, the power of the *Spirit* which Hegel related to us earlier. The *look* is what sets us apart from the I and the 'they'. Moreover, the *look* is not visual, it is our self consciousness reflecting upon itself through the other. If you do what is asked of you, then the *das Man* will protect you; then Kant's maxim is the way to ensure this protection. The *Spirit* that Hegel referred to is the norm, the indoctrinated behavior that we should follow to stay away from the *look*. As for Sartre he uses the *look* as a means to regulate our social behavior (Greene, 1960 54).

Before addressing the relationship of *shame* to the *look* we need to analyze how the *look* allows us to be free. With the *look* I am able to project the infinite possibilities of the 'other subject' (Sartre, 1943 (310) III-1-IV-22/35). No obstacle (the weather, mountains, etc) can prevent me from projecting the other's possibility through the *look*. Consequently, I realize that I too have this endless power to project myself, even though my *facticity* may prevent me from acting out my desired projections. On the other hand, the *look* can be used to restrict oneself; once a slave has accepted his or her situation, the mere *look* of the master will in effect remove all sense of freedom left in the slave (Sartre, 1983 278). The *look* is reflected in our conditioning. For example, in the zoo where the baby elephant is held by a huge

chain, and once it realizes that it cannot escape, the trainer replaces the chain by a rope which an adult elephant could easily break, however, the elephant, having been conditioned, does not even attempt to break the rope and learns to respect the trainer.

The *look* plays the role of God's eye, as the social consciousness (e.g. *Spirit*). My response to the *look* depends on the 'choices' that I have made freely. For example, if I accept the hierarchy of the church, I will follow the words of those higher ranked than me, in turn the *look* of a church official will leave me feeling inferior (we could have used the slave and master example). The gist of our relation to the *look* depends on whether we are 'looked' at as subjects or objects (Sartre, 1943 (296) III-1-IV-6/8). The power of the *look* in the case of the former leaves me with a sensation of complete freedom, with self responsibility, while the latter annihilates my freedom, and in the process my guilt and responsibility, it secures me into the *das Man*. The ideal situation is for the other to *look* at me as subject in his or her freedom. However, in all cases the *look* leads to objectification, hence to maintain one's freedom we must *look* rather than be *looked* at (Sartre, 1943 (405) III-3-I-2/4). We can deduce that we should be careful and only use the *look* when necessary. If we use it in every conceivable situation, then we fall into a state of superiority where suddenly the gentleman punching the tickets, the waiter, and so on are mere objects, and meaningless to me. In so doing, we forget our freedom, fall into *bad faith*, and return on our quest to be a 'pseudo-god'.

Shame

Shame is the result of the *look*, however, it comes from I and not the other. We feel *shame* because we did something which deviated from the social norm,

when we did not expect to get caught under the *look* of the other. Thus, if I am doing something, which is unacceptable in the eyes of the members of my culture, and wish to be caught in the *look*, then there is no sense of *shame*, rather it is *pride* which is no better. *Shame* has to be unexpected and unwanted. Through *shame* or *pride* we become aware of our freedom and our *facticity* as it reveals our situation, though it does not bring us towards *authenticity* as does *Angst*. The example of listening at the door given by Sartre reveals the elements of *shame*. I listen at the door, unbeknownst to those inside the room, as such my freedom is revealed as I have the freedom to listen without them knowing. Suddenly I hear footsteps behind me; I am caught, and then my *facticity* is revealed. I reflect what the other saw (i.e. *look*) which was my *plenitude*, my *being* (Sartre, 1943 (299) III-1-IV-10/12). *Shame* is the result of the *look*, but it is *shame* that reveals the *look*. Without *shame* the *look* is nothing more than another *looking* at me for no apparent reason, therefore I can brush off the *look*. If *shame* is involved, then I cannot brush off the *look* as my *facticity* is revealed. I am naked in front of the other's freedom. The slave example given above is a result of the *look* as was shown, but it is *shame* that makes the slave feel like an object and as such inferior (Sartre, 1943 (307) III-1-IV-26/27). We can already see how *shame* can play a role in Sartre's moral theory. This role we shall describe in the following chapter. One last aspect of *shame* is that the 'other' does not have to be there, because the *look* is not visual there is no need for someone to be using the *look*, only the belief that someone is watching me is enough to obtain the feeling of *shame*.

When discussing the other we are reminded of the work of Hegel, more specifically the concept of *Spirit*. There is no need to go over Hegel's position again, but rather what Sartre thinks of it, in relation to what we have seen of his stance.

First, Sartre contends that consciousness is in the *Spirit* as it is in Heidegger's *Dasein* (Sartre, 1983 100). However, Hegel forgot that human beings are transcendent, and that the relationship of the I to the other is derived from this *transcendence*. Thus, the *Spirit* that Hegel speaks of is either non-existent, which Hegel would deny, or it is *Spirit-object* (Sartre, 1983 11). The latter implies that we are part of the object and that it surrounds us, and protects us, but we conceive it objectively and this Hegel would oppose. Furthermore, if we seek to be part of the *Spirit* and join the *Volk* in the moral action of the *Spirit*, then we seek averageness, and Heidegger showed that it is what we want, for safety reasons. Sartre gives the example of the Americans whom he contends are obsessed with the concept of averageness (Sartre, 1983 93).

Morality as Personal

Throughout the analysis of Sartre's moral theory we became aware of the importance of the other, freedom, freedom of action, *authenticity*, and the removal of God from morality. We saw in the overview of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger the problems associated with a moral theory that starts off with the notion of the other (Kant's universalism and Hegel's *Spirit*). Nonetheless, it is not enough to justify a morality from the individual's stand point, or what we might call a personal morality. Sartre's moral theory is personal in that it is up to the individual to 'choose' his way. For example, the traditional saying of "do not tell lies" for Sartre does not have to be respected. If desired I might lie, but then I must face the consequences of my action. If I lie, the others might lie to me, since the truth is not something which I value, "[C]haque pour-soi est responsable dans son être d'une existence de l'espèce humaine" (Sartre, 1943 (565) IV-1-II-46/73), hence my action reflects my view of the

human species. "L'antisémitisme est un choix libre et totale de soi-même, une attitude globale que l'on adopte non seulement vis-à-vis des Juifs, mais vis-à-vis des hommes en général." (Sartre, 1954 18-19). We can only become aware of our 'choice' in reflective consciousness, but at that level the I decides if my acts are done freely, if they are acceptable or not, or if it is in my self reflection that I 'chose' myself. Morality is therefore personal because I 'chose' what is morally acceptable based on what I value. "Aucune morale générale ne peut vous indiquez ce qu'il a à faire." (Sartre, 1946 48). Our description of the other only helps us make that 'choice', but I have no care for what the other 'chooses' (de Beauvoir, 1947 102). That is why the young man in the example in the previous chapter had to decide for himself whether to go to England and fight for France or stay home with his mother. We should keep in mind when making our 'choices' and ask ourselves how would the world be if everyone did the same? This question is not unlike Kant's "what ought I to do", however it does not require us to fulfill the requirement of the *categorical imperative*. If the world is better off with lies in one's opinion then so be it.

In *Notebooks for an Ethics* Sartre reinforces his position concerning a personal morality. First of all, I conceive the world, the world is there, but I see it through my eyes, I make it what I want it to be (Sartre, 1983 133). If I 'choose' to see the world as corrupted and evil, then I cannot help but be wary of everyone and everything. If on the contrary I see the world as benevolent, then the people around me are also benevolent. If I believe in karma, then good things happen because I did something good previously, the same goes for the one who believes in chance, astrology, and so on. I won a million dollars because it was written in the stars, or God willed it, etc. The world is my own. "La morale est une entreprise individuelle, subjective, et historique." (Sartre, 1983 14).

If morality is a personal endeavor, it presumes then that we must make 'choices'. Sartre argued that we 'choose' at an early age what our paths will be, he referred to this choice as the *original choice*⁷. Our *original choice* is made in order to fulfill certain goals or goal, it represents what we want out of life (Greene, 1960 28). This *choice* is made freely, but combined with our *facticity* it limits our secondary 'choices' (Greene, 1960 29). We may deviate from our *original choice*, for example the evil person attempts to be good, but deep down there is an ulterior motive that relinquishes to the *original choice* that of the evil in our example. The *choice* that I made originally transcends me, it is my nothingness (Sartre, 1943 (490) IV-1-I-10/20). The person who is scared will transcend his or her fear in all of his or her actions in life. Again, any attempt at deviation will be futile. For example, the person who 'chose' fear might attempt sky diving, but fear is still present. To conquer one's fear does not imply to change one's *original choice*, it merely means that a secondary 'choice' has been modified (viz., that of sky diving). The same is true with immediate accomplishments, they do not announce the success or the completion of the *original choice* (de Beauvoir, 1947 83). The *original choice* can only be completed at death. The adventurer can claim that his or her goal is to climb K2, but that is a secondary 'choice'; once the climb is successfully done a new immediate goal will be 'chosen'. Any modification attempting to satisfy the *original choice* leads to failure; the *original choice* is a totality of our transcendence.

Why could we not change or modify our *original choice*? Actually we are able to modify or change our *original choice*, it is just that such a change rarely occurs

⁷ Sartre actually used the term 'originel', which is usually reserved for the 'original sin'. 'Originel' means going back to the origin. 'Original' is defined as that which emanates from its source or author; that occurs for the first time.

and it demands more than a change of personality. We know that we cannot change our *original choice* by changing one of our secondary 'choices', nor can we change by turning our back to the *original choice* (Jeanson, 1947 292). We have to go through a metamorphosis of our *being* (e.g. Saul to Paul) (Greene, 1960 34). In reality we fear such a change, we fear it as it goes against our *original choice*, we fear it because it would change who I am. Such a conversion leads me on the road to a new *original choice* (Jeanson, 1947 297). I fear such a change because it distracts me from my goal, of fulfilling my *original choice*. This is why the evil person, the fearful individual and the slave do not change. When it comes to the *original choice*, stability and consistency are wanted.

That we cannot, or rather do not deviate from our *original choice* does vitiate Sartre's theory. As long as we recognize that we are free to change our 'choices', namely the *original choice*, then we are free *beings*. This is why we should *choose* freedom as an *original choice*. The *choice* of freedom, however, precludes the *original choice*. To *choose* freedom, is to *choose* that we have such a *choice* as the *original choice*, that it is not imposed upon us. We can either *choose* freedom or God, once we made this choice then comes our reaction to our *original choice*. Once we *choose* freedom, then we *choose* "... non seulement ses actes mais son Bien..." (Sartre, 1995 652). *Choosing* freedom over God, it is to *choose* human kind, including I instead of God (de Beauvoir, 1947 98). In *choosing* freedom I *choose* all humans, no matter what culture, religion, race, gender, and so on (Greene, 1960 172). Hence we are free, as Sartre demonstrated in *Being and Nothingness*, yet we still have to *choose* our freedom. We can deny our freedom, but to do so would be in *bad faith*.

Conclusion

We covered a large amount of ground in our analysis of Sartre's moral theory, from God to personal morality, and the importance of the other. In the first section we discovered that humans are free from God, and from themselves. First, God is nothing more than a self-justification, in search of perfection, and of forgiveness. Once God is removed from morality, we become human, we become free. Second, in our freedom we discover our *facticity*, which in turn opens us up to *bad faith*. If our morality is to succeed we have to be in *authenticity*. Only once we accept the other's freedom and our *facticity* can we be *authentic*, and to do so we must engage ourselves into the world. Third, freedom and action are in unison, they mutually depend on each other, freedom to show action and action to show freedom. All three are caused by our transcendence, and all three require other human beings or else we revert back to our search for being God. My action, my freedom, my *facticity* are there in the eyes of the other. In my own eyes they do not exist, and if they did exist then I am God, which I am not.

In the second section, we were made aware of the other and what role the other plays in moral theory. First, the other is necessary, for the reason given above, as well as to justify our existence. I exist for the other and vice-versa, though I made my existence my own. Therefore we are in a constant struggle with the other. Second, the other is not an object, and as such I need to respect his or her freedom; what I make of the other's freedom I make of my own. Third, being with the other my freedom is revealed through him or her, and as such it is the *look* that my *shame* arises out of, and which allows me to reflect upon myself and see if my act was done in *authenticity* or not. Fourth, my moral theory requires the other to be there, yet a

Spirit as proposed by Hegel does not fulfill the requirements of an effective moral theory. The *Spirit* is nothing more than shared values objectified. Finally in the last section we saw that morality has to be personal, and that my freedom makes me responsible for my action which reflects who I *choose* to be originally. If I *choose* hatred, then my action will be that of hate. Furthermore, my *original choice* is judged by my consciousness as a reflected-reflection, and it affects how I perceived the world and how it should be.

Chapter 3:

Sartre's Critics

On Freedom

Does the Look Weaken our Freedom

Are we as free as Sartre claims? Rather, we should ask ourselves “how can I be free when people around us label us and objectify us constantly?” Bergoffen paraphrases de Beauvoir, who remarked that we cannot help but be in *bad faith* because the *look* of the other offers no other option. “As a patriarchally gendered woman I am directed to live the *bad faith* of vain immanence. As a patriarchally gendered man I am pointed towards *bad faith* of pure transcendence” (Bergoffen, 1992 221). First, it should be pointed out that I use this only as an example, and that the reverse could be true in a matriarchal society. Second, even if the question of feminism had been addressed by Sartre, it was not (see de Beauvoir’s interview with Sartre in *Situations 10*), it is beyond the scope of the present thesis. What is interesting for us in the quote above is the limits of a Sartrean moral theory, and if Bergoffen is correct then we can never be free as Sartre claimed. Let us not forget that I cannot exist without the other, that all my actions are taken in relations to another, and that the other is present in the presence of objects (see Heidegger). However, according to Bergoffen I only become aware of the other through the *look*, therefore, I am in constant *bad faith* meaning that I am never free. Let us not forget that the *look* objectifies and reveals the other’s freedom which in turn limits mine all the while revealing myself as a *being* in the world. We are now able to re-phrase the question asked at the onset of this paragraph as follows: Because my existence in the world is revealed through the *look* of others, how can I ever be free from the objectification of the other, and if I cannot be free, then would not a Sartrean moral theory collapse?

Bergoffen is correct when she says that through the other's *look* my freedom becomes limited. But she is mistaken when she says that we cannot help but be in *bad faith* as the *look* of the other objectifies us. The *look* as we saw only leads to objectification if the other so desires, and if I so desire it. First, the *look* is powerless on its own, the sense of *shame* in the I must accompany it, for without *shame* the *look* is empty. Actually, other sensations can accompany the *look* and make it efficient (e.g. fear, remorse and so on), but the *look* alone has no authority. Thus I must do something which will give such a feeling as *shame*. If someone *looks* at me and I feel that I am reduced to my gender, it is either caused by my *shame*, or *pride* and in either case we are in *bad faith*. However, if we follow Sartre and restrain ourselves from such passions then the *look* becomes empty and fails in its objectification. Second, the other must want to objectify me in his or her *look*. If the other is looking for no other reason than for the sake of glancing (i.e., not the *look*), then once again the *look* is empty, unless I give it meaning

Even if my *bad faith* is not caused by the *look* itself, in removing my freedom, I fall into *bad faith*. If this is the case then Heidegger was correct when he argued that we are in constant *inauthenticity*, except when we are in the *Angst* of death. The mistake which Bergoffen made was to forget that we are responsible for our own faith, that I impose the limits on my freedom, not on that of the other. I am free only in so far as I project my freedom beyond myself, towards my future, so that I may catch up to it, though I never will. "En un sens cette fin qui existe pour moi vient de moi, elle existe par moi, puisque je dois la projeter pour la saisir, elle est donc soutenue à l'être par ma liberté." (Sartre, 1983 288). Once again, the other's *look* does not limit my freedom unless I allow it to be limited, that is I prevent my being from projecting its freedom. In other words, I give the other the power to *look* at me

in my *plenitude* as the in-itself which I am not. The other in such a case becomes a 'pseudo-god'. We should not make ourselves, nor the other to be a God. Only in the recognition of my freedom will I become *authentic*, no matter what or who is *looking* at me.

Freedom is the surpassing of myself towards the future, that can only be revealed in action. The first half of this sentence was covered in the previous paragraph, and the second in chapter two, but we must now see what the sentence means as a whole. Whenever we do something we do so as free *beings*. Even if someone is coercing us in 'choosing' the act, it is as a free *being* that I follow through. In other words, I could refuse to do what is asked of me and force the alternative. Because we are not a *plenitude* (in-itself) we are free (see first part of *Being and Nothingness*) or we are a *nothingness*, therefore I exist freely and my freedom is in turn revealed to me when I take action. When the other objectifies me in the *look* it is because my freedom is constrained and I freeze up. Thus, we stutter when we get caught doing something that we know we should not do. Freedom is therefore not conditioned by the other who is doing the *looking* but by me who is *looked upon*. My *shame* arises because I am revealed which in turn limits my freedom. Therefore we are not merely limited by the other's *look*. We should be forewarned that without surpassing oneself, our freedom is discarded (Sartre, 1983 343).

But the acute reader might say that if the other's *look* is aimed at my *facticity*, then whether I accept it or not I am trapped in his or her objectification. That was Bergoffen's point when she used the example of gender, in that I cannot change it. Gender role however, is imposed by society. Thus, my *facticity* (my sexual structure) is revealed in the *look* of the other who reflecting on societal views makes me feel

either *shameful* or *proud*. Though Sartre never discussed the situation of women (see the interview), we do find the answer in *la Réflexions sur la Question Juive* (pages 18 and 22). Our *original choice* dictates our secondary ones, and how we perceive the world; this was shown in chapter two. If I 'choose' to judge people's gender, or in the case of Sartre's book, religion and race, then I have not *chosen* freedom, and I am judging myself as a gendered person. Bergoffen showed that both men and women are in *bad faith*, so the instant the other 'looks' and sees only my gender, he or she is in *bad faith*, and so am I if I accept the judgment of his or her *look*.

What if I decide to be in *bad faith* and see, the other's *look* as a judgment of my gender, while he or she was doing no such thing. We said earlier that if I do so, then I will be in *bad faith*, but what if I am indifferent to my gender unless forced upon it by the other? I perceive the *look* as a judgment on my gender, though the other never intended to judge it; but this is irrelevant because what is important is how I perceived the *look* (once again the *look* is not visual). Perception is personal, so is freedom and *facticity*, hence I fall in *bad faith* because I freely impose on myself a non-relevant view (i.e. gender). Thus whether my perception of the other's *look* is warranted or not has no relevance on me as *being* in *bad faith* or *authenticity*. I have 'chosen' to be in either *bad faith* or *authenticity*. Morally speaking my behavior is my own responsibility and its warrant is also mine. If I am in *bad faith*, let's say that I am ashamed of what I have done, it is not because the other *looked* at me that I felt ashamed, nor is it in the eyes of society, it is in my own eyes. My freedom is reflected in the other, and if I believe I did good, based on my *original choice*, then my freedom will surpass the *look* and I will be *authentic*; if not, then I will be in *bad faith*. I am therefore completely free to do what I want, and it will be morally correct if

it is true to my *original choice*, my *facticity*, and if it respects my freedom as a *being* and that of others.

Is Freedom Unlimited

The other can only limit my freedom if I allow him or her to do so by falling into a constant state of *bad faith*. Also, God cannot restrain my freedom without me being in *bad faith* (i.e., allowing for God to dictate what is right). Thus, I am free to do as I please if I am *authentic*, or so it might be believed. However, it is not the case; if I am *authentic* I have some limitation. Because the other is also free I must respect him or her as such. But why must I respect the other's freedom? According to Anderson, Sartre never mentioned that to be *authentic* an individual cannot deny the freedom of others (Anderson, 1970 130; Anderson, 1993 83). Secondly, according to Sartre the only freedom that I "need to choose is my own" (Anderson, 1970 129), therefore, why should I choose the other's freedom? Both of these questions were partly answered in the second chapter, but they were not made explicit as it shall be done here. Besides these two problems posed by Anderson, he advanced a third one in a later article which is a derivation of the first one, which is why would my freedom depend on the other? (Anderson, 1976 65).

We cannot answer the first and second question without responding to the third; if we cannot adequately find an answer to the question as to whether Sartre wants to respect others' freedom, then the first and second question will have a negative response. In other words, yes, Sartre does believe that we must respect others' freedom. In fact, Anderson quotes Sartre in his later article: "... je suis obligé de vouloir en même temps que ma liberté la liberté des autres, je ne puis prendre ma liberté pour but que si je prends également celle des autres pour but." (Anderson,

1976 65; Sartre, 1946 70). If that is not enough to convince the reader we can turn to *Notebooks for an Ethics* where on pages 146 to 148 Sartre explains at length why we should value freedom for the sake of freedom and not merely for our personal freedom. While freedom is an individual characteristic of the ego, it is part of all of us and it is therefore universal. Kant understood this when he proposed the *categorical imperative*, and so did Hegel with his argument on action, but they both failed to recognize that freedom cannot be universal, only individual. To be *authentic* I must recognize freedom, which we all have, and therefore it is not towards humanity as a whole (Kant), or a *Spirit* (Hegel), that I must recognize freedom, but as a part of uniquely free *beings*.

We have partly answered all three questions, unfortunately the more difficult task remains, notably to show why I should respect the other's freedom, but so far we have only recognized it. Once more let us remember Sartre's point in *Anti-Semite and Jew* where he says that to 'choose' anti-Semitism is not to 'choose' against the Jews, but to *choose* hatred towards all humans. However, we are not discussing the moral implication of a *choice* such as hatred, but more specifically the *choice* of freedom. A powerful reason to respect the other's freedom is that to be *authentic* I must *choose* freedom and because freedom is in all of us as individuals I must respect the other's freedom. In other words, by not respecting the other's freedom I fail to respect freedom as a whole, including my own, therefore, leaving me in *bad faith*. Anyone claiming consistency has to respect the other's freedom. What if someone does not care about consistency or if he or she is in *bad faith*? Can they still be convinced to be morally correct? Or can they freely go as they do, oppressing whomever they want? Clearly the answer to the second question has to be no, and the same for the first, if it is to be a moral theory.

Anderson provides us with two additional answers. First, "if any man is oppressed, I who am in fact no better than he, may also be oppressed" (Anderson, 1970 124). As good as this answer is it remains in the realm of consistency, and what if I do not care whether I am oppressed or not? We must therefore seek out an alternative answer, and again Anderson gives us one. "Help others and they will (hopefully) help you" (Anderson, 1970 130). This alternative lacks conviction as it is merely based on the hope that, if I respect the other's freedom, he or she will help me, or at least respect my freedom. A third alternative to those of Anderson is that if I maximize each individual's freedom, including my own, then the world as a whole will be better. Short of having Rawls' veil of ignorance there is little chance that people will follow such a position, especially since Sartre argued in *Being and Nothingness* that we need to maximize our individual freedom (i.e. mine). But that is where we would be mistaken, because to do so would imply that my freedom is superior to that of others and, therefore, I would be *choosing* myself as seeking God, rather than freedom. This abandons the whole project of humanly based morality.

We have yet to have a satisfactory answer to the question concerning the limitedness of freedom. Anderson is quick to point out that I can still prefer my freedom over that of others. In so doing, I escape the accusation of seeking God-like attributes. Anderson's suggestion is to follow de Beauvoir and "assist men in achieving this status" (equal freedom), but why should I (Anderson, 1976 67)? Let us not forget that we are asking this question from the point of view of someone who has little care for consistency, or equality for that matter. Thus for Anderson without a need for consistency we cannot, or do not have to want freedom equally among each individual. Our character wants to better his or her freedom, and as such he or she must act as freely as possible. Thus even if all our acts are done freely, as we

discussed in the previous section, they can still be imposed upon by others, so it follows that whoever wants to better his or her freedom will not want to be coerced into acting. Going back to Anderson's remark on I *being* no better than the other, it should be obvious to anyone that, if I do not respect the other's freedom, they have every right not to respect mine (see chapter two). Hence, I should not expect the other to be different from me, so it is in my interest that I respect every individual's freedom or as Sartre says in *Notebooks for an Ethics* freedom as a whole.

It seems that we have answered all three questions: that I must respect other's freedom, that I should *choose* not only my freedom but also that of the other, and that my freedom is being attacked by the other's. But why *choose* freedom? Why not "pleasure, or power, or *bad faith*" (Anderson, 1976 62). I could *choose* any of these, we could add to the list hatred which Sartre spoke of in *Anti-Semite and Jew*, but then I would be at an impasse. In *choosing* any of these I abandon freedom and want to become what Sartre called a "petit-Dieu".⁸ To value power, hatred or whatever else besides freedom, we not only fail to understand Sartre (see chapter two), but we fail to be free ourselves. In *choosing* any of these I lose my freedom, or relegate it to a second rank, and then my life must be lived according to an impossible achievement (i.e. God). Simply put, my life becomes a waste, just as the cheater in play who wins, but gets little pleasure in it, at least not the pleasure of winning within the rules. As long as life is taken seriously, where we set ourselves up

⁸ However, what if I want to be a 'pseudo-god'? How can we remedy this way of thinking? The answer is that in 'play' (viz., children's game) we make the rules, nothing is at stake and the goal of playing is the fun of it, so should be life. We are free, and we should make our rules as we please, rules that promote freedom. Linda Bell has a full chapter (5) on the role of play in her book entitled "Sartre's Ethic of *Authenticity*", but it is sufficient for us to know that play serves as the model of humanity in which a Sartrean model of moral theory can be fully accomplished.

to become 'pseudo-god', it is clear that we will not escape the hands of oppression, nor the hatred that comes with it. If freedom is not the highest value, then we cannot be morally correct.

Why Choose Freedom

Why *choose* freedom and freedom in the other? Because it is the only way. Both Kant and Hegel recognized the need for freedom, but they simply placed too much emphasis on the whole of humanity or culture, rather than the individual. All our values and actions are nothing without freedom. Only once each and every human being is free can we move on to a moral state; we are still, if I may borrow from Marx, in the prehistoric stage of moral development. In the eighteenth century freedom was beginning to be respected (e.g. Rousseau's Social Contract, the French Revolution, the American Constitution, and so on). But as of yet we have not followed freedom, we are still children who need rules and regulations in order not to mess up.

So far in this chapter we have seen how the *look* of the other limits my freedom only if I allow it, and the other wishes to do so. In addition, we need to *choose* the other's freedom as well as our own, allowing freedom to spread throughout the human race. Anderson raises an interesting point, which is why do we not have anarchy at this point? (Anderson, 1976 60). After all, if freedom is the supreme good for Sartre, and if freedom serves as the foundation of all morality, then we are left with no restraint, or anarchy. In order to properly respond to the threat of anarchy we have to keep in mind the following five points concerning Sartre's philosophy: 1) I *choose* myself in *choosing* freedom; 2) my only limitations are those set by my *facticity*; 3) the other limits my freedom when I am caught in the

look doing something which goes against my *original choice*; 4) I must respect the other's freedom; 5) to be morally consistent I must be *authentic*. With these five points it is possible to show why we will not fall into a state of anarchy if we follow a Sartrean model for a moral theory.

First, our freedom is not a freedom to do as we please, we are not "supermen", or a 'pseudo-god'. In the previous chapter, we discovered that for Sartre *facticity* is very important, that we cannot escape its limitations. For example, three individuals go hiking, after three hours of walking the first person stops and takes a break because he is too tired, the other two keep going, but then the second one pulls a muscle, while the third one has no problem finishing the hike. There are different explanations that can be given as to why the first two hikers did not make it. For the first hiker he was out of shape, and might have lacked the drive to push himself further. In the case of the second hiker she was in shape but she was not used to hiking nor did she have the proper equipment. In either case, Sartre would say that they could have (i.e. they were free to) push themselves and finish the hike (Sartre, 1943 (498) IV-1-I-24/37). But at what cost? Furthermore, unless they suffered from some disability, they freely 'chose' not to be in shape and not to bring the proper equipment. They also 'chose' to go on the hike even if they did not have "what it takes". In any case their freedom was halted by themselves, they stop because they wished to do so. We could say they were reasonable.

How does our analogy of the hikers, relate to the question of whether or not Sartre's moral theory leads to anarchy? The key word is reasonable. The hikers stop once they realized their limits. If Kant, following the Ancient Greeks, was correct in saying that all humans are reasonable, then we can assume that following a Sartrean morality people will not fall into chaotic anarchy. However, it would be

foolish to base the moral theory merely on the reasonability of people; even Kant asked that laws be written and that we should constantly question ourselves. Sartre is unsympathetic to laws, however his philosophy does offer ways to prevent a degeneration into anarchy. Starting with the concept of reasonability, individuals would want to remain within the limits of consistency as discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, I must remain *authentic* and as such respect points 1 to 5. In our discussion of the other in the second chapter, we saw a glimpse of the importance of the other in limiting our freedom not by coercion but from our desire not to follow our *original choice*. Since if I do something that contravenes our *original choice* a sensation of *shame* will overtake me, the same sensation would occur in an anarchic world. Still, individuals' *original choice* might be to do as they please even at the detriment of others, but we could recall the response raised by Anderson that if someone harms you, you could do the same to them.

So far, we have approached the problem of anarchy from the point of view of the individual who fails to comply with society at large. Sartre's moral theory might be individualistic but it applies to every individual, and unlike anarchism it is structured and it is expected of each individual to have a comprehension of their *original choice*, and that they be *authentic*. Hegel denounced laws as presented by Kant, but in some way there was a law in his moral theory, the law of the *Spirit*. The same is true for a Sartrean moral theory, as de Beauvoir says "L'Homme est libre; mais il trouve sa loi dans sa liberté même" (de Beauvoir, 1947 219). The reason why *authenticity* is so important is because it constitutes our personal law. If someone is *authentic*, then that person is morally correct. First, one must *choose* freedom, second each one of us must have secondary 'choices' that do not go against freedom, third we must accept our *facticity* without *pride* nor *shame*. To *choose*

anarchy is to *choose* pleasure, or power or hatred and we already saw that these negative 'choices' cannot serve as the *original choice* since they go against freedom. Sartre remarked in *Notebooks for an Ethics* that the ultimate 'choice' is "generosity" (Sartre, 1983 16). Not the generosity that makes the generous person feel good, or proud, nor the generosity which we talked about that has some positive repercussion, but the generosity of freedom. Such a view of generosity diverges from that of *Being and Nothingness*, yet it maintains the consistency. In *Being and Nothingness*, the struggle for freedom has to demonstrate the existence that we could bring our freedom to contemplate. We also saw the impossibility of achieving such a maximum of freedom, because I not only *choose* myself as free, but all humans (see section 2 of the current chapter).

In addition to those remarks against a downfall into anarchy, the freedom that is sought is not only that of action, nor of will, it is a combination, it is a freedom of *being* (Sartre, 1995 69). Anarchy only pertains to freedom of action as fully exploiting the freedom of will. In other words, we not only will the act but we enact it. We saw that there are many restrictions on us that would prevent us from enacting all of our whims: the example of the hikers, our downfall into *bad faith*, the *shame* from the *look*, and so on. We can try and do as we please, restrict the other's freedom, but in the end we will pay for what we did. For example, many dictators paid the price of their actions (e.g. Pol-pot). others escape through suicide (e.g. Hitler), but then Hitler did so because he knew what was coming, that even amongst Germans, many felt a sense of *shame* from the eyes of others. Finally other dictators escaped, but only thanks to international law that have little to do with the individual (i.e. very un-Sartrean). Granted, there are lesser levels of *bad faith*, however, we cannot escape

our *being*, and anarchism is just that, an attempt at *plenitude*, of fulfilling ourselves as 'pseudo-god', which is nothing more than our failure to be human.

Therefore, a Sartrean definition of freedom of *beings* does not lead to anarchism. No more does it lead to solipsism since we do not exist without others as Heidegger pointed out. It does not lead to anarchy, because of its intrinsic nature, we 'choose' what we value, but our 'choice' is constrained by the five points given earlier (1-5). Our freedom is complete. Unlike Kant there is no "ought" for all, nor a *kingdom of ends* for which we strive, nor a *noumenal* that needs respecting. Unlike Hegel's claim, the *Spirit* does not inhabit us and make us wonder if what we are doing is in agreement with the *Spirit*. Unlike Heidegger we can be *authentic and* should be so. Furthermore, freedom for Sartre is fulfilled in action not in will, and this freedom is the freedom of my *being*, to be free for myself not for others, though I must respect the freedom of others and they mine. There is no need for "rights" or written laws, these are found in our ontological structure, we project our freedom and we control it by letting it transcend our *being*. We are *being-for-itself*, and not *in-itself*, as long as we remember this ontological feature we will not abuse of our freedom on behalf of others. Only a *being* who believes it is a pure *in-itself* would act against freedom.

In this section we covered three important criticisms against freedom as proposed by Sartre. First, are we limited by the other's *look* since the other creates our *facticity* by judging us based on societal values. The answer was no. We are in charge of our freedom and our *facticity*, we feel *pride* and *shame* in the *look* of the other insofar as it reflects who we perceive ourselves to be. In both cases (*shame* and *pride*) we are in *bad faith*, we elevate ourselves either because of something we did or did not do. If someone helps an elderly person with their groceries that person should not feel *pride*, but good for having kept with his or her *original choice* (let us

say it was generosity). Second, why should I respect the freedom of others? The reason is that freedom is reciprocal, and my freedom depends on that of the other. All humans are equal, and as such all deserve the same amount of freedom. Unfortunately we have not evolved to the point where we can learn this and not abuse our freedom. Third, if we are free, then why do we not fall into anarchy? Because to do so would be in *bad faith*, go against our *facticity*, and renounce the entire project as proposed by Sartre. Freedom for Sartre is not the ultimate freedom as pictured by most of his readers, especially when reading Sartre's work immediately following *Being and Nothingness*, and de Beauvoir's *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguïté*.

On Choice

Inconsistency

Time and time again we have seen the importance of choice, namely the *original choice*. In the previous chapter, we defined what the *original choice* was, and we also showed its role in moral theory, but as it was the case with freedom, critics of Sartre have claimed that the *original choice* weakens, if not destroys, the possibility for a moral theory based on a Sartrean philosophy. The first objection held against the *original choice* is closely linked with the second one concerning freedom. Why should I value logic or consistency "when nothing can have any intrinsic objective value in a Sartrean ontology?" (Anderson, 1976 69). This objection leads to a second one that is closely related, which is if "nothing can have any intrinsic objective values", then how can we even achieve a sense of *in-itself* as a necessary being? (Hornyansky, 1989 152).

Once we have accepted a Sartrean moral theory, and Sartre's ontological understanding of *being*, we have *chosen* to value freedom. We can now answer the objection posed by Anderson, or rather he can answer his own objection as he does in his article when he says "If I do not value my freedom how could I consistently value anything it 'chooses' to value, including its valuation of my own life." (Anderson, 1976 64). We are caught in a circular argument that is positive. First I must value freedom in order to 'choose'; second, to value freedom I must *choose* to do so, *choosing* to value my freedom has to be done freely without intervention. Not only must we 'choose' our own values, but we must *choose* freedom and the value to freely *choose* one's *original choice*. Nevertheless, someone may 'choose' to value inconsistency or irrationality; if so, then the possibility of moral correctness falls through (Anderson, 1979 145). Anderson develops his objection even further when he notes that a person who has made the 'choice' of inconsistency could go even further and convince others (he gives the example of drug usage) (Anderson, 1979, 145). Suddenly our problem has deepened, because now our inconsistency seems to be justified in that others agree.

Furthermore, how do we convert the person who 'chose' inconsistency and irrationality (Anderson, 1979 146). After analyzing Sartre's philosophy we realize that such a person fails on all accounts. First, to 'choose' inconsistency and irrationality is still to value something (*viz.* inconsistency and irrationality). Second, such a person has also *chosen* freedom, the freedom to be inconsistent and irrational. Third, whether or not others follow suit does not increase the justifiability since we already established that 'choices' are personal. Thus, at first sight our inconsistent and irrational individual is consistent as he or she fulfills all of Sartre's requirements for 'choice'. Moreover, this person is also rational since he or she wants to show the

rationale of his or her thinking to others and is well aware of the steps to maintain this so called irrationality. Henceforth, this person is not inconsistent, nor irrational, instead this individual is in *bad faith*.

No matter what we decide we 'choose' our values, even the person in *bad faith* 'chose' his or her path towards *bad faith*. If I 'choose' to become, as Sartre says, a "petit-Dieu", then I have created a value for myself. If I 'choose' to follow the values of others, or the *Spirit*, I am nonetheless valuing these values. I can 'choose' to judge the others by my values, but they can 'choose' to refuse my judgment, after all I am not God, I am a free *being* as are these others. We become aware of the fallacy of Kant's *categorical imperative*, and why Hegel rejects it. If we follow Kant we not only prescribe, but we judge, we judge whether an act is morally correct or not. When we accept such a Kantian approach we reduce each *being* to a subject that is expected to follow the rules of more important subjects (i.e., those who made the law). Yet, if we are true to Kant, these are the same subjects. However, in so doing I 'choose' to do what I say is right, and coincidentally we all said it was right to do so. The we becomes irrelevant, unless it is the judge of moral action, but then we are talking about the *Spirit*. We are now trapped in a negative circular argument which seems positive on the surface. If I, with the help of the *categorical imperative*, say that to do "y" is wrong, so will everyone else make the same deduction, if they use the categorical imperative as I have. Yet, we can reach the same conclusion if we follow the Sartrean model. In other words, there are no universals, only individual ones. But since not everyone questions her or him self, many blindly follow the cultural mores or in the case of Hegel their *Spirit*. If values are to be consistent they cannot be objective, they must conform with our individual freedom. If more than two people agree on the same values, then so be it, but it does not make such a value

more important than another. Values are therefore not necessarily objective. What is more, we must be consistent as the attempt not to be consistent is consistency itself. This is one more remark, on the objection posed by Hornyansky. She said our 'choices' "achieve a sense of itself as necessary being"; to attempt this is *bad faith*. *Bad faith* is our attempt to become our *plenitude*, our *in-itself*, we are *nothingness* or free as a *being-for-itself* and as such we need to project our freedom not our *plenitude*.

Are Not All Choices Moral

When we choose values we 'choose' them consistently; they may be shared by others, but that is not important. Could this mean that no matter what I 'choose' as long as (1) I 'choose' freely, (2) in consistency with my *original choice*, (3) in *authenticity*, that will be morally right? Or as Anderson puts it: "Because all of man's 'choices' are free, if freedom is man's primary moral value this will mean that all of his 'choices' will inevitably have moral worth." (Anderson, 1979 50). If so, then what is the point of having a moral theory? So far we saw how important freedom and 'choices' were, including their values, and how all moral claims are personal, but then who is to say what is morally right or what is not. I may judge my own action, but I have no tools, nor rights to judge others. As such is Sartrean moral theory "devoid of ethical force or persuasiveness?" (Arras, 1976 178). Why it is devoid of persuasiveness, was explained in the last paragraph; but no, it is not devoid of ethical force. To demonstrate its 'ethical force' we shall seek to answer the question given above that Anderson alludes to in his work on Sartre's ethic.

Anderson's and Arras' comments are well taken because Sartre does say that no moral theory should tell you what you can and cannot do (Sartre, 1946 46).

Nor should we go out and do whatever pleases us, as we saw in the previous section; neither Sartre nor de Beauvoir were presenting a theory of anarchy. While no one, or no moral theory should tell us what to do or what not to do, we do have to follow our values and our *original choice*. At the risk of repetition, I am my own judge. For example, as the guest at someone's house, when before eating I decide to go wash my hands in my hosts' washroom, because I am curious by nature I take a peek in their medicine cabinet. Two possible outcomes can arise out of my act. First, I see what is inside the cabinet unbeknownst to my hosts and leave having satisfied my curiosity with not a care in the world. In the second scenario, I take a peek and I am surprised by someone who is walking by. This example is not unlike that of Sartre where the person is surprised while listening at the door. However, in this example I am caught in the *look* of my hosts; in Sartre's example it was a stranger for whom I might not care what he or she thinks of me and as such not feel *ashamed*. My *shame* as we already saw is coerced from me as I realize in the *look* of the other my error, my deviation from my *original choice*. But what of the first scenario where I do not get caught, and do not feel any *shame* for what I have done. In this case we are reminded of Plato's example of the ring of Gyges that makes anyone who wears it invisible. In both cases Sartre would say that it should not matter if someone is looking at you or not; your action should be the same, or else you are in *bad faith*. I might have the urge to peek inside the medicine cabinet, but that does not make me in *bad faith*. Without action there is no morality; what puts me in *bad faith*, is the act of peeking inside the cabinet. If it was not the case, then I would not be *ashamed* if I get caught in the *look* of the other. My behavior is judged by me before I do the act, as was the young man's decision whether to go to England and take care of his mother.

My 'choices' are also reinforced by my history. We should not forget that part of one's *facticity* is his or her past, or the 'choice' we previously made. We are also aware of the link between the *choice* of freedom (the *original choice*) and our secondary 'choices'. Furthermore, to remain consistent all three must partake in each other. Therefore, my 'choices' are judged by what I am even though I am not aware of it, unlike our previous example. It was this unawareness of our judgment that Hegel included in what he called the *Spirit*. True, our environment plays a role in who we are, but in the end I am my own person, and when I face my daily life I make my own decisions. In the previous example we were dealing with reflective consciousness. Reflective consciousness is aware of itself and of its decision, but non-reflective consciousness is not (Sartre, 1943 (516) IV-1-I-52/67). Yet because we are consistent, as was shown in the previous section and in the first objection of the current section, it follows then that our actions are consistent. Thus the person who has followed in the path of *authenticity* will take the right actions morally without the need for outside judgment. Life is not mere chance; it is a series of 'choices', an historical lineage built on the foundations of our freedom.

Am I Ever Wrong?

Reflectively or non-reflectively I make the right decision, so why have a moral theory? I cannot make a wrong decision, since I am never wrong. This objection has been held against Sartre on more than one occasion. Whatever we do cannot be wrong, even murder, hence, no matter what I do, it is never wrong. Is a Sartrean approach utopic when it comes to 'choice'? The first reason we answered why it is not utopic, was shown. As for the second the answer is quite simple. We are not God, nor a 'pseudo-god', we are free, imperfect *beings* that make irrational 'choices',

or 'choices' incoherent with our *original choice*. What Sartre wants us to be aware of is that in those cases we do so reflectively. Freud was wrong when he blamed irrational behavior on our subconscious state; in fact Sartre denies such a thing, since we are aware of our acts, even our thoughts. When we are not aware, we are behaving mechanically as if we were on auto-pilot, therefore following our path, the path which we freely 'choose', the path of our *original choice*. Hence, we do make negative 'choices', and we make them consciously.

Neither Sartre's philosophy, nor a model of moral theory based on it, is not "devoid of ethical force". Neither do all of our 'choices' have "moral worth"; their capacity to be worthy is based on their ontological structure, and if they follow consistently with past 'choices', while their worth is the result of the act. Depending on our *original choice*, or whether we are *authentic* or *bad faith* the "force" of Sartre's philosophy will be felt. The worthiness of 'choice' is dependent on our control over our actions, and not on how seriously we take 'choices', since seriousness is *bad faith*. Morality is like a "game" I can 'choose' to play it or not; if not then I will fall into *bad faith* and lose all the force of morality, and its worth will be lost in the process. I can play the "game" but I can easily forget some of its rules, even if I made them up. We are not perfect, as Sartre was well aware, hence the strength of his philosophy, namely the inclusion of *facticity*. We are aware of the 'choice' we make, no matter if we get caught or not.

Consistency

If a moral theory of the Sartrean kind is to succeed, it seems that it must depend on whether the individual is either *authentic* or in *bad faith*; the two can be summarized into a question of consistency (Arras, 1976 177). It was mentioned

earlier that even if the individual seeks inconsistency, he is being consistent. Such a statement should not be interpreted as claiming that no matter what we do we are consistent, thus *authentic*. Even though to seek inconsistency requires consistency, other aspects of our *being* may be in *bad faith* (viz., the *original choice* and the respect of freedom). Like Santoni, Arras oversimplified the notion of *faith*. Nevertheless, Arras' remarks brings out an important criticism pertaining to 'choice', and consistency as a 'choice'. What is wrong with an individual who could admit his or her responsibility for others and yet decide to enslave them? (Anderson, 1970 127). Granted we showed in the previous section that I need to respect freedom as a whole and not only mine, and that it should precede and concur with my *original choice*; however we never said why I should care. In other words, what do I get out of this *choice*, or instead what do I lose if I do not make it? Does Sartre's philosophy provide us with consistency? It can easily be said that it does not, that nothing stops me from engaging in *bad faith*. After all, Sartre offers no great reward at the end of the journey as does Kant, or a cultural emancipation as offered by Hegel. The only offering we get from Sartre is consistency, that our *being* accept its situation and its freedom.

Theologians have often used the term *call* and so has Heidegger when referring to the *call to authenticity*, but the role of the *call* no matter who uses it is to explain a person's awakening. Except in rare cases, the *call* is perceived as a message that helps to improve the individual, if the *call* is answered. We saw what Heidegger meant by the *call*, that it was neither mine nor alien, but comes from within. For people who are religious, the *call* is often associated with God, or any other important figure in the individual's beliefs. The *call* is reassuring, it allows the person who received it to re-organize his or her life in making it consistent with what

or who ever placed the *call*. Sartre does not deny that we think that we received the *call*, but he maintains that the *call* is from *me*, not from deeper within (Heidegger) or from some religious figure. It is myself who allows *me* to decide freely what my acts will be, or how I will react if caught (*shame*) (Sartre, 1946 35). The *call* is not telling me what to do in order to be good or just, it tells me that I am free, better yet that I am realizing my freedom (Sartre, 1983 285). When I pick up the *call* it already means that I want to be *authentic*, and consistent, even if I do not follow my *calling*. There is already in me the need for consistency.

We all desire consistency, the question is how do we recognize this need? The answer is up to each individual and as we speak most people fail to see the need. As Sartre maintained throughout his life we are for the most part in *bad faith*, we refuse freedom for all, believe that the *call* is from some spiritual force, pretend to be who others want us to be. Most of these decisions we take without knowing them. The main cause for following this 'empty' reasoning is that we are afraid to admit to our *nothingness*. We fear the unknown and that is what our *being* is, unknowing. We know our past, and we know what we want out of our future, but that has yet to happen, and as far as the present is concerned, it is *nothingness* neither past nor future, but related to the two. As long as we live in the past or in the future we are in *bad faith*; yet we feel comfortable, and to free ourselves we need to be in the instant, and to do so it is to accept our full freedom (Jeanson, 1947 322). As it was the case for the *call*, *nothingness* is what we are, we will be a *plenitude* only at death. We must therefore abandon the dream of 'pseudo-god' and accept ourselves, as *being authentic*. If not, then anything else will just end up falling apart since it is based on non-human standards.

My *being* asks of me (i.e. the *call*) to be *authentic* and so does my ontological structure (i.e. freedom as a *nothingness*). We are *transcending beings* and only in consistency can we satisfy ourselves; however our transcendence will push us away in to what Heidegger called *curiosity* and *idle talk*. No matter who we are, banker, doctor, student, even criminal, we all want to be satisfied with ourselves, but what we do not know is that satisfaction comes at the end of consistency. Sartre's philosophy offers this. While at first it seems ridiculous in the long run it makes us realize that we have been pretending to be who we are our whole life, and only in the accomplishment of *authenticity* will we be consistent and satisfied with our life. Not unlike Buddhists who must abandon all earthly belongings, for Sartre we must abandon our safety blanket (*das Man*), our unrealistic goal (i.e. 'pseudo-god'), and finally embrace our full freedom. Unfortunately, to do so is difficult and scary. The young man in the example of the first chapter, who went to see his professor in order to know whether he should remain in France with his mother or fight in the resistance by going to England, was asking for help without realizing that he had to answer his own dilemma, freely, and not have it resolved by another person.

Nevertheless why not be in *bad faith*. If to be consistent is so difficult, why not follow inconsistency? *Bad faith* is a 'choice', and because we are all free, whether we recognize it or not, it is acceptable. I cannot judge the other who 'chooses' *bad faith*. Though it is not a good 'choice', it is that individual's 'choice' and unless I myself 'choose' *bad faith* I cannot judge this person (Sartre, 1946 68). Therefore, anyone can 'choose' *bad faith* and inconsistency, but they will live a lie, not to the other but to themselves. A Sartrean moral theory remedies this situation. Kant wanted us to live according to the categorical imperative, but nothing stopped us from living a lie. As we saw in our discussion of freedom, the individual is

responsible for his or her 'choice' and as such his or her judgment as to whether the action is warranted or not, or morally right or wrong. The same goes for *authenticity* and *bad faith*, and consistency and inconsistency. We cannot coerce others into living in *good faith* nor tell them how to (categorical imperative and *Spirit*), nor should we expect an implausible realization which might alleviate the difficulties of the individual (Heideggerian *authenticity*). Only I can 'choose' what I want.

Can Others Prevent Me From Bad Faith

Arras concludes his article by saying that if I 'choose' *inauthenticity* (*bad faith*), then Sartre's philosophy, and in turn its moral theory, has no value (Arras, 1976 179). If I 'choose' to live the life of an unfulfilled person, who is inconsistent and in *bad faith*, then nothing stops me from hurting my fellow man since I have not a care in the world. As for those who 'choose' the Sartrean position they cannot reprehend me because if they did say I am doing something wrong, they would be in *bad faith* and in turn be no better than me. If Arras is correct, then the 'choice' we made can be used against us, especially if I 'choose' a Sartrean moral theory. What good is it to be consistent if everyone else uses me? In his *War Diaries* Sartre discusses for more than ten pages how the Kaiser 'chose' his path and the war, how each step he took led to his role in European history (Sartre, 1995 549-558). Obviously the Kaiser was not *authentic*. A more extreme example is Hitler and the treatment he ordered concerning all of those who were not fit to be "good" Germans. We have to answer two questions: first does history dictate our 'choices'? Second, why not prevent those who make nefarious 'choices' early on, before they go too far?

Moral 'choices' are not dependent on immediate circumstances as many people would like to believe. Kant has sometimes been misunderstood to say that we should never lie under any circumstances. However, if lying was necessary to save someone's life Kant would say that it is allowable. Utilitarians advocated an even more context dependent moral theory. These moralists were not wrong, however, they omitted an important aspect from their moral theory, history. The *original choice* that we made comes into play each time we take action and is just as important as the context which we are in (Sartre, 1983 52). Our past is dictated by the 'choice' we make now, in this instant, and so is our future. Unless we change our *original choice*, it is nearly impossible to make an instantaneous decision without deviating from our *original choice*. For example, if Hitler 'chose' to see the German nation as the greatest nation in the world, and that after witnessing its defeat in 1918 and the suffering of the depression, he 'chose' to take power and make those who were to blame pay for Germany's humiliating state during the Weimar period, then his 'choices' were historically linked with his 'choice' to see Germany as a great nation. We could further explain the Holocaust by linking it to Hitler's *original choice* of hatred. Many of Hitler's 'choices' were context dependent (e.g. the defeat of 1918, the depression, the failed putsch, etc), but they all followed his *original choice*, and his secondary ones.

Therefore, what someone values, comes out of their free 'choices'; that is, the *original choice* influences his or her decision. Can values be wrong, especially when looking at our example? Unfortunately not; they are right or wrong only for someone else, but values are personal and if I 'choose' a value which is extremely evil, it is still absolute for me (Jeanson, 1947 320). Thus, Hitler's values were to him the right ones. But how could we not be able to judge them? When faced with values we have no

right to judge; what is allowable is to prevent the other if it does not infringe one's *authenticity*. For example, a person *chooses* freedom and all of what Sartre argued for. This person is allowed to use violence to prevent another person from murdering. This is because we must promote the full emancipation of freedom, and murder, as an act which is harmful to freedom, must be prevented. Hence, following Sartre it would have been permissible to stop Hitler before he went too far.

Sartre is not proposing a Leibnizian universe where everything has its purpose. We can change our 'choices', even the *original choice* (i.e., the conversion). We are free to do as we please within the limits of our *facticity*. Unlike Leibniz, Sartre allows for unpredictability, and unlike many moral theorists Sartre does not believe in mere context dependence. I am *nothingness* as a *being-for-itself* and as such I am free to 'choose' my next action, and there is no universal organization that stimulates my 'choice' (Sartre, 1943 (512) IV-1-I-38/60). From this we can deduce that Hitler did not have to be who he was, nor did Ghandi, or Napoleon. These people did what they did because they 'chose' to. Different 'choices' could have led any of these individuals into a different path, they might have never existed, or become important, but they did. What is definite is the world in which we live. Each action we take makes the world after all, it is action that makes the world. Thus, while the world is freely construed it could not be different. In other words, we could conceive a world where Hitler did not exist, but it would not be the world we live in. To answer our second question, we could prevent events such as the Holocaust because they a) arise out of past 'choices' made by all humans, and b) they are not instantaneous. Going back to the example of Hitler, by 1933 any one who paid attention to Hitler's moves, and *Mein Kampf*, would have deduced the path on which Hitler set out, namely that of hatred and against freedom. Anyone

aware of this has to intervene in order to protect the integrity of freedom. In taking away the freedom of Jews, homosexuals, bohemians, and so on, Hitler was taking away freedom as a whole.

The objections held against Sartre's notion of 'choice' are to be expected in light of the freedom he allows us to use in order to 'choose'. When reading Sartre we have the impression that no matter what we 'choose' we cannot go wrong. Nonetheless, what was true for freedom also holds true for 'choice': we *choose* to be free, only insofar as we are free to do so. We cannot judge the *choice* of the other, but one's 'choice' shows itself in the action towards others (in morality). If I make a graffiti at a bus stop, then my 'choice' will only mean something if someone else sees it. The same goes for good actions, I cannot judge my action unless I see its effect; and unless I take myself to be a 'pseudo-god', then I cannot judge the other. Hence when we make a 'choice' we should be consistent and *authentic*. If I fail on either account, then my 'choice' is not in the spirit of Sartre. Furthermore, if I witness someone infringing on the freedom of others, I must intervene for the good of freedom, but for no other reason.

Sartre's Philosophy: Can it Lead to a Moral Theory

Moral theory has evolved since Kant, but one aspect that remains part of an acceptable moral theory is freedom, and no one has emphasized this more than Sartre. Throughout this thesis we witnessed the importance given to freedom and how it serves as the source of morality and life as a whole. Sartre argued that we are undeniably free *beings*, and that all of our actions are made freely. On the one hand, Kant, Hegel and most moralists recognize the pivotal role of freedom in life, yet they failed to give it its due in their moral theories. Why? Because they witnessed the

weakness of the human mind. Humans might be rational, but they do not always show it. Everyday the newspaper reports are of immoral activities. Philosophers such as Kant and Hegel felt that some restrictions were required, Kant had laws, Hegel the *Spirit* of the nation, Utilitarians the good of the majority, and so on. Sartre on the other hand, rejects all forms of restriction even those from the I, and instead he argued for a moral theory that asks of us to be *authentic* and remain consistent with our *original choice* (i.e. freedom). The law is my 'own', the *Spirit* is my own, and so is my happiness. But is that enough to make a moral theory? In this section we will briefly, answer this question through the intermediacy of three other problems.

Thomas Anderson attempted to refute in his 1970 and 1976 articles, and his 1979 and 1993 books claim that an existentialist ethics based on Sartre's ontology is in principle impossible and that it is why he never published an ethics (Anderson, 1976 61). The main opposition to such a morality is that it does not value anything above the I, or rather the I values whatever he or she pleases. Such a statement is false, I may value hatred, and others have no right to judge my values no matter how immoral they are. Yet, my values must not infringe on freedom. For example, is lying acceptable? For devoted Christians it is never acceptable. While, Sartre deviates from Kant in the following way: Kant would say that in order to save someone's life through lying I would have to make a choice. On the one hand, I can lie and save the individual's life, but in so doing I act immorally. On the other hand, I allow the person to be killed by not lying, hence acting morally. For Kant, the decision between good and bad is distinct from moral right or wrong. In the case of Sartre's theory, we have to remain faithful to one's *choice* and should the latter be honesty (rather than freedom), then no matter when I lie I am in *bad faith*.

A conflict arises then between the *choice*, the protection of freedom, and the context. Christians and Kantians have no problem when facing a moral issue, their decision is based on a clean cut set of rules or duties. Hegelians have it more complicated, they have to follow the *Spirit*. As for a Sartrean theory, it seems inevitably doomed to failure at this point, or does it? The answer to this question depends on which period of Sartre's career we look at. We are not interested in his career after 1950, nevertheless we noticed throughout our analysis a change in view on Sartre's part after *Being and Nothingness*. If we were to ask Sartre prior to *Being and Nothingness* which of the three (i.e. *original choice*, protection of freedom, and context) he would have given precedence to context dependence. At the time of *Being and Nothingness* his answer would have been the *original choice*. By the time of *Notebooks for an Ethics* it would have been the protection of freedom. Which one should it be? The only plausible answer is the protection of freedom. For three reasons, first freedom is the single re-occurring term in all of his work, including his literary work, second, the *original choice* cannot be made possible without freedom, nor decision based on context dependence; third, he devoted his life to the protection of freedom. Going back to our previous example, which was whether we should lie to protect someone's freedom, the answer is yes. Let us remember that freedom precedes the *original choice*.

Is there an underlying rule for Sartre? If so, then Sartre failed since he opposed all rules and the protection of freedom seems to emerge as a rule. However, it is only a rule if we take moral theory to be prescriptive, which Sartre did not. Then how do we escape this trap (i.e., protect freedom without making it a rule). The answer to this is found in *Notebooks for an Ethics*. Hegel had said in the *Phenomenology* that knowledge comes from negation, things are what they are

because they are not something else. Sartre adopted the same approach to moral theory. A moral theory tells you not "what to do", but " what not to do" (Sartre, 1983 173). How can he make such a claim when he opposes all restrictions? In the same way Hegel showed that negation is positive. Sartre never says what to do as this is prescriptive; yet he does say what not to do *if* we want to be morally correct. In other words, be *authentic* and you shall be morally righteous no matter what righteousness may be for you. Sartre is constantly using negative terms, we are after all *nothingness*, or *transcendent beings*. He does not say protect freedom, I merely used such terminology in order to make a point; he says do not deplete freedom. The same can be said concerning *bad faith*; if I please I may be in *bad faith*, but then I *lack* self fulfillment. Our values are negative, they are *lack*. We value what we cannot have, since once we have it is no longer a value but a possession. To value honesty, means that I must always seek honesty. Only in death may I stop but never will I possess honesty.

The Probability Theory

One strange criticism against the possibility of Sartrean morality comes from Slater who defines Sartre's theory as "Probability Theory" (Slater, 1988 327). Slater's reasoning is that Heidegger was wrong, that nothing will change after we have become *authentic*; with the exception of a few eccentric individuals we are average. Why Probabilistic? Because people will do what they 'choose' to do and things will average out, hence the probability to live to be 100 is dependent not only on one's health but also, for example, on whether a murderer comes in contact with that individual. Slater proposes the following example according to a Sartrean theory: that "terrorism is bad for the society attacked, should not make us think that it is bad

tout court, i.e. bad in all circumstances.” (Slater, 1988 327). Slater interprets Sartre, in the same way so many have before and after him, as saying that we can do whatever we want and that since judging is not permissible on the part of others, then even the worst of actions is acceptable. The problem with such an interpretation, is that it takes for granted that all actions are allowable, and omits to see that this is true only in so far as I am in *bad faith*. Slater says that only a few eccentric individuals would not be average, therefore, he admits that the great majority of people would stay away from *bad faith*. As to whether terrorism is sometimes justified the answer is yes, if it is used against a society that does not allow the emancipation of freedom.

Slater, as many others, failed to see the advantages of a moral theory such as Sartre’s. They are in *bad faith* as Sartre would say as they still search for the guiding light as did the young man going to see his teacher as to whether he should go to England or stay in France, they still want to be pardoned or judged by either God or someone else (e.g. *Spirit* or the *das Man*). They do not want to admit to their own doing. Robert G. Olson in an article published in 1959 demonstrated the difference between three points of view, one obviously that of Sartre, and two popularly held. Olson’s example goes as follows: Two men are pathological liars, the first one, Mr. A, admits that he constantly lies but excuses himself since in admitting to his lies he is by nature (i.e. in his essence) honest. Mr. B is also a constant liar, and he too confesses his crime, but he excuses himself by saying that it is by nature that he is a liar (i.e. determinism) and as such he cannot help himself. Olson calls Mr. A Leibnizian and Mr. B a Spinozist, but that is not what interests us. What does is the following: “Mr. A has failed to realize that human beings must by their nature live out of doors in the world, that man *is* ‘wholly’ what he does [see the definition of

action in chapter two]. Mr. B has failed to realize that human beings must by their nature transcend their being in the world, that man *exists* beyond all caused determinism" (Olson, 1959 99-100). Slater and others failed to see this point that "man as being is not what he is and who is what he is not" (Olson, 1959 100). My past does affect who I am, but that is not all, I am also in the making or as Heraclitus said in a state of becoming. We are not a *plenitude*, we are *nothingness* and as such free for better or worse. Only once we have mastered our self understanding will we be able to be in *authenticity*. Returning to Slater he made terrorism acceptable but valueless, Sartre gives the individual the power of value. If the cause is right (i.e. terrorism if it is for the emancipation of freedom), then the act is for the better. Neither determinism or self forgiving is justifiable. Maybe it would lead to an average society, but only by those who gather statistics, not for each unique individual.

Sartre's Literary Work Used Against His Philosophy

"L'enfer c'est les autres" (Sartre, 1947 93). These four words at the end of *Huis Clos* (No Exit) have tormented many who saw a possible moral theory in Sartre. First, we should ask ourselves why would a line from a play have any repercussions on a moral theory? Second, does it really weaken Sartre's position? Third, does it reflect his philosophy? The first and third question can be answered straight forwardly.

To the first question we say that Sartre's literary writing and philosophy are distinct. True we can find many important characteristics in his literary work, but it is not his philosophy as he intended it. He himself resented those who read *la Nausée* and then claimed to understand his philosophy; *Being and Nothingness* is not only more dense but different from *la Nausée*. The same is true about *Huis Clos* and

Sartre's view of others. We saw in chapter two section two the relation between the I and the other, and furthered this examination in the previous two sections of the current chapter, and nowhere have we arrived at the conclusion that others are so undesirable as to be characterized as hell. Thus, the answer to the third question is a resounding no. Sartre's literary work does not necessarily reflect his philosophy. Though it is true that he used his literary works (viz. plays) to convey some of his messages, they should not be taken as philosophical work, only as supporting it. Furthermore, his literary characters were borrowed, for the most, from people he had met or read about. In addition, he characterized many of them in order to show the absurdness of human kind (viz. to be 'pseudo-God'). He used literature to show the state of human kind, and to test some of his philosophical theories, but they were not intended to be philosophical per se. Hence, the famous line in *Huis Clos* represents how we are now and not his view of others nor how we should be.

Nevertheless, to attribute the line of *Huis Clos* to Sartre's philosophy would not weaken his position concerning morality. To believe that it would be detrimental to a Sartrean moral theory is to fail to understand *Huis Clos*. The three characters Garcin, Ines, and Estelle are not representative of what Sartre calls *authenticity*; they represent us in the state of *bad faith*. The three have always been around people and either depended on them (Estelle) or dominated them (Ines), or simply manipulated them (Garcin). The play shows how once someone is trapped with others, without an exit and where everything is determined, then that person is in hell. Their very existence in the room in which they find each other, where their acts, their thoughts, and so on, have all been determined by those who placed them there. These three lived their lives in complete *bad faith*, they followed the way of living that the human race had since its commencement. They are Mr. A and Mr. B, they live

the fallacy that they have no freedom, yet they want it all. They refuse to admit their acts arise out of them as free *beings*, and not as 'pseudo-god'. They expect others to take the blame, or to forgive their actions, and so on. *Huis Clos* is an example of living in *bad faith*. If hell is others, then when we refuse to acknowledge freedom in the face of others our existence feels as if it is hell. Thus, hell in *Huis Clos* is when we are determinist and when we cannot escape the judgment of others (who refuse to acknowledge that others besides themselves have freedom).

Examples of Sartre's literature which shows human weakness as it stands, are numerous. For example, in *la Nausée* Roquentin realizes that without the other he exists for himself only, but with the other present he exists (Sartre, 1938 143). Does this mean that the other removes my existence, or that I do not need the other? No. It shows that without the other I would be a 'pseudo-god' and the other prevents me from becoming so. Again in *la Nausée* Roquentin is possessed by *Angst* when it comes the time to 'choose' between two roads in order to return home. His *Angst* wins him over (Sartre, 1938 85). Sartre never claimed that we should succumb to our *Angst* in order to reveal our *authenticity* as Heidegger claimed. Roquentin should have 'chosen' the road he wanted and not feared the consequences of the unknown. Is it wrong to listen to our *Angst* as fear? Not because it is part of our *facticity*, but without it we would be invincible 'pseudo-god's (Sartre, 1938 84).

In *Les Mouches* we come across many discussions concerning freedom and the control of God on others. As Jupiter says "...les hommes sont libres. Ils sont libres, Egisthe tu le sais, et il ne le savent pas" (Sartre, 1947 200). Egisthe also fears that, if Oreste goes about proclaiming that all people are free, chaos will occur (Sartre, 1947 202-203). This illustrates how a person who has accepted that we are

free can be in *bad faith*, and as such fail to be moral. Such an example goes well with the first section of this chapter, in our discussion about the absurdity of a person who knows that he or she is free all the while claiming to be protecting others by chaining them. Even laws are for and by humans, and not the divine (Sartre, 1947 205). Furthermore, in *Les Mouches* Oreste explains why he cannot heal the torment of his sister as it is up to each one of us to 'choose' whether we are consistent or not (Sartre, 1947 227). Towards the end Jupiter proclaims his hatred toward Oreste, and Oreste is quick to respond that this is a weakness not a strength, only those who chose freedom, and *authenticity* are strong (Sartre, 1947 237). I could go on giving examples of how Sartre used his literature to expose our errors and demonstrate how his theories function but in no case should they be taken at par with his philosophical work. They were secondary and must be taken as such.

Conclusion

The question posed at the beginning of this section as to whether a Sartrean moral theory is plausible, proposed to answer the following three questions. What value if any is supreme? Second, does Sartre propose a probabilistic theory? Third, what role should be given to Sartre's literary work? Concerning the first problem we conclude that freedom is the highest value but that we have no right to impose it on others as this removes the other's freedom. To the second question I responded by showing two advantages of Sartre's theory over that of others, and that Slater's argument rested on *bad faith*. To the third problem I showed that Sartre's literary work does not have precedence over his philosophical work and that for the most part Sartre used it to show what is wrong with the human race. As such the quotes from *Huis Clos*, *Les Mouches*, and *la Nausée* are for illustrative purposes only and

often reflect an opposite view from that of Sartre's philosophy. It therefore seems that a Sartrean moral theory is possible, even if he never published one, nor finished *Notebooks for an Ethics*.

Chapter 4:

A Model of a Sartrean Moral Theory

In this final chapter I propose a Sartrean moral theory based on the analysis of Sartre's work that was conducted in the second and third chapters. I intend to construct the moral theory in the following way: First, I will explain why Sartre's philosophy provides the necessary material to construct a moral theory. Second, I will determine what is the relationship between the judicial system and a moral theory based on individual freedom. Third, I am going to show how *shame* and 'choices' are clearly related. Fourth, I present three examples of moral situations, and how they can be resolved following a Sartrean moral theory.

Material for Moral Theory

What do all moral theories have in common? First, they apply to everyone. Second, they help 'us' make the right 'choices' when facing a moral dilemma — as we have already seen this does not mean that it has to be prescriptive help, quite the contrary. Finally, it promotes or rather protects goodness, and it deals with moral issues not legal ones.

Sartre's philosophical work is sufficient enough to fulfill those four points mentioned above. The ontology of Sartre is individualistic, and so should be his moral theory as it is reflected in *Notebooks for an Ethics* and in de Beauvoir's *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguïté*. Sartre's philosophy is also universal in that it applies to all human beings in a reciprocal way. My existence depends on myself; and it is for me. Nevertheless, my awareness is only rendered to me in the presence of the other. Thus, a model for a Sartrean moral theory has to include the relationship between the I and the other.

Does Sartre's philosophy provide enough information to say whether a moral theory should or should not help us make decisions? The answer as we saw in the

first chapter, is that it provides us with the necessary tools to make our own decisions. Unlike Kant and most theorists, Sartre does not believe that a moral theory should tell you what to do, instead it should only help you make the right 'choices'. My 'choices' have to basically ensure that my freedom is protected and emancipated, and they also have to be consistent with my *original choice*, and not bring about the feeling of *shame* or *pride* obtained through the *look*. Therefore, a model of a Sartrean moral theory needs to include these aspects without the implication of judging. What this means is that the other has no right to judge my 'choices' and vice-versa. The reason why we have no right to judge is because our 'choices' are based on what we value as individuals. For Sartre each *being* is unique and as such free to 'choose' what is good for him or her. Moreover, if a moral theory tells us what to do, then it would be supreme over humans beings, and such a thing is not practical since it is a human concept; therefore, a moral theory can at best be our equal and guide us, and not master us.

Does a moral theory have to promote goodness? This question does not say whether moral theory should promote the good or happiness, but goodness. In other words, should all moral theories be able to revoke what is harmful to humans (physically and mentally) and prevent us from acting in such a way that harm might come to others, or should it allow us to do as we please as long as we feel good? Obviously, the latter is unacceptable, and Kant showed why the theory of happiness is not morally acceptable (though Kant was not the only one to disavow such a view). Yet, Sartre's theory would seem to promote the latter rather than the former. However, we saw in the previous chapter that Sartre had no intention of promoting what is good for me at the cost of others. The promotion of my freedom must concur with the freedom of all humans. Could someone do harmful acts in a Sartrean moral

theory? Conceivably yes, but short of restricting every human *being*, no moral theory could prevent people from falling into *bad faith* to the point of hurting others. That is why we have a judiciary system.

Clearly, Sartre left us with the necessary tools to build a moral theory based on the ontology of *Being and Nothingness*. These tools include the following: freedom, *facticity*, *authenticity*, action, *original choice*, the other, and consistency. All of these were defined in the second chapter and defended in the third. Now what remains is to organize our information so that they may form a coherent moral theory, something which Sartre failed to do. The reasons why Sartre did not do this or why he never completed *Notebooks for an Ethics* is not clear and for now these reasons have no bearing on the current work, though they shall be briefly presented in the conclusion of the thesis. Before we attempt to construct a Sartrean moral theory it should be pointed out that in order for such a theory to concur with *Being and Nothingness* precedence must be given to freedom. The theory needs to be grasped as a whole, and precedence should not be given to some specific aspects (besides general freedom) rather than others; there lies the problem with those who criticized Sartre.

We are all free, even though we fail to recognize it. Moreover, we entrap ourselves in the game of seriousness in order to present ourselves as a 'pseudo-god'. Not only do we fail to recognize that we are all free *beings*, and that we seek to become a 'pseudo-god', but we also look up to God or a *Spirit* for guidance and what not. Though Sartre was an atheist and rejected the notion of God as a supreme being which looks down upon us and guides us, this does not mean that we are not allowed to believe in God in order to follow Sartre's philosophy. What Sartre wanted us to understand is that it does not matter whether there is a God or not, life would

not be different. Sartre is saying is that 1) as long as we seek to become a 'pseudo-god' we will act in such a way that freedom is secondary; and 2) maintaining that God is our guide as such absolves us from 'choosing' our act (i.e., determinism). Therefore, the first thing we need to do is to stop invoking God when taking action and recognize that we are free *beings*, who are not free not to be free. To deny one's freedom is to be in *bad faith*, the same goes for denying freedom in others. All human beings are free and have the capacity to do as they please.

Unfortunately for those individuals who actually believe that they can do whatever they want, they tend to forget that there are some limits. Each *being* comes into the world with a series of characteristics, tall, overweight, strong, mediocre intelligence, and so on. These *facticies* limit my freedom since they prevent me from doing things which I might want to do but cannot because of who I am. For example, I cannot write a good symphony if I do not have any musical attunement. A second group of limits are also found in *facticity*, but unlike those enumerated above, they are made by me. Each 'choice' that I make in the moment towards the future is related to my past 'choices'. My past is part of my *facticity*. If I 'chose' at this moment to become a nuclear physicist I need to re-do my schooling since I never studied sciences. While in this example I am still free to 'choose' to become a nuclear physicist in other cases I cannot 'choose' to do something because of some past decision. For example, to be an astronaut by the age of forty when I 'chose' not to, until the eve of my fortieth birthday. Thus I am free to do as I please within the limits of my *facticity* which consists of my physical and my historical self.

We might not be able to do as we please, nevertheless nothing prevents us from doing harm to others. Sartre does not want any more limits beside those brought upon by *facticity* to restrict freedom. There is no need to restate what has

already been said with the exception that to 'choose' *authenticity* is still a free 'choice' that makes the *being* consistent and true to his or her existence and not his or her essence. We cannot be our essence (in-itself), our essence is what we were and will be. Only at the end of life can we be our essence; until then we exist as incomplete, as *being-for-itself*, as a *nothingness*. In morality this means that I cannot fulfill all my desires, namely that of *being-in-itself*. To 'choose' to be *in-itself* is to 'choose' to be a 'pseudo-god', which is absurd. To 'choose' to be a human is to 'accept that we are a *being-for-itself*. Though this sounds negative in Sartrean language, it is positive in that it is who we are. This implies that to *choose* freedom is to *choose* who I am which is a human being as *being-for-itself*, and in the process to *choose* my fellow *beings* as equals.

Because we are equal as human beings it follows that I should not do to the other what I would not want to be done upon me. One thing we should never do is judge the other. Kant said we should judge only our action, yet it is fairly easy to see how we could judge the other's action. Hegel opposed judging, but if one does not follow the *Spirit* of the *Volk* he or she is erring. As for Heidegger, to follow what the *das Man* does is blindly to accept *idle talk* and *curiosity*, henceforth, the individual is incorrect, which is a judgment. Could we not say that Sartre falls into the trap, in that he opposes all forms of judgment, that it is intrinsic to his theory? If a person infringes on the populace's freedom, then this person must be stopped even if it requires violence. What distinguishes Sartre's position from his German predecessors is that they explicitly said what was right or wrong, while for Sartre that decision is up to the individual. If oppression is found to be good for the cities of population "xyz", then that is their 'choice'. Should one person feel that his or her freedom is impaired, then he or she may turn to violence. Furthermore, others might

join if they share the same view. But as to whether we should judge the other's act or not, this is unacceptable to Sartre. The only thing I may judge is whether my freedom is maximized; and if not, then I must remedy this problem.

I must maximize my freedom but to what extent? As was shown in the chapter on "Love" in *Being and Nothingness* we have the impression that we should overtake the other's freedom. Fortunately Sartre revised himself in his later work, up to the point where he advocated a quasi-Marxist existentialism in the 1950's; but this is going beyond our scope. What we do find immediately following *Being and Nothingness* is that freedom needs to be respected. If I respect freedom in the other I respect freedom for all. Thus, to value freedom is personal and universal. I could value only my freedom, but this would lead me back to the quest of becoming a 'pseudo-god'. Freedom is either applied to all or to none. To *choose* freedom is to *choose* a morality that says we are all free, and we must value freedom in order not to remain in *bad faith*. If I remain in *bad faith*, it is a 'choice' that I made. There is no need to restate how we free ourselves from *bad faith*, if only that I must be consistent with my *original choice* and that I need to respect the 'choices' made by others. An *authentic* person cannot judge the one in *bad faith*, though he or she may protest, if this person felt that the other attacked his or her freedom.

We now arrive at the question how can we be moral, or what is morally righteous in a Sartrean mode? We are morally righteous when we are *authentic*. *Authentically* we are consistent with our *original choice*, and with freedom as previously described. To be *authentic* is more than to be sincere, nor is it the mere recognition of freedom, instead it is both, plus an acceptance of who we are as transcendent *beings*. First, I am *authentic* when I am sincere with who I am, that is my *facticity*, but I am in *bad faith* when I claim or act as who I take myself to be. This

means that any time someone claims to be x, or acts as expected of people who are x, that person is in *bad faith*. Secondly, I have to recognize that everyone is free including myself, and I must promote freedom. However, I must not hint to others that they are free; such a discovery is made in the eyes of the other but as seen by me. My freedom is revealed in the other as a *look*, when I *look* at the other my freedom comes into light. Thirdly, I am *authentic* when I am aware that I am not a *plenitude*, with unlimited possibilities. Nevertheless, I am in *bad faith* when I forget that I am my *facticity*. I am my past and I will be my future, but for now I am an instant or a *nothingness*.

Moral Theory and Judicial System

To be *authentic* requires more than simply knowing what is needed; thought or knowledge is meaningless until we act it out. To be *authentic* implies that I live my life according to the criteria enumerated above. Needless to say, to do so is extremely difficult, but not impossible. Unlike Heidegger for whom to be *authentic* occurs only for a *flash*, for Sartre we can maintain ourselves in *authenticity*. An individual who can sustain himself or herself in *authenticity* will live a life of moral righteousness. Neither Sartre, nor anyone else, should expect individuals to be capable of doing so, unless he or she were truly a God, but then that is impossible since we are talking about human beings. Undoubtedly then we cannot expect to be *authentic* at all times, even less expect this of a whole society, or all human beings. Such an expectation is unrealistic. As with all moral theories the expectations are set high and while some individuals might approach them for the most part people will fall short. There is one advantage with a Sartrean model over that of others in that it takes into consideration that we will not always be *authentic*. It also considers who

will use their *bad faith* to hurt others. As we already established a moral theory is not a legal theory and should not be expected to reproach individuals. However, it precedes legal theory in that it defines what is righteous and what is not.

Legal issues follow moral ones for two reasons. First, Sartre like Hegel had no sympathy for law and duty. Time and time again we have seen that no restrictions are to be imposed on us by others, and restrictions includes laws, duties, responsibility and so on. If I please, I may restrict myself, impose duties or responsibilities upon myself but I may not do so on others. I should be responsible for my acts, but I should not impose responsibility upon myself or others. From this can we deduce that Sartre would refuse any legal system? After all, to have a legal system requires judgments to be made on others by others. Probably if we were all *authentic*, that is if we would constantly be *authentic*, then we would not need a judicial system. Unfortunately we do not live in a perfect world, we are not gods, and because some people choose hatred, as their *original choice*, it leaves them morally bankrupt, and so we must maintain a judiciary system. This has the following implications: 1) that any legal system must refrain from imposing its power on freedom, 2) that it respects each individual as free and equal, 3) that in no circumstances should it judge people for the acts that they have committed that have no bearing on freedom, 4) that moral theory is above it, 5) that it leaves the individual who claimed that an infringement on freedom was done upon him or her, to prove whether his or her freedom was truly injured.

These five limits imposed on the legal system may seem to be exaggerated, or at least we have the impression that it turns the judicial system into a descriptive apparatus. However, upon close attention we can see how it could function effectively within the boundaries of a Sartrean moral theory. First, except for an

unreasonable mind no one would be opposed to the second point that says we are equal. Second, the fourth point implies that those who create, decide, and operate the judiciary system are not above the moral theory. Third, points one, three, and five imply that I am my own judge and if my acts infringe on someone's freedom then I must decide if my act were in fact infringed upon. Should the two disagree (i.e., the one whose freedom was infringed and the other who is accused), it would be then up to the members of the judicial system to decide.

An illustration might help clear up this strange structure. I am a well off book salesman, one day I realize that a person stole a book from me. In our current system we call the police, to arrest the robber, judge him or her, and serve a sentence. But did taking the book infringe my freedom? Making money is not a factor of freedom, the incapacity to make money has no relation what so ever with my loss of freedom, or its gain for that matter. In the case being looked at, my acts go on being free, even without the book. Because I am well off I am free to eat, and as such, live (without living, there is no freedom, therefore to live is primordial). My only moral claim against the individual who took the book is that he or she confesses to having infringed on my right to make money by selling the book. In other words, taking something material away from someone is not an infringement on morality. This is not surprising because Sartre saw no need for material possessions, with the exception of satisfying one's basic needs for survival. Not surprisingly that by 1947 he was leaning towards Marxism. Of course the person who took the book needs to justify why taking the book expands his or her freedom. On the one hand, if this person has the money to purchase the book, then his or her freedom cannot be expanded because he or she could easily have bought the same book. On the other hand, if this individual only had enough money for the bare necessities (i.e. food,

clothing, etc), then he or she might justify his or her act. Reading expands knowledge, and to expand our knowledge helps us to emancipate our freedom, and it does restrict the freedom of others. Thus, because he or she took the book in order to expand his or her knowledge, which helps freedom, and this person did not have enough money to purchase the book, then the act is acceptable. When using the term "acceptable" it is only for illustrative purposes, under no circumstances would Sartre allow such a term to be used when it comes to moral theory. Thus to justify one's act is a personal endeavor in moral theory, but when taken to the judicial level it is a public one. Until we can all live in a state of relative *authenticity* (i.e. the majority of the time all citizens do their best to be *authentic*), then a judiciary system is needed to protect those whose freedom is infringed upon by people who *chose* hatred.

Shame and Choice

The judicial system has nothing to do with a Sartrean moral theory. The reason why I briefly touched on the subject, was to show that it is possible to have one within such a moral theory. Sartre himself during the years of *Being and Nothingness* probably would have disagreed with any judicial system. Unfortunately he remained mute on the subject. Going back to moral theory, how can we say whether I am morally righteous or not? Christians look at the laws of the church as ordained by the will of God. Kantians ask whether they 'ought to' and see if it agrees with the universal maxim. Hegelians see if it falls with the *Spirit* of the *Volk*. Heideggerians (early) ask: was the act done *authentically* or was it a product of the *das Man*. Concerning Sartre, we know that freedom has to expand its limits, and that we have to be *authentic*, but how can I know if my act has all those characteristics?

The answer is with the *look*. For example, a teenager draws a graffiti on a bus shelter and is *looked* at by someone across the street, however the teen does not have a care in the world, is this young person *authentic*? Sadly, yes as long as his or her behavior would have been the same whether someone was *looking* or not. However, if a sense of *pride* over takes the teenager, or as many say it is the thrill of not getting caught, meaning that they will feel *shameful* if caught, then they are in *bad faith*. We should not forget our discussion concerning *shame* and *pride*, for only a person who 'chooses' to take the other's *look* as something *shameful* can be said to be in *bad faith*. It does not matter if the other is giving us a *look* of resentment, since I am the one who either feels or not the sensation of *shame*. My actions have to be in line with my *original choice* in order for the *look* to be effective. The same is true of the person giving the *look*. If person 'Y' believes that everyone should be free, yet gives the *look* when seeing someone doing something he or she disagrees with, then person 'Y' is passing judgment and as such is in *bad faith* and might make the person being looked at feel *shame* and therefore also be in *bad faith* for no apparent reason. Once more, the *look* has to be used carefully and not whimsically.

What is the condition of a person that never has the feeling of *shame* or *pride*? Such a person is either in self-denial, or suffers from some psychological disorder. For example, psychopaths have no remorse, nor do they express the feeling of *pride* or *shame* in their acts, they respond to them with indifference. What if someone has those feelings but refuses to do anything about them? Then this person remains in *bad faith*. Not that they should judge a person's decision to live in *bad faith*, but they do not have to interact with this person.

It may be debatable as to whether refusing to interact with someone is judging them or not; however to do so is to give too broad a definition to judgment.

'Choosing' consists of picking something out of a group. For example, I 'choose' to go to a concert rather than going to a play; or I prefer the color red (I chose red rather than let's say blue, yellow, green, and so on). The same is true about moral acts, I 'choose' not to steal as opposed to stealing. Judging does not necessitate a comparison between two or more things. For example, I judge Ronald's paper to be worth 85 percent. Comparison of group members may be linked to judging, for example Ronald got a better grade on his paper than Sylvia. In other words, Ronald should not get a better grade than Sylvia, instead his paper is worth alone should be judged to be such and such, and hers should also be judged on its own. Hence, the comparison in 'choice' precedes the act of choosing, while in judging comparison proceeds the act of choosing.

However, we should be careful, because if I 'choose' to be a person of moral righteousness I have 'chosen' to be in *bad faith* and as such I am not morally righteous. In addition, the person who 'chooses' *authenticity* is in *bad faith*. Why? Because we are morally righteous when *authentic*, there is no need to go over the steps on how we can be *authentic*, all that we need to remember is that we must respect freedom and follow our *original choice*. In 'choosing' myself and respecting freedom I am going to be morally righteous, maybe not as the other might see it, but as how I freely will. Let us not forget that for Sartre morality is a private endeavor and that it differs with each individual based on a personal set of values. Because values are personal it is impossible to say for each one of us whether an action is morally right or wrong. Once again we fall back to judging. I freely 'choose' my value but if I am being *authentic* I will *choose* freedom and consistency.

Moral Situations

Here is an illustration to explain how a Sartrean model of moral theory functions. John is a 20 year old student who enjoys the good life. Having been raised in a affluent family, he was encouraged to study and have the finer things in life. Unlike his parents John sees himself as a liberal, a person who sees himself defending those in need. If asked how should people live John replies that all should have the basic necessities of life. As with most liberals, he believes that we are equal and should be free to take our rightful place in the world, whatever it might be. So far we can say that John fits the Sartrean model of a person who is *authentic*. However, John does not do as he preaches, for example he has no trouble labeling people, nor does he do anything to advance his views. He is inactive. He fails to *be* what he 'chooses' to *be*, he is therefore in *bad faith*. He might give money to panhandlers, and he volunteers at the learning center of his school, but such activities only satisfy his intrinsic needs of self-gratification. A similar case is those who volunteer in order to gain experience to write down in their résumé.

John has an older sister, Pauline, who unlike him, has no pretension of helping those less fortunate, nor does she have any quarrels with her parents' conservative views, which she shares. Pauline believes in democratic rights and freedom, she is even part of a political party with centrist views. Unlike her brother she does not volunteer, nor does she often give money to beggars. She also distinguishes herself from her younger brother in that she believes that we all have a certain status. However, contrary to John, Pauline understands that one's status reflects the situation which he or she is in. For example a waiter is a waiter when at work, but outside the working environment he is like any one else. The same goes

for the president of a major corporation, when she is not working she is equal to the waiter. Pauline also differs from John in that she actively promotes her 'choices'. According to Sartrean model of moral theory, Pauline is *authentic* and she is morally righteous. Moreover, she promotes freedom and follows her *original choice*, and she is active not for self-gratifying reasons but for self-fulfilling reasons.

It follows then that what we were taught to value as morally righteous is not necessarily so. First, values cannot be taught, they are given by I to the 'choices' that I made. Second, moral righteousness depends on many factors: context, past, future, and more importantly, on what I value. In the previous example, John seemed to be the morally righteous individual, yet his sister was shown to be the one who is morally righteous. North American society would probably value John's character rather than Pauline's as good, however this would be imposing judgment upon the individual (i.e., society judges what we ought to value). Only John and Pauline can do so, however this does not imply that they are both *authentic*. As Sartre says, we are allowed to point out errors, and *bad faith* is one (Sartre, 1946 69). To correct himself, if he so pleases, John has to become more *authentic* with himself (viz. his 'choice'). As for Pauline she may not be the exemplar of moral righteousness, but she does fulfill the characteristics, and as Sartre would say if Pauline were to strive to be the exemplar she would eminently fail. She would fail in that she would abandon the *original choice*, and she would, like her brother, be acting for self-gratification.

One more example will help demonstrate the functioning of a moral theory based on Sartre's philosophy. Someone is walking down the street and witnesses a robber stealing an old lady's purse. Three options are available to the individual walking by: 1) ignore the event and keep walking, 2) call for help, 3) help the woman

in distress. Which one to 'choose'? According to Sartre, we are not allowed to say as only the person confronted with the situation can decide. What if the 'choice' was (1), then is the person immoral? Yes if this individual lives the *authentic* life, by ignoring the situation he or she accepts that freedom is suppressed in one human being by another. Should the person 'choose' (2), then is he or she morally justified? No. On the one hand, if this person has *chosen* the safeguard of his or her person (not running the risk of being attacked physically), then he or she is consistent, but the same individual is not *authentic* because he or she did not *choose* freedom. On the other hand, if this person *chose* freedom, then he or she is not only inconsistent, but also in *bad faith*, thus immoral. Finally, should the 'choice' be (3), then the same is true as if it were (2), but in reverse, except that such an individual could be both *authentic* and consistent. Therefore, the action we 'choose' to pursue must be in accord with our *original choice*, not with what others say it should be. Nevertheless, a person adhering to Sartre's philosophy will have to refuse (1).

For the third example, I shall demonstrate how important *shame* is in a Sartrean moral theory. A family member is sick, and I promised to go visit her at the hospital on Thursday. As Thursday rolls around, a friend asks me if I would want to go to the hockey game with the tickets his employer gave him. Not thinking twice, I say 'yes' and go watch the hockey game. So far Sartre's critics would say that I have not behaved immorally since I freely 'chose' to go see the hockey game and I have no remorse about it (according to my enthusiasm). Sartre would agree, moreover he would not judge my decision to go to the hockey game rather than the hospital. However, while at the game a friend of mine who is also a friend of the hospitalized individual notices me. Furthermore, the friend was present when I made the promise to go to the hospital. Realizing that I am being *looked* at, I am overwhelmed with

shame. I become aware of my failure to respect my word. Because I feel *shameful* it implies that my decision to go to the hockey game was made in *bad faith*, I behave immorally.

Let us look at the same situation with the following modification. First, no one who was aware of my promise was at the hockey game. Second, I watch the entire game, and never think twice about failing to follow through on my promise. Was I immoral? Even if another is forbidden from judging my act and calling it immoral, I failed myself. *Shame* does not have to be brought upon in order for me to judge as to whether my behavior was moral or immoral. As with Kant we 'ought to' do what is morally right. Unlike Kant, we do not follow a *categorical imperative* as there is no distinction in Sartre between moral goodness, and goodness. My 'choice' is to be a good person and as such I have no right to fall back on empty promises, or any other action that I myself find to be immoral. I am my own judge.

In conclusion, we can see how a Sartrean model for a moral theory would function. It is based on the individual's desire to be *authentic*, and on his or her 'choices', namely the *original choice* of freedom. Any deviation from one's *original choice*, or an *original choice* other than that of freedom, drives the person deeper into his or her state of *bad faith*. I mentioned in the previous chapter that we are capable of changing our *original choice*, and this is highly recommended if it does not concur with freedom. We have to realize that we are free *beings*, that we are *transcendent*. However, a change of *original choice* has to be through and through, in that it must serve as the basis of our existence; if it does not affect our whole existence, then the change did not proceed as planned. In this chapter I made clear the possible relationship between moral theory and the judiciary system, in that the

former predominates over the latter. Finally, we saw with the help of three examples how the moral theory could operate.

Conclusion

In the four chapters of this thesis, (1) I explained the German influence on Sartre's philosophy pertaining to a moral theory; (2) showed some of the most important aspects of Sartre's philosophy, that I judged to be essential for a plausible model of a moral theory; (3) responded to some of the criticisms held against Sartre concerning a moral theory; (4) showed how a Sartrean moral theory could function in every day life. Throughout, my intention was to demonstrate (a) that Sartre had provided us with the necessary information in order to construct a moral theory; and (b) that in no way did his philosophy make a moral theory impossible. I believe that both (a) and (b) have been demonstrated to be true. In this short conclusion, I intend to go through the four themes and show how they correlate with (a) and (b). Secondly, I will end off with a concise set of personal remarks concerning a Sartrean model of a moral theory.

The purpose of the first chapter was to show, not necessarily the direct influence Sartre received from Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, but rather what he learned from their mistakes. While Kant was at best a secondary source for Sartre, his work is nonetheless reflected in Sartre's view of freedom. While Sartre had concluded that freedom was important at a young age, he realized that Kant was the first modern thinker to recognize that we are in constant freedom which is why we should not judge the *being*, but the act, since each act arises out of freedom. Unfortunately, Kant was more preoccupied with universalism, and the coherence between his beliefs and rationality. Following Kant, Hegel had little interest in the promotion of the enlightenment and its universalistic point of view. For Hegel, moral theory had to arise out of culture as a communal will, or as he called it *Spirit*. Sartre saw two important things in Hegel's philosophy, first the importance of history, and secondly that each individual is limited somehow by another. Unlike Hegel, Sartre

saw the importance of history only at the individual level and not at the societal one (Sartre, 1995 138). The communal bond is not the *Spirit* as a supernatural entity, but the bond between each individual's understanding as a communal *Volk*. My consciousness understands itself only as a reflected-reflection, or as another. Thus, the other expresses who I am. I am exposed by the actions that I take, and how the other perceives it (i.e. *look*). Finally, Heidegger influenced Sartre more due to his popularity, than out of interest (the same is true about Kierkegaard; at the time Sartre was mostly interested in Husserl). This does not diminish Heidegger's importance. It was Heidegger who made the concept of individuality famous. Contrary to his predecessors, Heidegger believed that a form of salvation was to be found in *authentic* living, something that Sartre borrowed, and re-defined to fit his philosophy. Freedom (Kant), the relation with the other in action (Hegel), and *authenticity* (Heidegger) are essential to a Sartrean moral theory.

In the second chapter, these three elements were re-introduced as Sartre's own. Besides these three (freedom, action, and *authenticity*), new elements were introduced namely the role of God, *facticity*, *bad faith*, my relation with the other; These allow the conclusion that there is such a thing as a Sartrean moral theory. In this chapter, the reader saw the importance of the exclusion of God from a moral theory; without doing so we jeopardize the project by submitting human freedom to the will of God. I showed how *facticity* is essential in order to understand who we are and be able to exist authentically. All four elements are sufficient to build a moral theory, but they will be futile without a proper understanding of the other. It is for the other that a moral theory is required and it is through the other that it is made possible. I am free insofar as the other is. For I am the other to the other, and he or she is the other in relation to me. Freedom is part of all of us and we need to

recognize it as such. Furthermore the other has power, and its *look* allows me to self-reflect as to whether my actions are in accordance to my *original choice* and secondary 'choices'. Moral theory is for Sartre the protection and emancipation of freedom, but only if we are *authentic* in so doing. To be *authentic* is to recognize that we begin by being in *bad faith*, to accept our *facticity* and to follow our *original choice*. Should we fail to do any of these while taking action, or not to respect freedom, or judge others, then we are in effect acting immorally.

The following chapter was mostly concerned with answering some commonly held criticisms of Sartre's early philosophy. The first concerned freedom, the second concerned choice, and the third covered whether a Sartrean model of a moral theory is a moral theory as such. First, freedom was conceived in *Being and Nothingness* as untouchable and determinative. This gave the impression that we are not really free in that we are bound by our *facticity*; that no wrong could be done no matter how appalling an act is; and that all was permitted (e.g., anarchy). All three criticisms were answered succinctly, and all three answers were based on other works of Sartre for the most part. Either those who held the criticisms did not have access to the works, or they failed to interpret them properly. Nevertheless, it was shown that *Being and Nothingness* was also an important source in all three cases. The second set of criticisms was concerning 'choice'. Once again, I showed that as defined by Sartre 'choice' does not absolve ourselves from doing as we please. In those first three sections the response was more or less the same to the third criticism, that I am my own judge, and that what we concluded in the previous paragraph holds for Sartre's theory, including his views on morality, and so was my answer to the third section.

In the final chapter, I demonstrated first how a model of a Sartrean moral theory is moral, secondly how it possibly could interact with the judicial system, and finally I gave three examples of how such a model could function. A Sartrean moral theory is moral in that it promotes moral righteousness. It may not be conceived by many as doing so, but it does when one understands that I am the only one who knows what moral righteousness is based on my values. Since we are all human, we should not be surprised if many of our values intersect. Secondly, the judicial system has its own jurisdiction distinct from that of moral theory, but the former is subordinate to the latter. Nothing, not God, duty or law, takes precedence over a human being's moral values. Third, the three examples gave the reader the opportunity to see how the model could work in real life situations. One important thing to remember from the three examples is how we can easily fail to follow the model even if on the surface it seems that we are following it correctly.

I hope that it has become clear to the reader that both (a) and (b) as presented at the beginning of this conclusion have been accounted for throughout the thesis. Moreover, it should be evident that, even though Sartre never published a moral theory during life, as early as 1943 he was working towards one (as exemplified by the now famous last remark in *Being and Nothingness*). So why did he never publish one? Many authors have speculated: some say that it was impossible, at least for the early Sartre, others have argued that he became more pre-occupied with politics. I prefer to believe, along with Anderson, that Sartre realized the shortcomings of his theory when it came down to real life situations. After all, he would not have filled twelve notebooks (what remains today are only the first and second), if he had abandoned the idea, nor would he have attempted a second moral theory in the 1960s, and even a third moral theory shortly before his

death (Anderson, 1993 43). I have shown and so have numerous other authors that Sartre's philosophy is not a discourse which impairs a moral theory, thus a moral theory based on Sartre's philosophy is not inconceivable. It seems that Sartre was simply unsatisfied with his attempts, and I believe that he was correct in believing this.

What are those shortcomings? We can only speculate, but it would seem that Sartre had realized after the war that freedom was not enough, and after 1950 he began to see that the difficulties people face around the world (famine, war, disease), and that those problem need solving before attempting expand freedom. As long as we have not achieved a world in which all humans are freed from these atrocities, we will be incapable of implementing such a moral theory as our Sartrean model. I am not saying that the answer lies in the creation of a single global state; we are seeing how global economy alone does not solve poverty, in fact it seems to make things worse. Rather, human beings have to realize that life is precious; and that all those who were blessed with life, should have the opportunity to enjoy it. Individual self-realization can lead to a better world, but this is not found in power or wealth, but in understanding. In other words, the Sartrean moral theory can be used to appreciate the state the world is in. Nevertheless, it will not solve the problems enumerated above. The solution to these problems comes after the realization, or as Sartre called it salvation.

Therefore, a Sartrean moral theory could be used prior and subsequently to the resolution of global issues, but as Sartre realized, it can only be effective in its subsequent stages, since prior to that, the theory serves only to illuminate the problem. However, only the blind or the ignorant cannot see these problems. Unfortunately, we often prefer to stay blind or ignorant rather than tackle such

problems. In any case, Sartre had to construct a moral theory that would maintain the emancipation of freedom and *authenticity*, all the while functioning in a world filled with deficiencies, something which he obviously was unable to do. Many moral theorists before and after Sartre gave their best, but more often than not, they too fell short.

Bibliography

- Anderson, T. C. (1970). Is a Sartrean Ethics Possible? *Philosophy Today*, 14, 116-140.
- Anderson, T. C. (1976). Freedom as Supreme Value: The Ethics of Sartre and de Beauvoir. *The Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 50, 60-71.
- Anderson, T. C. (1979). *The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics*. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas.
- Anderson, T. C. (1993). *Sartre's Two Ethics : from Authenticity to Integral Humanity*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
- Arras, J. D. (1976). A Critique of Sartrean Authenticity. *The Personalist*, 57, 171-180.
- Bell, L. A. (1989). *Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Bergoffen, D. B. (1992). The Look as Bad Faith. *Philosophy Today*, 36, 221-227.
- de Beauvoir, S. (1947). *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguïté*. Paris: Gllimard.
- de Beauvoir, S. (1963). *La Force des Choses*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Caygill, H. (1995). *A Kant Dictionary*. Blackwell.
- Edwards, P. (Ed.). (1972). *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Second ed.). New York : Macmillan
- Greene, N. N. (1960). *Jean-Paul Sartre : the Existentialist Ethic*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Harris, H. S. (1995). *Hegel : Phenomenology and System*. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1965). *Philosophy of Right* (T.M. Knox, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Miller, Arnold V., Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1994). *Being and Time* (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Trans.). New York: HarperSanFrancisco.
- Hornyansky, M. C. (1989). The Nature of Sartre's Ethics: A Reconciliation of its Ideal and Positive Elements. *Man World*, 22, 151-161.

- Inwood, M. (1992). *A Hegel Dictionary*. Oxford, OX, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
- Jeanson, F. (1947). *Le Problème Moral et la Pensée de Sartre*. Paris: Éditions du Myrte.
- Kant, I. (1990). *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals ; and, What is Enlightenment?* (Lewis White Beck, Trans.) (2nd , rev. ed.). New York: Macmillan.
- Kant, I. (1997). *Critique of Practical Reason* (Gregor, Mary J., Trans.). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Olson, R. G. (1959). Authenticity, Metaphysics, and Moral Responsibility. *Philosophy*, 34, 99-110.
- Renaut, A. (1993). *Sartre, le Dernier Philosophe*. Paris: B. Grasset.
- Santoni, R. (1971). Sartre on 'Sincerity': Bad Faith? or Equivocation? *The Personalist*, 52, 150-160.
- Sartre, J. P. (1943). *L'Être et le Néant : essai d'ontologie phénoménologique* (16 ed.). Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, J. P. (1946). *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*. Paris: Nagel.
- Sartre, J. P. (1938). *La Nausée*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, J. P. (1947). *Huis Clos ; suivi de, Les Mouches*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, J. P. (1954). *Réflexions sur la Question Juive*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, J. P. (1980). The Last Words of Jean-Paul Sartre. *Dissent*, 397-422.
- Sartre, J. P. (1983). *Cahiers Pour une Morale*. Paris: Gallimard 1983.
- Sartre, J. P. (1995). *Carnets de la Drôle de Guerre : Septembre 1939-Mars 1940* (augm. d'un carnet inédit.). Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, J. P. (1992). *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology* (Hazel E. Barnes, Trans.): Washington Square Press.
- Slater, B. H. (1988). Contradiction and Freedom. *Philosophy*, 63, 317-330.
- Solomon, R. C. (1983). *In the Spirit of Hegel : a Study of G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Walsh, W.H. (1969). *Hegelian Ethics*. London ; New York: Macmillan ; St. Martin's Press.

Lexicon

Authenticity (Heidegger): ... the term denotes my 'ownmost' way of being-in-the-world. ... Heidegger advocates resolutely affirming my most authentic possibility, namely, my being-unto-death, and disvalues my prevailing tendency to flee this anguished [Angst] condition in favor of the average everyday world in which "one dies". But only I can know how to respond authentically to this fact of my radical finitude because that finitude is most properly my own and not another's.¹

Authenticity (Sartre): To be authentic... includes the acceptance of our human project as simultaneously gracious and reflectively appropriated. And it continues to entail a double aspect of unveiling and creation: unveiling of its radical contingency and creation of a reflective relation to this contingency. Authenticity implies living the tension that arises from appropriating the truth about the human condition: that it is finite, temporalizing flux, that this fluidity entails profound responsibility for whatever permanence we sustain within that flux, and that mutual recognition among freedoms enhances this concrete freedom even as it increases that lived tension.¹

Ambiguity (Heidegger): One of the three elements that leads Dasein into the fallness of the das man. Ambiguity is brought upon by the culmination of curiosity and idle talk, when they start to confuse Dasein's own structure of care.

Angst (Heidegger): Other moods and passions have everyday objects in the world; Angst has no such nameable, isolated object. It is a sense of the loss of objects, of nothingness, which lays hold of me when I face, not this or that thing or person, but the whole structure of being-in-the-world itself. For when I see my life, which is my world, in its entirety, I see its ending, death.¹

Angst (Sartre): The reflective apprehension of the Self as freedom, the realization that a nothingness slips in between my Self and my past and future so that nothing relieves me from the necessity of continually choosing myself and nothing guarantees the validity of the values which I choose. Fear is of something in the world, anguish is anguish before myself.²

Bad Faith (Sartre): A lie to oneself within the unity of a single consciousness. Through bad faith a person seeks to escape responsible freedom of being-for-itself. Bad faith rests on a vacillation between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognize either one for what it really is or to synthesize them.²

¹ Taken from the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Edwards, 1972).

² Taken from Hazel Barnes Key to Special Terminology at the end of her translation of *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre, 1992 799-807).

Being (Heidegger): Heidegger defended the interpretation that in Greek and other languages “being present” was the primary sense of all the verbs to “be.” ...however, Heidegger himself infers that being is not the presence that they enjoy but rather the event of coming-into presence, which first accounts for every case of presence. Indeed he infers further that being is precisely the letting come into presence...¹

Being (Hegel): Hegel associates being especially with Parmenides, who argued that since what cannot not-be, being excludes all negation, determinacy and becoming. ...to apply ‘being to anything is simply to say that it is, without ascribing to it any qualitative determinacy. Thus being and nothing each become the other, and so constitute the concept of becoming.’³

Being (Sartre): “Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is what is is.” Being includes both being-in-itself and being-for-itself, but the latter is the nihilation of the former. As contrasted with existence, being is all embracing and objective rather than individual and subjective.²

Being-for-itself (Sartre): The nihilation of being-in-itself; consciousness conceived as a lack of being, a desire for being, a relation to being. By bringing nothingness into the world of the for-itself can stand out from being and judge other beings by knowing what it is not. Each for-itself is the nihilation of a particular being.²

Being-in-itself (Sartre): Non-conscious being. It is the being of the phenomenon and overflows the knowledge which we have of it. It is a plenitude, and strictly speaking we can say of it only that it is.²

Call (Heidegger): A difficult concept to grasp at first, that is actually not so difficult. The call is not alien, nor from an other, nor from within, but from Dasein ownmost being, being-its-death. It is through the call that Dasein accepts itself and becomes authentic, but to do so Dasein has to recognize its structure as care, project being-its-death. The call itself has to be accepted passively, but acted upon actively, only through a balance of passive and active can it be properly answered, and once Dasein has done so it becomes authentic. Most Dasein will either ignore the call or attempt to answer it actively.

Care (Heidegger): Care can be regarded as Heidegger’s temporalizing of Greek eros, the desire to be (whole), the “want” that conjoins being and nonbeing in the erotetic question of being. ...care develops the formal structure totality schematizing the intentionality of the individual human situation (Dasein) as a whole... As this unity of existentiality, facticity, and fallenness corresponding to future, past, and present, care receives its ontological sense from the unifying whole of its original temporality. Care is first care of the self in its being, which, as being-in-the-world, is “equally original” with solicitude for others and preoccupied concern with things.¹

³ Taken from *A Hegel Dictionary* (Inwood, 1992).

Categorical imperative (Kant): Kant defines imperative as every 'proposition that expresses a possible free action, whereby a certain end is to be made real. ...rather than stating what is, they state what ought to be the case. The categorical imperative... declares an action to be necessary 'without reference to any purpose' and is concerned only with 'the form of the action and the principle from which it follows.'⁴

Curiosity (Heidegger): Similar to idle talk, curiosity is for Heidegger one of the three elements (the other is ambiguity) which brings Dasein to its downfall into the das man. While idle talk comes from the das man, curiosity is an inner desire to seek new things, to always be on the look out for something new, once apprehended, the new thing is immediately abandoned for a newer quest; it basically leads Dasein away from itself in a non-ending downfall.

Dasein (Heidegger): The being that says is – the "there" (or "Here": Da) among beings through which the Is (being: Sein) becomes articulated. ...a future comes to a Dasein that already is, with an alreadiness that may be called its past... by reason of what it is already becoming to be, Dasein can let every being (including itself) be present as showing itself as what it is, a structure that may be called its present.¹

Das man (Heidegger): Its meaning in English, as used by Heidegger, is close to "they", however, it carries a slight susceptibility of self exclusion as does the "on" in French. In other words, when used often the speaker forgets herself.

Death (Heidegger): The totality of human being, its authentic being, is being-to-death. If human being is to rise from forfeited to authenticity, it can do so only in isolation from the seductive "das man." Only death, or the relation to death, brings such isolation, for my death is the only event in my life, Heidegger says, which is uniquely mine: it is "authentic" because it is "my own".¹

Ethical life (Hegel): In German Sittlichkeit, is composed of Sitte which is German for "custom, a mode of conduct habitually practiced by a social group such as a nation, a class or a family, and regarded as a norm of decent behavior. The ethical norms embodied in the customs and institutions of one's society."³

Facticity (Sartre): The for-itself's necessary connection with the in-itself, hence with the world and its own past. It is what allows us to say that the for-itself is or exists. The facticity of freedom is the fact that freedom is not able not to be free.²

Good faith (Sartre): The opposite of bad faith, which cannot be achieved according to Sartre as we are all in bad faith existentially speaking. To resolve ourselves out of bad faith we need to become authentic.²

⁴Taken from *A Kant Dictionary* (Caygill, 1995).

Idle talk (Heidegger): It consists of conversations, whether they be verbal or not, which are taken to be important, and believed, when in fact they are empty and meaningless. For Heidegger, idle talk is one of the major cause for our inauthentic existence and the crisis in which we find ourselves. Idle talk can be loosely equated with gossip.

Inauthenticity (Heidegger): The state that Dasein finds itself when not authentic.

Kingdom of ends (Kant): "By 'kingdom' is understood 'a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws', each of which determines ends according to 'universal validity'... The kingdom of ends is an 'ideal' or 'intelligible world' which can only be used regulatively, as an as-if principle for testing practical maxims... the kingdom of ends serves as an important link in the ethico-theological proof of the existence of God."⁴

Look (Sartre): The look is what makes the being, being looked at, aware of herself, after which a sensation of either shame or pride overtakes her. The look is not a visual act, rather it is a strong sensation that over takes the whole being. Because it is not a visual act, there does not need to be an Other present, simply the sensation of being looked at is enough to persuade one of being looked at. The look is important when discussing Sartre's moral theory as it is through it that we make a self examination, and think about the act we have performed or about to.

Négatité (Sartre): Sartre's word for types of human activity which while not obviously involving a negative judgment nevertheless contain negativity as an integral part of their structure; e.g., experiences involving absence, change, interrogation, destruction.²

Nothingness (Sartre): Nothingness does not itself have being, yet it is supported by being. It comes into the world by the for-itself and is the recoil from fullness of self contained being which allows consciousness to exist as such.²

Original choice (Sartre): Sartre has two different meanings for choice. First there is the choice of the everyday, or secondary choice. These choices have to follow and be coherent with whom we are, namely our original choice. According to Sartre we each have an original choice, whether it be servitude, self gratification, evil, but more often than ever we chose to be 'pseudo-gods'. Unfortunately the only original choice that can lead to authentic existence, is that of freedom, only once we recognize freedom and choose it can we become authentic.

Plenitude (Sartre): The same as being, but it includes our transcendence. It is the opposite of nothingness.

Shame / Pride (Sartre): Either shame or pride take place after the look, in either cases it should be taken as negative result. If pride, then we performed the act for self gratification, while if it is shame then we have committed an act that we do not approve of ourselves.

Spirit (Hegel): The German term "Geist" is etymologically related to 'ghost', but its range of meaning corresponds closely to that of 'spirit'. Originally, it meant 'emotion, excitement', but it developed the sense of 'spirit, soul, mind; supernatural being, ghost.'" Hegel views

Spirit in a number of ways, however, they are not considered “distinct senses of Geist, but as a systematically related phases in the development of a single Geist.” (see the full list of meanings in *A Hegel Dictionary*).³

Transcendence (Sartre): Often refers simply to the process whereby the for-itself goes beyond the given in a further project of itself. Sometimes the for-itself is itself called a transcendence. If I make an object out of the other, then he is for me a transcendence-transcended. On the other hand, the being-in-itself which overflows all its appearances and all attempts of mine to grasp it is called a transcendent being. The word “transcendence” is sometimes purely a substantive, sometimes refers to process.²

Volk (Hegel and Heidegger): Neither seem to give it special meaning, and as such it can be translated as people, however, in English often the shared common culture that the German Volk carries is omitted. The Volk is the people of a common culture that shares a unique bound.