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COMMONWEALTH:

JAMES HARRINGTON'S LEGACY

By

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A Thesis

In

The Department

Of

Public Policy and Public
Administration

Presented in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts at Concordia
University Montreal, Quebec,
Canada

September 13, 2002

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ABSTRACT

COMMONWEALTH: JAMES HARRINGTON'S LEGACY

By Robert A. S. Fortin

This thesis represents an attempt to comprehend what is implied by or included in the idea of commonwealth. The principal authority on this subject is taken to be James Harrington, author of The Commonwealth of Oceana [1656]. But Harrington's political thinking drew upon the political experiences of other times and places: Athens, Rome, and Florence. We will consider the various insights Harrington took from his reading and his travels: civic virtue, an agrarian law, mixed government, checks and balances, tolerance. An attempt will be made to complement Harrington's political ideas by linking them with a theory of political judgment analogous to Aesthetic and Teleological judgment, as elaborated by Immanuel Kant in The Critique of Judgement. And, finally, Harrington's idea of commonwealth is shown to be consistent with a theory of rights, as institutionalized in the English Bill of Rights [1693], the American Declaration of Independence and subsequent amendments to the American Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To M:

Like two ships sailing through the night
We traveled in each other's wake
Heading for distant shores
We shared the current
Rode the tides

With the breaking of the dawn
Our course lay elsewhere
God's speed
Swift currents
Safe journey
Deep harbors

With the coming of dusk
May your path be enlightened
The wind in your sail
A song in your heart
And blessed by God

"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look into the abyss, the abyss also looks into you"

Frederick Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

"Forget about that macho bullshit and learn how to play Guitar"

John Cougar Mellencamp, Play Guitar

"You broke the boy in me but you won't break the man"

John Parr, St. Elmo's fire (Man in Motion)

"If this age fails me, the next will do me justice."

James Harrington, Art of Law Giving

Τησ σωιφτ γραπε σαγα

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge so many people here but these members of Concordia's community stand out in any crowd:

To Professor James Moore, words will not express my gratitude. I have always wanted to work with you on a project such as this. The experience has been unforgettable.

To Professor Daniel Salee, A + All the Way

To Laurie-Ann: who reminded me, when I forgot, People graduate.

Finally to Ron who made all this possible

Thanks big Brother! I think I have said that once before?

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INTRODUCTION

The problematic of James Harrington's works rest with the very nature of his legacy. Not that there is not sufficient evidence within the very framework of the modern western democracies, but that history has forgotten him. When we think of political theorists or political philosophers, his name does not come to mind. Even narrowing the search to British theorists prior to 1700 will not provide us with his name. All that remains is for us to see, as his legacy is the resulting governments crafted from his words and ideas so long ago. This journey is not a voyage of discovery, but one of retracing our path to relearn what has been forgotten. To do so we must first go through the many influences on Harrington. We must understand the history of his thoughts as he constructed them before we can hope to understand them. Let us divide this task threefold, the fall of Athens, the fall of the Roman Republic and the period where Machiavelli had fallen into disfavor of his political master in Florence. Once we have understood where Harrington came from, we can begin to discuss Harrington's work and their influences. Lest we re-offend this man's ideas by forging ahead in ignorance, we must find some way to understand him on his own terms. In

so doing, we shall make the most controversial claim of this thesis. Kant took his political theory from Harrington. We will be in a position to see how Harrington influenced the political theory of government for England, America and the United Nations.

The lack of understanding of James Harrington's work today is because commentators failed to use an interdisciplinary approach. It is sufficient to note that by understanding Kant's political theory, we can use it to see Harrington thoughts. Harrington was a genius in political theory but he was not a political philosopher and thus lacked the skill to express his ideas in a wider context than he did. Present commentators can thus be excused for their insufficiency of understanding, not by lack of skill or neglect but simply through the limits of the original work. Harrington was not sufficiently clear in his work, though his ideas were genius. They would need other geniuses such as Kant and the American Founding Fathers to actualize his ideas into something more than theory.

The reader may ask what purpose would this thesis fill? This work will provide a better understanding of the ideal version of our present government, what was the

original intention and where it came from. This will show just how far we have to go to achieve a commonwealth where we can truly call it a government for the common wealth. To do so, we must first discuss the background theories that Harrington was working with. Then we deal with Harrington's ideas and the interchangeable nature of Kant's ideas with them. This necessarily calls forth a needed proof sufficient that such a claim discharges its burden of proof. Thus, our burden of proof rests heavily upon the shoulders of this thesis to demonstrate that there is a likelihood of such a connection to a sufficient degree that the reader is convinced.

Finally, we turn to what effect Harrington has had upon the world. It is notable how his ideas are in the constitutions of three different government bodies. The simple fact is that his ideas are present and affecting the political world as we stand in today. In the end, the reader will concede the misunderstanding of Harrington in his philosophy and importance as a political theorist. Undertaking this task, the reader will have to travel with us on a multidisciplinary approach involving history, philosophy and political science. When the reader has laid this work to rest, they will understand the development of

political theory as it began in ancient Greece, its modifications in Rome and the twisting by Machiavelli. The reader will see the benefit of using Kant as a guide to Harrington's work and that, as fact, Kant had taken his ideas for political theory from Harrington.

Felix Raab (1930-1962) in 1962 discovered some 14 distinct versions or interpretations of James Harrington's (1611-1677) work. Certainly, Harrington's commentators have proposed more in the interim. This thesis is but one of many views on Harrington's work. While this view will certainly break new ground, previously untouched by others, it is but one more version of Harrington. In part, the design of this thesis is to make up for the limitation of previous works on Harrington. Yet without them, this work would not be possible. This story centers on James Harrington is not his story or that of one single work he wrote but the legacy that he created beginning with the liberal democratic tradition that we presently call our governing system. The truism of our political society,

¹Felix Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964.)

²Michael Downs, James Harrington. (Boston: Twayne Publishing, 1977.) p. 13.

³In a similar vein, Sir Isaiah Berlin found some 25 theories for Machiavelli's The Prince.

democracy, tolerance and checks and balances, all began with Harrington. The main benefit of this discourse, and perhaps sole benefit, rest with the method of approach we shall undertake. Instead of the traditional view of the subject resting on but one academic discipline, this work shall bring to bear an interdisciplinary approach using history, philosophy, political science and public policy, thus allowing us the benefit of the many possible forms of academic thought. Problems that hitherto have been dealt with unsatisfactorily by Harrington's commenters shall be overcome with alacrity for they suffered from the lack of clear sight in their limited viewpoint of one discipline.

This story does not begin in 1656 with the publication of Harrington's work, The Commonwealth of Oceana. It starts in the ashes of Athena's failed attempt to dominate the political sphere of influence for Greece (404 BCE). Like the Phoenix arising from the ashes, the political world of thought and philosophy would begin a hesitant step on the path that would today result in their becoming the governing system of the progressive states of the western world'. Harrington's legacy did not end with the Glorious

'The Western world consists of many countries including the countries of the British Commonwealth.

Revolution, or the American Revolution. It goes on even unto today. As the dates have changed, so too has the language that we use to express these ideas; however, this thesis is not the study of the language usage's but of the ideas behind them. Something even great men and excellent commentators forget. As we shall see, there are those who would look merely at language usage and mistake the tree for the whole forest. In the past, what we understood by the use of one word has a different meaning using the same word in a different time. Whether this rests with the limits of language or is a problem inherent in the language itself, this question is best left to philologist to offer their insight. Suffice to note that as we undertake this journey through time and space, the words will undergo a transformation in meaning. The words Republic, Democracy and Commonwealth, today seem to be the same word idea. What may seem as similar in the words used has a completely different meaning in thought. Each theorist uses nearly those same words. Yet not one has the same idea of what those words mean, what political system they imply and what conclusions reached from them. It is easy to confuse the words of any one philosopher as being the same as the words of another theorist. To resolve this difficulty we must

start with the earliest versions of the word found in its historical contexts and then move forward in time.

Placing James Harrington into this evolution is problematic. The difficulty can be seen as threefold. First, time has passed him by. Mostly he is forgotten. Were it not for the great efforts of a few scholars, such as Raab, Smith, and Pocock, he would be entirely forgotten. This raises the second problem, that of the scholarship undertaken in our effort to understand him. Historians such as Pocock and political scientists such as Blitzer have approached Harrington from their own background of scholarship and have limited Harrington's true value merely by the limits of their own background. Even as they have raised him from obscurity, they have left parts of his ideas behind. Thus our present approach to take partially from history, political science and partially from philosophy, an interdisciplinary approach, will be of more value to us in understanding the value of Harrington. This is also the truest way to understand Harrington himself. By writing that to be a politician one must either be a student of history or a world traveler, Harrington was offering insight into his own thought process, using both history and travel combined to write a theory of

government. This last point is in need of someone to clarify. It is only by recognizing that there is another person of equal skill and intelligence who took up the torch of Harrington to establish his own theories that we truly delve deep into Harrington's thoughts. Thus far, scholars have found Harrington linked to the British country party, in which John Locke was also a strong influence. To the American founding fathers and their grand republican virtues, Harrington's influential shadow covers them like night. However, if this quest is true and does not break faith with Harrington or his unique style of thought, we need to find a person who Harrington influenced, yet managed to anchor Harrington's work deeper into philosophy. His great ideas, we assert for the present, lack the depth needed to be truly an excellent philosophical theory. The philosopher whom we speak of was none other and none greater than Immanuel Kant. Hitherto unknown, this connection will both give to Harrington a deeper theoretical understanding, and illuminate Kant's own political philosophy that only with the murkiest of visions has it been glimpsed.

This is partially due to Kant's lack of systemization of his own political thoughts.

Our methodology for this journey begins in Athens as the city-state suffered its greatest loss in its war against Sparta (the Deceleian or the Ionian war of 413-404 BCE) which ended with the destruction of the city's walls and the end of the Athenian League. The end of the Glorious Age of Athens gives rise to the greatest of the philosophers, Socrates, (470-399 BCE) Plato (427-347 BCE?) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE). They will put their ink to parchment and create this thing we call today the science of politics by the very act of analysis of government itself, for the very first time. From there we journey to the fall of another republic, that of Rome. As it begins its own death throes, a voice cries out only to be silenced by his enemies. Cicero (106-44 BCE) will valiantly or not, so nobly try to stop the decay of the body politic into tyranny. He failed, so too did the Republic of Rome fail. Yet for our purposes, we must ask ourselves (so that we understand Harrington) just what he was trying so valiantly to protect. The quest for this answer is best found in Polybius (204-122 BCE?), the Greek leader captured by the Roman, enslaved, who wrote some 40 history books that favor the Roman world view. His theories will be what Cicero will

call upon to restore order, only to fail with the unkindest cut of all.

Like the owl that flies at sunset, our story pauses as the world drifts into darkness. For 1500 years, politics rested in the hands of despots and enlightened rulers, alike. Thinkers wrestled with the number of Angels dancing on pins.⁷ It is only with the Renaissance that the world is again open to such speculations as to what is a government's purpose. In a small but powerful city-state, having fallen to the hands of yet another despot, we find Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) a courtier of Florence, Italy. At this time when distance is greater then today, his exile to his estate but a few miles from the city's wall, defenestrated his ambitions and goals for political power. With nothing else to do, his thoughts turned to writing his *magnum opus*, The Prince and The Discourses⁸. These works will be the milestone against which Harrington must grind his axe.

⁷The question asked is how many angels may dance on the head of a pin. The answer is as many that want to. This may not have been an actual question at all, merely a humorous jest by a Renaissance writer.

⁸Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. (London: Penguin, 1986.)

⁸Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses. (London: Penguin, 1983.)

Harrington is yet another thinker who is writing at the end of one system of government and the beginning of another, Oliver Cromwell's (1599-1658) military victory to establish, first the Commonwealth of England (1648-1653) and then to become Protector of England (1653-1658). Thus, we will have reached the end of our preliminary remarks on the historical background to Harrington's worldview. Before we can thus dive into his work, we must have and express a methodology that will guide us navigating Harrington's work. The notions we will use as our guide is from Immanuel Kant in his view on judgement as it applies to politics. We shall see that there is a great deal of similarity in these two men, Harrington and Kant. The Theory of Judgement¹ shall open Harrington to a new interpretation that differs from the 14 Felix Raab has found in his all too brief career. Kant took his political theory from Harrington, alas, the weight of evidence falls short of proving this is the case. It is strongly suggested by the evidence. With this connection of the two; we shall see that Harrington's does have a methodology that needs Kant as the guide, even if there lacks direct proof that Kant did take his ideas from

¹Robert A. S. Fortin, The Possibility of Judgement. (Montreal: Concordia University Thesis, 1997.)

Harrington. We shall see that thus far the commentators have all but missed Harrington's methodology. It is only by a clear understanding of Kant, is it apparent that he is taking his own political theory from the pages of Harrington. We shall use Kant's ideas on history and teleology, the study of ends, to show Harrington's method is valid.

What value would this thesis have if we simply assume a combination of history and teleology to be the methodology best suited for political theory? Thus by offering a critical view of history, will its worth be secure. Just as Harrington, himself assumed nothing, neither shall we. Thus, we will offer arguments that in fact history has no validity beyond merely the subjective opinion of its writer. We then turn to the other leg of Harrington's methodology, Aesthetics. What started in Plato with his doctrine of "Forms" has returned in Harrington. The utilization of the beautiful allowed for Harrington to have the much-needed call to universality, so that his work would have universal validity.

Will a two legged stool stand? No, there is a need to have a third, unspoken leg. In our study, we shall see that

this leg is implied but rarely addressed by theorists. There is an implied valuation of Harrington's work that has yet to be identified. History is but the examples, aesthetics is the goal, yet in-between the two we have a hierarchy of valuation that we will explore. We must introduce the question of morality. Harrington does not explicitly do so, but we find it with every turn of the page in his works. Morality or virtue, are the key factor by which we judge all politics. Plato had its presence with the "Good" of the "Forms". Aristotle divided his states and classified them according to their virtue. Machiavelli classified his "Prince" by the amount of virtue he possessed. Harrington does not attempt to offer a theory on virtue or its application to politics. Strangely, we read Kant with the same problem. He does not link politics to morality or virtue. Yet by carefully examination, we shall see that while never explicitly expressed, morality and virtue have never left the theories of either of these two writers. In Harrington, his idea of "Ancient Prudence" and Kant's "judgement" are both loaded terms that necessarily demand the reader to have morality in mind as they read.

For the final sprint of Harrington, we shall narrowly focus upon three elements of Harrington's work. There are

ample volumes that explore the totality of his work.¹¹ We need not re-invent the wheel here. We need only draw out the themes that will present themselves into the future sufficient to justify our cause. Harrington's work is original not by the substance of his thought but the method in which he presents his work and the system he wishes to base it on. We may disprove each fact, historical example and illustration and yet still know Harrington to be correct. For the key to Harrington is not that he is making a historical point at all. He is merely using history as a tool to show ideas, "Ancient Prudence". The examples he uses to draw out his distinctions need not be correct to have a valid inference to a principle.

¹¹ Charles Blitzer, An Immortal Commonwealth. (New Haven: Yale, 1960.)

John Cotton, James Harrington's Political Thoughts and its context. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991)

Michael Downs, James Harrington. Ibid.

Z. S. Fink, The Classical Republicans. (United States. Northwest University Press, 1962.)

J. G. A. Pocock, The Political works of James Harrington. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.)

Felix Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli. Ibid.

Russell Smith, Harrington and His Oceana. (New York: Octagon Books, 1971.)

R. H. Tawney, Raleigh Lectures on History: Harrington's Interpretation of his age. (14 May 1941.)

H. R. Trevor-Roper, Historical Essays. (New York: Harper Torch Books. 1957.)

To comprehend the political, Harrington would have us understand that we must know history and we must have traveled. Both are elements that Kant holds to be of supreme importance in a political judgement. For make no mistake, Harrington is not a philosopher or a public servant like those whom we will have journeyed with before him, he is a political (scientist) theorist, perhaps the first to be so called. Thus, we look at the way power is held and divided amongst the people. His self-claimed uniqueness rests on his understanding of power being in some way associated with the economics of the country, the land to which food is grown, creates the power of a country. The second element that we shall address is that of balance. In this doctrine, derived from ancient prudence, we shall find the basic elements of the American separation of powers found in their constitution. We shall also find the doctrine of "Checks and Balances" needed to create a lasting system of government and so lacking in previous thinkers' work. The final section is the notion of tolerance. It is a natural conclusion of balance. It is here that we find the birthplace for human rights. The beginning of political community is where the modern world differs so greatly from the past that we have inherited.

Our story turns to the first politicians who used Harrington's work to produce Government. In chapter four, we are ready to turn to the practical application of Harrington's story with the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, as they wrestle with the implications of government. Each revolution, while separated by an ocean, has an identical statement of purpose. It is to provide balance to the people against the power of government. Harrington was not done justice in his time, thrown unceremoniously into jail, *gaol*, by the newly installed crown; his work lived on into the founding of not one or two countries, but the model by which the world compares governments to see if they measure up. Today, Harrington's message is not studied. It is a series of mere truism to our understanding of Government. Perhaps, this makes him the greatest theorist ever. His thoughts are of such greatness that we need not discuss them or even try to do so, for we hold them to be already true. Harrington's greatness is the result of creating an open system subject to change. What is an open system? How does it apply to James Harrington? By looking at two further revolutions, the British Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, we shall see that complex systems diversify but

do not lose their original intent. Harrington had done what he had set out to do. He had created a lasting system of government that was stable and able to keep faith with the people in balance between them and their government. Both governments establish that the work of Harrington has become not only a mere truism, but have replaced the very measure that we hold for government. Yet the question remains as to the normative value of an open system; why is it more valuable to have such a system than a closed system? What Harrington has created so long ago was an open system of government that broke the wheel of time. We shall see that Polybius felt that government underwent constant change in property, from the rule of one, to the few and on to the many. Then the wheel would spin again. Harrington's theory put the spike to that wheel to stop its unbalanced change. An open system of government with checks and balances has allowed for the stability of one system of government without change but allow for development of the government through internal changes. By looking at the UN declaration of human rights, we shall see enshrined in that document the properties that Harrington held to be true so long ago. Harrington is not only right for British or American citizens but is the correct path to take for all

people, all over the world. Harrington's ideas have had an impact upon the world through the British Bill of Rights, the American Constitution, and the UN convention on Human rights. We honor all three documents for their commitment to human freedom, dignity and the result of a more cosmopolitan world based on the rule of law not men. In our cynical times, this may not seem much to the reader, but the attempt is to recapture the sense of wonder and awe when considering how monumental these works are in human achievement. Paraphrasing Nietzsche, we must look upon these documents and the great things done in their name, as children would, so that we may recapture the spirit with which they endowed the world. If we can successfully do so, we may rekindle the spirit and renew the faith in human understanding and reason for the idea of commonwealth. Thus, escape the cynical age we live in that is critical for criticism sake and not for the betterment of humanity. This journey is a quest for the grail, a restored faith in our government but as government is nothing more than the reflection of human achievement. It is a quest for restoration of our persons in spirit of understanding, liberty and community. So let us begin.

"The powers of government, which proceeds out of the concept of a commonwealth, are just so many relationships in the united will of the people, which originates a priori in reason."¹¹

CHAPTER 1: PART 1

THE DEATH OF ATHENA'S GLORY

With a roar, the crowd stood to support their war with Sparta. The Athenian Assembly having been swayed by the elegance of the speakers voted to take the Athenian League to war to defeat the great land power of the Spartans so that they would be the single great power of Greece in 431 BCE. The citizens exercised their power to make war showing their strength of free men. With their hubris, as in their plays, tragedy struck with the coming of a plague in 430 BCE that killed one third of the city's population, including the great orator Pericles (490? - 429 BCE), whose fiery speeches so eloquently persuaded the people to take the tragic first step that ended in their own downfall. Leaderless, the mob was unable to achieve victory and

¹¹Susan Shell. A Study of Kant's Philosophy and Politics.

stumbled to defeat in 434 BCE. (Harrington said that Athens had collapsed "through the want of good aristocracy"...) From out of the ashes of the destroyed walls¹³ that protected the city began the quest for answers. Socrates, the "Gadfly" of the Acropolis, questioned the moral assumption of his people. Included in these questions were those of the very nature of the city's government, politics and the underlying reason for them. As recorded in the works of Plato¹⁴, we find that his questioning met with confusion and uncertainty in the responded or complete ineptitude. For example, if one is asked "are you a moral person?" Most people would say yes. If this is the case since they feel they are moral, then they should know what morality is. Socrates often refuted the answers his questions generated and then, he, by questioning the person brings them to a conclusion he had in mind from the beginning. Yet the

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.) P. 162.

¹⁴David McNally, Political Economy and the rise of Capitalism. (London: University Of California Press, 1988.) P. 42.

¹³One of the conditions for surrender was that the Athens had to pull down their protective walls that they had hidden behind for their war. The loss of those protections left the city without a means to protect itself from invasion.

¹⁴Among others, as we have Aristophanes (445-385 BCE?) in his play The Clouds and Xenophon (430-355 BCE?) a historian of note.

premise itself, that of questioning was valid,¹⁵ to ask of yourself, your people, your city and of your government is this 'good'? Why is it good? How do we know it is good? Thus for the first time, man had a process by which he could enquire to what value should we set for our lives, our government and ourselves.

His student Plato took up the challenge of Socrates to question after Socrates was put to death for his daring to ask of the city "why". Thus if we draw but one conclusion from Socrates, for this purpose it must be that to pose questions of the state and those in power, is a valid and moral act. Dialectic was born out of the ashes of the destroyed glory of empire. Plato's has many works of note, but for our considerations, we shall restrict ourselves to his political works of The Republic and The Laws". First, in the earlier work, The Republic, he held that for a just and properly governed city must have itself rationally divided into proper parts, each doing their proper chore

¹⁵I. F. Stone. The Trial of Socrates. (New York: Doubleday, 1980.) Offers what has been called "the Prosecutions case against Socrates." While excellent in research and writing, it shows the danger of attempting to understand events of the past without adequate study of the scholars.

¹⁶Plato. The Republic of Plato. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945.)

for the well-being and functioning of the city. The majority of the people function best as traders and merchants with no political power. The elite's of virtue are educated from birth to be the leaders, from the class of many, collectively called the Guardians. The top position of the guardians is that of the Philosopher Kings who would rule with reason as implied by the notion of the absolute good and that of the forms. The wisdom of such rulers would allow them to make only the best choices. One may say the perfect choice to govern the city. The people would not be in a position to argue with the philosopher king, as the rulers would be those that are the perfect understanding of such rules and behave perfectly rational. Crafted by the most excellent of all people for the most excellent of reasons all rules, laws, would be perfect. We would expect nothing less. Knowledge itself would be the cornerstone of this foundation. The people would not want to argue with such laws for they would be in the position to which they are best suited and incapable of such arguments. That would not be conducive to being able to furnish an argument in the first place. The city would

Plato. Dialogues of Plato. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1962.)

function in perfect harmony, as it should be. We may draw three conclusions from Plato's Republic. First, that the state is an entity that can be perfected. By the act of questioning, we can arrive at the perfection of the state by use of reason. Second, that this perfection is a question of morality. When we speak of morality, we speak of the notion of the scale of valuation. For something to be moral, it must be compared and contrasted with something that is not moral. We may assign terms to indicate this. Presupposed in valuation, from bad to good to the perfect, is the notion that we can perfect the state based on our judgement of morality. Perfecting is an act. If there is an act then it must have a value as compared to some criteria. In this case, of "Broad Shoulders"¹, it is the criteria of the rational perfection of the forms. Finally, that in understanding the political state, we must take into account the three levels of people, the merchants, or any person who was not a slave, female or underage, called the many, the Guardians or the few, and the Philosopher King or the one.

¹We do not know this great writer's name. Plato is but a nickname meaning Broad shoulders from his days as an Olympic wrestler.

In his later work, The Laws, Plato¹² further advises that a state must balance both its monarchic and democratic elements. "A state that does not partake of these can never be rightly constituted".¹³ He also warns against placing too much power in the hands of a single body: If one neglects the rule of due measure, and gives things too great in power to things too small, such as sails to ships. If your sail is too large and the ship too small, then it will be uncontrollable in water. Too much food eaten and you get fat or sick. Too much of anything then everything is upset, and they run through excess of insolence, some to bodily disorders, others to that offspring of insolence, injustice.¹⁴ Following the warning of the Oracle of Delphi that "Everything in moderation"¹⁵ So too does Plato offer the need for some sort of balance to be held in everything. The example Plato cited was that of the Spartan constitution, with its two kings, council of elders. Plato praised them for not only the blended form of government

¹²Plato. Ibid. Laws. 693e, cf. 756e

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid. 691c

¹⁵The carvings on the walls have to caveats for people seeking answers to their question. The first moderation, the other is to "know thyself". One may further risk the wraith of irate professors by asking if this means we should know ourselves but only in moderation...

but also those of tripartite construction, setting the stage for Aristotle to offer his insight.¹¹ Thus, we have the theme of balance within Plato.¹² Though this is of secondary consideration as it came in The Laws which is a later work of Plato, The later works are often where we find Plato's own theories expressed in the words from the 'Stranger' who has over taken the character of Socrates. Some consider this a reconsideration of his position from The Republic or that he has broken from following his Master Socrates' thoughts to expressing his own.

Plato's greatest student, Aristotle felt that Plato was incorrect in his views. "Dearly as I love Plato, I love the truth more," he said.¹³ Thus, Aristotle began to outline a more rationalist, systematic approach to government¹⁴. Aristotle 384-321 BCE, born in Stagira, the northern shore of the Aegean, was the son of a doctor to the king of Macedonia (Philip). He spent his internship as a biologist.

¹¹Ibid. 692

¹²Alfred North Whitehead said, "all of western Philosophy is but a footnote to Plato." It may not be all that far from the truth.

¹³The discussion of Socrates, Plato and the State begins with 1261a, Book II of: Aristotle, The Politics. (New York: Penguin, 1986.)

¹⁴Aristotle, The Athena Constitution. (New York: Penguin, 1987.)

At 17, he left for Athens to study under Plato. He left with the Macedonian invasion to be tutor to Alexander the Great. He collected 158⁺ studies of different political regimes of which only one survives or at least a part of it survives⁻. In 322 BC, he left Athens for good so that there would not be two great sins on the consciousness of the city⁻. Aristotle claimed that the best regime is one in which allowed for the development of all to reach the higher types of man, thus allowing man to reach his moral potential. Nature has always intended the best, whereas no human is the best that there can be. This is a direct attack on Plato's notion of a philosopher king who by Plato's definition would be the pure form of humanity, most moral and have the closest connection to the purity of the forms. Hence, politics allows all citizens to evolve to the higher moral types in the easiest fashion without state interference in their moral development. Humans for

Richard McKeon, The Basic Writings of Aristotle. (New York: Random, 1941.)

⁺Raphael Sealey. A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC. (Los Angeles University of California Press, 1976) P. 4-5, 89-91.

⁻Aristotle. The Athena Constitution. (London: Penguin, 1987.) Which in its introduction expresses doubts to his authorship

⁻Aristotle fled so that those who advocated for the death of Socrates would not have a chance to kill him.

Aristotle's sense of a political state would be there improving on nature by creating themselves as more moral persons. The good government is one in which the best personal development can occur. Aristotle's description of governmental systems is divided into two factors, the presence or lack of morality or virtue and the membership of the ruling class. He describes the virtuous state as 1) Poliararchy, many for all with minority rights, 2) Aristocracy, the many for all, 3) Monarchy, one for all. The bad governments, being morally bankrupt or not allowing for the virtue of men to develop are similar in form to the good ones. 1) Democracy: many for the many, "As we know, Aristotle thought *demokratia* to be a bad thing, a sort of mob-rule." 2) Oligarchy, the few for the few is bad for morality and made up of few members. 3) Tyranny, the one for himself, is the worst possible form of government. Thus in order of propriety, from the best to worst we may scale them as Poliararchy, Aristocracy, Monarchy, Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny.

¹William R. Everdell. From State to Freestate: The Meaning of the Word Republic from Jean Bodin to John Adams. (Seventh ISECS, Budapest, 1987, and later published in the Valley Forge Journal, June 1991. Sec II.)

Legislation and statecraft taught by education establishes habits and trains all three levels of the soul. The soul is perfectible from what it is in nature to what it can be in the civil state. The more attention giving to the souls the more life one has. States are there to perfect the soul in moral virtue. However, Aristotle has a specific meaning involved here. The moral life of virtue must be earned, not by working, but in the quiet of one's soul. A life of freedom from responsibilities;

"... That is, in full independence of the necessities of life and the relationship they originated. This prerequisite of freedom ruled out all ways of life chiefly devoted to keeping one's self alive - not only labour... But also the working life of the free craftsman and the acquisitive life of the merchant."³

Thus, a man must not be in the workforce in any way to have the time needed to perfect himself. Those that are working do not have the time necessary to devote to perfecting their souls. As such, allowing them equal access to power would necessarily imply that imperfect souls were trying to make decisions on the perfection of the soul, something in which they have no corresponding relationship with in order to be able to do so. Hence, the origin of

³ Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.) P. 12.

Aristotle's distrust of any group other than those who were free of economic relationships' like work or labour. (Harrington would later argue for an Agrarian reform act to spread out land to as many people as possible so that they would be in a position to have the time to perfect their souls.)

For our purposes, we may hold that Aristotle began by analyzing the different possible levels of government. As such there are three levels of government, that of the one, the few and the many. These levels judged by morality as being true to virtue, governing for the common interest or the perversion, governing for the private interests.¹¹ The good or true forms of government are Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity. The bad or perversions are tyranny, oligarchy and extreme democracy.¹² The conclusions we may draw from Aristotle are many but we shall restrict ourselves to only one. With his delineation of these forms of government, all enacted or realized versions of his potential forms can only be said to be "mixed government" as none can be said to reach the stage of Aristotle's true archetype. Mixed in some form or another type to create a hybrid government of

¹¹McKeon. Ibid. P. 1185 1279a (29)

¹²Ibid. P 1117.

more than one form, the mixing occurred in that a king, the one, must have assistants who would form a group of nobles, the few. The many must have a leader to show unity. This leader in time would become a king. He would over time, have need for assistants again to form a group of the few. The people would make up any of these groups to be the better form, must have the leisure to perfect their own souls by not having to labour or work for their living.

Thus, we are at the end of these remarks on Athens' fading glory. Before our next step, it is best to recall that from the Greeks we have established that government can and should be questioned so that it can be perfected into some form of mixed government of the three types, the one, the few, the many. The state's make up is of men who have had the time to either perfect their own souls or not. The result state they create will reflect their virtue.

CHAPTER 1: PART 2

ROME'S EAGLE HAS FALLEN

"I COME HERE NOT TO BURY CICERO
BUT TO PRAISE HIM."

Robert Filmer (1588-1653) in Patriarcha: A Defence Of The Natural Powers Of Kings Against The Unnatural Liberty Of The People called Rome's Republic a "history of uncertainty, chaotic government and civil war"¹¹ Our second stage of this short journey into history brings us to exactly that spot of chaotic government and civil war. Our journey of discovery has brought us to Rome's Republican government on its final death spiral. Civil war tore the Republic apart with Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in 45 BCE, casting the country republican government into its final death throw. Cicero, a man who desperately tried to stop the chaos that would inevitably follow. Assassinated in 43 BCE, with his death, so too died the last hope to restore the Republic or any form of government that could

¹¹James Moore, "Patriarchism and Classical Republicanism." Published in German in Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie Begrundet Von Friedrich Uberveg Vol. 3. (Basil: Schawbe and Co. 1988) P. 576.

claim to be republican or so is the often-cited claim³⁴. Sources say that he was a reformer not a revolutionary.³⁵ Cicero, perhaps the greatest Roman orator of his day,³⁶ had the insight to see that for the Republic to survive it must not be the subject of the cult of personalities such as with Caesar, but must instead be faithful to the idea of government.³⁷ A government formed upon the laws and not the personalities of powerful men. This is similar to the warning of Cato the Elder. He wished to curtail the powerful oligarchies, yet different in that he wished to expand the narrowness of access to power, if only very slightly. The faith Cicero had was in the organization of the government of Rome as it stood, as a republic, with a powerful Senate and the people or the Plebs having a (small) say in that power. ("Harrington proceeds to compare the Roman Empire with the Turkish sultanate... Power oscillated from one to another in a series of unstable

³⁴Henry Boren, Roman Society. (Toronto: D. C. Heath, 1977.) P. 102.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶An orator is similar to the position of a lawyer, bringing to mind another quotation of Shakespeare in the voice of Falstaff, "Kill all lawyers."

³⁷Boren. Ibid.

forces..."¹¹) Cicero was considered a great "reformer"¹². Yet the image of a reformer, which may come to mind, is that of a champion of the people, a person whose faith in the people would have him reform the system, such that the people could return that faith to the person. One who would give them greater access to power and freedom as held by the oligarchy. This is not the case with Cicero. In fact, we will find it to be the opposite. In so doing, we shall see just how much validity we may place on the claim that Cicero was a reformer. In 63 BCE, he exposed a conspiracy against the state. Lead by Catiline (Lucius Sergius Catilina, AKA Catiline.), we know little of Catiline's goal except that he was a dissolute patrician who wished to cancel debts and gather popular support from both the nobles and lower class. While we do not know much of his other goals¹³, it was seemingly a popular uprising, a peasant revolt. A military campaign ending in 62 BCE was required to suppress him and the army he had raised. As well it should be, as the people who are most affected by

¹¹J. G. A. Pocock. The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987.) P. 132-133.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Aside from planning to kill some of the Roman Leaders... Note that the source of this is none other than Cicero

debt are those who are poor, i.e. the plebs, this type of commitment aimed at gathering their support. We may assume that many people who felt they were in great debt, enough to join Catiline in his rebellion requiring a military operation of a substantial size, to put down. Cicero who was not a revolutionary, and demanded that all people respect the rule of law felt that this conspiracy and revolt would help him weld a coalition of moneylenders and the oligarchy to him, so that his reforms would be acceptable. This was not to be the case. Yet we may see that his aim was not to support the people, plebs in any effort to gain freedom from burdensome debt loads or with that freedom, the political power that may have arisen. Cicero's goals seemingly were the restoration of the rule of law and the ambition of forging a political union to allow him to offer his reforms.

Cicero was also against the person of Mark Antony. In 14 speeches collected in the work The Philippics, (44-43 BCE) he attacked Antony for, what Cicero believed, was his attempt to rule Rome with absolute authority. Finally, during the Civil war, Cicero commenting on the rich

himself as he made a great speech denouncing Catiline and his plot.

oligarchy members said they were only interested in protecting their "fishponds (for their Gourmet appetites)".⁴ It is a disparaging remark on the character of the oligarchy that is not without a touch of bitterness in it. Perhaps it is a note to his lack of success at gathering the members of the oligarchy to his ideas of reform. Clearly then we may see that Cicero was not for the people, the many, nor was he in favour of the rule of the one Caesar. He also did not like the oligarchy, the few. Therefore, the reader may ponder this mystery of just what were Cicero's goals. His reforms were not for the one, the few or the many. So for who were his reforms? By what criteria does he hold them? Interestingly enough, we have seen Cicero repudiated all three forms of government set out by Aristotle. Yet they are the only three versions or archetypes that can be possible, or are they? The new form must therefore include more than one archetype, to mix them and describe this new version as the "mixed government". Thus, we have entered with Cicero into a new form of political theory, one that, although based on the theory of Plato and Aristotle, is different in that its goal is not

⁴Boren. Ibid. P. 141.

theory of governments but the function of a government⁴². Instead of designing for thinkers, he based it on the need of a people to have a functioning government. Unfortunately, he then uses the ideological concept of the "New Man"⁴³ to do so,⁴⁴ thus beginning the epoch of the mixed government⁴⁵ of the Classical Republicans. Clearly, before we may ask what his ideas on those reforms are, we must have some understanding of the development of government in Rome so that we have a basis onto which Cicero may project his reforms. Then we may look upon his reforms in the light that he did.⁴⁶ Finally, we may ask, could his reforms have been successful?

It will prove useful to insert a brief history of the Roman Republic to see its values before returning to Cicero's reforms of this government. In 509 BCE, the Republic founded after the overthrow of its king vested

⁴²In the next chapter, we will examine the main difference between a political philosophy and political theory.

⁴³*Homines novi*

⁴⁴As we shall see later, this ideology based on Cato the Elder, has no claim to be empirical.

⁴⁵In the interest of clarity, when dealing with the term "mixed government", one must be careful in the extreme as many thinkers will use the term in a wildly different manner than the last. Cicero's version will be different from that of Harrington, though they both use the same word.

power in the Senate. It originally consisted of 200 members who passed the laws. In order to stand for election to the Senate, a person had to be of the Patrician class. Patricians were people who belonged to one of the original 35 tribes of Rome. The people, i.e. everyone else, were the Plebeians. The difference being the division was of your familial relation to the original tribes, and property ownership. The land ownership held by the few in the Patrician class will be a continuing source of problems, as. (As Rome expanded in their territorial conquests, the small landowners were wiped out as they made up the infantry for Rome's army. Either by their death on the field of battle or the lack of labour on their home plots of land to make them profitable, the larger landowners would buy out the smaller ones.) In 494 BCE, the plebeian class revolted against the patrician class. This revolt was in the form of a strike¹. (One of five such strikes in Rome's History: Plebeians to be senators, laws written down, judges could not use customs, Plebeians elected into public offices and finally Plebeians elected Consul in 366

¹To understand what he is reforming, we must understand the form against which he has to work.

²A non-violent sit down strike based on the refusal to work.

BCE.) The plebeians acted as a group, effectively shutting down the Roman economy and military. The plebes were the workers and soldiers. The Patricians were the managers and officers. The plebeians withdrew from Rome and occupied mountains outside the city. They declared an alternative government, modeled after the Roman assembly, and demanded that these tribunes could veto any decision by a Roman magistrate, official, or legislation by the Senate. In the end, the result of this first strike was an agreement to that effect between the classes that allowed the plebeians the right to a veto. The first plebeian consul was elected in 367 BCE. With the tradition of giving elected official's seats in the Senate, the Patrician class's sole hold on the Senate was broken". By 287 BCE, the plebeians' had enough support to pass a law giving them the power to veto the decisions of the Senate. The Romans began to expand their holdings and conquered such places as Greece and Spain."

"As we will see later, this action is the same as Henry VII breaking of the Lord's hold over the land. While seemingly good at the time, the system itself will go down in flames with the civil war some 300 years later.

T. J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995)

Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic (London: Penguin, 1954)

Plutarch, Makers of Rome (London: Penguin, 1965)

Livy, Early History of Rome (London: Penguin, 1960)

With this expansion, the old Republic was changing and not all thought that this was to the benefit of Rome. From a small city-state to the world power with armies afoot all over the known world, it was beginning to show the strain by cracking the system. Those cracks exploded into the Civil War. The system while workable in a small city-state and peninsula was not able to adjust to the needs of a world power. Its internal balance could not stand the gyrations that destabilized it into collapse.

Cicero wished to restore this type of government that had been, seemingly verging on democratic principles that surely can be seen as similar to our modern version. Or was it? The Plebeians were gaining greater power of the assembly, yet was that one of the reforms that Cicero would have hoped for? As well, there was a great need for land reform, such that the plebs could personally own land. Was it ever a concern? In fact, the opposite was in Cicero's mind. We may understand Cicero's idea for a Roman Republic best by looking at the work of Polybius and Cato, the Elder. We shall see in that these views, of what Rome

P. A. Brunt, *Fall of the Roman Republic and related essays*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.)

N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, *Roman Civilization I: The Republic* (second ed. Cornell Univ. Press.)

should be, are not reform minded as we, the modern reader might expect those words to mean. They are an effort to create a new founding theory of government (which today we call the Classical Republican theory of government) that is based on the mixed government and did not include the plebs but instead the concept of a "new man".

We turn to Polybius for insight into the thinking of Cicero for "if Polybius was the historian... Cicero was the disclaimer... Cicero restated all the principles of the Polybian theory."⁵ Thus, we can see that the two men while separated by hundreds of years had great similarities and affinity. They differ from the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato⁶ in that,

"Polybius tries to reconstruct that phase in an evolutionary process when human society 'comes into existence for the sake of bare physical survival,' while both Plato and Aristotle try to lay bare the foundation of a human society that 'exists for the sake of the good life,'⁷ This difference has far reaching implications."⁸

⁵ Fink. Ibid. P. 5.

⁶ Again, we deal more fully with this in chapter 2.

⁷ We may see that this distinction is the beginning of what will develop into political theory, but as both are void of empirical datum, or even historical arguments, they merely offer to us their assertions for their theories. Thus making their efforts ideological not theoretical.

⁸ Kurt Von Fritz. The Theory of Mixed Constitution in Antiquity. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.) P. 50

In other words while Plato and Aristotle were focused on the improvement of the morality of the person by means of their virtue and the condition of their souls, Cicero wanted a more practical understanding of his "New Man".

They both held a distrust of the 'many' (the majority) such that they wished for a mixed government of balance. Polybius writer's in his theory of the cycle of constitutions that heredity monarchs came into being, as people believed that the children of a just ruler would be just. As long as those children are true to the people, the system works well. After some time, the children forget this purpose and assume they have the right to rule as their birthright and that power is there to serve their needs. At some point, when the monarch is a tyrant to the people, this becomes unbearable and the people conspire to overthrow their oppressor. This group then formed the new aristocracy. They, in turn, will also forget their compact with the people and turn into an oligarchy. This again has a similar result in their overthrow with the people unwilling to entrust themselves to anyone but themselves and they form a government of the people, a democracy. In turn, this creates demagogues as the people quickly forget their own purpose. (This is a rather unflattering portrayal

of people who they wish to govern. It is best not to start a theory of government by insulting the people to whom one wishes to govern.) The result is anarchy until a strong man again takes the helm and forms a Monarchy.⁴⁴ As such, each successive government rises and falls on its pact with the people. When the government breaks faith with the people, the people target the government with discontent that will overthrow them in the end. This cycle is repeated by Cicero⁴⁵ indeed what he wrote could have been written by Polybius himself!⁴⁶ To remove this sort of threat from the constant upheaval of this cycle, there must be a way in which to balance the forces at work such that the cycle is at an end and that the state is not always looking for a new balance. This would involve the necessary balance of more than one element of the cycle. A system whereby uniting all the advantages of the best governments so that no element had too much power and was kept in check by the others. The balance they wish to hold would be that of a group, the few or the Patricians, and another group that would not be that of the many or the single ruler. Their

⁴⁴Fritz, Ibid. P. 60.

⁴⁵Cicero. De Re Publica, De Legibus. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966.) P. 101-105.

⁴⁶Fink, Ibid. P. 5.

distrust of the majority was such that Polybius thought that Carthage would necessarily fall because it was too trusting of the people. Polybius would not have wanted to see anything resembling a modern democracy. In Book 6, Polybius tells of Carthage. It too had a mixed government but was inferior, as the democratic element had already achieved a greater share of the power than the other two.¹⁷ Aristotle confirmed this understanding of Carthage's political structure, elected due to merit¹⁸ for that positions of government. So if there is to be a mixed government of the few and another, but that the other would not be a king or that of democratic element, than who shall it be? The other group would be that of the "new men" of Rome. One may be tempted to assert that this group is that of a petit bourgeois class as Macpherson¹⁹ does in other cases. That may not be far from being correct as a means of understanding this new class of people. Yet it might be better to look to a more contemporary source to further our

¹⁷ Fritz, Ibid. P. 114.

¹⁸ Aristotle, Ibid. 1172.

¹⁹ C. B. Macpherson. The Political Theory of the Possessive Individualism. (London: Oxford University Press, 1962.)

understanding of Polybius. We thus turn to Cato the Elder.⁶¹

"What I am about to say is derived from the aged Cato..."⁶²

Cato the Elder (234 BCE - 149 BCE) Marcus Porcius Cato, strongly believed in the 'traditional' Roman Republican values, rural, farming life was the most virtuous life for citizens where a man by his own work will create something of himself. As such, this "new man" will be different from the Plebs. The new men are land owners, the Plebs are not. The new men are not of the traditional families of the Patricians. Essentially, the "new man" as Cicero would consider himself to be, would be of both worlds, not of the patricians by birth, but, as well, not of the plebeians by effort. (One can see how such a distinction would easily fall into Macpherson's Neo-Marxist position.) Of interest to note that, Cato the Elder held that the Greek culture, brought back to Rome, had weakened the Republic rather than strengthened the state. The ideas they, the Romans, had brought with them from Greece in their conquest had rotted the "traditional" notion of a good citizen. The practical notion of the Romans set them

⁶¹ We use the name of "the elder" as there is a "younger" Cato who was a friend and supporter of Cicero. The "younger Cato, is the great grand son of the elder.

⁶² Cicero. Ibid. P. 111.

above the more theoretical Greeks². One further similarity to Polybius is that Cato the Elder felt that Carthage was the threat to Rome. As a Senator, he ended every speech with the words "Carthage must be destroyed"³, regardless of whatever the rest of the speech was. Yet with all this rhetoric, Cicero's use of Cato the Elder had not broken faith with the people, they had never even made the effort to create such a faith. The single reason for Cicero's reformation was that the rural man would be pure and filled with virtue in their soul. By bringing in the country party in large numbers, Cicero would offset the corruption of the city life. Thus enabling them to correct the weakness of the city filled with sin and debaucher by the virtuous country. Thus the sum totals of Cicero's reforms rest with the introduction of new blood who were considered virtuous not by deed or action but by place of living, based not on observed behavior but on the ideology of Cato the Elder. These people of ideological virtue, by their overwhelming virtue, would fight the corruption of the state not by any

²Cicero. Ibid. P. 189-190. Book 3, Sec 7.

³"...In Sallust's Conspiracy of the Catilines that after the defeat of Carthage 'virtue began to loose its luster as the result of riches, luxury and greed.'" Simon Schema. Citizens: A chronicle of the French Revolution. (New York: Knopf, 1989.) P. 170.

positive action but merely by their presence within the system. Perhaps the single interesting aspect of this idea would be the influx of such people, if in sufficient numbers, and with constant renewal of new members, would act like a river and slowly erode the corruption by carting it away. As the old, corrupt men eroded away by the "New men's" virtue, the system would see itself renewed with fresh perspectives. Of course this reform completely rests on the ideology that a man from the country is a virtuous person in the first place. Cicero and his sources Polybius and Cato the Elder, had failed to consider what was the essence of a government would be that held that the many, one third of itself in the triad of political power was inferior to the other two. Essentially, attempting to create a balance where they ignored the very nature of balancing the powers for the mere ideologically asserted position that a man from the countryside is inherently virtuous. This certainly defies any consistent reason and dooms the project to failure under its own internal contradictions.

Thus, we have seen that Cicero along with Polybius distrusted the notion of democratic rulership for the people; in fact, he distrusted the people from the first

instant. As such, they never tried to establish a trust with them to be their ruler. They did not want to see a government of a single archetype but that of a mixed government with the powers resting between two groups, the Patricians and the "new men" whose existence is traced back to the "traditional" notion of Cato the Elder's view of a Roman citizen from the country who is filled with virtue. The question that remains is; would the reforms of Cicero have worked?⁴ There seems to be two schools of thought here, one, that they worked very well and the second is that Cicero's reforms would not have worked at all. No, matter which side we come down on in this issue, we shall see that they both doom Cicero's reforms to their rightful resting place as mere ideology. For the first argument, that they worked too well, we see:

"Augustus' creation can be understood⁵, therefore, only as a force standing outside the republican order... At the same time, Augustus could seek support in ideas already widespread at the time of the Republic's crisis, which rest partially on a romantic view of the Roman State,⁶ partly no also on the

⁴While this sort of "what if" question is impossible to answer with certainty we may look at the view's others had expanded. We may not offer surety of either position being correct or even likely. Except to note, the judgement of history is that they failed.

⁵The New Rome, the Empire.

⁶Polybius, and Cato the elder

political theories of the Hellenistic philosophy⁶⁷. We can see them at work in the writings of Cicero on political philosophy and it is very instructive to observe how the ideas championed by this passionate republican were made to as a basis for overturning the republican order."⁶⁸

Rather an ironic position to hold as they used Cicero's own rhetoric to support what Cicero had opposed in life, and whose death was at those same hands. His reforms worked so well that they brought the Caesar's to power, men who were, for the most part, not from the country nor filled with anything resembling virtue."⁶⁹

For the second position, that Cicero's reform would not have worked, we should go no further than David Hume's critique of Harrington to offer three direct challenges to the nature of the Roman Republic. First, that by altering the office holders in this way, each only for their fixed terms⁷⁰, they throw into power people who may not be of such character, intelligence or moral to perform the duties. Secondly,

⁶⁷Aristotle, but mostly Plato

⁶⁸Wolfgang Kunkel. Roman Legal and Constitutional History. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.) P. 49.

⁶⁹One cannot help thinking of Caligula and Nero.

⁷⁰One of the main problems that Caesar had was this. He did not like the idea of giving up power once he had gained it.

"Men will soon learn the art that was practised in ancient Rome of concealing their possessions under other people's name, till at last the abuse will become so common that they will throw off even the appearance of restraint."

Third, there were not sufficient protections for liberties or redress of government.⁷³ For as their ideology help the people in such a low view of their possibilities, they need not offer such a group of people more than they deserve. In this case, they deserve nothing, which is what Cicero would give them, nothing. We may add to the last point, that there was not enough effort to address the imbalance in property ownership, deemed as not important to the political considerations either of the oligarchy, or for the "new man". For that would undermine the very foundation of the "new men" as they would lose their land in favor of the many, and hence lose their means of collecting virtue by having a life that is not dependent on work, labour or commerce. Cicero did not know of, nor could he have known what Harrington's greatest discovery would be; that property is place where power resides; balance is found in the many having that property to balance out the other two groups in the power triad. By so failing to

⁷³David Hume, Moral and Political Philosophy. (New York: Hefter Library of the Classics, 1962.) P. 374.

address the issue of property reform in any meaningful way as Catiline had tried to do in his rebellion that Cicero suppressed, his project was again doomed to failure. The issue of property reform has not been solved even on to this modern period.¹ Cicero is not alone in his failure to understand and address the issue of property reform. Modern governments in the third world still wrestle with the issue to no success. The wrong few people cannot own the land. Ownership must divide among the many that have the virtue, i.e. men of the countryside if there is to be virtue in the political system, as Cicero understood it to be. More importantly, Harrington's understanding is that land ownership be in the hands of the many if there is to be balance. It is the Rubicon of this issue, the shoals onto which Cicero crashed his ship of state. The distribution of land was always a continuing problem in Rome not just for Cicero. Small landholders had gradually lost their land as Rome had expanded (such as into Greece, Cato the Elder had opposed that foreign adventure). Small landholders had made up the infantry, as one had to be a landholder to be in the Roman army in the first place, (this would change later for

¹Take for example the political instability in Mexico, Columbia and many other poor third world countries. The key

obvious reasons). At first this citizen army was adequate, but as Rome spent more time at war, the small landholders were unable to work their farms and so often came back to find that they had lost their land, making the soldiers even more dependent on the Generals for their future livelihood. Hence, a cult of personality would spring up around their general. The common soldier's fate relied on the success of that general. Hence, the military power of the Caesar. They had the total loyalty of their soldiers due to the dependency on the general for land. Land reform would be an unsolvable issue until Harrington correctly framed the question and attempted to reform the theory of property ownership. Hume based his critique on the notion of trust and faith of the people with whom the government will govern. The faith of the people is in themselves. If they have nothing to lose than they have nothing to give. They cannot give faith to someone, allegiance to others unless they have something to base it on. Property ownership is the place by which a person can have faith in his or her own property. Even if their faith is based solely upon the idea that what they own is their property and no one else's. At that point, this person is willing to

factor is land reform.

do what it takes to remain in control of that property. They do so either by following a person who will preserve that property or by going to war to stop another state from taking that away from them.

This faith was not there for Cicero and his ideas. Worse, he did not even look for it, or account for it in his theories. Thus, whether his theories would have worked or could not work, Cicero's reforms were doomed. The Republic of Rome was in its death spiral and there was no one with enough insight to stop it. Cicero's lack of foresight was as much to blame for the death of the Republic as the knives of Brutus as he stabbed Caesar. Cicero's ideas were not reform minded as much as merely a rearrangement of the status quo. His scoop of inclusion was limited to a few "New Men", a slight change in the oligarchy even if they could have fulfilled in some way his ideological assertion of their natural virtue. We have seen that Cicero following the views of Polybius and Cato the Elder, would hold that Rome would be a mixed government of the few, the Patricians and the "new man" who are the 'traditional' idealistic Roman citizen filled with virtue. Allow the people to form the basis of government as in Carthage that was a state distrusted, was not acceptable.

The chosen rulers of Carthage merited their positions by their actions and not the internally perfect virtue of the soul inherent in a life of contemplation. Essentially, the system would hold together with little change from the way it had in the past. A cynic might argue that these so-called reforms were of no importance. They were the imposed ideology of Cato the Elder onto the political landscape of Rome. They had no attempt to address the fundamental issue of power or lack of shared power from the rulers to the people. There was no attempt to reform property laws and distribution it to the people. These rifts were left open. Cicero could have, from his position in the government tried to bridge the gap to the people of whom they, the oligarchy, deem to speak on whose behalf. He did not do so. Instead, he fostered the same status quo of limited property ownership even though he had fought a pitched battle with Catiline over it. The result was that the elite of Rome would stand as they did before, in power, holding all the property and fighting for more of both. There would be no checks and balances, even if Polybius would hold that these reforms would introduce such measures for who would be the ones to guard such balance? One does not get the fox to guard the hen house. There would be no new virtue from

the 'new man' for they would be questing for access to power. They would simply be out for the same thing as the able Patricians who were out for power already. Merely more people seeking a smaller and smaller amount of land. These reforms would open the door a small crack to allow in some few select people, the "new man" but would not address the fundamental issue of balance or of land reform. Where would balance be centered? If we hold true to these reforms, the balance would be left to the high minded ideals of men like Cicero, derived no doubt from their internal virtue? Yet in their own theory of cycles, this would steer them to ruin in the end. For in the end, Augustus was right to use their reforms as his own. He is the logical end of their policies. Power cannot be concentrated in the hands of the few in any event for it leads to the creation of a rule of one. Rome's lesson must surely be that any system of government must be balanced, it must have the trust of the people, but that balance must be with the widest possible franchise, for the most people so that they have no choice but to trust themselves. Carthage fell history records this. This fall was from military defeat and not due to some contest of political systems.

"Polybius' remarks on the difference between Roman and the Carthaginian military system ... Are undoubtedly pertinent. In fact, these differences alone might suffice to explain the final victory of Rome... One might argue that Carthage would have been defeated by the Romans, regardless of any deficiencies in its constitution for no other reason than that its military system was inferior to that of the Romans."

The democracy of Carthage had little to do with how well their troops fought. They used mercenaries according to Polybius¹³. A lesson that Machiavelli would not forget, he would demand that citizens fight for their state. (It would inspire Harrington to his own take on the issue that the army must be made of as many men who own land as possible.) It had to do with their political leadership going to war because of their people's will, provoked by Rome into battle. In the end, the evaluation of Cicero is not but an ideological extreme position masking poor thinking and even less understanding of balance that relies on cultural stereotypes and romanticism of an idealized version of what the "new man" should be, (not what they were). Thus, Cicero's reforms lacked any empirical evidence or social science on the nature of the people. The distrust of the people precluded ever achieving any possible

¹³Fritz, Ibid. P. 115.

balance. You cannot balance three groups with one group disenfranchised before you start to form the balance. Thus, the reforms can only be "so-called" in relation to that which will come after him, the Caesars and Augustus of the Roman Empire. The idealism of Cicero's virtuous "new men" was doomed, even before the assassin's blade struck true to his heart. The reforms were doomed under their own weight of internal contradictions. The Eagle was doomed to fall not by the lack of visions but by the inability to quest into history for understanding.

CHAPTER 1: PART 3
THE IDES OF MARCH REVISITED
FLORENCE IN SPRING

Our journey, though short in miles, is long in time. We have left Rome only to travel but a few miles north to Florence, yet in this short afternoon drive of a few hundred miles; time has sped forward from the fall of the Roman Republic of 44 BCE to the Renaissance or rebirth of Europe some 1500 years later. This historical period flourished some time during the 1300-1600 period. It was the end of the medieval period also known as the "Dark Ages". Learning was lost. The old thoughts barely preserved by cloistered monasteries. The intellectual discussion's of the medieval period range from earth shattering queries as "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin" (as many as want to), to the pertinent understanding of "did Adam have a bellybutton?" (No.) With few notable exceptions, it was better to leave the question of the *summum bonum* in the hands of the clergy. However, the question of what was best for the state did not go unheard or unanswered. The King, the rule of the one was the only form of government and the only one even thought possible. For the rulership of the

King was in direct parallel to the rule of G*d. G*d ruled in heaven and the King ruled on Earth. Hence, the logical extension of this theory to the Divine Rule of Kings. Similar to The Republic of Plato, the ideas of a city were cast in iron with the Church father, Augustine's work, The City Of G*d. Not only was the king's position based in the world of the here and now, but it was blessed by the kingdom of G*d. The question that needed to be answered was yet another rephrasing of the issue, who had more virtue to speak with G*d's voice in the first place? The King or the Pope? The Biblical injunction of "render unto Caesar what is Caesar and unto G*d what is God's"¹ set the stage for two separate arenas of power, secular and ecclesiastic, both vying for supreme power. Each took from the peasants, the church by tithe, the king by taxes and forced work. The problem began with the crowning of Charlemagne (768-814) "Holy Roman Emperor"² in 800. The Pope, Leo III, by crowning him, had established that the "Holy Mother Church" would have the authority to anoint who would be king, thus gaining an advantage over the Kings, be it only a temporary

¹Luke 20:25

²Paraphrasing Gibbons, he was not a holy man, Roman, nor even an Emperor... This of course must always be mentioned, when speaking of the Holy Roman Empire.

one. The conflict that would follow is twofold, the issue of land ownership plus taxes and the issue of power itself.

The issue of land ownership rested with the amount of taxes collected by the crown. The church had the privilege while not having to pay any taxes, with the amount of property they owned increasing so too did the conflict with the crown. As people died, their wealth as expressed in the property they owned, if they left their estates to the church, removed it from the royal tax rolls. Generally, they did so to pay penance, i.e. to buy their way into heaven, or because they had no one else to give their property to, the estates of the nobles were given to the church. Once the church inherited the land, they would no longer pay taxes to the crown. This also reduced the total amount of available land in which the nobles could own or leave to their family upon their death hence reducing the total number of people who would own land in the first. This centralization of ownership of the land among the few would be an important factor to Harrington's theory of property ownership. The same type of centralization of property occurred in the Roman Republic that leads to its fall. Fortunately, in the European case, the decentralization of the various kingdoms and the lack of a

central government of feudalism would not suffer the same fate. The king made no claim to being anything except sole ruler. The Roman Republic had the burden of their own myths to deal with, that they were a republic in more than name.

In the European kingdoms, the problem of property distribution was the background issue allowed to simmer over time as the church gained more and more land. What brought the crisis to violence was the Investiture Controversy. Kings would appoint a man to hold office of Bishop, usually after a gift of money. The church called this the sin of Simony, and tried to reform the practice. The church felt that a bishop, being a representative of God should in fact not be under the control of the king but should be answerable only to the Pope. No one invested by the king could be considered a real bishop but merely a sinner who was defying the will of the Holy Mother Church.

"We decree that no one of the clergy shall receive the investiture with a bishopric or abbey or church from the hands of an emperor or king of any lay person, male or female. But if he shall presume to do so he shall clearly ... Lie under excommunication."¹⁶

¹⁶Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300. (Englewood Cliffs. Prentice Hall, 1964.) P. 51.

This conflict soon turned to open war. The best example is The Germanic King, Henry IV, took up arms against the Pope Gregory VII. The Pope not having an army did the only thing that he could. He excommunicated the King. This freed the other nobles from their oath before G*d to obey the King. They rebelled and threatened his entire kingdom by electing a new King. King Henry had to travel to the Alps to kneel barefooted for three days in the snow awaiting the forgiveness of the Pope, which in due time was given. The King returned to the flock of Holy Communion. However, the slight was not forgotten. The king returned to his lands and restored order among the rebelling factions. With his country, once again firmly in hand, he returned the favor of the Pope by deposing him with an army. Only the arrival of the king's ally and vassal Robert Guiscard did the Germans leave the field of battle.

For our purposes, we divide the investiture conflict into three parts. First, the issue of land ownership: The appointed noble who paid the king cash for the land and title, would be beholden to the king and would have enriched the king's pocket, making up the diminishing tax revenue from the land. By having the bishopric appointed by

the Pope, the noble would be answerable only to the Pope. Second, the issue of political control, by being beholden to the respective appointer, be it the king or the Pope, the noble would then be removable by them, and thus be a proponent of their respective position. Thus lessening the respective amount of support they may draw on if the other appointed the position. Finally, we may refer to this as the amount of virtue in the position. However, this is of course the weakest of the three positions, if the Pope has his way, only the religious person would be nominated, thus making the position holy, or filled with religious virtue. The king would have the position filled by a loyalist. Be it one with cash on hand.

The general conflict of Pope verses King or emperor carried on throughout the middle ages. It would only be resolved with certainty with the Protestant Reformation. Attacking the issue from a Priest's point of view, Martin Luther would attack the Church's position to accept indulgences. His reforms allowed the German Princes to take up arms against the Church and confiscate their land holdings. Thus breaking the power of the Italian Pope as well as creating national based religions in their own country. The results for our purposes are best seen with

Henry the Eighth, who broke with the Catholic Church over the issue of his divorcing his many wives. He confiscated the lands of the Catholic Church in England, including the Monasteries and resold it to his nobles. This freeing of the land is crucial to Harrington's theory of land ownership. Thus the issue of virtue, founded upon the person with property having the ability to better their own soul, would create political controversy across the middle ages. That story was about to change however...

In a remarkable little city in Italy, the cry of humanistic philosophy screamed out with a passion to be heard anew in the bleak landscape of the darkened world of learning. We seek the writings of one man. So remarkable were his words that they affected the world. At least in so far as the world reacted against him. Denounced, hated and placed on the Index of Prohibited works by the Catholic Church, he certainly made his mark upon the European landscape. So much so that Pocock calls this The Machiavellian Moment¹¹. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) wrote The Prince¹² in 1513 while living in political exile

¹¹J. G. A. Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment. (New York: Princeton University Press. 1975.)

¹²URL://www-personal.ksu.edu/~adc8181/the_Prince.html

at his country estate outside of Florence. He had served as head of the second chancery of the Florentine Republic as a courtier in charge of the city defenses, but was dismissed after it fell in 1512. The Medici family returned to rule Florence once again. At the same time, a Medici was also Pope in Rome. They did not want any one from the old Republic to be too near the seat of their power. By exiling him but a few miles from their city, rendering him as powerless as if he had been assassinated, which ironically, he would have called for in a similar position.⁷³ The historical scholarship divides as to his motive in writing The Prince. Was it to mock the rulership of the Medici, or was it a job application? Either way, this work is telling for our understanding of Harrington. Continuing in our purpose with this exploration, Machiavelli expresses the highest respect for Latin classical authors such as Cicero. At the same time, The Prince is also critical of them as well. We shall look into but three of those exceptions here, first, the notion of virtue (morality), then the part of chance and finally the problem of Roman Agrarian laws.

The URL has a better translation used in the quotes, more robust and closer to the original meaning. Page references are to the physical texts

⁷³Ibid. The Discourse. Book three, Chapter 4, P. 394.

Cicero, in his idealism, held that rulers should be honest. Machiavelli would have none of that. He redefined the classical notion of virtue for his version of it. Moral standards have no place in the politics of a prince's court. Moral standards such as being truthful, promise keeping was fine when they did not endanger the Prince but if and when said danger happened, the prince should not shrink from doing what they must to preserve their power.

"Everyone knows how praiseworthy it is for a ruler to keep his promises and live uprightly and not by trickery. Nevertheless, experience shows that, in our times, the rulers who have done great things are those have set little store by keeping their word, being skilful rather in cunningly confusing men; they have got the better of those who have relied on being trustworthy... Therefore, a prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, when such fidelity would damage him and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant..."

This removal of morality was enough to have his work landed on the Catholic Index of prohibited works, burned and caste the person reading it as endangering their immortal soul, a judgement so harsh that but a few works were placed on this list.

"... However, how men live is so different from how they should live that a ruler who does not do what is generally done, but persists in doing what ought to be done, will undermine his power rather than maintain it. If a ruler who wants always to act honorably is

⁷ Ibid. The Prince. P. 99.

surrounded by many unscrupulous men, his downfall is inevitable. Therefore, a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary.¹¹

The obvious question to ask is what this thing is, called virtue, that Machiavelli feels is so important. Many commentators have offered their informed opinions on the subject.¹² Yet none seems to agree with the other.¹³ Does Machiavelli mean "manliness"? Does he mean political expedience of "might makes right"? The answer to these questions may not be even an answer. Rather than closing in on a specific definition, let us draw some general conclusion about his concept of "Virtue". First, that in some way, Machiavelli has drawn his understanding of virtue from Cicero. Second, that in some way he has separated virtue from a moral base similar to Aristotle's and that in some way following Cicero's idea, he has joined it with an action, in this case a political action. With both conclusions in hand, we have drawn from Machiavelli all that we need to progress in his thoughts. We need not close

¹¹Ibid. P. 92.

¹²Please See the following for some of these discussions:

Harvey Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.)

Anthony Parel, The Political Calculus. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1972.)

¹³Ibid.

in any closer to his meaning. For his very bases of thought, resting on the works of Cicero, among others, has no specific definition. The land owners in the country that Cicero would have been blessed with the virtue to clean up Rome, with his "New Men", are no more defined with specific definitions of virtue than their place of living and ownership of land. The fact that Machiavelli's translators disagree on what word to use in place of his written virtue is intentional on Machiavelli's part. He wanted this word to have wide latitude in meaning so to encompass a great deal of actions. Hence, the needed second conclusion is that Machiavelli had separated his idea of virtue from the moral overtones of previous thinkers such as Aristotle and emphasized an action. In the case of The Prince to keep the city safe from invaders is his virtue. Whatever actions taken to protect the city would be virtuous in the eyes of Machiavelli be they immoral or not.

Machiavelli reserved this virtue not for all men, for not all men are able to act for some goal of importance such as the protection of a city from invaders. Thus the reason why efforts to define the issue have failed is not due to the intellectual input but due to the subject matter. Machiavelli's virtue is not the virtue of a

philosopher, i.e. a generalized notion such as Aristotle would hold, but the specific act of a Prince ruling a city. The Greeks had *arrete*, often translated into virtue. Men on a battlefield earned it by showing honor. It was similar to doing "your duty", without the moral overtones. A man who took up arms to defend or protect an issue, be it land or honor, earned *arrete* for his actions. They did not have to win the battle, merely to take the action of doing so, the effort to do so. Differentiate this with the virtue of Aristotle that involved the improvement of the soul. *Arrete* was not the thinking man's action, but the fighting man's actions. Bring this back to Machiavelli and we have a man of action has earned virtue not by thinking but by doing. The problem in defining such a term is that it resists any attempt to generalize. Actions in the most specific of cases may earn virtue. Hence why Machiavelli gives instances, case after case of what this virtue is and what it is not.

This requires an example to show the distinction of Machiavellian virtue against moral virtue of Aristotle²⁴.

²⁴While it is possible to take such examples from Machiavelli himself, in his work, these examples are often unclear due to the passage of time, not to mention that it divides scholars on the meaning.

The simplest way to do so is to turn to the movie A Few Good Men.⁴⁵ In the final scene, we have Tom Cruise's character questioning Jack Nicholson's character. The key is to get Nicholson's character to admit to ordering the beating of a marine recruit. A so-called "code red" to train the recruit that they are lacking in proper military discipline. Because of the beating, the recruit dies. In this scene, Nicholson cannot admit to ordering the beating as that is against the law of the state. Yet it is not against his virtue understood in the Machiavellian sense detailed above. The conflicts, aside from the legal ones, are internal. Nicholson's character knows he did what had to be done to protect his command from a poor soldier yet also knows that a higher morality, the military legal system does not see the situation in the same way, portrayed by Cruise's character. In the specific incident, Nicholson was protecting his city, as a good prince should. Yet when compared to the morality of a different virtue that the beating causes a man's death is illegal under military law. In this case, only due to the man's death does the issue reach any moral judgement. If it had

⁴⁵If you have not seen this movie, rent it immediately. It is excellent and the example will make no sense.

occurred and the man not died, there would be no battle of morality. For the morality of Nicholson's character, a Machiavellian Prince, would not be called into question. He was doing his job to protect his city. Yet this brings in the next exception of fortune. If Nicholson had been lucky, the man would not have died. Yet the script calls for him to die and thus introduces the great need to address the issue of fortune in Machiavelli's system of virtue. An action may be virtuous in Machiavelli's system in itself, i.e. the beating to protect the city under the character's command. Yet due to misfortune, i.e. the man's death, the beaten removes the question outside of the strict view of Nicholson's morality into a different playing field. In other words, the goal has changed. The issue is not simply to protect the city, but to the issue of legality. This misfortune changes everything for the characters and brings in fortune.

The second exception in Machiavelli's break from ancient virtue, we must look at is that of the presence of luck, or fortune. Yet again, Machiavelli redefined the classical notion of fortune for his own views. In so doing, he would have fortune play a larger role in the affairs of a good prince. Such that even with good fortune a Prince

may fall, and with bad, may rise. The key is that in the face of fortune, a Prince must have virtue to act. The struggle of Nicholson's character rests with his own concept of virtue. His action, in ordering the beating was virtuous. Yet losing fortune's grace, he was being called to account, i.e. subject to the morality of another system that was not his own. The failure was not his action in order the beating, but that in the end when faced with the question of "if" he had so ordered it, he forgot his virtue and told the truth. Such an answer leads to his destruction. If however he had been true to his virtue and lied, he would have walked away freely to again take up the defense of his "city". The lack of morality here is not merely in the order to beat another man, but to fail to keep consistent with this morality when fortune does not favour you. The reader who may hold with some sort of ethical concept of virtue may find the conclusion distasteful. However, it is a strong tenet of any ethical system of morality to be consistent. Machiavellian morality may be disagreeable but it is not meant to be that way. Machiavelli's great triumph was not his system itself, for as we shall see, it does not withstand criticism. His victory is the break from morality itself. He had founded a

system that was based not on morality, G*d or virtue but on situation ethics. However, less we are remiss in our understanding, it is possible to have fortune turn against you and remain a Prince still. Take the modern examples of Bill Clinton. Throughout his efforts being elected than re-elected, he faces bad fortune, based on his vices, sex scandals pardoning criminals, etc. Yet through each event, he stood firm in his beliefs and returned to glory. His actions scream of situation ethics concerning his vices. At the same time, his policies also demand respect. Machiavelli's attempt to establish a study of the behavior of the rule of one, the Prince, is filled with problems such as we have seen above, that necessarily call out for rethinking, thus setting the stage for Harrington to appear. What science may we found upon a theory that relies on luck, fortune as its base?

Finally, the one issue that set the doom of Cicero's reforms, the lack of land management is addressed within The Discourses.⁷² The Roman agrarian laws were a great source of trouble with the inadequate distribution of land. The lack of an agrarian law destroyed Rome. It caused hatred between the people and the Senate. The Senate always

freely gave honor to the people, but resisted when it came to giving away their property. This led to strife. We need not delve deeper here, such that we have seen that Machiavelli addressed the problem. He could offer no solution to the problem except to correctly identify it. (Property will return to our discussion when we reach Harrington's view in the relationship of power and land.)

The need to regard Machiavelli's work critically must first start with his notion of what a government is. "All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or principalities." " Yet as we have seen, this is not the case. Aristotle showed that there were three different archetypes of government. We find Machiavelli's reasons" in his other great work, The Discourses, where he looks at the development of a state. (Discourse book one, chapter's 1-10 are on the State.) He does discuss the difference between the three archetypes of Aristotle, yet he denies implicitly the third option of a

"Ibid. The Discourses. Book one, Chapter 37. P. 200.

"Ibid. The Prince. P. 33.

"Machiavelli did not cover republics in The Prince, as "I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to principalities." (Machiavelli. Ibid. P. 33)

democracy, the rule of the many."¹¹ His proof, in the invalidity of the notion of direct rule by the people comes from the same argument as Polybius had. Namely, that states alter themselves from one form to another form as:

"... For men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves,¹² and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, ..."¹³

Less we make this jump with swiftness beyond reason; we must first argue that Machiavelli does address the issue. Unfortunately, we shall see that his address is itself predestined to fail. Machiavelli would hold that all three groups, the one, the few and the many, together under one state would make the best arrangement of government.¹⁴ Yet this never happens, as we have seen with Polybius and Cato the Elder, the form of government goes through the cycle of the rule of one, to the rule of the few, to the many and back again. When it so happens that the rule of

¹¹As such, we may hold that in Machiavelli's mind the notion of a Republic is the form of both that of the rule of the few and the rule of the many.

¹²With this type of warning Harrington, seek to have his balance direct away from personal gains any judgement, decision or policy made by the government without benefit to the person making the decision.

¹³Ibid. The Prince. P. 34-35.

one archetype, such as Rome's republic allows in another group such as the Plebeians gaining some measure of power, it stabilizes the system of government. As such when all are three groups are present in a government, the state is stable.

"When there is combined under the same constitution a prince, nobility, and the power of the people, then these three powers will watch and keep each other reciprocally in check."

If the above quote described the modern system of government, then we may rest our feet from this weary path... Unfortunately, it does not. The devil is always in the details and in Machiavelli's case; we should look at his devilish details". His grand scheme certainly sounds like our modern system but he is far from proposing that. What we have are three problems; his view of the world, his view of the fundamental human nature and his view of government.

The world of Machiavelli filled with nebulous areas that are impenetrated by reason. It is the area of his notion of fortune (*Fortuna*).

¹Ibid. The Discourses. P. 111.

²Ibid.

"Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. I compare her to one of those raging rivers ..."¹⁵

His advice in The Prince is to "beat and coerce" fortune as if she was a woman.¹⁶ In The Discourse, Machiavelli writes of signs and portents of future events. He does not know why they happen or why they occur, yet he still believes this to be the case.¹⁷ Machiavelli quotes Livy to establish a reference for his belief that Fortune blinds the minds of men when she wishes no resistance to her designs.¹⁸ Men should not despair for not knowing the goals of Fortune. Hope should always be present. Besides, she is only a woman to be beaten any ways. One can only marvel at this attitude towards women, rationality and more importantly the nature of humanity. Machiavelli's views on the world are rather strange, resorting to chance and luck as a means of political ascent into power is certainly lost on our modern paradigm of empirical, rational, scientific

¹⁵One possible origin of naming Satan as "Ol' Nick" comes from Machiavelli's work and the Catholic Church's reaction to him.

¹⁶Ibid. The Prince. P. 130.

¹⁷Ibid. P. 133.

¹⁸Ibid. The Discourses. P. 249.

understanding. We need not offer a serious critic of this views of the world put forth by Machiavelli. For implicit within this assertion is a view of man. That is seemingly a far more important issue. Thus instead of allowing ourselves to linger upon an admittedly weak point of his, let us instead turn to philosophical anthropology, what is man¹¹ in Machiavelli's mind?

Machiavelli has many things to say about man in general, and none of them seems to be very flattering. His view of men, typified by such comments as "because men are excessively self-interested,¹²" or:

"This advice would not be sound if all men were upright; but because they are treacherous and would not keep their promises to you..."¹³

We may draw the conclusion that Machiavelli has a less than charitable image of men in general. He had no faith to vest in them, as did Cicero or Polybius 1500 years before. Machiavelli did not break trust with the people. He had

¹¹Ibid. P. 369-370.

¹²I retain the word man hereon as Machiavelli has less than high regard for women. To use the more inclusive term of people or humanity would not be in keeping with his work. Chapter titles of such as The Discourses. Book Three, Chapter 35, "Reason why the French... Are... Locked upon in the beginning as Men ... And afterwards as less than Women.

¹³Ibid. The Prince. P. 97.

¹⁴Ibid. P. 100.

none to begin with. We need not look farther, one of his own chapter titles to refute his philosophical anthropology. "Though men make mistakes about things in General they do not make mistakes about particulars."¹¹ Machiavelli has asserted that men self-interested and treacherous which necessarily makes his political system to be less than generous towards the *res populus*.

His political system then would be similar in shape to that of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who asserted man as having a short nasty brutish existence in nature demanding of a Leviathan to keep their whims in check.¹² Can we then expect from Machiavelli to have a more enlightened view of man? Surely not. As such when Machiavelli wrote that his work The Prince would concern "All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or principalities,"¹³ he asserted that there were no democracies, and with his understanding of philosophical anthropology in such a negative vein, there would be none. Thus, we have found the last nail in this coffin. In the exact same manner as with Cicero, Machiavelli's project fails with this point. If a government system is to work,

¹¹ Ibid. The Discourses. Book One, Chapter 47

¹² Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. (London: Penguin, 1986.)

it must have all three elements, the one, the few and many, and that each must check and balance the other parts of the triad, with a distrusted legs that has missing, the tripod falls. Machiavelli himself holds this to be true. In other words, the limited nature of his franchise to the many, e.g. restricted due to their treachery and self-interest, the many cannot have a place in Machiavelli's political system. There is no foundation upon which to build a system of trust. Without trust there can be no civic virtue so needed in a society so that will be politically stable. The deprived *prima facie* of the third leg to the tripod, it surely must fall. The greatness of Florence may simply have been as Sir Robert Filmer has written (playing a real estate agent¹¹) as an attribute of its "location".¹² As such, mere geographical chance allowed the city to have an impact on the world stage that gave Machiavelli a podium from which to speak. The location allowed the city to interact with the cultures of the world, from the Chinese to the Arabs. The spice trade, shipping spice to the interior of the continent of Europe as the intermediaries created huge profits at very little risk to them.

¹¹ Ibid. The Prince. P. 33.

¹² "Location. Location. Location!"

Thus, our story of Machiavelli has shown us that while following in the path of Cicero he had three differences, that of his notion of the place of morality in politics, it has none. The role of fortune, a woman to be beaten and he did look at the need for reform in the Agrarian laws beyond an understanding of the problem. Machiavelli based his political systems on his worldview that allows in the flights of fancy to the mysterious force of chance controlling the world and blinding men to her purpose. His philosophical anthropology of man being treacherous and self-interested led to the certainty that he would not have wanted men, the many, to have a role in the political system even if that would be the best system to derive. His view that man was forced to act by fate left him with no recourse to stability of character in Man that may have been found if he had found man to be a rational animal. This uncertainty leads him to distrust his fellow men. Machiavelli had two questions. 1) How to maintain order? 2) How to create order? Wisdom needs virtue to be wise. To be wise is to stay in tune with the changes of fortune. To create a new society is the hardest job but one that every new prince must do by good virtue, good fortune, or evil

Fink. Ibid. P. 47.

means. No matter what happens to the government, Machiavelli thought unlike Aristotle, people remain ignorant, because they choose to do so. There is no hope for betterment, as the bases of all states are on fraud and theft. Laws are there so that you can improve yourself, not in the moral rational sense but in the sense of profit and acquisition of goods, therefore they are unavoidable. The base of Politics is coercion and violence. It cannot be reformed, as humanity is so fickle and untrustworthy. There is no higher expectation than for a government to maintain law and order to protect the goods acquired. There is four types of people, good or bad, strong or weak. A Prince is better to be feared than to be loved for in the fear he keep's the people in line with his rules and lessens the chance of people breaking the laws. The ends justify the means. A law-abiding society is the end and any means that further this is therefore justified to Machiavelli. There is no ultimate moral dilemma to resolve, for the explanation is inherent with the understanding of what man is. Wants are infinite and goods are finite. Therefore, there is war and strife. People need a strong ruler to keep themselves in check and their enemies at bay so to avoid war and strife. Anything is better than anarchism.

Therefore, any tactics to restore order is good. Just as rationality, wisdom and sound principles imply a well-regulated mind, so too does virtue imply control over emotions and whims of fortune. As such, the new age of man would need another more enlightened thinker to follow up on Machiavelli's works, to be the bringer of the new political system that governs our modern age. That man is James Harrington.

By Way Of a Pause

This part of our story is at an end, but it is by no means concluded. Rather let us put forth a summation of the journey so far. What distance we have traveled is the same steps James Harrington will have traveled to his understand political theory. We first looked at ancient Greece to find Socrates in his questioning of the good of a state. Plato's quest was to find and perfect a political system. Aristotle following his master's footsteps with a discourse of the three main archetypes of government, the one, the few and the many, that each having a good or bad reflection of itself. We then traveled to Rome. Learning with Cicero, we traced his ideas to Polybius and Cato the elder. That Polybius had a theory of the constant cycle of state government forms, from King to Senate to Democracy and back again. That Cato the Elder in his romantic view of the nobility of the Roman citizen was utilized by Cicero to formulate his notion of reforms, based on the idea of a "new man", such that some, select men would be allowed into the corridors of power, but the majority of the people would be excluded to avoid Carthage's fate. Finally we wandered into Florence, where Machiavelli his great *opus* of

how to live as a Prince, without morality and not so deep regard and mistrust of the people. Yet in each of these trips, we failed to find the roots of our system of government in our present day. We failed to find a system that would last. None was in balance. They switched from the rule of one to the rule of the few to the rule of the many in a cycle of change. None fostered the trust of the people to which the system must be based upon if it is to escape the turmoil of transitions from one to few to many. We have but only begun to set the stage of this story. For as all roads once led to Rome, our journey leads us to James Harrington who shall answer our quest. Where we have failed to find solutions in this chapter, the next shall surely offer us the beginning of how to make such a search for answers.

What we have learned is that for a system to work, it must have a union of three elements, the one, the few and the many. Thus far, the element of the many has not been found. Either by ideology or mistrust, our thinkers have given the short stick to the population and as such broken faith not only with themselves but also with their own ideas in contradicting themselves. We have mentioned land reform often. As it is the root of the power of these

agrarian systems, it must in some way be addressed so to balance the power of ownership so that the people in some way also have the power. If they cannot have land, they cannot hope to balance the power of the few or the one. Thus, what every system must address is the third leg, the people. They must be empowered by some manner or means so that they have access to power, or its source the land.

Chapter Two:

The Quest Begins Anew

Phenomenology posits that we must start an inquiry with an object, to enframe and make clear what the boundaries of the object are. To do this we must establish what we are about to do and what we have already done, hence the call for a needed methodology to understand what we have accomplished so far and what is to come. For our object is government, what matters now is how to understand it so that we can rationally create a framework that will last and not be caught in cycle of change, upheaval and revolt. What has thus been done by assertion¹, shall be made clear in this chapter. In order to proceed and understand what Harrington was trying to do with his writings, we must first understand what methodology Harrington has been using. What so far has been mere demonstrated by historical events and thinkers in the first chapter will now become explicit. Yet for all of his writing's Harrington is not a political philosopher, but a

¹ We have not yet attempted to describe the methodology in the first chapter. It has merely been accepted as they way

political theorist. The difference while we have touched upon it in the first chapter is seemingly a matter of mere words. It is rather more complicated and requires some thoughts and explanation to see the difficulty in trying to form a methodology from a theorist as opposed to doing so from a philosopher's point of view. Once it is clear why Harrington is not sufficient for the task of creating a methodology, we will need to obtain the thoughts of a political philosopher whom we may use to flesh out the short words of Harrington.

"The idea of 'the state as a work of art,' which clearly motives the discussion of the creation of the Commonwealth of Oceana, is fundamentally opposed to the belief that the political scientist seeks only to understand the operation of the laws of politic. The difference here is between the active creator and the passive observer. In Harrington's case, however, it is probably a mistake to insist in any such clear and logical separation;" there is no doubt that he believed firmly in both ideas."

to proceed. Thus, we must make clear why this path is the best direction to take in our exposition.

"Why is it that when a commentator has something they have failed to grasp in a writer the error rest squarely with the author and not the readers lack of insight?

"Charles Blitzer. An Immortal Commonwealth. Ibid. P. 107.

Even the excellent work of Charles Blitzer fails when called upon to explain this problem¹¹¹. How is it possible that Harrington could hold two such ideas in a clear and logical separation and still be consistent? Hither to this work, the question was answered by more questions that went into tertiary issues that are not at all that convincing. Thus, we first will delineate the difference between a political philosopher and a political theorist so that we may have a clear difference. Then we will demonstrate that the method Harrington had used to establish his theory is more than mere rhetoric, or ideology, but useable to show a strong understanding of the philosophic implications in his work. The key to understanding Harrington rests with his often quoted words, that:

"No man can be a politician except he be first a historian or a traveler;¹¹² for except he can see what must be, or what may be, he is no politician: Now if he has no knowledge of the story (History)¹¹³ he cannot tell what has been and if he has not been a traveler he cannot

¹¹¹ Not surprising as he had but one vision with which to see it. Lacking a more interdisciplinary view, he is subject to those limitations.

¹¹² Harrington's choice of words has lead to the problem itself of understanding his ideas. By allow for the reader to choice one or the other people have missed the linkage and union needed of both travel and history. Notably:

R. H. Tawney. Ibid. P. 7.

¹¹³My insert

tell what is; but he that neither knows¹¹³ what has been, nor what is, can never tell what must be or what may be..¹¹⁴

Harrington was not a politician, but a political theorist, so he did both. His work concerns history and the learning's of his travels, both of which are topics often remarked upon by scholars and need not be restated here.¹¹⁵ What we need is a philosopher to guide us into Harrington who has a theory of politic science that contains both history and travel as the means to understand the issues before them? The problem is that traveling is not considered an advantage to deeper meanings and understanding. Certainly, not one issued from the great philosophy tomes, but merely the travel logs of best sights to see. As such, travel, in the act of doing so is less than a serious thinkers resting place for knowledge. Thus, we will have to do something about that to explain this such that it makes any sense at all to Harrington's work and political theory in general. As Bertrand Russell wrote:

¹¹³I have altered Harrington's words to conform more to modern usage here.

¹¹⁴Russell Smith, Harrington and His Oceana. Ibid. P. 18. Quoting Toland's work P. 183. And Blitzer, Ibid. P. 102.

¹¹⁵Mostly it is used to explain their theory on what Harrington meant by Balance. I refer to Raab, Blitzer, and Downs etc.

"Every man, where he goes, is encompassed by a cloud of comforting convictions, which move with him like flies on a summer day."¹⁶

The flies represent a person *Weltanschauung* or worldview. This would include their myths, politics, moral codes and norms that they instinctively hold to be true, the Praxis¹⁷ of man.¹⁸ This would also include the things they may have seen on their journey. On a similar thought, Walter Lippman wrote:

"At The core of every moral code there is a picture of human nature, a map of the universe, and a version of history. To human nature (of the sort conceived), in a universe (of the kind imagined), after a history (so understood), the rules of the code apply."¹⁹

The *Weltanschauung* or worldview of a person presence itself in the world by the manner in which they act and judge.²⁰ Thomas Sowell discussed in his work²¹ that there

¹⁶Bertrand Russell. Skeptical Essays. (New York: Norton, 1938.) P. 28.

¹⁷Fortin. Ibid. For a full discussion of the meaning of Praxis as part of judgement, please read the definition of the word in Fortin. Ibid. P. X.

¹⁸The word Man is used throughout this work in the philosophical meaning. As such, it is the non-discriminatory English version of *Menche*, meaning person in German.

¹⁹Walter Lippman. Public Opinion. (New York: Free Press, 1965.) P. 80.

²⁰Fortin. Ibid.

²¹Thomas Sowell. A Conflict of Visions. (New York: Quell, 1987.)

are two visions of any issue or idea.¹¹¹ These two views are mutually exclusive. Hence, they exist in a perpetual conflict (of visions) towards any issue imaginable. This conflict divides the world by two, placing all people into one group or another. (He calls them the constrained and unconstrained visions.) From Russell's flies to Lippman's code and Sowell's visions, we see that people have a manner of seeing the world around them (*Weltanschauung*) that produces the paradigm of thought that then produces the interaction that we have and hold in our dealings and thinking patterns with the world and others. This judgement heuristic or mental shortcut is an approximate rule for problem solving.¹¹² Since all people have such person mannerism, the result is that they do not always match or agree with those positions held by others. This creates conflict between individuals.

"... They do not agree on what is wrong or what to do about. When there is no agreement not only on the cure but on the diagnosis itself, it is very hard to treat the patient."¹¹³

¹¹¹In fact, he is wrong there are three.

¹¹²Elliot Aronson. The Social Animal 8th ed. (New York: Worth Publishing, 1999.) P. 134.

¹¹³John Searle. "The Storm over the University." in Paul Berman, eds. Debating P.C. (New York: Dell, 1992.) P. 87.

Individual conflict is not measurable on the level of the person, except in scientific statistical research such as an opinion poll or social research. To do scientific research we must step back from individuals to a collection of individuals sometimes called groups, collective, or nations that are classified by some manner or means of intellectual designation. Data collection is the key to understanding these group dynamics. We have divided this datum collection into different area better to study it. The study of people is divided into different disciplines such as sociology, history, economics or political science, etc. Collectively we call these disciplines the social sciences. "Social Science is composed of three fundamental elements: theory, research method and statistics."¹ Yet this is not a claim to the perfection of the "science" but merely a classification. We have at the base, the *Weltanschauung* or worldview of a person. At the top, we have divine truth, such as a deity might offer to its followers. Somewhere in between, we have social science, history is but one of many disciplines. As such, we must remove from Harrington his *Weltanschauung* such that we can

¹Earl Babbie. The Practice of Social Research. (New York: Wadsworth, 1995.) P. 37.

find and use his method for political science so that we can better understand his ideas. However, we must keep in mind the needs of social research in that we have a scientific reliable methodology to which we can follow. As we cannot ask of Harrington to speak to us today to render his excellent of judgements, we must extract from his thoughts a methodology that is consistent with his own work. Thus far, academia has failed to the task, making this even more important to understanding Harrington's work.

Yet what if this produces a disagreement on a fundamental level or question? What if the method used for classification is in disagreement? What if deities argue over their divinity? Just as individuals disagree in their *Weltanschauung*, what can be done when our manner of understanding the collection of data on these phenomena is in disagreement? We must step back from this level into a more basic understanding of the world. It is not even possible to offer a settlement for a war between deities. Yet we can find some means or method to which we may settle disagreements of science. A philosophic understanding of the social science approach is created, a theory of how to

form theories. Thomas Kuhn¹¹⁶ would call these theories' paradigms. Therefore, our goal must be to extract from Harrington not only his methodology but as well a theory that includes a means of settlement that is applicable to correct the errors in judgement as they arise. In other words, any group of fools can lead where there is no disagreement. However, as often is the case, when you have two or more differing opinions, a need to resolve such a conflict must be asserted, created or derived. The burden we bear is heavy for these goal posts continue to recede from our view. Thus, it is not surprising that the commentators of Harrington have not been up to the task. The problem rest with the scope of interest they approach Harrington with. They come with a narrow field of thought and expect Harrington to fit their narrow field of vision.

Therefore, we must ask just what is the supposed benefit from one's travel and knowledge of history that Harrington would hold to be valuable? The simplest association we may find is to see what there is to see but as we have seen this is surely not enough. We need

¹¹⁶Thomas Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.)

The Essential Tension. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.)

something more in-depth than a simple sight seeing tour to hold as our method. We turn to the theory of art. For art is a sight of the perfection, whereas to travel and see the world can also easily be to see the perfection's of the world, i.e. in real politic terms, what the French Kings does well (the perfect), the Spanish king does not do so well, but in another policy area, the Spanish king is superior. So as a traveler goes from country to country, much as Harrington did, they pick up the perfection of this area and amass the art of government before moving on to the next location to see its "sites". In Harrington's case, by travel he means that a person should be going to see what government policy was in different states of Europe in the narrow sense of the argument¹¹. As well, we have the same problem from Harrington's call, to complete his theory, with history. We must reflect away from the simple example of the event to gather core principles that surrounds it. From the instant, we must gather the general principle of it¹². Yet in philosophical terms, this type of research is not thorough enough but there is the salvation

¹¹However, we focus on this aspect solely for clarity sake. It should not be confused as the sole implication of Harrington's argument. Other things in any given society are nonetheless important in our understanding.

of this idea. Since the notion of sight or any sense is linked to aesthetics by way of art. As well, History must be regulated by a theory of history such as dialectical materialism or teleology. We can proceed to see the need to relate Harrington notion of politics having something to do with both history (teleology) and see the sights of the world, or the aesthetics of the world. Thus, our political philosopher must have a theory that rests with both History and Aesthetics, justifying them both as being useful for his position and providing some means or manner in which to adjudicate differences of opinion. That would lead us directly to the door of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement.¹¹¹ In this work, Kant unites both history and aesthetics into a workable political theory. This would thus give us a more in-depth theory to use, a methodology, a means of adjudication and the one thing that Harrington does but does not explore, a theory of values, morality and virtue. However, the reader should bear in mind that the claim, presented later, is that Kant has taken from Harrington his basis for political theory. Their

¹¹¹I.e. The phenomenology discussed earlier in this chapter.
¹¹²Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, (New York: Macmillan, 1951) As well as Fortin Ibid. Where we discuss the specific details of Kant's theory.

identification with each other is naturally in accordance. Less we argue in circles, let us take the issue apart and proceed slowly to build the case. First, who is this man we speak of, James Harrington. A basic biography of his life will familiarizes the reader with some of the important events in his life. Second, by what evidence do we have to support the asserted connection of Harrington to Kant? Thirdly, the reasoning on why such a connection is vital to make, hence why we need to justify a leap from political theory of Harrington to the political philosophy of Kant. We shall also raise the objection that Harrington as well as Kant's methodology of using any concept of History is doomed to fail. Finally, we will see the deeper understanding of Harrington, which we may derive from such a connection to further our journey.

James Harrington was born on 3 January 1611, the eldest son of eight children in his family. His father died before he reached the age of majority. In 1629, he entered Trinity College Oxford as Gentleman Commoner. He left without earning his degree to travel Europe, specifically, Denmark, Germany, France and Italy. He joined up with a military regiment, but never saw battle, in the Netherlands as part of his travels. Upon his return to England, he was

chosen to join Charles I as a Gentleman of the Bedchambers in 1646 when Parliament sent a delegation to the King. He was fired from his position by the parliament for uncertain reasons but most likely, as they felt he had become too friendly with the King. His friendship with King Charles I ended with the King's execution. Harrington may have even been there to watch the death of his friend. His writing career lasted from 1656 with the publication of The Commonwealth of Oceana and ended in 1660. With the death of Cromwell, and the restoration of the King, Harrington was arrested on the 28 December 1661. In prison, his health collapsed. He would never fully recover. He died 11 September 1677. In 1700, John Toland would release a collection of his works including his last essay, written in 1662 just after his illness called The Mechanics of Nature. We have only Toland as the source that Harrington had indeed written this work. It was not published before Toland's collection.

Our next question to consider is whether Kant would have taken his political theory from Harrington. The factual evidence to be considered here must be separated from the philosophical similarities. (We will get to them only after we consider if we should do so.) The chain of

evidence starts with David Hume. We know that Kant had read Hume, due to his many references. The most well know being the "dogmatic slumber"¹ that Hume awakened Kant from. Is it any great leap to assume that Kant read Hume's works that are more political? In fact, we may acknowledge that the two as having read the same people. In Hume's "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth",² we find him

"The Republic of Plato and the Utopia of Sir Thomas More. The Oceana is the only valuable model of a commonwealth that has yet been offered to the public."³

In Kant, we find:

"Plato's The Republic⁴, More's The Utopia, Harrington's Oceana and Allais' Severambia have been successively brought on the scene, but never so much as been tried"⁵

¹ Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena. (Lasalle III.: Open Court, 1990.) P. 7.

² The article found in David Hume, Moral and Political Philosophy. Ibid.

³ Ibid. P 374.

⁴ Note that Kant calls this work the Atlantica. However, I have altered the texts to it more modern name of The Republic.

⁵ "Es ist doch süß, sich Staatsverfassungen auszudenken, die den Forderungen der Vernunft (vornehmlich in rechtlicher Absicht) entsprechen: aber vermessen, sie vorzuschlagen, und strafbar, das Volk zur Abschaffung der jetzt bestehenden aufzuwiegeln. Platos Atlantica, Morus' Utopia, Harrington's Oceana und Allais' Severambia sind nach und nach auf die Bühne gebracht, aber nie (Cromwells verunglückte Mißgeburt einer despotischen Republik ausgenommen) auch nur versucht worden."

The similarity of these texts is astonishing to call a mere coincidence. It leaves us two choices here. If we assume it is a coincidence than we must accept that Hume and Kant have read the same authors. Thus we have the basic link of Kant to Harrington established. If we assume that Kant read Hume to find these sources, than we still have our link of Kant to Harrington. Hume praises Harrington's work in the essay. Either way we can say that Kant knew of Harrington's work. The next step would be to find out which work did Kant read. Our case would be weakened if Kant had only read small parts of Harrington. However, we have another piece to consider. Kant writes:

"Such a person usually sticks to his opinion, like Harrington, the gifted author of Oceana, who had the whim that his transpiration¹³⁵ (...) jumped from his skin in the form of flies. (...) Harrington perhaps desired to point out only the similarity to a feeling of jumping off, rather than actually seeing these flies."¹³⁶

Kant. The conflict of the Faculties. (Lincoln Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1979.) P. 166 in German, 167 in English.

¹³⁵ (sic) Perspiration? Perhaps Kant was being charitable. Harrington is clearly referring to his sweat.

¹³⁶ "So hatte der geistvolle Verfasser der Oceana, Harrington, die Grille, daß seine Ausdünstungen (effluvia) in Form der Fliegen von seiner Haut absprangen. Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic point of view. (Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press. 1996.) P. 118.

This quote is rich in useful information. First, it is a very charitable reading of Harrington's Mechanics of Nature. Secondly, it is a reading of this work. Kant would never take such a stand and express an opinion on what Harrington was thinking if he had not read the work in the first place. What this tells us however is so much more important. For Kant to have read the Mechanics of nature, he would have to have access to a copy of Toland's work, collecting all of Harrington's papers. As such, it is clear that Kant had read Harrington's work, or is it? We may raise some further objections to this position. First, did Kant read English? Second, where did he get a copy of Harrington's work? Finally, Harrington's major idea was on land reform yet Kant does not mention it. However, these objections are merely the appearance of contradicting our position. First, it matter's not what language Kant read, and we need not show how he got his copy of Toland's collection. The evidence is there that he had indeed read Harrington's work The Mechanics of Nature that is only available from Toland's collection. In some way, he read it, and again in some way he received a copy of it. We could check Kant's library, if there was a copy of Toland's

in the collection¹²⁷, we could be one hundred percent positive he had read it. However, as that piece of evidence is not available, its lack is not evidence of a lack of proof, merely showing a lack of evidence.¹²⁸ We need not show that Kant has kept a copy on his bedside, merely that he has read the work. We would be hard pressed to produce a copy of Hume's works either. The final objection concerning Kant's lack of concern for property reform is more tenuous. We may never know why Kant did not address property reform. Perhaps it is merely that the subject lacked philosophical overtones to warrant his effort. Perhaps he never had the time to consider the issue. The answer may forever elude us. However, does this damage our claim? If we were to claim that Kant is merely copying Harrington's work, then it would. However, the claim is that Kant has taken his political methodology from Harrington. By showing that Kant has indeed read Harrington, we have crossed the first hurdle. Kant had access to the ideas. The key question is Kant's theory of politics similar enough to Harrington so

¹²⁷It is not there, despite e-mailing across Germany, Europe and North America, researching many sources in the library. Kant's library is mostly of unpublished manuscripts.

¹²⁸His library is mostly of traded works with his publisher. If he had a copy he passed it on to others or gave it to his friends

that we may use Kant to further our understanding of Harrington. For that, we shall proceed into the next section.

Theory versus Philosophy

Before this journey must turn from Harrington to Kant, we must ask should we take this path in the first place. Are there sufficient grounds for us to justify a need to use a philosopher to further our understanding of Harrington, even if that philosopher has taken his theory directly from Harrington? For in all his works, Harrington is not a political philosopher but a theorist. We have mentioned this distinction before when we discussed Cicero's difference to Plato and Aristotle. However, to make this path more clearly, the reason we are using Kant is that he has taken his political theory from Harrington and imported it into a system of philosophy. Harrington for all his works did not produce a system of philosophy thus making a clear understanding of his methodology a difficult chore indeed. Harrington's readers must draw out from the texts his methods in order to create a Meta theory behind his thinking. Using Kant, we need not make that step

ourselves for Kant has already done it for us. We, thus begin this effort with the question of what difference, if any, is there between a political philosopher and a political theorist. Will it help us to use a philosopher to read a theorist? By what reason do we hold this difference to have any possible meaning, not only for our case at hand but also in the general scheme, for we have already made such a call in the first chapter to there being a difference. The most obvious difference would be the subject matter. Yet one is forced to concede that they are both writing on the same subject of politics. Yet is there a difference in how they approach the subject at hand? Herein lies our distinction, in political theory the object is to create a system that is applicable to the actual events of the world and the relationship of governments to those events in the managing and shaping of them. Both Harrington and Cicero attempt to do this.¹³⁹ Political philosophy is not concerned at all with such policy but with the implications of the theory regarding aesthetics, metaphysics and epistemology, the fundamental subjects of knowledge. One is an active relationship to the subject;

¹³⁹Both failed but that is not important to our consideration.

while the other is more reflective and passive (*Vita Activa* verses the *Vita contemplativa*).¹⁷ Theory and philosophy overlap in the subject matter but then take very different directions. Theory aims for the result of public policy, action philosophy aims for the result of epistemology, aesthetics, and metaphysics, certainly a more passive result. If we were to draw a line, we could then add to arrows pointing in different directions, away from each other. The line would be the subject matter. The arrows would represent the theorist and the philosophy each has the same common area but aimed in different directions. With this distinction in hand, we must then acknowledge that there are those who are both Political theorists and philosophers. One such person is John Locke whom we will touch upon later. There are many other such persons. Aristotle to Hobbes and beyond, all have works that rest on both directions to the line, in our illustration above. Because of this difference and union, one must be very careful in labeling who is a theorist or philosopher as such.

¹⁷ For a discussion of this, see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. Ibid. P. 7-17.

Note that her distinctions are the reverse of those used here.

Pocock offers his own unique view on this distinction as merely the usage of language.

"For the historian it is primarily, I think, the study of language used in a particular society to discuss political problems and of the light thrown, often inadvertently by the use of that language upon the character of that society and the events taking place in it. For the political scientist it is - somewhat more abstractly - the study of the rise and the role of political language in a society's political activity, or in the political activity of society in general. Lastly, the political philosopher studies the ideas of the past with a view to seeing which of them are worth using, rephrasing, criticizing or employing as the foundation of other propositions in the making of statements about political abstractly considered."

As such, historians are looking at language used in the past. Political scientists at the different language used to express opinions and political theorists are looking for the value in the language. He writes further that:

"... About 1956 the subversion of political philosophy by linguistic analysis helped to liberate the history of political thought by converting it from a history of systematization (...) into one of linguistic use and sophistication..."

Somehow, this difference is less than useful. While it is true that the work is based on language and the writings

J. G. A. Pocock. Politics, Language and Time. (New York: Atheneum, 1971.) P. 104.

of people, all three groups are not dealing with some texts of a literary author. This is not an exercise in literary critique but of finding out the events. Pocock has placed his emphasis on the writings as they had no place or action associated with them. The historian's job is not to tell us what language was used but from the words contained in the written record explain the physical actions that are the events of history. The political theorist is attempting to create a theory so that those actions of people can be channeled into such a way to better the society. Finally, the political philosopher is looking into the value, the universal notion of an action. Pocock's effort to render the issue merely one for word's smiths has taken the words out of contexts and away from what they were meant to be, the record of actions. The words themselves, used in whatever way, altered over time, etc. are merely the manner by which we express the event of physical actions. They have value only as far as they are connected to actions. Without the action, those words are meaningless. Pocock's distinction is thus dismissed to the realm of literary criticism and not the difference between history, political theory and political philosophy that necessarily demand an

..Ibid. P.12.

associated action. For our purposes, it is enough to note that Harrington's work is not as philosophically deep as Kant's work but that one compliments the other so that we may use Kant to further our understanding of Harrington's goals," even if the linkage is more complimentary than actual. Kant's work being the more philosophical has the easier time in being made into a universal understanding than Harrington's work."

History

James Harrington's work has been described as:

"The Commonwealth of Oceana is a long tedious book, overburdened with trivial details endless citations of historical and literary authorities."⁴⁵

While his work may indeed be tedious to the political scientist, the historian finds it refreshing to see a political thinker turning to and actually using history for their understanding. Yet this is where Harrington also has

"It should be noted that they are both working towards the same goals. Though it may not be possible to show a link between the two men directly, it is clear in my mind that they both have the same position on what the political state should hold.

"Refer back to the beginning of this chapter where we discussed the nature of understanding and that we must attempt to have universal understanding of a subject and remove our concepts from mere subjective opinion to the more scholarly and frankly clearer understanding contained in a philosophical understanding.

problems, as the historians have searched out his source material to find it sometimes incorrect, or exaggerated. For example Harrington's use of Donato Gianotti's Libro de la republica du Venitiani is often his "major source of information (and occasionally misinformation) concerning the history of Venice."¹⁰ Historian Trevor Roper has remarked that Harrington was "singularly vague as to the dates and stages" he uses.¹¹ As well

"In Harrington's case, ignorance of late medieval history seems to explain the vagueness and the ideal state of things is an extremely generalized description of things."¹²

As such, we have the curious position that for a man who had demanded of the politician that they have the understanding of history to have his own history in doubt. Raising a fundamental issue of just what is this thing we call history and what claim it may have to validity. In so doing we shall raise some objections that are very modern. We will show that Harrington's use of historical examples

¹⁰Charles Blitzer. The Political Writings of James Harrington. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955. P. xxii.

¹¹Blitzer. Ibid. P. 40

Charles Blitzer. An Immortal Commonwealth. Ibid. P. 299-300.

Michael Downs. James Harrington. (Boston: Twayne Publishers. 1977.) P. 88.

¹²J. G. A. Pocock. The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law. Ibid. P. 141

is not simply an effort to illustrate his ideas but to draw out the principles from within those examples such that they may offer the lesson learnt. Essentially making his work a primitive attempt at social science that we presently use. Harrington was trying to grasp with history its values, not by means of the specific events and specific virtues but by extracting the moral tale from within to show the universal value of the prudence derived from the event. In other words, by using Kant we are merely following Harrington's own method, taking from him not his specific words but the prudence we may find in the universalization of his work, the philosophy behind it.

We may begin our attack on Harrington upon the modern and more abstract grounds that his use of history is incorrect. It is mere opinion, hence subjective. This is more than an attack on the philosophy of Harrington for it is, as well, an attack on the concept of objective history held by historians of today¹¹. It will become apparent that this problem is an amphibole or a word used in two meanings. What is meant by objective history is that which

¹¹Ibid. P. 142.

¹²The arguments expressed here are derived from Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. (London: Penguin, 1993) P. 47. The whole article is on the subject of history.

is done by modern historians, the attempt to ferret out just what happened in the days of yore. Historians rightly claim that they are "objective," not "subjective" as historians of the past have been and some still are. These words, "subject, object" have philosophical implications. Historians are not philosophers and as such do not deem the question worthy of efforts to answer, understand or refute. It is not their area of specialization or indeed their concern. This is where the solution of interdisciplinary studies can be found. Philosophers claim that "objective" implies a claim that leads to the absolute of impartiality⁵¹. There are no absolutes. Therefore, there can be no objective history. The second claim on objective history is that historians are subjective in what they are writing. As they select what they wish to include and what they exclude.⁵² The philosopher, Hannah Arendt, holds this view. She claims that history is subjective, simply by what questions are asked and what evidence is used to answer the question.⁵³ The philosopher seems to be right, mostly because there are so few interdisciplinary people who have knowledge of both sides of this problem that can answer

⁵¹ Arendt. Ibid. P. 52.

⁵² Ibid. P.49-50.

such objections. Historians, as much as philosophers have their own language, terms or jargon. This is where the amphibole occurs. When history is called "objective," historians mean different things from what philosophers believe that they mean. Modern historians claim they are objective, meaning not biased or partial, to the history they are telling. They have no stake in writing something that is pleasing to the person paying them to write. They are not claiming that their writings are absolutely perfect or even error free, just as free as possible of partiality. Modern historians are writing for themselves or better put, for the community at large and not for some noble who must be flattered by what is written. They are answerable not to their paymaster but to the historians who read their work. Arendt claims that this is exactly why they have lost objectivity. They are writing out of their own self-interests.¹² Their goal is not pay, praise or honors but to the stern demanding G*d of knowledge. This is why others scrutinize their writings so heavily in their own profession, so that the discipline maintains itself at a level of impartiality consistent with its own valuation. As

¹²Ibid.

¹³Arendt. Ibid. P. 53.

such using the exact same evidence, Arendt has reached the opposite conclusion. Thus, we are forced to seek not an absolute answer to this question but rather to seek a use value. This would be found in the differentiation of the historian who is trying to stick with the known facts to the ideologist who is using or even altering history so that they can make a point in their ideological argument. By lumping all of them together into one group of 'subjective historian's, none are considered for their own acts. Similar to Arendt's own argument found in Eichmann In Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil, that to lay the blame for the Holocaust on all Germans is to see that none are punished for their crimes. The guilty are thus spared the true burden of their actions.

However, if we look at these charges on the level of evidence, we shall see that philosophy will still refute itself. The defense of the historian from the first charge, seemingly prove the second charge. The historians writing for themselves means that they are written subjectively. Hence, they cannot claim to be objective. Yet the historians have a defense to this charge of being subjective. Historians have only a small part of the record of human history, 5000 years of written history to 50 000

years of existence. Written records have been kept for only 5000 years when man began to write. Of those 5000 years, any one paper, papyrus or books can only contain a small part or percentage of the many more works that have been lost to the ravages of times in those 5000 years of written record. To use Aristotle, the first philosopher to attack the idea of the absolute, we will find that the objections of philosophers are wrong. No knowledge would be created if we took the totality of 5000 years of subjective occurrences. We would simply have a series of events with no connection. For in the act of connection, the occurrences would demand that we have a Meta theory to do so. If history were purely subjective, then there would not be any Meta theory to make such a connection. Take your hand, and count the fingers. If your count were truly subjective, you would count, one, one, and one. For even if you cannot count (one, two, another and another), you have to in some way imply a connection of the fingers to each other. This is a basic Meta theory for fingers, with each finger being different from the other in real terms. Your thumb is stronger, thicker in size and more useful than your ring finger. To connect them together involves a Meta theory of fingers. The subjective instants of history, to

grow beyond being a mere finger into "fingers" must have a Meta theory, an objective difference that may be used to create a union of ideas. At best then, in the case of history, there would be a Meta theory for one person but different for the next. So still, the claim of history being subjective is substantiated. History however is not yet dead. For what is history, but a theory of knowledge? Knowledge is that which is abstracted out of the specific into the general and not the subject instances that all 5000 years of existing records are. As such, we have yet another level that unites the Meta theories of history, awkward to phrase it so, but there is a Meta, Meta theory for history as well. Epistemology, the study of knowledge has had a long history, since the day we began to ask philosophical questions. We need not cover the whole of this long debate to realize that historians have their own method of epistemology at work here that they adhere to, that are not the methods of philosophy. They have an epistemology of history that is as rich and complex as that of philosophy's own epistemology. Similarly, a philosophy of science is not itself science.¹² A historian must

¹² Heidegger's famous quote: "The being of a Being is not a Being"

abstract some small part of this totality of the surviving written records, out of the total possible written record, for there to be any knowledge of history at all. This abstracted part of the 5000 years of written records is that which is called objective history and is called knowledge. The last remain aspect of this erudition must deal with the facts of history themselves. While most people, i.e. the non-scholar, see only the final products of history, the textbooks, this is not what historical studies are all about. Merely showing the conclusions does not represent the totality of historical research. Evidence that is either lacking or contradictory must in some way be judged to its merit. From that judgement, issued in the form of conclusions, the community in turn judges the historian. History is as cantankerous as any other discipline in that disputes over the relative value of evidence should be weighted. Science must issue conclusion of experiments to be reproduced by other scientists, so too are the conclusions of historians published to be accepted by historians. In the struggle the result may not be the facts of the event as it happened, they are as close as mere mortals suffering human frailty can judge them.

Yet have we not committed the same error that we dismissed the first objection with. We have used subjective in its absolute form and not as they would hold it to mean. They would hold it to mean that historians are subjective in that they bring with them their own *Weltanschauung*, and that effect' the way they view and interpret their data. This is a rather common error in which one imposes ones own values from one's own time onto the subject of history. While that is true that we do bring our world view to the study of history, to posit that this effects the historian's judgement is to postulate their immaturity and lack of professionalism, which is an attack on the person (*ad nomen*) and illogical. As such, we need not deal with it any more than dismiss it. We need not lower the level of debate to name calling and self-affirming remarks. Those who have a claim to being historians also have a claim to having a methodology that is as scientific and repeatable in the way they present history such that while it is not science, it is not subjective either. It is objective to their understanding within their discipline and not subject to clarification from all disciplines. Hence, Arendt and these objections are wrong. There is objective history. We can thus proceed.

Yet we still have not offered any answers to what is this thing Harrington would call history. The need to look at history must be understood in Harrington's work first, by what it is not. It is not "Ancient Prudence". It is not natural law. History deals with the need to know the reasoning of man and not the accidents of fortune such as Machiavelli might hold. We seek history in conjunction with aesthetics to have an overview of the possible systems of government, as in our case, and use aesthetics to single out the best or more perfect system from the sum totality of historical examples. Ancient Prudence is the search to the past to see what history will tell us about the limits of governing humanity. By taking the events of history and comparing them to aesthetics, the beautiful, we may deduce the Ancient Prudence of man's ideas. It is not the event itself, used to illustrate his point, but the lesson learned from it. To have the prudence to know where a government should seek policy solutions from in the past that have created solutions and not more problems. Thus, he is trying to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past that have stood the test of time to offer stark warnings against. Ideas such as checks and balances or political virtue, which have been dealt with or will be later, are

examples of ancient prudence. Yet it is also not a reference to a direct event. It is an abstraction of the events of history so that while Harrington's source of history may be called into doubt, it is not an effective counter argument against his views. Harrington's case is to use the examples from history to illustrate the principle that he is deriving from them, the ancient prudence. The derivation is not from a single source but from a collection of them, similar to the method a modern historian would: the Meta, Meta theory we have spoken of above. Thus, the single example may well be very wrong without casting a negative aspersion unto the thoughts extracted from the many examples in history. Thus, where Harrington's work is flawed by his use of erroneous historical sources, his point is not lost, for it is not an effort to assert the validity of the event but to extract the prudence learned from the ancients. His work may indeed be tedious with details, but those details are offered not for the single event of note. Harrington uses them to form the bases of his derivation for the principles to which would form the bases of ancient prudence.

Harrington called this ancient prudence and not natural law for a very good reason as well. Natural law is

derived by some association to nature, not an understanding of history and the past mistakes. Seemingly, this difference is of little importance, what is the difference if we take our lessons from nature or if we take from history? Yet as we shall see this difference is of the utmost importance in the system that results. Machiavelli may be seen as taking human behavior as nothing more than the effects of nature, Fortune controlling the events. Hobbes, as well, takes a serious look at the notion of man in nature and derives a theory that is not accepted or even liked by Harrington. Since the notion of natural law rests upon nature, it would be of no further value than if we were to rest our foundation on fate. Yet the notion of ancient prudence involves the use of reason. Prudence is by definition a faculty of reason and reasoning. Nature just "is". Harrington is not attempting to assert a modified version of Machiavelli⁵³ but rather a break from the emotionalism of government by whims of fate to that of the intellectualization of the process from a government of men to that of law. Government should not rest on the ability of the Prince but on the rules of law derived from reason.

⁵³Though he likes and often praises Machiavelli in his writings, Harrington is not in agreement with him.

Men may indeed be creature of fate as Machiavelli holds, but even if this is true, the fate of government need not rest upon this fate. William Harvey, (1578-1657) who discovered the circulation of blood within the body, is often praise by Harrington as an excellent example of the inductive or scientific method.¹⁷ Harrington writes:

"Which is as if a man should tell famous Harvey that he transcribed his circulation of the blood not out of the principles of nature, but out of the anatomy of this or that body."¹⁸

Harrington is attempting to extract a science of thought on the principles of government using his abstractions of history and judging them against aesthetics for their worth and value.

Kant

We have asked ourselves a number of questions to reach this point. We have raised all manner of objections and still we have not found one objection that can stand up to scrutiny. Therefore, based on the evidence presented and the objections overcome, we may allow ourselves to turn to Kant for a better understanding of this project of

¹⁷Blitzer. The Political Writings of James Harrington. Ibid. P. 42.n7

Harrington that he call's History and travel. In order to understand the actions of the past we must have some theory to which we use to understand this information, an epistemology of history. We can block out this theory by starting at the lowest point and working our way up to teleology. The basis for our thought rests within each of us, our rationality or our ability to think, and common sense. We need not explore that we have rationality; however, the phrase common sense needs to be defined. According to Kant, common sense can be further explained as:

"1) To think for one self; 2) to put ourselves in thought in the place of everyone else; 3) always think consistently."¹⁴

This seems to be self-explanatory but unrelated to history. So let us do so now and relate common sense to history. If we look at the points in reverse, thinking consistently as if we were in the thoughts of another who was thinking for themselves, we place limits on what we can judge from history or what we can abstract from the historical event. (It is also the shoals upon which we

¹⁴ Ibid. Which are both supports for Harrington's turn to reason as well as his use of historical examples, as we have seen.

¹⁵ Critique Of Judgement, Ibid. P. 134-135

crashed Arendt's profound attack on our position concerning history. She attempted to go beyond the limits of history such that it met with philosophy. We found that her theory could not consistently hold with her other works.) We may not assume that the storming of the Bastille was done to start the French Revolution for that would be inconsistent with thinking in that person's place doing the action of attacking the Bastille. They would not know or even care how we would classify or categorize their actions as the "start of the French Revolution". Yet they would be undertaking an action that was based on reason, their specific reasons, reason that is known only to the people themselves. We may not claim to be mind readers. If we assume that they were acting for any other reason besides the specifics of their action, we have violated Kant's rule of thinking for one's self number two, to put ourselves into their place. In understanding the action, we must place ourselves into the actor's place to discover not our own understanding of the event, but what their understanding of the event in question. This result in the creation of a doctrine for the understanding of history called teleology. We use thinking, as a guide for action, for common sense is never a passive thing, it is "the mode

of thought"¹³⁶. It involves an action. By placing ourselves into the position of the actor, we may determine their actions only as far as they result in actions. A person attacking the Bastille may be thinking of Lunch, however, we the observer, would have no rational way in which to know it. What we know is they attacked the Bastille for some reason. Since we may not import our own views and we may not read their minds, we must allow the actions to speak for themselves as if this was the only purpose that the actor had in mind. Over time, the combined collective actions of people will result in creating a system of public policies that are designed to respond to the actions of the people. Such that the government need not have a mob storm their 'Bastille' in their time. Over time and in the fullness of history, we create ancient prudence based on the lessons learned. For Harrington, he turned to the ancients, like Venice, Rome and Athens. Kant turned to the French Revolution for his inspiration. Both used their "history" to draw out the principles of the event such that we may learn, grow and build on them.

"Kant's system of the public right is at once radical and conservative, imposing on the moral actor

¹³⁶Ibid. P. 136.

conflicting demands. Like Kant himself, who both applauded and abhorred the French Revolution, the citizens long for perfect justice but obey the imperfect laws which history subjects him."¹⁰¹

Can it not be said that Harrington was writing Oceana as a means to create a system of perfect justice but drawn out of the prudence inherited by the history he had learned judge by the notion of what would be a perfect system¹⁰²?

"In the end a system must answer to both demands, of the perfect and imperfect, of history and of the now. It must in some way transcend the boundaries of the two, to merge into something new. Yet the system must be ruled by neither, yet can answer to both. Somehow, this system must bridge the gap between praxis and theory or ideology. For in history we have teleology that begins a path to end this contradiction."¹⁰³

For teleology is the system in which we are examining the actions of the past without importing our own thoughts upon the actors nor is it the mere surrender to the will of nature such as determinism or even Machiavelli's concept of fortune. Like an audience, we must simply sit and watch the actors say their lines. When the play is over we then may judge them and their actions as to our values, our morality

¹⁰¹ Shell, Ibid. P. 167.

¹⁰² A perfect system would be on that was in balance to end the system of cycles that Polybius wrote of.

¹⁰³ Fortin. Ibid. P.31.

and ethics¹²³. We take what we judge is right to our values and condemn the rest. What we feel is right, correct and moral, we hold onto in our own judgements. These judgements over time build to create a body of judgements. Call it ancient prudence or what have you. What Harrington took from history, he called it ancient prudence. Kant would call this teleology. Yet before we may make this connection, we must ask again, what exactly Teleology is? The following definition: "Certain phenomena seem to be best explained by ends or aims, intentions or purpose."¹²⁴ *Telos* is from the ancient Greek word that means ends or goals. What is meant by the action of a person is the whole of the purpose. The ends of an action, the results, the goals, are studied not by some Meta theory like communism, or the dialectic, but by the actions themselves done by the people being studied. By examining these actions, we have a better understanding or insight into the goal, purposes or *Telos*. In this case, the end does not justify the means, they simply explain the reason behind the actions.

¹²³Morality is the theory of the how to live whereas ethics is the practice of how we do so.

¹²⁴Pan. A Dictionary of Philosophy. (London: Pan, 1979.) P. 350.

Teleology alone is insufficient to establish a political theory or philosophy. If it were, we would be offering nothing more than mere conservatism, the longing glance to the past. As the view of the past, must be joined with some measure or means to validate it to all people and all times (universalization), it must have a claim to being a universal law. Else, we have not achieved a working system of political government that is lasting or even stable, merely the chimera of it. Any fool can proclaim themselves a government onto themselves. The key is who would follow a fool? Cromwell took power in England, established a government and created law and order. It did not survive his death. A new King took over the government repudiating all that Cromwell had made, created and discovered. Simply put, the system created by Cromwell did not survive or have any lasting value beyond his death. It was the rule of one man and had no claim to universality. In order to avoid such a fate, a political theorist must have some call or claim to universality that will survive longer than his own death. It in some way must be a system that is usable in all societies and all countries at all times. Why is that necessary we may ask? Why is it needed that a political system has lasting value? This seemingly

is the single point that strings all of these thinkers we have discussed together. They do not want to have a cycle of governments constantly changing in a chaotic fashion but establish a form of mixed government that is lasting and universal. Harrington understood there was such a need when he adjoined the notion of history with travel or aesthetics. For in aesthetics we have the claim of universality not found in mere teleology. For that which is beautiful is that, which is universally admired. Which should not be confused with the sublime, something that attracts the eye but has not the same staying power for its seduction? We must not be seduced by the issue at hand but keep a weary eye towards eternity in what we judge to be the correct policy at this time. This, by necessity, demands of us to offer a system of valuation, so that we can adjudicate and resolve problems that arise. In fact, the call to beautiful must not be a call of emotion but one of intellectual stimuli of valuation. It must be pleasing to both the senses and the rationality of a person. If we recall to mind Plato, we find that his city and guardians were created not from history but from the call to the beautiful, or perfection. His notion was unworkable as

Aristotle pointed out¹⁶⁵. Therefore, that neither history nor aesthetics may survive alone. Each in turn has a need for the other to complement the shortcomings of the other yet be harmonious with the world itself. Yet there is still the missing element here. The two must be joined in some way for there is always a third issue at hand: "1) Condition, 2) The conditioned and 3) the concept that arises from the union of the two."¹⁶⁶ In this case, the concept that arises is an action, the judgement of a person based on their understanding of history and aesthetics. Where the notion of aesthetics, history and morality all combine to do an action is therefore a person expressing their judgement of what is good and necessary at that time and place. In Harrington's case, his action was to write a book. In Cromwell's case, it was to take over the country. Inherent in both of these are the need for morality or valuation. For some actions are better than others. In the course of an action such as our judging the past, we create a hierarchy of values based on our own valuation whether we use morality or virtue to do so. We impose onto an action

¹⁶⁵The argument in brief goes that the perfect is called a form, forms are only in Heaven. How then do the forms fall to Earth? Answer is they do not.

¹⁶⁶Kant. Ibid. P. 34n.

of history not by the importation of our values but by the repetition of said act. This does not mean that we value the storming of the Bastille; we must create it anew and do the storming ourselves. The repetition of history is the retelling of its tale. If, in Harrington's case, we judge his work to be of value, we need not use our judgement to explain him out of his own contexts, but that we read him, is an expression of our judgement in and of itself showing his judgement, i.e. his book, is of lasting value.

The joining of aesthetics and history occurs in the notion of judgement. What is then a judgement? It is the result of a combination of historical understanding and a call to the perfect or aesthetic beauty. Harrington would have that the joining would be in the political actions of people. Kant being a philosopher would have a wider scope for his answer and include all actions not just those of a political nature. The key is not whether they agree on the scope of what is encompassed⁶⁷ but that they agree on the means of determining the value of an action. That means is the joining of history and aesthetics to create a judgement. Thus, judgement is what we then begin again

⁶⁷Harrington, being a theorist is looking at a smaller subject area than the philosopher Kant is.

with. We take from them the valuable and leave the rest. In Cromwell's case, he took over England. Harrington and Kant wrote books. In both examples, we may now judge them to our values only in so doing we are repeating their acts. By judging them to be of value, we are taking an action. In the author's case, we read them. In Cromwell's case, we would retell his story of taking over the seat of the English government. Harrington's actions are seemingly validated today by their being called "mere truisms."¹⁰ They are not judged by whether we like them, for that would be an emotional issue, the sublime, we judge them based on the rational value they have offered to us in the form of the historical lesson they have giving us. In Harrington's case, his ideas being mere truisms, have been judged to not only have lasting value but so important as to have been incorporated into society as if they were the guiding principles of a deity¹¹. In other words, they are divine

¹⁰Op cit.

¹¹Keep in mind that the rhetorical flourish of calling Harrington's ideas as mere truism simply offers to him the greatest of compliments on the validity of his work and is not to be taken as if Harrington was some sort of prophet to a new religion.

truths not to be contradicted by mere mortals.¹⁷⁷ We do not offer them up to our own thoughts so that we may impose on Harrington what we think he should be saying. We merely acknowledge them for the value they have shown to be worthy of respect from our society.

We must allow Harrington to be a self-thinking person who has completed his work to the best of his ability and that it is as full and complete as he could have made it. We may not import to him our own views on what he should have meant we read from Kant a warning specifically against doing so:

"Teleology may not be used simply to ascribe human purpose to the objects of nature, which is simply a form of 'mental jugglery' that only reads the concepts of an end into the nature of the thing, but may serve as a means of achieving the systematic completeness of our knowledge. Teleological principles, in other words, have no explanatory significance."¹⁷⁸

We cannot use teleology beyond which it was meant. Marx's dialectical materialism can be seen as such an example of using teleological principles to explain the world. They ascribe the view of nature such as they thought

¹⁷⁷Refer back to the beginning of this chapter where we discussed the relationship of science facts to divine truths.

it to be as the explanatory of events to draw forth conclusions for the future, the inevitability of communism. As this will surely create confusion, an example is needed. If we look at the storming of the Bastille, the Marxist dialect will explain it as the workers freeing themselves of their chains attack the symbol of their repression, and that this act will be repeated all over the world as it is a simply development of human nature to desire to be free of their oppression. Teleology would look at the storming of the Bastille as people attacking it. No more and no less. We may then in turn use other source material to explain why they were attacking it. People may have written their thoughts, such as a newspaper scribe, letters or even books upon the subject itself.¹¹ They offer reasons and insight why the event happened as seen by the people who did the attacking itself. For those people undertook the extreme action of attacking a fortress, they surely did so on more than mere whim. Yet there is no offer of explanation from the action itself beyond the event that transpired. By collecting the various sources that explain

¹¹Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary. (Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell Reference, 1995) p. 389.

¹²For a good overview of the people, their thoughts and the culture that gave rise to the French Revolution see:

their action, we develop history based not on our personal, imported views, into their actions but their own self-justifications. We must not and can attribute these actions to nature or a goal of nature for that would be to deny these people their freedom in taking an action.¹¹ Marx's theory failed with spectacular results, in the USSR, among other countries. His theory was to impose his views onto the events of history without the attempt to understand the issue in contexts of the people. By using historical materialism, he thought he could predict the future of the world. We may surely torture these facts until they admit to anything. Yet we may not claim, however, that we have established anything but what we feel the future event to be. We cannot say what the event, or actions taken by individuals, meant for the people who took the actions that caused the historical event. We cannot suddenly claim necromancy¹² among our talents.

Harrington called his idea of teleology, ancient prudence. Prudence is certainly, what Kant would demand of his readers. To be cautious, in what may be concluded from

¹¹ Simon Schama, Citizens. (New York: Knopf, 1989.)
¹² If we deny freedom and reason from others, then we deny it for ourselves in taking the action in the first place.

an action. It must not mean more than the action allows. Actions may not be ascribing to "nature", a thoughtless mechanism, such as gravity and the orbits of planets. Using the term natural law would certainly be a violation of human freedom. Nature is a passive subject that happens. It is not a dynamic force that takes action. Humans are dynamic agents', not passive receptors. In all of this effort to distinguish the two we have to touch upon the inherent understanding of the issue. Often ascribed to Aristotle that man is a "Rational Animal"¹¹¹, we may see this duality present here as well. The use of nature cited by the likes of Hobbes, Marx's and Machiavelli is in direct contrast to the use of the rational by Harrington and Kant. Both are partial descriptions of the same thing, philosophical anthropology, yet each are aimed in the other direction. Machiavelli and Hobbes had a very low opinion of man, so too did Marx except for those select groups with a revolutionary consciousness. Kant and Harrington have the aim of perfection of man, in Harrington's case, it would be the perfection of man's governing system, which would then,

¹¹¹The divination of the future by communicating with the dead.

¹¹²However, it is often claimed that he did say so. He did not utter those two words together.

following Aristotle, allow for man to be perfected or perfect the soul. The former groups have a distrust of the masses; the latter know that they are needed if we are to have a lasting political system that is based on the better virtues of man. The former have no bond or faith in the people to whom they claim to speak for. They distrust them. The later start with such a bond of faith in the people. A knowing that a state is aimed at improving the virtue of all people. Only in the collective improvement would the state make a lasting stability. In so doing they avoid the obvious contradiction. Trust and a bond of faith are needed to have checks and balances. We may think the opposite, that it is distrust that drives the need for checks and balances. Yet we can trust because we have checked on the claims and are able to balance out the issue if the need arose. This allows for a working relationship, that the other group, be it the one, the few or the many, will do what has been agreed to because they can be checked if they do not and balanced or stopped if they are lying. For how can you expect checks and balance to work if there is not an opposite number able to erect the other half of the balance. It is not possible to balance oneself on a teeter-totter. There needs be someone on the other side to play

with. The result of this plurality is tolerance. Because in accepting that there are others, who are equal, hence derived from the notion of balance, they may not have the same background or constituent to represent. Yet as equals, they must be respected or they will not work with the others two parts that are capable of stopping the other groups from acting as they are in balanced. Therefore, trust and tolerance are needed such that people can work together to form the more perfect union even if they disagree in their view of what action or policy is needed for the system to answer to the needs of the people. We must allow the other to be present if we are to have any claim to balance. As we have seen in the first chapter, the systems of yore broke faith with the people in their first instant. They did not allow for the third leg of the tripod to be even considered as a fully functioning part of the whole. There was no respect for the many.

Thus far, we have established that teleology and aesthetics are needed to formulate a theory of government based on reason. Yet we have not entered into the application of this theory, the action. When we look at the word action, Kant defined it by using Aristotle's ideas of

action,¹⁷⁶ as seen in two forms; action of 'things made' and 'actions done'.¹⁷⁷ The first refers to art the second refers to history. Art is appearance. Action is the "first cause in all changes of appearance."¹⁷⁸ When a person does something, they have performed an act. This action is of one or the other, they have claimed to have produced a piece of art, or taken themselves into history, for clearly time has passed as they did their act. We may not ascribe to the act any overt theory except to look at the *Telos* or purpose of the act inherent within it. It would be disingenuous for ourselves to look at an action in anything but the light of reason, *Telos*, as we have already seen. The person who has done this or that act must have had a rational reason¹⁷⁹ to do so. That is a direct opposition to using fate as an explanation. Politicians must not be assumed to be so guided, nor can they be considered anything less than frank in their reasons, that is, they, having used their understanding of the issue, taken an action that was in their mind the best course of action

¹⁷⁶Caygill, A Kant Dictionary. P. 47-51.

¹⁷⁷Aristotle, Metaphysics. (New York: Random House, 1941) 1050a p. 829.

¹⁷⁸Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason. (London: Macmillan, 1992) p. 229 a205/b250.

they could possibly do at this time. (Though Harrington also allows balance to occur on such things as politicians, voting to ensure there is a disinterested outcome.) We must ascribe to the act that this is the judgement of the person onto the world as it was then and as it will ever be, on to eternity. That this action for good or not, is the action that must be done and can only be done by the actor now. This judgement is their final word on the subject. In so doing when another generation looks upon the action and casts a glance at their own values, they can acquire knowledge from the warning it has given to them, ancient prudence. The warning may be of what works and what does not work, as in our case the working or not workings of government policy. Yet it also allows us to offer the valuation of the event as well. It is a chance for us to see the morality of their actions and if it is virtuous to repeat.

By using teleology and aesthetics to form a judgement that results in an action, we create the notion of ancient prudence. Teleology the study of history and the means or ends of it, joined with the travel to see the world or

¹⁷⁷In their mind, it is a rational reason. We may not see it as a rational reason but must assume that the actors did.

aesthetics, will result in a person being capable of making judgements that will affect the political realm. Whereas we the viewer, are thus forced by our own rationality to offer our own judgement upon the issue. We may not want to impose them. By our reason or morality, we offer up to those who come after us, our judgement of the issue. The commonly used metaphor⁴⁰ is that of an actor on a stage. The actor acts. Considered an art form of thespians, acting applies to aesthetics. The stage on which they act is the backdrop of history. The props are the world that they have inherited from the past. That leaves the spectators to offer their judgement on what they see. Just like a theatre, audience may like or dislike what they have seen, so too in this metaphor, the spectator is able to judge upon the play what they will. However, they may not do so on such a base reason as like or dislike.

"Judgement of sense are completely subjective and usually involve the judgement that one likes or dislikes something. Judgements of taste, however, involve the judgement that such and such an object is beautiful. Although it is also subjective, in the sense that the presentation of the object was referred to the self, Kant makes the argument that a judgement of taste is also universal. In the case of judgement of sense -

⁴⁰ Lewis W. Beck. The Actor and the Spectator. (London: Yale University Press, 1975.)

the expression of the opinion that one likes an object - one does not necessarily expect other people to concur. However, in a judgement that something is beautiful, a judgement of taste, Kant maintains that one expects and even demands universal assent."¹⁷

This opens the door to morality as a political event. An action is moral and not the amorality that Machiavelli spoke. The problem here is that Harrington has no place to offer morality into his ideas. It is not an issue for the political theorist but best left to the political philosopher. Yet the very concept that Harrington calls ancient prudence is a moral valuation of the events. Recall that Aristotle thought that a person can only be moral if they improve their soul by not working and living a life of contemplation, something a worker does not have. The people who would be able to do this are the landowners. This theory later picked up by Cicero, when he assumed the morality of the country people as his "new men". The key factor in this is land ownership to be able to live the moral life. Harrington's goal of transferring land from the rich onto the people can be thus seen as transferring the virtue as well. So that all the people, not just the

¹⁷Elizabeth Meade. Thinking in the World: the Ethical thought of Hannah Arendt. (Ann Arbor Michigan: U. M. I. Dissertation Service, 1994.) P. 245.

landowners, as all would soon own land, would be virtuous. The virtue onto the people would allow them to make judgments. This example is better than that example. This lesson is more prudent than that one. In so doing, Harrington has already used morality in his ideas but has not offered them to us in an explicit form. (We have to draw the connections out from him.) With this understanding in mind, we are able to proceed to Harrington's work with the very important issue of morality squarely in our view, for he has offered us his judgments onto what such a political system should look like. We know that what Harrington is offering to us is a judgement that can and must be valued by the reader of this day. His judgement is not simply an issue of government structure but a demand of the reader for their acceptance of his moral judgement of his actions, the righteousness of his thinking, the morality of his cause.

"Kant specifically emphasises that his concern is not with the actual deeds of the political agents but only 'with the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in the games of great revolutions, and is manifest such a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered. Owing to its universality, this mode

of thinking demonstrates a character of the human race at large and all at once; owing to its disinterestedness, a moral character of humanity, at least in its pre-dispositions."¹³²

In other words, the key here is not history, or aesthetics, but how we apply the lessons learned. In Harrington's case, his application was to write a book on the subject of government.¹³³ If we have learned history and aesthetics, the judgement and morality of them, then they must be made manifest in the world by our own actions.¹³⁴ We must therefore check and balance our system with the systems of the past so they are valued anew. Altered by our own reason and morality to fit present day events, and correct the deviations from the true path. We can therefore see the connection that Harrington proclaimed among the ideas of teleology, aesthetics and the resulting system that is by necessity that of checks and balances. For as we view history we evaluate it to the perfect and express our judgement. In so doing we alter or correct the way, our system of government has deviated from the correct path.

¹³²Ronald Beiner, Hannah Arendt Critical Essay. (Lewis Hinchman et al. Eds. New York: State University of New York Press 1994.) P. 371.

¹³³One of many such books

¹³⁴Writing a thesis on Harrington perhaps?

So clearly, we have seen that there is a connection between Harrington and Kant's work. As well by using Kant, we are able to take Harrington's notion of what make a good politician and broaden it into a philosophical system that can be used as a methodology for a political theory. We however do not impose Kant onto Harrington. We have seen they both speak of the same or similar things. In so doing we allow Kant to fill in the blanks left void by Harrington's lack of effort to be anything but whom he was, a political theorist. The connections in Harrington are not as drawn out as one may want but with Kant to fill in the blanks, we are able to offer better insight into Harrington's work. We use history to find the case studies of political action. We then derive from them their implied values, their ancient prudence. As well, we open the discussion of the issue to some of the more important objections. All of which were found to be less than sufficient in blocking our inquiry. From their ancient prudence, we can judge them for their worth such that we aspire to find the more perfect, or aesthetically pleasing of them. Thus formulated a theory of politics that is based in the world, for our examples actually happened in the world, yet in our method they still have more than a mere

claim to universality with them. From this, we turned to action, the praxis of taking a judgement in the world, by which we in turn must judge, implicating a morality inherent in the action. This constant valuation and revaluation are the corrective of the system that was called by Harrington as balance. Thus in our first chapter we established the historical events surrounding the theories we examined. The bases of which Harrington would create his ideas on the body politic. Then we entered into the aesthetics of it by looking at the political theory held by the writer. We valued their judgements by declining to accept them but taking from them what each was validated as being worth. This method will allow us to proceed into the next two chapters with clarity of thought. We shall first look at the history and then the aesthetics of Harrington's political theory of the issue. Thus, we now turn to discover Harrington, having put forth preliminary remarks that set the stage for us to enter into his work.

Chapter 3

HARRINGTON: ON BALANCE

For all of Harrington's benefits, brevity is not one of them.¹⁷⁷ ("The reader who survives his discussion of the constitution of the Sanhedrim is unlikely to reproach him with a lack of sobriety.")¹⁷⁸ His work is filled with page after page of reference to the past to explain and expand his point of view. ("If (only) he confined himself... Omitting everything from his writings that now seems merely eccentric or old-fashioned."¹⁷⁹) Instead for our purpose, we shall investigate but three of Harrington's claims, his agrarian law, checks and balances and the necessary corollary of tolerance. For us to do so, we must follow Harrington's method of using history to explain and set the stage for our viewing, aesthetics to judge the universality of the issue and then take an action by judging the value

¹⁷⁷His wit is also excellent, he writes in a foot note to one of unimportant works, "Readers, I entreat your pardon, I know well enough that this is below me; but something is to be yielded to the times; and it has been an employment of two or three hours on a rainy day." Smith. Ibid. P. 97-98

¹⁷⁸Tawney. Op cit. P. 11.

¹⁷⁹Blitzer. An Immortal Commonwealth. Ibid. P.175.

of his issue. We have no need for Virgil to guide us¹⁵², as we may use Harrington's own method as more than enough light has been shed on it in chapter two. He traces the problems of his times back to the laws of Henry VII's attempt to keep the throne. ("... A throne supported by nobility is not so hard to be ascended, as kept warm.")¹⁵³ Henry has three laws of importance for our purpose that Harrington outlines. We then fast forward to their result as King Charles I tried desperately to hold off his own government's collapse to the force of Parliament and ultimately Oliver Cromwell. With the recent history understood in Harrington's context, we reach into his work for three gems in the rough, the use of land reform, balance and the necessary conclusion of these, tolerance.

Henry VII

Henry VII took a contested throne. Pretenders contested it and bitter feelings were felt all around the

¹⁵²A clever referent to the guide in Dante's Divine Comedy.
¹⁵³Blitzer. An Immortal Commonwealth. Ibid. P. 189. Showing not only Harrington's keen insight but his sharp wit as well.

realm in the aftermath of the War of the Roses. In order to secure his hold, Henry VII passed many laws that would ultimately lose Charles I his throne. Of those Acts, Harrington singles out three of them, Population, Retainers and Alienation.¹⁷ The Act of Population transferred land to the Yeoman or "middle people"¹⁸ with whom the nobility then had little control over. This effectively denied their service to the nobility if they should oppose the King. In effect, the nobles lost their infantry, just as the Act of Retainers lost the nobles their Calvary breaking the bond of the medieval oath upon the retainer. It deprived the nobles of the call of sworn oaths of their retainers, should they have a need to make war onto the king. For these people were no longer beholden to their superior nobles for their land. Finally, the king passed into law the Act of Alienation, which made it possible to sell land belonging to a noble. It diminished the land holdings of the nobles to the favour of the people, mostly of the yeoman class. Land ownership switched from four fifth's

¹⁷ Ibid. P. 189.

Smith. Ibid. P. 29.

Fink Ibid. P.69.

¹⁸ Moreover, not the Middle Class as some Marxist might hold. See Pocock. The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law. Ibid.

belonging to the King, nobles and church to nine tenths owned by the merchant class. Hence, the land passed from the control of the elites onto the people. When Henry VII's son, Henry VIII, broke with the Roman Catholic Church, and attacked the monasteries and gave out their land as well to the faithful servants loyal to him, he destroyed the religious or spiritual power of the nobles. As well, he placed the land away from the perpetual ownership of God to the more mundane and cash poor ownership of the faithful nobles. Effectively these two men, father and son, had destroyed the nobility, to secure their crowns. Little did they know that they had made gains in the short term to lose it all in the generations to come. The people led by the Yeomen class were then able to expand their holdings of the land and create their own centers of wealth that was not dependent upon the whim of the nobility through their regal ownership of land. Effectively over time, this would give the Commons more power at the expense of the House of Lords. This brings us from the War of Roses to the English Revolution. Harrington following Machiavelli¹⁷³ notes that land is the center of power for an army is based on its

¹⁷³The Church's land ownership policies were touched upon in the first chapter part three.

stomach that must be fed. Food comes from the land. If a man fights for the pay of a noble then they are nothing more than mere mercenaries. If however, they are fighting for their own land, for themselves and by extension¹³⁴ the country in which they live, have property they own, then they are fighting for the commonwealth, in effect fighting for themselves. A man who fights for his purse has no civic virtue, a lack of morality, nor is he a citizen.

"... That in a republic the soldier must be citizens and the citizen soldiers, if the soldier follows private men for reward then the republic cannot survive."¹³⁵

By making reference to the Swiss, ("no money, no Switzers {Swiss¹³⁶}")¹³⁷ the noted mercenaries of the times¹³⁸, who would come down from spring planting of their

¹³⁴Fink. Ibid. P. 60.

¹³⁵The modern notion of nationalism does not exist.

¹³⁶Downs. Ibid. P. 105.

¹³⁷My translation for clarification.

¹³⁸Ibid. P. 32.

¹³⁹"Sometime around 1200 a group of mountain folk managed to throw a wooden bridge across the Reuss River in the gorge where it hurtles through the Alps. Before long, the track filled with trains of mules bearing goods from the plains of Italy north to Germany. Princes began to notice the peasants and herdsmen who lived in the valleys along the new trade route. What the princes' saw was a form of governance so bizarre as to seem unworkable, so unfamiliar that they scarcely knew what to call it. Many since have called it democracy. For centuries, the Swiss mountain communities were only vaguely aware that they had any special political character. Everyone accepted the

mountain home to fight the wars of Europe's nobility. We can see these men had no stake in the issue they fought for. Whatever side offered them the most gold, they would join. In the end, they went home to their mountains and left the wars of the lowlands to fend for themselves. The very act of using weapons is the assertion of power and virtue¹³. It is an action taken and thus may be judged for its morality and civic virtue in this case. If however it is not by one's will that a man takes up arms but for the pay of another, they have forfeited their own morality and ability to reason in favour of another person, the one who

principle that communities should be subject to a feudal lord, in a hierarchy of nobles that extended up to the Holy Roman Emperor. Yet when one of these lords levied an unpopular tax or appointed an unpopular official, the Swiss would argue endlessly while quietly running their own affairs. Such resistance had not brought much conflict when these were bands of impoverished cowherds. However, with the booming new trade through the mountains, princes began to attend to their rights over toll and tax. Certain lords assembled their knights and rode into the forests to teach their obstinate subjects a lesson. Instead, they learned one: commoners in rugged terrain, standing alongside their neighbors to defend their freedom, can shatter cavalry. From the mid 1300s, we can regard some of the Alpine communities as independent states, acknowledging overlords in principle but scarcely in practice. There were not a few of these little Forest States. The first independent ones called themselves Uri, Unterwalden, and Schwyz (which would eventually give its name to all of Switzerland)." Spencer R. Weart. Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/MIRACLE.HTM>

has the coin.¹³⁷ They have subsumed their own existence, that of morality and reason, in exchange for the morality of the person who has the gold. Thus, we may draw two points from this. The first is the trust, faith that Harrington has in his fellow man, which Machiavelli does not. In Harrington's case, he would trust the people to defend their property and hence the country. Machiavelli would want the people to fight for their country however had no bases on which to justify such faith. Power must be held in the hands of the people. Even if they only do so for their enlightened, self interest of protecting their own property. Secondly, we may also draw from this the conclusion that the laws of the land must reside not in the men but in the laws themselves, making men forced to act in an indifferent manner towards the laws that they enact. For men might be tempted to disown their civic virtue for gold, as did the Swiss. Yet we have offered two contradictory conclusions. How can we have faith in people if at the same time we cannot have faith in them? The answer surely is that Man must be a person of enlightened self-interest. In other words when faced with the loss of their property they

¹³⁷Note the direct connection to Machiavelli.

¹³⁸Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment. Ibid. P. 386.

will fight ever the harder to protect what is theirs. However, when not faced by an external threat they may be tempted to act in their own self interests with regard to law. Such that a rule of men may be tempted to enrich themselves if they are allowed to. Hence, the rule of law is needed to check that same virtue needed to defend the realm. As well, if the issue is not of importance directly to the person, that the loss of their land by a foreign invader might be, they may be tempted to offer themselves to the pay of another person, again disowning their civic virtue. To assure this did not happen, Harrington divided the houses of government into two groups. The upper house, the Senate of Oceana, is made of members who had more income than the majority. Hence, a harkening back to Aristotle's and Cicero's idea of reflective virtue in the class as a whole. Yet this is at the same time tempered by the lower house, more numerous in numbers but having less income per person. The Senate would begin legislation and debate its value, but would not vote on the issue. That would be left to the lower house. Harrington had created a system that forced the government to render a "Judgement of Taste", indifferent to the object by, "mechanizing virtue" such that each group would be forced to act in a manner

that obligated them "to act disinterested."¹⁰⁰ The many are not expected to be as enlightened as the few. Yet the few must not only take into account the vote of the many, they must offer them reasons for voting for their proposals without compromising their own positions.

The relationship of property to power seems clear in Harrington's thinking. Harrington credits three other thinkers without whom he would not have found this relationship.¹⁰¹ He also notes with pride that they did not discover such relationship, which would have denied him the credit.¹⁰² Let us proceed to the result of Henry VII's laws found in Harrington's own time so that we may see just how power and property go hand in hand. The first date in this story of English revolution is 1642¹⁰³. The King of England Charles I was in serious jeopardy with his Parliamentary House of Commons. His efforts will come to naught as he failed to reach an agreement with them. The Cromwell's Commonwealth displaced him. What is important here is the process of gathering support for each side in the conflict of 1642. The Parliament presents to the King "19

¹⁰⁰Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment. Ibid. P. 394.

¹⁰¹Harrington. Oceana. Ibid. Preliminaries 1.

¹⁰²Downs. Ibid. P. 24.

Propositions". The answer he gives is very telling for our thoughts. It is perhaps a summation of the first chapter. It was also an appeal that was to the old style of governing and not to the new reality. The people had become economically supreme and could afford to make war on the under financed King. The King wrote "There being three kinds of Government among Men, Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy."--- Aristotle could have written this.--- The king however was not attempting to appeal that far back. He wanted to restore his own power by referring to a more modern prudence of the crowns recent history. Note the divisions of all three groups are included in the King's proclamation.

"In this Kingdom the laws are jointly made by a King, by a House of Peers--- and by a House of Commons chosen by the People, all having free Votes and particular privileges."---

The King ordered that this royal proclamation be issued and read in both Houses of Parliament but, more importantly, he also ordered that it be read in every

---G. M. Trevelyan. A Short History of England. (London: Penguin, 1942). The classic work of British History.

---Robert Schulyer, C. C. Weston. British Constitutional History since 1832. (Toronto: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1957.) P.98.

---Well, if Aristotle wrote in English that is...

--- House of Lords or in Canada called the Senate.

church and chapel¹¹⁹ in the country. The importance of this is lost on a modern secular audience but in those times:

"In a pre industrial and semiliterate society, the pulpit was the most important means of shaping public opinion."¹²⁰

What we have is a near absolutist monarch, or so he thought, explicitly allowing the division of his government, and thus placing limits on his own power, by turning to the people for support of his position. It was the attempt to establish a bond of faith with the people. The king had at least seen some insight of his new reality that he was not an all-powerful leader who was irreplaceable. (Not surprisingly, Harrington was a good friend of the King.¹²¹) The king had returned to the people for their approval of his ideas, as he needed the people to maintain his power. His hope may have been to foster a new union with his people such that they would support him against the Parliamentary forces. Harrington clearly saw that the people had inherited the power of the nobles from King Henry VII time with their acquiring of land and now

¹¹⁹Robert Schulyer, *Ibid.* P. 99.

¹²⁰C. C. Weston, J. Greenberg. Subject and Sovereigns. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.) P. 37.

¹²¹Barrett Beer. Rebellion and Riot. (Kent State University Press, 1982.) P. 24.

were prepared to take away the King's power as well.

Harrington explains this in his Art Of Law Giving as:

"When the Sovereign Power is not as entire and absolute as the Monarchy it self, there can be no government at all. It is not the limitation of Sovereign power that is the cause of a Commonwealth, but that such a liberation (i.e. Balance) or poise of order, that there can be in the same no number of men having an interest, that can have the power; nor any number of men having the power, that can have the interest, to invade or disturb the government."

We may draw two things from this. As the King removed the power of the nobility over the land, he removed his own power for his power was not entire and absolute. It rested upon his control of the nobles and their control of the people through the control of the land. When the keystone is removed, control of the land, so too does the immortal arch collapse, just as the King fell. We may also see that as long as there is a lack of balance in the system then there will be an interest in the power by men. With balance, this is and must be in some way checked from occurring. When the King destabilized the nobility, it destroyed the balance of the system. Harrington called this failed system, "Modern Prudence". It allowed for men who

...J. G. A. The political works of James Harrington. Ibid. P. 4.

would not normally have power to contemplate control or the interest in government. Modern Prudence created the Yeomen class, who were the membership of the House of Commons, to have such an interest in the power in the first place. Once with power in hand they refused to relinquish it to others. Remember that our philosophical anthropology does indeed hold that Man has an enlightened self-interest. To then restore order and create a commonwealth there could not be an effort to recreate the King's power, for that time had passed. The king's powers would lessen the power of the Yeomen class over the country. The new commonwealth, to restore the King, would therefore have to establish a new set of interests (i.e. Not power or control of government) for the people. Something that would be akin to an invader trying to conquer their land... The people would fight. Specifically as the land had already been transferred to the people, it would be nigh impossible to re-transfer it back to the king. Hence no land, the king had no power. Therefore, the only possible solution would be to create something new, a commonwealth. The interest of the people would be the liberation of the Kings powers onto

---Blitzer. The Political Writings of James Harrington Ibid. P. xxxvii-xxxciiii

themselves. They already had the land. They already had the power that came from ownership of said land. Next, they need the legitimacy of government to take control away from that of the king and nobles. This liberation is not any general type but of a special sort. Essentially, Harrington is advocating that there be a:

“... Method of mechanizing virtue, of distinguishing and distributing the elements of the decision process so that men are obliged to act disinterestedly.”¹³³

Balance should be restored to the people who will be forced to make disinterested judgements of taste rather than the judgement of senses.¹³⁴ In history, Cromwell does not do so and thus his experiment fails when he dies. Harrington offered a solution to how to mechanize virtue. To do this he divided the house of government into two parts, a senate of which the landed nobility (Nobility in the sense of greater ownership not title), would be able to claim. Those who had revenue greater than 100 pounds per annum would be the cavalry. (Some authors, notable Pocock, hold this to be a form of knights, an illustration to some medieval ideal they hold in their commentary. As such it is

¹³³Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment. Ibid. P. 394.

¹³⁴See chapter 2 for details why the difference is so important!

a loaded term to be avoided.)²¹⁵ Those who earned less would be in the house of tribes or of Foot. The distinction is militarily relevant as the upper house would be the leaders and cavalry in the event of war, as they would have the funds to field a man on a horse.²¹⁶ The rest of the population, not having the annual income to afford a horse would still be expected to fight as foot, or foot soldiers. This separation is based on the Roman division of manpower in war. The nobles on horses would fight one way, while the poor would have to walk to fight.

This division in the government as envisioned by Harrington is such that one part divided the issue, through debate, (Senate) and the other (The house or Tribes as Harrington called them again referring back to Athenian democracy) then decided or voted using secret ballots. Similar to cutting a pie, the person who is cutting must be disinterested, so not to cut too large a slice to unbalance the issue, for the other person would then take the bigger slice for themselves.²¹⁷ Thus while both are looking out for their own interests they are necessarily acting disinterested. John Rawls would in this century, 1971, call

²¹⁵We shall deal with Pocock soon enough.

²¹⁶Literally, to put a man in the field.

this type of action, a "Zero Sum Game" in his work A theory of Justice.

Harrington did not simply utter these words of Oceana in a rhetorical fashion leaving his remarks essentially empty words to blindly follow. In fact, he set up in painful details the manner to achieve this much-needed balance of government. First, the land must be redistributed to the people in an agrarian reform act, and secret ballots taken¹¹ with each vote. Harrington writes:

"An equal commonwealth is a government established upon an equal Agrarian, arising into the superstructures or three orders... through the suffrage of the people given by the ballot."¹²

With the land being owned by one, you have a monarchy. When a few hold the land, then they are nobility but when all people hold the land then you have a commonwealth.

"An 'equal Agrarian' he defined as a 'perpetual law establishing and preserving the balance of dominion, by such a distribution, that no one man or number of men within the compass of the few or aristocracy, can come to overcome the whole people by their possessions in land.'¹³

¹¹ Downs. Ibid. P.64.

¹² Fink. Ibid. P. 71.

¹³ Blitzer. The Political Writings of James Harrington Ibid. P. 72.

¹⁴ Fink. Ibid. P. 64.

As this law would limit the amount of ownership to revenues of 2000 pounds per year Harrington only envisioned it being held by as little as 5000 people⁻⁻⁻ owing to the somewhat bizarre claim that the lands of England having only some 10 million pounds in revenue per year.⁻⁻⁻ What had begun with Henry VII, Harrington proposed to finish. With each generation, the father would divide his land to his sons such that each has a maximum of 2000 pounds per years in income.⁻⁻⁻ Spreading out the land ownership would thus enfranchise more people and in time, the many would have land of their own. As with each division, instead of giving it to just one son, all of them would inherit. This would stop the medieval practice of passing the land on to only one person and look back to an older custom of fairly dividing land among all sons.⁻⁻⁻ Interestingly enough Harrington was enlightened enough to allow daughters to

⁻⁻⁻Ibid. P.72.

⁻⁻⁻N.B. Harrington is not talking economics nor does he seem to have a grasp of the issue beyond his rather simplistic notion of total revenue.

⁻⁻⁻Smith. Ibid. P. 30.

⁻⁻⁻Both are in fact medieval customs. However, the division to all sons is the older of the two. The modern custom was to give it only to one son and leave the rest to other duties such as the Church or Professionalism. The profession would of course change from military to law and medicine over time.

inherit up to 1000 pounds of land revenue.¹¹⁵ This custom goes back to the divisions of land in the early medieval period of European history and thus sparking Pocock on his early lines of enquiry. This theory, the agrarian reform, in later years, would seem to be a fit to that of a Marxist ideology. While there are some compelling reasons to hold, such as the means of production are the inherent means of power, there are ample reasons not to hold that Harrington was a pre Marxists theorist. Harrington's ideas were meant not to shift the means of production unto the people as his goal, for that was not what he proposed. The shifting of the means of production was so that there would be a balance of power of the people to the nobility and to the king. It was not the fading cry of a dying breed to halt their fall of the gentry. In fact, Harrington's contemporary critic, Lesley,¹¹⁶ declares his work to be a betrayal of the class from which Harrington comes.

Harrington' stated goal would be to create a stable balance of the people to the nobles and King. It was not to shift the means of production through land redistribution.

¹¹⁵One would expect this as he had such an excellent relationship with his sisters. They would be the one's to free him when he was imprisoned later on in life.

¹¹⁶Downs. Ibid. P. 40.

The basic notions of Marxist dogma, is that the industrial revolution and capitalism having not yet been envisioned in Harrington's time or even seen to have existed at his time. However, in the very near future the basis for such ideas would become reality. Harrington is not predicting the future here.¹⁰⁹ All too frequently the commentators of Harrington attempt to make him do just that by importing their own ideas into Harrington, e.g. What Macpherson has done is to import his own ideas, of his time and impose them onto Harrington. Something that happens with all too frequency with Harrington's modern commentators. This as we have seen previously is mental jugglery.¹¹⁰ Yet perhaps a pause is needed to clarify this issue and shown more conclusively that there is a difference in using Kant to expand what Harrington said, and what Macpherson has done, to impose his ideas. The two methods are distinct and different. Harrington does use the terminology of commerce in the economic character of balance.¹¹¹ Macpherson identifies this as the relationship where men are reduced to market commodities such that they may be held in

¹⁰⁹Ibid. P. 109.

¹¹⁰I refer to the above quote in the last chapter.

¹¹¹Downs. Ibid. P. 94.

balance.¹³³ Yet is Harrington doing so, reducing men to market commodities? The question cannot be answered. It is in the realm of speculation as a historical what if. Excepting in the answer can only be seen as negative for Harrington did not do so in his writings. The question thus becomes can we dismiss Macpherson's case as an imposition upon the thoughts of James Harrington, without so damaging our own case as presented in chapter 2? Is not the difference in using Kant, in our case, and Macpherson's using Marx, not simply a difference of word choice? One author, Kant, is being used over another author, Marx. The difference rests upon more than mere words. Macpherson has used ideas that are not present in the thinking of James Harrington, namely Marxist ideology. There was no call of proletariats to lose their chains but the gradual increase in property ownership as each generation passed on its own lands through inheritance. Pocock's summation of Macpherson's argument in the following way:

"When he (Wren) suggested that the many in Harrington's republic might use their power to seize and redistribute the land of the few, Harrington replied that they would never do so because it would be to rob themselves of the fruits of their industry. By 'industry'

¹³³ Macpherson. Ibid. P. 162.

Harrington seems to have meant the ability to maximize the yield of one's land or of one's labour and so to hope to purchase more land and the portrait is drawn of a cottager working for hire who makes more in his yearly wages than he could ever hope to have from his numerical share in a general redistribution of the land. On these passages there has been based an argument that Harrington's theory of property and so of politics, entails the existence of a market both in labour and in land. But Professor Macpherson, the author of this interpretation would surely have done better to look at Wren. Harrington's individuals may have indeed exchanged labour for wages and money for land, but their capacity for citizenship is not defined by their exchange relationships but by their possession of property which may, but need not, come to them through exchange. It is not the cottager's wages but his plot which defines him as other than a servant."³¹

Pocock is surprisingly clear here in his summation of Macpherson's position. His refutation of Macpherson is merely based on the texts that Harrington writes. Showing that Harrington was merely following the implications of virtue being in the land ownership and that the exchange relationship was of secondary importance, at best, to Harrington's theory. Macpherson's main thesis is that reading the works of Hobbes, Locke, and Harrington can only be made consistent if they possessed a bourgeois consciousness. Which reason demands that we ask first if

³¹Pocock, The Political Works of James Harrington. Ibid. P. 88.

these works should be read as consistent rather than reading them as separate theoretical works. For two members agree Locke and Harrington but both then disagree with Hobbes. Macpherson has again imposed, in this case a collectivist approach to these works, where the texts will not support. No matter how careful the reasoning, we can see that Macpherson has latched upon the weakest of evidence to establish a political Marxist theory by using the works of people like Harrington, out of context. Just as we have seen above where Pocock's distinction of a historian, political theorist and political philosopher has disassociated the words from the acts into a form of literary criticism, Macpherson is also disassociating Harrington from his own words in ways that are not supported by the texts. Knowing the chronological facts, i.e. the dates that each author published, Harrington before Marx and Marx before Macpherson, we can see that Macpherson is taking Marx's back into Harrington. There was no effort among these men to be consistent with each other's ideas. There was no evidence that they were in any speaking of exchange labour in their works. In other words, he is reading his own views into Harrington, by extracting Harrington from his own works.

In our case, we have used Harrington's own words as the basis of entrance to show what Kant is taking from Harrington. Harrington spoke of travel and history. Kant spoke of Aesthetic and history. Harrington spoke of disinterest in the governing process, so to Kant in the notion of a judgement of Taste. Finally, Harrington's notion of dividing a pie is almost exactly the notion of Rawls' zero sum game. Rawls is of course a neo Kantian. This is reflective of Kant's view of a disinterested judgement of Taste. Macpherson's case rests solely on the use of economic terms and the notion that there is some sort of exchange going on in society. It does not account for the overtly historical features of Harrington references back to land being the center of virtue that Aristotle held. Suffice to say Macpherson has done exactly what Kant explicitly warned against. In a form of mental jugglery, Macpherson has imposed his Marxist ideology onto Harrington as a means to explain his own position. It is dismissive of the total work in the body of Harrington's thoughts for one aspect of the issue as Pocock showed. Harrington is not suitable for any Marxist argument, pre-Marxist argument, proto Marxist ideas or any type of Marxist interpretation. His ideas cannot be incorporated

into that dogma prior to it even having been thought of, or the necessary components of economics coming into existence.

Merely mentioning the existence of exchange value does not establish a bourgeois thinker.

"Harrington had no concept of the Bourgeoisie as a class, and his revolutionary class is a "King people" of gentlemen, yeomen, Londoners and freeholders."

However, this does open up the question to other views of just where we may find the birth of this idea of balance. While this seems a very important question for the commentators, Michael Downs uses it to open his own examination of Harrington's work. Each theory is very compelling. The authors have done their utmost to establish their case, more so than the brief treatment here entails. Yet each has failed in their own way, not by want of skill, or lack of research but because in the end this issue of where Harrington found his notion of balance, is really not all that important to help us understand Harrington and Harrington himself, has already answered it. First, we will establish briefly, what the commentator arguments are then

why they are less than compelling. Then, we shall explain that the correct answer itself, from Harrington, shows that the question is not very interesting or important.

First, we may begin with the idea of H. R. Trevor-Roper who, while writing in opposition to Tawney¹³², held that this was a metaphysical construct like in some way a form of a social contract. Tawney having claimed that the shift of power from nobles to the rural gentry¹³³ through incompetence and extravagance, more favorable climate for renting lands, among other reasons¹³⁴ was where Harrington had taken his concept of balance from. In fact, the idea was presented in many other writings before Harrington, up to and including Machiavelli, who had the same idea but chose different words.¹³⁵ Trevor-Roper directly opposed Tawney finding instead that the power did not fall to the rural gentry. They suffered from a decline as well.¹³⁶ The power went instead to the friends of those in power. Instead of writing a new theory, Harrington was writing

¹³²Pocock The Varieties of British Political Thoughts, 1500-1800. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.) P. 167.

¹³³Op cit.

¹³⁴Moore. Ibid. P. 52.

¹³⁵Tawney. Ibid. P. 18.

¹³⁶Ibid. P. 17.

¹³⁷Moore. Ibid.

merely as an apologist for the failing order. The idea could not have developed out of anything but an ideology.¹³⁴ "The desperate slogans of a doomed party in its last convulsions."¹³⁵ Harrington was calling for a balance as his 'group' was losing their share and wanted to halt the hemorrhage with a call to *status quo*. It was the call for a social contract that would preserve their power as the *status quo*. Harrington knew the work of Hobbes, the first social contract theorist and could have used the notion of a social contract directly. There was no need for Harrington to create a new myth when the old ones and their terminology would have suited this case equally well. Instead, Harrington used the term ancient prudence, differentiating it from the modern prudence of his present governments and any failing group that these commentators may claim he represented. Harrington could have used almost anything he wanted for his terms but instead chose to argue for his terms by showing a difference in what the ancients had had, and what the modern governments had failed to give. Harrington did not find the present form of government to be based in the metaphysical format of a

¹³⁴H. R. Trevor-Roper. The Gentry 1540-1640. (London: Cambridge University Press. No Date.) P. 45.

social contract, that is ideological assertion, but he looked to history to find what had worked in the past and why they had succeeded and failed. During his research, he discovered that there was a difference in the thinking of the ancients and his modern form of government. As such, he argues for this difference, to show in his mind, what the difference is. He could have at any time, removed such a need to offer argument for his position by asserting that his argument is based on a social contract of the people to the government and the present government had broken faith with it or simply offered an appeal to the writings of Hobbes. He did not for he wanted to show his ideas were empirical and based on world history and he attacked Hobbes' ideas at the same time. In fact, his *magnum opus* is filled with such details to illustrate the need for his arguments. To hold true with Trevor-Roper is to break with Harrington's own design as shown by his writings. In other words, we may break with what Harrington had written or go along with him. Which would be the truer form of Harrington's thoughts? In so doing, Harrington made a great effort to remove himself from a position of ideology to that of a modern researcher or any class grouping of his

Moore. Ibid. P. 53.

society instead searching for a new and viable alternative. He cited his sources, from where he was taking his ideas, to show that examples about that he was talking. We may find fault with his version of history but it is not because he failed to make the effort so that we know from where he derived his theories upon what evidence. We may find fault with his history because he made the effort to show us where he took his information. We may not, however, break faith with him and still claim to speak with his voice. Thus, we are not dealing with an ideology or some apology for any specific group, when we are reading Harrington. These claims are merely assertions offered by Trevor-Roper and Tawney. Harrington is a thinker who is offering arguments for his thoughts of ancient prudence, showing from where he draws his conclusions. As such, Trevor Roper is not credible on this issue, in his theory.

Pocock takes a different track⁴¹ to show that Harrington came by his ideas from the medieval period.⁴² "A

⁴¹It should be noted that Pocock's opinion has evolved over time and that he has moved Harrington from being specifically focused on the medieval period in his Ancient Constitutions, to the Machiavellian Moment of his later works. However, as with each later work Pocock constantly refers back to it, we cannot help assume that he still holds with this position even if over time it has grown more sophisticated.

Machiavellian meditation upon feudalism."⁴² That in fact the notion of balance of property comes from the obligations that nobles, peasants and Kings had to one another. The land being the most obvious sign of this relationship. For a man is given land only in so far that they may produce men of war to aid in their feudal lord's quest or call to arms. Thus with the removal of the oath, for property from Henry VII's laws, the system was out of balance. Thus new paths to form an "oath" or a bond of loyalty or civic virtue must be formed. Harrington in Pocock's mind is doing so by the notion of balance. We may trace this concept however not to Harrington but the neo-Harrington's. Men like Neville, who followed Harrington's ideas on power and property but held that this change in the balance of property came from an earlier idea of "Gothic liberty and balance".⁴³ This had been corrupted with the modern advancements such as gunpowder, printing and the revival of learning. Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun⁴⁴

⁴²Pocock. The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law. Ibid. 124 - 147.

⁴³Pocock, The Varieties of British Political Thoughts. Ibid. P. 167.

⁴⁴Moore. Ibid. P. 65.

⁴⁵Ibid.

wrote⁻⁴⁵, that by these modern advance's nobles had forgone the bounds with their retainers since they were no longer needed.⁻⁴⁶ This break from the medieval period had caused the problems of modern prudence. Yet a return to ancient prudence would cure society of this modernity's illness. Such examples of "Neo-Harringtonianism", a term coined Pocock⁻⁴⁷, influenced his thinking greatly. Acknowledgement must be made that Pocock is certainly the better writer, has greater experience and is smarter than we are.⁻⁴⁸ As we have already seen in our previous discussions, Pocock's error is two fold. First, we have no evidence that Harrington's history was very complete as to offer such a complex reasoning of the oath of nobles to one another. More specifically, we have no real evidence that Harrington had studied the medieval period to find balance. In fact, it is only with such examples as Neville and Fletcher do we see such a connection made in the first place. Harrington's references were to Rome, Athens, Sparta, and the Turks, the Jewish states of the Bible and on and on. He did not

⁻⁴⁵Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse Concerning Militias and Standing Armies, with Relation to the Past and Present Governments of Europe and England in Particular.

Moore Ibid.

⁻⁴⁶Moore. Ibid. P. 66.

⁻⁴⁷Ibid. P. 65.

specialize in any one area but took his examples where he could find them. His understanding of the Venetian constitution was flawed based on a work of disputed historical value. What is worse for Pocock's case is that when Harrington did refer to things of the Middle Ages, as in post-Rome was always examples what not to do, that of modern prudence. Which are flawed theories of government that had caused the collapse of Harrington's own times for its lack of balance. To hold with Pocock is to overcome these overwhelming obstacles of thought. A feat of high jumping that is of Olympic proportion. Therefore, Pocock's theory concerning the origin of Harrington's 'Balance' being medieval is based not on Harrington's views but that of his followers like Neville and Fletcher. For which Harrington bears no responsibility. No amount of evidence, no matter how convincing will allow us to read a writer's mind. We may know someone's philosophy by the implications of what they write. In Harrington's case, we use Kant. We may even know their ideology, in Harrington's case it is pro republican. Yet we cannot reverse this to say their mindset is of an ideology, or that it was medieval. The *Weltanschauung* of a person is revealed as but one single

...Well two out of three is not bad...

point when we read their words or works. No amount of evidence will grant us certainty to what was in the mind of the author. Therefore, to try to take us back into the mind of the writer is wrong. To import into that mind, the works of later authors is equally incorrect.

The last theory as to the origin of 'balance' in Harrington is the closest to the facts that we have yet to see from his commentators. It is divisible by two commentators, the tragic Felix Raab⁴⁹ and the great Charles Blitzer. Raab found that within the life of Harrington there is much that can be used to draw out a notion of balance. From his life history, we know that the Harrington family was of the nobility class, we need only refer to Blitzer to see the long list of royal connections that the Harrington family had. In the end, Raab decided that there were ample experiences to justify his notion of balance. "In short, the balance was an *ex post facto* development, a practical discovery by a practical man."⁵⁰ Blitzer being more specific in his similar claims draws this back to

⁴⁹Raab died shortly after finishing his work on his PhD thesis, which was published posthumously. A tragic story for any student completing their degree.

⁵⁰Downs. Ibid. P. 37.

William Harvey's discovery of blood circulation⁵⁵ to serve as his own model of a government. All of these theories are compelling and well thought out. The last two of Raab and Blitzer being the most compelling, yet all fail. All of them are shaved away with Occams Razor for they add more than is needed to explain the issue by bringing in unneeded theories from theorists post Harrington. As well, these theories are breaking faith with Harrington's own purpose as seen by his own writings, in other words they contradict what Harrington had written. Harrington was writing his treatise to convince a rational person by means of reasons. His goal was not to self actualize his own life history. This is not an autobiography. However, by this fallacious line of reason we may thus ascribe to Raab, the question of what in his life gave his rise to research Machiavelli. Does Pocock have a strange fascination with the medieval period that is not expressed by him? Is Trevor Roper secretly afraid that his writings are mere ideologies? Is Blitzer afraid that he may stroke out for poor circulation? Each question is rude in the first place and unworthy of academic research⁵⁶. Yet each has done the same crime to

⁵⁵Op cit.

⁵⁶*Ad Hominem circumstantial*

Harrington's writings. In their effort to understand him, they have tried to cross the barrier to the other side of reason. To dwell into his psychology or mindset as he wrote his work, where there is no possibility of proof for his mindset except what he has written. A mere feat of mental jugglery as we have already seen with Macpherson. Each has offered to us an explanation that is void with but one simple question made to James Harrington himself. Harrington is dead and as such unable to answer the questions put to his corpse. We may not offer into evidence the channeled spirits of the dead. So why should we in any way attempt to ferret out from where did Harrington get his ideas. To do so is the same thing Macpherson has done, to import reasons from our time into the work of Harrington to force it answer our question. We may torture his work to confess to anything. Yet this breaks faith with Harrington and his work. He said what he had to say. He had opportunity to add, remove, correct or change anything that he did not want to say, or what he thought may have been unclear. That is all we have and that is all we need to understand him. Blitzer and Raab said to look at his life to see where the idea came from; they are the closest to the truth. If this question does need to be answered and it

does not, it need only be found that Harrington's notion of balance came from his own research and of his own understanding of the world. It came from his personal quest to understand government, from history and from his travels. We know this to be true as he showed us his method, which people like Blitzer admit to not understanding. We can see where he got his information because it is painfully there to read. Page after page of historical information offered up to show us that he has done the research into the past, and further more has done the thinking on the issue to show us where in history his ideas developed. He acknowledged where his inspiration was from, the authors, and ancient governments. To then demand of him to tell us where his inspiration is from after his own acknowledgement of where he was inspired is to postulate that either he is mistaken or lying. Both of which are fallacies. Must we badger this witness with questions already asked and answered? For in the end, the answer is not important. Where Harrington found balance is irrelevant. What is important is that he found it. Harrington's solution of balance was that it was easier to change the form of government than it would be to restore the land ownership into the hands of the nobility and the

king.¹⁵³ The form of government Harrington wanted England to take was that of a commonwealth. To be true to Harrington and true to ourselves, we must not then attempt to impose upon him what we think is the origin of his ideas when he goes to great pains to express his own thinking and the places he found his sources of ancient prudence. He traveled and he read into history. That is where balance came from. Exactly where Harrington said it came from. To think otherwise is to break faith with his work and his person. The observers have the disadvantage of not being able to peer across the distance into the mind of the actor. For the actor has many things that may be the cause of their action. We have listed three such items, Ideologies, philosophies and *Weltanschauung*, yet none of them is ever known by the observer except if the actor tells us in some way. In this case, we only have his work. To then try to read in to it more than it says, to cross the barrier into the mind of said writer is to go beyond that which can be supported facts on hand. The observer can only know a small fraction of the life, history, feelings and wants or desires of an actor, barely a fraction of the totality of being. Therefore, to take from the work and

¹⁵³Smith. Ibid. P.30.

work backwards into the mind of an actor is to journey beyond the Pale.

We may turn to social psychology to understand why this happens. It is called an actor-observer Bias, the tendency to attribute actions to the situation or to attribute the same action to personality dispositions.¹³⁴ Just as we did when cast aspiration upon the character of the commentaries above by asking impolite questions. The first group of commentators attributed Harrington's ideas to his situation, where he was, i.e. his knowledge of history or of his class. The latter two attributed it to his personality, what in his life affected him such that he found this idea. Now while the ideas expressed by these commentators are certainly compelling to read, do we have any possible means to prove their theories. Can we in any way hope to offer real proof of a scientific nature? Can we even say that they have offered a view that is not psychological in nature? The answer is no to both questions. All attempt to "get in the head" of Harrington to ferret out what he was thinking when he discovered balance have been shown to be incorrect. This as we have seen is a classic error of which teleology means to oppose.

We may never be able to show what Harrington was thinking, what caused him to think of balance or even what external influences affected his ideas. What we can offer to the reader is his work. In black and white, allow the reader the chance to read those same pages and draw the conclusions from them, not from the application of personal actor-observer bias.

An Open System

Thus far, we have spoken of the agrarian reform, balance and the needed checks and balance, all that remains to be seen of Harrington is where tolerance fits in. As a part of his faith in the virtue of the people, Harrington must hold with the tolerance of other with differing opinions. Thus, we shall proceed in the following manner to reach a theory of tolerance from Harrington. We shall begin with his astonishing break from the past of modern prudence from king to commonwealth that necessarily implies a tolerance. Yet of more importance, the underlying theory is that of an open system, the commonwealth.

²Aronson. Ibid. P. 168

Harrington follows Machiavelli in many ways⁻⁵⁵. Such as Machiavelli claims that, we should not put trust in Princes, whereas Harrington would hold that nowhere in the bible does it say to have faith in them. As we have seen Machiavelli had no faith in people either. Harrington did. He saw that they too might have virtue. By the Agrarian law, expanding ownership of the land, the people would soon all be part owners of the land and inherit the virtue that Aristotle spoke of so long ago. In any number greater than 5000 people owning land, the commonwealth could not be unbalanced. So the greater the number of people, the more surety of balance in his system. Why would this be so? As there are more people competing for their own desires, wants and needs, they will naturally be forced to work with each other and compromise for the whole so that they may receive some of their goals. Hence, the reason for a secret ballot and the bicameral legislature is to allow this socialization to occur. It avoids the tragedy of Athens and a mob voting for war that was in the end un-winnable. As the votes are cast in secret, you can never be sure who will vote for or against an issue. In the political deal

⁻⁵⁵Pocock. Machiavellian Moment. Ibid.

Raab. The English Face of Machiavelli. Ibid.

making, you would not know who was on your side where it counts, the ballot box. You can either trust them as men of good faith and virtue or not. As you would soon know who was of good faith, by their actions would it be revealed. There would be a greater tendency to trust good men and remove the bad ones from office. As there would be over 200 hundred men from all over the country, would it be possible to know them all? If we add in that the office holders were switched every three years, there would be a constant stream of new people to judge good or bad. (This can be seen as a more coherent version of Cicero's New Man bringing in new virtue.) Yet there would be a need to offer trust in them from the first moment they arrived to get legislation passed. This would create tolerance to the new people until they showed themselves for who they are. In the rule of one, there is no need for tolerance, as there is only one vote that counts, that of the king. In the rule of the few, they are mostly a cohesive group of people with similar concerns and wants. The tolerance would be there in a minor way. Yet when faced with new people every year, the need to work along side of them would demand the fostering of trust and tolerance of the different views as they arrive and emerge. This process, in Harrington's time was

not fully understood as it was not backed up by social research but it has all the elements already established in the title, commonwealth. The issue of a commonwealth rest with the understanding that a commonwealth refers to the people. The people, the many, would have to be open to return a new man to the legislature every few years. Each would serve a term of 3 years and not be allowed back into their seats for one year afterwards to avoid a cult of personalities but also to keep the system as open as possible for as many people as possible. Just as the order to march given to an army cannot be expected to have every man move forward at once, but to wait in orderly succession to move forward. So to would the systematic rotation of seat holder enforce the openness of the system. Yet what is an open system of which we speak?

Social researchers Katz and Kahn¹³⁶ have found there are eight characteristics of an open system. We may contrast this with a closed system such as Plato's never changing forms. In his state, once established it would last forever in a never changing pattern. Aristotle established three forms of government that were also not

¹³⁶D. Katz, R. L. Kahn. The Social Psychology of Organizations. (New York: Wiley, 1966.) P. 14-29

changeable. It is only with the creation of a mixed government do we see some movement of the people with Cicero's "New Man". Yet as we have seen, it was not a system open to the widest possible franchise, just a select few. Harrington's system is so wide open, in that, the land would be passed onto more hands with each generation and that those entrusted with the seats of government would be changed frequently, every three years. It can only be described to be an "open system". By looking at the eight characteristics that Social Research uses to describe an open system we shall see that Harrington had instinctively set up such a system with scientific validity.

1) *Such a system imports energy from its environment.* In Harrington's case, with the openness of elections to all, new people would constantly be added to the franchise of voters and those who would serve in the Parliament. 2) *Open systems import energy from their environment.* By the constant renewal, yearly of new people into the legislature, we have a new person with a new set of dynamic ideas and energy to constantly bring in new ideas and fresh visions with them. 3) *Open systems export their produce to the environment.* In this case, as the legislature will constantly be sending out new laws each year to the people

with fresh perspectives, as there will be new people with new ideas to produce this legislation. With each new law issued, new people will react to the legislation and want to either change it or produce more changes of a similar nature. If the system stops producing, it dies. In the historical events of Harrington's life, the Rump Parliament had stopped exporting things outside of itself. We need only call to mind what Cromwell said as he ordered them out.

"You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart I say, and let us be done with you. In the name of G*d, go!"

Surely, the lack of exporting is a sign of a system not in balance. 4) *The patterned activities of an open system's energy exchange are cyclical.* In the renewal of the seats every year, 1/3 of the people are removed from the Legislature and filled by new people. The system of nobles and Kings had no cycle except waiting for the death of the titleholder. Hardly a cycle of measurable quantity. The writings of Polybius are filled with his view on the cycle of government switch hands from the one, the few and the many. If these were the only factor involved in an open system, we may simply dismiss this as unneeded. Yet when taken with 5, the cycle nature becomes not a negative but a

positive factor, harnessing these forces acting on government to the advantage of political stability. 5) *Open systems survive by importing more energy than consume.* What we have seen in 4, with the mention of Polybius' cycles of government, it is a factor of entropy, a force of the universe to send all things to destruction. People grow old and die only to be replaced by new people. In this case, a legislature is forced to cycle its members every three years whether or not they have finished what they wanted to do. In other words, a member may have more energy and plans than could possibly be filled in three years. Yet they must leave at the end of their term. This allows the system of government to import more energy than it uses. With more people that are new, there for a limited time, having agendas that could not possibly be enacted into legislation. This allows the system to avoid the ruin of entropy, as happened with the closed system of the King, Rome and Athens. Entropy caught up with them, as they could not produce more energy to survive than the forces that were destroying them could remove. They succumbed to the forces of nature. Harrington's plan would forestall this from happening. 6) *Open systems can be corrected by negative feedback.* While such things as negative feedback

can be seen as open revolt, we need not have this present in Harrington's system. In the case of King Charles, the feedback could not reach him. He had not the ability or energy to answer to the demands of his parliament. They rebelled and put him to death. In Harrington's case, we have negative feedback in the elections each year. The new members are more familiar with the wants, needs and demands of the people who elected them. More so than the people elected who may have lost touch with their electorate. (While this may seem extreme in only two years, it is possible to see it happen.) As well, with the constant pressure of new people, the Legislature not only accepts the negative feedback of the people, but also are forced to accept such feedback with tolerance as they have need of those votes to pass any legislation. For one third of the votes are a large minority of people to whom they must appease anew each year. The constant renewal allows dissent to be heard from the people in who they are willing to elect. Charles had no such system available to him to allow for dissent. It was treason to do so. There was no concept of loyal opposition. So the people were forced into the only option they had available to hang separately for their dissent or hang together to remove the king. Harrington's

system being an open one, allows said dissent to be incorporated each year with each new crop of legislators. While the issues of the moment may not be fully dealt with each year, that there is such movement to address them will dispel from the people's mind such a need for extreme action as rebellion. 7) *Open systems can attain a steady state through dynamic equilibrium.* Just as the body works to regulate its own temperature, so too must a body politic take its own temperature to arrange itself to achieve balance. With the new energy coming in to allow for feedback, the system is adjusted to fix what is not working in the society. Charles did not have such a means to take the temperature of the body politic. As such, it overheated into rebellion. The term steady state is nothing more than the need for the system to have balance. Something that Harrington was in fact calling for, as we have seen. 8) *Expanding open systems differentiate further components with increasingly specialized functions.* This point is the hardest to see presently. For it calls on us to see what would happen to Harrington's system if it were to be expanded. This is beyond the realm of time for James Harrington. We must pass on to his future into the world betwixt him and ourselves to see if such occurred. Thus,

let us press on into the next chapter to see what his system resulted in.

Thus far, we have seen Harrington saw that the laws of King Henry VII passed contained the destruction of his own power held in check with the limited ownership of the land. By the time of King Charles, the result was in the crown's own destruction. The notion of land is where the power is for money may leave a country with ease, but land cannot unless invaded. In which case the more people who own land the more likely it is that they will defend it. The land is where the virtue is. Looking back to Aristotle's position, reflection into the soul for virtue come with land and the time needed to improve the soul to perfection. To achieve balance, the people, at least 5000 of them, must share the land. This will then check the power any few or one from taking over the system. As well, those who are allowed to hold power must do so for a limited term and cast votes by secret ballots. The Legislature will be bicameral, where the Senate will debate the issue but the House will then vote on it. This will force the people to be both disinterested and foster tolerance towards others. We have seen that where Harrington found such an idea of balance is of no importance to understanding his work, unlike other

commentator's claims to the contrary. Finally, we have seen that Harrington had stumbled onto the very modern idea of an open system allowing his system to be stable and renew itself. Thus, we now turn to the completion of this idea in the systems of government that were created in his model, namely the United States of America and Great Britain and beyond.

Chapter Four: The Result

We may now ask what happened after James Harrington's publication of his theories? His life after the publication of his work saw the restoration of a king with the death of Cromwell, his imprisonment and eventual madness. His last work being the stuff lunatics write. The Mechanics of Nature was Harrington's attempt to prove to his doctors that what delusions he was seeing were in fact real. Whether further investigation into this work will uncover anything of value is highly doubtful.⁵⁷ He died, was buried and so ends the lesson? Not at all. For in the writings of this one man, still read today by the very few, sparked an idea whose time would come shortly after his death. John Locke, a political theorist and philosopher took in hand the theories of Harrington⁵⁸ (and others), to construct a

⁵⁷ It has been attempted to link this work with other mystical cults of the time. However, this has been less than compelling and not a little weird.

⁵⁸ While we have no direct evidence of Locke reading Harrington's work directly such as presented in the case of Kant, we may infer that the popularity of Harrington's ideas was not diminished over this period. Other works that popularized his ideas, namely Henry Neville's Plato Redivivus, (1681) show a continuing fascination with Harrington. Locke would surely have been exposed in some way to them, even if he did not know them by name.

work of theory that would form the call to revolution in his own time¹⁵³, the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution¹⁵⁴. Many of their respective commentators amply demonstrate the connection of Harrington to Locke. Suffice to say they held true to the idea of Commonwealth. Locke being the philosopher surpassed Harrington the theorist. We need not then offer into evidence the connection of Locke to either revolution as others have done so,¹⁵⁵ but we shall do so for it helps to further our understanding of the issue. For our purpose here is to show that Harrington's system was in fact an open system. Our purpose is to show point 8) *Expanding open systems differentiate further components with increasingly specialized functions.* The purpose of so doing is twofold. First, we shall show that Harrington had overcome the pitfalls of his predecessors in the creation of a lasting system. Secondly, that his system

¹⁵³ Peter Laslett first made the case for this in Part III of his Introduction to John Locke's Second Treaties on Government. 1956. Prior to this, it was thought that Locke was an apologist for the revolution.

¹⁵⁴ Please consult:

Smith. Ibid.

S. B. Liljegren, James Harrington's Oceana. (Lund and Heidelberg, 1924)

¹⁵⁵ For a cursory examination of any of the primary sources would show that they found Locke to be highly valuable.

is with us today in our present form of government in an increasingly more specialized form. To do so, we must first establish that the United Kingdom and the United States both have a similar origin in their government and that this government is based on the model set up by Harrington though with increased specialization, as predicated by an open system. The link between these two great countries will be found in their own founding documents. We shall look at the United States constitution to show that it can be seen as an extension of the works of Harrington. We use the USA as our backdrop of examples only because it has a written constitution whereas the UK does not. We are forced to look at only a piece of their unwritten constitution, the Bill of Rights 1689. These documents will help to show our case is true. It will be easier for a reader to find the sum total of the American government's charter for it is one document. Our final act must then be to justify the value of an open system to that of a closed system. As we have shown above in the last chapter, it is more beneficial for such a system on describing its model, yet does that same view hold on philosophical grounds? In order to show

Bernard Bailyn. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.) P.

its philosophical value, we must show that it has practical value. In other words, we must show that over time these ideas of Harrington have progressed to encompass the whole of the world. We shall look at the UN Declaration of Human rights to see the footprints of time upon it. The evidence that follows is not definite. It is contingent. It would be impossible to prove that Harrington and only Harrington as being the sole source of these ideas. However, as we move forward in time, we see that Harrington's ideas are cited more often as their source. Thus, our certainty gains with each of the three examples. Thus acknowledging that Harrington may not be the only source for each of these examples, however it is sufficient for the case that we may see his shadow in their actions.

The Glorious Revolution

In November 1688, William of Orange (1650-1702) *stadholder* (Governor) of the Netherlands set foot upon the English shore. He did not know what was to await him. Would he fight for life and limb or would he be welcome with open

arms? History tells us he was welcomed by a group of men who were delegated by Parliament to offer on to him and his descendants the throne of England, as they were dissatisfied with the rulership of James II, his father in law. If he was willing to agree to their terms for a more just rulership, i.e. Protestant rules, unlike the Catholic rule of James II, and a bill of rights. This document, the Bill of Rights 1689, of "true, ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people" would become, with the *Magna Carta* one of the founding documents of the English people's civil rights and part of their unwritten constitution. William was crowned king with his wife Mary as Queen in February 1689. The Bill of Rights 1689 began with a very simple yet powerful statement:

"Whereas the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster, lawfully, fully and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm,"

The people who passed this law do so lawfully. They are not outlaws or acting in treasonous behavior. Their action is on the behalf of all the people of the country and is undertaken freely and without hesitation. Every group that has disposed of their king's rulership in the past have uttered such words. There is, in the first few

words they write, not a call to men, or to the people but to a respect of law. "Assembled ... Lawfully" to show they are not some beggars who took arms to better their own lot, but because of their "respectful of the law" that these men have been forced to take action. They are in fact referring back to the same idea of rule of law of which Harrington spoke. They were men out to better their position by revolution but honorable men who could not stand for the actions of their King. Harrington's views had made an impact already upon the society that they were doing so not for themselves but for all people and the rule of law. These words of Harrington had become ingrained in the words of these people that a government was made of law not of men was their first consideration. Furthermore who are these men speaking on their behalf for? The King? The nobles? No, they directly refer to "all" the people even those who are not in agreement with their actions. For "all" people, represents an inclusiveness for the realm extended to everyone. They could have limited this to speak on behalf of their supporters or only the non-Catholics, which they will take action against later on in this bill, by limiting the throne to only non-Catholics. Yet here, they judged to allow that even a Catholic would be in

favour of their actions with their use of "all." They go further into the spirit of Harrington with the following:

"And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representative of this nation, taking into their most serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends aforesaid, do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare:"

They refer back to their ancient rights, yet Locke would speak of a state of nature and a social contract, as did Hobbes. Neither are mentioned. They are calling upon the world to see that these men, these free men,¹⁰² are standing for their ancient rights, (their ancient prudence perhaps?) by returning England from the rule of a single man, King James, the rule of one, to the rule of laws, the house of Parliament, the rule of the many.

In other areas these men would, follow Locke for his Second Treaties on Government, we now know is not the apology for but a call to the Glorious Revolution.¹⁰³ Yet even Locke is echoing Harrington in many ways such as:

"The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace

¹⁰²This band of brothers...

¹⁰³Laslett. Ibid.

and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in the society, the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealth is the establishment of the legislative power."⁶⁴

"The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety,"⁶⁵ Property distribution being one of the major themes of Harrington, that the many should own their own property. This is to create balance of the many with the power of government such that it would keep peace with the property owners. "And the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in the society,"⁶⁶ The rule of law and not the rule of men was another theme of Harrington. This way laws would be for justice and not for some other reason such as person aggrandizement. Finally, "the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealth is the establishment of the legislative power."⁶⁷ That law is the supremacy of all things, first and fundamental part of a government is to make laws so that the rule is of law, not men. As well, we may see that a commonwealth is the form of

⁶⁴Locke. Political Writings. Ibid. P. 328.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Locke. Political Writings. Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

limited government of the people to preserve their property through the creation of a place of legislative powers that is based on law. This is of course directly related to Harrington's Agrarian Law in that the only way to produce a legitimate government is to establish ownership of the property to the people so that they will ensure the government remains legitimate to the people. Thus, before proceeding, we need to understand what a legislature is for Locke. What does Locke then hold to be the legislative power?

"... The legislature of 'three' distinct persons' - (1) a single hereditary person having the constant, supreme, executive power (2) and assembly of hereditary nobles and (3) an assembly of representatives chosen ... by the people."¹⁰

Which is certainly not, what Harrington would have as a government, his being a staunch republican would forgo the rule of any king. So Locke and the assembled people in Westminster have taken from Harrington some of his ideas, the rule of law over the rule of man, but not other parts. The notion of ancient prudence to be the basis for those laws and that property is of supreme importance for this to occur. Yet have they broken faith with Harrington's open system of government in being a kingship? The key to keep

in mind that this chapter is to show that Harrington's system was meant to be open and not a closed system, as such open to changes that as the system grows, each function becomes more specific. The king, William, signed this act that took away the notion of a supreme monarchy. It limited his powers from being all-powerful to being subject to law, but more so to having to answer to those laws as understood by ancient prudence enumerated as rights. William was taking his position not by inheritance, or force of arms, but by the will of the people. The king's power was further curtailed by assigning him the role of executive power. By so defining his area of power, they removed his presence from all other areas of governmental power. Whereas the word 'King' may be the problem with this difference. If we recall to mind, Harrington was not above dedicating his work to Oliver Cromwell as protector of the realm. In fact, he wanted Cromwell to follow his ideas and form Oceana. The role Cromwell was to play was not unlike to what William had just agreed to. The sole difference here is the use of the title 'King'. This, in the end, is only the word. What Harrington had wanted was nearly similar to this form of government even if the word he used

¹⁰⁰Weston. Ibid. P. 264-265.

was different. Harrington had wanted first that the people elected, freely and without coercion, a House of Commons. He also wanted a sort of landed Nobility forming the Senate and a dictator to rule over the place in times of problems with executive powers. What role did William fulfill but that of a protector who had to put down rebellions in both Scotland and in Ireland so that the realm was protected? If we remove the overly republican sentiment of Harrington as to the title of the person with executive powers, we have seen that his ideas were put into practice in large part with the two obvious exceptions of a king and the discrimination against Catholics. Yet can we do anything but expect that this entire whole Act would find favour with Harrington? While we may never know this to any certainty, yet it does sound likely that this Glorious Revolution had followed his design and had grown to become different in parts more specialized. Keep in mind that Henry Neville (1620-1694) wrote and published his work Plato Redivivus, in 1681. It was a reassertion of the Harrington's ideas with some few differences. Yet the essential ideas were freshly preserved and in the marketplace of ideas with plenty of time to be incorporated for the Glorious Revolution.

Tea for Two

In the darkened streets of Boston, hiding in an alley, a group of men gathered. Wearing the buckskins of the aboriginal "Savages"¹⁸ from along the frontier and putting war paint on their faces to disguise their looks, they prepare to attack the waiting ship as it prepared to unload. On 15 December 1773, these men would form a mob to destroy some 342 chests of tea imported by the British East India Company. The government in London had passed laws to restrict the tea importation in 1767 to the colonies, by placing duties upon it and other goods. They had repealed this law so that the East India Company could import it to the detriment of the local merchants. Widely considered illegal, these duties were taxation without representation by the Crown. With this cry on the lips of the mob, they stormed the ship. Thus, they began what is now called the American Revolution.

Harrington was not opposed to the issue of colonies; for it would be to "do her duty"¹⁹. Instead he describes

¹⁸The reference refers to The Declaration of Independence where they are specifically referred to as such.

¹⁹Fink. Ibid. P. 83.

three ways in which a country could go about colonizing.¹⁷⁷ They could "impose the yoke"¹⁷⁸ which refers to a military occupation. He warned against doing this. It would not catch or hold anything. "If for setting up liberty, you impose the yoke, (it) will surely destroy you."¹⁷⁹ Harrington's second and third method of equal and unequal leagues of association for colonies may or may not apply to the issue of America depending on the period used. If we look at earlier colonial governments, we can see there is a case to be made of an equal league with the mother country. That as agitation grew, this changed to a more unequal league where the colony became more and more under the yoke of the powerful English military force. For the British crown had forgotten Harrington's warning that "if you subdued a Nation that is capable of liberty, you shall make them a present of it."¹⁸⁰ The main argument of the American colonies being that there was 1) taxation without representation, 2) violation of the natural rights, 3) unjust crown intrusions into their affairs and 4) the

¹⁷⁷He is clearly taking this from the history of the Athenian League in ancient Greece. See:

¹⁷⁸Sealey. Ibid.

¹⁷⁹Fink. Ibid.

¹⁸⁰Fink. Ibid.

¹⁸¹Ibid. P. 85.

removal of their legislative ability. Reading the Declaration of Independence [Adopted in Congress 4 July 1776] We find the following causes:

1) Taxation without representation:

"For imposing taxes on us without our consent"

"He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only."

The link to Harrington's ideas must surely rest with the nature of property owners, as in the Agrarian Law, voting to secure the legislator for themselves (as many as possible in numbers) and that only they can decide what taxes, or proportion of their property they should hand over to their government for the spending upon governmental affairs. To be then force to relinquish said ancient prudence is an affront to their being and to their person, as free people without their consent. The people who make up the state must consent to the laws established by the government or the laws will not be enforced. In this case, with overwhelming military force to protect the British colonial officials and impose laws onto the people, their

consent was not needed. They had but one recourse, to sit on juries to give findings of not guilty for the so-called 'crimes' they had been accused of. The crown quickly resolved this problem by removing the jury system.

2) Violation of the natural rights:

"That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

"For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury"

Referring to the cycle of change that causes a government system to alter from the rule of one, to a few, to the many as it reaches its own end, the people must take into their hand the responsibility of creating a new system. In this case, so that it is the most likely, to produce happiness and safety for all concerned. One of the ways a person may so be deprived is to call them criminals and convict them for crimes, real or imaginary. The notion of a jury is the safe guard of the people. A jury of fellow men is the protection of a single person from the overwhelming power of the state. In that, to be convicted, all 12 members must agree of the charge as specified. We

need only return to ancient Athens and the trial of Socrates to see that this is very much an ancient prudence. This allows for the possibility that the jury will not convict someone who while guilty in the eyes of the law, is innocent to the people, who ultimately are the makers of laws. Called 'Jury Nullification' today, the jury will not convict a person who they think the government is persecuting for reasons other than the crime they may or may not have committed, even when the crime would normally be considered against a just law. In the end, this is the ultimate balance of government of laws. For in the eyes of the law it may be seen as a crime, the people have within their hands the power to disregard what the law claims to be just. For while the just system is fair in the general sense, there is no such claim that it is always so fair in the specific case. The king refused to grant trial by jury when it became clear that the local American juries would not convict fellow Americans for "crimes" that they saw as being done in the best interests of the people, such as acts to disrupt the Kings rules, like the Boston Tea Party mentioned above. For the king to abolish the ancient prudence of trial by jury is to become destructive of the very system of ancient prudence and the very nature of

balance. The crown has thus far deprived the people of their right to consent to laws and then moved to curtail the balance of said laws with their jury nullification. All of which is the unjust intrusion of the crown into areas that they should not have ventured into by ancient prudence. However, the system can be seen as balanced. The King passes unjust laws. The people refuse to obey them. The crown arrests them and the jury refuses to convict. It only begins to break down when the crown deliberately keeps trying to overcome the balance.

3) Unjust crown intrusions into their affairs:

"For taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments: For suspending our own legislatures and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever."

What then is a government if it is not the ability to pass laws for the good of the people, by the people and of the people? The crown was changing the way society was ruled in America, imposing a yoke upon them and destroying any balance of powers the people had, making them less men and more slaves. The crown was destroying the very nature of the relationship of balance to tip it towards the crown. By taking onto himself the right to make law, the king had

been attempting to establish a tyranny over the people who would not be so treated. In order to be fair here, we must look at the British view in that they were trying to establish law and order and the colonial people were in rebellion against them. The British Isle would benefit economically, to the exclusion of the American people cannot be overlooked here. As well, that this group of men in rebellion were not the majority but only a third of the population¹¹. To protect the laws of the crown, steps were taken to prevent the rebellious people from making a farce of those laws. It is interesting to note that in Canada in 1848 when rioters destroyed the Parliament building in Montreal, the government instead of responding with overwhelming force to destroy the mobs, offered tolerance to them by allowing the civil authorities to control and contain the problem. This was a more tolerant and peaceful solution. The result is seen in Canada today, as it is seemingly a more tolerant nation. The British had no such understanding and escalated the issue with each action and counter actions, depriving more and more the fundamental

¹¹One third being in rebellion. One third being is support of the crown. They would later flee to places such as Canada. Finally the one third who were neutral. This last group is where they lump in slaves and women.

ancient prudence of free men. The final act is to remove the right to control their own government with the removal of legislatures made up of the people to who owned the property.

4) The removal of their legislative ability.

"He has refused his assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. We has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolution's, to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the state remaining in the meantime exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within."

The power of the people rested in their ownership of land to create and feed their armies. They thus protect themselves by electing people to office to make disinterested legislation for themselves on behalf of themselves. These notions of Harrington could not be made

clearer than here. The crown having deprived the people of their right to govern themselves as free men was to impose further taxation, the removal of some part of their property without their consent or even their ability to offer their consent in a legislature.

The conclusion reached by the members was that the King was: "A prince, whose character is thus marked by every act that may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people." Clearly by far, despite Marxist rhetoric based on the property issue, the main issue was the deprival of ancient prudence from the people, for the people by the people. Americans were claiming that the King had taken away their natural rights as Englishmen, as a people to legislate their own destinies, laws and by what part they would relinquish to the crown for such issue as of the general good. Recall to mind that Harrington had said it was impossible to return to a kingdom once the land had been transferred from the ownership of the King or Nobles to that of the people. In the USA, there was no such thing as feudal landowners, or modern prudence, but simply that of the independent yeomen working their own land for their own benefit. Therefore, there was even less likelihood of such a transformation to occur in the first

place in America that would in anyway return to a state where the king owned all the land. That a revolution was likely to occur in this case is very easy to see in hindsight. Without their own ability to govern themselves, taken away by the British, the members felt compelled to take such a strong action, as a rebellion to restore onto themselves their rights as a people. We may better understand the thinking of the Americans by examining what they produced as their result of this conflict, with their constitution. In doing so, we shall see two things, 1) the effect of Harrington upon this work. We need not claim that he was the sole source of ideas for these many men for that would be impossible to claim, we simply offer that there is a clear indication that Harrington's ideas can be found in the American constitution. 2) We shall see that they have produced a more specialized document, showing that Harrington's system was an open system subject to more and increased specialization. The fact that, unlike the British, there is a written constitution is already an indicator that they have become more specialized. For from the simple general principal present in the British Bill of Rights 1689 they now have spelled out, codified what exactly is the power of the executive, or President. They

have also removed the King from this government that makes it even closer to resembling Harrington's Oceana.

Constitution for the United States of America

"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

In perhaps the most poetic words of political rhetoric ever uttered, began the American Constitution. Re-establishing for themselves their own government, by the people, themselves. Note the utterance of "a more perfect union" is a referent to there being a first constitution that had proven to be unworkable in the interim from the revolution to their secret meetings, hidden in the backwoods to avoid charges of sedition. In doing so, they sparked another revolution, only this time they did not use shot and powder but words and arguments. For our purposes, let us see how they envisioned such a more perfect union

America has had two constitutions. First, one was from 1776-1789 and the second one that is currently in force. The first based on the work of Thomas Paine was very decentralized, a union in name only. The President was a weak figurehead with almost no power. State governors were more powerful. This led to state versus state conflict that divided the union. Thus, the Founding Father had to

and if it in some way resembles that of Harrington's vision.

"Article. I. Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."

"Article. I. Section. 3. No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years ..."

Harrington held to a bicameral house of legislation as well. With an age restriction on to who may become a member of the voting class. He had, as well, rules to establish a form of landed nobility based on wisdom (as well as property ownership). Each House had specific duties to which they alone had the privilege to enact. Such as, money bills must be first introduced in the House of Representatives. The Senate alone will vote on Foreign Treaties or to declaring war thereby giving the President their advice and consent. They also had overlapping duties so that each may check and balance each other. The Supreme Court would have the power to adjudicate the legislation of the Congress but could only be appointed by the President. They would then have to be confirmed by the

meet in secret as they were in fact planning a coup d'etat of the union to replace it with a federation.

Article. 1. Section 7

Senate.¹⁷³ In the case of a law. It must pass both the House and the Senate, and then be signed into law by the President who may veto it. Finally, the Supreme Court would determine what its application would mean to the laws of society. In this way each branch would have powers onto themselves and have overlapping jurisdiction into the powers of another. This is called "Checks and Balances". While the issues are more complex than Harrington's vision, they hold onto his premises. Open systems do become more complex over time.

As well, we have many examples of what ancient prudence would be like.

Habeas Corpus:¹⁷⁴

"Article. I Section 9. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

Literally meaning, "where is the body". Where are you holding such a person? It is a legal document forcing the

¹⁷³Article. 2. Section 2

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

¹⁷⁵It is included here as Harrington's sisters used it to secure his release when he was charged with treason. At that time, it was useful only in one prison. The government was thus able to get around the issue by moving prisoners around from place to place. As they did with Harrington.

government to either show cause or proof that there is a need to confine a person to jail or release that person immediately. Often it is used if someone is not brought before a judge to grant or withhold bail.

Strong protection for property from being held by the government against the owner.

"Article the seventhth [Amendment V] "... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

There was an argument in the Pennsylvania ratification that by enumerating the rights of people that some fool may think that this was the entire sum total of human rights. The proposed solution was to issue the amendment that follows:

"Article the eleventh [Amendment IX] The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

Finally, the balance of state power versus the federal power is balanced here so that the majority of power not giving to the people or listed to the federal government thus becomes the power of the local states.

Doing so placed his life in jeopardy as he was housed in very bad conditions. It also broke his hold on sanity.

"Article the twelfth [Amendment X] The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

If we recall to mind that the Bill of Rights 1689 had a problem with tolerance towards Catholics being King or holding offices, the passage of time allowed for a more specialized functioning of the government and the ability to remove such discrimination with tolerance. It offered the fundamental balance of the people to speak out against government in public and in print. The right to gets their problems addressed whether by peaceful demonstrations or petitions. Essentially allowing a democracy to be a free market place of ideas and that the government having overwhelming power over the individual cannot infringe on their rights by closing said debate so long as it is peaceful. Recall that Harrington placed great faith in Harvey's work, which is essentially the rationalization of human biology. In order to do so, there must be some way in which rational ideas may be spread to all people, hence the need for a free market place of ideas. As well, Harrington

Note that while this is the Article the seventh, two amendments did not pass. As such, it is the Amendment V. As

published his work for all to see so that they may be persuaded to his ideas having worth.

"Article the third [Amendment I] Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

This amendment is clearly designed to allow the tolerance to be institutionalized into the body politic. So that there will be no government interference into religion, unlike the British version.

Thus far we have alluded to the open system designed by Harrington, became more specialized over time. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the role the "founding fathers" created for the President in Article II. They did not want a king to become all-powerful. They did not want to be unable to respond in event of a crisis either. (This is also covered in Harrington's Oceana as the need for a dictator in the event of a war.) Here is where they spell out what is the function and only functions allowable to the President. Even still, the other two branches check the

they were not ratified by the people's electorates.

President so that his power is not so overwhelming of the people.

"Article. II. Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

What we read is that the President has at his command as Commander in Chief the sum total of all military force available in the United States. With this military under his control he could do what had already happened with the King of England, establish a military dictatorship over America. He could also then pardon his officers for any crimes they may commit in so doing. The greatest fear was that a dictator would take hold of the office of POTUS.⁴⁴ In order to avoid this from happening, the Congress is the only authority able to promote a soldier to the rank of general. All officers may issue orders only as they have been so empowered by congress. They hold the ability to pay their soldiers, or to withhold this pay. Thus echoing

⁴⁴President of the United States. The term POTUS is used in short to refer to the officer holder.

Harrington that an army marches on its stomach. The President may command for but one day, for at supper time, when they want their food, the army may have second thoughts if there is none there to feed them.

Thus, we can see the echo of Harrington in the action of the statehood. Yet we may ask if there were such thoughts in the mind of the people themselves as they wrote, argued, and voted on it? For these were learned men, "It was an obscure pamphleteer indeed who could not muster at least one classical analogy or one ancient precept."¹²² The men were well informed individuals that:

"Their key concepts, natural rights, the contractual basis of society and government, the uniqueness of England's liberty-preserving 'mixed-constitution' were commonplace of the liberal thoughts of the time."¹²³

We need only to show that both sides of this debate were of the same interest as they created the form of government. In the first case, we have the "loyal" opposition to this new constitution, Centinel, Judge George Bryan or his son Samuel, in close consideration with the

¹²²Charles F. Mullet. "Classical Influences on the American Revolution." Classical Journal (35. 1939-40) P 93-94.

¹²³Bailyn Ibid. P. 45.

other wrote¹³⁵ of the need for a dispassionate and deliberate examination of the issue.¹³⁶ Saying: "It ought to be dispassionately and deliberately examined, and its own intrinsic merits the only criterion of your patronage."¹³⁷ Is this not a call for a judgement of taste rather than a judgement of sense, to use the Kantian terminology? We can be certain that Harrington would agree with the need for a disinterested judgement. Centinel goes on to attack the notion of a balanced government being impossible for humans to create lacking in enough wisdom.¹³⁸ Whereas in hindsight we can see that he is clearly wrong in his assertion, can it be said that at his time, they would have thought that there was enough wisdom to undertake such an action? John Adams clearly disagrees as he writes that:

"The arts and sciences, in general, during the three or four last centuries have had regular course of progressive improvement... Even in the theory and practice of government, in all the simple monarchies, considerable improvements have been made. The checks and balances of republican government have in some degree been adopted at the courts of princes. By the erection of various tribunals, to register laws, and exercise the judicial power, by indulging in petitions and

¹³⁵Herbert Storing. The Anti-Federalist. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.) P. 7.

¹³⁶Ibid. P. 8.

¹³⁷Ibid. P. 14.

¹³⁸Storing. Ibid. P. 8.

remonstrates of subjects, until by habit they are regarded as rights... Which is some degree approaches the spirit of republics. Property is generally secure and personal liberty seldom invaded.⁷⁷

We may draw three conclusions from this. The world may not have enough wisdom as Centinel may wish for, but it has had the wisdom enough to adopt to the more progressive theory of state held by Adam's "republicans". Secondly we may note that Adam's clearly sees a connection of progression to improving the lives of all people, even in principedoms by their having greater liberty and property rights. Finally that the truisms Charles Blitzer spoke of Harrington, liberty such as tolerance and property such as the Agrarian law, are taken as proven quantities. The truism seems to have taken only a few years for their adoption. We may note that while Harrington's ideas can be traced back to other thinkers and philosophers that his claim of uniqueness seems to be correct. Thereby marking all the roads that lead to Rome beating a path to his doorstep.

In the USA, between 1660-1690, three colonies, Carolina, New Jersey and Pennsylvania attempted to form a

⁷⁷Russell Kirk. The Portable Conservative Reader. (London: Penguin, 1982.) P. 51-52

constitution similar to Harrington's Oceana.²³⁷ New Jersey's constitution of 1683 was the closest to his model.²³⁸ By 1779, John Adam's devotion to Harrington in his support for this new constitution of Massachusetts was so great, that in jest, a motion was proclaimed to change its name to Oceana.²³⁹ It failed but the point was and is clear. This new constitution in Massachusetts and the constitution of the United States remain the closest to that of Harrington's intent.²⁴⁰

The Open Society

We may ask what is so beneficial of an open society. By what grounds do we hold it to be more valuable than its opposite the closed society? There seems to be two factors involved here. The first refers to Plato's Republic. As it is perfect, unchanging we may ask the same question Aristotle may have asked, in that how do we the imperfect enter into it (the closed system)? It is closed to the people in it as it does not change, for it is perfect but it is also closed to the people outside of it for we cannot

²³⁷ Downs. Ibid. P. 136.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Russell-Smith. Ibid. P. 187-97.

Downs. Ibid. P. 136.

enter it as well. As we have seen, this leads to its own destruction from the forces of entropy. The second problem faced by a closed society is they do not work on theoretical grounds or in practice either. Take the example of the USSR. This was an attempt to produce a worker's utopian paradise. It was a closed society and it failed. Yet does it even work in theory? We turn to Georg Lukacs²⁴⁴ who is arguably the best philosopher of the Marxist tradition. Could he have made the system work? Not in practice but in theory? The judgement alas fails here as well.²⁴⁵ Rather than expand effort to show why this notion of the closed society failed, let us instead show why the open society succeeded. The clue may well rest in the very name for this system, a commonwealth. It is not hard to separate it into two words, 'common' and 'wealth' or the wealth held in common. This refers to the people, as its first usage. Insidious nature cries out for expansion this inclusive phrase. The closed society rest on its foundation, for to expand would be to allow in new things, new lands, new people that would necessarily alter or

²⁴⁴Georg Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness. (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1990)

²⁴⁵Ernest Joos. Lukacs' Last Auto Criticism. (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1983.)

change the system. It may not then be open if it was to include new people but it would not be totally 'closed' either. Recall Cato the Elder's disappointment with the conquering of Greece by the Romans. His ways, traditions and life, based on an idea of a closed society of Rome, or at least his thinking of his country as a closed society, was forever altered by the expansion. This in turn would lead to the cracks that would spell the downfall of the Empire many years later. The open society is open to new changes and allows, as it premise, that all are in common from its very name. Yet an open society goes to what degree in its ability to expand? What motivation would there be in such an expansion in the first place?

Using a thought experiment, Harrington rather by accident than design created an open system. If he were to look forward five hundred years, what would he hope for the elements of his system be? (In so doing we craftily offer a summation of his theory.) What would be the elements he would want to see?¹⁴ He would want to see rational men, for

¹⁴As this is a thought experiment, I am not in any way trying to provide a view of his thinking but simply using his ideas at his time and projecting to the present using my own ends.

his arguments were for rational men²⁷, create a stable system of government, his main goal, that was the rule of law, not of men, with protection of property and hence the virtue of such men, the Agrarian law, election by secret ballots and a fostering of tolerance. We may add that with his system, there would be increasing specialization of the system and as argued above, that such a system would include all people. Have we over stated any of his goals in the above sentences? Each element has been thus far discussed, argued for and has had some offering of proof. Therefore, we may conclude that this is a fair summation of his goals. Yet what experiment is complete without a test of its conclusion? Yet how can we test such a thing? To be fair it must include the whole world for as we have said that would be the goal of the inclusiveness of the system. To reach the only end of the possible systems we must ask this of the whole world to be fair. Is this test too much to ask of our claims? Can it be expected that Harrington's efforts so long ago would still be present some 500 years later and include the whole world? We must also note well that Kant spoke of this as well. He wrote that:

²⁷While he was enlightened enough to allow women to inherit property, it was not a full participation that we would

"The greatest problem for the human species, whose solutions nature compels it to seek, is to achieve a universal civil society administered in accord with the right."³⁸

Kant recognized that a true civil society must have itself universalized such that the whole world was administrated according to the right.

"The Problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution depends on the problems of law-governed external relations among nations and cannot be resolved until the later is."³⁹

As such, the systematic basis to hold an open system to the control of the whole world is needed by the specific country to allow for its own system of government to survive. It is not an altruistic act but one of self-preservation. In order to protect oneself from the issue of tyranny one must convert the world to your political system. As more people become included in the republican system, the position becomes stronger. Even if the only reason being two can defend better than one.

What body or government may we turn to that includes the whole world? What body functions, if in name only, to govern the external relationships among nations? Where will

know today.

³⁸Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. (Indianapolis Indiana: Hackett, 1983.) P. 33.

we see a document contain the following elements: rational men, a stable system of government, the rule of law, not of men, with protection of property, election by secret ballots, a fostering of tolerance or as we today call them 'Human Rights' and having increased specialization of the system? Perhaps a world body where all governments may meet to discuss issues of world importance. Of course, we speak of the United Nations and its founding document, The United Nations Declaration of Human Right that was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. Can it be possible that Harrington's spirit is still alive and well, in such a diverse body as this? The only answer is to look and examine it. We shall be pleasantly surprised.

First, we must look to see if the document is for a rational person, or hold a philosophical anthropology of a rational person.

"Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."¹¹¹

¹¹¹Ibid. P. 34.

¹Note the word Brotherhood, for as far-reaching and insightful as this document is, it still has room to improve.

We may thus conclude that in fact, human beings endowed with reason and conscience is certainly one way to describe a rational person. The next thing on our list is Stability:

"(Preamble) ...Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, ..."

This says that to avoid rebellion, which certain does destabilize a system of government, and foster stability there needs be a rule of law. Would Harrington have wanted any thing else? The rule of law that they speak of in the preamble, do they offer further guarantees?

"Article 6: Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law."

"Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination."

"Article 8: Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."

"Article 10: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the

determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him."

"Article 11: (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed..."

Not one but five different articles refer to what the rule of law should mean. These statements are compatible with the *Magna Carta*, British Bill of Rights 1689, and the American Bill of Rights. The latter two have already been shown too certainly similar to the ideas of Harrington. Can we judge them anything less here? What about the nature of property? "Article 17: (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Which we can say is clearly not the Agrarian Law. At least it does not sound like it. In fact, the spirit of the Agrarian Law was to allow for the greatest number of people in the realm to own property. In this case, as we have moved through time, we now have reached the widest possible spread of property in that 'everyone' has the right to own it. If we were to allow the Agrarian Law to have been enacted 500 years ago, would not by now everyone or nearly

everyone have property? In roughly 7 generations (500/80=6.25)¹ property would surely have spread to a wide number of people. Would it even be right to make a claim that Harrington could not do the math here? The UN Declaration has gone even farther to allow that everyone has the right to property.

To preserve these rights, there would be a need for secret ballots to allow people to make their own reasoned choices without the mob's voice, similar to what happened in Athens, coercing them. Is there a provision for such a thing as secret ballots in the UN Declaration of Human Rights?

"Article 21: (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."

Yet will any of this mean anything to the common person. For without tolerance, we have made no gains at all. Today we worry so greatly about Human Rights or

¹Five hundred year's time divided by an 80 year life span

Tolerance, there must some mention of it in this document.

There is in fact:

"Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."

"Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."

"Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile."

"Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

"Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

"Article 20: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association...."

Interestingly these rights seem to be almost identical to those of the American Bill of Rights, leading to the counter argument that this UN document is nothing more than a piece of American propaganda. Of no more value than the exportation of American cultural values onto the other

= 6.25 generations.

countries of the world and imposed onto the world by the Americans after winning the Second World War. The answer to this is twofold, firstly we need not counter it as it proves the argument that there is a connection of this document to the American system, which is, as we have already seen, very similar to what Harrington had intended. If we hold the UN declaration to be an American cultural value, have we not already shown that Harrington's work is a mere truism in America? Yet if we must offer an answer for this document, and surely for completeness sake we must, then surely this argument is wrong. As the formation of this organization may have been the work of the Americans primarily, there were many allies who assisted in that war,² the whole of the British Commonwealth as well as Latin America, France, and many other countries that were part of the allies to defeat the fascist aggressors. They joined by alliance to fight the forces who would take over the rights and liberties of all people. When, in the end the forces of the allies won, they banded together to form the UN so that there will be no more world wars. Since then this group has expanded to include the world. No one was forced to join this group. All can opt out of it at any

² World War Two 1939-1945.

time. In fact, Switzerland has never joined this world forum, preferring to remain as neutral as possible. A simple look at the map will show UN members surround Switzerland. It would be trivial to compel this small country to join the UN. Yet this has not occurred in over 50 years. As such, as we can see, membership is by free association, all groups who do join, must agree to the principles of the organization. This is but one of them. Thus while it may be an American propaganda piece, the members have knowingly joined it as such. They have volunteered to accept its rules.

There is but one last item on this list of criteria, that of specialization. Can we find in this Charter, issued so long removed from the Harrington or the American Bill of Rights, issues that show an increasing specialization? "Article 23: (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work." Equal pay for equal work for all people, would have to include women, minorities and Catholics. Recall that the British Bill of Rights 1689 had the exclusion of Catholics. The American can be seen as to refer to white males and not women or minority, black and aboriginal. Blacks were to be counted as only two thirds a white person. Aborigines were called

'savages' in the Declaration of Independence. So by allowing for all people, all groups and all classes to all have equal pay for equal work must surely be seen as increased specialization.

We also find this rather curious sentence "Article 24: Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay." The United Nations has taken the time to worry about leisure and holidays. With increased specialization, we find that issues seemingly too small to be of importance gain greater and greater attention as time goes on. For in specialization, it requires more and more specific focus. As the focus gets narrower, the issues become smaller but sharper in our sight. We see them more as problems. Five hundred years ago, the issue of leisure was not considered to be of importance for the issue was of 'work or starve'. Five hundred years later, we may have the luxury to focus on issues that in the past were no so important.

"Article 27: (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."

Where once we worried about Life itself, we now find there is a right to cultural life. Seemingly that is itself the final proof we need to show that things have become more specialized over time. Can we find something more exterior to the principles of government than to worry about culture? While offering no answer to this question we can rest assured that if we can in fact discover something, even more distinct from government than culture that someday soon we will create another organization to which we will find it as a founding principle.

Thus, we may conclude this chapter with a strong answer. For it is clear that from the British Bill of Rights, to the American founding documents and to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, we can see the shadow of Harrington's thoughts echoed across the world and across time. As time has passed, his system has had the ability to specialize, or focus on more of the smaller issue of life in general. From the very foundation of political stability for a government unto the need for a cultural life, his ideas ring out strong and true.

"The formal condition under which nature can alone attain ... its final design is that arrangement of men's relations to one another by which lawful authority in a whole, which we call a civil community. ... If men were clever enough to find it ... and wise enough to submit themselves voluntarily to its constraints - a cosmopolitan whole."³¹³

Conclusion

Our journey that began so long ago has reached not an end, but the crossroads of now and tomorrow. We began this story in Ancient Greece to see her bowed low in humbled defeat. From her she gave us three philosophers. Socrates, who first opened this dialogue with but the simple act of questioning what is right, Plato who found that politics is but a system that can be improved and found to have morality. Finally Aristotle, who gave us our framework of thinking by dividing the systems of government in to that of the one, the few and the many. As well as the concept of morality and virtue connected to the ownership of property. It allowed men the leisure to reflect on their souls and improve them. We met Cicero, who at the fall of the Roman republic had not yet learned enough to give us a proper alternative. His vision was clouded by Cato the Elder's closed system of longing for the perfect world of an

³¹³ Kant Critique of Judgement, Ibid. P. 282 sec. 83.

Ancient Rome that never was. It had all the perfected elements we have seen. Men of property who had the noble virtue of Aristotle by merely having been born in the country. Cicero felt that his new men would save the republic. It was too little too late, as he did not have the understanding that it was not just a few good men he needed but a lot of good men from the people to keep Rome from destruction. Having misunderstood that his reformed would necessarily demand land reforms to be able to affect change, his theories fell along side him when his enemy's assassins struck. We have seen that while Polybius' cycle of governments has value in showing us the problems of government. He had no solution to it. Thus, Cicero was doomed to the knives of his rivals. His enemies would then take up his ideas to support their own position. Centuries later Machiavelli revived the ancient's to grace. Yet blinded by his lack of faith in the people to whom he claims allegiance with, he could not deduce that his system would not work either. He shared with all the previous thinkers the same flaw of mistrusting the people. No one felt allowing the many to rule would establish a stable government. Thus dooming governments to continue to

destabilize and then collapse. The redeeming feature of Machiavelli was that he separated virtue from morality.

We then explored Harrington's methodology. We found that it is based on two things, history and travel, teleology and Aesthetics. The philosopher to turn to was Kant for he had read Harrington and created his political theory on this vision. We then understood what has so far eluded many of the commentators of Harrington. That judgement must be made of disinterested expressions of value. That only with ancient prudence do we have true, lasting stable government, based on people having land. All people having the leisure of redeeming their souls to perfection. Harrington, following Machiavelli, did not bring the overtones of morality to his theory. He kept with practical reasons for his ideas. He did not use theoretic language but rather referred to history in all of his reasoning to find the beautiful for government. We tried to raise objections against this practice by using Arendt but found this failed when put to the test. We tried to offer counter examples and again they failed to disprove this theory. The theory worked both for Harrington and for Kant.

Of all the previous thinkers we have studied, it was left to James Harrington to revolutionize this endeavor of

bring stability to government. By seeing that property was the key to stability, he proposed his agrarian laws so that property would be passed onto the people. Each generation would find even more people owning some property as it trickled down to them. Secret ballots would hold off the mob. Tolerance would allow all people to flourish in their own thinking. His government would be constantly changing with one third leaving every year to be replaced by new people. With the Senate debating the issues but only the House being able to vote it, the Senate and the House had to work together to achieve legislation. Thus both sides would have to take a disinterested view on the issues if they were ever to become law. There would have to be a balance in government. We then took a needed detour into the commentators of Harrington to show that they do not do him justice in his ideas. They do not remain true to his writings. The origins of balance would not be something imposed on Harrington from his commentators. The question itself while seemingly important enough to them is not very difficult to understand why it is not. Thus, we have shown that the methodology used by this thesis is the correct approach to understanding Harrington. It is only with an understanding that goes beyond merely one discipline into

others that we were able to spot the correct methodology of Harrington that has thus far escaped his modern day commentators. Harrington had proposed nothing less than an open system, as we understand the meaning of it today in social research. His life was cruelly ended but his vindication was to come. With the Glorious Revolution, came the birth of his ideas into real politics. His ideas were out in the market place of ideas and may have affected John Locke's ideas. Henry Neville reprinted them just in time for the Glorious Revolution. Those ideas spread at first to the American colonies, getting more specialized as time passed. The American Bill of Rights held true to Harrington's ideas, and their Constitution was certainly to a great degree influenced by his thoughts. By the dawn of a new world, the victorious Allies of World War Two, draft a Declaration to all people, in all countries that was essentially his ideas made whole and real to the whole world. Not surprising as that is the very basis of an open system and it is the only rational thing to do.

If we have thus seen farther into the goal of understand society and government, then it can surely only be because we have had the chance to stand upon the

shoulders of giants.³⁴ Along the way, we have called into questions the works of Macpherson, Pocock, Russell-Smith, Raab, and Blitzler. Each suffering some deficiency of character that has flawed them. Yet without their efforts could this work have even have started? The debt owed to these men can only be repaid by some small measure of dragging, kicking and screaming, the scholarship beyond the mere one discipline viewpoint. The good student shall prove his worth by surpassing his mentor by proving him wrong. I hope that this attempt has been so worthy.

³⁴"If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." Most people are unfamiliar with the circumstances and history around this quote. It was in a letter to a misshapen dwarf named Robert Hooke (1635-1703) by Isaac Newton (1642-1727) to be an insult to Hooke's "of middling stature, something crooked, pale faced... head is large, eyes popping." It was written on 5 February 1675, as Newton defended himself against Hooke's claims of discoveries in optics and calculus. Newton, himself stole the line from a then famous work called Anatomy of Melancholy. Essential, what Newton meant to say to Hooke was that Newton learned only from his great predecessors and not (Hooke) some dwarf. Richard Zacks, An Underground Education. (New York: Doubleday, 1997.) P. 37.

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May 1993 - March 2001: Angus Reid: Mtl, Que. Interviewer in both languages for market research and political studies. Where we deal with many of the issue of concern for both business, government and for the public.

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