The Many Layers of the Strategic Process:
A Qualitative Study Examining Strategy from
both Corporate and Managerial Perspectives

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ABSTRACT PAGE

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This study approaches the strategy process using both grounded theory and qualitative statistical analysis to validate and uncover the suspected differences in the strategic behaviour of managers and corporate executives. While most strategy research offers either theoretical propositions or quantitative results based on fragmented constructs, they offer little in the way of rich, accurate knowledge (Fredrickson, 1986; Huy, 1992; Van de Ven, 1992). The grounded theory methods yielded significant differences between the strategic behaviour of managers and corporate executives, particularly in the domains of roles, responsibilities, and accountability measures. Common strategy terms were found to vary in meaning across the two types of cases as well. Results were validated with discriminate illustrations, textual examples, and statistical analysis.

DEDICATION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my family, friends, and professors: I would like to thank you for your continual support of me both personally and professionally. God has gifted me beyond belief.

To the Management department faculty: I am proud and thankful for the learning and opportunities you have instilled upon me. I look forward to carrying the name of Concordia with me in the years to come.

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1. Introduction

'Strategy,' 'strategic behaviour,' and 'strategy implementation' have all been frequent, and long-time topics of academic research and practitioner debate. These sexy topics have caught the attention and interest of countless individuals as hopes turn to strategy's ability to predict the best course of action or make sense of complex situations. Many different aspects of the strategy beast have been examined over the years: degree of formal planning (Kudla, 1980), the ordering of strategy and organizational structure (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Chandler, 1962), the structural (Porter, 1980) versus resource-based views (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1974, 1991), executive board involvement (Simmers, 1999, strategic leadership (Howe, 2001); levels of change (Jansen, 1996), planned versus emergent change (Huy, 2001; Mintzberg, & Westley, 1992), and frequency – emergent or continual (Weick & Quinn, 1999) – of change.

The list of researched topics is as vast as the unique perspectives from which they are approached. This wide array of approaches lends itself to the allegory of the blind men and the elephant to illustrate the vastly different opinions and conclusions that the numerous researchers have offered. Multiple blind men, after feeling an elephant for the first time, start describing what it looks like. "Long and tube-like," declares the one who felt the trunk; "flat and smooth, like a wall" says the one who felt its side; "no, it is thin and wispy, like a sheet," argues the one who held the ear. Depending on which approach each man took, which aspect of the beast they examined, each man yielded a very different description. Strategy research is no different in its rendering of multiple different descriptions of the same beastly subject, that of the strategy process.

Just as the blind men examined the beast using completely different methods different researchers have also approached data gathering with different biases and techniques Surveys, time series studies, case studies based on observation and testing and propositions based on literature and theory are all methods that have been used to help the reading audience see the strategy process more clearly.

Increasingly however, there is dissatisfaction with these methods and their resulting theories (Huy, 2001); the research community is lamenting that these may not be sufficient to richly describe what is happening during the strategy process (Buchanan, et al., 1999; Fredrickson, 1986; Van de Ven, 1992), describing previous research as "atheoretical" (Hendry, 1996, Pettigrew, 1985) and fragmented (Mintzberg & Westley, 1992). Strategy researchers have chosen to focus on largely theoretical modeling (Hendry, 1996; Pettigrew, 1985) and/or very fractioned and specific constructs - distorting the whole while explaining the parts (Mintzberg & Westley, 1992). Both methods have their own strengths and weaknesses when addressing all organizational activity.

To be able to integrate these two approaches, to develop a theoretical model that takes specific contextual nuances into account and does not distort any parts of the process, this is what can lead to the development of new theories. New theories that can integrate the two organizational worlds and have "stronger and broader explanatory power " than the original, disparate perspectives (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Van de Ven and Poole do admit that an integration of approaches and perspectives is desirable, but not at the cost of homogenization (pp 511). If the distinctiveness of each approach is preserved and the context, circumstances, and nuances that make up that distinctiveness are better known, then the strategy literature will increase in strength and explanatory power. This study is an attempt to describe the strategy process of both organizational worlds, specifically how it applies to both corporate executives and traditional managers, and do so by using richer and multiple data gathering methods. By approaching the subject in a holistic manner and using grounded theory approach as a primary source of data mining and quantitative, statistical analysis to validate the resulting findings this study hopes to fill a piece of the gap that exists in the present strategy process research.

2. Previous Theoretical Approaches

The distinction between the corporate and managerial levels is not one that needs to be introduced. Academic theorists have already accepted this general categorization between those who manage and discharge the firm's resources and those who serve as a liaison between the firm and the external environment (Bacharach, et al., 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Parsons, 1960; Thompson, 1967), or the separation between the doers and the thinkers (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984). Despite broad recognition, and acceptance of this structural taxonomy, there is little research that focuses on the differences between the two groups (Huy, 2001; Van de Ven, 1992; Van de Ven et al, 1989), on the impact that those differences might have on an organization, or on the validity of strategy process research.

While the discussion of the significance of distinguishing between the two structural levels will be discussed shortly, this next section will focus on the past research and current strategy discussion. This retrospective is separated into three areas which the strategy research seems to fall: research emphasizing the importance of individual characteristics, research emphasizing the characteristics of the organization, and research that emphasizes the multiple processes or approaches researchers use to examine and discuss strategic behaviour. Followed by this discussion will be a review of methods typically used – their strengths and their shortcomings, for an examination of managerial and corporate behaviour have specific methodological standards

2.2 The Individual in Strategy Research

The literature that, directly and indirectly, emphasized the importance of the individual repeatedly focused on the leaders and their leadership skills. Reflected predominately in the literature of the 1970s and 1980s was the "Great Leader View of Strategy" (Ireland & Hitt, 1999). The premise of the Great Leader View was that the CEO was the central, most influential figure in the organization. The organization was a reflection of its leader and success was the exclusive effect of its leader, its "corporate Hercules" (Bennis, 1997; Child, 1972). Andrew's 1980 work holds the leaders of organizations to be "mediators and motivators," "organizational leaders, personal leaders, and architects of organization purpose"(pp. 4). He supports Maccoby's (1976) characterization of CEO personality as "the Craftsman, the Jungle Fighter, the Company Man, and the Gamesman;" all indicative of the importance and centrality of corporate executives and their abilities to lead strategically.

Bourgeois and Brodwin's (1984) article reviews five different approaches to strategic leadership and does include multiple approaches where though the CEO is still central, they practice a more participative style of leadership. The CEO role is categorized as being a rational actor or planner, an architect, coordinator, coach, or a premise setter and judge. Though the latter three are all increasingly participative in nature, they all are explored from the perspective of the CEO. In a similar manner, Thoenig and Friedberg (1976) offer a case study on the power of employees' resistance to change, but begin by stating upfront that a widely held view in the organizational theory field is one in which the success of organizational change rests on the leaders, the corporate executives, and their abilities to define quality, relevant objectives and secure the resources necessary to execute the changes.

Carrying the topic of organizational change forward, Nadler (1998) discuss the skills CEO's require to successfully lead an organization through radical change. Radical, or discontinuous change, they say, always requires a critical emphasis on developing and implementing a new strategy"(pp. 65). Since these changes are more likely than smaller, discrete changes to affect the whole organization there is a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the leader to develop the perfect strategy.

It is worth noting that all the above pieces of research are all theoretical pieces; none of them have statistically verified their propositions nor have most of them offered evidence of a qualitative nature. Both Andrews (1980) and Nadler (1998) offer many examples of anecdotal illustrations, though these serve to illustrate rather than prove their points, and most researchers would agree this falls short of the rigor required for qualitative research. Day and Nedungadi (1994) and Buchanan et al (1999) do separate themselves from the group by using surveys and statistical analysis in their analysis. Both sets of authors used self-reporting measures to gather information that was compiled into a questionnaire that was then sent out to a larger sample. Both of these studies were focused still on the individual (the mental models of managers and a survey of concepts relevant to managers, respectively) however the individuals in question were managers as opposed to executives.

2.3 The Firm in Strategy Research

The next categorical grouping that the existing research divided into was that of the firm, where the whole organization was examined as opposed to individuals. It is the firm's characteristics, how the firm has been shaped to take on certain characteristics that are key to the success of organizational strategy. Just as the previous category was dominated by a few, select topics, the overall study of the firm as a subject is largely dominated by theory surrounding organizational design. Organizational design plays a large role in both the literature regarding structuring organizations so they can adapt to change (Brown & Eisenhard, 1997; Dunphy, 1996; Weick & Quinn, 1999) and the continuing debate about the ordering of the strategy and structure relationship (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Chandler, 1962; Channon, 1973; Dyas & Thanheiser, 1976; Grinyer & Yasai-Ardekani, 1981; Rumelt, 1974). While Amburgey and Dacin's (1994) study will not be the last, it did offer strong quantitative support for a contingency relationship between strategy and structure. The causal processes driving the relationship do however differ depending on which direction the pairing is examined from (pp. 1427); researcher perspective and approach are important. Overholt (1997) continues this discussion in his discussion of the flexible and more traditional, and stable, organizational designs so popular towards the end of the nineties. Overholt stressed the importance of adaptation and the use of organizational design to shape an organization so that it can compete successfully in a rapidly and frequently changing marketplace.

There is a brief comment that organizational design is an "internal business strategy equally important equally important to developing the corporate strategy" (pp. 23). Though Overholt does not expand on his distinction between internal and external business strategies, he does seem to imply that the processes that are happening internally to a corporation are distinctly different to those that happen and are outwardly oriented, such as the inward and outward orientation of managers and executives.

While other topics such as degree of formal strategic planning have a solid hold in the literature, there seems to be no statistical support, or qualitative consensus on whether there are actually any effects of strategic planning on economic benefits (Kudla, 1980). For over thirty years academics have discussed the effectiveness of this topic; a chronological sample of authors: Ringbakk, 1969; Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg, Portner, and Radosevich, 1970; Thune & House, 1970; Gerstner, 1972; Herold, 1972; Rue, 1973; Grinyer & Norburn, 1975; Karger & Milk, 1975 -- see Kudla, 1980 for summaries of these articles (Fredrickson, 1986). While the effectiveness of strategic planning will not be discussed further in this study, this study does recognize that planning is a responsibility often expected of those participating in strategy, specifically corporate executives who lead whole organizations.

Due to the particularly challenging nature of strategic research the majority of these articles have all been theoretical. While each offered a thorough discussion of the literature, well-supported propositions, and was published in a reputable peer-reviewed journal criticism regarding strategy research methodology has still found this stream of research. The constraints felt by strategy researchers – inability to enter strategizing organizations, privacy and disclosure constraints, the difficulty of operationalizing strategy concepts, lack of skill on the part of the investigators, and the time and resources to track corporations over time – are all very real and regarded as understandable (Fredrickson, 1986; Hatten, 1979; Mintzberg, 1977; Rumelt, 1979).

That being said, is has been argued that these constraints are worth fighting (Argyris, 1968; Van de Ven, 1992; Van de Ven & Poole, 1989). Van de Ven (1992) details what would be involved in strategy research that would be more apt to produce high quality research and advance new theory and knowledge. He suggests that the researcher examine the context and events leading up to the strategy and behaviours under investigation, by means of a retrospective case history as well as conducting real-time data-gathering, *"without knowing a priori the outcomes of these events and activities"* (pp. 181).

2.4 The Process in Strategy literature

The process literature tended to separate into research questions focusing on processes that affected individuals or the firm as well as processes that describe different approaches to strategy research. Studies such as how leadership types effect the creation of wealth in organizations (Howe, 2001), and the effects of language use on the acceptance, interpretation, and implementation of corporate strategy during corporate-initiated strategic change (Morgan, 2001) are examples of individual-oriented. Huy's (2001) article examines those involved in the strategic process and their perspectives of time and the content of change, proposing that this perspective will shape managerial prioritization and planning which would affect the overall strategy process. Other articles in this category examined such concepts as the use of dynamic capabilities to capture and create wealth in rapidly changing technological environments (Teese, et al., 1997), the use of a structural mental model to diagnose environmental trends and evaluate different intervention techniques (Wetzel & Buck, 2000), the ability of inter-organizational networks to serve as a source of competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998), and a review and critique of the popular Design School approach to understanding strategy.

Like the literature surrounding the firm, procedural papers are supported by the existing literature and previous research. Propositions draw their validity and originality from work that has already been done and the researcher's ability to find the areas for expansion and advancement.

2.5 Research Questions

The existing literature has discussed many facets of the strategy process over the last fifty or so years. Many concepts have been identified as relevant and their place within the greater body of knowledge has been researched in an attempt to determine how these concepts impact the success of firm strategy. What researchers have not yet looked at thoroughly is each of these processes and concepts in the context of their structural setting. That is, these concepts and processes have not yet been examined thoroughly from the both the corporate and managerial perspectives.

Given that corporate level strategy tends to focus on external cues – the industry, suppliers and buyers, competition (Porter, 1985), or the importance and skills of the CEO (Andrews, 1981; Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984; Maccoby, 1976) --- and mid level strategy focuses more on internal cues – available resources, logistics (Floyd & Woodridge, 1982, 1984) – it would make sense that common views of strategy, namely the resource based view and the industrial/organizational view, or emergent and deliberate strategies, and episodic and continual change theories, are seemingly in conflict when discussing the same things. It may not be that there is only one true way to approach strategy, it may instead be that certain perspectives are more apt to emerge when examining the characteristics of corporate executives, or mid level managers.

While there is significant literature on the CEO perspective, it has not been contrasted with that of the manager. This hierarchical exchange between CEO and manager is "one of the primary exchange relationships underlying organizations"(Bacharach, et al., 1996), and yet there is little presence of it's the exchange's significance in the literature (Buchanan, et al, 1999; Woodhall, 1996). Much of Floyd and Woodridge's research (1982, 1989, 1990) argues for the greater importance of the middle manager, citing Bower (1970) who declares that middle managers are the, "only men in the organization who are in a position to judge whether [strategic] issues are being considered in the proper context (pp 297-298)" (1990, pp 231). On the other hand, if one were to use the quantity of book titles and articles in the popular press about corporate responsibility, strategy, mission statements, values, goals, and leadership, the attention could convince a person it is the role of the CEO, the leader, which is of greatest significance.

The back and forth debate over which side is most relevant during the strategy process has yet to be resolved, though opinion does seem to agree that there is a distinction between cognitive and behavioural action (Floyd & Webber, 1994). What is still lacking however is integrative research that captures the sentiment and nuances of each side. The absence of the managerial perspective and a call to fill that gap is clear (Fredrickson, 1986; Huy, 2001; Van de Ven, 1992) and, with the stagnation of strategy process research at stake (Van de Ven, 1992) the need grows more significant as time passes. The primary objective of this research study is to do just that, to highlight the managerial perspective and determine if the suppositions regarding the differences in managerial and corporate behaviour are real or just anecdotal.

Proposition 1: There are both contextual and statistical differences between the strategic behaviours of managers and the strategic behaviour of corporate executives.

As this study will be using grounded theory to allow corporate and managerial differences to emerge out of their relative contexts, no specific propositions regarding differences will be offered at this time. Whereas this is likely not the first attempt at taking the managerial perspective it may be one of the few that has been completed. Fredrickson (1986) suggests there are two reasons, beyond the traditional constraints previously recognized, that strategy research has been delayed: (1) investigators cannot operationalize their vision of what the strategic process involves, and (2) construct and method development is not emphasized. The general approach of most top management team strategy research entails broad categories that do little to reveal what happens organization-wide during the strategy process. Van de Ven (1992) recommends that, "if the purpose of a study is to understand how to manage the formulation or implementation of an organizational strategy, it will be necessary for researchers to place themselves into the manager's temporal and contextual frames of reference"(pp. 181). While it is predominately quantitative survey methods that are being criticized, the opinion of observational methods is fluctuating between invaluable (Quinn, 1980) and inadequate -- not allowing for tests of generalizability (Fredrickson, 1986). This study seeks to use grounded theory with a sample size that will provide for generalizability in the findings. Using multiple cases, each used to replicate findings and inferences, this study can also mimic experimental replication (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Yin, 2001).

> *Proposition 2: The use of the grounded theory approach to gather data about the differences between corporate and managerial strategy processes will simultaneously allow for both construct development and allow the investigator to take on the managerial mindset.*

As there is a desire for strategy theories to be operationalized as well as retain their rich descriptive powers, and this study seeks to offer evidence that is clearly valid, this study will also use a quantitative validation tool. This tool will serve as statistical support for the qualitative findings, as well as a measurement tool that can be used as a starting base for future researchers

3. Methodology & Participant Selection

Figure 1 illustrates the steps used in this methodology visually. Multiple methods and approaches to the data were used in this study – qualitative and quantitative, grounded theory and analytical theory – all for the purpose of discovering rich information about the strategy process.

Figure 1. Methodology



3.1 Methodological Approach

A primary goal of this study was the emergence of the unique and specific characteristics of the sample. In order to accomplish this goal and reduce the chance of imposing previously defined strategy-related constructs onto the data in attempts at construct correlation (Glaser, 1978), a grounded approach was used as the primary means of gathering information (Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Langley, 1999; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A secondary goal of this study was to offer, from the qualitative results, a descriptive model of the strategy implementation process that could also be broken down into verifiable and measurable constructs (Dunphy, 1996; Fredrickson, 1986). To achieve these ends, a measurement tool was created concurrent to the qualitative study that would highlight significant constructs that differed across case type. This tool would help ensure the validity of the qualitative study's emergent constructs (Yin, 2003) as well as identify if there are significant differences in the two case types that the qualitative study did not pick up on.

3.2. Choice of Primary Data

Business school cases written to facilitate class discussion[1] were used as the primary source of data for the purposes of this study. Though not original sources of information, having been filtered multiple times by the case authors and publishing houses, these "non-technical" sources of data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) these cases do meet the rigorous standards set for judging an exemplary case; they are: significant, complete, theoretically triangulated, self-contained, and engaging (Yin, 2003). Cases were used because they respected the resource constraints often felt by strategy

[1] This was noted on each case produced by Harvard Business School, Ivey Publishing, and The Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, regardless of case author.

researchers. By choosing this type of sample common constraints, such as inability to access strategizing firms, inability to access a large number of strategizing firms, time to follow multiple firms over the entire duration of their strategy process, and the financial or material resources to do so, were mitigated without the sacrifice of accuracy (Argyris, 1968; 1985; Van de Ven, 1992).

Though it is likely that other sources of factual information could have been found to supplement these cases or to determine the results of their respective implementation efforts, outside information was deliberately not sought for multiple reasons. To supplement the data set with information regarding the organizations described would have resulted in asymmetrical amounts of information per case, with a consequentially incomplete data set in addition. To avoid hollowing out the data set cases were used with the assumption that they were self-containing. In support of the primary decision criteria, outside information was also left alone to prevent bias in the researcher. Knowledge of firm success *a priori* data gathering would reduce theoretical sensitivity, as it would impose expectations and definitions onto the data as opposed to letting the data "speak" for itself as well as foster researcher bias (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Van de Ven, 1992).

Furthermore, even if it were determined that metrics of implementation success were crucial, and information was available in equal amounts per case, ***direct metrics*** would have been next to impossible to obtain; the metrics would possess little construct validity. Financial performance could have been obtained for many of the firms described in the cases, however those metrics are too abstract and removed from implementation episodes at the managerial level, and could not be validated within the scope of this study as valid metrics for strategy at the corporate level. Due to the increasingly complicating factors outside information was avoided and parsimonious methods attempted.

3.3 Sample Characteristics

In order to illustrate the differing perspectives from which strategy can be presented, business school case studies were used as the data sample. The cases used in this study were selected from the Harvard Business Review and Ivey Business School Publishing websites. Searches were done using minimal criteria, so as to capture as many potential cases as possible:

(1) No case was dated earlier than 1990;

(2) No case was excluded by virtue of the discipline or industry to which it belonged or described,

(3) Each case was marked as a "field" case as opposed to other teaching materials produced by the publishing house, and

(4) The case described the active management of a forward-moving process – those describing only structures, methods, or only anticipatory information of the decision making process were excluded.

Approximately sixty-six cases and their supplements were originally purchased and twenty-eight were excluded due to the last selection criterion, leaving a working sample of thirty-eight. Twenty-six cases were from Harvard Business School, eight from Ivey Publishing, and four from Stanford Business School. Using the first two levels of the Standard Industrial Classification Index to classify cases, twenty-eight unique industries were represented. There was some repetition in case authorship as reflected in Appendix A's record of authors. This cross section of organizations, industries, publishing houses, and authors was preferred as it increased the likelihood of generalizability. Sample size was determined to be arguably suitable as other studies were found that utilized comparable, if not lesser, sample sizes (Collis, 1991 – 14 cases; Eisenhardt, 1989 – 8 cases; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988 – 8 cases; Lens, 2003 – 21 cases; Simmers – 17 firms, Wah, 2002 – 8 cases).

3.4 Data Collection

Strauss & Corbin's (1990) grounded methodology is explicitly laid out, and calls for the researcher to first describe (code) the different concepts and properties in each case, then move towards categories, which consume these sub-units and are also multidimensional. Appendices A and B are provided to give the reader an idea of what categories and concepts were highlighted in the original coding of the pilot study. The categories that were formed for each case type, such as "roles," "accountability," "concerns," etc., were grouped and condensed along the one dimension: level of organizational analysis.

In approximately half the cases, the level of analysis examined by the case writers was that of a corporate executive or a founder, while the rest examined behaviour at the manager's level. This division was done deliberately to satisfy the call from the existing research (Dunphy, 1996; Fredrickson, 1986), as well as to determine if this call was founded and if differences really did exist in the strategy processes of managers and corporate executives. Cases were divided into one of two categories: corporate or managerial, reflecting the level of analysis they most closely represented.

Corporate cases were identified as those where the lead organization required the collaboration of multiple units, people, or departments in order to plan or execute its strategy. Corporate cases typically focused on the whole organization; executives were reliant on information from multiple different divisions for summations of behaviour in order to determine the strategic direction to move. Managerial cases, in contrast, were focused on detailed behaviours of a specific sub-group within the whole organization. These sub-groups, with names like 'project team' and 'regional business unit,' would share work if necessary with other departments and divisions – they would cooperate – however, the sub-group was not heavily reliant on another department to accomplish the assignment before them. In the original study 22 cases were identified as corporate and 16 were identified as managerial.

3.5 Quantitative Validation

Heeding the concerns of Dunphy (1996) and Fredickson (1986) this study sought to develop theories that were rooted in grounded data that could also operationalized, tested, and confirmed. Concurrent to the data gathering stage, attention was paid to each group's strategy process by breaking down these processes with relevant strategy constructs and statistically testing for differences between the characteristics of these two groups. This discussion of methodology will describe the creation and use of the validation tool. Later sections will review the findings of the with-in group comparison.

3.5.1. Validation Tool Development

In an attempt to both emphasize construct development and conceptualize strategy research in a way that is operational (Dunphy, 1996; Fredrickson, 1986) it was necessary to first determine which characteristics would and should be examined. Looking for literature that would succinctly highlight the most important or relevant constructs, as recognized by both academics and practitioners, both professional press magazines and strategy textbooks (such as "Harvard Business Review," "Inc.," *Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases* d) were consulted; topics such as leadership, communication, change agents, strategic planning, etc. were obtained as a result. From this list of general topics, a search in the academic literature yielded a list of detailed constructs presently being examined in the strategy research (constructs and citations are listed at the end of each page of Appendix E). Previously tested measures for each construct were sought so they might be culled and used in the validation instrument. No previously validated scales or pre-existing measures were found for any construct so characteristics of each construct were obtained, scales and measures created, and an original measurement tool established.

An expert-panel, comprised of strategy professors from an accredited Canadian university, then validated the measurement topics to ensure that those chosen were (a) relevant to the process of strategy implementation, (b) reflective of what is being researched and discussed in professional circles, and (c) all-encompassing, that is the list did not exclude other relevant topics, but instead captured as many of the constructs considered important to strategy research as required. Additionally, the panel was asked to validate the way each construct had been operationalized to determine if the scales and measures (a) were easy to understand, (b) were likely to render the information being sought, and (c) were only measuring one construct per question. The measurement tool was revised in accordance to the feedback given and finalised (Appendix C). The measurement tool was used to code the cases in order to extract quantifiable data.

A series of ANOVA tests were conducted to determine the presence of significant and salient differences between the two case types. Appendix D is a record of the statistical results of the pilot study, and Appendix E records the statistical results of the extended study. Due to a relatively small sample size, a purposeful choice was made to highlight both those significant constructs with a traditional level of $p \leq 0.05$ and those referred to as 'salient.' As the sample size of the extended study may be too small to capture all the constructs, which might prove to be significant were the sample size to be larger, the phrase 'statistically salient' ($p \leq 0.1$) will be used to note those constructs recognized as important in comparison to the others in the analysis, yet fall just short of traditional significance.

3.6 Notes Regarding Theoretical Sensitivity

In preparing the quantitative validation tool many research articles and pieces of secondary, "technical," literature (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) were examined to determine what the most popular topics in the field of strategy process research. Though the reading of the technical literature was done concurrently, as opposed to after the qualitative coding, and could be considered potentially tainting in its ability to reduce the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher and coder, it is the opinion of this researcher that the review was benign and had no such negative consequences.

It has been argued that to much familiarity with previously done research will encourage the qualitative researcher to impose those categories that have already been defined semantically or highlighted as "important" to the field (Caiden, 1976; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The researcher may be more inclined to force the data to render the results that the researcher wants rather than letting the data "speak" for it's self. While recognizing this danger, the concurrent review of research is argued to be benign. Familiarity with the specific concepts most relevant to this field of study was average at the start of this study. To selectively code for "core variables," that keep re-occurring (Glaser, 1978), one must be familiar with the categories and concepts most relevant to his or her field. Immersion into the secondary data benefited the researcher by highlighting the most relevant topics, as well as pointing out clearly that there were gaps in the research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) – in both topic and in methodological approach; gaps this study attempts to fill.

4. Pilot Study Findings

After the cases were separated into the two case types, managerial and corporate, a pilot study was conducted to achieve two ends: (a) validate the choice of categories by gathering and comparing characteristics across the two case types, and (b) retrieve preliminary data from which theory building will occur.

4.1 Pilot Study Sample Characteristics

The pilot study sample consisted of eight randomly selected cases - four cases from each sub-group, representing 9% of the corporate sample and 25% of the managerial sample. Five cases were from Harvard Business School and three from Ivey Publishing, including one from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Eight unique industries were represented, four each in services and manufacturing (Appendix B). A content analysis was conducted on these cases and summaries of phrases, paragraphs, and decisions were made and noted in the margins and on loose-leaf papers for later comparison. Summary statements were listed and emergent themes and patterns recorded. These themes and patterns were then compared and contrasted across the two sub-groups. Preliminary models and illustrations were developed to understand and describe the differences observed between the two types of cases.

4.2 Pilot Study Findings

The pilot study confirmed that there were legitimate differences between the two case divisions. Differences where noticeable in three specific areas: in the role of leaders, in the type of leader responsibilities, and in measures of accountability. To summarize the findings the following discussion elaborates on these three dimensions. The findings will be presented in three ways in each section: data will be illustrated discriminately, followed by textual references, and triangulated (McGrath, 1982; Scandura & Williams, 2000) by quantitative support to validate the qualitative findings. The significance of these findings will be discussed after all the differences in the two case types have been illustrated.

4.2.1 Differences in Leader Roles

Leaders in both corporate and managerial cases held important roles with considerable responsibilities, yet these roles were noticeably different. In the corporate cases each leader or change agent held a formal role as, at least, a chief officer; in contrast, managerial case leaders were more often project or team managers (Table 1).

Table 1. Formal Leader Role

Case Type	Organization	Formal Job Title
Corporate	Explo Leisure Products	Co-Founder & co-founder/CEO
	Tele-Communications Inc.	President & COO
	U.S. Plastic Lumber	Founder, CEO, & President
	Edmunds.com	CEO
Managerial	Royal trust	Head of Special Projects Team developing the HSDS
	Acer America	Director of Product Management
	Novartis	Pharma Sector Web Officer
	General Motors of Canada	Project manager for implementing GMTKS

The role of the leader also differed in how work was carried out. The leaders of corporate cases *concluded* their work episodes by actively delegating decisions and mandates to those who could then carry them out, or 'implement them,' while managerial leaders *began* their work episode by having work delegated to them.

Corporate

Ex. 1: *TCI <u>developed a plan for delegating more authority</u> over marketing, programming, engineering, and government affairs to the field* (Tele-Communications, Inc.; pp. 12; emphasis added).

Ex. 2.*When TR Capital acquired Explo on April 1, 1997, Dave Rahall (President of TR Capital) began spending two or three days a week at Explo…Rahall explained: "Everyone would report on what they were doing. Although I would ask questions, the (management team) was so knowledgeable that it didn't take them much time to answer and to form a consensus.*" (Explo Leisure Products, pp:10)

Managerial

Ex. 1. *<u>The initial HSDC design was complete</u>. <u>Now all that the (project) team needed to do was build the system, and implement it</u> in the Royal Le Page organization.* (Royal Trust's Distribution System, pp. 1; emphasis added)

Ex. 2.*With the newly granted authority to create local products, the 29-year-old MBA who had joined Acer 2 ½ years earlier leaped into action with his vision to create "the first Wintel-based PC that could compete with Apple in external design, ease-of-use features, and multimedia capabilities.* (Acer America, pp.3; emphasis added)

To further validate the differences in leader roles the quantitative results were also examined. How leaders thought of the process of implementation – either as a discrete event or continual occurrence – was significantly different in the two groups. As would support the above findings, corporate leaders exclusively saw the implementation episode as one in a continual and ongoing series of changes in the organization.

Construct	P-Value	Salient	Significant
Management Style of Implementation Projects (Construct No. 8)	0.024	✓	✓

In contrast, managerial leaders saw the implementation process as a discrete event. Given that the case leaders hold widely different roles in the organizations in which they lead, one governing the larger, more macro-organization and one a more specific, functional piece of that organization, it makes sense that their perspectives also differ. As corporate leaders more readily see the whole organization by nature of their position, they can see the implementation of a strategy as one of many ongoing changes in the entire organization.

4.2.2 Differences in Type of Leader Responsibility

Additional differences in the type of tasks leaders were responsible for were present across the two case types (Table 2). Managerial leaders were responsible for more detailed, hands-on responsibilities while corporate leaders were responsible for broader tasks, tasks more cognitive than applied in nature.

Table 2. Differences in Leader Task Responsibility – Pilot Study			
Corporate	Determine Strategic Direction Establish Contacts Solicit New Deals Secure Financing Analyze the Industry Maintain Contacts	Managerial	Budget Making Design Technology Develop Marketing Plans Visit Stores Plan Public Events Write Reports Coordinate Team Members

Corporate

EX: *Alsentzer recognized the problem. Asked to lead the company as CEO and President in 1997, he turned the company around with a <u>two-pronged strategy</u>. First, <u>he invested</u> in research to speed up the manufacturing process and acquired other producers of plastic lumber to expand output. Second, <u>he increased demand</u> for the product by <u>increasing product recognition in the general public</u> at large.* (U.S. Plastic Lumber, pp. 1; emphasis added)

Managerial

EX: *To test his ideas, Culver <u>put together a project team</u>, which <u>began running focus groups</u> to examine market needs.* (Acer America, pp. 3; emphasis added)

In support of these findings, the statistical results show that the leaders of the corporate cases worked primarily with changes in roles, the culture, and the vision of the lead organization as opposed to changes in people, ways of doing things (procedures), and changes in facilities like managerial leaders.

Construct	P-Value	Salient	Significant
Leadership Concern (Construct No. 28)	0.067	✓	No

Likewise, the concerns and direction of influence leaders experienced in their roles also differed. Corporate leaders were oriented towards ideas, themes, relationships, and influencing the attitudes and thoughts of their employees. Managerial leaders were oriented towards influencing the behaviour and actions of their employees and were concerned with coordinating tasks, delegating work, and following-up on work further emphasizing the presence of a large difference in leader task responsibilities.

Construct	P-Value	Salient	Significant
Leader Influence (Construct No. 29)	.001	✓	✓
Subject of Implementation (Construct No. 3)	0.024	✓	✓

The third construct, "Subject of Implementation," statistically validated the unique concerns felt by leaders of different levels. Either the people, the way of doing things (i.e. the procedures), and the facilities of the lead organization or the changes in the individual roles, the culture, and/or the vision of the lead organization held the leadership's concern. In the case of the former, procedures and facilities were the concern of most managerial leaders while the former occupied the concern of the corporate leaders.

4.2.3 Differences in Accountability Measures

Each leader was held accountable for the tasks they carried out by both direct and indirect metrics. The cases repeatedly held corporate leaders accountable to financial numbers, equity holders, and those whom the firm had established relationships and commitments with. While these pressures tended to come from external influencers, the pressures of managerial leaders more often originated from internal influences. Obliging managerial leaders to perform, union rules, production deadlines, and budgets were all salient concerns. Breaching these obligations would be an obvious statement that something was being mismanaged, someone was under performing, or somehow, details were not controlled.

Table 3. Differences in Accountability Measures – Pilot Study			
Corporate Cases	Financial Performance Stock Value Stakeholders	Managerial Cases	Union obligations Production deadlines Department budgets

As evidenced by the text, CEO John Malone of Tele-Communications, Inc. showed concern when his organization's financial performance was slipping and rating agencies were looking negatively upon Tele-Communications, Inc; "the stock was telling us our strategy was flawed," Malone said (page 8). That, "no-one had clear profit accountability," was a severe problem when trying to coordinate the many cable systems Tele-Communications had acquired (page 9).

Likewise, U.S. Plastic Lumber fulfilled a commitment to provide an adequate supply of its product to its existing markets prior to changing directions (page 6). In a statement capturing much of the concerns of many of the executive officers in the corporate cases Leo Hindry of Tele-Communications said:

> *We have five constituencies here, all of whom are aggrieved. Our shareholders were out of control. Our customers were leaving. Our employees were demoralized...Regulators – national and local - were unhappy because we seemed to be backing away from our commitment* (Page 11).

The knowledge that feedback – in the form of reports (General Motors: 8), industry review (Acer: 6), scorecards (Novartis: 9), budget performance (Novartis' cost centre: 9), and quality assurance processes (Royal Trust: 13) – would reach those who controlled the resources, be they financial or human resources, the granting of autonomy, or the approval of decisions, compelled managerial leaders to make sure all feedback was positive lest their resources be threatened. The degree these leaders were held accountable, much like their responsibilities, was narrow and limited to specific processes, technologies, and performance of specific products.

The statistical analysis of the validation tool offers neither additional support for this finding nor does it negate the qualitative analysis. Rather than reflecting a weakly supported finding, the absence of statistical support is, instead, likely a reflection of the strategy literature. As the constructs tested for within the validation tool were constructed from the most popular topics in the strategy literature, the absence of topics related to leader accountability reflects either lack of research in this area or lack of perceived importance or popularity.

4.2.4 Differences in the Strategy Process

Throughout the pilot study it became evident that the process of strategy was also very different depending on which level of analysis one was focused on. The strategy process was not so fragmented that one level did the planning and one did the implementation, but rather both levels exemplified this paired behaviour in ways unique to each context. Likewise, concepts such as the end deliverable, the industry, and the orientation of strategic behaviour were highlighted as points of difference in each case context.

Previously, the strategy literature tended to break-down the strategy process as if it were an hourglass figure, with the corporate levels focusing on planning behaviour, tapering their decisions and plans till they could be passed off to the next level where it was then expanded upon and implemented accordingly (Figure 2).



Figure 2. Hourglass Illustration

What this pilot study revealed was that instead of an hourglass shape, the strategy process occurred wholly, and separately, at both levels in the organization, however the process was unique with significant differences. Instead of an hourglass, the strategy processes of the pilot study resembled two separate halves contributing to the whole organization (Figure 3). The decision to separate the two processes is two-fold. First, there is a desire to visually emphasize that there are two, unique and separate processes. Second, the hourglass' passing point, the narrow, inverted section in the middle, possesses different meanings within the two separate contexts. In the corporate process the inverted point represents a completion, a delivering of a decision whereas the inverted point, the top, of the managerial triangle represents a beginning, the recognition of a problem or mandate. Keeping the triangles together in an hourglass blurs this distinction, allowing the true meaning of strategic behaviors to hide behind common researcher-given labels.

Figure 3. Two Separate Processes



4.3 Preliminary Models of the Pilot Study

Neither type of leader found in the pilot study sample, be they a corporate executive or a line manager, held responsibilities that were of greater importance than the other. Each leader's responsibilities were important for different reasons. The behaviours of the executives or the managers, typically regarded as either only planning or implementation (though by no means the case) are both complex and multidimensional. Each with unique characteristics, the roles of both leaders have a significant place in the overall strategic behaviours of a firm. Corporate strategy, the more alluring of the pair, is easier to recognize as strategic in that it is most often referred to formally as such. This by no means belittles the, less recognizable, contribution of the strategic behaviour of the manager.

Whereas the role of the corporate leader required the execution of fewer tasks, each involving great time, involvement, or weight, managers held tasks that were, individually, of less weight but on the whole held a considerably greater quantity of tasks. Figure four attempts to model the difference in the roles of both leader types. The shape of the two leader roles is similar, yet almost opposite, as represented by the triangles. The manager begins with recognition of a narrow task that needs to be done. After recognition, behaviour spreads out into broader action – teams are formed, resources are gathered, execution is mapped out, and a deliverable is presented. Corporate executives, on the other hand, begin with broad observations, ideas and options. They hone these observation and options down through careful analysis and assessment of relevant information, until a specific decision is reached, a goal is stated, or a vision created.

Figure 4. Strategy Process Models



Managerial Process Corporate Process

The circles within each leader's role represent the types of responsibilities that each is required to perform. Corporate leaders held fewer tasks, each involving great time, involvement, or weight. Managers were responsible for tasks that were, individually, of less weight but on the whole held a considerably greater number quantity of tasks. Lastly, the reverse colouring of each role reminds the viewer that, in context of their respective roles, each leader's perspective is either oriented more inward or outward. The corporate executive is held accountable by external influencers as opposed to the internal influencers of the middle manager.

This descriptive model of the strategy processes of managers and executives is not complex. It is, however, a parsimonious reminder of the differences in roles, responsibilities, and accountability – each an important topic to the strategy implementation discussion. In the course of the next section, where the study is expanded to include a larger sample, this model will be tested to see if it holds to be true as it is generalized. More cases will be examined and more detail sought.

5. Expanded Study Findings

The sample was originally divided into two categories: corporate and managerial. The pilot study then offered discriminate, textual, and statistical support that validated this categorical difference. Tentative validation was achieved. The subsequent extended study sought to extend the pilot study's tentative findings and determine if they could be generalized to the broader sample. The themes and models elucidated in the pilot study were applied back to the remaining sample for a with-in group comparison to confirm or contradict the preliminary models. Each of the three facets of the original model was confirmed. Leaders' roles are different in type of formal title and in the way leaders execute their role. The types of tasks leaders were responsible for could be categorized according to vase type and accountability measures were found to be either internally or externally regulated respective to their use in either managerial or corporate settings. This study also sought a deeper understanding of the entire strategy process, which was explored further as the study progressed.

In this next section the previous findings will be expanded up, confirmed, and the unique strategy processes of both managerial and corporate cases and their significance will be discussed. As before, findings will be illustrated using discriminating comparisons between the two case types; explicit, textual examples will be offered, and quantitative evidence offered to support significant constructs. To remind the reader, throughout the study, the term 'statistically salience' will be used in combination with the phrase 'statistically significant' in order to highlight those findings that, given a larger sample size, would most likely become "statistically significant."[2]

5.1 Differences in Leader Roles

Like the pilot study the formal leadership roles of leaders was distinctly different. The difference in formal job titles (Table 4) and formal roles held as a finding.

Table 4. Differences in Formal Leader Roles - Expanded Study

Case Type	Organization	Formal Job Title
Corporate	Union City Schools	Superintendent, Union City School System, Thomas Highton
	Becton Dickinson	CEO, Clateo Castellini
	Taco Bell	President & CEO, John Martin
	NextStage Entertainment	President & CEO, Leo Linbeck
Managerial	Lehman Brothers	Head of Equity Division, Jack Rivkin
	Meridian Magnesium	VP Global Technologies Organization, Len Miller
	Polysar	Sarnia Site Quality Manager, Jim Newton
	Triangle Community Foundation	Director of Philanthropic Services, Tony Pipa

Additionally the findings regarding execution of leader roles were found to generalize to the remaining, larger sample. Executives were found to conclude their responsibilities by delegating authority, assigning work, and handing off the task-related work. The following textual examples illustrate these generalizations.

2 Highlighting the relevant and important findings was the goal rather than merely relaxing the level of significance to create the appearance that this study was any more significant or important because of a lengthy list of impressive statistical results.

Corporate Cases

Example 1. *"At the time we designed the new Taco Bell, in late 1989, we realized we'd need a whole new people system. We were going to be asking people to do new things and we realized that we'd need new training, both in content and delivery... We'd go to more management by exception, more coaching, broadening spans, taking out layers."* (Senior VP of Human Resources) (Taco Bell, pp5)

Example 2. *Castellini formed six design teams, each led by a top manager, to address the major areas requiring a significant redesign.* (Becton Dickinson, pp. 4)

Managerial Cases

Example 1. *The Quality Managers met in France to consider how Polysar should proceed with developing and implementing a company with quality system. Each manager would be responsible for the implementation of the quality system.* (Polysar, pp. 5)

Example 2. "*There's an intensity to managing a service organization... It is always a work in progress and requires hands-on management. You spend an enormous amount of time individually with the analysts. You need to do a lot of apparently little things that may not look like they relate directly to the business but are critical to reinforcing a culture and an attitude" (Jack Rivkin).* (Lehman Brothers, pp.4)

Further evidenced by the statistical support, the difference between executive and managerial delegation practices was found to be significantly salient. Corporate cases typically involved one to two leaders while managerial cases were repeatedly found to utilize upwards of two to three (p = .060). This finding would likely have reported statistical significance if the scale used to measure this concept had been operationalized differently. The qualitative notes reported a higher occurrence of one, maybe two leaders, in the corporate cases and the presence of three, occasionally two, key leaders in managerial cases. The quantitative tool however (construct 12, Appendix E), only allowed for one; two-three; four-six; or seven plus leaders. Had this measure separated out choice two, "two – three change agents," than the significance between the two groups would be presumably higher. As it is though, this difference most logically reflects the tendency of executives to be the central figure in their implementation episodes, playing key decision making roles. Managers however required teams, employees, suppliers, etc to implement their strategic behaviour, mirrored in the quantitative report of greater individual involvement.

Construct	P-Value	Salient	Significant
Number of Individuals Involved in Implementation (Construct No. 12)	0.060	✓	No
Management Style of Implementation (Construct No. 8)	.030	✓	✓

Just as in the pilot study, the difference leader roles had respectively different styles of managing strategy implementation. Managers were more likely (x = 1.62) to consider the implementation a discrete event, clearly a part of their role, not the role in its entirety, like an executive (x=1.27).

5.2 Differences in Type of Leader Responsibility

Both the grounded and statistical evidence supports extrapolating the pilot study's supposition that the types of tasks leaders are responsible for are significantly different. Table four gives categorical support to responsibility differences. Again, corporate leaders' responsibilities were shown to be broader is scope, related more towards the overall needs of the organization, and more inclined to require leaders to act as an interface between the organization and the public or external stakeholders. Managerial leaders, in turn, were charged with responsibilities that involved specific projects, were more concrete than abstract, and would be more likely to result in a tangible-product.

Table 5. Differences in Leader Task Responsibility – Extended Study

Corporate Cases	Managerial Cases
Sell off businesses, reduce employee headcount, develop strategic plans to increase return on net assets (Phillips versus Matsushita)	Choose projects to work on, do efficiency studies, design new technologies and processes, allocate people to projects (Meridian Magnesium)
Launch cultural initiatives, invest heavily in educational centre, recommend leaders/managers for initiatives, speak to shareholders (General Electric)	Deliver teaching supplies, develop curriculum, evaluate program effectiveness (National Foundation for Teaching Entrepreneurship)
Replace top management, lead company through aggressive changes, initiate a series of programs (Square D)	Write formal plan/report, research corporate fleet management, execute plans (Model E)

The following qualitative examples reiterate the difference in leadership concern and influence.

Corporate

EX. 1. *Fairbank and Morris realized that Capital One needed a radically new organization to support "the culture of testing and learning" at the heart of the IBS.* (Capital One Financial Corporation, pp. 9).

EX. 2. *(The leaders)* <u>*developed a*</u> <u>*restructuring plan*</u>*, which focused on enhancing the current strengths of the company.* (Escorts, pp. 1)

Managerial

EX. 1. *Jim Kaplan, product unit manager for Microsoft's Interactive Media Products Group was itching to* <u>*launch a*</u> <u>*new project*</u>*. His idea was to create a truly interactive toy.* (Microsoft, pp. 6)

EX. 2. *Francis and Newton were now faced with the decision of* <u>*how best to implement this new (ISO9000) quality system*</u> *in light of constraints.* (Polysar, pp. 1)

Construct	P-Value	Salient	Significant
Subject of Implementation (Construct No. 3)	.000	✓	✓
Leadership Concerns (Construct No. 28)	.000	✓	✓
Leader Influence (Construct No. 29)	.001	✓	✓

The statistical results highlight both the salience and significance, of the "Subject of Implementation" ($p = .000$), "Leadership concerns" ($p = .000$), and "Leader influence" ($p = .001$). The three of which measure the degree that leaders are concerned with ideas as opposed to tasks, changing culture versus processes, and their influence on others' actions versus others' ways of thinking.

5.3 Differences in Accountability Measures

Measures of accountability found in the cases of the extended study exhibited the same findings as the pilot study. Beyond the discrete differences, it became clearer that corporate accountability was reflected in obligations to those outside the organization; for example investors and executive boards, or the markets -- real or speculative as opposed to the accounting forces found in the managerial cases.

Table 6. Differences in Accountability Measures - Expanded Study			
Corporate Cases	Financial Performance Board of Directors The market	Managerial Cases	Expectations of leadership Peer ratings Department budgets

These forces of the latter group were, instead, found within the organizations, rather than outside them. Aside from the same discrete differences highlighted in the pilot study, which were confirmed again, managers were responsible to internal expectations such as fiscal responsibility and staff leadership. A factor somewhat more complex, 'peer ratings,' could be approval of colleagues with a department, colleagues of a parallel level outside the department, or even those peer organizations, outside the organization, who rate or offer accolades to those managers who are particularly successful in fulfilling their specific roles, as is the case in the textual example of Lehman Brothers.

Corporate

Example 1. *Both companies had performed poorly the previous year, and although we thought our forecasts were conservative, the market was concerned we would not be able to meet the promises made in our IPO.* (BRL Handy, pp. 4)

Example 2. *Believing that Phillips had finally turned around, the board challenged (CEO) Kleisterlee to grow sales by 10% annually and earnings 15%, while increasing return on assets to 30%.* (Phillips Versus Matsushita, pp. 7)

Example 3. *(CEO) Collins flew to meet with Paragon's suppliers and technology partners who had also been advised by the (competitor) that Pragon would be closing down. The suppliers appreciated the fact that Collins made the effort with them and to reassure them that Paragon was staying in business and intending to grow its business in the future. Thus, knowing that he had support at the corporate level, Collins was able to reassure major stakeholders that the company would remain in business.* (Paragon, pp. 5)

Managerial

Example 1. *TCF was struggling with many of the organizational issues that often accompany rapid growth, including stress on the staff as their workload increased and jobs became more complex; poor communication; and a perceived lack of internal leadership"*(Triangle Community Foundation, pp. 9).

Example 2. *Shearson Lehman Hutton's research department jumped from 15th in "Institutional Investor's" rankings in 1987 to seventh in 1988, the first year of Rivkin's stewardship... the department's ranking climbed to fourth in 1989...In 1990 Shearson Lehman Hutton was ranked number one for the first time on the "Institutional Investor's" All-American Research Team* (Lehman Brothers, pp 13 & 17).

5.4 The Strategy Process

The processes in the remaining multi-level cases did model the illustration of two separate, and unique, strategy processes. What became clearer as the cases were further explored was the difficulty that existed in using standard definitions when gathering valid examples and when coding the cases when using the quantitative validation tool. One standard definition, applied across both types of cases, was not easily applicable to both. As the study progressed, one set of definitions for corporations and another for managerial cases were used. What meant one thing in one context was simply not guaranteed to have the same semantic definition in another. Not surprising in general, given that in cross-cultural research procedures and standardized meanings do not cross borders as easily as the researchers themselves. Rigid standardization can be achieved at the expense of unnatural responses and biased interpretation of the results. Biases can be controlled if the group is allowed to "do its own thing in its own way" (Hulin, 1987; Osgood, et al., 1975), much as data extracted using grounded theory should be allowed to speak for itself.

Though the differences between executives and managers is certainly not as severe as the semantic differences between geographical cultures, there would likely be unique nuances that develop as words and phrases are defined by their specific setting. Whether the definitions are a result of the case author's bias or if the authors are simply capturing a nuance such as this in their writing cannot be determined presently. However, regardless of which it is, as long as a recipient of the message receives *the same* and intended *meaning* that was sent out all is fine. It is when the distribution of strategy process results turns into a giant version of the children's game "Telephone" that one should begin to worry. In order to prevent such mishaps six key phrases that differed in meaning across the two case types (Table 7) are offered along with textual examples.

Due to the implicit nature of many of these decisions it is more difficult to find textual examples in single cases that explicitly demonstrate the respective point. In the following section, textual evidence will be offered in a lesser fashion than in the pervious discussions, and discrete evidence will not be used in this presentation. Statistical evidence will be used where possible, though it also will be used to a lesser extent than previous sections. This is a larger reflection of the implicit nature of these findings then of anything else.

Table 7. Contextual Meaning of Multiple Strategy Concepts

	Meaning in managerial Cases	Meaning in corporate Cases
Planning	Recognize the problem, mandate, or better way of doing things Assess resources & capabilities Decide how to use resources economically	Assess the environment – competition, trends, environment Assess capabilities of organization – strengths, weaknesses, resources Gather information from the specialists
Deliverable	Reports, technology, process, methodology, or product	Ideas, decisions, goals, and guidelines
Implementation	Accept & Act	Deliberate & Decide
Role of Leader	Monitor, Expert, Specialist, Engineer	Figurehead, Liaison between firm and environment, Decision Maker, Information Gatherer
Industry	Those that do similar functions, or use the same technologies Skills or tools run across organization and/or business unit(s)	Those organizations who exist for the same reason as the organization, those who have a similar, competing product Skills or tools run along organizations
Location of Strategic Behaviour	Embedded – part of overall strategy, a piece of the whole	Encompassing – organization wide, multiple departments are involved

A. Planning

This term is in reference to the forethought that occurs prior to action. Whether planning is deliberate or emergent (Mintzberg, 1990), there is a move to act and choice to engage in one act over another -- there is cognition of some sort prior to action, though it may be happening so rapidly it is not evident. In the case of corporate leaders, this cognition may manifest itself as assessing and deliberating, whereas a managerial leader's cognition may appear as the planning of project execution. To managers planning is the decision on how to allocate resources – who to use, how much to spend, who will do which piece of the project. Managerial "planning" is less obtuse and cerebral than the analyzing and assessing that corporate leader do, but it is still a type of 'planning' in that there is a cognitive choice to focus attention on one, or a few, of many potential resource-requiring situations.

> Corporate: *(The CEO) added that the industry drove the need for change. "We're in a slow growth industry, with ties to the construction industry's cycles. They've looked pretty good over the years, but where will they go next?" In response to these challenges, Knauss and Stead initiated a series of aggressive programs* (Square D, pp. 3).

> Managerial: *Stone, Irving, and Lambrechts agreed that it made sense to focus only on northern California given their limited funds and decision to "learn as they go"*(Joint Juice, pp. 6).

A third piece of textual evidence, though not easily illustrated by quotations or tables, is the presentation of information in the case. In the corporate cases there is considerable more text describing the external environment and industry trends than in managerial cases, which had little emphasis on any such outside information. Consequently, this affected the reader to inadvertently think that outward looking observation was not as important to the manager as it was to the executive.

Statistically, the salience of ability to determine direction, purpose, and vision helps to indirectly support the interpretation of this discrete difference in definitions. Corporate leaders were found to be responsible for such a duty much more frequently than managers, and hence were clearer in determining the direction, vision, or purpose.

Construct	P-Value	Salient	Significant
Clear determination of direction, purpose, or vision (Construct No. 30)	0.073	✓	No

B. Deliverable

Prior to discussing the contextual meaning of 'implementation' it is important to recognize the difference in deliverables expected, for the type of deliverable will dictate or guide a traditional course of action-related steps. The corporate cases' deliverables, more obtuse in nature than those of their counter-parts, were those of expansion *strategies*, business *plans,* and *decisions* regarding product portfolio management. Deliverables in these cases were ideas, decisions, goals, and guidelines compared to the concrete infrastructure, technologies, processes, and products of corporate cases.

Corporate: *(Jack Welch, CEO) told his top 600 executives that by the June Session I strategy reviews he expected each business to explain how it would become the e-business leader in its industry* (General Electric, pp. 5).

Managerial: *Alliance managers has a challenging charter involving strategy, sales, and technology. They were expected to develop a business strategy for optimizing the vale of the alliance, disseminating that strategy upwards to the relevant executives and downwards to the relevant alliance team members and salespeople. They were also expected to understand the ways in which the alliance partners' products and services could work together, to motivate both business unit employees and salespeople at both companies to execute on the strategy, and, in many cases, to develop plans for creating jointly developed products or technologies. Finally, they were expected to include... all company functions or groups whose roles required them to interact with the strategic partner* (HP-Cisco Alliance, pp. 4).

As mentioned in the discussion on leader responsibilities, the statistical evidence also highlights the difference in what was expected of each leader to deliver. Managerial leaders dealt exclusively with procedures, people, and/or changes to facilities while managerial leaders were charged with delivering changes to organizational culture, vision, or goals. Not only is there a statistical significance but there is a significant difference in the type of actions each deliverable will require.

Construct	P-Value	Salient	Significant
Subject of Implementation (Construct No. 3)	0.000	✓	✓

C. Implementation

Just as planning is present in both the strategy processes of corporate and managerial settings, so is active implementation. Corporate leaders seek definition and understanding prior to delivering decisions regarding direction, strategy, or mission. Executives' action, their implementation, is the practise of gathering information, assessing options and formulating plans. This process requires deliberation and evaluation, and is followed by a decision, the deliverable they are charged with. At the more specific, functional levels of managerial leaders, 'implementation' has a more traditional manifestation in the form of task-oriented behaviours such as establishing teams, designing technology, communicating to different suppliers, writing reports, etc.

D. Leader Role

In both case types, individuals who negotiate and guide others through strategic behaviour are present. Often referred to as "change agents" in the literature, the presence of these individuals, in no way, negates or belittles the presence of executive leaders. A project manager in a managerial case does not mean that the organization or department exists without the guidance of a CEO or Founder. Web Officer, Matthew Timms', position does not eliminate the need for Pharma CEO, Thomas Ebeling (Novartis); likewise the provision of an expansion strategy by CEO & Founder of US Plastic Lumber, Mark Alsentzer, does not belittle the need for managers to manage the expansion budget or look over US Plastic Lumber's employees. As the proposed model would advocate, the two types of leaders simply coexist. Their roles are different, with unique and specific characteristics.

E. Industry

The phrase 'industry,' in the context of corporate cases, would translate to the standard "specific branch of manufacture or trade" (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000). This study, as a consequence of contextual relevance, defined "industry" as the organizations that the lead organization used to benchmark from. That could mean benchmarking from those peer organizations, which manufacture or trade similar goods or services, or those organizations that use similar tools or technology to produce goods or services. When comparisons are done to the lead organization's peer group, as in the case of those corporate cases, the organizations were likening themselves to others within the same overall manufacturing or service-related organization – those who produced the same product or service. Figure 5 illustrates a global market for winemakers. Each geographic grouping, competing for market share in the entire global market, of which BRL Hardy is just one of the many competitors within, makes up the contextually

Figure 5. Benchmarking within the Industry:



(BRLHardy, pp 13)

defined "industry" of international winemakers.

In managerial cases those reference organizations used as benchmarks for performance measurements, sources of information and inspiration, or recruitment sources for employees with specific skills, ran across traditional "industry" lines. An "industry" in this case, was a group of organizations that used a similar technology or process – as opposed to creating a similar technology or process. Managerial industries formed not around what was produced, but how it was produced or brought to market. In

Figure 6. Benchmarking across the Industries:



(Joint Juice, pp 5-6)

the example of Joint Juice, which sold a carbonated and flavoured Glucosamine beverage that aided in joint health, Joint Juice was able to take skills, technologies, and strategies from diverse, traditional industries – in this case the nutritional supplement industry, new age beverages, or other drink industries (both nutritionally enhanced/energy drinks and carbonated soft-drink industries). The lateral management of this one product allowed them a broader range of options to extract information and ideas from.

F. Location of Strategic Behaviour

The location of the strategic behaviour, where change originates, is discussed in this point. Hardly relegated to the corporate boardroom, strategic behaviour is seen to occur at multiple levels in organizations. The strategic behaviours of cognition and action, planning and implementation, are present at both the upper, all-encompassing level of the corporate executive and at embedded levels throughout the organization. Strategic behaviour in the corporate cases reflected the hopes and assigned responsibility of leaders to affect and guide the behaviour of the entire organization. In contrast, managerial cases reflected embedded episodes of strategic behaviour. There behaviour was contained multiple levels within the corporation. The Equity Research Department, was embedded within the Lehman Brothers Division, which was embedded within Shearson Lehman Brothers Division, which was in turn embedded within Shearson Lehman Borthers Holdings (Lehman Borthers, pp 30).

Managers strategic behaviour did not run counter to organizational objectives, that is, none of the managers decided to guide their departments or projects in directions antithetical to what the CEO had mapped out. Instead, managerial behaviour was 'a part of the whole;' it was strategic in that it was purposeful, economical, and intended to produce a deliverable that would raise costs and barriers for the competition and give their own organization a competitive lead. It was however, unique in character and only immediately impacted the department where the behaviour originated. Though the external market may react, say if a given department or product manager launches a new, successful product, though this success does not come at the expense of other internal departments or other product managers. Managers' strategic behaviour did not come at the expense of other managers – multiple departments could succeed, success was not mutually exclusive. Corporate behaviour was mutually exclusive; if the CEO took the company one direction it was at the expense of not choosing to go another direction.

6. Discussion

6.1 Relevance of Context

The models proposed during the pilot study were confirmed and generalized to a larger sample successfully during the expanded study. The differences in leader roles, responsibilities, and accountability measures were further supported with statistical evidence. Findings regarding leaders' roles and responsibilities align themselves well with CEO literature and their common portrayal as architect (Andrew, 1981). The CEO's overarching responsibility is to structure and construct the organizations they run. Managers instead, structure work processes, people, and resources and construct tangible deliverables. Both groups strategize how they will carry out their tasks and reach a favourable conclusion, and they do so in two separate and unique processes, though there are likely two reasons why these processes have been disregarded or blended together: the strategic tools already used for analysis do not take context into consideration, and two, because one set of strategies is embedded in the other it is difficult to distinguish where the behaviours and consequences of one group start and end.

The Application of Strategy Tools. The two predominant views of strategy seem to be either Barney's (1991) resource based view, which is mostly inward looking, or that of industrial strategists, which is mostly outward looking. However, were the CEO put in the position of looking both outward and inward simultaneously, they would become cross-eyed and the organization would go nowhere. As this study illustrated, there is a sort of established division of labour between corporate officers and their managers – the officers use their energy for looking outward, while the managers are responsible for making sure all things internal function efficiently. Said another way, strategic behaviour does not only occur at the broader, corporate level it occurs down in the ranks as well.

However, many of the popular strategic tools strategy (*SWOT Analysis*: Andrews, 1971; Bracker & Pearson, 1986; *Five Forces*: Porter, 1985; *Diamond Model*: Porter, 1990; *Resource Based View*: Barney, 1991) that researchers use as a lens to evaluate the success of a firm cannot be applied to the strategic behaviours of those at multiple organizational levels without significant modification. SWOT analyses and consideration of the Five Forces are effective for examining the behaviour of a CEO, and likewise these are valid tools for those CEO's to use in the formation of their strategy. In contrast, the evaluation of a senior project manager by use of these tools would not be fruitful; their jobs don't require that they *do* look outward (it would likely be seen as a negative job behaviour) and stress instead that they focus their attention to what is happening right in front of them. That is not to say that using an internal-looking point of view to examine the whole of the strategy process would be any more advantageous. While you might capture the micro-activities of managers more effectively, CEO's would begin to look as if they were not doing their job if expected to be constantly inward looking, and in practise few organizations would survive long-term if their corporate officers stopped paying attention to the external environment. Much of the inward-oriented research (Strategic Leadership: Ireland & Hitt, 1999; Visionary Leadership: Howe, 2001; Time: Huy, 2001; Motors of Change: Van de Ven & Poole, 1995; Tempo of Change: Weick & Quinn, 1999) is too specific to be readily applicable to the world of those executives in managerial settings.

While both approaches to describing strategy are rich within specific contexts they are failing to describe the whole. There is particular importance to the context in which strategy happens, is studied, and the conditions under which strategic tools are used. If the tools used to study strategic behaviour are not used in the manner most appropriate they will not likely capture anything more than blended information about the strategy process.

Embedded Strategy. Another complicating factor, obfuscating the distinct processes between corporate officers and mangers, is a difficulty with units of analysis when examining strategic behaviour. The distinction between strategic corporate and managerial behaviours and consequences is sometimes negligible. The consequential decision of a corporate officer has significant impact on the strategic planning of a manager. It is easier to subsume managerial behaviours under the category 'implementation' than to determine their contribution to the overall, strategy.

To use an anecdotal illustration outside of the data set, in 1992 Delta Airlines removed the single piece of lettuce from its airline meals so it no longer needed to pay people to trim, wash, and place lettuce on meal trays. The removal of this, both figurative and literal, piece of waste resulted in a shocking cost savings of almost $1.5million USD a year (Edmonton Journal, March 23, 1996). While this decision may seem to be nothing more than the good idea of some Auxiliary Services manager, it likely did stem from a larger corporate goal to reduce costs without impairing service to customers, or something to that extent.

Trivial, "lettuce" behaviour like this, or the organization of an e-Business day (Novartis), the conducting of focus groups (Acer), or the decision of which employee identification system to use (General Motors) are no less part of strategic action then the overarching corporate goals from which they stem from. By themselves these small-scale, "micro-level changes" (Orlikowski, 1996), these 'pieces of lettuce' seem almost insignificant (Weick & Quinn, 1999); when in reality they are the very sustenance that makes up strategic behaviour in the managerial context.

There is no refuting that aggregating behaviour and consequences from one organizational level to another is complicated and somewhat contentious (Adler & Kwon, 2002). This study does not try to avert that difficulty, but insists that the emphasis is not so much a matter of levels of strategy but of strategic contexts. Micro-level changes are what constitute managerial strategy. It is episodic, involves more people directly, and requires a watchful eye. Benchmarking is done across, as opposed to within, industries. Leaders are experts, specialists, and monitors who accept that there is a problem or task at hand and then take tangible steps to deliver the report, product, technology, or new process that is expected of them. Macro-level changes are the sustenance of corporate strategy. By definition, if someone else could have made these changes or decisions they would not have been for the corporate officers to decide. They have the vantage point of seeing change as continuous; they make their decisions by themselves or with few others in assistance, and are held accountable to few beyond themselves. They are responsible for leading the organization forward sometimes as a decision-maker, others as a liaison, a figurehead, or an information gatherer. They are expected to deliberate and decide, then deliver goals, ideas, and guidelines. These are two different and unique processes, which can and should be further explored.

6.2 Limitations

Great care was taken to ensure sound methodology, however, there are always points to improve on. Should this study be expanded upon or replicated the following points regarding methodology should be considered: sample size, data selection, and language of the coding tool.

This study may have been constrained by both sample size and the choice of cases. The original sample size sought was almost twice the size of what was eventually used by the end of the study. A sample size of 38 is characteristically small though there were studies that used similar numbers, though likely richer cases that contained more information (Collis, 1991 – 14 cases; Eisenhardt, 1989 – 8 cases; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988 – 8 cases; Lens, 2003 – 21 cases; Simmers – 17 firms, Wah, 2002 – 8 cases). However, it was surprising to find such strong statistical support given such a small sample. Perhaps a larger sample is not imperative, though for future research it is highly recommended.

The choice to use secondary and tertiary data, in the form of business cases, as opposed to using primary data gathered on an equal number of firms also potentially limits the richness and accuracy of the findings. It may not be determinable if the differences in the process behaviour was due to real differences in firm behaviour or if it more accurately reflects differences created or perceived by the authors. There did seem to be a difference between managerial cases, which more accurately reflected managerial behavioural, and corporate cases, which were more apt to reflect models for strategy analysis. This difference may be due to ontological differences in the cases or it may have been the author's reflection of the concerns and important information discovered during review of the primary and secondary information. These specific concerns were considered and addressed in the process of the study, however due to severe limitations of resources the choice of using cases was the most logical option at the time this study was conducted.

In retrospect, more care could have been taken with the language of the validation tool. Wording of the questions or scaled answers could have been more specific for coding ease and accuracy. Attempts were made to mitigate any invalidation of the tool by finding previously developed measurement tools. In place of prior validation, validation by an expert panel was used.

The concerns of both the sample and the validation tool are not insignificant, though great care was taken to lessen potential problems. The findings of this study do not seem to have suffered greatly as a result, though if ever replication or advancement off these findings was sought, these limitations should be considered.

7. Consequences Worth Exploring

The expanded study confirmed proposition number one, there was a significant difference between managerial and corporate behaviour during the strategy process. The original descriptive model proposed was also confirmed and differences in roles, responsibilities, accountability, and contextual meanings were proven using discriminate, textual, and statistical evidence. Through the use of these particular research methods, the combined use of grounded theory and a validation tool to statistically analyze concepts, holistic, rich understanding was extracted while providing a descriptive model that can also be operationalized. This study has also tried to emphasize the importance of context in the strategy process. In the following, concluding, section the relevance of context in light of the points previously discussed will be addressed and potential hypotheses offered for future exploration.

7.1 Embedded Strategic Behaviour

On their own, the strategic behaviours of managers and their departments may appear trivial, or mundane, their actions as significant as 'lettuce' – and likely the whole of the organization can function without many of these embedded groups. Though, it is these groups that add depth and value to whole organizations. Just as strategic behaviour at the corporate level can be used to compete dynamically in industry, the embedded strategic behaviour of managers should also be harnessable. Similar to the power of 'intrapreneurship' (Hirsch, 1990), strategic behaviour at managerial levels has the potential to become a competitive advantage if employees are guided and their strategic behaviour supported and fostered (Powell, 1992). A firm that has employees at multiple levels, in multiple departments, thinking efficiently, strategically, relating their behaviour to the overall corporate strategy, can be as dynamic and progressive as any of the 'learning organizations' (Hendry, 1996), or largely advocated resource-based organizations using employees as a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Ireland & Hitt, 1999; Wenerfelt, 1984).

Proposition 1: Firms with effective strategic managers will perform better at the managerial level.

Proposition 2: Firms with enough effective strategic managers will perform better at both the managerial level and at the aggregated firm level.

7.2 Contextually Using Strategy Tools

As has been discussed, a case can be made for the contextual use of specific strategy tools. Resource based perspectives and tools seem to be most applicable to inward looking managers while outward looking, industrial/organizational tools have their best fit among corporate executives. It would be worthwhile to know, beyond conjecture, if this is true and in fact which tools were most appropriate for which organizational contexts.

Proposition 4: Resource based tools or techniques, used in their purest form, would better serve strategizing managers than strategizing corporate officers at the managerial level of analysis

Proposition 5: Industrial/Organizational tools or techniques, used in their purest form, would better serve strategizing corporate leaders more so than managers, at the corporate level of analysis.

In a similar vein, just as there is contextual significance to the tools used in strategy there is apt to be contextual significance to the many theories that attempt to describe the dichotomous nature of change and strategy. Those that seemingly compete, for example perspectives on time: continuous versus discrete (Huy, 2001) or emergent versus deliberate strategy (Mintzberg, 1985), might actually be referencing the differences in behaviour, perception, or process at different levels in the organization.

Proposition 6: Viewed through a contextual lens, many dichotomous strategy or change theories would be better understood and would better explain the whole organization.

The original purpose of this study was not to reinvent the strategic wheel, so to speak. This study's findings did confirm – through both qualitative and quantitative support - what was sensed by many intuitively, establish a new framework from which to view strategy and strategic tools, as well as offer a starting point for further studies that combine approaches or who are seeking to use tools to operationalize strategy concepts, however basic and simplistic these tools and models are.

Appendix A. Original Managerial Categories and Concepts from Coding

Category Underlying property	
Large emphasis on product/service	**Episodes of implementation**
	Direction/emphasis of strategy/project changes
Direct contact with constituents: employees, suppliers, partners, distributors, mass market customers	Responsibilities shift to new people
	Responsibilities change
Dependency	Management/staff change
Positions appointed by upper levels	Ambiguity to new stages
Granted authority by leaders	Prompted by:
Seek approval for funding	New technology or program is initiated
Seek approval for decisions	Old system won't support strategies for "integration"
Seek approval for integration	Launch of a project
External pressures	**Functional departments named/discussed distinctly**
Industry	Distribution
Legislation	Inventories
Regulations	Customer service
Perceived conflicts with clients	Logistics
Corporate influence - perspective	Accounting
From levels up	
Conflict between levels	

Appendix A. Original Managerial Categories and Concepts from Coding

Category

Underlying property

Division of Work

- Into sub-systems
- Into teams

Managers named individually

Roles

- Informal during ambiguous times
- Managers and teams are "product experts"

Responsibilities of leaders:

- Oversee project team work
- Develop contacts across department
- Develop marketing concept
- Making budgets
- Functional approaches
- Design of technologies
- Run focus groups
- Visit stores

Held accountable for actions

- Budgets
- Upper management
- To other departments - waiting on completion

Concerns

- Production dates
- Costs
- Delays
- Inventory

Multiple "story lines" concurrently in an episode

Problems

- CD trays
- Matching colour design
- Coordinating different units -- design, price, marketing
- Tensions between SBUs and RBUs
- Component integration

Can tell who is accountable for which parts of implementation

Appendix B: Original Corporate Categories and Concepts from Coding

Category

Underlying property

Leaders' backgrounds
- Emphasis on school
- Emphasis on orientation
- Emphasis on industry experience

Competition
- Described as a threat
- Described as a non-threat (neutral)

Leader Selection
- Chosen out of relationships - friendship
- Chosen out of relationships - past work relationship
- Self-select themselves to take on a job

Prompts to change:
- Industry changes - moving with industry
- Industry changes - moving ahead of industry

Authority
- Can't figure out who has decision making ability

Responsibility
- Can't figure out where responsibility lies

Accountability
- To equity holders
- To those firm has relationships with
- Quarterly numbers

Markets
- Described collectively - little descriptive segmentation

Responsibilities:
- Establishing contacts
- Soliciting deals
- Securing financing
- Maintaining contacts
- Attend to multiple markets

Consensus
- Need for consensus before acting
- Consensus is valued

Collaboration
- Between heads/leadership

Appendix C. Whole Sample Characteristics	
Case Title Industry Type Case Author(s)	Case Type Year Published & Publisher
Acer America: Development of the Aspire Manufacturing: Industrial & Commercial Machinery Bartlett, C.A. & St. George, A.	Managerial 1998 – Harvard Business School
Becton Dickson – Designing the New Strategic, Operational, and Financial Planning Process Services: Health Services Simons, R.L., Davila, A. & Mohammed, A.A.	Corporate 1996 – Harvard Business School
Bell Atlantic and the Union City Schools (B): Education Reform in Union City Services: Educational Services Pruyne, E. & Kanter, R.M.	Corporate 1998 – Harvard Business School
Boston Lyric Opera Services: Amusement & Recreation Kaplan, R.S. & Campbell, D.	Managerial 2001 – Harvard Business School
BRL Hardy: Globalizing an Australian Wine Company Manufacturing: Food and Kindred Products Bartlett, C.A.	Corporate 1999 – Harvard Business School
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Wireless Strategy Finance: Depository Institutions Hamilton, D. & Wade, M.	Corporate 2001 - Ivey
Capital One Financial Corporation Finance: Non-Depository Credit Institutions Paige, C.H., Anand, B. & Rukstad, M.G.	Corporate 2000 – Harvard Business School
e-Business@Novartis Manufacturing: Miscellaneous Reavis, C., McAfee,A., & Knoop, C.	Managerial 2001– Harvard Business School
Edmunds.com (A) Services: Automotive Repair, Services, & Parking Akers, C. & Bradley, S.P.	Corporate 2000 - Harvard Business School
Explo Leisure Products Manufacturing: Rubber & Misc. Plastics Products Hamermesh, R.G.	Corporate 1998 – Harvard Business School
Escorts: A Restructuring Plan Manufacturing: Miscellaneous Delios, A. & Anand, J.	Corporate 1995 - Ivy
GE's Digital Revolution: Redefining the E in GE Manufacturing: (Multiple Groups) Bartlett, C.A. & Glinska, M.	Corporate 2002 – Harvard Business School
General Motors of Canada: Common System Implementation Manufacturing: Transportation Equipment Krajewski, A. & Schneberger, S.	Managerial 1998 – Ivey

Appendix C (continued)	
Case Title Industry Type Case Author(s)	Case Type Year Published & Publisher
Heartport, Inc. Manufacturing: Electronics Dobrow, A. & Pisano, G.	Corporate 2000 – Harvard Business School
The HP_Cisco Alliance (A) Manufacturing: Indust. & Comm. Machinery & Computer Equip. Casciaro, T. & Darwall, C.	Managerial 2003 – Harvard Business School
ISO9000 Implementation at Polystar Manufacturing – Rubber Gulbronson, R., Chaline, P. & Britney, R.	Managerial 1993 – Ivey
Joint Juice Manufacturing: Food & Kindred Products Roberts, M.J. & Wagonfeld, A.B.	Managerial 2003 – Harvard Business School
Jollibee Foods Corporation (A): International Expansion Retail Trade: Food Stores Bartlett, C.A. & O'Connell, J.	Corporate 1998 – Harvard Business School
Lehman Brothers (A): Rise of the Equity Research Department Services: Business Services Groysberg, B. & Nanda, A.	Managerial 2001 – Harvard Business School
Meridian Magnesium: International Technology Transfer Manufacturing: Transportation Equipment Cole, K. & Bansal, T.	Managerial 2001 – Ivey
Microsoft's Vega Project: Developing People and Products Manufacturing: Indust. & Comm. Machinery & Computer Equip. Bartlett, C.A. & Wozny, M.	Managerial 1999 – Harvard Business School
Mobil USM&R (A): Linking the Balanced Scorecard Retail Trade: Automotive & Gasoline Kaplan, R.S. & Lewis, E.	Corporate 1996 – Harvard Business School
Model E: An Incubated Enterprise Retail Trade: Automobile Dealers & Gasoline Service Stations Hart, M.	Managerial 2000 – Harvard Business School
NetLogic Microsystems Manufacturing: Electric and Other Electrical Equipment Flanagan, C.S., Foster, G. Wattis, P.L. & Wattis, P.	Corporate 2001 – Stanford University
NextStage Entertainment Services: Amusement and Entertainment Flanagan, C.S. & Barnett, W.P.	Corporate 2001 – Stanford University

Appendix C (continued)	
Case Title Industry Type Case Author(s)	Case Type Year Published & Publisher
Nike – 1986 Manufacturing: Apparel Urban, T.N. & Bartlett, C.A.	Corporate 1996 – Harvard Business School
Paragon Information Systems Communication Services: Communications Phillips, J.R. & Rowe, W. G.	Managerial 2002 – Ivey
Philips versus Matsushita: A New Century, a New Round Manufacturing: Electric and Other Electrical Equipment Bartlett, C.A.	Corporate 2001– Harvard Business School
Rakuten Retail Trade: General Merchandise McFarlan, F.W., Lane, D. & Seki, A.	Corporate 2003 – Harvard Business School
Reshaping Apple Computer's Destiny 1992 (Abridged) Manufacturing: Industrial. & Comm. Machinery & Computer Equip. Christensen, C.M. & Donovan, T.	Corporate 1999 – Harvard Business School
Royal Trust's Distribution Strategy Services: Non-depository Credit Institutions Bunka, L. & Huff, S. & Gandtz, J.	Managerial 1991 – Ivey
Square D Company Manufacturing: Electrical Equipment Malnight, T.W. & Yoshino, M.Y.	Corporate 1990 – Harvard Business School
Strategic Planning at NFTE Services: Social Services Grossman, A. & Curran, D.	Managerial 2002 – Harvard Business School
Taco Bell Inc. (1983 –1994) Retail Trade: Eating and Drinking Places Schlesinger, L. & Hallowell, R.	Corporate 1998 – Harvard Business School
Tele-Communications, Inc.: Accelerating Digital Deployment Services: Communications Eisenmann, T. R.	Corporate 1998 – Harvard Business School
Triangle Community Foundation Service: Social Services Anderson, B. & Dees, J.G.	Managerial 2001 – Stanford University
U.S. Plastic Lumber Manufacturing: Wood & Lumber Products, except furniture Grewell, J.B. & Anderson, T.	Corporate 2001 – Stanford University
Industry labels were taken from the Standard Industrial Classification Index	

Appendix D. Pilot Study Case Characteristics

Case Title	
Industry Type	Case Type
Case Author(s)	Year Published & Publisher
Acer America: Development of the Aspire	
Manufacturing: Industrial & Commercial Machinery	Managerial
Bartlett, C.A. & St. George, A.	1998 – Harvard Business School
e-Business@Novartis	
Manufacturing: Miscellaneous	Managerial
Reavis, C., McAfee,A., & Knoop, C.	2001 – Harvard Business School
Edmunds.com (A)	
Services: Automotive Repair, Services, & Parking	Corporate
Akers, C. & Bradley, S.P.	2000 - Harvard Business School
Explo Leisure Products	
Manufacturing: Rubber & Misc. Plastics Products	Corporate
Hamermesh, R.G.	1998 – Harvard Business School
General Motors of Canada: Common System Implementation	
Manufacturing: Transportation Equipment	Managerial
Krajewski, A. & Schneberger, S.	1998 – Ivey
Royal Trust's Distribution Strategy	
Services: Non-depository Credit Institutions	Managerial
Bunka, L. & Huff, S. & Gandtz, J.	1991 – Ivey
Tele-Communications, Inc.: Accelerating Digital Deployment	
Services: Communications	Corporate
Eisenmann, T. R.	1998 – Harvard Business School
U.S. Plastic Lumber	
Manufacturing: Wood & Lumber Products, except furniture	Corporate
Grewell, J.B. & Anderson, T.	2001 – Stanford University
Industry labels were taken from the Standard Industrial Classification Index	

Appendix E. Quantitative Validation Tool – Coding Schedule	
Construct Number	Construct Label
1	Dictator(s) of implementation[3]
	5= Outside people and/or events completely dictate and determine changes to strategy 4= Outside people and events dictate *and determine changes to strategy,* more so than internal people and events *3= What dictates and determines changes to strategy cannot be determined* *2=Internal people and events dictate and determine changes to strategy, more so than external people and events* *1=Internal people and events completely dictate and determine changes to strategy*
2	*Lead business unit knows clearly how it will implement its strategy*[4]
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*
3	Subject of implementation[5]
	2= *The subject of implementation is most closely related to the changes in the people, the way of doing things (procedures), and/or the facilities of the lead organization* 1= *The subject of implementation is most closely related to the changes in the individual roles, or the culture, and/or the vision of the lead organization*
4	The implementation effort is influenced and guided by formal, information-based procedures[6]
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*
5	*Impetus for Change*[7]
	5= What initiated or compelled the lead organization to implement changes was a formal institutional program, rules and procedures that needed to be followed *4= What initiated or compelled the lead organization to implement change was the purposeful evaluation and assessment of past situations or behaviours, a resulting, discussed decision that things could be done more efficiently and/or effectively, and a planned series of changes to be made* *3= What initiated or compelled the lead organization to implement change was conflict and confrontation with another group; the collision of one thesis and its antithesis* *2= What initiated or compelled the lead organization to implement change was the continuation of a sort of 'trial and error' strategy – trying multiple different strategies or methods in order to secure scarce resources, the decision that one strategy or method was most effective and/or efficient* *1= Cannot be determined*

[3] Construct: "Choice and planning of implementation strategies" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[4] Construct: "Choice and planning of implementation strategies" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[5] Construct: "Perception of Time" (Huy, 2001)
[6] Construct: "Visionary Leadership" (Howe, 2001)
[7] Construct: "Motors of Change" (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995)

Construct Number	Construct Label
6	Presence of planning problems[8]
	5=Problems regarding planning the implementation exist; the problems are clear, and, have major consequences *4=Problems regarding planning the implementation exist, the problems are clear, but have only minor consequences* *3= Problems regarding planning the implementation are ambiguous and the consequences cannot be determined* *2=Problems regarding planning the implementation do not exist in the case* *1=Problems regarding planning the implementation cannot be determined by the case*
7	Presence of implementation problems[9]
	5=Problems regarding implementing the implementation exist; the problems are clear, and, have major consequences *4=Problems regarding implementing the implementation exist, the problems are clear, but have only minor consequences* *3= Problems regarding implementing the implementation are ambiguous and the consequences are undeterminable* *2=Problems regarding implementing the implementation do not exist in the case* *1=Problems regarding implementing the implementation cannot be determined by the case*
8	Management style of implementation projects[10]
	2= The implementation described in the case is a discrete project; the lead organization recognizes a beginning and an end to the project *1= The implementation described in the case is a continual and ongoing series of changes in the organization*
9	Tempo of implementation[11]
	3=The implementation project is governed by a rapid tempo – a sense of urgency compels progress, and progress is made quickly *2=The implementation project is governed by persistence – a steady, constant stream of effort is put into the implementation, regardless of the duration of the project, progress is made steadily* *1=The implementation project is not governed by time – there is no sense of urgency, progress happens at its own pace*
10	Management of Implementation[12]
	5=Implementation is handled in a wholly autocratic manner - decisions are made in top-down style, communication and consultation are not stressed as important *4=Implementation is handled in more of an autocratic, versus participative, manner – decisions are made in top-down style; communication and consultation may happen by chance but are not prioritized* *3=The style of managing implementation cannot be determined* *2=Implementation is handled in more of a participative, versus autocratic, manner – select people are consulted and involved in communication during implementation* *1=Implementation is handled in a wholly participative manner – management stresses both vertical and lateral communication and consultation before and during the implementation process with all those involved*

[8] Construct: "Choice and planning of implementation strategies" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[9] Construct: "Choice and planning of implementation strategies" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[10] Construct: "Choice and planning of implementation strategies" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[11] Construct: "Tempo of Change: Episodic or Continuous Change" (Weick & Quinn, 1999)
[12] Construct: "Choice and planning of implementation strategies" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)

Construct Number	Construct Label
11	Management support during Implementation [13]
	3= Management shows genuine commitment to the needs and development of employees during the implementation process *2= Management support of employees is unclear or intermittent during the implementation process* *1= Management does not provide any support for the needs and development of employees during the implementation process*
12	Number Involved in Managing Implementation[14]
	4= Seven or more change agents *3= Four – Six change agents* *2= Two – Three change agents* *1= One change agent*
13	Role Description[15]
	3= Formal & Full time: This role was a formally assigned position, and was the sole responsibility of the change agent(s) *2= Informal &Part time: This role was not formally assigned, yet the change agent(s) took on this job informally in addition to their present responsibilities* *1= Formal & Part time: This role was a formally assigned position, in addition to someone's responsibilities*
14	Origin of Change Agent[16]
	5=Intra-organization Origin: Members of the implementation management team come from both within the parent or lead organization and from outside <u>both</u> the lead and parent organization (internal-external) *4=Inter-organization Origin: Members of the implementation management team come from within <u>both</u> the lead organization and the parent organization (internal-internal)* *3=External Origin of organization: The change agent originates from both outside the lead organization <u>and</u> outside the parent organization (external-org)* *2=External Origin of lead organization: The change agent originates from outside the lead organization; though still within the parent organization (external – lead)* *1= Internal Origin: The change agent originates from inside the lead organization (internal)*
15	Assignment[17]
	5= Passive Self-Appointment: Change agent(s) began to manage the implementation process because no one else would do it *4=Proactive Self-Appointment: Change agent(s) proactively volunteer to manage implementation process* *3=Appointment by Superiors: Change agent(s) are appointed by superiors to manage implementation process* *2= Appointment by Peers: Change agent(s) are appointed by peers to manage implementation process* *1= Assignment is unclear and cannot be determined in the case*

[13] Construct: "Choice and planning of implementation strategies" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[14] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[15] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[16] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[17] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)

Construct Number	Construct Label
16	Definition of the Change Agent Role[18]
	5= The role of the change agent is both well-defined and widely understood within the lead organization *4=The role of the change agent is somewhat well-defined, though not widely understood within the lead organization* *3=The role of the change agent is not present in the implementation process* *2=The role of the change agent is poorly defined and is not understood within the lead organization* *1=The role of the change agent is neither defined nor widely understood within the lead organization*
17	Ability of Change Agent(s)[19]
	5=Change Agent(s) effectively and efficiently manage the strategy implementation process; change agents are measured positively by present metrics *4=Change Agent(s) do pretty well at effectively and efficiently managing the strategy implementation process; change agents achieve some of the present metrics* *3=Change agent(s) were not part of the strategy implementation process* *2=Change agent(s) do not effectively nor efficiently manage the strategy implementation process; change agents fell short of some of the present metrics* *1=Change agent(s) neither effectively, nor efficiently, manage the strategy implementation process; they are inadequate by present metrics*
18	Job of Change Agent[20]
	3=Combination of agent roles: Change agent group is composed of both managers and non-managerial employees *2=Employees: Change agents are exclusively non-managerial employees* *1= Managers: Change agents are exclusively managers, or highest ranking employees involved in the implementation process*
19	Direction of Communication[21]
	5=Communication flows in all directions: vertically (top-down and down-up) and laterally (from within to outside lead organization) *4= Communication flows mainly vertically (top-down and down-up)* *3= Communication flows mainly vertically, but only top-down* *2= Communication flows mainly bottom-up* *1= Communication does not flow effectively at all*
20	The unit practices new and creative ways of communicating across the business unit[22].
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*

[18] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[19] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[20] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[21] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[22] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)

Construct Number	Construct Label
21	The content, timing, and targets of communication are carefully planned[23].
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*
22	Systematic evaluation exists[24]
	5=The lead organization has clear metrics for determining the progress and success of the implementation project, all those involved seem to be aware of the metrics *4=The lead organization has metrics for determining the progress and success of the implementation project, yet not everyone seems to know what those metrics are.* *3=The lead organization has ambiguous metrics for determining the progress and success of the implementation project* *2=The lead organization has no metrics for determining the progress and success of the implementation project, though those involved have a general 'sense' of how things are going* *1=Lead organization has no metrics for determining the progress and there is no consensus on the success of the implementation project*
23	Political Action[25]
	5= Change agents are not sensitive to implementation politics and are directly involved in political 'action' 4= Change agents are not sensitive to implementation politics but not directly involved in political 'action' *3= Change agents are sensitive to implementation politics but are directly involved in political 'action'* *2= Change agents are sensitive to implementation politics but not directly involved in political 'action'* *1= Cannot be determined by the case*
24	People trying to defend their personal territory or 'turf' is a major source of resistance during the implementation process[26]
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*
25	The degree of political intensity in the lead organization is directly related to the complexity and wide-reaching nature of implementation[27]
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*

[23] Construct: "Effective Management of Change" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[24] Construct: "Choice & Planning of Implementation" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[25] Construct: "Change Management & Political Factors" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[26] Construct: "Change Management & Political Factors" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)
[27] Construct: "Change Management & Political Factors" (Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999)

26	Perceptions of time[28]
	2= Time is seen as a scarce commodity that is counted in minutes, hours, days, weeks, or similar precise units, possibly seen as exchangeable with money, "time is money," discrete units of time dictate deadlines and the signalling of the next step's start *1= Time is seen as a source of uncertainty and is difficult to measure, cannot be manipulated easily, multiple different interpretations of time and deadlines, the end of one step dictates the beginning of another*
27	Temporal focus[29]
	5= Leaders are focused primarily on the long-term health of the lead organization *4= Leaders are focused mostly on the long-term health of the lead organization* *3= Leaders are focused equally on both the long-term and short-term health of the lead organization* *2= Leaders are focused mostly on the short-term health of the lead organization* *1= Leaders are focused primarily on the short-term health of the lead organization*
28	Leadership concerns[30]
	3= Implementation leaders primarily direct their energy and resources towards ides, themes, and/or developing relationships important to implementation *2= Implementation leaders split their energy and resources towards fairly equally between ides, themes, and/or developing relationships and coordinating tasks, roles, and/or delegating or following-up on responsibilities important to implementation* *1= Implementation leaders primarily direct their energy and resources towards coordinating tasks, roles, and/or delegating or following-up on responsibilities important to implementation*
29	Leader Influence[31]
	5= Implementation leaders primarily influence the attitudes and thoughts of others within the lead organization *4=Implementation leaders do influence the attitudes and thoughts but they also somewhat influence the behaviours and actions of others within the lead organization* 3= Implementation leaders influence both the attitudes and thoughts and the behaviours and actions of others within the lead organization equally *2= Implementation leaders do influence behaviours and actions but they also somewhat influence the attitudes and thoughts of others within the lead organization* *1=Implementation leaders primarily influence the behaviours and actions of others within the lead organization* *0=Implementation leaders do not noticeably influence others within the lead organization*
30	Those responsible for leading the implementation have clearly determined the direction, purpose, or vision of the business unit[32]
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*

[28] Construct: "Perceptions of Time" (Huy, 2001)
[29] Construct: "Visionary Leadership – managerial Leadership" (Howe, 2001)
[30] Construct: "Visionary Leadership – managerial Leadership" (Howe, 2001)
[31] Construct: "Visionary Leadership – managerial Leadership" (Howe, 2001)
[32] Construct: "Effective Strategic Leadership" (Ireland & Hitt, 1999)

Construct Number	Construct Label
31	Those involved in the implementation evaluate and accept the potential courses of action through a moral filter[33]
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*
32	Competitive Advantage[34]
	5= The lead organization has identified a competitive advantage and is clearly capitalizing on it *4= The lead organization has identified a competitive advantage and seems to be capitalizing on it* *3= The lead organization has identified a competitive advantage but is not capitalizing on it* *2= The lead organization has neither identified a competitive advantage, nor sought to capitalize upon it.*
33	Organizational citizens are viewed as part of, or a source of, competitive advantage[35]
	5= Agree strongly *4= Somewhat agree* *3= Neither agree nor disagree* *2=Somewhat disagree* *1= Disagree strongly* *0= Cannot be determined from the case*

[33] Construct: "Effective Strategic Leadership" (Ireland & Hitt, 1999)
[34] Construct: "Competitive Advantage" (Ireland & Hitt, 1999)
[35] Construct: "Effective Strategic Leadership" (Ireland & Hitt, 1999)

Appendix F. Results of the Pilot Study Validation Check ANOVAs

ID Number	Construct	Sum of Squares		df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Dictator of Implementation	Between Groups	0.000	1	0.000	0.000	1.000
		Within Groups	9.500	6	1.583		
		Total	9.500	7			
2	Aware of how to implement strategy	Between Groups	1.125	1	1.125	0.771	0.414
		Within Groups	8.750	6	1.458		
		Total	9.875	7			
3	Subject of implementation	Between Groups	1.125	1	1.125	9.000	0.024
		Within Groups	0.750	6	0.125		
		Total	1.875	7			
4	Guidance by procedures	Between Groups	2.012	1	2.012	1.356	0.297
		Within Groups	7.417	5	1.483		
		Total	9.429	6			
5	Impetus for change	Between Groups	3.125	1	3.125	1.596	0.253
		Within Groups	11.750	6	1.958		
		Total	14.875	7			
6	Presence of planning problems	Between Groups	2.000	1	2.000	0.774	0.413
		Within Groups	15.500	6	2.583		
		Total	17.500	7			
7	Presence of implementation problems	Between Groups	0.125	1	0.125	0.032	0.865
		Within Groups	23.750	6	3.958		
		Total	23.875	7			
8	Management style of implementation	Between Groups	1.125	1	1.125	9.000	0.024
		Within Groups	0.750	6	0.125		
		Total	1.875	7			
9	Tempo of implementation	Between Groups	0.125	1	0.125	0.429	0.537
		Within Groups	1.750	6	0.292		
		Total	1.875	7			

Appendix F. Results of the Pilot Study Validation Check ANOVAs							
ID Number	Construct	Sum of Squares		df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
10	Management of implementation	Between Groups	0.429	1	0.429	0.714	0.437
		Within Groups	3.000	5	0.600		
		Total	3.429	6			
11	Management support during implementation	Between Groups	0.429	1	0.429	0.306	0.604
		Within Groups	7.000	5	1.400		
		Total	7.429	6			
12	Number involved in implementation	Between Groups	0.500	1	0.500	0.333	0.585
		Within Groups	9.000	6	1.500		
		Total	9.500	7			
13	Role description	Between Groups	0.125	1	0.125	0.130	0.730
		Within Groups	5.750	6	0.958		
		Total	5.875	7			
14	Origin of change agents	Between Groups	1.125	1	1.125	0.310	0.598
		Within Groups	21.750	6	3.625		
		Total	22.875	7			
15	Leader assignment	Between Groups	0.298	1	0.298	1.050	0.352
		Within Groups	1.417	5	0.283		
		Total	1.714	6			
16	Definition of the change agent role	Between Groups	0.125	1	0.125	0.200	0.670
		Within Groups	3.750	6	0.625		
		Total	3.875	7			
17	Ability of change agent(s)	Between Groups	0.125	1	0.125	0.111	0.750
		Within Groups	6.750	6	1.125		
		Total	6.875	7			
18	Job of change agent	Between Groups	0.500	1	0.500	1.000	0.356
		Within Groups	3.000	6	0.500		
		Total	3.500	7			
19	Direction of communication	Between Groups	0.333	1	0.333	0.205	0.674
		Within Groups	6.500	4	1.625		
		Total	6.833	5			

Appendix F. Results of the Pilot Study Validation Check ANOVAs							
ID Number	Construct	Sum of Squares		df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
20	Practice of new and creative communication	Between Groups	0.750	1	0.750	0.444	0.541
		Within Groups	6.750	4	1.688		
		Total	7.500	5			
21	Planned content, timing, and targets of communication	Between Groups	0.000	1	0.000	0.000	1.000
		Within Groups	17.000	2	8.500		
		Total	17.000	3			
22	Systematic evaluation exists	Between Groups	0.500	1	0.500	0.545	0.488
		Within Groups	5.500	6	0.917		
		Total	6.000	7			
23	Political action	Between Groups	2.000	1	2.000	3.429	0.114
		Within Groups	3.500	6	0.583		
		Total	5.500	7			
24	Defensive behaviour during implementation	Between Groups	12.964	1	12.964	6.030	0.058
		Within Groups	10.750	5	2.150		
		Total	23.714	6			
25	Political intensity	Between Groups	8.679	1	8.679	3.403	0.124
		Within Groups	12.750	5	2.550		
		Total	21.429	6			
26	Perceptions of time	Between Groups	0.500	1	0.500	3.000	0.134
		Within Groups	1.000	6	0.167		
		Total	1.500	7			
27	Temporal focus	Between Groups	1.125	1	1.125	1.421	0.278
		Within Groups	4.750	6	0.792		
		Total	5.875	7			
28	Leadership concern	Between Groups	3.125	1	3.125	5.000	0.067
		Within Groups	3.750	6	0.625		
		Total	6.875	7			
29	Leader influence	Between Groups	2.083	1	2.083	0.565	0.494
		Within Groups	14.750	4	3.688		
		Total	16.833	5			

Appendix F. Results of the Pilot Study Validation Check ANOVAs							
ID Number	Construct	Sum of Squares		df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
30	Clear definition on of the direction, purpose, or vision	Between Groups	0.750	1	0.750	0.203	0.675
		Within Groups	14.750	4	3.688		
		Total	15.500	5			
31	Moral evaluation	Between Groups	4.800	1	4.800	7.200	0.075
		Within Groups	2.000	3	0.667		
		Total	6.800	4			
32	Competitive advantage	Between Groups	2.000	1	2.000	3.000	0.134
		Within Groups	4.000	6	0.667		
		Total	6.000	7			
33	Organizational citizens as a competitive advantage	Between Groups	4.500	1	4.500	1.588	0.254
		Within Groups	17.000	6	2.833		
		Total	21.500	7			

Appendix G. Results of the Expanded Study Validation Check ANOVAs

ID Number	Construct		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Dictator of Implementation	Between Groups	1.263	1	1.263	0.762	0.389
		Within Groups	59.710	36	1.659		
		Total	60.974	37			
2	Aware of how to implement strategy	Between Groups	0.870	1	0.870	0.618	0.437
		Within Groups	49.238	35	1.407		
		Total	50.108	36			
3	Subject of implementation	Between Groups	4.673	1	4.673	35.036	0.000
		Within Groups	4.801	36	0.133		
		Total	9.474	37			
4	Guidance by procedures	Between Groups	0.450	1	0.450	0.157	0.695
		Within Groups	97.550	34	2.869		
		Total	98.000	35			
5	Impetus for change	Between Groups	2.369	1	2.369	1.618	0.212
		Within Groups	52.710	36	1.464		
		Total	55.079	37			
6	Presence of planning problems	Between Groups	2.699	1	2.699	1.335	0.256
		Within Groups	72.801	36	2.022		
		Total	75.500	37			
7	Presence of implementation problems	Between Groups	0.003	1	0.003	0.001	0.972
		Within Groups	75.892	36	2.108		
		Total	75.895	37			
8	Management style of implementation projects	Between Groups	1.150	1	1.150	5.100	0.030
		Within Groups	8.114	36	0.225		
		Total	9.263	37			
9	Tempo of implementation	Between Groups	0.000	1	0.000	0.001	0.981
		Within Groups	19.710	36	0.548		
		Total	19.711	37			
10	Management of implementation	Between Groups	0.581	1	0.581	0.362	0.551
		Within Groups	56.176	35	1.605		
		Total	56.757	36			
11	Management support during implementation	Between Groups	0.554	1	0.554	0.585	0.450
		Within Groups	33.176	35	0.948		
		Total	33.730	36			
12	Number involved in implementation	Between Groups	4.024	1	4.024	3.780	0.060
		Within Groups	38.318	36	1.064		
		Total	42.342	37			

Appendix G. Results of the Expanded Study Validation Check ANOVAs							
ID Number	Construct	Sum of Squares		df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
13	Role description	Between Groups	0.097	1	0.097	0.102	0.751
		Within Groups	34.114	36	0.948		
		Total	34.211	37			
14	Origin of change agents	Between Groups	1.041	1	1.041	0.417	0.522
		Within Groups	89.801	36	2.494		
		Total	90.842	37			
15	Assignment	Between Groups	0.072	1	0.072	0.115	0.737
		Within Groups	22.036	35	0.630		
		Total	22.108	36			
16	Definition of the change agent role	Between Groups	0.553	1	0.553	0.152	0.699
		Within Groups	130.710	36	3.631		
		Total	131.263	37			
17	Ability of change agent(s)	Between Groups	5.606	1	5.606	3.753	0.061
		Within Groups	52.286	35	1.494		
		Total	57.892	36			
18	Job of change agent	Between Groups	0.005	1	0.005	0.007	0.935
		Within Groups	25.364	36	0.705		
		Total	25.368	37			
19	Direction of communication	Between Groups	0.050	1	0.050	0.082	0.776
		Within Groups	20.700	34	0.609		
		Total	20.750	35			
20	New and creative communication practices	Between Groups	0.026	1	0.026	0.013	0.911
		Within Groups	60.683	29	2.093		
		Total	60.710	30			
21	Planned communication	Between Groups	0.631	1	0.631	0.200	0.658
		Within Groups	85.162	27	3.154		
		Total	85.793	28			
22	Systematic evaluation exists	Between Groups	0.269	1	0.269	0.117	0.734
		Within Groups	82.705	36	2.297		
		Total	82.974	37			
23	Political action	Between Groups	0.029	1	0.029	0.017	0.896
		Within Groups	58.890	35	1.683		
		Total	58.919	36			
24	Resistence during implementation process	Between Groups	2.113	1	2.113	0.714	0.404
		Within Groups	100.638	34	2.960		
		Total	102.750	35			
25	The degree of political intensity	Between Groups	0.401	1	0.401	0.150	0.701
		Within Groups	91.238	34	2.683		
		Total	91.639	35			

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Appendix G. Results of the Expanded Study Validation Check ANOVAs							
ID Number	**Construct**	**Sum of Squares**		**df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
26	Perceptions of time	Between Groups	0.024	1	0.024	0.102	0.751
		Within Groups	8.528	36	0.237		
		Total	8.553	37			
27	Temporal focus	Between Groups	0.036	1	0.036	0.061	0.807
		Within Groups	21.438	36	0.595		
		Total	21.474	37			
28	Leadership concern	Between Groups	18.840	1	18.840	46.684	0.000
		Within Groups	14.528	36	0.404		
		Total	33.368	37			
29	Leader influence	Between Groups	25.689	1	25.689	13.244	0.001
		Within Groups	65.950	34	1.940		
		Total	91.639	35			
30	Clear determination of direction, purpose, or vision	Between Groups	5.092	1	5.092	3.441	0.073
		Within Groups	45.878	31	1.480		
		Total	50.970	32			
31	Moral evaluation of action	Between Groups	4.124	1	4.124	1.402	0.248
		Within Groups	67.636	23	2.941		
		Total	71.760	24			
32	Competitive advantage	Between Groups	0.401	1	0.401	0.289	0.594
		Within Groups	47.238	34	1.389		
		Total	47.639	35			
33	Organizational citizens as a competitive advantage	Between Groups	4.671	1	4.671	1.527	0.226
		Within Groups	94.844	31	3.059		
		Total	99.515	32			

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