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Canada

Canadian News Coverage
of the
Red Brigades

Anna-Maria Bassanese

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in
The Department
of
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ABSTRACT

Canadian News Coverage of the Red Brigades

Anna-Maria Bassanese

The present study examined the issue of international news flow and news content in the Canadian press. With the use of content analysis, 205 articles on the Red Brigades were randomly selected and analyzed in nine Canadian newspapers and one magazine. It was hypothesized that content varied according to language differences and authorship. Results suggested that authorship had a more significant impact on coverage of foreign events than linguistic variations.

Dédicace

A mes parents qui ont
cru en moi

A Manon et à toute sa
belle petite famille

A Stefano qui m'a attendu
au loin là-bas

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This study addresses the issue of international communications flow in a matter of controversy and political violence. Specifically, this study will be an analysis of news items on the Red Brigades (R.B.) published in the Canadian press. The primary technique used is content analysis.

The main purpose of this research is to examine the extent and quality of Canadian print media's coverage of complex foreign events such as war or terrorism. We believe, intercontinental relations and knowledge on other cultures and events are not primarily based on governmental exchange but most importantly on mass media exchange. With this study of news coverage on the Red Brigades, one may discover not only if international news presented to Canadians is adequate but will also understand the role journalistic newsgathering plays in the coverage of foreign events.

To evaluate news content on the R.B. an elaborate codebook has been created and can be consulted in Appendix A. The coding procedure was based principally on Holsti (1969) and Gamson's (1975) codebook whereby questions were

formulated and answers were to be found in documents. In this research only Canadian news items served as sources of information.

With this codebook (see Appendix A) the researcher systematically depicted the contents of Canadian newspapers and magazines used for this study. A profile of the Canadian press coverage of the Red Brigades was drawn and important aspects on the newsgathering process of foreign events within the Canadian print media were uncovered.

The Italian terrorist group, the Red Brigades (R.B.), was chosen as an example of terrorism and proven ideal as a case study for several reasons. First the R.B. have made the news headlines internationally assuring its presence in the Canadian print media. Their life cycle (1970-1986) also situates itself in a definite historical setting. This facilitates and permits one to study foreign coverage variations of a group that has gone through a full cycle: has grown, gained international renown in the media and has died slowly losing both power and media attention.

Secondly, the Red Brigades clearly represent a political oriented terrorist organization. Their violence was selective as they challenged both the State and the

corporate world. They furnished numerous documents to make explicit their targets and goals to the Italian media. This won them much support from the Italian population and to a certain degree succeeded in weakening the State's power.

Thirdly, the R.B. have expanded their activities from national to international terrorism. The foreign press eventually extended their coverage from a national terrorist group to international terrorism. It is also important to add that Italy was often chosen as the battling and negotiating ground for international terrorism.

As the fourth and last reason, the R.B. were politically active shortly after the October Crisis in Quebec but they remain a foreign terrorist group. The sensational impact on Canadians is far less than, for example, the F.L.Q. At the time of the R.B. then Canada and most certainly Quebec were not estranged to terrorism.

The following thesis is divided into nine chapters. Beginning with an introduction to the study in Chapter 1, it shifts in Chapter 2 to descriptive research done separately on the Red Brigades and based on scholarly material. In Chapter 3 the role of the media in relation

to terrorist violence and world communications is explored. Chapter 4 outlines the research design used for this research. Chapter 5 is a discussion of the various hypotheses tested in previous research and those to be examined in this study. Chapter 6 describes the general findings based on frequency counts of the Canadian press news coverage of the Red Brigades. Chapter 7 studies the differences between the English and French news coverage of the R.B. and Chapter 8 examines the impact of authorship on news content. The conclusion and closing remarks can be found in Chapter 9.

CHAPTER 2

THE RED BRIGADES

The main purpose of this chapter is to draw an overall picture of the Red Brigades useful both as an introduction to Italian terrorism and as a guideline for developing the procedures for content analysis. This chapter on the R.B. gives information on the Italian context in which they grew, their origins, ideology and goals, members, organization and modes of financing, targets and tactics concluding with their terrorist contacts and the future of the R.B.

Social, Political and Violent Context

Italy is a small country with a dense population of 56-57 million people. Its history is rich and its latin character is well known. During the seventies, most scholars agree that Italy lived through a severe social and political crisis. This crisis was mostly due to a weak conservative government, an inadequate civil infrastructure and a population that had lost faith in its government. Ronchey gives a good description of this Italian crisis:

...crisis of the last decade: the siege of the uprooted and marginal masses in the cities; the collective alienation that suddenly came into existence with the collapse of the public educational system; the ideologized prison revolts; the violent conflicts in the factories; the fragmentation of the Leninist ideology that is

a result of the Italian Communist party's quiet shift in policy; the stalemate among the major political parties and thus a government that has gone unchanged for 30 years; the widening gap between the available economic resources and the people's growing expectations and the opportunism of political power (Ronchey, 1978).

As Hannah Arendt (1970) said in her essay On Violence the State's powerlessness incites violence and offers opportunities to seize power. Italy's political system suffered from internal conflicts and scandals.

The Christian Democrats were losing popularity but still remained the ruling party. Since 1947 there have been 40 different cabinets but the Christian Democrats remained dominant. The Communist party's electoral support slowly increased between 1953 and 1972. Nevertheless, as a minority party the Italian Communist Party (P.C.I.) had no real power.

The most significant event generally mentioned in relation to the rise of leftist terrorist groups in Italy is the Historic Compromise, a coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Communist party, proposed by Enrico Berlinguer in 1972. Following this compromise, Communism promoted by the P.C.I. was defined by scholars and

revolutionary movements as a form of Eurocommunism or "democratic-communism". For the radicals and all leftist groups this meant a betrayal and the P.C.I. became, for most of them, a non-representative party of the communist ideology.

Based on this social and political unrest, the decade of the seventies was a violent one. The degree of violence reached its peak in the late 70s: 702 terrorist incidents in 1975, 1198 incidents in 1976 and 2128 in 1977. From 1976 to 1977 the number of incidents increased by 77.6%. Compared with 164 incidents recorded in 1968, 3000 were recorded ten years later (Alexander, 1979). It is important to mention that these violent incidents were not based on organized terrorist groups alone. They were also associated with individual actions and mass street demonstrations.

Terrorist groups flourished from both left and right wings. Cappadocia gives a list of the most important ones: "On the Right the key ones are: Young Italy, Youth Front, National Vanguard, New Order, Year Zero, Phoenix, Avenge and the Black Brigades. On the Left, the most important are Manifesto, Workers' Power, Continuous Battle, Armed Proletarian Nuclei, Front Line, Partisan Action Groups, Armed Strength for Communism and the Red Brigades" (Cappadocia,

1982). According to Padovani, 484 leftist terrorist groups have risen in twelve years (Padovani, 1982). The Red Brigades were not alone in the seventies to engage in political violence.

Origins

The Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse) surfaced in the urban context of northern Italy toward the end of 1969, early 1970s. Some authors situate the birth of this group at a congress held in Chiavari in 1969 (Padovani, 1982). Others situate it later in the 1970s (Pisano, 1985; Dobson & Payne, 1982; Allum, 1978). Whichever day, month or year the Red Brigades emerged it occurred shortly after the first serious terrorist incident in Italy. This incident set forth more than a decade of political violence in Italy.

On December 12, 1969 in Milan's Piazza Fontana a bomb was thrown into a bank killing sixteen persons. Those held responsible for this incident were terrorists from the right-wing, neo-fascist groups and some statesmen. They were imprisoned in 1979, ten years later. This Black Terror incident is sometimes proposed as the main factor for the appearance of the Red Terror in Italy (Cappadocia, 1982; Padovani, 1982).

"Black terror" is a term employed in literature on terrorism to identify right-wing terrorist groups promoting dictatorial rule. These groups generally spread fear and confusion amongst the population to reinforce the demand for social order. Their aim was to overthrow the government by a "military coup" and install a one-party regime, a philosophy in direct conflict with Red Terror.

"Red Terror" represents left-wing terrorist groups. These promulgated the idea of a communist state which would be representative of the vast majority of the population. Their aim was to force the public into revolt by a refusal of an imperialist world. These two tendencies were constantly in confrontation with one another. Yet, this does not explain the emergence of revolutionary groups whose process eventually led to terrorism.

The Red Brigades have arisen from radical social groups operating in Milan in the late 60s. One of the most important was the CPM (Metropolitan Political Collective) whose goal was to go beyond the struggles of autonomous committees present in factories and universities. Its ultimate goal was a European Revolution (Pisano, 1979). The roots of the Red Brigades are to be found in this movement. (Bertini, 1978; Pisano, 1979; Padovani, 1982; Faré et Spirito, 1982).

It is when the forms of struggle were debated that the CPM split into several other groups. A congress was held in Chiavari in the end of 1969 and a vote for "armed struggle" was forwarded by Renato Curcio, the founder of the Red Brigades. Unanimity was not reached and leftist groups such as Gruppo Gramsci, Potere Operaio (Workers' Power) or New Resistance appeared. This meant the beginning of terrorism in Italy.

Allum describes the shift towards terrorism as a decisive step taken by extraparliamentary leftist groups striving for civil war as means for class struggle. Still it is not clear if the Red Brigades were a direct consequence of the Chiavari congress. Before the final concretization of the group, many sources believe the R.B. were subsequently modeled on different group ideologies and structures. Nadia Montavani, an imprisoned brigadist states as follows:

...C'est la naissance du débat sur les formes de lutte et d'auto-défense qui amènera à la constitution des organisations autonomes. Ce sont les premiers embryons des B.R. (Faré et Spirito, 1982).

The Red Brigadists' aim, at the initial stage, was to form an active revolutionary group in Italy. They

have grown in a non-revolutionary context and were ideologically motivated and energetic. The sociology department in Trento University was often held responsible for producing radicals and revolutionaries. In fact, most first generation brigadists were sociology students from this university. Others were ex-members of the P.C.I. and various social movements.

The Red Brigades have gained international renown in the second generation. Their relationship with the media was regular and intense (anonymous, 1979). These messages meant recognition and possible popular support.

Several factors are advanced by scholars to explain the shift towards terrorism. Many analysts will mention the 1968 events as a decisive moment in time accountable for fashioning revolutionary minds (Dobson & Payne, 1982; Cappadocia, 1982; Pisano, 1979). The Red Brigades were also seen as a repercussion of the Communist Party's policies and more specifically the Historic Compromise (Murray, 1979; Zoppo, 1979; Cappadocia, 1982; Pisano, 1979). The third and least mentioned factor is the emergence of the R.B. as a direct reaction towards fascist groups such as the Movimento Sociale Italiano (Padovani, 1982; Cappadocia, 1982).

The first factor, the 1968 events, though a tempting explanation to Italian terrorism, is problematic because the authors do not demonstrate how these events directly or indirectly affected Italy and future terrorists. The 1968 events in both European and North American contexts have had a considerable effect on values but this did not necessarily pressure the youth to engage in political violence. It is true that the leaders of the Red Brigades and other terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction (R.A.F.) from Germany have been wholly engaged in these events. But other countries were also affected by these events and did not experience terrorism. The 1968 events alone are not sufficient to explain the existence of the Red Brigades.

The second factor, a repercussion of the Communist Party is also doubtful as a single cause. Other nations faced with a similar situation did not witness any growth of terrorism. At the beginning of this chapter, it was mentioned that other forms of protest have risen from the unstable political situation in Italy. The weakness of the Italian government was a good opportunity to spread the need for change. Terrorism was chosen by those who wanted immediate change.

The third and last factor is directly related to the

Piazza Fontana incident. Fascist terrorist groups were declaring open battle to the left-wing groups. Some say they tried to put the blame on the left-wing groups and, thus, create confusion to provoke a drop in popularity of the revolutionary cause. Others advanced the hypothesis that the fascist groups were preparing the public for a "military coup". This incident triggered a tension that was already in place but latent. This was the outset of a decade of political violence in Italy.

These three factors are still not sufficient to explain the birth of terrorism in Italy. It is more probably the result of various factors acting simultaneously and in a complex fashion (Pisano, 1979; Cappadocia, 1982).

Pisano, in particular, gives a long list of such factors. This list does not necessarily focus on the Red Brigades but mostly on the emergence of leftist terrorist groups in Italy. The list includes rapid technological progress, post World War II's economic boom, the centrist governments' difficulties, 20 years of dictatorial fascist rule, the desire for a Western style of life, the inefficiency of the socialist government 63-68, the 1968 cultural revolution, violence amongst unions, the center-left alliance-socialist party and the alliance between

the Christian Democrats (C.D.) and the Italian Communist Party (P.C.I.) (Pisano, 1979).

Unfortunately, Pisano did not elaborate on each factor and did not show how these could directly or indirectly affect the Italian population. The historical setting outlined by his list does help to situate the reader in regard to the Italian context but does not help to understand the author's perception of how these factors have had an impact on the generation which later became the social actors of terrorism.

These possible explanations are open for debate. Scholars have yet to reach unanimity on the reasons why terrorism emerged in Italy during the 70s.

Ideology

Class considerations were central to the Red Brigades. Most sources identified their political orientation as marxist-leninist (Fiorillo, 1979; Zoppo, 1979; Allum, 1978; Anonymous, 1979; Padovani, 1982). Pisano used a concept called "proletarian internationalism" found in R.B. documents. Most elements were also depicted in their ideology (Zoppo, 1979; Dobson & Payne, 1982).

Some authors identified one prominent ideological

element while others several. Ledeen, for instance, said that the R.B. had, as mode of reasoning, a mixture of Lenin, Che, Walid Haddad and Ulrike Meinhof (Ledeen, 1978). Fiorillo joined to marxism-leninism elements of permissivism and consumism (1979). As for Cappadocia, he simply labeled the group as "utopian nihilists" striving towards "true communism" (1982).

Both Pisano and Padovani mentioned that ideological commitment had changed between the first and second generation red brigadists. The first generation's actions were seen as solidly grounded in a marxist perspective. The second suffered from an impoverishment in intellectual and political thinking. Commitment in the second generation was towards revolution but also towards plain gratuitous violence.

The ideology of the Red Brigades has not been examined carefully by scholars. Identifying a group as marxist-leninist is not enough to understand the mode of thinking which is involved. Inferences seemed to have been based on terrorist manifestos which were offensive towards capitalism and promulgated anti-imperialism (Manderino, 1978). Could one specify the system the Red Brigades would have liked to replace the existent one with?

This does not seem to have been made clear by the Red Brigades themselves. As for marxist-leninist ideology this quote from Lenin demonstrates to some extent that he, himself, rejected terrorism as a means for revolution:

Le Congrès repousse résolument le terrorisme c'est-à-dire la pratique des assassinats politiques individuels, en tant que moyen de lutte politique au plus haut point contraire à nos buts à l'heure actuelle, détournant les forces les meilleures d'un travail d'organisation et de propagande urgent et absolument indispensable, coupant les liens des révolutionnaires eux-mêmes et parmi l'ensemble de la population les idées les plus fausses sur les tâches et les méthodes de la lutte contre le pouvoir absolu. (Lénine; Oeuvres vol. 6, p. 497).

Would their ideology lead eventually to a communist system or a form of democratic socialism? The Red Brigades promulgated generally what they were against in their campaigns and not necessarily what they were for as an alternative system to the existent one. Their ideal was to establish Communism (Dobson & Payne, 1982; Pisano, 1979) by the destruction of the bourgeois State (Cappadocia, 1982), the political system (Blackstone, 1979), the despotic State (Padovani, 1982) or the Christian Democrats (Pisano, 1979; Ledeen, 1978). Some will situate their purpose within

national grounds (Zoppo, 1979). Others identify revolution as their ultimate goal (Faré et Spirito, 1982; anonymous, 1979; Allum, 1978). Revolution or civil war as the goal, the basic strategy was to mobilize the masses and overthrow the government. But most of all, terror was the means to demonstrate the weakness of the system they wanted to destroy. The targets then became the symbols, the medium of communication the terrorists used to disrupt order and gain attention for their cause.


The members of the Red Brigades were fairly young. Most of them were in their twenties and thirties. Their class background was for some largely middle class (Murray, 1979; Allum, 1978) and for others ranged from blue-collar to middle-class (Vinci, 1979; Zoppo, 1979). The Red Brigades were highly educated, especially amongst the leaders.

Organization

The Red Brigades had a complex organization. The structure itself (see Diagram 1) was designed by Giorgio Semeria, a sociology student from Trento University and a first generation brigadist. He identified the R.B. organization as linear and pyramidal, thus, hierarchical, although, according to Allum (1978) the group was

DIAGRAM 1

Red Brigades' Organization



decentralized and homogeneous.

The upper levels of the structure as seen on Diagram 1 consisted of the strategic directorate and the executive committee. They supervised the lower stratas of the organization: fronts, columns, and brigades or cells.

The strategic directorate selected and decided upon the political objectives. It organized military campaigns. It could also modify the structure of the organization. It had financial and disciplinary power. It was the central and supreme organ of the structure and represented the whole organization. It was composed of the members of the nominated executive, members of the fronts and columns' leaders. Depending on which problems were to be discussed or solved members of other cells could also be represented. It met every six months or under exceptional circumstances.

The executive committee coordinated and applied the decisions given by the strategic directorate. It approved or disapproved the propositions forwarded by the fronts. It also examined the columns' financial assets every three months. It was seen by Padovani (1982) as the government of the organization. It was also responsible for international contacts and met permanently on special occasions such as

the Aldo Moro abduction.

The fronts offered logistical and administrative services. They were divided into three categories, according to their functions. The logistical front was responsible for the preparation of attacks, the search of military, industrial, medical and legal tools. The front for the public had to look at general questions such as relations with society, work and sympathizers. Finally, the third and last front was responsible for organizing the attacks against the State, legislature or police through information and propaganda. The fronts were responsible for the political orientation of the Red Brigades. They met every twenty days.

At the lower level, the columns were the base of the pyramid. They were relatively autonomous and they applied the decisions taken by the fronts. The members of these columns were full-time terrorists called "regulars". The leaders of each column knew two bases of operation, their own home and another member's. This was a means to protect clandestine members. Each column's directorate met every ten days. Padovani distinguished seven columns and Pisano five. Each column, according to Piancone, an imprisoned brigadist, consisted of 1500 members (Piancone, 1979).

The columns in turn had subordinates called cells or brigades. These cells consisted of part-time terrorists called "irregulars". Each cell had one to five members. Padovani distinguished two types of brigades: logistical and public. The first had to falsify documents, search for arm supplies, medical assistance and rents for "regulars". The public cells acted upon factories, police and political parties during elections.

The regular members of the Red Brigades were activists living clandestinely. The second type of members, the "irregulars", were part-time terrorists who still engaged in a normal life style. Militants for the Red Brigades could be regulars or irregulars, clandestine or not. There is no mention, by the consulted authors, of the rules which guided upward mobility within the organization. This competition for the upper stratas of the organization could have created internal conflicts amongst the Red Brigades.

Recruitment is a process seldom discussed, except that it is clear that the working class was usually welcome. Padovani (1982) mentioned that an exam determined admittance in the group. The very young were excluded and, generally, the "intellectual" type of students were not accepted. Recruitment was practiced during campaigns across universities,

factories and prisons (Pisano, 1982).

The actual number of members of this organization is unclear. Padovani said there were 1000 regulars, 3000 irregulars and 5000-6000 sympathizers. The "armed party" would then have constituted a total of 8000 to 10,000 people (Padovani, 1982). Dobson & Payne stated that the operational strength of the R.B. was around 200 and that they had the support of several thousand sympathizers. These numbers have decreased considerably after the massive arrests in the late seventies, early eighties (Dobson & Payne, 1982).

Rules were circulated in pamphlets to assure secrecy and protect the members of the organization. One was found in a hideout at 96 Via Gradoli in Rome. It was entitled "Security Rules and Work Methods" (Dobson & Payne, 1982). Pisano also said that "...security rules governed all aspects of individual and organizational behavior" (Pisano, 1985).

Communication within an organization as complex as this one was a basic necessity. Internal publications such as "Armed Struggle for Communism" circulated amongst the R.B. (Faré et Spirito, 1982). Others such as the "Contro Informazione" were identified as the voice of the Red Brigades (Bertini, 1978).

Finance

The financing of the organization was processed through illegal means. The R.B. were generally considered as autonomous, independent from outside government support or other terrorist groups. However, documents produced by the SID-intelligence services in Italy show that terrorist organizations had Soviet-Cuban and Czech support (Pisano, 1982). Domestic sources, such as extraparliamentary left-wing groups (Pisano, 1979) and Giancarlo Feltrinelli, a rich Italian publisher, (Cappadocia, 1982) have also offered some assistance to the Red Brigades.

Piancone, an imprisoned brigadist, declared that the financial sources derived from "proletarian expropriations". Bank robberies and abductions served the self-financing of the R.B. The industrial Costa, for example was worth one milliard, 500 million liras¹ as ransom money. By 1975, the Red Brigades had an annual income of one billion liras (Dobson & Payne, 1982).

Military equipment was sometimes made available from other terrorist groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) and the Red Army Faction (R.A.F.). These consisted of grenades, submachine guns, guns, pistols and bombs. The Skorpion Vz61, Beretta Model 12 and the

Walther P38 were the arms generally used by the R.B. (Dobson & Payne, 1982). Export and import agencies in Paris also specialized in the supply and distribution of weapons to terrorist groups.

As we all know, military equipment is very expensive. In Italy, in particular, the traffic of arms is important. Padovani, for example, notes that fifty percent of the arms sold by Italy to Third World countries never reached destination. This means that the remaining fifty percent were trafficked within Italy's frontiers. Sicilians have, according to Padovani, furnished the Red Brigades with arms supplies coming from Libya (Padovani, 1982). In a hideout in Rome, police found accounts proving that they had spent 20,000 dollars on arms (Dobson & Payne, 1982).

Reinvestment in real estate provided a reliable income for the organization. The "regulars" or full-time terrorists had a monthly pay and were assured of a social security system for dependents if they were killed or arrested. Peci, an imprisoned brigadist, revealed that each regular received 250,000 liras per month. Rent, legal, professional expenditures were taken care of by the organization.

Here is an example of the distribution of funds. Emilia

Libera, treasurer of the Roman column, said in 1980 that a column would receive 15 millions every year. The terrorists would receive 300 per month. The rent for 4 or 5 apartments would cost 150,000 per month. Pamphlets and clothes would cost 200,000 per month and a workshop for arms was 150,000 a month. Money was reinvested in members, cars, equipment and weapons (Padovani, 1982).

Targets and Tactics

Red Brigades' terrorist actions were specific and clear. Their targets were political figures (mostly Christian Democrats), entrepreneurs, managers, jurists, "conservative" journalists and the places (firms, executive homes, government offices) where these people operated. Their targets were selected in advance and were symbolic of what the group despised in society. They engaged in organized, selective violence. They were declared by the Red Brigades as the "enemies of the people", representatives of the imperialist State.

Most of the reported targets in academic sources are from the second generation of the red brigadists. They were far more active and dangerous than the first generation. No reliable statistics are to be found on the terrorist

activities in Italy. The Ministry of the Interior nevertheless published a report in 1979 describing the forms of violence used by the Red Brigades. The author remained anonymous because he was at the forefront of terrorism in Italy. If one looks at Table 2.1 in order of importance one notices that demonstrative damages, wounding and dynamiting were the most frequent activities used by the R.B. Homicide, robberies, aggression and kidnapping were the least practiced activities.

It is important to point out that the tactics and degrees of violence have changed over time. Pisano distinguished the different phases or periods of the group (1979). From tracts, the group shifted to property damage, kidnapping and, finally, to assassinations. They specialized in sabotage, ambush attacks, raids and abductions. The reason for this shift in tactics is usually not examined by scholars but media attention given to specific tactics could be a plausible explanation. Piero Vinci made the following remark at the United Nations in a European Convention on Terror: "I may sound cynical, but I think the Red Brigades will be destroyed not so much by police as by indifference... Knee-capping no longer makes news." (Vinci, 1979).

TABLE 2.1

Red Brigades' Terrorist Activity in Italy until January 31, 1979

Tactics	Number	Percentage
1) Demonstrative Damages	176	56.0%
2) Wounding	43	13.6%
3) Dynamiting	28	9.0%
4) Homicide	24	7.6%
5) Robberies, thefts, extortions	15	4.7%
6) Breaking, entering offices, homes	15	4.7%
7) Kidnapping (Short Term)	6	2.0%
8) Aggressions	4	1.2%
9) Kidnapping (Long Term)	2	0.6%
	---	-----
	Total:	314 100.0%
	Months of Activity:	101

Source (Anonymous: p. 159, 1979).

Usually, the strategy used during kidnappings was a mock or people's trial. They would judge their victims within what they called "people's prisons". During the first generation of the group, the victims were usually released after ransom was paid. In the second generation, the victims were always killed. The major reasons invoked for the numerous abductions exercised by the Red Brigades were self-financing, asking for the release of imprisoned comrades or pressuring the government. A good example to show this is the well-known abduction of Aldo Moro.

It is important to isolate Moro as a special case altogether. Although he was the eightieth victim (Ronchey, 1978) this spectacular coup has been the subject of a considerable number of books and articles and has received international attention from the press. It was also a turning point in the organization due to the government's response following these events. Police enforcement, special laws and anti-terrorist squads quickly paralysed the Red Brigades.

Aldo Moro, the former Prime Minister and leader of the Christian Democrats, was kidnapped in Rome on March 16, 1977. The twelve terrorists involved attacked his car and

killed his five body guards. Based on information found in a hideout in 96 Via Gradoli in Rome, the Moro kidnapping involved the cooperation of more than sixty people (Dobson & Payne, 1982) and was debated in the strategic directorate during seventeen months (Padovani, 1982).

Moro was held prisoner for 54 days, Mario Moretti was the only leader assigned to interrogate Moro during a mock trial. The Red Brigades, in exchange, were asking for the release of imprisoned terrorists. The objectives of Moro's abduction were to blackmail the government (Dobson & Payne, 1982), to cause the disintegration of the legal system (Ronchey, 1978) or to put pressure on the Italian government and its political parties (Vinci, 1979).

Gianfranco Sanguinetti (1980), in his book Del Terrorismo e Dello Stato gave a totally different account. He proposed that the State's secret services had infiltrated the terrorist organization and organized the Moro coup to win back the trust of the Italian people. Consequently, he concluded that the State itself killed the Christian Democrat politician to cause a backlash in the popular support for the Red Brigades.

The targets, up to the eighties, were all Italians. Most specialists in terrorism have identified the Red Brigades as

nationalistic, domestic and internal. It is in 1981 that the American General Dozier was kidnapped by the R.B. with the cooperation of Bulgarian activists. In 1984, the U.S. diplomat Leamon R. Hunt was also abducted.

In the 1980s, terrorist incidents decreased. This was not necessarily due to a change in tactics but to a loss in power due to the number of arrests carried out by the Italian police and special laws adopted after the Moro abduction. Pisano depicted four abductions in 1981, four raids against military installations in 1982 and the wounding of a professor in 1983. The attacks were directed eventually towards Americans. This reinforced their international links with other terrorist groups.

Contacts were made with the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (E.T.A.) but closer links formed with P.L.O., Noyaux Armés pour l'Autonomie Populaire (N.A.P.A.P.) and Action Directe. These contacts served primarily to supply the group with arms or particular assistance and their use of terrorism was a greater link than ideological motives. The P.A.F. from Germany was often said to be the closest affiliation to the Red Brigades. Padovani even mentioned that the Red Brigades had the objective of creating an international organization of terror.

As was seen in this chapter the Red Brigades existed during a definite unstable period in Italy's historical context. Scholars did attempt to grasp a logic in their origins, ideology and goals but full comprehension of terrorism has yet to be reached. Probably a multidisciplinary perspective on this social phenomenon would be more adequate. The R.B. organization was highly structured, demonstrating a full commitment to a political cause. Financing was also believed to be mostly controlled by themselves. They engaged in selective violence and modified their tactics and strategies through the years.

Since scholars have explored the R.B. to some extent it shall be of some interest to discover to what extent international news organizations and more precisely the Canadian press were informed on the R.B.

CHAPTER 3
MASS MEDIA

Mass Media and Violence

Media coverage of political violence has and still raises problematic issues. At the Conference on International Terrorism in Oklahoma, for example, a confrontation occurred between representatives of the social order (police, Federal Bureau of Intelligence) and those of the free press. The police were accusing the media of encouraging violence by giving terrorist groups too much publicity. Accusations such as "reporters are the worst terrorists" or "the press is after blood" were heard. These remarks were directed principally at "live broadcasting" which interfered with police work. The media's reply was that the public had a right to know and they were under obligation to cover these events (McEwen and Sloan, 1979; Finger, 1979).

In the context of mass media and violence, studies have focused primarily on the subsequent effects news coverage had on the public. There are two theories that are often mentioned to explain these effects. The first is the cathartic theory which states that: "...viewing violence reduces aggression in the observer because he purges himself of anger through vicarious identification..." The second is called imitative learning theory which as its name suggests is that individuals learn through example (Donner, 1976).

The media are often seen as seeking crisis and drama in terrorist coverage and social responsibility is often called upon to settle disputes between free press ideology and the maintenance of social order (Schmid & de Graff, 1982; Bassiouni, 1983; Finger, 1979; McEwen & Sloan, 1979; Martin, 1979; Mazur, 1982; Donner, 1976; Lang & Lang, 1972).

Tentative explanations of the inadequate coverage of terrorist events were forwarded by various researchers and disciplines. One of the reasons given for sensational coverage of terrorist events is the emotional impact terrorism has on reporters and journalists (Clutterbuck, 1981; Finger, 1979; McEwen & Sloan, 1979). Some then suggest that more specialists in the field of terrorism would result in more objective reporting (Raufer, 1986; Finger, 1979). Others, like Mazur, believe a concentration of specialists could lead to a concentration of knowledge (1981). Stewart (1972) believes that journalists who are closer to the phenomenon will have a better overall coverage of events because of their access to direct facts. Thus coverage of terrorism depends to a lesser or greater degree on the social distance between terrorists and journalists. It can also depend on the knowledge of terrorism that acquires from various sources.

Several authors show that the problematic issue is based

on content of news coverage:

...you see a vast amount of incidents and episodes covering terrorism and conflict but you do not get the issues, what it is about, what the consequences are going to be (Bassiouni: 193, 1983).

...the press, printed or electronic, has a way of cheapening and distorting the kind of experience we had gone through (Finger: 94, 1979).

...The press gives terrorists publicity but often omits the propaganda message that terrorists would like to see accompanying reports of their exploits, thus reducing it to crime and sabotage (Martin: 128, 1985).

News Production

Earlier media research tended to emphasize the assessment of the persuasive effects of media coverage. The agenda-setting focus, on the other hand, stresses the order in which the media places issues before the public for discussion. This distinction is aptly put by Bernard Cohen when he states that the press... may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people depending not only on their personal interests but also on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors and the publishers of the papers they read (Soderlund, Walter C: 348, 1980).

For communication to take place three elements are

needed: a sender, a channel and a receiver. Mass media are generally examined as a medium of communication or channel but one also can perceive it as a sender and not a transmitter of information. The sender can be the journalist, the editor or the press agency. The channel, such as television, radio, broadcasting, movies, books, newspapers or magazines becomes, in these circumstances, only a form of communication.

The making of news or the transmission of news goes through various processes before reaching print. Even if the news is gathered by journalists or reporters, the choice of news to be covered and the extent of coverage is mostly in the hands of the editors (Hodson, 1984). Assembling and selectivity is a necessary task in news organizations. How could it be possible to offer all the details and events occurring worldwide? Selectiveness mentioned in media research is sometimes labeled as "biased" information (Jones, 1958; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Mazur, 1981; Weimann, 1983; Finger, 1979; Bassiouni, 1983; Donner, 1976; Martin, 1985; Halloran, 1976; Cohen and Young, 1973; Clutterbuck, 1981; Henshel, 1973).

But what makes news? What calls for media attention? Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester (1974) defined the

creation of events for media attention in three distinct modes: the routine, habitual, and disruptive access. The routine access refers to press conferences given by news promoters such as prime ministers or public relations officers. Habitual access refers to those events normally covered by the news, such as sports or government. The last mode is used by the public, those who do not have access to the media. Disruptive access refers to the creation of turmoil in order to gain media attention. The disruption of social order is used extensively by terrorist groups. Disruptive access is described as follows:

They must 'make news' by somehow crashing through the ongoing arrangements of newsmaking, generating surprise, shock, or some more violent form of trouble. Thus the relatively powerless disrupt the social world to disrupt the habitual forms of event-making... This "obvious" disruption of normal functioning and its challenge to the received social world prompts the coverage of the mass media (Molotch and Lester, 1974).

Function of the Media

The operational purpose of the media is to give an account of world phenomenon occurring in the historical present. Generally the media is seen as engaging in the

transmission of facts for the use of individuals and collectivities. The quality of coverage in journalism is generally based on the capacity to situate an event in its social, political or historical context and develop a pluralistic view of the world. Pluralism is seen as one of the best approaches within the code of ethics in journalism (Davey Report, 1970; Beattie, 1976; Siegel, 1974; Zwicker, 1975; Mazur, 1981; Rice and Cooney, 1982).

Functions of the media also vary according to political regimes. Merrill depicts four different types of news coverage; authoritarian, communistic, libertarian and social responsibility. The two first types of coverage are used when the media is under governmental pressures and becomes a propaganda tool for a leader, a particular party or a definite political system. The two last types of coverage are existent in countries where the government has theoretically no right to affect media coverage of events. The media is then only under the pressure of competitiveness and is not affected by the government. In both these two last types "truth" is sought for and the professional journalist is responsible vis-à-vis society and must "...report facts accurately and in a meaningful context." (Merrill, 1983).

In democratic societies news coverage is guided by

the free press and social responsibility. In both types journalistic functions are informational and objectivity is sought for as objectivity leads theoretically to truth (Bassiouni, 1983). In the specific case of political violence or other complex issues these two types are constantly omnipresent and debatable. The free press system supposedly guarantees pluralism. Social responsibility is guided by a code of ethics whereby journalists have the responsibility to "report facts in an understanding, meaningful way to the public..." (Merrill, 1983). The public must then, in both types, not be led into false consciousness. Molotch and Lester describe well the main function of the media in democratic systems:

The typical conception of the media's role, then, at least in western, formally uncensored societies, is that the media stand as reporter-reflector-indicators of an objective reality "out there" consisting of knowably "important" events of the world... Any departure from this ideal tends to be treated as "bias" or some other pathological circumstance (Molotch and Lester, 1974).

The most excellent source found on bias in the news was Cohen and Young's reader The manufacture of News (1973). It had a list of case studies, mostly American, demonstrating the manipulative skill of the media. Another excellent

source was Mazur's article on scientific controversies. The conservative bias within the U.S. media concerning scientific controversies was due, according to Mazur, to the concentration of knowledge and sources based on a social network of journalists specialized in the domain. This case study demonstrated to some extent that the media had built and incited controversy by a selected reportage of events (Mazur, 1981). Pluralism in the media was suggested as a solution in this article.

Mass communication research has focused in the past and mostly in the last decade on the media's social process of mediation, the journalistic practice of newsgathering as the means used by media to present a "reality", a unidimensional view of the world, discordant with the factual world (Frizzel & McPhail, 1978; Mazur, 1981; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Cohen & Young, 1973; Winter & Frizzel, 1979-80). Mass communication has often been accused of exercising an overgrowing influence on ideology formation. Its power of socialization was mentioned by many others (Weimann, 1983; Halloran, 1976; Murdock & Golding, 1977; Imbert, 1982; Henshel, 1973; Schiller, 1973; Zwicker, 1975; Bassiouni, 1983; Cohen & Young, 1973; Finger, 1979; Mazur, 1982). Socialization is extremely effective when one thinks of the considerable impact mass media has acquired since

technological innovation allows most industrial societies to communicate and interchange with the world on national and international levels. Intrinsicly tied to this evergrowing modernization in mass communications is the dependency people develop vis-à-vis the media.

In Canada alone, 98% of Canadian households have one working television set, 54% have a strong daily newspaper affiliation and 78% read one or more magazines monthly. Books are less chosen by Canadians as sources of news (Kubas, 1981). This demonstrates that television and the press are the principal sources and intermediaries between people and the world. This dependency is even greater in the realm of international news.

Canadian Coverage of News

At the national level we find in Canada, the Canadian Press. This national agency serves seventy percent of the Canadian market. Thirty percent is served directly by the international and specialized press agencies. The Canadian Press subscribes to three international press agencies: Associated Press from New York and Paris, Agence France-Presse and Reuter (Gouv. du Québec, 1978).

Foreign news does not always come from press agencies. There

are also "...news agencies; special news services, syndicates, "stringers", staff correspondents of newspapers and broadcast entities" (Merrill, 1983). Yet national media, mostly for economical reasons, make full use of press agencies such as the Canadian Press.

Here is an excellent definition of a press agency:

1. Un organisme juridiquement indépendant de la presse écrite et électronique vendant de l'information d'actualité et du reportage contre rémunération aux média de masse, v.g. la Presse Canadienne.
2. Une entreprise de presse (écrite ou électronique) vendant de l'information d'actualité et du reportage contre rémunération à d'autres média de masse à condition que ceux-ci n'aient aucun lien de propriété avec la première, v.g. Los Angeles Time (Gouvernement du Québec, 1978).

In the realm of international news the journalistic process is generally dependent on international news agencies. There are five international press agencies: l'Agence France Presse, Associated Press, United Press International, Reuter and Tass. According to Merrill a world news agency is "...an organization, comprehensive in scope, which offers extensive world news coverage and large-scale distribution to subscribers in many nations

(Merrill, 1983).

According to Merrill and other researchers, international news and information is under the dominion of these international news agencies. A crisis in international communications also emerged when Third World countries called upon UNESCO to open a debate on the Western agencies' coverage of developing countries. Even if in theory these agencies' optic is to strive towards factual accounts of world events the debate has uncovered a general bias or unidimensional view of developing countries. This crisis and debate has developed into the New Information Order (Stevenson & Shaw, 1984).

Canadian Coverage of International Events

Communication studies of Canadian coverage of international events are sparse. Yet, the existent studies usually depict a basic problem in Canadian news media's coverage of foreign events; the total reliance and dependency on wiring services of news agencies to cover foreign news. In-depth coverage which would necessitate the use of other sources such as foreign correspondents, professionals or documents is generally dismissed by the media (Zwicker, 1975; Ketter & Smith, 1975; Barnard Patrick, 1975; Cuthbert, 1980; Metcalfe, 1975; Scanlon, 1968).

Some researchers will explain this lack of interest in investigative journalism and lack of diversity in Canadian news as a consequence of the growing concentration in the media. More than eighty percent of the media in Canada is within the dominion of corporations. As it was observed in the code of ethics, free press systems guarantee diversity but if this system is monopolized competitiveness does not exist anymore (Metcalf, 1975; Miller, 1977; de la Garde, 1981; Zwicker, 1975; Davey Report, 1970; Beatty, 1977; Beattie, 1976; Siegel, 1973).

Canadian news media is often criticized as engaging in corporate journalism detrimental to a balanced coverage due to the intention of making news a profitable business and not an educational institution. Other researchers, nevertheless, also believe the content of news is mostly related to editorial decisions or journalists' sense of professionalism. Diversity, pluralism is here seen as correlated not only with editorial decisions but also with structural incentives. It is then important to recall that 66% of Canadians are interested in international news coverage and they expect newspapers to have more in-depth coverage than television or radio (Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981). It is thus necessary to examine the relevance between the journalistic process of news-gathering

in the Canadian media and the quality of news in order to evaluate news stories offered to the Canadian public. This research serves this purpose.

CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN

This study seeks to examine the coverage of news stories on the Red Brigades published in a selection of Canadian newspapers and magazines. Content analysis is the method used to uncover the media attention the Red Brigades received in the Canadian press.

Sample & Data-gathering

Nine Canadian newspapers and one Canadian magazine were selected for close examination. These media are seen as "quality" newspapers since they are both general and objective in intent and are not considered by the Canadian public as sensational as, for example, some tabloids. The sample is composed of 205 articles. News items were generally chosen at random from the Canadian News Index, Periodex and Radar. The period under study includes the year of the emergence of the Red Brigades (1969) to 1988. In Table 4.1 one can examine the sample distribution.

The sample is not exhaustive. Le Devoir and the Globe & Mail had both a considerable number of articles on the Moro incident. In order to reduce the number on the Moro case, some articles were randomly selected for analysis. Yet all other articles in the indexes, excluding Le Devoir and

Table 4.1

Sample Distribution

Newspapers	Numbers	Percentage
Le Devoir	80	39.0
Globe & Mail	56	27.3
La Presse	28	13.7
Toronto Star	12	5.9
Maclean's	7	3.4
The Gazette	7	3.4
Vancouver Sun	6	2.9
Montreal Star	4	2.0
Winnipeg Free Press	3	1.5
Le Soleil	2	1.0
Total =	205	100.0

G & M were taken into account. 205 articles were considered sufficient on which to base our findings. The procedure of selectivity was also based on having an equal number of both French and English articles assuming the English news items would exceed the French ones. The contrary occurred since Le Devoir outnumbered all other media in the intensity of news coverage on the Red Brigades.

Problematical instances also emerged at the data-gathering phase. First the Globe & Mail is considered, in Canada, the only national newspaper and the French media is highly concentrated only in the Eastern part of the country. Geographical distribution of news media could then not be examined. Second it did not seem wise to rely heavily on the indexes in order to have a list of all the articles on the R.B. published in Canada. A more plausible and secure means to get an exhaustive list of articles would have been to contact directly all news agencies and newspapers for them to send us their list of publications. Late into the coding process some articles were discovered by mere chance and these had not been indexed.

Coding procedure

A coding manual has been formulated to find out the various aspects of the Red Brigades that were being stressed and dismissed, the articles' space profile and the sources

of information used in international news coverage. The coding procedure was designed as a questionnaire whereby the responses were to be found within news items. It was divided into three sections: 1) setting of the article; 2) news' content; and 3) sources of information.

Variables and categories of the codebook, found in Appendix A, are inspired by a literature review on the Red Brigades done prior to the coding stage and summarized in Chapter 1. The reasons for doing this study were both to have a more complete account of the Red Brigades and second to provide a guideline to construct a coding manual (See Appendix A). It also served as a reference point at the level of analysis. The construct of the codebook also relied on news items on terrorism in general.

Setting of the article

This section of the coding manual was developed to examine the mode of presentation of articles. All items were measured in terms of time, space and location. The quantity and intensity, number of words in an article, its textual and visual importance, were all taken into account in order to have an adequate space profile of the news items. The setting indicated, to a certain degree,

the importance media gave to the event in relation to space allocation. The categories can be consulted in the codebook found in Appendix A.

News' Content

This section is where one discovers what has and has not been gathered as information on the Red Brigades in the Canadian press. It is significant, to some extent, of the agenda-setting function of the media. It allowed one to answer the following questions. What would a Canadian citizen know of the Red Brigades if one limited their inquiry to printed news? And, does the Canadian public have all the elements necessary to understand foreign terrorist events?

Sources of information

Sources of information and authorship are of prime importance in media research done on international news flow. Taking this into consideration, this section was formulated in the assumption that the type of source used to cover events correlates directly with the type of information gathered. For example, if a reporter relied principally on policy alone as a source of information then he or she would most probably have only one point of view on terrorist events.

This section is also interested in the encoding process used by the Canadian news. It gives clues on the type of information newspapers rely on to cover terrorist events in a foreign country. Only at the level of analysis will it be possible to see if there is, indeed, a relationship between the number or type of source and news content.

Method of analysis

With the aid of the SPSS-X program, frequency counts and contingency tables were used to explore the trends and various relationships in the Canadian news world. The unit of analysis for this research was the article.

At the level of frequency counts one can see the characteristics of the text and the general trends in Canadian news coverage. It remains at a descriptive level but allows us to present a clear picture of what was and was not in Canadian news with respect to the R.B.

At the level of contingency tables one can explore the causes or antecedents of certain messages. It was at this phase of the study that relationships were tested to discover what affected the content of news.

The test of significance for the various bivariate relationships examined in this research was based on chi square. Although percentages give a clear idea of the relationships, the uncertainty coefficient and Cramer's V. were chosen as measures of association. Cramer's V was chosen based on the use of nominal variables and the great quantity of non-square and 2X2 tables. The uncertainty coefficient was selected because its calculation is based not on the mode but on the whole distribution. Many empty cells were found in the resulting tabulations thus a measure such as lambda would not have been appropriate. These coefficients are indicative of the strength and nature of relationships between variables and are found at the bottom of each significant bivariate relationship.

In the following chapters, one can examine English and French coverage of the Red Brigades. Relationships such as pluralism versus content or news agencies versus content are studied in order to see if whether or not one can infer on the journalistic process in international news flow in Canada based on content analysis.

CHAPTER 5
HYPOTHESES

After the literature review of both the Red Brigades and the Mass Media several hypotheses can be formulated. News coverage of foreign terrorism is based on many possible factors. It is important to remember that the dependent variable under study is the Canadian print media and not the Red Brigades. The Red Brigades, once again, were used in this content analysis as an example of foreign political violence.

Hypotheses

The most frequent hypothesis found in the theoretical works on media was that news organizations cover events to preserve the status quo. This means that any violence which disrupts social order is condemned. To test this, one could compare conservative, liberal and even radical newspapers in the Canadian context. For example one could make the comparison between The Globe and Mail (conservative) and Le Devoir (liberal). Emphasis in conservative newspapers would be on the detrimental effects of violence. In more liberal newspapers reformism would be seen as more plausible than terrorism.

A second hypothesis advanced in the literature was that news organizations feed on violence to make news a dramatic event. The focus of the news is then not to inform but to have an emotional impact on the public. The focus of the news would be in this case on the targets and more precisely on the details of the crime. If a newspaper spends

three to four paragraphs only on the description of the victims, this could be seen as an attempt to create sensationalism. A comparison could be made between different kinds of newspapers. A quality newspaper is expected to be more informative than a "popular" newspaper. The Gazette would then be more sensational than the Globe and Mail.

It is assumed that newspapers reflect public opinion. Yet this is hard to support if one does not directly go to the public itself and compare their opinions with the newspapers they read. Assuming that francophones and anglophones are two distinct cultures, public opinion on terrorism could differ. Let us recall that in Quebec the FLQ were francophones, a fact that could affect coverage on terrorism by both francophone and anglophone newspapers. A comparison of francophone and anglophone newspapers could be tested.

In Canada, terrorism was present in the late sixties and early seventies in the Province of Quebec. Arthur Siegel (1974) has done an interesting thesis on newspaper coverage of the F.L.Q. crisis. Siegel examined the contents of newspapers from five perspectives. 1) space profile, 2) themes of news coverage, 3) geographic sources, 4) personality mention and 5) editorials. Siegel's findings were most significant since he found strong variations between French and English coverage, small and large circulation papers, Quebec and Canadian newspapers. For

example, French dailies had a better coverage of the F.L.Q. events than English dailies because they made use of multiple sources (professors, news agencies, F.L.Q. communiqués etc.) and also because the terrorist group primarily addressed the French press. Other studies of foreign events have also depicted net differences between French and English news coverage (de la Garde, 1982; Cuthbert, 1980). How would news coverage of the R.B., a foreign terrorist group, differ in relation to linguistic affiliation?

Social distance was seen as a significant determinant of the quality of coverage. In past research, as Stewart (1972) suggests, the closer one is or has been to terrorism the better the coverage. Thus Quebec dailies, due to their past experiences with the F.L.Q. would have acquired a better knowledge of terrorism than Canadian dailies outside Quebec resulting in a better coverage of terrorist events in a foreign context. The opposite could also be verified. The closer one is to terrorism, the more sensational and subjective one becomes due to the emotional impact terrorism has upon the media (Miller, 1977; Clutterbuck, 1980).

News media as seen in the chapter on mass media, use press agencies for foreign news. It could be advanced that

newspapers which use correspondents will have a more extensive and investigative report on the Red Brigades than those which use press agencies. Correspondents may also be more directly involved with the event and thus be more sensational than informative. Padovani for example was a correspondent for Le Nouvel Observateur for years in Italy and her judgment of terrorism can be detected in most of her articles.

Variations of sources could be examined carefully. It was found that the number and variety of sources affects the quality of news. In Siegel's thesis French dailies were found to have a balanced and in-depth coverage of the F.L.Q. due to the various sources they relied on. It could then be possible to predict that French dailies will have a better coverage of the Red Brigades because they make use of various, selected sources even at an international level.

Variations in time could also be examined. For example how were the articles on the Red Brigades before and after the Aldo Moro crisis? The hypothesis advanced would be that the articles before the crisis were scarce, having little space allocation and no in-depth coverage. Crisis in news, which gain access to international media attention,

may stimulate more in-depth coverage on phenomena such as terrorism.

Other hypotheses could have been formulated but in this particular study data is not available to study these hypotheses. For example one could have compared newspaper articles with magazine articles assuming that the element of time affects the quality of coverage. Not enough magazine articles were found in Canadian magazines to make this comparison possible. Another hypothesis would have been that corporate owned newspapers have a unidimensional view of terrorism due to their opposition to terrorism which defies corporate ideology. Comparison between corporate owned and independent newspapers would have been a way of examining this hypothesis but in Canada there is a lack of both quantity of news and independent newspapers.

In chapters 7 and 8 two hypotheses will be tested. The first relationship will be between language and content. It is believed that French and English news coverage of the Red Brigades will differ due to cultural variations and the impact FLQ events had on both language groups.

The second relationship under study will be between authorship and news content. Variations of coverage are

also believed to be contingent on who or what agency covered the events. Hypothetically journalists and correspondents were thought to engage in more in-depth coverage of international events than news agencies whose motive is to remain brief and factual.

Other comparisons and variations could have been done but it was chosen to test the two basic hypotheses outlined above. In chapters 7 and 8 these are examined in detail.

CHAPTER 6

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (FREQUENCIES)

Since the purpose of this research is to verify the content of news stories on the Red Brigades in the Canadian Press it is important, prior to a more elaborate analysis, to outline the general trends in the journalistic coverage of the R.B. events. This chapter will serve this purpose and will be divided into three distinct sections according to the coding manual (see Appendix A).

First Section: Setting

The sample used for this research includes nine Canadian newspapers and one magazine. Of 205 articles, Le Devoir published 39%; the Globe and Mail 27%; La Presse, 14%; the Toronto Star 6%; the Gazette and Maclean's respectively 3.5%; the Vancouver Sun 3%; the Montreal Star 2%; and the Winnipeg Free Press and Le Soleil respectively only 1%.

Much more variety was found within the English press since the French press is principally concentrated in the Eastern provinces. Yet it is clear that Le Devoir outnumbered even the Globe and Mail in the quantity of articles written on the Red Brigades. Consequently 54% of the articles were written in the French language and 46% in English.

The geographical distribution of the articles is also related to the language issue. All of the French articles were issued in Quebec. Thus, Quebec had 55% of the total excluding the Globe & Mail. The only media considered as

national were the Globe and Mail and Maclean's representing 30% of the sample. Significantly Ontario and the Western provinces had a very low percentage in the publication of articles on the R.B. varying from 5 to 7%. Again this excludes the two national media.

Generally, the articles on the Red Brigades were placed in the international news section (64%). Yet a significant number (30%) did find their place in important sections (front page, editorial page) considering the non-Canadian content of these events.

Seventy percent of the articles were situated at the top and middle sections of the pages (54% at the top and 16% in the middle). The remaining 30% was at the bottom of the page.

With respect to space allocation, 58% of the articles occupied less than one-fourth of a page, 31% one-fourth of a page or a bit more and only 6% have half a page, 3% one page and 2% more than one page. In all of these cases 36% had photos or designs.

Most of the articles (40%) were published in 1978, considered as the peak year in the Red Brigades' activities: the year Aldo Moro was abducted and killed. Between 1978 and 1981, only 14% of the articles were published. Yet a re-emergence occurred in 1981-82 (31%) when General Dozier was kidnapped and freed by Italian's special anti-terrorist squads. Only 7% of the articles were published before 1978 and 8% after 1982.

Second Section: News Content

The articles' titles were generally identified as factual (55). Some 37% were considered as moderately sensational, meaning that a certain tone or interpretative approach was implicit in the title (see Appendix B). Only 7% were identified as sensational.

Emergence of the R.B.

More than 80% of all Canadian news stories did not mention when, where, how or why the Red Brigades emerged. The variation amongst these four variables varied from 83 to 97%.

The R.B. ideology was identified as leftist in 31% of all cases. Only 7% defined them as marxist-leninist. Thus fifty-nine percent of the articles did not mention the R.B. ideology.

Goals and Motives

Of the 205 articles, 64% did not mention that the R.B. had an ultimate goal. Sixteen percent said the R.B. wanted to overthrow or hit the State, 6% said they wanted revolution and 5% civil war. Communism as an alternative system to the existent one was rarely defined as a goal (94%). Only 5% of the news stories said that a new communist system was desired by the R.B. in Italy.

The motives forwarded for terrorist activities without

necessarily considering the ultimate goal of the Red Brigades varied from pressuring, destabilizing the State (28%) to destroying the servants of capitalism and imperialism (12%). Only 3% of the articles said the motive was to demonstrate the tyranny of the State or for financial support. Forty-five percent did not mention any motive for engaging in terrorism.

Organization

Only 25% mentioned some aspect or other of the infrastructure and operations of the R.B. organization. Very little information was given on the financial resources of the R.B.. Ninety percent of the articles did not address this issue.

The strategy used by the R.B. and identified in the news were in order of priority: use of tension (21.5%), people's trial (16%) and selective violence (10%). Fifty-two percent did not mention any special strategy in use by the R.B. terrorist group. The change in tactics in time, from the emergency of the Red Brigades to the present, was not addressed in 87% of the total cases.

News stories have also generally not distinguished various generations in Red Brigades. Ninety-three percent did not ever mention a change in members or generations. Only 7% did. Since most of the articles were

written after 1977 the second generation was already existent. The first generation was dissipated in 1975 with Renato Curcio's arrest and Maria Cagol's death.

One or more aspects of the Red Brigades' members were present in 52% of the news stories. In most of these it was the founder of the Red Brigades, Renato Curcio, who was considered. In order of importance 40% mentioned the role of members, 28% their age, 26% their studies or profession, 19.5% their relations with other members, 10% their psychological state, 6% their class background, 5% their place of birth or origin and 4% mention some aspect of their families. Only 11% of the cases wrote on the thinkers of terrorism such as Toni Negri and only 20% addressed the issue of the future of terrorism.

The Red Brigades were labeled mostly as the Red Brigades (96%). Fifty-seven percent named them as terrorists, 42% as murderers or outlaws, 26% as guerrillas, 17% as extremists and only 5% as revolutionaries. Thirty-three percent were identified differently from the labels above but these implied political connotations.

Targets and Tactics

The Red Brigades' targets were often indicated in

news stories (97%). By order of priority the targets considered as newsworthy were Aldo Moro (40%), military personnel (18%), jurists (7%), political figures (5%), professors (2.5%) and journalists (1.5%). Other targets aside from those mentioned above represented 20% of the sample. In most stories (57%), previous victims were reported and 43% did give a description in the way they were wounded or killed by the R.B.

Killing and Kidnapping were the tactics considered to be worthwhile and newsworthy at the international level. Forty-percent mentioned killing and 36% kidnapping as the Red Brigades tactics. This did not mean the R.B. used only these tactics but it appears as though the international news world considered only these to be worthwhile printing.

Other Contacts - Violent Context

Generally the Red Brigades were considered autonomous or isolated from other terrorist groups. Eighty-six percent of the cases did not mention links between the R.B. and other Italian terrorist groups. In effect, only 27% of the cases indicated terrorist activities other than the Red Brigades. Nineteen percent mentioned other non-Italian terrorist groups but seldomly have they

affirmed a link with a specific group. If so the Red Army Faction (R.A.F.) was the most frequently mentioned.

Social and Political Context

The social context was practically ignored by the Canadian media. Only 13% of the articles addressed the issue of the economic crisis or social unrest due to the economic situation. Social unrest due to terrorism appeared in 29% of the cases. Public opinion, when mentioned, was generally represented to be negative but unfortunately no variable has been formulated to measure this.

The political context in Italy was addressed in 41% of the cases. Fifty-nine percent of the articles did not talk of the governing parties in Italy. Twenty-three percent mentioned the State's unrest due to terrorism, 4% the Historic Compromise, 5% mentioned corruption and scandals within the government and another 5% mentioned the stagnation and inadequacy of Italy's government.

The State's reaction to terrorism and most precisely the Red Brigades was considered as important to the Canadian print media. Eighty percent of the cases have included the State's action and reaction to the R.B.

events. Twenty-five percent mentioned police intervention, 20% special laws or legal means, 16% a refusal to negotiate with the R.B., 10% political discussions and 6% the use of special squads to overcome the problem of terrorism. Only 19.5% did not give a clue regarding how the State responds to terrorist events.

Focus

Articles focused on a great variety of subjects. Most concentrated on events in general (67%), people (56%), terrorist events (30%), arrests (26%) and State's context (24%). Less coverage was made on Italy's violent context (16%), people's reactions (15), social problems (14%), consequences of terrorism (11%), political terrorism (9%) victims (4%) and the cause of terrorism (1%).

(2)

Third Section: Authorship

Authorship was usually indicated in Canadian print media (97%). Significantly 74% of the news stories based their news on one source, 18% on two and 4% on three or more. Few have used correspondants (29%). News agencies were the primary sources in Canadian international news coverage of the Red Brigades. By order of importance,

the news agencies in use by the Canadian press for coverage of the Red Brigades were as follows: Reuter (42%), AFP (31%), American Wire Services (18.5%) and the Canadian Press (4%).

Most articles were classified as news items (88%). Only 26% were classified as commentaries. Eight percent of them were editorials. The articles usually proceeded chronologically (71%) and 42% have created a certain atmosphere at the beginning or end of the article (see Appendix B). Only 18% engaged in analysis of the Red Brigades phenomena.

Within the content of the articles the sources of information were usually based on interviews and comments (86%) and not on written documentation. Thirty percent of the articles made use of other news items. 22% used the Italian press, 15% referred to documentary sources, 10% to government documents and only 8% made use of scholarly information.

Most articles relied on comments to build up news. Forty-nine percent of these were terrorists comments, 42% police information, 42% political leaders' opinions on events, 31% professionals' ideas and opinions and 28% of these interviews derived basically from other important public figures (international statesmen, pope). Only 12% of the comments were from victims, 11% from

citizens and 4% from relatives and friends of victims.

Generally the five W's (what, when, where, who, why) (see Appendix B) were answered in the articles as the journalistic practice demands. Only the 5th "W", that is, why events occurred had the lowest percentage with 65% of the cases. Articles rarely offered different perspectives on terrorism (17%). Few gave a global picture of the terrorist situation in Italy (12%) and a few (15%) presented the process and elements considered necessary to understand the phenomena of terrorism in Italy. Only four percent suggested directly or indirectly solutions to terrorism.

Findings

To summarize the findings disclosed in this chapter we can say that most articles were published in Le Devoir and the Globe & Mail, pluralistic views on the R.B. were most likely to be found in the English press and that the Canadian press primarily focused their attention on the R.B. in 1978, 1981 and 1982.

In general news stories mentioned the founder of the R.B., Ranato Curcio, and dedicated much information on their targets and tactics. The State's reaction to the R.B. was also very important.

Nonetheless a great deal of information on the Red Brigades was lacking. The emergency of the group, their motives and organization were not part of news stories. Their strategies, evolution, contextual setting and external links with other groups also did not filter into news' content.

At the newsgathering process most articles were identified as news items. Most stories were written by one author and usually these were news agencies. The use of interviews and comments was extensive but few articles were considered as truly informative of the R.B. events.

This chapter served mainly to draw a general picture of the Canadian news content on the Red Brigades. It has not explained the reasons for certain gaps in information but has identified where news media focused their attention on and where information lacked. In the following chapters this research will attempt in exploring the possible causes for these gaps considering the various hypotheses advanced earlier.

CHAPTER 7

THE IMPACT OF LANGUAGE ON NEWS COVERAGE

This chapter will examine the impact of language on international news coverage of the Red Brigades in the Canadian press. Language, here, is hypothesized as being the reflection of a specific culture and mode of thinking. In the Canadian context it is presumed that coverage of the R.B. varies according to the linguistic group of the newspaper or magazine. This relationship between language and news content is based also on the fact that both language groups in Canada have lived through the experience of the F.L.Q. events and thus can relate to terrorism in their own particular way (Siegel; 1974). Internal conflicts lived in the past could affect coverage of other similar activities abroad.

Distribution

This study selected nine quality newspapers and one magazine in which seven are published in English and three in French. Of the 204 articles used in this chapter, 110 were written in French and 94 in English. The Italian terrorist events were covered extensively by Le Devoir in the French sector and the Globe and Mail in the English sector. Most of the French newspapers were concentrated in the Eastern provinces and the English press extended across Canada. However, linguistic diversity is

present in Quebec due to the multicultural and linguistic character of its population which consequently creates a more pluralistic journalistic world, more specifically in the French sector. One just needs to look at the number of newspapers of both languages in circulation in Quebec and more precisely in Montreal.

Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show that most articles for each language group were written in 1978 and in the month of May. Moro was abducted and killed in that period and caught news attention internationally. Yet the French press focused primarily on this incident (46.4%) whereas the English press also had more coverage in the years 1981 and 1982. This was the period when General Dozier was kidnapped in Rome. Nonetheless there was more continuity within the French news than the English news. For example, no English articles were written on the R.B. in 1984, 1986 and 1988.

Setting

Similarly both French and English articles on the R.B. were generally placed on the top half of the page. Slightly more French articles were situated on the top right of the page and in the middle for English news. Both language groups set their articles in a prominent position for the reader to see.

Table 7.1

Distribution of French and English news stories by year

	French	English
1974	.9 %	0.0 %
1975	1.8	0.0
1977	4.5	5.3
1978	46.4	33.0
1979	10.0	4.3
1980	0.0	13.8
1981	11.8	22.3
1982	13.6	14.9
1983	.9	2.1
1984	1.8	0.0
1985	.9	1.1
1986	2.7	0.0
1987	1.8	3.2
1988	2.7	0.0
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0014	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .08	
Cramer's V	= .40	

Table 7.2

Distribution of French and English news stories by month

	French	English
January	13.6 %	20.2 %
February	5.5	6.4
March	20.0	14.9
April	19.1	11.7
May	25.5	21.3
June	1.8	5.3
July	4.5	0.0
August	0.0	4.3
September	0.0	2.1
October	.9	4.3
November	4.5	4.3
December	4.5	5.3
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0486	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .04	
Cramer's V	= .31	

However, French articles dedicated more important sections (front page, editorial) to R.B. news.

The French press devoted more articles, more text in general and thus gave more importance quantitatively to the R.B. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show that French news had slightly more text (no. of words) than English news in general. English news gave more visual importance to events than French. Slightly more English articles filled 50 to 75% of the space allocated for the events to pictures while French articles usually reserved 25% of the space to pictures.

Content

Both French and English articles' titles had a tendency to be factual. From 52 to 58% of each group produced factual titles. French titles were inclined towards moderately sensational and English outright sensational as is seen in Table 7.5 (See Appendix B, p. 215).

A high percentage (78 to 86%) of both French and English articles never mentioned any aspect whatsoever on the emergence of the terrorist group. More English items did mention the date of birth and more particularly 1969 and

Table 7.3

Distribution of French and English news stories by space allocation

	French	English
Less than $\frac{1}{4}$ page	53.6 %	62.8 %
$\frac{1}{4}$ of a page	23.6	10.6
More than $\frac{1}{4}$ page	14.5	11.7
Half a page	7.3	5.3
One page	.9	5.3
More than one page	0.0	4.3
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
$P (X^2)$	= .0142	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .04	
Cramer's V	= .26	

Table 7.4

Distribution of French and English news stories by length of text

	French	English
50-70 words	.9 %	1.1 %
100-175 words	12.7	4.3
250-275 words	12.7	19.1
350-400 words	19.1	33.0
500-600 words	26.4	14.9
750-800 words	9.1	9.6
900-1000 words	9.1	5.3
+ 1000 words	10.0	12.8
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0548	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .03	
Cramer's V	= .26	

Table 7.5

Distribution of French and English news stories by type of title

	French	English
Factual	58.2 %	52.1 %
Moderately Sensational	40.0	34.0
Sensational	1.8	13.8
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (X^2)	= .0046	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .04	
Cramer's V	= .23	

Table 7.6

Distribution of French and English news stories by year of R.B. emergence

	French	English
not mentioned	86.4 %	78.7 %
1969	2.7	9.6
1970	8.2	4.3
+ 1970	2.7	7.4
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.6	46.1 = 100.0
P (X^2)	= .0476	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .03	
Cramer's V	= .20	

1971. French articles indicated that 1970 was the most probable date of origin as can be observed in Table 7.6. Less than ten percent of both groups made an attempt to determine in which geographical context they emerged or how it occurred. Correspondingly both English and French articles had identified the consequences of the 1968 events as the most plausible reason for the emergence of the Red Brigades.

Ideology-goal

In comparison to French news items, twenty percent more English news items identified the Red Brigades' ideology. Sixty-eight percent of all French articles did not mention ideology compared to 49% of English articles as seen in Tables 7.7. In both linguistic groups "leftist" was the derogatory term mostly used to designate their ideology. Forty-one percent of all English news labeled the Red Brigades as leftists compared to 21% of all French news. Only 5 to 7% of both groups called the R.B. marxist.

The principal goals forwarded by the English press and by order of importance was to Overthrow the State, Civil War, Revolution, Establish Communism and least of all to demonstrate the weaknesses of the State. The French

Table 7.7

Distribution of French and English news stories by R.B. ideology

	French	English
not mentioned	68.2 %	48.9 %
leftist	21.8	41.5
marxism-leninism	5.5	7.4
other	4.5	2.1
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0135	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .03	
Cramer's V	= .23	

priority went in this order: Overthrow the State, Revolution and Civil War. The establishment of Communism as a goal for the English remained at the domestic level but for the French it went beyond the Italian frontiers. Some French-written news items have said Communism, according to the R.B., was to be spread across Europe.

French and English news gave different reasons for engaging in R.B. terrorist activities. In Table 7.8 one can see that both stated that the main reason was to put pressure on the State and secondly to destroy the servants of Capitalism. The French suggested as the third reason, that the R.B. wanted to demonstrate the tyranny of the State, finance themselves and create disorder. As for the English they were more likely to say that the R.B. would create disorder before demonstrating the tyranny of the State. Financial reasons for the English press has never been reported as a reason to engage in terrorist activities.

It is difficult to see if most reasons for terrorist activities were transmitted to both English and French newspapers in Canada by international news agencies and correspondents. It is also possible that at the selective phase in the news process, the English press would most likely report news in which the R.B. created disorder and the French in which terrorism was in use to demonstrate

Table 7.8

Distribution of French and English news stories
by reasons for terrorist activities

	French	English
not mentioned	47.3 %	43.6 %
pressure on State	24.5	31.9
destruction of servants of capitalism	15.5	7.4
demonstrate tyranny of the State	5.5	1.1
other	5.5	9.6
create disorder	.9	6.4
financial support	.9	0.0
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (X ²)	= .0400	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .03	
Cramer's V	= .25	

the tyranny of the State or other. The order of importance of certain elements, according to the language group, can reflect the news value given to these factors.

Thinkers and Members

Who were the thinkers or minds behind the Red Brigades? Of all the articles examined 87% did not address this issue. However, the members of the R.B. were discussed in various ways. The English gave significantly more information on class background and psychological traits as shown in Table 7.9. They also slightly covered more on origins, family and studies or profession. French put more emphasis on members' roles in the organization and their relations with one another. English news concentrated on the individual, psychological aspects of the R.B. The French focused more on the social and organizational features of the members. In both groups 93% never mentioned a change in generations within the twelve year life cycle of the Red Brigades.

French and English newspapers did not differ significantly in the way the R.B. were named except when they were labeled "terrorists" or "guerrillas". In Table 7.10 one can see that 71% of all English news items named the Red Brigades

Table 7.9

Distribution of French and English news stories
by R.B. characteristics

	French	English
Role in the Group	43.6 %	36.2 %
Age	28.2	28.7
Studies-profession	23.6	28.7
Relations-Members	23.6	14.9
Psychology*	5.5	14.9
Birthplace	2.7	8.5
Family	1.8	7.4
Class Background*	.9	11.7
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0

* = $P (X^2) < .05$

Table 7.9 has one independent variable (language) and eight dependent variables. Significant bivariate relationships are indicated with an asterisk (*). For example, we can read for the first content variable (role in the group) that 43.6% of all French news items mentioned the role of the R.B. in the group and 56.4% did not.

Table 7.10

Distribution of French and English news stories
by given names to R.B.

	French	English
Red Brigades	93.6 %	98.9 %
terrorists*	44.5	71.3
murderers	39.1	46.8
other	32.7	31.9
extremists	18.2	14.9
guerrillas*	6.4	50.0
revolutionaries	2.7	7.4
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0

* = $P (X^2) < .05$

Table 7.10. has one independent variable (language) and seven dependent variables. The reading of the table is the same as table 7.9.

"terrorists" compared to 44.5% for the French press. One can also notice that "guerrilla" was hardly ever used in French articles. Only 6.4% used this term in French news stories in comparison to 50% for English news. It is clear nonetheless that the English press labeled them in a more diversified fashion than the French press.

Organization and Finance

As seen in Table 7.11, 74 to 77% of both English and French news stories did not inform the public about the R.B. organization. Slightly more French news mentioned elements of their organization and when this was so most dealt with operations, infrastructure and members' roles. However, they never made mention of the number of members involved in terrorism. English news focused principally on the quantity of members, infrastructure, operations and rules of conduct.

In 86% of all cases, funding for the Red Brigades was not mentioned. Slightly more English news items did address this issue in general and more particularly identified illegal means and assistance from foreign nations as the funding sources. Only one French article advanced the possibility that funding came from other terrorist groups.

Table 7.11

Distribution of French and English news stories
by R.B. organization's characteristics

	French	English
not mentioned	74.5 %	77.7 %
operations	11.8	2.1
infrastructure	7.3	4.3
role-members	2.7	0.0
other	1.8	6.4
recruitment	.9	2.1
rules of conduct	.9	1.1
no. of members	0.0	6.4
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (X^2)	= .0053	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .07	
Cramer's V	= .31	

More English news said the R.B. controlled the funds and a low percentage of both groups said other governments held the reigns of finance.

More than 90% did not say anything on the arms supply for the Red Brigades. In the remaining ten percent a greater quantity and variety of answers could be found in the English press. The French press outnumbered the English only when it mentioned that other terrorist groups assisted in furnishing the R.B. in arms.

Targets and Tactics

The French press reported more news when the targets were Aldo Moro, political figures, managers and journalists in comparison to English news. The English press outnumbered the French when the targets were military personnel, jurists, professors or other (e.g. citizens, policemen, prison guards).

The English press also mentioned previous victims more frequently and gave longer descriptions of how the targets were hit by the Red Brigades. French news focused generally on the chief events such as Moro or Dozier but English covered other victims of terrorism as well.

R.B. tactics were reported in greater number by the English media than the French. French news were nonetheless far more diverse since it mentioned also knee-capping and bombing as means used by the terrorists to intimidate. The English concentrated on kidnapping, selective abduction, wounding, or one or more of these. In both language groups the change of tactics with time was not addressed in 88% of all cases.

Both French and English news described the strategies used by the R.B. in a similar fashion. The order of priority was the same and percentages were slightly different as French covered more this area. Both groups stated that tension, people's prison, and selective violence were the basic strategic processes of the Red Brigades.

Internal and International Contacts

The Red Brigades, according to the press, did not have many internal or external contacts with other terrorist groups. Eighty percent (80%) of both language groups did not cover or report any contacts. The remaining twenty percent enumerated, by order of importance, the following reasons for international contacts: international terrorism, arm supply, ideological links,

guerrilla tactics and other. The results for both groups were relatively the same.

Table 7.12 shows that the R.A.F. was the terrorist group most mentioned in articles on the Red Brigades. English news coverage had the tendency to name several terrorists groups apart from the Red Brigades but did not necessarily identify which one of these was most important. In English news it was generally noticeable that information was clustered and not distinct as in French news coverage on terrorism. As is shown in Table 7.12 the category "Other", implying one or more of the above, was used by seventeen percent of English cases compared to nine percent of French cases (see Appendix A and B).

The focus of the news was usually on present events, disregarding any tentative predictions of the future of terrorism in Italy. Both French and English news stories did not refer to the future of terrorism in 80% of all cases but twenty percent did. The two languages media did not differ on that point.

Context: Violent, Social and Political

Historical or contextual setting is most useful to help

**Distribution of French and English news stories
by non-Italian terrorist groups mentioned in news items**

	French	English
Not mentioned	79.1 %	80.9 %
R.A.F.	8.2	2.1
O.L.P.	2.7	0.0
E.T.A.	.9	0.0
Other	9.1	17.0
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0522	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .04	
Cramer's V	= .21	

the understanding of an event with political connotations. For example, "Does the Canadian Press cover violence present at the time of the Red Brigades' existence?" In both French and English language media seventy percent did not report any other political violence present on Italian grounds. Ten percent more English news mentioned other terrorist activities and the most popular group aside from the Red Brigades was Front Line (Prima Linea). Prima Linea was considered as the second most active leftist terrorist group in Italy and formed by disillusioned Red Brigadists.

Was social context taken into account when the media covered the Red Brigades? Eighty-five percent of the media articles did not mention Italy's social situation. Slightly more English news referred to this issue, dealing mostly with the economic crisis. Social unrest due to terrorism was most often referred to in the English media with ten percent more coverage. English news also included more references to public opinion in their coverage of the R.B. As shown in Table 7.13 fifty-four percent of English stories compared to forty percent of French stories mentioned Italian public opinion. Usually what was reported in the news was the negative reaction of the people against the R.B. Never did any article mention

Table 7.13

Distribution of French and English news stories
by mention of public opinion

	French	English
Yes	40.0 %	54.3 %
No	60.0	45.7
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0583	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .01	
Cramer's V	= .14	

anyone who outrightly approved of these terrorist activities. Only when sympathizers of the Red Brigades diminished was this factor reported in the news.

The political context was addressed more extensively than the violent and social context in Italy. Forty percent of all articles, English and French, reported on Italian politics. Here is a list of the political issues, in order of priority, covered by both media.

<u>French</u>	<u>English</u>
1) State Unrest	1) State Unrest
2) Historic Compromise	2) Conservative Government
3) Corruption	3) Corruption
4) Conservative Government	4) Other
5) Other	5) Historic Compromise

According to the list mentioned above, we can see the degree of importance given to different issues in the political scene for each language group. In both, State unrest, that is, the impact terrorist activities have on the State was the central focus. In both, a low percentage referred to the Historic Compromise but the English press addressed this issue the least. The State's

response to terrorism was of greater news value especially for the English press. Around 80% of both groups mentioned the State's reaction to R.B. activities. "How is the State going to solve this problem?" was the question the English and French press asked first.

Focus and Approach

On what issues did the media of both language groups focus or which elements were more newsworthy? The news value was similar for both but English put slightly more focus on criminal events and people's reactions to events. The French media centered mostly on arrests, the consequences of R.B. events, political events and victims. In Table 7.14, for example, forty-three percent of French news stories mentioned confusion resulting from the Red Brigades' events compared to twenty-two percent for English news. This could be due to the fact that Quebec society had been affected by the outcome of terrorist activities in the late sixties and the Press wanted to demonstrate that terrorism could not solve social problems in a society. It only confused the social and political spheres.

The approach adopted by both French and English groups differed mostly in the way the stories were written. In Tables 7.15 and 7.16 the English press in general created

Table 7.14

Distribution of French and English news stories
by mention of confusion resulting from R.B. activities

	French	English
Yes	42.7 %	22.3 %
No	57.3	77.7
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0034	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .03	
Cramer's V	= .22	

Table 7.15

Distribution of French and English news stories
by creation of atmosphere in news items

	French	English
Yes	34.5 %	50.0 %
No	65.5	50.0
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (X^2)	= .0367	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .02	
Cramer's V	= .16	

Table 7.16

**Distribution of French and English news stories
by detailed description of events**

	French	English
Yes	61.8 %	76.6 %
No	38.2	23.4
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (X^2)	= .0343	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .02	
Cramer's V	= .16	

more atmosphere at the beginning and end of texts and engaged in more detailed accounts of terrorist events than the French press. Violence was depicted as criminal in most cases but the approach was difficult to categorize, thus resulting in many "cannot say" answers for all cases. Thirty-one percent of English articles nonetheless straightforwardly referred to political violence in comparison to seventeen percent for French news.

Sources

One can infer the importance of the Red Brigades in the midst of Canadian news by observing the type of news that were written on the subject. For example, the French media wrote more editorials and commentaries than the English. Yet English engaged in more analysis. In both media, nevertheless, the majority of articles were classified as news items.

As for the authorship of articles, the great majority (95%) gave the name of the sources in use. An interesting difference is clear in the number of sources in use for each linguistic group as shown in Table 7.17. The French media used more sources, or based themselves on a greater variety of sources, than the English media. The latter

Table 7.17

Distribution of French and English news stories
by no. of sources in use

	French	English
0 sources	2.7 %	5.3 %
1 sources	63.6	86.2
2 sources	26.4	8.5
3 sources	2.7	0.0
4 sources	4.5	0.0
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0005	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .08	
Cramer's V	= .31	

used only one source in 86% of the articles compared to 64% of the French coverage. The French media also made use of 2 sources in 26% of its articles in comparison to only 8% for English stories. The French media also had in some circumstances made use of three to four sources while the English press never made use of more than two sources.

The fact that they used several sources for a non-Canadian event indicates to a certain degree the importance given to these events by the French. The next question would be, does the French media often use several sources for its coverage of international events? If so, does this necessarily give a better or more thorough coverage of events? The importance of this factor could be examined in another relationship. The importance or significance may be related to the number of sources but better coverage can also be related to which authors or sources are used for coverage. This will be examined in the last chapter.

The authors in use for each linguistic group also differed. English news used more often correspondants than the French press. In Table 7.18 one can see that 37% of all English articles were written by correspondants in comparison to 22% for French news. The French press used mostly A.F.P. news agency (58%) compared to the English media (1%). Language may be a barrier for English media but not necessarily for French media which used the British

Table 7.18

Distribution of French and English news stories
by authorship

	French	English
A.F.P.*	58.2 %	1.1 %
Reuter	46.4	37.2
Correspondants*	21.8	37.2
American wire services*	10.0	28.7
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
* $P (X^2) < .05$		

Table 7.18 has one independent variable (language) and four dependent variables. Significant bivariate relationships are indicated with an asterisk (*). For example 58.2% of all French news items used the news agency A.F.P., 48.8% did not. Reading of the table is similar to tables 7.9 and 7.10.

news agency Reuter in 46% of all its cases compared to 37% for the English media. The English made more use of American wire services than the French. In both groups the Canadian press was hardly used: only to deal with Canadian subjects such as Piperno.

The process in use for gathering information was relatively different for French and English media. What was most frequently used in both cases were interviews as shown in Table 7.19. The English media made more use of this than the French. Ninety-five percent of English news items compared to seventy-nine of French items used interviews to cover stories on the Red Brigades.

In Table 7.20 it is possible to examine the various types of sources used by both language groups to write a news story. More French media used terrorist comments whereas English used more police information, professionals and citizens' comments as well as more analysts or scholarly information. The French made more use of documentary sources but both groups in eighty percent of all cases did not make use of this type of information.

The five W's of journalism which include when, where, who, what and why some event occurred were answered similarly

Table 7.19

**Distribution of French and English news stories
by use of interviews**

	French	English
Interviews in use	79.1 %	94.7 %
No interview	20.9	5.3
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0
P (χ^2)	= .0025	
Uncertainty coefficient	= .05	
Phi	= .23	

Table 7.20

**Distribution of French and English news stories
by sources in use for coverage on the Red Brigades**

	French	English
Terrorist comments	52.7 %	44.7 %
Political leaders	39.1	46.8
Police documents	38.2	48.9
Police	35.5	48.9
News items	30.0	30.9
Professionals*	24.5	37.2
Other (pope, U.S.)	24.5	30.9
Italian Press	22.7	22.3
Documentary sources	17.3	13.8
Government documents*	11.8	8.5
Victims' opinions	9.1	16.0
Victims' relatives	6.4	1.1
Victims' friends	5.5	3.2
Citizens*	5.5	18.1
Scholarly information	2.7	13.8
Total	(110)	(94) = (204)
Percentage:	53.9	46.1 = 100.0

* $P (X^2) < .05$

This table can be read as tables 7.9 and 7.10.

in both groups. Both groups also showed a low understanding of terrorism in general, omitting to give several perspectives on events, lacking analysis and depth. News remained descriptive but non-informative. Eighty to eighty-five percent of all cases did not cover thoroughly the R.B. events and both from 62 to 68% did not say why these occurred.

As a conclusion there were not significant differences in general regarding the impact of language on news content. Both English and French covered the Red Brigades similarly. The results of these coverages were similar but the gathering process differed somewhat for each group. Slightly more importance was given to the setting and gathering procedures by the French press but other factors were probably more determinant than language differences. This importance may derive from the FLQ events but this cannot be certain basing oneself only on content analysis. Language is then not considered as an important and significant determinant of news coverage of the Red Brigades in the Canadian press.

CHAPTER 8

THE IMPACT OF AUTHORSHIP ON CONTENT

This chapter examines the impact of authorship on news coverage of the Red Brigades (R.B.) in Italy. Authorship was hypothesized as having a direct impact upon the extent and depth of coverage. A variation in content is, thus, expected to be contingent on who covered or reported a news story.

International news agencies such as Reuter (British agency), AFP (Agence France Presse), UPI (United Press International) and AWS (American Wire Services) were all used during the R.B. events. One can also find in the Canadian press, journalists or correspondants assigned especially for coverage on the Red Brigades.

The Canadian Press (C.P.), Canadian's national press agency, was only made use of when the subject or content was Canadian such as Piperno, an Italian physician accused of terrorist activities exiled in Quebec. Since a separate analysis was made for each type of source because of the possibility of using more than one source, C.P., having only 9 cases, was found largely insignificant compared to the other types of authorship. No separate analysis was made for the Canadian Press.

This chapter is divided according to the general sections within the coding manual; setting, content and news gathering process.

SETTING

Distribution

The Canadian press generally used one source for various types of news stories. Some newspapers tend to make use of international news agencies as principal sources of information and others prefer appointing a journalist to the task of reporting events at the international level such as in the case of the Red Brigades. In Table 8.1 the media's preferences are quickly noticeable.

Two newspapers, the Globe & Mail and Le Devoir, covered extensively the terrorist events in Italy and both made thorough use of international news agencies. Both medias chose Reuter in 50% of their cases. A.F.P. was used predominantly by Le Devoir and only 10% of R.B. news stories were written by Canadian journalists. The G & M appointed a greater number of correspondants (23%) and also gathered information from American wire services. It is possible as seen here that the quantity and frequency of publications (no. of articles) demonstrates the reliance a media has on one source or another. In the case of Le Devoir and G & M dependency was chiefly based on the use of news agencies.

Table 8.1

Authorship by Canadian Press Distribution

	Reuter*	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
Gazette	28.6 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	57.1 %
Montreal Star	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0
G & M	53.6	26.8	0.0	23.2
Vancouver Sun	0.0	50.0	0.0	66.7
Winnipeg Free Press	0.0	33.3	33.3	66.7
Toronto Star	25.0	41.7	0.0	33.3
Le Devoir	50.0	7.5	66.3	10.0
La Presse	39.3	17.9	39.3	50.0
Le Soleil	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Maclean's	0.0	14.3	0.0	100.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05=	.0059	.0078	.0000	.0000
Uncertainty =				
coefficient =	.06	.05	.24	.12
Cramer's V =	.34	.33	.66	.50

All tables in chapter 8 basically consists of four bivariate relationships between authorship (Reuter, A.W.S., A.F.P., Journalist) and news content. Only significant bivariate relationships are indicated by an asterix (*). Levels of significance and coefficients are shown at the bottom of each significant relationship in tables with four bivariate relationships.

Most newspapers (Gazette, Montreal Star, Vancouver Sun, Winnipeg Free Press and Le Soleil) published only a few articles on the Red Brigades and generally called upon journalists to cover events. La Presse and the Toronto Star are somewhat particular cases. La Presse, for example, had an interesting balance in sources as it made use of both news agencies and correspondants likewise. The Toronto Star also based its news on both types of sources but used the American wire services to a greater extent.

Maclean's, a Canadian magazine, made complete use of correspondents for every article it published on the Red Brigades. It also gathered some information from American wire services in some cases (14.3%).

All types of sources or authors, as seen in Table 8.2, were used principally in 1978, the year of Aldo Moro's abduction and assassination. News agencies were made use of particularly in 1978 and also in 1979 to have a follow-up on events. The years 1980, 1981, 1982 brought back journalists on the media scene. Forty-two percent of all news items were done in 1981-1982 by journalists: approximately 20% more coverage than international news agencies. Let us recall that General Dozier was kidnapped in the end of December 81 and freed by Italian's special squads in 1982. Coverage on the Red Brigades was most

Table 8.2

Authorship by year of publication

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists*
1975	1 %	0 %	1.5 %	0 %
1976	0	0	1.5	0
1977	8	0	5	5
1978	50	53	48	27
1979	10.5	10.5	12	2
1980	3.5	8	0	13
1981	15	18	11	20
1982	5	10.5	12	22
1983	1	0	0	3.5
1984	0	0	1.5	2
1985	0	0	1.5	2
1986	0	0	3	0
1987	5	0	1.5	0
1988	1	0	1.5	3.5
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0072			.0080
Uncertainty coefficient =	.06			.06
Cramer's V =	.38			.38

intense in 1978 and kept on to a lesser degree until 1982. Suddenly, in 1983, hardly any news on the Red Brigades were reported until this present day. Few heard of the Red Brigades in prison or of those that kept struggling to keep the organization alive. One gets the impression that the R.B. were hardly existant to the Canadian media readers before 1978 and after 1982. Coverage was more extensive when conflict and social disorder between the State and the terrorists was critical but also when the target was most prominent. Aldo Moro, let us remember, was R.B. 80th victim.

Setting

The setting or placement of an article is usually indicative of the importance given to a news story. For example, if one looks at Table 8.3 and 8.4 one can see that articles on the R.B. were generally placed on the top half of newspaper pages and hence were easy to identify. Entire pages were written and filled by journalists and American wire services. These have been placed in important sections such as the editorial page or in special dossiers as shown in Table 8.4.

European news agencies' articles were generally

Table 8.3

Authorship by Article's Setting on Page

	Reuter	A.W.S	A.F.P	journalist*
Top page	11 %	18 %	14 %	10.5 %
Top Right	23.5	16	29	10.5
Top Left	26	24	21.5	24.5
Middle	15	10.5	12	16
Bottom	3.5	5	5	7
Bottom Right	9.5	13	9	9
Bottom Left	9.5	3	8	9
Bottom Middle	2.5	0	1.5	0
Whole page	0	10.5	0	14
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =				.0032
Uncertainty coefficient =				.04
Cramer's V =				.34

Authorship by Article's Setting in Newspapers

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
Place of importance	15.5 %	34 %	23 %	54 %
Neutral	83	66	74	44
Place of non-importance	1	0	3	2
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0006			.0000
Uncertainty Coefficient =	.06			.08
Cramer's V =	.28			.33

found in the world news section, considered as neutral. Eighty-three percent of Reuter stories and 74% of AFP articles were placed in this section compared to 66% of A.W.S. and 44% of journalists news items.

The length of articles varied considerably between international news agencies and journalists. In Table 8.5 for example all news agencies had less than 1/4 of a page in more than 50% of their cases. Only 25% of articles written by journalists filled in so little space. Journalists generally had one-fourth of a page or more in most cases.

Table 8.6 gives a clear idea of the textual intensity and importance for each source. For example, Reuter and AFP had articles varying from 250 to 600 words in most of their cases. Journalists produced lengthy articles of 500 words or more. In twenty-eight percent of their cases they produced articles of more than 1000 words. American wire services also engaged in lengthy coverage (18%).

Space in news stories was also filled by photographs or designs. The American wire services allowed for more visual space than any other source as is demonstrated in Tables 8.7 and 8.8. Fifty percent of A.W.S. articles

Table 8.5

Authorship by space allocation

	Reuter*	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.	Journalist*
less than 1/4 page	67 %	58 %	57 %	25 %
1/4 page	20	10.5	21.5	22
more than 1/4 page	6	13	15	27
half a page	7	5	6	10
one page	0	10.5	0	8
more than one page	0	3	0	7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0091	.0901		.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.05	.02		.13
Cramer's V =	.29	.23		.50

Table 8.6

Authorship by length of text

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
50-70 words	1 %	3 %	0 %	2 %
100-175 words	12	8	9	2
250-275 words	26	13	12	3
350-400 words	27	34	26	12
500-600 words	21	13	28	25
700-800 words	2	10.5	8	15
900-1000 words	6	0	8	13
+ 1000 words	6	18	9	28
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05	=	.0017		.0000
Uncertainty coefficient=		.05		.09
Cramer's V =		.33		.50

Table 8.7

Authorship by type of visual supplement

	Reuter	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.	Journalist*
none	67 %	45 %	65 %	53 %
photograph	33	50	35	42
cartoon	0	0	0	2
drawing	0	0	0	0
both cartoon & photos	0	5	0	3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =		.0013		.0140
Uncertainty coefficient =		.05		.04
Cramer's V =		.28		.23

Table 8.8

Authorship by space allocation given to photos

	Reuter	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.	Journalists
none	67 %	45 %	65 %	53 %
25% of space	14	18	15	25
50% of space	13	29	17	17
75% of space	6	8	3	5
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =		.0158		
Uncertainty coefficient =		.03		
Cramer's V =		.22		

had photographs compared to 33-35% for Reuter and A.F.P. and 42% for journalists. A.W.S. photographs also filled 50% of the article's space in 29% of their cases and 75% in 8% of their news items. Journalists also made common use of photographs but these generally filled in only 25% of the article's space.

Photographs' content or subjects varied to a certain degree amongst authors. In Table 8.10 one can see that all sources generally depicted victims in their photos. Journalists also represented terrorists in their articles (12%) compared to 3.5% by European news agencies and 0% by A.W.S. .

Table 8.9

Authorship by Photo's setting in the Article

	Reuter	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.	Journalist*
none	67.5 %	45 %	65 %	53 %
upper left	3.5	5	3	2
upper right	0	0	3	5
bottom left	2.5	0	3	0
bottom right	0	0	1.5	3
left half	2.5	3	1.5	2
right half	8	8	12	2
middle	2.5	5	1.5	5
top half	8	10.5	6	2
bottom half	1	5	0	3
both upper right	0	5	0	5
both bottom right	0	0	0	2
both left half	1	0	0	0
both right half	0	0	0	3
both middle	1	3	0	5
both top half	0	0	0	2
both opposites	2.5	10.5	3	7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =		.0550		.0016
Uncertainty coefficient =		.06		.09
Cramer's V =		.36		.43

Table 8.10

Authorship by photos subjects

	Reuter	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.	Journalists*
terrorists	3.5 %	0 %	5 %	12 %
political leaders	2	8	0	3
victims	17	24	23	10
other	1	10.5	1.5	10
terrorists & victims	1	5	1.5	8
police	6	5	5	3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =		.0035		.0015
Uncertainty coefficient =		.06		.05
Cramer's V =		.30		.32

CONTENT

In this section the various authors will be compared with one another. As one who reads news, titles are the elements which grasp attention. In R.B. coverage it was found that titles tended towards sensationalism when written by Canadian journalists and American wire services. In Table 8.11 one can observe that Reuter least engaged in sensational titles. Sixty-three percent of Reuter signed articles were defined as factual compared to 53% of A.W.S., 55% of AFP and 51% of journalists' news items.

Emergence

In general, all types of sources have not focused their attention on the origins of the Red Brigades. For example, correspondents, whom have covered most in this area published in 30% of their cases, the year of emergence, 12% the place of emergence, 2% the manner in which they emerged and 25% the reasons why they emerged. Approximately seventy percent did not write anything on the initial years of the R.B. 'terrorist' group.

Ideology

As seen in Tables 8.12 and 8.13 mainly centralists

Table 8.11

Authorship by articles' titles

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists*
Factual	63 %	53 %	55 %	51 %
Moderate				
Sensational	35	37	43	32
Sensational	2	10.5	1.5	17
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0333			.0036
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.02			.03
Cramer's V =	.18			.23

Authorship by R.B. year of emergence

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalists*
not mentioned	89.5 %	78.9 %	87.7 %	70.0 %
1969	2.3	10.5	0.0	15.0
1970	7.0	2.6	12.3	3.3
+ 1970	1.2	7.9	0.0	11.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X ²) < .05 =	.0417		.0012	.0000
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.03		.08	.08
Cramer's V =	.20		.28	.33

Table 8.13

Authorship by reasons given for emergence

	Reuter*	A.W.S	A.F.P.	Journalists*
not mentioned	97.7 %	92.1 %	95.4 %	75.0 %
consequences 1968	2.3	7.9	4.6	8.3
dissatisfaction C.P.	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.7
dissatisfaction C.D.	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7
reaction to fascists				
terrorists groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Italy's social unrest	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0395		.0002	
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.07		.11	
Cramer's V =	.24		.35	

have informed Canadian readers of the Red Brigades' ideological motives for engaging in terrorist activities. Interesting was the primary reason given by all sources to explain the engagement in terrorism by R.B. The consequences of the 1968 events was always the principal explanation, proposed by sources for shifting to terrorism as a means for political change. A greater diversity and pluralistic view could be found amongst news stories reported by Canadian journalists.

In Table 8.14 R.B. ideology was mainly depicted as 'leftist'. Journalists have covered this factor to a greater extent than news agencies. Sixty-three percent of all articles published by journalists mentioned ideology compared to about thirty percent for all other sources. Therefore a Canadian press reader would most probably have had an idea of the R.B. ideology if he or she had read articles signed by journalists than if they had consulted only news reported by international news agencies. Nevertheless in all cases no source ever labelled the R.B. Maoists or Fascists and only a few (2-8%) defined them as Marxists-Leninists.

Goal

The Red Brigades' ultimate goal was once again

Table 8.14

Authorship by R.B. ideology

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalists*
not mentioned	67.4 %	65.8 %	75.4 %	36.7 %
marxism-leninism	2.3	7.9	3.1	8.3
maoism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
fascism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
other	1.2	7.9	4.6	3.3
leftist	29.1	18.4	16.9	51.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0467		.0057	.0003
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.03		.04	.06
Cramer's V =	.20		.25	.30

covered more thoroughly by journalists than by news agencies. Fifty-seven percent of journalists addressed the R.B. goal in comparison to a 27% coverage by news agencies. All sources believed the principal objective was to Overthrow the Italian government as seen in Table 8.15. It is interesting to observe how journalists also indicated the possibility that the R.B. opted for revolution and wanted to demonstrate the State's flaws to the Italian population through their terrorist activities. A greater coverage (30%) and diversity was found within news stories published by journalists.

Communism as an alternative state of affairs was said to be an ultimate goal for the R.B. by journalists (15%) and A.W.S. (8%). Both believed this communist system was to be installed at a domestic level. Only 1.5% of AFP articles wrote that the R.B. wished to create a communist system at a European level as shown in Table 8.16.

The reasons given by news media to explain the engagement in certain terrorist activities were similar for all sources. The primary reason advanced was to put pressure on the State. Even if 67% of journalists did cover the reasons for doing terrorist actions, 59%

Table 8.15

Authorship by R.B. goal

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists*
not mentioned	74.4 %	71.1 %	72.3 %	43.3 %
revolution	3.5	0.0	4.6	13.3
civil war	4.7	10.5	4.6	6.7
overthrow State	12.8	15.8	12.3	18.3
establish communism	1.2	2.6	0.0	1.7
anarchy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
other	1.2	0.0	3.1	5.0
demonstrate weaknesses of the State	2.3	0.0	3.1	11.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0003
Uncertainty coefficient =				.06
Cramer's V =				.35

Table 8.16

Authorship by R.B. goal (Communism as an Alternative)

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalists*
not mentioned	100.0 %	92.1 %	98.5 %	85.0 %
Domestic Italy	0.0	7.9	0.0	13.3
European	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Worldwide	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7
Both domestic & European	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0183		.0469	.0036
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.07		.06	.07
Cramer's V =	.22		.20	.26

of all news agencies also mentioned these motives.

Members

Normally a terrorist group is considered as a political organization formed of individuals. The question which arises again and again is who are the members? Where do they come from and how are they like? What made them strive towards violence as a means for a political goal? In the Canadian press the "brains", "leaders" or "thinkers" were rarely discussed, as seen in Table 8.17. Twenty-five percent of articles written by journalists nevertheless did comment on the thinkers behind the Red Brigades.

In Table 8.18 one can see the various characteristics generally reported on the R.B. members and to what extent. Journalists reported more on each characteristic except "AGE" which was outnumbered by AFP. Table 8.19 outlines the order of importance of the characteristics for each source.

The names given to the Red Brigades can reflect to some degree the perceptions an author has vis-à-vis terrorism and those who engage in it. For example in Tables 8.20 and 8.21 one can see that Reuter most likely called the R.B. murderers and guerillas and least likely

Table 8.17

Authorship by mention of thinkers of terrorism

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists*
mentioned	0 %	5 %	8 %	25 %
not mentioned	100 %	95 %	92 %	75 %
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0001		.0001	
Uncertainty coefficient =	.12		.08	
Phi =	.29		.30	

Table 8.18

Authorship by R.B. members' characteristics

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists
age	28 %	10.5* %	32 %	23 %
class	1*	8	0*	15*
origin	6	5	1	10
family	3.5	3	1.5	10*
psychology	6	16	3*	22*
role	36	32	43	45
relations	14	8*	21.5	28*
studies	14*	18	23	35*
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3

* $P (X^2) < .05$

Table 8.18 as tables 7.9 and 7.10 in chapter 7 has numerous bivariate relationships. There are four independent variables and eight dependent content variables. An asterix indicates each significant bivariate relationship. For example we can read that Reuter in 28% of all its news items on the Red Brigades mentioned the age of their members, 72% did not.

Table 8.19

Authorship by Members' Characteristics in order of priority

Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist
role	role	role	role
age	studies	age	studies
relations	psychology	studies	relations
studies	age	relations	age
psychology	class	psychology	psychology
origin	relations	family	class
family	origin	origin	origin
class	family	class	family

Table 8.20

Authorship by Given names to the Red Brigades

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist
terrorists	34* %	84* %	54 %	75* %
guerrillas	37*	32	5*	20
murderers etc.	50*	47	41.5	39
revolutionaries	1*	5	0*	10*
extremists	27*	18	21.5	8*
Red Brigades	98	100	97	93
Other	23*	18*	29	47*
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3

* $P (X^2) < .05$

This table can be read as table 8.18.

Table 8.21

Authorship by names given to R.B. in order of priority

Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists
Red Brigades	Red Brigades	R.B	R.B
murderers	terrorists	terrorists	terrorists
guerrillas	murderers	murderers	other
terrorists	guerrillas	other	murderers
extremists	extremists	extremists	guerrillas
revolutionaries	other	guerrillas	revolutionary
other	revolutionaries	revolutionary	extremists

named them terrorists or revolutionaries. American wire services preferentially labeled them terrorists and hardly ever named them with political connotations such as "armed party". AFP in majority named them terrorists or murderers. Journalists tended to identify the R.B. as "terrorists" and a significant percentage (47%) gave political labels such as "commando" or "brigadists". They less likely called them extremists and was the source which mostly identified them as revolutionaries.

Organization

As shown in Table 8.22 the R.B. organization was commented on chiefly by journalists (38%) and AFP (29%). The American wire services (18%) and Reuter (12%) have not focused on this aspect of the R.B.. When mentioned, Reuter concentrated on the type of organization, A.W.S. on the quantity of members, A.F.P. on operations and type of organization. Journalists had a greater diversity in coverage and reported principally on operations as seen in Table 8.23.

Financing and arm supply

The organization's mode of financing was not reported by 80% of articles written by journalists and

Table 8.22

Authorship by mention of the R.B. organization

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	11.6 %	18.4 %	29.2 %	38.3 %
not mentioned	88.4 %	81.5 %	70.8 %	61.7 %
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0009		.0100	
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.06		.04	
Phi =	.26		.21	

Table 8.23

Authorship by reported aspects of the R.B. organization

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
not mentioned	88.4 %	81.6 %	70.8 %	61.7 %
Type of organization	4.7	2.6	10.8	6.7
Role of members	2.3	0.0	1.5	1.7
Recruitment	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0
Number of members	0.0	7.9	0.0	6.7
Rules of conduct	1.2	2.6	1.5	1.7
Operations	3.5	0.0	13.8	8.3
Some of the Above	0.0	5.3	1.5	8.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0049		.0243	.0175
Uncertainty coefficient =	.08		.06	.05
Cramer's V =	.31		.28	.29

approximately 90% of news stories published by news agencies. Generally all sources concluded that the Red Brigades financed the organization on their own and by illegal means such as robbery, ransom or other. Only journalists have advanced the possibility that the R.B. could have been assisted by other nations or other governments as seen in Tables 8.24 and 8.25.

The R.B. also had military equipment at their disposal but where did it come from? All sources, 87% and more of their cases did not ever report any information on the way the R.B. furnished their group in arms. This lack of information could result from the ignorance of police and professionals, but 13% of journalists nonetheless attempted to give answers to this question as seen in Table 8.26. Reuter as is shown, has never commented on the issue of arm supply.

As was documented in the first chapter of this thesis, scholarly material had available some information on arm supply but did and does the media consult such material for their reportage?

Targets and tactics

Targets were frequently reported by all types of

Authorship by modes of financing for R.B.

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists*
not mentioned	95.3 %	89.5 %	93.8 %	80.0 %
illegal sources	4.7	7.9	4.6	8.3
assistance other				
terrorist groups	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0
assistance other				
nations	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.3
other	0.0	2.6	0.0	3.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0009
Uncertainty coefficient =				.09
Cramer's V =				.30

Authorship by who controls the R.B. finance

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists *
not mentioned	96.5 %	92.1 %	93.8 %	81.7 %
Red Brigades	3.5	5.3	6.2	8.3
Other governments	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.3
Other	0.0	2.6	0.0	1.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0005
Uncertainty coefficient =				.09
Cramer's V =				.29

Table 8.26

Authorship by source of R.B. military equipment

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists*
not mentioned	100.0 %	94.7 %	96.9 %	86.7 %
internal traffic of arms	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0
other terrorist groups	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.7
special agencies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
more than one of the above	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0
other	0.0	2.6	0.0	6.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0013
Uncertainty coefficient =				.10
Cramer's V =				.29

sources. Ninety-nine percent of Reuter articles, 98.5% of AFP articles, 95% of A.W.S. and 93% of correspondants all covered this aspect of the R.B., that is, the victims of terrorism. Similar results were found in the coverage of principal targets such as Moro. Forty percent of all cases for each source were used for the Moro case and 16 to 20% were used for military personnel including General Dozier. Correspondents or Canadian journalists were not necessarily used more often when Moro was the target. Likewise all sources mentioned previous victims when reporting on R.B. incidents ranging from 55% (Reuter) to 65% (AFP).

Description of violence and the way targets were hit was covered differently by journalists and international news agencies. As shown in Table 8.27 for example, 25% of news stories made by journalists mentioned the fashion in which targets were hit compared to 48% for AFP, 55% for A.W.S. and 58% for Reuter, that is a difference of 25 to 35% with international news agencies.

In Table 8.28 most spaces allocated for the description of events varied from 5-30% for all sources. Reuter was the news agency which engaged more in the description of events.

Authorship by reports on how targets are hit

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mention of the way targets are hit	58.1 %	55.3 %	47.7 %	25.0 %
not mentioned	41.9	44.7	52.3	75.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0002		.0020	
Uncertainty coefficient =	.05		.04	
Phi =	.27		.23	

Table 8.28

Authorship by space allocation for violent events

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
0 % space	39.5 %	44.7 %	46.2 %	70.0 %
5-30 % space	37.2	36.8	35.4	25.0
31-50 % space	10.5	5.3	12.3	3.3
51-70 % space	9.3	7.9	3.1	0.0
71-100 % space	3.5	5.3	3.1	1.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =		.0037		.0141
Uncertainty coefficient =		.04		.04
Cramer's V =		.28		.25

Correspondingly all sources did not comment on the change in tactics along the years. Journalists were those who made more notice of these changes with an 18% coverage compared to a 9% coverage by Reuter, the news agency which least reported on this factor.

In Table 8.29 it is quickly noticeable that when killing and kidnapping were the tactics in use, the Red Brigades made the news. Even if other tactics were in use these were of lesser news value to the international media. Consequently readers may picture the R.B. basically as killers and kidnapers since these are the tactics which grasped media attention.

As one can observe in Table 8.29 arson, damage to property, intimidation by threats, wounding and bombing rarely reached the international scene. Yet these were frequently made use of and was seen in Chapter 1. Knee-capping was the only tactic most reported second to killing and kidnapping. Yet correspondents in 23% of their cases listed more than one tactic adopted by the R.B. .

The Red Brigades used different strategies to make their messages clear. As is seen in Table 8.30 most sources depicted the use of tension as a manner to get attention to their cause. People's prison was also mentioned (12-20%)

Authorship by tactics in use

	Reuter*	A.W.S	A.F.P.	Journalist*
not mentioned	1.2 %	0.0 %	1.5 %	6.7 %
Arson	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Damage to property	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Intimidation-threats	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wounding	0.0	5.3	0.0	1.7
Knee-capping	10.5	13.2	9.2	0.0
Bombing	3.5	2.6	3.1	0.
Killing	41.9	28.9	43.1	36.7
Kidnapping	40.7	36.8	36.9	31.7
some of the above	1.2	13.2	6.2	23.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0002			.0030
Uncertainty coefficient =	.03			.06
Cramer's V =	.37			.32

Authorship by strategy in use

	Reuter*	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.	Journalist*
not mentioned	47.7 %	55.3 %	53.8 %	45.0 %
people's prison	18.6	13.2	15.4	11.7
selective violence	2.3	0.0	7.7	23.3
use of surprise	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
use of tension	30.2	26.3	21.5	20.0
other	1.2	5.3	1.5	0.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0034	.0012		.0022
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.04	.04		.04
Cramer's V =	.28	.26		.29

but it is significant that correspondents (23%) particularly made notice of selective violence as a R.B. strategy. Selective violence was supposedly one of the main reasons why the Red Brigades recruited so many sympathizers amongst the Italian population.

Contacts with other terrorist groups

The Red Brigades supposedly maintained internal and international contacts with other terrorist groups. Thirty-three percent of correspondents or journalists addressed this issue compared to 17% (AFP), 13% (A.W.S.) and 8% (Reuter) as shown in Table 8.31. The non-Italian terrorist group mostly named in news stories was the R.A.F. from Germany. Table 8.32 also demonstrates that journalists tended to mention more than one group (27%).

The reasons invoked for these international contacts varied depending on the source. In Table 8.33 both A.W.S. (13%) and journalists (10%) more likely said that the R.B. were part of international terrorism. A.F.P. in 5% of its cases mentioned arm supply as the primary reason for contacts. A greater diversity in coverage could be found, once again, amongst journalists.

Internal contacts with other Italian terrorist groups were hardly ever stated in the Canadian press. As seen in

Table 8.31

Authorship by mention of international contacts

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	8.1 %	13.2 %	16.9 %	33.3 %
not mentioned	91.9	86.8	83.1	66.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0014			.0016
Uncertainty coefficient =	.05			.05
Phi =	.24			.23

Table 8.32

Authorship by mention of non-Italian terrorist groups

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
not mentioned	89.5 %	86.8 %	80.0 %	66.7 %
R.A.F. (Germany)	5.8	5.3	7.7	5.0
O.L.P. (Middle East)	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.7
I.R.A. (Ireland)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
E.T.A. (France)	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0
Other	4.7	7.9	7.7	26.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0162			.0039
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.05			.05
Cramer's V =	.24			.27

Table 8.33

Authorship by reasons for international contacts

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
not mentioned	95.3 %	86.8 %	87.7 %	70.0 %
arm supply	0.0	0.0	4.6	6.7
ideological links	0.0	0.0	3.1	5.0
training	1.2	0.0	3.1	5.0
international terrorism	2.3	13.2	1.5	10.0
other	1.2	0.0	0.0	3.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0103			.0170
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.07			.05
Cramer's V =	.27			.26

Table 8.34 from 20% coverage by journalists to only 7% coverage by Reuter this left 80% and more of cases with no information on this factor.

Future of terrorism

The future of the Red Brigades, as Table 8.35 demonstrates, mostly intrigued journalists rather than news agencies. Forty-seven percent questioned and commented on the eventual future of the terrorist group. Only 3.5% of Reuter, 10.5% of A.W.S. and 12% of AFP articles mentioned this aspect. It is most likely that news agencies concentrate all their energies and time on present events since the flow of information is excessive at an international level.

Italian Context

The Red Brigades as seen in Chapter one were operating during a highly agitated and unstable period in Italy. Did the Canadian press report on the violent Italian context at the time of the Red Brigades?

Different types of terrorism were rarely mentioned by international news agencies. As demonstrated in Tables 8.36 and 8.37, 93% of all news agencies cases never commented on other kinds of terrorism compared to 70-72%

Table 8.34

Authorship by mention of internal contacts with other Italian terrorist groups.

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist
mentioned	7.0 %	10.5 %	10.8 %	20.0 %
not mentioned	93.0	89.5	89.2	80.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0306			
Uncertainty coefficient =	.03			
Cramer's V =	.17			

Table 8.35

Authorship by mention of the future of terrorism

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	3.5 %	10.5 %	12.3 %	46.7 %
not mentioned	96.5	89.5	87.7	53.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0000			.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.12			.15
Cramer's V =	.35			.43

Table 8.36

Authorship by mention of other types of terrorism

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	7.0 %	10.5 %	7.7 %	28.3 %
not mentioned	93.0	89.5	92.3	71.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0000
Uncertainty coefficient=				.08
Phi =				.30

Table 8.37

. Authorship by types of terrorism mentioned

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
not mentioned	91.9 %	86.8 %	90.8 %	70.0 %
Black terrorism	2.3	0.0	7.7	3.3
Red terrorism	2.3	5.3	1.5	3.3
Other (Right-Wing & more)	3.5	7.9	0.0	23.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =			.0040	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =			.07	.10
Cramer's V =			.25	.36

coverage by journalists. When mentioned Black Terror, Right and Left-wing terrorism were the types generally reported.

In Tables 8.38 and 8.39 one can only notice that journalists reported twenty percent more than international news agencies on other Italian terrorist groups. Nonetheless sixty to eighty percent of all sources have kept silent on the terrorist activities going on in Italy. Prima Linea or Front Line was the Italian group most frequently reported in news stories.

Table 8.38

Authorship by mention of other Italian terrorist groups

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
not mentioned	81.4 %	73.7 %	78.5 %	60.0 %
Autonomes	0.0	0.0	1.5	5.0
Fascist groups	2.3	2.6	3.1	8.3
Other groups (Prima Linea etc.)	16.3	23.7	16.9	26.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0114
Uncertainty coefficient =				.04
Cramer's V =				.23

Table 8.39

Authorship by mention of terrorist activities other than the Red
Brigades

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	18.6 %	23.7 %	24.6 %	43.3 %
not mentioned	81.4	76.3	75.4	56.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
F (X^2) < .05 =	.0358			.0011
Uncertainty coefficient =	.02			.05
hi =	.16			.23

Social issues such as youth unemployment, economic crisis or over-population in universities were discussed only in 3.5% of Reuter articles, 13% of A.W.S. articles and 18% of A.F.P. articles. Journalists covered the social context in 30% of the cases as shown in Table 8.40.

Public opinion and social unrest were of greater news value to the Canadian press than the social problems existent within the Italian social context. In Tables 8.41 and 8.42 we can see that both European news agencies, Reuter and AFP reported correspondingly on public opinion (40%) and social unrest (20%). American wire services and journalists reported similarly on both issues with a 20 to 25% more coverage. The American wire services are distinct from the two other news agencies. In this case, A.W.S. media attention has focused on the effects of terrorism on the Italian population.

Rarely have positive effects been in print although, as documented in Chapter 1, the Red Brigades have had for some time many sympathizers. It is important to remark that generally the effects reported in the media were negative.

The International and Canadian press focused primarily on the political context which appeared to be of

Authorship by mention of Italy's social context

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	3.5 %	13.2 %	7.7 %	30.0 %
not mentioned	96.5	86.8	92.3	70.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0016			.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.06			.10
Phi =	.23			.33

Table 8.41

Authorship by mention of public opinion

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	38.4 %	60.5 %	40.0 %	65.0 %
not mentioned	61.6	39.5	60.0	35.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =				.0014
Uncertainty coefficient =				.04
Phi =				.23

Table 8.42

Authorship by mention of social unrest

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
mentioned	25.6 %	42.1 %	18.5 %	43.3 %
not mentioned	74.4	57.9	81.5	56.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =			.0314	.0074
Uncertainty coefficient =			.02	.03
Phi =			.16	.20

greater interest than both the violent and social contexts. In Table 8.43 one can see in a glimpse that more coverage was made in this sphere. Forty-one percent of Reuter, 50% of A.W.S., 40% of A.F.P. and 53% of journalists' cases did inform the public on Italy's politics usually in relation to the Red Brigades.

Political issues discussed varied somewhat for each type of author. In Table 8.44 one can see that the majority of all sources reported on the State's unrest due to the Red Brigades. This was covered to a greater extent by news agencies. Yet journalists covered more different aspects of Italy's political system. For example, 15% of news stories signed by correspondants addressed the problematic issue of Italy's conservative and stagnant government unfavorable to any fundamental change. A greater diversity in coverage was found amongst journalists than in news agencies.

How will the State solve the social problem of the R.B.? This question and the will to respond to it attracted media attention as shown in Table 8.45. Eighty-three percent of Reuter, 84% of A.W.S., 85% of AFP and 77% of correspondents news stories answered the question mentioned above. All news agencies reported more on police intervention and journalists focused slightly

Authorship by mention of political context

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
mentioned	40.7 %	50.0 %	40.0 %	53.3 %
not mentioned	59.3	50.0	60.0	46.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0309
Uncertainty coefficient =				.02
Phi =				.16

Authorship by political issues

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
not mentioned	59.3 %	50.0 %	60.0 %	46.7 %
Historic Compromise	1.2	2.6	1.5	10.0
Corruption-parties	4.7	0.0	1.5	10.0
Conservative gov.	0.0	7.9	0.0	15.0
State unrest	31.4	31.6	35.4	18.3
Other	3.5	7.9	1.5	0.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0078		.0084	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.05		.05	.08
Cramer's V =	.28		.27	.39

Table 8.45

Authorship by State's response to terrorism

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist
not mentioned	17.4 %	15.8 %	15.4 %	23.3 %
law-legal means	12.8	10.5	16.9	25.0
police intervention	25.6	39.5	29.2	20.0
special squads	2.3	2.6	6.2	8.3
political agenda	15.1	15.8	13.8	5.0
refusal to negotiate	23.3	15.8	16.9	16.7
other	3.5	0.0	1.5	1.7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0102			
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.03			
Cramer's V =	.29			

more on laws enacted during the R.B. events. State's reaction to events or incidents generated by the R.B. was of central interest to news organizations.

Focus

Tables 8.46 and 8.47 demonstrates quite clearly the difference between coverage made by international news agencies and journalists. For example, correspondents focused far more on contextual factors than news agencies and less on isolated terrorist events. All sources nevertheless reported similarly on people and confusion deriving from R.B. events. International news agencies concentrated their attention on events and only A.W.S. had greater coverage in all spheres compared to European agencies.

If one proceeds step by step in Table 8.47 one can observe that no agency has made an article principally on the cause of terrorism. Only 5% of all cases (205 articles) which were written by journalists have made "cause" a central issue in their news stories. Reuter had chiefly dedicated their news items to R.B. events (41%). Journalists, compared to other sources, covered slightly more on political events (18%). Both A.W.S. (18%) and journalists (22%) have written articles specifically

Authorship by articles' focus of interest

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists
people	52 %	55 %	60 %	57 %
events	70	71	72	55*
confusion	33	26	38.5	42
political	17*	32	20	40*
violence	9*	18	8*	35*
social problem	2*	16	3*	35*
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
* $P (X^2) < .05$				

This table can be read as table 8.18.

Authorship by articles' focus of interest

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists*
cause of terrorism	0 %	0 %	0 %	5 %
criminal events	41	26	28	23
political events	3.5	5	9	18
consequences	7	18	12	22
arrests	22	24	31	17
reactions	17	16	12	8
victims	6	5	8	0
other	3.5	5	0	7
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0124		.0000	
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.04		.08	
Cramer's V =	.29		.42	

on the consequences of R.B. events. A.F.P. focused in 31% of all their cases on arrests. People's reactions and victims were rarely taken as central subjects for all sources.

Approach

Following the findings on news content for all sources how can one define the approach adopted vis-à-vis the Red Brigades? As shown in Table 8.48 terrorist violence was outwardly depicted as political for 47% of journalists and 26% of A.W.S. news stories. We also find 25% of journalists' articles defining R.B. activities as criminal. No source ever reported terrorist violence as creative. The high percentage of "cannot say" category indicates that news agencies generally did not engage in direct interpretation.

In Tables 8.49 and 8.50 a high percentage of neutrality and ambiguity amongst news agencies' coverage of events is noticeable. Journalists were more direct and subjective in their coverage. Does subjectiveness necessarily affect the quality of journalistic work? News agencies seem to protect themselves from being labeled as subjective. Their coverage of subjects such as terrorism was highly factual and descriptive

Authorship by depiction of R.B. violence

	Reuter*	A.W.S.*	A.F.P.*	Journalists*
political	14	26	9	47
criminal	7	0	6	25
creative	0	0	0	0
cannot say	79	74	84	28
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0014	.0522	.0003	.0000
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.04	.03	.06	.16
Cramer's V =	.25	.17	.28	.50

Authorship by Articles' approach towards R.B.

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalists*
Positive +	0 %	0 %	0 %	3 %
Negative -	2	8	0	40
Neutral	98	92	100	57
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0001		.0003	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.09		.11	.24
Cramer's V =	.30		.28	.52

Table 8.50

Authorship by articles' approach towards R.B.

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
neutral	43.0 %	23.7 %	41.5 %	15.0 %
cannot say	51.2	55.3	53.8	28.3
disapproval	1.2	5.3	1.5	30.0
condemns	0.0	2.6	0.0	15.0
sympathize	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
other	4.7	13.2	3.1	8.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0001		.0033	.0000
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.08		.06	.18
Cramer's V =	.36		.29	.58

resulting in a lack of depth and consequently a lack of understanding the process of political phenomena.

NEWS GATHERING PROCESS

Type of news

All news agencies, as shown in Table 8.51, generally wrote news items. These are considered mainly as factual, descriptive and objective. Only 5% of A.W.S. were not classified as news items. Sixty percent of journalists, approximately forty percent less than news agencies, engaged in factual coverage.

News agencies also rarely made any comments on R.B. events. Journalists, contrarily to agencies, frequently commented on events. Comments could be depicted in both news items and commentaries (Table 8.52).

The use of analysis was found principally in articles published by journalists (47%). News agencies as shown in Table 8.53 did not engage in analytic work. Analysis was used to some extent by only 2% of Reuter, 13% of A.W.S. and 9% by A.F.P. . As is the journalistic policy, editorials were only written and signed by correspondents (Table 8.54).

Table 8.51

Authorship by type of news (news item)

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
use of news items	100.0 %	94.7 %	100.0 %	60.0 %
no use of news items	0.0	5.3	0.0	40.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0000		.0009	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.13		.10	.34
Phi =	.31		.25	.57

Authorship by type of news (commentary)

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
use of commentaries	4.7 %	15.8 %	9.2 %	70.0 %
no use of commentaries	95.3	84.2	90.8	30.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0000		.0003	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.16		.07	.33
Phi =	.42		.26	.64

Table 8.53

Authorship by type of news (analysis)

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
use of analysis	2.3 %	13.2 %	9.2 %	46.7 %
no use of analysis	97.7	86.8	90.8	53.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0000		.0525	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient	.12		.02	.21
Phi =	.34		.15	.49

Table 8.54

Authorship by type of news (editorials)

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
use of editorials	0.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	26.7 %
no use of editorials	100.0	100.0	100.0	73.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0010		.0105	.0000
Uncertainty				
coefficient =	.09		.07	.24
Phi =	.25		.20	.45

International news agencies, because of the great amount of news flow, probably could not engage in analysis or commentaries. Their principle was to remain brief, complete and descriptive. They are useful tools for news organizations but the evergrowing dependency on them alone threatens to diminish the quality of coverage on international issues.

Form of writing

Eighty percent of news agencies proceeded chronologically when reporting terrorist events in comparison to 40% for journalists whom structured their texts by order of priorities (Table 8.55).

At the beginning and end of news stories, atmospheres were created principally by correspondents. The American wire services engaged in this practice far more than did the European news agencies as seen in Table 8.56. Forty-two percent of A.W.S. articles began their articles in a subtle and moderately sensational fashion compared to 26% for Reuter and 23% for A.F.P. articles.

The majority of international news agencies gave detailed accounts of R.B. events. From 72% (AFP) to 76% (A.W.S.) all news agencies made descriptive texts compared

Authorship by form of writing (chronological procedure)

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
use of chronology	84.9 %	81.6 %	84.6 %	40.0 %
no use of chronology	15.1	18.4	15.4	60.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =	.0003		.0049	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.06		.04	.15
Phi =	.26		.20	.43

Authorship by stories creating an atmosphere

	Reuter*	A.W.S.	A.F.P.*	Journalist*
Yes	25.6 %	42.1 %	23.1 %	75.0 %
No	74.4	57.9	76.9	25.0
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =	.0002		.0005	.0000
Uncertainty coefficient =	.06		.05	.15
Phi =	.27		.25	.44

Authorship by form of writing (use of detailed accounts)

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist*
use of description	73.3 %	76.3 %	72.3 %	56.7 %
no use of plenty of details	26.7	23.7	27.7	43.3
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (χ^2) < .05 =				.0327
Uncertainty coefficient =				.02
Phi =				.16

to 57% for journalists. As we have seen these dedicated articles to analysis and commentaries.

Usually, when news agencies were used in the Canadian press one media would most probably rely on more than one source for its' coverage of R.B.. As for correspondents, 95% were used as the only source for a news story. Rare are those items which made use of both news agencies and correspondents.

All sources made use of interviews to a great extent. Ninety-seven percent of news agencies and 83% of correspondants interviewed people to gather information for their stories.

The validity of news content depends largely on the type of information collected to write an article. Challenging and interesting news stories are contingent on asking good questions to the right people.

In Table 8.58 one can see that A.W.S., for example, most likely based their news stories on police information. Both A.W.S. and Reuter made use of police as the main source of information gathering with 52 to 68% of cases in comparison to a small 23% by correspondents. A.F.P. and Reuter both made extensive use of terrorist comments.

Authorship by sources of information for news stories

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalist
terrorists	52 %	53 %	65* %	37* %
police	52*	68*	46	23*
analyst	0*	11	1.5*	23*
victims	14	24*	12	7
victims' relatives	6	8	5	0
victims' friends	7	13*	9*	3
political leaders	51*	45	52*	43
police	51*	66*	45	22*
citizens	8	18	6	18*
professionals	21*	32	23	42*
other	20*	34	29	30
news items	30	32	35	35
Italian press	24	26	29	22
Government documents	15	13	15	7
Documentary sources	22*	18	25*	10
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
* $P (X^2) < .05$				

This table can be read as table 8.18.

Journalists made more reference to analysts or scholarly material as well as professionals for coverage on the R.B.. All sources gathered information from political leaders, other news items and the Italian press similarly. Little of all sources made use of victims' comments.

In Tables 3.5⁹ and 8.60 we can depict the results of coverage practiced by the various types of sources. All sources have answered what, when, where and who in their reportage. Journalists, as one can notice, have taken special care in answering why these events occurred.

Significantly, Table 8.60 shows that when Canadian journalists were held responsible in covering terrorist events it was most probable that Canadian readers had a far greater variety of perspectives on events, more awareness of happenings and a more thorough understanding of political violence than if they had read only articles written by international news agencies. Solutions to terrorism were also suggested when correspondents covered R.B. events.

In Chapter 8 we have seen that when journalists and correspondents were assigned to cover international news, in this case the Red Brigades, news stories were

Table 8.59

Authorship by 5 W's of Journalism

	Reuter	A.W.S.	A.F.P.	Journalists
What	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
When	98	97	95	93
Where	98	97	97	90
Who	99	97	98.5	98
Why	59	58	61.5	77*
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3
P (X^2) < .05 =				.0427
Uncertainty coefficient =				.02
Phi =				.15

This table can be read as table 8.18. As only one bivariate relationship was significant we did mention the significance level and the values of the coefficients.

Table 8.60

Authorship by depth of coverage

	Reuter	A.W.S	A.F.P.	Journalist
gives different perspectives	1* %	16 %	9 %	43* %
gives solutions	0*	0	0	15*
awareness on terrorism	5*	10.5	9	47*
understanding of terrorism	1*	8	6*	38*
Totals	(86)	(38)	(65)	(60)
Percentage:	42	18.5	31.7	29.3

* $P (X^2) < .05$

This table can be read as table 8.18.

more informative but also more subjective. News agencies, and more particularly the European ones, tended towards description and objectivity but remained at the surface and did not explore the depth of the complex issues of the R.B. News agencies were extremely useful at the level of factual news but were not sufficient to grasp the process of political violence because of their evergrowing coverage of present events. Consequently to have good journalistic coverage of international news the Canadian press should strive towards pluralistic and analytic reporting based on different types of sources and authors.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

Based on the bivariate relationships researched and tested in this thesis what can be said on the Canadian press coverage of the Red Brigades? First, we can conclude that of the 205 articles analyzed in this thesis we found Canadian news reported little on the Red Brigades as a terrorist group. We have seen that journalists and correspondents were far more engaged in in-depth coverage than news agencies supporting the hypothesis that variation in authorship affects news content.

Chapter 1 and 2 served principally to outline the contextual settings of both the Red Brigades and the mass media. Subsequent sections of this thesis served to further confirm conclusions reported in literature on news coverage; that Canadian news media relied too heavily on news agencies in international news coverage and consequently informed inadequately or insufficiently the Canadian population of foreign events.

News agencies generally remained objective by covering events factually but this consequently left readers with insufficient elements to understand political phenomena such as terrorism. News agencies' functional purpose was shown to be reporting present events. One then

gets no sense of history. It is useful to cover present or actual events, but this can only be explained and understood by a search into the past and future.

Though journalists and correspondents gave more coverage to the R.B., they were also more subjective. They were mostly assigned to comment on events and not analyze them. Journalists were willing to accuse the R.B. of political violence but were less engaged in analyzing, scrutinizing and understanding the process involved in adopting terrorism as a means for political objectives.

As we have seen most articles were written in the Canadian press in 1978, eight years following the emergence of the R.B. Canadian media attention focused on the R.B. only when political violence reached a climactic point; the abduction and assassination of Aldo Moro. Information was already available on the R.B. but mainly in scholarly material. News stories, as seen, were based mainly on interviews and not on documents. The press rarely made use of this type of information.

Principally, it was discovered that pluralism, less dependency on news agencies and the use of scholarly information were all positive factors for thorough and interesting coverage of the Red Brigades. These could also be the basic determinants of qualitative and informational reportage in the Canadian's press coverage of international events.

A second hypothesis in this research was tested and disproved. The impact of language on news content was generally insignificant and we presumed differences were based on other determinants not included in the bivariate relationship. We conclude that English and French coverage of the R.B. differed slightly in content. The main differences uncovered were mostly based on space profile and newsgathering processes. The French had a greater amount of news items on the events and also had the tendency to use more than one source for its news stories. It also had, in general, more text than the English press. We found more diversity in English coverage and this can be due to the greater variety of English newspapers in the the media. The English press engaged more in sensational reportage but this can also be based on their greater use of correspondents and of American

wire services which were considered more subjective than the European news agencies.

Solutions to the problem of international news coverage emerged throughout the process of this research. We suggest that news organizations use international news agencies as tools, supplementary to the coverage of events. Correspondants and journalists should rely on these agencies only for description and on other sources for analysis, as for example, professionals (professors, other journalists) or scholarly documents. Banks of data on specific subjects could also be kept in news organizations. These could be furnished regularly by the use of scholarly material or special interviews with professionals.

We would like to add that, content analysis, as a method to test the hypotheses outlined above was shown to be ideal. It permitted us to see in some detail what had and had not been printed in the Canadian press. Yet, basing oneself on content analysis alone we were limited in identifying and understanding the whole process of agenda-setting used by Canadian newspapers. In this research we have chosen to study the final product of communication (news items), but interviews with journalists and editors

would have been a useful and supplementary method to use in order to understand fully the agenda-setting function of the Canadian press in foreign news coverage.

FOOTNOTES

1. To be able to estimate the value of an Italian lira we can say that 1000 liras is approximately one Canadian dollar.
2. Authorship in the context of this thesis is the news agency or the individual (correspondent, journalist) writing the news item. There are four main authors on the Red Brigades in the Canadian press and they are Reuter, American Wire Services, Agence France Presse and journalists or authors identified by name.

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APPENDIX A
CODING MANUAL

A: SETTING

- V-1(A-1). What is the title of the newspaper or magazine?
- | | | |
|------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1) Gazette | 2) Montreal Star | 3) Globe & Mail |
| 4) Vancouver Sun | 5) Winnipeg Free Press | 6) Toronto Star |
| 7) Le Devoir | 8) La Presse | 9) Soleil |
| 10) Macleans | | |
- V-2(A-2). In what language is the article written?
- | | |
|-----------|------------|
| 1) French | 2) English |
|-----------|------------|
- V-3(A-3). Date of the issue (month)?
- V-4(A-4). Date of the issue (year)?
- V-5(A-5). Where is the newspaper or magazine issued?
- | | | |
|------------------|------------|----------------------|
| 1) Quebec | 2) Ontario | 3) Western Provinces |
| 4) Across Canada | | |
- V-6(A-6). How would you define the title of the article?
1. Factual/Neutral
 2. Moderate with some sensationalism
 3. Sensational
- V-7(A-7). On what page and section is the article situated?
3 digit value (2 first digits = page, 3rd = section)
1. Front Page
 2. Section World News
 3. First section of the paper
 4. Editorial Page
 5. Last section of the paper
 6. Other (Le Monde en Bref, Dossiers)
- V-8(A-8). Where is the article situated on the page?
1. Top of the page
 2. Top upper right
 3. Top upper left
 4. Middle of the page
 5. Bottom
 6. Bottom right
 7. Bottom left
 8. Bottom middle
 9. Whole page
- V-9(A-9). Where is the article situated in relation to the newspaper or magazine?
1. Place of importance
 2. Neutral
 3. Place of non-importance

- V-10(A-10). How much space is allocated to the article?
1. Less than $\frac{1}{4}$ of a page
 2. $\frac{1}{4}$ of a page
 3. A bit more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of a page
 4. $\frac{1}{2}$ a page
 5. One page
 6. More than one page

- V-11(A-11). What is the length of the article?*
1. 50-70 words
 2. 100-175 words
 3. 250-275 words
 4. 350-400 words
 5. 500-600 words
 6. 750-800 words
 7. 900-1000 words
 8. more than 1000 words

* The no. of words in an article can be calculated by the no. of words per line multiplied by the no. of lines in one column. Then you multiply the total by the number of columns of the same length. This gives a better precision of the length of the article.

- V-12(A-12). If there is any visual supplement with the written text of what type is it?
1. photograph
 2. cartoon
 3. drawing
 4. both cartoon & photos
 0. None/not relevant

- V-13(A-13). How much space does the picture occupy in relation to the written text?
1. 25% or $\frac{1}{4}$
 2. 50% or $\frac{1}{2}$
 3. 75% or ?
 0. None/not relevant

- V-14(A-14). Where is the picture situated in the article?
1. Upper left
 2. Upper right
 3. Bottom left
 4. Bottom right
 5. Left half
 6. Right half
 7. Middle
 8. Top half
 9. Bottom half
 10. In the case of two pictures at both extremes
 11. Both on the top upper left
 12. Both upper right
 13. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 = follow pattern of first categories
 20. other (opposite)
 00. Not relevant

B: CONTENT

- V-15(B-1). When did the Red Brigades emerge?
1. 1969
 2. 1970
 3. Other (1971, 1972 or more)
 4. Not mentioned
- V-16(B-2). Where did the Red Brigades emerge?
1. Milano
 2. Trento
 3. Metropolitan or Urban Context
 4. Northern Italy
 5. Other
 0. Not mentioned
- V-17(B-3). How did the Red Brigades emerge?
1. Split with the CPM
 2. Split with the Nouvelle Resistance
 3. Split with Potere Operaio
 4. Revolutionary Groups
 5. Other
 6. Split with Workers
 0. Not mentioned
- V-18(B-4). Why did the Red Brigades emerge?
1. Consequences of the 1968 events
 2. Dissatisfaction with the Communist Party
 3. Dissatisfaction with the Christian Democrats
 4. Reaction to the neo-Fascist terrorist groups
 5. Italy's social unrest (overcrowded universities, unemployment)
 6. Other
 0. Not mentioned
- V-19(B-5). Does the article address aspects of the R.B. organization?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-20(B-6). What is mentioned about the organization?
1. Type of organization/infrastructure
 2. Role of its members
 3. Recruitment
 4. Number of members
 5. Rules of Conduct
 6. Operations
 7. Some of the above
 0. Not relevant
- V-21(B-7) What are the financial sources of the organization?
1. Illegal sources (ex.: robberies, abductions...)
 2. Assistance from other terrorist groups
 3. Assistance from other nations
 4. Other (More than one of the above)
 0. Not mentioned

- V-22(B-8). Who controls the distribution of funds?
1. Red Brigades
 2. Other governments
 3. Other
 0. Not mentioned
- V-23(B-9). Where do the Red Brigades furnish themselves with military equipment?
1. Internal traffic of arms
 2. Other terrorist groups
 3. Special agencies (international terrorism)
 4. More than one of the above
 5. Other
 0. Not mentioned
- V-24(B-10). What type of ideology do the Red Brigades promulgate?
1. Marxism-Leninism
 2. Maoism
 3. Fascism
 4. Other
 5. Leftist (extrême gauche)
 0. Not mentioned
- V-25(B-11). What is the Red Brigades' goal?
1. Revolution
 2. Civil War/War
 3. Overthrow, Hit, Fight the State
 4. Establish Communism
 5. Anarchy
 6. Other (ex.: International Terrorism)
 7. Demonstrate the weaknesses of the State
 0. Not mentioned
- V-26(B-12). To what extent do the Red Brigades want to establish communism as an alternative system?
1. Domestic/Italy
 2. European
 3. Worldwide
 4. Both Domestic and European
 0. Not mentioned
- V-27(B-13). Are the targets mentioned?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-28(B-14). Who or what are the targets?
1. Political Figures
 2. Managers/Entrepreneurs
 3. Journalists
 4. Jurists/Lawyers/Judges
 5. Property
 6. Military Personnel
 7. Professors
 8. Aldo Moro
 9. Other (Syndicalists, Prison Guards, Police)
 0. Not mentioned

- V-29(B-15). Does the article mention specific names?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-30(B-16). Does the article mention previous or other victims?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-31(B-17). Does the article mention the way the targets are wounded or killed?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-32(B-18). How much space is allocated to the description of the sequence of events in relation to the rest?
Write down the percentage ex.: 10 = 2 digit value
- V-33(B-19). What are the tactics used by the Red Brigades?
1. Arson
2. Damage to property
3. Intimidation/Threats
4. Wounding
5. Knee-capping
6. Bombing
7. Killing
8. Kidnapping
9. Some of the above
0. Not mentioned
- V-34(B-20). What is the strategy used by the Red Brigades?
1. People's prison
2. Selective violence
3. Use of Surprise
4. Other (ex.: guerrilla tactics)
5. Use of tension
0. Not mentioned
- V-35(B-21). What are the reasons for terrorist activities?
1. Create disorder/Social Disorder
2. Put some pressure on the State/Defy or destabilize the State
3. Demonstrate the tyranny of the State
4. Destruction of the servants of Capitalism/Imperialism
5. Financial Support
6. Other (ex.: attack on U.S.A.)
0. Not mentioned
- V-36(B-22). Does the article talk about international contacts?
1. Yes
2. No

- V-37(B-23). Which non-Italian terrorist groups are mentioned?
1. R.A.F. (Germany)
 2. O.L.P. (Middle East)
 3. I.R.A. (Ireland)
 4. E.T.A. (France)
 5. Other (ex.: several terrorist groups)
 0. Not relevant
- V-38(B-24). What is the reason invoked for international contacts?
1. Arm Supply
 2. Ideological Links
 3. Training/Guerrilla Tactics
 4. International Terrorism
 5. Other
 0. Not mentioned
- V-39(B-25). Does the article mention internal contacts between the Red Brigades and other Italian terrorist groups?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-40(B-26). Which other Italian groups are mentioned?
1. Autonomes
 2. Armed Proletarian Cells
 3. Lotta Continua
 4. Fascist groups
 5. Other (ex.: more than one of the above, Mafia, Prima Linea)
 0. Not relevant/not mentioned
- V-41(B-27). Does the article mention terrorist activities other than R.B. in Italy?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-42(B-28). Does the article address the issue of social unrest (ex.: manifestations) in Italy due to terrorism?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-43(B-29). How does the State respond to Terrorism and specifically to the Red Brigades?
1. Laws/legal means (trials, special laws)
 2. Police Intervention/military force
 3. Special Squads/Secret Services
 4. Political Agenda
 5. Other
 6. Refusal to negotiate with the R.B.
 0. Not mentioned
- V-44(B-30). Does the article comment on the political context in Italy?
1. Yes
 2. No

- V-45(B-31). What are the political issues addressed?
1. Historic Compromise (Alliance between P.C.I. & C.D.)
 2. Corruption in political parties/Scandals
 3. Conservative Government/Stagnant & Unchanging Government
 4. State unrest due to Terrorism
 5. Other
 0. Not mentioned
- V-46(B-32). Does the article mention Italy's social context?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-47(B-33). What are the social issues addressed?
1. Unemployment
 2. Change in social values
 3. Poverty
 4. Workers & Unions
 5. Economic Crisis
 6. Other
 0. Not mentioned
- V-48(B-34). Are the members of the Red Brigades discussed?
1. Yes
 2. No
- Which members' characteristics are mentioned?
- V-49(B-35). Age
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-50(B-36). Class Background
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-51(B-37). Birthplace/Origin
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-52(B-38). Family
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-53(B-39). Psychology
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-54(B-40). Role in the group
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-55(B-41). Relations with other members
1. Yes
 2. No

- V-56(B-42). Studies/Profession
1. Yes
2. No
- V-57(B-43). Is the First Generation Red Brigades distinguished from the Second Generation?
1. Yes
2. No.
- V-58(B-44). Does the article talk about change of tactics through time?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-59(B-45). Does the article mention public opinion?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-60(B-46). What is the article's approach toward the Red Brigades?
1. Approval
2. Sympathize with the cause
3. Disapproval of terrorism
4. Condemns Terrorism
5. Neutral
6. Other
0. Cannot say
- V-61(B-47). Does the article mention anything about the thinkers of Terrorism such as Toni Negri?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-62(B-48). Does the article talk of the future of terrorism?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-63(B-49). What does the picture, if any, represent?
1. Terrorists
2. Political leaders
3. Victims
4. Other (ex.: citizens)
5. Both terrorists and victims
6. Police
0. Not mentioned
- V-64(B-50). What does the subject of the photo express or makes one feel?
1. Drama
2. Seriousness
3. Joy
4. Tenderness
5. Other
0. Not relevant

C: SOURCE & COMPOSITION OF MEDIA CONTENT

- V-65(C-1). Are the sources of information mentioned?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-66(C-2). Is the Italian Press cited or used as a direct source?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-67(C-3). Is a correspondant or journalist author of the news item?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-68(C-4). Are documentary sources (reports, special publications) used?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-69(C-5). How many sources are used in the news item?
 1. One
 2. Two
 3. Three
 4. Four
 5. More than 4
 0. Not mentioned
- V-70(C-6). Which international agencies are used?
 Is the AFP used as a source?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-71(C-7). Is Reuter used as a source?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-72(C-8). Is UPI/American wire services used as a source?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-73(C-9). Is the Canadian Press used as a source?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-74(C-10). What type of sources are used in the news item?
 Are interviews or comments included?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-75(C-11). Are terrorists' terms or comments included?
 1. Yes
 2. No
- V-76(C-12). Are other news items cited or discussed?
 1. Yes
 2. No

- V-77(C-13). Are government documents used?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-78(C-14). Are police documents or information used?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-79(C-15). Are analysts' comments or scholarly information used?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-80(C-16). In the case of opinions, attitudes on events who gives them?
Victims?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-81(C-17). Victim's Relatives?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-82(C-18). Victim's Friends?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-83(C-19). Political Leaders
1. Yes
2. No
- V-84(C-20). Police?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-85(C-21). Citizens/Witnesses
1. Yes
2. No
- V-86(C-22). Professionals (Lawyers, Professors, Journalists, etc..)?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-87(C-23). Other (ex.: Otan, observers, Pope)?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-88(C-24). Would you call this article a news item?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-89(C-25). Would you call this article an editorial?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-90(C-26). Would you call this article a commentary?
1. Yes
2. No

- V-91(C-27). Does the article proceed in a chronological manner?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-92(C-28). Does the article create an atmosphere or tone at the beginning or end of the article?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-93(C-29). Is there plenty of details and description of the events in the article?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-94(C-30). Is there some analysis in the article?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-95(C-31). Does the article focus on ...
People (victims, terrorists, political leaders)?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-96(C-32). Events (Date, Time)?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-97(C-33). Confusion Terrorism creates?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-98(C-34). Political Context?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-99(C-35). Violent Context?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-100(C-36). Italian Social Problems?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-101(C-37). What does the article focus on?
1. Cause of terrorism
2. Terrorism/Criminal events
3. Terrorism/Political events
4. Consequences of terrorism/Crisis in Italy
5. Arrests/Legal procedures/Trial/Search/Police
6. People's reactions (ex.: political leaders)
7. Other
8. Victims

- V-102(C-38). How is the violence in the article depicted?
1. Political violence
 2. Criminal violence
 3. Creative violence
 4. Cannot say
- V 103(C-39). How are terrorists named?
Terrorists?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-104(C-40). Guerrillas?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-105(C-41). Murderers/Bandits/Kidnappers ?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-106(C-42). Revolutionaries?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-107(C-43). Extremists?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-108(C-44). Red Brigades?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-109(C-45). Other (ex.: commando)?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-110(C-46). Are some of the names for terrorists repeated more than two times?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-111(C-47). Does the article mention different types of terrorism?
1. Yes
 2. No
- V-112(C-48). Which type of terrorism is mentioned?
1. Insurgent terrorism
 2. National terrorism
 3. Transnational terrorism
 4. Revolutionnary
 5. State
 6. Other (ex.: Right-Wing. More than one)
 7. Black/Noir
 8. Red/Rouge
 9. Not mentioned

- V-113(C-49). Does the article offer different perspectives on terrorist events?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-114(C-50). Does the article propose, in some way or another, solutions to terrorism?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-115(C-51). Does the reader become aware of terrorism in Italy with this article?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-116(C-52). Does the reader understand terrorism (process, motives, etc...) after reading the article?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-117(C-53). Which W's were answered?
Was the what answered?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-118(C-54). Was the when answered?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-119(C-55). Was the where answered?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-120(C-56). Was the who answered?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-121(C-57). Was the why answered?
1. Yes
2. No
- V-122(C-58). In general how would you define the approach towards terrorism in this article?
1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

APPENDIX B

DETAILS OF THE CODING PROCESS

To understand the rules and procedures involved during the coding process, this appendix intends to define the criteria and reasoning which led to the selection of data for specific variables. One can also consult the coding manual in Appendix A for further reference.

According to the coding manual, Appendix B has been divided into three sections. The first section deals with the presentation of articles, the second with the content of articles and the third with the news gathering process.

First Section

V-6(A-6)

How would you define the title of the article?

Three categories were created for this variable: factual, moderate-some sensationalism, and sensational.

The categorization of titles is based on the underlying intention apparent in the use of words. This selection of data has semantic implications.

When a title is direct and simply enumerates facts with no apparent interpretation or tone the category chosen is "factual". Here are some examples for the first category:

- 1) "Italie: deuxième attentat contre un journaliste."

- 2) "L'enlèvement du général Dozier."
- 3) "Les suites de l'affaire Dozier."

When a title has some form of interpretation but does not directly label terrorist events, the category chosen is "moderate-some sensationalism". Here are some examples for the second category:

- 1) "La colère monte en Italie."
- 2) "Les B.R. viennent de frapper un noeud."
- 3) "Rude épreuve pour l'Italie."

When a title is directly condemning terrorism or adopts a radical, judgmental tone the category chosen is "sensational". Here are some examples for the third category:

- 1) "Did Moro reveal State secrets before he died?"
- 2) "Bloody Italy."
- 3) "Terrorist 'malaria' in Italy might be traceable to Libya."

V-9(A-9)

Where is the article situated in relation to the newspaper or magazine?

Three categories were set for this variable. "Place of importance" includes the front page of a newspaper, the editorial page, or a special section dedicated to terrorism. The category "neutral" includes both the international news section and the Canadian news section when the subject is Canadian such as Piperno. "Place of non-importance" represents all

those articles on the Red Brigades which were not placed in the world news and were hardly noticeable by Canadian Press readers.

Second Section

V-19-20(B5-6)

Does the article talk about the organization?

What is mentioned about the organization?

Each category for this variable is directly related to the Red Brigades' organization or infrastructure. Isolated terrorist events reported without mention of the organization were not taken account of for this variable. Only when characteristics of the Red Brigades were related to the infrastructure as for example "Roman column" or "rules of conduct" then one or more categories were withheld.

V-27-28(B13-14)

Are the targets mentioned?

Who or what are the targets?

Targets selected are those central to the news story. If an article focuses on "Moro" but also mentions previous victims the target categorized will be "Aldo Moro".

V-33(B-19)What are the tactics used by the Red Brigades?

Similar to V-27-28 the tactic selected was the one used towards the principal target reported in the article. For example an article on Aldo Moro would read "kidnapping" as tactic even if it mentioned that previous victims were kneecapped.

V-35(B-21)What are the reasons for terrorist activities?

This variable answers the question why terrorists engaged in certain terrorist acts. In this case "activities" or "events" are not necessarily related to the Red Brigades' ultimate goal. For example Moro was kidnapped to put some pressure on the State and to free some terrorists in prison but not necessarily for revolution or to overthrow the State.

V-36-38(B-22-24)Does the article talk about international contacts?Which groups are mentioned?What is the reason invoked for these international contacts?

Any mention of other non-Italian terrorist groups was taken into account. Some had links with the Red Brigades and others were mentioned for other reasons. The motive for international contacts had to be clearly stated in the news stories in order to be considered.

V-59(B-45)Does the article mention public opinion?

This variable does not only imply citizens' comments on terrorism but also people's attitude vis-a-vis terrorism. For example if an article mentioned that Italy feared the Red Brigades then public opinion was observed as being a factor in the news item.

V-60(B-46)What is the article's approach toward the Red Brigades?

A high percentage of articles were coded as "neutral" or "cannot say" because categorization implied judgmental values. Only those articles which clearly defined or set forth their positions towards terrorism were coded as "condemns terrorism" or "disapproval of terrorism". Commentaries and editorials were fairly easy to classify but news items in general were coded as "neutral", "cannot say" or "other".

Third SectionV-65(C-1)Are the sources of information mentioned?

The sources of information means the authorship of the news story and not the sources used within the article's content.

V-68(C-4)

Are documentary sources used?

Documentary sources encloses reports, special publications as for example a report written by the Ministry of Defense. Moro's letters, terrorist manifestos or party newspapers were not selected as documentary sources. These documents were classified within other variables. For example party newspapers were considered as governmental information. Terrorist manifestos were considered as comments given by terrorists.

V-88-90(C-24-26)

Would you call this article a news item?

Would you call this article an editorial?

Would you call this article a commentary?

A news item is an article which is or appears as objective. The author has not given his opinion on events. The Five W's (What, When, Where, Who, Why) are generally answered in this form of news. An "editorial" implies an opinion and also an argument regarding the issue addressed. There is often some form of analysis in an editorial. A commentary is somewhat similar to an editorial but does not involve the newspaper itself: it remains an individual opinion on events.

V-92(C-28)

Does the article create an atmosphere or tone at the beginning or end of the article?

When a news item begins a story with a certain tone implying a position towards terrorist events, an atmosphere is created. For example a news story beginning with Italy. A country broken into a million pieces, as if someone has just blown it up and left the treasures mixed in with the debris..." or "If Hercules were around today, Italian police would do well to hire him" would definitely be coded as having reported the news with a certain negative tone.

V-94(C-30)

Is there some analysis in the article?

Analysis is obtained or existent when a news item presents the underlying forces affecting Italy's terrorism. It needs to address the cause and effects of terrorism and to some extent consider the social, historical, and global context in which the Red Brigades' terrorist events occur.

V-97(C-33)

Does the article focus on... Confusion terrorism creates?

This variable refers to the consequences of terrorism which lead to confusion and disorder in the Italian society.

V-102(C-45)How are terrorists named?

The variable "Other" implied all names given to the Red Brigades with a political connotation. For example "gauchistes", "intellectuels sans visage", "commando", "brigadistes", or "parti armé" were all names categorized as Other.

V-113(C-49)Does the article offer different perspectives on terrorist events?

When an article presented more than one perspective on terrorist events then the article was perceived as pluralist. For example if a news item mentioned more than one cause for terrorism in general it was considered to be pluralistic.

V-114(C-50)Does the article, propose, in some way or another, solutions to terrorism?

If an article proposed some solutions to terrorism such as special laws, then the article was reporting indirectly the means to eliminate terrorism. Only when laws were directly related to the desintegration of terrorism were these seen as solutions.

V-115(C-51)Does the reader become aware of terrorism in Italy with this article?

When an article reported political violence or terrorism in Italy due to several terrorist groups including the Red Brigades then this allowed the reader to become aware of the existence of Italian terrorist groups operating simultaneously. Italy was not only the target of the Red Brigades alone but of various pressure groups including other terrorist organizations.

V-116(C-52)Does the reader understand terrorism (process, motives, etc...) after reading the article?

This article mentioned the process and development of the Red Brigades. Both cause and effects had to be explicit in the news content. These motives and reasons for engaging in terrorist acts had to be related to terrorism as a means for an end.

V-117-121(C-53-57)What? When? Where? Who? Why?

The five W's in news coverage are usually covered by sources in news items. As a journalistic principle the 5 W's are to be answered when an author, news agency or correspondent covers an event.