

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| LIST OF TABLES | 1 |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER ONE | |
| INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF STRIKE ACTIVITY | 7 |
| The Ross and Irwin Study | 7 |
| The Ross and Hartman Thesis | 9 |
| Ingham's Strikes and Industrial Conflict | 11 |
| Industrial Diversity: The Critical Variable | 19 |
| CHAPTER TWO | |
| INDUSTRIAL DIVERSITY AND STRIKES | 24 |
| Research Design | 24 |
| Results | 28 |
| CHAPTER THREE | |
| UNION STRENGTH: ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS | 33 |
| Membership Comparisons | 36 |
| The Effects of Union Multiplicity | 41 |
| The Impact of Works Councils | 44 |
| Unions and Politics | 46 |
| CHAPTER FOUR | |
| EMPLOYER STRENGTH: SOME CONSIDERATIONS | 50 |
| CHAPTER FIVE | |
| THE STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ITS SCOPE, FORMS AND CONSEQUENCES: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS | 57 |
| The Scope of Collective Bargaining | 59 |
| Forms of Collective Bargaining | 63 |
| Some Consequences of Centralized Forms of Collective Bargaining | 66 |
| Some Consequences of Decentralized Forms of Collective Bargaining | 70 |

CHAPTER SIX

INDUSTRIAL DIVERSITY: THE EFFECT ON TRADE UNIONS,
EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND FORMS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 76

CHAPTER SEVEN

HIGH DIVERSITY AND DECENTRALIZED PATTERNS OF
ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND ITALY 79

Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining:
United States 81
Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining: Canada 90
Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining: Italy 99

CHAPTER EIGHT

LOW DIVERSITY AND CENTRALIZED PATTERNS OF
ORGANIZATION: NORWAY, WEST GERMANY AND FRANCE 116

Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining: Norway 117
Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining:
West Germany 124
Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining: France 138

CHAPTER NINE

INTERMEDIATE DIVERSITY AND MIXED PATTERNS OF
ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED KINGDOM, AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN 151

Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining:
United Kingdom 154
Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining:
Australia 172
Unions, Employers and Collective Bargaining: Japan 184

CHAPTER TEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 198

REFERENCES 207

LIST OF TABLES

| | | |
|----|---|----|
| 1 | Manufacturing: Days Lost Through Industrial Disputes per 1000 Workers (Yearly: 1966-1975) | 6 |
| 2 | Manufacturing: Days Lost Through Industrial Disputes per 1000 Workers (4, 5 and 10-year Averages) | 6 |
| 3 | Concentration and Time Lost From Industrial Disputes - 1966 | 18 |
| 4 | Proportion of Labour Force Engaged in Manufacturing - 1972 | 25 |
| 5 | Rankings by Average: Diversity and Time Loss From Industrial Disputes: 1966-69, 1970-73 and 1966-73 | 29 |
| 6 | Correlation Coefficient by Indicating the Relationship Between Industrial Diversity and Man-Days Lost From International Disputes - 1966-73 | 31 |
| 7 | Union Membership According to Different Sources | 37 |
| 8 | Union Membership According to National Sources - 1972 | 38 |
| 9 | Union Membership: Manufacturing | 39 |
| 10 | Union Membership: Manual and White-Collar, Private Sector | 40 |
| 11 | Percentages of Strikes by Major Issues Involved in Three Countries - 1946-66 | 61 |
| 12 | Duration of Strikes, Manufacturing Sector - 1966-72, Yearly Average | 80 |
| 13 | Union Membership in the United States in 1972 | 82 |
| 14 | Employer Unit in Agreements Covering 2000 Workers or More - 1971, United States | 85 |

| | | |
|-----|---|-----|
| 15 | Union Membership by Type of Union and Affiliation, Canada, 1972 | 91 |
| 16 | Collective Agreements for 500 Workers or More by Bargaining Unit, Canada | 95 |
| 17 | Labour Dispute Trends in the United States, Canada and Italy: 1966-75, All Industries | 114 |
| 18 | Labour Dispute Trends in the United States, Canada and Italy: 1966-75, Manufacturing | 115 |
| 19 | Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions (LO) Membership, 1973 | 118 |
| 20 | Avenue by which Labour Party Leaders Joined Party (in Percentages), Norway | 120 |
| 21a | DGB Members in Political Parties (in Percentages), West Germany | 126 |
| 21b | Political Party Members in DGB (in Percentages), West Germany | 126 |
| 22 | German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) Membership, 1972 | 128 |
| 23 | Support for Unions in Elections for Works Councils, France | 139 |
| 24 | Labour Dispute Trends in Norway, West Germany and France: 1966-75, All Industries | 149 |
| 25 | Labour Dispute Trends in Norway, West Germany and France: 1966-75, Manufacturing | 150 |
| 26 | Membership of Trade Unions by Size of Membership, United Kingdom | 155 |
| 27 | Unionization in Large Manufacturing Establishments, 1948 and 1974, United Kingdom | 156 |
| 28 | Union Membership and Density in Manufacturing, 1974, United Kingdom | 157 |
| 29a | Distribution of Votes within the Trade Union Congress, 1973; United Kingdom | 158 |
| 29b | Distribution of Votes within the Labour Party Conference, 1973, United Kingdom | 158 |

| | | |
|----|---|-----|
| 30 | Average Number of People Engaged per Establishment in Manufacturing, Six Countries | 164 |
| 31 | Reasons Given for Official and Non-Official Strikes, 1964-66, United Kingdom | 166 |
| 32 | Authorization of Strikes, All Industries, 1967-74 | 167 |
| 33 | Trade Unions in Australia: Manufacturing, December 1969 and 1971 | 175 |
| 34 | Percentage Distribution of Causes of Strikes in Australia, 1960-70 | 179 |
| 35 | Total Number of Unions and Membership in Japan: All Unions: 1966-73, Manufacturing 1973 and Three Largest Sectors | 185 |
| 36 | Estimated Rate of Union Organization in the Private Sector by Size of Establishment, 1969, Japan | 187 |
| 37 | Collective Agreements, Japan | 191 |
| 38 | Rate of Conclusion of Collective Agreements by Size of Union, Japan | 192 |
| 39 | Labour Dispute Trends in the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan: 1966-75, All Industries | 196 |
| 40 | Labour Dispute Trends in the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan: 1966-75, Manufacturing | 197 |

INTRODUCTION

Industrial conflict and, more particularly, strikes as an overt expression of industrial strife, are a feature common to the industrial relations in most democratic, capitalist industrialized societies.

The disruptive effects of strikes, as well as the attention they receive from the mass media and politicians may create the impression that they are a serious problem. The view that trade unions are too powerful, or that bargaining systems are inadequate is frequently expressed in this context. On the other hand, industrial relations experts quite often point at the limited economic impact of strikes as a percentage of total working time or in comparison to days lost to industrial accidents, illness and absenteeism for other reasons. Furthermore, losses in productivity through workers' apathy, job dissatisfaction, labour turnover or other manifestations of discontent cannot be easily measured, but are known to be considerable.

Whether one considers strikes to be a serious problem or not, international comparisons among countries with similar industrial structures will help to give some perspective to the assertions made about strikes and may provide some explanations for differences in strike rates among comparable industrialized nations.

It has been shown that strike activity differs considerably from one country to another and it appears that some countries show a persistently high rate of conflict expressed through strikes, while in other countries strike action is minimal. Why then do some countries display a consistently high rate of strike activity in comparison to others?

Earlier international studies (Ross and Irwin, 1951; Ross and Hartman, 1960) have sought to explain differences in strike activity in terms of the acceptance of the labour union, the development of more stable institutions for the regulation of conflict and the growing importance of the state in the area of industrial relations. Other factors frequently advanced for the differences in strike activity among countries include: the presence of a labour party, the severity of legal sanctions against illegal strikes, economic variables such as inflation, unemployment rates and expanding or contracting economies. It is clear that all of the above influence the rate of strike activity in many countries. However, neither one nor several of these factors combined seem adequate explanations for the consistency of the differences observed. For example, Norway and Britain have long established, strong labour parties, yet their patterns of strike activity show little resemblance. Australia's system of compulsory arbitration rules out any legal strikes, yet strikes continue to be frequent and are increasing in length. Inflation continues to be a feature

of most of the countries in the western world, whose economies are becoming more and more integrated, and it does not seem to be an acceptable explanation for widely varying rates of conflict.

Although the above variables may explain an increase or decrease in national rates of strike activity, they do not appear to be sufficient explanations for the consistently high or low ranking of countries on an international scale of strike activity (see tables 1 and 2, page 6).

What all of the above variables have in common is that they are external to the participants in the bargaining process. In other words, they are all environmental constraints, somehow limiting or expanding the bargaining power of unions and employers. Such explanations fail to take into account more basic, structural characteristics influencing the development of the two principal participants in the collective bargaining process -- unions and employers' organizations -- and the subsequent effects of these organizational variables upon the positions of power in the negotiation process.

This study argues that structural differences must be taken into account to arrive at an adequate explanation of international variations in strike activities. It will attempt to establish that the formation of unions and employers' organizations is related to the degree of industrial diversity in a country; more specifically, that a low degree of industrial diversity is conducive to the formation of

unified strong organizations, centralized forms of collective bargaining and a low volume of strike activity, conversely, a high degree of diversity will result in a complex, fragmented organizational structure of unions and employers, decentralized forms of collective bargaining and a high volume of conflict.

The model of analysis is based upon conflict and conditions leading to a balance of power. Where large homogeneous, powerful organizations emerge, unrestrained industrial conflict is unlikely to occur and normative regulation of conflict becomes a more viable alternative.

The need for more attention to structural variables in relation to the institutionalization of conflict was most recently emphasized by G. Ingham (1974) in his monograph on British and Scandinavian systems of industrial relations.

This thesis further pursues some of the implications of Ingham's suggestions and it will attempt to refine its applicability. After a review of some of the studies in this field an analysis of the relationship between industrial diversity and strikes will be presented. Because of problems associated with an international comparative analysis in particular the availability of equivalent classifications, the number of countries to be analyzed is limited to nine and is restricted to the manufacturing sector.

Following the aggregate statistical analysis of the relationship between industrial diversity and strike action,

other factors affecting the homogeneity and strength of unions as well as employers' organizations will be examined. It will be argued that these variables in conjunction with the structural characteristics account for variations in forms of collective bargaining. Once in place, these systems produce their own particular effects and, thus, influence the rates and severity of strikes as well.

Taking into account the above considerations, the effect of industrial diversity on unions, employers' associations and forms of collective bargaining will be examined in more detail in chapters six to ten. Since industrial diversity is the basic structural variable, the countries have been divided into three groups in accordance with their ranking on the scale of diversity as used in the correlation analysis of diversity and strike activity.

This study should not be regarded as a comprehensive review of collective bargaining or international strike activity. Its focus is on one particular structural characteristic, industrial diversity, and some additional related variables. It is meant to be a contribution to the development of a more comprehensive framework for explaining differences in strike activity among industrialized nations.

The findings suggest that the structure of industry ought to take an important place within such framework and, ultimately, provides the parameters within which different forms of institutionalized conflict resolution will be successful or not.

Table 1

MANUFACTURING
DAYS LOST THROUGH INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES PER 1000 WORKERS, YEARLY

| Countries | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Italy | 1682 | 595 | 957 | 4486 | 1856 | 1126 | 1749 | 2785 | 1908 | 1552 |
| Canada | 1139 | 1125 | 2136 | 1479 | 2028 | 859 | 1101 | 1715 | 2378 | 2955 |
| US | 713 | 1429 | 1213 | 1195 | 1964 | 995 | 643 | 713 | 1172 | N/A |
| Australia | 256 | 286 | 377 | 646 | 712 | 629 | 702 | 1020 | 2509 | 1290 |
| UK | 107 | 181 | 421 | 477 | 719 | 804 | 996 | 717 | 938 | 626 |
| France | 201 | 414 | N/A | 181 | 207 | 355 | 292 | 329 | 283 | 495 |
| Japan | 142 | 97 | 127 | 162 | 192 | 299 | 199 | 171 | 381 | 341 |
| Norway | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 71 | 5 | 1 | 16 | 668 | 12 |
| W.Germany | 2 | 9 | 3 | 19 | 8 | 421 | 6 | 57 | 61 | 3 |

Source: Derived from data published by the International Labour Office in the 1970, 1973, and 1976 editions of the Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva.

Table 2

MANUFACTURING
DAYS LOST THROUGH INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES PER 1000 WORKERS
4, 5 and 10 year averages

| Countries | 1966-69 average* | R a n k | 1970-73 average* | R a n k | 1966-70 average | R a n k | 1971-75 average | R a n k | 1966-75 average | R a n k |
|-----------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Italy | 1930 | 1 | 1879 | 1 | 1915 | 1 | 1824 | 1 | 1870 | 1 |
| Canada | 1470 | 2 | 1426 | 2 | 1582 | 2 | 1801 | 2 | 1692 | 2 |
| US | 1138 | 3 | 1079 | 3 | 1303 | 3 | 880 | 4 | 1115 | 3 |
| Australia | 391 | 4 | 766 | 5 | 455 | 4 | 1230 | 3 | 843 | 4 |
| UK | 297 | 5 | 809 | 4 | 381 | 5 | 816 | 5 | 599 | 5 |
| France | 265 | 6 | 296 | 6 | 253 | 6 | 351 | 6 | 302 | 6 |
| Japan | 132 | 7 | 215 | 7 | 144 | 7 | 278 | 7 | 211 | 7 |
| Norway | 1 | 9 | 23 | 9 | 19 | 8 | 140 | 8 | 80 | 8 |
| W.Germany | 8 | 8 | 123 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 109 | 9 | 59 | 9 |

*Columns one and two coincide with data available for industrial diversity, which will be dealt with in chapter two.

Source: Derived from data published by the International Labour Office in the 1970, 1973 and 1976 editions of the Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva.

CHAPTER ONE

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF STRIKE ACTIVITY

1. The Ross and Irwin Study

In 1951 Ross and Irwin measured and compared the volume and trends of strike activity in five countries. In doing so, they intended to shed light on such issues as: the effect of older and more powerful labour movements on the frequency and the length of strikes, the economic and political institutions conducive to a high or low volume of strike activity, and theories explaining the underlying causes of strikes (Ross and Irwin, 1951).

Although the authors believe that the aging of unions and the improvement of bargaining procedures lead to a reduction in strike activity, their facts suggest that these factors "are not in themselves any guarantee that abiding stability of industrial relations will be achieved" (ibid.:336). They conclude on the basis of their data that in three of the five countries studied (United States, Canada and Australia), the strike has not been withering away and that only in Great Britain and Sweden there has been a tendency for strikes to disappear (ibid.).

The divergent trends in strikes are subsequently

explained as a consequence of " ... the differences in the position of the union and the union leader." (ibid.: 336,337) Ross and Irwin conclude that strike activity would decline if unionism were fully accepted by employers, if there were a united labour movement, if duplicated jurisdictional claims were eliminated, if union membership were compulsory, if union political machines were well entrenched, if the collective bargaining structure were more tightly cartelized and if a labour party were established (ibid.:340).

Most of these solutions seem to be related to the particular problems of American unions and the solutions suggested seem to be answers to more immediate problems rather than underlying causes. Moreover, both in Britain and Sweden, where strike activity had declined, there is a strong labour party and a more centralized bargaining structure. This may have led the authors to believe that the absence of such features is one of the underlying causes that strike activity has not withered away in North-America. However, Ross and Irwin conclude that such solutions may well be deemed too excessive (ibid.:341). Indeed, they would probably agree that transplanting some of the apparently successful features of the European industrial relations systems would not be a solution to the problem of strikes in Canada or the United States. This suggests that there are other more permanent characteristics in these countries which would account for their particular strike patterns.

2. The Ross and Hartman Thesis

The sequel to Ross and Irwin's paper is the study of international trends in industrial conflict: Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, Ross and Hartman, 1960. Ross and Hartman examine the trends of strike activity in fifteen "non-communist" countries and "explore differences in trends and the meaning of strikes between one country and another" (ibid.:8). They used a number of measures to compare strike activity in these countries, but they state that two of the six comparative measures used are particularly useful to describe distinctive patterns of industrial conflict: membership involvement ratio (percentage of union members going on strike), and the duration of strikes (days lost per striker). A third, the membership loss ratio (working days lost per 100 union members), is helpful in combining the effect of changes in the degree of participation and the duration of strikes.

Ross and Hartman believe that the decline in strike activity was the result of a sort of maturing process affecting the approach of both unions and management in collective bargaining, as well as the growth of more or less elaborate bargaining procedures and the increased role of the state in this area. The authors' thesis, "the withering away of the strike", was probably more based on a theoretical analysis of historical developments of industrial relations in the various countries than on the analysis of their data. Many criticisms

regarding the way the authors compiled and handled their data can be made:

- The data are grouped in three periods with great differences in length (1900-1929; 1930-1947; 1948-1956). As Ingham argues, the strike data could very well be presented in a way which does not reflect "such a startling and uniform decline" (Ingham, 1972:12).

- The data is relatively crude. The authors recognize the shortcomings (and supply an exhaustive list of sources of data and methods of making estimates), but when they say: "... these figures are not precise in every instance" (Ross and Hartman, 1960:9), this would have to be considered an understatement.

- The limited reliability of the data was undermined further by using union membership figures as the common denominator in what they consider to be their most important measures. Even today with more sophisticated methods of data collection exact union membership figures are very hard to come by. One cannot assume that figures going back to the early 1900's have any reasonable degree of reliability. The prime examples of this problem are France and Italy. No reliable figures of union membership are available, even today, and estimated figures vary as much as two million members (France; 2.5 million to 5 million; Italy: 4 to 6 million, see Kassalow, 1969; Barkin, 1975). The inaccuracies in the membership figures are magnified by the fact that union

membership involvement ratios include non-union members going on strike. Where short, politically oriented strikes occur frequently, an exaggeratedly high percentage of involvement emerges, because workers are counted each time they go on strike. Furthermore, an increase in union membership would have the effect of lowering the involvement ratio. This membership involvement ratio is with strike duration the authors' most important measure in analyzing strike activity (Ross and Hartman, 1960:13). Altogether, the unreliable union membership figures and the inconsistencies in the membership involvement ratios rule out any valid conclusions.

Statements such as: "The strike has been going out of style -- This proportion (the number of strikers in relation to the number of union members) has fallen off sharply -- Strikes that do occur have been growing much shorter" (ibid.:4,42) can readily be proven wrong. Even though the authors did not consider these trends to apply to all countries, judging other data (Hyman, 1972:84; Barkin, 1975:371) the strike can hardly be said to be withering away and quite often seems to be "flourishing rather than withering." (Eldridge, 1968:40).

3. Ingham's Strikes and Industrial Conflict

Ingham in Strikes and Industrial Conflict also deals with the institutionalization of conflict. He focusses on the contrast (rather than similarity) between Britain and

Scandinavia. He states that: "... Ross and Hartman's conclusions are in need of significant modifications" (Ingham, 1974:9). Ingham makes an attempt to account in general terms for observed variations in the level of institutionalization by reference to important differences in the industrial infrastructure (ibid.:10).

In general, infrastructure refers to "those features of a society's economic and technical system which shape the organization of and the social relationships between those groups engaged in the process of production" (ibid.:10). It is this infrastructure which accounts for the extent of institutionalization of conflict, and not the 'maturation' of organization, the growth of democratic processes, the differences in style and culture (Ross and Hartman, 1960:174), nor a change in personality and attitude of the employer (ibid.:48). According to Ingham, variations in the components of the industrial infrastructure are the key in understanding differences in strike activity among countries. While he agrees with Ross and Hartman that the institutionalization of industrial conflict in the form of "procedural and especially substantive norms" intervenes in the effects of objective economic conditions and expressions of discontent, these forms themselves are "vulnerable when rapid changes occur in material conditions" (ibid.:37). The latter statement implies that "the nature of material conditions ultimately provides the parameters within which different models of institutionalized conflict resolutions will

be effective substitutes for work stoppages" (Smucker and Van Biljouw, 1977:3). The characteristics of "the material conditions" which Ingham regards to be of particular importance are:

- industrial concentration: the degree of economic control within industrial sectors
- technical and organizational structure: the degree of technical and organizational complexity involved in producing goods
- product specialization: the range of goods produced within an economy

Ingham's argument is based on the notion that, in general, small scale societies with economies that are strongly dependent on exports of manufactured goods, tend to have a high degree of concentration within their industrial sectors. In order to be competitive in world markets specialization and economies of scale are imperative, resulting in a relatively small number of large scale employers in each sector. Under such conditions dominant and powerful employers' associations tend to emerge, which are often able to impose normative regulations upon the relationships between employers and labour. They also tend to make "power relations and points of conflict more visible" which in itself favours the growth of formal regulation (Ingham, 1974:42-43). Where there is a low level of concentration, high level of complexity and low product specialization, such developments

are not likely to take place.

A similar process affects the growth and structure of labour organizations. Technological and organizational complexity and low levels of specialization result in a differentiated and fragmented trade union structure. Such a structure is most likely to increase interunion disputes and competition reducing the chances for a solidary and cohesive labour movement.

The combined effects of a structurally complex fragmented trade union movement and a parallel structure of employers' associations inhibits institutionalization.

Ingham's thesis is tested on data from Britain and Sweden. His argument revolves around the effects of market size and the history of industrial development. He uses studies by Pryor (1972) and Bain (1966) to show that industry in Sweden is more highly concentrated. He also draws attention to Pryor's finding that the degree of concentration seems to be inversely related to the size of the domestic market. Small scale societies, more dependent on export of their manufacturing products, have had to specialize to be able to compete internationally. Sharp competition has tended to force out the inefficient, mostly smaller companies. Mechanization and technological and organizational progress have also been more rapid in Sweden, because of the relatively recent industrialization. In contrast, Britain has a much longer history of industrialization. What remains of earlier phases has impeded the introduction of newer, more efficient

methods of production, thereby maintaining the relatively more complex technological and organizational structure.

In the area of product specialization, Ingham concedes that data "are lacking entirely" (ibid.:41). His suggestion is that those nations which arrived on the industrial scene relatively late have had to compete with world markets, which compelled them to specialize in their manufacturing products. Nations which were among the first to industrialize and which possess rather large domestic markets have tended to produce a wider range of goods and were able to develop a more diverse industrial structure. It is this 'wider range of goods', the more diverse industrial structure to which we shall return later.

The greatest difficulty with international comparisons of industrial conflict is the comparability and reliability of the data. While it is not necessarily more difficult to measure labour disputes internationally than other social phenomena (levels of education, crime rates, etc.), it is obvious that extreme caution should be taken with the interpretation of such data. The indices chosen to prove or disprove a theory are essential to the validity of any subsequent conclusions. Ingham, in relying heavily on frequency of strikes seems to have made an unfortunate choice. As has been pointed out (J. Fulcher, Industrial Conflict in Sweden and Britain, A Critical Note, Sociology, Vol. 9, 1975:477) the difference in the definition of a work stoppage, and the

methods used in collecting the data had too much of a distorting effect. A study by Korpe is quoted (ibid.:478), which indicates that the British definition of a strike excluded 93 percent of the strikes recorded by the Swedish unions.

Ingham views the number of disputes as indicative of the relative strength of adherence to normative procedures in conflict resolutions while time loss is a measure of severity. Yet strikes themselves may be normative and/or symbolic expressions of union strength in industrial disputes. Indeed, institutionalized measures to control industrial conflict may only increase the incidence of strikes, a point which Jamieson argues in the case of Canada (Jamieson, 1973: 139). Of course, at some point there is a transition between symbolic strikes and time loss which thereupon can be taken as an index of the severity of the conflict. Thus, Ingham's other measure, number of days lost per 100,000 workers seems a more valuable tool for analysis. Here, the differences in recording strikes would have a less distorting effect, that is, in the case of strike frequency a difference of a few hours in what constitutes a work stoppage or not, could eliminate a substantial number of short strikes. This would strongly affect the number of stoppages, but the effect on the total number of days lost for the year would be less severe.

Ingham's reasoning in the development of centralized

employers' federations has also been subject to criticism: "far from making for organization among employers, it would appear that a near-monopolistic or oligopolistic product market situation implied by high levels of concentration tends to encourage individual action in the form of company and plant bargaining" (Pierson, 1960, quoted in Jackson and Sisson, 1976:316-317). Thus, Jackson and Sisson argue that size of establishments can also militate against employer organization. Larger establishments can exploit their advantages vis-à-vis the smaller ones in terms of lower unit cost and can afford to make concessions when faced with industrial action. The fact that in the United Kingdom the size of establishments in terms of employment are considerably larger than in other industrialized countries eliminated to a large extent the need for organization. Thus, merely dealing with concentration within sectors does not ensure unified groupings, if there exist many different sectors within a given economy. Canada, for example, has extremely high concentration ratios within sectors, but it also has a wide variety of different industrial sectors in large part due to its ties with the United States economy. International comparisons of concentration ratios have been based upon averages of percentage of control by the largest enterprises or establishments e.g., the top four enterprises of the 20 largest establishments, or the number of those units required to account for the most earnings or employment

in comparable industries (Bain, 1966; Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1971; Pryor, 1972). Ingham's interpretation of the relationship between concentration ratios and strike activity may make sense in the case of Britain and Sweden, but it does not seem to apply to Canada. Canada's concentration ratios are similar to Sweden's, yet it has one of the highest strike rates of all major industrialized countries (see table 3).

Table 3

CONCENTRATION AND TIME LOST FROM INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - 1966


| | Four-Firm Average Concentration Ratios as Ratio of US Concentration* | Days Lost per 1,000 Workers in the Manu- facturing Sector** |
|---------------|--|---|
| Italy | 0.97 | 1682 |
| Canada | 1.52 | 1139 |
| United States | 1.00 | 713 |
| France | 0.90 | 201 |
| Japan | 1.05 | 142 |
| Great Britain | 1.04 | 107 |
| West Germany | 0.98 | 2 |
| Sweden | 1.58 | N.A. |

*Source: Pryor (1972).

**Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1970

Industrial Diversity: The Critical Variable

Canada's unique condition of a highly diversified economy with a high degree of concentration within the major sectors suggests that industrial diversity is the fundamental variable in explaining variations in strike activity among nations. This diversity i.e., the distribution of industrial activity over the range of sectors of an economy, is the crucial factor in the formation of unions and employers' associations. The characteristics of these organizations in turn, affect the emergence and stability of particular models of collective bargaining. The logic of explanation among these variables is illustrated in the following figure:



Proceeding from the theoretical premises of Ingham and assuming that in an increasingly more integrated world economy economic conditions have similar effects upon strike activity among comparable nations, the distinguishing variable among them should be the degree of diversity of their industries. Thus, a low degree of diversity would foster the development of strong workers' and employers' organizations. A confrontation of power is likely to ensue with neither side wishing to risk the huge costs of unrestrained industrial conflict. Under such conditions compromise becomes an alternative to confrontation and it is within this setting that normative procedures for the containment of conflict are fully worked out.

Government legislation plays a role as well -- both as a consequence of structural characteristics and as an independent source of influence. For example, Ingham notes that a highly diversified industry is likely to result in fragmented opposition groups and a weak normative structure for conflict resolution unless such a structure is imposed and maintained by a strong authoritarian government (ibid.:43).

With respect to government interference with labour relations the existence of a labour party may have attenuating influences on the rate of industrial conflict in two ways:

- By taking some of the issues out of the area of collective bargaining and pursuing these issues through political channels. As Ross and Irwin point out, demands that would

otherwise be made on the employer are directed towards the government instead (Ross and Irwin, 1951:338).

- If the party is in power, labour unrest is detrimental to the political prosperity of the party. The need to attract votes from non-organized sectors of the population has a restraining influence on trade unions with strong party affiliations.

In the following chapters an attempt will be made to link the issue of diversity, the strength of unions and employers' associations and particular forms of collective bargaining to the rate of strikes in nine industrialized nations. Initial testing suggests that industrial diversity is a significant variable in relation to strike activity. If we assume that countries with a highly diverse industrial structure tend to develop fragmented and heterogeneous labour unions and employers' associations we may expect a relatively high rate of strikes under such circumstances. Considering the increased risk factor in power confrontations between large, homogeneous, powerful unions versus similar employers' associations, a much lower rate of strike activity may be expected in those countries which have a less diverse industrial structure.

The development of formal regulations regarding collective bargaining is similarly related to the structure of industries. In countries with a less diverse industrial structure one would expect to find the formal regulations to be relatively simple but extremely broad in coverage.

Centralization of governing bodies in both union and employers' associations might be expected in this situation. In contrast, countries with highly diverse industrial structures would tend to develop a very much differentiated system of collective bargaining. In such countries one would expect the formal regulations to be very complex in order to allow for specific needs and demands of the many unions and employers' associations in the various industries.

Following the presentation of the data regarding industrial diversity and strike rates in chapter two, the organizational structures and the strength of unions and employers' associations will be analyzed. In simplistic terms one would expect to find large, centralized powerful unions and employers' associations in the least diverse industrial structures and small, relatively less powerful unions and employers' associations in the industrially diverse countries. We will find, of course, that the reality does not lend itself to such a simplistic categorization. In fact, a very detailed analysis of unions and employers' associations is necessary to appreciate the true strength and the extent of centralization and homogeneity of these organizations. Membership rates, multiplicity in organization, the impact of works councils, political affiliations and other factors influencing the strength of unions and employers' associations will be examined in chapters three and four.

Out of the confrontations between unions and employers'

associations normative structures are likely to develop through which conflict is channelled. Assuming that countries with a diverse industrial structure have fragmented, differentiated labour unions and employers' associations, these can be expected to be accompanied by a relatively decentralized structure of collective bargaining. Conversely, countries with a low rate of diversity and large, homogeneous unions and employers' associations would tend to develop centralized institutions to solve labour conflicts. This variable, forms of collective bargaining, is dealt with in chapter five.

Finally, the unions, employers' associations and forms of collective bargaining in each of the nine countries are examined in more detail. The accumulation and analysis of data in those chapters should provide evidence if indeed the link between diversity and strike activity is worth further investigation.

CHAPTER TWO

INDUSTRIAL DIVERSITY AND STRIKES

Research Design

With the increased standardization in classifying industrial sectors in different countries, one is able, within limits, to provide some indices for industrial diversity. The quality of the data on industrial disputes suffers from definitional variations, but they are useful for crude comparisons. Having these caveats in mind two indices for correlational analysis were constructed: structural diversity and severity of industrial disputes. Both measures are limited to the manufacturing sector. The source of data for the measure of diversity was the United Nations publication, The Growth of World Industry, Vol. I. While it has been publishing statistics on economic growth and changes since 1960 with data going back as far as 1938, comparable industrial classifications of the labour force for most western countries are available only since 1966. Of these, equivalent data - in terms of industrial classifications - were found for ten capitalist industrialized countries: Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. About 36 percent or less of the labour force are

employed in the manufacturing sector in each of the ten countries. The percentages of the selected countries are shown in Table 4.

Table 4
PROPORTION OF LABOUR FORCE EMPLOYED
IN MANUFACTURING - 1972

| | Total Labour Force* (thousands) | Percentage Employed in Manufacturing |
|----------------|------------------------------------|---|
| Australia | 5,464 | 25.8 |
| Canada | 8,329 | 22.3 |
| France | 20,662 | 28.0 |
| West Germany | 26,125 | 36.7 |
| Italy | 18,331 | 31.8 |
| Japan | 51,260 | 27.0 |
| Norway | 1,649 | 23.8 |
| Sweden | 3,862 | 36.9 |
| United Kingdom | 24,019 | 32.9 |
| United States | 81,702 | 23.4 |

*Total civilian labour force

Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1976

The measure of diversity itself was taken as the proportion of the manufacturing labour force accounted for by the three largest employment sectors, or industrial classifications, indicating the distribution of employment over the range of sectors of a country's manufacturing industry. While not all of the 28 major subdivisions were strictly comparable, those employing the highest proportion of labour force were.

The three-digit ISIC classifications which accounted for the highest percentage of the labour force in

the ten countries included food products, metal products, electrical machinery, machinery not elsewhere classified, transportation equipment, and textiles. Over the seven year period from 1966 to 1972 the percentage of the manufacturing labour force accounted for by the top three sectors ranged from a low of 28.3 percent in Canada in 1970 through 1972 to a high of 37.4 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1971.

Evidence that the different manufacturing sectors have a reality that goes beyond mere classification comes from the works of Kerr (1954) who argued that occupation, industry and types of unions are three principal factors that distinguish labour markets; Dunlop (1957) who noted that wages differ by age of industry; and Stolzenberg (1975) who pointed out wage differentials across industrial sectors, holding occupation constant. The research review by Cain (1975) describes the emerging interest among economists in the impact of institutional structures upon defining the characteristics of different labour markets. Finally, Johnson (1974) has noted the different effects labour unions have upon different industrial sectors.

Indices for strikes and lockouts were derived from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics, published by the International Labour Office. This includes statistics on the number of industrial disputes (strikes and lockouts), number of workers involved and number of working days lost.

Every three years these statistics are divided into eight major economic sectors. Since the analysis is limited to the manufacturing sector, the data is based upon these triennial publications.

While there is some variation* in the inclusiveness of the data, the strike statistics appear to be roughly comparable among nine of the ten countries for which data on industrial classifications was available as well.

There is, however, the problem of the meaning of the three different measures of industrial disputes. Ingham views the number of disputes as indicative of the relative strength of adherence to normative procedures in conflict resolution while time loss, he believes, has more to do with a stance of power. These interpretations seem overly discriminating in relation to the aggregate nature of the data.

*Variations in definitions of recorded industrial disputes are the following: Canada: excludes disputes in which the time loss is less than ten man days and excludes workers indirectly affected by the dispute. United States: excludes disputes involving less than six workers and lasting less than a full day or shift. Japan: excludes workers indirectly affected and disputes lasting less than four hours. France: no special conditions for the manufacturing sector. West Germany: excludes disputes lasting less than one day except when a loss of more than 100 working days is involved. Italy: excludes political strikes and workers indirectly affected. Norway: excludes workers indirectly affected and disputes lasting less than one day. Australia: excludes disputes where less than ten working days are lost. United Kingdom: excludes disputes not connected with terms of employment or conditions of labour; disputes involving less than ten workers or lasting less than one day are excluded unless a loss of more than 100 working days is involved. (International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1974).

It would appear to be sufficient to deal only with time loss. This provides a measure of severity of the work stoppages and incorporates those strikes which may be merely symbolic expressions of dissent. For purposes of comparison this will be expressed in terms of number of work days lost per 1,000 workers in the manufacturing sector. The analytic question is whether the differences in industrial diversity as measured by employment statistics are related to time loss from strikes or lockouts.

Results*

Following the format of Ingham's data presentation, table 5 shows the rank ordering for both employment diversity and time loss due to industrial disputes. These are averages over the period 1966-1969, 1970-1973 and 1966-1973. The first period duplicates Ingham's data on rank order of industrial disputes. (While the numerical rates differ from Ingham's data -- Ingham used total number of disputes for the entire non-agricultural labour force expressed as thousands of days lost per 100,000 workers -- the ranking remains the same.)

*The results of the analysis of the link between industrial diversity and strikes were presented at the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association meetings at Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 13, 1977.

Table 5

RANKINGS BY AVERAGE: DIVERSITY AND TIME LOSS
FROM INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES: 1966-69¹ and 1970-73

| | 1966-69 | | 1970-73 | |
|----------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Diversity ² | Time Loss ³ | Diversity ² | Time Loss ³ |
| Canada | 28.7 | 1470 | 28.4 | 1426 |
| United States | 30.6 | 1138 | 30.0 | 1079 |
| Italy | 30.8 | 1930 | 30.5 | 1879 |
| Japan | 32.5 | 132 | 33.2 | 215 |
| Australia | 33.1 | 391 | 33.5 | 766 |
| United Kingdom | 34.0 | 297 | 33.5 | 809 |
| France | 34.0 | 265 | 34.6 | 296 |
| Norway | 35.0 | 1 | 35.2 | 23 |
| West Germany | 35.4 | 8 | 37.4 | 123 |

1966 - 1973
Diversity² Time Loss³

| | | |
|----------------|------|------|
| Canada | 28.6 | 1448 |
| United States | 30.3 | 1109 |
| Italy | 30.6 | 1905 |
| Japan | 33.1 | 174 |
| Australia | 33.3 | 579 |
| United Kingdom | 33.7 | 553 |
| France | 34.3 | 283 |
| Norway | 35.1 | 12 |
| Germany | 36.5 | 66 |

| | | | |
|---------|------------------------------------|--------|---------|
| 1966-69 | Spearman's Rank Order Correlation: | -.8285 | p < .05 |
| | Kendall's Tau | -.6480 | |
| 1970-73 | Spearman's Rank Order Correlation: | -.8285 | p < .05 |
| | Kendall's Tau | -.6480 | |
| 1966-73 | Spearman's Rank Order Correlation: | -.8333 | p < .05 |
| | Kendall's Tau | -.6667 | |

¹In 1966 the data as reported by the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia and Germany were not yet standardized according to ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification). In the case of Australia the classification was not standardized until 1969. Non-ISIC figures were consistent with ISIC categories in all cases except for the United Kingdom and Australia in 1966. In these two cases the year 1966 has been excluded to determine the averages. If for Australia the

data were based on standardized figures only, its diversity would be 32.6

No figures are given in the United Nations' publication for Italy 1966, 1967, United Kingdom 1969, Australia 1971, Japan 1973.

²Percent of the labour force in the three largest manufacturing sectors.

³Days lost per 1000 workers. No data are available for France in 1968.

Rank order correlations on these sets of data suggest an association between diversity of employment and time loss due to strikes and lockouts within the manufacturing sector. Canada, Italy and the United States are the most diverse in the distribution of their labour forces and also have the greatest amount of time loss due to strikes and lockouts. Germany and Norway are consistently the least diverse in their employment patterns and they also have experienced relatively little time loss due to strikes and lockouts. The differences among the countries in the middle range are relatively small.

Year by year comparisons yield consistent findings. Except for the year 1971, the rank order correlations attain a statistical significance well beyond the .05 level.

Table 6

Correlation Coefficient by Indicating the Relationship between Industrial Diversity and Man-Days Lost from Industrial Disputes: 1966-1973*

| Year | Spearman's Rho | Sign. | Kendall's Tau | Sign. | N |
|------|----------------|-------|---------------|-------|---|
| 1966 | -.8857 | .010 | -.7333 | .020 | 6 |
| 1967 | -.8095 | .008 | -.6429 | .013 | 8 |
| 1968 | -.8916 | .002 | -.7412 | .006 | 8 |
| 1969 | -.8810 | .002 | -.7143 | .007 | 8 |
| 1970 | -.9333 | .001 | -.8333 | .001 | 9 |
| 1971 | -.6192 | .051 | -.3571 | .109 | 8 |
| 1972 | -.7167 | .015 | -.5556 | .019 | 9 |
| 1973 | -.8571 | .004 | -.6429 | .013 | 8 |

*For missing data see footnote 1, table 5.

Since degrees of diversity have changed somewhat for different countries over the years 1966-73, a more robust measure is suggested by correlating the full range of scores over the eight year period. If complete data were available this would yield 72 scores for both diversity and time loss (nine countries for eight years). Unfortunately, missing data reduced this to 64 usable scores for both scales. Spearman's Rho was $-.8046$ and Kendall's Tau rank order correlation on the two variables was $-.5818$, both significant well beyond the .05 level (.001).

These findings suggest that within the limits of relatively crude indices, there is justification for taking into account the diversity of employment among industrial sectors when explaining variations in time loss due to strikes and lockouts. Taken alone, the index of structural

diversity is, of course, insufficient in explaining variations in work stoppages. But the preliminary findings do suggest that it is an important variable.

CHAPTER THREE

UNION STRENGTH: ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS

Are organizational factors i.e., the strength and homogeneity of unions and employers' associations, significant determinants in the rates of strike activity? Most North American studies have employed economic models and interpretations, linking business cycles, rates of inflation and wage expectations to strike activity (Rees, 1954; VanderKamp, 1968; Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; Swidinsky, 1977).

Recently, however, a number of studies have appeared which question the sole importance of economic variables in relation to strike activity (Britt and Galle, 1972 and 1974; Eisele, 1974; Snyder, 1975 and 1977). Instead, these studies are paying more attention to the organizational capacity and the political environment as important determinants of strike activity. In fact, a more recent article comparing the merits of economic and expanded models of strike activity, concludes that "measures of unionization should be explicitly included, and the case for incorporating political variables is equally as strong" (Snyder, 1977:331). Similarly, in Europe it has been argued that "post-war trade union membership developments have received

relatively little attention" (I. Roberts, 1973:45).

In the articles which displayed a shift towards the study of organizational variables, it was found that the degree of unionization and the size of plants are important determinants in relation to strike activity. Britt and Galle (1974) compare two such studies (Shorter and Tilly, 1971; Britt and Galle, 1972) and they find in both studies that concentration of workers in large plants and high degrees of unionization are conducive to broader (workers involved), shorter strikes. Furthermore, a high degree of unionization was found to increase the frequency of strikes, but the size of plants was found to be negatively related to frequency. In other words, large plants tended to have fewer strikes than average sized plants with the degree of unionization being equally high.

In explaining these findings organizational capacity is considered to be the most crucial factor. Organizational capacity is in most cases defined as the potential for efficient action, in Britt and Galle's words as "the capacity for flexibility and effectiveness of strategies of action" (1974:644).

The cross-industry analyses above appear to corroborate the confrontation of power theory as advanced in chapter one, assuming of course, that organizational capacity as indicated by the degree of unionization and the concentration of workers is synonymous with the conditions

leading to a stalemate of power, as set out in chapter one. However, the analytical models in the above studies were tested on national data only (France and the United States). While the data for industrial diversity and strike activity as employed in chapter two have been reasonably standardized internationally, data for unions and employers' associations at this level are very crude, non-standardized and, at times, not available at all.

International assessments of union strength are affected by many different variables. Union multiplicity i.e., the existence of several unions within a specific enterprise, different patterns of organization, the autonomy of local units in relation to regional or national organizations, the effect of alternate "bargaining" institutions such as, works councils and tri-partite national institutions, differences in strength and type of political affiliations, all influence the "flexibility and effectiveness of strategies of action." Thus, before attempting a cross national analysis, it is necessary to consider some of the issues involved in an assessment of the strength of unions and employers' associations.

Assuming that the most effective deterrent to strikes is a high risk factor for both parties, it would follow that the stronger and larger the unions the less likely it is that strikes will occur. Thus, large and powerful unions rather than being a cause of strikes would appear to be conducive to industrial peace. Of course, this presupposes the

existence of equally strong employers or employers' associations. If concentration of workers in particular industries facilitates the formation of large, strong organizations, do Norway and Germany, which have extremely low strike rates indeed have strong unions and employers' associations? Similarly, if diversity is negatively related to the strength of unions and employers' associations, these organizations should be relatively weak in Italy, Canada and the United States, which are characteristic for their high rates of strike activity.

Membership Comparisons

The most widely used index of union strength is the percentage of workers unionized. However, in computing the percentages quite often, a different base is used e.g., total labour force, non-agricultural labour force, all salary and wage employment. It is also difficult to obtain a standard year for the figures of all countries. Furthermore, the aggregates do not give us any idea about the rate of unionization in particular sectors of the economy or the different industries. Finally, union membership estimates may also vary according to the sources providing the figures i.e., trade unions, government or business research organizations (see table 7).

Table 7

UNION MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SOURCES

| | Kassalow(A) | | Labour Canada(B) | | Hoffman(C) | Euro-Stat(D) | |
|------------|-------------|----|------------------|------|------------|--------------|----|
| | millions | % | millions | % | % | millions | % |
| Canada | - | - | 2.6 | 31.8 | - | - | - |
| US | 21.2 | 30 | 21.2 | 30.2 | 28 | 17.6 | 19 |
| Italy | 4.0 | 33 | - | - | 25-40 | 7.3 | 38 |
| Australia | - | - | 2.2 | 53.2 | 50 | - | - |
| UK | 11.0 | 48 | 11.0 | 48.0 | 44 | 11.3 | 44 |
| Japan | - | - | 11.6 | 35.1 | 35 | 10.0 | 19 |
| France | 2.4 | 23 | - | - | - | 6.1 | 28 |
| W. Germany | 8.3 | 38 | 8.1 | 36.9 | 37 | 7.2 | 27 |
| Norway | .7 | 65 | - | - | - | - | - |

(A) Source: E. Kassalow, Conflict and Cooperation in Europe's Industrial Relations, Industrial Relations, Vol. 13, May 1974, p. 157. Based on total union membership as a percentage of all non-agricultural wage and salary employment in the US and Western Europe. Data are for 1971, but in a few instances for 1970 and 1972. US figures include employee associations. A note of caution is made for France and Italy.

(B) Source: Labour Canada, Economics and Research Branch, in W. D. Wood, The Current Trade Union Scene, Queen's University, Ontario. Figures are for 1970. Union membership percentage is based on the total of all wage and salary employment.

(C) Source: E. B. Hoffman, Resolving Labour-Management Disputes: A Nine Country Comparison, The Conference Board Inc. 1973, p. 26. Figures are total union membership as a percentage of wage and salary earners in 1970, or in the latest year for which figures are available. Footnote states: "Union membership figures are at best, close approximations. They often include overlapping and inflated estimates, especially when unions are in competition for members, as in Italy." The data for this table were derived from national sources, the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics and the Europa Year Book, 1972.

(D) Source: European Marketing Data and Statistics, 12th edition, 1975. Figures are for 1973. Union membership percentage is based on the total work force.

In order to stabilize the data the table below shows union membership figures according to national sources as a percentage of the total and the non-agricultural labour force, determined according to guidelines set out by the International Labour Organization.

Table 8

UNION MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO NATIONAL SOURCES, 1972

| | Millions | % of Labour Force | % of Non-Agricultural Labour Force |
|-----------|----------|-------------------|------------------------------------|
| Canada | 2.4 | 28.9 | 30.8 |
| US | 20.8 | 25.5 | 26.6 |
| Italy | 4.0-6.0* | 22-33 | 26-39 |
| Australia | 2.5 | 45.5 | 50.0 |
| UK | 11.3 | 46.9 | 48.5 |
| Japan | 11.8 | 23.0 | 27.0 |
| France | 3.0-4.2* | 15-25 | 17-23 |
| W.Germany | 8.4 | 32.2 | 35.0 |
| Norway | .75 | 47.0 | 53.6 |

*Estimates

Sources: Canada, Labour Canada, Labour Organizations in Canada; United States, Handbook of Labour Statistics; Italy, range of estimates from various sources; Australia, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth; United Kingdom, British Labour Statistics; Japan, Japan Statistical Yearbook; France, range of estimates from various sources; Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch; Norway, Statistisk Arborg.

Total labour force and non-agricultural labour force according to International Labour Organization, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1973.

Since our data analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector, a more accurate measure would be the percentage of unionization in manufacturing. Precise numbers

for this sector are even more difficult to obtain and the figures lack, of course, in precision for reasons already pointed out. Table 9 below indicates union membership in manufacturing as a percentage of total employment in this sector. Table 10 indicates union membership categorized according to manual and white collar employment for selected countries.

Table 9

UNION MEMBERSHIP FOR NINE COUNTRIES
% OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING

| | |
|----------------------|-------|
| Canada (1973) | 45 |
| United States (1972) | 47 |
| Italy (est.) | 40-45 |
| Australia (1971) | 54 |
| UK (1972) | 53 |
| Japan (1973) | 31 |
| France (est.) | 15-20 |
| Germany (1972) | 38 |
| Norway (1973) | 70 |

Sources: The union membership data are derived from the annual publications of the national statistical offices of the countries listed. The total employment in manufacturing is according to data published by the International Labour Organization.

Table 10

UNION MEMBERSHIP FOR FIVE COUNTRIES

| | % of Private Manual Employment | % of Private White Collar Employment |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| US (1973) | 53 | 9 |
| Australia (1972) | 56 | 26 |
| UK (1973) | 50 | 27 |
| France (1973) | 25 | 15 |
| Germany (1972) | 42 | 19 |

Source: Clegg, H.A., Trade Unionism Under Collective Bargaining, 1976:12

Keeping in mind the deficiencies of the data as indicated, we note that there is little or no relationship between industrial diversity and union strength as indicated by membership rates. Canada and the United States may have low overall rates of unionization, but Japan and France with less diverse industrial structures have an equal (Japan) or even lower rate (France) of union organization (see table 8). Norway with its low rate of diversity has a high rate of union density, but so do Britain and Australia, countries in the middle range of the diversity scale. Germany, the country with the least diverse industrial structure, has a relatively low overall rate of unionization and ranks among the lowest in union membership rates for the manufacturing sector. At the same time unions in Germany are "reputed to be powerful" (Bergmann and Muller-Jentsch in Barkin, 1975: 235) and "there is little doubt about the power and influence

of the German trade unions, despite their relatively low degree of organization" (Malles, 1973:30). Thus, it appears that membership rates have only limited value as an index of the strength of unions and the variations appear to be due to differences in patterns of organization, various methods of membership recruitment, size of establishments and employer resistance.

With the limited value of union density as an index of union strength it is essential to examine other factors which affect the homogeneity and power of the unions.

The Effects of Union Multiplicity

In the United States and Canada one union, representing the majority within a given enterprise, has the exclusive right to bargain with a specific employer. This, especially in earlier days during organizing drives, resulted in intense rivalry and jurisdictional disputes. In the period from 1946-1969 strikes from disputes on trade union matters represented 25 percent of the issues leading to strikes in the United States (Cullen, 1972:518). While there has been somewhat of a decrease in the number of disputes in these matters, the rate was still about 22 percent for the 1966-1969 period (ibid.)

In European countries this type of conflict is practically unknown, even though there is quite a degree of union multiplicity in France and Italy. The low degree of organizational rivalry is related to the already established

loyalties i.e., workers belong to a particular union in accordance with their religious or political conviction. Shifts in membership numbers are not a result of raiding, but often a consequence of changing attitudes towards religion and political ideologies. Moreover, all major unions are represented at the bargaining table and no union can obtain a more generous agreement for its members.

The union structure in Italy, France, Germany and Norway is related to the development of socialist and communist parties and the historical rôle of the church. In both Italy and France there are catholic, socialist and communist trade unions. In Germany these divisions existed until they were abolished under the Nazi regime. The reconstruction after the second world war established the powerful DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), a confederation of 16 industrial unions. In Norway the socialist oriented LO (Landsorganisasjon) is the dominant trade union federation; representing almost all national unions. These unions are organized along industrial lines.

In Britain and Australia union multiplicity is a result of the existence of different types of unions. Craft unions, industrial unions and general unions, all of these may represent workers in one company. It is not uncommon in Britain to find one company bargaining with up to ten or more unions per plant. Seyfarth (1968:19) reports an average of 7.4 unions per plant, and cites the example of the Ford Motor

Company plant at Dagenham with 22 unions representing the workers. In Australia craft unions exist along with industrial unions and as a rule several unions represent the workers in one particular plant.

To facilitate bargaining when there are several unions in one plant, shop stewards' committees are formed. The existence of such committees has had important consequences for the amount of control the various unions are able to exercise over local bargaining issues. With the absence of specific written agreements, day to day problems are usually handled by shop stewards and shop stewards' committees. Since most unions are organized on a geographical basis and have a minimum number of full time union officers, direct communications with the workers are rare. As a result, shop stewards and their committees have become almost autonomous bargaining agents, also because the committees are not responsible to any particular union. The high number of unofficial strikes in Britain (95%) and the use of independent strike action by shop stewards in Australia should be seen in light of these developments.

Concluding, it appears that similar degrees of unionization have different meanings in terms of strength when union multiplicity is taken into account. Especially in Britain and Australia and to some extent in Italy and France multiplicity detracts from the effective strength of unions in confronting the employers. Furthermore, union

multiplicity appears to be a factor in strike activity in these countries, while in the United States and Canada competition among unions to represent the workers of a particular plant is an issue leading to strikes as well.

The Impact of Works Councils

As in Britain and Australia, unions in Italy, France, Germany and Norway are organized on a regional basis. In Britain and Australia the unions are represented in the place of work by shop stewards. However, in Italy, France and Germany unions do not have a formal role in management-worker relations at the plant level.* Alternate 'bargaining' institutions, works councils, have been established by law in these countries. The members are elected by a vote of all employees i.e., both union and non-union members. Works councils are primarily consultative bodies, depending a great deal upon the goodwill and cooperation between management and workers, supplemented by legislation which defines the procedures and areas of 'negotiations'. The councils have no right to call strikes or to employ forceful tactics to back up their position. On the contrary, they are under an obligation to promote harmonious worker-management relations within the enterprise.

*In Norway the union branches are empowered to conclude local agreements with employers to supplement industry-wide agreements.

Consequently, these councils are "too ready to accept paternalism from employers and suffer from a general lack of toughness" (G. Giugni, 1971:311).

Although works councils are not integrated with the union organization, in practice, most council members are also union members. During elections unions nominate their choices for election on these works councils and, thus, ensure that their union's view will be expressed on the council.

The existence of confessional and political unions in Italy and France further weakened the efficiency of the works councils. It is in elections for these councils that interunion rivalry comes to the fore. The elections are generally regarded as a barometer of the popularity enjoyed by the unions nominating candidates. Thus, they bear more resemblance to elections for political office than for a trade union. In France this is reinforced by the political stance of the unions. In Italy councils have been "cold-shouldered" (ibid.) by the unions and a new type of representation has emerged (see page 107).

In Germany, where union rivalry is minimal, works councils do in practice conclude informal agreements. Employers show a strong preference for bargaining with works councils, because these have no effective bargaining strength. In fact, councils can be a subversive instrument in the hands of the employer (see pages 133 and 134).

The ambiguous role of the works council is caused by the fact that it has no legal rights to engage in bargaining, while at the same time it functions to ensure that any agreements reached by the unions are properly implemented.

Unions and Politics

The presence of political alternatives to capitalism in European countries has been a strong force in the development of labour unions. The church's involvement in politics, especially in Italy and, to a less extent, in France had - with the growth of socialist and communist parties - a divisive effect on the labour movement. The church denied the existence of any fundamental conflict in the management-worker relationship. Instead, it promoted the corporate model of owner-worker relations in which both parties have rights and obligations in the pursuit of a common goal. The existence of a common endeavour was in direct contrast with the socialist and communist labour movements advancing the ideas of class conflict and the inherent contradictions in the owner-worker relationships. The church's historical role in right wing politics alienated large numbers of the working class and intelligentsia and contributed to the growth of communist parties in France and Italy.

The radical reformist split in the socialist movement was an important factor in the development of the labour movement. In most Northern European countries

socialism has taken the direction of a reformist movement, which chose political action and advocated gradual change within the rules of the system. This has been the case in both Norway and Germany, where social-democratic parties have become strong forces in the parliamentary system after initial ideological struggles with communist factions. France and Italy are the only countries where the communist parties have become larger than their socialist rivals and exert a strong influence on the working class.

The above developments have had major implications for the role of the state in the area of industrial relations. Unions, closely allied with political parties could to a certain extent translate their political power into favourable legislation, resulting in a large number of legally guaranteed benefits. On the other hand, unions were drawn into the making of national policies resulting in moderating pressures on the demands of labour unions. Especially in Norway, Germany, Britain and Australia trade unions are strongly represented in political parties and legislative bodies. Mallet (1969:28) concludes that there is a mutual interest for the parties to have a political power base in the unions as well as for the unions to be able to exert a direct influence on the legislatures.

In contrast to the European developments is the development of trade unionism in North America. The absence of a feudal tradition, the divisive effects of ethnic

diversity and the ethos of an egalitarian society emphasizing the ideas of classlessness, opportunity, and social mobility precluded the development of clear class identities. Although at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of this century socialist movements were active in the United States and Canada, they were unable to get a strong foothold. Freedom, opportunity to advance and the heterogeneous nature of North-American society with its religious, language and racial barriers provided little fertile ground to launch social movements based on class solidarity and committed to a fundamental reform of the system.

Economic unionism was a more viable alternative than a broad social revolutionary or reform movement. More specifically, the highly skilled, better paid craftsmen who made up the bulk of the AFL membership were more interested in the protection of their jobs, higher wages and better working conditions than in social legislation providing for minimum wages or other benefits for people outside their organization (Bok and Dunlop, 1970:389). The effects of the depression and the development of mass production industries have to an extent altered the non-political stance of the AFL. However, in comparison with European unions political involvement is still minimal and emphasis is on collective bargaining to win immediate economic benefits for the membership. Political activity is limited to lobbying for legislation and supporting candidates for political office,

who have shown to be sympathetic to labour.

In summary, the strength of unions cannot be adequately measured by the density of organization. Union multiplicity and rivalry may weaken the power of unions in collective bargaining. The degree of centralization of decision making bodies (e.g. the number of national unions), local representation (works councils, local bargaining units), political affiliations, as well as different patterns of organization in the various sectors of the economy significantly influence the effective strength of trade unions in advancing the interests of their constituents. It is only in a more descriptive analysis that these factors can be fully appreciated.

CHAPTER FOUR

EMPLOYER STRENGTH: SOME CONSIDERATIONS

One of the most important variables interfering with the realization of union objectives is the resistance encountered from the other side, the employer or the employers' organizations.

According to Ingham, solidary and centralized employers' organizations able to impose normative regulation on the capital-labour relationship are most likely to emerge in small scale societies (1974:42). He argues that the degree of industrial concentration and technical complexity is lowest in such countries, because of their dependence on export markets. The competitive nature of these markets has forced these countries into a high degree of product specialization and economies of scale resulting in a relatively small number of large sized companies.

While Ingham's account seems to be plausible for such countries as Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, strong employers' organizations have also emerged in West Germany and France. In these countries the elimination of competition in labour markets and the regulation of cut-throat competition in product markets seem to have been the major forces in the emergence of these organizations.

The existence of a large number of small employers within a particular sector, geographical proximity, a highly developed network of transportation and communications promoting the integration of labour and product markets, and the threat of strong trade unions appear to be the main influence leading to the formation of employers' organizations in such situations.

Further evidence for this phenomenon can be found in the United States where multi-employer bargaining has emerged under similar conditions (see page 86). Multi-employer bargaining, however, is mostly a practical, voluntary way of joining forces to increase employer bargaining power vis à vis unions and it leaves individual employers free to make their own decisions. Employers' associations in Germany, Norway and France are dominant organizations and leave little room for local initiative and employer autonomy. Malles, in a discussion of management organization in Western European countries, notes the tradition of economic organization of interest groups. He observes that the employers' associations not only assumed power positions vis à vis labour but also over their own membership. The author ascribes this to "the fact that cooperation rather than competition has for long been a pronounced feature of much European economic life leading on the one side to the unhindered formation of trusts and combines, and on the other to protective measures favouring the small entrepreneur" (1969:24,25).

The view that the size of establishments is a determinant in the strength of employers' associations has also been advanced by Jackson and Sisson (1976:318). Contrary to Ingham's observations, they argue that large companies, rather than being conducive to the formation of employers' associations, are an obstacle in the proper functioning of these associations. Under conditions of high demands for labour they tend to offer higher wages and better working conditions which they are able to offset through increased efficiency. They also tend to develop their own labour relations departments geared to the needs of their company rather than follow the advice of the employers' associations. Jackson and Sisson believe that the weakness of employers' associations in Britain is related to the relatively large size of establishments in comparison with Sweden (ibid.) Further evidence comes from France where large employers have been the first to abandon industry wide agreements concluded by generally strong and homogeneous employers' associations. In Germany as well, large employers e.g., Volkswagen are known to opt out of industry-wide agreements, or, unofficially, do not abide by the regulations called for in these agreements, resulting in the so-called wage drift as well as superior working conditions.

Considering all of the above arguments and the fact that both oligopolistic tendencies in a nation's economy and the existence of a large number of small and medium sized

companies within particular sectors may lead to the formation of strong centralized employers' associations, it appears that the concentration of industrial activity in a relatively limited number of sectors is the determining factor in the development of powerful employers' associations.

As in the case of unions a mere enumeration of membership figures reveals little about the actual strength of employers' associations. Moreover, in several countries employers do form associations for reasons not primarily related to collective bargaining, but objectives such as, financial advice, product and market development, etc. Considering these limitations it would appear that a better indication of the strength of employers' associations is their ability to enforce industry-wide agreements and to maintain control over their members.

In countries where collective bargaining is carried out primarily at the level of the enterprise, employers' associations are less prominent and, where they exist, their main function is to provide specialized services to their membership rather than directly engage in collective bargaining. Again, it appears that the importance of employers' associations is related to the size of establishments. Whereas the large enterprise is in a better position to maintain an extensive labour relations staff and is better able to match the power of the unions, small sized firms would

tend to find strength in collective action. Multi-employer bargaining and coalition bargaining have emerged in situations where employers encountered powerful trade unions or as a means of preventing 'whipsawing' tactics. These forms of association are usually ad hoc rather than continuous. They offer strength of combined action without relinquishing autonomy in the regulation of local management-labour relations.

As noted earlier large sized enterprises have less need for the services of 'employers' associations. They develop their own industrial relations departments, which employ sophisticated methods in dealing with unions.

In earlier days trade unions were viewed as the causes of labour unrest and as arch enemies -- today the unions become part of the "control system of management" or in the words of Mills the "managers of discontent" (D. Bell, 1960:215). With the need for more extensive regulations in the operation of large scale companies the unions can be made an agent in the justification and enforcement of normative regulations.

Through the formulation of demands, the negotiation and the conclusion of specific agreements the union implicitly legitimates the wages and working conditions stipulated and takes on the responsibility to have its membership abide by the agreement. The shift in managerial policy towards unions and the ability of management to tactically

exploit the power of unions over its membership to further company interests, led Ross and Hartman (1960) to believe that strike activity would decline.

Apart from greater expertise in industrial relations, large scale enterprises, in particular, multinational companies, have a wide range of tactics at their disposal to undermine trade union power:

- shifts of production to other areas of the country or, if necessary, to other countries
- the threat of directing new investments to countries where the labour climate is more favourable
- diversification i.e., the buying of other companies or investing in other product markets to fragment the power of trade unions which are usually organized according to market categories.

The special characteristics of collective bargaining with multinational companies have become a growing concern for the unions. The International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) and the International Federation of Chemical and General Workers' Union (ICF) have been the most active in coordinating actions against multinational companies. Ford, St. Gobin, Philips, Shell, Michelin and the four big US tire companies have all been targets of coordinated action by international unions. A Conference Board survey of 555 companies which were on Fortune's list of the 1000 largest US manufacturing companies and 173 companies that were on

Fortune's list of 300 largest non-US companies, revealed that more than one quarter of these companies have already been targets of international union action (Herschfield, 1975:9).

The steadily increasing integration of world product and labour markets has major consequences for the bargaining power of employers and trade unions and the above is merely an illustration of the growing importance of this aspect of collective bargaining.

Concluding, it appears that the best indication of the strength of employers' associations is their ability to enforce adherence to standard agreements throughout the industry. Where individual employers deviate from such standard agreements the power of the association will be undermined considerably. In general, large companies have less need for the services and the benefits of employers' associations and they will tend to be the first to abandon industry agreements.

The expansion of large companies into multinationals already has had some effect on the bargaining power of unions and this will be considered where necessary.

The growth of multinationals may, in the years ahead, have important consequences for the balance of power between unions and employers, but this relatively new development is outside the scope of the thesis.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ITS SCOPE, FORMS AND CONSEQUENCES: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In chapters one and two I have attempted to show that industrial diversity is one of the basic variables to be taken into account in dealing with strike activity. The argument is based on the assumption that a low degree of diversity facilitates the formation of strong unions and employers' associations. This will lead, after initial confrontations, to a clear demarcation of lines of conflict and power relations.

Where lines of conflict and strengths of organizations are sufficiently clear, normative regulation is likely to develop. In such cases the resolution of conflict by means of an agreed set of rules becomes a better strategy than the use of pure economic force. This process of joint decision making, collective bargaining, can be developed into an extensive system of norms for the regulation of the relations between workers and management.

The development of particular systems of collective bargaining is, of course, not exclusively governed by

economic variables such as, the distribution of employment, the concentration of industries and the characteristics of product markets. Although these factors exert a strong influence on the formation of more or less homogeneous employers' associations and unions, we have also noted (chapters three and four) that these organizations do not operate in a vacuum, but within the setting of a larger, specific socio-economic and political context. This context influences strongly the formulation of rules and procedures regulating management-labour relations, and the emergence of different forms of collective bargaining is the outcome of the mediating effects of social and political factors upon the economic variables.

The variety of ways in which unions and employers confront each other and the mechanisms worked out for the resolution of conflict, once firmly in place, produce their own effects and, thus, become an important intervening variable in the initial relationship between industrial diversity and time lost through strikes.

In this chapter I shall first explain how differences in the legislative framework affect the scope of collective bargaining i.e., the number of issues to be covered in collective bargaining. Then an attempt will be made to demonstrate how industrial diversity and the existence of certain types of unions and employers' associations are related to the development of particular forms of collective bargaining, which in turn affect the rate of strike activity.

The Scope of Collective Bargaining

While it is almost impossible and also unnecessary to describe all the legal variations which exist among the countries in this survey, there are some essential differences which have a direct influence on the scope of collective bargaining and, as such, limit or expand the areas of possible conflict.

These variations are not only a result of the difference of approach in the common law and civil law system, but are also related to the interactions of employers' organizations and unions with the state.

In the European countries the number of employee benefits established by law is greater than in Canada, the United States, Australia and Japan. This development is a result of the special ties of trade unions and political parties, discussed earlier, and, according to O. Fairweather (in Kamin: 1970:70-71) these unions "find that benefits can be won more quickly in the political arena than across the bargaining table." These legislated benefits reduce to a great extent the 'total package' to be covered in collective bargaining. Many benefits -- the length of vacations and working hours, pension plans, medical insurance, procedures for dismissal, severance pay, etc. -- are regulated by law.

In North America these benefits form a substantial portion of the areas for negotiation. In the United States

and Canada it is essential for a worker to know the content of his collective agreement, which in most cases is a quite lengthy and complicated document. (It also reinforces his bond with the union for interpretation and protection of his rights.) This collective agreement supersedes any individual contract the worker may have with his employer.

In the European countries the worker has an individual contract with his employer which is supplemented by legislation. Social legislation, thus, effectively decreases the number of issues to be negotiated.

In most countries a distinction is made between conflicts of rights (disputes arising from existing collective agreements, laws or contracts of employment) and conflict of interests (disputes concerning the negotiation of wages and wage related issues). In the European countries disputes of rights are decided in the courtroom and not through strike action. According to J. Schregle (1974:11-12) "This has undoubtedly reduced the incidence of work stoppages." Strikes which do occur in these countries are a result of conflicts of interests and/or dissatisfaction with the degree of local autonomy i.e., the need for more decentralization.

In the United States and Canada contracts provide grievance procedures for resolving disputes of rights and this, combined with mediation and binding arbitration, reduces the number of strikes related to non-economic issues. In Britain the informality of shop agreements and the

obsolescence of industry-wide grievance procedures has led to the frequent use of short work stoppages by shop stewards (not the union) to enforce demands. In Australia the lengthy arbitration procedures and the tendency of arbitration courts not to infringe on managerial prerogatives have resulted in frequent, short work stoppages. In an international comparison of issues leading to strikes (D. Oxnam, 1971:135) it was found that while in Britain strikes related to non-economic issues were appreciably higher than in the United States, in Australia non-economic issues comprised more than 80 % of the major issues leading to a strike during the years 1946-1966 (see table 11).

Table 11

PERCENTAGES OF STRIKES BY MAJOR ISSUES INVOLVED
THREE COUNTRIES, 1946-1966

| Major Issues | Australia | Great Britain | United States |
|--|-----------|---------------|---------------|
| Wages, Hours, Leave, etc, | 14.5 | 48.7 | 54.6 |
| Physical Working Conditions and Managerial Policy | 58.2 | 47.5 | 23.3 |
| Trade Unionism | 9.7 | 3.6 | 20.8 |
| Miscellaneous | 17.6 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
| All Issues | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: D. W. Oxnam, Issues in Industrial Conflict: An International Comparison, The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 135, June 1971, Sydney.

In summary, in countries where legislation plays an important role in establishing specific employee benefits, there is a corresponding decrease in the amount of joint power which unions and employers' associations have over the issues to be decided. In countries where legislation plays an important role in regulating the specific procedures for collective bargaining, it tends to increase the amount of joint power held by unions and employers' associations over the issues to be decided, thus, augmenting the chances for disputes and possible strike action.

Legislation of specific employee benefits, limiting the scope of collective bargaining is more likely to occur in countries with less diverse industrial structures. In these countries which tend to have large homogeneous unions and employers' associations and centralized forms of collective bargaining, the integration of differing interests is relatively less difficult to achieve. Formal ties between unions and labour parties appear to be stronger resulting in a coordination of political and industrial action. Moderation in wage demands by the unions in return for gains in the form of legislated employee benefits are more likely to occur here than in countries with diverse industrial structures, fragmented unions and employers' associations and local bargaining.

Forms of Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining in the countries in this study takes place at a variety of levels with the units ranging from an entire industry at the national level to that of a single enterprise at the local level:

a. industry-wide bargaining: This bargaining is sometimes at a national level, but usually on a wide regional basis. It takes place between representatives of employers' associations and representatives of federations of unions. Agreements cover a wide range of workers, depending on the definition of 'industry', which in many cases encompasses a wide range of industries e.g., 'metals' industry. Industry-wide bargaining is prevalent in Norway, Germany and France.

b. plant-level bargaining: Negotiations are carried out between one union and a single employer. The number of workers covered by the agreement is limited to those of the plant. This type of bargaining is common in Canada, the United States and Japan.

These two types of bargaining can be considered as the extremes on a scale of centralized and decentralized bargaining. As noted, the ranking of the countries on this scale appears to be similar to their position on the scale of diversity and strike activity. The bargaining systems of Australia and Britain, countries in the middle range on

the diversity scale, as well as that of Italy which has a high ranking, cannot be so easily classified in this simplified manner, because of their special characteristics. In the case of Britain and Australia these special features may be in part a result of their moderately diverse industrial structure. The notable exception is Italy, which has a diverse industrial structure, a very high rate of strike activity, but historically a centralized system of collective bargaining. This poor 'fit' of the bargaining system with the diverse industrial structure in Italy may be one of the causes of the extremely high number of days lost through strikes.

The above two levels of bargaining are, of course, in most countries supplemented by a variety of other forms of collective bargaining. In North America, for example, where plant-level bargaining is most frequent, there are tendencies towards more centralized forms of collective bargaining. This trend is particularly noticeable in those industries with large concentrations of workers, steel, automobile and textile, thus confirming the main thesis. Multi-employer, coalition and pattern bargaining have emerged as a result of efforts by employers and unions to coordinate bargaining and to form a more united front vis à vis the unions or management. Multi-employer bargaining often takes place where there are many small enterprises within a certain geographical area and the competition in

labour and product markets is strong. If in such situations the workers are highly unionized, small companies prefer to face strong unions in a coordinated fashion (multi-employer bargaining) rather than face the situation individually.

Unions at times have to deal with multi-plant companies. Instead of unions at each plant trying to deal with the company locally, the various unions bargaining with the same employer try to agree on a common strategy in their confrontation with this employer (coalition bargaining).

Pattern bargaining is frequently practised in the automobile and steel industry in North America: an agreement reached with one of the major companies becomes the 'pattern', the master contract for other manufacturers in the industry.

In Japan similar tactics are applied in the large steel and electronics companies. Also in Japan, where negotiations are carried out by enterprise unions, a special campaign is mounted each year by all the major unions to secure wage increases. Thus, enterprise bargaining is complemented by a highly coordinated national campaign.

In the United Kingdom and Italy the importance of industry-wide agreements has been reduced to a great extent by informal agreements at the plant-level. In these countries two systems are operating simultaneously, although the industry-wide agreements have ceased to be very effective and it may in fact be more appropriate to regard the system

of collective bargaining in these two countries as largely decentralized.

Notwithstanding some of the changes above, it is generally conceded that national bargaining structures once firmly in place, tend to persist over a long time. Changes do take place, but they are usually gradual and supplementary rather than sudden and drastic (ILO, 1974:125 and Malles, 1969:58). Too many structural economic and institutional factors inhibit the radical transformation of industrial relations systems. As a result different forms of collective bargaining tend to produce their own particular effects on the internal organization of unions and employers' organizations as well as their bargaining power and ultimately on strike activity.

Some Consequences of Centralized Forms of Collective Bargaining

Industry-wide bargaining is accompanied by a concentration of decision making power among the upper levels of different industrial organizations. It has meant a commitment by employers to the policies set out by their associations. These often insist on employers' solidarity (J. Schregle, 1974:5). For the unions it has meant that the ratification of the collective agreement by union membership vote either did not develop at all, or has progressively fallen into disuse (Malles, 1969:54).

The centralized process in European countries committed both the union and the employer to a specific set of rules and conditions which were in most cases extended to employers and workers not part of any association. This principle of extension has led to a levelling of wages and greater uniformity in working conditions, which had important consequences for both labour and management in terms of competition. For the employers wages and other cost related to labour have remained virtually the same for everyone, thus eliminating pressures on these costs through competitive action. This was accompanied by the fact that in all cases general wage policies were determined by what was affordable for the smaller and less efficient companies.

For labour it has had the effect of improving wages from the bottom up. It would appear that workers with skills high in demand have been denied significant economic improvements to the advantage of the labour force in the less profitable sectors of the economy.

In times of strong economic expansion the central policies have come under extreme pressure from both the employers and the unions at the local level, resulting in the so-called wage drift: the extent to which wages actually paid by individual companies exceed the nationally negotiated level. This is one of the most difficult problems of national and industry-wide agreements i.e., how to relate the wages of high profit, low labour cost industries

(chemicals, metal industries) to low profit, labour intensive industries (textiles, service industries) and how to integrate the interests of relatively large companies with those of medium sized and small companies.

In conditions of nearly full employment employers can only attract the labour they need by offering wages and working conditions which are above the conditions set in the industry-wide agreement. Many companies, especially the larger ones, have done this with the result that wage drift reached levels of 30 to 40 percent in Norway and Germany i.e. the difference between the conditions established by national or industry-wide agreements and the benefits actually paid by the employer (J. Schregle, 1974:6; Barkin, 1975:252). The neglect of the workers' aspirations at the plant level and the fact that industry and economy wide agreements were frequently linked to the national interests, or the interests of the industry as a whole, led to an erosion of confidence in centralized forms of collective bargaining.

In Europe most of the strikes during the 1969-1972 period did not originate within the regular national union machinery that is, they were mostly wildcat or unofficial strikes. Both dissatisfaction with aspects of the established systems for negotiating collective agreements and the settling of local problems were common causes of these unofficial strikes (E. Kassalow, Conflict and Cooperation in Europe's Industrial Relations, Industrial Relations, May, 1974: 156-163).

In Germany the spontaneous strikes in 1969 resulted from dissatisfaction with the trade unions' cooperation with incomes policies. Bergmann and Muller Jentsch (in Barkin, 1975:268) report that "workers felt they had been discriminated against on finding that profits were rising perceptively whereas wages were falling behind". The strikes in 1973, when almost 200,000 metal workers were involved in unofficial strikes, were the immediate consequence of the unsatisfactory wage increases which were subsequently obliterated by a rise in the cost of living (ibid.) Thus, while the formal structure of collective bargaining in Norway and Germany discourages strike activity, the strikes which do occur are a function of the unequal development of productivity rates within the industry-wide organizations.

In Italy and Britain industry-wide agreements have lost in significance under conditions of economic expansion and nearly full employment. The inability of national unions and employers' organizations to make provisions in the industry-wide agreements for local needs and aspirations has led to the emergence of informal bargaining at the plant level. The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (Donovan Commission, 1968) argued that Great Britain in effect has two systems of industrial relations: a formal (industry-wide agreements) and an informal system (plant level bargaining). The informal system has increasingly become the reality (Fox and Flanders, 1969:151).

In Italy, what once was a highly centralized system of collective bargaining has developed into a decentralized system of informal bargaining (Giugni, 1965 and 1971). Both in Italy and Britain most strikes originate outside the official machinery i.e., the workers' delegates in Italy and the shop stewards in Britain. Noteworthy is the lack of union control over the workers' delegates and the shop stewards and, consequently, over bargaining and the use of the strike at the plant level. We will deal with this in more detail later on.

In France, the existence of many small and medium sized enterprises, the presence of strong employers' associations and the extremely low rate of unionization appears to have kept workers' influence (formal and informal) at the plant level relatively low. Industry-wide agreements continue to determine the wages and working conditions in most enterprises. Strikes which do occur are often in large enterprises or of a political nature. The latter are of extremely short duration (average one day) and large numbers of non-unionized workers participate.

Some Consequences of Decentralized Forms of Collective Bargaining

In decentralized bargaining systems workers represented by strong local unions in high profit and/or low labour cost industries have distinct advantages in negotiating wages and working conditions over those workers who do

not belong to strong unions and are employed in less profitable sectors of the economy. On the employers' side, small companies and employers in labour intensive, low profit industries face great difficulties when confronting powerful unions. In such situations tactics to discourage workers to organize and tendencies towards multi-employer bargaining are not unfamiliar.

Single-company bargaining increases the possibilities for strikes. Not only is the number of contracts to be negotiated much higher, which in itself increases the chances that conflict will occur, but competition induces both employers and unions to resist demands or offers which do not 'measure up' to agreements reached by other unions and companies. Employers will try to keep their labour cost below those of competitors or prevent them from going higher. Unions will strive for settlements higher or at least equal to those reached in other sectors. 'Whipsawing' tactics i.e., playing one employer off against the other, are often used to achieve advantageous settlements. Thus, it appears that single-company bargaining increases competition among unions and among employers. This in contrast with industry-wide agreements, where all employers and unions agree to standard rates throughout the industry. Industry-wide agreements also eliminate an important factor contributing to inter-union rivalry: no union is able to offer its membership a better deal than the others. In the United States union

rivalry and jurisdictional disputes represented more than 20 percent of the issues leading to strikes during the past 25 years. Single employer bargaining is the dominant method for negotiating agreements in the United States and Canada.

In Japan, which also has a decentralized bargaining system, all bargaining is carried out by enterprise unions. The enterprise union is completely autonomous in the negotiation of an agreement and in most cases outside unions and federations are explicitly excluded from interference. The special characteristics of Japanese society, where the traditional concepts of the hierarchical family system often permeate working conditions in industry, make it impossible to equate the enterprise union with its North-American counterpart. Paternalism of employers and the employees' strong feelings of attachment to the company reinforced by a wage system based on age and seniority as well as traditional life time employment, make enterprise bargaining as carried out in Japan fundamentally different from the way it is practised in North America.

Forms of decentralized bargaining make local units especially vulnerable to employer interference. In North America employer resistance and anti-union policies, especially in earlier days, resulted in a high rate of industrial strikes. According to Ross and Hartman, union members in the United States were more prone to strike than those anywhere else during the first three decades of the century and about

one third of all unionists went on strike each year (1960: 19). The legal recognition of the union, the increased strength of unions and the "profound changes in managerial attitudes towards the worker and the union" (ibid.47) have reduced the unusually high propensity to strike of American unionists.

In the centralized bargaining systems of Europe unions were recognized de facto, from the moment employers' associations entered into industry-wide negotiations with representatives of unions. Local unions have, however, been excluded from workplace bargaining in Germany, Italy and France. Their role has been taken over by works councils. These works councils conclude agreements re bonuses, productivity increases and other ways of providing indirect wage increases as well as improvements of other benefits. They also supervise the correct implementation of the collective agreement. Due to the lack of real bargaining power the councils are open to a great degree of employer influence, a topic which we will discuss in more detail later.

In Norway the unions do negotiate local agreements on piece rates and related issues through their shop stewards and the works councils' function is mainly in the areas of training, information and research (Balfour, 1972:113).

In Britain and Australia local bargaining is usually done by shop stewards. The inadequacy of industry-wide agreements in Britain resulted in an 'informal' local bargaining system where shop stewards frequently make use of

short unofficial strikes to back up demands. In fact, from 1967 to 1974 unofficial strikes i.e., strikes not called for by the union averaged 95 percent of the total number of strikes (Department of Employment Gazette, May 1975).

In Australia compulsory arbitration has not eliminated strike action. Strikes which do occur are typically brief, in most cases short demonstrations of discontent with managerial policies or working conditions. From 1946 to 1970 67 percent of the strikes were related to physical working conditions and managerial policies. (see tables 11 and 34). This direct action is often intended to bypass lengthy arbitration procedures.

Summarizing, it would appear that while centralized bargaining structures reduce the overall rate of strikes, much depends on the accompanying structure of local management-worker relations. When industry-wide agreements are inadequate in regulating local worker-management relations informal negotiations tend to develop. With an absence of strong central unions and employers' associations, these informal negotiations may develop into an extensive system of fragmented, unregulated bargaining, resulting in a high number of strikes (Britain and Italy).

Works councils may attenuate the inadequacies of industry-wide bargaining. They serve as a mechanism to

integrate industry-wide agreements and local conditions. Works councils, however, have no authority to negotiate agreements and the failure of central unions to monitor local developments and subsequently integrate workers' aspirations into industry-wide agreements may lead to wild-cat strikes (Germany).

In decentralized bargaining structures tendencies toward more centralized forms of bargaining are present in the form of multi-employer bargaining, coalition bargaining and pattern setting. The by now ritualistic yearly drive for wage increases in Japan, shunto, is a form of institutionalized wage conflict, whereby disorder within the enterprise is kept at a minimum while at the same time bargaining power is maximized through a coordinated effort.

In general, these coordinated bargaining efforts appear to keep the rate of strikes at a minimum. Ross and Irwin (1951:338) note the infrequency of strikes in American industries practising multi-employer bargaining. In pattern bargaining the 'pattern' set by one company in an agreement concluded with the unions (with or without a strike) eliminates the need for further strike action, if others "fall in line". Unified action in coalition bargaining and also in shunto, raises the stakes involved to the interests of both parties.

CHAPTER SIX

INDUSTRIAL DIVERSITY: THE EFFECT ON TRADE UNIONS, EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND FORMS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Having taken into account the considerations in the preceding chapters, it remains to be determined if the variations in the strength of unions and employers' associations and the forms of collective bargaining in the nine countries can be accounted for by their degree of industrial diversity.

Following the assumptions regarding the effect of diversity on labour organizations and the ranking of the countries on the scale of diversity, the number of locally organized, independent unions in the countries with a diversified industrial sector should be especially high in comparison to that of the countries which have a low degree of industrial diversity. In these countries the trade union movement rather than being fragmented, should be characteristic for its homogeneity, centralized power structure and relatively small number of independent unions.

The strength and organization of employers' associations should be similarly related to the structure of industry. In the countries with a relatively low degree of

diversity we may expect to find large, strong employers' associations and a centralization of decision making powers. Conversely, those countries with a diverse industrial structure should be characterized by independent employer action and relatively weak employers' associations.

With regard to the structure of collective bargaining, in countries with centrally organized unions and employers' associations bargaining may be expected to take place at the national level. This may be done for the economy as a whole, but, more likely, it will cover the employers and workers for a particular industry. In countries with fragmented, independent, local union organizations and similarly organized employers bargaining will tend to be at the local level. As a result such countries will be characteristic for their large number of collective agreements, each covering a relatively small number of workers. In the countries with a moderate degree of diversity bargaining most likely will take place at various levels: local, regional and, sometimes, at a national level.

In the chapters which follow, the trade unions, employers' associations and the forms of collective bargaining of the countries included in this study will be analyzed in more detail. The issues discussed so far, will be analyzed nationally; more specifically, those factors affecting the strength of unions and employers' associations as well as the particular forms of collective bargaining and the degree

of consistency of these variables with the structural characteristics of industry in these countries will be examined. For analytic purposes the countries have been divided into three categories. These categories are consistent with the diversity ranking as presented in the correlation analysis of diversity and strike activity:

- Countries with a high degree of industrial diversity and decentralized patterns of organization: Canada, the United States, and Italy (chapter seven)

- Countries with a low degree of industrial diversity and centralized patterns of organization: Norway, Germany and France (chapter eight)

- Countries with an intermediate degree of diversity and indeterminate patterns of organization: United Kingdom, Australia and Japan (chapter nine)

CHAPTER SEVEN

HIGH DIVERSITY AND DECENTRALIZED PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND ITALY

Decentralized collective bargaining in the form of single employer bargaining is most prevalent in the United States and Canada. In both countries the number of local unions as well as the number of agreements in force is extremely high. In the manufacturing industries the average yearly number of single employer agreements comprises about 75 percent or more of the total number concluded in this sector.

In Italy decentralized bargaining is a more recent phenomenon. Here the system traditionally based upon industry-wide agreements has within a relatively short time become "extremely decentralized" (Giugni, 1971:325). Now Italy has in fact, although not in a formal way, a decentralized system of collective bargaining.

The rapid disintegration of a redundant system of centralized bargaining and the emergence of local negotiations have left Italy ill-equipped in terms of legal regulations for the procedures of local bargaining.

In the United States and Canada, on the other hand, local bargaining has been well established for many years and the procedures for collective bargaining are legally

regulated into detail.

These differences in the legal framework have resulted in distinctly different strike patterns. In the United States and Canada strikes are fairly regular tests of economic strength i.e., they are usually long and predictable. In Italy, where there are virtually no legal regulations regarding the different ways in which employers and unions confront each other, the practice of local bargaining seems to have led to a large number of frequent short strikes (see table 12).

Table 12

DURATION OF STRIKES, MANUFACTURING SECTOR
1966-1972, Yearly Average

| | No. of Days Per Worker Involved |
|----------------|------------------------------------|
| Canada | 24.3 |
| United States* | 21.6 |
| United Kingdom | 5.3 |
| Italy | 5.2 |

*Excl. 1972

Source: Based on data from Yearbook of
Labour Statistics, 1970 and 1973
editions

In this chapter the unions, employers and structures of collective bargaining of the industrially diverse countries are examined. In the case of Italy special attention will be paid to the transitional aspects of its collective bargaining system.

UNITED STATES

Trade Unions

Trade Unions in the United States had a total of almost 21 million members in 1972 out of a total work force of approximately 82 million. This represent about 25 percent of the total labour force. In comparison with the other countries this is a low rate of unionization. However, as pointed out earlier, these figures tell little about the actual strength of unions. American unions are characterized by their strong organization at the local level and their strength in particular industries. For example, such sectors as the automobile industry, electrical machinery and steel industries have very strong unions, while in other sectors the rate of unionization is rather insignificant. Thus, the overall low rate of unionization may create a false impression of the economic strength of the major American unions.

The number of people unionized in manufacturing in 1972 was approximately 9 million, or about 48 percent of the workers employed in this sector. This is almost twice as high as the rate of unionization for the total labour force. (See table 13, page 82)

The number of local unions in the United States was as high as 57,000 in 1972, affiliated to about 177 national, or so-called international unions. About two-thirds of these unions are affiliated with the AFL-CIO (American

Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations). The federation has relatively little authority over the national unions which are autonomous and which set the policies for the actual bargaining. Unions gain recognition at the local level on a plant basis. The union selected by the majority of the workers in a particular plant has the exclusive right to negotiate with a specific employer.

Table 13

UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1972

| | Membership (000) | Labour Force (000) | Unionized % |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| All Unions | 20,838 | 81,702 | 25.5 |
| Manufacturing | 8,920 | 18,919 | 47.2 |
| <u>3 Largest Sectors:</u> | | | |
| Machinery excl. electrical | 608 | 1,820 | 33.4 |
| Transport Equipment | 1,032 | 1,720 | 60.0 |
| Electrical Equipment and Supplies | 1,052 | 1,650 | 63.8 |

Sources: United States Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1974
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974

Employers

Single employers are the most common form of collective organization in the United States. With the exception of municipalities and some other forms of coordinated activities, despite the growth of strong unions, continue to operate independently. Rosen

(in Barkin, 1975:335, 337-339) observes that while unions have become stronger, business has "more than matched that strength." Diversification of product markets, collaboration, economic power, international activities and increased managerial effectiveness are given as the main reasons for the employers' strength. The author believes that "Unionism in the United States is on the defensive and is likely to remain so." (ibid.:335)

Diversification has favoured business' bargaining power to the extent that it made it possible to deal with separate unions. Unions, organized according to traditional market categories, are faced with different expiration dates of contracts and other variations in the agreements, which make it difficult for them to bargain effectively. International activities allow companies to shift production; corporate mergers have increased economic power and sophisticated managerial methods are used to contain unions, reduce their effectiveness and employ them as a vehicle to increase worker satisfaction and production. According to Rosen, American unions have not been able to counteract any of these developments effectively (1974:337-341).

In industries where companies are relatively small -- textiles, furniture, printing, food processing -- and local competition is high, employers have initiated multi-employer bargaining to deal with unions. D. Cullen in Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the United States

(1973:513) reports on 'mutual aid' plans by employers in some industries. This plan guarantees to cover part of participating companies' losses during a strike in order to prevent 'whipsawing', to improve staying power in a strike and to strengthen the employers' position during a strike.

Thus, it appears that employers, with some exceptions, have experienced few pressures necessitating a more unified approach. The absence of powerful central labour organizations, the fragmented structure of collective bargaining, and, in general, the strength of private enterprise in the United States seem to be some of the more important factors in this development.

Collective Bargaining

Bargaining in the United States most frequently takes place at the plant level. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 155,000 collective bargaining agreements covering about 21 million workers in 1968 (Cullen: 1975:520). While this figure indicates the decentralized nature of collective bargaining, it does not reveal the effects of pattern setting, coalition and multi-employer bargaining. A breakdown of agreements covering 2000 workers or more showed that of 620 agreements, 355 were concluded with single employers covering almost three million workers.

In the manufacturing sector the single employer is even more prevalent. Of 306 agreements concluded in this

sector 248 were with single employers. The situation is reversed in the non-manufacturing sectors where multi-employer agreements outnumber those with single employers two to one

Table 14

EMPLOYER UNIT IN AGREEMENTS COVERING 2000 WORKERS OR MORE, 1971*

| Industry | Single Employer | | | | Multi-Employer | | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------|------|------------------|------|-----------------|------|------------------|------|
| | Agree- ments | % | Workers (000) | % | Agree- ments | % | Workers (000) | % |
| <u>All Industries</u> | 355 | 57.3 | 2919 | 60.0 | 265 | 42.7 | 1945 | 40.0 |
| <u>Manufacturing*</u> | 248 | 81 | 2141 | 83 | 58 | 19 | 434 | 17 |
| Food | 11 | 38 | 44 | 36 | 18 | 62 | 77 | 64 |
| Textiles | 3 | 60 | 9.4 | 39 | 2 | 40 | 14.3 | 61 |
| Apparel | 5 | 33 | 32 | 15 | 10 | 67 | 185 | 85 |
| Printing and Publishing | 1 | 17 | 2.2 | 8 | 5 | 83 | 26.4 | 96 |
| Chemicals | 12 | 100 | 44 | 100 | - | - | - | - |
| Primary Metals | 45 | 98 | 479 | 100 | 1 | 2 | 2 | - |
| Machinery | 23 | 96 | 93 | 92 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 8 |
| Electrical Machinery | 37 | 95 | 335 | 99 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 1 |
| Transportation | 53 | 96 | 794 | 99 | 2 | 4 | 11 | 1 |
| Other Manufacturing | 58 | 97 | 308 | 75 | 17 | 23 | 105 | 25 |
| <u>Non-Manufacturing</u> | 107 | 34.1 | 777 | 34 | 207 | 65.9 | 1511 | 66 |

* Total number of Workers Covered: 4.9 million
Total number of Agreements: 620

Source: United States Department of Labour, Characteristics of Agreements Covering 2000 Workers or More, Bulletin 1729, Washington D.C., 1972.

Multi-employer bargaining is associated with certain characteristics (ILO, 1974:124,125). It is most prevalent in industries where:

There are both craft and industrial unions. The fifth largest, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and the eighth largest, Electrical Workers, are both craft unions. The industrial unions are those organized in the mass production industries. The United Steelworkers and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers are the two largest (1972).

Of great importance for Canadian industrial relations is the presence of American companies. Canada's special ties with American industries has resulted in a highly diversified industrial structure. The consequences of this diverse structure for the labour movement have been two-fold: a fragmentation of the labour movement and a strengthening of the many locals through their ties with American based unions. Jamieson observes, that while the need of American unions to grow may have been one reason for international unionism, the main pressures and motivations seem to have come from the Canadian side (Jamieson, 1974:50). Most locals only have a few hundred members, too small to recruit leaders and too poorly financed to support research, staff training, etc. For these services they depend heavily upon their American organization. The general policies of the international unions, geared to the American system, have been a major stumbling block in the formulation of specifically Canadian policies.

In recent years there have been growing pressures for

more autonomy in Canadian matters in the Canadian branches of the international unions. In addition, the percentage of unionized workers belonging to international unions has dropped resulting in an increase of power for the national unions in the CLC.

Employers

It is estimated that there are about 300 official employers' associations in Canada. They mainly act as spokesman for the industry in attempting to influence government policies and they are consultative bodies for their members. Some associations do negotiate for a number of employers in the same industry (clothing, printing, trucking) following the pattern of multi-employer bargaining, as discussed earlier. The occurrence of multi-employer bargaining is relatively small in comparison to single employer bargaining, as we shall see later.

With the presence of American multinationals many points pertaining to the strength of employers as indicated for the United States, are applicable to Canada. Diversification, shifts in production and mergers have all strengthened the employers' position. It is in locally or regionally based industries that employers frequently rely on multi-employer bargaining.

The Structure of Collective Bargaining

As in the United States, bargaining mostly takes

place at the plant level. The typical form of bargaining is between one local of a union and one plant of a single company (see table 16). The total number of collective agreements in force has been estimated at 20,000 (Beaucage, 1976: 30).

Table 16

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS FOR 500 WORKERS OR MORE BY BARGAINING UNIT

| Bargaining Unit | Collective Agreements (%) | | | | Workers (%) | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|
| | 1953 | 1958 | 1963 | 1968 | 1953 | 1958 | 1963 | 1968 |
| One Plant | 55 | 61 | 59 | 61 | 31 | 42 | 41 | 38 |
| Several Plants (one employer) | 26 | 22 | 22 | 19 | 37 | 35 | 34 | 30 |
| Several Employers | 19 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 32 | 24 | 26 | 31 |

Source: Unpublished data from the Canada Department of Labour in "An Outline of Canadian Labour Relations System", Canada Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1976.

While the industrial structure remains highly diversified in Canada, there are tendencies toward greater centralization. Especially in the automobile industry, pattern bargaining is common and this also influences to a certain degree industries dependent on the automobile manufacturers.

Overall, the structure of Canadian collective bargaining has shown very few signs of change (see table 16). While these figures do not reveal much about company mergers, concentration of industries and some other centralizing tendencies, as discussed earlier, the structure of Canadian collective

bargaining can still be described as "fragmented and decentralized" (Government Task Force, 1968:60).

Strike Pattern

The Canadian strike record has during the last 25 years closely paralleled the American strike pattern. Historically, the number of days lost per worker was somewhat lower in Canada. However, in recent years the Canadian record has not only matched the American, but quite often exceeded the American losses due to industrial disputes. The increase in unionization of public service employees is frequently said to have caused this rise in days lost through strikes. However, when comparing the overall strike record to that of the manufacturing sector we notice that in the latter the trend has been similar (tables 17 and 18, pages 114 and 115). Although the increase of unionization in the public service may have had psychological effects in terms of an increasing awareness of industrial conflict, through its overtness and inconvenience to the general public, it cannot be a sufficient explanation for the parallel increase in the manufacturing sector.

The growth of unions in the public sector in Canada has drawn the federal and provincial governments directly into the collective bargaining arena. Wages obtained in the public sector, often act as trendsetters for industry.

Unrest and strikes, injunctions, back to work

legislation, arbitration have become more frequent and 'acceptable' means of settling disputes. In such a climate unions not only strike to obtain better working conditions, but also to protest what they consider to be repressive government action. Thus, increased government involvement instead of reducing, may actually intensify industrial conflict.

The economic situation in Canada also has its consequences. As in the United States, the trend towards longer contracts since the early seventies was noticeable in Canada. However, after 1974 most longer term agreements were replaced by agreements for one year (Beaucage, 1976: 31). The higher rate of inflation in comparison to the United States, was a major factor in this reversal.

It is too early to make any definite conclusions about changing strike trends and the effects of growing government involvement in both the economy and the area of collective bargaining. This growing involvement of the governments and the absence of an institutional framework -- a tripartite body or other direct participation of labour -- facilitating a macro type approach in the regulation of industrial relations, may in part be responsible for the reversal in strike trends.

While the above are mere speculations, there is substantive evidence that the Canadian structure of collective bargaining is even more fragmented than that of

the United States. The variations between the two countries are put in perspective in the following summary.

- industrial diversity: Canada 28.5 (1966-1972 average), United States 30.1 (1966-1972 average)

- number of locals: Canada approximately 1 per 29 unionized workers (1972), United States about 1 per 367

- number of agreements: Canada approximately 1 per 120 unionized workers, United States about 1 per 135

- strike activity: Canada 1692 days lost per 1000 workers (1966-1975 yearly average), United States 1115 days lost per 1000 workers (1966-1974 yearly average)

Thus, in light of the relationship between fragmented bargaining structures and industrial disputes the higher rate of conflict in Canada in comparison to the United States comes as no surprise. Taking into account the continued fragmentation of the labour movement and the limited role of employers' associations in collective bargaining, Canada's strike rate will probably continue to surpass that of the United States in the years ahead.

ITALY

Trade Unions

Trade Unions in Italy are divided along political/ideological lines and are predominantly organized on a geographical or industrial basis. Until recently organization at the plant level was weak, and the strength of unions has been mostly at the national level.

The strongest confederation is the CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labour), which is dominated by the communist and left wing socialists. Their membership is estimated to be between 2.5 and 3.5 million workers. The CGIL is strongly represented among the industrial workers in Northern Italy. It is closely allied with PCI, the Italian Communist Party. The second largest confederation is the CISL (Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions), dominated by the Catholics and in the past often allied with the Christian Democratic Party. It derives its strength mainly from agricultural workers, white-collar workers and pensioners. Membership estimates for the CISL range from 1.5 to 2 million workers. The third major confederation is the UIL (Italian Union of Labour) moderately socialist oriented and an estimated membership of around .4 million workers.

Total membership figures of Italian labour unions are highly inaccurate and estimates by authorities in the field of labour unions vary from four to six million members, or

between 22 and 33 percent of the labour force. Consequently, the membership figures above are little more than indications of the relative strength of the national confederations.

The centralized organizational structure of the Italian labour movement is a result of its creation by political parties during the second world war. A central trade union, combining communist, socialist and catholic labour, was formed after the fall of Mussolini in 1943. Political developments after the war led to the exclusion of the communists and socialists from the government, and eventually resulted in a split within the central trade union.

It is beyond the limits of this paper to discuss the historical developments of trade unions in Italy, and the short historical digression is merely to illustrate that the centralized structure of the labour movement is an artificial political structure and not one based on strong unified labour movements.

Collective bargaining did not really exist prior to the 1960's. Unions until that time were more instruments for political action than for collective bargaining. Inter-union hostility further weakened union power at the bargaining table and unions more or less accepted the general terms set out by management in national contracts. Strong industrial unions were non-existent and local issues were dealt

with through the commissione interni, a type of works council. This council is elected by union and non-union members. Candidates are usually put forward by the unions. Thus, the political rivalry among the major national federations also effectively eliminated any possibilities for a strong local labour structure. However, to attribute the weakness (until recently) of the Italian labour movement to political rivalry is too simplistic an explanation. The special characteristics of industrial development in Italy provide more fundamental reasons for the limited strength of the trade unions. Some of these characteristics are:

- the large proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture. Until 1950 40 percent or more of the labour force was engaged in agriculture. (In Britain this figure was around nine percent as early as 1900.) As late as 1969 as much as 21 percent of the labour force was employed in agriculture. (Kendall, 1975:141)

- the existence of an industrialized north and an underdeveloped south. Industries are concentrated in the industrial triangle of the northern cities, Turin, Genoa and Milan. The south is underdeveloped, with primitive farming methods and handicraft-type of industries. National unions recruit members from both the industries in the north and agricultural workers in the south.

- the high rate of unemployment until the beginning of the 1960's

Under these conditions the climate for the development of trade unions was not unlike that in the United States before the advance of mass production industries and the introduction of the Wagner act; an atmosphere where management vigorously opposes any trade union presence in the plant, where trade union organizers are viewed as dangerous revolutionaries and where employers almost unilaterally define the conditions of employment. This situation was reinforced by the political divisions within the labour movement and its class movement orientation. Illiteracy and the rural background of a great part of the labour force initially provided little challenge for the generally paternalistic approach of employers.

The years of the "economic miracle" in the early sixties and the emergence of Italy as a modern and industrially advanced nation during the past 15 years have had important consequences for the direction and the strength of the labour movement. G. Giugni considers this period in the history of Italian industrial relations " a period no less important than for instance, the 1930's for the United States, which was the decade that saw the rise of the industrial trade union movement and its penetration of the great mass production industries" (1965:273).

Employers' Associations

The dominant employers' confederation in the private industrial sector is Confindustria. It represents about 10,000 firms totalling 3 million employees which corresponds to about half the work force in the manufacturing industries. It includes 103 national associations and 106 regional associations (Europa Yearbook, 1973).

In the 1950's, under the then national structure of collective bargaining, Confindustria was a powerful organization consisting mainly of small and medium sized enterprises. The subsequent decentralization of collective bargaining and the creation of Intersind, the employer organization for state owned companies, have strongly diminished the centralized decision making powers of Confindustria. The creation of a separate employer organization for state-controlled industries was according to Malles (1973:55) motivated mainly by the desire to dissociate the Christian Democratic Party from the generally conservative labour policies of Confindustria.

Both Intersind and Confindustria have encountered difficulties with the growing practice of local bargaining. However, under these circumstances it is much easier for Intersind to adhere to a consistent policy than it is for Confindustria which represents widely varying interests among its many employers' associations.

Changes in Collective Bargaining in Italy

Collective bargaining as it existed until the end of the 1950's was centralized at the national level. It was at this level that national agreements were worked out for the various industries including basic skill classifications and regional variations. Wages were fixed at a low level, affordable to the economically weaker sectors of industry. Agreements were binding only to those employers who belonged to the associations which had negotiated the agreements. P. R. Weitz (Labour and Politics in a Divided Movement: The Italian Case, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 1975: 232) states that prior to 1959 there was almost no genuine collective bargaining: "Management announced the general terms of national contracts and the labour confederation, particularly the CISL, usually accepted them." Employers strongly resisted unions with repressive measures and kept union activity far removed from the plant.

The first initiatives for change came from the CISL, in particular from those active in the northern industrial unions. They began to press for industry and plant level agreements. The CGIL at first resisted this movement, which it regarded as an attempt to fragment the working class, but eventually under pressure from its own members and successes of the CISL (Kendall, 175:164), it adopted a similar position. The creation of a new association of state owned companies,

Intersind, separate from Confindustria, the only other employers' organization, was another important factor in the changing collective bargaining structure, as we shall see below.

Major changes took place during the 1962-1963 national negotiations. The metal industry (P. Weitz, 1975:233) proved to be the crucial sector in the unification of the labour movement and the demands for negotiation of local issues with the unions. A series of coordinated strikes soon led to the breakdown of negotiations for a national agreement. However, Intersind which controls an important sector of the metal working industry continued to negotiate. Agreement was reached on a system of 'articulated' bargaining i.e., a coordination of industry-wide sectorial and plant level agreements. This occurred in July, 1962, without interruption of production. For the privately owned industries, agreement was not reached until February of the following year, after a series of strikes, totalling 40 days (Giugni, 1965:285).

Articulated bargaining, a major break with previous bargaining practices, soon became the typical system in industry. Employers had some success by insisting that plant level bargaining be done by provincially organized unions. The unions' most important gain besides the articulated bargaining, were clauses regulating trade union rights within

the plants, including the right to 'check off'. Most of these clauses relating to union presence and recognition were later made law under the Workers' Charter, passed in 1970.

The recognition of these trade union rights has given unions, especially in the metal industry, greater, in particular financial independence. This increased independence and organizational strength of the key industrial unions, coupled with the need for more unified trade union action, led to the eventual severing of formal ties between labour confederations and political parties in 1969. However, pressures for coordinated action of different unions were not limited to the key industrial unions. During the 1967-1969 pension reform issue (pensioners are a major organized group in the Italian labour movement) a precedent for confederal unity was set in the pursuit of a national goal (P. Weitz, 1975:234). The national confederations presented the government directly with a set of proposals, and for the first time in 20 years the CISL agreed to join the CGIL in a national strike.

The above historical events illustrate the growing unity of the Italian labour movement. Pressures for this increased coordination of action originated in the key industrial unions: textiles, chemicals and above all, the metals sector. During the second half of the sixties unions not only secured a greater say in local bargaining, but they

also expanded the scope of plant level bargaining. At the same time the confederations started to coordinate action to press for specific national economic policies rather than the ideologically oriented action of the past:

The 1969 round of negotiations marked a new point in the history of collective bargaining (Giugni, 1971:307, 321). They were decisively different, because of the emergence of a new type of representation, the so-called "delegates". Elected by their fellow workers in the workshops they act as spokesmen for the group. They form the liaison between unions and the workers at the plant, but are not necessarily union members. (Reportedly 50% are union members, *ibid.*:325). This development was accompanied by a growing worker militancy at the plant level in the form of short unofficial strikes, which in a large number of cases resulted in the conclusion of plant agreements (*ibid.*:316). The strikes were not against the unions and these were quick to channel worker discontent into collective bargaining strategies. The agreements concluded after the 'hot' autumn of 1969 culminated in an 'unprecedented success' for the trade unions (*ibid.*:321). The extent of plant level bargaining, which appeared to be the main issue, remained unsettled. Unions felt that a definition of the scope of bargaining at the various levels would limit their freedom, which at the moment is virtually unrestricted. Employers insisted on a

definition of the exact scope of plant level bargaining and maintained that once an issue was settled, it should not be negotiated elsewhere until the expiration of the agreement. The problem has not been settled and unions today bargain extensively at the plant level as well as at other levels and there are no restrictions on the issues that can be dealt with.

The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining in Italy has in a relatively short time evolved from an extremely one sided centralized structure into a highly decentralized structure of fractional bargaining. Giugni terms it "extremely decentralized, democratic and representative" (1971:325).

The early sixties showed the emergence of articulated bargaining i.e., coordinated bargaining at various levels. This multi-tiered system has lost its importance with the emergence of plant level bargaining which frequently reopened issues dealt with at other levels. The core of this local organization are now the shop delegates (22,000 in the metals industry, belonging to 1400 factory committees. Average age is between 30 and 35 and only 30% belong to a political party, *ibid.*:324). Although plant level agreements are becoming wide spread, national collective agreements have continued to be of importance, in particular to workers in the smaller firms. The essential

difference with earlier years is that plant level bargaining now sets the trend for national agreements. Giugni foresees that with all the changes in representation and the probable trade union unification, "bargaining will tend to be decentralized to the maximum extent..." (ibid.:327).

Forms of Collective Bargaining and Conflict

Collective bargaining as it presently exists in Italy is in a state of flux and is undergoing profound structural changes. No stable pattern of relationships between employers and unions has been established. The institutional framework for collective bargaining as it existed before the changes started, was the remnant of a previous era. Both employer attitudes and the political ideology of labour organizations fostered the continuation of the centralized structure. Nevertheless, economic expansion leading to increased power of workers, especially those in mass production industries, soon confronted employers and ideologically oriented labour unions with a different reality. Pressures for change have come from the strong industrial unions in the north, notably in the metal sector. These unions have taken new initiatives in the area of local bargaining. In spite of employer resistance and ideological stumbling blocks within the labour movement, decentralization is taking place at a rapid rate. At the same time the essence of the

of the national structure is being maintained; moreover, coordinated action has strengthened the bargaining position of labour at the national level as well.

With the conditions described above it would be inaccurate to link the high rate of conflict exclusively to the high diversity of industry. More immediate causes for conflict, consequences of recent changes in collective bargaining can be identified:

- Local bargaining has increased the possibilities for conflict. The emergence of the workers' delegate and the practice of informal bargaining, together with the rapidly diminishing importance of articulated bargaining has resulted in the negotiation and renegotiation of agreements at various levels. This has been accompanied by the disappearance of the no-strike provision which was explicit in the earlier articulated bargaining agreements.

- The retention of the essence of national agreements and coordinated action of labour has created two levels of conflict. Moreover, bargaining at these levels is done simultaneously and makes coordinated action of unions all the more effective

- With the exception of the Workers' Charter, defining the rights of workers to organize and covering issues related to union presence in the plant, there is little statutory

regulation of collective bargaining. For all practical purposes there are no legal restrictions on the right to strike. Strong union resistance has been the main deterrent in government attempts to legislate.

While the above are more immediate causes for conflict, they appear to be in accordance with our assumptions regarding the link between industrial diversity and structures of bargaining. Thus, the decline of a bargaining system created by political forces and the emergence of a new decentralized structure under the pressure of strong economic expansion are not unexpected developments in view of the general thesis.

Industrial diversity, of course, is only one of the many forces shaping the structure of an industrial relations 'system'. Among others, an important factor in determining the extent of decentralization of collective bargaining in Italy will be the strategy of the labour movement. For the moment it has shown its adaptability by being able to integrate plant level movements into the overall strategies of the confederations. It has severed formal political ties and has overcome initial difficulties in establishing a united labour front. The permanence of this coordinated action is unpredictable at the moment. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the labour movement in Italy can no longer be described as weak and divided. (Ross and Hartman, 1960: Galenson, 1962) Political-ideological divisions have, for

the moment at least, made way for direct industrial action and bread and butter issues. To what extent the egalitarian ideas of a working class movement can be reconciled with the high economic aspirations of workers in the strong sectors of industry remains to be seen.

Labour Dispute Trends in the United States, Canada and Italy

Tables 17 and 18 show labour dispute trends in the industrially diverse countries. The number of days lost accounted for by the manufacturing sector (table 18) is about half or more of the total number of days lost in all sectors (table 17), even though the manufacturing sectors of these countries with the exception of Italy, make up only one-fourth or less of the total labour force. The exact proportions are shown below.

United States:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-74: 376 million - 100%
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-74: 196 million - 52%
Percent of the work force in manufacturing: 24.7 (1966-75 average)

Canada:

Total days lost in all industries, 1966-75: 65 million - 100%
Total days lost in manufacturing, 1966-75: 31 million - 48%
Percent of the work force in manufacturing: 23.5 (1966-75 average)

Italy:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-75: 194 million - 100%
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-75: 109 million - 56%
Percent of the work force in manufacturing: 31 (1966-75 average)

Note that in Italy, where strikes are relatively frequent and of short duration, the number of workers involved is extremely high in comparison to the United States and Canada which are characteristic for their rather prolonged labour disputes.

Table 17
LABOUR DISPUTE* TRENDS, ALL INDUSTRIES: 1966-1975

| Year | UNITED STATES** | | CANADA | | ITALY | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|
| | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) |
| 1966 | 4405 | 1960 | 25,400 | 617 | 411 | 5,178 | 2387 | 1888 | 14,474 |
| 1967 | 4595 | 2870 | 42,100 | 522 | 252 | 3,975 | 2658 | 2244 | 8,568 |
| 1968 | 5045 | 2650 | 49,018 | 582 | 224 | 5,083 | 3377 | 4862 | 9,248 |
| 1969 | 5700 | 2481 | 42,869 | 595 | 307 | 7,752 | 3788 | 7507 | 37,824 |
| 1970 | 5716 | 3305 | 66,414 | 542 | 262 | 6,540 | 4162 | 3722 | 20,887 |
| 1971 | 5138 | 3280 | 47,589 | 569 | 240 | 2,867 | 5598 | 3891 | 14,799 |
| 1972 | 5018 | 1714 | 27,066 | 598 | 706 | 7,754 | 4765 | 4405 | 19,497 |
| 1973 | 5353 | 2251 | 27,948 | 724 | 348 | 5,776 | 3769 | 6133 | 23,419 |
| 1974 | 6074 | 2778 | 48,045 | 1216 | 592 | 9,255 | 5174 | 7824 | 19,467 |
| 1975 | - | - | - | 1054 | 482 | 10,894 | 3601 | 14110 | 27,189 |
| Yearly average total work force | | Yearly average total work force | | Yearly average total work force | | Yearly average total work force | | Yearly average total work force | |
| 1966-1974: 79 million | | 1966-1974: 79 million | | 1966-1975: 8.1 million | | 1966-1975: 8.1 million | | 1966-75: 18.7 million | |

*Excl.: United States: disputes less than six workers or lasting less than a full day or shift
Canada: workers indirectly affected and disputes in which the time lost is less than 10 man days

** 1975 data not available

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1970, 1973 and 1976 editions

Table 18
LABOUR DISPUTE* TRENDS, MANUFACTURING: 1966-1975

| Year | UNITED STATES** | | | CANADA | | | ITALY | | |
|--|-----------------|------------------------|---|-----------------|------------------------|---|-----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) |
| 1966 | 2295 | 922 | 13,700 | 301 | 96.2 | 1,988 | 1275 | 827 | 9,050 |
| 1967 | 2328 | 1350 | 27,800 | 267 | 91.5 | 1,976 | 1486 | 912 | 3,282 |
| 1968 | 2664 | 1180 | 24,000 | 342 | 155.6 | 3,746 | 2085 | 2641 | 5,370 |
| 1969 | 2822 | 1310 | 24,100 | 284 | 88.3 | 2,690 | 2097 | 4016 | 25,585 |
| 1970 | 2481 | 1128 | 38,006 | 263 | 92.0 | 3,631 | 2283 | 1713 | 10,889 |
| 1971 | 2391 | 863 | 18,485 | 278 | 94.3 | 1,542 | 3169 | 2206 | 6,659 |
| 1972 | 2056 | 646 | 12,283 | 291 | 117.7 | 2,044 | 2688 | 2462 | 10,200 |
| 1973 | 2282 | 963 | 14,319 | 384 | 148.9 | 3,376 | 1901 | 3985 | 16,425 |
| 1974 | 2822 | 1135 | 23,484 | 685 | 232.4 | 4,815 | 2906 | 4512 | 11,644 |
| 1975 | - | - | - | 481 | 207.5 | 5,585 | 1984 | 7706 | 9,518 |
| Yearly average work force 1966-74: 19.5 million | | | Yearly average work force 1966-75: 1.9 million | | | Yearly average work force 1966-75: 5.8 million | | | |

*Excl. United States: disputes less than 6 workers or lasting less than a full day or shift
Canada: workers indirectly affected and disputes in which the time lost is less than 10 man days

Italy: political strikes and workers indirectly affected for the years 1966-74
**1975 data not available

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1970, 1973 and 1976 editions

CHAPTER. EIGHT

LOW DIVERSITY AND CENTRALIZED PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION NORWAY, WEST GERMANY AND FRANCE

Of the low diversity countries, the case of Norway seems to correspond most accurately with the model of analysis presented in chapter two. Here, earlier, serious confrontations between strong unified trade unions and powerful central employers' associations have led to a balance of power accompanied by a low rate of strike activity. The presence of a strong labour party which has frequently formed the government, has reenforced the stability of the Norwegian system of industrial relations.

The organizational structure of trade unions, employers' associations and collective bargaining in Germany shows great similarity to that of Norway. The creation of a centralized industrial union structure after the second world war has shown to be a good match with the country's low rate of diversity. Strong links between the trade unions and the labour party as well as close consultation among unions, employers and government at the national level have reenforced the stability of labour relations in Germany.

France, which has a somewhat more diverse industrial structure than Norway and Germany, also has a centralized

system of collective bargaining. Here, however, the low rate of strike activity is not a result of a balance of power between strong centrally organized unions and employers' associations, but rather the consequence of a bargaining system dominated by strong employers' associations facing an industrially inept union organization which is mostly politically oriented.

In the following discussion of the organizational structure of trade unions, employers' associations and collective bargaining in Norway, Germany and France particular attention will be paid to the interaction of unions with labour parties.

NORWAY

Trade Unions

The degree of unionization in Norway is very high in comparison to most other countries. Approximately 48 percent of the labour force is unionized. However, in most industries the actual rate of organization is much higher, in some cases 80 to 90 percent of the workers. The largest union is the Iron and Metal Workers Union with almost 97,000 members. The membership of the 10 largest unions and their proportion of the total membership is shown in table 19.

Table 19

NORWEGIAN FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (LO) MEMBERSHIP 1973

| | Membership | % of total Membership |
|------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------|
| Total | 613,490 | 100 |
| <u>Largest Unions</u> | | |
| 1. Iron and Metal Workers | 96,809 | 15.8 |
| 2. Municipal Employees | 94,202 | 15.4 |
| 3. Building Industry Workers | 47,189 | 7.7 |
| 4. Commercial and Office Employees | 41,723 | 6.8 |
| 5. Chemical Industry Workers | 36,370 | 5.9 |
| 6. Food, Drink and Tobacco Workers | 28,887 | 4.7 |
| 7. Seamen | 28,750 | 4.7 |
| 8. Government Employees | 28,386 | 4.6 |
| 9. General Workers | 27,826 | 4.5 |
| 10. Clothing Workers* | 19,663 | 3.2 |
| Total for ten largest unions | 449,805 | 73.3 |
| 1973: Total Labour Force | 1,654,000 | |
| Manufacturing | 389,000 | |

*Amalgamated in 1969 with textile and shoe workers' unions

Sources: Norway Statistical Yearbooks, 1974
ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1975

There are approximately 753,000 trade union members. About 604,000 of these, in 40 unions, are affiliated with the Federation of Trade Unions, LO or Landsorganisasjon (P. G. Martin, 1975:76).

Norwegian trade unions are not divided by religion or politics. The central federation has maintained a close

relationship with the Norwegian Labour Party, the DNA (Det norske arbeiderparti). This party has been the major party in government from 1945 to 1965, and after a four year absence (1965-1969) was returned to power in 1969. Although structurally the labour party and the trade unions are completely autonomous, informal cooperation and coordination are extremely high. P. Martin describes the labour party and the trade union federation as "dual arms of a single labour movement." (ibid.:76). The informal integration of the labour movement takes several forms:

- Sharing of professional functionaries. The job of a provincial party secretary is frequently combined with an LO provincial secretaryship, and the unions pay a generous portion of this person's salary. The chairman of the Oslo Labour Party, a non-salaried position, is employed full time by one of the large trade unions as editor of its monthly magazine (ibid.:77). The integration of union and labour party functions is illustrated in table 20.

- Collective affiliation. In 1965 of the approximately 170,000 party members 90,000 were collectively affiliated, bringing in about 2.5 million Kroner (.5 million dollars in 1977) per year from the unions in membership dues.

(A. Zachariassen, quoted in Martin, 1975:77)

- The labour press. Thirty-nine regional and local newspapers and the national daily Arbeiderbladet are owned and operated jointly by different groups within the labour

movement, mostly by the trade unions and party organizations.

Under these conditions the party becomes so intertwined with the union that the two are actually an integrated movement in which the party pursues political goals and the union concentrates on the industrial sector. Thus, the political setting which gives the unions a "direct interest in promoting cooperation and industrial peace" (Ross and Hartman, 1960:107) has greatly influenced the low rate of conflict in industrial relations in Norway.

Table 20

AVENUE BY WHICH LABOUR PARTY LEADERS JOINED PARTY
(IN PERCENTAGES, N: 499)

| Avenue to Party Entrance | Period of Party Entrance | | | | Total (All Periods) |
|--|--------------------------|---------|---------|---------|------------------------|
| | Before 1931 | 1931-44 | 1945-50 | 1951-69 | |
| Joined party first | 61 | 40 | 10 | 10 | 23 |
| Joined party and union simultaneously | 21 | 33 | 49 | 19 | 31 |
| Joined union first | 18 | 27 | 41 | 71 | 46 |

Source: Penny Gill Martin, "Strategic Opportunities and Limitations: The Norwegian Labor Party and Trade Unions", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, October 1975:79

Strong political ties alone are not a sufficient explanation for the peaceful industrial relations in Norway.

Political unity and institutional security have promoted a climate of 'mature' industrial relations, where

disputes are settled by "reason, negotiation, arbitration and the idea of justice". (Balfour, 1974:48). These principles will only continue to be respected if both parties in the negotiations are aware of their mutual interests, and bargain from a position of strength.

The foundation for this balance of power and recognition of mutual interests was laid after years of intense struggle and a series of strikes and lockouts, resulting in a per union member loss of 52 days, "a ratio, probably never matched in any other industrialized country." (Ross and Hartman, 1960:105).
L

Employers' Associations

Most of the employers in the private sector belong to the Norwegian Employers Confederation (NAF). The confederation has about 8700 members who together employ about 350,000 workers. All the decision making power is located in the national confederation. Employers who do not conform to NAF policies may be disciplined for such action.

The dominant industrial organization is the Norges Industriforbund to which the main industry employers' associations (17) are affiliated. With 375 members employing about 75,000 workers, the federation of engineering industries is the largest employers' association in the Norges Industriforbund.

Collective Bargaining

It was not until after the struggles mentioned above, that a formal agreement was concluded between the representatives of labour and the employers. This agreement recognized the right to organize and to bargain collectively (1935).

This collective bargaining is highly centralized. The LO conducts the biennial wage negotiations with the Norwegian Employers Association. LO backing has to be obtained before member unions can negotiate on wages and working conditions (Balfour, 1974:47). A similar situation exists on the employers' side where neither an affiliate nor a member may enter into an agreement without the approval of the central board (Ross and Hartman, 1960:106). Balfour reports the possible use of sanctions against members who do not observe the decisions of the central body of employers' associations, the NAF (1972:55). Agreements are both national and industry-wide and set minimum rates which may include personal increments. They are supplemented by local agreements, negotiated by the branches. These locals have relative autonomy to settle disputes, but the national union will interfere when progress is lacking.

Most collective agreements are for a period of two years. Strikes which occur during the term of the agreement are illegal and the employer may bring the strikers before

the court. Anderson (quoted in Balfour, 1974:48) points out that the unions and employers now accept arbitration on both matters of rights and interests, and the right to strike is rarely exercised.

The mutual acceptance of unions and management as partners in the production process is reinforced by the working councils and the cooperation council. The latter is a national center for information, training and research. Management and labour are equally represented in this council.

Trade union training is also an important aspect of industrial relations in Norway. The Workers' Educational Association is the most important trade union training center and shop stewards usually acquire a good knowledge of negotiating. In 1970 the LO and the employers established a common fund for trade union and management education.

In summary, a strong belief in cooperation, consultation and joint participation in all aspects of industrial relations prevails. The existence of a strong, unified labour movement and an equally united front of employers, as well as a favourable political climate form a solid basis for industrial peace in Norway.

WEST GERMANY

Trade Unions

An entirely new trade union structure was established in Germany after the second world war. Before 1933, when the Nazis abolished the trade unions, workers were organized in unions which were divided along craft, political and religious lines. In 1949 a new confederation consisting of 16 industrial unions was founded: the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). The 16 affiliated unions each cover a major industry. They organize all the workers in their particular sector, both blue collar and white collar. The affiliates are independent i.e., they hold the power and determine the negotiating policies for their particular industry.

Some seven million workers belong to the unions affiliated with the DGB. Other smaller confederations are:

- the DAG (Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft), a union grouping salaried employees, membership almost 500,000
- the DBB (Deutscher Beamtenbund), a civil servants union with about 700,000 members
- the CGB (Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands), a confessional union with about 200,000 mainly white-collar workers

In all there are about 8.4 million union members, comprising about 32% of the total labour force.

As a result of the system of proportional representation in the DGB, the IG Metall, the largest industrial union with more than one third of the total DGB membership yields considerable influence in the congress. At the 1969 DGB convention the IG Metall had more delegates than the ten smallest unions combined.

The main function of the DGB is one of coordination and political representation. Although politically independent, the DGB has strong ties with the SPD, the Social Democratic Party. As is the case in Norway, the informal relationship between the unions and the Social Democratic Party is supported by the joint membership of union officials (see table 21). This informal integration brings with it a number of advantages, similar to those stated earlier in the case of Norway: the sharing of expertise, propaganda support, indirect financial aid, votes in elections, etc.

With its financial strength the DGB is able to provide expertise in many areas of importance in social and economic questions.* Not only is this of direct benefit to the

*The financial strength of the DGB is evident in its large scale business activities. It operates the fourth largest bank in Germany, a large insurance company, a building society and construction company which has built some 400,000 houses and is engaged in the building of hospitals, town halls, nursery schools, swimming pools, shopping centers; it owns a chain of over 5000 food and furniture shops, including supermarkets, department stores and factories producing household goods. The DGB is also involved in publishing, research institutions and the support of high level academies (Stewart, 1974:104, and Williams, 1974:46).

affiliates, it also carries considerable weight in the making of national economic policies.

Table 21 a

DGB MEMBERS IN POLITICAL PARTIES
(in percentages)

| Political Body Claiming DGB Members, and Year | Political Party | |
|--|-----------------|--------------|
| | SPD | CDU/CSU |
| DGB members in party (1967-69) (estimated) | 38-70 | Less than 12 |
| DGB members in Bundestag Fraktion (1972) | 91.3 | 10.3 |
| DGB officials in Bundestag Fraktion (1972) | 14.9 | 1.3 |

DGB : German Trade Union Confederation
 SPD : Social Democratic Party
 CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic / Christian Social Union

Table 21 b

POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERS IN DGB
(in percentages)

| Political Party | Rank and File (1967-68) | Union Officials (1969) |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| SPD members in DGB | 4.4-8.0* | 90.1 |
| CDU/CSU members in DGB | Less than 1 | 4.5 |
| No party membership or membership unknown | 91.0-94.6 | 5.4 |

*Eight percent of all unionists would mean approximately 513,000 union members in the SPD, or 70 percent of the 733,000 member party in 1967.

Source: Richard J. Willey, "Trade Unions and Political Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, October 1974:43

R.J. Willey (1974:38) observes that in the spheres of labour, social and economic policy at the national level, the DGB since 1969 has been somewhat more than first among equals. The economic interest groups cooperating with the government in national economic policies include in addition to the unions, big business and industry, agriculture and small sized enterprises (Mittelstand). Kirkwood and Mewis (1976: 297,298) view the strong bargaining position of German unions as a consequence of the wide range of services they provide for both the state and business.

As mentioned above, each of the 16 member unions of the DGB is independent and has the power to enter in collective agreements with the employers. Some of the negotiating authority is frequently delegated to the regional level or the district which, depending on the size may coincide with the Lander (West Germany is a federal republic divided into Lander).

At the bottom of the union structure is the local branch, which consists of the members of the union in a town or city. The locals' main function is to maintain contact among workers, works councils and district organizations, the latter usually the main center for carrying out collective bargaining.

The largest union in the DGB, the IG Metall, has a membership of about 2.4 million (1972). It is larger than the Teamsters in the United States or any other industrial union in the nine countries. It organizes about 46 percent

of all employees in its sector. The second largest union is the Public Services, Transport and Communications Union with about one million members. The Chemical Workers Union is the third largest with about .6 million members. In 1972 these three unions accounted for well over half (57%) of the membership of the DGB (see table 22).

Table 22

GERMAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (DGB) MEMBERSHIP, 1972

| | 1972 | % |
|--|------------|------|
| Total (16 unions) | 6,985,548 | 100 |
| <u>Largest Unions</u> | | |
| Metal Workers | 2,354,976 | 33.7 |
| Public Services, Transport and Communications | 997,771 | 14.3 |
| Chemicals, Paper and Ceramics | 626,771 | 9.0 |
| Building Industry Workers | 520,879 | 7.5 |
| Total 4 largest unions | 4,500,396 | 64.5 |
| Other 12 unions | 2,485,152 | 35.6 |
| Total Labour Force | 26,125,000 | |
| Manufacturing | 9,550,000 | |

Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, 1973
ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1976

Most sources report the strong centralizing tendencies in German trade unions, particularly in the process of collective bargaining. According to Seyfarth (1969:12), authority is highly centralized and unions operate "from the top down."

Bergmann and Muller-Jentsch (in Barkin, 1975:246) report that bureaucratic administration and centralized control is especially evident in collective bargaining. This centralization of power at the top is accompanied by an absence of effective union action at the plant level. Unions are denied the right to bargain or to represent workers at the level of the enterprise.

Works councils represent the workers at the plant level. These councils have a wide range of responsibilities among others, the supervision of the proper implementation of the collective agreement, the handling of employee grievances, enforcement of safety and health regulations and the negotiation of issues not dealt with by the regional or national industry wide agreements. While the works councils have a wide range of issues to deal with, they have no effective bargaining power. They are legally prohibited to resort to strikes, slowdowns, demonstrations or any other forceful tactics. They are subject to a clause (stated in the 1952 law on works councils) obliging them to "work together in mutual trust with the employer." The councils cannot determine basic wage rates, which are negotiated by unions and employers at the regional or national level. However, they do determine to a large extent the actual wages paid in the enterprise. They decide, in cooperation with management, on incentive premiums, bonuses, regulation of overtime payments, fringe benefits, etc.

The willingness of the employers to deal with works councils rather than with unions, and the consequent erosion of trade union influence in the setting of real wages will be dealt with later. Although unions cannot control works councils, they can exert influence indirectly by designating candidates for the elections of works councils. In fact, in 1972, about 78 percent of all council members were members of the DGB unions (in Barkin, 1975:250).

Employers' Associations

The counterpart of the DGB is the BDA (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitverbände), the German Employers' Confederation. The industrial associations affiliated to the BDA employ about 90 percent of all people employed in private industry (in Barkin, 1975:247). In 1971 44 national associations with 385 Länder and regional organizations were affiliated with the DBA (ibid.).

The DBA is, as is the DGB, a coordinating body and represents the employers in legislative or government activities.

Collective bargaining is carried out by national and regional associations for a particular industry. Employers generally prefer national or wide regional agreements. These agreements as a rule set wages and working conditions at a minimum level and are subsequently supplemented by enterprise agreements. This dual structure of collective

bargaining would appear to give the employers the best of both: the standardization of wages and employment conditions, as well as an opportunity to adjust wages at the local level according to the prevailing economic conditions. With the absence of any direct bargaining power for the unions, enterprise agreements are in reality almost unilaterally decided by the employer.

As is the case with the unions, the employers' associations in the metal and chemical sectors are the most powerful. A survey quoted in Barkin (1975:247) estimates that 50 persons who are in leading positions in Gesamtmetall, the employers' association in the metal sector, determine the policy, strategy and negotiations for the entire industry.

Employers coordinate counter action and promote solidarity in case of strikes. Reichel (1971:484) reports on guidelines issued for a number of industries, to help strike hit firms to keep losses at a minimum, and the existence of funds to assist companies financially. Employers also do not hesitate to use the lockout, which is subject to hardly any restrictions (Kendall, 1975:125).

Collective Bargaining

Agreements between unions and employers' associations are concluded for a particular industry in a specified region, frequently coinciding with the Land. Those regional

agreements quite often cover more than 100,000 employees and a large number of branches within the industry. The metal industry includes shipbuilding, car manufacture, machinery construction, optical industry and precision machinery (Barkin, 1975:251). The framework established by these agreements sets wages and working conditions at a level affordable to the average or less than average competitive position of the participating enterprises. Agreements are generally valid for a period of one or two years.

The collective agreements are binding contracts and impose on the participating unions and employers a 'duty of peace' for as long as the contract is in force. Companies not part of employers' associations may conclude separate agreements with the unions. Volkswagen is not a member of an employers' association and has its own agreement with the IG Metall. This used to be the case with the Ford Motor Company in Cologne. However, when in 1963 the unions demanded Ford to pay all extras above the standard rates for the industry, and threatened with a strike, Ford quickly decided to join the employers' association. From that point on the unions were bound by the peace clause in the general agreement which had not yet expired.

The national or regional industry agreements are in most cases supplemented by enterprise agreements. At this level not the trade union, but the works council elected by all employees, is the party 'negotiating' with the

employer. In the more profitable industries employers are able to make considerable concessions in wages and working conditions. The resulting wage drift, the difference between real wages and wage rates provided for in the national or regional agreements, rose to 40 percent in the metal sector and 30 percent in the chemical industries (in Barkin, 1975:252).

The increasingly more important role of the works council in the determination of local wages and working conditions takes away an important incentive to join a union. Unions have tried to enter into enterprise agreements, but the employers have strongly resisted any such moves. In fact, employers have little or nothing to gain by plant level agreements. They prefer dealing with works councils, which in the event of disputes cannot resort to economic pressure tactics. The works council is elected by all the employees in the enterprise. It has the responsibility to oversee the correct implementation of the collective agreement, it handles employee grievances, it may work out with employers additional wages in the form of productivity premiums, bonuses, overtime rates and other ways of increasing minimum wage rates established in the standard agreements.

The works council is dependent on the employer for the facilities essential for its effective operation.

Works council meetings are not open to attendance by the work force at large and works councillors are limited in reporting freely to other members of the work force or unions (Kendall, 1975:128). Kendall also reports that works councillors tend to be long service employees who are re-elected again and again. As a result there tends to be a build up of strong company loyalties (ibid.:129).

In addition to the above, several other factors severely limit the possibilities of works councils to effectively pursue workers' interests in dealing with management:

- they are under a statutory obligation to promote peaceful cooperation within the enterprise
- they have to rely on the employer for most of their information regarding the operation of the plant
- they represent all the workers of the plant, most of whom are not unionized.

According to Bergmann and Muller-Jentsch this dual system of industrial relations - unions and works councils - accounts for its flexibility and ability to absorb social conflicts (in Barkin, 1975:248). The absence of union negotiating power at the local level can be viewed as a weakness of the German trade unions which has not become serious yet. In the postwar German economy (Wirtschaftswunder) employers have generally conceded quite easily to wage increases, while unions were as a rule reluctant to demand high wage increases so as not to jeopardize

economic recovery. The absence of union power at the local level puts employers in an advantageous position: in times of economic growth and labour shortages they use increases in benefits to attract the necessary labour; in times of recession they have little local resistance in cutting benefits which have never been part of a negotiated agreement.

Centralization of union powers at the top, their participation in national economic policies and the absence of direct confrontations at the local level, appear to be closely related to the low rate of strike activity in Germany. The incidence of strikes is further limited by a number of legal and self-imposed restrictions on the right to strike. Legally a strike is prohibited during the term of the agreement. In addition, German courts have ruled that even the act of holding a strike vote is considered in violation of the peace clause. With the negotiations for a new agreement starting well before the expiration of the contract, there is little immediate pressure on the employer. Even after the expiration of the contract a strike is not considered legal if not all other avenues to solve the problem have been explored. A work stoppage in Germany always requires the approval of the national union. Before this can be given 75 percent of the membership of the negotiating unit must endorse strike action in a secret ballot.

In summary, the German trade union movement shows two distinct characteristics:

- financially and politically powerful national organizations
- an absence of trade union power at the plant level, combined with inadequate mechanisms to ensure representation of local interests at the higher levels of the union hierarchy.

The wide spread occurrence of wildcat strikes and the more aggressive action of shop stewards are evidence of dissatisfaction with the higher levels of union organization. Not only employers are unwilling to change the present collective bargaining structure, the established union hierarchy as well, has been reluctant to make changes in union organization.

Bergmann and Muller-Jentsch report on the unions' intolerance of internal dissidents and their harsh actions against those who initiate rank and file movements and independent tactical moves (in Barkin, 1975:273,274). Thus, it would appear that while there are recurring signs of dissatisfaction at the local levels, the union organization seems to be well in control and has not been forced to abandon its general policy of 'concerted action', that is, coordinated action of the state, the unions and the employers' associations. Whether this kind of action is always in the

best of interests of the workers is a matter of perspective. That it has contributed to keep the rate of industrial disputes low is evident in the statistics (see tables 24 and 25, pages 149 and 150).

FRANCE

Trade Unions

The degree of unionization in France is the lowest of the countries surveyed in this study. It is estimated to be around 3 to 3.5 million workers (Kendall, 1975:61; Stewart, 1974:82) or approximately 17 percent of a total labour force of around 20 million. The main confederations are the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) estimated membership 1.5 to 2 million, the CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail) estimated membership .7 million and CGT/FO (Confédération Générale du Travail / Force Ouvrière) estimated to have .5 million members. The CGT, CFDT and CGT/FO consist of a number of federations (each around 40, Kendall, 1975:68) usually representing the workers in a particular industry. The fédérations are organized regionally, rather than plant based. Not only is union membership very low, the industrial strength of the unions is further weakened by the union multiplicity at the plant level (see table 23, page 139).

Kassalow (1969:115) argues that the weakness in industrial power, a consequence of "structural make up and internal political division", has led French unions to depend on political action. They rely heavily on the state in such areas as: the extension of collective agreements, the regulation by statute of basic wages and working conditions

and the provision of office headquarters. Dependence upon political action, favouring concentration of union power at the top, and reliance upon the government would tend to keep industrial power weak, " ... and the cycle of political dependence tends to perpetuate itself." (ibid.:115) Kendall (1975:70) reasons in similar fashion that the underdevelopment of collective bargaining and the competitive politically-oriented nature of French unionism has endowed the confederations with more power than they might otherwise possess.

Table 23

SUPPORT FOR UNIONS IN ELECTIONS FOR WORKS COUNCILS

| | Percent Support First Collège | Percent Support Second Collège | Total |
|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------|
| CGT | 53.9 | 16.5 | 46.0 |
| CFDT | 20.2 | 17.5 | 19.6 |
| CGT/FO | 7.4 | 7.2 | 7.3 |
| CFTC | 2.6 | 3.3 | 2.7 |
| CGC | - | 25.8 | 5.5 |
| Others | 5.9 | 11.2 | 7.0 |
| Non-Union | 10.0 | 18.5 | 11.9 |

CGT : Confédération Générale du Travail
 CFDT : Confédération Française du Travail
 CGT/FO: Confédération Générale du Travail / Force Ouvrière
 CFTC : Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens
 CGC : Confédération Générale des Cadres

"An idea of the relative support for each of the main organizations can be gained from the results of the elections for works councils, which are organized in every enterprise. These are divided into two 'collèges' (electoral colleges), one for technicians, foremen and other executive grades and the other for manual and clerical workers. The most recent figures available give the breakdown shown" in Margaret Stewart, Trade Unions in Europe, 1974:85.

It is this tendency that has enabled the PCF, the communist party, to almost totally dominate the CGT, which is a politically independent confederation. Opposed to communist inspired, politically oriented strike action, the socialist group within the CGT broke away and formed the Force Ouvrière in 1948. This group has never been able to obtain any substantial support among industrial workers and its members are mostly from white-collar and professional groups. The CFTD is a continuation of the French Confederation of Christian Workers, which dropped its Christian label to become a left wing socialist oriented union federation. It is said to be the best organized and the most militant of the confederations (Kendall and Marx, 1971:11).

According to a reputable source (Reynaud, quoted in Kendall, 1975:80) the level of organization in the private industry is "between 15 and 20 percent overall." This low rate of unionization seems to be in part related to the existence of many small scale employers and their reportedly "archaic" and "paternalistic" attitudes (Kendall, 1975; Seyfarth, 1972), as well as the political orientation of the trade unions. The rate of organization in the public service is twice as high and contributes to the importance of political action in the strategy of French unions.

Stewart (1974:90) points at the militant operations of unions in strategically important sectors of the economy such as, engineering, transport and electricity. According

to the author the nationalized Renault car undertaking is one of the most strike hit plants, which is a "CGT bastion and is used to set the pace" (ibid.:90). The reputation of worker militancy in nationalized industries does not necessarily translate into strength at the bargaining table. Kendall's information puts the strength of unions at Renault in a somewhat different perspective, "Here (Renault plant) only some 20 percent of the work force are organized (1970 figures) and this despite the plant's reputation as a union stronghold."

With such a low rate of unionization it is hardly feasible to use the strike as an effective weapon to back up demands at the bargaining table. Instead, the strike is more or less a protest demonstration, an expression of general discontent rather than a technique to bring about specific changes in the terms of the collective agreement. Thus, the French sociologist Reynaud observes, "... the French strike is never the disciplined action of a troop which takes the steps designed by its leaders ... The strike is the materialization of agitation and the concordance of different displeasures." (J. Reynaud, quoted in Aaron and Wedderburn, 1972:48). Strikes often have a revolutionary character, the open expression of disapproval of authority. In most cases the initiative and militancy is more among the workers than on the side of the trade unions. The strikes are of short duration and involve large numbers of non-unionized workers. Kendall (1975:86) blames the lack of

the means of expression of conflicting interest groups for the explosiveness of strike action. Reynaud quotes a study by Seeman (in Barkin, 1975:284) to show the strong feelings of powerlessness of the French worker in comparison to Swedish and American samples, resulting in the outbreak of the 1968 strike explosion. The lack of an institutional framework, an effective bargaining system, as a mechanism through which a continuous expression and channelling of discontent is made possible, partially explains the feelings of powerlessness of the French workers, as described by the authors above.

Employers' Organizations

Employers in France show an extremely high rate of organization. In the industrial sector there are very few enterprises which do not belong to an organization. In the commercial and service sector the rate of organization is somewhat lower.

The 'Conseil National du Patronat Français' (CNPF) consists of more than one million enterprises, employing more than thirteen million workers (Récentes Tendances en Matière de Négociations Collectives, Séminaire Patronal International, Supplément au Rapport Final, OCDE, Paris, 1972).

Realization of common economic interests, the potentially divisive effects of competitive action when there are many small scale enterprises, the representational functions and lobbying in relation to the government and, in general,

the benefits of united action seem to have been more important reasons for the formation of employers' organizations in France than the threat of strong labour unions.

Despite recent mergers in the steel industry, chemicals and heavy electrical equipment, France is still a country of small manufacturing plants (Seyfarth, 1972:57). Seyfarth notes that it is the large number of small, marginal employers (97 percent of French employers in non-agricultural activities employ fewer than 100 employees) which gives the Patronat its conservative tone (1972:57).

Most sources report on the archaic attitude of employers in industrial relations. Kendall sees this as the first cause of the French industrial relations being backward, "almost beyond belief" (1975:74). Seyfarth quotes S. de Gramont (in Seyfarth, 1972:20-21) in a description of the French employers' attitude towards union activity. He describes the factory as an extension of the family where management only deals with individual workers and where union delegates are threatened with punitive action. Kassalow (1969:115) contrasts the bitter resistance of employers to having unions in their plants with the more progressive outlook of government commissions. He believes that the resistance of top management against union presence reflects their continued feudalistic-familistic attitude towards property. Reynaud (in Barkin, 1975:305) believes that the events of 1968 combined with the large number of mergers

that produced a group of larger corporations has led to a deeper division among the employers: the small and medium sized companies, on the one hand, and the large companies on the other. In spite of some evidence of a more progressive approach in industrial relations, in particular by large companies and government owned industries, strong employer resistance has effectively kept trade union influence at a minimum.

Collective Bargaining

The disproportion of power between management and unions is reflected in their collective bargaining.

In France most collective bargaining for a particular industry is carried out at the national level. This level of bargaining is most favoured by the employers' associations (ILO, 1973:106). It is usually between employers' associations and a committee representing the various unions. The practice has been to conclude national agreements for one year, but a provision in the law extends automatically an initial agreement where no new agreement has been concluded. Delamotte gives evidence from the early sixties that employers could refuse to bargain, "both in law and in fact" (1971:356).

The national (and regional) industry accords only provide minimum wage rates i.e., a review of previous

minimum wages. The agreement applies to all workers in the firms affiliated with the employers' organization signing the accord. Even though some unions for tactical reasons may refuse to sign, this in no way affects the validity of the agreement. The determination of the actual wages is within the jurisdiction of the firm and for most wage earners this actual wage cannot be negotiated (in Barkin, 1975:291).

Larger and more efficient companies have been able to offer higher wages and better working conditions than the minima provided for in the national and regional agreements. In some cases management has entered in voluntary agreements, guaranteeing a number of successive increases in the real wages. The nationalized Renault corporation took the initiative to enter in such voluntary agreements with the unions, in order to limit wildcat strikes and to promote better labour relations. Kendall observes that the 'negotiations' took one day to complete (1975:81). He also reports that other large scale, modern, highly capitalized enterprises followed the Renault initiative, which was strongly criticized by other French employers (ibid.).

Except for initiatives in the nationalized industries especially since 1969, the general level of wages and conditions continues to be decided by unilateral management decisions. Market conditions, rather than management-union negotiation, are commonly the determining factors in the setting

of wages and working conditions. Reynaud views the weakness of negotiations at the enterprise level as a "long standing failing" (1975:296), and at the national level Kendall sees the unions outmatched at the bargaining table in all respects by "well staffed, well equipped, disciplined and unified employers' associations" (1975:73). Yves Delamotte concedes that collective bargaining in France has never played the role which it has in other countries, where it is regarded as "the trade unions' chief function, the most effective protection for the wage earners' interests and the best way of settling industrial disputes" (1971:351).

To the industrially weak and divided unions political action, exploiting notions of class conflict and the disapproval of authority, becomes a viable alternative. The existence of strong employers' organizations, asserting the authority and decision making powers of management reinforces this class conflict orientation in industrial relations. Thus, both the established hierarchies of labour and of management have an interest in the continuation of the centralized forms of decision making.

As noted earlier, in the case of employers' organizations, new forces are changing existing structures. Recent developments in market economies, the increased competition within the EEC and in world markets have fostered the emergence of large scale enterprises and increased the number of company mergers. While in the small scale enterprises in

France strong local trade unions were difficult to organize, the emergence of large scale enterprise favours the organization of strong enterprise unions.

The government has taken an active role in these developments. It encourages consolidations, and large manufacturing firms have been formed in steel, chemicals and heavy electrical equipment. In 1966 more than 2000 mergers took place as compared to 450 in 1957 (Seyfarth et al., 1972 57). Accompanying these trends are initiatives by the government to establish new procedures for the negotiation of agreements. According to Delamotte these initiatives are an "outcome of a conscious political determination to promote collective bargaining in the nationalized industries and to define the rules governing relations between the signatories" (1971:366).

In the private sector the effects of government innovations are hardly visible, and it is "far from certain that the old pattern is being questioned at all" (ibid.:1971:374). Thus, it appears that apart from new trends in large scale enterprises and government initiated negotiations, few major changes have occurred.

Labour Dispute Trends in Norway, Germany and France

Tables 24 and 25 show labour dispute trends in the countries which have a low degree of industrial diversity. In comparison to the United States, Canada and Italy their strike rates are extremely low. Again the manufacturing sector accounts for well over half the number of total days lost; in the case of Germany the figure is about 86 percent. Precise figures for the three countries are:

Norway:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-75: 456,000 - 100 %
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-75: 303,000 - 66.4 %

Percent of the labour force in manufacturing 23.5 (1966-75
average)

West Germany:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-75: 7 million - 100 %
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-75: 6 million - 85.7 %

Percent of the work force in manufacturing 37.6 (1966-75
average)

France:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-75: 30 million - 100 %
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-75: 16 million - 53 %

Percent of the work force in manufacturing 27.9 (1966-75
average)

Note the extremely high figures for Germany in 1971, which were a consequence of local dissatisfaction with centrally negotiated wage rates (see page 69).

Table 24
LABOUR DISPUTE* TRENDS, ALL INDUSTRIES: 1966-1975

| Year | NORWAY | | | WEST GERMANY ¹ | | FRANCE ² | |
|--|-----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---|-------------------------|---|------------------------|
| | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) |
| 1966 | 7 | 1.3 | 5.2 | 196 | 27 | 1711 | 3341 |
| 1967 | 7 | .4 | 4.7 | 60 | 390 | 1675 | 2824 |
| 1968 | 6 | .5 | 13.5 | 25 | 25 | - | - |
| 1969 | 4 | .8 | 21.6 | 90 | 249 | 2207 | 1444 |
| 1970 | 15 | 3.1 | 47.2 | 184 | 93 | 3464 | 1160 |
| 1971 | 10 | 2.5 | 9.1 | 536 | 4484 | 4318 | 3235 |
| 1972 | 9 | 1.2 | 12.4 | 23 | 66 | 3464 | 2721 |
| 1973 | 12 | 2.4 | 11.4 | 185 | 563 | 3731 | 2246 |
| 1974 | 13 | 22.1 | 318.4 | 250 | 1051 | 3381 | 1564 |
| 1975 | 22 | 3.3 | 12.5 | 36 | 69 | 3888 | 1827 |
| Yearly average total work force (Adjusted to allow for change in 1971) | | | | Yearly average total work force 1966-75: 25.8 million | | Yearly average total work force 1966-75: 20.4 million | |

*Excl. Norway: workers indirectly affected and disputes lasting less than one day
West Germany: disputes lasting less than one day except when a loss of more than a 100 working days is involved.

1. Number of disputes not available 2. 1968 data not available

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1970, 1973 and 1976 editions

Table 25
LABOUR DISPUTE* TRENDS, MANUFACTURING: 1966-1975

| Year | NORWAY | | | WEST GERMANY ¹ | | FRANCE ² | | |
|--|-----------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|---------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | No. Of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) |
| 1966 | 2 | .5 | 1 | 104 | 21 | 1300 | 1788 | 1090 |
| 1967 | 2 | .06 | .1 | 53 | 91 | 1267 | 1146 | 2238 |
| 1968 | 1 | .05 | .03 | 25 | 25 | - | - | - |
| 1969 | 2 | .3 | .5 | 75 | 197 | - | - | 1002 |
| 1970 | 11 | 1.8 | 26 | 183 | 90 | - | - | 1172 |
| 1971 | 5 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 530 | 4430 | - | - | 2038 |
| 1972 | 2 | .05 | .5 | 22 | 64 | - | - | 1689 |
| 1973 | 6 | 1.8 | 6.3 | 178 | 544 | - | - | 1938 |
| 1974 | 4 | 13.4 | 262.1 | 57 | 571 | - | - | 1683 |
| 1975 | 8 | .7 | 5.0 | 33 | 31 | - | - | 2864 |
| Yearly average work force 1966-75: .4 million (Adjusted to allow for change in 1971) | | | Yearly average work force 1966-75: 9.7 million | | Yearly average work force 1966-75: 5.7 million | | | |

*Excl. Norway: workers indirectly affected and disputes lasting less than one day.
West Germany: disputes lasting less than one day except when a loss of more than 100 working days is involved
1. Number of disputes not available 2. 1968 data not available. After 1968 data for the number of disputes and workers involved are no longer available.

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1970, 1973 and 1976 editions

CHAPTER NINE

INTERMEDIATE DIVERSITY AND MIXED PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED KINGDOM, AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN

In the countries ranked in the middle of the scale for industrial diversity we encounter a mixture of various types of unions, employers' associations as well as great differences in collective bargaining procedures.

In Britain, due to the early development of trade unions, traditionally organized according to particular skills, there remains until today a fragmented picture of union organization. The emergence of shop stewards' committees has resulted in a dual system of collective bargaining. The increased importance of informal bargaining at the plant level combined with the absence of formal regulations for the procedures of collective bargaining has led to frequent, short, unofficial strike action. The situation in Britain shows many points of similarity -- shop stewards' committees informal local bargaining, few legal regulations regarding the procedures for collective bargaining -- with the situation in Italy, resulting in a similar pattern of strike action (see table 12, page 80). The more moderate degree of diversity of British industry and the greater participation

of the British labour party in government would seem to account for the lower total number of days lost in Britain.

In Australia, compulsory arbitration prevents a direct confrontation between unions and employers' associations. The arbitration authorities tend to decide on the basis of "comparative justice". The existence of a large proportion of craft unions has been preserved by the security of the arbitration system and the overall union structure remains rather fragmented. There exist strong, large unions and employers' associations in the 'metals' sector which employs almost half of all the workers in manufacturing.

Walker (1970:367) characterizes their negotiations as " 'power bargaining': hard bargaining between extremely well organized parties". Increased bargaining outside the system has resulted in more frequent, longer strikes, which have undermined the authority of the arbitration system.

It appears that in Japan the relatively low volume of strike activity is related to the traditional socio-economic organization of society. Due to the relatively short history of industrialization the full effects of industrialization upon the economic organization of interest groups is yet to be felt. Significant in this respect are the changing attitudes and expectations of workers employed in the large scale enterprises, as well as the more business like orientation of their unions.

In the following discussion of trade unions, employers' associations and collective bargaining of the countries which have a moderately diverse industrial structure we will find very few parallels among their patterns of organization other than that they are neither highly centralized nor highly decentralized. Their diffuse structures of organization in combination with other special characteristics of their industrial relations make the systems in the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan incomparable.

UNITED KINGDOM

Trade Unions

Britain's trade union structure is the most complex of the countries in this survey. Unions vary widely according to type and unit of organization. Three types of unions can be distinguished:

- craft unions: organizing workers according to particular skills or occupations
- industrial unions: organizing all the workers in a particular industry irrespective of their skill or occupation
- general unions: organizing workers regardless of skill or industry

Of the above craft and general unions are most common. Large variations in size and geographical unit further complicate the organizational structure.

As a result of amalgamations the number of unions shows a steady decline. Moreover, the membership is concentrated in a relatively small number of unions: 61 percent in 11 unions with more than 250,000 members. In 1972 132 unions were affiliated with the Trade Union Congress, TUC, and their total membership was about 10 million. Thus, out of a total of 466 unions with a combined membership of 11.3 million, the 132 unions affiliated with the TUC

accounted for about 90 percent of all organized workers
(see table 26).

Table 26

MEMBERSHIP OF TRADE UNIONS BY SIZE OF MEMBERSHIP

| Year | Size of Membership | No. of Unions | Total Membership 000's | Total No. of Unions (%) | Total Membership of Unions (%) |
|------|--------------------|---------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1960 | totals | 664 | 9,835 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 1965 | totals | 608 | 10,318 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 1970 | totals | 513 | 11,168 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 1972 | totals | 466 | 11,315 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | under 100 | 74 | 3 | 15.9 | 0.0 |
| | 100-499 | 118 | 31 | 25.3 | 0.3 |
| | 500-999 | 40 | 28 | 8.6 | 0.3 |
| | 1000-2499 | 62 | 92 | 13.3 | 0.8 |
| | 2500-4999 | 53 | 174 | 11.3 | 1.5 |
| | 5000-9999 | 32 | 214 | 6.9 | 1.9 |
| | 10,000-14,999 | 13 | 150 | 2.8 | 1.3 |
| | 15,000-24,999 | 18 | 333 | 3.9 | 2.9 |
| | 25,000-49,999 | 18 | 609 | 3.9 | 5.4 |
| | 50,000-99,999 | 13 | 901 | 2.8 | 8.0 |
| | 100,000-249,999 | 14 | 1,879 | 3.0 | 16.6 |
| | 250,000 and more | 11 | 6,901 | 2.3 | 61.0 |

Source: British Labour Statistics, HMSO, London 1973.

The overall rate of unionization in the United Kingdom is about 47 percent of the total labour force with Norway and Australia among the highest of the countries surveyed. In manufacturing the rate of organization is much higher: 62 percent of the labour force in this sector. Union density in most large establishments is considerably

higher. The table below gives a breakdown of unionization figures when excluding the smaller establishments.

Table 27

UNIONIZATION IN LARGER MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS, 1948 and 1974

| | 1948 | | 1974 | |
|--|-----------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| | Labour Force 000's | Density % | Labour Force 000's | Density % |
| All manufacturing | 6,709 | 52.2 | 7,779 | 62.2 |
| Excluding establishments with less than 100 workers | 5,194 | 67.4 | 6,292 | 76.9 |
| Excluding establishments with less than 200 workers | 4,268 | 82.1 | 5,423 | 89.2 |

Source: R. Price and G. S. Bain, Union Growth Revisited: 1948-1974 in Perspective, the British Journal of Industrial Relations, November, 1976.

According to the above figures, the establishments with more than 200 workers have a rate of unionization of almost 90 percent. Considering that these figures include white collar employees, who are generally less strongly organized (see table 28, page 157) the rate of organization among manual workers in most of British manufacturing is extremely high.

The TUC is the only trade union center in Britain and acts as the official spokesman for labour on a broad range of issues, especially in relation to the government and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).

Table 28

UNION MEMBERSHIP AND DENSITY IN MANUFACTURING, 1974

| | Labour Force (000) | Union Membership (000) | Density (%) |
|---------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| Manufacturing | 7779 | 4836 | 62.2 |
| - Manual | 5678 | 4164 | 73.3 |
| White Collar | 2100 | 672 | 32.0 |

Source: R. Price and G. S. Bain, op.cit.

The TUC's authority over the membership is limited to moral persuasion. Affiliated unions are autonomous. They rely on the national body, mainly for advice and guidelines, rather than instructions. The influence of the largest unions in the TUC is considerable. The Transport General Workers Union and the Engineering Workers Union together control almost one third of the total votes. The ten largest unions in the TUC, out of a total of 132, hold two-thirds of the total voting power. Thus, the policies of the TUC are strongly influenced by the largest unions, in particular by the leadership of the Transport Workers' and Engineers' unions.

While the TUC has no direct organizational relationship with the Labour Party, its member unions provide about 90 percent of the Labour Party's funds and control more than four fifths of the votes at the annual conference (L.Minkin, 1974:23). Again the influence of the largest unions is

high (see tables 29 a and b).

Table 29 a

DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES WITHIN THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS, 1973*

| Trade Union Congress | Votes | |
|--|-------|------|
| | No. | % |
| Two Largest Unions | 3089 | 31.7 |
| Transport Workers | 1747 | 17.9 |
| Engineers | 1342 | 13.8 |
| Ten Largest Unions | 6451 | 66.2 |
| Total votes cast by all unions represented at the Congress (97 organizations) | 9742 | 100 |

Table 29 b

DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES WITHIN THE LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE, 1973*

| Labour Party Conference | Votes | |
|--|-------|------|
| | No. | % |
| Two Largest Unions | 1971 | 31.8 |
| Transport Workers | 1074 | 17.3 |
| Engineers | 897 | 14.5 |
| Ten Largest Unions | 4213 | 67.9 |
| Total votes cast by all unions represented at the Conference (56 organizations) | 5449 | 87.9 |
| Total Conference Vote | 6197 | 100 |

*At both meetings votes are allotted on the basis of one vote for every 1000 members or part thereof.

Source: L. Minkin, The British Labour Party and the Trade Unions: Crises and Compact, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, October, 1974:23.

The crucial role of labour in the success of government in Britain is well known. The 1969 defeat of the Labour Party was largely attributed to its failure to carry out proposals to limit the power of the unions. The 1970-74 period of Conservative government, in particular the first two years were marked by politics of confrontation between government and unions and resulted in an unprecedented wave of industrial disputes. The 1974 elections were conducted by the Conservatives on the theme "Who Governs Britain?" and by Labour on its ability to forge a "social contract" with the unions.

The long history of worker organization and the pre-eminence of craft unions in the development of labour unions have resulted in an often complex form of representation at the plant level. Local unions are usually organized on a geographical basis and represented in the place of work by the shop steward. The steward is, as a rule, elected by the union members of a particular union and not as in the other European countries by all the workers in the establishment. The shop stewards occupy a pivotal place in the system of industrial relations in Britain. With the diminishing authority of industry-wide bargaining, their role in what is often referred to as the 'informal' system of collective bargaining has become of crucial importance in the regulation of management/worker relationships. Because of union multiplicity at the

plant level the number of shop stewards may vary considerably and is in some cases as high as 22 (Seyfarth, et.al., 1968:73). Sometimes they form shop stewards' committees to coordinate policies, but according to Kassalow (1969:163) they often compete with one another at the shop level and their strategy vis à vis the employer is frequently not coordinated. Notwithstanding their crucial position the task of the shop steward and his relationship with the union is ill defined. Kassalow notes that "the exact manner of his election, his precise powers and role - these often remain a sort of no man's land in British industry and union life" (ibid.:162).

Employers' Associations

The majority of British employers are members of an employers' association. J. F. Goodman (in Barkin, 1975:59) reports that there are over 1300 employers' associations in Britain, many of which are local associations federated to industry-wide organizations. The Confederation of British Industry combines 108 organizations whose members employ about 80 percent of the labour force. The task of collective bargaining rests with the national associations which conclude industry-wide agreements with representatives of the various unions. The most important employers' association is the Engineering Employers' Association which covers approximately 460 establishments with several million workers (Kendall, 1975:196).

Studies cited in Aaron and Wedderburn (1972:14) reveal that most of the national associations no longer seek to determine wage levels in the establishment. National and industry-wide agreements negotiated by these associations and the unions increasingly serve as a reference point for individual employers and can no longer standardize wage rates and working conditions.

The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, 1965-1968 (Donovan Commission) reported that workplace negotiations take place in 80 percent of the cases in which union organization exists (Kendall, 1975:196). Many large companies are not members of employers' associations and they conduct bargaining directly with the unions. Again company-wide agreements are often supplemented by plant level negotiations.

Collective Bargaining

Free collective bargaining i.e., the negotiation of voluntary agreements without intervention of the state is an essential characteristic of industrial relations in Britain. There are no legal rules or alternate procedures which govern the forms of collective bargaining other than those traditionally established by the parties involved.

The Donovan Report (1968) distinguished two systems of industrial relations in Britain: a formal and an informal system. The formal system is composed of the industry-wide

agreements between the national employers' associations and the unions. The informal system consists of the plant level negotiations taking place between managements and shop stewards.

Some 14 million manual workers out of a total of approximately 16 million were covered by industry-wide negotiated agreements in 1964 (Roberts and Rothwell, 1972:545). Traditionally the wages and working conditions set under these agreements were regarded as standard rates throughout the industry. With the advent of local bargaining these industry-wide agreements are now more and more regarded as minima, and additional wage schemes and rules governing working conditions are in most cases negotiated at the level of the workshop.

Roberts and Rothwell (1975:545-546) regard the high level of demand for labour as the main influence in the development of plant and company bargaining. Other factors further stimulated the growth of plant level bargaining:

1. The lack of a central trade union authority

Because of union multiplicity negotiations are usually carried out between management and shop stewards' committees. While each union is represented by its own shop steward, the committee as a whole is not subject to the authority of any particular union and thus operates independently. Moreover unions depend to a large extent on shop stewards in the areas of recruitment, payment of dues and representations vis à vis the employer. In fact, for most workers the shop steward is the union and the latter is in no position to exercise

authority over the shop steward. There are an estimated 2600 full time union officials and approximately 200,000 shop stewards. Under conditions of full employment, the inadequacy of the industry-wide agreements and the lack of precise regulations of disputes at the plant level, the shop stewards frequently resort to the use of the unofficial strike as a means to exert pressure on the employer. An unofficial strike is one not called by the official union machinery and goes against the industry-wide agreements, which do not provide for plant level negotiations.

2. The willingness of most employers to engage in local bargaining

For many employers it was easier to deal with shop stewards' committees at the plant level than with the multitude of unions representing the workers in the company. The growth in the size and structure of enterprises also played an important role in the employers' attitude towards industry-wide bargaining. Roberts and Rothwell (1972:547) assert that as enterprises grow larger they become more conscious of their separate interests and more concerned to develop their own strategies, rather than be dependent on the employers' organization. Further evidence for the increase in the size of enterprises in the United Kingdom and the accompanying tendencies toward autonomy in collective bargaining comes from

Clegg (1970:158) and Jackson and Sisson (1976:318). Both sources stress the need for more specific rules and procedures in the large enterprises, which cannot possibly be covered in the industry-wide agreements. According to Jackson and Sisson size of establishments in terms of employment militates against employer organization and seems to have contributed to the decline of the industry-wide agreements (ibid.) Not only do many large companies develop their own expertise and policies in management/worker relationships, the standardization of wage rates and working conditions encouraged by industry-wide agreements are not as attractive to the large enterprises as they are to small sized companies. Their competitive position allows the large enterprises to attract the necessary skilled labour by offering more advantageous wages and working conditions when labour is in short supply. The large average size of establishments in the United Kingdom is illustrated in table 30.

Table 30

AVERAGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENGAGED PER ESTABLISHMENT IN MANUFACTURING

| All Manufacturing | | The Three Sectors Employing the Highest Number of People | |
|-------------------|------|--|-------|
| Japan | 17.9 | Japan | 29.6 |
| Australia | 40.0 | Norway | 49.8 |
| Norway | 41.4 | Australia | 58.1 |
| Canada | 53.5 | Canada | 82.1 |
| United States | 59.8 | United States | 127.4 |
| United Kingdom | 87.3 | United Kingdom | 172.7 |

Source: United Nations, Growth of World Industry, Vol. I, 1973
(Figures are for 1971 or 1972)

While pressures for decentralization of collective bargaining are evident in many European countries, the problem in Britain is compounded by the absence of formal procedures for collective bargaining, in particular at the local level. The industry-wide agreements have traditionally relied on "custom and practice" rather than on a precise definition of substantive issues. They do not specify rules for plant level bargaining nor do they define the role of the shop steward or the shop stewards' committees. Consequently, workplace agreements produced a "profusion of uncodified informal understandings and concessions of a largely pragmatic form" (J. F. Goodman, in Barkin, ed. 1975:53). Moreover, with the voluntary nature of collective bargaining 'contracts' are not legally binding and bargaining is continuous because, in most instances, there is no specified term of agreement.

The non-legalistic aspect of collective agreements does not allow for a clear distinction between disputes of 'rights' and disputes of 'interests'. Many local agreements do not appear in writing at all (A. Flanders, 1967:28) and, in effect, most decisions taken jointly by management and shop stewards constitute an agreement (S. Lerner, cited in ILO, 1974:114). Without the precise formulation of procedures and agreements issues arising out of conflicting interpretations of an agreement tend to be settled by the use of force rather than through labour courts or independent

arbitrators (Roberts and Rothwell, 1972:553).

Earlier international comparisons of issues leading to strikes indicated the high number of non-wage issues related to work stoppages in Britain. These non-wage issues have continued to be a major cause of strikes: in 1973, of 2873 work stoppages 1413 were caused by non-wage issues (Department of Employment Gazette, June 1974). A breakdown of reasons given for strikes show how in the area of working conditions the number of unofficial strikes is disproportionately large (see table 31).

Table 31

REASONS GIVEN FOR OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL STRIKES, 1964-1966

| Reason | Official | Non-Official | Official : Non-Official Ratio |
|--------------------|----------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| Wages | 38 (49%) | 1052 (48%) | 1 : 28 |
| Working Conditions | 4 (5%) | 676 (31%) | 1 : 169 |
| Employment | 20 (25%) | 326 (15%) | 1 : 16 |
| Union | 17 (21%) | 138 (6%) | 1 : 8 |
| Total | 79(100%) | 2196 (100%) | 1 : 29 |

Source: M. Silver, "Recent British Strike Trends: A Factual Analysis," British Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1973:87

The Donovan Commission put the rate of unofficial strikes at 95 percent of all strikes for the years 1964-1966. These unofficial strikes accounted for 69 percent of the days lost due to industrial disputes during that time. More

recent figures (see table 32) indicate that this trend is continuing.

Table 32

AUTHORIZATION OF STRIKES, ALL INDUSTRIES, 1967-1974

| Year | No. of Strikes | | | Days Lost in All Strikes | | | Days Lost per Striker | |
|------|----------------|--------------|------|--------------------------|--------------------|------|-----------------------|----------------|
| | Total | Non-Official | % | Total (000) | Non-Official (000) | % | Official % | Non-Official % |
| 1967 | 2116 | 2008 | 94.9 | 2787 | 2394 | 85.9 | 10.9 | 3.4 |
| 1968 | 2378 | 2287 | 96.2 | 4690 | 2491 | 53.1 | 1.4 | 3.6 |
| 1969 | 3116 | 3018 | 96.9 | 6846 | 5233 | 76.4 | 5.7 | 3.8 |
| 1970 | 3906 | 3744 | 95.9 | 10980 | 7660 | 69.8 | 11.2 | 5.1 |
| 1971 | 2228 | 2067 | 92.8 | 13551 | 3501 | 25.8 | 26.7 | 4.4 |
| 1972 | 2497 | 2337 | 93.6 | 23909 | 5681 | 23.8 | 29.2 | 5.2 |
| 1973 | 2873 | 2741 | 95.4 | 7197 | 5188 | 72.1 | 5.1 | 4.6 |
| 1974 | 2882 | 2764 | 95.9 | 14740 | 7727 | 52.4 | - | - |

Source: Department of Employment Gazette, HMSO, London, May 1975

- Note: 1. The number of official strikes was subtracted from the total number of strikes to obtain the number of non-official strikes
2. The number of days lost per striker was arrived at by dividing the total number of days lost by the number of workers involved. It indicates the average length of strikes

With the inadequacy of industry-wide agreements, the absence of formal procedures at the plant level and the lack of binding regulations, it is not surprising that the non-official strike has continued to be an important tactical weapon in the hands of the shop stewards and is for all practical purposes the typical British grievance procedure.

Besides the high number of non-official strikes, the above table also shows the difference in the average length

of the official and non-official stoppage. The erratic pattern of the length of official strikes is caused by the effect of 'big' strikes e.g., the national one day stoppage in 1968.

M. Silver (1973:97-98) in his analysis of British strike trends notes that both the length and scale of strikes is on the increase - the author interpretes this phenomom as the emergence of "the major confrontation as a central focus of industrial conflict." (ibid.:98). Related to this is the increase in work stoppages caused by wage issues: from 32 percent of all strikes during the period 1959-1961 to 51 percent ten years later (1969-1971).

Summarizing - it appears that the chaotic nature of British collective bargaining was at the root of much of the public concern about strikes. During the so-called "Donovan Era", 1964-1967, Britain in comparison to the other countries in this survey ranked seventh among the nine nations in terms of days lost per 1000 people employed. This measure is considered to be an index of the economic cost of strikes (M. Silver, 1973:70, J. Vanderkamp, 1968:22).

In terms of strike frequency (number of strikes in proportion to the size of the labour force) Britain ranks with Australia and Italy among the highest.

While the economic effects of short frequent strikes

are difficult to assess, they seem to be indicative of the extent of industrial unrest and the stability of an industrial relations system. In Britain, the traditionally established norms which govern the collective bargaining process are in most cases no longer adhered to. The practices of industry-wide agreements are no longer adequate for the regulation of management/worker relationships. In fact, they have been replaced by an informal system of collective bargaining at the local level. Traditional structures, however, continue to persist. According to the Donovan Commission, "the assumptions (of authority) of the formal system prevent the informal system from developing into an effective and orderly method of regulation." (Donovan, 1968:36, quoted in Garbarino, 1970:208).

The Commission concluded that the two systems are in conflict:

the unreality of wage agreements at the industry level lead to the abuses of incentives schemes and overtime rates; the general grievance procedures in industry-wide accords are ineffective in dealing with local issues and result in frequent direct action. In view of these shortcomings of the traditional structure the Commission suggested the "drastic curtailment, if not, the abandonment of industry-wide agreements in 'most industries', and the conversion of the present informal system into a new formal system of factory or establishment level agreements." (ibid.)

It appears, however, that bargaining structures once firmly in place, cannot be easily replaced, not even by legislative force. The unsuccessful attempts of both the Labour (voluntary approach) and the Conservative government (legislative approach) are evidence that measures which do not have the cooperation of the parties involved in the collective bargaining process are unlikely to succeed. It would seem that an established system can only be reformed over a longer period of time. Not unrelated to this are the effects of the employment situation, inflation and the economic situation in general. The unions' cooperation is to a large extent guided by the prevailing market conditions i.e., in times when there is a high demand for labour any attempts to restrict effective union power will be met with strong resistance; in times of unfavourable market conditions for labour, attempts to define union rights and obligations may be welcomed by unions as they fear an erosion of traditionally established rights as a result of their diminished bargaining power.

In view of the above, the time when economic pressures resulted in the decentralization of collective bargaining in Britain and exposed the inadequacies of the traditional system to deal with the resolution of conflict, would also seem to have been the time when attempts to define the rights and obligations of unions were least likely

to succeed. The sharp increase in industrial conflict after the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act in 1971 and the outright refusal of almost all unions to register seem to corroborate this assumption.

AUSTRALIA

Compulsory Arbitration

Almost 90 percent of wages and working conditions of Australian employees have been established by arbitral bodies (K. Laffer, 1972:156) and as Yerbury and Isaac (1971:421) point out, "purists might well deny the use of the term collective bargaining." The authors write:

"The entire socio/legal framework has been not only inappropriate for free and independent collective bargaining and fraught with formal barriers for those who prefer its operation, but also in a very real sense, hostile to the values which underlie it. The egalitarian notion referred to as 'comparative wage justice' traditionally underlined by arbitration authorities runs counter to the 'bargaining power' concept of collective bargaining." (ibid.:422)

However, the system of conciliation or arbitration and the resulting awards have not completely eliminated the direct negotiation of wages and conditions of employment between unions and employers. Especially during the past ten years negotiations with regard to over-awards -- additional wages or special conditions -- have gained in significance. This development has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the number of strikes as well as changes in the duration of work stoppages (see tables 39 and 40, pages 196 and 197).

It is generally believed that the system of compulsory arbitration is in "turmoil" and that "the authority of the arbitration system is very tarnished." (K. Laffer, 1972). Nevertheless, the system of arbitration, in existence since the beginning of this century, has greatly influenced the strength and organizational structure of the trade unions and employers' associations as well as Australia's strike pattern.

Trade Unions

Australian workers have been strongly unionized since the beginning of this century. This is largely a consequence of the fact that unions who registered under the arbitration system were given legal recognition. Compulsory arbitration was introduced after large scale work stoppages in the 1890's, during which employers successfully held out for "freedom of contract" and collective bargaining (Isaac, 1968:2). According to Isaac, the unions with their "power squashed and their survival threatened" accepted compulsory arbitration as "a source of support and protection" (ibid.). Apart from official recognition by the arbitration authorities, awards granted often included preferential treatment for union members with regard to hiring practices. Isaac (1968:9) reports that in the federal jurisdiction these preferences are of the qualified type, "other things being

equal". The states of Queensland and New South Wales have given their tribunals the power to award absolute preference to union members. Consequently, the degree of unionization is, according to the author, "significantly higher in these states."

The structure of unions is characterized by the presence of many small craft unions, which were already well established before the emergence of mass production industries and the development of industry based unions. Thus, as is the case in the United Kingdom, it is not unusual to find several unions in the same industry or enterprise.

About 2.5 million workers belong to more than 300 unions. In manufacturing .8 million workers belong to 72 unions, but almost half of these workers (in the engineering, metals, vehicles sectors) belong to only 9 unions (see table 33, page 175).

Isaac argues that, once established, unions are not likely to amalgamate. The security and awards granted through the arbitration tribunals favour the persistence of established structures (1968:11).

The basic unit of organization is the branch. This unit covers the state or a large district within the state. The degree of autonomy of the branch depends on the jurisdiction under which it operates. Those operating under state tribunals set their own policies and call work stoppages independently of the federal trade union. If a branch is under

the jurisdiction of a federal tribunal, policies are coordinated with the federal body. A district, or state council coordinates action and policies of different unions where necessary by means of disputes committees. In addition, a branch may also belong to a federation of unions which operate in the same industry e.g., the Metal Industries Federation. They are mostly consultative, but sometimes they negotiate with employers.

Table 33

TRADE UNIONS: MANUFACTURING, DECEMBER 1969 AND 1971

| Industry | 1969 | | 1971 | |
|------------------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|
| | Number of Unions | Workers (000) | Number of Unions | Workers (000) |
| Engineering, metals, vehicles etc. | 9 | 363.4 | 9 | 405 |
| Textiles, clothing, footwear | 5 | 99.9 | 5 | 96.7 |
| Food, drink and tobacco | 28 | 134.3 | 26 | 153.0 |
| Sawmilling, furniture | 6 | 32.8 | 6 | 32.6 |
| Paper, printing, etc. | 5 | 59.9 | 5 | 62.3 |
| Other Manufacturing | 22 | 90.4 | 21 | 91.3 |
| All Manufacturing* | 75 | 780.7 | 72 | 840.9 |
| All Industries** | 309 | 2239.1 | 303 | 2436.6 |

*Total work force 1971: 1.5 million, percent unionized: 55

**Total work force 1971: 5.5 million; percent unionized: 45

Source: Australia, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth, 1972.

At the federal level 97 unions, with a membership of 1.3 million or 64 percent of all union members, are affiliated with the Australian Council of Trade Unions, ACTU (K. Walker, 1970:52). It controls and directs disputes involving more than one state in the same manner as the disputes committees of the state councils (ibid.) The organization of the union at the plant level is weak. Walker reports that most unions have voluntary part time representatives in the plant, but are alert to keep plant level organization limited (ibid.:54).

Employers' Associations

The structure of employers' associations is generally parallel to that of the trade unions. The two main federations are the chambers of manufactures and the employers' federations in the various states. They are also present at the federal level. The best organized trade association is the Metal Trades Industries Association. Walker notes that both in trade unions and employers' associations members tend to be apathetic, except when vital interests are at stake. Meetings are poorly attended and the same men stay in office for long periods (ibid.73).

Collective Bargaining: Voluntary and Compulsory

Most of the bargaining which takes place is carried out within the framework of the state or the federal

arbitration system. Even though all unresolved labour disputes are in final instance decided through arbitration, direct negotiations between employers and unions do take place before (consent awards*) and after (over-awards*) legally binding arbitration awards are established. Undoubtedly, the existence of compulsory arbitration severely limits the extent of bargaining that does take place.

Arbitration awards are made by tribunals**, both at the federal (for interstate agreements) and the state level. They are for an entire industry or on a craft basis. The awards are based on representations (log of claims) made by the parties involved and the arbitration commission's evaluation of a set of criteria such as, the inflationary consequences, productivity, equity considerations and the distribution of national income.

*A consent award is the result of a settlement negotiated by the parties in compliance with the arbitration system and issued afterwards by the arbitrator as if it were an award resulting from his adjudication (Yerbury and Isaac, 1974:426)

For over-awards see next page

**There are three types of tribunals - the court type, the tripartite board type and a mixture of these. The federal tribunals are court types, made up of legally qualified persons with the status of judges and laymen, all of whom have power of conciliation and compulsory arbitration. Boards consist of equal numbers of employers' and employees representatives and an independent chairman. They perform essentially the same functions as the court type of tribunals. The differences are mainly in their composition and in the greater informality of the board type (Yerbury and Isaac, 1971:424).

Awards cover about 90 percent of employees in Australia (Hoffman, 1973:55). Until the middle of the 1960's arbitration awards were minima and in most instances maxima for rates of pay and working conditions i.e., they established the exact rates of pay and working conditions for almost all employees in Australia. However, with growing pressures of full employment (ILO, 1973:103) and shortages of skilled labour (Yerbury and Isaac, 1971:433) an increasing number of supplements, or over-awards have been negotiated. Over-awards are outside the tribunal system i.e., they are informal agreements which cannot legally be enforced. Unions use over-awards agreements as a lever in obtaining higher tribunal awards. Initially (in 1967 and 1968 in the metal trades industry), the arbitration commission suggested that employers absorb increases in tribunal awards in over-awards already paid. Industrial action proved that this was not realistic (ibid.:446). Thus, unions have learned to obtain the best of both: protection of the weaker sectors by tribunal awards, and negotiation of over-awards under strike pressure with a subsequent incorporation of the higher rates in new awards. The increasing number of over-awards not only tends to raise tribunal awards, but it also undermines the authority of the arbitration system, especially, because its penal provisions have become largely ineffective in limiting strike action.

Although wages are becoming the major cause of strike action, physical working conditions and managerial policies have, in most instances, been the causes of strikes (table 34).

Table 34

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF
CAUSES OF STRIKES IN AUSTRALIA (1960-1970)

| Year | Wages | Physical Working Conditions and Management Policy | Jurisdictional Disputes | Other Causes |
|------|-------|---|-------------------------|--------------|
| 1959 | 12.1 | 64.0 | 9.9 | 14.0 |
| 1960 | 18.6 | 56.6 | 11.1 | 13.7 |
| 1961 | 15.1 | 64.4 | 8.1 | 12.4 |
| 1962 | 24.5 | 59.8 | 7.8 | 7.9 |
| 1963 | 22.3 | 59.8 | 9.2 | 8.6 |
| 1964 | 24.0 | 56.8 | 10.1 | 9.0 |
| 1965 | 31.6 | 54.6 | 7.5 | 6.2 |
| 1966 | 25.5 | 56.1 | 11.2 | 7.1 |
| 1967 | 25.1 | 57.6 | 9.6 | 7.7 |
| 1968 | 31.8 | 54.8 | 6.9 | 6.6 |
| 1969 | 43.0 | 50.9 | 9.0 | 6.1 |
| 1970 | 44.9 | 42.7 | 9.2 | 3.3 |

Source: Philip H. Hiley, Philip and Hughes, Barry, "Australia: Cyclical Strike Patterns," The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 13:4, December 1956.

of an effective union organization at
disputes have to be referred to the
tendency of the arbitration system not to
managerial prerogatives, have often ensued
in broad strike action. Isaac (1968:33) reports that it
is presumed that employers have the sole discretion in

such areas as dismissals, disciplinary action, seniority claims, transfers, etc. and "to be rid of a 'troublemaker' all the employer needs to do is give a week's notice of dismissal." Both Laffer (1972:169) and Walker (1970:77) support the view that arbitration bodies have largely preserved management's discretionary power in non-economic matters.

The lack of grievance procedures and the increasing number of strikes associated with the negotiation of over-awards has exposed the shortcomings of the Arbitration system. Despite the many restrictions on the right to strike -- depending on the state varying from a total ban to requirements for a secret ballot -- compulsory arbitration has not prevented strikes. However, strikes which do occur are typically brief, averaging 1.75 days in 1970 (Laffer, 1972:154). They are characteristically short protests, which occur spontaneously to register discontent with managerial decisions and to force concessions in over-award negotiations. These strikes are quite often without union consent and this direct action is intended to bypass lengthy arbitration procedures.

Summarizing - it is evident that the existence of an arbitration system prevents a direct confrontation between unions and employers' organizations. The unions and the employers' organizations have become an integral part of the

arbitration system in which their main task is to present their case before this decision making body. As a result unions abandoned the use of the official strike.* Strikes that do occur, are short protest stoppages to deal directly with grievances or, and this especially recently, to force concessions in over-award negotiations.

There seems to be a definite trend to negotiate outside the official system (ILO, 1973:104). Strong unions who can force more favourable agreements through direct negotiations, favour collective bargaining and the abolition of the arbitration system. The inability of the system to enforce awards and the limited effects of punitive action have led many employers to believe that collective bargaining may well be the lesser of two evils (Yerbury and Isaac, 1971:447).

According to Laffer, Australia is moving "headlong in the direction of collective bargaining" and there is "no more than a bare possibility" that compulsory arbitration will reestablish itself (1972:174). Yerbury and Isaac believe that the system can be improved and adapted (1971:452). They foresee compulsory arbitration "working effectively at one end of the spectrum and free collective bargaining at the

*Unions which prefer not to register may strike at any time, unless essential services are involved. Once registered it is practically impossible to leave the arbitration system. (see e.g., K. Walker, 1970:36).

other; and in between a peculiar hybrid of quasi-collective bargaining, which could well become the dominant feature of industrial relations in Australia." (ibid.)

Considering the experience of other countries (Italy, Britain, Germany) under conditions of full employment and high inflation, it may well be wise to attempt institutional changes and to adapt the system of arbitration to new economic conditions. In Britain and Italy similar conditions led to a virtual breakdown of industry-wide agreements, in the first place, because of the absence of strong central trade unions and employers' associations and, secondly, because the process was facilitated and accelerated by the absence of a strict legal framework. In Germany, the presence of a strong, disciplined, unified trade union movement and a well organized employers' association prevented such a rapid breakdown of established procedures.

With a fragmented labour movement and a number of relatively weak employers' associations, the maintenance of an amended institutional framework as proposed by Yerbury and Isaac might well be the only safeguard against strike activities as experienced in Italy and Britain.

Three factors would appear to favour the above developments towards a mixed situation of centralized procedures (compulsory arbitration) and decentralized collective bargaining:

- the moderately diverse structure of industry

pattern is set by the private industry (ibid.:278), in other years by the public sector.

The number of unions participating in the spring offensive has increased greatly since 1955 and it is estimated that in 1970 more than two-thirds of the total union membership took part. The Federation of Japanese Employers' Associations (Nikkeiren), like the trade union centers a largely advisory body, issues a white paper on wages in December or January, analysing the general economic situation and indicating a general policy to be followed in the spring negotiations (ILO, 1974:117). It also reacts against Sohyo's target figures and it makes specific recommendations to the employers.

Employers in the 'Big Five' steel companies have for several years practised the 'one-shot offer', which has had an important impact on other companies in the steel industry as well as in shipbuilding, automobiles and electric machines (Shirai, in Okochi, 1974:300). These industries are dominated by large companies which in most cases, have strong unions. The unions in these large enterprises often form enterprise federations which bargain collectively. They have become powerful in national organizations as is the case with Toshiba and Hitachi. In other cases e.g., the Federation of Iron and Steel Workers, an industrial union has the right to call and to end a strike, and the member enterprise federations do the bargaining (Kawada, 1974:238).

Notwithstanding the common strategies and coordination in bargaining for wages, practically all the actual bargaining is carried out at the enterprise level. Latest figures available (1973) show a total of 44,312 separate collective labour contracts in force, representing 8.7 million workers, or 77.8 percent of the unions entitled to conclude agreements (see table 37).

Table 37

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

| | Eligible | | Covered | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|----|---------------------|----|
| | Unions (000) | Membership (000) | Unions (000) | % | Membership (000) | % |
| All Unions: | | | | | | |
| 1966 | 45.5 | 8,501 | 31.6 | 70 | 6,976 | 82 |
| 1969 | 50.5 | 9,358 | 37.3 | 74 | 7,905 | 85 |
| 1972 | 55.2 | 9,859 | 42.5 | 77 | 8,591 | 87 |
| 1973 | 57.0 | 9,965 | 44.3 | 78 | 8,716 | 88 |
| Manufacturing | 18.9 | 4,464 | 15.2 | 80 | 4,154 | 93 |
| Textiles | 2.2 | 387 | 1.9 | 86 | 365 | 94 |
| Ordinary Machinery | 2.1 | 426 | 1.7 | 81 | 395 | 93 |
| Electrical Machinery | 1.6 | 680 | 1.3 | 84 | 658 | 97 |

Source: The Japan Institute of Labour, Japan Labour Statistics, Tokyo, 1974.

Not all employers are willing to spell out in an agreement the conditions of work, and collective bargaining, at times, is not concluded with a written contract, but with an implicit understanding between unions and management.

This appears to be more so in small and medium-sized firms than in large companies (Shirai, in Okochi, 1974:284), see table 38.

Table 38

RATE OF CONCLUSION* OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
BY SIZE OF UNION

| Union Size | 1965 | 1968 |
|-----------------------|------|------|
| 1000 members or more | 82.3 | 85.5 |
| 500-999 members | 76.8 | 80.4 |
| 300-499 members | 71.9 | 76.1 |
| 100-299 members | 60.6 | 70.4 |
| 30- 99 members | 49.7 | 60.3 |
| Fewer than 30 members | 38.0 | 48.2 |
| All Agreements | 53.0 | 62.5 |

*Rate of Conclusion is:

$$\frac{\text{No. of unions with collective agreements}}{\text{No. of unions legally eligible to conclude collective agreements}}$$

Source: Ministry of Labour, "Basic Survey on Labor Unions" in K. Okochi, B. Karsh, S. Levine, Workers and Employers in Japan, 1974:286.

The content of contracts also gives evidence for the view that outsiders should not interfere in the internal organization of the enterprise. The items relating to union 'security' are spelled out in great detail. While it gives the enterprise union exclusive bargaining rights, it also excludes other unions or federations from interfering in the bargaining process. The items relating to wages and general working conditions are generally ill defined and lack specification (ibid.:288).

Summarizing, we can distinguish two orientations in management/worker relationships.

The first one, mainly in small and medium-sized enterprises, is characterized by a strong paternalism. Relationships are based on the vertical structure of traditional Japanese society. Employers promote the traditional ideas of the extended family. They emphasize the autonomy of management and unions in the enterprise and resent any outside interference. Many workers strongly identify with the enterprise and respond affirmatively to management's paternalistic policies.

The second orientation is prevalent in the large enterprises and the public sector. Worker/employer relationships are less traditional i.e., more based on the economic reality of today's labour market. With the number of workers in large scale enterprises increasing strongly, they have come to occupy a more dominant position in the labour movement. The strong growth of shunto, the yearly wage offensive, is a result of this development. With the continuing shortage of labour, especially young workers (Kawada, 1973:148), the influence of larger enterprises and their more economically oriented unions will increase in accelerated fashion.

Labour Dispute Trends in the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan

Tables 39 and 40 show labour dispute trends in the countries which are in the middle range of the scale of diversity. Comparing both tables the importance of manufacturing in terms of strike rates is clear: it accounts for 54, 50 and 60 percent of the overall number of days lost in the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan respectively. Exact figures are as follows:

United Kingdom:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-75: 93 million - 100 %
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-75: 50 million - 54 %

Percent of the work force in manufacturing 33.9 (1967-75 average)

Australia:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-75: 24 million - 100 %
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-75: 12 million - 50 %

Percent of the work force in manufacturing 30.1 (1967-75 average)

Japan:

Total days lost in all industries 1966-75: 48 million - 100 %
Total days lost in manufacturing 1966-75: 29 million - 60 %

Percent of the work force in manufacturing 26.6 (1967-75 average)

Note the high rate of strikes in Britain in 1972, the year following the introduction of the new Industrial Relations Act (see page 171).

Overall, the strike figures of the countries in the middle range of the diversity scale have shown a steady

increase since 1966. This is even more clearly demonstrated in table 1 (page 6) where 1966-1969 and 1970-1973 averages can be compared.

Extremely high rates of inflation in the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan may in part be responsible for this increase (Canada which also had a high rate of inflation shows an increasing strike rate as well). In the countries with centralized bargaining procedures, increased tensions caused by economic factors are more likely to be reduced by agreements and compromises worked out at the national level.

Table 39
LABOUR DISPUTE* TRENDS, ALL INDUSTRIES: 1966-1975

| Year | UNITED KINGDOM | | AUSTRALIA | | JAPAN | |
|---|-----------------|--|-----------------|---|-----------------|------------------------|
| | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) |
| 1966 | 1937 | 544 | 1273 | 395 | 1252 | 1132 |
| 1967 | 2116 | 734 | 1340 | 483 | 1214 | 732 |
| 1968 | 2378 | 2258 | 1713 | 720 | 1546 | 1163 |
| 1969 | 3116 | 1665 | 2014 | 1285 | 1783 | 1411 |
| 1970 | 3906 | 1801 | 2738 | 1367 | 2260 | 1720 |
| 1971 | 2228 | 1178 | 2404 | 1327 | 2527 | 1896 |
| 1972 | 2497 | 1734 | 2298 | 1114 | 2498 | 1544 |
| 1973 | 2873 | 1528 | 2538 | 803 | 3326 | 2236 |
| 1974 | 2922 | 1626 | 2809 | 2005 | 5211 | 3621 |
| 1975 | 2282 | 809 | 2432 | 1398 | 3391 | 2732 |
| Yearly average total work force 1967-75: 24.5 million | | Yearly average total work force 1966-75: 5.3 million | | Yearly average total work force 1967-75: 51.1 million | | |

*Excl. United Kingdom: Disputes not connected with terms of employment of conditions of labour. Disputes involving less than ten workers or lasting less than one day are not included unless more than 100 working days are involved.

Australia: Disputes where less than ten working days were lost.
Japan: Workers indirectly affected and disputes lasting less than four hours.

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1970, 1973 and 1976 editions.

Table 40
LABOUR DISPUTE* TRENDS, MANUFACTURING: 1966-1975

| Year | UNITED KINGDOM | | AUSTRALIA | | JAPAN | | |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|------------------------|---|--|
| | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | No. of Disputes | Workers Involved (000) | Working Days Lost (000) | |
| 1966 | 872 | 332 | 977 | 645 | 206 | 362 | |
| 1967 | 1178 | 529 | 1624 | 679 | 292 | 417 | |
| 1968 | 1422 | 2012 | 3752 | 768 | 352 | 553 | |
| 1969 | 1923 | 896 | 4312 | 934 | 537 | 964 | |
| 1970 | 2588 | 1063 | 6495 | 1401 | 615 | 1,090 | |
| 1971 | 1465 | 760 | 6577 | 1149 | 608 | 982 | |
| 1972 | 1671 | 846 | 7876 | 1213 | 660 | 1,075 | |
| 1973 | 1857 | 989 | 5701 | 1151 | 319 | 1,462 | |
| 1974 | 1946 | 1013 | 7498 | 1122 | 837 | 3,608 | |
| 1975 | 1474 | 628 | 5002 | 1069 | 744 | 1,743 | |
| Yearly average work force 1967-75: | | 8.3 million | | Yearly average work force 1966-75: 1.6 million | | Yearly average work force 1967-75: 13.6 million | |

*Excl. United Kingdom: Disputes not connected with terms of employment or conditions of labour. Disputes involving less than ten workers or lasting less than one day are not included unless more than 100 working days are involved.

Australia: Disputes where less than ten working days were lost.

Japan: Workers indirectly affected and disputes lasting less than four hours.

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1970, 1973 and 1976 editions

CHAPTER TEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this study has been to provide substantive evidence for the thesis that structural diversity as measured by the distribution of employment over the range of sectors of a nation's manufacturing industry is related to time loss from strike activity. Using industrial diversity to interpret differences in strike activity, it appears that structural diversity is an important factor in the development of unions and employers' associations, the emergence of particular forms of collective bargaining and ultimately strike action. In the United States and Canada, where industrial employment is distributed over a relatively wide range of sectors, unions, employers' organizations and bargaining structures are largely decentralized. In both countries there is a high volume of conflict expressed through strikes. In Norway and Germany employment is concentrated within a relatively small number of industrial sectors. This concentration of employment is accompanied by large, homogeneous unions and employers' associations, centralized forms of collective bargaining and a low volume of strike activity.

While the relationship between industrial diversity and strikes can be most clearly demonstrated for Norway, Germany, Canada and the United States, it also appears to apply to the other nations when taking into account other factors which affect the homogeneity of unions and employers' associations and the development of bargaining structures.

In the case of Italy, a nation with a diverse industrial structure, a centralized bargaining structure was superimposed in earlier days by an authoritarian government. During times of rapid economic expansion this artificial bargaining structure collapsed and a new decentralized system of bargaining emerged. The subsequent higher rate of strike activity which is in line with our assumptions regarding decentralized forms of bargaining and volume of industrial conflict, has in this case been exacerbated not only by the effects of a disintegrating normative system of industrial relations, but also by the anomic tendencies of a rapidly changing society at large.

In Britain, which has a moderately diverse industrial structure, union multiplicity and the country's traditional market structure have adversely affected the homogeneity of unions and employers' associations.

Both Italy and Britain have developed informal largely decentralized systems of collective bargaining,

which, in contrast with the decentralized system of the United States and Canada, lack a detailed legal framework to regulate bargaining procedures. This legal framework as well as wide variations in the strength and the role of the labour-oriented party in national economic policies have been noted to account for striking differences in the length and frequency of work stoppages among these nations.

In Japan and France, the generally small size of establishments and the dominant employers' position appear to have led to a low rate of strike activity. In Japan traditional, societal relationships and in France the politicalization of the unions cannot be ignored in discussing the weakness of the unions and the strong position of employers. In Australia the imposition of a system of compulsory arbitration has affected the development and the strength of the unions as well as the rate of strike activity.

In short, the issue of diversity and strike activity cannot be viewed in isolation. While the model is useful to explain basic trends in the formation of unions, employers' associations and specific forms of collective bargaining in relation to strike activity, additional related variables need to be considered. A particular combination of several of these variables may account for special patterns of industrial conflict as noted for example, in Japan and Australia.

Notwithstanding some particular characteristics, a number of general tendencies can be distinguished among the nine nations when applying the model of analysis as proposed in this thesis:

- industrial diversity is correlated with fragmented unions and employers' associations
- industrial diversity is correlated with decentralized forms of collective bargaining
- industrial diversity is positively related to strike activity

In addition to the above, other trends can be identified, although not always in all countries:

- the existence of a labour party tends to reduce industrial conflict when this party has a decision making role. In cases where a relatively strong labour party is consistently denied a role in the decision making process industrial conflict seems to be heightened, resulting in a higher rate of strikes with political overtones (Norway, Germany, Britain, Australia; Italy, France)

- in countries with decentralized bargaining the absence of a detailed system of formal regulations for collective bargaining procedures seems to lead to a large number of strikes of short duration (Britain and Italy)

- the size of establishments seems negatively related to paternalistic employer attitudes and appears to relate

positively to the strength of unions and strike activity
(France and Japan)

- rapid and severe economic changes appear to lead to an erosion of established normative regulation for collective bargaining. Subsequent anomic conditions contribute to increased strike activity (Italy, Britain, Australia)

- coordinated bargaining tactics seem to relate negatively to strike activity (United States, Japan)

The following chart presents an overview of the main variables discussed in this thesis and their influence on strike activity for each of the nine nations.

SYNOPSIS OF CORRELATES OF DIVERSITY
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON STRIKE ACTIVITY FOR NINE COUNTRIES

| Country | Canada | United States | Italy | Norway | Germany |
|----------------------------------|--|---|--|---|---|
| Diversity Ranking | high | high | high | low | low |
| Intervening Variables | | | | | |
| Unions | fragmented strong local | fragmented strong local | national but lacking control over "delegates" | strong national and industrial | strong national and industrial |
| Employers' Associations | individual employer action | individual employer action | similar to unions with frequent independent employer action | similar to unions | similar to unions |
| Forms of Collective Bargaining | decentralized | decentralized | formal industry wide and regional | centralized industry wide | centralized industry wide |
| Additional Intervening Variables | highly regulated bargaining procedures | highly regulated bargaining procedures multi-employer bargaining in more highly concentrated industries | little formal regulation of bargaining procedures labour party excluded from decision making rapid changes in institutions for collective bargaining | strong labour party comprehensive legal framework | strong labour party comprehensive legal framework |
| Strike Activity | high | high | high | low | low |

SYNOPSIS OF CORRELATES OF DIVERSITY
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON STRIKE ACTIVITY FOR NINE COUNTRIES

| Country | France | Britain | Australia | Japan |
|----------------------------------|---|--|--|---|
| Diversity Ranking | medium/low | medium | medium | medium |
| Intervening Variables | | | | |
| Unions | national but very weak | mixed national/regional but lacking control over shop stewards | basic unit "branch" by large district or state wide | company unions |
| Employers' Associations | national and very strong | similar to unions with frequent independent employer action | similar to unions | individual employer action |
| Forms of Collective Bargaining | centralized | formal industry wide informal local | compulsory arbitration | decentralized combined with Shunto |
| Additional Intervening Variables | dominant employers' position generally small sized enterprises labour party excluded from decision making | little formal regulation of collective bargaining procedures strong, participating labour party union multiplicity | increased bargaining outside the system inefficient grievance procedures union multiplicity strong, participating labour party | traditional structures reinforce employer's dominant position generally small sized enterprises |
| Strike Activity | medium/low | high (unofficial), low (official) | medium/high | medium/low |

It cannot be stressed enough that the classifications employed, in particular those relating to forms of collective bargaining, should not be regarded as deterministic or final, but rather as a device to bring some order in the many variables to be considered in an international comparison of strike activity.

Concluding, a note with respect to the practical implications of this study. Can strike activity be reduced by imposing amalgamations of unions and the centralization of collective bargaining? In Germany, after the second world war, a new structure of industrial unions and centralized bargaining were superimposed by the authorities in their efforts to rebuild the economy and to keep it strike free. This postwar economic climate and the need to avoid conflict at all cost, resulting in very strict rules regarding the right to strike, cannot be totally ignored in discussing Germany's low rate of strike activity. However, the findings of this thesis suggest that even under the above special circumstances such a low rate of strike activity could most probably not have been maintained in an economy which is structurally diverse. National desires to keep industrial peace and artificially created central structures of collective bargaining appear to disintegrate quickly where structural supports are lacking, which can be

exemplified by the situation in Italy.

In Canada, there have been attempts recently, to involve the CLC in the making of national economic policies. Considering the diversity of Canadian industry such attempts seem ill conceived at the moment. However, the shift in employment from the manufacturing industries to the service sector, the growth of unions in the public service and their increasing importance in national organizations may well open new vistas in the development of more centralized forms of collective bargaining.

REFERENCES

Books

Aaron, Benjamin and Wedderburn, K.W., eds. Industrial Conflict: A Comparative Legal Study. London: Longman, Group Ltd., 1972.

Allen, V.L. Militant Trade Unionism. London: Merlin Press, 1966

_____, "The Sociology of Industrial Relations," in B. Barrett et al, Industrial Relations and the Wider Society, London: Collier MacMillan, 1976.

_____, "Trade Unionism: An Analytical Framework," in B. Barrett et al, Industrial Relations and the Wider Society, London: Collier-MacMillan, 1976.

Balfour, Campbell. Industrial Relations in the Common Market. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.

Barbash, Jack. Trade Unions and National Economic Policy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1972

Barkin, Solomon, ed. Worker Militancy and Its Consequences, 1965-1975. New York: Praeger, 1975.

Barrett, Brian, Rhodes, Ed and Beishon, John, eds. Industrial Relations and the Wider Society. London: Collier MacMillan, 1975.

Bain, Joe S. International Differences in the Industrial Structure: Eight Nations in the 1950's. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Beaucage, André. An Outline of the Canadian Labour Relations System. Ottawa: Canada Department of Labour, March, 1976.

Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology, New York: The Free Press, 1965.

Blumer, H., "Social Structure and Power Conflict," in Kornhauser et al., Industrial Conflict, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.

Bouvard, Marguerite. Labour Movements in the Common Market Countries. New York: Praeger, 1972.

Bok, Derek C. and Dunlop, John T. Labor and the American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.

Clegg, Hugh A. The System of Industrial Relations in Great-Britain. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972

_____. Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976.

Crispo, J., "Industrial Relations in Europe and Canada," Vol. 2, pp. 183-229, A Review of Industrial Relations Research. 2 Vols., Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison, Wisconsin.

Dunlop, John T. Industrial Relations Systems. New York: Holt, Reinhart, Winston, 1958.

_____, "Political Systems and Industrial Relations," in B. Barrett et al., Industrial Relations and the Wider Society, London: Collier MacMillan, 1976.

_____, "The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory," in G.W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, New Concepts in Wage Determination, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957, 117-139.

Eldridge, J.E.T. Industrial Disputes: Essays in the Sociology of Industrial Relations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.

Fairweather, Owen, "Western European Labour Movements and Collective Bargaining - An Institutional Framework," in Kamin, Alfred, ed., Western European Labour and the American Corporation, Washington D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1970.

Fisher, Malcolm. Measurement of Labour Disputes and Their Economic Effects. Paris: OECD, 1973.

Flanders, Allan. Collective Bargaining: A Prescription for Change. London: Faber & Faber, 1967.

_____. Collective Bargaining: Selected Readings. Middlesex: Penquin Books, 1969.

Fox, Alan. A Sociology of Work in Industry. London: Collier MacMillan, 1971.

Galenson, Walter. Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe.
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.

Garbarino, J.W., "British American Trends," in Robertson,
D.J. and Hunter eds., Labour Market Issues of the
1970's. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1970, pp.203-221.

Giddens, Anthony. The Class Structure of the Advanced
Societies. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1973.

Government of Canada, "The Report of the Task Force on
Labour Relations," Canadian Industrial Relations,
Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968.

Harbison, F.H., "Collective Bargaining and American
Capitalism," in Kornhauser et al., Industrial Conflict,
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.

Herschfield, David. The Multinational Union Challenges the
Multinational Company. New York: The Conference Board
Inc., Report no. 658, 1973.

Hoffman, Eileen. Resolving Labor-Management Disputes: A Nine
Country Comparison. New York: The Conference Board Inc.,
Report no. 600, 1973.

Hyman, Richard. Social Values and Industrial Relations.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1975

_____. Strikes. London: Fontana Books, 1972.

Institute for the Study of Conflict. Sources of Conflict in
British Industry. London: ISC, 1974, Special Report.

International Labour Office, "Basic Agreements and Joint
Statements on Labour-Management Relations," Labour-
Management Relations Series, No. 38, Geneva: 1971.

_____. Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market
Economies. Geneva: ILO, 1974.

Ingham, Geoffrey K. Strikes and Industrial Conflict: Britain
and Scandinavia. London: Macmillan, 1974.

Isaac, J.E., "Compulsory Arbitration in Australia," Task
Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa: Privy Council Office,
1968.

Jacobs, Eric. European Trade Unionism. New York: Holmes and
Meier Publishers Inc., 1973.

Jamieson, Stuart. Industrial Relations in Canada. Toronto:
Macmillan, 1973.

- Kahn-Freund, Otto. Labour Law: Old Traditions and New Developments. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Ltd., 1968.
- Kamin, Alfred, ed. Western European Labour and the American Corporation. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1970.
- Kassalow, Everett M. Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: An International Comparison. New York: Random House, 1969.
- Kawada, H. and Komatsu, R., "Post-War Labour Movements in Japan," in Sturmthal and Scoville, The International Labour Movement in Transition, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1973, 123-148.
- Kawada, H., "Workers and Their Organizations," in Okochi et al., Workers and Employers in Japan, Princeton, 1974.
- Kelly, L.A. Settlements Methods in Ontario Collective Bargaining, 1970-1973. Kingston: Queen's University, 1974.
- Kendall, Walter. The Labour Movement in Europe. London: Allen Lane Penguin Books Ltd., 1975.
- Kerr, Clark, "The Balkanization of Labour Markets," in E.W. Bakke et al., Labour Mobility and Economic Opportunity, New York: John Wiley, 1953.
- Kornhauser, Arthur, Dubin and Ross, eds. Industrial Conflict. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.
- Laffer, Kingsley, "Does Compulsory Arbitration Prevent Strikes? - The Australian Experience," in Richard L. Rowan, ed., Collective Bargaining: Survival in the 70's, Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, University of Pennsylvania, 1972, 154-178.
- Levinson, Charles. Capital, Inflation and the Multinationals. London: Allen and Unwin, 1971.
- Macbeath, Innis. The European Approach to Worker/Management Relationships. Montreal: British/North American Committee, C.D. Howe Research, 1973.
- Malles, Paul. The Institutions of Industrial Relations in Continental Europe. Ottawa, Canada Department of Labour, 1973.

- Malles, Paul. Trends in Industrial Relations Systems of Continental Europe, Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, Privy Council Office, 1969.
- Mann, Michael. Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class, London: Macmillan, 1973.
- Marx, E. and Kendall, W. Unions in Europe. Sussex: Lewis Press Ltd., 1971.
- Mills, C.W., "The Labour Leaders and the Power Elite," in Kornhauser et al., Industrial Conflict, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.
- O.E.C.D., "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining," Final Report of International Management Seminar, Paris: OECD, 1972.
- _____, "Récents Tendances en Matières de Négociations Collectives," Supplément au Rapport Final, Paris: OECD, 1972.
- Okochi, Karsh and Levine, eds. Workers and Employers in Japan, Princeton: University Press, 1974.
- Parkin, Frank. Class Inequality and Political Order. London: Paladin, 1972.
- Parkinson, C.N. Industrial Disruption. New York: Leviathan House, 1973.
- Rees, Albert, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations," in Kornhauser et al., Industrial Conflict, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.
- Robertson, D.J. and Hunter L.C., eds. Labour Market Issues of the 1970's. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1970.
- Ross, Arthur M. and Hartman, Paul T. Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict. New York: John Wiley, 1960.
- Scoville, James, "Some Determinants of the Structure of Labour Movements," in Stürmthal and Scoville, The International Labour Movement in Transition, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973.
- Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather. Geraldson. Labour Relations and The Law, in the United Kingdom and the United States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968.

Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather, Geraldson, Labour Relations and The Law in Germany and the United States. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1969.

Labor Relations and The Law in Italy and the United States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1970.

Labor Relations and The Law in France and the United States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1972.

Shirai, Taishiro, "Collective Bargaining," in Okochi et al., Workers and Employers in Japan, Princeton: University Press, 1974.

Stewart, Margaret. Trade Unions in Europe. Epping Essex: Gower Press Ltd., 1974.

Sturmthal, Adolf and Scoville, James. The International Labour Movement in Transition. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973.

Vanderkamp, John. The Time Pattern of Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1901-1966. Ottawa: Draft-Study for Task Force in Labour Relations, 1968.

Walker, Kenneth F. Australian Industrial Relations Systems. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Willatt, Norris. Multi-National Unions. London: The Financial Times Ltd., 1974.

Williams, Michael, ed. Directory of Unions in the EEC. London: 1974.

Wood, W.D. The Current Trade Union Scene, Patterns and Trends. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1976, Research Series, no.33.

Articles

- Ashenfelter, Orley and Johnson, George E., "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, Vol. 59, no. 1, March 1969: 35-49.
- Balfour, Campbell, "Industrial Relations in Norway," Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 5, no. 4, Summer 1974:46-54.
- Bean, R., "The Relationship between Strikes and 'Unorganized' Conflict in Manufacturing Industries," Research Note, British Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1975.
- Belford, J.A., "Relations with Labour," The Conference Board Record, February, 1975.
- Britt, D. and Galle, O., "Structural Antecedents of the Shape of Strikes: A Comparative Analysis," American Sociological Review, Vol. 39, October 1974:642-651.
- _____, "Industrial Conflict and Unionization," American Sociological Review, February, 1972:46-57.
- Cain, Glen G., "The Challenge of Dual and Radical Theories of the Labour Market to Orthodox Theory," The American Economic Review, 65, May, 1975 Papers and Proceedings of the 87th Annual Meeting, 16-22.
- Cullen, Donald E., "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the United States," International Labour Review, June, 1972:543-571.
- Delamotte, Yves, "Recent Collective Bargaining Trends in France," International Labour Review, April, 1971: 351-379.
- Dubin, Robert, "A Theory of Conflict and Power in Union-Management Relations," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 1960: 501-518.
- Eisele, C. Frederick, "Organization Size, Technology and Frequency of Strikes," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, July, 1974:560-571.
- Fox, Alan and Flanders, Allan, "The Reform of Collective Bargaining from Donovan to Durkheim," British Journal of Industrial Relations, July, 1969: 151-180.

Fulcher, James, "Class Conflict in Sweden," Sociology, Vol. 7, January, 1973:49-70.

_____, "Industrial Conflict in Britain and Sweden," Critical Note, Sociology, Vol.9, 1975:477-484.

Gifford Sr., Adam, "The Impact of Socialism on Work Stoppages," A Research Note, Industrial Relations, 1974:208-212.

Giugni, Gino, "Recent Developments in Collective Bargaining in Italy," International Labour Review, Vol. 91, no. 4, April, 1965:273-291.

_____, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Italy," International Labour Review, Vol. 104, no. 4, October 1971:307-329.

Hill, Stephen and Thurley, Keith, "Sociology and Industrial Relations," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, March, 1974:147-170.

Hyman, Richard, "Inequality, Ideology and Industrial Relations," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, March, 1974:171-190.

Jackson, Peter and Sisson, Keith, "Employers Confederations in Sweden and the United Kingdom and the Significance of Industrial Infrastructure," British Journal of Industrial Relations, November, 1976:306-323.

Johnson, George E., "Economic Analysis of Trade Unionism," in The American Economic Review, 65, May, 1975:23-28.

Kassalow, Everett M., "Conflict and Cooperation in Europe's Industrial Relations," Industrial Relations, May, Vol. 13, 1974:156-163.

Kirkwood, Thomas and Mewis, Horst, "The Limits of Trade Union Power in the Capitalist Order: The Case of West German Labour's Quest for Co-Determination," British Journal of Industrial Relations, November, 1976: 295-305.

Martin, Penny Gill, "Strategic Opportunities and Limitations: The Norwegian Labour Party and Trade Unions," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 28, no.1, October, 1974: 75-88.

Minkin, Lewis, "The British Labour Party and the Trade Unions: Crisis and Compact," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 28, no. 1, October 1974:7-37.

Mitsufuji, T adashi and Hagnosisawa, Kiyomiko, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Japan," International Labour Review, Vol. 105, no. 2, February, 1972: 135-153.

Oechslin, Jean-Jacques, "The Role of Employers' Organizations in France," International Labour Review, November, 1972:391-413.

Oxnam, Desmond W., "Issues in Industrial Conflict: An International Comparison," Journal of Industrial Relations, Sydney, Vol. 13, no. 2, June 1971.

Price, Robert and Bain, George S., "Union Growth Revisited: 1948-1974 in Perspective," British Journal of Industrial Relations, November 1976:339-355.

Pryor, Frederic L., "An International Comparison of Concentration Ratios," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 54, 1972:130-140.

Reichel, Hans, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the Federal Republic of Germany," International Labour Review, Vol. 104, no. 6, December, 1971: 469-487.

Reynaud, Jean-Daniel, "Trade Unions and Political Parties in France: Some Recent Trends," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 28:2, January, 1974:208-225.

Roberts, B.C. and Rothwell, S., "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the United Kingdom," International Labour Review, Vol. 106:6, December 1972:543-571.

Roberts, Ivor L., "Trade Union Membership Trends in Seven Western European Countries: 1950-1968," Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 4:2, Summer 1973:45-56.

Ross, Arthur M. and Irwin, Donald, "Strike Experience in Five Countries," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 4:3, April, 1951:323-342.

Schregle, Johannes, "Labour Relations in Western Europe: Some Topical Issues," International Labour Review, January, 1974:1-22.

- Silver, Michael, "Recent British Strike Trends: A Factual Analysis," British Journal of Industrial Relations, March, 1973:66-104.
- Smucker, Joseph and Van Biljouw, Will, "Industrial Diversity and Strikes: An Inquiry," Paper presented at the Annual Conferences of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, Fredericton, 1977.
- Snyder, David, "Early North American Strikes: A Re-interpretation," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 30, no. 3, April 1977:325-341.
- Snyder, David, "Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict: Comparative Analysis of France, Italy and the United States," American Sociological Review, June, 1975: 259-278.
- Stolzenberg, Ross M., "Occupations, Labour Markets and the Process of Wage Attainment," American Sociological Review, October, 1975:645-665.
- Sturmthal, Adolf, "Some Comments on Strike Experience in Five Countries," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, April, 1953:391-394.
- Swidinsky, R., "Strike Settlement and Economic Activity," Industrial Relations Industrielle, Vol. 31, no. 2, 1976:209-221.
- Waisglass, H.J. and Craig, Alton W.J., "Collective Bargaining Perspectives," Labour Gazette, Ottawa, Vol. 68:10, October, 1968.
- Weitz, Peter R., "Labour and Politics in a Divided Movement: The Italian Case," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 28:2, January, 1975:226-242.
- Willey, Richard J., "Trade Unions and Political Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 28:1, October, 1974:38-59.
- Yerbury, Dianne and Isaac, J.E., "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Australia," International Labour Review Vol. 103:5, May, 1971:421-452.

Statistical Sources

By country:

- Australia Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra (1970 and 1972 editions).
- Canada Canada Yearbook, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, 1973.
W.D. Wood, The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada, Industrial Relations Centre, Kingston, Queen's University (1973 and 1975 editions).
- France Annuaire Statistique, INSEE, Paris, 1974.
- Germany Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden (1970 and 1973 editions).
- Japan Japan Statistical Yearbook, Tokyo Bureau of Statistics (1970 and 1975 editions).
Japan Labour Statistics, The Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo, 1974.
- Norway Statistisk Arbok, Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo (1970 and 1973 editions).
- United Kingdom Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO, London, 1972.
British Labour Statistics, HMSO, London, (1969, 1970 and 1971 editions).
Department of Employment Gazette, HMSO, June 1973, November 1973, June 1974, May 1975, February 1977.
- United States Handbook of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., (1974 and 1975 editions).
Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1974.