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THE ROLE OF TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY
IN KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is the presentation of an analysis and evaluation of the central issue in Kant's Transcendental Analytic, viz, the transcendental unity of apperception. Kant's fundamental premise of the 'absolute unity' of the (pure) understanding is herein interpreted as an epistemological concern, depicting the functioning of pure apperception, and the possibility of justifying the formal elements of this unity.

The Introduction and Chapter One contain the necessary distinctions which I felt were precedent to discussion of the central issue. In the Introduction, I am concerned to distinguish between the 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Deductions, with the consequent suggested re-orientation of the 'Subjective' Deduction to preparatory discussion of the Schematism. Chapter One argues against viewing the categories as 'derived' from the Table of Judgments; rather, the categories are to be considered as systematically developed from the originary relation between understanding and sensibility. Further, Chapter One suggests a new interpretation of the Table of Judgments as the rules of Transcendental Logic.

Chapter Two presents elucidation of the 'original' relation between the transcendental unity of apperception of the understanding and time as formal intuition: a relation, or functioning, without the 'aid' of imagination. This relation is the grounding, and justification, of the elements of the 'absolute unity' of the understanding including,

of course, the categories. Resultant from the analysis of the original relation are the precise Kantian meanings of the ways we may speak of the epistemological 'self'.

Chapter Three is merely the explicit statement of the implied inessentiality of imagination found in the previous chapters. The 'kinds' of synthesis are presented in order to carefully distinguish the intellectual synthesis from both the reproductive synthesis in imagination and from even the transcendental ('productive' or figurative) synthesis in imagination.

MOTTO

"In any case, as is not surprising, I have learned that Kant himself is incomparably his own best commentator; and I have sought throughout to rid myself of the theories of others, and to see his doctrine, so far as I may, through his own eyes. No one who understands the difficulty of this undertaking will expect...to find a work free from errors, free even from serious errors. But there is one error I have never committed: I have never thought that any part of Kant's philosophy...could justly be regarded as negligible."¹

¹Paton, H. J. Kant's Metaphysic of Experience (New York: MacMillan Co., 1961), Vol. I, p. 19. Hereinafter cited as 'Paton; KME'.

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DEDICATION

To Dr. Vladimir Zeman, whose
encouragement was unfaltering. To
his example, I acknowledge my constant
enthusiasm and respect for Kant.

PREFACE

This thesis is a development and defense of the Kantian theory of the transcendental synthetic unity of pure apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason;² a theory which is central to intelligibility of the Transcendental Deduction of both editions of the Critique. As such, the second chapter of this thesis, entitled 'Unity and Apperception', is to be considered as the matrix of my thesis. As well as containing expository development of the theory of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception, the second chapter is a presentation of what I have entitled the 'original relation' between transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and time, represented as formal intuition. It is my contention that this original relation is the a priori necessity which grounds and makes possible all other relations between thinking and sensibility; therefore, it is the (original) necessary transcendental condition of knowledge. It is because the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception is the characterization of self-consciousness of spontaneous conjoining in time in general that it provides the confirmation of the justification of the categories as representative of original unity, a theme which is discussed in the first chapter of this

²All referrals to the Critique of Pure Reason are to be understood as references to the translation by N. Kemp Smith (Toronto: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1965), unless otherwise explicitly stated. This thesis shall utilize the system of pagination as found in the translation by Kemp Smith: 'A' and 'B' referring to the First and Second Editions, respectively. Hereinafter cited as 'Critique'. Most references to the Critique will be found in parentheses in the text.

thesis.

'Unity and Categories' is the subject of the first chapter, and the representative unity of the categories is confirmed when grounded in the objectivity of transcendental apperception through its original relation to time as formal intuition. The categories are representative of the unity of synthesis of all possible relations of space and time; they are representative of the unity of thinking which characterizes knowledge. The first chapter traces the systematic development of the Table of Categories as expressive of the pure forms of thought (or functions of unity) of the pure understanding.

Not only is the intent of the second chapter self-inclusive, it confirms the first and, as well, introduces and grounds the differentiations of the third chapter, entitled 'Unity and Synthesis', which defines the transcendental synthesis of imagination in contradistinction from both the intellectual synthesis and the reproductive synthesis of imagination. Because the intellectual synthesis is representative of the original relation of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and time, it is an activity of spontaneity without the 'aid' of imagination. As such, exposition of the transcendental synthesis in imagination in the third chapter is clearly delimited, and imagination can be seen to be developed as 'transcendental' (or 'productive', or 'figurative') only insofar as it is expressive of the spontaneity of pure apperception.

The Introduction to this thesis is not merely a conventional presentation outlining the general material of the chapters which follow it. It is that, as well as being the occasion I have chosen to make necessary distinctions which do not properly belong in the succeeding chapters. As such, the Introduction can rightly be regarded as an

introductory chapter to the problems of the thesis. The underlying problem of the Introduction is to clearly distinguish the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Deduction(s) in anticipation of lessened confusion and misunderstanding concerning Kant's intention in the Transcendental Deduction.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is the clarification of Kant's concept of the transcendental synthetic unity of pure apperception. Principal analysis will focus on the Transcendental Deduction in both editions of the Critique of Pure Reason with the aim of discounting dissimilarities between the two. Signification of the 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Deductions³ needs to be analyzed before a final declaration be pronounced concerning Kant's real intention in an alleged diminution of the role of imagination in the Second Edition. I maintain that Kant intended the Transcendental Deduction(s)⁴ to establish: 1) that the categories are a priori objectively valid because they are functions (modes) of unity; and 2) that the grounding, or foundation (or source), of this unity is the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception. Unity of thinking, and its principle of unifying, is the prime theme of the Transcendental Deduction of both editions. The unifying of thought of sensible representations is anticipated in the 'Subjective' Deduction and this anticipatory material is realized in the Chapter on Schematism.

The categories are not accorded full significance concerning their employment in the Transcendental Deduction(s); in fact, they are not until they are schematized. In order to have objective reality, they must be

³Critique, CF., e.g., Axvi-xvii.

⁴'Deduction(s)' expresses my contention that both editions of the Critique are fundamentally identical in intent and that dissimilarities are incidental to the thematic issues of the Transcendental Deduction. Further, all references to 'Deduction', or 'Deduction(s)', mean 'Transcendental Deduction(s)' unless otherwise identified.

the conditions of the possibility of experience and the possibility of sensible objects. This means they must be related, as conditions, to objects of sense and this occurs only when appearances are time-determined. Kant writes, on occasion, as though the categories are accorded their full objective significance as a priori concepts when once he has shown their determination of the transcendental synthesis of imagination in time as formal intuition. This procedure stresses only the unity and objective validity of thinking (understanding) and is, in fact, all that is theoretically demanded of the Deduction(s) itself. That which distinguishes the aim of the Deduction(s) and the Schematism is the distinction between objective validity and objective reality, respectively. If the categories are shown to be objectively valid, the aim of the Deduction(s) is realized.

Kant has antecedently made it clear in the Aesthetic that all perceptions must be spatially and temporally ordered if we are to know them as appearances. Thus, if the categories apply a priori to the synthetic unity represented in formal intuition, this means that the categories are the ways (modes) in which specific temporal (thus, spatial) relations are unified, ergo their transcendental deduction. Once perceptions are temporally ordered (determined) in inner sense, Kant calls them appearances to indicate their still incompletely-determined character in contrast to the concept (or unity) of 'object'. There are not two processes of determination, i.e. one spatial-temporal and one categorial, but one. The possibility of perceptions being temporally-determined and characterized as appearances is dependent upon the categorial modes of unifying. The 'object' as determined appearance is not merely ordered in temporal relations of succession or coexistence of representations of the permanent by the imagination. Synthesis is not

sufficient for knowledge; the principle of unity is necessary for synthesizing, or combining, else the result be a mere aggregate. The categories, as representative of unity, are the pure rules (or modes) of succession or determination of coexistence. All that is ordered in time in inner sense is ordered according to the original pure concepts of synthesis. Categories are ways of synthesizing all possible relations of space and time; thus, they are modes of knowing. Knowledge, for Kant, is never actually knowledge of objects but is, rather, explicitly stated, concepts of objects. We do not directly or immediately apprehend the object as a thing-in-itself but we do conceptualize the matter, or sensation, of sensible impressions, or affections, i.e. we order the successively apprehended spatial relations and unify this ordering in specific ways. Actually, it is even simpler; we unify the successively-ordered spatial relations (strictly, there would be no 'succession' without the conditions of unity).

A: 'Validity' as Condition of 'Reality'

Often, then, in the Transcendental Deduction(s), one has the confused impression that there are two processes involved in justifying the objective validity of the categories. The first seems to be the relating of the categories to formal intuition and secondly, relating the categories to objects of the senses. The latter possible process can also be expressed as relation of the categories to time-determined appearances in contradistinction to the former relation of categories to the pure synthesis in the determining form of time. Concomitant with the apparent process relating categories to time-determined appearances are two further possible interpretations of the Transcendental Deduction(s). The first would emphasize the importance of the 'Subjective' Deduction in

the First Edition and would stress, consequently, a psychological interpretation of the Kantian Transcendental Deduction. In fact, this interpretation very nearly equates 'psychological' with 'transcendental'. N. Kemp Smith is quite explicit in his support of the above interpretation. He says that the subjective deduction is 'psychological in character' and that the objective deduction is 'logical' or 'epistemological',⁵ and that the latter 'rests upon' the former.⁶ In fact, Kemp Smith goes further and says that, seemingly, Kant did not "despair of developing a transcendental psychology."⁷ In contrast, S. Al-Azm states: "Kant is clearly not embarked on a program of constructing a new faculty of psychology. His purposes are primarily logical and critical in the best Kantian sense of the term."⁸ The second possible interpretation conjoined with viewing the Deduction of the categories as a relation of them to time-determined appearances is itself bi-directional: either nullifying the significance of the Chapter on Schematism or, more prevalently, nullifying the importance of the Transcendental Deduction itself as the process of determination is allegedly more concretely developed in the Chapter on Schematism. Regardless of the direction, the general idea of both is that the categories are schemata, i.e. more precisely, that categories are always schematized categories.

I believe it can be shown in the analysis of the Transcendental

⁵Kemp Smith, N. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', 2nd Edition. (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 236. Hereinafter cited as 'Kemp Smith'.

⁶Ibid., p. 238.

⁷Ibid., pp. 269-70; and cf. pp. 50-51.

⁸Al-Azm, S.J. Kant's Theory of Time. (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1967), p. 37. Hereinafter cited as 'Al-Azm'.

Deduction(s) that Kant's intention does not warrant the above-indicated conflicting interpretations. His intention in the Deduction(s) is to demonstrate the apriori validity of categories as necessary conditions of a possible experience in general and of possible objects in general. The categories, as modes of unifying, make possible formal understanding (i.e. rather, are the formal understanding, or pure conceptual thought) of spatio-temporal relations of all possible appearances. In other words, categories are the conceptualization of the synthesis in the forms of intuiting as formal intuitions. Time, e.g., is the form of inner sense of all possible appearances whatever. But to know it as the form, i.e. as one time, is to conceptualize it as unity. This knowing, or conceptualizing, is synonymous with unifying, or at least with the possibility of unification of successive appearances. Time itself is not a concept; it is, rather, formal intuition just because it represents the only possible relations of appearances in inner sense. All perceptions, as appearances, are subject to the formal condition of temporal succession. Succession is the form of appearances in human consciousness; ergo time as formal intuition, or condition of intuiting. As such, it is formal intuition which does not suggest that it itself is intuited. A. Ewing, rather oddly, interprets 'formal intuition' as explained in the Aesthetic to mean that space and time are themselves immediate intuitions.⁹ He says, further, that Kant 'drew back' from this view, citing the presupposition of the proofs of the Analogies, viz. that

⁹Ewing, A.C. A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1965), p. 32. Hereinafter cited as 'Ewing'.

time itself cannot be perceived.¹⁰ Al-Azm criticizes this general view of Kant and specifically criticizes Kemp Smith's attribution of inconsistency concerning space and time in the *Aesthetic* and the *Analytic*. Al-Azm says that:

The *Aesthetic* deals with time after it has been...generated and does not concern itself with its synthetic origins.... In other words, from the isolated point of view of the *Aesthetic*, the temporal manifold looks like an immediately given fact that came from nowhere.¹¹

Space and time are originally represented as a priori intuitions; more precisely, not as concepts or intuited 'objects', but infinite and unlimited given magnitudes.¹² The meaning of this characterization of space and time is that although in determining appearances we limit them, we cannot do the same to the pure sensible conditions of all possible appearances. All appearances as determined by conditions of functions of unity of the understanding are abstracted in analysis of sensibility in order for Kant to finally conclude that we represent space and time originally (i.e. prior to any specific intuition) as unique a priori formal intuitions. We could even say, with grave danger attendant, that formal intuition represents for a priori knowledge (which is nothing other than necessary conditions of empirical knowledge, or necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge) a pure 'matter' in the sense that it is the necessary form whereby sensations are determined as appearances.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 63.

¹¹ Al-Azm, p. 56 (my emphasis); and cf. p. 31, pp. 60-61.

¹² Critique, cf. A25/B40, A32/B47-8. Cf. Kant's Inaugural Dissertation, translated by J. Handyside (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1929), pp. 54, 64; hereinafter cited as 'Dissertation'. Refer also to the pertinent discussion in Al-Azm, pp. 58-60, 61-67.

Formal intuition is the pure representation of objects of our senses. If the categories relate to formal intuition as the sources of unification of all possible appearances in formal intuition, they relate strictly and purely to the a priori conditions of all appearances whatsoever, i.e. categories as representative of unity, relate purely to formal intuition which is the determining condition of successive sensations, identified thereby as appearances, or object(s) of the senses. If the categories relate purely to a priori formal intuition, they relate necessarily to objects of the senses as conditions of knowing these appearances successively intuited. Thus, the categories necessarily condition time as the determining form of inner intuition and there is, consequently, shown to be one process involved in justifying the objective validity of the categories. This one process may yet be analyzed further to distinguish the possibility of objectivity from the application of the conditions of objectivity. That is precisely why Kant's aim in the Deduction(s) refers to the former distinction whereas the Schematism (and Principles) is the analysis of the employment of the categories. It remains true to say, though, that the employment (or conditions of objective reality) is dependent upon transcendental proof of the objective validity of the categories. So if we cannot show that the categories are objectively valid, we cannot discuss their objective reality for they are representative of the original conditions of objectivity in general.

B: Objectivity

As Kant states clearly both in the Preface to the First Edition of the Critique and in the Deduction of both Editions, the intelligibility of the objective validity of the categories refers to their relation to objects of pure understanding (Cf. Axvi-xvii). 'Objects' are 'objects

of senses' for Kant, and the categories are seen to relate to the form of these 'objects of senses', or appearances. That is his essential purpose in the Deduction(s). He had previously analyzed the faculty of sensibility (or faculty of sensible representations) in the Transcendental Aesthetic and discussed at length the 'subjective sources' of sensibility, viz. space and time as forms of intuition. They were seen to be related to sensations as the forms in which we are conscious of sensation (thus, perceptions). Analysis of the receptivity of the faculty of sensibility and its relation to perceptions necessarily preceded analysis of the spontaneity of the faculty of understanding. The Deduction(s) contains not only the justification of the objective validity of the categories but as well an analysis of the source (or condition) of spontaneity as the Aesthetic discussed the source (or condition) of receptivity.

The establishment of the relation of the conditions of receptivity to possible objects (appearances) is relatively simple in the Aesthetic for space and time are the forms of intuiting appearances. Demonstration of a similar relation of conditions to conditioned is more difficult in the Deduction(s) as the relation is mediate. But analysis of spontaneity as it is manifested in synthesizing at any level (or rather, synthesizing regardless of content synthesized) serves to characterize the forms of understanding and their necessary relation to 'objects of senses'. This is so because the modes of synthesizing characterize even the empirical apprehension of perceptions. More though, than an analogy of receptivity-forms and spontaneity/forms, and elucidation of both as sources of knowledge, is revealed by an analysis of understanding, or spontaneity. It is demonstrated absolutely that synthesis itself has no meaning, in fact has not even possibility of meaning, if the aggregate is not unified

in one mode or another.

The categories not only relate to objects in general represented by their apriori form, thus to objects in experience because these latter 'objects' are determined in (time, the categories are so related because they are the functions of unity of the understanding's spontaneity and first make knowledge of objects of experience possible. The theoretical transformation of appearances successively intuited in inner sense into objects of experience occurs because the successive appearances are thought of in certain ways which, of course, are inclusive of uniting them. Thus, the 'Subjective' Deduction, considered as an illustration of the problematic of the objectivity of the categories, is no more psychological than the 'Objective' Deduction, or the Aesthetic which includes clarification of the subjective sources of sensibility. All three analyses are transcendental, i.e. at least in the sense that they are all oriented toward investigating modes of apriori knowledge, and when we remember that for Kant, 'knowledge' means 'determination of objects' (means 'experience', etc.), explication of the understanding as actively determining in certain apriori modes and the pure forms of sensibility as apriori determination of appearances should be more clearly recognized as epistemological, not psychological, conditions of knowledge. Kant explains this by stating:

...it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing, not the origin of experience, but that which lies in experience. The former pertains to empirical psychology and would even then never be adequately explained without the latter, which belongs to the critique of knowledge, and particularly of the understanding.¹³

¹³ Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Edited by L.W. Beck (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1950), p. 51. Herein after cited as 'Prolegomena'.

C: Subjectivity

Synthesis is not a sufficient mark for knowledge; the synthetical activity must be unified in specific ways for it to be 'synthesis' at all. This is clearly illustrated by Kant in the Syntheses of Apprehension, Reproduction and Recognition; they must be synthetical activities in accordance with the unity of apperception in order for concepts corresponding to the intuition to be possible. Further, these syntheses are what occasion possible identification of the Transcendental Deduction(s) as partially psychologically-oriented. These syntheses are, in fact, anticipations of the Chapter on Schematism wherein categories are empiricized, i.e. wherein time is determinable in respect of the syntheses of representations of specific empirical intuitions. H. Paton succinctly states the issue when he says, "All references to imagination are a sure sign that we are dealing with the Subjective Deduction"¹⁴ and, "This subjective side of the Deduction is a necessary preparation for the Schematism of the Categories."¹⁵

The manifold of time, as formal intuition, is determinable as unity just because the manifold in time, as form of intuition, is synthesized by imagination. This last synthesis is itself possible only because it is determined by the transcendental unity of apperception by virtue of specific time-determination. Nonetheless, the synthesis is sensible and includes both 'apprehension' and 'reproduction' (and, strictly, empirical consciousness or recognition), which is to say that they are empirically subjective activities...which is not to say that empirically

¹⁴Paton, KME, Vol. I, p. 241.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 529, n.1.

subjective activities are necessary conditions of the objective validity of the categories.

To know the appearances apprehended and reproduced means unification of the synthesis of them as representations in specific ways, thus thinking them as concepts of objects of the senses. The only possible way of doing this is through the 'third thing', the 'mediator', i.e. time as determinable. Time, or rather the transcendental syntheses in time, because it is determined by the categories as representative of transcendental unity, thus contains in its manifold specific determinable syntheses of appearances with sensible matter. Anticipatory discussion of the material of the Schematism chapter does not nullify the purpose or importance of either the Deduction(s) or the Schematism. Justification of the objectivity of categories is the purpose of the former, and an outline of the employment of the objectively valid categories the purpose of the latter. Fuller analysis of Schematism will have to await a future project, for my only aim concerning it in this thesis is to have indicated its general nature in relation to anticipatory discussion of it in the Deduction(s).

It can be concluded, then, that the discussion of the 'Subjective Deduction' belongs more properly to Schematism as it is a presentation of the subjective processes determined in time which the categories condition and in so conditioning, objectify. The objectification of the subjective syntheses in time is simultaneously the expression of the application of the categories; thus, their objective reality. It is totally incidental to the subject herein that the subjective deduction is also the locus, were one interested, of psychological analyses. Although it is of no interest in this thesis, it is mentioned merely to clearly

orient and distinguish the epistemological emphasis of the Transcendental Deduction(s) from any alleged subjectivism. H-J. de Vleeschauwer, for example, says that the attribution of 'subjective idealism' to Kant is "a misconception of his teaching."¹⁶

D: Objective Unity

Essentially, the 'Objective' Deduction is meant to establish the categories as the sole means by which an object is thought. Kant suggests that the 'Subjective' Deduction is non-essential to his "chief question--what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? not:--how is the faculty of thought itself possible?" (Axvii) It is often forgotten that his 'chief question' is pure reason and its pure thinking--apart from all sensibility. An analysis of pure understanding and its possibility of conceptualization about objects of the senses is perhaps also non-essential but of 'great importance', then, to a critique of pure reason. This analysis, though, is essential to the science of Transcendental Logic which is to determine the 'origin, scope, and objective validity' of the knowledge of the understanding. The sole concern of Transcendental Logic is 'laws of understanding and reason... in so far as they relate a priori to objects'. (A57/B82) What is non-essential to both the 'chief question' and Transcendental Logic is the three-fold synthesis grounded in spontaneity; these syntheses are more favourably elucidations of Schematism than Deduction(s). But the principle of unification (of spontaneity) is essential to Transcendental Logic and,

¹⁶Vleeschauwer, H-J. de. The Development of Kantian Thought, translated by A.R.C. Duncan (Toronto and New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1962), p. 95. Hereinafter cited as 'Vleeschauwer'.

more specifically, to the 'Objective' Deduction.

There are no categories as representations of synthetic unity relating a priori to possible objects of the senses if there is no possibility of unification. The principle of spontaneous unification is indispensable for knowledge for it is, in the order of knowledge, the 'ultimate' determination of objects. Entailed by analysis of unity is discussion of synthesis, or combination, in general in order to demonstrate what is unified or rather, that we are affected and determine these affections as concepts of objects. How we are affected, i.e. synthesis of perceptions by imagination, if we could speak of it as actual and not merely as an abstraction, would be a subjective determination of inner sense. Unity of pure apperception appropriates the synthesis as my thought of objects, i.e. determines it as objectively valid.

Consideration of the transcendental unity of apperception as essential to pure reason and its pure ideas is not a meaningful issue (here). I would suggest that for Kant, the converse is true, i.e. unity is plurality considered as totality and this latter is an idea of pure reason.¹⁷ It is another problem altogether than the one considered in this thesis. The difficulty of accounting for the principle of the unconditioned in the series of conditions is compounded by its most probable relation to the unity of apperception and, in turn, this relation to Kant's belief in the idea of the soul which renders possible the idea of human freedom in action. I think, though, as Kant obviously did, that theoretically the problems can be dealt with separately. It would seem

¹⁷ J.D. McFarland discusses this suggestion in Kant's Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), pp. 14-15. Cf., also, Critique, B383, B673, B679, B693.

to be a fact of our experience that we do unify discrete data into coherent wholes. The 'fact', though, is not the Deduction of the categories, merely the illustration of occasioning them. That is precisely why Kant doubts the essentiality of his exposition of unity in the First Edition Deduction; it is exhibited as the 'cause of the effect', i.e. unity is the cause discovered from the occasion of unified synthetical activity, rather than as origin of the unity caused (effected) by the categories...a mode of exposition he alters in the Second Edition Deduction.

E: Summation

The main problems of this thesis, then, concerning elucidation of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception are: 1) clarification of the categories as functions of the understanding representative of synthetic unity; 2) coherent presentation of the theory of transcendental unity of apperception itself; and 3) discussion of the synthesis of imagination with a view to knowing this synthesis, i.e. determining it as unified and objective, and not primarily to learn how imagination 'gathers together' and remembers past representations as instances similar to those presently occasioned. The incidental corollary of problems raised in this introductory material is the displacement, or re-orientation, of the 'Subjective' Deduction (inclusive of the question of the possibility of 'psychological' investigations) to where it more rightfully belongs, i.e. in the Schematism chapter. The categories determine time-relations, i.e. transcendental syntheses of imagination, and are not, conversely, determined themselves by time. Knowledge is unity, nature is unity, experience is unity...analogous wholes, if not wholly synonymous or identical terms for Kant. Rightly or wrongly, this

unity is Kant's principal premise. We know nature, or experience, as unity because we unify the representations of the sensible material, i.e. we determine them as unified concepts of objects of our senses.

The proper defense of the thesis outlined in this introduction of the problem of transcendental synthetic unity of apperception must begin with exposition and supportive argumentation of the categories. With great expectations, the chapter concerning the unity of apperception will follow naturally after discussion of the categories and with equal ease precede, as proper antecedent, the presentation of synthetical activity of imagination.

CHAPTER ONE

UNITY AND CATEGORIES

A: The Problem of the Categories

Resolution of the problematic epistemological significance of the categories will be initiated herein if discussion is successful concerning three closely interrelated aspectual views of them, viz., and primarily, the relational significance of the Tables of Categories and Judgments (Metaphysical Deduction); the Kantian significance of justification (Transcendental Deduction) of the categories; and their functions as representative of the principle of synthetical unity of apperception. All three aspects of categorial meaning are, actually, synonymous as representational unity and its necessary a priori import in knowledge. It is a misapprehension to say that categories are 'derived' from the Table of Judgments; rather, the latter, as embodying the original synthetic principle, provides the method (or 'clue') of 'discovering' the Table of Categories as original pure concepts of synthesis. Another misapprehension, concerning Kant's intention in the Deduction(s), results in the alleged assimilation of categorial relations to formal intuition with the consequently determined formal intuition in relation to those diverse appearances which are in it. Precisely because there is no such assimilation is the reason why the Deduction(s) is successful and, further, why the importance of the Chapter on Schematism is not diminished or obliterated, i.e. the understanding schematizes (temporally-determines) the synthesis of the contents of empirical consciousness.

There are, of course, differing opinions concerning the categories/schemata issue. Kemp Smith, for example, says that the categories are schemata and that, therefore, Kant created for himself "the artificial difficulties of the section on schematism."¹⁸ In contrast, R.P. Wolff claims that the Principles are not 'applications' of categories; "they are the categories."¹⁹ E. Schaper says that outside the Anglo-Saxon 'context', the possibilities of interpreting the Schematism as 'either continuation or replacement of Deduction' have not been formulated as the 'extreme' form of 'dilemma' 'favored by Anglo-Saxon commentators'. She states that Continental Kant scholarship generally considers the Schematism chapter as 'completion', 'development', or 'application' of the Deduction; an approach with which I am in full agreement.²⁰

For Kant, schemata are necessary because the 'content' considered is not purely a priori; just the contrary, it is perceptible sensation considered as transcendental matter of appearances. The objective validity of the categories is 'proved' once we consider the formal relations of intuition, in abstraction from the synopsis and synthesis of the imagination, as dependent upon the formal principle representational of unity of the understanding. Only such dependence suffices to explain the representations of time and space as concepts with qualitative unity. In order to be thought, 'time', for example, must be thought as representative

¹⁸Kemp Smith, p. 195.

¹⁹Wolff, R.P. Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1973), p.204. Hereinafter cited as 'Wolff, KTMA'.

²⁰Schaper, E. "Kant's Schematism Reconsidered," Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 18 (December 1964), p. 271, n. 8. Hereinafter cited as 'Schaper, Schematism'.

of a set of relations within which the possibility of appearances being related occurs. Conceptualization of time is possible only as unification of the formal relations, as formal relations, in which 'objects of senses' appear and are synthesized.

Strict adherence to what Kant himself states concerning the 'discovery' of the categories and their objective validity is implicitly inclusive of the meaning of the categories as representations of synthetic unity. Further, elucidation of the categories as they are discussed in the Transcendental Analytic in general anticipates their empiricization in the unification of synthesis of appearances, preparatory to further specification of the unified form of appearances in the Chapter on Schematism. This elucidation of the categories also reveals them as ways of unifying which are grounded in the transcendental unity of apperception, the anticipatory subject of the following chapter of this thesis. The former anticipation, that concerning schematism, is only treated as of secondary importance, i.e. only to the extent that I have maintained, in general, the necessity of displacement of the subject matter of the 'Subjective' Deduction, viz. subjective apprehension, reproduction and recognition, from the Deduction(s) proper to the Chapter on Schematism.

Kant's real purpose in the discussion of the 'subjective sources' (A97) of our knowledge in the Deduction(s) was simply to illustrate the continuity (and dependency) of empirical consciousness, and its synthesis, both as empirically apprehended and as formally intuited, with that principle which conditions the possibility of the contents of empirical consciousness being known. This continuity can also be exhibited solely through the transcendental unity of apperception and the objective deduction of the categories without involving illustration of the

experience within which we encounter the pure concepts of the understanding. The inessentiality of the latterly 'illustration' is precisely why the syntheses in imagination are dealt with perfunctorily in the Second Edition. Synthetical activity in imagination is properly an element of explication of schemata, not categories. Synthetical unity is identified by Kant with experience, and his analysis of human experiencing was a purposive endeavour to discover the elements and origins of synthetic unity which conditions experience. I doubt greatly that his actual procedure was as circular as the preceding sentence appears to present the truly important epistemological methodology. Rather, we may in general acknowledge some sort of systematic combination of elements, or discrete data, and, to understand Kant, accept one of his primary premises that without a unifying activity there is no knowledge, no judgment, no thought, and no mankind in the sense in which he understood them.²¹

Analytical illustration of human experience may possibly have been Kant's initial procedure but his effort was always to render intelligible the conditions of that very analysis; in fact, of the experience itself.

Once clarification had been achieved, Kant's problematic was to show the conditions as operative and originary in experience. If the categories as modes of unifying and their originative source are justified as conditions of the very possibility of knowledge of 'objects of senses', continuity is assured. Thus, Kant's 'greatest labour' is in the Transcendental Deduction(s). If the assertion of the apriori conditions follows from analysis of their possibility, their necessity is established in the objective deduction. Justification of the objective

²¹ Wolff, *KTMA*, says that the 'fact of the unity of consciousness' is Kant's only premise in the Critique, p. 111.

validity of the categories necessarily is inclusive of their originative unity, which is why analysis of the transcendental unity of pure apperception occurs in the Deduction(s). To argue from the conditioned to its conditions is the procedure employed in the 'Subjective' Deduction, (A119) whereas Kant's methodological emphasis concerns the movement from apriori and necessary conditions to that which is conditioned, i.e. to that which is determined, and recognized to be so determined, by those very conditions. G. Bird states the distinction loosely by saying that Kant is not claiming to go from the fact that synthesis is necessary to necessary synthesis. Bird says:

He is not arguing to the existence of apriori knowledge or synthesis, but rather presupposing that there is such knowledge and arguing that it must involve abilities of the kind contained in apprehension.²²

To 'follow up' (A116) what is synthetically unified is to see the categories and their source of unity as constantly present determining factors of knowledge. The labour of the Deduction(s) was to show that transcendental unity, its principle, and its modes or rules of unifying are original apriori sources of knowledge relating 'directly' to formal intuition, thus 'indirectly' to the manifold of appearances (this last developed more concretely in the Chapter on Schematism).

²²Bird, G. Kant's Theory of Knowledge (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 119. Hereinafter cited as 'Bird'. Cf. Kemp Smith for his analysis of the transcendental argument, pp. 44-45, 239. Also, cf. E. Schaper's distinction between the 'weak' and 'strong' transcendental arguments in "Arguing Transcendentally", Kant-Studien, Band 63 (1972), pp. 101-16. Hereinafter cited as 'Schaper, Arguing Transcendentally'. Kemp Smith says the transcendental argument is 'hypothetical' while Schaper says that Kant's 'stronger' claim characterizes the Transcendental Deduction as opposed to the weaker argument from conditioned to conditions. The 'stronger' claim concerns specific principles 'without which we could not think coherently about experience at all', says Schaper (p. 102).

This first chapter of my thesis, then, will be an expository analysis, and defense, of the relation of the categories to the Table of Judgments, and of the meaning of their objective deduction, viz. their relation to time (and space) as formal condition of intuition. The third aspectual view of the categories as procedural manifestations (or functions) of transcendental unity of apperception is implicit in the two previously introduced relations. The originary source of the categories as rules of synthetic unity will be presented in the second chapter, whereas synthesis in general will be considered in the third, and last chapter. The matrix of the entire problem centers in real meaning being accorded the transcendental unity of apperception in order both for synthesizing to be synthetic unity, i.e. combination to form wholes, and for systematic specification of differentiation in unifying the syntheses, viz. determinative combination as wholes in accordance with the pure a priori concepts of syntheses. In order, firstly, to understand these a priori concepts of synthesis, it is necessary to distinguish between pure General Logic and the Table of Judgments of Transcendental Logic.²³

²³ There are two articles dealing with the distinctions between formal and transcendental logic: Paton, H.J. "Formal and Transcendental Logic," Kant-Studien, Band 49 (1957/1958), pp. 245-63 (hereinafter cited as 'Paton, Logic'); and Smart, H.R. "Two Views on Kant and Formal Logic," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (December 1955), pp. 155-71 (hereinafter cited as 'Smart, Logic'). Paton's article is in response to Smart's interpretations of both Kemp Smith's and his own (Paton's) discussion of the distinctions between the logics. Smart is saying that whereas Paton makes transcendental logic dependent upon formal logic, Kemp Smith offers the converse interpretation. Smart himself seems to be saying that transcendental logic is derived from the categories, and that transcendental logic is the basis of general (formal) logic. He says: "...one may say that what kind of a logic--formal or other--a philosopher subscribes to, is a function of, derives from, that philosopher's metaphysics," (p. 163); (and the categories are the 'metaphysical forms'). And cf. Paton's comments, pp. 257-58. As I would maintain that 'dependency' is not a relevant issue, this brief reference to either of

B: Negative Logical Criteria

Pure General Logic considers the form of thought in general, and is concerned with necessary rules, or criteria, of formal truth of thought in general. (A52/B76, A59/B84) Kant says:

General logic resolves the whole formal procedure of the understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as principles of all logical criticism of our knowledge. This part of logic, which may therefore be entitled analytic, yields what is at least the negative touchstone of truth. Its rules must be applied in the examination and appraising of the form of all knowledge before we proceed to determine whether their content contains positive truth in respect to their object. But since the mere form of knowledge, however completely it may be in agreement with logical laws, is far from being sufficient to determine the material (objective) truth of knowledge, no one can venture with the help of logic alone to judge regarding objects, or to make any assertion. We must first, independently of logic, obtain reliable information; only then are we in a position to enquire, in accordance with logical laws, into the use of this information and its connection in a coherent whole, or rather to test it by these laws. (A60/B85)

The above quotation is a succinct reminder from Kant concerning the intent and problematic of the Critique. The analytic of pure general logic contains only the criteria of the agreement of thought in general, or thought(s) with thought(s); it contains no more than negative formal logical criteria pertaining to the objective content (material) of these thoughts and their relations.

Kemp Smith draws radical conclusions from the definition of the analytic of pure general logic; conclusions which in no respect accord with my thesis nor, I maintain, with Kant's. Kemp Smith's general position begins with his distinction between general and transcendental logic, the former concerned only with 'discursive' (analytic) activities and the

the articles is sufficient. The two logics seem to me to be supplying different criteria of objectivity, viz. pure general logic is the negative criterion of objectivity; and transcendental logic is the positive criterion of objectivity.

latter with 'originative' (synthetic) activities.²⁴ Discursive activities are analytic thinking, thus reflective;²⁵ originative, or creative, activities are synthetic thinking, thus interpretative.²⁶

Kemp Smith says that

Discursive activities are conscious processes, and are under our control; the synthetic processes, are non-conscious; only their finished products appear within the conscious field.... The synthetic activities...are due to a faculty of imagination.²⁷

And, "the former presupposes and is conditioned by the latter."²⁸ The conclusion we can draw from Kemp Smith's position is that all synthetic thinking is due to the imagination--a very un-Kantian thought.

The entire Critique is actually a systematic presentation of sets of relations and their possibility of being related. G. Martin expresses it as:

Nature is nothing but a system of relations and the understanding nothing but the faculty of establishing relations, and nature must therefore arise out of the activity of such an understanding.²⁹

The dialectic of pure general logic is concerned to expose the consequent fallacies when we do attempt to treat general and necessary logical laws as criteria of objective content. The only application of these general logical laws to objective content is their function as 'negative

²⁴ Kemp Smith, p. 172.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 179.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 178-79.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 179.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 178.

²⁹ Martin, G.: Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, translated from the German by P. G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961), p. 125. Hereinafter cited as 'Martin'.

touchstones', i.e. any thought about objects must fundamentally conform to these laws to be thought coherently at all. We are already involved in presuppositions of unity and coherence, for the analysis of the understanding and reason has revealed as important for thinking pure general laws which function as principles of formal thinking in general. And as 'thinking' is by means of concepts and concepts are related in judgments, the most general laws of thinking condition all judgments, analytic as well as synthetic. These laws constitute the negative condition for objective truth, and are the positive criteria for merely formal, or analytic, truth: (Cf. A151/B191) Any thinking of the understanding and reason must conform to these most general laws of significance for understanding and reason. Such criteria are already representation of the characteristics of a systematic whole.

In Kant's Introduction to Logic,³⁰ we are told what these most general pure logical laws are. Before he states them, Kant advises us that

these formal universal criteria are certainly not sufficient for objective truth, but yet they are to be viewed as its conditio sine qua non. For before the question, whether the cognition agrees with the object must come the question, whether it agrees with itself (as to form). And this is the business of Logic.³¹

Kant introduces three principles as 'the universal merely formal or logical criteria of truth', namely:

1. The Principle of Contradiction and of Identity (principium contradictionis and identitatis) by which the intrinsic possibility of a cognition is determined for problematical judgments.

³⁰ Introduction to Logic, translated by T.K. Abbott (London: Vision Press Limited, 1963). Hereinafter cited as 'Kant, Logic'.

³¹ Ibid., p. 42.

2. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (principium rationis sufficientis) on which the (logical) actuality of a cognition depends; that it is well-founded, as material for asserterical judgments.
3. The Principle of Excluded Middle (principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria) on which the (logical) necessity of a cognition is based, that we must necessarily judge thus and not otherwise, that is, that the contradictory is false. This is the principle of apodictic judgments.³²

The above criterial principles of pure general logic are taken as a given for the purposes of this thesis. Interest in the logical elements of the unity of understanding is directed primarily to the differences between pure general logical laws of thought in general, including analytic judgments, and the a priori transcendental logical laws, concepts and principles of thought of objects in general, exclusively concerned with a priori and necessary synthetic judgments about (objective) experience, or nature, in general.

General logical principles of thinking, or judging; have efficacy only if they are applied, or employed, as criteria of thoughts or judgments in general. Now, thoughts and judgments are about something, i.e. they are ways of doing something which, more specifically characterized, are ways of relating representations in accordance with conceptual differentiation of 'objects of our senses'; referents which are thusly distinguished from other 'objects of our senses'. If we create the object corresponding to conceptual identification, the content which is formalized is purely subjective and as such does not constitute knowledge, i.e. objective content. Such content is still determinable by the general logical laws, for example, characteristics are non-predicable of a subject if they are contradictories of the

³² Ibid., pp. 43-44.

meaning of the subject-concept. It is irrelevant herein to consider any objections to these general laws which cite ascriptions of just such contradictory characteristics in fantasizing, for these objections assume the efficacy of the laws in general as the basis for the sought effect. It more usually occurs that such imaginative, i.e. fanciful, ascription concerns contrariness and not contradictoriness. In either case, the first consideration is the analysis of the subject-concept to discover wherein it has been altered or distorted to allow of containment of contrary, or contradictory, predicates. It would be merely accidental, thus contingent, if such a created object were actually to refer to an object of our senses.

C: Logic and Sensibility

As Kant states in the above quoted selection concerning pure general logic, we need 'reliable information' obtained 'independently' of logic to supply the formal criteria of material content of the forms of understanding. Precedently to the Analytic, he has already established in the Aesthetic such necessary conditions of the material content of formal thinking. Space and time as forms of intuition are necessary conditions of our representations of perceptions. In this characterization, space and time are subjective forms of sensibility; they become 'objectified' only as they are (and for knowledge, realized to be) determinable as formal intuitions, i.e. unifiable, and unified, as pure intuitive forms in abstraction from the determinable empirical manifold in them. Paton endorses this interpretation when he writes that:

Pure formal intuition is said to contain an a priori manifold, a manifold which is not a manifold of sensa, but is given because of the nature of our sensibility. This manifold is composed only of relations (spatial and temporal). It is at once the content of

pure [formal] intuition and the form of (empirical) intuition.³³

The distinctions of the Aesthetic have also made manifest the necessity of distinguishing between 'pure and empirical thought of objects' (A55/B80) because of the differentiation between pure and empirical intuitions. Initially, we can think of this differentiation as thought about space and time as formal intuitions necessitating conformance of the conditioned manifold of appearances, and thought about the 'objects of senses' which are spatial and temporal sets of relations. Acceptance of Kant's theory of space and time as subjective forms of apprehension of objects of our senses compels us: 1) to distinguish space and time as both formal and forming relations, and 2) to attempt to distinguish concepts, some of which are determinatively attributable to both formal intuitions and formed intuitions, and some which are attributable exclusively to formed intuitions. Characterization of categories as representative of the understanding's synthetic unity means they determine the general ways in which the formal intuitive relations are unified. As well, the categories apply equally, though indirectly, to concepts of formed intuitions; in fact, they are the conditions of the possibility of the latter empirical concepts. Nonetheless, the distinctions were carefully presented by Kant for the purpose of establishing the possibility of a priori and necessary conditions of knowledge of objects of our senses. The distinctions made in the Aesthetic

³³Paton, *KME*, Vol. I, p. 105 and n. 7. The only reservation I have concerning Paton's otherwise clear discussion of space and time as formal (he says 'pure' rather than 'formal', as noted on p. 105) intuitions is that he says they are known by pure intuition, rather than saying they are thought as pure intuitions, which is one reason why Kant differentiates them as 'formal'; cf., e.g., pp. 115, n. 5, 117, 121.

necessarily precede the 'search' for apriori concepts (of synthesis) of the understanding precisely because the concepts will express as unified the merely formal and formalizing intuitions in order for them to be known, and for them to be known as presenting 'reliable information' concerning the material content of judging.

D: Positive Logical Criteria

What is needed now is further specification of the elements of the 'absolute unity' of the pure understanding. (A67/B92, Cf. A65/B90)

Principles of the understanding and reason contain laws of all logical (thus, coherent) thought(s) and interrelation(s) of thought, i.e. pure laws of thought in general. These self-same principles do not contain positive criteria of thought of objects in general. If we are to apply, or employ, these negative criteria of truth to judgments of objects in general, we need to specify positive criteria which serve as necessary rules for the formulation of a complete and systematic list of concepts which constitute the 'content' of these judgments. Fundamentally, judgments are specific combination of relatable concepts, or of relatable marks of unified intuitions; intuitions which are identifiable because they contain (in recognitions) something homogeneous with the functions of unity known as 'marks' or, in the present discussion, pure categories. We need, that is, to enumerate the kinds of judgments which condition the ways in which we know sensible objects and, in modality, conditions the relation of the judgment of objects of our senses to the pure general criteria, or principles, of thought in general. (Cf., for example, A74-5/B100-1) We can legitimately move from principles of pure general logic to rules of thought of objects in general in the sense that the movement is only further specification of the principles and

inprincipled elements 'contained' in the presupposed absolute unity of understanding. In fact, the very restriction of pure general logical laws concerning objective truth compels us to ~~continue~~ analysis of the pure understanding. In order, though, to account as least partially, for the compulsion, or necessity, of further analysis of the presupposed unity of the understanding, the results of the Aesthetic must be accepted not as subsidiary assumptions but as an integral part of the problematic of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments.³⁴ It is because we discern in sensibility, as a fundamental source of knowledge, pure material content (i.e. determinable formal relations of intuition), that we are entitled to assume pure a priori concepts which determine this content in certain specific ways.

Kant has done exactly this in enumerating his Table of Judgments; judgments which are functions of unity in Transcendental Logic. Assumption of pure a priori concepts will be justified in the Deduction(s); the problem of justification is projection, though, beyond the issue now being considered concerning the Metaphysical Deduction of the categories.

Kant says:

In the expectation, therefore, that there may perhaps be concepts which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or sensible intuitions, but solely as acts of pure thought--that is, as concepts which are neither of empirical nor of aesthetic origin--we form for ourselves by anticipation the idea of a science of the knowledge which belongs to pure understanding and reason, whereby we think objects entirely a priori. Such a science, which should determine the origin, the scope, and the objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called transcendental logic, because unlike general logic,

³⁴ Caird, E., Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1968) develops the idea that "...the Aesthetic is necessary to make intelligible the very statement of the problem of the Analytic," pp. 283-84 (Vol. I). Hereinafter cited as 'Caird'.

which has to deal with both empirical and pure knowledge of reason, it concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason solely in so far as they relate apriori to objects. (A57/B81-2)

Metaphysics as a science is possible if we can discover the origin, scope and objective validity of apriori synthetic judgments. Thus metaphysics is possible if we can enumerate the logical forms of the unity of understanding as systematic, or scientific, expression of its most general rules determining knowledge of objects of our senses. The new methodology (Cf., for example, A64-5/B89-90) which is to 'secure' metaphysics as a science (Bxviii-xix) begins as an assumption; its justification is achieved simultaneously with the Deduction(s) of the categories. (Cf. Bxxji n.)

Pure general logic is considered by Kant to be propaedeutic to the sciences (including metaphysics); therefore, it contains no specific rules or principles of metaphysics as a pure science of apriori knowledge of objects of senses, merely fundamental principles of all thinking. Debate about the rules established by the new methodology of metaphysics may be disregarded as irrelevant for the purposes of this presentation. We shall assume that the Table of Judgments (of Transcendental Logic), is exhaustive of the ways in which we judge (relate) representations of objects in general, independently of the specific perceptions which constitute primary content. Perhaps it would be more precise to say that the Table of Judgments can be considered as rules determining the ways possible objects of senses are known apriori. Whether the Table is defective concerning Kant's claim of exhaustiveness, or merely linguistically, is an issue constituting the subject-matter of another thesis. On the assumption that the Table is exhaustive, we discover that methodologically this Table had to precede any attempt to

list, or enumerate, the 'expected' system of apriori pure concepts (whose possibility, though, in relation to the pure forms of sensibility, stimulated further analysis of the pure understanding, thus anticipation of the rules of transcendental logic as methodological principles of metaphysics). The rules of judgments of objects in general,

I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being apriori. They find expression in apriori concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. (Bxvii-xviii)

I recognize that my assertions concerning the Table of Judgments of Transcendental Logic cannot remain totally undefended. I have found no convincing arguments to the contrary and am supported by, for example, Paton, at least to the extent that he expresses doubt about some of the 'moments' of the Table of Judgments being 'compatible' with a pure general logic.³⁵ But my interpretation does not rest solely upon what others failed to see in Kant. References to Kant's statements, for example, about infinite judgments being distinguished from affirmative judgments in transcendental logic "although in general logic they are rightly classed with them" (A71-2/B97) is supportive of my conclusions. Transcendental logic is the 'other logic' which contains rules for the pure thought of an object. (A55/B80)- We should also keep in mind Kant's definition of the understanding as the faculty "which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition" (A51/B76) while we compare the two distinct canons of pure general logic and transcendental logic. Pure general logic as a canon is concerned only with formal employment of understanding and reason, regardless of content. (A53/B77). The

³⁵ Paton, KNE, Vol. I, p. 205.

transcendental analytic is the part of transcendental logic which 'deals with' the elements and principles of pure understanding and "should be used only as a canon for passing judgment upon the empirical employment of the understanding." (A62-3/B87-8; cf. A796/B824) The analysis of this 'other logic' should 'reveal' logical laws proper to its aims which include, for example, discovery of the origin of the ways in which we know objects a priori, and exclusion "only of those modes of knowledge which have empirical content" (A55/B80); aims which are not identified with pure general logic. In the Prolegomena, as well, Kant indicates the general direction of my thesis that the Table of Judgments is not a systematization of general logical rules. Specifically, he says that the labours of logicians which were not yet 'quite free from defects' was a 'help' in exhibiting a complete table of 'the pure functions of the understanding'. Kant

finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the conditions of determining judgments as objectively valid; and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which he could make certain that these, and this exact number only, constitute our whole knowledge of things by pure understanding.³⁶

It was based upon such evidence as the above that I concluded that the intelligibility of the Table of Judgments was only possible if they were viewed as the logical laws of Transcendental Logic.³⁷

³⁶ Prolegomena, pp. 70-71.

³⁷ Cf. Paton's discussion, e.g., KME Vol. I, pp. 300-301, concerning the source of the related confusion between analytic-synthetic judgments, specifically in Caird and Kemp Smith. Caird, for instance, insists that all analytic judgments are not judgments but tautologies, i.e., barren identities, and that consequently Kant was mistaken in attempting to 'derive' or 'deduce' principles of synthesis from empty identity; cf. Vol. I, pp. 268, 332ff., 387-88. Kemp Smith's general position is outlined earlier in this chapter.

E: Possibility of Categories

We are not permitted to view the categories as derivations from the Table of Judgments. Contrarily, it is Transcendental Logic, i.e. the apriori laws of judging possible representations in inner sense, which 'finds expression' in the apriori conceptual system of the synthetic unity of the understanding. (Cf., for example, A241-2) It is interesting to note that E. Caird in general would agree with the former statement (and never considered the latter) but for reasons entirely different from those presented in this thesis. Caird's reasons constitute a curiously convoluted ensemble of misinterpretations of Kant. Caird maintains generally that the categories cannot be 'derived' from the Table of Judgments because, firstly, the Table of Judgments are 'moments' of pure general logic, thus analytic judgments, thus barren identities from which no synthetical rules can be derived. He allows the possibility of exception in the case of the first two classes of categories, "which alone it can seem plausible to derive from the analytic judgment,"³⁸ because they inherently represent adherence to Caird's criterion of synthesis, i.e. the third category of each of these classes is already 'schematised', or is the representation of the re-integration of thesis and anti-thesis. Caird suggest that intelligibility of Kant's theory can be salvaged if we do not view, with Kant, pure thinking as actually separated from sensibility (which I maintain Kant never does). Caird's erroneous interpretation leads him to conclude that the isolated pure understanding is an empty identity. He suggests in its stead that we view pure understanding and its logical laws as relative

³⁸Caird, Vol. I, p. 444.

moments in the reciprocal unity between understanding and sensibility;³⁹ a unity which transcends the relative differences of the two terms, or moments. Caird, in effect, firstly misinterprets Kant's theory of 'pure thinking'; then rescues Kant through a proposed alternate theory • which equates 'synthesis' with the third stage of the dialectical movement of judgment. He says:

...first, the thesis, the simple position or assertion of a thing in which it is referred to itself or set before the mind in its self-identity; secondly, the antithesis or determination of the thing by distinction from, and relation to, other things; and lastly, the synthesis or re-integration of the elements thus differentiated and related--a synthetic movement of which we become conscious when we bring into view the unity of thought which underlies all such distinction and relation. Or, to put it otherwise, in judgment the mind posits its object, determines it by relation, and recognizes its unity with itself in this determination; or, what is the same thing in another point of view, it recognizes the unity of the object with the thought for which it is.⁴⁰

Had Caird recognized that the Table of Judgments are the 'moments' of Transcendental Logic, the problem of derivation would not have arisen. For, as the categories are the conceptual representations of the ways the pure understanding synthesizes and unifies objects of sensible intuition, the judgments of Transcendental Logic are simply the laws of apriori thinking about (thus, 'synthetic' knowledge) the objects of intuition in general which are synthesized and unified. There can be no apriori thinking about conceptualized (synthesized) objects of intuition if there is no idea what these concepts are:

Judgments of transcendental logic are 'functions of unity' of the understanding which means they are modes of actively unifying

³⁹ Ibid., e.g., p. 437.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 460-61; cf. p. 427.

representations insofar as logical form is concerned. (Cf., for example, A68-69/B93) Not only a priori concepts 'rest' upon these functions, all concepts of objects do. The systematic development of the division of the Table of Categories is possible because of the "common principle, namely the faculty of judgment (which is the same as the faculty of thought." (A80-81/B106) The single principle which is operative in both the Tables of Judgments and Categories is the always-present Kantian premise of the understanding as an 'absolute unity' which 'supplies us with a rule' of conceptual connections by which we are able to develop a systematic list of categories. (Cf. A67/B92, A64-65/B89-90) This is what Kant means when he writes

the same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. (A79/B105)

It is pertinent to stress that the categories are the original pure concepts of synthesis. In relation to the pure synthesis in time, the categories are representative of the ordering principles of the pure understanding which 'supply' judgments of transcendental logic with the formalized (or, unified) transcendental content of a priori synthetic judgments. The categories can be said to be representations of the 'ordering principles' only because they are originally characterized as representations of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception of the pure synthesis in time. (Cf. A79) As the categories are merely modes of pure synthetical activity of the transcendental unity of apperception in its relation to objects of intuition, they must be in conformity with the laws (of thinking objects in general) of this self-same pure unity of apperception. If emphasis upon 'derivation' is insistent, we can

only conclude that categories, and the Table of Judgments, are 'derived' from the absolute synthetical unity of the pure understanding.

In analyzing the pure understanding, we have seen Kant's consequent Table of Judgments as representative of the laws of the 'absolute unity' of the pure understanding. The analysis was motivated because: 1) we now know sensibility to 'contain' pure apriori forms with their manifold of spatial and temporal relations (which are also conditions of receptivity of perception in general); and 2) because we consequently ask if there are pure apriori concepts which do not abstract from all content, i.e. which are not the mere result of analysis of General Logic whose representations may be given from any source. These pure concepts would necessarily have to correspond with the functions of unity in the Table of Judgments in order to be concepts developed methodologically from the unity principle of the pure understanding which is the fundamental principle of the possibility of metaphysics as a science. They would be pure concepts because they are expressions of logical functions of the pure understanding, and as pure apriori concepts expressive of unity, their 'content' must be pure as well. And, as we have read in the Aesthetic, the most likely possibility of pure objective content is to be found in pure apriori intuition, i.e. formal intuition.

General Logic, as Kant tells us, (A76-77/B102) 'transforms' representations in general into concepts by discovering the analytical unity in the representations, i.e. by discovering the logical form corresponding to the representations by which the understanding and reason in general is able to think the representations insofar as their form is concerned. Logic in general then can be characterized as the methodology by which the understanding is enabled to think the formal

unity of representations, i.e. it brings representations to concepts. 'Concepts' mean for Kant 'common ground of unity' which means 'analytic unity' in general logic, i.e. the logical (formal) unity discovered in representations in general, and 'synthetic unity' in transcendental logic, i.e. the material unity of the synthesis because it is conditioned by the same basic functioning of unity, in order to be known.⁴¹

F: Categories and Sensibility

Kant says Transcendental Logic has 'lying before' its pure material content without which the possibility of pure a priori concepts of objects of the senses cannot be foreseen. (A77/B102) The meaning of this awkward phraseology of 'lying before' can be clarified if we refer to the beginning of the discussion of Transcendental Logic. Since there are pure and empirical intuitions, a distinction must be made between pure and empirical thought of objects in which case we would only abstract from empirical content of knowledge. The result is that we formulated the idea of a science in which the functions of unity of the pure understanding will be the formal conditions of pure thought of objects in general. Further, transcendental logic

would exclude only those modes of knowledge which have empirical content. It would also treat of the origin of the modes in which we know objects in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects. (A55-56/B80)

⁴¹ Critique, e.g., A77/B102, A78/B104; and references, already quoted, to pure a priori concepts as 'expressions' of functions of unity in transcendental judgments. The subtitle of Chapter One of the Analytic of Concepts is differently translated by Kemp Smith, and F. Max Müller (Critique of Pure Reason, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Anchor Books, 1966; hereinafter cited as 'Critique, Müller). Kemp Smith writes 'The Clue to the Discovery...'; and Müller, 'Method of Discovering' Cf. Critique (Kemp Smith), A66/B91; and Critique, Müller, p. 53. Müller's translation seems more indicative of Kant's purpose.

Thus, we see why pure apriori sensibility 'lies before' transcendental logic: methodologically, it is the only possible given content which would be commensurate with both the formal functions of unity and with sensation as the 'matter' of appearances⁴²...the only possible content through which we are able to have pure apriori thought of objects.

The characterization of space and time as not only formal intuitions having a manifold of apriori intuition in them, but also as conditions of receptivity, must be taken into account. The latter characterization will 'affect' (A77B102) the apriori concepts developed according to the principle of unity of the pure understanding. The very fact that space and time are conditions of empirical intuition means that whatever linguistic expression we give to the pure concepts as expressions of the unity in judging, thus knowing, objects of the senses, must reflect the relation between understanding and sensibility, i.e. these concepts must reflect their characterization as conditions of apriori knowledge of objects. To 'take account' of the 'affection' of space and time as apriori forms of empirical intuition upon the systematic development of a list of pure apriori concepts of synthesis means precisely to introduce the concept of synthesis. To enumerate the categories does not mean merely enumeration of other names for the divisions and 'moments' of the Table of Judgments. Quite the contrary; it is from the possible relation between logical functions of thinking pure intuitions and the material source, from which we abstract all that is empirical to have the concept of space and time as formal conditions of intuition (and also, after exhaustive analysis, the concept of formal intuition), that pure apriori

⁴²Critique; concerning sensation as 'matter', cf., e.g., A51/B75, A86/B118, A223/B270.

concepts arise. The concept 'synthesis' is introduced at this point in the analysis to demonstrate the principle common to both transcendental logic and sensibility (if sensibility is to be known).

Unity of the understanding is, of course, the common principle operative both in its pure thinking about objects and in its objects known. Pure synthesis means methodological conjoining, or synthesizing, based upon a priori synthetic unity. (B104) The developed categories are to express this unity of logical functions and synthesis in time. The 'synthesis in general' of imagination is introduced in explication of the development of the categories; its further analytical unity is clarified and grounded in the synthetic unity of pure apperception in the Transcendental Deduction(s), and its importance is shown to be culminated in the necessary synthetic epistemic structure of perceptions in Schematism and Principles. As such, the only possible meanings of synthesis of imagination for knowledge are restricted to the two alternate characterizations: 1) that within which we see the principle of synthetic unity of apperception manifested; or 2) the 'blind' aggregating of perceptions in the absence of the aforementioned principle of apperception.

The understanding, as spontaneity, not merely 'requires' (A77/B102) synthesis, but stipulates the specific kinds of conjoining which will be commensurate with ways of thinking of objects in general. Specific ways of conjoining representations of objects in general are not synonymous with general ways of conjoining representations of specific temporal objects. The former is the problem of the Deduction(s); the latter problem is that considered in the Schematism. Neither of these characterizations of knowledge is the problematic issue of the

present discussion concerning the possibility of stipulation of the certain ways conjoining is effected in order to be known as representations of objects of our senses. The distinction is made immediately by Kant, in the discussion concerning the categories, between synthesis in general and pure synthesis, the criterial differentiation being the nature of the manifold synthesized. An apriori manifold is given, i.e. formal temporal and spatial relations from which we have abstracted the empirical elements of related sensible perceptions. It should be stated categorically that any discussion of a manifold of representations of objects of our senses or of a pure apriori manifold in space and time already presupposes the synthetic unity which conditions their possibility. But Kant felt it incumbent to explain the unifying process, which necessitated theoretical and linguistic isolation of the categories as the terms expressive of the functions of pure apperception he considered in actuality to be unified. Such theoretical and linguistic isolation, though, does not warrant consequential functional isolation and thus attribution of inconsistency, contradictoriness or paradoxical confusion to Kant's theory. The understanding does not frantically ferret out some passive bits of sensory data which it can inform by means of arbitrarily chosen words expressive of arbitrarily chosen ways of thinking of the world. The world as we sense it is the world in the ways we think about the ways we sense. To explain, in theoretical isolation, the functionings of the unified understanding of experience in general is to constantly be subject to that unity as condition while at the same time to try to 'suspend' it in order to explain it, which is why Kant considered justification of that explanation his 'greatest labour'.

G: Sensibility Restricts Employment of Categories

We "first obtain knowledge properly so called" when we 'bring' synthesis in general to concepts. (A78/B103) 'Bringing' synthesis to concepts is a function of the unity of the understanding, thus 'bringing' synthesis in general to concepts is precisely to unify the synthesis in specific ways, ways designated as concepts which constitute the fundamental formal content of judgments. Pure synthesis, or synthesis of a pure a priori manifold, is brought to pure concepts of the understanding by the same methodological procedure. In general logic, synthesis of representations in general are brought to unity, i.e. to concepts, by means of analysis. Through analysis, we determine if synthetic representations (the source of which is irrelevant) accord with the designated logical unity with which we are concerned. Kant says:

What transcendental logic, on the other hand, teaches, is how we bring to concepts, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. (A78/B104)

The logic which is concerned with the 'origin, scope, and objective validity' of a priori knowledge herewith is shown in the initial establishment of the 'scope' of a priori knowledge. We are henceforth to see that unification, or bringing to concepts, of the pure synthesis is the condition of possibility of knowledge. Explication of how synthesis is unified constitutes the 'Subjective' Deduction, and the further characteristic of synthetical unity of temporally-determined objects of our senses is elucidated in Schematism. The 'scope' with which we are here concerned is rigorously defined in the Deduction(s) as the limits of knowledge, i.e. the logical functions of the unity of the understanding can 'bring' to concepts only the 'content' comprised

of sensibility in general and its conditions. The pure concepts thusly developed cannot find positive application, or employment, beyond these limits or beyond the 'scope' of its objective validity. Careful specification of the general scope of transcendental logic is, in turn, just as carefully brought to empiricization in the schemata. The nature of sensibility in relation to the functions of unity of understanding delimits the scope of the categories and simultaneously confirm their objective validity. The third concern of transcendental logic, i.e. 'origin', is made explicit in the following chapter in examination of the originary source of unity (and objectivity) nominally known as the transcendental unity of apperception.

The 'pure synthesis' which is brought to concepts in transcendental logic is more fully and adequately expressed as the synthesis in the pure form(s) of representations. The synthesis is pure only because the apriori form of intuition is apriori. Pure synthesis 'rests upon a basis of apriori synthetic unity' (A78/B104) which means it rests upon the systematization of the pure concepts as common grounds of unity of thoughts of objects in general, i.e. upon the relation between judgments of objects in general and the pure form of sensibility. When Kant says that what "must first be given--with a view to the apriori knowledge of all objects--is the manifold of pure intuition," (A78-79/B104) he means the determinable perceptions of objects of our senses. Such 'givenness' must be firstly possible before it is synthesized by means of imagination, thus before we are able to analytically determine space and time as the formal conditions of sensibility and characterize them as formal intuitions, the 'content' of which is formal relations by virtue of which all possible perceptions are determinable. The concepts which are

expressive of the unity of the pure synthesis have, then, been developed systematically as designations of common grounds of unity of the formal relations of spatio-temporal determinations of perceptions. The categories

consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity [and] furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the understanding, (A79/B104)

i.e. they rest on functions of unification of the understanding. The self-same functional unity of the understanding 'produced' the logical form of judgments through analysis of that unity. Kant adds that the same operative functionalism of the understanding "also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general." (A79/B105)⁴³

The understanding not only brings the synthetic unity of representations in general 'under' concepts, it also brings the pure synthesis of the manifold in intuition in general 'to' its representations, i.e. to categories. The categories are systematically developed as expressive of the pure thought of objects in general; thus they are representative of certain ways of synthetically unifying possible relations of spatio-

⁴³ It is interesting to note the widely divergent views which some interpreters of Kant suggest concerning this passage. I believe that 'its representations' refers to the categories as the concepts 'which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity' and 'which rest on the understanding'. (A79) The 'transcendental content' which the understanding introduces into the categories is the synthesized unity of the manifold in intuition in general (all possible formal temporal relations of objects of our senses, or all formal relations of 'object in general' in time). 'On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding'. (B105) Paton, Logic, says that an 'element' (not 'content') is introduced into (its) 'representations' and he interprets 'representations' to mean 'intuitions', p. 257. Smart, Logic, replaces (its) 'representations' by 'judgment' and says that the 'element' (not 'content') introduced is a category, p. 169.

temporal determination.

The definiens of the categories consists of two elements: 1) the transcendental unity of apperception and its principles, or laws, of unifying which are expressed in the Table of Judgments; and 2) time-determination, inclusive of the formal nature and the synthetic determining of the temporally determinable. Actually, as Kant states, (A241-42, A727-30/B755-58) the categories cannot strictly be defined but they can be explained, or made the subject of an exposition.⁴⁴

Philosophical explanations may be accorded the 'honorable title' of 'definitions', though, if we understand the term to mean 'exposition of concepts'. In this sense, we shall never be able to 'define' categories apart from the above-stated definiens; apart, i.e. from the functions of unity of the pure understanding upon which they rest and from the sensible conditions in general which limit their employment. This is so precisely because the pure synthesis in sensibility in general constitutes the 'transcendental content', and the functions of unity represent the form of pure a priori knowledge of objects in general. Characterized thusly, the categories cannot be viewed as 'empty'. When Kant discusses in his correspondence what I have referred to as the 'definition', or 'exposition', of the categories, he says:

In other words, in order to think the object as something that has been synthesized, I must presuppose the functioning of synthesizing; and this is accomplished by means of the schematism of the faculty

⁴⁴ Cf. L. W. Beck's discussions concerning the general issue of the indefinability of the categories without the general conditions of sensibility: He says that the definitions which would reduce a priori knowledge to analytic knowledge 'cannot be given'. Cf. "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made Analytic", *Kant-Studien*, Band 47 (1955/1956), pp. 177-78; and "Kant's Theory of Definition", *Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Edited by R.P. Wolff (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 27, 33.

of judgment, whereby synthesizing is related to inner sense, in conformity with the representation of time, on the one hand, but also in conformity with the manifold of intuition (the given), on the other hand.⁴⁵

H: The Meaning of 'Objective' Deduction

We can therefore conclude that the problematic of the 'Objective' Deduction is the justification of this possibility of unification of pure synthesis, or relation of pure sensibility to the pure understanding. Kant's primary concern in his labour is not to define synthesis itself; such an exposition merely aids in comprehension of how synthesis is unified; thus how it makes experience possible, in respect to the prescription of laws for the employment of categories to nature, i.e. Schematism and Principles. An exposition of synthesis itself is not sufficient to make clear that the possibility of synthetic unity is equally the possibility of knowledge.

The transcendental deduction of all apriori concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely, that they must be recognized as apriori conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the intuition which is to be met with in it or of the thought. Concepts which yield the objective ground of the possibility of experience are for this reason necessary. (A94/B126; cf. A93/B124)

The objective validity of the categories rests upon their character as conditions of the possibility of experience. If it can be proven that only through the categories can objects be thought, "this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity."

(A97) As a result of their systematic development, the categories may be characterized as

⁴⁵ Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, Edited and translated by A. Zweig (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), Letter to J.H. Tieftrunk, December 1797, p. 245. Herein-after cited as 'Correspondence'.

concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment. (B128)

The exposition also has shown us their fundamental nature as representations of the synthetic unity of the pure understanding. Kant says:

Pure understanding is thus in the categories the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances, and thereby first and originally makes experience, as regards its form, possible. This is all we were called upon to establish in the transcendental deduction of the categories, namely, to render comprehensible this relation of understanding to sensibility, and, by means of sensibility, to all objects of experience. The objective validity of the pure a priori concepts is thereby made intelligible, and their origin and truth determined. (A128; cf. A130)

T.K. Swing claims that Kant appeared to have two conflicting views concerning the functions of the categories. The first Swing characterizes as the 'formal function theory' whereby pure concepts are assumed to be mere formal functions. In the second view, designated as the 'material function theory', pure concepts are assumed to be material concepts. Swing adds in a note that Kant also 'entertained' the 'double function theory' as the central premise of the Metaphysical Deduction. This latter theory reveals that the pure concepts can have at once both formal and material functions. He says:

Kant may have reached this hybrid position either as a compromise between the formal and the material function theories or in his transition from the latter to the former.⁴⁶

Swing has already concluded that if the Table of Categories

is a formal table, the Deduction becomes an impossible task. If the Table is a material table, the Deduction becomes a ludicrous affair. Thus the Metaphysical Deduction turns out to be an ill-conceived program.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Swing, T.K. Kant's Transcendental Logic (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 94.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 33.

As is clear from my account in this chapter, I do not believe that Swing's proffered options between impossibility and ludicrousness exhaust the understanding of the exposition of the categories, especially when it appears evident that Swing considered the categories to be deduced from "the logical forms of analytical reason."⁴⁸ Further, I think Swing is incorrect when he defines 'transcendental logic' as 'material logic' because he claims that Kant

intends it to be the logic of transcendence, that is, the material logic that enables the Cartesian subject to transcend its subjectivity and attain objective knowledge.⁴⁹

I think Swing is incorrect precisely because the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception is the condition of the objectivity of knowledge and, thus, precludes the need for 'transcendence' of subjectivity.

I: Summation

All I have attempted in this chapter is to clearly exhibit the nature and systematic development of the categories and the purpose of the objective deduction in relation to them as representations of pure synthetic unity of the understanding. The objective validity of the categories does not become evident simply because they are characterized as representations of pure a priori synthetic unity. Rather, Kant has shown in the Deduction(s) their nature as representations of the objective validity of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception of the pure understanding.⁵⁰ This unity of apperception is to be viewed as supplying the principle of spontaneity which is the ground of the three-fold synthesis in imagination. The 'original' relation between

⁴⁸ Ibid., e.g., p. 53.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. viii.

⁵⁰ Critique; cf., e.g., A122, A126, A127, B138, B139.

pure understanding and sensibility is the relation of the transcendental synthetic unity of pure apperception to the intuitive form of possible experience, a thesis developed in the following chapter. This theory, developed by Kant in the Deduction(s), if successful, easily proves the objective validity of the categories as expressive of the logical functions of judgements of objects in general and as expressive of the relation between understanding and sensibility. I claim this 'ease' of transcendental proof because more than the justification of the categories is involved in the Deduction(s). The new 'science', its methodology and principles (Table of Judgments) are to be justified, or proved, as well. Further, because the aforementioned are all 'elements' of the absolute unity of the understanding, the fundamental problem of the Deduction(s) is the justification of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception of the understanding and its principle of synthetic unity. If the latter Deduction is successful, the categories, the Table of Judgments of Transcendental Logic, the new science of metaphysics and its methodology are all confirmed as necessary and apriori conditions of the possibility of knowledge. The only remaining objection would be centered upon the idea of the totality (Cf. A64/B89) which most certainly is a regulative idea and thus beyond the scope of this thesis.

The aim of the new science, viz. the origin, scope, and objective validity of apriori knowledge of objects has been stated concretely by Kant. Actually, demonstration of the origin of the scope and of the objective validity depend (as indicated above) upon the intelligibility and justification of the Kantian theory of the 'original' relation between the transcendental unity of apperception and time as formal intuition. We may, though, employ as a differentiating principle the

fundamental elements of knowledge in order to more concretely illustrate the triple aims of the new science...if it clearly be understood merely as a technique and not as enumeration of immutable elements. The 'scope' has already been indicated in the section of this chapter entitled 'Sensibility Restricts the Employment of the Categories'; the forms of unity are delimited by their only possible content, i.e. the pure synthesis in time in general. As I believe is evident in this chapter, the 'origin' of the categories has been indicated to be the transcendental unity of apperception of the pure understanding; thus, of course, they conform to its laws of thinking objects in general. I am here distinguishing between the 'origin' and the 'development' of the categories as the pure concepts of apriori knowledge. The latter exposition is inclusive of the relation between understanding and sensibility; thus, is inclusive of the problematic of 'scope'. The problem of the 'objective validity' of pure apriori knowledge of objects may also be defined as the problem of the relation between understanding and sensibility, i.e. generally, how is it possible to make apriori synthetic judgments about objects of sensible intuition in general. The resolution of the problem is through the original relation between the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and time. This resolution is naturally inclusive of resolution of the question of the 'origin' and 'scope' of apriori knowledge of objects; as well as determination of the origin and scope of the categories as representation of the necessary synthetic unity of the understanding. Once we have determined the originary source of objective validity for knowledge, as the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception in its relation to time, we have concomitantly determined the origin and development of the pure apriori concepts and their scope.

and, of course, determined the scope and origin of apriori knowledge of objects according to the laws of the pure understanding.

It is through the further specification of the understanding's spontaneous determination of appearances in time (the syntheses and schematism) that the categories have not only formal objective validity but "objective reality, that is, application to objects which can be given us in intuition," (B150-51)⁵¹ which I claim is to be viewed as anticipatory introduction to Schematism.

The objective validity of the categories, then, i.e. their possibility as conditions of the determination of appearance, 'follows from' the relation of the 'original synthetic unity of apperception' and the 'original forms of sensibility'. (B169) Vleeschauer notes that the 'problem of objectivity' is synonymous with the transcendental deduction and that the latter is conditioned by the metaphysical deduction of the categories. He says that in the metaphysical deduction, Kant has to

make an exhaustive inventory of them and arrange this inventory by means of a principle. The principle is to be a guarantee of the necessary completeness of the list.⁵²

Vleeschauer suggests that at one point (in the Nachlass), Kant considered, and abandoned, Verbindung as the heuristic principle guaranteeing the categories. Vleeschauer translates Verbindung as "liaison (let us not yet speak of synthesis)."⁵³ He says further:

⁵¹ Critique; cf. A119, A125. And cf. B159-60 for the distinction between 'metaphysical' deduction, 'transcendental' deduction, and the possibility of apriori knowledge of objects 'presented' to our senses, i.e. explication of syntheses.

⁵² Vleeschauer, p. 75.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 79.

This function of liaison is the function which resolves the problem of objectivity, that is, which constitutes and brings about the close connection between sensibility and understanding. The categories or pure concepts then represent all the diverse ways in which the combination of the two faculties operate when integrated in our knowledge of an object.⁵⁴

I cannot agree with Vleeschauer that Kant abandoned this general indication of the principle guaranteeing the categories as a system of apriori concepts of synthesis in favor of a principle of parallelism between judgments and the categories which were discovered precedently to the principle.⁵⁵ I maintain that the categories were developed systematically from the principle of pure apperception and its unifying relation to time; an interpretation developed in the following chapter which 'grounds' objectivity in the transcendental unity of apperception.

Schaper suggests my general approach when she says:

For the Deduction is not merely a deduction of the pure categories; of at least equal importance is Kant's elaboration of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, in which time is an essential factor, not fully accounted for by calling it a pure form of sensibility.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 75, 78.

⁵⁶ Schaper, Schematism, p. 278.

CHAPTER TWO

UNITY AND APPERCEPTION

A: The Principle of Unity

"The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge." (B135) Accordingly,

This principle holds a priori, and may be called the transcendental principle of the unity of all that is manifold in our representations, and consequently also in intuition. (A116)

This "...pure apperception supplies a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition." (A116-17)

The synthetic proposition, that all the variety of empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general. (A117 n.)

Kant defines the 'absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general' also as:

The supreme principle [of the possibility of all intuition] in its relation to understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. (B136)

This latter "Principle of the Synthetic Unity is the Supreme Principle of all Employment of the Understanding." (B136, my emphasis).

My purpose in beginning this chapter with the above quotations is two-fold: 1) to firmly establish the identity of intent in both Editions of the Deduction, as the principles receive equal stress in both presentations; and 2) to keep clearly in view the fundamental Kantian presupposition of the 'absolute unity' of the understanding which is to be explained by further analysis and specification of this presupposition

as the source of the originary principles conditioning knowledge.

As already mentioned, Kant stated in the Preface to the First Edition that the 'Subjective' Deduction was not an 'essential part' of the enquiry of the Deduction. (Axvi-xvii) The Preface to the Second Edition states categorically that he has omitted or abridged nothing 'essential' to completeness; he found nothing to alter but the mode of exposition, for example, improvements to help remove the 'obscurity' of the first edition deduction. (Bxxxvii-xlii) Paton says:

I believe Kant is right in saying that it [Second Edition Deduction] does not add anything which was not implicit in the first edition, and the suggestion that he was retracting the views there expressed seems to me groundless.⁵⁷

Kant, in his correspondence with Marcus Herz, May 1781, says that he found nothing to change in the 'main theory'.⁵⁸ In a letter to Christian Garve, August 1783, Kant says that as the 'work stands', he 'should not wish it unwritten for any price'.⁵⁹ To Moses Mendelssohn in August 1783, Kant says he 'completed it hastily' (the first edition of the Critique) 'with the greatest attentiveness to content but less care about its style'.⁶⁰ I maintain that obfuscation of the first edition of the Deduction can be traced to the emphasis on the syntheses in imagination which is omitted as less than 'essential' to the 'chief purpose' in the second edition. General allegations of inconsistencies and/or attribution to Kant of implicit retention of the alleged centrality of imagination in explication of synthesis, or combination,

⁵⁷ Paton, KME, Vol. I, p. 500.

⁵⁸ Correspondence, p. 95.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 101.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 105-106.

in the second edition, cannot be supported, including M. Heidegger's extreme accusation of Kant's 'recoil' from the 'unknown root' of transcendental imagination in the laying of the foundations of metaphysics.⁶¹

B: Confirmation

Introduction of the concept of combination actually anticipates the following chapter but it is necessary to discuss it at least to the extent that it aids in the development of the present chapter. Also, there is a paragraph in the chapter in the Critique concerning the pure a priori principles of the understanding which makes an important distinction concerning the employment of these principles which 'proceed from concepts to intuition' (A160/B199); a paragraph which as well refers to a note added in the Second Edition which carefully defines 'combination'.

Mathematical principles allow of 'intuitive certainty' according to the categories of quantity and quality, while dynamical principles allow only of 'discursive certainty'. Kant continues by saying that he is concerned only with 'the principles of pure understanding in their relation to inner sense'. He says:

It is through these principles of pure understanding that the special principles of mathematics and dynamics become possible. I have named them, therefore, on account rather of their application than of their content, (A162/B202)

i.e. on account of the employment of the categorial synthesis. It is because perceptions are determinable as to quantity and quality that specification of their time order is possible. Time itself is generated

⁶¹ Heidegger, M. Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972), Section 31. Hereinafter cited as 'Heidegger, KPM.'

(synthesized) in the synthesis of apprehension; the schema, or unity of pattern, of which is empirically expressed as number. (A141-45/BB182-84) 'Number' itself, discursively, is nothing more than plurality considered as unity, i.e. totality. (Cf. B110, A103) Then we are able, for example, to speak of the 'parts' of time as differentiation of a time-series 'filled' with synthetically unified sensation as 'matter'. As the mathematical, or ~~constitutive~~, categories have no 'correlates' but "are to be met with only in the second group", (B110) so too is the generation and 'content' of time in the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction to be 'met with' only in time-order and -scope, i.e. in the relating of objects of our senses to one another and to the Table of Judgments ('bringing' the pure synthesis to categories). So, too, is the same dependence exhibited in the principles...intuitive certainty is confirmed in discursive certainty because of the function of synthetical unity in determination of inner sense which precedes characterization of construction. That is, the categories, in their restriction to time (schematization), determine the relations (and the unifying of the relations) of possible objects of our senses before consideration of the mathematical properties of the objects which are to be related in specific ways.

For an object of intuition to be commensurate with the categories, it must be possible to consider it as a totality, i.e. differentiation of numerical identity, and to stipulate that we are affected sensibly by it and in what way (something like the traditional primary and secondary qualities); but precedent to this specification, it must be possible to determine the possible relations of sensible affections to one another and to the understanding--if they are to be known by an understanding

whose absolute unity is ultimately the epigenesis of the system called experience, or nature. (Cf. B167) Caird interprets the 'epigenesis' of pure reason as "a new development in which the same principle [unity of apperception] reaches what Schelling called a 'higher potency'."⁶² He is referring to what he calls the dialectical 're-integration' of known objects and objects known. This interpretation contrasts sharply with, for example, Paton's discussion wherein epigenesis is explained as the power of thinking differentiating itself progressively as the senses are 'stimulated'.⁶³

We can say, then, that application of mathematical principles to inner sense has intelligibility as "rules for the objective employment" of categories (A161/B200) only if it is possible to specify the objective relations predetermining objects in general. (Cf., for example, A177-80/B220-23)

The preceding discussion was preparatory to introduction of the definition of 'combination' as Kant stated it in a note added in the Second Edition. (Incidentally, Martin, rather amusingly, says that the definition of the understanding as a faculty of combining a priori is 'the crimson thread' of the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition.)⁶⁴ I feel it is important to reproduce Kant's definition verbatim before proceeding to the development of the theory of pure apperception. He says:

All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio) or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of the manifold where its constituents do not necessarily belong to one another.

⁶²Caird; Vol. I, p. 392.

⁶³Paton, KME, Vol. I, p. 578.

⁶⁴Martin, p. 124.

For example, the two triangles into which a square is divided by its diagonal do not necessarily belong to one another. Such also is the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything which can be mathematically treated. This synthesis can itself be divided into that of aggregation and that of coalition, the former applying to extensive and the latter to intensive quantities. The second mode of combination (nexus) is the synthesis of the manifold so far as its constituents necessarily belong to one another, as, for example, the accident to some substance, or the effect to the cause. It is therefore synthesis of that which, though, heterogeneous, is yet represented as combined a priori. This combination, as not being arbitrary and as concerning the connection of the existence of the manifold, I entitle dynamical. Such connection can itself, in turn, be divided into the physical connection of the appearances with one another, and their metaphysical connection in the a priori faculty of knowledge. (B202 n.; cf. B134)

Incidentally, this 'a priori faculty of knowledge' is pure apperception considered as a 'faculty', or function. (Cf. A117 n., B133 n.)

Specifications of combination as enumerated above one and all refer to the kind of synthetic unity represented in the categories in their employment in time. Principles 'specify a priori the instance', i.e., are formulations "of universal but sufficient marks [of] the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts [categories]." (A135-36/B174-75) Thus, the principles are formulations concerning the application of specific temporal relations (time-series, -content, etc.) to intuitions in accordance with the determining categories, as representative of original synthetic unity of apperception. The relation between the specification of the a priori instance guaranteeing commensurability of objects in time and the categories is summarized aspectually in the above differentiation of combination and in the previous discussion of the principles. In relation to the categories of the understanding, the Principles (and Schemata) represent the application in time to intuitions rather than the origin and objective validity of the categories justified in the Deduction(s). This relation may in general be characterized as the

relation between objective reality and objective validity and we can see, then, that the latter objectivity confirms (or determines) the former. It is implicitly evident that the pattern of confirmation is repeated in this relation. In fact, it is the fundamental and original 'confirmation' which is indicated herein. In general, we may say that intuition is confirmed, or determined, by the understanding or, more specifically, that the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception confirms time as formal intuition because the principle of apperceptive unity is the ground of the possibility of the unity of time.

C: The Original Relation

What is not explained but presupposed in the confirming relations is the original relation between the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and time as the form of inner sense. Interestingly, Wolff's suppositional comment that we try to 'derive' the Table of Categories from time-consciousness suggests this 'original relation'.⁶⁵ He could not pursue it, though, because he did not make the necessary distinction between self-consciousness of time as formal intuition, and self-consciousness of time as forming intuition. This original relation was presented generally in the preceding chapter as the determining of formal intuition by the Table of Judgments defined as synthetic functions of the unity of pure understanding, occasioning the systematic development of the Table of Categories. Kemp Smith says, contrarily, that it is only because of the unity of the categories that the unity of apperception is possible.⁶⁶

Further clarification of the original relation can be accomplished

⁶⁵ Wolff, KTMA, p. 209; cf. p. 77.

⁶⁶ Kemp Smith, p. 287.

in either of two ways. Either we illustrate the syntheses of imagination in time and their dependence upon rules and principles of the unity of consciousness; or, we show that the characterization of the 'original' relation is incomplete thus far, viz. that both functions of unity and formal intuition⁶⁷ are themselves grounded in representations which are the most fundamental in knowledge of objects of sensible intuitions. Kant has developed both general modes of explanation; the difficulty is that the original relation is always presupposed in discussion of the syntheses of imagination and their unity, as well as unity being presupposed in explication of time as a singular representation. In the order of knowing, the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception is the last known, and the original relation between this unity and time is the penultimate knowing. In the order of knowledge, unity of pure apperception is fundamental and its relation to time second (although this latter may appear the converse as Kant explains time first in the Aesthetic, it is not so for unity is always assumed in all 'parts' of time.) The extreme danger is that in abstracting from all empirical content and ultimately all intuition to explain the unity of apperception, the bare representation no longer exhibits the functioning through which we were enabled to abstract. Nevertheless, exposition of this relation between pure apperception and time, as singular representation, is final characterization of the development of the objectivity of the categories in the first chapter of this thesis, and grounds for the differentiation between intellectual synthesis and syntheses in imagination as developed in the third chapter. The originary relation between time and apperception

⁶⁷ Critique; cf. A34/B51: we are here and in the succeeding discussion concerned solely with time, as formal intuition.

is not completely clarified until apperception itself is fully developed in this chapter. The development, if successful, will be inclusive of the deduction of the relation.

D: Singularity of Time

It is pertinent here to interject a few comments on time as the *a priori* form of inner sense. Kant says there is only one time in which all representations of times are contained (A188-89/B232) and the general method of discovering the singleness is suggested in his discussion concerning space. In this instance, (A27/B43) 'we abstract from' (or 'eliminate') objects conditioned by the form of sensibility.⁶⁸ The same procedure is sufficient to arrive at the form of inner sense, i.e. we abstract from objects of empirical apperception (or, inner sense; Cf. A107) and recognize that it is one dimension of time within which all the objects of sensibility have been related as simultaneous or sequential alterations of the permanent, i.e. of representations of the permanent. (Cf. A182/B225-26, B291, A30-31/B46-47). The singularity of time not only means many representations are contained in one but also that many representations are contained in the consciousness of that one singular representation and thus "the unity of that consciousness is therefore synthetic and yet is also original." (B136 n)⁶⁹ The 'proof' of the manifold of representations all being 'mine' (or at least in one

⁶⁸Cf. Paton's discussion of the distinction between 'abstracting from something' and 'abstracting something' in relation to space and time. The primary importance of the distinction is between necessity and contingency. Paton, *KME*, Vol. I, pp. 125-26.

⁶⁹Critique; cf. A33/B49, A32/B48 where time is characterized as an 'original' representation.

consciousness and therefore attributable to the one whose consciousness it is).

rests on the represented unity of intuition, by which an object is given. This unity of intuition always includes in itself a synthesis of the manifold given for an intuition, and so already contains the relation of this manifold to the unity of apperception. (B144 n.)

Thus, time (and space) is "represented with the determination of the unity" of the manifold and is as a result, represented as formal intuition whose 'unity' belongs to itself. (B160, B160 n; cf. A107) Vleeschauer says:

Hence Kant finds in this formal intuition a ground of agreement between sensibility and understanding. Formal intuition maintains a connection with receptivity in the sense that the apriori spatio-temporal matter is itself the form of receptivity; on the other hand, it is connected with intellectual unification, since this matter has to be categorically determined in order to become actual.⁷⁰

P. Hoffman views the unity of time differently than represented in this thesis. He states that time is 'nothing but an apriori category of understanding' because it expresses the way in which synthetical activity appears as schematized. Hoffman qualifies this by saying that the 'I think' means 'I combine' and as this latter activity always means synthesizing ('constructing') time, the 'I think' is to be considered the concept of the understanding, and time 'itself' is 'a schematized concept of understanding'.⁷¹ His assumptions, and his confusion, include viewing 'I think' as a particular concept⁷² and he assumes that the activity of combining is not a temporal process but that it 'appears' to

⁷⁰Vleeschauer, p. 107.

⁷¹Hoffman, P. "Note on Time and Subjectivity in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," Philosophical Forum (Boston), Vol. 4 (Spring 1974), p. 318.

⁷²Ibid., cf., e.g., p. 322 n.16.

be so.⁷³

More simply expressed, time as a singular representation for Kant is the representation of unified relations of inner sense once we have abstracted from the specifications of the related synthetic manifold. This representation of intuitive singularity is original 'content' of the unifying function of original apperception as it is represented in judgments which find expression in pure a priori concepts. The categories, then, are developed as a system (A83/B109-10) relating to the unity of apperception as representative of this synthetic unity and they are applied, or employed, as rules, to the manifold of objects in general synthesized in temporally-determined consciousness.

E: Identity and Time

In the order of knowledge, the original representation of synthetic unity results from knowing the functioning of my own consciousness. In addition to consciousness of the identity of function,

I require...an intuition of the manifold in me.... I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly regarded. (B158-59)

It is the original synthetical unity of the relation between apperception and time which grounds the unity of all other synthetical relations (which actually comprises the whole of 'nature' or 'experience').

For the original apperception stands in relation to inner sense (the sum of all representations), and indeed a priori to its form, that is, to the time-order of the manifold of empirical consciousness. All this manifold must, as regards its time-relations, be united in the original apperception. (A177/B220; cf. A34/B51)

⁷³Ibid., cf. p. 317.

The synthesis (ses) of the productive, or figurative, imagination in time is grounded in the original synthetical unity and is thus dependent upon understanding for both its spontaneity and its synthetic unity.

This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application--and thereby the ground of all its other applications--to the objects of our possible intuition.
(B152)

With the positioning of time and imagination in relation to pure apperception accomplished, we may now attend fully to exposition of this concept of intellectual functioning of apperception. In anticipation, I may offer a brief and general characterization of the distinctions which will be made in the following sections. Transcendental apperception may be considered as identity of consciousness whereas transcendental unity of apperception is expressive of consciousness of identity, or self-consciousness. Transcendental synthetic unity of apperception can be characterized as (self-) consciousness of identity in time in general.

F: Self-Knowing

Unity of synthesis of the manifold in imagination is grounded in original apperception which is a spontaneous functioning (faculty) of the understanding.⁷⁴ In respect of this faculty (and reason), "the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility," man 'knows' (is aware of) himself as "a purely intelligible object." (A546-47/B574-75). Man's spontaneous functioning is 'revealed' through his empirical actions (by virtue of which we call him 'appearance'), (A546/B574) i.e. we seek the conditions of the conditioned. This 'revelation' is not the transcendental proof of unity of pure apperception (it is rather its illustration occasioned by experience): that proof

⁷⁴Critique, A68-69/B93-94, A117 n., B145.

consists in showing that without the presupposition of the transcendental unity of apperception and the principle of synthetic unity which follows from pure apperception, knowledge is impossible. One may 'know' oneself as a 'purely intelligible object' in two ways: 1) as 'object' of the idea of reason whereby one may 'think' the soul as simple substance, but may not 'assume' it to be so; (A771-72/B799-800) or 2) consider the representation(s) 'I' (or 'I think' or 'I am' or 'I exist thinking') in general as undetermined representation(s) generated by the spontaneity of pure apperception (or 'original apperception' or 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness'). (B132)⁷⁵

The former 'knowing' is a consequent of consideration of morality, i.e. involved (at least implicitly) in the postulation of God, freedom and immortality of the soul in determination of the activities of practical life. Martin reveals his confusion of the two senses of knowing when he says:

We are thus considering the pure theoretical self-consciousness of the 'I think' from the point of view of the practical self-consciousness of freedom.⁷⁶

The latter 'knowing' is represented in the analytic proposition by which we state the spontaneous functioning of the understanding as condition of synthetical unity of knowledge, after abstracting from all modes of sensibility; it is, in fact, the transcendental condition which enables us to differentiate between morality and epistemology. Some qualification is needed concerning 'knowing' or 'thinking' oneself

⁷⁵ Kemp Smith says that B132 is 'artificial' and 'obscure', and I contend it is primarily because he does not consider original apperception as 'dynamical'; p. 260 n.

⁷⁶ Martin, p. 178.

as an intelligible object. Strictly, one 'thinks' oneself an intelligible object only in morality. We 'know' the self in morality in the sense that we 'think' a determined intelligible object, whereas we 'know' the subject of knowledge in the sense that we think an undetermined and determining intellectual functioning. As we shall see, to know the thinking subject as determined is to know it through its determining of time and through its predicates of intuition determined in time. Thus, to know the determined thinking subject is neither to 'know' it as determined intelligible object nor as pure intellectual functioning but to know it in abstracto as the intellectual functioning of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and to know it concretely as the empirical subject.

The modes of knowing oneself with which this thesis is concerned are the determining subject and the determined object in abstracto, excluding both the moral self and the empirical self. These modes of knowing are neither Cartesian-like alleged mental intuitions; nor are they facts expressible as existential propositions (at least not in the accepted sense of observable facts); nor, finally, are they based on educible data from empirical conditions. Due to Kant's unique sense of 'abstraction',⁷⁷ we may consider original apperception apart from its application, i.e. we consider the unity of the understanding, or knowing, abstracting from all that is sensible. Bird expresses it by saying:

The notion of a transcendental apperception is that of an

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Cf., e.g. Dissertation, pp. 47-49; Kant, Logic, p. 35; and the previous reference in this chapter to Paton's discussion.

understanding from which every reference to sense experience has been removed or abstracted.⁷⁸

Thusly, we are enabled to consider unity of apperception 'in abstracto' as an intellectual functioning of knowledge (A256/B312 n.) and formulate the conditions of its application which comprise its formal relations with 'all that is sensible'. Paton has 'no sympathy' with criticisms which suggest that Kant's attempt to consider pure thought in abstraction was a mistake. He says:

This view is particularly prominent in Caird, and is bound up with the belief that Kant considered thought in abstraction to be purely analytic--an error so profound that it makes the understanding of the Deduction impossible.⁷⁹

I shall firstly consider pure apperception and its unity in general, then proceed to a more detailed exposition of the careful distinctions Kant has made.

G: Pure Apperception in General

The unity of the understanding is the unifying of the elements of knowledge: the condition of this unifying is expressed in the logico-linguistic analytic proposition(s) 'I' -am, -think, -exist thinking, which in turn are themselves expressive of identical functionings. The case is truly as Kant represented it, i.e. development of transcendental knowledge. Strictly regarded, the 'I' represents transcendental consciousness (or, apperception), consciousness which makes possible further a priori knowledge. The 'I am', 'I exist thinking', 'I think', represent original apperception or, synonymously, transcendental unity of apperception. This representation of apperception declares more than bare transcendental consciousness which as 'I' is a fundamental

⁷⁸Bird., p. 174.

⁷⁹Paton, KME, Vol. I, p. 560 n.2.

presupposition of all knowledge, it declares that all consciousness must be consciousness 'of'. The primary function of the 'I think' is to explicitly represent self-consciousness, i.e. I am conscious of being conscious. Implicit in self-consciousness is the relation between the functioning of the unity of understanding and sensibility (which I am abstracting in order to consider formal unity and conditions of the relation.) Consciousness of self, then, is consciousness of all that I may be conscious of. Consciousness of, then, is explicitly representative of self as subject of spontaneous intelligence and implicitly representative of all objects of consciousness of self. Consciousness, if it is to have any meaning, must have meaning for me, i.e. I must be able to think the object of consciousness. I do not have consciousness, I am conscious...for example, of apprehending perceptions. Unity of apperception already suggests that everything of which I am conscious must be related as a unity of understanding according to the principle of apperception. Further, everything must be related according to the rules of the unity of understanding, i.e. according to the ways self-consciousness relates to sensibility in general (or, the application of conditions of unity to all that is sensible.) Thus, characterization of transcendental unity of apperception of the understanding as the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception symbolizes not only the unity of self-consciousness but also the unifying of all that is sensible (or the unifying of all sensibility of which we are conscious.) Paton emphasizes that

the mind could not possibly think, and think a priori, its own identity in the manifold of its ideas [representations], unless it had before its eyes the identity of its own act⁸⁰

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 413.

which thereby makes possible the system of determined appearances.

Paton continues,

This act incidentally is the act which Vaihinger, and to an almost greater degree Kemp Smith, maintain to be for Kant unconscious and pre-conscious.⁸¹

Unifying sensibility constitutes, in general, the 'relation' between understanding and sensibility, and simultaneously differentiates between what Kant calls 'knowing' and 'thinking'. All knowing is synthetical unification of sensible objects and all thinking in general is representational of synthetical unity of the understanding, abstracting from all sensibility. 'Knowing' is the mediate relation of functions of unity of the understanding to sensible objects in general in time, and through time-determinations, to a sensible object commensurate with particular categories. The above may be briefly characterized as the relation of a priori concepts of synthesis of sensible objects in general in distinction from the characterization of 'thinking' as the relation of a priori concepts of synthesis of objects in general whereby a specific 'object' may or may not be posited but is never known merely through thinking it, i.e. merely through reflection of logical unity. Transcendental synthetic unity of apperception represents, then, possibility of application of the formal conditions of self-consciousness to sensible objects in general because it is the principle of unifying, or conjoining, all possible appearances in time-relations as my appearances. Whatever may be characterized as 'perceived' must be apperceived in order to be so characterized. Caird comments:

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 413 n.1. Paton should have added Caird to the list as well; cf. Caird, Vol. I, p. 311.

And if we suppose that, in the individual, a percipient consciousness preceded an apperceptive consciousness, yet it will not be possible for us to account for the latter by means of the former; on the contrary, we shall be obliged to treat the former as conformed a priori to the conditions of the possibility of the latter. Hence we may, and indeed must, start with the unity of intelligence with itself as the precondition of all objects for the intelligence; seeing that it is only through their conformity to that precondition that they can become objects for us, or that we can be conscious of ourselves in relation to them.⁸²

H: 'I Think'

'I' is simply representation of bare consciousness, or the 'mere form of consciousness' which accompanies intuitions and concepts; a representation which "has no content, and therefore no manifold." (A381-82, A346/B404) Kant says:

The consciousness of myself in the representation 'I' is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject (B278)

and has, therefore, no predicates of intuition. Also;

Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions are to be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the subject in itself. (A350)

The 'I think', though, is representational of not only the original unity of apperception but of the principle of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception. 'I think' considered in abstracto has the concomitant danger of being viewed as static, whereas its full meaning is actively thinking "the manifold in one representation." (A354) Kemp Smith interprets the 'I think' as 'I am I', although I have found no occurrence of 'I am I' in his translation of the Critique. He says that the 'I am I' represents the 'transcendental subject' which

⁸²Caird, Vol. I, p. 351.

is 'mere identity' and has 'no content'.⁸³

The proposition, 'I think',

expresses the perception of the self, [and] contains an inner experience...this inner perception is nothing more than the mere apperception 'I think', by which even transcendental concepts are made possible: what we assert in them is 'I think substance, cause', etc. (A343/B402)

'I think' is the formal proposition of the unity of apperception generated by the spontaneity of the understanding. The representations of its unity whereby we linguistically express the functions of unity and general logical laws, and its principles of application to sensibility, may be studied and developed apart from specific references of application and relation to sensibility but they may not be considered to be apart from sensibility. The errors of, for example, Plato and Descartes are not Kant's errors.

Caird obviously thought Kant considered the unity of apperception to be apart from sensibility. Caird, as well as Kemp Smith, interprets the self-identity of the subject as 'I am I' which is a pure identity. Caird proposes a theory of 'pure identity' of self 'transcending'⁸⁴ its synthetic (re-integrating) relation with sensibility. Because Caird identifies the Kantian 'ideal' of knowledge with an alleged intuitive understanding, the self (in Kant), in its 'return' upon itself, repels sensibility as imperfect and is then characterized as a bare identity expressed as the empty analytic judgment, 'I am I'.⁸⁵ Caird says that the self must

⁸³Kemp Smith, pp. 251, 285, 462.

⁸⁴Caird, Vol. I, e.g., p. 405.

⁸⁵Ibid., cf. pp. 400-401.

cease to be regarded as an analytic unity which rests in simple identity with itself, and it must be seen to be a synthetic principle, a principle of difference which goes out of itself to objects in order through them to realise its unity with itself.⁸⁶

To accomplish this, Caird says, "it would be necessary to get rid of Kant's idea that the movement of thought in itself is purely analytic...."⁸⁷

Firstly, Caird misinterprets Kant, then proposes a theory of synthetic unity far more suspect (for example, 're-integration', 'goes out', and 'transcending') than Kant's theory could possibly be. Because of Caird's own insistence upon the organic nature of knowledge and the 'return' of self to itself, thereby transcending the duality of conception and perception, he sees the 'return' as including all the elements of unity and 'completing' them at a higher level.⁸⁸

'I think' as a formal proposition of the principle of the unity of apperception is expressed by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction of the Second Edition as an identical, thus analytic, proposition. (B132-35) And so it is, if we think of the principle of self-consciousness being represented and expressed as 'object in general' from which we have abstracted the mode of intuition. (B429) Bird notes:

Kant certainly does speak in this logical or formal way of the transcendental concept of apperception, though he would not have said that it was merely an analytic unity.⁸⁹

The identity of self-consciousness in relation to the manifold of representations in general presuppose, though, and is grounded in, (B134) synthesis of the manifold which reveals the identity because the pure

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 412.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 402.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 398, 413.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 176.

understanding combines (or unifies) the manifold and is conscious of doing so as an identical functioning. We then abstract from the mode of intuition through which we receive representations of sensible objects and state the analytic unity which as a principle is operative in all our consciousness.

An alternate mode of expressing this analytic unity of consciousness is to state the representation 'I am' or 'I exist thinking'. 'I am' is representative of 'intellectual consciousness of my existence'; (Bx1) it is representation in abstracto of the existence given in the proposition 'I think' when we consider the identity of pure apperception in relation to sensibility in general. (Cf. B418-24) The proposition 'I exist thinking' is the 'I think' no longer considered in abstracto as 'mere logical function' (B429-30) expressed as the analytical unity of pure apperception. It is a proposition expressive of self-perception by which we are able to state the analytic unity of pure apperception. Self-consciousness cannot be divided; in self-perception (or self-intuition) it is both determining subject and determinable object. But self-consciousness is not determined as determining subject, i.e., the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception which is the condition of all combination in one consciousness is not intuited in inner sense. Itself as determining the form of inner sense is viewed as undetermined subject and determined object in time in general which can be studied and expressed in abstracto but which can also be expressed in the general empirical proposition 'I exist thinking' as indicative of its still indeterminate relation with the form of inner sense, or time as formal intuition. The transcendental synthetic unity of apperception is determined as an object in time in general in the sense that it is 'related' to time, thus affected by itself in time. Through determining,

or unifying, formal temporal relations, the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception self-affects (self-intuits) itself. But this sense of 'determination' of the thinking subject is not equivalent to determination through schemata and principles and particular concepts of sensible objects (empirical subject). We are discussing the originary relation of self-determining and self-determination in time in general which can be expressed as an empirical proposition only because the determining self has self-intuited itself in time. If it may be allowed, the correct characterization of the relation would be an 'indeterminate determination', or non-particularized determination; better yet would be 'transcendental determination'.

Kant repeats at least four times that 'I think' and/or 'I exist thinking' is, apart from consideration of it in abstracto, an empirical proposition.⁹⁰ Although the 'I think' or 'I exist thinking' is characterized as an empirical proposition, the 'I' remains an intellectual representation of thought.

Without some empirical representation to supply the material for thought, the actus, 'I think', would not, indeed, take place; but the empirical is only the condition of the application, or of the employment, of the pure intellectual faculty. (B423)

Consciousness, without consciousness of its power of spontaneous combination and consciousness of its combining, would not be representable as identical, or analytic, unity.

But we are not here considering self-consciousness determined in relation to some specific time-relation of objects of our senses. That is, we are still engaged in transcendental enquiry concerning the relationship of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and

⁹⁰Critique; B420, B424, B428, B429.

formal intuition. Kant says:

For inner experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relation to other perception, in which no special distinction or empirical determination is given, is not to be regarded as empirical knowledge but as knowledge of the empirical in general, and has to be reckoned with the investigation of the possibility of any and every experience, which is certainly a transcendental enquiry. (A343/B401)

Although 'I think', or 'I exist thinking', is an empirical proposition (capable also of being expressed as intellectual representation of the unity of apperception in relation to the manifold of representations of intuition, i.e. in abstracto), it is properly seen as empirical representation of the principle of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception. This 'supreme principle of all employment of the understanding' (B136) is operative, or functions, in the fundamental apriori synthetic judgments which ground the empirical proposition(s) 'I think', or 'I exist thinking'. One such expression of the fundamental apriori synthetic judgment of the possibility of all knowledge of experience (and, thusly, of knowledge of its objects) is found in Kant's critique of the Third Paralogism in the First Edition. He states therein that as self-consciousness is an object of inner sense, the identical (analytical) proposition of self-consciousness expresses numerical identity of self-consciousness in time;

For it really says nothing more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself; and it comes to the same whether I say that this whole time is in me, as individual unity, or that I am to be found as numerically identical in all this time. (A362)

I: Self⁹¹

From the preceding discussion of the original synthetic relation between unity of apperception and time which as singular representation is expressive of formal intuition of inner sense, it is evident that we are not allowed to consider pure apperception, or transcendental unity of apperception, as atemporal. But this is precisely what Wolff does in his discussion of the four selves in The Autonomy of Reason.⁹² He equates the transcendental unity of apperception with the 'noumenal' self and identifies it with the 'real' self which is atemporal and outside of the causal order of nature.⁹³ He then equates the real, or noumenal, self with the 'moral' self.⁹⁴ As we are reduced by Wolff to the dichotomy between noumenal and empirical selves, we have no way to account for unity of consciousness in time. Wolff ends his interpretation of the four selves in Kantian philosophy with reference to the 'absurd conclusion' Kant must reach if forced to realize the implications of his theory of 'selves', i.e. "that many independent noumenal selves are all simultaneously synthesizing the one nature in

⁹¹Cousin, D.R. in "Kant on the Self," Kant-Studien, Band 49 (1957/1958), confidently asserts that Kant's statements concerning the 'self' imply a mysterious transcendental subject of experience of which Kant can legitimately know, thus say, nothing, (pp. 29-30). Cousin insists that it is only a 'slight overstatement' to represent Kant as actually claiming that if one says, for example, 'I think I have broken my leg', "I must be referring to two different people," (p. 29) i.e. either to the transcendental self and 'the' body, or to the transcendental subject and 'my own' mind.

⁹²Wolff, R.P. The Autonomy of Reason (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1973).

⁹³Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 14.

which they all appear....⁹⁵

Nor are we allowed to confuse the senses in which we may think the self in epistemology. The former speculative thinking concerning the 'self' as atemporal results from confusion of the senses of 'self' in transcendental knowledge. Regarding unity of apperception as expressive of a self-in-itself (or, noumenon) results from consideration of unity of apperception, in abstracto, as a separate pure existence to which we then fallaciously apply the categories. Kemp Smith considers that in 'Kant's view', the self-conscious subject (as opposed to 'self-consciousness as such') is always noumenal; he bases this conclusion on A346/B404, for instance.⁹⁶ I think he himself has confused the moral 'self' with the 'self' as intelligence. Martin is subject to the same confusion, as we saw earlier in this chapter. A further problem arising from Martin's interpretation is his statement that Kant applied nearly all the categories to things-in-themselves, for example, God and finite intelligences;⁹⁷ a problem which, however, remains generally irrelevant to this thesis beyond its mention which is perhaps indicative of Martin's fundamental Kantian perspective.

Actually, unity of pure apperception must always be thought at least implicitly as transcendental synthetic unity of pure apperception

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 15. Wolff's (mis)interpretation of Kant's 'selves' begins by equating the transcendental unity of apperception with an atemporal noumenal 'self', rather than viewing the unity of apperception as the functioning of pure understanding. Because I consider Wolff's assimilation of the 'selves' an error, I would venture to suggest that the condemnation of 'absurdity' has more relevancy were Wolff to realize it as self-ascriptive.

⁹⁶ Kemp Smith, p. 327.

⁹⁷ Martin, p. 198.

of the synthesized temporal relations of all objects of the senses in general, whereby we are disallowed speculation about the separate atemporal existence of a knowing subject. Predicating existence (or any other category) of the 'self' expressed in unity of pure apperception apart from its explicit or implicit relation to time as formal relations of all objects of our senses confuses the meanings of the determining self with the meanings of the determined self and confuses both with self-intuiting in time in general. It is very evident, Kant says,

that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self that is to be determined (the thinking subject)...[it is] illusion which leads us to regard the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. (A402; cf. B407-09)

We arrive at the thought of a determinable self (thinking subject) through self-intuition, i.e. through the original relation of unity of self-consciousness and formal intuition (which is actually determination of time relations in general, or unifying temporal relations in general through pure apperception of the manifold of sensible representations in general.) We think an indeterminate intuition of our self-consciousness in time in general (i.e. in formal intuition.) The thinking subject that is to be determined is determined with specific predicates of schematized categories, for example, I have a concept (or 'I think') of something permanent in existence. (Bx1-xli) This thinking subject thus determined is grounded, or made possible, in the intellectual functioning of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception in its relation (self-intuition) to time wherein the relations of time are subjected to specific rules. The thinking subject considered in general as the transcendental synthetic unity of

apperception is 'determined' in the sense that it is subjected to a limiting condition (time) in order to have objects corresponding to its concepts. Although we may loosely speak of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception as 'determined', strictly regarded it is indeterminate. The objects in relation to the pure a priori concepts of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception are objects in general in time in general and are not specific objects of sensible intuition.

We do not perceive unity in the subject; we apperceive unity of self-consciousness in time (or apperceive relations of time unified in self-consciousness.) The thinking self

does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself. (A402)

Pure self-consciousness knows the categories and objects of the senses because it is conscious of itself in its original synthetic relation to all syntheses in time in general. (Cf. B160-61, B161 n.)

J: Original Relation, or Self-Intuiting

The original relation between the unity of apperception and time as formal intuition may be characterized, then, as the formal expression of the unity of self-consciousness of all possible objects of the senses in time in general which is simultaneously consciousness of myself intuiting myself (or, intuiting my self-consciousness of the manifold in general.) The interpretation of the Deduction of the categories as presented in the preceding chapter is now more fully justified as it is clear that the systematic development of the Table of Categories as functions of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception is made possible by self-intuiting in time which is the necessary and original

condition of knowledge of sensible objects. Further elucidation of self-intuition may strengthen the preceding thesis concerning the original relation of self-consciousness and time as formal unity of intuition, and will also serve as the method of transition to the distinctions which will be developed in the following chapter.

The 'original' relating of pure apperception and pure singular representation of time is an act of the spontaneity of the understanding. It is 'original' in the sense that unity of self-consciousness must be unity of self-consciousness in time; a presupposition which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of knowledge, i.e. possibility of thought of objects in general, being related to the matter and form of our sensibility (which is the same as thought of objects in general having significance, or being significant.) Imagination has no function in this original relation which is an intellectual relation, or synthesis, and an intellectual consciousness of the functioning of the understanding. Even though the relation is linguistically expressed as an empirical proposition (i.e. I exist thinking) and even though this means a relation between understanding and intuition in general, neither the relation nor the consciousness of the relation is empirical. The unity of all that is synthesized in time can be, and is, expressed by Kant as the formal unity of intuition in time, or time as a formal intuition, which means we abstract from all that is empirical and consider only the unity of intuition. As self-consciousness of my unity of apperception, and self-consciousness of my unifying all that is in time in order to represent time formally to myself (as the set of unified formal relations to which all appearances must conform), is related to formal relations of time in

order mediately to be related to sensation, and since we consider the relation in abstracto (abstracting from all empirical conditions), the representation of the original relation and the original relating is intellectual consciousness and intellectual synthesis. Only thusly do we declare unity of apperception and its original relation to time as a formal intuition to be the transcendental conditions of knowledge and the grounding of all other synthetic a priori judgments.

K: Method of 'Proof'

Consideration of the unity and spontaneity of apperception and its ordinary relation to time in general in abstracto does not constitute a proof of this presupposition of the original transcendental condition of knowledge. Neither does the 'presupposition' equate with postulation or with hypothesization. Abstracting from empirical conditions is the illustration of transcendental conditions of knowledge. Its 'proof' is in showing that without these conditions, knowledge (nature, experience) is impossible. These conditions 'confirm' intuitions as concepts of objects, i.e. they are the conditions which distinguish knowledge from subjective intuitions. Schaper maintains that Kant's argument

is certainly not an argument from our in fact making the objectivity distinction. Rather, it is an argument showing that something like this distinction must be drawn as a consequence of the unity of consciousness being necessary for any coherent question about experience ever arising.⁹⁸

The 'proof' takes the form of the Deduction(s) of the categories characterized as functions of the original synthetic unity in the possibility of their application to the syntheses in imagination of

⁹⁸ Schaper, Arguing Transcendentally, p. 115.

appearances in time. Firstly, the original relation established the possibility and conditions of application of concepts representative of its synthetic unity. The categories are more specifically-defined functions of the original synthetic functional unity in its application to time in general. The necessity of more-specifically defining the conditions of appearing in temporal relations is clear in order to more precisely show the relationship between functions of unity of the understanding and time in general as form of all inner sensing of appearances...and this necessity is fulfilled in the Schemata (and the Principles.) Synthesis in general was introduced in the First Edition Deduction precisely to account for the specifications of conditions of appearing in time; an 'account' which would be completed in the Schematism and the Analytic of Principles.

A further purpose of introduction of synthesis in the First Edition was to distinguish between subjective and objective synthesizing in imagination. If we consider only 'unity' in discussion of the syntheses in imagination, we can determine if the syntheses are objective, i.e. if they conform to the categories as representative of the original synthetic unity. Only in that way is imagination considered 'pure', i.e. as expression of the unity of the spontaneity of the transcendental unity of apperception. Expression of the unity of apperception is simultaneously expression of the original conditions of objectively valid synthesis, i.e. those which conform to the original synthetic unity and thereby are expressive of such. Because Kant was sorely misunderstood in this intent of the First Deduction, the Second Edition Deduction established the objective unity of self-consciousness first (Cf. B139ff.) and then developed the theory of the

syntheses in imagination. But to more clearly understand both the preceding anticipation of the following chapter and its development therein, I must provide a fuller statement of self-intuition whereby the fundamental distinction between the original relation as the transcendental condition of objectivity and the subjectivity of the syntheses in imagination will be evident in this chapter and confirmed in the next chapter.

L: Self-Intuition and Objectivity

The most prevalent method Kant employs to explain self-intuition also constitutes the original 'proof' of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception as the originary source of unity; therefore, of knowledge; therefore, of objectivity. We have considered the presupposed 'absolute unity' of the understanding in abstracto as the unity of pure apperception which 'supplies' through its functioning the supreme principle of the synthetic unity of all employment of the pure understanding in knowledge. We must now show that this unity determines knowledge, which means it determines experience in general and experience of objects in general. We must remember that the transcendental unity of apperception has been considered in abstracto which does not mean a positing of a separate simple and substantial subject. Discussion of a determining subject which exists thinking is accomplished only when we abstract from all empirical conditions and intuition in general...and means nothing epistemologically if we insist that thought in general can determine its own existence, i.e. determine itself as an object. If we remember Kant's stipulations that mere thinking is not knowing, that knowledge requires intuition, and that only through intuition does the mind have material for concepts, we

shall be well oriented in developing the Kantian theory of self-intuition.

Now that he has explained unity of apperception in abstracto, he shows precisely that pure thinking and pure intuiting are related and in what manner; a manner which reveals that the unity of the understanding is operative in every function, or activity, of the mind. It is the same mind which thinks, intuits, and imagines. We cannot 'imagine' unity of thought (nor even thinking) for to attempt to do so is to presuppose the principle of unity which is operative in thought. We cannot 'intuit' thought in general or its unity, for formal intuition is represented as unity because we presuppose unity of synthesis. But we can, as unitary consciousness, think ourself as thinking in abstracto and think ourself as intuiting. We think ourself as thinking in an inner state, or as a representation of self-consciousness in time in general. Self-consciousness in time in general is consciousness of our intuitions in general, i.e. includes consciousness of our possible perceptions of objects of senses which are ordered in specific time-determinations (inclusive of the intuitive relations of succession, coexistence, and duration, and their manifold determined according to specific functions of synthetic unity, or categories, commensurate with the object of intuition.) Schaper seems to suggest that this self-consciousness in time is exhibited in the schematism as a Heideggerian 'being-in-time' or as Goethe expressed it: meaning and being at the same time.⁹⁹ We could add to her list the Husserlian Lebenswelt. But my point, and I think Kant's, is that the grounding,

⁹⁹Schaper, Schematism, p. 282.

or originary, relation is not being-in-time but knowing-we-are-is-knowing-we-are-restricted-to-our-own-mode-of-sensible-intuition. From the original relation, all other relations are made possible, including pure a priori concepts of synthesis of objects in general, in time.

Consequently, I do not know myself through being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined with respect to the function of thought. Modi of self-consciousness in thought are not by themselves concepts of objects (categories), but are mere functions which do not give thought an object to be known, and accordingly do not give even myself as object. The object is not the consciousness of the determining self, but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my inner intuition (in so far as its manifold can be combined in accordance with the universal condition of the unity of apperception in thought.) (B407)

This same thesis is repeated by Kant several times, a few of which I will refer to in the following statements. Self-consciousness requires intuition of the manifold for knowledge of itself just as it requires intuition for the categories. "Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state." (A33/B49) The form of intuition represented as formal intuition contains "no determinate intuition, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold." (B154) Understanding, as pure apperception, determines inner sense by virtue of its characterization as the original principle of the objective combination of the manifold, thus determining thought (concept) of objects of senses in specific time-determinations. In so doing, it determines time as formal intuition and self-consciousness in time.

The intellectual representation 'I think' is expressible as an empirical proposition 'I exist thinking' because the intellectual functioning it represents determines the synthetic unity of all appearances in time and simultaneously itself in time. Kant says:

The understanding does not, therefore, find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects that sense. (B155)

Knowledge of objects and of self, and "all that is manifold in the subject" (B68) is not given by self-activity (or, self-consciousness); "this consciousness demands inner perception" (B68) of the manifold in time. Therefore, self-consciousness of the manifold in time is self-intuition, i.e. knowing time as formal relations of inner intuition and knowing self both as determining subject and determinable object in time. The synthesis of the manifold in time, even the pure synthesis,

if the synthesis be viewed by itself alone, is nothing but the unity of the act, of which, as an act, it [the understanding] is conscious to itself, even without (the aid of) sensibility, but through which it is yet able to determine sensibility. The understanding, that is to say, in respect of the manifold which may be given to it in accordance with the form of sensible intuition, is able to determine sensibility inwardly. (B153; cf. B158 n., A 129, Bx1)

Self-intuition, then, is simply unitary self-consciousness of the manifold given in time. Through determination of this manifold, it has 'affected' itself by being conscious of its self-consciousness operative in all modes of thinking the manifold. 'Consciousness' knows itself as determining subject (in abstracto) and knows itself as determinable object in time, i.e. its thoughts of all objects of the senses are restricted to the conditions of temporality (and spatiality through the 'matter' of appearances in inner sense.)¹⁰⁰

Thus, we can say with Kant (A116-17, A117 n., B136) that the principle of the original synthetic unity of the relation of understanding and sensibility is the supreme principle in all employment of thought

¹⁰⁰ Critique; cf., e.g., B75, A143, A223. And cf. Critique, Müller, p. 118.

of objects, i.e. in all application of thought to objects of the senses. The possibility of this principle rests on two fundamental functions of the pure understanding: 1) that the mind can abstract from the empirical conditions of its thought of sensible objects and all intuition in general to consider the source of unitary (or identical) intellectual functioning represented as the principle of the analytic unity of apperception; and 2) that the mind thinks of its intuition of the manifold in general in inner sense and thereby thinks itself in time in general, i.e. affects itself in time in general. The latter activity is expressible as the 'I think' (the manifold in general) representative of the original synthetic relation between unity (or identity) of apperception and time as formal relations of inner intuition. This relation is the transcendental condition of the possibility of experience, of the possibility of objects of experience, and of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. It is, thus, the condition and grounding of objectivity, i.e. objective knowledge.

M: Inessentiality of Imagination

Both the systematic development of the categories in the first chapter and the conditions of their possibility as developed in the present chapter can be seen to be intelligible without the theory of imagination. It is not simply that references to imagination were omitted; rather, imagination is inessential to the theory of the development of the categories and their justification as functions of unity of the pure understanding. Imagination is equally inessential in justifying the principles of unity of apperception and of synthetic unity of apperception, and in explicit discussion of the original relation of pure apperception and time in general. In short,

imagination is inessential in exposition of the transcendental conditions of pure thought of objects in general which is the necessary condition of any thought of objects of the senses. If, though, we consider determinate objects of the senses as material for the commensurate concepts, imagination is essential. But its function must be clearly delimited and this has been accomplished in part through its distinction from the spontaneous self-activity of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception.

Imagination, even when designated as 'pure', is an activity of the mind which can never be considered in abstracto from empirical conditions and intuition in general for, simply, it is operative only within inner sense, the form of which is time. Unity of apperception in abstracto is merely the principle expressive of the presupposed absolute unity of the understanding and provides the principle for conditioning, thus understanding, the combination of thought and intuition in our knowledge. Perhaps in developing the essentiality of imagination in determinate knowledge in the following chapter, its inessentiality in relation to the transcendental deduction of the categories and unity of apperception will become clearer. W. Walsh seems to think that imagination is unnecessary as well, but for entirely different reasons than those herein presented. He claims that to speak of the understanding is not to speak of activities but of the ability to operate with concepts (he cites Wittgenstein) and to have this ability is to know how to apply the concepts. Walsh claims that imagination 'mystifies' the ability, and I would claim that this is principally so for him because he equates imagination with

'visualisation' 101

N: Summation

This chapter can be concluded with a summation of the general characteristics of the senses of 'self' in Kantian epistemology. The determining self in general can be identified as the transcendental unity of apperception which is the identity of intellectual functioning, i.e. consciousness (of) is self-consciousness. It is expressible as an analytic proposition emphasizing identity. The determining self in general may be theoretically distinguished from the determining self in time in general. This latter sense of 'self' is the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception which is identity of intellectual functioning in time in general; this relation is inclusive of both determination of the formal relations of time and self-intuiting. It is expressible as an existential (empirical) proposition, emphasizing originary synthetic unity in time in general.

Characterization of a 'determined self', in a qualified sense of 'determined', is the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception considered as intellectual functioning limited by time in order to have objects of its pure a priori concepts of synthesis. We may now conclude, in this summation, that the qualification of 'determined self' is properly 'determinable self' rather than the 'indeterminate determined self' suggested precedently to the discussion of self-intuition and objectivity, i.e. the 'object' of self-intuiting is the 'determinable subject'. It is expressible as an empirical proposition, emphasizing self-intuition. The other general sense of 'determined self' is the concrete (empirical) thinking subject. We could make the further

101 Walsh, W.H. "Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique," Kant-Studien, Band 57 (1966), pp. 197-98.

distinction here between 'empirical subject in general' and 'an empirical subject'. The distinction would be important if only to distinguish between the conditions of epistemological determination (including schemata and principles) and conditions of subjective, or psychological, determinations. My only intent is to indicate that the personal history of one individual is not the same consideration as the possibility of personal histories of individuals.

Concerning the references to expressibility of the senses of self in the preceding discussion, it can be stated that any empirical proposition which has objective reality as to its form, i.e. if its formal conditions have applicability to the possibility of experience, (Cf. A156, B195, for example) necessarily involves both senses of the 'determining self' as well as the 'determinable self' (also, if we allow the distinction, the 'empirical subject in general'.) The examples Kant uses, for example, I -am, -think, -exist thinking, fundamentally reflect both the expression of analytic (identity) unity, and the determining and determinable self. That he does not always make this clear can be attributed to the fact that while we may emphasize one 'aspect' of the thinking subject, the others are presupposed.

It has been shown that the original relation between the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and time as formal intuition is the condition of objectivity. Thus, we may conclude that this justification of the validity of the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception is, as well, the objective deduction of categories (as representative of the ways synthesis is unified) in their applicability to objects in general in time. Justification of the

transcendental synthetic unity of apperception (which is really the fundamental goal of the Transcendental Deduction(s)) and, thus, of the categories, necessarily justifies the 'new science' and its methodology for Kant.

CHAPTER THREE

UNITY AND SYNTHESIS

A: 'Kinds' of Synthesis

This chapter can properly be considered as nothing more than an appendix to the discussion of the two preceding chapters. There are three modes, or 'kinds', of synthesis in Kant's *Analytic*: the intellectual synthesis, the transcendental synthesis of ('productive', 'figurative', 'pure': B151-52) imagination, and the reproductive synthesis of empirical imagination. P. Strawson has 'no faith' in synthesis at all; in fact, he discards the 'story' of synthesis which he calls 'an essay in transcendental psychology'.¹⁰² One of Strawson's primary motivations for 'by-passing' synthesis is his general notion that objects possess a unified and enduring spatio-temporal framework independently of any theory of space and time as forms of intuitions, and independently of synthesizing.¹⁰³ The independent unity of objects seems, then, to make possible self-consciousness (which Strawson interprets as empirical consciousness and equates with transcendental unity of apperception.)¹⁰⁴

Heidegger's characterization of imagination in the *Critique* merits mention as a fourth kind of synthesizing activity. Heidegger claims that imagination is another mode of intuition; it is 'unlike perception'

¹⁰² Strawson, P.F. *The Bounds of Sense*. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 32, 96-97, 117.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, Cf. pp. 27, 29, 41, 89.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

which needs an object to be present to provide an 'aspect'. Imagination can give itself aspects of objects not present. It is a 'formative faculty' in a dual sense: it produces an image dependent indirectly upon receptivity of intuition, and it forms and provides (produces) images as a faculty not dependent upon objects of intuition. The true essence of the imagination is its 'at one and the same time' receptivity and productivity (spontaneity.)¹⁰⁵ Pure intuition and pure thought, for Heidegger, are reduced to transcendental imagination which is their 'formative root'.¹⁰⁶ Further, Heidegger states that

understanding and reason are not free because they have the character of spontaneity but because this spontaneity is a receptive spontaneity, i.e. is transcendental imagination.¹⁰⁷

In summation, Heidegger concludes that transcendental imagination is only possible as the root of 'transcendence' because it is 'nothing other' than primordial time (which is pure self-affection orienting, ob-jectifying, itself toward the 'essent' as 'e-ject'.)¹⁰⁸ I think it is clear from this brief presentation of Heidegger's interpretation of imagination in the Critique that, contrary to the task of clarifying imagination, Heidegger has done such 'violence' to the concept as to render it unrecognizable as a Kantian term.

To return to the discussion of the three 'kinds' of synthesis, Kant informs us that the reproductive synthesis "falls within the domain, not of transcendental philosophy, but of psychology" because it is

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger, KPM, pp. 135-36.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 145-46.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 162.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 205 ff.

subject to laws of association. (B152, A100, A121) As such, references to the reproductive synthesis of imagination shall be merely incidental, i.e. only insofar as I shall explicate its grounding, thus its possibility, in the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This latter synthesis shall be seen to be spontaneous only if it is considered as expressive of the "transcendental unity which is thought in the categories." (B151) The transcendental synthesis of imagination is a synthesis of imagination in time in general. When we abstract intuition in general from consideration of the synthesis, we see that its possibility of unity is that thought in the pure forms of unity, i.e. categories, and that thusly the categories have applicability to objects of the senses through imagination. This applicability (or, the application) is in fact the relation developed later by Kant as the schematism (the procedure of the understanding in its relation to pure imagination in time.) (Cf. A139-40/B178-79) Time (as the form of inner sense) is determined by specific unifying thought of appearances which we synthesized by the imagination. Consideration of just the pure synthesis reveals its relation with the categories, thus its unity; a relation subsidiary to, and made possible by, the original relation considered in abstracto of transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and time as formal relations of inner intuition.

Paton says the text seems to be 'corrupt' when Kant refers to 'self-intuition', or 'combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time', "which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly regarded." (B159)¹⁰⁹ It seems to be 'corrupt'

¹⁰⁹ Paton, KME, Vol. II, p. 403 n.1.

for Paton because he seems to assume that the original relation is between categories and the transcendental syntheses in imagination and not between pure synthetic apperception and formal intuition (time), which is the relation from which we develop the categories as pure concepts of synthesis.

B: Intellectual Synthesis

If we remember Kant's stricture that "only modes of knowledge are either intellectual or sensuous," (A256/B312 n.) it is manifest that the meaning of 'intellectual' synthesis has been fully anticipated in the discussion of the formal relation of unity of apperception and time in the last chapter. What remains to be done is merely the summary formal presentation before we consider more fully the problematic issue of this chapter. For once we accept the Kantian thesis with which the preceding chapter was occupied, the problematic issue of synthesis, or combination, is seen to be neither reproductive imagination, which is empirical, nor intellectual synthesis, which is a formal expression of the original relation between understanding and sensibility, but to be the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

The 'I' is "a merely intellectual representation of spontaneity of a thinking subject," (B278) i.e. it is expressive of an intellectual (non-sensuous) mode of knowledge. "But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an intelligence;" (B158) i.e. I represent to myself my act of thinking. I am non-sensuously conscious of my self-thought. I represent the combination of the manifold of intuition in general, when considered in abstracto, as an intellectual synthesis, or the pure apperception of the unity of all possible synthesis of intuition in general (pure or empirical.) Kant says:

It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination, in order to render its [pure imagination] function intellectual. For since the synthesis of imagination connects the manifold only as it appears in intuition, as, for instance, in the shape of a triangle, it is, though exercised a priori, always itself sensible. And while concepts, which belong to the understanding, are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought into relation to sensible intuition. (A124)¹¹⁰

It is only when imagination expresses the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception that we entitle it transcendental imagination and it is precisely through this medium of unity of given intuitions in time that we are able to say that the categories relate, or determine in specific ways, to objects of sensible intuition. The categories, as forms of thought (or, synonymously, functions of unity) relate to intuition in general because they have been systematically developed from the original relation of pure unity of apperception and time as formal intuition. Kant says:

The synthesis or combination of the manifold in them relates only to the unity of apperception, and is thereby the ground of the possibility of a priori knowledge, so far as such knowledge rests on the understanding. This synthesis, therefore, is at once transcendental and also purely intellectual. (B150)

When we think of the categories as mere forms of thought, we are thinking only of the synthesis of the self-thinking intelligence, whereas when we are thinking of the manifold of given representations synthesized in time, we are thinking the "synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition," (B150) through the categories as determining modes of thought. The former thought has an implicit reference (and is therefore itself the transcendental condition) to indeterminate empirical intuition, while

¹¹⁰ Cf. Critique, Müller, p. 114, for a clearer translation of the last sentence.

the latter thought explicitly refers to some given, therefore determined, empirical intuition. Thus, Kant is able to state that

the empirical is only the condition of the application, or of the employment, of the pure intellectual faculty. (B423 n.)

Because we can say, then, that the given empirical intuitions are determined in time (actually, in inner sense whose form is time) according to specific modes of thinking, we can also say that the categories are applicable to objects of our senses and confirm their deduction.

C: The Dependence of Imagination

Reproductive synthesis having been dismissed as inconsequential to the problematic of the present discussion, and intellectual synthesis having been shown to be expressive of pure self-thought (or, pure intellectual functioning), we may now turn to elucidation of the role of the transcendental synthesis of imagination in Kant's *Analytic*. I have already distinguished the pure synthesis in imagination from the intellectual synthesis by the previous discussion. What remains to be done is to further distinguish them by outlining the function and significance of the transcendental synthesis of imagination in order more clearly to see its nature in contradistinction from the intellectual synthesis. The full significance of the function of the transcendental synthesis of imagination is not realized until the *Schematism* and the *Principles* are analyzed. But such a task is beyond the scope of this thesis, for its more modest aim concerning imagination is merely to show its dependence upon, and its distinction from, the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception and its principle of synthetic unity. It is in the *Schematism and Principles* that we see that the rules and laws of the functioning of the transcendental synthetic unity of

apperception, expressed through the categories, are operative as conditions of specific empirical intuitions. We are here concerned only with the possibility of such specification; specification which is made possible because the pure synthesis in imagination in time in general is 'brought to concepts', i.e. is determined as a unity.

Two things must be kept in mind throughout the discussion of the transcendental synthesis of imagination. The first is Kant's explanation of what Transcendental Logic 'teaches', viz, "how we bring to concepts [unity], not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations." (A78/B104). He continues the above statement by saying that what must necessarily be present for the possibility of a priori knowledge of objects is the givenness of the manifold of pure intuition, the synthesis of this manifold by imagination, and the categories which give unity to this synthesis. The second point to be kept in mind is that it is in recognition of the categories as the source of unity of the synthesis in imagination whereby they (the categories) are justified, that the imagination is both distinguished from the intellectual synthesis and seen to be a non-determining activity (except insofar as it expresses the spontaneity of the original unity of apperception.) This last point is confirmed by Kant's statements concerning imagination as the 'blind' function of the soul. (A78/B103) Imagination, considered in this latterly manner, is explicitly seen to be a function more easily associable with intuition than with thought, especially when we remember the oft-repeated Kantian phrase, "intuitions without concepts are blind." (A51/B75) Imagination and intuition are 'blind' functions when considered as distinct from conceptual unity.

Much emphasis can be accorded imagination and its synthesis if statements are quoted from Kant concerning imagination as the third

original subjective source; or as a fundamental faculty of the soul; or, more especially, as the mediator between understanding and sensibility. An extreme example of the latter can be found in G. Schrader's article, wherein he states:

Kant's doctrine of imagination plays an important role in his epistemology and on the subjective side serves to bridge the gap between intuition and conception. In fact, understanding itself may be viewed as a function of imagination operative at the conscious level and in accordance with explicitly formulated rules and laws.¹¹¹

Schrader further states that imagination is "as impressionable as an adolescent girl, but has all the cunning of a Socrates."¹¹²

Imagination is a subjective 'source' of knowledge; but bear in mind Kant's qualification of this statement as, for example, in A94-95. By 'original source', he means 'capacities or faculties of the soul', and he does not mean merely to indicate some kind of potentiality of the mind but actual activities or functionings of the human mind, or soul. There is no need to contest this claim on the part of imagination; it is an original subjective source, or function, of the mind as is intuition. But of the three original subjective sources, only pure apperception has objective validity as the ground of knowing, therefore 'seeing', what is given in intuition and synthesized by imagination. (Cf., for example, A122, B137, B139) Both intuition and imagination are merely subjective sources of knowledge unless we can bring the synthesis of intuition to conceptual unity. This is a consequence which means apperception is more than 'subjective', it is also the

¹¹¹ Schrader, G., "Kant's Theory of Concepts" Kant-Studien, Band 49 (1957/1958), p. 274.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 276.

possibility of objective knowledge which means it is the ground of the relation of understanding, or knowing, objects of the senses.

Actually, 'subjective' is used ambiguously by Kant and he relies upon the context to provide the meaning he is stressing. Apperception, intuition, and imagination are 'subjective' in the sense that they are the functions, or capacities, of the human mind. 'Merely subjective', or 'subjective' in a sense distinguished from the former, indicates an activity, or reception of intuition, which has no necessity, i.e. is not objectively valid. Even apperception, as empirical consciousness (or inner sense), (A107/B140) is 'merely subjective', dependent upon personal circumstances and does not provide a basis for an objective relation between thought and intuition. It is in both senses that imagination is subjective. And even though we may consider time and space as singular representations of intuitions, their singularity, which Kant characterizes as

the purest objective unity, [namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and time),] is only possible through relation of the intuition to such unity of consciousness [transcendental apperception].
(A107)

It is not possible to meaningfully state that space and, especially, time have 'more' objective meaning than imagination does but that in effect is what Kant does indicate in the original relation between time as formal intuition and unity of apperception. Imagination, on the other hand, is 'transcendental' (or possibility of objectivity) only when we recognize functions of unity in its synthesis; as a 'faculty' it has no objective meaning.

The alleged role of imagination as the mediator, or mediating faculty, between understanding and intuition is, I contend, a misunderstanding of Kant. It is a misunderstanding found, for example, in both

Paton and Caird. The misinterpretation in both cases seems to be founded in the belief that imagination has itself a 'power' of synthetic unifying 'in accordance' with the transcendental unity of apperception. The difference between Caird and Paton is that the former believes it to be an 'unconscious' unifying and Paton associates it with the consciousness of the synthetic unity of apperception but on a lower level, dealing with empirical intuitions.¹¹³ I suggest that the misunderstanding results from confusing 'synthesis', which implicitly includes the synthetic unity of apperception, and 'successive apprehension' which may result in an aggregate of intuitions or a 'rhapsody of perceptions'.¹¹⁴ A 'misunderstanding', or radical re-interpretation, of another sort is prominent in Kemp Smith. As we saw in the first chapter of this thesis, he equates synthesis with the 'creative' imagination which is presupposed by the discursive activities of the understanding. According to Kemp Smith, the productive imagination, as a non-conscious activity, 'completes' itself before consciousness, and pre-conditions consciousness (as its 'generating condition'.)¹¹⁵ In addition, Kemp Smith says that because of imagination's synthetic activities, it 'seems' to be the common root, the mediator, between understanding and sensibility.¹¹⁶ And, probably based on his constant reference to both Kemp Smith and Paton, Ewing states emphatically: "Note that it is not time itself but the schema

¹¹³Caird, cf., e.g. Vol. I, pp. 353, 361, 390-92. Paton, KME, Vol. I, pp. 354 n.3, 364, 468-69, 474-75; Vol. II, p. 227.

¹¹⁴Critique; cf. A156/B195, A162-63/B203-04, A201/B246.

¹¹⁵Kemp Smith, pp. 51, 273, 277.

¹¹⁶Ibid., pp. 77, 265.

which is the mediator."¹¹⁷

I maintain that it is time as formal relations of intuition which 'mediates' between understanding and intuitions and which is 'homogeneous' with unity of thought and with given intuitions, or perceptions. Because of the original relation which is what Kant means by intellectual synthesis, or the pure self-thought of intuition in general in time as formal intuition, expressed through the categories, the pure synthesis in imagination in time has meaning because it is determinable as unity and is expressed by the categories. The transcendental synthesis of imagination expresses no more than the unity of thought in time (or, the pure apperception of synthetic unity of sensible intuitions in time.) But this topic is better summarized after a more developed explanation of the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

D: The Unity of the Transcendental Synthesis of Imagination.

We are not concerned herein with illustration of the synthesis of the experience wherein we encounter (A94) the categories as functions, or forms, of thought, i.e. with their 'merely' subjective deduction; rather, we are interested only in the objective ground of the transcendental synthesis of imagination. As such, the discussions of apprehension and reproduction are irrelevant to present purposes. In the First Edition Deduction, Kant introduced the objective unity of apperception after the discussion of specific syntheses in imagination, viz. under the subtitle concerning recognition. In the Second Edition

¹¹⁷Ewing, p. 145.

Deduction, he grounds the syntheses in imagination by firstly defining combination, or synthesis in general, as an act of the spontaneity of the pure understanding. (B129-30) This definition is also present in the First Edition Deduction wherein spontaneity is described as the "ground of a threefold synthesis." (A97) The Second Edition continues in the attempt to remove the 'obscurities' of the first by following the definition of combination, or synthesis in general, with the exposition of the objective unity of self-consciousness. When Kant does introduce the syntheses of imagination, he does so to show how the categories relate to sensible objects in general; their justification of determining intuition in general through the unity of the transcendental synthesis of imagination in time having already been established in the transcendental deduction. (Cf. B159-60) In such a manner, Kant is trying to make it very clear that the objective synthetic unity of apperception is the condition of any empirical consciousness and of (blind) imagination in general. This is the fundamental intent of the First Edition Deduction as well, but as it did not appear to be uniformly clear, he changed the mode of exposition to remove the obscurities.

The spontaneity of the pure understanding, under the title 'productive', or 'figurative', imagination, combines the manifold of intuitions in inner sense, the form of which is time (Cf., for example, B162 n.b, B151-52). The 'productive' and 'figurative' syntheses are synonymous terms for explication of imagination insofar as it reflects the spontaneity of the understanding. It was Kant's manner of distinguishing the a priori combination of pure intuitions in time from both the empirical reproductive synthesis and from the intellectual (purely spontaneous) synthesis. Insofar as the productive (or

figurative) synthesis 'aims' at nothing other than the necessary unity in the manifold, i.e. at the original synthetic unity of apperception, it is called, or entitled, the transcendental synthesis of imagination. The preceding point is made at least twice in each edition of the Deduction(s) and at least once in the Chapter on Schematism.¹¹⁸ We can summarize the point by saying,

the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge; and by means of it all objects of possible experience must be represented a priori. (A118; my emphasis.)

A confirmation of this Kantian thesis concerning the dependence of the pure synthesis in imagination upon the synthetic unity of apperception is provided at least once in the First Edition and twice in the Second Edition of the Deduction. Insofar as productive imagination is directed solely to the synthetic unity of apperception (i.e. insofar as we think what characterizes 'productive' imagination as a function, or faculty, of knowledge), we represent it as a spontaneous, or intellectual, mode of knowledge. It is unity of pure apperception which is 'added' to the pure synthesis in imagination "in order to render its [imagination] function intellectual." (A124)¹¹⁹

It is the synthetical unity of self-consciousness which thinks, therefore unifies, the pure synthesis of intuitions; or, I am conscious of unifying the a priori representations in time as form of inner sense. Synthetic unity of apperception is the basis of the original relation of understanding to the unity of intuition, or time as formal intuition, (Cf., for example, B144) whereas the categories as functions of unity

¹¹⁸ Critique; cf. A118, A123, B151-52, B153, A140/B179.

¹¹⁹ And cf. Critique, B131, B131 n., B164.

are the basis for the unity in the transcendental synthesis of imagination. (Cf. A125, B137) Because of the original relation, which is expressible as consciousness of self in accordance with the formal relations of time, considered in abstracto, the synthesis of all intuitions in time can be considered apart from the empirical conditions under which they were intuited. As such, the synthesis of these intuitions is determinable by the categories as representative of the original synthetic unity of apperception and we can thus think through imagination the synthetic unity of apperception of sensible objects. When we begin to differentiate the different kinds of synthetic unity operative in the transcendental syntheses of imagination in pure time, we are anticipating the schemata.

E: Summation

The transcendental synthesis of imagination has, thus, three sources of significance. The first source is sensibility which 'provides' it with given intuitions in time; the second source is the unity of time as formal relations within which imagination expresses the functions of unity of pure apperception; and the third source is, of course, the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception itself which is the source of unity and spontaneous combination. We can see, then, that although the First Edition Deduction says that the transcendental function of imagination is the 'mediator' between understanding and sensibility, (A124) and although the Chapter on Schematism says that the transcendental schema is the 'third thing' homogeneous with the category and appearance, (A138/B177) the real homogeneous, or mediating, representation is time, represented as formal unity of inner intuition. The transcendental synthesis of imagination is, in general, the schema, or specific time-determination, of the acts of the understanding.¹²⁰ Spontaneity operative

¹²⁰ Ibid., A140/B179, A665/B693.

in certain ways (represented by the categories) in relation to time is expressible as the schematism (or, ordering) of the transcendental synthesis of imagination.¹²¹ Time as the 'third thing' or 'medium' (mediator) is confirmed in the Principles where Kant states that there is only one

whole in which all our representations are contained, namely, inner sense and its a priori form, time. (A155/B194)

The transcendental synthesis of imagination is

an action of the understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application--and thereby the ground of all its other applications--to the objects of our possible intuition. (B152)

It is itself the schema of the understanding, or synthetic unity of pure apperception; the categories determining the formal relations of intuitions in time as specific (or, determinate) modes of knowledge of objects of our senses. (Cf. A139/B178) Imagination, then, is a blind function, or activity, of the 'soul' and is accredited with spontaneous determining activity only when it is used as a synonymous term for the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception in its application of synthetical unity to sensibility in general.

¹²⁰ Ibid., A140/B179, A665/B693.

¹²¹ Cf. Paton, *KME*, Vol. II, p. 73. Cf., also, Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*, translated by J.H. Bernard (New York and London: Hafner Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 196-97.

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