UNITY AND DISORDER

IN

THE PROBLEM PLAYS

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with three plays that have suffered considerably from critical preconceptions and prejudgement: Troilus and Cressida, All's Well That Ends Well, and Measure for Measure. The term "problem play," while so widespread as to be unavoidable, has resulted in insufficient consideration being given to the unity of theme and structure that does exist within and between the plays.

The first chapter consists of a survey of "problem play" criticism. I suggest that, until recently, there has been an unfortunate and unjustified tendency to attribute the murkiness surrounding the plays to some flaw in their design, rather than to an inadequacy in the criticism itself. A noticeable anti-feminist bias among many of the earlier critics has, moreover, had a pervasive and lingering effect. The character of Cressida, in particular, has suffered from this.

In the second chapter, I suggest an interpretation of Troilus and Cressida based on Cressida as the champion, rather than the betrayer of love; as victim rather than victimizer. The interpretation is based on a study of the double nature of self and society in the play. The basic premise is that man is capable of operating on two levels, whether we call these appearance and reality, physical and spiritual, "blood" and "truth," or whatever. When these two levels are operating simultaneously and in total harmony, we have the unity of Love. When a destructive opposition is set up between them,

however, we have the destructive conflict and disorder of Mars. The former condition is associated with health and well-being, the latter with a self-consuming sickness.

In the third and fourth chapters, I expand the themes found in Troilus and Cressida to the two later plays.

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CHAPTER I

> There must be something wrong with it--otherwise the critics would not so 'entangle themselves in apologies and interpretations.'[1]

The "problem plays" present a challenge which a multitude of critics have found impossible to ignore, and an opportunity which they seem unwilling to forego. Ever since Franz Boas, in 1896, decided to "borrow a convenient phrase from the theatre of today"[2] the word "problem" has proved increasingly alluring to most critics, but increasingly inconvenient to those few who have attempted a serious, detailed study of the plays as integral and successful works of art.

There seems to be an unfortunate tendency to accept as a priori the proposition that any confusion surrounding the plays must somehow originate with Shakespeare himself rather than with subsequent criticism of the plays.[3] All too often major critics have been more concerned with redefining, explaining or apologizing for the "problem" (even at the cost of "discovering" new difficulties) than with attempting to appreciate the plays as they stand. The entrenched presupposition that a problem certainly does exist too easily enables a critic to present a theory which adequately covers only certain aspects of the plays, while soberly announcing that the "problem" is Shakespeare's inability to maintain such a theme, structure or tone throughout.[4] Partially for this reason, there seems to be increasing doubt recently as to the validity of grouping together and, in effect, isolating three or four works[5] under

the guise of "problem plays."[6] Unfortunately, the easy virtues of the term probably assure its continued existence.[7] Given such a situation, the simplest course would seem to be that suggested by William Toole:

> The phrase is probably best regarded as an idiom of Shakespearian interpretation, a convenient tag for all four plays that have provoked much critical controversy.[8]

The critical history of the problem plays is an oft-told tale that bears repeating, if only as an example of the amazing variety of opinion possible on the subject. Not only is there little unanimity in the criticism of the plays themselves, but even the critical surveys show considerable diversity in approach. Henry Morris, for example, classifies the criticism under three major headings:

> Prior to E.E.Stoll but after Dr. Johnson, the criticism may be termed Romantic....Stoll insists that Shakespeare's characters not be treated as flesh and blood; they are created puppets and must not be expected to exhibit lifelike qualities nor psychological consistency....A school of critics in opposition to Stoll reasserts that a certain poetic, dramatic, and psychological consistency does exist in Shakespeare's plays, even in the problem comedies. This group may be called the Scrutiny critics, and they derive ultimately from the work of G. Wilson Knight.[9]

William Toole also sees three main stages, but his description of them varies considerably:

> (1) The classification, based on biographical inferences, suggested by Edward Dowden in 1889; (2) the reorientation supplied by W.W. Lawrence's social and historical spadework in 1931; and (3) the full-length interpretation of the plays as works of art by E.M.W.Tillyard in 1950.[10]

Toole, moreover, sees "the foundation for a fourth stage in the critical history of the problem group...in Neville Coghill's 'The Basis of Shakespearian Comedy.'"[11]

Some critics feel that this lack of unanimity concerning the

problem plays stems from varying trends in the "cultural and intellectual life of our society,"[12] but others, while admitting that the "conflicting assessments may be taken to reflect literary taste and intellectual orientation," feel that the diversity is "more significantly related to a distinctive quality of the work itself."[13] For almost every position, a counter-position can be found.

Certain main lines do, however, emerge from without the confusion. Early criticism, for example, seems to have been scanty, based on personal impression rather than objective analysis. Not unnaturally, differences of opinion abound. Swinburne calls Troilus and Cressida "one of the most admirable among all the works of Shakespeare's immeasurable and unfathomable intelligence,"[14] while Hazlitt terms it "one of the most loose and desultory of our author's plays"[15] and the Clarkes find it "shallow, inconsequent and unearnest."[16] As for All's Well, Johnson "cannot reconcile [his] heart to Bertram; a man noble without generosity and young without truth";[17] but Coleridge "cannot agree with the solemn abuse which the critics have poured out upon Bertram."[18] To J.G.A.Dow, the play is "a drama of the temperate period.... [Shakespeare] has begun to wrapt in dismal thinkings";[19] to Hazlitt, it "is one of the most pleasing of our author's comedies."[20] Coleridge considers Measure for Measure[21] "the most painful--say rather, the only painful--part" of Shakespeare's works, while the Clarkes feel that, although the materials may be "strong and repulsive," Shakespeare has "contrived to produce a lesson that may be taken to heart by all men."[22] Hazlitt, to round out the picture, finds it "a play as full of genius as it is of wisdom."[23] Other than Swinburne's description of "the singular little group of plays

not accurately definable at all but roughly describable as tragi-comedies, or more properly in two cases at least as tragedies docked of their natural end, curtailed of due catastrophe,"[24] criticism of the plays as a group seems to have been minimal.

Near the end of the nineteenth century, however, two works appeared which drew the lines of critical battle for the next half century. Edward Dowden's Shakspere: A Critical Study of His Mind and Art, which grouped together various plays as stages in Shakespeare's development, was soon followed by Boas' Shakspere and His Predecessors, which saw Hamlet, Troilus and Cressida, All's Well and Measure for Measure as dealing with issues that "preclude a completely satisfactory outlook" and concluded that "dramas so singular in theme and temper cannot be strictly called comedies or tragedies."[25] Thus we can draw a distinction between those critics who, like Dowden, deal with the plays as the product of a certain definite period, whether in Shakespeare's emotional or artistic development or in the evolvement of his society,[26] and those who, like Boas, consider the plays in comparative isolation from the rest of Shakespeare's works and as a group united more by plot or theme than by mood or treatment. The former group, for example, when referring to "historical" influence are concerned only with the specific period in which the problem plays were written; the latter group tends to consider the influence of the Elizabethan and early Jacobean years as a whole.[27] Towards the middle of this century the boundary lines of the two groups tend to blur, and recently, with the tremendous increase in problem play criticism, even to merge. Nonetheless, the distinction between these two modes of approach will serve for as stable a guide-

line as is possible in the shifting and ever swelling tide of critical comment.

Dowden termed Troilus and Cressida, All's Well and Measure for Measure "serious, dark, ironical" plays.[28] Troilus and Cressida "is the last attempt to continue comedy made when Shakespeare had ceased to be able to smile genially, and when he must either be ironical, or else take a deeply passionate and tragical view of life."[29] For several decades this notion of a "dark period" went virtually unchallenged. E.K. Chambers called the plays "the three bitter and cynical pseudo-comedies."[30] According to Caroline Spurgeon, "one feels in these plays that Shakespeare, whose deepest and purest feelings have somehow been deeply hurt, takes pleasure in hurting them still more by exposing all the horrible, revolting, perplexing and grotesque aspects of human nature."[31] As John Middleton Murry suggests, the cause for this malaise was often felt to be an unfortunate affair with the dark lady of the sonnets:[32]

> We feel we are in contact with a wounded and bewildered spirit that can see life steadily and whole no more....Whether the cause of this clouding actually lay, as we ourselves sometimes incline to believe, in the love-catastrophe recorded in the Sonnets is a minor matter; but the fact is that the disturbance is to be most clearly distinguished in his treatment of love.[33]

Running alongside such views was the opinion that historical events, rather than personal misfortune, caused Shakespeare's cynicism. John Dover Wilson associates the mood of the plays with the fall of Essex and Shakespeare's dissatisfaction with the new court of James.[34] Una Ellis-Fermor, who feels that the four plays form a clear "descent to Measure for Measure...the very nadir of disgust and cynicism,"[35] attributes the blackness to "the heritage of the Jacobean drama....

Spiritual uncertainty springing in part from the spreading of Machiavellian materialism...and in still greater degree from...the fear of the impending destruction of a great civilization."[36]

Such "dark period" criticism was dealt a rapid series of blows in the mid-thirties. C.J. Sisson was the first, in 1934, to seriously repudiate such an approach, but his attack on the "dark lady," "the myth of the seventeenth century blues," and the nineteenth century criticism which had laid the foundations of "dark period" criticism[37] was quickly reinforced by both R.W. Chambers and H.B. Charlton. Chambers neatly points out the illogic of assuming that the problem plays and tragedies must mirror a personal tragedy for Shakespeare by observing that the death of his only son, undoubtedly a great personal loss, was followed by some of his greatest comedies.[38] As to the theory that Shakespeare was an ardent admirer of Essex and supported his unsuccessful rebellion, Chambers wryly notes that "the Government had a good spy service, and would have discovered the plots which modern criticism has hatched, if they had existed in Tudor days."[39] Charlton sees the plays as "an intense impulse to discover true sources of nobility in man and of joy in life."[40]

These three papers severely dampened the "dark period" critics but did not entirely obliterate them. Mark van Doren, for example, could still claim, in 1939, that "the three comedies...may be said to indicate in their various ways that what [Shakespeare] should have kept on writing at such a time was tragedy and nothing else."[41] Joseph Longo, as late as 1963, declares that "Shakespeare's 'dark' plays mirror the zeitgeist of the early seventeenth century rather than the personal ex-

periences of the poet," though he does later replace "the romantic epithet 'dark' with the critical label 'mannerist.'"[42]

The interesting thing about the "anti-dark period" essays of the thirties is that, although attacking Dowden's position, they actually maintain his biographical approach. As Rossiter comments concerning the R.W. Chambers paper, "the positive side of the paper was none the less actively concerned with what amounts to a spiritual biography--of an 'optimistic' and Christian cast."[43] In short, they were not attacking the theory that the plays can be treated in terms of Shakespeare's personal and artistic development, but rather Dowden's interpretation of that development. R.W. Chambers and Charlton, in particular, are quite specific that the problem trio are the predecessors not of the tragedies, but of the romances.[44]

This concept of a continually maturing development in which the problem plays were a definite and positive stage has received increasing support. Tillyard, for example, speaks of All's Well and Measure for Measure as "truly seminal plays," and feels that "the themes...of mercy and forgiveness are genuine as well as prominent, and they unite All's Well and Measure for Measure with Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale, and The Tempest."[45] Derek A. Traversi, speaking "from the point of view of Shakespeare's developing art," reaches a similar conclusion with regard to the problem plays:

> All these plays are concerned, each after its fashion, with the effort to arrive at some kind of personal order in a world dominated by contradiction and obscurity. Though none of them can be said to attain more than a partial measure of it, each represents in its own way an important step in Shakespeare's advance towards

maturity of vision and in the mastery of his craft.[46]

J.C.Maxwell and Virgil Whitaker also follow the same line of thought, though both emphasize to a greater extent than Traversi or Tillyard the comparative dramatic failure of the plays.[47] Maxwell feels that "if none of the plays is entirely satisfying...it may be less because of any spiritual crisis in Shakespeare's personal life than because of a tendency for virtuosity to outrun mastery over experience."[48] Whitaker hypothesizes that Shakespeare, in writing the problem plays, "was interested in applying to comedy the same fund of ideas and the same philosophical analysis of human action that he employed in writing the mature tragedies," but that the material and techniques of the earlier comedies proved inadequate "to support close intellectual analysis."[49]

There are, of course, other critics who have adopted the "development" theme to their own theories, and who stand less firmly within its boundaries. O.J.Campbell sees Troilus and Cressida and Measure for Measure as examples of a genre--"comicall satyre," typified by Jonson's Every Man Out of His Humour--which influenced Shakespeare's style after 1603:

> The two plays are alike in possessing a background of social disintegration which forms an appropriate milieu for the individuals who are to be satirized. They are alike in attacking lust, the vice against which all satirists directed most of their barbed shafts.[50]

A.P.Rossiter, in a refreshingly balanced study of the plays, treats them as examples of the "tragi-comic view of man."[51] He presents tragi-comedy as "an inquisition into human nature and humanism," and considers the problem plays to have five common traits: (1) "Lust...is

central to all these plays"; (2)"ideal" figures undercut any tendency towards cynicism or satire; (3) there is the discovery of "a bad reality beneath the fair appearances of things"; (4) they are concerned with "seeming and being, and this can cover both sex and worth"; (5) they have a quality of "shiftingness" and all viewpoints are "felt to be fallible."[52] Although Rossiter deals with the problem plays separately, he certainly does not isolate them:

> To catch the full range of Shakespeare's tragi-comic utterance we must start with Henry IV...and follow him through the ambiguities of Troilus and Cressida and Measure for Measure to the uncertainties Othello. We shall then no longer be content with an external triangle of three "Problem Plays."[53]

He is, in a sense, a perfect example of the increasing versatility and flexibility of the "development" school of critics.

Almost a decade after Dowden's classifications first appeared, Franz Boas initiated the second approach to problem play criticism, and did it, apparently, almost inadvertently. What Boas saw in the plays was not "darkness" but "obscurity."[54] "Dramas so singular in theme and temper cannot strictly be called comedies or tragedies," and he therefore decides to "class them together as Shakespere's problem-plays."[55] Boas' use of the term "problem-plays" is, "to borrow a convenient phrase from him, 'swathed in folds of mist,'"[56] and it is for this reason that his initiation of a second approach to the play can be called inadvertent. As Schanzer points out, "Although he gives the most diverse meanings to the term 'problem play,' he nowhere gives it the meaning it had in the theatre of his own time...: namely, a play dealing with problems confronting...society as a whole."[57]

It was from such humble beginnings that the second major critical approach to the problem plays sprang, for the term "problem play" lent itself admirable to socially or philosophically orientated criticism. George Bernard Shaw, for one, was quick to utilize such an approach:

> The Ibsenite-Fabian slant comes out very nicely in Shaw's Preface to Plays Pleasant and Unpleasant (1898), where the assumption is that Shakespeare would have been an Ibsen if he had had a chance: "...in such unpopular plays as All's Well, Measure for Measure, and Troilus and Cressida, we find him ready and willing to start at the twentieth century if the seventeenth would only let him.' (Preface, ix)[58]

W.W. Lawrence undoubtedly did more than any other one critic to institutionalize such an approach. Adding an historical outlook to the established social focus, his primary goal lies in "illustrating the general importance of a study of medieval literature and life for an understanding of Shakespeare's plays."[59] The essential characteristic of the problem plays is, he finds, that "a perplexing and distressing complication in human life is presented in a spirit of high seriousness... in a situation admitting of different ethical interpretations."[60] The historical aspect is important since the Elizabethan audience, familiar with the folk themes which Lawrence finds in the plays, would feel the situation to be less complex or distressing than the modern audience.[61] Like most critics who followed in his footsteps, he finds Troilus and Cressida particularly hard to deal with: "All these plottings and schemings, all the rhetoric and philosophy, all these amorous intrigues, all these big words and blaring trumpets bring at the last no settled issue."[62]

Lawrence's contention that the plays should be studied in the light of the Elizabethan background found additional support in the

works of E.E.Stoll. He felt that critical emphasis should be on the plot and structure rather than the psychological condition of either author[63] or characters. Aspects of the plays which might appear difficult or disturbingly significant to the modern reader should be studied, according to Stoll, in terms of the demands of the plot[64] and the expectations and demands of the Elizabethan audience, who were relatively unconcerned with psychological consistency.[65]

The socio-historical criticism of Lawrence and Stoll paved the way for a philosophical-historical school which commenced with the religious interpretations of Measure for Measure by Roy Battenhouse and G.W.Knight,[66] and recently expanded to include such philosophical critics as Terence Hawkes and Eric LaGuardia.[67] Knight and Battenhouse, who dealt only with individual plays, were quickly followed by Neville Coghill and William Toole, who are more concerned with a religious approach to the problem plays as a whole. Coghill's basis thesis is that there were "two theories of Comedy, the Romantic and the Satirical, of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance respectively, that twinned out of the late Latin grammarians to flower in Tudor times."[68] The Romantic or medieval tradition was common to Dante, Chaucer and Lydgate, but "the satirical tradition...was far better known in the Renaissance."[69] Shakespeare typified the medieval tradition which "expresses the ideal that life is to be grasped. It is the opposite of Tragedy in that the catastrophe solves all confusion and misunderstanding, by some happy turn."[70] The satiric mode, whose prime exemplar is Ben Jonson, "pursues the principal characters with some bitterness for their vices and teaches what is useful and expedient in life and what is to be avoided."[71] The conclusion

drawn by Toole is that three of the plays (Hamlet, All's Well and Measure for Measure) follow the Christian pattern of "temptation, sin, remorse, repentance, penance and pardon"[72] which came to Shakespeare through the mystery cycles and the morality plays; the fact that it takes a good deal of special pleading to fit Troilus and Cressida within the system[73] doesn't seem to particularly upset him.

As Toole points out, a major premise of the Christian interpretations of the problem plays is that "the intellectual atmosphere in which Shakespeare's vision was shaped...was a continuation of that part of the medieval vision reflected in the figural interpretation of history":

> Such an interpretation, as Erich Auerbach has observed, "implies that every occurrence, in all its everyday reality, is simultaneously a part in a world-historical context through which each part is related to every other, and thus is likewise to be regarded as being of all times or above all time."...Thus, in Measure for Measure, Neville Coghill can see both a real and a typological Duke.[74]

This figural interpretation of history also plays a major part in much of the philosophical criticism of the play. LaGuardia, for example, is basically concerned with the Renaissance conception of order, and the belief that "nature and man may be in a fallen condition but within them are unfulfilled forces of goodness and order":

> Thus, nature has a double characteristic: it may, both physically and morally, become permanently corrupt, or it may be restored to its proper condition as a temporal counterpart to the eternal order....The resulting condition of concord and harmony is one in which nature is cleansed of its moral and physical corruptions, but not one in which nature is renounced completely in favour of the redemption of man in the heavenly city.[75]

LaGuardia also uses Auerbach's "distinction between the figural and the secular representation of reality in literature" to support his thesis

that "the limitation of reality in...[All's Well] is restricted to nature, yet expresses the link between nature and hell and nature and heaven."[76] His conclusion is that the "chaste love heroine" is able to "form the body between nature and spirit and thus redeem the fictional world of nature....[There are] limited analogical relationships between the natural and supernatural in order to express immanence rather than transcendence."[77]

A slightly different type of philosophical approach to the plays was taken by Terence Hawkes. His work, Shakespeare and Reason: A Study of the Tragedies and Problem Plays, is, he claims, an extension of G.W.Knight's theories concerning intellect versus intuition in Troilus and Cressida.[78] Hawkes changes the word "intellect" to "reason,"[79] and draws a comparison between intuition and reason and the scholastic concept of a composite ratio, intuition and ratio inferior:"These two aspects of the human ratio have complementary functions which are not mutually exclusive."[80] In the sixteenth century, Hawkes suggests, there arises a reason/faith dichotomy, for which Sir Francis Bacon was primarily responsible. "The idea of a composite ratio with a dual aspect has been replaced by that of a mind which has two distinct halves, each with a separate job to do."[81] The "iconoclastic spirit of Protestantism"[82] tended to encourage this new scientific movement, and science was no longer limited to confirming theological "truths" but became capable of discovering "counter-truths." Many of Shakespeare's villains, Hawkes asserts, are part of "the new iconoclasm...; they are in essence 'explainers.'"[83] In the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries a counter-trend arose which had its roots in Neo-Platonism. The "Neo-

Platonic dichotomy between appearance and reality was capable of subsumption within the Scholastic distinction between reason and intuition."[84] This was, however, only possible through a misunderstanding of Aquinas "for it involved removing his notion of interdependency of these faculties and replacing it with the idea of an opposition between them."[85] Intuition was thus associated with the true reality, contemplation, and the "non-analytic unity of love";[86] reason with discursive analysis, earthly appearance, and the "duality" of science, as well as the activism of the "moderns" and the Protestants. The trend towards the new "rational 'man' of action" meant that "intuition would be relegated to the opposite position, that of a merely feminine characteristic."[87] "Division had replaced unity, and man could be faced with a moral choice to make between two now opposed ways of thinking, to both of which he was committed by his very nature....Tragedy lay not in whatever alternative was chosen, so much as in the fact that a choice was required."[88]

Working from such a basis, Hawkes decides to accept, in a limited sense, Boas' concept of a socially orientated "problem play" since "moral or metaphysical problems have a good deal of relevance to society."[89] The plays involve much more than social problems, however, for "all three...construct entirely artificial 'societies' which become the 'backgrounds' for human problems only incidentally connected with them; the problems have priority over their 'social setting.'"[90] A more serious objection to Boas' definition, Hawkes feels, is that "these plays are in no sense 'self-contained' or conclusive as a group about the kind of problem with which they deal....In this usage they constitute experiments in finding more adequate means of 'talking about' the issues which

Hamlet considered."[91] They deal with the most basic of "problems"--"the conflict between two opposed views of the world, the rational and the non-rational, the conflict between appearance and reality."[92] In All's Well and Measure for Measure the discovery is made that "reason and intuition are complementary and ought properly to constitute a unity."[93]

Hawkes's viewpoint more or less completes this brief and very sketchy survey of problem play criticism. It should, perhaps, be mentioned that there are a growing number of critics who reject completely the traditional grouping,[94] and who would either discard it totally or else reform it radically. Ernest Schanzer's book, The Problem Plays of Shakespeare, is the lengthiest and most complete treatment of such a viewpoint to date. Schanzer would define a problem play as one "in which we find concern with a moral problem which is central to it, presented in such a manner that we are unsure of our moral bearings, so that uncertain and divided responses to it in the minds of the audience are possible or even probable."[95] Under this definition he would reject as problem plays both All's Well (because Helena faces only a "difficulty" and not a "moral perplexity") and Troilus and Cressida (because the only moral problem is the return of Helen, and this is relatively clear-cut).[96] Instead, he would substitute Julius Caesar and Anthony and Cleopatra. Schanzer's argument is reasonable and well written but, because of the unfortunate history of the term "problem play," it merely introduces more confusion into an already complicated situation. It could easily be said that he does not do full justice to the similarities that do exist between the traditional three plays; and that if a term as inherently unsatisfactory as "problem plays" is to be retained at all,

then it should at least remain attached to the plays that originally spawned it.

Criticism of the problem plays has, at least until this decade, been generally poor when compared to Shakespearian criticism as a whole. If this poverty could be traced back to one element of the criticism, that element would probably be a noticeable anti-feminist bias among almost all but the most recent critics. Stoll's comment that female characters have suffered from criticism of the "dark period" variety has already been noted; but they have also suffered severely from the Puritan criticism that was mixed in with, and outlasted, the former. Dowden himself spoke of the heroines of the later plays as "intellectual women...bright and clever, but over-confident, forward or defiant."[97] Charlton describes Helena as appearing at first glance to be "a nymphomaniac succeeding in her quest and the whole worthless bargain sanctified by the name of marriage,"[98] and Isabella as "the sort of self-possessed hussy she sometimes seems."[99] As Sisson notes, "It is hard to be a woman and to please your pure Puritan."[100]

Examples of the damage done by this bias are innumerable, but perhaps the simplest means of illustration would be to take one man, respected, eclectic and relatively modern--E.M.W.Tillyard. Tillyard is placed, or places himself, in a situation so awkward that it at times descends to the comic. As an intelligent and thoughtful critic he realizes, on the whole, where Shakespeare intends our sympathies to lie. As a critic apparently trained in the anti-feminist tradition, he finds it difficult to accept his own conclusions. Thus he must continually attempt, to put it roughly, to "have his cake and eat it too." Forced

by his own logic, for example, to sympathize with Helena, he manages to emotionally leave the opposite impression:

> We are vaguely on Helena's side and we wish her well in her intrinsically dubious adventure.[101] (Italics mine.)

When he cannot avoid praising her, he evades the issue by quoting another critic:

> And because her body is real her mind is gifted with a rank, a sometimes masculine fertility.[102] (Italics mine.)

Wishing to describe the "natural touches" that make Helena a very warm, human character, he begins thus:

> Not that Shakespeare makes her a mere humour of predatory monogamy.[103] (Italics mine.)

Of course not--so why, then, does Tillyard make the suggestion at all?

And why, one might ask, is his treatment of Bertram so obviously different? When Bertram enters in Act Four, scene three, he is concluding a busy night. He has, among other things, received a letter from his mother which, according to Tillyard, stings his "sensitive conscience,"[104] "buried a wife, mourned for her," and in consequence "writ to [his] mother that [he] is returning" (AWW IV.iii.85-6).[105] The death of his wife, states Tillyard quite seriously, is a heavy blow; "his seduction of Diana has become serious, for he could now marry her."[106] Bertram, with his "sensitive conscience," manages to bear up under the "blow," however, for after he receives both the letter and the information of his wife's death he calmly proceeds with the supposed seduction of Diana.[107] He then returns to camp to boast of his multiple successes. Tillyard's comment?

> It has been a heavy series of blows, but for the moment he keeps

> control of himself and bluffs it out with a brutal callousness and a bravado which we know conceal an inner qualm.[108] (Italics mine.)

So much for at least one normally first rate critic's objectivity.

It may seem that I have gone on overlong concerning the deficiencies of anti-feminist critics, as personified by Tillyard who is by no means the worst. The reason for it, however, can now be broached. Tillyard, I have tried to show, has, like many of the earlier problem play critics, an anti-feminist (or, if you prefer, pro-masculine) bias. It prejudices his approach to All's Well and Measure for Measure, but not fatally so. Isabella, in fact, gets off comparatively mildly as Tillyard's critical logic again wins the day by a mere hairbreadth:

> We must accept Isabella quite simply for what she is and refuse to consider her as a vicious comment on how inhumanly a self-centred and pious prude can behave.[109]

Troilus and Cressida is another matter:

> The next scene, V.2, crowns the play....It includes not only Troilus' terrible suffering and schizophrenia but his self-cure through turning that portion of his mind which, against the evidence of his senses, continues to love and idolize Cressida into hatred for Diomed, a hatred which can find vent in action. This mutation, often overlooked, is essential for understanding the play's true course.[110]

"This wonderful scene, then, is all gain."[111] For Tillyard to suppose that Troilus plays the "double part of romantic and unfortunate lover and of leading spirit among the Trojan commanders"[112] is disturbing, but understandable. If the female is the villain, then the hero must be male. Several critics,[113] both before and after Tillyard, have shown quite convincingly that Troilus is "in contact with the remnants of a Chivalrous world" only as "an agent of corruption" who with "his mercenary-mindedness and appetitiveness... [plays] the glutton throughout."[114] The

myth of Troilus as romantic lover remains, nonetheless, persuasive. What is not understandable is that a critic of Mr. Tillyard's standing could seriously describe the transformation of love, however shallow or misplaced, into unreasoning hate as "wonderful," a self-cure" or "all gain."[115] Rossiter puts it admirably simply when he says, "I know that Dr. Tillyard says Troilus has effected a self-cure...but what Shakespeare shows me is that he has exchanged one mad passion for another,"[116] and that a worse one.

Troilus and Cressida is a play that has been so distorted by a pervasive anti-Cressida and pro-Troilus bias that the only solution lies with a fresh start, a fresh outlook. In the following chapter I hope to demonstrate that a case can be made for Cressida as the most sympathetic character in the play--if not the heroine, then definitely the major victim. Such a reading would obviously have consequences for a study of the problem plays as a group. The reason so much space has been spent on a general critical survey is that much of the rest of the thesis will be an argument against aspects of the traditional criticism which saw Cressida as betrayer rather than betrayed.

The thesis will deal only with Troilus and Cressida, All's Well and Measure for Measure, omitting Hamlet. That a connection exists between Hamlet and the other plays seems clear,[117] but the tragedy is too complex to cope with in a thesis of this nature. The three plays will be dealt with as an isolated group, but this is for convenience only and does not imply that the relationships hypothesized between them do not extend to other writings of Shakespeare.

The major premise of the thesis is that all three plays deal

with the double nature of man and the world he inhabits; with double concepts of identity and reality. There is an unnatural self and the natural self, an apparent reality and a truer, more stable reality. Both the natural self and the true reality are related to what Hector calls "this law of nature" (TrC II.ii.176-7);[118] both the unnatural self and apparent reality are related to power (misused), will, appetite, and eventual self-destruction:

> Power into will, will into appetite.
> And appetite, an universal wolf,
> So doubly seconded with will and power,
> Must make perforce an universal prey
> And last eat up himself.
> (TrC I.iii.120-4.)

There are obvious similarities here to Hawkes's concept of the Tudor split between the ratio inferior and the ratio superior, reason and intuition, appearance and reality; and to LaGuardia's concept of the double potential of nature and man, or the split between the lower and upper levels of nature and man which the chaste love heroine can reconcile. To attempt to place Shakespeare in any one philosophical system, as these two do, seems, however, an unnecessarily risky venture. Therefore, while using such critics as Hawkes and LaGuardia to reinforce certain specific points, the thesis will generally be restricted to a more basic, less specialized phraseology, such as that put forth by John Bayley:

> And the 'inside and outside' effect, which I have suggested shows the greatest art of character drawings, is continually used by Shakespeare to present the subtlest kind of dramatic conflict--the conflict between the indefinable interior man and the persona that is required of him by society, or imposed by his own will.[119]

The natural and the unnatural self, and consequently reality

and appearance,[120] can be either in harmony or in conflict. The ideal form of unity appears, in the problem plays, as Love. The symbol or indicator of disunity is war or Mars. Taking the order of the plays as Troilus and Cressida, All's Well and Measure for Measure, we move from a noticeably exterior conflict between the two forces to a basically interior one. In all three plays, however, there is a correlation between the fate of the individual and the society. Social conflict is always paralleled by conflict within the self, social harmony by personal unity, and social destruction by self-destruction. We are, inevitably, "our own traitors" (AWW IV.iii.20). The "will," if unconfined, "is infinite and the execution confined" (TrC III.ii.83). Will, unrestrained, is insatiable and must eventually, in its ravenous appetite, turn on itself. "So every scope by the immoderate use / Turns to restraint" (MM I.ii.119-20).[121] This paradox leads to the inevitable self-destructive quality of Mars, or of a persona imposed by will or society that conflicts with the natural, interior self. The disease imagery in the plays is, appropriately, divided between ulcers which "eat up themselves," and syphilis which, through will, accomplishes a gradual destruction from within. Unity and health are to be found in the order and self-imposed moderation of 'true love' or chaste love, the primary objective of which is a spiritual union which includes, but is not corrupted by, the physical world, and a physical union which is informed, but not superseded by, the spiritual world.

Troilus and Cressida and All's Well exemplify totally opposite treatments of the same basic themes. Set side by side, their virtues become more noticeable, their weaknesses more understandable. Measure

for Measure is an attempt to merge the realistic pessimism of Troilus and Cressida with the complete, but unrealistic, order of All's Well. As Toole notes, "The phrase 'problem plays' seems to be a poor designation for the group of dramas,"[122] since it has never been conclusively proven that a problem effectively exists (other than in the minds of certain critics). This thesis, although retaining the phrase for convenience, approaches the plays with the assumption that they are successful within the limitations of their dramatic purpose. The simplest way to discover that dramatic purpose, therefore, is to explore the aspects in which the plays are a success. Any "problems" encountered are assumed due to a critical failure in the thesis, rather than a creative failure by Shakespeare. The increasing popularity of just such an approach is fast revitalizing a critical tradition that threatened to become not so much the key to the "problem comedies" as a comedy of problems in itself.

CHAPTER II

Cressida. I have forgot my father;
I know no touch of consanguinity--
No kin, no love, no blood, no soul so near to me
As the sweet Troilus. O you gods divine,
Make Cressid's name the very crown of falsehood
If ever she leave Troilus! Time, force, and death,
Do to this body what extremes you can;
But the strong base and building of my love
Is as the very centre of the earth,
Drawing all things to it....
.....
...I will not go from Troy.
(TrC IV.ii.108-111.)

Whenever the problem plays are treated as a group, Troilus and Cressida is normally the first to be discussed. The basic cause, of course, is that it is generally dated as the earliest of the plays. There is, however, an even stronger reason that is too often overlooked. Ever since "the title-page of the Quarto described it as a History, the Epistle to the Reader spoke of it as a Comedy, and the Folio as an afterthought put it between the Histories and the Tragedies,"[1] the play has been considered inordinately difficult to classify or interpret. Critics have found it especially difficult to thematically or structurally relate this first play to the two later problem plays,[2] and any attempt to present a coherent and unified view of the problem group should therefore first come to terms with the dilemma of Troilus and Cressida. It is the contention of this thesis thatakey to the critical quandry about the play lies, in a sense, in the passage quoted above.

If there is one point on which the critics of the play are united,

it is that the character of Cressida is, to put it mildly, somewhat undesirable.[3] Yet is it not odd, given a play in which the abund nt commercial and alimentary imagery makes suspect most of the orations on love, that it should be Cressida--the "whore,"[4] the "society woman without depth of feeling"[5]--who has the one powerfully moving and untainted speech on the subject? Is it not strange, in a play concerned with the overwhelming influence of "time" on human relationships,[6] that faithless, fickle Cressida should be the one character to recognize, and consciously defy, the power of time; that in a play about "love and war"[7] she is the only character to creatively ("the strong base and building") oppose the absolute value[8] of love to the powers of war ("force, and death").

It has been suggested that Cressida's delivery to the Greeks joins the double theme of love and war,[9] but in fact these themes are strongly joined from the first scene to the last.[10] It is only Cressida, in her refusal to accept the exchange, to leave Troy, who realizes the basic opposition that should--that must--exist between the unifying power of love and the divisive strife of war. Both the imagery and context of her speech prove that she is the one character to challenge, in the name of love, the necessity of what is, at bottom, nothing more than a political manoevre, an exigency of a dishonourable and increasingly brutal war.

If Cressida can be considered the champion, and not the betrayer, of love, then a new view of the play obviously becomes justified and necessary. And why, the question then becomes, has such a view not been taken before? Surely if there anything admirable in Cressida's character it would have been discovered long ago, and since nothing of the sort

has happened is it not sheer impertinence to suggest that the critics have been wrong; that poor Cressida is the most maligned character in the entire Shakespearian assemblage?

The answer to such a charge can either be most simple or quite complicated, depending on whether it consists merely of an attack on the critics' view of Cressida or whether it includes the defense of a new interpretation of her. At the simplest level we can say, "But the critics have always pre-judged her; they have come to the play with the idee fixe that Cressida is faithless and that she cannot possibl be the most sympathetic character in the play." There has, in fact, been very little effort to discover a rationale, beyond sheer, innate fickleness, for Cressida's actions. Few critics have discussed her greatest speech, presumably because it does not fit their conception of her character. Perhaps even more revealing than this omission are the comments on one critic who <u>does</u> discuss it. Donald Stauffer says of the play:

> Love is so strong that Dante's conception of
> "The love that moves the sun and other stars"
> is translated into Shakespearian terms as the force that binds all things together in its noble gravity.

As an example, he quotes Cressida's speech. Yet does he pause, even for an instant, to consider the possible implications of the fact that Shakespeare gave such a speech to Cressida and not to Stauffer's hero, Troilus? No. He prefers instead to make nonsense of his own statement: "Any speech on love in a play about Cressida will seem ironical."[11]

Some possible origins of the anti-Cressida bias have already been discussed in terms of an anti-feminist bias among many critics of the problem plays. There are, of course, more specific reasons for the

antipathy towards Cressida in particular: the claims that Shakespeare inherited from his sources an unpopular, even notorious, Cressida who was too well-known and generally accepted to be altered; the 'kissing scene' in the Greek camp, and Ulysses' uncompromising judgement of Cressida's character; and, finally, Cressida's indisputable acceptance of Diomedes following her vow of faithfullness to Troilus.

None of these reasons, examined closely, presents an adequate basis for the generally harsh critical treatment of Cressida. Rather than dealing with them separately, however, it seems wiser to refute them in the course of putting forth an alternative to the usual derogatory interpretation of her character; and to put forth such an alternative it is first necessary to clear the ground by discussing, and attempting to alter, two critical viewpoints that often go hand in hand. The first is that the Trojan and Greek camps represent two opposed "world views"; the second that Troilus, for all his youthful flaws, is basically admirable and heroic.

In short, this discussion of Troilus and Cressida will suggest the following points: that the "identity in opposition of the Greeks and Trojans"[12] is stronger than the opposition itself; that a major theme of this identity in opposition is appearance and reality, expressed in terms of apparent and real value or reputation and character; that this theme, among other things, discredits the theory that Shakespeare was forced to give Cressida an unfavourable and faithless "character" because she had an unfavourable and faithless "reputation" among his audience; that, given the theme of apparent versus real value, just the opposite is likely; that Troilus, rather than a hero, is basically an

immature, undisciplined, self-willed and self-centred young man; that the play deals with such oppositions as war and love, strife and unity, appearance and reality, "endeavour" and "performance," the sensual and (for lack of a better word) the spiritual, the mutable and the absolute; that these oppositions are observable not only in the external world but in the double nature of man himself; that Cressida is one of the few characters to recognize the existence of such oppositions, and to consciously attempt to choose between them; that her attempt to choose the latter values (love, unity, reality, etc.) is thwarted by circumstances beyond her control; that these circumstances do not arise from such abstract forces as time or fortune, but from human actions resulting from human flaws; that the immediate cause is an unrecognized and unconscious coalition among the very three people on whom she should be able to count for support--her father, her uncle and her lover--which forces her into the one course of action she has sworn to avoid ("I will not go from Troy"); and that alone and helpless she has little alternative but to accept Diomedes as lover and, more important, "guardian." If she is not the heroine of the play, she is at least its major victim. Despite all the critics who have called her faithless, fickle or unstable, she is more closely related to a true concept of absolute value than her lover, Troilus, or the much admired Ulysses.

The concept that Shakespeare, in Troilus and Cressida, uses the Greek and Trojan camps to express two distinct and essentially opposed approaches to life is too well-known to require a detailed resumé. Basically only the adjectives change: the Trojans represent alternatively "intuition," "idealism," "honour" and "the Machiavellian heresy that

to follow Nature is to follow Will"; the Greeks correspondingly stand for "intellect" or "reason," "realism," "policy" and "the ordinary Stoic position...that to follow Nature is to follow Reason."[13] Normally, the Trojan viewpoint is judged superior but Campbell, at least, seems to prefer the Greeks. A growing number of critics wisely see serious flaws in both.[14]

Accepting the fact that certain oppositions do exist, the similarities between the two camps become even more intriguing. If we take the first council scenes, for example, we find that two similar propositions are introduced in each camp. In the Greek camp, Ulysses draws a picture of natural order, and then follows it up with a vivid description of the alternative:[15]

> Force should be right, or rather right and wrong--
> Between whose endless jar justice resides--
> Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
> Then everything include itself in power,
> Power into will, will into appetite,
> And appetite, an universal wolf,
> So doubly seconded by will and power,
> Must make perforce an universal prey
> And last eat up himself.
>
> (TrC I.iii.116-124.)

Two scenes later, in the Trojan camp, we find two remarkably similar views put forth. Hector speaks of a "law of nature," and notes the necessity of curbing "wills" and "raging appetites" that may be disobedient to this law. Although Hector is concerned with moral order, rather than Ulysses' political order, both are referring to the well-known Elizabethan concept of a social or physical order that parallels a natural or heavenly one:

> ...these moral laws
> Of nature and of nations speak aloud
>
> (TrC II.ii.184-5.)

> And therefore is the glorious planet Sol
> In noble eminence enthroned and sphered
> Amidst the other; whose med'cinable eye
> Corrects the influence of the evil planets,
> And posts, like the commandments of a king,
> Sans check, to good or bad.
> (TrC I.iii.89-94.)

In opposition to Hector's vision of a natural order, we have Paris making such comments as, "Had [I] as ample power as I have will / Paris should ne'er retract what he hath done" (TrC II.ii.140-1). Troilus, speaking in support of Paris, is so subjectively impetuous that Hector must remind him, "But value dwells not in particular will" (TrC II.ii.53). Again and again the ideas of power, appetite and (especially in relation to Troilus) will reappear. Ulysses' universal wolf is at large in both camps.

The "identity in opposition" can perhaps be most clearly exemplified in the personalities of Troilus and Ulysses, two figures who have often been seen as the practical leaders of their respective camps.[16] The opposition between the two is obvious. Troilus, in character, is far more closely related to Ulysses' arch foe, Achilles, than to Ulysses himself. Both Achilles and Troilus are temporarily incapacitated as soldiers on account of love affairs. Ulysses' description of Achilles ("They tax our policy and call it cowardice,/ Count reason as no member of the war" [TrC I.iii.197-8]) is echoed in Troilus' reply to his brother:

> You fur your gloves with reason. Here are your reasons:
> You know an enemy intends you harm;
> You know a sword employed is perilous,
> And reason flies the object of all harm.
> .....
> Nay, if we talk of reason,
> Let's shut our gates and sleep! Manhood and honor
> Should have hare-hearts, would they but fat their thoughts

With this crammed reason.
(TrC II.ii.38-49.)

In short, both are emotional rather than rational; they base their acts on "blood" rather than reason. "With too much blood and too little brain, these two may run mad," says Thersites at one point (TrC V.i.49). The second of the two could as well be Troilus as Patroclus, and Hector at one point intimates as much:

> Or is your blood
> So madly hot that no discourse of reason,
> Nor fear of bad success in a bad cause,
> Can qualify the same.
> (TrC II. ii.115-8.)

Yet despite the fact that Troilus, psychologically, is as opposed to Ulysses as Achilles, there is a strong bond of identity between the two. This is, in one sense, symbolized by the immediate bond that seems to form between them upon meeting. Tillyard's comment that "Troilus instinctively chooses Ulysses as his confidant over Cressida,"[17] is typical of those critics who feel that the two are joined by their superior qualities and leadership ability. Critics who wish to idealize Troilus, moreover, invariably point to Ulysses' glowing description of him.[18] It does seem indisputable that Troilus and Ulysses have a definite affinity for each other.

Nor are they as far apart, ideologically speaking, as might at first seem. Ulysses, in his discussion with Achilles, seems basically in agreement with Troilus' statement, "What's aught but as 'tis valued" (TrC II.ii.52), though Ulysses is undoubtedly thinking of public rather than private valuation. Moreover, both Ulysses and Troilus seem to have the habit of speaking in terms of commercial imagery. It is Ulysses who

first introduces the merchant metaphor into the Grecian council, and Troilus likewise introduces it into the Trojan.[19] For all Ulysses talks of Troilus' "bounty," both of their minds seem to think more naturally in terms of 'buy' and 'sell' than 'give' or 'take.'

If we remember Ulysses' "universal wolf" speech, the basis of the identity is not difficult to discover. Troilus, throughout the plays, is associated with "will."[20] It is, moreover, a will "enkindled by mine eyes and ears" (TrC II.ii.63), and therefore limited to a sensual plane. Ulysses, on the other hand, "thinks throughout of a public world in which men are manipulated and it is the public appearance that counts."[21] If Troilus never manages to transcend his own subjective, sensual "will," then Ulysses remains equally locked within the narrow world of Grecian politics. He seems incapable of applying the celestial metaphor at any level beyond the immediate power struggle in the Grecian camp. Power, not order, is his basic concern. The fundamental disorder implicit in the war itself causes him no qualms, and he seems far less concerned with what is right than with what is possible.

Both Troilus' capitulation to "will" and Ulysses' preoccupation with political scheming or "power" are manifestations of the basic disorder implicit in the play. Their opposition is as the two sides of a coin. Both Troilus' "will" and Ulysses' "power" are forms of the "appetite" that is predominant throughout the play: the "appetite" indicated, in part, by the food imagery and the commercial, acquisitive metaphors. When these two characters gain control of their respective camps, the play is doomed to end in tumult and unhappiness. Hector's symbolic comment to Troilus, "I am yours" (TrC II.ii.206), seals the Trojan fate

as surely as Ulysses' political power plays increase the chaos in the Grecian camp. Hector, having proved the necessity of respecting the "law of nature," abruptly reverses his position and accepts the rationale of Troilus; "reasons" to "conduce to the hot passion of a distempered blood" (TrC II.ii.169). Ulysses, similarly, "having proved that any violation of 'degree' involves the danger of anarchy...proceeds forthwith to hatch a plot for pulling Achilles out of his place....As a deranger of degree..., he turns out to be an advance agent of his own Universal Wolf."[22]

Troilus goes the way of "will"; Ulysses leads the Grecian camp the way of "power." The results are identical as both experience, as a consequence of their actions, total disorder and apparent chaos. Troilus' moment of truth, when he views Cressida with Diomedes, is the more obvious and remarked upon:

> Dispassionately considered, these lines [V.ii.134-57] complete the demonstration of the identity in opposition of the Greeks and Trojans....[Troilus] now embodies in his own person the disorder envisaged in Ulysses' speech on degree.[23]

The same disorder is, however, occurring in the Grecian camp, for Ulysses' political manoevering has gone as badly astray as Troilus' desire for the "infinite" desires of the will. The plan for pulling down Achilles has backfired. Too little heed is paid the fact that it is only Patroclus' death, the "chance of war," and not Ulysses' plan that returns Achilles to the field:

> O'the t'other side, the policy of those crafty swearing rascals... is not proved worth a blackberry. They set me up, in policy, that mongrel cur, Ajax, against that dog of as bad a kind, Achilles; and now is the cur Ajax prouder than the cur Achilles....Whereupon the Grecians begin to proclaim barbarism and policy grows into an ill opinion. (TrC V.iv.9-18.)

The play, in the last scenes, is reduced to a charade of all the players "clapperclawing one another" (TrC V.iv.11); the Universal Wolf is eating well.

One of the more obvious characteristics of this Universal Wolf, disorder, is a growing disparity between the apparent and the real or, more specifically, between character and reputation, name and substance. Ulysses first sounds this theme in his degree speech:

> Force should be right, or rather right and wrong--
> Between whose endless jar justice resides--
> Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
> (TrC I.iii.116-8.)

Basically, this seems to imply that in an ordered state name and substance coincide--the name "right" is identical with the actuality "right" or the substance "right"--whereas in a disordered state, or in a state of chaos, the name "right" may be attached to something that is essentially not "right." Similarly, in a perfectly ordered state, the reputation of a person or thing should be identical with its character; though in a disordered state this may not be, and probably is not, the case.

This concern with the relationship between name and substance is not, it should be noted, confined to Troilus and Cressida, but is found in all the problem plays. According to Hawkes, for example, the King in All's Well "argues that 'names' mere words, are worthless, are appearances; 'honour' is a name, 'virtue' is a reality."[24] This is true insofar as it goes, but the King's full argument can be construed to mean that "names" are "worthless" only insofar as they are detached from the actuality which they imply. "Honour," for example, is a worthless

name insofar as it applies only to reputation and not to an actuality such as character. Similarly, in Measure for Measure, Claudio is quick to note that Angelo condemns him for breaking the name, and not the spirit or the substance, of the law:

> ...and for a name
> Now puts the drowsy and neglected act
> Freshly on me: 'tis surely for a name.
> (AWW I.ii.158-60.)

In all three plays, this disparity between name and substance implies an illness or disorder in society, aptly symbolized by the abundant disease imagery.[25]

In Troilus and Cressida, the dissonance between name and substance is as constant and unending as the sickness that afflicts both camps. Even in the final speech we find the two linked:

> Why should our endeavor be so loved, and the performance so loathed?
> .....
> Till then I'll sweat and seek about for eases,
> And at that time bequeath you my diseases.
> (TrC V.x.138-56.)

The cause of Pandarus' dilemma is not difficult to discover; it lies not in an inequality between the "endeavor" and the "performance," but in a disparity between the name and the substance of the "endeavor." Pandarus' "endeavor" masquerades as the fulfillment of a mutual love. It is "loved" so long as it goes by this name. In reality, however, the "endeavor" is nothing more than the satisfaction of Troilus' "will"; and the "performance" is "loathed" because it conforms, or is on a par with, the substance and not the name of the "endeavor." It is "bad success in a bad cause" (TrC II.ii.117).

The discrepancy between name and substance takes two forms in Troilus and Cressida: a split between reputation, or self-valuation, and character, such as is most obviously seen in the Grecian camp; and a clash between subjective, sensual value and true value, as is seen in Troilus.

Ulysses, the supposed upholder of degree, has no qualms about accepting the divorce of reputation and substance:

> One touch of nature makes the whole world kin,
> That all with one consent praise newborn gauds,
> Though they are made and molded of things past,
> More laud than gilt o'er dusted.
> (TrC III.iii.174-8.)

Indeed, at times he seems almost indecently anxious to add to the rift, as when he states, "If the dull brainless Ajax comes safe off, / We'll dress him up in voices" (TrC I.iii.380-1). The whole Grecian camp, following Ulysses' lead, seems to take unnecessary pleasure in the political strategm of building in Ajax a self-esteem that is at total odds with his true value.

Achilles, apparently, needs no such aid; he comes ready-made with a self-image--the opposite side of the coin to reputation--which is also inflated. He has, however, the intelligence to realize that, in the eyes of his fellow Greeks

> ...not a man, for being simply man,
> Hath any honor, but honor for those honors
> That are without him, as place, riches, and favor,
> Prizes of accident as oft as merit.
> (TrC III.iii.80-3.)

The association of "honour" with reputation is prevalent in the Trojan camp as well,[26] but is overshadowed by the theme of individual, sensual value versus true value or substance. Ulysses' comment on

right and wrong--
Between whose endless jar justice resides--
(TrC I.iii.116-7.)

is echoed only by Hector:

The reasons you allege do more conduce
To the hot passion of distempered blood
Than to make up a free determination
'Twixt right and wrong; for pleasure and revenge
Have ears more deaf than adders to the voice
Of any true decision.
(TrC II.ii.168-73.)

Hector's "true decision" is equivalent to Ulysses' "justice." Troilus changes these terms to "election" and paraphrases Ulysses in a totally distorted manner:

...my election
Is led on in the conduct of my will--
My will enkindled by mine eyes and ears,
Two traded pilots 'twixt the dangerous shores
Of will and judgement.
(TrC II.ii.61-5.)

Thus, instead of "free determination 'twixt right and wrong," we have the senses mediating 'twixt "will and judgement." Instead of judgement or a true decision being the end result, it is only one of the factors (and apparently the weaker at that) to be considered in choosing a course of action. Right and wrong have indeed lost their names when Troilus' position prevails in the Trojan camp. "What's aught but as 'tis valued" (TrC II.ii.52) is only one short step away from "What's aught but as 'tis named"; and when the value or name is decided by "particular will" (TrC II.ii.53), the gap between name and substance may be wide indeed. "Pleasure and revenge," for example, may be disguised as love and war.

This is, in effect, what happens. The play must end in chaos

because the double themes of love and war exist in name only. In actual fact, with the possible exception of Cressida, the play never moves beyond the level of pleasure and revenge, which have "ears more deaf than adders to the voice / Of any true decision" (TrC II.ii.172-3). To Paris, for example, "Hot blood begets hot thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love" (TrC III.i.28-9). Speaking of Helen specifically, he makes it even more obvious that pleasure, not love, is what he feels:

> Sir, I propose not merely to myself
> The pleasure such a beauty brings with it.
> (TrC II.ii.146-7.)

Troilus, similarly, is concerned with pleasure, not love. The war itself hinges on revenge, originating as it did when Paris brought back Helen in revenge "for an old aunt whom the Greeks held captive" (TrC II.ii.77), and gains its impetus from the Grecian revenge on Troy, Troilus' revenge on Diomedes, and Achilles' revenge for Patroclus' death. The character of the war, and of the love affairs associated with it, do not live up to their reputation. Their substance is at odds with their name.

Given such a split between name or reputation and substance or actuality, it seems strange that so many critics argue that Shakespeare inherited, with Cressida, a reputation which he was forced to incorporate into his characterization of her. How much more likely that he would play her reputation off against her character. L.C.Knights comes closest to suggesting this:

> In other words, we--the spectators--are directly involved; and it is our confusion that largely contributes to the ambiguousness of

> of the play. The material that Shakespeare chose to work on was public property. His audience, he knew, would have some preconceived notions about Agamemmnon, Ulysses, Helen and the rest. Yet he weaves these preconceptions into the texture of the play by the simple device of now appearing to endorse them, now turning them upside down.[27]

This, however, does not go nearly far enough. When Shakespeare seems to be most endorsing these preconceived notions, he is, in fact, most turning them upside down.

The scene that is most commonly referred to as proof that Shakespeare was keeping the traditional characterizations is that one where Pandarus' scheming is consummated:

> If ever you prove false one to another, since I have taken such pains to bring you together, let all pitiful goers-between be called to the world's end after my name; call them all Pandars. Let all constant men be Troiluses, all false women Cressids, and all brokers-between Pandars! Say, "Amen." (TrC III.ii.200-6.)

This has generally been taken as Shakespeare's concession to the Morality mode:

> Pandarus, Troilus and Cressida emerge from their distinctive and dramatic characters and become types: Pandarus as the Bawd, Troilus as Fidelity in Love, Cressida as Falsehood in Love.[28]

The true purpose of the speech, however, appears to be somewhat more complicated. J.C.Maxwell puts his finger on the clue without realizing it:

> The purpose of calling attention to the traditional roles of the three is sufficiently urgent to override the logical contradiction between "false one to another" and "all constant men."[29]

Shakespeare was rarely overly bothered with calling attention to "traditional roles," and, more important, he was far too competent a craftsman to miss such an easily corrected contradiction. We can therefore assume that the contradiction exists, in all probability, for

a definite artistic reason; and given the context, the most obvious reason is to draw our attention to an analogous contradiction between the "traditional" reputations of the characters and their actions in the play itself.

Such a view gains credence from the generally accepted fact that the play was written for no ordinary audience but rather for "the young lawyers at one of the Inns of Court."[30] A.P.Rossiter suggests that "the play's style--the intellectual demands it makes,"[31] are evidence for such an audience. "A debating play on moral and philosophical values, in which...the ideas mattered immeasurably more than the action."[32] Is it likely that in such a play, for such an audience, Shakespeare suddenly felt so compelled to call "attention to the traditional roles" that he would utilize such a simplistic speech, complete with logical contradiction to boot? Some critics apparently feel so. Tillyard, for example, is quick to notice the problem, but his solution can hardly be called satisfactory:

> The cynicism, the scurrility, and the academic tone of some of the speeches could be accounted for, if Shakespeare were writing for the sophisticated audience of the Inns of Court....There is, however, one scene which does not fit. This is III. 2....The scene is quaint and primitive and alien to the sophisticated audience of the Inns of Court....It is as if Shakespeare was saying, 'I think you have a notion in your heads of Troilus, Cressida, and Pandarus as proverbial persons and you are curious to know how they have become such. Generally, I give you my own version of the story, but in this scene here they are, for your satisfaction, in the guise in which you have habitually pictured them.[33]

Surely the "sophisticated" audience which enjoyed such "cynicism," such "scurrility" and such an "academic tone" would scarcely demand that Shakespeare pay such simplistic lip-service to the "traditional" roles? Surely lawyers, trained in logic and rhetoric, would be the first

to appreciate the difference between reputation and character, opinion and event.

Nor is it really necessary to turn to the audience to prove that Shakespeare had tongue in cheek when writing, "As true as Troilus" (TrC III.ii.183). The characterization of "true" Troilus offers evidence enough. Troilus is several times described as "true" and "simple" but, unfortunately, only by his unhumble self:

> Troilus shall be such to Cressid, as what envy can
> say worst shall be a mock for his truth, and what
> truth can speak truest not truer than Troilus.
> (TrC III.ii.98-100.)

> I am as true as truth's simplicity,
> And simpler than the infancy of truth.
> (TrC III.ii.170-1.)

> Whiles others fish with craft for great opinion
> I with great truth catch mere simplicity;[34]
> Whilst some with cunning gild their copper crowns,
> With truth and plainness I do wear mine bare.
> Fear not my truth; the moral of my wit
> Is "plain and true"--there's all the reach of it.
> (TrC IV.iv.103-8.)

The fact is that neither he nor Pandarus has even moderate respect for the truth. Cressida notes this of Pandarus early in the play:

> Pandarus. Faith, to say truth, brown and not brown.
>
> Cressida. To say the truth, true and not true.
> (TrC I.ii.99-100.)

Troilus, as Hector notes, reasons in a fashion that more inclines "to the hot passion of distempered blood" than "any true decision" (TrC II.ii.169 and 173). The only "truths" he ever accepts are the dictates of his own will, and a political expediency that forces Cressida from Troy:

> Cressida. And is it true that I must go from Troy?

> Troilus. A hateful truth.
> (TrC IV.iv.30-1.)

It is a strange record for one whose motto is "plain and true."

Not only is Troilus' "trueness" in question, but his capacity to love at all. Even those critics who have considered Troilus basically heroic have noticed an odd quality about his love poetry:

> But the images of Troilus lead us down; they are violent and harsh. As Troilus speaks of love he uses such words as drown'd, deep, indrench'd, mad, ulcer, ink, ploughman's hand, gash, knife.[35]

> All the characteristics of the love poetry of Troilus can be recognized here--its tenuous and unnaturally refined expression, its subtlety in dealing with distinctions within an apparent unity, its sensuous thinness balanced by the imagery of disgust and repletion.[36]

The few critics who have not found Troilus admirable have been much more specific. Perhaps the harshest is Raymond Southall, who sees the play as an "exploration and definition of that manumission of life, specifically of love and chivalrous war, that was being effected by the spirit, or the ethic, of emergent capitalism":[37]

> Thus Troilus remarks [TrC I.i.97-103] his transformation into a merchant for whom Cressida is a desirable commodity and Pandar a trading vessel--elsewhere he describes Pandar as a broker.[38]

> The act, it will be noticed, is invariably one of touch and taste.... He almost invariably thinks of Cressida with his belly; beginning as a tasty tidbit yet to be enjoyed she ends as a piece of left-over meat.[39]

> Sickness is a prominent strain in Troilus' 'love' poetry....It is, of course, Troilus who has played the glutton throughout, Troilus who has 'o'er eaten,' and, clinging to the belief that lily beds can be wallowed in without defiling their purity, he regurgitates the truth for which he has no stomach.[40]

True it is that Troilus' speeches are heavily burdened with food and merchant imagery. We do not, however, have to go to capitalism for the reason. Troilus, as even Tillyard will admit, is overly influ-

enced by "will"; and one of the Elizabethan meanings of "will," as Campbell and Rossiter remind us, is "lust" or "physical desire."[41] That Shakespeare was aware of this, even if Tillyard is not, is proven by the multiple puns on the word in Sonnet 135. Moreover, Troilus himself admits that his "will" is "enkindled" by his senses--his eyes and his ears. Accepting the supremacy of a sensual will entails certain consequences: limitation to a material, physical, commercial world of appearances; subjugation to the control of sequential time;[42] and the existence of a powerful, destructive appetite which, incapable of being satisfied, must eventually turn on itself.

Troilus' "will" is associated with his "madly hot," "distempered blood." As Rossiter points out:

> Caroline Spurgeon shows that the play has a dominant image of disease in the body-politic. Disease is the result of an imbalance of 'humours'; the humour in excess here is 'blood'--the essential principle at once of lust and pride....There are, furthermore, social considerations about the Elizabethan realization of syphilis. ...Its existence was one of the 'disturbing new ideas' of the later sixteenth century.[43]

The disease, Southall notes, "is closely associated with the appetites and infects the blood and only gradually makes its presence felt."[44] He feels that the syphilitic metaphor refers to the destructive effect of the new commercial, capitalistic spirit on the older medieval society. Rossiter phrases the same thought in more general terms:

> I can see this as nothing but a Jacobean play, concerned with the questioning of values in the new and sceptical atmosphere generated from the decay of the worlds of Spenser and the Petrarchan sonneteers...where the dismissing of the old stable Medieval universals leaves thoughtful minds with the distressing discovery that if every individual thinks freely for himself and follows his own will, then chaos results, in which all order is lost.[45]

The value of Rossiter's phraseology is that it allows us to more clearly

see the relationship between this play and Measure for Measure, where Shakespeare again deals with the themes of licence and liberty, "blood" and "truth," authority and order, against the background of a society sick with the new disease--a disease which, like Troilus' "ulcer," eats up itself.

Troilus' entire philosophy is most simply summed up by his statement to Cressida:

> This is the monstruosity in love, lady, that the will is infinite and the execution confined, that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit. (TrC III.ii.82-5.)

The words "will," "execution," "desire" and "act" are no accident. By refusing to place voluntary limits on a "boundless" physical, material "desire," Troilus places his love and his aims completely within the sphere of the physical and material. He thus becomes the "slave" of physical limits; limits of time, change and chance. Because he sees his relationship with Cressida as a personal "achievement" (TrC IV.ii.69) rather than a spiritual extension of his own being,[46] he is helpless before the exigencies of war. Because he thinks only of self, he cannot rise above the vagaries of fate. On being told that Cressida must leave Troy, his only comment is, "How my achievements mock me!" (TrC IV.ii.69). He gives no thought to Cressida's feelings or position; and, because his feelings for her do not rise above sensual self-satisfaction, he can give no thought to the possibility of opposing the truth and unity of love to the divisive pseudo-necessities of war.[47] His next comment is even more revealing:

> I'll bring her to the Grecian presently;
> And to his hand when I deliver her,
> Think it an altar, and thy brother Troilus

A priest there off'ring to it his own heart.
(TrC IV.iv.7-9.)

Troilus asks pity for himself while wilfully, blindly refusing to see that it is Cressida that he is sacrificing on the altar of war by assenting to their separation.

The ending, for Troilus, is no more or less than what he has brought on himself. Having rejected, in the Trojan council scene, the "debt" of wife to husband (TrC II.ii.175-6), he has no right to claim, "Cressid is mine, tied with the bonds of heaven" (TrC V.ii.151). Seeing love throughout in terms of commercial imagery, and having "delivered" Cressida willingly and promptly to the Greeks, he can hardly complain when they take their acquisition seriously. His subservience to the physical, material sensual world of appearances places his relationship with Cressida under the same limitations that he himself suffers; it is slave to time, change and fortune. Having unquestioningly accepted the rule of his will and of appearance, he divides himself from any spiritual reality and should not be surprised to discover that "a thing inseparate / Divides more wider than the sky and earth" (TrC V.ii.145-6). It was he himself who split them. Having started by reducing love to personal pleasure, it is not surprising that he should finish by reducing war to personal revenge. Having accepted the appearance that Helen, stolen from her husband, "is a theme of honor and renown" (TrC II.ii.194) and that the war itself is an endeavour of "glory" rather than "the performance of our heaving spleens" (TrC II.ii.195-6), Troilus is at the end subjected to a reversal of that appearance:

Thersites. [of Troilus and Diomedes]
Hold thy whore, Grecian! Now for thy whore,
Troyan!

.....
What's become of the wenching rogues. I think they
have swallowed one another. I would laugh at that mir-
acle--yet, in a sort, lechery eats itself.
(TrC V.v.25-37.)

Having submitted to will and appetite, Troilus ends by facing the spectre of the Universal Wolf.

The kindest judgement that can be passed on Troilus is made by Goddard when he notes that there is "the eternal distinction between imagination, which actually grasps reality, and idealization, which merely tries to impose itself on it."[48] Troilus continually attempts to impose upon a reality, which he blindly ignores, an idealized, self-deceptive version of his "endeavor." "Will" affects glory and honour; pleasure is love, and revenge, war. Why should the "endeavor be so loved, and the performance so loathed" (TrC V.x.138-40)? Perhaps because the performance is an impersonal judgement on the true nature of the endeavour; a judgement made by a reality which Troilus neither wishes nor is able to understand. How ironic that he, of all people, should feel called upon to warn Cressida as he deserts her:

But something may be done that we will not;
And sometimes we are devils to ourselves,
When we will tempt the frailty of our powers,
Presuming on their changeful potency.
(TrC IV.iv.94-7.)

What we have suggested so far is basically that "disorder is a consequence of the frailty of man and not an inevitable result of a chaos at the center of creation."[49] Simplistically speaking, man is capable of operating at two levels, whether we call these appearance and reality, physical and metaphysical, sensual and spiritual, or whatever. In a perfectly ordered state, he operates on both levels simultaneously

and with total harmony. The greatest symbol of such a harmonic unity is true love, which also functions on both levels simultaneously. In such an ordered state, man rises above the temporal, mutable aspects of existence. Time and chance may affect him on the apparent or physical level, but they lack the power to destroy him utterly.

More often however, man divides the two levels and, consciously or unconsciously, places them in opposition. If he chooses to accept totally the physical world of appearances, he becomes totally powerless before the forces of time and chance which rule this physical world. A division between name and substance (reputation and character, endeavour and performance, authority and order) is a cause and a characteristic of such a disordered state. War and strife are the perfect symbols of it.[50] Because of the opposition between the two levels, it is intrinsically a destructive state, a diseased state.

Order and disorder can be considered in terms of either general man (society), the individual, or an interplay of the two. The double level is seen in the individual by means of what Bayley terms "the inside and outside" effect; "the conflict between the indefinable interior man and the persona that is required of him by society or imposed by his own will."[51] In other words, there is a natural and an unnatural self; a true, inner, potential self and an apparent, outer, actual self. An ordered state is typified by an identity between the inner and the outer self, and a disordered state by an opposition between them. Just as a society destroys itself by war, so can an individual destroy himself by self-conflict. We are our "own traitors" (AWW IV.iii.20) when the outer self revolts against the inner. The outer self, of course,

is that part associated with, and influenced by, appetite and will.

In Troilus and Cressida, and to an even greater extent in the later problem plays, Shakespeare deals with both the double nature of the world and of the individual. As befits the play, disorder is the predominant note. "Kingdomed Achilles," for example, "in commotion rages / And batters down himself" (TrC II.iii.177-8). Pandarus' "prayer," which plays on the difference between reputation and character, is preceded by a similar "prayer" from his Grecian counterpart, Thersites, which implies a difference between the potential inner self and an outer self "imposed" by will, society, or self-ignorance:[52]

> If I could 'a' remembered a gilt counterfeit, thou wouldst not have slipped out of my contemplation! But it is no matter; thyself upon thyself! The common curse of mankind, folly and ignorance, be thine in great revenue. Heaven bless thee from a tutor, and discipline come not near thee. Let thy blood be thy direction till thy death. Then, if she that lays thee out says thou art a fair corse, I'll be sworn and sworn upon't she never shrouded any but lazars. Amen. (TrC II.iii.26-35 [Italics mine].)

The suggestion that a fair appearance ("a gilt counterfeit") may hide a rotting inner self, which death discovers, reappears in the play and, in one sense, summarizes it. Hector, in an action unworthy of him, pursues and kills a Greek for his armour:

> Hector. Most putrified core, so fair without,
> Thy goodly armor thus hath cost thy life.
> (TrC V.vii.1-2.)

In a manner of speaking, "goodly armour," the maintenance of an "honourable" persona or outer self, is responsible for a goodly number of putrefied cores in the play. It is also responsible for a goodly number of deaths, both spiritual and literal. The unlucky Greek is not the only character pursued and hounded on account of his sumpt ous armour:

> To have done, is to hang
> Quite out of fashion, like a rusty mail
> In monumental mock'ry....
> .....
> For emulation hath a thousand sons
> That one by one pursue.
> (TrC III.iii.151-7.)

The purpose of this discussion of the double concept of self is, of course, to point out that there is only one character in the play who seems fully aware of it:

> Troilus. What offends you, lady?
>
> Cressida. Sir, mine own company.
>
> Troilus. You cannot shun yourself.
>
> Cressida. Let me go and try.
> I have a kind of self resides with you;
> But an unkind self, that itself will leave
> To be another's fool.
> (TrC III.ii.145-51.)

The "kind of self" that resides with Troilus is her natural inner self. The "unkind self" is, in this case, "the persona that is required of [her] by society."[53] Goddard feels that here "she gives us a glimpse of the ingenuous girl, Troilus' Cressida, who is being buried alive under the worldly witty woman, Pandarus' Cressida."[54] Without such an awareness of the curious tension between the "two" Cressidas, much of the complex beauty of her characterization is lost.

In order to do the double nature of Cressida justice, it is necessary to follow her development from the beginning of the play. To take a cue from Tillyard:

> Since the character of a play (if it has any consistent character at all) is determined by its opening scenes, I will begin by recording how these scenes in Troilus and Cressida strike me.[55]

The first two scenes parallel each other. They introduce us respectively

to Troilus and Cressida, both in counterpoint to Pandarus, and give us our first view of their attitude towards love. Troilus appears as a self-indulgent young fool, who caters to Pandarus' humorous but foolish touchiness in order to use him as an approach to Cressida. His "love" is rendered immediately suspect by its association with appetite (the food imagery and the extended "cake" metaphor), pleasure and war:

> Aeneas. Hark what good sport is out of town today!
>
> Troilus. Better at home, if "would I might" were "may."
> But to the sport abroad.
>
> (TrC I.i.117-9)

Cressida's conversation with her uncle, on the other hand, consists mainly of brief, pointed answers that limit his long-windedness, and she uses her ready wit to good-humouredly deflate his wilder statements.[56]

The contrast between their respective soliloquies (TrC I.i.93-108; I.ii.294-307) is even more emphatic. Cressida speaks of "firm love" as opposed to Troilus' merchant imagery, and she exhibits a self-control ("Nothing of that shall from mine eyes appear") that is lacking in Troilus' depiction of "the wild and wand'ring flood." She has an awareness of the relationship between time and sensual pleasure ("Things won are done, joy's soul lies in the doing") which Troilus apparently lacks.[57] The simple language of her soliloquy has impressed more than one critic. R.A.Folkes feels that "at the end of the scene she shows that her flippancy, too, is partly a pose, in the couplets which mark her soliloquy as coming from the heart."[58] B. Ifor Evans similarly states:

> It is true that it could be argued that Shakespeare was using these naive lines for contrast to keep this meditation in soliloquy distinct from all that surrounds it. But the degree of simplicity is

remarkable in a play where so much is complex.[59] Troilus may elaborately claim simplicity as one of his virtues, but it is Cressida who here practices it.

The first meeting of the lovers extends the impression of Cressida's superior wisdom. While Troilus' heart "beats faster than a fevrous pulse" (TrC III.ii.36), and his love imagery becomes increasingly strange ("Like a strange soul upon the Stygian banks": "O, be thou my Charon"; "Where I may wallow in the lily beds" [TrC III.ii.8-11]), Cressida speaks in terms reminiscent of Hector at the Trojan council. He spoke then of "modest doubt" that "is called / The beacon of the wise," that "searches / To the bottom of the worst" (TrC II.ii.15-7). This suggestion of "depth" and "doubt" is absent in both Troilus and Ulysses, but Cressida sees "more dregs than water" at the bottom of "their fountain of love" (TrC III.ii.67-8). Moreover, she suggests that "blind fear, that seeing reason leads" is superior to the "blind stumbling without fear" (TrC III.ii.72-4) that typifies Ulysses, and, presumably, superior also to the blind will rushing without reason that could be said to describe Troilus.

Cressida alternates between the witty, self-sufficient Cressida of Pandarus, and the vulnerable, simple, "natural" Cressida of Troilus. It is the witty, self-sufficient Cressida who has been the object of most critical jibes. Even Foakes, who is more sympathetic than most, finds her "too light, too flippant in her attitude."[60] Yet is it surprising that, deserted by her father and apparently alone in Troy but for her continually prodding uncle, she has developed a self-protective social manner? Is it surprising, considering the all too justified

reservations she expresses in her first soliloquy, that she is hesitant to place herself entirely in Troilus' power by unreservedly confessing the depth of her love? It is, if we remember that important soliloquy, against her better judgement that she admits her love at all. She is caught between the feelings of her inner, natural self and the necessity of her protective outer "shield." She accedes to the inner voice, but not without misgivings:

> Why have I blabbed? Who shall be true to us
> When we are so unsecret to ourselves?
> (TrC III.ii.126-7.)

By morning her misgivings have not been allayed. If anything they have intensified, and it is almost impossible not to feel sympathy for her vulnerability. She is more unsure than ever of her position with Troilus:

> Are you aweary of me?
> .....
> Prithee, tarry;
> You men will never tarry.
> O foolish Cressid! I might have still held off
> And then you would have tarried.
> (TrC IV.ii.7-18.)

She has, moreover, now lost the aura of witty invulnerability that was her shield against her uncle's thoughtless jibes:

> A pestilence on him! Now he will be mocking.
> I shall have such a life.
> .....
> You bring me to do--and then you flout me too.
> (TrC IV.ii.21-6.)

Worse is to follow. At the beginning of Act Four, the Greek and Trojan camps unite together, and it almost seems as if the major purpose of the unexpected union is a conspiracy against Cressida's love. It is notable that not one person considers Cressida's difficult posi-

tion, and no one, save herself, questions the necessity of the exchange:

> Aeneas. Troilus had rather Troy were borne to Greece
> Than Cressid borne from Troy.
>
> Paris. There is no help.
> The bitter disposition of the time
> Will have it so.
> (TrC IV.i.46-9.)
>
> Aeneas. We must give up to Diomedes' hand
> The Lady Cressida.
> .....
> Troilus. How my achievements mock me!
> I will go meet them.
> (TrC IV.ii.65-70.)
>
> Pandarus. Pray thee, get thee in. Would thou hadst
> ne'er been born! I knew thou wouldst be his death.
> .....
> Thou must be gone, wench, thou must be gone; thou
> art changed for Antenor. Thou must to thy father
> and be gone from Troilus. 'Twill be his death;
> 'twill be his bane; he cannot bear it.
>
> Cressida. O you immortal gods! I will not go.
>
> Pandarus. Thou must.
>
> Cressida. I will not uncle....
> .....
> I will not go from Troy.
> (TrC IV.ii.87-111.)

Isolated and unconsidered, Cressida sacrifices even the minimal security of her self-sufficient *persona* as she commits herself totally to her love of Troilus. "I have forgot my father," she proclaims. "I know no touch of consanguinity" (TrC IV.ii.98-9). Again she is reminiscent of Hector at the Trojan council scene. "What nearer debt in all humanity / Than wife is to the husband" (TrC II.ii.175-6), he asked; and Cressida, seeing herself as Troilus' wife, goes straight to the true heart of the matter, completely ignoring the temporal, political aspect of the situation. Realizing, like Hector, that absolute value

or any "true decision" can never lie in the realm of politics and war, she forcefully asserts that Troilus' claim as husband is greater than her father's. "In Troilus, the supremacy of time is never really questioned," says Traversi;[61] but he forgets Cressida's words:

> Time, force, and death
> Do to this body what extremes you can.
> (TrC IV.ii.103-4.)

Moreover, unlike Hector, Cressida seems quite capable of adhering to her principles in the face of serious verbal opposition. "I will not go from Troy" (TrC IV.ii.111), she reiterates for the third time as she exits.

There is one source of opposition, however, against which Cressida is helpless. She can stand against her father; she can stand against her uncle; but she cannot stand against Troilus himself. What a shock it must be to discover that he, for whom she has just given up her father and dared the worst that time and death can do, sees their separation as inevitable. She seems too stunned, at first, to do more that ask the same question again and again:

> And is it true that I must go from Troy?
> ...What, and from Troilus too?
> ...Is't possible?
> .....
> I must, then, to the Grecians?

To all her unbelieving questions, Troilus answers in effect, "No remedy" (TrC IV.iv.55). When she finally composes herself sufficiently to ask the question that is foremost in her mind, "When shall we see again?" (TrC IV.iv.57), Troilus can only reply, "Be thou but true of heart----" (TrC IV.iv.58). From Cressida's viewpoint, it must be a fearful reply. She has committed herself completely to remaining with

with him, and he not only rejects that commitment offhand, but questions her very sincerity. Bayley points out that "love is of all forces in society the most confusing and the most revealing;...its existence implies the ideal existence of understanding and its absence the total removal of it."[62] No wonder that in the face of such total incomprehension by Troilus, Cressida's misgivings return multiplied. "You love me not" (TrC IV.iv.82), she cries; and all that Troilus can answer is, "Die I a villain then....But be not tempted" (TrC IV.iv.83-91), again impugning her sincerity. Cressida's last words to him are, "My lord, will be true?" (TrC IV.iv.101). Perhaps, she seems to feel, she can show Troilus the lack of understanding that his doubts imply by returning his own question to him. If so Troilus, in his self-centred narrowness, misses the subtletly. His answer, a classic of self-righteous 'Who? Me?'-ism, can hardly be reassuring in its unemotional flatness: "Who? I? Alas, it is my vice, my fault" (TrC IV.iv.102).

Throughout the exchange Troilus speaks of buying and selling, of separation and temptation, and of a love so "noble" that the gods are envious; but never once does he condescend to speak of simple consideration or honest affection. Never once does he tell her, "I love you." Troilus has rejected Cressida's natural inner self, the "kind of self" (TrC III.ii.149) that would reside with him. It is therefore only reasonable that he should later have to witness the results of the division between that natural self and the "unkind self" (TrC III.ii.150) that leaves to be "another's fool" (TrC III.ii.151). "If there be rule in unity itself / This was not she" (TrC V.ii.137-8), he exclaims on watching Cressida and Diomedes; but it was Troilus himself who destroyed

that unity. He is, therefore, perfectly right in crying, "This is, and is not, Cressida" (TrC V.ii.143).

Cressida's world, as she is delivered to Diomedes, must be in a chaotic shambles. Her attempt to establish love as an absolute value has been undercut by her own lover, and her only alternative is to accept her position as a pawn in the time and chance dominated game of politics. Events have moved beyond her control. Her uncle wishes she "hadst ne'er been born" (TrC IV.ii.88). Her father speaks of her as a purchase acceptable in lieu of wages: "And he shall buy my daughter; and her presence / Shall quite strike off all service I have done" (TrC III.iii.28-9). Troilus speaks twice of "delivering" her to the Greeks, and his speech to Diomedes is filled with unconscious irony:

> Welcome, Sir Diomed. Here is the lady
> Which for Antenor we deliver you.
> At the port, lord, I'll give her to thy hand,
> And by the way possess thee what she is.
> Entreat her fair; and, by my soul, fair Greek,
> If e'er thou stand at mercy of my sword,
> Name Cressid, and thy life shall be as safe
> As Priam is in Ilion.
> (TrC IV.iv.105-16 [Italics mine].)

The only effect of Troilus' self-righteous superiority is to draw Diomedes' attention to Cressida in a contrary and unfortunate manner:

> When I am hence,
> I'll answer to my lust; and know you, lord,
> I'll nothing do on charge. To her own worth
> She shall be prized; but that you say "be't so,"
> I speak it in my spirit and honour, "no."
> (TrC IV.iv.131-5.)

Cressida is thus not only a political pawn; she also becomes a powerless victim of the personality conflict between Troilus and Diomedes.

The delivery of Cressida to the Greeks is the decisive action of the play:

> After this scene the tone changes...; humor almost disappears; those who had been playing roles, like Troilus, suddenly discover the gap between fantasy and reality, and the war, which had been a sport to the Trojans and a political game to the Greeks, becomes earnest indeed.[63]

Since Troilus' self-indulgent role as sacrificial and romantic lover has destroyed all true love in the play, the supremacy of war and strife is now unhindered. The identity in opposition of the two camps nears completion with the exchange of Cressida and the kinship in battle of Hector and Ajax.[64] Cressida's position as political pawn is further emphasized when, her exchange having been concluded by the "general state of Troy" (TrC IV.ii.67), her welcome to the Grecian camp is similarly "in general" (TrC IV.v.21). The Trojan abduction of Helen is now echoed in the stylized reception of Cressida.

Cressida, at this point, is already doomed. Troilus, by making "fulfillment and separation seem inevitable and connected aspects of a single situation," forces Cressida to accept "the impossibility, the meaninglessness of constancy in such a world."[65] She has sworn, "Make Cressid's name the very crown of falsehood / If ever she leave Troilus" (TrC IV.ii.102-3). When Troilus himself forces her away, her oath and her faith are already broken. It is the departure from Troy and Troilus that marks her downfall, not her later acceptance of Diomedes which is merely the inevitable consequence. Foakes fairly points out that "if she is now a 'daughter of the game,' in the phrase of Ulysses, Troilus brought her to it."[66]

Her fall, however, is not so sudden or so great as many critics

would suggest. She is often accused of unbecoming behaviour in her welcome to the Grecian camp, but here too many critics have let their prejudice against her outweigh the actual words that Shakespeare gives us. Left completely alone and defenseless, Cressida has, of course, reverted to her social pose of witty self-sufficiency, but her actions are blameless. Kissing was certainly not unknown to the Elizabethans, and Agamemnon's welcome seems no more than civility; it would have been discourteous of Cressida to refuse his gesture.[67] It is Ulysses who creates the problem with his thoughtless suggestion, and puts Cressida in an exceedingly awkward situation. Despite any reservations she may have about the procedure, she can hardly afford to antagonize the Grecian leaders on whom she is now completely dependent. Moreover, the occasion is given the seal of respectability by the venerable Nestor: "And very courtly counsel. I'll begin" (TrC IV.v.22). There is no way in which she may gracefully oppose this white-haired man, "most reverend for [his] stretched-out life" (TrC I.iii.61), and so she is forced to hold her peace until the situation threatens to move out of control. When she does speak it is not to flirt, but to wittily and firmly decline to continue the ceremony. She is comparatively gentle in refusing Menelaus; but her treatment of Ulysses, the originator of her discomfort, is justifiably sharp:[68]

> Ulysses. May I, sweet lady, beg a kiss of you?
>
> Cressida. You may.
>
> Ulysses. I do desire it.
>
> Cressida. Why beg then.
> (TrC IV.v.47-8.)

Ulysses is no man to take such an insult lightly, and it is no surprise that he responds with a scurrilous speech, worthy of Thersites himself, immediately following her departure. Unfortunately, many critics have considered this angry and ill-considered speech, which reflects less favourably on the character of Ulysses than that of Cressida, as the definitive definition of her character. It does not disturb them that they must reach outside the given text to justify such a description:

> It appears to be the dumb language of her body...which disturbs Ulysses.[69]

> But the quality of Cressida's coyness is so crude, each joint and motive of her body is so eloquent of the game as she passes down the row of Greeks lined up to kiss her....[70]

It is not until her actual acceptance of Diomedes that we have any cause to question Cressida's actions, and in this matter she has little choice. Troilus' self-centredness has left her isolated and defenseless. Diomedes offers at least some slight protection, and she seems terrified of alienating him. She greets him with the words, "Now, my sweet guardian" (TrC V.ii.7), and when he threatens to leave in anger at her hesitation she quickly recalls him: "Guardian! Why, Greek!" (TrC V.ii.45). Troilus unhesitatingly accepted their separation and delivered her from Troy like purchased merchandise, leaving her alone and powerless in the Grecian camp. Diomedes is a guardian and a Greek. Considering the circumstances, it is almost a wonder that she even hesitates with Diomedes before accepting the inevitability of "the other eye" (TrC V.ii.185).[71] She realizes that she has no real choice,[72] but she vacillitates to the end and is obviously not happy with her situation:

> Ay, come--O Jove!--
> Do come--I shall be plagued.
> (TrC V.ii.101-2.)

The "plague" that pervades the play at the end infects all.

Foakes feels that Cressida "plays with Diomedes the free game of love or lust that Helen with Paris, Polyxena with Achilles, and she with Troilus, have taken for granted,"[73] but it is, ironically, Cressida's very inability to take the "game" for granted that damns her in the eyes of many critics. They see her hesitation, her unwillingness to commit herself to a definite decision, as further proof of her apparent coyness and teasing nature. A straight "yes" would probably satisfy them more. Yet her words can also be read as a helpless attempt to stave off an undesirable inevitability. "Her tragedy, such as it is," notes Traversi, "derives from awareness of her helplessness."[74] Troilus was able to blindly and unhesitatingly accept the pseudo-necessities of a dishonourable and baseless war, and for this he is praised. Cressida, seeing the situation for what it is, vacillates , and is damned. If she had immediately and unreservedly attached herself to Diomedes, she would, apparently, have made fewer critical enemies.

Once Cressida finally submits to the forces of war, the play moves to a rapid and violent conclusion. The identity in opposition of the camps is complete, but otherwise little has changed from the start of the play. The "war-within-a-war" between Troilus and Diomedes is new, but its origins and purpose obviously parallel the earlier, major war:

> Hold thy whore, Grecian! Now for thy whore, Troyan.
> (TrC V.iv.25-6.)

The poles have reversed, the tables turned, but the basic futility of the conflict remains unchanged. It is, in fact, only emphasized by the reversal of appearances. This reversal occurs not only in action, but also in character. It is now Diomedes, the Grecian, who seems the courtly medieval lover:

> Diomedes. Go, go, my servant, take thou Troilus' horse;
> Present the fair steed to my Lady Cressid.
> Fellow, commend my service to her beauty;
> Tell her I have chastised the amorous Troyan,
> And am her knight by proof.
> (TrC V.v.1-5.)

Troilus, on the other hand, has become the modern, practical realist in the style of Ulysses:

> Troilus. For the love of all the gods,
> Let's leave the hermit pity with our mother,
> And when we have our armors buckled on,
> The venomed vengeance ride upon our swords,
> Spur them to ruthful work, rein them from ruth.
>
> Hector. Fie, savage, fie!
>
> Troilus. Hector, then 'tis wars.
> (TrC V.iii.44-9.)

Even Hector, as Toole notes, reverses himself: "Cassandra, in trying to hold Hector back, uses exactly the same arguments he had used in the Trojan council scene for sending Helen back to the Greeks."[75] He too has become the servant, rather than the opponent, of the Universal Wolf:

> There is a thousand Hectors in the field;
> .....
> Here, there and everywhere, he leaves and takes,
> Dexterity so obeying appetite
> That what he will he does.
> (TrC V.v.19-29.)

In effect, Troilus has spread the "plague" of the gods--"thyself

upon thyself. The common curse of all mankind" (TrC II.iii.28-9)--both to Cressida and the entire Trojan camp:

> Troilus. O gods, how do you plague me!
> (TrC I.i.98.)
>
> Cressida. Ay, come--O Jove!--
> Do come--I shall be plagued.
> (TrC V.ii.101-2.)
>
> Sit, gods upon your thrones, and smile at Troy.
> I say, at once let your brief plagues be mercy,
> And linger not our sure destruction on.
> (TrC V.x.7-9.)

Thersites continually implies the presence of the same plague in the Grecian camp, and it is this plague--"thyself upon thyself"--that lets loose the dogs of war and the Universal Wolf. If there is one deduction that can be drawn from the play, it is that the plague of the gods is man himself. The gods are not responsible for the suffering of Troy; man is quite capable of his own destruction. The worst curse that even a pessimist like Thersites can discover is not, "The gods destroy you," but "Thyself upon thyself." The common curse of man is that he is so often to be found divided against himself.

"How strangely the whole ends," muses Lawrence. "All these plots and schemings, all these big words and blaring of trumpets bring at last no settled issue."[76] No settled issue is exactly what they bring. No settled issue is all they can bring. The disruption of Cressida's attempt at achieving the absolute unity of love ensures instead the absolute supremacy of the Universal Wolf, of disorder, of self-destruction, of appearance, and of time and chance. In such a world, since disorder perpetuates itself and time brings change forever, no settled issue is really possible.

CHAPTER III

> Helena. Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie,
> Which we ascribe to heaven; the fated sky
> Gives us free scope; only doth backward pull
> Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.
> (AWW I.i.212-5.)

The basic premise of this chapter is that Troilus and Cressida and All's Well That Ends Well can profitably be viewed as companion plays; that a study of the relationship, real or apparent, between the two can contribute to an understanding of either. The keystone of such a study remains, however, the interpretation of Troilus and Cressida put forth in the second chapter, and this discussion of All's Well will be correspondingly shorter and less detailed. The emphasis is on the themes and ideas that the two plays have in common, rather than on a complete or independent study of All's Well alone.

Some of the similarities between the two plays are obvious. Both deal with love, lechery and war; both are concerned with the interplay between endeavour and performance, or intention and deed; both involve the dichotomy between power-will-appetite and order, between subjective and objective value, between appearance and reality. There is an easily made comparison between the thoughtful, realistic idealism of Cressida and Helena, and the emotional, wilful (and, therefore, self-centred) idealism of Troilus and Bertram. Despite these basically similar elements, however, the plays form a complete contrast of mood, treatment and conclusion. In Troilus and Cressida, there is "no remedy" (TrC

IV.iv.55); in All's Well, "our remedies oft in ourselves do lie."

Hector's statement on value, made in the Trojan council, forms as good a starting point as any:

> But value dwells not in particular will;
> It holds his estimate and dignity
> As well wherein 'tis precious of itself
> As in the prizer. 'Tis mad idolatry
> To make the service greater than the god;
> And the will dotes that is attributive
> To what infectiously itself affects,
> Without some image of th' affected merit.
> (TrC II.ii.53-60.)

This suggests the double nature of value ("As well wherein 'tis precious of itself / As in the prizer"), a key theme in both plays, and the connection between the "infection" or "disease" metaphor and the will-order dichotomy. L.C.Knights comments on the type of "will" described:

> It is a will that 'dotes', so that its possessor is betrayed into rejecting the true good and is delivered to the false appearance. But why does it dote? Because it is 'inclinable to what infectiously itself affects'. What then is 'infection', and what is health?[1]

Since Troilus and Cressida ends with chaos and disease ("I'll bequeath you my diseases" [TrC V.x.55-6]), while All's Well, as the title suggests, ends with order and health,[2] the answer to Knights' question would seem to be a key factor in establishing the exact nature of the relationship between the two plays.

Ulysses, in his "degree" speech (TrC I.iii.75-113), suggests that the root of the sickness in Troilus and Cressida involves the disruption of the natural order. Similarly, Hector suggests that "right and wrong" are based on a "law of nature," and that the social laws "in each well-ordered nation" are a means to "curb those raging appetites" that might disrupt this law of nature (TrC II.ii.168-82). Troilus and Bertram

both opt for "will" and "appetite" and, as a result, discover that "the will is infinite and the execution confined; that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit" (TrC III.ii.82-5). To "dote" involves unchecked emotion rather than reason, and implies an inability to distinguish appearance, or subjective value, from reality, or objective value. Troilus and Bertam, with their doting, emotional, "particular" wills, lack any "image of th' affected merit" or awareness of right and wrong based on the law of nature. Bertram is, therefore, quite right to speak of his "sick desires" (AWW IV.ii.35); his will is in discord with the law of nature and therefore becomes appetite which eats up itself. He is sick in the sense that he is not whole. He "contrives against his own nobility" (AWW IV.iii.23-4); he is in conflict not only with the law of nature, the "true" reality, but with his own "true" or natural self.

Sickness, therefore, involves a disruption of the natural order;[3] a split between appearance and reality, will and order, blood and truth, and consequently between intention and act, between the "derived" or inner, natural self and the "achieved" or outer, apparent self. This disruption can be either external (in the state) or internal (in the individual).[4] Thus the external conflict and sickness of Troilus and Cressida is mirrored by an internal conflict and sickness. Troilus is subject to "a cruel battle here within" (TrC I.i.3); Cressida speaks of a "kind of self"[5] which resides with Troilus, and an opposing "unkind self" which will leave him (TrC III.ii.149-51); Pandarus' illness intensifies as the "performance" becomes more divorced from the "endeavour"--"I have a rheum in mine eyes too, and such an ache in my bones that,

unless a man were cursed, I cannot tell what to think on't" (TrC V.iii. 104-7). Sickness also implies an emotional, doting will that inclines towards subjective, apparent value. This will refuses to accept the limitations placed on it by natural law. It will not be qualified by the "discourse of reason" nor "fear of bad success in a bad cause" (TrC II.ii.116-7).

Inclining towards apparent value, such a will inclines also towards apparent honour. True honour never derives from "success in a bad cause" but rather from the honourable defense of the true or natural order of things. Thus Bertram's "sword can never win / The honour that he loses" (AWW III.ii.93-4) by opposing the commands of the king. His father, on the other hand, had an honour that, "clock to itself, knew the true minute" (AWW I.ii.39) to act. Bertram's concept of honour, instead of regulating or clocking itself, is in rebellion against, and traitor to, itself. It is ruled by blood, not truth. He "contrives against his own nobility, in his proper stream o'erflows himself" (AWW IV.iii.23-4). This self-treachery results from a refusal to recognize the limitations that the natural law places on individual will or power:

> And sometimes we are devils to ourselves
> When we will tempt the frailty of our powers,
> Presuming on their changeful potency.
> (TrC IV.iv.95-7.)

Bertram, like Troilus, refuses to subject his will and appetite to the natural law of right and wrong; consequently he, like Troilus, becomes a captive of his own will, his appetites, and the chaos that rules the world of appearance. The King warns, "Beware of being captives / Before you serve" (AWW II.i.21-2), and Bertram, by refusing to

serve his king or render to Helen "what law does vouch [her] own" (AWW II.v.82), becomes the captive of Diana, of appearance, and of his own subjective will and values. Thus he becomes, in the final scene, the victim of appearances and is accused of murdering Helena. It is only with Helena's arrival that all apparent contradictions are resolved, as appearance unites with reality, and Bertram is saved.

If health is the opposite of sickness, then it must involve the maintenance of natural law; the unity of appearance and reality, will and truth, intention and act, the derived natural self and achieved apparent self. Helena has such a unity: "she derives her honesty and achieves her goodness" (AWW I.i.41-2). Helena not only has her own health, her own unity, but also the gift of restoring health to others. This ability seems to have a double source: the prescriptions bequeathed her by her father are reinforced by a superhuman grace. Whether this grace is also inherited is left unclear:

> There's something in't
> More than my father's skill, which was the great'st
> Of his profession, that his good receipt
> Shall for my legacy be sanctified
> By th' luckiest stars in heaven.
> (AWW I.iii.237-41.)

The likeliest interpretation, however, is that this grace is peculiar to Helena, and associated with her unity, since her "appliance" is as important as the remedy itself.[6] There are numerous suggestions in the play that Helena's gift has heavenly origins,[7] and this "heaven" can be associated with natural law or natural order.

If we accept such an association, then Helena's speech at the end of the first scene becomes pivotal:

Helena. Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie,
Which we ascribe to heaven; the fated sky
Gives us free scope; only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull
What power is it which mounts my love so high,
That makes me see, and cannot feed mine eye?
The mightiest space in fortune nature brings
To join like likes, and kiss like native things.
Impossible be strange attempts to those
That weigh their pains in sense, and do suppose
What hath been cannot be. Who ever strove
To show her merit that did miss her love?
The king's disease--my project may deceive me,
But my intents are fix'd, and will not leave me.
(AWW I.i.212-25.)

One of the first things noticed is that Helena's first concern is not with the King's illness; it is with the contradiction within her own existence. She expresses this contradiction more fully when speaking to the Countess:

But if yourself,
Whose aged honour cites a virtuous youth,
Did ever, in so true a flame of liking,
Wish chastely and love dearly, that your Dian
Was both herself and love....
(AWW I.iii.204-8.)

The second thing noticed is the implicit belief in the basic unity and order of nature;[8] the suggestion that nature, through fortune, attempts to join "like likes." The first four lines can then be read thusly: the "fated sky" gives us free scope so long as we are working within or towards this unity; it only pulls us back when we are so "dull" (foolish) as to oppose this order; the remedy (cure) for apparent disorder or sickness in our lives lies within ourselves. The "remedies" "which we ascribe to heaven" (natural law or order) lie within "ourselves" (true or natural selves). The natural self has a natural affinity for such an order or unity if not over-ruled by will or appetite. Thus,

Bertram's father was able to know "the true minute when / Exception bid him speak" (AWW I.ii.39-40).

Helena, like Cressida, has a superior wisdom and awareness concerning the natural order of things. Like Cressida, she experiences "modest doubt... / The beacon of the wise" (TrC II.ii.15-6). Despite the awareness that they may be erring ("my project may deceive me"), both stake everything on love. Hector speaks of the marital relationship as a basic "law of nature": "What nearer debt in all humanity / Than wife is to the husband?" (TrC II.ii.175-6). Both Helena and Cressida dramatically accept the implications of such a union:

> Cressida. I have forgot my father;
> I know no touch of consanguinity--
> No kin, no love, no blood, no soul so near me
> As the sweet Troilus.
> (TrC IV.ii.98-101.)

> Helena. I think not on my father,
> And these great tears grace his remembrance more
> Than those I shed for him. What was he like?
> I have forgot him; my imagination
> Carries no favour in't but Bertram's.
> (AWW I.i.77-81.)

The disruption of such a union is a disruption of the natural order. This disruption takes place in both plays, and the different ways in which it is handled lead to the varying conclusions. Troilus has already, at the time of his separation from Cressida, rejected the importance of the husband-wife relationship. In the Trojan council he argues that Helen is not so much Menelaus' wife as a "theme of honour and renown" (TrC II.ii.199). Placing "renown" above "right," he accepts the world of appearances rather than that of reality. Since time "is the ultimate reality to those who live in a world of appearance,"[9] Troilus

must accept the separation from Cressida as necessary:

> Injurious time now with a robber's haste
> Crams his rich thievery up, he knows not how;
> .....
> And scants us with a single famished kiss.
> (TrC IV.iv.42-7.)

Her unity split, the world of appearances in control, her "kind of self" and "unkind self" again divided, Cressida is doomed. Troilus' final unhappiness results directly from this acceptance of appearance rather than the natural law:

> If there be rule in unity itself,
> This was not she. O madness of discourse
> That cause sets up with and against itself:
> Bifold authority,...
> .....
> ...This is, and is not, Cressid.
> (TrC V.ii.138-43.)

When appearance is divorced from reality, there is no unity. When the endeavour is opposed to natural law, the performance will be loathed. When Troilus refuses to recognize the "bonds of heaven" binding Helen and Menelaus, he assures that his own bonds with Cressida will be "slipped, dissolved, and loosed" (TrC V.ii.153). Having justified Paris' seduction of Helen, he must experience Diomedes' seduction of Cressida. Appearance, detached from reality, reverses itself. The appearance of "honour and renown" costs Troilus heavily. Choosing appearance over reality, renown over the bonds of heaven, he must consequently experience "that a thing inseparate / Divides more wider than the sky and earth" (TrC V.ii.145-6). For Troilus, committed to will, renown, appearance and "earth," there is indeed "no remedy" (TrC IV.iv.55).

Thus, in Troilus and Cressida, Troilus is mover and Cressida the moved. He acts upon Cressida, and the situation in general, but it

is her reaction that forms the basis for the movement of the play. Troilus, for all his energy and action, remains basically unchanged throughout. Lust gives way to hate, hope for revenge replaces hope of fulfillment; yet essentially he remains committed to will, uncontrolled passion, appearance, and, therefore, conflict. Cressida, on the other hand, moves from an ambiguous position to a firm embrace of love and unity. Deserted and doubted by the lover she has sworn never to leave, Cressida's whole world is shaken. Finally, she grasps at the appearance of stability in the form of a "guardian" Greek.

In All's Well, the opposite process occurs. Here Helena is the mover and Bertram the moved. She remains basically unchanged and the movement of the play revolves around the change in Bertram. Helena is a far stronger personality than Cressida and manages, with her healing powers, to maintain control of the action. She in never plagued by Cressida's ambiguity (or, perhaps, her appealing vulnerability). She is, therefore, able to restore order and unity to Bertram rather than succumb to his disruptive will. Love defeats Mars; unity triumphs over conflict. Bertram, like Troilus, seeks "bad success in a bad cause" (TrC II.ii.117). Helena, however, manages to manipulate appearances to coincide with reality (i.e. natural law):

> Why then tonight
> Let us assay our plot; which if it speed,
> Is wicked meaning in a lawful deed,
> And lawful meaning in a lawful act,
> Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact.
> (AWW III.vii.43-7.)

Van Doren and Tillyard both note that "nature" is one of Helena's favourite words.[10] If so, then "law" certainly runs a close second.[11] This

association of "nature" and "law" is typical of Helena's belief that there is a basic order or unity that man should mirror. Social law should be at one with natural law, authority with order. By curing the king she becomes the lawful wife of Bertram. Her dilemma, however, rests in the fact that she is his wife by law but not in appearance, by right but not in practice. The basic cause of this is that Bertram, ruled by appearance or will, has the same faith as Troilus in apparent honour--honour based on reputation or appearance rather than any meaningful concept of right and wrong. Thus, Helena has a double task. She must unite appearance and reality, practice and natural law, in respect to her own situation as Bertram's wife; and, at the same time, save Bertram from the consequences of the conflict between his true and apparent selves. The thoughtless, immature apparent self must not be allowed to destroy Bertram's true inner nobility (derived from his father). The first crisis arises when the King warns Bertram: "Thou wrong'st thyself if thou shouldst strive to choose" (AWW II.iii.146). Rather than force the issue Helena immediately withdraws her suit. The King, however, persists, and Bertram does "wrong" himself. Later, she leaves her home and friends in an attempt to save Bertram from the danger inherent in his false concept of honour:

> Come thou home, Roussillion
> Whence honour but of danger wins a scar,
> As oft it loses all; I will be gone.
> (AWW III.ii.120-2.)

When Helena attempts to affirm her union with Bertram,[13] he rejects both her overture and, by implication, the "non-analytic unity of love."[14] Under the guidance of Parolles, he becomes a follower of Mars (conflict)

not Love (unity):

> This very day,
> Great Mars, I put myself into thy file;
> Make me but like my thoughts and I shall prove
> A lover of thy drum, hater of love.
> (AWW III.iii.8-11.)

Bertram's "thoughts" are obviously based on appearance and will, and he does not realize that the problem consists of reconciling his thoughts to his true self, not his self to his thoughts. Attempting to fit his true self to his thoughts (will) he becomes only a traitor to himself:

> The young lord
> Did to his majesty, his mother and his lady
> Offence of mighty note, but to himself
> The greatest wrong of all.
> (AWW V.III.12-5.)

His true self does retain some influence, as illustrated by his reaction to his mother's letter ("There is something in't that stings his nature, for on reading it he chang'd almost into another man" [AWW IV.iii.2-4]); but his will runs basically uncontrolled. His surrender of the family ring to Diana is a perfect example of the "mad idolatry" which "makes the service greater than the god" (TrC II.ii.56-7). Like Troilus, he becomes the slave of his own unchecked will, his own reliance on subjective value, his own unquestioning acceptance of appearance.

Helena, however, manages to utilize this unquestioning acceptance of appearance, and the ambiguous nature of appearance, to unite appearance and reality, will and order, intention and act, Bertram's natural and apparent selves. He intends, through his affair with Diana, to cure his "sick desires" (AWW IV.ii.35) and win "a heaven on earth" (AWW IV.ii.66), and this, thanks to Helena, is exactly what his actions accomplish. Playing on "the saucy trusting of the cozen'd thoughts" (AWW

IV.iv.23), she causes Bertram to accept in practice the wife he is joined to by law. As in Troilus and Cressida appearance reverses itself, but here it is a controlled and healing reversal.

Helena's main problem is Bertram's false conception of "honour." Honour, as mentioned earlier, can be either apparent (reputation) or true (the defense of the natural order). Ideally, of course, the two are in unity. Bertram, however, places complete emphasis on reputation, and rejects Helena because she lacks apparent honour or the "word" honour. Bertram inherited from his father both a natural self (as noble as his father's and in harmony with his high social state) and apparent honour (the family "name"). Helena, from her father, also inherited a natural self that was good and noble, but no apparent honour. She achieves true honour, however, by her healing of the King, her defense of the natural order. Thus there is really no concept of natural or inherited honour. What is inherited or derived is apparent honour plus a natural self that has the potentiality of achieving an equal or matching quantity of true honour. Honour is a quality of the exterior world, of the outer self,[15] and only the potentiality of it can exist in the innate, natural self. As the King notes:

> That is honour's scorn
> Which challenges itself as honour's born
> And is not like the sire. Honours thrive
> When rather from our acts we them derive
> Than our foregoers. The mere word's a slave.
> (AWW II.iii.133-7.)

Thus (true) honour's scorn is inherited (apparent) honour (honour's born), which is not supported by true honour or the fulfillment of the inherited natural self (is not like the sire). The "mere word," divorced

from the substance, is, as always, a "slave" to the limitations of the physical world--time, chance and death ("Debosh'd on every tomb" AWW II.iii.138).

Helena must, therefore, unite her true honour with an equal apparent honour for Bertram's sake; she must also unite Bertram's apparent honour with a true honour. She achieves this through the exchange of the rings, which are in themselves symbolic of unity. Helena's ring is associated with true honour since it was given her by the King when she restored his health and, thereby, helped maintain the natural order. This she gives to Bertram who has been seeking instead his own false concept of honour in the war. In return she gains Bertram's family ring, which is obviously related to apparent honour or the family "name" ("It is an honour 'longing to our house, / Bequeathed down from many ancestors" [AWW IV.ii.42-3]). Thus, when they exchange the rings, perfect unity between apparent and true honour is attained in a double sense as Helena gains the necessary apparent honour, and Bertram is given true honour.

Another variation on the theme of apparent and true honour involves the concepts of virginity and chastity, the continuous use of the word "honesty" in relation to both Helena and Bertram, and the relationship between Helena and Diana. Virginity is inherited or apparent honesty or chastity ("Mine honour's such a ring" [AWW IV.ii.45]):

> In this sense Bertram's "name" (nobility of title) is analogous to Helena's "name" (virginity), both being inherited rather than achieved kinds of honour.[16]

> Feminine honour and masculine honour are thus equated, so that in the bed-trick Bertram surrenders to Helena his honour of "name" and nobility of title while she surrenders her honour of virginity to him.[17]

"Virginity and chastity are not necessarily synonymous,"[18] however, especially since "virginity, in this play, is a condition which represents nature unfulfilled."[19] True chastity, like the true honour it is related to, is less concerned with appearance than with the maintenance of the natural order and natural law. It can be found in true or chaste love which involves the joining of "like likes" (AWW I.i.219) within the natural order. Bertram considers it honest to "steal away bravely," but we know there is no "honour in the theft" (AWW II.i.29-34) because it flaunts the King's commands and, therefore, natural law. Diana, on the other hand, has a true conception of feminine honour and honesty that moves within the natural order:

> Bertram. For you are cold and stern,
> And now you should be as your mother was
> When your sweet self was got.
>
> Diana. She was then honest.
>
> Bertram. So should you be.
>
> Diana. No.
> My mother did but duty; such, my lord,
> As you owe to your wife.
> (AWW IV.ii.8-13.)

In Bertram's supposed seduction of Diana, honour or honesty is lost on both sides apparently. The substitution of Helena turns this apparent loss of honour into gain as Bertram's dishonourable revolt against the natural law, and against his own natural self, is ended, and Helena's chaste love is honourably fulfilled:

> Shakespeare is also here playing upon the two meanings of honesty (virginity and truthfulness), both Helena and Bertram losing their different kinds of "honesty" in the bed-trick. Until the ring is found in Helena's possession, both of them appear to be dishonest.[20]

The bed-trick solves not only Bertram's revolt against himself,

but also resolves the apparent contradiction in Helena's self. She does, she tells the Countess, "Wish chastely and love dearly that [her] Dian [is] both herself and Love" (AWW I.iii.207). Thanks to the bed-trick, she does in fact sleep with Bertram as Diana, thereby joining "Dian" and "Love" in a chaste love. Her belief that nature inclines towards a natural law which joins "like likes," and her faith that "our remedies oft in ourselves do lie" (AWW I.i.212) so long as our intents are in harmony with this natural law, have been justified. "The ritualized consummation of [Bertram's] marriage with Helena...indicates to the reader that Bertram was destined to be reconciled to Helena in a chaste love."[21]

The reconciliation of Bertram and Helena in a chaste love has implications that reach beyond their individual unity. In All's Well, the frequent capitalization of "Love" sets up an automatic antagonism between the unity of Love and the disorder and conflict of Mars. "The reconciliation," therefore, "of Bertram and Helena stands for a more inclusive order."[22] It implies the absolute unity of the double nature of man and the universe that is found in the "married chastity" of "The Phoenix and the Turtle":[23]

> So they loved, as love in twain
> Had the essence but in one;
> Two distincts, division none:
> Number there in love was slain.
>
> .....
>
> Property was thus appalled,
> That the self was not the same;
> Single nature's double name
> Neither two nor one was called.

> Reason in itself confounded,
> Saw division grow together,
> To themselves yet either neither,
> Simple were so well compounded.

G.W.Knight calls it "the expression of a unity beyond, and yet including, the male and female principles, a faculty of purity, perception and power."[24]

Helena's plan is basically accomplished in the fourth act, and is intermingled with scenes concerning Parolles' downfall. These two themes combine to pave the way for Bertram's reformation in the fifth act. Parolles, throughout, is the typification of fraudulent "appearance." He is continually associated with his clothing or outward demeanor: "Yet the scarfs and the bannarets about thee did manifoldly dissuade me from believing thee a vessel of too great a burthen" (AWW II.iii.202-5); "I will never trust a man again for keeping his sword clean, nor believe he can have everything in him by wearing his apparel neatly" (AWW IV.iii.141-3); "When his disguise and he is parted" (AWW III.vi.100). He is the name, or "word,"[25] divorced from any substance; all words and error but no deeds:[26]

> The fact that Bertram is attracted to Parolles indicates that he is dazzled by shiny appearances. And the symbolic nature of the conflict between reality and appearance...is suggested in the structure of the play by the numerous juxtapositions of Parolles and Helena.[27]

Bertram has earlier said that he will never return home while he can "shake [his] sword or hear the drum" (AWW II.v.91), and the drum is a crucial part of Parolles' outward disguise. It is the loss of the drum that eventually leads to his complete exposure as a "counterfeit" (AWW IV.iii.33). Thus there is no longer a "drum" for Bertram to hear. Parolles downfall suggests the defeat of "appearance."

Parolles himself comes to the realization that "there's place and means for every man alive" (AWW IV.iv.328) in the natural order. Whereas his attempt to maintain an apparent self brought him only danger and discomfort, his acceptance of his true self, however base, ensures survival: "Simply the thing I am / Shall make me live" (AWW IV.iii.322-3). Significantly, at his next entrance (V.ii) his outward appearance has degenerated considerably and is consequently in harmony with his true nature: "He looks like a poor, decayed, ingenious, foolish, rascally knave" (AWW V.ii.23-4). Lafew's reaction to Parolles acceptance of his true nature--"Though you are a fool and a knave you shall eat" (AWW V.ii.50)--parallels Hector's reaction to Thersites:

> Thersites. No, no, I am a rascal, a scurvy railing knave, a very filthy rogue.
>
> Hector. I do believe thee; live. (TrC V.iv.29-31.)

Acceptance of the natural self, however base, brings survival; conflict between the natural and apparent self, however well-meant, brings danger.

Bertram's reaction to the exposure of Parolles, "Come, bring forth this counterfeit module has deceiv'd me like a double-meaning prophesier" (AWW IV.iii.95-7), ironically relates to the other theme of the fourth act since Bertram has just left another "double-meaning prophesier" who is about to deceive him with a "counterfeit module" (Helena substituting for Diana):

> Diana. When you have conquer'd my yet maiden bed,
> Remain there but an hour, nor speak to me.
> My reasons are most strong and you shall know them
> When back again this ring shall be deliver'd;
> .....
> ...You have won
> A wife of me, though there my hope be done.
> (AWW IV.ii.57-65.)

Thus the parallel themes of the fourth act, the defeat of appearance through both the exposure of Parolles and the medicinal, unifying intervention of Helena, combine to bring about the cure and salvation of Bertram in the final act.[28]

The final act, as in Troilus and Cressida, moves toward confusion and contradiction. Bertram becomes the victim of appearances and is accused of the murder of Helena. Diana introduces the same type of paradox that marked the end of Troilus and Cressida. Shakespeare, in fact, "vastly complicates the action"[29] of his original source in order to have such paradoxes. The situation is resolved, however, by the entrance of Helena who brings about a union of appearance and reality, thus solving the paradoxes. This union revolves around her success in reconciling Bertram's natural and apparent selves, his natural self and his deeds, through the bed-trick. "When I was like this maid, / I found you wondrous kind" (AWW V.iii.303-4), she remarks to Bertram, recalling Cressida's distinction between her "kind of self" and "unkind self" (TrC III.ii 149-50). Thus the manipulation of the appearance in which Bertram puts so much faith, the substitution of Helena for Diana, has forced Bertram to become his "kind" or natural self. Instead of forfeiting his hereditary ring through appetite he has, in fact, passed it on to his newly conceived child. By healing Bertram's unnatural split, Helena has also solved the contradiction in her own existence. To her comment, "'Tis but the shadow of a wife you see; / The name and not the thing," Bertram replies, "Both, both" (AWW V.iii.301-2). She has "doubly won" (AWW V.iii.308) Bertram, both in the realm of natural law and the realm of appearances. She resolves the paradoxes, whereas Cressida suc-

cumbs to them. She has, with the aid of Diana, kept "a wife herself" (AWW V.iii.324), whereas Cressida could not.

One aspect of the plays that should be mentioned, although it cannot be treated with the thoroughness it deserves, is the contrasting attitudes towards time in the two plays. As Knights points out,[30] the theme of appearance and reality is closely related with the themes of time and death. In Troilus and Cressida, because the realm of appearances is in control, time is an enemy--destructive and undefeatable. The play begins with abundance and vigour and, with time, moves inexorably towards disease and death. In All's Well, the play begins with death and disease, and moves toward health and rebirth. The play commences with characters dressed in mourning, but the cure of the King quickly lifts the pall of Bertram's father's death. By the close of the play, Bertram, cured, succeeds his father "in manners as in shape" (AWW I.i.58), and Helena is quick with child. Death and change are accepted as part of the natural order, not as disastrous conclusions. Bertram's father, for example, maintained a philosophy of natural continuation that typifies the mood of the play:

> "Let me not live," quoth he,
> "After my flame lacks oil, to be the snuff
> Of younger spirits,...
> .....
> I, after him, do after him wish too,
> Since I nor wax nor honey can bring home,
> I quickly were dissolved from my hive
> To give some labourers room.
> (AWW I.ii.58-67.)

This contrasting attitude towards time and death is most clearly seen in the metaphors used to express the co-existence of the sweet and the sharp. In Troilus and Cressida, the predominant metaphor is of bees

and honey, and the metaphor culminates with Pandarus' image of double loss: "Till he hath lost his honey and his sting; / ...Sweet honey and sweet notes together fail" (TrC V.x.43-5). In All's Well, although the bee and honey metaphor does occur, the predominant one, especially after the King's cure, is rather that of the rose or briar:

> "The time will bring on summer"--
> When briars shall have leaves as well as thorns
> And be as sweet as sharp.
> (AWW IV.iv.31-3.)

The image is of rebirth not death, and of cyclical not devouring time. Seasonal change replaces the concept, "That old common arbitrator, Time, / Will one day end it" (TrC IV.v.224-5). Life does not end with winter in All's Well, for spring and summer return. Thus time and death have an omnipotence in Troilus and Cressida which, thanks to Helena's healing powers, they lack in All's Well.

If Shakespeare is talking of health in All's Well and disease in Troilus and Cressida, then he seems totally in favour of neither. The latter ends with chaos and futility, the former with an unsatisfactory simplicity and one-dimensionality. If the conclusion of Troilus and Cressida lacks order, then the conclusion of All's Well lacks passion; All's Well confirms that marriages are made in heaven, Troilus and Cressida that they are consummated on earth. The dialogue between Helena and the Clown in Act Two suggests that one can never be totally "well" on earth; that such a state is reserved for heaven.[32] At the close of the play we seem to have entered such a "heaven," a formalized, forced personification of natural law, or order. It is informative to compare, for example, Troilus' last emotional discourse on his relationship with

Cressida and Bertram's last speech. "If she, my liege, can make me know this clearly, / I'll love her dearly, ever, ever dearly" (AWW V.iii. 309-10) is completely lacking in emotion, energy or intensity. "His jingle might be the conclusion of a clipped narrative in clever rhyme, or it might be the epilogue of an adult fairy tale."[33] There is something highly unsettling about the manner in which All's Well so often "falls into the stiffness and ceremony of rhyme. This use of rhyme at the high moments of action is indeed extraordinary."[34] Shakespeare "is deliberately evading drama and substituting ritual and cloudy incantation."[35] Troilus' speech, on the contrary, is nothing but passion and intensity. His logic and cause may be faulty, but his emotion seems genuine.

All's Well ends with a formalized, ritualistic, non-emotional order that implies a heavenly stability, control and unity. Troilus and Cressida ends with a passionate, chaotic, non-logical conflict, and a hellish hatred and futility. Neither leaves us satisfied; neither seems a suitable solution to a human dilemma. Approaching Measure for Measure, one of the questions will have to be, "Does Shakespeare manage to synthesize these two partial, unsatisfactory world views?" Can this conflict between order and passion, between truth and blood, between natural law and human emotion be realistically and satisfactorily resolved?

CHAPTER IV

> Duke. I pray you, sir, of what disposition was the Duke?
>
> Escalus. One that, above all other strifes, contended especially to know himself.
>
> (MM III.ii.224-7.)

Measure for Measure has been many things to many critics. The very diversity of the criticism is itself a revealing commentary:

> These conflicting assessments may be taken to reflect changes in literary taste and intellectual orientations; but they are also--and more significantly--related to a distinctive quality of the play itself. Each interpretation has its limited validity; each amounts to an abstraction from the composite whole.[1]

This chapter, therefore, by no means aims at a total interpretation of the play, but merely attempts to illustrate how the themes found in Troilus and Cressida and All's Well continue to operate in the last of the problem plays. The double nature of man and the importance of a harmonious unity between his two modes of being both in society and in the individual himself is again a central issue. The concern with political philosophy found in Troilus and Cressida reappears, in conjunction with obvious echoes of All's Well in "plot, characterization, themes, [and] vocabulary."[2] Specifically, however, Measure for Measure concentrates to a greater degree than either of the earlier plays on the need for self knowledge, especially in the head of state.[3] To achieve order and unity man needs to be thoroughly aware of both his inner and outer selves, his spiritual and physical states, his nature as well as his "place." Since the order or disorder implicit in a ruler may well

extend to his state, self knowledge becomes a vital necessity for king, prince or duke. They must know 'what they are' in every sense.[4]

One reason for the critical divergence on Measure for Measure is that the play deals neither with the complete disorder of Troilus and Cressida nor with the folk-tale simplicity of All's Well, but rather with a realistic composite of the two. "The air of Vienna is poisoned, like Cressida's Troy,"[5] but the restorative machinations of the Duke, "Grace, like power divine" (MM V.i.367), are more reminiscent of Helena'a "Heaven hath through me restor'd the King to health" (AWW II.iii.64). Although the syphilitic metaphor reappears and "the imagery of venereal disease dominates"[6] Measure for Measure quite as much as Troilus and Cressida, the Duke, like Helena, opposes those who cry "no remedy,"[7] and personifies the argument, "Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie" (AWW I.i.212).

The Duke, however, is no less realistic than the characters he attempts to manipulate. He strives to restore order and unity to the complex entity that is the state and his success is significant, but imperfect:

> A lawgiver must be aware of this complexity, must seek to harmonize the natural sources of experience with the moral "law." In Measure for Measure, however, this knowledge is still a strife rather than a harmony; the goodness of human inclination, which must be recognized to attain moral maturity, contains also a seed of evil which the moral law must uproot. The Duke's own self-knowledge, however, still hangs in the balance. It is still a "strife," a "contention," a matter of working out obscure and even contradictory impulses that refuse, so far, to submit to a common unity.[8]

This "evil," in Measure for Measure, is not, as D.L. Stevenson points out, "evil as defined by the prohibitions of church and state, not a post-lapsarian and expected evil":

> It is the evil in man contingent upon his human predicament. It is evil viewed as a destructive element in everyone, the latent capacity of Isabella, of Angelo, even, finally of the Duke (to Johnson's dismay), to unleash angry retaliatory "justice" in order to maintain his personal place or role in society, his own ego intact.[9]

And, it could have been added, his own will unobstructed.

Such an "evil," perpetually inherent in mankind, cannot, as Angelo discovers, be uprooted, nor even simply rejected. It must, instead, be constantly controlled. Because it is part of the physical, mutable world, the maintainance of such control is never certain but creates a constant strife in itself. Thus, although we have been talking of order and disorder, or unity and self-destructive duality, as opposite poles of existence, Measure for Measure recognizes the human truth that absolute unity is as unattainable as absolute chaos. Strife is a pre-requisite of any unromanticized existence, and the vital element becomes whether it is the strife of disorder or the strife against disorder. To continually strive "above all other strifes" (MM III.ii.226) for a self-knowledge that can never be absolute is, therefore, the closest man can come to unity.

To put the problem another way: one of the basic premises of the previous two chapters has been that the problem plays illustrate a consistent conception of the 'double' nature of man and, correspondingly, of the interplay between 'reality' and 'appearance.' 'Reality' is associated with the non-physical, non-sensual, non-temporal aspect of man, the absolute immutability of 'natural law' or 'natural order.' 'Appearance,' on the other hand, is a characteristic of the temporal, mutable, physical, sensual level of being. To the extent that these two modes of being coincide, man lives a unified, ordered, harmonious

existence. To the extent that they are separated and in opposition, a self-destructive, self-consuming strife occurs. To reject either mode of being is no solution whatsoever for, as Hawkes points out, they are "complementary functions which are not mutually exclusive."[10]

To ignore or be ignorant of the physical, temporal side of man, as Angelo does or is, leads to disorder as quickly as ignorance or ignoral of the 'natural law' does in Troilus anc Cressida. "Blood" can no more be rejected than "truth,"[11] but it must be controlled so that it does not attempt to overthrow truth. Control requires self-awareness and maturity, but it brings awareness of a larger freedom, a greater scope, than can be found in the subtle limitations imposed by a separation of, or opposition between, "blood" and "truth," the physical and the spiritual:[12]

> The dramatic tension in poetry between naturalism and natural law reflects the larger issue of the relationship (separation or interaction) between nature and spirit, for the victory of natural law over naturalism is an affirmation of the functioning of the divine world in the natural, a declaration of the interaction of nature and spirit.[13]

In Measure for Measure we also have a more specific concern than in either of the earlier plays with the relationship between order and authority. J.F. Sullivan concludes:

> Shakespeare did not concur in the Tudor appeal to authority against disorder. Instead, his plays imply that order must come first. Authority is not simply a less painful alternative to disorder but, ideally at any rate, a good which in itself is a component of order. In man's fallen state, some degree of disorder is inevitable, but human authority is itself fallible, and, as disorder increases, such authority must also be corrupted; it cannot, therefore, cure the disease.[14]

Authority, in other words, is ideally associated with order; authority is the name, order the substance. As usual, when name and substance

are separated disorder results. It is, therefore, vitally important that the ruler, the personification of authority and of the law , be united within himself. If he is not at one with himself, he can hardly be at one with his laws. If he is not in harmony with natural law; if his physical, outer, actual self is not in harmony with his spiritual reality; if his "place" is not in harmony with his "glassy essence" (MM II.ii.121);[15] then authority in the state cannot be in harmony with natural law or order. As Stanton Millet puts it:

> Angelo and the laws are separate and tyrannous; the Duke and the laws are one, and just.[16]

A ruler must know 'what he is' in both a personal and a formal sense. He must 'be what he is'; and he must, at the same time, 'be what his place is,' that is 'be what a Duke (or a king, or a prince) is.' B.J. Burges discusses the use in Shakespeare of "nature erring from itself" or "I am not what I am," and concludes that "the theme reinforces the idea that order in the nature of things, especially in the nature of man's identity, was an important concept to Shakespeare."[17] Angelo, the "seemer,"[18] is the perfect example of this "I am not what I am" theme applied to the philosophy of leadership, for on first the personal and then the formal level he 'is not what he is.'

Troilus and Bertram, on the one hand, illustrated the limitations of blood uncontrolled and uninformed by natural law or order. The physical self, divorced from natural order, is meaningless, limited, and, eventually, turns back upon itself. Divorced from natural order, it is also divorced from any immutable or absolute truth, and descends to subjective relativity and the rule of appearance. Angelo, on the

other hand, proves that any abstract concept of law and order that rejects blood may well be lifeless and a parody of true order. Any order or 'state' that is divorced from the physical world, from experienced actuality and "pattern,"[19] can only be empty form forever vulnerable to the unrecognized and, therefore, uncontrolled power of "blood." Angelo is at first divorced from his unrecognized physical self; his study of "state" (MM II.iv.7) is, therefore, only a veneer, a form. Not knowing what he is, he 'is not what he is.' Rejecting blood for so long, he is incapable of control when finally forced to recognize its irrefutable existence: "Blood, thou art blood" (MM II.iv.15). Thus he not only remains divided against himself ("When I would pray and think, I think and pray / To several subjects" [MM II.iv.1-2]), but is alienated from his formal place in society. Supposedly the deputy of order, justice and truth, he becomes the agent of disorder, tyranny and falsehood:

> Or, by the affection that now guides me most,
> I'll prove a tyrant to him. As for you,
> Say what you can: my false o'erweighs your true.
> (MM II.iv.167-9.)

There is more than a slight suggestion that the Duke, from the very beginning of the play, is well aware of Angelo's problem. Indeed, his interest in Angelo's character seems to be one of the motivations behind his sudden exit from Vienna. After first mentioning that order must be restored (i.e. that liberty must replace licence), he is quite specific in the second reason he gives the friar for his departure:

> Hence shall we see
> If power change purpose, what our seemers be.
> (MM I.iv.53-4.)

Given the fact that he is aware of Angelo's disturbing attitude towards

Mariana, the Duke's first speech to Angelo himself is interestingly phrased:

> There is a kind of character in thy life
> That to th'observer doth thy history
> Fully unfold.
> (MM I.i.27-9.)

Angelo is, in many ways, virtuous. As Isabella admits, "A due sincerity govern'd his deeds" (MM V.i.444) until his disinherited blood rebels and wins. The Duke seems to see, however, that Angelo's treatment of Mariana implies a cold legalism lacking in human warmth. His slander of her is unforgiveable, separating as it does the name from the substance. His actions are based on a legalistic formality rather than an inner concept, or intuitive knowledge, of order, suggesting that he believes legalism is its own justification even when divorced from human experience. Angelo's self-righteousness, based on his outer virtue, blinds him to his inner disunity which the Duke, as "observer," discovers.

Angelo's lack of inner awareness forces him to rely on legalism rather than order, repression rather than control. According to the Duke:

> He who the sword of heaven will bear
> Must be as holy as severe:
> Pattern in himself to know,
> Grace to stand, and virtue, go.
> (MM III.ii.254-7.)

While Angelo has outward marks of virtue, without grace he cannot stand, nor go. "Hold therefore, Angelo" (MM I.i.42), the Duke tells him; but he lacks the unity, the completeness to do so. He may be severe, but not holy. He lacks grace. Raymond Southall suggests that man has both an inner and an outer realm of conduct, "social man or man's social con-

duct...and man's inner state and conduct":

> The concept of 'seeming,' a very important Shakespearian concept, takes its importance and its dramatic potency from the belief that these two realms may become non-complementary. It is these two realms of conduct that had traditionally been held together by the doctrine of Grace....The play is chiefly concerned with the separation of these two realms of conduct.[20]

So long as Angelo is divided within himself and lacks the unity implied by grace, his potential virtues are limited to empty, and often deceptive, externalization. According to the Duke:

> For if our virtues
> Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike
> As if we had them not.
> (MM I.i.33-5.)

Angelo's virtues do not go forth from him, but rather impose themselves upon him.[21] Unless the Duke can expose "this well-seeming Angelo" (MM III.i.223) to himself, and bring about unity through self-awareness, Angelo's potential virtues will be wasted; and Angelo himself will be wasted on his formal, repressive, outer "virtue." Thus the Duke, as the representative of natural law and order, must act.[22] It is his right and his duty:

> Thyself and thy belongings
> Are not thine own so proper as to waste
> Thyself upon thy virtues, they on thee.
> Heaven doth with us as we with torches do,
> Not light them for themselves.
> (MM I.i.29-33.)

Thus, when he later says to Isabella, "It is a rupture that you may easily heal" (MM III.i.235), he is thinking beyond a mere breach of contract to Angelo's deeper illness. The marriage contract is related to the unity of love; it is the reunion of self, which Angelo's union with his fiancee foreshadows, that is of primary importance.

In the first two acts of the play the rupture of word and deed, name and substance, letter and spirit, predominates the action. W.A. Freedman, for example, notices that the "theme of reputation...touches crucially in Measure for Measure virtually every major character."[23] Even the Duke is not exempt. His major reason for leaving, he declares, is to restore order while avoiding a reputation for tyranny.[24] For him to reinstate the "strict statutes and most biting laws" (MM I.iii.19) is undesirable, for that would go against the "pattern" or precedent which he himself set. It would encourage, not heal, disunity. Angelo, however, can combine the authority and power of the Duke with his own apparent "pattern" of "stricture and firm abstinence" (MM I.iii.12). Authority is harshly restored in the Duke's name, but, because the Duke's "nature" is "never in the fight," (MM I.iii.42), there is no rift between the harshness and the Duke's pattern. He need not "do in slander" (MM I.iii.43) of himself.[25]

In the same vein, Claudio claims that Angelo is imprisoning him "for a name" (MM I.ii.158), and only for a name. Juliet was "fast [his] wife" in all except the "denunciation...of outward order" (MM I.ii.136-8). In other words, she was his wife in deed, substance and spirit, and only the "name" of marriage was lacking. Angelo's answer is to condemn Claudio with a severity that exists only in the name or wording of the law, and not in its spirit.[26] Moreover, Angelo is severe in order to maintain his own name or reputation of unallayed justice.[27] Thus, Claudio is condemned "for a name" in a triple sense: for lack of the name "marriage"; for, or by means of, the name, as opposed to the spirit, of the law; and for the purpose of furthering Angelo's name or reputation as a

purveyer of cold, impartial, legal justice. Although Claudio's punishment is legal and just in name, it is small wonder that he is dissatisfied with its substance.

It might also be noted at this point that Claudio's speech on "too much liberty" (MM I.ii.117) echoes the earlier problem plays. The "two opposite attitudes towards sexual relationships expressed through much of the play"[28] expand on the theme of "blood," which is seen alternatively as a life-force and a self-destructive impulse depending on whether it is controlled by, or oblivious of, a higher order. It is associated with sexuality, will, appetite and, particularly, the immaturity and energy of youth.[29] At its best, in the service of natural law, it is the source of fertility and vitality. Uncontrolled, it seeks immoderate liberty or licence with the result that it works in opposition to, rather than in harmony with, natural law. Thus, its search for excessive liberty "turns to restraint" (MM I.ii.120)[30] as it becomes subject to the limitations of the physical, temporal world divorced from natural order and the inner, spiritual self. Troilus, as has been noted, becomes aware of such a limitation without realizing its cause.

Moreover, as Bertram discovers, the restraint increases. Unwilling to place his "blood" at the service of natural law, he becomes its slave as the King forewarned:

> Beware of being captives
> Before you serve.
> (AWW II.i.21-2.)

Blood unrestrained becomes will or appetite which, unsatisfied and unsatisfiable,[31] must eventually turn back upon itself and pursue its own destruction. When liberty sets itself against natural law it becomes

licence, and the self, divided against itself, is sick or poisoned. The poison, like ratbane, results in an unquenchable thirst that must drink though it die:

> Our natures do pursue,
> Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,
> A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.
> (MM I.ii.120-2.)

> What will it be
> When that the wat'ry palates taste indeed
> Love's thrice-repurèd nectar? Death, I fear me.
> (TrC III.ii.19-21.)

> Here, take my ring;
> My house, my honour, yea, my life be thine.
> (AWW IV.ii.51-2.)

The only cure is the restoration of natural law, of freedom within rather than against order, of union and interaction between the double self. Then blood gives natural law vitality and strength; and passion, in the service or as an expression of the natural unity of love, is seen as "something natural, creative, and desirable."[32]

Critics have often noticed an apparent contradiction in Claudio's attitude towards his guilt, or lack of it. "What," asks Schanzer, "are we to make of this young man, who feels deeply sinful because he has cohabited with his wife, and at the same time sees himself as the nominally guilty victim of a tyrannical ruler?"[33] Insofar as Claudio is being condemned for cohabitation with Juliet, he is guilty in name only. Thus he can see himself as victim. Insofar as he doubts the honesty of his attitude towards that cohabitation, however, he will naturally feel guilty of licence. If he thinks of Juliet as his wife, however, then whether their sexual relationship was based on licence ("the immoderate use" [MM I.ii.119]), or controlled by love is between Claudio and his con-

science, not Claudio and the law.

The opposite of too little control over the blood is too much restraint, and it is here that Isabella, as well an Angelo, errs. "It is clear that Isabella sets out with no thought of calling the law into question. Indeed, she and Angelo are at first of the same way of thinking about it."[34] "She sees right and wrong as absolutely clear-cut, and is happiest when they are schematized into formal rules. She fears liberty...and equates it with the licence of Vienna."[35] Like Angelo, she attempts to impose order upon her actions, rather than expressing order through them. External restraint[36] is confused with inner control; the word of the law is confused with natural law (the true substance of the law); an outer order based on repression is confused with the vibrant reality of inner unity. Only unwillingly does Isabella allow Lucio to prod her into pleading that the letter of the law may be misused; that it must be based on experience as well as theory.

Isabella, like Angelo, suffers from a bad case of self-righteousness. They both assume that, because their actions appear virtuous, their motives must be also. "You do blaspheme the good in mocking me" (MM I.iv.38), Isabella indignantly tells Lucio. Similarly, Angelo, when first confronted with his feelings towards Isabella, self-assuredly assumes that the devil is using a saint "to catch a saint," and speaks of the temptation to "sin in loving virtue" (MM II.ii.180-4).[37] Their major concern is with the preservation of a virtuous self-image rather than virtue itself; the status-quo rather than order; reputation rather than inner honesty.

Isabella's flaw is at once more obvious and less serious than

Angelo's. As early as her first meeting with Angelo she is "at war 'twixt will and will not" (MM II.ii.33), as her natural goodness and concern for her brother clashes with her need for a repressive authority that will confirm her own concept of virtuousness. Her first casual reaction to Juliet's pregnancy ("O, let him marry her" [MM I.iv.49]) implies that she finds it more a social than a moral failing; yet she dare not attack the justness of Angelo's sentence, for to do so would be to attack the value of her own desire for "more strict restraint" (MM I.iv.4). To question Angelo's righteousness is to question her own. Under Lucio's prodding, however, her better half emerges and she, like the Duke, argues for a justice in harmony with personal experience and self knowledge:

> Go to your bosom,
> Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know
> That's like my brother's fault.
> (MM II.ii.137-9.)

Angelo answers Isabella's plea for mercy with the argument, "It is the law, not I, condemn your brother" (MM II.ii.80). "He takes refuge in the identification of himself with the officially published word,"[38] and identifies the law absolutely with justice. Apparent mercy argues with apparent justice and the scene is set. The rest of the play concerns itself with changing appearance to reality; and it will end, as Stevenson says, "only when Isabella has really become the thing the argued for her brother in Act II, that is merciful ('against all sense' as the Duke points out); and Angelo has really become the thing he argued for in the great debate of Act II, absolutely just."[39]

The first step in the cure is, curiously, a worsening of the dis-

ease. Angelo, recognizing the folly of his self-righteousness and satisfaction with the outward "form" of virtue, exchanges one type of "seeming"[40] for a worse:

> O place, O form,
> How often dost thou with thy case, thy habit,
> Wrench awe from fools, and tie the wiser souls
> To thy false seeming! Blood, thou art blood.
> Let's write good angel on the devil's horn--
> 'Tis not the devil's crest.
> (MM II.iv.12-7.)

Accepting the folly of form or place without substance, he turns instead to blood without regard for form or place. Rather than attempt to harmonize his new awareness of blood with his old regard for form, he accepts it as an absolute. The result, as seen before, is that "right and wrong...should lose their names" (TrC I.iii.116-8). "Good angel" is written on the devil's horn for, as appearance becomes totally divorced from reality, that is no longer the devil's crest.

By the end of the second act, the divorce is complete. Angelo, whose original concern was to let the "body public...straight feel the spur" (MM I.ii.148-51), now gives his own "sensual race the rein" (MM II.iv.159).[41] Having originally identified himself with the virtue of his 'name,' he now uses that name and "place i'th'state" (MM II.iv.155) against virtue. Name is set against substance, and "false o'erweighs... true" (MM II.iv.169). Power, as the Duke foresaw, has indeed changed purpose, becoming will and appetite. Isabella's final speech in the scene has clear echoes of Ulysses' pronouncement on degree:

> Bidding the law make curtsey to their will,
> Hooking both right and wrong to th'appetite,
> To follow as it draws.
> (MM II.iv.174-6.)

Disorder is paramount, as in Troilus and Cressida, and the end of this act signals the darkest point in the play.

The disorder stems from Angelo, but Isabella lacks the spiritual integration to stand against it, and she too descends to her lowest point. Deprived of seeming authority, she clings more desperately to her personal symbol of virtue--her virginity.[42] Critics have noticed her lack of indecision or "inward struggle" and her use of the royal plural in sacrificing her brother.[43] Her words suggest that there is more than a passing resemblance between her insistent "chastity" and Angelo's austere legalism.

The first, and most obvious, point is that Isabella identifies herself with her technical chastity almost as strongly as Angelo identifies himself with the technical law:

> Then, Isabel live chaste, and brother, die:[44]
> More than our brother is our chastity.
> (MM II.iv.183-4.)

Angelo admits that his "gravity" is a source of secret pride ("my gravity / Wherein--let no man hear me--I take pride" [MM II.iv.9-10]), and Isabella seems to suffer a similar pride with regard to her purity.[45] Both the royal plural and the use of such words as "stoop" and "pollution" (MM II.iv.181-2) are suggestive in this regard. With Isabella, as with Angelo, technical outer virtue, based on repression of an inner self leads to a self-righteousness which is fatal to inner awareness. Both of them fit Isabella's description of "man, proud man":

> Dress'd in a little brief authority,
> Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd--
> His glassy essence.
> (MM II.ii.118-21.)

They are both more concerned with the name, the outer appearance, than the substance. The 'word' gains an importance that is completely out of proportion, and is mistaken for the thing itself or the reality.[46] Angelo, as Mary Lascelles notes, implies that "the officially published word" is irrevocable: "He's sentenc'd, 'tis too late" (MM II.ii.55).[47] Isabella speaks of "what I abhor to name" (MM III.i.101), and, in fact, seems even more reluctant to "name" the offense than to commit it. Their joint concern with appearance is most clearly seen in their similar attitude to the one obvious, unhideable consequence of an unauthorized sexual relationship--illegitimate children. Angelo suggests that Claudio's most serious offense, the one that deserves death, is coining "heaven's image / In stamps that are forbid" (MM II.iv.45-6). Isabella, in her statement to the Duke, seems similarly to touch upon her most basic objection to Angelo's proposal: "I had rather my brother die by the law, than my son should be unlawfully born" (MM III.i.188-90).

Isabella's version of chastity seems as sterile and empty as Angelo's version of honour.[48] Lucio says of Angelo, "He is a motion ungenerative; that's infallible" (MM III.ii.107-8), and at times we have the same impression of Isabella. Before she meets the Duke, one of her favourite words is "abhor," and she makes it quite plain that what she "abhors" most is the thought of losing her claim to virtue, her virginity. The word "abhors" is a key one, for it implies a virtue based on a rejection, rather than an acceptance, of life. The prison motif may remind us of "the prison of the flesh,"[49] but, on the other hand, "Abhorson the hangman is a visible presence of death."[50] Until the Duke provides a "remedy," Isabella's insistent chastity is as barren as

Angelo's legalism. Typically, whereas Cressida and Helena transfer their emotional centre from father to husband, Isabella sees her brother in terms of her dead father:

> There spake my brother: there my father's grave
> Did utter forth a voice.
> (MM III.i.85-6.)

Act Three marks the turning point of the play, and those critics who find the play unsatisfactory often place the blame here. Rossiter's statement is not untypical in this respect:

> Nearly all critics are agreed that there is a break in the play.... It is to me quite evident that the texture of the writing--the tenseness of the image and the evocative quality--undergoes an abrupt change when the Duke begins talking prose in III.i.[51]

According to Tillyard, the problem is that the realism of the first half of the play gives way to folk lore in the second.[52] In short, the mood of Troilus and Cressida gives way to the mood of All's Well. As the majority of recent critics accept, however, this change in mood is a part, rather than a disruption, of the overall unity.

The first half of the play has been concerned with disease and disunity, both in the society and in the individual characters. The second half concerns the cure, the "remedy." "Appearance will be used to fight appearance,"[53] and the echoes of Troilus and Cressida at the end of the second act give way to echoes of All's Well at the end of the third:

> Duke. Craft against vice I must apply.
> With Angelo tonight shall lie
> His old betrothed, but despised:
> So disguise shall by th'disguised
> Pay with falsehood false exacting,
> And perform an old contracting.
> (MM III.ii.270-5.)

Helena. Why then tonight
Let us assay our plot, which, if it speed,
Is wicked meaning in a lawful deed,
And lawful meaning in a lawful act,
Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact.
(AWW III.vii.43-7.)

Diana. Only, in this disguise, I think't no sin
To cozen him that would unjustly win.
(AWW IV.iii.75-6.)

The Duke's basic concern is with healing the "rupture" (MM III.i. 25), and he acts to restore unity on two levels. First, on the level of appearance, he sets the scene so that the characters must apparently suffer the "performance" synonomous with their "endeavour". Isabella, willing to sacrifice her brother to her chastity, must suffer the apparent death of that brother. Angelo, attempting to violate Isabella and silence her brother, must pay:

'An Angelo for a Claudio; death for death.
Haste still pays haste, and leisure answers leisure;
Like doth quit like, and Measure still for Measure.'
(MM V.i.407-9.)

The apparent harshness is necessary, for "there is so great a fever on goodness that the dissolution of it must cure it" (MM III.ii.216-7).[54] Only by bringing apparent disorder to its logical conclusion, by making Angelo aware that "he hath sentenced himself" (MM III.ii.251), can the Duke show to Angelo and Isabella the actual performance behind their endeavours, or the logical consequences of their disunity. Not until Angelo does become just, demanding death for his actions, and Isabella, however grudgingly, seeks a mercy for Angelo that she would not grant her brother, can the Duke reveal the full scope of his cure. Only then can he make public his manipulation of a disordered appearance to an ordered reality. As in All's Well, all apparent paradoxes are then re-

solved, as the Duke shows that he has used Angelo's reliance on appearance to deceive him with appearance;[55] and that this deception or craft has neutralized Angelo's worst intentions.

The Duke, using appearance to counteract appearance and craft to fight vice, does not nevertheless condemn Angelo. Rather, he sets the scene so that Angelo is condemned out of his own mouth. The Duke, in fact, acts as catalyst rather than agent. He does not impose "measure for measure" upon the action of the play, but rather facilitates and emphasizes its natural occurrence. Performance matches endeavour, and disunity returns to haunt itself. Man makes his own measure, but must then answer to it. Troilus accepts and propagates disunity both privately (by his complete acquiescence to the sensual) and publicly (by placing subjective value over the law of nature) and, consequently, experiences disunity in the form of Cressida. Deeds return upon their doers, and appearance answers appearance. Bertram asks Helena to depart immediately following their marriage, asking her trust:

> And rather muse than ask why I entreat you;
> For my respects are better than they seem,
> And my appointments have in them a need
> Greater than shows itself at the first view
> To you that know them not.
> (AWW II.v.65-9.)

Later, he becomes the victim of his own action when Diana admonishes him to depart immediately following their supposed assignment:

> My reasons are most strong and you shall know them
> When back again this ring shall be deliver'd.
> (AWW IV.ii.59-60.)

Fortunately Diana's respects, unlike Bertram's, are "better than they seem," but Bertram can have no cause to censure the trick in any case,

for it follows the pattern that he himself set. Effect follows from cause, performance from endeavour. Each man charts his own course, but a particular course must eventually lead to a matching destination. Angelo's statement, "Let mine own judgement pattern out my death, / And nothing come in partial" (MM II.i.30-1), applies to all three plays, and the Duke's manipulations only reinforce and highlight a larger order that pervades the play.

The theme of measure for measure, and of Angelo discovering too late that he has passed judgement on himself by passing it on Claudio, commences even before the Duke, as friar, makes an appearance. Claudio and Lucio, for example, urge Isabella to use her maidenly talents to move Angelo and, as D.L.Stevenson notes, "the obvious result of her wooing Angelo for her brother's life with all her prowess as a woman is what we should expect in a comedy of ideas."[56] Performance matches endeavour as Isabella's "prone and speechless dialect" and "prosperous art" (MM I.ii.173-4) persuades Angelo beyond Claudio's wildest anticipations. Similarly, no sooner does Angelo emphatically draw a distinction between temptation and deed ("'Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus, / Another thing to fall" MM II.i.17-8), than he discovers how fine the distinction truly is:

> Why does my blood thus muster to my heart,
> Making both it unable for itself
> And dispossessing all my other parts
> Of necessary fitness.
> (MM II.iv.20-3.)

No sooner does he condemn Claudio for impregnating Juliet out of wedlock than he, like her, becomes "pregnant with an unnatural thought":[57]

> And in my heart the strong and swelling evil

Of my conception.
(MM II.iv.6-7.)

The Duke, when he appears on the scene, commences to make the parallel between action and reaction even more precise, while at the same time healing the ruptures in both Angelo and Isabella. As Stevenson says, "We are made fully aware that we are witnessing a repetitive plot movement in which the second half of the play is a replaying of the situation discussed in the first half, but to a contrasting conclusion."[58] Unity, instead of disorder, results.

The substitution of Mariana for Isabella serves both of the Duke's purposes admirably. By uniting Angelo with his betrothed, he at least partially restores unity. By presumably preventing the death of Claudio, and preserving the virtue of Isabella, he prevents further disorder. This double restoration of unity and prevention of further disorder is probably the "doubleness of the benefit" which the Duke feels "defends the deceit from reproof" (MM II.i.258-9). Additionally, of course, as Leavis points out, the substitution means that Mariana "plays an important part in the pattern of correspondences and responses by which, largely, the moral valuations are established....Angelo's treatment of her takes its place of critical correspondance in relation to Claudio's offence with Juliet."[59] Thus, even when Angelo discovers that he is not guilty of his apparent major offenses, he is still forfeit to his own earlier judgement. Technically he is innocent of his intended crimes against Isabella and Claudio, but, technically also, he remains guilty of the same fault for which he condemned Claudio to death. Never again will he be able to self-righteously invoke the name, rather than the

spirit, of the law; for to do so would be to condemn himself anew.

The substitution of Mariana for Isabella serves one other purpose, analogous to the substitution of Helena for Diana in All's Well. In the earlier play Diana's final function is to propound a series of paradoxes which emphasize the apparent split between appearance and reality. It is finally Helena who, as the agent of grace, reveals that the paradoxes conceal an actual unity of appearance and reality (or natural law). In Measure for Measure, Mariana similarly utters a series of paradoxes which serve an identical purpose.[60]

The major agent of grace, in Measure for Measure, is, of course, the Duke; and the concept of grace is strongly evident in the final scenes. Grace, in the play, is associated with the unification of the double nature of man. Blood, truth and grace are the only concepts in Measure for Measure that are given an absolute identity. "Blood, thou art blood" (MM II.iv.15), "truth is truth" (MM V.i.48), and grace, which is the marriage of blood and truth, "is grace, despite all controversy"[61] (MM I.ii.24-5). According to Lever, Measure for Measure is "plainly concerned with the broader humanist problem of co-ordinating the spiritual [truth] and natural [blood] forces of personality for the welfare of man upon earth."[62] The Duke, who is continually referred to as "your Grace,"[63] is one of the most obvious and successful co-ordinators in the entire Shakespearian assemblage.[64]

The most difficult aspect of the Duke's task is the re-unification of Angelo. By keeping the apparent performance consistent with Angelo's apparent endeavour, however, he brings the deputy to a realization of his own disunity, and of the logical consequences of such a disunified state:

> Alack, when once our grace we have forgot,
> Nothing goes right; we would and we would not.
> (MM IV.iv.31-2.)

Such self knowledge is the first step in Angelo's cure. Instead of speaking of "the strong and swelling evil / Of my conception" (MM II.iv. 6-7), we find him saying,

> This deed unshapes me quite; makes me unpregnant
> .....
> ...He should have liv'd.
> (MM IV.iv.18-26.)

Nonetheless, he would still use the authority of his position to keep appearance (his virtuousness) separate from reality (the "deed"):

> For my authority bears so credent bulk
> That no particular scandal once can touch,
> But it confounds the breather.
> (MM IV.iv.24-6.)

Not until the Duke answers Isabella's plea to "make the truth appear where it seems hid, / And hide the false seems true" (MM V.i.69-70), an action analogous to Helena's solution of Diana's paradoxes, does Angelo truly accept the necessity of unity between appearance and reality. From the viewpoint of Grace, there can be no split between appearance and reality, and Angelo finally realizes that the Duke, as Grace, cannot be fooled by an apparent split:

> I should be guiltier than my guiltiness
> To think that I can be undiscernible,
> When I perceive your Grace, like power divine,
> Hath looked upon my passes.
> (MM V.i.365-8.)

It is this realization that leads Angelo to champion a true justice:

> Immediate sentence, then, and sequent death
> Is all the grace I beg.
> (MM V.i.371-2.)

True justice (on the personal level) is essentially a self-judgement; the acceptance and enforcement of the concept that performance must match endeavour, and of the statement, "Let mine own judgement pattern out my death" (MM II.i.30).[65] As such, it is based on self-knowledge and a comparative lack of hypocrisy, and is related to grace in that it demands a unification of appearance and reality, of endeavour and performance. Death for his actions is the unity that Angelo desires:

> 'Tis my deserving, and I do entreat it.
> (MM V.i.474.)

His self-cure, encouraged by the Duke's manipulation of appearance, seems complete.

Isabella is a problem of a different sort. The Duke recognizes her potential goodness and self-unity immediately:

> But grace, being the soul of your complexion, shall keep the body of it forever fair. (MM III.i.181-3.)

Isabella, however, is blinded to her own inherent grace by immaturity and lack of self-awareness. She never, unlike Angelo, actively encourages disorder, but is only unaware of the true nature of unity. Helena recognized that "virginity...is a condition which represents nature unfulfilled,"[66] but Isabella, in all innocence, sees it as an end in itself. "Married chastity" ideally represents the physical, sensual world "informed by the divine but not replaced by it."[67] Isabella, unwisely, attempts the replacement of the physical world, and her reliance on the word rather than the substance stems from this one error. Like Bertram, she must move "from a youthful condition to a more mature condition."[68] She must acquire self knowledge.[69]

The first step in Isabella's cure is her acceptance of the Duke's

plot. She is, as Lever notes, "being re-educated in the function of virtue as an active force in the world,"[70] rather than as a rejection of the world. "Virtue," the Duke tells her, "is bold, and goodness never fearful" (MM III.i.208).[71] This plot leads her to lose the appearance of absolute virginity in which she had placed such great store. As Angelo's apparent loss of honour leads him to an awareness of a more profound honour, and his apparent misuse of justice to an awareness of a more profound justice, so Isabella's apparent loss of chastity leads her to an awareness of a more profound chastity.

Isabella's relinquishing of her apparent virginity is her initiation into maturity. It is her acceptance of the meaninglessness of an appearance divorced from reality. Her education is completed through her experience of her brother's apparent death, the logical consequence of her rejection of his plea for life. If true justice is self-judgement, then true mercy is the judgement of others based on that same self-judgement. Thus Isabella's original plea to Angelo for mercy for Claudio was based on an appeal to Angelo's own self-judgement. Later the Duke reiterates this thought:

> He who the sword of heaven will bear
> Should be as holy as severe: [72]
> Pattern in himself to know...
> (MM III.ii.253-5.)

Isabella's mercy towards Angelo in the final act is based on such a newly found self-awareness. Having shown no mercy to her brother, she is now mature enough to show it towards Angelo.

The same Isabella who, luxuriating in her self-image of purity, refused to "her body stoop" (MM II.iv.181) for Claudio's sake, now kneels

with Mariana for Angelo's. Having violently condemned Claudio for his thoughts on death and his intent in pleading with her, she now concedes that "thoughts are no subjects; / Intents, but merely thoughts" (MM V.i.451-2). Most important, having lived by the word and not the spirit of the law herself, she now refuses to condemn Angelo for doing the same:

> My brother had but justice,
> In that he did the thing for which he died.
> (MM V.i.446-7.)

The essence of the Duke's cure involves the same concept of married chastity found in All's Well:

> So they loved, as love in twain
> Had the essence but in one;
> Two distincts, division none;
> Number there in love was slain.
>
> .....
>
> Property was thus appalled,
> That the self was not the same;
> Single nature's double name
> Neither two nor one was called.
>
> Reason, in itself confounded,
> Saw division grow together,
> To themselves yet either neither,
> Simple were so well compounded.[73]

The unity of married chastity, man's sensual nature in harmony with a higher order, signifies a unity in the individuals themselves. Bertram's final acceptance of Helena, his natural wife, implies the cure of his destructive self-rebellion; a cure made possible by the "bed-trick" which turned apparent disorder into lawful unity. The marriage of Angelo and Mariana at the end of Measure for Measure serves much the same purpose. Angelo, like Bertram, may still not seem the ideal husband but Mariana,

like Helena, can honestly state, "I crave no other, nor no better man" (MM V.i.424). Just as personal unity does not always guarantee a perfect character (i.e. Thersites, Parolles and Lucio), so married chastity does not always imply two perfect partners, but merely perfect unity between them.

Nor are Angelo and Mariana the only couple in the play to find married unity. Claudio and Juliet seem to be lacking only the outward name of such a state, for when the Duke asks Juliet, "Love you the man that wrong'd you?" she replies in terms that suggest "love in twain / Had the essence but in one": "Yes, as I love the woman that wrong'd him" (MM II.iii.24-5). Similarly the Duke's statement to Isabella, "What's mine is yours, and what is yours is mine" (MM V.i.534), recalls "Property was thus appalled, / That the self was not the same." Isabella, it seems, is about to trade her legalistically repressive virginity for a true married chastity. Her earlier version of chastity, based on appearance and potentially destructive, gives way to a chastity of grace that unites the sensual with the spiritual, the existence with the essence.

The impending union of Isabella and the Duke serves one other purpose as well. It assures us of the final state of the Duke who, for all his wisdom and desire for self knowledge, also matures throughout the play. As Marsh notes, the Duke too is "man, proud man" (MM II.ii. 118), and at points in the play we laugh at, as well as with, him.[74] Howard Cole goes so far as to suggest that "the play as a whole...reveals a central, consistent purpose...of examining, sometimes satirically and sometimes with high humour, the Duke's credentials for his self-appointed

role as a benevolent Providence."[75] Although it is a bit extreme to suggest that such is the "central" purpose of the play, the Duke in the first act is not completely free of the same self-satisfaction that plagues Angelo and Isabella. "Believe not," he admonishes the friar, "that the dribbling dart of love / Can pierce a complete bosom" (MM I.iii.2-3).[76]

If the Duke's self-satisfaction is based, as he implies, on his own imperturbability and self-sufficiency, then his self knowledge is certainly augmented through the course of the play. As Bayley notes, "The Duke's human nature and weakness appear in his exchanges with Lucio, that most natural of men....The Duke cannot forbear to be human in his own defense."[77] By confessing his love for Isabella, he admits that love can indeed pierce "a complete bosom."

The Duke, like Helena, is basically an agent of grace and unity, but this does not mean that he himself must, from the start of the play, personify perfect grace and unity. Like the other characters, he too matures in self knowledge and awareness. "It is as a representative of this conception of Grace that the Duke passes judgement upon Angelo's insincerity and Lucio's slanders, upon the evils of both an absolute trust in appearance and a cynical disrepect for appearance";[78] but it is as an individual character that he admits his love for Isabella and, thereby, his humanity, thus increasing his personal grace.

The play ends with the characters stripped "of their seeming,"[79] and united both among themselves and in "married chastity." Stauffer suggests that in the problem plays "the canker eats up the rose,"[80] but with Measure for Measure, as with All's Well, the canker would seem to

be cured before the destruction becomes irremediable. Knights feels that the play explores the balance between liberty and restraint,[81] but it might be more accurate to say that it seeks an alternative to both licence and repression. Sensuality without natural order is licence, and apparent order divorced from the senses is repression. The alternative which Measure for Measure attempts to explore is a harmony between blood and truth, or the potential unity of the double nature of man. If Troilus and Cressida seems to have too little truth and order, and if All's Well seems to have too little blood or passion, then this play attempts to strike a path between. If the unity at the close seems imperfect; if we doubt, for example, the depth of Angelo's feelings for Mariana or the complete sincerity of Isabella's plea for Angelo; then it is a realistic imperfection:

> The characters of Measure for Measure, at its close, are presented as men and women on the verge of change, anticipating positive action. The ending is not on a joyous, festive moment as in Shakespeare's earlier comedies.[82]

The close of the play represents only a small advance in the strife against disorder, not absolute victory. Time and change do not end with the play, and neither can the potentiality of disorder. Self knowledge, which Lever calls "the essential quest in Measure for Measure," is an endless journey.

Notes

CHAPTER I

[1]Oscar J. Campbell, Shakespeare's Satires (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1963), p. 121, quoting Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch and John Dover Wilson, ed., Measure for Measure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. xiii.

[2]Franz Boas, Shakspere and his Predecessors (1896), quoted in Ernest Schanzer, The Problem Plays of Shakespeare (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 1.

[3]One of the best example of this attitude can be found in Harold Goddard's discussion of All's Well in The Meaning of Shakespeare, II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951):

> "It is difficult for the imagination not to ask what would have happened if Helena had...resolutely refused, even against the King's wishes, to allow an unwilling bridegroom to go through the empty form of marriage....If Shakespeare had continued his story along these lines, he would have had to throw away most of his inherited plot, but he would have saved a multitude of critics the trouble of apologizing for or explaining Helena's subsequent conduct." (p. 42.)

[4]E.M.W.Tillyard, in Shakespeare's Problem Plays (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965), makes the dubious assumption that Troilus plays the "double part of romantic and unfortunate lover and of leading spirit among the Trojan commanders," and then states, "I fancy that one reason why the play fails to satisfy us completely is that Troilus as a character is made to bear too much, that his double part...take the spectator's aesthetic credulity beyond its powers" (p. 66). William Toole, in Shakespeare's Problem Plays: Studies in Form and Meaning (The Hague: Mouton, 1964), proves to his own satisfaction that All's Well and Measure for Measure are based on a pattern "similar to that employed by Dante in the Divine Comedy," and then calls Troilus and Cressida "somewhat puzzling" because it does not easily fit into the same pattern (p. 231). G.K.Hunter sums up the issue nicely in the Arden All's Well (The Arden Shakespeare Paperbacks [London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1959]): "Assumptions about the harmony towards which the play is supposed to be moving are liable to be arbitrary and unwarranted" (pp. xxix-xxx).

[5]The term "problem plays" normally refers to Hamlet, Troilus and Cressida, All's Well and Measure for Measure, while "problem comedies" refers only to the latter three. Although this thesis omits Hamlet,

the term "problem plays" is retained since the word "comedies" is unsatisfactory.

[6]Tillyard admits that "it is anything but a satisfactory term, and I wish I knew a better" (Problem Plays, p. 9). Schanzer, more strongly, warns that the classification can "cause much harm by fencing plays off from their kindred, exaggerating the supposed similarities between those inside the pale, and their supposed differences from those outside it (Problem Plays, p. 191). Hunter feels that "there is a strong case for avoiding the traditional separation of 'problem plays' from 'romances' and considering as a group the 'later comedies'" (All's Well, p. lv); and A.P.Rossiter, in Angel with Horns (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1961), sees the plays as "tragi-comedies" rather than problem comedies (p. 116).

[7]As Schanzer notes, "Although Boas' notion of what constitutes the Shakespearian problem play is...undefined and muddled--or, dare one suggest, just because of these qualities--both his grouping and his label found very general acceptance in the decades that followed" (Problem Plays, p. 2).

[8]Form and Meaning, p. 237.

[9]Henry Caesar Morris, "Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Criticism of Shakespeare's Problem Comedies," DA, XVII (1957), 1546.

[10]Form and Meaning, p. 10. [11]Ibid, p. 19.

[12]George Leo Geckle, "A History of the Literary Criticism of Shakespeare's Measure for Measure," DA, VI (1966), 6041.

[13]J.W.Lever, ed., Measure for Measure, The Arden Shakespeare Paperbacks (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1965), p. lviii.

[14]A.C.Swinburne, A Study of Shakespeare (London: Chatto and Windus, 1880), p. 203.

[15]William Hazlitt, Characters of Shakespeare's Plays (London and Toronto: J.M.Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1906), p. 64.

[16]Charles Clarke and Mary Cowden Clarke, eds., The Plays of Shakespeare, III (London: Cassel, Patter and Galpin, n.d.), p. 3.

[17]Samuel Johnson, Johnson on Shakespeare, in The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, ed. by Arthur Sherbo, VII (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 404.

[18]Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Coleridge's Writings on Shakespeare, ed. by Terence Hawkes (New York: Capricorn Books, 1959), p. 253.

[19]J.G.A.Dow, "Notes on All's Well," New Shakespeare Society Transactions, 1880-8 (London: Truber & Co.; reprinted Vaduz: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1965), p. 227.

[20]Shakespeare's Plays, p. 220. [21]Shakespeare, pp. 249-50.

[22]Shakespeare, II, 135. [23]Shakespeare's Plays, p. 245.

[24]Shakespeare, p. 194. [25]Shakspere, p. 345.

[26]Shortly after Boas, Georg Brandes, in William Shakespeare: A Critical Study, I (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), suggested that the causes for Shakespeare's "growing melancholy" were as much social (i.e. the growth of Puritanism) as personal: "From Twelfth Night onwards, an unremitting war against Puritanism, conceived of as hypocrisy, is carried on...through Measure for Measure in which his wrath rises to a temptestuous pitch" (p. 282).

[27]O. J. Campbell, for example, who is concerned with the influence of the satiric mode on the problem plays, and specifically with the influence of Every Man Out of His Humour which was written only a few years earlier, would be classified as following Dowden's "development" school; Neville Coghill (see infra, n. 68), who deals with the theory of comedy in the Tudor period as a whole, would be associated with the Boas group.

[28]Edward Dowden, Shakespere: A Critical Study of his Mind and Art (3rd ed.; New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), p. viii.

[29]Ibid, p. vi.

[30]E. K. Chambers, Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., XXIV. 785.

[31]Caroline Spurgeon, Shakespeare's Imagery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), p. 290.

[32]E. E. Stoll notes, in From Shakespeare to Joyce (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1946), that the characters of the heroines in the problem plays have suffered from such "dark period" criticism (p. xviii). It was assumed all too often that, because of the dark lady, Shakespeare must be anti-feminine in these plays, and such criticism has left its mark on general opinion. This is most noticeable in the case of Cressida, though Helena and Isabella have also been affected to a lesser degree.

[33]John Middleton Murry, John Clare and Other Studies (London: P. Neville, 1950), pp. 39-40.

[34]John Dover Wilson, The Essential Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

[35]Una Ellis-Fermor, The Jacobean Drama (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1936), p. 261.

[36]Ibid, p. 7.

[37]C. J. Sisson, "The Mythical Sorrows of Shakespeare," Annual Shakespeare Lecture, 1934 [New York: Haskill House, 1964] (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, XX).

[38]R. W. Chambers, "The Jacobean Shakespeare and Measure for Measure," Annual Shakespeare Lecture, 1937 [New York: Haskill House, 1964] (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, XXIII), p. 1.

[39]Ibid, p. 16.

[40]H. B. Charlton, "The Dark Comedies," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXI (1937), 6.

[41]Mark van Doran, Shakespeare (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), p. 173.

[42]Joseph Anthony Longo, "Shakespeare's 'Dark Period' Reviewed in the Light of Twentieth Century Criticism," DA, XXIV (1964), 2892.

[43]Angel with Horns, 113.

[44]See "The Dark Comedies," p. 6.

[45]Problem Plays, p. 137.

[46]Derek A. Traversi, An Approach to Shakespeare (2nd ed.; New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), p. 62.

[47]Tillyard describes them as "early artistic failures" in comparison with the "later successes of The Winter's Tale and The Tempest (Problem Plays, p. 137). To Traversi, they are "obscure and difficult" (Shakespeare, p. 61). Both, however, tend to emphasize the virtues rather than the flaws in their critiques of the individual plays.

[48]J. C. Maxwell, "Shakespeare: The Middle Plays," in The Age of Shakespeare, The Pelican Guide to English Literature 2, ed. by Boris Ford (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 202.

[49]Virgil K. Whitaker, "Philosophy and Romance in Shakespeare's Problem Comedies," in The Seventeenth Century... (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 339. B. Ifor Evans, in The Language of Shakespeare's Plays (London: Methuen & Co., 1952), says much the same thing: "In Measure for Measure and All's Well That Ends Well, Shakespeare found himself engaged with themes that were too strong for the stories that tried to contain them. Properly the themes he would discuss are tragic" (p. 134).

[50]Shakespeare's Satires, p. 139.

[51]Rossiter lists five attitudes that may be found in a tragicomic play: (1) "a refusal to wholly credit the dignity of man," unlike tragedy; (2) "an emphasis...on human shortcomings"; (3) "any trend

towards suggesting...that the 'other side' to the serious, dignified, noble, famous and so forth is comic"; (4) "offering the comic, but giving it a grating quality which excludes geniality and ensures disturbing after-thoughts"; and (5) "a corresponding attitude toward traditionally funny subjects which insinutates that in some way they are serious... without abolishing the comic situation" (Angel with Horns, p. 116).

[52]Ibid, p. 126-7.

[53]Ibid, p. 128.

[54]Shakspere, p. 384.

[55]Ibid, p. 345.

[56]Schanzer, Problem Plays, p. 2.

[56]Ibid.

[58]Rossiter, Angel with Horns, p. 109.

[59]W.W.Lawrence, Shakespeare's Problem Comedies (New York and and London: The MacMillan Co., 1931), p. vii.

[60]Ibid, p. 4.

[61]The best known example is that of the "bed-trick." Answering modern criticism that it is "immodest" on Helena's part, Lawrence states that the attitude of the Elizabethan audience would have been, "She is lying with her husband, as any chaste wife has a right to do" (Ibid, p. 51).

[62]Ibid, p. 123.

[63]Speaking of the "irony" in the problem plays which, according to the "dark period" critics, proves Shakespeare's unhappy frame of mind, Stoll says, "There is no cynical irony....What irony there is, if of the simple theatrical sort" (From Shakespeare to Joyce, p. 239).

[64]The unhealthy atmosphere over Vienna, for example, need mean no more than that "a Vienna given over to carnal pleasure is demanded by the story--to provoke the Duke to revive the old law of death" (Ibid, p. 238).

[65]Northrop Frye takes much the same position in A Natural Perspective: The Development of Shakespearian Comedy and Romance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965). He suggests that if we approach Measure for Measure as an example of "actual human behaviour," then "after an act or two we decide that, with the possible exception of Lucio, every character in it is insane" (p. 11). "The problems of the problem comedies have to be looked at first of all as conventional descendents of myths" (p. 64), with which the Elizabethan audience was familiar.

[66]Roy Battenhouse, "Measure for Measure and the Christian Doctrine of Atonement," PMLA, LXI (1946), 1029-59; and G.W.Knight, "Measure for Measure and the Gospels," in The Wheel of Fire (London:

Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1949), pp. 73-96. As Toole notes, "The Christian interpreters of Measure for Measure are historical as well as aesthetic critics. They read the play in the light of the philosophy of the time in which it was written" (Form and Meaning, p. 185).

[67]Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare and Reason: A Study of the Tragedies and Problem Plays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964); and Eric LaGuardia, Nature Redeemed: The Imitation of Order in Three Renaissance Poems (The Hague: Mouton, 1966). LaGuardia has so far dealt only with All's Well, but his approach would certainly seem helpful in Measure for Measure and Troilus and Cressida as well.

[68]Neville Coghill, "The Basis of Shakespearian Comedy," in Shakespeare Criticism, 1935-60, ed. by Anne Ridler (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 206.

[69]Form and Meaning, p. 23. [70]Ibid, pp. 23-4.

[71]Ibid, p.22. This clear-cut distinction between Shakespeare and Jonson is primarily found in Coghill who states: "Faced by a choice in such matters, a writer is wise if he follows his temperament. Ben Jonson knotted his cat-o-nine-tails. Shakespeare reached for his Chaucer" ("Shakespearian Comedy," p. 206). Toole makes a point of qualifying this "generalization": "This is that, though the ideas of mercy, of a benevolent providend, governs the framework of Shakespearian comedy, retributive justice, which has been associated with Jonsonian comedy, may be contained within the Shakespearian structure" (Form and Meaning, p. 26). There is obviously a radical clash between such views and O.J.Campbell's theory that the problem plays are Shakespeare's contribution to the "comicall satyre" mode.

[72]Form and Meaning, p. 231.

[73]The argument goes thus: the theme of Troilus and Cressida is that retribution come "inevitably to those men who succumb to disorder": this suggests "a rational, orderly principle in the universe"; the Elizabethan audience associated such a principle with Christianity; the only remedy for such disorder "lies in the Christian concept of repentence, penance, and pardon, which in Troilus and Cressida is conspicuously absent." Therefore, Troilus and Cressida, by implication supports the Christian pattern of the other problem plays. (Ibid, p.236.)

[74]Ibid, pp. 185-6.

[75]Nature Redeemed, pp. 7-8. [76]Ibid, p. 11. [77]Ibid, p. 170.

[78]G.W.Knight, "The Philosophy of Troilus and Cressida," in The Wheel of Fire, pp. 47-72.

[79]Shakespeare and Reason, p. 2. [80]Ibid, p. 10. [81]Ibid, p. 15.

[82]Ibid, p. 17. [83]Ibid, pp. 18-9. [84]Ibid, p. 19.

[85]Ibid, p. 20. [86]Ibid, p. 23.

[87]Ibid, p. 35. This seems related to G. Gordon's comments on "Shakespeare's Women," in Shakespearian Comedy and Other Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1944): "In woman alone, Shakespeare seems to say --not in all women by no means, but in the best--will you find that perfect harmony and balance of the parts of human nature, which is the basis and first condition of a happy life" (p. 53).

[88]Shakespeare and Reason, p. 37. [89]Ibid, p. 73. [90]Ibid.

[91]Ibid. [92]Ibid, p. 74. [93]Ibid, p. 98.

[94]Brian Morris, in "The Tragic Structure of Troilus and Cressida," SQ, X (1959), sums up this viewpoint when he speaks of "an increasing uneasiness, a sense that the plays differ from each other perhaps more than from others of Shakespeare's plays, a feeling that they have been forcibly and unequally yoked together" (p. 482).

[95]Problem Plays, p. 6. [96]Ibid, p. 7.

[97]Mind and Art, p. 92. [98]"The Dark Comedies," p. 11.

[99]Ibid, p. 45. [100]"Mythical Sorrows," p. 14.

[101]Problem Plays, p. 98.

[102]Ibid, p. 111. Tillyard is quoting Van Doren, Shakespeare, p. 184.

[103]Problem Plays, p. 112. [104]Ibid, p. 115.

[105]The Arden edition of All's Well That Ends Well, ed. by G.K. Hunter (supra, n. 4) is used throughout.

[106]Problem Plays, p. 115.

[107]Tillyard implies that the seduction takes place before Bertrand receives his mother's letter or learns of Helena's supposed death, but the play itself strongly implies that he knew of these things before keeping his midnight appointment.

[108]Problem Plays, p. 115. [109]Ibid, p. 138. [110]Ibid, pp. 78-9.

[111]Ibid, p. 82. [112]Ibid, p. 66.

[113]For example, O.J.Campbell, A.P.Rossiter and Raymond Southall.

[114]Raymond Southall, "Troilus and Cressida and the Spirit of Capitalism," in Shakespeare in a Changing World, ed. by Arnold Kettle

(New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1964), p. 228. This conclusion, in all three critics, is based primarily upon Troilus' imagery and the fact that "will," Troilus' main characteristic, also means "carnal appetite" or "lust."

[115]Tillyard, unfortunately, is not the only critic to take this position. According to Charlton, Troilus "becomes for the first time a real assest to his fellows" after the desertion of Cressida, since earlier his "sentimental" love interfered with his military ability: "For the world then, Troilus is a greater asset at the end of the play, and Cressida less a source of harm." With unconscious irony, he finishes by asking, "Is this a cynic's solution?" ("The Dark Comedies," pp. 17-9).

[116]Angel with Horns, p. 146.

[117]Numerous critics have noted similarities between Hamlet and Troilus and Cressida, and Hamlet and Measure for Measure. To name only a few: Tillyard points out that in Troilus and Cressida "there are features that correspond to the masterly pattern in Hamlet" (Problem Plays, p. 86); Maxwell says that Troilus and Cressida "is linked to Hamlet by its imagery" ("The Middle Plays," p. 213); Spurgeon discusses the similar food and disease imagery in Hamlet and Troilus and Cressida (Imagery, pp. 320-4); and Evans concludes that Shakespeare "exchanged... a number of images between Measure for Measure and Hamlet and the closeness of the repetition is rare in any other period of his work" (Language, p. 134).

[118]The Signet edition of Troilus and Cressida, ed. by Daniel Seltzer (New York: The New American Library, 1963), is used throughout.

[119]John Bayley, The Character of Love (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 46.

[120]This by no means refers to an appearance/reality dichotomy under strict philosophical criteria, but is used only in the most basic manner. There is a very real sense, for example, in which Bertram is deceived by "appearances" in the matter of the "bed-trick" and in the character of Parolles.

[121]The Arden edition of Measure for Measure, ed. by J.W.Lever (supra, n. 13) is used throughout.

[122]Form and Meaning, p. 237.

CHAPTER II

[1]Kenneth Muir, "Troilus and Cressida," Shakespeare Survey, VIII (1955), 28.

[2]Many critics feel that the play is isolated not only from the other problem plays, but from all other Shakespearian works. B. Ifor Evans, in The Language of Shakespeare, states: "I leave Troilus and Cressida until last because it stands so much in an almost aggressive isolation linguistically" (p. 132). J.C.Maxwell, in "Shakespeare: The Middle Plays," also calls it the "most isolated" of the plays (p. 213).

[3]"Everyone would agree...that the two themes [of the play] are approximated through having as motives a woman, each bad in her own way" (E.M.W.Tillyard, Shakespeare's Problem Plays, p. 55). Even Anna Jameson who, in Shakespeare's Heroines (London: G. Bell, 1889), takes great pleasure in fulsomely expounding on the virtues of Helena ("the union of strength of passion with strength of character" [p. 124.]) and Isabella ("angel of light" [p. 78]) noticeably avoids mentioning Cressida.

[4]Theodore Spencer, Shakespeare and the Nature of Man (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1942), p. 121.

[5]Tillyard, Problem Plays, p. 57.

[6]See, for example, L.C.Knights, "The Theme of Appearance and Reality in Troilus and Cressida," in Some Shakespearian Themes and an Approach to Hamlet (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 57; and Raymond Southall, "Troilus and Cressida and the Spirit of Capitalism," p. 227.

[7]Derek Traversi, An Approach to Shakespeare, p. 63.

[8]Una Ellis-Fermor, in The Frontiers of Drama (Suffolk: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1945), says that "this play is an attempt...to find that image" of absolute value which is subject to neither time, death, nor appearance (p. 71), but apparently does not feel Cressida's speech relevant.

[9]Tillyard, Problem Plays, p. 76.

[10]Troilus' very first speech joins them ("Why should I war without the walls of Troy / That find such cruel battle here within" TrC I.i.2-3), as does his last major speech. When he states, "And, thou great-sized coward, / No space of earth shall sunder our two hates. ...Hope of revenge shall hide our inward woe" (TrC V.x.26-31), he is presumably speaking of Achilles, his "hate" in war; but the words themselves cannot help but remind us of Diomedes, the other of his "two hates." In actual fact, it should be noted, the conjunction is always

between war and "will" or lust (or, as Thersites would put it, "wars and lechery" [TrC V.ii.192]). However, since many critics feel that Troilus' feelings really are "love," the discrepancy should perhaps be passed over here and left until later.

[11]Donald A. Stauffer, Shakespeare's World of Images (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1949), pp. 136-7. Such an attitude brings to mind R.W.Chambers remark in "The Jacobean Shakespeare and Measure for Measure," on problem play critics: "Critics look for irony and cynicism. They find it by interpreting everything ironically" (pp. 26-7).

[12]Knights, "Appearance and Reality," p. 69.

[13]See respectively, G.W.Knight, "The Philosophy of Troilus and Cressida," p. 47; Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare and Reason: A Study of the Tragedies and Problem Plays, p. 2; Tillyard, Problem Plays, p. 86; and O.J.Campbell, Shakespeare's Satires, p. 108.

[14]R.A.Foakes, in "Troilus and Cressida Reconsidered," in Troilus and Cressida, ed. by Daniel Seltzer, seems determined to be scrupulously, if negatively, fair: "The Trojans are no better than the Greeks" (p. 268). A.P.Rossiter sees both sides as exemplifying the fact that "if every individual thinks freely for himself and follows his own will, then chaos results, in which all order is lost" (Angel with Horns, p. 148). Raymond Southall, in "Troilus and Cressida and the Spirit of Capitalism," feels that the Greek and Trojan camps illustrate "the relationship between the growing predominance of the middle class and the deterioration of social relationships" (p. 228).

[15]It is, of course, possible to accept Ulysses' description of order versus chaos without accepting the rest of his ideology or the general worth of the man himself. He is quite capable of twisting valid philosophical speculation to fit specific political ends. The split between order and authority which Ulysses typifies is discussed at greater length in relation to Measure for Measure.

[16]See, for example, Tillyard, Problem Plays, pp. 77-8.

[17]Ibid, p. 78.

[18]Ulysses' description (TrC IV.v.96-112) is so at odds with Troilus' actual behaviour that it immediately places under suspicion both Ulysses' integrity and the dramatic intent of his alliance with Troilus. Troilus hardly seems to be "not soon provoked." Moreover, the fact that his "election" "Is led on in the conduct of [his] will-- / [His] will enkindled by [his] eyes and ears" (TrC II.ii.62-3) gives the lie to "yet gives he not till judgement guide his bounty."

[19]"Let us, like merchants, / First show foul wares, and think perchance they'll sell" (TrC I.ii.358-9); "Weigh you the worth and honour of a king / So great as our dread father in a scale / Of common ounces?" (TrC II.ii.26-8); "We turn not back the silks upon the merchant / When we have soiled them" (TrC II.ii.69-70); "And turned crowned kings to merchants" (TrC II.ii.83).

[20]Even Tillyard is forced to admit that Troilus, his hero, is "defective in wit but strong in will" (Problem Plays, p. 68).

[21]Knights, "Appearance and Reality," p. 63.

[22]Harold C. Goddard, The Meaning of Shakespeare, II, 15.

[23]Knights, "Appearance and Reality," p. 69.

[24]Shakespeare and Reason, p. 86.

[25]In All's Well the basic disorder is quickly cured when Helena heals the king, but it continues in the more specific person of Bertram and his young companions. Bertram has a notorious aversion to the medicinal effects of Helena, but finally succumbs as the title, All's 'Well' That Ends 'Well', suggests.

[26]"She is a theme of honour and renown" (TrC II.ii.199).

[27]"Appearance and Reality," p. 68.

[28]Tillyard, Problem Plays, p. 52.

[29]"The Middle Plays," p. 213.

[30]Seltzer, Troilus, p. xxv.

[31]Angel with Horns, p. 150. [32]Ibid, p. 150.

[33]Problem Plays, pp. 52-3.

[34]This is the same Troilus who, in the Trojan council scene, craftily gave all manner of reasons why Helen should be kept, and only on achieving success finally burst out with his true purpose: "Troilus... dropping any pretence at argument, enthusiastically proclaims the glory for which Helen is a pretext" (Tillyard, Problem Plays, p. 67).

[35]Spencer, Nature of Man, p. 115.

[36]Traversi, Shakespeare, p. 79.

[37]"The Spirit of Capitalism," p. 231.

[38]Ibid, p. 222. [39]Ibid, p. 225. [40]Ibid, p. 229.

[41]Satires, p. 11; and Angel with Horns, p. 125.

[42]"The thematic function of Time here is simply to define the sensibility of Troilus and, consequently, that of the play: Time is appetitive, sensual and limiting" (Southall, "The Spirit of Capitalism," p. 227).

[43]Angel with Horns, p, 138.

[44]"The Spirit of Capitalism," p. 230.

[45]Angel with Horns, p. 148.

[46]There is, for example, nothing of the ideal love of Shakespeare's "The Phoenix and the Turtledove" in Troilus' love:

> "So they loved as love in twain
> Had the essence but in one;
> Two distincts, division none:
> Number there in love was slain."

[47]Cf. Chaucer's Troilus in his Troilus and Criseyde:

> "'For which, with humble, trewe and pitous herte,
> A thousand tymes mercy I you preye;
> So rueth on myn aspre peyes smerte,
> And doth somwhat as that I shal yow seye,
> And lat us stele awey bitwixe us tweye;
> And thynk that folie is, whan man may chese,
> For accident his substaunce ay to lese.'"
> (IV. 1499-1505.)

[48]Shakespeare, II, 24.

[49]William B. Toole, Shakespeare's Problem Plays: Studies in Form and Meaning, p. 202.

[50]"Let Mars divide eternity in twain" (TrC II.iii.246).

[51]John Bayley, The Character of Love, p. 46.

[52]The importance of self-knowledge, especially for a ruler, is more fully discusses in relation to Measure for Measure.

[53]Bayley, Love, p. 46.

[54]Shakespeare, II, 8.

[55]Problem Plays, p. 55.

[56]Foakes perceptively notes, "We laugh at [Troilus] and with her" ("Troilus," p. 67).

[57]Her words, "But more in Troilus thousandfold I see / Than in the glass of Pandar's praise may be" (TrC I.ii.296-7), may also indicate a superior wisdom. Evans notes that in Measure for Measure there is consistent use of imagery "which, in one way or another, contrasts the real object and its reflection in a glass, the shadow and the thing.... Throughout, the comparison is between the real thing and the unreal imitation" (Language, p. 137). In one sense, Cressida is in love with Troilus' real, inner, potential self; but his outer, apparent self, the "unreal imitation," is so much in control throughout the play that she has little chance to reach the Troilus she loves.

[58]"Troilus," p. 267.

[59]Language, p. 142.

[60]"Troilus," p. 267.

[61]Shakespeare, p. 67.

[62]Love, p. 129.

[63]Foakes, "Troilus," p. 271.

[64]"This relationship, of course, is openly 'symbolized' in the combat between Hector and Ajax (IV,v), when Hector refuses to carry on the duel with his 'cousin-german' and Ajax agrees to call a truce" (Traversi, Shakespeare, p. 74).

[65]Ibid, p. 69.

[66]Foakes, "Troilus," p. 271.

[67]A Continental visitor to England at the time noted that "when a foreigner or an inhabitant goes to a citizen's house, or is invited as a guest, and having entered therein, he is received by the master of the house, the lady, or the daughter, and by them welcomed...he has even a right to take them by the arm and to kiss them...which is the custom of the country, and if anyone does not do so, it is regarded and imputed as ignorance and ill-breeding on his part" (Samuel Kiechal, "England and the English, 1584" [London, 1865], quoted in William Brenchley Rye, ed., England as Seen by Foreigners [in the days of Elizabeth and James the First], [New York: Benjamin Blom, 1967], p. 90).

[68]Even Ulysses' supporters find his actions a bit difficult to condone. Many attempt to do so by implying that he has in mind some sort of "test" for Cressida, but there seems little justification for this supposition. Toole admits, "We could think more of Ulysses for refusing the kiss if he had not devised the test" (Form and Meaning, p. 214). Even S.L.Bethell, who vigorously attempts to depict Ulysses as "abstract Worldly Wisdom," is forced to agree, in Shakespeare and the Popular Dramatic Tradition (London: Staples Press, 1954), that his denunciation of Cressida is out of place in any realistic reading of the play: "Speaking naturalistically, we should admire this moral rectitude more heartily if Ulysses had not himself initiated the general kissing" (p. 100).

[69]Toole, Form and Meaning, p. 214.

[70]Van Doren, Shakespeare, p. 167.

[71]Given the motif of the double self, it is tempting to see in Cressida's final speech an eye/I pun:

> "Troilus, farewell. One eye yet looks on thee,
> But with my heart the other eye doth see.
> Ah, poor our sex! This fault in us I find
> The error of our eye directs our mind.
> What error leads must err. O, then conclude
> Minds swayed by eyes are full of turpitude."
> (TrC V.ii.104-9.)

Also, given the fact that Troilus' decisions are "led on in the conduct of [his] will-- / [His] will enkindled by [his] eyes and ears" (TrC II.ii.62-3), it is ironic that Cressida's statement has more application to Troilus than to herself. "What error leads must err" strongly echoes Hector's earlier warning to Troilus about "bad success in a bad cause" (TrC II.ii.117).

[72]In regard to Cressida's attachment to Diomedes, it is interesting to recall Pandarus' bragging statement: "Our kindred...are burrs, I can tell you; they'll stick where they are thrown" (TrC III.ii.111-4). Cressida is certainly "thrown" to Diomedes. Is it any wonder that she sticks there?

[73]"Troilus," p. 271.

[74]Shakespeare, p. 68.

[75]Form and Meaning, p. 220.

[76]W.W. Lawrence, Shakespeare's Problem Comedies, pp. 122-3.

CHAPTER III

[1]L.C. Knights, "The Theme of Appearance and Reality in Troilus and Cressida," p. 72.

[2]The association between the word "well" and health is made by Helena and the Clown (AWW II.iv.1-12). Other than the title, this is the only point in the play where the word "well" plays a significant role.

[3]The King also makes a distinction between sickness and nature, and implies a connection between health and nature thereby: "Nature and sickness / Debate it at their leisure" (AWW I.ii.74-5).

[4]The King's illness, unlike Bertram's, is purely physical. It suggests a disorder in the external world, the state which he governs,

not in the King himself as an individual.

[5]The definition of "kind," in C.T.Onions, A Shakespeare Glossary (2nd ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966), runs in part, "natural disposition or character...nature in general or in the abstract, established order of things...." (p. 122).

[6]G.W.Knight, in "The Third Eye," in The Sovereign Flower: On Shakespeare as the Poet of Royalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), feels that "Helena functions as a medium only; but this function is one with her poetic Shakespearian insight, born of love" (p. 154).

[7]"Inspired merit"; "The help of heaven"; "Of heaven, not me, make an experiment" (AWW II.i.147-53); "A showing of a heavenly effect in an earthly actor" (AWW II.iii.23-4); "Heaven hath through me restor'd the King to health" (AWW II.iii.63-4). Such comments, together with Lafew's remark, "Hence is it that we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear" (AWW II.iii.3-6), contrast with the attitude towards Cassandra's warnings in Troilus and Cressida: "This foolish, dreaming, superstitious girl...." (TrC V.iii.78).

[8]William B. Toole, in Shakespeare's Problem Plays: Studies in Form and Meaning, feels that "Helena is directed in her enterprise by her intuition and faith. These faculties lead her to believe--and, the action of the play proves, rightly so--in a universe which is divinely rational and ultimately beneficient" (p. 137).

[9]Knights, "Appearance and Reality," p. 71.

[10]Mark Van Doren, Shakespeare, p. 184; and E.M.W.Tillyard, Shakespeare's Problem Plays, p. 111.

[11]"What law does vouch mine own" (AWW II.v.83); "You see it lawful then" (AWW III.vii.30); "And lawful meaning in a lawful act...." (III.vii. 45-7). Helena seems to use the word "law" to refer to both social law and natural law simultaneously.

[12]The idea of "scar" seems to be a fairly recurrent metaphor in All's Well, associated with appearance and with war: "You shall find... one Captain Spurio, with his cicatrice, an emblem of war, here on his sinister cheek" (AWW II.i.20-3, italics mine); "Whence honor but of danger wins a scar" (AWW III.iii.121); "Yonder's my lord your son with a patch of velvet on's face; whether there be a scar under't or no, the velvet knows; but 'tis a goodly patch of velvet. His left [sinister] cheek is a cheek of two pile and a half, but his right cheek is worn bare" (AWW IV.v.90-4).

[13]"Strangers and foes do sunder and not kiss" (AWW II.v.86) recalls her earlier "nature brings / To join like likes, and kiss like native things" (AWW I.i.218-9).

[14]Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare and Reason: A Study of the Tragedies and Problem Plays, p. 123.

[15]See, for example, Falstaff's famous speech in Henry IV, Part One, where honour is associated not only with "word" as opposed to substance, but also with the armour imagery discussed in connection with the outer self in the previous chapter:

> "What is honour? A word. What is in that word honour? What is that honour?...Therefore I'll none of it--honour is a mere scutcheon, and so ends my catechism." (V.i.)

[16]James L. Calderwood, "Styles of Knowing in All's Well," MLQ, XXV (1964), 283.

[17]Ibid, p. 291.

[18]John F. Adams, "All's Well That Ends Well: The Paradox of Procreation," SQ, XII (1961), 262.

[19]Eric La Guardia, Nature Redeemed: The Imitation of Order in Three Renaissance Poems, p. 165.

[20]Calderwood, "Styles of Knowing," p. 292.

[21]LaGuardia, Nature Redeemed, p. 163.

[22]Ibid, p. 150.

[23]Oscar James Campbell, ed., The Sonnets and Songs of Shakespeare (New York, Toronto and London: Bantam Books, 1964), pp. 306-8.

[24]"The Third Eye," pp. 156-7.

[25]Hawkes points out that Parolles is a "manifold linguist" (AWW IV.iii.227-8), aside from the obvious significance of his name (Shakespeare and Reason, p. 87).

[26]For the connection between words and errors, and their opposition to deeds, see also "My love with words and errors still she feeds / But edifies another with her deeds" (TrC V.iii.111-2).

[27]Toole, Form and Meaning, p. 155.

[28]Derek Traversi's term "spiritual integration," which he uses while discussing what is lacking in Troilus and Cressida, in An Approach to Shakespeare (p. 81), could probably also be used to describe the cure of Bertram in that his natural and apparent selves become integrated.

[29]Tillyard, Problem Plays, p. 104.

[30]"Appearance and Reality," p. 57.

[31]Insofar as the concept of rebirth is concerned, Adams notes that "while Bertram, in his riddle, in effect identifies the ring which he wears with the powers of generation, at the same time he denies these powers," until Helena's "cure" takes effect ("Paradox of Procreation," p. 261).

[32]Helena. My mother greets me kindly; is she well?
Clown. She is not well, but yet she has her health; she's very merry, but yet she is not well. But thanks be given she's very well and wants nothing i'th'world; but yet she is not well.
Helena. If she be very well what does she ail that she's not very well?
Clown. Truly, she's very well indeed, but for two things.
Helena. What two things?
Clown. One, that she's not in heaven, whither God send her quickly! The other, that she's in earth whence God send her quickly! (AWW II.iv.1-12.)

[33]Van Doren, Shakespeare, p. 179.

[34]Tillyard, Problem Plays, p. 100.

[35]Ibid, p. 102.

CHAPTER IV

[1]J.W.Lever, ed., Measure for Measure, p. lvii.

[2]G.K.Hunter, ed., All's Well That Ends Well, p. xxiii. Hunter lists as similarities:

> "(1) The woman with clear intelligence and a sense of mission, who starts out of her sphere and entangles a nobleman....(2) The process of development out of frigid immaturity through active evil into humbled wisdom and acceptance of life....(3) The legalistic handling of the dénouement." (p. xxiv.)

Another obvious similarity is, of course, the presence in both plays of the "bed-trick" (p. xliv), and the fact that it is used to fulfill early conditions that both Bertram and Angelo set down for their own downfall (i.e. "When thou canst get the ring upon my finger..." [AWW III.ii.56-8]; "When I that censure him do so offend..." [MM II.i.29]).

[3]The possibly biblical origin of the title has often been noted by critics: "with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again" (Matt. 7:2). The quotation has been used to justify the view-

point that the play is concerned with Christian Mercy versus Old Testament Justice, but, taken in context, the passage is concerned not so much with mercy as with the necessity, especially for the judge, of self knowledge and a lack of hypocrisy: "Judge not that ye be not judged. For with what judgement ye judge, ye shall be judged....Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye" (Matt. 7:1-5). This has obvious relevancy to Angelo's position.

[4] Agamemnon. We dare not move the question of our place
Or know not what we are.
(TrC II.iii.84-5.)

L.C.Knights, in "The Theme of Appearance and Reality in Troilus and Cressida," also relates the "analogy of the eye," used in Ulysses' debate on fame with Achilles, to a Grecian text "where the analogy is part of an argument that leads up to the necessity for the statesman of self-knowledge" (p. 61).

[5] Mark Van Doren, Shakespeare, p. 186. See also O.J.Campbell, in Shakespeare's Satires: "The two plays are alike in possessing a background of social disintegration" (p. 139).

[6] Derek Traversi, An Approach to Shakespeare, p. 110.

[7] I.e. Troilus ("No remedy" [TrC IV.iv.55]); the King, who speaks of "our past-cure malady" (AWW II.i.119), leading Helena to claim, "What I can do can do no hurt to try, / Since you set up your rest 'gainst remedy" (AWW II.i.133-4); Escalus, who repeats twice, "There is no remedy" (MM II.i.278 and 282); and Angelo, who tells Isabella, "Maiden, no remedy" (MM II.ii.48).

[8] Traversi, Shakespeare, p. 120. Warren Smith, in "More Light on Measure for Measure," MLQ, XXIII (1962), substantially agrees. He finds it interesting that the same critics who draw attention to the statement, "One that, above all other strifes, contended especially to know himself" (MM III.ii.226-7), "admit no growth in the character from the beginning of the play to the end. The fact that he strives to know himself hardly signifies that the Duke has already arrived at self-knowledge in the opening scenes" (p. 320).

[9] D.L.Stevenson, The Achievement of Shakespeare's Measure for Measure (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 133.

[10] Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare and Reason: A Study of the Tragedies and Problem Plays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 10.

[11] "Blood" and "truth" become convenient name-tags for the double nature of man because they are two of three nouns directly related in the play to the law of identity: "Blood, thou art blood" (MM II.iv.15); and "Truth is truth" (MM V.i.48).

[12]Troilus, for example, fears

> "...some joy too fine
> Too subtle, potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness
> For the capacity of my ruder powers.
> I fear it much."
> (TrC III.ii.22-5.)

[13]Eric LaGuardia, Nature Redeemed: The Imitation of Order in Three Renaissance Poems, p. 19.

[14]J.F.Sullivan, "Awful Rule, and Right Supremacy: The Problem of Authority and Order as a Theme of Shakespeare's Plays," DA, XX (1959), 1771.

[15]Lever glosses "glassy essence" as "spiritual entity" (Measure for Measure, p. 46). B. Ifor Evans, in The Language of Shakespeare, notes the part that the imagery of the "mirror or glass" plays in the "comparison between the real thing and the unreal imitation" (p. 137).

[16]Stanton Millet, "The Structure of Measure for Measure," Boston University Studies in English, II (1956), 217.

[17]Barbara Jane Burge, "'Nature Erring from Itself,' Identity in Shakespeare's Tragedies: A Study of the Use of 'I Am Not What I Am' and Its Related Variations in the Delineation of Character," DA, XXVII (1966), 4217. What she terms "a loss of identity" is very similar to what is termed a separation between name and substance in this thesis.

[18]See Darrel Mansell's "'Seemer' in Measure for Measure," MLQ, XXVII (1966), 270-84.

[19]"He who the sword of heaven will bear
> Must be as holy as severe;
> Pattern in himself to know..."
> (MM III.ii.254-6.)

See also Angelo's ironical statement, "Let mine own judgement pattern out my death" (MM II.i.30).

[20]Raymond Southall, "Measure for Measure and the Protestant Ethic," Essays in Criticism, XI (1961), 17.

[21]This is reminiscent of Harold Goddard's comment on Troilus, in The Meaning of Shakespeare, II: "There is the eternal distinction between imagination, which actually grasps reality, and idealization, which merely tries to impose itself on it" (p. 24). Whereas Troilus attempts to impose upon reality his disordered will, Angelo imposes his lifeless, abstract concept of virtue. Fittingly, Troilus manages to retain through most of the play his vitality, and Angelo the appearance of outward order, but both are equally divided against themselves.

[22]Campbell notes that, from the beginning, "the semi-tragic action

of the play is devised, then, not so much to test Angelo's undisciplined virtue as to expose the folly of his confident self-righteousness" (Satires, p. 132).

[23]William A. Freedman, "The Duke in Measure for Measure: Another Interpretation," TSL, IX, 33.

[24]"'Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them
For what I bid them do....
.....
I have on Angelo impos'd the office;
Who may in th'ambush of my name strike home,
And yet my nature never in the fight
To do in slander.
(MM I.iii.36-43.)

[25]It is notable, in this regard, that the one person whom the Duke finds he "cannot pardon" (MM V.i.497) at the end of the play is Lucio. His final comment on Lucio's punishment: "Slandering a prince deserves it" (MM V.i.522). Again there is an emphasis on the necessity of unity for the political leader. Lucio's unforgiveable act is to encourage a separation between the Duke's substance and his reputation.

[26]Ernest Schanzer, in The Problem Plays of Shakespeare, speaks, like many other critics, of "Angelo's legalism, his adherence to the letter rather than the spirit of the law" (p. 78).

[27]See Lever, Measure for Measure, p. 17.

[28]Schanzer, Problem Plays, p. 82.

[29]See, for example, the Countess' speech in All's Well:
"If ever we are nature's, these are ours; this thorn
Doth to our rose of youth rightly belong;
Our blood to us, this to our blood is born,
It is the show and seal of nature's truth,
Where love's strong passion is impress'd in youth."
(AWW I.iii.124-8.)
It is also associated with 'fire' imagery, and fire can be either a vital force or consumingly destructive, depending on whether or not it is controlled.

[30]Southall, in particular, notices the "Prison-Flesh motif" of the play ("The Protestant Ethic," p. 29).

[31]"The monstruosity," in Troilus' conception of love, is that "the will is infinite and the execution confined; that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit" (TrC III.ii.82-5).

[32]Schanzer, Problem Plays, p. 82.

[33]Ibid, p. 75.

[34]Mary Lascelles, Shakespeare's Measure for Measure (London: Athlone Press, 1953), p. 65.

[35]John Bayley, The Character of Love, p. 165.

[36]"...I speak not as desiring more,
But rather wishing a more strict restraint
Upon the sisters stood."
(MM I.iv.3-5.)

[37]See Mansell, "Measure for Measure," p. 276.

[38]Lascelles, Measure for Measure, p. 67.

[39]"Design and Structure in Measure for Measure," ELH, XXIII (1956), 273.

[40]Mansell's article, "'Seemer' in Measure for Measure," points out, as might be expected, the importance of the word and concept of "seeming."

[41]L.C.Knights, in "The Ambiguity of Measure for Measure," Scrutiny, X (1942), notes that the liberty/restraint theme in the play is both individual and has "another and more public aspect" (p. 229). The horse and coin imagery in the play, both discussed by Evans (Language, pp. 136-7), is one means by which the individual and public themes are joined. Angelo, for example, starts by enforcing the "strict statutes and most biting laws, / The needful bits and curbs to headstrong jades" (MM I.iii. 19-20), and ends by giving his own "sensual race the rein" (MM II.iv. 159). He accuses Claudio of coining "heaven's image / In stamps that are forbid" (MM II.iv.45-6), but he himself becomes a counterfeit image of the true Duke ("What figure of us, think you, he will bear" [MM I.i. 16]).

[42]According To Stevenson, Isabella "exists to maintain her own personal chastity, not to entice others to follow her example" (Measure for Measure, p. 45).

[43]D.R.C.Marsh, "The Mood of Measure for Measure," SQ, XIV (1963), 134; and Smith, "Measure for Measure," p. 312.

[44]This line of Isabella's, along with Angelo's original attitude to Claudio, bring to mind Andromache's injunction to Hector: "Do not count it holy / To hurt by being just." As Cassandra continues: "It is the purpose that makes strong the vow; / But vows to every purpose must not hold" (TrC V.iii.19-24). Neither Angelo nor Isabella seem to have the self knowledge to fully realize the "purpose" behind their ascetic "vows."

[45]Isabella's concept of virginity would seem to have some relationship to Parolles' description of it: "Virginity is peevish, proud, idle, made of self-love which is the most inhibited sin in the canon" (AWW I.i.141-3).

[46]As Lever notes, "Several writers have seen the play as a treatment of Puritanism" (Measure for Measure, p. xcii), or rather as an attack on Puritanism. The importance given the "word" by both Angelo and Isabella would seem to fit with this theory, for Puritan reliance on the "Word" is notorious: "The problem was one of distinguishing between objective and subjective reality. For the Puritans, everything which had a name, which was expressed in words in the Bible, had a physical reality" (A.A.Orendorff, "'The Rumour of Witchcraft is All About,'" [Unpublished paper, McGill University, 1969]). Mentioning the Puritan dependency on the word in a lighter vein is Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49 (Toronto: Bantam Books of Canada, 1967): "You guys, you're like the Puritans are about the Bible. So hung up with words, words" (p. 56); "Remember that the Puritans were utterly devoted, like literary critics, to the word" (p. 117).

[47]Measure for Measure, p. 67.

[48]Lever points out, in reference to Isabella's final speech in the second act, that Shakespeare replaced the word "honour," which appears in the comparative speeches of both Cinthio and Whetstone, with "chastity" (Measure for Measure, p. 65). This strengthens the identification of Isabella with apparent chastity, as opposed to the identification of Angelo with apparent honour, and maintains the equivalence found in All's Well between feminine chastity and masculine honour.

[49]Southall, "The Protestant Ethic," p. 25.

[50]Lever, Measure for Measure, p. lxxxv. See also LaGuardia's suggestion that the choice facing the chaste love heroine "is, in short, a matter of life or death. It brings shame to a young virgin to choose love, but it brings death (figuratively) for a maid to choose not to be a woman" (Nature Redeemed, p. 156).

[51]A.P.Rossiter, Angel with Horns, p. 164.

[52]E.M.W.Tillyard, Shakespeare's Problem Plays, p. 132.

[53]Hawkes, Shakespeare and Reason, p. 96.

[54]The theme of apparent death and rebirth (Claudio's) echoes All's Well, where it is Helena herself who apparently dies and then solves all paradoxes by her sudden reappearance. In Measure for Measure, goodness itself apparently dies with Angelo's supposed execution of Claudio, and is rediscovered, cured, with the rediscovery of Claudio. Lever puts the problem of the "dissolution" of goodness another way: "It is in the nature of the play that Isabella's personality, like the personalities

of Claudio and Angelo, should seem neither 'good' nor 'bad', but basically self-ignorant, with inner tensions stretched to the point of moral collapse before the process can be reversed and a new psychic integration achieved" (Measure for Measure, p. lxxxi).

[55]This involves both the "bed-trick" and the substitute head.

[56]Measure for Measure, p. 26.

[57]Millet, "Structure," p. 211.

[58]Measure for Measure, p. 10.

[59]F.R.Leavis, The Common Pursuit (London: Chatto & Windus, 1952), p. 171.

[60]"My lord, I do confess I ne'er was married;
And I confess besides, I am no maid.
I have known my husband; yet my husband
Knows not that ever he knew me."
(MM V.i.185-8.)

[61]Lucio goes on to say,"As for example, thou thyself art a wicked villain, despite all grace" (MM I.ii.25-6). Lucio himself seems to be additional proof that a man can know what he is and be unified within himself, and still be a moderately "wicked villain" in the order of things. In the same way, Parolles and Thersites discover that being the very things they are, even though it be "a rascal, a scurvy railing knave, a very filthy rogue" (TrC V.v.29-30), preserves their lives. Lucio, at the end of the play, could say with Parolles, as the Duke spares his life, "Simply the thing I am / Shall make me live" (AWW IV.iii.323-4).

[62]Measure for Measure, p. lxxiii.

[63]See, for example, MM I.i.25; I.iii.31; I.iii.6; IV.iii.135; V.i.77; V.i.139; V.i.367. The association of the Duke with grace, Angelo with honour (MM I.i.83; II.i.8; II.i.33; II.ii.27; II.ii.158; II.ii.162; II.iv.34; etc.), and Isabella with chastity maintains the same theme of honour, chastity and grace found in All's Well.

[64]"The most obvious candidate in Shakespeare for the role of the all-wise as well as all-powerful observer is of course the Duke in Measure for Measure" (Bayley, Love, p. 164).

[65]"For with what judgement ye judge, ye shall be judged" (Matt. 7:2).

[66]LaGuardia, Nature Redeemed, p. 165.

[67]Ibid, p. 9.

[68]Ibid, p. 156.

[69]"Isabella's condition would probably be understood by a Protestant audience of Shakespeare's age in terms used by the first translator of Economium Matrimonii: she was one of those young neophytes who would 'professe & vowe perpetuall chastyte before or they suffyciently knowe themselues and the infirmite of theyr nature'" (Lever, Measure for Measure, p. lxxvii).

[70]Ibid, p. lxxxii.

[71]This echoes his other speeches on virtue: "For if our virtues / Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike / As if we had them not" (MM I.i.33-5); and "Grace to stand, and virtue, go" (MM III.ii.257).

[72]"Should be as holy as severe," again echoes Andromache's, "Do not count it holy / To hurt by being just" (TrC V.iii.19-20).

[73]Shakespeare, "The Phoenix and the Turtle."

[74]Marsh, "Measure for Measure," p. 136.

[75]Howard C. Cole, "The 'Christian' Context of Measure for Measure," JEGP, LXIV (1965), 431.

[76]There is also, as Smith mentions, "the strong possibility that the appointment of Angelo was made originally not as a test of the deputy so much as a vindication of the Duke" ("Measure for Measure," p. 318).

[77]Love, p. 166.

[78]Southall, "The Protestant Ethic," p. 31.

[79]Mansell, "Measure for Measure," p. 283.

[80]Donald Stauffer, Shakespeare's World of Images, p. 162.

[81]"Measure for Measure," p. 229.

[82]Stevenson, Measure for Measure, p. 128.

[83]Measure for Measure, p. xcviii.

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