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Justice and Care as Moral Orientations: The Impact of the Feminist Response to Kohlberg

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ABSTRACT

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Elizabeth Reilly

This thesis explores Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development and the feminist reaction to it as initiated by Carol Gilligan. Beginning with a description of Kohlberg's theory, which involves development towards an ethic of justice, his view of appropriate moral education is presented. Gilligan's alternative to Kohlberg's theory follows. This involves two complementary moral orientations: the ethic of justice which Kohlberg elaborates and which is more often employed by men, and the ethic of care which is described in Gilligan's 1982 book and which is more often exercised by women. Nel Noddings' work is examined following Gilligan's, as she has presented both a philosophical justification of the ethic of care and a model for education in such a moral orientation. The work of Jane Roland Martin is then examined. Martin argues that because women's sensibilities have been ignored in educational theory, and have not played a part in the formation of an educational ideal, both men and women are harmed through the lack of attention to "feminine" attributes belonging to each sex. The final chapter looks at Justice and Care as two complementary moral orientations, and examines the ways in which one calls for the other in the life of a fully mature moral being.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction..... 1

Chapter 2
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development..... 7
Background to Kohlberg's Theory..... 7
Levels of Reasoning and Stages..... 12
Three Levels of Reasoning..... 14
Six Stages..... 15
Stage 7..... 21
Moral Reasoning Versus Moral Behaviour..... 22
Empirical Evidence..... 24
Moral Education..... 27
Summary..... 29

Chapter 3
Gilligan's Presentation of Two Moral Orientations..... 32
Background to Gilligan's Theory..... 32
The Two Orientations of Justice and Care..... 35
Origins of Morality..... 37
Sequence of Development..... 40
Empirical Evidence..... 44
Summary..... 50

Chapter 4
Noddings' Development of a Feminine Ethic..... 55
The Origins of Feminine Morality..... 57
What Does it Mean to Care?..... 58
Principle Versus Context..... 59
Justification..... 62
What Defines a Caring Relationship?..... 63
Reception..... 64
Natural and Ethical Caring..... 66
The Ethical Ideal..... 67
How Does One Educate for a Caring Attitude?..... 70
Criticisms: Is it Enough to Care?..... 76
Summary..... 79

Chapter 5
Martin's Ideal Educated Woman..... 81
Historical Theories Regarding the Education of Women..... 83
Plato..... 83
Rousseau..... 85
Wollstonecraft..... 87
Beecher..... 89
Gilman..... 90
Standing on Shoulders..... 93
Towards an Ideal of Education..... 95
Initiation into the Male Mode..... 96
Education for Reproductive Processes..... 98
Trait Genderization..... 99
Compensatory Education Versus a Transformed Ideal..... 101
Summary..... 102

Chapter 6
Justice and Care as Complementary Orientations..... 104
Justice and Care..... 108
As Two Subjects/Two Teaching Strategies..... 108
As Two Orientations/Perspectives for Adults..... 115
On a Social Level..... 115
On a Personal Level..... 117
Beyond Justice and Care..... 120

References..... 124

Chapter 1

Introduction

The theory of moral development advanced by Lawrence Kohlberg has generally been accepted as an appropriate means of understanding and promoting children's moral development. Over the past decade, however, there has been a great deal of research and debate surrounding the feminist response to Kohlberg's theory, initiated by Carol Gilligan. Whereas Kohlberg's theory is based on the principle of "justice" as the universal highest good, Gilligan argues that "care" is an equally valid principle, and is in fact the one employed most frequently by women for resolving dilemmas. Gilligan's theory, which is psychological in nature and does not address the ethical questions raised by her observations, is extended into the philosophical realm in Nel Noddings' book Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Noddings argues that "care" is a more adequate ethical ideal than is "justice". Like Kohlberg, Noddings describes the moral education which naturally follows her proposed ethic. As educators, therefore, we are called upon to examine these two theories of development and their implications for moral education.

It is not my intention in this thesis to set up the two theories as opposites. On the contrary, I argue in my final chapter that these two moral "voices" are both important to

the development of mature adults. In his book Perception, Theory, and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science, Brown discusses the evolution of scientific theory. He argues that contrary to the traditional myth about the objectivity of scientific enquiry, one's perception is necessarily influenced by the preconceptions one brings to the enquiry. Such preconceptions not only affect the course of the enquiry, by suggesting which questions are relevant and the way in which they should be asked, but also colour the answers one obtains. "In order to carry out research," Brown says,

> we require a research problem and some criteria of what evidence is relevant to its solution. More fundamentally, we require some basis for deciding what research problems are worth pursuing (Brown, 1977, p.100).

Brown rejects, however, the notion that such theory is therefore arbitrary. "To accept a theory because it solves some problems, eliminates others, and provides a guide to further research, is not to decide arbitrarily to accept that theory" (Brown, 1977, p. 154-155).

The subject of Brown's discussion is the way in which scientific theories have evolved historically, with new paradigms supplanting their predecessors. I will, in this thesis, apply the same type of reasoning to the theories I examine. Brown's description of preconceptions, and the idea that two different existing theories do not require that one be right while the other is wrong, are my preconceptions in writing this thesis. In the balance of this chapter,

therefore, I will outline the thesis which is to follow.

Kohlberg's theory is based upon a cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. His thesis is in opposition to those which promote relativism in values. For Kohlberg, there are "higher" and "lower" forms of moral reasoning. Certain values ought to take precedence over others, and some ways of measuring rights or claims in a moral conflict situation are better than others (Hersh et al., 1979, p. 90). Kohlberg posits a six-stage process through which all humans develop. Although most adults never reach the highest stage, all development passes through the same initial stages in the order in which he presents them. Kohlberg's theory has been criticized by both feminist and non-feminist writers, for ignoring the emotional and behavioral sides of moral development (see Peters, 1978, for a non-feminist example). In the second chapter of this thesis, I present Kohlberg's theory of moral development, and discuss the evidence he provides in support of it as well as a number of its criticisms.

Following an examination of Kohlberg's theory, I present the feminist criticism, which was initially proposed by Gilligan. Gilligan maintains that Kohlberg's view of morality, which is based upon weighing and evaluating competing sets of rights, represents only the masculine approach to moral dilemmas. Women, in Gilligan's theory, tend to respond to questions of morality in a "different voice";

women's relationships and the responsibilities they entail form the basis of decision-making. Neither voice, however, is limited to use by one gender. Gilligan argues that it is not only men who respond to dilemmas in the manner described by Kohlberg, nor is it only women who reach decisions through the process she describes. Both orientations are used by most people, but as is suggested by her 1982 book and demonstrated in her 1988 study, more men focus predominantly on the "justice" ethic corresponding to Kohlberg's stages, while women more often employ the ethic of "care" which she describes. Gilligan has been criticized by feminists (Kerber, et al., 1986) and non-feminists (Walker et al., 1987) for lacking empirical evidence to support her theory. She has been accused of exaggerating gender stereotypes (Mednick, 1989) and of imagining non-existent differences (Pratt, et. al., 1984). Her theory and the criticism it has prompted are presented in the third chapter.

Although Gilligan's work examines the nature of women's moral decisions, she is criticized for not examining the philosophical aspects of women's morality, and for not discussing the implications of the two moral languages in schools (Sichel, 1985). Nel Noddings undertakes both of these. Noddings argues, in part, that masculine ethics require principles for behaviour, and it is precisely this abstracting of moral problems, this process of making them into "math problems with people", which is distasteful to many

women. Women prefer to deal with real problems in their contexts, Noddings argues. There is no such thing as "all things being equal" in real life. Rather than limiting her ethic to women, Noddings argues that both men and women would do better to conceive of morality through the perspective of care. Noddings further argues that moral education ought to be the centre of all education, rather than a separate subject taught by parents or religious authorities. Noddings' theory is presented in Chapter Four, along with those of some of her critics who argue that her ethic of care cannot stand up on its own.

The work of Jane Roland Martin examines the ways in which the present system of education reinforces masculine values at the expense of the feminine. Martin calls for a transformation of the current ideal of education, which she argues necessitates the neglect of the feminine qualities and traits Gilligan and Noddings describe. Martin discusses the "genderization of traits" which are valued positively for one gender and negatively for the other, leading to the adoption of a male or female "cognitive perspective". She argues that current practices in education harm both men and women, as both are educated only for rational thought and objective analysis. Martin's thesis is presented in Chapter Five.

In the final chapter of the thesis, I examine "justice" and "care" as two complementary orientations to morality. I present arguments, following Martin, that the schools have

ignored "feminine" sensibilities in favour of those more commonly attributed to men. I call for the development, on the part of the schools, of an ethic of care to be employed alongside the current one of justice. I consider the implications of this for the schools, both in terms of curricula and teaching strategies. I go on to examine the way in which the two principles of justice and care may be employed in a complementary way by adults, on both the personal and social levels. Finally I ask if there may be more than two moral orientations, and suggest that justice and care may not be the only valid ethical principles.

Chapter 2

Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

For Kohlberg, morality involves a process of decision-making based on reasoned judgements which the individual brings to a moral question. As a psychologist, Kohlberg is concerned primarily with the development of cognitive processes. Decisions of a moral nature may be categorized, he says, according to the type of reasoning used. Moreover, these "categories" of reasons are hierarchical in nature; an individual passes from one to the next in an invariant sequence as that person matures. Although innate maturation is crucial to the development of moral reasoning, so too is an environment conducive to such development.

After considering the context in which the theory arose, I will, in this chapter, describe the stages of reasoning Kohlberg describes. I will then examine aspects of the theory, including the distinction Kohlberg draws between moral reasoning and moral behaviour, the empirical evidence supporting Kohlberg's outline of development and applications of the theory in the field of moral education.

BACKGROUND TO KOHLBERG'S THEORY

Kohlberg's original theory of moral development arose from his examination of Piaget's description of children's development, and particularly, children's moral development.

Kohlberg went beyond Piaget, however, in describing the moral development of adolescents and adults. When, in later writing, Kohlberg began to describe moral education, he intended to correct the two common means of teaching morality which he identified as equally faulty. On one hand, many schools teach the content of rules by way of direct indoctrination and instruction in "right" modes of action. This approach Kohlberg calls the "bag of virtues" approach. He rejects it, drawing instead on the Platonic conception of virtue as knowledge of the good (Kohlberg, 1970a, p.77). Arbuthnot and Faust (1981), writing about Kohlberg's theory, explain that by teaching students only the rules of right behaviour, there is the risk that the student may not know how to behave when a situation is encountered for which she or he has not already been prepared. Furthermore, equating morality with rules may result in inconsistencies and conflict when two incompatible courses of action arise from the same situation.

On the other hand, the values clarification approach to moral education promotes examination of one's own values in the context of those held by one's peers, but does not challenge students to defend their values or the reasons for them. Furthermore, there is no incentive to pay attention to others' values except for the sake of curiosity, since it is not possible from this point of view to measure their relative validity. One is forced to defend an ethic of moral relativism. In his paper "Indoctrination versus Relativity

in Value Education" (1972b), Kohlberg notes what he calls "cop-out solutions" to the problem of indoctrination which lead to moral relativism. These include calling moral education "socialization" - which implies that respect for social authority is a moral good in itself - and relying upon vague titles like "moral and spiritual values" which, Kohlberg claims, do not clearly describe anything (Kohlberg, 1972b).

Kohlberg's theory of moral education states that it is more important to learn how to discover the "right" in a moral dilemma than to be told the type of behaviour which would be moral. Moral education, he says, is the "leading of men upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that was not there in the first place" (Kohlberg, 1970a, p.68). Morality is not embodied in rules, but rather involves the application of a standard of justice. Kohlberg calls justice a principle, by which he means, "a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt always in all situations" (Kohlberg, 1970a, p. 69-70). The application of justice depends on certain universal principles, with which Kohlberg maintains all rational, disinterested moral individuals would agree.

> There are exceptions to rules, then, but no exceptions to principles. A moral obligation is an obligation to respect the right or claim of another person. A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims, you versus me, you versus a third person. There is only one principled basis for resolving claims: justice or equality (Kohlberg, 1970a, p.70).

Thus, because all moral dilemmas may be resolved by the

application of a standard of justice, there exists only one virtue, namely, knowledge of the good.

As an adherent to the cognitive-developmental model of moral reasoning, Kohlberg draws on the work of Piaget and Dewey among others. This perspective involves recognition that children are capable of reason, albeit a different form of reason than that of adults. It is reason which determines moral judgement. Affectional factors such as the ability to empathize and the capacity for guilt necessarily enter in, but moral situations are defined cognitively by the judging individual. Moral development is therefore the result of an increasing ability to perceive social reality and to organize and integrate social experience (Kohlberg, 1972a p.15). It is the development of cognitive structures and their relation to moral problems which interests Kohlberg, rather than the content of the answers given.

Cognitive developmentalists also rely on the concept of "stages" through which individuals mature. According to Piaget (1960) stages have the following characteristics:

> (1)Stages imply distinct or <u>qualitative</u> differences in children's modes of thinking or of solving the same problem at different ages.
>
> (2)These different modes of thought form an <u>invariant sequence</u>, order, or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do not change the sequence.
>
> (3)Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a "<u>structured whole</u>". A given stage-response on a task does not just represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it. Rather, it represents an underlying thought-

organization.

(4)Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations. Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfil a common function.(Piaget 1960, quoted in Kohlberg 1969, p. 352-353).[1]

Furthermore, within the realm of moral stages, Kohlberg states that there is a hierarchical preference within the individual to prefer a solution to a problem at the highest level available to him (Kohlberg, 1973, p.4).

Kohlberg uses interactionist theory to explain moral development. Through this perspective, development of thinking abilities is a product of the integration of the child's current manner of thinking and the stimulation provided by the environment. Therefore, maturation, together with stimulation and the opportunity for role-taking will lead to development (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg sums this up and places it in historical context:

> Moral judgement and emotion based on respect for custom, authority, and the group are seen as one phase or stage in the moral development of the individual rather than as the total definition of the essential characteristics of morality it was for Durkheim. Judgement of right and wrong in terms of the individual's consideration of social-welfare consequences, universal principles, and justice is seen as a later phase of development. This phase depends upon and integrates many of the emotional features of the earlier customary phase and does not spring directly from the minds of unsocialized rational adults, as it did for the utilitarians.

---

[1]In (4) above, more differentiated means more complex, while more integrated means that the parts are better ordered.

> Both a morality of respect for social authority and an autonomous rational morality are to be understood as arising from the development of a self through the process of taking the roles or attitudes of other selves in interactions occurring in institutionalized patterns (Kohlberg, 1968, p.487).

LEVELS OF REASONING AND STAGES

Within Kohlberg's theory, three levels of reasoning are defined, and each is further subdivided such that there are six distinct stages of moral development, using the term "stage" in the Piagetian sense defined above. The overall development in reasoning is from an externally motivated morality to one which is controlled by the individual. At the lower stages, the "good" is defined by external authorities and is respected for egocentric reasons. At the highest stages "goodness" is valued for its own sake, and is defined internally by the individual.

A person's level of development is measured by means of a series of interviews in which the subject is asked to respond to various moral dilemmas. Responses are scored according to a standard developed by Kohlberg, and according to the number of responses which correspond to a particular stage, the individual's stage of moral reasoning is determined. The most well known and commonly quoted of Kohlberg's dilemmas is the "Heinz Dilemma", which is here reproduced in full:

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife (Kohlberg, 1970b, p.125-126).

Having presented the dilemma to the subject, the interviewer asks whether the husband was justified in stealing the drug, and why or why not. The important part of the answer is the reason why the man is or is not justified. The Kohlbergian interviewer is assessing moral reasoning, and not prescribing moral or immoral behaviour. The reason the Heinz dilemma is so often used as an example is precisely because it lends itself so well to reasoning at each of Kohlberg's stages.

It should here be noted that in his later papers, Kohlberg suggested that he had, to some extent, changed his designations of stages. Arbuthnot and Faust (1981) suggest that Kohlberg merged Stages 5 and 6 such that Stage 6 was seen as an alternate endpoint to Stage 5, a type of Stage 5b. Furthermore, Kohlberg wrote of an hypothesized Stage 7 orientation for which he did not have any empirical evidence, but which he suggested was the logical philosophical endpoint of moral development. The stages will be detailed below,

after a description of the three levels of reasoning Kohlberg describes. Because of the complexity of Kohlberg's differing formations of stages, the six stages which are most commonly associated with him and which he originally conceived will be outlined. A brief description of the hypothetical Stage 7 will follow.

Three Levels of Reasoning

Level One

At the lowest level of reasoning, called the preconventional level, the right comes from concrete rules backed by power and punishment. The right is that which serves one's own interests or the interests of some other person. The reasons for choosing the right include avoiding punishment, serving selfish interests, and exchanging favours.

Level Two

The second level of reasoning is called the conventional level. This is the level at which most adults reason. At this level, the right is that which conforms to expectations concerning good behaviour. There is an inner motivation to uphold rules and to do what is expected. The egoistic orientation of the less mature level is subordinated to the desire to act according to the views and opinions of the larger social group.

Level Three

The postconventional level, also called the principled level, is the most mature, and is not achieved by the majority of people. At this level, the "right" is defined by general or universal human rights, values, and principles. Principled moral reasoning suggests that through membership in society one has made a contract to uphold the rights of all members of the group. The moral orientation is not to rules per se, but to the principles and purposes behind them.

Six Stages

Stage 1: Heteronomous Morality

At this most immature stage, the orientation is towards punishment and obedience. There is an emphasis on the physical consequences of a moral decision. A person's life is valued according to the importance of that person, not for its own sake. There is no true sense of justice or fairness at this level; rather, conceptions of morality are based on external threats. A typical answer to the Heinz dilemma from this level of reasoning would be "No, he should not take the drug because he would be caught and punished." Interestingly, this stage of reasoning is often encouraged by parents and other figures of authority because children who use it are much easier to control.

Stage 2: Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange

This stage is often referred to as utilitarian hedonism. That which is good is defined as that which produces some desired event or condition. This stage is also referred to as "marketplace morality" because a person reasoning in this way will act to maximize his or her own outcomes; the end justifies the means. It still falls within the preconventional level of reasoning, but is higher than Stage 1 because it deals with needs rather than mere physical consequences. Morality at this stage is more internally determined, but is still highly egocentric. A typical answer to the Heinz dilemma would be "Yes, he should steal the drug, because he needs his wife. He probably really loves her and needs to save her life."

The transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3, which also marks the transition from preconventional to conventional reasoning, is marked by a recognition that one needs rules or conventions to guide behaviour and to protect one's rights.

Stage 3: Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity

This stage is sometimes called the "good boy - nice girl" orientation. At this level, one behaves in accordance with the demands of one's role. This stage normally is entered when the individual is a teenager and thus is concerned with peer approval and loyalty to the social group. The focus is

on the meaning of acts; good acts are those which gain approval. This stage is still relatively egocentric. The determinant of morality is external to the individual, depending on a stereotyped view of what is morally right. Typical answers to the Heinz dilemma might be "Yes, he should steal the drug because it is his responsibility as her husband to try to save her. He would feel guilty if he didn't. The druggist was being cruel." - or - "No, the husband is not the heartless one, it's the druggist. Heinz should obey the law and not selfishly think of himself and his wife."

The individual moves out of this stage and into the next through the discovery that stereotyped roles are not an adequate means of deciding on moral action because of the times when these roles come into conflict.

Stage 4: Social System and Conscience

This is known as the "law and order" orientation. An individual at this stage reasons that one behaves morally through doing one's duty in society in order to maintain social order and self-respect, not merely for the sake of obedience. Kohlberg divides this stage into two substages. At stage 4a, the individual reasons that without standard laws there would be chaos. Since laws are established by representatives of the state, it is the individual's responsibility to uphold these laws and sanctions. Stage 4b is slightly closer to principled reasoning, in recognizing

that laws are the product of people who have vested interests in the law. At this stage, the individual questions the formation of laws and holds one of the following three opinions:

(1) laws should be based on the common good
(2) laws should be based on majority rule
(3) laws should be based on the moral law

Stage 4a is rigid and categorical while 4b looks for ordering principles behind the laws. A typical stage four answer to the Heinz dilemma is "No, the druggist has the right to set his price. Heinz has no right to steal it. That's what laws are for - otherwise society would break down."

The transition from Stage 4 to Stage 5 also marks the transition from conventional moral reasoning to principled reasoning. This transition involves the realization that laws are arbitrary and are valid only because they are mutually agreed upon. The individual begins to reason that laws should reflect underlying principles of justice and fairness.

Stage 5: Social Contract, or Utility and Individual Rights

At this stage, the individual reasons that the "right" moral decision will be one that upholds basic rights, values, and mutually agreed upon contracts of society, even if to do so means breaking the law. The stage five reasoner recognizes two types of laws: relative ones and non-relative ones. Relative laws should be maintained because they are part of the social contract which is upheld by all members of society.

Non-relative rights or values on the other hand, such as the rights to life and liberty, must be upheld regardless of public opinion or the wishes of the majority. There is, at this stage, a high value placed on mutual trust and respect. It is recognized that one often finds moral and legal rules in conflict. This level of reasoning is oriented towards maximizing the welfare of the community and respecting the will of the majority while protecting the rights of the minority. A Stage 5 reasoner might answer the Heinz dilemma by saying, "Yes. While the law does forbid stealing, the law wasn't designed with this circumstance in mind. Heinz is justified in taking the drug, but must be prepared to make recompense. The value of human life exceeds the value of private property." Kohlberg says that this is the level of morality on which the American Constitution is based.

Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles

This highest stage of those originally conceived by Kohlberg is very rarely achieved. Examples of individuals who display reasoning at Stage 6, include such people as Einstein and Gandhi. At Stage 6, the right is recognized according to a set of self-chosen principles which would be appropriate for all humanity to follow at any point in time. While it is agreed that laws should be followed, principles are accepted not because of societal approval but because they are, in Kohlberg's words, prior to society. Right laws are derived

from basic notions of justice: equality of human rights and the preservation of respect for the dignity of the individual person. Living beings must be respected as ends in and of themselves. There is a rejection of unjust laws and a belief that one ought not to obey them. In fact, Kohlberg quotes the following from Martin Luther King Jr. on this subject, calling it a classic example of stage six thought:

> One may well ask,"How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?" The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws, just and unjust. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. Any law that uplifts human personality is just, and law that degrades human personality is unjust. An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal (Kohlberg, 1970a, p.76).

Kohlberg points out, "King makes it clear that moral disobedience of the law must spring from the same root as moral obedience to the law, out of respect for justice" (Kohlberg, 1970a, p.77). At this stage, one's moral decisions are guided from within. One obeys one's conscience, but not because of fear or guilt. The individual must decide whether an act is in keeping with a self-chosen set of universally applicable beliefs which promote justice. At this stage, an answer to the Heinz dilemma suggested by Arbuthnot and Faust is:

> "Yes, Heinz should steal the drug. He must decide between obeying a law (against stealing) which he endorses, and preserving a human life. Since he must chose, he will have to steal. When a fundamental right (life) is not protected by the

> law, an individual has the right and perhaps even the duty to break that law. The druggist's position is not in keeping with general notions of justice" (Arbuthnot and Faust, 1981, p.66).

Stage 7

In his paper "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited" (1973) Kohlberg discusses the concept of a seventh stage of reasoning. Kohlberg's understanding of this ultimate in moral reasoning arises from Erikson's suggestion that beyond justice lies a "religious" wisdom which is the most mature level of moral reasoning. Kohlberg argues that a Stage 6 orientation to universal human ethical principles demands a further post-conventional orientation. Stage 6 reasoning, while presenting the reasoner with an ultimate direction for moral decision-making, still begs the question "Why be moral?" As Kohlberg puts it, "the ultimate moral maturity requires a mature solution to the question of the meaning of life." (Kohlberg, 1973, p.55). Kohlberg recognizes, however that this is not a moral question, but rather is an ontological one. It cannot be resolved on logical or rational grounds. Kohlberg writes that such reflection is often expressed in religious terms, but need not be. It does, however, require the adoption of a cosmic as opposed to universal humanistic perspective (Kohlberg, 1973, p.55). A philosophical contemplation of one's Stage 6 values will lead, he says, first to despair at the recognition of the meaninglessness of

life, thence through to the resolution of this crisis in the form of a more cosmic perspective.

> Even most persons who are not "religious" temporarily achieve this state of mind when on the mountaintop or before the ocean. At such a time, what is ordinarily background becomes foreground, and the self is no longer figure to the ground. We sense the unity of the whole and ourselves as part of that unity (Kohlberg, 1973, p.56).

While Kohlberg presents no empirical evidence for this orientation, none of his subjects having achieved it, he offers Stage 7 as the natural philosophical endpoint of development.

MORAL REASONING VERSUS MORAL BEHAVIOUR

In addressing the problem of moral behaviour, Kohlberg refers on numerous occasions and in many of his papers to studies carried out by Hartshorne and May involving honesty and the likelihood that a person will cheat under varying circumstances. Kohlberg summarises the findings, saying that they "suggest that honest behaviour is determined by situational factors of punishment, reward, group pressures, and group values, rather than by internal disposition of conscience or character" (Kohlberg, 1968, p.484). Furthermore, he says,

> The cheating research [by Hartshorne and May, 1928-1930] indicates that while the conventional level of moral judgement is a guarantee of core social conformity to external authority, it is no guarantee

> of conformity to internal moral norms in the absence of explicit sanctions, observation, and group disapproval (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971, p.458).

Kohlberg does not suggest that a high level of moral reasoning will necessarily lead to highly moral behaviour, but he does say that there is a considerable correspondence between maturity of moral values - the possession of rational and internal reasons for moral action - and maturity of action in moral-conflict situations (Kohlberg, 1968, p.485). The example he gives refers to his discussion regarding Martin Luther King Jr. and Stage 6 reasoning:

> Espousal of unprejudiced attitudes toward Negroes does not predict action to assure civil rights in an atmosphere where others have some prejudice; however, knowledge, true knowledge of principles of justice, does predict virtuous action (Kohlberg, 1970a, p. 77).

Kohlberg goes on to discuss the now-famous experimental study carried out by Stanley Milgram involving subjects who were ordered by an experimenter to administer increasingly more severe electrical shocks to stooge victims under the pretence of testing their ability to learn.

> In this case, the principles of justice involved in the Stage 5 social contract orientation do not clearly prescribe a decision. The victim had voluntarily agreed to participate in the experiment, and the subject himself had contractually committed himself to perform the experiment. Only Stage 6 thinking clearly defined the situation as one in which the experimenter did not have the moral right to ask them to inflict pain on another person. Accordingly, 75% of those at Stage 6 quit or refused to shock the victim, as compared to only 13% of all the subjects at lower stages (Kohlberg, 1970a, p. 80).

To return to Kohlberg's description of some forms of

moral education as merely teaching children a "bag of virtues", it becomes clear at this point why he values the development of moral reasoning over behaviour. If on one hand, moral behaviour does not reflect a particular innately moral character, and if high levels of moral reasoning do predict more consistently moral behaviour, it is clear that the efforts of educators ought to be directed towards the development of moral reasoning.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Over the three decades since Kohlberg first described his stages of moral development, numerous studies have been conducted to verify their sequence and their universality. Initially, Kohlberg's data was gathered through interviews conducted with 72 boys aged 10-16 years. Beginning in 1957, Kohlberg interviewed them every three years for more than twenty years. Other studies, conducted in Taiwan, Yucatan, Turkey, Britain, and the United States, involved middle-class urban, lower-class urban and tribal or rural subjects, aged 10-21 years, notably all male. He reports that all middle-class groups reached stages 5 or 6, as did some lower-class groups. No tribal or village peasant groups did, however. Kohlberg concludes, therefore, that moral advance depends on both intelligence and cognitive advance on the one hand, and

moral role taking within peer groups on the other:

> The main experiential determinants of moral development seem to be amount and variety of social experience, the opportunity to take a number of roles and to encounter other perspectives. Thus middle-class and popular children progress farther and faster then do lower-class children and social isolates. Similarly, development is slower in the semiliterate village cultures that have been studied (Kohlberg, 1972a, p.15).

Arbuthnot and Faust (1981) go on to suggest that cultures which are less heterogeneously "modern" and more bound by tradition, demonstrate less advancement to the post-conventional level of reasoning because

> in more modern societies or cultural settings, in which we are more likely to find questioning of and changes in norms, there will be an attendant greater degree of reference to general or abstract principles of what is right in moral settings (Arbuthnot and Faust, 1981, p. 80-81),

which is reflected in a higher rate of achievement of the more advances stages. Furthermore, Arbuthnot (1975), in a study comparing female and male levels of moral reasoning, found that among adults, females were disproportionately represented at Stage 3:

> until middle and late adolescence, females may develop at the same or even faster rate than the males. But the demands of certain roles in their lives may cause an arrest or fixation in their development at Stage 3, while males continue to progress (Arbuthnot and Faust, 1981, p. 88).

Kohlberg explicitly says that higher developmental stages are morally more adequate and as such are more desirable, although he would not suggest that an individual at a higher stage is of greater personal worth (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971, p.442).

Arbuthnot and Faust (1981) go on at length about the vice of moral relativism in order to support Kohlberg in his claim that universal moral principles must be respected. In an effort to defend himself against the criticism of promoting an elite form of thinking to which few can hope to rise, Kohlberg responds:

> In terms of moral education, then, an effort to stimulate the development of higher stages of thought is not the imposition of the thinking of an elite minority of "moral experts" upon the rest of the community. Rather, it is the facilitation of a movement toward a level which people tend to appreciate even before they reach it: it is facilitation of movement in a "natural" direction... The recognition that every individual has equal rights in the area of belief and value does not mean that we must view every individual's values as equally sound (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971, p. 441).

Thus, although only a very small population will achieve Stage 6, and Kohlberg cannot point to anyone who has reached "Stage 7", the abstract principle of justice as embodied in post-conventional reasoning is held up as the ideal to which all aspire. Despite the fact, which Kohlberg notes, that no tribal or village peasant groups employ principled reasoning in moral issues, his conclusion is that these groups, together with a disproportionate number of women in urban society, have arrested or delayed moral development due to the paucity of their role-taking opportunities and their lack of development of abstract reasoning.

MORAL EDUCATION

One of the assumptions held by cognitive-developmentalists is that the appropriate environment will foster natural development from one stage to the next. Kohlberg's early papers, written in the 1960's, laid out in detail his stages of development. Later work, arising from the hypothesis of one of his graduate students that moral development could be encouraged in the classroom, focused on "cognitive-developmental moral education" (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975).

Arbuthnot and Faust (1981) list four principles of moral education which follow from a Kohlbergian perspective. First, it is assumed that moral education does in fact facilitate development. Second, the way in which this development is fostered is through the creation of "disequilibration" on the part of the student. Only when the student is challenged will development follow. Third, the role of the educator is to engineer experiences that will stimulate both the disequilibration just mentioned and the discovery by the student of a higher stage reasoning. Fourth, the educator must protect both the student's right to decide on participation in the group and also the right of the student to adopt any value system or belief without fear of reprisal.

One of the goals of moral education is upward stage movement, but this does not mean attempting to rush an individual through the six stages as quickly as possible. As

has been noted previously, development in moral reasoning cannot precede the comparable level of cognitive development. Furthermore, there must be time for the student to generalize new and advanced stages of reasoning abilities beyond the situations and dilemmas encountered in class. As well, moral education is concerned with the implementation of advanced reasoning in everyday behaviour.

The tool used by moral educators to stimulate discussion and create disequilibration is the dilemma. Before introducing a dilemma to the class, the teacher must prepare the class by forming small groups of eight to fifteen students who are at two or three different stages of moral reasoning. The teacher explains the rules of dilemma discussions, including the rule that each student has the right to express opinions without recrimination. In this way, what Arbuthnot and Faust call "an appropriate psychological set" is created. The dilemma is then presented and debate is guided by the teacher so as to address the lowest level of reasoning first and gradually move through the stages until an argument one stage beyond that of the highest student is presented. Blatt and Kohlberg's (1975) study showed that through the use of "+1 reasoning" (i.e. an argument one stage above that suggested by the student) disequilibration is created and the student is challenged to accept the higher level of reasoning as more adequate.

Dilemmas used in such a discussion must be open ended so

that a number of different reasons for either choice are possible. They must involve competing claims, because the process of weighing competing rights is central to Kohlberg's conception of justice. Obviously they must both be commensurate with the intellectual abilities of the students and be interesting and realistic to the students. Finally, the best dilemmas will suggest different answers at different stages.

SUMMARY

Kohlberg is a psychologist, not an ethicist. He lists ideal principles, such as justice, equity, worth of human life, and trust within the social contract, which he says every fully mature and reasonable adult in any culture will agree to. He does not go on to prescribe means by which these principles are to be put into effect. Rather, he describes the reasoning process by which individuals at different stages of development apply the principles to which they adhere. Kohlberg's theory is not content-oriented; its purpose is to outline the process by which the content of morality is determined. He uses the Hartshorne and May studies to suggest that given principled moral reasoning, adequate and consistent moral behaviour will result.

As a Piagetian, Kohlberg presupposes that the innate abilities of the child, as they develop, will encourage moral maturation to the highest stage possible. The educator's role

is not to instruct the child as to the proper path of development, nor to train the child in the socially accepted behaviours expected. The teacher is merely a facilitator, providing an environment which promotes development. The teacher is responsible for assessing the child's stage of moral reasoning and for then challenging the child with an argument from the stage immediately above that to which the child has developed. A maturing child is stimulated to develop from one stage to the next, but is not instructed in the "correct" path of development. Given adequate innate cognitive abilities, development will occur naturally if a conducive environment is provided.

Kohlberg's theory rests on the assumption that individuals prefer to reason at more sophisticated levels and that they prefer more consistent modes of reasoning. He argues that the abstract principle of justice is more adequate than would be a context-specific motivation. While an individual's moral reasoning can never advance beyond what is comprehensible cognitively, it can lag behind cognitive development if the appropriate stimulation is not present.

If one rejects, as would many, a theory of moral relativism, and one chooses, as does Kohlberg, not to rely on a religious or other authority to dictate moral action, one is forced to conclude, with Kohlberg, that there exist universal moral principles which may be identified and which must be respected in any culture and at all times. Kohlberg

has attempted to do this, in naming "justice" as the moral principle on which everything rests. Having initially interviewed urban, middle-class, white males, Kohlberg defined his stages and then generalized them to other populations. When he discovered inconsistencies in development, specifically the fact that other groups seemed not to develop to the highest stages, he concluded that their development had been arrested. Kohlberg says that all groups value justice as their prime motive in moral reasoning, but this cannot be true if women and people from less "modern" cultures do not achieve the highest levels of reasoning which he defines. In the next chapter, I introduce the work of Carol Gilligan. A former student of Kohlberg's, she proposes an alternate guiding principle, that of "care" which may be applied to moral dilemmas to achieve a different progression of moral decision-making.

Chapter 3

Gilligan's Presentation of Two Moral Orientations

As a former student of Kohlberg's, Gilligan also approaches morality from the point of view of a psychologist; and like him, she is concerned with moral reasoning rather than behaviour. Her thesis is a direct response to the bias she sees arising from Kohlberg's use of an exclusively male group of subjects. She suggests in her 1982 book that complementary to the moral orientation described by Kohlberg, which privileges justice as the highest moral principle, there exists another orientation to morality which is characterized by concern for caring. In this chapter, I present Gilligan's theory of two moral orientations, including her discussion of the psychological origins of these two orientations, the sequence of development within the care orientation, and the empirical evidence supporting these.

BACKGROUND TO GILLIGAN'S THEORY

Gilligan's first book, In a Different Voice, begins with a description of the sexual bias evident historically in psychological theory. The aim of her work is to remedy that bias in theories of morality by presenting women's moral development as distinct and legitimate rather than as a deviant form of masculine morality. She notes that theories which were formerly considered sexually neutral in their

scientific objectivity "are found instead to reflect a consistent observational and evaluative bias" (Gilligan, 1982, p.6). Psychological theorists have, she says, implicitly adopted male life as the norm and have tried to "fashion women out of a masculine cloth....In the life cycle, as in the Garden of Eden, the woman has been the deviant" (Gilligan, 1982, p.6).

Specifically, she notes that Lever (1976), Piaget (1965), and Erikson (1950) all define development in terms of the male; women's development is described, almost as an afterthought, as deviating from the norm. In Piaget's account of the moral judgement of the child, for example, "girls are an aside, a curiosity to whom he devotes four brief entries in an index that omits 'boys' altogether because 'the child' is assumed to be male" (Gilligan, 1982, p.18).

Gilligan's work is primarily a reaction to Kohlberg's theory of moral development. As opposed to theorists such as Piaget and Freud, who devote space to the ways in which women deviate from the "norm" of development, Kohlberg's theory was formulated without any regard for potential differences in women. The original group of subjects on whom his theory was based contained no females whatsoever, yet he claims universality for his stages.[1] The particular over-

[1]As I noted in Chapter 2, there is some debate over the existence of differences in development through Kohlberg's stages. Gilligan argues that members of any group not included in Kohlberg's original study rarely reach his higher stages. This discussion will be presented in more detail below.

representation of women at stage three of Kohlberg's hierarchy, the stage at which morality is conceived in terms of interpersonal relations, is Gilligan's starting point of enquiry. While Kohlberg and others suggest that it is women's socialization which discourages their advancement beyond this stage, Gilligan argues that women's moral viewpoint is distinct and cannot be adequately defined within the Kohlbergian system.

> Where our colleagues have seen evidence of female deficiency in disparities between women's moral reasoning and psychologists' moral theories (deficiencies which they have attributed to women's position of social and economic disadvantage), we have seen a problem in theory, a problem reflected in the practices of choosing all-male research samples. (Gilligan and Attanucci, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.453-454).

Gilligan also notes that there has been a tendency to define adulthood and the tasks which lead to it in solely male terms. Thus, women's development is described as having been "arrested" in Kohlbergian terms because their development does not follow male lines. By the male oriented criteria, women are found in disproportionately high numbers at the stage level normally filled by children and young adults. While independent assertion in judgement and action is considered the hallmark of adulthood, it is rather in their care and concern for others that women have both judged themselves and been judged. To achieve adult status thus requires a woman to grapple with the discrepancy between adulthood and womanhood.

> The conflict between self and other thus constitutes the central moral problem for women, posing a dilemma whose resolution requires a reconciliation between femininity and adulthood....It is precisely this dilemma - the conflict between compassion and autonomy, between virtue and power - which the feminine voice struggles to resolve in its effort to reclaim the self and to solve the moral problem in such a way that no one is hurt (Gilligan, 1982, p.71-72).

Gilligan discusses the way in which care and dependence have been doubly disparaged by their association with women and children, rather than seen as part of the human condition. "To heal the division between adult and female, thus, requires a revisioning of both images" (Gilligan, in Gilligan, et al., 1988, p.157). It is this revisioning that Gilligan has undertaken.[2]

THE TWO ORIENTATIONS OF JUSTICE AND CARE

There are, according to Gilligan, two distinct orientations to morality. These are gender related, but are neither gender specific nor biologically determined (Gilligan, 1982, p.2). They are the result of the reaction of the young child to relationships formed in early life, the specifics of which will be discussed later in this chapter. Because these relationships are experienced differently for boys and girls, their ensuing moral development progresses in two different ways, although adult men and women are each capable of

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[2]This division between adulthood and femininity is a main theme in the writing of Jane Roland Martin, and is taken up in more detail in Chapter 4.

understanding the orientation of the other.[3] Gilligan has named these two moral orientations "justice" and "care", the justice orientation being the one studied and described by Kohlberg. The care perspective is the one detailed in Gilligan's first book. As she describes it:

> the distinction made here between a justice and a care orientation pertains to the ways in which moral problems are conceived and reflects different dimensions of human relationships that give rise to moral concerns. A justice perspective draws attention to problems of inequality and oppression and holds up an ideal of reciprocity and equal respect. A care perspective draws attention to problems of detachment or abandonment and holds up an ideal of attention and response to need. Two moral injunctions - not to treat others unfairly and not to turn away from someone in need - capture these different concerns (Gilligan, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.73).

Gilligan makes the point that caring is not to be conceived of as passive or confined to the private sphere. She notes Kohlberg's (1984) suggestion that the two moral voices of justice and care are domain specific, with justice pertinent to public or institutional dilemmas and care germane to private or personal conflicts (Gilligan and Attanucci, in Gilligan et al.,1988, p. 453). Gilligan herself describes care and justice as "two moral perspectives that organize both thinking and feelings and empower the self to take different kinds of action in public as well as in private life" (Gilligan, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.326).

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[3]Lyons, in Gilligan et al. (1988), demonstrated that as young as eleven years of age, boys and girls are for the most part capable of comprehending both moral orientations.

Justice and care are not to be seen as opposites, however, with justice uncaring and caring unjust. Rather, they constitute different ways of approaching a moral dilemma, and lead to different reasoning strategies.

> As in the ambiguous figure which can be perceived alternately as a vase or two faces, there appear to be two ways of perceiving self in relation to others, both grounded in reality, but each imposing on that reality a different organization. But, as with the perception of the ambiguous figure, when one configuration of self emerges, the other seems to temporarily vanish (Gilligan, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.9).

Furthermore, the fact that people solve a problem in one way does not mean that they have no access to other approaches (Gilligan, in Gilligan et al., 1988).

THE ORIGINS OF MORALITY

Gilligan's initial thesis, as detailed in her 1982 book, originated with questions arising from the observation that few women progress to the principled levels of moral reasoning within Kohlberg's framework. She went on to conduct her own studies on women's morality, and observed that when one listened to the ways in which women answered moral questions without imposing Kohlberg's stage theory, a course of development became apparent which did not follow the one he described. She concluded that women's development was different from men's, and explained this using the work of Nancy Chodorow (1974).

Gilligan explains Chodorow's argument, in which it is

suggested that the reason for the reproduction within each generation of certain general and nearly universal differences that characterize masculine and feminine personality and roles is the fact that women, universally, are largely responsible for early childhood care (Gilligan, 1982).

> Because this early social environment differs for and is experienced differently by male and female children, basic sex differences recur in personality development. As a result, in any given society, feminine personality comes to define itself in relation and connection to other people more than masculine personality does....Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation. Thus males tend to have difficulty with relationships, while females tend to have problems with individuation (Gilligan, 1982, p.7-8).

In the time since the publication of her initial work, Gilligan has developed a psychologically based theory of the difference between girls' and boys' experiences of relationship, and the way in which early relationships determine the course of moral development. Gilligan, writing together with Wiggins, notes following Piaget that apart from our relationships with other people, there would be no moral necessity. This observation is central to her position that a perspective on relationships underlies any conception of morality (Gilligan and Wiggins, in Gilligan et al., 1988).

Gilligan and Wiggins go on to describe two facets of a child's early experience of relationship. The first is the experience of inequality. The child very early on becomes aware of the unequal strength, size, and status of various

members of the family in relation to the child's own self. Focusing on the constraint of the young child's situation, psychologists have defined morality as justice and aligned development with the child's progress towards a position of equality and independence (Gilligan and Wiggins, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.114).

The second aspect of early relationship, and the one which has largely been ignored in traditional psychological writing, is the sense of attachment which every child experiences. This aspect of relationship allows the child to recognize her or his capability to have an effect on others.

> In the context of attachment, the child discovers the patterns of human interaction and observes the ways in which people care for and hurt one another. Like the experience of inequality, although in different ways, the experience of attachment profoundly affects the child's understanding of human feelings and how people should act toward one another (Gilligan and Wiggins, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.115).

In the past, the implication of attachment has been largely overlooked, in part because psychologists have focused on the passive nature of attachment rather than on the child's activity in creating and sustaining relationships. The authors note, however, that the experience of attachment in early childhood may attenuate the experience of inequality by empowering the child in relation to the parent.

As girls identify with their mothers, to whom they are attached and with whom they are in closer proximity, their experience of inequality may be less overwhelming, and the

sense of security they gain through creating connections with others will be more central to their developing self-concept and self-esteem. As well, the social norms of femininity impede their striving towards equality, resulting in an even stronger reliance on identity through attachment. Boys on the other hand, while more strongly attached to their mothers, identify with their fathers, and see their fathers as the embodiment of authority and physical power in the context of the family. Their desire to overcome their own unequal status becomes more salient in organization of self-concept and separation thus becomes more crucial to self-esteem. In another essay, Gilligan states that

> although the experiences of inequality and attachment initially are concurrent in the relationship of parent and child, they point to different dimensions of relationship - the dimension of inequality/equality and of attachment/detachment. The moral visions of justice and care reflect these different dimensions of relationships and the injunctions to which the experiences of inequality and attachment give rise (Gilligan, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p. 144).

To the extent that biological sex, the psychology of gender, and the cultural norms and values that define masculine and feminine behaviour affect the experience of equality and attachment, these factors presumably will influence moral development (Gilligan and Wiggins, in Gilligan et al., 1988).

SEQUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT

The moral orientation described by Gilligan is made up of three different "perspectives" or attitudes towards what

constitutes good behaviour, and these are developmental to the extent that more mature individuals employ the third perspective while less mature subjects more often choose the first. However, Gilligan does not call these perspectives "stages", and makes no attempt to link them to the Piagetian conception of stages, which by definition are invariant, sequential, hierarchical, and structural wholes. In her 1982 book, Gilligan describes each of the three perspectives in detail, providing numerous examples drawn from her empirical studies. She includes a description of the two transitions between stages and the types of issues which prompt development. The portion of her book In a Different Voice which deals with this description is organized in much the same way as the Kohlbergian descriptions of stages which are included in so much of his writing. In her writing since that time, however, Gilligan has not attempted to label her subjects' reasoning within either moral orientation as belonging to one perspective or another. In fact, it not at all clear whether she views development through the care orientation as linear or whether on the other hand an individual may use a mixture of perspectives, moving from one to the other depending on the circumstance. Here is a description of the three perspectives as Gilligan describes them.

The first of the three views involves a focus on caring for the self in order to ensure survival. In this

perspective, the woman is self-oriented. She is concerned only with her own needs; if these are not in conflict, then there is no dilemma. This is followed by the first transitional phase in which conceptions of selfishness and responsibility begin to appear. This transition includes for the first time the possibility of "doing the right thing", and there is a move towards social participation. Criticism of one's "selfishness" signals a new understanding of the connection between self and others leading to the second view in which the good is equated with caring for others.

> Whereas from the first perspective, morality is a matter of sanctions imposed by a society of which one is more subject than citizen, from the second perspective, moral judgement relies on shared norms and expectations. The woman at this point validates her claim to social membership through the adoption of societal values. Consensual judgement about goodness becomes the overriding concern, as survival is now seen to depend on acceptance by others (Gilligan, 1982, p.79).

In the second transition the individual recognizes the difficulty within a relationship which ensues when the needs of the self are abnegated. The individual in this transitionary phase confronts the confusion between self-sacrifice and care, particularly as these are evident in the conventions of female goodness. The shift in concern is from goodness to truth, as the woman wonders whether it is selfish or responsible to include her own needs within the compass of her care and concern (Gilligan, 1982, p.82). During this transition, the needs of the self have to be deliberately uncovered. As Gilligan writes, paying attention to one's own

needs may be selfish from one point of view, but from a different perspective it is not only honest but fair. This is the essence of the shift toward a new concept of goodness, which turns inward in acknowledging the self and in accepting responsibility for choice (Gilligan, 1982).

The third perspective focuses on the dynamics of relationships, and the recognition that the interconnection between other and self necessitates compromise and the ability to take on the other's point of view. There has developed a recognition that one must also care for oneself. Once the obligation to goodness extends to include self as well as others, the disparity between selfishness and responsibility dissolves. The woman recognizes that in certain situations there is no resolution which will not cause harm to someone. Although care is the universal ethic towards which the woman strives, she realizes that in order to respond to one set of needs she must at least partially neglect another. Gilligan summarizes development of the care orientation:

> Thus a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships - an increasing differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of social interaction - informs the development of an ethic of care. This ethic, which reflects a cumulative knowledge of human relationships, evolves around a central insight, that self and other are interdependent (Gilligan, 1982, p.74).

For both the moral orientations of justice and care, Gilligan writes that full maturity involves an understanding

and integration of the other.[4] The task for women involves the development of an understanding of the psychological "logic" inherent in relationships. Men, on the other hand, must recognize the need for more active responsibility in caring, in order to correct the potential indifference of a morality of non-interference, and focus on the consequences of choices rather than their formal logic. Starting from the two very different points of justice and care, both men and women must come, in the course of development towards adulthood, to a greater understanding of both points of view and thus to a greater convergence in judgement. Recognizing the dual contexts of justice and care, they realize that judgement depends on the way in which the problem is framed; thus, they are capable of weighing the dilemma in both orientations and of more fully understanding the dynamics and the consequences of the choice they eventually make.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Evidence regarding the actual existence of sex differences in moral development or in moral orientation has come from each of the two "camps" headed by Kohlberg and Gilligan. In Chapter 1, I reported that Kohlberg and his colleagues did find, as Gilligan accuses, a disproportionately high representation of members of groups which were not part

[4]Interestingly, Kohlberg himself hints that this is so for the justice orientation, in discussing his seventh stage which entails an ethic of love.

of his original study at the lower levels of his scale. Arbuthnot and Faust (1981) note these findings and take great pains to explain that the differences are not biological but sociological and educational in nature. If women, members of the lower-class, and residents of non-Western countries were as educationally and socially sophisticated as were Kohlberg's boys, they too could advance morally.

Since the publication of Gilligan's first book, however, Kohlbergians have been quick to rise in defence of his theory. They report that under a more adequate scoring system these differences, particularly the sex-related ones, disappear (Pratt et al, 1984). Walker (1984) and Walker et al. (1987) report an overall pattern of non-significant sex differences in moral reasoning. Thus "these findings fail to support the notion that Kohlberg's theory and scoring system are biased against the 'female' response orientation" (Walker et al., 1987, p.856). Vasudev (1988) cites Gibbs, Arnold, & Burkhart (1984), Vasudev & Hummel (1987), and Walker (1984, 1986) all of whom report non-significant sex differences on Kohlberg's hierarchy. Bebeau and Brabeck (1987) also report that gender differences do not exist on Kohlberg's theory, and cite Baumrind (1986) who reports that such differences as have been found in the past disappear when the effects of education are controlled. Thoma (1986), also cited in Bebeau and Brabeck (1987), reported that at every age and educational level females actually scored significantly higher than males, and

that educational level was five hundred times more powerful in predicting moral judgement level than was gender.

Regardless of the existence or non-existence of gender differences in Kohlberg's description of moral development (and the answer seems to depend on which of Kohlberg's four scoring systems one uses), Gilligan's point is entirely different. She criticizes the entire Kohlbergian system for ignoring women's moral development. In response to a series of articles discussing her book, Gilligan writes:

> Seizing on the Walker article (1984)...my critics claim that there are no sex differences in moral development because there are no sex differences on the Kohlberg scale. Thus they completely miss my point. My work focuses on the difference between two moral orientations - a justice and a care perspective, rather than on the question of whether women and men differ on Kohlberg's stages of justice reasoning. On two occasions, I have reported no sex differences on Kohlberg's measure. But the fact that educated women are capable of higher levels of justice reasoning has no bearing on the question of whether they would spontaneously choose to frame moral problems in this way (Gilligan, in Kerber et al., 1986, p.328).

Obviously, if one looks only within Kohlberg's system one is not likely to find evidence of an orientation which falls outside it. Although Gilligan's work began as a result of the observation by Kohlbergians that sex differences existed, her contention that there exist two distinct moral orientations does not depend on the former. While, in her view, the two orientations are gender related, she does not suggest that men achieve higher levels of justice reasoning, nor that women are more sophisticated in care reasoning.

On the other hand, Gilligan's early critics were quite right to point out that her first book represented little more than an hypothesis regarding the voice of care. More empirical evidence was necessary than her anecdotal observations of women's moral preferences provided. With the publication of her 1988 book, which is largely composed of empirical studies, the evidence in support of her theory has grown greatly.

Lyons' chapter details a study of justice and care orientations which concluded (1) that the care orientation was far more complex and complete than is the description by Kohlberg of his stage three morality, and (2) that older women tended to make use of higher levels of justice (i.e. to score higher than stage three on Kohlberg's hierarchy). Lyons writes:

> Morality of care appears to be a systematic, life-long concern of individuals...not a temporary, stage- or level-specific concern subsumed within a morality of justice, as Kohlberg's work posits" (Lyons, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.42).

Johnston's study notes that gender, but not age, is related to moral orientation. Through her study, which focused on boys' and girls' moral judgement, she learned that both genders are capable of reasoning within both the care and the justice orientations, and that girls as a group employ both orientations more frequently than boys, who tend as a group to use the rights orientation more exclusively. "In other words, boys use the moral orientation of care much less

often than girls use the moral orientation of justice" (Johnston, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.61).

Gilligan and Attanucci, in the same volume, report on their study of justice and care orientations, noting that (1) concerns about justice and care are both represented in people's thinking about moral dilemmas, but people tend to focus on one set of concerns and minimally represent the other, and (2) there is an association between moral orientation and gender such that while most men and women use both orientations, Care Focus dilemmas are more likely to be presented by women and Justice Focus dilemmas by men (Gilligan and Attanucci, in Gilligan et al., 1988). They further note that if one is not looking for the two orientations, one is not likely to find evidence of them:

> Our findings indicate that the selection of an all-male sample for theory and test construction in moral judgement research is inherently problematic. If women were eliminated from the present study, Care Focus would virtually disappear. Furthermore, most of the dilemmas described by women could be scored and analyzed for justice considerations without reference to the considerations of care. Thus, the interpretive question hinges on the understanding of the care perspective (Gilligan and Attanucci, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.82).

The study by Bardige et al. involved children from Boston's inner city, exploring the extent to which socioeconomic background affects moral development. They note that, like the omission of women from theory-building samples, the lack of samples which included members of low-income groups created a potential for tunnel vision, through the

exclusion of important perspectives. They found that

> in several cases responses that would have been coded as developmentally delayed and amoral had they been seen only in terms of justice were shown to reflect complex observations and strong moral commitments when analyzed from a care perspective (Bardige et al., in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.172).

They noted as well, that social class does influence moral development; however, "seeing low socioeconomic status as merely retarding the development of universal moral constructs can lead one to misrepresent both the experience and the knowledge of low-income adolescents" (Bardige et al., in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.173).

While Bardige and her colleagues are quite right to note the omission of low-income children from the original studies, and to suggest that these potentially different perspectives ought to be studied in their own right, they miss the obvious conclusion that these perspectives might in fact have altered the theories had they been part of their formation. The investigators accept Gilligan's two-orientation theory, and its inherent criticism of Kohlberg's "universal" theory, but do not hesitate to apply Gilligan's framework to yet another formerly omitted group. Thus they fall into the same trap of which Kohlberg is accused: that of generalizing from the group on which the theory was based to another which had been excluded. Had they done as Gilligan originally did (i.e. listened to the new group with an open mind, without imposing a previously existing structure) their results might have been different. Perhaps they would have discovered a third

orientation to moral dilemmas.

SUMMARY

Like Kohlberg, Gilligan is a psychologist. She in no way attempts a philosophical discussion of the "good" in moral terms. She and her colleagues are concerned with observation of different attitudes towards moral dilemmas and with interpreting their origins. Although she does suggest that men and women who are most fully mature can adopt each others' moral orientation when the need arises, she does not advocate means by which to help children develop in a particular direction; neither does she describe philosophically why a particular mode of behaviour is superior to another. Her work focuses on mental processes which result in decision-making. As with Kohlberg, the behaviour resulting from these decisions is not addressed. But while Kohlberg does suggest means by which moral development can be stimulated in the school, Gilligan does not.

In describing the distinction between the justice orientation described by Kohlberg and the care orientation Gilligan ascribes to women, the terms "hierarchy" and "web" are employed. The analogies are useful but may at times be unclear as they are applied in two different ways. The reader is often unclear as to what precisely is meant.

In certain contexts the two analogies are used to designate an individual's response to a given dilemma. If the

person's considerations focus on competition between sets of rights, if the dilemma is seen as a "math problem with people" (Gilligan, 1982), it may be said to fall within the justice orientation. In this context Gilligan describes a hierarchy to which competing rights belong; for example, "life" holds a superior position on this hierarchy to "property". On the other hand, if the person's moral considerations focus on the interconnected nature of humans and their relationships, if the person is more concerned with responding to another than with equality as such, a decision is reached within the care orientation. Gilligan describes this focus as web-like, in that the individual acknowledges the interconnected nature of humans. This first distinction, between a hierarchy of rights and a web of relation is the one used by Gilligan most frequently.

The second way in which these terms are used involves description of an individual's development within each of the two orientations. In Kohlberg's justice orientation the six stages are clearly linear and hierarchical. Kohlberg describes the higher stages as superior, with few people reaching them. In the orientation described by Gilligan, however, it is not clear that the perspectives are hierarchical. On the contrary, although Gilligan does describe the third perspective as the most mature, she implies that individuals may use a mixture of perspectives at any point in development. Movement from one to the other is web-

like in nature, with the individual moving in different directions depending on the context in which the dilemma is considered.

Discussion of the two orientations frequently includes mention of the terms "web" and "hierarchy", and it is important for the reader to be aware of the context in which the term is being used. Engaging in discussion about these two orientations, "hierarchy" most often is used to describe the way in which individuals develop through their understanding of the justice perspective, progressing from one stage to another. On the other hand, when discussing weblike relations, the most common use of the term involves the way in which an individual dilemma is addressed within the care perspective. Thus, it is important for writers to be clear about their use of the terms, and equally important for readers to recognize the distinction and take note of the use to which the analogies are being put at a given time.

The strongest criticism I have of Gilligan's theory is the one levelled at Bardige et al. above. I criticized that study for imposing a pre-constructed theory upon a group whose members were not involved in its construction. Gilligan initially reacted to Kohlberg's "universal" theory by suggesting that its range was too narrow; that it only included morality from a particular perspective, namely that of urban, middle-class, well educated males. Her "two-orientation" theory is more inclusive, but she and her

colleagues tend towards a dogmatic defence of it. If there exist more than one moral orientation, there may well be more than two. In her 1982 book Gilligan explicitly states that her subjects are drawn from an urban, North-American group, and she denies any attempt to generalize her theory to other populations. However, she does not go on to suggest that other orientations are possible, nor does she call for further studies to be conducted involving the groups she omits. This point is taken up again in Chapter 5.

Given, however, that Gilligan's work could be more inclusive of different cultural groups, her theory nevertheless does reflect morality within the culture she describes. In fact, her justice/care distinction points to differences so well recognized in Western society that she is condemned by Kerber for stereotyping women's reasoning (Kerber et al., 1986). Gilligan discusses the way in which recognition of justice and care orientations has gone on throughout history, noting however that the tendency in the past has been to value only decisions born of the justice orientation. In pointing out the over-representation of the justice orientation in western culture, she argues that care is an equally valuable principle for action:

> The care ethic cannot be reduced to a "personal" aspect of morality conceived as justice, as Kohlberg and others have argued. To do so not only fails to see that care can be "principled" - governed by

> standards of authentic relationship - but also overlooks those dilemmas that arose from conflicts between perspectives or from blind spots within one point of view (Gilligan, in Gilligan et al., 1988, p.129).

If care can be principled, then there is the need for a philosophy which describes its potential use and its impact in moral behaviour and everyday life.

In noting criticisms of Gilligan's theory, I have focused mainly upon those questioning the empirical validity of Gilligan's theory. In a 1985 article, however, Sichel offers comments aimed not at the existence or non-existence of Gilligan's two moral orientations, but rather on the lack of philosophical background to her work. Sichel points out that whereas Kohlberg interrelated psychology and philosophy, Gilligan did not ground her raw data or thesis with philosophical assumptions (Sichel, 1985). Sichel calls for a philosophical examination of feminine morality, and for further discussion of the implications of the two moral languages in schools, businesses, and public life as a whole. In Chapter 4, I present Nel Noddings' description of a feminine ethic; one which results from application of a morality of care.

Chapter 4

Noddings' Development of a Feminine Ethic

Gilligan's thesis, rooted in psychological theory and followed up with empirical investigation, has been criticized both for her lack of a moral philosophy from which the "care" response is derived, and for not having suggested ways in which to develop a care focus in young men and women. In her 1984 book Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Nel Noddings undertakes both of these. Noddings is not concerned with outlining stages of development or the means by which children achieve higher levels of moral maturity. Rather, she describes the desire to care as natural, and as a fundamentally feminine characteristic which is nevertheless found in men as well as women.

At the beginning of her book, as well as on numerous occasions throughout it, Noddings discusses the way in which ethical argument has frequently proceeded as if it were governed by the logical necessity characteristic of geometry, with problems deliberately set free from actual conditions. In real life, Noddings notes, moral problems do not appear clearly constrained and decked out like so many textbook problems in algebra (Noddings, 1984). It is important, therefore, for educators and parents to aid children in developing talents not so much in logical examination of dilemmas, but in recognizing the sort of action which must be

taken in a particular instance. Schools, she argues, have always been used as incubators for good citizens, and citizenship has not always been defined in term of academic achievement scores (Noddings, 1988). Noddings' argument is based on her conviction that an education aimed at producing good people must include feminine perspectives on morality. These perspectives are rooted in context-specific decisions intended to enhance at all times the caring relationship. Noddings' own words best introduce and summarize her ethic:

> The view to be expressed here is a feminine view. This does not imply that all women will accept it or that men will reject it; indeed, there is no reason why men should not embrace it. It is feminine in the deep classical sense - rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness. It does not imply either that logic is to be discarded or that logic is alien to women. It represents an alternative to present views, one that begins with the moral attitude or longing for goodness and not with moral reasoning. (Noddings, 1984, p. 2)

In this chapter, I outline Noddings' philosophy as well as her suggestions for its implementation in schools. There are three main sections, which discuss Noddings' understanding of what it means to care, define a caring relationship, and describe her prescriptions for education, respectively. Before all of this, it is appropriate to examine Noddings' views regarding the origins of feminine morality.[1]

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[1]Following Noddings, I use the feminine pronoun to refer to the one-caring and the masculine pronoun to refer to the cared-for.

THE ORIGINS OF FEMININE MORALITY

Having noted that her examination is philosophical rather than empirical, Noddings makes no claims that caring is a moral view held exclusively by women. On the contrary, she implies that both men and women have access to this feminine nature. Nevertheless, she feels compelled to offer explanation for the fact that it is predominantly women who care, and for the reason that women are more comfortable in the "caring mode" than are men.

There are, Noddings notes, three predominant paradigms used to explain gender differences: the biological, the sociological, and the psychological. The biological view holds that women, having given birth and entered lactation, are naturally nurturant toward their infants. The sociological view denies arguments for natural instinct and natural nurturance and insists that mothering is a learned role. The psychological view, which was developed by Chodorow and was the basis for Gilligan's theory, holds that the tendency for girls to want to mother is the result of deep psychological processes established in close and special relationships with their mothers (Noddings, 1984).

Noddings dismisses the sociological view as "nonsense", commenting that society is not nearly so successful at socializing people into roles as it is at reproducing mothering in women. Mothering is not a role, says Noddings, but a relationship (Noddings, 1984, p. 128). She accepts the

psychological view up to a point, but suggests that biological arguments ought not to be set aside or minimized:

> It is true that woman's natural inclination to mother a newborn does not explain why she continues to mother a child into its adolescence or why she mothers other people's half-grown children. But it may well be that a completely adequate theory will have to embrace both biological and psychological factors -and, perhaps, even socialization factors- if we are going to consider competence in mothering. (Noddings, 1984, p. 128)

Thus, without committing herself to one or another framework, Noddings implies that a combination of biological and psychological factors causes women to chose to care as an appropriate means of expressing themselves and of relating to others.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO CARE?

In this first section, I present Noddings' basic conception of a caring ethic. The importance of a two-party relationship is discussed, as well as the two important ways in which her ethic differs from traditional morality - first, in that it is context-specific rather than relying on principles, and second, in that there is not the need to justify one's actions.

Caring, in Noddings' philosophy, involves two parties: the one-caring and the cared-for. They enter into a relationship characterized by the completion of the act of caring; the cared-for must accept the action or attitude in order for it to be completed by the one-caring. Noddings

makes it very clear that it is not enough for the initiator to exhibit a caring attitude:

> Suppose I claim to care for X, but X does not believe that I care for him. If I meet the first-person requirements of caring for X, I am tempted to insist that I do care - that there is something wrong with X that he does not appreciate my caring. But if you are looking at this relationship, you would have to report, however reluctantly, that something is missing. X does not feel that I care. Therefore, sadly, I must admit that, while I feel that I care, X does not perceive that I care and, hence, the relationship cannot be characterized as one of caring. (Noddings, 1984, p. 68)

Lack of completion does not, however, signify negligence on the part of the one-caring; there are limits on the extent to which one may care. But in order for the relation to be considered a caring one there is the necessity of reception on the part of the cared-for.

Principle versus Context

Because the caring ethic is fundamentally rooted in relationship, it can neither be examined nor undertaken apart from the context in which the relationship exists. Noddings is not concerned with abstract truths which are applied without regard for the individuals or circumstances involved. For her, the context is essential, and she spends a large portion of her book discussing and giving examples of the ways in which principles - the mainstay of masculine ethics - are extraneous to an ethic of caring. Noddings rejects principles as ambiguous and unstable because, she says, wherever there is a principle there is implied its exception. She also

cautions against the "dangerously self-righteous" attitude of those who believe that their principles are the only moral ones.

In keeping with the above, Noddings also rejects the notion of universalizability in ethical life. Although she notes the arguments of ethicists who insist that an ethical judgement must by definition be universalizable, she herself rejects this for two reasons. First, she is less concerned with judging a particular act than with considering the extent to which the other has been met morally. For this reason, there is little point in setting up abstract principles of action against which to measure the relationship at hand. Second, she focuses on the uniqueness of human encounters:

> What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly upon rules - not upon a prior determination of what is fair or equitable - but upon a constellation of conditions that is viewed through the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for. By and large, we do not say with any conviction that a person cares if that person acts routinely according to some fixed rule. (Noddings, 1984, p. 13)

Principles, she says, are a guide to action "with all other things being equal." But, as she notes, all other things are rarely if ever equal. Thus, one is forced to question the relevance of principles outside of theoretical discussions. Furthermore, principles, when used as a guide to behaviour, encourage one to suppress the basic feeling or longing which prompts the need to justify actions. As Noddings puts it:

> One is led to suppose that reason produces the decision. This is the ultimate and tragic

> dishonesty, and it is the one that we shall try to avoid by insisting upon a clear-eyed inspection of our feelings, longings, fears, hopes, dreams (Noddings, 1984, p. 57).

If, then, the one-caring is swayed by emotion more than reason, and is not obligated to abide by any rules which do not enhance the caring relationship, one is forced to ask whether she is completely "capricious and unprincipled," to use Noddings' words, "swayed this way and that by intensity, proximity, and the conditions of the moment." On the contrary, Noddings' response is that

> moral life based on caring is coherent, although it may defy description in terms of systematic consistency. It is swayed, but not determined, by intensity, proximity, and temporal conditions. The one-caring is dependable, not capricious. Her principles are guides to behaviour, and she sees clearly that their function is largely to simplify situations, to prevent hundreds of similar questions from arising. She sees, also, that they may be of little use if a serious question actually arises. (Noddings, 1984, p. 56)

Thus, traditional values and principles are not excluded from the ethical considerations of the one-caring, but neither do they hold the primary position in consideration of a dilemma. An example offered by Noddings is that the one-caring will in general find it wrong to kill, but if the cared for is objectively hopeless in his misery, her caring may find it better to kill him than to abstain from killing. She cannot say, "I would like to help you, but I cannot kill." The one-caring will never put principle above person (Noddings, 1984, p. 107).

Justification

In the same way that she rejects abstract principles, Noddings rejects the traditional ethical understanding of justification of moral actions. Because the moral, to her, is not derived from facts or principles but rather from the caring attitude, it cannot be objectively justified. In fact, for Noddings the moral viewpoint is prior to any notion of justification (Noddings, 1984, p. 95). If one attempts to justify every disobedience or rejection of principle, one tacitly acknowledges that principles are paramount in ethical life. As one-caring, Noddings does not seek justification for action but completion of the act of caring through acceptance on the part of the cared-for.

> The test of my caring is not wholly in how things turn out; the primary test lies in an examination of what I considered, how fully I received the other, and whether the free pursuit of his projects is partly a result of the completion of my caring in him. (Noddings, 1984, p. 81)

Thus, to summarize this first section, caring as a moral ideal is characterized primarily by the relationship between the one-caring and the cared-for, and the ability of this relationship to sustain the caring attitude. Because caring is dependent upon the context of a relationship, the one-caring is not bound by abstract principles, nor is she forced to justify her behaviour to anyone outside of the relationship.

WHAT DEFINES A CARING RELATIONSHIP?

Because the act of caring depends fundamentally upon the caring relationship, it is important to note both the extent and the limits of this relationship. Within Noddings' framework, for (A,B) to be a caring relation, both A (the one-caring) and B (the cared-for) must contribute appropriately. There is something, usually an attitude of caring, which must be initiated by A and completed in B. Thus, while the cared-for clearly depends upon the one-caring, the one-caring is also in a different sense dependent upon the cared-for. In this section, I examine the caring relationship, focusing on the necessity for reception on the part of the one-caring, the difference between natural and ethical caring, and finally the nature of the ethical ideal.

In order to live ethically, one is obliged to care within two circumstances. First, if there exists or is the potential for relationship between the two parties then one is obliged to act in a caring manner. Second, if the relationship includes the dynamic potential for growth, as in a relationship with a child with whom one may reasonably expect to experience increased reciprocity and perhaps mutuality, one must also acknowledge an obligation to care. The obligation to care increases with the proximity of the relationship, so that circles of care may be seen to exist in which the one caring has more responsibility to members of her innermost circles.

There is, however, a limit on the extent to which one may care. This limit depends in part on the number and proximity of the circles one recognizes around oneself, and in part upon the personal resources available to the one-caring. Noddings notes that caring itself is reduced to mere talk about caring when one attempts to care for everyone (Noddings, 1984, p. 86). For example, one cannot care for starving children in another country without abandoning the caring to which one is obligated at home.

> So long as this is possible, she may reach outward and enlarge her circles of caring. When this reaching out destroys or drastically reduces her actual caring, she retreats and renews her contact with those who address her. (Noddings, 1984, p. 89)

Thus, universal love cannot exist. While Noddings does acknowledge that one may <u>care about</u> starving children, she cautions her readers not to confuse this with <u>caring for</u> them in the ethical sense.

<u>Reception</u>

The caring relationship is marked by reception of the cared-for into the consciousness of the one-caring. The word Noddings uses is "engrossment" to describe the manner in which the one-caring receives the cared-for. This is not to be confused with "putting oneself into the other's shoes" which would imply an objective attempt to analyze his reality and project oneself into it. Rather, one must receive the cared-for into oneself; to "see and feel with the other." The one-

caring is invaded by the other, Noddings says, and can never again be completely without regard for him.

From relationships involving two humans, Noddings goes on to examine the relationship of the one-caring to animals, commenting that within her framework there is no absolute source of life, meaning, or morality that separates the species neatly according to some preordained value hierarchy (Noddings, 1984, p. 148). On the other hand, as with the above example of the starving children, the obligation of the one-caring to summon the caring attitude is limited by the possibility of reciprocity (Noddings, 1984, p. 149). Noddings resolves this by saying that while animals cannot enter into a relationship with humans as ones-caring, they do fulfil their obligation as cared-fors; they respond to caring in a way which allows for completion of the caring attitude. In this respect animals are like human infants, the difference being that infants possess a potential for human growth which is not present in animals. Human infants have the capacity to grow into future ones-caring; therefore, they deserve a more proximate consideration in the circles with which the one-caring surrounds herself. "It is not speciesism to respond differently to different species if the very form of response is species specific" (Noddings, 1984, p. 152).

On the subject of caring for animals which are not pets, Noddings is rather vague. She allows the one-caring to choose whether or not to be vegetarian through a rather unclear

argument about the way in which the world will be over populated with animals if they are not eaten (Noddings, 1984, p. 153-154). She notes that whichever one chooses, one is obliged to spare animals unnecessary pain. But even here, she allows scientific testing involving animals if the greater good to humanity requires it. She points out, however, that the one-caring, while allowing such testing to continue, will constantly look for alternatives which would spare the animals. Furthermore, she cautions those who would oppose such practices as whaling and trapping to consider the lives of the people who engage in these activities:

> When I dare to make an ethical judgement of someone else's behaviour, when I insist that he should behave as I would in a given situation, I must also offer my support and help (Noddings, 1984, p. 158).

Natural and Ethical Caring

Noddings describes caring in terms of not one but two sentiments. The first, called natural caring, arises from the natural impulse one feels to care for those with whom one is in closest proximity. Ethical caring, on the other hand, occurs in response to a sense of duty which one feels towards others. Because ethical caring arises in remembrance of the sentiment of natural caring, it is not superior to, but rather is dependent upon natural caring and arises from this first sentiment.

The impulse to care naturally is not, in a true sense, ethical. As Noddings suggests, a woman who allows her child

to die of neglect is more likely to be considered sick than immoral. By the same token, one cannot demand that another adopt this natural feeling. A parent can tell a child that he is hurting the dog, but cannot begin to explain why this is wrong. The child must recognize that it simply, and naturally, is wrong to cause another thing to suffer:

> One either feels a sort of pain in response to others, or one does not feel it. If he does feel it, he does not need to be told that causing pain is wrong. If he does not feel it in a particular case, he may remember the feeling - as one remembers the sweetness of love on hearing a certain piece of music - and allow himself to be moved by this remembrance of feeling. For one who feels nothing, directly or by remembrance, we must prescribe re-education or exile. (Noddings, 1984, p. 92)

The second sentiment, that of ethical caring, arises from the first when one consciously recognizes that it is better to care even in those situations where caring does not naturally occur. It arises when one recognizes caring as superior to other forms of relatedness. This type of caring depends not upon a rule or principle, but upon the development of what Noddings calls the "ideal self." It involves one's remembrance of having been cared for and one's conscious choice to continue to care. Noddings calls it, "the longing to maintain, recapture, or enhance our most caring and tender moments" (Noddings, 1984, p. 104).

The Ethical Ideal

Noddings' ethical ideal is neither absolute not relative. It is more in the nature of a goal towards which one strives

but from which one is expected to fall short. It is not absolute because it is constantly being revised in ways which will be discussed presently. On the other hand, it is not relative because it is grounded in the caring relationship which is constant. Noddings' vision of the ethical ideal involves, at its best, a sense of what can only be described as innocence on the part of the one-caring. Having committed an act which falls short of the ideal, she is not irredeemable, but at the same time, she will never again live with the same sense of incorruption. In Noddings' terms, the ethical ideal must be "revised downwards."

For example, Noddings suggests the hypothetical case of a woman who is pushed to murder her abusive husband. The act cannot be considered ethical within an ethic of care; however, it will not be considered immoral if the woman's situation is genuinely intolerable. The woman is forced to either put up with the abuse which is clearly unethical, commit the murder while still believing that it is always and everywhere wrong to kill, or commit the act with the understanding that it is right but only under certain very wrong circumstances. If she does not revise her ethic downwards, then she is forced to break it. Her act therefore becomes wrong in her own eyes, and she must see herself as unethical and a hypocrite. However, the situation is different if she says that while she does not approve of killing, she sees that in this situation she must for certain reasons. In this latter case, says

Noddings, the woman's ethicality is retained, but the cost is considerable. This woman has ceased to be "one who would never kill"; she has become "one who has killed once but hopes never to do so again." Thus, in order to preserve her ethical self she must accept a constrained ethical ideal.

In Noddings' ethics, there exist "no-win situations" just as these situations exist in life. Noddings makes allowance for these, and accepts that as the one-caring encounters them she is irreversibly affected. The one-caring is idealistic enough to hope for the best, but she is realistic enough to recognize that when impossible situations arise, these too must be managed. Under a principled ethic, the one-caring would be forced to offer an abstract and well reasoned sub-clause to the "do not kill" rule, or would be forced to make an exception to her principle. Under an ethic of care, she has no such constraints, and need not look towards a forgiveness which purports to erase what has gone before. The one-caring recognizes that in some situations she is compelled to perform actions from which she would ordinarily shrink, and equally recognizes that having done so, she will not be the same.

This is not to suggest that the one-caring can act according to her whims. Noddings says that the test of ultimate blame or blamelessness, under and ethic of caring,

> lies in how the ethical ideal was diminished. Did the agent choose the degraded vision out of greed, cruelty, or personal interest? Or was she driven to it by unscrupulous others who made caring impossible to sustain? (Noddings, 1984, p. 102)

There is, in this ethic, no judgement from outside the conscience of the one-caring. There is no book of rules to guide her in her actions, outlining the circumstances under which she may or may not take a given action. But she herself knows the context of her situation. Only she will decide the point at which she commits the action she would have formerly considered unethical. And she alone will have to live with the diminished ethicality which she is forced to create.

Thus, to summarize this portion, a caring relationship is marked by an obligation on the part of both the one-caring and the cared-for to sustain the caring attitude. The relationship of the one caring to potential cared-fors is limited by the number and proximity of the circles she recognizes around herself. It involves reception on the part of the one-caring, and may include reception of animals. The relationship occurs in the twin sentiments of natural and ethical caring. It is modeled on the ethical ideal, which while being grounded in care, is itself malleable and is continually being redefined as the one-caring encounters new ethical dilemmas.

HOW DOES ONE EDUCATE FOR A CARING ATTITUDE?

As befits a practical ethics, Noddings' book includes a very practical chapter on the way in which her philosophy would change education were it more fully implemented in the school system. In this section, I present Noddings' view of

education as a primarily moral undertaking, her description of the one-caring as teacher, and her proposed reorganization of the school system as a caring institution.

The primary aim of education, says Noddings, must be nurturance of the ethical ideal. She does not mean that intellectual growth cannot join with moral growth, but the latter must be the priority. The analogy she uses is of a mother, one of whose primary tasks is to ensure that her child receives an adequate and nutritious supply of food in order to be healthy. Another of her tasks is to clothe the child and keep him clean, but if she were to deny the child milk on the basis of the fact that every time he drinks it he spills it and must have his face washed and his clothing changed, she would clearly have misplaced her priorities. In the same way, Noddings maintains, the school must re-examine its priorities. Intellectual stimulation is surely an important task of the school but if there occurs a situation in which a teacher has the choice of initiating an exercise with intellectual benefits which might threaten the ethical ideal, one would expect the choice to be clear. The problem is that schools lose sight of the ethical implications of their actions, thus failing to notice the damage which is done to their children's moral growth. Rationality as trained intelligence, says Noddings, cannot be the dominant and guiding aim of education. Rationality must serve something higher.

> The school, ideally, is a setting in which values, beliefs, and opinions can be examined both critically and appreciatively. It is absurd to suppose that we are educating when we ignore those matters that lie at the very heart of human existence. (Noddings, 1984, p. 184)

As the school must become a moral institution, so the teacher must respond to her students as one-caring. She has, Noddings says, two main tasks with regard to her students. She must stretch the student's world by presenting an effective selection of it; presumably this will include education for intellectual, physical, and spiritual growth. Furthermore, she must work cooperatively with the student in his struggle toward competence in that world. But above both of these, her priority must be to nurture, as one-caring, the student's ethical ideal (Noddings, 1984, p. 178).

To teach, Noddings says, involves a meeting of one-caring and cared-for. Lecturing to hundreds of students may be important and useful, but it must not be confused with teaching:

> I do not need to establish a deep, lasting, time-consuming personal relationship with every student. What I must do is to be totally and nonselectively present to the student - to each student - as he addresses me. The time interval may be brief, but the encounter is total. (Noddings, 1984, p. 180)

As one-caring, the teacher is not necessarily permissive. She does not, Noddings says, refrain from persuading or coaxing the student toward an examination of those subjects which will stimulate him intellectually, but she recognizes that in the long run he will learn what he pleases (Noddings, 1984, p.

176). Most importantly, the teacher cannot teach about the caring through any other means than by example. If the teacher does care, the message will not be lost upon her students.

In terms of the organization of schools, Noddings is strongly opposed to the current American practice of using the schools to teach only intellectual and physical subjects while moral education is the exclusive domain of the home and church. Humans are integral composites of qualities and deserve to be educated as such. Furthermore, the primary aim of the school, as with every educational effort, must be the maintenance and enhancement of caring (Noddings, 1984, p. 172). Moral education, then, should be a community-wide enterprise and not a task exclusively reserved for home, church, or school. Education ought to be moral in two senses: first, those involved in planning and conducting education should strive to meet all those involved morally; and second, the education itself must enhance the ethical ideal of those being educated so that they will continue to meet others morally (Noddings, 1984, p. 171).

In classes on religion, Noddings would have the children exposed not only to information about religions, but to their affective accompaniments as well. "They should read religious writings, view religious art, and hear religious music. They should have opportunities to feel what the other is feeling as a result of deeply held beliefs" (Noddings, 1984, p. 185).

In very practical terms, Noddings describes the organization of her ideal school. She calls for enhancement of the teacher-student relationship through assigning a particular class to a given teacher for three consecutive years. Anticipating the criticism that forcing a class to endure a difficult or harmful teacher for three years is far too long, she replies that even one year is too long for such a teacher, and that this person should not, in fact, be allowed to teach. Along the same lines, Noddings suggests that a problem in school boards is the administrative hierarchy which draws too strong a distinction between teachers and administrators. Most teachers experience very little mobility in their jobs, and rarely get a break from their year-to-year routine. On the other hand, many administrators miss the close relationship with children which they had as teachers. Noddings suggests that there be a rotation of teachers and administrators, such that after three years with a class, the teacher spends one year administrating. Obviously decisions would have to be made in a less autocratic manner if there were to be any continuity from year to year, and this too would lessen the gap between practitioners and administrators.

Noddings is opposed to the current grading system. Grades tell neither the teacher nor the student anything they could not have found out more easily, more clearly, and less destructively through other means. Grading is an intrusion

into the existing caring relationship. The teacher is asked to look at the student as an object - as a thing to which some measuring stick can be applied. Noddings offers a number of alternatives to grading. In the first, the teacher would set up a clear standard to which the child's work must conform, giving the child as much time as is necessary to complete it satisfactorily. In the second, the teacher and student together would agree on the amount and quality of work which is to be completed, creating a contract agreeable to both. Finally, if grades must be assigned, they should be assigned by external examiners who are not party to the relationship which has been set up between student and teacher. The primary goal is to provide an environment which encourages and supports the teacher-student relationship as a caring one, and which nurtures the child's growing understanding of the ethical ideal.

Noddings' criticisms of schools and schooling provoke reaction on two levels. In the more broad range, she calls for a rethinking of education which takes into account the nonacademic, nonrational aspects of education and development. Through her view of the school system, one sees a radically different vision of what it means to be educated. While this vision is compelling, it is not within the power of a teacher or even a group of educators to implement Noddings' proposed restructuring on a grand scale. In the more immediate range, however, Noddings calls upon each teacher to relate as one-

caring both in the classroom and elsewhere. This challenge is not beyond the grasp of members of her reading audience. To care as teacher is merely a natural extension into one's professional life of the caring for which Noddings calls in all aspects of a person's life.

CRITICISMS: IS IT ENOUGH TO CARE?

A recent issue of Hypatia, a journal of feminist philosophy, devoted space to a number of reviews of Noddings' book. The most common criticism centred on Noddings' excessive dependence on caring as an ethical ideal, to the complete exclusion of principles such as justice. Claudia Card and Barbara Houston both bring this point up, but present its ills from two different points of view. Card maintains that it is not enough to be ethically responsible to only those with whom one is in a relationship, while Houston's argument concerns the harm that can befall the one-caring if she must continue to care in an exploitive relationship. These two arguments will be presented separately, followed by Noddings' response to them.

Card's fundamental question is: "Can an ethic of care without justice enable us adequately to resist evil?" (Card, 1990). By evil, she means "complicity in evil doing," both directed towards a stranger and directed towards an intimate. Card's answer is no, in both situations. Because Noddings regards as ethically insignificant our relationships with

people remote from ourselves, she invites attitudes of racism and xenophobia (Card, 1990, p. 102). In an age where technology has made it possible for us to affect, even fatally affect, those whom we will not meet, we must depend on principles, such as justice and the preservation of human life and dignity, in order to respond to these types of situations. On the subject of relationships, Card quotes Noddings' argument that principles function to separate us from one another. Disagreeing with this, Card suggests that certain principles such as those which compel us to honour our parents or to value familial ties serve actually to draw us together. Card suggests that what Noddings is actually objecting to is not principled action as such, but rather the content of particular principles. Summarizing her argument, she says

> In a poorly integrated multicultural society dominated by phobic stereotypes, opportunities for interracial caring relationships are not what they should be. In such a context, if one's ethical repertoire is exhausted by caring, there is nothing left to operate with respect to many of the interracial consequences of one's conduct. Normally, this is the place for justice and respect for others (Card, 1990, p. 105).

Houston's criticism of Noddings also focuses on the lack of principles by which to judge the caring act, but her concern is not for the potentially "uncared-for" but for the vulnerable position of the one-caring. She worries that if the one-caring sees her moral worth as wholly dependent upon her capacity to care for others, or contingent upon being in relation, then she may opt to remain in relations which are

harmful to her (Houston, 1990, p. 117). Houston points to the fact that women in a patriarchal society have always been primarily responsible for caring and for service to others. She worries that women may be perceived to have moral worth only to the extent that they service their intimates. She criticises Noddings for not offering any hope for a radical transformation of the gendered conditions which presently exist (Houston, 1990, p. 118). She grants that Noddings (in an unpublished manuscript, 1986) has said it is <u>not</u> a caring act to allow oneself to be exploited, because such exploitation diminishes the ethical self of the other, but Houston responds by pointing out that we cannot know what counts as another's well being without having recourse to other values such as autonomy, justice, mutuality, and respect for persons (Houston, 1990, p. 118). In summary, her point is

> if we stick to a formal account of caring, then we have no way to rule out undesirable relations. We must appeal to other moral values to keep caring morally decent. Caring is not an ethic that can stand alone (Houston, 1990, p. 119).

In her response to the above, Noddings notes that the traditional philosophical approach is to defend one's position "to the last rhetorical gasp" (Noddings, 1990, p. 120). As a feminist, however, she has learned the value of sharing and of listening, thus she does not apologize for her concession that her critics may be right; however, she is not prepared to accept justice into her ethic without a certain amount of

scrutiny. Among other things, Noddings warns that working in a framework of justice, one may mistakenly suppose that everyone ought to live like oneself.

> Most grievous of all, from the point of view of caring, is the tendency to bog down in endless abstract wrangling over procedural rules and definitions instead of listening and responding (Noddings, 1990, p. 122).

Noddings agrees that the one-caring is vulnerable to exploitation, but argues that this fact does not make it wrong to care. Her book emphasizes moral education, precisely so that such exploitation will not occur.

> I agree with Houston that the language of caring is dangerous. It has an ambiguous ring and a deeply flawed history. That does not mean that my analysis is wrong or that an ethic of caring is inherently inadequate. It means I - and others working in the area - should pay far greater attention to historical context and social tradition (Noddings, 1990, p. 126).

SUMMARY

Noddings' vision of caring as an intimate relationship between the one-caring and the cared-for allows her to suggest that to be ethical one must actively undertake relationship with the people surrounding oneself. To care is the primary aim of all relations, including those in the school, and caring must take precedence over all considerations which may conflict with or impede the relationship. Ethics must be undertaken on a personal level, rather than discussed in the abstract. The good depends on the context in which it occurs; thus, principles are of little use.

Noddings has taken Gilligan's framework, outlined an ethical system resulting from adherence to the "care" orientation, and applied it to the school. Jane Roland Martin's philosophy of education involves an historical view of the education of women and a discussion of the way in which education would necessarily change if a feminine ideal were incorporated. Her thesis is presented in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5

Martin's Ideal Educated Woman

Jane Roland Martin has written a number of articles on various aspects of educational philosophy, including attacks on the hidden curriculum, discussions of current educational philosophies (such as that of Peters and Hirst), and suggestions concerning teacher education. She is particularly concerned with the ways in which an implicit curriculum leads to difficulties for women and other disadvantaged groups. The ideal educated person is, and has historically been, trained in rational thought and skilled in objective analysis. Martin's main thesis is that given this ideal, women are at a particular disadvantage in their attempt to become educated because these are not traits which women are encouraged to develop. Education, Martin says, has meant and does mean initiation into male modes of thought and of action; those traits traditionally considered feminine are deemed unnecessary for the educated person. In moral education particularly, Martin argues against the rational and abstract methods of reasoning advocated by Kohlberg and his colleagues. Morality, she says, is equated with decision-making, decision-making is then viewed as reasoning and reasoning is conceived of as judging, with dilemmas or conflict situations assumed to be the proper objects of that activity. While she notes that this is hardly surprising given the current ideal of

liberal education, Martin points out, as does Noddings, that moral life is not reducible to a series of dilemmas, nor is it comprised mainly of them. The resolution of conflict, - whether between opposing parties to a dispute, between one's own desires and moral principles or between competing principles - is neither the only nor even the most important element of moral thought and action (Martin, 1987, p. 212).

In order to understand the current educational ideal, Martin argues that one must first examine the history of attitudes towards women and education. In the introduction to her book Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman, Martin notes that while educational theorists tend not to take notice of gender, feminist theorists in their turn pay no attention to matters of educational philosophy (Martin, 1985, p. 1). Her own book presents an historical view of selected theories of education for women. Martin discusses works by Plato and Rousseau, saying that these well known philosophers have been misinterpreted. She also brings forward works by the lesser known writers Wollstonecraft, Beecher, and Gilman. Having first addressed her reconstruction of these historical theories, I will, in this chapter, go on to examine her arguments regarding the current educational ideal and her suggestions for the formulation of a new one.

HISTORICAL THEORIES REGARDING THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN

Martin's 1985 book, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman, details and contrasts the educational philosophies of five writers: Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft, Catherine Beecher, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman. In each case she draws upon the one work which she feels best exemplifies the educational theory of the author. Her purpose in this exercise is to bring to light attitudes regarding the education of women which have until now been either misinterpreted, improperly applied, or dismissed altogether. Martin argues that without a solid understanding of history, each subsequent generation of philosophers is forced to "reinvent the wheel" when confronted with the issue of education for women. Because these authors have many common issues, each handled differently from one author to the next, Martin presents them as if in conversation with each other; in fact, she joins into the conversation herself from time to time, and invites her reader to do the same.

Plato

Martin's study of Plato focuses on the recommended education for the guardian class as detailed in his Republic as it is the guardian's education which epitomizes the current ideal of liberal education. She notes that later students of Plato have commonly overlooked the fact that in his just state men and women guardians were to be coeducated, following the

same curriculum in the same classes. Both needed the same education as they were expected to rule together and equally. The problem Martin finds with Plato's education is in the fact that both men and women are educated only in the "productive processes" of society. Martin's discussion of the productive/reproductive distinction will be more fully detailed in the second part of this chapter, but in brief, she defines the reproductive processes broadly to include not only conception and birth but also the rearing of children and associated activities such as tending the sick, taking care of family needs, and running a household. The productive processes are defined to include political and cultural activities as well as economic ones (Martin, 1985, p. 6). While Martin applauds Plato's vision of sexual equality, she notes that it requires rulers to abandon the reproductive processes completely. Having given birth to the next generation, female guardians are counselled to abandon their children to nurses and tutors who rear them. In order to free these women for their education alongside the men, Plato removes from them all responsibilities in the reproductive sphere. This leads to problems in later interpretations and applications of Plato's philosophy to other societies - if Plato's rational and liberal education is to be implemented, those being educated must abandon the reproductive processes to someone else's hands. It is not surprising, therefore, that later societies following Plato's philosophy of education

chose to educate men while leaving to women the reproductive responsibilities.

Rousseau

The standard texts on Rousseau's Emile, says Martin, have focused on the education of the boy, Emile. In discussing Rousseau's growth-model of education, historians of educational thought are caused acute discomfort, says Martin, when they are forced to consider Rousseau's education of Sophie:

> The education of Sophie is an anomaly relative to the standard interpretation of Emile: her education cannot be explained by an interpretation which abstracts education from societal influences and constraints and which pictures it as a process of natural growth and development. The fundamental assumptions Rousseau makes in Emile V constitute a production model of education. What Sophie is to become is determined not by her nature, as the standard growth interpretation of Emile requires, but by the role she is to play in society (Martin, 1981b, p. 358).

Rather than seeing the educations of Sophie and Emile as two fundamentally different types (namely, growth for the boy and production for the girl), commentators have preferred to ignore Sophie altogether and propose for girls an education similar to the one Emile receives. Martin proposes, on the other hand, that we view Emile's and Sophie's educations as complementary. Both are designed to produce a particular adult - Emile will be a citizen for Rousseau's ideal society, while Sophie will be his helper and the maintainer of his household and children.

> In Sophie's case, Rousseau clearly embraces Plato's Postulate of Specialized Natures: Sophie's nature is for him as inborn, fixed, and specific as the natures of the inhabitants of the Just State are for Plato (Martin, 1985, p. 39).
>
> Because Sophie can acquire any number of traits that Rousseau would rather she did not, it is not plausible to attribute to him a conception of the teacher or tutor as a gardener who provides the proper conditions for a plant to flourish (Martin, 1985, p. 41).

Martin develops the argument that Sophie and Emile are both moulded into complementary images - Emile must be strong, independent, rational, and self-controlled, while Sophie is to be attractive, emotional, and cunning (but not disobedient). Although both children are given the illusion of freedom, in reality their environments are strictly controlled by their tutors; this sort of manipulation, says Martin, is exactly what one would expect of an educational theory that tells the teacher to be humane but gives that teacher a hidden agenda (Martin, 1985, p. 51).

Martin goes on to speculate about the nature of the marriage of Sophie and Emile. Since they do not share any traits, it is unlikely, she maintains, for theirs to be a harmonious union.

> If a woman is not herself a rational, autonomous being, her marriage will be doomed....It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that for their union to be harmonious Sophie requires some of Emile's virtues but he requires none of hers....For Sophie, caring for Emile is its own reward. He will not - indeed cannot- reciprocate. For how long can unreciprocated tenderness and care last?...We need do no more than remark on the fact that without Sophie's virtues Emile himself will be a defective individual, for Rousseau knows this. The marriage

> he arranges is intended to correct Emile's emotional deficiencies - not by teaching him to be tender and caring but by giving him a tender, caring mate (Martin, 1985, p. 55).

Thus only through the union of their natural talents is a balanced individual produced.

Martin points out further that Sophie's only concerns are domestic, while Emile's are in the public sphere. Sophie herself would never defy Emile, should these two spheres clash, but her skill in manipulating him and her cunning will cause him to favour familial interests over his public obligations. He cannot hope to convince Sophie by rational persuasion to sacrifice her private wants for the public good; rational argument is not Sophie's strong point, and the public good is not her concern (Martin, 1985).

> In truth, the only people in Rousseau's philosophy who could conceivably fill the role of citizen, as he defines it, are the male-female pairs created by marriage (Martin, 1985, p. 63).

Thus, Martin has two comments to make regarding Rousseau's proposed education: first, one must recognize the manipulation behind the scenes of this supposedly free education, and second, the individuals produced by it are incomplete unless they are half of a male-female pair.

Wollstonecraft

Mary Wollstonecraft's essay, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, was written in direct response to Rousseau's Emile. Wollstonecraft's education is designed with the conviction

that to be a fully moral human being necessitates the exercise of one's powers of reason. The powers of reason cannot be developed except through education of the mind; therefore, if women are to be considered humans rather than brutes, they deserve to be granted a full education leading to the development of rationality. Wollstonecraft does not want to separate Sophie from her wifely role, but argues that a mother and wife must be proficient intellectually in order to properly run her household. Not only does such an occupation require a rational mind, well schooled in logic and decision-making skills, but furthermore, a woman cannot necessarily count on having an intelligent husband; therefore, she herself deserves some development of her mental powers, if only in the name of self-preservation. Girls and boys are to be educated together, following the same curriculum, with the only exception being a separate education in the afternoons for those girls and boys who are "intended for domestic employments or mechanical trades" (Wollstonecraft, quoted in Martin, 1985, p. 82).

Wollstonecraft's education sets out to show that theories of women's inferior mental powers are false. In fact, she challenges men to grant women an education before condemning them as unfit for one. Wollstonecraft argues for the extension of the rights of men to women, thereby bringing women into the domain of citizenship. While this does not guarantee political equality, it does at least put women in

the position where they can actively seek it. At the same time, Martin argues, Wollstonecraft's belief in rationalism allows her to demonstrate the compatibility of the citizen and the wife-mother role, something neither Plato nor Rousseau attempted (Martin, 1985, p. 99).

Martin's main criticism of Wollstonecraft is that she seeks for women entry into the masculine sphere without critically examining that sphere for its inherent deficiencies. Martin would rather that women's traits be incorporated into the male sphere in order to better balance it. Wollstonecraft argues that women are capable of a masculine education, but does not address the inherent male bias it incorporates. By recommending that women absorb masculine thinking without suggesting the reverse for men, she under-values feminine traditions and viewpoints. This is a topic which will be detailed further in the discussion of Martin's proposed educational ideal.

Beecher

Catherine Beecher's proposed education for girls assumes that they will be housewives, and her book A Treatise on Domestic Economy is intended to give them the skills and rationality necessary for control over this environment. Beecher does not want her homemakers to be active in the public sphere, as did Wollstonecraft, but she argues that the education Rousseau proposed does not prepare women for even

the domestic sphere. In Martin's words:

> Beecher's philosophy of female education, like Rousseau's, is a mirror image of Plato's. Whereas Plato is able to design an education in ruling for females because he has detached them from family and children, Beecher is able to design a domestic education for her daughters because she has detached them from the responsibilities and duties of citizenship (Martin, 1985, p. 104).

Beecher withholds from women full powers as citizen, but grants them a status which Rousseau did not by expecting their husbands to represent their needs in the broader sphere. Unfortunately, as Martin points out, women do not have even this power unless they marry. Beecher's women must have a man through whom to make their needs known, but they do enjoy some small measure of freedom in that they may choose their own ruler.

Within the domestic sphere, however, women do rule because only they are educated in the domestic sciences. It would be pointless for the husband to attempt to control his household with his lack of domestic knowledge and experience.

> Beecher's ideal is not a stereotypical two-sphere society in which one distinctly inferior sphere, the domestic, supports the other, the public or political, which is taken to constitute the whole of civil society. In Beecher's vision the domestic and the public spheres <u>together</u> constitute the whole of civil society, and there is <u>interaction</u> between them (Martin, 1985, p. 135).

<u>Gilman</u>

Charlotte Perkins Gilman is the fifth of the educationists discussed by Martin. Gilman's book <u>Herland</u> was

originally published in serial form, and describes an imaginary country in which there are no men. According to Martin, Herland has several lessons to teach. The first is that male dominance, a sex-based division of labour, and traditional notions of masculinity and femininity are presuppositions of the American society of Gilman's day. The second echoes Wollstonecraft's thesis that to the extent that women are in fact physically weak, emotionally unstable, and intellectually childish, these traits are theirs by socialization and expectation, not by nature. The third lesson, and Gilman is the first of these philosophers to mention it, teaches that if women were allowed to develop their potential fully the world would be a better place. In Gilman's society, competence is a derivative of mother-love, while cooperation and united action replace competition and individual achievement (Martin, 1985, p. 140). Thus, Gilman's world takes for granted the ideal of motherhood, and in fact considers the education of its children the highest priority and the most esteemed profession:

> In Gilman's utopia biological mothers nurse their infants, but from the very beginning child care is undertaken by specialists. "Education is our highest art, only allowed to our highest artists," Somel tells Van (p. 82). "The care of babies involves education, and is entrusted only to the most fit," she continues; "Childrearing has come to be with us a culture so profoundly studied, practised with such subtlety and skill, that the more we love our children the less we are willing to trust that process to unskilled hands...even our own." (Martin, 1985, p. 141).

Martin spends some time at this point contemplating Gilman's

proposal that children ought to be reared outside the home by skilled artists in education:

> Now, it may well be that in the course of history some processes have been removed from the home without society's having been changed radically. But Gilman is talking about the rearing of children, surely the most important reproductive process, and not just about washing clothes or even about cooking and eating. Nor is she asking the larger society simply to establish a holding operation such as day-care centres in which children are kept until parents get home from work. She is calling for something quite different: educational environments outside the home -"child gardens"- in which the "whole" child is cultivated (Martin, 1985, p. 163).

One of Martin's main criticisms of the first four philosophers of whom she writes is that they have not considered this point, now raised by Gilman. Beyond merely extending to women the rights of men, Gilman would have men incorporate into their code of ethics the "feminine" traits. Thus, while it is agreed that women should be granted an education in rationality, they will not sacrifice their womanly traits in doing so. The three men who visit Herland are considered incomplete because they were not reared in women's ways. Gilman calls all traits "human", and suggests that both men and women will benefit from their acquisition.

Martin goes on, however, beyond Gilman, noting that she has ignored the "genderization" of these traits:

> In calling such traits as courage "human," Gilman only masks the fact that they are genderized. Misled by her own theoretical structure, she thus fails to make provisions in her educational theory for the problems that arise when both sexes are expected to acquire traits genderized in favour of one....It is one thing for girls to grow up to be fleet, fearless, agile, calm, wise, and self-assured

> in a society that considers these traits not so much human as masculine. It is another thing altogether for the ideal of mother-love to be held up for boys in a society that considers nurturance and caring to be feminine traits (Martin, 1985, p. 165-166).

Therefore, while Martin agrees that these "feminine" traits ought to be a part of the larger society, she argues that unless society accepts that both men and women have the right and the responsibility to incorporate both male and female traits into their lives, there will still be the stigmatization of women who are "too rational" and men who are "too emotional".

Standing on Shoulders

> In a letter to the English scientist and philosopher Robert Hooke, Sir Isaac Newton wrote: "If I have seen further (than you and Descartes) it is by standing upon the shoulders of giants" (Martin, 1985, p. 174).

The final chapter of Martin's book discusses the necessity for modern educational theorists to be familiar with past philosophies:

> Implicit in the image of standing taller, and hence seeing farther, is a conception of theory construction in particular, and of the attainment of knowledge more generally, which does not at all capture the nature of educational thought. Standing on Hooke's shoulders, Newton could presumably see what that giant saw and more besides. Someone else then standing on Newton's shoulders - Einstein, for instance - would presumably see what Newton and Hooke had seen, and more. The picture is one of linear progress with knowledge portrayed as cumulative, each new theory incorporating the discoveries of earlier ones and consequently being more inclusive than its predecessors (Martin, 1985, p. 174).

Martin's point is that while theories develop in relation to earlier theories these are not necessarily additions. On the contrary, she says, having read Republic, book 5, Rousseau saw differently from Plato, not farther than he. Having read Emile, book 5, Wollstonecraft did not extend Rousseau's vision, she altered it. A Vindication is not more inclusive than Emile and Republic in the sense of incorporating the theories of both Rousseau and Plato. How could it be, Martin asks, when their theories contradict each other? (Martin, 1985, p. 175).

On the other hand, this contradiction is not only healthy, but necessary to the evolution of educational theory. When each individual and each generation has to ponder anew an issue as complex as the education of women, the resultant ideas tend to be reactive rather than creative, to represent the rejection of some clear evil rather than the adoption of a well-developed alternative (Martin, 1985, p. 175).

> Fresh, creative thinking about women's education is to be desired, but it is not to be confused with de novo thinking. If it does not derive from discipleship, neither will it emerge without acquaintanceship, especially when the assumptions with which we approach our problem are so deeply entrenched in the culture that we do not now even recognize their existence (Martin, 1985, p. 172).

Educationists must, then, study the history of educational philosophy before attempting to define a new ideal for education, or even criticize the existing one. Furthermore, and particularly when exploring a history which pertains to women, educationists must be prepared to become historians in

the more primary sense of unearthing sources which have been lost through years of inattention.

TOWARDS AN IDEAL OF EDUCATION

What is needed, then, is an examination of the current ideal of education, which does not lose sight of the history behind it. Martin criticises current educational philosophy for privileging the rational over the emotional, the productive processes of society over the reproductive, and for creating an education which necessitates initiation into male modes of thinking and acting. The current ideal results from the fact that the function we assign to education makes the neglect of the so-called feminine qualities and traits a necessity.

> Assuming that the 'true' object of education is the development of mind, we subscribe to an ideal of the educated person that gives pride of place to intellectual virtues and attainments....It is generally accepted that the object of liberal education is to develop the mind, that a well-developed mind is governed by reason, that rational mind is defined as the acquisition of knowledge and understanding and that the preferred kind of knowledge is theoretical (Martin, 1987, p. 206).

It is no accident, Martin notes, that our ideal of the educated person coincides with our cultural stereotype of a male human being. The reason, she argues, is that education is, and has been, viewed as preparation for carrying on the processes historically associated with males, i.e. those ascribed to the "productive" sphere. Furthermore, it is not considered important to incorporate "feminine" traits into

one's practice of the productive processes. This, too, Martin challenges:

> Although the reproductive processes are of central importance to society, it would be a terrible mistake to suppose that the traits and qualities traditionally associated with them have no relevance beyond them. On the contrary, today there is every reason to believe that they have the broadest moral, social and political significance, that care, concern, connectedness and nurturance are as important for carrying on society's economic, political and societal processes as its reproductive ones (Martin, 1987, p. 208).

In saying this, Martin is arguing, in the same way as Nel Noddings, for these feminine values to be recognized and consulted in the everyday running of society. Martin's criticism is of an ideal of education which (1) necessitates initiation into the male mode of thinking and learning, (2) educates only for the productive processes of society, and (3) upholds traits genderized in favour of men. I will first examine her arguments on these three issues, and will then present Martin's own ideal of education.

Initiation into the male mode

Martin argues at length in her book about the way in which metaphors tied to our cultural definitions of masculinity are associated with science.

> The more objective a science, the "harder" it is; the more subjective, the "softer." Facts are "hard," feelings "soft." Scientists are "he," nature is "she." Scholars maintain, moreover, that the fundamental scientific norm of objectivity is itself a reflection of the cultural image of

> masculinity, involving, as it does, a distance or separation between the knower and what is known, the setting aside of feeling, and the rejection of immediate sensory experience (Martin, 1985, p. 25).

In an earlier paper entitled "The Ideal of the Educated Person" (1981a), Martin discusses the educational philosophy of R.S. Peters. She notes that Peters himself, despite his use of gender-exclusive terms and pronouns, seems to have intended his "educated man" to be either male or female. Martin's argument with him is not that women are excluded from his vision of education as such, but rather that if they choose education they must to a large extent ignore feminine attributes and embrace a masculine style of thinking which involves competition, abstraction, and objective analysis.

> In sum, the intellectual disciplines into which a person must be initiated to become an educated person exclude women and their works, construct the female to the male image of her, and deny the truly feminine qualities she does possess....Thus, Peters's educated person is not one who studies a set of ideal, unbiased forms of knowledge: on the contrary, that person is one who is initiated into whatever forms of knowledge exist in the society at that time. In our time the existing forms embody a male point of view. The initiation into them envisioned by Hirst and Peters is, therefore, one in male cognitive perspectives (Martin, 1981a, p. 101).

Women are excluded from education firstly in that their initiation is into masculine, not feminine ways of thinking, and secondly in that works by women have not been part of the literature. Women are constructed in the male image through being forced to accommodate themselves to an image which they did not help to create. Because they are initiated into

existing forms of knowledge, and because many forms of knowledge associated with the feminine have not historically been part of a standard education, whatever new forms of knowledge they develop or old forms of knowledge they rediscover will not be allowed; these will not be considered a part of their education. Finally, an educated woman must deny her femininity to the extent that it falls outside of the standard for education. Thus, to the extent that a woman refuses to play by male rules, she is excluded from the game.

Education for Reproductive Processes

It is not enough, says Martin, to educate for the productive processes of society. Because both men and women are required to act in some capacity in each sphere, both are hindered through their lack of education in the reproductive processes. As does Noddings, Martin argues for education in what she calls "the three C's" of caring, concern, and connectedness, alongside the existing curriculum.

> I am not suggesting that the curriculum Rousseau prescribed for Sophie should become the norm or that cooking and sewing be placed on a par with science and history. An education for coquetry and guile is not good for either sex; and, while there is nothing wrong with both sexes learning how to cook and sew, I am not advocating that these skills be incorporated into the liberal curriculum....My point is, rather, that when the activities and experiences traditionally associated with women are excluded from the educational realm and when that realm is defined in terms of male activities and experiences, then these become the educational norms for all human beings (Martin, 1982, p. 146).

Martin argues that to give courses in caring would be no more

necessary than it now is to give a lesson in objectivity, if caring were part of the educational ideal.

Trait Genderization

While both men and women are capable of rational, objective analysis of a set of issues, the process is considered a male one; thus, a man who is rational and objective is thought of as manly, and a woman who possesses the same qualities is also told that she "thinks like a man". Martin certainly would not argue that only men have the capacity for rational thought, or that only women can care. But, whereas a male will be admired for his rational powers, a woman who is analytical and critical will be derided or shunned or will be told that she thinks like a man. Similarly, although a female will be praised for her daintiness, a male will be judged effeminate and scorned for possessing this characteristic (Martin, 1987, p. 209). Thus, a woman who seeks to educate herself, finds herself in a double bind - to the extent that she is educated she must deny her femininity; to the extent that she is feminine, her rational and objective powers are held at bay. This is what Martin means when she says that certain traits are "genderized" in favour of one sex or the other.

The problem for Martin, then, is to decide what the alternative is to genderized traits. One possible option would be to ignore gender completely: to pretend that there

are no sex differences. Martin rejects the notion of a gender-free educational ideal, saying that to ignore gender is merely to deny its existence; it can never be dispensed with completely. Furthermore, as Martin points out, equivalent education is not always the same thing as equal education. If two people come to their education with unequal backgrounds or preparation for education, and are given equal education, they cannot be expected to emerge with the same level of skill. Since girls are already treated differently before beginning school, they are likely to react differently to their initial education than are boys. Furthermore, for reasons which will be explored presently, it is not enough to simply add some sort of special education for women onto the ideal which already exists.

The answer Martin proposes is that of an educational ideal which is gender-sensitive, meaning that it takes gender into account when it makes a difference and ignores it when it does not (Martin, 1981a, p. 109). Such an ideal, she says, would be gender-just:

> This does not mean that we must, in the manner of Rousseau, hold up different ideals for the two sexes. It does not mean that we should agree with him that sex is the difference that makes all the difference. What it does mean is that we must constantly be aware of the workings of sex and gender because in this historical and cultural moment, paradoxically they sometimes make a big difference even if they sometimes make no difference at all (Martin, 1985, p. 195).

Compensatory Education versus a Transformed Ideal

> To the extent that people learn differently, they require different educational treatment to attain the same ends. The question is whether there is any reason to suppose that females learn differently from males. No research has yet been done that shows conclusively that being female affects the way one learns, but I submit that in view of everything we know about the differential socialization of males and females it would be foolhardy to assume that it does not (Martin, 1985, p. 19).

Because they are treated differently almost from birth, with different expectations held up to them within the family and in the early years of schooling, Martin argues that children become aware at an early age of their culture's distinctions between masculine and feminine roles and of their culture's higher valuation of men and masculine roles (Martin, 1985). It is not simply that girls enter school with a deficit in certain areas for which boys have been prepared. Their early experiences have given them a <u>different</u> outlook, and a different self-concept. Therefore, it is not enough simply to add something more onto girls' education to compensate. On the contrary, Martin argues that both girls and boys ought to be exposed to a transformed educational ideal. In order to transform education, Martin calls for the raising to consciousness of the hidden curriculum which denigrates women's experiences and their traits (Martin, 1972). She calls for a change in both the type of education and its subject matter; women must learn like men to be rational, but by the same token men must learn to be compassionate. Both must work to uncover scholarship by and about women, such as

that included in Martin's book. The goal is to redefine education, so that its ideal moves beyond the development of the mind alone to incorporate an education of the emotions.

> If we are finally able to listen to the full range of our conversation, we will have to change our notion not only of what counts as a bona fide topic of study but also of what counts as a bona fide source of data (Martin, 1985, p. 179).

Women and men must both be prepared to broaden the standard curricula to include more works by and about women. As well, men and women must be prepared in the development of curricula to uncover writers such as Beecher and Gilman whose opinions have not been made available to students.

SUMMARY

Martin's thesis is made in two parts. First, she insists that without knowledge of the history of educational thought there cannot be advancement of educational theory. While theory does not advance in a linear fashion, with each subsequent idea extending the one which has gone immediately before, an educational theorist must be aware of earlier writings in order to avoid "reinventing the wheel". It is with this purpose in mind that her book was written. Theory is created, however, in reaction to both existing theory and the present reality. Commenting on current educational practice is the second part of her thesis.

Martin criticizes the existing educational ideal for its focus upon the "masculine" traits of rationality and

objectivity, and for its exclusion of the skills necessary to reproductive sphere. Like Noddings, Martin argues for education in the "three C's" of caring, concern and connectedness. She would not replace the existing curriculum with these, but rather would have education in "feminine" traits complement that already in existence. Martin argues that although certain skills and attitudes are attributed primarily to one gender or the other, boys and girls may be brought up to share in both objectivity and connectedness, and in both rationality and emotion. By not making these skills available to boys and girls through their inclusion in the standard curriculum, we do a disservice to both.

Gilligan was the first to describe women's distinct moral orientation, and to suggest that the most mature men and women are capable of employing both justice and care as principles in resolving moral questions. Martin also calls for the development of "masculine" and "feminine" ways of thinking and feeling. In Chapter 6, I consider justice and care as two complementary orientations to morality.

Chapter 6

Justice and Care as Complementary Orientations

In the last four chapters I addressed, respectively, Kohlberg's description of moral development, which privileges justice as a moral principle; the "feminine" model of moral growth whose goal is preservation of relationship; the specific nature of this feminine ethic and its place in the school system; and finally, the harm that is done to both men and women when gender equity, including the honouring of feminine ethics, is not realized. Kohlberg began with an empirical study to discover the way in which children and adults develop powers of moral reasoning. He went on in his 1971 paper "From Is to Ought" to link his observations with a philosophical justification of the reasoning process he described. In this way he was able to argue that educators have the responsibility to promote moral development along the lines he described. The problem, as Gilligan was the first of a number to point out, lies in the fact that in any study of the sort Kohlberg undertook, one's observations depend upon the way in which one's question is posed. Kohlberg's interviews were initially conducted with males only, and when later studies included girls, the interview questions were still geared to measure only their level of development in the "justice focus" orientation.

Gilligan's first book described the complementary "care

focus" orientation to morality. This book set out her theory, with anecdotal evidence to support it, but it was only in her 1988 publication that she provided extensive empirical evidence to support her two-orientation theory. Nowhere does Gilligan make the link, as did Kohlberg, between the orientation to morality she ascribes primarily to women, and its ethical necessity. What she does describe is a process of moral decision-making and a pattern of moral development distinct from that described by Kohlberg. While Gilligan has been criticized by both feminists and non-feminists, it is also true that her theory has been embraced by members of both groups. Gould (1988) argues that Gilligan's popularity stems from the fact that everyone can relate to what Gilligan writes about women's morality: feminists agree that women's "different voice" ought more often to be heard, while conservatives will be relieved to hear that women tend to be more subjective and more caring, just as they have traditionally been portrayed.

Gilligan's theory, after having been set out in 1982 and serving as the springboard to a number of articles in various disciplines, still needed a philosophical base. Furthermore, Gilligan made no attempt to link her theory of development to educational theory. Her description of "care focus" reasoning is not rooted, as was Kohlberg's, in Piagetian stages. It is not at all clear whether development is linear, nor is there any direction, as Kohlberg and Blatt described, for the

development of this orientation in children. These two tasks are undertaken by Noddings. Through her description of the relationship between the one-caring and the cared-for, Noddings answers the philosophical questions surrounding issues of principled behaviour, justification of one's ethical decisions, and the nature of the ethical ideal. She also places the moral orientation of caring in the context of the school, describing the type of education which would be necessary to nurture an attitude of caring on the part of young people. Noddings has been criticized for relying on caring to the exclusion of justice in ethical matters, and while she does not retract any of her arguments on behalf of caring, she does admit that the two may be compatible in some respects.

Martin's starting point of enquiry is neither Kohlberg not Gilligan, rather it is the existing educational system and the way in which it reflects "masculine" attitudes and learning styles. Both in theory, including the formation of educational ideals, and in practice, in the existing curricula and school systems, society has limited the education of its young people to development of traits and attitudes which are more commonly and more comfortably masculine. Feminine points of view, learning styles, and moral attitudes have been ignored or at best considered secondary to the child's education. Martin argues that this does women a disservice, through forcing them to choose between becoming educated and

remaining feminine. She also argues that while men are capable of the "feminine" attitudes and characters just described, they are discouraged from developing them and thus they too are harmed by the educational ideal as it now exists.

The last four chapters, therefore, advanced and discussed the themes of justice and care as alternative means of approaching morality and moral education. Each theory was discussed from the point of view of the author in question. For Kohlberg, justice is the ultimate moral principle; there is nothing more important or more adequate for resolving moral issues. For Noddings, care is the ultimate criterion of morality, although she rejects the term "principle". Both Kohlberg and Noddings describe the education which is necessary for moral development, each in terms of the designated ideal. Gilligan and Martin call for both masculine and feminine attributes to be developed. Gilligan says that men and women are capable of both justice and care reasoning, while Martin calls for the inclusion of feminine perspectives and traits, alongside those masculine, in the schools.

In this final chapter, I will address questions raised by the attempt to combine justice and care in a system of moral decision-making and in an educational system. I will discuss justice and care as two subjects of enquiry, and as two complementary teaching strategies. I will go on to examine ways in which the two orientations are important to adult life, both on a personal and on a social level.

Finally, I will ask whether there can be more than these two orientations to moral decision-making.

Justice and Care

As Two Subjects/Two Teaching Strategies

I reported in earlier chapters that both boys and girls are capable of justice and care perspectives from primary school age. Lyons (in Gilligan et. al. 1988) found that by age eleven both boys and girls are capable of each. Kohlberg, by neglecting to mention girls, implied that he believed them as well as boys capable of justice reasoning. Garrod, Beal, and Shin (1990) tested boys and girls at ages 6, 8, and 10 years and found that the younger children of both sexes preferred to use the care orientation in solving dilemmas raised by fables. If children are capable of development in each of the two orientations, two questions present themselves. The first is the question of the ethical need for each of these orientations. The second, which involves the circumstances under which development in these two orientations can be nurtured, will be examined after a brief restating of the positions of Kohlberg and Noddings on the former.

Kohlberg answers the question of the ethical need for justice through an examination of the "is-ought" problem first identified by Hume. In his 1973 paper, written together with Dwight Boyd, Kohlberg explicitly distances himself from the

types of mistakes he identifies as having commonly been made in this area. He is not, he maintains, claiming that merely because one stage follows another in some temporal sequence within the lifespan of the individual, it must therefore be better in some evaluative sense. Second, he does not argue that because an argument at a higher stage is more complex it is therefore more morally acceptable. Third, he is not tying the "is" to the "ought" through making an evaluative assumption about a certain structure of moral deliberation, for example Stage 6, and then examining the empirical steps through which one goes in developing toward this assumed goal. To do this would be not to close the is-ought gap, he says, but rather to avoid it by studying the "facts" of moral development in the context of an assumed ought (Boyd and Kohlberg, 1973). Kohlberg argues that an individual's moral deliberative capacities seem to carry equal weight in both the empirical and the moral point of view. Kohlberg does assume, as a developmentalist, the value of the formal concepts of differentiation and integration, and argues that these span the is-ought gap:

> the characteristics of differentiation and integration are anchored on the "is" side by their explanatory power in the study of the development of directed thinking, and on the "ought" side by their necessary inclusion in rational justification (Boyd and Kohlberg, 1973).

There is not, Kohlberg asserts, one single gap representing a static dimension which separates human thought in moral situations, with the "facts" piled up on one side while the

"oughts" sit on the other. Rather, there are many gaps, and equally many areas of overlap between the two areas. The "ought" will develop throughout the individual lifespan, parallel to the "is".

In the above argument, Kohlberg defends his theory from the criticism that he is committing the "naturalistic fallacy", that is, equating what "is" with what "ought to be". He does not, however, clearly set out his ethics, except to say that one's ethical life develops alongside one's powers of moral reasoning, and to suggest that to be better capable of differentiation and integration is itself an ethical good. By contrast, Noddings' ethic of care is laid out in detail in her book. Noddings argues at length for context-specific moral reasoning, which does discriminate between individuals and between events as these affect the one-caring. She also argues against the need to justify one's actions to a third party; only the one-caring and the cared-for can know whether theirs is a caring relationship. While Kohlberg's purpose is to explain why in his theory "is" can be identified with "ought", Noddings avoids empirical research altogether, relying instead on purely theoretical discussion, and asking the reader to use common sense in applying her ethic to real life.

The next issue which presents itself, once it is assumed that children are capable of both justice and care reasoning, and once it has been argued that each sort of reasoning can

be defended on ethical grounds, involves the education of children in each of these two orientations. Kohlberg and his colleagues assume that development within the justice orientation follows the child's cognitive development, granted that the child has opportunities to discuss these viewpoints and to attempt to adopt another's perspective. Development occurs as a result of "disequilibration", caused by the individual being challenged by another and higher level of reasoning. The student is protected by the educator, such that in the group the former is free to decide on participation or non-participation in the group, and has the right to adopt any value system or belief without fear of reprisal. The entire exercise is a rational one, the dilemmas are abstract, and it is "challenge" which leads to "disequilibration" and thence to development.

The contrast between this and the moral education within the care orientation described by Noddings is striking. Noddings argues that moral education must permeate the school and be a part of each interaction with the teacher. While intellectual stimulation is surely an important task of the school, she says, fostering the ethical ideal is far more so. She thus implies that moral education is not necessarily, or even primarily, an intellectual undertaking. The teacher as moral educator must accept two main tasks. First she must stretch the students' world by presenting an effective selection of it, and second she must work cooperatively with

the student in his struggle towards competence in that world. But above both of these, her priority must be to nurture, as one caring, the student's ethical ideal (Noddings, 1984, p. 178). Lessons in caring are not carried out through discussion, but rather involve a meeting of one-caring and cared-for. Thus the teacher teaches primarily by example - she lives the ideal.

Because adults ought to use a balance of justice and care perspectives, for reasons which are described below, children need to be nurtured in the development of both of these orientations. Kohlberg and Noddings present two very different paths for moral education in each of these orientations. I will argue, however, that the two sets of skills are both important to the child's moral development, hence it is the responsibility of the moral educator to nurture both.

First, children must learn that morality is a rational process. It makes sense. One's ethics do not arise spontaneously; on the contrary, they can and ought to be defended. Furthermore, one's moral beliefs ought to matter enough for a person to <u>want</u> to defend them. Students need, first of all practice discussing their values and developing a language with which to defend them and secondly, exposure to other arguments and other languages. This is the type of education advocated by Kohlberg, whose moral principle is justice, but the same education befits a person who upholds

another principle. Noddings' book is a perfect example of this: although she would have teachers nurture the caring ideal through example, she herself presents a rational defence of it.

Still, rational moral education is not enough; it is potentially abstract and sterile. A brilliant rational defence does not explain one's emotional commitment to a given principle or system of ethics. Robert Carter, who writes from the "justice" perspective, argues in his 1988 article, "Beyond Justice," that

> there is more to ethics than justice reasoning, even at stage one, and that something more might be expressed quite simply as the search for greater fulfilment, or for life's meaning, or for the summum bonum, or for wisdom (Carter, 1988).

He argues that Kohlberg's Stage 7 represents this commitment to something greater than the self; something which gives the self a reason for ethical life. Stage 7 is described by Kohlberg to involve not justice, but agape, which he describes as a sort of "love" which is not unlike Noddings description of ethical caring. Carter argues that commitment to both agape and justice can result in conflict:

> If the omega point of justice reasoning is the universalization of principles (à la Rawls), the omega point of agape is uncompromising particularity, grasped selflessly....Justice's advantage is its greatest flaw; it is impersonal....The agapist, however, not only wishes to treat everyone fairly, but also uniquely, i.e. differently (Carter, 1988).

Put this way, Kohlberg's Stage 7 sounds increasingly like caring as Noddings conceives it.

Moral education demands, therefore, its affective side. Whether the ideal is justice or care, the student/child must see a teacher/parent who lives the ideal. Noddings has made this point with regard to caring, but justice is commonly taught by example as well. In the classroom there are all too many potentially unjust situations which arise from the unequal power relationship of the teacher to the class. Children learn at a very young age the meaning of "fair" and "unfair", and recognize justice when they presented with examples of it.

Furthermore, students must be educated to defend something each one believes in - not merely rationally but on a deeply emotional level as well. As Kohlberg himself has said:

> if one reflects on his own moral deliberation, one finds that no matter how thoroughly and systematically he analyzes the facts of a situation, a moral ought never emerges until one adds a little bit of his self, until one commits himself to an act or state of affairs and is willing to support it publicly (Boyd and Kohlberg, 1973).

Finally, the child ought to be given the opportunity to see two perspectives on a number of issues. As Gilligan describes the faces/vase perspective switch, so the child being educated must learn that the same dilemma (whether abstract or real-life) may be solved in more than one way, each one of which may be equally defensible. Children resist this kind of thinking, preferring to hear that one answer or another is the "right" one. Challenging them, and gently

encouraging them to rise above this to the recognition that there is more than one perspective to a given problem, whether this is an abstract dilemma or a context-specific incident, is one of the responsibilities of the moral educator.

As Two Orientations/Perspectives for Adults

On a social level

Although justice and care are presented as two solitary alternatives, there is no inherent reason why the adoption of one must result in avoidance of the other. In fact, as I noted above, it seems that they really ought to be used together, with each complementing the other. Care as an ethic does not stand up alone, as Card (1990) and Houston (1990) both pointed out. Card noted that one must certainly have some ethical obligation to people one has never met and is unlikely ever to meet. If the one-caring is not in relationship with hungry children in developing nations, what is it that compels her to take some, minimal, responsibility for them? Card suggests that beyond care, there is a sense in which it is "not right" (i.e. "unjust") that some live at ease while others do not. One feels a need to act on behalf of those one cannot be said to "care for". Noddings notes that while the one-caring may "care about" those who are outside her circles of relationship, she does not "care for" them. According to Noddings, the one-caring is limited in her ability to care by the personal resources at her disposal. She has a

responsibility to extend her caring to those around her in ever-widening circles, with the bulk of her energy focused on those most proximate to her. As the circles widen and grow distant from her, her responsibility to care diminishes. Card's argument addresses the sense that one ought still to act, that is, one has an ethical obligation which goes beyond one's obligation to care. Justice, in this sense, is necessary to one's ethics.

Houston notes that the one-caring must keep her sense of perspective if she is not to run the risk of being exploited. While caring is crucial, it also depends, as she says, upon other standards such as autonomy, justice, mutuality, and respect for others, so as not to lose its perspective. Houston's worry is that as women have traditionally assumed the burden of servicing and caring for men and children, they might be encouraged by Noddings' argument to see themselves as ones-caring to the point where they cannot leave an abusive or otherwise undesirable relationship. Houston argues that without a sense of justice, or honour, or self-worth, the one-caring never knows when enough is enough. Thus, while caring may be an important facet of her relationship, the one-caring must also have recourse to other standards of behaviour and of reasoning.

Using care as her only criterion for relations, it is not at all clear how Noddings would organize and run a large bureaucracy. Although she suggests that the school ought to

do away with its administrative hierarchy, with each teacher taking an administrative turn, this would be far from practical in a larger institution; in the more extreme example of government, it is absurd to suggest that caring be the ultimate principle for organization and for action.

On the other hand, justice having historically been the guiding principle, writers through the centuries have recognized that justice at its best is mitigated by "care", although care has alternately gone by such names as "mercy" and "love". Recall, for example, Portia's famous speech in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, and any number of poetic examples before or since. Indeed, justice without mercy may be considered a corruption of itself; the legal system, which is based upon the principle of justice, is also expected to take into account the context of the circumstances concerned. Furthermore, a bureaucracy such as was suggested above run without an inkling of care would also be corrupt, although examples of this can certainly be called to mind.

On a personal level

The entire justice/care debate begs questions about the nature of men and women that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer. Gilligan focuses on the psychological origins of gender differences in morality, while Noddings suggests that the differences may be biological in origin. In her 1990 article "The Reproduction of Female Relationality,"

Jeri Dawn Wine addresses conceptions of men's and women's natural differences. Her term "relationality" refers, she says, to a consciousness of the necessary interdependence of human beings, to a sense of connectedness to others, to awareness of one's embeddedness in human, social and historical contexts, to concern for non-violence and for maximizing the well being of all persons in interaction (Wine, 1990, p. 29-30). Wine discusses in her article the suspicion with which arguments for biological sex differences are viewed, noting that feminists are only too aware of the uses to which biological explanations are put. She argues against such biological explanations:

> Human beings are not... static, instinct-ridden biological creatures, but are social creations, themselves actively creating and constructing their own realities within the limits of the social, political, and economic conditions imposed on them. Commonalities in women's experience across time, classes and cultures, render superfluous biological explanations of woman's specificity (Wine, 1990, p. 28).

Gould (1988) argues that the political contexts within which women experience the world must also be taken into consideration, because such constraints as are put on women will affect their development both ethically and otherwise. On the other hand, such differences as exist, for whatever combination of biological, psychological, sociological, or other reasons, are consistently and historically the subject of measurement, discussion, comparison. Wine notes that the assumption in such comparisons has been that, "any

characteristic that men have more of, whether attitudinal, behavioral, or intellectual, is of a higher level, essential, a mark of superiority," (Wine, 1990, p. 27). To be more like an adult man is to be more adult, hence Martin's point about the choice women have had to make between adulthood and womanhood.

In the introduction to her book on feminist philosophy, Marilyn Pearsall (1986) briefly outlines the history of feminist thought, noting that its development took place in two waves. The first wave of feminism appeared at the start of the nineteenth century with such works as Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792). The first wave gave rise to the women's suffrage movement in Europe and the United States and culminated in the United States in women's right to vote (1920). The second wave of feminism began with Simone de Beauvoir's book The Second Sex (1949). De Beauvoir's work was pivotal in that she shifted the conceptual framework of feminism from a discussion of equality to a discussion of freedom.

> This line of thought forms a dramatic shift from the point of view of first-wave feminism. Whereas earlier feminism was stated as a demand for legal equality, de Beauvoir's response is that, in effect, not only must women be free to choose not to be the second sex, but they must choose the act of freedom: they must choose to liberate themselves. Thus, the second wave is a women's liberation movement (Pearsall, 1986, p. xii).

The first wave, then involved women like Wollstonecraft arguing that women could be just as rational as men.

Gilligan, as a part of the second wave, wrote In a Different Voice in an attempt to describe and defend a different morality. Martin's argument, and that of Noddings, is that not only can women care, but men ought to as well. It is not enough, they argue, for women to gain legal access to the public sphere as long as that sphere is dominated by "masculine" processes. Women want more than to be equal. They want to be free to bring their morality, and relationality, with them. Furthermore, women like Martin and Noddings think that men, too, would benefit from a stronger sense of relationality.

Beyond Justice and Care

It was argued in the chapter on Gilligan that if more than one moral orientation exists, there may well exist more than two. The study conducted by Bardige et. al. (reported in Gilligan et al., 1988) suggests that the omission of low-income children from Gilligan's (and Kohlberg's) original studies might have resulted in important perspectives being omitted from study. The question I asked in that chapter was, if the views of this new population had formerly been excluded, why was the justice/care framework now imposed upon these subjects? The alternative would have been to interview them, as Gilligan did her women, without a developed system but rather with a view to discovering their moral orientation. It may have been found that they in fact espoused a third

orientation, or a variation on either the justice or care orientation. Garrod, Beal, and Shin (1990) suggest that parenting style, social class, and minority status may be related to children's moral orientation. Gould (1988) argues that Gilligan's description of development within the care orientation is confined within the very societal and disciplinary structures to which it appears to react; that is, it is dominated by a white, middle-class, Western conception of adulthood. For example, in Gilligan's theory, women who express responses that integrate the needs of self and other are seen to have reached the highest stage of moral development.

> To accept this ideal of a fully developed moral woman (commendable as it may be), is tantamount to adopting another deficiency model to judge the moral maturity of women...whose lives might necessitate that survival be given priority (Gould, 1988, p. 413).

On one hand, to argue that education produces more moral people is not necessarily to discriminate, if it is agreed that education is a good thing. Furthermore, if some women and men are powerless and are abused by the social system such that they cannot develop, this points to deficiencies in society perhaps, not to deficiencies in the developmental model. On the other hand, given the above criticism of Bardige's article, we need not necessarily cling to two orientations. At the very least, there is need for exploration of groups not included in the earlier studies without the superimposition of formal developmental models.

As tempting as it is to generalize one's theories to previously unexamined populations, it is true that one tends to find what one looks for in such things.

Obviously, I am not arguing that any "moral" code one may encounter in such an exploration can be justified on ethical grounds. Both Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories of moral development have been defended on ethical grounds, and this must be the case for a potential third or fourth orientation to morality. At the same time, however, both Kohlberg and Gilligan began their enquiry with open-ended interviews, without imposing a pre-constructed theory on those whom they studied, and it is this approach which led in both cases to their respective theories. In attempting to identify other moral orientations, one may undertake the same process, beginning with enquiry, and following this with an ethical examination of the attitudes uncovered. Caution is required, of course, in the examination of another's ethics. The issue of whose ethic one chooses to endorse and the power relations involved in that choice might be the subject of another thesis in itself. I would merely suggest here that the is/ought problem does not disappear; on the contrary, whenever one attempts to empirically discover an ethical attitude, "is" and "ought" must be addressed. The investigator/philosopher walks a fine line between moral relativism and strict dogmatism. My point is that perspectives being what they are, it is always tempting to recognize two sides, or orientations,

or viewpoints, and then argue that one must choose one or the other. There is a simplicity which appeals when two "opposites" or "complements" are presented, and this may result in the exclusion of potentially valid third or fourth options.

In a study of classroom interactions, Sadker and Sadker (1986) found that the educators they studied were, for the most part, unaware of the sex bias that existed in their classes, and of the effects of this bias on the boys and girls they taught. They discovered that brief but focused training can reduce or eliminate sex bias from classroom interaction. It may also be true, therefore, that brief but focused training will bring about models of care and justice in the classroom. For those studying towards a teaching career, child development classes ought to include the theories of Gilligan and Noddings alongside that of Kohlberg. Unless the teacher has developed her or his own capacity to reason according to care and justice, there will not be the opportunity for children to grow morally through positive classroom experiences.

I argued earlier that adults do use both justice and care orientations in their lives; no less do teachers in their classrooms. If children are to be taught that both justice and care are defensible moral orientations, they must learn rationally of the two and witness them both through example. If more care is to be brought into the schools as a legitimate

method of teaching and of administrating a school, there must be further discussion of it and of the need for it, by educators at every level.

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