



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file - Votre référence

Our file - Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

Autonomy in Durkheim's Moral Education

David Boote

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Education

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Masters of Arts at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

August 1995

© David Boote, 1995



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file *Voire référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

THE AUTHOR HAS GRANTED AN
IRREVOCABLE NON-EXCLUSIVE
LICENCE ALLOWING THE NATIONAL
LIBRARY OF CANADA TO
REPRODUCE, LOAN, DISTRIBUTE OR
SELL COPIES OF HIS/HER THESIS BY
ANY MEANS AND IN ANY FORM OR
FORMAT, MAKING THIS THESIS
AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED
PERSONS.

L'AUTEUR A ACCORDE UNE LICENCE
IRREVOCABLE ET NON EXCLUSIVE
PERMETTANT A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE
NATIONALE DU CANADA DE
REPRODUIRE, PRETER, DISTRIBUER
OU VENDRE DES COPIES DE SA
THESE DE QUELQUE MANIERE ET
SOUS QUELQUE FORME QUE CE SOIT
POUR METTRE DES EXEMPLAIRES DE
CETTE THESE A LA DISPOSITION DES
PERSONNE INTERESSEES

THE AUTHOR RETAINS OWNERSHIP
OF THE COPYRIGHT IN HIS/HER
THESIS. NEITHER THE THESIS NOR
SUBSTANTIAL EXTRACTS FROM IT
MAY BE PRINTED OR OTHERWISE
REPRODUCED WITHOUT HIS/HER
PERMISSION.

L'AUTEUR CONSERVE LA PROPRIETE
DU DROIT D'AUTEUR QUI PROTEGE
SA THESE. NI LA THESE NI DES
EXTRAITS SUBSTANTIELS DE CELLE-
CI NE DOIVENT ETRE IMPRIMES OU
AUTREMENT REPRODUITS SANS SON
AUTORISATION.

ISBN 0-612-05080-7

Canada

ABSTRACT

Autonomy in Durkheim's *Moral Education*

David Boote

I look at Durkheim's *Moral Education* and related works to understand how he argued that autonomy is a necessary outcome in moral education in advanced societies. Especially interesting is his articulation of the relation of autonomy to discipline and attachment to social groups, which he argued are also necessary for moral education. I use Lawrence Haworth's distinction between procedural and substantive independence: the former allows an agent the critical competence to rationally understand his choices, the latter allows a person to act different from other people. While only procedural independence is necessary for autonomy, I argue that substantive independence is necessary for morality in advanced societies. I find that Durkheim successfully explained the importance of procedural autonomy and argued that it facilitates discipline and social attachment. However, while Durkheim understood the importance of substantive independence, the *fin de siècle* unrest encouraged him to not incorporate it into his theory of moral education.

Acknowledgement

The process of writing a thesis was almost as instructive as learning the content that went into it. Dr. Geoffrey Fidler kindly accepted the challenge of helping me shape and elucidate my scattered ideas. He made this process easier rather than harder, helping me to craft my thoughts into a form that academe can accept, aiding me to draw together difficult and disparate ideas, and encouraging me to understand that the solutions weren't as easy as I often made them sound. Any faults that remain, however, are solely my responsibility.

The faculty, staff, and students of Educational Studies, collectively and individually, made my time here enjoyable and interesting. If their contributions to this thesis are less direct, they are certainly not any less real.

Finally, and most importantly, Melissa Boote has endured and encouraged my eccentricities. Her love has given me the stability I have needed to get where I am, and the courage to go where I feel I need to be.

**schools are always the focal point of our attempts to understand
and resolve new conditions of culture.**

Neil Postman, *Conscientious Objections*

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	vi
INDIVIDUALISM.....	6
DIVISION OF LABOUR.....	6
ELEMENTARY FORMS.....	15
THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT.....	23
MORALITY AND THE STATE.....	Error! Bookmark not defined
RULES.....	40
SUICIDE.....	47
INDIVIDUALISM AND THE STATE.....	57
MORAL EDUCATION.....	69
SECULAR PUBLIC EDUCATION.....	72
DISCIPLINE.....	78
ATTACHMENT TO SOCIAL GROUPS.....	84
AUTONOMY.....	88
PEDAGOGIC RECOMMENDATIONS.....	92
CRITIQUE.....	110
AUTONOMY: A NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT.....	119
DESCRIPTION.....	120
<i>Minimum Autonomy</i>	121
<i>Normal Autonomy</i>	122
<i>Autonomy and Rationality</i>	125
<i>Requirements for Autonomy</i>	129
<i>The Decision Process</i>	140
<i>Institutional Life and Limits on Autonomy</i>	146
THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY.....	153
<i>Education and Indoctrination</i>	156
<i>Ideology and Function</i>	160
AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY.....	165
REFORMING DURKHEIM'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY.....	168
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	172
ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL DECISION PROCESS.....	180

Introduction

Emile Durkheim's *Moral Education* is a curious work. Originally written and delivered as a course for prospective teachers in the theory and method of moral education, it posits that three attributes -- discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy -- are required to educate moral people. Or, stated differently, these three attributes are necessary and sufficient for moral education. Durkheim explained the importance of each of the three attributes and provided curricular and pedagogic recommendations for each. What is odd, however, is that he did not really address the interplay between discipline, attachment, and autonomy. He seems to have taken it as obvious that these attributes are not mutually exclusive, that teaching one will not undo another, or positively, how they might augment one another. Since this was a course for prospective teachers and not a monograph intended for sociologists or philosophers, there is little wonder that he did not explore these issues more fully. But reading it nearly a century later, one is left to wonder how the father of French sociology juxtaposed these three attributes.

Does not an ethic of duty clash with an ethic of attachment? That is, can people both be compelled to action because they feel they are required to and feel compelled to action because of love? Similarly, how can we speak of both attachment and autonomy being required for morality? Does being autonomous not mean that one is free from emotional attachment? Or, how can one be both responsive to external authority, part of discipline according to Durkheim, and remain autonomous? While he argued well for each of these attributes and explained why each is needed for morality in advanced societies, he

failed in *Moral Education* to explicitly address these rather fundamental questions. Wanting to understand how he could argue that these attributes are necessary and sufficient for moral education, I chose to investigate this problem further. More specifically, I was interested in Durkheim's argument that autonomy is required for morality in advanced societies, as Kant argued, yet it also requires discipline and attachment to social groups. This required going well beyond *Moral Education*, indeed well beyond his educational writing. This problem, the relationship between individual autonomy and moral society, is central to Durkheim's sociology.

Durkheim's work is full of dichotomies: individual and social, psychological and sociological, morals and values, sacred and profane, normal and pathological, mind and body, action and thought, rational and conventional, foundational and relative, good and effective (Lukes, *Prolegomena* 335). He approached these dichotomies, explicitly and implicitly, like Hegelian dialectics, trying to tease out meaningful and useful syntheses. It is easy to misinterpret Durkheim by grabbing hold of one extreme of his dialectic and missing the highly nuanced relationship with its opposite. But if his theories are dialectical, they are also empirical and he was among the first to argue that social facts are irreducible to other types of facts. This combination of dialectic reasoning and empirical research produced a body of sociological research that is still the focus of heated debate and profound disagreement. Many others, however, have dismissed Durkheim's sociology as hopelessly conservative or muddled beyond use. This is unfortunate as his social theory contains interesting ideas that serve to bridge the gap between the disparate elements of educational theory.

It seems, at first, that individual autonomy and morality are antithetical, this is a common misunderstanding that Durkheim sought to correct. Indeed, one way to look at his *oeuvre* is as an attempt to reconcile seemingly disparate strands of social theory -- especially socialism, communism, liberalism, and utilitarianism -- that each contains enough truth to make them defensible but not enough to vanquish the others. Looked at another way, Durkheim was truly a son of the Revolution, trying to produce a social theory that at once recognises liberty, equality, and fraternity. From his first published papers to his planned *magnum opus*, we can read his various attempts to explain and justify his deeply felt conviction that all of these seemingly dissimilar social and individual needs could be satisfied if only he could provide enough nuance and generality. Education, especially moral education, was central to his understanding of how this might be achieved.

Durkheim defined morality rather broadly. "Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of his ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong." (*Division of Labour* 257) In *Moral Education*, he argued, much as Dewey did a little later, that the individual apart from society is an abstraction. This does not mean, however, that autonomy is impossible; it does mean that we need to better understand both autonomy and society. Individual autonomy is impossible without advanced society and advanced society is impossible without individual autonomy; autonomy is a source of

solidarity, makes people account for others, and forces them to regulate their conduct
 Durkheim's analysis cuts to the quick of many contemporary educational problems

Durkheim's four major works tried to establish a methodology and theoretical foundation for sociology. He tried to understand the structures of social action that allow individuals to lead a moral life and societies to thrive. These theories have provided ample fodder for several theoretical traditions, but most of these traditions seem to ignore some important aspects of his work in favour of others. Much of Durkheim's writing was concerned with developing and defending sociology as a distinct academic discipline. Alpert feels that two major reasons underlie Durkheim's choice of academic focus: "(a) his dissatisfaction with the state of philosophical disciplines, (b) his desire to contribute to the moral consolidation of the Third Republic" (*Emile Durkheim and His Sociology* 28). Though he had a few excellent teachers, Durkheim felt his education, especially his time at *L'École Normale Supérieure*, was excessively literary, dialectic and non-scientific, and was snobbishly aloof from social reality (Lukes, *Emile Durkheim* 44-65). He felt that social theory was open to empirical study and that sociology, as a discipline, should be distinguished from all other disciplines with its own facts, methodologies, and theories. Developing this new discipline was also very timely, propelled by the *fin de siècle* gloom and despair.

Durkheim's France faced a complex political situation. It is often claimed that his social theory, in juxtaposition with Marx's, ignored social conflict. But while Marx tried to create a social theory that neatly analysed class conflict in economic terms, Durkheim readily acknowledged the divisions between Right and Left, Bourgeois and working class,

Paris and the provinces, North and South, Church and State, Monarchists and Republicans, and industrial and agrarian. He eschewed simple economic theories and saw France's problems in moral terms. More specifically, France had seen well over a century of conflict between the old morals of *l'ancien regime* and the new morals of individualism. Durkheim did not see individualism as an absence of morals, but as a new type of morality in which the abstract notion of individuality is recognised.

The difficulty, however, was that belief in individualism had spread more quickly than the social institutions needed to prevent society from sinking into despotic egoism. As we will see below, Durkheim's analysis of *anomie* (as opposed to Marx's narrower 'alienation'), a mismatch between resources and expectations, and a lack of social integration, was true for all social classes. Everyone -- the farmers who were moving to factory jobs, the emerging bourgeois, the disappearing aristocracy and the secular state -- was having difficulty adjusting to a new social reality and finding that existing social institutions did not meet those needs. Durkheim wanted to develop a theory of society that would allow us to understand the importance of both individual rights and societal rights. From this theory, he wanted to explain the role of new social institutions, especially secular public schools and professional organisations, that would inculcate and reinforce the value of individuals and allow for the creation and maintenance of social institutions that would maintain the standard of living required for an ethic of individualism.

Chapter 1

Individualism

Durkheim's early work criticised the French conservatives for ignoring the problems of industrialisation for social cohesion and for not listening to the recommendations of the French socialists for creating social institutions needed to maintain cohesion. But Durkheim was also critical of contemporary German socialist movements for being too authoritarian and for ignoring the historical movement toward individualism. He further criticised French socialism for being too individualistic and for underestimating the long-term movement toward collectivism and control (Alexander, *Theoretical Logic* 81-91). While Durkheim was clearly a socialist of some description, he did not see the necessity of choosing between voluntarism and morality as the prevailing socialist doctrines required.

Division of Labour

The first means of explaining these new social institutions Durkheim explored at length in his dissertation, was the moral value of division of labour in society. Durkheim argued that "taken by itself, civilisation has no intrinsic and absolute value, what makes it valuable is its correspondence to certain needs." (*Division of Labour* 54). So, from the beginning, he trumpeted his critique of German idealism and the idea that the State is supreme to its citizens. But he also wanted to go past Adam Smith's mechanistic economic theory that tried to portray division of labour as a necessary good. Durkheim wanted to explore the complex historical and social development of division of labour to

understand its role in complex industrial societies. Or, looking at it differently, he wanted to understand how division of labour became the force holding society together in place of common ideas and sentiments derived from common religion.

To understand how Durkheim sees the relationship between individual and society, we must understand his use of the term *conscience collective*.¹

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system that has its own life; one may call it the *collective* or *common* conscience. No doubt, it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by definition, diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless, it has specific characteristics that make it a distinct reality. It is, in effect, independent of particular conditions in which individuals are placed, they pass on and it remains. . . it connects successive generations with one another. . . An act is criminal when it offends strong and defined states of the collective conscience. (*Division of Labour* 80)

So it is through understanding the collective conscience that Durkheim defines criminal and immoral behaviour, "we do not reprove [an action] because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it." (*Division of Labour* 81) The punishment criminals receive is an act of vengeance, emanating from social disdain.

To explain the moral nature of division of labour Durkheim examined the laws of societies through history in relation to the degree of personal autonomy people were able to exercise. He divided laws into two types: juridical, which seek to punish transgressions, and restitutive, which seek to restore the *status quo*. In societies in which juridical laws make up the greater proportion of total laws, we see that the greater restriction on behaviour correlates with greater homogeneity of individual action and thought. Conversely, in societies in which the greater proportion of laws are restitutive, greater division of labour correlates with greater personal autonomy.

¹The French *conscience* translates into either conscience or consciousness in English. I will use either the normative or the cognitive form when appropriate for the context.

In relatively primitive societies, ones in which there is little division of labour, people do most things by and for themselves. The relatively few 'economic' connections in primitive societies necessitate a common religion, a tangible manifestation of *conscience collective*, and it requires these religions to prescribe and proscribe behaviour rather strictly. Transgressions in primitive societies are punished severely to ensure the high degree of conformity required to keep these societies together for everyone's benefit. Social order is maintained by juridical laws that, in extreme cases, tell citizens exactly what to do in most facets of life. These primitive societies portray what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

Societies in which there is a greater degree of division of labour demonstrate what Durkheim called "organic solidarity."² Laws in advanced societies seek not to punish and scare, but to return conditions to what they were before the transgression. For advanced societies to hold together with less oppressive laws, Durkheim felt organic solidarity must have the following three qualities: (1) individuals are bound to society because they depend upon the parts of which it is composed, (2) the society has specially defined functional units, such as institutions and professions; (3) individuals have distinct personalities. This is contrasted with mechanical solidarity: individuals are bound directly

²The nomenclature is based upon the premise that whereas primitive society relied upon direct cause/effect, mechanistic relationships, advanced societies are much more complex and homeostatic, like an organism. According to Pickstone, the idea comes fairly directly from Saint-Simon who compared society to the human body, with cells (people) making organs (communities), organs making organ systems (industries), and the complex interrelationships required to keep the person (society) alive and prospering. Saint-Simon was educated by Xavier Bichot's colleagues at *L'École de Santé*. Bichot was the first physiologist to identify the workings of organs and organ systems. Saint-Simon identified three social functions - economic, artistic, and rational - carried out by the three social classes - industrial, artistic, and scientific. It was the physiological metaphor which led Saint Simon to realise the importance of organisation in the new French political system. See Pickstone, pages 133 and 134. Cf. Lukes, *Emile Durkheim* 140

to society without any intermediaries, society is based upon a totality of beliefs and sentiments common to every member, and persons cannot be distinguished as individuals.

In primitive societies personal rights are not distinguished from real rights because individuals are not distinguished from society. In advanced societies

[i]t is necessary . . . that the collective conscience leave open a part of the individual conscience in order that special functions may be established there, functions that it cannot regulate. The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion that results from this solidarity. In effect, on the one hand, each one depends much more strictly on society as labour is more divided; and, on the other hand, the activity of each is as much more personal as it is more specialised. (*Division of Labour* 131)

The laws of society need no longer scare us into conformity, we comply with social norms because we understand, at least tacitly, our dependence upon social norms.

Societies have become far too complex to prescribe action in every instance, so the collective conscience must allow for individuality in responding to social situations. When social norms are transgressed, most of our laws seek merely to restore the *status quo*, recognising individual rights and returning to an environment conducive to normal social action. The laws that remain juridical in nature are reserved for that relatively small portion of transgressions against the collective conscience that still carry strong emotive responses, ones where we feel the need for revenge and to instil fear in others who might make the same transgression.

It is not, according to Durkheim, that the collective conscience plays a less significant part in our lives, it is that it has changed its character to allow for the greater individual conscience and consciousness that is required by societies relying on a great deal of division of labour. Individual conscience is still imbued with social norms, and these social norms are what Freud was examining during this period. Schools are a prime

site for inculcating a desire for autonomy and teaching the skills needed to achieve it. These social norms are enforced by increasingly numerous and firm attachments to society. Whereas individuals in primitive societies gain relatively little from being in social groups and could live almost as well outside society, individuals in advanced societies are quite incapable of maintaining their standard of living outside society. Thus, "[t]he division of labour appears as the master symbol of organic solidarity because it expresses the interdependence of social roles and relations in industrial societies, whilst at the same time recognising their relatively individualised character" (Hamilton 3).

It is useful to understand Durkheim's social theory by what it is not. He argued particularly vehemently against social contract theories because of their incompatibility with division of labour.

For in order for such a contract to be possible, it is necessary that, at a given moment, all individuals will direct themselves toward the common bases of the social organisation, and, consequently, that each particular conscience pose that political problem for itself in all its generality. But that would make it necessary for each individual to leave his special sphere, so that all might equally play the same role, that of statesman and constituent. (*Division of Labour* 201)

Only in primitive societies where each person is attached to society directly through the sovereign is this sort of social contract possible. Advanced societies must rely on their social institutions, such as education, to mediate between individuals and the collective conscience. For example, "[t]hey force the individual to act in view of ends that are not strictly his own, to make concessions, to consent to compromise, to take into account interests higher than his own." (*Division of Labour* 227). Individuals need not subscribe to some intangible, abstract social contract for advanced societies to work. A citizen's dependence on society -- economically, affectively, and otherwise -- causes solidarity.

This interdependence is encouraged by, and encourages, division of labour. Division of labour, in turn, requires greater individuation.

With this established, Durkheim explained the causal relationship between morality and the division of labour. Adam Smith explained that division of labour helps individuals to gain the necessities of life with less effort, but this explanation is insufficient. The division of labour developed as more individuals were in contact. As more individuals negotiated relationships, the common conscience becomes increasingly generalised and widespread. This is what Durkheim called "moral density." This moral density is correlated with the material wealth of the society and the advantages that increased material wealth has for bringing people into contact. "Moral density cannot grow unless material density grows at the same time, and the latter can be used to measure the former." (*Division of Labour* 257) Thus, the concentration of material wealth indicates morality.

The division of labour appears to us otherwise than it does to economists. For them, it essentially consists in greater production. For us, this greater productivity is only a necessary consequence, a repercussion of the phenomenon. If we specialise, it is not to produce more, but it is to enable us to live in new conditions of existence that have been made for us. (*Division of Labour* 275)

Durkheim did not claim that increases in material wealth cause increased morality. Rather, increased material wealth is both an indicator and a facilitator of increased social contact, which in turn requires increased morality.

So we can also see Durkheim's fundamental objection to utilitarian philosophies. These philosophies assume that people naturally exist as isolated and independent

individuals, and see society as the scourge that limits and bounds individuals. Durkheim asserted that individuality emerges only with the division of labour. Thus, utilitarian theories postulate a *creatio ex nihilo*. As division of labour increases, through the increased diversification of society, the elasticity of individual action increases, though still within ever diminishing boundaries.

Now we can see where Durkheim has been leading us. Division of labour is not just correlated with society, morality, and individuality, it is the cause of them. "[W]e see even better how false it is to make civilisation the function of the division of labour, it is the consequence of it" (*Division of Labour* 337). Society exists only because of division of labour. Morality exists only because of the necessities of social action, and is also a result of division of labour. Social action exists to benefit individuals. But the reasoning is not circular. Society exists to benefit the individual, which facilitates individuality, but individuality is not reducible to the individual. In this way, individuality and morality are two sides of the same coin.

This is not the entire story, however, because Durkheim identifies three abnormal forms of division of labour: anomic, forced and non-solidarity forming. Of these, only anomic is of interest to us here, the other two being largely self-explanatory. Anomic³ division of labour is the result of individual differentiation without solidarity -- individuals

³ Orrù looks at the use of the word 'anomie' through history showing that the semantic definition has changed significantly. "Anomie means ruthless and *hybris* in Euripides, anarchy and intemperance in Plato, sin and wickedness in the Old Testament, unrighteousness or unwritten law in Paul's letters, irregularity or formal transgression in Bishop Bramhall's treatises, a positive characteristic of morality in Jean-Marie Guyau's books, and a human condition of instability in Durkheim." (2) The broad etymological definition ('the absence of laws or norms') assumes different semantic definitions in different epochs. Here I'm concerned mainly with Durkheim's use of the word. Especially important is the difference, discussed below, between the functional definition in *Division of Labor* and the normative definition in *Suicide*.

are differentiated and no longer feel the common life of society (This becomes more clear when we look at anomic suicide) Durkheim did not agree with Comte, however, that anomic division of labour is necessarily the end point of division of labour in society. He also disagreed with Marx¹ Durkheim would argue that Marx correctly diagnosed some of the symptoms of social malaise but misunderstood the causes Durkheim argued that we see anomie because we have not yet developed all the social institutions required to complete the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity Once this has been completed, anomic division of labour will no longer be a problem Rather than allowing the requirements of division of labour to destroy social life, it must create the possibility for new forms of social life

It might seem then that Durkheim cannot decide if individual and society are in opposition or in collusion I feel that he was quite definite that "[i]f, from a certain point of view, there is antagonism between them, it is not because they serve different ends On the contrary, it is because they lead to the same end, but through opposing means "

¹ Lukes cuts to the heart of the difference between Marxist and Durkheimian sociology by placing them in separate intellectual traditions of social and political theory Marx belongs with the romantic tradition of Rousseau, the Utopians, and Hegel where "man is still an angel, rational and good, who requires a rational and good society in which to develop his essential nature." Durkheim belongs to the conservative tradition of Hobbes and Freud where "man is a bundle of desires, which need to be regulated, tamed, repressed, manipulated and given direction for the sake of social order." (Lukes, *Prolegomena* 85) We can go a step further, though Durkheim did not, and follow Durkheim's argument *The Evolution of Educational Thought* and say that Marx belongs to the Greek pagan tradition of Western thought and Durkheim belongs to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Alexander argues that this strictly dichotomous view of Marx and Durkheim has more to do with *post facto* Marxism and Durkheimianism than the writing of the authors (*Theoretical Logic*) Giddens argues that the most significant difference between them was that Durkheim did not see revolutions as a useful means of making meaningful, long-term social change, which can only come about by reforming social institutions to produce greater social equality. (*Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* 31-33) More generally, Durkheim disagreed with the socialist assumptions that the solution to society's problems was economic, that a centralised political structure would work, or that the problem should be seen as a class struggle (Giddens *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* 54-55) Most interesting, however, is Cladis' argument that Durkheim tried to provide a 'communitarian defence of liberalism' In this way, Durkheim should be seen as trying to reconcile the traditions Lukes points out

(*Division of Labour* 397) If division of labour is the source of individuality and the source of society, it is equally true that individuality is required for societies that use division of labour. But he also recognises that social mores will often be contrary to individual wishes. There are two ways to overcome this conflict: first, ensure that individuals are attached to social groups so that social goals become personal goals, second, enable individuals to rationally recognise that moral acts ultimately help to maintain the social order that helps the individual. Recognising that both of these ways --arational and rational -- of overcoming the conflict between moral goals and individual goal require social attachment, autonomy, and discipline, we understand the source of Durkheim's recommendations in *Moral Education*.

However, Alexander does not feel that Durkheim was consistent on the role of individuality

[D]espite his best theoretical intentions and some crucial initial formulations -- Durkheim could not free himself in the early part of his career from the deterministic theoretical framework that Marx had himself embraced. When Durkheim does finally construct a theory that is at once collectivist and voluntary - - in his later writings -- he avoids the determinism of Marx's later works only at the cost of making the "structures" of his own theory overly dependent on the very voluntarism they were designed to protect. (*Theoretical Logic*, 80)

Alexander's desire to create simple causal explanations blinds him to the idea that Durkheim was trying to develop. That is, as we see in Durkheim's later work, *Elementary Forms*, Durkheim moved past the Positivist belief that he needed to find the foundation on which everything else could rest, such as division of labour.

We also need to recognise that the social theory that Durkheim *felt* he was constructing differed significantly from the social theories he did create. This is a very

important reason why his theories have been so widely and variously interpreted. As we will see, he changed his theories significantly through the years. Yet, one gets the feeling that Durkheim did not discern the change as he was rather consistent in what he says his theories show.

Elementary Forms

Elementary Forms of Religious Life was Durkheim's last major work, and an attempt to rework the earlier social theory from *Division of Labour*. By exploring the genesis of the totemic religion of the Australian Aboriginals, he argued that religion is fundamentally constitutive of social life and only through understanding the purpose and function of religion can we hope to understand society. Giddens argues that *Elementary Forms* effectively reworked Durkheim's theory of mechanical solidarity by providing the genesis of later individuality (*Emile Durkheim* 49)

Durkheim said “[a] religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.” (*Elementary Forms* 47) He saw two basic categories of religious life. beliefs and rites. “The first are states of opinion, and consist of representations; the second are determined modes of action. Between the two classes of facts there is all the difference which separates thought from action.” (*Elementary Forms* 36) Rites are different from other actions, even from other moral actions. The difference is the beliefs that are accrued to the action; that is, rites acknowledge the sacred.

Fundamental to Durkheim's understanding of religion is the notion of the dichotomy between sacred and profane. He asserted that this is the most basic differentiation because they are diametrically opposed. Religious beliefs "presuppose a classification of all the things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words *profane* and *sacred* (*profane, sacré*)" (Durkheim, *Elementary Forms* 37). Initiation rites serve the purpose of making the profane sacred.

It was in the totemic beliefs of the Australian Aboriginals that Durkheim found the most primitive yet recognisable religion. The totems of the clans are more than merely a name or an emblem. They are a collective label for the group and have a religious character as Durkheim has defined it. "Religion really commences only at the moment when these natural forces are no longer represented in the mind in an abstract form. They must be transformed into personal agents, living and thinking beings, spiritual powers or gods.." (Durkheim, *Elementary Forms* 75). The clan's totem becomes an embodiment of the abstract ideas of sacred and profane. Individuals are initiated into the totemic groups through various rituals and their membership is a function of these rituals rather than economic or genetic relationship. Initiation only happens when the individual sufficiently understands the world view of the clan, embodied in the religion. In the same way, today we consecrate people as full members of society when they have completed high school because this is an indication that they have learned enough to be autonomous in our society.

In this way, Durkheim argued that totemic religions go beyond simple group identification, and produce and sustain a cosmology and classification system. That is, their religion gives them a view of reality. Durkheim was not arguing that this classification system is random or that it denies individuals the ability to recognise an object's characteristics. Rather, he said that this system of categorisation acts as a system of reasoning based upon very fundamental feelings of affinity (sacred) or repulsion (profane). These feelings originate from the necessities of collective life, with the sacred being good and the profane being bad for collective life. Thus, he agreed with Kant's categorical imperative in that categories are in a sense given to us *a priori*, but he does not agree that there can only be one such system of categorisation. He does, however, assert that criteria of truth and objectivity, as well as the principles of logic, are non-relative and non-context-dependent. So while he admitted cultural relativism insofar as the types of categories of knowledge, he did not admit epistemological relativism. That is, while he understood that different cultures could see the same phenomena in different ways, the reality is the same.

In trying to find the origins of these collective representations Durkheim returned to the thesis forwarded in *Suicide*, that religion is a means of mediating social life and maintaining communal equilibrium. Thus, the totemic system serves as an abstract representation of cultural learning. As communities form, interact, and live together, they develop these forms of collective meaning and rituals that embody their learning about the world in which they live. The phenomena of daily life pass by, needing no explanation, becoming constituted in the vernacular. The vernacular ideas become entrenched in

beliefs and rituals, symbolised as the clan's totem "So if [the totem is] at once the symbol of the god and the society, is it not because the god and the society are only one?"

(Durkheim, *Elementary Forms* 206) The totem, derives its authority from the society, by way of the collective opinion

Reflecting on more recent history, Durkheim sees the process happening more explicitly during the French Revolution, with public opinion trying to establish itself as a god, with its own religious things liberty, equality, and fraternity It developed its own dogmas, symbols, altars, and feasts Both the Revolutionaries and the Australians were trying to deal with external constraints, developing a system of rites and beliefs, and institutionalising them.

These social institutions are pre-eminently religious because they represent society, and form the abstract representation of the bond between the individual and his community. the holy trinity of society, individual and totem (Father, Son and Holy Ghost), the three that are one. The challenge Durkheim addressed in *Moral Education* was developing a theory of moral education that could articulate the connection between individuals, society, and the collective consciousness in advanced society

As a society develops, Durkheim argued, the collective system of representation expands to encompass all knowledge, becoming a "form the cosmological systems expressed by the primitive classifications." (*Elementary Forms* 223) The basis of the moral authority of society rests in its collective representations, epistemological and ontological. "That is how the most diverse methods and practices, both those of the moral life (laws, morals, beaux-arts) and those serving the material life (the natural, technical and

practical sciences), are either directly or indirectly derived from religion." (*Elementary Forms* 223) If, however, a set of rites and beliefs outlive their utility, the religion will hurt society. This can happen by several means, though often they are kept because of the difficulty of separating a malevolent part of a religion from the whole. It is difficult to give up an entire system of beliefs, risking moral confusion.

At its best, our collective conscience, when it optimally represents reality, allows us to operate on the assumption that we have a greater degree of autonomy than we actually do. "In a word, the only way we have of freeing ourselves from physical forces is to oppose them with collective forces. . . . So those who insist upon all the social elements of the individual do not mean by that to deny or debase the personality. They merely refuse to confuse it with the fact of individuation." (*Elementary Forms* 272) This is not to deny autonomy or to imply a deterministic ontology, but it does imply distinct bounds on the possible sphere of personal autonomy.

Thus, Durkheim sees religion as fundamental to the relationship between individual and community.

It is by common action that [society] takes consciousness of itself and realises its position, it is before all else an active co-operation. The collective ideas and sentiments are possible only owing to these exterior movements which symbolise them, as we have established. It is the action which dominates the religious life, because of the mere fact that it is society which is its source. (*Elementary Forms* 418)

Ritual is not mere mechanical observance, but acts as a cognitive, physical, and emotional buffer that helps to decrease sensory stimuli and the number of things that have to be rationally considered so that the person can use their rational faculties on things that are more important. One is reminded of R.S. Peters' famous image: "We enter the palace of

reason through the courtyard of habit. These rituals help us deal with the uncertainty of life, especially the uncertainty of other people's actions. "Religion, in all its manifestations, represents, re-enacts, reinforces, celebrates this drastic asymmetry in the -- otherwise dialectical -- relationship between society and individual" (Poggi 374)

Religions also help us to understand our world by raising the level of abstraction with which we understand it. Science, however, is taking over this role. "Religion sets itself to translate these realities into an intelligible language that does not differ in nature from that employed by science. The attempt is made by both to connect things with each other, to establish internal relations between them, to classify them and to systematise them" (Durkheim, *Elementary Forms* 429). The logic upon which religion and science are based is an impersonal social system that allows us to discuss issues in a more abstract way with greater generality. It also provides a means of verification and produces a stable body of knowledge upon which we can act with certainty. "A collective representation presents guarantees of objectivity by the fact that it is collective" (Durkheim, *Elementary Forms* 437).⁵

A problem lies in Durkheim's assumption that in advanced societies the role of religion is being taken over by more rational domains. Durkheim did not make an effort to describe how primitive religions become advanced religions, or how advanced religions dissolve into secular societies. Giddens infers that religion is composed of its moral ideas

⁵ Unfortunately, Durkheim views all religions as equal and religion equal to science -- they are all just forms of collective representation. (There is the unspoken proviso that the religion must sufficiently resemble Judeo-Christian religion to qualify.) This line of thinking goes against his basic assumption that as society becomes more complex, it needs more complex representational systems. It would be more correct, following his reasoning, to say that religions cannot be compared in the abstract. They can only be judged for their usefulness in a given society. From this, Durkheim argued in *Division of Labour*, scientifically based individualism was the best 'religion' for early twentieth-century France.

and its moral regulations. The former, normative part, developed into the individualistic ethic Durkheim was defending. The latter, functional part, became the province of science. The scientific emphasis on critique and rationalism have clashed with the normative side of the collective consciousness because science disallows normative ideals. “[F]aith no longer exercises the same hegemony as formerly over the system of ideas that we can continue to call religion. A rival power rises up before it which, being born of it, ever after it submits to criticism and control.” (*Elementary Forms* 479)

One has to wonder, in retrospect, if we have overestimated the rate at which we can develop social institutions to produce and maintain moral individualism. It also seems possible that we have overestimated our population’s ability to grasp the world view of science over dogma. Social reforms have outstripped society’s ability maintain a match between resources and expectations or its ability to remain integrated, leading to even greater social anomie. The global trend toward fundamentalist religions and cults might be taken as an indication that people are not able to find comfort in secular religion and science. Durkheim believed that greater social integration lay in secularisation. We have to question this belief, or at least the pace at which it has developed.

Contemporary critics of *Elementary Forms* complained that Durkheim had completely ignored the visceral feeling that people feel when social constraints proscribe a wanted action. Durkheim responded to this criticism by dividing all intellectual activity into two types: the sensory and the conceptual. He asserted that the former is necessarily egoistic as it is concerned entirely with the self. The latter is of a social or moral nature that allows interaction with others. The two types of thought are not only different but

entirely opposed. Conceptual thought can only occur where self-interest can be suppressed or where it does not matter “Morality begins with disinterest, with attachment to something other than ourselves” (*Dualism* 151) Conceptual and moral thoughts are distinguished by the fact that the rules of conduct can be universalised. This duality is fundamental to humanity, a point that is implicit in *Elementary Forms* but not fully articulated In *Elementary Forms* he focused so much on the role of religion mediating between this fundamental duality that one might be led to believe that he felt that it had been eliminated or was not important But in *Dualism* he is explicit about the necessarily antagonistic nature of social existence

[Man] has always felt that he is pulled apart, divided against himself, and the beliefs and practices to which, in all societies and all civilisations, he has always attached the greatest value, have as their object not to suppress these inevitable divisions but to attenuate their consequences, to give them meaning and purpose, to make them more bearable, and at the very least, to console man for their existence (*Dualism* 155)

The only way that this duality would completely disappear would be if we could completely ignore sensory input and live entirely in the conceptual sphere.

This duality cannot be an aberration, he insists, because it would have corrected itself long ago Dualism has always been a part of human nature and will only get worse as societies advance. Alexander quotes Durkheim in “La science positive,” an early piece, writing “[m]oral ends have the particular characteristic that they are conceived as obligatory” (*Rethinking Durkheim* 134)

Thus, while moral constraint is internal, it exercises on us a public influence that we are bound to respect Yet Durkheim stresses that this external compulsion need not necessarily be anti-voluntary The individual is not simply ‘integrated’ with society, society actually ‘penetrates’ him It is absurd, therefore, to try to conceptualise voluntarism by negating what is external to the individual, for ‘to

isolate oneself from it, to abstract from it, is to diminish oneself” (Alexander, *Rethinking Durkheim* 465, quoting Durkheim in “La Philosophie” 134)

Durkheim was consistent throughout his career that his social science could explain that one could be moral, feeling the social bounds, and autonomous, accepting those bounds knowingly and freely

Thus, Durkheim provides a picture of religion much more complex and nuanced than the vernacular. Religious life, social life, acts to smooth over egoistic concerns and helps us to concentrate on the collective. Public festivals, ceremonies, and rites help to replenish and reinvigorate our attachments to society so that when we have a concern we are less likely to act in an anti-social way. Our shared beliefs, a product of religious life, give us a common vocabulary and common goals that enable us to overcome egoistic desires. It was this loss of shared public ritual and belief that led Durkheim to be so very concerned with the moral health of France during his life, and what led him to believe that the tension between our social-self and our self could only increase.

The Evolution of Educational Thought

While *The Evolution of Educational Thought* was written for a course after *Moral Education*, his significant knowledge of French history certainly influenced the earlier work. Likewise, his ideas of education must have influenced the way he portrayed the history of education. *Evolution* provides a concrete example of the process of Western society changing from mechanical to organic solidarity, and how religious and social institutions increase the aggregate level of intellectual abstraction that allow advanced societies to flourish.

We see an important change in thinking in this work that partially explains the change in his thinking seen in *Elementary Forms*. Whereas he had earlier argued that primitive religions and moral beliefs are *sui generis* realities, he also argued that individualism is the result of (or at least correlated with) population density. Along the same line, he argued that individuality did not have functional significance, but that individual rights are fundamental in modern societies. *Evolution* was part of a trend in his shift away from *sui generis* explanations to functional explanations.

Not surprisingly, Durkheim looked to Rome as the nucleus from which Western culture emerged. He argued that contemporary society is the result of a dialectic tension between the barbarism of the early Franks and the civilisation of the Romans, and between the Earthy paganism of Greece and the anthropocentricity of Christianity. Durkheim presents these tensions as Hegelian dialectics, leading to syntheses that are appropriate for a given milieu. But they are also presented as an evolution toward greater actualisation of innate human potential. He argued that it was in the 'middle ages' that the tensions inherent in modern society and educational theory were integrated into the various social institutions that created modern society.

The Church assimilated aspects, especially the language, of the Roman empire from which it emerged. The Church also absorbed aspects of the Germanic tribes they sought to proselytise and the Irish Church with its Byzantine influences. From these four influences emerged and evolved the various social orders. The Church "was the channel along which the intellectual life of Rome gradually flowed into the new societies which were in their formative stages. And it was precisely by means of education that this

transfusion was effected " (*Evolution* 20) But the Romanisation of Christianity never did sit well As Durkheim said, "the content and the container, the substance and the form of this civilisation, were mutually contradictory and incompatible." (*Evolution* 20)

Only in the South of Italy and Northern Ireland did classical learning continue in a true form The Irish had a closer connection to the Eastern, Byzantine, Church with its connection to Greek learning When the missionaries of the Irish Church clashed with the Benedictines, the Irish ostensibly losing, the Italian order assimilated the Irish literature and educational activities "This constituted a cross-fertilisation of influences which played a role of considerable importance in the intellectual development of the Christian monks " (*Evolution* 35) Thus, the form and content of Christian learning were again infused with the individualism of Greek thought, though it remained largely dormant. The scientific, mathematical, and literary influences, manifested themselves in the Benedictine cloister schools

The term "middle ages" used for this period denotes the idea that this era was barren of creative and intellectual ideas, a void between two great civilisations. Durkheim argued that, in fact, this era saw the creation of one of the central elements of the proliferation of modern ideas and practices. the school. The Church could make the transition from ancient to modern civilisation because it contained both the elements of Christian doctrine and elements of ancient civilisations While this bipolarity allowed it to effectively make the transition, it has also been a source of essential tension ever since.

While the Roman Empire also educated its citizens, the education was largely decorative Charlemagne attached educational goals to the maintenance of a Christian

Empire, and used it to try to conquer and hold formerly disparate feudal states in a broad political unit. This unity existed before Charlemagne as an abstract collective consciousness through common ideology, but he brought Christianity together as a political entity. The focus of the education was changed. No longer was education solely concerned with basic literacy. Now the focus was on educating a cadre capable of serving the Empire. By enlisting education in worldly pursuits, the formation of a Christian empire, schooling was further secularised. To do this, education strove to be encyclopaedic, teaching not simply a few certain things, but the totality of human knowledge. The encyclopaedic knowledge was divided into the seven fundamental disciplines--the *septem artes liberales*. The primary education was the 'trivium', consisting of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. The advanced education was the 'quadrivium', consisting of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music.

The easy way to understand the division is that the trivium centred around the humanities, intended to instruct the mind about itself, and the quadrivium around the natural sciences (understanding that music was seen as a mathematical subject) used to teach about the world and things. Where the trivium was taught to most scholars, the quadrivium was reserved for the elite as it was seen to possess some sort of mystical power. "The object of education as it was henceforth understood was to train the mind in large generalities, about essential and fundamental principles" (*Evolution* 49). It was only centuries later that people began to realise that the natural sciences might be useful and later still that they were incorporated in the curriculum.

The part of the trivium emphasised tells of the needs of society. During the Carolingian Renaissance, grammar was predominant in the curriculum. It was a vehicle for secularisation, allowing a greater degree of abstraction in communication and thinking by allowing better understanding of the relationship between signified and signifier. The main focus of the education was to teach verbal formalism on the assumption, probably correct, that language is at the heart of higher intellect. So, while Durkheim did believe the form was silly, he did not dismiss the importance of this stage of educational history. The problem of the grammarian was not defining and teaching the rules of grammar, but "of explaining them and systematising them in a logical way" (*Evolution* 59)

After Charlemagne's death, education, and Western civilisation itself, went through a period of decay and decline. It was not until the eleventh century, after the 'millennium madness', that the seeds planted during the Carolingian Renaissance began to grow. The intervening years lacked a coherent focus and common morality, degrading again into feudal rule and constant clashes. The people lacked the leisure and relative affluence required for cerebral achievement. Education had continued in the cathedrals and monasteries but did not progress, and arguably retrograded. It was with the Crusades of the eleventh century that the Papacy and the Empire again unified and tried to gain control of the dispersed Christian people⁶

The Catholic tradition implies a cleavage between the will (the individual) and the spirit (the social). It was through the Latin grammar and dialectic that these ideas came into Realism in the Catholic tradition. In Catholic dogma, this cleavage could render

⁶ Unfortunately, Durkheim ignores the effect of the infusion of Islamic learning into Western culture during the Crusades

certain ideas easier to understand, though these ideas were far from uncontroversial “It confronted dogma with reason, even though it refused to deny the truth of dogma ”

(*Evolution* 73) This odd merging of faith and reason produced Scholasticism

To combat the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation started to use dialectic to teach theology Training in logic became the primary goal of *bacalaureat* education, with the teaching methods entirely centred around logical argument Education became entirely formal, whereas in the Carolingian schools the desire was for encyclopaedic knowledge During this long transition, education went from being almost entirely outwardly focused to being almost entirely inwardly focused As Durkheim put it, “any education whose subject-matter is the mind is almost entirely formal ” (*Evolution* 140) He argued that this was an important transition for human consciousness Verbal and grammatical education indicated an emphasis on the physical world Logic encouraged the student to think only of man, indicating an increase in the level of abstraction during this time

On a practical level, education centred around teaching students to debate and learning the art of refutation Finding ‘truth’ was not the objective of this exercise Rather, it was simply to weigh one’s opponent down with arguments, “to vie with one another in empty subtleties ” (*Evolution* 142) Durkheim is not quick to dismiss Scholastic education, however. Scholastic education seemingly missed the point by becoming caught up in the form of thinking rather than in the content, but Durkheim argued that dialectic is the pathway to knowledge. The hope was that while the students were practising the form of argument they would in fact be learning the tools needed to think about truth “Everything was given over to public debate, because apart from special, restricted

spheres of knowledge everything was within the domain of the controversial.” (*Evolution* 152) To know about things and the laws that govern them, to learn about people and their writings, it was necessary to enter into a conflict and to explore ideas orally

The same general reasoning applies for the almost cult like reverence for books. With a lack of any sort of experimental knowledge and a general lack of intellectual cross-fertilisation, books, especially ancient books, were an unparalleled source of knowledge and wisdom. Legal, moral, and political questions are still, and may forever be, outside the bounds of experimental logic, so we still need facility at argument. These initial ventures into what might at first seem bald relativism were in fact important steps leading to an empirically based understanding of the complexity of reality.

Durkheim did not give us the standard caricature of the Middle Ages. Rather, “he present[ed] it as a period based on a tense and creative balance between faith and reason, spontaneity and institutionally grounded constraint.” (LaCapra 206) It was not a period of intellectual quietude, but a dynamic period of intellectual tension and institutional genesis that made the Renaissance possible.

The Renaissance brought better government and more efficient administration, towns prospered and became more populated, the discovery of America and routes to India brought fortunes to Europe. This in turn narrowed the distance between the social classes and strengthened the position of the *bourgeoisie*, politically and economically, encouraging them to take up the life style that had previously been reserved for the aristocracy. These advances allowed greater individuation, as Durkheim described in *Division of Labour*, and made people less tolerant of the ascetic Catholicism of the middle

ages. The Reformation spread quickly, shattering the hegemony of the Holy See, and bringing the influence of a more individualistic religion. These changes created a demand for a new type of education.

Rabelais' writings tell us of a great disdain for discipline and regulation. Underlying his work is a great trust in the fundamental goodness of people, in which people only need to be left to themselves to flourish. Where Scholastic education supposedly stunted development and produced incomplete people, humanist education was returning to the Platonic ideal encompassing all facets of humanity, rather than narrow intellectualism. Rabelais is to be contrasted with Erasmus, however, to get a better picture of the theoretical foundation of this era.

On the surface, Erasmus had the same desire for encyclopaedic knowledge. He demanded that teachers should know everything in the field they wanted to teach and its relationship to other fields. The teacher was to learn everything so that he could teach the students only the best. Of central importance to Erasmus is discursive ability, either oral or written. "This is the art of intellectual analysis, of organising the elements of thought in the best possible way and above all of rendering the form of its expression ideal" (*Evolution* 194). Also important was teaching manners, with literature as the key element in the education for the life of relative luxury. In practice, Renaissance education began to teach all the chivalric arts needed for polite society that had hitherto remained the preserve of the aristocracy. The difference between Rabelais and Erasmus is the difference between the ornamental and the instrumental.

Many ethical ideas that we now assume to be fundamental in the human constitution, especially the idea of duty, developed during the Renaissance. Inherent in the idea of duty is the necessity of a relationship between the individual subject and the society he lives in, whereas Greek and Roman moralists were more concerned with the sovereign good and harmony with nature. With Christianity comes a sense of duty to God and the necessity of obeying rules with all considerations of individual happiness being banished from the moral sphere. So, whereas society might be becoming progressively more secular, we have traces of both the pagan and the Christian ethics tied up in all our social and individual institutions. What drove the Renaissance, Durkheim felt, was the re-emergence of the pagan tendencies that had been lying dormant in our civilisation that Christianity had succeeded in driving down but not eradicating. With this paganism of the late Roman Empire is the egoism that undermined the Empire. Durkheim's scorn for humanism's egoism is palpable.

Durkheim concludes his treatment of the Renaissance by describing it as an era of moral and pedagogical crisis during which men failed to adequately cope with genuine moral issues. His treatment of the Renaissance did not do justice to the subject and is obviously slanted to suit his thesis. Where Durkheim's treatment of Rabelais and Erasmus is fair but uneven, identifying them as precursors of hedonism, his treatment of Montaigne is either disingenuous or simply inaccurate. Durkheim sees in Montaigne the worst representation of egoism that sprang from the Renaissance's educational ideas. Reading Montaigne as nihilistic is obviously incorrect given his expressed concern for moral order. Durkheim could have used Montaigne to support his thesis of balancing traditional and

personal knowledge to gain personal integrity and social justice, rather than dismissing him because he is associated with an era that Durkheim wanted to distance from his educational theory.

Coming to rescue this supposed moral malaise was the Society of Jesus, which reorganised educational theory “so that it could enter into harmony with the demands of the age” (*Evolution* 227) The Society was started by St Ignatius and supported by the Catholic Church to battle the spread of Protestantism and paganism. The Jesuits were a strange combination of characteristics that made them at once successful in fighting Protestantism yet internally contradictory. Like the Dominicans and Franciscans, they are an order subject to the rules of communal discipline, obedience, and unity of thought. Yet they behave like secular priests, living for action and realising the goals of the Society. This militant ecclesiastic order was a new and effective weapon against the Protestants. To wrestle themselves free from the by-the-letter dogma, they used their casuistry with its “excessive flexibility and over-ingenious refinement” (*Evolution* 233). Rather than fighting humanism, they took control of it.

Open to both members of the order and to non-members, free of charge, the Jesuit schools sought to completely indoctrinate the students by teaching essentially two things: piety and literature. This system was very successful, not least because it was free, but also because it provided an education that was consistent with the needs of the era. Excellence in reading and writing were stressed, combining all three of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, with emphasis on the last as taught by Cicero. “If then we can say of the

Jesuits that they, in one sense, realised the educational ideal of the Renaissance, they did not achieve this until they had mutilated and impoverished it " (*Evolution* 252)

The interesting aspect of Jesuit education was its veneration of the individual, through competition and individualised education. It also absorbed the students completely into the community, first through constant surveillance, then through the knowledge that they were completely indoctrinated. The result of Jesuit education was that "[i]t was impossible to leave school without a conception of human nature as some kind of eternal reality, immutable, unchangeable, independent of time and space, since it is not affected by the diverse conditions obtaining in different times and in different places " (*Evolution* 273) It was felt, under the influence of Cartesian philosophy, that individual characteristics could be safely ignored. This tendency to over-generalise was not restricted to literature or philosophy, but worked its way into the entire intellectual and moral temperament of France.

The grammatical precision of Latin and Greek allowed a proliferation of philosophy and science that promoted increased individual differentiation, both through literature and the added prosperity science brought to society. Thus, while philosophy and literature spoke increasingly of a universal human type, people had less and less in common, so the actual sphere of commonality of humanity decreased. This entirely anthropocentric education of the sixteenth-, seventeenth- and most of eighteenth-century France "was to imprison the mind permanently in an environment inhabited exclusively by abstractions, simple types and generic entities, with the result that people became incapable of thinking in any way other than in abstractions, in generalisation and

oversimplifications" (*Evolution* 275) This is the trade-off we have made in our intellectual development. As we have developed the intellectual tools -- grammar, logic, rhetoric, math, and science -- to probe the complexity of reality we become less capable of perceiving it. Being less capable of perceiving the complexity of reality, our connection to that reality becomes more tenuous and endangers our ability to sustain the society that enables us to develop and support our intellectual tools.

For Durkheim this phase of abstraction in education was the third and last important era leading up to the era he placed himself in, which started with the Revolution. It is often assumed that the literary tradition of education and the scientific tradition are antithetical, but Durkheim challenged this notion, asserting that, properly understood, they complement each other. The essence of both the Scholastic and Humanist traditions is that each person is the central object of study. Stated another way, the curriculum was almost entirely composed of the trivium, with different elements emphasised at different times. With the Revolution in France, the emphasis started to change, including the quadrivium and its emphasis on things.

Durkheim looked to Comte as blazing a new theory of society by arguing that society was ruled by complex forces. This complex understanding of society had its roots in the very classical literature that the Humanists like Rabelais and Montaigne had supposedly rediscovered, but one only needs to look at the pre-Socratic thinkers to see that man had not always been the centre of thought. Before Socrates, the pagans viewed not man but nature as sacred and divine. The profound contrast was not accidental, but based in the very origin and purpose of these religions. Paganism is a system of rites,

observance of which is deemed essential to ensure the regular progress of the universe. These primitive religions developed in a time that religion was used to understand the physical world. Christianity, by contrast, developed and prospered in civilisations which were relatively stable and prosperous, allowing and requiring the development of a religion that stressed ideal morality to enable civil society to flourish. People in these societies must continually observe and regulate their inner life to live in society. Thus, the need for education to teach the skills of reflection. As society became more complex, the education needed to increase the level of abstraction to compensate for the increased need for reflection.

To put it another way, archetypal paganism and archetypal Christianity are thesis and antithesis from which we continually re-negotiate a synthesis of morality and social institutions for a given epoch. A given ideal works well for a time but is abandoned when it loses its effectiveness to serve the needs of diverse areas of experience. This was the source of the Revolution, in abstract terms. With a new understanding of the needs of society, especially individualism, comes a new understanding of education. Durkheim felt that the secular and amoral needs of society became of great enough importance to redefine education to include them. We might also say that what was previously secular and amoral became moral as the needs of society changed. This is more than a simple pendulum swing. Durkheim makes the tacit assumption that in these swings from thesis to antithesis, from will to intellect, society had been steadily marching toward a more true representation of the form of humanity, in Platonic terms, or the absolute representation of humanity, in Hegelian terms. As we oscillate between will and intellect, the pagan and

Christian form of social order, we become better integrated, in Durkheim's terms, or we approach the *Geist*, in Hegelian terms. While Durkheim would want to avoid this idealistic conclusion, we see quite clearly that this is an important facet of his thesis.⁷

Clearly there was, and is, extreme confusion about the process and content of education because of an extreme confusion about the purpose of education. Durkheim notes with no small irony that whereas Humanism and the Church once battled for control of educational institutions, in nineteenth century France they formed an alliance to try to maintain the *status quo*, keeping science, and the 'immorality' that came with it, out of the schools. With the Third Republic, however, the factions that championed liberal educational thinking began to make significant strides. In this turf battle between the conservatives, who favoured literature, and the liberals, who favoured science, literature and science came to be seen as antithetical. Durkheim argued that they can and should be seen as serving the same end.⁸

Durkheim claimed to not look at history for plots or structures. LaCapra asserts that Durkheim did not subscribe "to Hegel's theodicy of history. History did not have a meaning. But men in society created meaning, which existed in a tense dialectic with anomic forces" (201). While Durkheim, still working with Positive assumptions, might agree with LaCapra, Wallwork's analysis is more correct. Wallwork feels that the Saint-Simonian idea of oscillations between periods of order and chaos was important to

⁷ It is important to note that Durkheim's (unacknowledged) dialectical process did not have all the weaknesses of Hegel's. While Hegel represents this as an entirely discursive process, Durkheim's empiricism (not the Positivism he espoused) allows for an interplay between reality and theory.

⁸ A notable failure in Durkheim's treatment of the nineteenth-century history of education, as Floud points out, was to totally ignore the *instituteur*. Where in *Professional Ethics* and *Suicide* Durkheim argued for the importance of professionalisation, and where he universally acknowledges the importance of secularisation, it is distinctly odd that he would completely ignore this group of teachers who were formative in the professionalisation and secularisation of French public education.

Durkheim's historical analysis. Durkheim's representations of historical changes as "experiments" is telling. While Durkheim never states it, he held the tacit teleological assumption that society is becoming increasingly integrated, and history demonstrates that we are coming to a more true version of human society and individual potential. For example, Durkheim argued that the long convoluted process from the Roman empire to the sixteenth century was not some sort of natural end point, but was the ebb and flow of ideas that likely would have been eventually articulated, the difference is unclear. It is this tendency to read history into his theory, choosing his examples carefully and ignoring or blatantly misinterpreting events, makes his history quite inadequate.

LaCapra points to a constellation of influences that likely explain Durkheim's evolutionary approach to history (204-206). First there are the biological analogies, between Darwin and Lamarck, that explain social evolutionary in terms of mortality and normality, as we will see in the next chapter. LaCapra also claims that Durkheim was influenced by Bergson's ideas of creative evolution and *élan vital*. Though LaCapra fails to give any evidence for a direct connection to Bergson, Durkheim did recognise the creative side of anomie and understand that criminality is necessary to lead the way for social change in his later works, especially *Elementary Forms*.⁹

⁹ This creative understanding of anomie is also apparent in the Introduction to the uncompleted *La Morale*. "Life, all life, is rich with an infinite number of seeds of every variety, of which some are at present developed and correspond especially to the exigencies of the milieu but of which many are dormant, temporarily unused, and undeveloped. These will perhaps be awakened tomorrow under new circumstances. All life is changed and is refractory to static states. A living being is not made for a single end, it may lend itself to a very different ends and to multiply situation. So much the more is this true of human nature. history is not only the natural framework of human life, and is a product of history." (in LaCapra 205, or Fenton 86 for another translation) This, from the last project he worked on, is the best example of Durkheim coming to a Darwinian evolutionary model.

But Lukes reminds us that Durkheim's method was at once historical and sociological

[I]t went beyond the analysis of successive educational institutions and practices, and the exposition of educational doctrines he continually sought to explain why particular ideas and ideals, practices and institutions arose, surviving during certain periods, disappearing, and in some cases, reappeared. It was neither monocausal nor one-sided; the explanations advanced were always complex and stressed different explanatory factors at different points (*Emile Durkheim* 381)

In Durkheim's narrative, the Carolingian era served as preparation, establishing the importance of education. Scholasticism laid the foundations of academic organisation. Humanism established the literary nature of French education. The Revolution brought an era that tried to assert history and science as primary

We see a number of recurring themes in Durkheim's analysis: formalism, encyclopaedic ambitions, growth of secularism and reason, and a long obsession with the study of man as opposed to nature. Durkheim also returned to seeming discontinuities in history, showing that they are actually something more akin to natural selection. It is only when ideas and institutions are required for society that they become the norm. 'By relating the emergence of the cult of man and the rights associated with it to social differentiation, Durkheim attempted to root the rights of man in a metaphysics of history' (Wallwork, *Durkheim: Morality and Milieu* 82). Durkheim wanted to argue that certain ideas, especially empiricism and secularism, are becoming more important for society while other ideas, literature and theism especially, should become less important. Especially important here is Durkheim's explanation of how individualism developed and how educational institutions responded by facilitating autonomy.

Chapter 2

Morality and the State

Durkheim stressed that many common facts about humanity -- "sexual jealousy, filial piety, paternal love" (*Rules* 107) -- are produced by the necessities of social life, and not biologically or otherwise based. In explaining these social facts we need to look at their functions in society. If we understand their functions, we understand their causes. "*The function of a social fact ought always to be sought in its relation to some social end*" (*Rules* 110-111). The usefulness of a social fact is measured against the society in which it exists. But he is inconsistent on this point because he also asserts that in measuring the utility of a social fact we need to remember that society exists for the benefit of the individuals that constitute it.

Thus, Durkheim is quite critical of social theories that indicate that there is a discontinuity between individual and society, or that they are antagonistic, identifying Rousseau, Hobbes and Machiavelli specifically. Against these theories, Durkheim argued that the benefits of living in a civil society, and conforming to its restrictions, far outweigh its detractions.¹⁰

Since the superiority of society to [people] is not simply physical but intellectual and moral, [society] has nothing to fear from critical examination. By making man understand by how much the social being is richer, more complex, more permanent than the individual being, reflection can only reveal to him the intelligible reasons for the subordination demanded of him and for the sentiments of attachment and respect which habit has fixed in his heart. (*Rules* 123)

He is not saying that social life is more 'natural' than individual life. Rather, it is only through living in a civil society that we are able to be individuated, and to feel the constraint of society and yearn for the spontaneity that it inhibits. His sociology "sees in

¹⁰ Durkheim is disingenuous in this argument, however. None of these authors say what Durkheim claims they do. Rather, each in his own way is pointing to the difficulty of maintaining a civil society that does not trammel individual rights. However, the ideas that Durkheim is refuting have come to be associated with these men.

the spirit of discipline the essential condition of all common life, while at the same time founding it on reason and truth " (*Rules* 124)

Rules

Durkheim's *Rules of Sociological Method* is much less a treatise on sociological methods than a defence of sociology and a set of precepts for doing sociology. Or, as Lukes said, it "was at once a treatise in the philosophy of social science, a polemic and a manifesto " (*Emile Durkheim* 226). To understand the actual methodology of Durkheim's sociology it is better to look at his other major works. This shortest of Durkheim's works does, however, help us to understand the importance of not only critical competence in moral society, but also the importance of 'civil disobedience'

Of pre-eminent importance is his articulation of the unit of sociological study. Since almost everything that people think or do is in some way related to society, happens in society, or bears upon society, Durkheim needed to distinguish social facts from all other facts. These social facts are the rules, laws, customs, duties, etc., that are external to the self and are created to try to maintain social order. He insisted that while these facts are subjectively felt by individuals and are often seen as deriving from sentiment, they are "still objective, for [the individual] did not create them, [he] merely inherited them through [his] education " (*Rules* 1). This is even more convincing today, in an era of post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, where we define scientific objectivity by its intersubjective-testability¹¹ (Brown). Social facts are socially relative, since we do not see the same customs, rules, laws, etc., from society to society.

¹¹ Alexander makes this point in a slightly different way, showing that Durkheim's science is relativistic because "it continually responded to the social and cultural texts of his time, as these contexts changed, so did his work. Yet this externalisation has not produced a complete relativism. [He also shows] a reconstructed realism by insisting that there were elements internal to Durkheim's theorising that were relatively autonomous vis-à-vis external events. These elements derive not from the empirical logic of internal observation or inductive generalization but from a 'theoretical logic' that proceeds from generalized understanding about action and order that are of a more metaphysical scope " (*Theoretical Logic* 375).

So, to study social facts is to study the social constraints that try to maintain social order. It is quite fair, then, to call Durkheim's sociology a science of morality. He was interested to see how the coercive power of society affects individual will. That these social facts are coercive is plain from any attempt to contravene accepted mores, which is to transgress the collective conscience. Restraint need not be violent: it also works by ridicule, isolation, ostracism, and habit. This social nature distinguishes social facts from biological facts and psychological facts. Biological facts are constituted in the self and not changeable by will, external or internal. Psychological facts are constituted solely in the individual.

It is important to understand that for Durkheim, all education is a continuous effort to impose on the child ways of seeing, feeling, and acting which he could not have arrived at spontaneously.... If in time this constraint ceases to be felt, it is because it gradually gives rise to habits and to internal tendencies that render constraint unnecessary; but nevertheless it is not abolished, for it is still the source from which it is derived. (*Rules 6*)

Pedagogic methods that allow children complete freedom are an abdication of the pedagogue's responsibility to prepare the child for civil society. "The unremitting pressure to which the child is subjected is the very pressure of the social milieu which tends to fashion him in its own image, and of which parents and teachers are merely the representatives and intermediaries" (*Rules 6*). Education must impose the discipline required for social life. The obligatory nature of social facts is the source of the authority of society and its representatives.

Durkheim was certain that morality could be separated from philosophy, theology and speculative ethics, and that we could determine the correct mode of social conduct with scientific methods. He tried to find an objective means of defining subjective qualities. Especially important is his attempt to define normality.

It is very possible for us to vindicate the legitimate rights of reason in the solution [of ethical problems], without reverting to ideology... If, then, we can find an objective criterion, inherent in the facts themselves, which enables us to distinguish scientifically between health and morbidity in various orders of social phenomena,

science will be in a position to throw light on practical problems and still remain faithful to its own method (*Rules* 49)

He defines normality as those characteristics of individuals with the lowest rate of mortality. Connecting social milieu with mortality, he ascribes those conventions that increase mortality rates as pathological and hence immoral. "[T]here is only one possible reason for characterising the aforementioned consequence as harmful, namely, that it disturbs the normal functioning of society" (*Rules* 54). Unfortunately, this theory entails assumptions that Durkheim did not appreciate.

"[O]ne may say that the normal type merges with the average type, and that every deviation from this standard of health is a morbid phenomenon" (*Rules* 55-56). This biological metaphor for social types led him to believe that the relationship between average characteristics of an individual must correlate with viability. This leads to the incongruous conclusion that average persons must be moral. This is incongruous because it is often the saints, artists, scientists, and statesmen who contravene social mores who are venerated as moral archetypes in later generations for helping to produce a better social order. Durkheim was correct to connect normality with usefulness, but only usefulness in the past. That something was useful in the past does not guarantee that it will be useful in the future. He does recognise that normal attributes might not be the most useful but he does not equate the broader idea of utility with normality. Durkheim's functional definition of morality contains normative assumptions that are fine for the 'herd' in mechanical solidarities, but quite inadequate for an organic solidarity that should foster increasing individuality.

Lukes points out that while Durkheim gave this as his official definition, he usually used the criterion of "social integration," as seen in *Division of Labour*, as the true test of normalcy. "Any real society was bifurcated into (1) its normal, ideally integrated state and (2) the pathological conditions deviating from that state. As a result, he tended to idealise societies he thought of as integrated, ignoring tensions and conflicts within them, while

seeing the realities of his own society only as pathological deviations from its future, normal, ideally integrated state ” (*Prolegomena* 355) In short, while Durkheim’s desire was to encourage people to become socially integrated, he tended to proselytise a social theory that would lead to mechanical solidarity

So we find that Durkheim’s theory of normality is useful, but only to a point. For example, he argued that social equality is not an eternal moral truth *sui generis*. Rather, it is a development for society as it exists today. He felt that moral reality “which consists not in a system of concepts that might be constructed by a *sui generis* logic, but in a system of forces -- surely not physical ones -- but mental, moral forces, forces which derive all their power from action, *représentations* and from states of *conscience* ” (*Social Equity* 65) As an example, asserting that people are of equal worth as a universal principle is to confuse explanation and justification. These are two different senses of rationality. An explanation is functional, a justification is ideological. Durkheim wanted to be able to explain all ideologies with functional explanations. This Positivist dream cannot be achieved because we do not have any indisputable social facts from which we can build a theory. What we can do is articulate a constellation of arguments that support one another, support assertions that are regarded as good, and have empirical justification. (Brown) Durkheim recognises this in statements such as this.

I cannot understand how an institution can be rational *in itself*. The rationality of a fact is relative, as is the fact. If an institution has its fundamental justification in a given social system, which itself has its *raison d’être* in the entire series of historical conditions on which it depends, which consequently cannot be other than it is at the moment under consideration, how can such an institution be irrational. (*Social Equity* 74-75)

In this light, we see that Durkheim’s definition of normality has advantages and disadvantages. This theory does view normality as a transitory attribute, changing from society to society and evolving as a society evolves: “[A] social fact can, then, be called normal for a given social species only in relation to a given phase of its development.”

(*Rules 57*) Thus, we need to consider how an attribute or characteristic affects people as society changes. But “[i]t would be incomprehensible if the most widespread forms of organisation would not at the same time be, *at least in their aggregate*, the most advantageous. The greater frequency of the former is, thus, a proof of their superiority” (*Rules 58*). For Durkheim, normality is defined by an attribute being the most common, and most common because it is the most useful. The difficulty is, especially where society is changing so rapidly, that what is most common and average now may not be what is needed as society changes. The aggregate may not be able to adapt quickly enough to new situations requiring new norms. Durkheim clearly did not fully grasp the importance of diversity in a group.

However, Wallwork argues that “it is appropriate in Durkheim’s view for the social scientist to make use of the paradigm of evolutionary biology” (*Religion and Social Structure* 164). He bases this argument on, among other things, the fact that no other model can account for the development of altruism. That is, altruism is a development of selective socio-cultural development. While I would not argue with this, I would argue that if this is what Durkheim had in mind, he also frequently confused it with teleological assumptions. Durkheim’s cultural relativism indicated that he understood that cultures evolved to satisfy their needs, but he could never seem to completely separate himself from Spencer’s teleological evolution. It is difficult to separate Durkheim’s understanding of the importance of cultural myths, such as Spencer’s evolution, from the underlying rationale.

Fortunately, connecting normality, and hence morality, with the average enables Durkheim to recognise a useful theory that explains how societies evolve. It would seem, from Darwin, that it is the outliers, criminals, that lead social evolution by providing diversity for times of change. Durkheim makes the provocative assertion that criminality is inevitable because of the nature of morality, a certain portion of the population will always act in ways that are outside accepted behaviour. This is useful because as the

needs of society change, formerly criminal acts become necessary and the average behaviour of society moves in the direction of the formerly criminal behaviour. "Crime is, then, necessary, it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life, and by that very fact it is useful, because these conditions of which it is a part are themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law." (*Rules 70*)

It was through criminality that Durkheim began to mediate the role of the individual autonomy in society by tying it to social progress. "To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself" (*Rules 71*) It is the utility of individuality for society that encouraged it to prosper. Evoking the sociological equivalent of Newton's Third Law of Motion (for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction) he asserted the social force of individuals must be equal to the social force of society (*Rules 90*) That is, as the various forces that try to get the individual to comply increase (as the division of labour in society increases), we must have a commensurate increase in personal autonomy. If personal force increases faster than social force, we see egoism. If social force is greater than personal force, we see malevolent altruism. So he was aware that traditions can continue even when they no longer serve any useful function, or even serve a malevolent purpose. This theory is fleshed out in *Suicide*.

Rules demonstrates two major deficits in Durkheim's sociology. First, he tried to assimilate all facets of social life into his sociology, even those that clearly are not *entirely* social. For example, "sexual jealousy, filial piety, paternal love" are not just social facts, but are also economic, biological, anthropological, and psychological facts. In trying to claim these as purely social facts and by ignoring anything that cannot be argued to be purely social, besides making some silly claims, Durkheim hinders the possibility of integrating his sociology with other disciplines. It is difficult to tell how much of this tendency arose from his desire to differentiate sociology from other discipline and how much of it is fundamental to his theory. Second, Durkheim tended to be glibly optimistic

about the benefits of society and dismissed any problems in society as simply temporary problems that will be corrected with time. His tendency to look at what was supposedly best for society led him to ignore the individuals who were to be venerated and who were to lead social change.

Suicide

Suicide is probably the best demonstration of Durkheim's sociological method. By looking at broad social phenomena and their effect on the rates of suicide, he demonstrated the importance of sociological method. But this book also drew a great amount of criticism for its methodology, fortunately very little of this criticism affects the present discussion as I will not be looking at his empirical methods.

In this study he was not concerned with the causes attributed to individual suicides. Rather he wanted to examine the effect of various conditions in the social milieu that cause individuals to make this ultimate protest. He defines suicide as "any death which is the direct or indirect result of a positive or negative act accomplished by the victim himself" (*Suicide* 42). For a death to be a suicide the person must have intended harm to himself, so one who is hallucinating does not intend this outcome.¹² However, Durkheim dismisses the necessity of intent in general because of the difficulty of determining what the victim intended. A person may intend another result but know that death may result. If the victim knows that this will likely be the result, Durkheim defines it as a suicide. Similarly, an attempted suicide is an act so defined that does not produce death.

¹² Giddens point out one major problem with Durkheim's definition of suicide. While Durkheim insists that a person must intend to kill themselves to be a suicide, he shortly dismisses intention in favour of a model that ignores the individual agent in favour of social causes, external to the person. "[H]is theory of suicide does not allow room for the idea of the rationalised character of human action: the intrinsic feature of human conduct that actors reflexively 'monitor' their behaviour in conjunction with its purposive content. In other words, it is a deterministic theory, which treats suicide as the outcome of social causes, as these operate on particular types of individuals" (*Emile Durkheim* 119). Giddens misses the point, however, because Durkheim wanted to understand the social conditions that increase people's propensity to kill themselves.

Durkheim also introduces the idea of partial suicides. That is, the possibility that an individual will not have the optimal level of individuation or that their needs are mismatched with their resources, and this will cause them to not take as good care of themselves as they might. So while they do not attempt or succeed in taking their life, partial suicides are aware that their actions may lead to their early demise through poor health or careless actions. In this way, Durkheim can use the ideas of egoism, malevolent altruism, and anomie in a general way by relating social integration with mortality, and hence morality. Education plays a vital role in society by helping the students to develop the right amount and quality of social integration.

Durkheim's definition allowed him to discard the psychological theory that suicide is always the result of a psychosis, because the psychotic may not intend his death or may be motivated by imagined causes. Some psychotic self-deaths are founded in reality and must be considered suicides, so the cause lies in reality, not in the psychosis. So, for Durkheim, suicide is not the result of insanity. That a greater proportion of suicides are of psychotics did not concern him, because he was interested in the sociological conditions that causes these particular individuals to be predisposed to suicide.

Similarly, he dismissed the idea that race, heredity, 'cosmic factors' (such as weather or geography), and imitation cause suicides. While he demonstrated meaningful correlations between these factors and suicide rates, he felt that it was misleading to attribute causation to these factors. While they might point us to important social factors, such as social relations between Blacks or that in a given region a certain religion predominates, he insisted that suicide is a social phenomenon and that it is best to look there for its causes. As for imitation, he felt that it only affects those individuals who are already predisposed, for sociological reasons, to self-death.

Durkheim defined three categories of suicide -- egoistic, altruistic, and anomic -- each resulting from an improper relationship between individual and society. More specifically, each type of suicide indicates a different problem with "social integration."

“Integration, which is a fundamental characteristic of all social organisation, may be defined as the degree to which the component parts of an organisation are interrelated so as to give unity or wholeness to the system ” (Olsen 47) All social organisations have some degree of integration but the quality and quantity varies significantly between groups

Durkheim found that “suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual form a part ” (*Suicide* 209) The less an individual depends on the groups of which he is a part, the more he depends upon himself and refuses to recognise rules of social discourse that are not to his favour This state is what Durkheim calls “egoism ” Egoism is exerting one’s interests excessively over others’ and it is the result of excessive individualism But this is merely to indicate that lack of social cohesion correlates with increased suicide rates How does Durkheim explain the causes?

Since individuals are of use to society, society prohibits people from killing themselves When society is strongly integrated, individuals are more likely to obey this prohibition against self slaughter People see living as their duty to society But this simply explains why people do not kill themselves Durkheim tells us that people cannot live without attachment to some transcendental purpose and that life is not worth living without some higher purpose All the various names people have given to the transcendental -- God, spirits, ghosts, totems, gods -- are in fact the society in which people live Living gives people myriad reasons to kill themselves, but strong and plentiful attachments to social groups give them bountiful reasons to not kill themselves “If life is not worth the trouble of being lived, everything becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of it ” (*Suicide* 213)

Attachments to social groups, family, colleagues, children, religion, etc , give people a purpose to live Egoistic suicide results from too much individual freedom of inquiry Durkheim found that learning increased suicide rates It is not learning itself that leads people to kill themselves, but it is the same reasons that people learn that causes

them to kill themselves "Man seeks to learn and man kills himself because of the loss of cohesion in his religious life, he does not kill himself because of his learning. It is certainly not the learning he acquires that disorganises religion, but the desire for knowledge wakens because religion becomes disorganised." (*Suicide* 169) So mere intellectual freedom is not the cause of suicide. Intellectual self-sufficiency, in Durkheim's mind, is not the end of education but simply the means of reinvigorating social life.

Religion, the embodiment of the collective conscience, does not protect a person from suicide because it condemns taking one's life. Faith in religion is faith in society. "The more numerous and strong these collective states of mind are, the stronger the integration of the religious community, and also the greater its preservative value. The details of the dogmas and rites are secondary" (*Suicide* 170) Most religions encourage people to marry and have children, and proscribe esoteric knowledge and suicide because these things have been found to affect social stability. The important thing about religious doctrine is that it supports a "sufficiently intense collective life" (*Suicide* 170)

But Durkheim argued that you can, in fact, have too much of a good thing. While a lack of social integration is an important cause of suicide, he also argued that excessive social integration also causes people to kill themselves. Here, however, we need to think of suicide in different light, though still in keeping with the definition given above. "Altruistic suicide" results from society having too little respect for individual persons, leading people to knowingly kill themselves. Durkheim points to three general types of altruistic suicide. First, obligatory altruistic suicide encourages the old and infirm to kill themselves. It also commands women in some cultures to kill themselves when their husbands die or servants to kill themselves when their masters die. If these people do not kill themselves, they risk being killed. Second, optional suicides occur in societies where killing oneself is seen favourably. This can happen when there are bad feelings between members of the society. Finally, acute altruistic suicides occur when a society views self-death as the proper renunciation of individuality in veneration of society or a god.

So, for the moral educator, it is not that too much social integration or autonomy is bad *per se*. The problem isn't even that there is an imbalance between them. The problems arise when there is insufficient respect for individuals, either the self or others. The challenge is to inculcate a respect for individuals and then teach the means of maintaining the balance between respect for self and respect for others.

Finally, "anomic suicide" does not depend on the degree of social integration but rather the type of social regulation.¹³ It results from a mismatch between perceived needs and resources. Durkheim finds that the effect is the result of a crisis—disturbances of the collective order. Thus, crisis that brings improved living conditions also produces an increase in suicide rate.

If our goals are unattainable we can only be unhappy. Conversely, if all our goals can be attained without effort, there is no challenge and we are continually robbed of the joy of agency. The task is to maintain an equilibrium that matches resources with needs. Since the actual needs for physical survival are, in most parts of the world at most times, relatively easy to attain, we conceivably have a large degree of leeway with our perceived needs. So the first necessity of socialisation is to limit the passions. "Only then can they be harmonised with the faculties and satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force must play the same role for moral needs that the organism plays for physical needs. This means that the force can only be moral." (*Suicide* 248) Society, through its institutions such as school, must play the role of limiting peoples' desires through its moral authority. Indeed, only society *per se* has the authority to devise laws, regulations, conventions, and customs that can stipulate a point beyond which the passions must not pass. Common interest must define the proper balance between desires and resources. The necessity of limiting

¹³ The ambivalence between 'degree' and 'type' of social integration led Johnson (*Durkheim's One Cause of Suicide*) to conclude that there is only one reason for suicide—egoism. That is, narcissism, on the part of the suicide or of his social group, reduces healthy social integration. This is a fair analysis, but it muddies the conceptual distinction Durkheim was trying to make.

expectations is why Durkheim saw discipline, enabling the child to recognise the authority of society, as the first principle of moral education.

In most times in history and in most societies anomic suicide was relatively rare, occurring most often during infrequent abrupt social changes. The industrialisation and commercialisation of public life over the last two centuries has led to most of life being lived as if it were a business. Pointing to statistics that indicate that in France at the time, industrial and commercial professions made up the greater portion of suicides, Durkheim asserted that this is due to the continual mismatch between needs and resources, resulting from a relatively unstable life compared with agriculture or craft work. “Anomie, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies .. [it] results from man’s activity’s lacking regulation and his consequent suffering ” (*Suicide* 258) A rapid change of life prospects can also result from domestic causes. For example, Durkheim points to data that demonstrates the increased suicides among people who have a spouse or child die, inferring that the resulting crisis increases the likelihood of self-murder.

Anomic suicide is similar to egoistic suicide as they are both the result of the insufficient presence of society in the individual, but they are the result of a different sort of absence. Egoistic suicide results from insufficient quantity or quality of collective activity, depriving the individual of shared meaning. In anomic suicide, society is unable to exert proper control on a person’s desires, allowing them to become mismatched. Durkheim insisted that while they are similar, they are in fact independent.

Orrù helps to understand the idea of anomie, but misunderstands Durkheim’s use of the phrase. Orrù points out that all uses of the phrase have common ethical (normative) and cognitive (functional) assumptions. Ethically it can emphasise the social nature of morality and its externality to the individual. Alternately, it can focus on the individual nature of morality and people’s relative autonomy in the social sphere. Cognitively it can take a holistic view of social phenomena or it can take an atomistic view stressing

voluntarism. Orrù takes the standard view of Durkheim and argues that his ethical and cognitive position on anomie is of the former, conservative type, in both cases. Orrù recognises that Durkheim insisted that autonomy is the factor that distinguishes secular morality from religious morality, yet he asserts that "the autonomy that Durkheim advocates is only a fictitious one. Since moral understanding comes from science, science is certainly a source of autonomy" (111). Orrù rejects Durkheim's autonomy as being based on a deterministic perspective in which one is only free to do what society and science tells one to do.

It is a common misunderstanding to try to fit Durkheim into either the materialistic or the idealistic genre of social thought. Orrù sees Durkheim placing himself in opposition to Guyau.

Guyau states [in the introduction of his *Esquisse*] that the variability of moral rules caused by the elimination of obligation and sanction should be considered the characteristic of morality in the future. The history of ethics shows a gradual shift from collective and external criteria for ethics and conduct towards individual and internal criteria. (Orrù 100)

For Guyau, anomie is not evil. It is merely an emerging reality of modern society. Orrù makes the very simple mistake of seeing Durkheim and Guyau in opposition when they are using the same word in different ways. Guyau uses the word anomie to mean what Durkheim uses the word individuation for. While it would be a mistake to think that they have the same ideas on the subject, it would be correct to say that Durkheim was trying to show that Guyau's anomie, individuation and increasing autonomy, need not be immoral.

One of the aims of *The Division of Labour* was precisely this: to show that the spread of the ideals of individualism is not a symptom of a pathological condition of society, but on the contrary is the 'normal' and healthy expression of the social transformations that are engendering a new form of social solidarity. It was a diagnosis which Durkheim never abandoned, even if he later came to be dissatisfied with some aspects of his initial formulation of it. (Giddens, *Emile Durkheim* 11)

Durkheim was arguing that his anomie, a mismatch between expectations and resources, would lead to immoral behaviour¹¹ This distinction is important, because it shows the source of individuation in advanced societies “For Durkheim, social consciousness arose in a response to the doubt and anomic anxiety caused by the breakdown of tradition.” (LaCapra 7)

The difference between anomie and autonomy is significant. The anomic person transgresses social mores because he does not understand them and is not sufficiently integrated into society to have other people correct him. The autonomous person would only transgress a social more because he thoroughly understood social norms and needs, and felt that the transgression was justified for society’s benefit. Unfortunately, Durkheim tended to only think of autonomy as a psychological factor, allowing a person to understand social mores, and not as a potential cause for action.

Olsen distinguishes between two types of integration: normative, which looks at common values in a group, and functional, which looks at the division of labour and how this necessitates complementary relationships. Olsen argues that Durkheim tended to conflate normative and functional social integration. This is especially obvious when we compare the term anomie between *Division of Labour* and *Suicide*. In the former he was mainly concerned with functional integration and in the latter he tended to look more at normative integration. While it might be useful to follow Olsen’s suggestion to distinguish

¹¹ Guyau was arguing against externally imposed morality, believing that a universal and disinterested ethic could emerge that need not be categorical or fixed. “What Durkheim portrays as a late nineteenth-century social pathology, Guyau postulates as an ideal of individual-as-social authenticity. A contrast between their respective concepts of anomie was indeed implicit to Durkheim’s original presentation of social morality in strict opposition to Guyau’s moral *anomie*. On the other hand, to contrast the two concepts of *anomie* may also ignore differences more apparent than real, assuming the wider philosophical dimension to Durkheim’s concept. Durkheim arguably considers *anomie* the social expression and cause of a ‘low’ species of individualism, an ‘unfettered’ will prone to uniquely egoistic desires. Anomie defined by what it does *not* contain--by the absence of optimal degrees of social and social-psychological integration and regulation--is the non-achievement of *solidarité organique*. Conceptually distinct, though psychologically related on this definition, Guyau’s *anomie* is characterised by the equilibrium it *contains* as the putatively perfect integration of ‘volonté pure’ with ‘intelligente contrainte’” (Fidler 94). So, while Durkheim and Guyau agree that morality must reside with the individual, Durkheim feels that it must start from the collective conscience and be completely assimilated.

between the two terms for clarity, the result would be the same because Durkheim argued that they are interrelated. That is, functional integration requires normative integration, and vice versa. We see the conflation of narrative and functional explanations most clearly in the next section.

Individualism and the State

We now have a good idea of how Durkheim saw the tension between individual and social forces in advanced societies. But all of these discussions were couched in theoretical and historical contexts. To better understand what Durkheim had in mind as an ideal for contemporary society we need to look at two other works. "Individualism and the Intellectuals" describes the role of the individual and *Professional Ethics* describes the role of the State in advanced societies. In both cases, he doesn't simply take the side of the Right or the Left, but argues for an original concept for both the rights and function of the individual and the State.

"Individualism and the Intellectuals" was originally published as a response to the anti-Dreyfusard and thus carries a much more 'political' tone. As Lukes points out, this paper firmly establishes that while Durkheim's ideas might be interpreted into fascist dogma,¹⁵ he himself was certainly not. (*Emile Durkheim* 338-339)

His first concern is to separate himself, and the concerns of the Third Republic that he represented, from what he considers the thoroughly discredited ideas of Utilitarianism. Reducing the social question, as Utilitarians do, to a question of maximising happiness, leads to "crass commercialism" (*Individualism* 44) and to viewing society as a mere vehicle for production and exchange. For him, "all communal life is impossible without the existence of interests superior to those of the individual" (*Individualism* 44). He

¹⁵ For example, Svend Ranulf gratuitously misreads Tönnies, Comte and Durkheim saying: "Obviously, Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* is identical with Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, and *Gesellschaft* with the stage of individualism expected by Durkheim to be remedied by the development of or organic solidarity" (34). Ranulf obviously misunderstood both Durkheim's emphasis on individualism and his definition of it.

wished to assert that his articulation of individualism, as represented by the Third Republic and the Dreyfusard, was the only tenable solution to the difficulties of France during this time of national crisis

Central to the thinking of the Revolution were the ideas of Rousseau and Kant. Kant asserted that one can only be sure of acting properly when one is concerned with the abstract humanity in one's action, rather than the particular circumstances of the situation. For Rousseau, "the general will, which is the basis of the social contract, is infallible, if it is the authentic expression of perfect justice, it is because it is the sum of all individual wills" (*Individualism* 45). In both schemes, whether coming from the individual's perspective in Kant's case or the collective's perspective in Rousseau's, the morally correct way of acting is the way that applies to all people indiscriminately. This found its basis in the Revolution as the rejection of the aristocracy's assertion that they were of a different sort, deserving different rules. This veneration of individuals' fundamental rights is at the heart of modern thinking.

This individualism is quite different from egoism, which is concerned with the self. Individualism, as Durkheim articulated it, is concerned with individuals in general, not in particular. This respect for persons creates horror when we witness acts that affront a person's integrity. This can only indicate that we consider persons sacred, much as people react at the desecration of their religion's idols: "it is a religion in which man is at once the worshipper and the god" (*Individualism* 46). Thus, individualism is the 'religion' of advanced societies that must recognise the rights of all individuals. But because individualism is tied up with rational discourse -- because all people must have access to the truth -- this 'religion' must make rational discourse its primary ritual because it cannot rely on social myths. No act of society, or of individuals acting by its authority, can transgress the rights of the individual without due process. This shift is commensurate with the shift, discussed in *Division of Labour*, from juridical laws that punish individuals for transgressions against society to restitutive laws that merely wish to restore social

order. So, while Durkheim is defending individualism from the Right, he is also telling the Left that they cannot sink into despotic egoism in the name of individualism.

The difficulty France was facing, epitomised by the Dreyfus Affair, was the transition from Catholicism and monarchism to individualism and nationalism without sinking into egoism. A good portion of the difficulty derived from the internally contradictory nature of the Enlightenment ideal. Rousseau's uncompromising ideal of the individual as a sovereign makes any sort of civil society difficult to imagine. Kant presents a system that requires individuals to submit to social commandments without question. Simply trying to integrate these ideas, not to mention the myriad others that come with Enlightenment thought, and the existing and emerging social institutions, led to the problems the French faced and we still face. Durkheim saw individualism, as he articulated it, as the only feasible solution to society's problems.

The main problem with individualism that Durkheim saw is that "it has as its primary dogma the autonomy of reason and as its primary rite the doctrine of free enquiry. But, we are told, if all opinion is free, by what miracle will they be in harmony? how can they not be incoherent?" (*Individualism* 49). He agreed that individualism requires a degree of intellectualism "because freedom of thought is the first of the freedoms" (*Individualism* 49). But this does not imply that everyone will or ought to go off by themselves and devise their own ethics and metaphysics. It frees individuals to know what they can know, but does not condemn them to incompetence. Free enquiry enlarges the circle of people who are actively in the process of trying to determine what is true through collaboration and verification. Freedom of enquiry simply insists that we be given reasons for accepting someone else's opinions as true and not to be forced into beliefs based upon authority alone. "Respect for authority is in no way incompatible with rationalism as long as the authority is rationally grounded" (*Individualism* 49). It is not enough to tell people that society is not possible "without mutual sacrifice and without a certain spirit of subordination." (*Individualism* 50). If people are to be asked to submit to the will of

society they need to be given reasons. Durkheim felt that his science of society would provide these reasons so that individual autonomy could coexist with social attachment.

When this belief in the supremacy of reason has achieved the status of general acceptance and is generally practised by the community it deserves the status of religion. This intellectual and moral commitment is necessary for community. We need a religious system that will accommodate itself to a diversity of situations and to increasing social and individual mobility, capable of dealing with individual variations. Industrialisation, as we saw in *Division of Labour*, encourages the individuation of citizens. Increasingly people have little in common except their common humanity, so the only system compatible with all of these variations would be a system that would enable people to relate on this basis. "The communion of spirits can no longer be based on definite rites and prejudices, since rites and prejudices are overcome by the course of events. Consequently, nothing remains which men can love and honour in common if not man himself." (*Individualism* 52) Any existing religion cannot hope to deal with this social diversification because it is based on given assumptions and cannot deal with the rapid change of social life. We must then go to the common denominator of people, their individuality, and encourage rites, such as rational discourse, that will act to reduce social friction.

It is important to note that Durkheim's understanding of individualism changed through his major works. In *Division of Labour* individualism is egoistic individualism, which is focused on "the needs, interests and desires of the concrete individual." (Seidman 284) "Individualism and the Intellectuals" represents something of a departure for him in this regard because he introduces the idea of moral individualism, which features an altruistic ethic of obligation and social responsibility. No longer is he speaking of self-interested individuals, but rather the ideal individual with inherent integrity and which evokes a feeling of sympathy and responsibility for others, the religion of humanity is a socially unifying moral force.

To mediate between Kant's ideal in which people conform to social mores without question and Rousseau's demand for uncompromised individual control, Durkheim rearticulates a realistic idea of social function *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (from the lecture notes for a course given at Bordeaux between 1890 and 1900, and at the Sorbonne in 1904 and in 1912) tried to do this. In these lectures Durkheim looked at individuals' attachments to society through various social groups, especially professional groups, in the proper functioning of the State, and at various rights of individuals in modern society. In this way, he identifies a partial cure for the endemic civil strife he pointed out in *Suicide*. It is one of Durkheim's more practical statements of the functioning of a democratic state and refutation of the categorical imperative, Utilitarianism, and Hegel's mysticism.

He wanted to explore the seemingly natural tension between government and citizens, "between authority and those subject to it" (*Professional Ethics* 42) that he later wrote about in *Dualism*. The idea of State has very little to do with the territory on which the people live. Rather, political societies are formed from the gradual aggregation of minor groups. Durkheim's interest is in the rules that the political society develops that allow people to live in larger aggregates with minimal internal strife. These rules determine the relationship between individuals and the authorities entrusted to maintain social order. This group of officials entrusted with representing this authority he called the 'State'. While the word is often used to identify the political society as a whole or the various administrative functions of the political state, here he wanted to restrict the word to just the people entrusted with determining the rules of social conduct.

What separates the State, this select group who form the executive of society, from the various administrative functions associated with political society? The State makes decisions while the administrative functions, police, army, tax collection, etc., serve its will. In a representative democracy, the type with which Durkheim is primarily concerned, the State is representative, in some sense, of the collective consciousness of

society. The electorate has decided to allow these people to make decisions on its behalf. Thus, he defines the State as “a groups of officials *sui generis*, within which representations and acts of volition involving the collectivity are worked out, although they are not the product of the collectivity. It is not correct to say that the State embodies the collective consciousness, for that goes beyond the State at every point.” (*Professional Ethics* 50) The collective consciousness is diffuse and the State deals only with those sentiments that are “higher, clearer and with more vivid sense of itself.” (*Professional Ethics* 50) The function of the State is to work out certain representations that are true for the entire community. These representations should be distinguished by their rational conception. If its deliberations produce representations that are characteristic of the collectivity they are imbued with authority and the administrative functions take their lead from the State’s decisions.

Durkheim looked at two broad ideals of the purpose of the State’s deliberations. The first, associated with the Utilitarians, Kant, and Rousseau, sees the State’s sole purpose as the benefit of individual. More specifically, the purpose of the State should be limited to caring for individuals’ fundamental rights. This group -- Kant, Rousseau, and the Utilitarians -- has many differences, but they all see the purpose of the State as limited to administering wholly negative justice, preventing unlawful trespass of one person on another’s rights. This caricature is what Cladis calls ‘liberalism’. The major alternative is the mystical ideal of State forwarded by Hegel, and later Marx, in which the State is an entity beyond individuals and should be venerated in its own right. People should work for the enhanced prestige of the State. This, however, requires that the rights of individuals are subservient to the State. Cladis calls this caricature ‘communitarianism’. For Durkheim, neither solution is wholly satisfactory.

Rather, he sees truth and fallacy in both. “History seems indeed to prove that the State was not created to prevent the individual from being disturbed in the exercise of his natural rights. No, that was not its role alone -- rather it is the State that creates and

organises and makes a reality of these rights.” (*Professional Ethics* 60) So, while the individual should not be subservient to society, neither should society simply exist as a minimalist avenue for the exercise of individual rights. The functions of society, beyond mere distribution of negative justice, should work to allow individuation that would not otherwise appear. If individual will appears to be subordinate to the common will it is because this is a requirement of civil society. The larger the social groups, the greater the necessity for common will to command the individual will, but also, generally, the greater the freedom to develop an individual will. “This concept of State is, then, an individualistic one, but it does not limit the State to the administration of an entirely prohibitive justice. And in this concept there is recognition of the right and duty of the State to play the widest possible part in all that touches collective life, without however having a *mystique*” (Durkheim, *Professional Ethics* 64) Hence, Cladis’ argument that Durkheim provided a communitarian defence of liberalism, though it could equally be seen as a liberal defence of communitarianism.

This theory demonstrates Durkheim’s tendency to see the wisdom in social conventions, through empirical study, rather than relying on speculative philosophies about what ‘should’ be. If the theories he rejects are unworkable, it is because they ignore the collective wisdom embodied in social facts. “The fundamental duty of the State is laid down in this very fact: it is to persevere in calling the individual to a moral way of life” (*Professional Ethics* 68-69) Giddens reminds us, however, that this view of the state may be naive. “Durkheim took it for granted that the state, in the ‘normal’ form of organic solidarity at least, represents the interests of the mass of the population. That the corporations have not developed in Western societies in the manner in which Durkheim anticipated, however, indicates the persisting character of conflict within the division of labour.” (*Emile Durkheim* 109-110) To compensate for this, Durkheim put stress on occupational groups as the proper intermediary between citizens and the state. It’s difficult to think, however, of the large unions and corporations of today actually being

responsive to the needs of their members, let alone the large portion of the population without work or benefit of unionisation¹⁶

Professional Ethics is one of the better examples of Durkheim trying to consolidate the functional, economic side of social theory with the normative, moral side. As this wide application of Durkheim's strategic reduction of the social to the moral indicates, the elimination of instrumental order that it rationalises affects every sphere of his institutional analysis. By far its most important application, however, is to economic life. As has been seen, Durkheim consistently tried to moralise his explanations of economic facts, but there were also many occasions when he recognised their relative intractability to moral concerns. In these situations, where the moralisation of economic life was impossible, Durkheim argued that economic facts simply were not social, and that they were, for this reason, 'inexplicable' in sociological terms" (Alexander, *Rethinking Durkheim* 294)

This tendency to reject anything that cannot be entirely assimilated into sociology was discussed above

So Giddens is not entirely correct in saying that Durkheim ignored or discounted civil strife. Durkheim recognises that if collective life seems filled with anxiety and strife it is because we need to continually negotiate collective life and our mutual rights and obligations in it. So, as we saw in "Dualism," he viewed conflict as natural and a productive part of life, and objected to the Marxist, romantic idea that we could somehow create a perfect system to do away with all conflict. If it seems that civil strife increases, it is because as societies become bigger and more complex, they also become both more delicate and robust. Advanced societies are much more stable because they have complex interrelationships that resist change. But while society as a whole is more difficult to damage, individuals within it become more vulnerable. Thus, we need to expend much

¹⁶ We can note, however, that Durkheim's prediction that professional groups would come to dominate politics seems to be correct. We now see business, labour, and other special interest groups dominating provincial and federal politics. But we can also see that our government face the same problems as more simple representative democracies, namely that the rich are better able to gain the ear of the powerful. In short, this might not be the ideal Durkheim envisaged.

energy to maintain everyone's rights, including the right to access to the increasing standard of life.

His argument with the theorists who call for minimalist government lies in their ignoring important social functions that lie outside economy and commerce.

[T]he State does not inevitably become either simply a spectator of social life (as the economists would have it), in which it intervenes only in a negative way, or (as the socialists would have it), simply a cog in the economic machine. It is above all, supremely the organ of moral discipline. It plays this part at the present time as it did formerly, although the discipline has changed. (Here we see the error of the socialists.) (*Professional Ethics* 71-72)

Clearly Durkheim is trying to articulate a theory of society that accepts the fundamental truths of the libertarian and the communitarian tradition while rejecting the sundry baggage needed to maintain these ideals.

If the State is to be the organ of social thought, as Durkheim describes it, it must have effective mechanisms for determining and disseminating that thought. The diffuse nature of social opinions, practices, conventions, etc., makes it difficult for the State to effectively formulate that into a formalised code. But this difficulty does not allow the State to ignore what people are thinking. Democracy, for all of its difficulties, seems to be the single most effective means of ensuring that the State is aware and generally responsive to the masses, and yet effectively maintain the moral authority needed in complex societies. This is because "[t]he more societies grow in scope and complexity the more they need reflection in conducting their affairs" (Durkheim, *Professional Ethics* 89). Only through reflection can a society develop new and more effective practices. Democracy encourages this reflection. That is, democracy does not simply bring advantages to citizens, it also brings the duty of self government. In this way, democratic society both requires and encourages autonomy. Again, Durkheim anticipates Dewey.

Neither Durkheim nor Dewey anticipated a time, such as we are beginning to see, when people are so generally knowledgeable that they become difficult to govern. The

difficulty, in Durkheim's terms, is that people are placing their own needs before the needs of other people. The source of this strife is a mismatch between perceived needs and resources. Our educational and other social institutions have allowed us to become egoistic rather than autonomous.

So we find Durkheim's most clear defence of autonomy in modern societies. To be autonomous means, for the human being, to understand the necessities he has to bow to and accept them with full knowledge of the facts. Nothing that we do can make the laws of things other than they are, but we free ourselves of them in thinking of them, that is, in making them ours by thought. This is what gives democracy a moral superiority. Because it is a system based on reflection, it allows citizens to accept the laws of the country with more intelligence and thus less passively. Because there is a constant flow of communication between themselves and the State, the State is for individuals no longer like an exterior force that imparts a wholly mechanical impetus to them. Owing to constant exchanges between them and the State, its life becomes linked with theirs, just as their life does with that of the State (*Professional Ethics* 91)

But while there is constant communication between the citizens and the State, they are separate and there will be tension between them as all individuals will not be happy with all State decisions.

While Durkheim's thought is neither complete nor internally consistent, neither is it readily dismissed. In the end, he tried to produce a theory that did what he told his students they should be doing. That is, "that we must fashion rationalists, that is to say men who are concerned with clarity of thought; but they must be rationalists of a new kind who know that things, whether human or physical, are irreducibly complex and who are yet able to look unflinching into the face of this complexity." (*Evolution* 348)

Integral to Durkheim's understanding of morality was his theory of moral education.

Chapter 3

Moral Education

If Durkheim's sociology was a science of morals, his educational theory centred around moral education. As we have seen, Durkheim was critically aware of the need for social reconstruction in his society. While he did not publish a major work on education, a large part of his teaching (as much as two-thirds) was on education. Both his chair at Bordeaux and his chair at the Sorbonne were of Pedagogy first, Sociology second or later (Lukes). We see in the articles, reviews, and lectures published posthumously that he felt education generally, schooling more specifically, was an important mechanism for social renewal or control. While it could not do the task itself, it is central to any social reform.

Durkheim's sociology is based on the study of social facts, the practices and theories of education are social facts open to investigation. These practices are not arbitrary or capricious as many assert as they are creations of the society they serve. So pedagogical recommendations need to be founded in the society for which they are intended and responsive to changes in society. For example, as individuality becomes more important in society, schools need to take this into account and change their curriculum to help to develop individuality.

While the course that was published as *Moral Education* was developed relatively early in Durkheim's career, we see in it most of the characteristics and issues we saw in his major works. His educational theory was also important in the overall development of his social theory. Since *Moral Education* was intended for academically less gifted students, he does not develop many of the ideas to the degree that he did in *The Evolution of*

Educational Thought It does provide, however, a much more explicit, if not as highly nuanced, argument for the place of individual autonomy in advanced societies and the role of public education in promoting it

Just as it is useful to understand Durkheim's social theory by what it was opposed to, it is equally helpful to understand what his educational theory was opposed to. Especially interesting is the refutation of James Mill and Kant. It is generally agreed that education is some sort of influence by one's environment on one's actions and thoughts. But what exactly is the nature of this influence? Kant took the romantic position that "the end of education is to develop, in each individual, all the perfections of which he is capable" (*Education and Sociology* 62) But this notion of perfection is vague, and it is far from clear that one can develop all of one's faculties without having them interfere with one another. If this goal is necessary and desirable, it is not attainable. "We cannot and must not all be devoted to the same kind of life, we have, according to our aptitudes, different functions to fulfil, and we must adapt ourselves to what we must do." (*Education and Sociology* 62) Modern society requires division of labour, to expect people to spend time developing attributes for which they are not suited is a waste of effort.

Durkheim finds Mill's goal of education to "make the individual an instrument of happiness for himself and his fellows" (*Education and Sociology* 63) no more helpful. Happiness is entirely subjective and leaving this as the goal of education leaves education entirely open to personal fancy. Spencer tried to define happiness as an equilibrium between the individual and his environment, but this seems to imply a certain quietism that ignores the joys of the intellect or desires to improve the quality of life. Both Kant's and

Mill's perspectives fail because they take the goal of education as some sort of ideal "which applies to all men indiscriminately; and it is this education, universal and unique, that the theorist tries to define" (*Education and Sociology* 64) But these ideals ignore the historical and cultural differences in education that indicate changing ideals of humanity. The goals of education are entirely dependent on the needs of society. "If one begins by asking, thus, what an ideal education must be, abstracted from conditions of time and place, it is to admit implicitly that a system of education has no reality in itself." (*Education and Sociology* 64) If children are ignorant of the customs or skills expected by society, they will neither be able to develop their potential to its fullest nor be happy

The education the child receives is dependent on his future occupation. However, there is a core of sentiments and practices which education must inculcate in all children. Durkheim insists that there must be a "common base and, consequently, a certain balance of functions, organic and psychic alike, without which the health of the individual would be endangered, as well as social cohesion" (*Education and Sociology* 62-63) Even in a caste society there is normally a common religion. Thus education has both its specific and its general nature.

Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity, education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands. But on the other hand, without a certain diversity all co-operation would be impossible, education assures the persistence of this necessary diversity by being itself diversified and specialised" (*Education and Sociology* 70)

There are two facets in this socialisation that are both antagonistic and complementary. The first is the mental states that are entirely personal, composing our individual being. The other is the system of representations, sentiments, and practices that

are not of our personality but our milieu. The totality of these religious and moral beliefs, national and professional practices constitute our social being. The role of education is to institute and actualise the latter. Conjugal society requires that individuals in society understand these representations and obey them. Society faces a *tabula rasa* with each generation from which it must build the necessary constituents to continue society.

There came the point in history when a systematic means of looking at society was required as people could no longer rely on knowledge passed from previous generations. People needed to freely enquire about reality. This collaborative reflective effort is what Durkheim calls science. But free enquiry is dangerous to established tradition and at the beginning these efforts were proscribed. We see again now, from a different perspective, the conundrum. Because society creates people according to its needs it might seem, as it did to Bentham, that people were submitting to intolerable tyranny. But individuals are interested in submitting because it is only through collective life that people can make the best of themselves. "Man is man, in fact, only because he lives in society." (*Education and Sociology* 76)

Secular, Public Education

While there were many changes in education in eighteenth-century France, including 74 promulgations, decrees, and circulars between 1802 and 1870, there was very little substantive change. Educational institutions were in a continual state of flux, but the changes came so quickly that the increasingly large system did not have time to make one change before the next came. (The comparison with contemporary educational change is striking.) However, Durkheim cautions us to avoid thinking that the rapidity of change is

a new phenomenon or that it is the source of social problems. Rather, the changes resulted from an intense disagreement about the function of education and the best way to achieve these ends. "Nothing is more futile than complaining immoderately about these incessant changes and recommending patience; one does not cure a fever victim by advising him to keep calm." (*Evolution* 308) Durkheim argued that people have chronically felt that education need only be tweaked with this change or that when what is needed is a complete reorientation of its ineffective orientation. Durkheim is disingenuous with this argument: he both dismisses the revolutionary changes and demands a complete reorientation.

The Republican ideal of democracy required that everyone have a basic education and that this education be based on rational ideas rather than on revealed religion. Durkheim's work on education is very nationalistic, especially *Moral Education*. "The schools must be the guardians par excellence of our national character." (*Moral Education* 3-4) But to see in Durkheim the embryonic stages of fascism, as some have asserted,¹⁷ is clearly wrong.

As we have seen, Durkheim wanted to explore morality scientifically. That is, he felt that he could explain moral phenomena rationally. His secular understanding was central to his conception of moral education. He wanted schools to no longer indoctrinate students with the religiously based social mores, but rather to teach students to understand the rational foundation for the social conventions. "In order to do this, it was crucial to provide a rational, not a symbolic or allegorical, explanation of the nature of morality; one could then discern what moral rules and ideals were latent in and appropriate to the

¹⁷ see footnote 15 in chapter 2

contemporary social situation.” (Lukes, *Emile Durkheim* 112) As we have seen, Durkheim himself was only partially successful at providing a secular explanation of social conventions.

As we saw in *Elementary Forms*, he saw religion as an eminently social creation that served to enable people to live in societies. As we have been able to better understand these religious tendencies in rational terms and as society has increasingly used division of labour, religion has become less important and desirable. Christianity, especially Protestantism, has enhanced this process of secularisation by placing increasing emphasis on individual rights and duties over collective rights and duties. In Protestantism we see increasing emphasis on the individual's relation to God (society) and decreased emphasis on ritual.

Simply removing all religious elements from schools was not sufficient to produce a secular education. Durkheim argued that religion has the function of providing social cohesion and a common epistemology that allows contemporary societies to exist. What was needed was a rational system of morality to replace the religiously based one. This, in turn, would require a vastly different pedagogy because teachers could no longer rely on old methods. In this way, Durkheim was continuing Comte's attempt to provide a 'religion of humanity' based in rational language.

While Durkheim was criticised by his early readers for sociological myth-making for trying to cast society in the place of God, Lukes argues that this was a major breakthrough (*Emile Durkheim* 114-115) By looking at the supra-individual elements of social life and placing these within the province of collective representations, Durkheim made

social mores available for rational discourse enabling us to use rational language to inculcate moral truths in our schools. The challenge is to explore these truths rationally without having them lose their sacred character. The problem is that between denying the necessity of religious morality and accepting secular and rational discourse there is a tendency to deny any morality whatsoever and to deny the necessity of social life. We see this most clearly in the Utilitarian and libertarian philosophies. Lack of social authority, in turn, denies the teacher his source of moral authority, without which he cannot inculcate what he needs to have the child understand social life rationally.

We need to differentiate between acting for reasons and having reasoned. The reasons one might choose a certain action might include mystical or irrational reasons. Does this not mean that once one has gained the ability to reason, it is immoral to act without reasoning? Durkheim argued that the purpose of a moral system is to free oneself from having to reason all the time and that it is exorbitant to expect one to reason everything. “[R]eflection tends to become an element of morality, but what has to be discovered is whether it is a necessary element, without which morality could not exist, which must enter into the same definition of morality and which must be placed on the same level as its social character..” (*Positive Morality* 60) He answers his question by pointing out that most people comply with moral imperatives passively and that only very few even partially reflect on them. “To be sure reflection raises and perfects morality but it is not the necessary condition of it.” (*Positive Morality* 61) For this reason, people who are cognisant of their actions are held to a higher level of responsibility than those who are not

Durkheim refused to admit that morality is not subject to reason and must be explained by mysticism “As it is a human creation, fashioned by men and of men, one cannot see in what way or in what respect it could be shielded from the judgement of reason.” (*Morality Without God* 34) As we just saw, however, that does not mean that morality can be understood by brute force reasoning alone.

Morality is not a geometry, it is not a system of abstract truths which can be derived from some fundamental notion, posited as self-evident. It is a complexity of a different order. It belongs to the realm of life, not to speculation. It is a set of rules of conduct, of practical imperatives which have grown up historically under the influence of specific necessities. (*Morality Without God* 34)

This is the province of sociology Not only is this the only way that we can come to understand and articulate morality, it is the only way “which will enable it *to be taught in a rational way*” (*Morality Without God* 35) Thus, if we want to cleave morality from the province of mysticism, as Durkheim felt we must, we need to be able to explain morality with reasons If we understand the reasons for our morality we can adjust it when the conditions of social life change

In a very sympathetic review of Lévy-Bruhl's *La Morale et la science des moeurs* (1903) Durkheim agreed with Lévy-Bruhl's position that “[m]orality seeks to discover what goals man *should* pursue, and what the hierarchical relation of these goals *should* be with one another. The only function of sciences, whatever they are, is to discover what is, not to prescribe or legislate.” (*Lévy-Bruhl* 29) He rejects that idea of a normative science as oxymoronic Durkheim starts with a study of social facts to determine the actual moral norms of a society; or, at least, that is what he tried to do in his major studies.

The morality of a people at a given moment in its history does not have to be created. It exists: it is a reality. The old conception, according to which there is one natural morality and only one, to wit, the morality that is based on the human

conception in general is now no longer tenable. All the moral institutions one encounters in history are equally natural, in so far as they are founded in the nature of the societies which uphold them. *There is only one particular morality that a society can have, given the way it is constituted.* (Durkheim, *Lévy-Bruhl* 32, emphasis added)

Morality is not the creation of a single genius who can create it *ex nihilo* by sheer brute intellectual force. Morality evolves with society, regardless of what individuals may think of it. This is why, Durkheim tells us, the science of morals is a branch of sociology. By implication, then, it is not the bastion of philosophy or theology. While abstract theoretic constructs might be able to give us some insight into the principles of human action, any attempt to draw specific recommendations from them is hopeless. But as we have seen with Durkheim's own work, it is folly to try to separate the normative from the descriptive.

The importance of teaching students the reasons for morality lies in society's propensity to change

If children are to be given an idea of what moral life is, they must therefore be made to feel that it is normally subject to variations, yet without these variations discrediting it in their eyes. They must be made to understand that the morality of the future will probably not be that of today. At the same time the morality of today will still appear worthy of their respect (*Moral Doctrines* 131)

A healthy understanding of history and anthropology will help the student to understand this. Durkheim does not see the efficacy of basing a morality on a falsehood and would rather the child gain comfort and support from a reality that they understand. If one argues that the people need something transcendent of the self, imbued with unquestionable authority, Durkheim feels that society qualifies on both counts.

Discipline

The first requirement of morality, which we distil from religion, is the need for a spirit of discipline. Durkheim saw the initial year of schooling as the “critical moment in the formation of moral character.” (*Moral Education* 17) Before this period the child has not developed enough to understand the complex ideas and sentiments that are the foundation of morality. But from school age “all one can do is to complete the job already begun, refining sensibilities and giving them some intellectual content, i.e., informing them increasingly with intelligence.” (*Moral Education* 18) Thus, the educator must carry on from the foundation laid by the family life. “For if it is the family that can distinctly and effectively evoke and organise those homely sentiments basic to morality and -- even more generally -- those germane the simplest personal relationships, it is not the agency so constituted as to train the child in terms of the demands of society.” (*Moral Education* 19) He understood that the family has the key role in developing the foundation of morality and understood that the school is ill equipped to deal with this necessity.

The first common aspect of all behaviour we consider moral is that it conforms to pre-established rules. “To conduct oneself morally is a matter of abiding by a norm, determining what conduct should obtain in a given instance before one is required to act.” (*Moral Education* 23) This is the domain of what he calls duty -- acting in a prescribed way. This is not to say that the moral person does not encounter situations where he does not know what to do, but he understands the general rules of social conduct and can apply these rules to the specific situation fairly well. It is the rules that are important to learn so that the child can eventually master them to be free of them. These rules of social conduct

tell us how to act properly, that is conscientiously. This commonsensical first principle underscores a facet of morality that is often misunderstood. Looking particularly at Kant and the Utilitarians, Durkheim notes the moralist's tendency to reduce moral action to as simple a formula as possible. The difficulty is that Kant's categorical imperative leads logically to the Utilitarian conclusion of egoism, which is to say a virtual absence of morality. Applying this general formula leads to the view that morality resides in the individual. Durkheim argued that this view of morality looks at reality backwards. Morality consists of myriad specific rules that individuals must master. These individual rules exist independent of one another and vary according to the conditions of social life. The various general principles and schematic representations are nothing but metaphors that try to represent reality, not reality itself. Thus, like any good scientist, Durkheim tried to ensure that people do not confuse reality with the theories we use to try to describe it.

Teaching the child his social duty is teaching the child the specific rules of social conduct and must begin with prescribing seemingly arbitrary action. People who transgress social mores, purposefully or by ignorance, are immoral or amoral. "Morality thus presupposes a certain capacity for behaving similarly under like circumstances, and consequently implies a certain ability to develop habits, a certain need for regularity." (*Moral Education* 27) This 'certain capacity' is what Durkheim calls duty. In more primitive societies this would have been a capacity for living by God's (or gods') rules. But these rules are not simply a matter of habitual behaviour, "it is a way of acting that we do not feel free to alter according to taste." (*Moral Education* 28) What keeps us from feeling free to alter our conduct according to taste is the authority inherent in moral

rules. Whether this is the authority of God, the police, teachers, rationality, or society *per se*, we agree to these rules because of a power greater than ourselves. Durkheim's desire is to shift the authority from deities or the power of force to authority based on rational understanding. Fundamental to his understanding of sociology is that social facts exist for reasons and it is these reasons that he wants to expose and explain (if these reasons serve a useful purpose, as he assumes they generally do). Thus, "[t]here enter quite utilitarian considerations, which are intrinsic to the nature of the act and to its outcomes, possible or probable" (*Moral Education* 30). If we transgress social norms we face various forms of retribution. When rules are governed by anything other than authority these rules are no longer moral in character.

At the root of our desire for moral conduct is a desire for regularity so that we will know what other people will do in a given circumstance. Regularity is closely linked with moral authority. Durkheim argued that this is because both regularity and authority derive from the common root of discipline. Thus, Durkheim shows that the fundamental element of morality is discipline. But discipline is not good in-and-of-itself. It derives its value from the behaviour that it produces. Well-disciplined anti-social behaviour is not moral. It is necessary to examine why exactly discipline is good in moral behaviour, if it is not good *per se*.

Since many theoretical perspectives, especially the Utilitarianism of Bentham, see any form of social control as a barely tolerable infringement on individual rights, we must find the source of our desire for moral authority. Durkheim's reply is that it is only through regularity that we are able to function in a society. If we were forced to negotiate

behaviour for each new situation, we would not be able to maintain complex societies. This assertion is based on Durkheim's conflation of pathology and mortality. Regularity allows us to function at a relatively high level of abstraction because we do not need to worry about relatively mundane things. This is not a sufficient explanation, however.

Social institutions exist to serve people in general, not particular people or groups. Here Durkheim brings in an interesting argument from *Suicide*. If all of our desires are too easily fulfilled, we become bored. If our desires cannot be fulfilled, we give up. We necessarily seek an equilibrium state most of the time that encourages us to seek the proper balance of ability and desire. Moral authority, on the other hand, represents a goal that cannot be perfectly achieved. Recognising these unachievable goals is what Durkheim calls 'spirituality'. The desire to attain perfection of spirituality is at the root of our desire for regularity, it is our ideology. Hence, Durkheim explains the function of ideology. Similarly, moral rules prevent us from looking too closely at taboo things that are detrimental to social order. So discipline for Durkheim is a force that keeps us centred around our equilibrium, neither expecting too much nor too little. It is the force of the collective conscience that ensures a person is contributing to society but not asking too much of it.

The role of education, as a social institution, is to instil in the student this spirit of discipline: to tell them the rules of society, ensure they live by them, and to tell them how much or how little to expect. In short, to regulate their habits. "[F]reedom' from moral constraint was no freedom at all, but the curse of insatiable desires" (Fenton '47). Durkheim asserts that neither complete control nor complete freedom is necessary or

desirable. We need not rely on external authority to maintain regularity but neither can we have complete freedom. The solution, like Rousseau's *Emile* or Montaigne's "On the education of boys," is to let the students discover for themselves the natural constraints on their actions so that they will be able to know the limits of their freedom without having to rely on external authorities to tell them when they have contravened social norms. The teacher's or parent's reaction to a moral transgression should be seen as a natural reaction. How we view and react to external constraints, social and natural, is how we develop our personality.

Achieving discipline, without being either too free or controlled, is difficult in advanced societies because democracy and division of labour open up a much greater range of possibilities than in more primitive societies. The rapidity of social and personal change in advanced societies means that constraints and avenues of possibility change much more quickly than they do in simple societies. Hence, it is difficult to tell the life prospects of given child and prepare him accordingly. This requires not only a change in the rules of society but also in the way we inculcate these norms. Morality must be flexible enough to deal with the changes in society but rigid enough to be useful. "[T]his requires that morality not be internalised in such a way to be beyond criticism or reflection, the agents par excellence of all change." (*Moral Education* 52) This should not be confused with the desire to remove all rules, which is aberrant. We need, rather, to be able to exchange new rules for old when that is appropriate.

So we see that discipline is the first necessity of morality, but insufficient by itself. While Durkheim owed a great intellectual debt to Kant, he did not entirely agree with him.

Duty, the Kantian imperative, is only one abstract aspect of moral reality. In fact, moral reality always presents simultaneously these two aspects which cannot, in fact, be isolated. No act has ever been performed as a result of duty alone, it has always been necessary for it to appear in some respect as good. (*Sociology and Philosophy* 45)

Thus, *homo duplex* until individuals achieve complete rationality (probably never), and the commensurate complete autonomy, we will have to rely on some arational reasons to maintain social order. In this way, we will always require some ideology for normative judgements. So we can see, in this light, Durkheim critiquing his own position. We cannot rely on an entirely rational science of society, let alone teach it. So when Durkheim uses ideological foundations in his social theory it is only because he does not have a choice. Unfortunately, he was never able to fully come to grips with this rationale.

Fenton notes that it is quite probably Durkheim's emphasis on duty and discipline that has made his work largely anachronistic in contemporary sociology of education. The overwhelming emphasis on the romantic Marxist and liberal traditions, combined with a misreading of Existential philosophy, has led to the pervasive view that any restriction on personal freedom is not to be tolerated.¹⁸ "Here is a vocabulary -- discipline, authority, duty, will -- which a sociologist of education hardly dare whisper, he will be tempted to close the covers of the book with impatient haste. It soon becomes apparent, however, that discipline is understood as a condition of, not a barrier to, freedom; it is unrestrained egoism which is the tyranny" (Hargreaves, quoted in Fenton 173). But, while discipline is central to Durkheim's analysis of education, we must not see it as the end of education.

¹⁸ Entwistle has made the penetrating assertion that 'freedom' has become the albatross around the neck of educational theory. Having become afraid of transgressing a child's freedom in any way, teachers and administrators have tied their own hands, making themselves incapable of enabling many of the children to ever gaining the self-mastery needed to exercise their autonomy.

Attachment to Social Groups

We need to look further into the purpose of morality to understand it. All possible objectives are divided into two groups: those concerned only with the self, and those concerned with something other than the self. The former are personal objectives, the latter are impersonal objectives. Personal objectives that seek merely to sustain life are amoral, or morally neutral. But if in seeking to sustain life for oneself one is also looking out to protect others, then this is a moral act. Trying to preserve oneself is good, but it does not have any moral value. Personal objectives that go beyond simply sustaining life, such as personal aggrandisement or development, are also morally neutral. We may admire a person who develops themselves well, but unless they are doing so for others' benefit, we do not see these actions as moral.

If personal objectives lack in any moral value, morality must remain entirely in the domain of impersonal objectives. But simply acting to benefit specific other people in an economic arrangement, doing for another person in expectation of receiving in like, is also morally neutral in-and-of-itself, this is the difficulty with social contract theory and Utilitarianism. Moral action must "necessarily involve something other than individuals. It must be supra-individual" (*Moral Education* 59). Durkheim limits his argument so that the object of moral action must be conscious and sentient. In short, moral actions are those whose object is society. "To act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest." (*Moral Education* 59). This is true if the collective is the family, group, nation, or all of humanity. He is not saying that all of these actions are of equal moral worth, but simply that the action must be directed at a group to be moral.

Implicit in this argument is that the individual must intend to help the collective. Acting in a way that unintentionally helps a group is obviously not moral. Also implicit in this argument is that society exists and that society is something greater than the sum of individuals. That is, the collective must embody a collective consciousness capable of doing what individuals cannot -- it must possess moral authority. Having ruled out the theological notions, society is the only thing that is greater than individuals and deserving of moral action. To refute the idea that society is simply the sum of individuals, he points to the collective representations embodied in ritual, language, etc., which together make the collective able to do more than individuals working alone. These shared representations are what enables society to outlive its individuals.

Alexander feels that this perspective is what sets Durkheim free from the determinism of Marx. By making society a subject, individuals can serve society voluntarily as they would another person. By attaching people emotionally to society, rather than economically, they will choose to act morally. "Collective order structures action through voluntary adherence, through the actor's ability to see and feel in institutions something familiar and desirable... If education is successful, if motivation is attached to the emotional core of the crystallised structure, then constraint is no longer experienced as such" (*Rethinking Durkheim* 219). But Alexander is only seeing an intermediary stage in Durkheim's social reconstruction. Ultimately, Durkheim believed that people will choose to act morally because they rationally understand the purpose of moral actions. In lieu of this possibility, it is better to have people attached to society and the abstract idea of individuality than to have them attached to communities and religions.

that do not respect society as a whole or the rights of individuals. This leads us to the second requirement of moral education. Beyond simply instilling discipline in the students so that they perform moral actions, they must be attached to society so that their actions will be moral.

This argument rests on the assumption that individuals are better off, in aggregate, in society than out. This 'truth' is difficult to remember whenever social rules or outcomes work against our desires, requiring that citizens generally recognise their fealty to society whenever they feel tension between personal goals and social mores. Ensuring that people act in moral ways, ways that are for the greater common good, is an important purpose of education. The intellectual and vocational components of education enable the student to serve society by increasing their capacity for agency and increasing autonomy.

Thus, Durkheim does not admit that the antagonism between individual and society exists, while recognising that it will appear to be there. Our collective representations make us individuals and our collective representations come from society itself. We can only be individuals because of society and without society we could not be individuals. "We must, then, be receptive to [society's] influences, rather than turning back jealously upon ourselves to protect our autonomy" (*Moral Education* 72). It is when we cut ourselves from the influence of society that the dichotomy appears.

The first task of moral education is to unite the person with the fundamental social group, the family, because it will serve as the basis for future growth. The school, as a representative of the state, then acts as an intermediary between the family and broader society. Society is too complex for the family to teach its children what is needed to take

full part in collective life. So schools are the only social organ that can link family and society. This is why schools, for Durkheim, play such an important part in national morality. The essentially social character of education explains why the State must control education. Durkheim wrote this to counter the assumption prevalent in his day that the Church should be allowed to continue running education. It is equally important today to protect public education from religious groups and private business. Education must serve society's needs, and the only way to do that is to have education publicly funded and directed.

Is morality good? It is far from self-evident that acting for the collective is necessarily good. Morality is good because it makes society possible and society makes a richer, more varied life possible. A richer, more varied life makes life more meaningful, which, for Durkheim, is good. It is also good simply because we enjoy collective life. Morality is both a commandment that requires complete obedience and an ideal that we hope to attain. Despite his arguments to the contrary, Durkheim does eventually say that morality is good because it benefits individuals, but the causal connection between any given moral act and the benefit to the individual goes well beyond any simple "economic" theory proposed by the social contract theorists or the Utilitarians. The causality is so remote that, from anything other than a macroscopic perspective, it is all but meaningless. If Durkheim seemed to flip-flop on the question of whether society and individuals are opposed or in collusion, it is caused by these different foci. From a 'global' view, he argued that it is in the majority's best interest to follow the rules of society. From a

particular individual's perspective, it will often seem that the rules of society work against him

But how then are we to instil moral sentiments without using irrational arguments and pure emotion? Durkheim proposes "to link the students as directly as possible with that to which these ideas and feelings refer. ... Education through direct experience affects the moral as well as the intellectual elements of culture" (*Moral Education* 97) That is, we cannot help but use ideology or emotions to inculcate a desire to aid society. Only in this way can the child eventually learn to use rational thought for the benefit of society.

Autonomy

Underlying all of these arguments is the assertion that human beings are fundamentally deserving of respect, or even more strongly, "that the human being is the sacred thing par excellence" (*Moral Education* 97) "As a result of this principle, any kind of restriction placed upon our consciousness seems immoral since it does violence to our personal autonomy" (*Moral Education* 107)

Because of its prevalence, it is impossible to merely discard the idea of individual autonomy as an aberrant idea that needs to be rejected. Rather, we need to understand it. Kant said that for an action to be moral, the actor must be autonomous: "The relationship between human will and this law [the categorical imperative] is one of dependence; we call it obligation which indicates a constraint" (quoted in *Moral Education* 108-109) Yet, Kant refused to accept that a rule can be moral if it is not accepted autonomously. "The autonomy of the will, is the unique principle of all moral laws and of all their corresponding duties all heteronomy in matters of the will... is opposed... to the morality

of the will.” (quoted in *Moral Education* 109) Kant argued that for a purely rational being, moral laws lose their obligatory nature because the individual would understand the causality of moral action. For anything less than this ideal, moral law must maintain its coercive manner. But ‘coercive’ is not quite the right word. We only sense the tension between submitting to social obligations and our individual will because we are neither automata nor autonomous. “Thus, the contradiction is resolved in terms of the dualism of our nature: autonomy is the product of reasoned will, heteronomy the product of the senses.” (*Moral Education* 109) Moral laws are only obligatory when they oppose the passions, else we comply of our free will. Kant’s genius was explaining the role of religion, the embodiment of the collective conscious, in helping reason. Durkheim goes further than Kant, however, by insisting that only ‘reasoned will’ and not complete autonomy is necessary, and not sufficient, for morality.

Moral theory is fraught with dichotomies: “the contradiction between the good and the obligatory, between the individual and group, between the limitation imposed by the role and the self-willed unfolding of human nature.” (*Moral Education* 111)

Durkheim’s conceptual framework eliminates these dichotomies by relegating each of them to its proper role. For example, there is no dichotomy between the content of education and its process, because you cannot have one without the other. As Bantock put it: “if mind determines what is taught, what is taught also determines mind. In their haste to demolish metaphysics and superstition, some eighteenth-century philosophers had tended to forget this.” (18) Choosing an extreme is not necessary, nor is flaccidly saying that both are correct. We must devise a coherent framework that can encompass the truth

of both extremes. Can we say that morality is compulsory because it commands our action, yet unless we yield to it of our free will it is immoral, and not be inconsistent? Yes, if we understand that people are not sufficiently rational to maintain a civil society without commandments, yet not sufficiently irrational to yield without reasons. This 'solution' is highly abstract and dialectic in nature, and thus does not give us any guidance in making moral choices. It does, however, help us to understand the source of our problems so that we can create social institutions that facilitate finding the right moral answers.

Fundamental to the Enlightenment ideal is that society is progressing towards increased reason and increased autonomy. Increasing reason helps us to gain more than moral autonomy. It allows us to develop technologies, corporeal and incorporeal, that help us to gain control of our physical environment. This, in turn, allows us increasing moral autonomy by allowing greater opportunity to reflect. As we increase our moral, physical, and intellectual autonomy, we increasingly see the patterns that allow life and civilisation to prosper.

What prompts the faithful to see that the world is good in principle because it is the work of a good being, we can establish a posteriori to the extent that science permits us to establish rationally what faith postulates a priori... Conforming to the order of things because one is sure that it is everything it ought to be is not submitting to a constraint. (*Moral Education* 115)

One has to wonder, however, if Durkheim's faith that the world is how it 'ought to be' is possibly misguided. His belief in the Enlightenment ideals of natural, unstoppable progress does seem, for lack of a better phrase, a leap of faith.

This leap of faith is necessary, Durkheim tells us, because we are not sufficiently rational to understand our moral life any better. Schools must inculcate this willingness to

accept the central tenet in order for the students to be able to behave rationally later.

“When... we blindly carry out an order of whose meaning and import we are ignorant, but nonetheless *understand why* we should lend ourselves to the role of blind instrument, we are as free as when we alone have all the initiative in our behaviour ” (*Moral Education* 118) We cannot claim, at this stage of our aggregate intellectual development, any more autonomy than this. But by progressively understanding more and more of what controls us we slowly gain autonomy. Autonomy, thus understood, is the third element of morality

The increasing complexity of society is encouraged by our increasing understanding, and our increasing understanding in turn increases the complexity of our society. In simpler societies, an act was sufficient for morality. Now we also require that the person intend his action for it to have moral character. Schools must now teach not simply what constitutes moral action but also why these actions are moral, what purpose they serve. “For to teach morality is neither to preach nor to indoctrinate, it is to explain ” (*Moral Education* 120) This is the distinguishing facet of a secular moral education. But to be able to teach morality in this way requires that we understand and can articulate the reasons for our moral actions. Devising these explanations was the purpose of Durkheim’s sociology, his science of morality. One fear of a secular moral society is that by relying on explanations rather than commandments, society loses its authority, destroying discipline. Durkheim argued that this is not necessarily true because people will recognise the authority of rational arguments.

It would seem, however, that if our society has declining discipline it is because the rate of secularisation has outpaced the rate of development and articulation of rational explanations of the necessity and function of morality. If our society has endemic anomie it is quite possibly because our collective representations portray an ideal of individual autonomy that is unattainable for all but a very few. These romantic ideals of individualism, coming from various sources, have led us, much like the *philosophes* and the Utilitarians, to see any infringement of our personal freedom as a personal affront. Remembering Durkheim's "Individualism and the Intellectuals," the proper form of individualism upholds the rights of the individual in the abstract and does not seek to place individual rights above collective rights because the collective is composed of other individuals.

Pedagogic Recommendations

We now have a good grasp on Durkheim's conceptual framework for moral education. His recommendations for curriculum and instruction support this framework. The recommendations parallel the analysis of moral education, looking at punishment and reward as a means of attaining discipline, classroom practices for attaining social attachment, and the curriculum for attaining autonomy. Durkheim did not expect, say, the curriculum to cover all facets of moral education. School must be a 'total environment', with the curriculum and method being internally and mutually coherent.

Durkheim began by refuting the assumption common in his day that children are without any form of natural restraint and that all socialisation must come from without and must be taught. While he agreed that children are not social creatures from day one, they

do have natural tendencies toward social action, especially in mimicry and love of pattern. Modern societies need citizens to be able to co-operate. This requires that they conform to the myriad social regulations that make advanced societies possible. If there was nothing in children's makeup disposing them to regulation, it is impossible to see how society would have started, let alone how the educator or parent would start to introduce the child to social rules and norms. So we must rely on the child's predisposition to habit and their openness to suggestions. I feel comfortable ignoring the "data" that Durkheim draws upon to demonstrate these points, including the idea that children are in a natural hypnotic state. The idea that children are physiologically predisposed to learn is generally accepted today through the work of evolutionary biology, psychology, and developmental linguistics. Building upon these natural foundations is the basis of the students' early education.

Durkheim emphasised the necessity of accustoming the child at an early age to self-control and moderation; "we can make him feel that he should not yield without reservation to his inclinations, but that there is always a limit beyond which he ought not to go" (*Moral Education* 142). The child should be aware that the moral forces that he is yielding to are unlike physical forces that are beyond his control. These moral constraints are open to him to circumvent but he would be unwise to do so. In this way the child learns to take responsibility for his actions and be aware of the nature of his actions. He develops an 'inner state' that tells him which actions are correct. It is through obeying a person who has moral authority, usually a parent or teacher, that the child learns to want to imitate the authority to gain authority themselves. This is why, unlike Rousseau's tutor,

it is best to expose the child to a variety of authority figures to give the child a variety of examples. No single person can represent the authority of society without also transmitting his or her vices. Only through a well-chosen combination of people can the child learn the best that their civilisation has to offer. It is also important to have a variety of authorities so that the child will not simply learn allegiance to a single person but to society itself. Through properly developing the child's habits with well-placed suggestions we can begin the process of moral development. We can also see why Wallwork views Durkheim as not simply an important theoretical perspective for Piaget and Kohlberg, but also as providing a prototype stage-theory of psychological and moral development.

The family must provide the foundation for establishing discipline and self-control. But the limits of the family require an external mechanism, the school, for preparing the child for social life. Schools provide the first opportunity to learn to respect rules, to complete assignments, and to do well. The child learns responsibility and obligation. But the process should not degenerate into "a tyranny of complicated rules" (*Moral Education* 148). This serves only to try to induce the child into a bland uniformity by trying to enforce peace in the classroom. When it works the students emerge without personality, when it does not they emerge without respect for rules. Durkheim sees the class as a small society that must have its own morality that corresponds to its size, character, and function. It is not as rigid as the morality of the workplace or society in general, but also not as forgiving as the family.

The morality of the classroom must take into account the first function of the classroom, learning and teaching. Egoism in the children cannot be allowed because this

interferes with lessons, both intellectual and moral. If the classroom is to encourage discipline, class rules and discipline must not be arbitrary and must take into account the various elements of the small society that is the class. The teacher derives his authority from the society that puts him in charge of a given class. To allow a loss of discipline is to reflect badly on society and to allow the impression that the children are not bound by social rules. The discipline of the classroom also applies to the teacher. He cannot allow arrogance, vanity, or pedantry to enter into his relations with the students because this undermines his authority. The authority he uses must be seen as emanating from society and the rules of the class must be seen as emerging from this context and not from the whims of the particular teachers. One has to wonder, however, if this is true for all grades, or if the teacher's personality should be obvious in later grades as an example for the students. It is impossible to imagine older students seeing their teacher as the embodiment of society rather than a person. In requiring so much from the teacher, Durkheim opens himself up to the same criticism as Dewey: they both expect the average teacher to be at least as competent as themselves. That their theories would have to be implemented by lesser mortals may make them untenable.

As we saw in *Division of Labour*, sanctions are at the heart of social regulations. There are two types of sanctions used in schools: punishments and rewards. The purpose of punishment in school is to let the child know that he has transgressed some rule of the classroom. But Durkheim had no use for teachers who use excessive exuberance in punishing students. He saw this as a transgression of the moral authority entrusted to the teacher. Further, Durkheim wanted to eschew all forms of punishment that might harm

the student. Rather, punishment should arise naturally from the transgression to teach the child the causality of the action. Similarly, Durkheim saw assigning meaningless work as harmful because it simply antagonises the student to the work. "Denying participation in games, [meaningful] extra tasks, as well as reproaches and reprimands are the chief elements of school punishment" (*Moral Education* 198). Punishment should be on a finely graduated scale, starting from the most lenient and increasing with the gravity of the transgression. But the teacher should be very careful in using punishment because once it has been used it loses its effectiveness in the future. Effective punishment expresses blame for introducing the profane into the sacred.

Rewards, on the other hand, are used to praise actions well done. Durkheim sees little use in them, and potential harm in them when overused. Whereas punishment is part of the moral instruction of the classroom, rewards are part of the intellectual instruction, and to confuse them is dangerous. In part, Durkheim's distaste for rewards in schools developed from the educational system he went through which, drawing from the Jesuits, was highly competitive and used rewards all the time. The danger of using rewards in moral education is to identify correct behaviour with material reward or esteem, rather than having moral action emanating from internal forces. Thus, through maintaining proper class discipline, with proper decorum, and a minimum of punishment and rewards, Durkheim felt that it is quite possible to teach children the first element of moral life, discipline.

The second element of moral life, attachment to social groups, is also facilitated greatly by the schools. Durkheim's main concern is attaching the child to his country.

“providing that the country is conceived not as a narrowly selfish and aggressive personality but as one of the agencies through which the idea of humanity is realised ”
 (*Moral Education* 207) The schools are not simply an ‘ideological state apparatus’ in the negative sense that Althusser may have portrayed it They are a vehicle for the fullest possible development of the individual, which requires being thoroughly versed in the morality of one’s society

How does the school work to attach its students to society? “The source of this part of moral life is of course in our faculty of empathy.” (*Moral Education* 207) That is, the students must learn altruism and disinterestedness as part of their preparation to become full citizens Some would question whether the child has any altruism whatsoever, or even, as some economic theorists assert, if altruism is possible. But Durkheim felt, much as he did in the case of discipline, that the child is predisposed to empathy He defined altruism, the opposite of egoism, as those tendencies “aiming to secure the pleasure of a human being other than the agent ” (*Moral Education* 208) We normally think of egoism as the natural state of people and altruism as a later development in human and social evolution Since children are much like primitive people, they start off as entirely egoistic Seemingly, according to this view, education must create altruistic feelings *ex nihilo* This is to mistake the child’s egoism as wilful when it is simply due to a lack of competence Durkheim rejects the notion that altruistic feelings are necessarily just concerned with pleasing others Often what we do for ourselves has derivative benefits for other people We can only understand something outside ourselves by representing it to ourselves, by attaching it to some part of ourselves that we recognise. For example, we

grieve the death of someone dear to us not for their loss but for our loss of that part of our life "[B]eing attached to them, it is to a part of ourselves that we are attached. Thus, we have egoism embedded in altruism, conversely, there is altruism in egoism" (*Moral Education* 215) Hence, we are confused by naive ideologies that see altruism and egoism as diametrically opposed

One major difference between primitive societies and advanced societies is the range of people from which a person composes himself in primitive societies it is basically just the familial group; in advanced societies one draws upon a much greater range. If we were to take away all the parts of ourselves that are not social, Durkheim argues, there would be little, if anything, left. So those who do not believe altruism is possible misunderstand it, "egoism and altruism are two abstractions that do not exist in a pure state" (*Moral Education* 217) The difference is a matter of degree, if the objective of an action is more inwardly directed, we call it egoistic, if more outwardly directed, we call it altruistic. We can see, then, that children are not purely egoistic. They have simply not assimilated enough of the collective consciousness for his action to often appear altruistic

This, then, is how we begin to teach the child empathy. The proclivity for habit and suggestion Durkheim spoke of when discussing discipline can be used equally well here. If the child loses an object or person they have become habituated to, they become quite upset. Similarly, children are very aware of their emotional environment, grieving when others grieve, happy when others are happy. If a child appears cruel or uncaring it is only because their conceptual understanding is not yet adequate to grasp the full meaning

of their actions. "The circle of personal interests in the child is very restricted. It does not extend beyond what feeds and entertains it. The egoism of the adult is infinitely more complex." (*Moral Education* 228) First the family, then the school, must gradually extend the child's interests beyond his organic needs. The child must begin to interact with an increasing circle of people to whom he is emotionally attached. This is less an intellectual lesson, delineating the various relationships and mechanisms of relationships, than a participative exercise. The child must actively engage with his milieu; "by linking, through repetition, these ideas and feelings, so that the former are constantly called to mind so that he will resist any diminution or weakening of them. . . such is the general method we must follow to commit the child to the collective goals he must pursue." (*Moral Education* 230) The schools facilitate this process in two ways: the school environment and what is taught.

These suggestions for social attachment and discipline centre around how the class is conducted rather than what is taught -- methodology rather than curriculum. Morality is also centred in our intelligence. Thus, the teaching of intellectual subjects necessarily augments moral education. As we have seen, Durkheim divided the possible subjects of human thought into two categories: "human phenomena and natural phenomena, the world of the mind and the world of physical things." (*Evolution* 321) The question, broadly speaking, is how we are to teach pupils these two basic categories of things. First we will look at his recommendations for teaching the humanities, then we will look at the sciences. We will see that they are not mutually exclusive, but augment one another.

Durkheim argued that we do not need to design humanities education from scratch. The humanist tradition was almost untouched in Durkheim's day and had served to teach students about the general idea of man for many centuries. Durkheim starts his analysis by questioning how well this curriculum accomplished this, why it no longer serves the needs of society, and what needs to be changed. He pointed to two fundamental principles in Humanism: human nature is universal and eternal, and people need to be initiated into a common Christian culture through Latin literature. When Durkheim was writing, these ideas had been under attack for well over a century and a half because it was obvious that an education entirely centred around human thought, especially millennia old Latin thought, was no longer sufficient to manage an increasingly complex society.

Durkheim felt that the fundamental substance of people, which affects the way they perceive the world and the way they conduct themselves, is in a constant state of flux and varies from place to place. History and anthropology show that there are as many different moral systems as there have been societies. The diversity of these systems is simply the diverse contexts in which people live collectively, each system having its origin and development. For example, if the present 'cult of the individual' was placed in Greek or Roman civilisation, those civilisations would collapse. Each of these moral systems is represented in the symbolic system of religion, each religion developing and changing to suit the needs of its society. Durkheim insists that his society needed the symbolic form of understanding that is science. Thus, the Humanist desire to teach children about human nature in general, while it might have been appropriate during its time, was fundamentally

misguided. Indeed, the Humanist tradition used a synthesis of three ideals—Greek, Roman and Christian, three fundamentally different ideologies. Any similarities were the result of common history, not essential similarity.

Still, we need to teach students about people. To do this Durkheim proposed that they learn about cultures other than their own. He felt the students would learn about themselves by looking at primitive cultures. “In the myths, legends and skills of even the most primitive peoples there are involved highly complex mental processes, which sometimes shed more light on the mechanism of the human mind than the more self-conscious intellectual operations on which the positive science is based.” (*Evolution* 328)

It is only through this kind of study that any generalised conception of human nature is possible. Thus, cultural anthropology, though he does not use the phrase, finds a significant place in Durkheim's education.

History teaches many of the same lessons. Only by seeing the ebb and flow of civilisations can the students learn to be neither neophobic, fearing all change because they think that theirs is the only possible order, nor neophilic, grasping and extolling all that is new. Through history the student gains perspective. “[H]uman nature as it manifests itself in history is above all something which we can and should credit with amazing flexibility and fecundity. . . . What history teaches us is that man [in the general sense] does not change arbitrarily, he does not transform himself at will on hearing the voices of inspired prophets.” (*Evolution* 329)

As we have seen, Durkheim's study of history had shown him that all social change is inevitably hard and laborious. Any lasting changes only arise from the changing needs of society, the “product of changes within the whole

network of diverse causal relationships which determine the situation of man " (*Evolution* 330) Approaching humanity through history and cultural anthropology brings not only an abstract idea of human nature, but a richly contextual understanding of oneself and one's society by seeing where it came from and what else it could be

"To become attached to society, the child must feel in it something that is real, alive, and powerful, which dominates the person and to which he also owes the best of himself." (*Moral Education* 275) He is not interested in the history of so-called great men, but rather the history of nations, particularly the students' nation history This view of history will show the student not only the complex interrelationships of their contemporaries, but also how one generation led to the next and the progress of history For Durkheim, this is important in undermining revolutionary ideas by showing their ineffectiveness in leading to any sort of fundamental change Studying history also inoculates students against current ideas and fashions that have yet to prove themselves All of this serves to make the history of the nation a part of the student "[Society] is a complex of ideas and sentiments, of ways of seeing and of feeling, a certain intellectual and moral framework distinctive of the entire group. Society is above all a consciousness of the whole It is, therefore, this collective consciousness that we must instil in the child." (*Moral Education* 277) To use history to this end, it is important that history not be merely ornamental but rather that it be used to understand contemporary society

Unfortunately, Durkheim does a volte face if the student is to study a civilisation other than his own he should study Greece and Italy. Granted, Durkheim is not suggesting that they should be studied in the way the Humanists studied them, but rather

from a historical and cultural perspective. Since he includes learning the literature in learning the history of a civilisation, he is almost back where he started. Turning back to again grasp Greco-Latin culture probably indicates just how tied up in this tradition he was. Indeed, I suppose, this conservative perspective is consistent with Durkheim. He has essentially shown us why the system of the Jesuits is suitable, with minor changes to provide a more complex view of man. Yet, preferring to be seen in the tradition of the humanists, he says “[l]et us, therefore continue the work of the humanists, but by transforming it and infusing it with new ideas” (Durkheim, *Evolution* 381). It is difficult to not see this turn as a cop-out.

Aesthetics are also useful curricula in schools for teaching moral ideas. But, like science, we cannot take arts education -- both the *beaux arts* and literature -- at face value. This is because the arts are expressions of ideals. In neither fine arts nor literature is the idea to slavishly copy nature, but rather to produce aesthetically pleasing pieces; a process that requires discipline. This is useful because “[o]ne cannot be attached to an ideal, whatever it may be, without being connected at the same time with something other than one’s self” (Durkheim, *Moral Education* 268). This avenue into something other than the self is the one Durkheim wished to use.

The artist’s mental processes, or, for that matter, those of a person experiencing aesthetic pleasure, are in their internal make-up identical at every point to the process that leads to great acts of devotion and sacrifice. The man who gives himself wholly to the beauty that he contemplates is at one with it, as the man who gives himself to a group of which he is a part, wholly identifying himself with it, is at one with that group. When we awaken a taste for the beautiful, we open the avenues of the mind to disinterestedness and sacrifice. (Durkheim, *Moral Education* 269)

It is this habit of transcending the self that Durkheim sees as the root of moral life

Ripping the person from self-centredness and from narrow conceptions of reality, is the purpose of aesthetic training

However, there is a flip side of aesthetics that is antithetical to moral life. When art is not of reality and is wholly fantastical, it works against social life. Or, alternately, when the illusion of the art is too perfect, self contained, such that the artist or viewer is enticed to forget the reality beyond the art, then it is destructive. "The impact of a wholly artistic education is all too often to induce some men to elaborate ideas and ideals, which they contemplate with affection and indolence, instead of energetically participating in the common life" (Durkheim, *Moral Education* 272) So again, as with much in Durkheim's writing, it is a matter of degrees. Aesthetic education is a useful means of drawing the student out from themselves. But if it is used in excess it serves only to remove people from reality and society -- it draws people away from their duty. The play of art is useful for leisure and extension of self, but should not be used in excess. It is of secondary importance in moral education

This brings us to the means of teaching students about the physical universe

A subject-matter which limits itself to providing us with knowledge which will give us greater control over the world of things may well b[e] of use in enabling us to increase our material prosperity; but it can in no way affect our interior life. The Christian concept of education is far from being without justification. If the symbolic language in which it has enveloped itself is no longer acceptable as scientific truth, underlying these symbols there is nevertheless a profound truth we ought not to abandon. (*Evolution* 336)

That is, Christian dogma aside, there is truth to the idea that there is a fundamental unity and underlying principle of existence. Durkheim may be a cultural relativist but he is not

an empirical relativist. It is empirically true, he tells us, that human consciousness is central to ourselves and that education needs, first and foremost, to teach us about our common humanity. While Durkheim disagrees with the humanists about a universal human character, he wants to teach about a common humanity: it is difficult to understand if he is being conservative or inconsistent.

Rather than imparting reductionist principles, the role of science teaching is to help the students understand the enormous complexity of reality. Any generalisations must be understood as provisional. Without training in the sciences we tend to over-simplify reality. "This state of mind is characterised by the fundamental tendency to consider as real in this world only that which is perfectly simple and so poor and denuded in qualities and properties that reason can grasp it at a glance and conceive of it in a luminous representation, analogous to that which we have in grasping mathematical matters." (*Moral Education* 250)

Understanding complexity is the basis of his sociology. Society cannot be understood as the simple sum of its individual constituents any more than biology can be understood as the simple sum of atoms or molecules. To develop and inculcate the science of morality we need to understand that society cannot, for example, be reduced to a mere amalgam of economic transitions. "Only such a reality can draw us out of ourselves and so perform the function of providing a moral goal." (Durkheim, *Moral Education* 251) He also blamed the French (and supposedly the English) language for being excessively analytic, making connections too easily, and obscuring what we do not know. This is apparent in the Western narrative tradition in which heroes are archetypal

and everything is clear to them -- he sites Goethe's *Faust* and Shakespeare's *Hamlet* as examples. This is even worse in the North American tradition of cowboys in black or white hats. He is not arguing that everything is irreducibly irrational. He is simply calling for a more reasonable understanding of the limits of reason.

The folly of reductionism is why Durkheim opposed revolutionary social thought. He denied the likelihood that one can impose a 'rationally created' social order on society and have the changes remain permanent. It is impossible to fully comprehend social organisation in its entirety, a task required if one is to change society all at once. Else, those facets of society that were ignored, underestimated, or not seen will undoubtedly wreck the best laid plans.

The biological sciences are ideal for teaching about complex interrelationships. "To forestall simplistic thinking, it is therefore necessary first to give the child a defence against these constructions and deductions. The child must be brought to see how science is studied, how the labour, time, and trouble that study entails contrasts with such deductive improvisations" (Durkheim, *Moral Education* 262). Simple recitation of, say, the principles of physics and the correct equations will only encourage the student to think that all really can likewise be educed. Rather, the students need to work through the problems, coming across answers only "after long and patient experiments, groping, and failures of all sorts" (Durkheim, *Moral Education* 262). Further, the students must understand the provisional nature of scientific knowledge and the process of legitimisation. Showing the child all the incorrect "scientific" conclusions that have been arrived at by reasoning alone should dull their taste for gross generalisation. Taught in this way,

Durkheim argued that science, rather than being the root of moral decay, is a rich source of moral teaching by teaching ideas and mental habits that help to sustain social life.

Thus, science education needs to be humanised, to augment the humanistic education. What is essential is to teach the child about physical reality. Without this understanding of the causal nature of existence, it is easy, and possibly inevitable, to believe in determinism -- that one's fate is beyond control. Conversely, an excessively scientific education that does not relate nature to humanity leads one to believe that nature is entirely controllable. Durkheim believed in neither complete freedom nor absolute determinism. With scientific thinking comes a certain disposition to conventions. One is neither entirely willing to believe them without reason nor is one willing to do away with them entirely. Understanding that science is a co-operative activity that both questions and relies upon presuppositions prevents one from taking either extreme view. Learning science also requires meta-cognition; "[the student] must ... explain the method, the mental operations, the logical mechanisms of which the results are the product."

(Evolution 341)

This view of education, in which science augments humanities education, tends to break down the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy. That is, understanding the interrelations between the physical, social, and psychic world makes it almost impossible to view consciousness, morality, and physical reality as separate. But the relationship is not one way only. The preparation involved for learning about people is largely identical to the preparation for learning about things. Learning the meaning of a logical statement, mastering one's thinking, being able to articulate a clear and coherent thought, are all

requisite for science. Approached from this way, the differentiation of science and humanities becomes meaningless. Science relies entirely on the ability to form grammatically sensible ideas -- ensuring that the signifier clearly identifies the signified, the importance of modifiers and relational statements, and so forth -- that the Jesuitical education did so superbly. Conversely, science provides meaningful content for otherwise often empty formalism.¹⁹

What better way to learn all the intricacies of one's language than through the study of another. Another modern language, at least the Modern Languages, would not do because they are too similar to one another. Not surprisingly, Durkheim tells us that Greek and Latin are the best. The object of the exercise is to give the children ample opportunity to dissect and reconstruct their thinking. Various forms of translation and other exercises serve this purpose well. "And as the habit of lucid thought is a prerequisite for the study of the sciences it is clear that a training in style is no less essential for scientific education than for so-called 'literary' education" (*Evolution* 347)

We see now that indeed all facets of human knowledge are essential in education and in this way it should be encyclopaedic. But it is the form that this constellation takes that is important, not as Rabelais wished with a formless conglomeration of all which is known. "But what is possible is to acquaint their minds with all the diverse intellectual

¹⁹ Viewed in another way, Durkheim is arguing against the idealist-materialist dichotomy. Thus, later theorists, both Left and Right, who try to interpret Durkheim into this theoretical framework miss the point. To try to argue that Durkheim is either a failed materialist or a failed idealist is to place him into a framework he rejected. It is like trying to argue that Einstein is a failed Newtonian. Durkheim was trying to articulate a social theory that went beyond this dichotomy -- arguing for the utility of transcendent myths and the teleological implications of developing social technologies. While it is useful to try to interpret Durkheim's theory into another framework, his theories must ultimately be discussed on their own terms.

attitudes with which they will be equipped when one day they come to confront the different categories of things.” (*Evolution* 348)

At the heart of Durkheim’s analysis and synthesis we see the heart of the writer. Profoundly conservative yet equally concerned about humanity, wanting to change it for the better. After an elaborate deconstruction of education he elegantly reconstructs a picture of the practice of education not entirely dissimilar to that of his day. A little more science and fewer rote exercises, maybe a little changing of timelines. His analysis reveals a new understanding of the already existing rationale for why the education system is the way it is and why it needs a little updating. In one way, this was profoundly *kind* to those future teachers he taught. Rather than sending them out with the intellectual and moral burden of having to change the system, he sent them out understanding the system and enabling them to make better informed choices should changes be needed.

Seen in another way, however, Durkheim was being disingenuous. While his evidence does support the specific curricular suggestions he made, the same evidence could equally support a very different curriculum. It would seem that it was Durkheim’s distaste for revolution that prompted him to make the recommendations he did. Unfortunately, he did not do a good job at convincing us that revolutions are ineffective. Indeed, his history of education was peppered with revolutions and revolutionaries. However, Alexander argues that *Evolution* “demonstrate[s] that an emphasis on conflict and change is in no way incompatible with an emphasis on normative order.” (*Rethinking Durkheim* 505) That is, Durkheim looked at the dialectical tension inherent in normative

order. So, while he might have had very good reasons for these specific curricular recommendations, such as the contemporary political situation, his evidence does not support them as well as he would lead us to believe.

Critique

We see now why Durkheim's theory of moral education was so influential with later seminal writers such as Piaget and Kohlberg. As Piaget wrote,

we cannot enter upon a discussion of a work so sincere, so lofty in inspiration as that which we have just summarised without a feeling of profound respect for the memory of its author. But such is the seriousness of the question at stake, that we must not hesitate to examine these theories of Durkheim's in detail and in a spirit of complete freedom. The greatest tribute we can play to his vigorous scientific spirit is to forget for a moment his immense authority. (360)

We can also see why his influence has decreased in recent years. Durkheim's single-mindedness about looking at moral education from an entirely sociological perspective is a prime indication of what Wrong called the "oversocialised conception of man in modern society."

Durkheim's theory of education developed from his definition of education as an entirely social fact. By discarding even the possibility of looking at moral education in any other way, Durkheim may have doomed himself to eventual oblivion. This would be an unfortunate loss for educational theory as his theories are potentially very important. It is difficult, if not impossible, to try to extract from Durkheim's writing those elements which are atemporal wisdom from those elements that are reactions to contemporary politics. To make use of these theories, we first need to understand them in their own right, and

then understand them in a contemporary context. An important part of making them amenable to contemporary educational theory is to compare them with psychological theories. I begin this task in the next chapter by comparing Durkheim's theories with psychogenetic theories of autonomy. Before we can do that, however, we need to better understand the shortcomings of Durkheim's theories.

Piaget chides Durkheim for recommending a "traditional model and rely[ing] on methods that are fundamentally those of authority" (341) when it is likely only that progressive forms of education will produce a rational authority. Where Durkheim saw all constraint as the same, Piaget saw internal obligation and external coercion as separate. For Durkheim, the internal obligation is simply a reflection of the external collective conscience. Even where the individual has so-called autonomy, that autonomy is limited to rational consideration of external factors. Piaget understood the situation as being much more complex. The advance Piaget made over the behavioural psychologists was the introduction of stages of cognitive development. Simply, the individual's cognitive processes cannot be reduced to a simple reaction to external stimuli. While Freud's psychoanalysis also had a stage theory and went beyond cause/action theories, it placed too much emphasis on the unconscious and failed to define operationally useful mechanisms. Piaget provided a means, if relatively primitive, of understanding cognitive processes. Piaget was willing to concede that "society is always the same, and the differences between co-operation [internal causes] and obligation [external causes] are more a matter of degree than quality" (343), however, in practice, one is not entirely reducible to the other. So, while Piaget agreed with Durkheim that morality is social, he is

not willing to concede that normative autonomy is social, and hence an entirely moral characteristic. Durkheim's attempt to conflate autonomy with morality robs autonomy of meaning.

While Piaget chides Durkheim for not realizing that progressive pedagogic methods are the only means of developing a rational morality in children, Bantock was equally scornful of progressive educators. While Bantock agreed that "the development of autonomy is seen as an essential feature of any sophisticated morality," (31) he felt that progressives like Piaget missed the point of developments in cognitive psychology. Children below a certain threshold are incapable of handling moral concepts in a meaningful way. Education must be authoritative to enable children to gain the cognitive sophistication to be able to develop the skills, knowledge, and dispositions required for autonomy. The incredible proliferation of knowledge in recent history makes Erasmus' requirement that teachers (or at least the Ministry of Education that makes the curriculum guidelines) be broadly knowledgeable, so that they can distil it for students, even more profound.

Also of concern is Durkheim's difficulty articulating the mechanisms of social change in a moral society. Durkheim's ideal is a moral person who is at once disciplined, attached to his various social groups, and autonomous, but the person's autonomy is circumscribed by the necessity of remaining under the authority of society. What, then, does a person do if he disagrees with, say, a rule that he feels is no longer appropriate or contradicts other mores? Wallwork interprets Durkheim's answer to this problem as "individuals accept[ing] only those rules emanating from respected persons, but this simply

pushes the problem a step further: How is it possible to reject commandments emanating from respected authorities unless individuals have an innate or developed ability to decide among the standards perpetrated around them?" (*Durkheim: Morality and Milieu* 147)

Thus, Wallwork claims that it is necessary for individuals to reflect on social mores, something he claims Durkheim's theory ignores. "Individualism and the Intellectuals" shows that Wallwork is wrong. Durkheim's definition of autonomy recognises this necessity for reflection. What is unclear, however, is what an individual is to do when he disagrees with a social more. The problem is that we are not entirely rational, autonomous people. If we were, and had a disagreement, we would be able to rationally find a solution. Since we are neither entirely rational nor entirely irrational, there is tension. We need ideologies and we need means of disputing and changing these ideologies. Durkheim's social theory, especially his educational theory, tried to overcome, or at least explain, this tension, but Durkheim's concern about *fin de siècle* anomie prevented him from being entirely successful.

Durkheim's articulation of autonomy is fraught with difficulties -- apparent if not real. His autonomy is a means of rational consent. "Personal autonomy was not a matter of individual differences [in Durkheim's later theory] but was 'superimposed' on individuals from outside" (Seigel, J. 485). A person is autonomous when he is able to rationally understand the mores of his society. This presupposes that social mores are, in fact, rational. What if they are not? What is the rational person to do then? "For example, [Durkheim's theory] implies that the authority, the norms and rules and principles that defined, for instance, the Nazi moral system must be considered as

legitimate as any others that have served to sustain the social fabric of a collectivity.”

(Prakash 344) This possibility was repugnant to Durkheim, but his entirely social focus led him to ignore other facets of autonomous life that are amoral but equally valuable

While Durkheim explicitly rejected the necessity of an individual conforming to the rule of a despotic state, it is unclear how the moral individual is to proceed

The similarity of Durkheim's social theory to Alfredo Rocca's defence of fascism is significant

Our concept of liberty is that the individual must be allowed to develop his personality on behalf of the state, for the ephemeral and infinitesimal elements of the complex and permanent life of society determine by their normal growth the development of the state. Freedom therefore is due to the citizen and classes on condition that they exercise it in the interest of society as a whole (Rocca quoted in Callan 11)

While Durkheim's "Individuals and the Intellectuals" is an elegant and provocative defence of individualism, it is one-sided. Durkheim's defence of individuation is based on his assertion, *a priori*, that individuation is for the betterment of society. His argument boils down to: the liberal intellectuals are morally superior to the monarchists and royalists because liberalism is progressive. While Durkheim clearly believes in the idea of social evolution, he is attached to Spencer's teleological variety, in the tradition of Kant and Hegel, that sees a continuous movement toward greater actualisation of the ideal form of humanity. Durkheim was unable to develop a social theory that allowed him to incorporate Darwinian evolutionary models, which are compatible with his cultural relativism, that recognise the benefit of social diversity. Durkheim was too much a man of the Enlightenment to be able to accept the possibility that contemporary French culture was not the pinnacle of social evolution and a natural step toward an ideal society.

Other facets of autonomous life, such as Erikson's focus on "wilful exploration, spontaneous initiative, competent mastery, and creative self-actualisation" (Wallwork, *Durkheim: Morality and Milieu* 148) were all but forgotten. Durkheim felt that certain types of arts are inherently immoral because they are not of reality. Art is a means of understanding reality and advances in artistic expression indicate, cause, and reinforce changes in society. Similarly, the engineer or scientist who explores new ideas is going beyond accepted reality. Durkheim's theory makes all of these people criminals for going beyond the accepted collective consciousness and the sacred. In *Division of Labour and Evolution*, in different ways, Durkheim recognised the importance of criminal activity in social change, often social change for the better. But, while recognising this, his theory leads to social quietude. Another way to express this is to say that Durkheim needed to address Nietzsche's claim of the importance of the Dionysian element of creativity in society. While Durkheim recognised that advanced societies require individuation he did not allow for individual difference. This may be because he assumed that individual difference would develop without problem, but this is not clear in his writing.

While he recognised the necessity of division of manual and intellectual labour, he didn't as readily recognise the importance of division of moral labour. As I have pointed out, this is in no small part due to his milieu, but we must recognise the necessity of encouraging a reasonable diversity of moral perspectives -- pluralism. Our global society is too diverse to impose a singular morality as we saw in mechanical solidarities. We must allow groups and individuals to find their own morality, accepting that people will choose to live in different ways. We must allow people to live in different way and rationally

argue for the benefit of their way, so long as they do not harm other people, because we cannot say which modes of life will be needed as society evolves

We also need to question Durkheim's assertion that we can rely on an entirely secular education. While it is obvious that Durkheim was correct in interpreting the social trend toward greater secular society, we need to look at the recent backlash from fundamentalist religious groups throughout the world. Durkheim's interpretation would say that these groups are simply retaining an unhealthy social attribute. Looked at from another perspective, however, we might see that these people are entirely uncomfortable in a secular world, and we need to understand why. It seems clear to me that fundamentalists are uncomfortable with secular society because it does not explain for them their place in the world. The truth is that we do not yet, and possibly might never, understand society in an entirely rational way. Durkheim's 'civic religion' requires us to be able to explain our reasons; only a very small portion of the global population is able to do that in an entirely secular way. Indeed, it is quite likely that even they rely on religious and other dogma to make it through the day. Durkheim was also certain that nationalism was integral to social integration. Today, as nationalism changes to internationalism, with international trade organisations making social control even more remote from the masses, there is an ever increasing sense of lost control. So, while I do not necessarily disagree with Durkheim's interpretations of the historical trend, I do believe that we do need to at least question the pace we have been trying to enforce a secular society with centralised government. As we have seen in North America, religious groups are becoming increasingly powerful and right-wing paramilitary organisations are stockpiling provisions

for Armageddon. We need to fear a backlash that will put us further back on the road to greater individuation.

We also need to at least be open to the other possibility that the fundamental assumption that we are on the road to necessarily greater individuation may be false (or at least unhealthy). Perhaps the modern era was only a blip, not an indication of a general trend. "Durkheim is less than convincing when he predicts, on evolutionary grounds, that traditional religions are destined to be replaced by the new cult of man because they conflict with the modern scientific *Weltanschauung*" (Wallwork, *Durkheim, Morality and Milieu* 149). We see that Durkheim's recommendations go beyond his evidence, leading him to internally contradictory statements: "[Autonomy] is the principal differentiating characteristic of a secular morality since, logically, it can have no place in a religious morality. If morality comes from God and expresses His nature, it must at the same time be beyond the grasp of our reason" (*Moral Education* 121). So, while Durkheim recognises the necessity of ideology and used it to justify his social theory, he still pushed for an entirely secular education and rejected the necessity of normative foundations.

Durkheim's assertion of moral relativism between societies is at odds with his teleological assertion that societies are naturally progressing toward greater rationality.

As a champion of humanism, personal liberties, equality and rationality, Durkheim speaks in a voice which rings with the overtones of Kantian Ethics. It seems to suggest that there are universal moral principles which all social groups ought to accept in the interest of rational morality. Yet, for all the philosophical merits of such a stance, it raises too many embarrassing questions for the sociologist who seeks to explain morality completely as a social fact (Prakash 345).

It is unclear to me, however, whether this internal contradiction is damning or if it is workable. For example, looking at Durkheim's theories in an entirely normative manner,

as Prakash does, one is led to believe that Durkheim's theories are unsalvageable. But Pekarsky encourages us to look at Durkheim's theories from a functional perspective. Would Durkheim's system of moral education be workable, for example, with a Whiteheadian curriculum that emphasises rhythms of education? This might work, with the children first becoming enamoured of society, learning its rules, then critiquing them, and finally understanding the rational foundation upon which their society is based. Alternately, one could try to integrate a cognitive stage theory into Durkheim's theory that would better recognise the students' different needs at various stages. Durkheim's homogeneous treatment of education precludes us from reading these interpretations into his theories, but it might possibly prevent us from scrapping the whole.

The next chapter will provide an analytic framework for understanding personal autonomy. With this I hope to be able to ferret out Durkheim's misleading arguments while preserving what is fundamentally a sound and wise analysis.

Chapter 4

Autonomy: A Normative and Descriptive Account

Terms like individuality, individualism, freedom, autonomy and liberty have become conflated in vernacular discourse and educational theory alike. Dworkin points out that if there has been something of a renaissance of the use of the term of autonomy, very few people have paid much attention to what exactly it might mean.

It has been used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty (positive or negative in Berlin's terminology), sometimes as equivalent to self-rule or sovereignty, sometimes as identical with freedom of the will. It is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom from obligation, with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one's own interests. It is even equated by some economists with the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. It is related to action, to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other persons, to thoughts, and to principles. (6)

Durkheim used almost all of these meanings without distinguishing between them or coherently connecting them. In this chapter I want to use Haworth's psychogenetic theory of autonomy as a conceptual framework to highlight the tensions inherent in, and the conceptual advantages of, Durkheim's theory of autonomy in moral education. I will use Haworth as a primary source here because he presents a well-unified analysis of autonomy.

Autonomy derives from the Greek, *autos* (self) and *nomos* (rule). Hence, self-rule is "the condition of living in accordance to laws one gives oneself, or negatively, not being under the control of another." (Haworth 11) Thus, autonomy has both a descriptive and a normative sense. One can be described as autonomous, meaning that the person is neither

unnecessarily dependent on others nor overwrought by his emotions, and can complete tasks he sets for himself. Other times a person might assert that he is autonomous, meaning that he believes he has a right to autonomous behaviour that another is infringing upon. To fully understand autonomy, we must look at both senses, learning from what is involved in becoming or being autonomous, and why this state should be valued. Philosophical discourse, which has predominated in this area of inquiry, has focused on why autonomy is valued but has not looked at the psychological conditions that are necessary and sufficient for individuals to be autonomous. Consequently, the idea of autonomy has suffered from lack of specificity.

If Durkheim underplayed the role of autonomy in his day it was because he was concerned with the deleterious effects the 'cult of the individual' was having on French society. Durkheim's lack of attention to defining what exactly he meant by the term autonomy -- a result of his exclusively sociological emphasis and his relative lack of ability in, and mistrust for, conceptual analysis -- meant that he failed to provide a coherent understanding of this crucial aspect of his work. Thus, while he said individuation is necessary in advanced societies, for example, his social theories rarely back this up.

Description

The psychogenetic view relates autonomy and competence. One is not born autonomous, most people are capable of functioning with sufficient agency by the time they must live as an adult. Indeed, as we will see, the idea of adulthood is bound to the idea of autonomy. Others are less able, for organic or environmental reasons, and require help throughout their lives. A few are recognisably more capable of autonomous action

than others. This implies degrees of ability. Piaget's model of psychological development interpreted these degrees of ability as developmental stages.²⁰ Autonomy requires that a person first adopt an evaluative stance toward his desires and then reflect critically on his evaluative stance. Early in life, as Durkheim argued, one's evaluations are derived from other people, likely parents, teachers and peers (and, increasingly today, the media). Later, one is able to reflect on these evaluations and determine if they are consistent with other evaluations.

Minimum Autonomy

We value someone who has a high degree of self-control and independence, but we need to look at attributes more fundamental than self-control and independence to understand the genesis of autonomy. "Independence and self-control qualify behaviour: one acts independently and exhibits self-control in action. But being able to act, setting aside for the moment any concern of acting skilfully, is an achievement highly relevant to autonomy." (Haworth 13) This initial stage of being able to act is the first hurdle we need to clear in becoming individuated. The child must learn to perform an action at will to be said to have acted. To become competent suggests that one is able to act and that the action is adequate for the purpose. To be smiling, the baby must be trying to smile. "By barely trying, the infant establishes himself as a minimal agent. Development of competence beyond this involves gaining the ability both to conceive goals and to perform so that they are in some measure realised. It consists in becoming able to produce

²⁰ Unlike Kohlberg's scheme of moral development, neither Durkheim's nor Haworth's theory excludes archetypally female morality. That is, they do not exclude an ethic of caring in favour of an ethic of justice, but see both as contributing to full rationality and moral society.

intended effects ” (Haworth 14) To make the jump from minimal competence to minimal autonomy requires the involvement of the self. With the self interposed in action, the action is no longer directed by others. The self must become a subject, an agent capable of executing intended results. As one gains the ability to act wilfully, one gains a self. It is this striving for minimal autonomy that Durkheim’s attributes to the child’s propensity for mimicry, that leads to discipline and altruism.

Competence is integral to autonomy because without competence there can be no self, let alone self-rule. Without a sense of occurent agency one cannot be seen as trying “This institutes a self and reflects development of a rudimentary repertoire of skills forming the substance of the self’s competence.” (Haworth 17) Minimal autonomy is the beginning of independence and self-control.

Independence and self-control are different before a person is intellectually capable of reflecting than they are after. We mean different things when we speak of self-control in a child and in an adult. If moved to violence, the self-controlled child strikes well, the self-controlled adult refrains from striking. Similarly, the difference between independence in a child and an adult is the difference of being able to act without direction and acting with conscience. The difference is of critical reflection. The capacity for critical reflection is the difference between minimum autonomy and the autonomy of a normal adult.

Normal Autonomy

To understand the jump from minimal autonomy to normal autonomy, Haworth differentiates between substantive and procedural dependence. “Substantive dependence refers to the relation between how one acts and how others would have one act, and

connotes following " (Haworth 20) I am substantially dependent if I live my life the way I do because others have told me to. The reason I conform is irrelevant. I may conform by choice, knowing the full range of options and having weighed them, or I may not have the ability to choose. Thus, substantive dependence does not necessarily imply any lack of personal autonomy.

The independence that makes one autonomous is procedural, not substantive. We must consider why a person chooses to act the way he does to decide if he is autonomous. Critical thinking is the key to enabling a person to perform an action for their own reasons rather than the reasons of another. Durkheim believed that the capacity to think critically is central to morality in advanced societies, but he is ambivalent about the importance of substantive independence. Haworth reminds us that while the difference between substantive and procedural independence might be clear conceptually, they are very hard to separate in practice. It is this difficulty that prevents us from knowing if a person is contravening social mores for rational reasons that will benefit society, or if they are being ignorant or hurtful. So, while Durkheim recognised that deviance leads social evolution, he was more concerned with maintaining a minimum social homogeneity required for civil society.

To help us understand normal autonomy Haworth tells a useful allegory:

Three people -- Linus, Lucy, and Schroeder -- are told to go to a certain place. They find there a patch of cleared land, wood and other materials, tools, and a note nailed to a tree. The note reads, "Build a house." Linus's first thought is to start. He begins by sawing a board. Lucy looks for the nearest soapbox, stands on it, and shouts, "We'll put the house here. It will be a bungalow. Put shutters on the windows and paint everything blue." Schroeder sits down and thinks: "Would it

be better to place the house here rather than there? Why not a front-to-back split? Are shutters really necessary? Wouldn't all blue look odd?" (Haworth 22)

In this story, Linus is the competent technician, Lucy is the boss, and Schroeder is the critic. Haworth tells us that only Linus is indispensable. Without someone to do the sawing, nailing, and so forth, the house will not be built. But we should think of Linus as not having an idea in his head, so while he is indispensable to building the house, it is unlikely that a house will be built from his undirected movements. Thus, Lucy is nearly indispensable because she is the one with ideas and she knows what she wants. The house could be built with only Linus and Lucy, and it might be a good house; without Schroeder, the critic, it is unlikely that it will be the house they would have built, upon reflection.

Haworth now introduces Charlie, someone who does the two functions performed by Linus and Lucy. Charlie is competent, self-controlled, and independent, and thus the model of minimal autonomy, but without access to Schroeder, his independence is sheer wilfulness. Charlie lacks the ability to question if a bungalow is best for the site, if it needs shutters, and the aesthetics of an all blue house. Being able to question these choices, reach tentative answers, and adapt plans accordingly, signifies the move to normal autonomy. This shift is brought about by the capacity for critical reflection, deliberation, and the ability to integrate this reflection into action. In other words, "[a]chievement of normal autonomy presupposes that the individual has brought to the conduct of his life a measure of deliberation or critical reflection. Our hypothesis is that 'thinking sets one free.'" (Haworth 26)

Autonomy and Rationality

This opens up two other issues. First, what is the range of issues the autonomous person is able to reflect upon? Second, how does reflection enhance autonomy? The connection between being autonomous and being rational will help answer both questions. "A rational person is one who acts on reasons. He acts reflectively (Deweyan model) or deliberates before acting (Cartesian model)" (Haworth 27) The capacity to reflect critically, which allows one to move from minimal autonomy to normal autonomy, is what enables one to be rational. Understanding the conditions for rationality will help us understand the range of issues open to reflection. This will demonstrate that people are neither incapable of autonomy nor capable of complete autonomy.

Haworth identifies three types of rational people to understand his model. The *technically* rational person has reasons for using the means of achieving his ends, but cannot explain the ends themselves. The *economically* rational person chooses rationally among given a order of ends. The *fully* rational person can go a step further and give reasons for the order of the preferences, and may quite possibly find alternative means of choosing that are embedded in economic rationality. We will see that as a person moves from lower styles to higher, the requirements of rational judgement increase, which in turn helps us to better understand critical reflection. As the capacity for critical reflection expands, we will see that personal autonomy is widened and deepened.

Technical rationality allows a person to use reason to complete an objective. The problem for the technically rational person is to find the best means to an end. We understand intuitively that someone who is able to chose the best means to an end has

greater freedom than one who does not, but why? The person who is unable to make this choice is either limited to trial and error solution methods, or to taking other people's directions. In either case, the person who lacks technical rationality is seen to act mindlessly. The autonomous person must be open to feedback and approach the problem with a coherent plan. Using another's means does not lessen autonomy so long as there is awareness of the possibility of better means, but because the technically rational person is limited to only trying to find the best means to prescribed ends, autonomy is limited with respect to those ends.

Economic rationality can be seen either as an achievement or as a process.²¹ The ability to decide an issue by determining a value for its utility and the probability of success gives a person an increased ability to live a rational and autonomous life over someone who cannot. Someone who decides by asking another person or flipping a coin might make the best choice but is not doing so rationally. A mechanic is technically rational when fixing his car because he is able to choose the most efficient means of doing this. He is also economically rational, for example, when he chooses to fix his car rather than garden because fixing his car has the greatest potential benefit. His autonomy is greater than a mere technically rational person because he is able to make the best choice from a limited selection of options. Where, as a mere technically rational person he might have been under the control of others, the economically rational person is able to use attempts to control him as inputs into the deliberative process to be rejected or allowed by his choice of mechanism.

²¹ Appendix A shows a detailed analysis of the economic decision process.

This does not exhaust the limits of his possible control. Economic rationality ignores the rationality of the options, their assigned utility, and their assigned probability. If we limit rationality to mere economic rationality, we say that one's autonomy does not depend on his ability to determine his preferences. To be fully autonomous, a person needs to go beyond choosing from given ends and means. Haworth points out several other issues that need to be addressed. First, if he acted on his preference, would it satisfy him? This is another way of asking if his preference is accurate. Second, if the preferred action causes unforeseen circumstances to occur, had they been foreseen, would he have revised his choice? Possibly his choice makes future actions impossible or changes the way he makes choices in the future. Third, are the preferences based on sound reasons? Fourth, is his choice consistent with his principles? Fifth, is his choice consistent with his other values?²² Asking these questions may cause one to change one's preference ranking or probabilities. The self-rule of the technically or economically rational person is limited by his inability to question his assumptions, possibly uncritically borrowed from another or an expression of a strong impulse. The non-fully rational person lacks procedural independence and/or self-control. This may have no impact on his technical or economic rationality, or on his limited autonomy. "But a life guided by preferences uncritically borrowed from others is obviously not finally guided by reasons and so in the full sense lacks rationality and autonomy." (Haworth 37)

Deliberation on preferences, such as the questions above, can occur on several levels. One might ask if a choice is consistent with one's principles, but one can also ask if

²² By values, Haworth means things that the person considers good, and principles are rules that he tries to live by.

one's principles are in need of revision. This is an exercise of finding the reasons for one's reasons, allowing one to be both procedurally independent and self-controlled. Haworth notes two possible problems with this perspective, one theoretical the other practical. First, in trying to find reasons for all of our reasons, is there not a possibility of infinite regression? If not, does it not necessitate some unsubstantiated assumption? If this is true, the difference between economic and full rationality collapses. This would seem to imply that autonomy is a theoretical impossibility. Second, this theory of autonomy requires one to go to higher and higher levels of reasoning, quite unattainable for all but a very gifted person. Is this not an elitist theory that denigrates "normal" autonomy?

Both objections are persistent problems in modern philosophy. It rests on the positivist and foundationalist assumption that the entire exercise depends upon finding the final reason, misconstruing the value of a good reason and who can have one. If reason B supports reason A, and reason C supports reason B, and so on, both objections rest on the assumption that B has no value in supporting A unless the chain of reason ends in some reason that does not need justification. Much as Brown overcomes the logical positivists' expectations without sinking to Kuhn's relativism by asserting the value of intersubjective testability supporting scientific truths, Haworth asserts that it is enough that one's reasons are sufficiently supported. Here 'sufficient' depends on the circumstances, including culture and the importance of the choice. An extended chain of reasons need not terminate with some unquestionable truth because each link in the chain supports all the others. The theoretical problem is vanquished by doing away with the necessity of a deductive system of beliefs ending with unassailable axioms.

The practical objection disappears by realising that one need only to go to reasonable lengths in justifying one's beliefs. Normal autonomy is simply the capacity to find sufficient reasons as dictated by one's culture. Haworth takes the principle of sufficient argument required for Platonic dialectic rather than Euclidean geometry. Good reason needs to be based on sound argument rather than logical proof. Reason has to be reasonable, sufficient, and acceptable. To go beyond this level of reasoning is to go beyond the normal level of autonomy.

Like Durkheim, Haworth supports the notion of cultural relativism in knowledge and morality while acknowledging an underlying reality. Haworth does not feel that we need to find a presuppositionless first premise to have reasonable beliefs because the reasonableness of beliefs is contextual. Certainly, if there were indisputable facts from which all else could be logically derived, perfect autonomy would be theoretically possible. Since we lack this indisputable fact, we need not conclude that we are restricted to mere technical or economic rationality. Full rationality simply requires that one is able to question one's beliefs, change them as needed, and that one can do so to a reasonable degree.

Requirements for Autonomy

At the root of autonomy is self-rule. The autonomous person is one who is in charge of his life. This requires just three things. First, self-rule is impossible if a person cannot act. Thus, competence is the first necessary trait of autonomy. Competence differs from self-control in that one may be competent to perform a task but prevented by, say, paranoid delusions, from doing so. One might have all the required physical

capability to act, but psychological factors prevent the action. Self-rule is not possible if the person's passions and impulses dictate his responses, so that he is led to do that which, had he reflected, he would have avoided doing. Thus, self-control is the second necessary trait for autonomy. Finally, a person cannot be in charge of his life if his objectives are borrowed from others. Thus, the third necessary trait for autonomy is (procedural) independence. To see that procedural independence and self-control are necessary (and, with competence, sufficient) for autonomy one needs to understand that only he and other people are able to reduce his self-rule. "Procedural independence is the trait that ensures self-rule vis-à-vis others; self-control, vis-à-vis oneself" (Haworth 43)²³ Nature, non-human elements, is not considered a constraint on autonomy in any reasonable sense

If critical reflection is necessary for autonomy, how much is needed? If we think of autonomy in developmental terms, we see this question as nonsensical. Autonomy is seen when a person is able to take a certain perspective on their actions. This perspective cannot be measured. Deciding who has the capacity of this perspective differs from culture to culture, and can only be meaningfully asked in relation to the necessities of living in a given culture. It is quite impossible, and probably meaningless, to ask precisely when a person gains autonomy. It is quite clear, however, that a serious deficiency in any of the three necessary traits for autonomy restricts the person's autonomy. One trait

²³Haworth likens procedural independence and self-control to a gatekeeper who decides whom to let in. "The gatekeeper is derelict in case he mindlessly allows in whoever demands admission (heteronomy) or in case his decisions are prompted either by impulse (inner-impelled) or, at the other extreme, by nothing whatever (anomic), so that in effect he allows the gate to swing freely on its hinges" (Haworth 43). A healthy gatekeeper will be presented with appeals to open the gate and will have his own desires to open the gate to certain ideas, but will only open and close the gate based on critical reflection, taking into account all needed information. To deny this, and deny the necessity of critical reflection, is to assert either that a person can simply know without deliberation what ideas to let in and keep out, or that he can simply be led by his impulses. Acting in either of these ways limits a person's ability to control their life because it is either guided by whim or other people

cannot compensate for another and there is no reason to believe that any one attribute contributes more to autonomy than the others. We might say that competence is more fundamental than self-control and independence because they are built upon it, but this does not mean that we are able to judge a person's autonomy by their competence. This psychogenetic view of autonomy implies that there is a period of life in which autonomy is not possible because critical reflection is impossible due to lack of cognitive sophistication. Once a person is capable of critical reflection they are recognised as autonomous because they are individuated.

Haworth coins the phrase 'critical competence' to denote the achievement of all three necessary traits and the ability to reflect critically. The term also denotes the relationships between the traits

Having critical *competence*, a person is first of all active and in his activity succeeds in giving effect to his intentions. Having *critical* competence, the active person is sensitive to the results of his own deliberation, his activity is guided by purpose he has thought through and found reasons of his own for pursuing. Normal autonomy is critical competence. As a complex character trait or habit, the sign of its possession are found in the way a person meets the challenges of day-to-day living and, beyond this, creatively seizes the opportunities that come his way (Haworth 46, underlining added)

It is precisely this critical competence that Durkheim's educational theory tried to achieve and what he called autonomy. We can see that the curriculum and the methodology Durkheim prescribed would produce this critical competence. School discipline encourages one to master one's will, and develop the habits and traits that allow one to meet the challenges of living in complex societies. Science, history, and cultural anthropology force one to think critically and articulate problems. Similarly, literature and languages allow one to think at higher levels of abstraction. We can also see that this

critical competence is not antithetical to discipline -- they aid one another. Critical competence allows one not only to function as an agent, it requires that one engage in thinking about the problems of moral society because one understands the problems of maintaining moral society. This does not, however, resolve Durkheim's ambivalence about substantive independence. While we see that it is not required for autonomy, it may be required for moral society. Being critically competent may lead one to understand that a social more is not in the best interest of society. So, while autonomy and social attachments are not necessarily in conflict, one's desire to help a group may lead to conflict if they do not share your reasoning.

A common word used to explain adulthood is 'responsibility'. This implies that one is an agent, capable of producing intended results, and capable of being trusted. Autonomy establishes agency and agency entails responsibility. But with added autonomy comes added responsibility. As Durkheim pointed out, we hold people who are more capable to a higher standard of responsibility than we hold those who are less capable. The assumption is that highly autonomous people *should* be responsible for actions that they can control. Since we consider autonomy sacred, we have initiation rights to signify when a person has gained the competence, self-control, and independence to reach a new level of autonomy in a given sphere. The initiation right often entails explicit or implicit increases in responsibility.

To help us understand the evaluative stance autonomous people have over their desires we need to understand the distinction Haworth makes between first- and second-

order wants. People want various things. Sometimes they reflect on these wants and determine if they want these wants. To want something is called a first-order want and to want a want is a second-order want.²⁴ Understanding this is important because we can see that having second-order volitions is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for normal autonomy. It is not sufficient because simply having second-order volitions does not tell us the process by which the first-order want is determined. These second-order volitions could come either from the internalisation of standards of other people -- parents, teachers, peers, or the media -- or from independent reflection. If the former, then there is no increase in personal autonomy, but normal autonomy is possible. The latter, however, does indicate a higher level of autonomy. Without second-order volition there is no evaluative process for wants, so one does not have the procedural independence or self-control that is necessary for autonomy.

This distinction helps us to understand the most fundamental feature of normal autonomy. A person with only first-order wants stands in a very different relationship to their life than a person who evaluates their wants. "That is, by backing certain of one's desires, one forms the conception of a sphere of responsibility and thinks of oneself as responsible for acting in the ways contemplated by those desires" (Haworth 52). To become a normally autonomous person one must develop second-order volitions and become responsible for one's life in a serious sense -- not just culpable for one's actions but deserving of responsibility.

²⁴ There is a theoretical possibility of infinite regression here, having to decide if one wants to want to have a want, etc. This is unimportant in practice as society sets the number of regressions it expects and the amount of deliberation needed.

Durkheim's moral theory assumes that the normal first step in developing second-order volitions is the internalisation of parental (or societal) commands such that one obeys those commands even when parents (or other authority figures) are no longer in a direct position to enforce them. This is what Kohlberg called the 'good boy, nice girl' stage of moral development. The child moves toward assuming responsibility by developing second-order volitions, but because these volitions are their parents the child's responsibility is not full. To develop more autonomy one needs to develop the capacity for critical reflection so that one's second-order volitions emanate from oneself and are more fully backed by the self. Whereas the child's 'inner voice' is their parents', with normal autonomy, the 'inner voice' becomes his own. As the voice becomes one's own, one can be said to become more fully responsible, in the broad sense, for one's actions. Our 'cult of the individual' expects normal people to have gained not only an evaluative stance on their desires but that those evaluations be at least nominally thought through. Our idea of personhood is tied up with our reflective ability. It is this capacity for reflecting on second-order desires that is root of Durkheim's autonomy.

Haworth argues, from developmental psychology, that autonomy is not a learned process but is a natural development. That is, he assumes that a person will develop autonomy, but that he requires appropriate conditions to actualise this potential. This *a priori* assumption is contentious, though better defended than Durkheim's similar conclusion from a social evolutionary assumption.²⁵ The alternative is to assume that

²⁵ There is an important difference between Haworth and Durkheim on this point. Haworth assumes, much like Durkheim in *Moral Education*, that there is a basic 'competence motive' that simply needs the right environment to flourish. In this way he makes the Humanist assumption of the primacy of the individual. The difficulty with this view is that while there is evidence for a basic competence motive for elementary skills, it is dangerous to extend this motive into the higher capacity for critical reflection. It

without external intervention of the correct type the person will not develop normal autonomy

This basic "competence motive" moves people to become agents and gain some sort of control over their environment. To do this, there is a desire to develop a repertoire of skills and coping abilities. From this perspective, most of early life involves trying to develop this basic competence and every viable creature must manage it. Given the survival value of this competence motive, it is easy to understand why it evolved, especially for creatures like humans who have a long period of physical dependence.²⁶

These 'motivations' and 'trends' lead to what Haworth calls minimal autonomy. As we have seen, this desire for competence entails a desire for self-control, via self-discipline, and an urge for independence, that parents call wilfulness. The lack of any sort of critical reflection or second-order volitions means only that minimal autonomy is being developed.

Simply because this urge for competence is normal does not mean that it will happen *in vacuo*. The environment must be such that the child is able to succeed, as the principles of operant conditioning seemingly apply at this early stage of development. "But such influences only accelerate, decelerate, or divert a tendency the developing person brings with him into the world" (Haworth 57). Haworth makes the interesting analogy of the competence motive being like the law of inertia in classical mechanics. We don't need to explain normal development, only understand it. "But if the child goes

would seem that Durkheim's assertion for the cultural necessity of critical reflection makes more sense. Most likely, this propensity is both social and physiological in differing proportions in different stages of life

²⁶ Haworth lists various specific traits that child psychologists have developed to stand in place of this more general competence motive: instinct of curiosity, joy in being a cause, exploratory drive, manipulative drive, activity drive, instinct to master, autonomous ego development, motility urge, sense of industry, self-actualisation, growth motivation, need for mastery, and autonomous capacity to be interested in the environment (Haworth 56)

quiescent, or becomes unexpectedly active in his quest for autonomy, or begins to pursue that quest in unexpected ways, then we shall want to know why." (Haworth 57) In an educational context, we need a model to explain ways of facilitating this development, and certainly need to know what prevents or slows this development.

In an essay entitled "Childhood," Durkheim asserted that childhood "is the period of *growth*, that is to say, the period in which the individual, both in a physical and moral sense, does not yet exist, the period in which he is made, develops and is formed" (*Childhood* 150) Growth produces an instability because equilibrium is constantly changing. The salient thing about childhood is that it is a period of both strength and weakness. Children have so much potential -- moral, intellectual and physical -- to take advantage of, but it is untutored, aimless and fleeting. "It is the duty of the educationist to bear in mind this dual character of the child whom he undertakes to train in every aspect of that process" (*Childhood* 151) The first lesson of education is to adapt the child to his capabilities. At the same time one must take into account the child's felt needs and respond to his whims. The child must not, however, suffer from discontinuity and must learn continuity.

Haworth's assertion is that people will naturally go through these stages of their own accord, but it is difficult to imagine a person not going through some sort of formalised education in contemporary society. In contemporary society people need, at minimum, education in social mores. Schooling can also help students to ask meaningful questions about those mores more quickly by helping them to develop critical competence. Marxists critique this idea because they believe that schools either teach the values of the

people in control or prevent students from developing the skills to ask meaningful questions. The first problem is addressed by Haworth looking at institutional structures. I answer the second, using Seigel, by looking at the notion of indoctrination.

Haworth agrees with Piaget that children only gradually begin to see things from others' perspectives. To develop empathy, and later altruism, they must understand that there are perspectives and points of view other than their own. To understand this, they must understand the possibility of error; understanding error creates the possibility of a problem. Having a problem makes critical reflection possible because it calls one's first-order desires into question. As Durkheim pointed out, authority figures are crucial in this stage of development, because it is their influence that brings the child to evaluate their first order desires. In seeking to avoid being punished for doing something an authority figure disapproves of, the child learns to take another perspective into account and question their first-order desires. This introduces the category of correctness, and is reinforced by games and disputes over rules. So, in Haworth's scheme, though he does not point it out himself, second-order desires are an eminently social creations. Especially important is the process of the child taking over society's rules and using these to mediate his own truth, as Durkheim suggested in *Elementary Forms*.

It is normal in advanced societies for a child to move beyond simply mimicking his parents' rules and achieve normal autonomy. This can happen in two general ways. First, the child can discover that his parents views are mistaken and that they do not produce the expected results. Second, as the child's experience broadens and the parents' influence decreases, giving way especially to teachers and peers, critical reflection usually occurs.

For this critical reflection to be meaningful, and for the child to not simply replace certain beliefs with others, a certain intellectual competence is required. The stage of minimal autonomy is related to childhood and normal autonomy is related to adulthood. Thus, the period of development of critical capability is associated with adolescence: teen angst. The transition from technical to economic rationality is realised with the development of second-order volitions. The shift from economic to full rationality is realised with critical appraisal of these second-order volitions.

What Haworth calls a shift from stage two to stage three in personal development is the shift from what Durkheim calls mechanical to organic solidarity in societies. Organic solidarity develops where the collective consciousness expects people to develop the capacity for reflecting on social mores. The advantage of Haworth's scheme is that it allows for higher than normal levels of autonomy, where Durkheim is ambivalent. "[B]eyond normal autonomy, we meet the ideal of fully developed autonomy which inspires only some and is approximated by few. This ideal condition can be conceived in two, importantly different, ways." (Haworth 63) The romantic view "stresses the power the individual would gain over himself if, as fully autonomous, he was capable of being *totally self-determined* in the sense of self-made" (Haworth 63, emphasis added). Durkheim tells us that this romantic ideal of full autonomy is a central myth in the modern cult of man, with the desire to attain this ideal being central to his secular morality.

In "Pedagogy and Sociology" Durkheim calls our attention to the effect of the romantic ideal of autonomy on contemporary educational theory, stemming in large part from Kant and Mill, seen also in Rousseau and Spencer, that education exists solely to

actualise in each individual the highest possible attributes of humanity. The stem of this assumption is that there exists a single abstract ideal of humanity, and thus a single education will serve to produce this ideal. Haworth's notion of critical competence explains Durkheim's insistence that education needs to vary both with the individual and the society. A common curriculum is needed to maintain social order. However, education is becoming more generalised as the needs of public education become more diverse.

Society finds itself, so to speak, with each new generation, faced with a *tabula rasa*, very nearly, on which it must build anew. To the egoistic and asocial being that has just been born it must, as rapidly as possible, add another capable of leading a social and moral life. Such is the work of education, and you can readily see its great importance. If it is not limited to developing the individual organism in the direction indicated by nature, to eliciting the hidden potentialities which need only be manifested. It creates in man a new man, and this man is made up of all the best in us, of all that gives value and dignity to life. This creative quality is, moreover, a special prerogative of human nature. (*Education and Sociology* 121-125)

So while Durkheim recognised that the myth of romantic individualism is just a myth, it serves an important social purpose like all myths. Important in Durkheim's sociology, however, was an attempt to first temper that myth with an ethic of community, and later to develop social institutions that could rely on the rational explanation of the purpose of individuation and autonomy. Thus, the act of being educated is not a privation of individual liberty but an initiation into a realistic full autonomy.

The realistic ideal of full autonomy differs from the romantic view by focusing on a person's competence rather than the power of self-definition. The ideal of achieving unlimited rationality and critical competence is paired with an ideal of a creative life that is fully one's own. So, while the realistic objective as an ideal is unattainable, it is

asymptotically approachable. Understanding this ideal is what Durkheim called spirituality

Higher degrees of autonomy, in this scheme, correspond to less direct response from social pressure and greater input from inner causes. Education allows a person to better understand the inputs into a decision process. The central mistake Skinner made when he denied the possibility of autonomy, by taking his theories from pigeons and rats, was ignoring the individuality of people as an input. If a person holds two beliefs that are contradictory, they produce dissonance when called into action. One belief should lead to one action; the other, another. To resolve this dissonance the person has two choices. He can either change his beliefs, his second-order volitions, or he can convince himself that these beliefs are not contradictory. In the former case he gains autonomy, in the latter he deludes himself and does not gain autonomy. Thus, while Haworth's refutation of Skinner establishes the possibility of autonomy, it does not guarantee it. To encourage people to make autonomous choices, Durkheim relies on a curriculum that enables people to critically challenge social beliefs, and social institutions that encourage such questioning

The Decision Process

To better understand autonomy, Haworth develops a model of the autonomous decision process. To operationalize autonomy we have to focus on the decision processes and the choices the person makes. "The autonomy of a person's life is largely fixed by the way in which he confronts the difficulties and seizes the opportunities these occasions

bring " (Haworth 83) More specifically, developing the earlier discussion, we need to consider the ways competence, self-control, and independence affect the process

Haworth see five tasks for the decision maker: "(1) he must determine whether he confronts a problem that requires action on his part, (2) he must identify what the problem is, (3) he must decide on a line of action that responds to the problem; (4) he must carry out his choice, and (5) he must assimilate the outcome of his choice, as feedback " (Haworth 86) To start a decision making process there must be some felt difficulty There is a problem when the proper action is unclear Looking at the situation this way is important because it opens the possibility of a problematic situation arising at any time, rather than just when something goes wrong or a problem is defined for us. This is important in Haworth's model because it allows for the possibility of an agent entering into the decision process even when others might not perceive a problem. Thus, it allows for innovation and represents the creative process as containing rational elements. Deciding not to try to proceed may either reflect lack of motivation or may indicate reasons A important case is deciding that the problem is only apparent and not really a problem, as this may indicate a lack of autonomy Alternately, one may decide that the problem is better left for some other time

It might seem that choosing and acting on the problem are collapsible, but we know that there is a difference between choosing to act and acting Choosing to act is the focal point of the autonomous decision because this is where one proves that one is an agent In fact, choosing to act on a decision may provoke another problem -- overcoming nonautonomous inclinations Whereas 'deciding' is a continuous event (one can change

one's mind), acting is a discrete act that cannot be recalled. It is this tension between understanding the correct action (enabled by procedural independence) and acting (in a way that might be substantively independent) that causes ambivalence in Durkheim's moral theory.

Each of the five stages of the process is accompanied by information gathering and processing tasks, and we can understand a person's autonomy by looking at the way they approach these tasks. To understand the distinction between autonomous and nonautonomous decision processes, we need to distinguish between the way each of these subprocesses demonstrates autonomy or a lack of it. There are two extreme positions in approaching a problem. At one extreme, one has no idea of how to solve the problem. At the other, the solution is obvious and one needs only follow preordained steps to solve it. At the first extreme, the problem is insoluble because one does not know where to start. At the other extreme, there are no decisions to make, indeed, it isn't really a problem. It is between these two extremes that we need to look at the approaches needed to solve problems.

A 'problem space' consists of all the relevant information the decision maker thinks might be relevant to solving the problem. The 'task environment' is all the factors that are relevant to the problem. The problem space is comprehending the task environment well enough to make a rational decision and be able to act on the choice. "The decision maker initiates his decision-making activity by invoking a problem space amplified by his antecedently held view concerning an appropriate technique for dealing with the problem, a plan of attack." (Haworth 92) This plan of attack is what Haworth

calls a 'decision map'. One starts with an idea of how to proceed (a cognitive map) and finds new and missing information along the way. As a person gains experience with a certain decision map he will possibly reconfigure it to take new information into account. "The activities the decision maker undertakes, in completing his decision tasks, are information search and processing activities, carried out under the control of a decision map which may undergo changes as the decision activity proceeds." (Haworth 92-93)

At one extreme, a complete decision map would pre-program every step and substep in the process. At the other extreme, one has no decision map whatsoever and hence no guidance. In between, an incomplete map will give direction on how to carry on with the process and tell you what information is needed to complete the task. Important in the decision map will be the decision rules that help to find relevant information and process it. Experienced decision makers will have a repertoire of decision maps and will start a problem solving process by trying to fit a problem into a known map. Sensitivity to feedback will tell the problem solver if success is likely or whether they need to try another approach.

This will help us to begin to understand how the autonomous decision making process differs from the nonautonomous. Above we saw that three things hinder autonomy: incompetence, procedural dependence, and lack of self-control. Each factor affects the decision making process. We are dealing in degrees, from complete competence to complete incompetence, complete procedural dependence to complete procedural independence, and complete self-control to being completely inner impelled. Each of the five steps in the decision making process will fall somewhere on the scale of

each of these three factors. Alternately, we could also look at each stage as a task rather than a decision. The way each task is carried out will affect one's autonomy. The way one carries it out will fall somewhere on the competence, independence, and self-control scales, which will affect autonomy.

Interestingly, having too much competence in solving a certain kind of problem, for example, will affect one's autonomy negatively, just as having too little, because one will be 'blinded' to possibly better solutions. In looking at highly creative people, Gardner points out the importance of productive asynchrony. The substantively autonomous person will neither have a complete decision map nor be clueless in his attempt to find a novel solution to a problem. Gardner also found that highly creative people repeatedly forced themselves into asynchrony -- either within themselves, in their domain, or with others in their field -- in an attempt to remain creative. This 'productive asynchrony' prevents them from becoming overly dependent on a solution. As we have seen, Durkheim is sympathetic to the importance of creativity, deviance, substantive independence, or whatever you wish to call it, but was unable to incorporate the idea fully into his social theory. In no small part, this was because he felt that his society had far too much deviance to remain viable. So, while he understood the importance of substantive independence in a broad historical perspective, his educational theory reflects his felt need for increasing social homogeneity -- hence his derision for art that is 'not of reality'. However, he also understood that procedural independence was crucial for advanced societies. Consequently, we have a distinct tension in Durkheim's theory of moral education between independent thought and independent action.

While we might be able to use Haworth's approach to determine a person's autonomy for a given problem, it does not allow us to determine the overall autonomy in a person's life. To determine this, you might be able to look at the way he approaches major decision in his life, such as his choice of education, career, or spouse, and the way he responded to feedback from past choices. Some decisions have a great impact on a person's subsequent competence, independence, and self-control. It is quite possible that a person's life autonomy will be the outcome of these pivotal choices and the way he adjusts his future decisions by what he learned from previous decisions. Then again, luck does seem to be a major factor in life. However, as Stephen Leacock put it, "I'm a great believer in luck and I find the harder I work the more I have of it."

Alternately, rather than focusing on the few significant life choices, one could look at an entire life as a continuous process rather than a series of discrete choices. In this way, the five stages of the problem solving process are choices one must make about one's existence and tasks to perform to actualise these choices. All the other problems become second-order or sub-problems to be resolved in solving the bigger problem. The extent to which the person is able to deal with the second-order problems determines the extent to which the person's entire life will be autonomous and his ability to pursue his life's plan. A person's autonomy is seen by focusing on the degree of personal autonomy an individual has in planning his life and fulfilling those plans by dealing with the second-order problems that arise, the coherence of those plans, their ability to actualise those plans, and change them appropriately.

Haworth's perspective nicely captures the salient ideas about autonomy. In his model, the decisions a person makes contribute to the making of his life, and what is important is the degree to which the life he creates is his own and under his control.

Institutional Life and Limits on Autonomy

This is to look entirely at the individual and exclude his environment, which is of central importance in Durkheim's moral education. Haworth's theory rests on the assumption that normal autonomy is possible if and only if the environment is conducive to the development of autonomy. At first this might seem to conflict with Durkheim's notion that individuation came from the needs of division of labour, but we will see that it does not. They come to the same conclusions from opposite directions. To understand the decisions a person makes, we have to understand the task environment (all the features that are relevant to the problem) and how the person relates to it. More specifically, Haworth is interested in the way that institutional structures channel feedback. By looking at the generic features of the institutional task environments he is able to emphasize the difficulty of living an autonomous life.

He begins by looking at the naive conception of a task environment that is prominent in philosophical and economic literature. This is what he calls the 'frontier view' that sees the environment as devoid of form and waits for an individual to bring his agenda to give it shape. This prevalent view of reality ignores that "the resources and obstacles the agent confronts are organised into structures of action." (Haworth 108) This naive theory also views the decision maker as detached from the world. The decision maker's purpose is supposedly entirely internal and he confronts the external world to

mould it to his will. Obviously this view lacks relation to the real world. The individual is a member of groups. These groups are organised resources for specialised purposes. These organisations represent resources that facilitate, and constraints that restrict, the application of the resources and the means of use. To better understand the limitations of this naive view we need to better understand the generic form of the task environment.

Haworth sees Sir Henry Maine's generalisation of history, "from status to contract", meaning that where once one's position in life was established at birth, it had become a function of contracts. Individuals are significantly freer today because the plan of their life is no longer a birthright and is a set of semi-voluntary transactions. Jordan suggests that Maine's idea could be updated to "from status to contract to structure." While we went through a historic period where social contracts were the norm, we now live in a world increasingly dominated by contracts that have congealed into institutional structures. "Institutions embody practices and roles, but they do so through the manner in which they organise material, the means of action." (Haworth 109) The similarity to Durkheim's generalisation of society going from mechanical to organic solidarity is striking. The institutional structure of organic solidarities, and the required autonomy and morality required to live in advanced societies, precludes the possibility of societies being structured around social contracts.

When Haworth refers to 'institutional structures' he means banks, libraries, schools, families and the like. But his argument is equally valid for music, language, mathematics, or any other means of organising material and means of action. In this way,

intellectual education is seen as a means of gaining intellectual autonomy while having to conform to constraints, hence the moral nature of intellectual education

The means of action embodied in social institutions are constraints on the exercise of autonomy and confine the domain of critical reflection. To enjoy the opportunities an institution can bring, such as increased autonomy, one also has to agree to follow its rules. Society is possible because opportunities and resources are within one organisation or another, and it is all but impossible to enjoy the liberties of an organisation without subscribing to its rules and techniques. These institutions structure the world by organising resources to realise common purposes. Hence, institutions serve social purposes and respond to social needs.

As the developing person tries to master the practices embodied in these institutions with their largely fixed nature, they gain autonomy within those structures as they learn the operating logic of the institutions. "As each individual matures, his participation in institutional practices expands." (Haworth 110) Thus, people are not developing in a world that is devoid of shape, so they are not free to structure it to their will. They have to learn to live in a largely structured environment. These preordained structures constitute the necessity of education and why Durkheim considered all education to be moral education at its foundation.

An interesting facet of this institutionalised life is that people seem to want to live in the way that the institutional structures dictate. This has two main sources. First, institutions such as the family, school, language, religion, television, employment, and so forth, are powerful mechanisms of socialisation that try to fit people to society's

expectations. Second, society is structured to fit human needs and desires. In Durkheim's terminology, the collective conscience embodies the best of human knowledge through processes of natural selection and solidified into social institutions. We see that people are bent to fit society and society bends to fit its people. Naive theories, such as Marxist educational theories, argue that only the children bend. It is important to recognise that everyone has to bend to society's will, but it is easier for some and the benefit is greater for some.

The interplay of needs keeps the institutional structures of society surprisingly static. This is because these institutions need one another for their mutual existence. Haworth shows the underlying truth of Marxist economic determinism by asserting that social institutions take and hold the form required to facilitate productive forces. But Haworth, like Durkheim, has more sympathy for speaking of institutional momentum rather than determinism. He does not agree that social institutions are unstoppable and require revolutions to change, merely that their internal logic makes them very hard to properly understand and hence change.

So we see the two sides of social life. It offers the opportunity to do things that could not be done without them, but it also requires discipline to be able to use its benefits. Organisations are developed to realise a purpose; to expect them to perform another function is to expect too much. But while institutions are required for good life, they are not sufficient. We have many institutions that contribute to poor life and we lack institutions for many things we would like to do. Durkheim's preference for gradual social change -- not surprising after a century and a quarter of a series of revolutions --

blinds him to the possibility that profound change is occasionally needed to sweep away old institutions and create new ones

The constraints required to gain the benefits of institutional life pose limitations for autonomy. If one wants to gain the benefits of institutional life, one has to conform (to some degree) to its rules and techniques. This has appeared to many, including Rousseau, as a catch-22, implying that the constraints of civilised life surmount the benefits. Durkheim takes the other extreme and argues that the advantages of civil life far outweigh the constraints it demands. Durkheim's wavering on whether individual and community are antagonistic or symbiotic arises from this question. On the large scale, he was certain that the benefits outweighed the drawbacks. On the scale of an individual life, one tends to see the constraints more than the advantages, especially where the cult of the individual demands unconstrained freedom.

If the institutionalised world is seemingly the sum total of all the options one can exercise, then the only options seem to be: conform, or do nothing. The mistake here is to see the limits on personal autonomy as defined. Haworth would rather we understand that institutionalisation *per se* is neutral with respect to autonomy. Some institutional arrangements are conducive to autonomy, others limit or quash autonomy. The question is to look at society from the perspective of the developing person. What are the institutional arrangements he needs to become autonomous?

Haworth argues *a priori* that there are just three conditions to be met to foster autonomy: flexibility, controllability, and (discretionary) accessibility. Again, each of these criteria is on a scale from complete to none, with autonomy being a function of

degree. Flexibility is the degree to which the roles, positions, functions, and so forth, of an institution's structure are not preordained and unchangeable. Or, positively, a flexible institution allows the user to change facets of the system as needed. Obviously the system cannot be infinitely malleable because it would not then be an institution. So we cannot argue, as some progressive educators have, that autonomy is entirely constituted in making social institutions completely flexible, controllable, and accessible. To do this is to lose the advantages of the institution. Significantly (remembering Durkheim's emphasis on professionalization), professionalization of an occupation entails a significant increase in flexibility and subsequent autonomy. The professional defines the place and hours of work, and commands respect from clients. While a flexible system allows for increased autonomy, it does not guarantee it. It is certain that an inflexible system precludes autonomy because it prevents self-control unless it is facilitated by either controllability or accessibility. Haworth notes, of special relevance in post-Illich educational discourse, that flexibility does not mean deinstitutionalising an institution. Flexibility derives from the way the institution is organised, not from its destruction.²⁷

Personal autonomy is also enhanced by giving the users of a system increased control. In this way, the structure the institution imposes is only what they impose on themselves. This not only means control of the overall structure, but also of its constituent parts. One might argue that giving people control over insignificant pieces of

²⁷ But then, Illich's suggestions for education and other institutions are not in fact deinstitutionalisations *per se*. They seek to create new institutions to replace possibly outdated ones. In fact, the replacements Illich suggests are much in keeping with Haworth's suggestions (with increased controllability, accessibility, and flexibility) but ignore the necessity of broader moral requirements such as a core curriculum. In this way, Illich's system exhibits too much flexibility, controllability, and accessibility.

the process is a cheap way to buy them off, but participatory democracies are generally well liked because they reorient the process to the user.

It might seem that flexibility and controllability are the same thing because if one is to control a system it must be flexible, and *vice versa*. The important difference is that flexibility refers to the way one uses the system, whereas controllability refers to the possibility of changing the way the system is organised. Like the difficulty of too much flexibility rendering a system useless, too much controllability also has its problems. A tyranny of the majority is possible, if not likely, because it is unlikely that everyone will agree with the decisions of the majority. Two general solutions are useful here. First, controllability can be limited to affect a smaller number of participants so that they are more likely to reach an agreeable consensus. Second, increased flexibility, also called plurality, enables dissenting groups to accommodate the decisions of the majority. In this way, a degree of decentralisation in educational decision making that allows for both a common curriculum and local control satisfies the concerns both of people concerned with having values imposed on them and broader society to have public schools serve a moral purpose. Durkheim's sense of impending social crisis encouraged him to develop a theory of education that was entirely centralised. While his concerns are equally valid today, it seems less likely that his approach would respond to the needs of a diverse country like Canada, or even some of the larger Provinces, with diverse employment and social needs.

The value of a highly flexible and controllable institution is meaningless to those who do not have access to it. Alternately, if people's participation is forced, their autonomy is also restricted. Of all institutions, the state is the most important example of

this principle Almost everyone becomes a member of a state by birth and is accorded certain rights and duties because of that membership. The difference between the state and society is the difference between involuntary membership in the state and voluntary membership in the institutions of society. The forced participation in the state detracts from a person's autonomy, but voluntary association in society increases autonomy. Where social institutions are inaccessible to certain people, their autonomy is certainly decreased

Forced participation in schools is a different matter, however. Schools try to ensure that a person gains the capacity to lead an autonomous and moral life. Given the choice, most students would not go to school because they cannot appreciate the advantages of gaining the skills, knowledge, and dispositions that doing so can bring. The value of school lies, among other things, in its ability to increase autonomy. To not force the child to gain a generative core of skills, knowledge, and dispositions that public schools teach is to do the child harm by limiting his possible autonomy.

The Value of Autonomy

Haworth's description of autonomy is couched in the assumption that autonomy is desirable in its own right. He argues that this is because autonomy is fundamental to several other things that we believe are desirable. Most obvious is the belief that autonomy helps us to develop to our full capacity, especially our capacity to govern ourselves. This assertion is based on the assumption that personal autonomy and self-governance are natural, and hence good. We must be cautious about such teleological appeals to nature, however, because they can be misleading. As we have seen, Durkheim

argued that the value of autonomy stemmed from its social benefit. Haworth does not deny the social benefit of autonomy -- he concludes by arguing for it. To better understand how Haworth's theory combines with Durkheim's, we need to better understand autonomy not just in a descriptive sense but also in a normative sense.

The first concern is whether autonomy is derivative or intrinsic. That is, is autonomy valuable because it allows us to achieve another desirable goal, such as happiness, liberty, or a moral society, or is it good in-and-of-itself? From the Utilitarian perspective, for example, the value of autonomy is derivative because it contributes to increased happiness. The difficulty is that we cannot be certain that autonomy and happiness can be separated such that the former is a derivative of the latter.

Haworth argues that autonomy is both valuable and a fundamental right. He starts with the libertarian assertion that adults have the right to live their lives as they will, subject to the constraint that they do not harm others. This assumes that no person's idea of the good life is better than any other's, so no one can force another to do what he does not want. This brings in the necessity that people be protected from harm and that they be left to do as they will. This assertion is based on the assumption of a person's capacity to live autonomously. This is why this assumption is restricted to adults, as children are assumed not to be capable of autonomy. To be able to enjoy the rights of liberty, his 'domain of autonomy', one must qualify as an autonomous person. From these assumptions and arguments it is obvious that autonomy must be seen as valuable in its own right and not derivative.

Haworth restates the basic argument by looking at the idea of a natural and moral person, Rousseau's dichotomy "A natural person is an individual with a capacity for autonomy, for effective self-governance. A moral (or legal) person, by contrast, is one who has moral (or legal) rights and duties" (Haworth 126). These rights and duties define the sphere of decisions society has delegated to the individual, and those for which he will be held responsible. To set up the natural person as the moral person assumes individuals possess a developmental capacity for performing their responsibilities with autonomy. In this way, society responds to a person's natural autonomy. In approaching the question from this angle, it is again clear that autonomy is not derived but is fundamental. That is, autonomy is fundamental to our idea of being human. In this way, society does more than make it possible for an individual to live an autonomous life, it requires him to. Durkheim came to the same conclusion when he argued that the Humanists had responded to the developing social necessity of individuality by developing a cult of man that portrayed individuality as natural. It is not that autonomy simply derives its value from its social function, its social function derives from its survival benefit.

Children (and other people with underdeveloped autonomy) have a fundamental interest in developing their capacity for autonomy. If a parent or the state fails to ensure this development, the child is harmed. Hence, children must be free to use those modes of development that will enable them to develop their autonomy. Parents and the state have a duty to ensure that children develop their capacity to live autonomously. This is a restriction of the autonomy of people who are responsible for the care of people who have not, or cannot, developed their autonomy. To achieve the right to an autonomous life,

children have a 'right to an open future', and actions that foreclose options that will enhance their adult autonomy are violations of their rights

Education and Indoctrination

This idea of respecting a child's 'right to an open future' is fraught with conceptual difficulties.²⁸ We cannot leave a child to do as he wishes, as some progressive educators assert, because that would deprive the child of the benefits of an education. Neither can we simply impose an education without placing it in the context of the child's eventual right to autonomy. To understand this difficulty we need to understand the difference between indoctrination and 'non-indoctrinative belief inculcation'

In the relatively small body of literature that exists connecting the ideas of education and indoctrination there is great disparity of understanding of the term indoctrination. Pre-Renaissance the term did not carry the pejorative sense it does today. Indoctrination simply implied giving people the doctrine by which the majority lived in a given time and place. This is the nature of discipline and attachment to social groups demonstrated by mechanical solidarities, in Durkheim's sense. In this context it was quite proper to speak of education as indoctrination. As the cult of the individual proliferated, and the necessity of individual autonomy has become more obvious (commensurate with the increase in division of labour), association with the term indoctrination has increasingly become something that we wish avoid at all costs.

Three definitions of indoctrination are common. If X is getting Y to believe that p is correct, then when is interaction correctly considered indoctrinative? One view holds

²⁸ This section is adapted from a paper I wrote for ESTU 601

that the status of indoctrination depends upon the *intentions* of X: if X intends to convince Y of p regardless of the epistemological status of or evidence for p, then it is indoctrination. The second view uses the *method* X employs as the determining factor: if X suppresses information that might lead Y to question p, then it is indoctrination. The third view holds that the *content* of p is the determining factor: if p is false or unfalsifiable, independent of method or intention, then we have indoctrination. The various authors' choices of definition vary with the theoretical position they need to hold to prove the point they want.

There is a single alternative suggested by Seigel (57) that covers all of these approaches. He takes the case of Y: Y is indoctrinated if he holds that p is true without evidence to support it, or considers evidence against p to be irrelevant. Thus, it is the *style of belief* that counts. A teacher is indoctrinating a student when that teacher teaches in such a way that the student does not or cannot question on basis of evidence the subject's validity or truth. So we see that spurious intentions, method, or content of teaching, while neither sufficient nor necessary for indoctrination, all tend to promote non-evidential, non-critical belief.

Is not steeping the child in the collective consciousness, or teaching his the rules and techniques of social institutions, not the best way to teach critical thinking? It *can* be. It is not necessarily. If we hold beliefs about the death penalty or the importance of punctuality, for example, it is critical to examine *how* we hold these beliefs. If we hold these beliefs on a reasoned basis and we are willing to critically examine any evidence against these ideas knowing that we may well have to change our opinion then we have

not been subject to indoctrination. If, on the other hand, we have not examined the evidence or will not consider evidence against these ideas, then we have been indoctrinated. Notice that it is not important how we came to hold these beliefs, one need only consider our current state of thought. This is why procedural independence is not necessarily indicative of indoctrination.

Is it possible to teach morality, or anything else for that matter, without indoctrinating? How are we supposed to teach a child to think rationally without using rational thought? Here Seigel makes the critical distinction between indoctrination and *non-indoctrinative belief inculcation*. Education in advanced societies must enable the child to gain autonomy, and this requires the capacity to reason. We cannot teach a child the importance of thinking in a reasoned fashion, children do not have, due to lack of cognitive sophistication, the ability to accept reason -- they are not capable, in Piaget's model. Thus, we must inculcate children into accepting the importance of reason to have them be able to accept reason later. If a child does not accept reason he will never be able to discern the difference between indoctrination and inculcation. This argument follows for any other educative process required for the child to gain autonomy. The child only needs, by the time they reach adulthood, to be able to question the reasons for the inculcation.

Just inculcating the child to believe that reason is important is not sufficient. The child must also have a significant repertoire of skills, knowledge, and dispositions before they can begin to act in a reasoned fashion. Or, as Haworth argues, they need to acquire competence, independence, and self-control. Determining what exactly these skills,

knowledge, and dispositions are is certainly a non-trivial exercise, especially if we consider Durkheim's argument that they vary with society. It is important, however, to avoid thinking that there is a single set of these attributes that the child must accumulate before being able to think in a reasoned way. Rather, it seems likely that the ability to think in a reasoned fashion will develop gradually, along with additional attributes the child learns, in school and out, and that the development of reason will only help with the acquisition of these attributes.

The role of the compulsory education provided by the state is to provide a generative core of skills, knowledge, and dispositions that will enable the students to gain the competence, independence and self-control expected for normal autonomy in their society. This issue is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis, but understanding the problem in this way seems to shed light on the contribution psychogenetic approaches to autonomy lend to resolving the dichotomy between the individual and social in moral education. More generally,

[e]ducation is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states that are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined . . . [Education is the] methodical socialisation of the young generation. (*Education and Sociology* 71)

To develop a child's capacity to live an autonomous adult life, the child requires formal and informal education that will "nurture both an ability to think critically and an ability to act on the results of such thought. And very often it will be necessary to require the child to submit to discipline, in the interest of nurturing capacities on which development of the capacity for autonomous life depends." (Haworth 127) Thus, while

children are inherently capable of autonomous life, they must submit to coercion so that they can learn the skills, knowledge, and dispositions required for competence, self-control, and independence. This contrasts with adults who are coerced to prevent them from causing harm to others, including children, not to themselves. We saw above that this capacity for autonomy develops in stages. Thus, as the capacity for autonomy develops, the child is given ever greater responsibility, "both in recognition of the level of maturity reached and in order to nurture further development." (Haworth 127)

Ideology and Function

We see that Haworth's argument for the fundamentality, rights, and duties of autonomy has a libertarian flavour because of the assumption that autonomous adults have a right to live as they wish so long as they do not harm others. It is interesting here because these rights and duties look much like Durkheim's arguments for rights and duties, though he started from the primacy of society. The difference is the extent to which various actions are seen as injurious to others in each scheme. Haworth's argument differs from libertarian arguments in that his definition of harm covers a greater domain. This argument supports paternalism where it will help in the development of autonomy. It does not accept broader ideas of paternalism that seek to coerce the child for 'his own good', it only accepts these arguments where good is defined in terms of eventual autonomy, including the requirements of moral society.

The difficulty, and seeming incomensurability, arises from where Durkheim and Haworth feel it is appropriate to say that an individual is capable of leading an autonomous life. Haworth would argue that this capacity develops fairly early and is

present in most adults. Durkheim, by contrast, would argue that anyone who does not act in the best interests of society is demonstrating their lack of competence and understanding and are hence open to coercion by the state. While I do not wish to underplay the importance of this difference, it is important to note that both men agree that social conventions determine who is autonomous and should be left with rights and duties unmolested. This commonality allows us to say that the definition of autonomy cannot be normatively defined and is relegated to a 'political problem'. Understanding that the limits on autonomy are a political problem, we can see that Haworth's articulation of the problem is more general because Durkheim was responding to the contemporary problems France faced. Durkheim was arguing that everyone's right to an autonomous life was in jeopardy because the social institutions that support autonomous life were in danger from anomic forces.

Haworth finds the rationale for his argument in "the nonderivative value of living autonomously." (Haworth 129) That is, the value of autonomy is not simply derived from its ability to increase happiness, liberty, or morality, as the Utilitarians, Libertarians, or Durkheim respectively argued. While each is a desirable goal, each is nearly worthless if not accompanied by autonomy. That is, one cannot be happy unless that happiness is gained autonomously, and an open range of options or a moral society is worthless if they do not support an autonomous life. It must be remembered that the autonomous life sought is not so much a state as a process, so open options are good, not least because they require a person to exercise choice and develop their capacity for autonomy. "It is probably the close connection between the harm principle and the status of moral

personhood that explains the frequency with which that principle has found a place in the writing of political philosophers over the past four centuries ” (Haworth 133)

To understand the normative value of autonomy, we need to look at the closely allied value of liberty. In saying that each person owns himself, Haworth is saying that each person has a right to develop his potential for autonomy

The function of the no-harm constraint is to define the limits of the domain within which autonomous life is to be respected: autonomy exercised to harm others is converted by that fact from a distinctly human achievement pre-eminently worthy of being encouraged to a distinctly human capacity for destruction (Haworth 152)

Durkheim provided a more general explanation by arguing that our belief in the sacred nature of individuality had a functional explanation.

For Kant, the right to liberty is an innate right, as opposed to a juridical right. To have a right is to be authorised to limit another's freedom in that area. “Freedom (independence from constraint of another's will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity ” (quoted in Haworth 155) All juridical rights prevent another from interfering with this innate right. These juridical rights form the social contract that enables people to exercise their right to freedom. The state enables people to be moral persons by allowing them to exercise their freedom

Kant argued that autonomy is only possible when one strictly obeys the laws of a well-developed state. This is to overstate the necessary condition for autonomy. Haworth differs from Kant by not identifying autonomy with morality. It is obvious that a person can be both autonomous and amoral or immoral. One's critical competence enables one

to take a critical attitude toward one's desires, but nowhere in the preceding discussion is there any necessity that an autonomous person also be moral. This agrees with Durkheim's position as he saw the necessity for both autonomy and morality, but did not attempt to collapse one into the other as Kant did. In Kant's writing the word "heteronomy" is what Haworth calls "inner-impelled." This led Kant to believe, mistakenly, that if one is not inner-impelled then one is "other-impelled," that is, moral. Haworth, however, contrasts inner-impelled action with self-control, which does not necessarily mean moral.

The extension of Kant's thesis is the central mistake that Kohlberg made when trying to take Piaget's cognitive model into the moral realm. Kohlberg assumed that with increasing cognitive competence one would become increasingly other-impelled and hence more moral. In distinguishing between rational and full autonomy, Haworth argues that only people who endorse and live in a society that is founded on agreement -- those who generally live by the rule of techniques of social institutions -- are capable of full autonomy. Rational autonomous people are not guided by moral principles. Durkheim's tendency to eschew simple reductionism allowed him to see that morality could not simply be reduced to autonomy, or vice versa, and that there will always be a tension between them.

Haworth argues that unless we attribute the right of liberty to people, we cannot attribute any moral rights to them. If a society is to treat its members as having moral right then it must believe that everyone enjoys a natural right to liberty. He quotes H.L.A. Hart at length:

[Kant's] point is, I think, that we must distinguish from the rest of morality those principles regulating the proper distribution of human freedom which alone make it morally legitimate for one human being to determine by his choice how another should act, and a certain specific moral value is secured (to be distinguished from moral virtue in which the good is manifested) if human relationships are conducted in accordance with these principles even though coercion has to be used to secure this, for only if these principles are regarded will freedom be distributed among human beings as it should be. And it is I think a very important feature of a moral right that the possessor of it is conceived as having a moral justification for limiting the freedom of another and that he has this justification not because the action he is entitled to require of another has some moral quality but simply because in the circumstances a certain distribution of human freedom will be maintained if he by his choice is allowed to determine how that other shall act (quoted in Haworth 159)

This line of thinking coincides with Durkheim's definition of individualism in

"Individualism and the Intellectuals" In advanced societies, the fundamental right is human liberty in the abstract. This right is 'in the abstract' because we recognise that we must respect not only our own right to liberty, but also everyone else's. Social mores are maintained in an attempt to sustain an optimal level of individual liberty. This is the line of reasoning that led Cladis to conclude that Durkheim provided a 'communitarian defence of libertarianism'. Only by creating and maintaining social institutions that respect the right to liberty *in the abstract* can we expect to maintain specific rights to liberty. However, liberty is meaningless unless it is autonomous liberty. Hence, we see that attaching students to social groups and giving them the capacity for autonomy are not antithetical (in the abstract).

In short, "the right to liberty is not a fundamental right, if that means that people are entitled to be free regardless of the uses to which the freedom will be put and regardless of their capacity to exercise the freedom in a certain way. [T]he right to liberty is accorded in order that the individual may exist in an environment that nurtures

and endorses autonomy” (Haworth 167) Haworth sees the often used distinction between negative and positive freedoms as the difference between open options and autonomy. Another way to put this is to say that one has a right to liberty *if and only if* one is capable of enjoying that right and does not interfere with another’s right to developing and maintaining an autonomous life. To be capable of enjoying a right to liberty one must have gained normal autonomy. Until one has developed normal autonomy, it is an infringement on one’s rights to not be coerced into activities that will enable one to eventually gain normal autonomy. This articulation of the harm clause is not a call for minimal government, however, because we need publicly funded social institutions, possibly quite large and complex ones, to ensure that people are able to develop their capacity for autonomy. Neither does this harm clause does not endorse all facets of life being taken over by social institutions because it is quite possible that this would reduce people’s capacity for an autonomous life.

Autonomy and Community

Nothing in Haworth’s argument implies that autonomy is a goal to be pursued to the exclusion of all others. If he makes it clear that liberty and happiness are nearly worthless without autonomy, he is not saying that autonomy is a sufficient condition for a good life, only that it is a necessary one. Neither is Haworth, nor Durkheim, happy with the prevalent idea that one needs to trade some autonomy for some other desirable goal, like community. Rather, he would rather we understood the inherent limits of personal autonomy, limits that are the result of the very institutional life that made a greater degree of personal autonomy possible. To desire autonomy as an ideal means that we desire two

things: an increase in critical competence and increased ability to live the life one chooses. The first desire does not in any way threaten community as it only implies an increase in self-control, procedural independence, and competence. Increased critical competence does not imply that one will necessarily act in contravention to any social more. Critical competence is what Durkheim sought when he encouraged teachers to enable students to individuate themselves because advanced societies require critical competence of their citizens.

The difficulty occurs when the students try to act in ways that their critical competence encourages them, if those actions transgress social mores. It would seem that autonomy of this sort would be a prescription for anarchy, with no one willing to compromise their desires while trying to actualise greater personal autonomy. We have to remember, however, that Haworth showed that the independence that makes one autonomous is procedural, not substantive. Where people are acting in ways that will limit their autonomy, the State is required to coerce them into activities that enable them to achieve greater autonomy. Similarly, Durkheim felt that coercion, or non-indoctrinative belief inculcation, was justified to increase discipline and social attachment.

This does not help us with the more general problem, however. How is the State to distinguish between actions that are malevolent and those that are beneficent? Obviously there can be no general solution to this problem short of clairvoyance, so we have to devise and regulate social institutions that will mediate between social stability and social change. Mediating between these antagonistic concerns will always be a messy business, but Durkheim felt that good public education, healthy social and professional

groups, and representative democracy (and we can add healthy media) would channel the debate into constructive rather than destructive courses.

We see, then, that Durkheim's seeming ambivalence on the relationship between individual and community was well founded. At a macroscopic and theoretical level of analysis, individual autonomy and morality are not antithetical and are (usually) mutually dependent. On a microscopic and day-to-day level personal autonomy and morality are often opposed, forcing the individual to choose between one and the other. Recognising this, Haworth and Durkheim do not try to devise a normative theory that will explain away this fundamental problem. Durkheim's science of morality has not progressed, and may never, to the state where it will tell us what is right to do in any given situation. It does focus our attention, in a phrase popular with monetarist economists, on the important of 'getting the fundamentals right'.

Postscript

Reforming Durkheim's Educational Theory

I started by stating that *Moral Education* is a curious work. It is, but that is only because any honest attempt to develop and justify a theory of moral education is a difficult and complex task. That Durkheim was unable to fully justify his assertions in that work is of little surprise. When we look at his *oeuvre*, however, we see that he provided an elaborate theory for a complex problem. Understanding this theory, and then trying to verify it, is hampered at least two problems from a contemporary reader's perspective. First, Durkheim felt that the anomic forces in the *fin de siècle* and the *belle epoch* were at a crisis level. Thus, it is difficult, but not impossible, to separate the temporal recommendations from the atemporal wisdom he presented. I have shown that we can separate, if not always cleanly, the social theory Durkheim wanted to (and felt that he did) produce, from the theories that he did produce, and the recommendations he made from those studies.

These three strands of his writing are complexly interwoven and it impossible to look at them objectively. Fortunately, we don't need to. Contemporary epistemology has, in many ways, caught up with Durkheim's. We do not need to, and we cannot, produce a timeless educational theory appropriate for all people in all times. Undoubtedly, my analysis of Durkheim reflects my view of the culture I live in and the needs I believe should be addressed. As we have seen, while we understand the subjective nature of educational theory, we can still build general theories that are contextually correct by showing the rational connections between existing theories and between social facts. In

this way, Durkheim's critics, and Haworth's analysis of autonomy from a very different perspective, show a remarkable convergence that we can only take as verification of Durkheim's general theory. That there is verification and convergence does not mean, however, that we can simply uproot Durkheim's theory and transplant it into Canadian schools today. It does mean that there is a largely unmined bounty of educational thought that can be exploited to address contemporary problems.

We have seen that it is not easy to pin down Durkheim's ideas, especially given the many contradictory interpretations. This difficulty has many sources. While I have shown that his basic beliefs did not change, he tried to justify these beliefs in several different ways through his career, producing theories that often appear to be contradictory. We have also seen that he was not exceedingly careful with his concepts. Often within a given work he would make contradictory assertions or try to support the same argument with assumptions that appear contradictory. Add to this confusion that he was trying to demonstrate that traditionally contradictory philosophical traditions could be unified, and we begin to understand the complexity of the problem he was trying to address.

Durkheim's writing was sufficiently clear and penetrating to demonstrate that he had a deep understanding of society. He developed many interesting and enticing conceptual models and distinctions that tantalise the contemporary reader. His interpreters have taken this rich source of ideas, developing several antagonistic interpretations that make understanding Durkheim yet more difficult. Many authors, the ones I have drawn upon as secondary sources and many others, have tried to argue that they understand what Durkheim *really* meant and proceeded to use his decontextualised

ideas to support their arguments. I am not so certain of what Durkheim *really* meant and I hope that I have provided enough reasons to demonstrate that any definite or unifying ideas that summarise his work should be treated with suspicion. In short, Durkheim probably knew what he wanted his ideal society to look like, but he was unable to develop a social theory that would explain how it would work or how we could develop it from existing society. He knew what ideas he did not agree with, but he never articulated a social theory he was entirely happy with. I do think, however, that Cladis comes closest to a unifying theme by describing Durkheim's sociology as a communitarian defence of liberalism.

I am not as certain as Cladis, however, that Durkheim successfully or consistently articulated this idea. As I demonstrated in Chapters One and Two, reconciling the essential truths of French and German Socialism with the ideas of English Liberalism was a major thrust of Durkheim's work from the earliest published pieces to his barely-started *magnum opus*. Looking over Durkheim's *oeuvre*, we can see his various attempts to reconcile the seemingly antagonistic traditions. But Durkheim was a man of his era and his concern for social stability at times overcame his concern for developing a more general social theory. Saying that Durkheim was unsuccessful or inconsistent in achieving this "crown jewel" of social theory is, by no means, a damning criticism. Indeed, that he had any success is an testament to his immense insight.

The notion of a communitarian defence of liberalism helps us to understand the difficult idea of autonomy being necessary for moral education. Durkheim's arguments for the necessity of autonomy are based on the necessity of a new social consciousness

that requires individuals to be capable of rationally understanding social mores, and requires that social mores expect individuals to individuate themselves. In this way, we have seen, Durkheim defended the necessity of individual autonomy. We have also seen that Durkheim circumscribes the realm of personal autonomy to what Haworth calls procedural autonomy. People must behave morally because they rationally understand the reason for doing so, not simply because they were told to do so.

While we have seen some evidence of Durkheim's recognition of the importance of substantive independence -- people not just capable of autonomous thought but also choosing to act differently -- his feeling of national crisis encouraged him to emphasize discipline and social attachment. We recognize the importance of, and encourage, substantive independence when it is beneficial to society. We need to develop a theory of education that will explain how to develop substantive and procedural autonomy in all people and maintain the civil society that allows this development.

Durkheim's concern for social decay and decadence in his *fin de siècle* are, quite probably, all the more real in our *fin de siècle*. Where he was concerned with the malevolent affects of industrialisation, we need to be concerned with the affects of post-industrialisation. Where he was concerned with anomic result of living all of life as if it were a business, we have to be concerned with a growing segment of society that has been permanently "disenfranchised." Where he was concerned with creating a society founded on secular, liberal institutions that would allow for a pluralistic, equitable society, we need to be concerned with the increasing power fundamental religions and conservative politicians who are interested in protecting themselves and their concerns. Where he was

concerned with developing a viable national society, we are pondering the meaning of an supra-national society. The issues are, in many ways, the same, but with a different face. Reforming Durkheim's theory of moral education would be an excellent way to approach contemporary concerns of maintaining a viable society that is worth living in.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Jeffrey C. "Rethinking Durkheim's Intellectual Development: On the Complex Origins of a Cultural Society." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 1. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 355-383. 4 vols.
- . *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*. Vol. 2. "The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim." Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982. 4 vols.
- Alpert, Harry. *Emile Durkheim and His Sociology*. New York. Russell and Russell Inc., 1961
- "Emile Durkheim and the Theory of Social Integration." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 2. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 28-39. 4 vols.
- Bantock, Geoffrey H. *Dilemmas of the Curriculum*. New York: Wiley, 1980. Chapter 1 "The Evolution of the Curriculum "
- Brown, Harold I. *Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science*. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- Callan, Eamonn. *Autonomy and Schooling*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988.
- Cladis, Mark S. *A Communitarian Defence of Liberalism: Emile Durkheim and Contemporary Social Theory*. California: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- Collins, Peter. Introduction. *The Evolution of Educational Thought*. By Emile Durkheim. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. xvii-xxx.

- Durkheim, Emile. "Childhood." 1911 Trans H.L. Sutcliffe *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*. Ed. W.S.F. Pickering London. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979 149-154.
- . "Contribution to 'Morality Without God. An Attempt to Find a Collectivist Solution'." 1905. Trans. H.L. Sutcliffe. *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*. Ed. W.S.F. Pickering. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 34-36.
- . "A Discussion on Positive Morality: The Issue of Rationality in Ethics " 1908 Trans. H.L. Sutcliffe *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*. Ed W.S.F Pickering London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 52-64
- . "A Discussion on the Effectiveness of Moral Doctrines." 1909. Trans. H.L. Sutcliffe *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*. Ed W.S.F. Pickering London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 129-139.
- . "A Discussion on the Notion of Social Equity." 1910. Trans. H.L. Sutcliffe *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*. Ed. W.S.F Pickering London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 65-76.
- . *The Division of Labour in Society*. Trans George Simpson. New York. The Free Press, 1933.
- . "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions." 1914 Trans. Charles Blend. *Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society*. Ed. Robert N. Bellah London. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. 149-163.

- "Education Its Nature and Its Role " Trans Sherwood D. Fox. *Education and Sociology* New York: The Free Press, 1956 61-90
- *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Trans Joseph Ward Swain. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1915.
- "The Evolution and the Role of Secondary Education in France." Trans. Sherwood D Fox. *Education and Sociology* New York: The Free Press, 1956. 135-154.
- *The Evolution of Educational Thought* Trans. Peter Collins. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.
- "Individualism and the Intellectuals." 1898. Trans. Mark Traugott. *Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society* Ed. Robert N. Bellah London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973 43-58
- "Introduction to Ethics." 1920 Trans. H.L. Sutcliffe. *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education* Ed. W.S.F. Pickering. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979 77-96
- *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education*. Ed. Everett K. Wilson. Trans. Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer New York. The Free Press, 1961.
- "The Moral Greatness of France and the School of the Future." 1916. Trans. H.L. Sutcliffe. *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*. Ed. W.S.F. Pickering. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979 158-161.
- "The Nature and Method of Pedagogy." Trans. Sherwood D. Fox. *Education and Sociology*. New York: The Free Press, 1956. 91-112.

- . *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957
- "Review 'Lévy-Bruhl, *La Morale et la science des mœurs*.'" 1903. Trans. H.L. Sutcliffe. *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*. Ed. W.S.F. Pickering. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 29-33.
- . *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Ed. George E.G. Catlin. Trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller. New York: The Free Press, 1938
- . *Sociology and Philosophy*. Trans. D.F. Pocock. New York: Free Press, 1953.
- . *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. Trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.
- Dworkin, Gerald. *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Entwistle, Harold. "Freedom: Education's Albatross?" Unpublished. Concordia University.
- Fenton, Steve, et al. *Durkheim and Modern Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Fidler, Geoffrey C. "On Jean-Marie Guyau, Immoraliste." *Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.* 55 (1994): 75-97
- Floud, Jean. "L'Evolution Pédagogique en France." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 4. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 163-165
- 4 vols.

- Gardner, Howard *Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen Through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Elliot, Graham, and Gandhi*. New York: Basic Books, 1993
- Giddens, Anthony *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- *Emile Durkheim*. New York: Penguin Books, 1979.
- Hamilton, Peter Commentary *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 2. By Hamilton London: Routledge, 1990. 3-4. 4 vols
- Haworth, Lawrence. *Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986
- Holland, R F "Suicide as a Social Problem: Some Reflections on Durkheim." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 2. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 292-299. 4 vols
- Johnson, Barclay D. "Durkheim's One Cause of Suicide." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 3. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 34-51. 4 vols
- Jones, Robert Alun *Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works*. London: Sage Publications, 1986.
- LaCapra, Dominick. *Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher*. London: Cornell University Press, 1972.

- Lukes, Steven *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study*.
New York. Harper and Row Publishers Inc., 1973
- . "Prolegomena to the Interpretation of Durkheim " *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments* Vol. 2. Ed Peter Hamilton. London. Routledge, 1990. 318-342
4 vols.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990
- Olsen, Marvin E "Durkheim's Two Concepts of Anomie " *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 2. Ed. Peter Hamilton London Routledge, 1990. 47-54 4 vols
- Orrù, Marco. *Anomie: History and Meanings*. Boston. Allen and Unwin, 1987
- Pekarsky, Daniel "Relativism, Autonomy, and Religion in Durkheim's Moral Education A Response to Prakash." *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. 351-355
- Peterson, Howard, L "The Quest for Moral Order: Emile Durkheim on Education " *Journal of Moral Education* 4 (1974): 39-46
- Piaget, J *Moral Judgement of the Child* Trans Marjorie Gabain. Hammondsworth, Middlesex Penguin, 1977.
- Pickstone, John. "Bureaucracy, Liberalism and the Body in Post-Revolutionary France. Bichot's Physiology and Paris School of Medicine" *History of Science* 19: 115-142

- Poggi, Gianfranco. "The Place of Religion in Durkheim's Theory of Institutions." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 3. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 346-375. 4 vols.
- Prakash, Madhu Suri. "Reflections on Durkheim's Moral Education." *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. 339-349
- Ranulf, Svend. "Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol. 1. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 23-37. 4 vols
- Seidman, Steven. "Modernity and the Problem of Meaning. The Durkheimian Tradition." *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Vol 1. Ed. Peter Hamilton. London: Routledge, 1990. 277-304. 4 vols.
- Seigel, Harvey. "Indoctrination and Education." *Freedom and Indoctrination in Education: International Perspectives*. Eds. Ben Spieckler and Roger Straughan. New York: Cassell Education Limited, 1991
- Seigel, Jerrold. "Autonomy and Personality in Durkheim: An Essay on Content and Method." *Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.* 48 (1987): 483-507.
- Stock-Morton, Phyllis. *Moral Education for a Secular Society*. Albany: SUNY Press, 1988
- Wallwork, Ernest. *Durkheim: Morality and Milieu*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.

---. "Religion and Social Structure in *The Division of Labour*" *Emile Durkheim:*

Critical Assessments Vol 2. Ed Peter Hamilton. London. Routledge, 1990.

139-168. 4 vols

---. "Sentiment and Structure: A Durkheimian Critique of Kohlberg's Moral Theory."

Journal of Moral Education 14 (1985): 87-101.

Wrong, Denis Hame. *The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society* New

York Free Press, 1994.

Zeldin, Theodore *France: 1848 – 1945*. Vol. 2 Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1973. 2 vols

Appendix A

Economically Rational Decision Process

To present a schematic representation of the problem of choosing ends, Haworth represents the preference for an outcome by "O", the function of rational behaviour is the ability to choose an action, "A", that will maximise the likelihood of realising that outcome. Typically one is able to order preferences and choosing to satisfy one precludes satisfying others. I will follow Haworth's example. The technically rational person is able to find the action that will most likely satisfy a given outcome. In thinking about his day, a mechanic is able to decide the best means (A1) of fixing his engine (O1). He also wants to read a book (O2), spend time with his girlfriend (O3) and garden (O4). For each possible outcome he is able to determine the best possible action (A1 through A4). This demonstrates his technical rationality in each of these areas. The ability to choose which outcome he wants to pursue is the demonstration of his economic rationality.

This is the problem our mechanic must choose, but it does not tell us which criteria he must satisfy to be an economically rational choice. Let us assume that the criterion the mechanic wants to use is to "maximise expected utility." (Two other alternatives Haworth suggests might be appropriate are to maximise the probability of either avoiding the worst outcome or realising the best outcome.)

Haworth also points out some other assumptions about the choices. First, while the mechanic must choose one of the alternative actions, his preference depends on his preferred outcome, not his preferred activity. So, while he may prefer gardening as an action, here Haworth is only concerned with the outcome of having gardened. Second,

we assume that the mechanic can order his preferences for outcomes and this ordering has three properties: weak connexity, transitivity, and asymmetry, "that is, (i) his preferences form an unbroken ordering, (ii) if he prefers O_1 to O_3 , and he prefers O_4 to O_1 , then he prefers O_4 to O_3 , and (iii) if he prefers O_4 to O_1 he doesn't also prefer O_1 to O_4 "

(Haworth 31) Finally, we assume that our mechanic can identify the probability that each alternative action will realise the outcome with which it is paired

Let's suppose the order the mechanic prefers is, from most to least

- 1 O_4 - gardening
2. O_1 - tune the engine
- 3 O_3 - get together with his girlfriend
- 4 O_2 - read a book

If each action was certain or had the same probability, the problem would be simple

Thus, A_4-O_4 would be the economically rational choice. But since it might rain, he estimates the probability of successfully gardening at 25%, or $p(A_4-O_4) = .25$. Similarly, $p(A_1-O_1) = .75$, $p(A_3-O_3) = .66$, $p(A_2-O_2) = .99$. Now, since our mechanic decides that it is better to succeed at doing something, which is his best course of action? To make this decision, he must decide the utility that each action will bring. Since, in the example that Haworth gives, the utility is subjective (i.e., it cannot simply be measured in monetary units or the like), he chooses to give each a cardinalised preference as such:

- 1 $A_4-O_4 = 1$
2. $A_1-O_1 = 5$
- 3 $A_3-O_3 = .25$

$$4 \quad A2-O2 = 0$$

Since we have decided that the rule we will apply in this case is to “maximise expected utility” we multiply the expected utility by the probability of the outcome to get the expected utility for each action. The greatest expected utility is the economically rational choice. (Haworth also assumes that utility or disutility is associated with not realising an outcome.) So our expected utility is thus:

1. $e = p(A4-O4) = .25(1) = .25$
2. $e = p(A1-O1) = .75(.5) = .375$
3. $e = p(A3-O3) = .66(.25) = .165$
4. $e = p(A2-O2) = .99(0) = 0$

So we see that the economically rational choice of action is A1, the mechanic should spend his day tuning his engine, deferring gardening, reading, and love-making.