

The Collapse of Myths
Nietzsche and Timely Reflections on Capitalism

Amin Asadollahi

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ABSTRACT

The Collapse of Myths Nietzsche and Timely Reflections on Capitalism

Amin Asadollahi

This dissertation examines Nietzsche's treatment of truth, both in his earlier writings and continuing in his latter works, and explores its socio-political implications. While rejecting the correspondence theory of truth, it is argued that what Nietzsche conceived of as the Apollinian and Dionysian psychological states are significantly useful concepts to an understanding of what manner of persons populate the political landscape of contemporary capitalist societies. The study rejects the Apollinian reality purely as a constraint on the creative possibilities of interpreting and constructing new worldviews, while remaining attentive to the need for an alternative view placed in the service of truth and hence of valued life. The socioeconomic relations specific to capitalism are examined for their Apollinian characteristics, and the prevailing mode of production is thus taken up as a significant constraint against the potentials for human creativity and development. The implications of Nietzsche's notion of the Dionysian are introduced, and indeed conceived of as vital to the offering of a deconstructive moment in the domains of art, politics and economic governance. Emphasizing the metaphorical character of truths in the actually-existing world, the dissertation concludes with proposed strategies for the capture of the deconstructive moment, possible at the level of the complexly-layered dimensions of linguistic and cognitive play on offer at the conjuncture of Apollinian and Dionysian realities, and promising truly liberatory new conceptions of truth.

In memory of
Dr. Fereydoun Farrochsad

آرامگه ابلق صبح و شام است
گورست که تکیه گاه صد بهرام است

*This ancient desert that is named earth
Joy ground left from hundred Jamshids*

این کهنه ریاط را که عالم نام است
یزمی است که واما نده صد جمشید است

*Rests all that exists day and night
Graveyard for hundred Bahrams to lean on*

Omar Khayyam - Rubaiyat
[Translation mine]

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CONTENTS

Reference Key	VIII
Prologue	1
1 Metaphor and Truth	5
2 Aesthetics: Creativity and The Lost Potential of Art	22
3 The Myth and Illusions of Capitalism	62
4 Beyond Nihilism: The Symbiosis of Art and Knowledge	92
Notes	108
References	116

Reference Key to Nietzsche's Writings

References will be made to section numbers and will be provided within the text. Where Nietzsche had not used section numbers, as in the case of "Thus Spoke Zarathustra", the translating editors' numbering will be used. For direct citations, bibliographic references to the particular edition used are found at the end of the dissertation.

BGE	Beyond Good and Evil
BT	The Birth of Tragedy
D	Daybreak / Dawn
EH	Ecce Homo
GM	On the Genealogy of Morals
GS	The Gay Science / Joyful Wisdom
HH	Human, All Too Human
TL	On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense
TI	Twilight of the Idols / How to Philosophize with a Hammer
WP	The Will to Power
Z	Thus Spoke Zarathustra

❧ Prologue ❧

If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility – without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises – were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.

Michel Foucault – *The Order of Things*

The collapse of the established Weltanschauung – our comprehensive interpretation of the world and life – or otherwise the collapse of the worldview that we have come to make for ourselves, is perhaps the most serious challenge that humanity is to face, while remaining quite unprepared for the event. This feature of nihilism is most vividly exposed where all meanings, many of which are quite fundamental to the status of Western culture, fail to provide and take with them all those structures which had previously afforded stability. This fate of our worldview has its roots in the dismissal of Dionysian fluxes of reality, which Nietzsche traces back to Socrates. The end of Socratic culture reveals its implicit nihilism, which can be explored through a study of Western capitalist culture. Every culture imposes its truths, interpretation of life and experienced realities, over the world. These truths are myths specific to each society that, in Nietzsche's words, *make life possible and worth living*. That which this thesis deconstructs is the myth of capitalism as it unfolds in the last stages of Socratic culture. It examines the illusions that capitalism has furnished man¹ and remains critical of its certainty in its worldview. Furthermore and following Nietzsche, this thesis examines the difficulties associated with the universalization of Western capitalist myth as coinciding with the disintegration of Socratic culture.

The novelty in Nietzsche's philosophy is the theoretical possibility offered in powerfully deconstructing one's worldview while ultimately leaving a disassembled version of his reality and of his being in his hands, in pieces, to stare at them. Nietzsche not only deconstructs and exposes the nihilistic fate of man under Western capitalism, but also provides the possibility to construct a new man, which he names *Übermensch*. To pause and stagnate at the noon of nihilism, as many postmodern cultural theorists do, is characterized by the coming of the last man. Thus, our attempt must be, as Zarathustra reminds us, not merely to reproduce but to create a higher being and with it a higher reality (Z III:12 §23). This dissertation explores Nietzsche's deconstructive efforts in reevaluating the capitalist worldview, and at the same time puts emphasis on the reconstructive possibilities offered outside the interpretive limitations of this view. The endeavour of this thesis is to follow Nietzsche in advocating creative forms of truth seeking and construction that go beyond the orthodoxy of dualistic thinking. In doing so, correspondence and coherence theories of truth are rejected, and an empirical scientific study, aimed at capturing an objective or complete description of reality, is not employed. Béatrice Han's recent discussion on Nietzsche's critique of truth is useful in understanding the chosen methodology. Han distinguishes between three common strategies, three theories of truth (coherence, correspondence, and pragmatic), used to save Nietzsche from justifying his own truth claims.² Coherence theory of truth states that truth is held within its coherence to set of statements; usually to those which are best justified and held as the most complete description of the world. Correspondence theory of truth sees an objective reality that can be rendered through truth statements about it.

Finally, pragmatic theory of truth examines the utility of truth and treats it true only as far as it is useful. Han rejects the coherence theory on the basis of Nietzsche's rejection of logic and praise for contradiction. In regards to the correspondence theory, she believes that both in *Human, All too Human* and the *Gay Sciences* Nietzsche rejected any possibility for the idea of *adequatio*. In the latter he writes: "What sleepwalker has to go on dreaming in order to avoid falling down. What is 'appearance' to me no! Certainly not the opposite of some essence – what could I say about any essence except name the predicates of its appearance! [...] Certainly not a dead mask that one could put on an unknown x and probably also take off x!" (GS 54) Finally, and although Nietzsche highlights the importance of truths in making life possible, as "the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live" (WP 493), we must not treat Nietzsche as an advocate of a pragmatic theory of truth. Thus Han argues that, "... the possibility of playing a proposition's efficiency *against* its truth value being in itself proof of the distance that separates Nietzsche from a pragmatism which remains for him merely a critical tool."³ Certain truths are treated as true as far as having a valuation within a particular interpretation of life, one that remains a fictitious understanding. Nietzsche believed that life is both Dionysian and Apollinian, but under Western culture, the latter has come to dominate life and suppress the former. Within this culture, truths are not only errors without which life would be impossible, but have become dangerous to life itself through man's certainty in their illusions and denial of anything outside of them, especially as present in the capitalist myth.

This study is divided into four chapters, four artistic plays. In the first chapter, a short and concise linguistic and cognitive re-examination of Western canon of truth and structure of the world that we experience is examined. In chapter two, the thesis critiques our now-existing truths as having essentially undermined our ability to cultivate our being, and an extensive illustration on the lost role of creative forms of art, as often advocated in Nietzsche's Dionysian, is provided as a way of highlighting use of wills to power in construct of truths. This thesis puts together Nietzsche's earlier thoughts with his later publications, and maintains the assertion that we can find continuity in his writings.⁴ This position has come under intense criticism from some of the most prominent names in the Nietzschean philosophical circle, who have come to see a divide within Nietzsche's ideas. The theoretical foundation developed in the first two chapters moves away from such division and posits a continuous line of thought which is carried over to the analysis of our modern *Weltanschauung*. The third chapter is devoted to the experience of capitalist myth in Western culture, which is reaching its height of rhetoric in contemporary socio-political environment. In this chapter, capitalism is argued to suppress the Dionysian and the perceived certainty in its truth claims is brought under examination. In the fourth and final chapter, the possibility of a form of truth building at the world-level, one that is respective of the dual Apollinian and Dionysian dynamic character of life, is explored. The invocation of the Dionysian is advocated as the basis through which an honest form of *Weltanschauung*, which is lacking in now dominant political discourse, would be possible.

CHAPTER ONE

METAPHOR AND TRUTH

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and longer as coins.

Nietzsche – *On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense*

Every view and position that we hold, we must question and bring under examination. We must question them in their entirety: of how we obtained them, what they stand for, and their role in justifying other truths by way of coherence. We must question them in their entirety for they are the basis for an understanding of a worldview which seems to provide less and less. The events of our modern times, social relations which no longer fall within mainstream patterns, lack of faith in God, and decline of orthodox values has reduced our trust in our own truths and significantly affected our valuation of life itself. In the age of nihilism, every member of the scientific community has rushed towards a quick bandage solution, only to, in the end, cover over the lies of the Apollinian Weltanschauung that are felt to have been exposed as illusions.

Most contentious is the laughter of victory towards Truth in sciences that parallels the same aftertaste of religious optimism. It imposes a motionless reassurance on how things are, and in its “objective” quest towards the *Real*, science like religion produces an order and a privileged point of reference which ultimately stipulates, and even presumes, that in its trajectory towards the absolute, the truths which it has uncovered are Real.

While the pursuit of knowledge is not rejected in this thesis, it is argued that the optimism which it entails essentially has forgotten metaphors as being an inclusive part of its truth statements. “What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding.” (TL 1) The presentation of this chapter is aimed at exploring Nietzsche’s earlier thoughts on truth, while the following chapter studies the development of these thoughts in his later writings, towards the more complexly articulated idea of, what Nietzsche called, the Dionysian man.

Truth and Language

The error in all logic claims is rooted in the linguistic difficulties associated with a marked inattention to the metaphorical character of language. The disassociation between experience, reflection, and truth formation is an important omission, one that not only forgets the speaker but also paves the path to further utterance. In Nietzsche’s words, “[l]ogic is merely slavery within the fetters of language. But language includes within itself an illogical element: metaphor, etc.” (TL 177). In order to understand this assertion, the intent of this thesis is a reassessment of the significance of metaphor in our truth claims. Moreover and most importantly to this dissertation, I centre the impressions of language as metaphorical construct in such a way as to conceive metaphors as themselves measures of reality. Following Lawrence Hinman’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s examination of truth,¹ the central role of “carrying over” or *Übertragung* in

Nietzsche's critique of linguistic composition is emphasized, and its symbiotic relationship in Nietzsche's writings with language and truth is explored.

The argument is as follows: that once a metaphor gains a fixed position in our psyche it morphs into truth. Let us begin by exploring this assertion first within truth construction that assume a literal, an object-relation, and present the problem in this arrangement, as Hinman points out, in the construct of the literal itself. Hinman argues that the literal, in proximity to the periphery or otherwise point of conjuncture where the object world and language come into contact, has no *Übertragung*, and thus refers to its own singularity and none other. Given such strict defining parameters, Nietzsche maintains that whenever a word is identified through anything outside of itself, it subsequently gains a metaphorical character; for it cannot identify itself as a thing-in-itself, and uses a reference to an imagined identity outside of itself. In a complex language in which words are closely interlaced with one another, however, it seems hardly plausible to place a word under such strict defining parameters. Even at the first instance of image reception, of the first concept, *Übertragung* occurs between the stimuli of an image – its sensory reception – and its treatment in imagination. “To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one.” (TL 1) In other words, what is carried from reception is treated interpretatively in the imagination through not what it *is* but what it is perceived as. No singularity, in this sense, can be grasped as a thing-in-itself. Drawing from this is the metaphorical character of even the

prime formation of a word, which through its interpretive element, gives it not an absolute position but rather more fluid certainty, unwieldy as this may seem.

The central error in how we treat metaphor begins with how we employ our conceptual knowledge. Nietzsche notes that in order to make real the use of our conceptual knowledge, we necessarily group two dissimilar things within a singular object-relation under the same word. This is done in two ways, both by way of treatment of things which are similar as equals: (1) by omitting their dissimilarities, and (2) by overemphasising the apparent commonality. In both cases, carrying over from one object to another gives *not* a literal case of the word but its metaphorical counterpart. The individualized metaphorical experience is forgotten, and the distinction in both objects and experience becomes blurred. This error further carries its after-effect in how man employs his knowledge in his judgment actions. In every judgement Nietzsche finds that in aid of our recollection, we declare to having found an “identical case,” while in essence being trapped in the above two errors.

The judgment does not produce the appearance of an identical case. Rather it believes it perceives one: it works under the presupposition that identical cases exist... There could be no judgments at all if a kind of equalization were not practiced within sensations: memory is possible only with a continual emphasizing of what is already familiar, experienced. (*WP* 532)

Judgement and actions within our perceived reality are induced from man's conceptual take on abstractions which, are in the end metonymies: “Thus we forget the metaphorical origins of our own concepts, imbue them with an independence and causal efficacy which they did not originally possess, order them in accordance with schemata which are themselves of metaphorical origins, and then place ourselves under the domination of a

world which was originally of our own construction.”² When it comes to non-object relations, the conceptual making of a *Weltanschauung* can be seen as an act of art which has produced a fixed order of things. There are two ideas that are being presented here, that through art truths are constructed of the real, and second, by forgetting the artistic origin of these interpretations, the constructed view limits possibilities outside of it. The directional function of the human mind, through the projection of a final destiny – whether be of otherworldly hopes, the projection of scientific optimism, or earthly devotions – attempts to bring meaning to rather a significantly superficial human understanding of the world. As discussed in forthcoming chapters, the Apollinian is both a way of expression and a reality which is lived, and it is under its state that we treat certain subjective constructs as truths and deny anything that transgresses beyond the restrictive parameters of the experienced Apollinian myth. The problem in this endeavour is not the pursuit of truth itself, but the lost image of ourselves as artists and as well as the act of creation. Through the errors of conceptual knowledge, humanity now alike the stoic then inscribe an order that does not exist onto the world. It is thus the case that, the perceived order of how things are does not necessarily imply an existing order of things in Reality but how they are perceived to be – a truth behaviour that exists in abstraction as a product of its creator.³ If this is so, the difficulty rises in distinguishing the thing-in-itself, as Kant wanted, from that of a thing of appearance. Truth, in Nietzsche’s words, “is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations:– to classify phenomena into definite categories. In this we start from a belief in the ‘in-itself’ of things (we take phenomena as *real*)” (*WP* 517).⁴ Nietzsche further writes,

[f]rom the sense that one is obliged to designate one thing as 'red,' another as 'cold,' and a third as 'mute,' there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth... As a '*rational*' being, he now places his behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. (TL 1)

The truths which man makes of this world are useful as far as they serve a function in allowing him to interact with and within the realm of a constructed world. To make a truth of a stone as being hard, for instance, serves its function, as Nietzsche reminds us, as long as we remember that the sensation aroused in the first place is from our subjective stimuli. This however is commonly not the case, and by forgetting the artistic origin of both signifier and signified, there exists a tendency to make sense of the world in which one lives by generalizing the product of subjective impulse into philosophical-linguistic categories. Overtime, the product of the impulse, of one person or of a shared experience, is treated in society by forgetting the artistic and subjective origin of the experience, and gains permanence within the language of the given society.

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche associates the origin of language with the expression of power (cf. *GM* I §2); a project that he goes to great length to assess in *Beyond Good and Evil*. If we are to understand what is good and bad we must look at their origin and of how they have come to be. "The signpost to the *right* road" writes Nietzsche, "was for me the question: what was the real etymological significance of the designations for 'good' coined in the various languages?" (*GM* I §4) Expressions of power as originally having evolved specific to variant master and slave societies entailed the cohesion of a social relation that was specific to a given society. Interpretation of the world results out of the language that evolved from this expression of power, and the

values and judgments which one society holds survives or declines in relation to their socio-historical development. The error in forgetting the evolution, if we were to use such term, of language from which certain values arise leads also to the forgetting of their metaphoric origin. The problem is more revealing, as discussed in chapter three, when certain myths and truths of a language, with a limited capacity to express only those subjective sensations that it has experienced through the course of its growth, is universalized and becomes the dominant medium for later experience. Not only does such threat challenge the extent of possibilities of expression but also carries the sensations of one language onto a society that does not share its historical experience; effectively bringing about a sense of confusion of what things really are and most significantly, of new power relations. The linguistic connotation of values and judgements of one society do not necessarily bear similar meaning in another, and the forgetting of their artistic origin raises serious socio-political challenges.

Beneath everything, as Nietzsche would have it, is the *residue of a metaphor* which we over time replace with the illusion of its certainty, as a thing-in-itself. In other words, truths, whether they be of object-origin or social myths, come as result of an artistic preoccupation that over time transcend the creator, and subjugates him to his own art and takes away his artistic abilities, for he is certain in the product of art which he has created. In short, truths are best understood as constructs which make life possible, bring meaning to life, and provide structure within which one can act and interact. Whether they be of object-origin or the products of non-object impulses, they are the result of human constructions that settle into definite understandings, by their routine application

and through the forgetting of their artistic origin. We cannot do without our “truths,” but can also limit ourselves within their restrictive views, if we were to take them too seriously. There are multitudes of impulses within us, as discussed in the following chapter, that fight against one another, form unions towards a common direction, or even cancel each other out. These many impulses, however, are not all explored or brought to the realm of possibilities; primarily for the existing truths make possible only those certain impulses that affirm the existing language and alienates the many of which remain outside of it. “Language and the prejudices upon which language is based” writes Nietzsche, “very often act as obstacles in our paths when we proceed to explore internal phenomena and impulses: as one example, we may instance the fact that there are only words to express the superlative degrees of these phenomena and impulses.” (D 115) Variant impulses are denied for they either remain alien within existing language or counter already established truths. Interpretive constructs which settle as truths and gain a life outside of their artistic origin restrict one’s view through a narrow passage while it pushes all those impulses outside of it down into our subconscious. These latter impulses do not simply disappear, but the possibility for their expression is denied and hence, as Nietzsche would have it, they remain awake in our dreams, a state of mind that is still open to the possibilities of art.

Real life has not the freedom of interpretation possessed by dream life; it is less poetic and less unrestrained ... that there is no really essential difference between waking and dreaming! ... That our moral judgments and valuations are only images and fantasies concerning physiological processes unknown to us, a kind of habitual language to describe certain nervous irritations? That all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary of an unknown text, one which is perhaps unknowable but yet felt? (D 119)

If existing truths are to be understood as a measure of reality, we must also accept that the language through which truths are articulated produce a power relation. This is a power relation is manifested in two ways. First, language subjugates man to his own truths, and while it makes life possible under certain truths, at the same time it also denies those impulses that remain outside of the language through which one experiences the world and life. Second, the language of the experienced reality reasserts the status of the ruling class, who have a special role and interest in maintaining the status quo language and its illusions. Under Western Socratic culture, we remain constrained within the illusions of our truths, and suppress the Dionysian which could expose its illusions as illusions. Thus within this culture, man becomes repetitive, certain of his truths, and denies the possibility of becoming anything outside of what he has made of himself and the world which he experiences.

The Significance of Truths as Metaphors

Nietzsche's emphasis that the Real world can only be grasped as an appearance and never as a thing-in-itself separates him from an entire scholarly history that has been and is preoccupied with Truth as something that can be ultimately obtained.⁵ Wayne Klein correctly situates Nietzsche's treatment of Truth, when he writes, "Nietzsche does not deny truth in the rather simplistic and polemical manner so often claimed. What is being denied – if one wishes to employ this vocabulary – is the coherence of the correspondence theory of truth, not the concept of truth itself."⁶ Klein argues that readings of Nietzsche tend to bring confusion on the philosopher's later thoughts within

the frame of his critique of truth. The relevance of truth within Apollinian and Dionysian states, a theme explored in more detail in chapter two, is introduced in this thesis and it is argued that Nietzsche's critique of truth in his earlier unpublished notes remained as the central basis for his later writings.

To assume that Nietzsche's deconstruction of the truths of his reality, as many in the scholarly circle have, was merely aimed at the Christian ideal would be to take his critique too lightly and without due consideration afforded to the overall continuity of his writings. From this scholarly circle is Clark, who argues "that Nietzsche rejects metaphysics and eventually overcomes it in his own work, but that he ultimately affirms the existence of truths, and therefore does not undermine his own theory when he claims truth for his own positions."⁷ In effect and in order to support her theory, Clark treats will to power and the thought of eternal return through a literal reading of Nietzsche and as ideals that he ultimately held. My reading of Nietzsche situates will to power as plurality of impulses, where under the Apollinian reality certain of which are brought to the realm of possibilities and under the Dionysian the many will points are awakened, as they are in dreams under the Apollinian. The thought of eternal return, on the other hand and following Heidegger, is best understood if we relate it closely with will to power. "The fact that Nietzsche called his thought a *belief* probably also led to the customary view that the doctrine of return must have been a personal confession of religious faith on Nietzsche's part."⁸ Heidegger goes further to state that though this thought came in relation to religions that "denigrate life on earth and posit a life 'beyond' as definitive", the doctrine nevertheless is also present in the existing and not simply as an alternative to

the existing. The truths that are an outcome of the Apollinian reality reoccur through will to power, for they are the products of realized impulses; one's that the artist remains unconscious of but nevertheless reproduces, because it is fundamental to his understanding of the self. Heidegger writes:

The thinking of the most difficult thought is a believing. It holds firm in the true. Truth for Nietzsche always means the true, and the true signifies in Nietzsche's view of being – that which is fixated as permanent. This occurs in such a way that the living creature secures its subsistence in and through the circle of what is fixated. As fixation, belief is the securing of permanence.⁹

In the Apollinian state, those impulses that have been substantiated eternally reoccur as they have been brought to the realm of possibilities and are willed. Under the Dionysian, however, the possibility of becoming allows the construct of new truths. The fallback on the Apollinian gives the Dionysian man the possibility of accentuating those wills to power which he would want to see reoccur under the former state. Put the other way around, the Dionysian makes possible a state of becoming by removing the Apollinian mask and making possible those impulses that were denied under the Apollinian. This is a higher joyous state that is conscious of the chaos over which the Apollinian has imposed order, and goes back to its former state with a new wisdom that allows the construct of new truths. There are two thoughts that highlight the post-Dionysian state: First is the rejection of otherworldly hopes and myths that have worked against life; Second is the construct of new truths that are directed towards enhancing life and the willing towards those that one wants to see reoccur. It is in this way that Clark views Nietzsche as contradicting himself and proposing an ideal, while she marginalizes the importance of eternal recurrence within the Apollinian reality. Clark believes "that

Nietzsche himself has brought to the aid of his own will to truth his doctrine of life as will to power. For though he presents it as if it were true, it is actually his 'creation of the world,' a construction of the world from the viewpoint of his own ideal."¹⁰ Eternal return is not a system of morality, as Clark would want us to believe, but is already present in the existing order of things. Moreover, both will to power and eternal return are better understood if we treat them as constructs which allow us have a better understanding of the world which we experience, rather than absolute truth claims. Furthermore, the problem in Clark's study of Nietzsche is a selective reading of how Nietzsche treats truth within the Apollinian and Dionysian states. My reading of Nietzsche appreciates him for not only deconstructing the Kantian thing-in-itself, as Clark would have us to assume, but indeed any logical claims towards truth, for he states that, "... between two absolutely different spheres such as subject and object there is no causality, no correctness, no expression, but at most an *aesthetic* comportment, a stuttering *post factum* translation into a completely differently language."¹¹ This remained as the main backdrop through which Nietzsche critiqued the value of our lives within the illusions of Apollinian truths. Ultimately what Nietzsche proposed, as discussed in chapter two and through his conception of the Dionysian, was both the deconstruction of our truths and also the artistic construction of new illusions. Apollinian myths, especially capitalism as discussed in chapter three, have worked against life by making truth claims outside of life and have valuated everything, including life, in terms of truths that are constructed under its guise. A new way of understanding the world and living must correspond to a myth that allows the cultivation and further enhancement of life; for life goes beyond and

comes before any truth statement, and is not, as Clark treats it, a truth construct that Nietzsche is attempting to enhance. The new way of understanding the world is also a myth that is made possible through the Dionysian wisdom that allows man to become his own legislator and to explore the multitude of his impulses as an “*artistically creating subject*.” What is important to underline here is that, Nietzsche’s truth statement through the Dionysian does not fall within the boundaries of orthodox understandings of truth. Nietzsche is aware that the Dionysian is his creation and he becomes its disciple as far as he becomes his own disciple – the truths that the Dionysian constructs, are themselves taken to remain always conscious of its creator and its creator of it.¹²

Following the arguments developed in the previous section, we are essentially unable to *contain* Reality within absolute concepts and without a metaphorical disposition. The metaphorical relation between image and word, for example, radically undermines our understanding of object-origin truths. Truths that we make of reality and encapsulate within concepts come out of our artistic impulse until we forget their artistic source, at which point they gain a life of their own. If we are to follow Nietzsche’s line of argument, especially under the conditions of Apollinian reality, we find that there is an internal causality following the creation of a concept which lends to other truths, neither making them true or false in the conventional sense of the word. It is for this that Klein goes to critique Clark as having a very “narrow understanding of the concept of truth” and asserts that “...in his later writings Nietzsche employs the concepts of truth in a way that exceeds the logic of binary opposition which grounds the traditional philosophical understanding of truth. That rather than seeing an essential opposition between true and

false, there is instead a sense in which truth and falsity are essentially implicated within one another..."¹³ For Nietzsche, as Klein later notes, the true world over time becomes a fable, for the error of having essentially forgotten the metaphoric disposition in our conceptualization of the world continually repeats itself, leading to other truths statements that embody the error in more than one way. Clark's assessment of Nietzsche's position gives way to the idea that Nietzsche essentially believed in a true world outside of our current view, which can ultimately be obtained, through what Clark sees as the Dionysian. Although Nietzsche upholds the Dionysian as a more honest way of formulating truths, I differ from Clark on her conclusion. The Dionysian exposes the myths of the Apollinian and constructs truths that are treated at the end as artistic constructs which make life possible. Nietzsche's critique of truth does not leave any room for the Real to be grasped completely in anyway, empirical or otherwise, and this is consistent even in his later publications. The Apollinian creates illusions that we over time forget to be illusions, and the Dionysian serves as a means to awaken a state wherein we are aware of them as such; the latter invoking a metaphorical relation towards an apparent world which does not stand in contrast, or opposition if you will, to a Real world.¹⁴ The truths that result out of this artistic activity cannot substantiate any understanding that advocates true and false as opposing dichotomies of one another, but radically rather as rooted together in the concept.

Klein believes "...that a rigorous reading of Nietzsche's later writings assumes both a rejection of precisely the neo-empiricist view of truth which Clark and others attribute to Nietzsche and an appreciation of Nietzsche's radical reinterpretation of

truth.”¹⁵ Given his critique that the literal is essentially not possible without having a metaphorical disposition, Nietzsche offers a new scheme of thought where disposition towards knowledge is made possible, and he goes to advocate this throughout his later publications. The solution is best highlighted through Rüdiger Safranski’s excellent inquiry into the development of Nietzsche’s thoughts, which posits what he calls a *bicameral system* of knowledge.¹⁶ Following his critique of scientific and philosophical preoccupations with trying to encapsulate reality within absolute truths, which essentially remain fictions, Nietzsche praises art for its creativity but attacks it at the same time “for feigning truth that it cannot provide.” What Nietzsche offers is a division, if you will, within the faculty that makes the coexistence of artistic illusions with their stability *within concepts* possible. This idea is best noted, as Safranski indicates, in *Human, All Too Human*, where Nietzsche remarks,

... [that] a higher culture must give man a double-brain, as it were two brain-ventricles, one for the perceptions of science, the other for those of non-science: lying beside one another, not confused together, separable, capable of being shut off; this is the domain of health. In one domain lies the power-source, in the other the regulator: it must be heated with illusion, onesidedness, passions, the evil and perilous consequences of overheating must be obviated with the aid of knowledge furnished by science. (*HHI* §251)

Nietzsche cannot be any clearer here in advocating the need for scientific rationality that is heated by the energetic call of art – most vivid through the Dionysian. One can not have a full appreciation of Nietzsche’s ideas without taking into account his admiration for art. Science lends to errors through its instinctive shelter in logic but only to experiences a shipwreck, as Nietzsche would have it. Science experiences nihilism as did optimism at which the metaphorical composition of concepts was ill-rendered. The

Modern sciences, in order to avoid this impasse, have sought to avoid asserting certainty by rather claiming this or that is what *seems* as the most logical conclusion.¹⁷ All the same, science remains optimistic in relation to its objectivity and it is for this reason that Nietzsche, in his 1886 preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, praises the dare he took in that book, “to look at science in the perspective of the artist, but at art in that of life.” (BT Attempt at a Self-Criticism: 2) Given his critique, Nietzsche nevertheless believed that humanity essentially needs stable truths in order to live: to give life meaning and to make it possible. Under Apollinian truths, man remains trapped within illusions that he remains unaware of *as* illusions. On the other hand, a Dionysian state of awakening praises the chaos, the incapacity of man to encapsulate this world within any static notion of truth, and for this Nietzsche is aware of its danger against life. Given the chaotic impossibility of grasping the Real within our truths, Nietzsche does not reject a preoccupation with making this world more “sensible,” but rather advocates an honest treatment of truths as our constructs.

If we remain instinctively aware, however, that the Dionysian cannot grant any truth in the absolute sense of the word, we can notice the continuity from Nietzsche’s earlier writings on truth and language and his later works, without resorting to the conclusion that Nietzsche is making any Truth statements in the neo-empiricist sense of the word. “That the artist places a higher value on appearance than on reality constitutes no objection to this proposition. For ‘appearance’ here signifies reality *once more*,” writes Nietzsche, “only selected, strengthened, corrected.... The tragic artist questionable and terrible in existence, he is *Dionysian*...” (TI: *Reason in Philosophy* 6) Nietzsche

does not proclaim that there is an ultimate reality that can be obtained, but a constant Dionysian engagement of Apollinian reality, upon which we fall back – the artistic play between the two that makes possible a sense of movement that is not, in the end, directed towards any ultimate Reality.

Conclusion

To understand the devaluation of our own truths, we must understand how we have thus far lived life within the illusions which we ourselves had created but without essentially being aware of them. We must understand how we have situated this as true and that as false, and given them names without consciously being aware of the discretion which we had employed. Beneath every truth statement remains an important element, mainly that of metaphor. It denies any possibility of making truth statement that is literal and with it any static *Weltanschauung*. All that is is interpretive and a product of our subjective being. The truths that we construct, as described in the next chapter, are useful fictions as far as they make life possible, and become true only within the construct of the truths which we have made of this world. Beneath it all, the world that we live is rather chaotic and there are no conceptual schemes to encapsulate it within any static order of things that are not essentially fictions themselves. This is a world that the Dionysian praises and the Apollinian fears. With this understanding in mind, we may begin to reevaluate our views and all those truths which we blindly take as true.

CHAPTER TWO

AESTHETICS: CREATIVITY AND THE LOST POTENTIAL OF ART

Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that *this* sun, *this* window, *this* table is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an *artistically creating* subject, does man live with any repose, security, and consistency.

Nietzsche – *On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense*

The energetic call of art makes tremble all those who have become used to the imminent *is*, the existing interpretation of reality. The stroke of a brush is to draw a line on the present and to pronounce all that was as no more. In a way, the reality of Western Socratic culture is deceiving for preference is given to certainties over fluidity, to constants rather than to the fluxes of life, and the chaos underneath everything is essentially denounced. Pain and suffering had a central role in this deception, which began by objectifying suffering into intoxications, into ideals and absolute virtues, and eventually led to the creation of a stable worldview of things. As an example, through him and above him man's creation of a God in Western culture had been one initial project working to distort reality and allowing man to rest within the comfort of his own truths. This intoxication is rightly rooted in what Platonic philosophy has become; in the quest for knowledge, the Socratic virtue has denied the world of becoming and has in turn objectified the good outside of the flux of reality; while at the same time the history of this fascination has constituted a fight against life, a rule over nature, and indeed of the highest narcotic effects. The catastrophe under examination here comes as a result of a preoccupation with truths of reality as absolutes which have devalued not only life but

that have also paved the path to the eventual collapse of all meaning – a nihilistic fate that the postmodern reality dangles tantalizingly in front of us.

Absolute truths that are metaphysical or otherwise are of central concern; for in his will to truth, man constructs truths of life, ones that are illusions but are treated as truth. Nietzsche moved to produce a critique of metaphysical truths as part of a greater critique of all life and worldviews that assume a privileged status. Nietzsche employed a very dynamic notion of truth, as discussed in the preceding chapter, and the Dionysian god which he presents hardly fits the orthodoxy of truth statements based upon which Clark evaluates Nietzsche's thoughts. Following Debra Befgoffen rather, the death of God in Nietzsche's writing represent the symbolic death of a culture infatuated with the desire for the absolute and with a static understanding of truth.¹ The death of God in Nietzsche's writings represents not only the God of the metaphysics but also and indeed more importantly all conceptualizations of the world that we experience as determinate. The use of religion in this thesis will serve the same case in point in this work, so as to reflect the role of absolute truths in the actually-existing world. Contrary to Clark, I demonstrate the dynamic dimension of Nietzsche's Dionysian view, as being both inclusive and creatively deployed within his greater critique of truth. The decline of these truths, under Nietzsche's deconstruction, gives way to the philosopher's nihilistic revelation, through which he ultimately advocates the need for a new understanding of truth as a creative product of art if humanity is to survive what is to come.

Art produces a multitude of portrayals of our world, and some are no doubt better and more illustrative than others. Nevertheless, art produces a multitude of truths in such a

way as to be respective and representative of the artist, which can be both destructive and creatively employed. In order to understand the role of art in relation to the truths of the reality which we experience, this chapter is divided into four subsections. In the first part, the context for theorizing in the thematic sections to follow is established by introducing the role of tragedy as a creative aesthetic force. In the second part existent human efforts to disguise the suffering in life through Apollinian art are highlighted. In the third, the dance of Dionysus and its play with the Apollinian is presented. Finally in the fourth section, we will attempt to revive Nietzsche's tragic hero and highlight the importance of will to power for this character.

Camouflaging Reality

The life which we live is not essentially beautiful but is mainly constituted of pain, suffering, and endless contradictions, and that I accept. Schopenhauer exposed this pain, presented in Richard Schacht's words, as a "[c]easeless striving, inescapable suffering, inevitable destruction – all pointless, with no meaning and no justification, no redemption or after-worldly restitution, and with the only deliverance being that of death and oblivion..."² But why don't we all feel the extremity of this view of life and continue to live? Is it perhaps because some feel the burden of life less than others? I would like to make the case that the explanation rests in the symbiotic conceptual relation between the world which we experience and life, and over time we have come to falsify the former in order to arouse a better sensation in the latter – a theme developed in a more nuanced way in chapter three. To begin with those certain religions that have place guilt

of suffering on man, we must go back to the original sin which essentially ascribed suffering to a course of history that in turn brought forth an intergenerational guilt and took away the most pleasant sensations from man: of the fruit, of sensuality, of ability to write ones own biography and of creation. Schopenhauer would suggest that “[t]he true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight that what the hero atones for is not his own particular sins, but original sin, in other words, the guilt of existence itself...”³ Depriving us of not only the higher sensations but also of life, religious intoxication would otherwise credit suffering into the realm of a divine experiment and at times as a punishment, or life as an experimental realm for a God who is uncertain about his own creation and who finds fancy in appeasing and punishing at the same time. This is what religiosity teaches: “humanity as a mockery for the divine”; and perhaps it should be the ape that should laugh at us rather than we at it! Nevertheless, we carry the same experiment over to other species; making the laboratory mouse run around in circles towards his fancy and then shocking it to learn if it will progress for the next experiment. At the first jolt we should have long ago thrown the apple back at our gods and shouted, that if they wanted it, they could come and get it themselves; and wouldn’t that be an astonishment if the mice did the same to us! But we remained mice, caged in the puzzle with the everlasting guilt of *c’est la vie*, running around in the dream of finally one day being appeased in the Christian heaven with promises of reunification with the master, in its Islamic counterpart of virgins, and in some Eastern religions of hierarchical reincarnations based on one’s adherence to laws of the divine. In short and in light of suffering, after-worldly hopes provide something to look forward to beyond the misery of

this life, all the while crafting and fusing meaning to and finding meaning in everything that exists in the world and in the imagination. When the question is of pain, the person of faith will quickly raise an eyebrow to remind you of the devil, whom God created out of leisure on the seventh day to constitute the politics of religion for us until now – for indeed we must be either on God’s side or against him.

When God is no longer able to provide meaning, or perhaps we should say when faith is no longer, it is faith in the object-world that fails and all that exists seems no more and collapses before our very own eyes.⁴ This is the nihilistic revelation of the Schopenhauerian reality of which the Soothsayer reminds Zarathustra, and is one which continues to be a central concern of Nietzsche’s. In the instance of divinity, God plays a substantial role in defining our existence and all that exists around us, and to see it diminish brings to our very eyes the imaginary of suffering and of pain both in on this world and without expectations outside of it. Nietzsche praises the “honest atheism” of Schopenhauer as the first step in bringing such honesty to European thought, which was(is) so infatuated with valuations of Christian morality and divine reason that it could (can)not see outside of it (*GS* 357).⁵ This affected Nietzsche insofar as, Hollingdale puts it, “[w]hen he broke away from Christianity and religion, Nietzsche spoke of setting sail upon a sea of doubt, from the midst of which one would often long for firm land again: Schopenhauer was firm land upon which he temporarily came to rest.”⁶ The deconstruction of absolute truths is a necessary process, and in the case of ascetic truths, its deconstruction provides the temporary and indeed necessary resting ground for one to feel the burden of existence for what it is.⁷ The difficulty lies in the burden of reality

without any protective measure, or as Alenka Zupančič writes, “[t]ruth is like an excessively strong light: if we look at it directly, it blinds or destroys us.”⁸

Given such a view of life, it seems implausible to look forward to anything if the Apollinian covers over reality are removed. Schopenhauer goes so far as to denounce all acts of will while correlating man’s will, as Christopher Janaway makes clear, with satisfaction and *Glück* (happiness).⁹ In all acts of the will, Schopenhauer would argue, there is always striving for something more, and this lack brings to the fore a pain that makes absolute satisfaction simply unattainable. *Glück* in turn becomes only possible momentarily, and in a time frame that essentially distorts and reduces our conception of happiness to moments rather than to a continuous status, and it is thus felt that it is at neutral points of time when suffering is absent. In other words, the willing towards absolute ends are illusions which upon a point of achievement presents a further distance, or a sort of mirage towards a setting sun. At the end of the day what we are left with is rather darkness, pain and suffering, and a proposed solution is “... to seek nothing positive from a world which owes one nothing and to concentrate on minimizing our pain.”¹⁰ Although Nietzsche’s reflections stand at a particular historical juncture wherein his thoughts present themselves best in light of, what I would regard as, Schopenhauer’s Dionysian experiment with life, this extreme position of Schopenhauer, in giving preference to non-existence over any types of suffering, is a major divide between the two philosophers (cf. *WP* 46 and 84). There is much underlying agreement between the two thinkers, and Nietzsche’s break from his mentor comes not as a result of their agreed preconditions of life but their reflections on it. The agreement is so deep that Zarathustra

remained speechless in presence of the Soothsayer's revelation and grieves for three days (Z II:19), and Nietzsche needed to address this essential agreement and overcome it at the same time.¹¹

Matthew Rampley is quite right to suggest that in *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche assigned himself the task of exploring representative means of the will to live. It is a book that came out of a reflection on Schopenhauer's reactive nihilism and the rejection of the latter's passivity.¹² I believe that the two common outlooks on suffering, especially where their conditions fully express their extent, are to overcome the difficulties of suffering or to accept them as given prior absolutes. Nietzsche presents a third option, however, and fuses these choices into the polarity of option C, which not only accepts the Schopenhauerian suffering but goes so far as to incorporate it in an active way and within the definition of existence. For Nietzsche life makes sense partly in reflection to suffering, and in turn by no means is suffering an objection to life.¹³ Our linguistic scheme in fact demands contrasting relations for the foundation of the literal and of all defining matters. If we are to use the example of the rock, we only know that it is hard if we can formulate another sensation of what soft is, and the same is true of pleasure and pain.¹⁴ "[Nietzsche] did not deny that much of life was suffering," Hollingdale writes, "but he considered that suffering was the coin which purchased happiness and that to desire happiness without suffering was to ask the impossible."¹⁵ Moreover and in numerous accounts, Nietzsche refers to suffering as a sign of strength and one which correlates directly with both themes of will to power and Eternal Return; this was best presented when Zarathustra the godless declares, "I, Zarathustra, the

advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle; I summon you, my most abysmal thought!" (Z III: 13 §1) Lampert's commentary here specifically distinguishes Zarathustra from the Soothsayer and all those who deny meaning to life, for "Zarathustra's thought responds to his command; it comes forth through his will to an encounter or struggle."¹⁶ That is to say, Nietzsche is not advocating bringing suffering upon us nor its denial, but rather that in the noble act of its embracing as a phenomenon of existence, suffering needs to be incorporated in our valuations. What Nietzsche refers to as "eternal bliss" or otherwise psychological nonsense, is a valuation contrasted between what life is on this world and what one desires it to be; that there is a true world outside of this world and/or superimposed upon it which negates certain certainties while leaving others. At the same time, the status of psychological nonsense can be also ascribed to the denial of refuge in the aesthetics of art and away from the pain of existence. "Brave and creative men" Nietzsche remarks, "*never* consider pleasure and pain as ultimate values – they are epiphenomena: one must *desire* both if one is to achieve anything –"(WP 579). In short, Nietzsche's conception of suffering as a value, comes as a response to the secondary phenomenon that suffering induces; mainly devaluation of life, pity and formulation of values that supersede suffering in life.¹⁷

We should be doubtful of even *Wissenschaft* and modern scientific reasoning in general, for like metaphysical assertions they are often inclined to justify life on account of dissatisfaction with life and reality in general,¹⁸ thus constructing no better than a veil over the world which we experience. "Modern science has as its goal: as little pain as possible, as long life as possible – thus a kind of eternal bliss, though a very modest kind

in comparison with the promises of the religions.” (HH 1 §128) In the sciences man is preoccupied with the longing for bringing perfection, for life is resented for what it is. Distant ideals are created and man is encouraged to divert his attention away from his existing reality, towards distant possibilities. In addition, suffering in life is denied as part of life, while prescriptions are considered to heal the exposed pain. In turn, truths are constructed of how life ought to be, for life is detested for what it is, and ideals outside of life are thus created and are raised above man. Moreover, both sciences and religion create metaphors that substantiate authenticity through their systematic self-affirmation, internal verification, and expression wherein there are no corners to turn through abstract reasoning, and which we have come to take as *bona fide* truths. This tradition of thought essentially denies that “... the physical world which we normally think of ourselves as living is a world of constant change, a world full of contradictions and paradoxes, of pain and suffering, [and these] reveal to us the existence of a stable and unchanging (and therefore ‘true’) order transcending the changing, material order of things.”¹⁹ Within this tradition, it has been not only a routine but in fact the role of science and religion to domesticate life and undermine the most creative forms of art. The loss of knowledge of truths as metaphors is evident not only in the narcotic aspects of religious fervour but in all forms of decisive art that seek to subdue the individual in a net of absolutisms. Romanticism of the sciences and their resultant cognitive preoccupations have similarly sought to dominate nature and to establish a hierarchical order over it while at the same time and ironically proclaiming how life should be lived!

The Mask of Apollo

The swathe over reality has not necessarily healed the pain of living but has rather left a scar which when uncovered reveals its protohistory and the *ressentiment* for which it has been a veil. The Apollinian could be said to have transformed suffering into those beautiful illusions with which we live and have adopted as conditions or otherwise truths of existence. What I stand against here is not the illusions themselves but consequential sensations of truth and the morality that arise from them. The unconscious aesthetic vision that is aroused through the Apollinian gives way to the construction of a vision of human reality which is bound to collapse without having left anything to deal with the suffering which it exposes. In Nietzsche's words, "[t]he more the domination of the religions and all the art of narcosis declines, the stricter attention men pay to actual abolition of the ill..." (*HH I* §108). This position leads us to deconstruct the veil of Apollinian art and to question both its aesthetic ideals and the moral persuasions that it awakens. The first argument here is the association between living and dreaming, and most importantly for the remainder of the dissertation is its relevance to different types of human characters which are briefly introduced in this subsection. Secondly is the imposition of the dream state that intoxicates us and its everlasting state that needs to be explored. These intoxications, however, having become able to adapt to changing conditions, are necessary for they soothe the pain of living. In other words, the end result of the Apollinian experience has been prolific, insofar as it has functioned as a means to distort the world we live, but *with certainty in its illusions*, or what I would like to call here the human order of things.

Given Parmenides' position on what is not, what we are left with is ultimately the conviction that "... what can be thought of must certainly be a fiction" (*WP* 539), and all forms of art have ever since tried to take ill advantage of this disposition and have dictated absolute positions onto reality.²⁰ The use of terminology here, *the human order of things*, is thus intentional, for the reality which we experience is one conditioned by our own human artistic act that engages realities, but only to cover it through metaphors which over time become constants – it is *a* reality in presence of man. In Ruediger Grimm's words, "[m]an, with his intense longing for a stable world, a world which is predictable, which can be 'counted on,' has created a world which is commensurate with this desire, has constructed a world in which he can exist."²¹ In other words, the worldview that we have is at once a vision of it while at the same time a superimposition of certain views over it, or to say it the other way around, we have essentially mistaken Apollinian constructs for Truths. Fiona Jenkins correctly emphasizes that most predominantly in *Ecce Homo* than in any other works of Nietzsche, we are left with the impression that truthfulness and our engagement with the Apollinian reality are inseparable.²² In the previous chapter, we went into detail to explore the origins of the worldview we have developed, conceiving of a metaphor as being embedded in any truth statement and denied the possibility of ever truly grasping the Real, making the prevailing conceptualization of the world a chaotic one. The concern of the thesis here is the subjective experience of this world as an intoxication, insofar as we have come to deny its flux and its chaotic order in preference to certainties that should be termed as

submission and surrender this, not to Reality itself, but to what we have made out of it – the *dream* which we *live*!

Nietzsche's association of the Apollinian with the "beautiful illusions"²³ of the dream worlds" (BT I §1) differentiates between what I see as two important modes of dreaming: an art that continues to live in *rêverie* and one that identifies itself with dreaming and appreciates it; *dreams* and *intoxication*. The former state or what I have called *rêverie* resembles the above description of religious intoxication, for example, and takes the truths by which it lives as though they are "mere" certainties. The latter, on the other hand, represents constant mode of dreaming and then awakening, seeing the truths which he has made for himself and then going consciously back to the dream state. I like to resemble such an aesthetic state of affairs with those types of dreams under which we realize that we are dreaming but continue to go on dreaming. Under critique here is not the process of dreaming but the complete surrender to our own truths and beliefs which make dreams feel as though they are certainties, and Nietzsche cautions us of this "... delicate boundary [where] the dream image must not overstep lest it have a pathological effect (in which case mere appearance would deceive us as if it were crude reality)." (BT I §1) This fine border between dreaming and staying asleep is one that also distinguishes man and the overman, and rightly the higherman as well. Although at times the highermen may sound quite awake, they participate in intoxicating the masses and later themselves in continuing the dream state, whether consciously or not, in deceit. The overmen, on the other hand, dream *for* themselves in the second typology of dreaming, while recognizing and appreciating these dreams; and in a world where the masses are

unconscious of the dream state, the overmen can easily be considered as strangers and deviants from the worldview which they cannot accept as anything other than an illusion.

Like those religions that have seduced us in times of pain, our poets, philosophers, and those who have gained higher social power and influence over our life course, and here we are speaking of highermen, have equally sought to keep us in a dream state and have equally deceived us as our gods have. These artists initially created beautiful illusions but eventually lost the ability to create, thus doing no more than to recreate that which already existed. Their injustice to the human species has not been their loss of artistic ability but the indoctrination that they have participated in by guiding electorates, for example, within the existing reality vis-à-vis recreating values and ethics from that which already exists; in short they have maintained a blind morality for the civil societies they govern. Goethe in “Hikmat Nameh” of *Divan* asks,

Was machst du an der Welt? Sie ist schon gemacht,
Der Herr der schöpfung hat alles bedacht.
Dein Los st gefallen, wrfolge die Weise,
Der Weg ist begonnen, vollende die Reise:
Denn Sorgen und Kummer verändern es nicht,
Sie schleudern dich ewig aus gleichem Gewicht.²⁴

Should we rather not ask, oh dear poet, “Why do we walk this path in ecstasy and pretend that it is straight?” We should remain critical of the ecstasy which Goethe arouses and ultimately of his inability to go beyond and to be dangerous.²⁵ It is here that even Hafez, in Ghazal 11 of his *Divan* and in the counsel of whom Goethe writes, rhythms the path of life in the state of drunkenness,²⁶

مستی بچشم شاهد دل‌بند ما خوشست زانرو سپرده اند بمستی زمام ما

Both Goethe and Hafez alike sought, unlike Schopenhauer, to connect man to life and not its denial; to live life in love was the call of their poetry, but the ecstasy that they aroused of the way in which it should be lived is another matter. Let us propose this question, that when you ask the joyous or the drunk of the crooked path do they not pronounce it faithfully as straight? And who has the authority to declare *a* path as rightfully straight, as the path to walk on and life to live? These are the types of questions that are rarely conjured, in spite of the fact that here lies the essential surface for honesty! Of the intoxicators who see the crooked but declare it as straight, these highermen, what is to be said about them other than that they are crooked themselves? Even this is not the least of our worries, but the taking of their truths, their interpretation of the world which we experience, as Truths without reservation displays not only their power over the citizenry but mainly the weakness of the citizenry in not questioning the very foundation of their lives – assumed as these are to fall within the unilinear path set and their inability to create and live their own lives as an active process; it is a dilemma that we return to in the following two chapters. The dilemma is a real one as far as Apollinian cleverness lies not only in its ability to present its take of reality as the Real, but also in diverting attention from the actually-existing-objects towards certain ends by means of specific paths. The suffering of life is justified in a way by diverting attention away from it, through the praising of something outside of the suffering, and in turn changing the way of our lives away from life and towards mythical creations of man, such that of God or even capital.²⁷ These mythical constructs, for all intents and purposes, gain a life in the state of drunkenness which the poet writes of, and have given no reason to look forward to life in

this world and be active in its formation.²⁸ I am not implying that we do not reside as the human species in and of this world, active as we are in ensuring our subsistence. Rather, what is suggested is that there exists an inactive state of cultivation, active only in the sense of creating nothing substantially new for ourselves outside the structures of our reality. If a certain direction of life is upheld in our society as the “good” one, then though different variations on that path are accepted, no pathway significantly outside of its domain can be approvingly trodden. The latter possibility implies fundamentally questioning everything that forms our identity, for the values of how one should live his life is essentially embedded in the path which directly shapes one’s character. This character rarely fundamentally reflects on itself, and looks optimistically and blindly ahead. Thus why would we deconstruct the foundation of our lives if we are looking to life outside of life itself? I would go even further to suggest that this is a certain type of optimism that has embedded its dogmatic tendencies in both religion and scientific conceptualization of life towards the ultimate and outside of life, though eventually in *ressentiment* of life itself. Thinking of the former for the time being, the faith in afterlife, whether it exists or not, essentially gives meaning to life by making it straight with a concluding punctuation that finally relieves us of this world towards something higher, and while we live this life it enforces at the same time a morality as a way of guiding us towards its end.

Apollinian dreams bring a sense of purpose through distorting Reality into a conceptual framework that can be absorbed by the human species. From its metaphoric disposition, it should be quite evident that in its domain, “... the subject lacks self-

possession, and is interpreted as a product rather than the source of artwork,”²⁹ and this is yet once again the path that the poet writes of: to walk the path unconsciously and in delusion. In other words, the music and poetry of Apollo soothes and imposes submission of life into a rhythm which brings a state of drunkenness and subdues man in a fictional joy. This is “[t]he higher truth,” Nietzsche writes, “the perfection of [this state of illusion] in contrast to the completely intelligible everyday world, this deep consciousness of nature, healing and helping in sleep and dreams, is at the same time the symbolic analogue of the soothsaying faculty and of the arts generally, which make life possible and worth living” (*BT I* §1). It is here under such company that Apollinian art produces harmonious melodies that demand surrender to its virtues. Thus it is also here that two (dys)functions of Apollinian art over life are introduced: (1) an imposition of order away from the harshness of reality, and (2) virtues that internally stabilize such surrender. In the first part and in reference to a specific cult of artistry, the role of artist is to falsify reality and to distort it from what it is, to what it might be in preference. The artist, being confident of his artistry, does not stop there but further deceives the reader in believing that the morality which he draws from has authenticity. Thus ideals and values are set to guide life in a certain direction by the very artist that continues to be embedded in the reality that he shaped. What is more, this human submission forgets at the same time that *characteristics*, values and moralities, if you will, are hereby imposed on the reality which one experiences.³⁰ In other words, by guiding life in a straight line, the Apollinian not only suggests moral guidance but stabilizes its order over reality through characteristics that it has drawn out itself. The prolonged historical dream state of the

human species – for anything and everything outside of it has gone on with life but man – is reinforced by its internal mechanism of stable affirmation, which re-intoxicates as each dose wears out, or otherwise through a pattern whence near nihilism is reached, and a new dream or a reinterpretation of an old one puts the disbeliever back to sleep.

One should not look at Apollinian truths as constants, unable to respond to changes and to their devaluation. The Apollinian is a fluid form of art, which schemes out new covers over reality when a glimpse of its lie is exposed. To say it in another way, it covers or deconstructs one lie with another. These Apollinian variations on what I would like to call *neue Wahrheiten*, have thus far provided nothing more than the hallucinations which had preceded them. It is perhaps an addiction that man seeks comfort in the Apollinian even when part of its illusions are exposed, and what better example of this than in religion. In the height or even of the sight of pain even the cursing man begs for mercy and reassurance, and in Islam a last minute allegiance to God and his prophet assures comfort and guarantee of peace in afterlife. It is quite odd of man that he would rather not laugh at his God when he is in torment, but instead resorts to him in weakness; perhaps for he is cursed or perhaps he lacks any confidence in himself and of his own artistic abilities! Has man forgotten to paint, to dance, and to cry in joy at the same time? Let us make the point very clear here and describe Apollinian art as having had the ability to condition the order over life with respect to emerging changes, but having interpreted life, to imply it ironically, as a way of *ressentiment* and revenge against life itself.³¹ *Ressentiment* produces slave morality that needs in the first place a hostile external world, and always as a reaction, it creates values and truths only out of

hate and powerlessness in relation to its experience of reality (cf. *GM I §10*). Contemporary revaluations of Apollo's deception, however, has forced the resurface of the flux of reality which had for thus long been veiled under the cover of an illusion which is less illustrative in our (post)modern conditions than at any other time.

Nihilism should not be taken literally, as an anarchic attempt over the established; rather, it is a burst of feelings and impulses against the backdrop of a reality that no longer makes sense – *the collapse of myths*. Nihilism is the beginning of revaluation of all values, as the subtitle of *The Will to Power* should rightly read, and in the preface Nietzsche goes further to suggest this to be the prevailing occupation of the next two centuries. The order and stability which are brought through Socratic culture are not inherently life denying; but rather, they become life denying especially when their artistic character is disregarded and their delusions are taken as literals. Towards the height of nihilism, the treatment of these illusions as illusions eventually leads to the collapse of the reality which we have come to make for ourselves, for this thesis relates nihilism more directly to the lack of Apollinian meaning than with anything else. Once established, and for it fears creative art that can destroy it, the reality which we live denies the possibility of becoming anything outside of that which *is*. The Apollinian "... imposes order and form on the world of Becoming ... [and] elevates the world of appearance into reality",³² and this is especially problematic, for its collapse does not necessarily lead to the creation of a new higher myth but to the destruction of everything and perhaps for the very few a return to the no longer meaningful myth.³³ The error, as noted in the prologue, has its roots in Socrates, who by being unable to handle the

harshness of reality was neither willing to accept the flux of reality nor the world of becoming. In reference to the Allegory of the Cave, Thomas Howe suggests that Socrates had a sense of Dionysian experience but being discontent of the harshness of reality he sought to make reality more straight and in turn more rational.³⁴ This view, Howe continues, further denies the life of becoming for it reduces man's interpretation of his reality as an imperfect copy of a higher true world of forms. In the case of the Christian dogma, Nietzsche's project provides a deconstructive critique which by uncloaking it, leaves the misery of life as something given but nevertheless needing to be overcome; more properly said, to conceptually clamp together the pain of existence alongside our definition of life, which in turn provides the possibility not of denial but of becoming what one is. At the end the message is very clear, Zarathustra is able to dance, and this is a role that Nietzsche struggles to provide for humanity.

The Song of Dionysus

In this part of the thesis, the possibility of an adventurous form of art and a theoretical means of constructing new truths, which had briefly introduced chapter one, is presented. As noted there, let us not hasten to assume that the creative nature of Dionysian art can ultimately lend us Reality. Let us to begin this section by reasserting that everything is an interpretation. Dionysian art exposes the chaos and appreciates the flux of reality as one that cannot be captured within static truths. Even through the study of Dionysian art, as presented here, reality can not be captured in static truth claims, for the basis of my worldview is one which is situated in a flux rather than in linearity,³⁵ "There are no facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relatively

most enduring is – our opinions.” (WP 604) The power of Dionysian art is not in its inability to capture Reality but the possibility that it provides in deconstructing the truths which we have made of and over it, while allowing us to have a sense of this chaos within it. This is an important form of art in presence of the Apollinian mask over reality, for “[t]he Dionysian strives to *remove* the veil rather than put it on,…” as noted by Ivan Soll, and it is emphasised more consistently in the later works of Nietzsche that it is “...because of the intrinsic magnetism of the idea of a wild, destructive, unmanageable drive with erotic connotations.”³⁶

This magnificent and violent form of art fears not the reality which it lives, and by all means welcomes its deconstruction, even if this means the identity of the artist. In his translation of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Kaufman notes that while in his earlier writings Nietzsche wrote of the Dionysian in reflection to and synthesis of the Apollinian, in his later writings it came to reflect “... the creative form of passion and affirmation of life in spite of suffering ...”³⁷ In the *BT* Nietzsche compares the two psychological states to the duality of the sexes, which compliment one another. The Dionysian and Apollinian experience are parallel psychological states that are products of their relative forms of art which engage reality via different processes, and Nietzsche’s latter usage of the Dionysian reflects the unity of the two as being complementary in relation to one another. While our contemporary worldview suffers from being deeply immersed in Apollinian rhetoric, Nietzsche’s solution to nihilism is an active state of consciousness where the Apollinian and the Dionysian life experiences are in constant unity, and where the former fundamentally allows the re-emergence and the possibility of the latter. This theme is

developed in the following two subsections, where at the outset the fiercely creative powers of the Dionysian art are explored, and in the fourth section of this chapter its relation to Apollinian art and their relative psychological states are examined. Here two topics of the Dionysian form of art are presented: (1) that it has an active engagement of reality and (2) its ability to dance, its ability to free itself from its prior Apollinian state. In the end, that which is highlighted is the powerful effects of the Dionysian experience, and Nietzsche's later usage of the Dionysian is left for the next subsection where the role of tragic art is explored. In the main, I want to emphasise the fundamental need for Dionysian transfiguration while at the same time being cautious of the potentially oppressive implications of its experience.

The first two parts of this chapter have sought to posit the Apollinian veil over reality as something counter productive when man treats Apollinian illusions as Truths and essentially denies himself of being anything outside of the established order of things. Though the Apollinian makes life possible, the order that is constructed through it raises not only questions on our value system, the honesty of those who maintain it, and the way through which we experience it, but essentially underlines the denial of becoming anything outside of the established view of things. The product of this being the world of appearances, or for Schopenhauer of "representation," forms the backdrop behind which Nietzsche wishes to make the psychological distinction between the Dionysian and Apollinian forms of art, and was only able to do so, as David Allison argues, by essentially allowing the possibility of ecstatic states.³⁸ The Dionysian bears such a powerfully spiritual connotation in Nietzsche's writing that Karl Jaspers, perhaps

making the same error as Clark and relating it so closely to the symbolism of religion, had contested that Nietzsche used the myth of Dionysus as a symbol and employed it in his philosophy without really understanding it.³⁹ The God Dionysus by bringing wine to the Greeks brought also with it the spontaneity and disorder that the God of sun had in essence denied mankind.⁴⁰ It is this frenzy that Nietzsche seeks to awaken in humanity who have been asleep since at least Socrates.⁴¹ Adrian Del Caro has effectively argued that while in its earlier usage Nietzsche associated Dionysus with aesthetic characteristics, from *Daybreak* on, it gained a life-affirming character that emphasized Nietzsche's main ideas such as Eternal Return and will to power.⁴² Nevertheless, the Shadow of Apollo remained inclusive in Nietzsche's thought, and his usage of the two Gods, which he employs metaphorically in his own way, should be seen as part of a continuous work that eventually freed the Dionysian and its most passionate powers, while at the same time never denying the Apollinian entirely.⁴³

The Apollinian reality which we live suggests that its portrayal of the world and life in general is not only the real one but the absolute. The result of this Apollinian reality, as it has been argued in the previous sections, is thus two fold: to swathe the pain of existence under its "truths," and also the presentation of "truths" constructed under its domain as absolute. In the first respect, the Dionysian begins by laughing at such distinction between reality and appearance,⁴⁴ and seeks to unveil the Apollinian cover. The Dionysian experience is the engagement and the unveiling of Apollinian "truths", and as a result bursts potent doses of pain and suffering which had been till then covered – in other words, the Apollinian illusion is exposed. The Dionysian here does not create

any fundamental “truths” but rather deconstructs the Apollinian truth from which it had originally come. In this first instance, the Dionysian man is not a new entity but is born out of Apollinian conditions. Thus in a sense, we could say that the Dionysian experience is a reflection and a deconstruction of not only the truths of reality but is a reflection on the self. Such reflection is a painful one for it deconstructs the reality which we had lived and taken for granted up until the point of the Dionysian experience, and it is further a way of reflection and deconstruction of the self. Out of this experience, what is realized is that the totality of these expressions is that which forms the “body,” one which is now in pain and need of rebirth.⁴⁵ The embracing of pain and suffering is a central theme in Nietzsche’s work that eventually lead to the creation of something higher, and Deborah Mullen is right to suggest that, “[i]t is significant, then, that the metaphor of the pain and the joy of a very freshly occurrence, childbirth, runs throughout *Zarathustra* and is so closely tied to Dionysian, tragic wisdom and to creativity.”⁴⁶ The embracing of pain and suffering is the first step towards the *creation* of something higher, *not* its denial. Apollinian reality, however, had denied pain and sought every method, whether through religious trickery or scientific curiosity, to make its way around pain and to look forward towards something outside of the chaos of our everyday world. The Dionysian man, nonetheless and after reflecting on his consciousness and the reality of which he is part, sees these challenges as obstacles to overcome, and he does so by first taking away man’s certainties in the truths of the Apollinian reality.

The Dionysian is better characterized by the rupture it causes from the life – denying Apollinian man, as well as from the reality which it had drawn out. The desire

to destroy, to change and to become something higher is a product of the Dionysian experience that seeks to embrace a reality of becoming and not the illusions of Apollinian tranquility.⁴⁷ In a sense, the Dionysian endangers life, for not only does it deconstruct the pre-existing stable reality from which it burst, but also because it stands in direct opposition to Apollinian order. This is a dangerous philosophy that essentially seeks to destroy, one that "... breaks down form, dissolves individuation, and strives for unification with the underlying primal unity."⁴⁸ In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche goes on to admit the danger of his philosophy and himself as the most terrible human being for the presentation of Dionysian man, but this comes sarcastically while also introducing the man who through destroying is able to overcome the Apollinian gravity (*EH: Why I am Destiny* §2). The Dionysian is both destructive of the Apollinian psychological state and of its reality, which nevertheless surrounds the Dionysian man. Having unveiled the Apollinian cover over reality and exposed its lies, the Dionysian man can neither go forward with living in deceit nor can he deceive others. When we look at the Dionysian man, fore and foremost we see a man that cannot live in a lie, and is willing to endure both reality and its harshest truths. Action forms the deep attitude of the Dionysian man towards a reality that he can no longer bear to live and can only laugh at. To the flocks of the masses, this laughter is observed as deviance, and they in return laugh at the furious message of Dionysian reason. Thus the Dionysian man has no desire to take his message to the masses but only to himself and those like him. Most importantly, his word is his action, and contra to his little reason, his great reason not only says "I" but does "I".⁴⁹ I believe here Nietzsche implies a physical and psychological sense of action, both of

which are important to Dionysian art. On this question of Dionysian action, Schacht's reading of Nietzsche explores a psychological sense of reflection and transfiguration,

The Dionysian does not exchange his physiological and sociocultural identity and situation in the world for another, or escape them altogether ... the Dionysian is psychologically transformed into one for whom the only reality of which he is aware – and therefore that with which he himself identifies – is that which is expressed in the movement, tonalities, or other symbolic forms in which he is immersed.⁵⁰

The Dionysian symbolically expresses the world which he observes in order to absorb it as a product of his perspective and in order to be able to reflect on it. If we were to talk about institutional arrangement of our world and if their symbolic representations were to produce an obstacle for growth, as discussed in chapter three, I believe that the Dionysian would directly engage it in order to overcome it. In the process, however, if destruction of these symbolic representations were to produce a higher reality, the Dionysian man cannot rule out physical destruction as an outcome of his action. The one thing that nevertheless remains constant and essential to the status of the "I" is the world itself. To accept life and earth as a precondition to existence becomes the only obstacle that the Dionysian man cannot destroy and rather absorbs as a prior phenomenon. All else, the world that we have shaped through art, both Apollinian and Dionysian, are mere aesthetic artefacts that can be shaped, reshaped, and even destroyed if by the will to power their destruction can serve in the cultivation of the self and the creation of a higher reality. The Dionysian man never accepts reality as a constant matter, for Dionysian man views the world as constantly in flux, changing, and in turn views any concept of truth that is in denial of this matter as simply irrelevant.⁵¹ Put the other way around, given that truths of

reality can never be conceived as constants for the Dionysian man, for he sees them as mere artistic interpretation and creations of man, their transformation becomes an active part of his art. The psychological transfiguration of man among the most prominent is active part of Dionysian art, and Schacht's presentation on the deconstruction of the illusions of consciousness which had characterized one in terms of the other and within the Apollinian truth is a correct one. However, I would go a step further to suggest that the self-reflective transfiguration implied in Dionysian art also signals the transfiguration of the world that the self experiences, and through art such sensation is awakened.

The Dionysian experience teaches man one thing above all else, that art is more important than truth. These truths are, however, necessary in order to make life possible and we can not do without them. The Dionysian sees all truth constructs as interpretations that are relative to one's point of view and subject-original gaze. He even knows that what he interprets is only relative to his aesthetic appreciation and cannot fundamentally declare them as "Truth" but rather as *his* "truth". Given the emergence of this psychological state of mind, the Dionysian wants to dream and to create beautiful illusions once more, but is now actively aware that these are his dreams and his alone. The difference here is foremost a contrast between Dionysian dreams and Apollinian ones, the latter being unaware of the dream process. I have already labelled such Apollinian mode of dreaming as *rêverie*, or an absent minded thought while one is awake. It essentially denies creativity, and the art that it produces falls within the definitional parameters of a reality of which it is unaware; hence it only reproduces that which already exists. The Dionysian creativity becomes an expression of its active mode

of reflection and it constantly seeks to express itself outside of the boundaries of the created Apollinian reality which restricts it. This process of becoming, as Jenkins puts it, “is not the character of reality ‘in itself’ – a self-contradictory thesis – but the character of performance through which life ‘lives’ or is expressed.”⁵² There are two ideas that are being presented here: (1) that the Dionysian wants to become something rather than to be something, and that (2) it wishes to express himself by the way of life which he lives. The idea of becoming looks forward towards something higher, while at the same time it looks at itself. What does this mean? It is important to distinguish that, for Nietzsche, the goal of higher artistic value is of utmost importance and that one should will towards it so that one can have momentum in their direction. In Zarathustra, man is presented as a bridge between what is and what is to be created, and throughout his journey Zarathustra reminds mankind of the need to esteem and to create, and most importantly to move towards such esteem for creation. Such ideas, however, are not without their own problems.

If God and afterlife is something of a higher and distant prospect, why doesn’t Nietzsche advocate the move towards such creation? The answer lies in the internal logic of Nietzsche’s idea of becoming. Above all else, Zarathustra advocates that we “*remain faithful to the earth,*” and not be deceived into afterworldly hopes. He further suggests that we discover ourselves within the realm of this world and through it begin to cultivate ourselves. The second inherent problem, as highlighted by Lampert, is the idea of Eternal Return that essentially rules out any forward movement towards a distant object, for time is essentially not linear, in the Nietzschean formulation.⁵³ I contextualize the

idea of becoming as a slippage forward on impulse driven feeling, which remains constrained to the gravity of where it is but can nevertheless esteem to become something higher. Creativity and the art that springs from the Dionysian is aesthetically beautiful *not* because it projects soothing emotions, but is pleasing as far as it brings a sense of movement in illusions that it is aware of as one of its own; one which this thesis more distinctly associates with a state of health than anything else.

The Apollinian construction of our reality is associated with an ailing society, first and foremost, for it rejects the chaos and with it the possibility of change. It enforces a system of order onto society and hails it as ultimate while rejecting anything outside of the boundaries of such order. In effect this takes away the potential to grow outside the truths of Apollinian reality and any such behaviour it labels as deviant and in need of correction. This is essentially the constitution of correctional institutions, that seek to reintegrate those who have tried to escape established truths.⁵⁴ In its final phase and most fundamentally, Apollinian reality can be associated with an ailing society through the exposition of its lies, the deconstructive moment does not unfold in the Apollinian reality, independent of the Dionysian impulse. It is here that the Dionysian invokes laughter, gives us wings, and allows us to dance in the presence of a reality which has been exposed for its fallacies.

Although the Dionysian is most inherently responsible for exposing the lies of Apollinian reality, it also goes to embrace the reality which it exposes. The pain of such exposition invokes the healing powers of the Dionysian, which is most vividly embodied in its Dionysian dance that begins by taking the limitations of life and the world, in short

its gravity, as so profoundly given that needs ought not be undone but rather incorporated. The Dionysian both dances over the gravity of things and at the first instance it sings out of its great reason, incorporating action, as described above, with its music. Dance and celebration are also found in the Apollinian experience, but unlike its Dionysian counterpart under its shadow, man was essentially unaware of the truths of Apollinian reality as of its own creation, and experienced dance only within its boundaries. In contrast and for Nietzsche, beneath the Dionysian enchantment is fundamentally the core concept of action, the "I" that does, and it exposes its full character upon deconstruction of Apollinian reality. The Dionysian is able to take that which is no more and recreate a new reality which within it is able to live and cultivate its being while being both essentially aware of its truths as being of its own and being dedicated to the world which it lives in. Crawford's reading of "Nietzsche presents three levels of dancing: dancing with words and ideas, with the 'little reason'; dancing with the body, the self, with 'great reason'; and joining in the dance of all things which is the mystical experience of the movement of the universe in the will to power."⁵⁵ This final level of dance focuses one's impulses in a mystical fashion towards a creative activity that goes beyond any boundaries that man has set for himself. It is an unstoppable force of dance which goes beyond the limitations of any human reasoning, and the joy that it brings cannot in anyway be conceptualized as a static notion – it is mystical in every aspect. Crawford goes to label such a form of dance as an overpowering one, one that plays gravity and the seriousness of things, for she sees that "... we raise ourselves lightly over and above them, but only because we press our feet joyfully on the dwarf's back to

gain momentum for the leap.”⁵⁶ Essentially what Crawford is stating here is that the Dionysian man wills to power while aware of the gravity which the dwarf embodies. The spirit of gravity reminds the Dionysian man of the world in which he lives, while at the same time he wills to experience every moment as that for what it is. Horst Hutter puts it this way, that “[d]ancing and flying represent the greatest possible forms of freedom from gravity. Yet neither abolishes gravity, nor escapes from it completely; they merely use it and follow it better than those that neither dance nor fly.”⁵⁷ That which is being presented here is essentially two further thoughts: (1) That the Dionysian man is aware of the enigmatic nature of eternal return. (2) That within it, he wills especially at those moments which he wishes to reoccur. Thus while dancing and flying do not entail freedom from gravity, they do, however, posit the ability to play with it. The complexity of this thought is first presented in Zarathustra’s dialogue with the dwarf, otherwise the spirit of gravity, and Lampert believes that “[e]ternal return is a ‘selective principle’ (*WP* 1058), not because it selects out this or that event to eternally return, but because the thought that every event eternally returns selects out for stoning by the philosopher’s stone those capable of being possessed by a thought, those for whom life is thought and who have brought civilization under a rule, the traditional teachers of mankind who have judged that life is no good.”⁵⁸

The highermen, who received a good dose of critique in the preceding section, restrict the development of our consciousness within the narrow path that their optimism has drawn out, and this is what Nietzsche wishes to free men from. My reading of Nietzsche supports a dance that plays with the spirit of gravity as a form of dance that

cultivates. Through the Dionysian form of dance, man is able to break away from those specific conceptual relations that Apollinian reality has drawn out for it. Allison notes that “[r]ather, what occurs in this state of Dionysian-musical enchantment is an emotional disassociation or detachment of affective states from specific object relations.”⁵⁹ The Dionysian man frees himself from the man made conceptual limitations and views of the Apollinian world, and dances above such confines. The battle to destroy the Apollinian worldviews is an elemental attempt of Dionysian art that liberates man from the margins of Apollinian order, in order that he may finally dance. It respects also to the spirit of gravity itself; the Dionysian makes himself aware of and dances slightly over it in a mystical fashion, often pressing on its back. As Crawford notes, “Nietzsche characterizes Zarathustra as an eagle who is able to fly above all abysses of gravity. But Nietzsche unites the eagle of mystical freedom with the serpent of gravity when he sees the necessary relationship between them in the rhythms of mystical dance and song.”⁶⁰ In short, man is able to free himself from Apollinian falsifications of this world and the limitations which it had set out, but remains gravitated towards the earth, over which it takes wing only ever so slightly. This rather mystical character of Nietzsche’s Dionysus, essentially allows man to be his own disciple, freed from the Apollinian truths that dictate an outside to this world and the “I”.

The interpretation of the spirit of this form of art is usually erroneous as in both Clark and Jasper, as far as they assume that Nietzsche’s writings on the Dionysian God is symbolic of a metaphysical truth that the philosopher ultimately maintains. Del Caro writes that in addition to the two senses of the Dionysian that we have used above, “there

is also a sense in which one speaks of Nietzsche *as* a Dionysian, seen in Jung in particular, in which 'Dionysian' means a devotee of the god Dionysus."⁶¹ He correctly asserts that Nietzsche is often falsely taken at his word literally when critics relate *his* Dionysus with a God and with the notion that Gods too philosophise (cf. *BGE* 294-5). In a way Dionysianism has a spiritual feel, but this neither requires dogmatic faith nor defence.⁶² Central to its theme is the process of transformation, and Del Caro correctly underlines that by transforming himself Nietzsche was able to transform the Dionysian, through the process of which he becomes his own disciple and not one of any god.⁶³ The Dionysian transfigures one's consciousness and gives us the real power to dictate our future yet aware of the gravity of restrictions that life imposes on it. It is dangerous, as argued above, as far as it rips away the constraints of Apollinian illusions and preoccupation with will to truth, while creating a creative consciousness that is aware of what one is; but nevertheless, it does not invoke the dogmatic tendencies found in Apollinian truths. The Dionysian awakes the individual, and gives him a real sense of power which is essentially absent under metaphysical submission. Nimrod Aloni sums up the affirmative powers of Dionysian as follows:

"... the 'yes-saying' Dionysian mode of existence connotes the following themes: first, restoring our ties with and love for the earth or this-worldly life; second, substituting the 'unconditional will to truth,' which can constitute a danger to life, with an experimental and creative pursuit of health, growth, wisdom or power as the 'truly metaphysical activity of man.' And the third theme consists in the affirmation of the sublimation of impulses and passions – as opposed to repression and extirpation – as an efficient means for generating ever new perspectives, transfiguring man into a 'self-propelled wheel,' esteemer and creator."⁶⁴

Will to Power and Tragedy

Although the Apollinian, by denying the world of becoming, has thus far made us unprepared to what is to come, it nevertheless serves the dual function of being a necessary fiction through which we can experience the world of suffering without destroying ourselves. The role of the Apollinian here in a sense can be defined as one that provides meaning to the world we experience and in turn is a condition of tolerating life. The necessity of these meanings and its utility characterize the central theme of *The Birth of Tragedy*, and is a theme that Kaufmann believes is much forgotten as one of Nietzsche's main ideas.⁶⁵ The Apollinian, though less frequently and more indirectly referred to in his later writings, remained as an important idea which Nietzsche continuously sought to deconstruct and reconstruct a nouveau. Apollinian truths are necessary fictions which make life possible and worth living, and although they create "truths" about reality, they do not, however, provide the conceptual possibility of achieving the Real, as it has been argued in the first chapter, without having to resort to metaphors, and thus constructs only illusions of reality. Nevertheless, the Apollinian seeks rationalistic approaches to impose structure onto the world so that it can be experienced; in Nietzsche's words and in his draft preface to the new edition of *The Birth of Tragedy*:

The antithesis of a real and an apparent world is lacking here: there is only *one* world, and this is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning – A world thus constituted is the real world. *We have need of lies* in order to conquer this reality, this "truth," that is, in order to *live* – That lies are necessary in order to live is itself part of the terrifying and questionable character of existence. (WP 853)

“According to Nietzsche, we construct the everyday empirical world for the sake of ‘life’ – that is, to render what is intrinsically an awful and intolerable world beautiful and tolerable. We create the illusory world of our everyday experience so that we can continue to want to live.”⁶⁶ These necessary fictions become an inclusive element of the later usage of the Dionysian by Nietzsche, and give way to one of his main ideas, that of will to power.

Will to Power does not entail a physical sense of power, which is an illusion of our Apollinian reality, though it could, but rather signifies the key idea of *movement* in a direction. I follow Michel Haar in his interpretation of Nietzsche and I believe he properly conveys the idea of directing our impulses as being central in understanding the notion of will to power.⁶⁷ Haar’s association of *Wille ‘zur’ Macht* or ‘movement towards’ unveils the impulses that are embodied in all action and thought, whether conscious or otherwise.⁶⁸ Within us there are essentially many desires which point to various directions in a four-plus dimensional world. These impulses could even oppose one another and nullify each other once added, at which point will to power becomes the status quo – what I otherwise label as inactive reactivity. The Dionysian invokes our inner impulses and seeks to actualize them through the “I” that *does*. The will to power of the Dionysian man becomes the focus of these impulses towards a desired artistic end. The Dionysian awakens the desires and impulses which had been put to rest, subjugated, and forced into the deep rest within our subconscious in the Apollinian reality. The magnitude of such awakening is unimaginable, and it posits both a creative endeavour and a dangerous threat to the self, which had come to be as a product of our little reason

and under the cover of Apollinian reality. Once invoked, the Dionysian man is consciously aware of the peaceful locale of the Apollinian, and he can always actualize the Apollinian state if he desires it. In addition, the danger posed by the Dionysian limits its indefinite continuity, and eventually “[...] when the Dionysian aesthetic experience comes to an end, and we ‘return to ourselves,’ our psychological identities transformed back again into their original non-Dionysian state. The only enduring comfort is the recollection of the rapture of the Dionysian experience and the knowledge that it remains available to us.”⁶⁹ The knowledge of this rapture cannot be suppressed in any healthy manner and demands transfiguration, which occurs actively both within the Dionysian and in a continuous fashion once we return to the Apollinian state.

Will to Power is the essential drive that makes everything happen; it is present both in the Dionysian and Apollinian psychological states. The idea is best understood if we take will to power’s drive over our impulses as a form of art, which actualizes both psychological states under examination. If we recollect from what was said earlier, the Dionysian realizes one thing, that art is more important than truth, and this comes to light through its understanding of the metaphoric disposition within truth and thus our inability to capture reality in any absolute sense. From this awareness, the Dionysian experience leads to a complimentary form of art that seeks to create, dance, and sing in the most unfashionable way.⁷⁰ Once returned to its Apollinian counterpart, Dionysian knowledge leaves open the possibility of a new Apollinian truth that can be maintained within the returned state, essentially a state of transfiguration aided by will to power. The transfiguration occurs both at the Dionysian and Apollinian states, but a return to the

latter gives it the stability that is essentially lacking within the Dionysian. Schacht suggests that will to power should "...be understood as an outgrowth of the dual notions of the Dionysian and Apollinian 'art impulses of nature,' in which they are *aufgehoben* in the threefold Hegelian sense of this term: they are at once negated, preserved, and superseded."⁷¹ I would agree and put it this way, that transfiguration produces an overcoming of the Apollinian truths that come to end once their lies are exposed, and once again *neue Wahrheiten* are constructed but this time as a result of the Dionysian experience. Will to Power here produces not the Apollinian myths that had previously come as a result of *ressentiment* of life on earth and towards an illusionary rest outside of it, but as a result of the Dionysian experience life under the Apollinian is transfigured and enhanced towards affirmation of life. In this return, will to power affirms its Dionysian knowledge by creating *neue Wahrheiten* that it remembers as being one of its own constructs. Examining the development of such a thought for Nietzsche, Grimm suggests that, "as the concept of the will to power matured, however, these two poles were gorged together into a unitary principle which was both the surging chaos of creative vitality and the urge to impose order, form, and harmony upon this chaos: the will to power."⁷²

The *tragedy* here and as understood by Nietzsche is, that we need such illusions in order to survive – for the world to make any sense, for us to bear the pain of existence, in order to relate to the other; and *tragic art* should be understood here as the preoccupation to produce such illusions. "In short, tragic art provides us with a way of apprehending this reality that enables us to come to terms with it – and not only to endure but also to affirm what we thereby see, as we thereby learn to see it. In this way it resembles

Dionysian art.”⁷³ The Dionysian never disappears and its experience always remains a backdrop against which the Dionysian can be re-invoked. In the Apollinian falsification of our worldview, we effectively found that truths which were our constructs were forgotten as such and were taken literally, as absolute and unquestionable. The Apollinian experience, without its Dionysian counterpart, produced an atmosphere where we lived in assurance of certainty and essentially watched ourselves forgotten as “*artistically creating* subjects.” The Dionysian, however, is able to create and move beyond the conceptual restrictions of the Apollinian and once “artistically-creative subjectivity” is experienced, it is possible to revive it once again. When we resort to the Apollinian, “[t]he hope, or rather the trust of a spectator of tragedy is that the god Dionysus will be reborn. This rebirth is implicit in the tragedy.”⁷⁴ Tragic art provides not only the possibility to enjoy the chaos of this world, even if momentarily, but maintains the thought of this chaos in the back of ones mind, and be reminded that all truths which we make of this world are our own – underneath the Apollinian order remains chaos. Tragic art, as Schacht rightly sees it, is this union between Apollo and Dionysus, which acknowledge the need and desire for one another. In Mullen’s words, “Apollo, without Dionysus, can produce only rhetoric, only pretty a world cut off from the flesh of the world, sedimented expression.”⁷⁵ Put the other way around, and although Nietzsche praises Dionysian enchantment and its fury, without the Apollinian he nevertheless sees its danger in bringing an end to existence itself. While the end to the Apollinian brings rhetoric and the real possibility of what Nietzsche sees as will to nothingness, the single willing of the Dionysian, though more sincere, cannot provide a

stable psychological state for existence; it is excessively chaotic, lays bare no human order, and exposes truths that may not be assimilable. Within the Apollinian state, however, we are able to dance once more, though now out of our little reason we essentially dance in deception but aware of them through our great reason, with the deception taken as one of our own.⁷⁶

Nietzsche's prime goal was one of bringing the forces of tragic art into play over purely Apollinian dreaming which remains unconscious of its psychological state. This is the message that he brings to a humanity that is suffering the first doses of nihilism, and tragic art can be seen as an artistic means to avoid complete annihilation, and make life possible and worth living. I agree with Klein that, "Nietzsche could hardly be clearer: the unity with nature produced by tragedy is a truth built on a lie," and he goes to suggest, "that redemption from this truth is achieved not when we take it literally, but when we accept it for what it is, namely, lie, illusion, and phantasm."⁷⁷ It is here that Nietzsche's artistic solution embodies two of his key ideas, that of will to power, which serves as a means to actualize such art, and eternal return, that serves as its, to say in a traditional terms, moral foundation.⁷⁸ Through tragic art, Nietzsche believes that without recourse to fundamentally falsifying reality, it is not possible to create truths that would allow us to live and go on with life. Man's view of reality is a product of how he interprets and interacts with it, and although life forces that are part of him, surround him, and are prior to him have a role in such interpretation, much weight is placed on the individual.⁷⁹ Nietzsche advocates in essence a psychological transfiguration that allows

the cultivation of the individual through Dionysian experiences that reflect back on to its Apollinian counterpart, and which will fundamentally towards its eternal return.

Conclusion

In revisiting the role of art, what we find are two varieties that are both actualized through the same means, that of will to power. Behind everything are impulses towards a given direction, and will to power actualizes these desires. It is an artistic ability that is present beneath everything that moves. Within Apollinian reality, will to power functioned to deceive and maintained a state of willing that made possible only certain impulses while suppressing others. The Dionysian can be said to break free from Apollinian limitations and exposes the plurality of will points. The Dionysian sees the chaos underneath our truths, while the Apollinian selectively wills certain impulses, and constructs a myth through which life is made possible. Nietzsche's solution is to bring the two psychological states together, in a bicameral system which makes possible a new higher state of willing. Under the new psychological arrangement, man can cultivate himself, always becoming, in a continuous movement towards a higher state.

Revaluation of our truths, values, and all that we regard as "true" is necessary, for if man is to be thought of a bridge, then he must know where he stands. Nietzsche's Dionysian employs a radical reassessment of our truths and provides an equally radical way of creating new ones. What Nietzsche offers is not supremacy over the world but the bringing of one's life to adhere to its own rhythm rather than a rhythm that he remains unconscious of, the Apollinian myth. It is here that Zarathustra symbolically employs his

whip, but as his message is carried to the overman, not all are able to handle Zarathustra's whip, experience the Dionysian and employ a play with the Apollinian. The possibility posed by Nietzsche is one which we must nevertheless take seriously, if we are to address the collapse of the illusions that we have come to make for ourselves, in this culture that has denied the Apollinian and Dionysian play and with it our inner most artistic abilities.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MYTH AND ILLUSIONS OF CAPITALISM

Where solitude ceases the market place begins; and where the market place begins the noise of the great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies begins too.

Nietzsche – *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

The truths we construct and actions through which we experience and build our lives are based on metaphors which we have long ago forgotten as metaphors and have since allowed ourselves to become dogmatically fixated on. Nietzschean critique of our contemporary Weltanschauung would attack the essential underlying truths of our reality which will be the focus of the following radical perspectivist deconstruction. Attempt is made in this chapter to take what I see to be as the foundational brick of this reality away from its structure and in turn let the remainder of the formation collapse downwards. This chapter does not examine the economic contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, but rather by reevaluates the treatment of its truths. Capitalism is examined as a metaphor, as a construct of man that has been abandoned as such, but as a necessary fiction that gives meaning and direction to life. This chapter take the form of three sections. The first examines how the metaphor of capital has become real, and how it is treated as a certainty. The second section examines the values that capitalism creates and upholds one of Apollo's masks, as previously stated. The third section examines how we surrender ourselves to capitalism and go on living in the state of *rêverie*. Capitalism is criticised on two levels: the interpretation of the world which it renders, and second, truths which we make of ourselves from and within it. In short, this chapter is a continuation of the themes of the proceeding pages, and in accordance with which it is

argued that capitalism has established a mask over reality which has brought order while denying the world of becoming – a state of narcosis that limits our actions within the parameters of its truth.

How a Metaphor Became Real

From a Marxist perspective, capitalism contains inherent economic contradictions which in turn stand against the very values that capitalism seeks to promote. Marx would have it that the concentration of capital and the ever growing gap between classes will constitute a central role in bringing the capitalist mode of production to its end, and ultimately making possible the highest mode of production.¹ In opposition to this point of view, Nietzsche's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and of any absolute end undermines our certainty in how we see and interpret this present reality. We must question the certainty of our truths, and be wary about our direction. Marxist critics have sidelined the critique of truth, a critique presented in the previous two chapters, for at the end it is ideologically bound to make similar truth assertions itself. Nevertheless, McCarthy maintains that "[f]or Hegel and Marx, there are no foundations (epistemologies) for any possible truth-claims, because these foundations are also claims to absolute truth, which are themselves beyond justification. For Nietzsche, there are no objective (substance, causality, and so on) or subjective (ego or self) realities that can act as a reference or validation point for truth-claims."² Yet Marxist studies have not seriously examined how the truths of capitalism have been able to maintain themselves, and I agree with McCarthy's praise for Nietzsche in pushing his arguments beyond a

critique of Marxism's traditional epistemology. Nietzsche's presentation of truths as metaphorical constructs weakens any praise for one worldview as having an ultimate perspective over another; though possibly there may be a higher one. Capitalism accentuates its view of the world as ultimate and true, insofar as it is under its reality that that we experience life, while having essentially forgotten that both capitalism and the ideas that it promotes are our own constructs. It is only through this forgetfulness, Nietzsche would have it, that we fancy of having discovered the truth, and go on with shaping our lives by its limitations within; what I have earlier termed the state of *rêverie*.

If we were to critically question many of the values and views which we uphold, we will find ourselves helplessly confined within the limits of the language which we employ. The *human order of things* that we experience is a product of perspectives that have been solidified through the course of human social history. The undermining aspect of social history, rather than human history, designates a specific course of truth construction. The first perception of an object into sound, for example, is later further carried over to the social sphere, possibly with modifications, through social interaction. "Insofar as the individual wants to maintain himself against other individuals," writes Nietzsche, "he will under natural circumstances empty the intellect mainly for dissimulation. But at the same time, from boredom and necessity man wishes to exist socially and with his herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strive accordingly to banish from his world at least the most flagrant *bellum omni contra omnes*." (TL 1) In the first place, we strive for uniqueness, but nevertheless our social inclusion by design leads us to mimic the truths of the latter. Take for example, social movements and

discontents as represented in demonstrations; where one shouts a slogan and without thinking twice, the individuals turn around and echo one sound into the noise of the many. The social reality of capitalism functions in the same way, as an idea which first presents itself to one person charged with the task of convincing others of its truthfulness, for it affirmed their power status, and over time truths of capitalism became internalized by the masses.

Rousseau would have it that civil society began by “the first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say *this is mine* and found people simple enough to believe him,”³ but perhaps this is also how the truth of capitalism began.⁴ Modern capitalism is a myth no doubt more complex than that of property ownership itself, for it brings society together in a complexly interwoven ways. The study of capitalism is important because capitalism stipulates the idea that the individual has meaning only within market relations and as possessing value only as far as s/he is integrated among the forces of production. It puts emphasis on our life-course as it is patterned from the truth claims that it makes of life and of the world in which we live. Ostensibly capitalism narrows the possibilities toward which our impulses can be directed, to put to practice the Dionysian elements of will to power, and to make possible the cultivation of the self in such a way that we are able to pursue our innermost desires. Democratic liberal capitalism essentially undermines freedom, though it portrays the idea that freedom is only possible through it, “... and produces a utilitarian, consumer-oriented society, which itself is antithetical to strong individuality and ultimately leads to slavery.”⁵

Capitalism in its later advanced stages of imperialism, demands that not only it have access to labour markets globally but also for capital to have no restrictions imposed upon it. More lucid are the liberties which capital has gained over this period, and it is an essential truth that we should reconsider. While Marx believed that it is effectively capitalist social relations that produce economic expressions, Geoffrey Ingham goes further to suggest that once these expressions are produced, they become independent from their creators. In reference to monetary expressions, Ingham suggests, "that capitalist credit money not only expresses, symbolises or mediates social relations, but itself *is* a social relation and that the production and control of money is a relatively autonomous social process that has independent effects."⁶ Ingham in effect goes beyond the orthodox analysis of credit money and explores the relationships that result out of its expressions. He suggests that a conceptual truth which initially came as a result of man's construct, later hardened itself within social expressions. Though the concept would continue to express itself within social relations, it is now largely independent from man, as an object of its own – what is considered here as a form of reification. With the concept of commodity fetishism, Marx had long ago demonstrated how the product of man's labour becomes detached from labour and begins to express itself in relation to man and other commodities.⁷ In a similar way, capital itself too has become a social relation, by incorporating an independence within language. The term "capital" is used here both in its more literal sense, or as real capital and not to be restricted with in the Marxist typology, and also as a concept that is closely associated with valuation of wealth and worthiness. In the latter sense, capital is a truth that has been dissociated from its

physical counterpart, employed in an arbitrary sense, and most importantly as a metaphor closely associated with how we employ the notion real capital. This latter usage integrates itself within language as a truth, while being routinely and unconsciously applied in our everyday lives. As Nietzsche put it:

The man engaged in commerce understands how to appraise everything without having made it, and to appraise it *according to the needs of the consumer*, not according to his own needs; 'who and how many will consume this?' is his question of questions. This type of appraisal he then applies instinctively and all the time: he applies it to everything, and thus also to the productions of the arts and sciences, of thinkers, scholars, artists, statesmen, peoples and parties, of the entire age: in regard to everything that is made he inquires after supply and demand *in order to determine the value of a thing in his own eyes*. This becomes the character of an entire culture, thought through in the minutest and subtlest detail and imprinted in every will and every faculty: it is this of which you men of coming century will be proud: if the prophets of the commercial class are right to give it into your possession! But I have little faith in these prophets. (D 175)

Capital is a way of valuating the world and all that is within it, not unlike a market insofar as it also works at discriminating one object from another in terms of its worth in the capitalist reality. In addition, capital is also a truth that discriminates in non-object relations by associating itself. Allow us to express few thoughts on the description of real capital.

The conceptual designation of "liberal capitalism" is misleading, for it suggests that there are variants of capitalism,⁸ while liberal capitalism predicates at least one thing above all else, that of its liberty. By this I do not mean a state of *laissez faire* with a reduced role for government, but rather its continuous involvement in promoting capital and advocating its contradictory freedom. This is the controversy between orthodox and neo-Marxists: is the government essentially on the side of the bourgeoisie or does it mediate class conflict? Neither matter, because governments stand always, for the

reasons which will become clearer, on the side of capital. Moreover, it is odd that within this relationship, no one to my knowledge has yet called such state of affairs as either *capital liberalism* or the liberty of capital. It may either be just that what we are fed unconsciously in capitalism is the notion of capital as predicating liberalism, and we are encouraged to look for the features of the latter to be achieved in the context of the former. It is in this manner that the concept of capital is viewed as having developed a life beyond its object-original, limiting us unconsciously in how we behave and direct our lives – in a way integrating itself within our language and our thought, without being associated directly with any necessary correlation to its signified object. Both Marx and Nietzsche, though each in his own way, posited philosophies to emancipate man from the conditions of his social realm, and yearned for a mode of being that would work in the cultivation of himself outside of socially imposed values and belief systems.⁹ McCarthy is right in suggesting that, “[l]iberalism, on the other hand, limited human vision to consumer rights and commodity consumption, reduced imagination to improving profits and acquiring property, distorted reason to cleverness and calculations of domination, and replaced hope and happiness with market success and commodity pleasures.”¹⁰

The values that liberalism puts forward, through its predicate, limit the possibilities for creativity, experience and direction. Capitalism puts forward competition, investment and profit maximization, ownership and the egoistic pursuit of surplus as central to the formative identity of its subjects. These ideas constitute not only the capitalist reality but also the language which we employ in order to structure the experience of life under it. That is to say, in the first place capitalism limits the

possibilities of supplementarity in how we interpret things, and that second, deriving from the first assumption, capitalism projects a linear course for human progress and towards what it portrays as determinate values. The latter assertion is explored in the next subsection. On the first note, capitalism projects its truths as absolute a-priories and with them introduce a scheme of language that grows and develops deep in our subconscious. What is meant by this? That capitalism employs a specific language which affirms its reality and maintains its truths; it uses one set of truths to affirm another, and as discussed in the previous chapter, maintains a system of internal coherence. That which originally came about as an artistic construct of man, over its routine employment, slowly begins to thaw over ice, as Nietzsche would have it, and present itself as a certainty.

Foregrounded in the life-courses, of contemporary subjects, is the pursuit of monetary gains, and this thesis is very specific to underline that all other moral and ethical considerations always come second to the requirements and considerations of capital. Even if we are to assume that one gives preference to a simple form of life than to a luxurious one, subsistence and survival in this world formally demand access to a reasonable amount of capital. To say it the other way around, any action that we want to take, whether promoting profit or constituting a zero-sum relation,¹¹ invokes one thing in our thoughts above all else, that of capital. If morality is that which confines our behaviour, then McCarthy is right in stating that “[liberalism] inverted morality to marketable and alienated values, defined humanity through competition, self-interest, and profit maximization...”¹² It is in this sense that the most fundamental critique of the left,

both from those on the right and those who have abandoned their more radical positions on the left, has been on the viability of non-profiting relations as the basis for social relations. They have questioned the possibility of being motivated to work, if one is not to be compensated in terms of some monetary related gains for one's labour. Self-satisfaction and cultivation of one's being through one's work are denied as "reasonable" possibilities; for the logic of capitalism limits projecting these options in the realm of actually-existing possibilities.

Even prior to broad-scale participation in the capitalist mode of production, capital institutes its role through the careers which we choose to pursue; that is, *if* we were given the monetary means of making such desires even possible. Economists have long recognized the positive correlation between career choice and income promises of that profession,¹³ but rarely have they questioned the relationship between the image of a profession and the truth of its pursuit. In this sense we should ask, for example and most importantly, if a lawyer or a judge does what she does out of a love for their conception of justice or the promises of a comfortable income. Under the myth of capitalism, the latter often *is* justice, and in this respect we should thus be doubtful of all moral persuasions in this existing view of things. Nietzsche, at odds with the aesthetic appreciation of capitalism and having fled Bayreuth in disappointment, agreed that "... the market molds individuals according to a common measure and value, where morality is bought and sold for exchange."¹⁴ Put the other way around, capitalism projects an ultimate end of economic and material luxury which decrees indirectly that all values to come, are to also be founded on the basis of further promotion of capital. In this way,

capital functions as a truth without subjects being seriously aware of its presence, for it is routinely, both consciously and unconsciously, actualized in the most tacit forms of thought and action.

The Value of Capital

How much is capital worth in our lives? Let us explore how this question articulates itself in the reality that we live and shape. Even in the midst of crisis, capitalism is able to paint a vibrant portrayal of reality by driving our attention away from present difficulties and towards comforting illusions in the future. While likewise religion had previously afforded comfort by portraying this world as temporal and science continues to be entangled in the idea that it can one day remove the pain of existence and make this world ideal, capital too in the same way projects the possibility of reaching higher aesthetic enjoyments of life in the future, if the present is otherwise. This is the second assertion introduced above, that capitalism projects a linear course for human development, and it does so by always portraying happiness in the distant. Consider, for example, the mule who blindly marches towards the carrot off a stick – except if the rider happens to fall – and even if he happens to hate the load on his back, delight is always there but only a step away. In regards to the sociology of man, Durkheim puts it beautifully when he writes, “[w]hat blinded him to himself was his expectation always to find further on the happiness he had so far missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks; from now on nothing remains behind or ahead of him to fix his gaze upon.”¹⁵ In the case that we stop, when the rider happens to fall or for need of

breath, we are faced with the possibility of revaluating our pursuits. It is at this point that the fallacies of our truths present themselves for what they are and our value pursuits become no more. In order to understand the linear course for progress that capitalism portrays, allow us to present the rhetoric itself, and to continue in exploring how the truths therein are maintained.

Capitalism has developed clever methods of diverting our attention away from the harshness of reality by consuming us in its rhetoric. What is this rhetoric? In short, that the world is here at our disposal and that further pleasure is always available at a further distance through the equal possibilities of exploitation which the machinery of capitalism makes possible. Nietzsche is quite critical of this self exploitative and world destructive form of thinking, as Lampert notes, for “[h]e is not content with European liberalism, the blind commercialism tied to a rape of the planet for immediate profit and ease which tempts the whole world to do the same in the ignorant conviction that everyone can go on doing it forever; nor is he persuaded by European progressivism that supports itself with myths of freedom and equality dependent on machinery.”¹⁶ This however, as Lampert is correct to suggest, does not mean that Nietzsche is advocating a return to the past, but he is rather critical of how settled man has become with his idea of progress. Allow us to begin by attending to the idea of the unending exploitation that this world can take under capitalism. This line of thinking has come under criticism from a wide range of schools of thought; from those on the left who see capitalism as essentially destructive to earth yet go on to suggest it as an object at the disposal of man, and those who believe that with certain modifications, or what they call sustainable development, capitalism can be

rescued from the self-exploitative error. Development and progress nevertheless remain central ideas of capitalism, and no matter the extent of adjustment it takes, it cannot relinquish the notion of unending progress and towards further blind production, or what it calls progress. Capital is so well embedded in our language, as a mode of symbolic exchange, that even once the last man realizes the rhetoric of capitalism, that the world is not here at our free dispense and its unending destruction, rather than not to will at all, he consciously prefers to will nothingness. When we get in our cars, do we not know that we are contributing to the growing pollution in the world? How about disposal of garbage, use and misuse of water resources, and over consumption of nature's by-products; do we not consciously engage in the practice of ignorance? Capital is able to rationalize all things that question its pursuit, and it does so by using itself as the basis for reasoning. After being exposed to its lies, very few are able to make substantial changes in their manner of living. Capital is embedded, in its psychological sense, in the language of how we conceptualize the physical resources of this world. Everything on earth is conceptualized in terms of its utility in service of capital maximization and our regard of the environment expresses itself in terms of investment in and profit from its resources. Even when it comes to protecting the environment, we still remain entangled in the language of capital. What better example than the foremost international environmental policy which has incorporated, for example, the idea of emission "trading," and has reduced the environment to the status of an object reflected in terms of monetary value and at our disposal? The entire preoccupation with saving the environment from human mass consumption continues to incorporate the processual profitization characteristic of

capital. By remaining in the background, in valuating the world and our lives, capital justifies our preoccupation with it no matter what occurs outside of it.

Capitalism conceals suffering, in its Schopenhauerian sense, by making aesthetic truth claims and providing the possibility of redemption through its exchange. These truth claims are essentially two fold: (1) object or material happiness, and (2) non-object valuations of the world. Let us begin with the former and stipulate the idea that material happiness is vital in keeping the capitalist machine going forward in the direction of what it calls progress. These pursuits constrain our creative powers and render us unable to cultivate ourselves and experience life for what it is and delusion us in thinking that we are happy and free. In Nietzsche's own words:

Poor, happy and independent! – these things can go together; poor, happy and a slave! – these things can also go together – and I can think of no better news I could give to our factory slaves: provided, that is, they do not feel it to be in general a *disgrace* to be thus used, and *used up*, as a part of a machine and as it were a stopgap to fill a hole in human inventiveness! ... Are you accomplices in the current folly of the nations – the folly of wanting above all to produce as much as possible and to become as rich as possible? What you ought to do, rather, is to hold up to them the counter-reckoning: how great a sum of *inner* value is thrown away in pursuit of this external goal! But where is your inner value if you no longer know what it is to breathe freely? if you no longer possess the slightest power over yourselves?" (D 206)

To understand these pursuits, to understand how capital restricts us and gives us a sense of happiness, we must understand how its state of mind is developed and maintained. Thus on the first point, two further assertions are made: The reality which we live drives our attention away from the immediate and towards the attainment of pleasures in the future. Second, if we were to look for Apollinian illusions in the capitalist mode of production, and resulting from the desires aroused from the first point, we find that we

are thrown in a relationship where the means of production naturalize their character in relation to mental life.

By being preoccupied with capitalism, happiness is placed in object relations that serve the central role of fulfilling pleasure over their utility. Adam Smith was right to situate subsistence as being prior to convenience and luxury, but what he did not realize was the capacity of capitalism in converting what is luxury to necessity. Marx saw the latter as a product of social being and believed that aesthetic desires in objects transform over time into necessities.¹⁷ This essentially introduces the argument that the socialization process associated with the mode of production peculiar to capitalism, converts luxury items into necessities by rationalizing them as something possessed of exchange/market value, especially as the norm pronounces them as such. What is found problematic here is not the products that capitalism produces, for they might be pleasing and beautiful, but the way by which they are treated as categories of thought. As McCarthy shows, preoccupation with capital induces in us an egoistic pursuit for commodity satisfaction through a competitive mentality. Individuals engage in exchanging their valuations of objects with one another and develop the desire to acquire new objects which no longer present themselves as a luxury but a necessity. In this manner, one's immediate dissatisfaction with life is psychologically distorted by directing attention towards the prospect of attainment of commodities in the future. The preoccupation begins, not simply with attainment of objects but indeed on how to attain them.

The most important aspect of this relationship is the stimulation of a state of rêverie according to which we begin to direct our lives. The point was made earlier that capitalism has a central role in the education system not fundamentally towards educating ourselves but rather towards the attainment of capital. At the same time the point on the prior importance of our monetary capacity in this relationship was also made. The American dream projects an optimistic vision, and makes the have-nots aspire towards the possibility of moving up the economic hierarchy, even if the odds maybe against them. In this way, not only do we find ourselves oriented towards the pursuit of capital and commodity accumulation, but we also begin to believe that through its activity we will be able to change our conditions. In the section on "The New Idol," Zarathustra speaks these words:

"Behold the superfluous! They gather riches and become poorer with them. They want power and first the lever of power, much money – impotent paupers! Watch them clamber, these swift monkeys! They clamber over one another and thus drag one another into the mud and the depth. They all want to get to the throne: that is their madness – as if happiness sat on the throne. Often mud sits on the throne – and often also the throne on mud. Mad they all appear to me, clambering monkeys and overardent. Foul smells their idol, the cold monster: foul they smell to me altogether, these idolators." (Z I: §11)

As shown shortly, Nietzsche saw capital pursuit no differently than those projects we had pursued in the name of religiosity, and overall, he remains critical of such preoccupations. Of the above section, Lampert notes that "Zarathustra implicitly criticizes Locke and other teachers of the modern commercial state by condemning the emancipation of acquisitiveness, or of the desire for more than one needs, that such teachers counseled as the basis of a new political order."¹⁸ Under capitalism, lack of participation in the capitalist myth stipulates the idea that the cause of our sufferings is

us, and in this way we begin to explore possibilities of changing our conditions through objects that are outside of us. Once we accept this, we are forced to participate in the discursive making of capitalism, by becoming good consumers, directing our life course towards the attainment of wealth, and interpreting the world within the linguistic constraints of capital. Under capitalism, man directs his attention towards the acquisition of the products of capitalism, while treating capital as a truth.

Capitalism attains meaning by way of its close association with the aesthetic values that bring us pleasure, such as material happiness, and also by promoting the idea that some of our most valued truths are only attainable through it. As capital should be treated as a metaphor and our own construct, we begin to look at its physical counterpart, that of money, and no longer see paper but a mysterious object in-itself, with a set of values and implications attached to it.¹⁹ In same way that we have forgotten money to be our own, its psychological counterpart conceals itself as a form of truth above and for the most part independent of us. This thesis has tried to show that we employ the concept of capital in our language, as a de facto, a priori truth and without largely being aware of it, and cleverly incorporate it within further truth claims. Through this latter relationship, capital advances a transference by attaching its meaning to other truth claims, many of which are induced from it. This is the second point, that capital plays a central role in non-object relations by affiliating itself with the other values and truths that we uphold. In his inaugural address, Harry Truman differentiated between communism and democracy, rather than between communism and capitalism, as two opposing systems. For him the latter provided "...material well-being, human dignity, and the right to

believe in and worship God”,²⁰ essentially characteristics of liberal democratic capitalism which he and the line of politicians ever since have tried to convince the masses as lacking within communism. Why not the contrast of *capitalism* with communism, and why the value contrasts against it? In the previous chapter, we stated that “ideals and values are set to guide life in a certain direction by the very artists that continue to be embedded in a reality which they shape.” They uphold certain truths over others and believe so strongly that they have discovered truth. In the celebration of having attained the Real, they assert a certain path along which their truth can be achieved, and furthermore uphold certain values and moralities as rules which guide us towards the presumed “Real”. These truths are true as far as capital is held to be a truth, unquestioned and above man. The way by which capital is invoked in our language, and here we do not simply mean its usage but its conscious importance, is the conceptual clamping-together within which our Weltanschauung associates itself with capital. If we examine capital and capitalism as resembling so closely to both God and religiosity this idea will become clearer. Perhaps in this way, capital should be regarded as a *neue Wahrheit*, new truth, once belief in God was no longer able to provide meaning. In his reading of Max Weber, Vattimo writes that “modern capitalism is born not as the abandonment of the medieval Christian tradition, but as its transformed application.”²¹ The way through which we design our lives towards this end is not simply by consuming (or in the case of religion by praying) but by making abstract assumption through which we shall live; along these lines religion stipulates that God is great and good, and similarly capitalism asserts that capital is true, great, and good, through both of which a

better aesthetic appreciation of life will lead to higher status. Nietzsche could not agree more,

The means employed by the lust for power have changed, but the same volcano continues to glow, the impatience and the immoderate love demand their sacrifice: and what one formerly did 'for the sake of God' one now does for the sake of money, that is to say, for the sake of that which *now* give the highest feeling of power and good conscience.
(D 204)

Have we not become subjects of capital as we were once subjects of God? Moreover, capitalism by resembling religiosity so closely does transference by constructing values and associating its meaning with them – essentially truth claims themselves – and upholding these values universally.

In the most persuasive rhetoric that surrounds the way by which we would like to have the world administered, democracy today is portrayed as an ideal and the true way of being governed. The picture that the democratic ideal paints is a beautiful one and promises hope to all by incorporating them in the social realm. In addition, democracy has a second ideal, that all are equal before the law. Both these ideals are derived from religions that preach the idea that in the realm of God we are all participants and equal before him. The Modern principles of democracy, however, resemble market practices more than religious indoctrination. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis have argued that capitalism and democracy have seen their historical development coincide.²² The foremost ideal remains inclusion, where now it implies more than anything else that of inclusion in the competitive capitalist reality. It is not odd at all that democracy and capitalism have come to work hand in hand, for political suffrage initially had property ownership as a requirement, the foremost aspiration under capitalism, inexorable tethered

to it. When it comes to equality, however, capitalism does not promote the idea of equal property ownership (and how could it?), but rather it stipulates the idea that we have equal rights to participate in the capitalist system.²³ This is the myth that we carry on, that the Western democratic model is an ideal one for it promotes participation in the market. In one other way, however, democracy could be understood as a way of having your voice heard as a means of political expression. It is a concession to trade other means of social expressions, "... once very legitimate and effective forms of political expression: political strikes, bread riots, machine wrecking, the tarring and feathering of customs offices, and even dumping tea into Boston Harbor", with more "civilized" forms social expression.²⁴ What would democracy mean at all if one is hungry, lacks shelter, and lacks security? Does having an elected member to carry one's voice signify anything at all when we are denied the most fundamental access to the means of subsistence? The way democracy has been able to address this challenge has been primarily through presenting the possibility that once one's voice is heard, change is possible. It is a relationship between citizen and the state, as argued by Bowles and Gintis, that resembles so closely those relations specific to the competitive market; I would go further to argue that this has reinforced the language of capitalism rather than fundamentally challenging it.

Capital normalizes itself in relation to man through democracy. The mentality of masters remains the predominant way of thinking, though they too by competition are reduced to obeying market forces;²⁵ while through *ressentiment*, for they hate what they have, the slaves occupy themselves with similar dreams. Nietzsche would have it that

democracy brings about the formation of herd mentality, inherited from Christianity, and blending the blood of master and slaves (*BGE* 261). The latter subdue themselves in the idea that they can achieve ultimate capital ecstasy, and in its pursuit they blindly march towards capital's satisfaction, destroying all in their path. They objectify and devalue both earth and life on earth, while capital presents itself as the ultimate dream. The "majority become masters" under democracy, insofar as the majority's passion towards capital as modes of self-cultivation asserts itself as norm of behaviour. In this sense, the morality of self-egoism of the herd toward the aesthetic pleasures of capitalism, becomes universalized. What capital does here is employ will to power in a very limited and narrow sense, making only those passions that affirm capital as a truth possible, while denying any impulse that goes against it. "Like Marx," writes McCarthy, "Nietzsche was critical of idealism for he, too, recognized that he had no ideals to realize, since ideals are disembodied forms that are abstracted from existence and imposed upon individuals from the outside. Marx and Nietzsche continued to move beyond, maintaining that true freedom required the subject to become its own moral self-legislature; that is, it required the subject to determine its own moral laws from within itself."²⁶ The morality that arises from capitalism is the product of its culture, produced by and reproduced through man, and should not be treated as a truth independent of man.

Capitalism produces a culture of consumption and egoistic preoccupation with the accumulation of capital. Under it, as McCarthy argues, the idea of democracy gets reduced "... to a defence of narcissistic rights, consumer liberties, class property, and plebiscitary participation."²⁷ By encouraging these values and sensibilities, capitalism is

able to draw attention away from our conditions, firstly by focusing our attention on future aesthetic pleasure, and second, by completely denying the ruthless character of capitalism through its association with values such as democracy and progress. We assume, for example, that development is possible by way of competition. In this example, the illusion rests not in the cruelty of competition but the progress which results from it. The end aesthetic values of capitalism sustain the existing reality by driving persons' preferences towards these ends, with the idea that only through them can ultimate happiness be found. Thus, will to power is actualized by making only those impulses that are true under capital possible and all else is rejected as deviant. As a result, we are drawn into the illusion of happiness without being afforded the possibility of radically undermining its truths.

Capital should be treated as a supremely strong narcotic without which, it may seem to the average man, life will be reduced to agony. Though Nietzsche was quite critical of the narcotic effects of Apollinian illusions, he was also aware of the importance of pleasure in allowing us to go on with life. (cf. *GS* 127) This is why the tragic hero is characterized by his need to refer back to Apollinian illusions once he sees reality for what it is. This world of appearances, or for Schopenhauer of "representation," forms the backdrop against which Nietzsche sought to make the psychological distinction between the Dionysian and Apollinian forms of art, and he was only able to do so, as David Allison argues, by showing the possibility of ecstatic states.²⁸ If we are going to remove the veil over reality how could this result in happiness or delight? The exposure of the lies of capital, the presentation of this reality as our own

construct, strongly undermines our valuation of life. If life is ever more expressing itself in terms of capital, to deconstruct its meaning without presenting an alternative Apollinian illusion, takes away the very happiness that we had found in life. "During their searches [Marx] found the horrors of existence in social exploitation and economic alienation and [Nietzsche] found it in the suffering and pain produced by a meaningless world."²⁹ The latter, unlike the former, does not propose a fundamental absolute truth, though Clark would maintain otherwise, but rather proposes the idea that joy lies in seeing reality for what it is, and also rejects any absolute view of things. Only then, after our Dionysian experience, can we construct Apollinian truths as a measure to cover this chaos of reality. Through the latter, we once again find happiness, but now we take our truths as our constructs for the purpose of making this life possible. These truths are reached through Dionysian ecstasies, and we construct a creating a stable reality for ourselves without stipulating our truths as absolute.

Madness and Order

The way by which we view progress, here in the west and ever more globally, projects a linear history confined to the boundaries of capital as a truth. Pleasure is always placed at a further distance, and we blindly march towards it. In the pursuit of such pleasures we are entrapped in a never-ending preoccupation with capital accumulation. In this sense, progress actualizes itself through the pursuit of real capital as well as all those social and industrial processes that ensure production of new product fantasies. The underlying relation that drives both is a political relation which employs

and asserts the language of capital. It does this, as demonstrated here, in three ways: First, capital associates itself closely with how we define ourselves, and we do so in terms of it; second, a morality arises that reaffirms the truths of capital; finally we engage ourselves in a regulatory process, what Foucault had termed self-policing, as an unconscious activity. In effect, what should become evident in this section is the idea that capitalism maintains its status quo not because it is an absolute reality nor for workarounds against its inherent economic contradictions, as so often pointed to by its Marxist critics. Rather, it is argued that the myth of capitalism has stood the test of time by becoming so essential to how we identify ourselves and interpret the reality which we live.

We have thus far maintained that we internalize capital within our language and allow it to guide our lives, our behaviour and truth assessments, without being for the most part aware of its discriminatory presence. One way by which capital is internalized is by entangling us in its process. This process initially has its most obvious consequence in setting the environment through which we develop our identity. Madan Sarup contends that identity is a construction and consequence of interaction between people, institutions and practices. If we are born into conditions that predate our existence, we essentially interact within the limits of that system and identify both ourselves and others in terms of it. For Sarup, the internalization of the outside, or what he calls introjection, moulds us consciously and unconsciously through language.³⁰ While we employ the language of capitalism, we operate as market mechanism, sorting out all those who remain outside as alien or as the undesirable. Participation in the capitalist reality

demands, before anything else, acceptance of its truths. Accepting the capitalist reality does not mean being fully satisfied with it, but rather incorporating capital within our language and acting within certain norms of behaviour that do not seriously challenge capitalism and in fact reaffirm its productive relations. Here, as Sarup would agree, language sets those boundaries between people who fall within the norms of behaviour and those who remain outside of it.³¹ Those inside reaffirm the existing myth through the medium of mass culture. People participate equally in maintaining the capitalist mode of production not only by participating in the forces of production and consuming its by-products, but above all else by reaffirming its truths within them. Bourdieu writes, that "... in the mythology of artists and intellectuals, whose outflanking and double negating strategies sometimes lead them back to 'popular' tastes and opinions, the 'people' so often play a role not unlike that of the peasantry in the conservative ideologies of the declining aristocracy."³² Capitalism does not maintain its vision of reality without the masses internalizing its truths by reaffirming them in their daily lives. The pleasures which capitalism promises and capital as a truth is reflexively fed back into the mass culture, which popularises an artistic construct in the realm of an absolute interpretation, a virtual irreality, if you will. In reference to virtual America, for example, Arthur Kroker writes, "[h]ere there are no politics and no society either, but only the suddenly concentrated and then dispersed flow of cybernetic pulses. A strange electronic world populated by chip personalities, where power mutates into information, information seeks only its own moment of cancellation, and where the body itself is seduced by its own metamorphosis into a servomechanism of digital reality."³³

Capital serves the interests of the masses in as much as it deludes with its values and preoccupies them with the accumulation of material fantasies. The interest of the highermen, however, is a more direct and advantageous one; through affirming and promoting the language of capital, they in turn reassure their hierarchical status. This process is not taken to be for the most part a conscious one, though the bourgeois amongst other highermen are quite aware of the class distinction which serves their interest more directly than those of the proletariat. We should rather pay closer attention to their inclusive part in affirming the truths of capitalism, which they too also internalized.³⁴ “The ‘political’ becomes, almost by definition, the covert and semiconscious – and hence all the more irrational – endless Nietzschean struggle for power...”³⁵ The highermen will to power as the masses do, while it is through capitalism that their hierarchy maintains itself. Having developed their status, highermen have a more direct role in ensuring the continuation of truths of the capitalism, for it ensures their elevated status. It is here that Foucault’s concept of governmentality helps in making sense of this relationship: “The word ‘economy,’ which in the sixteenth century signified a form of government, comes in the eighteenth century to designate a level of reality, a field of intervention, through a series of complex processes that I regard as absolutely fundamental to our history.”³⁶ Highermen must ensure that this power relation and their status are maintained, discursively through the language of capital – what I would argue to be an inclusive part of governmentality rather than a result of it. This process of ensuring the continuity of the language of capital does not necessarily imply, however, the usage of coercion in its Weberian sense and in all instances, but rather

ensuring that the language of capital has universalized itself. David Harvey best illustrates the process by which man's views are universalized:

Universals cannot and do not exist ... outside of the political persons who hold to them and act upon them. They are not free standing nor do they function as abstracted absolutes that can be brought to bear upon human affairs for all time and places. They are omnipresent in all practices. But to the degree that we begin to shape and order them for given purposes they take on the guise of abstract principles (even written codes and laws) to which we adhere. And if we find in them successful guides to action (as we do, for example, within the corpus of scientific understandings) so they shape our world view and become institutionalized as mediating discourses. They tend to cluster and converge as dominant paradigms, as hegemonic discourses, or as perceived ethical, moral, or political-economic principles that inform our beliefs and actions. They become codified into languages, laws, institutions, and constitutions. Universals are socially constructed not given.³⁷

The continuation of the capitalist reality implies order and patterns of behaviour that fall within specific norms of capital. Foucault, who saw politics as ethics, diagnosed social patterns as accommodating a relationship of self-policing from within.³⁸ Similar to that which we have contended above, Foucault believes that this active sense of ensuring that all fall within the norms of behaviour came as a result of protecting wealth and through moralizing the masses. Following Nietzsche, truths are only metaphorical constructs which over time and through their routine employment settle as conventional concepts, through which subjects come to view things. The socialization of concepts takes away from them the image of their metaphorical disposition, and their habitual behaviour presents an absolute perception of their status. Any behaviour or further truth constructs that deviate from the realm of the regular stand out as abnormal and alien. We are quite suspicious of anything that does not employ or relate to those truths that we hold as absolute and so intricately related to our worldview. Since it is the concept of capital,

above anything else, that is employed in our linguistic discrimination towards the world, we produce a reality that falls within its domain and closely guard its sanctity. "To say that modern societies are, among other things, normalizing societies is not only to say that they bestow institutional privilege on a restrictive set of identities and then apply intensive institutional pressures to establish those identities as the norms against which a variety of modes of otherness are defined and treated. It is also to say that these norms are touted as standards that the self will endorse for itself, once it understands its true nature."³⁹ The pattern of these behaviours produce alongside them a morality that ensures all behaviours fall within the existing, ones that routinely reaffirm capital as their basis for judgement, preference and political choice.

Nietzsche relentlessly critiqued all moral judgements that were based on some determinate conception of truth. He closely related moral judgements with power relations that subdued the masses to a certain pattern of behaviour, this only reaffirming the status of power of those holding it. Drawing from both Nietzsche and Marx, McCarty writes, "[t]he determination of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong is defined ultimately by their utility and their expression of the needs of the ruling class in society. They are expressions of the initial power relations of the aristocracy whose political and economic power is manifested in its ability to use language, define terms, and categorize human actions as good or bad."⁴⁰ In turn, contemporary moral persuasions, especially those found in international relations, are a result of a dishonest form of politics and have no place of universal application. If we look carefully at the motivations behind political action, we can see very vividly the role of capital, though the

involved parties might even believe otherwise. As an example, Alex Mintz who carefully draws a noncompensatory theory of the 1991 Gulf War, concludes that political decisions employ rational choices that do not necessarily maximize utility but minimize undesirable alternatives.⁴¹ What Mintz would only see as a marginal variable is an important one in our understanding of the event, in terms of capital being conceived of as the underlying truth for which the invasion took place. Moral action can only portray authenticity, if they can refer to themselves alone, but like the myth of the literal, moral actions should be looked at as always relating to other metaphorical constructs, and in this case, it was the pursuit of capital. In turn, since no moral argument can in any case refer to an end-in-itself, they are thus only subjective practices that fall within the domain of existing patterns of behaviour – the contemporary one being the pursuit of capital on the part of dominant actors.

These are the ideal that I believe the Western liberal model celebrates: right of property ownership, freedom of expression (as far as we are free to express those ideas that fall within existing truths), consumption, and finally the right to sell one's labour power. The foreseen problem here is the imposition of a worldview over others by universalizing decidedly oppressive truths and moral practices. We see anything that does not follow our truths, moral principles, and in short worldview as existing out of the realm of reason, and seek to change that which is different or incomprehensible. This is evident especially in the history of Christianity which sought to "civilize" the "uncivilized." This, part of a Eurocentric view of things, continues to be employed in our contemporary reality, but on a considerably grander political-economic scale.⁴² Bourdieu

writes, that “[a]t stake in every struggle over art there is also the imposition of an art of living, that is, the transmutation of an arbitrary way of living into the legitimate way of life which casts every other way of living into arbitrariness.”⁴³ This universalization of capitalism is an inherent behaviour of capital, or what the left has often referred to as imperialism. While political commentators have studied this process largely in terms of empirical data signifying economic trends, they have disregarded processes that expand the application of language, or new truths. Capitalism not only spreads as a result of its imperialistic tendencies, but also grows to include an absolute interpretation of reality, for the moral judgments of the dominant group legitimize them as so.

Conclusion

Capitalism can portray only one view of the world, one that is characterized by never-ending blind pursuit of capital through whatever means possible. All interpretation of life and the world are channelled to express themselves through capital, while upholding the morality of which only reaffirms its truths. The authenticity of its absolute perception will come under question once capital becomes less illustrative of the world, as has happened with religion. This is the tragedy which capitalism has brought upon itself, but one which dates back in a long history of the will to truth, originally marked by, according to Nietzsche, Socrates. “The tragedy of modern moralizers is best told, in the Western canon, by Nietzsche, who understood that once the moralizers no longer offered explanations that organized the world for its inhabitants, the moralizing would begin to work against itself.”⁴⁴ Have we become so consumed in our myths that we are

not able to see anything outside of them? How has this undermined our ability to create beyond the limits that we have imposed on ourselves but without being aware of any longer? Are we honest with our selves and others when we hail, "Thus I have found truth, this is happiness, and behold I bring you the message?" These are the questions that this chapter has sought to answer, and I believe that we must question and bring under sincere examination the very truths of capitalism which we uphold. This is a revaluation that comes in light of a prophesy, that Apollinian truths cannot maintain themselves forever. Thus, we must begin to question ourselves and the world which we have made for ourselves, and be doubtful of all moral persuasions that try to divert us away from this activity. This is a dangerous philosophy, but one which will open the way for possibilities denied to man, essentially those denied by himself.

CHAPTER FOUR

BEYOND NIHILISM: THE SYMBIOSIS OF ART AND KNOWLEDGE

This tremendous event is still on its way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder need time; the light of the stars needs time; deeds need time, even after they are done, in order to be seen and heard. This deed is still more remote to them than the remotest stars – *and yet they have done it themselves!*

Nietzsche – *The Gay Science*

That which this chapter continues to maintain is the idea that art is more important than truth, that truths are artistic constructs, and at the same time, it also argues that truths are necessary to make life possible. In this sense we are not suggesting that Apollinian stability of our reality should be traded for a chaotic one, but nevertheless we should not be reluctant to fall in the trap of its certainties and continuous will to truth. It would not be possible to go on with the Dionysian form of dance forever without collapsing, without losing our sanity and being dangerous to ourselves. Then at the same time, the status of life under mask of Apollo cannot be called sanity, but rather as simply fitting neatly within the patterns already established. By emphasizing the need for a bicameral system of knowledge in the post Dionysian state, what is suggested here is a symbiosis between the two. This is the idea that is brought together in this concluding chapter, and I argue that we must be prepared to remove the mask of Apollo, embrace the multitude of views that the Dionysian makes possible, and thence construct a new Apollinian myth that we embrace as a “myth.” In other words, a psychological transfiguration that enhances life – a post Dionysian state that falls back on its Apollinian counterpart, and wills to its eternal return – is advocated in this chapter. It is a frame of

thought that makes possible a new way of interpreting the world and allowing the development of multitude of myths globally without recourse to homogeneity.

Removing the Mask

This thesis has thus far maintained that the Apollinian veil over reality is a counter productive artistic cover as far as one treats truths under its domain as certainties. Chaos essentially relates to our inability to attain the Real and conceptualize it within “Truth.” What we call “truth” is true as far as it is a product of our interpretation of the world, within the confines of the Apollinian reality in which the interpretation occurs. In the capitalist reality, capital presents itself as a truth and devises its pursuit as a form of aesthetic fulfilment, while introducing a morality and a set of values which man ultimately holds as true. The truths of capitalism, employed through the language of capital, construct a limited worldview which interprets everything in terms of it – it devaluates life and put capital above it. Under capitalism, competition, investment and profit maximization, ownership and egoistic pursuit of capital become central in defining ourselves. In this sense, under capitalism we do not simply consume, but capitalism consumes us; we become its subjects and live our lives within its rêverie. The question to be raised here is the length of the dream state, and we should consider the effects of a possible post awaking experience.

By announcing a prophecy, are we not at the same time recognizing the error and invoking possible solutions? The Dionysian recognizes the nihilistic end of the will to truth, and understands our post-awaking experience as quite dangerous. In this way, the Dionysian invokes also a solution, and through the tragic hero it wants to provide a

means of going forward with life once we treat our illusions as illusions. If we, however, think that there is essentially nothing wrong with our will to truth, and that with few modifications of this reality we can continuously avoid nihilism, then we are not seriously offering a solution. As long as we believe in the linearity of history and live our lives according to such ideas, we are stuck in the very problem that Nietzsche outlines. In this latter view, one would question the desire to awaken someone from a state of rêverie. If Nietzsche sees truth as indispensable to life, why would we want to take something away from someone who is already happy? The question is even raised in the prologue of *Zarathustra* when he chooses not to bring his full message to the joyous saint, and departs mockingly, "What could I have to give you? But let me go quickly lest I take something from you!" (Z Prologue: 2) Nietzsche's message is not for everyone and not everyone can handle the awakening, after being asleep for a long time. To remove Apollo's mask means to deconstruct all those truths that we upheld so dearly and to treat them only as illusions. The effect of such unmasking also makes us recognize that the way by which we have thus far lived has been in a state of dreaming, and what can be more powerfully destructive than this!

In rêverie what is essentially denied, as explored in detail in the next subsection, is the world of becoming. The denial of the world of becoming is destructive in two ways: First, the possibility of being something more is denied and man becomes repetitive; Second, the resulting ultimate nihilist is found unable to deal with reality once existing truths no longer provide. We take the truth of capital so seriously and blindly that we are not open to any ideas outside of it. We destroy the diversity of myths, by

being too certain in our own and treating our construct, or otherwise a “sedimented expression,” as a “Truth.” In doing so, we constrain the possibilities of experiencing life within the limitations of our Truth and not outside of it. Under capitalism, our reason restrains our will, as argued earlier, and by making possible only those impulses that affirm capital as a truth. In this way, “[r]eason and will are turned against each other as impersonal forces that undermine their own life-sustaining functions.”¹ Will to power under the Dionysian provides a state of consciousness of the plurality of one’s many will points, and gives him the possibility to direct those that he wishes to see reoccur towards desired ends, which are only beginnings, under the Apollinian state. The Dionysian man dreams of and indeed wants to create new myths, but the conceptual restrictions that capitalism imposes essentially deny creativity outside of its myth. Under capitalism, our identity is ever more acutely defined through the truths of the Apollinian reality which we experience, what we have analytically reduced to capital as an essential truth. By this I have argued that we can only see ourselves and relate to others by using the medium of capital, and then define ourselves within the parameters of already-established patterns that affirm the capitalist reality rather than question it. Under the mask of this Apollo many of our impulses are denied by the myth and metaphors which we treat as Truths, and the status quo is maintained. For Nietzsche identity is not about being something, confined to what already existing, but *becoming* something.² The idea of becoming is a forward impulse driven feeling which remains constrained to the gravity of where it is but that can nevertheless esteem to become something higher. Under capitalism, however, what we can esteem for is to become better consumers, or at best, better capitalists. This

is understood as progress, and it is within this linearity that the Apollinian reality proposes, that there is essentially no movement other than being preoccupied with its truths.

This Apollinian reality can be associated closely with an ailing society, for upon exposition of its illusions, it provides very little for man to come to terms with. Nihilism may be defined as neither a reaction nor simply the decline of traditional values and beliefs, but rather put it in relation to an implied end of meaning, the inability of language to further render any sense of the world. "Nihilism is" as George McCarthy would have it, "a psychological state resulting from the insecurity, shame, and deception produced by traditional ideas about reality."³ In this light, what we upheld previously no longer makes sense, and we are left confused, for our existing truths are no longer able to provide meaning for what we have at hand now. In addition, nihilism also traditionally is the product of a way of thinking, one which evolves out of religious and scientific conceptualization of the world; the latest of these is capitalism. The will to truth has a self-destructive tendency, for there are no truths that can correspond with Reality and capture it within them as literals, as original objects. What we have at most, are illusion that allow us to make sense of this world; but nevertheless they remain illusions. It is the progress towards this event, when "*why?*" *finds no answer*, from which the following conclusions are drawn:

Conclusion: The faith in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to categories *that refer to a purely fictitious world*.

Final conclusion: All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore devaluated the world – all these values are, psychologically considered, the results of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human constructs of domination – and they have been falsely *projected* into the essence of things. What we find here is still the *hyperbolic naiveté* of man: positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things. (WP 12B)

For the reasons mentioned, the study of capitalism was undertaken, and its central role in political and economic discourses was explored. It was argued, that we have become indelibly inscribed within its categories, while being closed to anything outside of it. Nietzsche “prophesised remarkably that nihilism would be the shadow in many guises and forms, that would haunt the twentieth century.”⁴ Capital is one such guise. Under capitalism, nihilism emerges as the degeneration of the linguistic scheme that previously aided us in interpreting the world and that now remains doubtful of its continuous truthfulness. Capital provides a means through which we valued our truths and developed our lives according to its sensibilities, and under myth of capitalism it becomes true. A closer and deeper reflection on the nature of capital, however, will force not only its lies to be exposed but most importantly will allow us to treat it differently. Once we treat capital as our own construct, then all those valuations which were based upon it, start making less and less sense. The magnitude of awakening from the dream of capitalism, seeing its fallacies and no longer treating its illusions as truths, is unimaginably powerful to the extent that not only does it posit the possibility for creative endeavours but also poses danger to the self, which has defined itself under the capitalist reality. The need for awakening is of great importance, and in order to avoid the defeatism found in the latter possibility, this chapter will propose a new way of thinking

and a new language that is able to prepare us for, if not evade, the collapse of meaning found in those truths which are central to our contemporary identities.

On the Art of Dance and Becoming

Following the line of thinking of this dissertation, the main delusion to which humanity has fallen prey, one that can lead to nihilism, is in the Apollinian man's certainty in what he has treated as "truth." The capitalist reality brings a sense of meaning and maintains an internal consistency through employment of concepts and a way of thinking that is Apollinian in character. In this way, under capitalism man rejects all those other perspectives which see outside of his point of view, all those that stand against the myth of capitalism. Furthermore, capitalism reduces what we regard as good and bad to a set of values and morality whereby capital is celebrated as a truth. It denies in essence the possibility of receiving an honest criticism, for we are afforded with its truths as a means of critiquing it, or as Nietzsche would have it, by *using truth to critique truth itself*. This inhibits our ability to render a new worldview using the existing language. The Dionysian, as may be argued, frees man from the conceptual limitations and views of the Apollinian world, while dancing above such confines. It embraces the idea of revaluating the truth of the Apollinian world, while recognizing that its critique is limited to what it has at hand. In this sense, the power of Dionysian art is not in its inability to capture Reality, since it does not create any new absolute truths but only new myths, which are in turn Apollinian. The Dionysian engagement of reality provides the possibility of deconstructing the truths of capitalism in order to provide a taste of chaos in

a world without it. In short, the power of the Dionysian art is within its engagement of reality, and in order to dance freely and make possible all those impulses within, it frees man from the conceptual limitations of the capitalist reality. At the level of meta-theory, this is a common position between both Marx and Nietzsche, and McCarthy writes,

[that] their definitions of human potential in terms of self-realization and self-becoming; their viewing of key human experiences as self-defining and self-legislating activity; their seeing life in terms of *praxis* and aesthetic creativity; and their critiques of the moral inversion, reductionism, and abstractionism of modernity and the mediocrity and levelling of liberalism... Thus, social theory, aesthetics, and morals, there are common grounds for a joint discussion between Marx and Nietzsche.⁵

Marx had a specific political agenda through which he wanted to create those conditions that allowed us to cultivate our being and fully experience those inner desires that were confined within capitalism. While Marx preoccupied himself with capitalism, Nietzsche not only undermined our will to truth and the morality that arose from it, but also provided a form of art that can free us from the capitalist conceptual limitation, allowing us to take wings once its truths collapse. Thus the reduction of Marx to be a prophet of communism is an error, and we should above all else regard him as a political economist, much of whose works was directed towards the critique of capitalism. Nietzsche's view of man as a bridge, and the yes-saying power of his Dionysian, provides the possibility to create a higher reality, if Marx's prophecy of the internal contradictions of capitalism proved destructive to itself and/or whence those very few individuals awaken to see capital as an illusion. The limitations of capital had thus far narrowed man's will to power to mere material pursuits, over and above life, while Nietzsche gravitates him back to earth and to life.

The Dionysian creativity is aesthetically beautiful not because of its attempt to sooth and subdue us in false pleasures, but rather for the sense of movement which it brings. Unlike under the Apollinian myths of capitalism, the truths that result in the post Dionysian experience are treated as artistic constructs and in this sense it brings tolerance to other worldviews and even truths that contradict it. This is a state of health, for once the fallacies of the capitalist reality are exposed, the Dionysian man cannot go on with living in deceit, nor can he deceive others, as highermen do in our reality. The Dionysian does not create any ultimate truth, stipulate one mode of production as absolute, nor maintains that its worldview is able to capture the Real. Nevertheless, the Dionysian does treat one artistic creation as more beautiful than another, and in turn does treat some illusions as truer than others. Nietzsche's Dionysian does not induce an infinite numbers of interpretations that can be treated as equals, as he stands firmly against the idea of treating unequals as equals. What the Dionysian does is to accentuate the idea that infinite interpretations of realities can be introduced; whether some are truer than others remains at the hand of those who intend to experience it. Recent philosophy, Aloni believes, has brought forward a new type of revaluation "... that aims to overcome philosophical nihilism by endorsing and restoring the integrity of the form of reasoning which, on the one hand, does not make any appeal to ultimate foundations and eternal standards, and, on the other, establishes a ground for repudiating the view that 'anything is just as good or as true as anything else.'⁶ Nietzsche does have a moral perspective that encourages our will to power to fall within a pattern, but this idea is radically different from that experienced under the mask of Apollo. If we were to understand Nietzsche's

usage of eternal return in a two fold way, as willing at each moment that we want to see again and also as a play between Dionysian and Apollinian forms of art, then we can appreciate its importance in the post-nihilistic state. Keith Ansell-Pearson believes that, "[t]his is to posit the world as a '*monster of energy*' without beginning and without end, a Dionysian world of 'eternal' self-creation and 'eternal' self-destruction, moving from the simple to the complete and then back again to the simple out of abundance: cold/hot/hot/cold, 'beyond' satiety, disgust, and weariness, a world of becoming that never attains 'being', never reaching a *final* death."⁷ Under capitalism, progress does not mean a forward movement in the Dionysian sense, but that eternal return in the terms of the Apollinian keeps the reality in a circle, never moving further than its truths. As Vattimo notes, for progress in the Apollinian sense to be possible, history needs to be regarded as unilinear, and modernity collapses when we are no longer able to view it as such.⁸ This latter state of consciousness removes destination from the ideals of capital, and bends time into a circle that repeats itself indefinitely. It is perhaps in this way that Marx saw the reoccurring relationship between the master and the slave, regardless of the mode of production. Given this circularity of time, we must ask if the possibility exists to free ourselves from this cycle. To will beyond the truths of capitalism, we must first treat its truths as illusions, and thence allow our will to power to create new myths and illusions which we want to see again. Once we fall back on the world of capital, if we happen to want that, we will our new truths at every moment of our lives. We will towards that which we would like to see again, for we view it with stark clarity as our own construct and we treat it as such. This is the Dionysian morality that allows us to

overcome our conditions by bringing to reality our Dionysian knowledge, and allows us to will beyond the confines of capital. Aloni interprets it best when he writes,

The possibility of 'using' Nietzsche to establish a context that would make it possible to redescribe and overcome ourselves seems especially important and promising in connection with existential condition of present man. We live in an era that has witnessed the rise of new and sophisticated forms of man's self-violation: the standardization of experience and mechanization of behavior, liquidation of man into his role-playing, the corruption of language, the equating of knowledge with scientific-technological knowledge, and of education with training. All these are elements that cause self-alienation, impede critical and creative thinking, and hinder the development of genuine moral agency.⁹

In short, the morality that Nietzsche suggests goes beyond the Apollinian gravity through the willing of the Dionysian man, who is on the one hand aware of the mysterious nature of eternal return, while on the other and through his Dionysian knowledge, he wills more towards that which he wishes to see reoccur.

Beyond the Dionysian

The Dionysian man, by rejecting reality as a determinant entity that can be rendered by way of human objectivity, views truth within a world that is constantly changing, always in flux. Nietzsche provides a new way of thinking that rejects a correspondence view of truth but yet allows the possibility of creating truths which would allow us to continue with living and make sense of the world. "Nihilistic philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger (but also pragmatists like Dewey or Wittgenstein), in demonstrating that being does not necessarily coincide with what is stable, fixed and permanent, but has instead to do with the event, with consensus, dialogue and interpretation, are trying to show us how to take the experience of oscillation in the

postmodern world as an opportunity of a new way of being (finally, perhaps) human.”¹⁰ What Nietzsche offers is the possibility of becoming, beyond the confines of existing truths and by treating our truths for what they are, as illusions. By embracing the flux of reality, we can see beyond our *Weltanschauung* by appreciating possibilities outside of our own views, always open to change, always open to new sensory experiences. If we were to view the human sciences as a form of what Kant called pragmatic anthropology, which examines not the nature of man but what man has made of this reality,¹¹ we nevertheless would find a preoccupation with truth that fails to address its key Nietzschean critiques. Vattimo believes that both the human sciences and all forms of media participate in “fabling the world” by reasserting existing truths. “The images of the world we receive from media and the human sciences, albeit on different levels,” notes Vattimo, “are not simply different interpretations of reality that is given regardless, but rather constitute the very objectivity of the world.”¹² The Dionysian frees our impulses and thus allows a multitude of interpretations of this world to burst and be realized through our will to power. In this way and being aware of the multitude of possible interpretations of the world, the Dionysian man is a moderate man,¹³ something which is lacking in the contemporary subject of power. In his book, *Transparent Society*, Vattimo’s central criticism is the lack of openness to these new ideas, constrained as they are by existing social and power structures that reaffirm the prevailing truth and nothing outside of it. This of course does not mean that we should view the Dionysian as creating a chaotic world with no meaning, but one that opens the possibilities of being more, of becoming, quite elsewhere beyond the existing margins.

The Dionysian finds rest back in on Apollinian reality, either a return to the pre-existing one that it burst from or by creating a new myth within which it can live. In both cases there is a new way of understanding things. In the case of the former, when the Dionysian man returns to his pre-existing state, a return to the myth of capitalism, for example, he is left with the powerful knowledge of his Dionysian experience. In case this knowledge is lost, as the highermen had in *Zarathustra*, we may return to our pre-existing state and turn back to our old gods, and treat capitalism once again as a truth over and above us. These highermen, however, are not those for whom Zarathustra brings his message; but Zarathustra addresses those who are able to incorporate Dionysian wisdom within their lives. The ones who Nietzsche addresses should be able to bring change within the existing state of things, or simply go on with its truths treated as illusions. When the Dionysian man looks at money, for example, he no longer sees an object beyond him, but see it for what it is, as a form of paper currency. The Dionysian man, however, cannot go on living with Apollinian illusions if these illusions restrict those impulses which he wants to accentuate. Capital has falsified our reality to such an extent that it seems difficult, if not impossible, to bring it back to the realm of man. Thus in this way, it is possible that the Dionysian may let go of capital and create new myths. The construction of such new truths bring stability to the chaotic world that the Dionysian had exposed, in his deconstruction and revaluation of his lived reality, and allows life to have meaning in order that it can be experienced. In this sense, the Dionysian creates new illusions that are treated as just that – more illusions. Under this higher state of morality, will to power brings together the mutual desires for the Apollinian and the

Dionysian, and allows them to act together. What becomes obvious is that although the potent dose of Dionysian experience falls back on the Apollinian world, it has awakened a state with the never-ending desire to return back to its higher view of things.

The Dionysian is not simply a psychological state but above all else it is a way of life. The Dionysian expresses his will to power by the way in which he thinks and acts. Unlike under capitalism where we are confined to act within certain patterns, lest we be marginalized as deviant, the Dionysian embraces change both in the reality which he constructs and the life which he lives. "Becoming is not the character of reality 'in itself' – a self-contradictory thesis – but the character of performance through which life 'lives' or is expressed."¹⁴ The Dionysian art is above all else a form of action that struggles to free itself both from one's psychological treatment of truth and from the professedly objective constructs imposed over reality. The will to power of the Dionysian awakens those impulses that had been forced into the deep rest within our subconscious under this Apollinian, and focuses its impulses towards desired artistic ends which go beyond the conceptual limitations of capitalism.

Conclusion

Dishonesty begins by first treating illusions as truths, and thence asserting the resulting beliefs universally. We do this by legitimizing our views vis-à-vis values that we make out of our produced truths, while making use of a complex system of morality which remains closed to any form of living outside the domain of our truths. "Moral values not only dominate and control their creators, but also dominate all other values in

society, including aesthetics, knowledge, and politics.”¹⁵ This is a destructive way of thinking for it rejects creativity, most implicitly found in the Dionysian art, and is unable to offer anything new once its truths are exposed for what they are, as illusions. The Dionysian allow the possibility of constructing a new way of thinking and with it a new *Weltanschauung* that is open to change and to alternative views. The Dionysian, as Aloni summarizes it, heals us from the self-destructive forces of the Apollinian reality in three ways:¹⁶ (1) Through affirming life on earth, in contrast to the illusions, of capital perhaps, which remain outside of it; (2) The Dionysian cultivates the self through creative artistic attempts outside of the conceptual limitation of this existing capitalist reality; (3) And finally, will to power is freed to explore its full potential and the experience of those mystical passions that were not allowed to flourish under the capitalist myth. This is how the Dionysian heals; it reevaluates everything and brings new honesty to the fabled reality.

If we are to be honest about our motives, we have to above all else be honest to ourselves. We have to begin by questioning our truths and bring to question all that which we treat as “Truth”. This process of revaluation will expose our illusions and the way by which we have falsified this world. At the end of this knowledge, what remains in our hands, in the domain of theory building, is the possibility of creating something new. Are we to take this step and walk the tight rope towards a higher being? This is the ultimate question that each of us will have to face at the height of nihilism, and whether we will overcome our conditions or stagnate – whether we want to create something beyond our truths or remain bound by them – remains a subjective answer. I have presented a study of the destructive powers of the latter, and like Nietzsche I believe the

creative possibilities of the Dionysian option will construct a new world above what we presume to be the limitations of our realities.

∞ Notes ∞

Prologue

¹ Contra to Nancy Love's introductory critique, in her book *Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), x, I believe Nietzsche's masculine use of language is directed towards both sexes. Similarly in this dissertation, the use of such terminology reflects a bias of the language and not that of the author. In a recent conference, my listeners hastily remarked this as a point of critique; though the intent of my presentation was to persuade the need of a new vocabulary and all together new grammar, which made my use of language intentional. Although I follow and believe in feminist critique of a bias within the English language, I also believe that the existing neutral vocabulary renders its own problems. Nevertheless and in general references, I make use of both sexes without implying one or another.

² Béatrice Han, "Nietzsche and the 'Masters of Truth': The Presocratics and Christ," Unpublished work presented at The Annual Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society (University of Greenwich, September 11-13, 1998), 1-3.

³ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴ This position similarly held by Alan Schrift, *Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* (New York: Routledge, 1990) and Wayne Klein. In his study of Nietzsche's critique of language and truth, Wayne Klein, *The Promise of Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

Chapter 1 - Metaphor and Truth

¹ Lawrence M. Hinman, "Nietzsche, Metaphor, and Truth," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43, no. 2 (Dec., 1982): 179-199.

² Hinman, 190-1.

³ See pp. 31-2.

⁴ Here Nietzsche is also talking about "Will to Power." See section on *Will to Power and Tragedy* in chapter two, where I discuss this notion at length.

⁵ Walter Kaufmann (1974: 79) argues that Nietzsche does not provide a philosophical system based on assumptions which are thence inferred upon. Peter Levine, in his book, *Nietzsche and The Modern Crisis of The Humanities* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 89-95, however, argues that Nietzsche's truth claims stand in contrast with his valuation of truth, and that he essentially makes an absolute truth claim through his usage of *eternal reoccurrence of the same* and *will to power*. This is a similar line of argument which Clark follows. I agree with Kaufmann and strongly disagree with both Levine and Clark's readings of Nietzsche. A more plausible readings, I believe, is one by James Winchester [*Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn: Reading Nietzsche After Heidegger, Deleuze, and Derrida* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 9-33], who goes to extent of demonstrating eternal return as being *relative* to the context which it is used and never as an absolute truth statement. Similarly Ruediger Hermann Grimm asserts that, "[t]he will to power is itself [too] another 'illusion' or 'useful fictions' which is 'true' for those who can utilize it to grow and increase their power, false for those who cannot" [*Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge* (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1977), 28]. These central Nietzschean typologies serve in a better understanding of how man's will is articulated, and as Gianni Vattimo notes, such truth constructs remained as artistic thoughts which Nietzsche was quite aware of being his own construct. Vattimo goes further to criticize the literal treatment of Nietzsche as being based on the readings of French authors, who had "the disadvantage to take the most 'metaphysical' aspects of Nietzsche philosophy, the idea of eternal recurrence, too seriously; it is not obvious at all [Vattimo continues to remark,] that Nietzsche intended this doctrine to be read as a 'description' of the true reality of things" [Gianni Vattimo "Nietzsche and Contemporary Hermeneutics," in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 61].

⁶ Klein, 74. On the other hand and in their separate analysis, Robert Nola and Steven Hales argue that for Nietzsche there exist two notions of truth. For Nola, Nietzsche attacks and critiques pragmatic thought while advocating correspondence (i.e. Will to Power); while for Hales, Nietzsche does not stand against rational thought nor logic, but his critique is based on semantics of formal science versus rational thinking. Robert Nola, "Nietzsche's Theory of Truth and Belief," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 47:4 (June 1987): 525-562. Steven D. Hales "Nietzsche on Logic," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 56, no. 4 (Dec., 1996): 819-835.

⁷ Clark, 21.

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1984), 122.

⁹ Ibid., 129.

¹⁰ Clark, 242.

¹¹ *TL* 1, quoted in Hinman, 186.

¹² Cf. Adrian Del Caro, "Nietzschean self-transformation and the transformation of the Dionysian," in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, 75.

¹³ Klein, 60. Also see Klein 92-5.

¹⁴ Nietzsche's praise for the Dionysian, in revealing the chaotic essence of the world, lends one to prematurely conclude that the Dionysian does not produce illusions (cf. Klein 132-3). On the contrary and in Chapter 2, I argue that the Dionysian produces illusions even of the reality which it exposes, its role as uncovering Apollinian illusions, and being aware of the truths which it makes of reality as a product of its subjective artistic interpretation.

¹⁵ Klein, 60-1.

¹⁶ Rudiger Safranski, *Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography*, trans. Shelley Frisch (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 178-200.

¹⁷ Thomas Kuhn paradigm theory is that which comes to mind here. Kuhn has left a strong impression within the scientific community that their theoretical conclusions are rather based on the paradigm which their theory drives from. Nevertheless, Kuhn remains unaware of metaphorical character of our observations and believes that the problem is at the theoretical level which lends to its downfall when empirical observations do not coincide with the hypothesis.

Chapter 2 - Aesthetics: Creativity and The Lost Potential of Art

¹ Cf. Debra B. Begoffen, "Nietzsche's Madman: Perspectivism without Nihilism," in *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

² Richard Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche: Reflections Timely and Untimely* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 130.

³ Schopenhauer quoted in Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Transfigurations of intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus," in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, eds. Daniel W. Conway, Ivan Gaskell, and Salim Kemal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 355-6.

⁴ The death of God is not a physical assertion but the symbolic announcement of an event [cf. Vattimo, Gianni, *Nietzsche: An Introduction*, trans. Nicholas Martin (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 85] and can also be representative of all truths which we have made for ourselves.

⁵ Christopher Janaway also agrees that nothingness and suffering in life, for Schopenhauer, is as it is for he takes away the Christian value of life. Christopher Janaway, "Schopenhauer's Pessimism," in *The Cambridge companion to Schopenhauer*, ed. Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 318.

⁶ R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 81.

⁷ For Schopenhauer, at least philosophically speaking, it unfortunately became a permanent nest. In *WP* 84, Nietzsche goes to critique Schopenhauer for essentially having misunderstood the notion of *will*, "... the will is precisely that which treats cravings as their master and appoints to them their way and measure." Rather than denying suffering in life, will to power embraces it, and wills to become something higher

within the existing reality. We must also note, as Hollingdale (Ibid.) does, that although Schopenhauer went on to highlight life as nothing but misery, in reality he himself had a good life and Nietzsche was quite aware of this when he wrote the fourth section of Zarathustra.

⁸ Alenka Zupančič, *The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Two* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003), 95.

⁹ Janaway, 323. I have retained the original German for *Glück*, as it can be rendered in English as happiness but also as good luck or as something positive to hope for in the future. I believe their combined translation gives more weight to Schopenhauer's frame of thought than either could render independently.

¹⁰ Ibid., 324.

¹¹ Lampert notes that this is the third time in the text that a teaching contrary to that of Zarathustra is presented, and unlike the first time against the teacher of virtue, Zarathustra finds no joke to riddle his way out of the contrasting teaching. [Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus spoke Zarathustra* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 135-6].

¹² Matthew Rampley, *Nietzsche, Aesthetics, and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 93-4.

¹³ Janaway, 335.

¹⁴ In relation to the need of forgetting that I have highlighted in the first chapter, Klein similarly underlines the need for binary opposition within our conceptual framework. Klein, 73.

¹⁵ Hollingdale, 86.

¹⁶ Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, 212.

¹⁷ Suffering becomes a justifiable element, for it is the will of the divine, something that should not be embraced but bowed before in shame. Nietzsche often relates Christianity as the religion of pity, for it advocates not esteem and energy in will, and denies any active forward stance towards life. Similar disregard can also be applied to Judaism and Islam, and in the case of the latter there is a similarity between it and Christianity as far as the act of punishment and divine judgement is concerned. In the case of Judaism, however, there isn't much to fear, for it embraces the idea that they are the chosen ones, and through such view marginalize all others vis-à-vis their divine. One God is thus set against another, and every man is hence punished – heaven becomes deserted, and thus sit alone the lonely gods.

¹⁸ Thomas J. Howe, *Faithful to the Earth: Nietzsche and Whitehead on God and the Meaning of Human Life* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 38-42.

¹⁹ Grimm, 34. Hollingdale (pp 84-5) suggests that Nietzsche's philosophy unlike Schopenhauer was not based on metaphysical postulations but rather materialistic observations of reality. Hollingdale also underlines F.A. Lange's "History of Materialism" where the argument is put forth on the importance of philosophies that are occupied with the material world rather than abstractions that supersede this world of phenomena.

²⁰ Cf. Ivan Soll, "Nietzsche on the illusions of Everyday Experience," in *Nietzsche's Postmodernism: Essays on Nietzsche's Prelude to Philosophy's Future*, ed. Richard Schacht (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7-33.

²¹ Grimm, 138.

²² Fiona Jenkins, "Performative Identity: Nietzsche on the Force of Art and Language," in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, 216.

²³ Kaufmann notes that he renders the term *Schein* at times as "illusions" and at times as "mere appearance." I have to agree that there is a strong association between the two translations, as the perceived reality is only an image of which its presumed factuality would be an error. The term could also be rendered in English as "to shine" or *Lichtschein* as "light"; for the Apollinian projects the light through which we see the world for the reality which it gives, however the word of caution here is this, *der Schein trügt*.

²⁴ The following English translation is from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *West-Eastern Divan*, trans. Edward Dowden (London: J.M. Dent, 1914), 78:

Wouldst thou remake the world? Long since 'twas made!
Creation's Lord each point has duly weighed.
Thy lot is fallen; the course assigned intend;

They way is entered, follow to the end;
 For care and cumber, though they change it never,
 Will fling thee off thy equipoise for ever!

²⁵ Cf. BGE 198. Also see Adrian Del Caro (87-8) who notes Nietzsche's shift away from Goethe to Heinrich Heine for the former fails to represent the Dionysian.

²⁶ The term "مستی" is often mistakenly rendered literally to English as the status of drunkenness, while in Farsi it often refers to joyful behaviour. Here I use the reference to the beautiful experience that the path of life deludes one in, a state of ecstasy if you will. The poem can be rendered to English as: "Intoxication is pleasing to the eye of our heart-binding witness; to this we have given our restraint." *Translation mine.*

²⁷ I discuss this further in Chapter 3, especially see pp. 74-5.

²⁸ I believe that Lampert and in reference to sections 192-95 of *Beyond Good and Evil* correctly correlates this human history of deception, as far as metaphysics is concerned, as rooted in Platonism that projected a new begging past the mortality of life and one which denied life for its woes. Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 161-7.

²⁹ Jenkins, 222.

³⁰ Schacht, *Nietzsche*, 62.

³¹ This is what Aaron Ridley calls "bad version of the bad conscious", as opposed to the creative 'good' version of bad conscious; Aaron Ridley, *Nietzsche's Conscience: Six Character Studies from the 'Genealogy'*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998), 80.

³² Belliotti, 136.

³³ Following the collapse of the Christian myth, Nietzsche writes, that if we are to have a clean conscious, a romantic return to the myth is not acceptable once knowledge leads us away from it. (*HHI* §109)

³⁴ Howe, 37 and 47.

³⁵ Cf. Belliotti 11.

³⁶ Soll, 15, *emphasis added*.

³⁷ *BT* pp. 20 f. 5

³⁸ David B. Allison, "Musical Psychodramatics: Ecstasis in Nietzsche," in *Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics*, ed. Alan D. Schrift (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) 68. In his study, Allison creatively brings in Dionysian art within the domain of auditory dissonance and explores the role of ecstasy in Nietzsche's writings.

³⁹ Del Caro, 71-2.

⁴⁰ Howe, 37-8.

⁴¹ On Nietzsche portrayal of Socrates as a demon set against wisdom of Dionysus and tragic worldview cf. Keith M. May, *Nietzsche on the Struggle between Knowledge and Wisdom* (Basingstoke: Macmillan., 1993) 42-3.

⁴² Del Caro, 73.

⁴³ Once more I am in agreement with Klein here, and believe that the arrangement of this dissertation thus far demonstrates consistency in Nietzsche's writings. The reading Apollinian and Dionysian should be seen as rhetorical usage of the word, which Nietzsche so often advocates (Klein, 137).

⁴⁴ Cf. Belliotti, 135

⁴⁵ Cf. Horst Hutter, "Nietzsche's New Modes of Self-Cultivation," unpublished work presented at The 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Hilton San Francisco and Towers, August 30-September 2, 2001), 7-8, where he presents the self-reflective outcome of the notions of the body, self, and the I.

⁴⁶ Deborah Carter Mullen, *Beyond Subjectivity and Representation: Perception, Expression, and Creation in Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999), 90-1.

⁴⁷ Belliotti, 135, and also, Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche*, 229.

⁴⁸ Belliotti, 135

⁴⁹ For a discussion on little and great reason cf. Claudia Crawford, "Nietzsche's Dionysian arts: dance, song, and silence," in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, 312.

⁵⁰ Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche*, 142.

⁵¹ Grimm 27.

⁵² Jenkins, 217.

⁵³ Lampert argues that since Zarathustra's teaching opposes the idea of a linear time, that it is for this reason that Nietzsche's writings after Zarathustra thus do not refer to the superman, for it stands at the distant and as an ideal outside the circle of time. Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, 257-258. On this I believe Nietzsche addresses his critics in *Ecce Homo*, "... that the author of *Human, All-Too-Human* is the visionary of *Zarathustra*." I disagree with Lampert on this point, for aspiration for a higher being remains always an underlying drive to awaken the Dionysian.

⁵⁴ With the usage of correctional institutes, I do not only refer to the prison system but all establishments that have employ reintegration, and this also includes most specifically religious and educational institutions.

⁵⁵ Crawford, 315.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 328.

⁵⁷ Horst Hutter, "The Individual as a Work of Art in Nietzsche's Teaching," unpublished work presented at The Annual Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society (University of Warwick, September 12-14, 2004), 36.

⁵⁸ Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, 167-8.

⁵⁹ Allison, 69.

⁶⁰ Crawford, 335.

⁶¹ Del Caro, 73.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 89.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁶⁴ Nimrod Aloni, *Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche's Healing and Edifying Philosophy* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), 109-10.

⁶⁵ Vattimo, *Nietzsche*, 88.

⁶⁶ Soll, 11.

⁶⁷ Michel Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, trans. Michael Gandre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 7-10.

⁶⁸ Haar goes to distinguish between active and reactive forces, or for Nietzsche ascendance and decadence, involved in Will to Power. For the purpose of this dissertation, however, I concentrate only on the movement of impulses involved in Nietzsche's usage of the concept.

⁶⁹ Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche*, 143.

⁷⁰ Nietzsche's chaotic singing after his break, I believe signifies the release of the Dionysian that cannot be rationalized in any sense, for there is no rationality behind Dionysian enchantment other than its unity to life and earth. It is significant, I believe, that Nietzsche's break from our rational order came at a moment of him trying to save an animal, so rationality abused by his contemporary men. I believe the long preoccupation to connect Nietzsche's progressive decline of health with syphilis cannot produce a serious contention. Like many who have already pointed to this, I would regard Nietzsche's decline of health as a product of his *ressentiment* of the reality which he lived, it sickened him, and his madness I would regard as a break from the Apollinian order that he could not accept.

⁷¹ Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche*, 133.

⁷² Grimm, 141.

⁷³ Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche*, 148.

⁷⁴ May, 88.

⁷⁵ Mullen, 108.

⁷⁶ Crawford (316) writes that "[s]ince humans do have a 'little reason' and want to exercise it in knowledge and expression, when they do this, they should at least do it in realization of the surface illusions with which they work." Dionysian knowledge allows its honesty to be carried over to the Apollinian realm where it remains an active element which can be reborn at will.

⁷⁷ Klein, 135.

⁷⁸ Though Alexander Nehamas, "The Eternal Recurrence," *The Philosophical Review* 89, no. 3 (Jul., 1980): 331-56, provides a solid reading of Eternal Return from which my understanding of Eternal Return has benefited, I believe he treats it too literally as an ideal. Eternal Return should be understood as a cosmological and psychological event, as Nehamas points out. I believe that there is a relation between these two types of events, and for this I see its moral persuasions as being a result of its cosmological experience.

⁷⁹ Similarly Schacht agrees that much of the emphasis is placed on the individual and that, "the kind of transfiguration occurring here is one that pertains to our perception of individual human existence – as existence that is individual rather than merely a part of an inexhaustible and indestructible flow of life, and that is human rather than above and beyond the conditions to which human being are subject." Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche*, 147.

Chapter 3: Truth Building and The Politics of Illusion

¹ Even Marx was consumed in upholding communism as an ultimate truth. The right has often attacked his writings on the basis of this and through such critique have sought to undermine his essential preoccupation, mainly showing the socioeconomic contradictions of capitalism. What I see problematic in Marx critique of history is not his presentation of errors of capitalism but his, following Hegel, view of history as a linear phenomenon which can ultimately be directed towards a certain final end [cf. Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 283-4].

² McCarthy, 305.

³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin of Inequality" in *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*, ed. Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992), 874.

⁴ On a discussion on how capitalism may not have evolved as a natural process but effected by specific social conditions, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (London: Verso, 2002).

⁵ McCarthy, 277.

⁶ Geoffrey Ingham, "Class inequality and the social production of money," in *Renewing Class Analysis*, eds. Rosemary Crompton, Fiona Devine, Mike Savage and John Scott (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 66-7.

⁷ Cf. Karl Marx, "The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret," in *The Consumer Society: Reader*, eds. Douglas B. Holt and Juliet B. Schor (New York: The New Press, 2000).

⁸ I believe that variations of capitalism, at either end of the spectrum, do not seriously change the character of the truths which it presumes. The concepts maybe different and we may suffer from grouping them together by disregarding the two errors of metaphor (as presented in the chapter one), but nevertheless and no matter what type of capitalism we are talking about, the various models incorporate the central role of capital in socioeconomic and political life, and I underline above all else the conscious and unconscious functions of capital within our language.

⁹ Nietzsche went as far as to suggest that "all contact ... 'in society' – involves inevitable uncleanness." Nietzsche quoted in Robert J. Antonio, "Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History," *The American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 1 (Jul., 1995), 7. Nietzsche's comment comes in light of his disregard for Western rationality, with its certainty in search for the ultimate reality, which disregards the metaphorical character of the literal and seeks to impose its truths universally. In regards to Marxist ideology, a reflection on the economic grounds that communism puts forth has led to a common error in assuming that the individual is moulded by the society in every shape and form. Communism, at least in theory, sees a healthy society where the individual is actively engaged in cultivating his being, both physically and psychologically.

¹⁰ McCarthy, 310-11.

¹¹ Outside of its monetary implications, there can be no relationships that are zero-sum. All relations, I believe are self serving. Even those relations that have no physical gain for us, at the end we do it for it makes us happy, perhaps, and even this I see as self-serving. Moral actions that extend a helping hand, out

of pity, for example, do so as far as it returns a sense of satisfaction. In this sense, I see no good example of any action that is not self-serving and completely exterior the self, unless one is not aware of it.

¹² McCarthy, 311.

¹³ Cf. Fredrick A. Flyer, "The Influence of Higher Moments of Earnings Distributions on Career Decisions," *Journal of Labor Economics* 15, no. 4 (Oct., 1997), 689-713. Also see Edward Lazear, "Education: Consumption or Production?" *The Journal of Political Economy* 85, no. 3 (Jun., 1977), 569-598, where Lazear demonstrates the correlation between higher education and income earnings.

¹⁴ McCarthy, 278.

¹⁵ Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 256.

¹⁶ Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 430.

¹⁷ More specifically, Marx stipulated that surplus capital was the cause of luxury production and that it was in turn fed back into the circle of consumption.

¹⁸ Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, 57.

¹⁹ Marx, in the chapter on "Money" in *Das Kapital*, defines money in the same manner by incorporating it in the relationship C-M-C, where the relationship initially begins with M. In this way, money begins to gain meaning by being included in the relationship of circulation, over time morphing into a new metaphorical object of its own.

²⁰ Harry S. Truman "Inaugural Address of Harry S. Truman" *The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School* Jan 1949 <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/truman.htm>>.

²¹ Gianni Vattimo, *The Transparent Society*, trans. David Webb (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 41.

²² Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gitis, "The Invisible Fist: Have Capitalism and Democracy Reached a Parting of the Ways?" *The American Economic Review* 68, no. 2, Papers Proceedings of the Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1978), 358-9.

²³ Equality of wealth goes against the very dynamics of capitalism which has concentration of wealth as a principal character. The central idea under capitalism is that we have equal rights to participants within it, but I believe it is illusion to assume that under capitalism we are equal before the law. This resembles the same myth of religion, though all are equal before the law, a rich man who has misdeeds in his life, can earn the forgiveness of God if he is to raise a hand of pity to the poor, the reverse of which remains an impossibility. To assume that the legal system treats the rich and the poor alike is a mockery at our intelligence.

²⁴ Bowles and Gitis, 363.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 359.

²⁶ McCarthy, 308.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 311.

²⁸ David B. Allison, "Musical Psychodramatics: Ecstasis in Nietzsche," in *Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics*, ed. Alan D. Schrift (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) 68. In his study, Allison creatively brings in Dionysian art within the domain of auditory dissonance and explores the role of ecstasy in Nietzsche's writings.

²⁹ McCarthy, 301.

³⁰ Madan Sarup, *Identity, Culture, and the Postmodern World*, ed. Tasneem Raja (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 33-47. Nevertheless and for being influenced by Hegelian dichotomy of identity, he maintains that identity as a relation in regards to the other.

³¹ Sarup, 11-12.

³² Pierre Bourdieu, "The Aesthetic Sense as the Sense of Distinction," in *The Consumer Society: Reader*, eds. Douglas B. Holt and Juliet B. Schor (New York: The New Press, 2000), 210.

³³ Arthur Kroker, *Spasm: Virtual Reality, Android Music, and Electric Flesh* (Montréal: New World Perspectives, 1993), 170.

³⁴ Marx would say that the bourgeois are even more so alienated, for they do not realize, for example, that they are negated from the process of cultivating themselves through their labour. This idea is perhaps from

Hegel's master and slave dialectic, where the slave realizes this lack of consciousness and reverses the power relations. I would go a step further to suggest that highermen remain for the most part unconscious of the importance of capital in their language, and project a worldview with dangerously excessive certainty.

³⁵ Thomas L. Pangle, *The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of The Post Modern Age* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press), 78.

³⁶ Michel Foucault, *The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, eds. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New Press, 2003), 234.

³⁷ David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope*, (Berkeley: University of California Press; 2000), 247.

³⁸ Cf. Nythamar Fernandes de Oliveira, *On the Genealogy of Modernity: Foucault's Social Philosophy* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003), 146-54.

³⁹ William E. Connolly, "Democracy and Contingency," In *Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of C.B. Macpherson*, ed. Joseph H. Carens. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 205-6.

⁴⁰ McCarthy, 287.

⁴¹ Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 4 (December 1993), 595-618.

⁴² Vattimo interprets the contemporary character of capitalism in the same way, when he writes, "The view I would describe as 'archaism' could also be called an 'apocalyptic view'. It concerns the widespread mistrust of Western techno-scientific culture as a way of life that violates and destroy our authentic relation to ourselves and to nature, and which is also inextricably bound to the system of capitalist exploitation and its imperialistic tendencies." *Transparent Society*, 31.

⁴³ Bourdieu, 206.

⁴⁴ William Chaloupka. "The Tragedy of the Ethical Commons: Demoralizing Environmentalism," In *The Politics of Moralizing*, eds. Jane Bennett and Michael J. Shapiro (New York: Routledge, 2002), 118.

Chapter 4: Beyond Nihilism: The Symbiosis of Art and Knowledge

¹ McCarthy, 268.

² Cf. Sarup, 6.

³ George E. McCarthy, *Dialectics and Decadence: Echoes Antiquity in Marx and Nietzsche* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), 262. See also WP 12A where Nietzsche discusses three psychological states of nihilism as: (1) when the search for meaning proves futile; (2) a supreme order over the individual is allowed "in order to be able to believe in his own values"; and (3) the true world presents itself as a construct of man.

⁴ William Barret quoted in Aloni 49.

⁵ McCarthy, 314.

⁶ Aloni, 79.

⁷ Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and The Transhuman Condition* (London: Routledge, 1997), 62-3.

⁸ Vattimo, *The Transparent Society*, 2

⁹ Aloni, 191.

¹⁰ Vattimo, *The Transparent Society*, 11.

¹¹ Ibid., 15.

¹² Ibid., 24-5.

¹³ For a discussion on this idea, see Vattimo, *The Transparent Society*, 97.

¹⁴ Jenkins, 217.

¹⁵ McCarthy, 268.

¹⁶ Aloni does not specifically explore the healing powers of the Dionysian in the capitalist reality, but provides a general interpretation. Aloni, 120.

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