

The Causes and Management of Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Post-Communist
Yugoslavia

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ABSTRACT

The Causes and Management of Ethnic Conflicts The Case of Post-Communist Yugoslavia

Alexander Usatenko

Most conflicts in the current international environment are rooted in nationalistic and ethnic clashes. The scope of ethnic violence in the past decade has produced an increasing and alarming number of civilian victims as well as massive destruction of the infrastructure of the states involved. Often, such conflicts have assumed an international dimension by involving multiples states.

This thesis analyzes the ethnic conflict that erupted in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and became one of the most significant and devastating of all ethnic conflicts that have taken place in the post Cold War period. In particular, the thesis has two goals. First, it will seek to identify the main reasons that caused this ethnic violence, in a state that had been famous for its inter-ethnic peace in the communist period, through the critical assessment of modern comparative politics theoretical approaches. Second, the thesis will also explore and evaluate the major strategies and techniques of ethnic conflict management that have been used by national and international actors.

The central argument of the thesis is that both the causes and the effective management tools of ethnic conflicts are multiple: no single theory can explain them and no single formula of conflict management can be used in their settlement. As such each conflict requires an individually tailored solution.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the bipolar world structure of the Cold War era, there has been a steady increase both in the frequency and the intensity of ethnic conflicts around the globe. In fact, most international conflicts since 1991 have been “largely generated within state boundaries... By one account, only seven out of 111 militarised conflicts in the twelve years after 1989 were of traditional interstate kind, and even these may have had a strong internal or communal dimension.”¹ The scope of the ethnic violence of the past decade and a half produced not only an unprecedented number of victims, usually civilians, but also massive destructions of the physical infrastructure of states involved, frequently leading to humanitarian crises. Most ethnic crises also endanger the political stability of neighbouring states with floods of refugees, illegal arms trade and ethnic instability spilling over to provoke instability and regional crises. Moreover, they endanger the future normative and financial progress of humankind by violating hard won norms of acceptable behaviour in the international scene and distracting a great amount of financial and material resources of the international community provided to the conflict zones by wide variety of international organizations.

This thesis will analyze the causes and the solution of the ethnic conflicts that shattered the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In particular, it will look at the crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth Bosnia), Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Although the demise of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe gave hope for a new era of peace and prosperity, the gory disintegration of Yugoslavia defied all such, in retrospect naïve, expectations. The Yugoslav case is

¹ Bercovitch J. and Derouen K., “Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts: Assessing the Determinants of a Successful Process”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.30, (Winter 2004), 147-48.

particularly important and puzzling for an academic researcher for multiple reasons. First, the Yugoslav crisis was not simply an intrastate ethnic dispute but, from its very beginning, it took a markedly international dimension as soon as constituent parts of the former federal Yugoslav state were recognized as sovereign political actors by the international community. Thus, the case study of Yugoslavia presents an excellent testing ground for a range of theories, and the hypotheses they generate, about the causes of the ethnic conflicts both in the comparative politics and the international relations literature on ethnic conflicts.

Second, the case of Yugoslavia is also important because it shows the difficult challenges facing a multiethnic state in the period of the twin transition from communism to both democracy and a market economy. The East-West division of Europe no longer serves as a stabilizer for international relations in the region. Yet, it is precisely this moment of regime change that would necessitate strong international commitment to the peaceful management of inter-ethnic relations because the respective governments of the East European states, in particular Yugoslavia, may find their capacity to do so curbed by the difficulty of managing the complex economic and social transformation that the collapse of communism had resulted in. In the absence of an established political culture that would sustain the peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups, the declining capacity of the post-communist Yugoslav state to maintain inter-ethnic consensus allowed historically defined age-old conflicts among the ethnic communities to re-emerge and go unchecked.

Finally, the Yugoslav case is particularly important due to its geopolitical significance. The conflict rapidly took on a regional dimension by threatening the stability of the entire European continent through spillover effects such as flood of

refugees fleeing from the war-torn parts of Yugoslavia not only the neighbouring states but also to other Western European ones. It took enormous political, military and finally economic efforts for the international community to bring down the Yugoslav ethnic conflagration to a civilized peaceful end. In fact, as I will argue, that ethnic peace in the Balkan region is due mainly to the successful involvement of the international community in its settlement.

In order to properly analyse the causes of ethnic disputes as well as major strategies of the ethnic conflict management the thesis will employ a single case study research design augmented with the within the case comparative analysis in Chapter 5. It is believed that the case study research is quite beneficial to put forward the general propositions as well as theory-testing, based on the already available empirical evidence provided by historical events in extensive timeframe. "The great advantage of the case study is that of focussing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined even when the research resources at the investigator's disposal are relatively limited."²

I strongly believe that case study approach can help generating the major hypothesis of my thesis stating that while the causes of the ethnic conflicts are generally multiple none of them may inevitably lead to the ethnic dispute. I am persuaded that the latter take place when such causes converge and accumulate into the "critical mass" frequently accompanied by eruption of violent actions. Hypothesis generating case study research design will help me as well to build up a strong argument that there is no single or uniform approach in conflict management process. "One size fits all" politics are obviously unworkable even with the same ethnic groups in conflict taken in the different

² Lijphart A., "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", *The American Political Science Review* 65 (1971), 691.

political environment or time frame. I believe that each of the ethnic conflicts under examination necessitates the individually tailored solutions. My major hypotheses will be tested against the wide spectrum of empirical evidence in Yugoslav case study under consideration. My thesis will use the within-case method of analysis. It will obviously provide my research with additional strength and validity explaining the case under investigation in its continuity and progress.

I have to admit as well that a single case study research design along with its methodological strength incorporates some obvious weakness. Restricting research to a single historical event may lead to creation of bias and become a potential source of inferential errors. "There is a trade-off between achieving a high level of construct validity, which is easier to do in case studies, and the establishing a high level of external validity, or the ability to apply findings across a wide population of cases, which statistical studies are better suited to doing."³

In order to reduce this possibility I have selected the case of the former Yugoslavia due to the fact that it could be easily broken into the number of separate sub-cases, different enough to explore the applicability and the effectiveness of the available contemporary ethnic conflict management strategies and techniques pursued on the ground in the reality. The ways of ethnic conflict settlement in Croatia are quite different from those undertaken in Bosnia. Inter-ethnic pacifying strategies conducted in Macedonia are obviously distinct from those of Kosovo. The intra-case comparison will obviously provide me with the opportunity for making the wider generalizations. It will definitely strengthen the validity of my inference that while major causes of the ethnic

³ Bennett A., "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages" in Sprinz D. et al. *Models, Numbers & Cases. Methods for Studying International Relations*, (University of Michigan Press, 2004), 34.

conflicts are generally similar in their nature, the conflict management strategies may obviously vary depending on the particular sub-case.

At the same time I have to mention that while remaining representative enough, my study of the Yugoslav case does not pretend to make bold generalization about either the causes and the “cures” of the ethnic conflicts. Variations in structure, time, culture and other factors may lead to the emergence of deviant cases which will require additional explanations. To conclude the assessment of effectiveness of the case study research design it is worth of referring to J. Snyder who states “... the cases constitute a preliminary test, subject to further historical and theoretical scrutiny.”⁴

I consider it to be a task of the major importance for the scholars of political science to find out the roots and the causes of the ethnic conflicts in order to prevent new outbreaks of nationalist violence as well as to work out the “cures” or models of the conflict resolution to let the modern political actors implement them on the ground. In this regard, it is worth recalling Brubaker’s comment on the important link between nationalism and international (in)stability who claims that “[f]ar from “solving” the region’s national question, the most recent nationalizing reconfiguration of political space, like its early twentieth-century analog, has only reframed the national question, recast it in new form. Nationalism has been both cause and effect of the great reorganizations of political space that framed the “short twentieth century” in Central and Eastern Europe.”⁵

⁴ Snyder J., *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 65.

⁵ Brubaker R., *Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3-4.

The main goal of the thesis is to identify the causes of the Yugoslav ethnic conflicts as well as solutions that worked and some that did not work so effectively to resolve them. In this connection the task of my thesis is twofold. First of all I will evaluate the explanatory claims of the dominant approaches examining the causes of contemporary ethnic disputes, particularly those of the prominent comparative politics scholars as A. D. Smith, D. Horowitz, A. Lijphart, R. Brubaker and others in the concrete empirical context of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe. In my research I will examine both structural and cultural/political factors which lead to the origin of ethnic conflicts interrelating and complementing each others.

The thesis will argue that ethnic conflicts are the result of structural factors such as the weakness of the state, interior security concerns, geopolitical and demographic factors and political or cultural ones including inefficient political institutions, role of political leaders or elites, problematic group histories, democratization and weak economy. I will argue that on their own none of these causes may inevitably lead to ethnic violence; instead, the latter erupts when multiple such factors converge and accumulate into the "critical mass" culminating in the explosion of the ethnic crisis.

In order to solve the ethnic conflicts in practice, it is obviously not enough to learn and understand their causes. Therefore, the second major task of the thesis will be to investigate the general strategies of ethnic conflict management, such as ethnic separation, territorial partition, autonomy, federalism and various power sharing mechanisms. I am persuaded that such strategies as democratization and economic reforms are found among the major factors of the ethnic conflicts as well as among their major cures. The purpose of the thesis is to arrive to an understanding that there is no

single formula or recipe to solve an ethnic dispute. As such, I will suggest that even similar ethnic groups in different situations may require the different approaches.

In pursuing these arguments, my thesis will proceed according to the following plan. Chapter Two will examine the major arguments put forward by contemporary scholars of comparative politics about the causes of international conflict. In this chapter I will spend some time on carefully defining the essential terms and concepts of my study, particularly nationalism and ethnicity. Chapter Three will present the reader with a narrative overview of the Yugoslav ethnic conflict that also includes important information about the historical background of ethnic conflicts in Balkans in the 20th century. Based on the theoretical and empirical material, Chapter Four will assess the causes of the Yugoslav ethnic conflict. The fifth chapter will examine the major strategies of the conflict management. In this chapter I will argue that international solutions, rather than domestic ones, have been most important and effective to secure peace and stability in the conflict-torn region.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES

The following theoretical review will prove to be very helpful in providing an account both for the causes and the solutions of the Yugoslav ethnic conflict. This chapter will start with explanation of key terms and concepts that are borrowed from the comparative politics literature on ethnic conflicts and nationalism and will be followed by the brief overview of the main relevant theoretical explanations provided by the scholars of contemporary political science on causes of the ethnic disputes.

Ethnicity and Nationalism

A.D. Smith, a leading authority on the study of nationalism, argues that ethnic communities are collectivities characterised first of all by the following six features: "(1) a collective proper name (2) a myth of common ancestry (3) shared historical memoirs (4) one or more differentiating elements of common culture (5) an association with a specific homeland (6) a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population."⁶ Modernization, may lead to the conversion of ethnicity into nationhood. Here, the ethnic communities play an important role in the formation of national identity and finally the nation-state. By the term nation Smith understands "a named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and sharing common myths and memories: a mass, public culture: a single economy; a common rights and duties for all members."⁷

The main differences between ethnic communities and nations may be related to the four factors: territoriality, cultural, economic, and legal aspects. In the case of ethnic communities, connection to particular territoriality is obviously not obligatory, whereas in the case of a nation it is one of the most important constitutive components of the concept. The same could be said about a common economy, mass culture and legal factors such as duties and obligations which are definitely not the part of the ethnicity construct. Thus, there is a significant difference between an ethnic group which may successfully perform within existing state boundaries and which does not claim a separate territory under its control, and a nation-state, which is defined by the successful claim of an ethnic group to establishing internationally recognized control over a piece of territory. Given this difference, nationalism is best defined as anti-ideological movement

⁶ Smith A.D., *National Identity*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 40.

for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential “nation”.⁸

By historical standards, nationalism is a relatively modern phenomenon. To a great extent it is a product of industrialization and further economic progress which required the common language and means of mass communication. Since the early 19th century, different forms of nationalism have emerged, however, the most frequently encountered two versions of nationalism are the *ethnic* and *civic* ones. Ethnic nationalism is normally based on a shared identity, common history, blood ties and culture. Thus, it is also often called cultural nationalism. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is a much more inclusive phenomenon that is based on the principle of common citizenship regardless of the characteristics that defined ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is characterised by open membership in the nation to everyone who is either born or the resident on particular territory irrespective of the common ancestry, history or culture. The two types of nationalism are rarely present in their pure or ideal forms. In reality, civic and ethnic forms of nationalism are frequently intertwined and contribute to each other.

The two World Wars which took place on the European continent in the last century resulted in significant changes in historical borders, population shifts as well as demographic developments. That is because the national minorities are the characteristic and inherent feature of the overwhelming majority of contemporary Eastern European states. Roger Brubaker characterises a national minority by the following elements. “(1)

⁷ Smith A.D., *The Nation in History. Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Brandeis University Press, Israel, 2000), 3.

⁸ Smith A.D., *The Nation in History. Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Brandeis University Press, Israel, 2000), 3.

the public claim to membership of an ethnocultural nation different from the numerically or politically dominant ethnocultural nation; (2) the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethnocultural nationality; and (3) the assertion, on the basis of this ethnocultural nationality, of certain collective or political rights.”⁹ National minorities are not a static phenomenon, they are characterised by the steady process of social, political, economic and demographic change and development. National minorities within particular states are frequently intermingled with the majority nation; however, they may also be territorially concentrated to such an extent that in the areas of their settlement they may represent national majorities vis-a-vis the titular nation.

In post-communist transitional societies, the behaviour of ethnic groups is seriously affected by economic and political crises, the erosion of the existing systemic values, low level of political culture as well as increased political mobilization of masses. Contradictions between the interests of different political players such as states, nations, and ethnic groups over the range of vital objectives such as political power, security, economic influence and many others may lead to wide variety of the internal conflict situations in general. An ethnic conflict is normally a conflict which involves two or more different groups belonging to the different ethnicity. Such conflicts erupt when ethnic groups arrive at the understanding that their governing structure is no more able to solve their basic problems. When such ethnic grievances are not properly responded to or even denied, situation generates the conflict. The intensification of nationalism may obviously increase the possibility of conflict between the ethnic groups.

⁹ Brubaker R., *Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 60.

Contemporary Theoretical Discourse on Ethnic Conflicts

The upsurge of ethnic conflicts in the last decades of the XXth century stimulated the modern scholars of comparative political science to work out the explanatory theories dealing with the causes and effects of such a phenomenon. Analysing and systematizing the ethnic disputes the majority of scholars while admitting the multiplicity the causes of ethnic disputes are united in their opinion stating the interrelationship and interconnectedness of them in order to result in conflicts threatening the peace and order in human communities.

Analysing the theories of the national conflict prominent scholars of nationalism such as D. Horowitz stresses the significance of the phenomenon of the ethnic conflict for contemporary political science in the following words: "The importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, as phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be denied."¹⁰ In his research Horowitz directly connects the rise of the nationalism with the democratization in modern societies. He came to the conclusion that the problems of reducing the ethnic conflict are in many points connected to the problems of fostering democracy.

Horowitz considers also the security concerns or the fear of extinction as one of the major causes of the ethnic disputes. Ethnic groups are seriously concerned with survival issue. According to the scholar this question is interconnected to a great extent with demographic insecurity which in its turn is interconnected with the geopolitical positions of the nations. "Majorities within a country become minorities within an international region, depending on how the region is conceived. Political space is not a

fixed concept. This is another way of saying that the environment of group juxtapositions may be broader than that created by formal territorial boundaries.”¹¹ In this connection the fear of extinction is considered as a powerful threat and the trigger mechanism for ethnic hostility.

Furthermore, Horowitz believes that mutual insecurity results in the increasing competition for power. People are afraid of domination of one nation over the other. Scholar believes that the word of domination is frequently associated with political control and question – who is in control of whom.

Horowitz argues that geopolitical as well as survival issues are not the only causes of the ethnic disputes. He raises the question of historical relationship of nations as one of the causes or cures for ethnic hatreds also. Historical interactions of nations create memoirs which may seriously influence the future inter-ethnic relations. “To ask question such as whether increasing intergroup contact accelerates or retards conflict, is to miss the decisive impact of the quality of that contact. Without feeling an antipathy, there can be no ethnic conflict.”¹²

The other prominent scholar of nationalism and nationalist conflicts in post-Communist environment R. Brubaker in strong agreement with Horowitz in his analysis formulates the relationship between geopolitical reconfiguration of the political space and raising security concerns of the national minorities affected by the change. The scholar develops a triangular configuration paradigm analysing the relationship between the

¹⁰ Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) xi.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 178.

¹² *Ibid.*, 189.

national minorities, the newly nationalising states as well as the external national homelands to which they belong.¹³

In his research Brubaker emphasize the importance of the massive restructuring of the territories as a result of the demise of the Soviet Empire as well as collapse of communism on the European continent. Such territorial reconfiguration inevitably produced mismatch between political and cultural boundaries of nations and left millions of people outside their historical homelands. According to the scholar, this process implies the change of political and cultural status of the national groups from privileged majority into the minority with frequently uncertain status. Forcefully attached at one state such minorities frequently associate themselves with their kin state according to the ethnic principle. These developments may cause the conflicting situations between the ethnic groups involving the third party representing the external homeland. "The New Europe, like the interwar Europe, confronts a potentially explosive – and in some cases actually explosive – dynamic interplay between a set of new or newly reconfigured nationalising states, ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation states, and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation."¹⁴

Brubaker predicts that the nationalistic steps of the newly nationalizing states will inevitably reciprocate with the protest activities of the minority groups in the contested political fields. Finally Brubaker arrives at the conclusion that national minorities as a result of unjust interior policies may mobilize against a state they actually live and seek autonomy or even threaten secession.

¹³ Brubaker R., "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe", *Daedalus*, 124, no. 2, (1995), 108.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

Analysing the theories of nationalist conflict I can not avoid addressing the ideas of such a prominent scholar of nationalism as M. Hroch. His theoretical analysis deserves particular interest as far it is conducted in the historical comparative perspective. In his research M. Hroch emphasizes the relevance of such causes of the nationalist disputes as political and economic crises, group interests, importance of political elites or leadership and role of the historical legacies of nations.

Comparing so called "classical" national movements of the XIX century with contemporary nationalism which has developed in the post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe in the recent decades the author makes the number of important inferences which help to achieve the better understanding as well as interpretation of modern developments. "The primary aim of this analysis is to determine whether or not we could use the results of historical research on the nation-forming process in order to explain current nationalism, national movements and ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe."¹⁵

M. Hroch argues that both national movements (old and new) emerge as a result (and an answer to) the crisis and disintegration of an old regime and its value system, both cases are characterised by low level of political experience. Among the differences of the old and new nationalist movements were found extremely high levels of social communications, due to the spread of literacy, education and high levels of influence on the population of modern mass media.¹⁶

¹⁵ Hroch M., "Nationalism and national movements: comparing the past and the present of Central and Eastern Europe", *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (1), (1996), 35.

¹⁶ Hroch M., "Nationalism and national movements: comparing the past and the present of Central and Eastern Europe", *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (1), (1996), 37.

Analysing the historical perspective of nationalist conflicts M. Hroch underlines the importance of a structural factor as the trigger mechanism for the ethnic disputes. The empires dominated by the limited number of nations served as restricting factor for the nation-forming process as far as their unbalanced structure of governance provoked the multiple ethnic groups populating their territories to aspire for self-determination.

Addressing the past and the present of the ethnic movement in Eastern Europe M. Hroch defines three major groups of demands still effective as the major driving forces of the ethnic disputes. They are: "Political demands, strongly concentrated towards independence or self-administration/the autonomy, cultural demands, which tried to establish and strengthen national literary language, social demands, which asked for a just division of national income and tried to achieve a full social structure in the emerging national society."¹⁷

The scholars of nationalism and ethnic conflict are strongly persuaded of the importance of the economic wellbeing and stability of states as a conflict prevention measure. Defining peculiarities of the modern ethnic conflicts M. Hroch is strongly persuaded that the break down of economic ties and planned economy may spark crisis situations, when old regimes are no more able to successfully manage the political developments. Leading to political, economic and social uncertainty crisis situations make nationalism the prevailing ideology of societies and increase the possibility of ethnic conflicts. "When the decline of the economy and the standard of living is

¹⁷ Hroch M., "Nationalism and national movements: comparing the past and the present of Central and Eastern Europe", *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (1), (1996), 38.

hopelessly deep and the ethnic situation allows the agitators to denounce 'the others' as responsible for backward developments”¹⁸

Along with the economic issues the leading theoreticians of the comparative political science had paid attention to the role of the national elites as a primary mobilizing element of any national movement. In crisis situation the new political elites are entering in contradiction with the old “nomenclatura” and both are trying to explore the nationalist card in order to obtain the political benefits by any means. “New elites, educated under the old regime but belonging to the new regional movements, are successfully trying to achieve the status of ruling elites. In the recent cases the upward social mobility is not influenced by any striving traditional systems or moral norms – except individual and national selfishness.”¹⁹

Democratization is also widely considered as a major trigger mechanism for the ethnic disputes. M. Hroch believes that such a process may simultaneously play two mutually exclusive roles - as a major treatment as well as a major cause for the ethnic conflicts. While it is believed that constitutionalism and democracy are an inevitable condition of civil society, in many cases the oppressed national minorities regard democratization as a convenient instrument to support their claims.

In democratization important role belongs to the mass media means which may either reconcile the disputing nations or provide an additional impact to the ethnic conflict. “The modern mass media are now strong enough to manipulate populations, to

¹⁸ Hroch M., “Nationalism and national movements: comparing the past and the present of Central and Eastern Europe”, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (1), (1996), 39.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

distort or to intensify in what they portray conflicts of interests where they do not exist, that is to promote or diminish the danger of aggressive nationalism”,²⁰

Summarising theoretical findings of the modern scholars of nationalism and ethnic conflict I argue that while nationalism is generally modern phenomenon, it is still one of the most serious and controversial political matters facing contemporary international community. Collapse of the communism in Eastern Europe provided the researchers of this issue with additional stimulus to define the major causes of the ethnic disputes. The modern theoretical argumentation provided by the prominent scholars of political science on the ethnic conflict is obviously interrelated and mutually contributing. According to the views of D. Horowitz, R. Brubaker and M. Hroch the major causes of contemporary ethnic conflicts may be defined as structural and cultural or political ones. Among the structural causes I may define weak structure of states, security concerns of ethnic groups, geopolitical as well as demographic arrangements. Cultural or political factors imply the impact of the ruling elites, democratization process, historical legacies of ethnic groups and economic grievances.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CONFLICT

As mentioned earlier, I have selected the case of the Yugoslav ethnic conflict for the purposes of this investigation due to the fact that it involved a number of different ethnic groups in a post-communist environment and because it was underpinned by multiple factors such factors as political, territorial, economic, cultural and religious divisions. Moreover, this conflict is definitely worth of attentive study since it produced

²⁰ Hroch M., “Nationalism and national movements: comparing the past and the present of Central and Eastern Europe”, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (1), (1996), 41.

mass civilian casualties and resulted in wide scale destruction of material resources not far from the heart of Europe. The conflict in the Balkans attracted significant efforts of international community to settle its inter-ethnic disputes with such prominent international actors involved as the United Nations Organization, the OSCE, the EU, the NATO and many others.

The rapid disintegration of Yugoslavia and the horrible civil war based on the ethnic contradictions took many politicians as well as scholars of political science by surprise. However, I argue, the roots of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia may be traced back to the very first days of its foundation. I am persuaded that the conflict resulted to a great extent due to the reason that numerous ethnic groups populating the former Yugoslavia claimed the same territory for their respective and exclusive control. The ensuing historical description of the conflict will give me the opportunity to trace the political processes which led to disintegration of Yugoslavia through the extensive nationalist violence accompanied by the armed conflict.

The Beginning of Yugoslavia: The Interwar Period

The first Yugoslav state was created under the name of Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. At that time the idea of the Southern Slav union was universally regarded as an instrument of the struggle for the national liberation from continuous oppression by politically stronger neighbouring states such as the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires and Italy. It was widely believed that primordial ethnic sentiments such as the similar languages, cultures, blood ties and histories will be sufficient to cement the newly created ethnic union into the civic multinational state.

The Kingdom was created of basically industrially underdeveloped territories

where the overwhelming majority of the population was involved in agriculture. Moreover, the state was characterised by a strongly intermingled population made up of the different nationalities. "Except in the case of Slovenia and Macedonia (Yugoslav) borders were never meant to be ethnic boundaries. They left some 700,000 Serbs in Croatia and roughly twice as many in Bosnia; they left almost 800,000 Croats in Bosnia, 200,000 in Serbia, and some in Montenegro; and they also left a huge number (around 2,000,000) of Albanians divided between Kosovo, Serbia proper, Macedonia and Montenegro."²¹ (Map 1, 2).

Despite being united under the structures of the new state, the different nationalities had quite different understandings about the very *raison d'etre* of the Kingdom. On the one hand, it was widely regarded that from the point of view of Serbia, the political union of the Southern Slav nations served the purpose of expanding Serbian control over the Balkans under the ideational auspices of pan-Slavic brotherhood. In stark contrast, the Croats and Slovenes saw the multinational union as a method of securing their territorial sovereignty and independence from possible alien conquest.²² As a consequence, from the very outset of the newly created state these rival ideologies were conflict and soon resulted in multiple interethnic tensions and disputes. These tensions were generally based on the fear of the Serbian ethnic domination and hegemony in the multinational union. These fears were reinforced to a great extent by the political steps of King Aleksandar – himself a Serbian nationalist. In particular, in 1929 the King refused to agree with the opposition that demanded the federal reorganization of the state and

²¹ Denich B., *Ethnic Nationalism. The Tragic death of Yugoslavia*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 26.

²² Sekulic D., "The creation and dissolution of the multinational state: the case of Yugoslavia", *Nations and Nationalism* 3, (1997), 165-179.

decided to dissolve the parliament and proclaim personal rule. In the attempt to reinforce the national unity the same year the state was renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In response to the establishment of the royal dictatorship of King Aleksandar, which was seen as further step to consolidate Serbian influence in the Kingdom, various national groups started the creation or revitalization of the separatist organizations of their own, such as the "Ustashe" in Croatia and "IMRO" in Macedonia, each of which aiming at the dismemberment of the Kingdom. King Aleksandar's direct rule ended only in 1931 with the proclamation of a new constitution which was rejected both by the Croat as well as Slovene opposition. Such political resistance was effectively smashed by jailing the opposition leaders from all national groups. The increasing polarization of Yugoslav politics among the various ethno-national groups resulted in the eventual assassination of the King by the members of IMRO in 1934 during his visit to Marseilles. Although there were multiple attempts to find a compromise among the constituent ethnic groups in order to reach nation-wide reconciliation, the Nazi invasion of 1941 caught Yugoslavia badly divided and could thus effectively destroy it.

Yugoslavia and Communism

The German occupation brought to life a number of political movements whose political ideologies seriously differed from those of the major political players in the interwar period. The most important one of these was the Communist Party, which took an active part in leading the Partisan resistance movement against the occupying German troops under the leadership of its Soviet-trained leader, Josip Broz Tito. Besides the Partisans, another very important group in the resistance movement was that of the Chetniks, led by the royalist Colonel Mihailovic and supported by the Yugoslav

government in exile. Finally, a third important group was the Ustashe that supported the Nazi forces which created a nominally independent pro-German Croatia.²³

The war in Yugoslavia had sparked the massive rise of the nationalist ideologies throughout the region. The Ustashe viewed the Croatian nation to be superior to the other Balkan nationalities; they considered Yugoslavia as artificial state which they dreamed of replacing with a Greater Croatia. In pursuit of their hegemonic aspirations based on racist ideologies, the Ustashe, composed mainly of Croatian as well as Muslim nationals, widely massacred so-called "inferior" nations such as Serbs, Jews and Gypsies with active German support. "Around 300 000 Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia were victims of the massacres. The Ustasha massacres were unprecedented for that matter anywhere in the region; no regime or movement in Yugoslavia had ever attempted to wipe out a whole ethnic or national group."²⁴

In contrast to the Ustashe, the Chetniks had no active political programme. Under the influence of Serbian nationalism, the Chetniks would frequently massacre Croats and Muslims thereby creating the foundation of the future passionate hatred of Croats and Bosniaks against Serbs. At the same time, however, the Partisans, organized by communists under the slogan of brotherhood of nations, had managed to organize a powerful nationwide political force. They welcomed all nationalities in their ranks and rapidly gained wide recognition. Throughout the war all three movements representing different interest groups were fighting each other. The mutual fighting between the different movements in the war time Yugoslavia was a struggle for reestablishment of control of the post war over the whole country. At the end of the war Partisans obviously

²³ Pavkovic A., *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia*, (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1997), 37.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

became the dominant force among the other national political movements. Along with the Soviet Army they effectively defeated the Ustashe and then the Chetniks. When the War was over the Communists remained the only powerful political force in the country.

In 1946 the Communists proclaimed the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia according to the already existing Soviet model. For a time being the national question was removed from the political agenda by means of Stalinist methods of governance adopted and employed by his Yugoslav followers. That is why the post war the borders between new republics within the Yugoslav state were left untouched, as they were previously drawn by Austro-Hungarian and even Ottoman rulers. However, after the well documented break with the Soviet Union in 1950, Yugoslavia shifted its policies to the West. It started effectively balancing between the Communist world and the USA with its West European Allies. As a result, Yugoslavia became the biggest recipient of Western economic and military aid. "Foreign aid in the period from 1951 to 1960 became the source of 42.6 per cent of all investments in Yugoslavia."²⁵ As part of concessions to the West, the Yugoslav authorities abandoned the Stalinist system of economic, cultural and scientific management; the communist party control had been relaxed to a great extent. Ever fearful of the possibility of Soviet intervention, the Yugoslav military created a country wide system of territorial defence weapon storages and trained the Yugoslav population to start the armed resistance to foreign intervention.

The Yugoslav economy was rapidly developing thanks to the huge loans provided by the West. Unemployment was eased by extensive emigration of labour to the most developed countries of the world. Also, in the 1960s new communist elite started

²⁵ Mazdar L., "The Economy of Yugoslavia" in Allock J., Horton J. and Milivojevic M., *Yugoslavia in Transition*, (New York: Berg, 1992), 84.

replacing the old partisan cadres who had been nurtured and brought up by Tito. In the officially sponsored campaign to secure the equal national representation, the communists of all Yugoslav republics had managed to build influential republican branches of the federal party. In 1966 a powerful supporter of the federal power, the Chief of the federal secret service A. Rankovic, was removed from his post. As a result of his fall, the communist leaders of each republic gained full control of their own republic's secret police which made it easier for local elites to target their own internal enemies.²⁶

Since the end of 1970 the economy of the Yugoslav state started slowing down. "The downward trend in economy was aggravated by a large foreign debt which, in 1982, stood at over 18 billion US dollars, amounting half of the Yugoslavia's annual socialist product."²⁷ The foreign loans were frequently mismanaged and even wasted. The faulty economic policies made the repayment of such debt very difficult. The socialist management system of the economy had proved itself ineffective. In Yugoslavia, each republic was responsible for its economy, the government enterprises were protected from competition by subsidies, and obstacles were made to prevent cooperation with other republics. Such policies inevitably raised the wave of discontent by the population which was easily transformed by local dissidents and political elites into the nationalist discourse.

The Rise of Nationalism and Disintegration

The unity of the federation was greatly endangered with the death of President Tito in 1980 and the emergence of nationalist leaders to power in the respective constituent units of the Yugoslav state. In 1989 the leader of the Serbian branch of the

²⁶ Pavkovic A., *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia*, (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1997), 65.

²⁷ Lydall H., *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 198.

Communist Party, S. Milosevic, became the president of Serbia. Famous for his nationalistic speeches and policies in defence of Serbian population, one of the major steps he took upon his election was the passing of constitutional amendment to abolish the autonomous status of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, populated by ethnic Albanian and Hungarian majorities respectively (Map 3).²⁸ In Kosovo, the reaction was immediate and violent. Thousands of people came out to take part in demonstrations of protest which were effectively crushed by riot police resulting in multiple casualties from both sides. The ethnic protests were strongly supported by local Albanian elite; many of them were arrested and later put on trial. Such Serbian ethnic policies were strongly criticized by Croat, Slovene and other communists as significantly damaging the unity of the Yugoslav communist party²⁹. Indeed, from this critical turning point onwards, political leaders started drawing political courses of their own frequently converting the communist slogans into nationalist ones under the pretext of resistance to Serbian expansion and political voluntarism.

In 1990 elections were held in all constituent parts of the Yugoslav Federation. By this time the republican communist parties had effectively changed their political rhetoric from communism to nationalism blaming the central authorities of Yugoslav state for all economic and political calamities. These nationalist turned former communists performed in these elections very well. In Croatia the victory was won by radical Croat nationalist F. Tudjman, a former communist general and political dissident who was inclined to build a Greater Croatia generally at the expense of Bosnia. Similarly, a former communist, M. Kuchan, was elected president in Slovenia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the elections were

²⁸ Webb A., *Central and Eastern Europe Since 1919*, (London: Longman, 2002), 59.

won by Moslem nationalist intellectual A. Izetbegovic. In Slovenia and Croatia political meetings were held raising offensive nationalist slogans - Slovenia and Croatia for their respective nationals only and let's Serbs go home. The nationalist activities in the republics resulted as well in the creation of the dissident parties such as opposition coalition bloc DEMOS in Slovenia, HDZ in Croatia, SDA and SDS in Bosnia, IMRO-DPMNU in Macedonia, which populist slogans were widely supported by local population.

Similarly to the inter-war period, Serbian nationalism came into conflict with these competing republican nationalisms very quickly. Whereas the political leadership of Slovenia and Croatia sought eventual secession from the federation, Milosevic insisted on the idea of territorial unity of all Yugoslav republics within a common federative state. As time went on, each group started accusing the other for alleged victimization thus starting and perpetuating a seemingly never ending spiral of hatred.³⁰ By mid-1990 it was quite clear that the most developed republics of the Yugoslav state, Slovenia and Croatia, had no intentions to stay in the federative union any more, while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia took a more neutral position and stated their willingness to work towards the creation of a looser federation without compromising the union of all Yugoslav constituent parts. The ethnic composition of these republics clearly had a lot to do with their stated position: while the population of Bosnia was almost evenly split among Serb, Muslim and Croat ethnic communities, Macedonia had a significant part of Moslem minority living on its territory. (Map 2).

²⁹ Denich B., *Ethnic Nationalism. The Tragic death of Yugoslavia*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 68.

³⁰ Godina V., "The outbreak of nationalism on former Yugoslav territory: a historical perspective on the problem of supranational identity", *Nations and Nationalism* 4, (1998), 412.

While the nationalist leaders of Croatia and Slovenia were insisting on the immediate break up of the federal state, Serbia claimed that in case of the collapse of the centralized Yugoslav state, Serbia should be reconstituted in such a way so as to include additional territories from neighbouring Croatia that were historically populated by Serbs. In this game, Milosevic could count on the support of the Yugoslav Armed Forces (JNA), trained in the spirit of Tito's communist ideas, the officer's corps of which was heavily dominated by Serbian nationals³¹. Thus, when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence of Yugoslavia in June 1991, the JNA tried to re-establish central power in the renegade republics. However, due to the fact that Slovenia had no significant Serbian minority, the Yugoslav Army had been withdrawn from republic after ten days of skirmishes and by mid-autumn 1991 Slovenia established its full independence maintaining peaceful life. In stark contrast, Croatia had a significant Serbian minority living in compact communities generally in the Eastern part of the republic. Under the pretext of extending protection to this Serbian minority the JNA forces were moved in Croatia and quickly occupied one-third of its territory. As a result of this campaign thousands of civilians have been killed, about of one million of Serbs and Croats became refugees. Moreover, Croatian regions with substantial Serbian population such as Eastern and Western Slavonia, as well as South and North Krajina have been unilaterally proclaimed by Serbs as sovereign territories.³²

The European Community tried to broker the peace between Serbia and Croatia as well as to prevent the break up of Yugoslav republic but failed in its efforts. Therefore, economic sanctions were imposed against Serbia in 1991, followed by military sanctions

³¹ Woodward S., *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 162.

on the entire region by 1992. In the fall of 1992, the United Nations finally interfered into the conflict by launching UNPROFOR, the most ambitious peace keeping operation in the history of the UN that deployed a military contingent of 14.000 men between the Croatian and Serbian lines (Map 4). The intervention satisfied both conflicting parties. On the one hand, the UN peacekeeping mission secured the territorial gains that Serbia had acquired through its aggressive offensive while, on the other hand, it gave Croats a welcomed cease-fire in order to regroup and rearm the armed forces as well accumulate the necessary resources for future battles.

In 1991 the independence was declared by the Republic of Macedonia. The nationalist parties failed to win the overwhelming majority in this republic what resulted in formation of the coalition government. This fact as well as the inclusion of the Albanian minority political leaders in the government has obviously played the pacifying role, preventing the republic from falling into armed nationalist conflict. As far as Macedonia had no sufficient Serbian minority its succession from Yugoslavia proper was quick and peaceful. "Following an agreement with the Yugoslav army's High Command, in March 1992 the Yugoslav federal army left the republic without any incident."³³ In order to prevent a spillover of the nationalist conflict on the Macedonian territory in December 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 795 (1992) extending the UNPROFOR mandate to Macedonia known as UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).³⁴

The next flashpoint of the Balkan ethnic conflict became Bosnia and Herzegovina. The republic was composed of three different ethnic groups with no single

³² Glenny M., *The fall of Yugoslavia: the third Balkan war*, (London, New York: Penguin, 1992), 34-36.

³³ Pavkovic A., *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia*, (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1997), 117.

one constituting an overwhelming majority. “Out of 4.4 millions of the Bosnian population, Bosnian Muslims constituted 43.7 percent of the population, Serbs constituted 31.4 percent, Croats constituted 17.3 percent.”³⁵ (Map 2) Following the example of Slovenia and Croatia the Muslim and Croatian political parties in Bosnia decided to create a sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In October 1992 the Muslim and Croatian parties in Bosnia produced the Memorandum on secession from Yugoslavia. Such idea was strongly opposed by Bosnian Serbs who were willing to stay in the union with the Yugoslav state. The Bosnian crisis was driven by mutual fears and security concerns of the major ethnic groups populating the republic. While the Bosnian Serbs were afraid of cutting ties with Yugoslavia as well as creation of the orthodox Muslim state, the Bosnian Muslims as well as Croats were seriously concerned with Serbian domination and possible dissolution of Bosnian state into the greater Serbia. The Bosnian crisis was seriously aggravated by positions of the neighbouring Serbia and Croatia interested in partition of Bosnia between themselves. Political leaders of Serbia and Croatia (S. Milosevic and F. Tudjman) even allegedly conducted the secret talks on this issue.³⁶

As soon as the Bosnian authorities declared the independence of Bosnian state in February 1992, next month the Serbian community led by R. Karadzic backed up by Belgrade authorities decided to declare the independent state on Bosnian territory of its own called Republica Srpska. The unilateral decision of the Bosnian Serbs immediately caused the armed conflict on Bosnian soil. Backed up by JNA the same way as it was

³⁴ Sokalsky H., *An Ounce of Prevention*, (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 2003), xxi.

³⁵ Morton J., *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia*, (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2004), 11.

³⁶ Rogel C., *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004), 94.

done in Croatia the Serbian ethnic community rapidly occupied vast territories in the Bosnian state. Moreover, the great number of JNA officer's corps switched off to the Bosnian Serbs paramilitary formations called the Bosnian Serbian Army (BSA). The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterised by brutalities from all conflicting sides, vast ethnic cleansings by rival warring groups as well as great number of civilian casualties. Moreover, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) continued to provide open support to the Serbian factions in violation of UN sanctions. Such actions resulted in unprecedented retaliation by the UN which expelled the FRY from its ranks.

To strengthen its efforts the UN sent an additional 16,000 troops to Bosnia Herzegovina³⁷. By the fall of 1992 the UN created six safe or protected areas within Bosnia around Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa. However the ambiguous mandate of the UN protection force did little to settle the dispute or protect the victims of the conflict. To be more specific, the UN forces were not authorized to fight just to enforce the already existing status quo between conflicting parties. In early 1993 the international community, namely the UN and EC, worked out together the first peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, so-called Vance-Owen plan (Map 5). This plan proposed dividing Bosnia into 10 provinces – 3 for each national community as well as the separate UN-controlled zone of Sarajevo. However, the plan was refused by the Bosnian Serbs because they would have had to give up territory that they had already occupied. In response, the UN urgently prepared another scenario of conflict settlement – the Owen-Stoltenberg plan (Map 6). The new plan proposed that Bosnia be reconfigured into a confederation of three ethnic units. This scenario was prepared in close cooperation of the Serbian and Croatian ethnic groups of Bosnia. However, this time the plan was

rejected by the Moslem side. One of the major objections of the Muslim side to this plan was due to the division of Muslim territories into the multiple enclaves separated from each other by Croatian and Serbian populated areas what made the Muslim ethnic group especially vulnerable to its neighbours.

This time the Bosnian Croats decided to follow the Serb model by unilaterally declaring the creation the independent state of Herceg-Bosna in the Southern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Map 4). This decision had met serious opposition from the Moslem side which strongly insisted on the existence of unified Bosnia and Herzegovina widely recognized by that time internationally. Such mutually exclusive political positions of ethnic groups concerned resulted in renewal of combat actions. In 1993 Croats and Muslims who only recently fought together against the Serbs started fighting each others. Both ethnic groups followed the Serbian tactics of ethnic cleansings. Thus, by 1994 all ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina were fighting against each other. The separate ethnic hostilities took on the character of a civil war. All parties were engaged in ethnic cleansings and atrocities against civilians.

In February 1994, worldwide media attention was focussed on the shelling of a market place in Sarajevo by Bosnian Serbs. This incident became the turning point of the Bosnia civil war as it compelled NATO to issue an ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs to create heavy weapons exclusion zone at least 20 kilometres outside Sarajevo³⁸. As a result of the de-armament of the Bosnian Serbs, the Muslim as well as Bosnian Croat forces were able to increase their relative military strength, and in fact doubled the manpower of their military contingents, throughout the year by smuggling a great amount of weaponry

³⁷ Tharoor S., "United Nations Peacekeeping in Europe", *Survival*, 37, (1995), 123.

despite the UN imposed embargo.³⁹ The same year resulted in the new peace plan designed this time by the Contact Group made up of France, Germany, UK, Russia and the USA. (Map 7). The plan envisioned a peace agreement between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims by getting rid of their radical leaders as well as creation of loose confederation of Bosnian Croats with Croatia, while leaving the rest of Bosnia under the Muslim authority. The plan was accepted by Muslims and Croats. The next step of the Contact Group was to break the cooperation of the Bosnian Serbs with the FRY in order to cut off the supplies the Belgrade had been providing for them. This plan was facilitated by the economic hardship that the FRY had been experiencing as a result of the economic sanctions imposed by the world community in 1991 and 1992. In order to secure his position as a leader of the Yugoslav state, Milosevic had indeed changed his attitude towards the Bosnian Serbs. Blaming them for the commitment of atrocities, Milosevic effectively cut off all required supplies to them, in response to which, the international sanctions against the FRY were eased. However, the actions of FRY produced the reverse effect of the self-proclaimed Serb Republic. The BSA had launched another offensive against Sarajevo and seriously aggravated the situation in Bosnia. "By December 1994, Bosnia had been at war for 1000 days. The estimated number of deaths was 200,000; there were 2 million refugees, 1.1 million of whom now lived abroad."⁴⁰

The following year, 1995, was marked with the significant increase of Croatian military might due to a three year long cease-fire agreement with the Bosnian Serbs supervised by the UN. In January 1995 Croatian President F. Tudjman announced a

³⁸ Woodward S., *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 4.

³⁹ Ibid. 345.

⁴⁰ Rogel C., *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004), 35.

serious cut in the UN presence in Croatia and insisted on changing the UN mandate to monitoring only the borders of the country. In May, Croatian troops had launched an offensive on BSA positions initially in Slavonia on the North and finally along all the front lines with Bosnian Serbs. (Map 4) The Serbian power on the occupied territories collapsed within a couple of days. By August 1995 all Croatian territories occupied by Bosnian Serbs for the last three years were finally taken back by Croatian authorities. However, the successful Croatian offensive also produced a side effect by causing the mass displacement of Bosnian Serbs who moved generally to the FRY. It is worth pointing out that there was no international response to the Croatian offensive as well as no interference in the conflict from the side of the FRY. By the end of the year the UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia ceased to exist.

Encouraged by its military success, the Croatian military, along with the Muslim contingents, had launched a joint offensive on the Bosnian Serbs and significantly reduced the size of the Serbian held territories. At the same time BSA troops had started fighting against the Muslim enclaves, which were UN protected areas, within Bosnian territory followed by ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population. The Serbian offensive resulted not only in the displacement of civilians and mass murders of people, but also in taking hundreds of hostages from the UN side who have been chained to the BSA military installations and filmed on the Serbian TV in order to prevent the NATO retaliation.

However, NATO planes continued the bombardment of Serbian military installations in Bosnia and finally forced them to start negotiations under the aegis of the Contact Group. The modified plan of the Contact Group (Map 7) envisioned the re-

establishment of the pre-war borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however it sought to divide it into a Muslim-Croat Federation, already established a year ago, and the Serbian Republic (Republica Srpska) each with its own constitutions and the right to conduct foreign relations of their own. In mid-October, the talks between the warring parties have been continued at the Air Force Base near Dayton, the USA which gave the name to the final peace plan known to the public as Dayton agreement. (Map 8).

The final agreement confirmed the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 49 percent of its territory to be controlled by the Serbian ethnic community and 51 percent by the Muslim-Croat one⁴¹. The central executive was to comprise of a collective presidency. The peace plan has to be supervised by Implementation Force (IFOR) composed generally of NATO troops replacing the UN forces on the ground. However, the civil aspects of the agreement it was decided to let monitor by the UN administration.

Despite extensive international efforts none of the warring parties were entirely satisfied with the final peace plan. The Serbs were not happy with the loss of some territories and especially Sarajevo, while the Moslems were dissatisfied with the plan because it left Bosnia divided among the three the ethnic groups, which they had resisted from the very beginning of the conflict. As for the Croat side, the source of disillusionment with the peace plan was their failure to unite with Croatia proper.

With the collapse of the Former Yugoslavia and the reshaping of the borders among the newly emerging states the ethnic conflict in the Balkans was not yet over. The next problematic area in the region became Kosovo, the province of Serbia, which occupied less than 12 percent of the entire territory of the republic but was populated by

an almost completely homogenous ethnic Albanian community.⁴² Moreover, Kosovo was the historical heart of the first Serbian state in the Middle Ages and as such it remained an important symbolic centre of Serbian national identity. However, the ethnic Albanians also claimed Kosovo as their own arguing that their ancestors had inhabited the area since long time before the arrival of ethnic Serbs.⁴³ When Milosevic' constitutional amendment revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo in 1989, a time bomb was planted in the relationship between the Serbs and the Albanians by putting the latter ethnic group in silent opposition to Serbia. Indeed, as the Kosovar Albanians realized that the Dayton Accord did not touch the status of Kosovo, they drew the conclusion that pacifism was not a viable strategy for them to follow any longer. Therefore, the year after Dayton came into effect the military detachments of the Kosovo Albanians, called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), started guerrilla warfare, backed by wide popular support among the Kosovo Albanian community, in order to put pressure on the Serbian authorities as well as the international community to accommodate their interests.

The mutual killings of Serbs and Albanians continued and violence escalated throughout 1998. In September, the United Nations issued a Resolution of the Security Council calling all warring parties in Kosovo to cease fire. Simultaneously, NATO started to make preparations for the use of military force in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/NATO joint verification missions were rapidly deployed on the ground in Kosovo which found out atrocities against Albanian

⁴¹ <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonaccord.html> > accessed July 20, 2004.

⁴² O'Neil, *Kosovo. An Unfinished Peace*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 21.

⁴³ Buckley W., *Kosovo. Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William Eerdmans, 2000), 77-78.

civilians conducted by Serbian military.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, both warring parties were brought to negotiations by Contact Group at Rambouillet near Paris.

The peace agreement of Rambouillet⁴⁵ envisaged the demilitarization of Kosovo and the creation of conditions for the effective self-governance of the Albanian community within the framework of a federative Yugoslav state. The institutions of Albanian self-government were to include a freely elected local legislature, a Presidency, a Council of Ministers responsible to the legislature, and even a Constitutional Court. The proposed agreement also assumed the temporary deployment of a NATO peacekeeping military contingent as a guarantor of truce and mutual respect of the agreement by the conflicting parties.

Despite the international efforts both parties to the conflict rejected this peace plan. The Serbian side was dissatisfied with the NATO deployment on its sovereign territory while Albanian politicians were strongly opposed to the agreement due to the fact that it lacked the provision of full independence to the Kosovo province. However, the Albanian side eventually ceded to American pressure and signed agreement, while the Serbian side refused to do so. This refusal gave the brokers of the deal the justification to blame the Serbian side for their unwillingness to settle the dispute and start the military actions against the FRY. As soon as the NATO started bombings Belgrade and Serbian military targets in Kosovo, Albanians heavily pressured by the local Serbian police started leaving the province. The Serbian police immediately seized their property and even destroyed Albanian refugees' personal identification papers in order to prevent them

⁴⁴ Buckley W., *Kosovo. Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William Eerdmans, 2000), 321-22.

⁴⁵ <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm> > accessed July 20, 2004.

from ever returning to Kosovo province. "In one week alone, 300.000 fled and for the whole period of conflict the figure of refugees had reached 848.000. "⁴⁶

In early June 1999 Serbs finally capitulated and the UN passed a Resolution outlining the post-war settlement in Kosovo. According to the UN a new peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had to be established.⁴⁷ The Serbian military forces had to be withdrawn from Kosovo, the Albanian guerrillas had to disarm, and all Albanian refugees had to be allowed to return to their homes in Kosovo. The peace in the province had to be maintained by NATO mission called Kosovo Force (KFOR).⁴⁸ By autumn 1999 the situation in Kosovo had been generally stabilized with the overwhelming majority of Albanian refugees returning and resettling in the province. However, with the return of Albanians to Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serbian troops from the province, the majority of the Serbian population left the province out of fear of future reprisals from the Albanian side. Indeed, a number of Serbian historical monuments were destroyed, Serbian real estate was burned down in order to stop the Serbian return in the future. The pendulum of the human atrocities and violence seemed to swing the other way reducing the likelihood of peaceful coexistence of Serbs and Albanians in the future.

The last hot spot of ethnic conflicts in the region was the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYROM, which had a considerable Albanian minority accounting for one third of the state's population. When the ethnic conflict erupted in Kosovo in the late 1990s, Macedonia was a safe haven to hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees. However, in 2001 fighting erupted along the Macedonian-Kosovo border between government forces and armed ethnic Albanians. Although at first

⁴⁶ O'Neil, *Kosovo. An Unfinished Peace*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 30.

⁴⁷ <http://www.unmikonline.org/> > accessed July 25, 2004.

it was believed that the fighting was provoked by the Kosovo Albanians, it soon became clear that the Macedonian Albanian community stood behind the provocation in order to demand rights, a greater voice and eventual autonomy for itself in Macedonia.⁴⁹ It took a couple of months for the Macedonian government, with the active participation of NATO leaders such as G. Robertson and J. Solana, to work out the mutually beneficial agreement satisfying the interests of the Slavic and Albanian communities of Macedonia called lately Ohrid peace accord.⁵⁰ The key gains for Macedonia's Albanians were recognition of Albanian as an official language, provision of higher education in the Albanian language, increased representation in local police as well as amnesty for the Albanian fighters. In parliamentary election the aims for the greater voice of Albanian community was also realized via the guaranteed Albanian representation in the government. Compliance with the agreement was initially monitored by NATO forces, but it was replaced recently by an EU contingent.

At the time of writing, there is no more fighting on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. However, the multiple political, ethnic, and territorial problems are far from being resolved. The Balkans region is still more of a powder keg than an area of friendly cooperation and mutual trust. It will take the generations to come in order to let the historic memoirs be replaced with the modern civilized values.

CHAPTER 4

EXPLAINING THE CAUSES OF THE BALKAN CONFLICT

"No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a

⁴⁸ <http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html> > accessed July 25, 2004.

⁴⁹ Rogel C., *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*, (Connecticut: Greenwood, 2004), 198.

⁵⁰ http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_/OHRID%20Agreement%.asp > accessed July 26, 2004.

single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strength and weaknesses and spur subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom.”⁵¹

1. Assessing structural factors

The scholars of comparative politics argue that part of the primary cause of the ethnic conflicts depends on the structural factors such as the weakness of the state, interior security concerns as well as geopolitical and demographic factors. The following pages will review the explanatory potential of each of these variables to uncover the extent to which they may shed light on understanding the causes of the Balkan ethnic crises.

1.1 The Weakness of the State

Contemporary scholars of nationalism are persuaded that inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkan region erupted generally due to the reason of the artificial construct of the Yugoslav state. As explained in the previous chapter, and shown in Map 1, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was indeed constructed from the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire according to the will of the winning coalition at the end of the World War I. Prior to 1918, only Serbia and Montenegro had been independent kingdoms, the other national groups, particularly the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and the Bosnian Muslims had lived under the control of the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian empires. The unification of the Southern Slavic nations was sponsored as well by Slavic intellectuals because their people spoke a similar language and shared a common ethnic origin. The new state, called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, came into

⁵¹ Walt S., “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, (Spring 1998), 30.

existence in 1918 unifying the number of Slavic nationalities under the aegis of Serbian monarchy.

The victorious allies at the end of the First World War decided to reconfigure the map of Europe to serve better their own political interests by means of “awarding” their own allies with additional territories. The territories that were taken from the losing side of the military conflict as “punishment” ignored ethnic realities and historical borders. The case of Kosovo is only one example out of many. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the First World War, almost half a million Albanians were incorporated by force and against their will into the newly-created state.

Such political steps were obviously not a solution of the already existing ethnic problems in the region. These short-sighted political actions served as bomb with time mechanism waiting only for appropriate conditions to come to let the nations concerned claim back their territories or demand the right of self-determination.

It was not taken into serious consideration that the Southern Slavic ethnic groups had never lived together within the framework of common state. Politicians paid little attention to the fact that ethnic groups from the Balkan region had different culture, traditions and religious affiliations. The people of Slovenia and Croatia were generally Roman Catholics, Serbs and Macedonians were Christian Orthodox and Bosnia was divided between Muslims, Catholics and Christian Orthodox. A serious concern for the politicians should be the presence of significant ethnic minorities within the borders of constituent parts of the newly created Southern Slav state.

The problem of peaceful coexistence among the parts of the newly created state arose from the very first years of its existence. Since the common state was created under

the auspices of the Serbian monarchy the other member nations have been always fearful of Serbian domination and willingness of the latter ethnic group to build a strongly centralized state. "As early as the 1920s, Croatian leaders complained that the extension of the Serbian constitution of 1903 to the rest of the country failed to respect the rights of the non-Serbs. When compromise on state organization appeared to be impossible, the king of Serbia suspended the constitution and convened a dictatorship in 1929."⁵² In order to reinforce the union among the different ethnic groups within the common state the country was renamed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, the resistance to the Serb domination continued which was clearly displayed by the assassination of the King of Yugoslavia.

The decision of the Southern Slavs to create their common state was heavily influenced by the exterior security concerns as well. Historical neighbourhood with such political actors as Austria, Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria, who kept parts of the Slavic nation oppressed for a long time, contributed to a great extent to the decision of Slavic nations to form their own state despite the existing ethnic, historical, religious and cultural differences (Map 3). The Nazi occupation during the Second World War contributed to the understanding by Southern Slav nations of the necessity to stay united under the aegis of the Yugoslav federal state. "Ideologically, the Yugoslav Partisans, who took power at the war's end, stressed the unity of all nationalities in the federal republic. Nationality as a divisive force was condemned by patriots, who remembered the

⁵² Morton J., *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia*, (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2004), 5.

partitioning of Yugoslavia during the World War II and the foreign-inspired internecine warfare that cost hundreds of thousands of lives.”⁵³

In the language of balance of power theory, it seemed that the existence of the sovereign Yugoslav state after the Second World War was dependent to a great extent on the balance of power between the Western and Eastern political blocks. Such balancing position enabled Yugoslavia to get economic, political and military support simultaneously from both the West and the East. However, the Helsinki accords, stating the irreversibility of the state borders in Europe as well as non-interference in the home affairs of the neighbouring states, signed by European states on August 1, 1975 drastically changed the European security system by reducing the plausibility of future territorial claims among the signatories⁵⁴. Thus, by the end of the 1980s the West was not considered dangerous any more for Yugoslav state. The process of European integration, economic prosperity and the absence of territorial claims made the idea of unification with Europe particularly attractive to communist opposition within the Yugoslav state. It was believed that the existence of such prominent international institutions as the European Union and NATO contributed to the sense of stability at the European continent.

At the same time the collapse of the world communist system and the resulting absence of pressure from the Soviet Union facilitated the disintegrative processes in Yugoslavia as well. No longer dependent on Soviet power and political will, the Yugoslav state was let to pursue the policies of its own. While the Cold War provided a kind of external deterring force to the Yugoslav state, the East-West competition for

⁵³ Sekulic D., Massey G. and Hodson R., “Who were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia”, *American Sociological Review*, 59, (1994), 85.

influence in the Balkans no longer seemed to be of strategic importance. The international environment after 1990 no longer seriously constrained the dissolution of Yugoslavia and its move into ethno-nationalistic violence. "The bi-polar world which held Yugoslavia together as the result of pressures from both sides; the disappearance of bi-polarity meant the collapse of the outside forces keeping Yugoslavia intact."⁵⁵

When states are weak, violent conflicts often take place⁵⁶. Regional leaders may try to take over the military resources such as weaponry or attract military personnel to their sides. The weakness of the central authorities may also lead to the appearance of ethnic bands from each ethnic side with the primary purpose of attacking the rival ethnic groups in order to drive their population away. Ethnic groups previously protected by the central government start feeling themselves more vulnerable. In such cases, the vulnerability of civilians makes it possible for small criminal groups to initiate and escalate armed conflict leading to wide-scale violation of human rights and eventually to the fragmentation or the total collapse of the state. When they are small and disorganized such militant groups are hard to control, which makes it possible for the political leadership of the responsible ethnic group to decline their involvement in ethnic hostilities.

Such tactics were employed by each side of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The ethnic gangs of so called "Chetniks" were acting on the Serbian side, while the Moslem "Mujaheddins", frequently composed of the foreign mercenaries, were

⁵⁴ <http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html> > accessed July 21, 2004.

⁵⁵ Sekulic D., "The creation and dissolution of the multinational state: the case of Yugoslavia", *Nations and Nationalism*, 3, (1997), 177.

⁵⁶ Huntington S., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 123-132.

acting on behalf of the Bosnian ethnic community. The similar ethnic gangs contributed to the outbreaks of the ethnic conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia also.

The scholars of nationalism believe that the state of anarchy is an inherent condition of any ethnic conflict which creates chaos and makes it difficult to influence the outcome of rapidly developing situations by means of modern mechanism of conflict management. In the words of one of the United Nations military commanders in the Former Yugoslavia Lt. Colonel B. Stewart: "There are more than three sides (to the conflict) – Serb, Croat and Muslim – we hear about in the media. There are factions within groups and group within factions... These different elements had created a situation as close to anarchy as I have yet witnessed."⁵⁷

1.2 Interior Security Concerns

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist system in Eastern Europe not only reinforced the state of anarchy, which is believed to be the characteristic feature of the international system, but also upset the prevailing equilibrium of powers therein. When states are getting weak, the ethnic groups populating them start feeling insecure and start taking care of their own security. However, making an attempt to secure their own kin, ethnic groups endanger the security of the others. In this case the latter ethnic groups start making their own security arrangements. This creates the never-ending spiral of what is called the "security dilemma"⁵⁸.

B. Posen argues, under conditions of anarchy ethnic groups within states fear for their security in the same way as states do in the international realm. "In areas such as the

⁵⁷ Hislope R., "Can evolutionary theory explain nationalist violence? Czechoslovak and Bosnian illustrations", *Nations and Nationalism* 4, (1998), 476.

former Yugoslavia, 'sovereigns' have disappeared. They leave in their wake a host of groups – ethnic, religious, cultural – of greater or lesser cohesion. These groups must pay attention to the first thing that states have historically addressed – the problem of security, even though these groups lack the attributes of statehood.”⁵⁹ Contemporary analysts of ethnic conflicts strongly believe that the security dilemma provides a robust account why ethnic groups with generally similar goals (survival, expansion, etc) find themselves in competition and war in the international anarchic system. Under conditions of anarchy, each group's security concerns present a real threat to the security of other groups. Frequently the nationalist rhetoric which accompanies ethnic mobilization is regarded by the other ethnic groups as offensive by its nature. In such conditions the mobilizing ethnic group may be regarded as presenting a direct danger to other groups.

Political scientists further argue that military capabilities obtained for defensive purposes may be successfully used for offensive purposes as well. The majority of ethnic militias are normally armed with small arms. However, the same type of weaponry is necessary to equip infantry units which normally constitute the core of offensive troops in the regular armed forces. Under conditions when it is quite difficult to make out the difference between offensive and defensive forces the real intentions of the ethnic sides could be easily misinterpreted. The scholars of comparative politics also acknowledge that the relative power of ethnic groups is not easy to measure. What is considered by one group as sufficient for the defensive purpose may be considered by the other groups as offensive capabilities. In this connection each ethnic party is obviously afraid to be cheated by the others, so inter-ethnic cooperation may become rather difficult.

⁵⁸ Jervis R., “Cooperation Under Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, 30, (1978), 167.

⁵⁹ Posen B., “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, *Survival*, 35, (1993), 28.

In case of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, all ethnic political leaders utilized the nationalist rhetoric to strengthen their political positions as well as to gain the popularity within particular ethnic groups. They paid few or no attention to the fears from ethnic minorities. Pursuing such policies the leaders provoked the ethnic minorities' concerns of their security and forced them to take care of their security themselves. Moreover, political leaders frequently paid no attention to opinions that their intentions could be regarded dangerous and threatening by other groups. Even when local leaders start understanding that by pursuing such policies they escalate inter-ethnic tension, elites find themselves in the vicious circle of the "security dilemma" and are forced to continue building up their military powers. "Making an adversary more insecure will often increase its interests in expansion, since expansion can often increase security. A more insecure adversary will find expansion more desirable when it can provide more secure borders, strategic depth, or control of resources that are valuable for building military capabilities."⁶⁰

It is widely believed that offensive actions are much more effective for survival purposes than the defensive ones. In this connection interior security concerns predispose the ethnic parties to offensive actions versus the defence. The case of ethnic war in Croatia of 1992 clearly testifies in favour of such an argument. When Croatian political leaders started their nationalist rhetoric refusing to recognize the minority rights of the Serbian ethnic group on its territory, the Yugoslav Armed Forces launched the pre-emptive offensive in Krajina area in order to safeguard the ethnic interests of Croatian Serbs.

⁶⁰ Glaser C., "The Security Dilemma Revisited", *World Politics* 50 (1997), 177.

1.3 Geopolitical and Demographic Factors

Such scholars of comparative politics as D. Horowitz as well as R. Brubaker in Chapter 2 underline the importance of geopolitics, especially ethnic geography, as an important cause leading to ethnic conflicts. The relative strength of this factor depends both on the number and the territorial distribution of ethnic minorities in the disputed area. In general, the more homogeneous the ethnic composition of a particular state, or the more territorially separated the different ethnic communities of a multi-national state are, the less chances there are for inter-ethnic conflict to take place. According to scholars, inter-ethnic strife and rivalry is much stronger when ethnic groups are intermingled and the state is rather weak to insure their common security. In such a case each ethnic side is rather fearful of the intentions of the rival group and has a strong incentive to drive the population of the other ethnic group out of the area in order to create a more secure space for itself.

The importance of ethnic geography can be appreciated by considering a number of examples from the history for the Balkan conflict. For instance, it was precisely due to the ethnic homogeneity of its local population that allowed Slovenia's succession from the Yugoslav state not to provoke any significant interethnic tension. In contrast, it was the intermingled ethnic pockets of Bosnia that rendered the situation of Bosnia so difficult to resolve: "In 1991 the Serbian diaspora in Croatia and Bosnia was cut off from the Serb homeland by walls of Moslem-inhabited territory, and the vast Serbian cruelties against the Bosnian Moslems during 1992-93 grew mainly from Serbia's effort to punch corridors through these walls in order to attach these diasporas to Serbia proper."⁶¹

⁶¹ Van Evera S., "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War" in Brown M., *Nationalism and Ethnic Violence*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, England: MIT Press, 2001), 41.

Similarly, the territorial concentration of a Serbian minority along the borders of Croatia made it relatively easy for Croatian Serbs to claim secession for the sake of their own national self-determination thereby provoking further ethnic strife.

Demographic change may provide an additional impulse to the emergence of ethnic tensions. As the size of a given ethnic group increases, due to either an increase in the natural birth rate or to government sponsored settlement policies, the ethnic balance within the particular state may change leading to inter-ethnic tension. Initially small ethnic groups, especially when they are territorially concentrated, may claim for self-governance or autonomy. However, as their population growth they may even claim for the right of self-determination. Such situations require a well balanced and realistic approach of politicians from both sides otherwise the violent actions may take place, leading to unpredictable consequences. The case of the Albanian community in Kosovo is a good case in point to illustrate this. By the end of the 1990s, due to demographic tendencies, Albanians became the overwhelming majority in Kosovo which led to heightened rivalry between them and the local Serb minority, who, however, constituted a clear majority in the republic of Serbia of which Kosovo was an administrative part. "The questions (between Serbs and Albanians) "who came first" and "who is a guest of whom" figure quite prominently in this discourse. Kosovo is an integral to both group's competing national identities. Nevertheless, Serbian nationalists continue to claim Kosovo as their Jerusalem, as the essential part of Serbianity."⁶² The policies of the Serbian nationalists culminating in the eventual elimination of the autonomous status of

⁶² Mertus J., *Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 10-11.

Kosovo contributed to a great extent to raising a wave of nationalism among the Albanians.

Inter-ethnic conflict may be stabilized when the disputed territory is partitioned. In such a case defensive and offensive intentions of ethnic groups are more distinguishable, civilian population is more protected and the incentive of ethnic cleansing disappears. However, drawing the line of partition is itself a challenging and difficult task, which, if not carried out with great care, could only further enhance and escalate inter-ethnic tension.

2. Assessing cultural / political factors

2.1 The Type of Political Regime

As it was stated in Chapter 2 contemporary scholars of political science believe that the nature of the domestic political regime may strongly affect inter-group relationship and provoke, or prevent, ethnic conflicts. In particular, authoritarian political systems normally generate extensive political dissatisfaction in society. Any opposition is usually suppressed by state law enforcement mechanisms and not reported or discussed openly due to the absence of the freedom of speech in society. In the Eastern European context, the locus of political power was the Communist Party which found it easy to abuse existing civil authorities or manipulate the existing legislation under different pretexts such as the requirements of national security. Slobodan Milosevic's authoritarian manipulation of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution is a very important example in this regard. The 1974 Constitution created a highly decentralised federal state of six republics and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) where federal decisions on many issues such as security, common economy and foreign policies had to be taken

according to the principle of mutual consensus. However, in 1989 “Milosevic changed the existing power structure by orchestrating the dissolution of the governments in Vojvodina and Kosovo and replacing the government of Montenegro with his loyalists, thus giving Serbia half the votes in the federal presidency.”⁶³ Such authoritarian activities brought the state of Yugoslavia to the brink of disruption when the other constituent part of the federation eventually started voicing their disagreement with they regarded as the emergence of dominance by one nation (Serbs) over the others in a previously well balanced consensus-based political system constrained by the Constitution.

The shortcomings of the existing political institutions, including their inability to manage ethnic tensions in an adequate manner contribute to the development of ethnic conflict. The problem is frequently connected with the lack of democratic politics. Governments fail to protect ethnic groups from violence due to the fact that they are dominated by the nationalist leaders interested in pursuing the populist policies. In Eastern Europe such governments are usually composed of former communist ‘nomenclatura’ who changed the slogans from communist to nationalist ones in order to stay in power. Such problems are normally associated with particular forms of institutions selected by the majoritarian “winner takes all” principle. In deeply ethnically divided societies majoritarian democracy is self-destroying.⁶⁴ When nationalist feelings are strong and when the central government is weak people normally vote depending on the ethnic preferences. If one ethnic group in society wins elections and forms a majority government, the weakness or complete absence of democratic traditions, which is

⁶³ Massey G., Hodson R., Sekulic D., “Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post-war Croatia”, *Nations and Nationalism*, 9, (2003), 78.

characteristic of transitional societies, can easily degenerate into a tyranny by the majority. Such form of the governance usually assumes the structure of a unitary, centralised state as well as a rigid administrative system. Majoritarian governance excludes minorities from power and creates situations wherein such minorities have no other effective means of influence on the situation but violence. In other words, majoritarian institutions create transform inter-ethnic relations into a zero- (or at least a constant)-sum game in which the gains of one group by definition becomes the loss of the other(s). Therefore, in new and ethnically divided democracies majoritarian institutions can undermine the future stability of the state. In the case of both Croatia and Serbia, majoritarian rule strengthened the positions of the nationalist forces and left the ethnic opposition to rely on alternative ways to represent and pursue their interests outside the formal structure of political competition. "In Croatia an electoral system, foolishly designed by the outgoing communists, handed Tudjman's party 69% of the seats with only 42% of the vote. In Serbia, Milosevic party had an enormous advantage under the election rules. Although it garnered less than half of the vote, it gained 78% of the seats."⁶⁵

An additional institutional source of conflict may be the establishment of ethnic control over the armed and police forces. In poorly institutionalised systems of governance democratic control over the armed forces and law enforcement agencies may be rather weak allowing the dominant ethnic group to wrest control over these very powerful arms of the state. Clearly, when this happens, the ethnic "security dilemma" is

⁶⁴ Linz J. and Stepan A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 358-64.

exacerbated. Historically all federal republics of the Yugoslav state had territorial defence units of their own. When nationalists came to power in Slovenia and Croatia they declared the independence of such forces from Yugoslav Armed Forces (JNA) and started their own rearmament. At the same time the JNA was controlled and manipulated by the Serbia. When ethnic fighting erupted in the former Yugoslavia the JNA clearly took side of the local Serbian ethnic groups, which only heightened the tensions and escalated the military dimension of the conflict.

2.2 Faulty Institutions

As described in Chapter 2, the number of prominent theoreticians of nationalism believe that an important factor leading to ethnic conflicts is the existence of faulty political and state institutions. “The most aggressive nationalist movements arise when states fail to carry out those tasks, spurring people to create more effective states. The problem is that many of these new states lack the institutional capacity to fulfil popular demands.”⁶⁵ In the Former Yugoslavia the faulty institutional structure had been presented by a seriously decentralised ethno-federal structure of the state. The majority of the Yugoslav republics, with the exception of Bosnia, were populated generally by ethnic majority groups. A rotating presidency composed of representatives from various republics was responsible for cooperation of the republics.

In itself, the ethno-federal structure of governance does not present any danger to stable inter-ethnic relations. However, coupled with the liberal reforms pursued by the central government of the former Yugoslavia in the 1960s-70s provided additional power

⁶⁵ Mueller J., “The Banality of “Ethnic War”, in Brown M., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 100-01.

to the republics, which contributed to rendering the institutional foundations of the Yugoslav state unviable. By the late 1980s, the relationship among the republics was quite anarchic. The central authorities lacked sufficient institutional power in the economy, interior politics and media to combat the centrifugal political processes and nationalist tendencies. All of this seriously damaged the constructive relations between republics and launched political rivalry between different ethnic groups. Interestingly, the only exception to this weakening of the authority of the federal state was provided by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which not only remained firmly under federal control but was also dominated by an overwhelmingly Serb officer corps. However, while JNA “was useless as a tool for holding the federation together through democratic reform, ... it was highly useful as an instrument for supporting ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia.”⁶⁷

The Yugoslav Armed Forces were completely free of any civilian control. If civil Yugoslav society underwent some degree of liberalization, the Armed Forces remained the guardian of Tito’s communist ideas of the centralized Yugoslav state. When ethnic rivalry between the federal center and the republics became particularly acute it played the role of invader initially in Slovenia and later in Croatia and Bosnia. Trying to play the role of the law enforcement agency, it committed numerous military crimes against humanity, such as shelling the historical center of the city of Dubrovnik, destruction of Vukovar etc. Moreover, it organized, trained and supplied with military hardware Serbian illegal paramilitaries responsible for the multiple human rights’ abuses and casualties among civilian population. Denitch further notes that the “army enabled the more vicious

⁶⁶ Snyder J., “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State”, *Survival*, 35, (1993), 7.

Serbian volunteer paramilitary units to commit a great deal of criminal killing and looting. It did so by disarming Croat villagers and then standing by when the volunteers moved in to do their killing. It was later repeated in Bosnia on a far vaster scale.”⁶⁸ The Armed Forces not only seriously contributed to the conflagration of the ethnic conflict, but also to the demise of the Yugoslav state itself.

The crisis of political institutions inevitably sparked the wave of ethnic nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. In contrast to civic nationalism, which normally exists in well-institutionalized democracies, ethnic nationalism emerges in an institutional vacuum. As such, “ethnic nationalism is a default option: it predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people’s basic needs and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available.”⁶⁹ In general, when political institutions are weak, political dynamics become determined more by personalities than by institutionally routinized practices.

2.3 The Role of Political Leaders

Non-accountable populist political leaders are widely regarded as one of the legacies of the communist environment. Contemporary scholars emphasize the importance of political leaders or “national elites” as one of the primary causes of the ethnic conflicts. According to scholars most ethnic conflicts are provoked by so-called “bad” leadership of particular ethnic groups who sacrificed peace and stability in society

⁶⁷ Snyder J., *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2000), 209.

⁶⁸ Denitch B., *Ethnic Nationalism. The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 9.

⁶⁹ Snyder J., “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State”, *Survival*, 35, (1993), 12.

in order to pursue their own interests.⁷⁰ The motivation of the local elites in ethnic conflicts could be vary from case to case. Some of the leaders are driven by ideological aspirations, some by criminal ones. However, the most frequent case is when the elites are trying their best to stay in power. "Many internal conflicts are triggered by self-obsessed leaders who will do anything to get and keep power. They often incite ethnic violence of the most horrific kind for their own political ends."⁷¹

In the post-authoritarian societies of Eastern Europe the more elites were threatened by the prospect of democratization the stronger was their decisiveness to switch the attention of the public to nationalist issues. Democracy assumes competitiveness for those in power. When the political situation in transitional societies is aggravated by economic hardship, political leaders, frequently the old ruling elite, are obviously endangered by their political rivals or emerging elites in their struggle for power. In such a condition those in power may resort to the populist tactics of "scapegoating". In order to stay in power for another term elites tend to blame the other ethnic groups for problems they can't resolve themselves. Indeed, this is precisely what the nationalist elites of Slovenia and Croatia did at the end of 1980s: in their attempts to shift public attention away from the consequences of their own economic mismanagement they blamed Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia for receiving disproportionately large shares from the common Yugoslav budget which was disproportionately generated by the most developed Yugoslav republics.

⁷⁰ Skalnik Leff C., "Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States. The Breakup of the Communist Federations", *World Politics*, 51 (1999), 225.

⁷¹ Brown M., "Internal Conflict and International Action", in Brown M., *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 614.

In order to stay in power the national elites also frequently resorted to policies of exclusion, which refers to the exclusion of particular ethnic groups from enjoying democratic rights on grounds of their association with external powers or states willing to destabilize the domestic situation.⁷² The policies of exclusion are applied normally when the democratic political institutions are weak, when media is under control of the elites and threats to elites resulting from democratization of society are rather high. Moreover, the use of exclusion facilitates and justifies the imposition of further limitations on democratic norms in the country such as the freedom of speech, assembly, information and others. In such situation if the excluded groups or ethnic minorities have enough power to resist start resorting to violence. When such ethnic minorities are associated with the foreign power they frequently have no choice but to ally with their kin states and ask them for support. When Croatian nationalists won the elections of 1990 they in turn excluded the Serbian minority from power and blamed them for being a destabilizing enemy force within Croatian state. Such tactics reciprocated immediately with the proclamation of the Serbian self rule, creation of the paramilitary units and finally assistance by the federal armed forces with safeguarding the ethnic minority rights.

The ethno-federal system of the Yugoslav state contributed to a great extent to the polarisation of the ruling elites according along ethnic lines. It was the republican political parties who delegated the elites to the central authorities and not vice versa. The Slovenian and Croatian initiatives to secede from the federative state were possible generally due to the significant autonomy that the national elites enjoyed from the central power. In a sense, the other Yugoslav republics just followed the same example. There is

⁷² Wimmer A., *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict. Shadows of Modernity*, (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 63.

no doubt that all the regional political leaders of the Former Yugoslavia and particularly Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic took direct part by their ambiguous actions in promoting the nationalist policies within their constituencies which resulted in ethnic tension and finally collapse of the common federative state.⁷³

It is not difficult to see how separatist ideas fit the interests of the national elites. By means of creating new nation-states they ensure less competition for their offices and positions in power. Instead of competing with the leaders of the other ethnic groups for power, elites from minority groups can easily dominate within their nations. In the post-communist political environment the elites normally inherit an authoritarian style of management of their predecessors. Pursuing their nationalist policies they frequently manipulate the mass media which are usually dependent on those in power. By doing so elites may easily spread information they need to influence their ethnic supporters as well as restrict dissemination of the information originating from the other ethnic groups. Normally such nationalist leaders dominate on the TV screens, the first pages of newspapers; they are frequent guests on the radio too.

The nationalizing ethnic elites in Yugoslavia realized that the major threat to their power was coming not from outside states but from rival ethnic groups within the states. To stay in power competing nationalist leaders generate nationalist discourse in the media and frequently make the attempts to rewrite the history or “re-codify” the events for the benefit of their own. When leaders have control over the media such campaigns are particularly effective.⁷⁴ For example, in Serbia, the nationalist elites had even

⁷³ Hislope R., “Can evolutionary theory explain nationalist violence? Czechoslovak and Bosnian illustrations”, *Nations and Nationalism*, 4, (1998), 477.

⁷⁴ Snyder J., *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2000), 121-25.

subcontracted the National Academy of Science to write a report on the discrimination of the Serbian ethnic group by the others.⁷⁵ Similar political steps are made in order to demonize the ethnic rivals, push different ethnic groups towards violence by dividing and radicalizing multiethnic population along the ethnic lines. Moreover, the local elites driven by the nationalistic ideas pay few or no attention to rights of ethnic minorities living on their territories. "Many leaders of national movements interpret state frontiers as national frontiers, and regard the ethnic minorities within 'their own' territory as outlanders."⁷⁶

By neglecting the rights of other ethnic groups, national elites can contribute to the further polarisation of society, provoke the emergence of counter-elites which are normally pursuing the same nationalistic policies as an ethnic counterbalance. In transitional societies with weak or no democratic traditions of leadership, institutional checks and balances that could contain the consequences of such nationalistic passion are rather weak. Post-communist systems have inherited strong authoritarian style of command and control over society, and a tradition of political management which facilitates the efforts of ethnic elites in post-communist environment to stay in power and even augment their political potential at the expense of ethnic minorities.

2.4 Problematic Group Histories

A number of examples from the Balkan ethnic wars strongly support the arguments that stress the relevance of historically defined group relations as an important explanation. Ethnic hatred is normally based on both past and present conduct of rival

⁷⁵ Rogel C., *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004), 224.

ethnic groups. In the Balkans mutual hatred and mistrust characterise the history of inter-group relations among all ethnic groups concerned - Serbs, Croats, Muslims and Albanians. Past historical memories were generated by mutual ethnic discrimination, mass murders, and expulsion of the population. Separate cases of negative behaviour were frequently projected on the whole ethnic group and result in diaspora intolerance. The mutual hatred between Serbs and Croats is particularly illustrative. "Serbs and Croats both have a terrifying oral history of each other's behaviour. This history goes back hundred of years, although the intense Croat-Serb conflict is only about 125 years old. The history of the region is quite warlike."⁷⁷

The old inter-ethnic negative histories are frequently augmented by the memory of contemporary group behaviour. When Croatian nationalists had started the political discourse on secession in 1990 it gave the reason for the Serbs to assume the worst about the behaviour of the sovereign Croatian state. The Serbian memory of Croatian behaviour in the WW II was largely based on the widespread atrocities towards them from Croatian nationalists.

It is a common practice in ethnic groups to exaggerate the fear of the other or even distort it in order to portray opponents as "bad guys" as well as depict themselves in bright colours of fighters for the national unity or against oppression. Such ethnic hatreds are frequently exploited by the nationalistic elites for propaganda purposes. Ethnic hatred is frequently used by politicians to create ethnic myths based on historical events. With time such artificially created myths evolve into the legends and are widely spread in societies. "The grievances and fears (against each others) were there to be mobilized.

⁷⁶ Hroch M., "Nationalism and national movements: comparing the past and the present of Central and Eastern Europe", *Nations and Nationalism*, 2, (1996), 39.

Although representations of war-time atrocities – often greatly exaggerated – were indeed widely propagated from Belgrade, memories and stories about the murderous war-time were locally rooted, sustained within family and village circles, and transmitted to the post-war generations.”⁷⁸

Such hatred stimulates the negative attitudes of one group towards the other and provokes nationalist desires for redistribution. These mutually negative memories and mutual blames provide fertile ground for intolerance between the ethnic groups. Furthermore, the greater the atrocities were of one ethnic group against the other in the historic past the stronger will be present mistrust, fears and concerns of mutual activities. These memoirs are obviously playing disintegrative role, promoting separatism and conflicts.

Ethnic hatred is frequently reinforced by emotions which increase the chances of the conflict. Emotions may cause the ethnic groups to act irrationally. Affected by emotions the rival ethnic groups often exaggerate the claims of the others while seeing their own quite reasonable and moderate. Thus the past horrors sponsor discriminative policies of one ethnic group towards the other, fuel the ethnic hatreds and provoke violence.

2.5 Democratization

The collapse of the authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe provided fertile ground for further democratization of states, liberalization of ideologies and spread of the freedom of speech. This factor served as another trigger mechanism for the increase of the ethnic tensions leading to the conflict situations. “Certain world wide ideological and

⁷⁷ Posen B., “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, *Survival*, 35, (Spring 1993), 36.

institutional currents have also underpinned the growth of ethnic conflict. The spread of norms of equality has made ethnic subordination illegitimate and spurred ethnic groups everywhere to compare their standing in society against that of groups in close proximity.”⁷⁹

The logic of democratization in multinational post-Soviet states challenged the existing ethnic bargains within newly democratized environment. The available weak institutions of governance in the context of rapid democratic developments in the post-communist environment were unable to provide the post-communist societies with the balanced “market of ideas” which is a characteristic feature of mature and well established democracies. The freedom of speech obtained by the people of the ex-communist states was understood to provide an unlimited right to overstep the bounds of decency. If earlier those in disagreement with the central authorities were imprisoned, exiled or punished by state authorities, the democratization processes removed the existing barriers and let the previously suppressed ideas appear on the agenda. Relaxing constraints on public discussion facilitated the reopening and intensified the nationalist debate, leading to the growing ethnic mobilization and further segmentation of nation into the ethnic domains.

In the period of transition from authoritarian rule to stable democracy, when legal constraints are weakened due to the reform process, nationalist debates come out of civilized legal framework and can easily cause tensions between the ethnic communities. In such conditions politicians addressing the nationalist grievances start claiming for ethnic control over policy making process. Pursuing the nationalist discourse politicians

⁷⁸ Brubaker R., “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe”, *Daedalus*, 124, (1995), 123.

facilitate the dismemberment of the multiethnic undermining the foundations laid by the previous authorities. As Leff notes, the “removal of constraints on public discussion, whenever it occurred, permitted not only a broader critique of existing policy on the national question but also the revisiting of previously sacrosanct state foundation myths: the Tito myths.”⁸⁰

Normally the primary purpose of nationalist discourse is to illegitimate the existing state order, provoke tensions between national communities and create conflict situations. Public opinion plays an important role in promoting nationalist ideas. In the authoritarian environment the leaders of the state usually do not care about the public opinion of their population. When the authoritarian state has effective monopoly on the distribution of information it frequently makes the masses sceptical of the official viewpoint. In these conditions people try to find alternative sources of information or read between the lines. Moreover, in conditions of monopoly on political power state authorities do not need to address the nationalism card at all. Facing no real opposition, authorities of the authoritarian states do not need to struggle for public support or take care of the legitimacy of their actions. On the contrary, in the democratizing environment politicians try to swing public opinion in society on their side. In such situations, the mass media frequently takes ethnic sides and plays an important role in this process. Coupled with the uncontrolled freedom of speech, unlimited by democratic norms mass

⁷⁹ Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 5.

⁸⁰ Skalnik Leff C., “Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States. The Breakup of the Communist Federations”, *World Politics* 51 (1999), 217.

media involvement into the interethnic discourse may cause serious destructive consequences.⁸¹

Many newly democratized states lack effective institutions to monitor the monopoly of state on the information, the ability to create well balanced and genuinely independent mass media which enable the free exchange of ideas and arguments. In such conditions demagogues of nationalism take leading positions producing more new myths and distorting information for their own benefit. The process of democratization forces the previous authorities, associated with the authoritarian rule, to start competing with newly emerged opposition for power control. In these conditions both sides try to attract masses on their sides by making public appeals in mass media means. Here, the nationalist card starts obtaining its importance. Ethnic communities not only oppose each others through the means of the public media but they also try to attract the attention of the international media to their side. In doing so conflicting ethnic groups try to persuade those at home and abroad that previously friendly ethnic communities are no more capable of living together because of the hatred and mutual fear. At the same time ethnic parties resort to attempts to limit the ethnic opposition from influencing on political developments through access to the media. When ethnic conflict erupted in Bosnia the very first targets for Serbian forces became pro-Bosnian media – television and radio stations, as well as offices of local Muslim newspapers. When Serbian forces, pressed by the UN, agreed to withdraw from the mountain positions, dominating Sarajevo, they blew up the TV tower located there.⁸²

⁸¹ Snyder J. and Ballentine K., "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas", in Brown M., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 61.

⁸² Woodward S., *Balkan Tragedy*, (Washington D.C.: Brooking Institution, 1995), 236.

The segmentation of media and political life is another important feature of democratization in transitional societies, leading to the rise of nationalism, ethnic controversies and the development of conflict situations. Along with the democratization process the so-called market place of ideas quickly segments from centrally monopolized to the one controlled by different political forces. "Market segmentation in newly democratizing states sometimes follows communal and linguistic lines. The federalization of power left pan-Yugoslav reformers with no instrument for transcending the Serb and Croat nationalists' media monopoly over their respective ethnic niche markets."⁸³ Democratization may enhance nationalist mythmaking unless democratic institutions are stable and well-developed. The "market of ideas" definitely requires some regulative institutions and legal rules in order to guarantee that all sides are heard equally and the arguments raised in the ethnic discourse are within the legal framework. It will make political sides accountable before the legal institutions such as courts in order to stop spreading the ethnic conflict at the very beginning. Without such regulatory institutions the democratizing environment presents itself as rather dangerous and potentially conflict space.

A well-balanced democratic society cannot be created overnight. In the newly democratized societies the liberalization of ideas, leading to the nationalist discourse is frequently endangered by biased journalists who lack adequate training, who are paid by political forces in order to support their interests, who frequently misinterpret information and lack professional ethic. In multinational states the ethnic discourse is usually segmented along the lines of the linguistic communities. The previously homogeneous

⁸³ Snyder J. and Ballentine K., "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas", in Brown M., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 76-77.

media of the authoritarian state rapidly fragments into a number of separate ethnic political outlets which defend not the interests of the multiethnic state, but those of the separate ethnic groups which are frequently found at odds and in conflict with each other. "The multiple discourses, which continue to mark post-communist media, generate bounded national "marketplaces of ideas" where external perspectives (from the center or rival national groups) are filtered through the lens of ethno-national concerns. This filtering process does little to create common political ground for negotiation or cross-national constituency building."⁸⁴

The electoral process, another component of the democratization process, also encourages the segmentation of society along ethno-national lines as the Communist party, breaks up into ethnically separate units which no longer support the common interest of the democratic multinational society but rather those of the respective particular ethnic groupings. The history of the former Yugoslavia suggests that political parties with a clear cross-national constituency may be very rare in divided new democracies. Moreover, the existing ethnically driven parties frequently resist the other national minorities from entering into the formal coalitions. Such practices are usually done either out of ideological convictions or out of fear of competition from the side of ultranationalist parties strongly tied to their national groups. Either way, the electoral process may leave minorities without the possibility of real political "voice" and force them to search for alternative to political means in their struggle for their rights.

⁸⁴ Skalnik Leff C., "Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States. The Breakup of the Communist Federations", *World Politics* 51 (1999), 212-13.

2.7 Economic Factors

Scholars also consider economic or social problems as potential factors contributing to the emergence of the ethnic conflicts. The transition from centrally-planned to market-based economies created a wide spectrum of economic difficulties, ranging from high unemployment to inflation. Such a transition period is usually directly connected with dramatic reduction of the quality of life of many people. In Yugoslavia the collapse of national economy, oriented generally on the trade with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, left hundreds of thousand people unemployed and as a result made them unable to support themselves. Economic hardships disrupted traditional living of people and seriously affected the ability of state to provide previous benefits of the socialist system to the population such as free health care and education. "By 1985-86 annual inflation stood at 50 percent. Unemployment reached 20 percent outside of Slovenia and Croatia, creating what has been described as a "revolutionary situation". This crisis heightened incentives for an intensification of nationalism in several ways."⁸⁵ Economic grievances inevitably provoke a wide range of human discontent among different strata of the population. Negative attitudes towards the central government normally grow proportionally to the amount of economic problems and provoke tensions which are usually of centrifugal character. In such a case, the local authorities normally use this opportunity to mobilize population of respective ethnic areas against the policies of central government. Such actions in their turn provoke confrontation with the neighbours on the ethnic grounds. Differences of the economic development and market reforms across republics in the Former Yugoslavia reinforced challenges to central

economic policy. "The varieties of market reform that Serbia preferred differed from those preferred by Croatia and Slovenia. The latter two were better adopted to attempt a strategy of economic liberalization. The Serb economy, in contrast, was more tied to an uncompetitive metallurgical sector and East-bloc trade on the Danube. As a result, the economic crisis continued, and power further devolved to the ethnic republics."⁸⁶

Differences in economic development across the regions in the multinational state may provoke another problem inherently existing in any state whether of a federative or unitary nature – the problem of balance between the economic output of the regions and redistribution policies of the central authorities. In order to maintain the uniform level of living standards of nation, populating the different regions of state, the central authorities have to provide the economic aid to the regions which frequently significantly differs between the developed and underdeveloped constituent parts of the state. As mentioned, the wealthier regions of Yugoslavia - Croatia and Slovenia, tried to resist the investments of the central government in the less developed regions such as Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia, which were made for political rather than by economic reasons. These policies of economic resistance were favoured not only by nationalists in the more advanced republics, but also by so called "liberals" – people who insisted on the adoption of profitability criteria for investments and greater pluralism.

Within the framework of the authoritarian state the so called "redistribution" policies are pursued without objections from either region due to the repressive nature of the system of governance. However, with the process of liberalization of economy, introduction of market reforms, inevitably leading to financial accountability of the

⁸⁵ Woodward S., *Balkan Tragedy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), 73.

regions to their populations, the problem of distribution of the economic benefits became rather acute, inevitably leading to political objections, raise of the nationalist discourse and further confrontation between the regions. "Distributional conflicts, when they become extreme, can destroy the stability on which the ideal of the nation depends. The nation implies a common framework in which problems can be resolved; but particular groupings interpret their interests as those of the nation as a whole, and clashed with other groupings with alternative formulations."⁸⁷

Understanding the importance of market reforms, the central government itself encouraged the republics to pursue the independent economic policies which included borrowing finances from international agencies. However, the spending of these loans was poorly managed by the respective authorities. As a result, Yugoslavia became one of the biggest debtors in Europe. In this situation, the international financial institutions pressured the Yugoslav government to modify economic policies, pursue economic reforms, and seriously cut spending. However, these steps uncounted serious resistance from the central government. The resistance to pursue cardinal market reforms further aggravated situation in economy which was quite serious by the end of the 1980s.

Another historical factor which pushed the former Yugoslavia towards the nationalist conflict was its relatively late, by historical standards, economic development. For a long time peasants were the dominant economic class in Yugoslav society as well as in the economy of the communist Yugoslav state. At the same time the majority of urban centers in Yugoslavia remained generally cosmopolitan. The relatively low levels of education of the population in rural areas as well as division of the state according to

⁸⁶ Snyder J., *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000), 211.

the ethno-federal principle into the ethnically distinct areas served as a ground for further recruitment of the supporters of nationalist policies. “Because the early phase of democratization preceded economic development in Serbia, mass politics arrived without the sophisticated middle class needed to sustain a civic outcome. Serbia reversed the developmental sequence and as a result, the country was primed for rivalrous ethnic nationalism.”⁸⁸

At the same time it has to be admitted that market reforms alone do not necessarily lead to nationalism and ethnic tensions. The multiple successful examples of transition to market economy in a number of Eastern European states strongly support this argument. It is obvious, therefore, that there is no necessary connection between the level of the economic development and ethnic violence. Instead, it is the political institutions that strongly matter and may make a difference in mitigating the potentially destabilizing consequences that the transition from a command to a liberal economic regime may have on fragile inter-ethnic relations.

The above analysis suggests that both structural and political/cultural factors provoking the ethnic conflicts are interconnected and inseparable in practice. Systemic failures in the former Yugoslavia resulted from the weakness of the federal Yugoslav state, as well as geopolitical and demographic factors that provided the local political elites with an opportunity to exploit the nationalist card for their individual political gains. The faulty political system imposed by authoritarian actions of local elites contributed to the further destabilization of states – the basic unit of analysis for proponents of neo-realism. Cultural factors such as problematic ethnic group histories

⁸⁷ Dandeker C., *Nationalism and Violence*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 59.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 208.

interconnected with the changing demography and artificially constructed borders of constituent parts of the Yugoslav federation were the last drops which “broke the dam” of the ethnic hatreds and caused a violent conflict with tremendous human and material losses.

CHAPTER 5

ETHNIC CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Effective management of ethnic conflicts assumes the provision of firm guarantees for the security and safety of ethnic minorities by the local governments as well as the international community to. Moreover, the ethnic parties to the conflict should be provided with equal rights for their cultural, economic and political development. To reach such goals and solve the ethnic dispute the following strategies could be employed: political partition and ethnic separation, power sharing, providing ethnic entities with autonomy status, institution building and democratization of society within the realistic time frames. As a strategy of the last resort the policy of external intervention could be applied as well.

1. Political Partition and Ethnic Separation

Lasting ethnic peace assumes the removal of the “security dilemma”. In this connection, the separation of the ethnic parties through the political partition of territory under dispute may become important tool of ethnic conflict management. Once ethnic groups are mired in the heavy and long lasting hostilities, which result in serious ethnic hatred, atrocities and ethnic cleansing, the most effective, and in many cases the only one, way to reconcile conflicting sides is to separate them. The more intense violence and the

larger the scale of violence, the more likely that separation will be the only option. “The twentieth-century bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is just about as strong as the nineteenth-century bias against martial divorce. Where secession is possible, contemporary statesmen might do well to view it with greater tolerance.”⁸⁹ There are no official statistics in the world reporting what scale of violence or human losses should take place to give incentive to the warring parties to arrive to such an option. However, the most important stimulus to separation undoubtedly results from mass casualties of civilians.

Another important incentive to separation will obviously result from inability to find out the other options guaranteeing the survival of particular ethnic group within particular territories. Such process becomes the only option particularly in cases when not only the local security forces but the international community as well is no more able to provide such guarantees. The case of the Bosnian ethnic conflict supports this in a number of ways. For instance, when Bosnian Serbs had launched an attack against the Muslim civilians assembled in the UN protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, tens of thousands of Muslim civilians were murdered or displaced. However, the international community did nothing to prevent the ethnic genocide on these territories and finally just secured the Serbian territorial gains of this bloody offensive in the Dayton Accords.

While conflict management requires the separation of ethnic groups into distinct regions, it does not necessarily mean ethnic purity. Normally, the remaining national minorities have to be small enough that the ethnic majority groups don't fear them as a potential military or demographic threat. For example, before “the Krajina offensive in

⁸⁹ Lijphart A., “The Power-Sharing Approach”, in Montville J.V., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 493.

1995, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia is said to have thought that the 12 percent Serb minority in Croatia was too large, but that half as many would be tolerable.”⁹⁰

Ethnic separation is closely linked with the issue of political partition of the territories where the ethnic conflict takes place. Partition is a division of a troubled state into distinct and politically independent units. These units may be totally sovereign states or autonomous regions within the existing state. A strategy of partition is undertaken to physically divide the rival parties to the conflict in order to defuse ethnic hatred. Partition does not guarantee successful conflict management by itself. However, it is a workable solution to the ethnic crisis if other mechanisms of conflict management had failed to settle the dispute. It is strongly advisable to have such an agreement brokered by the third political party, normally a credible international organization with strong capabilities to influence the outcome of the dispute as well as to secure the human rights of the ethnic groups concerned. Normally such a deal, if performed under the auspices of the international community, facilitates the exchange of the ethnic groups on the respective territories, arranges fair compensations for the loss of the household, and guarantees respect for human rights in the war-torn territories. However, if such an action is undertaken unilaterally by one of the parties to the conflict, normally by self-proclamation of a particularly territory as it was done by the Serbian Krajina in Croatia, it will inevitably lead to further hostilities and it is finally doomed to the failure.

Partition without ethnic separation gives the warring parties incentive for ethnic cleansings as it was in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. At the same time even if ethnic separation may seriously reduce the intensity of the conflict, it does not provide enough

⁹⁰ Kaufmann C., “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars” in Brown M., *Nationalism and ethnic Conflict*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 471.

legal guarantee for the future status quo and mutual security of the ethnic groups. It is widely believed that the status of a sovereign state may provide the dominant ethnic group with additional international legal guarantees of non-interference of the others in its home or ethnic affairs. However, even partition and international recognition of the new founded nations does not guarantee interior stability and ethnic security. As soon as the international community had officially recognized the sovereignty of Slovenia, Croatia and lately of Bosnia it served as a detonator of immediate invasion by Serbia in their interior affairs.

The territorial distribution of ethnic minorities assumes particular importance in designing the partition of a state. The location of such ethnic minorities along the outer borders of the state concerned may provoke further secessionist incentives among them. This factor is quite essential especially if strategic communication routes or important deposits of raw materials are found in these areas as far as it may inflict an irreparable damage to the security of the state concerned and cause the ethnic dispute. It was the case of the Serb diasporas in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina which resulted in proclamation of Serbian Republic of Kraina, lately defeated by Croatian authorities, as well Republica Srpska – the Serbian populated part of Bosnia. In case of ethnic separation the boundaries between the ethnic groups should be drawn along the natural divisive lines such as the mountain ranges, rivers and other natural obstacles preventing the possible aggression of one ethnic group on the other. In the absence of such careful considerations, the consequences could be disastrous. For instance, the “Croatian forces were able to overrun

Krajina in part because its irregular crescent shape meant that 30.000 Krajina Serb forces had to cover a frontier of more than 725 miles.”⁹¹

The Dayton Agreement was obviously the classic example of ethnic separation with further political partition. (Map 8). Long before it became effective, the Contact Group of international mediators reached preliminary agreement between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims on this issue creating the Bosniak-Croat alliance. At that time it was already agreed that the territory under their joint control would be 51 percent of the whole territory of Bosnia. The remaining 49 percent of the territory was to be controlled by the Serbian community. At the Dayton meeting itself the peaceful partition accord had been finally agreed and approved. The ethnic parties were separated by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) with no relation to historical, economic or previous administrative regions and monitored by the international peacekeeping force. It was agreed that the “Parties may adjust the Inter-Entity Boundary Line only by mutual consent. During the period in which the multinational military Implementation Force (“IFOR”) is deployed, the Parties shall consult with the IFOR Commander prior to making any agreed adjustment and shall provide notification of such adjustment to the IFOR Commander.”⁹²

The Dayton accords resulted in the peaceful displacement of tens of thousands of people. It would be not so painful and far less costly both for the ethnic parties involved as well as the international brokers if it had been performed much earlier. However, it took more that four years of ethnic conflict and hundreds of

⁹¹ Kaufmann C., “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars” in Brown M., *Nationalism and ethnic Conflict*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 471.

⁹² <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex2.html> (Dayton Accords, Annex 2) > accessed July 23, 2004.

thousands of civilian casualties to make the mind of the international community to take the partition solution.

The political partition accord served as the basis for further security of the ethnic groups involved. The Dayton Accords provided for the creation of two separate Armed Forces (one for Republica Srpska and the second one for the Bosniak-Croat alliance). However, it has to be noted that while partition strategy created the balance of power it strengthened the division rather than facilitating reconciliation between the ethnic parties involved. Despite the optimistic experience of Bosnia there are some negative sides to its partition as well. It has to be remembered that partition is frequently connected with ethnic separation. Any such a separation inevitably results in refugee flows which usually go in both inward and outward directions. These refugees are normally short of food, money, transportation which cause to them additional sufferings. Refugees are an easy target for local bandits or paramilitaries and frequently suffer from them additional losses. It is estimated that there are approximately 2.5 million refugees in the former Yugoslavia. This means that “every fourth person in Croatia, every fifth person in Serbia, and every third person in Bosnia is now a refugee.”⁹³ (Table 1)

The new states created as a result of partition and ethnic separation may not be viable. The political will of the local elite may not be sufficient to get the economy to perform at levels that would generate acceptable standards of living. The self proclaimed Serbian State of Krajina created by means of partition of Croatia finally overrun by Croatian forces is vivid example of such artificial entity. Finally, partition and separation do not resolve the root of the problem of ethnic hatred. Usually such entities are fertile

⁹³ Denitch B., *Ethnic Nationalism. The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 171.

grounds for local elite to cultivate the nationalist ideologies and demonize the neighbours.

2. Power Sharing

In multiethnic societies the power-sharing mechanisms of governance may become an important lever of conflict management. In war-torn societies organized along the ethnic lines it is quite difficult to create multiethnic parties credible enough in each ethnic community and popular throughout the whole state. In such a condition the power-sharing agreement may effectively replace traditional one-party cabinets, centralized governments as well as the unitary state concept.

The Dayton peace accords envisioned the application of such a power sharing model for Bosnia. Under the new constitution adopted in the framework of Dayton Accords, Bosnia became a highly decentralized state divided into autonomous constituent parts created according to the ethnic principle. Each constituent entity possesses the high degree of political, economic and military sovereignty. All of them enjoy wide range of political and administrative rights authorised even to pursue their own foreign policies and maintain their Armed Forces. The three major nationalities of the republic are guaranteed proportional representation across all branches of government. Legislature is based on the consociational principle as well. The structure of the Bosnian bicameral Parliament testifies the adherence to this principle. The upper chamber, the House of Peoples, comprises 15 delegates, with two-thirds from the Federation and one-third from the Republica Srpska. The two constituent units of the Federation are entitled to the same number of representatives, i.e. 5 Croats and 5 Bosniaks. The lower chamber, the House of

Representatives consists of 42 Members, two-thirds of whom are elected from the Federation and one-third from the territory of the Republica Srpska.⁹⁴

Nonetheless, the power-sharing approach has its obvious drawbacks also. It initially assumes the permanent division of the ethnic groups along ethnic lines. For example, non-Serbs living on the Serbian part of the Bosnian state will not be elected to the parliament and will have no legal opportunity to run for the presidency. The same procedures refer to the other constituent parts of Bosnia. It means that partition is initially written into the structure of representation and will obviously prevent the ethnic reintegration in Bosnia in the foreseeable future. As such, it may serve as a discriminatory measure as well. Another problem with the consociational model is the stimulation of the creation of mono-ethnic political parties. If multi-ethnic coalitions begin to emerge they will be compelled to select the candidates for any position according to the ethnic principle first which obviously create some obstacles to nation building.

The Bosnian legal provisions guarantee the protection of the ethnic groups' rights by casting a veto. However the veto power may work both ways – to secure the vital interests of particular groups as well as threaten the very existence of confederative state. The Former Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the UN to the Balkans C. Bildt describes this drawback the following way: “On the one hand, there was an evident need for a means to prevent (vital) decisions taken by simple majority. On the other hand, there was a clear risk that such a device might be abused to block less crucial decisions. There would then be a risk that no decision would be taken at all, and the country would

⁹⁴ <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex4.html> (BIH Constitution. Article 4: Parliamentary Assembly) > accessed July 22, 2004.

fall apart for that reason.”⁹⁵ What constitutes vital interests is not clearly defined in Bosnian legislation and any potential problem could be easily interpreted as such. The low level of political culture of local elite in the Bosnian State may frequently result in groundless speculations on this issue. Moreover, in addition to the possibility of using a veto, the parliamentary decision-making procedures are also such that they may create never-ending legislative deadlock. The reason for this is that any parliamentary decision requires the support of at least 1/3 of the representatives of each of the three ethnic groups.

A central component of the consociational model that is obviously missing from the Bosnian peace architecture is the existence of grand coalitions among the ruling elite. As far as the credentials of the central authorities of the Bosnian state are quite limited and the decisions of central bodies of governance may be easily hindered by complex voting procedures there is no incentive for ethnic elite to cooperate. The Dayton accords assume rather division of powers than creation of grand coalitions between the different ethnic groups at the federal level. The Bosnian example testifies that power-sharing agreement in itself is not sufficient to promote cooperation and reconciliation among the former enemies. Whereas the institutional framework of the Dayton Accords has been successful in ending of the ethnic conflict, however it failed to provide effective mechanism for future inter-ethnic relations. The conflict-management techniques in Bosnia are hardly compatible with federal state building procedures leading to the separation of ethnic segments rather than to inter-ethnic cooperation. Power-sharing under conditions of lack of democratic experience of political actors has led to political

⁹⁵ Bildt C., *Peace Journey: the Struggle for Peace in Bosnia*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998), 138.

paralysis of the Bosnian state. It may very well be that the final word in the Bosnian peace agreement still belongs to nationalists who ultimately replaced the civic values of their societies with ethnic principles of exclusion and division.

3. Regional Autonomy and Federalism

Along with power-sharing, the establishment of regional autonomy may also play a pacifying role in the settlement of ethnic conflicts. The forms and the scope of autonomy may widely vary. It may range from demanding the recognition of the minority language to the possibility of limited sovereignty or even the right for self-determination. The distinctive feature of autonomy is that it is demanded within the framework of the already existing state. The most frequently used territorial devices to attain this goal are federalism and regional autonomy for the ethnic groups concerned.⁹⁶ Such reforms rest on the expectation that the provision of an additional range of administrative as well as economic powers to particular ethnic groups may serve as a stabilizing and unifying factor between the central state authorities and the ethnic minorities.

Frequently the autonomous status of the territory serves as a safety valve to let “the steam of the ethnic tensions” come out peacefully satisfying the interests both of the central authorities and those of minority group. However, central governments are frequently reluctant to grant regional autonomy for the following reasons. First of all, they are afraid that by granting territorial autonomy to a minority group they may stimulate its aspirations for secession. Second, the provision of autonomous status to a particular region may be considered as a discriminatory measure in relation to the other parts of a state. Finally, the granting of autonomy may also provoke territorial claims

from the neighbouring kin state that may want to look after the interests of the ethnic minority as their own citizens.

Despite the above mentioned concerns, the granting of territorial autonomy may still be regarded as a very effective means of conflict management. The most attractive feature of this solution is that it prevents the fragmentation of already existing multiethnic states by modifying the interior balance of ethnic powers. "In international law, autonomy is taken to mean that "parts of the state's territory are authorised to govern themselves in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but without constituting a state of their own."⁹⁷ The granting of an autonomous status to the Serbian constituent part of the Bosnian state (Republica Srpska), as a result of the Dayton peace accords, played a crucial role in the re-establishment of the multinational Bosnian state within its pre-war borders.

On this note, it is important to mention that autonomy does not necessarily mean the territorial restructuring of a particular state. In fact, two different types of autonomy should be distinguished: territorial (see the example of Bosnia) or personal-cultural. Cultural autonomy does not suppose a territorial division but rather the provision for particular ethnic group the guarantee of human and civil rights that are essential in the preservation of their cultural traditions. Such guarantees include the teaching of their native language in local schools, publishing of newspapers in local languages etc. Cultural autonomy status protects and maintains the diversity of society while at the same time does not create the types of problems mentioned above that are associated with territorial autonomy. The Macedonian conflict provides a good case to illustrate this

⁹⁶ Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 596.

⁹⁷ Cornell S., "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict", *World Politics* 54 (2002), 249.

point. The armed conflict that erupted in Macedonia in March 2001 between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Slavs was rather quickly and effectively diffused by the constitutional arrangements that were agreed within the framework of the so-called Ohrid Agreement. Despite serious ethnic cleavages between Albanians and Slavs it was recognized that territorial division of Macedonia was not a solution to the ethnic conflict.⁹⁸ Instead, the constitutional amendments provided for a kind of “social contract” which granted the local Albanian minority the recognition of their native tongue as an official language as well as a language of higher education. In addition, the Agreement included important power-sharing mechanisms such as the increased representation of Albanians in the police force.

The provision of territorial or cultural autonomy requires careful balancing of multiple interests. The central authorities must be aware that neglecting the interests of other ethnic groups as well as delaying the provisions of such arrangements may lead to the undesirable consequences of bloody violence. Indeed, it was the unwillingness of Croatian authorities to recognize the ethnic rights of the Serbian minority as well as to provide them with the guarantees of human rights which provoked the invasion of Croatian territory by the Yugoslav Armed Forces with further proclamation of the Serbian Krajina sovereign state. The political blindness of the Croatian central authorities, their reluctance to peacefully and timely negotiate a compromise, and to find a mutually beneficial decision resulted in hundreds of thousands of people displaced as well as multiple human and materiel losses.

⁹⁸ Sokalsky H., *An Ounce of Prevention. Macedonia and the UN Experience of Preventive Diplomacy*, (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 237.

The outbreak of violence may provide the much needed incentive for the central authorities to introduce these relevant structural changes. As the case of Bosnia shows, the extensive period of hostilities among the three major ethnic groups forced the internationally recognized authorities to modify the previously unitary structure of the republic. By providing autonomous status to all the three parties of the ethnic dispute, the Bosnian government agreed to modify the existing balance of power within a state and made the ethnic coexistence possible.⁹⁹ In Bosnia the autonomous status of the Serbian ethnic group enabled it to create its own defensive forces, to establish diplomatic relations with the other states as well as provided the republic with the wide range of economic powers. It is important to stress also that the sub-national autonomy that was granted to the ethnic minorities of Bosnia also stabilized the region and diffused further Croatian and Serbian interest in aggressive expansion.¹⁰⁰

The manner in which autonomy is achieved may complicate the picture. The Dayton Accords, in particular, were imposed on the ethnic parties from above, by an inter-elite agreement produced under considerable international pressure. As such, it does not really represent a genuine equilibrium of the competing interests and preferences of the rival ethnic parties. Therefore, to make the arrangement work in the long run, the Bosnian state must be closely monitored by international agencies for some time to come, otherwise it may provoke the outbreak of yet another round of revision and violence.

Once granted, autonomy can be revoked only at great cost as the example of Kosovo shows. When autonomy is revoked from a group, even if it is done so under the

⁹⁹ <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex4.html> (BIH Constitution, Article 1) > accessed July 26, 2004.

¹⁰⁰ Sokalsky H., *An Ounce of Prevention. Macedonia and the UN Experience of Preventive Diplomacy*, (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 250.

pretext of nation building, it will create a cleavage between the now disadvantaged ethnic group and the central government that may well be seen to act on behalf of the titular national majority. It is not surprising that the revocation of autonomy may turn the minorities concerned into a political opposition to the central government and may force them to search for alternative solutions to secure their ethnic interests. As expected, Serbia's revocation of the autonomous status of Kosovo autonomy in 1989 initially provoked a political boycott of republican and federal institutions by ethnic Albanians. However, when Kosovars finally understood that nobody, including the international community, was interested in the protection of their human rights, they started open military resistance. The military hostilities between Serbs and Albanians finally resulted in international humanitarian intervention and the establishment of international protectorate over the Kosovo province. However, the conflict is far from being over. Here another international agreement is required to satisfy the demands of each of the parties involved.

4. Democratization of Environment

Democratization may serve both as a catalyst of ethnic conflict as well as a stabilizing factor in conflict management. Democratic peace theory suggests that democracies behave much more peacefully between each other rather than between themselves and other types of states. The theory offers both a normative and a structural account for this expectation. The normative argument assumes the existence of similar legal norms and procedures across democracies, while the structural view presupposes the existence of strong democratic institutions and a political system which encourages a

negotiated rather than a violent settlement of conflicts. Thus, democracy can be understood as a system for the peaceful management of the conflicts. It provides ethnic parties with non-violent methods for selecting their ruling elite and it also facilitates public discussion by which the ethnic relations could be peacefully debated and resolved.

The Dayton Agreement made a new democratic framework for Bosnia by providing it with the appropriate constitutional structures, electoral provisions as well as guarantees of human rights. These democratic institutional arrangements were imposed on Bosnia in a very undemocratic environment after the years of ethnic hatred and open hostilities by undemocratic techniques such as NATO bombardments, economic sanctions, embargos and multiple diplomatic threats. The Accord is both an international treaty and a constitution at the same time. Although it is not flawless, it provided a much needed breakthrough in the peace process and the establishment of a democratic future.

The Bosnian experience, however, also bears testimony to the problems associated with the imposition of democracy. Given that all republics of the former Yugoslav state had a continuous authoritarian past, it is understandable that it would take some time for the newly democratized environment to correspond to modern Western requirements and expectations. For the moment, the new Bosnian democracy, for instance, is haunted by the political culture of the former Yugoslavia. The nationalist parties created their own elite or 'nomenclatura' which control all appointments to public service including the legislature and judiciary. They supervise financial flows in the republics and frequently mix public interests with the interests of their political parties or even with the interests of their own.

To help the stabilization of Bosnia democracy, international authorities provide on-going supervision and control. Some observers even believe that the primary purpose of Bosnia peace efforts was to restore the credibility of the international community strongly undermined by UNPROFOR failure to restore legitimate peace and order. "As their (NATO) protectorate over Bosnia continued, the goal of Bosnian democracy became almost secondary to the primary agenda of building a new US-European world order. For some it was also an experiment, a testing ground for future democratization projects."¹⁰¹

To become a mature democracy the ex-communist society had to get rid of the wide range of authoritarian heritage such as ethnic intolerance, corruption and many others. An important momentum in this process is the creation of an effective and corruption-free civil service. To reach the standards of leading world democracies in building their public services to the present day requirements based on the merit principle rather than on protectionism. Corruption, however, runs deep in the former Yugoslavia and may be very difficult to root out. In this regard, the intertwined connections between political and criminal circles is especially alarming. To cite but one example, Rogel reports that "President Alija Izetbegovich's son, for example, enriched himself through control of Sarajevo's housing bureau, taking \$2.000 kickbacks for allocating publicly owned apartments (80.000 of them). Bakir Izetbegovic also owned 15 percent of Bosnia Air, the country's airline."¹⁰² Similar corruption techniques characterise the practices of the political elite in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro as well. Whatever the constitution

¹⁰¹ Rogel C., *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004), 96.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 97.

might provide, it would be several years before public institutions could ensure the real democracy by applying the law in favour of justice and not of those in power.

Successful democracy requires the establishment of the rule of law, which further suggests civic rather than ethnic or cultural approaches to conflict management. In resolving the conflict in Bosnia, however, both of these approaches were carefully followed. The preamble of the Bosnian constitution identifies the Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs both as *constituent peoples* and as *citizens* of Bosnia.”¹⁰³ This clearly shows that Bosnian constitutional authority rests both on ethnicity and citizenship. The concept of ethnic equality was later defined by the Bosnian Constitutional Court which defined all Bosnian nations as equal and prohibited any national privileges on ethnic grounds. Nonetheless, while one must be aware that dividing Bosnia along ethnic lines was imperative in solving the on-going ethnic conflict, the new constitution also laid down the foundation of a state that looked dangerously similar in its structures to the highly decentralized federal Yugoslavia.

Along with the introduction of democratic constitution the Dayton Agreement obliged the Bosnian State to become a member of a number of international human rights protection agencies guaranteeing by this individual human rights for the Bosnian citizens. Democratization of post-conflict environment assumes that peacebuilders should exclude ethnic extremists – individuals who frequently appeal to violent actions against the other individuals or groups from participating in active politics. The same approach should be maintained towards war criminals. In Bosnia, for example these arguments were written down into the electoral rules however they were not properly enforced. The Dayton

¹⁰³ <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex4.html> (Annex 4. Constitution of BiH) > accessed on July 21, 2004.

Accords effectively denied any individual indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia from holding any public office. It helped for example to prohibit well-known Serbian political extremist Radovan Karadzic from assuming the presidency in 1996. The participants of the peace process in Bosnia agreed to cooperate with the Tribunal in gathering evidence against the war criminals as well as hand them over to the international authorities. However, in practice this commitment proved to be unrealistic. Moreover, initially the international peace enforcement agencies refused to arrest persons blamed with war crimes, later, however, SFOR began to carry out the arrests.

An important instrument of democratization in conflict-torn societies is the liberalization of the popular media. Manipulation of the media by the ruling elite of rival ethnic groups may promote ethnic group rivalry, mutual mistrust and fears leading to the worst possible scenario of violence and civil war. In newly democratizing societies, it is quite important to work out the balance between the civil freedoms, including the freedom of information, and civil responsibilities. "To prevent conflicts of interests expanding into nationally relevant ones is to avoid artificially constructed conflicts 'produced' by mass media. Naturally, this is difficult under conditions of free society."¹⁰⁴ Prior to liberalizing the mass media in post-conflict and post authoritarian environment, it is necessary to establish some legal agencies responsible to stop of spread of the ethnic hatred propaganda, disrupt the monopoly of ethnic elite on supply of information to population. It is quite important that one of the few powers vested in the central government of Bosnia was the one dealing with control of the media means and communications. The goal of such central agencies has to stimulate the diversity on the

¹⁰⁴ Hroch M., "Nationalism and national movements: comparing the past and the present of Central and Eastern Europe", *Nations and Nationalism*, 2, (1996), 44.

market of ideas, promote equal access of the different ethnic groups to the information as well as control and preventing of propaganda provoking the national hatred.

5. Constitution Building in Post-conflict Societies

Any negotiation on ending an ethnic conflict needs to adopt the following sequence of institutional arrangements: cease fire agreements, transitional agreements, and finally constitution or long-term agreement. All three phases of institutionalising ethnic peace are both interrelated and dependent on each other. In order to ensure the durability of the ethnic settlement all three arrangements have to be consistent with each other. Truce or cease fire alone can not provide long lasting peace process, but neither can peace talks or transitional agreements be launched without a truce. Of course, the making of a constitution requires long lasting constructive preliminary talks. A constitution normally defines procedures for the selection of governing agencies, protection of minorities, guarantees of human rights as well as relations between the ethnic groups.

A good example of such a Constitution is the one designed for Bosnia in the framework of Dayton peace agreement – one of the most comprehensive constitutional arrangements of the international community ever implemented in practice. In order to satisfy the ethnic interests of all conflicting parties concerned, the constitution provides for a rather complex state structure for Bosnia. It establishes four levels of governance in one half of the country (state, entity, canton and municipality) and three in the other (Serbian part has no cantons) creating a great number of administrative officials within

each ethnic subdivision of governance. This institutional structure is totally new for Bosnia, all its main elements were borrowed from foreign models

As far it is quite difficult to keep the former warring parties interacting within the same institutions of governance, the state of Bosnia was designed to be extremely decentralized. The central government has a minimum range of functions which include foreign affairs and trade, monetary policy, interstate communications, transport and fighting with crime. The central authorities have no revenue collection functions and are completely financially dependent on transfers from the constituent parts. However, the constitution also provides a range of important rights that are aimed to solidify the unity of the state. These include the freedom of movement of goods, persons, services, and financial capital across the entire Bosnian state. The responsibility of the central government for telecommunications and broadcasting will inevitably reduce the possibility of raising the ethnic hatred discourses on state level and stimulate conciliation approach. In addition, leaving the conduct of foreign affairs in the hands of the central authorities is a very useful tool to ensure that the new state would remain a reliable and good international citizen. The establishment of a Constitutional Court with six national and three international judges is another important constitutional mechanism for the management of ethnic conflict in Bosnia. The international part of this court may easily interfere in any constitutional discourse by forming a majority in favour of strengthening the central state.

The constitutional design of Bosnian also has important short-comings, however. Its most visible weaknesses are excessive decentralization, complex decision-making procedures frequently leading to the deadlock, and poor financial basis of the central

government, and strong institutional stimuli for the national elite to maintain their ethnic loyalty. It is wise to recall that it was precisely this combination of institutional features that led to the eventual dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, while the new constitutions accommodates the conflict between the Moslem and Croatian ethnic communities, now united in a Moslem-Croat federation designed according to the Dayton's accords, it does not address then integration of the Bosnian Serbs.

An additional factor which may unifying different ethnic groups in a multinational society is the encouragement of a construction of interethnic political organizations and parties as well as the creation of multiethnic political coalitions as a way to counterbalance organizations evolving along the ethnic lines. Unfortunately, there has been little positive development on this dimension in the Former Yugoslavia, with the only exception being the experience of the Republic of Macedonia, where the representatives of both major ethnic groups have found the balance of their interests in cooperation rather than in mutual claims and rivalry. The multiple interethnic arrangements sponsored by the range of international organizations and credible political players such as Vance-Oven federal plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg and Contact Group plans for Bosnia as well as the peace plan for Kosovo had failed to persuade the parties to the conflict to join the political organizations to interethnic level.

Constitutional and legal provision for the proportional allocation of positions in the structures of government among the different ethnic groups is also very important, as consociational theory states. Even though such arrangements may raise the possibility of institutional paralysis, they are essential for the stability of the post-conflict governing structures. Horowitz aptly notes that "Ethnic quotas are not inherent in grand settlements.

It is possible to have grand settlements without quotas and quotas without grand settlements. Nevertheless, quotas are appealing to the makers of settlements, because they are one of the few ways of quantifying and compromising claims that are generally difficult to quantify.”¹⁰⁵

The Dayton Accord provides for such checks and balances in Bosnia, the most divided and ethnically fragmented of the Yugoslav successor states. The constitution establishes a rotating presidency including representatives from each of the three major ethnic groups; and a Parliamentary Assembly where seats are allocated proportionally among the constituent parts of the republic. The Council of Ministers and the Constitutional Court are also constituted on the basis of the principle of ethnic proportionality.

In order to ensure the long lasting post-conflict peace process the rules and guidelines of inter-ethnic agreements have to be periodically revised as well as initially made flexible enough to accommodate possible changes and amendments in case of possible demographic changes or policy shifts. Unfortunately, the Dayton accords do not envision periodic revisions of the ethnic quota. The quotas which were initially satisfactory to all parties to the conflict with time could create a problem.¹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, the Dayton peace accord does assume periodic, normally annual, renewal of the mandates of military as well civil police forces deployed by international agencies such as NATO and the UN in the region in order to maintain stability and assist in impartial support of civilian order.

¹⁰⁵ Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 586.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 586.

6. Realistic Time Frames

The use of realistic time frames is a very important factor facilitating successful conflict management. Although it is quite possible to sign a peace accord within a short span of time, especially when adequate international pressure is being brought upon the conflicting parties, it is quite another matter to ensure that the institutions designed and agreed upon will work as intended and will live up to the expectations of all the parties concerned. To ensure the latter requires time.

The Dayton Accords of 1995 were conceived in haste. Although the peace agreement provided for multiparty elections, within 6 to 9 months of signing the Accord, to the newly created central bodies of governance of the Bosnian state, it was obvious that adequate preparations still had to be made in order to develop the local context ready for open political contestation. Therefore, the OSCE was empowered to find out whether the conditions facilitating genuinely free elections existed before they would be held and even delay such elections if it deemed it important.¹⁰⁷ The primary mission vested in the OSCE was to ensure the necessary freedom of movement, to create a politically neutral environment, as well as build the adequate conditions for the effective holding of elections within the time limit imposed by the Agreement. The time limit in the Agreement was obviously very short and unrealistic. However, the international community was pressed to proceed with the elections generally due to American decision to station its military contingent in Bosnia for no more than one year long period of time.

To hold an election in the immediate aftermath of the conflict was regarded very risky as it could strengthen the support base of the extreme nationalist forces, it could

¹⁰⁷ <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex3.html> (Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 3, Article 1(2) > accessed July 18, 2004.

seriously damage the peace process and even consolidate the ethnic division of Bosnian society. Indeed, as predicted, nationalist parties won in both the federal and regional elections. Instead of bringing the nation together, the Bosnian elections reinforced the already deep division of society along ethnic lines which now became the task of the international administering agencies to deal with. "The decision to proceed with elections in the immediate post-war environment was highly controversial, leading to widespread voter intimidation and ethnic engineering through electoral fraud."¹⁰⁸

The polarization of Bosnian political life was clearly illustrated by the postponement of the first session of the Bosnian Parliament. Although the legislative body was supposed to hold its inaugural session in October 1996, it did not convene until January of the following year due to the unwillingness of the Serbian side to swear allegiance to the new Bosnian state. It means that rapid and unprepared activities of political actors responsible for conflict management may only complicate the existing situation by means of creation of the other problems. At the time of writing, it is still unclear whether the central governing bodies of the new Bosnian state will actually stimulate the process of ethnic reconciliation or just gaining the time in order to let the ethnic groups to accumulate power in order to proceed further with hostile activities. "Seven years after Dayton, the national factor continued to be central, particularly in politics. In the latest balloting, which took place in October 2002, the nationalist candidates were still the voters' favourites. This frustrated representatives from the UN, the OSCE, NATO and other agencies."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Bild C., *Peace Journey: the Struggle for Peace in Bosnia*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998), 262.

¹⁰⁹ Rogel C., *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004), 95.

The adoption of realistic time frames applies not only to the holding of elections but also other arrangements such as the mandate of peacemaking operations. These are normally established for six to 12 month periods, which, are typically not sufficiently long and need to be periodically renewed as the case may require. In the case of the Bosnian conflict, the mandate of NATO peacekeeping stabilization force SFOR has been extended for eight years already. However, the size of the NATO forces has been progressively scaled down “from the original 60.000 in 1995 to approximately 7.000 in 2004 due to the increased role played by the local authorities in providing a secure and safe environment for their citizens.”¹¹⁰ Along with the actual monitoring of the conflicting parties’ compliance with the provisions of peace accords, peace-building agencies should continue to render financial, economic, humanitarian assistance and other forms of aid as well. Frequently financial restraints may considerably hinder the peace efforts and may even lead to the total bankruptcy of the peace-keeping operations.

7. External Intervention

Third party external intervention may be considered as the option of last resort to solve ethnic disputes. In the post-Cold war world international interventions in the interior conflicts of states are likely to provoke significant interior as well exterior tensions within society. Interior resistance to the involvement of particular countries in the ethnic conflict is normally generated due to the fears of possible human losses within interfering contingents, the possibility of inevitable losses from the side of innocent civilians in the area of the conflict due to the escalation of combat actions as well fears of the further escalation of the conflict as a whole. NATO’s intervention in the settlement of

¹¹⁰ <http://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/taskfor/t040526a.htm> > accessed 19.07.2004.

the Kosovo conflict caused a wave of pacifist demonstrations not only in Serbia but also in a number of NATO countries involved in the attacks. External tension was also raised due to fears in international community that intervention may only do more harm than good by upsetting the status quo of the balance of power in the region. Such international reactions may, in turn, weaken the resolve of the intervening troops, which could easily put the entire expedition in doubt.

The intervention of foreign troops, however, may be indispensable as the case of the former Yugoslavia testifies. In fact, all its ethnic conflicts have been finally settled as a result of such intervention by regional (the EU, NATO, OSCE) or wider international (the UN) alliances. This suggests that when liberal conflict management techniques do not work and an ethnic conflict goes dangerously out of control, intervention as an option of last resort could be applied in order to settle and manage the conflict effectively.

Intervention could take two principal forms: coercive or non-coercive ones. Non-coercive intervention is normally performed by the international community when the conflict-torn society is experiencing some difficulties to in managing the conflict by itself. It may be arranged either on the request of the conflicting parties, normally the sovereign state itself or on the initiative of the international community. The latter usually happens when the conflict-torn state violates the human rights of its population, endangers the neighbouring countries with instability, or threatens to spillover the ethnic conflict across its borders.

Non-coercive intervention may involve mediation or good offices services. Such services are normally provided under the aegis of well respected international organization and serve the role of the confidence building measure for the ethnic

communities involved. This action can make further negotiations credible and may produce workable non-coercive solution to the ethnic crisis. The case of Macedonia has proved to be a good example of such non-coercive policy. "Indeed, the overall efforts (to broker the peace agreement in Macedonia) of Javier Solana and Francois Leotard on behalf of the European Union, George Robertson on behalf of NATO, the Romanian chairmanship of the OSCE, and James Paldrew on behalf of the United States eventually proved to be well-intentioned and laudable."¹¹¹

The threat of exclusion is an important strategy that may be used in such efforts at mediation. This policy aims at damaging the political reputation of a party by threatening to drive it into international isolation. Such a strategy was employed by the international community to break the wedge between the Bosnian Serbs and the State of Serbia. The Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic was threatened by the USA as well as the EU to weaken the relations with the Bosnian Serbs in order to force them to accept the conditions of the Dayton Accords. Otherwise Serbia will continue to be excluded from the UN as well as denied of economic cooperation with Western European states.

Such non-coercive intervention is obviously most suitable for the early stages of the ethnic conflict. Once the ethnic conflict has lasted for some time and produced terrible casualties, ethnic hatred may be deep and the human losses may be so great as to render such forms of intervention ineffective. When Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Armed Forces commander Ratko Mladic were isolated politically, militarily and economically by the international community from the rest of the civilized world, it did not prevent them from launching an offensive on the UN protected areas in

¹¹¹ Sokalsky H., *An Ounce of Prevention. Macedonia and the UN Experience of Preventive Diplomacy*, (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 235.

Eastern Bosnia. Such international steps have been reciprocated by mass ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims as well as humiliation of UNPROFOR.

The second type of intervention relies on the use of coercive instruments. Coercive intervention is based on the threat or the real use of punishment to change the behaviour of conflicting parties. The use of coercive intervention may be difficult to reconcile with the principle of state sovereignty on which the current international system is based. However, assuming that states are responsible for their own interior stability in order to prevent international de-stabilization, the international community is justified in applying coercive intervention in what normally would be regarded domestic affairs. In this, the primary goal of any coercive involvement must be the restoration of international peace and stability. For example, NATO's intervention in the ethnic conflict in Kosovo was justifiable because it served the purpose of restoring the status quo between the warring parties as well as provided additional guarantees for peace and stability in the war-torn region.

International coercive intervention is not without risks and dangers. In particular, it has to be born in mind that intervention may change the prevailing inter-ethnic balance of powers leading to quite controversial consequences. By augmenting the power of the weaker party, third party intervention may reduce the chances of winning for the stronger side. By doing so, intervention may weaken the future bargaining position of the stronger party, while strengthening that of the weaker side. In the end, the effects of the intervention may be mutually contradictory and cancel one another out as it was the case in the Bosnian conflict. By the summer of 1995, Serbian forces had controlled 2/3 of Bosnia's territory. With this advantage, the Bosnian Serbs refused to agree with the plan

of the Contact Group to divide Bosnian territory. However, after extensive NATO bombardments of Serbian forces, the balance of power had changed in favour of Bosnian Moslems and Croats. Now it was the latter that were unwilling to accept the Contact Group peace plan.

Coercive diplomacy can play an important role in guaranteeing peaceful inter-ethnic agreements. In this form of diplomacy, the credible commitment of the third party may be supplemented by the permanent presence of its military contingents on the ground. In the absence of such military presence, hostilities may soon break out again. When the UN peacekeeping contingents deployed in Macedonia under the aegis of the UNPREDEP mission were withdrawn, armed Macedonian Albanians rapidly filled the vacuum resulting in the escalation of conflict in the region. In contrast, strong commitment by NATO to continue their military presence in the area can serve as a pacifying factor to potentially hostile ethnic neighbours. "The Parties understand and agree that this Implementation Force will be deployed to Bosnia to help ensure compliance with the provisions of these Accords. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right to deploy on either side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina."¹¹²

The international community must be fully and credibly committed to settling ethnic disputes in order to make third party intervention of either type workable and effective. Peace agreements will work only if the parties involved strongly believe that they will be honestly enforced and that they will not be restricted and compromised by short and unrealistic time limits. Furthermore, the impartiality of the intervening third

¹¹² <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex1A.html> (Dayton Peace Accords. Annex 1) > accessed July 26, 2004.

party can also prove to be very important. Normally, states that share a border with the conflict-torn area are not invited to participate in conflict management activities themselves but they can provide transit bases for the third party intervention. Biased peacekeepers, with strong ethnic interests in conflict torn societies will have no balanced support from all the conflicting parties and may fail to perform their mission honestly. It is quite important, therefore, that the third party involved should be interested not in the defeat or the victory of any of the parties involved but that they should be fair and just peace facilitators.

6. CONCLUSION

So long as it lasted, the communist regime of Yugoslavia successfully silenced historical, cultural and economic tensions and differences among ethnic groups. However, the collapse of communism brought to the surface multiple ethnic disputes. The causes of these conflicts were discussed in detail in the Chapter Four. In sum, it can be concluded that the main causes of the ethnic conflict were structural such as the weakness of state, interior security concerns, geopolitical and demographic factors, and political ones such as the nature of the political regime, the role of elites, problematic group histories, democratization, faulty institutions and finally, economic forces. The Balkan experience suggests that alone no single theoretical paradigm can adequately explain the root cause of an ethnic conflict. In particular, all theoretical inferences discussed in Chapter 2 are mutually contributing rather than exclusive in this sense.

The review of some recent ethnic conflicts in the Eastern European post-communist environment shows the availability of the great diversity of conflict-management strategies as well international community policy instruments to influence

them. Despite the similar causes of the ethnic conflicts under review, the wide range of conflict-management techniques explored in the research suggests that there is no uniform approach to modern ethnic conflict management. A comparative analysis of different strategies testifies that a “one size fits all” conflict regulation mechanism could not be applied even for the same rival ethnic groups when found in different historical setting, political environment or time frame. In this connection the thesis addressed a number of techniques and factors applicable in practice to solve existing ethnic conflicts. They are the following – political partition and ethnic separation, autonomy and federalism, consociational democracy. The reviewed case studies testify that factors such as the democratization of environment, institution building as well as realistic timeframes strongly facilitate implementation of the conflict resolution strategies in practice.

The current political situation development in Eastern Europe suggests that all ethnic conflicts are manageable. However, all conflict situations seriously vary depending on their historical, political, economic, and related particularities. Even the similar ethnic groups require the application of different political strategies in conflict. For this purpose a broad range of conflict management alternatives exist. The current research testifies that there is no single formula of conflict management and each of the conflicts require individually tailored solution.

While the range of historical and contemporary modes of conflict management is rather wide, the evidence from post-communist Yugoslavia suggests that the most viable strategies are partition, federalization, provision of autonomy and power sharing. Depending on particular case, however, some strategies ought to be applied in a mix. For instance, partition after the violence was applicable in Croatia and Bosnia. It took place

after the civil war had ended with tremendous casualties and ethnic cleansing. However, whereas in Croatia the establishment of ethnic peace required the domination of the Croatian ethnic group over the Serbian minority, in Bosnia partition had to be supplemented with ethnic separation, federalization and power sharing. The Balkan experience testifies that ethnic conflicts could also be managed as by means of *preemptive partition*, as it was done in case of Macedonia and Slovenia. In such a case territorial separation between the ethnic groups facilitates solution of the ethnic dispute. Partition best fits situations in which the communities are characterised by strong ethno-nationalism and insist on independence. It is relatively easy to undertake if the ethnic groups occupy separate territories and are not dependent on each others.

At the same time, partition may be highly controversial. Since it leads to an increase in the number of sovereign states, partition may not guarantee the viability of the new small states created. The fragile economic situation, which is quite characteristic of a post conflict environment, as well as the security dilemma involving the ethnic minorities, may easily produce the domino effect resulting in another round of ethnic disputes with further claims for the territorial sovereignty. Since partition could work only in separate cases the main accent in conflict management should be done on such democratic strategies as *autonomy, federalism and power sharing*.

The Yugoslav experience suggests that ethnic grievances could be addressed by means of granting of *cultural autonomy* as it was done in Macedonia. The strongly intermingled ethnic groups serve as the major stimulating factor for application of such a strategy. When ethnic communities are still united by cross-cultural ties, when they territorially mixed, ethnic conflict could be managed by means of *power sharing or*

consociationalism, as it was done in Bosnia. The crucial role in ethnic conflict management process should belong to the multilateral efforts performed by the international community with such institutions in charge as the UN, EU, OSCE and obviously NATO. In time of the global challenges no single political player can master important political decisions and world order alone. The only alternative to the chaos and anarchy in international relations is obviously interdependence and cooperation.

For this purpose the modern international society - invaluable political actor in ethnic conflict management has multiple instrument at its disposal. In order to successfully manage the ethnic conflict a great deal of international attention should be paid to preventive measures. Ethnic conflicts are quite costly for international society to settle. In its turn the international resources are limited, so from the cost-benefit point of view it is obvious that for international community it is quite reasonable to pay greater attention for the relatively low cost early preventive measures in order to avoid the ethnic conflict escalation and its spread in the region. Unfortunately frequently the opposite international policies prevail which let the conflict situations develop in order to attract the international attention. In this connection the international community should pay its close attention to causes and roots of the ethnic conflicts in order to facilitate the process of conflict prevention.

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Kosovo of 1999)
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Law. 1949 Conventions and 1977 Protocols Full Text)
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
<http://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/taskfor/t040526a.htm> (Official Web Site of the Stabilization Force)

http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_/OHRID%20Agreement%.asp (Ohrid Framework Agreement on Peace in Macedonia of 2001)

<http://www.unmikonline.org/> (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo)


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Map 1.
Yugoslavia at the time of creation, 1918-20



Source: "A Short History of Yugoslavia", ed. S. Clissold, Cambridge University Press, 1996

Map 2.
Distribution of national groups by republic and province.
Yugoslavia in 1991



Source: "Yugoslavia's Inferno", ed. P. Mojzes, Continuum Publishing, New York, 1994

Map 3.
Yugoslavia in 1990-91




Source: "Balkan Tragedy", ed. S. Woodward, The Brookings Institution, 1995

Map 4.
Croatia, Showing UN Protected Areas, and Bosnia and Herzegovina




Source: "Balkan Tragedy", ed. S. Woodward, The Brookings Institution, 1995

Map 5.
The Vance-Owen Plan




Source: "Boundary and Territory Briefing" ed. M. Klemencic, vol.1, no.2
(International Boundary Research Unit, Department of Geography, University of
Durham, UK, 1994)

Map 6.
The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan




Source: "Boundary and Territory Briefing" ed. M. Klemencic, vol.1, no.2
(International Boundary Research Unit, Department of Geography, University of
Durham, UK, 1994)

Map 7.
The "Contact Group" Plan



Source: "Balkan Tragedy", ed. S. Woodward, The Brookings Institution, 1995

Map 8.
Dayton Agreement division of Bosnia and Herzegovina



Source: US Department of Defence, Washington, DC

Table 1.
Refugees from Yugoslavia by Country of Destination
Selected Countries, 1992-94

<i>Country</i>	<i>As reported 7/29/92</i>	<i>As reported 8/13/92</i>	<i>As reported 11/12/92</i>	<i>As reported 12/4/92</i>	<i>As reported 7/16/93</i>	<i>As reported 4/94</i>
Austria	50,000	50,000	57,500	73,000	89,739	55,000
Belgium	870	870	1,800	3,371	5,420	4,865
Czech Republic	1,500	4,000	4,000	10,000	3,300	2,730
Denmark	1,637	1,637	6,412	7,323	7,078	20,128
France	1,108	1,108	1,108	4,200	5,524	15,918
Germany	2000,000	200,000	235,000	250,000	340,000	309,449
Hungary	50,000	50,000	50,000	40,000	128,700	8,886
Italy	7,000	7,000	17,000	16,500	23,483	33,902
Luxembourg	1,000	1,000	1,200	1,618	1,280	2,535
Netherlands	6,300	6,300	6,300	7,000	2,648	42,253
Norway	2,331	2,331	3,674	3,720	2,173	18,563
Poland	1,500	1,500	1,500	3,000	3,170	675
Portugal	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	144	159	150
Russia	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	8
Sweden	44,167	55,000	74,141	62,202	92,047	76,189
Switzerland	17,573	17,573	70,450	80,000	72,380	32,102
Turkey	15,000	15,000	15,000	18,060	20,270	33,817
United Kingdom	1,100	1,300	4,000	4,424	8,640	8,027
Total	432,069	445,731	581,425	594,645	819,815	692,611

Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates.
n.a. not available

Source: "Balkan Tragedy", ed. S. Woodward, The Brookings Institution, 1995