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European Integration and Ethnic Minority Mobilization in East Central Europe

Émilie Blais

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

Political Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts (Public Policy and Public Administration) at  
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## **Abstract**

The thesis seek to understand the implications of the perspective of European integration on the mobilization of ethnic minorities and to answer the following question: to what extent and in which ways European integration shapes the mobilization of ethnic minorities in the newly democratic states of post-communist East Central Europe? To this end, a theoretical overview of the theories of European integration is provided and an analytical framework is built on various rational choice and social movement literature. Two independent variables (Homogeneity and convergence with European Union's policies and expectations) are identified to influence the type of mobilization that will prevail. Three hypothesis are being investigated: a homogeneous country that is EU convergent will have high political mobilization and low non-political mobilization; a country who is heterogeneous and not EU convergent will have a high level of non-political mobilization and low political mobilization; finally, a country that is heterogeneous and is EU convergent will have an even level of both types of mobilization. The analysis is based on three case studies that each represent a hypothesis: Hungary (Homogeneous and EU convergent), Romania (Heterogeneous and not EU convergent) and Latvia (Heterogeneous and EU convergent). The analysis reveals that the political opportunity structure is influenced by the presence of the EU which is considered as a soft veto player and confirms the hypotheses.

## **Dedication / Acknowledgement**

À ma mère, qui m'a toujours soutenu dans l'atteinte de mes objectifs et dans les moments difficiles, et aussi à ma famille qui occupe une place importante dans mon coeur.

I want to thank warmly my supervisor, Dr. Csaba Nikolenyi, for his open mindedness and his support throughout the writing of this thesis and also during my studies. He always made constructive remarks on my work and encouraged me constantly, not only for this thesis, but also for pursuing my academic objectives. Because of him, I discovered a passion I have for party politics, especially in East Central Europe. Maybe the student will follow in the footsteps of its mentor!

I also want to thank Dr. Norrin Ripsman who offered me the opportunity to be his research assistant and who was also extremely supportive, and Dr. André Lecours for his kind assistance and support.

This thesis would not have been possible without the support, the trust, and the dynamic academic environment provided by the Department of Political Science of Concordia University to me. For this reason, I want to thank all the people that have played a part in my academic success.

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## INTRODUCTION

The 20<sup>th</sup> Century marks an important turn in history because of the increasing globalized context that has proved to be difficult to understand and control. Its consequences are not only felt at the economic level: it is influencing ideas, strategies, and decisions of many states and people at the political level.

Globalization has had many consequences, and one of them is the increasing migration of population. The situation is not new; however, it is the magnitude of people involved that has tremendously changed the equation. Consequently, many states now have to deal with a different population composition than it used to be at their origins. Their population is more heterogeneous and usually reflects a plural reality. Those who are not members of the majority are considered minorities, often linked to ethnic origins. This is particularly difficult in the East-Central European context because many countries only recently acquired their independence, adopted a new democratic regime and worked to consolidate it. Three set of interests are emerging in this context: (1) those of the ethnic minorities who are becoming citizens of their host country with everything that it involves, like collective and individual rights; (2) the interests of the host state; and (3) the interests of the home state. The home state represents the national country of origin, for example, Hungary for Hungarians, Russia for the Russians and so forth. The host country is the country where ethnic minority leaves such as Romania for the Hungarians, Latvia for the Russians, etc. As a result, political ideas revolving around concepts such as the state, regional integration, citizenship, nationalism, identity, collective and individual rights have constantly being questioned and redefined. As such, the academic literature

on these matters is large and no particular stream has dominated.

New dynamics have also emerged and need to be considered here, like (1) the new international dynamics in which the issue of minority protection and identity formation is now taking place; (2) the new institutions with which some of the countries have to deal with; and finally (3) the new actors influencing the issues at the different political levels.

With the development of technology, which includes transport and communication, the world has become a field where interactions at different levels (economic, cultural, political, etc.) have drastically increased. The states now have to deal with situations where their sovereignty is at risk. A movement toward the lifting of barriers between countries for different purposes like free trade is occurring and poses dilemma for them because they have to give up certain aspect of their sovereignty to be able to survive in the global system. They have to decide on which issue they should open, and in what cases they will decide to keep their borders closed. Basically, openness and protection now have to conciliate. In this context, there is a “convergence toward a common set of cultural traits and practices” at the global level, which is dominated by the Western values, namely liberalism, democracy, and free trade (Holton, 2000:142). Information is also more and more available to citizens, not only through their governments but also through international/regional non-governmental organizations. This has considerable effects on the level of demands coming from their citizenry, rendering the functioning and efficiency of states rather slow and low. This is in such an

environment that the states have to produce bills regarding their cultural issues, the treatments of their minorities, which is varying everyday with the increase in mobility of different people. This level of mobility also pressures the states to find solutions and it becomes harder for new states to consolidate with their population changes.

The individuals are also subjected to the cultural effects of globalization. Three effects are possible: the hybridization of cultures, the increased heterogeneity of society, or its inverse effect, its homogenization. Hybridization is more the result of population movements (or “movement between cultures”) due to “migration, cross-border employment, and colonization, which are probably necessary though not sufficient condition for interculturalism” (Holton, 2000:149). Heterogeneity is characterized by the maintenance of differences between groups, polarizing the relationships between ethnic groups, which subsequently creates ethnic conflicts around the globe (Holton, 2000:145). Homogenization is characterized on the other hand, by the adoption of mainly Western values like consumerism, etc. by other people. These three effects are occurring in the same time, at varying degree. But one thing that has for sure been created by these phenomenon are the birth of many new groups that defend a variety of issues, and that sometimes have radical opinions and visions on things.

The international scene has become more complex. International and regional organizations have acquired an important place and influence, each also developing their own set of organizational interests, sometimes conflicting with the states interests. The role these institutions play in the consolidation of the emerging countries and the

influence it may have on the policies adopted is great. The European Union has played an important role in the transition to democracy of many countries in East Central Europe. Not only did it give funding to the countries, but they also gave incentives to pursue certain types of policies by encouraging the new countries to apply for membership. The PHARE program exemplifies well this reality. If countries did not adhere to the vision and values of the overall group, it could have repercussions on future membership. With the integration of East Central European countries (the Baltic States, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, and Poland) it gave the opportunity to many groups to make demands at another level. Also, the entrance in the EU of these countries had an effect of restriction on the possible policy adoption in different areas, and such is the case in regard to minority issues.

The minorities should not be considered as unorganized. In fact, many political parties now exist to defend the interests of different groups. This would of course not been as easy if the countries would have adopted other institutions than a proportional system for representation. But what is important to understand here is that the minorities have become in competition with other groups when the regime changed to a democracy. Not only are they in competition with the majority, but they are also in competition with other minority groups and their interests – these include other ethnic minorities, women, youth, etc. The ethnic minorities of each country are also faced with internal dilemmas, because not all their members share the same interests. Often, distinct interests exist between the rural population and the urban population, and those who have assimilated and those who want to remain different.

The general objective of this thesis is to understand those new dynamics in the context of European enlargement and integration. To achieve this, we will look at different questions: Why ethnic minority groups have become an issue, more particularly in Europe? How has European integration influenced states' behaviour? How minority groups have used this context to put forward their demands and interests? Is there a way to accommodate minorities in the European Union? Considering the density of the subject matter, it will be impossible to put a definitive light on the issue in this thesis. However, by focusing on specific case studies, we believe to be able to understand better the relationship existing within the quadratic nexus of ethnic minorities, the European Union, the nationalizing state, and the home nation that are composing **our central investigation: To what extent and in which ways European integration shapes the mobilization of ethnic minorities in the newly democratic states of post-communist East-Central Europe?** In order to answer this question, we will first look at the literature on European integration and ethnic mobilization, and then we will move on a descriptive analysis of our three case studies (Hungary, Latvia, and Romania), to finally analyze the differences between the case studies.

The first chapter of this thesis is important for the understanding of the issue we will look at. We will proceed by contextualizing the importance of ethnic minorities issue in Europe since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Subsequently, we will review the literature on the theories of European integration in order to set the context in which the fifth round of enlargement is taking place, and to understand the interests of the EU member states prior to consideration of the candidate countries. It will also help us to

identify how the European Union has understood the ethnic minority issue. Next, we will go on the elaboration of a framework for analysis, based on a large range of literature on rational choice, social movement, and nationalism. We will end this chapter by methodological concerns for the empirical chapters.

The second chapter will mostly consist of a descriptive account of our three case studies. For each of the candidate countries considered we will proceed in the same manner. First, an account of the legislation affecting the minority will be provided. Secondly, we will look at the important political parties and their platforms relating to ethnic minorities. Thirdly, we will review the yearly evaluations made by the Freedom House and the European Commission on the evolution of the situation of minorities. Finally, we will provide statistical data on the situation of each ethnic minority. The aim of this chapter is to provide empirical information to support our analysis in our last chapter. It will provide us with contextual particularities of each of the countries that are important to understand the domestic variables and the relationship developed with the European Union and whether the country has adopted truly convergent policies or not.

The third chapter will go further in the analysis of differences between the case studies. The aim is to prove that the perspective of integration with the EU has an impact on the type of mobilization of the ethnic minorities.

We will finally end the thesis by an update on the situation of minorities since 2004.

## **CHAPTER ONE: ETHNIC MINORITIES AS A PROBLEMATIC ISSUE**

### **1.1 Introduction**

The objectives of this chapter are to provide a historical and political background on the issue of ethnic minorities in Europe. Moreover, this chapter will review the different approaches to understanding European integration and enlargement. It will also discuss the literature on ethnic mobilization in order to come up with a framework for later analysis. We will end this chapter by methodological concerns.

### **1.2 Brief historical background**

The 20<sup>th</sup> Century has witnessed the increased popularity of the use of the terms “Human Rights”. Taking roots during the Enlightenment period in Europe, the individual and its relation to the state and God particularly rested on the fact that some authors such as John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that some sort of ‘natural law’ existed and shaped the relationship between individuals. Such ideas gave birth to the notion of ‘rights’ and responsibilities in society as we know them today. But the meaning of human rights only gradually started with these liberal ideas. One of the issues that can explain the meaning to human rights as we know it today is the historical developments that have taken place in Europe during the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

The history of the European continent can be linked to ethnic minority population concerns. The outbreak of the First World War can be related not only to the different pacts made between the European powers of that time, but also to the treatment of

minorities within the empires, more precisely within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb (Bosnia) nationalist demonstrates this. The Serbs (Bosnia) were disadvantaged and exploited by an agreement regarding free trade between the members of the empire, and they did not enjoy any particular privileges in the empire (Roskin, 2002: 16). Furthermore, Serbia had just become independent from the Ottoman Empire and assumed that the annexed territory in the Austro-Hungarian Empire should have been taken by them (Roskin, 2002: 16). In response to the assassination, Austria attacked back Serbia, highly supported by the Germans, which eventually resulted into the outburst of World War One.


As a consequence of the First World War, the empires dissolved and new countries were created, or at least, restructured and redefined. The Peace conferences of 1918-1920 pursued that aim and produced the new map for Europe. One major problem arising with the new boundaries divisions was that some 31% of the European people became a minority population (Roskin, 2002: 27). The conferences created new countries, some of which had never been independent before. The objective was to create a more homogeneous region to prevent future conflicts and to neutralize the states that were allied with the losers of the War. As a result, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were the essential components of the "Cordon Sanitaire" created by the West European winner states. Hungary and Bulgaria were reduced in territory.



**Figure 1.1 Maps of Historical Territory Changes in the Region**



**The Peace settlement 1919-1923**



**Territorial changes resulting from the Second World War**

*Source of the Maps:* Antony Polonsky, "The Little Dictators – The History of Eastern Europe since 1918", Boston: Routledge, 1975, pages 21 and 136.

Table 1.1 Minority Populations Changes in East European States

Country	Prior to World War I	Before World War II	Communist Period	In the 1990s	NOW
<b>Estonia</b>	1897 89.4% Estonians 4.6% Russians 3.4% Germans 0.9% Latvians 1.7% Others	1934 92% Estonians 4.4 % Russians 1.5% German 4.1% Others	1959 74.6% Estonians 20.1% Russians 1.4% Finns 1.3% Ukrainians 2.5% Others	1998 65.2% Estonians 28% Russians 2.5% Ukrainians 1.4% Belarussians 2.9% Others	2000 Census 67.9% Estonians 25.6% Russians 2.1% Ukrainians 1.3% Belarussians 3.1% Others
<b>Latvia</b>	1897 68.3% Latvians 8% Russians 7.1% Germans 6.4% Jews 4.1% Belarussians 3.4% Poles 1.3% Lithuanians 1.4% Others	1935 75.4% Latvians 10.6% Russians 4.8% Jews 3.2% Poles 3% Germans 3% Others	1959 62% Latvians 26.6% Russians 2.9% Belarussians 2.9% Poles 1.7% Jews 1.5% Lithuanians 2.4% Others	1998 55.5% Latvians 32.4% Russians 3.9% Belarussians 2.9% Ukrainians 2.2% Poles 1.3% Lithuanians 1.8% Others	2002 Census 57.7% Latvians 29.6% Russians 4.1% Belarussians 2.7% Ukrainians 2.5% Poles 1.4% Lithuanians 2% Others
<b>Lithuania</b>	1897 59.3% Lithuanians 17.5% Poles 13.2% Jews 4.3% Germans 3.5% Russians 1.1% Latvians 1.1% Others	(Between the Wars with present day boundaries) 69.2% Lithuanians 15.2% Poles 8.2% Jews 3.4% Germans 2.6% Russians 1.4% Others	1959 79.3% Lithuanians 8.5% Russians 8.5% Poles 1.1% Belarussians 2.6% Others	1997 81.6% Lithuania 8.2% Russians 6.9% Poles 1.5% Belarussians 1% Ukrainians 0.8% Others	2001 Census 83.4%Lithuanians 6.7% Poles 6.3% Russians 3.6% Others
<b>Poland</b>	1897 76.6% Poles 13.8% Jews 4.4% Germans 3.4% Ukrainians 1.1% Russians 0.7% Others	With boundaries of 1931 65.4% Poles 15.7% Ukrainians 9.5% Jews 6.1% Belarussians 2.3% Germans 1% Others	1960 98.4% Poles 0.6% Ukrainians 0.6% Belarussians 0.2% Jews 0.1% Slovaks 0.1% Russians	1999 98.2% Poles 0.9% Germans 0.4% Ukrainians 0.2% Belarussians 0.1% Gypsies 0.1% Slovaks 0.1% Others	2002 Census 96.7 % Poles 0.4% Germans 0.1% Belarussian 0.1% Ukrainian 2.7% Others
<b>Czech Republic</b>	1900 (with today's boundaries) 63.1% Czechs 33.9% Germans 1.5% Jews 1.4% Poles 0.1% Others	1930 68.4% Czechs 29.5% Germans 0.9% Poles 1.2% Others	1950 93.8% Czechs 2.9% Slovaks 1.8% Germans 0.8% Poles 0.2% Ukrainians 0.5% Others	1991 81.2% Czechs 13.2% Moravians 3.1% Slovaks 0.6% Poles 0.5% Germans 1.4% Others	2001 Census 90.4% Czechs 3.7% Moravians 1.9% Slovaks 4% Others

Country	Prior to World War I	Before World War II	Communist Period	In the 1990s	NOW
<b>Slovakia</b>	1900 60.5% Slovaks 22.3% Hungarians 6.5% Jews 6% Germans 3.5% Ukrainians 1.2% Others	1930 67.7% Slovaks 17.2% Hungarians 4.5% Germans 4.1% Jews 3.3% Ukrainians 3.2% Others	1950 86.7% Slovaks 10.3% Hungarians 1.4% Ukrainians 1.2% Czechs 0.4% Others	1991 85.7% Slovaks 10.8% Hungarians 1.4% Gypsies 1% Czechs 0.5% Ukrainians 0.6% Others	2001 Census 85.8% Slovaks 9.7% Hungarians 1.7% Roma 1% Ruthenian/Ukrainian 1.8% Others
<b>Hungary</b>	1900 (Kingdom of Hungary) 51.5% Hungarians 16.7% Romanians 11.9% Slovaks 11.9% Germans 2.6% Serbs 2.5% Ukrainians 1.1% Croats 1.8% Others	1930 92.1% Hungarians 5.5% Germans 1.2% Slovaks 0.5% Croats 0.2% Romanians 0.5% Others	1970 98.5% Hungarians 0.3% Germans 0.2% Croats 0.2% Slovaks 0.2% Romanians 0.7% Others	1990 98% Hungarians 0.5% Jews 0.4% Germans 0.2% Croats 0.1% Slovaks 0.1% Romanians 0.7% Others	2001 Census 92.3% Hungarian 1.9% Roma 5.8% Others
<b>Romania</b>	1899 (Kingdom of Romania) 92.2% Romanians 4.5% Jews 1.7% Hungarians 0.4% Turks 0.3% Greeks 0.9% Others	1930 71.9% Romanians 7.9% Hungarians 4.1% Germans 4% Jews 3.3% Ukrainians and Ruthenians 2.3% Russians 2% Bulgarians 1.5% Gypsies 0.8% Turks 0.6% Gagauzes 1.6% Others	1956 85.7% Romanians 9.1% Hungarians 2.2% Germans 0.8% Jews 0.6% Gypsies 0.4% Ukrainians 0.3% Serbs 0.2% Russians 0.1% Slovaks 0.1% Bulgarians 0.5% Others	1992 89.5% Romanians 7.1% Hungarians 1.8% Gypsies 0.5% Germans 0.3% Ukrainians 0.2% Russians 0.1% Serbs 0.1% Slovaks 0.1% Bulgarians 0.3% Others	2002 Census 89.5% Romanian 6.6% Hungarian 2.5% Roma 0.3% Ukrainian 0.3% German 0.2% Russians 0.2% Turkish 0.4% Others

*Sources:* Piotr Eberhardt, *Ethnic Groups and Population Changes in Twentieth-Century Central-Eastern Europe: history, data, analysis*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001; and the CIA World Fact book for the column “now”, URL Address: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

The treaties signed during the Peace conferences were combined with minority protection clauses, and that protection was directly placed “under the guarantee of the League of Nations” (Rosting, 1923: 641). The aim of these treaties was to help the signatory states to provide rights to all citizens independent of their “birthplace, nationality, language, race or religion” (Rosting, 1923: 641). These treaties were

important considering the new territorial limits of the countries because it obliged all of the countries to give the national citizenship to the people newly integrated within their borders (Rosting, 1923: 648). Furthermore, special provisions were made for particular ethnic minority groups. Despite the signature of these treaties by the participant countries and the good will of the League of Nations, the implementation of these minority protection clauses turned out to be very difficult. The procedure required to submit a complaint regarding a specific abusive situation was lengthy, and the institutions created to resolve the specific issues were malfunctioning (Rosting, 1923: 653-655; Stone, 1932). For example, of all the cases submitted, only 2 cases were identified to be worth being brought before the Council of the league during its existence: the German minorities in Poland, and the Jewish minority in Hungary (Rosting, 1923).

Also, nationalism could not be countered by the treaties. Rather, the result from the agreements was a mere resurgence of division: tensions between the “home states” and the “kin states” increased. The period between the two wars was also not sufficient in the consolidation of democratic regimes in the East Central European countries, which could have been another way to counter nationalism in the region by providing a better treatment for everyone. The hardship of these years and a resurgence of the political right resulted in the occurrence of the Second World War.

After the War, the Yalta conference (1945) divided Europe again, but this time according to spheres of influence as opposed to strategically dividing the continent to protect Western Europe like it was done after the First World War. Consequently, the

East Central European countries ended up under the control of the Soviet Union. The latter imposed its communist regime in its controlled area, thus resulting in the beginning of the communist period in East Europe. In essence, communism can be considered as a “solution” to the nationalist problem in Europe, because it theoretically aims at preventing the alienation of humans at different levels, and nationalism is considered one of them. Marx and Engels (1998: 72-73) envisioned the proletariat as a class that does not belong to any Nation, it is a global social class. However, the adoption of a communist regime in the Soviet Union did not quite result in the suppression of nationalism envisioned by Marx. Indeed, Brubaker (1996: 27) suggests that the institutionalisation of territorial identity by the Soviet Union for its ‘republics’ residents only prevented the spontaneous emergence of nationalism, which occurred later, at the eve of the dismantlement of the Soviet Union.

Another important outcome of the Second World War was the creation of the United Nations. Only a few years later, the organization’s members have adopted a *Universal Declaration on Human Rights*. This document became to be a major argument shaping the relationship between many countries whether they were adherents or not. The actions taken toward minority groups and individuals in general became to be dealt with according to the articles in the declaration. This document has also become a tool for minority groups to defend their claims and rights not only as individuals, but also as communities. The declaration also shaped the direction taken by the West European countries in regard to minority groups, especially in verge of the fifth enlargement of the European Union. This will be more extensively discussed in the following section.

### **1.3 Theoretical Consideration: European Integration**

#### ***1.3.1 The Origins***

One of the main concern emerging in Western Europe with the end of the Second World War was nationalism, and especially how to control German nationalism. During this period, the literature on international relations developed extensively. The theories aimed at explaining the changes in the international sphere and proposed solution to prevent future wars. The functionalist school emerged during that period, with Mitrany (1948: 359) as its proponent, arguing that only functional arrangements around common social issues concerning the states could prevent a new rise of nationalism. These arrangements were seen as the only possible positive response to nationalism after the Second World War, due to the importance states gave to their sovereignty and their perceived need to co-operate on different issues to prevent conflicts (Mitrany, 1948: 351). According to this view, the failure of the League of Nations could be explained and the establishment of the United Nations did not seem an appropriate response to the international trend (Mitrany, 1948: 351). Mitrany (1948: 351) believed that these institutions did not tie states together enough because their objectives are too general. The functionalist approach proposes the creation of agencies supervising each their spheres of actions on issues that are not necessarily a concern to states sovereignty (at first) in order to increase interdependence between states. It was aimed at resulting into lesser capability for independent actions. In a broader sense, peaceful conflict management was encouraged by this proposition.

During the same period, the idea of a West European federation also emerged, in

the hope to find a solution to further co-operation in the area, and to also find a solution to nationalism. The unification of West Europe seemed to be the answer for some. Spinelli (1947) favoured the emergence of a federal structure, to prevent the rise of other empires, particularly the Americans and to influence states that have not adopted democratic principles and values after the Second World War. However, the idea did not gain much ground among the political élites. In the main time, others like Monnet (1978: 289) also judged that it was time to act to reconstruct European welfare because the population was still terrified.

The important element to remember from this is that both schools encouraged an increase of connections between the states. The political élites had a choice to make. Monnet (1978: 293) was a pre-eminent figure at the period and believed that the sole solution was to make states interdependent through shared resources. Such a strategy would insure that sovereignty was kept safe for each party and that they would all benefit from the outcome. Accordingly, the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) emerged, in which Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands took part. The ECSC represented the perfect test because the Ruhr region had been a conflict area nearly forever between France and Germany. Each country wanted to control the resources available on this territory due to their possible strategic use: they were important in the production of weapons (Monnet, 1978: 293). Looking back, the creation of this community was only the first step toward further integration and unification of West European countries. Yet, the will to prevent future war cannot be the only explanation for the developments that took place over the following years and

decades, something more profound needs to account for it.

### *1.3.2 The Deepening of Institutions*

The countries participating in the ECSC continued to integrate more spheres of their economies, which resulted in the creation of two other communities: in 1957 they signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) (Europa, The History of the European Union). The later development is more important to us because the member states set about removing trade barriers between them and forming a "common market". A decade later, the member states decided to merge these institutions together to create a single commission, a single Council of Ministers, as well as a European Parliament. They realized that other sectors were influencing the well-being of the community and that, not only did they need to integrate economically, but also politically.

The neo-functionalist school explains these developments by the concept of spillover. Their first concern was to understand why states were willing to give up certain parts of their sovereignty to joint international institutions, while acquiring techniques to resolve conflicts between themselves. The spillover concept gives us the opportunity to understand how the process itself can get out of the control from the governments. The first step toward integration depends essentially on the willingness of the states, but that further integration of political, economical, and cultural spheres have become out of the control of the states because the process has acquired a life on its own. The result is that states have integrated in various spheres more than they actually anticipated. The neo-functionalist identifies three types of spillover: functional, political and cultivated (Haas,



1958).

A functional spillover refers to the identification of a specific sector in which states are involved, particularly in regard to the economy. How that sector is interconnected to other sectors is essential because it is what will determine further integration. Basically, it spreads to other realms. The interconnectedness of these sectors would reveal a need for further integration. The second type of spillover involves the political forces pressuring the states in favour of more integration within the states: in order to be efficient, integrated sectors need to be incorporated at the supranational level and have their own institutions. Furthermore, Haas (1958) argues that the driving force for integration was due to the calculation of self interests coming from the political elites, which will later be confirmed by De Gaulle's behaviour. Governments remain powerful actors because they retain certain powers and also because the nation-states have the means for absolute compliance (Haas, 1958: 58). Finally, the third type of spillover involves the emergence of initiatives coming from institutions created during the integration process, like the European Commission, which would work toward furthering the process. This gradual process can be seen as a convergence toward the creation of a political community. In essence, the central governing institutions created by the states develop their own interests and values. The achievement of this is when we can consider that political integration has occurred. Consequently, the political actors go through a shift in "their loyalties, expectations, and political activities" toward this new supranational centre (Haas, 1958: 16). Furthermore, Haas underlines the need to distinct between political and economical success.

Other changes taking place after the Second World War at the communication and technological levels particularly influenced the process. These developments increased the pluralistic dimension of each society. An increase in the level of information available to the political elite involved in the process of integration, as well as to those not directly involved in the process like non-governmental organizations and the private sector, impacted by increasing the exchanges of these groups among the different countries. Transnationalism and transgovernmentalism had in this sense their role to play in the harmonization of policies in the community. For Haas (1958: 452), it was only logical that West European states moved toward integration because of the momentum; "it confirmed the post-capitalist social structure." The pluralist aspect of the changes taking place is important for Haas (1964: 456) in the continuation of the integration process because the later is argued to be dependent on it. The scope and automatics of the spillover would not be the same otherwise. If pluralism was non-existent in the states prior to the design, establishment and functioning of the central institutions; the actual move toward integration would have never occurred (Haas, 1964: 451). Pluralism has to exist within each nation-state, and it is seen as requisite. Elements favourable to integration include cultural similarities between the future members of the union, networks of intra-regional communication in each state, common technical services, common forms of government, and the involvement of powerful local interest groups which are federating at the regional level to advance further integration (Haas, 1964: 451). These elements are considered necessary, but they are not sufficient to start integration.

What is important to remember here is the focus on the incremental nature of the integration process. Taking this into consideration, it means that integration can only become deeper, which is at the center for explaining the creation of other institutions and the will to create a community to make sure policies are converging.

### ***1.3.3 The Enlargement of the Community and the creation of the European Union***

The different benefits that could result in a specific period of time from the integration of the nations composing the original European Economic Community were well known by many of their neighbours, and it resulted in their demand to join the community. Such was the case of the United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, and Denmark. The accession process for future member states was not easy because some member states did not have the same vision of the future for the community. The delegation of powers to the central authority had become an important concern: some states like France under Charles de Gaulle wanted deliberately to keep the European Community as an intergovernmental organization (Dinan, 1999: 38). Furthermore, he wanted it to be limited to technical aspects only (Dinan, 1999: 42). France's membership in the community was never questioned because it served de Gaulle's objectives for economic modernization and for an institutional framework to strengthen their links with Germany (Dinan, 1999: 40). Moreover, the European Community created an opportunity to modernize the French agricultural sector (Dinan, 1999: 41).

De Gaulle, President of France, saw the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), an organization which would offer preferential trade treatment to its members, as a threat for the EC, but also for his agricultural objectives. The EFTA

initiative was lead by Britain, which considerably strained the relationship between the two countries. Meanwhile, the relationship between France and Germany strengthened during that period and they symbolically signed accords together. It is in the early 1960's that the EC started to be recognized by some of its external partners (Dinan, 1999: 45). This was particularly reflected through its multilateral trade negotiations and Third World development initiatives. But the best achievement of the EC during that period was probably the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which nearly contributed to the collapse of the EC. The policy was a proposal from France, but during the negotiations, the increasing initiatives taken by the Commission, which proposed an increase in its powers and that of the European Parliament, greatly opposed De Gaulle's ideas, who wanted to keep its country's sovereignty and make sure that its national interests were going to be respected (Dinan, 1999: 47). The conflict between the two instances resulted in the "empty chair crisis." All actions were put on hold due to the veto power France possessed. The only thing that put De Gaulle back around the table was the result of the domestic vote for the election (Dinan, 1999: 48).

In the meantime, Britain was considering becoming a full member of the EC, especially because EFTA failed. Britain's negotiations to enter the EC did not have a positive result due to its deteriorating relationship with France caused by the signature of the Nassau agreement by Britain with the United States. De Gaulle considered this as a reflection of Britain's adverse intentions. The second application of Britain for EC membership was also negated because France wanted to conserve its leadership among the EC members (Dinan, 1999: 60).

This behaviour can directly be seen as a shortcoming of the neo-functional idea of spillover because it obviously shows that states remain the sole power in the process, like the intergovernmentalist school posits. In that regard, the integration process was not linear because drawbacks were possible, like the 'empty chair crisis' shows (Caporaso, 1972). Not only national governments are the ones taking decisions in order to voluntarily get in or not, or let a country getting in, but they also need to consider their domestic issues, and the possible electoral consequences of their actions. The governments remain powerful in the integration process for many reasons, but the principals are that they are the one possessing the legal sovereignty over the issues they want to get involved in and also because they obtained their legitimacy through democratic elections. Basically, all actions taken depend on the willingness of the states: "the interstate bargains remain the necessary conditions for European Integration and must be recognized as such." (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991: 17). This experience also demonstrates that the European institutions do not have equal capacities and power : the European Parliament and the European Commission are much weaker than the Council.

The liberal intergovernmentalist approach emerged from similar critiques to the neo-functionalist approach. In order to explain integration, three distinctive elements, each interacting with each other, are important to understand. The school assumes that the states are rational actors, that national preferences are established at the national level according to domestic interests, and that interstate relations should be seen as negotiations on particular issues, which are the reflections of a will to co-ordinate, or co-operate (Moravcsik, 1993:480). Consequently, the bargaining power of each state will

differ, which will subsequently influence the outcome. The EC shapes a two-level game because it represents an arena where the states can interact, take initiative, and influence other governments through bargaining by also increasing each of the national governments' "legitimacy and domestic agenda-setting power for their initiatives" (Moravcsik, 1993:517).

The implications underlined by the intergovernmentalist school are realistic if we look at the process through which the applicant states go through to obtain membership. Not only do they have to enter in negotiations on the terms of integration, but also the future member states are asked to conduct a referendum among their population to approve the process.

The first process toward enlargement did not contain much political aspect in the sense that issues discussed were mainly economical. Charles de Gaulle's empty chair caused many problems during the first round of enlargement. The process did not result in a convincing agreement and until he resigned from his position no advancements could be done. Only then could the talks toward enlargement be re-engaged. Thus, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973; and Norway which also applied at the same time did not because its population did not approve their integration in the European Economic Community (EEC).

The second and third round for enlargement took place between 1973 and 1986. During that period much advancement took place to integrate further: the European

Council, which was formed of the head of each member's states, instituted regular meetings; also, the European Monetary System came into force in 1979. The first elections at the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage were also held during that period. The fall of dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal brought new prospects for further enlargement, which would involve these countries. Greece became a new member in 1981. The year 1985 marked a new departure for integration when the states agreed to review the Treaty of Rome, and to negotiate the Single European Act, which aimed at creating a single market by 1993. Spain and Portugal also became members of the EEC in 1986.

The EEC members went further by putting efforts on the elaboration of a single political, economic, and monetary union, through intergovernmental conferences. In the mean time, the Schengen Agreement signed by the members was also put into effect and aimed at abolishing the checks at the borders between the member countries, and mobility drastically increased as a result. The major move toward integration in political, economical, and monetary spheres took place with the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union. It lays the basis for a common foreign and security policy, closer co-operation on justice and home affairs and the creation of an economic and monetary union, including a single currency, which constitutes the three pillars of the Union (EUROPA, Glossary: Pillars of the European Union).

Negotiations for membership with Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway began in 1993 and were quite easy due to the high economic development of those countries and

also by the fact that they were stable democracies. The ratification of the Treaties was accomplished in 1994 and the fourth wave of enlargement took place in 1995. Norway stayed out again from the union because its people voted against the entrance in the EU through referendum. In early 1996, talks to reform the Treaty of Maastricht started to take place. The member states wanted to elaborate on a treaty that would meet the new dimensions involved in the political union like the citizenry, the EU's role on the international scene, and the perspective of future enlargement toward East Central Europe. The Amsterdam Treaty was born out of these talks.

The Amsterdam treaty gave a whole new range of power to the European Union. The treaty also reiterates the fundamental values carried by the member states such as liberty, democracy, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the rule of law (EUROPA, Amsterdam Treaty). A Social Charter was annexed to the treaty, in which moral obligations from the part of governments were to be respected in regard to social rights (EUROPA, Social Charter). The charter basically involves rights in relation to labour market, vocational training, equal opportunities and the working environment. The Amsterdam treaty also put usual states' sovereign concerns under a communal view such as the free movement of persons; controls on external borders; asylum, immigration and safeguarding of the rights of third-country nationals; and judicial co-operation in civil matters (EUROPA, Amsterdam Treaty).

Reasonable concerns regarding future integration and enlargement came up after the fourth wave of enlargement because of the changes that took place in East Central



Europe. The events taking place introduced the possibility of a near future round of enlargement as the new democracies made the entrance in the EU a foreign policy priority. Furthermore, Russia was seen by all as a common threat. Consequently, the EU-15 managed to discuss terms under which the next round of enlargement should take place. This was done through the adoption of Agenda 2000 and the Treaty of Nice.

#### ***1.3.4 Fifth Enlargement: East Central Europe***

##### ***a) Context***

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the changes of domestic regimes taking place in East Central Europe, the European Union had to react to these newly independent countries because they now had the possibility to apply for membership and also because they represent new accessible markets. The EU encouraged the countries to adopt democratic institutions and to better their economic wealth through the creation of programs developed and modified to help them in Agenda 2000. The Agenda was strategically important for the EU due to the high number of future applicants: no previous round of enlargement involved as many potential new members, as many peoples and such a high disparity in economical and social development in comparison to the member states.

Agenda 2000 was meant to describe the precise process the applicant states would have to follow in order to obtain full membership, as well as the domestic reforms needed in regard to the enlargement. This is called the Copenhagen requirements. The Agenda also evaluated the future applicant countries on the basis of progress made since 1989.

The countries were evaluated on three levels: democracy and the rule of law; functioning market economy, competitive pressures and market forces; and the *acquis communautaires* (Dinan, 1999: 193). Only at the adoption of the Agenda were the ECE countries able to officially submit their application. Following this, the Commission recommended opening negotiations for membership with Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia because these states were considered the most likely to fulfil quickly the requirements. The negotiations started in 1997. Despite the recommendation from the Commission, other states from ECE interested in becoming member of the European Union also applied (Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria). The accession negotiations of these countries began in 2000.

To demonstrate their willingness, the states had to adopt policies that were closely linked to the policies established by the Union. With this in mind, and the economical burden it represented for these countries, the EU increased the number of states eligible to the PHARE program, originally created to support the accession of Poland and Hungary. Its first aim was to support the transition of these countries to market economies and democratic institutions. Beneficiaries of this program increased and reached the number of thirteen in 1998. As of 2000, the PHARE program included agricultural aid and a structural tool to meet these objectives. In order to be eligible to these accession partnership programs, the states had to officially commit to democracy, nuclear safety and stable macroeconomics; they had to provide a particular timeline defining how they will adopt the *acquis communautaires* according to the priorities identified by the Commission; on the other hand, the EU would provide the funds for

reforms on priorities, and an annual assessment would describe and analyse the progress made by the candidate states (Dinan, 1999:194).

The PHARE program needs to be further discussed here because it has implication on the ethnic minority issue during the transition period, it also demonstrate that the EU-15 were concerned with the minority issue, and finally it brings up again a discussion on spillover. One part of the program provides support to improve the position of minorities within their society (Pinder, 1996: 183). Furthermore, a special fund within this fund is available for programs aimed toward the education of the minority population on manners to get involved in a democratic regime (Pinder, 1996: 183). The EU strategy in encouraging the ECE countries to deal with their ethno-national problems was through the democratization of the countries. Each country were able to benefit of 'national' envelops aimed at helping the candidates to meet the requirement underlined by the annual reports made by the Commission. In total, 1223.3 million euros were affected to these projects (EUROPA, Enlargement, Phare programme types / national programmes). The focus of the EU has been on the Roma population of the east-central European region because Agenda 2000 assessed their marginal situation and also because the Roma population was present in most of the candidate countries (EUROPA, EU Support for Roma Communities in Central and Eastern Europe). Most of the projects financed aimed at capacity building of the Roma community (EUROPA, EU Support for Roma Communities in Central and Eastern Europe).

What needs to be pointed out is that the enlargement process was not a one way

course of action for the sole benefit of the EU-15. It also involved the reforms of EU institutions to increase democracy at the supranational level in order to prevent future crisis with the arrival of new members. To this end, the Treaty of Nice was designed to reform internal institutions of the European Union in the prospect of the fifth enlargement. The number of votes allowed by country was revised in the Council, as well as when majority and minority decisions were going to occur. More seats were made available within the European Parliament. One important implication of the Treaty of Nice, was the adoption of a Charter on Fundamental Rights.

**Table 1.2 Distribution of the seats and number of votes per country after the adoption of the Treaty of Nice for the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union**

### The European Parliament

Country	Seats	Country	Seats
Belgium	22	Bulgaria	17
Denmark	13	Cyprus	6
Germany	99	Estonia	6
Greece	22	Hungary	20
Spain	50	Latvia	8
France	72	Lithuania	12
Ireland	12	Malta	5
Italy	72	Poland	50
Luxembourg	6	Czech Republic	20
Netherlands	25	Romania	33
Austria	17	Slovakia	13
Portugal	22	Slovenia	7
Finland	13		
Sweden	18		
Great Britain	72		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>535</b>		<b>197</b> <b>147</b>

*Source:* Treaty of Nice, *Guide for the European Citizen*, p.10.

URL

[http://europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/dialogue/info/offdoc/guidecitoyen\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/dialogue/info/offdoc/guidecitoyen_en.pdf),  
last visited January 24, 2006.

Address:

### **The Council of Europe**

Countries	Number of votes for each
Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom	29
Spain and Poland	27
Netherlands	13
Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal	12
Austria and Sweden	10
Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland	7
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia	4
Malta	3

*Source:* EUROPA – European Institutions and other bodies, The Council of Europe, URL Address: [http://europa.eu.int/institutions/council/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/institutions/council/index_en.htm), last visited January 24, 2006.

Human Rights are fundamental in the orientation taken by the EU in its actions toward the protection of minorities. Its main strategy focuses on the elimination of discriminative behaviour and systems (European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; EU Charter on Fundamental Rights). Furthermore, it proclaims that diversity within the EU and within its member states should be protected. This last element has been a present concern since 1993, with the need for applicant countries to also meet the Copenhagen criteria, in which a provision for the protection of minorities is explicitly stated. The protection of minorities within the applicant countries is monitored through the regular annual reports done by the EU on the achievements made by the candidate countries toward accession.

#### **b) The Ethnic Minority Issue**

As stated earlier the boundaries designed by the Conference after the War did not consider the ethnic composition of the population of the countries in the East Central region, and the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and later, the Balladur Plan (1994) made sure

the boundaries would stay the same. Moreover, some states ended up more homogeneous than others due to these new territorial borders. Consequently, the states did not encounter the same problems in regard to their ethnic minorities.

The changes in the political situation after the fall of the Soviet Union brought changes in the composition of the populations again. The Baltic States used to be fully integrated in the Soviet Union, which granted their population the Soviet citizenship. The colonialist policies pursued by the Soviet Union encouraged a lot of Russians to migrate in the Baltics. Thus, when independence came, the Baltic countries were composed of a large Russian population, which used to be treated as a majority in the decision-making process. They became a minority population within the new borders. This situation gave place to different problems such as the obtainment of republican citizenship, the learning of a new language, their political representation and the respect of their rights. Not only did it change the relationship between the republican majorities and the Russians, but the Russians were also faced with the reconstruction of their identity.

The newly independent countries in Central Europe also had their own population problems in the transition. Czechoslovakia resolved its problem by separating the country into two different entities: the Czech and Slovak republics. Each of these republics became more homogeneous in that regard even if some problems remained with the Sudeten Germans in Czech Republic and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Hungary even if considered as a homogeneous country has difficult relations with its neighbouring countries due to the boundaries set after the First World War. Many of the Hungarian

population ended up in other countries, also newly independent. The Hungarian government has tried to influence the policies conducted towards the Hungarian minority especially within Slovakia and Romania through different means. The Czech Republic and Poland's main concern in regard to minorities involved their German minority, which also relates back to the redefinition of boundaries.

That situation was of particular interests for the EU, because granting the Hungarian citizenship to Hungarian minorities outside the borders, especially once Hungary becomes a EU member, it involves also the European citizenship for people from countries that are not necessarily becoming members of EU, or at least, not in the same time. Basically, not only the ethnic minority question has repercussion on the relationship between the EU and the candidate countries but it also has an effect on the relationship maintained between the ECE countries. The Hungarian example can best illustrate this with the prospect of the adoption of its status law. As Fowler explains, the adoption of a kin-state role by the Hungarian government is based on a "fuzzy" definition of citizenship as opposed to its classic definition (Fowler, Working Paper 40/02, 59). The issue was very important in regard to the integration process due to the new vision promoted by Hungary: people could become citizens even if they did not reside in the country, which was a difficult issue with Romania because it did not allow for dual citizenship and saw the initiative as an attack on its sovereignty, which would come and disrupt the balance of relationships between people within its population because on the long-run some would have benefited from higher standards than others. This post-modern view of citizenship can be seen as a reflection of how the values of the EU have

influenced the perception of candidate states on the role they can play at the regional level, and how states and organizations can adapt to a new environment.

If we consider the often expressed concerns of the EU towards the protection of minorities, we can wonder if this can have an impact during the accession process, not only on the candidate states, but also on the ethnic minorities within these candidate states. Up to this point, the EU has given only a systemic response to a systemic problem. We need to explore further how exactly the prospect of integration can influence the situation of ethnic minorities within the candidate countries and how should integration be pursued in that regard.

If we take the different concepts from theoretical approaches discussed earlier on integration, we can understand some of the underlying concerns faced by the West European countries, as well as some implications it has on the East European states and their minorities. The increasing interdependence between the countries within the Union has an effect on how countries can resolve their disagreements. If a conflict arises within the Union, the internal stability can be disrupted, which could have an impact on the overall well-being of the Union as well. Furthermore, the creation of new institutions provides channels to settle conflicts just as the functionalist school posits. More precisely, in response to the predictable fifth enlargement, the member countries have created institutions to help the ECE countries to transit.

The problem arises in regard to the ECE countries when we consider what the



functionalist and neo-functionalist schools refer to as a process of gradual integration. This dimension is basically non-existent amongst the ECE applicants. They have to adopt the *acquis communautaires* as they are and implement them as soon as they can. Moreover, the pace of integration they experience has never been encountered anywhere else in the world. What should be noted is that the spillover inevitably produced, according to the neo-functionalist, is only half-present. What the ECE countries are faced with resemble more to an ‘artificial spillover’ than an actual gradual integration in the functional and political realms. Thus, we propose a fourth type of spillover that has not been considered by the neo-functionalist literature, nor commented by any other school on European integration.

This artificial spillover is very important to be considered because it represents a paradox of integration. We call it so due to the quantity of legal, political and economical obligations the ECE countries are faced with, but also due to the pace at which the countries need to integrate, and especially because the minority issue in ECE has nothing to do with what is done in the West European countries in that regard. This is expressed by the fact that the minority issue has been incorporated within the integration requirements, but that there does not appear to be a Western norm on minority protection that could spillover to the East-Central region, yet the EU seems to think otherwise.

In order to understand fully the importance of the minority issue for the EU, we need to consider the strategic interests the EU-15 has in pushing for balanced relationships within ECE population and “resolving” the minority issue over a

conditional requirement for accession. This initiative started with the Balladur Plan (1994). Immigration has been a challenging issue among the current members and with accession, the burden over the entrance of third countries population comes back to the ECE countries, which can represent a door to the EU. The EU is basically passing the burden to them. The minorities in ECE countries have to be well treated in order to prevent their movement toward wealthier countries, where they could potentially have a better treatment, and this is also the case for other national citizens of ECE countries. In all ECE countries, the minorities represent an economical burden for society, they are less educated and usually they hold lower paid jobs. In that sense, Kraus and Schwager (2003) argue that the perspective of integration may reduce immigration to the West; more specifically because of the means taken to level-up the conditions of living of ECE citizens. These concerns are also reflected through the postponed application the Schengen agreement with the ECE countries. The increasing concern with cultural protection can also be reflective of the need to intervene in ECE. Not strange to these concerns is the rise of the right wing parties in West Europe, particularly in France and Holland, which reflects the importance put on the protection of each states' *acquis* and the tendency they have to restrict the countries' openness. Thus, in the aim of preventing a flow of population from the East with the entrance of the post-communist countries in the EU, the minority problem of ECE had to be dealt with. The timing was also an important consideration because once the ECE countries become member states, they could legally refuse to comply with the EU expectations. Moreover, the entrance of the countries within the Union also brings a redefinition of the balance of power within the institution, which could well undermine the compliance will from ECE countries. The

issue represents well the problem of incongruent changes taking place at the regional level versus the national level; in this sense, the EU-15 has imposed values, norms, and a legal framework not established in their own countries to deal with minorities.

The fifth enlargement also takes place in a new orientation of policies in the EU toward devolution. In that sense, Keating argues that a re-orientation of the definition of nationalities could be relevant in so far as the basis regarding spatial cultural communities and territorial rights are abolished (Keating, 2004:373). This is considering the transformation that states have to go through once they integrate the Union. An example of transformation occurring at the political level, is the organization of political parties at the regional level: most of the national secessionist movements have now opted to work within the regional arena instead of talking sovereignty. Rather, they want to work within the European Union and access as much opportunities available to them as they can to further their objectives. Their political discourse has changed and they started to talk about “self-determination, insertion into Europe, or asymmetrical federalism” (Keating, 2004:369).

The accession process and negotiations give the opportunity to the EU-15 states to maximize their preferences. After the enlargement process has taken place, the EU does not need the approval of the states on certain policy issues. As so, Keating underlines that the minority issue is important in that regard and questions if the EU will still monitor the situation regarding the ethnic minorities in the member states, which would also imply the EU-15 ( Keating, 2004:380). We can see the diverse interests of the states expressed

during the negotiation process. The outcome is closer to the stronger players' preferences. Usually, the smaller countries are those who will make more concessions because it is in their interest: they will gain more from interstate co-operation (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 44). For example, this is expressed in the EU by the states that have lower GNP (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 44). This can be translated into the fifth enlargement easily because the countries of ECE involved in the accession process represent only 3 to 5% of the total GNP of the EU (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 46). It is also on this basis that concessions made during the negotiation process are penalising the acceding countries, and protecting the actual members (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 48). Only once the countries become members do they have more power to influence the common decisions through their use of their veto power. Historically, "the core members and the richer countries have proposed and most intensely favoured new initiatives, thereby casting the newer and poorer member states in the role of effective veto players" (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 52).

Minorities have an interest to favour integration in the EU because they know that their fundamental rights would be more respected and it also gives them a supranational layer of institutions to appeal to and balance off in their political game against the national government of their home state. The ties between the Western and Eastern minority groups should also be noted: the increase of interactions between the two groups has put the minority issue on the agenda. Ethnic minorities are treated as human rights issues within Western Europe. The EU-15 has put particular attention on the Roma case. Many non-governmental organizations have taken the issue as their priority intervention

and lobbying point, and the available resources in West Europe have encouraged involvement in the issue. For example, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) has a consultative status at the Council of Europe and at the United Nations. (European Roma Rights Centre, About ERRC). Furthermore, the ERRC board of director is composed of people involved in this issue from each ECE countries (European Roma Rights Centre, About ERRC).

Integration should be pursued in regard to the minority issue for reasons previously stated, but also because it expressively meet a concern that existed since the creation of the League of Nations. Furthermore, the perspective of integration increased the pressure for government to solve their minority problems, especially in the Baltic states, because the illegal immigrants in each of the applicant countries had to be dealt with: if they did not receive their citizenship, they would have been considered illegal migrants in the EU as well. The spillover now expected would be probably more at the cultural level: the creation and integration within the ECE countries of a European Identity. This identity could also be the solution to ethnic conflicts within these societies, because it creates an identity higher than the national level, and nationalism could be counteracted with this. Integration should also be pursued because it creates new points for demands, at different levels, for different issues, which gives minority population the ability to influence policies and make sure they get their preferences considered in the process. We can look at the political parties they are allying with at the regional level to transmit their interests. This makes us come to the question whether the perspective of European integration results in an increase of minority civil mobilization to further their

interests.

#### *1.4 Analytical Framework for the Study of Ethnic Nationalism and Minority Mobilization in the Context of European Enlargement*

One assumption that needs to be made here and which is presumed to hold is that minorities will behave differently than the majority because they do not face the same kind of barriers to mobilization. One example that could be given to support this assumption is that the voting pattern of immigrants will be different from that of the majority, in that, they would be more inclined to vote for an immigrant/minority party than a national party because such political parties do not represent the interests of the immigrants. Diehl and Blohm have demonstrated this through their study of Turks immigrants in Germany (Diehl and Blohm, 2001).

Mobilization can be influenced on many levels, namely what has been identified by Diehl and Blohm (2001) as the **macro-**, meso- and micro-levels. The first level regards the opportunities offered by the structure of the host country and of supranational institutions. The important point to retain from this approach and which has a direct effect on the behaviour of immigrants is whether they enjoy voting rights, and moreover, the rapidity to which they will have access to citizenship, which will make them part of the national political community (Diehl and Blohm, 2001: 403). The inability of a country to meet these requirements will have repercussion on the mobilization level of immigrants, saying that they would be more likely to be demobilized (Diehl and Blohm, 2001: 403). Furthermore, an indirect effect of the institutions which would impact the

involvement of immigrants in political affairs, regards their view about political involvement: whether it is seen as successful or not (Diehl and Blohm, 2001: 403). Institutions are said not only to affect if immigrants become politically involved, but also how they would do so (Diehl and Blohm, 2001: 403). Basically, this is where the political institutions are said to influence the opportunities available to the group. We believe that if it is the case for immigrants, it can also be the case for ethnic minorities.

This focus on institutions has led to the publication of many works on political opportunity structures, which is not only an analytical concept for mobilization, but also on the possible strategies that could be used by groups. Basically, the political opportunity structure (POS) is based on “consistent – but not necessarily permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentive for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure” (Chappell, 2002:9). Three key dimensions of the POS identified by Banaszak (in Chappell, 2002:9) will be useful here, and those are: “(1) the formal political rules and institutions that provide challengers with points of access; (2) the constellation of the political actors involved (including political parties, interest groups and social movements); and (3) the informal procedures of decision-making and the strategy of those in power.” These three dimensions will be useful in the analysis of our case studies.

Moreover, Máiz (2003) demonstrates the importance of identifying whether the political opportunity structure is open or closed. In any case, it has been observed by Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) that not all movements are mobilized the same way: some

increase their mobilization level because of the presence of an open POS, whereas other movements react to threat. Máiz (2003) identifies two important aspects of the political context which directly influence the success or failure of political mobilization. The first one consists of the institutionalisation of ethnicity, and the second one consists of policies and regulatory strategies applied by governments to ethnic problems and conflicts (Máiz, 2003:201). These elements are concordant with Brubaker (1996) and Latin (1991, 1998) analysis. There are no exhaustive lists of variables involved in the POS, rather it has been left to the scholar to decide what to use depending on the issue, the country, and the movement studied (Tarrow, 1998:20).

What is important to retain from the structure of political opportunities is that it can be altered by the actors involved (movements and countermovements), it is not solely fixed by the external environment (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996: 1634). Meyer and Staggenborg (1996: 1634) enumerate the ways social movements can influence the POS: “[they] can influence policy, alter political alignments, and raise the public profile and salience of particular issues,” and so forth.

However, the institutions still play an important role in determining the success of policy changes and strategies that can be adopted by the different political actors involved in the game. With these considerations in mind, George Tsebelis (2002) complement perfectly the POS approach. His focus on institutions for explaining changes in policies through the analysis of veto players will be quite important for us to understand if we can consider the European Union to have a great impact in the policy changes that have occurred and what kind of impacts the minority actors can also have in



each of the countries we will be looking at. Veto players are defined as “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis , 2002:19). Veto players can be institutional, saying that they emerge by the rules created in the game like a constitution, or they can be partisan, identified by the fact that they are created as a result of the political game (Tsebelis , 2002:19). Four things need to be taken into account when using the veto players angle: “how are the veto players selected, who are the veto players – who needs to agree for a change in the status quo, who controls the legislative agenda – who makes proposal to whom and under what rule, and finally if these players are collective, under which rule they decide” (Tsebelis, 2002: 76).


The following results have been demonstrated by him:

- *The addition of new veto players increase policy stability or leave it the same;*
- *The veto player who set the agenda has an advantage over all the others because he can decide to act within the winset of the other players and select the one he prefers;*
- *The outcome is different depending on the method of decision (whether simple majority, qualified majority, or unanimous decisions);*
- *Referendum introduces the preferences of the population, which will be reflect through that of the median voter, and is equivalent to a new veto player (Tsebelis, 2002).*

Since the focus of the analysis of Tsebelis is on policy stability, governments play

an extremely important role. Consequently, the form a government takes will have an impact on its ability to promote effective policy changes. In the case of minimum-winning coalitions, the government coincide with the majority in the chamber, thus if the bill presented coincide in the winset of the all the coalition members, all partners will be better off (Tsebelis, 2002: 94). In the case of oversized coalitions, the situation is completely different as some of its members can be disregarded in the decision-making procedures (Tsebelis, 2002: 95). However, it can be costly to do so because the party disregarded can decide to resign and the government formation process must be done again (Tsebelis, 2002: 95). In the case of minority governments, its advantage reside mainly in its control over the agenda setting, and also for its ability to achieve its preferred outcome if its winset is centrally located (Tsebelis, 2002: 97-98). Laver and Schofield (1990) provide insightful explanations on the formation of surplus majority governments. They explain that surplus majority government formation will occur in cases where office-seeking parties need to ally in order to either amend the constitution of a country, or when party discipline is low, or again for national unity in times of crisis (Laver and Schofield, 1990:82-83). The most important variable that need to be considered in explaining surplus government is the proximity of policy preferences between the political parties (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 83). Figure 1.3.1 illustrate how the status quo can change depending on the winset of the political actors involved as explained by the previous propositions put forward by Tsebelis.

Figure 1.3.1 Illustration of policy change



Source: George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Institutions Work*, New York : Russell Sage Foundation, 2002, p.298.

At the meso and micro levels, the determinants are generally linked to the availability of resources. An example of resources which greatly affects participation is the number of associations in which an immigrant could take part. Associations have been identified by many authors as a source of mobilization reinforcement, independent of their ethnic composition (Diehl and Blohm, 2001: 404). Klandermans and Oegema (1987) have identified four important concepts related to life association for mobilization on particular issues and that are the formation of mobilization potentials (the reservoir from which the organizations can draw from), the formation and activation of recruitment networks, the arousal of motivation to participate, and the removal of barriers to participation.

The reservoir available to organizations consists of people that have a positive attitude toward the particular issue on which a movement has formed and from which the

organizations can draw from due to campaigning on the inadmissibility of the state of affairs (or framing alignment) (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). Framing alignment can also happen at the political level. For example, we can observe this by the restructuration of the party system with electoral alignment i.e. for example, the appearance of nationalist parties (Máiz, 2003:205).

Snow & *al.* (1986) identify four frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. Frame bridging is similar to mobilization potentials as articulated by Klandermans and Oegema (1987). More precisely, it is referring to the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem. (...) At the individual level, [it is reflected by the congruence of people’s sentiments with the issue/problem], but who lack the organizational base for expressing their discontents and for acting in pursuit of their interests” (Snow & *al.*, 1986:467). Bridging occur through ideological lines. Frame amplification refers to the increasing information available on the issue through various means, which are used by organizations to reach more personally the individuals in order to increase their will for involvement (Snow & *al.*, 1986:469). This amplification can be done through two type of lines: values (*identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons.*) and beliefs (*ideational elements that cognitively support or impede action in pursuit of desired values*) (Snow & *al.*, 1986:469). Frame extension refers to the ability of a movement to enlarge its pool of adherents by portraying its activities and its

objectives in a congruent manner to values and interests of potential adherents (Snow & *al.*, 1986:472). Frame transformation refers to the ability of a movement to reframe values, understandings and beliefs of people, so as the programs, values and causes which the organization defends can be supported (Snow & *al.*, 1986:473).

Back to Klandermans and Oegema (1987:520), the second step identified regards recruitment networks and mobilization attempts which is essential for the realization of mobilization (third step). This specific step aims at using all possible mean to attract potential individual to get involved in the movement, thus contributing to the realization of the third step: create a motivation for the individuals to participate. This step is crucial and derives more precisely from the rational choice school. Basically, the individual needs to calculate the costs and benefits involved in the participation of a movement. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) make the distinction between collective and selective incentives, which has impact on the calculation of the individuals. Collective incentive is greater when the potential for success is present, whereas the selective incentives concern more the individual and how he/she can be rewarded by his/her participation. The assumption is that higher the participation of an individual is, so too for the community, the higher the barriers a groups would be able to overcome. In the study conducted by Klandermans and Oegema (1987), each step of the mobilization process involved some people to drop out of the process.

Olson (1971) offers a nuanced view in regard to group formation and individual's behaviour, which help to understand the possibility and restrictions for collective action.

We must not forget that groups are formed by self-interested individuals, and that unless some means of coercion, incentive or other special device exist, they will not act in a common interest (Olson, 1971:2). However, organizations may exist and “the interests expected to be furthered by these organizations are common and those belonging to these organizations can be presumed to have a common interest” (Olson, 1971: 8). It would be wrong to assume that members obtaining a collective benefit from the organization would be willing to pay the cost. In fact, no common interest in paying the cost for the production of the collective good exists (Olson, 1971: 21). It is also important to be aware that not all individuals will place the same importance and value to the collective good wanted by a certain group (Olson, 1971: 22).

The size of the group has also considerable influence on the ability to pursue the optimal outcome for the group. “The larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good” (Olson, 1971: 35). The high number of individuals in a group would result in a higher proportion of free-riding as it would be unperceivable to find out who is not participating in the collective good (Olson, 1971: 45). On the other hand, cost sharing appears to be favourable for the achievement of a collective good, and the costs can be substantially decreased by the increasing number of members (Olson, 1971: 37). Collective good may be pursued only by a small number of the group because they have an incentive that the collective good be provided even if the individuals have to bear the full burden of providing it themselves (Olson, 1971: 50).

Staying at the individual level, another important game needs to be included in the

analysis, and that is the ‘tipping game’ as offered by Laitin (1998, 1988). Language is an important factor of mobilization which can be used as a tool by leaders to create a common symbol, and it also plays an important role in regard to state building (Laitin, 1988 and 1998). The tipping game involves incentives and some kind of punishment for the people to either keep their mother tongue or learn the country’s national language. Calculations in the payoffs associated with learning the new language involve issues such as education, employment, and citizenship for some (Laitin, 1998). On the other hand, elites calculations will somewhat be different because they will always have the incentive to learn the national language (Latin, 1988). The following table summarizes the important point at the three different levels of analysis:

**Table 1.3.1 Summary of the Analytical Framework**

<b>Level of analysis</b>	<b>Important elements being considered</b>
<b>Macro</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The opportunities offered by the structure of the host country and the supranational institutions</li> <li>- The political rights enjoyed and the rapidity of citizenship obtainment</li> <li>- Successful mobilization or not</li> <li>- POS: incentives offered to the group affecting their perception for success or failure by looking at the formal political rules and institutions, political actors involved, informal procedures of decision-making and strategy of those in power. Must find out if it is an open or closed POS</li> <li>- Identification of the veto players and the rules under which they decide and look at the form the government will take</li> </ul>
<b>Meso</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Availability of resources for the group</li> <li>- Mobilization potential, formation and activation of recruitment networks (frame alignment), arousal of motivation to participate, removal of barrier to participation</li> <li>- Collective action theory (Size of the group, availability of the collective good)</li> </ul>
<b>Micro</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tipping game ; Calculations of the members of the minority</li> </ul>

### **1.5 Methodology**

As a general hypothesis, we expect the level of ethnic minority mobilization to

increase when we consider the perspective of European integration. However, we make the distinction between two types of mobilization: *political*, that is through the official structure, closer to political participation, for example, through the electoral system; and *non-political*, through non-official channels or not depending on the state, such as activism in non-governmental organizations. This distinction is made because we believe that not the same type of mobilization will be strategically used by minorities whether they are from a country favourable to EU policies. Thus, three sub-hypothesis emerge:

- First, we can expect the level of political mobilization to be higher in a candidate country that has a homogeneous population and a high degree of convergence to EU policies because it represents low costs to adapt to these policies at high benefits. However, non-political mobilization would be expected to be lower because all resources have been devoted to the development of political mobilization of minorities.
- Secondly, we can expect the level of formal mobilization to be lower in a candidate country that has a heterogeneous population and a low degree of convergence to EU policies because it represents high costs to adapt to these policies at low benefits. However, informal mobilization would be expected to be higher because minorities do not necessarily have the chance to influence decisions through political mobilization.
- Third, we can expect the level of mobilization to be intermediate (higher



mobilization than in the second hypothesis, but lower than in the first one) in a candidate country that has a heterogeneous population and a high degree of convergence to EU policies because it represents low costs to adapt to these policies at medium benefits. The levels of political and non-political mobilization should be similar.

**Table 1.3 : Summary of Hypotheses**

	<b>Homogeneous Population</b>	<b>Heterogeneous Population</b>
<b>EU Convergent</b>	<b>HYPOTHESIS #1</b> High political mobilization Low non-political mobilization <i>Low costs, High benefits</i>	<b>HYPOTHESIS #3</b> Medium political mobilization Medium non-political mobilization <i>Low costs, medium benefits</i>
<b>Not EU convergent<sup>1</sup></b>		<b>HYPOTHESIS #2</b> Low political mobilization High non-political mobilization <i>High costs, Low benefits</i>

So if these are true, we should witness a high degree of convergence with EU's policies in regard to ethnic minority populations, maybe even witness policies that goes further than what is actually expected for the entrance in the EU. Further, we may also be able to link the degree of Europeanization to ethnic conflict. In that sense, the hypothetical claim is that an increase in the deepening of European identification or values (here observed through convergence) may lower the number of conflicts arising between the host state and the ethnic minority population. Furthermore, it may even be

<sup>1</sup> Hypothesis 4 is non-existent at this point because it would not have been chronologically acceptable for the purpose of the thesis. Further, no case study (which will be discussed later) fit in this category in the fifth enlargement in the East Central European region.

reflected by a displacement of conflicts from the national level to another one, probably the supra-national level. Moreover, we may be able to link the institutional responses to ethnic minority conflicts of applicant states to European integration. Furthermore, the interaction between the three variables would also be reflected by changes at the EU level in the management, adoption of vision on the protection of ethnic minorities.

*a) Definitions and indicators*

The perspective of European integration (our independent variable) is measured in terms of convergence to EU interests, that is, according to the political orientations given to the candidate countries in terms of dealing with their ethnic minorities. This would be measured through the progress assessments made by the Commission during the fifth enlargement.

We also have a second independent variable which is the composition of the population. It is an important variable because it may also influence the willingness of a country to accommodate specific people because the costs associated with specific measures are not the same from one type of population composition to the other. We also presume that it has an impact on the level of conflicts between the majority and the minority. The homogeneity of a country is measured according to the “Ethnic Fractionalization Index” and the results can be found in the following table. A country is considered to be homogeneous when the result of the calculation is lower than 1.25. The ethnic division population number taken for the conduct of these calculation is based on the last census conducted in each of the countries.

**Table 1.4 Ethnic fragmentation in the countries of East Central Europe<sup>2</sup>**

Country	Results
Estonia	1.88 – Heterogeneous
Latvia	2.38 – Heterogeneous
Lithuania	1.41 – Heterogeneous
Hungary	1.16 – Homogeneous
Czech Republic	1.21 – Homogeneous
Slovakia	1.33 – Heterogeneous
Slovenia	1.41 – Heterogeneous
Poland	1.06 – Homogeneous
Romania	1.25 – Heterogeneous
Bulgaria	1.41 – Heterogeneous

Mobilization refers to the organizational capabilities of a group, its ability to use resources available. As such, mobilization is closely linked to the capacity of the group under study to empower itself. It is referring to concepts such as advocacy, action and organization. As we have previously explained, our concept is twofold. On one hand, official channeled-mobilization refers to the ability of an ethnic group to get elected representatives and to organize themselves at the electoral and legislative levels, to identify leaders, and to make sure that citizen from their common cultural background are encouraged to vote. On the other hand, non-official channeled-mobilization refers to the links made between the non-profit sector and minority citizens i.e. participation in non-governmental organizations (NGO) devoted to different type of issues, their relationship with the EU, Western NGOs, the nationalizing state and home state, demonstrations in the streets, and newspaper coverage.

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<sup>2</sup> Calculations of Ethnic Fragmentation is provided in the annex.

*b) Case studies*

The research is based on comparative case studies, which have been selected for the purpose of theory-building. More precisely, the case studies selected here can be considered as “hypothesis-generating”, since the generalization coming out from their analysis could presumably be applied to countries contained in the same box in the following 2x2 table (Lijphart, 1971: 692). It is important to notice that this 2x2 table can be linked to hypotheses presented in the previous table.

**Table 1.5: Classification of Case Studies**

	<b>Homogeneous</b>	<b>Heterogeneous</b>
<b>EU convergent</b>	<u>Hungary</u> , Poland, Czech Republic	Estonia, <u>Latvia</u> , Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia
<b>EU non-convergent</b>		<u>Romania</u> , Bulgaria

The case studies that will be covered in this thesis are underlined in the table. These countries have a similar politico-historical background. We believe that Hungary provides a good insight on the first hypothesis because it has a homogeneous population. It also produced a legal, social and cultural framework in regard to minority protection within its borders that sometimes went further than what is expected from the EU. Moreover, Hungary has many concerns regarding its ethnic population outside its borders. This apprehension directly affects its relationship maintained with other countries, for example, with Romania.

Romania provides a good case study for the second hypothesis because it is a country that adopted policies considered to be the farthest from the EU’s objectives, and

also because it has a heterogeneous population. In addition, the country has encountered many conflicts with Hungary in regard to the treatment of the Hungarian minority population within its borders. The EU has been involved in the settlement of conflicts between the two countries. This case study could also serve as a predictive tool in what could be witnessed in regard to minority protection in the sixth enlargement.

Finally, Latvia is a good case for the third hypothesis because it has a very heterogeneous population. Its ethnic minority population is mainly constituted of the Russian diasporas, which has concerned the EU for a while due to the difficulties the Russians had in getting the republican citizenship.

These three case studies also bring an interesting variable in: the institutional design of each is different. The institutions can be insightful in the sense that specific type of institutional design can exacerbate the conflicts between majority and minority populations because they simply constrain the relationships in particular ways. Moreover, as we have supported in a previous section, the institutional design represent a political opportunity structure with which the ethnic minority groups need to work.

### **1.6 Conclusion**

We have seen through this chapter that the theories of European integration have been built around the accession process of West European countries in the building of a European Community, later becoming the European Union. The member states (EU-15) have developed common interests and values through this process and have been trying

to impose them on the East-Central European candidate countries. This was particularly the case for the minority issue. Although the EU seems to be more concerned with the Roma populations present in most of the East Central European countries, the ethnic minorities also seem to pose a problem. Since the interventions seek by the EU towards minorities rest on the development of democratic institutions, the mobilization of such population is important to be considered.


Mobilization involves many things, but we will focus mostly on capacity building and empowerment of these communities and the effect the perspective of European enlargement has on them. The next chapters of the thesis will deal with this. What our argument has been is that the EU has imposed values in regard to the protection of minorities that they themselves do not implement within their own borders in order to grant accession to the ECE countries. However, we believe that the effect was beneficial for minority population.

## CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUAL PARTICULARITIES

### 2.1 Introduction

Democratization and the consolidation of democracy followed different patterns in Latvia, Hungary and Romania. Figure 2.1 illustrates these differences based on the scores offered by the annual evaluations of the Freedom House. Clearly, Hungary has been considered as a “free” country early on in 1990, whereas Latvia only reached that point in 1994, and Romania in 1998. These different paths also exemplify well the context in which the minority issue was taking place in each of the country. Consequently, the issue did not have the same importance at the same time for them and each of the countries dealt differently with the protection of minorities.

**Figure 2.1 Patterns of democratic evolution for Latvia, Hungary and Romania**



This chapter deals with the domestic measures taken, or not taken, by each of the countries to achieve the protection of minorities as understood by the European Union. It

also gives empirical data on different aspects that influence the quality of mobilization of the Russians in Latvia, the Roma in Hungary, and the Hungarians in Romania. For each of the case study, we follow the same structure. First, we start with an overview of the domestic legislative framework in which the minority issue takes place because it is of great importance since they reflect the interests of those who govern the country at the time they are adopted. Although sometimes they do not quite reflect the reality because they are not implemented rigorously, they bring substantive rules to the game in which the actors are involved. Secondly, we will describe important political parties and their platforms, with a particular attention to the minorities. Thirdly, we will go over the annual reports made by the Freedom House and the European Commission, with special focus on the Copenhagen criteria. Finally, we will provide empirical data on issues specific to each of the case study like, but not exclusively, on education, emigration, and self-governments.



## 2.2 Latvia

### *2.2.1 Legislation affecting the Russian Minority*

Many Latvian laws have been adopted with the situation of the Russian ethnic minority in mind on issues such as citizenship, language, elections, and education. Each of these laws has an impact on the Russian individuals and community in realms such as political participation and education matters.

In the aim of consolidating Latvian statehood, the laws on citizenship were efficiently directed towards the Russian minority in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union by limiting their access to citizens' privileges. According to the citizenship law restored from the prewar period, only those citizens of Latvia from the prewar republic (before 1940) and their descendents were entitled to Latvian citizenship, which meant that many Russians ended up as stateless citizens. The remaining Russians were covered by the "Law on the Status of Former USSR citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State", which grants them the status of "non-citizen" and make sure they receive a "non-citizen" passport (Law on the Status of Former USSR citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State, Article 3). The rights, responsibilities and obligations of non-citizens are determined by other types of legislation such as the constitution and those enumerated previously. Basically, non-citizens are entitled nearly to no rights or protections in Latvia (Van Elsuwege, p.9).

Subsequent amendments to the citizenship law created a "windows system": specific waves of Russians were entitled to apply for citizenship at a certain point in time

(Citizenship Law, section 2). However, applying for the citizenship is not sufficient, the amendments made to the law specify the procedure to follow: those who want to obtain their Latvian citizenship have to go through two kind of tests in order to obtain their naturalization, one evaluating knowledge on Latvian society and history, and the other the fluency in the state language (Citizenship Law, Chapter three). The citizenship law has been one of the most contentious issues in Latvia for nearly a decade now and many modifications were brought to it in a small lap of time (in 1995, 1997, and 1998).

Since more than the majority of the Russian-speakers were not entitled to citizenship rights after the independence of the country, they had little influence on the political outcomes, as political rights are granted only to Latvia's citizens. Thus, not only did the Latvian implement a restrictive citizenship law, they also took the opportunity to implement a constraining language law for Russians (Official Language Law; Tsilevich). The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia recognizes Latvian as the only official language (Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, Chapter One). The *Official Language Law* was adopted in order to further the protection and development of Latvian language. It prescribes the use of other languages in public places like the courts, the governmental institutions, companies, etc. (Official Language Law, Section 2). Any other language is considered to be foreign, even if the Russians represent 30% of Latvia's population. Moreover, provisions are taken so that if one meeting is held in a foreign language, and if only one person request a translation in Latvian, it must be offered (Official Language Law, Section 7). The law precisely stipulates that the way to integrate ethnic minorities in Latvian society is by learning the state's language (Official Language Law, Section 7).

All written communications to state's institutions must be in Latvian (Official Language Law).

For the Russian-speakers who obtained their citizenship and wanted to participate in elections, they had to prove their proficiency in the republican language; with the highest degree of knowledge (Bogushevitch). Moreover, no provision has been made to encourage participation of non-citizens i.e. like the ability to vote in municipal elections which was the case for Russian-speakers in other Baltic states (Bogushevitch). In Latvia, representatives of national minorities were sometimes invited to give their advice when they could be directly affected by governmental decisions; however, they were not in positions of power (Bogushevitch). Amendments to the electoral legislation in 2002 was determined by the Constitutional court because some articles of the law were recognized to be in contradiction with the Constitution of Latvia, and the judgment had the effect to withdraw language requirement from the law (The Saeima Election Law, article 2 ).

The *Education Law* specifies that the only institutions in which the education in language other than Latvian can be used is in private educational institutions, or in state or local government institutions in which an ethnic minorities programs are implemented (Section 9, article 1). Moreover, even in these institutions it is not possible to have all education solely in a foreign language as all students need to pass a test evaluating their knowledge of Latvian and must obtain professional and higher degrees qualifications in the official language (Education Law, Section 9, articles 3-5). The teachers also need to demonstrate their fluency in Latvian before obtaining their certification allowing them to

teach (Laitin, 1998). Under the *General Education law*, which covers pre-school, basic and secondary education, measures were taken in 2002 to make sure students in Latvia were all going to be educated in the official language starting in 2004. However, some provisions were made to allow ethnic minorities education that aimed at enhancing their integration in Latvia society through the keeping of their identity (General Education Law, section 31). The law encourages mixed language education (General Education Law, section 42).

### ***2.2.2 Political Parties and their platforms***

Many qualifications can be used to describe Latvia's electoral system and party politics: pluralist and proportional, fragmented, volatile, and weak. It is a pluralist system because it allows for the representation of diverse interests on the political spectrum through the creation of political parties. The political parties are elected according to the proportional rule, with a 5% threshold. Thus, it is quite easy to have many political parties holding seats in the parliament. The political system is fragmented because many political parties are registered and run for election: in 1993, 23 parties run in the elections and 8 parties won seats; in 1995, 19 parties run in the elections and 9 won seats; in 1998, 21 parties run for elections and 6 parties won seats; and finally, in 2002, 20 parties run in the elections, while 6 of them won seats (1993, 1995, 1998 and 2002 Parliamentary Elections results, University of Essex; and Bugajski, 2000). Moreover, these numbers do not make the distinction between electoral coalitions and political parties; this means that the political parties involved during these elections were more numerous. It is a volatile system precisely because of the fact that the political system is fragmented: most of the

governments will have to be coalitions, which increase the chances for a no confidence vote. Also, there have been thirteen Prime Ministers since 1990. Finally, the political parties can be considered to be weak as many parties do not have many members, nor do they actually get seats from one election to the other.

Rare are the political parties in Latvia that have not taken position on the ethnic minority Russians issue. Interestingly, the political parties that could be considered “pro-Russians” are situated more on the left of the political spectrum, whereas those who are not are more right-oriented. The annex provides a table with the political parties that won seats in at least one of the elections. The citizenship law has limited the ability of Russians to form political parties or getting them elected as many of them were not granted citizenship, thus not allowed to vote or to form a political party. Despite these measures many political parties and associations were created to defend the Russian minority: the Latvian Russian citizen party, The Russian Party, For Equal Rights, For Human Rights in United Latvia, the Russian Cultural Societies Association of Latvia, and Russian Community. However, the most of these parties were not successful in any of the elections. Other pro-Russian parties less clearly identified gained seats in parliamentary elections. Only the Latvian Social Democratic Alliance succeeded in entering in a government coalition in 1999, after the first coalition government from the 1998 elections collapsed. The government however was not a minimum winning coalition and was composed of four political parties, most of which were not pro-Russians.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The 1999 coalition government of which the Latvian Social Democratic Alliance (14 seats) was part was headed by Latvia’s Way (21 seats), and composed also of For Fatherland and Freedom (17 seats), and the New Party (8 seats).

### ***2.2.3 Evaluation by the Freedom House and the European Commission***

Both the Freedom House (through “Nations in Transit”) and the European Commission started to monitor and make assessment on the progress of Latvia in 1998. Since 1994, Latvia has been considered as a “free” country in the evaluation of the Freedom House. However, some specifications can be brought in these general results, as the reports entitled “Nations in Transit” bring more nuances to these results. The Freedom House’s reports evaluate the country on many things that have been integrated under the political criteria in the evaluation done by the European Commission, such as the political process, civil society, the independence of media, governance and public administration, the rule of law, and corruption that are of great interest to us for the purpose of this research.

In its 1998 “Nations in Transit” report on Latvia, the Freedom House indicates that the country is “marked by continuing political instability and scandals” (Freedom House, 1998: 344), which has caused the stagnation of decisions on contentious issues within the government. The report specifically points out that decisions on issues regarding language and citizenship have been delayed or were lacking consensus due to the fact that the government was formed of many parties with divergent interests (Freedom House, 1998: 345). Latvia is given a 2 on 7 (Free) on the political process, even if 30% of its population, the Russian minority, is not allowed to vote. The report does not put much emphasis on this situation, so this was also the case in the 1999-2000 report. The Freedom House starts to talk about political stability only in its 2001 report, mainly basing its argument on the fact that Latvian society has showed intolerance

towards extremist groups encouraging hatred behaviour, either towards Russians or Latvians (Freedom House, 2001: 235).

Starting in the 2001 report up to 2004, we observe the increasing importance of the situation of non-citizens, and mainly the Russians. The issue takes more place in the introduction, in the political process part, and most importantly, hard numbers on ethnicity and citizenship get included in the report. With these numbers, we learn that close to 42% of the Russians have Latvia's citizenship (Freedom House, 2001: 236). The Roma is the minority population that has the highest percentage with citizenship, with close to 92%. The Roma represent 0.34% of Latvia's population.

The Freedom House 2002 report is really interesting because it specifically identifies the "status of national minorities" as a key issue since Latvia's independence (Freedom House, 2002: 241), which was not identified as so in previous report. According to the Freedom House, many non-citizens that do not have Latvia's citizenship "want to live in the country without becoming Latvian citizens" (Freedom House, 2002: 241), but no reason for this argument is given. However, we could make some sense of this if we consider the Freedom House critics on the language policies which were to be implemented by the government by saying that "the government needs to ensure that the implementation of existing language legislation takes place in a way that fully respects the OSCE'S principles of proportionality and justified public interest" (Freedom House, 2002: 241). The report also underlines the progress made towards human rights and the fulfilment of the political criteria for membership in the European Union. The 2003

report acknowledge the influence of the EU due to the political and human rights criteria toward which the country had to converge, and other international organizations, in avoiding internal clashes between ethnic groups (Freedom House, 2003: 355) However, not much progress was made to accord citizenship to Russians, as only a 3% of increase from the previous year number was registered in the 2002 report, and no numbers were given in subsequent reports (Freedom House, 2002: 242). The language requirement was still considered in the 2003 report to be an obstacle to Russian to obtain the Latvian citizenship (Freedom House, 2003: 356). This, however, was refuted in the next year report which indicated that the acquisition of citizenship that had now become based on a “simple language and history test” (Freedom House, 2004: 5).

The results of the 2001 municipal elections are important to mention as they represent a change in the political dynamic because left-wing parties, usually pro-Russians, and the Russian dominated political party *For Human Rights in United Latvia*, gained all the seats in the city of Riga, which is one of the city with a plurality of Russians (Freedom House, 2002: 242). It is important to note that the majority of the cities in Latvia are dominated by non-Latvians. These electoral results may be helpful to understand the change of tone of important actors on the Russian minority.

The change of opinion on the ability of Russian citizens to obtain their citizenship may be interpreted as a change also in dealing with the issue. Governments and international organizations, whose influence started to be acknowledged in the 2002 report, started to focus more on the integration of the minorities into Latvia's society. It also seems that the Russian minority has started to be out of the agenda of the ruling parties from the last elections since most of the parties' electoral platform focused on



other issues (Freedom House, 2004: 6). Two important points are raised by the 2004 report: the low representation of non-Latvians on the electoral lists (Freedom House, 2004: 6) and the ethnical polarization of the referendum vote on the entrance of the country into the European Union. The report does not provide numbers on the later, but it indicates that the majority of Russophones voted against Latvia entrance in the EU (Freedom House, 2004: 2).

The European Commission has been more critical in its assessment progress due to the stake involved in the enlargement process. The EU gave to Latvia (through the 1998 PHARE program) € 21 million to support the achievement of the Accession Partnership priorities identified by the commission, and the naturalization of non-citizens is one of them (European Commission, 1998). More specifically, in 2003, €5.3 million were reserved for the political criteria (Annex to the General report on Pre-Accession Assistance, 2003). The major problem identified by the Commission for the non-citizens is the rate of naturalization, which has been put as a short-term priority for the Latvian government (European Commission 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002). Some explanations are given for this: the restrictions included in the law through the “window system” (until 1999) and the advantages for the non-citizens of not possessing the Latvian citizenship, for example, it renders travels to Russia easier (European Commission, 1998). The EU pushed for amendments in the citizenship law “for the abolition of the window system, to grant the citizenship to stateless children and to simplify the procedures to obtain the citizenship for people over 65 years old” (European Commission 1998:52). Compliance with these recommended amendments will mean that Latvia fulfils international conventions. The amendments were approved through a

national referendum in Latvia, with the support of 53% of the citizens (European Commission, 1998). These changes are seen as the base for future social integration of ethnic minorities. An increase in the number of demands has been observed in the following years (European Commission, 1999). The number of stateless children obtaining citizenship is not high mainly due to parents wishing to obtain their citizenship in the same time as their children (European Commission, 2000). Changes in the tests requirement were made in 1998 and the fees reduced for the majority of the applicants (European Commission, 1999); however, the Commission reports of the following years state that the language proficiency test and the fees are still a barrier for naturalization (European Commission, 2000, 2001 and 2002). In the following years, the problem resulting from this was the capacity of the Naturalization Board to process the high number of applications (European Commission, 1999). Although the government injected money into the Naturalization Board in 1999, the budget was reduced the following year, which subsequently brought up soft critics by the EU: "it will also be important to ensure sufficient resources are allocated to measures promoting the integration of non-citizens" (European Commission, 2000: 24). As a result, funding was reinserted in the Naturalization board in 2001, but concerns were raised again in the European Commission's report in face of another budget reduction in 2002 (European Commission, 2001).

Many other legislations and regulations were modified during 1998 to reduce inequalities between Latvians and non-citizens, and the Commission reports that the Latvian authorities "significantly improved the situation" (European Commission, 1998: 13). These modifications touched the ability of non-citizens to practice certain jobs that

used to be reserved only to citizens, to request amnesty, and to be allowed to register with the State Employment Services and to register for unemployment benefits without having to prove their fluency in the state language (European Commission, 1998). However, the 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 reports mention that linguistic restrictions are still apparent in many legislations and that some jobs are still restricted to citizens such as lawyers, armed security guards and private detectives. (European Commission, 1999, 2000 and 2001). In regard to human rights, the country has ratified all international convention, except the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, and has integrated a new section in its constitution to include basic human rights (European Commission, 1998). The European Social charter has still not been ratified either (European Commission, 2001). The European Commission urged Latvia to ratify the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities in 2002, but the country has not done so yet (European Commission, 2002). The ability of individuals to make complaints to the Constitutional court was granted in 2001; before, it was mainly a tool for governmental institutions (European Commission, 2001). However, in most of the treaties Latvia entered, reservations were made on different aspects, which were related to the obtainment of Latvian citizenship or inconsistencies with Latvia's laws (European Commission, 2001). The European Commission was quite stringent on the Russian-speaking issue in its 2002 report: "With the reservation that the steps need to be taken to enable the Russian-speaking minority to become better integrated into society, Latvia demonstrates the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law and human rights" (European Commission, 2002: 18).

Another important problem identified by the Commission in relation to

application for Latvian citizenship for non-citizens is the lack of information available to them. The EU supported the Naturalization Board with the implementation of an information center (European Commission, 1998). The EU and other donors also contributed to the Latvian language program, which aims at training minority teacher to give Latvian lessons (European Commission 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001). The EU gave € 0,5 million per year for this program (European Commission, 1999). The support of the EU to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) concerned with issues relating to the non-citizens and non-Latvian minorities is specifically mentioned in the annual report (European Commission 1998: 11).

A larger problem present in Latvian society and that encompass all institution is corruption, and it has important impacts for the Russian population. It has been observed in almost all reports that the Latvian government has to make substantial efforts towards implementing anti-corruption measures (European Commission, 1998:14; 1999:13; 2000:18; 2001:27; 2002:24). The problem seems to be at higher levels in institutions such as the judiciary, public administration and the customs (European Commission, 1999:14; 2000:102-103).

Two important conflicting amendments are mentioned in the 1998 report and touch the situation of ethnic minorities. The first one concerned the Labour Code and the fulfilment of language requirement otherwise the person would be fired, which was blocked by the President; and the second one concerned the Language Law, but its adoption was delayed because the OSCE critiqued it as not meeting the international standards (European Commission, 1998). The law was later blocked by the President (European Commission, 1999). The Language Law was raised intensively in the 1999

Commission's report to encourage the government to converge with international standards and the Europe Agreement (European Commission 1999, 2000, 2001).

One governmental initiative that has been particularly congratulated has been the action plan for the integration of minorities in Latvia (European Commission, 2000) which covers many fields of concerns by the European Union, as it was fixed in the short-term priorities for accession (European Commission, 2000). What is interesting about this action plan is its implementation through four new institutions, and one of them being a Foundation created to attract enough founding for the implementation of the action plan (European Commission, 2000). This action plan has been welcomed by the EU (European Commission, 2001).

Education reforms have been engaged since a decision in 1998 to increase bilingual schools at the secondary level, as to aim for education solely in Latvian at this level for 2004 (European Commission, 2001).

For the first time, in 2001, a complaint from a Russian who is citizen of Latvia was received admissible to the European Court of Human Rights (European Commission, 2001). The case was that he had been denied to run in the 1998 parliamentary elections because state officials declared that he was not fluent enough in Latvian. A case was also presented at the United Nations Human Rights Committee because another individual was denied is right to run in local elections in 1997 (European Commission, 2001). The language requirements to run in elections were withdrawn from the law in 2002 (European Commission, 2002).

Both the reports from the Freedom House and the European Commission have put

emphasis on the development of civil society in their report. According to them, non-governmental organizations have become more numerous in recent years and have been encouraged by the development of laws enabling them to reduce their functioning costs like tax reduction and charity numbers. In 1995, they numbered around 1700 and reached over 7000 in 2004 (Freedom House, 1998: 346; 2004: 8). However, only about 10% of this number is considered to be fully active, as one of the main challenges faced by these organisations is the mean to hire permanent staff (Freedom House, 2004: 8). Moreover, most of the Latvian decision-makers believe that cooperation with NGOs does not improve the quality of decisions (Freedom House, 2004: 10). The European Union has injected money in the consolidation of NGOs in Latvia through the PHARE programme; the EU has also reported the consultation of ethnic minorities NGOs on issues such as social integration (European Commission, 1999: 17).

In general, the Russian minority has access to information in its own language. Until 1999, one newspaper was published in both Latvian and Russian (*Diena*), until its Russian media room was closed down due to the lack of Russian readers (Freedom House, 2004: 12). Another newspaper did the same thing, except that the opposite situation occurred and the owners favoured the Russian language, and they created the *Vechernaia Riga*. The Russian-speakers have access to 11 newspapers in their language on a total of 28, whether at the national or regional/local levels (Media in Latvia). Until 2003, television broadcasting had to be composed of 75% Latvian language and programs during a 24-hour period. The Constitutional court's judgement changed this by deciding that only market considerations will determine the language in which the broadcasting will be diffused (Freedom House, 2004: 11).

#### ***2.2.4 Statistical data on the situation of the Russian minority<sup>4</sup>***

- *Political level*

The Russians represent 30% of Latvia's population. If we consider their representatives of same ethnic origins in the parliamentary elections, they are well below their proportion. The highest proportion they have attained in the parliament is 14%, and this was in the latest elections in 2002, when the language requirement was abolished (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia).

In regard to local elections, we witness an augmentation of the number of candidates from 2001 to 2005, also probably due to the changes in the language requirement to run in elections. The number of candidates of Russian origins is well below their proportion in Latvian society, so are those who get elected to be members of city councils: they represented 4% of elected members in 2001 and 2005 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). The Latvians were almost 16 times more numerous in terms of candidates in each of the elections, and 19 times more numerous than Russians in regard to elected members.

The redrawing of districts and cities limits may be another explanation for the low representation Russian minority. In 1989, Russians were more numerous than Latvians in four cities and one district, and in the other cities and districts, the Latvians were less than the majority in four more cases. Many modifications to the law on municipalities have redrawn the boundaries of the cities and districts once Latvia

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<sup>4</sup> Tables with complete data will be provided in the Annex

became independent, and resulted in a totally different scheme: now, only three cities have either a majority of Russians or a plurality. Latvians are less than the majority of the population in four districts. In the rest of the districts and city, the Latvians usually represent more than 60% of the population.

- *Education*

Education is important to be considered because schools allow the Russians to perpetuate their culture from one generation to the other, and also because it shows the openness of society in regard to minority education when they allow gaining it in their own language.

In terms of preschools, the number of establishment using Russian as the language of instruction has drastically diminished, passing from 153 in 1994 to 64 in 2004 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). Similarly, the number of establishments teaching in both Latvians and Russian has also diminished, although slightly in comparison to the Russian schools passing from 111 in 1994 to 101 in 2004 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). The same diminishing trend is observable in the enrolment. As it can be expected, the trend is the opposite in regard to Latvian-language preschools: the number of institutions has augmented passing from 342 in 1994 to 384 in 2004 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). The same trend is observable in general schools enrolment (high school) (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia).



- *Migration*

In the aftermath of Latvia's independence many Russians wanted to leave the country. In 1995, more than 10 000 Russians left the country (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). This pace has somewhat slowed down in the following years as in 2000 and 2001 Russian emigration reached a number around 3700 individuals (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). It continued to slow down, however, remained steady between 980 and 1330 in the following years (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia).

## 2.3 Hungary

### *2.3.1 Legislation affecting the Roma minority*

The constitution of Hungary sets the base for legislations affecting the Roma. It recognizes cultural diversity and the contribution of ethnic minorities to Hungarian society and history particularly through article 68, which also responsabilizes the state in taking action for the promotion of this diversity and their representation (The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary). Article 32b also establishes a Parliamentary ombudsman for the rights of national and ethnic minorities (The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary). The constitution also establishes the “right to form local and national bodies for self-government” to national and ethnic minorities (The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, article 68). The groups identified as ethnic minority groups in Hungary through many legislations, notably the legislation on “The Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities”, and those who are allowed to form self-governments are Bulgarians, Gypsy (Roma), Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian. They have been identified as such by criteria based on history.

“The Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities” gives even more weight to the articles entrenched in the Constitution by giving provisions that are being applied in a number of policy fields such as culture, politics, education and language. In general terms, the law prohibits policies of assimilation and persecution, or policies that aim to force displacement or evacuation of ethnic minorities, or also aimed at creating disadvantageous conditions in territories where minorities live (Law on the

Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, Chapter 1, article 4). The law specifically addresses individual (Chapter 2) and collective rights (Chapter 3) of ethnic minorities. Article 9 is probably the most representative concerning individual rights of members of minorities: the Hungarian government is obliged to promote equality of opportunity in politics and culture for individuals from ethnic minorities through “effective measures”. However, these measures are not specifically described. Under chapter 3, many guarantees are given to minority communities: the government needs to ensure that public television and radio broadcast minority programmes, the communities have the right to create conditions favourable for kindergarten, primary, secondary and higher education in the mother tongue or bilingual, to establish national networks, being represented at the National Assembly and to continue to perpetuate their culture.

The formation of minority self-governments is probably one of the most important collective rights granted to ethnic and national minorities in Hungary. The role and functioning of these institutions get specified under this law. First of all, minority self-governments can be formed at the local (or by districts in Budapest), municipal and national levels. There are two ways to form minority self-governments: either directly or indirectly. In the first case, the candidates are directly elected by the minority population. Municipal governments can declare themselves a minority municipal government if one ethnic minority group hold 50% of the seats. On the other hand, if more than 30% of a municipal government are from one particular minority, the representative can form a minority self-government with a minimum of 3 members per minority, and that would be considered as an indirectly formed minority self-government. Local self-government

must be formed by a minimum of 3 representatives for settlement of 1300 population and lower, the others they have to be a minimum of 5 representatives (and capital city districts), whereas the capital city need to be a minimum of 9 representatives. The national minority government is elected by minority electors composed of minority representatives at the municipal governments, minority governments representatives and spokespersons.

The role of minority self-government is similar at the local and municipal levels. They have the authority and competence to approach any public body on issues affecting the minorities. They have the power to ask for information, make proposal, initiate measures, and object to a practice or decision. Basically, they have an advisory role, even if the public bodies are obliged to answer positively or not to their requests. The law makes cooperation between regular local and municipal governments with minority institutions. Moreover, regular local and municipal governments need to get the approval of minority governments when they take decisions that may have an impact on the situation of minorities.

The national self-government has an independent decision-making power on its location and budget, the nation-wide feast of the minority represented by it, the award of medals, the principals and means for the utilisation of television and radio channels at its disposal, the publication of its press releases, the establishment, organisational structure and mode of operation of its institutions, the maintenance of a theatre, a national minority museum, a library, institute of arts and/or sciences and a publishing house, etc. On all

other matters, the national self-government has an advisory power.

In addition to the self-governments, the minorities have the ability to determine a local spokesperson for the group. This position has been created to make sure every minority of a particular locality has an advisory power and the right to be heard by the local government.

At the educational level, the law sets obligations for the municipal government and the state to provide education in the minority language, according to the feasibility and the demands. Eight minority parents can request a minority class and it needs to be offered. In regard to education, the Roma minority is specifically aimed by the law: "to relieve the disadvantages of the Gypsy minority in the field of education specific educational conditions may be introduced" (The Law on the Rights of Ethnic and National Minorities, Chapter 6, article 45 (2)).

The use of minority language is not restricted in Hungary. In the case of civil or criminal proceedings, the individuals from minority groups can obtain that it may be in their mother tongue. The representatives sitting at the National Assembly can also use their language when they intervene, so it is the case for other governments' institutions. The local governments must publish their regulations and announcements in Hungarian and the minority language if a minority self-government requests it.

Through this law, the government of Hungary establishes a foundation which

would procure financial support for minority self-governments and other minority organisations (The Law on the Rights of Ethnic and National Minorities, Chapter 8, article 55). The board of trustees of the foundation is headed by one representative from each national minority self-government, one person appointed by each political party represented in the National Assembly, five persons coming from five different ministries.

### ***2.3.2 Political Parties and their platforms***

Generally speaking, the change of regime in Hungary radically modified the political scene of the country. The incorporation of liberal democracy brought an increase in the number of political parties: in 1998, the Freedom House reports that nearly 200 political parties were registered (Freedom House, 1998: 279). In the 1998 national elections, 20 parties competed for seats in the National Assembly. However, this number drastically diminished and by 2001, the number of political parties registered was of 75 (Freedom House, 2001:198). Thus, we can say that the political system is partially fragmented due to its mixed-members system that combines both proportional and single-constituencies for elections, and it is also stable because elections have been held regularly and that no government has felt due to a confidence vote. The existence of the 5% threshold at the national level for proportional elections also helps the country to maintain a lesser fragmented parliament.

Because only few political parties won seats in the parliament in the democratic elections, we will concentrate only on parties that obtained seats during these elections. Despite this focus, it is worth mentioning that many Roma political parties or politically

active associations exist in Hungary. Of the 11 ethnic minorities parties described by Bugajski (2000), four (4) are composed uniquely of Roma (namely the Nationality Council of Gypsies in Hungary –MCNU; the Roma Parliament- MRP; the Democratic Alliance of Hungarian Gypsies – MCDSz; and the Phralipe Independent Gypsy Association – PFCSz) and one (1) is a multiethnic party, the National Minority Roundtable (KK), which was originally composed of representatives from different minority organizations that elaborated the ethnic and national minority law (Bugajski, 2002: 364). According to the University of Essex database, only one Gypsy party ran in the elections of 1994, one mixed minority party ran in 1998, and two Roma parties ran in 2002. None of the parties won seats.

In 2001, the Alliance of Young Democrats and the Hungarian Civic Party coalition (Fidesz-MPP) concluded a deal for the 2002 elections with a Roma organization, *Lungo Drom* (Freedom House, 2002: 198). The objective was to allocate three (3) seats to Roma candidates on the national list and seven (7) seats on its regional list. However, the Freedom House remarks that “Florian Farkas (the leader of *Lungo Drom*) lacks credibility among many Roma organizations and intellectuals, in part because his organization is often perceived as avoiding conflict with government authorities on important Roma issues” (Freedom House, 2002: 198). With the deal, the Democratic Roma Party feared the division of the Roma vote, which would not enable it to pursue its political agenda (Freedom House, 2002: 198). The leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party - MSzP (at the time, Peter Medgyessy) met with 33 Roma groups (other than *Lungo Drom*) and took commitments to find solution to major problems affecting

the Roma minority (Freedom House, 2003: 292). The Democratic Roma Party is recognised to lean toward the MSzP. The 2002 elections resulted in the election of four (4) Roma representatives: two from the Fidesz-MPP coalition, and two from the MSzP. The local elections also resulted in an increase of the representation of Roma representatives in local governing bodies: 545 Roma representatives were elected, and 4 Roma mayors were also elected (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 9).

Since the political scene of the country is complex, a table with the political parties that won seats in the elections since 1990 can be found in the annex. The political scene is not divided along ethnic lines in Hungary even if some extremist factions exist within some parties and that political parties like the *Hungarian Justice and Life Party* (MIEP) who pursue a “xenophobic and anti-Semitic” agenda have been able to settle seats in some elections. All parties pursue generally broad political agenda, in line with their ideology. Pál Tamás (2005:130) argues that since 1994 all major political parties in Hungary have similar policy agenda toward the Roma. Basically, the status quo prevails in this field although the situation remains difficult for the Roma population.

### ***2.3.3 Evaluation by the Freedom House and the European Commission***

Non-governmental organizations have drastically increased with democratization: they numbered 40 000 in 1995, grow to 55 774 in 1997, to 65 335 in 2000, to 67 151 in 2001, to finally reach 68 000 in 2002 (Freedom House, 1998: 280 and Freedom House, 2003: 293). Almost 12% of the Hungarian population declared to be members of these organizations. However, the report mentions that many organization have registered



under non-profit and foundation, but are actually pursuing gains for private benefits (Freedom House, 1998: 280). Many of these NGOs have the possibility to obtain financing by organization such as the Open Society Institute and the PHARE networks. It is important to note that both of these programs have developed a particular interest in the minority issue in the financing of organizations. However, one of the most compelling problems in Hungary in regard to NGOs is that these organizations “are not financially viable and are dependent on the grants from Western NGOs and the Hungarian government (...) [and that] public opinion polls suggest that NGO activities are generally perceived negatively in Hungary” (Freedom House, 1998: 281-282). Most of the ethnic groups have their own civic and cultural organizations, but they are faced with these financial problems which disable them “to engage in costly activities like bringing lawsuits against government agencies” (Freedom House, 2001: 198; Freedom House, 2002:199).

In regard to ethnic and national minorities representation in the parliament, Hungary’s Constitutional court ruled that they had the right to be proportionally represented, thus that the equivalent of 13 seats should be reserved for them (Freedom House, 1998: 287). However, in 1998, only one member was not Hungarian; he was from the German minority. The Roma were not represented. A bill was presented to the parliament to solve the problem, but was not adopted (Freedom House, 1998: 287). The situation in local governments is not better: in 1994, only 1% of mayoral posts were hold by a member of an ethnic or national minority, 3% of local government seats at all levels were hold by minority candidates; and the German was the better represented minority,

and the Roma the least (Freedom House, 1998: 289).

The Freedom House concludes in its 2003 report that “efforts throughout the 1990s to ensure Roma representation either by guaranteeing seats, lowering the threshold for party representation of minority parties, or creating advisory seats in Parliament have never been implemented successfully” (Freedom House, 2003: 291). During the elections for the National Gypsy self-government in 2003, many irregularities occurred which led to a Supreme Court rule to repeat the elections (Freedom House, 2004: 5). The results of the second elections removed the *Lungo Drom* from an eight (8) year domination to let the place to the Democratic Roma coalition with 52 seats on 53 (Freedom House, 2004: 5). Moreover, it is stated in the 2004 reports that many minority representatives got elected to further their personal interest as many of them were not from minorities, nor did minorities lived on the territory where the local minority self-governments were formed (Freedom House, 2004: 5).

On the situation of Roma, the 1998 report mentions that the “Roma continue to suffer *de facto* discrimination in employment and housing and have suffered severely from economic restructuring of the country. They have also been the victims of attacks by skinheads and vigilantes” (Freedom House, 1998: 289). Opinion polls also show that 50% of Hungarians hold a negative impression of Roma (Freedom House, 1998: 289). The Freedom House identifies the Roma minority as being “Hungary’s greatest political and social problem” because they experience frequent discrimination by the police, and also in the area of employment and education (Freedom House, 2001:197). Moreover, the

report states that the Roma's situation deteriorated during that year, and that the people were still enduring poverty and deprivation (Freedom House, 2001: 197).

Although the government eliminated the separate settlements for Roma by the mid-1990s, 60% of Roma are still living in segregated neighbourhood (Freedom House, 2001: 199). Moreover, there have been instances where local governments refused the move of Roma families into their territories: in 1997, the city of Zámoly decided to demolish the houses of Roma families, and no local government offered them hospitality, they had to be moved from one temporary settlement to another (Freedom House, 2001: 199). Some families moved to France, with the refugee status, and filed a case against the government of Hungary to the European Court of Human Rights (Freedom House, 2001: 199; Freedom House, 2002:197). However, their case was rejected because the ECHR claimed that they did not exhaust all local remedies (Freedom House, 2002: 197).

The discrimination made by the local governments to the Roma has dramatic impact on their ability to find work and gain unemployment benefits. The modification of the Social Security Act made compulsory "public interest work" in order to obtain unemployment benefit during a longer period of time, but many local governments do not want to employ Roma for these jobs. Moreover, no preferential treatment has been established for Roma for public employment (Freedom House, 2001: 199). NGOs and the parliamentary commissioner for minority rights have observed that governmental agencies and local governments often use the neutral worded laws to indirectly discriminate the Roma (Freedom House, 2001: 203; Freedom House, 2002: 206). In

2001, the Roma community launched a radio station “Radio C” to address problems lived by Roma (Freedom House, 2002: 206).

The European Commission’s evaluations used a more positively worded approach to the situation of the Roma in Hungary. Already in 1998, Hungary had agreed and ratified the major international human rights instruments, like the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (European Commission, 1998: 9). The European Commission suggests that the Roma are not always receiving equal treatments before the law as are the majority of the population (European Commission, 1998: 11). The commission congratulated Hungary for the submission of a Roma medium-term action plan, but bring some nuances to this by mentioning that not enough money seems to be available for its realization (European Commission, 1998: 11). Maybe something important to be mentioned here is that since the publication of the 1999 report of the European Commission, Hungary is identified as fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, even if two areas still needing attention from the government, one of them being the situation of the Roma (the other is corruption) (European Commission, 2000: 13).

The 1998 annual report indicates that the Ombudsman for National and Ethnic Minorities examined 352 petitions during that year and that the majority of them were related to Roma; furthermore, close to half of them reported situation where Roma were victims of violation of minority rights at the individual or collective levels (European Commission, 1998: 11). The situation did not change, as in the 2001 Commission’s report, it is mentioned that complaints submitted increased of 12% (European

Commission, 2001: 19). The situation stayed the same as 453 new cases were registered at the Ombudsman office in the following year (European Commission, 2002: 30).

The ombudsman highlighted in 1998 that one of the reason Roma children suffered from discrimination was that they are segregated in different classes or groups in the educational system even if the law prohibits this (European Commission, 1998:11). More than 150 segregated schools are remaining, and reflect the institutional prejudice still existing in Hungarian society towards them (European Commission 1999:15; European Commission, 2000: 20; European Commission, 2001 and European Commission, 2002). It is important to notice that the ombudsman report dealing with this situation was rejected by the ministry in 1998 (European Commission, 1998:11).

Since Roma have been victims of discrimination from the police force for a long time, the government changed the way it used to functions. Now, “each time a complaint is made, the police have the obligation to receive the representatives from the local self-governments in a case of complaint” (European Commission, 1999: 15). Ill treatments from the police were still not eradicated by 2000, as the Commission’s report addresses this point again (European Commission, 2000: 18). As high as 80% of Roma detainees reported mistreatment in the course of the investigation (European Commission, 2000: 18). Steps to reduce this trend have been taken by the government in 2000 with the creation of the “Roma Policemen Programme” to encourage candidatures in the police force from members of the Roma community and increase the cooperation of the force with local Roma organizations (European Commission, 2000: 19). Despite these steps

forward, in 2001, a police raid was conducted against a Roma settlement (European Commission, 2002: 27).

Discrimination in all fields seems to be the major problem identified in all the reports of the European Commission. In 2000, the government signed the Protocol no.12 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which prohibits discrimination (European Commission, 2001: 19). But no law has been adopted in Hungary to sanction discriminative behaviour (European Commission, 2001: 19 and European Commission, 2002).

The European Union has invested considerably for the integration of the Roma in Hungarian society. It invested €5 million for the integration of Roma in school and employment through the 1999 PHARE program (European Commission, 1999:7). On another issue, the equivalent of €17 million was reserved for cross-border cooperation with Austria (€10m), Romania (€5m) and Slovakia (€2m) (European Commission, 1999: 8). An additional €2 million for cooperation with Slovenia was added to this in 2000 (European Commission, 2000: 9). The Delegation of the European Commission to Hungary is ultimately responsible for the allocation of funding to projects in the country because it plays the role of checks and balance. However, shared responsibility starts to occur as soon as the funds become available: the National Authorising Officer (NAO) who is the head of all financing programmes is selected by the national government and reports to the Commission; the implementing agencies are located within specific ministries in the country, but fall under the authority of the NAO. The transfer of full

responsibility for its management is only done after the accession in the European Union. In Hungary, a ministerial agency under the Hungarian State Treasury was created for this purpose and is called the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU). Other implementing agencies exist depending on the objective of the fund.

Starting in the 1999 report, the European Commission largely discussed the medium-term plan adopted by the Hungarian government without much going in depth about it (European Commission, 1999:15). Moreover, annual action plans will be drawn with the consultation of National Roma self-government and the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities (European Commission, 1999: 15). An interministerial committee is also formed to handle Roma affairs within each of the ministries touched by the action plan. In 2000, the Commission reports that the country launched specific measures in area such as education, with the creation of scholarships and support for educational institutions, in the cultural field with the opening of Roma community houses, in employment, with the creation of public work programmes and public utility programmes, in housing, health and the anti-discrimination field (European Commission, 2000: 19). However, no evaluation of these programmes and initiatives are given in the report. In its 2001 report, the European Commission mentions that an improvement in regard to education was the availability of these services in their language at kindergarten and primary levels (European Commission, 2001: 22). Moreover, money was also injected in the field of health, to improve conditions of all Roma community. With this money, health centres have been created by the government (European Commission, 2001: 23). The National Self-Government will be the prime actor in the implementation

of this new strategy.

Local conflict management centers have also been put in place and they will give free legal advices to members of the Roma minority (European Commission, 2001: 23). However, the costs associated with proceedings if the case is not upheld are not covered (European Commission, 2002: 32).

In 2001, Radio C was born and aimed at reached through its broadcast the Roma community and around one hour of the programmes are offered in the minority language (European Commission, 2001: 23). Although some progress has been made on this field, the Roma magazine diffused on the Hungarian public television faced a considerable budget decrease which endangered its operations (European Commission, 2001: 23). But the medium-term strategy gets critiqued in the 2002 Commission's report because the programme itself does not provide detailed strategy to remediate properly to the problems (European Commission, 2002: 31).

The European commission observed that the number of local self-governments has almost doubled in one year, which is interpreted by the commission as being a reflection of increasing participation of Roma in public life (European Commission: 1999:15). In the Commission's 2001 report, local self-governments are identified to be a tool encouraging the empowerment of minorities because they can have an impact on linguistic, cultural and educational rights (European Commission, 2001: 23). However, by 2001, no progress was made for the obtainment of seats for minorities in the parliament even if the constitutional court ruled in "1992 that the absence of such a system is unconstitutional" (European Commission, 2001: 15). No measures have been



decided yet on this matter.

In regard to financing Roma self-governments, a total of €5.5 million was given by the government and Roma foundations (European Commission, 1999: 15). However, the commission critiques the adequacy of the amounts engaged into the realization of the medium-term program and annual action plans because the government does not give enough (European Commission, 1999: 16). Subsequently in 2000, the government injected €19 million of its budgetary resources for the implementation and realization of the medium-term plan and was seen as an important step forward by the Commission (European Commission, 2000: 19). The only comments on that by the European Commission were that these efforts will need to be sustained over time (European Commission, 2000: 21). In 2001, the Commission writes that the government strengthened the “policy instruments and measures to improve the rights of minorities, with particular emphasis on the situation of the Roma” (European Commission, 2001: 22). The budget to implement the actions foreseen in the medium-term action plan in regard to ethnic minority increase substantially of 30% during the annual period, to amount for €35 million (European Commission, 2001: 22). Of this money injected for the implementation of the plan, €23 million directly targeted the Roma minority. It amounted to €49 million in 2002 (European Commission, 2002: 31). However, on the ground the actions are not felt yet as there is a lack of coordination between the different ministerial instances involved (European Commission, 2001: 22). This situation led the European Commission to recommend in 2001 that “the introduction of impact assessment mechanisms would help to improve the focus of the various measures on the target

population (...) [and that] more active participation of the Roma minority in public life, including through their representation in Parliament, would give a further impetus to the process” (European Commission, 2001: 24).

An interesting step was taken in 2002, when the Prime Minister’s office became responsible for National and Ethnic Minorities and that a special political State Secretary was appointed to deal more particularly with the Roma because the community got separated from the other minorities at that level (European Commission, 2002: 31). Subsequently, a Roma Coordination Council was set up to foster the development of a new Roma policy around the country (European Commission, 2002: 31). The Commission notes that the “Roma policy is not well integrated into general social development strategies and exists as a separate and parallel project” (European Commission, 2002: 32).

Interestingly, the European Commission praised Hungary on the international level. The European Commission underline the distinctions Hungary has gained during various years: the country received the Refugee prize in 1998. In the 2000 report, the European commission points out the international recognition gained by efforts done by the government to create opportunities for disabled people, which led to the earning of the “Franklin Delano Roosevelt International Disability Award Prize” (European Commission, 2000: 19).

Even if the Commission reacts positively to the actions taken by Hungary to

improve the situation of the Roma, they recognized every year that the situation continues to be difficult, especially due to the fact that positive results will only be seen in the medium-term. Despite this situation, it did not stop the government start thinking about a long-term plan for the improvement of Roma' situation in the country by increasing their integration in the Hungarian society, but not many details are given at this point since it was not adopted yet in 2002 (European Commission, 2001: 22 and European Commission, 2002: 32).

#### ***2.3.4 Statistical data on the situation of the Roma<sup>5</sup>***

First of all, we need to acknowledge that getting data on Roma is difficult since many countries, like Hungary, have used their constitutional provision against discrimination so that statistical data divided by ethnic background is seen as discriminative or could lead to other forms of discrimination. It is against the law to keep records of nationality or ethnicity and many organizations and authors have contested this issue (Tamás, 2005:130; Clark, 1998; ERRC; Open Society Institute). However, many NGOs and governmental agencies have published on the subject and this is how we got the following information.

This statistical problem is also politically reflected through the elections of minority self-governments because the ballots are distributed to all citizens. Tamás (2005: 130) claims that fewer than 10% of the votes for the elections of Roma self-governments are actually from Roma citizens. This problem led to the adoption of a law

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<sup>5</sup> Tables are available in the annex

in 2005 for the registration of Roma voters.

The Roma are estimated to be between 400 000 to 800 000 depending on the source used (Open Society Institute, 2001: 16).

- *Education*

The Roma population has a very low level of education in comparison to the majority population in Hungary. Nine percent (9%) of the Roma population has no education whatsoever (in comparison to 0 for the rest of the population), 33% do not finish primary school (grade 1-7) (11% in the rest of the population), and 46% actually get their primary school diploma (grade 8) (in comparison to 36% for the majority) (Ringold, 2000:53). A total of 11% go to vocational schools in comparison to 19% for the rest of the population, 2% get high school diplomas (against 24% for the rest of the population) and none to university (compared to 9% for the majority of the population) (Ringold, 2000: 53).

The picture for elected representatives at the Roma self-governments is similar: 63% only have primary education level, 25% have a vocational diploma, only 8% have a high school diploma and 3% have a post-secondary education (Ferenc and Kovács Ilina, 1999:73). These data have been obtained from all 420 elected Roma self-governments.

A scholarship system has been put in place by the government in order to encourage the Roma minority to obtain diplomas and prevent school drop-out. The number of scholarships offered has increased every year passing from 750 in 1998, to

12 000 in 2001, and reached the number of 19 000 in 2003 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 10). The money offered was coming from different sources: the state and public foundations aiming at support minorities, especially Roma, activities.

- *Minority Self-Government*

On 754 minority self-government in Hungary in 1994, 412 (55%) are Roma self-governments, and with the exception of one self-government, all of them are directly elected (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 66). Hungary is divided in 19 counties plus the city of Budapest divided in districts. The most numerous Roma self-governments were in the counties of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (84 Roma self-governments on a total of 97), Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (47 Roma self-governments on a total of 50), Heves (37 out of 38), Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok (26 out of 26 are Roma governments), Hajdú-Bihar (24 out of 28), and Somogy (20 out of 24) (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 67). Most of these counties are situated in the North-Eastern part of Hungary except for Somogy which is in the South-Western part of the country. A table with the total number of Roma self-governments in 1994 is included in the annex. Elections for Roma self-governments were also held in 1998 and 2002 and showed a drastic increase in their number: 764 Roma self-governments were formed in 1998, and a total of 998 were formed in 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 5).

Interestingly, the activity sector of the Roma representatives in the self-government is very diversified. They are almost evenly distributed between the public

sector, the service sector and the entrepreneurial sector that each amount respectively for 32%, 31% and 27% of the total representatives' occupation (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 75). Only 4% of the members work in the cooperative field, and 6% are qualified to be in other activity sectors (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 75). These data can provide us with a broad picture, but they do not define precisely the situation because only 118 Roma self-governments were surveyed on this (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 75). Moreover, when the number of Roma self-government increase in another table to survey the employment status of Roma representatives, the picture is quite different, and the statistics may be more reliable since 409 Roma self-governments have been surveyed for that (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 76). The Roma have the lowest level of employment in comparison to the other minorities in Hungary. Only 23% of the members of Roma self-governments declare to be employed (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 76). In regard to unemployment rate, the situation is also alarming because 32% claim to be unemployed, which is the highest rate among the minorities (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 76). The rest of the members are dispersed as follow: 23% of the members are pensioners, 4% are on welfare, 6% are on income supplements, 7% autonomous workers, and 3% were on maternity leave (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 76).

Financial assistance is crucial for the functioning of self-governments, and especially how it gets used once offered. On the type of support offered by the government, almost 44% of the budget is allocated to cover operative costs for running the Roma self-governments, 2.7% offered as a general support, 8.2% allocated for the organisation of events, 12.3% directed toward hiring help to obtain other sources of

financing (grants) for the organization (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 84). Another interesting thing on sources of financing is their origins. The Roma are the minority receiving the least from domestic sources and from abroad according to data prior to 1999 (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 85).

It is the responsibility of the self-government to determine how best the funds will be distributed in the organization of their community. Most of the budget coming from the state is directed toward the operational costs which use 33% of the budget, and 25% to pay for honoraria. Of the budget left for the organization of activities or the offering of services, 12% is directed toward social assistance to the minority's members, 10% in the organization of cultural and sports events, 8% in education, and 1% in development. The rest of the budget (11%) is used for other purposes (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 86).

Self-governments receive funding through grants and these are directed toward particular activities. Of the grants obtained, 51% are for cultural activities, 32% for welfare, 18% concerns social assistance, 10% are directed toward education (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 87). The grants received for the Roma minority is almost similar to the amount received by the Germans, even if the Germans do not represent a large proportion of the minorities' population in Hungary (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 87).

Another interesting table in Ferenc and Kovács Ilona (1999: 146) is the evaluation of the Ethnic and National Minorities Office done by the self-governments. Although not many self-governments (only 88) have been interviewed, their attitude seems to be pretty

positive toward the Office according to 56.8% of the people. Only 22.7% said that they thought the Office offered them poor services, and 8% thought that the Office work was definitely bad (Ferenc and Kovács Ilona, 1999: 146).

- *Discrimination and Violence*

According to Minorities at Risk's recording of events up to 1995, out of 40 events, 13 are related to violence and discrimination against Gypsies. Most of them have been inflicted by skinheads/neo-Nazis or the police (Minorities at Risk). According to the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC, 1999), "numerous racially motivated killings have taken place since 1989 (and) the police investigators and prosecutors rarely apply criminal code provisions on racially motivated crimes." Police brutality is explained by the stigmatised perception that is still prevailing among the police force, where "about 80% of Hungarian police officers consider Roma violent and 54% believe that a criminal way of life is a key element in the Romani identity" (ERRC, 1999).

- *Non-Profit Organizations*

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004: 4), 96 non-profit Roma organizations were registered in 1991, and reached the number of 260 by 2001. These organizations have been pretty active in offering community services, and they created with state, public foundations and EU subsidies what is called "Gypsy Community houses" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 11).



## **2.4 Romania**

### ***2.4.1 Legislation affecting the Hungarian Minority***

The Constitution of Romania is the first legal document that indicates well the relationship maintained between the majority and the minorities in the country. Strikingly, the constitution starts with a strong article on the sovereignty of the state: “Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State” (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 1(1)). Although the constitution does not precisely recognize the multinational composition of its population, article 4 provides the base for a pluralist society recognizing the equality of all Romanian citizens “without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin” (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 4 (2)). Specifically in regard to minorities, the article 6 is the most important because it discusses the “right to identity”. Basically, it states that “the State recognizes and guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities, to the preservation, development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity” (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 6 (1)). Parameters for the implementation of these guarantees are detailed in the following paragraph and basically states that “the protecting measures taken by the Romanian State for the preservation, development and expression of identity of the persons belonging to national minorities shall conform to the principles of equality and non-discrimination in relation to the other Romanian citizens” (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 6(2)).

Although it is common for all States to integrate international treaties into

domestic legislation once they have been ratified, Romania add to this practice that not only will this happen, but especially in the case of human rights, if contradictions between domestic laws and international treaties exist, the latter would prevail over the other (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 20(2)). It is worth mentioning that the constitution recognizes Romanian as the only official language of the country (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 13). Another important article in the constitution that may affect the Hungarian minority is the one setting criteria for the holding of public offices or dignity, civil or military positions: citizens that hold these positions must “only and exclusively have the Romanian citizenship and whose domicile is in Romania” (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 16). Concerning the elections, the constitution guarantee the representation of all minorities in the Deputies chamber by giving them one seat if one of their minority organization does not reach more than the minimum threshold (Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 59).

The constitution was modified in 2003 and a few amendments concerned the minorities. Under the article 32 concerning education in Romania, minorities are now allowed to receive education in their mother tongue (Constitution of Romania, 2003, article 32). Article 127 also guarantees legal proceedings in the mother tongue of national minorities (Constitution of Romania, 2003, article 127).

The electoral law of the country allowed for the representation of many parties in the chambers. In 1992, the threshold was of 3% for regular political parties, and 4% for coalitions (Law on Elections of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 1992, article 66

and 91). In 2000, an emergency ordinance raised the threshold to 5% (Freedom House, 2003: 477). The 1996 Law on Political Parties modified the number of members required to be registered as a political party to put it higher than it used to be in the 1989 law: it passed from a minimum of 250 people to 10,000 members (1996 Law on Political Parties; and Freedom House, 1998: 465). However, minorities are somewhat exempted from these measures because minorities organization can run during elections without actually being political parties (1992 Law on Elections of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate; 1996 Law on Political Parties; and Council of Europe, 1999: 54). A special exception was made for national minorities' organizations with an amendment to the electoral law in 2000 for allowing them to use the same candidate lists in many electoral constituencies (Law on Elections of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 2000, article 5 (8)).

Other pieces of legislation are of great importance for the minorities. However, access to this information was difficult. The Education law was amended in 1995 to allow for the education of students in their minority language, except for specific courses mentioned in the law, and to publish material like textbooks in minority languages (Council of Europe, 1999: 43-44; and Open Society Institute, 2001: 413). However, in 2001, modifications to this law placed the teaching of minority languages in school at the discretion of school directors and the number of inspectors for minorities was reduced to one per county. (Open Society Institute, 2001: 414). The right to be taught in a minority language was subsequently entrenched in the constitution.

In 1993, a Council for national minorities was formed through legislation by the

government to give advice on legislation drafts (Constantin, 2004:3). The Department of the Protection of National Minorities was created in 1997, with mandates such as the initiation of bills and advices on others that are affecting minorities, monitor the application of national and international legislations, etc. (Council of Europe, 1999: 57). The Department was later replaced by the Department of Inter-ethnic relations, within the Ministry of Public Information. Reporting was thus changed because the minorities did not have a minister directly reporting to the Prime Minister; instead it was a secretary of state (Open Society Institute, 2001: 422). The mandates stayed the same, but the new head of the office stated that “the current executive was concerned with depoliticising interethnic relations...” (Open Society Institute, 2001: 422).

Since 1996, with the amendment of the Law on Local Public Administration, national minorities' individuals are now allowed to demand for services in their language if they are judged to be considerably numerous in the region (Council of Europe, 1999:37). In the case of local elections, no specific measures were taken for dealing with the representation of national minorities. However, the law provided for legal provision to give media visibility to minority candidate in their own language, according to their proportion in the region where they run for election (Council of Europe, 1999: 56).

#### ***2.4.2 Political Parties and their platforms***

The transition to democracy in Romania was drastic: for the first parliamentary elections in 1990, 71 political parties and organizations, plus many independents, ran for seats in the Chamber of deputies (Essex University, 1990 Parliamentary Elections: Chamber of Deputies). In 1992, it was 79 political parties, plus many independents

running again for the elections (Essex University, 1992 Parliamentary Elections: Chamber of Deputies). Subsequent amendments to the electoral law were made to reduce the number of political parties, but they remained very high. For the 1996 parliamentary elections, 64 political parties and organizations plus many independents ran for the elections, and in 2000, 37 political organizations ran for the elections and 3 independents (Essex University, 1996 and 2000 Parliamentary Elections: Chamber of Deputies). Worth mentioning, Romania has adopted a bicameral system, and both of these chambers have about the same number of political parties running for each election. This exemplifies the high fragmentation of the political system in Romania.

Even if not all these political parties obtained seats in the parliament, the parties that do so still remain high; this affects the degree of volatility of the system by rendering governments and coalitions unstable. Maybe the only positive aspect of this system is the plurality of interests that has the chance to be represented in the chambers. Precisely because the Romanian political system is complex, we will focus on important political parties only.

The *Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania* (UDMR) is the most stable political organization to be elected since the transition to democracy in the country. The UDMR has won many seats in every parliamentary election and even participated in the 1996 government coalition. The UDMR is also very successful at the local level. The party was formed to represent the interests of Hungarians in Romania by focusing on self-determination. According to the party, about 95% of the Hungarians in Romania vote

for them (UDMR website). The party itself is formed of many factions, each having a different political agenda, it includes about 16 different parties and associations (Bugajski, 2002: 865). Other minorities' political parties fighting for the interests of Hungarian interests and/or other minorities exist in Hungary, but none of them have been successful in securing seats in the parliament.

One backlash effect of the success of the UDMR in Romania was the success of nationalist Romanian political parties. Although Romania has historically been 'nationalistic', two parties have been particularly successful in the elections since 1990: the *Romanian National Unity Party* (PUNR) and the *Greater Romania Party* (PRM). The PUNR was basically anti-Hungarian and pretended to defend the interests of the Romanian in Transylvania (Bugajski, 2002: 857). The party has been part of the 1994 government coalition, and through its electoral coalition with the Democratic National Salvation Front, the party was able to win the mayoral seat in Cluj, which is formed of about 25% of Hungarians (Bugajski, 2002: 857). The mayor pursued anti-minority policies and ethnic tensions escalated in the region (Bugajski, 2002: 857). Most of its members are also members of *Vatra* (VR), another ultra-nationalist party that organized many anti-Hungarians demonstration in the country, demanded for the removal of privileges granted to Hungarians, and threatening enough, the party had a high level of support from the military based in Transylvania (Bugajski, 2002: 859). The PRM was even more extremist in orientation: they disseminated propaganda on the UDMR which claimed that it was a terrorist organization, and the puppet of Hungary in Romania (Bugajski, 2002: 860). This party has not been in any government.

The other political parties in Romania have a more tempered opinion on the minorities in Romania and pursue a larger political agenda in concordance with their position on the political spectrum. We can only pretend on their opinion on the Hungarians if we look at the government coalitions formed with parties previously discussed. A table is available in the annex with the details on political parties and their participation in the government. Overall, we can say that there exist a division along ethnic lines in the political system in Romania, but the reality is tempered by the number of parties elected that have different platforms.

#### ***2.4.3 Freedom House and European Commission Reports***

The Freedom House reports often in its annual *Nations in Transit* surveys on Romania that a lot of information is not available to evaluate the real situation in Romania because it is either not reliable or official (Freedom House, 1998: 465). The reports themselves are less detailed in the information given with comparison to Hungary and Latvia's reports. Sometimes the analysis given in the same report is contradictory. For example, in 2001, the Freedom House states that "Romania's political system is fragile but not unstable" to later finish by saying that "the political crisis exemplified the instability Romania faces (...)" (Freedom House, 2001: 299). These contradictions and the lack of information in the report cast doubt on the reliability of the information given in these. However, they can still complement the reports done by the European Commission. Another important difference with Hungary and Latvia was noticed: in its 2003 report, the Freedom House was still not recognizing Romania as a consolidated democracy (Freedom House, 2003:475).

In 1998, around 23 000 non-governmental organizations were registered. However, only 2% of them were considered to be active (Freedom House, 1998: 465). Around 102 NGOs working on minority issues exist in the country, and 60 of them promote the right of the Hungarian minority (Freedom House, 2003: 481). The Freedom House reports that the government has made a few attempts to collaborate with the NGOs but it remains difficult for them to disseminate information to the government and the media (Freedom House, 1998: 467). Moreover, funding remains the central issue of most NGOs since most of them are continuously in a financially precarious situation and also for the fact that funding is mostly available to larger well-established organizations (Freedom House, 1999-2000: 510-511). One of the main factors influencing NGOs sustainability is the “lack of a participatory and philanthropic ethos in society” (Freedom House, 1999-2000: 510). However, the Freedom House will still qualify civil society in Romania as “relatively vibrant” (Freedom House, 2001: 300).

The influence of NGOs mostly occurs at the local level in Romania because the local representatives are thought to be more open and approachable than any other politicians (Freedom House, 1999-2000: 511). The Freedom House recognizes organised protest demonstrations as the most efficient mean to influence government (Freedom House, 1999-2000: 512 and Freedom House, 2001: 301). However, they are rarely invited to participate in the decisions at all levels, even if elected representatives have adopted legislation requiring them to meet with the public on a regular basis (Freedom House, 1999-2000: 512 and Freedom House, 2001: 301). Maybe one exception to all this is the adoption by government of a Law on Freedom of Information in 2002, which was



pushed by NGOs (Freedom House, 2003: 475). However, this was followed by the adoption of a Law of State Secrets and Classified Information by the government, which reduced the gains obtained by the previous law because it allows them to arbitrarily chose what information shall be divulgated to the public (Freedom House, 2003: 475 and 488).

One central problem in Romania is corruption. For this reason, many NGOs (and most often, international NGOs) focus on increasing governmental transparency (Freedom House, 1999-2000: 511). Romania has been widely criticised by the lack of the existence of an independent national electoral bureau to monitor the elections. In 1996, one Romanian NGO took the initiative to monitor the elections (Freedom House, 2001: 299).

Although freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution, the government has passed legislation that restricts this freedom in certain ways and that also allows for punitive measures when the legislation is not respected. Moreover, legislation was passed to allow politicians to reply to public allegations on them in the media. The penal code of the country stipulates that the penalties for libel and slander coming from journalists can be as high as 2 to 5 years in prison for libel or divulgation of false information (Freedom House, 2001: 302). In 1999, 6 journalists were in prison (Freedom House, 2001: 302). This situation is particularly problematic considering the fact that most journalist must rely on unofficial sources of information because departmental secretaries decides whether or not journalist will enter in contact with ministerial officials or not (Freedom

House, 2001: 302). Journalists and media outlet are harassed by the government through lawsuits (Freedom House, 2003: 486). Romania has received international and European pressure to remove these punitive measures, especially because these do not meet European standards (Freedom House, 2003: 484). Corruption is also an issue in the information area since most of the media rely on or are dependent of state funding, which makes them vulnerable to political pressure (Freedom House, 2003:486). The Freedom House reports that the “ruling party interfered in several instances with freedom of the press and curtailed journalist’s rights” (Freedom House, 2003: 484).

One of the main problems of governance covered by the Freedom House is the reliance of the government on emergency ordinances to adopt legislation, which do not require or allow for democratic debate, consultation, and modification of the proposed bills. Since 2000, it is estimated that about one-third of the legislation adopted were through emergency ordinances, which amount to 228 on a total of 683 (Freedom House, 2003: 487). This situation has continued despite the “demands from NATO and the EU for stronger checks and balances” (Freedom House, 2003: 490).

The European Commission reports demonstrate that Romania started behind than Latvia and Hungary. Many issues are covered in the reports by the commission were either not covered nor extensively discussed by the commission in the case of Latvia and Hungary such as child protection, human trafficking, and corruption. In the 1997 Opinion, the European Commission did not recognize Romania as fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria, which was not the case for Latvia and Hungary (European Commission, 1998: 7). However, it considered it to be fulfilled at the end of 1998

(European Commission, 1998: 12), although this seems to be fragile considering the conclusion of the European Commission in 1999: “The Commission considers that, at the moment, Romania still fulfils the Copenhagen criteria although this position will need to be re-examined if the authorities do not continue to give priority to dealing with the crisis in their child care institutions” (European Commission, 1999: 19). The subsequent reports were not as severe as these, and simply recognized that Romania was fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria.

The European Commission reports that the NGOs are increasingly playing an important role in Romania and that some efforts have been made by the elected representatives to collaborate more with them (European Commission, 1998: 10). However, it seems that they are consulted too late in the process to really influence the decisions (European Commission, 2000: 16; European Commission, 2001: 18). In 2001, the Economic and Social Council was created to encourage the comments of social partners on the legislation that would have significant economic and social impact in the country (European Commission, 2001: 28). Similar councils have been created within all ministries and prefectures in the country (European Commission, 2001: 28). However, the systematic consultation of these councils have not occurred (European Commission, 2001: 28). In 2002, the European Commission observed that the Economic and Social council has had many opportunities to comment on draft legislations; however, it was often done at the last minute and the council had little time to respond (European Commission, 2002: 23; European Commission, 2003:17). NGOs have increasingly been consulted on important issues such as public access to information, the protection of

minorities and children (European Commission, 2002: 23).

The extensive use of ordinances for the adoption of legislation is criticized by the European Commission in many of its reports (European Commission, 1999: 12). The European Commission states that extensive use of this method can mix the legislative and executive power (European Commission, 1999: 12). It was only in the 2001 report that the reduction of the use of this method was mentioned, although it remained too common (European Commission, 2001: 17, European Commission, 2003:16). This cast doubt on the ability of the country to adopt the *acquis communautaires* following their negotiations because the time available to do so is quite short and also for the fact that the parliament has been faced with parliamentary research short-staffing for many years (European Commission, 2003: 14). To increase transparency in the legislative system, the “sunshine law” was adopted in 2003, and aimed at setting particular requirements to insure that the legislative process will be open and decisions transparent (European Commission, 2003: 16-17).

In 1998, the European Commission considered the protection of minorities in Romania to be satisfactory, except for the Roma (European Commission, 1998: 11). The main issue mentioned by the commission for the Hungarian minority was the adoption of an education law in Romania that would allow the creation of a Hungarian language University (European Commission, 1998: 11).

The PHARE program has been particularly generous to Romania. In 1999, the

Commission reported that Romania had benefited from € 28 million for strengthening human rights, democracy and the rule of law, €5 million for cross-border cooperation with Hungary, and €5 million for cross-border cooperation with Bulgaria (European Commission, 1999: 7). Supplemental funds were also allocated to fight against corruption and to catch up for EU accession in certain areas (European Commission, 1999: 7). From 1990 to 1999, it is estimated that the PHARE programme allocated € 1.2 billion to Romania (European Commission, 2000:9). From 2000 to 2002, PHARE is estimated to amount at € 242 million (European Commission, 2000: 8). The office holding the management of PHARE was first the European Commission delegation to Romania and became in 2001 the Romanian Ministry of European Integration (European Commission, 2001: 17).

The Freedom House underlined corruption as being a wide-spread phenomenon, even if many laws have tried to diminish its preponderance in the country without much success. Romania was ranked in 2000, 68<sup>th</sup> out of 90 countries in Transparency International's Corruption index (Freedom House, 2001: 306). Because of its large state apparatus, opportunities for corruption are numerous. It is especially wide-spread in the civil service. The Freedom House reports that "although it is possible to receive services without bribes, the process can be long and difficult. Almost all sections of the civil service have been affected by bribery" (Freedom House, 2001: 306).

Many institutions have been created and are involved in fighting corruption in the country; however, the persistent problem in Romania seems to be the discrepancies

between the laws and their actual implementation (European Commission, 1999: 13-14). The trend in corruption cases is not clear from the information obtained by the European Commission, but the cases seem to happen more often in the public area (European Commission, 1999: 14). In 2000, a law on the prevention and punishment of acts of corruption was adopted by the parliament, but its implementation remains difficult because the role of each institutions involved remains unclear (European Commission, 2000: 18-19). The Commission's 2001 report reveals that all political parties may as well be involved in corruption because their expenditures are higher than the revenues declared (European Commission, 2001: 21). No improvement has been made to resolve the situation (European Commission, 2001: 22). Although the situation did not change much by 2002, the government did sign many international conventions on anti-corruption and replaced ineffective institutions on the implementation of anti-corruption law in the country (European Commission, 2001:27). In 2003, many reforms were also brought in, with changes in the method of financing political parties and the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor office became operational although some problems remain (European commission, 2003: 21). In its 2004 annual report, the European Commission writes that political migration is a significant problem in the country and that "a number of independent reports have noted a correlation between the migrations of mayors [from the opposition parties to the ruling party] and the allocation of domestic and EU funds" (European Commission, 2004: 18).

Although the Romanian Constitution stipulates that international conventions ratified by the government become automatically part of the domestic legislation and that

in cases of contradictions, the international convention prevails over the domestic legislation, the European Commission reports that the implementation of this principle is doubtful since many cases have been brought up to the European Court of Human Rights instead of being solved at their national level (European Commission, 1999:15). Child protection is probably the main issue on which the EU focuses in each report in terms of human rights and that many International organizations got involved in the financing and monitoring of its evolution.

The European Commission underline that the media are generally free but that severe punishment entrenched in the criminal code limits the freedom of expression (European Commission, 1999:17; European Commission, 2000: 21). The criminal code is not considered to be meeting European standards especially in area such as “homosexuality, libel, insult, offence to authorities, verbal outrages, domestic violence and abuse” (European Commission, 1999: 17). Access to information is in the constitution; however by 2001 no legislation has been adopted to really implement these provisions (European Commission, 2001: 22). The European Commission doubts that Romania is complying with international standards and practices in this domain (European Commission, 2002: 33). The penal code was revised in 2002 for the reduction or the suppression of punishment that could be accorded to journalists (European Commission, 2002: 33). Although these show improvements from the part of the government, it was still not meeting the international and European standards, especially those of the European Court of Human Rights which Romania should be implementing on its own territory (European Commission, 2002: 33).

In its 1999 report, the European Commission writes that the conditions for the use of minority languages, particularly Hungarian have improved (European Commission, 1999: 18). Considerable improvements were made to provide a legal framework allowing the establishment of multicultural universities, allowing members of a particular minority to pursue education at all levels in its language (when the demand was sufficient) (European Commission, 1999: 18). However, these improvements have not settled the dispute on the creation of a public university, which would teach in Romanian, Hungarian and German (European Commission, 1999:18).

Hungary is particularly involved in the defence of Hungarians' rights in Romania. In 1999, both countries signed an agreement which aimed at increasing the number of lectures given in Hungarian, and also, to increase the number of bilateral exchange students (European Commission, 1999:19). In 2001, the courses started for 450 students in the private Hungarian University financed with the support of the Hungarian government (European Commission, 2001: 29).

Another gain for the Hungarians in Romania was the adoption of the law of local administration in 1999 which obliged the civil servants working with the public in areas where a minority represents at least 20% of the population to offer these services in the minority language, and bilingual signs in these localities would have to be put up (European Commission, 1999: 19). With the exception of the Roma, the European Commission recognizes that many consistent developments have occurred in the treatment of minorities in the country (European Commission, 2000: 24; European



Commission, 2002: 37). In its 2002 report, the Commission states that “human rights organisations provide evidence that certain local authorities have obstructed attempts by Csango to be taught the Hungarian language” (European Commission, 2002: 37). The situation of the Csango improved during the following year as two villages offered Hungarian classes (European Commission, 2003: 31). The constitutional revision of 2003 entrenched more situations where minority languages could be used: courts proceedings, local administration if they are in a considerable proportion (European Commission, 2003: 29). Romania is also signatory of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities since 1995, and has ratified it in 1998 (Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities).

The restitution of properties (agricultural land and forests) which were taken from ethnic minorities owners by the communist government under its regime was legislated in 1999 (European Commission, 1999: 19). However, its implementation remains slow and behind schedule, and the Senate has blocked the resolution on the issue for real estate until 2001, subsequently a legislation that went further than the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights was implemented and covered almost all confiscations under the communist regime (European Commission, 2000: 22; European Commission, 2001: 27). However, some problems remain as administrative procedures have not been precisely defined (European Commission, 2001: 27; European Commission, 2002: 34).

In 2000, the adoption of a legislation prohibiting discrimination on various

grounds (nationality, race, ethnicity, age, gender, or sexual orientation) was adopted by the Romanian parliament, and was complemented by heavy fines for its violation (European Commission, 2000: 21). However, the European Commission remains sceptic about its actual effects because it has not been implemented yet because secondary legislation essential to its operations was not adopted, nor was the implementing body created one year later (European Commission, 2000: 21; European Commission, 2001: 22).

Romania's major problem is the continuous discrepancies between the actual legislation and their implementation. The year 2003 represents a important step for Romania as the changes in the constitution for EU accession were adopted in 2003, following a popular referendum, and the country signed its protocol with NATO (European Commission, 2003: 14).

Interestingly, the government passed an emergency bill in 2002 for banning fascist, racist or xenophobic organisations as well as symbols relating to individuals guilty of crimes against humanity (European Commission, 2002: 32).

#### ***2.4.4 Statistical information on the Hungarians***

The Hungarians are the largest minority in Romania representing around 7.1% of the population (Haug & al., 1998: 145; HTMH, 2000:8). Hungarian is the language of more than 1.8 million of people in the country (HTMH, 2000: 10). Most of the Hungarians are concentrated in the Transylvanian region, where they make 20% of the

population (HTMH, 2000:10). In some part of the region, more precisely the Szekler region, the Romanians do not exceed 12-15% of the population (HTMH, 2000:10). Predictions for the future proportion of Hungarians reveal that there has been a continuous decrease, even if migration is not accounted for (Haug & al., 1998: 145). According to data provided by the National Institute of Statistics of Romania, the emigration of Hungarians has consistently diminished since 1990 (National Institute of Statistics – Romania, 2004: table 2.3.5). Moreover, the Government Office for Hungarians Abroad (Hungary) argues that the ratio of Hungarians is also decreasing because Romania has pursued a resettling policy in the Transylvanian region for about 70 years, until democratization (HTMH, 2000: 11). According to the same data, around 175 settlements in Transylvania were composed of more than 50% of Hungarians in 1992 (HTMH, 2000: 11).

According to the data offered by the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, the attendance of Hungarians in Hungarian speaking schools has decreased over the past years, except for the attendance of students at the level of vocational training. This does not necessarily mean that the level of attendance has decreased, since the population is naturally decreasing as well. For pre-school education, the number passed from 46 700 pupils in 1990/1991 and slowly declined to 40 811 in 2003/2004 (National Institute of Statistics – Romania, 2004: table 15.8). In fact, this situation represents an increase of .03% in the number of pupils attending schools in Hungarian. In the case of primary and secondary education, the level of attendance has been proportionally stable, passing from 142 459 in 1990/1991 to 104 068 in 2003/2004 (National Institute of Statistics –

Romania, 2004: table 15.8). In the case of High School education, it is diminished almost of one-tier: 41 367 students were registered in 1990/1991 and only 29 634 attended high school in 2003/2004 (National Institute of Statistics – Romania, 2004: table 15.8). For vocational training, the situation is totally the opposite: 4 123 students were registered in these schools in 1990/1991, and 8 281 were attending in 2003/2004 (National Institute of Statistics – Romania, 2004: table 15.8). The attendance almost doubled. Another important aspect to this is the fact that the Hungarians are the only minority that has been continuously receiving vocational training in their own language. In the data provided by the HTMH, the opposite situation is revealed by the numbers. In fact, the ratio of students in Hungarian language schools between 1989 and 1997 has increased for all levels of education (HTMH, 2000: 32). A table with both information is available in the annex. On 15 counties studied by the HTMH, only 5 counties have more than 50% of the Hungarians students attending Romanian language schools at the primary level, and it is the case for 6 counties at the high school level (HTMH, 2000: 32).

The majority of the Hungarians do not share the same religion as the Romanian citizens who are Orthodox. Most of the Hungarians are Reformed Calvinist (47.1%) and Roman Catholic (41.2%) (HTMH, 2000: 36). This is important since the lands owned by other religion were not restored by the law.

On the level of communications, the Romanian government has not engaged enough in the support of minorities media through the diffusion of Hungarian programs on the television and on the radio. The HTMH reports that only 3 hours of Hungarian

programs are broadcasted weekly on the national television, and one hour program on the Central radio station (HTMH, 2000: 37). Around 60 Hungarian-language press publications exist in Romania, but only few of them receive support from the State, and most of them actually depend on funding available from Hungary (HTMH, 2000: 37). An association of Hungarian journalist also exist. The HTMH recognizes the most important dailies to be “*Bihari Napló* (with a circulation of 15-20,000 copies), *Hargita Népe* (20,000), *Háromszék* (20,000), *Krónika* (launched in October 1999, 35,000), *Népújság* (20,000), *Romániai Magyar Szó* (13,000), *Szabadság* (10,000) and *Szatmári Friss Újság* (15,000). Among the weeklies, *Brassói Lapok* (8,000), *Erdélyi Napló* (15,000) and *Európai Idő* (18,000) are also considered to be very important” (HTMH, 2000:38).

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Latvia, Hungary and Romania have each taken a different approach toward their minorities. Hungary adopted a view in regard to identity that empowered not only the individual, but also the group as a whole. The country found a way to empower politically the minority groups through the creation of minority self-governments. However, the Roma are facing a socio-economical situation completely different from the other minority groups, which resulted in the development of measures specifically oriented toward them by the government. Latvia's measures in regard to the Russian minority evolved in time since its transition to democracy. The major issue of concern is still the ability of Russians to get their Latvian citizenship, which is far from reaching into the participation of minorities in the country's life. However, this issue has been particularly political, dividing the political scene into pro-Russian and not pro-Russian political parties. In Romania, the Hungarians have been very politically active through the participation of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania in the parliament and sometimes in the government. As a result, extremist parties have increasingly taken some place on the political scene.

The European Commission seems to have played a significant role in pressuring the governments to adopt measures that would either encourage the participation of minorities in the government (for example, by putting pressure on the government of Latvia to make the application for citizenship much easier to Russians), or make sure the minorities would have the same standard of living as any other citizens in the country (for example through pressuring Hungary's government to adopt short and medium term

plans). Most significantly, the Commission drew attention in the countries' annual reports on the discrepancies existing between the adopted laws and measures with their actual implementation in regard to minorities.

## CHAPTER 3: OPPORTUNITIES OF MOBILIZATION FOR THE RUSSIANS, ROMA AND HUNGARIANS

### 3.1 Introduction

As the previous chapters have shown, the European Union has put considerable pressure on the candidate countries to comply effectively with the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. However, we must acknowledge that minorities started to face their specific problems prior to the application of their country for European integration, thus could have been already mobilized around these issues. *Our prime hypothesis and argument is that the application for European Integration actually gave an incentive for Latvia, Hungary and Romania to take effective measures to enhance the protection of minorities, and also increased the opportunities available for the Russians, Roma and Hungarians to mobilize at the political and non-political levels.*

Each of the minorities studied have used different strategies to mobilize in order to further their issues. This chapter will analyse the differences among these groups. First, we will be looking at each of the minorities' domestic context in which these groups exist, with their individual and group behaviour, as well as the structure of the political system and the opportunities offered to them according to the analytical framework developed in chapter one. Then, we will turn on explaining these differences and how the findings are related to our hypotheses.




### **3.2 Mobilization of the Russians in Latvia**

#### **3.2.1 Macro Level**

We must first start to look at the opportunities offered by the structure at the domestic and supranational level. The following graph exemplifies the structure of the system and schematize where the veto points are.

**Figure 3.2.1 Political Opportunity Structure of Latvia for Russians**



We have identified two starting points in the game, which also simultaneously constitute veto points in Latvia: the obtainment of Latvian citizenship and the governing coalition. We have identified the Latvian citizenship as one of the first veto points exercised by the structure because this is necessary for Russians to enable them to experience their whole range of political rights, which allow them to elect political

representatives in the legislative chamber and at other levels. Without this right, they do not have the political opportunity to influence agenda setting. For this reason, the governing coalition is also identified as another first veto point in the game because it has the power of agenda setting in the parliament, which subsequently enable it to modify laws and policies affecting the Russians, notably in regard to citizenship, language and education. Basically, these two elements constitute a continuous circle.

The parliament constitutes the second veto point, where the preferences of the parties in the chamber fix the outcome in function of the bills presented to the chamber by the governing coalition's own preferences. In parallel, the European Commission has put pressure on the government of Latvia to modify its legislation affecting the Russian minority: we can consider it close to being a veto player as Tsebelis (date) defined it, because the European Union preferences are important for Latvia if it wants to get integrated. For example, the European Union makes sure the candidate countries adopt the *acquis communautaires* and different framework conventions and treaties the way EU-15 designed it. Thus, the European Union constitute a considerable veto point in the structure, and its preferences are defined through the reports reviewed in the second chapter. Figure 3.2.1 shows the relationships maintained by each of the actors in the system. We recognize that the Russian population can go directly to EU institutions to influence the outcome either individually, for example in cases of human rights abuse, or collectively through NGOs transnational linkages.

One important element we need to underline here is our explanation for not

having integrated Russia in the political structure. We have not done so for many reasons. First, the Russians in Latvia are not supported consistently by their “home” country: they only sometimes receive moral support when it pleases Russia to do so, and it is not necessarily in the advantage of the Russian minority. Secondly, Russia is not generally perceived by the European Union to be an admissible future member-state; rather, the EU behaviour towards Russia could not be qualified to be very friendly. The Baltic States constitute a tampon zone between the West European states and Russia. This situation is important to understand because it brings light on why the Latvian government had the possibility to deal with the Russian minority the way it did for considerable time without being considerably penalized from the part of the EU. It also explains why the Russian minority cannot rely on the influence of its home country to make some gains.

We could say that the Latvian political system offers a moderate number of opportunities for numerous reasons. First, a certain number of Russians enjoy their full political rights, thus enable the group to be represented at different levels: in the parliament and at the municipal levels. However, they are not represented in proportionality to their number in the population. Another important aspect is that the political scene at the national level is divided into two camps: the political parties that are pro-Russians and those who are not. That way, the interests of Russians are still somewhat defended.

In order to evaluate this argument thoroughly, we will look at policy changes in regard to citizenship because it has been the most contentious issue faced in the country,

and is also one of the most important for Russians and the EU. This analysis will enable us to evaluate the political mobilization of Russians. First, we will start with the issue of citizenship: the following table offers a summary of the important amendments to the law and the political parties who are member of the governing coalition and those sitting in the parliament.

**Table 3.2.1 Summary of Amendments to the Citizenship Law since 1990**

Year of the Amendment	Governing Coalition	Other Parliament Members	What was changed in the Law
1991	Pro-Independence Popular Front Movement (not free and fair elections)		Restoration of the Citizenship Law of the interwar period
1995	LC and Harmony for Latvia <i>Minority Government : 49 seats out of 100</i>	LZS, Equality, TUB, LKDS, DCP, LNNK	Establishment of the window system, registration without residence in another state or received an expatriation permit, etc.
1997	DPS, TUB, LC, LNNK, LZS/LKDS <i>Majority Government: 64 seats out of 100</i>	TSP, LSP, LVP, TKL-ZP	Stayed the same, but got more precise i.e. definitions
1998	LC, FF-LNNK, LZS, LKDS <i>Minority Government: 46 seats out of 100</i> <u>Called a Referendum for adoption</u>	TSP, LSP, LVP, TKL-ZP, DPS	Stop the window system, have completed general education in Latvian, and children are able to apply without language proficiency.

If we look at the table 3.2.1, we observe that the governing coalitions of 1997 and 1998, when the vote for the amendments took place, were composed mostly of parties that are not pro-Russians, although they were headed by non-hostile parties to minorities (LC and DPS). Interestingly in 1995, although one member of the coalition is definitely pro-Russian, the amendment adopted for the citizenship law were only very small gains from the one dating from the prewar period, which confirms what Tsebelis (2002) underlined that the only power minority governments have is agenda setting. In all of

these cases the decision-making rule that was prevailing, even within governing coalition partners, was simple majority. In none of the cases were pro-Russians parties a majority. As it is showed by Tsebelis (2002), the greater the number of political parties involved increases the possibility of policy stability, which would explain the small modification to the law in 1995, or also increases the chances for the preservation of the current status quo, which explains the situation prevailing in 1997.

The situation of 1995 can be explained by the fact that the governing coalition has decided to act within the winset of the majority of the political parties in the legislative chamber. The modifications represent only small gains for the Russians because it enables a larger part of its group to apply for citizenship; however, it does not represent the optimal outcome. If the Russians were properly being represented in the parties that are pro-Russians, the end result should have been different. The presence of Harmony for Latvia in the governing coalition probably did not change too much the proposal presented to the legislative chamber, since if the coalition was aiming to gain simple majority, they could have easily done so with a proposal that would have been more pro-Russian and would have secured the support of Equality (which would have represented a total of 56 votes in favour of the amendments). However, this was not the case and a rather moderate proposal for modifications was presented to the chamber, in order to gain the maximum support from the parties in the chamber. The status quo moved only slightly toward the preferences of the Russian population.

The small change in from the status quo of 1995 to the one of 1997 can be

explained by the fact that many of the parties that were in the opposition in 1995 were now part of the majority government composed of an oversized coalition. Within the coalition, the majority of the representatives are not hostile to minorities (35 seats), although those who are not pro-Russian are represented in great numbers (29 seats). Thus, only within the coalition the status quo was preferred over any other proposals. Moreover, the Freedom House reported many scandals during this period and divergence among the coalition's members. This situation probably explains the technical and superfluous modifications that occurred.

The change of the status quo to the 1998 situation is a little more complex to explain because the political actors are the same, but there has been a significant change in the status quo. First, the revision of the citizenship law was brought about because of international pressures. Many international organizations like the EU and the OSCE had pointed out the unwillingness of Latvian authorities to offer adequate opportunities to Russians to obtain their citizenship. Thus, the legislative chamber was well aware of the potential consequences of not removing enough barriers for Russians. Inaction could notably have implications on EU membership, which has been a foreign affairs policy priority since Latvia's independence. In this situation, the cost of not modifying it duly was too high to assume for the government. As a result, the coalition presented a proposal that would reflect more the interests of international organizations and pro-Russians parties, which increase considerably the number of Russians able to apply for citizenship. However, the governing coalition members introduced another veto point for the adoption of the law: a referendum. By doing so, the government had to make sure that the

proposal that would be presented to the citizens would reflect the median voter's preferences; otherwise, it would not be adopted (Tsebelis, 2002). That way, the coalition secured a moderated modification to the citizenship law since the electorate is composed of a majority of Latvians.

Although we have seen that the government did remove some of the greater barriers for application to citizenship, others remain. The Russians need to succeed in a History and language evaluation, and pay a high fee for the process. The Freedom House and the European Commission have criticized Latvia for these remaining important barriers for the Russians, which resulted in their reduction in the beginning of 2000. Although the number of Russians applying for Latvian citizenship has increased every year since the adoption of the 1998 modifications, two important remaining problems still continue: the Latvian passport restricts the exchanges and travels to Russia for their holders since they need to apply for a visa each time they cross the borders; moreover, children covered by the 1998 citizenship law could obtain their citizenship, but not their parents, which rendered travels more difficult and many parents want to obtain their citizenship in the same time as their children. This situation could be considered as a reflection of the unwillingness of the Latvian government to create favourable conditions for Russians to stay in Latvia and foster their group cultural development, although they are complying with moderation to international expectations.

Another very important issue for Russians in Latvia is in regard to language. The requirement of knowing Latvian for exercising certain professions, as well as for running

in the elections, is a barrier for many people. The adoption of the language law in 1999 has been recognized to be legitimate by many international organizations like the OCSE and the European Union. Considering the time at which this law was adopted, it seems that the government wanted to protect its Latvian citizens from an important Russian political presence and also to reserve the most prestigious professions to them. The situation of Latvia is the perfect case to exemplify what is meant by a complex electorate by Colomer (2001). Rational explanations can be given to explain the attitude of the government toward the franchise of certain part of the electorate, namely the Russians. The Latvian government benefits from keeping them outside the political structure as they restrict what Colomer refers to as innovation (Colomer, 2002: 14). This situation is explained by the fact that enfranchising correctly the Russians would change the median voter's preference as they represent more than 30% of the population and have different preferences, which could destabilize the system in the eyes of the political parties in power, or rather, drastically change the face of the political system and create different interests. The absence of innovation in the Latvian system is also the result of a non permissive system (Colomer, 2002), which we defined as a moderately closed political structure earlier.

In function of this analysis we could say that the perception of success from the group in regard to political gain would be moderate as they have not been able to sufficiently influence the Latvian government and had to rely mostly on the influence of the European Union on their government to make some gains. The political opportunity structure can be considered to be moderately closed, as there have been instances of issue advancement, but the Russians are still faced with conditions disabling them to fully



participate and mobilize. The local elections results also illustrate this reality.

### ***3.2.2 Meso Level***

The pool of the Russian community from which organizations can draw from is very large, as they constitute 30% of Latvia's population, whether they have been receiving their citizenship or not. In this case, citizenship does not necessarily represent an important aspect for non-political mobilization as they are granted rights at the same level of citizens in all other issue but elections and representation. In that sense, the Russian have a high mobilization potential. Many NGOs are registered in the country (around 7000 organizations in 2004, but 10% active –Freedom House), which demonstrate that opportunities are available to Russians and this also maximise the potential of mobilization of the group. Although interests are unequal within group members, we believe that the stakes at hand creates conditions that unifies the group interests, namely when we are looking at citizenship. Frame alignment is articulated by the positive attitude of Russians that the state of affairs is unacceptable, which result in frame bridging and amplification. Frame extension is reflected at the political level by the division of the party system into pro-Russians and more nationalist parties. Because of this division, we can argue that the Russian minority has been successful in the activity of frame amplification and extension since they only account for 14-16% of the chamber in the last two elections that have taken place. It has succeeded in enlarging the pool of adherents to their cause to many Latvian citizens who vote for the pro-Russian political parties. This may have been helped by the dissociation of the Association of Russian

citizens from the Soviet Union's unwillingness to withdraw its troops from Latvia at the beginning of independence if the republic did not show concerns for the Russian minority (Minority at Risk, Chronology of events). This has created sympathy among the Latvians. Since the presence of the Russian minority is restricted in the parliament, the only mean available to the Russian minority to influence the government is through demonstration in the streets, especially when international political actors are coming to Latvia. The Minority at Risk project reflect this through their chronology of events. The Russian minority has mobilized around collective issues such as citizenship, education and language.

We cannot claim that the Russian minority reached the maximum level of mobilization because of the size of the group, which increase the incentive for its members to free-ride as Olson (1971) explained. The perspective that the collective good will be provided even if they do not participate is extremely present in this case as the fight is mostly based on the obtainment of political rights, language use and education. Thus, although the collective incentive to mobilize is great, the reality is otherwise.

### *3.2.3 Micro level*

The tipping game has been very important in Latvia for the Russian as the situation involved a change in identity and an adaptation to a new reality which was completely different from the previous one. Each individual had to make a decision on whether they would learn the new language, in function of their own cost-benefit calculations. The tipping point represent the position where a sufficient number of people

would have choose to learn the new language, providing incentive for others to do so. It also reflects the point toward a new equilibrium, where everyone would learn the language. Obviously, the tipping point has not been reached because the Russian minority is still fighting for the use of its language and the obtainment of services in it. This is also exemplified by the number of Russians that did not obtain their citizenship yet, the modification of the electoral law to enable members of the Russian minority to run in the elections although they do not have a sufficient knowledge of Latvian, or by the number of people that have chosen to send their children in Russian-speaking schools. On the other hand, the Latvian government has made compulsory the learning of Latvian for Russian children to obtain their general school diploma.

The costs associated with a change if language can be calculated at the individual and the collective level. At the collective level, it is costly not to learn Latvian since most of the Russians not doing so will not be able to obtain their citizenship, thus gain effective representation at the political level. On the other hand, it is also costly not to learn the language at an individual level because services are not available in their mother tongue, career perspective and economic well-being are reduced. The only benefit left to the Russian minority for not learning the republican language is the collective identity and unification of the group around their issue. However, the lack of incentives provided by the Latvian government to encourage the change in language use can also explain this situation. However, this harsh reality unites the group together.

### **3.2.4 Conclusion on Latvia**


The case of Latvia shows that the findings of Tsebelis are correct, meaning that the high number of political actors created conditions favourable to policy stability or prevalence of status quo. Moreover, this approach enabled us to show that the European Union and the perspective of European integration had a considerable impact on the modification of laws in favour of the Russian minority because it offered a “soft veto point”. We call it a soft veto point because the European Union does not constitute a veto player *per se* as defined by Tsebelis since its agreement is not necessary in the decision-making process of the country, but has an important level of influence on the decision-making by changing the costs associated with particular decisions. The European Union reinforced the position of the Russian minority within Latvian society by providing its support to them on specific issues, at the political and non-political levels. This situation reflects the linkages existing at the political and non-political levels existing between the Russian minority and the European Union. Although the conditions are not favourable for mobilization in Latvia, the Russian minority has reached a satisfactory level to make them gain some benefits on particular issues.

### 3.3 Mobilization of the Roma in Hungary

#### *3.3.1 Macro Level*

The political opportunity structure of Hungary is probably the most complex of the three countries we are looking at because they have developed a structure to enhance the political participation of minorities at all levels. The structure is summarized in the following graph.

**Figure 3.3.1 Political Opportunity Structure of Hungary for the Roma**



Of course the starting point is the vote of citizens because everyone has the same political rights. They decide the composition of the municipal government, the self-governments and the parliament. The structure offers many opportunities to the Roma to advance their issue, and it is available at all levels. The figure illustrate the different ways

the Roma can influence their issues depending at which level they take place and what it is about.

The government has shown great openness to minorities by creating institutions, which increase their opportunity to influence the government and manage their own things, mainly related to culture, and by adopting bills to enhance their collective rights. This vision is entrenched in the constitution of the country and various subsequent laws. Although the power of minority self-governments is limited, the regular institutions must answer their questions and demands. Basically, the minority self-government empowers the Roma minority and ensures that their voice is heard at all levels. As it has been discussed in chapter 2, the self-governments and the Roma parliament have seen their role and responsibilities toward their community increasing in recent years. The Hungarian government basically relies on these institutions to implement effective measures toward the minority. For these reasons, these institutions are considered to be mobilization bases for the community and they represent veto points in regard to their minority if the government was to take decisions deeply affecting them.

The drawbacks of the structure reside in the systemic discrimination faced by the Roma in other areas such as education, employment, housing, etc. and the lack of Roma representatives in the parliament until the 2002 elections. The European Commission has put particular emphasis on these issues and pointed out that the status quo in that regard was a stain on Hungary's reputation on the treatment of minorities.

The Roma minority is quite active at the political level, as it has been able to create many self-governments for their community and supported the elections of few mayors; however, they haven't been able to secure any seats in the national assembly even if four Roma political parties exist and one multi-ethnic presented Roma candidates in the elections. Furthermore, the parliament decided not to reserve seats to minorities in the chamber, which still defies to this day a Constitutional court judgement on this matter. The first veto point of the structure is the coalition government, which hold the power of agenda setting. Since 1994, the decisions regarding the Roma issues have been quite stable because the political parties have a similar policy agenda: the primacy of the status quo. In fact, Hungary adopted a medium-term plan in relation to the Roma to remediate to the problems they face because of the pressure put by the European Union, through its annual evaluation criticising the government's inaction and implementation of adopted measures. The European Union has invested a lot in the consolidation of NGOs in Hungary, particularly those promoting the rights and the protection of minorities.

It did not take long for the Hungarian parliament to adopt policies in regard to the Roma minority and to adopt specific measures for them after the critiques of the European Union had been brought to them (here, we do not discuss the effectiveness of the measures and policies adopted). This has usually been done during the following year or two. The minority issue has never been contentious in the Parliament. The politization of the representation of Roma in parliament started to take place in the year prior to the 2002 elections. In 2002, the Prime Minister's Office became responsible for the National and Ethnic Minorities Office, and appointed a state secretary responsible only for the

Roma. The issue had become significant due to the focus the European Union put on them. For this reason, the European Union is also a veto point because the Roma can turn to it in order to gain influence and money, but also for the fact that the European Union has demonstrated an important influence on the Hungarian government to change the status quo quickly.

The political opportunity structure of Hungary as evolved since the application of the country for EU membership: it has started as a moderately open structure to become fully open. The Roma minority has adapted well to this and was ready for it, as the alliances made between Hungarian leading political parties and major Roma organization show.

### ***3.3.2 Meso Level***

The pool from which the organizations can draw from when they mobilize the community over particular issue is quite small since they are assumed to be between 400 000 to 800 000 individuals. They are most notably concentrated in the North-Western area, although they are still dispersed in the whole country. The European Commission numbered the organizations offering support to Roma individuals to about 620. These organizations mostly offer services to them because regular institutions would discriminate them. The European Roma Right Centre has been an organization advocating for the rights and equality of Romani people in East Central European countries by providing training to different associations and is mostly financed by



European funding. Even if the organization has been quite present and welcomed to present advocacy papers and researches to many international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, this organization cannot account for mobilizing the Roma minority since its board of directors is composed of West Europeans, so too is most of its staff. It can be considered to be another service-based organisation, although its service is related to political and non-political mobilization of Roma organizations on the issues affecting them.

The mobilization potential of the group is very small since it is difficult for the Roma to change people's attitudes toward them in order to gain their support. Many sources have discussed the persistence of discriminative behaviour against the Roma among the Hungarian population in nearly all fields. For many decades now, the Roma have been victims of a reinforcing cycle: the portrayal of Roma elites elected as representatives in self-governments is only the peak of iceberg but demonstrates that more than 60% of the Roma only have a primary education diploma, are highly unemployed, which explains why minority self-governments would devote 50% of its grants resources to social assistance and welfare. However, this reality only reinforce prejudices in the population, exemplified by the existence of school and housing segregation, violence done against Roma, etc. The Roma have not used demonstration as a mean for attaining their objectives either.

### ***3.3.3 Micro Level***

The incentives offered for the individual for non-political mobilization are limited in Hungary. The structure of the Hungarian system is designed in a way that forces the Roma to act politically rather than non-politically. This is indirectly recognized by the European Commission since they have strived to put pressure on the Hungarian government in order to adopt anti-discrimination legislation which would punish those committing these acts. The fact that many Roma face difficult living conditions increases the cost of mobilization because it reduces their ability to better their individual living conditions (economic costs). Moreover, if an individual is been identified as a Roma during a demonstration, this could have a negative impact on the short and medium term for them since they are frequent victims of violent acts at the individual level.

### ***3.3.4 Conclusion on Hungary***

The political structures offer many opportunities for the Roma and could be qualified as been an open structure since 2000, and more particularly since 2002 when the political elites of the two important parties offered alliances with Roma groups to help them secure seats in the national elections. Political mobilization of minorities is very well entrenched in the country's constitution, and the institutions created have mobilized a great number of people around them, which reduce the necessity of non-political mobilization to achieve gains for the group. The European Union has played a significant role in bringing the country to fully open its structure to the Roma and create an additional opportunity for them, that of being elected in the national assembly. The


European Union has also pushed for the amelioration of living condition of the Roma, which resulted in the decentralization of responsibility from the government and official provider agencies to Roma organizations and institutions.

### **3.4 Mobilization of Hungarians in Romania**

#### **3.4.1 Macro Level**

The political structure of Romania is quite simple in comparison to the two other cases. An interesting variable entering the portrait is the presence of a foreign country, Hungary, because the Hungarian government has developed its linkages with Hungarian minorities abroad and tries to ameliorate the opportunities available to them. The following figure summaries the structure.

**Figure 3.4.1 Political Opportunity Structure of Romania for Hungarians**



The coalition government constitute the most important veto point of the structure because it has the power of agenda setting in both chambers. The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) is the only Hungarian political party presented in the elections and is constituted of many smaller political parties. The Alliance has been part

of the governing coalitions after the 1996 and 2004 elections. However, the influence of the Hungarians on the agenda was still restricted. Table 3.4.1 shows the distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies as well as in the coalition.

In 1996, the coalition was oversized, which reduced the unity between its member, and more precisely with the UDMR since its approval was not necessary for passing the bill in the chamber. Regular decisions are taken under the simple majority rule, which required the governing coalition to have 173 seats secured in order to make sure bills would be adopted in the Chamber of Deputies before going to the Senate. In the aftermath of the 1996 elections, the coalition size was of 200 deputies, which is more than sufficient to forward their bills to the other chamber. Interestingly, the CDR could have decided to form a minimum winning coalition during this election, with the USD only, which would have secured a total of 175 seats but decided not to do that. This situation can be explained through the explanations offered by Laver and Schofield (1990) by the fact that these political parties share a similar policy agenda, which contribute to their willingness of association.

**Table 3.4.1 Distribution of Seats in the Chamber of Deputies since 1996**

1996			2000			2004		
CDR	122	Total in the coalition: 200	FDSN/PDSR	155	Coalition	PNL	64	Total in the coalition: 153
USD	53		UDMR	27		PD	48	
UDMR	25		PNL	30		PUR	19	
FDSN/PDSR	91	Total in the opposition: 143	PRM	84	Total in the opposition: 172	UDMR	22	Total in the opposition: 179
PUNR	18		PD	31		PRM	48	
PRM	19		Minority seats	18		PSD	113	
Minority seats	15					Minority seats	18	
<b>Total of seats</b>	<b>343</b>		<b>Total of seats</b>	<b>345</b>		<b>Total of seats</b>	<b>332</b>	

**Table 3.4.2 Distribution of Seats in the Senate since 1996**

1996			2000			2004		
CDR	53	Total in the coalition: 87	FDSN/PDSR	65	Coalition Total in the opposition: 75	PNL	28	Total in the coalition: 70
USD	23		UDMR	12		PD	21	
UDMR	11		PNL	13		PUR	11	
FDSN/PDSR	41	Total in the opposition: 56	PRM	37		UDMR	10	Total in the opposition: 67
PUNR	7		PD	13		PRM	21	
PRM	8		Minority seats	0		PSD	46	
Minority seats	0					Minority seats	0	
<b>Total of seats</b>	<b>143</b>		<b>Total of seats</b>	<b>140</b>		<b>Total of seats</b>	<b>137</b>	

The situation is quite different in 2004 for many reasons. First of all, four political parties are involved in the governing coalition, which is the most numerous of all coalitions since the democratization of the country. Secondly, the coalition forms a minority government, which does not secure its bill adoption in the chamber; rather, its power mainly resides in agenda setting and its secured seats in the other chamber to make sure the legislation adopted is closer to its preferred outcome. Table 3.4.2 gives the distribution of the seats in the Senate since 1996. In the case of the 2004 election, the votes of each party of the coalition become important, consequently, the UDMR has gained influence in the coalition.

The important nuance to be made is that the Hungarian minority does not really have the choice to run under a single party to gain considerable presence and influence in the parliament. Most probably, if each of the parties composing the alliance were going to run alone, they would attain the same level as the other minority parties that have obtained only one seat because the Hungarian minority vote would be divided. In presenting only one alliance of party, the Hungarian minority maximises the votes of

their members in reaching an important number in the parliament. Moreover, the restrictions inserted in the reformed 1996 Electoral Law on the number of members required to register as a political party constrain the UDMR to use this strategy. Moreover, the UDMR has experienced a diminution in the numbers of seats allocated to them since the first democratic elections. In 1990, they obtained 29 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and were at 22 seats after the 2004 elections. Again, amendments made to the Electoral Law on the threshold can explain the decreasing presence of the UDMR, mainly in the Chamber of the Deputies.

The amendments to the Electoral Law affecting the representation of minorities in the parliament occurred for the first time when the UDMR was in the coalition, which confirms the analysis put forth before, and the other changes when the FDSN was forming the government, even if it was faced with a larger opposition. Moreover, no step has been taken by any of the parties to allow for the representation of minorities in the Senate, which would have showed great openness to the minorities by requesting their input at all stage of the legislative process.

The regular use of emergency ordinances by the government changes a little the game too as the parties represented in the parliament are not able to present motions or amendments on the bills presented before the chamber. That way, the governing collation and most importantly, the leading parties within it, becomes the only political actor(s) that will decide if a bill will be successful or not by making sure it falls within the winsets of the other political parties in the parliament.

The growing success of nationalist parties in Romania after 1996, more precisely those who are advocating anti-Hungarian progress like the PUNR and the PRM, demonstrates that the issue of minorities is extremely politicized. However, none of these parties have been part of governing coalitions, most probably by the fact that their presence in the chamber was already straining the relationship between Hungary and Romania, so their part in a governing coalition would have been disastrous. Over time, the nationalist parties have gained more importance than UDMR in the chamber.

The two domestic issues related to minorities that has most probably taken a lot of place on the political agenda is the modification to the education law, to allow education in the minority language, and amendments to the law of local administration to offer public services in the minority language where a minority group amount for at least 20% of the population in a given city. The following paragraphs will explain the outcome according to the preferences of each political party in the chamber, as generally represented by the figure provided in chapter 1 with the winset of each party.

The modification to the education law took place during a time when secured seats in the chamber were equal to a minimum winning coalition: the PDSR/PUNR government secured the support of two other parties (the PSM and the PRM) although they were not part of the coalition. However, the governing coalition would have had to make sure the proposals presented fell within the winset of these parties also. Interestingly, we can observe that the changes in the status quo occurred when the UDMR was not part of the governing coalition. However, the UDMR has not been able



to make substantial gains with the amendments proposed. The amendments changed the status quo, but comprised measures for arbitrary decisions by school directors to offer courses in minority language and certain classes were to be offered in Romanian only, and these are not detailed in the law. Concerning the local administration law, although this could be considered as a small gain for the Hungarians, it is very restrictive. Rare will be the city having at least 20% of a same minority group within its borders. The Hungarians are regionally concentrated in Transylvania, where they form close to 20% of the population. Consequently, the gain was relatively small.

The European Commission has been particularly criticized toward Romania. However, the influence of the EU on the policies adopted by the country is less apparent. Although Romania did sign many of the European conventions and ratified them, their implementation has not been respected. The influence of the EU could be illustrated by the status quo changes; however, the gains are limited in all the cases for the Hungarians because the governing coalition did not meet the expectations of the EU in regard to the treatment of minorities. Moreover, one important aspect pointed out by the Commission in every annual report was the problem of corruption in the country. This reality reduces the influence Hungarians can have on the structure because bribery has been a too often used mean to obtain favours.

The perception of success by the Hungarian minority must be low, since their presence in the governing coalition did not offer them more opportunity to advance their agenda than when they were in the opposition. The political opportunity structure of

Romania can thus be defined to be closed.

### *3.4.2 Meso Level*

Corruption is identified to be a major problem by the European Commission and affects not only the political structure, but also the social structure and the individuals. It restricts the ability of the group to obtain adequate resources and services required to mobilize. However, the Hungarian minority has been quite innovative and succeeded in mobilizing well at the non-political level.

The legislation on the freedom of press is quite restrictive in Romania, but has not restrained the Hungarian minority from being organized at the information level. As it was described in chapter 2, many newspapers at the national, regional and local levels, as well as many periodicals are available to them. The availability of information and its dissemination, more precisely in the language of the minority, is an important starting point to mobilization.

Another important point that needs to be brought in here is the support the Hungarian minority in Romania has from the Hungarian government. No other government has been as much supportive for its nationals outside its territorial borders, and its support is not limited to moral support. The Hungarian government has been pushing to obtain agreement between the two countries that would favour Hungarians in Romania. Two examples are the approval of a Hungarian fully financed university in Transylvania, and the arrangements the government wanted to obtain in regard to social

benefits for Hungarians abroad. The Hungarian government has been extremely supportive of Hungarian NGOs in Romania, giving them funding and other support. Thus, the durability of these organizations is increased by this support, which increases their mobilization potential. HTMH reports that more than 300 organizations have been created since 1989 to support the Hungarian minority in about every range of activity it is possible (economic development, social welfare, education and culture, etc.). Youth people are particularly active at self-organizing and mobilize on the issues concerning them, particularly in the field of education. They even offer leadership workshop for individuals.

An interesting aspect of the case of ethnic Hungarians in Romania is their mobilization level and their ability to mobilize although they have not been able to practice frame extension and transformation. They have not been able to do so because they did not need to since they have a political party in the parliament who developed alliances with other parties, but also for the fact that they have the support of their home country, Hungary, and of the European Union in the protection of their rights. This is particularly surprising considering the obstacle they face to increase their mobilization level. The size of the group is considerably large, which is supposed to affect the possibility for mobilization since many people can decide not to participate. One explanation to the high level of non-political mobilization may be that the availability of collective good is already present by the fact that they support each other and they are supported by the Hungarian government and the European Union through the PHARE programme. They already have access to a certain portion of the collective good.

### ***3.4.3 Micro Level***

The individuals need to assess the costs involved in mobilizing in order to find out if they would benefit from a collective action or not. If we take the tipping point in order to explain what is taking place in Romania, we should see it as the tipping point has been reached and the momentum exists in order for Hungarians to take their place within Romanian society. The tipping point here would be a change in behaviour from Hungarians minority individuals to further their interests instead of staying in the status quo where they did not obtain any preferential treatment or benefits. The appearance of the UDMR after the first democratic elections created a momentum to unite the Hungarian minority along political issues affecting them.

The leaders of the UDMR have set the stage for mobilization as they made demands on ethnic grounds and self-determination. The Hungarian identity became a tool for these leaders to make demands. This situation reinforced the individuals to claim their ethnic differences, the tipping point was reached, and a group movement started to take place. In this situation, the social costs associated for not mobilizing gets higher because the community is united in this fight.

### ***3.4.4 Conclusion on Romania***

The information collected leads us to confirm that the Hungarians have used prominently the non-political level to mobilize. This is due mainly by the existence of a closed political structure for the articulation of the demands from the minority, which

disable them to use effectively the political structure. The moral and financial support from the Hungarian government has been one of the strong assets of the minority to further their interest at the political and non-political levels. But this support has been largely effective at the non-political level.

### **3.5 Conclusion: Explaining the differences of Latvia, Hungary and Romania**

In this section, we will take the hypothesis summarized by the following table (taken from chapter one) and confirm them or not.

	<b>Homogeneous Population</b>	<b>Heterogeneous Population</b>
<b>EU Convergent</b>	<b>HYPOTHESIS #1</b> High political mobilization Low non-political mobilization <i>Low costs, High benefits</i>	<b>HYPOTHESIS #3</b> Medium political mobilization Medium non-political mobilization <i>Low costs, medium benefits</i>
<b>Not EU convergent</b>		<b>HYPOTHESIS #2</b> Low political mobilization High non-political mobilization <i>High costs, Low benefits</i>

The development of our hypotheses started with two independent variables: EU convergence and the composition of the population. The different degrees of EU convergence have been showed through the evaluation made by the European Commission. The analysis done in the three previous parts of this chapter confirms that the hypotheses elaborated in the first chapter are verified, with the available information found and consulted.

We also confirm many of the elements contained in our analytical framework or find explanations on the disparities existing between the types of mobilization used by the different minorities we have been looking at. Diehl and Bloom (2001) point out that the rapidity at which the group obtains their political rights like the ability to vote in the

elections has an impact on the level of their mobilization, their perception of success in the political realm and the way they will mobilize. The case of the Russians in Latvia demonstrates this as their level of political and non-political mobilization is less intense than the minorities in Hungary and Romania and they haven't been able to achieve substantial gains in one realm or the other; rather, the Russians have achieved moderate gains through both political and non-political mobilization.

In all the cases, we have seen how the dialogue between the political actors and the structure took place. It demonstrated in the case of the Russians and the Hungarians that the political opportunity structure was altered by the presence of counter-movements just like Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argued. Moreover, all the cases confirmed the affirmations made by Tsebelis (2002), which enabled us to demonstrate the different levels of influence the EU had on the gains made by the minorities in each of the countries, associated with the costs of converging or not with the demands made by it.

## CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

We have seen in the thesis that the problems faced by ethnic minorities within a country can be extremely different from one country to the other. The experience of majority-minorities relations in East Central Europe, and more specifically in Latvia, Hungary and Romania, are the expression of a long history and modern set of influences. Although, the experience and situation faced by these countries is unique, similar outcomes could be expected from countries who were also classified in the same category in chapter one (see the 2 x 2 table of the case studies in that chapter). Whether they have converged with EU expectations or not, and whether they have a homogeneous or heterogeneous population the issue of ethnic minority protection was of great importance for the European Union and deeply influenced the set of opportunities available for the mobilization of ethnic minorities.

We have looked throughout the thesis at the history and theories of European integration, the political opportunity structure and mobilization potentials at the macro, meso and micro levels within our three case studies of Latvia, Hungary and Romania. This concluding chapter will summarize the previous chapters of this thesis before going into an update on the issue after the entrance of Latvia and Hungary into the European Union.

Chapter one overviewed the theories of European integration with particular emphasis on the enlargement process. We related these theories to the issue of minority



protection. This issue has always been important for the European community and is essentially reflected by the fact that East Central European countries that applied for EU membership after the fall of communism had to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, one of them being the protection of ethnic and national minorities. In no other rounds of enlargement was this criteria a concern and imposed by the members of the EU, so we called it an artificial spillover. We also built our framework for analysis in this chapter, dividing it into three levels: the macro, more concerned with the international and institutional dimensions; the meso, focusing on the sub-national elements and more particularly the ability to mobilize at the non-governmental level; and the micro, dealing with individual cost-benefit calculations for taking part into a collective action. Three case studies were chosen according to their classification in the 2 x 2 table.

Chapter two deals with the specifics of each of our case studies on which our analysis in chapter 3 relies on. We started with a review of Latvia's important legislation that affects the Russian minority, namely, the Constitution, the citizenship law, the language law, the electoral law and the education law. Each of these showed numerous barriers for the Russian minority. The political parties defending the Russians' interests in the domestic political arena are not only Russians parties even though they represent more than 30% of the total population of Latvia. The review of the Freedom House and the European Commission evaluations demonstrated that Latvia did comply with the Copenhagen criteria, although some changes had to be done and that the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities did not get ratified before June 2005. Latvia complied moderately to the Commission's expectation as sometimes the

government adopted measures that would mediate between their own position and that of the EU.

In the case of Hungary, the legislation adopted by the government affected very positively the collective possibilities of the Roma. The constitution, and other laws grant them the status of historical minority, which enable them to claim and have many collective rights like the establishment of Roma self-minority governments at the local and national level. The major Hungarian political parties have enhanced the possibilities for Roma to participate effectively in the Parliament in recent years by signing agreements with important Roma groups. Hungary has received positive evaluations from the Freedom House and the European Commission since the beginning of its application for membership. Hungary has usually adapted its policies to the recommendations made by the European Commission in an effective and timely manner. The only shadow to the case of the Roma is the social barriers they face because they are widely discriminated in many spheres and live in poor conditions.

Romania has proved to be a difficult case because of its lack of compliance with the expectations of the European Union at many levels. On the political scene, the presence of Hungarians is important in the Parliament under the umbrella organization of the UDMR, but the side effect has been the resurgence of extreme nationalist parties against the progress of Hungarians' interests. The Hungarians are facing some discrimination and do not have access to services in their own language (for example, education) are rely on the support of the Hungarian government to do that.

In Chapter 3, we use the analytical framework developed in the first chapter to answer our central question: To what extent and in which ways European integration shapes the mobilization of ethnic minorities in the newly democratic states of post-communist East-Central Europe? The first part of the answer is that the European Union had considerable impact on the mobilization of ethnic minorities in the candidate countries. We identified its role as a 'soft veto player' in the description of the political opportunity structure expressed in each of the countries we have looked at. Our answer to the second part of the question is threefold depending on the categorization of the case study, and it also confirms our hypotheses: (1) a homogeneous and convergent country with EU policies and expectations has a high level of political mobilization and a low level of non-political mobilization (such was the case of Hungary); (2) a heterogeneous and non-convergent country with EU policies and expectations has a low level of political mobilization and a high level of non-political mobilization (such as Romania); finally, (3) a heterogeneous and convergent country with EU policies and expectations will have an even mobilization level between the political and the non-political type (such is the case of Latvia).

The three case studies illustrate three different ways countries have adopted to deal with ethnic minorities. Latvia has adopted an exclusionist approach, by pushing out or keeping out of the political system the Russian minority. On the other hand, Hungary has adopted a collective rights approach by giving many political opportunities to its different minorities, and the Roma have benefitted a lot from it. In the case of Romania, no specific measures have been taken to enhance the participation of the minorities.

In the 2004 enlargement, from the region, only Romania and Bulgaria stayed out of the acceding countries.<sup>6</sup> If we consider the reports done by the European Commission that are reviewed in the second chapter of this thesis, it is not surprising that Romania was kept out of this enlargement. However, it is difficult to understand how Latvia succeeded in entering the EU based on the sole issue of minorities: the country is denying the political rights of many of its minority population and it did not comply with the Venice Commission by signing the Framework Convention on the Protection of National and Ethnic Minorities. Latvia did not sign the Convention until 2005, and many of its Russian population still do not have their citizenship. Actors within the EU are working together to change this situation in Latvia, but it remains difficult since they do not want to step too much into the domestic affairs of the country. One of the explanation generally accepted to defend the entrance of Latvia in the EU in regard to the Russian minority issue is to remove the responsibility of the State to provide citizenship to this population and instead put it in the hands of the Russians by explaining that they are not applying for it since the State removed some barriers. This explanation is confirmed in the last reports done by the European Commisison prior to the entrance of Latvia in the EU. In any case, the situation of the Russians remain difficult, even if the Latvian state has entered the EU. The situation remained the same for the Roma in Hungary and the Hungarians in Romania.

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<sup>6</sup> Note that Turkey was also not integrated in the EU

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1990 Parliamentary Elections Results (Hungary)

1994 Parliamentary Elections Results (Hungary)

1998 Parliamentary Elections Results (Hungary)

### 2002 Parliamentary Elections Results (Hungary)

URL Address:

<http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=HUNGARY&opt=elc>  
, Last visited December 7<sup>th</sup>, 2005.



**Annex**

## Calculations of the Fractionalization Index

### Estonia

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.679^2) + (0.256^2) + (0.021^2) + (0.013^2) + \\ & (0.022^2) = \\ & 0.46 + 0.065 + 0.0005 + 0.0002 + 0.0005 = \\ & 0.5262 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.5262 = 1.90 - \text{Heterogeneous}$$

### Latvia

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.577^2) + (0.296^2) + (0.041^2) + (0.027^2) + \\ & (0.025^2) + (0.014^2) + (0.02^2) = \\ & 0.33 + 0.088 + 0.0017 + 0.0007 + 0.0006 + \\ & 0.00019 + 0.0004 = \\ & 0.4216 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.4216 = 2.38 - \text{Heterogeneous}$$

### Lithuania

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.834^2) + (0.067^2) + (0.063^2) + (0.036^2) = \\ & 0.6956 + 0.00449 + 0.00397 + 0.0013 = \\ & 0.7054 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.7054 = 1.41 - \text{Heterogeneous}$$

### Hungary

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.923^2) + (0.019^2) + (0.058^2) = \\ & 0.852 + 0.00036 + 0.116 = \\ & 0.968 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.9684 = 1.03 - \text{Homogeneous}$$

### Czech Republic

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.904^2) + (0.037^2) + (0.019^2) + (0.04^2) = \\ & 0.817 + 0.0014 + 0.0004 + 0.0016 = \\ & 0.8204 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.8204 = 1.21 - \text{Homogeneous}$$

### Slovakia

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.858^2) + (0.097^2) + (0.017^2) + (0.01^2) + \\ & (0.018^2) = \\ & 0.7362 + 0.0094 + 0.000289 + 0.0001 + \\ & 0.000324 = \\ & 0.7463 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.7463 = 1.33 - \text{Heterogeneous}$$

### Slovenia

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.831^2) + (0.02^2) + (0.018^2) + (0.011^2) + (0.12^2) \\ & = \\ & 0.691 + 0.0004 + 0.000324 + 0.00012 + 0.0144 = \\ & 0.7062 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.7062 = 1.41 - \text{Heterogeneous}$$

### Poland

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.967^2) + (0.027^2) = \\ & 0.935 + 0.000729 = \\ & 0.9357 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.9357 = 1.06 - \text{Homogeneous}$$

### Romania

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.895^2) + (0.066^2) + (0.025^2) + (0.014^2) = \\ & 0.801 + 0.00436 + 0.00063 + 0.000196 = \\ & 0.8062 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.8062 = 1.25 - \text{Heterogeneous}$$

### Bulgaria

$$\begin{aligned} & (0.839^2) + (0.094^2) + (0.047^2) + (0.02^2) = \\ & 0.7039 + 0.008836 + 0.002209 + 0.004 = \\ & 0.7189 \end{aligned}$$

$$1 / 0.7189 = 1.39 - \text{Heterogeneous}$$

**Table 2.2.1 Political Parties in Latvia**

Name of the Political Party	Year of participation in elections and number of seats obtained	Member of the Governing Coalition?
Latvia's Way (LC)	1993 – 36 seats 1995 – 17 seats 1998 – 21 seats 2002 – 0 seats	In 1993 with LZS, then with Harmony for Latvia in 1994 In 1995 with DPS, TB, LNNK, LVP, LZS/LKDS and LSP 02/1997 with DPS, TB, LNNK, LZS/LKDS 08/1997 with TB/LNNK, DPS, LZS, LKDS In 1998 with TB/LNNK and JP In 1999 with TP and TB/LNNK In 2000 with TP, TB/LNNK and JP
Latvian Agrarian Union (LZS)	1993 – 12 seats 1995 – 8 seats 1998 – 0 seats	In 1993 with LC (until 1994) In 1995 with DPS, TB, LNNK, LVP, LC and LSP 02/1997 with DPS, TB, LNNK, LC 08/1997 with TB/LNNK, DPS, LC, LKDS
Harmony for Latvia / National Harmony Party (TSP)	1993 – 13 seats 1995 – 6 seats (national harmony party) 1998 – 16 seats (TSP)	In 1994 with LC
Democratic Party – Saimnieks (DPS)	1995 – 18 seats	In 1995 with TB, LC, LNNK, LVP, LZS/LKDS, LSP 02/97 with TB, LC, LNNK, LZS/LKDS 08/97 with TB/LNNK, LC, LZS, LKDS
For Fatherland and Freedom Alliance (TB)	1993 – 6 seats 1995 – 14 seats 1998 – 17 seats (TB+LNNK)	In 1995 with DPS, LC, LNNK, LVP, LZS/LKDS and LSP 02/1997 with DPS, LC, LNNK, LZS/LKDS

	2002 – 7 seats (TB+LNNK)	08/1997 with LC, DPS, LZS, LKDS In 1998 with LC and JP In 1999 with TP and LC In 2000 with LC, TP and JP In 2002 with JL, ZZS and LPP (until Feb. 2004) In 1995 with DPS, LC, TB, LVP, LZS/LKDS and LSP 02/1997 with DPS, LC, TB, LZS/LKDS 08/1997 with LC, DPS, LZS, LKDS In 1998 with LC and JP In 1999 with TP and LC In 2000 with LC, TP and JP
Latvian National Conservative Party (LNNK)	1993 – 15 seats 1995 – 8 seats 1998 – 17 seats (TB+LNNK) 2002 – 7 seats (TB+LNNK)	
Latvian Unity Party (LVP)	1993 – 0 seat 1995 – 8 seats 1998 – 0 seat	In 2002 with JL, ZZS and LPP (until Feb. 2004) In 1995 (until 1997) with DPS, TB, LC, LNNK, LZS/LKDS and LSP
Latvian Christian Democratic Party (LKDS)	1993 – 6 seats 1995 – 7 seats (LZS+LKDS)	In 1995 with DPS, LC, LNNK, LVP, TB and LSP 02/1997 with DPS, LC, LNNK, TB 08/1997 with LC, DPS, LZS, TB
Latvian Socialist Party (LSP)	1993 – 0 seat 1995 – 5 seats	In 1995 with DPS, LC, LNNK, LVP, TB and LKDS (until 1997)
New Party (JP)	1993 – 0 seat 1998 – 8 seats	In 1998 with LC and TB/LNNK In 2000 with LC, TP and TB/LNNK (until 2002)

People's Party (TP)	1998 – 24 seats 2002 – 20 seats	In 1999 with TB/LNNK and LC  In 2000 with LC, TB/LNNK and JP (until Nov. 2002)  03/2004 with ZZS and LPP  12/2004 with JL, ZZS, LPP
	Equal Rights Movement 1993 – 7 seats	No
	Democratic Centre Party 1993 – 5 seats	No
	People's Movement for Latvia 1995 – 16 seats	No
	Latvian Social Democratic Alliance (LSDA) 1998 – 14 seats	No
New Era (JL)	2002 – 26 seats	11/2002 with ZZS, LPP and TB/LNNK (until 03/2004)
		12/2004 with TP, ZZS and LPP
		No
For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) Latvia's First Party (LPP)	2002 – 25 seats	In 2002 with JL, ZZS and TB/LNNK
	2002 – 10 seats	03/2004 with TP and ZZS 12/2004 with TP, JL and ZZS
		In 2002 with JL, LPP and TB/LNNK
Green and Farmers Union (ZZS)	2002 – 12 seats	03/2004 with TP and LPP 12/2004 with TP, JL and LPP

Table 2.2.2 Resident Population in Latvia 1989, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004

	1989				2000				2001				2002				2003				2004			
	Number of population		Per cent distribution		Number of population		Per cent distribution		Number of population		Per cent distribution		Number of population		Per cent distribution		Number of population		Per cent distribution		Number of population		Per cent distribution	
	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latvians	Russians
Riga city	331934	430555	26.5	47.3	313368	335431	41	43.9	311609	330471	41.2	43.7	309692	324810	41.5	43.5	308623	320016	41.7	43.3	308429	315993	42	42.9
Daugavpils city	16243	72775	13	58.3	18393	63651	16	55.2	18474	63071	16.1	55.1	18566	62338	16.4	55	18848	61602	16.7	54.7	18917	60602	17	54.5
Jelgava city	36801	25736	49.7	34.7	32441	20664	51	32.5	33442	20558	51.8	31.9	35216	20366	53.4	30.9	35366	20158	53.8	30.7	35791	20083	54.2	30.4
Jurmala city	26789	25503	44.2	42.1	27364	20668	49.1	37.1	27513	20551	49.4	36.9	27393	20382	49.5	36.8	27401	20255	49.7	36.7	27666	20189	49.9	36.4
Liepaja city	44432	46316	38.8	43.1	44149	31311	49.4	35	44222	30538	50	34.5	44017	29991	50.3	34.3	44090	29569	50.7	34	44045	29148	50.9	33.7
Rezekne city	15839	23379	37.3	55	16710	19873	42.6	50.7	16547	19511	42.8	50.4	16440	19028	43.2	50	16359	18832	43.3	49.9	16252	18392	43.7	49.4
Ventspils city	21766	19934	43	39.4	22658	14042	51.6	32	22753	13903	51.9	31.7	23075	13782	52.4	31.3	23255	13683	52.8	31.1	23517	13529	53.3	30.7
Alūksne district	32808	7406	73.7	16.6	31777	6138	75.7	14.6	31777	6025	76	14.4	31676	5976	76.2	14.4	31762	5933	76.5	14.3	31721	5931	76.5	14.3
Alūksne district	21681	5260	75	18.2	21629	3650	81.9	13.6	21525	3618	82	13.8	21358	3564	82.1	13.7	21263	3533	82.2	13.7	20917	3477	82.2	13.7
Balvi district	24362	8306	71.8	24.5	23448	5982	76.6	19.5	23220	5879	76.8	19.4	22965	5741	77	19.2	22768	5577	77.2	18.9	22341	5584	77.5	18.7
Bauska district	38249	8006	88.4	14.3	38882	5965	73.1	11.3	38708	5968	73.2	11.3	38465	5923	73.2	11.3	38524	5922	73.4	11.3	38417	5920	73.7	11.2
Cēsis district	51690	8238	81.2	12.9	50948	5795	85	9.7	50825	5740	85.1	9.8	50506	5628	85.2	9.5	50330	5553	85.4	9.4	49906	5437	85.6	9.3
Daugavpils district	16922	19200	35.9	40.8	16877	16252	39.5	38	16792	16142	39.5	38	16676	16064	39.5	38.1	16475	15860	39.6	38.1	16312	15586	39.7	37.9
Dobele district	28264	8315	83.7	18.7	29369	4932	73	12.3	29365	4888	73.2	12.1	29179	4803	73.3	12.1	29083	4775	73.4	12	28759	4714	73.4	12
Gulbene district	23887	4644	79.8	15.5	23799	3332	84.4	11.8	23946	3295	84.6	11.6	23691	3208	84.8	11.5	23541	3147	84.9	11.3	23286	3070	85	11.2
Jelgava district	23903	8335	81.1	21.3	24317	6957	85.1	18.6	24310	6989	85.2	18.7	24296	6935	85.5	18.7	24509	6973	85.8	18.7	24506	6969	86	18.8
Jelkabpils district	37593	16566	81.6	27.1	37809	12881	87.1	22.9	37542	12742	87.2	22.8	37192	12534	87.4	22.7	36866	12432	87.4	22.7	36452	12230	87.5	22.6
Kuldīga district	17903	11356	43.2	27.4	17770	8970	48.2	24.4	17730	8917	48.5	24.4	17634	8851	48.7	24.5	17469	8853	48.7	24.7	17119	8725	48.8	24.8
Krāslava district	34591	3277	84.4	8	34818	1281	91.2	3.4	34591	1244	91.3	3.3	34324	1216	91.3	3.2	34232	1195	91.4	3.2	33963	1165	91.5	3.1
Ludza district	43026	4987	79.2	6.2	40834	1652	87.2	3.5	40667	1623	87.4	3.5	40420	1578	87.6	3.4	40117	1560	87.6	3.4	39769	1529	87.8	3.4
Liepāja district	35127	3005	85.4	8	35463	2517	88.3	6.3	35447	2477	88.4	6.2	35323	2447	88.5	6.1	35068	2394	88.6	6.1	34755	2370	88.6	6
Madona district	40594	5151	82.3	12.4	40490	4139	87.2	8.9	40260	4067	87.3	8.9	39873	4006	87.4	8.8	39779	3979	87.4	8.8	39213	3854	87.8	8.6
Ogre district	46396	13243	70.3	20.1	47907	9973	79	15.8	48083	9663	79.2	15.6	48136	9880	79.4	15.7	48187	9834	79.5	15.6	48491	9766	79.6	15.5
Preiļi district	29192	13733	63.5	29.9	28146	11264	67.4	27	28030	11185	67.5	26.9	27682	11062	67.5	27	27421	11003	67.4	27.1	27078	10789	67.8	26.9
Rezekne district	23146	18125	53.3	41.7	24528	16786	56.9	39	24686	16797	57.1	38.9	24534	16742	57	38.9	24311	16725	56.8	39.1	23906	16596	56.6	39.3
Rīga district	88202	44460	83.2	28.3	92668	36009	83.9	24.8	93287	36038	84.1	24.8	93865	35820	84.8	24.5	94755	35831	84.8	24.4	97307	36520	84.8	24.3
Saldus district	31845	2760	80.7	7	32353	2130	83.1	5.5	32168	2079	83.3	5.4	31975	2049	83.5	5.4	31927	2033	83.6	5.3	31683	2022	83.7	5.3
Talsi district	44947	2480	88.8	5	45775	1799	91.9	3.6	45477	1772	92	3.6	45041	1736	92	3.5	44828	1702	92.1	3.5	44410	1646	92.1	3.4
Tukums district	46303	7087	79	12.1	45591	4580	84.1	8.5	46141	4543	84.4	8.3	46547	4531	84.5	8.2	46744	4541	84.7	8.2	46939	4525	84.8	8.2
Valka district	27780	6492	74.3	17.4	27608	4419	80.4	12.9	27399	4382	80.5	12.9	27114	4282	80.7	12.7	26980	4192	80.9	12.6	26688	4125	81	12.5
Vaimiera district	49259	8365	76.5	14.3	49894	6762	82.6	11.2	49638	6847	82.8	11.1	49396	6557	82.9	11	49496	6515	83	10.9	49405	6360	83.3	10.7
Ventspils district	13493	1287	85.9	8.2	13144	718	89.9	4.9	13119	732	89.9	5	13056	731	89.8	5	13010	720	89.8	5	12783	714	89.9	5

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, "4.17 Resident Population by Ethnicity and by City and District at the Beginning of the Year", URL Address: <http://data.csb.lv/EN/dialog/statfile1.asp?xu=&yp=&lang=1>, last visited Jan.23, 2006.

**Table 2.2.3 Full-time General School Enrolment by Language of Instruction in Latvia (in thousands)**

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/2000	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
<b>ENROLMENT</b>															
Latvian	331,8	331,2	321,1	320,5	323,5	329,8	334,6	339	339,8	338,6	334,6	326,8	315,4	302,7	290,9
Russian	147,5	150,5	151,2	158,1	166	174,1	181,3	188,7	194,3	201,6	203	203,3	199,2	193,1	188,4
Latvian and Russian (mixed schools)	129,6	133,4	127,3	123	117,3	114	110,8	108	104	99,9	93,8	87,9	81,7	78,2	72,6
	54,7	47,1	42,3	39,9	39,5	40,9	41,6	41,3	40,3	35,8	36,5	34,2	33,1	30,1	28,6
of which language of instruction - Latvian	29,1	28,2	26	24,3	24,4	25,1	25,8	26,2	26,2	22,9	22,8	21,7	21,1	19,7	19,2
of which language of instruction - Russian	25,6	18,9	16,3	14,6	15,1	15,8	15,8	15,1	14,1	12,9	13,7	12,5	12	10,4	9,4

*Source:* Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, "9-7. General Full-Time School Enrolment by Language of Instruction", URL Address: <http://data.csb.lv/EN/dialog/statfile1.asp?xu=&yp=&lang=1>, last visited Jan.23, 2006.

**Table 2.2.4 Elected Members of City Councils in Latvia**

	Candidates				Elected		
	2001	%	2005	%	2001	2005	%
<b>Total</b>	13 560	100	15 676	100	4 335	4 179	100
<b>Latvians</b>	12 485	92	12 570	80	4 007	3 450	83
<b>Russians</b>	622	5	792	5	191	181	4

*Source:* Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, "24-7 Elected Members of City Councils of the Republic of Latvia by Age, Sex, Ethnicity and Education level", URL Address: <http://data.csb.lv/EN/dialog/statfile1.asp?xu=&yp=&lang=1>, last visited Jan.23, 2006.





## 2.2.7 Pre-School Enrolment by Language of Instruction

	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003																					
	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R																				
Preschool establishments, number	T	a	M	T	M	T	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M																				
	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v																				
	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i																				
	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a																				
	L	n	d	L	n	d	L	n	d	L	n	d	L	n	d	L	n	d	L	n																				
TOTAL	608	342	153	111	608	357	136	115	611	379	112	120	598	385	99	114	586	376	71	135	573	384	68	119	561	378	56	125	552	375	59	115	551	375	64	110	550	380	66	102
Urban localities	426	183	142	99	414	187	125	102	411	202	105	104	393	201	91	101	388	199	66	119	386	217	63	104	378	213	52	111	375	215	55	102	378	217	60	99	376	218	62	94
Rural localities	182	159	11	12	194	170	11	13	200	177	7	16	205	184	8	13	198	177	5	16	187	167	5	15	183	165	4	14	177	160	4	13	173	158	4	11	174	162	4	8
Preschool establishment enrolment, thsds	T	a	M	T	M	T	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T	M																				
	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v	i	O	v																				
	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i	x	T	i																				
	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a	e	A	a																				
TOTAL	68.5	35.6	17.4	15.3	72.8	39.5	15.8	17.3	72.3	41.4	13.9	16.8	68.4	39.9	11.5	16.8	66.1	38.5	8.6	18.3	65.1	40.6	7.7	16.5	61.8	38.5	6	17	61.5	38.4	6.6	16	69.2	44.8	7.8	16.2	70.3	45.9	8.3	15.7
Urban localities	56.7	25.3	17	14.2	59	27.4	15.5	15.9	57.5	28.6	13.6	15.1	54.1	27.4	11.2	15.3	52.7	28.8	8.5	16.7	51.3	28.5	7.5	15	49.2	27.2	5.9	15.8	49.2	27.6	6.5	14.6	52.6	29.8	7.5	14.9	53.6	30.3	8.1	14.8
Rural localities	11.8	10.3	0.4	1.1	13.9	12.1	0.3	1.4	14.8	12.8	0.3	1.7	14.3	12.5	0.3	1.5	13.4	11.7	0.1	1.6	13.8	12.1	0.2	1.5	12.6	11.3	0.1	1.2	12.3	10.8	0.1	1.4	15.6	15	0.3	1.3	16.7	15.8	0.2	0.9

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, "9-3. PRESCHOOL ESTABLISHMENTS BY LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION", URL Address: <http://data.csb.lv/EN/dialog/statfile1.asp?xu=&yp=&lang=1>, last visited Jan.23, 2006.

**Table 2.3.1 Political Parties of Hungary**

Name of the Political Party	Year of participation in elections and number of seats obtained	Member of the Governing Coalition?
<i>Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)</i>	1990 – 164 seats 1994 – 38 seats 1998 – 17 seats 2002 – 188 (with Fidesz and Hungarian Civic Party)	In 1990: formed the government  In 1998: Included in the government coalition
<i>Alliance of Free Democrats (Szdsz)</i>	1990 – 92 seats 1994 – 69 seats 1998 – 24 seats 2002 – 19 seats	In 1990: Official opposition, agreement for constitutional questions with the MDF  In 1994: Government coalition with MSzP with 3 ministers  In 2002: in the governing coalition
<i>Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP)</i>	1990 – 44 seats 1994 – 26 seats 1998 – 48 seats 2002 – 0 seats	In 1990: in the governing coalition until 1992  In 1998: In the governing coalition with Fidesz, and obtained 4 ministries
<i>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP)</i>	1990 – 32 seats 1994 – 209 seats 1998 – 134 seats 2002 – 178 seats	In 1994: formed a majority government (and coalition with Szdsz)  In 2002: In the governing coalition
<i>Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz)</i>	1990 – 22 seats 1994 – 20 seats (with MPP) 1998 – 148 seats 2002 – 188 (with MPP and MDF)	In 1998 formed a government coalition
<i>Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)</i>	1990 – 21 seats 1994 – 22 seats 1998 – 0 seat 2002 – 0 seat	In 1990: in the governing coalition
<i>Agrarian Alliance (ASz)</i>	1990 – 1 seat 1994 – 1 seat	
<i>Hungarian Civic Party (MPP)</i>	1994 – 20 seats (with Fidesz) 1998 – 148 seats (with Fidesz) 2002 – 188 seats (with Fidesz and MDF)	In 1998: in the government coalition

<i>Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP)</i>	1998 – 14 seats 2002 – 0 seat	
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### 2.3.2 Minority Self-Governments by type (in 1994)

Minority	Minority Self-Government	Directly Elected
Bulgarian	4	4
Roma	412	411
Greek	6	6
Croatian	56	40
Polish	7	7
German	163	134
Armenian	16	16
Romanian	12	11
Russian	-	1
Serb	19	19
Slovak	52	41
Slovenian	6	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>693</b>

*Source:* Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.66.

### 2.3.3 Number of Roma Self-Government by Counties (in 1994)

County	Total number of Self-Government in the County	Number of Roma Self-Governments
Budapest	73	21
Bács-Kiskun	37	12
Baranya	65	19
Békés	39	18
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén	97	84
Csongrád	15	6
Fejér	14	6
Győr-Moson-Sopron	19	5
Hajdú-Bihar	28	24
Heves	38	37
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok	26	26
Komárom-Esztergom	24	3
Nógrád	32	18
Pest	71	28
Somogy	24	20
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg	50	47
Tolna	33	16
Vas	27	3
Veszprém	27	11
Zala	15	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>412</b>

*Source:* Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.67.

### 2.3.3.4 Highest Education Level reached by Members of Minority Self-Government (in percent)

	Elementary	Professional school	High School	Post-Secondary
Roma (420)	63	25	8	3
Total for all minorities	34	19	19	28

Source: Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.73.

### 2.3.3.5 Members of Minority Self-Government's Type of Job (in percent)

	Public Administration	Service sector	Entrepreneur	Cooperative sector	Other
Roma (118)	32	31	27	4	6
Total for all minorities (453)	45	18	25	4	7

Source: Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.75.

### 2.3.3.6 Employment Status of the Members of Minority Self-Governments (in percent)

	Employed	Unemployed	Pensioner	Welfare	Income Supplement	Entrepreneur	Maternity	Other
Roma (409)	23	32	23	4	6	7	3	2
Total for all minorities (899)	39	16	27	2	2	10	1	2

Source: Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.76.

### 2.3.3.7 Type of Support Offered to Minority Self-Governments (in percent)

	Operative costs	Moral Support	Events	Grant writing help	None	Other
Roma (73)	43,8	2,7	8,2	12,3	13,7	19,2
Total for all minorities (295)	51,9	2	12,2	16,3	4,7	12,9

Source: Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.84.

### 2.3.8 Distribution of State Funding in Minority Self-Governments (in percent)

	Leisure (cultural and sports events)	Education	Social Assistance	Honoraria	Operating Costs	Development	Other
Roma (238)	10	8	12	25	33	1	11
Total for all minorities (459)	14	8	8	24	34	2	10

*Source:* Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.86.

### 2.3.9 The Use of the Grants to Minority Self-Governments

	Operations	Development	Social Assistance	Cultural Activities	Education	Welfare	Administration	Other
Roma (156)	4	3	18	51	10	32	0	12
Total for all minorities (432)	14	4	8	56	10	2	0	6

*Source:* Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.87.

### 2.3.10 Evaluation of the Work of the National Ethnic Minorities Office by the Self-Governments

	Positive	Poor	Redundant	Never heard of it	Fine in Individual Cases	Bad in Individual Cases	Definitely Bad	Other
Roma (88)	56,8	22,7	-	9,1	-	-	8	3,4
Total for all minorities (303)	52,1	14,9	0,3	17,5	0,7	0,3	6,6	7,6

*Source:* Csefkó Ferenc and Pálné Kovács Ilona, *Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Magyarországon*, Budapest: Osiris, 1999, p.146.

#### **2.4.1 Political Parties in Romania**

<b>Name of the Political Party</b>	<b>Year of participation in elections and number of seats obtained</b>	<b>Member of the Governing Coalition?</b>
<b>National Salvation Front</b>	1990 – 263 seats (Deputies) 1990 – 91 seats (Senate)  1992 – 43 seats (Deputies) 1992 – 18 seats (Senate)	
<b>Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)</b>	1990 – 29 seats (Deputies) 1990 – 12 seats (Senate)  1992 – 27 seats (Deputies) 1992 – 12 seats (Senate)  1996 – 25 seats (Deputies) 1996 – 11 seats (Senate)  2000 – 27 seats (Deputies) 2000 – 12 seats (Senate)  2004 – 22 seats (Deputies) 2004 – 10 seats (Senate)	12/1996: In the governing coalition with USD and CDR  04/1998: In the governing coalition with USD and CDR  2004 – In the governing coalition
<b>National Liberal Party (PNL)</b>	1990 – 29 seats (Deputies) 1990 – 10 seats (Senate)  2000 – 30 seats (Deputies) 2000 – 13 seats (Senate)  2004 – 64 seats (Deputies) 2004 – 28 seats (Senate)	2004 – In the governing coalition

<b>Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR)</b>	1990 – 9 seats (Deputies) 1990 – 0 seat (Senate)  1992 – 30 seats (Deputies) 1992 – 14 seats (Senate)  1996 – 18 seats (Deputies) 1996 – 7 seats (Senate)	
<b>Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania</b>	1990 – 9 seats (Deputies) 1990 – 0 seats (Senate)  1992 – 5 seats (Senate)	
<b>Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN)</b>  <u>In Coalition with PDSR for 1996 and 2000 elections</u>	1992 – 117 seats (Deputies) 1992 – 49 seats (Senate)  1996 – 91 seats (Deputies) 1996 – 41 seats (Senate)  2000 – 155 seats (Deputies) 2000 – 65 seats (Senate)	In 1992: The only party in cabinet  In 2000: In the governing coalition with PSD
<b>Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR)</b>	1992 – 82 seats (Deputies) 1992 – 34 seats (Senate)  1996 – 112 seats (Deputies) 1996 – 53 seats (Senate)	12/1996: In the governing coalition with USD and UDMR  04/1998: In the governing coalition with USD and UDMR
<b>Greater Romania Party (PRM)</b>	1992 – 16 seats (Deputies) 1992 – 6 seats (Senate)  1996 – 19 seats (Deputies) 1996 – 8 seats (Senate)  2000 – 84 seats (Deputies) 2000 – 37 seats (Senate)	



	2004 – 48 seats (Deputies) 2004 – 21 seats (Senate)	
<b>Socialist Party of Labor (PSM)</b>	1992 – 13 seats (Deputies) 1992 – 5 seats (Senate)	
<b>Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR)</b> <u>In coalition with FDSN</u>	1996 – 91 seats (Deputies) 1996 – 41 seats (Senate) 2000 – 155 seats (Deputies) 2000 – 65 seats (Senate)	08/1994: In the cabinet with PUNR, supported in the chamber by PSM and PRM 10/1995: In the cabinet with PUNR, only supported in the chamber by PSM
<b>Social Democratic Union (USD)</b>	1996 – 53 seats (Deputies) 1996 – 23 seats (Senate)	12/1996: In the governing coalition with CDR and UDMR 04/1998: In the governing coalition with CDR and UDMR
<b>Democratic Party (PD)</b>	2000 – 31 seats (Deputies) 2000 – 13 seats (Senate) 2004 – 48 seats (Senate) 2004 – 21 seats (Senate)	2004 – In the governing coalition
<b>Social Democratic Party (PSD)</b>	2004 – 113 seats (Deputies) 2004 – 46 seats (Senate)	In 2000: in the governing coalition with FDSN
<b>Humanist Party of Romania (PUR)</b>	2004 – 19 seats (Deputies) 2004 – 11 seats (Senate)	2004 – In the governing coalition with PD, UDMR and PNL


## 2.4.2 Hungarians by Counties in Romania (from Census 2002)

1 : 700 000

Megye/Județ/County	1992					2 002				
	Osszesen/ Total	Român/ Romanian	Magyar/ Hungarian	Német/ German	Egyéb/ Alté etnik/ Others	Osszesen/ Total	Român/ Romanian	Magyar/ Hungarian	Német/ German	Egyéb/ Alté etnik/ Others
Alba Fehér	413 919	373 951	24 765	3 243	299	382 747	346 059	20 684	1 311	1 698
Arad	487 617	392 600	61 011	9 392	11 289	461 791	379 451	49 291	4 852	10 533
Bihar	638 863	423 097	181 703	1 593	8 674	600 246	404 468	155 829	1 163	8 697
Bistrița-Năsăud/Beszterec-Naszód	326 820	293 549	21 098	9 54	215	311 657	281 273	18 349	1 155	2 119
Brașov/Brassó	643 261	553 101	63 558	10 059	931	589 028	514 161	50 936	4 418	1 180
Caras-Severin/Krassó-Szörény	376 347	325 758	7 876	11 936	23 001	333 219	294 031	5 824	7 914	19 281
Cluj/Kolozs	736 301	571 275	146 186	1 407	1 099	702 755	557 891	122 301	944	1 785
Covasna/Kovácsna	233 256	54 586	175 502	252	275	222 449	51 790	164 158	5 973	339
Harghita/Harghita	348 335	48 948	295 104	199	257	326 222	45 870	276 038	3 835	339
Hunedoara/Hunyad	547 950	503 241	33 849	3 634	1 649	485 712	450 302	25 388	1 937	1 262
Maramures/Máramaros	540 099	437 997	54 902	3 416	37 083	510 110	418 405	46 300	8 913	34 489
Mures/Maros	610 053	317 541	252 651	4 588	475	580 851	309 375	228 275	40 425	731
Satu Mare/Szatmár	400 789	234 541	140 392	14 351	1 682	367 281	216 085	129 258	13 478	2 043
Sălaj/Szilágy	266 797	192 552	63 151	146	1 724	248 015	176 671	57 167	6 417	1 531
Sibiu/Szeben	452 873	397 205	19 309	17 122	507	421 724	382 661	15 344	17 125	6 554
Timis/Temes	700 033	561 200	62 866	26 722	34 409	677 926	563 639	50 556	14 174	31 473
<b>Erde/Hrdeal/Transylvania</b>	<b>7 723 313</b>	<b>5 684 142</b>	<b>1 603 923</b>	<b>109 014</b>	<b>123 569</b>	<b>7 221 733</b>	<b>5 393 552</b>	<b>1 415 718</b>	<b>53 077</b>	<b>176 272</b>
<b>România/Romania/Romania</b>	<b>22 810 035</b>	<b>20 408 542</b>	<b>1 624 959</b>	<b>119 462</b>	<b>255 985</b>	<b>21 680 974</b>	<b>19 399 597</b>	<b>1 431 807</b>	<b>59 764</b>	<b>254 666</b>

Source: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, URL Address: <http://www.rmdsz.ro/script/mainframe.php?lang=eng>, last visited February 9, 2006.

### 2.4.3 Map of the Distribution of Hungarians in Romania (Transylvania)



Source: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, URL Address: <http://www.rmdsz.ro/script/mainframe.php?lang=eng>, last visited February 9, 2006.

### 2.4.5 Emigrants from Romania by Nationality

Nationality	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Romanian	23 888	19 307	18 104	8 814	10 146	18 706	16 767	16 883	15 202	11 283	13 438	9 023	7 465	9 886
Hungarian	11 040	7 494	3 523	3 206	2 509	3 608	2 105	1 459	1 217	696	788	647	489	661
Total of all emigrants	96 929	44 160	31 152	18 446	17 146	25 675	21 526	19 945	17 536	12 594	14 573	9 921	8 154	10 673

Source: National Institute of Statistics – Romania, “Population Data, Table 2.3.5 Emigrants by Nationality and Country of Destination”, URL Address: [http://www.insse.ro/anuar\\_2004/zip\\_e2004/chap2-pop.pdf](http://www.insse.ro/anuar_2004/zip_e2004/chap2-pop.pdf), last visited February 9, 2006.

### 2.4.6 Enrolment of Pupils by Language and Level of Education

	1990/ 91	1991/ 92	1992/ 93	1993/ 94	1994/ 95	1995/ 96	1996/ 97	1997/ 98	1998/ 99	1999/ 2000	2000/ 01	2001/ 02	2002/ 03	2003/ 04
Preschool Education	752 141	742 232	752 063	712 136	715 514	697 888	659 226	623 553	624 778	616 313	611 036	616 014	629 703	636 709
Romanian	687 611	686 405	694 406	655 741	658 994	644 987	609 718	576 015	577 620	569 520	564 991	569 629	582 627	589 702
Hungarian	47 600	47 530	49 255	48 192	47 754	45 839	42 816	40 978	40 397	40 207	40 086	40 266	41 457	40 811
Primary and Secondary Education	2 730 306	2 639 279	2 572 454	2 533 491	2 532 169	2 541 945	2 546 231	2 559 766	2 556 930	2 498 139	2 411 505	2 320 536	2 198 312	2 122 226
Romania	2 574 999	2 492 848	2 431 048	2 396 033	2 394 630	2 407 964	2 412 950	2 424 716	2 420 636	2 366 691	2 285 960	2 198 693	2 080 242	2 006 983
Hungarian	142 459	134 186	128 879	125 480	124 167	121 215	120 597	121 244	122 385	119 157	114 420	109 498	106 515	104 068
High School Education	995 689	778 120	714 013	722 421	757 673	787 211	792 788	765 903	718 017	694 376	687 919	710 663	740 404	758 917
Romanian	952 058	742 946	680 725	689 573	725 086	754 570	760 377	733 611	687 555	664 816	657 910	677 824	705 904	724 186
Hungarian	41 367	33 147	31 196	30 475	30 055	29 950	29 604	29 604	27 274	26 430	26 207	28 301	29 415	29 634
Vocational and Apprenticeship Education	365 860	373 303	333 624	300 443	288 674	285 450	262 057	247 239	227 585	222 234	239 550	252 347	270 215	279 124
Romanian	361 281	368 714	327 535	294 331	282 381	279 959	256 785	241 255	221 709	216 469	232 736	245 257	262 265	270 843
Hungarian	4 123	6 380	5 738	6 112	6 293	5 491	5 272	5 984	5 876	5 747	6 798	7 090	7 950	8 281
Post High School and Foremen Education	29 225	54 907	57 037	50 707	45 321	54 642	73 521	86 300	96 134	94 700	82 117	72 685	61 855	54 732
Romanian	28 651	53 706	55 865	49 537	44 337	53 621	72 662	85 112	94 675	92 507	79 693	70 651	60 197	53 305
Hungarian	525	1 103	969	1 058	862	906	753	1 087	1 347	2 094	2 362	2 001	1 658	1 427

Source: National Institute of Statistics – Romania, "Education Data, Table 15.8: Pre-University Education by Teaching Language", URL Address: [http://www.insse.ro/annual\\_2004/zip\\_e2004/chap15-education.pdf](http://www.insse.ro/annual_2004/zip_e2004/chap15-education.pdf), last visited February 9, 2006.

#### 2.4.7 The ratio of registered Students in Hungarian-Language schools between 1989/90 and 1996/97

Type of schools	1989/90 (%)	1991/92 (%)	1994/95 (%)	1995/96 (%)	1996/97 (%)	1997/98 (%)
Nursery schools	5.3	6.4	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.7
Primary schools	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.9
High schools	2.5	4.3	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.8
Vocational schools	0.04	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.1	–
Higher education	4.3	4.3	N/A.	3.8	4.1	–

Source: Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, "Reports on the Situation of Hungarians Living Abroad – Hungarians in Romania 2000", p.32.

URL Address: [http://www.htmh.hu/en/007\\_romania/text011/doc\\_upload/romania2000.pdf](http://www.htmh.hu/en/007_romania/text011/doc_upload/romania2000.pdf), last visited February 10, 2006