

An Aesthetic Challenge to Manipulation:
A Study on the Pragmatics of Communication

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Abstract

An Aesthetic Challenge to Manipulation: A Study on the Pragmatics of Communication

Tyler Field

In this thesis, it is my intent to argue that introducing John Dewey's aesthetic theory into Jürgen Habermas's pragmatics of communication will provide more evidence in opposition to the suggestion that manipulation can avert future legitimation crises. In developing this thesis, several steps will be taken. First, I will explicate Habermas's work on legitimation crises in order to explain what a legitimation crisis is and how such a crisis arises. I will then consider two potential remedies that might help avert a legitimation crisis: increasing material rewards or increasing ideology/manipulation. Next, I will provide some explanations concerning why Habermas's pragmatic theory needs to be reinforced in order to adequately oppose the recommendation to use manipulation to avert legitimation crises.

By juxtaposing Dewey's aesthetic theory with Habermas's pragmatics of communication, I intend to align myself with Habermas, and oppose the suggestion that manipulation can permanently avert future legitimation crises. By considering Dewey alongside Habermas, I will problematize manipulation and argue that manipulation is an unstable remedial measure. In conclusion, I will suggest that more stable remedial measures need to be sought if society desires to permanently avert legitimation crises.

Acknowledgement

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I would also like to thank my parents, Paul and Bernadette. Without their support, I might never have had the opportunity to further my education. And, finally, I would like to thank Heather, your company has been priceless throughout these last couple of years in Montreal. To all those people mentioned, and to the many people that I have not mention because there are simply too many people to name, Thank-You!

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Introduction

A Pragmatic Juxtaposition

In this work, I intent to *juxtapose John Dewey's aesthetic theory*¹ with *Jürgen Habermas's pragmatics of communication in order to oppose the belief that manipulation is a satisfactory solution to avert legitimation crises in late capitalism*. To develop and defend this thesis, two major steps are required. The first half of this thesis (Chapters 1-5) will argue that in late capitalism, manipulation *is* the remedy used in the attempt to cure legitimation crises and Habermas's pragmatics of communication,² in isolation of Dewey, is not sufficient to dissuade the social practice of using manipulation to avoid a legitimation crisis.

Several steps will be required to develop Part I. Chapter 1 will provide a more thorough introduction to Part I than is provided in this introduction. Chapter 2 will explicate Habermas's *Legitimation Crisis*.³ Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will consider two potential remedial measures for curing a legitimation crisis: material rewards and manipulation. Chapter 5 will conclude Part I by arguing that manipulation has become the remedy of choice, in late capitalism, to avoid legitimation crises.

¹ Dewey's aesthetic theory is in many ways a pragmatic theory of communication. The similarities between Dewey's pragmatics and Habermas's pragmatics of communication will be teased out in Part II.

² Because of both time and space constraints, this thesis will not be able to fully consider Habermas and Dewey's political and social writings. The focus will be placed upon their respective pragmatics of communication in relation to *Legitimation Crisis*.

³ Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1975)

As I consider these two potential remedial measures that could be used to avert legitimation crises, I will also pragmatize Habermas's pragmatics of communication. What this entails is that I will consider how the pragmatics of communication is perverted within the context of late capitalism. This is an important move for two reasons. First this move allows me to argue that manipulation appears to be a feasible remedy for future legitimation crises. Secondly, since Habermas evaluates manipulation from within the context of his pragmatics of communication and not from a pragmatics of communication that has been contextualized in late capitalism, I will argue this problematizes Habermas's ability to evaluate the plausibility of using manipulation as a remedial measure for legitimation crises.⁴

If evidence, which puts into question the safety of using a remedy, could be provided, people would likely feel the need to re-evaluate the remedial measures that are currently being used. By juxtaposing Dewey's aesthetic theory with Habermas's pragmatics of communication, I will bring forth new evidence that challenges the suggestion that manipulation can help avoid future legitimation crises. This juxtaposition is the intent of the second part of this thesis.

Part II (Chapters 6-11) will argue towards the main intent of this thesis, which was stated in the opening lines of this introduction. Chapter 6 will provide a thorough introduction to Part II. Chapter 7 will juxtapose Dewey's aesthetic theory with Habermas's pragmatics of communication, which will lead to the suggestion that art can

⁴ This thesis will not consider how Habermas might (or does) evaluate manipulation within all his political or sociological writings. This thesis will primarily focus on Habermas's pragmatics of communication. Such a limitation may be unfair to Habermas's corpus since his writings frequently intertwine and reinforce each other, but rather than hide this flaw with this thesis, I would like to be the first to highlight this deficiency. This thesis hopes to establish a foothold within Habermas's works from which I might develop and expand this work in more detail at some future point.

either reinforce or challenge manipulation – though it is not necessary that art do one or the other. Chapter 8 will consider how art is used to reinforce manipulation (propaganda), while Chapter 9 will consider how art is used to challenge manipulation (emancipatory art). I will then consider, in Chapter 10, how censorship attempts to eliminate emancipatory art; however, I will argue that censorship might help prolong manipulation by reducing emancipatory art, but censors are unlikely to eliminate all potential emancipatory art. In Chapter 11, I will conclude by noting that so long as there remains the potential that art could challenge the integrity of using manipulation to remedy legitimation crises, we should realize the possibility that manipulation does not permanently avert legitimation crises, but only stalls legitimation crises.

To conclude, this thesis will attempt to reconstruct a pragmatics of communication, which will overcome some of the inadequacies in Habermas's pragmatics of communication. Part I will evaluate Habermas's pragmatics of communication in late capitalism and explain why Habermas's opposition to the remedial use of manipulation is unpersuasive. And Part II will juxtapose Dewey's aesthetic theory with Habermas's pragmatics of communication; in doing so, I hope to uncover more evidence in opposition to the current social practice of using manipulation in the attempt to remedy legitimation crises. And as I have noted, as evidence grows to problematize the safety of using manipulation to avert legitimation crisis, so too grows the potential to deter this social practice from continuing.

Part I

Legitimation Crises & Remedial Measures

Chapter 1 : Introductory Comments

In this section of my thesis, Part I, I will argue that *in late capitalism, manipulation is the remedy used in the attempt to cure legitimation crises regardless of Habermas's warnings against using manipulation.* In order to develop this argument, several steps will be taken. The first step will consider Jürgen Habermas's *Legitimation Crisis*,¹ which is a commendable attempt to explain the deficiencies of Karl Marx's analysis concerning economic crises. Habermas expands the scope of the social world beyond Marx's limited scope that focuses upon materialism.² Because of this expanded scope, Habermas can suggest that Marx's forecast regarding the collapse of capitalism "exclude[s] the possibility that economic crisis can be permanently averted."³ *Legitimation Crisis* helps us understand how economic crises have been averted in late capitalism. However, Habermas also forecasts the likelihood that the averted economic crisis will evolve and

¹ Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1975)

² I am herein using social world as an overarching category that encompasses the three social spheres that are being considered in this thesis (the lifeworld, the economic system and the political system) and the interactions that take place between these spheres. I have attempted to capture how these spheres interact with each other in Figure 1. Using social world in this manner differs from how Habermas uses the social world; according Habermas the social world is where interpersonal relationships occur.

³ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 40.

re-emerge as another social problem. As Habermas notes, and as I will explain in Chapter 2, averting economic crises “produce[s] a series of other crisis tendencies.”⁴

In Chapter 2, I will explicate Habermas’s work on social crises so that we may understand the causes that create a legitimation crisis and the possible remedies that might help avert a legitimation crisis. This explication will provide the necessary groundwork from which I will develop my thesis that challenges manipulation. I will begin by considering the social interactions that take place between the economic system, the political system, and the lifeworld.⁵ Then, I will introduce the notion of economic crises and I will map out the evolution of an averted economic crisis, showing how an economic crisis evolves to a legitimation crisis. I will pay particular attention to the relationship between legitimation crises and motivation crises. This relationship is central because, according to Habermas’s analysis of legitimation crisis, if we can increase the inputs that fuel motivation, which rewards the lifeworld for its output, we

⁴ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 40.

⁵ Habermas explicates the social world similar to systems theory. This is not to say that Habermas agrees with systems theory; in fact, Habermas is very critical of systems theory. Rather, I take Habermas’s intention behind creating parallels between his own work and systems theory as a conscious attempt to heighten the force of his critical remarks concerning the inadequacies of systems theory.

In *Legitimation Crisis*, Habermas suggests that systems theorists would comprehend the lifeworld as a social system (p. 5). Habermas uses the notion of socio-cultural system rather than lifeworld throughout this work. Here are two possible reasons why: (1) Habermas uses socio-cultural system to maintain a conceptual tie with systems theorist, and (2) in his explications of crisis tendencies in late capitalism, Habermas can suggest how the socio-cultural system interacts with both the political and economic systems. In his later works, Habermas criticizes systems theory for attempting to pigeonhole all aspects of society. More specifically, Habermas will argue that systems theory is inadequate to explain the lifeworld. Habermas suggests that social theory needs to make a conceptual move away from the concept of socio-cultural system towards the more dynamic concept “the lifeworld.” As such, I will accept Habermas’s suggestion. I will use the concept of the lifeworld, rather than the concept of socio-cultural system, as I explicate Habermas’s work on legitimation crises.

might avert a legitimation crisis. In *Legitimation Crisis*, Habermas recognizes that the lifeworld has two types of motivational inputs: material rewards and ideology. The following two chapters will consider the ramifications that will result from increasing these motivational inputs.

In Chapter 3, I will explain why the suggestion to increase material rewards to avert a legitimation crisis is problematic in late capitalism. Habermas suggests that unfair distribution of material rewards can be overcome by democratizing the lifeworld.⁶ I will consider Habermas's suggestion beside his explication of Karl Bühler's schema of language functions in order to illustrate how a democratic lifeworld might avert a legitimation crisis. In theory, Habermas's recommendation is sound; however, I worry that the democratization of the lifeworld may be difficult to implement. Because there is a history of conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat,⁷ it seems improbable that these classes can overcome their mistrust of one another and achieve the level of communicative competency that is required to implement Habermas's democratic theory. This will lead me to conclude that material rewards are an unlikely remedy for

⁶ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 123.

⁷ I would like to acknowledge a significant oversight in this thesis. I will argue from the Marxist's class division of bourgeoisie and proletariat. However, this is a false dichotomy. For instance, many students are landless people, this would suggest they are not bourgeoisie; however, the proletariat do not have the leisure time nor the financial resources available for study. Thus, it could be argued that students represent a class of citizens that does not fit into either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. However, since students are intellectuals, I would suggest that, within the context of this thesis, they approximate the bourgeoisie. This decision is based upon the fact that students, like the bourgeoisie, have vast knowledge, which allows them to readily critically evaluate expressions. The significance of accessing knowledge (appealing to experiences) will be considered throughout this thesis. Secondly, I would like to indicate that I am using "proletariat" in a very limited sense. "Proletariat" is herein being used to indicate people who need to sell their labour for wages; in doing so, their labour is used to pursue ends that are determined by someone other than themselves.

legitimation crises. The other remedial option is to input more ideology into the lifeworld in attempt to motivate people to increase the output of legitimation.

Chapter 4 will argue that ideology (a specific kind of manipulation) is a viable remedy for legitimation crises. I will suggest that we need to re-evaluate Bühler's schema so it will adequately represent the communicative situation as it exists in late capitalism. Doing this will highlight the fact that the bourgeoisie currently monopolizes knowledge. The problem here is that "privileged access to the sources of relevant knowledge makes possible an inconspicuous domination over the colonized public."⁸ This will lead to the further suggestion that since the bourgeoisie have privileged access to relevant knowledge, the proletariat are the colonized public. Furthermore, I will argue that, in late capitalism, the colonized proletariat are particularly susceptible to manipulation. This colonial pattern will also allow me to suggest that the proletariat are the likely source from which legitimation crises will arise.⁹ Thus, because the proletariat are particularly susceptible to manipulation, manipulation appears to be a viable remedy for legitimation crises in late capitalism.

Chapter 5 will conclude Part I by suggesting that Habermas is not sufficiently pragmatic in his analysis concerning the remedial measures for legitimation crises. I will suggest that the bourgeoisie are holding all the cards and will likely steer society towards

⁸ This quote complements, quite nicely, the work that I have developed in my thesis, and it helps to highlight how the work I have undertaken *might* be relevant to Habermas's more recent works. However, I have not undertaken a comprehensive analysis of Habermas's later works. Thus, I am only suggesting that my thesis, which primarily considers Habermas's earlier works, might have some bearing on Habermas's later work; I am not asserting that my thesis does have bearing on Habermas's later work. Before I am able to assert the latter, I would first need to embark on a thorough reading of Habermas's later work. [Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 317.]

⁹ I will provide support for this claim in Chapter 2.

their own choice of remedial measures. I will neither disagree nor oppose Habermas's recommendation; rather, I will simply assert, for reasons that will unfold throughout Part I, that manipulation is used to avoid legitimation crises in late capitalism. I will finish by noting that even though Habermas believes his own remedial measure would be a more potent remedy than manipulation,¹⁰ he does allow for the possibility that manipulation might successfully avert legitimation crisis. Habermas notes, "As long as the capitalist economic system begot of itself a viable ideology, a comparable legitimation problem (which sets restrictive conditions to the solution of the problem of capital realization) could not arise."¹¹ Although Habermas does believe there is "a systematic limit to attempts to compensate for legitimation deficits through conscious manipulation,"¹² he has not shown that the systematic limit of manipulation is less than the level of manipulation that is required to remedy legitimation crises. Thus, Habermas's argument against the use of manipulation is insufficient to convince society that better remedial measures need to be implemented.

¹⁰ This claim is based upon Habermas's statement that "complexes of interaction cannot be stabilized simply on the basis of the reciprocal influence that success-oriented actors exert on one another...society must be integrated through communicative action." (*Between Facts and Norms*, p. 26.) Since manipulation is a type of communication that is oriented towards success while the democratization of the lifeworld would promote communicative action, Habermas believes that his remedy measure would be more stable than using manipulation as a remedy. [Jürgen Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, p. 21-103, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 93. {also found in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1979)}]

¹¹ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 58.

¹² Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 71.

Chapter 2 : Legitimation Crises in Late Capitalism

Before I can even consider arguing towards my goal, it is important that I first take the time to consider Habermas's *Legitimation Crisis* because this book is central to my argument. This chapter has two primary goals: *it will explicate Habermas's work on social crises so that we may understand the causes leading to a legitimation crisis and it will suggest the possible remedies that might help avert a legitimation crisis.* Though this chapter will be relatively void of original thought, it provides the theoretical cosmic ooze from which my thesis will develop. I will develop this chapter in two steps: (1) I will consider the three social spheres that are prevalent in Habermas's *Legitimation Crisis*: the economic system, the political system and the lifeworld. And I will consider how these three spheres would interact with each other when society is crisis free. (2) I will then consider how late capitalism produces crisis tendencies within these social spheres. I take this approach because it will help to highlight how crisis tendencies have been generated, which will provide us with some insights concerning how society might remedy legitimation crises.

(1) In *Legitimation Crisis*, Habermas consistently breaks down the social world into three social spheres; he begins by isolating the economic system, considers the political system next, and rounds things up with the lifeworld.¹³ Concerning the

¹³ On at least three separate occasions, Habermas refers to these three social spheres in this order. These three occasions are: (1) Part II, Chapter 1, A Descriptive Model of Advanced Capitalism, (2) Part II, Chapter 3, A Classification of Possible Crisis Tendencies, and (3) Part II, Chapters 4-7, which consider, in order, Economic Crisis (which has its point of origin in the economic system), Rationality Crisis (which has its point of origin in the political system), Legitimation Crisis (which has its point of origin in the political system), and Motivation Crisis (which has its point of origin in the socio-cultural

economic system, in a way that is similar to Marx, Habermas notes, “The economic system requires an input of work and capital. The output consists in consumable values.”¹⁴ The economic system acquires these inputs whenever the lifeworld integrates into the economic system.¹⁵ However, what is perfectly clear is that not everybody in the lifeworld has the abundance of financial resources that are required to invest capital in the economic system.¹⁶ The proletariat primarily possess an abundance of labour to trade; this makes them an unlikely source of capital investment. Working from a bourgeoisie/proletariat dichotomy, we are left to assume that it is the bourgeoisie who invest capital into the economic system. But, perhaps before we consider who contributes which inputs into the economic system, we should ask the question, why would either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat decide to integrate into the economic system in the first place? What motivates economic integration?

It is generally believed that the basic function of the economic system is to produce goods that people desire.¹⁷ This makes the economic system desirable, which in turn helps motivate people to integrate into the economic system. However, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have different desires. The bourgeoisie are motivated to invest their capital because they expect and desire profitable returns for their investments.

system/lifeworld). Habermas makes the above ties between the points of origin and crisis tendencies on the table he provides on p. 45. [Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 33-41, 45-50, 50-92.]

¹⁴ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 45.

¹⁵ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 20-21.

¹⁶ Thomas Pogge notes that 1.5 billion people are living under a U.S. dollar per day. He also notes, “The number of persons who are poor by this absolute measure...if recent trends persist, will reach 1.9 billion by 2015.” According to Pogge’s statistics, there is a large portion of the world’s population that will be unable to invest capital into the economic system. [“Priorities of Global Justice,” in *Global Justice*, p. 6-22, ed. Thomas W. Pogge (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001)], p. 11.

¹⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, p. 131-134.

In contrast, the proletariat are motivated to input labour because they desire wages. Thus, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have differing means at their disposal to use and they have differing ends being pursued. The economic system would be at equilibrium whenever the economic system produces and distributes a level of material rewards that satisfies the expected desires of the people who are integrated into the economic system.




Figure 1
Social Interactions at Equilibrium

The second social sphere that Habermas considers is the political system. It is readily apparent that political systems frequently abet their respective economic system.¹⁸ The political system uses ideology in the effort to justify political actions to the lifeworld.

¹⁸ History provides countless examples in which a political system has used administrative power to expand its society's economic interests. The opium wars in China and the tensions between colonial powers that proliferated into World War I are two prime examples.

An ideological justification for the political system's involvement with economic matters is to help protect the economic system from potential economic crises.¹⁹ The political system provides support to the economic system, which helps maintain the output produced by the economic system, which is required to meet expectations and maintain economic integration. As long as the political system achieves its ideological goals, the political system is likely to acquire legitimation.²⁰ In brief, legitimation denotes the case when people willingly integrate into the political system, submit to the system's binding conditions, and accept the system's decisions.²¹ Under the aforementioned conditions, when the economic system is at equilibrium and the political system is legitimated, the social world would be at equilibrium and be free of crises (see Figure 1).

(2) The problem with the above proposed equilibrium is that it is not indicative of late capitalism. Both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie actively engage with the economic system because they expect certain material rewards. However, as Habermas notes, the economic system "expropriates individual capitalists (competition) and deprives the labouring masses of their means of subsistence (unemployment)."²² The point is that it is the bourgeoisie's economic imperative to compete with one another in the pursuit of maximizing profits.²³ This ravenous competition frequently leads to the success of one capital venture at the demise of another capital venture. However, this bourgeois competition acts to the detriment of the proletariat's economic imperative,

¹⁹ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 61-62.

²⁰ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 62.

²¹ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 101-102.

²² Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 29.

²³ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 21.

which is to acquire wages for their labour.²⁴ The proletariat become unemployed whenever businesses collapse under the pressure of bourgeois competition. As “class opposition between owners of capital and masses dependent on wages again becomes manifest,”²⁵ “contradictory system imperatives...threatens social integration.”²⁶

The problem with the economic system is that there are two distinct imperatives that are in tension with each other. The bourgeoisie expect to maximize profit, while the proletariat expect to attain a liveable wage.²⁷ For the bourgeoisie to maximize profit, they need to reduce expenditures. One cost saving measure that can be taken is to reduce wages that are paid for labour. However, reducing wages is in direct opposition to the proletariat’s expectations. On the other hand, if labourers have their wages increased from a minimum wage to a liveable wage, it means that the bourgeoisie are having their profits reduced. It is this contradiction that has the potential to create a crisis in the economic system. If one of these groups successfully attains their expectation, it would imply that the other group would not have their expectation met. When expectations are not met, people become frustrated by the economic system,²⁸ and when people become frustrated, they will decrease their current level of integration in the economic system.

²⁴ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 25.

²⁵ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 46.

²⁶ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 29.

²⁷ A liveable wage is a wage that would be adequate to satisfy basic human needs, such as food, shelter and clothing. The notion of liveable wage has been put forth as a critique of minimum wage. According to advocates for a liveable wage, minimum wage is inadequate to satisfy basic human needs.

²⁸ Sociological research indicates that there is a direct correlation between the size of the gap between expected rewards and actual rewards, and potential threat to the status quo. The greater the gap is, the greater the potential demand for change; the smaller the gap is, the smaller the potential demand for change. This correlation has come to be known as relative deprivation theory. [Samual D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson & Linda M.Grayson, *Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Canada*

As is becoming more evident everyday, in late capitalism the economic system acts in favour of the bourgeoisie and to the detriment of the proletariat. The decline of welfare systems, environmental standards, and labour unions are all changes that allow the bourgeoisie to increase their profit margins; these changes also reduce the material rewards that are distributed to the proletariat. The point is that, in late capitalism, the bourgeoisie have come to dominate over the distribution of material rewards.²⁹ With this in mind, we can begin to consider how social equilibrium, which was presented in Figure 1, has been displaced by the class struggles that exist in late capitalism, which will lead us to Figure 2.

Step 1, the bourgeoisie control the distribution of material rewards. This allows the bourgeoisie to reduce the material rewards that are distributed to the proletariat. Step 2, the first step will create a surplus of material rewards, which will enable the bourgeoisie to increase the material rewards that are distributed to themselves. Step 3, the reduction in material rewards that are distributed to the proletariat will enlarge the gap between actual rewards and their expected rewards, which in turn will create a correlating reduction in motivation to participate in the economic system. This creates a potential threat to the economic system because the lack of motivation might effect the efficiency of labour. As the saying goes, a happy worker is a productive worker. Reading between the lines allows us to infer that an unhappy worker is an unproductive worker, which in

(Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Limited, 1975) p. 8; David A. Locher, *Collective Behavior* (United States of America: Prentice Hall, 2002), p254-258.]

²⁹ I will provide more details explaining how the bourgeoisie have come to dominate over the distribution of material rewards in Chapter 4.

turn would negatively affect the economic system. This change to economic integration has the potential to create an *economic crisis*.




Figure 2
Social Interactions in Late Capitalism

Step 4, the extra material rewards that are being distributed to the bourgeoisie will motivate the bourgeoisie to increase legitimation and to try to steer the political system to modify its behaviour to support the economic system. Step 5, the political system, when steered by the bourgeoisie, will increase economic support in order to stabilize the input that is required by the economic system. Step 6, if increasing the input into the economic system leads to the production of more material rewards and some of this increased economic output is distributed to the proletariat, the new, pro-capitalist political agenda

might acquire legitimation from the proletariat. However, if the political system does not increase the proletariat's portion of material rewards, a rationality crisis arises. A *rationality crisis* arises whenever the consequences of political action do not converge with the ideological goals that justified those actions, such as when the increase of political support to the economic system is not sufficient to remedy the economic crisis. In the case being discussed, if there is no increase of material rewards being distributed to the proletariat, there remains no increase to motivation to dissuade the proletariat from limiting their labour in the economic system.

Step 7, the political system will increase ideological control over the proletariat in an effort to motivate the proletariat to legitimate the new political directives. In the end, if a sufficient level of input is not achieved to motivate the proletariat to legitimate this new political agenda, a legitimation crisis will arise. At this point, there are two crisis tendencies in close interaction with each other. The insufficient level of input to motivate legitimation is a *motivation crisis*, while the insufficient output of legitimation is a *legitimation crisis*.

As I think should be clear, several important points have been made in the above paragraphs. First, the proletariat are the likely source of legitimation crises in late capitalism. Second, if we can remedy motivation crises, the effect will remedy legitimation crises. And third, there are, at least, two different inputs that motivate people in the lifeworld: material rewards and ideology.

In conclusion, the above explication of Habermas's *Legitimation Crisis* suggests that there are three potential remedies for legitimation crisis. We can increase the proletariat's share of material rewards, we can increase the use of ideology to manipulate

the proletariat, or we can increase both material rewards and ideology. The next two chapters (3 & 4) will consider the practicality of the first two remedial measures.³⁰ I will conclude this first part of my thesis (chapter 5) by explaining why we might (mis)perceive manipulation as being the more feasible remedy to combat legitimation crises in late capitalism.

Chapter 3 : On the Pragmatics of Material Rewards

As was noted in the previous chapter, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have contradictory economic imperatives. The bourgeoisie desire to maximize profit – which entails reducing wages that are distributed to the proletariat – while the proletariat desire a liveable wage – which entails reducing the profits distributed to the bourgeoisie. This tension between economic imperatives is at the root of class struggles. Because the bourgeoisie oversee the distribution of material rewards, it should come as no surprise if the proletariat became discontent, which might affect the output of the labour. The intent of this chapter is to consider *whether it is feasible to implement the social changes that would be required to implement a sustainable distributive pattern of material rewards*. Sustainability implies a sufficient level of material rewards that will motivate people to maintain economic integration, which in turn will reduce the threat of economic crises. This is important, because, as Chapter 2 made clear, a legitimation crisis is likely to arise

³⁰ I will not consider the third remedy because it does not add any force to my argument. The first remedy allows me to critically evaluate some of the deficiencies with Habermas's remedial suggestions, while the second remedy allows me to explicate manipulation, which is the main focus of this thesis. The third remedy, though possibly the most potent remedy of the three, is unlikely to add any new information concerning the problem surrounding the use of manipulation as a remedial measure.

when the political system attempts to avert an economic crisis by supporting the economic system. If we can reduce the threat of an economic crisis, we reduce the need to avert an economic crisis, which reduces the possibility that a legitimation crisis will arise.

I will (1) begin by considering the internal logic of the economic system. According to its internal logic, the economic system will distribute material rewards in response to the lifeworld's consensus. (2) I will then consider how Habermas's democratic consensus would be developed. However, (3) since consensus needs to be developed between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in order to determine a sustainable distributive pattern of materials rewards in hopes of remedying legitimation crises, we should contextualize how Habermasian consensus would be developed in late capitalism. (4) I will conclude this chapter by problematizing Habermas's recommendation that the democratization of the lifeworld is a feasible remedy for legitimation crises in late capitalism.

(1) The economic system is dependant on the input of capital and labour that is supplied by the lifeworld. A certain level of input is required so that the economic system can produce sufficient output to reward the lifeworld for supplying the required input. Equilibrium would be established whenever the economic system acquires the required input from the lifeworld and the lifeworld receives adequate rewards for supplying this input. In order for equilibrium to be established, the lifeworld would need to be able to determine how much input the economic system requires, and the economic system would need to be able to determine what rewards the lifeworld expects in return for its input. The point is that a certain level of communicative interaction is required

between the lifeworld and the economic system in order to develop economic equilibrium.

In economic equilibrium, the economic system would not prioritize either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat's economic imperative. Since both the capital that the bourgeoisie input and the labour that the proletariat input are required for the economic system to function, the economic system would not favour either class because favouritism would likely frustrate the unfavored class, which might lead to an economic crisis. It seems counter-intuitive to think that the economic system would function in a manner that promotes economic crises. Thus, favouring one class over the other is not likely to be found within the internal logic of the economic system. According to this logic, the economic system would output material rewards to an agreeable middle that lies between both the bourgeoisie's and the proletariat's expectations. This impartial attempt to distribute material rewards is required from the economic system in hopes of maintaining the input of both capital and labour.

The economic system does not determine how agreement is developed; agreements are determined within the lifeworld. All the economic system can do is interpret what it takes to be the lifeworld's consensus and distribute material rewards accordingly. The problem, however, is that the economic system does not differentiate the bourgeoisie's consensus from the proletariat's consensus from the lifeworld's consensus. As the economic system attempts to distribute material rewards, the economic system might mistake either the bourgeoisie's consensus or the proletariat's consensus as being the lifeworld's consensus. If such a misinterpretation ever occurred, we could anticipate the consequences. The economic system would distribute material

rewards according to either the bourgeoisie's economic imperative or the proletariat's economic imperative, pending upon which was mistaken for the lifeworld's imperative.

It is, at least in part, because of the aforementioned reasons that Habermas promotes the need to democratize the lifeworld. According to Habermas, a democratic lifeworld would act in harmony with the discourse principle, which states, "Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity *as participants in a practical discourse*."³¹ Thus, neither the bourgeoisie's economic imperative nor the proletariat's economic imperative would satisfy the discourse principle in a democratic lifeworld because neither class would approve of their counterpart's economic imperative.

Democratizing the lifeworld, which would overcome the problems that arise when discourses are fragmented. Democratizing the lifeworld would converge bourgeois consensus with proletariat consensus to develop the lifeworld's consensus. This would reduce the possibility that the economic system would mistake a group's consensus for the lifeworld's consensus, which would increase the potential that the economic system would distribute material rewards to the satisfaction of the lifeworld; thus, reducing the threat of an economic crisis. In order to evaluate Habermas's suggested remedy for legitimation crises, we will need to understand the pragmatics of consensus, which supports his proposal.

(2) Habermas's pragmatics of communication will help enlighten us regarding how the lifeworld might go about developing a consensus. To describe the communicative interactions that enable people to develop consensus, Habermas draws

³¹ Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1990), p. 66.

upon Karl Bühler's schema of language functions. Like Bühler, Habermas suggests that people start by making claims to express their experiences.³² It is important that we understand the relationship between experiences and claims before we consider the relationship between claims and consensus. After all, if experiences are antecedent to claims and claims are antecedent to consensus, to provide an adequate explanation for consensus, we should begin from the start of this chain of causal connection.

Habermas's work, however, subordinates the role of experiences because they are personal, while prioritizing the role of communication. Because of Habermas's epistemic focus, he has not adequately considered "experience."³³ Rather than turn to Habermas regarding experiences, I will consider what John Dewey has to say about experience. Dewey has gone to great lengths to explain what it means to have an experience, and he thoroughly considers the role of experience in communication. Furthermore, Dewey's work on experience will confirm how Habermas relates experience to communication. There is also an ulterior motive for considering Dewey's thoughts concerning experience; much of the Part II will spring forth from this explication of Dewey's notion of experience.

Dewey begins by suggesting, "Impulsions are the beginnings of complete experience."³⁴ This notion of impulsion is central to Dewey's work on experiences; "Impulsion" designates a movement outwards and forward of the whole organism to

³² Jürgen Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interactions*, trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 86-87.

³³ I should qualify this claim by noting that Habermas has not thoroughly considered "experience" in any of the texts that I have been working with; however, it is possible that he does so elsewhere.

³⁴ John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934), p. 58.

which special impulses are auxiliary.”³⁵ Dewey is not using the term “auxiliary” in the sense of “secondary,” but rather in the sense of “supporting.” To illustrate how impulses and impusions are mutually supporting, consider what happens when a person touches something hot, such as boiling water. Their nervous system will perceive the interaction between person and the scalding water as being undesirable. This initial response is an impulse.³⁶ The impulse will lead the organism to take action in order to remedy their interaction with their environmental conditions. In the case being considered, the person will respond by withdrawing their hand from the water, which is the impulsion – the overall action that an organism makes in response to an impulse.

Dewey continues:

Impulsion from need starts an experience that does not know where it is going; resistance and check bring about the conversion of direct forwards action into reflection; what is turned back upon is the relation of hindering conditions to what the self possesses as working capital in virtue of prior experiences. As the energies thus involved re-enforce the original impulsion, this operates more circumspectly with insight into end and method. Such is the outline of every experience that is clothed with meaning.³⁷

Some unpacking is required to explain the significance of this passage. Dewey begins by reiterating that an impulsion instigates an experience. He then introduces the notion of “resistance” to imply an undesirable interaction between organism and environment.³⁸ For instance, when a person places their hand in scalding water, that

³⁵ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 58.

³⁶ John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), p. 89-94.

³⁷ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 60.

³⁸ An undesirable interaction is not limited to when a person desires to avert interacting with the environment. An undesirable interaction can also arise when a person needs to increase their interaction

person will be resistant to maintain contact with this object. “Forward action” is the impulsion that is used to overcome resistance and bring about a desirable outcome. The “check” is an evaluation to determine whether the forward action was successful to overcome the resistance; if the forward act was unsuccessful, further forward actions will be taken until a desirable outcome has been acquired.

At this point when an impulsion has come to its conclusion, Dewey distinguishes a behavioural quality that separates humans from other creatures. People have the uncanny ability to reflect upon their preceding actions. People recognize and remember how environmental conditions have hindered them in the past and what forward actions were required to overcome these obstacles. This recognition is brought forth as experience; people can draw upon this resource in the future when similar resistant occurrences arise. Experience provides people with insight concerning methods that can be used in order to overcome environmental obstacles and achieve the desired results.

According to Dewey, experience, in practice, would work in the following way. Consider the person that burns their hand in scalding water. After their initial experience with hot water, they would come to the realization that placing their hand in scalding water creates undesirable consequences. As a result, this person will make a conscious effort to refrain from touching boiling water in the future. The problem is that a circumstance might arise where this person will need to retrieve something from boiling water, such as removing an egg from boiling water. The person, by reflecting upon previous experiences, might realize that they could pour the boiling water out of the pot and let the egg cool before attempting to retrieve the egg, or they might use a spoon or

with the environment; for example, a person is hungry when they have not adequately converged with the environment. People are resistant to maintain an aversion to food.

some other device to lift the egg out of the dreaded water. The point is that people are influenced by previous experiences as they attempt to find new and better methods to overcome future difficulties.

To sum up Dewey's work on experience, an experience is instigated by a tension between a person and their environment; this tension instigates an impulsion; the impulsion is the active effort to overcome the aforementioned tension; we will reflect upon successful actions; and we will take forth these reflections in the form of experiences. Now that a brief explanation has been provided for the notion of experience, we can go back and consider how discursive claims appeal to our experiences.

Habermas notes,

Corroborating experiences are the foundation on which everyday practice of our lifeworld rests; they provide us with certainty. But certainties are always subjective; they can be upset at any time by dissonant experiences. From the perspective of the believing subject, certainty is the correlate of the actual validity of a belief. To that extent experience – that is, continually corroborating experience – grounds the truth claims raised.³⁹

According to Habermas, a speaker will appeal to their experiences, try to ascribe meaning to these experiences, and then express the meaning of their experiences through language. The hearer will then take their own understanding of the expression, appeal to their own experiences, and determine whether their own experiences coincide or contradict the expressed claim. Whenever experiences coincide with the expression, the hearer will agree with the speaker's utterance, which helps explain why corroborating

³⁹ Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interactions*, p. 88.

experiences are foundational for the lifeworld. However, if there is a discrepancy between the hearer's experience and the original claim, the hearer will express their own critical evaluation of the speaker's expression. Whenever a challenge is made against a claim, the claim "must be discursively redeemable; that is, the statement must be able to hold up against all counterarguments and command the assent of all potential participants in a discourse."⁴⁰ Figure 3 attempts to capture this schema of language functions, which Habermas has adapted from Karl Bühler.




Figure 3
Bühler's Schema of Language Functions⁴¹

⁴⁰ Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interactions*, p. 89.

⁴¹ Jürgen Habermas, "Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning," in *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, p. 277-306, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 278.

Regarding discourse, Habermas notes:

Discourse can be understood as that form of communication that is removed from contexts of experience and action and whose structure assures us: that the bracketed validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings are the exclusive object of discussion; that participants, themes and contributions are not restricted except with reference to the goal of testing the validity claims in questions; that no force except that of the better argument is exercised; and that, as a result, all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded. If under these conditions a consensus about the recommendation to accept a norm arises argumentatively, that is, on the basis of hypothetically proposed, alternative justifications, then this consensus expresses a “rational will.” Since all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in the practical deliberation, the “rationality” of the discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioural expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a *common* interest ascertained *without deception*. The interest is common because the constraint-free consensus permits only what all can want; it is free of deception because even the interpretations of needs in which *each individual* must be able to recognize what he wants become the object of discursive will-formation. The discursively formed will may be called “rational” because the formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can arise only through appropriately interpreted, *generalizable* interest, by which I mean needs *that can be communicatively shared*.⁴²

When people use rational discourse to debate over alternative expressions with the intention of developing a consensus, each alternative will appeal to a variety of validity claims.

[C]onsensus rests on the recognition of at least four claims to validity that competent speakers must raise reciprocally for each of their speech acts: the *intelligibility* of the utterance, the *truth* of

[also found in PostMetaphysical *Thinking*, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992)]

⁴² Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 107-108.

its propositional component, the *normative rightness* of its performative component, and the *sincerity* of the intention expressed by the speaker.⁴³

Since the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have different economic imperatives, and they use different means to pursue different ends, it is reasonable to think that these classes will have different economic experiences, which leads to the possibility that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will have dissonant economic experiences. Since the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are likely to have dissonant economic experiences, it is unlikely that these two classes will converge and develop a consensus regarding the distribution of material rewards. We need to recognize the possibility that a permanent disagreement can arise. As Thomas McCarthy notes:

Disagreements of these sorts are likely to be a permanent feature of democratic public life. They are in general not resolvable by strategic compromise, rational consensus, or ethical self-clarification in Habermas's senses of these terms.⁴⁴

Though I think it is unlikely that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will come to an agreement concerning economic matters, I should not dismiss the possibility that I might be proven wrong. With Habermas's thoughts on rational consensus in the background, I would like to consider how the bourgeoisie and the proletariat might go about developing a discursive consensus when they start from varying claims about the economic system.

⁴³ Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interactions*, p. 90.

⁴⁴ Thomas McCarthy, "Practical Discourse: On the Relation of Morality to Politics," in *Jürgen Habermas. Vol. 1-4*, Vol 2: p. 353-369. ed. David M. Rasmussen & James Swindal (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2002), Vol 2, p. 365.

(3) The bourgeoisie often express the biased belief that the function of the economic system is to maximize capital. On the other hand, the proletariat are likely to reply that the function of the economic system is to provide liveable wages. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat have incompatible beliefs concerning the function of the economic system. In order to develop a consensus, according to Habermas, these beliefs need to be criticized and redeemed in relation to all four types of validity claims. By analyzing each belief, I hope to be able to explain the factors that create the current disagreement. Understanding the current disagreement might help the lifeworld to devise a way to overcome such a disagreement.

The first type of validity claim that a belief adheres to is intelligibility. Intelligibility implies that “an utterance must be sufficiently well formed so that it can be understood. Otherwise it does not serve the purpose of reaching mutual understanding.”⁴⁵ So long as both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat can understand the meaning of the expression being professed by their counterpart, intelligibility is achieved. Even though the bourgeoisie and proletariat do not ascribe to the beliefs that are being put forth by their counterpart, I would be surprised to find that there is a problem of intelligibility,⁴⁶ especially since both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are competent language users.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interactions*, p. 149.

⁴⁶ In more recent works, Habermas drops the notion of an intelligibility claim and focuses on the remaining three claims.

⁴⁷ I would like to note the difference between being linguistically competent and discursively or communicatively competent. Being linguistically competent requires having knowledge about the significance of words and grammatical rules. Being discursively or communicatively competent requires knowledge about the state of affairs that terms appeal to. The difference is that in order to be discursively

The second type of validity claim that an expression adheres to is truth. According to Habermas, truth relates to the function of speech that corresponds to a state of affairs.⁴⁸ To evaluate the truth component of a sentence, people need to be able to evaluate how aptly a statement represents a state of affairs. If the state of affairs contradicts the expression being made, the truth component of an expression is taken as false. By teasing out the truth component of the two different beliefs, we will see that a problem begins to develop.

The bourgeoisie believe that if they invest capital into the economic system, they will acquire more capital in return for their investment. As I noted in my attempt to explicate the function of the economic system, the economic system does reward investors by providing investors with more capital. Thus, the bourgeoisie's belief does correspond to the state of economic affairs. In contrast, the proletariat believe if they invest labour into the economic system, they will receive an adequate wage in return for their labour. Again, the above explication concerning the function of the economic system does affirm the truth component of the proletariat's belief. Hence, we have two beliefs that are in tension with each other, yet both beliefs are justified by the internal logic of the economic system. What is missing, what allows these two classes to be antagonistic towards each other, is that both groups are expressing a belief that is based upon half-truths. Each group interprets the function of the economic system through

or communicatively competent, a person requires the epistemic ability to critically evaluate the accuracy of the signs being used; where as to be linguistic competent, a person only needs to be able to use the signs.

⁴⁸ I would like to qualify my use of *The Theory of Communicative Action* by conceding that I limited my focus to the areas of text that are relevant to Habermas's pragmatics of communication. I have not thoroughly considered the social and political ramifications of this work. [Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (1981), trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 329.]

cultural biases. These cultural biases take us to the heart of class antagonism, which relates to the third type of validity, normative claims.

Normative validity claims, according to Habermas, are the part of speech that appeal to previously founded background norms. For instance, it is expected that an employee will obey their employer's demands; however, an employer does not need to appease their employee in a reciprocal manner. Throughout history, society has constructed an abundance of social expectations concerning how people should act given a certain set of circumstances. Speech frequently appeals to these societal norms. The normative validity claim is satisfied whenever an expression meshes with social norms and is unfulfilled whenever an expression conflicts with social norms.

According to Habermas, a problem arises whenever normative claims are isolated to a "group of primary reference persons,"⁴⁹ consensus is isolated to "culturally interpreted needs,"⁵⁰ which explains the aforementioned cultural biases. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat adhere to different economic imperatives and these imperatives influence how each group will interpret truth claims. Accordingly, the bourgeoisie's claim that the function of the economic system is to maximize profits is a claim that would only be redeemable within a bourgeoisie reference group. Likewise, the proletariat's claim that the function of the economic system is to create liveable wages is a claim that would only be redeemable within a proletariat reference group. Habermas would likely suggest that disagreement and class antagonism arise because both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are morally immature.⁵¹ I have modified Bühler's schema

⁴⁹ Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, p. 89.

⁵⁰ Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, p. 89.

⁵¹ Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, p. 89.

of language functions in an attempt to display this disagreement between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, see figure 4.




Figure 4
Bühler's Schema of Language Functions
in Social Equilibrium

This suggestion, that both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are morally immature, is derived from Habermas's exposition of Lawrence Kohlberg's six stages of moral consciousness.⁵² Stages one and two are the least developed stages of moral consciousness, taking place at the pre-conventional level. Stages three and four are

⁵² Habermas draws upon Kohlberg's six stages of moral consciousness in, at least, two places: *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, p. 78-90, and in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 119-133.

moderately developed stages of moral consciousness, taking place at the conventional level. And stages five and six are the most developed stages of moral consciousness, taking place at the post-conventional and principled level.

Since both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat create beliefs that are to the benefit of their own primary reference group, these two classes display characteristics that are indicative of the third stage of moral development. “*Stage 3*, the stage of mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and conformity.”⁵³ In order for these two groups to enter into a competent discourse with each other, they would need to develop their moral consciousness to the post-conventional level where “moral decisions are generated from rights, values or principles that are (or could be) agreeable to all individuals composing or creating a society designed to have fair and beneficial practices.”⁵⁴ Habermas goes to great lengths to argue that the principle for discourse ethics is a means that, if acted upon, would get participant to act at the post-conventional level of moral consciousness. From Habermas’s discourse ethics, we can contemplate how a communicatively competent bourgeoisie and a communicatively competent proletariat would go about establishing an agreement regarding the socially desirable distribution of material rewards.

Habermas notes, “The impartiality of judgment is expressed in a principle that constrains *all* affected to adopt the perspectives of *all others* in the balancing of interests.”⁵⁵ This leads Habermas to conclude:

⁵³ Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p.123.

⁵⁴ Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p.124.

⁵⁵ Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p.65.

Every valid norm has to fulfill the following condition:

(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).⁵⁶

If they follow this principle, the bourgeoisie will take the proletariat's expressions into consideration. In doing so, the bourgeoisie will come to realize, if they do not already realize, that the economic system requires labour to function. Since the integration of labour is depend upon the proletariat receiving material rewards, the bourgeoisie should be able to understand the potential economic crisis that will arise if the proletariat do not receive an adequate wage. On the other hand, the proletariat will take the bourgeoisie's expressions into consideration. This will allow the proletariat to realize, if they do not already realize, that the existing state of the economic system requires capital to function. Since the integration of capital is dependant upon the bourgeoisie receiving profit, the proletariat should be able to understand the potential economic crisis that will arise if the bourgeoisie do not receive adequate profit.

Since both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat desire the maintenance of the economic system in order to pursue their own economic interests and they can come to understand the economic imperative that is being pursued by their counterpart, each class may decide to make concessions in order to help preserve the economic system, which is to everybody's interest. The bourgeoisie may realize that maximizing profits at the expense of the proletariat may prove harmful to everyone, while the proletariat may realize that continually demanding increases to wages at the expense of bourgeoisie may

⁵⁶ Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p.65.

also harm everyone. This shared understanding allows the bourgeoisie and the proletariat to unite in the shared desire to stabilize economic integration.

When the bourgeoisie and the proletariat come into discourse with each other, they will need to re-evaluate their normative background beliefs and find a common point of overlap if they desire to develop consensus. Once a point of overlap is found, these two classes can argue from a common normative claim about the distribution of material rewards that would maintain economic integration. Over time the differences between how the bourgeoisie interpret their economic experiences and how the proletariat interpret their economic experiences will be reduced, if not dissolved. This resolution would create a common normative interpretive lens from which to develop a consensus regarding the expected distribution of material rewards.

In conclusion, Habermas's approach attempts to remedy legitimation crises by finding a way to assure that the economic system will re-distribute material rewards in such a manner that would reduce the threat of economic crises. Since the economic system functions in such a way that the output of the economic system is determined by the consensus of the lifeworld, Habermas focuses his attention on the problems plaguing the lifeworld. The problem is that the bourgeoisie currently dominate the lifeworld's discourses – reasons for this domination will be provided in Chapter 4. Thus, when the economic system attempts to distribute material rewards according to its interpretation of the lifeworld's discourse, the economic system will mistake bourgeois discourse as being the lifeworld's discourse and will distribute material rewards according to the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Democratizing the lifeworld would help assure that a genuine consensus is developed in the lifeworld, which would be required to assure that the output from the economic system meets the lifeworld's expectations. In remedying this problem, material rewards would be distributed in a manner that would reduce, and possibly eliminate, the threat of economic crises. Remedying economic crises will reduce the need for the political system to support the economic system, which will reduce the possibility that a rationality crisis will arise. In turn, reducing the threat of rationality crises will reduce the threat of legitimation crises.

(4) There are some oversights with the above Habermasian remedy for legitimation crises that should be considered. First, manipulating the public to legitimate changes to the political agenda is a possible method to avert legitimation crises; Habermas never denies this possibility. Habermas prioritizes his own remedial measure because he thinks competent communication would provide a stronger remedy than manipulation.⁵⁷ Competent communication would cure economic crises, thus eliminating the need that the political system supports the economic system, which leads to a legitimation crises; thus, competent communication pre-emptively remedies legitimation crises.

By analogy, legitimation crises are the potential cancers that plague society. In order to act pre-emptively, we need to know the causes that create these cancers. Habermas's *Legitimation Crisis* and *The Theory of Communicative Action*⁵⁸ can be read

⁵⁷ See note 10. p. 8.

⁵⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol 1; The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason* (1981), trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1987).

as attempts to expose these cancer-causing agents. Furthermore, his “Discourse Ethics,”⁵⁹ “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,” and *Between Facts and Norms*⁶⁰ could be read as potential remedies to eliminate these cancer-causing agents. However, like all medicine, if Habermas is wrong about the causes that create the disease, any pre-emptive remedial measure taken will miss their mark. On the other hand, manipulation is equivalent to the use of chemotherapy. Manipulation is used to battle legitimation crises as it develops; manipulation might send legitimation crises into remission and allow society to live a full and happy life.

The second oversight is that if manipulation can successfully avert legitimation crises, why should people be convinced to pursue Habermas’s remedial recommendation? This is a problem for Habermas because the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are currently antagonistic towards one another. In order for society to implement Habermas’s proposed remedy, these two classes need to improve their moral consciousness. The problem is how do you get these two groups from being dire antagonists to discursive participants? To be discursive participants, one of the underlying presuppositions is trust, trust that other discursive participants are being sincere. Though Habermas suggests that moral development is required and he considers the different stages of moral development, there is a lack of insight concerning how these antagonists would develop trust. But if trust is taken in its common sense meaning, you

⁵⁹ Jürgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 43-115; “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,” in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 116-194.

⁶⁰ I should note that I have not rigorously considered the importance of the text *Between Facts and Norms*. After a superficial look at this text, I think that there is evidence to support my claim that this book could be read as a potential remedy for legitimation crises. However, I would need to go through this text in greater detail to verify, or falsify, my suggestion.

either trust someone or you don't, it seems unlikely that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat can develop the ethical discourse that is required for Habermas's remedy because these classes do not trust each other.

The third oversight with Habermas's remedial suggestion is that it presupposes that both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat can actively engage in discourse. However, as I will explain in Chapter 4, the bourgeoisie have the upper-hand in most discourses that will take place between these two classes. As such, the existing conditions of late capitalism are not conducive for the proletariat to actively engage in discourses as full communicative participants.

Because of Habermas's three oversights, people might think Habermas's remedial measure is unpractical. It would be equivalent to applying a Band-Aid to a hand sopping with blood; it would never stick to the wound. Now with these preliminaries out of the way, the remainder of Part I will attempt to engage with the idea that manipulation can be used to avert legitimation crises. The next chapter will consider manipulation in relation to Habermas's work on the pragmatics of communication; I will argue that, according to this Habermasian framework, we should expect that manipulation would successfully avert potential legitimation crises. And Chapter 5 will conclude Part I by explaining why Habermas's pragmatics of communication is insufficient to sway society away from using manipulation as a remedial measure for legitimation crises in late capitalism.

Chapter 4 : On the Pragmatics of Manipulation

I hope the previous chapters have been fair to both the intent and analysis of Habermas's work. So long as I was fair, the previous chapters suggest that Habermas has not fully considered the complexities of late capitalism. I will not reiterate the criticisms that have been made above. Rather, (1) this chapter will begin to introduce some of John Dewey's philosophical insights that explicitly concern society in capitalism, which I take to be relevant for late capitalism. Dewey provides some helpful insights concerning how the bourgeoisie have come to monopolize public discourse. (2) I will also consider how this monopoly affects Bühler's schema of language functions. Reconsidering Bühler's schema, according to Dewey's consideration of capitalism, will allow me to explain why the proletariat are particularly susceptible to manipulation. Combining these points will be integral for the argument that will be developed in this chapter, which is, *Habermas's work on the pragmatics of communication, when contextualized in late capitalism, will actually reinforce, not challenge, the suggestion that manipulation may successfully remedy legitimation crises in late capitalism.*

(1) A striking characteristic of late capitalism, and capitalism in general, is the division of labour. In *Experience and Nature*,⁶¹ Dewey devotes some substantial time to consider the social ramifications of the division of labour. Dewey notes that the division of labour has created a rift between the means and the ends of human activities.⁶² Intellectual activities focus on the ends of human activities, which are concerned with

⁶¹ John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1925) in *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 1*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988)

⁶² Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 84.

human survival and enhancing various aspects of life while physical labour is the means required to bring about these ends.⁶³

According to Dewey, an organism uses labour either to acquire matter that is necessary to survive, such as food, or to avoid potential perils that threaten an organism's well being.⁶⁴ Labour is a necessary condition for survival. Taking Dewey's work and expanding it analogously to represent the lifeworld enables us to suggest that the lifeworld needs to labour in order to survive. Because intellectual activities will only be pursued after all necessary things required for survival are present,⁶⁵ we should anticipate that intellectuals would approve of the labourer's activities.

Intellectual activities, on the other hand, are concerned "with consequences to be brought into existence by action conditioned on the knowledge."⁶⁶ To understand what Dewey means, we first need to understand how he uses the word knowledge. According to Dewey, "all knowledge is historic."⁶⁷

Knowledge is obtained...through deliberate institution of a definite and specified course of change. The method of physical inquiry is to introduce some change in order to see what other change ensues; the correlation between these changes, when measured by a series of operations, constitutes the definite and desired object of knowledge.⁶⁸

⁶³ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 71.

⁶⁴ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*

⁶⁵ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 76.

⁶⁶ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 299.

⁶⁷ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 130.

⁶⁸ John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, (1929) in *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 4*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), p. 68.

This passage mentions that physical activity is used to modify an object; after which, we reflect upon the consequences of action; this is very reminiscent of the earlier discussion of experience. Knowledge is the accumulation of our experience. This would explain why all knowledge is historic; it is based upon experience, which is reflective by nature. Furthermore, intellectual activity is the attempt to use knowledge to inform and guide our actions in the future. Intelligence is forward looking.

Dewey suggests that human intelligence is on a quest for certainty. The implication of this quest is to make the environment as stable as possible – stability here relates to conditions that are conducive to the survival of the human species. It is believed that stabilizing our environment would reduce, if not liberate, humanity's bondage in labour.⁶⁹ Thus, we should expect that people who labour would approve of such intellectual activities.

One last point, it is generally believed that the division of labour reduces the amount of time that is required to remove uncertainties from our environment. Multitasking, on the other hand, reduces the efficiency from what could be achieved with the specialization of tasks. I think most people would agree that if they needed surgery, they would prefer a surgeon than a butcher to cut them open even though the butcher might be able to cut with more precision than the surgeon. The specialist is more likely to acquire the desired outcome. Specialization has increased humanity's ability to calculate, control and predict desired outcomes. Thus, through specialization, humanity heightens its ability to acquire certainty.

⁶⁹ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 78.

These last few paragraphs have made a quick attempt to show why the lifeworld might consent to the division of intellectual labour from physical labour. Now, with the division of labour in place, we can consider who are likely to take on which roles. As noted in Chapter 2, the proletariat are forced to participate as labourers because they need to exchange their labour for wages. Only people who are relieved from this preoccupation of making a wage have the leisure required to indiscriminately pursue intellectual activities.⁷⁰ This suggests that the bourgeoisie will take on the role of intellectuals. The bourgeoisie can participate in labour, if they desire; however, the proletariat do not have the leisure that is required to participate as an intellectual.

The fact that the bourgeoisie monopolizes intellectual activities while the proletariat toil as labourers has a significant impact upon the pragmatics of communication. Labouring, as anybody who has laboured will testify, is hard and tiring work. After working, a minimum of an eight-hour shift, a labourer is usually ready for physical rest. Although a labourer does not perform the mental exercises required of an intellectual, it is important that we understand that mundane jobs are more mentally frustrating than we might recognize.

Imagine working at a plant that produces elastic bands. Your job is to pick fifty elastics off a conveyor belt, place these fifty elastics into a little plastic bag, fold the bag and staple the bag closed. After the bag is stapled, you drop it into a container to your right side. And finally, you repeat this process throughout the duration of an eight-hour workday, five days a week. Now imagine the added pressure of quality control. It is the responsibility of quality control to select random bags of elastic bands to assure that you

⁷⁰ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 71.

are placing exactly fifty elastics into each bag, no more and no less. If quality control finds more than one mistake a week, you will be fired.

Since I assume (possibly wrongly) that most people who are reading this thesis are, at least, moderate intellectuals who have never needed to submit to the atrocious working conditions described above, it might be difficult for any one reading this thesis to conceive the sort of mental strain that would arise from such a mundane job. But consider an experience that might be minutely parallel to the conditions described above. At one time or another, most of us have sat down, emptied a container filled with coins and spent time counting pennies up to fifty, rolling the pennies, and then repeating this procedure. If your experience of rolling pennies is in anyway similar to mine, you likely grew tired of the process well before finishing. The point is that even though we have never worked in a job as mundane as that described above, we can understand the level of mental awareness that would be required to focus on such a mundane task. Thus, we can empathize with the fact that after an eight-hour workday, labourers will often be mentally exhausted.

Consider what has been said so far, the labourer, at the end of their workday, will likely be both mentally and physically fatigued and will desire rest. As a result, they are unlikely to engage in many rigorous mental activities after the workday has ended. The problem is that limiting mental activities reduces focused reflections, which in turn would reduce the ability to acquire experiences. The point that I want to make is that the proletariat, as a result of their working conditions, have, for the most part, been disenfranchised from experiences. Their disenfranchisement is in part due to mentally frustrating working conditions and partly due to the mundane working condition that are

not conducive for the development of new experiences. The point of all this is that the proletariat will have limited experiences of the world, which in turn would force us to re-evaluate Bühler's schema of language functions in the context of late capitalism, see Figure 5.




Figure 5
Bühler's Schema of Language Functions
In Late Capitalism

So long as Dewey's analysis is correct, the task of the intellectual is to identify factors of resistance and conceive possible methods to overcome these resistances while the labourer supplies the physical activities that are required to pursue the desired ends. Thus, the intellectual determines what actions need to be taken and the labourer performs

those actions. In the end, the intellect and the labourer complement each other's work, thus allowing ends to be acquired. However, because this separation of intellectual work and physical work correlates to the class divide between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, we can begin to see how the bourgeoisie might come to monopolize discourses that take place in the lifeworld.

To recapitulate, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat oppose each other from their own biases about the function of the economic system. Unlike Habermas's work on the pragmatics of communication where all communicative participants have access to the world, in late capitalism the proletariat are in a particularly poor position to argue about the truth conditions of propositions. The lack of experiences makes the proletariat incompetent to judge many of the assertions that are put forward by the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, because the proletariat are frequently communicatively incompetent, their arguments are unlikely to make any significant impact on the outcome of public discourse. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie are communicatively privileged because of their abundance of experiences, which are pertinent for discursively redeeming their expressions. The point is that when the lifeworld discusses the distribution of material rewards, consensus will be heavily swayed toward the bourgeoisie's desired outcome. Now, having considered how late capitalism affects the pragmatics of communication, we are ready to consider why manipulation might successfully avoid potential legitimation crises in late capitalism.

(2) In Chapter 2, I asserted that the bourgeoisie control the economic system. At that point, I had not covered the theoretical ground required to redeem this claim. Since then, I have noted that the bourgeoisie does not have direct control over the economic

system; the lifeworld steers the economic system. However, I have also considered how the pragmatics of communication is perverted in late capitalism, which indicated that the bourgeoisie dominates most discourses that arise in the lifeworld. By dominating public discourse, the bourgeoisie have substantial control over the lifeworld's consensus. And, finally, by controlling the lifeworld's discourse, the bourgeoisie control the steering mechanism for the economic system.

When the output from the economic system favours the bourgeoisie, which is the case in late capitalism, there is the worry that the material rewards distributed to the proletariat will be insufficient to motivate the proletariat to sustain their current levels of economic integration. At this point, the lifeworld, which is controlled by the bourgeoisie, will steer the political system to support the economic system. The problem is that when the political system is steered by a bourgeois controlled lifeworld, the proletariat might withdraw their legitimation from the political system. This withdrawal of legitimation has the potential to create a legitimation crisis. Thus, as has been pointed out in Chapter 2, we can motivate the proletariat to legitimate changes in political agenda in one of two ways: input more material rewards or input more ideology. The last chapter focused on the recommendation to increase material rewards to remedy potential legitimation crisis. The remainder of this chapter will consider the feasibility of using ideology, which is a form of manipulation, to remedy legitimation crisis.

The problem with considering the concept of "manipulation" is that it is not thoroughly considered in Habermas's pragmatics of communication; he considers manipulation primarily within the context of latently strategic action. In "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" Habermas develops a figure displaying the various types of

intersubjective communication. He notes that there are two types of latently strategic actions: manipulation and systematically distorted communication. Habermas writes:

Manipulative Action versus Systematically Distorted Communication. Whereas in systematically distorted communication at least one of the participants deceives *himself* about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparently being maintained, the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about her own strategic attitude, in which she *deliberately* behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner.⁷¹

Before we attempt to unpack the differences between manipulation and systematically distorted communication, both of which are important to this thesis because manipulation creates systematically distorted communication that keeps the proletariat docile, we first need to unpack the overarching category, latently strategic action.

According to Habermas, latently strategic action arises when “the speaker inconspicuously employs successful illocutionary acts for perlocutionary purposes.”⁷² He further notes,

In situations of latent strategic action, at least one of the parties behaves with an orientation toward success, but leaves others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied. This is the case of manipulation that we mentioned in connection with perlocutionary acts.⁷³

⁷¹ Habermas, “What Is Universal Pragmatics?” p. 93.

⁷² Jürgen Habermas, “Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication,” in *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, p. 105-182. p.140. [also found in Habermas’s *The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.1*]

⁷³ Habermas, “Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication,” p. 169.

In order to understand what Habermas is saying about latently strategic action, it is necessary to consider the adverb “perlocutionary.” “As is well known [at least amongst philosophers], [John] Austin distinguishes between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.”⁷⁴ Habermas explains these Austinian notions and relates them to the four types of validity claims that expressions must adhere to.

“Through *locutionary acts*, the speaker expresses states of affairs.”⁷⁵ To express a state of affairs, the expression would need to satisfy both intelligibility and truth claims.⁷⁶ People would need to understand the expression and be able to appeal to their experiences to verify the expression. “Through illocutionary acts, the speaker performs an action by saying something. The illocutionary role establishes the mode of sentence employed as a statement, promise, command, avowal, or the like.”⁷⁷ An illocutionary act is more complicated than the locutionary act. For instance, in order for somebody to perform a promise by way of illocutionary act, both the promiser and the promisee need to understand how a promise binds the promiser to fulfill certain actions. The promiser needs to understand a promise before they can consent to the binding force of a promise, and the promisee needs to understand a promise because it will allow the promisee to evaluate when the promise has been fulfilled. In order for a promise to arise, the promise

⁷⁴ Habermas, “Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication,” p. 122.

⁷⁵ Habermas, “Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication,” p. 122.

⁷⁶ Habermas questions whether or not locutionary and illocutionary acts can be divided as per Austin’s recommendation. Since a locutionary act is a statement about the state of affair, and a statement is a type of illocutionary act, it might be argued that there are no strictly locutionary acts. Habermas makes this point in “Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning,” p. 290. But, since I am concerned with the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, the debate about locutionary and illocutionary may be interesting to note; however, this debate is not relevant to the argument being put forth by this thesis.

⁷⁷ Habermas, “Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication,” p. 122.

needs to be intelligible, it expresses certain states of affairs (such as the expected behaviour of the promisee), and it is normatively binding. Thus, an illocutionary act will appeal to intelligibility, truth, and normative rightness claims. And, according to Habermas, the significant difference between illocutionary aims and perlocutionary aims is that the first is sincere, while the latter is insincere.

Habermas notes that illocutionary aims are oriented towards consensus, for this would allow the speaker and hearer to mutually coordinate their social interactions. On the other hand, “a speaker can pursue perlocutionary aims only when he deceives his counterpart concerning the fact that he is acting strategically.”⁷⁸ In this latter case, a speaker expresses an illocutionary act, such as a promise, and the hearer interprets the promise as being sincere. However, the speaker is not being sincere when making the promise; they lie with the explicit intent to bring about a certain effect. “Through *perlocutionary acts*, the speaker produces an effect upon the hearer. By carrying out a speech act she brings about something in the world.”⁷⁹ Now let us consider how illocutionary aims and perlocutionary aims might play out in late capitalism.

I would like to reiterate the argument that has been put forth concerning how the division of labour might have been discursively legitimated. Intellectual work was separated from physical work so that each type of work, by reducing the scope of its responsibilities, would become more efficient. The illocutionary aim that was common to both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat was the aim to enhance social life. If the bourgeoisie and the proletariat perceived each other to be acting towards mutual cooperation, it is possible that both classes would have allowed the ends to justify the

⁷⁸ Habermas, “Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication,” p. 128.

⁷⁹ Habermas, “Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication,” p. 122.

means. However, the dynamics of the situation change whenever one side approaches this discourse with perlocutionary aims.

As I have noted, the proletariat are in a particularly poor position to enter into discourse. Because they have limited worldly experience, the proletariat are vulnerable to deceit, and they are likely to fall victim to the bourgeoisie, if the bourgeoisie acted towards perlocutionary aims. Consider the expectations that motivated the proletariat to legitimate the division of labour. The proletariat consented to the division of labour because they expected the division of labour would enhance social life. However, because the proletariat do not have the specialized knowledge that is required to evaluate the economic system, they rely on the bourgeoisie to tell them the state of economic affairs. At this point, the bourgeoisie could either take illocutionary aims and tell the proletariat the facts of the matter (the economic system is thriving, capital is being distributed amongst the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat are being left in the cold) or the bourgeoisie could take perlocutionary aims and lie (the economic system is struggling, people must persevere through hardships, but improvement is just around the corner). If illocutionary aims were taken and the facts of the matter were revealed to the proletariat, the proletariat would likely demand increases to wages or they might pursue other, more dramatic, challenges to the economic status quo. However, if the bourgeoisie took perlocutionary aims, and most evidence seems to suggest this is the path that the bourgeoisie have taken, the proletariat might become more motivated and work harder than ever before because of the hope that improvement is right around the corner.

In the above example concerning perlocution, the proletariat believe that discourse is oriented towards consensus, while the bourgeoisie knowingly deceive the

proletariat in order to manipulate the proletariat to act in ways that are contrary to how the proletariat would act if discourse were oriented towards consensus. The problem is the proletariat do not have the means to verify whether the bourgeoisie are being sincere or insincere in their communication. This leads to the problem of trust. Since the proletariat are not in a position to have the expert knowledge that is required to evaluate bourgeois expressions, the proletariat can do nothing except decide whether or not to trust expressions that are put forth by the bourgeoisie.

If the proletariat trust the bourgeoisie, the proletariat would interpret the bourgeoisie's expressions as being accurate representations of the state of affairs. As such, the proletariat would believe the intellectual authority of bourgeoisie and would likely replicate bourgeois expressions. Thus, at least for those proletariats who trust the bourgeoisie, the proletariat would reify expressions that originated from the bourgeoisie. At this point, when the proletariat express meaning concerning a state of affairs even though they have never experienced these states of affairs, the proletariat exemplify systematically distorted communication. Systematically distorted communication arises when a person expresses a false claim as being valid, such as the pre-Copernicus belief that Earth is the centre of the universe. The point is that when perlocutionary aims are successful and manipulate a communicative participant, it frequently creates systematically distorted communication.

If the proletariat do not trust the bourgeoisie, the proletariat are likely to be apathetic towards the propositions that are expressed by the bourgeoisie. The problem here is even though the proletariat might be sceptical about what the bourgeoisie express – for example, regarding the state of economic affairs – the proletariat are unlikely to

have the experience that is required to falsify bourgeois expressions when bourgeois expressions are false. The proletariat may refrain from accepting bourgeois claims, but the proletariat have limited capacity to discursively challenge these claims. We can now begin to understand why the proletariat, at least the proletariat who do not trust the bourgeoisie, might be apathetic toward the existing state of the economic system.

The proletariat are at a crossroads; as the bourgeoisie ascribe meaning to the economic system, the proletariat will need to either accept or deny the validity of expressions being made. I think that it would be fair to suggest that there will be disunion amongst the proletariat; some accepting and reifying bourgeois expressions while others will deny these bourgeois expressions. The proletariat who mirror bourgeois expressions will likely reify the belief that economic crises needs to be averted, and they will legitimate the political system's decision to support the economic system. On the other hand, the proletariat who deny bourgeois expressions are the likely source of potential legitimation crises.

Most people perceive the political agenda as being bound, at least in democratic societies, to the will of the people. Because the political system exists outside the boundaries of the lifeworld and is steered by the lifeworld, people are likely to perceive a democratic political system as being impartial, and people might legitimate the political system to act as an arbiter to resolve conflicts of class interests. However, like the economic system, the political system is steered by a lifeworld whose discourse is dominated by the bourgeoisie, which implies that the political system may not be as impartial as people are led to believe. We should not be surprised if we were to find that political ideology supports the bourgeoisie. But, since the political system is cloaked by

impartiality, the proletariat are less likely to challenge the political system's agenda than they are to challenge the bourgeoisie's agenda.




Figure 6
Manipulation and Böhler's Schema of Language
Functions in Late Capitalism

To reiterate, the bourgeoisie have acquired privileged access to knowledge, which allows them to dominate discourses. As a result, the bourgeoisie are empowered to use perlocutionary aims to manipulate the political system. The political system reifies the interest of the bourgeoisie, which is a form of systematically distorted communication. And in unison the bourgeoisie and the political system attempt to manipulate the proletariat to accept bourgeois expressions. And, as I have already noted, the proletariat have limited means to redeem a challenge against the bourgeoisie and/or the political

system. Because of this, the proletariat are extremely vulnerable to manipulation in late capitalism. Figure 6 attempts to capture how these social realities effect Bühler's schema of language functions in late capitalism.

In conclusion, manipulation might successfully challenge the proletariat's existing beliefs. Manipulation could be used to undermine the proletariat's current expectations for economic rewards. Reducing expectations would help reduce the potential for motivation crises; after all, if people only expect minimal rewards, only minimal rewards will be required to maintain motivation. And, as was noted in Chapter 2, eliminating motivation crises will allow people to acquire the motivation that is required to legitimate changes to political agenda. Though this is not a proven remedy for legitimation crises, when we consider Habermas's pragmatics of communication in the context of late capitalism, it seems feasible to suggest that manipulation is, minimally, a possible remedy for legitimation crises.

Chapter 5 : Concluding Remarks

The last two chapters have suggested two different remedial measures that could be used to combat potential legitimation crises in late capitalism. However, I have yet to consider which remedy is more likely to be implemented in the context of late capitalism. In these concluding remarks, I would like to analyze the last few chapters in light of the intent of Part I. To reiterate what has been said at the outset of this part, the intent of Part I is to argue that *manipulation will likely be the preferred remedy for legitimation crises in late capitalism*. Thus, these concluding remarks will argue toward this point.

According to Habermas, the class antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat can be overcome if moral consciousness can achieve the post-conventional stage. In order to acquire post-conventional moral consciousness, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will need to be able to partake in intersubjective illocutionary aims. However, Habermas does little to show how to get from class antagonism to a trusting relationship, which would be required in order to orient communication towards illocutionary aims. Furthermore, I think that both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have justified reasons to be sceptical about illocutionary aims.

There are historical examples that illustrate the bourgeoisie making conscious attempts to bring about consensus in the lifeworld. The era of the French Revolution exemplifies the intelligentsia promoting learning amongst the masses. Learning was intended to empower the proletariat with the ability to critically evaluate expressions that were being put forth by figures of authority. This allowed the rabble to challenge authority. However, contrary to the illocutionary intentions of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution brought about a shift in domination. The nobility were demoted, while the merchant class were promoted. In the aftermath of the Revolution, people who continued to promote illocutionary aims were beheaded at the guillotine. The point is when the dominant communicators promoted illocutionary aims, the previously oppressed people asserted their own perlocutionary aims, which created a reversal in power, not the elimination of power. The French Revolution is not the only example of ill attempts to pursue post-conventional moral consciousness. Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika is another example of a failed attempt to promote post-conventional moral consciousness. In both these cases the attempt to democratize the lifeworld in order to

remedy motivation crises were unsuccessful. Instead, a shift in power dynamics occurred and problems concerning social integration remained.

Beyond failure, these historical examples also suggest that the dominant class comes to ill ends whenever they attempt to pursue post-conventional moral consciousness. Many of the noblemen and clergy who promoted the French Revolution were beheaded in the Revolution's aftermath. History instils a sense of scepticism within the dominant class concerning promoting Habermas's remedial suggestions. This is important because, since the bourgeoisie steer the lifeworld, which in turn steers both the economic system and the political system, it is imperative that Habermas convince the bourgeoisie to promote illocutionary aims. If Habermas cannot convince the bourgeoisie to modify their moral consciousness, his philosophy will, in all probability, remain unattainable. And in order to promote the sort of moral development that is required to put Habermas's work into practice, the problem with trust will need to be resolved. At present, it is reasonable to suggest that the bourgeoisie are unlikely to pursue the remedial suggestion put forth by Habermas.

On the other hand, manipulation can be used to maintain or increase input levels that are required by both the economic system and the political system. Habermas, however, criticizes manipulation because the social presuppositions toward communication are to satisfy the validity claims, while manipulation contradicts these communicative presuppositions by intentionally undermining at least one type of validity claim. Because of this, Habermas believes that communication that develops consensus is more useful for maintaining social integration than is manipulation. Theoretically, if we were in an ideal speech situation, Habermas would be correct. However, the point

that I have been (desperately) trying to make throughout Part I is that we are not considering legitimation crisis in the context of an ideal speech situation, but in the context of late capitalism.

In conclusion, Habermas's opposition to manipulation is developed from an argument that springs from the context of an ideal speech situation and is insufficient to highlight the inadequacies with using manipulation to remedy legitimation crisis in late capitalism. Since the suggestion to use manipulation to remedy legitimation crises is based in the context of late capitalism, in order for Habermas to oppose the suggestion to use manipulation to remedy legitimation crises, Habermas's pragmatics of communication would need to be contextualized in late capitalism. I have attempted to do this on Habermas's behalf. However, my findings suggest that Habermas's pragmatics of communication considered in the context of late capitalism would reinforce, not refute, the suggestion that manipulation is able to avert legitimation crises.

Part II

An Aesthetic Challenge to Manipulation

Chapter 6 : Introductory Comments

In the first half of this thesis, I argued that in late capitalism because the bourgeoisie are in a privileged position that allows them to dominate communicative discourses, manipulation is the remedial measure that will likely be used to avert legitimation. Though Habermas goes to great lengths to argue that developing consensus is more conducive to social integration than is manipulation, he never refutes the possibility that manipulation might be able to sustain social integration. Thus, the intent of Part II is to challenge the practice of using manipulation as a remedy for legitimation crises. I will argue that *juxtaposing John Dewey's aesthetic theory with Habermas's pragmatics of communication will allow us to challenge the belief that manipulation can successfully avert legitimation crises in late capitalism.*

In Chapter 7, I will explicate Dewey's aesthetic theory and consider how Dewey's aesthetics would relate to the pragmatics of communication. The intent of this chapter is to explain how art is experienced and how this aesthetic experience relates to the dominant bourgeois discourse and political ideology. As I will note, the artist attempts to lead the audience to a particular experience. The point will be to show that art has the ability to produce experiences that can either conflict or complement manipulation. I will

take some time to consider both artistic effects: when art complements manipulation (propaganda) and when art conflicts with manipulation (emancipatory art).

In Chapter 8, I will consider art as propaganda. I will consider how propaganda manipulates the proletariat to experience the world. As the proletariat experience propaganda, this constructed experience will complement manipulation. This chapter will show that propaganda can be used to stabilize the use of manipulated communication and help maintain systematically distorted communication.

In Chapter 9, I will consider how art can be used towards emancipation. Emancipatory art, like propaganda, constructs certain experiences; however, emancipatory art will create experiences that will be in tension with manipulation. This chapter will show that emancipatory art can be used to challenge the use of manipulated communication that reinforces bourgeois discourse.

In Chapter 10, I will consider the role of censorship; I will argue that the role of censorship is to eliminate emancipatory art, thus eliminating the social disruptions that might arise as a result of emancipatory art. This chapter will scrutinize the ability of censorship. This chapter will explain why bourgeois censorship may reduce, but is unlikely to eliminate, all emancipatory art.

In Chapter 11, I will bring Part II to conclusion. I will explain that because of the looming threat of emancipatory art, manipulating the proletariat to avoid legitimization crises will possibly postpone, but not likely permanently avert, all circumstances that might lead to legitimization crises. In conclusion I will suggest that emancipatory art has the potential to motivate the proletariat and some of the bourgeoisie to oppose the status

quo, regardless of the attempt to maintain existing social integration by way of manipulation.

Chapter 7 : On the Pragmatics of Dewey's Aesthetic Theory

In *Experience and Nature*,¹ Dewey provides a preamble to his aesthetic theory. "Experience is equivalent to art...art reflected the contingencies and partialities of nature...art was born of need, lack, deprivation, incompleteness."² In chapter 3, I considered Dewey's account of experience; the gist of which is that when there is a tension between a person and their environment, the person will attempt to resolve this conflict. After the conflict has been resolved, people develop experience by reflecting upon and giving meaning to the perceived causal connections between the beginning and the end of the event that is under consideration. Dewey believes that the nature of communication is to allow people to communicate their experiences to one another. Communicating experiences will enable people to recognize certain problems even when they have no prior personal experiences with these problems. Dewey, pace Habermas, prioritizes artistic expression over linguistic expressions because he believes that "works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience."³

¹ John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1925) in *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 1*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988)

² Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 266.

³ John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934), p. 105.

Dewey's preference for artistic over linguistic communication is based upon the belief that "experience is emotional...emotions are attached to events and objects in their movement."⁴ When an artist attempts to communicate their experiences through the creation of an artwork, "emotion operates like a magnet drawing to itself appropriate material: appropriate because it has an experienced emotional affinity for the state of mind already moving."⁵ The artist tries to convey both meaning and emotions in their artistic expression. Dewey suggests, "The separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy."⁶ By eliminating emotions from communication, the "idealistic revolt is blind and like every blind reaction sweeps us away."⁷

Dewey believes this idealistic revolt is tragic because emotions are the primary source that motivates human actions, while intelligence is secondary. As Dewey makes abundantly clear, people interact with the world before they can ascribe intelligible meaning to the world. When the world is resistant to our needs, we will take certain actions in order to overcome this resistance. At the moment when we have overcome this obstacle, we will acquire a sense of satisfaction with our success. Emotions arrive with the conclusion of an action.⁸ Intelligible meaning, however, only comes later, after we have had time to reflect upon and bring meaning to our interaction with the world. The problem with separating emotions and intelligence is that we become blind to the fact that our ideas are informed by our emotions. For instance, I might state, "It is a good idea to

⁴ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 42.

⁵ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 69.

⁶ John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), p. 258.

⁷ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 259.

⁸ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 64, 78, 118; *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 83; *Experience and Nature*, p. 292.

build a bridge across a gorge if we want to get to the other side.” However, this statement neglects the fact that I am motivated towards this idea because I am too scared to swing across the gorge by a rope that is tied to a branch of a tree. Art, according to Dewey, differs from discursive statements because discourse only conveys intelligible meaning about an experience while art aims to express both intelligible meaning and emotions that correspond to an experience,⁹ which is the reason that Dewey prioritizes artistic expressions.

Now that I have explained why Dewey prioritizes the communicative capacity of art, I would like to consider the interrelationship between Dewey’s aesthetic theory and Habermas’s pragmatics of communication. Dewey believes that aesthetic “theory is concerned with discovering the nature of the production of works of art and of their enjoyment in perception.”¹⁰ He then, in one fell swoop, criticises most contemporary aesthetic theories. Dewey notes, “We have no word in the English language that unambiguously includes what is signified by the two words ‘artistic’ and ‘esthetic.’”¹¹ Furthermore, “there is a certain verbal awkwardness in that we are compelled sometimes to use the term ‘esthetic’ to cover the entire field and sometimes to limit it to the receiving perceptual aspect of the whole operation.”¹² Dewey attempts to resolve this discomfort by differentiating artistic from aesthetic, though, he believes a truly artistic expression will merge artistic with aesthetics.

⁹ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 84-86.

¹⁰ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 12.

¹¹ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 46.

¹² Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 46.

Art denotes a process of doing or making. This is as true of fine as of technological art. Art involves molding of clay, chipping of marble, casting of bronze, laying on of pigments, construction of buildings, singing of songs, playing of instruments, enacting roles on the stage, going through rhythmic movements in the dance. Every art does something with some physical material, the body or something outside the body, with or without the use of intervening tools, and with a view to production of something visible, audible, or tangible...The word "esthetic" refers...to experience as appreciative, perceiving, and enjoying. It denotes the consumer's rather than the producer's standpoint.¹³

According to this passage, art represents the productive actions required for creating an expression. The artistic expression conveys meaning and emotions that will be interpreted by an audience. In light of Bühler's communicative scheme, the artist can be considered in parallel to a person who utters an expression. Aesthetic, on the other hand, relates to the audience that appreciates or experiences the produced artwork. Thus, the receptive audience has an affinity with Bühler's communicative receiver. Figure 7 displays how Dewey's aesthetic theory might fit within Bühler's schema.

The point is that, in accordance with Bühler's linguistic schema, artistic expressions, like discursive expressions, express meanings in hopes of developing understanding between communicative participants. Although Dewey's was not likely aware of Bühler's writings,¹⁴ Dewey would likely have noted the parallels between his own thoughts and those of Karl Bühler. After all, Dewey does recognize that "language involves what logicians call a triadic relation. There is the speaker, the thing said, and

¹³ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 47.

¹⁴ Karl Bühler's *Sprachtheories* (Jena, 1934) was published the same year as Dewey's *Art as Experience*. Thus, both authors would have been writing their works at the same time, which creates little opportunity for the possibility that their works influenced each other. Although, regardless of the fact that I have not found any evidence to support the following claim, it is possible that they were in contact with each other.

the one spoken to. The external object, the product of art, is the connecting link between artist and audience.”¹⁵ I have tried to capture the relationship between Dewey’s aesthetics in relation to Bühler’s triad in figure 7.




Figure 7
Juxtaposing the Dewey’s Aesthetic aside
Bühler’s Schema of Language Functions

The artist, in the development of an artwork, converges his/her actions with resistant materials in hopes of developing this material into a medium that is used as a mediator between the artist and their audience. “What makes a material a medium is that it is used to express a meaning which is other than that which it is in virtue of its bare

¹⁵ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 106.

physical existence: the meaning not of what it physically is, but of what it expresses.”¹⁶

The medium is then left for others to interpret.

An artwork is qualitatively different from discourse in at least two significant ways. First, if people are asked to talk about a painting, they might talk about vibrant colours and complement the artist’s brush stroke. However, if asked about the meanings that are entangled in the painting, many of these same people will be dumbfounded. It is not because there is no meaning to be interpreted. It is because artworks are not expressed in a natural language, which in turn makes the meaning unclear to the audience. An artwork is resistant to interpretation.

Also, art is not limited to ascribing meaning to our experiences. An artwork also attempts to communicate the experience being expressed. In order to withdraw meaning from the material, the perceiver will be forced to focus his/her reflection upon the material in hopes of unravelling the mystery of its meaning. As we attempt to interpret the meaning of an artwork, we are forced to use certain means (intelligent action) to acquire the desired ends (understanding the artwork). And, as Dewey notes, means dissipate once ends have been acquired. Thus, in attempting to understand the meaning of an artwork, we use goal-oriented actions. And, as has already been noted, reflecting upon goal-oriented actions is how we develop our experiences. This allows Dewey to suggest that when people understand the meaning of an artwork, they have not interpreted the artwork, but they have experienced the artwork. Furthermore, when the artwork is truly artistic, the audience will aesthetically experience those exact experiences that the

¹⁶ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 201.

artist appeals to when constructing their artwork. Thus, an artwork communicates experiences.

The difference between interpretation and experience leads to the second major difference between discursive expressions and artistic expressions. Discursive expressions do not create experiences. Because society has become so entrenched in discourse, most people can readily interpret discourse into meaning. Regardless of whether or not people ascribe the correct meaning to an expression, people do interpret discursive expression with little difficulty. The point is that there is little or no resistance between expression and interpretation, and when there is no resistance, according to Dewey, experiences will not arise. This differs from artistic expressions where interpretation is difficult, but once acquired will allow experiences to be developed. Thus, when we understand the meaning of an artwork, we have an experience and abstract both emotions and intelligible meaning that accompanies that aesthetic experience.

What is central for the remainder of this thesis is the fact that communicative mediums can complement or contradict each other. I would like to reiterate the fact that Part I considered how the proletariat have a lack of experiences, which makes them particularly susceptible to manipulation. Dewey, however, in his aesthetic theory provides us with the suggestion that even though the proletariat have limited experiences, the proletariat can indirectly experience the world by way of experiencing artworks. Furthermore, a truly artistic piece will capture both the emotions and intelligible meaning that correspond to an experience and express them so that the audience will experience these same emotions and intelligible meaning through the medium of art. The point is

that artistic expressions communicate more information than does discursive expressions. As such, if artistic meaning contradicts discursive meaning, people might be provoked to re-evaluate beliefs based upon discourse. On the other hand, if artistic meaning complements discursive meaning, people might become more inclined to accept discursive expressions. The next two chapters will consider how artistic expressions can complement manipulation and how artistic meaning can contradict manipulation.

Chapter 8 : On the Pragmatics of Propaganda

This chapter, proceeding from the last chapter (7), will consider how *Dewey's aesthetic theory, juxtaposed to Habermas's pragmatics of communication, can help us understand the practice of propaganda as a means to reinforce bourgeois discourse and political ideology*. As I have noted near the end of Chapter 4, in late capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the political system frequently reinforce each other's efforts to manipulate the proletariat in attempt to keep the proletariat integrated into the social system. In the last chapter (7), I suggested the possibility that art could be used to complement discursive manipulation. Within the context of this thesis, I am using propaganda to denote a mediated expression that produces an aesthetic experience in the audience, and this aesthetic experience reinforces discursive manipulation. I am using "propaganda" in a different way than how it is generally understood; I will not consider the intentionality of the artist. I want to consider "propaganda" in a broadened way so that I can account for not only intentionally constructed propaganda, but also for the possibility that some artists might create artworks that reinforce sources of discursive manipulation even

though it was not their intention to do so. I will (1) begin by considering the pragmatics of propaganda on a theoretical level; after which, (2) I will consider some examples to illustrate how propaganda works in practice.

(1) Propaganda differs from bourgeois discourse and political ideology because these latter forms of communication only express intelligible meaning while propaganda expresses both emotions and intelligible meanings. As has been noted in Chapter 7, Dewey notes that people are more inclined to act when emotions and ideas reinforce each other. Since discursive manipulation only aims at instigating an intellectual response (if discourse instigates an emotional response, it is usually a coincidence, it is not an aim of discourse) and propaganda instigates both an intellectual and an emotional response, it is reasonable to suggest that propaganda is more likely to motivate people into action than is discursive manipulation. This helps us understand why the political system and the bourgeoisie might desire to control art. If art could be steered and manipulated to emit expressions of propaganda, art as propaganda would both reinforce and heighten the potential that manipulation could avert a motivation crisis; which in turn, would reduce the threat of a legitimation crisis. Lets consider why this might be the case.

The proletariat are in a particularly frustrating situation because they have limited access to experiences, which is required to critically evaluate specialized expressions. Their decisions are not likely to be made through critical appraisal, which Habermas suggests would be required to develop consensus, but the proletariat will accept or decline an expression based upon the rhetorical ability of the speaker. Furthermore, the proletariat are unlikely to feel as though they fully participate in the consensus process, which in turn makes them unlikely to be invested in expressions after they have acquired

consent. This lack of personal investment in the consensus process, in all probability, would likely lead to a weak bond between the proletariat and consensus. As a result of this disenfranchisement, the proletariat might easily become sceptical about expressions that have acquired consensus.

Propaganda, like any artistic expression, can create aesthetic experiences. Propaganda that reinforces the bourgeois status quo is expressed through bourgeois controlled, politically sanctioned, sources of media; the primary source of propaganda is television. Televised propaganda will create different effects in different audiences. For instance, since the bourgeoisie mostly controls television,¹⁷ television predominantly expresses the world as the bourgeoisie experiences it.¹⁸ By propagating bourgeois expressions, television will help reaffirm bourgeois beliefs. This reaffirmation might not only solidify bourgeois biases, but it might enhance and strengthen their biases.

The proletariat, on the other hand, because they do not have a cultural affinity with mediated bourgeois experiences, may be more resistant to accepting what they see on television. The problem, however, is that the media packages the information in a manner that makes it difficult for most people to criticize, especially since most people do not have the time that would be required to do so. The most astute media critics are in a privileged disposition because they have developed careers as media critics. Most

¹⁷ I recognize that there is public access television, and I should concede the possibility, regardless of how unlikely the possibility is, that public access television could be used as a counter measure against bourgeois controlled mediated expression. I will consider some problems with non-bourgeois sources of media in Chapter 9.

¹⁸ Todd Gitlin provides a very thorough case study in support of this claim. He provides an account of how people who control the media steered the media to make and unmake the S.D.S. (Students for a Democratic Society). [*The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (California: University of California Press, 1981)]

people are not fortunate enough to be able to merge time devoted to criticizing the media with time devoted to a career. Because the proletariat's limited ability to critically evaluate media, the proletariat frequently have little choice but to accept the media at face value. This being the case, it increases the likelihood that the proletariat will accept the propagated bourgeois expression as being valid, which will lead the proletariat to reify bourgeois expressions. I have attempted to diagram how propaganda will affect other forms of expression in figure 8.




Figure 8
Juxtaposing the Aesthetic of Propaganda aside
A modified Schema of Language Functions¹⁹

¹⁹ See figure 6, which considers manipulation aside Bühler's Schema of Language Functions in late capitalism. It was this juxtaposition that created this modified schema of language functions.

Finally, if the proletariat acquire aesthetic experiences as a result of television, these experiences will replicate the bourgeois experiences used to produce the televised artistic expression. Television enables the proletariat to experience bourgeois experiences. Furthermore, by experiencing bourgeois experience, the proletariat will be more likely to agree with and to become invested in bourgeois discourse.

The trick with propaganda is that the audience is likely to interpret their acquired aesthetic experiences as being authentic experiences, rather than inauthentic, distorted experiences. Thus, television allows the proletariat to acquire mediated experiences, which increases the proletariat's resource of experiences that can be appealed to in attempt to critically evaluate bourgeois discourses. The problem is that television predominantly distorts communication in favour of bourgeois experiences, which would influence the proletariat to take these bourgeois experiences as being their own. As a result of this distorted communication, the proletariat may come to trust bourgeois expressions. This is all very convoluted at the moment, but perhaps a quick reflection on pop culture will help clarify things.

(2) In the 1980s, what is known as the Thatcher-Reagan era, political agendas deviated away from maintaining national welfare – which was achieved by the means of trade barriers and regional economies – toward a global, tariff-free economic system. The demise of trade barriers made it feasible for companies to outsource labour in order to increase profit margins. As outsourcing rose, the dynamics of western economies changed from a working industry to the service industry. We should anticipate that this industrial shift would have frustrated many people from the proletariat. It was one thing to toil away on a factory floor, making decent wages and being a productive member of

society, but it is something entirely different to be making minimum wage at a job where you serve the very class that has eliminated you as a productive member of society. It seems fair to think that this shift in the West's economy would not have acquired legitimation from the proletariat. I would like to consider how television may have helped sooth the potentially hostile proletariat, thus helping to avert the threat of a legitimation crisis.

Television provides many examples of artistic expressions that mesh nicely with bourgeois beliefs. Consider the television show *Seinfeld*, arguably the best (most popular) sitcom of the 1990s. Here is a show that was developed to tell and glorify events from everyday life. The characters, George and Kramer, glorify mediocrity and unemployment. Jerry and Elaine both work in the entertainment industry, Jerry is a stand-up comic and Elaine is an editor at a publishing house. None of the main characters have working class jobs. Thus, we should not expect to acquire any proletariat values from this show. The point is that this show, like many other shows that were popular after the Thatcher-Reagan era (some other shows to contemplate are *Cheers*, *Friends*, *Married With Children* and *The Simpsons*), promotes accepting an inept economic system while problematizing non-material expectations, such as family and friends.

By prioritizing non-material expectations, these shows hint at the suggestion that the cause of social frustrations is social and not economic in origin. This shift reduces the threat to economic integration, but increases the threat to cultural integration. People would lack the desire to participate in the lifeworld if they identify the lifeworld as being the source of their frustrations. If my analysis is correct, the following will result from

the aforementioned propaganda. Since the proletariat are more likely to be frustrated by the economic system than the bourgeoisie while propaganda attempts to establish the lifeworld as the source of social frustrations, if propaganda is successful, the proletariat will minimize their participation within the lifeworld. This, however, would not have any effect on economic integrations. More importantly, if the proletariat did minimize their participation within the lifeworld, it would allow the bourgeoisie to increase their stranglehold over the lifeworld. Furthermore, by limiting their actions within the lifeworld, the proletariat would no longer actively participate in the legitimation process that is required by the political system; after all, legitimation is a function of the lifeworld. This is one way that propaganda can help eliminate the threat of legitimation crises.

Television also allows people to experience conditions that are far worse than those they experience in their own lives. *Married With Children* and more recently the dumbfounding success of *The Trailer Park Boys* are a couple of shows that exemplify living conditions that are likely far worse than most of us would ever experience. I think that part of the appeal of these shows is that they portray miserable standards of living, which in turn allows the audience to find comfort in the fact that their own lives are not nearly as dismal as those portrayed on these shows. Here, television might be helping to lower social expectations. Reducing expectations also reduces the amount of rewards that are required to motivate people to legitimate political agendas. Thus reducing expectations reduces the possibility that a motivation crisis will arise, which in turn reduces the possibility that a legitimation crisis will arise. This is a second way that propaganda can help eliminate the threat of legitimation crises.

In conclusion, propaganda provides aesthetic experiences to the proletariat. However, these experiences are often an aesthetic experience of bourgeois experiences. As a result, the proletariat, unknowingly, experience the world through the interpretive lens of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, because propaganda creates a sense of experiencing the world, though it is an aesthetic experience of a bourgeois experience, the proletariat may come to believe that they have an abundance of experiences that enables them to critically evaluate bourgeois discourse. However, since these experiences are de facto bourgeois experiences, the proletariat simply reify bourgeois beliefs when they use these aesthetic experiences in attempt to evaluate bourgeois discourse. As a result, the proletariat will come to agree with bourgeois discourse because the proletariat argue from within systematically distorted communication. Yet, because the proletariat do not recognize their communication as being distorted, they are likely to misperceive themselves as coming to a consensus with the bourgeoisie. This allows the proletariat to become invested in whatever decisions are made in the lifeworld, and as a result, they are unlikely to disagree with bourgeois/political ideology. Though this is far from an exhaustive discussion on propaganda, it should suffice to hint at how propaganda can help reinforce the aims of manipulation.

Chapter 9 : On the Pragmatics of Emancipatory Art

Emancipatory art is similar to propaganda in many ways. However, one significant difference is that while propaganda reinforces the sources of manipulation, such as political ideology and bourgeois discourse, emancipatory art challenges these sources of

manipulation. It is the intent of this chapter to show how *emancipatory art can be used to challenge the use of manipulation and help absolve systematically distorted communication*. Emancipatory art, like propaganda, will, for the most part, be judged by the effect of the aesthetic experiences that it will create.

To reiterate, Dewey notes that the division of labour into physical and intellectual labour has disenfranchised the proletariat from the ability to acquire many experiences. As a result of these institutional circumstances that create barriers between physical labourers and experiences, the proletariat have limited opportunities to participate in political discourse. This communicative limitation extends beyond discursive communication; it also hampers their ability to produce artistic expressions. Any artwork that the proletariat will express will encompass emotions and meaning that relate to their limited experiences.

Proletarian art, however, might prove useful towards emancipatory ends; it would allow the bourgeoisie to aesthetically experience proletarian experiences. If the bourgeoisie were to aesthetically experience proletarian life, the bourgeoisie might come to understand, both emotionally and intellectually, the injustices that result from the bourgeois economic imperative. Aesthetically experiencing proletariat life might force the bourgeoisie to re-evaluate their old experiences in order to mesh this new experience with their previous experiences. It is possible that the new experience will simply be discarded because it is incompatible with previous bourgeois experiences. However, it is also possible that this new experience will allow the bourgeoisie to become empathetic toward the proletariat economic imperative. Empathy might help reduce the

bourgeoisie's willingness to dominate the proletariat, which in turn would reduce their willingness to intentionally use propaganda and manipulation.

Even though proletarian art might persuade the bourgeois to emphasize with the proletariat, it is unlikely that proletariat art will acquire the mass audiences that would be required to motivate significant social change. The problem is the bourgeoisie control the dominant sources of mass media and evidence suggests that they are particularly careful about what messages they are willing to express through their media. For example, during the Summit of the Americas (2001), the media attempted to de-legitimize the actions of the anti-globalization movement while legitimating actions of the state. One eyewitness provides the following account:

The media, following the lead of their capitalist owners and of the political elites, tends to see – or at least so they say – the antiglobalization movement as spearheaded by anarchists...The media focuses on the carnival-like and the violent aspects of the protests... And in much of the reportage there was a wild exaggerating of the violent aspects of the protest...The media talk of “vandalism,” “hooligans,” and “violent elements.”²⁰

By focusing upon the negative aspects that took place within a mostly peaceful protest, the media helped legitimate the political use of force. Naomi Klein notes:

Despite the government line of praising “good” protesters while condemning “bad” ones, treatment of everyone on the streets of Quebec City was crude, cowardly and indiscriminate. The security forces used the actions of a few rock throwers as a camera-friendly justification to do

²⁰ Kai Nielsen, *Globalization and Justice* (New York: Humanity Books, 2003), p. 30-32.

what they had been trying to do from the start; clear the city of thousands of lawful protesters because it was more convenient that way.²¹

The media did not consider the possibility that violence arose because of “repeated and brutal police attacks.”²² Rather, the media suggested that the police were doing their job, which was to keep the peace. According to mass media, the police protected society while protestors embodied chaos. The point is that mass media is selective about what messages it expresses. However, sources of mass media cannot eliminate all possible expressions of emancipatory art (details will be provided the following chapter); mass media might unintentionally express emancipatory art.

One further point is that emancipatory art does not have to be expressed by the proletariat. What has been considered above is the possibility that the proletariat might be able to motivate the bourgeoisie to change. However, it is not the case that the entire bourgeoisie support the stereotypical bourgeois economic imperative that I have been focusing on throughout this thesis. Leo Tolstoy and Peter Kropotkin both exemplify the possibility that disagreement can arise within the dominant social group. Tolstoy and Kropotkin were both born from noble blood during an era in which the aristocracy were the dominant interest group. But regardless of their birthrights, Tolstoy and Kropotkin were both, to varying degrees, anarchists. Though Tolstoy and Kropotkin were aristocrats and not of the bourgeoisie, I hope the reader will accept the analogous point that I am trying to make; some people in the dominant social group will disagree with

²¹ Naomi Klein, *Fences and Windows: dispatches from the front lines of the globalization debate* (Canada: Vintage Canada, 2002), p. 147.

²² Nielsen, *Globalization and Justice*, p. 31.

their group's norms. As a result of this internal friction within the bourgeoisie, some bourgeois art will not be propaganda, but will be aimed at emancipating the proletariat. Furthermore, because the bourgeoisie have more financial resources at their disposal than the proletariat, I would suggest that bourgeois emancipatory art is more likely than proletariat emancipatory art to acquire mass audiences.

Now that I have suggested the plausibility that emancipatory art can create aesthetic experiences that conflict with bourgeois discourses, and these experiences might motivate us to re-evaluate our existing beliefs; we should consider how this theory might work in practice. To illustrate this, I will consider Edvard Munch's *The Scream* and examine how this painting has challenged some of my own background beliefs concerning progress.

The development of capitalism was accomplished alongside the development of progress. Progress helped develop new techniques for production, such as the production line and animated machinery. As new technologies develop, however, old technologies become obsolete. The problem is that sometimes it is more economically viable to abandon old equipment rather than refurbish or update it. This is apparent to anyone who walks in an abandoned industrial area. However, as modernity progresses and creates problems, the bourgeoisie promotes the belief "that technology can produce all you need to buy, and dispose of all you need to get rid of."²³ Many people in society have come to reify this bourgeois faith in progress. It should be noted that this faith in progress is based on bourgeois discourse, but as we have already noted, discourse only denotes meaning. Because faith in progress is void of emotional sentiment, Dewey would worry

²³ John Ashton & Ron Laura, *The Perils of Progress*, (Nova Scotia, Canada: Fernwood Publishing, Ltd., 1998) p. 6.

that this faith would be blind. But regardless of whether or not faith in progress is blind, since, like many people, I had no evidence that falsified this belief, I accepted this bourgeois belief as my own; this allowed me to become desensitized to the negative aspects of progress.

During a stint when I lived in the St. Henri region in Montreal, an abandoned industrial centre, I frequently experienced my environment through a desensitized interpretive lens. Anyone who walks along the Lachine Canal is likely to see some of the negative side effects of progress. Old, dilapidated industrial buildings haunt the sides of the canal. These once booming centres of commotion now rest as decaying canvases for graffiti. Looking upon these buildings once filled me with hope at the promise of progress. I interpreted these buildings as marks of distinction since they represented past progress. I looked at these buildings through a desensitized lens because I accepted the bourgeois discourse concerning progress. I looked upon those abandoned buildings with nostalgic awe and hope.

However, an encounter with Edvard Munch's *The Scream* forced me to re-evaluate my beliefs concerning progress. *The Scream*, as one commentator says, "is an image of fear: the terrifying, unreasoned fear we feel in a nightmare...The rhythm of the long, wavy lines seems to carry the echo of the scream into every corner of the picture, making of earth and sky one great sounding board of fear."²⁴ Another source indicates "*The Scream* is, of course, a canonical expression of the great modernist thematics of alienation, anomie, solitude, social fragmentation, and isolation, a virtually programmatic

²⁴ H.W. Janson & Anthony F. Janson, *History of Art*, Sixth Edition, Volume II (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1991), p. 752.

emblem of what used to be called the age of anxiety.”²⁵ However, these two accounts of Munch’s *The Scream* should not be perceived as being aesthetic experiences. Rather, they are attempts to provide discursive accounts regarding how these critics had aesthetically experienced Munch’s work.

It is unlikely that any two people are going to be socialized in exactly the same way. Since our socialization has played a significant role in tuning the strings of our emotions, it seems likely that even slight variations in our indoctrination will create variations in emotional reactions. Because I have many similarities with the two critics above – we all live in capitalist democracies – we are likely to adhere to many of the same social norms concerning the omnipotence of progress. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that my own discursive account concerning my aesthetic experience of Munch’s *The Scream* would be similar, though not identical, to those accounts already provided.

The emotion that *The Scream* stirred in me was not fear but a sense of anxiety. I saw a man walking upon a pier. He was walking away from the serene and tranquil blue of the sea. He was walking towards something, something that lay outside of my sphere of vision. The colours in the painting hinted that he was walking toward the promise of progress. The blue of the sea and the brown of the dock provoked images of wood and steel, which are materials often used in industrial construction. However, the ambers and oranges glooming over top of the blue sea reminded me of bursts of rust slowly settling over the surface of steel. I took these colours in the background as an indication of the deteriorating conditions of progress that awaited the man who stood on the dock. The

²⁵ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (United States of America: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 11.

man not wanting to venture back to the land from which he came, yet not wanting to go forward, finds himself trapped in a moment of anxiety. Trapped, feeling as though there is no correct decision to be made, there was nothing for him to do but cope with his anxiety. His means for coping with his anxiety has been captured in this painting, his scream. I sat, and as I stared on my feelings began to reverberate with the painting, growing with empathy. I grew restless and horrified about the deteriorating effects of progress.

Since I believe that both the dilapidated buildings and *The Scream* are indicative of progress, yet the dilapidated building instills a sense of nostalgic awe while *The Scream* makes me nauseous, I had contradicting emotional sentiments toward objects that represented progress. This emotional contradiction, which was instigated by an aesthetic experience, motivated me to re-evaluate my background beliefs concerning progress. As a result, some of my background beliefs have changed. Since I have viewed and reflected upon Munch's *The Scream*, anytime I walked by those dilapidated buildings, which I spoke of earlier, I no longer looked at these buildings with nostalgic awe. Rather, I looked at these buildings and was overcome with nausea. Now, with revisions to my background beliefs, I interpret the dilapidated buildings in a different vein than I previously did.

In conclusion, aesthetic experience can motivate people to question and re-evaluate background beliefs. According to Habermas, being able to challenge background beliefs is extremely important, yet extremely difficult.

We make use of such knowledge without the awareness that it could be false. Insofar as all knowledge is fallible and is known to be such, background knowledge does not represent

knowledge at all, in a strict sense. As background knowledge, it lacks the possibility of being challenged, that is, of being raised to the level of criticisable validity claims. One can do this only by converting it from a resource into a topic of discussion.²⁶

Thus, the force of aesthetic experience is that it can convert these resources of knowledge into topics of discussion. Emancipatory art has the ability to highlight potentially unjust background beliefs that people adhere to.




Figure 9
Juxtaposing the Aesthetic of Emancipatory Art aside
a Modified Schema of Language Functions²⁷

²⁶ This quote complements, quite nicely, the work that I have developed in my thesis, and it helps to highlight who the work I have undertaken *might* be relevant to Habermas's more recent works. However, I have not undertaken a comprehensive analysis of Habermas's later works. Thus, I am only suggesting that my thesis, which primarily considers Habermas's earlier works, might have some bearing on Habermas's later work; I am not asserting that my thesis does have bearing on Habermas's later work. Before I am able to assert the latter, I would first need to embark on a thorough reading of Habermas's later work. [Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 22-23.]

Highlighting unjust background beliefs could reopen the debate about the moral permissibility of using manipulation to maintain social integration. Reopening this debate would jeopardize the stability of using manipulation to remedy legitimation crises. Furthermore, emancipatory art instills the potential in the proletariat to actively engage in discourse, thus allowing them to overcome their systematically distorted communication. These last two points reduce the effectiveness of using manipulation to remedy legitimation crises. Figure 9 highlights the communicative readjustments that emancipatory art may instigate.

Chapter 10 : On the Pragmatics of Censorship

In the last chapter, three important points were made. First, art can challenge the audience's background beliefs, which has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of using manipulation to remedy legitimation crisis. Second, to pose a serious threat to manipulation, art would need to be able to challenge the distorted background beliefs that are accepted by the masses. Challenging the background beliefs of one or two people is unlikely to create a legitimation crisis. Third, the bourgeoisie control the means to produce mass art and are likely to censor any expression that might potentially invoke an aesthetic challenge to manipulation. The intent of this chapter is to explain why *bourgeois censorship may reduce, but is unlikely to eliminate all emancipatory art*. I would like to begin by explicating the era of McCarthyism to exemplify that even though

²⁷ See figure 6, which considers manipulation aside Bühler's Schema of Language Functions in late capitalism. It was this juxtaposition that created this modified schema of language functions.

ensorship attempts to eliminate emancipatory art, censorship is unlikely to achieve complete success.

In March 1947, President Truman “presented his doctrine to the American people...as the necessary defence against a totalitarianism whose aim, like Hitler’s, was nothing less than the enslavement of mankind.”²⁸ With the memory of Hitler fresh in America’s collective mind, Truman put forth the suggestion that communism was the next great evil that needed to be defeated. “Truman defined the Soviet-American rivalry as a global struggle between freedom and communist totalitarianism.”²⁹

The following month, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy took part in a radio broadcast that foreshadowed the high profile career that was about to emerge.³⁰ Senator McCarthy suggested that the United States should outlaw all communist parties. According to McCarthy, however, outlawing communist parties would only scrape the surface of the communist threat. Comparing the communist party to an iceberg, communist parties only represent the visible portion of the iceberg; the majority of their danger lies beneath the surface of the water. Pressing the analogy, Senator McCarthy claimed that the main communist threats were the unknown communist cells that have already infiltrated America’s social institutions. Senator McCarthy did not believe that outlawing

²⁸ Albert Fried, *McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1997), p. 4.

²⁹ Seyom Brown, *The Causes and Prevention of War*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) p. 56.

³⁰ “The ‘Town Hall Meeting of the Air’ was a popular radio program of the 1930s and 1940s. For an hour once a week four people debated the burning issues of the day. On April 3, 1947, Joseph R. McCarthy, the recently elected and attractive young Wisconsin Senator, took the affirmative on the question, ‘Should the Communist Party Be Outlawed in the United States?’ (The debate was published later that month in the magazine *Town Meeting*.) How prescient he was – about himself and the age to which he gave his name – is evident from his opening remarks.” (Fried, *McCarthyism*, p. 76).

communism would eliminate the communist threat. Beyond legislation, McCarthy suggested that America needed to implement an anti-communist program. McCarthy promoted the following anti-communist criteria:

1. The Department of Justice should rule that the Communist Party is an agency of a foreign power and subject to the Voorhis Act and the Logan Act, which laws concern themselves with conspiracy against the nation and action on the part of foreign agents.
2. The FBI should be empowered and directed to publish the names of all the Communist front organizations such as Youth for Democracy, Progressive Citizens of America, and on down the line.
3. All Communist aliens should be forced to leave the country.
4. Communists being the agents of foreign powers, should be barred from representing clients or groups before labor and other boards.
5. Communists and members of communist front organizations should be required to register with a federal agency and be fingerprinted.³¹

On May 8th, 1950 the court made McCarthy's program a reality. Congress was empowered with the ability to remove threats to the American way of life. The black list was developed; it contained the names of people suspected of being involved in 'un-American' activities. The black list "drew on sources as numerous as they were raw and gossip-laden...its potency may be measured by the number of entertainers and writers who lost their careers from among the 151 it listed, or smeared."³²

McCarthyism was, in many ways, similar to 'The Terror' that arose in the aftermath of the French Revolution. People were frequently accused, tried and convicted without due process. While obviously the guillotine was a worse fate than being publicly denounced as a communist, it is still important to recognize that people, under the reign

³¹ Fried, *McCarthyism*, p. 76-77.

³² Fried, *McCarthyism*, p. 119.

of McCarthyism, lost their livelihoods. More importantly than eliminating these known opponents, McCarthyism dramatically reduced public opposition to the political system. Rather than voice their views in oppositions to the political system, people simply withdrew their voices from public discourse.

As the impact of McCarthyism escalated, people who opposed this political agenda were increasingly feeling coerced into docility. It would be reasonable to think that such groups would have been dissatisfied with the state of America under Senator McCarthy's reign of fear.

[Arthur Miller] was deeply disturbed as he watched men who had known him well for years pass him by "without a word" because of this terror "knowingly planned and consciously engineered." McCarthyism was in the air and it had all the qualities – for those personally affected – of the witch-hunt. Miller consciously draws the parallel: his plays are efforts to deal with what was "in the air." "They are one man's way of saying to his fellow men, 'This is what you see every day, or think or feel; now I will show you what you really know but have not had the time or the disinterestedness, or the insight, or the information to understand consciously.'" ³³

Miller artistically expressed how he experienced this oppression by writing a play. *The Crucible*³⁴ opened on Broadway January 22, 1953, "at the height of the furor stirred up by the accusations of senator Joe McCarthy."³⁵

Through the use of simile, Miller adapted historical events that occurred in Salem to criticize the injustices of his day. The play draws out the fact that law was being manipulated in such a manner that it threatened fundamental civil rights – especially,

³³ Thomas E. Porter, "The Long Shadow of the Law: The Crucible," (1969) in *Critical Essays on Arthur Miller*, p. 75-92, ed. James J. Martine (Boston, Massachusetts: G. K. Hall & Co., 1979), p. 79.

³⁴ Arthur Miller, *The Crucible* (United States of America: Penguin Books, 1976)

³⁵ Porter, "The Long Shadow of the Law," p. 78.

freedom of speech. Miller suggested that it was not communism, but the malice of the American people that was “responsible for the evil that is abroad.”³⁶ And, most importantly, “due process provides no tool for coping with the kind of hysteria that... was generate[d]”³⁷ The point, is that “the Law itself becomes the instrument of perversion.”³⁸ *The Crucible* highlights how injustices might arise when an irrational majority steers the political system to use political means to terrorize a minority group.

The Crucible was intended to resonate with certain sympathetic emotions regarding the unjust treatment towards those who were being accused of witchcraft. It was hoped that the masses would see the parallels between their own support of McCarthyism and the irrational public that supported the witch-hunts that took place in Salem.³⁹ If the masses that supported McCarthyism could aesthetically experience *The Crucible*, they would be forced to deal with a contradiction. Both McCarthyism and *The Crucible* denote the lifeworld steering the political system to use political means to terrorize a minority group; however, the masses supported McCarthyism while at the same time being repulsed by the irrational public portrayed in *The Crucible*.

Though *The Crucible* did not instil the sort of mass mobilization that was required to overthrow the McCarthy regime, it highlights the attempt to use artistic expression to mobilize resistance against an unjust political system. *The Crucible* is not the only

³⁶ Porter, “The Long Shadow of the Law,” p. 83.

³⁷ Porter, “The Long Shadow of the Law,” p. 87.

³⁸ Porter, “The Long Shadow of the Law,” p. 88.

³⁹ The published play makes the similarities between *The Crucible* and McCarthyism more explicit. Miller wrote, “The analogy, however, seems to falter when one considers that, while there were no witches then, there are Communists and capitalists now, and in each camp there is certain proof that spies of each side are at work undermining the other” [*The Crucible*, p. 35.]. Though this statement does not explicitly name McCarthyism, it does make a direct tie between the witch-hunt and the hunt for communists.

example where aesthetics were used in attempt to mobilize political opposition against an oppressive regime. William Godwin's novel, *Caleb Williams*,⁴⁰ was intended as a criticism of the feudal system. However, Godwin set his story in the past, one generation before the generation that Godwin belonged to, so that he would not be accused of seditious libel. Seditious libel was the ban of discourse that opposed the feudal system. What is particularly interesting is that *Caleb Williams* professed the same philosophical thesis as did Godwin's political treatise, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*,⁴¹ namely, the omnipotence of the truth. Yet, Godwin was not willing to place his name on the latter work out of fear that he would be accused of seditious libel. Godwin's work helps to illustrate how aesthetics can be used, during reigns of fear (such as seditious libel, the Terror, McCarthyism, or contemporary discourses surrounding terrorism), to allow people to publicly oppose political systems during times of severe censorship.

The reason that aesthetics has the ability to go unnoticed by censors is because censors are frequently from a different reference group than the audience that the aesthetic expression is intended for. A censor is likely to be a person who will toe the line of political ideology. In the case of McCarthyism, if there had been any censors, they would likely have come from a very pro-McCarthyism group. This pro-McCarthyism stance might have blinded the censor to the fact that the historical account of Salem paralleled the McCarthy era. After all, what similarities could there be between an irrational public that promotes injustices in Salem and the rational public that legitimates the justice being pursued by McCarthyism? A person who approved of

⁴⁰ William Godwin, *Caleb Williams* (New York: Rinehart & Co. Inc., 1960)

⁴¹ William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793) in *Philosophical and Political Writings of William Godwin*, Vol.3, ed. Mark Philp (London: Pickering, 1993)

McCarthyism would likely be blinded to the parallels that other people would tease out. For people who perceived McCarthyism as unjust, the similarities were apparent.

The problem with political agendas that aim at curbing or, more specifically, limiting public opinion is that these political agendas cannot eliminate public interests. Consider the contemporary war on terror. Rhetorical use of language has helped to tie the evils of terrorism to anti-capitalist sentiments. This in turn has helped to delegitimize many progressive anti-capitalist movements. Similarly to how McCarthyism helped suppress political opposition, the War on Terrorism has helped to oppress the anti-globalization movement, which opposes capitalist globalization.⁴² The problem is that McCarthy and the War on Terrorism use manipulation to rally public support to oppress political opposition. This, however, does not eliminate opposition, but forces opposition into hiding.

There are other apparent similarities between McCarthyism and the current War on Terrorism. First, as was just noted, is the fact that the War on Terrorism has implemented means to systematically oppress possible sources of political opposition. The Bush Administration is acting in a similar fashion as Senator McCarthy. The slightest joke poking fun of the Bush Administration could be sufficient to instigate a full-scale investigation into a person's potential terrorist ties. While McCarthyism suppressed opposition against the unfair treatment of communists, Bush has reduced the opposition voiced against the unfair treatment of alleged terrorists – although opposition has been strengthening. However, it should be noted that the current reign of fear is not

⁴² It should be noted that not all anti-globalization movements oppose globalization. In fact, many anti-globalization groups actually support globalization. It is generally the case that anti-globalization groups are opposed to capitalist globalization.

isolated to the United States; Canada, Britain and Australia have all adopted various forms of the Patriot act – an act that allows unlawful detainment of suspected terrorists.⁴³

During times of terror, such as Salem, McCarthyism, or almost any capitalist democracy that is currently fighting against terrorism, there is going to be a heightening of social frustrations with the increase of political authority. Let us reconsider the French Revolution for a moment; the majority of the population in France were frustrated by the feudal system. Several very articulate thinkers used aesthetic expressions to contradict political ideology. Political ideology is likely to support the status quo, which in turn would likely instil apathy or hopelessness within the mass public; in contrast, aesthetic expressions were aimed to instil a hope that rationality might overcome feudal and theological ideologies. This hope, though only one factor amongst many, helped to mobilize the general public against the source of their oppression.

Regardless of censorship, there is the possibility that censors will not be able to recognize, let alone suppress, all potential aesthetic expressions that will incite opposition to mobilize against the status quo. Godwin used aesthetics in Britain to oppose seditious libel laws and Miller used aesthetics to voice his discontent with McCarthyism. Though neither of these two aesthetic examples created an immediate difference, this does not gainsay the possibility that aesthetics might yet motivate enough political opposition to force political changes.

⁴³ The detainment is technically legal because it is permitted by these new legal acts. However, I do not believe the public opinion supports these methods of detainment. According to Habermasian theory, public opinion is supposed to steer the legal system; thus, a law that does not reflect public opinion is an unjust law. Because public opinion might not legitimate current methods of detainment, we should be suspicious of their alleged lawfulness.

The problem with the above examples is that these cases of emancipatory art only reached a limited audience. Only theatregoers were likely to experience Miller's *The Crucible*, and printed books, such as Godwin's *Caleb Williams*, are limited to a literary audience. Habermas, however, criticizes this second point by providing an account of people discussing literature with an illiterate audience,⁴⁴ thus allowing the audience to evaluate the experiences being expressed through written words.⁴⁵ Though Habermas's criticism is correct, it does not assure that literature will reach mass audiences. In fact John B. Thompson criticizes Habermas on this exact point, "The mass of the population is excluded from public discussion."⁴⁶ Thus, it might be the case that printed books can acquire an audience that surpasses the literary public, but that does not affirm that books will reach the masses. Another problem with Habermas's criticism is that when a person reads a book aloud, some people might ask the orator to reread a sentence, another person might cough or sneeze, or a number of other possible disruptions might arise upsetting the flow of the oration. This will reduce the audience's ability to focus on the artwork, thus reducing the likelihood that they will aesthetically experience both meaning and emotions expressed in this work. Now, having hypothesized why the above emancipatory art was unsuccessful, I would like to consider an example of emancipatory art that was successful.

In 1963, the SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) began its civil rights campaign in Birmingham, Alabama. In the initial stage of the campaign:

⁴⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962), trans. Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 31-42.

⁴⁵ Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, p. 49.

⁴⁶ John B. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 74.

Limited sit-ins and picketing at segregated lunch counters in several department stores and drugstores were carried out...while simultaneously mobilizing the black community and implementing economic boycott. Shortly after the sit-ins began, thirty-five of the demonstrators were quietly arrested on trespassing charges.⁴⁷

The media, seemingly impartially, covered these events in the news. Media coverage created both support for and opposition against the SCLC. The media mobilized empathetic people to replicate the actions that were being portrayed by the media.⁴⁸ On the other hand, political elites perceived the methods used as being unlawful. Political elites opposed the movement's tactics because there were legitimate institutional means available for negotiations, and the movement simply bypassed these means. However, what the political elites neglected in their analysis was that institutional means were the source of the injustices that the civil rights movement opposed, for institutional means were not distributed equally. Some of the political elites would come to acknowledge these institutional injustices as the result of further media coverage.

The second stage of the SCLC campaign "called for mass marches."⁴⁹ The events concerning the march in Birmingham are well documented.

Birmingham's notorious commissioner of public safety, Bull Connor, trained fire hoses and unleashed attack dogs on peaceful demonstrators. The resulting scenes of demonstrators being slammed into storefronts by the force of the hoses and attacked by snarling police dogs were

⁴⁷ Gary T. Marx & Douglas McAdam, *Collective Behavior and Social Movements: Process and Structure* (United States of America: Prentice Hall, 1994), p. 94.

⁴⁸ Marx & McAdam, *Collective Behavior and Social Movements*, p. 104-107.

⁴⁹ Marx & McAdam, *Collective Behavior and Social Movements*, p. 95.

picked up and broadcast nationwide on the nightly news. Still pictures of the same events appeared in newspapers and magazines throughout the nation and the world. The former Soviet Union used the pictures as anti-American propaganda at home and abroad. Thus, the media's coverage of the events in Birmingham succeeded in generating enormous sympathy for the demonstrators and putting increased pressure on the federal government of intervene on behalf of the movement.⁵⁰

The Birmingham affair is a perfect example of media unintentionally acting as emancipatory art. The public, en masse, were mobilized to support civil rights. In turn, this newly mobilized pro-civil rights discourse steered the political system to change and accommodate a newly developed consensus. The Birmingham affair is only one example displaying the liberating potential of media.

However, what we need to remember is that with every new experience, we increase our ability to control the outcome of events. As a result of the sixties, the media is more experienced and is now more able to take an active role in containing social movements than they were in the sixties. If the media desires to promote a social movement, the media could portray the movement in positive light. To illustrate this, let us reconsider the Summit of the Americas. If the media wanted to help the movement, the media could have shown one of the following incidents.

Several incidents that had not been reported, including that police used a laser-guided scope to fire a plastic bullet into the genitals of one protester. A man already lying on the ground was shocked with a police stun gun, and a stilt-walker dressed as the Statue of Liberty was taken out at the knees by a water cannon as she approached the fence.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Marx & McAdam, *Collective Behavior and Social Movements*, p. 106.

⁵¹ Klein, *Fences and Windows*, p. 148.

However, as I have already noted, the media is not impartial. Many news stories are slanted and support bourgeois discourse and political ideology. This is why we should not be surprised that the media hovered around violent protesters rather than peaceful protesters; the television audience is likely to disapprove of violent protesters. The media has learned from the Birmingham affair; it has learned that by focusing on illegitimate protest tactics and ignoring legitimate protest tactics, the audience will likely be appalled by these violent tactics portrayed by the media and will not support the protest.

The media has the ability to censor their media coverage as a result of acquired experiences. When a censor understands how certain media coverage will create certain aesthetic experiences in the audience, the censor can eliminate certain artistic expressions, which in turn will influence the audience's aesthetic experience. However, as has already been noted, all knowledge is reflective. Censors cannot anticipate how an audience will react to unknown artistic expressions. Censors are mainly effective for removing artistic expressions that are similar to previous artistic expression; in doing so, the censor hopes to eliminate the aesthetic experience that corresponds with the known expression. Thus, as time goes by and more artistic expressions are produced, sensors will acquire more knowledge about artistic expressions and will become more competent to eliminate certain aesthetic experiences. However, censors are not the only people who acquire knowledge about artistic expressions; artists also acquire this knowledge. This enables artists the ability to devise new ways to express themselves artistically. Thus, the censor will always be one step behind of the artist. The censor is unable to predict

unknown aesthetic experiences until after the artist has produced the next unknown artistic expression.

Though censorship might greatly reduce emancipatory art, it is unlikely that censors would be able to assure the elimination of emancipatory art. Thus, emancipatory art remains looming in the background, waiting to come to surface to incite another mass mobilization against the status quo, such as what happened from the aesthetic experience of Birmingham. While the news coverage at Birmingham allowed the mass public to experience the injustices that resulted from segregation, the next aesthetic expression might allow the mass public to experience the current unjust distribution of wealth.

At this point, I should take a moment and defend my suggestion that journalism has the potential to act as emancipatory art; some people might find this suggestion problematic. And I think that most of the time these people would be correct in suggesting that journalism is not emancipatory; this, however, is far from agreeing that journalism is never emancipatory. The problem with journalism is complex, and I can only introduce some elementary remarks concerning why I suggest that journalism has the potential to have affinities with emancipatory art. For the sceptic, my remarks will be far from convincing, a deficiency that I hope to resolve at some later point, but at the moment, these remarks should be sufficient to, at least, highlight how journalism relates to discursive and artistic expressions.

Journalism is more complex than either discursive expressions or artistic expressions because journalism binds discursive expressions with artistic expressions. Think about the average newspaper, there is a discursive passage that provides a linguistic account concerning a specific event that has taken place, usually, in recent

history. Many times, journalistic discourse will be complemented with a picture. But what is a picture?

A picture is a visual copy of a certain state of affairs. The photographer takes a photo in hopes of capturing, on film, an experience in the making. By capturing an experience in the making and displaying it to an audience, the photographer provides the audience the opportunity to interpret the images being portrayed. Similar to the earlier suggestion concerning art, a photograph can be difficult to interpret, which, in turn, allows the audience to experience the event being portrayed in the photo.

In most cases, the narrative and the photo will complement and reaffirm each other. Under these circumstances, there would be no reason to suspect the potential that journalism would act as emancipatory art. However, there is the possibility that the audience might interpret the visual images in a manner that contradicts the discourse that complements the visual images. I am not saying that this is a very likely scenario, but it a possible explanation regarding why Birmingham incited so much support for the civil rights movement. Journalistic editors, like a censor, may slip up and it might be possible that a journalistic story will express contradictory meanings, one discursive meaning and the one aesthetic meaning, and such a slip up might be all that is required to provoke and mobilize frustrated individuals to oppose the status quo.

Chapter 11 : Concluding Remarks

As I had noted in the introduction (A Pragmatic Juxtaposition) and argued in Part I, manipulation is the remedy currently being used in the attempt to cure legitimization crises

in late capitalism, and Habermas's pragmatics of communication, without Dewey's theory, is not sufficient to challenge the social practice of using manipulation to avoid a legitimation crisis. In the conclusion of Part I, I noted that because Habermas develops his pragmatics of communication from an ideal speech situation, his analysis of manipulation would be inadequate to evaluate the use of manipulation in late capitalism.

This thesis has attempted to overcome the fact that Habermas's pragmatics of communication is insufficiently pragmatic. By juxtaposing Habermas's pragmatics with John Dewey, I have attempted to re-evaluate Habermas's pragmatics of communication within the context of late capitalism. This move has allowed me to evaluate the use of manipulation in the context of late capitalism and to argue that the bourgeoisie are discursively privileged. Since Habermas prioritizes discursive communication over other communicative mediums, he has a tremendous task ahead of him if he desires to show that discourses can be used to challenge bourgeois discourse regardless of the fact that bourgeois discourses are systematically privileged. I am not saying that Habermas's task is unachievable or should not be pursued; I have simply taken another avenue in attempt to challenge bourgeois discourses.

I have considered Dewey's aesthetic theory juxtaposed to Habermas's pragmatics of communication in order to consider artistic expression as an alternative method of communication. I considered artistic expression alongside discursive expression and highlighted the fact that artistic expression, according to Dewey, communicates more information about our experiences. Artistic expression expresses both meaning and emotion while discursive expression expresses only meaning. With this contrast in mind, I showed how artistic expression could be used to either complement or challenge a

discursive expression. The intent of doing so was to highlight the fact that artistic expression could challenge manipulation that is used to reinforce bourgeois discourse.

I have suggested that the bourgeoisie and the political system are likely to implement censors in hopes of eliminating potential artistic expression from challenging manipulation; however, I have demonstrated why censorship can only reduce, but is not likely to eliminate the potential of an artistic challenge to manipulation. As a result, the bourgeois cannot remedy the possibility that art will challenge and undermine manipulation. It might be just a matter of time until another event like Birmingham is expressed and shatters the dogmas expressed through ideology. If the manipulative effects of ideology break down, it will increase the possibility that a motivation crisis will arise. And when a motivation crisis arises, a legitimation crisis is likely to follow.

By invoking art in the pragmatics of communication, I have argued that because artistic expressions have the potential to undermine manipulation, we should not be content with the current social practice of using manipulation to avert legitimation crises. If we desire to permanently avert legitimation crises, we need to find improved remedial measures to avert legitimation crises. I am not suggesting that, by default, we should turn to Habermas's remedial recommendation, for there could be other remedial measures that have not yet been considered. All that I am prepared to say is that we should not be content with using manipulation as a remedial measure, for I have provided evidence that suggests manipulation is prone to failure.

In retrospect, the narrow scope of this thesis, which has focused on the pragmatics of the communicative potential of art, has allowed me to bypass a very important issue that surrounds the suggestion to use art for political purposes. Habermas places himself

amongst a generation that promotes the “physical repudiation of the kind of ‘aesthetics of the state’.”⁵² Habermas’s own life experiences help to explain some of the motivation behind his philosophy and behind his rejection of “the aestheticization of politics.”⁵³

Habermas was...brought up in a middle-class German family who uncritically adapted to the Nazi regime without actively supporting it...After the war, when he viewed the Holocaust film documentaries and followed the proceedings of the Nuremberg trials, his eyes opened to the horrifying reality of Auschwitz and the full extent of the collective moral catastrophe of the Nazi period.⁵⁴

Habermas grew up in a nation where aesthetic propaganda had manipulated the German language by employing it to use “Nazi jargon at which level it remained during Hitler’s reign.”⁵⁵ It is reasonable that Habermas is disturbed about the negative side effects of aesthetic manipulation, as we all should be. Thus, I would like to take a moment and divert attention away from defending a potential emancipatory use of aesthetics and acknowledge this moral concern regarding aesthetics.

The problem with the use of aesthetics in Nazi Germany is similar to that which has already been considered regarding the French Revolution. A group of people felt they were being systematically oppressed by a second dominant group; in the case of Germany, Germans felt as though they were being oppressed by the Western capitalists in the aftermath of World War I. The Nazis’ created a jargon to strike a chord with

⁵² Jürgen Habermas, *Time of Transitions* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 3.

⁵³ Habermas, *Time of Transitions*, p. 15.

⁵⁴ James Gordon Finlayson, *Habermas: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. xiii.

⁵⁵ Max J. Skidmore, *Ideologies: Politics in Action* (United States of America: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1993), p. 171.

Germany's desire to emancipate itself from the oppression of the Versailles Treatise. Many Germans, as Habermas points out, adopted the Nazi party because the promise of a revitalized German power. The downfall with Germany, like France after the Revolution, was that certain figures of authority determined the end of emancipation. The point that needs to be made is that the horror that arose in the aftermath of both emancipatory efforts would likely never have happened if people were not originally frustrated by their social environment, which motivated both the French and the Germans to revolt against their oppression. Thus, art is not fully to blame for the circumstances that arose in the aftermath of these emancipatory tendencies.

However, a point that I need to acknowledge is that, if what I have argued is correct, aesthetic manipulation is likely to incite a greater response than is discursive manipulation since aesthetics appeal to both reasons and emotions. Thus, Habermas is correct to worry about the possible political usage of art. But, the Nazis' not only used art to propagate their ends, they also used linguistic jargon. By "the skilful and cynical crafting of language,"⁵⁶ the Nazi party "achieve[d] maximum emotional effect. When the subject was Nazism, the recurring words were 'strength,' 'youth,' 'vigor,' 'honor,' 'glory,' 'power,' 'spirit,' and the like."⁵⁷ By focusing on these words, the Nazi party exploited the hopes of the German people, which were to emancipate Germany from Western authority. In contrast, when the topic switched to those who were to blame for Germany's ailments, "the words used were 'vermin,' 'lice,' 'maggots,' 'stinking,' and

56 Skidmore, *Ideologies: Politics in Action*, p. 171.

57 Skidmore, *Ideologies: Politics in Action*, p. 171.

‘scum’.’”⁵⁸ These words helped to dehumanize the sources, according to Hitler, that were responsible for oppressing Germany.

Thus, words can cause as much damage as art. Habermas, however, differentiates ethically good communication, that which is oriented towards understanding, from ethically bad communication, that which is oriented towards success. Though I will not redeem the claims that I am about to make, I hope to return to this task at some future point, I will hint at how aesthetic communication might fit within Habermas’s moral framework. Habermas’s discourse ethics considers the difference between good and bad methods of communication. Habermas’s uses his discourse principle as a base from which morality could be generated.

I have spent a great deal of time attempting to show the parallels between discursive expressions and aesthetic expressions. From the work presented here, I would think that it is reasonable to suggest the possibility of expanding the scope of Habermas’s discourse ethics to incorporate various forms of communication. As such, I would think that artistic expressions that are oriented towards understanding would be an acceptable artistic practice while artistic expressions that are oriented towards success would be an unacceptable artistic practice. The difference between being oriented towards understanding and oriented towards success is simply whether or not the artistic expression is a genuine expression that intends to represent a person’s experiences. However, such a proposal will fall victim to many of the same problems that I have already highlighted with Habermas’s moral theory. There are questions of sincerity, trust and the development of moral consciousness that will problematize using artistic

58 Skidmore, *Ideologies: Politics in Action*, p. 171.

expressions towards understanding. These are concerns that I will leave for future consideration.

However, for this work, I will conclude by suggesting that aesthetics, if oriented towards understanding, would help undermine linguistic communication that is oriented towards success. By default, because art could reveal communication that is oriented towards success, art is conducive for understanding, which in turn is conducive for consensus. And in closing, I would suggest – though I will need to consider this claim in detail at some future time – that aesthetics that are oriented towards success are not likely to undermine communication that is oriented towards understanding. The historical evidence that problematizes art – the case of Nazi propaganda – exemplifies aesthetics that were oriented towards success being used to undermine discourse that was oriented towards success.

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