

Settling the Dispute or Disputing the Settlements:
Representations of the Disengagement Plan in the *Jerusalem Post*

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ABSTRACT

Settling the Dispute or Disputing the Settlements: Representations of the Disengagement Plan in the *Jerusalem Post*

Reisa Klein

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories have been a contentious issue within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a major obstacle towards bringing peace to the region. Beginning in April 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced that Israel would withdraw all 21 of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements from the West Bank. The implementation of this disengagement plan began on August 15, 2005 and was completed less than 10 days later on August 24, 2005. On September 11, 2005 the last Israeli soldiers left Gaza and the settlements were officially handed over to the Palestinians the following day.

The news media became a crucial conduit through which the Israeli nation was informed about the disengagement of settlements. Through the application of a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on Israel's largest English daily newspaper, the *Jerusalem Post*, I examine how the newspaper framed the disengagement of the settlements. I argue that the paper re-constitutes Israel as a democratic nation and postures itself as a public sphere and a fourth estate, giving the illusion of democratic deliberation, a strategy that works discursively to privilege Zionist and state hegemonic ideologies. Further, the *Jerusalem Post* reifies an Orientalist trope in which Palestinians are constructed as 'Other' and figured outside of the demos and public debate. I conclude that the newspaper arrests true democratic deliberation necessary for lasting peace in the region.

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PREFACE

If you hear a speaker on some platform use the phrase 'dismantling the settlements,' then laugh to your heart's content. These are not children's fortresses of Lego or Meccano. These are Israel itself; Israel the idea and the ideology and the geography and the trick and the excuse. It is the place that is ours and that they have made theirs. The settlements are their book, their first form. (Bargouti, 2003, p. 29)

This thesis research has been both an academic and personal journey. As a Jewish woman living in the 'Diaspora', a thesis on the news media's representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has led me to question my own a priori assumptions and cultural upbringing. Recognizing some of the hardships that Zionism, occupation and the settlements have inflicted on the Palestinian people has forced me to challenge prevalent cultural discourses in which I have been subjugated since I was a child. Since we are all always/already positioned by discourse, I can never fully escape my own cultural identity-nor do I want to. It is from the standpoint of a Jewish Montreal woman that I critically interrogate how an Israeli national newspaper, the *Jerusalem Post*, represents the disengagement of settlements from the Occupied Territories. Often Jews who critique Israel are labeled as self-hating Jews. Nevertheless, I concede that it is precisely because of my cultural standpoint, that I have the cultural capital to critically examine Israeli policies to possibly incite a change within Israel as well as the very discourses that speak us.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Disputing the Settlements

Background

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories have been and continue to be one of the most contentious issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the 'Six Day War' of 1967, when Israel captured parts of East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, these territories were placed under military occupation, denying Palestinians citizenship and permanent residence in the region. Since then, the Israeli government has continued to politically and financially endorse the construction and expansion of settlements within the Occupied Territories, first setting up military installations in these regions, and later Israeli civilian settlement blocs.

The history of the settlements can be characterized by two stages (Tenenbaum and Eiran, 2005). Within the initial phase between 1967 and 1977, when the Labour party (Left) was in power, the government justified the establishment of settlements by emphasizing their strategic and tactical importance for national security and the safeguarding of Israeli borders. With the Likud government (Right) of 1977, support for the establishment and expansion of the settlements grew. Within Prime Minister Begin's government, Ariel Sharon, who served as Minister of Agriculture between 1977 and 1981 championed the expansion of the settlements asserting that the Occupied Territories inherently belong to Israel. Furthermore, "Sharon believed that it was important to prevent a large contiguous Arab territory from forming around the Green Line which is a term for the boundary between Israel proper and the occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza" (Tenenbaum and Eiran, 2005, p.173). The settlement project was further

institutionalized through the use of both government agencies and non-governmental Zionist organizations such as the Jewish Agency and the World's Zionist Organization. In fact, between 1993 and 2001, the number of housing units in the Gaza Strip and West Bank rose from 20,400 to 31,400, 54 percent in eight years (Lein, 2002). Supporters of the settlements uphold that the annexation of land by Israel in the Occupied Territories is legal insofar as Jews are the rightful owners of the land dating back to biblical times, as well as through having seized the land in war, and thus seek to incorporate these territories into a Greater Israel.

Conversely, the interim Palestinian government (the Palestinian Authority), many Palestinian civilians and Palestinian groups such as Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, argue that the settlements are illegal insofar as they are built on their land and that the policy of settlements constitutes an effort to pre-empt or even sabotage a peace treaty that includes Palestinian sovereignty. They argue that the settlements impose a concrete reality of oppression for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. Specifically, the occupation and settlements prevent Palestinians in the Occupied Territories from moving around freely between different villages as a result of Israeli control of major roadways and access points. This, in turn, hinders a unified Palestinian nation and opportunity for Palestinian self-autonomy insofar as political leaders cannot provide goods and services to Palestinian people. Similarly, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories must endure lengthy military roadblocks that limit their access to particular areas and inhibit freedom of movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli military continues to confiscate and demolish Palestinian homes, bulldoze orchards and crops, place entire towns under curfew and destroy shops and businesses. Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-

based international, non-governmental organization reports that settlers enact physical acts of violence against Palestinians including “frequently stoning and shooting at Palestinian cars. In many cases, settlers abuse Palestinians in front of Israeli soldiers or police with little interference from the authorities” (Human Rights Watch, February 2001)

The international community (apart from the U.S.) upholds that the establishment of the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are illegal. Specifically, they have been described as violations under the fourth Geneva Convention¹ and as “having no legal validity” by the UN Security Council in resolutions 446, 452, 465 and 471. Moreover, international human rights groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have also denounced the settlements as illegal. Nevertheless, the U.S. holds the view that the settlements are legal arguing that the West Bank and Gaza Strip have never been part of a sovereign state and therefore do not meet the criteria for illegal occupation since there is no ‘High Contracting Party.’ The U.S. government has generally abstained or voted against UN Security Council resolutions which condemn Israel. By inference, the settlement issue remains highly debated and contested both nationally and internationally, and is an ongoing obstacle towards bringing lasting peace to the region.

¹ Belligerent occupation is governed by The Hague Regulations of 1907, as well as by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and the customary laws of belligerent occupation. Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000), paragraph 3 continued: “Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and its responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in a Time of War of 12 August 1949;...” Again, the Security Council vote was 14 to 0, becoming obligatory international law (If Americans Only Knew, 2006).

The Disengagement of Settlements

The Israeli government's decision to disengage settlements from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, a plan implemented in August 2005, is the latest development in the evolution of the settlement issue. Beginning in April 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided that Israel would withdraw all 21 Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip², and four settlements in the West Bank³, while retaining control over Gaza's borders, coastline and airspace, as well as reserving the right to undertake military operations when necessary. The unilateral disengagement plan was first announced by Sharon at the 4th annual Herzliya Conference, in December 2003 where participants discuss national policy. In April 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon met with U.S. President George Bush in order to get U.S. backing for his unilateral disengagement plan. Bush announced that the U.S. would support the disengagement plan as part of the U.S.-backed Road Map for peace in the region.⁴ The plan was defeated in a Likud party referendum on May 2, 2004 whereupon Sharon proposed a modified version which was passed on June 6, 2004, stipulating that the dismantling of each settlement should be voted separately.

Israeli evacuation of Gaza settlements and four West Bank settlements began on August 15, 2005 and was completed less than 10 days later on August 24, 2005. On September 11, 2005 the last Israeli soldiers left Gaza. On September 12, 2005 the

² The 21 Gaza settlements are: Bedolah, Bnei Atzmon, Dugit, Elei Sinai, Gadid, Gan Or, Ganei Tal, Katif, Kfar Darom, Kfar Yam, Kerem Atzmona, Morag, Neveh, Dekalim, Netzarim, Netzer Hazari, Nisanit, Pe'at Sade, Rafiah Yam, Slav, Shirat Hayam, Tel Katifa.

³ The four settlements in the West Bank are: Kadim, Ganim, Homesh, Sa-Nur.

⁴ The Road Map for peace is a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict proposed by a quartet of international entities: the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations. The principles of the plan were first outlined by U.S. President George W. Bush in a speech on June 24, 2002, in which he called for an independent Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace. The road map further stipulates that the Palestinian Authority must dismantle the terrorist organizations and that Israel must withdraw from settlements and freeze settlement expansion.

settlements were officially handed over to the Palestinians. Subsequently, a passage was opened between Gaza and Rafah in Egypt to ensure that Palestinians were not cut off both physically and economically from the rest of the world. Egyptians, Palestinians and EU representatives monitor the passage to prevent the smuggling of arms.

While Sharon insisted that he dismantled the settlements in a move for peace in the region by returning land under Palestinian jurisdiction, he continued to build a 'security fence' in the West Bank that encases them so as to "protect settlements from suicide bombers." (Morris, 2001, p.242). Nevertheless, this 'security wall', which Palestinians term an 'Apartheid wall' (Pengon, 2002) blocks their roadways and freedom of movement. As such, many critics, both national and international, maintain that disengagement in Gaza is a political ploy to increasingly annex land within the West Bank and is thus not a genuine move towards peace in the region. The disengagement of settlements in the Occupied Territories has raised questions amongst both Israelis and Palestinians as to whether Sharon's plan was an international publicity stunt to mask the continued human rights violations of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Furthermore, with the plan, Israel still maintains control over the major roadways, airspace and water supply, giving rise to questions as to whether or not the withdrawal will grant true autonomy and self-determination to the Gazan Palestinians. Many Palestinians do not trust Sharon, who during his election platform was against Israel's withdrawal of the settlements, and as Defense Minister originally financially endorsed and supported their expansion. Simultaneously, the disengagement plan has fueled debate within the Israeli nation concerning whether Israel should relinquish control over the land in the Occupied Territories. Detractors of the plan assert that it is forcibly removing

settlers from their homes and from land that inherently belongs to Israel. Thus, the Israeli nation has deliberated upon whether the policies and procedures of the plan are fair to settlers. Moreover, the disengagement plan has caused internal debate amongst Palestinian groups including the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, who both claim responsibility, through peaceful negotiations and acts of violence respectively, for putting pressure on Israel to implement the plan. Despite the disengagement from settlements, violence between Israelis and Palestinians continues to escalate as they argue about who has the true right to the land.

Contested Histories and Positions of Power

This contemporary incarnation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not exist in a vacuum, but rather is part of a long, complex and contested history with both groups vying for control over the land. On the one hand, Israel maintains that they captured and held onto the land in the 1948 and 1967 wars and thus hold the rights to Greater Israel (which includes the Occupied Territories), rights which they trace to biblical times. On the other hand, Palestinians view the Palestine that existed during the times of the Ottoman Empire and British rule between 1918 and 1948, as their own land. They see themselves as the indigenous population of this region and hence the natural owners of Palestine in its entirety. In other words, while Zionism found a homeland for the Jewish people, it simultaneously displaced the Palestinians into the position of refugees (Said, 1980). Thus, present-day Israel (formerly Palestine) is a disputed territory, with both Israelis and Palestinians claiming the right over the land, thereby fostering continued fighting over the region.

Nevertheless, the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by power relations that serve to simultaneously reinforce the Israeli position of domination as well as frame the history according to the Israeli perspective (Chomsky, 2003; Said, 1980). Specifically, those in the position of power, in this case the Israeli Jews, often secure the dominant ideologies, discourses and narratives of how the history is represented, thus privileging their own side. In the following section, I lay out the dominant Israeli historical narrative of the conflict which justifies the continued existence of Zionism (Jewish nationalism) and the Jewish nation-state.

Dominant Discourses: The Israeli Historical Narrative of the Conflict

The State of Israel is the answer to the Holocaust and the Arabs represent the outside forces striving for their destruction [succeeding the Nazis]; this is simply one more instance in the long history of their triumphant struggle to survive (Velloso, 1998, p. 367).

As the above quote by Velloso surmises, the Israeli case for the existence of Israel relies on a history in which the Jewish people suffered two millennia of exile and persecution, culminating in the Holocaust of World War II, thereby justifying the need for a national homeland to feel secure and protected. The inception of the Jewish state stems from the initial Zionist thesis of Theodore Herzl (1897) who argued that the only solution to anti-Semitism in Europe was to create a Jewish homeland. The Zionist project entailed the building of a nationalist identity out of a unified belief system linked through language, culture, religion and place. At first, the Zionist movement (comprised of a small group of Eastern European Jewry) considered locations in Africa and South America before settling on Palestine for their colony. The region of Palestine was seen by

early pioneers as occupied by a “backward” and “nomadic” tribe of Arabs and several communities of Jews and Christians, and thus deemed a suitable homeland for the Jews of Europe.⁵ Under the Ottoman Empire (1516-1918) Palestine never formed a political administrative unit of its own, which rationalized the Zionist slogan “a land without people for a people without land” (Morris, 2001, p.42). In other words, Zionism completely disregarded the native Palestinians who were indigenous to the land. Instantly, Zionist supporters began purchasing land and immigrating to Palestine. As for the Arab population there was little unified opposition to Jewish immigration and land purchase in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ottoman officials and large landowners seemed willing to ignore regulations restricting Jewish immigration and land sales, allowing Jewish land purchases in return for financial favours. Thus, with the Zionist project Jews began increasing their presence and power within Palestine.

The Zionists further strengthened their cause by aligning themselves with British colonialism. The Zionist movement won the support of Winston Churchill who in 1908 stated:

The establishment of a strong, free Jewish state astride the bridge between Europe and Africa, flanking the land roads to the East, would not only be an immense advantage to the British Empire, but a notable step towards a harmonious disposition of the world among its peoples (Morris, 2001, p.72).

Furthermore, during the time of its rule in 1917, the British government signed the Balfour Declaration, a document promising support for the establishment of a Jewish

⁵ In 1850 these consisted of approximately 400,000 Muslims, 75,000 Christians, and 25,000 Jews. For centuries these groups had lived in harmony: 80 percent Muslim, 15 percent Christian, 5 percent Jewish (If Americans Only Knew, 2006).

national homeland in Palestine.⁶ Thus, the British Empire reneged on earlier agreements they had made to the Arabs, where they had promised support for their independence after World War One, in exchange for assistance in overthrowing the Ottoman Empire. Despite promises made to both sides, with the British rule over Palestine after the War, Britain backed down on its promise to the Palestinians, and under the Balfour Declaration favoured increased Jewish migration to the area. Nevertheless, these documents made it unclear whether the land belonged to Jews or Palestinians, thereby increasing conflict in the region.

Under British rule, the Yishuv (Jewish population) grew in numbers and in economic, social and political mass more rapidly than the Arabs. In 1918, there were about 60,000 Jews and close to 700,000 Arabs. According to the first British census, by the end of 1922 there were about 84,000 Jews and 760,000 Arabs. The relatively large Jewish increase was due to immigration: 1,800 in 1919 and more than 8,000 per year in 1920-22. Immigration peaked in the mid-1920s with arrivals of around 8,000 in 1923, 14,000 in 1924, 34,000 in 1925 and 14,000 in 1926. The Jews had constituted less than one-tenth of the population in 1919 and by 1931 they represented one-fifth and their demographic weight was to grow even more dramatically during the following decade.

The 1920s, 30s and 40s saw Israel's fledgling communities attacked by local Arab residents, and oppressed by British magistrates, who began to refuse entry to new

⁶ The Balfour Declaration took the form of a letter signed by Lord Arthur, under the persuasion of Zionist supporter Chaim Weizmann Balfour to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, who headed Britain's Zionist Federation. It stated: "I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet: His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights of political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country" (Morris, 2001, p.75).

immigrants. Consequently, the Israeli pioneers created the *Haganah*, the 'Defense', to protect their farmers and settlements. The role of the *Haganah* was to guard the Jewish Kibbutzim and farms, and to warn the residents of and repel attacks by Palestinian Arabs. Later, with U.S. backing, the *Haganah* evolved into one of the strongest militaries worldwide, under the name Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

Wars in the Region

Zionists justified the need for a Jewish state as a result of increased anti-Semitism resulting in the Nazi Holocaust that killed over six million Jews. With pressure from international Jewry in 1948, just three years after the end of World War II, the United Nations intervened and announced Israel's independence. Under considerable pressure from high-placed American Zionists, the UN decided to give away 55 percent of Palestine towards a new Jewish state, despite the fact that this group represented only about 30 percent of the total population, and owned less than 7 percent of the land (If Americans Knew, 2006).⁷ Less than 24 hours later, the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, as well as local Arab guerrillas attacked the Jews of Israel. With monetary and weaponry support from the U.S., the Zionists fought back and acquired control over 78 percent of Palestine- far more than proposed by the UN partition plan. Within the dominant Israeli narrative, this war was known as 'the war of independence' and marks the moment when the Jews named the Jewish state 'Israel.' With its victory, and the establishment of a Jewish state, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced into the position of refugees. After the war, Israel prevented those Palestinian refugees from

⁷ Due to internal conflicts between the Zionists and the Palestinians as well as a result of the promises Britain made in the Balfour Declaration and to the Palestinians during WWI for their support in overthrowing the Ottoman Empire Britain realized that colonial rule over Palestine was no longer tenable. It was one of the first colonies to be released from British rule, in 1948.

returning to their homes. Rather the 'Right to Return' was extended to all Jews in the Diaspora. A paradox emerged thereafter in the psycho-cultural narratives of Israeli Jews: there existed both a sense of paranoia about being an island in a sea of enemies, as well as a growing feeling of invincibility among the Jewish citizens of Israel (Oren, 2002).

The trauma of violence and militarism which currently ensues among the population stems from the stream of wars and unrest throughout the past 60 years. In the 'Six Day War' of 1967, the Israeli army pre-empted an attack by the surrounding Arab nations. Despite being outnumbered, the Israelis defeated Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the guerrilla fighters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and succeeded in expanding Israel's borders to include the Golan Heights in the North, the West Bank in the east, which included Jerusalem's old city and its eastern parts (East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip in the West and the Sinai desert in the south. In the following years, Israel launched vast settlement drives which in effect meant the projection or extension of Israeli dominion into these territories.

In 1973, (what the dominant narrative calls) the 'Yom Kippur War' broke out, when Syria and Egypt coordinated surprise attacks during the highest of Jewish holidays against Israel in order to recapture the land lost in the 1967 war. Nevertheless, with U.S. backing, Israel was able to win the war and ward off its enemies. With the Egyptian peace deal, Israel eventually withdrew from its settlements in the Sinai Peninsula in 1982 and returned the land to Egypt. Meanwhile, in 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon⁸ in an effort to derail the home base of the PLO. The Israeli command authorized a force of about 150 Phalange fighters' entrance into the Sabra and Shattila refugee camps, claiming that a

⁸ The Government of Israel gave a green light for the invasion as a response to the assassination attempt against Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov by the Abu Nidal Organization.

force of '2000 PLO terrorists' remained in the camp. The result was a massacre of between 700 and 3500 defenseless Palestinians by the Phalange. Israeli investigation found that then defense minister Ariel Sharon was indirectly responsible for this massacre, leading to his resignation from his position. By 1983, Israel withdrew its troops leaving a small residual Israeli force and an Israeli-supported militia in southern Lebanon in a 'security zone', which Israel considered a necessary buffer against attacks on its northern territory.

With continued occupation in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories launched the first *Intifada* (the Arabic term for 'uprising') in 1987 against the occupation, following a seemingly unrelated incident: a car accident in which an Israeli truck driver ran over and killed three Gazan Palestinians. Fed up with living conditions and violations of human rights, the *Intifada* was a popular mobilization that drew on the organizations and institutions that had developed under the Occupation. It involved hundreds of thousands of people, many with no previous resistance experience, including children, teenagers and women.⁹ For the first few years, 'resistance' entailed many forms of civil disobedience, including massive demonstrations, general strikes, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of Israeli products, political graffiti and the establishment of underground schools (since regular schools were closed by the military as reprisals for the uprising). It also included stone throwing, Molotov cocktails and the erection of barricades to impede the movement of Israeli military forces. Although Israel tried to suppress the movement through border closures and military actions, Palestinians succeeded in resisting the soldiers by throwing stones and building home-made bombs and rockets. The *Intifada* received widespread international media

⁹ Eventually the PLO, under Yasser Arafat took credit for the continuation and strength of the *Intifada*

coverage, thereby challenging the occupation on an international scale. The 'violence' declined in 1991 and came to an end in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo peace accord.

Peace Negotiations?

The issue of the settlements and Israel's presence within the Occupied Territories has been a critical area of consideration for bringing peace to the region. At the Camp David Accords of 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin and Egypt President Anwar Sadat paved the way for all subsequent peace negotiations by highlighting the need to resolve the question of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁰ The resulting 'Framework for Peace' stipulated that "in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants...the Israeli Military Government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government" (Morris, 2001, p.204). These Camp David Accords also discussed the relations between Israel and Egypt, in which Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces and settlements from the Sinai Peninsula, resulting in the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. This agreement guarantees freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and resulted in the U.S. committing to several billion dollars worth of annual subsidies to both governments, which continue to this day. Other Arab nations could not accept the Accord insofar as it did not include negotiations about Jerusalem, and many Arab nations blamed Egypt for not putting enough pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestinian issue in a way that was

¹⁰ The Camp David accords ignored the question of East Jerusalem and the future of the Golan Heights.

satisfactory to them.¹¹ As a result, all Arab countries (except Oman and Sudan) severed diplomatic relations with Egypt.

The *Intifada* reordered the diplomatic priorities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bringing the Palestinian Arabs and the issue of settlements to the forefront. The Oslo Peace Accord, signed between The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993, addressed issues including the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the refugee situation, control over East Jerusalem, security arrangements, borders, water supply and economics. Furthermore, it was the first attempt at stipulating that the two states both have a right to exist. In fact, the U.S., Israel and the PLO set up the Palestinian Authority (PA): an interim administrative organization to nominally govern parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The PA was designated to have control over both security related and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas and only civilian control over Palestinian rural areas. The remainder of the Territories including Israeli settlements, the Jordan Valley and the bypass roads between Palestinian communities were to remain under Israeli control. It was meant to be a five year transitional body during which final status negotiations between Israel and Palestine were to take place. Nevertheless, the Accord fell apart under Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who refused to dismantle the Israeli settlements, as well as under Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who refused to return parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank to Palestinians.

The next ten years illustrated the terms for peace according to Israel: “Sealing of territories, curfews, undercover units, torture, extra-judicial killings, repression, house

¹¹ Egypt was criticized for promoting the disintegration of a united Arab front in opposition to Israel and for not outlining in detail how to solve the Palestinian issue.

demolitions, mass deportations” (Velloso, 1998, p.361), and the continuous demolition of Palestinian homes to make way for new Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (Shashaa, 2003). Again in 2000, the settlements were a major area of contention during the peace talks at Camp David with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO President Yasser Arafat, organized under U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration. Barak offered to give up all of Gaza to create an autonomous Palestinian state in exchange for Israel’s annexation of 12 percent of the West Bank without territorial compensation. The Palestinians rejected this idea at the Camp David Summit in July 2000, insisting that the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza are illegal under international law and must therefore be evacuated. Specifically, Arafat refused negotiations that recognized Israel as existing past the Green Line border into the Occupied Territories.¹²

The collapse of the peace process led to a Second *Intifada* (*the Al-Aqsa Intifada*) in 2001. Specifically, On September 28, 2001, then Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount¹³ in Jerusalem, a holy site for both Israelis and Palestinians, presently under Palestinian jurisdiction. This provocative act and the massive police presence were catalysts for the second *Intifada*. In this uprising, suicide bombings become the mainstay of Palestinian resistance while Israel continued a policy of consistent collective

¹² Barak offered to form a Palestinian State initially on 73 percent of the West Bank (that is 27 percent less than the Green Line borders) and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip. In 10 to 25 years the West Bank area would expand to 90 percent (94 percent excluding greater Jerusalem). The West Bank would be separated by a road from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea, with free passage for Palestinians although Israel reserved the right to close the road for passage in case of emergency. The Palestinian position was that the annexations would block existing road networks between major Palestinian populations. In return, the Israelis would cede 1-3 percent of their territory in the Negev Desert to Palestine. Arafat rejected this proposal and did not make a counteroffer.

¹³ In Palestinian Arabic terms, this area is called Haram al-Sharif, which is translated as the Noble Sanctuary. It is a holy Muslim site where the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque are located while simultaneously corresponding to the site of the first and Second Jewish temples and according to Judaism is the site in which the third Jewish Temple is to be rebuilt after the coming of the Messiah. Thus, it is one of the most contested religious sites in the world.

punishment. Over 12,700 Palestinians lost their homes, 2400 were killed and 28,000 injured (Global IDP Database, 2003).

The increase in violence and suicide bombings set the stage for Sharon, a right wing member of the Likud party to be elected as Prime Minister in 2001. Part of his platform was the disavowal of any proposals made by Barak, opposing the dismantling of any of the settlements. Nevertheless, once elected, he reneged on this election promise, generating disapproval from his cabinet and those who voted for him. Specifically, he met with U.S. President George Bush and Yasser Arafat to establish the Road Map to peace. In this accord, Israel promised the disengagement of settlements from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the cessation of Palestinian violence and 'terrorist acts'.¹⁴ Simultaneously, he implemented a plan to build a 'security fence' around settlements in the West Bank, a structure meant to stop 'terrorism' and suicide bombings against settlements in the Occupied Territory. As already mentioned, these contradictory moves have fueled debate and disagreements amongst both Israelis and Palestinians as to whether Sharon's policies are truly a move towards peace or a political ploy to annex more land in the West Bank. Despite the disengagement of settlements, violence persists on both sides.

On November 21, 2005 Sharon resigned as head of Likud and dissolved parliament to form a new center-left party called *Kadima* ('Forward'). This party endorsed the disengagement plan, and also Israeli control over East Jerusalem and the

¹⁴ The first step on the road map was the appointment of the first-ever Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The United States and Israel demanded that Arafat be neutralized or sidelined in the road map process, claiming that he had not done enough to stop Palestinian attacks against Israelis while in charge. The United States refused to release the road map until a Palestinian Prime Minister was in place. Abbas was appointed on March 19, 2003, clearing the way for the release of the road map's details on April 30, 2003.

West Bank. Thus, the issue of settlements has not officially ended with Sharon's disengagement plan, but remains an integral aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On January 4, 2006 Sharon suffered a massive stroke, forcing him to step down as Prime Minister, leaving the aftermath of the disengagement and the future of the settlements in the hands of his successor Ehud Olmert.

Through an Orientalist Frame

The news media are a crucial conduit through which individuals (both within Israel and internationally) become informed about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general and the contemporary disengagement of settlements. Edward Said (1980) argues that representations of the Arab-Israeli conflict in scholarly and popular discourse, including news media, have tended to fit into an Orientalist discourse. As he puts it, contemporary Orientalism is informed by the construction of "absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior" (Said, 1978, p.300). Thus, he defines Orientalism as "a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said, 1978, p. 3). The news media tend to reproduce the Orientalist discourse through the construction of a binary opposition of 'us' and 'them' in which Israelis are constructed in positive terms and Palestinians are constructed in negative ones. These binaries are rendered into absolutes and translated into dogmas that uphold the master narrative of Orientalism. Similarly, Shohat and Stam (1994) argue that news media reproduce the 'commonsense' Orientalist assumption that connects the West with knowledge, advanced technology and the making of peace in the Middle East.

Within the following section, I first interrogate how a historical Orientalist discourse (reinforced in academic and popular outlets) secured Israeli hegemonic power in the region as well as unequal relations of domination and subordination. Secondly, I summarize scholarly research that evinces the recurrence of an Orientalist discourse within contemporary international and national news outlets, which reaffirms a dominant Israeli framing of the conflict.

Orientalism and the Dominant Historical Narrative

Said (1980) argues that an operative Orientalist historical discourse which constructed Palestinians as ‘Other,’ helped to bolster Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine that completely ignored the Palestinians who lived there. Specifically, the Orientalist narrative connected Zionism with British colonialist discourse in which the Palestinians were seen as ‘native others’ to be conquered, liberated and Westernized.

Zionism is to be carried out by the Jews with the assistance of major European powers; that Zionism will restore “a lost fatherland,” and in so doing mediate between the various civilizations; that present-day Palestine was in need of cultivation, civilization, reconstitution; that Zionism would finally bring enlightenment and progress where at present there was neither (Said, 1980 p.68).

Thus, Orientalism is a discourse that works to ignore the Palestinians as autonomous beings with rights, displacing them into the position of refugees and privileged a dominant Israeli narrative in which Israel had a right to the land.¹⁵

¹⁵ For example, Said writes that Golda Meir said that there were no Palestinians and Yitzhak Rabin always referred to them as “so called” Palestinians and Menachem Begin referred to the Arabs of Eretz Israel as Israel “own” Blacks thereby demonstrating how Zionism has completely denied the existence of the Palestinians as a people who have rights in Israeli society. (Said 1980)

Through an Orientalist discourse, Zionism was further able to cement its domination through Israel's alliance with the U.S. Zionism became associated with Western values such as liberalism and democracy, and thus Jews (despite their often Eastern background) were associated with 'us' while Palestinians were cast as the Eastern 'Other'.

Israel was a device for holding Islam-and later the Soviet Union, or communism- at bay. Zionism and Israel were associated with liberalism, with freedom and democracy, with knowledge and light, with what 'we' understand and fight for. By contrast, Zionism's enemies were simply a twentieth-century version of the alien spirit of Oriental despotism, sensuality, ignorance and similar forms of backwardness (Said, 1980 p.29).

Noam Chomsky (2003) stipulates that there were numerous complex reasons for U.S. alliance with Israel, including political strategies to gain control of the oil in the Middle East and undermine the USSR's power in the region. He further demonstrates that the U.S. supported Zionist policies because of pressure from the American Jewish elite who believed that the U.S. should have to make up for closing its doors to Jews during the World War II. Similarly, Said argues (1981) that U.S. alliance with Israel was a political strategy for the spread of U.S. imperialism and control in the Middle East.

Israel's security in American eyes has become conveniently interchangeable with fending off Islam, perpetuating Western hegemony, and demonstrating the virtues of modernization. In these ways, three sets of illusions economically buttress and reproduce one another in the interests of shoring up the western self-image and promoting Western power over the Orient: the view of Islam, the ideology of modernization, and the affirmations of Israel's general value to the West (Said, 1981, p.31).

Thus, the Orientalist discourse served to aggrandize established U.S. and Israeli power as well as legitimize existing systems of domination and subordination.

The U.S. attempts to conceal its alliance with Israel by presenting itself as a neutral party trying to create peace in the region. Nevertheless, it supplies Israel with monetary and weaponry support and backs Israel's control over the land including its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus supporting a Zionist discourse.

From 1967 to October 1973, support for Israeli occupation of the territories was consistent with the general objectives of American policy...A major threat to American interests is radical Arab nationalism. The oil producers and the United States had and still have a common interest in blocking any such force, and thus tacitly accepted the arrangements resulting from the 1967 war (Chomsky, 2003, p.18).

Thus, the relationship between Israel and the U.S. fostered Israeli domination within the region, turning the nation into an occupying power. Accordingly, "Military conquest also has a marked effect on society, a fact that has not been lost on Palestinians. Israel became an occupying power and not simply a Jewish state" (Said, 1980 p.137). The Orientalist discourse that ignored the rights of Palestinians fostered an invisible alliance between Israel and the U.S., securing their hegemony in the region. Furthermore, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), an Israeli lobby in the U.S., exerts power over the U.S. government's shaping of American policy regarding the Middle East. A July 6, 1987 *New York Times* article describing the AIPAC stated:

"The organization has gained power to influence a presidential candidate's choice of staff, to block practically any arms sale to an Arab country, and to serve as a catalyst for intimate military relations between The Pentagon and the Israeli army. Its leading officials are consulted by State Department and White House policy makers, by senators and generals" (Shipler, July 6, 1987).

American policy is complicit with Israeli policies in the Middle East.

'The Holocaust' and Orientalism

The Holocaust, in which Jews suffered extreme and brutal anti-Semitism, resulting in mass genocide, has been discursively employed to justify the need for the Jewish state. According to Norman Finkelstein (2000), 'the Holocaust' has proven to be an indispensable ideological weapon, and he differentiates between the terms 'Nazi Holocaust,' which signifies the actual historical event and 'the Holocaust,' its ideological representation (p.1):

The Holocaust dogma of eternal Gentile hatred has served both to justify the necessity of a Jewish state and the hostility directed at Israel. The Jewish state is the only safeguard against the next (inevitable) outbreak of homicidal anti-Semitism; conversely, homicidal anti-Semitism is behind every attack or even defensive maneuver against the Jewish state (Finkelstein, 2000, p. 50).

Finkelstein argues that the Holocaust was deployed as a discursive strategy insofar as it was only after the war of 1967 that the Jews (particularly in the U.S.) played up the Jewish Holocaust in order to protect its new strategic assets. Israel and American Zionists drew attention to Israel as a small nation surrounded by Arab enemies that needed protection so that a Jewish Holocaust would 'never happen again,' as the famous slogan asserts. As such, 'the Holocaust card' works to "justify criminal policies of the Israeli and US support for these policies" (Finkelstein, 2000, p.7). By highlighting the Holocaust, Israel focuses on its own suffering and obliterates how its policies and militarism affect the lives of Palestinians. As such, the running Orientalist discourse allows for the hierarchical distinction between 'our' Jewish suffering and 'their' Palestinian victimhood. In other words, Jewish persecution and claims to the land trump those of the Palestinians.

Orientalism within the News Media

Popular Representations of Palestinians and Israelis

Academic scholars have evidenced that the contemporary news media within local and international arenas (particularly North America) reproduce dominant Israeli narratives and hegemonic framings of the conflict by re-invoking Orientalist representations of 'us' and 'them.' Within this section, I lay out the findings of these researchers, paying particular attention to popular Israeli and North American representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, I address not only how the conflict is constructed in a local domain, but rather how it is picked up and recast by international news outlets to fit into their local discourses. In general, Israeli and North American news media continually repeat stereotypic representations of Arabs as 'Others.' A U.S. media watchdog group, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, contends that the American media tends to secure a discourse in which Palestinians are represented as terrorists and suicide bombers (2001). The repeated construction of Arabs as terrorists devalues Palestinian perspectives insofar as terrorists are seen as irrational and undemocratic. This stereotype therefore validates the actions of Israel and the West who are represented as democratic nations. As Elliot *et al.* (1986) suggest:

The terrorist is the polar example of the extremist, a fanatic and psychopath who lies beyond the pale of the comprehensible, rational politics of a liberal democracy. A particular sign of this exclusion from the humane tradition is the terrorist's disregard for the value of individual human life, and his supposed necessary indiscriminacy in taking it. Against this picture of the terrorist, the state (often the liberal-democratic variety) portrays itself as a benign protector of its subjects. In deploying violence, the state also deploys discourse that presents its actions in the vein of internal and external security necessary to protect the nation and its subjects (p.266).

These scholars therefore insinuate that the news media construct an image of Palestinians as violent terrorists and portray Israel as employing violence as a form of self-defense. Similarly, Jack Shaheen (1984), who examines popular media representations of Arabs, sums up in his infamous passage “billionaires, bombers and belly-dancers” that Arabs are continually stereotyped as violent ‘others’ or romanticized as ‘exotic’ others. While at first glance it seems as though billionaires and belly-dancers are at least more positive representations of Arabs, as Hall (1990) has noted stereotypes tend to be two-dimensional. Thus, they do not foster a representation of Arabs as infinitely diverse and multifarious, and only serve to further construct the view of Arabs as ‘Others.’

In Liebes’ (1997) exemplary study on Israeli media’s representation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, she argues that the Israeli media constructs an us/them binary when reporting the conflict, particularly during times of war, in which Palestinians are positioned as inciting the violence through suicide bombings. The representation of Palestinians as ‘Others’ fosters a coverage in which the Palestinian perspectives are “depersonalized, dehumanized and sometimes demonized” (Leibes, 1997, p. 14). The tendency is to focus on Palestinian violence, calling it “acts of terrorism”, while downplaying Israeli violence, generally legitimizing it as military self-defense. The representation of Palestinians as terrorists within the news media fixes a dominant Israeli rendering of the conflict. “In the West, Palestinians are immediately associated with terrorism, as Israel has seen to it that they are. Stripped of its context, an act of Palestinian desperation looks like wanton murder” (Said, 1980 p.171). Thus, the conflict is seen as the fault of Palestinians, removing their violent acts from a context of brutal military occupation of their region.

In contrast to this monolithic stereotyping of Palestinians, representations of Israel cohere around its portrayal as a democratic nation with a complex and diverse society. The American news media tend to fashion stories that concentrate on Israel's democratic government and policies, featuring many stories about elections in Israel (If Americans Knew, 2006). Furthermore, they offer a plurality of perspectives and disagreements within the Israeli public, thereby representing the Israeli nation as heterogeneous. There is a propensity to humanize and personalize Israeli citizens as victims (casting them more like us/the west). For example, Jhally and Ratzkoff (2003) demonstrate that U.S. news media flesh out the story of Israeli soldiers who have been killed by Palestinians, by providing their names, backgrounds, occupations, hopes and dreams within the coverage as a semantic ploy to create empathy for Israelis and their perspective.

Anat First (1998) shows that the Israeli *Mabat* broadcast news coverage of the period following the *Intifada* featured 65 percent Israeli accessed voices and only 35 percent Palestinian. Moreover, most of the Arab participants were presented as anonymous individuals, while almost all Israeli participants were named. Furthermore, the coverage sets up a dichotomy of 'us' and 'them' insofar as the nature of interaction between Palestinians and Israelis always contained some level of violence or confrontation. Within the news stories, Palestinians are blamed for inciting the violence. She concludes that *Mabat* overrepresented Israeli perspectives while undermining Palestinian ones, depicting the latter as "an enemy injuring Israeli soldiers and citizens in an effort to secede from the state." She continues, "Our findings suggest that television news tends to portray Arab participants as *Intifada* terrorists rather than heroes" (First, 1998, p.248-9). The repetition of these 'us' and 'them' representations of Israelis and

Palestinians in the news media excludes a perspective in which Palestinians are seen as fighting against an illegal military Occupation.

Representations of the Intifada

Scholars have further shown that news coverage of the *Intifada* within national and international news outlets fit into a dominant Zionist narrative. For instance, Cohen and Wolfsfeld (1993) indicate that journalists package stories into already familiar frames, thereby couching the Palestinian uprising within a master Zionist narrative. While the Palestinian news media reports on the *Intifada* center on the frame of “injustice” and their demand for self-determination, focusing on how they became victims, identifying who is responsible for the occupation and how they can bring the occupation to an end, the Israeli news media tends to frame the *Intifada* as a “law and order” issue, particularly concerning how to handle the violence. Cohen and Wolfsfeld conclude that the Israeli news media dismiss the context of Occupation as a factor for the uprising, and portray the Palestinians as inherently violent and aggressive by nature. Similarly, according to Collins and Clark (1993) the *Intifada* is represented in the *Jerusalem Post* as a continuation of powerful Arab terrorism against a tiny, peace-loving Israel. Moreover, Roeh and Nir’s study (1993) of four Israeli newspapers’ representations of the *Intifada* indicates that references to Jewish actors are more personal and humanistic, while references to Palestinian actors reinforce negative stereotypes, where Arabs are usually characterized as enemies. Only 6 percent of the Arabs included within the news coverage are mentioned by name, compared with 44 percent of the Jewish actors. “This finding was expected, since we assumed that the press articulates the sense of collective identity within the conflict of ‘us’ vis-à-vis ‘them’ or ‘others’” (Roeh

and Nir, 1993, p.190). The newspapers articulate an 'us against them' stance, with clear preference for 'us' (Israel). The same effect is manifest in the syntactical structure which tends to refrain from ascribing direct responsibility to 'our people', particularly in instances of attacks against Palestinians. The context of occupation is left out of the reporting of the *Intifada*, positioning Palestinians as inciters of violence.

Semantic Strategies

The news media's use of series of semantic moves works to privilege a pro-Israeli framing of the conflict. Through the discursive strategy of a 'body count' of Israeli and Palestinian victims, the news media emphasizes Israeli deaths and Palestinian violence, (despite the reality that more Palestinians have been killed) thereby fostering a dominant Israeli rendering of the conflict. According to Judith Butler (1993) certain bodies count more than others and are given more presence within the news media to privilege their perspective. According to the U.S. media watchdog group, *If Americans Knew*¹⁶, the U.S. news media tend to over-report the number of Israelis soldiers killed in the conflict and underreport the number of Palestinians soldiers killed. For example, in a study on the *New York Times*, *If Americans Only Knew* reported that in 2001, Israeli deaths were reported at a rate 2.8 times higher than Palestinian deaths, and in 2004 this rate increased by almost 30 percent, to 3.6, widening still further the disparity in coverage between deaths on either side of the conflict (If Americans Knew, 2006). In addition, while Israelis were often depicted as innocent victims of Palestinian aggression, Palestinian deaths were generally portrayed as a necessary result of conflict, the victims frequently identified as combatants. Similarly, it appeared that while Israeli civilian deaths were

¹⁶ *If Americans Knew* began issuing report cards of news media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinians conflict, particularly comparing how many deaths were reported on the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

emphasized, Palestinian civilian deaths were minimized, almost to the point of invisibility. *If Americans Knew* found similar results in terms of disproportionate reporting of Israeli and Palestinian deaths for other news agencies and newspapers including the *Associated Press*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *San Jose Mercury News*, and the *New London Day*. The lack of coverage of Palestinian deaths functions semantically to de-emphasize Israeli violence while the overrepresentation of Israeli deaths highlights Palestinians as violent causes of the conflict. Jhally and Ratzkoff (2003) support these findings by stating that within the U.S media there is a proclivity to name each of the victims on the Israeli side, while rounding victims to an abstracted number. Consequently, the lives of Israelis (insofar as they are like 'us') have more cultural capital and importance than Palestinian lives ('them').

The news media further use a series of lexical choices to erase the perspective that Palestinians are under an illegal military occupation and that Israel is attempting to annex land within the Occupied Territories. For example, journalist Robert Fisk demonstrated that "in September 2001, CNN changed its policy on how to characterize Gilo: 'We refer to Gilo as a Jewish neighborhood on the outskirts of Jerusalem, built on land occupied by Israel in 1967. We don't refer to it as a settlement,' said the order from CNN headquarters" (Coen, August 2002). The term settlement implies a narrative in which Israel is trying to annex land that is not rightfully theirs while the more positive term 'neighbourhood' connotes that the land naturally belongs to Israel. By calling a settlement a neighbourhood, CNN is privileging a Zionist discourse in which the land in the Occupied Territories is seen as belonging to Israel and not as a military occupation. Similarly, the Israeli national newspaper, *Ha'aretz*, reported (May 31, 2005) that the

Israel Broadcasting Authority, at the behest of a member of the Israeli cabinet, has directed its editorial departments not to use the terms 'settlers' or 'settlements' on radio or television news. Thus, the Israeli media support a dominant state perspective which ignores the notion that Israel is illegally constructing settlements on occupied land. Furthermore, within the Israeli right wing press, including the *Jerusalem Post*, journalists refer to the area of settlements within the Occupied Territories of the West Bank by their biblical names – as 'Judea' and 'Samaria' (Cohen and Wolfsfeld, 1993). The use of these names instead of the 'West Bank' works as a discursive tool to claim that Israel is and always has been the rightful owner of the land since Biblical times, without any consideration of their illegal Occupation of Palestinian land.

The U.S. media frequently refer to Palestinian actions as 'attacks' and Israeli actions as 'retaliations' (Jhally and Ratzkoff, 2003). 'Attacks' for Palestinian action implies that Palestinians are responsible for the violence, while 'retaliations' connote that Israel is responding in self-defense. These word choices thus erase a context in which Palestinian violence exists against the backdrop of Occupation. Furthermore, the U.S. media refer to periods when only Palestinians but no Israelis have been killed as 'relative calm', thereby de-emphasizing Israeli violence and Occupation. Similarly, within the Israeli press' coverage, the *Intifada* was referred to as 'riots' or 'disturbances' rather than 'uprising', further fostering a hegemonic Israeli framing of the conflict (Roeh and Nir, 1993).

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: De-contextualized

The representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the news media frames out the larger context, in which Palestinians were displaced from their land and

are living under Israeli military occupation. Consequently, the news media focus the way the conflict is reported through a dominant Israeli lens (Jhally and Ratzkoff, 2003). According to the organization *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting*, only 4 percent of U.S. news network reports mention that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are occupied (2006). By ignoring the issue of occupation, just like the Israeli media representations of the conflict, the U.S. news media frame Israeli acts of violence as self-defense and dismiss Israel's illegal occupation. Furthermore, when the news media report on suicide bombings, there is no recognition that the circumstances of occupation and the ontological reality of the hardships inflicted on the Palestinians have created the context for the bombings. Within the U.S. media the Occupation is generally framed as a response to suicide bombings (Jhally and Ratzkoff, 2003). This lack of context creates the illusion that Israelis and Palestinians are on equal footing, which further lends credence to a framework in which Palestinians are seen as inherently violent terrorists and not as reacting to the conditions of a military occupation.

Erasure of U.S. Israeli Alliance

The alliance between Israel and the U.S. is often overlooked within news media, creating the illusion that the U.S. does not support Israel's military occupation. Nevertheless, as already outlined above, the U.S. government has continually vetoed against resolutions to end military occupation, and has provided billions of dollars in military aid, thereby supporting Israeli occupation.¹⁷ Rather, the U.S. is represented within the news media as a neutral broker, interested in bringing peace to both parties in the region. De-contextualizing the relations between the U.S. and Israel serves to

¹⁷ Since 1949, the U.S. has supplied Israel with over one hundred billion dollars in military aid, making the IDF the fourth most powerful military worldwide with the largest F16 fighter planes outside the United States.

downplay American support for Zionist policies, helping to strengthen the illusion that Israelis and Palestinians are on an equal playing field, where both sides must make concessions, the Israelis by relinquishing land-ownership, and the Palestinians by dismantling terrorist organizations as stipulated within various peace negotiations and accords. The news media's not too subtle implication is that the Palestinians have the upper hand because they are being unreasonable- the Israelis must concede land in order to maintain peace, and have no other choice. The Israelis are seen as willing to negotiate in a civilized manner, while the Palestinians will only resolve the issue through violent intimidation.

For example, when the U.S. media reported on the peace deal at Camp David in 2001, they described Barak's concessions as a "generous offer" and that Arafat did not accept it because he was "not interested in actual peace" (Malley and Agha, 2001). They neglected to explain that Arafat did not accept for the simple reason that the land in question is of incredible cultural and historical importance to Palestinians, and that he did not feel that the size of the offer reflected this significance.

The notion that Israel was 'offering' land, being 'generous' or 'making concessions' seemed to [the Palestinians] doubly wrong- in a single stroke both affirming Israel's right and denying the Palestinians. For the Palestinians land was not given but given back (Malley and Agha, 2001 p.151).

The U.S. news media tend to reinforce a parallel between Palestinian terrorist acts directed at Israel and Osama Bin Laden's terrorist act of 9/11 against America, in order to invoke empathy for Israel. Particularly, the U.S. media stepped up coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after September 11, 2001 as the topic of terrorism became paramount in public discussion and consequently the coverage of the conflict became part of a larger discourse on terrorism. Pednekar-Magal and Johnson's (2004) study on two

U.S. newspapers in West Michigan, the *Grand Rapids Press* and the *Holland Sentinel*, shows that in the aftermath of 9/11, public discourse about terrorism in the U.S. provided the essential framework for representing news about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, hegemonic discourse of the Israeli state as one which casts oppressive and also violent state actions as essential security measures against an irrational enemy pervaded the discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where it was represented only in light of the terrorist activity. They conclude that: “such discourse, replete with distorted and one-dimensional images... obscures key issues of the conflict and prevents understanding of the many realities and, in effect, hampers a serious debate on it” (Pednekar-Magal and Johnson, 2004, p.41). By repackaging an illegal military occupation as part of America’s ‘War on Terror’, the U.S. media buttress a larger us/West/Israel against them/Islam/Arab/Palestinian polarity.

Thesis Research

Although these trends in news media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict focus on both Israeli and U.S. media, they point to a larger operative dominant discourse of Orientalism which rests on and reproduces an ‘us’/ ‘them’ dichotomy. In other words, the dominant national discourse coheres around and fleshes out the larger categorical binaries of inclusion and exclusion. It is important to understand that these national dominant discourses operate across broad, global contexts as evidenced in the patterns inherent in the US media coverage of this conflict.

My thesis research, however, concentrates on how these dominant discourses are operative within a more local, national setting, particularly on how the news media

became a crucial conduit through which the Israeli nation was informed about the disengagement of settlements. Specifically, national news media do not provide objective accounts of the event but often constitute an ‘imagined community’ and a collective national identity through the reaffirmation of national myths (Anderson, 1983). As such, I investigate an Israeli national newspaper, particularly the *Jerusalem Post*’s coverage of the most contemporary evolution of the conflict, Israel’s disengagement of settlers from the settlements in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. The *telos* is to discover how the dominant narrative operates and is retold within this national daily newspaper’s representation of the disengagement plan. Through the application of a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) I examine how the newspaper re-constitutes the Israel as a democratic nation and postures itself as a public sphere and a fourth estate giving the illusion of democratic deliberation which in fact discursively works to privilege Zionist and state hegemonic ideologies. Particularly, I examine how the *Jerusalem Post* reifies an Orientalist trope in which Palestinians are constructed as ‘Other’ and figured outside the demos and public debate. Consequently, the newspaper discursively arrests true democratic deliberation, necessary for bringing lasting peace to the region.

The *Jerusalem Post* has been selected for my research because it is the “largest and most influential English-language daily newspaper in Israel” (World Press Encyclopedia, 2003, p.477). Ideologically, the *Jerusalem Post* has the reputation of being positioned at the right of centre in the political spectrum as compared to its only English counterpart, *Ha’aretz*. The *Jerusalem Post* publishes nationally with weekday circulation figures at 30,000 and weekend numbers at 50,000. It also publishes a weekly English international edition with circulation numbers at 70,000 and a French international

edition with circulation figures at 7,500. Having no Hebrew edition restricts its popularity within Israel, however, “though its circulation numbers are low, it is disproportionately influential due the fact that it is read by the diplomatic community and all the foreign journalists in Israel” (*ibid.*).

With the newspaper’s inception in 1932 by publisher Gershon Agronsky, before the state of Israel was established, the *Jerusalem Post* primarily aligned itself with Zionist ideals. After 1948, the *Jerusalem Post* was affiliated with the Likud party and upheld left-wing ideologies. Nevertheless, in 1989, the *Jerusalem Post* experienced a marked shift to the right following its purchase by the Hollinger Group, led by media mogul Conrad Black, owner of newspapers in The UK and Canada. In the wake of the radical reshuffle that took place, a number of the paper’s senior (and politically leftist) journalists left. In 2004, the newspaper went through another shift in ownership after the Security and Exchange Commission filed a civil fraud lawsuit against Black for misappropriating company funds. Presently and during the period of disengagement, in which this research is situated, the newspaper is owned by both Mirkaei Tikshoret (a large media group in Israel with holdings that include TV and radio stations, as well as daily newspapers in Russian) and Canwest Global Corporation (one of Canada’s largest news media corporations). The paper’s tougher line on issues such as security, the settlements and the Occupied territories has remained constant throughout the shift of ownership.

The Israeli press is vast and diverse with newspapers in a variety of languages, across the political range. This paper was chosen out of a hotly contested news media market with Hebrew national dailies vying with Arabic, English and Russian daily national newspapers as well as a host of weekly and local publications. Today’s most

popular newspapers within Israel are *Ha'aretz*, *Yediot Aharonot*, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post*. Reporters Without Borders, describe the Israeli press as “traditionally robust and independent”, reflecting a broad spectrum of views (Reporters Without Borders, 2005). Nevertheless, Leibes (1997) argues that although on the one hand, the Israeli media is democratic and committed to freedom of the press, on the other hand, Israeli news media is subject to formal military censorship which intervenes prior to dissemination of stories in print and electronic media. This contradiction facilitates a veiled reproduction of hegemonic power. Thus, within my thesis research, I examine how these dominant, hegemonic representations are carried out within a national newspaper concerning the latest incarnation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

My thesis investigation focuses on the following key questions: (1) What representations and dominant narratives are reaffirmed and retold within the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement of settlements? (2) How are these representations repeated and recast within this latest installment of the conflict? (3) What semantic devices and discursive moves are used to relay the representations of the dominant narrative? (4) How are the primary actors represented and stereotyped? And, (5) what narratives are framed in and framed out, emphasized and marginalized to support the dominant historical narrative?

In the following chapter, I trace the links between news and ideology, paying particular attention to the larger theoretical and methodological issues that inform my study. Thereafter, I analyze the coverage that appeared in the *Jerusalem Post* using the tools afforded by CDA. I conclude with an examination of how this coverage resonates with larger patterns of coverage pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

Introduction

This thesis takes as its point of departure existing scholarship that situates news media as an ideological enterprise; a highly selective and constructed practice that constitutes the social world often in line with the interest of those in positions of power (Fairclough, 1995; Hall *et al.*, 1978; Tuchman, 1978; Van Dijk, 1988). While, *prima facie*, news reporting appears to be an objective, neutral reflection of the natural world, traditionally fashioned through the metaphor of ‘news as mirror’, news media scholars have employed a more appropriate metaphor of ‘news as frame’ in that the news frames reality through decisions of inclusion, foregrounding, occlusion, and exclusion to construct a particular representation of social reality (Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974; Tuchman, 1978). My focus here is on the press and in particular, the dominant print media as in the national or regional newspapers.

The aim of this chapter is to outline and synthesize existing scholarship which views ‘news as ideology’. First, I analyze how newspapers are not simply purveyors of objective reality insofar as they are central components in the constitution and reaffirmation of the nation and a collective national identity. Moreover, I examine how the newspapers’ or the press’ position as a democratic institution and an arena for a public sphere eclipses their role in reproducing the ideologies of the ruling class. Second, I analyze how ideology functions within news media, particularly in terms of how dominant ideologies are negotiated and reproduced through professional journalistic

standards and everyday news media routines. As such, news media are conceptualized as an Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser, 1971), an institution that discursively promulgates the dominant ideologies of the ruling class, and also functions as sites of hegemonic struggles of domination and subordination (Gramsci, 1927/1971).

Furthermore, I explore how news media use semantic strategies for the containment of oppositional perspectives. As well, I outline the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a tool for revealing how ideology and power operate within news media. Within the last section, I demonstrate how I applied CDA to examine the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement plan.

Newspapers as 'Imagined Communities'

News media tend to reinforce national myths and dominant historical narratives. Specifically, news media act as contemporary bards (Fiske and Hartley, 1987), retelling and reproducing national myths and dominant narratives which serve those in positions of power (Lule, 2002). In other words, news media act as purveyors of hegemonic constructions of reality and as unifying forces in solidifying a sense of an imagined collective, one based on a shared adherence to national mythologies (Anderson, 1983; Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1978). Thus, newspapers perform an important function in the constitution and reaffirmation of the nation and national identity; thereby indicating that news media do not replicate the natural world, but rather divide the world into categorical constructions of 'us' versus 'them' (Anderson, 1983; Mouffe, 2000).

Anderson (1983) argues that with the rise of print capitalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, newspapers constructed national 'imagined communities'. Specifically, newspapers provided news readers who did not know each other with a

common print language which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to relate themselves to others as part of the same community. Anderson further stipulates that the constitution of nationalism and a collective national identity within newspapers is now modular: “above all, the very idea of nation is now nestled firmly in virtually all print languages and nation-ness is virtually inseparable from political consciousness” (Anderson, 1983, p.135). By inference, newspapers do not mirror or provide objective accounts of the natural world, but rather act as crucial conduits through which representational discourses about the ‘self’ and ‘other’ are communicated (Sreberny, 2002). Specifically, the constitution of the nation within newspapers necessarily circumscribes ‘our’ nation in contrast to ‘theirs’, thereby inscribing binary representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ with a tendency to privilege ‘our’ nation.

The inclusion of historical narratives within newspapers is an essential mechanism for the constitution, consolidation and reaffirmation of a collective national identity, which serves the interests of political elites. According to Anderson (1983), print capitalism facilitated the emergence of a collective national identity by providing a new fixity to language which helped tie the nation to antiquity and a past, a condition that is central to the subjective idea of the nation as a cohesive entity. In other words, newspapers consolidate collective national identity by linking current events to a historical past. Similarly, in his seminal work, Charland (1987) argues that historical narratives are integral to the constitution of a collective national identity. “Narratives lead us to construct and fill in unified subjects out of temporally and spatially separate events”. (Charland, 1987, p.139). Through the case study of the *Peuple Québécois*,

Charland (1987) argues that collective national identities are constituted through historical narratives:

In the telling of the story of a *peuple*, a *peuple* comes to be. It is within the formal structure of a narrative history that it is possible to conceive of a set of individuals as if they were but one (Charland, 1987, p.140).

In other words, Charland claims that the telling of a historical narrative within rhetorical texts functions, in Althusserian terms, to ‘interpellate’ individuals as collective subjects/people such that they serve the interests of political leaders in the establishment and continuation of national sovereignty and the nation-state. For Charland, individuals are not ‘persuaded’ to adopt a collective national identity, rather it is through the act of identification that individuals are constituted as peoples through historical narratives; what he terms constitutive rhetoric insofar as it calls an audience into being. Consequently, “the subject and the collectivized ‘peuple Québécois’ are, in Althusser’s language, ‘interpellated’ as political subjects through a process of identification in rhetorical narratives that ‘always already’ presume the constitution of subjects” (Charland, 1987, p.134).

Although Charland maintains that it is traditional rhetorical texts (such as speeches and documents from political parties) that constitute a collective national identity, I extend rhetorical texts to include newspapers as a discursive arena for the construction of a nation. Specifically, through the reproduction of political ‘accessed voices’, viewpoints and discourses, newspapers unconsciously spread state ideologies and thus construct a historical narrative of the nation, often in line with dominant state perspectives. By constructing and representing a dominant historical narrative to

consolidate a collective national identity, newspapers are not providing neutral accounts of reality, but rather reasserting hegemonic power.

The Myth of Newspapers as a Democratic Public Sphere

Newspapers further give the illusion that they are transmitters of objective reality by projecting themselves as independent of government and state control. Viewed from this liberal pluralist lens, newspapers have been fashioned as central constituents of democracy. Carey writes: “Without journalism there is no democracy, but without democracy there is no journalism either” (Carey, 1999, p. 51). In its ideal sense, a liberal and deliberative democracy connotes that every person within the demos is inherently equal to every other person, and that all citizens have equal opportunity to influence government policy (Habermas, 1962/1989; Mouffe, 2000). Consequently, freedom of the press from state control and surveillance is essential within a democratic society. News media provide the public with a richly pluralistic spectrum of information so that the public can make informed and rational decisions about public affairs, politics, and government. Newspapers are viewed through the common metaphor of a “fourth estate” (as distinguished in historical terms from the church, the judiciary and the commons) in which journalists act as watchdogs of government and corporations through a system of ‘checks and balances’ that hold the state accountable (Allan, 1999). Thus, it appears that newspapers do not reproduce the ideologies of the state so that individuals can make informed decisions about the government. Nevertheless, I argue below that the posturing of the newspaper as a democratic institution masks its crucial role in reproducing the dominant ideologies of the state and elite sources.

The “liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere” as originally conceptualized by Habermas (1962/1989), connotes unrestricted, rational debates and discussions among equals on public matters in order to hold politicians and governments accountable for their decision making and policies. Fraser (1993) sums up the Habermasian model:

These publics aimed to mediate between “society” and the state by holding the state accountable to “society” via “publicity.” At first this meant requiring that information about state functioning be made accessible so that state activities be subject to critical scrutiny and the force of “public opinion”. Later it meant transmitting the considered “general interest” of bourgeois society” to the state via forms of legally guaranteed free speech, free press, free assembly, and eventually through the parliamentary institutions of representative government...The idea of the public sphere designated an institutional mechanism for “rationalizing” political domination by rendering states accountable to (some of) the citizenry (Fraser, 1993, p.4).

Therefore the newspaper is ideally an essential arena for providing information to the public, and thereby fostering public debate. From this perspective, newspapers appear as purveyors of objective reality which allow individuals to make informed and rational decisions about government policies and procedures.

Scholars have critiqued Habermas’ model, arguing that contemporary newspapers rarely provide a space for truly democratic public debate. Specifically, Fraser contends that Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere excludes women and lower classes: “Thus the view that women were excluded from the public sphere turns out to be ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one that accepts at face value the bourgeois public’s claim to be *the* public” (Fraser, 1993, p.7). From this point of view, newspapers are only an arena for dominant members of the public sphere, thereby reproducing positions and perspectives that do not upset relations of domination and subordination:

The official bourgeois public sphere is the institutional vehicle for a major historical transformation in the nature of political domination. This is a shift from a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one, from rule based primarily on acquiescence to superior force to rule based primarily on consent supplemented with some measure of repression. The important point is that this new mode of political domination, like the older one, secures the ability of one stratum of society to rule the rest (Fraser, 1993, p.8)

Therefore the public sphere does not really promote true democracy in which all citizens are viewed as equal. In the case of news media, newspapers reproduce the viewpoint of the population with cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1990), displaying a superficial, ritualistic antagonism with government, all the while reiterating a hegemonic frame. Furthermore, Fraser argues that with the emergence of a “welfare state mass democracy” newspapers do not truly act as a forum for democratic deliberation. Instead, publicity in the sense of critical scrutiny of the state has given way to public relations, mass mediated staged displays, and the manufacturing and manipulation of public opinion. Thus, newspapers give the illusion that they are an arena for state scrutiny when in fact they are touting dominant state ideologies. For example, the opinion poll has become a common discursive practice within news media to give the appearance that individuals are participating in debates about government and its policies. However, opinion polls do not accurately or comprehensively reflect widespread public opinion, and simultaneously work to sway the reading public. Bennett (1996) maintains that news media and government display a posture of antagonism between press and government, creating the appearance of mutual independence. In other words, it seems as though the news is critical of politicians and government, all the while creating a narrow frame of the event.

Similarly, Mills (1962) argues that as democracies have moved from a bourgeois public sphere to mass society, newspapers do not facilitate true public discussion.

The public and the mass may be most readily distinguished by their dominant modes of communication: in a community of publics, discussion is the ascendant means of communication, and the mass media, if they exist, simply enlarge and animate discussion, linking one *primary public* with the discussions of another. In a mass society, the dominant type of communication is the formal media, and the public becomes mere *media markets*: all those exposed to the contents of given mass media (Mills, p.304).

Thus, newspapers do not offer a true forum for public discussion and debates, but rather create hegemonic constructions of events in order to ‘interpellate’ individuals to submit to state policies. The concept of newspapers as integral democratic institutions does not guarantee objective accounts of the natural world. According to Mouffe (2000) , “the identity of a democratic political community hinges on the possibility of drawing a frontier between us and them...democracy always entails relations of inclusion and exclusion” (Mouffe, 2000, p.43). By inference then, as proponents of democracies, newspapers continually reproduce and reaffirm these binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

News as Ideology

Scholars have further evidenced that news media do not provide objective, neutral accounts of reality by explicating that news media are impregnated with ideology. Specifically, news media are a highly selective and constructed enterprise that privilege dominant perspectives. Furthermore, news media scholars argue that objectivity, fairness and balance- the professional values that are supposed to decrease news bias- in fact legitimize official perspectives and thus reinforce the status quo. These journalistic standards then enable the dissemination and legitimization of official ideologies.

The term 'ideology' has many uses across a variety of disciplines ranging from a Marxist perspective of false consciousness¹⁸, to meanings, ideas and belief systems about the world propagated by the ruling class, to a world view or class outlook, and societal level phenomena that structures society. Cultural studies theorist, Raymond Williams defines ideology as a "relatively formal articulated system of meanings, values and beliefs, of a kind that can be abstracted as a 'world view' or 'class outlook'" (Williams, 1977, p.109). According to Samuel Becker (1983), ideology "governs the way we perceive our world and ourselves; it controls what we see as 'natural' and 'obvious'...An ideology is an integrated set of frames of reference through which each of us sees the world and to which all of us adjust our actions" (Becker, 1983, p.69). From this perspective, ideology is not an individual belief system, but rather a total structure that functions at the macro-societal level.

Despite the multitude of definitions, the authors cited above concede that ideology serves to further the power of certain groups, be it a class, a gender or a race. Thompson (1990) sums up the connection between ideology and power:

The concept of ideology can be used to refer to the ways in which meaning serves...to establish and sustain relations of power which are systematically asymmetrical- what I shall call "relations of domination." Ideology, broadly speaking, is *meaning in the service of power*. Hence the study of ideology requires us to investigate the ways in which meaning is constructed and conveyed by symbolic forms of various kinds...to investigate the social contexts within which symbolic forms are employed and employed (Thompson, 1990, p.7).

Nevertheless, various schools of thought comprehend the relation between power and ideology differently. Specifically, the Marxist tradition maintains that there is a

¹⁸ False consciousness implies an 'upside down' view of the world propagated by the ruling class to the subordinate class in order for the subordinate class to submit to the domination of the ruling class. In other words, the subordinate class has fallen for or been deceived by the arguments/values put forth by the ruling class.

direct correlation between those who control the material means of production and ideology; in other words, the economic base determines the superstructure. In the case of news media, this view maintains that those in the economic positions of power, including the owners and publishers of news media, have control over the ideology and directly influence media content. Marx and Engels write:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force in society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx and Engels, 1970, p.64).

According to the Marxist perspective then, society is divided along class lines between dominant and subordinate groups. Here ideology works through the news media as a 'false consciousness' in which the ruling class advocates ideas and actions such that dominated classes accept their position of subordination. The political economy perspective most resembles a traditional Marxist perspective insofar as scholars take the link between economic conditions and ideology to be fairly direct, regarding media content as ultimately determined by those in the economic position of power or those who own the media. "The role of the media here is that of legitimation through the production of false consciousness, in the interests of the class which owns and controls the media". (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982, p.26).

Structuralist Louis Althusser (1971) expanded the Marxist notion of ideology and power by arguing that control and domination are not exercised by a series of individuals (those who control the means of production), but rather, is diffused through ideology within a variety of institutions. Althusser moves beyond classical Marxism by arguing

that the State and the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) and the economic base are key determinants in reproducing the relations of production.¹⁹ He argues that the superstructure, specifically the State Apparatus, the state power, and the Ideological State Apparatus all play a role in the reproduction of the relations of production. More specifically, Althusser distinguishes between the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA,) such as the courts, police and army, and the Ideological State Apparatuses, which is made up of a body of institutions including the school, family, church and media. Simply put, the RSA ensures the ruling class' domination of the subordinate class through violence and/or coercion. Contrarily, the ISAs are relatively autonomous, private institutions, which function primarily through ideology, particularly the dominant ideologies of the ruling class. Althusser views ideologies as conceptual frameworks for making sense of the world and how we construct meaning within it, particularly in connection to the relations of production. Ideology has an effect on human consciousness, so that individuals of particular classes accept their position in society.

Althusser further discusses how ideologies 'interpellate' or hail individuals into larger discourses of domination and subordination.

Ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects by that very precise operation which I have called *interpellation* or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!' (Althusser, 1971, p.162-3).

By being hailed and by responding, the individual turns into a subject. Althusser gives a treatment of the word 'subject', which can mean: a free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives; author of and responsible for its actions, or a subjected being who submits to

¹⁹ To be clear, reproducing relations of production connotes reproducing capitalist relations of exploitation whereby the (bourgeoisie) ruling class secure their role as exploiters and the working (proletariat) class as exploited in order to maintain the capitalist system.

the higher authority and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission. These double meanings highlight the important point that individuals see themselves as having agency and free will, when in fact ideology (whose concrete forms are realized in the Ideological State Apparatus) calls individuals into the system to play specific roles. In other words, ideology subjugates individuals into discourses of power.

It is important to note that ideology works on everyone, insofar as individuals are 'always/already' subjects, including those who own the means of production (newspaper owners, publishers, and journalists), as well as audiences. Media owners and journalists reproduce ideologies and power relations, often unknowingly. Specifically, they unconsciously maintain the structural system that is in place, thereby reinforcing the status quo. For Althusser and structuralists alike, ideology moves beyond false consciousness. From this perspective, there is no upside down or right side up view of reality because we are 'always/already' entrenched within ideology. Just like the subordinate class, the ruling class cannot step outside of ideology.

Cultural studies theorists further advance the concept of power and ideology by stating that the ruling class does not have direct control over ideology but rather it is a dynamic and lived process which must continually absorb and incorporate disparate values. In other words, they reject the traditional Marxist notion, like Althusser, that the economic base determines the superstructure and look more closely at how the dominant ideologies are simultaneously naturalized and negotiated within news media. Cultural Studies theorists draw upon Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony (1927/1971) which is defined as:

A ruling class' (or alliance's) domination of subordinate classes and groups through the elaboration and penetration of ideology (ideas and assumptions) into their commonsense and everyday practice; it is the systematic (but not necessarily or even usually deliberate) engineering of mass consent to the established order (Gitlin, 1980, p.253).

Media institutions serve a hegemonic function by continually reproducing a cohesive [is this really cohesive? Hall would argue otherwise] ideology, a set of commonsensical values and norms that serve to reproduce and legitimate the social structure through which the subordinate classes participate in their own domination. Specifically, the media use what Gramsci calls 'commonsense' to reproduce relations of domination and subordination. Hall explains:

What passes for 'common sense' in our society- the residue of absolutely basic and commonly agreed consensual wisdoms- helps us to classify out the world in simple but meaningful terms. Precisely, common sense does not require reasoning, argument, logic, thought: it is spontaneously available, thoroughly recognizable, widely shared. It *feels*, indeed, as if it has always been there, the sedimented, bedrock wisdom of 'the race', a form of 'natural' wisdom (Hall, 1978, p.325).

By inference, official, elite viewpoints of the ruling class are translated as natural and commonsensical. It follows then that hegemony is achieved when people ascribe their powerlessness not to its source in economic and social relations, but to external forces of nature or when they interiorize it as a failing on their part.

Central to the notion of hegemony is that it is based not on coercion or force but rather through ideologies used to win the consent of subordinate classes. In this sense, power is not maintained through the dominant group imposing its ideologies on a subordinate group.

The dominant economic class does not, for the most part, produce and disseminate ideology directly. That task is left to writers and journalists, producers and teachers, bureaucrats and artists organized for production within the cultural apparatus as a whole (Gitlin, 1980, p.254).

From this perspective, power is not reinforced through a 'top down' model but is rather diffused within the news media through a system of discursive techniques in which it is constantly renegotiated and fought for. "Ideology is not directed behind the scenes by a top television anchor, a publisher or a board of directors. Rather ideology happens as a natural outgrowth of the way the system operates, making it a true, societal macro-level phenomenon" (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991, p.244). Ideology becomes the central means through which power is legitimated and exercised insofar as "the economic elite now becomes dependent on other sectors for securing the allegiances of the whole society...Ideology assumes special importance as a symbolic mechanism through which the interests of these diverse social strata may be integrated" (Gitlin, 1987, p.255-6). Consequently power is spread out throughout the cultural apparatus and constantly renegotiated. While the cultural studies theorists like the classical Marxists, political economists, and structuralists support the notion that news media reinforce the ideologies of the ruling class, the reinforcement they argue, is less direct. Furthermore, they believe that there is more wiggle room for competing and subordinate ideologies to creep their way into news accounts. Consequently, hegemonic power is not stable and fixed, but rather must be consistently renewed, recreated, defended, and modified as different groups continually compete for control. In other words, the news media are not simply seen as sites in which the dominant ideology reigns supreme, but as sites of contention in which different groups and classes attempt to secure dominance and control. As such, it is a negotiated zone in which fissures and subordinate perspectives crack through the dominant ideology.

News as Frame

Closely linked to the notion of 'news as ideology' is the conceptualization of news as frame. Within framing analysis, Goffman (1974) applies a metaphor in which news is understood as a 'frame' that necessarily includes and excludes particular events, people and ideas. He argues that a frame is constituted by "the principles of organization which govern events-at least social ones- and our subjective involvement in them" (Goffman, 1974, p.10). Frames organize 'strips' of the everyday world, "an arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity" into an ordered, discernable event (Goffman, 1974, p.11). In other words, news frames work to impose an order on the multiple happenings of the social world so as to render them into a series of meaningful events. As a result, the way that social reality is framed- what is included, fore-grounded, excluded and back-grounded- reveals an ideological selection and an ordering of social reality.

Gitlin (1980) extends Goffman's notion of frame to argue that the journalistic standard of objectivity works to naturalize these frames as 'commonsense' when they in fact succumb to hierarchical rules of inclusion and exclusion. Specifically, he states that news frames make the world beyond direct experience appear natural and objective, through "principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin, 1980, p.6).

According to Gitlin, these frames are often imposed through journalistic routines and practices.

Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely: to recognize it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences. Thus for organizational reasons alone, frames are unavoidable, and journalism is organized to regulate their production (Gitlin, 1980, p.7).

The authoritativeness of the frame is contingent upon its implicit appeal to objectivity, which means it must be seen as balanced and fair in its treatment of counter-positions. “Only by absorbing and domesticating conflicting values, definitions of reality, and demands on it, in fact does it remain hegemonic” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 256). Consequently, both Goffman and Gitlin observe that the framing of news works to make an event appear neutral and objective when it in fact reinforces dominant ideologies and hegemonic definitions of the world.

As Gitlin argues:

The media specialize in orchestrating everyday consciousness, by virtue of their pervasiveness, their accessibility, their centralized symbolic capacity. They name the world's parts, they certify reality *as* reality—and when their certifications are doubted and opposed, as they surely are, those same certifications limit the terms of effective opposition. To put it simply: the mass media have become core systems for the production and distribution of ideology. They relay more or less patterned images of reality, through what can be called frames: persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. (Gitlin, 1979, p.12).

This pattern of framing—selecting what gets into the story and what is left out, as well as which issues are brought to public attention or evacuated from the public arena—makes the news a powerful ideological agent of legitimation.

Other scholars have built upon Goffman’s theory of ‘news as frame’. Hall (1982) argues that it is the media’s ability to ‘define’ or *frame* a situation that gives them their ideological power. The framing and selection methods of news media are inherently ideologically biased insofar as they construct a particular representation that privileges specific groups and ideas over others. Accordingly, the media shape perceptions that make the existing order appear natural and unchanging, with alternatives hard to imagine.

From the viewpoint of the media, what was at issue was no longer specific message injunctions, by A to B, to do this or that, but a shaping of the whole ideological environment: a way of representing the order of things which endowed its limiting perspectives with that natural or divine inevitability which makes them appear universal, natural and coterminous with 'reality' itself (Hall, 1982, p.65).

Hall *et al.* (1978) further explain that news contributes to the process of marking the limits of acceptable thought or action. In other words, it functions to produce social knowledge and cultural values contributing to the process whereby people submit to class inequality. Hartley confirms this viewpoint: "News naturalizes the (fairly narrow) terrain on which different sectional ideologies can contend- it constantly maps the limits of controversy" (Hartley, 1982, p.62).

Professional News Standards and the Manufacturing of Ideology

News media scholars argue that professional journalistic standards such as objectivity, balance and fairness contribute to ideological biases within the news. As Bennett opines:

the most important biases in news occur not when journalists abandon their professional standards, but when they cling most responsibly to them...The great irony ...is that the very quest for objectivity, fairness and balance may contribute to deeper information defects in the news (Bennett, 1996, p.142).

The popular defense of objective reporting (which is in and of itself a news routine or ritual) is that it prevents or at least minimizes political bias and distortion in the news. Schudson (1995) explains that the norm of objectivity emerged in the late 19th and early 20th century with the move away from partisan to penny presses, as newspapers attempted to appeal to a mass audience to increase profits. He argues that a set of routines evolved to ensure that journalists would not include their overt political and personal bias

in news accounts. These include fact centered techniques of observation, further refinement in news interview conventions and more aggressive questions for public figures, more pronounced reliance on quotation marks for source attributions, dispensing of the language of truth in favour of objectivity, and improvements in the relative degree of autonomy from day to day control of proprietors and editors.²⁰ Consequently, the objectivity norm gives the press the appearance of an independent social institution. Because they are largely privately owned and heavily concentrated with power, the media ensure public support by appearing to be objective.

Nevertheless, news critics argue that objectivity systematically favours the reporting of news heavily filtered through the ideologies of the ruling class, legitimate institutions, corporations and governments. For example, reporters rely on credible sources which tend to be those in positions of power (Hallin, 1989). Tuchman (1978) argues that the practice of objectivity requires journalists to verify facts against each other. She calls this the 'web of facticity' implying that what a source says does in fact have to be true, it merely has to be verified that it was said. Thus the 'web of facticity' serves to reinforce the view put forth by official sources, by not questioning the facticity and validity of official sources. Furthermore, since journalists rely on official sources for legitimate news, they do not genuinely critique these sources.

Bennett (1996) further outlines how objectivity works to construct a hegemonic view of the social world:

²⁰ Moreover, the establishment of wire services such as Reuters and Associated Press further increased objective, standardized news reporting. Specifically, the broad marketability of news meant that it had to be stripped of its overt political messages so that it would be appealing to news organizations of all political persuasions, thereby increasing objectivity in news reporting. The transmission of national and international news over the telegraph wires dictated a simplified, standardized reporting format-one that could convey a large amount of information in the most economical form. Thus, objectivity came about in order to satisfy newspapers' economic expansion and was later turned into an expected standard (Schudson, 1995).

As diverse political perspectives gradually disappeared from the news or became discredited as not objective, it became easier to convince people that the dominant mass media political perspective that remained was somehow objective. The logic of such a claim is simple: As one reality comes to dominate all others, the dominant reality begins to seem objective. ..Unfortunately, this illusion of objectivity has been created by a set of journalistic practices that actively promote mainstream political perspectives while drowning out competing views (Bennett, 1996, p.149).

Bennett explains that part of the norm of objectivity is that journalists adhere to standards of decency and good taste. The normative function is to keep reporters away from sensationalistic aspects of political life. By excluding issues, events, and people that are regarded as too tasteless for the news, the media legitimizes and objectifies an illusory world of middle class values, reinforcing the status quo and hegemonic constructions of the social world.

Furthermore, in the name of objectivity, journalists have adopted a documentary reporting style. It assumes that journalists do not embellish stories or advocate particular interpretations of ambiguous events. Journalists only report on what they have witnessed and whatever facts credible sources have confirmed, including manufactured news events put forth by governments and corporations. Bennett argues that packaging news as stories has become part of the objectivity norm. Stories can be defended as standardized and mechanical means of communicating information. This representation gives journalists a claim to a universal methodology of objective reporting. Inherent to creating a news story, are processes such as word selection, and the tying of disparate events together in ways that makes sense or that are intelligible. The use of dramatization, narratives and plot techniques ultimately frame the event to privilege a particular rendering of social reality. Bennett also claims that the standard of objectivity promotes the use of reporters as generalists over specialists so that reporters can give clear and simple information to

audiences. Nevertheless, generalist reporters are often at the mercy of the news source and thus end up repeating and reproducing their point of view.

Like objectivity, the professional standards of balance and fairness create political (ideological) bias in news accounts. Fairness indicates that reporters try to gather as much information as they can while giving both sides equal time to register their comments and interpretations. Likewise, balance indicates giving both sides equal weight within a story. The problem with these two standards is that complex stories are simplified into having only two sides and complexities and subordinate perspectives are framed out. According to Bennett (1996), journalists almost invariably report the views of two familiar, predictable and legitimate groups or actors. The two sides that appear in most stories are anything but a broad sample of viewpoints, but rather reinforce official perspectives and ideologies. Fairness and balance infer that equal time and space is given for both sides to present their positions. However, well-established official views take less time to explain than new ideas and consequently receive more in depth coverage than new ideas that require greater amounts of time to explain. "It is well established that when people encounter a new idea alongside a familiar one that already has considerable social support, the psychological tendency is to discount the new and embrace the old" (Bennett, 1996, p.145). Thus the dominant ideologies are constantly reproduced and reinforced. Furthermore, when there are only two positions stated, they are often set up as binary oppositions, such as 'us' and 'them', 'good' and 'evil'. These stereotypical, categorical constructions work to legitimate one (often dominant) group over another (subordinate group).

News Routines and the Manufacturing of Ideology

Scholars exemplify that systemic news routines and the practical workday context of news making aid in reproducing the dominant ideologies of the ruling class.

Shoemaker and Reese (1991) explain that news media perform a 'gate keeping' function.

Particularly, journalists must winnow down a larger number of potential messages to a few and thus the selection of stories point to an ideological choice by news agencies.

Moreover, the newspaper editor must decide on a handful of stories to run on the front page. These decisions directly affect the media content that reaches the audience. These

selections are often chosen according to what is considered 'newsworthy.' Specifically, newsworthy events are chosen from an informal paradigm of news values which point to a particular routine implicit within news media. According to Stuart Allan (1999), news

values include: "conflict, relevance (proximity), timeliness, simplification,

personalization, unexpectedness, continuity, composition (local, national, international),

reference to elite nations, reference to elite persons, cultural specificity (stories that fit in with a culture's predetermined 'maps of meaning') and negativity (bad news)" (Allan,

1999, p.62-3). These news values influence which stories will be told over others, thereby

shaping the ideological bent of the paper, often unbeknownst to journalists. By inference,

news values frame out particular stories, events and people. "Of course, news values are

neither natural nor neutral. They form a code which sees the world in a very particular

(even peculiar) way. News values are, in fact, an ideological code" (Hartley, 1982, p.80).

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) outline a series of media routines that affect news content. One example of such a routine is the use of the inverted pyramid style in news writing. Here the most important information is placed up top so that editors can cut the

bottom of the article to fit in with the allotted physical space on a news page, and readers can get information quickly. Nevertheless, the inverted pyramid style implies an ideological assumption on what information is considered the most important, thereby favoring a particular perspective. Other news routines such as dividing the news into topics or themes such as local, national, international, sports, business also affects how the news is told. Stories are simplified and categorized to fit in with what Hall (1978) calls 'maps of meaning': preconceived, often stereotypical ways that a culture understands the world.

Tuchman's metaphor of a 'news net' (1978), in which certain events, ideas and people fall through the holes while others gain prominence is used to explain how official voices and legitimated institutions are more commonly reported. The news net refers to a system of reporters deployed to institutions and locations expected to generate news events. Once deployed, this net tends to act at the expense of other events, reinforcing and certifying the newsworthiness of those events that happen to fall within it. Specifically, the news net disperses journalists in a series of locations where news is expected to happen and accordingly shapes the news that is reported, often in line with official sources and legitimate institutions. This organizational plan nevertheless influences the ideological bent of newspapers. For instance, generating news from a series of wire services, bureaus and beats, privileges particular events over others.

Clearly, whom one asks for information influences what information one receives...The bureau reporters seek out centralized sources, politicians and bureaucrats. I never observed these reporters contacting the leaders of social movements...They contacted the powerful (Tuchman, 1978, p.81).

In manufacturing symbolic content, the media rely on external suppliers of raw material, whether speeches, interviews, corporate reports, or government hearings. Thus,

sources have a major influence on media content. Specifically, the use of routine channels for gathering news such as official proceedings, press releases, press conference and non spontaneous events, shape the content of the news in line with official sources and by inference dominant ideologies. In other words, the news media's reliance on government sources allows official, government sources to regulate the release of information.

The Containment of Oppositional Perspectives

As already ascertained, news media within democratic societies ideally intend to express oppositional voices, perspectives and frames. Because of certain standards and practices, news media marginalize oppositional voices. Entman (2003) extends scholarship on how oppositional voices are structurally restrained by arguing that frame contests are buried within the newspaper, and true frame parity in which both frames are presented side by side is the exception, not the rule:

Frame parity describes the condition that free press theories prefer: two (or more) interpretations receiving something like equal play. Parity requires not merely that news provide bits of unrelated information critical of the administration's frame scattered throughout the coverage to reach frame parity, the news must offer a counter frame that puts together a complete alternative narrative, a tale of problem, cause, remedy and moral judgment possessing as much magnitude and resonance as the administration's. Availing themselves of such diverse, clashing and equally well developed understandings, a democratic citizenry can in theory freely and intellectually choose (Entman, 2003, p.418).

Through "the cascading activation model", Entman argues that official and government viewpoints and ideologies more easily spread than subordinate ones. Like the metaphor of a waterfall, ideas flowing down from the government to other systems including the administration, non administration elites, news organizations, the texts they

produce, and the public, gain more momentum than ideologies flowing up from the public. Furthermore, the most inherently powerful frames are those fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society. Counter frames cannot gain equal weight and power as the dominant frame insofar as they are 'always/already' couched within the prevailing ones.

Such a cascading activation model is clearly apparent in the news coverage and privileging of a 'law and order' perspective when reporting on crime. Hall (1978) and Hartley (1982) suggest that newspapers use the discursive strategy of 'law and order' to establish the dominant state frame as the correct lens for understanding a conflictual event, thereby suppressing competing perspectives. Hartley (1982) demonstrates that within stories about dissent among the state and other groups such as demonstrators, the government's perspective is presented as impartial. In other words, the government's interpretation of the event is taken up and used to define the whole event. Conversely, the oppositional perspective is often translated as violent disorder, threatening civility and democracy.

'Opposition' and 'authority' appear as two quite different 'facts'- opposition is action, shouting, disorder and an appropriate context for police while authority is statement, reason, order and an appropriate context for applause. (Hartley, 1982 p.73).

Thus, a law and order discourse writes out that oppositional dissent is integral to a democracy and establishes the state's interpretation of the event as the status quo.

Here the ideological use to which commonsense language is put becomes apparent. As we have noted, the staple diet of news is the sayings and doings of the 'elite persons' who not only wield institutional power, but also act as 'representatives' of large social groups- MPs, Ministers, trade-unionists, industrialists, experts, campaigners and the like. The media's colonization of commonsense language serves to 'translate' the sayings and doings of these people and institutions into a familiar idiom (Hartley, 1982, p.99).

Similarly, Hall (1973) contends that news media reaffirm that oppositional groups must act in accordance with the law, thereby establishing the state as the authority.

In our society conflict is supposed to be regulated, and politics is exactly 'the continuation of social conflict without resort to violence': a society that is where the legitimacy of the social order rests on the absolute inviolability of 'the rule of law' (Hall, 1973, p.184).

As such, the state's perspective is established as correct and oppositional groups are seen as violent and a threat to democracy.

The distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' news in which hard news is seen as more factual and timely, and soft news as less timely, non-scheduled feature stories, works as a semantic strategy to marginalize oppositional voices. A 'hard' story is generally deemed to be one based on facts, on something precise which has happened, in a particular sphere and labeled as 'important.' By contrast, a story based on description, individual experience, a nuanced human interest story or something which has happened in a sphere not labeled 'important' is characterized as 'soft' news. Bird and Dardenne (1988) argue that these categories obliterate a recognition that all news is ideologically constructed:

It is accepted that 'hard' news is informative and factual, while 'soft' news is diverting. In ideal terms, this split is supposed to be dictated by content-certain types of news simply 'are' hard, others soft. These qualities are intrinsic in the events being narrated. This perception blinds us to the way narrative devices are used in all news writing, maintaining the illusion that the structural devices used in hard news are merely neutral techniques that act as a conduit for events to become information, rather than ways a particular kind of narrative text is created (Bird and Dardenne, 1988, p.69).

The distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ news (which often take the form of feature stories) is not objective, universal and neutral but rather creates hierarchies of what is considered important, often in line with the interests of the dominant class:

Having laid out this terrain and demonstrating how ideology infuses and informs the very structures and routines of news-making, I now turn to critical discourse analysis as a methodological tool by which to decipher the way dominant ideology seeps into and structures the content of the news stories that I wish to examine.

Methodological Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) denotes a theoretical and methodological tool for revealing how power and ideology function within language and language use (Fairclough, 1995; Garret and Bell, 1998; Van Dijk, 1988). The major aim of CDA is to produce explicit and systematic tools for investigating how power is diffused through a series of semantic and linguistic moves within news media. “The media are a particular subject of CDA analysis because of their manifestly pivotal role as discourse bearing institutions”. (Garrett and Bell, 1998, p.6). CDA theorists assume that “media use can tell us a great deal about social meanings and stereotypes projected through language and communication” (Garret and Bell, 1998, p.3). More specifically, CDA has an explicit socio-political agenda, a concern to discover and bear witness to unequal relations of power, which underlie ways of talking in a society, and in particular, reveal the role of discourse in reproducing or challenging socio-political dominance (Garret and Bell, 1998). Similarly, Henry and Tator express the function of CDA as providing a tool for deconstructing the ideologies of the mass media and elite groups, and for identifying and

defining social, economic, and historical power relations between dominant and subordinate groups (Henry and Tator, 2002, p.72). According to scholars, CDA is a central tool for democracy. As Mouffe argues:

Instead of trying to erase the traces of power and exclusion, democratic politics requires us to bring them to the fore, to make them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation (p.36).

CDA therefore offers an avenue for making explicit how we are interpellated and subjugated within linguistic and discursive structures. Mouffe and Laclau (1985) argue that it is vital for democratic politics to acknowledge that any form of consensus is the result of hegemonic articulation that reproduces hierarchical relations of power and the same type of subordinated subject.

It is only from the moment when the democratic discourse becomes available to articulate the different forms of resistance to subordination that the conditions will exist to make possible the struggle against different types of inequality (Mouffe and Laclau, 1985, p.154).

CDA becomes a method for exposing the relations of domination and subordination and is therefore a critical tool for bringing about real forms of democracy.

CDA is consistent with a Foucauldian approach to discourse and power insofar as power is understood as existing within a series of discursive strategies mobilized by various institutions (Foucault, 1982). Though Foucault does not utilize the term 'ideology' per se, he looks at how power functions through a variety of institutions that produce larger discourses (i.e. the parameters of what is knowable, thinkable, sayable in a particular context). By inference, news media are institutions that diffuse power and dominant ideologies through a series of semantic maneuvers that work to define the limit

of how an event, issue, group, or person is understood. Consequently, CDA works as a method for uncovering relations of power and ideologies inherent within news media.

CDA is a three-dimensional framework where the aim is to map three separate forms of analysis onto one another: analysis of spoken or written language texts, analysis of discourse practice (processes of text production, distribution and consumption), and analysis of discursive events as instances of socio-cultural practice (Fairclough, 1995). These latter features of the framework indicate that analysis of texts should not be artificially isolated from analysis of institutional and discoursal practices within which texts are embedded. Thus CDA also looks at the diverse ways in which the text is interpreted and responded to. By broadening the examination of news media texts, Fairclough states:

CDA aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor in securing power and hegemony (Fairclough, 1995, p.132-3).

Similarly, van Dijk opines that it is only by analyzing texts themselves that researchers can gain insight into how the texts are ideologically constituted but also through contexts and the social cognitions of news producers and audiences which shape and receive these texts (van Dijk, 1988). Specifically, textual dimensions account for the structure of discourse at the various levels of description, while contextual dimensions relate these structural descriptions to various properties of context, such as cognitive processes and representations or socio-cultural factors. In other words, the contextual component includes an analysis of the cognitive and social factors, conditions,

constraints, or consequences of such textual structures and indirectly their economic, cultural and historical embedding.

The ideological analysis of news crucially depends on advances in both these textual and contextual dimensions of news and communication processes: They need textual structures for their expression and communication and cognitive representations and strategies for their role in social practices, the interpretation of news events, news writing and news understanding by media users (van Dijk, 1988, p.176).

CDA is an interdisciplinary approach which includes semiotics, linguistics, rhetoric, cognitive psychology, and sociology. Van Dijk relies heavily on cognitive psychology to indicate that journalists and readers use extant situational models, knowledge structures stored in the episodic (subjective) memory fed by subjective experience, general knowledge frames, and ideologies to sum up and understand news reports. He claims that individuals fit new information into old models, thereby repeating and reiterating prevailing dominant ideologies and frames. Nevertheless, understanding a news story does not imply the adoption of identical messages or modes of apprehension by all readers. Rather, individuals do manifest a glimmer of agency in interpreting discursive structures:

The influence of the media is more indirect and more structural. News reports do not necessarily prescribe the concrete opinions of readers. Rather, they are the main form of public discourse that provide the general outline of social, political, cultural and economic models of societal events as well as the pervasively dominant knowledge and attitude structures that make such models intelligible. The structure of news reports at many levels condition the readers to develop such interpretation frameworks rather than alternative ones, in which other goals, norms, values and ideologies are used to provide counter interpretations of news events (van Dijk, 1988, p.182).

Despite a level of agency, individuals are 'always/already' subjugated in dominant discourses. According to Fairclough, (1995) for instance, texts in their ideational

functioning constitute systems of knowledge and belief and in their interpersonal functioning they constitute social subjects (identities, forms of self) and social relations between categories of subjects. Thus CDA functions to expose how news language interpellates subjects to accept the prevailing dominant ideologies.

CDA as Method

Van Dijk (1988) provides a series of criteria for making the relationship between news, ideology, and power more explicit. Based on an 'ideological square' of 'us' and 'them' in which in-groups are represented in positive terms and out-groups in negative terms, van Dijk shows how groups are included, fore-grounded, occluded and excluded to create a particular ideological construction of news events that privileges particular perspectives. Specifically he states that the strategy of most ideological discourse is to emphasize positive things about 'us', emphasize negative things about 'them', de-emphasize negative things about 'us' and de-emphasize positive things about 'them'. "The use of the opposing pairs 'emphasize' and 'de-emphasize' allows for many forms of structural variation: we may talk at length or briefly about our good or bad things, prominently or not, explicitly, or implicitly, with hyperbolas or euphemisms, with big or small headlines and so on" (van Dijk, 2002 p.28). Moreover, meaning in news discourse is not only determined by what is there, but also by what is absent, not selected, and discursively repressed. Analysis of implicit content can provide valuable insights into what is taken as given, or as common sense. It also gives a way into ideological analysis of texts, for ideologies are generally implicit assumptions. Hartley further supports this view stating that:

Meaning in news-discourse is not only determined by what is there, but also by what is absent, not selected, discursively repressed. In addition, the 'absent' elements, whenever they can force an entry into the news, will be 'interrogated' through the perspective of the 'us'/'present' elements. The world will be meaningful to the extent that it impinges on (threatens) the 'home' culture (Hartley, 1982, p.117-8).

Van Dijk's method focuses on both the macro-level of analysis, a global level that looks at whole parts of a discourse or entire discourses, as well as the micro-levels of analysis, including local levels of sounds, words, sentence patterns and their meanings.²¹ At both the macro and micro levels, van Dijk analyses semantics (meaning of words and texts), syntax (the form of sentences and the overall form of discourse; what he calls schemata or superstructure), and pragmatics (the social act we accomplish by using a particular speech act in a particular situation) to look at how an ideological meaning is constructed. He also looks at how stylistic and rhetorical elements at both the macro and micro levels function to promote a particular ideological meaning.

Macrostructures of News Discourse

Topics and Themes

Van Dijk outlines that topics or themes, the gist of what a story is about, constitute semantic macrostructures that control the further interpretation of the rest of the text. "Topics are crucial in the overall understanding of a text, e.g. in the establishment of global coherence; and they act as a semantic, top-down control on local understanding at the micro-level" (van Dijk, 1988, p.35). Thus headlines and leads act as macro-organizers of stories, which define the overall situation and indicate to the reader a

²¹ He thus moves beyond Linguistic and grammatical approaches, as illustrated by Flower, Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979) which tend to focus solely on the micro-levels such as sentence syntax, to news discourse analysis

preferred overall meaning of the text. The ideological function of topics follow directly from the general principles: if we want to emphasize our good things or their bad things, the first thing we need to do is topicalize such information. Conversely, if we want to de-emphasize our bad things and their good things, then we will tend to de-topicalize such information.

News Schemata

Overall syntax (news schemata or superstructures) defines the possible forms in which topics or themes can be inserted and ordered in the actual text. In terms of news discourse, each news item in the press has a headline, lead, main events, context (of the main event), background (history), consequences, verbal reactions and comment. These schemas have an order with the headline preceding the lead and the lead preceding the main event while the context, background, verbal reaction and comments are optional. These formal characteristics influence how the news story is told. Structurally, and as indicated in the previous section, news discourse is organized so that the most important or relevant information is put in the most prominent position.

Microstructures of News Discourse

Local Coherence

Van Dijk further outlines how to analyze local or microstructures of news at the level of words and sentences. He looks at how propositions (the smallest bits of information) and proposition sequences give meaning to the text. Local coherence addresses how propositions are strung together to reinforce a particular meaning. Here the analyst examines how clauses are combined together into the complexes of clauses

that are generally referred to as sentences, at the relations of cohesion that are set up between such complexes of clauses, and at the particular forms of argumentation being used.

Another semantic maneuver to analyze the ideologies present within a discourse is to examine the level of description and degree of detail within a text. A text will usually be more specific and more detailed about 'our' good attributes and actions and the bad attributes and actions of 'others', while remaining vague and general about 'our' failures. The use of examples and illustrations act as another semantic feature to emphasize 'our' positive qualities and 'their' negative ones, thereby acting as an ideological instrument of legitimation.

Implications and Presuppositions

Van Dijk also looks at how implications and presuppositions within a text work ideologically. The option to express information or leave it implicit is not ideologically neutral. Journalists tend to leave implicit information that is inconsistent with the positive self-image of the actors or institutions they are trying to represent, while information that expresses the bad qualities about enemies tend to be explicitly expressed in text and talk. Furthermore, presuppositions imply that the journalist and readers are operating from and reaffirming commonplace frames and scripts.

When we consider the amount of knowledge and beliefs necessary to interpret sentences and sequences of sentences, actual discourses are much like the proverbial icebergs: Only the top information is visible as expressed information in the discourse itself. Most other information is personally or socially shared and cognitively represented by the language users and, therefore, may remain implicit and presupposed by the speaker (van Dijk, 1988, p.62-3).

It is also crucial to look at what is left out entirely in terms of what narratives, contexts and backgrounds are excluded (Fairclough, 1995)

Lexical Choice

The decision to use one word over another implies an ideological selection. The classic example of whether the newspaper selects the term *terrorist* or *freedom fighter* to denote the same person is indicative of a particular ideological perspective. The use of synonymy and paraphrasing allow different synonyms to construct different ideological meanings. Moreover, the use of indirect speech (paraphrasing) may transform and translate the direct quote into a discourse which fits more easily into the reporter's voice/intention/ideologies.

Word Order and Syntactic Structures

Syntactic structures may also express underlying ideological positions. For instance by using passive constructions and deleting agents from typical subject positions, the negative actions of elite and powerful groups are de-emphasized.

Representation of Actors

Another aspect of CDA is the examining of how the actors within a story are represented. Discourses that are controlled by racist attitudes and ideologies will tend to construct minorities as out-groups. 'Others' can be homogenized and described using generic terms such as 'Arabs'. In other words, actor descriptions that are ideologically based semantically reflect the social distance implied by racist ideologies.

Style

Choices of stylistic features further indicate an ideological hierarchy by the newspaper. Although, news style is controlled by particular constraints such as its

confinement to a print medium, its public and mass mediated nature, institutional impersonality, formality and topic selection, and production demand, there is still room for subtle style variations. Newspapers adopt particular styles to include and exclude particular groups. “We focus on stylistic variations as systematic markers of the speech of social and cultural groups as signals that a discourse is seen as characteristic or normatively appropriate for speakers that are members of such groups” (van Dijk, 1988, p.73). Consequently, the style or mode of representation used in the newspaper legitimates or de-legitimates certain sources.

Rhetoric

Rhetoric is another dimension of discourse and on one hand connotes the use of figures of speech such as irony, metaphor, and alliteration as forms to persuade the audience. These strategies can be used by the journalist to convince the audience to submit to the dominant ideologies. Yet, on the other hand, news rhetoric is not limited to the usual figures of speech. Rather, strategic devices that enhance truthfulness, plausibility, precision, or credibility are used as a way to promote a particular ideological perspective. News discourse has a number of standard strategies to promote the persuasive process for assertions, thereby promulgating prevailing dominant ideologies. First, news media emphasize the factual nature of an event through direct descriptions, using evidence from close eyewitnesses and other reliable sources (authorities, professionals, experts), as well as signals that indicate precision and exactness such as numbers and using direct quotes from sources when opinions are involved. Second, news media build a strong relational structure for facts by mentioning previous events as conditions or causes, and describing or predicting next events as possible or real

consequences, inserting facts into well known situational models that make them relatively familiar even when they are new, using well-known scripts and concepts that belong to that script, and trying to further organize facts into well known specific structures. Third, news media provide information that also has attitudinal and emotional dimensions. Through these techniques news media reassert ideological representations as fact, framing out counter ideologies and frames.

Sources and Quotations

As already mentioned, the selection of particular (often elite) sources and 'accessed voiced' are a discursive tool to promote a particular ideological construction. Furthermore, quotations and quasi quotations work a discursive tool for the journalist to inflect an ideological position within the newspaper without giving their own opinion.

Numbers Game

The rhetoric of news discourse forcefully suggests truthfulness by the implied exactness of precise numbers. This is one of the reasons why news discourse abounds with numerical indications of many kinds: numbers of participants, their age, date, time of events, location descriptions, polls, percentages, body counts, victim tolls, numerical descriptions of instruments and props (weight, size) etc. Numbers are predominantly meant as a signal for precision and hence truthfulness. They work as a discursive strategy to imply veracity or concreteness of information when, in fact, numbers are employed to privilege a particular group (van Dijk, 1988).

My Methodology: The *Jerusalem Post*


By analyzing the discursive strategies outlined above, I performed an informal discourse analysis on the two week period of coverage of the disengagement of settlements beginning August 14, 2005 until August 27, 2005 inclusive. This two week period was chosen because it was during this time that the actual disengagement of settlers from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was in effect, and reflects the period with the highest frequency of articles. Using Concordia University's Factiva Database, a newspaper search engine that includes coverage of the national edition²² of the *Jerusalem Post*²³, I performed a sophisticated key word search with a combination of terms including Israel, Palestinian, Gaza, Occupied Territories, settlement, withdrawal, pullout, and disengagement in order to amass articles on the event.²⁴

The table below illustrates the quantity of coverage pertaining to the issue.

²² "99%+ of The Jerusalem Post content is from the domestic Israeli edition, with the very occasional story from the international edition" (Factiva database).

²³ The other Israeli English national daily, *Ha'aretz* is not included within this database.

²⁴ The actual search used the following terms: (Israel* or Palestin*) and (gaza* or occup* or territor* or settl* or homeland) and (withdr?w* or disengag* or pullout* or pull-out* or pull out or resettl*) which grouped sets words and synonyms together in order to find the most amount of articles possible. The * is a symbol of truncation and finds other forms of the word such as Israel, Israeli, Israelis, or settler, settlers, settlement or settlements etc. The ? is a wildcard and supplants different letters such as withdraw or withdrew.



Coverage of the disengagement plan June to Oct, 2005

I chose primarily to analyze news articles (including features) and editorials.

News articles were chosen for analysis because they indicate how news standards, values, and news reporting practices naturalize ideologies and make them appear objective.

Editorials were also selected because they provide concrete information on the newspaper's standpoint and thus make explicit the ideological position of the newspaper.

Once I had amassed the material, I systematically logged articles within newspapers, including the date, the section (to show its positioning within the larger paper), the type of article (news, feature, and editorial.), author, source (staff, news agency etc), synopsis of article, and representation.

Within the representation section, I focused on how the article was ideologically constructed according to a binary of 'us' and 'them'. By using the elements of CDA described above, I examined how the articles emphasized positive elements about us/Israel and highlighted negative elements about them/Palestinians. More specifically, at

the macro level, I focused on how the headline and lead act as a macro-organizer of the story to favour a particular perspective, how the main actors are represented within the story, as well as what is emphasized, made explicit, left implicit, marginalized and left out. These particular macro-elements of CDA were chosen because readers often only read the headline and the lead of newspaper articles and consequently, their analysis points to an overall understanding of how newspapers construct a dominant ideological representation and how news readers receive these texts. Similarly, the analysis of actors indicates how the primary Israeli and Palestinian actors are constructed within the newspaper, directly answering my research question. Furthermore, by scrutinizing what is emphasized and left out of the coverage provides insight into how the *Jerusalem Post* frames the coverage, thereby indicating what dominant ideologies and frames are enacted. At the micro level, I analyzed how the use of quotations and sources work to construct a hegemonic framing of the conflict, as well as lexical and structural choices deployed by the paper. These particular micro-elements of CDA have been chosen because they provide a detailed account of how the newspaper supports dominant frames and ideologies at the micro-level of news production. I also address rhetorical elements, specifically, the use of metaphors, as well as how a 'numbers game' was applied through as a strategic ploy to enhance veracity whilst promoting a dominant Israeli frame. My decision to analyze rhetorical elements is founded upon an imperative of bringing the rhetorical elements of news media to the forefront to show how newspapers persuade readers to submit to dominant ideologies while adhering to the rubric of the professional news standard of objectivity. These rhetorical elements therefore bring the use of professional standards as a way of achieving objectivity into question and show how

they, in fact, promote dominant ideologies. Thus, they highlight how dominant ideologies are couched within the news media and are instrumental in answering my thesis questions. The following chapter fleshes out the results of my analysis, particularly in terms of how the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement plan over this two week period reconstitutes an Orientalist discourse and a dominant, hegemonic construction of the event.

CHAPTER 3

Critical Discourse Analysis of the Disengagement Plan in the

Jerusalem Post

Introduction

Sharon also addressed the soldiers and policemen who were to carry out the evacuation orders, reminding them that, 'it's not an enemy you face, rather your brothers and sisters. Sensitivity and patience are the order of the hour. I am certain that this is how you will behave. I want you to know the entire nation stands behind you and is proud of you.' Acknowledging that his plan has 'caused severe wounds, bitter hatred between brothers and severe statements and actions,' Sharon said he understood 'the feelings, the pain and the cries of those who object. However, we are one nation even when fighting and arguing' (Keinon, August, 16, 2005).

What cannot be disputed, however, is one parallel that may be even truer today than it was in the times of Babylon and Rome: that the main hope our enemies have of defeating us is that our unity and sense of purpose—rather than our physical might—will fail us. Both sides [Israelis pro disengagement and Israelis anti disengagement] deeply believe that their path is the best, perhaps only way to secure the future of the Jewish state. Crucially, both sides must internalize that fact that those fellow Israelis with whom they so strongly disagree nonetheless seek the same goals as they do: the well being of Israel (Staff, August, 14, 2005).

The aim of this chapter is to trace how Israel's largest English national newspaper, the *Jerusalem Post*, covered the disengagement of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank between August 14, 2005 and August 25, 2005. As stated within my research questions in chapter one, my goal is to analyze what representations, ideologies and dominant narratives are reaffirmed and retold within the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of this contemporary embodiment of the conflict, as well as how these representations are repeated and recast. By beginning this chapter with these two epigraphs from the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the settlers' disengagement, my intention is to highlight how the newspaper acts as an arena for the constitution and reaffirmation of Israeli nationalism and a collective national identity. Both epigraphs call

on the Israeli nation to adopt a unified collective identity in the face of their enemies: the Palestinians. The first quotation in particular indicates that the *Jerusalem Post* constitutes the Israeli nation as a democracy in which all Israeli citizens are represented as participating in deliberative debates to influence policies and procedures on disengagement. The second excerpt reveals that the newspaper presents itself as a public sphere, a forum in which national public debate occurs. The newspaper implies that it is a central institution and a fourth estate in that it gives equal representation to both sides of the debate. Nevertheless, its adherence to professional news standards and ritualistic display of antagonism works to certify the conflict almost entirely according to the players within the Israeli nation. Within this chapter, I argue that the constitution and reaffirmation of the Israeli nation as a democracy, which necessarily constructs 'our' nation in contrast to 'theirs' (Anderson, 1983; Mouffe, 2000) re-invokes an Orientalist discourse in which Palestinians are figured outside the demos. Furthermore, I argue that the posturing of the newspaper as a public sphere and a fourth estate discursively veils the marginalization of Palestinians within the coverage. Simultaneously, these tactics help to camouflage both the *Jerusalem Post's* championing of Zionist and state ideologies and their effort to influence Israelis (particular settlers and protestors) and Palestinians alike to submit to state policies and procedures on disengagement through a language of inferiorization.

Through the application of a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (as outlined in chapter two), within the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement of the settlements, I address how the *Jerusalem Post* constructs an Orientalist 'us' and 'them' dichotomy by prioritizing and de-emphasizing particular ideologies, narratives, frames

and discourses. First, I lay out the evolution of the disengagement narrative in the *Jerusalem Post* over this two week period. Second, I map out how elements of the dominant historical narrative (summarized in chapter one) were re-invoked as a foundational narrative to construct a Zionist frame. Third, I analyze how the primary Israeli players, including the Israeli government, the army and police, the settlers, and the protestors against disengagement were represented to construct an image of the Israeli nation as a democracy with a variety of viewpoints on disengagement. Fourth, I examine how the Palestinian players including the Palestinian Authority (PA), Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian ‘civilians’ were represented, particularly in terms of how they were stereotyped and constructed as ‘others’ in order to de-legitimize their perspective. Fifth, I investigate how particular discursive strategies, such as the use of official sources and quotations (Tuchman, 1978), a ‘law and order’ discourse (Hall, 1973; Hartley, 1982), a ‘numbers game’ (van Dijk, 1988) and categorical distinctions between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ news (Bird and Dardenne, 1988) were deployed to privilege a hegemonic state framework and to restrain oppositional perspectives. Lastly, I address what was marginalized and completely left out of the coverage as well as how these omissions contributed to a pro-Zionist framing of the event. As such, I argue that the constitution of the Israeli nation as a democracy and the *Jerusalem Post* as a ‘fourth estate’ which rests on its adherence to professional news standards, gives the impression of tolerance for opposing perspectives while actually silencing or muting these voices through a framework of inclusion and exclusion in order to reinforce a hegemonic construction of disengagement.

The Narrative of Disengagement in the *Jerusalem Post*

The *Jerusalem Post*'s coverage throughout the two week period primarily focused on the actual process of the settlers' withdrawal from the 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and the four settlements in the West Bank. The newspaper tended to focus on the debates amongst Israeli Jews while Palestinian concerns, including how the Arab citizens of Israel, the Gazan Palestinians and the West Bank Palestinians were affected by the outcome of disengagement and issues of self-governance, were largely ignored. The lack of Palestinian representation within the coverage is evident from the actual number of articles that included Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, sources and 'accessed voices.' Out of a total of 157 articles on the disengagement plan spanning the two week period, only 17 articles concentrated on Palestinians while 96 focused on Israelis. The other 44 articles had both Israeli as well as Palestinian representations within them.

These incongruent numbers indicate that the parameters of the event were limited to the Israeli nation and did not reflect the larger debate between Israelis and Palestinians. According to the 2005 Israeli census, Israel's population of 6,990,700 is broken down into the following ethnic groups: 5,313,800 Jews, 1,377,100 Arabs and close to 300,000 unaffiliated. Although at first glance these incongruent numbers of representation support an argument of proportionality in which the *Jerusalem Post* reports more stories on the largest population (Israeli Jews), I argue that the lack of articles on Palestinian perspectives demonstrates inequality insofar as the disengagement directly affects the lives of Palestinians. Ideally, both perspectives and voices should be included within the

coverage. By privileging only one explanation of the event, then the newspaper is failing its own mandate as a public sphere- even that of informing Israeli citizens.

The coverage of the disengagement plan is encased within a master Zionist narrative in which the Occupied Territories are seen as inherently belonging to Israel. Through the use of rhetorical devices as outlined by van Dijk (1988), particularly the repetition of a 'land' metaphor in which imagery of plants and gardens are invoked when describing the settlements, the *Post* supports the notion that the land naturally belongs to Israel. For example, in the article headlined "Settler council goes to Gaza to rein in activist" (August, 16, 2005), reporter Matthew Gutman states: "Dozens of community members planted fruit trees across the settlements. 'This shows that we plan not to go anywhere, that our children will one day eat these fruits,' said settlement spokesman Asher Mivtzari." Similarly another headline reads: "Hendel leads tearful exodus from Ganei Tal; Residents work to keep settlement 'green until the end,' then leave without violence." (August 18, 2005) The lead continues to use the garden metaphor in order to imply that the land belongs to the settlers and that the settlements are their rightful homes. "The sprinklers in this emerald green settlement sprayed lawns even as the convoy of buses evicting Ganei Tal residents rolled back into Israel." This rhetorical device bolsters a narrative in which settlers are seen as victims, while overlooking the fact that the settlers are illegally occupying Palestinian land.

The connection between the relinquishment of settlements from the Occupied Territories to a master Zionist narrative in which Israel claims ownership of Greater Israel seems contradictory. Nevertheless, I argue that the master-Zionist historical narrative actually condones state framing in that it reconstitutes the nation-state, justifies

occupation of the territories and eclipses Sharon's plan to annex more land in the West Bank. Despite this particular contemporary event that involves the relinquishment of land, the *Post* supports Israel's right to ownership. The newspaper secures a future narrative in which Israel has a natural right to return to the Occupied Territories. For instance, the article "'Noble' departure from Netzarim marks end of Gaza settlement era" (Schalit, August 23, 2005) states: "'I'm absolutely sure that I will be able to return, [that] my grandchildren and great grandchildren will make this place blossom again. I'm not destroyed or without hope,' said Ziv."

Couched within this prevailing master narrative, the *Jerusalem Post* focuses on the actual process of disengagement. The evolution of the narrative within the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage began with representations of the Israeli government, soldiers and police offering aid and compassion to the settlers who were voluntarily leaving their homes. In an article in the *Jerusalem Post* entitled: "From midnight Gaza off-limits to Israelis. Unilateral disengagement about to begin," (August 14, 2005) journalists, Dudkevitch, and Katz write:

On Monday, in a two-day operation dubbed 'Operation Helping Hand to Our Brothers,' teams of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Israel Police officers will go to settlers homes to try to persuade families to leave before the cut-off date on Wednesday.

The newspaper reported soldiers and settlers rationally discussing and debating the disengagement. Three days later, beginning on August 17, 2005, the narrative shifts in its depiction of soldiers "forcibly evacuating the settlements" (Lazaroff, and Krieger August, 16, 2005). One headline states: "Forced eviction of Gaza settlers begins; Karadi to 'Post': We'll use full force. Morag, Atzmona, Neveh Dekalim First." (Katz and O'Sullivan August, 17, 2005). Despite this hard-line, militaristic approach, soldiers are still

represented as kind and compassionate towards settlers and the narrative of the disengagement process was described as 'smooth and swift' with 'little incidents of violence.'

The narrative proceeds to describe the influx of 'activists,' 'protestors,' 'infiltrators' and 'extremists' (terms that are carefully selected within the newspaper, to be discussed further below) into the region protesting the disengagement plan. The coverage focuses on their use of non-violent protests and demonstrations against disengagement. Nevertheless, within its coverage, the *Jerusalem Post* includes instances of protestors instigating acts of violence against soldiers and police, casting them in a more negative light.

Once the actual disengagement of settlers was complete, the narrative shifts toward representations of other disengagement procedures that affected the Israeli nation, including the demolition of settlers' homes and of synagogues, and the exhumation and movement of graves from the settlements to locations within the Green Line. The *Jerusalem Post* also reported that the allocation of Israeli settlements to Palestinians would not be officially completed until mid-September 2005, after the dismantling and removal of all military installments in the Gaza Strip. Until then, Israel would maintain military control of the region.

In order to project an air of objectivity, balance and fairness, the *Jerusalem Post* interspersed this dominant narrative with coverage of the disengagement's effect on Palestinians. Generally, Palestinians are described as celebrating the disengagement process as a symbol of the land being returned to their jurisdiction. The PA, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are reported as arguing over which group was responsible for having put

pressure on the Israeli government to disengage from the settlements. Specifically, the newspaper reports that PA Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas believes their negotiations with Israel and the United States facilitated disengagement, while Hamas and Islamic Jihad believe that continued attacks and suicide bombings coerced Ariel Sharon into withdrawing. The *Jerusalem Post* further reports on Israeli government policies affecting Palestinians, such as the transfer of Israeli farming equipment and hothouses in the West bank, border crossings, convoy links between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the future control over the airport and seaport within the Gaza Strip.²⁵ The newspaper also covers the agreement reached by Israel and Egypt which stipulated that Israel would relinquish military control over the Philadelphi Corridor (the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip) and that Egypt would deploy 750 Egyptian soldiers along the border to prevent the smuggling of weapons into the Palestinian territory (Keinon, August 16, 2005).

The narrative of disengagement during the two week period also reports on the United States government's reaction to disengagement. The newspaper includes U.S. President, George Bush's support for Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement plan, calling it 'a move towards peace in the region.' Bush places the onus on Palestinians to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure but calls on Israel to continue the disengagement of settlements from the West Bank and East Jerusalem as stipulated under the Road Map for peace. In spite of U.S. pressure, the newspaper upholds the state of Israel's stance to make no further land concessions. For example, in the article headlined:

²⁵ Presently, Israel still maintains control over the airport, seaport and electricity in the region, giving rise to questions as to whether Israel intends to continue occupation of the Gaza Strip.

“Sharon vows he will continue construction in the West Bank settlements. There will be no second disengagement” (August 22, 2005) journalist, Herb Keinon writes:

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon signaled a right turn Sunday, vowing to build inside the West Bank settlement blocs, even as bulldozers began mowing down Gaza’s settlements... ‘Each government since 1967- right, left and national unity- has seen strategic importance in specific areas beyond the Green Line. I will build.’ Sharon said. Sharon mentioned specifically that ‘Ma’ale Adumim will continue to grow and be connected to Jerusalem,’ and that Ariel and its satellites would be a part of Israel forever. ‘Because of the settlements we can pray at the Cave of the Patriarchs’ in Hebron, he said. If not for the settlement movement, he asked, ‘would it have been possible to renew the settlement in Gush Etzion; incorporate Rachel’s Tomb inside Jerusalem’s fence; or have Ma’ale Adumim and its satellites, Beit El, Shilo, the Ariel Bloc, or the security zone overlooking the coastal plain?’

In the following section, I lay out how the newspaper employed particular elements from the dominant historical narrative to support the implementation of the disengagement plan as well as justify Israel’s continued Occupation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Historical Narrative

There are times when everyone knows a turning point in history is playing out live, before our eyes. (Staff, August 18, 2005)

This quote is characteristic of The *Jerusalem Post* coverage that situates the latest incarnation of the Israeli Palestinian conflict within a larger historical context. The *Jerusalem Post* alludes to the dominant Zionist master-narrative (outlined in chapter one) in order to simultaneously reassert Israeli claims to the land and interpellate Israeli citizens to submit to state policies on disengagement. On the one hand, the newspaper portrays the settler movement as an integral part of Israeli national history and the collective national identity: For example, in the article “PM: Reality interrupted settlement dream” (August 16, 2005), reporter Herb Keinon writes:

Sharon praised the settlers for their years of sacrifice, telling them that, “today marks the end of a glorious chapter in the story of Israel, and a central chapter in the story of your lives as pioneers, as those who realized a dream and as those who bore the security and settlement burden for all of us. Your pain and your tears are an inseparable part of the history of this country. Whatever disagreements we have, we will not abandon you, and following the evacuation, we will do everything in our power to rebuild your lives and communities.

On the other hand, through the reproduction of official state ‘accessed voices’ (van Dijk, 1988), the newspaper calls on individuals to now accept the pullout of settlements from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In the same article Sharon is quoted as saying:

‘It is no secret that I, like many others, believed and hoped that we could forever hold on to Netzarim and Kfar Darom,’ Sharon said in a pre-taped, five minute radio and television address. ‘However, the changing reality in this country, in this region, and in the world, required another reassessment and changing of positions.’

These quotes reaffirm a historical narrative that simultaneously justifies the original occupation of the land and the current withdrawal from the settlements.

1967 Borders

While the *Jerusalem Post* recasts a historical narrative in which Israel has a right to a national homeland, the newspaper also espouses that Israel is the rightful owner of the Occupied Territories. Specifically, it upholds the viewpoint that the Israelis captured the Occupied Territories in the 1967 Six Day War and thus have the most recent claims to the land. In so doing, the *Jerusalem Post* neglects to mention that through the occupation of the territory Israel displaced Palestinians from their land. For instance, the article “Infiltrators vow to block pullout by sabotaging Kissufim” (Gutman, August 15, 2005) states: “The ceremony effectively makes the presence of Israelis in the Gush Katif settlements illegal for the first time since the 360 sq. km ribbon of land was taken in the Six Day War.” The lexical selection of the term ‘presence’ de-emphasizes the history of

occupation and establishes the Occupied Territories as the settlers' home. The article "Morag settlers reluctantly say good-bye" (Katz and O'Sullivan August 18, 2005) represents the disengagement as a process in which families are forced to evacuate their 'homes': "Pasted to the door was an orange sign reading, "Here lived the Gross family happily for 23 years." The reference to length of time constructs a frame in which the Gaza Strip is an established home for the settlers and an integral part of Israel.

Biblical References

The *Jerusalem Post* further ties the contemporary narrative to Zionist land claims through the use of detailed religious and biblical imagery. As I summarized in chapter two, van Dijk (1988) explains that the use of 'over-complete' details emphasizes the positive attributes of 'our' nation. Thus, the repeated use of religious references and imagery, particularly in describing settlers' protests, discursively functions to assert Israel's claim to the region since biblical times. For example, in the article "Settlers' quiet fortitude is 'the way of Netzarim,'" journalist, Anshel Pfeffer writes on August 23, 2005:

The disengagement did not stop Yossi Krakower from leading the afternoon prayer a short hour before the final farewell, with the 'Prayer for the well-being of the State,' normally recited only on Shabbat. He also included in the prayer the sentence, 'and send your light to her [Israel's] leaders, ministers and advisors,' which in some synagogues has been omitted recently out of anger with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. But in Netzarim, no one was surprised at the enduring loyalty to the state and its symbols.

The marriage of religion and state works to justify Israel's ownership of the land. As well, it calls for the adoption of a collective national unity, despite differences of opinions between the government and the settlers. The *Jerusalem Post* also selects the terms

‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria’ when referring to the settlements in the West Bank.²⁶ This lexical choice adds to the construction of an ideological framework in which the land naturally belongs to the Jews since biblical times, thus re-establishing a Zionist narrative. This example supports previous scholarly literature which shows that national Israeli media tend to use these terms in order to reproduce a national and state frame (Roeh and Nir, 1993).

The inclusion of settlers ‘accessed voices’, which claim that God will save them from disengagement, is a semantic tool used to solidify the idea that Greater Israel belongs to the Jews through God’s decree. As I demonstrated in chapter two, the use of ‘accessed voices’ and quotations helps to create an ideological frame, while still allowing the journalist to appear objective (van Dijk, 1988). In the article “And still, a sense of denial. In part of Gush Katif, life as usual and the hope of redemption” (August 14, 2005) journalist Matthew Gutman writes: “Many, like gangly 16 year old Ilan-who has gone barefoot since his sandals disintegrated two weeks ago-carry their faith as a shield, saying that they’ll be saved by a last minute ‘miracle by God.’ He added, ‘It is all up to Him.’” The reference to God is a semantic strategy to promote a historical narrative in which God sides with Israel, thereby reinforcing that Israel is the rightful owner of the land.

²⁶ ‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria’ are the biblical terms used to describe the area now more commonly referred to as the West Bank. The names Judea and Samaria are also employed specifically as a collective term for the Jewish settlements in that area, especially by the settlers and their supporters. It is the official name of the area in the Israeli sources and the Hebrew media (with the exception of the left-wing Ha’aretz newspaper). Many Palestinians object to this term, which they perceive as a rejection of their rights to the land. Nevertheless, the term *al-Yahudiyya was-Samarah* is used by Arab Christians in reference to the Bible.

From Pullout to Pullout

The *Jerusalem Post* compares this contemporary disengagement to previous pullouts from Egypt in 1974 and 1982 in order to reassert that Israel has continually made land concessions in an effort to create peace in the region. The semantic strategy of invoking a parallel between the present disengagement to previous pullouts from the Suez Canal and the Sinai area under the terms of the peace treaty with Egypt helps to define the current disengagement as part of a bid for peace, while glossing over the idea that Sharon is withdrawing from the Gaza Strip in order to maintain control of the land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the comparison of this disengagement to other pullouts emphasizes that Israelis (settlers) are continually uprooted from their homes, thereby reconstituting a history of suffering, persecution and nomadism. The reconstitution of this dominant Zionist narrative re-establishes the need for a Jewish homeland in order to bring security to the Jewish people. In the article headlined “Avi Farhan despondent at having to move again” (August 16, 2005) journalist, Jason Silberman, writes:

Farhan, 58 is facing a forced evacuation for the second time. In 1982, he was among those removed from the Sinai community of Yamit under the terms of the peace deal with Egypt. At the time of the previous evacuation, Farhan thought of setting up a refugee camp near the Erez crossing until he would be allowed to return to Yamit, where he has lived for seven years. Instead, he was persuaded by a representative of then defense minister Ariel Sharon to put his energies into creating a seaside community of Elei Sinai. ‘In Yamit, I was leaving after seven years. I lived in Elei Sinai 23 years, a much longer amount of time. I have grandchildren born here. I have a daughter now 39 years old, a 33-year-old daughter, a 31-year-old daughter and a son now 23, and I have eight grandchildren. We are here for three generations. Ariel Sharon was the one who convinced me to move and begin to create Elei Sinai. They brought people here and they said, ‘We need to move you just this one time.’ And now what can they say?

This example highlights a frame in which settlers are viewed as victims, continually displaced from their homes. Further, they are represented as ever-ready to serve the state – as loyal citizens.

The re-constitution of this historical narrative reconfirms the need for defined borders and a strong collective national identity. For example, the article “Back to the future” (Rabinovich, August 19, 2005) states:

The Pullbacks over the past three decades have not made Israel weaker. On the contrary, “shrunk” Israel is stronger today than it has ever been vis-à-vis the Arabs. It remains a country impelled every few years by the urge to understand ‘who we are’ and what matters. The final pullback on Israel’s southern front promises to evoke such questions with as much vigor as those following the first pullback.

The comparison between pullouts establishes the need for unity in the face of its enemies. Consequently, the invocation and repetition of this historical narrative reconfirms a strong national military front.

The ‘Holocaust Card’

The *Jerusalem Post* further correlates the disengagement to ‘the Holocaust’, which ideologically reconstitutes a dominant Zionist historical narrative consolidating the need for an Israeli nation-state. As I have identified in chapter one, ‘the Holocaust’ has proven to be an ideological weapon insofar as it justifies Israel’s politics and military operations due to brutal anti-Semitism that culminated in the mass persecution and destruction carried out against the Jews in Europe during World War II (Finkelstein, 2000). Consequently, by reifying this dominant narrative in relation to the disengagement, the *Jerusalem Post* secures a context in which Israel has a right to the land. Specifically ‘the Holocaust’ evokes a sense of continued victimization and thus

supports the need for protection to be gained from the establishment of a strong and secure nation. Through the inclusion of settlers' and protestors' 'accessed voices', which compare Israeli soldiers to Nazis and the disengagement of settlers to the deportation of Jews to concentration camps, the newspaper validates this perspective as part of the national debate. For example, the article "Pullout finale at Sa-Nur features costumes and dancing, but no violent drama. Security forces seemed bemused by the absence of physical resistance" (Gutman, August 24, 2005) reads:

While the resistance was largely non-violent, some of the activists deployed the doomsday weapon of Jewish symbolism: Dozens of women in the Sa-Nur fortress had donned the uniforms of concentration camp inmates, complete with yellow stars.

Nevertheless, the Israeli public also critiques this comparison, claiming that it trivializes the atrocity of the Holocaust. In the article "Chabad rabbi plans 'Yad Vashem for Gush Katif.' Yad Vashem calls linkage to Holocaust 'revolting'" (Lefkovits, August 25, 2005) a spokeswoman for the Holocaust museum is quoted arguing that:

'The repeated use of the Holocaust as part of a political struggle is revolting and unacceptable. Such usage necessarily results in baseless comparisons which cheapen the memory of the Holocaust, are rooted in Holocaust denial, and cause damage to Holocaust survivors and to the basic values of our existence as a nation,' Yad Vashem spokeswoman Iris Rosenberg said in a statement.

The inclusion of multiple perspectives once again gives the illusion that Israel is a democracy where citizens have the right to disagree. Furthermore the newspaper constitutes itself as a public sphere insofar as it is operating from professional news values of objectivity, balance and fairness.

Tisha Be'av

The *Jerusalem Post* further re-invokes a dominant pro-Israeli narrative by drawing parallels between the disengagement of settlers from the Occupied Territories to Tisha Be'av, the commemoration of the destruction of the first and second temples in Jerusalem in 586 BCE and 70 CE by the Babylonians and Romans respectively. "There is indeed, no avoiding the parallels to this day from our history," one editorial claims (Staff, August 14, 2005). Nevertheless, drawing together separate, disparate events because they share the same date functions ideologically to reassert both a Zionist and state framework for disengagement. The same editorial states that the second Temple was destroyed by the Babylonians because "according to the most straightforward religious narrative, we sinned by hating each other, and God punished us... The destruction of both temples, though carried out by our enemies, was mainly our own doing." The newspaper calls on Israeli citizens to consolidate a collective national identity in order to defend themselves against their enemies. Thus, the *Jerusalem Post* uses this historical event to call upon Israelis to put their differences regarding the disengagement aside and strengthen national unity. For instance, in the article "Settlers to hold 11th -hour protest opposite Prime Minister's office," (August 15, 2005) journalist Etgar Lefkovits writes:

'The destruction of the Temples was brought about by causeless hatred among Jews, and during these trying times we should remember that the settlers were the real heroes who went out to settle the land with the approval of all the governments, and we should understand their pain,' said Jerusalem resident Esther Price.

This article therefore asks the Israeli public to be tolerant and understanding of each other's different perspectives. Despite accepting the settlers' perspective, the newspaper still calls on the Israeli public to approve disengagement. The constitution of national

unity is another subtle discursive technique used by the newspaper to convince the Israeli public to submit to government policy and accept disengagement.

By linking the disengagement to the destruction of the two temples, the *Jerusalem Post* again propagates a dominant Zionist historical narrative in which an Israeli nation-state is necessary for protection against anti-Semitism and persecution. For instance, in the article, “Pulling together on the eve of pullout,” journalist Atira Winchester writes: “Tisha Be’av is traditionally one of the darkest days of the Jewish calendar: the date saw the destruction of the two temples, the declaration of the first Crusade and the first deportation from the Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka.” By reasserting a narrative in which Israel needs land for security, protection and survival, the *Jerusalem Post* supports Israel’s colonization of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, a strong military and homeland. Furthermore, by correlating the disengagement to Tisha Be’av, the *Jerusalem Post* calls upon the Israeli public to adopt a collective national front against their true enemies, the Palestinians.

The Constitution of the Israeli Nation as a Democracy

Sharon expressed frustration at the cabinet meeting with the youth who managed to sneak into Gush Katif over the last few days and are now there illegally, as well as the leaders who encouraged them to do so. ‘Those who want to live in a state where this is the norm can ignore this situation, but I don’t intend to do so,’ he said. ‘I see it as our responsibility to ensure that life in Israel is carried on without violence, without coercion and without incitement, but in a manner acceptable in democratic countries.’ (Keinon, August, 16, 2005)

This citation is another example of the *Jerusalem Post*’s representation of itself as a public sphere for rational and fair deliberation and of the Israeli nation as a democracy. Specifically, the newspaper facilitates this construction by securing a discourse in which

the many Israeli players are non-violent, but rather willing to rationally, calmly and peacefully debate the policies and the procedures of disengagement. The representation of non-violent disagreements among different Israeli actors bolsters the illusion of Israel as a democracy insofar as disagreements among its citizenry is essential to democratic ideals (Mouffe, 2000). The *Jerusalem Post* frames the dialogue within the Israeli nation, omitting Palestinians from the debate. Despite the divisions, the Israeli national identity is constructed as unified. In the article headlined “All colors weep together in J’lem” (August, 15 2005) the journalist Atira Winchester reports that an event was organized by the New Israeli fund (NIF), a non governmental organization “dedicated to religious pluralism and civil rights in Israel,” (New Israel Fund, 2006) to promote non-violent debate and discussion amongst different Israeli actors:

On the eve of the pullout from Gaza, under the banner ‘For these things I weep,’ hundreds gathered at Jerusalem’s Liberty Bell Park Sunday as Tisha Be’av drew to a close. The event, organized by the New Israel Fund, brought media personalities, politicians, and academics from across the social and religious spectrum to talk about the disengagement and the state of the nation.

This example illustrates that the *Jerusalem Post* secures a range of discourses on disengagement in which Israelis of different social and political factions are willing to discuss the disengagement and how it affects the nation as a whole. The article continues: “According to NIF executive director Eliezer Ya’ari, the event is part of the fund’s ongoing attempt to “bring people together from all colors of the rainbow,” advocating dialogue and avoiding potential civil conflict in the run-up to disengagement.” As such, the Israeli nation is again represented as a public which exercises democracy in a civilized way insofar as they voice their disagreements in a legal demonstration without violence.

The Israeli Players

The *Jerusalem Post* primarily constructs the Israeli nation as a diverse and multi-layered democratic society through the representation of primary Israeli players, including the government, the army and police, the settlers, and the activists, protestors and infiltrators. In the following section, I argue that the constitution of the Israeli nation as a democratic public sphere works as a discursive strategy to veil the newspaper's positioning of Palestinians as outside the demos and reproduce the dominant ideologies of the state apparatus. The marginalization of Palestinians from public debate fosters a construction of Palestinians as 'Others' in that they are not seen as part of the democratic arena. By constituting the nation as democratic, the *Jerusalem Post* implies that all Israeli actors have equal symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1990), when in fact it privileges the dominant ideologies of official voices such as the government, the army and the police.

The Government

The *Jerusalem Post* represents the Israeli government as a democratic institution, operating in the interests of the Israeli public. For example in the article "Sharon to nation: 'Gaza cannot be held onto forever'. Full text of PM's disengagement day statement" (Ohayon, August 16, 2005) Sharon is quoted as saying:

Citizens of Israel, the day has arrived. We are beginning the most difficult and painful step of all- evacuating our communities from the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria. This step is very difficult for me personally. It was with a heavy heart that the Government of Israel made the decision regarding disengagement and the Knesset did not lightly approve it.

Not only does the newspaper underscore the Prime Minister's sensitivity and compassion towards the settlers but it also emphasizes the government's enactment of the democratic

process to reach the decision to disengage. This double representation works to reinforce the government as a democratic institution working in the interests of its public.

In the article headlined “PM: blame me, not IDF for pullout” (Keinon, August 18, 2005), the government and Prime Minister Sharon are represented as compassionate towards the settlers while still advocating disengagement.

During the press conference Sharon praised both the settlers and the soldiers, saying the settlers were ‘the best people we have,’ and that the sensitivity the security forces demonstrated had given the country something to be proud of. ‘I must say the behaviour of the evacuees- despite the horrible difficulty and the pictures we are seeing, pictures that are breaking my heart- are behaving in an honorable, restrained manner,’ Sharon said.

The newspaper further highlights that the state offered monetary compensation for the evacuation, thereby signaling that the government established policies that were kind to the settlers. Similarly, the newspaper reports that the government provided the settlers with temporary housing solutions and hotel rooms to make their transition smoother. For example, the article headlined “10 days of full room and board for evicted settlers” (August 18, 2005) journalist Dan Izenberg writes in the lead: “The state has rented 2,500 hotel rooms for emergency housing for settlers from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria who have nowhere to go after being evacuated, a senior official in the Disengagement Authority said Wednesday.” Another article “Time’s up for Neveh Dekalim’s small shops” (Mizroch, August 14, 2005) shows that a governmental office, the Disengagement Authority set up a department to deal with “the issue of settler employment and business establishment.” The newspaper reproduced a letter sent by the department to the settlers:

We are a center to serve your special needs, including advice, consultation and business placement for salaried workers and the self-employed,” to help settlers plan and choose anew their professional future in the most effective way and in the shortest possible time. We will carry through together with you a process of workforce integration that will be

appropriate to your experience and talents...The whole purpose of the center is to walk hand-in-hand with the settlers to treat them like VIPs. They mustn't give up.

These examples demonstrate that the government is constructed as a democratic institution that acts in the interests of its public. Particularly, the newspaper constructs the Israeli government as a liberal democracy: a form of government in which the elected representatives exercise decision-making power that emphasizes the protection of the rights and freedom of individuals and which places constraints on the leaders to act in the will of the majority (Mouffe, 2000).

The *Jerusalem Post* further constitutes the Israeli government as peaceful which further consolidates its representation as a democracy. According to the democratic peace theory, which stems out of political science and international relations, there is a direct correlation between democracy and peace in that liberal democracies never or almost never go to war with one another. Democratic peace theory is built on Kant's theory (1795) that a majority of people would never vote to go to war, unless in self-defense. The newspaper constructs the Israeli government as peaceful through the news value of 'referencing an elite nations and elite persons' (Allan, 1999). Specifically the *Jerusalem Post* reports that British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and U.S. President George Bush, support Sharon's disengagement plan, seeing it as a move to bring peace to the region. In the article "PM hears world praise, Ze'evi fears terror rise" (August 17, 2005) reporter, Herb Keinon writes:

British Prime Minister Tony Blair sent a letter to Sharon saying: 'I believe you are right to see disengagement as an historic opportunity to pursue a better future for Israelis and Palestinians. I look forward to working with you to help achieve this, and to continue working together towards a just and lasting peace, free from the scourge of terrorism.' Blair wrote that he greatly admired Sharon's 'courage' for developing and implementing this policy, and reiterated his government's 'full support'...In Crawford,

Texas, where US President George W. Bush is spending the month, a White House spokeswoman said Bush 'supports Prime Minister Sharon in this bold initiative and believes this will strengthen Israel.'

Through the inclusion of these elite 'accessed voices,' the *Jerusalem Post* once again fixes the Israeli Prime Minister and the Israeli government as peaceful and democratic, serving the interests of Israelis and Palestinians alike. Furthermore, by including the positive reactions from Western democratic countries, the *Jerusalem Post* is creating a similitude between Israel and a larger Western democratic discourse in which Israel is seen as a peaceful and democratic nation, bringing democracy and peace to the Palestinians. For instance, U.S. President Bush operates from a democratic peace theory stance arguing that the best strategy to ensure U.S. security and build durable peace is to support the advancement of democracy elsewhere.

And the reason why I am so strong on democracy is because democracies do not go to war with each other...I have great faith in democracies to promote peace. That is why I am a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East is to promote democracy (Bush, November 2004).

By constructing Israel as a peaceful democracy, the newspaper secures a discourse in which Israel is part of a larger Western, democratic 'us,' thereby downplaying its own political motivations for disengagement.

The Army and Police

The representation of Israel's army and police within the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement plan helps to further strengthen the image of the Israeli nation as a democracy. Particularly, the soldiers are portrayed as willing to engage in rational dialogue with the settlers as they implement the disengagement plan, and using non-violent and helpful means to evacuate settlers:

Soldiers are not arguing with settlers, nor are they harming them. They are listening with respect to the evacuees' painful pleas and expressing solidarity with them. When they carry off settlers who refuse to obey the lawful order to leave, they not only do so as gently as possible but they even stop to replace the settlers' kippot on their heads when they fall (Staff, August 18, 2005)

Here we see the reification of the democratic process in which different positions are willing to openly and rationally deliberate about the state policies surrounding disengagement. According to Gastil and Levine (2005), advocates of deliberative democracy presume that it is worthwhile for diverse groups of citizens- not just experts and professional politicians to discuss public issues. In another article "From midnight, Gaza off-limits to Israelis. Unilateral disengagement about to begin," (August 14, 2005) the reporters Margot Dudkevitch and Yaakov Katz state:

General Halutz called in soldiers to recognize and understand the pain felt by the evacuees. 'You are permitted to identify with their pain and shed a tear...Remember you are not confronting the enemy, but our brothers,' he said.

The *Jerusalem Post* therefore insinuates that Israel is one collective democratic nation which calls for solidarity with the settlers, despite differences of opinion.

The *Jerusalem Post* depicts the soldiers and the police as helpful, kind, compassionate and understanding towards the settlers, thereby solidifying an image of the army as one which behaves democratically. In his exemplary study on democracy, Tocqueville (1835) draws out the parallels between democracy and compassion. He argues that democracies foster equality and with the lessening of social distinctions comes a fellowship amongst individuals as well as an ability to sympathize and be compassionate towards one another.

In democratic ages men rarely sacrifice themselves for one another, but they display general compassion for the members of the human race. They

inflict no useless ills and they are happy to relieve the grief of others when they can do so without much hurting of themselves; they are not disinterested but they are humane (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 239).

The personification and humanization of the soldiers is another strategy that works to present the army as compassionate and democratic. The highly detailed descriptions of soldiers' personal characteristics make them seem civilized and humane, and helps to make readers relate to them on a personal level. The *Jerusalem Post* overlooks the army's responsibility in murdering Palestinians and emphasizes instead that they are upholding democracy. For example, in the article headlined 139 "Cmd. Uri Bar-Lev: This evacuation was 'my hardest operation,'" (August 22, 2005) journalist Yaakov Katz writes:

Bar-Lev is no stranger to settlers' sentiments. He lived with his family in the West Bank settlement of Ofra for close to six years. As chief of police in the south and head of the Gaza pullout - together with OC Southern Command Maj.-Gen. Dan Harel - Bar-Lev also knows what it's like to make sacrifices for the country. He lost a leg in 1980 after a bomb exploded near him and three other troops in the Golan. 'I gave my entire self to this mission,' he said. 'I have been working on this mission for a long time and it has been the hardest and most complicated operation I ever directed. I have commanded over hundreds, if not thousands, of missions in Israel and abroad but they were all one- dimensional - fighting terrorists when it was clear what needed to be done. Here it was more complicated, since there was no clear enemy.'

This example personalizes Bar-Lev by including the detail that he lost his leg after a bomb exploded, which works to subtly de-emphasize his role in military operations against Palestinians. Furthermore, it emphasizes how disengagement is a more difficult operation than 'fighting terrorists', indicating that the newspaper reaffirms a binary opposition of 'us' against 'them.'

The army is fashioned as an integral institution within Israeli society, upholding democratic ideals insofar as it is essential for the preservation and security of the Israeli

nation. The article “Family says good-bye to Neveh Dekalim, carried off in the arms of police,” (Katz, August 18, 2005) states: “‘We are faithful soldiers in the army. We have come to do this in the name of the State of Israel the best way possible,’ IDF soldier Hacoen told the Bendayan family when he arrived.” The lexical choice of ‘security forces’ instead of ‘army’ further constructs a narrative in which soldiers are necessary for securing the state of Israel and thus essential to the preservation of democracy and peace in the region.

Much of the coverage of the army works to represent it as a microcosm of an Israeli democratic society:

Referring to the opinions and emotions of the soldiers themselves, Halutz said, “It is no secret that in the past month a deep public disagreement has arisen. This disagreement has entered the IDF. It threatened and still threatens to create fractures in our hierarchy. The army is the face of the nation. We will have to fix some fractures that opened. Not to whitewash them, but to fix them” (O’Sullivan, Katz and Dudkevitch, August 15, 2005).

The use of the term ‘fractures’ implies that not everybody agrees with Sharon’s plan. However, this very representation of dissent strategically works in favour of a discourse emphasizing the democratic nature of the Israeli state in that its citizens are able to feel and express dissent. Consequently, the army is seen as a democratic institution within a democratic society.

The Settlers

As previously stated and continuing the theme above, the representation within the *Jerusalem Post* of the settlers as willing to rationally deliberate about the disengagement reinforces the Israeli nation as a deliberative democracy and a public

sphere in which all citizens participate in the debate. As outlined in chapter two, a Habermasian public sphere connotes rational debates and discussions among equals on public matters in order to hold politicians and governments accountable for their decision making policies. Specifically, the settlers are portrayed as non-violent, using democratic demonstrations and passive resistance to oppose the disengagement plan. For instance, in an article titled “Last three families choose their own ways to leave. Gaza is empty of settlers, but Caracal's work goes on,” (August 23, 2005) journalist Sheera Claire Frenkel writes:

Each family chose to leave the community in a different mode, echoing the three types of resistance the army has encountered over the past two weeks. The Nachum family invited the soldiers into their home, offering cold drinks and smiling as the female soldiers took turns holding their seven-month-old baby girl. They explained that they harbored no ill will towards the soldiers and simply wanted help packing their belongings and leave in peace. The Yifat family said that they did not want to engage in conversation with the soldiers and would not allow their children to play with them...The Mizrahi family said that they would pack several belongings, but insisted that soldiers physically remove them from their home.

None of these examples show violence among the settlers, but rather show different degrees of peaceful protest. Despite opposing state policies, the majority of the settlers still submit to the government's orders. This example also ignores the reality of a minority of soldiers who protested more forcefully.

The *Jerusalem Post* further reaffirms Israel as a democratic nation by positioning the settlers as an integral component of Israel's national debate on disengagement. The settlers are often referred to as ‘residents.’ This lexical choice insinuates a pro-settlement framework in which settlers have a right to reside on the land. By representing the settlers as victims and depicting the hardships they must endure by being forced to leave their

homes, the *Jerusalem Post* supports a dominant narrative in which Israel deserves the land. For example, the article entitled “And still, a sense of denial. In parts of Gush Katif, life as usual and the hope of redemption,” (Gutman, August 14, 2005) leads:

In the tent camps that have sprung up all over Gush Katif, the smell of sun-spoilt food is unmistakable. In the new tent neighbourhood in Shirat Hayam, flies gather on scraps of Shabbat dinner dumped in cardboard boxes. On a makeshift communal sink set up besides the “kitchen tent,” a bar of soap shares a shelf with a pair of dirty socks and a rotting chicken breast.

By focusing on the ‘hard’ conditions of the settlers and by representing them as victims, the newspaper marginalizes an ontological reality in which these settlers forced Palestinians from their homes and displaced them into the position of refugees (Said, 1980). Another article, “Netzer Hazani evacuees build tent camp in Tel Aviv,” (Halkin, August 23, 2005) uses settlers’ ‘accessed voices’ to portray the settlers as victims: Here, the invocation of the term ‘refugee’ is a charged term, suggesting displacement but also hopelessness and dependency – refugees in ‘their own’ land.

‘I don’t know where my son will go to kindergarten at the beginning of the school year,’ Schneid said. ‘He asks us when we are going home, and we don’t know what to tell him, because we don’t know where our home is. We need to move somewhere, and start looking for jobs. Right now, we are refugees here in Israel.’

Activists/Protestors/Infiltrators

The *Jerusalem Post*’s representation of ‘activists’, ‘protestors’ and ‘infiltrators’ further projects the view of the Israeli nation as a democracy. For the most part, these actors are constructed as an integral part of the functioning of an active democratic society insofar as they are reported as holding non-violent demonstrations against the

government's disengagement plan. As I referenced in chapter two, Hall (1980) argues that demonstrations and protests are fundamental to democratic ideals in which citizens can criticize and oppose government policy. The *Jerusalem Post* tends to select the term 'activist' when describing people who hold legal demonstrations to express anti-disengagement sentiments. This term strengthens the image of Israel as a democratic society insofar as the term connotes activism and taking a positive action in which members of society are exercising their democratic right to oppose the policies of the Israeli government. Moreover, the inclusion of activists in the headline and lead of the articles positions protestors prominently within the context of the national debate. In other words, the anti-disengagement perspective is an integral part of Israel's national collective identity. Thus, the *Jerusalem Post* reinforces its own image as a public sphere, open to multiple points of view. For example, in the article headlined "Beit Shemesh turns out protestors of all ages," (August, 18, 2005) the reporter Daniella Cheslow states in the lead:

While the highest profile protest actions against disengagement may be coming from impassioned teenagers who infiltrated into the settlements, regular citizens from Beit Shemesh have demonstrated that the fight against evacuation draws people of all ages.

This article, as well as many others, highlight that 'regular citizens' have participated in legal demonstrations against disengagement.

Another article, "Pulled out, tearfully, one by one," (Lazaroff and Katz., August 19, 2005), shows that protestors do not use violent means for expressing their disagreement with the government: "One protestor, not connected to the teens in the synagogue, stood in front of them and tried to set an Israeli flag on fire...Activists in the synagogue yelled to him to stop, explaining that his act was not symbolic of their

protest.” When acts of violence are reported they are relegated to the second half of the article. For example, in the article headlined “Morag settlers reluctantly say good-bye,” (August 18, 2005) reporter Yaakov Katz writes:

The evacuation went smoothly, baring one casualty- a female soldier who was stabbed with a syringe by one of the infiltrators as she tried to help another woman leave her home.

Within the last paragraph of the article, after describing the peaceful nature of the disengagement, the journalist includes “another activist was caught with chemical substances, which police feared he would use against security forces.” The placement of this detail at the end of the article functions ideologically to downplay its importance. As stipulated by the journalistic routine of the inverted pyramid style (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996) this ideological ordering is a discursive tool to gloss over the violence and cast the protestors in a positive, democratic light.

Nevertheless, the *Jerusalem Post* does provide a more negative representation of protestors than they do their settler counterparts. Specifically, protestors are represented as more violent than settlers and thus they are sometimes figured as a threat to democracy. For example, in the article “Swat team storms synagogue to end Kfar Darom siege (August, 19, 2005), journalist, Matthew Gutman writes:

In what is likely to prove the toughest confrontation in the pullout from Gaza, police SWAT teams stormed the Kfar Darom synagogue Thursday afternoon following a 12-hour siege in which anti-pullout activists barricaded themselves in. The activists seemed to anticipate every police tactic. Some of them stole motor oil from the Kfar Daron military base to cause police and soldiers scaling ladders to slip. They prepared Y-shaped pikes to shove away the steel cages and used doors hauled up to the rooftops as shields against water cannons.

By representing the protestors as violent, the *Jerusalem Post* de-legitimizes the protestor perspective. In another article “Security forces fear extremists, terror during northern Samaria evacuations,” (August 23, 2005) reporter Margot Dudkevitch writes:

Hundreds of extremists ousted from the Gaza Strip have fled to the northern Samaria settlements of Homesh and Sa- Nur to oppose the evacuations set to begin Tuesday, according to security officials. Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) sources said the extremists had joined others who had already infiltrated the two settlements. The extremists were inciting violence and an unknown number of them were believed to be armed, the officials said. ‘We are not talking about homogeneous communities, but settlements that have been inundated with infiltrators, including those affiliated with the ‘hilltop youth,’ who not only refuse to recognize any rabbinical authority but also the law,’ one official said. A security official said the evacuations in northern Samaria settlements could not be compared to those in Gaza, where the majority of evacuees were law-abiding citizens who used democratic means to protest and refrained from resorting to violence.

Thus, protestors are represented as a threat to Israel’s democracy. Furthermore, the lexical choice of ‘protestor; ‘extremist’ and ‘infiltrator’ constructs a more negative representation of those who are anti-disengagement, a semantic maneuver that further devalues their perspective. This discursively functions to support a state framing of the disengagement plan by denouncing certain forms of protests and valorizing others – i.e., the peaceful protestor who obeys the state injunction as opposed to those who openly disobey and express their opposition through violent means. By emphasizing that only a minority of protestors conducted acts of violence, the newspaper isolates these vociferous hostile responses and consequently marginalizes their perspective from the national debate. In other words, through the containment of oppositional voices, the newspaper reproduces a hegemonic state framing of disengagement.

The Palestinian Players

In chapter two, I considered how the constitution of a collective national identity and democratic logics always entail relations of inclusion and exclusion (Anderson, 1983; Mouffe, 2000). I therefore argued that the constitution of the Israeli nation as a democratic public sphere re-incites an Orientalist discourse through the binary opposition of 'us' and 'them' in which Palestinians are figured outside the democratic nation. Palestinians are excluded from the national debate and their perspectives are marginalized in the newspaper. The newspaper plays a significant role in maintaining the popular notion of the Palestinians as terrorist 'Others' in order to devalue their perspectives and position. The *Jerusalem Post* strategically uses Israeli expert 'accessed voices' to control the way the Palestinians are represented. In the article "JCSS: Post-disengagement doomed to scenarios of failure," (August 14, 2005) journalist Ariel O'Sullivan reports:

A leading Israeli think tank predicts that the disengagement is highly likely to lead to an eruption of Arab terrorism in the West Bank and to exacerbate political, economic and social chaos among Palestinians. According to researchers at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies affiliated with Tel Aviv University, the Palestinian terrorist' major focus in the post-disengagement scenario will be to attack Jewish settlements and access roads in Judea and Samaria.

Through the use of Israeli experts who are employed ideologically to give the illusion of objectivity and credibility, the newspaper represents the Palestinians as violent, irrational and chaotic, with no structure or democratic leadership. By reconstituting this violent stereotype, the newspaper reinforces a pro-Zionist ideology and justifies Israel's need to defend itself from their 'evil' enemies.

In contrast to the Israeli public, which is represented as complex and diverse, Palestinians are constructed one-dimensionally as a non-democratic group. The

newspaper's lack of representation of the Palestinian public reinforces a framework in which Palestinian society is not multilayered and complex, with dissension and a variety of viewpoints, characteristics which are necessary for a democracy. Palestinians are lumped into a monolithic group and often conflated with the terms 'Arab' or 'Muslims' further detracting from their own authentic identity. Whereas the term 'citizen' is often selected in reference to the Israeli public, the term 'civilian' is commonly used for Palestinians. These two lexical choices function ideologically to portray Israel as a democracy and Palestinians as undemocratic. Specifically, 'citizen' implies a democratic participant whereas 'civilian' connotes a resident within a military regime, or of another nation/group, thereby further constructing the view of Palestinians as 'Others.'

The *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of Palestinians primarily concentrates on Palestinian political groups, while under-representing the views of resident Palestinians living in Israel or in proximity to the various settlements. The lack of Palestinian 'civilian' representation works to reinforce a pro-Zionist framing of the event by not covering how occupation and disengagement affects the everyday lives of all Palestinians. In the following section, I lay out how the PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Palestinian 'civilians' are represented within the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement and how these representations privilege a hegemonic Zionist framing of the conflict.

Fatah in the PA

The *Jerusalem Post's* emphasis on Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah as the *elected* body within the PA is the closest the newspaper comes to representing the

Palestinian nation as democratic. Using a quote from PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas, the article "Headed Toward confrontation" (Staff, August 14, 2005) states:

'The Palestinian Authority was elected by the people in a free and democratic election and it is the legitimate representative of the Palestinians.' Abbas's comments were directed first and foremost, towards Hamas, which has long been suspected of seeking to create an alternative leadership to the PA in the Gaza Strip.

The representation of the Fatah as a democratically elected organization serves to uphold the Israeli state's position that Fatah is the lesser of all evils and hence more worthy of recognition as a legitimate Palestinian government.²⁷ As such, the *Jerusalem Post* includes articles which help to strengthen Abbas' authority.

Alarmed by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad festivities, PA Information Minister Nabil Shaath said he was strongly opposed to the presence of a 'parallel authority' in the Gaza Strip other than the PA. 'The Palestinian Authority, which was elected by our people, is the only legitimate authority,' he stressed. 'The government is the only party authorized to run the affairs of the Palestinians and impose law and order.' (Toameh, August, 14, 2005)

Prime Minister Abbas is represented as a leader trying to improve the conditions of his people and thus affiliated with democratic ideals. Specifically, the coverage emphasizes that Abbas plans to dismantle terrorist organizations, create a seaport, rebuild the airport, generate jobs and build housing units for Palestinians after the transfer of the settlements:

Abbas said the PA planned to build 3,000 housing units in the settlement of Morag immediately after the disengagement. In addition, the settlement of Netzarim would be used to expand the future seaport in Gaza City, he said. (Staff, August 14, 2005)

²⁷ Some scholars argue that Abbas and his PA government is a puppet of Israel and the U.S. insofar as Abbas was appointed after these nations charged that PA's previous leader, Yasser Arafat was a terrorist (Morris, 2001).

Similarly, the article “Abbas sets out plans for Palestinians use of Gaza; settlement areas; Calls parliamentary election for Jan 25,” (Toameh, August 21, 2005) states:

Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas told a group of Palestinian youths in Gaza City on Saturday that the small jihad (holy war) has ended and that the big jihad has begun to rebuild the economy and restore security and public order. ‘We want our people, in a century's time, to live a normal life like any other people in the world,’ Abbas said. ‘Therefore the next battle will be the real battle.’

While Abbas is seen as working in the interests of his people, the previous quote cites his use of the term ‘jihad’, invoking a larger East/West discourse resonant of Orientalism and negative representations of Islam. ‘Jihad’ has multiple connotations whose literal meaning is ‘struggle’ with religion undertones, usually struggle of the soul to avert evil. Nevertheless, within Western discourse, it denotes a ‘holy war’ which Muslims wage against nations and governments that deny the practice of Islam (Barber, 1995).

The atmospherics of Jihad have resulted in a breakdown of civility in the name of identity, of comity in the name of community. International relations have sometimes taken on the aspects of gang wars- cultural turf battles featuring tribal factions that were supposed to be sublimated as integral parts of large national, economic, post colonial and constitutional entities (Barber, March 1992).

By referencing the term ‘jihad’ through a Palestinian leader’s accessed voice, Abbas demarcates Palestinians as ‘Others,’ engaged in ‘battle’ and violent holy war. By inference, Palestinians are inevitably seen as undemocratic. As Barber (1995) explains, jihad is often categorized by militarism and theocratic fundamentalism that empowers an individual to rule on behalf of people. Ironically, Barber explains jihad’s counter-politics, McWorld, a globalization of technology, economy, communication and commerce, does not foster true democracy either, insofar as the incredible influence of the Western world heavily impacts the choices made by citizens of non-Western nations.

The *Jerusalem Post* also uses Abbas's 'accessed voice' to reinforce a Zionist framework of the disengagement and to establish that the Israeli government is implementing the plan as a move towards peace. In the article "Abbas calls to congratulate Sharon," (August 23, 2005) journalist Herb Keinon writes:

Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas phoned Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Monday night, congratulated him on the evacuation of Gaza and said he hoped this would usher in a new era in the relations between the two peoples. According to Sharon's office, Abbas praised Sharon for what he called a "courageous" and "historic" decision, and complimented him for carrying out the plan.

Nevertheless, despite these efforts at legitimizing the Fatah government, the *Jerusalem Post* manages to undermine Fatah as a democratic institution. In particular, Fatah's military is often depicted as violent and divisive, thereby diminishing its credibility as a legitimate representative organization:

Dozens of Fatah gunmen on Sunday stormed the Palestinian Legislative Council chamber in Gaza City, demanding that the Palestinian Authority provide them with jobs and money. Eyewitnesses said the gunmen were carrying Kalashnikov and M-16 rifles, as well as rocket-propelled grenades. No one was hurt during the raid, the latest in a series of incidents indicating the growing state of lawlessness and anarchy in the Gaza Strip on the eve of the withdrawal from the area (Toameh, August 22, 2005)

Here the use of words such as 'dozens', 'demanding', 'guns' and 'grenades' in combination with references to increasing 'lawlessness and anarchy' work to undermine any positive representations of the PA. It simultaneously constructs an 'us' and 'them' dichotomy in which Israel is represented as more democratic than the PA. In other words, while the Israeli public is represented as engaging in rational deliberation, Palestinians are represented as inherently violent, and irrational and incapable of reasoned debate.

Palestinians are figured as undemocratic in that even their government body cannot engage in rational deliberation, a central constituent of democracy.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad

In contrast to the PA led by the Fatah, the *Jerusalem Post* represents Hamas and Islamic Jihad as non-democratic, terrorist organizations. Hamas, whose Arabic acronym means 'zeal' is a Palestinian Islamic organization created in 1987 at the onset of the first Intifada. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by Canada, the EU, Israel, Japan and the U.S. Nevertheless, Hamas defines itself as a legitimate resistance movement, defending Palestinians from brutal Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territories. Hamas argues that suicide bombings are an effective measure for pressuring Israel to end its military occupation. Viewed from this context of illegal occupation, Hamas does not support the State of Israel and its policies. Hamas has gained popularity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, culminating in a victory in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. Hamas has gained further approval by establishing extensive welfare programs, funding schools, orphanages and healthcare clinics throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Similarly, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine is another Palestinian political group that has been labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S., the E.U., the U.K., Japan, Canada, Australia and Israel. Founded in the 1970s, like Hamas, it opposes the illegal occupation of Palestinian Territories, and its goal is to create an autonomous Palestinian state.

The *Jerusalem Post* does not provide the context of illegal occupation when representing Hamas and Islamic Jihad, thereby reifying an Orientalist trope in which they

are viewed as an irrational, violent 'Other.' Specifically, the newspaper selects the term 'terrorist' groups instead of resistance groups, as they are more commonly referred to in the Palestinian press (Roeh and Nir, 1993). For instance, an article titled, "Jihad terrorist plot foiled," (O'Sullivan, August 18, 2005), which states that "security forces have uncovered a plot masterminded by the Islamic Jihad to attack evacuating forces or Gaza settlers during disengagement", portrays the group as a terrorist organization. Similarly, the headline: " Hamas claims majority of terror attacks in the past five years," (Barzak, August 23, 2005) positions Hamas as terrorists. Furthermore, by demonstrating that Hamas itself defines their attacks as terrorist acts, validates the popular view of Hamas as a terrorist organization. These two groups are further represented as taking credit for the disengagement of settlements, claiming that their "terrorist attacks and suicide bombings have driven out Israel."

Through specific details concerning weaponry, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are constructed as violent players.

Local reporters were invited on Friday to watch more than 1,000 Hamas gunmen in military fatigue armed with AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenades stage a mock attack on an Israeli settlement. It was the biggest show of strength by Hamas' armed wing in years. (Toameh , August 14, 2005)

The newspaper goes on to report that these players will continue to implement violent strategies. In the same article, Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar states:

'This [Hamas] army will continue to defend the Palestinian people. As long as one inch of our land remains under occupation, these weapons will remain in the hands of the Hamas soldiers. These young men will continue to train others until all Palestinians are turned into fighters so that we can liberate Palestine from the [Jordan] river to the sea'. Similarly Said Siam a senior Hamas leader, warned that his movement would continue to launch attacks against Israel unless it relinquished control over all border crossings.

Although this excerpt exposes a fissure in the *Jerusalem Post*'s dominant Zionist narrative by including a reference to the term 'occupation,' this subordinate framework is couched within the larger dominant framework. Therefore, it does not provide a true challenge to the prevailing discourse, but rather reaffirms a dominant Zionist narrative in which Palestinians are terrorists, thereby justifying Israel's use of violence as a means of self-defense.

Palestinian 'Civilians'

Palestinian 'civilian' perspectives and those not belonging to political factions are largely marginalized within the coverage of the debate. When they are included within the newspaper's coverage, they are often represented as callous and undemocratic. For instance, the article "Settler tears have Gaza Palestinians smiling. Delight at the sight of Israel leaving," (Gutman, O'Sullivan and Katz, August 18, 2005) employs the stereotype of Palestinians dancing and celebrating at the pain of Israelis. The representation of Palestinian civilians as callous once again reinforces an Orientalist trope (Jiwani, 2006). Specifically, to laugh at someone's misfortune suggests that the person doing the laughing is bereft of any kind of compassion or morality, – that they are vengeful when the context for such is not recognized or even included. The article continues:

Eleven-year-old Hanadi Abd al-Daim danced and laughed in the family living room as she watched IDF soldiers drag settlers out of their homes only a few kilometers away... 'I wanted to see how they are taking out the settlers from their villages,' Hanadi said sitting on a mattress on the floor of the TV room. 'It makes me very happy.'

By excluding a context of structural inequality, Palestinian civilians are constructed as inherently callous, something intrinsic to Muslim culture and their internal make-up, thereby marking Palestinians as 'Others.'

The *Jerusalem Post* also includes Palestinian cultural reactions to disengagement in order to reassert that Palestinians are undemocratic. The newspaper features Palestinians who have drawn comics and written victory poems celebrating the return of the land. While at first glance these articles represent a crack in the dominant Israeli framework by including Palestinian perspectives, these representations reify an Orientalist trope in which Israel must protect itself against this irrational 'Other'. For example, in the article "Palestinians celebrate with poetry," (August 19, 2005) journalist Khaled Abu Toameh writes:

Most of the poems and songs laud the 'resistance;' for its role in driving Israel out of the Gaza Strip and urge Palestinians to prepare for the next struggle to liberate Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem...Poet Khamis Lutfi wrote: 'No stranger has ever lasted on our land. Our history has testified to this. Peace with you [Israel] will remain a lie and your continued existence is impossible. You will vanish and we will continue to exist. O modern barbarians go away! You came as invaders and the time has come to leave. Don't lie by saying that you have a homeland here. We will destroy you and we will chase you forever.'

Although this poem provides a Palestinian perspective, it reinforces a representation of extremism: Palestinians who believe that Israel does not have a right to exist. Its inclusion constructs a Palestinian discourse of war and violence which is marked by intransigence. In other words, the *Jerusalem Post* does not include perspectives of Palestinians who are in favour of peace in the region. Thus, Palestinians are not represented with a variety of moderate perspectives.

The newspaper further uses Palestinian 'accessed voices' of moderation to echo the sentiments of Zionism and those in the positions of power. For instance, in the article headlined "Palestinians deride 'artificial' scenes of settler anguish. A minority praises Sharon for standing up to extremists" (Toameh, August 24, 2005) the lead states:

As far as many residents here are concerned, the evacuation of the settlers from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank is just a “play” designed to show the world that Israel was prepared to make painful concessions for the sake of peace.

At first glance this example illustrates a divergence from the dominant ideologies by exposing the viewpoint that Sharon is not really implementing the disengagement for peace. It seems as though the newspaper is an arena for presenting antagonistic relations and perspectives from the state and thus central to democracy, particularly because it provides a voice for the Palestinians. Nevertheless, this perspective does not carry equal weight insofar as it is couched between articles that reinforce a dominant frame. Furthermore, within the opening sentences of the article, the newspaper uses Palestinian accessed voices that support the state ideologies, despite them not representing the mainstream Palestinian point of view:

Another merchant, reflecting the view of a minority, heaped praise on Sharon for using a ‘tough policy’ against the settlers. ‘Let’s face it, Sharon has proven to be a brave leader,’ said Amjad Abu Omar, who describes himself as a ‘peace-loving’ Palestinian. ‘I wish we Arabs had leaders like Sharon who are capable of standing up against the extremists.’

This Palestinian merchant uses the term ‘extremist’ to describe those who oppose the state of Israel and thus he is the voice of moderation. Although the pretense of inclusion is there, and often persuasively presented, the reality is that these voices are often chosen out of a multitude of other competing voices to represent a viewpoint that is aligned with the state. In so doing, these accessed moderate voices also serve to marginalize those who are represented as extremists. As such, the newspaper gives the illusion of balance by providing Palestinian testimonies however the juxtaposed Palestinian voices work to reinforce the dominant ideologies and marginalize others that are considered to be too oppositional.

The Containment of Oppositional Voices

The *Jerusalem Post* employs a series of semantic strategies to persuade Israeli citizens to adopt state ideologies and policies, as well as to restrain oppositional perspectives. By representing the Israeli nation as a democracy, the newspaper gives the illusion that all the aforementioned Israeli actors have equal symbolic weight within the newspaper, when in fact it privileges a state framework wherein the state's discourse defines the issue. The following section lays out the semantic strategies that the newspaper employs to reinforce a hegemonic state frame. Through the repeated use of official sources and the reproduction of state 'accessed voices', a 'law and order' discourse, a 'numbers game' and the division of 'hard' and 'soft' news, the *Jerusalem Post* reinforces the government ideals as the status quo.

Law and Order Discourse

The *Jerusalem Post* uses a 'law and order' discourse to interpellate settlers to adopt state policies on disengagement. As I explained in chapter two, a 'law and order' discourse is a discursive strategy that establishes the government's views as 'commonsense' (Hall, 1973; Hartley, 1982). In the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement plan, through the reproduction of government 'accessed voices', the newspaper calls on settlers to accept the disengagement because it is the rule of law and further, that it is in the best interest of the Israeli state. Through the repetition and constant representation of government sources, its interpretation of the event is established as the status quo and the dominant frame through which the disengagement plan should be understood. Specifically, by reiterating official accessed voices in which the government states that settlers must evacuate from their homes because it is the law,

the *Post* supports both a state discourse and submission to a state framework. For example, the article “Text of IDF eviction order,” (Staff, August 16, 2005) reproduces a governmental statement that settlers must evacuate their homes by the rule of law:

In accordance with the ‘implementation of the disengagement plan 2005 law’ and following the decision of the Israeli government you are required to leave your home and the Gaza Strip today, Monday 15/8/05. Starting on the 17th, the IDF must begin enforcing the evacuation in order to implement the decision and the law.

While the *Jerusalem Post* gives the illusion that settlers and activists can protest against disengagement within a democratic society, it simultaneously privileges a state ideology in which opposition does not have any real effect in halting government policies. In the article “Forced eviction of Gaza settlers begins; Karadi to ‘Post’: We’ll use full force,” (August 17, 2005), reporters Yaakov Katz and Ariel O’Sullivan write: “‘We will make every effort, the army and the police, to have law and order in this process and anyone who acts illegally will be treated according to the law,’ army official Mofaz said.” Thus, settlers must submit to state policies. Similarly, the article headlined “Sharon to empathize, not apologize in address to nation,” (Keinon, August 15, 2005) states:

If the cabinet, as expected, approves the evacuation, the IDF could begin moving the residents out on Wednesday. According to this official, Sharon- who, in his address to the nation, was expected to salute the settlers for their contribution and sacrifice over the years-would also call on them to respect the rule of law and be mindful of the day after disengagement, when the country would have to unite to face the considerable threats and challenges.

The *Jerusalem Post* further reinforces the state perspective through ‘law and order’ discourse between government and protestors. Although the activists are given space within the newspaper, thus confirming their role within the debate, the government’s perspective is still adopted as the prevailing one. Specifically, the state and

the army still maintain control through the backing of the law. For instance, the article “Morag settlers reluctantly say good-bye,” (Katz and O’Sullivan, August 18, 2005) states: “Another activist was caught with chemical substances which police feared he would use against security forces. He was arrested and detained for questioning.” The police, army and government are represented as in charge- not only of the activists but of the discourse. By reasserting state control of the discourse, the newspaper calls on individuals to adopt state policies and submit to the disengagement plan. In other words, the settlers and activists are allowed to express their views within the democratic system. Nevertheless, they must also evacuate the settlements or they will be arrested. The newspaper therefore deploys what Gramsci calls a ‘war of position’ (1927/1971), in which power is legitimated, secured and diffused through discursive strategies in order to win consent of the settlers.

‘Numbers game’

The *Jerusalem Post* further emphasizes the state perspective as the dominant one through a ‘numbers game’. As outlined by van Dijk (1988), the inclusion of numbers within an article seems objective but is in fact used by the newspaper as a discursive tool to privilege a particular perspective. In the case of the *Jerusalem Post*, the use of numbers, particularly in terms of how many police and soldiers are involved in the implementation of the disengagement plan, as well as how many settlers have been evacuated, functions to establish the police and military as in control of the disengagement. For instance, one article’s headline reads: “Only 35% of Gaza settlers remain after day of confrontation, tears; Ezra to ‘Post’: Evacuation could be over by mid-next week,” (Gutman, O’Sullivan and Katz, August 18, 2005). The lead continues:

Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank will likely be completed faster than the three weeks originally anticipated, the IDF and police said on Wednesday night after some 10,000 unarmed troops and police swept through five settlements in the first 24 hours of the largest Israeli military operation in a generation. After the first day of forced evacuation, officials said five settlements had been totally cleared out- including 533 homes and 1,523 residents in the course of the one day alone.

Similarly a 'numbers game' is employed to show that the settlers are compliant with the disengagement process. For example, the headline states; "280 of Nisanit's 290 families have moved out. Gaza's 2nd largest settlement now a ghost town. All Dugit residents to leave on Monday," (Gutman, August 15, 2005) Numbers are used to show that settlers submit to state policy. Another example of the 'numbers game' being used to portray the government, army and police as in control can be seen in the lead: "The Shin Bet's Diskin said that since January, some 2,696 people have been arrested in connection with anti-disengagement activity, and that 1,253 of those arrests took place in the last week," (Keinon, August 22, 2005)

Hard and Soft News

Through the distinction of 'hard' and 'soft' news, the *Jerusalem Post* limits the credibility of oppositional perspectives. Often, the Palestinian and settlers' perspectives are confined to feature stories or soft news as opposed to hard news which is constituted by the everyday reportage of events, usually involving news releases and quotes from government sources. For instance, out of the 17 articles over the two week period that primarily focus on Palestinians, 12 of them are classified as feature stories. Similarly, out of the 66 articles that contained settler 'accessed voices', 22 of them were feature stories. This structural strategy works to de-legitimate and marginalizes their perspectives from the dominant frame organizing the news coverage. For example, in the feature article

“Internal Fallout from Gaza,” (August 19, 2005) journalist David Horowitz discusses the right-winged rabbis’ perspective that settlers should not be uprooted from a land that inherently belongs to them.

The rabbi is convinced that Israel is making a mistake of historic proportions. ‘We are uprooting people, against their will, in the midst of their pioneering activity. These are sand dunes where nobody lived before. Now it is green, flourishing. I hoped it wouldn’t happen. I prayed it wouldn’t happen. I believed that our activity here, our success, proved that the prophecy was with us. I believe the people of Israel will return here. But for now, we will have to find other ways to do God’s work.’

By presenting this as ‘soft’ news, the *Jerusalem Post* provides a contained toleration of the right-wing rabbi’s perspective whilst maintaining the dominant state ideologies.

Stories of Palestinian victimization are relegated to feature articles. In the feature article “No longer a pariah state” (August 23, 2005) reporter Gershon Baskin writes:

The Land of Israel was never a land without a people for a people without a land. Even if there was significant immigration of Arabs to Palestine after the birth of the Zionist movement, the fact remains that in the Land of Israel there are two peoples - the Jewish people and the Palestinian people. It is time for Israel to come to terms with the reality that there is no chance for it to continue to colonize the West Bank. What we have begun in Gaza must now continue in the West Bank.

The newspaper places positive representations of Palestinians working to improve the conditions of their people within these ‘soft’ feature articles in order to de-emphasize their perspective. In the feature article, “Upward mobility?” (August, 18, 2005), reporter Matthew Gutman writes:

The new city will consist of a large neighbourhood of at least 3,000 low-income housing units and several; neighbourhoods for ‘low-density housing,’ i.e. villas. The municipality plans on utilizing the massive agricultural infrastructure the settlers will leave behind and setting aside large swaths of land for ‘green areas,’ A long beach-side of land where the abandoned Gush Katif Palm Hotel now sits, has been set aside to build a tourist resort.

Lack of Context and Coverage

The *Jerusalem Post* completely omits a historical context of colonialism and occupation from its coverage. The newspaper occludes Israel's colonization of the settlements, displacing Palestinians from their land and turning them into refugees (Said, 1980). The occlusion of this narrative as well as the lack of context on the illegal status of the settlements buttressed a narrative in which Israel is the rightful owner of the Occupied Territories. Despite the suppression of this historical context, there are instances of fissures within the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage that expose the illegal occupation of the land. Nevertheless, these cracks are couched between prevailing frames and thus dominant ideologies reign supreme (Entman, 2003). For instance, the feature article "Palestinians deride 'artificial' scenes of settler anguish. A minority praises Sharon for standing up to extremists" (Toameh, August 24, 2005) exposes a chasm within the coverage:

'The settlers' sadness and depression was artificial,' Bassem Abu Sumayyah, director-general of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation said. 'It was a surrealistic scene full of contradictions. There is no similarity between the tears of the settlers who left the Gaza Strip voluntarily and the tears of the Palestinians when they were forcibly expelled from their lands. The settlers are racists who occupied others' lands in 1967, spread corruption and displaced the Palestinian people and turned their lives into hell.'

Through strategies of inclusion and exclusion, the *Jerusalem Post* creates a contained toleration of oppositional perspectives. It seems almost tokenistic.

The newspaper mostly overlooks the view that in spite of disengagement, Israel will continue to maintain control over borders, roadways, electricity, water, the seaport and the airport in the Gaza Strip. In the article "Gaza withdrawal is a defeat for Israel, says PA foreign minister" (August 21, 2005), journalist Khaled Abu Toameh states:

'The disengagement plan is not a painful concession on the part of Israel,' Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Nasser al-Kidwa said. He added that the legal status of the evacuated lands would not change after the disengagement. 'Israel will remain an occupying authority bound by international and humanitarian laws under the Fourth Article of the Geneva Convention,' he explained. 'Israel will remain an occupying force as long as it maintains control of the airspace and border crossings of the Gaza Strip.'

This excerpt reveals that Palestinians will not have full control over their land, thereby insinuating that they will not have true self-government in the region. In spite of disengagement, Israel will continue to be an occupying force. Similarly, the newspaper neglects to report that the disengagement of the four settlements in the West Bank do not achieve any autonomy for the West Bank Palestinians insofar as Israel still maintains control of the land and the roadways in the region. The article "Palestinians hope Homesh land will now revert to them. Israel: We know which areas here were Palestinian-owned" (Halpern, August 24, 2005) states:

The settlers are gone from Homesh, but the Palestinians who share the mountain with them are not rejoicing. Unlike the raucous celebrators in Gaza, the people in the village of Burqa went about their daily chores Tuesday as if nothing were happening only a few hundred meters above them. 'The settlers are going, but the soldiers are staying,' said Tutu Seif, a 20-year-old Burqa policeman. 'It's all the same.' The government's decision to remove settlers from four northern West Bank settlements does not improve the lives of the Palestinians, locals said. Israeli soldiers are holding Homesh and Sa-Nur until further notice, and the area remains under overall Israeli control.

Similarly, the *Jerusalem Post* ignores Sharon's motives for implementing the disengagement plan. It glosses over the concurrent event in which Sharon is building a 'security fence' around the settlements in the West Bank in order to maintain control of land in the Occupied Territories. By emphasizing that Sharon is executing the disengagement plan as a move towards peace in the region, the newspaper veils his continued annexation of land in the region. For example, the article "Sharon vows he will

continue construction in West Bank settlements. There will be no second disengagement,” (Keinon, August 22, 2005) is revealing in this light:

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon signaled a right turn Sunday, vowing to build inside the West Bank settlement blocs, even as bulldozers began mowing down Gaza’s settlements. ‘There will be building in the settlement blocs,’ Sharon said.

The *Jerusalem Post* further neglects to highlight the complicit relationship between Israel and the U.S. The newspaper presents the U.S. as a neutral broker interested in achieving peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Nevertheless, the *Jerusalem Post* overlooks the U.S.’ political alliance with Israel and its continued monetary support for the Israeli military. For instance, the newspaper reports that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice upholds that Israel must make further land concessions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In the article “Condoleezza Rice saying Israel has to dismantle more settlements,” (August 24, 2005) reporter Herb Keinon writes:

Rice distanced herself from the widespread Israeli interpretation that the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure must come before anything else in the road map and instead spoke of the steps the sides have to take as being parallel and not sequential.

The newspaper simultaneously reports that Sharon opposes Rice’s stipulation, stating that Israel has made enough concessions and that the Palestinians must now dismantle the terrorists. For example, in the article “Words left unsaid” (Keinon, August 19, 2005), Sharon is quoted as saying:

‘Now the Palestinians bear the burden of proof,’ he told the nation Monday night. ‘They must fight terror organizations, dismantle its infrastructure and show sincere intentions of peace in order to sit with us at the negotiating table.’

Thus, the newspaper illustrates an antagonistic relationship between the U.S. and Israel to de-emphasize the alliance between the nations.

The *Jerusalem Post* also ignores that the Israeli government did not enact a true democratic process to pass the disengagement plan within parliament. The newspaper leaves out the fact that Sharon forced some of his cabinet ministers who opposed disengagement to resign and that the government did not hold separate referendums for each settlement, a stipulation agreed upon in order for the Likud party to pass his policy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the *Jerusalem Post* re-invokes a larger Orientalist discourse, in which 'our' nation Israel is represented as a democracy and 'their' nation (Palestinians) is represented as a non-democratic, 'Other.' The similitude with Western ideals positions Israel as part of a larger operative discourse between East and West. In other words, the *Jerusalem Post* situates the disengagement of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories as part of a larger us/them discourse in which Israel is affiliated with the democratic West while Palestinians are grouped as undemocratic, Muslim Others, except for those moderate voices whose views are resonant with those of the government of Israel.

Furthermore, the *Jerusalem Post's* representation of Israel as a collective national identity is an attempt to subtly convince Israeli citizens to adopt state disengagement policies, which should not be the intention of a true democratic arena and a 'fourth estate.' Similarly, the reaffirmation of the Israeli nation marginalizes Palestinian perspectives within the national debate. Consequently, the newspaper reproduces pro-

Zionist and state ideologies to win the consent of the Israeli public regarding the use of disengagement as a strategy for fending off their real enemies: the Palestinians. Through the construction of a binary opposition of 'us' and 'them,' the event is portrayed so that both sides are incommensurable. The *Jerusalem Post* therefore reifies a war discourse that arrests true deliberation about peace in the Middle East. In the end, hegemonic power relations disguised as truth, objectivity and balance are kept in place.

CHAPTER FOUR

Settling the Dispute

The Aftermath of Disengagement

On September 12, 2005, Israel completed its disengagement plan through the removal of Israeli settlements and evacuation of permanent military installations (army bases and ground troops) from the Gaza Strip. Upon completion, Israel declared an end to the military government that had administered the Gaza Strip since Israel's capture of the territory in 1967. Three days later, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared "the end of Israeli control over and responsibility for the Gaza Strip"²⁸, leaving the region under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. Nevertheless, within this chapter, I argue that Israel continues to maintain control over the Gaza Strip through an 'invisible hand,' in which the exercise of power is diffused within the political and cultural apparatuses. In other words, rather than what Gramsci calls a 'war of maneuver,' in which power and control are reinforced coercively through the army apparatus, the Israeli state fights for hegemony through a 'war of position' in which power is legitimated, secured and diffused through state policies and a variety of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), including national and international newspapers.

²⁸ Sept. 15, 2005 Speech by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon before the United Nations General Assembly. Text available at www.mfa.gov.il.

Indirect Occupation of Gaza through State Policies

Disengagement from the settlements in the Gaza Strip did not end Israeli occupation of Gaza but rather changed the way in which such control is effectuated. While the overtly, 'occupation' according to international law is defined exclusively by the continuous presence of military troops in a given territory, I extend the meaning to include the ability to exercise effective control over a territory even without military ground presence in the territory.

According to Gisha, an Israeli non-profit organization whose goal is to protect the freedom of movement of Palestinians²⁹, the aftermath of disengagement has contributed to an economic and humanitarian crisis in Gaza not seen in the 38 years of Israeli occupation that preceded the withdrawal of settlements and permanent ground troops (Bashi and Mann, 2007). Bashi and Mann argue that the Israeli government continues to maintain its stronghold on Gaza through control of many border crossings³⁰, the importation and exportation of goods and services, as well as control of airspace, territorial waters, population registry and the tax system. More specifically, Israel retains authority of Gaza's land crossings through legal regulation over the entrance and exit of all persons, imports and exports by virtue of the ability to close all crossings leading into the territory. By regimenting the flow of people at the Rafah border between Gaza and Egypt, Israel restricts the entrance of medical supplies and professionals, both necessary

²⁹ Gisha, whose name means both "access" and "approach," uses legal assistance and public advocacy to protect the rights of Palestinian residents. Because freedom of movement is a precondition for exercising other basic rights, Gisha's work has a multiplier effect in helping residents of the occupied territories access education, jobs, family members, and medical care.

³⁰ Israel has ultimate control over the Rafah crossing, the border between Israel and Egypt and the Karni crossing, the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Israel has said it will allow imports to Gaza from Egypt through the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom Crossing, located near the meeting point of Israel, Egypt, and Gaza. Thus far, imports from Egypt have been limited to sporadic shipments of humanitarian supplies.

for basic human needs and economic development³¹. Similarly, Israel restricts the movement of those who can enter and exit Gaza through its jurisdiction over the population registry in which Israel has ultimate power over who is considered a Gaza resident. Since 2000, Israel has not permitted additions to the Palestinian Population Registry, with the exception of minor children of Palestinian ID-card holders. Only holders of Palestinian ID cards can enter Gaza through the Rafah crossing, so control over the Palestinian Population Registry implies control over who may enter and leave. Despite the disengagement of settlements and ground troops, Israel maintains complete and exclusive control over Gaza's air space and territorial waters since 1967, which works to exercise domination over Gaza without ground troop presence. For example, warplanes and drones regularly patrol the skies of Gaza, using cameras to observe activity, and periodically firing missiles aimed at militants which often inadvertently hit civilians (Bashi and Mann, 2007). Furthermore, Israel completely restricts imports and exports from sea and air, limiting Palestinian access to goods and services as well as economic self-sustenance. Israeli control over territorial waters has significantly weakened the Gazan fishing industry insofar as Palestinians do not have access to these waters. Only commercial goods arriving first in Israel which are inspected there can be brought into Gaza via the Karni Crossing. During the first year following the signing of the Agreement on Movement and Access, Karni was open for just 222 days, and for 166 of those days it was open only partially, for limited hours and using only a small number

³¹ Between June 25, 2006 and Nov. 14, 2006, Rafah Crossing was open for just 21 days, and on each day, for an average of less than two hours, instead of the 12 hours regularly scheduled. Similarly, in the first year following the completion of its disengagement program, Israel kept Rafah Crossing closed for 148 days, meaning that Gaza was cut off from the outside world 42 percent of the time. Figures taken from U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territories, following disengagement is measured from September 12, 2005 to September 11, 2006 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *The Agreement on Movement and Access One Year On*, 2007).

of available commercial lanes. The restrictions on imports via Karni Crossing have, at various points, caused severe shortages of basic goods that threatened the health and welfare of Gaza residents.³² Israel also restricts movement within the Gaza Strip through sporadic deployment of troops in the region, and artillery fire from positions along its borders with Gaza. Further, it controls a northern section of the Gaza Strip which it declared a 'no-go' zone in December 2005. Residents were warned that they would be shot on sight if found in that area.

Israel further exercises indirect domination over the Gaza Strip through its rule over the Palestinian Authority. Specifically, Israel maintains control over Palestinian tax revenues which amount to 50 percent of the PA's operating income. Following Hamas' victory in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections³³, the Israeli government decided to cut transfers of the \$55 million tax-receipts which it receives on the PA's behalf. At the same time, the PA also stopped receiving monetary support from most donor countries including the U.S. and the EU. As a direct consequence, PA employees including civil servants, teachers and healthcare workers have not received their salaries since February 2006 (Bashi and Mann, 2007, p.56). Regulation of these finances is therefore not only control over the PA as a legislative entity, but also control over the livelihoods of Gaza residents and the provision of civilian services, including

³² The lack of basic goods and services was especially made apparent in March 2006 and during the military operations that ensued following the capture of an Israeli soldier on June 25, 2006. In the course of those operations, Israel destroyed Gaza's only power plant by bombing six transformers that provided 43% of the electricity to Gaza. The remainder of the electricity is purchased from Israel. Gaza was plunged into darkness, and the functioning of critical institutions such as the medical and water systems was crippled by the lack of electricity and restrictions on the supply of fuel and spare parts through Karni Crossing and the fuel crossing at Nahal Oz, which was closed by the Israeli military in late June and early July 2006.

³³ In January 2006 Hamas won the parliamentary elections in the Gaza Strip, taking 76 of the 132 seats in the chamber.

health care and education.³⁴ Responsibility for these services may have formally been transferred to the authority of the PA, but by withholding the budget needed by the PA to exercise that responsibility, Israel hinders the provision of those services.

Additionally, Israel exercises power over self-autonomy within the Gaza Strip and the functioning of Palestinian institutions of government. Specifically, Israel influences the Palestinian elections by determining who may vote through its control over the Palestinian Population Registry and its power to permit or disallow residents of East Jerusalem to vote. It also controls the identity of the candidates for Palestinian offices, by regulating the entrance of non-Palestinian ID-card holders into Gaza and the West Bank. In addition to financial authority, Israel controls movement between Gaza and the West Bank and has recently prevented officials in the Hamas government from crossing between Gaza and the West Bank, thereby preventing their participation in legislative and governmental meetings. By inference, continued direct Israeli control over the West Bank is a form of indirect control over Gaza, because Gaza and the West Bank constitute two parts of a single territorial unit, with a unified and undifferentiated system of civilian institutions spread throughout, funded from the same central budget and run by the same undifferentiated central authority. These aforementioned conditions imply that the Israeli government has arrested the constitution of a self-autonomous democratic government within the Gaza Strip.

³⁴ According to the Paris Protocol of 1994, Israel controls the tax system in the territories of the Palestinian Authority, including Gaza and the West Bank, with the exception of direct taxes such as income tax and some kinds of value-added ('VAT') and customs taxation. Israel, which controls all imports into Gaza and the West Bank, collects VAT and customs duties imposed on imports on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and is to transfer them to the PA each month. This system gives Israel control not just over tax policy and the provision of humanitarian goods to Gaza, but it also gives Israel control over the Palestinian Authority, particularly its civil services, funded by tax revenues.

In November 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon formally left the right-wing Likud Party and formed the Kadima Party.³⁵ According to the Kadima Party's platform, the Israeli nation has a national and historical right to Greater Israel and despite land concessions in the Gaza Strip, Israel remains steadfast in its continued maintenance of control of Jerusalem and large settlement blocs in the West Bank. However, in late December 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered a stroke and on January 4, 2006 fell into a coma. As a consequence, Sharon could no longer run for a second term as Prime Minister in his newly formed Kadima Party. In lieu, Ehud Olmert replaced Sharon as Kadima's leader and won the most Knesset seats in the March 2006 elections. As such, with the termination of Sharon's leadership and the new Kadima Party in government, Israel has tightened its reigns and incited a reversal of the disengagement policy. Despite the implementation of the disengagement plan, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem remain under different degrees of indirect and direct occupation.

Newspapers as Sites of Diffused Control

While the aforementioned section discusses how Israel executes control over the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip through a series of political maneuvers, I argue that Israel maintains its stronghold on Gaza through operative discourses within the ISA of the news media. Specifically, as this thesis has demonstrated, newspapers act as sites in which the Israeli government exercises hegemonic power over the Gaza Strip. Power is not reinforced through a 'top down' model in which those who control the means of

³⁵ On 21 November 2005, Sharon resigned as head of Likud, and dissolved parliament to form a new center-left party called *Kadima* ('Forward'). November polls indicated that Sharon was likely to be returned to the Prime Ministership. On December 20, 2005, Sharon's longtime rival Benjamin Netanyahu was elected his successor as leader of Likud.

production dictate ideology consciously, but is rather unconsciously diffused within the news media through a system of discursive techniques. Thus, the news media employ a 'war of position' in which power over the Gazan Palestinians and the Israeli public is exercised through its dispersal within institutions and ideological state apparatuses. In other words, news media's discursive strategies persuade individuals into accepting a hegemonic view of the world.

In the case of the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement plan, the newspaper employed a series of semantic techniques to secure Israel's hegemonic power and 'discursive occupation' over Palestinians. Through the constitution of an Israeli national 'imagined community' which necessarily defines 'our' nation in contrast to 'others', the newspaper reified an Orientalist discourse that serves relations of domination and subordination. The newspaper's posturing as a public sphere and a fourth estate in which democratic deliberation can occur, strategically worked to construct a democratic image of the Israeli nation. By adhering to professional news standards such as 'objectivity' and 'balance,' the newspaper gave the illusion that it provides a variety of perspectives as well as a rigorous critique of government policies, thereby playing a key role within the framework of a democratic nation which they in fact helped to create. The constitution of the Israeli nation as a democracy re-invokes an Orientalist binary opposition of 'us' and 'them' insofar as Palestinians are figured outside the demos and are constructed as violent, undemocratic 'others.'

As the previous chapters illustrated, the Israeli government and army are represented as working in the interests of the Israeli public and acting compassionately to the settlers who are being evacuated from their homes. The settlers and protestors are

generally depicted as holding peaceful demonstrations to protest the disengagement. Furthermore, the placement of the settlers and protestors' voices in the headline and the lead helps to position their perspective as an integral component of the Israeli nation as a whole. Thus, the *Jerusalem Post* represents Israel as both a liberal, representative democracy in which the government acts in the interests of its citizens as well as a deliberative democracy in which citizens actively participate in public debates to influence governmental policies.

In contrast, Palestinians are largely represented as violent, homogeneous and undemocratic 'others.' The continued interchange of the terms 'Palestinian', 'Arab' and 'Muslim' works to de-legitimize Gazan Palestinians' authentic identity and lumps Palestinians under one of these monolithic labels. The Palestinians therefore are not represented as a multifarious nation with a variety of nuanced viewpoints. Moreover, the *Jerusalem Post* represents Palestinian political groups, particularly Hamas and Islamic Jihad as terrorist organizations. Even the Fatah, the elected body within the PA, is fashioned as untrustworthy and violent. Similarly, the newspaper tends to marginalize Palestinian 'civilian' accessed voices as a strategy to literally silence Palestinian perspectives, further adding to the one-dimensional representation. When 'civilian' voices are included within the coverage, it is often the more extremist sources that are selected, serving only to further cast Palestinians as irrational, callous and violent. When non-violent Palestinian accessed voices are included, they express favourable views on Sharon's policies and actions, thus reasserting a dominant pro-Zionist state framework. This only works to present another extreme, which neither represents a majority viewpoint, nor helps to foster a representation of the Palestinian nation as diverse and

complex. These semantic representations of Israelis as democratic and Palestinians as violent terrorists function to legitimize control and 'occupation' of the Palestinians.

Through the reproduction of official Israeli accessed voices and sources, the newspaper privileges dominant (state) ideologies. These official perspectives are packaged as commonsense, which de-legitimizes Palestinian perspectives. Sharon's disengagement plan is defined as a move towards peace in the region. By securing a discourse in which the Israeli state is peaceful and democratic, the *Jerusalem Post* downplays the reality that Israel still plans to exert direct occupation over the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories beyond the Gaza Strip. The newspaper rarely includes any discussion of the building of a 'security fence' in the West Bank during the disengagement process, thereby marginalizing a discourse in which the withdrawal of settlements is seen as a political ploy to increasingly annex more land in the West Bank. Furthermore, the *Jerusalem Post* reproduces a dominant Zionist narrative in which because of its history, the Israeli nation has an inherent right to Greater Israel (including the Occupied Territories). The newspaper therefore reinstates a framework of security in which occupation is defined as necessary for safeguarding the Israeli public and its borders. These discursive techniques are yet another one of the newspaper's strategies towards securing discursive occupation over the Palestinians.

The *Jerusalem Post* further employs a series of discursive strategies to persuade the Israeli public to accept disengagement policies. Through the application of a 'law and order' discourse, a 'numbers game' and the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' news, the newspaper once again reinforces state power as commonsense. Furthermore, the newspaper's inclusion of oppositional voices such as extremist protestors works to de-

legitimate their perspective because it is undemocratic and violent. The *Jerusalem Post* marginalizes these voices within its coverage and defines them as a threat to democratic society. Thus, the representation of these oppositional voices functions to negate an anti-disengagement perspective and discursively attempts to convince individuals to adopt the state framework. Consequently, not only does the *Jerusalem Post* center its coverage on the Israeli nation, it simultaneously calls on Israelis and Palestinians alike to adopt state ideologies.

Larger Patterns of Representation

Both the dominant state framework of occupation and the Orientalist discourse within the *Jerusalem Post*'s coverage of the disengagement work echo the findings of other scholarly research on the Israeli news media's representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As outlined in chapter one, Leibes (1997) stipulates that the Israeli media tend to collude with the government and army and reinforce state and military ideologies. Furthermore, like other Israeli news media outlets, the *Jerusalem Post* reaffirms the Israeli nation as an active democracy, through its focus on governmental democratic procedures and its representation of a plurality of perspectives. Similarly, when Palestinian perspectives are included, they are often represented as violent extremists, terrorists or suicide bombers that are decidedly undemocratic. The constitution of the Israeli nation as a democracy and the repetition of Palestinians as 'others' re-establishes hegemonic power relations that justify Israeli actions as security measures. Like other Israeli news outlets, the *Jerusalem Post* omits a context of occupation and a more nuanced discussion of the conflict. For instance, the newspaper's representation of the disengagement of settlements is akin to Israeli news media

representations of the *Intifada* in which news outlets adopt commonplace and established ideas, such as Israel's inherent right to the Occupied Territories. Like Roeh and Nir's study suggests (1993), the *Jerusalem Post* also selects the terms 'Judea' and 'Samaria' when referring to the settlements in the West Bank, which discursively works to establish Israel as the rightful owners of the Occupied Territories. Consequently, just like other Israeli news outlets the newspaper privileges Zionist and Orientalist discourses which arrest nuanced debates and possibilities for peace in the region.

Similarly, the trends regarding coverage within the *Jerusalem Post* point to a parallel with a larger operative discourse in Western (particularly North American) news media. The *Jerusalem Post* and the major U.S. news outlets figure the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of a greater Islam versus the West discourse. As Pednekar-Magal and Johnson's study (2004) explains, U.S. news media tend to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of a larger War on Terrorism. Similarly, the *Jerusalem Post's* constitution of the Israeli nation as a democracy functions to align Israel with Western democratic values. Constructing a parallel between Israel and the West, the newspaper consolidates Israel's status as part of a larger 'us' that needs to defend itself against 'them', specifically the Palestinians, but against all Muslims in general.

Another similarity between the *Jerusalem Post's* coverage of the disengagement plan and larger trends of coverage of the conflict within the U.S. news media is that both tend to downplay a narrative of in which occupation of the settlements is in fact deemed illegal under international law. This is another strategy that works to justify Israel's right to the land, condone their acts of violence as security measures and marginalize explanations about Palestinian acts of violence. As indicated by Coen (August 2002), the

U.S. media tend to call the settlements 'neighbourhoods,' which semantically works to cement the Occupied Territories as part of Israel. Similarly, the *Jerusalem Post* describes the settlements as Israeli homes. The use of land metaphors and terms such as 'presence' in lieu of 'occupation' suggests that the newspaper privileges a narrative in which the Occupied Territories belong to Israel. Moreover, both the *Jerusalem Post* and the U.S. news media ignore that the establishment of the settlements pose a reality of hardship and oppression for Palestinians. By highlighting that settlers are being forcibly evacuated from their homes, the *Jerusalem Post* marginalizes that these very same settlers placed Palestinians into the position of refugees.

Both the *Jerusalem Post* and the U.S. news outlets leave out the complicit relationship between Israel and the U.S. In both cases, the U.S. is presented as a neutral broker working in the interests of both Israelis and Palestinians. There is no deliberation as to why the U.S. defines Hamas and Islamic Jihad as terrorist groups, or why the U.S. supports Israeli policy and the building of the wall in the West Bank. The marginalization of these ideas hides that these news outlets' privilege a hegemonic Israeli framework of the Israeli Palestinian conflict.

Settling the Dispute through Discourse

I argue that in order to end the physical occupation of Palestinians, it is not enough to change Israeli political policy. Rather, news media must reconfigure the discourses of Orientalism and occupation which they unconsciously and systematically favour. The continued Orientalist binary opposition of 'us' and 'them' within the *Jerusalem Post* as well as national and international newspapers serves to hinder the

possibility of peace in the region. The professional news standards of balance in which two diametrically opposing views are positioned side by side fosters a discourse of war in which these perspectives are represented as incommensurable. In order to truly help the situation through serving as a genuine fourth estate or public sphere, news media must fundamentally alter the very way in which they construct the news. In other words, they must become true democratic institutions which include offering more nuanced and subordinate perspectives. This radical shift cannot just occur at the local or national level (Israel), insofar as the regional conflict is part of a larger international operative pro-Israeli discourse. It is therefore necessary to reform the discursive structures at the macro-international level.

I propose that newsmakers, including journalists, editors and publishers must acquire and develop CDA skills in order to shift hegemonic representations of the conflict as well as relations of domination and subordination. Through the application of CDA, newsmakers can become aware of how language and professional news standards operate ideologically and privilege dominant official sources couching oppositional perspectives within prevailing dominant frameworks. As Entman (2000) argues, it is not enough to simply place subordinate frameworks within the existing dominant ones insofar as hegemonic power relations remain steadfast. In order to illicit a shift in the power balance, news media must alter the very structure of the news as well as the professional standards to which they so desperately cling. Through CDA, newsmakers can become aware of how language selection and formal constraints construct particular hegemonic representations of the conflict and thus can begin to introduce lasting counter-frames and alternative sources. Particularly they can change the formal structures such as

what and who is emphasized in the headline and lead and use alternative sources.

Awareness of CDA therefore opens up avenues for change and agency by unraveling the discursive structures in which we are all bound. I therefore argue that in order for the method of CDA to prove more effective, it must make its way from the academic milieu to increased discourse analysis and reflexivity within the news media.

By applying CDA to news stories, the news media can become true sites of democratic deliberation. As already outlined in chapter two, CDA is a central tool for democracy insofar as it reveals how language use reinforce relations of domination and subordination (Mouffe, 2000). Although CDA is still bound by language (and therefore just like the news media is caught up in subjugating individuals into discursive structures), it offers the most democratic method by exposing how power and ideology function, allowing readers increased opportunity to make informed decisions. Through the application of CDA, newspapers would not just posture themselves as democratic institutions, which inadvertently reproduce relations of domination and subordination, but would become true public spheres that would allow for a shift in these power imbalances.

Just like the newsmakers, I also propose what Fairclough (1995) recommends; that news readers too must develop CDA skills. “A critical awareness of language and discursive practice is...becoming a prerequisite for a democratic citizenship, and an urgent priority for language in that the majority of the population are so far from having achieved it” (Fairclough, 1995, p.140). News readers must become aware of how professional news standards meant to decrease bias and distortion actually work to represent power and ideology as commonsense. With CDA, news readers can therefore loosen the discursive grip of the news media and develop a level of agency.

Limitations and Future Research

Further research exploring audience reception of the coverage would provide insight into the different ways that news readers interpret these texts, thereby offering a more nuanced comprehension of how individuals are interpellated into the discursive structures. Similarly, research that explores text production, such as how the articles are selected, edited and how the *Jerusalem Post* reconfigures news wire stories would provide further understanding of how news production impacts particular ideological representations.

In terms of the analysis of the texts themselves, because of temporal and spatial limitations, and due to the sheer number of articles on disengagement, my thesis research was limited to a two week period of coverage of the issue in one Israeli national newspaper. A more comprehensive CDA of the *Jerusalem Post* since June 2004, when Sharon originally introduced the plan, would provide further insight into how the overall framework and discourse changed throughout the evolution of the narrative. Specific research into whether the newspaper was more critical of the plan when it was originally opposed and rejected by the Likud Party would have indicated whether the newspaper had ever taken a critical stance on Sharon's policies. Although my research tended to focus on news and feature articles, a more in-depth analysis of editorials, which explicitly reveal the ideological position of the newspaper, would provide a more nuanced analysis of the possible relationship between media ownership and ideological representations. The examination of letters to the editor would also indicate how the newspaper contributes to the news standards of 'balance' by providing an outlet for public

expressions of approval and dissent. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that these letters do not carry equal symbolic weight as editorials and news articles, and are often used to shore up the newspaper's reputation as a 'fourth estate' while simultaneously privileging a dominant frame. Another important conjecture of investigation would be the analysis of photographs in terms of how they contribute to an overall representation.

Further comparative analyses of other national Israeli newspapers (both mainstream and alternative) would allow a comparison between different national news media outlets' framing of the disengagement, and shed light upon the possibility of an overarching pro-Zionist discourse at work. Concomitantly, a CDA on how the disengagement plan is recast within the Palestinian news media would illustrate how subordinate frames are refigured and oppositional views represented. Another area for further research would be the application of a CDA on international news media (particularly North American newspapers) to ascertain how the local conflict is retold and repackaged on an international level. Specifically, newspapers often refigure international or foreign news to fit in with local discourses and ideologies. As such, the examination of international newspapers would reveal how the coverage shifts within different contexts and whether there is a larger operative pro-Zionist discourse at the international level.

Concluding Remarks

What this research expresses is that there is an inherent danger in newspapers' constructions of imagined national communities, insofar as they entrench binary relations defining 'our' nation in contrast to 'theirs'. Furthermore, if newspapers are to provide or

reflect a public sphere and act as fourth estates, they cannot simply become mouthpieces for powerful ideologies and elite actors or nations. For newspapers or the news media in general to become real sites for democratic deliberation, they need to implement systemic changes. The first step is becoming aware of how news language subjugates us within discourse. Ironically, it is by admitting that we are 'always/already' subjugated by discursive structures that we can begin to loosen the structural grip. Specifically, hegemonic power is not stable and fixed, but must be constantly negotiated and fought for, consequently allowing room for dissenting and competing voices.

In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, newspapers must challenge existing representations and allow alternate, subordinate ones to come into the light. In terms of the ensuing direct and indirect occupation of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the news media must provide a context of how Israel continues to exert indirect control over the Gaza Strip. They must report that the Israeli government continues to maintain its stronghold on Gaza through control of many border crossings, the importation and exportation of goods and services, as well as control of airspace, territorial waters, population registry, the tax system, and over the PA. By including the Palestinian framework, news readers can truly become informed. By altering the discourses within the news media, news readers and those in positions of power can apply pressure to truly end the occupation of Palestinians.

Through continued use of subversive discourses, increased cracks within the dominant framework will seep through and shift hegemonic power relations insofar as news media have the power to influence those in positions of power as well as news readers. Reporting the conflict through an 'us' and 'them' reversal in which Palestinian

perspectives and ideologies are privileged and packaged as commonsense is not an effective strategy. This reversal still functions within the confines of a 'war discourse' in which both sides are incommensurable, hindering true possibilities for peace. Instead, true democratic deliberation, in which alternate perspectives are included within the coverage, will open up new, more complex dialogues and possibilities for peace. Solutions cannot function exclusively at the national political level. Rather, a shift in discourse and hegemonic power relations must occur within the discursive realm of news media at the transnational level. This process cannot simply occur via the hands of individual news workers. It must occur structurally: journalistic routines and practices must be reconsidered to allow more access for subordinate groups. Only by making the relations of domination and subordination explicit can we begin to loosen the shackles of the discursive structures that bind us as well as end the physical and discursive occupation of Palestinians.

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