# Empirical test of structural model under time-varying volatility 

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#### Abstract

Empirical test of structural model under time-varying volatility


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In trying to explain the "Credit Spread Puzzle", we empirically examine two competing structural models: the Leland (1994b) constant volatility model and the Perrakis and Zhong (2013) Constant Elasticity of Variance (CEV) model. We use the Leland model as our benchmark and hypothesize that the CEV model under state-dependent volatility will outperform it. For our estimation, we incorporate firm level time series data from different markets. Our sample covers the period from 2001 to 2011 . We apply the General Method of Moment (GMM) for our estimation of the parameters of the diffusion process for the Leland and CEV models respectively. In our results, we document on average a significantly negative beta, the elasticity parameter in the Perrakis and Zhong CEV model. More importantly, we find that the CEV model can fit the historical data much better than the constant volatility Leland (1994b) model across all maturities, suggesting that the state-dependent volatility can explain the "Credit Spread Puzzle" to some extent.

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## 1. Introduction

Pricing debt as a contingent claim on the firm's value is an approach known as a structural model of the firm, adopted from the option pricing domain. Following the Black and Scholes (1973) theory of option pricing, Merton (1974) implemented this approach in his pioneer work of bond pricing and risk structure of interest rates. In this approach, the firm asset value is treated as the underlying asset and the balance sheet items such as liability and equity play the role of contingent claims that can be valued by methods adapted from option valuation. Because of its detailed results, the structural model has drawn a lot of attention from academics and practitioners. Earlier studies have tackled, among others, the issues of debt pricing, credit risk, and optimal capital structure by applying this method. These structural models of the firms are distinct from the other major class of bond pricing models known as reduced form models. In reduced form models the underlying asset is no longer the unlevered firm value. Instead, observable variables such as equity returns and equity value take the place of underlying assets. Therefore, reduced form models do not tackle the optimal capital structure as structural models do.

The first study by Merton (1974) imposed several assumptions and restrictions to the model which may seem a little bit unrealistic by now. These restrictions include debt composed of zero coupon discount bonds, no transaction costs, no taxes, no bankruptcy cost, fully liquid markes and default that can only happen at the time of debt maturity. The firm value $V$ was set to follow a simple diffusion process. Thus, we can treat any security of the firm as a contingent claim on the underlying asset, the firm value. The closed-form solution was derived under this framework. Based on this pioneer model, Black and Cox (1976) proposed a new model which relaxed some of the assumptions. They allow the default to happen before the maturity and make the default boundary depend on certain types of bond indenture provisions. In particular, they examined the effect of three types of provision: safety covenants, subordination agreements and restrictions on
the financing of interest and dividend payments. Their conclusion is that these provisions would certainly increase the value of bonds and may affect the behaviour of the firm's securities. Also, they mentioned the possible effects of the introduction of bankruptcy cost and taxes, the time-varying volatility and the presence of a jump process. Although these models were adopted in many subsequent studies, the criticisms never disappeared. One of the most important such criticisms is the empirical result found by many researchers that the credit spreads predicted by those models were much smaller than actually observed credit spreads. ${ }^{1}$ This phenomenon was termed the "Credit Spread Puzzle" by Huang and Huang (2003). Several subsequent studies have tried to explain this phenomenon from different aspects. In Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) the authors proposed a two-factor model which incorporated interest rate risk. They derived a closed-form solution for risky coupon bond and debt value, distinguishing their work from that of others who also took into consideration interest-rate risk. They concluded that the interest rate can affect the valuation of firm securities through its correlation with firm value. Following Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Collin-Dufresne and Glodstein (2001) adopted this same two-factor framework to allow the interest rate to follow a stochastic process. However, they relaxed the assumption of constant default boundary while still keeping it exogenous. They argued that there was a target level of leverage for each individual firm or the firms in a certain industry, a stationary leverage ratio. They used a mean-reverting default threshold to represent this feature. Most importantly, in their work, they developed an exact solution for the Fortet equation of the first passage time to default under a multi-dimensional diffusion framework, which in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) is only found by an approximation of the true solution. Their model predicts credit risk more consistent with the observed credit spread. Huang and Zhou (2008) show that the Collin-Dufresne and Glodstein (2001) model was the only one that survives their empirical test.

[^0]Leland (1994a, b) and Leland and Toft (LT 1996), introduced the endogenous default boundary for infinite maturity debt and finite maturity debt respectively. They also incorporated in their model the Modigliani and Miller (MM) theorems by introducing the tax benefit and bankruptcy cost of debt into their model. They derived closed-form solutions for corporate debt value, firm value, equity value and the endogenous default boundary. Based on Leland (1994b), Perrakis and Zhong (2013) proposed a new structural model which incorporated time-varying volatility. Unlike the working paper of Elkamhi, Ericsson and Jiang (2011), which also introduced time-varying stochastic volatility into their structural model, Perrakis and Zhong (2013) used constant elasticity variance (CEV), a one-dimensional asset dynamic that significantly reduces the complexity of derivation and calculation of the model. Their conjecture is that the time-varying volatility will explain the "Credit Spread Puzzle" to some extent. Our objective in this paper is to test their conjecture empirically.

We adopt the framework and method from Huang and Zhou (2008). In their work, these authors used Credit Default Swap (CDS) market information because compared with corporate bond spreads the CDS spreads are relatively more pure for default risk pricing because of better liquidity in their respective markets. They also used the whole term-structure of the CDS spreads that can make the pricing error of the model more efficient. To solve this over-identified system, the General Method of Moments (GMM) is implemented here for the parameter estimation. ${ }^{2}$ Unlike Huang and Zhou (2008), which examined five classic structural models and compared their performance, our estimation goal is more specific here. We like to examine whether the introduction of time-varying volatility would explain the well-known "Credit Spread Puzzle".

[^1]Therefore, we only compared two models directly. One is Leland (1994b), with constant volatility, finite maturity and a closed-form solution; the second one is Perrakis and Zhong (2013) which adopts CEV asset dynamic for firm value and make the Leland (1994b) a special case, while still having a closed-form solution.

We collected 10 years firm level time series data for the estimation. Then we fitted all the available historical data into these two competing models. Those data include historical CDS spreads, firm financial statement data, equity market data, historical term structure of interest rate, and implied equity volatility from option market. Since $\sigma$ and $\beta$ are the only parameters we are interested, all the data from the different markets build up an over-identified model. Therefore, we applied the General Method of Moment (GMM) to empirically estimate our parameters. In our results, we document that the CEV model with time-dependent volatility outperforms the Leland (1994b) constant volatility model in fitting across all maturities.

To close our introduction and literature review, we discuss briefly the reduced form models. Even if our scope in this paper does not cover these models, they are an alternative strand of models for debt valuation. Similar with structural models, reduced form models also allow their primary asset dynamics to follow the diffusion or jump diffusion process. Reduced form models have their own advantages by using observable variables as their underlying asset instead of the unobservable unlevered firm value. However, reduced form models have the disadvantage of lacking the link between the default process and the capital structure, or the first time that asset value falls below a certain level. Due to this reason, reduced form models will not be examined and tested in this paper. ${ }^{3}$

The rest of this paper is structured as follow. Section 2 will briefly review the two models that we will compare in our estimation. Section 3 will discuss our econometric method and our empirical

[^2]estimation techniques in details. Section 4 will present our data cleaning and construction. Section 5 will be the analysis of our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

## 2. Review of structural models

In this section, we will review several important structural models which have appeared in the literature since the Merton model. They are: Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), Leland (1994b), and Perrakis and Zhong (2013). The structural models that will be tested by our empirical work are the last two models: Leland (1994b) and Perrakis and Zhong (2013) constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model. Since the major concern of our empirical work is testing whether the introduction of time-varying volatility into the model can improve the fitting of the historical data, we set in these two models everything equal except for the parameter which represents the time variation of the volatility. In other words, we consider the Leland (1994b) model as a special case of Perrakis and Zhong (2013) CEV model when the elasticity parameter $\beta$ is equal to zero. Therefore, we can get a straightforward result of the model performance by comparing the fitting of these two models.

### 2.1 The Merton (1974) model

The Merton (1974) model is the pioneer structural model, which considers securities of a firm as contingent claims on the underlying asset, firm value. This model has relatively strict restrictions such as: no transaction costs or taxes and bankruptcy costs, fully liquid market, zero coupon bond, unlimited borrowing and lending and the default can only happen at maturity. Unlike default in the subsequent barrier models, default in this model happens when the firm cannot pay the promised payment to the debt holder at maturity. Namely, when $V<B$, the firm will not make the payment to the debt holder and default, otherwise the equity holder will pay extra money.

Here $V$ is the underlying asset or firm value and $B$ is the promised payment to the debt holder at maturity. The firm value $V$ is following a simple diffusion process:

$$
\begin{equation*}
d V=\mu V d t+\sigma V d W \tag{2.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Therefore, the market value of any security of the firm at any point of time can be written as a function of the value of the firm at that time, $Y=F(V, t)$. Applying Ito's lemma, we can get the diffusion process for debt and then the differential equation which must be satisfied by the value of the debt:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2} V^{2} F_{V V}+r V F_{V}-r F-F_{\tau}=0 \tag{2.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Subject to the condition:

$$
F(V, 0)=\operatorname{Min}(V, B)
$$

Then the value of the equity of the firm can be written as $f(V, t)=V-F(V, t)$, and it satisfies the following partial differential equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2} V^{2} f_{V V}+r V f_{V}-r f-f_{\tau}=0 \tag{2.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Subject to the condition:

$$
f(V, 0)=\operatorname{Max}(0, V-B)
$$

It is identical to a European call option with the firm value corresponding to the stock price and the payment $B$ corresponds to the exercise price. Then we get directly the solution of the differential equation from the Black-Scholes option model:

$$
\begin{equation*}
f(V, \tau)=V \phi\left(x_{1}\right)-B e^{-r \tau} \phi\left(x_{2}\right) \tag{2.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where

$$
\phi(x) \equiv \frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{x} \exp \left[-\frac{1}{2} z^{2}\right] d z
$$

And

$$
\begin{aligned}
& x_{1} \equiv\left\{\log [V / B]+\left(r+\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}\right) \tau\right\} / \sigma \sqrt{\tau} \\
& x_{2} \equiv x_{1}-\sigma \sqrt{\tau}
\end{aligned}
$$

From $f(V, t)=V-F(V, t)$, we can get the value of the debt as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(V, \tau)=B e^{-r \tau}\left\{\phi\left[h_{2}\left(d, \sigma^{2} \tau\right)\right]+\frac{1}{d} \phi\left[h_{1}\left(d, \sigma^{2} \tau\right)\right]\right\} \tag{2.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& d \equiv B e^{-r \tau} / V \\
& h_{1}\left(d, \sigma^{2} \tau\right) \equiv-\left[\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2} \tau-\log (d)\right] / \sigma \sqrt{\tau} \\
& h_{2}\left(d, \sigma^{2} \tau\right) \equiv-\left[\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2} \tau-\log (d)\right] / \sigma \sqrt{\tau}
\end{aligned}
$$

### 2.2 The Black and Cox (1976) model

After Merton (1974), Black and Cox relaxed some of that model's assumptions and examined the effect of certain types of bond indentures which are encountered in practice. Namely, they examined three kinds of bond indentures: safety covenants, subordination arrangements and restrictions on the financing of interest and dividend payments. Their model has the following
assumptions: fully liquid market; no transaction cost, tax and bankruptcy cost; unlimited borrowing and lending with identical interest rate; and the value of the firm follow a diffusion process. However, default can happen before maturity when the firm value hits a certain boundary.

### 2.2.1 Safety covenants

Safety covenants are contractual provisions that give the debt holder the right to force a bankruptcy or firm reorganization before maturity if the firm is doing poorly by certain standards which are described in the covenants. One of these standards is that the firm omit the interest payment to the debt holder. However, the authors argued that if the equity holders are allowed to sell assets to fulfill the requirement, then this provision is not effective. Therefore, they made the safety covenants as follow: if the firm asset value falls below a certain level which was decided in the covenants, then the debt holder has the right to force a bankruptcy or reorganization. Thus, the value of bond $F$ will satisfy the following differential equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2} V^{2} F_{V V}+(r-\alpha) V F_{V}-r F+F_{t}=0 \tag{2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Subject to condition

$$
\begin{aligned}
& F(V, T)=\operatorname{Min}(V, P) \\
& F\left(C e^{-\gamma(T-t)}, t\right)=C e^{-\gamma(T-t)}
\end{aligned}
$$

Where $P$ is the promised payment to the debt holder, $\alpha$ is the proportion of dividend the equity holder can receive continuously and $C e^{-\gamma(T-t)}$ is the time-depended bankruptcy level.

Similarly, the value of stock has to satisfy the following differential equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2} V^{2} f_{V V}+(r-\alpha) V f_{V}-r f+f_{t}+\alpha V=0 \tag{2.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Subject to the conditions

$$
\begin{aligned}
& f(V, T)=\operatorname{Max}(V-P, 0) \\
& f\left(C e^{-\gamma(T-t)}, t\right)=0
\end{aligned}
$$

Solving the differential equation, the authors got the closed form solution for debt under the safety covenants as:

$$
\begin{align*}
F(V, t)= & P e^{-r(T-t)}\left[N\left(Z_{1}\right)-y^{2 \theta-2} N\left(Z_{2}\right)\right]+V e^{-\alpha(T-t)}\left[N\left(Z_{3}\right)+y^{2 \theta} N\left(Z_{4}\right)+y^{\theta+\zeta} e^{\alpha(T-t)} N\left(Z_{5}\right)\right. \\
& \left.+y^{\theta-\zeta} e^{\alpha(T-t)} N\left(Z_{6}\right)-y^{\theta-\eta} N\left(Z_{7}\right)-y^{\theta-\eta} N\left(Z_{8}\right)\right] \tag{2.8}
\end{align*}
$$

Where

$$
\begin{gathered}
y=C e^{-\gamma(T-t)} / V, \theta=\left(r-\alpha-\gamma+\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}\right) / \sigma^{2}, \zeta=\sqrt{\delta} / \sigma^{2} \\
\eta=\sqrt{\delta-2 \sigma^{2} \alpha} / \sigma^{2}, \delta=\left(r-\alpha-\gamma+\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}\right)^{2}+2 \sigma^{2}(r-\gamma) \\
Z_{1}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(V)-\operatorname{Ln}(P)+\left(r-\alpha-\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}\right)(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)} \\
Z_{2}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(V)-\operatorname{Ln}(P)+2 \operatorname{Ln}(y)+\left(r-\alpha-\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}\right)(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)} \\
Z_{3}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(P)-\operatorname{Ln}(V)-\left(r-\alpha+\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}\right)(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)} \\
Z_{4}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(V)-\operatorname{Ln}(P)+2 \operatorname{Ln}(y)+\left(r-\alpha+\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}\right)(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)} \\
Z_{5}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(y)+\zeta \sigma^{2}(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)}, Z_{6}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(y)-\zeta \sigma^{2}(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)} \\
Z_{7}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(y)+\eta \sigma^{2}(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)}, Z_{8}=\left[\operatorname{Ln}(y)-\eta \sigma^{2}(T-t)\right] / \sqrt{\sigma^{2}(T-t)}
\end{gathered}
$$

### 2.2.2 Subordination arrangements

The second kind of bond indenture provision is a subordination arrangement. It means that there exist two kinds of debt holders, senior debt holder and junior debt holder. Junior debt holders are subordinated to senior debt holders: they can get paid only after the promised payments to senior debt holders have been fully fulfilled at maturity. Suppose the payments to senior and junior debt holder are P and Q respectively. The author argued that the value for senior debt is the same as the value of debt in safety covenants provisions, and the value of junior debt is given by the following expression:

$$
J(V, t)= \begin{cases}F\left(V, t ; P+Q, \rho P e^{-r(T-t)}\right)-F\left(V, t ; P, \rho P e^{-r(T-t)}\right), & \text { if } \rho<1  \tag{2.9}\\ F\left(V, t ; P+Q, \rho P e^{-r(T-t)}\right)-P e^{-r(T-t)}, & \text { if } 1 \leq \rho \leq \frac{P+Q}{P} \\ Q e^{-r(T-t)}, & \text { if } \rho \geq \frac{P+Q}{P}\end{cases}
$$

Where $F\left(V, t ; P, \rho P e^{-r(T-t)}\right)$ denote the expression given in (2.8), and $\left.\rho P e^{-r(T-t)}\right)$ is the safety covenants boundary.

### 2.2.3 Restrictions on the financing of interest and dividend payments

Under the third kind of bond indenture provisions, the author supposed that the firm has interest paying bonds outstanding. It must fulfill these payments to the bond holder periodically. Once the firm missed one of these interest payments, the bondholder will force a reorganization and take over the firm. However, in this model, raising money by selling part of the firm asset is totally forbidden. Therefore, the stockholder can only issue new securities to meet the requirement of the payments. But in some situation the stockholder may not be able to do this if the equity value after the payments would be less than the payments. The author argued that even if the stockholders offer an equity issue which will dilute their own interest, there might be no taker for
the issuance. Therefore, it explained the observed fact that many firms end up with bankruptcy even if their asset value is still quite significant. On the other hand, if the firm issues new bond, the old bond holders must require that the new bond be subordinate bond. However, issuing a new junior bond at this situation would in fact help the senior bond holder and hurt the stockholder. Because issuing junior bond will make it more likely that interest payments will be missed and the bondholder will take over the firm. After this discussion, the authors stated that the value of security should satisfy the following equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2} V^{2} F_{V V}+r V F_{V}-r F+C=0 \tag{2.10}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, the solution can be obtained as follow:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(V)=\frac{C}{r}-\left[\left(\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha}\right)^{\alpha}-\left(\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha}\right)^{\alpha+1}\right]\left(\frac{C}{r}\right)^{\alpha+1} V^{-\alpha} \tag{2.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where

$$
\alpha=2 r / \sigma^{2}
$$

And $C$ is the continual interest payment of the bond.

### 2.3 The Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) models

After Black and Cox (1976), two other important structural models were presented in the literature. One such structural model is the Longstaff and Schwartz model. The authors adopted most features from Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976), while gradually relaxing more assumptions and examining more variables that might affect the credit spread. As in the previous models, they also allow the firm value to follow a diffusion process, but with one step further:
they make the interests rate time varying and following a diffusion process itself. Then basically, this model is a two dimensional diffusion model rather than the previous one-dimensional model. Moreover, in their model, a bankruptcy cost was introduced. With $\omega$ percent bankruptcy cost, if default happens, the bond holder will only receive $(1-\omega)$ percent of the face value of the default boundary, making their model more realistic. And they also challenged the strict absolute priority rules which were discussed in the Black and Cox (1976) model. They argued that growing evidences shows that in realistic corporate restructuring, the absolute priority rules are frequently violated. Furthermore, the authors provided evidence supporting that the actual payments allocation among different debt holders might be affected by many other factors such as: firm size, bargaining power of the debt holder, the strength of ties between firm manager and stockholders. Despite all these improvements of their model, they still adopted the setup in Black and Cox (1976) that the default boundary is a prefixed level which will not change during the process. In general, their major contributions in this model as they announced in paper are two aspects: first, the introduction of time varying interests rate; second, the violation of strict absolute priority rules.

In their model, the asset dynamic is as follow:

$$
\begin{align*}
& d V=\mu V d t+\sigma V d Z_{1} \\
& d r=(\zeta-\beta r) d t+\eta d Z_{2} \tag{2.12}
\end{align*}
$$

Where $Z_{1}$ and $Z_{2}$ are standard winner process, $\mu, \sigma, \zeta, \beta$, and $\eta$ are constants, and the asset dynamics of $r$ are drawn from the Vasicek (1977) model.

They derive the following expression for the value of fixed rate debt in their model:

$$
\begin{equation*}
P(X, r, T)=D(r, T)-\omega D(r, T) Q(X, r, T) \tag{2.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& Q(X, r, T, n)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_{i} \\
& q_{1}=N\left(a_{1}\right) \\
& q_{i}=N\left(a_{i}\right)-\sum_{j=1}^{i-1} q_{j} N\left(b_{i j}\right), \quad i=2,3, \ldots, n \\
& a_{i}=\frac{-L n(X)-M(i T / n, T)}{\sqrt{S(i T / n)}} \\
& b_{i j}=\frac{M(j T / n, T)-M(i T / n, T)}{\sqrt{S(i T / n)-S(j T / n)}}
\end{aligned}
$$

And where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& M(t, T)=\left(\frac{\alpha-\rho \sigma \eta}{\beta}-\frac{\eta^{2}}{\beta^{2}}-\frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}\right) t+\left(\frac{\rho \sigma \eta}{\beta^{2}}+\frac{\eta^{2}}{2 \beta^{3}}\right) \exp (-\beta T)(\exp (\beta t)-1) \\
&+\left(\frac{r}{\beta}-\frac{\alpha}{\beta^{2}}+\frac{\eta^{2}}{\beta^{3}}\right)(1-\exp (-\beta t))-\left(\frac{\eta^{2}}{2 \beta^{3}}\right) \exp (-\beta T)(1-\exp (-\beta t)) \\
& S(t)=\left(\frac{\rho \sigma \eta}{\beta}+\frac{\eta^{2}}{\beta^{2}}+\sigma^{2}\right) t-\left(\frac{\rho \sigma \eta}{\beta^{2}}+\frac{\eta^{2}}{2 \beta^{3}}\right)(1-\exp (-\beta t))+\left(\frac{\eta^{2}}{2 \beta^{3}}\right)(1-\exp (-2 \beta t))
\end{aligned}
$$

And $D(r, T)$ is the value of a riskless discount bond given by Vasicek (1977) and have the following form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
D(r, T)=\exp (A(T)-B(T) r) \tag{2.14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& A(T)=\left(\frac{\eta^{2}}{2 \beta^{2}}-\frac{\alpha}{\beta}\right) T+\left(\frac{\eta^{2}}{\beta^{3}}-\frac{\alpha}{\beta^{2}}\right)(\exp (-\beta T)-1)-\left(\frac{\eta^{2}}{4 \beta^{3}}\right)(\exp (-2 \beta T)-1) \\
& B(T)=\frac{1-\exp (-\beta T)}{\beta}
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, the expression for the value of floating rate debt is given as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(X, r, \tau, T)=P(X, r, T) R(r, \tau, T)+\omega D(r, T) G(X, r, \tau, T) \tag{2.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where

$$
\begin{gathered}
R(r, \tau, T)=r \exp (-\beta \tau)+\left(\frac{\alpha}{\beta}-\frac{\eta^{2}}{\beta^{2}}\right)(1-\exp (-\beta \tau))+\left(\frac{\eta^{2}}{2 \beta^{2}}\right) \exp (-\beta T)(\exp (\beta \tau)-\exp (-\beta \tau)) \\
G(X, r, \tau, T, n)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_{i} \frac{C(\tau, i T / n)}{S(i T / n)} M(i T / n, T)
\end{gathered}
$$

And where

$$
\begin{aligned}
C(\tau, T) & =\left(\frac{\rho \sigma \eta}{\beta}+\frac{\eta^{2}}{\beta^{2}}\right) \exp (-\beta \tau)(\exp (\beta \operatorname{Min}(\tau, t))-1) \\
& -\frac{\eta^{2}}{2 \beta^{2}} \exp (-\beta \tau) \exp (-\beta t)(\exp (2 \beta \operatorname{Min}(\tau, t))-1)
\end{aligned}
$$

After Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) also proposed a two factor model with stochastic interest rate which took a step further in relaxing the constant capital structure assumption and allowing the firm to issue new debt in the future. They also argued that there exists a target leverage level for each firm or each kind of industry. Then, the process for firm leverage follows mean-reverting asset dynamics, which means the firm will issue more debt if its leverage is below the target and otherwise retire the debt. In the later empirical work of Huang and Zhou (2008), the Collin-Dufresne and Glodstein (2001) model was the only one that survived their empirical tests.

### 2.4 The Leland (1994b) model

Leland (1994a) derives the close form solutions for corporate debt and optimal capital structure under an infinite maturity framework. Moreover, it introduces the impact of tax shield and bankruptcy cost into the model for the first time. The Leland (1994b) model inherited most of its
assumptions but with one very important modification: changing the maturity of bonds from infinity to arbitrary maturity. However, to keep the time-homogeneous cash flow feature of the debt, the new model allows a constant fraction of currently outstanding debt to be retired and replaced by newly-issued counterpart. Then the debt service cash flow will be constant as long as the firm is solvent. The author defined the rate at which the principal of debt is retired as the retirement rate $g$. We assume that at time $t=0$ the firm has total principal $P$, paying a constant total coupon rate $C$. As time goes by, the remaining value for this debt will be $e^{-g t} P$. The bondholder will receive the cash flow including coupon payments and fraction repayment of principal as $e^{-g t}(C+g P)$. Average debt maturity is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
M=\int_{0}^{\infty} t\left(g e^{-g t}\right) d t=\frac{1}{g} \tag{2.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

As in the previous Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976) and Leland (1994a) studies, the firm value $V$ follows a diffusion asset dynamic with constant volatility:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d V}{V}=\mu(V, t) d t+\sigma d z \tag{2.17}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $d z$ is standard Brownian motion. This process will continue endlessly as long as the firm is solvent. The default is triggered when $V$ first touches $V_{B}$, the default boundary which is endogenously determined by a "Smooth Pasting" condition.

Under this setup, Leland (1994b) derived the closed form solution for corporate debt $D$, firm value $v$, equity value, $E$ and endogenous default boundary $V_{B}$.

Corporate debt value $D$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
D=\frac{C+g P}{r+g}\left[1-\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-y}\right]+(1-\alpha) V_{B}\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-y} \tag{2.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where

$$
\begin{equation*}
y=\frac{\left(r-\delta-0.5 \sigma^{2}\right)+\left[\left(r-\delta-0.5 \sigma^{2}\right)^{2}+2(g+r) \sigma^{2}\right]^{0.5}}{\sigma^{2}} \tag{2.19}
\end{equation*}
$$

$\alpha$ is the fraction of value lost in the event of bankruptcy; $\delta$ is the proportional payout rate; $(1-\alpha) V_{B}$ is the total amount that bondholder will receive if default happens.

Firm value $v$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
v=V+T B-B C \tag{2.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

It can be interpreted as the total value of the firm equals the unlevered firm value plus the value of tax benefit, minus the bankruptcy cost. Tax benefit and bankruptcy cost are as follows:

$$
\begin{gather*}
T B=(\tau C / r)\left[1-\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-x}\right]  \tag{2.21}\\
B C=\alpha V_{B}\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-x} \tag{2.22}
\end{gather*}
$$

Implying:

$$
\begin{equation*}
v=V+(\tau C / r)\left[1-\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-x}\right]-\alpha V_{B}\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-x} \tag{2.23}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $x$ is given by equation (2.4) of $y$ by setting $g=0$, another word, when the average maturity of debt is infinity.

Equity value $E$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=V+\left(\frac{\tau C}{r}\right)\left[1-\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-x}\right]-\alpha V_{B}\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-x}-\left(\frac{C+g P}{r+g}\right)\left[1-\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-y}\right]-(1-\alpha) V_{B}\left(\frac{V}{V_{B}}\right)^{-y} \tag{2.24}
\end{equation*}
$$

This value of equity is calculated as firm value minus debt value: $E=v-D . v$ and $D$ are given by equations (2.23) and (2.18).

Endogenous default boundary:

$$
\begin{equation*}
V_{B}=\frac{\left[\frac{(C+g P) y}{r+g}-\frac{\tau C x}{r}\right]}{1+\alpha x+(1-\alpha) y} \tag{2.25}
\end{equation*}
$$

This closed form solution for endogenous default boundary is derived by applying the "Smooth Pasting" condition.

Therefore, we can clearly see that under this framework of Leland (1994b), the very neat and intuitive closed form solution for all the balance sheet items we are interested in can be derived easily. Due to its simplicity of computation and straightforward intuition, we apply this model in our empirical estimation as a benchmark to compare with the CEV model. However, there is a clarification needed to be made: in our estimation, we used the $\mathrm{KMV}^{4}$ default boundary instead of the endogenous default boundary to make our comparison of these two models more directly.

[^3]
### 2.5 The Perrakis and Zhong (2013) CEV model

This CEV model is the main target of our empirical estimation and test. It was derived in Stylianos Perrakis and Rui Zhong's working paper "Structural Models of the Firm under State-Dependent Volatility: Theory and Empirical Evidence". The authors took the Leland (1994b) as their base case and introduced the time-varying volatility into the model. The major assumptions also follow the previous models: continuous coupon payment, finite maturity for debt, endogenous default boundary ${ }^{5}$ and first passage time default. The unlevered firm value $V$ following a diffusion process with state dependent volatility $\sigma\left(V^{D}\right)$ (Q-distribution)

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d V}{V}=(r-q) d t+\sigma\left(V^{D}\right) d W^{Q} \tag{2.26}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $r$ is the risk free rate; $q$ is the payout rate of the asset, including coupon to debt-holder and dividend to shareholder; $\sigma\left(V^{D}\right)$ is the state dependent volatility; $W$ is the standard Brownian motion. Then if we consider the bond maturity date $T$, and the first time firm value touches the boundary $\tau$, then we will have the following asset dynamics:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\frac{d V_{t}}{V_{t}}=(r-q) d t+\sigma\left(V^{D}\right) d W^{Q}, \text { if } 0<t<\tau<T  \tag{2.27}\\
V_{t}=\min \left\{V_{\tau}, K\right\} \text { if } 0<\tau \leq t<T
\end{array}\right.
$$

Where $K$ is the default boundary. Once the firm value $V$ passes this value for the first time, the default will be triggered and the debt-holder will receive $(1-\alpha) K$. Under the CEV model, the

[^4]state-dependent volatility then can be presented as $\sigma\left(V^{D}\right)=\theta V^{\beta} . \beta$, the elasticity of volatility, is the key parameter in the CEV model, which is also the key parameter in our estimation. When $\beta>0(<0)$ then the volatility is positively (negatively) correlated with firm value; when $\beta=0$, the model is reduced to constant volatility as in Leland (1994b). In Perrakis and Zhong (2013), the authors adopt $\beta<0$ without further restrictions. However, in this paper, our empirical results can give reader an idea of how exactly beta is distributed across our sample.

To make the debt maturity finite in this model, the authors also applied the continuous retirement of fraction of the debt principal and replaced it with newly issued equal amount of debt. The retirement rate is also $g$, and satisfies the same relationship as Leland (1994b) does in equation (2.16):

$$
M=\int_{0}^{\infty} t\left(g e^{-g t}\right) d t=\frac{1}{g}
$$

Under this framework, Perrakis and Zhong (2013) derived the close form solution for corporate debt value, firm value and equity value.

Corporate debt $D$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
D(V, K, g)=\frac{C+g P}{r+g}\left(1-\frac{\phi_{r+g}(V)}{\phi_{r+g}(K)}\right)+(1-\alpha) K \frac{\phi_{r+g}(V)}{\phi_{r+g}(K)} \tag{2.28}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where
$\frac{\phi_{r+g}(V)}{\phi_{r+g}(K)}$ is the expected present value of one dollar payment when bankruptcy happens. ${ }^{6}$ The expression for $\phi$ can be found in Lemma 2 from Perrakis and Zhong (2013):

$$
\phi_{r}(V)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
V^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{\epsilon} W_{k, m}(x), \beta<0, r \neq 0  \tag{2.29}\\
V^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{\epsilon} M_{k, m}(x), \beta>0, r \neq 0
\end{array}\right.
$$

Where

$$
\left.\begin{array}{c}
\left.\left.x=\frac{|r-q|}{\theta^{2}|\beta|} V^{-2 \beta}, \epsilon \quad r-q\right) \beta\right), m=\frac{1}{4|\beta|} \\
k=\epsilon_{(<} \quad \text {, } \quad . \\
\text { (r) }
\end{array}\right)-\frac{r}{2|(r-q) \beta|} .
$$

Where $W_{k, m}(x)$ and $M_{k, m}(x)$ are Whittaker functions ${ }^{7}$.

Firm value $v$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
v(V, K)=V+T B(V, K)-B C(V, K) \tag{2.30}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where:

$$
\begin{equation*}
T B(V, K)=\frac{w C}{r}-\frac{w C}{r} \frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)} \tag{2.31}
\end{equation*}
$$

[^5]\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
B C(V, K)=\alpha K \frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)} \tag{2.32}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

Then:

$$
\begin{equation*}
v(V, K)=V+\frac{w C}{r}-\frac{w C}{r} \frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)}-\alpha K \frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)} \tag{2.33}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $w$ is the tax rate. The intuition and structure here is similar with the one in Leland (1994b).

Equity value $E$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=v-D \tag{2.34}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then:

$$
\begin{equation*}
E=V+\frac{w C}{r}\left[1-\frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)}\right]-\frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)} \alpha K-\frac{C+g P}{r+g}\left(1-\frac{\phi_{r+g}(V)}{\phi_{r+g}(K)}\right)-(1-\alpha) K \frac{\phi_{r+g}(V)}{\phi_{r+g}(K)}(2 \tag{2.35}
\end{equation*}
$$

## 3. Empirical estimation method and techniques

### 3.1 Parameters to be estimated

The unlevered firm value is the unobservable basic process in structural models. Our task here is to estimate the components of the unlevered firm value process; for this we need the parameters of the basic unlevered firm value process. In the Leland (1994b) model, the asset dynamics of this unlevered firm value are:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d V}{V}=\mu(V, t) d t+\sigma d z \tag{3.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since we are interested in the risk neutral version of this process, the only parameter that needs to be estimated is $\sigma$. According to the model specification, the endogenous default boundary should
be another important component to be estimated for the Leland (1994b) model. However, for simplicity of the calculation and the direct examination of the effect of time-varying volatility, we set the default boundary exogenously, for both the Leland (1994b) and the Perrakis and Zhong (2013) models. We implemented the KMV default boundary in our estimation. ${ }^{8}$ Thus, the only difference between these two models is the form of the diffusion volatility.

The CEV risk neutral asset dynamics for the unlevered firm value in Perrakis and Zhong (2013) is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
d V=(r-q) V d t+\theta V^{\beta} d W \tag{3.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then for this model, the parameters that need to be estimated are $\theta$ and $\beta . \beta$ is the elasticity coefficient for the CEV process as mentioned in the previous section. However, $\theta$ does not have a direct economic intuition here. Thus I define a new variable $\sigma_{0}$ here, which satisfies the following relationship:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sigma_{0}=\theta V_{0}^{\beta} \tag{3.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $V_{0}$ is the initial value of firm, and is scaled to value 1 in our estimation. ${ }^{9}$ Obviously, $\sigma_{0}$ here is the initial volatility of the firm value. Since it has a straightforward economic intuition, we estimate this parameter instead of $\theta$. There is a good reason we did this. Since we apply numerical methods to estimate the parameters we are interested in, we have to guess an initial value of the parameters to start the process. If the parameters have straightforward economic intuition, it will be easier for us to give those parameters meaningful initial guesses. Moreover, once we get the results of our estimation, it will give us the convenience to check whether the

[^6]results fall into a reasonable range. Then, after we get the value of $\sigma_{0}$, we can calculate the value of $\theta$ by applying the above relationship.

### 3.2 Moment conditions and the GMM method

To estimate those parameters we are interested in by the GMM method, we first construct our moment conditions which will be used to calculate the objective function for the GMM method. Follow Huang and Zhou (2008), we use the term structure of CDS spreads and volatility as part of our moment conditions. In addition, we incorporate equity value and leverage ratio into our moment condition. In particular, we have nine moment conditions: equity value, equity volatility, leverage ratio, and six different maturity CDS spreads (1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years). First, we will present the method used to calculate these values.

Model predicted CDS spreads: ${ }^{10}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{CDS}(0, T)=\frac{(1-R) \sum_{i=1}^{4 T} D\left(0, T_{i}\right)\left[Q\left(0, T_{i-1}\right)-Q\left(0, T_{i}\right)\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{4 T} D\left(0, T_{i}\right) Q\left(0, T_{i}\right) / 4} \tag{3.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

Here we assume that the CDS premium payment is quarterly. $R$ is the recovery rate, $D\left(0, T_{i}\right)$ is the discount factor, and $Q\left(0, T_{i}\right)$ is the survival probability during the time interval $\left[0, T_{i}\right]$. The CDS spreads can be calculated while the survival probability can be derived based on the asset diffusion process. Actually, the survival probability $Q(0, T)$ is the crucial connection bridge between our empirical estimation and the model:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Q(0, T)=1-A(0, T) \tag{3.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

[^7]Where $A(0, T)$ is the first passage default probability. Unlike the first passage default probability of the Leland (1994b) model, the probability for the Perrakis and Zhong (2013) CEV model is very complicated. It has already been proved that the first passage default probability for the CEV model can be calculated by the formula bellow: ${ }^{11}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
A(T)=\text { inverselaplace }\left(\frac{1}{\lambda} \bullet \frac{\phi_{\lambda}(V)}{\phi_{\lambda}(K)}\right) \tag{3.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $\phi$ can be calculated by applying equation (2.29). However, the build-in functions in Matlab to calculate the Whittaker Functions W and M are very inefficient. Moreover, there is an overflow problem with the Matlab programing, ${ }^{12}$ so we used numerical methods to approximate the Whittaker Functions in our estimations. The details can be found in Appendix A.

Then applying the inverse-Laplace transformation we can get the default probabilities we need for the CDS spreads. ${ }^{13}$

Model predicted equity value:

$$
\begin{align*}
E & =v-D \\
& =V+\frac{w C}{r}\left[1-\frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)}\right]-\frac{\phi_{r}(V)}{\phi_{r}(K)} \alpha K-\frac{C+g P}{r+g}\left(1-\frac{\phi_{r+g}(V)}{\phi_{r+g}(K)}\right)-(1-\alpha) K \frac{\phi_{r+g}(V)}{\phi_{r+g}(K)} \tag{3.7}
\end{align*}
$$

Notice that in the expression for the equity value, there are several $\phi$-values in our calculations. For these we adopt the same numerical method as the one presented in Appendix A to approximate the value of the Whittaker Function and $\phi .{ }^{14}$

[^8]Model predicted equity volatility:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sigma_{\mathrm{E}}=\frac{\frac{\partial E}{\partial V} \theta V^{\beta+1}}{E} \tag{3.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

This relationship between equity volatility and firm value volatility was first pointed out by Merton (1974). We can see that both the equity volatility and firm value volatility here are time-varying. Since we already have the expression for equity value $E$, the crucial part of this formula now is the partial derivative of equity value with respect to firm value. We can find the answer in Appendix B of Perrakis and Zhong (2013). However, if we directly apply their expressions, we will encounter some technical issues such as the overflow of the Matlab programming. Therefore, we have to find a way to numerically estimate the partial derivative. We provide our numerical solution in Appendix C of this paper.

Model predicted leverage ratio:

$$
\begin{equation*}
L e v=\frac{D}{D+E} \tag{3.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $D$ and $E$ can be calculated by equation (2.18) and equation (2.24).

Then we can use these values to build up our moment conditions and conduct our empirical test. In our first exercise, we only incorporate seven moments: equity volatility, and term structure of CDS spreads. We denote the estimation parameter vector $\psi_{1}=\left(\sigma_{0}, \beta\right)$. The Leland (1994b) model will be a special case when $\beta=0$. Thus, we will have the following over-identified system:

[^9]\[

f_{1}\left(\psi_{1}, t\right)=\left\{$$
\begin{array}{c}
\sigma_{E}(t)-\sigma_{E}(t)  \tag{3.10}\\
C D S\left(t, T_{1}\right)-C D S\left(t, T_{1}\right) \\
\ldots \ldots \\
C D S\left(t, T_{i}\right)-C D S\left(t, T_{i}\right)
\end{array}
$$\right\}
\]

Where $f_{1}$ is a function of our parameter set at each time point $t=1,2, \ldots, T . \sigma_{E}$, is observed equity volatility. $C D S\left(t, T_{i}\right)$ is observed term structure of $\operatorname{CDS}$ spreads. Under the null hypothesis that the model is correct, we have:

$$
\begin{equation*}
E\left[f_{1}\left(\psi_{1}, t\right)\right]=0 \tag{3.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

By applying the GMM method, we want to minimize $E\left[f_{1}\left(\psi_{1}, t\right)\right]$. We set:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{1}\left(\psi_{1}, t\right)=\frac{1}{T} \sum_{1}^{T} f_{1}\left(\psi_{1}, t\right) \tag{3.12}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then we can estimate our parameter $\psi_{1}$ by minimizing the following objective function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\psi_{1}=\arg \min G_{1}\left(\psi_{1}, t\right)^{\prime} W G_{1}\left(\psi_{1}, t\right) \tag{3.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where ${ }^{W}$ is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. In Huang and Zhou (2008) and Elkamhi, Ericsson and Jiang (2011), they specify that the weighted matrix $W$ is the asymptotic covariance matrix. However, from page 443-447 in Green's Econometrics Analysis (Sixth Edition), we can see that the most efficient weighted matrix is the inverse of the variance and covariance matrix of the moments. Moreover, intuitively, due to the different magnitude of each moment, if we directly apply the covariance matrix as our weighted matrix, it will definitely give different weights to different moments in our estimation, causing bias. On the other hand, the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix will give each moment equal weight,
incorporating information in different moments equally. Therefore, we chose the inverse of variance matrix to be our weighted matrix. We also used the variance matrix as a robustness check and, as we predicted, the results were not as good. The results of this robustness check are not reported in this paper. The details of the GMM method are presented in Appendix D of this paper.

In our next exercise, we add leverage ratio and equity value in our estimation. Thus, we have the following over-identified restrictions:

$$
f_{2}\left(\psi_{2}, t\right)=\left\{\begin{array}{c}
C D S\left(t, T_{1}\right)-C D S\left(t, T_{1}\right)  \tag{3.14}\\
\ldots \ldots \\
C D S\left(t, T_{i}\right)-C D S\left(t, T_{i}\right) \\
\sigma_{E}(t)-\sigma_{E}(t) \\
E(t)-E(t) \\
\operatorname{Leverage}(t)-\operatorname{Leverage}(t)
\end{array}\right\}
$$

Where $\psi_{2}$ is the parameter vector. $C D S, \sigma_{E}, E$, and Leverage are the observed CDS term structure, equity volatility, equity value, and leverage ratio respectively. Then, it is obvious that each moment in this system is the difference between the observed value and its model calculated counterpart. This difference is the pricing error of the model.

As in the previous exercise, the null hypothesis is that the model is specified correctly; we have:

$$
\begin{equation*}
E\left[f_{2}\left(\psi_{2}, t\right)\right]=0 \tag{3.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

To minimize $E\left[f_{2}\left(\psi_{2}, t\right)\right]$ by the GMM method, we set:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{2}\left(\psi_{2}, t\right)=\frac{1}{T} \sum_{1}^{T} f_{2}\left(\psi_{2}, t\right) \tag{3.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

Our objective function will be:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\psi_{2}=\arg \min G_{2}\left(\psi_{2}, t\right)^{\prime} W G_{2}\left(\psi_{2}, t\right) \tag{3.17}
\end{equation*}
$$

The calculation of the weighted matrix $W$ is the same as the one in the previous exercise.

## 4. Data description

We incorporate data from different sources: Credit Default Swap market, equity market, option market, debt market, and firm financial statements.

Our CDS spreads data is from the Markit database. The data period is from January 2001 to December 2011. We restrict our sample to United States firms and the currency is in US dollars. Moreover, we focus on CDS contracts with modified restructuring (MR) policy because they are the most popular in the US market. ${ }^{15}$ Observations for which important variables ${ }^{16}$ are missing or have unreasonable values ${ }^{17}$ are deleted from our sample. After these cleaning up steps, the observations left will constitute our final sample. Since we need to build up our dataset monthly while all the CDS data from Markit is daily, we chose the last Wednesday of each month to represent that month and convert our daily data into monthly data. Eventually, to make our estimation more reliable, we only select those firms which have at least 60 months' consecutive observations.

[^10]The financial statement variables and equity variables are acquired from the Compustat and CRSP databases. After unifying their measurement units ${ }^{18}$ and standardizing ${ }^{19}$ them, we expanded their frequency form quarterly to monthly by SAS. ${ }^{20}$ Equity value is calculated as stock price times shares outstanding, firm value is calculated as book value of debt plus market value of equity, and payout rate is calculated as dividend payments plus interest payment scaled by the firm's total assets. As for the CDS spreads data, we eliminated those observations whose important variables values are missing or unreasonable.

The option implied volatility is obtained from the OptionMetrics database and the realized volatility is obtained from the TAQ database on five-minutes intervals and is then converted to monthly data. In our main test, we used implied volatility only, with the realized volatility used just for robustness checks. The reason is that the option implied volatility can reflect the information from option market. Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010) argue that implied volatility is a more efficient forecast for future realized volatility.

## [Insert Table 1]

Following Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Collin-Dufresne and Glodstein (2001), we used the term structure of interest rates instead of a constant interest rate as our risk free rate. We interpolated our risk rate term structure from observed 3 month, 6 month Libor rates and 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 years interest rate swap rates.

After merging and cleaning all the data from the different databases by the above criteria, we have 104 firms surviving in our total sample.

## [Insert Table 2]

[^11]
## 5. Estimation Results and Analysis

In this section, we summarize and analyze the findings of the empirical test of the GMM estimator defined in the last section using the CDS spreads term. On the basis of these results, we also compare the Leland (1994b) and Perrakis and Zhong (2013) models in terms of their goodness of fit. For the estimation, we use two alternative data sets in our tests: the first is the 7-moment set, which includes 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, 7-year and 10-year CDS spreads and implied equity volatility; and the second set is the 9 -moment, which contains two additional moments, equity value and leverage.

### 5.1 Summary Statistics

In this paper, we used data from different sources and converted their frequencies to monthly. Table 1 defines the variables used in our empirical tests and their units of measurement. Table 2 lists the 103 firms in our data base and provides descriptive statistics of their most important characteristics. Table 3 provides summary statistics on firm characteristic and CDS spreads of our sample firms across both rating and sector categories in terms of average value. As can be seen from Panel A of this table, our sample firms' debt ranges from triple-C to triple-A. Nonetheless, most of our sample is concentrated in the single-A and triple-B categories, which account for $82 \%$ of the total, consistent with the study of Huang and Zhou (2008). In terms of the averages in the entire sample, the 5 -year CDS spread is 61.76 basis points, implied equity volatility is $27.31 \%$, and leverage ratio is $37.91 \%$. As we expected, the CDS spreads, volatility and leverage increase as rating decreases. However, we note that single-B and triple-C are two exceptions, with the CDS spreads and implied volatilities actually decreasing as rating decreases. Since they only have 1 observation in each category respectively, we attribute this finding to lack of sufficient sample size. Consistent with our intuition, the CDS spreads for all rating are increasing as maturity increases.

## [Insert Table 3]

[Insert Table 4]

Figure 1 plots the time series of the average CDS spreads (5-year CDS spreads from January 2001 to December 2011). As presented in the figure, the average CDS spreads show large variation during the period and have two peaks around late 2002 and late 2008 respectively.

## [Insert Figure 1]

### 5.2 Tests for the Leland model

We use Leland (1994b) as our benchmark model. However, to simplify the calculations at this point, we used the fixed exogenous default boundary instead of the endogenous default boundary setting. Hence, the parameter we care about in Leland model is "Sigma", the volatility of the unlevered firm value. In Tables 5 and 7, the parameter estimation results are shown respectively for 9- and 7-moment estimations under the Leland model. As can be seen in Panel C of Tables 5 and 7, the average values of Sigma are $15.57 \%$ and $16.18 \%$ respectively. Also shown are the test statistics for each rating and sector categories. The T value shown in the table are the average T values of the estimated parameters for each individual firm. We can clearly see that they are all highly significantly different from zero. However, in both tables we could not find a clear pattern about Sigma across different rating groups and different industrial sectors. The column titled " $F$ Value" reports the optimized value of our object function, equation 3.17. And the column titled "J test" reports the value of the J statistic, $J=T \times F_{\_}$value .
[Insert table 5]
[Insert table 7]

In Table 9, the distributions of Sigma under the Leland model across individual firms are shown, respectively for 7 - and 9 -moment estimations. Firm "Dow Chem Co" has the largest Sigma values for 7- and 9-moment, 0.2974 and 0.2913 respectively; firm "Raytheon Co" has the smallest Sigma values for 7- and 9-moment, 0.05 and 0.05 respectively. We can see that overall, the Leland model with 7 -moment conditions will get a bigger estimation for Sigma. However, even if the T-statistics under 7- and 9-moment are both highly significant, we can still observe a significant difference, 40.33 and 64 on average for 7 - and 9 -moment respectively. Since the T-statistics are calculated as the quotient of the values of Sigma and the standard errors of the sigma, the standard errors for Sigma under 9-moment conditions must be smaller than their counterparts under 7-moment conditions, especially since the values of Sigma under 9-moment conditions are generally smaller. In fact, in our estimation, most of the firms have a smaller standard error under the 9-moment condition, only two firms ("Merck \& Co Inc" and "Wal Mart Stores Inc") have a smaller standard error under 7-moment conditions. Therefore, from the aspect of parameter estimation, the Leland model under 9-moment conditions perform a little bit better than the Leland model under 7-moment conditions due to its smaller estimation standard error. On the other hand, if we take a look at Figure 6, we can see that from the aspect of historical data fitting, both Leland models with 7 - and 9 -moments are very similar with each other. The 7-moment condition fit is slightly better than the 9 -moment condition.

## [Insert table 9]

Since Single-A and Triple-B CDS account for $82 \%$ in our total sample, their Sigma distribution are shown separately in Table 10. The average Sigma value for A- rated firms with 7- and 9 -momnet are 0.1743 and 0.1675 respectively; The average Sigma value for BBB rated firms with 7- and 9-moments are 0.1494 and 0.1444 respectively; The total average Sigma values for these firms with 7-and 9-moments are 0.1607 and 0.1549 respectively. For A rated firms, "Baker Hughes Inc" has the largest Sigma value of 0.2756 and 0.2749 for 7 - and 9 -moments respectively;
"Raytheon Co" has the smallest Sigma value of 0.05 and 0.05 for 7 - and 9-moments respectively. For BBB rated firms, "Dow Chem Co" has the largest Sigma value of 0.2974 and 0.2913 for 7and 9-moments respectively; "Textron Inc" has the smallest Sigma value of 0.0685 and 0.0507 for 7- and 9-moments respectively. We can clearly see from Table 10 that the Leland model with 7-moment conditions will yield a bigger estimate of sigma than the Leland model with 9-moment conditions, consistent with the result of Table 9.
[Insert Table 10]

### 5.3 Tests for the CEV model

In the CEV model, we estimate two parameters, Sigma and Beta. Because of the computational complexity mentioned in the previous section of this paper, we estimated positive betas and negative betas separately. Then, we use the F value as the standard to decide whether our firm is positive beta or negative beta (whichever has the smaller F value). Table 6 shows the estimation results for the CEV model using 9 moments. The left panel shows the result for all firms, the middle part shows the firms with positive beta, and the right panel shows the firms with negative beta. We can clearly see that all betas in the left panel are not significant, while most of the betas in the middle panel and the right panel are highly significant. Our total sample here is 103 firms (Republic Services Inc. cannot be calculated for either positive or negative betas), the number of firms with positive betas is 52 , and the number of firms with negative betas is 51 . Hence, in the entire sample the values of positive betas and negative betas cancel out and make the test statistic not significant. Once we separate the sample into positive and negative betas, they are both very significant. In terms of the averages in each sub-sample, the value of beta is 0.6392 for the positive group and -0.5204 for the negative group, both significant. Looking at the T values, we find that on the individual firm level, all our estimated parameters are significant except for the triple-A firm with positive beta, which has a T value equal to 1.7.

Table 8 shows the estimation results for the CEV model using 7 moments. In contrast with Table 6 , the number of firms with negative beta dominates this time. The total sample number is still 103 (Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. cannot be calculated for both positive and negative betas), but the number of firms with positive beta is only 29 , while the number of firms with negative beta is now 74 , accounting for $71.84 \%$ of the total sample. All betas in the negative group are highly significant. When we directly compare these two CEV models with different moments settings, we find that the CEV model with 7 -moments performs better than the CEV model with 9 moments, with a total average J test value equal to 13.51 , which is smaller than the J test value in the 9 -moment model of 14.39 . This finding is confirmed further on, by the figures presented in the next subsection. In addition, all T values in this test are highly significant. We can also see that in Table 8, the T values for both positive and negative groups are much larger than the corresponding T values in Table 6. This finding implies that from the point of view of parameter estimation, the CEV model with 7-moment conditions also perform better than the CEV model with 9-moment conditions.

## [Insert table 8]

In Tables 11 and 12, we show the beta distributions across our sample firms. Table 11 presents the beta distribution for the CEV model with 9-moment conditions. There are 51 firms with negative betas and 52 firms with positive betas. Panel A shows the firms with negative betas. Firm "Gen Mls Inc" has the smallest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are $-0.5204,14.159$ and 64.8393 respectively for the negative group; panel B shows the firms with positive betas. Firm "AmerisourceBergen Corp" has the largest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are $0.6392,14.6222$ and 5.656 respectively for the positive group. Table 12 presents the beta distribution for the CEV model with 7-moment
conditions. There are 74 firms with negative betas and 29 firms with positive betas. Panel A shows the firms with negative betas. Firm "Smithfield Foods Inc" has the smallest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are- 0.9508 , 13.4377 and 200.7618 respectively for the negative group; panel B shows the firms with positive betas. Firm "Gen Mls Inc" has the largest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are 0.5201 , 13.7058 and 61.777 respectively for the positive group. We can see that, in both 7 - and 9 -moment condition CEV model, the negative beta groups have larger T values and smaller J statistics. This implies that for both historical data fitting and firm level parameter estimation levels, the negative beta group performs better than the positive beta group. On the other hand, we can directly compare the test statistics between 7- and 9-moment condition models. Clearly, in both positive and negative beta groups, the 7 -moment condition CEV model has a much larger T value and a smaller J statistic, implying that the leverage ratio as a moment condition in the CEV model does not improve the fitting and estimation ability of the model.
[Insert table 11]
[Insert table 12]

### 5.4 Comparing results

In Figure 2 and Figure 4, we show the 5 -year CDS spreads, the historical data and the fitted values of both models using 7-moment and 9-moment estimations respectively. The solid line represent the observed historical data, the dot line represent the CEV model calculated 5-year CDS spreads, and the dashed line represent the Leland model-calculated 5 -year CDS spreads. Consistent with Huang and Huang (2013), the "Credit Spread Puzzle" can be observed in the figures. The Leland model calculated 5 -year CDS spreads are consistently underestimating the observed spreads during the whole period. . On the other hand, we can see that the CEV model calculated CDS spreads are much higher, and follow the trend more precisely than the Leland
model. At this point, we can state with confidence that the introduction of time varying volatility can enhance the fitting ability of the structural model significantly.
[Insert figure 2]
[Insert figure 4]

However, when we compare the two CEV models with different moments settings, we find that the CEV model with 7 moments outperforms the CEV model with 9 moments. In Figure 6, we put all model and moments combinations together, and it is clear that the CEV model with 7 moments is the best.

## [Insert figure 6]

Figures 3 and 5 present the historical data fitting of equity volatility for the Lelandand CEV models with 7 - and 9 -moment conditions respectively. The Leland- calculated equity volatility is a little more volatile than the CEV- calculated equity volatility. However, there is no other obvious difference between the Leland and CEV models with different moment conditions. We attribute this to the weight of equity volatility as a moment condition in the estimation, which is not as large as the weight of CDS spreads since there are five CDS spreads moment conditions and only one equity volatility moment condition.

We speculate that making Leverage a moment condition would decrease the model- calculated CDS spreads. In Perrakis and Zhong (2013), the authors have similar findings in their model calibration.

At this point, we state that the introducing of time-varying volatility can improve the historical data fitting for structural model significantly, and the 7 -moment condition has a better performance compared to the 9 -moment condition. However, a comprehensive comparison between the CEV and Leland models should be done in a more systematic way, such as by
comparisons of the mean square errors of the moment conditions across all the firms. In addition, we can differentiate the sample firms into different quartiles by beta values and investigate the effect of firm characteristics on beta value by regression. Last but not least, the effect of leverage as a moment condition should be examined thoroughly, ,since the major difference between 7and 9-moment conditions is the leverage ratio.

## 6. Conclusion and suggestions for future research

In trying to explain the "Credit Spread Puzzle", we empirically examined two competing structural models: Leland (1994b) and Perrakis and Zhong (2013) Constant Elasticity of Variance (CEV) model. The sample we applied in our test covered the time period from 2001 to 2011. The GMM method was used in this paper to conduct the parameter estimation.

One of our most important findings and conclusions is that the introduction of time-varying volatility into the structural model can significantly improve the model fitting compared to the constant volatility one. We found that most of the betas in the CEV model are highly significant and the time series figures of model calculated CDS spreads show that the Perrakis and Zhong (2013) model performs much better than Leland (1994b) and can fit the historical CDS spreads data better.

Another finding is that Leverage as a moment condition in the GMM test has the effect of driving the model predicted CDS spreads downwards, while CDS spreads as moment conditions have the opposite effect. This finding is consistent with the finding in Perrakis and Zhong (2013) in their calibration.

Last, we note several ideas for expanding and solidifying the conclusions of this paper. First, we note that in our estimation we only used option implied volatility to do the calculations. As a robustness check, the realized volatility can be used to conduct the same estimations. Second and
most important, out of sample test of the two models should definitely be carried out to verify the predictive power of the models. Third, since we have already found that leverage as a moment condition has the effect of suppressing the CDS spreads, we should delete leverage and do an 8-moment condition estimation to check independently the effects of equity value on the CDS estimates. Fourth, we should examine the distribution of the CEV model's beta estimates across firms, by identifying firm characteristics that affect their beta values. Last but not least, the difference of the pricing errors between the Leland and CEV models should be examined and quantified more systematically.

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## Appendix A: Numerical approximation for Whittaker Functions

The definition of Whittaker Functions can be found on "Wolfram MathWorld" website ${ }^{21}$.According to their definition, Whittaker Functions can be written as:

$$
\begin{align*}
& M_{k, m}(x)=e^{-x / 2} x^{m+1 / 2} F_{1}\left(\frac{1}{2}+m-k, 1+2 m ; x\right)  \tag{A.1}\\
& W_{k, m}(x)=e^{-x / 2} x^{m+1 / 2} U\left(\frac{1}{2}+m-k, 1+2 m ; x\right)
\end{align*}
$$

Where ${ }_{1} F_{1}$ is the first kind Confluent Hypergeometric Function, and $U$ is the second kind of Confluent Hypergeometric Function ${ }^{22}$ :

$$
\begin{gather*}
{ }_{1} F_{1}(a ; b ; x)=1+\frac{a}{b} x+\frac{a(a+1)}{b(b+1)} \frac{x^{2}}{2!}+\ldots=\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{(a)_{k}}{(b)_{k}} \frac{x^{k}}{k!}  \tag{A.2}\\
U(a ; b ; x)=\frac{1}{\Gamma(a)} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-x t} t^{a-1}(1+t)^{(b-a-1)} d t \tag{A.3}
\end{gather*}
$$

Where:

$$
a=\frac{1}{2}+m-k ; b=1+2 m
$$

$(a)_{k}$ and $(b)_{k}$ are rising factorial

The expressions for m and k are given in equation (2.14). For Whittaker M function, the expression is basically an infinite summation. To get reasonable accuracy without sacrificing too much efficiency, we chose to pick out the first 2000 terms in this summation to calculate the function.

[^12]On the other hand, however, the estimation for the Whittaker W function is a little bit tricky. The value of parameter " $a$ " for $U(a ; b ; x)$ is negative due to its expression. The negative parameter in the Gamma Function will cause a lot of trouble in the calculations: first, when the parameter is a negative integer, the value of the Gamma Function will be infinite; second, for some negative values of the parameter, the magnitude of the value of the Gamma Function will be too large and would cause the overflow of the programming. Therefore, we have to find a way to get rid of the Gamma Function $\Gamma(a)$ in $U(a ; b ; x)$. Fortunately, in our estimation, the calculation of $\phi$ always comes in pairs under the form of:

$$
\frac{\phi_{\lambda}(V)}{\phi_{\lambda}(K)}
$$

Then, we derived the formula for this expression:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{\phi_{\lambda}(V)}{\phi_{\lambda}(K)}=\frac{V^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{\epsilon-\xi} W_{k, m}\left(x_{V}\right)}{K^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{2^{-K}} W_{k, m}\left(x_{K}\right)} \\
& =\frac{V^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{2^{2-1}} e^{-x_{V} / 2} x_{V}{ }^{m+1 / 2} \frac{1}{\Gamma(a)} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-x t} t^{a-1}(1+t)^{(b-a-1)} d t}{K^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{\epsilon}{ }^{2-\kappa} e^{-x_{K} / 2} x_{K}{ }^{m+1 / 2} \frac{1}{\Gamma(a)} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-x t} t^{a-1}(1+t)^{(b-a-1)} d t} \\
& =\frac{V^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{2^{\epsilon}} e^{-x_{V} / 2} x_{V}^{m+1 / 2} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{\left(-x_{V} t+(a-1) \ln (t)+(b-a-1) \ln (1+t)\right)} d t}{K^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{\epsilon-\kappa} e^{-x_{K} / 2} x_{K}{ }^{m+1 / 2} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{\left(-x_{K} t+(a-1) \ln (t)+(b-a-1) \ln (1+t)\right)} d t} \\
& =\frac{V^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{\epsilon} e^{2^{2}} e^{-x_{V} / 2} x_{V}^{m+1 / 2} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{\left(-x_{V} t+(m-k-0.5) \ln (t)+(m+k-0.5) \ln (1+t)\right)} d t}{K^{\beta+\frac{1}{2}} e^{\epsilon} e^{2-\kappa}} \frac{e^{-x_{K} / 2} x_{K}{ }^{m+1 / 2} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{\left(-x_{K} t+(m-k-0.5) \ln (t)+(m+k-0.5) \ln (1+t)\right)} d t}{} \tag{A.4}
\end{align*}
$$

After eliminating the Gamma Function $\Gamma(a)$, the calculation became fairly easy and straightforward. In addition, we did some transformations to the integrand of the above expression. The reason is that we have to eliminate the parameter $a$ on the exponential due to its magnitude, which might cause some calculation problems. We can clearly see that after the transformation, the positive $a$ and negative $a$ will offset each other to some extent.

Even though we use the definition of Whittaker functions to approximate the calculation of the exact function,.,the results we get from these approximations are very accurate when compared to the results we get from the built-in function of Matlab and Mathmatica.

## Appendix B: Numerical method of inversion of Laplace transformation.

We directly apply the method provided in Kuo and Wang (2003) to do the Inverse-Laplace transformation. The method is presented as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
f_{n}^{*}=\sum_{k=1}^{n} w(k, n) f_{k+B}(t) \tag{B.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $f_{n}^{*}$ is the inverse-Laplace transformation. Breaking down this expression, we have:

$$
\begin{equation*}
w(k, n)=(-1)^{n-k} \frac{k^{n}}{k!(n-k)!} \tag{B.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Which is the extrapolation weight for an n-point Richardson extrapolation. $f_{k+B}(t)$ is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
f_{n}(t)=\frac{\ln (2)}{t} \frac{2 n!}{n!(n-1)!} \sum_{k=0}^{n}(-1)^{k}\binom{n}{k} f\left((n+k) \frac{\ln (2)}{t}\right) \tag{B.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $f$ is the Laplace transformation:

$$
f(\lambda)=\int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\lambda t} f(t) d t
$$

Therefore, the counterpart of this Laplace transformation in our paper is $\frac{1}{\lambda} \bullet \frac{\phi_{\lambda}(V)}{\phi_{\lambda}(K)}$. Substituting this expression into the formula presented above, we can get the inverse-Laplace transformation for our calculation.

However, we still made some small modifications to this method. In Kuo and Wang (2003), the authors stated that the typical value for parameter B is 2 or 3, and the typical range for parameter n is from 5 to 10 . In our work, for $\beta>0$, we found that $\mathrm{n}=8$ and $\mathrm{B}=2$ is the most efficient value. For $\beta<0$, we found that for large values of n , the algorithm did not converge very well, especially for very short time periods. Therefore, for time periods less than two quarters, we set $\mathrm{n}=4$, otherwise, $\mathrm{n}=5$, and we set $\mathrm{B}=0$ for all time periods.

## Appendix C: The numerical approximation for the partial derivative of equity value with

 respect to firm value.In Appendix B of Perrakis and Zhong (2013), the authors gave their expression for the partial derivative of equity value with respect to firm value as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial E(V, K)}{\partial V}=1-\left[\frac{w C}{r}+\alpha K\right]\left[\frac{1}{\phi_{r}(K)} \frac{\partial \phi_{r}(V)}{\partial V}\right]+\left[\frac{C+g P}{r+g}-(1-\alpha) K\right] \frac{1}{\phi_{r+g}(K)} \frac{\partial \phi_{r+g}(V)}{\partial V}( \tag{C.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where:

$$
\frac{\partial \phi_{r}(V)}{\partial V}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
{\left[\beta+0.5+0.5 V x^{\prime} \varepsilon\right] V^{\beta-0.5} e^{0.5 \varepsilon x} W_{k, m}(x)+V^{\beta+0.5} e^{0.5 \varepsilon x} W^{\prime} x^{\prime}, \text { if } \beta<0} \\
{[\beta+0.5+0.5 V x \varepsilon] V^{\beta-0.5} e^{0.5 x x} M_{k, m}(x)+V^{\beta+0.5} e^{0.5 x x} M^{\prime} x^{\prime}, \text { if } \beta>0}
\end{array}\right.
$$

Where:

$$
\begin{aligned}
W^{\prime} & =-\left(\frac{k}{x}-\frac{1}{2}\right) W_{k, m}(x)-\frac{W_{k+1, m}(x)}{x} \\
M^{\prime} & =\frac{M_{k+1, m}(x)(k+m+0.5)}{x}-\left(\frac{k}{x}-\frac{1}{2}\right) M_{k, m}(x)
\end{aligned}
$$

However, when we apply this expression to our empirical work, the programming cannot generate the right value. After scrutinizing the code piece by piece, we located the problem in the part of the partial derivative of $\phi$ with respect to firm value. Therefore, we implemented the following definition of the derivative to get around this problem:

$$
\frac{d y}{d x}=\frac{f(y+\Delta}{2 \Delta}_{2}
$$

Hence:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{\partial \phi_{r}(V)}{\partial V}=\frac{\phi_{r}(V+\Delta}{2 \Delta} \\
& \frac{\partial \phi_{r+g}(V)}{\partial V}=\frac{\phi_{r+g}(V+\Delta}{2 \Delta} \tag{C.2}
\end{align*}
$$

Incorporating the adjacent multiplier, we got:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{1}{\phi_{r}(K)} \frac{\partial \phi_{r}(V)}{\partial V}=\frac{\phi_{r}}{2}(V+\Delta \\
& \frac{1}{\phi_{r+g}(K)} \frac{\partial \phi_{r+g}(V)}{\partial V}=\frac{\phi_{r+g}}{2}(V+\Delta \tag{С.3}
\end{align*}
$$

We can see that, after this transformation, the expression changes into a familiar $\phi$ over $\phi$ shape. Therefore, we can apply the technique derived in Appendix A to approximate its value.

Substituting into the whole expression of the partial derivative of equity value with respect to firm value, we can get:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial E(V, K)}{\partial V}= & 1-\left[\frac{w C}{r}+\alpha K\right]\left[\frac{\phi_{r}}{2}(V+\Delta\right. \\
& {\left[\frac{C+g P}{r+g}-(1-\alpha) K\right]\left[\frac{\Delta}{\frac{\phi}{r+g}^{2 \Delta}}(V+\Delta\right.} \tag{C.4}
\end{align*}
$$

## Appendix D: GMM estimation.

One advantage of the GMM method is that the weight matrix $W$ can be updated during every iteration of the estimation. Therefore, the objective function is evolving during the whole estimation process by incorporating new information from the last iteration. The entire estimation starts from setting the weight matrix $W$ equal to a same dimension identityl matrix $I$. Then, during the first iteration, the objective function will be like:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\psi=\arg \min G\left(\psi_{1}, t\right)^{\prime} G\left(\psi_{1}, t\right) \tag{D.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Which is similar to an OLS estimation. After we get the parameter vector $\psi$, we can build up the moment conditions and weight matrix $W_{1}$ based on this parameter vector. Then the objective function is updated to:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\psi_{2}=\arg \min G\left(\psi_{2}, t\right)^{\prime} W_{1} G\left(\psi_{2}, t\right) \tag{D.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, the new parameter vector $\psi_{2}$ is used to construct a new weight matrix. This procedure will continue for several iterations and eventually converge to the desired parameter. In our estimation, we set our number of iterations to 8 .

## Table 1: Description of the important variables

This table shows how we constructed the most important variables that will be heavily used in our estimation. Panel A shows the variables from COMPUSTAT database; panel B shows the variables from CRSP; panel C shows the data from Markit database; panel D shows volatility measurements.

Panel A: Description of Compustat variables

| Variable | Description |
| :--- | :--- |
| LCTQ | Current liability total. It is used to calculate the value of the asset as <br> following: <br> V=LCTQ+LLTQ+PRC*SHROUT <br> Long term liability total. It is used to calculate the value of asset. |
| LLTQ | Interests and related expense. It is used to calculate the payout rate: <br> Payout=XINTQ+DVY <br> Cash dividend. It is used to calculate the payout rate. |
| DVY |  |

Panel B: Description of CRSP variables

| Variable | Description |
| :--- | :--- |
| PRC | Stock price. It is used to calculate the value of asset. See panel A. |
| SHROUT | Shares Outstanding. It is used to calculate the value of asset. See <br> panel A. |

Panel C: Description of Markit variables

| Variable | Description |
| :--- | :--- |
| spre1y | CDS spread for 1 year maturity |
| Spre2y | CDS spread for 2 year maturity |
| Spre3y | CDS spread for 3 year maturity |
| Spre5y | CDS spread for 5 year maturity |
| Spre7y | CDS spread for 7 year maturity |
| Spre10y | CDS spread for 10 year maturity |
| recovery_new | Recovery Rate |

Panel D: Volatility measurement

| Variable | Description |
| :--- | :--- |
| Option implied volatility | Extracted from OptionMetrics database. |
| Realized volatility | Extracted from TAQ database by five minutes <br> interval, and converted to monthly frequency. |

## Table 2: Summary Statistics of Individual Firms

This table reports the summary statistics of individual firms. We have 104 firms in our total sample. Note that in sector column, $B M, C G, C S, E N, H C, I N, T E, T S$ are abbreviations of Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Energy, Healthcare, Industrials, Technology and Telecommunications Services, respectively. The payout ratio is the sum of cash dividend and interest expense divided by the total asset. The recovery rates are the estimated recovery rates reported in Markit datasets. The implied volatilities are extracted from Optionmetrics for the at the money call options.

| Company Name | Sector | Rating | Begin | End | Total <br> Asset | Payout | Leverage | Recovery | Implied <br> volatility |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| date Co | date | (billion) | Ratio | Ratio | Rate | 0.22 |  |  |  |  |
| Abbott Labs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.18 | 0.40 |
| AN Prods \& Chems Inc | BM | A | $04 / 2003$ | $09 / 2008$ | 20.78 | 0.01 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.22 |  |
| Alcoa Inc. | AM | BBB | $08 / 2001$ | $09 / 2008$ | 45.79 | 0.01 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.34 |  |
| AmerisourceBergen Corp | CS | BBB | $02 / 2004$ | $12 / 2011$ | 17.37 | 0.00 | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.27 |  |
| Anadarko Pete Corp | EN | BBB | $01 / 2003$ | $09 / 2008$ | 40.52 | 0.01 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.31 |  |
| Anheuser Busch Cos Inc | CG | A | $06 / 2003$ | $10 / 2008$ | 51.64 | 0.01 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.18 |  |
| APACHE CORP | EN | A | $03 / 2003$ | $09 / 2008$ | 31.58 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.31 |  |
| Archer Daniels Midland | CG | A | $06 / 2003$ | $09 / 2008$ | 31.83 | 0.01 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.30 |  |
| Arrow Electrs Inc | CG | BBB | $11 / 2001$ | $12 / 2011$ | 7.43 | 0.00 | 0.57 | 0.40 | 0.38 |  |
| Autozone Inc | CS | BBB | $03 / 2003$ | $07 / 2011$ | 12.58 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.27 |  |
| Avon Prods Inc | CG | BBB | $01 / 2003$ | $12 / 2011$ | 19.04 | 0.01 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.31 |  |
| Baker Hughes Inc | EN | A | $11 / 2001$ | $09 / 2008$ | 20.82 | 0.01 | 0.17 | 0.40 | 0.34 |  |
| Baxter Intl Inc | HC | A | $02 / 2002$ | $12 / 2011$ | 36.91 | 0.01 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.26 |  |
| Black \& Decker Corp | CG | BBB | $05 / 2002$ | $01 / 2010$ | 8.50 | 0.01 | 0.47 | 0.41 | 0.32 |  |
| Boeing Co | IN | A | $04 / 2001$ | $09 / 2008$ | 92.46 | 0.01 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.28 |  |
| BorgWarner Inc | CG | BBB | $11 / 2001$ | $09 / 2008$ | 5.21 | 0.01 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.31 |  |


| Bristol Myers Squibb Co | HC | A | 04/2003 | 12/2011 | 64.12 | 0.02 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.25 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Campbell Soup Co | CG | A | 06/2002 | 10/2011 | 17.43 | 0.01 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.21 |
| Caterpillar Inc | IN | A | 04/2001 | 09/2008 | 67.27 | 0.01 | 0.54 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| CenturyTel Inc | TS | BBB | 03/2003 | 04/2008 | 8.99 | 0.01 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.22 |
| Clorox Co | CG | BBB | 07/2004 | 07/2009 | 13.16 | 0.01 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.21 |
| Coca Cola Entpers Inc | CG | A | 06/2003 | 09/2008 | 30.04 | 0.01 | 0.66 | 0.40 | 0.23 |
| Colgate Palmolive Co | CG | AA | 08/2003 | 12/2011 | 41.92 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.20 |
| ConAgra Foods Inc | CG | BBB | 08/2001 | 07/2011 | 20.08 | 0.03 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.22 |
| ConocoPhillips | EN | A | 01/2003 | 09/2008 | 152.40 | 0.01 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.25 |
| Costco Whsl Corp | CS | A | 07/2004 | 07/2011 | 35.93 | 0.00 | 0.29 | 0.40 | 0.25 |
| CSX Corp | IN | BBB | 01/2003 | 09/2008 | 29.17 | 0.01 | 0.58 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| Cytec Inds Inc | BM | BBB | 02/2004 | 12/2011 | 4.30 | 0.00 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.36 |
| Danaher Corp | IN | A | 01/2004 | 12/2011 | 29.13 | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.40 | 0.25 |
| Diamond Offshore Drilling | EN | A | 07/2003 | 09/2008 | 10.89 | 0.02 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.37 |
| Dover Corp | IN | A | 12/2004 | 12/2011 | 12.74 | 0.01 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| Dow Chem Co | BM | BBB | 01/2002 | 09/2008 | 65.87 | 0.02 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| Eastman Chem Co | BM | BBB | 01/2003 | 09/2008 | 8.57 | 0.01 | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.25 |
| FedEx Corp | IN | BBB | 08/2002 | 07/2011 | 36.34 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| Gen Dynamics Corp | IN | A | 11/2004 | 12/2011 | 41.54 | 0.01 | 0.36 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
| Gen Mls Inc | CG | BBB | 04/2002 | 07/2011 | 31.57 | 0.02 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.19 |
| Goodrich Corp | IN | BBB | 09/2001 | 09/2008 | 9.19 | 0.01 | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.33 |
| Halliburton Co | EN | A | 02/2003 | 09/2008 | 34.94 | 0.01 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.33 |
| H J HEINZ CO | CG | BBB | 04/2001 | 10/2011 | 21.96 | 0.02 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.21 |
| Home Depot Inc | CS | A | 02/2002 | 09/2008 | 95.07 | 0.01 | 0.22 | 0.41 | 0.28 |
| Honeywell Intl Inc | IN | A | 11/2001 | 12/2011 | 54.86 | 0.01 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.30 |
| Intl Business Machs Corp | TE | AA | 04/2001 | 12/2011 | 233.09 | 0.01 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.25 |
| Intl Paper Co | BM | BBB | 04/2001 | 09/2008 | 39.13 | 0.01 | 0.56 | 0.40 | 0.27 |
| Johnson \& Johnson | HC | AAA | 03/2003 | 12/2011 | 207.15 | 0.01 | 0.15 | 0.40 | 0.17 |


| Kellogg Co | CG | BBB | 03/2003 | 12/2011 | 27.45 | 0.01 | 0.33 | 0.40 | 0.18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kimberly Clark Corp | CG | A | 02/2004 | 12/2011 | 38.91 | 0.02 | 0.29 | 0.40 | 0.18 |
| The Kroger Co. | CS | BBB | 08/2006 | 10/2011 | 33.61 | 0.01 | 0.53 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| Eli Lilly \& Co | HC | A | 06/2003 | 12/2011 | 70.15 | 0.02 | 0.22 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
| Ltd Brands Inc | CS | BB | 03/2003 | 09/2008 | 12.76 | 0.01 | 0.29 | 0.40 | 0.32 |
| Lockheed Martin Corp | IN | A | 04/2001 | 12/2011 | 52.81 | 0.01 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.26 |
| Lowes Cos Inc | CS | A | 01/2003 | 09/2008 | 54.34 | 0.00 | 0.22 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| Marriott Intl Inc | CS | BBB | 05/2002 | 09/2008 | 18.00 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.30 |
| Masco Corp | CG | BB | 07/2002 | 09/2008 | 18.45 | 0.01 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.31 |
| Medtronic Inc | HC | A | 09/2003 | 10/2011 | 62.35 | 0.01 | 0.16 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
| Merck \& Co Inc | HC | AA | 03/2004 | 10/2009 | 105.48 | 0.02 | 0.23 | 0.40 | 0.27 |
| Mohawk Inds Inc | CG | BBB | 12/2004 | 12/2011 | 7.91 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.38 |
| Molson Coors Brewing | CG | BBB | 10/2005 | 12/2011 | 12.93 | 0.01 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.27 |
| Monsanto Co | BM | A | 04/2003 | 09/2008 | 31.34 | 0.01 | 0.22 | 0.40 | 0.32 |
| Motorola Inc | TE | BBB | 08/2002 | 09/2008 | 57.09 | 0.01 | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.38 |
| Newell Rubbermaid Inc | CG | BBB | 05/2001 | 02/2009 | 11.75 | 0.02 | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.30 |
| Nordstrom Inc | CS | A | 11/2001 | 09/2008 | 10.30 | 0.01 | 0.35 | 0.41 | 0.37 |
| Norfolk Sthn Corp | IN | BBB | 04/2001 | 09/2008 | 29.32 | 0.01 | 0.54 | 0.39 | 0.32 |
| Northrop Grumman Corp | IN | BBB | 04/2003 | 03/2011 | 36.98 | 0.01 | 0.46 | 0.40 | 0.22 |
| OCCIDENTAL PETRO | EN | A | 09/2002 | 09/2008 | 45.32 | 0.01 | 0.29 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| Omnicare Inc | CS | BB | 11/2004 | 02/2011 | 7.65 | 0.01 | 0.50 | 0.26 | 0.40 |
| Omnicom Gp Inc | CS | BBB | 05/2002 | 12/2011 | 25.77 | 0.01 | 0.47 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| ONEOK Partners LP | EN | BBB | 05/2006 | 12/2011 | 7.79 | 0.04 | 0.53 | 0.40 | 0.22 |
| J C Penney Co Inc | CS | BB | 06/2001 | 09/2008 | 20.37 | 0.01 | 0.51 | 0.38 | 0.39 |
| Pepsico Inc | CG | A | 06/2004 | 12/2011 | 124.03 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.18 |
| Pfizer Inc | HC | AA | 10/2003 | 12/2011 | 234.37 | 0.02 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
| Pitney Bowes Inc | TE | BBB | 11/2003 | 12/2011 | 15.76 | 0.02 | 0.53 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
| PPG Inds Inc | BM | BBB | 07/2001 | 12/2011 | 17.96 | 0.01 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.27 |
| Praxair Inc | BM | A | 10/2003 | 09/2008 | 25.16 | 0.01 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.23 |


| Pride Intl Inc | EN | BBB | 06/2003 | 09/2008 | 6.49 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.38 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Procter \& Gamble Co | CG | AA | 04/2001 | 12/2011 | 213.09 | 0.01 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.19 |
| Quest Diagnostics Inc | HC | BBB | 09/2005 | 12/2011 | 14.15 | 0.01 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
| Raytheon Co | IN | A | 06/2003 | 12/2011 | 32.39 | 0.01 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.22 |
| Rep Sves Inc | IN | BBB | 09/2004 | 12/2011 | 14.30 | 0.01 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.27 |
| Reynolds Amern Inc | CG | BBB | 11/2004 | 12/2011 | 26.53 | 0.02 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.23 |
| Rohm \& Haas Co | BM | BBB | 05/2001 | 11/2008 | 15.81 | 0.01 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.27 |
| Ryder Sys Inc | IN | BBB | 01/2003 | 09/2008 | 7.26 | 0.01 | 0.62 | 0.39 | 0.29 |
| Safeway Inc | CS | BBB | 07/2005 | 12/2011 | 20.99 | 0.01 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.31 |
| Schering Plough Corp | HC | A | 04/2003 | 09/2008 | 40.65 | 0.01 | 0.23 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| Sealed Air Corp US | IN | B | 02/2006 | 12/2011 | 7.05 | 0.01 | 0.47 | 0.40 | 0.31 |
| Sherwin Williams Co | CG | A | 06/2002 | 12/2011 | 9.60 | 0.01 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| Smithfield Foods Inc | CG | BB | 07/2003 | 08/2008 | 7.53 | 0.01 | 0.57 | 0.39 | 0.29 |
| Southwest Airls Co | IN | BBB | 06/2003 | 12/2011 | 18.62 | 0.00 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.35 |
| Sunoco Inc | EN | BB | 07/2003 | 09/2008 | 14.55 | 0.01 | 0.51 | 0.40 | 0.34 |
| SUPERVALU INC | CS | CCC | 03/2003 | 09/2008 | 15.13 | 0.01 | 0.60 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| Sysco Corp | CS | A | 03/2005 | 12/2011 | 24.48 | 0.01 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.23 |
| Target Corp | CS | A | 04/2002 | 09/2008 | 64.06 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.30 |
| Textron Inc | IN | BBB | 10/2002 | 09/2008 | 23.69 | 0.01 | 0.58 | 0.39 | 0.28 |
| Un Pac Corp | IN | BBB | 09/2003 | 09/2008 | 45.93 | 0.01 | 0.49 | 0.39 | 0.24 |
| Utd Parcel Svc Inc | IN | AA | 08/2004 | 12/2011 | 68.52 | 0.02 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.23 |
| Utd Tech Corp | IN | A | 06/2003 | 09/2008 | 85.24 | 0.01 | 0.33 | 0.40 | 0.20 |
| Unvl Health Svcs Inc | HC | BB | 03/2004 | 12/2011 | 5.10 | 0.01 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.31 |
| UST Inc. | CG | BBB | 04/2003 | 10/2008 | 8.99 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.40 | 0.22 |
| V F Corp | CG | A | 09/2004 | 12/2011 | 11.07 | 0.01 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| Wal Mart Stores Inc | CS | AA | 01/2001 | 10/2011 | 296.93 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.23 |
| Waste Mgmt Inc | IN | BBB | 01/2004 | 08/2009 | 31.50 | 0.01 | 0.46 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
| Whirlpool Corp | CG | BBB | 04/2001 | 09/2008 | 12.73 | 0.01 | 0.59 | 0.40 | 0.33 |
| Wyeth | HC | A | 02/2003 | 07/2009 | 81.20 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.26 |

## Table 3: Distribution of moments for individual firms under 9-moments models

This table reports the industry and rating distribution of our sample firms in Panels A and B, respectively. "N" represents the number of firms in each category. The $1,3,5,7,10$ years credit default swap spreads are reported as basis points $(b p s)$. The reported values of all variables are mean values.

| Panel A: Rating distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rating/Industry | N | 1year spread | 2year spread | 3year spread | 5year spread | 7 year spread | 10year spread | Implied volatility | Equity value | Leverage |
| AAA | 1 | 11.51 | 14.05 | 16.57 | 22.33 | 26.19 | 30.76 | 0.1743 | 0.9223 | 0.1547 |
| AA | 8 | 15.60 | 19.39 | 23.09 | 30.72 | 35.54 | 41.26 | 0.2262 | 0.8675 | 0.2478 |
| A | 39 | 17.30 | 21.85 | 26.42 | 35.80 | 41.81 | 48.93 | 0.2643 | 1.0128 | 0.3123 |
| BBB | 47 | 37.94 | 46.28 | 54.70 | 71.91 | 80.68 | 90.29 | 0.2797 | 0.6947 | 0.4420 |
| BB | 7 | 83.09 | 104.23 | 121.94 | 154.16 | 166.00 | 177.62 | 0.3377 | 0.7335 | 0.4571 |
| B | 1 | 72.47 | 91.65 | 111.10 | 150.17 | 163.88 | 176.62 | 0.3115 | 0.4640 | 0.4728 |
| CCC | 1 | 54.54 | 71.96 | 89.48 | 124.22 | 140.64 | 157.33 | 0.2807 | 0.8826 | 0.6001 |
| Panel B: Industry distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Basic Materials | 10 | 26.85 | 33.17 | 39.11 | 51.92 | 59.30 | 68.51 | 0.2807 | 0.9606 | 0.4022 |
| Consumer Goods | 27 | 32.96 | 40.62 | 48.07 | 62.81 | 70.40 | 78.63 | 0.2499 | 0.7797 | 0.3661 |
| Consumer Services | 17 | 45.53 | 56.66 | 67.02 | 87.08 | 95.90 | 105.87 | 0.3000 | 0.7545 | 0.3937 |
| Energy | 10 | 30.21 | 37.82 | 44.73 | 58.86 | 66.96 | 76.00 | 0.3134 | 1.2839 | 0.3576 |
| Healthcare | 12 | 20.89 | 26.64 | 32.54 | 44.76 | 51.22 | 58.01 | 0.2486 | 0.7867 | 0.2516 |
| Industrials | 24 | 29.49 | 35.94 | 42.60 | 56.27 | 63.71 | 71.82 | 0.2740 | 0.7536 | 0.4388 |
| Technology | 3 | 37.66 | 45.74 | 54.12 | 68.55 | 76.46 | 85.50 | 0.2869 | 0.6178 | 0.4077 |
| Telecommunications Services | 1 | 24.76 | 34.88 | 46.52 | 71.38 | 86.84 | 102.93 | 0.2224 | 0.5338 | 0.4962 |
| Panel C: All firms |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 104 | 31.90 | 39.49 | 46.90 | 61.76 | 69.49 | 78.07 | 0.2731 | 0.8299 | 0.3791 |

## Table 4: Distribution of moments for individual firms under 7-moments models

This table reports the industry and rating distribution of our sample firms in Panels A and B, respectively. "N" represents the number of firms in each category. The $1,3,5,7,10$ years credit default swap spreads are reported as basis points ( $b p s$ ). The reported values of all variables are mean values.

| Panel A: Rating distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rating/Industry | N | 1year spread | 2year <br> spread | 3year <br> spread | 5year spread | 7year spread | 10year spread | Implied volatility |
| AAA | 1 | 11.51 | 14.05 | 16.57 | 22.33 | 26.19 | 30.76 | 0.1743 |
| AA | 8 | 15.6 | 19.39 | 23.09 | 30.72 | 35.54 | 41.26 | 0.2262 |
| A | 39 | 17.3 | 21.85 | 26.43 | 35.81 | 41.82 | 48.94 | 0.264 |
| BBB | 47 | 37.94 | 46.28 | 54.7 | 71.91 | 80.68 | 90.29 | 0.2797 |
| BB | 7 | 83.09 | 104.23 | 121.94 | 154.16 | 166 | 177.62 | 0.3377 |
| B | 1 | 72.47 | 91.65 | 111.1 | 150.17 | 163.88 | 176.62 | 0.3115 |
| CCC | 1 | 54.54 | 71.96 | 89.48 | 124.22 | 140.64 | 157.33 | 0.2807 |
| Panel B: Industry distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Basic Materials | 10 | 26.85 | 33.17 | 39.11 | 51.92 | 59.3 | 68.51 | 0.2807 |
| Consumer Goods | 27 | 32.96 | 40.62 | 48.07 | 62.81 | 70.4 | 78.63 | 0.2499 |
| Consumer Services | 17 | 43.87 | 54.62 | 64.65 | 84.1 | 92.76 | 102.56 | 0.2971 |
| Energy | 10 | 30.21 | 37.82 | 44.73 | 58.86 | 66.96 | 76 | 0.3134 |
| Healthcare | 12 | 20.89 | 26.64 | 32.54 | 44.76 | 51.22 | 58.01 | 0.2486 |
| Industrials | 24 | 29.49 | 35.94 | 42.6 | 56.27 | 63.71 | 71.82 | 0.274 |
| Technology | 3 | 37.66 | 45.74 | 54.12 | 68.55 | 76.46 | 85.5 | 0.2869 |
| Telecommunications Services | 1 | 24.76 | 34.88 | 46.52 | 71.38 | 86.84 | 102.93 | 0.2224 |
| Panel C: All firms |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 104 | 31.76 | 39.32 | 46.7 | 61.52 | 69.23 | 77.79 | 0.2729 |

Table 5: Distribution of parameters with 9 moments under the Leland model

This table reports average values of parameters by fitting leverage, equity value and equity implied volatility along with the CDS spreads under the Leland model. P-values for each parameter reported in the parentheses are category level test statistics. T value reported in the table is the firm level test statistic of each parameter we estimated.

Panel A: Rating Distribution

|  | N | sigma | F value | J test | T value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{A A A}$ | 1 | 0.1439 | 0.1632 | 17.2986 | 40.1 |
| $\mathbf{A A}$ | 8 | 0.1672 | 0.1590 | 15.6877 | 47.76 |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{A}$ | 39 | 0.1675 | 0.1757 | 14.4522 | 63.78 |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{B B B}$ | 47 | 0.1444 | 0.1750 | 15.3587 | 65.34 |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{B B}$ | 7 | 0.1673 | 0.1826 | 13.5247 | 76.06 |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{B}$ | 1 | 0.1342 | 0.1516 | 10.7666 | 91.88 |
| $\mathbf{C C C}$ | 1 | 0.085881394 | 0.1715 | 11.4906 | 51.37 |


| Panel B: Industry Distribution |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | N | sigma | F value | J test | T value |
| Basic Materials | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1720 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1756 | 13.9785 | 56.41 |
| Consumer Goods | 27 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1505 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1725 | 14.9641 | 63.45 |
| Consumer Services | 17 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1663 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1679 | 14.3626 | 76.6 |
| Energy | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1848 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1817 | 12.8199 | 87.08 |
| Healthcare | 12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1718 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1677 | 14.9742 | 63.97 |
| Industrials | 24 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1322 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1822 | 16.0571 | 51.45 |
| Technology | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1286 \\ (0.0293) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1449 | 17.0801 | 44.63 |
| Telecommunications Services | 1 | 0.109646727 | 0.2056 | 12.7460 | 69.68 |
| All firms |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | N | sigma | F value | J test | T value |

## Table 6: Distribution of parameters with 9 moments under the CEV model

This table reports average values of parameters by fitting leverage, equity value and equity implied volatility along with the CDS spreads under the CEV model. P-values for each parameter reported in the parentheses are category level test statistics. T value reported in table is the firm level test statistic of each parameter we estimated.

|  | Panel A: Rating distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | All |  |  |  | ve beta |  |  |  | ive beta |  |
|  | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test |
| AAA | 1 | 0.1447 | 0.9973 | 17.0762 | 1 | 0.1447 | 0.9973 | 17.0762 | 0 |  |  |  |
| AA | 8 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1850 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1355 \\ (0.5534) \end{gathered}$ | 16.6869 | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1622 \\ (0.0097) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8358 \\ (0.0067) \end{gathered}$ | 17.0910 | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1987 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2848 \\ (0.0701) \end{gathered}$ | 16.4445 |
| A | 39 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1978 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0107 \\ (0.9142) \end{gathered}$ | 14.3201 | 20 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1690 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5108 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 14.5641 | 19 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2280 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.5157 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 14.0632 |
| BBB | 46 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1621 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1359 \\ (0.2434) \end{gathered}$ | 14.3273 | 25 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1627 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.7306 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 14.5293 | 21 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1614 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.5722 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 14.0868 |
| BB | 7 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1937 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1087 \\ (0.6064) \end{gathered}$ | 13.1295 | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1987 \\ (0.0051) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5748 \\ (0.2046) \end{gathered}$ | 13.0681 | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1917 \\ (0.0007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.3821 \\ & (0.0350) \end{aligned}$ | 13.1541 |
| B | 1 | 0.1133 | -1.3939 | 11.0940 | 0 |  |  |  | 1 | 0.1133 | -1.3939 | 11.0940 |
| CCC | 1 | 0.1172 | 0.1017 | 11.3541 |  | $0.1172$ <br> value | 0.1017 | 11.3541 | 0 |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{A} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{A}$ |  | 13.28 | 1.7 |  |  | 13.28 | 1.7 |  |  |  |  |  |
| AA |  | 54.72 | 18.2 |  |  | 20.32 | 3.94 |  |  | 75.36 | 26.76 |  |


| A |  | 159.76 | 58.2 |  |  | 37.21 | 5.51 |  |  | 288.77 | 113.66 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BBB |  | 113.12 | 20.84 |  |  | 37.08 | 6.06 |  |  | 203.64 | 38.44 |  |
| BB |  | 73.8 | 28.32 |  |  | 29.65 | 9.25 |  |  | 91.46 | 35.95 |  |
| B |  | 31.47 | 26.6 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 31.47 | 26.6 |  |
| CCC |  | 6.81 | 0.5 |  |  | 6.81 | 0.5 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panel B: Industry distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | All |  |  |  | Positive beta |  |  |  | Negative beta |  |  |  |
|  | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | j |
| Basic Materials | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2088 \\ (0.0006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3537 \\ (0.2252) \end{gathered}$ | 13.9297 | 6 | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.1785 \\ (0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.9427 \\ (0.0016) \end{gathered}$ | 14.6331 | 4 | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.2542 \\ (0.0899) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.5294 \\ & (0.1233) \end{aligned}$ | 12.8745 |
| Consumer Goods | 27 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1603 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0319 \\ (0.8159) \end{gathered}$ | 14.8719 | 13 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1491 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.6558 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 14.9825 | 14 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1707 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.5474 \\ & (0.0001) \end{aligned}$ | 14.7692 |
| Consumer Services | 17 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1836 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0805 \\ (0.6380) \end{gathered}$ | 13.9268 | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1681 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5161 \\ (0.0067) \end{gathered}$ | 13.9285 | 7 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2058 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.5417 \\ (0.0157) \end{gathered}$ | 13.9243 |
| Energy | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2194 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1670 \\ & (0.2670) \end{aligned}$ | 12.4489 | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2062 \\ (0.0078) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2551 \\ (0.0675) \end{gathered}$ | 12.9927 | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2282 \\ (0.0012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.4484 \\ & (0.0182) \end{aligned}$ | 12.0864 |
| Healthcare | 12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1891 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2169 \\ (0.2864) \end{gathered}$ | 15.4313 | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1689 \\ (0.0002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.9208 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 15.0928 | 7 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2036 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2859 \\ (0.0631) \end{gathered}$ | 15.6731 |
| Industrials | 23 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1594 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1138 \\ & (0.4514) \end{aligned}$ | 14.5958 | 11 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1513 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5054 \\ (0.0008) \end{gathered}$ | 15.2057 | 12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1668 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.6813 \\ & (0.0001) \end{aligned}$ | 14.0368 |
| Technology | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1875 \\ (0.0152) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5006 \\ (0.2398) \end{gathered}$ | 15.5814 | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2090 \\ (0.0483) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8014 \\ (0.0444) \end{gathered}$ | 15.5213 | 1 | 0.1444 | -0.101 | 15.7017 |
| Telecommunications Services | 1 | 0.1551 | 1.1093 | 12.7566 | 1 | 0.1551 | 1.1093 | 12.7566 |  |  |  |  |


| Basic Materials | 64.13 | 20.22 | 40.27 | 9.18 | 99.92 | 36.77 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Consumer Goods | 130.74 | 19.22 | 29.73 | 4.7 | 224.54 | 32.71 |
| Consumer Services | 278.67 | 80.21 | 36.44 | 5.04 | 624.7 | 187.6 |
| Energy | 82.76 | 24.97 | 43.87 | 4.86 | 108.69 | 38.38 |
| Healthcare | 60.65 | 42.6 | 25.45 | 5.89 | 85.8 | 68.82 |
| Industrials | 75.86 | 31.42 | 32.49 | 4.9 | 115.62 | 55.74 |
| Technology | 69.98 | 9.05 | 68.87 | 9.68 | 72.2 | 7.77 |
| Telecommunications | 21.25 | 5.29 | 21.25 | 5.29 |  |  |


| Panel C: All firms |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All |  |  |  | Positive beta |  |  |  | Negative beta |  |  |  |
|  | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test |
| Total | 103 | 0.1785 | 0.0650 | 14.3928 | 52 | 0.1653 | 0.6392 | 14.6222 | 51 | 0.1919 | -0.5204 | 14.1590 |
|  |  | (<0.0001) | (0.3471) |  |  | ( $<0.0001$ ) | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  | $(<0.0001)$ | $(<0.0001)$ |  |
| T value |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 120.78 | 34.96 |  |  | 34.84 | 5.66 |  |  | 208.4 | 64.84 |  |

Table 7: Distribution of parameters with 7 moments under the Leland model

This table reports average values of parameters by fitting equity implied volatility along with the CDS spreads under the Leland model. P-values for each parameter reported in the parentheses are category level test statistics. T value reported in table is the firm level test statistic of each parameter we estimated.

Panel A: Rating Distribution

|  | N | sigma | F value | J test | T value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{A A A}$ | 1 | 0.1407 | 0.1482 | 15.7082 | 38.98 |
| $\mathbf{A A}$ | 8 | 0.1732 | 0.1473 | 14.5199 | 46.9 |
| A | 39 | 0.1743 | 0.1662 | 13.6492 | 44.55 |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{B B B}$ | 47 | 0.1494 | 0.1660 | 14.6625 | 34.55 |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{B B}$ | 7 | 0.1821 | 0.1668 | 12.3731 | 48.1 |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{B}$ | 1 | 0.1254 | 0.1519 | 10.7862 | 42.1 |
| $\mathbf{C C C}$ | 1 | 0.0816 | 0.1946 | 13.0372 | 39.83 |


| Panel B: Industry Distribution |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | N | sigma | F value | J test | T value |
| Basic Materials | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1729 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1703 | 13.5040 | 41.14 |
| Consumer Goods | 27 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1563 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1671 | 14.5313 | 38.73 |
| Consumer Services | 17 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1782 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1602 | 13.6668 | 42.68 |
| Energy | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1931 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1680 | 11.8808 | 41.29 |
| Healthcare | 12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1773 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1570 | 13.9359 | 48.95 |
| Industrials | 24 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1359 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1675 | 14.8851 | 35.01 |
| Technology | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1404 \\ (0.0228) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1353 | 16.1689 | 38.83 |
| Telecommunications Services | 1 | 0.1082 | 0.1976 | 12.2482 | 54.46 |
| All firms |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | sigma | F value | J test | T value |


| Total 104 | 0.1618 | 0.1646 | 14.0746 | 40.33 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $(<0.0001)$ |  |  |  | (<0.0001)

## Table 8: Distribution of parameter with 7 moments under the CEV model

This table reports average values of parameters by fitting equity implied volatility along with the CDS spreads under the CEV model. P-values for each parameter reported in the parentheses are category level test statistics. T value reported in table is the firm level test statistic of each parameter we estimated.

|  | Panel A: Rating distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | All |  |  | Posi | ve beta |  |  | Nega | ive beta |  |
|  | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test |
| AAA | 1 | 0.1639 | -0.9688 | 16.484 | 0 |  |  |  | 1 | 0.1639 | -0.9688 | 16.484 |
| AA | 8 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1899 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.4820 \\ & (0.0271) \end{aligned}$ | 15.8734 | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2016 \\ (0.0303) \end{gathered}$ | 0.1 | 14.6972 | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1860 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.6761 \\ (0.0084) \end{gathered}$ | 16.2655 |
| A | 38 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2198 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.5197 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.2864 | 11 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1858 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3989 \\ (0.0015) \end{gathered}$ | 13.2885 | 27 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2336 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.8940 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.2856 |
| BBB | 47 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1858 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.5090 \\ (0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.6437 | 13 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1555 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.7139 \\ (0.0005) \end{gathered}$ | 14.2449 | 34 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1973 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.9766 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.4138 |
| BB | 7 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2175 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.7865 \\ & (0.1521) \end{aligned}$ | 11.0514 | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1911 \\ (0.1131) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5574 \\ (0.4270) \end{gathered}$ | 12.0651 | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2281 \\ (0.0005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.3240 \\ (0.0448) \end{gathered}$ | 10.6460 |
| B | 1 | 0.1213 | -1.3682 | 12.3008 | 0 |  |  |  | 1 | 0.1213 | -1.3682 | 12.3008 |
| CCC | 1 | 0.1261 | 0.1005 | 12.5876 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1261 \\ & \text { value } \end{aligned}$ | 0.1005 | 12.5876 | 0 |  |  |  |
| AAA |  | 28.75 | 169.96 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 28.75 | 169.96 |  |
| AA |  | 37.21 | 88.85 |  |  | 28.71 | 14.39 |  |  | 40.04 | 113.66 |  |
| A |  | 43.59 | 184.36 |  |  | 25.95 | 64.13 |  |  | 50.78 | 233.34 |  |
| BBB |  | 33.6 | 167.24 |  |  | 20.27 | 77.44 |  |  | 38.69 | 201.57 |  |


| BB |  | 30.92 | 106.04 |  |  | 24.31 | 22.83 |  |  | 34.22 | 147.65 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| B |  | 19.89 | 224.3 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 19.89 | 224.30 |  |
| CCC |  | 6.21 | 4.95 |  |  | 6.21 | 4.95 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panel B: Industry distribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | All |  |  |  | Positive beta |  |  |  | Negative beta |  |  |  |
|  | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test |
| Basic Materials | 10 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2291 \\ (0.0006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.8618 \\ (0.0032) \end{gathered}$ | 13.2281 | 1 | 0.1751 | 1.0414 | 15.1523 | 9 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2350 \\ (0.0013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.0733 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.0143 |
| Consumer Goods | 27 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1796 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.5385 \\ & (0.0112) \end{aligned}$ | 13.9951 | 8 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1524 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.7725 \\ (0.0091) \end{gathered}$ | 14.9371 | 19 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1911 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.0906 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.5985 |
| Consumer Services | 17 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2016 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2254 \\ (0.1974) \end{gathered}$ | 13.1237 | 9 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1780 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3621 \\ (0.0102) \end{gathered}$ | 13.1865 | 8 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2282 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.8863 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.0530 |
| Energy | 9 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2683 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.6084 \\ (0.0006) \end{gathered}$ | 11.4854 | 1 | 0.2403 | 0.1605 | 10.6878 | 8 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2718 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.7045 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 11.5851 |
| Healthcare | 12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1965 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2919 \\ (0.2241) \end{gathered}$ | 15.0803 | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1917 \\ (0.0007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5998 \\ (0.0762) \end{gathered}$ | 14.6710 | 8 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1989 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.7378 \\ (0.0023) \end{gathered}$ | 15.2849 |
| Industrials | 24 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1925 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.7108 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.5601 | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1590 \\ (0.0021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.4084 \\ (0.1377) \end{gathered}$ | 13.1652 | 20 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1992 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.9347 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.6391 |
| Technology | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1492 \\ (0.0451) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.7947 \\ (0.2900) \end{gathered}$ | 12.2032 | 1 | 0.2099 | 0.2702 | 9.886 | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1189 \\ (0.1142) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.3271 \\ (0.1348) \end{gathered}$ | 13.3618 |
| Telecommunications Services | 1 | 0.1282 | 0.1393 | 12.2224 | 1 | 0.1282 | 0.1393 | 12.2224 |  |  |  |  |
| T value |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Basic Materials |  | 28.41 | 172.44 |  |  | 13.37 | 79.50 |  |  | 30.08 | 182.77 |  |
| Consumer Goods |  | 49.73 | 245.85 |  |  | 19.41 | 88.86 |  |  | 63.20 | 315.62 |  |
| Consumer Services |  | 29.67 | 97.42 |  |  | 21.99 | 46.80 |  |  | 38.30 | 154.37 |  |
| Energy |  | 31.44 | 75.18 |  |  | 26.41 | 17.64 |  |  | 32.07 | 82.38 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 64 |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Healthcare |  | 34.19 | 108.18 |  |  | 20.38 | 49.58 |  |  | 41.10 | 137.49 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industrials |  | 35.26 | 156.92 |  |  | 26.16 | 65.21 |  |  | 37.07 | 175.26 |  |
| Technology |  | 46.98 | 361.80 |  |  | 69.97 | 90.07 |  |  | 35.49 | 497.66 |  |
| Telecommunications |  | 12.09 | 13.14 |  |  | 12.09 | 13.14 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panel C: All firms |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | All |  |  |  | Positive beta |  |  |  | Negative beta |  |  |  |
|  | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test | N | sigma | beta | J test |
| Total | 103 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1994 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.5366 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.5132 | 29 | $\begin{gathered} 0.1716 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5201 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.7058 | 74 | $\begin{gathered} 0.2103 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.9508 \\ (<0.0001) \end{gathered}$ | 13.4377 |
| T value |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 37 | 162.86 |  |  | 22.80 | 61.78 |  |  | 42.64 | 203.02 |  |

## Table 9: Distribution of Sigma across different firms for the Leland model

This table presents the distribution of Sigma across individual firms for the Leland model, and for both 7 -moments and 9-moments. For 7-moments, the firm "Dow Chem Co" has the largest Sigma 0.2974, the firm "Raytheon Co" has the smallest Sigma 0.05, and the average value of Sigma is 0.1618 . For 9 -moments, the firm "Dow Chem Co" has the largest Sigma 0.2913, the firm "Raytheon Co" has the smallest Sigma 0.05, and the average value of Sigma is 0.1557.

| Firm | Sigma_7mom | Sigma_9mom | Firm | Sigma_7mom | Sigma_9mom |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Abbott Labs | 0.1842 | 0.1567 | Norfolk Sthn Corp | 0.1282 | 0.1211 |
| Air Prods \& Chems Inc | 0.1551 | 0.1564 | Northrop Grumman Corp | 0.1099 | 0.1061 |
| Honeywell Intl Inc | 0.1573 | 0.1598 | OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP | 0.2008 | 0.1929 |
| Alcoa Inc. | 0.1947 | 0.1893 | Omnicare Inc | 0.2000 | 0.1788 |
| Wyeth | 0.1869 | 0.1833 | PPG Inds Inc | 0.1524 | 0.1428 |
| Anheuser Busch Cos Inc | 0.1382 | 0.1394 | J C Penney Co Inc | 0.1935 | 0.1474 |
| APACHE CORP | 0.2179 | 0.2195 | Pepsico Inc | 0.1388 | 0.1327 |
| Archer Daniels Midland Co | 0.1754 | 0.1519 | Pfizer Inc | 0.1637 | 0.1655 |
| Arrow Electrs Inc | 0.1393 | 0.1134 | Altria Gp Inc | 0.2867 | 0.2443 |
| Avon Prods Inc | 0.2170 | 0.2175 | ConocoPhillips | 0.1358 | 0.1285 |
| Baker Hughes Inc | 0.2756 | 0.2749 | Pitney Bowes Inc | 0.0976 | 0.0847 |
| Baxter Intl Inc | 0.1527 | 0.1210 | Procter \& Gamble Co | 0.1509 | 0.1513 |
| Black \& Decker Corp | 0.1435 | 0.1428 | Raytheon Co | 0.0500 | 0.0500 |
| Boeing Co | 0.1895 | 0.1834 | Rohm \& Haas Co | 0.1389 | 0.1633 |
| Bristol Myers Squibb Co | 0.1865 | 0.1818 | Ryder Sys Inc | 0.1352 | 0.1302 |
| CSX Corp | 0.0804 | 0.0886 | Safeway Inc | 0.1366 | 0.1316 |
| Campbell Soup Co | 0.1489 | 0.1330 | Schering Plough Corp | 0.2203 | 0.2200 |


| Caterpillar Inc | 0.1259 | 0.1153 | Sealed Air Corp US | 0.1254 | 0.1342 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CenturyTel Inc | 0.1082 | 0.1096 | Sherwin Williams Co | 0.1867 | 0.1875 |
| Clorox Co | 0.1513 | 0.1520 | Smithfield Foods Inc | 0.1253 | 0.1240 |
| Colgate Palmolive Co | 0.1422 | 0.1457 | Southwest Airls Co | 0.1776 | 0.1699 |
| ConAgra Foods Inc | 0.1147 | 0.1160 | Sunoco Inc | 0.1727 | 0.1505 |
| Molson Coors Brewing Co | 0.1619 | 0.1522 | SUPERVALU INC | 0.0816 | 0.0859 |
| Danaher Corp | 0.1921 | 0.1914 | Sysco Corp | 0.1684 | 0.1609 |
| Target Corp | 0.1979 | 0.1917 | Textron Inc | 0.0685 | 0.0507 |
| Dover Corp | 0.1551 | 0.1460 | Un Pac Corp | 0.1131 | 0.1256 |
| Dow Chem Co | 0.2974 | 0.2913 | Utd Parcel Sve Inc | 0.1389 | 0.1437 |
| Omnicom Gp Inc | 0.1321 | 0.1257 | UST Inc. | 0.1802 | 0.1784 |
| FedEx Corp | 0.1938 | 0.1882 | Utd Tech Corp | 0.1387 | 0.1407 |
| Gen Dynamics Corp | 0.1429 | 0.1354 | Unvl Health Svcs Inc | 0.1621 | 0.1603 |
| Gen Mls Inc | 0.1019 | 0.1063 | V F Corp | 0.1954 | 0.1936 |
| Goodrich Corp | 0.1394 | 0.1320 | Wal Mart Stores Inc | 0.2033 | 0.1836 |
| Halliburton Co | 0.2444 | 0.2147 | Whirlpool Corp | 0.1216 | 0.1164 |
| H J HEINZ CO | 0.1174 | 0.1181 | Anadarko Pete Corp | 0.1599 | 0.1569 |
| Home Depot Inc | 0.2515 | 0.2170 | Coca Cola Entpers Inc | 0.0667 | 0.0665 |
| Intl Business Machs Corp | 0.1667 | 0.1592 | Waste Mgmt Inc | 0.1241 | 0.1267 |
| Intl Paper Co | 0.1049 | 0.1064 | Pride Intl Inc | 0.2466 | 0.2306 |
| Johnson \& Johnson | 0.1407 | 0.1439 | Autozone Inc | 0.1821 | 0.1718 |
| Kellogg Co | 0.1279 | 0.1220 | Mohawk Inds Inc | 0.1950 | 0.1913 |
| Kimberly Clark Corp | 0.1260 | 0.1088 | Praxair Inc | 0.1704 | 0.1734 |
| The Kroger Co. | 0.1177 | 0.1148 | BorgWarner Inc | 0.1819 | 0.1728 |
| Eli Lilly \& Co | 0.1823 | 0.1811 | ONEOK Partners LP | 0.0924 | 0.0870 |
| Ltd Brands Inc | 0.2341 | 0.2246 | Marriott Intl Inc | 0.2091 | 0.2037 |
| Lockheed Martin Corp | 0.1352 | 0.1261 | Costco Whsl Corp | 0.1740 | 0.1645 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Lowes Cos Inc | 0.2216 | 0.2202 | Eastman Chem Co | 0.1073 | 0.1064 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Masco Corp | 0.1868 | 0.1853 | Cytec Inds Inc | 0.1714 | 0.1643 |
| Medtronic Inc | 0.1896 | 0.1888 | AmerisourceBergen Corp | 0.0828 | 0.0884 |
| Merck \& Co Inc | 0.1954 | 0.1959 | Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc | 0.1850 | 0.1929 |
| 3M Co | 0.1794 | 0.1797 | Quest Diagnostics Inc | 0.1633 | 0.1638 |
| Motorola Inc | 0.1568 | 0.1419 | Rep Svcs Inc | 0.1214 | 0.1140 |
| Newell Rubbermaid Inc | 0.1698 | 0.1566 | Reynolds Amern Inc | 0.1672 | 0.1578 |
| Nordstrom Inc | 0.2440 | 0.2170 | Monsanto Co | 0.2365 | 0.2265 |

## Table 10: Distribution of Sigma across A and BBB rated firms for the Leland model

This table presents the Sigma distribution for A and BBB rated firms. The average Sigma value for A rated firms with 7 - and 9 -moments are 0.1743 and 0.1675 respectively; The average Sigma value for BBB rated firms with 7- and 9-moments are 0.1494 and 0.1444 respectively; The total average Sigma value for these firms with 7-and 9-moments are 0.1607 and 0.1549 respectively. For A rated firms, "Baker Hughes Inc" has the largest Sigma value of 0.2756 and 0.2749 for 7 - and 9-moments respectively; "Raytheon Co" has the smallest Sigma value of 0.05 and 0.05 for 7 - and 9 -moments respectively. For BBB rating firms, "Dow Chem Co" has the largest Sigma value of 0.2974 and 0.2913 for 7 - and 9-moments respectively; "Textron Inc" has the smallest Sigma value of 0.0685 and 0.0507 for 7 - and 9-momentsrespectively.

| Rating A |  |  |  | Rating BBB |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Firm | Rating | Sigma_7mom | sigma_9mom | Firm | Rating | Sigma_7mom | sigma_9mom |
| Baker Hughes Inc | A | 0.2756 | 0.2749 | Dow Chem Co | BBB | 0.2974 | 0.2913 |
| Home Depot Inc | A | 0.2515 | 0.2170 | Alcoa Inc. | BBB | 0.1947 | 0.1893 |
| Halliburton Co | A | 0.2444 | 0.2147 | FedEx Corp | BBB | 0.1938 | 0.1882 |
| Nordstrom Inc | A | 0.2440 | 0.2170 | Mohawk Inds Inc | BBB | 0.1950 | 0.1913 |
| Monsanto Co | A | 0.2365 | 0.2265 | Altria Gp Inc | BBB | 0.2867 | 0.2443 |
| Lowes Cos Inc | A | 0.2216 | 0.2202 | Pride Intl Inc | BBB | 0.2466 | 0.2306 |
| Schering Plough Corp | A | 0.2203 | 0.2200 | Avon Prods Inc | BBB | 0.2170 | 0.2175 |
| APACHE CORP | A | 0.2179 | 0.2195 | Marriott Intl Inc | BBB | 0.2091 | 0.2037 |
| OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP | A | 0.2008 | 0.1929 | BorgWarner Inc | BBB | 0.1819 | 0.1728 |
| Target Corp | A | 0.1979 | 0.1917 | Southwest Airls Co | BBB | 0.1776 | 0.1699 |
| V F Corp | A | 0.1954 | 0.1936 | UST Inc. | BBB | 0.1802 | 0.1784 |
|  |  |  | 69 |  |  |  |  |


| Danaher Corp | A | 0.1921 | 0.1914 | Cytec Inds Inc | BBB | 0.1714 | 0.1643 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Medtronic Inc | A | 0.1896 | 0.1888 | Quest Diagnostics Inc | BBB | 0.1633 | 0.1638 |
| Boeing Co | A | 0.1895 | 0.1834 | Reynolds Amern Inc | BBB | 0.1672 | 0.1578 |
| Wyeth | A | 0.1869 | 0.1833 | Anadarko Pete Corp | BBB | 0.1599 | 0.1569 |
| Sherwin Williams Co | A | 0.1867 | 0.1875 | Rohm \& Has Co | BBB | 0.1389 | 0.1633 |
| Bristol Myers Squibb Co | A | 0.1865 | 0.1818 | Newell Rubbermaid Inc | BBB | 0.1698 | 0.1566 |
| Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc | A | 0.1850 | 0.1929 | Autozone Inc <br> Molson Coors Brewing | BBB | 0.1821 | 0.1718 |
| Eli Lilly \& Co | A | 0.1823 | 0.1811 | Co | BBB | 0.1619 | 0.1522 |
| Archer Daniels Midland Co | A | 0.1754 | 0.1519 | Safeway Inc | BBB | 0.1366 | 0.1316 |
| Costco Whsl Corp | A | 0.1740 | 0.1645 | PPG Inds Inc | BBB | 0.1524 | 0.1428 |
| Praxair Inc | A | 0.1704 | 0.1734 | Clorox Co | BBB | 0.1513 | 0.1520 |
| Sysco Corp | A | 0.1684 | 0.1609 | Black \& Decker Corp | BBB | 0.1435 | 0.1428 |
| Honeywell Intl Inc | A | 0.1573 | 0.1598 | Motorola Inc | BBB | 0.1568 | 0.1419 |
| Dover Corp | A | 0.1551 | 0.1460 | Ryder Sys Inc | BBB | 0.1352 | 0.1302 |
| Air Prods \& Chems Inc | A | 0.1551 | 0.1564 | Goodrich Corp | BBB | 0.1394 | 0.1320 |
| Baxter Intl Inc | A | 0.1527 | 0.1210 | The Kroger Co. | BBB | 0.1177 | 0.1148 |
| Campbell Soup Co | A | 0.1489 | 0.1330 | Norfolk Sthn Corp | BBB | 0.1282 | 0.1211 |
| Gen Dynamics Corp | A | 0.1429 | 0.1354 | Kellogg Co | BBB | 0.1279 | 0.1220 |
| Utd Parcel Svc Inc | A | 0.1389 | 0.1437 | Waste Mgmt Inc | BBB | 0.1241 | 0.1267 |
| Pepsico Inc | A | 0.1388 | 0.1327 | H J HEINZ CO | BBB | 0.1174 | 0.1181 |
| Utd Tech Corp | A | 0.1387 | 0.1407 | Omnicom Gp Inc | BBB | 0.1321 | 0.1257 |
| Anheuser Busch Cos Inc | A | 0.1382 | 0.1394 | Un Pac Corp | BBB | 0.1131 | 0.1256 |
| ConocoPhillips | A | 0.1358 | 0.1285 | Whirlpool Corp | BBB | 0.1216 | 0.1164 |
| Lockheed Martin Corp | A | 0.1352 | 0.1261 | ConAgra Foods Inc | BBB | 0.1147 | 0.1160 |
| Kimberly Clark Corp | A | 0.1260 | 0.1088 | Arrow Electrs Inc | BBB | 0.1393 | 0.1134 |
| Caterpillar Inc | A | 0.1259 | 0.1153 | Rep Svcs Inc | BBB | 0.1214 | 0.1140 |


| Coca Cola Entpers Inc | A | 0.0667 | 0.0665 | CenturyTel Inc | BBB | 0.1082 | 0.1096 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Raytheon Co | A | 0.0500 | 0.0500 | Eastman Chem Co | BBB | 0.1073 | 0.1064 |
|  |  |  |  | Intl Paper Co | BBB | 0.1049 | 0.1064 |
|  |  |  |  | Gen Mls Inc | BBB | 0.1019 | 0.1063 |
|  |  |  |  | Northrop Grumman Corp | BBB | 0.1099 | 0.1061 |
|  |  |  |  | CSX Corp | BBB | 0.0804 | 0.0886 |
|  |  |  |  | AmerisourceBergen Corp | BBB | 0.0828 | 0.0884 |
|  |  |  |  | ONEOK Partners LP | BBB | 0.0924 | 0.0870 |
|  |  |  |  | Pitney Bowes Inc | BBB | 0.0976 | 0.0847 |
|  |  |  |  | Textron Inc | BBB | 0.0685 | 0.0507 |
| Rating A |  |  |  | Rating BBB |  |  |  |
|  |  | 7 moment | 9 momnet |  |  | 7 moment | 9 moment |
| Average |  | 0.1743 | 0.1675 |  |  | 0.1494 | 0.1444 |
|  |  | ent |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total Average |  | 0.1607 | 0.1549 |  |  |  |  |

## Table 11: Beta distribution for CEV model with 9-moment conditions

This table presents the beta distribution for CEV model with 9 -moment conditions. There are 51 firms with negative beta and 52 firms with positive beta. Panel A shows the firms with negative betas. Firm "Gen Mls Inc" has the smallest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are $-0.5204,14.159$ and 64.8393 respectively for the negative group; panel B shows the firms with positive betas. Firm "AmerisourceBergen Corp" has the largest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are $0.6392,14.6222$ and 5.656 respectively for the positive group.

| Firm | Beta | Standard error | J Test | T |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
|  | Negative beta |  |  |  |
| Gen Mls Inc | -1.4099 | 0.0685 | 16.0398 | 20.5825 |
| Sealed Air Corp US | -1.3939 | 0.0524 | 11.0940 | 26.6011 |
| The Kroger Co. | -1.0664 | 0.0807 | 12.7630 | 13.2144 |
| Lowes Cos Inc | -1.0215 | 0.0200 | 14.0085 | 51.0750 |
| Intl Paper Co | -1.0119 | 0.0505 | 14.6964 | 20.0376 |
| Medtronic Inc | -1.0091 | 0.0319 | 16.1936 | 31.6332 |
| Honeywell Intl Inc | -0.9650 | 0.0443 | 17.3969 | 21.7833 |
| Textron Inc | -0.9457 | 0.0275 | 12.4459 | 34.3891 |
| Ryder Sys Inc | -0.9225 | 0.0273 | 12.0790 | 33.7912 |
| OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP | -0.9067 | 0.0176 | 12.3581 | 51.5170 |
| Monsanto Co | -0.9053 | 0.0422 | 11.4217 | 21.4526 |
| Pepsico Inc | -0.8975 | 0.0424 | 15.2876 | 21.1675 |
| Caterpillar Inc | -0.8855 | 0.0063 | 14.8702 | 140.5556 |
|  |  |  |  |  |


| Mohawk Inds Inc | -0.8650 | 0.0362 | 13.9250 | 23.8950 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Norfolk Sthn Corp | -0.8525 | 0.0526 | 14.4680 | 16.2072 |
| Omnicare Inc | -0.8358 | 0.0457 | 12.2683 | 18.2888 |
| H J HEINZ CO | -0.7942 | 0.0719 | 18.0136 | 11.0459 |
| Un Pac Corp | -0.7770 | 0.0332 | 12.4555 | 23.4036 |
| Waste Mgmt Inc | -0.6778 | 0.0523 | 11.4072 | 12.9598 |
| Archer Daniels Midland Co | -0.6696 | 0.0242 | 11.1345 | 27.6694 |
| Anheuser Busch Cos Inc | -0.6653 | 0.0334 | 12.8858 | 19.9192 |
| Procter \& Gamble Co | -0.6456 | 0.0287 | 18.4776 | 22.4948 |
| Pride Intl Inc | -0.6218 | 0.0156 | 11.1393 | 39.8590 |
| Halliburton Co | -0.6108 | 0.0409 | 11.5637 | 14.9340 |
| Molson Coors Brewing Co | -0.5213 | 0.0485 | 12.8712 | 10.7485 |
| Wal Mart Stores Inc | -0.4772 | 0.0669 | 18.4947 | 7.1330 |
| Masco Corp | -0.3785 | 0.0303 | 12.7038 | 12.4917 |
| UST Inc. | -0.3609 | 0.0338 | 13.3902 | 10.6775 |
| Schering Plough Corp | -0.3270 | 0.0187 | 13.3983 | 17.4866 |
| Sunoco Inc | -0.3220 | 0.0032 | 12.2454 | 100.6250 |
| Southwest Airls Co | -0.3060 | 0.0115 | 16.4563 | 26.6087 |
| Unvl Health Svcs Inc | -0.2632 | 0.0063 | 15.7583 | 41.7778 |
| Goodrich Corp | -0.2080 | 0.0010 | 13.5138 | 208.0000 |
| Target Corp | -0.1683 | 0.0116 | 13.2191 | 14.5086 |
| Utd Parcel Svc Inc | -0.1411 | 0.0023 | 14.9576 | 61.3478 |
| ConAgra Foods Inc | -0.1361 | 0.0511 | 17.0622 | 2.6634 |
| ONEOK Partners LP | -0.1292 | 0.0101 | 13.6648 | 12.7921 |
| Sysco Corp | -0.1197 | 0.0001 | 13.7570 | 1157.6402 |
| Smithfield Foods Inc | -0.1108 | 0.0169 | 12.7948 | 6.5562 |
| Altria Gp Inc | -0.1088 | 0.0362 | 17.2010 | 3.0055 |


| Home Depot Inc | -0.1027 | 0.0020 | 12.9598 | 51.3500 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: |
| Eli Lilly \& Co | -0.1022 | 0.0063 | 17.3523 | 16.2222 |
| 3M Co | -0.1011 | 0.0016 | 17.2972 | 63.1875 |
| Pitney Bowes Inc | -0.1010 | 0.0130 | 15.7017 | 7.7692 |
| Praxair Inc | -0.1002 | 0.0045 | 12.3330 | 22.2667 |
| Baxter Intl Inc | -0.1001 | 0.0003 | 19.0565 | 333.6667 |
| Air Prods \& Chems Inc | -0.1000 | 0.0012 | 13.0470 | 83.3333 |
| Black \& Decker Corp | -0.1000 | 0.0004 | 14.9817 | 264.9709 |
| Merck \& Co Inc | -0.1000 | 0.0046 | 13.6090 | 21.7391 |
| Pfizer Inc | -0.1000 | 0.0052 | 14.3440 | 19.2308 |
| Anadarko Pete Corp | -0.1000 | 0.0095 | 11.5471 | 10.5263 |
|  | -0.5204 | 0.0263 | 14.1590 | 64.8393 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Positive beta |  |  |  |
| APACHE CORP | 0.1000 | 0.0694 | 13.6553 | 1.4409 |
| Baker Hughes Inc | 0.1000 | 0.0322 | 13.7164 | 3.1056 |
| CSX Corp | 0.1000 | 0.1070 | 11.7133 | 0.9346 |
| Danaher Corp | 0.1000 | 0.0971 | 16.0142 | 1.0299 |
| Kellogg Co | 0.1000 | 0.0830 | 17.1015 | 1.2048 |
| Autozone Inc | 0.1000 | 0.2091 | 16.8616 | 0.4782 |
| SUPERVALU INC | 0.1017 | 0.2014 | 11.3541 | 0.5050 |
| Safeway Inc | 0.1077 | 0.0613 | 13.0120 | 1.7569 |
| Northrop Grumman Corp | 0.1587 | 0.1455 | 16.1149 | 1.0907 |
| Marriott Intl Inc | 0.2156 | 0.0776 | 13.1209 | 2.7784 |
| Raytheon Co | 0.2271 | 0.1511 | 17.1213 | 1.5030 |
| Coca Cola Entpers Inc | 0.3032 | 0.3190 | 13.0901 | 0.9505 |
| FedEx Corp | 0.3090 | 0.0632 | 14.8316 | 4.8892 |
|  | 74 |  |  |  |


| V F Corp | 0.3279 | 0.0788 | 14.3328 | 4.1612 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: |
| BorgWarner Inc | 0.3583 | 0.1038 | 13.8510 | 3.4518 |
| Sherwin Williams Co | 0.3625 | 0.0910 | 15.8362 | 3.9835 |
| Cytec Inds Inc | 0.3684 | 0.1118 | 15.4304 | 3.2952 |
| Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc | 0.3716 | 0.0328 | 12.8220 | 11.3293 |
| J C Penney Co Inc | 0.3835 | 0.1103 | 14.8752 | 3.4769 |
| Nordstrom Inc | 0.4221 | 0.0532 | 13.5369 | 7.9342 |
| ConocoPhillips | 0.4487 | 0.1262 | 11.7771 | 3.5555 |
| Costco Whsl Corp | 0.5342 | 0.1020 | 14.1839 | 5.2373 |
| Boeing Co | 0.5382 | 0.1491 | 14.5554 | 3.6097 |
| Dover Corp | 0.5983 | 0.0622 | 14.1908 | 9.6190 |
| Utd Tech Corp | 0.6000 | 0.0626 | 12.9556 | 9.5847 |
| Campbell Soup Co | 0.6002 | 0.1118 | 16.0267 | 5.3685 |
| Avon Prods Inc | 0.6760 | 0.1113 | 16.4972 | 6.0737 |
| Dow Chem Co | 0.6994 | 0.0767 | 13.8217 | 9.1186 |
| Intl Business Machs Corp | 0.7454 | 0.1542 | 18.5198 | 4.8340 |
| Ltd Brands Inc | 0.7662 | 0.0510 | 11.2610 | 15.0235 |
| Abbott Labs | 0.7915 | 0.1393 | 16.3636 | 5.6820 |
| Motorola Inc | 0.8574 | 0.0590 | 12.5227 | 14.5322 |
| Bristol Myers Squibb Co | 0.8709 | 0.0883 | 17.4791 | 9.8630 |
| Lockheed Martin Corp | 0.8879 | 0.1731 | 18.0761 | 5.1294 |
| PPG Inds Inc | 0.9065 | 0.1036 | 17.0506 | 8.7500 |
| Wyeth | 0.9191 | 0.1524 | 12.4004 | 6.0308 |
| Gen Dynamics Corp | 0.9402 | 0.0846 | 14.5436 | 11.1135 |
| Whirlpool Corp | 0.9476 | 0.2302 | 14.6319 | 4.1164 |
| Newell Rubbermaid Inc | 0.9496 | 0.0569 | 15.9277 | 16.6889 |
| Kimberly Clark Corp | 0.9637 | 0.1709 | 14.9676 | 5.6390 |
|  |  |  |  |  |


| Reynolds Amern Inc | 0.9655 | 0.2891 | 14.3849 | 3.3397 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: |
| Colgate Palmolive Co | 0.9706 | 0.7450 | 16.3896 | 1.3028 |
| Johnson \& Johnson | 0.9973 | 0.5879 | 17.0762 | 1.6964 |
| Omnicom Gp Inc | 0.9975 | 0.1457 | 16.3600 | 6.8463 |
| Clorox Co | 1.0005 | 0.2056 | 11.7352 | 4.8662 |
| Quest Diagnostics Inc | 1.0254 | 0.1656 | 12.1446 | 6.1920 |
| Alcoa Inc. | 1.0903 | 0.0546 | 14.4232 | 19.9689 |
| Arrow Electrs Inc | 1.0995 | 0.2044 | 17.1461 | 5.3792 |
| CenturyTel Inc | 1.1093 | 0.2095 | 12.7566 | 5.2950 |
| Eastman Chem Co | 1.1499 | 0.1531 | 11.8492 | 7.5108 |
| Rohm \& Haas Co | 1.4415 | 0.2232 | 15.2233 | 6.4583 |
| AmerisourceBergen Corp | 1.5320 | 0.2398 | 14.7193 | 6.3887 |
| Average | 0.6392 | 0.1478 | 14.6222 | 5.6560 |

## Table 12: Beta distribution for the CEV model with 7-moment conditions

This table presents the beta distribution for the CEV model with 7 -moment conditions. There are 74 firms with negative beta and 29 firms with positive beta. Panel A shows the firms with negative betas. Firm "Smithfield Foods Inc" has the smallest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are-0.9508, 13.4377 and 200.7618 respectively for the negative group; panel B shows the firms with positive betas. Firm "Gen Mls Inc" has the largest beta. The average beta, average J statistic, and average T value are $0.5201,13.7058$ and 61.777 respectively for the positive group.

| Firm | Beta | Standard error | J Test | T |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Negative beta |  |  |  |
| Smithfield Foods Inc | -3.0525 | 0.0851 | 10.7882 | 35.8696 |
| Pitney Bowes Inc | -1.6123 | 0.0596 | 9.8951 | 848.5789 |
| Masco Corp | -1.4593 | 0.0645 | 9.6145 | 291.8600 |
| Quest Diagnostics Inc | -1.4319 | 0.0459 | 12.1357 | 318.2000 |
| Intl Paper Co | -1.4047 | 0.0665 | 13.8871 | 401.3429 |
| Reynolds Amern Inc | -1.3858 | 0.0391 | 12.5708 | 230.9667 |
| Sealed Air Corp US | -1.3682 | 0.0693 | 12.3008 | 224.2951 |
| Raytheon Co | -1.2901 | 0.0788 | 14.9110 | 222.4310 |
| Eastman Chem Co | -1.2259 | 0.0775 | 11.2071 | 215.0702 |
| Pepsico Inc | -1.1710 | 0.0594 | 14.4490 | 249.1489 |
| Dow Chem Co | -1.1502 | 0.0702 | 13.1101 | 426.0000 |
| Un Pac Corp | -1.1016 | 0.1119 | 11.8393 | 121.0549 |
| Autozone Inc | -1.0999 | 0.0469 | 17.0106 | 224.4694 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 77 |  |  |  |


| Lowes Cos Inc | -1.0823 | 0.0300 | 13.9755 | 300.6389 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Kellogg Co | -1.0744 | 0.0956 | 17.2310 | 358.1333 |
| Black \& Decker Corp | -1.0572 | 0.0508 | 13.7356 | 160.1818 |
| Molson Coors Brewing Co | -1.0524 | 0.0989 | 11.2845 | 113.1613 |
| Lockheed Martin Corp | -1.0495 | 0.0775 | 14.1631 | 276.1842 |
| V F Corp | -1.0479 | 0.0429 | 12.1260 | 2095.8000 |
| Cytec Inds Inc | -1.0479 | 0.0465 | 14.7499 | 100.7596 |
| Anheuser Busch Cos Inc | -1.0453 | 0.0576 | 12.6176 | 201.0192 |
| Intl Business Machs Corp | -1.0419 | 0.0722 | 16.8284 | 146.7465 |
| Medtronic Inc | -1.0410 | 0.0328 | 14.8923 | 185.8929 |
| Coca Cola Entpers Inc | -1.0390 | 0.0733 | 15.5321 | 611.1765 |
| Colgate Palmolive Co | -1.0292 | 0.0496 | 16.2404 | 177.4483 |
| Wyeth | -1.0271 | 0.0690 | 14.5739 | 180.1930 |
| Gen Dynamics Corp | -1.0094 | 0.0524 | 13.6122 | 142.1690 |
| Alcoa Inc. | -1.0073 | 0.0681 | 14.7320 | 111.9222 |
| Northrop Grumman Corp | -1.0035 | 0.0535 | 15.0197 | 346.0345 |
| Utd Tech Corp | -0.9985 | 0.0378 | 12.1775 | 129.6753 |
| Air Prods \& Chems Inc | -0.9932 | 0.0636 | 10.8773 | 91.9630 |
| Ryder Sys Inc | -0.9912 | 0.0534 | 11.8448 | 120.8780 |
| Sherwin Williams Co | -0.9816 | 0.0625 | 14.0872 | 103.3263 |
| Monsanto Co | -0.9742 | 0.0491 | 10.9551 | 35.4255 |
| Johnson \& Johnson | -0.9688 | 0.0606 | 16.4840 | 169.9649 |
| Pride Intl Inc | -0.9673 | 0.0500 | 11.1092 | 89.5648 |
| The Kroger Co. | -0.9651 | 0.0718 | 12.5403 | 229.7857 |
| Textron Inc | -0.9580 | 0.0726 | 11.4960 | 177.4074 |
| FedEx Corp | -0.9557 | 0.0119 | 16.4899 | 66.8322 |
| Marriott Intl Inc | -0.9522 | 0.0535 | 12.4622 | 78.6942 |
|  | 78 |  |  |  |


| PPG Inds Inc | -0.9435 | 0.0334 | 16.6418 | 159.9153 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| H J HEINZ CO | -0.9138 | 0.0513 | 19.7234 | 179.1765 |
| Praxair Inc | -0.9125 | 0.0455 | 10.9687 | 102.5281 |
| Procter \& Gamble Co | -0.9114 | 0.0530 | 15.4600 | 136.0299 |
| Archer Daniels Midland Co | -0.9067 | 0.0803 | 11.0206 | 159.0702 |
| Altria Gp Inc | -0.9064 | 0.0816 | 12.4950 | 95.4105 |
| Rep Svcs Inc | -0.9052 | 0.0372 | 14.2439 | 100.5778 |
| Goodrich Corp | -0.8988 | 0.0521 | 13.0832 | 187.2500 |
| Danaher Corp | -0.8927 | 0.0420 | 15.2366 | 111.5875 |
| OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM | -0.8911 |  | 0.0433 | 11.7143 |
| CORP | -0.8541 | 0.0406 | 11.8905 | 64.5725 |
| Omnicare Inc | -0.8198 | 0.0424 | 15.3991 | 174.4250 |
| Southwest Airls Co | -0.8124 | 0.0270 | 11.7337 | 116.0571 |
| ConocoPhillips | -0.8088 | 0.0653 | 14.5204 | 149.7778 |
| Honeywell Intl Inc | -0.7819 | 0.0426 | 12.8130 | 190.7073 |
| Caterpillar Inc | -0.7657 | 0.0728 | 12.2633 | 104.8904 |
| Safeway Inc | -0.7655 | 0.0856 | 13.2526 | 74.3204 |
| ONEOK Partners LP | -0.7629 | 0.0232 | 12.2674 | 231.1818 |
| Norfolk Sthn Corp | -0.7290 | 0.0426 | 12.8739 | 220.9091 |
| Boeing Co | -0.7243 | 0.0711 | 13.2427 | 109.7424 |
| Newell Rubbermaid Inc | -0.7068 | 0.0597 | 11.4594 | 102.4348 |
| J C Penney Co Inc | -0.7009 | 0.0120 | 11.1823 | 194.6944 |
| CSX Corp | -0.6910 | 0.0333 | 11.7730 | 93.3784 |
| Anadarko Pete Corp | -0.6675 | 0.0572 | 17.3084 | 117.1053 |
| 3M Co | -0.6643 | 0.0273 | 12.8219 | 99.1493 |
| Target Corp | -0.6277 | 0.0369 | 12.5538 | 313.8500 |
| BorgWarner Inc |  |  |  |  |


| Sunoco Inc | -0.5475 | 0.1004 | 9.4773 | 101.3889 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Baxter Intl Inc | -0.5363 | 0.0588 | 19.6418 | 75.5352 |
| Schering Plough Corp | -0.4909 | 0.0341 | 12.7961 | 65.4533 |
| Baker Hughes Inc | -0.4875 | 0.0277 | 13.2236 | 79.9180 |
| APACHE CORP | -0.4739 | 0.0250 | 10.3974 | 39.8235 |
| UST Inc. | -0.3349 | 0.0240 | 13.5983 | 95.6857 |
| Pfizer Inc | -0.2846 | 0.0400 | 18.6323 | 51.7455 |
| Merck \& Co Inc | -0.1217 | 0.0104 | 13.1233 | 52.9130 |
| Average | -0.9508 | 0.0542 | 13.4377 | 200.7618 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Positive beta |  |  |  |
| Abbott Labs | 0.1000 | 0.1090 | 13.8598 | 17.5439 |
| Wal Mart Stores Inc | 0.1000 | 0.0799 | 15.5346 | 11.2360 |
| SUPERVALU INC | 0.1005 | 0.2103 | 12.5876 | 4.9507 |
| Ltd Brands Inc | 0.1152 | 0.0810 | 10.2125 | 23.0400 |
| Waste Mgmt Inc | 0.1154 | 0.2223 | 11.1237 | 10.3964 |
| Home Depot Inc | 0.1294 | 0.0660 | 10.7552 | 8.6846 |
| Dover Corp | 0.1303 | 0.1004 | 12.4872 | 21.7167 |
| CenturyTel Inc | 0.1393 | 0.3129 | 12.2224 | 13.1415 |
| Mohawk Inds Inc | 0.1549 | 0.2042 | 13.3039 | 13.1271 |
| Halliburton Co | 0.1605 | 0.0554 | 10.6878 | 17.6374 |
| Sysco Corp | 0.2003 | 0.0877 | 12.3173 | 22.2556 |
| Campbell Soup Co | 0.2342 | 0.1086 | 15.1319 | 38.3934 |
| Motorola Inc | 0.2702 | 0.0874 | 9.8860 | 90.0667 |
| Eli Lilly \& Co | 0.3378 | 0.0881 | 14.1718 | 22.6711 |
| Nordstrom Inc | 0.3855 | 0.0656 | 13.2957 | 66.4655 |
| Avon Prods Inc | 0.3963 | 0.1130 | 15.7842 | 68.3276 |
|  | 80 |  |  |  |


| Utd Parcel Svc Inc | 0.4040 | 0.1249 | 12.0812 | 126.2500 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Costco Whsl Corp | 0.4623 | 0.1418 | 13.7251 | 57.0741 |
| ConAgra Foods Inc | 0.5029 | 0.1863 | 16.1409 | 34.9236 |
| Omnicom Gp Inc | 0.7960 | 0.3310 | 15.6059 | 104.7368 |
| Clorox Co | 0.8742 | 0.3979 | 11.4175 | 136.5938 |
| Bristol Myers Squibb Co | 0.9619 | 0.1162 | 16.7348 | 135.4789 |
| AmerisourceBergen Corp | 0.9697 | 0.4939 | 14.6450 | 122.7468 |
| Kimberly Clark Corp | 0.9816 | 0.2035 | 14.7852 | 188.7692 |
| Whirlpool Corp | 0.9819 | 0.3237 | 14.4610 | 78.5520 |
| Arrow Electrs Inc | 0.9838 | 0.1927 | 16.9686 | 102.4792 |
| Unvl Health Svcs Inc | 0.9996 | 1.1247 | 13.9177 | 22.6154 |
| Rohm \& Haas Co | 1.0414 | 2.1474 | 15.1523 | 79.4962 |
| Gen Mls Inc | 2.0542 | 1.1858 | 18.4723 | 152.1630 |
| Average | 0.5201 | 0.3090 | 13.7058 | 61.7770 |

Figure 1: Time series of the 5-year CDS spreads over the period from 2001 to 2011.


Figure 2: Time series of model calculated 5-year CDS spreads under 7-moments setting.


Figure 3: Time series of equity volatility under 7-moments setting.


Figure 4: Time series of model calculated 5-year CDS spreads under 9-moments setting.


Figure 5: Time series of equity volatility under 9-moments setting.


Figure 6: Time series of all scenarios together.



[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ In Duan (1994), Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) was introduced as a superior method to estimate the parameters for a unobservable asset value process. In Ericsson and Reneby (2005), the authors also demonstrated the strength of MLE in this kind of estimation work compared to the previous method. However, in Huang and Zhou (2008), the term-structure of CDS spreads plus the equity volatility made the system an overidentified one since normally there are just two or three parameters to be estimated. So GMM estimation was implemented here to incorporate all the information carried in the moment conditions. We adopted this same econometric method, following also Elkamhi, Ericsson and Jiang (2011).

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ See Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Duffie and Lando (2001) for more details on reduced form models.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ Moody's KMV defines as trigger value $K=P_{\text {Short }}+0.5 * P_{\text {Long }}$. Where $P$ represent firm liability.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ In our empirical estimation and test, we reduce this endogenous default boundary into a KMV pre-fixed default boundary as we did for the Leland (1994b) model to make the computation more efficient and comparison between these two models more directly.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ The cumulative default probability $A(T)$ and the present value of one dollar payments when default happens $B(T)$ are very crucial for our estimation. Perrakis and Zhong (2013) applied
    Laplace-transformation and inverse Laplace-transformation to get the closed-form solution for them under finite maturity. The details and proofs of these equations can be found from Proposition 2 in Davydov and Linetsky (2001) and Appendix A in Perrakis and Zhong (2013).
    ${ }^{7}$ To avoid the enormous time and resources consumption when computing the Whittaker Function in Matlab, we used numerical method instead of the Matlab build-in function to calculate the Whittaker Function. It will be discussed in detail in a later section of this paper.

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ Moody's KMV defines as trigger value $K=P_{\text {Short }}+0.5^{*} P_{\text {Long }}$. Where $P$ represent firm liability.
    ${ }^{9}$ Other related balance sheet items are also scaled accordingly. The details will be discussed in the data section.

[^7]:    ${ }^{10}$ This formula for CDS spreads is directly adopted from Huang and Zhou (2008).

[^8]:    ${ }^{11}$ The proof can be found in Perrakis and Zhong (2013) Appendix A and in Proposition 2 in Davydov and Linetsky (2001).
    ${ }^{12}$ Extremely small numbers in Matlab will be treated as zero. However, when this number takes the position of denominator, overflow will happen.
    ${ }^{13}$ The numerical method of inverting Laplace transforms can be found in Section 5 of Kuo and Wang (2003). We present the method in Appendix B in our paper. Note that we have modified some of the parameters of their method.

[^9]:    ${ }^{14}$ The proof can also be found in Appendix B of Perrakis and Zhong (2013)

[^10]:    ${ }^{15}$ We follow Huang and Zhou (2008) for this part.
    ${ }^{16}$ "Important variables" means those variables which will be used in our estimation, such as Recovery Rate, CDS Spreads, etc..
    ${ }^{17}$ "Unreasonable" means the value of the variable does not make economic sense, for example, negative recovery rates or bigger than one CDS spreads.

[^11]:    ${ }^{18}$ Unit for Compustat items is \$millions and unit for CRSP items is \$thousands.
    ${ }^{19}$ The standardization is achieved by scaling the accounting items to the total assets of the firm in the first observation for each individual firm.
    ${ }^{20}$ Expand Procedure is used in SAS.

[^12]:    ${ }^{21}$ Website address: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/WhittakerFunction.html
    ${ }^{22}$ We found that the definitions or expressions for Whittaker Function W and M are not unique. However, what we report here are the most efficient expressions for those two functions to do our task.

