

Soviet cultural diplomacy in India, 1955-1963

Severyan Dyakonov

A thesis

in the History Department

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of Master of Arts (History) at

Concordia University

Montreal, Quebec, Canada

April 2015

© Severyan Dyakonov, 2015

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY

School of Graduate Studies

This to certify that the thesis prepared

By: Severyan Dyakonov

Entitled: Soviet cultural diplomacy in India, 1955-1963

and submitted in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Arts (History)

complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Signed by the Examination Committee:

_____ Chair

Ted McCormick

_____ Examiner

Rachel Berger

_____ Examiner

Graham Carr

_____ Supervisor

Elena Razlogova

Approved by _____

Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director

_____ 2015

Dean of Faculty

- Abstract -

Soviet cultural diplomacy in India, 1955-1963

Severyan Dyakonov

This thesis explores Soviet cultural diplomacy efforts in India during the late 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. This was a time when Indian foreign policy of neutrality in the Cold War was challenged by a conflict with communist China. The Soviet Union found itself in a difficult position because it did not want to lose ties with communist China nor friendly relations with India. This gave the US an opportunity to drag India on their side of the Cold War. India was important for both superpowers because it was one of the leaders of the nonaligned movement of Asian and African countries. The US ideological influence had great advantages in India because of the status of English which was, thanks to the British colonial heritage, the language of elites in general and of higher education in particular. The Soviet Union nevertheless launched an array of programs for India: student exchanges, books and newspapers in Indian languages, as well as film exchanges. The USSR tried its best to convince Indians that a socialist country could be a superpower and that Indians too could achieve the same level of development if they took the Communist path.

- Acknowledgments -

I would like to thank my wife Daria Dyakonova, a fellow historian, for her support in so many ways in this endeavor of finishing my Master's. I also want to thank my friend Justin Veuthey, a PhD candidate in geography, for bringing his American spirit and Swiss precision to my work as a graduate history student in North America. During the trip to Moscow where I worked in the archives for two and a half months the family of my friend Ekaterina Smirnova, her mother Larissa and her sister Nina, gave my wife and I shelter free of charge, asking only for interesting conversations. I remember the long talks with Ekaterina's grandmother Galina Stoyanovna Smirnova who was telling me her family's history. It was particularly striking for me to realize that she was 27 years old when Stalin died and in her thirties during the epoch of my research.

I want to thank professors Christopher Goscha at UQAM for helping me to develop my ideas about the research and Erik Kuhonta at McGill University for initiating me to argumentative writing in English. I also want to thank professors Anya Zilberstein, Theresa Ventura, and Ted McCormick at Concordia for their interesting courses and helping develop my abilities as a researcher.

Finally, I would like to thank Professor Elena Razlogova for supervising my work.

Table of contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter I. The Context: Strategies, Realpolitik, Reform.....	11
1. American Strategies in India.....	11
2. Soviet Strategies in India.....	14
3. Reforms in Soviet Cultural Diplomacy Agencies.....	16
4. Soviet Foreign Policy Toward India and Chinese-Indian Conflict.....	20
Chapter II. Soviet ideological influence in India.....	27
1. Student exchange and academic cooperation.....	28
2. International expositions as space for global competition.....	30
3. Soviet ideological literature for India.....	36
4. Constructing common Russian-Indian past.....	41
5. Soviet press for India.....	46
6. Soviet “special tourist groups”.....	49
7. Challenges of teaching Russian in India.....	53
8. Radio Moscow for India.....	56
Chapter III. Soviet Films and the Cold War in India.....	58
1. Sovexportfilm and the Indian film industry.....	58
2. Competing with Hollywood in India.....	65
3. The Solution: Soviet Film Festivals.....	69

4. Soviet films during conflict with China.....	79
Conclusion.....	82
Bibliography.....	86

Introduction.

In April 1959 a festival took place in Androl, a midsized town in Western Bengal, India. The yearly event provided rare entertainment for the people of Androl and local farmers from the area. The Soviet Consulate in Calcutta sent a special minibus with a film projector and a number of Soviet documentaries about USSR's new factories, electric plants, and achievements in the space race. Soviets did everything they could to convince Indians that the USSR was a strong, industrialized country that achieved these spectacular results in technology and science thanks to its superior socialist economy. Likewise, the United States Information Service (USIS) sent a bus with 16 mm documentaries about the superiority of the "American way." Soviets arrived to Androl first and occupied one of the central plazas for screening their films during the evening hours. The next day they decided to move to the outskirts of the festival to an area with more space and to avoid the noise of the crowds. The USIS minibus came two days after the beginning of the festival and took the spot previously occupied by the Soviet team. Initially Soviets and Americans were relaxed and friendly with each other and discussed their work, how they find these kinds of public gatherings, and where they had gone for previous events. Americans were not happy with the noisy spot and asked if they could come to where the Soviets were and use the back of the Soviet screen for American films, as a symbol of the "peaceful coexistence" that the Soviet government had been talking about at the time. But the Soviets refused the proposition for "obvious reasons." Later, Americans tried to convince the Indian driver of the Soviet minibus to work for them, for a better salary. That same evening "someone flattened the tires of the American bus." After the festival both buses left to find new festivals with large public

gatherings and the possibility to show their respective documentaries.¹

This story is just one of the many examples of the ideological competition between the two superpowers during the Cold War which lasted for more than forty years. During this period from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the US and the USSR had several crises that brought the two countries to the verge of an overt military conflict. But the war was not only about military victory: ideological battles were fierce during the Cold War. Many Third World countries became the ground for the Cold War struggle. Odd Arne Westad in his book *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* argues that the two conflicting Cold War ideologies had the same philosophical origins – in the European Enlightenment – and both superpowers imposed different version of modernity:

[...] the United States and the Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in their politics. Locked in conflict over the very concept of European modernity – to which both states regarded themselves as successors – Moscow and Washington needed to change the World in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of the newly independent states proved fertile ground for their competition.²

Therefore, ideological competition had an important role in the Cold War. Nigel Gould – Davies in his article “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy” argues that the situation of a direct military conflict was rendered irrational because of nuclear weapons:

[...] superpower competition was channeled into indirect military and non military forms conflict and direct non military force... the battle for both sides called 'the hearts and minds' of the undecided, attracting through the exertion of economic and cultural influence rather than coercing through the use of force.³

Currently, there are debates among historians about the terms and theories of ideological

¹ RGALI, Sovexportfilm India 1959, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, spravka ot 25 Aprelya.

² Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4.

³ Nigel Gould – Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 2003), 195.

influence.⁴ Cultural diplomacy is a form of ideological influence that uses culture in a broad sense to persuade public opinion of a foreign country. The notion of cultural diplomacy is close to the concept of “soft power” that is used to contrast the traditional military “hard power.” Harvard political science professor Joseph Nye Jr. developed the concept of “soft power” in the late 1980s. Nye argues that a country can realize its influence over another country without direct threats or payments if the receiving side admires its values and aspires to its level of development.⁵ This point of view also suggests that cultural diplomacy is never neutral and always has political motivations. The pioneer of the theme of cultural diplomacy Frank Ninkovich argues that cultural diplomacy is imperialist: “it is difficult to imagine a foreign policy activity that is more serious, even subversive, in intent... at bottom, [cultural relations] are about the uprooting of traditional identities.”⁶ Ninkovich inaugurated the concept of cultural diplomacy in the 1970s and legitimized the topic that had seemed irrelevant before that.⁷ Historians still debate on whether cultural diplomacy is efficient and what its real goals are. Danielle Fosler-Lussier in her article, “Music Pushed, Music Pulled: Cultural Diplomacy, Globalization, and Imperialism,” analyses music as a tool of cultural diplomacy. Fosler-Lussier argues that cultural products themselves were often subsidiary to human relationships created by cultural exchange programs. This historian also highlights that cultural diplomacy creates Benedict Anderson's “imagined community,” when through media and cultural export people of

⁴ Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Ethridge eds., *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 12-13. Historians questions whether public and cultural diplomacy are euphemisms for propaganda. The debate however is beyond the scope of this Master's thesis.

⁵ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

⁶ Frank Ninkovich, *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy* (New York, 1996), 44 cited in Danielle Fosler-Lussier, “Music Pushed, Music Pulled: Cultural Diplomacy, Globalization, and Imperialism,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 2012), 62.

⁷ Frank Ninkovich “The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State Department, 1938-1947,” *Diplomatic*

one country imagine themselves in relation to others that they never met.⁸ This thesis is in line with the argument of Jessica Gienow-Hecht in her article, “The World is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America,” which states that cultural diplomacy “legitimizes a nation's political influence as well as confidence to exert leadership abroad.”⁹ Gienow-Hecht developed this argument using American symphony orchestras performing abroad as an example. The classical music (mostly of European composers) did not have a particular ideological message, but the ability to bring world-class symphony orchestras to foreign countries was a legitimization of American leadership.

Since the 1990s the theme of cultural diplomacy thrived on the material from the Cold War confrontation. Frances Stonor Saunders writes on the ideological Cold War in *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. This work touches upon different strategies that the American Central Intelligence Agency used to influence European intellectuals after the World War II. Saunders describes secret CIA activities, such as: planting intellectuals into various “cultural freedom” organizations; supporting of European opinion journals; promoting of an intellectually sophisticated image of the US. For Saunders these activities were not neutral in their approach and sought to influence European public opinion in such a discrete way that Europeans would believe that the imposed ideas had always been their own ones.¹⁰

Until recently, historians of cultural diplomacy mainly focused on American activities in Europe. A good example is Walter L. Hixon's *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and*

History, vol. 1, no. 3 (July 1977), 215-238.

⁸ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, “Music Pushed, Music Pulled: Cultural Diplomacy, Globalization, and Imperialism,” *Diplomatic History*, vol.36, no. 1 (January, 2012), 57,59.

⁹ Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “The World is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 36, no.1 (January, 2012), 19.

¹⁰ Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 1999), 4. More on relations between art and CIA JeanMichel Tobelem eds., *L'Arme de la Culture: Les*

the Cold War, 1945-1961, on the US propaganda efforts in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Hixton argues that Western “cultural infiltration” into the communist countries had an impact on the collapse of the Soviet bloc.¹¹ Laura Belmonte's *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* is about the development of the US public diplomacy agencies, such as United States Information Agency, at the beginning of the Cold War. Belmonte is interested in how American ideological efforts explain their political culture and national identity.¹² However, there is an understanding among historians that the field became America-centric over the years and that there is a need to internationalize diplomatic history.¹³

During the Cold War many experts published various books on Soviet ideological influence, “propaganda,” and “subversion” all over the world.¹⁴ Now these works represent a useful source for Cold War historians.

Historians have recently been publishing works on American and Soviet relations with India. Andrew Rotter in *Comrades at Odds: the United States and India, 1947-1964* argues that culture played an important role in US-India relations. According to Rotter, Indians had negative stereotypes of Americans as people because of racial segregation in the US. Rotter also shows how Americans had their own negative stereotypes of Indians as less virile than Pakistanis and

Stratégies de la Diplomatie Culturelle Non Gouvernementale (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007).

¹¹ Walter L. Hixton, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), xv.

¹² Laura Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 7-8.

¹³ Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Ethridge eds., *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 5.

¹⁴ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Richard Remnek, *Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Soviet Policy Towards India* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1975); Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda: A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1976); Peter Sager, *Moscow's Hand in India* (Bern: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966).

therefore less capable to fight in the Cold War.¹⁵ Andres Hilger, a specialist on USSR-India relations, in his article, “Building a Socialist Elite,” studies Soviet attempts to create new elites in the “Global South” through student exchange programs.¹⁶ David Engerman writes about Soviet influence in Asia during the Cold War. Notably, Engerman's article “Learning from the East” is about Soviet experts and advisors in India in the 1950s.¹⁷ Jeremy Wishon in his article “Soviet Globalization: Indo-Soviet Public Diplomacy and Cold War Cultural Spheres” analyses the impact Soviet “soft power” had in India.¹⁸ However, to date there are no major contributions on the USSR’s cultural diplomacy in India during the Cold War.

Cinema played a crucial role in the cultural Cold War. Several works underline the themes in Soviet and American cinema during the Cold War without exploring the promotion of films in foreign countries.¹⁹ Kerry Segrave’s *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screen* is on how Hollywood exported its films during the twentieth century.²⁰ Historians have yet to examine how the Soviets exported their films and used films as propaganda in other parts of the world. This thesis hopes to remedy this scholarly oversight.

¹⁵ Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000).

¹⁶ Andreas Hilger, “Building a Socialist Elite,” in *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Jost Dulffer and Marc Frey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 262-287.

¹⁷ David Engerman, “Learning from the East,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, vol. 33, no. 2, (2013), 227-238.

¹⁸ Jeremiah Wishon, “Soviet Globalization: Indo-Soviet Public Diplomacy and Cold War Cultural Spheres,” *Global Studies Journal*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2013), 103-114.

¹⁹ David Cate, *Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Andrei Kozovoi, “Défier Hollywood: La Diplomatie Culturelle et le Cinéma à l'Ère de Brejnev,” *Relation Internationales*, no. 147 (March 2011), 59-71; Thomas Shaw and Denise Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas: 2010); Maya Turovskaya, “Filmy Kholodnoi Voiny,” *Iskusstvo kino* 9 (September 1996): 98–106.

²⁰ Kerry Segrave, *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screen* (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland and Co., 1997).

Cinema was already a powerful tool for influencing politics long before the Cold War. Lenin himself called the cinema “the most important of all arts,” especially in a country with low literacy rate, such as Soviet Russia in the beginning of the 1920s, or 1950s India.²¹ In America, Hollywood became one of the most important industries of entertainment and ideological influence, especially during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Thomas Shaw and Denise Youngblood in *Cinematic Cold War* offer an important insight into what Americans thought about cinema as an ideological tool. For example, in the 1930-1940s Hollywood producer David Selznick argued that films were the best propaganda medium and the best “American ambassadors abroad.”²² Cinema contains more compressed information about a particular culture than any other form of art that can be seen by a large audience in a short period of time.

A book on Indian films in the Soviet Union during the Cold War – Sudha Rajagopalan's *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going after Stalin* – explains why Indian films were popular in Soviet cinemas during the Cold War.²³ This thesis will analyze Soviet cultural diplomacy in India during the Cold War, with an emphasis on films. The research looks at state-funded cultural diplomacy efforts.²⁴ It is based on previously secret documents from the Soviet cultural diplomacy agencies which worked in India during the Cold War: Sovexportfilm (an organization in charge of Soviet film export), the Soviet embassy, and other Soviet organizations. Historians often ask if cultural diplomacy was part of state strategies or if they

²¹ Mira Liehm, Antonim Liehm, *The Most Important of All Art: Eastern European Film After 1945*, (Berkeley: University of California press, 1977), 1.

²² Thomas Shaw and Denise Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas: 2010), 11-12.

²³ Sudha Rajagopalan, *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: the Culture of Movie-Going After Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008)

²⁴ Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Ethridge, ed., *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 13-14.

were private initiatives.²⁵ These considerations are not pertinent in the Soviet experience because of the nature of the Soviet state; indeed in the Soviet Union it was hard to define the limits of the state and there was no private property. All Soviet cultural organizations such as the Union of Writers were in some way affiliated with the state. It is also hard to say how truly independent were American cultural diplomacy agencies. Indeed Hollywood's Motion Picture Export Association closely collaborated with the US State Department.

The case of India is particularly interesting because the country just got its independence in 1947, and the new Indian elite did not want to join either of the Cold War camps, unlike its neighbors. In 1955 Pakistan became part of CENTO – a military organization on the Western side of the Cold War. Chinese communists, supported by the Soviet Union, took control over most of China by 1949, making China the second most important communist country in the World. India because of its size and political influence in the region was crucially important for both the USSR and the US. By the 1950s, the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing friendly relations with India without formal military or political agreements.²⁶ But what was actually happening with Soviet cultural presence in India in the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s?

In 1962 the India-China war became a major challenge for Soviet diplomatic efforts in India. The war put the USSR in a difficult position because it had been seen as an ally of China. At the same time the Soviets clashed with China over the leadership in the communist world after 1957. During the 1962 conflict the Indian public started to question the neutral status of their country in the face of the war with communist China. The whole conflict became an opportunity for the US to draw India to the American side of the Cold War.

²⁵ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried, eds., *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 9-10.

This thesis argues that the Soviet Union believed that an extensive cultural diplomacy strategy was mandatory to prove that it was a superpower. This was particularly important for the USSR because it wanted to demonstrate that a country with socialist economy could be a superpower. India was the scene of fierce competition between the two giants because it played a pivotal role amongst nonaligned countries. In order to prove to the Indian public that it was a superpower, the Soviet Union had a battery of activities: regularly screening Soviet films, broadcasting *Radio Moscow*, promoting academic exchanges, as well as publishing books and magazines. In many ways the Soviet Union strove to respond to American challenges. For example, it responded to the widespread presence of Hollywood in India. However, despite all these efforts, Soviet cultural influence in India cannot be compared to the American one, contrary to the Cold War era western discourse about the huge scale of “the Soviet cultural offensive.”²⁷

In fact, Americans had an enormous advantage in their cultural influence efforts in India during 1950s, especially in films. There are many reasons for this and one of them is that India is a country with an important colonial heritage. The role of the English language in the country gave a clear advantage to American cultural influence. The British Empire had created an elite in India, which was sometimes unable to freely speak the native Indian languages.²⁸ The sub-continent's universities had long-term academic ties with Great Britain. Furthermore, the Indian government had a difficult relationship with communist ideology and in many cases was afraid of Soviet ideological influence. As a result, India often stayed on the edge of the Cold War, but

²⁶ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union: the Nehru era* (Chicago: University of Chicago press), xi.

²⁷ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Peter Sager, *Moscow's Hand in India* (Bern: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966).

sometimes tumbled into “hot wars,” with China and Pakistan. Nevertheless, India overcame the 1962 crisis with China and remained officially neutral throughout the Cold War. This neutrality provided India the ability to work with both sides. Seeking US aid for its defense from China as well as Soviet aid in its tensions with Pakistan.

This thesis is based on declassified data retrieved from the Moscow archives during the summer of 2013. The sources include documents from the following institutions: Russian Archive of the Contemporary History (*Rossiysky Arkhiv Noveyshei Istorii*--RGANI), Russian Archive of Literature and Arts (*Rossiysky Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusstva*--RGALI), and State Archive of the Russian Federation (*Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii*--GARF). American sources were also used for this research, notably documents on American foreign policy from the US Foreign Policy Project for Historians.²⁹

The thesis is structured as follows: the first chapter analyses how Americans and Soviets viewed India, as well as the reforms in Soviet cultural diplomatic agencies in the 1950s. The second chapter addresses Soviet cultural diplomacy in India, including student exchange, press, and tourism. The third chapter is devoted to Soviet film export in India and how vital films were in the cultural competition between Soviets and Americans in India.

²⁸ Judith M. Brown, Jost Dulffer and Marc Frey, eds., *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 194 in foot note.

²⁹ US Department of State. Office of the historian. The documents are for the years 1952-1954 vol. XI, 1961-1963 vol. XIX on the US foreign policy in African and Asia. For example: Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-

Chapter I. The Context: Strategies, Realpolitik, Reform.

After India obtained its independence in 1947, the country has led its own independent international policy. This policy was formulated in the terms of nonaligned countries that did not want to join the Cold War struggle. This situation was potentially dangerous for both superpowers, but at the same time it gave each an opportunity to entice India into its political and military camp, or at least to keep it away from the camp of the opposing side. India's large space, geographical position, and enormous population were key for domination in Asia. Finally, both superpowers wanted India to be a counterbalance to China in the region. This chapter will discuss the historical context; American strategy in India; the change in Soviet foreign policy after 1953; reforms in Soviet cultural diplomacy agencies; and challenges of the 1962 India-China war for Soviet positions in India.

1. American Strategies in India

Andrew J. Rotter in *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* represents the American strategy towards India with regard towards the security in the Middle East. According to Rotter, the US named Pakistan as the main ally in the region. Pakistan received military aid from the US to defend the Middle East in a possible war with the Soviet Union for the oil-rich region.³⁰ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed in 1953 a plan to construct a system of “free world” military alliances that would encircle the Soviet empire. The

1954 vol. XI, part 2, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), doc. 1001, accessed December 1, 2013, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

³⁰ Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 60.

US needed to build a system of outposts around the periphery of the Soviet bloc to contain the communist expansion. This policy included plans for India and Pakistan.³¹ Americans saw the Indian policy of the nonalignment as silent help to the USSR in the region.³² One of the aims of American strategy was to draw India into the Cold War in the line of the containment strategy. Walter L. Hixon describes the containment as: "... (applied) external pressures, short of direct military conflict, that would promote instability behind the Iron Curtain with the ultimate goal of 'rolling back' communism in Eastern Europe and to the extent possible, in the USSR itself."³³ India's independent policy left the US and the Soviet Union a limited space for action. Cultural influence became one of the aspects that the US and the Soviet Union could use in these circumstances.

Just after independence and violent partition with Pakistan, India faced an economic crisis that concerned the US. China was the main ally in Asia for the USSR during Joseph Stalin's time, although in 1952 Stalin showed some signs of rapprochement with India, fully realized only after his death in 1953.³⁴ American memorandum of the acting assistant Secretary of State for South Asia to the Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews (February 8, 1952) shows anxiety among American diplomats for security in South Asia. The document warns:

There is no time to lose. Communist gains in the recent elections in India show clearly that the conditions our program is designed to combat are being successfully exploited by Communist agents. NEA (bureau of Near Eastern Affairs) believes that if South Asia is subverted it will be only a matter of time before all of the Asian land-mass and over a billion people will be under Communist domination, and our national security will face an unprecedented threat. NEA believes that if this very real possibility materializes, the Department will find it difficult to defend any action, which may have

³¹ Ibid, 64.

³² Ibid, 57.

³³ Walter L. Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), xiv.

³⁴ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 30,36.

reduced the amount now requested for the region for FY (Financial Year) 1953.³⁵

One of the main questions of the time was the US food aid for India, when the country faced a serious food crisis in the beginning of the 1950s. The picture of a failed state in India that could not nourish its population, thus provoking revolution, looked plausible. The American proposition was to help India strengthen its statehood:

\$150,000,000 program for South Asia in FY (Financial Year) 1953 as the minimum which may be expected to achieve our aims, i.e., to help the countries of South Asia, particularly India, to strengthen their national economies as a prerequisite of political stability, and to prevent subversion of a strategic region containing nearly half a billion people and natural resources which play an important part in our defense program.³⁶

Thus Americans saw democratic India as an alternative to Communist China in Asia.³⁷ The American food aid program remained important in US-India relations until 1960s. After Nehru, Indira Gandhi tried to change the Indian subordination to American aid. Indians thought that Americans used The Public Law 480 program as a weapon of influence. President Johnson used the wheat shipments as a means to change India's economic development priorities, such as to reduce investments into heavy industry. Many western economics advisers suggested the same, under the pretext of developing agricultural export.³⁸

The US ambassador in India Chester Bowels wrote to the Department of State on February 21, 1952 about the survival of a democratic Indian government over the next five years as “definitely unlikely unless bold steps are taken now to sharply increase food production and

³⁵ Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954 vol. XI, part 2, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), doc. 1001, accessed December 1, 2013, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 57.

³⁸ Rober J. MacMahon, “On the Periphery of a Global Conflict: India and the Cold War 1947-1991,” in *India in the World Since 1947*, ed. by Andreas Hilger and Corinna Unge (Hamburg: Peter Lang, 2012), 293. Look for the different approaches of economic advisers from the US and the USSR in India in chapter 2.

strengthen economy.”³⁹ The confidential telegram sent only to the Secretary of State and President Truman. Ambassador Bowels continues:

Failure of Indian democracy would in all probability result in disaster substantially greater than Communist victory in China since Southeast Asia and Middle East would become impossible to hold once India is lost. Communist sweep in Asia would gravely undermine our position in Europe and convince hundreds of millions our friends all over world they are betting on the wrong horse. The Soviet Union is well aware of dynamic possibilities of this situation. If we succeed in stabilizing lines of Europe through NATO their efforts in Asia, already great, will surely be stepped up considerably with India as principal target.⁴⁰

The main strategy of Americans for Soviet containments resulted in the nomination of Pakistan as the main American ally, starting formally in 1954 after signing the mutual security agreement. The neutral Indian foreign policy did not let Americans the space in India they probably wished. At the same time the oil rich Middle East remained the key in American strategy and India was regarded as a secondary front. The political consequences of a communist revolution in India could damage American positions dramatically. In these circumstances ideological influence and economic aid were the actions Americans could actually pursue in India.

2. Soviet Strategies in India

The Soviet Union had its own reasons to focus its cultural policy on India. The Soviet nation lived through its own turbulent moment after Stalin's death in March 1953, notably the de-Stalinization of its domestic and foreign policy, known as the Thaw period. In the beginning of the 1950s it was clear that the postcolonial countries in Asia formed a new force. Therefore the Soviet Union abandoned the “two camps” approach in international politics and turned to the

³⁹ Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954 vol. XI, part 2, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), doc. 1003, accessed December 1, 2013, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Third World, including India.⁴¹ The tone of the Soviet official speeches towards India changed as the de-Stalinization policy came into effect. If earlier Jawaharlal Nehru was called the "running dog of imperialism" in the Soviet press, in 1955 he was described as an "outstanding spokesman" during his 16 day visit to the Soviet Union.⁴² The year 1955 was the turning point in the Indio-Soviet relations. After Nehru's visit in June 1955, Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulgarin visited India in December, during their two months tour to Afghanistan, India and Burma. The official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union *Pravda* published the new Soviet strategy toward India in the article "A model of peaceful coexistence" from December 14, 1955:

Countries that differ from one another in their political, social and economical systems, may and should cooperate with each other on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference in the domestic affairs and follow the policy of active and peaceful coexistence... I think that if one needs a clear model of peaceful coexistence this model is our relationship with India... – said N.S. Khrushchev at the Bombay meeting of November, 24 – We have certain discrepancies in methods and theories. We do not hide it, neither you. But this does not prevent us from friendship... This is an example of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems.⁴³

The piece illustrates the acceptance of other socio-political systems by the Soviet Union and readiness to work with them. That said, these systems should not be hostile to the Socialist bloc. India is pointed out as a model for relationship because it was also one of the leaders of the nonaligned countries. India was an active participant in the Bandung conference of April 1955 in Indonesia. This was a conference of African and Asian states that just achieved their independence from the colonial rule. Therefore these new nations saw close alignment with the USSR and the US as a possibility to lose their independence again. The Soviet Union praised the conference but remained on the sidelines. The conference was organized by Indonesia, Burma,

⁴¹ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 37.

⁴² Charles B. McLane, *Soviet-Asian Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 55.

⁴³ *Pravda*, December 14, 1955.

Pakistan, Ceylon, and India.⁴⁴ The message of Khrushchev can be seen as a message to all post-colonial countries, placing USSR-India relations as a model. In this regard the Soviet strategy was to help new countries in their pursuit of stable statehood, and, if they would not be direct Soviet allies, at least to keep them away from the US.

3. Reforms in Soviet Cultural Diplomacy Agencies

The Soviet Union established its first cultural diplomacy agency in 1925: the All Union Society for Cultural Ties (VOKS). This organization was headed by People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁵ In March 1953, a Department for Ties with Foreign Communist Parties was created. It was responsible, among other tasks, for overseeing the work of VOKS.⁴⁶ The first "friendship" societies were organized in 1941, such as "The Friends of the Soviet Union."⁴⁷ These organizations worked in close collaboration with VOKS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sharing literature and other documents. In India the society of Indo-Soviet friendship was created in 1952. By the middle of 1960s there were fifteen of them all over the country. The Cold War era is filled with accusations that Soviet friendship societies were a continuation of Moscow's power.⁴⁸ This research shows many instances when society members in India had their independent views and did not support some of the campaigns of the Soviet embassy, as in the case of Soviet film festivals. The Cold War obsession with "Moscow's hand" allegedly present in different organizations in foreign countries is a question of agency. During the Cold War it was unacceptable in the West to suggest that people could have leftist ideas and participate in some

⁴⁴ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 59-61.

⁴⁵ People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Changed its name to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) after 1947.

⁴⁶ Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 2003), 203.

⁴⁷ Jeremiah Wishon, "Soviet Globalization: Indo-Soviet Public Diplomacy and Cold War Cultural Spheres," *Global*

sort of friendship societies by their own will. That is why it was crucially important to present the communist ideology as irrational, and to embed the idea that only foreign influence could make people sympathize with either communism or the USSR.

The reforms of the 1950s in the Soviet Union, such as the deconstruction of the “personality cult” of Stalin, also had repercussions in the Soviet strategy of cultural diplomacy. The documents from the RANI archive show the intentions of the Soviet government to bring a new image of the Soviet Union to the world. Soviets desired to project an image of a democratic country with a large number of independent civil societies who independently wanted to establish cultural relations with foreign civil societies. The new realities of the Cold War and the expansion of cultural relations caused the VOKS organization to be transformed into the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD) in September 1957. That same year the State Committee for Cultural Ties (GKKS) was created. GKKS was a committee within the government of the USSR, and in 1967 it became part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁹ During the Khrushchev era GKKS became the main organization for international cultural relations, even more important than the Ministry of Culture.⁵⁰ The head of the GKKS was reporting directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and not to the ministries.⁵¹ The Ministry of Culture worked on particularities, such as the preparation and dispatch of delegations abroad and reception of foreign artists who came to perform in the USSR. The Central Committee of CPSU explained the

Studies Journal, vol. 5, no. 2 (2013), 106.

⁴⁸ For example Peter Sager, *Moscow's Hand in India* (Bern: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966), 168-175.

⁴⁹ Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History Journal*, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 2003), 205-206.

⁵⁰ Simo Mikkonen, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Soviet Music in the Cold War Struggle Against the West,” in ed. by Pauline Fairclough, *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 141.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

reorganization of VOKS by the “outdated structure and form of the organization which did not respond to the demands of the international situation and does not represent the Soviet society at large.”⁵² The charter of SSOD proclaimed its goals as:

Development and strengthening of friendship, mutual understanding, trust between the peoples of the USSR with peoples of foreign countries through mutual learning of history, economics, culture, science, and languages... Work with organizations and persons that fight for peace, friendship, mutual understanding and cooperation between peoples; to coordinate and to lead the work of Soviet public organizations with organizations from foreign countries or groups of foreign countries; to send delegations; to manage the 'House of Friendship' in Moscow; to organize gatherings dedicated to foreign holidays; to organize film screenings and exhibitions abroad; to publish literature; to be a member of international organizations.⁵³

The goals of the organization show that it wanted to become the face of the Soviet society abroad. SSOD had the following regulations and organizational principles: each five years a conference with delegates from different societies would be held. The conference was proclaimed as the supreme power of the organization, which elected the council of the Union. The council in its turn had the right to appoint the administration – the Presidium. The SSOD was financed through the contributions from each member organization.⁵⁴ A monthly journal *Kultura i zhizn* (*Culture and life*) was to become the official organ of SSOD. Thus SSOD strove to project an image of a democratic organization where different artistic movements, cultural groups, and trade unions freely participated and decided SSOD's agenda. The Central Committee of the CPSU concluded:

We need an organization based on equality and reciprocity... in order to popularize internationally the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet state... Members of the organization can be representatives of scientific organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, sport unions, writers, painters, theater, cinema,

⁵² RANI, f. 89, perechen 55, doc. 21.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

medicine.⁵⁵

The image of SSOD had to be free from traces of previous hard line communist ideology from the Stalinist era. SSOD had to promote the culture of the Soviet Union and the direct communist ideology had to step back, or at the very least not be too obvious. One of the main issues for the organization was to promote the refusal of the Cold War paradigm around the world. This idea was complementary to the ideology of the nonalignment that India followed. All these points made the activity of SSOD the “soft power” of the Soviet Union, based on general humanist values and not on specific ideologies such as communism. This fit the new post-Twentieth-CPSU-Congress (1956) ideology of de-Stalinization, which wanted to slow down the pace of the Cold War.

It is difficult to tell in what way Soviet public organizations were free to join SSOD and how the organization really functioned, but it is possible to discern its public image projected internationally. Frederick Barghoorn's book *The Soviet Cultural Offensive*, written in 1960, confirms the success of Soviet efforts: “...Kremlin partially succeeded in creating the impression that it had abandoned isolationism and chauvinism in favor of freedom of exchange and East-West contacts as a path toward the relaxation of international tensions and the fostering of peace between the communist and non-communist worlds.”⁵⁶ However, observers in the West in the 1950s witnessed the overwhelming American superiority in cultural presence worldwide. For example, only around 5,000 Soviet citizens were working outside the Communist World in 1957

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 1.

compared to 580,000 Americans.⁵⁷

The document on the reorganization of VOKS spells out the first steps for the new SSOD organization: "...first of all [we need] to create friendship societies with Chinese People's Republic and other People's democracies, Italy, France, England, Finland, India, Iran, and Japan."⁵⁸ The document thus confirmed the importance of China as the main target for Soviet influence, as well as capitalist countries with a significant population with sympathies to leftist ideas. India was on the list of the countries to be influenced. The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CCCPSU) from July 1958 decreed to create branches of the SSOD friendship societies with India in Soviet Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well as in the Transcaucasian republic of Azerbaijan.⁵⁹ Soviet republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan and India had many cultural aspects in common such as long history of being a part of the Muslim world. It is plausible that the question of race played a role here, although the documents on the topic never expressed this consideration directly. It seems that in the minds of Soviet authorities the Soviet Asian republics would be examples for Indians as successful Asian socialist republics.⁶⁰

4. Soviet Foreign Policy Toward India and Chinese-Indian Conflict

The main direct Soviet aid to India was the help to build heavy industry in the country. In February 1955, the Soviet Union and India signed an agreement for Soviet technical and financial aid to build a steel plant in Bhilai. Another large construction was a petrol refinery in

⁵⁷ Ibid, citation from *Life* magazine December 23, 1957.

⁵⁸ RANI, f. 89, perechen 55, dok. 21.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Chapters 2 and 3 have many examples of the use of Central Asia in Soviet cultural diplomacy strategy in India,

the Bengal Bay, began in 1958. Throughout the second part of the 1950s relations between the countries showed positive dynamics. The leaders of the two countries made several visits to Delhi and Moscow. India also enjoyed great Soviet support on the question of Kashmir and Goa.

Goa had been a part of the Portuguese empire for four hundred years. Lisbon considered Goa as integral part of Portugal. The difficulty in the situation was that Portugal was a part of NATO, the main US-led military bloc. Despite of that, India occupied the territory in 1961. This was met with great enthusiasm from the Soviet Union and China. *Pravda* published articles such as “Clean Asia from colonizers,” “Happiness of gained freedom,” “Imperialists debunked,” “Get the Portuguese colonizers out of India.”⁶¹ The US publicly accused India of violating the international law and tried to pass a resolution at the UN Security Council, which was vetoed by the USSR. These were the sole measures implemented by American diplomats, because they believed that any NATO involvement would tarnish the image of the West in Asia, polluting it with reference to colonialism.⁶² The US government refused any use of force. At the same time, Americans recognized that Goa problem had been a colonial issue and that “colonial age is passing... and will continue to urge Portugal to recognize this fact.”⁶³ Supporting Indians in Goa was easy for the Soviet Union because here the two countries had a common enemy: a NATO member state of Portugal. But China remained the main problem in USSR-India relations.

Mao's China criticized the de-Stalinization in the USSR. This criticism became more pronounced after the Twentieth CPSU Congress. Chinese interest might also be seen from the perspective of competition for the supremacy in the communist world. In 1950 China occupied

such as university ties, desire to have more Soviet Asians in India as tourists, tours of Central Asian artists in India.

⁶¹ *Pravda* December 19, 20, 1961.

⁶² Foreign relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Africa and South Asia, doc. 68,69, accessed December 1, 2013, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

Tibet, a territory contested with the British Empire for decades. Indians hoped to have Tibet as a buffer between them and China but the occupation and the future events ended this illusion. In 1954 India acknowledged Chinese control over Tibet in signing the five principals of peaceful coexistence agreement. The treaty affirmed mutual respect of territorial integrity and non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The Five Principles became the basis for the future relations of nonaligned countries.

In 1959 an uprising against Chinese rule erupted in Lhasa, and the head of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama, fled to India. The events provoked the first military clashes between India and China in 1959 on a shared border in the Himalayan mountains. Nehru said during his meetings with American ambassador in March 1961 that the danger to the world comes from Beijing rather from Moscow: “The Chinese Communists were at the height of their aggressive intentions and the situation is dangerous. At the same time the negotiations on the boundary question had gone nowhere.”⁶⁴ The neutral India enjoyed aid from both superpowers when faced the Chinese threat. The new Kennedy administration continued the policy of US economic aid to India and sent one billion dollars during the period of 1961-1962.⁶⁵

The relations between India and China came to its low point in 1962 when the border disputes ended up in war between the two countries. This time the Soviet Union found itself in a difficult situation, since it did not want to further aggravate its relations with China, which had been worsening in previous years. At the same time the USSR did not want to lose its position of

⁶³ Foreign relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Africa and South Asia, doc.72, accessed December 1, 2013, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

⁶⁴ Foreign relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Africa and South Asia, doc. 12, accessed December 1, 2013, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

a supporter of India and its nonaligned foreign policy. In this situation many Indians started to question the neutral status of their country in the Cold War. The conflict with China brought India to the hot phase of the Cold War. Soviets decided not to send direct military aid to India, such as the MIG-21 jet fighters that Delhi had requested, and not to oppose American military aid to India only if India would stay nonaligned.⁶⁶ India could not fall into American military camp because of its hostile relations with Pakistan, a country which already was in the military bloc with the US. This position served India when Soviet aid was especially crucial during 1965 war with Pakistan over Kashmir. At that time, Americans refused to send weapons to India, but the USSR agreed to build an assembly plant for Soviet jet fighters in India.⁶⁷

Thus, from the Indian perspective, in 1962 Soviet image was badly damaged because Soviets were from the communist world. Soviet position was especially frustrating for Indians when during the 1962 conflict Soviet press was ambiguous about it. The conflict coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis, which preoccupied the USSR. At that time many Indians hoped that Soviet disapproval of Chinese actions could save India from aggression.⁶⁸ This did not happen. When *Pravda* published proclamations of the Chinese government, Indians saw the publication as a Soviet desire to end the war on the Chinese terms, which did not recognize the border India inherited from the British.⁶⁹ But for the USSR it was equally important to remain in good relations with both countries. On November 20, 1962, *Pravda* argued in an article “Negotiations is the solution for the conflict.”

⁶⁵ Foreign relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Africa and South Asia, doc. 19, accessed December 1, 2013, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

⁶⁶ Harish Kapur, *The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations* (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1972), 78.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 79.

⁶⁸ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo 433, 83-86.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*.

This is a conflict of two great countries, one is a socialist state and the other is a major power in the group of young countries who fight against colonialism... It cannot be good for both sides of the conflict... it can only be good for the aggressive Western militarists... who want to enlarge the scale of the conflict with their military aid... The USSR sees the solution in negotiations... Soviet people cannot be indifferent to the sufferings of the Chinese and Indian peoples.⁷⁰

Thus the Soviet government refused to put the blame on any side of the conflict and put it instead on its direct adversaries in the Cold War.

In the Indian society, the conflict split the Communist Party of India, as well as many other organizations. The Communist Party of India (CPI) supported Nehru and turned against the Communist Party of China (CPC). Their newspaper *New Age Weekly* published a proclamation, after a meeting of Indian writers on November 10, 1962, with a demand to Asian and African intelligentsia not to destroy the African and Asian solidarity and to support the nonalignment. This position was identical to the Soviet one. At the same moment a group of Indian writers close to the ruling Congress party asked Nehru to abandon the policy of neutrality and seek American aid. They addressed the government and the European public through a letter published in December 1962 in an Italian intellectual journal *Tempo presente*. In the article "Solidarity with India" they called the conflict "an assault on democracy in Asia from communist imperialists."⁷¹ Many of the Indian intellectuals stood on the American side and presented India as a victim of communist aggression. Soviet government finally publicly criticized the Chinese only a year later, in the end of 1963.

The USSR tensions with China started in 1957 when China saw the de-Stalinization in the USSR as a reactionary trend. The Soviet refusal to support China in the war against India worsened the USSR-China relations. By September 1963 the split was complete, when the

⁷⁰ *Pravda*, 20 November, 1962.

Soviet government called the Chinese acceptance of the idea of a global nuclear war as “madness.”⁷² The USSR blamed Beijing for the 1962 war, and criticized the Chinese view of

Indo-Soviet relations:

Chinese government speculates about Soviet aid to India but they do not tell their population that the nature of its aid to post colonial countries is... to strengthen their positions in economy to help them in their struggle against imperialism... In recent years the Chinese side did not respect its borders, since 1960 there were several cases of the Chinese border guards crossing the USSR-China border... over 5,000 times only in 1962...⁷³

Violations of the Soviet border by the Chinese were becoming more and more aggressive during the 1960s. The chill between the USSR and China was greatest in 1969 when the Chinese and the Soviets had their own direct military border conflict on Damansky island that took lives of dozens of border guards from both sides.⁷⁴

Historian Mnajeet S. Pardesi writes in his article “India in Asia: India's relations with Southeast Asia and China, 1962-1991” that after the defeat of India in the 1962 war India lost its prestige among Asian countries and was forced to upgrade its relationship with the USSR.⁷⁵ The Sino-Pakistani detente soon after the 1962 war and the first Chinese nuclear bomb test in 1964 brought India closer to the USSR. During the India-Pakistan war of 1965 the US made an arms embargo that ended the nascent American-Indian cooperation. The Indo-Soviet cooperation culminated in the signing of the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, which was signed on the eve of the Bangladesh war.⁷⁶

⁷¹ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo 433, 229-236.

⁷² *Pravda*, September 22, 1963

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Alexei Voskressenski, *Russia and China: A Theory of Inter-State Relations* (London: Routledge, 2003), 171, 173.

⁷⁵ Mnajeet S. Pardesi, “India in Asia: India's Relations with Southeast Asia and China, 1962-1991,” in *India in the World Since 1947*, ed. by Andreas Hilger and Corinna Unge (Hamburg: Peter Lang, 2012), 15-34.

The neutral status of India in the Cold War gave the US and the USSR equal opportunity for influence in the region. For both the US and the USSR India was important. The US was scared of communist insurrection in India and eventual domino collapse of Asian countries into the communist block. The USSR supported neutral Indian foreign policy and proclaimed USSR-India relations as a model for other new Asian and African countries. The Soviet Union reformed its foreign policy after the Stalin's death in 1953 and proclaimed peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist countries. In Soviet perspective socialist countries would get higher levels of economic development over capitalist countries without direct war through peaceful competition. This changed Soviet ideological influence. From the middle of the 1950s the Soviet Union appealed to large foreign public opinion and not only to communist activists abroad. The 1962 India-China war became the challenge for India-USSR relations. However, Indian government stayed firm in its nonaligned foreign policy and kept relations with both superpowers.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 19, 23.

Chapter II. Soviet Ideological Influence in India

Official cultural relations between the Soviet Union and India started with the 1955 push of Soviet diplomacy in Asia. However, there was no big breakthrough until February 12, 1960 when the two countries signed the Cultural Ties agreement. The agreement sought the strengthening of Indo-Soviet cooperation in education, arts, science and technologies.⁷⁷ The document formalized the will to build ties between universities, scientific societies, sport organizations, exchange of scholarly and scientific delegations, tourist exchange, and cooperation in scientific research. Many of such exchanges did happen before 1960 without regularity, nor legal basis. A joint Soviet-Indian commission was created to survey the realization of the agreement and was supposed to work according to a one-year plan of activities. The commission held regular meetings in Moscow and Delhi.⁷⁸ *Pravda* wrote about the visits of Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Voroshilov to Delhi and the Cultural Ties Agreement looked as a natural continuation of good relations between the countries. At the same time the agreement did not force any direct obligations. The US monitored the rapprochement. *New York Times* article from February 6, 1960, "India to Sign Pact for Cultural Ties with Soviet Union," claimed that Soviet economic aid to India had been \$678,300,000 by the year 1960 and that America had granted or lent India three times that much.⁷⁹ Academic literature from the Cold War period informed on a significant increase of trade between the USSR and India in the second half of the 1950s. By the 1960s India became the USSR's most important trading partner among Third world countries. As for India, its main partners were Britain, the US, Japan, and the USSR,

⁷⁷ *Pravda*, February 13, 1960.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

which ranked fourth. In 1966 the estimated total trade between the countries was 198 crores rupees (\$416.8 million).⁸⁰

1. Student exchange and academic cooperation

Student exchange and ties between universities were crucial for ideological Cold War. The main problem for Moscow was that almost all new Third world countries had very close ties with universities in their ex-metropoles. India was not an exception. The Soviet Union wanted to change this. According to Molotov, in 1949 Soviet Union could not receive Indian students due to “material difficulties.”⁸¹ Three or four Indian students studied in the Soviet Union in 1955, six in 1956.⁸² Khrushchev had an ambition to have an educational center in the Soviet Union for the Third World. The Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow was opened on November 17, 1960 for this purpose. The university was later named after the Congolese Communist leader Patrice Lumumba. The Cultural Ties agreement with India in 1960 increased the number of students to 113 in 1961, 183 in 1962, 248 in 1965 (95 in East Germany).⁸³ Russian as the language of instruction was the main difficulty for foreign students. Normally, a foreign student would have to have a preparatory course of one year, to learn Russian, and only then start studies. Another point, suggested by many authors, is that the Indian government had a certain degree of fear of communist indoctrination of Indian students during their studies in the Soviet Union.⁸⁴ A KGB report states that Indian students “had to sign a pledge of loyalty before being allowed to leave

⁷⁹ *New York Times*, February 6, 1960.

⁸⁰ Arthur Stern, *India and the Soviet Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 196-198.

⁸¹ Andreas Hilger, “Building a Socialist Elite,” in *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Jost Dulffer and Marc Frey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 273.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 274.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 275.

for Soviet universities.”⁸⁵

If we compare the Soviet numbers with the Western educational exchanges, we see how far behind Soviet Union was from the United States. The US had 6,000 Indian students in 1961, UK 3,400, Western Germany 1,800. According to Soviet estimates the US would accept 1,000 Indians a year to their universities.⁸⁶ Four thousand Indian students abroad used private scholarships for their studies in 1961. India actively expanded its possibilities to send its students abroad. In 1962 the Indian government received authorities responsible for the student exchange from Western Germany and the US. The main goal for India was to build up a new scientific elite with knowledge in technologies, which would modernize the country. One of the issues was that half of Indian students who went abroad studied the Arts and Humanities.⁸⁷ H. Kabir, Indian Minister of Scientific Research, reported to the Indian parliament in May 1962 that only 3,000 Indian students went studying science abroad. The Soviet Union education programs were attractive in this sense.

The advantage of Soviet route was that education for foreign students was free of charge. And if a student had a scholarship from the Indian government there would be no need to work during studies. Another problem for India was that a large part of Indian students would stay in the West after graduating.

Few Soviet students went to India and most of them would study languages or Indian culture. The 1960 agreement established direct bilateral ties between Soviet and Indian universities. The 1961 year plan for intercultural cooperation suggested using not only big central Russia establishments but also Central Asian universities. Thus the main Soviet

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo 431, 312.

university, the Moscow State University, was to establish ties with the main Indian university in Delhi; the Leningrad State university – with Bombay university; the Transcaucasian Tbilisi University – with Madras; the Tajikistan’s Stalinabad university – with Aligarh; Uzbekistan’s Tashkent university – with Lucknow; Turkmenian Ashkhabad university – with Osman University in Hyderabad.⁸⁸

The situation during the early 1960s shows that cultural ties between the two countries were only beginning to be established. Different cultural agencies added their suggestions for cultural exchange with India in addition to the agreement. For example, the Union of Soviet Writers received Indian writers Hoja Ahmad Abbas and Ali Sardar Jaffry who pointed at the lack of literature in Urdu from the Soviet Union. The Urdu language had 10 million interlocutors and was understandable by many more.⁸⁹ The language was spoken by the urban Muslims in India and was one of the main languages in Pakistan where it enjoyed the same importance as Hindi in India. The Union of Soviet Writers took the criticism seriously. The reports of the Writer’s union to GKKS state that ”Urdu can be a vehicle for Soviet ideology... And due to its ethnological closeness to Tajik language and other Central Asian languages can be a beautiful golden bridge for intercultural exchange.”⁹⁰ The Soviet ideological machine was hoping to present itself as neutral to the inner Indian tensions between Hindu majority and Urdu speaking Muslims.

2. International expositions as space for global competition

Both superpowers, the US and the USSR, gave great significance to participation at

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 138-141.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

international exhibitions. In January 1960 a large international agricultural exhibition was held in Delhi. Here the Soviet Union had a chance to show its advancements in agriculture. A Soviet pavilion had samples of animals and agricultural machines, a cinema, a theater, and a restaurant. According to a report of the director of the Soviet pavilion A. Tulupnikov to GKKS, 445,000 persons visited the space in January 21-31, 1960.⁹¹ The exhibition happened during the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic of India. The Soviets did not lose the opportunity to show their support and sent a large delegation of Soviet leaders, including the Minister of Culture Y. A. Furtseva. The Soviets organized celebrations at their pavilion during the Indian Republic day on January 21, visited by President Prasad and Prime Minister Nehru.⁹² Both high guests, according to the report, spent 40 minutes in the Soviet pavilion and then watched the show of Soviet Central Asian artists.⁹³

While the Soviet strategy at exhibitions was to show the advancement in technology, Americans were stressing the idyllic life in American suburbia. One of the Soviet reports describes the American pavilion as being full of “annoying American consumerism and abundance of kitchen appliances.”⁹⁴ Sarah Nilsen in her book *Projecting America, 1958* provides an interesting analysis of US program for the 1958 Brussels World Exhibition, similar to the one for the 1960 Delhi fair. Nilsen notes American advertisement of a perfect suburban life and the significance of the domestic arena as a part of the Cold War struggle.⁹⁵ The American exhibits worldwide in the 1950s were organized by Katherine Howard who designed the new strategy where family home became a part of the Civil Defense unit and agent of the state in keeping the

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo 426, spravka o vystavke.

security of the society in the face of nuclear war with the USSR.⁹⁶ It seems the exposition in Delhi resembled the one in Moscow in 1959 where the famous “kitchen debate” happened between US vice-president Richard Nixon and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. At the Moscow fair Nixon led Khrushchev through the American kitchen model with different household appliances claiming to show how Americans make lives of women easier. Khrushchev reacted by telling that in the Soviet Union “we do not share the capitalist attitude toward women” in the sense that women have equal employment opportunities and do not have to stay at home.⁹⁷ The debate attracted much attention of the Soviet public to the American exhibition and at the same time showed the difference in approaches of the two countries to exhibitions.

Soviet cultural diplomacy agencies gathered information on the ground, especially in the local press. Historian Nicholas Cull in his article “Films as Public Diplomacy” argues that systematic gathering of information about foreign public opinion is one of the main goals of public diplomacy.⁹⁸ The GKKS reports reveal the aspects that interested Indians most, including what they discussed during their visits to the Soviet pavilion. One of the main themes at the exhibition was the use of nuclear technologies. The Soviets tried to counterbalance the US pavilion where the question of nuclear power was better presented, according to the Soviet diplomats. A *Times of India* article shows that during the fair Americans were popularizing the idea that the use of isotopes in the agriculture could solve the problem of food security for

⁹⁵ Sarah Nilsen, *Projecting America, 1958: Film and Cultural Diplomacy at the Brussels World's Fair* (Jefferson, North Carolina: MacFarland, 2011), 16.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 18.

⁹⁷ Laura Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 88.

⁹⁸ Nicholas Cull, “Film as Public Diplomacy,” in *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History*, ed. by Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Ethridge (Leiden, Boston: Martinus

India.⁹⁹ Lacking a special stand on the nuclear power, Soviets just had to deliver lectures on the subject and other subjects which interested Indians. Sometimes Soviets had to act on the spot. For example, a GKKS official demanded to publish a report of a Soviet specialist on nuclear power physicist Kletchkovsky with photo materials from Sovinformburo in order to “weaken the efficiency of American propaganda.”¹⁰⁰ In addition, Soviets had to respond to the presence of American farmers at the fair who would speak with Indians about the difference between Soviet kolkhoz type of farming and the American approach.¹⁰¹ The reports informed Moscow that the Indian Ministry of Agriculture was “filled with American and Western German consultants” therefore Soviet specialists should be sent there too.¹⁰² The presence of the American Peace Corps was seen as very large, especially in the countryside where they had a program of digging wells.¹⁰³ According to Soviet reports on the agricultural exhibition in Madras in January 1961 the chairman of the Indian Farmer's committee Sharma told that Indian Ministry of Agriculture “is sieged by consultants from the US.”¹⁰⁴

The theme of the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes was used by both superpowers in the ideological competition, each party flaunting their own technical expertise. During the Delhi 1960 Fair Soviet physicist Demchuk talked about the possibility of the use of radioactive isotopes and radiation, which “could play the same important role in raising productivity in agriculture as the use of nuclear power in industry.”¹⁰⁵ In order to prepare future materials for exhibitions, GKKS studied questions raised during the 1960 exhibition in Delhi,

Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 258.

⁹⁹ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo 426, spravka o vystavke.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 431, 229.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

such as: "...the use of isotopes to reduce abrading; the efficiency of nuclear radiation for creation of new mutants of plants and animals; the possibility of higher yields of different crops with its preliminary radiation treatment by thermal and fast neutrons."¹⁰⁶ The interest of Indians in the theme of nuclear power can be traced back to the Indian Industries Fair of 1955 in Delhi, when Americans built a huge 9,300 square meters concrete, brick, and steel pavilion. The 1955 pavilion designed by John Vassos was the largest pavilion at the fair and was dedicated to the use of nuclear power. The structure had a giant model of an atom on its roof to inform about its theme from afar.¹⁰⁷ Nuclear power got its new ideological frame in December 1953 when US President Dwight Eisenhower proposed the Atom for Peace initiative with the creation of a new United Nations Agency. Each superpower was to donate a certain quantity of uranium. Many believed that this was a way to weaken the Soviet nuclear resources because US had the material in larger quantity than the USSR.¹⁰⁸ The 1958 Brussels exhibition, the main World's technological exhibition after the 1939 New York exhibition, proclaimed the age of Atomic energy.

Almost all reports from exhibitions and fairs would have a chapter on informal meetings, and on the delivered lectures. At the meetings during the fair, Indians were mostly interested in the question of Soviet credits to the Third World countries.¹⁰⁹ Another interesting theme was the image of Soviet Union as a democratic country.¹¹⁰ The reports state that Indians would ask about the state of democratic institutions, about the freedom of religion in the USSR, specifically

¹⁰⁵ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Jack Masey and Conway Lloyd Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations: US Exhibitions and Their Role in the cultural Cold War* (Lars Muller Publishers, 2008), 43.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 46.

¹⁰⁹ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

whether there were active churches.

There were instances when Soviet delegates had to face the ideological challenges instigated by the US. There is a case of *Doctor Zhivago* affair specifically pointed out in the report on the Delhi fair.¹¹¹ The question of publishing of the book in the USSR played an important role in the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union.

Doctor Zhivago, a novel written by a Russian writer Boris Pasternak (1890-1960), has autobiographical aspects and tells a story of a man who lives through the troubles of the Russian revolution. The book was to be published with the consent of the Soviet authorities in 1957 but was suddenly banned by the authorities. This fact was a big success for American ideological war. As the Chief of the CIA's covert Action Staff wrote:

Books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily because one single book can significantly change the reader's attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact on any other single medium. This makes books the most important weapon of strategic propaganda.¹¹²

Apparently, *Doctor Zhivago* was that book. New declassified documents show that the CIA was behind the publication of *Doctor Zhivago* in Europe and used it to undermine Soviet positions.¹¹³

A secret memorandum of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA cites that:

This book has great propaganda value, not only for its intrinsic message and thought-provoking nature, but also for the circumstances of its publication, we have the opportunity to make Soviet citizens wonder what is wrong with their government, when a fine literary work by the man acknowledged to be the greatest living Russian writer is not even available in his own country... We are making efforts to stimulate the production of the book in Russian by some 'non-political' and preferably non-American entity...¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New York Press, 1999), 245.

¹¹³ *Washington Post*, April 5, 2014

¹¹⁴ Memorandum for SR Division Chiefs from 24 April 1958 published by *The Washington Post* website, April 5, 2014.

First the book was published in Italy in 1957 and then in “a maximum number of foreign editions.”¹¹⁵ The first main target for distribution was the first postwar world fair, the 1958 Brussels Universal and International Exposition. The book was published in Russian by a small publishing house in the Netherlands with the aim to hand copies to Soviet citizens who were to come to the fair. The affair took a new turn when Pasternak got the Nobel Prize for the book in October, 1958, although it was not published in the Soviet Union. Pasternak faced pressure from Soviet authorities and had to refuse the prize. Nine thousand copies of the book were purposefully published to be handed to Soviet and Eastern European citizens during the 1959 World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship, which was to be held in Vienna.¹¹⁶ The limits of the present research do not allow to judge if Americans were purposely using the affair during the 1960 Delhi fair but one can presume that the probability of it is very high. And the reports of the Soviet delegation show that Soviets had to comment on the issue to the Indian public.¹¹⁷

3. Soviet ideological literature for India

American and other Western books on the Soviet propaganda from the Cold War era stressed the abundance of Soviet ideological literature in the Third World.¹¹⁸ However, the Soviet documents show a concern about the lack of ideological literature for India. In 1960 there was no ideological literature – at least in the sense that Soviets understood it – published in English on Indian History or Indian politics. According to Soviet diplomats there were very few

¹¹⁵ *Washington Post*, April 5, 2014.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426.

¹¹⁸ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet foreign Policy*

books on important historical events in Indian history, such as the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-1859.¹¹⁹ The direct book exchange between libraries was not systematic and not frequent. There was a problem with the publishing of specific and general vocabulary books, especially in spoken Indian languages. Dr. Ganghili from Delhi School of Economics showed Soviet diplomats American editions of Soviet scholarly articles on Asian countries in English.¹²⁰ The teaching of the Russian language was not satisfactory either. For example, Calcutta University had one Russophone professor Guseva, a person that had not lived in the Soviet Union for over 30 years, and who apparently had emigrated to India in the 1920s. Guseva was asking the Soviets for new materials to teach Russian because Calcutta University only had manuals published either in the US or in the UK.¹²¹ In addition, according to the GKKS officials, the exchange of scientists did not have a systematic base before the 1960 Cultural Ties Agreement. The same can be said about invitations for Indian businesspeople, newspaper editors, rectors of universities, and ministers of Indian states.¹²²

The lack of scientific ties featured prominently in a report from an orientalist scholar of the USSR Academy of Science Ulyanovsky R.A. (1904-1995) who participated in the Forty-Seventh Indian Scientific Congress between December 30, 1959 and January 21, 1960. Ulyanosvky had an interesting personal story, which parallels that of other Soviet citizens of his generation. Ulyanovsky graduated from the Oriental Institute, and in the 1930s worked there as a researcher of the Indian independence struggle. He was arrested in 1935 and accused of Trotskyism. The arrest was vetted by Khrushchev, who at that time was an official in the city of

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Peter Sager, *Moscow's Hand in India* (Bern: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966).

¹¹⁹ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 57-111.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

Moscow party branch. Ulyanovsky was released in 1940 but lived in exile working as an economist in a provincial town. In 1954 he was able to come back to Moscow, and in 1955 he was rehabilitated and fully recognized as a scholar working as a deputy director of Orientalist Studies at the Academy of Science of the USSR, and later working in the Central Committee of the CPSU.¹²³

During the Indian congress Ulyanovsky witnessed an interest in the Soviet scientific community, especially the interest of Indian students to come to study in the Soviet Union.¹²⁴ In the 1950s, 90 percent of academics who got access to lecture in the USSR were scientists while 90 percent of those exported by the Soviet Union were in social sciences.¹²⁵ Ulyanovsky describes the case of the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), which asked for help in the organization of the five year plan of economical development.¹²⁶ Ulyanovsky states that nobody had been sent from the appropriate Soviet bodies such as Institute of World Economics, Oriental Institute, Gosplan, a situation that, according to him, “damages our authority.”¹²⁷ At the same time, prominent Soviet scientists: D.D. Degtyar, M.O. Rubinstein, A. Stuchkov from Gosplan and others worked in the ISI during the organization of the second five year plan. The annual ISI reports show that in 1958-1959 ISI received 136 foreign academic visitors: 26 among them were from the USSR, 5 from GDR, 16 from Czechoslovakia, 32 from the USA, 7 from the UK, 9 from

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ <http://memory.pvost.org/pages/ulianovskij.html>, 17 August 2014.

¹²⁴ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 57-111.

¹²⁵ Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History Journal*, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 2003), 207.

¹²⁶ For more information about Indian Statistical Institute see David Engerman, “The Political Power of Economic Ideas,” in *India in the World Since 1947*, ed. by Andreas Hilger and Corinna Unge (Hamburg: Peter Lang, 2012), 120-135.

¹²⁷ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 57-111.

Japan, and 2 from the FRG.¹²⁸ Americans opened the MIT Center for International Studies (CENIS) in Delhi in 1955 to provide economical and statistical expertise to Indians. Soviets did not have anything comparable in India, nor could they afford it and fund other academic institutions like Americans could. In 1955 the Rockefeller Foundation helped to create the School of International Studies in Delhi. This school taught using American academic materials and produced future servicemen for the Indian ministry of foreign affairs. The Soviet Embassy documents accuse the school to be the vehicle of American interests.¹²⁹

After April 1959 nobody was sent to the ISI from the Soviet Union, except for technicians for the “Ural” computer. This computer had been sent through the UN aid program to developing countries because Americans refused to offer their new \$1,500,000 UNIVAC machine that provided economic modeling of the sort that was dominant in the 1960s.¹³⁰

It should be noted here that historians identify the 1950s as the period when Americans systematically applied their vision of modernization as an instrument of influence, especially in the Third World.¹³¹ The theory suggested that underdeveloped countries could modernize themselves quickly through American aid and advising.¹³² Interestingly, throughout the 1950s CENIS and other Western experts, which used UNIVAC for calculations of the models for the Indian economy, advised the Indian government to invest less into heavy industry and more in agriculture.¹³³ Probably the Soviet “Ural” was programmed differently and advised the contrary.

¹²⁸ David Engerman, “The Political Power of Economic Ideas,” in *India in the World Since 1947*, ed. by Andreas Hilger and Corinna Unge (Hamburg: Peter Lang, 2012), 127.

¹²⁹ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 57-111.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹³¹ Nick Cullather, “Modernization Theory,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. by Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ David Engerman, “The Political Power of Economic Ideas,” in *India in the World Since 1947*, ed. by Andreas Hilger and Corinna Unge (Hamburg: Peter Lang, 2012), 132-133.

The Soviet economic aid meant to help India to develop its local heavy industry and thus gain sovereignty from the West. Indians did not listen to the Western advice to invest less in heavy industry. In 1965 CENIS Delhi bureau closed when India turned more to the Soviet Union.

According to Ulyanovsky, specialists from the US and UK were active in the search of contacts in the ISI, “an institution with great importance for Indian political life.”¹³⁴ Ulyanovsky suggested to send one or two specialists in statistics and planning who should be accompanied by two or three specialists on India from the Institute of World Economics and Oriental Institute. As Ulyanovsky put it: “The absence of specialists is alarming.”¹³⁵

This situation of the absence of Soviet specialists at the ISI just after the spring of 1959 can lead to certain suggestions. It is hard to believe that the Soviet side was not interested in the work of such an important state organization as the ISI. Developments in China may explain this. In the spring of 1959 the Lhasa uprising happened in Tibet. Dalai Lama flew to India in April 1959. This situation infuriated China and could possibly be a reason why the Soviets hesitated to continue relationship with India on the same scale. We can find how the Soviets were gathering information through private meetings. Ulyanovsky sought contacts with the Chinese and had a conversation with a pro-rector of Beijing University Ju Pen Yuan who claimed that:

Neru and the ruling Congress party had stopped to fight against colonialism and conspired with imperialists... Lenin said that the Orient had liberating part of the bourgeoisie and the reactionary one. Neru and his class play for the second part who wanted to occupy Tibet, countries in South-East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East and to isolate the Soviet Union and China from them. Indian bourgeoisie and Neru are the most cunning and powerful enemies of socialism in all Asian countries... There will be a fight with the bourgeoisie. They are our main enemy in Asia.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 57-11. The name Ju Pen Yuan is a transliteration from Russian Джу Пен Юань.

The Soviet Union had a similar position on Nehru government before 1955. The relations between India and China would only worsen within the first two years of the 1960s. It is worth mentioning that in 1959 Indians explained their tensions with China to Soviet scholars as a “family quarrel... without mass nationalism,” a typical reaction among the Indian intelligentsia according to Ulyanovsky.¹³⁷

The information about the abundance of American literature on the Orient in India led the Oriental Institute in Moscow to order the publication of technical, economic, historic, orientalist literature for Indian and South-East Asian countries in 1960. Main books to be published were on the USSR and especially manuals published by Soviet Universities. The Moscow State University had to prepare Russian language manuals in Asian languages and send professors to India.¹³⁸ In 1960 the Soviet Academy of science was planning to send five to six Soviet scholars to India to deliver lectures for a period of one to three months. Moreover, every year four to five PhD candidates in History, Economy, Ethnography, Literature, Languages were to publish scholarly articles in English in India.¹³⁹

4. Constructing common Russian-Indian past

The Soviet Union used the common cultural heritage with India for constructing a common ground for cultural relations. The USSR Ministry of Culture received suggestions about the restoration of the Buddhist datsang temple in Leningrad. The construction of the datsang dates back to the time of the Great Game, the competition between the Russian and British empires in Asia. The datsang was built in 1909 in the imperial capital of Russia Saint Petersburg

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 143-163.

as a confirmation of Russian ambitions in Asia, especially in Tibet and Mongolia.¹⁴⁰ The Buddhist theme has another important ideological meaning in the sense that India only had a very small Buddhist population, mostly of Tibetan origin. At the same time India was the birthplace of the religion. After the partition with Pakistan, India was torn apart by the Hindu/Muslim tensions, so it chose neutral Buddhist symbols from the Buddhist Maurya Empire of the IIIrd century B.C. as the State symbols of the new republic. The Asoka pillar is on India's coat of arms and the image of the wheel of Ashoka – on its official flag. The use of neutral Indian Buddhist past was meant to unite the two confronting religious majorities of the country. The Soviets decided to restore the datsang, which had been closed since 1935, and make it a center for archive of Chinese, Tibetan, and Indian manuscripts on Buddhism. The program was not realized in its full scale, but in 1968 the building acquired the status of architectural heritage of the city.

Another example of the common past is the campaign over the Russian traveller Afanasy Nikitin who supposedly visited India in 1469-1472. This paper does not try to support or deny the credibility of Nikitin's accounts. Nikitin's voyages were first mentioned in N.M. Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*, published in 1818, a period when the Russian Empire already started its move into Central Asia.¹⁴¹ Soviet diplomatic strategy demanded an example from the past that would be a symbol of traditionally good relations with India. On May 31, 1955 in the hometown of Nikitin, Kalinin (Tver), on the Volga river the city inaugurated the monument for Nikitin with the following inscription: “to the courageous Russian traveller... in memory of his

¹³⁹ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 200.

¹⁴⁰ Alexandre Andreev, *Soviet Russia and Tibet: The Debacle of Secret Diplomacy, 1918-1930s* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 48-50.

¹⁴¹ Eva Liusternik, *Russko-Indiiskie Ekonomicheskie, Nauchnye i Kulturnye Svyazi v XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966).

journey of friendship visit to India.”¹⁴² The article in *Pravda* stressed the “different intentions” of this Russian traveller, unlike the “greedy conquistadors who would come to India later.”¹⁴³ The Indian ambassador Menon participated in the opening and in his speech also pointed out the different nature of the intentions of the Russian traveller “which only can be compared to the Chinese travelers of the time.” In 1960, a book based on Nikitin's letters was published in Russian, Hindi, and English with colorful illustrations.¹⁴⁴ The most evident instrumentalization of Nikitin was the Indian-Soviet coproduction film *Travel over the Three Seas*, made in 1957 by directors Mahmud Addas (Naya Sansar) and Vasily Pronin (Mosfilm). The film is a story of a traveller who makes his voyage to India for the purpose of discovery and curiosity. The film premiered on December 7, 1957 in Bombay with the participation of the Soviet delegation from the Ministry of Culture and the governor of the Bombay state Prakasa.¹⁴⁵ The film itself is a valuable source on the Russian self-representation as white European non-colonizer.

Another attempt to create common Russian-Indian past is tied with the name of a Russian adventurer, linguist, and pioneer of Bengal theater Gerasim Lebedev (1749-1818). Lebedev enlisted into the East India Company as a musician in a military band and came to India in 1785. After having settled in Calcutta he opened a theater in 1794. In 1797 the British authorities banned Lebedev from India, and he went back to Russia and settled in Saint Petersburg where he worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. GKKS received a letter from India asking to give the name of Lebedev to a public theater in Calcutta. Finally the plan did not work. Possibly because

In 1857 Nikitin's accounts were published in England in *India in the Fifteenth Century Being a Collection of Narratives of Voyages to India*, ed. with an introduction by R.H. Mayer (London, 1857).

¹⁴² *Pravda*, 1 June 1955.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Pravda*, 10 February 1960.

¹⁴⁵ *Pravda*, 7 December, 1957.

in that case the Soviet side would have to finance the theater.¹⁴⁶ There were also plans to make a film about Lebedev, which did not work out either. The figure of Afanasy Nikitin instead got the state funded support.

The work of the Russian painter Nikolay Roerich (1874-1847) was also used by the Soviets to boost cultural ties with India. The artist left Russia after the revolution and settled in the Indian Himalayas where he created a great number of paintings of Indian landscapes. The main collection of Roerich's work remained in India and the Soviet government helped to promote his art: in 1960 exhibitions were organized in the USSR and India.

Russian director Roman Karmen made a color documentary travelogue about India in 1957 entitled *Morning of India* that depicted “the dawn of the Indian independence after the evil black night of colonialism.”¹⁴⁷ The Soviet team of filmmakers spent six months traveling around the country for material. The films portrayed various Indian landscapes and had a large section Indian history, in which the authors praised Nehru for his struggle for independence. The film also showed recent historical development of the country, the contrast between colonial underdevelopment and industrious independent India. It stressed the socialist character of changes in India, the importance of Soviet aid, and similarities between Russian revolution and Indian independence: acquisition of land by peasants as in the Soviet Russia; industrialization projects such as the construction of the Bhilai steel plant; students studying foreign languages; Delhi university student reading *Eugene Onegin* by Pushkin in Russian; students studying medicine in order to be able to work in villages that had never seen a doctor before; and finally,

¹⁴⁶ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426.

¹⁴⁷ *Pravda*, January 25, 1957. V.P. Sitnikov eds., *Kto est kro v mire* (Moscow: Slovo, 2003), 641.

the construction of the first Indian nuclear reactor.¹⁴⁸

One of the main events of 1960 in Soviet-Indian cultural relations was the fiftieth anniversary of Leo Tolstoy's death. The Russian writer in his late life had a very important cultural influence all over the world for his pacifist views. Tolstoy's fame was global, he received people from all parts of the world and corresponded with the world's artistic and social elite, including Mahatma Gandhi, Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore as well as Indian revolutionary and scholar Taraknath Das to whom Tolstoy wrote the famous "Letter to the Indian." Gandhi praised Tolstoy and claimed his influence in his strategy of non-violent struggle against the British rule in India. Therefore the figure of Tolstoy was popular in India.

For the Soviets it was important to represent Tolstoy as a predecessor of the Russian revolution and counter the celebrations organized by the Munich based Tolstoy Foundation, funded by Americans.¹⁴⁹ The western foundation used the "concept of the individual freedom" and the participation of the Tolstoy's descendants in the organization. The writer's grandson Ilya Tolstoy was directly involved in the work of the CIA funded Congress for Cultural Freedom and Cold War ideological war since his work in CIA's predecessor Office of Strategic Services (OSS) mission in Lhasa in the 1940s. The Congress for Cultural Freedom had a branch in India.

During the week long celebrations in India, the Soviet Ministry of Culture helped to organize numerous exhibitions, presented to the Indian public new translations of Tolstoy's books in Hindi and Urdu, lectures, and screenings of the Soviet documentary film about Tolstoy in numerous Indian cities.¹⁵⁰ The Communist Party of India asked materials for the celebrations

¹⁴⁸ *Pravda*, January 25, 1957.

¹⁴⁹ Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New York Press, 1999), 331.

¹⁵⁰ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 287-289.

from Soviet cultural agencies, the head of the organization committee for the celebrations was Saj Zahir a member of the CPI.¹⁵¹ The main museum for the Tolstoy heritage was his home in Yasnaya Polyana near Tula, USSR. The museum received numerous letters with demands for financial aid for the celebrations from many countries, including India. The museum was just a member of the Indo-Soviet friendship society and did not have funds for such aid. However, the museum sent materials for expositions, such as the famous author's correspondence with Gandhi.¹⁵² The twenty-second issue of the *Soviet Land* magazine was dedicated to the writer.¹⁵³

5. Soviet press for India

The Soviet Union launched the publishing of the *Soviet Land* magazine that would tell about life in the USSR. This magazine has a long history. It was published since the 1930s for in European languages to be diffused abroad. In 1950 Moscow organized a special edition of the journal for India in local Indian languages.¹⁵⁴ The Cold War era book from 1966 *Moscow's Hand in India* by Peter Sager has a chapter on the magazine where the author talks about the “very expensive efforts” and “unlimited funds” of the magazine.¹⁵⁵ But the actual documents from the Soviet Information Agency (Sovinformburo) who published *Soviet Land* show a different picture. For example, one document in Russian, a letter from B. Korotkov the director of Sovinformburo (editor of *Soviet Land*) in Bombay to Moscow was written on a broken typewriter with a missing SHIFT button, which resulted in making all text to be written in small characters. Capital letters were written over it with an ink pen afterwards. The editor who had the

¹⁵¹ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 275-284.

¹⁵² GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 280

¹⁵³ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 287-289

¹⁵⁴ Peter Sager, *Moscow's hand in India* (Bern: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966), 58. The magazine had translations in

rank of a Soviet vice consul explained in the letter that the typewriter he had shared with the Soviet consul in Bombay had been broken and he did not have one of his own.¹⁵⁶

Unfortunately the limits of the current thesis did not allow a study of the journal itself but there is a description of it in Sager's book. Each issue of the journal would have 48 pages with a quarter of it devoted to photo images. The headquarters were in Delhi and several cities had regional offices for the journal to prepare translations in local languages. A Bombay bureau had a staff of nine people, mostly Indians. Their task was to prepare the English edition, and do translations in Marathi and Gujarati. It is interesting how the Soviet editor described the situation in the office. Notably he mentioned that translators were overloaded with work and needed extra pay for extra hours. However, he stated the impossibility of additional funding as the budget had been adopted in advance. The Bombay editor also stressed the importance of publicity for the journal because "publicity is politics too." Tensions between editors and translators provoked a difficult situation in the office, to such an extent that one of the translators wanted to quit, which in itself was an extraordinary situation at that time in Bombay with its scarce job market. The editor Korotkov wrote: "I do all I can to better the conditions and promise them some time off... Sometimes I feel angry at them but then I have so much pity for them because they are such poor people."¹⁵⁷

By 1960 an issue of the magazine would be sent to 30 000 addresses, a number considered very low by its editor for a country like India. It is worth mentioning here that the editor suggests to make the magazine smaller with better quality paper and use more literature

twelve Indian languages plus Nepali by 1965.

¹⁵⁵ Peter Sager, *Moscow's Hand in India* (Bern: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966), 51-59.

¹⁵⁶ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 426, 164-170.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

instead of “clear propaganda” in order to be able to compete with foreign editions. The magazine gathered information from Sovinformburo and was willing to have more sources eventually. The work of the editor was also to search for contacts with Indian journalists. In the letter B. Korotkov let Moscow understand that extra funds were needed for organization of contacts with local journalists. For example, if he needed to invite an Indian journalist for a breakfast at a restaurant it would cost “at least 15 rupees for a breakfast without wine.” The conditions in the secondary Bombay branch of the magazine were worse than in its headquarters in Delhi, which had air conditioning in the office. The Sovinformburo in Bombay received press information through an “old, rusty HELL teletype that broke all the time.” The need for air conditioners often comes up in reports of Soviet agencies to Moscow. B. Korotkov explains, not very directly, that some Indian journalists get an extra pay from the Soviet consular personnel on an unofficial basis and that “they take the money with pleasure here.”¹⁵⁸ This detail provides a glimpse into the theme of unofficial network for Soviet influence, even though the documents of GKKS provide scarce information on the subject.

The reaction of the Indian public to the Soviet press materials can be found in the discussions of the Soviet diplomats with Indians. Soviet consulate in Bombay held a discussion on the perception of Soviet press with the President of Overseas Impex Private Ltd. Tajura who worked with socialist countries. Tajura explained that *Pravda* for example is a newspaper for the Soviet public who “is anti-imperialist, anti-western, and is communist when we are not communists, are not anti-western, not anti-imperialists, we are neutral.”¹⁵⁹ Therefore it was easy for Indian editors not to republish Soviet press materials, seen by many as “propaganda.” Tajura

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ GARF, P-9518, opis 1, delo 431, 224-229.

characterized the style of texts as being:

...boring and hard to read, single minded, as if whatever you do is grandiose and great. When at the same time Americans have lots of books with various materials on economy, philosophy, culture, politics, and history and they do books about the Soviet Union that are of course anti-Soviet in their approach.¹⁶⁰

Tajura suggested to follow the American model and create magazines such as *Time*. Furthermore USIS was a lot better equipped than the Sovinformburo, with a large office, including a cinema, a reading room, and a library (all air conditioned). “USIS does not spare money because they know that now we, Indians, are comparing the USSR and the US in everything, including small details.”¹⁶¹ GKKS sent the copied text of the discussion to various Soviet information agencies: news agency TASS General Director, the Board of Foreign Languages and Literatures, and the office of propaganda in Soviet republics.

6. Soviet “special tourist groups”

Tourism also played an important role in the Soviet cultural influence efforts during the Cold War. In the Soviet Union tourist industry saw a great change during the Thaw. The Soviet Union dramatically limited the rights of its citizens to leave the country after 1929. During Stalin era only elite Soviet citizens such as diplomats, trade officials, journalists, and prominent cultural figures could leave the country. Some estimates mention only 2,000 Soviet tourists during this period. In 1955 the Soviet government allowed its citizens to travel abroad. The procedure remained complicated. A Soviet citizen had to apply to authorities to be able to travel to foreign countries. However, the number of Soviet tourists increased dramatically after 1955,

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

with half million tourists in 1955-1964.¹⁶² The ideological body of the Communist Party Central Committee decided to create a campaign of “special tourist groups” within the Union of the Friendship Societies with Foreign Countries in addition to ordinary tourism.¹⁶³ For example, the plan for 1961 was to send 1,500 special tourists abroad. The first “special tourist groups” went abroad in 1959. In 1960 the ideological body of CPSU considered “special tourist groups” as the most “successful in propagating Soviet achievements in technology and science during tours in the US.”¹⁶⁴ The Union of Friendship Societies selected candidates for tourist groups who should have “had excellent behavior, correct political education, and be able to fulfill the responsibilities.” The aim of the groups was to actually “play the role of official delegations.” SSOD had to supervise the groups in tours and create a position of a group instructor chosen from activists of SSOD, or “Intourist” – a state run tourist company. A tourist would get a 50 percent discount for tours in countries of South East Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; 30 percent discounts for tours in the US, Canada, UK, and Western Germany. The ideological body of CPSU thought that ordinary tourists would only be interested in sightseeing and travel, and may not be able to have direct contacts with local population. Special groups would visit factories, other working spaces, meet different people, share opinions, and discuss life in the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁵ For example, SSOD had plans to organize special groups from Ukrainian, Armenian, Lithuanian republics to the US and meet with corresponding immigrant associations to “talk about the achievements of their Soviet republics.”¹⁶⁶

The GARF archive in Moscow contains documents from special groups for every country

¹⁶² Anne Gorsuch, *All This is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad After Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2011), 12-13, 18.

¹⁶³ RANI, fond 89, perechen 55, dokument 8.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

they visited. Available reports on trips to India are for 1959, 1961, 1965-1980s. An ordinary tour would have an official part and an unofficial one when Soviet specialists in a certain area would meet with their Indian counterparts, such as physicists, biologists, doctors, artists. During the 1959 tour, the tourists met with theater actors after a show, at the Bombay union of journalists and students who wanted to learn Russian, at Calcutta Art Center. The group had a meeting at the Bombay Union of Journalists where they discussed the following topics: the freedom of the press in the Soviet Union; how Soviets saw the Indo-Chinese conflict; the conference of writers from Asia and Africa. Indian journalists wrote articles on the meeting in the Indian press.¹⁶⁷

The first groups in the beginning of the 1960s included representatives of the middle strata of the Soviet elite. For example, the chief architect of the Moldavian capital Kishinev M.F. Smirnov met with the chief architect of Bombay Sathi. The diversity of professions did not allow representatives of all professions to meet with their Indian colleagues, so it was suggested to have 2/3 of a group formed from one profession. Later versions of a tour would include visiting more than one country.

In 1961 a group visited Japan and India. This group, among others, consisted of professors from Moscow State University, a worker, and a chairman of a kolkhoz. The reports usually document the themes discussed during meetings, such as the role of women in Soviet society: “why do the majority of women work in the USSR?” The SSOD would organize a press conference for the group with the local press.¹⁶⁸ In 1965 a group of 13 people visited India and Nepal. It consisted of professors, engineers, journalists, two doctors, a worker from the Russian

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ GARF, fond 9576, opis 23, delo 1.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

Republic (RSFSR), Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan. The report from the group quotes their observations on India, for example, on the overwhelming influence of Gandhism as a form of religion in the country. During a lecture delivered by a professor from MGU, Indians asked questions about the difference between models of society in China and Soviet Union, as well as about classes in the Soviet society. The reports characterized the meeting as calm except an incident provoked by two “white” Americans who compared Communism to a religion. Other questions during the meeting concerned democratic institutions, such as why only one party ruled in the USSR. The report said that in order to answer the question “we had to make a workshop on the October Revolution of 1917 and the fate of bourgeois parties during the Revolution.” Other questions were on the Soviet economy and how prices were established.¹⁶⁹

The instructor of the group A.K. Belykh from the chair of the theory of scientific communism at Leningrad University was satisfied with the answers given by the tour group and even made a “very important” suggestion to “consider sending only (underlined by the GKKS recipient) special tourist groups... especially to distant Asian countries.”¹⁷⁰ Belykh concluded: “The concept of simple sightseeing objectively weakens the political effect of the tours. We should read the texts of lectures of the participants in advance and translate them... Use more tourists from Asian and Transcaucasian republics.”¹⁷¹ This statement about the sending of special groups shows the frustration and fear of committing a *faux pas* on the part of Soviet tourists abroad. The special concern about the “distant Asian countries” also underlines the understanding that the main ideological struggle was to take place in the Third World countries and the racial question was therefore very important.

¹⁶⁹ GARF, fond 9576, opis 23, delo 60.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

The Soviet Union tried to project an image of a country where Asian peoples enjoyed the same rights as Russians. This was particularly important to contrast it to the US of the 1950s that still had laws for racial segregation. The US state department had to respond to many incidents of racism against the representatives of the Third World on their tours in the US. For example, in August 1955 a dark skinned man was refused to be served in a restaurant in Huston airport. The person turned out to be Indian ambassador to the US G.L. Mehta.¹⁷²

7. Challenges of teaching Russian in India

Soviet cultural diplomacy agencies considered the question of teaching Russian to be crucial for Soviet influence efforts. The English language enjoyed privileged position of the mediating language between local regional languages of India. At the same time English remained the language of the elite and of higher education. This explains the need to publish materials in English. Poland and Yugoslavia for example published their scientific articles in English. V.K. Rao, director of the Institute of Economical Development of India, during his lecture at MGU in April 1962 urged the Soviets to start a program of teaching Russian.¹⁷³ His argument was that the “language is linked with philosophy and culture.” Rao suggested opening a special school in India for the Russian language. After the signing of the 1960 Cultural Agreement the Soviets could send professors of Russian or Indian universities. The number of professors remained small. An estimate from the GKKS documents suggests that after 1960 one teacher of Russian was sent to every large Indian university.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 51. Azza Layon, *International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2000), 134.

The particularity of the Soviet education system created a situation when the majority of professors of Russian language were women. This particularity suggests a gendering of instruction where sciences would usually be taught by men and humanities and social sciences, such as the Russian language, by women. A major turn happened during the India-China border conflict and the proclamation of a state of emergency in the autumn of 1962 in India. GKKS decided to send only men after November 12, 1962 because of “difficult political environment and emergency situation.”¹⁷⁴ This revealed the lack of male professors of Russian who would know English. The documents of the GKKS and SSOD following the 1962 India-China border conflict have reports from professors of Russian who witnessed the change of attitude in the Indian academic community towards Soviet professors. For example, a teacher of Russian at the University of Rajasthan mentioned that his Indian colleagues stopped saying hello on seeing her in the corridors of this establishment.¹⁷⁵ The information published by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion did a survey on the attitude toward the USSR during the conflict in November 1962. According to this survey, among 1,500 literate respondents in four main Indian cities only 1 percent thought India should align with the Soviet Union and 36 percent favored alignment with the US and Britain.¹⁷⁶

The establishment of a state of emergency during the 1962 conflict forbade exhibitions and festivals and other gatherings. The plan of cultural cooperation for 1963 could not be realized on the same level as in 1962.¹⁷⁷ Kabir, the Indian Minister responsible for Cultural Cooperation, did not go to Moscow in December 1962 as it had been planned. Tours of Indian

¹⁷³ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo, 432, 28-43.

¹⁷⁴ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo, 433, 135.

¹⁷⁵ GARF, 9576, opis 15, delo for 1963.

¹⁷⁶ Peter Duncan, *The Soviet Union and India* (London: Chatham papers, 1989), 102. The situation reversed during

scientists to the USSR were postponed as was the tour of the Bolshoi Theater in India, Soviet circus tours, as well as football team tour.¹⁷⁸ A trip of the Indian minister was postponed until May 1963 but it was obvious to Russians that the minister did not give clear answers about the trip, trying to adapt to the new political situation.¹⁷⁹

Before the 1962 crisis an official form the Indian Ministry of Scientific research Lakhini stated that in cultural cooperation the Soviet Union had been the main partner for India, outdoing the US.¹⁸⁰ But Soviet cultural cooperation differed from the American one in India. Because main Soviet cultural diplomacy agencies were state-run and worked according to the state-to-state cultural cooperation agreement. By contrast, Americans worked differently: often the US NGO's, private funds, and private companies contributed most to an important portion of American cultural diplomacy efforts in India.

The damage of the India-China war of 1962 reduced the plan for cultural cooperation from 60 paragraphs of the yearly plan to 35 for 1963. The GKKS and SSOD documents have several letters from Indian organizations that postponed or closed altogether their cooperation initiatives that had been planned before the outbreak of India-China conflict. The Mysore General Assembly delegation was supposed to visit one of the Soviet Asian republics' Supreme Councils but they cancelled the trip claiming lack of funds.¹⁸¹ Indian Department of Nuclear Power postponed for one year the exhibition on the Soviet space program.¹⁸²

the Bangladesh war in 1972 when only 2% favored the US against 46% for the USSR.

¹⁷⁷ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo, 433, 25.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 34.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 8.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, spravka ob obmene delegatsiyami.

¹⁸² Ibid.

8. Radio Moscow for India

Radio was considered as one of the most important vehicles for ideological influence because 80 percent of the Indian population was illiterate in the beginning of the 1960s, according to Soviet estimates.¹⁸³ The main concern was as always to beat the *Voice of America* (VOA) radio station. According to Soviet reports, VOA had 105 stations by 1963 in the US, UK, Morocco, Liberia, Greece, Ceylon, Philippines, and Japan. The signal for India went from the Philippines and Morocco to three transmitters in Ceylon. *Moscow Radio* was available on four shortwave frequencies in English, Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, and Tamil. The main information of the *Moscow Radio* was the news about the Soviet Union, its social and political life. *Moscow Radio* conducted a poll in India with questions about the quality of the signal and popularity of the station. The answers in the report tell that Indians were interested in the Soviet economical, scientific achievements, the culture of Soviet Central Asian republics and about the development of Soviet relations with India in economy and technologies.

Moscow Radio would also broadcast Russian and English language lessons.¹⁸⁴ One of the problems revealed by the polls was that *Moscow Radio* did not do programs on Indian themes. For example Indian public asked to put music from Indian movies.¹⁸⁵ An Indian poll showed that in 1964 only three percent of urban radio listeners ever listened to *Moscow Radio*.¹⁸⁶ The Cultural Ties agreement allowed exchange of radio programs, which in theory gave the Soviets access to Indian radio stations, but Indians did not air Soviet radio programs on political themes. The main Indian station *All India Radio* claimed that it was an entertainment station and did not

¹⁸³ Ibid, 339.

¹⁸⁴ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union* (University of Chicago Press, 1969), 231.

¹⁸⁵ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo, 433, 130.

¹⁸⁶ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union* (University of Chicago Press, 1969), 231.

accept programs on politics. Another problem was that the Soviets were mostly using frequencies that were hard to capture with cheap radio receivers. Therefore Soviets needed to invest more to reach a larger Indian public that used cheap receivers.¹⁸⁷

India and the Soviet Union enjoyed positive dynamics in their relations on the high levels of power. The Soviet Union increased its “soft power” in India after signing the 1960 Cultural Ties agreement that allowed the two countries to have different types of exchanges. Americans had a large presence and a lot more developed student exchange with India. The ideological Cold War between the superpowers took many forms, such as publishing of literature, radio, and economic expertise. One of the themes of Soviet influence was the creation of a common cultural ground and common past. The 1962 war damaged cultural exchange between India and the USSR, but the threat of India's war with Pakistan kept India seeking help from the Soviet Union.

¹⁸⁷ GARF, 9518, opis 1, delo, 433, 329-339. The documents from 1963 do not allow to see if Soviets succeeded in reaching low frequency waves for cheap receivers.

Chapter III. Soviet Films and the Cold War in India

The importance of films for the ideological Cold War was enormous in the 1950s, especially in India, a country with a large illiterate population that frequented cinemas. For many Indians it was the only entertainment they could afford. Both superpowers the Soviet Union and the United States were conscious of the importance of films for their ideological struggle. A capacity to organize a stable market for their films was a message in itself. The USSR did not succeed in getting to the large Indian public on the same scale as Americans. At the same time, Indian government had its own policy in supporting its developed local film industry. In the end of the 1950s India was the third country in the world in the number of films made by year after the US and Japan.¹⁸⁸ Before the middle of the 1960s Soviet films faced huge difficulties in getting access to the Indian public. Soviets had to make a special campaign of Soviet film festivals to reach local spectators. These films got freer access to Indian cinemas only after signing the reciprocity order of films exchange between the two countries in 1962. This agreement allowed Indians to sell as many Indian films to USSR as they bought from it and also guaranteed the assistance of the Indian government in promoting Soviet films in India.

1. Sovexportfilm and the Indian film industry

Sovexportfilm, an organization within the Chamber of Commerce of the USSR, an equivalent of the US Chamber of Commerce, was responsible for the export and distribution of Soviet films abroad. The organization had a branch in Bombay since 1949 with a staff of not more than four persons. Interestingly, the office shared the building with American and French news agencies. The documents of Sovexportfilm show that the agency worked in close

cooperation with the Soviet embassy and Soviet Cultural exchange agencies like the Soviet Ministry of Culture, GKKS, and SSOD.

A secret report from Sovexportfilm from 1959 brings to light the Soviet view on the Indian market. The bureau in Bombay was giving yearly overviews on Soviet films perspectives on Indian film market, always keeping an eye on its main competitor, the United States. At that time Indian cinema public was 2,5 million persons a day, 56 percent male and 44 percent female. The 14-36-years-old age group was 69 percent. Normally, a person visited cinema three times a month or more. People older than 37 visited cinema once a month. 22 percent of the public earned 700 rupees a month, 30 percent earned 300-700 rupees, 48 percent earned less than 300 rupees – they were the poorest young people who could not afford any other entertainment but films.¹⁸⁹ India had one cinema theater for 100,000 inhabitants for the population of 450,000,000 people. More than 55 percent of theaters showed only Indian films (63 percent in Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Maharati; 125 in Urdu, Tamil, Telegu; 17 percent in other Indian languages). 37 percent of theaters showed both foreign and Indian films, and 8 percent showed only foreign, mostly American, films. By 1960 Indian film industry had the budget of 450 million rupees with a profit of 250 million of rupees. 100,000 people were involved in the Indian film industry making 300 feature and 100 documentaries a year.¹⁹⁰

The Soviets considered the technical level of Indian films to be very weak. One of the peculiarities of the market was that Indian public liked dances and songs in films which took 1/3 of their length, making overall length up to three or four hours. There were 3,829 cinema theaters in the country. American and British companies directly controlled the 1,000 largest and most

¹⁸⁸ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 145.

¹⁸⁹ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49.

comfortable of them. 50 theaters showed only American and British films. 1,000 Indian organizations with personnel of 7,000 persons distributed and screened foreign films. In 1959 Indian imported 350 films a year: 300 from the US, 40 from UK, 2-10 from other countries. Sovexportfilm thought that the distribution was almost entirely subservient to the interests of American companies on all stages of distribution. Soviets named the use of English as the main reason why American films had such large distribution. Dubbing of films into local languages was a difficult issue because Indian government wanted to save Hindi market for Indian films. Sovexportfilm claimed difficulties in negotiations with Indian government in dubbing Soviet films into Indian languages.¹⁹¹ By 1959 all attempts to dub Soviet films failed because the Indian public wanted to see foreign films in English.¹⁹² The majority of Soviet films for export only had English subtitles.¹⁹³

The question of the use of English is one of the central in the issue of distribution of foreign films. Educated Indians were the main target group for Soviet films. These people spoke and understood English well and this gave big advantage to Hollywood films. Throughout the 1950s Soviets hesitated whether to dub films into local languages or just into English. One of the suggestions was to dub films into local Indian languages but this was denied because of financial reasons. Dubbing thought to cause larger time gaps between production and screening.¹⁹⁴ The distribution of foreign films was regulated through a license sold by the Indian government to foreign film producers. According to a Sovexportfilm report: "In order to import films a distributor must buy a license. In 1956 it was 360 000 rupees, in 1957 – 288 000 rupees, in 1958

¹⁹⁰ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 145.

¹⁹¹ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, 49-53.

¹⁹² RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 145, 59.

¹⁹³ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, 49-53.

– 300 000 rupees. With a single license the Soviet Union can sell 10 feature films, and/or 20 – 25 short films a year.”¹⁹⁵ The problem was that Indian government was selling a license with a limit in length of film footage. By 1959 there was an agreement for 400,000 meter license for Soviet films.¹⁹⁶ But even the footage of the license was hard to use as it had been planned. In 1957 the license was 600,000 feet and only 47,800 were used; in 1958, 280,000 – 47,900 used; in 1959, 300,000 – 129 000 used; in 1960, 400,000 – 201,000 used for the first eight months of the year.¹⁹⁷

Many Soviet critics did not approve Indian films for Soviet market because they lacked social conflicts and concerns. They thought Indian mainstream melodrama films to be fundamentally bourgeois.¹⁹⁸ After the 1962 India-China war the USSR decided to reach Indian public at any price and started buying Indian films regularly to be able to sell Soviet films in India with a guarantee of their future screening. After 1960 the license depended on reciprocal film exchange. The films were measured in length. The Soviets could sell as many films as they bought Indian films starting from 1960. The reciprocal film exchange was a strategy of the Indian government to reach new markets for its own film industry. In the USSR, Indian films gained popularity among Soviet citizens. The lack of political issues in Indian films served them well in getting through Soviet censorship. The ideological “harmlessness” of Indian films as entertainment provided a pass from the censorship office.¹⁹⁹

Sovexportfilm documents reveal that the USSR did not have a clear strategy in its film

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, 54-56.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Sudha Rajagopalan, *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going After Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 101.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 75.

export to India during the 1950s. The head of Sovexportfilm Didenko was dismissed once but then rehired. The representative of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce in India wanted to transfer the Sovexportfilm bureau to the Indian capital New Delhi away from the capital of Indian film industry Bombay. The office in Bombay protested this decision.²⁰⁰ Sovexportfilm distributed films through Indian distributor companies because they controlled or owned cinema theaters. At first, the Soviets thought that success depended on the reputation and size of Indian distributing companies. By 1959 Sovexportfilm had contracts with Select Films, Norona Ltd., Goodwin Pictures, International Distributors, Naren Pictures, Singh Films Distributors, and National Education. Before 1959 films were either sold to distributors or leased for 50 percent profit. In 1959 Sovexportfilm decided to sell film only onward with strict regulation of revenues. Sovexportfilm tried to get more control of screenings and held negotiations about funding 30 Indian theaters for Soviet films. The companies that controlled theaters asked 20 percent of the screening time for 15–20 years. Sovexportfilm refused this plan because according to Soviet laws the government could not finance private companies.²⁰¹

A relative success story for Soviet films was the screening of documentaries. The 16 mm films could be screened freely and bypass the license regulations. Both Soviets and Americans from USIS were looking for traditional festivals all over the country and send specially equipped buses to screen films about their respective countries. For example, films shown in April 1959 reveal the Soviet propaganda strategy: *Leningrad metro*, *Oil in the Caspian Sea*, *Peaceful nuclear energy*.²⁰² Feedback from Indians shows that the Soviets succeeded in constructing this

²⁰⁰ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, 50.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

image: “In the Indian mind they see us as builders of satellites and nuclear power plants.”²⁰³ It is interesting to note that some reports from actual screenings in provincial towns reveal that the majority of Indians did not even have basic knowledge about the Russian Revolution.²⁰⁴

Moreover, the Indian government had a censorship committee that refused to show a number of Soviet films: *The Mother*, *In Budapest*, *Aggression against Egypt*, *Vassa Zheleznova*, *Prolog*, *Episodes from the Circus*, *Forty First*, *Skanderberg*, *Vladimir Ilyich Lenin*.²⁰⁵ *In Budapest* and *Aggression against Egypt* were documentary newsreels. *In Budapest* was likely censored because India openly criticized the USSR for its intervention in Hungary in 1956. It is not clear why the film on the Suez crisis of the 1956 was banned because the official position of India was close to the one of the Soviet Union. *The Mother*, *Prolog*, and *Vassa Zheleznova* were the films based on literary works of Maxim Gorky (1868-1936), a Russian writer critical of Tsarist Russia, who produced works on social injustice and the misery of the poor. In the 1930s Gorky's works were proclaimed to be the icon for the official Soviet art – social realism. It is hard to say why *Episodes from the Circus* was banned. It is quite obvious why the film about Lenin was banned. The film is an important part for the Thaw de-Stalinisation period, during which the role of Stalin was purposely silenced and the Soviet ideology machine constructed a cult of Lenin. As it had been mentioned, Indians in general had very little knowledge about the Russian revolution and the political developments in the USSR. This situation may be a reason why Indian public was not interested in films on Soviet history. In any case, it seems that the Indian government was not interested in promoting films on revolutionary themes.

International context influenced the fate of censored films. *Skanderberg* (1955) is a

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

historical feature film on the fight of the Albanian people against the Turks. *Skanderberg* was a coproduction of the USSR with Albania, a close ally of Mao's China. After one year *Skanderberg* did appear on Indian screens. This can be accounted for by the fact that *Skanderberg* obtained international acclaim, the International prize at the Cannes Film Festival of 1954. *The Forty First* was first banned but then made its way to Indian cinemas too, possibly for the same reasons. In 1957 *The Forty First* was nominated for the Palm d'Or at Cannes and got the Special Jury Prize of the festival. *The Forty First* is one of the most important Thaw period films. This is the first film about the Russian Civil War where we can see first time in Soviet films an intelligent, caring, and reflective White officer – enemy of the Bolsheviks. The fact that both *Skanderberg* and *The Forty First* both got prizes, were banned, and then got to the screen may suggest that it was easier for Indians to accept pictures with international, at that time Western, acclaim and not to accept pictures on Gorky's books or on the theme of the communist revolution.

Officially, Indians denied political slant in film distribution. The Soviet Council General in Calcutta Cherkasov discussed the question of censorship with the owner of New Films Enterprise Sen Gupta distribution company who assured him that Indian censorship committee did not have any particular attitude in regards to Soviet films and was censoring other foreign films as well.²⁰⁶ Soviet films were mainly shown in large cities, especially in Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay. The Central district almost never saw Soviet films. It was only in 1959 that a distributing company from the Central district bought two Soviet films.²⁰⁷ At the same time,

²⁰⁵ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, spravka o kinoprostate.

²⁰⁶ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, 54-56.

²⁰⁷ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, 26 October, 1959 to Kachugin.

Hollywood had a license that allowed it to bring 200-300 American films a year.²⁰⁸

2. Competing with Hollywood in India

Foreign markets became especially important for Hollywood with the outbreak of the World War II when most of Europe and Asia were at war. By 1940 most of Europe was occupied by the Axis. One of the solutions was the development of the Latin American market. That would give cash to the industry and fight the Axis propaganda in Latin America.²⁰⁹ Latin America became a playground, where Hollywood developed its market strategies for production.

After World War II Hollywood sought its presence in the Indian market, encompassing millions of people who understood English. In 1945 the Hollywood association Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) was transformed into Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA) to facilitate distribution of films at home, and into Motion Pictures Export Association (MPEA) to promote films abroad. Eric Johnson (1896-1963) became the head of the two associations after having served as the head of the US Chamber of Commerce. Thus MPEA became the main agency that worked for Hollywood abroad in cooperation with the State department. MPEA was formed under the protection of the Export Trade Act that allowed American firms to be exempted from all anti-trust laws that regulated business domestically. And at the same time this regulation allowed US firms to fix prices outside the US, an illegal practice at home. MPEA worked in cooperation with the State Department and was even called the “Little State Department” in Hollywood.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ RGALI, Sovexportfilm, fond 2918, opis 4, delo 49, 54-56.

²⁰⁹ Darleen J. Sadlier, *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in the World War II* (Austin: University of Texas, 2012).

²¹⁰ Kerry Segrave, *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screen* (Jefferson, North

In the 1950s Americans established ties with India to export its films. A *Variety* article from November 25, 1953, “Is India an Expandable Market?” argued: “the American scheme to expand the Indian market and to establish a closer relationship with the Indian industry and public should be the setting up of a Motion Picture Export Association office in India... to start up a campaign to educate Indian audiences to Western tastes in entertainment.”²¹¹ MPEA appointed a special representative for India in 1960.²¹² In 1953 Eric Johnston had a public meeting in New York where he expressed the feeling of “neglect” of the full “development of world markets outside Europe... for potential expansion particularly as it might apply to the Far East .”²¹³ India occupied the central place in the American strategy to fill the film market in Asia:

...(Johnston) said he had worked out several phases of a program which would widen the circulation of American pix in the Far Eastern Areas. He is specifically concerned over the Indian market where, he said: 'we are getting only 2% of our potential. I think it's time we went into that problem and did something about it.'²¹⁴

Arnold M. Picker, United Artists vice president in charge of foreign sales, proposed the establishment of the film screening infrastructure first, and encouraged Hollywood to be patient with immediate revenues:

Only way to conquering the Indian market is to construct a series of showcases for American product and to keep playing it until the Indian public cultivates a taste for Hollywood films... Picker, who said he was fully aware of the inadequacy of the US pix impact in India, fully understands that the program he proposes is both costly and not likely to pay off in a hurry.²¹⁵

This consideration about long-term investments without immediate profits gives more ground to the theory that in many instances American globalization was driven by a long-term strategy for

Carolina, and London: McFarland and Co., 1997), 141-144.

²¹¹ *Variety*, November 25, 1953.

²¹² *New York Times*, July 10, 1960.

²¹³ *Variety*, September 9, 1953.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ *Variety*, December 9, 1953.

the realization of American influence.²¹⁶ Eric Johnston urged for investments in the Indian film infrastructure, pointing out that Indian standards were “inevitably moving up and Hollywood should prepare itself to participate in this progress...” and urging “to make efforts for US pic imports as palatable as possible to all sections of the country.”²¹⁷ Americans estimated that their earnings in India run to no more than about \$900,000 but could be expanded to as much as \$10,000,000.²¹⁸ Significantly, *Variety*, a magazine for the Hollywood film industry, in this article indirectly asked the industry to invest and be ready not to have large revenues, at least in the beginning, and to lift up the market to American standards. In the 1950s 72 percent of the American film revenue in India (same for Soviets) was coming from the four key cities – Bombay, New Delhi, Calcutta, and Madras.²¹⁹ Therefore, the Indian foreign films market was large only in its potential. Even in 1962 India was on a fifth position among the Far Eastern markets for Hollywood. A country of 450,000,000 population was coming “closely behind New Zealand in volume of billings.”²²⁰

India established a license system with MPEA for American film distribution that had to be renewed every three years, unlike the one-year license for the USSR.²²¹ A *Variety* article from February 27, 1957, “India Latest Foreign Land to Baldly 'Misunderstand' US Film Economics,” attacked protectionist measures of the Indian government. Americans denied India's attempt to establish reciprocal film exchange between the two countries. The American argument of the

²¹⁶ Alfred E. Eckers, Jr. and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century* (Cambridge University Press: 2003), 5.

²¹⁷ *Variety*, September 9, 1953.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ *Variety*, January 17, 1962.

²²¹ Kerry Segrave, *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screen* (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland and Co., 1997), 217.

time was:

What is consistently misunderstood abroad, and so frequently held against the film companies, is the fact that – in the US - audiences follow their own inclinations and can't be told what to see or not to see. In India an educated Indian, if he doesn't wish to see one of his own country's formula films (mostly song-and-dance) has but little choice than to attend an American or British picture... Americans are confronted with an ample choice of quality screen material either from Hollywood, where an attempt is made to reach all intellectual strata, or from Europe...²²²

The American argument stated that Indian companies would lose revenues because they could not provide enough Indian films to their cinema theaters. Thus more American films in the market would benefit Indian theater owners and Hollywood alike.

This discussion on different views on the economics of the motion picture industry came out when the Indian government decided to ban the import of all foreign films for three months in 1957.²²³ *Variety* published fewer articles on Hollywood activities in India after 1957 until 1962. After 1962 the number of *Variety* articles on Indian market augmented. Indian government had its own agenda to protect its local cinema production and distribution companies as well as to establish reciprocal order of film trade with all foreign nations. The Indian strategy of forcing Americans to buy Indian films did not work. At the same time Hollywood enlarged its presence in India. The Motion Pictures Export Association billings in 1960 were 23 percent higher than in 1959, and the first nine months of 1961 had already exceeded those most profitable months of 1960.²²⁴ Since 1957 India had climbed from the twenty-fourth to the eighteenth position in the MPEA's table of master markets.²²⁵

²²²*Variety*, February 27, 1957.

²²³*Variety*, July 10, 1957.

²²⁴*Variety*, January 17, 1962

²²⁵ *Ibid.*

3. The Solution: Soviet Film Festivals

Moscow declared the seventeen years experience of Soviet films distribution in India unsatisfactory. The head of Sovexportfilm complained that this situation created a bad reputation for Soviet films in India. The abundance of American films proved a failure of Soviets in ideological struggle. Therefore Soviets needed to change their strategy. This provoked a search for a solution to how to get to the Indian public en mass. Sovexportfilm found the solution in reproducing distribution experience they had had in Israel: showing films through the organization of Soviet film festivals. This way the Soviet Union could show films directly, bypass Indian distributors, and have access to large audiences. This strategy allowed Sovexportfilm to show the same films all year round everywhere they wanted as many times as they could. The solution was to show the best of Soviet cinema of the time and get the best propaganda effect they could. At the same time Didenko succeeded in signing contracts with large Indian distributors and in selling films directly to these companies. This strategy gave positive results. 1960 was the first year when Sovexportfilm succeeded in realizing a yearly budget.²²⁶

The first new type Soviet films festival took place in January, 1960 in Delhi. Sovexportfilm rented one of the best cinema theaters in Delhi the Rivoli theater, with 445 seats. On January 15-16 they screened: *The Cranes are Flying*, *The Great Peace Fighter*, *Soviet Exhibition in New York*; January 17-18: *Ilya Muromets*, *The Greatest Victory of Humanity*; 19 January: *Khrushchev's Visit to the US*, *Swan's Lake*; January 21-22: *Destiny of a Man*, *On the Ice Arena*, *A Boy from Naples*. This time Sovexportfilm paid great attention to publicity. On January 14 the agency held a press conference, plus publicity in Indian press, boards in the streets,

billboards on mobile carts, posters and signs on the theater building. One hundred people participated at the press conference where Sovexportfilm showed parts of two films. Soviet Ambassador Benediktov I.A. opened the festival. Documents of Sovexportfilm show that Soviets succeeded in associating top Indian elite figures with the new types of festivals. During the opening day the festival received Indian federal ministers and other important statesmen, such as foreign diplomats, “including those from capitalist countries.” In the end 9,345 persons attended the festival.

Didenko suggested holding festivals regularly during the next four to five years in order to “cultivate a taste for Soviet films” in the Indian public, as the Americans had been doing since the beginning of 1950s. Didenko proposed to target the main Indian cities and to organize festivals as commercial enterprises, meaning financially self-sufficient. Didenko also suggested to buy or even to build a new cinema theater in Bombay for Soviet films. He also suggested other capitalist style innovations: to use the extra money from theater leases for direct control of screening; and to make Hollywood-style tours of actors during film premiers. The new program of Sovexportfilm was a big change from its experience in India in the 1950s.

Southern and Bengali districts were considered as the most friendly for Soviet films because of they had “more sympathies towards the USSR.”²²⁷ For example, the Southern State of Kerala had one of the first democratically elected Communist government in the World. That is why the second festival was held in the South in Bangalore. At the time it was a city of 1,200,000 habitants, with 35 theaters. Bangalore was the second film producer in India after Bombay, but producing films in Tamil language. Before the 1960 Soviet films festival, the city

²²⁶ RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 145, 17-59.

²²⁷ RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 50, 13 September, spravka ot Didenko.

would rarely see Soviet films. Sovexportfilm office complained that before 1960 Madras distributing companies showed no more than six Soviet films a year, without publicity, at early morning hours, and with very little number of viewers. The problem was, as in many other places, that theaters were booked months ahead by American and British companies for their films. Sovexportfilm set up a special committee for the festival headed by Mr. Partasarti, a prominent Bangalore doctor, member of the legislative assembly of the Andhra Pradesh State. The committee also included Garadacha, a member of the State Cinematographic Chamber; Krishna Rao, the secretary of the State Journalist Association; businessmen; and lawyers. The publicity became very important for the organization of the festival. Sovexportfilm ordered: 150 placards, 1000 wall posters, 200 posters for the main films *Swan's Lake* and *Fate of a Man*; 20 streamers; 5,000 personally addressed postcards (the names were searched in phone books); and 30,000 leaflets (15,000 in English, 15,000 in Tamil and Kannada). The main city squares had large 30-by-10-meter boards with information about the festival two weeks in advance. As in Delhi, Sovexportfilm held a press conference three days before the festival. They sent 650 special tickets to the “main social, state and cultural activists,” the elite of the city. Only twelve people refused the invitation. Only people with invitation tickets could come for the opening of the festival. The first speech was given by the festival committee chairman, followed by that of the speaker of the Mysore legislative assembly S.R. Khanti. The speaker thanked the Soviet Union for its “endless help to India” and added that films were the best way for peoples “to understand one another.”²²⁸ The most successful pictures were the feature film *Destiny of a Man* and the documentary *First of May in Moscow*. The *First of May in Moscow* was very popular for

²²⁸ RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 50, Bangalore festival.

its portrayal of the Soviet Capital and was shown every day of the festival instead of one day as it had been planned. *Indian Express* and *Deccan* wrote positive reviews about *Destiny of a Man*: "...an outstanding feature, it is different from films like *On the River Kwai*, *Old Enemies* ... it is not only about the horrors of War but how it affects an individual... the film is not only a great film but a life experience which nobody would like to have but one can't forget after getting it."²²⁹

The success of the festival in Bangalore gave a green light to Soviets to continue festival screenings. In addition, it was easier to sell films that got publicity at festivals. For example, films *A Girl Searches for Her Father* and *The Way to Stars* were very popular at Bangalore festival. The festival cost 8,485 rupees and earned 8,922 from tickets which was a financial achievement as well. The result was a surprise for Sovexportfilm and its Indian partners. At the same time as the Soviet film festival, West Germany organized a festival for their films in Bangalore with the participation of German stars. Germans earned only 7,000 rupees. Western tourists visited the Soviet festival too and were happy to "see things not accessible at home."²³⁰ Sovexportfilm confirmed that this success could not have been achieved without close cooperation with the Soviet embassy and Soviet Chamber of Commerce:

Obviously because in the larger framework of cultural-propagandistic events the screening of Soviet films is more interesting to the Ministry of Culture and the Soviet Embassy than to the Chamber of commerce. By its nature the Chamber of commerce does not pay much attention to the propaganda side in distribution of Soviet films. It does not show big interest in commercial affairs either because it is not about business... As we know the propaganda effect is the most important feature in Soviet films distribution. In this regard Sovexportfilm feels itself in isolation being within the organization of the Chamber of Commerce.²³¹

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

This phrase characterizes well the state of the entire Soviet film distribution program in India by 1960. It was not yet clear how different agencies were to collaborate. The facade of Sovexportfilm as a purely commercial enterprise was good in terms of cultural diplomacy, which was supposed to use neutral agencies for its work and to be far from criticism of being a branch of an ideological organization. In this sense Sovexportfilm was a mirror of the American MPEA.

A final report for 1960 from Sovexportfilm states that only in 1960 they could achieve direct exchange of films with India for the first time. This worked till the end of the 1980s and had a large cultural influence on the Soviet Union. In 1960 Sovexportfilm refused to continue collaborating with two Indian distributors Goodwin Pictures and Pravda Pictures and stayed only with large distributors – Jeremy Pictures, Billimoria, and Laji. After 1960 the Soviets stopped the percentage scheme for screening and only sold films to distributors from then on. Before Sovexportfilm had no control over distributors who would “mark down” the profits. In 1960 nine films were sold: *Swan's Lake*, *The Destiny of a Man*, *The Cranes are Flying*, *Ilya Muromets*, *Artists of the Circus*, *Arena of Friendship*, *Forty First*, *We Became Friends in Moscow*, *The Mystery of the Two Oceans*. The exchange rules allowed to show and sell films that had been sold in previous years and Sovexportfilm tried to sell the best films to new distributors. Sovexportfilm bought only six Indian films because the exchange was tied to the length of films and Indian ones were longer. Only two Soviet film festivals were held in 1960 in Delhi and Bangalore but Sovexportfilm planned four more in the next year in Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Pune. The Sovexportfilm representative Didenko complained in the end of 1960 that Soviet films were still generally not seen by the larger Indian public. Didenko claimed that the Soviet cinema industry still did not have enough films that would satisfy the tastes of Indian viewers. Even *The*

Destiny of a Man, a film with best press coverage and most favorable reviews, was not commercially successful. Sovexportfilm speculated that Indians did not like films about war and did not “feel emotional attachment to the events of the two world wars.”²³² By the end of 1960 Sovexportfilm did not decide if they should dub or subtitle films. Till 1960 Sovexportfilm's sales of films were still financially non-profitable but the success of the two festivals looked promising to continue the same strategy. This posed a question if Soviets had to adjust to the Indian market.

Soviets explained the failure in accessing Indian masses by the fact that Soviet films were too complicated for Indians. Soviets imagined a struggle of high European culture with American entertainment, universal humanitarian values against American oversimplification. As Didenko wrote to the Moscow headquarters: “Indian public grew up on their own pictures and American films which falsify real life with fairy tale adventures and sexual scenes... therefore Indian public is not ready for Soviet films with their accent on social problems and deep content.”²³³ Thus the festivals were meant to make Indian public discover the “high culture.” David Caute writes in *The Dancer Defect: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* that Soviets made generalizations about American art as dressed in mannerisms and abstractions selling illusory nonsense to the World.²³⁴

In 1961 Sovexportfilm continued the festival program. In the south the agency organized festivals in Hyderabad in October, 20-16; in Vizagapatam in November, 3-9; in Gantur in November, 10-16; in Nilore in November, 17-23. All festivals had the same patterns of festival

²³²RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 51, Spravka ot Didenko.

²³³ RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 51, 9-22.

²³⁴ David Caute, *Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 8, 11.

committees with representatives from the local elites, and close cooperation with Soviet cultural agencies, such as the International Book, the Indo-Soviet Friendship Society, and the News Agency Novosti. This allowed Sovexportfilm to organize other cultural activities, such as Soviet books exhibitions, as well as signing up for Soviet periodicals during festivals.

At that time Hyderabad had 2 million inhabitants and 41 theaters, five of which were for films in English. The organization committee in Haderabad consisted of 28 persons, headed by the most famous Telugu writer (according to Didenko) Tapi Dharma Rao; Sen Jansarna, a doctor; San Jang, ex-supreme court judge; and Kumari Jamuna, a film star. From the Soviet side came a councilor of the Soviet Embassy Veshchunov; Velkov, the Embassy's First Secretary; as well as editors from Novosti, TASS, and an *Izvestia* correspondent. Minister of finance K. Vrahmanandan Reddhi of Andhra Pradesh opened by the festival. Another speaker was D.S. Reddhi, vice chancellor of the Hyderabad Osmania University. The theater in Hyderabad hanged Soviet and Indian flags, and played the hymns of the countries at the opening. Didenko was happy to write: “a hundred people tried to rush into the theater building to see films... so that Police had to intervene... finally all that worked well for publicity.”²³⁵

The festival showed the following feature films: *Leili and Mejnun*, *First Flight to Stars*, *The Destiny of a Man*, *The Cranes are Flying*, *The Arena of the Brave*; shorts: *First of May Marches in the Country*, *A Man Came Back from Space*, *Different Wheels*, *Ali Baba and Forty Bandits*, and *Ancient Symbols*. The most popular film, as in many other cities, was *First Flight to Stars*, a documentary about Gagarin – the first man in space. The Hyderabad festival happened half a year after the first manned space flight. Tickets for another film about the first man in space, Yuri Gagarin, *A Man Came Back from Space*, were sold on the black market at several

times more than the original price. In all 19,512 tickets were sold with an 8,000 rupees profit. Minor difficulties occurred in the organization of the festival. Local president of the Cinema Chamber and the local president of the Indo-Soviet Friendship society refused to participate, claiming that Soviet film festivals should be free of charge.²³⁶ Reports of Sovexportfilm have records about instances when Indian police officers would come at homes of theater owners and would ask questions why they had agreed to lease their theaters for Soviet films and what was all this “non commercial activity” about.²³⁷

A large festival was held in Calcutta, a city of eight million people, with its own film industry, and 77 theaters. The committee of the festival was headed by the president of the West Bengal legislative assembly S.K. Chatarji; R.K. Munadar, mayor of Calcutta; T. Sen, rector of the University of Calcutta; T.S. Benerji Ben, a writer; M.D. Chararji, president of the Association of Cinema Producers; and other people from Bengal film industry. It was preceded by a press conference and a publicity campaign in the press and in the streets. The Mayor of Calcutta opened the festival on December 15. Some films that nobody wanted to buy before were very well received during the festival in Calcutta, including *The Destiny of a Man*, *Unsent Letter*, *First Flight to Stars*, *Girl's Spring*, *Leili and Mejnun*, and *Mamlyuk*. The festival proved to be successful. 30,713 tickets sold, and the event produced a good impression on the Indian public. Even a “non friendly” to the Soviet Union newspaper *Statesman* wrote:

...the main feature of Soviet films is that they are very far from light cheap comedies with cheap show. What is good in them is their realism, the faith in the strength of a human being. Best of their features are sacramental and depressing... Films at the festival are an example of silent propaganda, connection of reality with human relations... Although the films are made mainly for their Soviet public they do have

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ RGALI, 2918, opis 5, delo 254, spravka ot 1963.

success internationally.²³⁸

In 1961 Soviet film festivals were held in Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Vizagapatam, Guntur, Nilore, Calcutta, Bombay. Apparently, there was no other way to get to the public but through the festivals. Sovexportfilm planned to organize festivals monthly in 1962 and to have them in Assam, Orissa, and Bihar.

In the end of 1961 – beginning of 1962 Sovexportfilm organized a festival in the Indian film industry capital Bombay. Dr. A.V. Baliga, president of Indo-Soviet Friendship society, chaired the festival committee. Other members were Bimhal Roy, president of Producers Association; film industry representatives; and distributors. On December 26, 1961 they held a press conference in the Soviet consulate with 60 journalists. Minister of the State of Maharashtra Dr. Naravane opened the festival. The festival took place in the oldest Bombay theater Excelior with screenings of *Girl's Spring*, *First Flight to Stars*, *Malyuk*, *Leili and Mejnun*, *Unsent Letter*, *Ballad of a Soldier*, and shorts *Baikal Lake*, *Again to Stars*, *First of May Marches over Moscow*.

Sovexportfilm faced certain difficulties in Bombay during the organization because the city had the most developed film market and all theaters were booked for American and British films.²³⁹ Some theater owners refused to screen Soviet films.²⁴⁰ K.K. Modi, the owner of the Excelior, had worked closely with American companies, so Sovexportfilm had a long and difficult negotiations for the lease of the theater. The report says that twenty days before the opening of the festival K.K. Modi asked for a very high lease price “hoping to get our refusal.” But Sovexportfilm decided to pay the high price and have the festival in Bombay. This situation was even commented in the Indian press, in the film industry magazine *Cinema Express*:

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 145, 1-9.

“Regardless the high rental price Soviet films gained financial success. If one compares the theater owners attitude to foreign films we can see that they are more reserved towards Soviet films. Without taking any responsibilities theater owners demanded high prices from Russians.”²⁴¹

Later on officials in Moscow criticized Sovexportfilm for the festival's program for being too overtly propagandistic and for the instrumentalization of diplomats and elite local public figures. Moscow did not like the elitist character of festivals and the neglect of the masses of the Indian poor. It is important to note that Sovexportfilm was thinking about targeting the Indian poor in Bombay. The first mention of this is after the Bombay festival. Sovexportfilm suggested renting the Aurora theater in a working class neighborhood of Bombay for a festival in this neighborhood as well.²⁴²

Sovexportfilm's branch in India suggested in its letter to Moscow headquarters to have festivals in 1962 in Ahmedabad, Syrat, Baroda, Baunagar, Jamnagar, Nasik, Puna, Kolhapur, Hubli, Sholhapur, Belgaum, Saugore, Nagpur, Gwalior, Jodhpur, Adjmer, and Jaipur. The document is marked by recipients in Moscow headquarters with a suggestion to have festivals in 54 Indian cities and towns in the year 1962. In many small towns it was the only way for Indians to see Soviet films, for example, this was the case with the Rajmundri, a southern town with a population of 80,000 people. As the report says:

The revenues in small towns are low but we get something bigger – it is for the first time thousands of people watch Soviet films. Publicity is modest there but one has to understand that in small Indian towns publicity with an orchestra and a car with a speakerphone a sign of solemnity. As in big cities, now our goal is to increase the

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

number of cities.²⁴³

4. Soviet films during conflict with China.

In the middle of 1962 the feeling of tension between Indian and China became clearer. The Moscow bureau asked to prepare a report on the state of Chinese film export in India and found out that: “For several years there are no Chinese films in Indian cinemas. Contacts between Indian and Chinese film distributors are non-existent due to the obvious reasons.”²⁴⁴

On October 26, 1962 India proclaimed the emergency regime because of the border conflict with China. This banned all film festivals starting in November 1962 and all Indian film distributors stopped showing Soviet films. In Hyderabad people boycotted the Soviet film festival and films were screened in half-empty theaters. The festival in Madras was held between October 26 and November 8, 1962 with participation of the sheriff of Madras and Ministers of Tamil Nadu. The Indian authorities allowed publicity banners only on the third day of the festival but then people in the streets destroyed them. The Indo-Soviet friendship society refused to participate in the festival. In Madras on October 28 a group of young people made a rally against the USSR in front of the *Maryland* theater which showed Soviet films. More than half of people invited for the festival opening did not come. On October 30 the local party Jan Sang organized anti-Soviet demonstration where they were giving out leaflets calling the Soviet Union “an abettor of Chinese aggressors.” Representatives of Indian distributors suggested Sovexportfilm to have a brake with screening of films due to the emergency situation.

The Sovexportfilm's report of 1964 for the previous year calls the period the “hardest

²⁴³ RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 145, 1-9, spravka 21 January 1961.

²⁴⁴ RGALI, 2918, opis 4, delo 145, 1-9, spravka 21 January 1961, spravka 5 March 1962.

period in history of Sovexportfilm in India.”²⁴⁵ The situation seemed bad because Indian authorities got a stance not only against communists from CPI but trade union leaders as well. Soviet diplomats characterized the situation as an “anticommunist hysteria.”²⁴⁶

During the conflict Indian government created its own propaganda agency for cinema, a Cinematographic Committee for Creation of Patriotic Films and “Collection of Funds for War.” The collection of funds increased the price of tickets up to 50 percent and the foreign films import fee was tripled.²⁴⁷ In this situation Sovexportfilm feared that Americans would bribe Indian distributors so they would stop working with the Soviets as it had happened in Israel. According to Sovexportfilm report in 1953-1957, the US embassy in Israel paid Yairfilmkot, an Israeli distribution company for Soviet films in Israel, to stop screening Soviet films. Soviets wanted more control for their film distribution in these circumstances.²⁴⁸

The situation of the 1962 conflict led Moscow to have stricter measures to gain results in the film export. The Moscow headquarter closed its eyes on revenues and told the Bombay bureau not to be that keen on profits and be ready to have none in India and to organize distribution in such a way that Indian theater owners could be financially interested, even at the expense of Sovexportfilm.

The Indian government used Soviet interest to export Indian films to the USSR. It established the reciprocity order and then created their own agency for film export – the Indian Motion Picture Export Corporation (IMPEC) in 1963. Sovexportfilm had to work directly with this agency. In 1964 Shah, the Indian Minister of Commerce, discussed Indian film export in the

²⁴⁵ RGALI, 2918, opis 5, delo 253, 44-50.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ RGALI, 2918, opis 5, delo 253, spravka o konflikte na granitse.

Indian parliament, stressing in particular the possibility of export to the Socialist countries. This brought a stricter control of the reciprocity for Soviet film export and established the market for Indian films in the Soviet Union. The Sovexportfilm headquarters in Moscow never hurried in buying Indian films. This in turn cut the license for Soviet films by half twice – in 1962 and 1965. In order to have markets in India, the Soviet Union started buying Indian films according to the license. This research does not study the scale of Soviet cinema presence in India after the changes in the 1960s. However, it is widely known that Indian films became extensively available in the Soviet Union from the middle of the 1960s and until the end of the 1980s.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁹ Sudha Rajagopalan, *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going After Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 281.

Conclusion.

India's neutral foreign policy gave the US and the USSR equal opportunities to influence the country. India was important for both superpowers not only because of its size and geographical position but also because the country was one of the leaders of the nonaligned. The possibility of a communist revolution in India scared Americans the most because this could provoke further communist insurrection in Asia and therefore the collapse of American prestige. Soviets supported the neutral status of India, because this kept the country from military cooperation with the US. Moreover, Moscow proclaimed the relations between the USSR and India as a model for other Asian and African nonaligned countries.

The Soviet foreign policy changed significantly after Stalin's death in 1953. Indeed the USSR turned to the policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries. From then on the Soviets officially sought to win the race of economic development in peaceful competition with capitalist countries. This new course demanded a change in Soviet foreign policy and therefore a change in Soviet cultural diplomacy. That is why Moscow created a number of new cultural diplomacy agencies. The State Committee for Cultural Ties (GKKS) became the main Soviet cultural diplomacy organization and had the same functions and authority as a ministry within the Soviet government. The main task of the GKKS was to supervise cultural exchange programs with foreign countries. In 1957, the newly created Union of Friendship Societies with the Soviet Union (SSOD) became the main Soviet civic society institution that appealed to large foreign audiences. The SSOD was successful in creating branches of friendship societies with the Soviet Union all over the world.

The main challenge for the Soviets in India was the India-China War of 1962. This was a

point in history when India could be tempted to join the American side in the Cold War. However, this did not happen. India did not change its policy of neutrality. This can be explained by the hostile relations between India and Pakistan, that latter being the main US ally in the region. As for the Soviet policy, ideological tensions between the USSR and China made India even more important for the Soviet Union in the region.

In the 1950s Soviet cultural efforts in India were scarce. But the dynamics of diplomatic and cultural relations between USSR and India was positive. The main change came with the signing of the Cultural Ties Agreement in 1960, which regulated the cultural exchange between the two countries. However, the US had an important advantage in India, as far as its “soft power” was concerned, mainly because English had a special status in India as the language of higher education spoken by the elite. Moreover, Indian authorities were afraid of the diffusion of communist ideology in the country. Indians already had an established world cultural hierarchy. For example, British and American universities were considered to be the best and were hence the most desirable for the children of the Indian elites. The USSR therefore had a difficult mission – to create a new reality for Indians, where the Soviet Union would be seen as an advanced industrialized country that could help India achieve the desired level of development.

One of the key elements of Soviet cultural diplomacy strategy was the ability to create a stable market for Soviet films in India. Hollywood had a dominant position on the Indian foreign films market with 200 new films against 8 Soviet new films a year. The Soviet agency for film export Sovexportfilms had to face realities that Soviet film industry did not have at home, such as the necessity to have publicity for films. The overwhelming presence of Hollywood in India forced Soviets to search for new and creative solutions for its films export. Thus Sovexportfilm

started a campaign of Soviet film festivals in India. This effort had a relative success when many new Indian cities saw Soviet films for the first time.

The war of 1962 and the state of emergency in India affected Soviet cultural diplomacy programs in a negative way, including Soviet film festivals. At that time the Soviets reported many instances when Indians expressed negative reaction toward the USSR. At the same time the Indian film industry also searched for foreign markets. In 1962 the USSR took advantage of this situation and established a new reciprocal film exchange with India. So ultimately the India-China war of 1962 reinforced relations between the USSR and India; this was also due to the fact that Soviets had had their own conflicts with China since the end of the 1950s.

This thesis opens up new avenues for reflection. The most natural development of this research would be to study the Indian side of India-USSR cultural relations. How did Indians perceive Soviet cultural diplomacy efforts? How visible were these efforts? What image did Indians have of the Soviet Union?

Furthermore, as far as Soviet history is concerned, this study offers new thought-provoking insights. In fact, the actual realization of Soviet cultural diplomacy in a non-communist country reveals interesting details about the effect it had upon the Soviet political structure itself. For example, the Soviets were ready to use capitalist tools, such as publicity for films, to win Indian audience and promote Soviet values. This raises other questions: how did this influence the Soviet Union itself? How did Soviet ideological committees manage the contradictions between the communist ideology and the need to play the capitalist game?

This master's thesis shows that the main objective of Soviet cultural diplomacy was to project the image of the USSR as a superpower. The mere fact that an Indian citizen in India

could listen to *Moscow Radio*, watch a Soviet film, read a Soviet magazine in a local language, or have an opportunity to apply to a Soviet university (which were all tuition-free), was the best proof of the success of this effort. This research also points out that Soviet cultural diplomacy activities themselves were a powerful means to show that a country which had lost millions of men and women during World War II was not only able to restore its industry but also to fight in the Cold War, moreover, to fight against such an advantaged rival as the United States. In this sense even such a tiny effort as sending a minibus with documentaries about Soviet industrial achievements and space race to midsized Indian towns mattered. It would show Indians what socialist economy was capable of.

Bibliography.

Primary sources

Russian Archive of the Contemporary History, *Rossiysky Arkhiv Noveyshey Istorii* (Российский Архив Новейшей Истории) RANI fond 89, perechen 55, dok. 21.

Russian Archive of Literature and Arts, *Rossiysky Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusstva* (Российский Архив Литературы и Искусства) RGALI: Soveksportfilm fond 2818, opis 3, delo 24; fond 2918 and 2329, for the years 1955-1964.

State Archive of The Russian Federation, *Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii* (Государственный Архив Российской Федерации) GARF: perepiska SSOD i GKKS fond 9518 for the years 1955-1964.

U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XI part 2, 1961-1963, vol XIX Africa and South Asia, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

The New York Times

The Washington Post

Pravda

Variety

Secondary sources

Alexandre Andreev, *Soviet Russia and Tibet: The debacle of secret diplomacy, 1918-1930s*, Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, 1960.

David Caute, *Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 2003)

Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy* (Harvard University Press, 1974)

Edited by Jost Dulffer and Marc Frey, *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

Gould–Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History*, Apr2003, vol. 27 no. 2, p193-214.

Karen Dawisha, “Soviet Cultural Relations with Iraq, Syria and Egypt 1955-70,” *Soviet Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (July, 1975), 418-442

Peter Duncan, *The Soviet Union and India* (London: Chatham papers, 1989)

Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Engerman, “Learning from the East,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2013, 227-238

Danielle Fosler-Lussier, “Music pushed, music pulled: cultural diplomacy, globalization, and Imperialism,” *Diplomatic History*, vol.36, no. 1 (January, 2012)

Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda: A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict* (Israel University Press, 1976)

Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Mark Donfried, eds., *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*

(Berghahn Books, 2010)

Anne Gorsuch, *All this is your world: Soviet tourism at home and abroad after Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2011)

Walter L. Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997)

Harish Kapur, *Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations: A Case Study of Soviet Policy Toward India* (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1972)

Andrei Kozovoi, "Défier Hollywood: La diplomatie Culturelle et le Cinéma à l'Ère de Brejnev," *Relation Internationales*, no. 147 (March 2011), 57-59

Azza Layon, *International politics and civil rights policies in the United States, 1941-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2000)

Mira Liehm, Antonim Liehm, *The most important of all art: Eastern European film after 1945*, (Berkley: University of California press, 1977)

Eva Liusternik, *Russko-indiiskie ekonomicheskie, nauchnye i kulturnye svyazi v XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966)

Tina Mai Chen, "Internationalism and Cultural Experience: Soviet Films and Popular Chinese Understandings of the Future in the 1950s," *Cultural Critique*, no. 58 (Autumn, 2004), 82-114

Charles B. McLane, *Soviet-Asian Relations* (London: Central Asian Research Center, 1973)

Jack Masey and Conway Lloyd Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations: US Exhibitions and Their Role in the Cultural Cold War* (Lars Muller Publishers, 2008)

Lynn Mally, "Exporting Soviet Culture: The Case of Agitprop Theater," *Slavic Review*, vol. 62, no. 2 (Summer, 2003), 324-342

Simo Mikkonen, *Winning Hearts and Minds? Soviet Music in the Cold War Struggle against the West* in edited by Pauline Fairclough, *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics* (Ashgate, 2013)

Sara Nilsen, *Projecting America, 1958: Film and Cultural Diplomacy at the Brussels World's Fair* (McFarland and Company Publishers, 2011)

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004)

Edited by Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Ethridge, *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010)

Sudha Rajagopalan, *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going After Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008)

Richard Remnek, *Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case study in Soviet policy towards India* (Carolina Academic Press, 1975)

Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003)

Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000)

Darleen J. Sadlier, *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in the World War II* (University of Texas, 2012)

Masha Salaznina, *Soviet-Indian Coproductions: Alibaba as Political Allegory*, *Cinema Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Summer 2010), 71-89

Kerry Segrave, *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screen*

(Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1997)

V.P. Sitnikov eds., *Kto est kro v mire* (Moscow: Slovo, 2003)

Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (The New York Press, 1999)

Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (University Press of Kansas, 2010)

Martina Topic and Sinisa Rodin, *Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism: European Perspectives* (Peter Lang, 2012)

Mastny Vojtech, The Soviet Union's Partnership with India, *Journal of Cold War Studies*. Summer 2010, Vol. 12 Issue 3, p50-90. 41p.

Jean-Michel Tobelem, eds., *L'Arme de la Culture: Les stratégies de la diplomatie culturelle non gouvernementale* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007)

Alexei Voskressenski, *Russia and China: A theory of inter-state relations* (London: Routledge, 2003)

Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat, eds., *Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

Maya Turovskaya, "Filmy kholodnoi voiny," *Iskusstvo kino* 9 (September, 1996), 98–106

Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Jeremiah Wishon, "Soviet Globalization: Indo-soviet Public Diplomacy and Cold War Cultural Spheres," *Global Studies Journal*, vol. 5, vol. 2 (2013), 103-114.