‘Big-Men’ Coalitions and Political Order in Northern Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2013)

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ABSTRACT

'Big-Men' Coalitions and Political Order in Northern Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2013)

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Civil war creates significant opportunities for the contestation of political authority. In Sub-Saharan Africa, rebels commonly use organized violence to challenge the authority of pre-conflict elites. Nonetheless, armed movements also ally with pre-conflict elite actors as a strategy for mobilizing popular support and maintaining political order. Contestation and cooperation between rebels and pre-conflict elites is possible because local communities are often comprised of multiple elite groups. What explains coalitional choices? Why do local leaders of armed movements ally with certain actors and not others? These questions are puzzling because local-level rebel leaders sometimes make counterintuitive coalitional choices that restrict their ability to establish and maintain social control.

To explore the relationship between coalition-building and control, this study focuses on the political crisis and war-to-peace transition in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2013). It compares three towns – Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – that fell under the military control of the principal armed movement involved in the conflict, the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN). Despite being under the control of the same group, each of these cases demonstrated marked variation in the ability of the FN to politically control local populations.

My argument is advanced in two steps. First, what explains patterns of coalition-building in rebel-held zones? I argue that coalition-building is shaped by pre-conflict brokerage relations. Brokers are those political actors that link local communities to the state. I argue that if elites function as brokers between local communities and the central state in the pre-conflict period, this limits their availability as potential allies for leaders of armed movements. Pre-conflict brokerage relations constrain the choice of potential local partners. Second and relatedly, this study explains levels of control established by armed movements that result from coalition-building. The wartime authority of armed movements can, in some cases, be met with stiff resistance from local actors. In others, the wartime political order imposed by armed movements is underwritten by broad support within local communities. I explain these differences by focusing on what I call 'hierarchical configurations'. Hierarchical configurations describe the relative levels of social hierarchy of competing elite groups. I argue that the level of wartime control established by armed movements is a function of variation in hierarchical configurations because these differences influence the political clout of rebel allies relative to their broker counterparts (or those elites aligned with the state). In summary, pre-conflict brokerage relations influence the coalition-building strategies of armed groups. These coalition-building strategies shape levels of contestation and rebel control as a result of variation in local-level hierarchical configurations.

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For Ellie

Table of Contents

PART I ***1***

Chapter 1. Coalitions and Control: Political Authority in Violent Conflict **2**

The Puzzle of Counterintuitive Coalitional Choices in Civil War 2

Authority Relations, Coalitions and Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 6

'Everyday' Politics and Contested Authority in Rebellion: A Gap in the Literature 11

Rebellion and Civilian Support 11

Armed Group Behaviour 13

Coalitions and Conflict in Rebellion: The Argument 17

Brokerage Relations 19

Hierarchical Configuration 24

Authority and the War to Peace Transition in Côte d'Ivoire 28

Moving Forward: Plan of the Dissertation 32

Chapter 2. Côte d'Ivoire's Conflict in Historical Perspective **36**

The Ivoirian Crisis in Historical Perspective 37

Rebel Leadership and Recruitment in the Early Days of the Rebellion 42

War Economies and Organization of Rebellion in the Ivoirian North 45

Towards a Fledgling Peace? From Civil War to Linas Marcoussis 51

Continuity and Change in the Ivoirian Peace Process: The Ouagadougou Peace Accords 54

Performing Peace in Côte d'Ivoire 60

Conclusion 68

Chapter 3. Methodology and Case Selection **70**

Case Selection and Research Design 70

Operationalization and Indicators 76

Data Collection and Sources 82

PART II ***89***

Chapter 4. Rebellion and Revolt in Bouna's Contested *Com'zone* **90**

State-Building and the Dynamics of Lobi-Koulongo Relations in Pre-Conflict Bouna 94

The Lobi: A History of a 'Shatter Zone' 97

Bouna's Fall: Samory Touré, French Colonialism and Lobi migration 101

Rebellion and Resistance in Bouna 109

Authority and Elite Politics 115

After 'Dimanche Noir': Reconfiguring Authority in Post-Conflict Bouna 119
Contentious State-Making in Post-Conflict Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire 123
Conclusion 128

Chapter 5. Civil War and Enduring Factionalism in Korhogo 130
The Historical Origins of Korhogo's Senoufo Elite 134
Colonialism and the Threatened Legitimacy of the Chiefly Class in Korhogo 138
Marginalizing the Dyula Community in Early Post-Colonial Korhogo 142
Factional Conflict in Post-Colonial Korhogo 147
The Civil War in Korhogo 151
FN Factionalism in Korhogo and the emergence of Fofié Martin 156
Senoufo factionalism, Presidential Politics and Political Order in Korhogo under the FN 160
The 2010 Presidential Elections, Factionalism, and the Emergent Political Order in Korhogo 166
Conclusion 170

Chapter 6. Rebellion in the Borderlands: The FN and *les commerçants* in Ouangolodougou 173
Trade, Migration and Brokerage in West Africa 178
Dyula Expansion and the History of Brokerage Relations in Northern Côte d'Ivoire 179
History of the Cattle Trade in West Africa 183
The History of Ouangolodougou and Northern Côte d'Ivoire's Border Regions 185
Opportunities and Constraints for Commerce During the Crisis Period 189
Commerce in Times of Crisis : Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l'UEMOA (COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). 193
Belonging and Conflict in Ouangolodougou: National-Local Connections 196
Taxation, Authority and Political Contestation in Post-OPA Ouangolodougou 200
Ouangolodougou's Rebel-Trader Alliance and the Incipient Post-Conflict Order 204
Conclusions 208

PART III* *211

Chapter 7. Conclusions 212
Summary of Findings 215
Brokerage Relations and Coalition Formation 216
Hierarchical Configurations and Social Control 219
Limitations 223
Implications and Future Directions 226
Bibliography 231
Appendix: List of Interviews 251

List of Figures

Figure 3.1 Map of Côte d'Ivoire (with Bouna, Ouangolodougou and Korhogo)……..75
Figure 4.1 Map of the administrative Region of Zanzan, Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire……..93
Figure 5.1 Map of the administrative Region of Savanes, Northcentral Côte d'Ivoire……...131
Figure 5.2 Photo of Korhogo Vegetable Market…….155
Figure 5.3 Photo of Korhogo Mayor's Office…….155
Figure 5.4 Photo of *Monument du soldat inconnu*……..155
Figure 5.5 Photo of *Monument en homage à femme noir*……....155
Figure 5.6 Photo of Korhogo wall mural…….....155
Figure 5.7 Photo of Korhogo wall mural…….....155
Figure 6.1 Map of the administrative Region of Savanes, North-Central Côte d'Ivoire…….177
Figure 6.2 Yearly cattle sales from Mali to Côte d'Ivoire (2008-2010)……...193
Figure 6.3 Monthly cattle sales from Mali to Côte d'Ivoire (2008-2010)……...193

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Levels of social control……..27
Table 2.1 The FN's ten *Com'zones*……....48
Table 3.1 Levels of social control……..79
Table 6.1 Municipal election utcomes, Ouangolodougou 2013……...207
Table 7.1. Levels of social control……...216

Glossary

AOF – *l'Afrique Occidentale Française*
ANCI – *l'Alliance pour la nouvelle Côte d'Ivoire*
ATP – Agribusiness and Trade Promotion
AU – African Union
CADO – *Coopérative agricole Djiguiya de Ouangolodougou*
CFA – Central African franc
COBOF – *Compagnie Bocoum et Frères*
COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA – *Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l'UEMOA*
DCCA – *la direction centrale du commissariat des armées*
DGFPM – *la direction général des forces paramilitaires*
DGPG – *la direction général de la police et la gendarmerie*
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS – Economic Community Of West African States
EU – European Union
FAFN - *Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles*
FENACOFB-CI – *Fédération nationale des coopératives, associations et societies de la filière bétail viande de Côte d'Ivoire*
FESCI – *Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire*
FN – *Forces Nouvelles*
FPI – *Front populaire ivoirien*
FRCI - *Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire*
GVC – *Groupement à Vocation Coopérative*
IB – Ibrahim Coulibaly
IGA – *l'inspection général des armées*
IRTG – Improved Road Transport Governance
MFA – *Mouvement des Forces de L'Avenir*
MJP – *Mouvement pour la justice et la paix*
MPCI – *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire*
MPIGO – *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirian du Grand Ouest*
NRA – National Resistance Army
ONUCI – *Opération des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire*
OPA – Ouagadougou Peace Accords
PAIGC – *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*
PDCI – *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire*
RCD – *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*
RENAMO – *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*
RDA - *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*
RDR- *Rassemblement des Républicains*
RHDP – *Rassemblement des houphouétistes pour la démocratie et la paix*
RUF – Revolutionary United Front
SIMTB – *Société Ivoiro-malienne de transport de bétail*

SYNTMVCI – *Syndicat National des Transporteurs et Marchandises et Voyageurs de Côte d'Ivoire*
UDPCI – *Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire*
UEMOA – *Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine*
UN – United Nations
UNITA – *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UTSC – *Union transport*
ZKB – *Zone Kolodio-Binéda*

PART I

Chapter 1. Coalitions and Control: Political Authority in Violent Conflict

The Puzzle of Counterintuitive Coalitional Choices in Civil War

In January 2011, I had a lengthy conversation with a high ranking member of the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN), the rebel group that controlled the northern half of Côte d'Ivoire for nearly ten years. His explanation of the group's armed struggle was simple. In 2002, Ivoirians persecuted by Côte d'Ivoire's then-President Laurent Gbagbo, 'northerners', Muslims, and perceived supporters of one of his principal political rivals, Alassane Ouattara, confronted a stark choice: they could continue living in the discriminatory system established by Gbagbo or they could take up arms against him. My interviewee expressed a view of the FN shared by many of the movement's members. The FN was seen as a group fighting for the basic freedoms and opportunities (voting, getting a job or going to school) for *all* Ivoirians that were being closed off by the current government. FN members viewed themselves as a movement positioned squarely against the nativism espoused by Gbagbo and his supporters.

However, this image of the FN, as a group fighting to advance the rights of all Ivoirians, including 'strangers'[1] in Côte d'Ivoire, was frequently inconsistent with the strategies it adopted to mobilize support in many localities. This dissertation highlights cases where the FN rallied support by constructing political alliances with elites *indigenous* to the different sub-regions under their control. These alliances often worked to antagonize immigrant or non-native groups

[1] In the context of Côte d'Ivoire, the label 'stranger' (*étranger*) has been used to describe two distinct groups: migrants (and descendants of migrants) from other parts of West Africa (particularly Burkina Faso and Mali) and migrants with origins elsewhere within Côte d'Ivoire who are considered non-native to particular localities.

and actors in these communities. For instance, in Bouna, a town adjacent to the large *Parc National de la Comoé* in Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire, the FN allied with members of the Koulongo monarchy, the group indigenous to this part of the north. This coalition-building strategy is puzzling for the simple reason that the politically, economically and demographically predominant group in the Ivoirian northeast is not the Koulongo, but the Lobi, a group of migrants who have settled in the rural areas surrounding Bouna in growing numbers since the turn of the 20th century. Why would the FN *not* choose to ally with Lobi, a group that appeared to be a natural ally for the rebels given their status as migrants and non-natives to Côte d'Ivoire's northeast? The political implications of the decision to ally with the Koulongo make this decision even more puzzling. Many Lobi felt that the Koulongo were using their relationship with the rebels to check or reverse the political and economic gains that the Lobi had achieved relative to the Koulongo over the course of the 20th century. Consequently, the Lobi viewed themselves as the principal political targets of the rebels. In 2007, these tensions reached their peak when some Lobi youth organized an armed revolt against the FN. My fieldwork in Bouna revealed that many retained a deep resentment towards the rebels four years later.

What explains the disjuncture between rhetoric and practice? Why would an armed group committed to fighting the politics of nativism at the national level marginalize the position of strangers locally? More generally, why do local leaders of armed movements ally with certain local groups and actors and not others? What explains the patterns of cooperation and contestation over power and authority that result from coalitional choices?

Existing responses to these questions provide only partial explanations. Studies that focus on contestation between armed movements and civilian groups ask questions about violent interactions between these groups (Reno 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Johnson 2008; Metelits 2010). Why do armed movements use violence against civilians? What explains variation in the employment of violence against civilian populations by armed movements? Research focusing on the most violent aspects of civil war and armed conflict are typically justified because civil wars are at least partly defined by the violence they cause. Yet, as Lubkemann (2008) argues, this privileging of violence as the object of study in civil war can obfuscate and push to the background a host of other political struggles and social processes. Civil wars are about "much more than violence or its avoidance" (Lubkemann 2008, 13; see also

Wood 2008); they can offer a host of opportunities for implicated actors to contest, renegotiate and reconstruct social relations along generational, gendered or class lines. In war, these contestations are not suspended; actors continue to struggle to shape social and political futures that are influenced as much by pre-war processes as they are by wartime dynamics and violence. Civil wars are violent, but violence does not preclude other forms of political interaction. The analytical challenge is to see how changes in the larger contextual environment produced by civil war create different sets of opportunities and constraints for the actors engaged in these local political contests. Moreover, political contestation does not preclude cooperation between armed movements and other civilian groups and actors. Pre-conflict elites can use alliances with armed movements to advance their position vis-à-vis local rivals. Similarly, the local-level rebel leaders use coalitions established with pre-conflict elites as means of buttressing rebel social control over civilian populations.

There is also a growing scholarship showing how coalitions formed between armed groups and diverse sets of local actors – non-governmental organizations, churches, businessmen and 'traditional' authorities – underpin systems of governance and preserve political order in the face of protracted state weakness (Little 2003; Tull 2003; Menkhaus 2007; Arjona 2008, 2010; Roberts 2008; Boege, Brown and Clements 2009; Mukhopadhyay 2009; Mampilly 2011; Raeymaekers 2010, 2013; Titeca and De Herdt 2011; Joireman 2011; Meagher 2012; Seay 2013). These perspectives emphasize the partnerships and collective action taken by different actors to maintain political order where the state cannot. Nonetheless, despite the successes of these alliances in maintaining political order, the authority of elites playing prominent roles, as part of emerging 'non-state' systems of governance, remains hotly contested. Elites empowered by the reconfiguration of political order work to maintain and institutionalize their positions of authority. Subordinate groups and other elites who have lost out amidst wartime transformations struggle to mitigate, circumvent or even reverse the political changes prompted by violent conflict. As a result, incipient political orders often exhibit patterns of both conflict and consensus. In this sense, wartime orders are similar to authority relationships in other settings, which typically exhibit a contested, dynamic quality, given the inequalities they tend to generate and support.

The empirical focus of this dissertation is the almost decade-long political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2011). The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire began as an attempted coup d'état in 2002. While failing to take Abidjan, the rebels established control over the Ivoirian north, dividing the country in two. This north-south divide would last through repeated efforts to peaceably resolve the conflict, until the forced removal of the country's then-President, Laurent Gbagbo, in 2011. In addition to the well documented national-level conflicts unleashed by the rebellion, the civil war also precipitated a host of heated contests over local-level authority in different parts of the country. Different actors – traders, 'traditional' chiefs, bureaucrats, elected politicians, as well as the rebels themselves – used the crisis as an opportunity to jockey for position and preserve or improve their relative political standing. Rebel commanders appointed by the FN within northern communities were just one of many types of actors looking to reposition themselves in the new political environment created by the conflict. In order to strengthen their political status within the communities they controlled, rebel leaders explicitly threatened and challenged some pre-conflict elites, while mobilizing and drawing on the support of others. Each of the cases included in this dissertation – Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – exhibited markedly different patterns of conflict and cooperation while under the control of the rebels. In Bouna, the rebels were heavily resented and the target of collective action. In Korhogo, FN leadership took sides in ongoing factional conflicts. In Ouangolodougou, the FN drew on broad support from local elites who were resisting efforts at state reconstruction.

This dissertation presents a two-step argument that explains differences in the patterns of conflict and cooperation between rebels and pre-conflict local elites during civil war. First, this study provides an explanation of the coalitions that emerge between local-level rebel leadership and pre-conflict elites. Rebels confront choices over potential allies because local communities are frequently comprised of multiple sets of elites. Why do rebels ally with certain elites and not others? I argue that if elites function as brokers between local communities and the central state in the pre-conflict period, this limits their availability as potential allies for leaders of armed movements. Coalitions between pre-conflict brokers and rebel leaders are less likely to form because the political status of brokers is likely to be threatened by the presence of the rebels and because brokers are more likely to be viewed with some suspicion by rebel leaders, as result of their proximity to the pre-conflict state. Second and relatedly, this study explains levels of social

control established by armed movements in particular localities. As indicated above, the wartime authority of armed movements can, in some cases, be met with stiff resistance from local actors. In others, the wartime political order imposed by armed movements can be underwritten by broad support within local communities. I argue that relative levels of social hierarchy within broker groups (local opponents of rebels) and rebel ally groups influences rebel control. I describe differences in relative levels of social hierarchy in terms of competing 'hierarchical configurations'. Levels of wartime control established by armed movements is influenced by differences in hierarchical configurations because configurations shape the political clout of rebel allies relative to their broker counterparts (or those elites aligned with the state). In sum, pre-conflict brokerage relations influence the coalition-building strategies of armed groups. These coalition-building strategies shape levels of contestation and rebel control because they influence whether rebels ally with strong or weak elites relative to their broker counterparts. Where rebel allies are weak, they should confront serious obstacles to mobilizing support and controlling local populations. Where rebel allies are stronger, systems of rebel governance should confront less resistance.

Authority Relations, Coalitions and Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

This dissertation focuses on contests over authority in rebel-held zones during violent conflict. It is based on a straightforward two-part definition of authority. First, at a basic level, authority is commonly thought to represent any relationship of inequality that is imbued with legitimacy by others.[2] 'Legitimacy' itself speaks to the extent to which relations of political inequality, or

[2] Scholars have expressed competing understandings of the relationship between authority and legitimacy. Some view authority as representing any relationship of political inequality imbued with legitimacy (Hurd 1999). This is in line with my understanding of the relationship between authority and legitimacy expressed above. From this perspective, where legitimacy is lacking, relationships of political inequality are defined by relations of power alone. Compliance is achieved through coercion, rather than the perception that rules are normatively good and should be followed as a result. Alternatively, authority relationships could themselves vary according to the legitimacy with which political hierarchies are imbued by subordinate groups. From this perspective, one might juxtapose 'domination' with 'legitimate authority' as simply being competing types of authority (rather than arguing that all authority relationships legitimate). Competing interpretations stem in part from ambiguities in Weber's original texts. As Onuf and Clink (1999, 152) write, "the term *Herrschaft* occurs dozens, possibly hundreds of times in the original text of Economy and Society. As we have seen, the standard English translation renders *Herrschaft* as domination, but not exclusively or systematically. It also uses 'authority' on numerous occasions (e.g., 1968, 213), as well as 'dominance' and 'dominancy' (e.g. 1968, 225, 942; dominancy was Rheinstein's choice, retained in the standard translation) and 'system of domination' (1968, 214). Such variability in rendering a word in translation would suggest any one of three possibilities: that the word is used inconsistently throughout the work; that it has an unstable

relations of domination, are considered right or just (Friedman 1990, 59-60; Lukes 1990, 207; Hurd 1999, 381; Lake 2010, 591-592). Second, in this study I do not understand legitimacy to be a static or "fixed" quality inherent in *all* authority relations (Sikor and Lund 2009, 6). Instead, legitimization and de-legitimization better represent diverse, dynamic processes that can work to either support or undercut relations of authority. As a result, authority relationships typically have a perpetually incomplete and contested character to them. Dominant actors go to great lengths to legitimize, institutionalize and naturalize relationships of political inequality. They draw on a diverse set of material and symbolic resources to delegitimize, mitigate or threaten any challenges to the established political order (Lake 2010, 593; Poteete and Ribot 2011, 440). Dominant elites act to preserve their power vis-à-vis rivals as well as subordinates. Predictably, those who are disadvantaged by existing political orders struggle to delegitimize them and push for reform. They can challenge dominant actors directly through collective action or other, more "everyday" forms of resistance (Scott 1985). Sally Falk Moore summarizes this dual process succinctly, suggesting that "the making of rules and social and symbolic order is a human industry matched only by the manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing and unmaking of rules and symbols in which people seem almost equally engaged" (quoted in Lund 2006, 697).

Civil wars create unique spaces and opportunities for heightened contestation over authority and the legitimate right to rule (Cramer 2006, 216; Wood 2008; Hagmann and Péclard 2010, 556). Specifically, violent conflict and the weakening of existing social and political institutions create conditions for subordinate groups to mobilize different material and social resources, and challenge existing hierarchies and the authority of established elites.[3] In Africa, challenging established social hierarchies at the local level has typically represented an important goal of armed movements. Mike McGovern (2011, 55) suggests that in the forest zones of West Africa, intergenerational competition was an important element underscoring warfare and violence: "younger men often found that warfare was their best chance to jump ahead in the

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meaning in the original language; or that that language into which it is being translated does not have a precise counterpart for the concept conveyed by that word."

[3] Beyond civil wars per se, Christopher Cramer (2006, 216) argues that this is a characteristic of many historical examples of political and economic transformations. He writes that "the terms of accumulation and distribution of wealth and the institutions in which these terms are cast are contested. New classes are forming around changing activities and interests; old classes are gripping tight onto accustomed sources of wealth or survival."

elder-dominated (gerontocratic) hierarchy" (see also Chauveau and Richards 2008, 533). Similarly, Krijn Peters (2011, 88) suggests that the potential for "role reversal" between young people and their seniors in rural communities attracted recruits to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) during the course of Sierra Leone's civil war. Pierre Englebert (2009, 168) has made this point more generally, arguing that armed movements in Africa typically function as "vectors for the formation or replacement of regional elites". Marginalized groups use "rebellions to challenge the state and obtain recognition as a local counterpart or interlocutor, in competition with existing local authority".[4]

Despite these motivations for rebellion, there are reasons to expect both conflict *and* cooperation between strongmen engaged in violent conflict and pre-conflict elites. Despite their purported reformist agendas, armed movements in Africa have rarely enacted any meaningful change in the zones they occupy. As Pierre Englebert (2009, 48) has argued, armed movements in Africa "typically do not embark upon institutional innovation; they rarely implement any substantive political project in the region they control."[5] Instead, many African insurgents have relied on local elites as partners in territories under their control. This dependence stems partly from the minimal authority rebels have over issues related to local governance. In the absence of the state, managing conflicts at local levels represents an enduring challenge for the young people who comprise the bulk of Africa's rebels. In Guinea-Bissau's struggle for independence, for example, Chabal suggests "the support of the *homen grande* was indispensable" in establishing PAIGC (*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*) presence in rural villages, given "the fact that the PAIGC members were young and carried no natural or traditional authority, particularly in their regions of origin" (1983, 72). Reflecting on the post-conflict period after independence in Mozambique, Harry West makes a similar point regarding the relationship between age and resolution of conflicts over land in rural areas:

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[4] Ahram and King (2012, 172) argue that this is, in fact, a goal shared across many historical cases of 'warlordism': "the warlord seeks a privileged place within the existing legal system – wedging himself into a legal order provided by a recognized state or crafting his own (often arbitrary) code of behaviour that he claims represents the will of a superior political authority."

[5] Indeed, prominent instances of sustained insurgencies – in Southern Sudan, Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Northern Côte d'Ivoire, and Northern Uganda – support this point. They all stand in stark contrast to historical and contemporary cases of rebellion elsewhere in the developing world, where principled social and political intervention and change were advanced to a far greater extent (Tull 2003; Englebert 2009; Mampilly 2011; Reno 2011).

> …because people continued to cultivate land which they had obtained through *likola* networks [matrilineal descent group], village authorities [young and foreign to the region in which they worked] were in no position to resolve land conflicts as they rose. If they became involved at all, village presidents had to rely on expert witnesses to confirm or deny the validity of claims. In most cases, expert witnesses were none other than *venang'olo vene kaya* [village founders] of the disputants' *valikola* [rural settlements] (1998, 156).

Thandika Mkandawire (2002, 202) summarizes this challenge more generally: any African insurgency looking to expand the territory it controls is "likely to end up in some other area in which it enjoys neither traditional authority nor communal usufructuary rights to land."

Without political institutions tying them directly to the bulk of the rural population (such as revolutionary cells or village committees), armed movements have had to rely overwhelmingly on the support of rural elites to maintain political order in rebel-held zones. In the words of James Scott, pre-conflict hierarchies remain one of the few "graspable" social structures through which leaders of armed movements can govern rural populations (2009, 209). In the Eastern DRC, Tull writes "since the RCD (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*) does not dispose of any alternative local assets to extend its authority to the countryside , the chiefs are by default perceived as valuable instruments contributing to the establishment of a minimum of control over the rural areas" (2003, 438). During the Angolan civil war, "local communities were integrated into the UNITA system under the leadership of traditional authorities… [who] had both their economic reproduction and their positions of authority secured by their relations to the insurgents" (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005, 370). Even in rare cases where armed movements have been far more 'interventionist' or reformist, existing relations of authority have often proved highly resilient. Challenging the view that African liberation movements commonly achieved significant political and social changes within the 'liberated' areas under their control, Patrick Chabal writes "there is little ground to suggest that the experience of political mobilization and of war-time collaboration between villagers and party turned village committees into 'revolutionary cells'" (1984, 119). In the post-colonial era, the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni in Uganda reinforced the powerful Buganda notables, despite its professed commitment to equality and democratic decision making by civilians in the areas under its control. The potential for broad social change stemming from the introduction of elected

committees was limited by the fact that committee chairs were "mostly conservative landed notables" (Kasfir 2005, 287).

Herein lies the tension confronting many African armed movements. On the one hand, upsetting local relations of power and privilege guarded by elders at local levels represents an important motivation for both the leadership and rank-and-file. On the other, any changes resulting from these political challenges seriously threaten the principal means by which rebels establish political order in liberated zones. One way of making sense of this tension is that the leaders of these movements frequently 'talk' about these grievances in order to further social mobilization in rural areas, but have very little actual intent to follow through with these reformist commitments (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoefller 2004). This argument is plausible but cannot explain the varying relationships between rebels, local elites and larger populations that develop during episodes of violent conflict, such as those described in this dissertation.

It is possible to observe simultaneous conflict and cooperation between rebels and pre-conflict elites in violent conflict because multiple elites exist within local political arenas. This study explains divergent patterns of conflict and cooperation by focusing on variation in wartime coalition-building at local levels. Coalition formation and fragmentation feature prominently in explanations of political stability (Boone 1990; Allen 1995; Oyugi 2006; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009), economic development (Beall and Ngonyama 2009; Poteete 2009), and the consolidation of democracy (Brownlee 2007). In a number of cases of rebellion in Africa, scholars have examined the shifting coalitions underpinning these movements, as well as the causes and consequences of the dissolution of these coalitions (Tull 2003; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004; Debos 2008; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012). Much less has been said about the coalitional arrangements underpinning *local* political order in violent conflict.

In rural Africa, political power at local levels commonly rests on the continual renegotiation of alliances (Lonsdale 1981, 158; Bierschenk 1988; Lund 2001; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003). Continuity of political order and the apparent acceptance of political hierarchies by rural communities belie the frequent tensions within them and the shifting coalitions that sustain them over time. This study highlights how national-level conflict propels reconfigurations in the alliances underpinning political order in local arenas. Political changes at

the national level work to introduce new actors and resources and legitimize certain discursive claims or strategies, empowering some groups over others in the process (Lund 2006, 687; see also Bierschenk 1988; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003). By focusing on coalitional dynamics at the local level, this dissertation shows how very similar armed group strategies (in terms of levels of violence, the procurement of taxes, or the absence of institutional innovation) are themselves underwritten by coalitions that vary dramatically in terms of their breadth and subsequent stability. I argue that differences in coalition-building strategies explain the extent to which armed movements are able to establish political control in rebel-held zones.

'Everyday' Politics and Contested Authority in Rebellion: A Gap in the Literature

This dissertation explains variation in levels of contestation and control established by armed movements by focusing on the coalitions that emerge between rebel leaders and pre-conflict local elites in civil war. Existing research focusing on the relationship between civilians and armed movements ignores coalition building. It focuses on one of two things: (a) the conditions under which civilians will support armed movements in their struggle against the state and (b) the behaviour of armed movements and the strategies they employ to elicit political support from civilian populations. Studies that focus on civilians and rebel group behaviour offer some insights into variation in levels of control, but by themselves, they remain only partial explanations.

Rebellion and Civilian Support

Under what conditions will civilians support armed movements? Scholars have responded to this question in one of two ways. First, a well-established literature focuses on the objective conditions under which actors, largely peasants, support rebellion or participate in organized violence against states (Johnson 1964; Huntington 1968; Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Ranger 1985). Many early studies of violent mobilization advance structural explanations for decisions to organize violent opposition and participate in rebellion. At their core, structural explanations share an emphasis on how different social, political and economic changes wrought by 'modernization' (literacy, urbanization, participation in political life beyond the village, the development of rational or 'non-traditional' relations of authority, the transition to capitalism) work to upset pre-existing social relationships that maintained political stability and order. From

this perspective, these changes either directly produced the grievances that prompt heightened political mobilization (Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Ranger 1985) or put immense strains on the ability of newly established political systems to channel or manage social change in ways that preserve political order, rather than endanger it (Johnson 1966; Huntington 1968).

In contrast to the structural approaches, agency-based approaches focus on the choices and diverse survival strategies employed by civilians in violent contexts (Arjona 2008; Baines and Paddon 2012; Barter 2012). Civilians confront difficult choices, but choices nonetheless. Civilians can choose to stay or flee, support or join armed movements, or resist the authority of armed movements through a litany of direct or indirect means.

Both structural and agency-based approaches ignore why some actors or groups ally with armed movements while others chose to contest rebel authority. Structuralists overlook contestation between armed groups and civilians altogether. Perspectives emphasizing civilian choice treat contestation as one of an array of options available to civilian groups. However, as a fundamentally *social* relationship, relations of authority are ultimately formed through practice and hence are *always* contested (Lund 2006; Sikor and Lund 2009; Lake 2010; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Poteete and Ribot 2011). As Lake writes, political authority "is more or less biased toward the governor and toward different groups within society. As a result this contract is *continuously contested and open to renegotiation* by both the governor and governed; authority is not static but a dynamic, almost living thing" (Lake 2010, 589, emphasis mine). In contrast to structural and agency approaches, this project takes conflict over authority in rebel held zones as a *constant* feature of politics in rebel-held zones. In this way, the project answers Timothy Raeymaekers' call for academics and policy-makers to pay "more attention to the *struggle* these war-to-peace transitions generate over the right to govern in environments characterized by violent political competition" (Raeymaekers 2013, 613, emphasis mine). By focusing on rebel social control, this study moves beyond an exclusive focus on civilian support for armed movements and instead directs analytic attention to difference in the *mix* of support and resistance generated by rebel governance.

Armed Group Behaviour

A second literature examines the strategies that armed groups employ in order to win the support of civilian populations. From this perspective, the extent to which armed movements control the use of violence and provide public goods shapes the extent to which they mobilize support for their cause. These approaches emphasize variation in either the strategies groups adopt to control the organized use of violence (Reno 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Metelits 2010) or, alternatively, in how groups legitimize the use of violence (Wickham-Crowley 1992; Schlichte 2009; Mampilly 2011). Armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and, most recently, Syria, represent high profile cases of civil war where high levels of violence have been directed at civilian populations by armed movements. Nonetheless, indiscriminate violence can be a self-defeating strategy for armed movements because it "engenders discontent among civilian populations, creates higher levels of resistance to rebel advances, and damages the reputation of a rebel group both within the country and outside of it" (Weinstein 2007, 206, see also Kalyvas 2006, 141-145).[6] Overall, armed movements confront powerful incentives to minimize the levels of violence directed at civilian populations. Beyond simply managing the use of violence, armed movements can legitimize their actions through a variety of democratic, secessionist, nationalist or other ideological appeals to both domestic and international audiences (Schlichte 2009). The provision of public goods (educational, financial or health services) beyond security by armed movements in lieu of the state can also go far in bolstering support (Mampilly 2011). Studies that focus on armed group behaviour – either in terms of controlling violence, or the ways in which groups legitimize its use – emphasis rebel actions and strategies as the main factors influencing whether armed movements mobilize support. While they point to the array of factors that condition which strategy armed

[6] Similarly, Kalyvas argues that civilian collaboration is important because it is the only way by which armed movements can gain information about suspected government opponents. In this way, indiscriminate violence "is much less likely to achieve its aims in the midst of civil war, where the presence of a rival makes defection (of civilians) possible" (2006, 143). Mass violence directed against civilian populations can run at cross-purposes with the larger political aims of armed combatants because it can encourage others to support and join the opposing side. Overall, these approaches share the assumption that (a) controlling rebel violence is central to winning the support of unarmed groups and (b) that the extent to which armed groups gain civilian support explains the survival and military success of these movements.

movements can or will follow, these perspectives downplay other potential variables that influence the actual effectiveness of the mobilization strategies groups employ.

One problem associated with this tendency is behavioral approaches tend to emphasize and explain only group-wide aspects of rebel behavior. This is why patterns of behaviour are typically thought to be consistent spatially and over time. Weinstein makes this point explicitly in *Inside Rebellion*, suggesting that his theory predicts that:

> The character of violence will remain fairly constant across time and in different geographic regions of each conflict. That is, groups that kill indiscriminately, destroy villages, and loot property are likely to do so at the beginning of the conflict as well as at the end and will tend to do so in every region in which they operate (Weinstein 2007, 207-208).

The assumption that group behaviour is spatially and temporally consistent is a product of the analytic strategies of behavioural approaches. Research focusing on the behaviour of armed movements explain variation by pointing to different exogenous variables (the absence or presence of natural resources, conflict dynamics or differences in the exercise of state power) that shape rebel behaviour (in terms of whether armed movements choose to target civilian populations or provide public goods). These causal factors are thought to have important group-wide effects on the behaviour and overall character of armed movements. This tendency is problematic for two reasons. First, by focusing on different causal factors influencing rebel behavior and the group-wide character of armed movements, scholars have overlooked variations in interactions between civilians and rebels in different regions under the military control of the same group (Arouna 2010, 2014; Staniland 2012). Second, in concentrating on spatially consistent elements of rebel behavior, scholars have unnecessarily ignored other aspects of behavior to be explained. By shifting analytical attention to different localities under the control of the same armed movement, this study highlights coalition-building between rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites as a key feature of feature of rebel behavior. I follow Timothy Raeymaekers' (2013, 614) suggestion that "it might be worthwhile paying more attention to the clients of armed protection during wartime – rather than exclusively focusing on armed groups and their strategies of political and economic mobilization". Overall, in focusing on coalition-formation, this study significantly broadens aspects of rebel behavior to be explained *and* offers an explanation of

differences in patterns of rebel-civilian relations that vary across regions governed by the same armed group.

Coalitions are important because they influence how other aspects of rebel behaviour emphasized by existing scholarship (using violence, taxation, providing public goods) might 'reverberate' differently across diverse local contexts. Coalitions mediate whatever impact rebel strategies might have in terms of mobilizing support or prompting resistance from civilian populations under different circumstances. In focusing on coalitions, as well as those causal factors that influence coalitional choices, this study highlights how other aspects of rebel behavior can simultaneously promote or discourage mobilization. The case of the FN in Northern Côte d'Ivoire illustrates the limits of explanations of rebel-civilian relations that assume invariant effects of spatially consistent rebel behaviour. Under the FN, mass violence in the north was rare. In some cases, local commanders initiated a number of local development projects (see Chapter 5, Korhogo). Yet many FN members, particularly its leadership, developed significant economic stakes in the continuation of the political crisis. Many in the north complained about the burden of the extensive system of checkpoints and taxes the FN set up to finance the rebellion. Theoretically, should scholars expect high or low levels of support under these circumstances? In the case of the FN, the similar – albeit 'mixed' – behaviour of the rebellion ultimately prompted very different reactions from local communities. In Bouna, Lobi youth organized a revolt against the FN and many of the town's residents deeply resented the presence of the rebels up until the end of the conflict. In Ouangolodougou, local traders supported rebels in efforts to defend their claims to authority over taxation. In Korhogo, conflict was primarily factional. Some elite factions support the rebels while others opposed them. Arguments emphasizing group wide factors shaping group behaviour cannot explain this variation. Reactions to how rebels rule and how coalitions and pre-existing political configurations structure these reactions figure prominently in the different kinds of rebel-civilian relations described in this study. In emphasizing coalitions as an important aspect of rebel strategy, this study focuses on the outcomes of other, group-wide aspects of rebel behavior (using violence, taxation, providing public goods) across diverse local contexts.

Studies that privilege military control in explanations of rebel-civilian relations are the exception to this critique; they do not assume spatial and temporal invariance. For example,

Kalyvas (2006) argues that shifts in military control over people and territory during the course of the conflict influences levels of support armed groups receive. Broad support from civilian populations is more likely when the movements have absolute or uncontested territorial control because in these instances, civilians do not have the choice to support rebel opponents (particularly government forces). Civilians support dominant military groups to ensure their survival. However, Kalyvas does not assume levels of military control to be fixed. It can change over time and across space. In contrast to levels of military control, the absence or presence of natural resources (Weinstein 2007) or pre-conflict ties to the state (Reno 2005, 2007 and Mampilly 2011) are typically thought to have constant, group-wide effects on the overall character of armed movements. This dissertation acknowledges levels of military control as potentially significant explanatory factor, but argues that it is not the only factor influencing the levels of support shown to armed groups. My approach shows how these relationships can vary dramatically in a host of imaginable ways across territories where levels of military control remain constant. To highlight spatial variation in the relationship between armed movements and civilian populations, this study treats military control as "a key background condition" that is held constant across each of the three cases examined (Staniland 2012, 247). Groups can draw on broad or narrow support from the communities they govern. They can monopolize authority over different issue areas or they can share authority with an array of different actors (Arjona 2008). Overall, this dissertation agrees with Staniland (2012, 247) that armed conflicts represent "heterogeneous landscapes of authority," rather than uniformity, even where levels of military control remain constant.

My approach complements existing research focusing on civilian support and rebel behaviour. Scholarship focusing on civilians in armed conflict either ignores civilian contestation or treats contestation as part of a set of potential strategic choices available to unarmed groups. In focusing on questions surrounding authority, I view contestation as a constant feature of relationships between armed movements and civilian populations. The *degree* of contestation varies across cases. By focusing on the coalitions that form between pre-conflict elites and armed movements, this project highlights how very similar mobilizing or legitimizing strategies can result in varying levels of control and contestation. In explaining these differences, this study

draws attention to the significance of local-level coalition building in civil war. I explain my framework in greater detail below.

Coalitions and Conflict in Rebellion: The Argument

This study explains differences in the patterns of conflict and cooperation between rebel leaders and elites at local levels. Specifically, it explains two related aspects of these relationships: the coalitions that form between rebel leaders and local elites and the level of political control armed movements establish.

My explanation proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that the extent to which local elites function as *brokers* with the state during the pre-conflict period influences the alliances formed between rebels and segments of local elite groups. Local political arenas are comprised of multiple elites. Elites that function as brokers between local communities and the state are less likely to become the political partners of armed movements (and are more likely to be in opposition to the rebellion at local levels). Second, I argue that relative levels of social hierarchy within broker groups (local opponents of rebels) and rebel ally groups influences rebel control. I express differences in relative levels of social hierarchy as competing 'hierarchical configurations'. Decisions surrounding coalition-building shape the kinds of conflicts that emerge in civil war because authority is distributed differently between local elites within local communities. Whether elites are organized more or less hierarchically influences the political clout these actors wield. Hierarchical configuration shapes the level of control exercised by rebels by shaping the relative capacity of their allies at local levels to mobilize support. In sum, brokerage conditions influence the alliances that emerge between armed movements and segments of the local elite, while hierarchical configurations influence the levels of contestation and the degree of political control established by rebels as a result of coalition-building.

Theoretically, my explanation builds on existing approaches that emphasize variation in the political authority of local elites. In *Political Topographies of the African State*, Catherine Boone (2003) argues that differences in the authority enjoyed by local-level elites shaped the institution-building strategies employed by African states during the early post-colonial period. Boone explains the institutional choices of African states in terms of two variables that influence the political capacity of rural elites: the absence or presence of social hierarchy and the capacity of rural elites to mobilize resources independently of the central state. These two variables

influence the institutional choices of states and how states share power with local elites. Outcomes are described through four ideal type 'institutional choice' scenarios. For Boone, *power-sharing* refers to situations where the state devolves decision-making (largely over land and other material resources) to local elites. Power-sharing occurs when local hierarchies are present and elites depend on resources derived from their relationship with the state. *Usurpation* refers to cases where states seek to attack and undercut the social authority of local elites. States attempt usurpation when hierarchies are present, but elites have access to resources independent of their relationship with the state. *Administrative occupation* refers to instances where national-level actors rule directly, through a set of political actors flown in from the capital or other localities. Administrative occupation occurs in cash-crop producing zones where local hierarchies are non-existent and elites depend on resources derived from their relationship with the state. Finally, *non-incorporation* describes instances where national-level leaders do not seek to incorporate localities into the administrative structure of the state. These choices are predicted in zones that lack both extensive cash-crop agriculture and local social hierarchy.

My approach, like that of Boone, privileges differences in the local-level authority of elites as an important causal variable. It breaks with Boone, however, in three significant ways. First, it downplays questions probing the *causes* of the different kinds of state-society relationships. Rather, this study emphasizes the effects of these differences on the ability of rebel leaders to build coalitions in rural areas. The analytical strategy employed in this dissertation more closely resembles Beck's (2008) study of the role of brokers in shaping patterns of political competition and participation in Senegal. Beck argues that the extent to which brokers enjoy social authority and autonomy determines how clientelist relations, linking capital cities to peripheral areas, shape levels of political competition and participation. Like Beck, I emphasize the mediating influence of local elites – given their varying levels of authority and autonomy from national-level actors – rather than focusing explicitly on historical processes and factors that explain how these differences emerge.

Second, my approach views local arenas as comprised of multiple sets of elites. As Olivier de Sardan (2005, 177) puts it, "rarely ever," are local arenas defined by the "exclusive

domination by one single power."[7] In the case studies that follow, FN commanders chose to ally with some segments of the local elite while simultaneously challenging others. Rebels confront constrained choices regarding potential allies in different contexts. The ways that power was distributed among different elites and across overlapping "fields of public authority" (Lund 2001, 53) influenced decisions to ally with an actor or set of actors and oppose others. Boone characterizes authority relationships in local communities as being hierarchical or decentralized. Obviously, we should expect to find multiple actors exercising authority in decentralized contexts. However, even in cases of centralized authority there can still be competing poles of power. An authority structure comprised of two competing factions could still be considered a relatively hierarchical system. Moreover, centralized and decentralized systems of authority can coexist within the same locality.

Third, the variables used in this study also differ from those developed by Boone. I evaluate: (1) the extent to which local elites function as brokers with the state during the pre-conflict period and (2) differences in hierarchical configurations. Each of these factors borrows from Boone, but is modified to fit my argument. I explain these differences below.

Brokerage Relations

This study argues that the extent to which pre-conflict elites function as brokers between local communities and the central state influences patterns of coalition-building during the conflict period. The political significance of brokers is widely recognized (Olivier de Sardan 2005; Beck 2008; McGovern 2011; Koter 2013a). Drawing on the work of the anthropologist Max Gluckman, Mike McGovern describes these kinds of actors as "intercalaries" who "do the work necessary to align the interests and strategies of high-level state actors and those of local actors, down to the level of the farmers in villages" (2011, 191). Linda Beck (2008, 2) shows how brokers fulfill important political functions in linking local arenas to broader national-level political networks. Brokering is challenging but important work for local elites. Their political

[7] Oliver de Sardan defines arenas as spaces where "heterogeneous strategic groups confront each other, driven by more or less compatible (material or symbolic) interests, the actors being endowed with a greater or lesser level of influence and power. But one also encounters centres of instituted local power: an emir, a district chiefs , a *sous-préfet*, an imam, the head of a fraternity, all have specific powers, linked to their functions and recognized as such" (2005, 186).

survival often depends on how well they fulfill this role. Elites at regional and local levels generally require the support of both their political bosses at the national level and their principal political constituencies within local communities. But the interests of these groups often run at direct cross-purposes. The challenges confronting different kinds of 'traditional' leaders under colonialism illustrate these tensions. For these actors, maintaining their position depended on their performance of certain functions for the colonial project, namely, mobilizing labour and collecting taxes from communities under their authority. Nonetheless, their collaboration with the colonial state commonly jeopardized their ability to function as legitimate representatives of local communities. Meeting the demands of either European administrators or local communities almost inevitably meant alienating the other group, thereby jeopardizing the political survival of this set of actors.[8] Similar sets of challenges exist for local elites in the contemporary period as well (see Migdal 2001, 88-92; Moore 1978).

I distinguish between two types of brokers: those based on state dependence and autonomous elites who chose to politically align themselves with the state. State dependence refers to the extent to which leaders rely on their relationships with the state for the reproduction of their local level authority. Elites who are highly dependent on the state have little choice but to act as brokers for it; otherwise, they risk losing the political and material support from their national level patrons on whom they depend. In other instances, elites choose to become brokers, even if their authority is derived autonomously from the state.

Dependence is heightened when access to resources rests on decisions made by national-level politicians. Will Reno (2005, 2007) highlights how national level leaders in Africa grant political control over markets to local elites as a strategy for sustaining ruling coalitions. Accumulation by local elites becomes almost entirely dependent on staying in the good graces of national-level politicians rather than the fostering and maintenance of broad political support within local communities. Elites have more autonomy from the state when they derive resources

[8] In this sense, colonial chiefs, as an arm of the colonial state, often represented a threat as well as an agent of resistance to European administrators for rural communities. While many used their position to accumulate wealth and further colonial ambitions, they also at times functioned as a 'resource' for social subordinates, shielding individuals from the arbitrary coercive power of the formal institutions of the colonial state (Schneider 2006, 99; see also Berman 1998, 329-330).

from sources beyond state patronage networks, such as local economic production, trade and/or informal taxation.

Resource dependence is reinforced by the degree to which the maintenance of local institutional orders depends on support from capital-based politicians. For example, Boone (2007a, 2013) refers to cases where the central state is the principal institution defining property rights and governing access to land as statist land regimes. When the state grants ownership or user rights to land to migrants or ethnic strangers, it directly challenges indigenous customary institutions for the allocation of land. Elites who benefit from these interventions (i.e. wealthy migrant farmers) depend heavily on the support of the state for the maintenance of private property rights in rural areas. In places like the cocoa-growing regions of Southwestern Côte d'Ivoire or the Rift Valley in Kenya, the security of migrant farmers remains entirely bound up with the political support they receive from national capitals in Abidjan and Nairobi. Conversely, autonomy is enhanced when rules governing different aspects of social life – such as the allocation of land and labor, marriage or taxation – operate independently of any intervention by the state.

How does the relative dependence of pre-conflict elites on the state shape wartime coalition-building? For Boone, relative dependence on the state shapes whether local elites position themselves as allies or opponents of their national level counterparts. In the context of post-colonial state-building, Boone argues (2003, 29, 2013) that, where dependence on the state is high (such as in those instances of statist land regimes described above), local elites side with those in power because they fear being challenged or even dispossessed in the event of a power transfer. This dynamic influences civil war processes as well. In contexts where the position of local elites is, for the most part, a product of the intervention of the state into rural areas, they are viewed as functionaries and allies of the state by leaders of armed movements. The interests of rebel leaders and the former beneficiaries of state interventions are likely to be fundamentally in conflict with each other in these scenarios. Local elites and armed groups are less likely to be at odds when local elites enjoy more autonomy from the state.

In Uganda for example, Buganda elites in the Luwero Triangle enjoyed high levels of autonomy from the state. Their authority was not a product of state interventions. Rather, it was the target of land reforms introduced by Amin and Obote in the 1970's and 80's (Apter 1995,

161-162; Hunt 2004, 176). During the Ugandan civil war, Yoweri Museveni and the NRA easily mobilized the support of Buganda notables. As one high ranking NRA member put it, Museveni drew on Buganda elite's existing rivalries with the state and promised that "he would remain loyal to the Buganda after the war, would restore the Buganda state, restore the kingdom and return the properties of Buganda" (quoted in Kasfir 2005, 283). Similarly, William Minter highlights the significance of relative levels of dependence in different regions under the control of RENAMO during Mozambique's civil war. Minter explains that, in Nampula province (Northern Mozambique), local chiefs were commonly sympathetic to the RENAMO fighters, given government attempts to undercut chiefly authority through state sponsored 'villagization'. As a result:

> The implicit contract between Renamo and the chiefs who invited Renamo to set up bases on their land was that Renamo would block government interference with their way of life and enable them to remain on their land. In return, the chiefs would serve as administrators for Renamo, taking the Renamo title of mambos and mobilizing the population to provide for food and collaborators to serve as police (1994, 208).

By contrast, in Gaza (Southern Mozambique), where villagization programs were far more advanced and traditional authority structures long ago dismantled, RENAMO found "less social space for penetration" (1994, 212). Overall, Gaza's elites enjoyed far less autonomy from the state than their counterparts in Nampula and as a result, were far more likely to support the state (and not the rebels) during the civil war. In sum, dependence eliminates some elites as potential local partners for armed movements.

Nonetheless, dependence on the state does not explain all of the alliance patterns observed in this study. Even where local elites enjoy some autonomy from the state, they may choose to align with those in power at the national level. Brokering relationships, in this sense, are not defined strictly in structural terms. Consider the case of Kassoum Coulibaly, who was one of if not *the* central rival to the FN in Korhogo during the conflict period (see Chapter 5). The legitimacy Kassoum enjoyed, as a grandson of Korhogo's founder, Gbon Coulibaly contributed to his elite status. Gbon was immensely popular because of his successful fight against the forced labor regime installed by the French during the colonial period (see Chapter 5). Since the period of Gbon's rule, the Coulibaly family represented the principal group through which the old

single-party, the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), mobilized support in the Korhogo region of Northern Côte d'Ivoire. Leading up to and during the conflict period, Kassoum was one of a number of Senoufo elites with familial ties to Gbon. Like other members of the Coulibaly family, Kassoum's authority was derived from social relationships formed independent of his relationship with the central state.

To some extent, Kassoum represented someone with whom the FN would want to ally. Why did the FN decide *not* to ally with Kassoum? Political choices to align with the pre-conflict state, despite the autonomy of his authority from the state, eliminated Kassoum as a potential ally for the FN. Leading up to the 1995 elections, Kassoum remained part of the PDCI rather than throwing his support behind the PDCI's main opponent in the north at this time, the RDR. The PDCI was seen to be supportive of the nativist policies espoused by the then Ivoirian President, Laurent Gbagbo. Kassoum's flight from Korhogo, after the beginning of the conflict, confirmed the FN's suspicions about his true loyalties. Later, Kassoum attempted to improve his relative standing within the Coulibaly hierarchy and become Korhogo's cantonal chief. Because of his earlier actions, many viewed his efforts as an attack on the authority of the faction supportive of the rebels led by Amadou Gon Coulibaly. Overall, choices to ally with different national-level parties leading up to the conflict shaped the alliance patterns that emerged after fighting began. Kassoum's decision to remain with the PDCI despite changes in the political environment leading up to conflict shaped the alliance patterns observed in Korhogo during the conflict.

Together, these two types of brokerage – based on either elite dependence or alignment by autonomous elites – influence the alliances that emerge between local leaders of armed movements and pre-conflict elites. Irrespective of the reasons for alignment with the central state, brokerage relations with the state affects the availability of local elites as potential political partners for leaders of armed movements. I conceptualize the brokerage variable dichotomously: either elites are brokers at the time civil war onset or they are not. Brokerage shapes the strategic decision made by rebels to ally with certain elites and not others, as well as the decisions made by local elites to side with armed groups or the state. Both types of brokers are unlikely to function as local allies of armed movements. Local leaders of armed movements view local elites as potential allies only when they were not brokers at the time of civil war onset. That brokerage relations shape the choice of allies is important because, as I explain in greater detail below,

authority is distributed in highly uneven ways within local communities. The brokerage roles of some elites can force rebels to ally with other elites who have limited political clout within local communities. This would be the case when brokers themselves exert high levels of political authority (over land, taxation etc.) *and* there are few other pre-conflict elites with comparable levels of political influence. In these instances, armed movements are forced to ally with actors who lack the authority of those elites aligned with the state. Variation in political clout stems from the social hierarchy of rebel allies relative to other local elites, which I refer to as hierarchical configurations. Below, I expand on my conceptualization of social hierarchy and hierarchical configurations.

Hierarchical Configuration

For Boone, social hierarchy refers to the degree to which authority and control over material resources is concentrated or dispersed within a locality. Social hierarchy is high when elites have authority over many people (moving from individual families to larger towns or urban areas) with respect to many issue areas (governing taxation, land, labor, or bride-wealth). Where such control is dispersed (amongst village chiefs rather than paramount chiefs, or small versus large landholders), social hierarchy is reduced. Authority is hierarchical when "it is broad in its functional scope, broad in geographic extent, and concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals" (Boone 2003, 27). Social hierarchy matters because it influences the bargaining position of rural elites vis-à-vis the central state. For Boone, the absence or presence of social hierarchy shapes the institutional choices states make in terms of governing rural areas.

This study shares Boone's basic understanding of social hierarchy with one important caveat. Boone ignores non-indigenous elites, including those elites implanted by the state into local communities, largely because she explains their very presence as a result of the absence of any indigenous social hierarchy in rural communities (see the description of *administrative occupation* above). Take the example of Southwestern Côte d'Ivoire (one of Boone's cases). Here, politicians in Abidjan pursued a strategy of administrative occupation largely because of the absence of social hierarchy and the overall impotence of local elites in the southwest. National-level politicians ignored customary rules governing land tenure. They channeled resources through state agents 'parachuted in' from Abidjan. Migrants from other parts of Côte

d'Ivoire and West Africa represented the central beneficiaries of the state's decision to rule the southwest 'directly' in this way, because it circumscribed the already limited power of local authorities to restrict access to land for migrant farmers. For Boone, the absence of any prior, effective structures of authority dictated the institution-building strategy followed by Abidjan. Nonetheless, local elites empowered by these state-building strategies – bureaucrats, wealthy migrant farmers - *did* have substantial pull in the southwest. They controlled resources, influenced who could gain access to land, and received the political support of a sizable political constituency (migrant farmers). Despite the status of these elites as strangers to this part of Côte d'Ivoire, some groups recognized their authority (albeit the breadth of support varied). Thus, while there *may* be differences between 'native' and 'non-native' elites, there is no obvious reason why non-indigenous elites would necessarily enjoy less authority than their indigenous counterparts. In short, outside of instances of what Boone calls *non-incorporation* (for which Boone does not provide a case), this study considers *all* the cases examined in *Political Topographies* as instances where social hierarchy is *both* present *and* absent because all the cases she describes are comprised of multiple sets of elites whose political authority varies dramatically. This alternative understanding of social hierarchy reflects larger differences in how elites are conceptualized in this study, compared to in *Political Topographies*. For Boone, social hierarchy describes the authority relationships present within specific localities, whereas I use social hierarchy to describe the authority of specific groups of elites within local communities.

Social hierarchies themselves are sustained in a variety of ways. Access to resources and economic differentiation (i.e. class formation) enhance the clout of elites. These factors influence the ability of patrons to distribute resources through patron-client relationships and create material dependencies that heighten political control of elites over subordinate groups. Access to material resources does not necessarily mean that group hierarchies are present. In West Africa, Dyula traders, often known as 'strangers' to local communities, have long controlled substantial resources through market networks but were often incapable of using these economic assets to establish durable political hierarchies (see Chapter 5). Social hierarchy also reflects the extent to which local elites are embedded in social relationships with members of the broader community. Elites are embedded within broader frameworks of community relations when they are members of groups such as churches, community organizations, farmers' cooperatives, or informal social

networks (Tsai 2007, 96). Local level social ties and networks can empower local elites by enhancing their social control and monitoring over other community members (Tilly 1964, 87; Hechter 2000, Ch.6). Hierarchies reflect the extent to which local elites exercise social control through the enforcement of different sets of social or political rules (Migdal 1988, 25, 2001, 67). In rural Africa, varying constellations of actors enforce rules covering a wide variety of issue areas, including local citizenship, property rights, taxation, marriage, bride-wealth and the labor power of young men (Isaacman 1990; Berry 1992, 2002; Boone 2003).

The ability of local elites to ensure some degree of social order represents one reason why armed movements choose to ally with local elites in the first place. Nonetheless, levels of social hierarchy vary within and across local communities. Some elites monopolize authority across a wide array of issue areas, while others possess little capacity to control and regulate the lives of other community members. Given that there can be multiple elites within a local community, levels of social hierarchy influence the political clout of *both* those elites with whom rebels choose to ally as well as those pre-conflict elites who functioned as brokers (and oppose rebellion). I describe differences in the relative levels of social hierarchy within groups as competing types of hierarchical configurations. Although differences in hierarchical configurations do not shape the choices of local partners, they shape the level of political control rebels are able to establish. Rebels sometimes establish political partnerships with elites with relatively limited authority given that alliances are determined mainly by the status of pre-conflict elites as brokers.

Local contexts vary according to whether some or all groups within a given locality are organized hierarchically. Where groups represented by brokers are organized hierarchically and others are not, rebels confront serious challenges in mobilizing support and establishing political control. In these cases, rebel elite allies lack authority comparable to their broker counterparts. As a result, brokers are far more capable of mobilizing resistance against the rebellion. Rebels are the targets of widespread resistance led by powerful elites with close ties to the state in the pre-conflict period (see the box in the upper right-hand corner in Figure 1.1). Conversely, when rebel allies are organized hierarchically and brokers are not, rebels can draw on the clout of their local partners to mobilize support for their wartime control over local communities. The outcome of the first scenario is reversed: rebels are able to mobilize a sizable portion of the elite and wider

local population against the state (see the box in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 1.1). In instances where broker *and* non-broker groups are organized hierarchically, contestation over authority should occur in the form of ongoing factional conflict, as competing sides use their relationship to the rebels or the state to gain advantage in these local struggles (see the box in the top left-hand corner of Figure 1.1). Finally, contexts that would fall in the bottom right-hand box of Figure 1.1 were omitted from this study. This box represents cases where there are no hierarchically organized groups. Local-level rebel-elite conflicts are presumed to be absent in these instances because there are no elites embedded in local communities for rebels to either confront or work with. The implications of omitting these scenarios will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion of this dissertation.

Social hierarchy of pre-conflict state brokers	**Social hierarchy of rebel allies (non-brokers)**	
	High	Low
High	*Moderate social control*. Indirect resistance against rebels. Ongoing factional conflict between pre-conflict elites	*Low social control*. Substantial resistance against rebels
Low	*High social control*. Limited or weak resistance against rebels.	*Absence of local elites.* Absence of indigenous elite and limited state presence.

Table 1.1: Levels of Social Control in Rebel Zones

To summarize, this dissertation explains patterns of conflict and cooperation between local level rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites. It explains the coalitions that emerge between rebel leaders and segments of the local elite, and the level of political control rebels are able to enact in particular localities. My central argument is that patterns of conflict and cooperation between rebels and pre-conflict elites are influenced by the (1) extent to which local elites function as brokers with the state during the pre-conflict period and (2) differences in hierarchical configurations. I characterize elites as brokers when they are politically and economically dependent on the state or when local elites choose to align with politicians in power at the national level. Together, these variables constitute a framework for understanding variation in the

patterns of political contestation observed in each of the three case studies examined in Part II of this dissertation.

Authority and the War to Peace Transition in Côte d'Ivoire

This study explains variation in levels of political control established by armed movements in local arenas during violent conflict. In all of the cases included in this study, local leaders of armed movements directly challenged the authority of pre-conflict elites. In doing so, rebels relied on the support of other local actors as means of buttressing their claims to authority. This illustrates the contested nature of authority relations highlighted earlier in this chapter. Authority relations are at their core fundamentally contested social relationships because the rules that comprise them almost always benefit some groups at the expense of others. This section briefly discusses a different set of ontological and methodological questions surrounding authority from those raised earlier in the chapter. Specifically, there may be a host of different reasons why subordinate groups might support relations of political inequality. In this study, civilians supportive of local FN leadership might have expressed support for any number of reasons including coercion, self-interest or legitimacy. Existing approaches in the literature on civil wars have focused overwhelmingly on coercion in explaining why civilians support armed movements. In focusing on questions of authority, rather than relationships defined strictly in terms of power or domination (where compliance is induced through coercion alone), I argue for a broader consideration of the motivations that compel compliance in violent conflict. At their core, authority relations represent an ongoing, competitive process of legitimization and de-legitimization led by actors occupying different positions within prevailing political hierarchies. Nonetheless, efforts at legitimization do not always elicit support solely because actors view these relationships as just or good. Claims to legitimacy may fall on deaf ears; or actors may decide to give support for reasons other than legitimacy (self-interest, coercion, etc.).

The analytical challenge is distinguishing from amongst the diversity of motivations (such as self-interest, coercion or legitimacy) as to why any actor might accept a relationship of political inequality. Rarely do different modes of compliance operate exclusively of one another. Weber's (1919/2009, 77) notion of the monopolization of the legitimate use of physical force captures the complex interrelationship between different modes of compliance. Actors coerced to follow rules may simultaneously recognize the right of the state to uphold and enforce them

through coercive means. Drawing sharp distinctions between reasons for compliance based on self-interest and legitimacy is equally challenging because rules can themselves constitute individual preferences. For constructivist scholars, "constitutive frameworks" (Ruggie 1998, 871) or socially defined "boundaries of the legitimate" (Williams 2004, 101) go far in defining or constituting individual 'self-interest'. Thus, is it a fruitful or chimerical exercise to untangle, conceptually and empirically, competing motivations for compliance?

Efforts at unbundling different reasons for compliance highlight a litany of potential reasons for accepting rules and the political hierarchies that underpin them. In the literature on civil wars, scholars have tended to privilege coercion to the expense of other potential reasons why actors might support political inequalities generated by armed conflict (see Kriger 1992; Kalyvas 2006). This tendency reflects the challenges of distinguishing different modes of compliance. For example, one's decision to join an armed movement, contribute food and other resources to soldiers, or provide information about enemy targets may reflect a spectrum of attitudes ranging from legitimacy to fear of reprisals (Kalyvas 2006, 91-104). Moreover, in civil war, perceived threats provide powerful incentives to conceal one's true preferences or motivations. For this reason, Stathis Kalyvas (2006) warns against focusing on popular support for rebellion as a cause of civil war. Nonetheless, to assume that physical threats and coercion are the sole motivation driving support for armed movements is no less problematic than simply assuming legitimacy (Hurd 1999, 392). Methodologically, how can researchers capture the spectrum of reasons for compliance in any given case?

Ian Hurd (1999, 391, see also Elster 2007, 63) suggests that one way of testing for legitimacy-driven compliance is by evaluating whether "other centers of power come to the aid of an institution under threat…If few come to the defence of a crumbling institution, we might reasonably infer that it possessed little legitimacy". This strategy offers a useful means of discerning motivations for wartime support other than coercion. Kalyvas (2006) argues that wartime support for armed movements more often reflects the threat of coercion than other potential reasons for lending support (e.g., self-interest, personal beliefs, legitimacy, etc.). According to this perspective, levels of support induced by coercion should *not* vary when armed movements monopolize military control over rebel-held zones because levels of rebel control is

viewed as the principal determinant of changes in civilian support.[9] Support shown to groups in the context of post-conflict transitions might result from a range of potential reasons beyond coercion because (a) the coercive power enjoyed by rebel leaders should, in principle, be ending in the near future and (b), as a result, the support received by armed movements during post-conflict transitions can vary. This study uses Hurd's method to evaluate authority in rebel-held zones by focusing on the politics of the post-conflict transition in Côte d'Ivoire. In 2007, the Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA) introduced changes designed specifically to undercut the political networks constructed by the rebels, including the authority of the local-level rebel leaders who had remained in place since the beginning of the conflict. The political transition initiated by the signing of the OPA in 2007 worked towards opening up new spaces for political contestation at local levels.

This claim is admittedly contentious because, on the surface, the signing of the OPA resulted in little actual meaningful political change in the regions controlled by the FN. The overall difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire speaks to the challenges in drawing clean-cut distinctions between contexts of 'war' and 'peace' that all researchers studying civil war confront. This is a particularly daunting problem in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. Despite the country's bifurcation – between the rebel-held north and the government-controlled south – for nearly ten years (2002-2011), Côte d'Ivoire's status as a case of 'civil war' is contestable. Compared to conflicts in the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire's de facto partition resulted in far less violence. Most Ivoirians themselves do not even refer to this period as one of civil war. Many describe it as being a condition of "neither war, nor peace" (*ni guerre, ni paix*) or as a social or political crisis (*une crise sociale, une crise politique*) rather than a full blown civil war. Scholars have made similar observations. Referring to the relative absence of violence during this period, Mike McGovern claims that "the Ivoirian civil war has not yet happened" (2011, 3). This ambiguity is reinforced by the fact that the uninterrupted control of the north by the FN between 2002 and 2011 was punctuated by what would prove to be a series of failed peace agreements, beginning in 2003.

[9] This is in contrast to instances where territorial control is incomplete and contested by rebel and government military forces.

Finally, the fact that President Laurent Gbagbo was forcibly removed from power in 2011 suggests that the OPA did little to transition the country from 'war' to 'peace'.

Given the lack of an objective break, my decision to privilege this moment requires some justification. I argue that what distinguished the period following the signing of the OPA was the way in which political elites began to speak about 'peace'. Thus, rather than drawing these distinctions myself, this dissertation takes seriously the viewpoints of the actors engaged in the collective projects of making peace or war. The OPA represented the last and most concerted effort to peaceably resolve the conflict. Many observers note the uniqueness of the OPA compared to earlier political efforts aimed at ending the impasse (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2007; Bah 2010; Mitchell 2012). What were the larger political effects of the OPA? To answer this question, I draw from theoretical approaches that highlight the effects on legitimacy of alternative discursive environments (Gamsen and Meyer 1996; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Schmidt 2008). Changes in prevailing discursive environments, or simply how actors talk about politics, cast new light on the legitimacy of the existing political order. They heighten or lower the costs of political action by influencing the legitimacy of perceived political choices and/or outcomes. As I explain in more detail in the next chapter, although the OPA did very little to reverse the political changes initiated by the conflict (for example, undercutting the authority of the FN through administrative reunification), it did change the ways in which elites on either side of the conflict began to speak about being 'at peace'. In this way, collective understandings about being 'at peace' created openings for actors at the local level by facilitating claims of authority that could not credibly be made prior to the signing of the OPA. This broader discursive shift goes far in explaining the *timing* of the cross-case variation in the levels of support and the breadth of coalitions underpinning local-level authority that this dissertation seeks to explain.

This dissertation examines the wave of political contention that followed the OPA in three towns in Northern Côte d'Ivoire: Bouna, Ouangolodougou and Korhogo. To evaluate support for rebel leaders in these three towns, I examine two interrelated processes linked to the 'post-conflict' transition precipitated by the OPA in Côte d'Ivoire: (a) the emergence of relationships between rebel commanders tied to the FN and other local-level elites and (b) conflicts over who has authority over local-level taxation. The formation of diverse relationships between different sets of established northern elites and the FN's zone commanders characterized the post-OPA

time period. On one hand, the arrival of the FN's political leadership represented a credible political threat to many established northern elites. Many FN local zone commanders established control over substantial material resources as a result of the rebellion. By the terminal stages of the conflict, many had already begun to assume prominent political positions as local administrators and party representatives, or at the national level within the new integrated armed forces. Despite the threat FN zone commanders seemed to pose, different kinds of relationships between these actors and pre-conflict elites emerged. In some cases, the FN's local leadership garnered substantial support from local elites. In others, these relationships were far more antagonistic. In most localities, both kinds of relationships were present. During the conflict period, local elites could use relationships formed with the rebels to gain advantage over their political opponents within local political arenas. Relationships formed during the conflict period between the FN's local leadership and the local pre-conflict elite continued into the post-conflict period after the signing of the OPA in 2007. Overall, the breadth of the elite coalitions that FN commanders built reflected variation in the extent to which FN commanders were able draw support for their wartime positions of authority.

Authority over taxation became a hotly contested issue between the FN's local leadership and pre-conflict elites across Northern Côte d'Ivoire in the wake of the OPA. Government initiated reforms aimed to put an end to the political and fiscal powers of the administrative *Com'zones* installed by the rebels and reassert the authority of the central state. Efforts to reinstall state functionaries across the north after 2007 heightened political struggles between the rebels and other actors over who should control taxation in the post-conflict period. Support for rebel control over local level taxation varied considerably. In response to local opposition, some former FN administrators conceded authority over taxation to other institutions and political actors. In other places, they retained it, and in some cases taxation was a far less significant political issue.

Moving Forward: Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds in three broad parts. Part I (includes this chapter, as well as Chapters 2 and 3) situates the dissertation theoretically, methodologically and historically. Part II presents the case material. Part III presents the conclusions and central findings of this study.

Chapter 2 provides a historical background to the Ivoirian conflict and is comprised of three sections. Section 1 outlines a concise macro-level political history of Côte d'Ivoire and provides an overview of the politics of the northern rebellion more specifically. Section 2 examines the the Ivoirian peace process leading up to the signing of Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA). This section argues that the OPA enflamed factional conflicts between the political and military wings of the FN. Given their control over taxation and commodity markets in the north, many of the FN's zone commanders had a strong incentive to hold up the process of administrative reunification, which was one of the central political aims of the OPA. This is an important reason why the OPA brought only limited political change in the northern zones under the control of the rebels. Section 3 elaborates my argument that the signing of the OPA in 2007 had significant effects on political conflicts at the local level in communities controlled by the FN. Others have noted that the 'direct dialogue' with the leader of the FN, Guillaume Soro, initiated by Gbagbo in the discussions leading up the signing of the OPA distinguished this peace process from its predecessors (Yabi and Goodwin 2009; Bah 2010; Mitchell 2012). I argue that the ways in which national-level elites began to speak about peace opened up the political space required for the expression of the different grievances and conflicts under scrutiny in the case chapters. Chapter 3 explains the research design, methodologies and data collection strategies.

Part II presents the principal empirical content of the dissertation. To support my theoretical argument, this study focuses on empirical cases of rebel administration in three sub-national regions in Northern Côte d'Ivoire. Bouna (Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire), Korhogo (the largest city in the north, Central-Northern Côte d'Ivoire) and Ouangolodougou (Central-Northern Côte d'Ivoire, on the border with Burkina Faso and Mali) all fell under the control of the FN after the beginning of the conflict in September 2002. The first part of each chapter examines the historical processes shaping the authority of pre-conflict elites. To support my central argument, the second half of each chapter details (a) the kinds of relationships that emerged between local FN commanders and other, pre-conflict elites, as well as (b) how these coalitions informed debates over local-level authority.

Chapter 4 examines the case of Bouna in Zanzan province, in Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire. Bouna's local politics were shaped by significant demographic, economic and political changes stemming from the pre-colonial military defeat of the Koulongo kingdom based in Bouna by the

great West African empire builder, Samory Touré. By the beginning of the civil war, Lobi migrants from Burkina Faso comprised approximately 80% of the population in the rural areas around Bouna, controlled the majority of the land and had become the dominant group economically. Wealthy Lobi lineage heads also became the principal representatives of the old single-party, the PDCI, in Bouna. The local authority of the emergent Lobi political class was reinforced by their relations to the old single party. These political and economic changes increasingly strained the relationship between the native Koulongo and Lobi migrants. After the beginning of the conflict in September 2002 and the FN's subsequent control over Bouna, the local FN administration quickly began to regard the Lobi with some suspicion. Open hostility emerged between the zone commander in Bouna, Morou Ouattara, and the long-time PDCI politician in Bouna, Palé Dimaté. Additionally, many Lobi felt that the native Koulongo were using their newly established ties to the FN to check the imbalance in economic and political power that had been growing between these groups. These tensions led to violent clashes over local-level taxation between Bouna's zone commander, Morou Ouattara, and a number of Lobi youth in October 2007, described earlier in this introduction. Bouna represents a case of *low social control* because state brokers (the Lobi) were organized hierarchically relative to the FN's allies (the Koulongo).

Chapter 5 examines the case of the largest city in the north, Korhogo. Unlike in Bouna, the FN confronted a set of elites, the Coulibaly family, whose authority was drawn from their authority over Senoufo peoples in Korhogo, *as well as* their recognition as community leaders from the state. During the post-colonial period, political conflict in Korhogo was organized around competing Coulibaly family factions. Competing elites struggled to become the central broker of the central state and ally of national-level elites based in Abidjan. Factional competition continued unabated into the conflict period. During the civil war, the key conflict was not between the rebels and local groups, or even between the FN and the state, but between elites jockeying for position within the Coulibaly family hierarchy. Competing members of the Coulibaly family allied themselves with different sides of the armed conflict. Factional struggles within the Coulibaly family intensified after the death of Korhogo's cantonal chief, Drissa Coulibaly in 2008. Kassoum Coulibaly's (discussed above) decision to proclaim himself as the next cantonal chief represented a direct attack on the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family

(from which the FN drew much of their support). With the backing of the conservative faction, the FN's zone commander in Korhogo, Fofié Martin, approached Kassoum to convince him to withdraw his challenge. Korhogo represents a case of *moderate social control* because the rebels confronted *and* drew support from elites enmeshed in existing social hierarchies.

Finally, Chapter 6 explores the case of Ouangolodougou (commonly referred to as simply 'Ouangolo'), a small town on Côte d'Ivoire's border with Mali and Burkina Faso. In Ouangolo, the FN confronted an actor who drew on his position as the head of a regional network of traders. Issaka Sawadogo (known by most in Ouangolo as 'Potcho') was the president of a regional trading network that regulated and promoted national and regional trade in livestock. Despite Sawadogo's prominence in Ouangolo, he was often at odds with national-level politicians based in Abidjan. Sawadogo became the chief intermediary between traders based in Ouangolodougou and the FN. He played a central role in fixing tax rates and prices for livestock to be shipped from Mali and Burkina Faso through Ouangolodougou and across the north-south division of the country towards Abidjan. Yet, the political clout Sawadogo enjoyed as an intermediary between the rebels and Ouangolo's community of traders was continually under threat from the state as a result of his own status as a foreigner. As a result, the advantages of the conflict for many of these traders (lower tax rates, fewer hassles regarding citizenship) meant that there was some resistance to the reinstallation of state powers, particularly those over taxation. Thus, in 2008, when the mayor of Ouangolodougou attempted to reassert control over local taxation, traders supported the FN's counterclaims that that these powers should remain under their control. Ultimately (and in stark contrast with Bouna), the FN drew much more support in Ouangolodougou from the most powerful actors in the city. Ouangolo represents a case of *high social control* because rebels allied with a hierarchically organized community of traders whose elites did not function as brokers in the pre-conflict period and there were no hierarchically organized brokers to challenge them.

Part III of this dissertation is comprised of the concluding chapter. It restates the principal argument advanced in this dissertation and summarizes its main findings. It examines what might be the potential limitations of this approach. Finally, it offers some final thoughts regarding the larger theoretical and policy implications of this study.

Chapter 2. Côte d'Ivoire's Conflict in Historical Perspective

Côte d'Ivoire's almost ten year long political crisis (2002-2011) provides the national-level context to the local-level narratives detailed in the case-study section of this dissertation. Côte d'Ivoire was once a model for political stability and economic development in West Africa. However, years of growing political instability followed the death of the country's long-time President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, in 1993. The country was split in two after a failed coup d'état in 2002 that left the northern half of the country under control of a rebel movement and the south under the control of the government, then led by Laurent Gbagbo. The first part of this chapter reviews the events leading up to the 2002 civil war and examines the principal rebel group involved in the 2002 uprising, the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN). It details the social origins of the leadership of the movement as well as the organizational structures developed by the FN to govern civilian populations in the north and control recruits.

The second and third sections of this chapter makes two distinct claims related to the Ivoirian peace process and the larger argument advanced in this dissertation. The second section argues that the Ivoirian peace process, leading up to the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA) in 2007, significantly heightened factional conflicts between the political and military wings of the FN. While the signing of the OPA and the peace process more generally advanced the interests of the 'political' or 'administrative' side of the FN, it simultaneously threatened the control over taxation and different commodity markets established by many on the military side of the movement, specifically the FN's zone commanders (*commandants des zones*). Thus, FN zone commanders had strong incentives to slow down or block efforts at reinstalling

the state beginning after 2007. Not surprisingly, the signing of the OPA resulted in few tangible changes to how the north was governed after 2007. Most zone commanders did not see their political and economic powers curtailed in any meaningful way. The third part of this chapter also suggests that, while the national-level peace process did not result in any substantial changes on the ground (in terms of restricting the FN's control over the north), the discourse surrounding 'peace' that accompanied the signing of the OPA created opportunities for contestation over local-level authority. Changes in the ways national-level elites spoke about peace challenged the legitimacy of the political order established by the FN in the north. The tentative outcomes of some of these debates are discussed in the case study section.

The Ivoirian Crisis in Historical Perspective

Côte d'Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960. Over the next two decades, the 'Ivoirian miracle' became a well known African success story characterized by relative economic growth and political stability. The country's post-colonial achievements were in large part a product of the leadership of Côte d'Ivoire's long reigning President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993). Houphouët-Boigny was an ethnic Baoulé and former medical doctor and big cocoa planter before he gained fame as the leader of the *Syndicat Agricole Africaine* (SAA)/*Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) and the movement against the French imposed forced labour regime during the late colonial period.

Despite his early opposition to colonial rule and his role as the widely recognized leader of the nationalist movement in Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny's reign as President was reinforced by his enduring close relationship with French political and economic interests. By the late colonial period, the French state had created strong ties to the emergent metropolitan economy in Côte d'Ivoire by ensuring privileged access to French capital markets for Ivoirian firms, establishing guaranteed purchasing prices for Ivorian commodities, and integrating Côte d'Ivoire into the Franc monetary zone. These policies all functioned to incorporate the Ivorian

economy into the global (or French) market (Campbell 1985, 276-278). Houphouët-Boigny reinforced these ties during the post-colonial period (Campbell 1985, 278-286).[10]

Houphouët-Boigny developed the economy of post-colonial Côte d'Ivoire through an 'open-door' policy towards migration to the cocoa growing regions in the southwest. Migration to this part of Côte d'Ivoire began in earnest after the abolition of forced labour in 1946. Leading up to independence, smallholders (less than 5 hectares of land) represented approximately 75% of all cocoa farmers in Côte d'Ivoire (Zolberg 1964, 67; Campbell 1985, 274). The majority of these were migrants from either the centre or northern parts of the country (Chappell 1989, 681-684). Migrant smallholders ultimately became a key political constituency of the SAA/PDCI (Zolberg 1964, 67). The reciprocal relationship between migrant farmers and the PDCI continued into the post-colonial period. Houphouët-Boigny welcomed migrants from surrounding African countries, particularly Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. In famously stating that "the land belongs to the one who cultivates it" (*la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur*) Houphouët-Boigny directly challenged customary/community level authority over land in the cocoa growing regions of the southwest, opening it up to cultivation by ethnic 'strangers' (Ivoirian or otherwise). Supporting migration in the cocoa regions worked as a political strategy for Houphouët-Boigny for a number of reasons. Granting migrants access to land garnered the PDCI unwavering political support from immigrant communities as long as the positions of ethnic minorities in southern communities remained dependent on the support of the party to cultivate cocoa in the southwest. As Boone (2003, 209) argues, irrespective of the wealth accumulated by migrant planters and traders in the Ivorian south, their 'foreign' status in many southern communities ensured that this wealth did not translate into the development of any local political base.

Groups indigenous to the southwest welcomed ongoing migration as long as the economy was growing, education was accessible and government jobs remained plentiful. By 1990, however, Côte d'Ivoire faced a dire economic crisis: reduced global commodity prices, over-borrowing from international lenders and an overall decline in commodity production culminated

[10] Zolberg wrote that, in acknowledging the "major dislocations and readjustments" that the Ivorian economy would require if "left to its own devices," Houphouet-Boigny actively sought the further integration of the two economies. "If this were slavery" Zolberg argued, "then he was willing to remain in bondage all his life" (1964, 235-236).

in the reluctant acceptance of an IMF loan that carried the usual demands for structural adjustment. The Ivoirian government was forced to radically restructure the public sector: wages were cut by up to 40 per cent; some parastatals were privatized and sold off; many higher level bureaucrats deemed expendable by Houphouet-Boigny were sacked. The overall effect was "catastrophic" (Crook 1990, 666) because these reforms undercut the capacity of the old single party to mollify disaffected elites and groups through their integration into the state apparatus (Boone 2003, 205). The old methods of social control that Houphouet-Boigny relied upon to maintain political order soon became untenable given the growing fiscal crisis of the state (Woods 1998, 218-220; see also Crook 1989, 215).

The shrinking pool of resources the PDCI had at its disposal to 'buy off' the support of different social groups revealed cleavages within the ruling coalition that had henceforth been carefully managed. Pressure from the international community to hold multiparty elections also contributed to the fragmentation of Houphouet-Boigny's political base.

The PDCI handily won the 1990 presidential elections, receiving 81.7 per cent of the vote. Rather than pacifying growing tensions within the country, this victory exacerbated them. During this round of elections, the primary opposition to the PDCI, the *Front Populaire Ivoirian* (FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo, set itself up as the defender of the rights of 'indigenous' Ivoirians. The FPI attacked the PDCI for favouring its principal ethnic support base – the Baoulé – at the expense of other groups in the country and for using votes from non-Ivoirians to steal the 1990 election (Fauré 1993, 326; Crook 1997, 222; Woods 2003, 649). Divisions also emerged within the ruling party itself. Leading up to the 1990 elections, Houphouët-Boigny's Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, began to gain some support as the figurehead of the 'reformist' faction within the PDCI (including bureaucrats, younger members of the party). Reforms proposed by Ouattara threatened to dismantle the PDCI patronage machine and attack the interests of the old guard within the party, led by Houphouet-Boigny's constitutionally appointed presidential heir and fellow Baoulé, Henri Konan Bedié.

These debates intensified after the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December of 1993, when Bedié assumed the Presidency. Soon after, a number of former PDCI members supportive of Ouattara, led by Djeny Kobina formed a new opposition party, the *Rassemblement des républicains* (RDR). The party's loyalty to Ouattara represented an immediate threat to Bedié and

the PDCI. Even though he had accepted a post with the IMF in early 1994, Ouattara and the RDR were viewed as capable of mobilizing 'northerners' – based in the south as well as the north – against the old single party.[11] In response to the emergence of the RDR, Bedié took decisive steps to block this challenge and prevent Ouattara from competing against him. Bedié began to promote a highly exclusive form of Ivoirian nationalism labelled *ivoirité*. This represented a complete reversal of the political strategies pursued by the PDCI under Houphouët-Boigny. Specifically, *ivoirité* called for the exclusion of 'foreigners' from the electoral process and required that political candidates reside in Côte d'Ivoire and have parents who are both 'native' Ivorians. These restrictions constituted deliberate and poorly veiled attacks on Ouattara, whose origins subsequently became the subject of vigorous debate.[12]

Bedié complemented this narrowing of Ivorian citizenship with other political measures targeting what he viewed to be his 'foreign' opponents. He purged the civil service of suspected Ouattara loyalists. Unable to 'buy out' potential rivals to his government as Houphouët-Boigny had done, Bedié increasingly relied upon state security forces to deal with the increasing number of opponents to his rule. However, these actions, coupled with the increasing international dissatisfaction with his regime, left Bedié with little support (Toungara 2001, 67-68; Bassett 2004, 39; Akindés 2004, 20). On December 24th, 1999, Bedié was ousted in bloodless coup led by Gen. Robert Guëi.

Gen. Guëi came to power with the stated intent of reforming Ivorian political life. He promised to "sweep the house clean" and return to the barracks after overseeing democratic elections and establishing Côte d'Ivoire's next civilian government (quoted in Kohler 2003, 20). Initially, Guëi seemed to be living up to his word. He made overtures to national reconciliation by restoring the citizenship of Alassane Ouattara and reaffirming the rights of immigrant

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[11] It should be stated that the RDR, at the time of its foundation, was not necessarily a 'northern' party. As Crook writes, "if the original RDR faction is examined in detail, it was not in fact an exclusively northern party and did not have a sectarian or regionalist message" (1997, 226). Djeny Kobina himself was from the southeast. And of the nine original Deputies convinced to quit the PDCI, only five were from the north (Crook 1997, 226).

[12] Numerous elements of Ouattara's past have been invoked in this debate, primarily: whether his father was born in northern Côte d'Ivoire or Burkina Faso, his past use of a Burkinabé passport, his acceptance of a Burkinabé scholarship to study in the United States, and, finally, his long absence from the Ivorian political stage as a result of his occupational commitments to the IMF have been oft cited as evidence as his non-Ivoirian status. For a summary of this debate see "Ouattara is an Ivorian" *West Africa*, 15th- 21st July 2002 and "Ouattara: end of the road?" *West Africa*, 20th- 26th November 2000.

populations throughout the country. Guëi also followed through on his promise of a democratic transition to civilian rule by scheduling presidential elections for October 2000. However, Guëi's behaviour quickly began to resemble the actions of the civilian politicians he had earlier criticized. After expressing interest in staying in power and running in the 2000 elections, Guëi appropriated the nationalist discourse used by both Gbagbo in 1990 and Bedié in 1995. Guëi introduced Article 35 to the Ivoirian Constitution, which required that both parents be born in Côte d'Ivoire in order to stand as a candidate for President. This again, was seen a poorly veiled attack on Guëi's principal opponent in the 2000 elections, Alassane Ouattara. Additionally, Guëi purged many of the 2002 rebellion's future leaders from the military at this time for their suspected ties to Ouattara and the RDR and their suspected roles in a September 2000 plot against Guëi, the *complot de cheval blanc* (plot of the white horse). In the end, the Supreme Court disqualified both Ouattara and Bedié, preventing them from running in this round of presidential elections.[13]

Despite Guëi's efforts at controlling the opposition, Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI won the 2000 elections. In response, Guëi dissolved the National Electoral Commission, cancelled the elections, and proclaimed himself the winner. Afterwards, tens of thousands of protestors with allegiances to the various political parties participating or disqualified from the elections descended upon downtown Abidjan to protest Guëi's decision. After these protests underlined Guëi's growing illegitimacy, the military and police both abandoned him and Guëi promptly fled to Benin. On the 25th of October 2000, one day after Guëi's departure, the FPI candidate, Laurent Gbagbo, declared himself President of Côte d'Ivoire (ICG 2003, 7).

Many opposition parties immediately called for new elections in which all of the parties' candidates could run. In the wake of these calls, violence between supporters of the FPI and the RDR quickly escalated. In November 2000, a mass grave containing 57 bodies was discovered in the Abidjan neighbourhood of Yopougon. Most were identified as RDR supporters killed by pro-FPI armed groups. As a result, the RDR boycotted the December 2000 legislative elections. After a failed coup attempt against Gbagbo in January 2001, the *complot de Mercedes noir* (plot of the black Mercedes), the crackdown on northerners and perceived Ouattara supporters continued.

[13] In contrast to Ouattara, Bedié was barred from running as a result of charges of embezzlement and corruption.

During this time, many RDR supporters were assaulted, killed or arrested (ICG 2003, 7-8). Gbagbo's contested electoral victory and nearly two years of persecution of his northern opponents ultimately led to another attempted coup d'état and coordinated attack on three of Côte d'Ivoire's principal cities: Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo on September 19th 2002. Forces loyal to Gbagbo repelled the attacks on Abidjan. However, the rebels gained control over Bouaké and Korhogo. Instead of a coup d'état, Côte d'Ivoire found itself embroiled in a civil war for the first time in its history. The rebels assumed effective control over the northern half of the country while the government retained its position in the south.

Rebel Leadership and Recruitment in the Early Days of the Rebellion

The September 19, 2002 attempted-coup d'état-turned-rebellion was planned and organized by a group of Ivoirian exiles based largely in Burkina Faso. This group had grown substantially following successive political crackdowns against 'northerners' led first by the government of Guëi and then, after 2000, by Laurent Gbagbo. The precise date of the birth of the original movement, the *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) is unclear, although its founders began to circulate publications related to its inception in Abidjan as early as September 2001 (Soro 2005, 79).

The leadership of the movement – those responsible for organizing the original 2002 attacks and maintaining the rebellion over its nearly ten-year duration – came from diverse backgrounds. A large group consisted of former officers of the Ivoirian armed forces, many of whom had been purged from the military as a result of suspicions that they were organizing against the government. Some prominent future rebel leaders and future *commandants de zones* – such as Chérif Fofana, Chérif Ousmane, and Ouattara Issiaka ('Wattao') – were tortured or exiled during these anti-northern purges. Other prominent former military personnel who participated in the planning and execution of the 2002 coup attempt included Tuo Fozié, Massamba Koné, as well as the future chief of staff of the rebellion's armed forces FAFN (*Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles*), Soumaila Bakayoko. The widely acknowledged mastermind of the rebellion in Burkina Faso was the former head of the Presidential Guard, Ibrahim Coulibaly (or 'IB') (see ICG 2003,10; Balint-Kurti 2007, 12-14; Boutellis 2011, 4). Former elements of the Ivoirian military were also heavily involved in leading two movements that formed in western Côte

d'Ivoire and joined the fighting later in November 2002: the *Mouvement pour la justice et la paix* (MJP) and the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirian du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO). MPIGO was led by the former Guëi aide, N'dri N'guessan (more commonly known as 'Felix Doh'). The MJP was organized by Adama Coulibaly, a former member of the armed forces accused of plotting against Guëi during the *complot de cheval blanc* (Balint-Kurti 2007, 16).

Beyond former members of the Ivoirian military, two other groups assumed leading roles in the organization of the MPCI. First, much of the MPCI's leadership consisted of former university student leaders involved in campus politics during the 1990s. During this time, the principal organization involved in the Ivoirian student movement, FESCI (*Fédération Estudiantine Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire*), became increasingly factionalized along partisan-cum-ethnic lines, which largely mirrored cleavages underpinning political competition at the national-level. By May 2000, openly 'dissident' (aligned with the RDR) and 'loyalist' (tied to the ruling Guëi's junta/FPI) factions of FESCI emerged on university campuses in Abidjan and Bouaké.[14] Contests over the leadership of the organization resulted in a series of bloody clashes between these groups on the streets and on university campuses (commonly referred to as the 'war of machetes'). Many survivors on the 'dissident' side found themselves jailed or forced into exile. At this time, these former FESCI members faced difficult questions about whether to accept what they viewed as the 'exclusionary' political system Gbagbo was establishing or to fight against it militarily (interview, FN member, Korhogo, January 4, 2011). A number of former student leaders of this 'dissident' faction, including former FESCI president Guillaume Soro, featured as prominent actors in the 2002 rebellion. Many former FESCI members formed the administrative core of the FN during its decade-long control of the north (HRW 2008, 29-30).[15]

Finally, the rebellion initially also drew on the support of a number of Gbagbo's factional rivals, some with past ties to the ruling FPI. The most prominent was the former Gbagbo ally and FPI bigwig Louis Dacoury-Tabley. Although it was unclear how much of a role Dacoury-Tabley

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[14] Gbagbo himself was the former Director of the Institute of History, Art and African Archaeology at the University of Abidjan.

[15] Human Rights Watch suggests that there was an explicit connection between the 2002 rebellion and the student politics of the 1990s and 2000s for many on the government/loyalist side. They write that "in the eyes of many FESCI loyalists, the rebellion was but a continuation of the dissident insurgency they thought they had vanquished on the university campus some 18 months prior" (HRW 2008, 30).

played in planning the 2002 attacks, his close relationship to Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré made him a valuable ally for the MPCI in the early days of the rebellion (ICG 2003, 8, 10).

The MPCI began the rebellion with a membership of approximately 800 people. However, its membership quickly swelled after the movement consolidated its control over the north. By 2005, estimated membership grew to anywhere between 35,000 and 43,000 (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007, 93-94; Balant-Kurti 2007, 18). The reasons for joining the fighting changed as the conflict wore on. At the early stages of the civil war, political and economic marginalization was widely cited as justification for joining the northern rebellion by the MPCI rank-and-file. According to Moussa Fofana, many saw themselves as 'noble warriors' who were fighting against an unjust, xenophobic and exclusionary system established by the Gbagbo government that, in the end, severely constrained the life chances of those of 'northern' (or Burnikabé or Malian) heritage (2011a, 55-62). Economic motivations were also important, if only because joining the rebellion became one of the last remaining economic opportunities for young men after the beginning of the conflict (Fofana 2011a, 65).

In contrast to the MPCI, the rank and file of each of the two Western-based movements – the MJP and the MPIGO – was comprised overwhelmingly of Liberian mercenaries politically and military backed by that country's then President, Charles Taylor. In contrast to the MPCI, the MJP and MPIGO employed violence indiscriminately against civilian populations, suggesting that economic motivations might have been a more prominent factor in influencing participation for the members of these groups (see HRW 2005; Weinstein 2007). The growing indiscipline of these movements resulted in a growing political gulf between them and the leadership of the MPCI. In early 2003, Guillaume Soro sent the MPCI *commandant* of zone 3, Chérif Ousmane, from Bouaké to lead a force that pushed the Liberian elements within these groups back across Côte d'Ivoire's western border. This left the parts of the west controlled by the rebels under a unified command. In December 2003, the MJP, MPIGO and the MPCI formed a formal coalition under the banner the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) (Balant-Kurti 2007, 17; Soro 2005, 87).

The different groups that comprised the leadership of the armed movement in its earliest days left enduring cleavages within the FN. One of the first and most prominent divisions to emerge within the FN involved factional conflicts between FN partisans loyal to Ibrahim

Coulibaly ('IB') and those loyal to the former FESCI leader and student activist Guillaume Soro. As indicated above, 'IB' was widely regarded as a central organizer of the September 2002 planned coup d'état. He also played a prominent role in the coup that brought former President Gen. Robert Guëi to power in 1999. Yet, despite IB's central role in the planning of the 2002 attacks, the fact that he remained in Burkina Faso during the initial days of the fighting significantly weakened his position within the armed movement. This may have lost IB some credibility in the eyes of others who had participated in the initial attacks. IB's position was further weakened following his arrest in Paris in August 2003 under suspicion that he was plotting another coup against the Ivoirian government. IB's absence gave valuable time to Soro to consolidate his own position within the movement.[16] By 2004, divisions between pro-IB and pro-Soro forces within the FN came to the forefront. On July 20-21 2004, violent factional clashes in Korhogo and Bouaké left 22 dead (see Chapter 5). Many of these victims were IB loyalists. In the end, these events helped Soro and his supporters consolidate their control over the movement.

War Economies and Organization of Rebellion in the Ivoirian North

At the onset of the rebellion, the *Forces Nouvelles* enjoyed modest popular support from northern populations. A growing hostility to Gbagbo and his supporters in the south, who were seen as unjustly marginalizing and persecuting Ivoirians of northern origin since coming to power after

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[16] Soro himself comments on IB's decision to remain in Burkina Faso during these crucial moments. He writes: « Je sais qu'il dit être le père de la rébellion ivoirienne. Pourtant, le 19 septembre 2002, IB était bien loin d'Abidjan et de Bouaké. Je le sais présomptueux, mais quand même. Zaga-Zaga était bien à Bouaké; il a péri sur le champ de bataille. Tuo Fozié, Chérif Ousmane, Wattao étaient présents. Même moi, le civil, j'étais au cœur des opérations à Abidjan. IB préférait visiblement vivre prudemment, loin du front.

Depuis lors, IB n'a jamais voulu revenir sur le terrain. Lui qui a été dans l'armée un garde du corps de personnalités plutôt qu'un commando, n'a jamais trouvé l'occasion de montrer son courage…Autre affabulation, IB affirme sans vergogne qu'il a personnellement désigne ceux qui ont été nommés pour représenter les Forces nouvelles au sein du gouvernement ivoirien de réconciliation. Bien entendu, la seule liste que le Premier ministre ait jamais recue est venue de moi. IB ne connaît même pas certains de ces ministres comme Dosso. Quant à Tuo Fozié, nommé ministre de la Jeunesse, beaucoup savent les rapports exécrables entre les deux hommes.

C'est dans ce contexte que, appelés de Paris par notre camarade, alors sous contrôle judicaire, nous avons été estomaqués de l'entendre exiger d'être sans délai nommé leader de la rébellion. Par égard pour lui, nous avons bien voulu en discuter, mais, entre sa légitimité limitée et sa situation judicaire problématique, nous avons naturellement décidé de ne pas donner suite.

Á partir de ce moment, IB s'est mué en adversaire des Forces Nouvelles… » (2005, 110-111).

the 2000 elections, enhanced the popular backing of the FN. The legitimacy of the FN was also buttressed by its ability to maintain a degree of political order during the early stages of the rebellion. After gaining control over the north, the rebels were initially praised for their behavior and the positive relationships they forged with civilian populations.

After the rebels seized Bouaké, HRW reported that "the MPCI were sympathetic to civilians and offered food, medicine and other aid to civilians in need" (2003, 25). Aid workers and journalists confirmed "the positive behavior of the MPCI troops towards civilians in the first months" (HRW 2003, 25). Yet not long after the beginning of the rebellion, indiscipline within the movement rose sharply. Reports of theft, economic racketeering and violence used against civilians in the north steadily increased (HRW 2003, 35; 2005, 19-20; Soro 2005, 106-107). The discipline of foot soldiers that had characterized the early days of the rebellion slowly declined as reports of economic predation increased. Many high-ranking FN members were able to use the rebellion as a pretext to carve out control over the lucrative trade routes running through northern zones. As a result, as the war dragged on, fatigue with the rebellion grew and relations between northern populations and the rebels gradually deteriorated.

Many of the FN's zone commanders used their new source of authority to establish personalized control over local war economies. In Bouaké, commandant Issiaka ('Wattao') Ouattara charged trucks 5,000 CFA[17] for a "ticket Wattao" and passage through his zone. Similarly, for passage through the corridor south of Bouaké, commandant Soro ("Doctor") Dramane required a payment of 2500 CFA (ICG 2008, 19). Before his removal in 2008, *commandant de zone* Koné Zakaria personally controlled all tax revenue derived from cocoa exports leaving Séguéla (Global Witness 2007, 34). As the conflict wore on, the *commandant de zone* in Korhogo, Fofié Martin amassed a personal fortune from a variety of sources (see Chapter 5). Yet, despite these exactions, many FN foot soldiers were not regularly paid by the local rebel leadership. As a result, foot soldiers themselves increasingly used their minor positions of authority to extract resources from civilians. FN soldiers used roadblocks on roads and pathways to demand payments from northern populations (HRW 2005, 19-20).

[17] In 2010-2011, at the time of my fieldwork, 500 CFAs equaled approximately $1USD.

After the elimination of the IB threat, controlling the actions of FN agents on the ground – both the rebellion's local commanders and foot soldiers – became an important priority for Soro and the rest of the political leadership of the movement. Part of the impetus to do so came from the increasing divergence between the rhetoric of the movement's political representatives, including Soro, and the behaviour of FN soldiers on the ground. Not unlike other armed movements across Africa and elsewhere, the FN's leadership confronted significant organizational challenges in controlling its members.

In response to these challenges, the FN's leadership began to radically restructure its relationship with its local command and foot soldiers. By 2004, the FN had begun to develop a series of political, military and financial institutions that connected the national administrative centre of the rebellion in Bouaké to the regional administrative offices in the cities and towns under their control. By 2006, the FN had established its own army, the *Forces Armée de Forces Nouvelles* (FAFN), which was headed by a *chef d'état-major*, Soumaïla Bakayoko. Under FAFN, the military wing of the movement was itself divided into a number of distinct branches: *la direction général de la police et la gendarmerie* (DGPG), headed by Tuo Fozié, *la direction général des forces paramilitaires* (DGFPM), under Koné Massamba, *la direction centrale du commissariat des armées* (DCCA), under Adama Ouattara, and *l'inspection général des armées* (IGA), headed by Seydou Ouattara (Fofana 2011a, 4).

Another key component to the organization of the rebellion on the military side was the system of territorial control established through the administration of ten distinct *Com'zones*. Each *Com'zone* was headed by a *commandant de zone* who was solely responsible for its security. For the most part, former members of the Ivoirian military staffed and headed the *Com'zones*. As explained above, they comprised a significant portion of the group responsible for organizing the original 2002 attacks. Many of the *commandants de zone* used their administrative powers to tax and benefit from control of the commodity markets (cocoa, coffee, diamonds, yams, etc.) running through the regions under their control. Many also had personalized control over military units or factions within the FN that were demarcated by unique titles (Guépard, Cobra, Force Pure, Battalion mystique, Costa Nostra, Ninja noir, Delta Force, Anaconda and Armée Rouge) (Fofana 2011a, 4).

Com'zone	City	Commandants de zone
Zone 1	Bouna	Marou Ouattara
Zone 2	Katiola	Touré Pélikan Hervé
Zone 3	Bouaké	Chérif Ousmane
Zone 4	Mankono	Ouattara Zoumana
Zone 5	Séguéla	Koné Zakaria[18]
Zone 6	Man	Losseni Fofana
Zone 7	Touba	Daouda Doumbia
Zone 8	Odienné	Coulibaly Ousmane
Zone 9	Boundiali	Koné Gaoussou
Zone 10	Korhogo	Fofié Kouakou Martin

Table 2.1: The FN's ten *Com'zones* Source: Fofana 2011a, 5.

Across most of the regions under the control of the rebels after the September 2002 uprising, the *Com'zones* were generally the first, and for a long time, the only institution established by the FN. The failed 2002 coup attempt and the military stalemate that followed required the FN to establish at least a minimal military presence over the vast territory they now controlled. This posed a challenge for the leaders of the armed movement because the 2002 attacks were planned principally as a putsch. Prior to the original attacks, leaders gave little thought to how to govern rebel controlled zones in the case of a drawn out conflict. Thus, for a long time, the *Com'zones* represented the only administrative structure installed by the rebels. But they remained poorly monitored (if at all) by the national level political and military leaders of the movement. Soro in particular, appeared more than willing to grant autonomy to those regional commanders who remained loyal to him during the 2004 conflicts between the pro-Soro and pro-IB factions of the FN. As a result, many of the FN's zone commanders established and maintained some autonomous control over the economic resources in their respective zones.

In order to enhance control over the military side of the movement represented by the *Com'zones*, the FN also developed distinct political and financial bodies. The *secrétariat général* (also referred to as the *cabinet civil des Forces Nouvelles*) was the principal political or administrative wing of the rebellion. The *secrétariat général* was headed by the *secrétaire général* and political leader of the movement, Guillaume Soro. The *secrétariat général* was

[18] In May 2008, Zakaria was removed from his position by troops loyal to another FN bigwig, Issiaka ('Wattao') Ouattara.

represented at the level of the *Com'zone* by a local representative, a *délégant général*. As indicated above, much of this administrative wing of the movement was filled by former students involved in campus politics through FESCI. The functions of the *secrétariat général* were diverse, but were broadly related to relationships between the rebellion and other civil society groups and organizations based in the north. It commonly functioned as an intermediary between local actors and the military leadership of the FN (particularly the *Com'zones*). The *secrétariat général* filled the void left when bureaucrats either fled the north after the beginning of the conflict or, if they did stay, simply did not have the resources necessary to fulfill their administrative functions in any meaningful way. FN administrators fulfilled a number of different responsibilities that included: working with international organizations supplying aid or social/health services in the north, keeping schools open and ensuring the holding of final exams, communicating the aims and political positions of the movement to the populations under the FN's control, regulating problems between the civilian population and the military wing of the movement as well as those conflicts which emerged between different groups within society itself, and finally, after 2007, establishing relations with state agents looking to re-establish their offices after the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA). The goal of the *secrétariat général* was to give the political leadership of the movement a direct link with the civilian populations the rebels were forced to govern. Nonetheless, despite this stated mandate, the FN's leaders generally remained hesitant to expand their role in everyday governance over explicitly 'political' issues such as local conflicts over land, gender relations, and/or chiefly succession. It is for this reason that others have described FN rule as an example of local-level power sharing: although arbitrary in many respects, many domains of governance remained in the hands of other actors who retained some authority over specific issue areas, even after the beginning of the civil war and the retreat of the formal institutions of the state (Heitz 2009; Förster 2010).

Finally, the national level leaders of the rebellion sought to regulate the relationships between the movement and the civilian populations under its control through the direct management and regulation of economic activity in the north. The first institutional body built by the FN to manage finances in Northern Côte d'Ivoire was Dirmob (*Direction de la Mobilisation des Ressources Humaines)*, which was an organization controlled largely by supporters of Soro's primary factional rival, 'IB,' during the initial stages of the rebellion. After 2004, the FN's new

leadership under Soro constructed a complex and extensive financial institutional structure in order to shift control over the northern economy away from Dirmob and IB's backers. The overarching umbrella institution responsible for the FN's finances was the *Secrétariat National chargé de l'economie et des finances*. However, the autonomous body, *la Centrale économique,* was responsible for decisions related to revenues and expenditures for the FN. These decisions were made principally by *la Centrale's* Management Council which was staffed by a number of prominent FN members including Soro, Moussa Dossa (the FN's National Secretary in Charge of Economy and Finances), André Ouattara (the head of *la Centrale*), the FN military chief of staff, and all of the *commandants des zones* (Balint-Kurti 2007, 23). Through *la Centrale*, the FN extended its reach over the entirety of the north, taxing and regulating much of economic life in northern zones.[19] The UN's Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire reported that *la Centrale* managed five principal revenue generating activities: the taxation of transported goods through a system of checkpoints on major roads; budget contributions (*budget de contribution*), which were taxes levied on all major companies doing business in the north; service charges for utilities such as water and electricity; the taxation of extractive industries, particularly natural resources such as diamonds and gold; and the ownership and taxation of fuel depots in the north (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 47-50). Much of the responsibility for the local day-to-day management of tax collection rested on the shoulders of tax-officials positioned in each *Com'zone* called *régisseurs*.

Estimating the total amount derived from each of these sources is difficult given that the FN never provided reliable statistics on total revenues and expenditures. Whatever the total amount, much of the FN's revenue was derived from two key sectors: cocoa and other natural resources, including gold and diamonds (Global Witness 2007, 33-45; United Nations Security Council 2009a, 55-58). Although many of the principal cocoa producing regions of the south-west remained under the control of government forces, the FN did control substantial cocoa producing areas in the western part of the country, particularly the region around Vavoua-Séguéla. In 2006/2007, the UN estimated, Northern Côte d'Ivoire produced 128,000 tons of

[19] Efforts to formalize and centralize control over resource extraction in the rebel-held north through *La Central,* ran into resistance from some zone commanders, many of whom were able to establish personalized regimes of fiscal extraction in local areas after the beginning of the conflict. They fiercely guarded their authority from Bouaké's efforts to centralize control over resources and taxations in the north.

cocoa, which amounted to almost 4% of global production of this commodity (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 55).[20] The American NGO Global Witness estimated that between 2004 and 2007, the FN averaged US $30 million per year from the cocoa trade (Global Witness 2007, 33). Revenues from cocoa were procured through a series of taxes administered by *La Centrale*. The FN levied an export tax on outgoing shipments of cocoa of 125-150 CFA (US$ 30 cents) per kilogram (Global Witness 2007, 34; Balint-Kurti 2007, 23). Despite the war, a handful of cocoa buying companies continued to broker deals between producers and large multinational corporations (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 55). The FN charged companies 100 million CFA (US$193,500) for cocoa purchasing agreements (Global Witness 2007, 34). Finally, the FN charged 15,000 CFA (US$29) per truck per trip for a *laissez-passer*, permitting travel in northern zones and 5,000 CFA (approx. US$10) per truck per trip for an escort tax that provided a security escort along major northern routes between Mali/Burkina Faso and Southern Côte d'Ivoire (Global Witness 2007, 34). Mineral extraction also comprised a large portion of the FN's tax revenue. There are two large diamond mines in northern Côte d'Ivoire: Tortiya (100 km south of Korhogo) and Séguéla (125 km west of Bouaké). Although the exact value of this market is unclear, the FN profited from its growth either through direct participation in the marketing of Ivoirian diamonds or by taxing diamond miners (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 58-65).

Towards a Fledgling Peace? From Civil War to Linas Marcoussis

Initial efforts at restoring peace after the failed September 2002 coup attempt were compromised from the start by conflicts between the Gbagbo's supporters and Côte d'Ivoire's former colonial power, France. France was the first international actor to intervene in the conflict, primarily for the purpose of protecting and evacuating the large number of French expatriates and other foreign nationals living in the country at the time. However, France's ongoing involvement in the crisis was quickly complicated by the ambiguous and, at times, contradictory position it took vis-à-vis the different parties to the conflict. First, in light of the historic weakness of Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces, France's early military involvement in the crisis enabled Gbagbo to retain power at

[20] Southern Côte d'Ivoire produced 37.2% of total global cocoa production (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 55).

this critical moment. Well trained and better equipped French forces repelled the rebels as they moved southward approaching Abidjan and forced them back to Bouaké, behind the eventual *'zone de confiance'* that partitioned the country in two (ICG 2003, 29). Gbagbo used this reprieve to build up his military in the subsequent months. Yet, despite the initial actions by French forces, France was seen by many Gbagbo hardliners as tacitly supporting the rebellion. France's insistence on its role as a neutral mediator and peacekeeper in the conflict (rather than simply backing Gbagbo's government), its reluctance to frame the rebellion as merely an "external terrorist attack," and its refusal to hand Ouattara over to Ivoirian security forces all contributed to suspicions shared by many within the Gbagbo camp that the French were complicit with the rebellion (ICG 2003, 29-30). For others, France's refusal to support Gbagbo's government was tantamount to treason in light of France's historic role of militarily supporting leaders in Côte d'Ivoire and its other former African colonies (Piccolino 2012, 7; see also Bovcon 2009). For Gbagbo, by not intervening on his behalf, France was denying him the status and legitimacy accorded to past Ivoirian heads of state, particularly Houphouët-Boigny, and other contemporary French African leaders such as Omar Bongo in Gabon or Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, with whom the French had continued to maintain close relations.

Political tensions between the French and Gbagbo's government were further strained during the first round of peace talks in the Parisian suburb of Linas-Marcoussis. Spearheaded by then French president Jacques Chirac, the peace talks at Linas-Marcoussis resulted in an ambitious and comprehensive power sharing agreement. The agreement included provisions establishing a transitional government of national reconciliation that included members of all the signatories to the agreement, the installation of a consensus prime minister with full executive powers, reforms to national citizenship laws, a tentative timetable for the holding of the next round of presidential elections and stipulations pertaining to eligibility of presidential candidates, and land reform (Yabi and Goodwin 2009, 10). Despite the fact that the Linas-Marcoussis agreement explicitly addressed some of the key contentious political issues that were at the heart of the conflict, the agreement itself was fundamentally limited in its capacity to establish and maintain an enduring peace for a number of reasons.

First, by including the FN in the power-sharing talks, the French and the Linas-Marcoussis accords ultimately forced Gbagbo to recognize the rebels as legitimate political

players with legitimate grievances that should be taken into account. For many within Gbagbo's camp, this was just too much to bear. Widely viewed by Gbagbo and his supporters as "kids with pistols" and "houseboys turned rebels," the Gbagbo camp felt that the Linas-Marcoussis accords elevated the rebels to an undeserved status within national-level political circles (ICG 2003, i). These sentiments were further entrenched by the views of many that Linas-Marcoussis disproportionately shifted the balance of power between Gbagbo's camp and his opponents. Referring to the distribution of seats in the transitional government established at Linas-Marcoussis, Andreas Mehler has written that "it was simply unacceptable to Abidjan (and particularly the army leadership) that the rebels should get the Defense and the Interior portfolios, ministries that would give them preponderance on all security issues" (2009, 466). Not only did Linas-Marcoussis work to entrench the position of the rebels on the national political scene, it also directly aimed to radically restrict the autonomous powers of the President. The consensus Prime Minister agreed upon at Linas-Marcoussis, Seydou Diarra, was selected under the assumption that he would assume full executive powers until the next round of presidential elections in 2005. Clearly reluctant to share power, Gbagbo and his supporters used their advantage as political insiders to block Diarra at every opportunity (ICG 2003, 36). Overall, many within the FPI viewed Linas-Marcoussis as a 'constitutional coup d'état' whose outcome was largely in line with the original political goals of the rebels.

In the end, many on the government side refused to accept the political outcome of the French initiated peace talks at Linas-Marcoussis. Even in the midst of negotiations, Gbagbo gave the green light to FPI youth leaders to organize anti-French rallies in Abidjan. After the installation of Diarra's power-sharing government, the prominent FPI politician Mamadou Koulibaly called for acts of "civil disobedience" to protest the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement. Ultimately, Gbagbo simply refused to implement some of the central components of the agreement. In particular, his refusal to appoint the agreed upon candidate for the defence portfolio, Koné Ouassenan, signalled to the FN that Gbagbo was uninterested in negotiating a peace within the confines of the agreement signed at Linas-Marcoussis (ICG 2003, 3-5). In October 2003, the FN pulled out of the transition government in protest of Gbagbo's growing unilateralism.

The security situation and the prospects for sustained peace degenerated quickly after the collapse of the transitional government. By early 2004, the Gbagbo government had stepped up its repression of 'northerners' and other suspected political opponents. In July 2004, the signatories met again in Accra, Ghana to restart peace talks and sign a new agreement. Despite these diplomatic efforts, implementation of an agreement based on talks held in Accra began to stall as early as September 2004. In light of the failure of this latest round of peace talks, Gbagbo renewed his military offensive against the northern-based rebellion. On November 4, Gbagbo initiated 'Operation Dignité,' which included a sustained aerial bombardment of selected targets in rebel-held northern zones. When the bombings hit French military barracks, killing nine French soldiers and one American, the French responded in kind by attacking and destroying the entirety of Côte d'Ivoire's air force. This in turn sparked three days of anti-French riots, where bands of pro-Gbagbo youth looted property and beat and raped French citizens and other expats of suspected European descent. By November 9, 9,000 foreigners were airlifted out of Abidjan by French forces (ICG 2005, 12). Despite UN sanctions against suspected human rights abusers, Gbagbo's decision to repeal Article 35 of the Constitution (the nationality clause which prevented Ouattara from running in the 2000 elections) and another round of political negotiations hosted by South African President Thebo Mbeki in Pretoria in March 2005, tensions remained. ECOWAS, the AU, the EU and the domestic political opposition agreed to extend Gbagbo's presidential mandate into 2006, after the installation of a new transitional government under former head of ECOWAS, Charles Konan Banny. Buoyed by international support, Banny, like Diarra before him, was expected to manage the transitional government, implement the peace process, and prepare the country for elections in October 2006 (ICG 2005, 12; McGovern 2011, 24).

Continuity and Change in the Ivoirian Peace Process: The Ouagadougou Peace Accords

The nomination of Banny as the new PM in Gabgbo's newly prolonged government did little to restrict the autonomous powers of the President. Immediately after the signing of UN Resolution 1721, which confirmed the consensus choice of Banny as PM, Gbagbo refused to implement those aspects of the resolution that contravened aspects of Ivoirian law. In this way, Gbagbo justified resistance to efforts by Banny to assert his authority as PM, and ultimately his ability to push the peace process forward (ICG 2007, 2). Yet in December 2006, Gbagbo surprised the

international community again, this time by announcing a plan out of the current political malaise through 'direct dialogue' with the rebels themselves. The talks between Soro and Gbagbo were hosted in Ouagadougou by the then ECOWAS Chair and Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré in January 2007. The Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA) were signed on March 4, 2007.

The push for 'direct dialogue' between Soro and Gbagbo and the eventual signing of the OPA resulted from the domestic and international political pressures these actors confronted. Through cooperation with each other, both Soro and Gbagbo temporarily stemmed the sense of growing frustration felt by the variety of domestic and international-level actors involved in the peace process (ICG 2005, 14-16; Yabi and Goodwin 2009, 21). Ultimately, ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and France all accepted Gbagbo's proposal as part of a modified framework for the UN Security Council Resolution 1721. However, the reformed proposal looked entirely different from the UN resolution and the number of agreements that came before it in terms of its substance. Now, as the ICG put it, the "responsibility for the conduct of the transition has been transferred to the protagonists themselves" (ICG 2007, 7). The OPA contained four key provisions pertaining to: (a) national identification and electoral registration; (b) disarmament and the reunification of the national armed forces; (c) national reunification through the redeployment of the public administration and finally; (d) the organization of clear and fair elections where all parties are able to put forth the candidate of their choice (within 10 months of the signing of the OPA). Bah argues that it was the content of the OPA – that it included provisions which directly addressed issues pertaining to citizenship and national belonging that were at the heart of the conflict – that created far more optimism regarding its potentially successful implementation compared to earlier efforts at solving the crisis (Bah 2010, 398). The inclusion of these provisions was an important part of the reason why there was so much optimism – in Côte d'Ivoire and within the international community – about it contributing to lasting peace, but it was not the only one. The fact that the signing of the agreement itself was initiated by Ivoirians and the Gbagbo-Soro partnership were the central political reasons why there was so much broad support for the OPA.

The other important feature of the OPA was that, while it offered tangible reasons for optimism in terms of peaceably resolving the conflict, it also worked to exacerbate lingering

divisions within the FN itself.[21] As indicated above, many of the *commandants de zone* were former officers in Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces. In contrast, many of those who comprised the political wing of the movement were former FESCI student activists who participated in the heated university campus politics in Abidjan and elsewhere during the 1990's. Many of the *commandants des zones* viewed the peace process as disproportionately advancing the interests of Soro and others comprising the political wing of FN. For this group, the OPA seriously threatened to undercut the control over many aspects of the northern economy they had established during the conflict. Not surprisingly, a number of prominent *Com'zone* leaders – including Cherif Ousmane in Bouaké, Hervé Touré in Katiola, and Koné Zakaria in Séguéla – expressed public scepticism about the OPA (ICG 2008, 13). After the signing of the agreement, most *commandants* resisted any attacks on their authority, subverting efforts at administrative and military reunification in the process.

Towards the terminal stages of the conflict, specifically after the signing of the OPA, tensions between Soro and the military wing of the movement manifested themselves in a variety of ways. First, conflicts emerged within the FN over the decision to name Soro as the Prime Minister (PM), replacing Charles Konan Banny. As explained above, Banny was the former Governor of the Bank of West African States (ECOWAS) and was originally named interim PM in 2005. Gbagbo sought to neutralize Banny from the outset in order to reinforce his own political authority. Banny, lacking a real power base of his own, found his authority as PM drastically curtailed (ICG 2007, 2). The relationship between the PM and President Gbagbo changed with the nomination of Soro. In contrast to Banny, Soro could draw on significant material resources and political support derived from his position as head of the FN. With Soro as the PM, Gbagbo now confronted an opponent who wielded comparable political influence and clout.

However, many within the FN became suspicious of Soro's nomination as PM and the close relationship between Soro and Gbagbo after the signing of the OPA (see ICG 2007, 4;

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[21] This problem was also confronted by Gbagbo. Divisions emerged because many hardliners felt that the President had given up too much and they still preferred a military option for dealing with the former rebels. Rumours of a 'secret deal' between the Gbagbo and Soro circulated wildly on both sides (ICG 2007, 4).

Allard 2008; Coulibaly 2008; Depry 2008). For some, the removal of Gbagbo *was* the aim of the rebellion and aligning with him at this point was just too much to bear (ICG 2007, 4). In a similar vein, others suggested that the political deal struck with the signing of the OPA was at cross-purposes with the general political values and interests that underpinned the northern rebellion. For some, the process of national identification contravened notions of equality of citizenship for which the war was fought. Formulating some criterion for establishing Ivoirian citizenship was a sticking point for many within Gbagbo's camp, however this concession left many FN foot soldiers exposed because they lacked the necessary documents for recognition as Ivoirian citizens. Leading up to the signing of the OPA, *Commandant* Cherif Ousmane criticized the peace process, stating that "you can't share four years with soldiers who offered you their lives, and then overnight, throw them into the wild, without pieces of identification, without projects for professional reinsertion and in deplorable conditions of security" (Adeva 2006).

Comments such as these from some within the FN appeared to reflect an emergent division within the movement between those looking to push the peace process forward and those more sceptical of the intentions of its authors (and hence more reluctant to disarm). Another illustration was the 2008 public spat between André Dakoury Tabley, the then assistant to Guillaume Soro, and the *commandant de zone* in Bouaké, Issiaka ('Wattao') Ouattara. The basis of this conflict revolved around a 2008 RDR congress, where RDR president Alassane Ouattara underscored many of the commonalities between his party and the stated aims of the FN. In wrapping up his speech, Ouattara made a general invitation to all FN members to join the RDR as a strategy for continuing their struggle against Laurent Gbagbo. Dakoury Tabley called Ouattara's invitation "courageous" (Allard 2008). Wattao reacted sharply to this overture, "we are the arbiters in the peace process. Dakoury came to eat. If he eats he'll keep quiet. If he wants to leave, he'll leave. Indeed, he is an opportunist who doesn't know how the FN was created" (Allard 2008). For Wattao, Dakoury Tabley did not represent the broader interests of the FN. His acceptance of Ouattara's overtures represented an effort to advance the agenda of a small cadre within the FN that, to Wattao, was largely out of sync with many military actors on the ground who still had a stake in the continuation of the conflict and FN control over the north. The conflict between Wattao and Dakoury Tabley was not an isolated incident – it seemed to reflect a broader schism running through the heart of the FN about the political future of the movement.

By 2009, these conflicts resulted in urgent calls from within the FN for Soro to step down as the PM in the transitional government – suggesting that the OPA power-sharing agreement did not sufficiently advance the interests of the movement (Kouamé 2009). Soro even mused that some within the FN were responsible for the June 2007 assassination attempt on his life, when rockets were fired on a plane carrying him and some of his closest aides (Koffi and Essis 2007).

After the signing of the OPA, the removal of the military, administrative and fiscal powers of the *Com'zones* and the reinstallation of state institutions in the north became a central goal of the *camp presidential*, as well as one of the more contentious political issues in the post-conflict period. Two of the central elements of the OPA – disarmament and administrative unification – directly addressed the problem of the ongoing military and political presence of the FN in the north, and a third – the holding of free and fair elections – ultimately became entirely contingent on the dismantling of the *Com'zones*. The interconnected issues of disarmament and administrative reunification at times strained the seemingly cordial post-OPA political relationship between the old rivals Gbagbo and Soro. The crux of the conflict was simple. For Soro, the dismantling of the FN's military and fiscal networks was predicated first on the holding of free and fair elections. Conversely, for Gbagbo elections could not be held until all fiscal, military and administrative powers were transferred back to the state (*Jeune Afrique* 2009a, 2009b).

Soro himself was caught in a delicate position. On the one hand, Soro's legitimacy as a broker within national and international level political circles rested on his capacity to push the peace process forward. For Soro, administrative reunification needed to advance on some level to show that he was indeed a credible and committed partner in the peace process. On the other hand, Soro needed to manage growing criticisms of his leadership and the sizeable divisions that had grown within the FN, which *were themselves* exacerbated by the advancement of the OPA and the process of disarmament and administrative reunification. In the end, Soro did put sizeable public pressure on the military wing of the FN to hasten these processes (Bakayoko 2007; Armand Didi 2008; Stanislas 2008). Yet for a sizeable group within the FN, particularly many *commandants des zones*, the peace process represented a serious threat to their economic interests. Most recognized that not all the military elites on the FN side would benefit from the reunification of the armed forces (ICG 2008, 15).

Given these divisions within the FN over the direction of the peace process, it is not surprising that, according to most observers, efforts at administrative reunification in the north went largely unfulfilled. Redeployment of administrative personal was initiated by a series of presidential decrees made between April and July 2007 that appointed new *préfets*, *sous-peféts* and magistrates to their respective jurisdictions in the north (United Nations Security Council 2007, 6). In order to reclaim control over the taxation of trans-border trade, the government initiated the first integrated customs post in Ouangolodougou on May 12th, 2008 (United Nations Security Council 2009a, 6). On March 4th, 2009, Soro introduced the first *'guichet unique'* in Bouaké, which integrated customs, financial and registration services (United Nations Security Council 2009b, 3). Despite these efforts, the *Com'zones* did not officially hand over local administrative powers until a May 2009 ceremony in Bouaké that formally marked the transition. Even then, the extent to which these declarative and symbolic gestures actually transformed political relations on the ground is highly debatable. First, only one zone commander, Fofié Martin, actually attended the ceremony in Bouaké, suggesting that many *Com'zone* leaders were not really interested in the process of administration reunification. More concretely, actual efforts at reinstating the powers of civil servants at local levels were circumscribed. For the most part, the *Com'zones* simply continued to control local tax revenue including taxes levied through roadblocks and those derived from their administration of trans-local commodity trade. This denied state actors the resources required to fulfill their duties and made the former FN the ultimate arbiter in the use and distribution of resources. Even by 2010, many mayors, mayoral assistants and civil servants complained to me that they had neither the resources nor the authority to fulfill their duty in any meaningful way. The FN administration, particularly the *commandants de zone,* generally remained the dominant political actor in local arenas. As Kathrin Heitz has written in reference to Man in Western Côte d'Ivoire, the "real force in zone 6 are [*sic*] the ex-rebels" (Heitz 2009, 127). This was the case for much of the north throughout the post-OPA period.

In the end, the FN retained control over the northern half of the country for the better part of the decade, leading up to the 2010 Presidential elections. Buoyed by the support given to him by Bedié and the PDCI, Ouattara emerged as the victor in the second round of these elections,

garnering 54% of the vote.[22] However, soon after the announcement of Ouattara's victory by Côte d'Ivoire's independent electoral commission, the courts nullified the results, citing voting irregularities in the north that had skewed the results in Ouattara's favour. Votes cast in the northern departments under question were subtracted from the original total, which then swung in favour of Gbagbo with 51.45% of the vote. Gbagbo was subsequently sworn in as President by the courts on December 4th, 2010. After a four month stalemate following Gbagbo's refusal to cede power, on March 28, 2011, the rebels, newly named the FRCI (*Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire*), with support from ONUCI (*Opération des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire*) and French forces, launched an attack on the southern half of the country. By April 3rd, the FRCI controlled the entirety of the country. Ouattara gained sole control over the Presidency on April 11th, 2011 (Bassett 2011a, 472-478; Fofana 2011b).

Performing Peace in Côte d'Ivoire

The resistance of the FN's local commanders to administrative reunification, and the limited extent to which reforms actually eroded the wartime authority of these actors, suggest that the post-OPA period was marked more by continuity than change. However, the political struggles between Soro and the military wing of the movement, and the overall skepticism of the peace process represented only part of the story of peacemaking in Côte d'Ivoire. What remains is how peace was subsequently 'made' through a series of interconnected symbolic and discursive practices by national-level elites which underwrote Côte d'Ivoire's transition from war to peace in the post-OPA period. I argue that even in speaking about 'peace' rather than 'war' after the signing of the OPA, national-level elites created significant political openings for some groups at local levels, while closing off possibilities for others. Beyond being simply empty rhetoric, what I call the 'performance of peace' by national level elites created a discursive environment that structure local debates about power and authority. Rebel actions carried out and legitimated through discursive strategies that foreground 'being at war' are subject to greater challenge in

[22] As part of a strategy for defeating Laurent Gbagbo, the main opposition parties had formed a pre-electoral coalition in 2005 called the RHDP (*Rassemblement des houphouétistes pour la démocratie et la paix*). The RHDP included the RDR, the PDCI, the UDPCI (*Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire*) and the MFA (*Mouvement des Forces de L'Avenir*).

'post-conflict' contexts, even if peace does not radically transform local environments after the cessation of conflict (as is often the case). The challenge for this research project is seeing how local *and* national level factors work together to determine political outcomes on the ground.

To address these ambiguities this project builds on perspectives critical of arbitrary distinctions between of war and peace used in much social science scholarship (for general criticisms see Mbembé 2001; Richards 2005; Mundy 2011). Scholars relying on positivist methodologies have themselves debated definitions of civil war along a number of criteria including: its spatial delimitations (the distinction between civil wars and inter-state wars), its organizational basis (to what extent do formal government forces need to be involved), numerical thresholds of violence, as well as the beginnings and endings of civil war (for a summary see Sambinas 2004; Mundy 2011). Beyond debates surrounding definitions, cut-off points and the coding of specific cases, other scholars have revealed deeper problems with these approaches. One is that the naming of civil wars by scholars often does not capture, or even sidelines the views of those living through violent conflict.[23] As Mundy argues, whether or not mass violence is understood as a condition of 'civil war' is often hotly contested by actors on different sides of the conflict. In reference to the Algerian experience, he (2011, 293) writes that:

> Although the new school of civil war studies has not been able to obtain a consensus definition of civil war, it has never doubted that Algeria experienced a civil war in the 1990s. Nevertheless, a survey of the domestic and international discourse of the conflict shows that the term civil war was often treated as a problematic description of what was happening in Algeria. The fact that the term civil war had become politicized with the political discourse of the Algerian conflict is perhaps not surprising. Where rebels often embrace the moniker civil war (war as legitimate violence), governments tend to deny the legitimacy of insurgent violence by labelling insurgents terrorists (Kalyvas 2006:17). To some degree, this observation fits with the Algerian case, especially the way in which the Algerian regime framed the conflict throughout the 1990s. A change of tone seemingly occurred in 1999, when President Abdelaziz Bouteflika became the first Algerian leader to use the term civil war (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1999). However, this was more the exception than the rule. Official Algerian documents, such as the 2005 *Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale* (Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation), use euphemisms such as 'national tragedy'. Members of Algeria's civil society and opposition convey just as much contention and hesitancy in their deployment or exclusion of the term civil war. However, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) never seemed to embrace the term civil war wholeheartedly, perhaps out of a preference for an Islamic vocabulary of *jihād* (Moussaoui, 2006: 436). Even when it seemed that the violence

[23] Charles King (2004, 250) writes that "the point is that where any instance of collective violence begins and ends, whether it is a single riot or an entire civil war, can be determined only from within the cognitive landscape of those who are engaged in it. Marking off events as discrete by fiat of the researcher will not do the trick."

> in Algeria could not get any worse, in early 1997 an exiled FIS leader, Kamar Edienne Kherbane, was still reluctant to say that the conflict had crossed into civil war (Dennis, 1997).

In 'post-conflict' contexts however, where formerly opposing elites have accepted the terms of a peace agreement, we should expect to see the opposite: elites should struggle to 'sell' the peace in order to legitimize and naturalize the incipient post-conflict political order. This is similar to what Séverine Autesserre (2010, 66-67) describes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Here, the understanding shared by much of the international community that the DRC had shifted to a "post-conflict" environment, after the signing of peace agreements in 2002, shaped the kinds of policies peace-builders pursued. This framing of the situation sustained itself despite high levels of ongoing violence in the eastern part of the country. Cedric Jourde (2007, 489) has underscored how small neo-authoritarian states in West Africa have 'performed' political stability in order to meet the political expectations of more powerful international patrons. In Mauritania for example, state elites use public arrests of actors they defined as "Islamic radicals" or "pan-Arab nationalists" as a way of hitting "right at the centre of Western states' representations of politics in the developing world" and reducing international pressures for democratization.

How do these discourses at national levels shape outcomes on the ground? Some approaches examine how differences or changes in discursive fields create openings (or closures) for political action. In this vein, Koopmans and Statham (1999, 228) used what they termed a "discursive opportunity structure" to explain the varying success of parties on the extreme right in Italy and Germany. Discursive opportunity structures refer to sets of variables which "may be seen as determining which ideas are considered 'sensible', which constructions of reality are seen as realistic, and which claims are held as 'legitimate' within a certain polity at a certain time" (Koopmans and Statham 1999, 228). Similarly, "national moods" and "prevailing cultural climates" are other ways of conceptualizing meso-level changes in discursive structures that can legitimate and enable political movements in some specific contexts, and close off opportunities in others (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 279). "Symbolic events," such as political crises, court hearings and dramaturgical performances by national level elites are parts of national discourse that are the most prone to change. Symbolic events are important because they "recast or challenge prevailing definitions of the situation, thus changing the perceptions of costs and

benefits of policies and programs and the perception of injustice of the status quo." (Zald 1996, quoted in Joachim 2003, 251). In short, symbolic events cast new light on the political legitimacy of the existing political order, or alternatively, options for political change. All of these elements heighten or lower the costs of political action because of how they influence the legitimacy of perceived political choices and/or outcomes.

Such changes in the surrounding discursive field filter down to local levels and open up opportunities for political challenges and change. In the context of the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire, peacemaking by national level elites can work to legitimize their position, but also subjects them to new challenges given the expectations about what such 'peace' talk might entail. James Scott's (1990, 102) *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* highlights how dominant discourses propagated by dominant actors can be used by subordinate groups and enable social struggle and resistance. Even if the terms of the debate are structured by the powerful, the meaning, interpretation and implications of the dominant discursive forms remain up for grabs and function as a point of struggle between dominant and subordinate groups. Thus, just as the shift towards peace in Côte d'Ivoire might legitimize the position of wartime actors, it may also offer fodder to subordinates looking to improve their position vis-à-vis dominant groups (Lund 2006, 687). The key question remains exactly how changes in the discursive opportunity structure at national levels reinforce localized political orders already in place or whether they "allow(s) for a reshuffling of the cards, either in the form of a reduction of inequality or in terms of the emergence of new 'elites'" (Olivier de Sardan 2005, 98; see also Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003, 152). I argue that these changes opened up some spaces for debate over local level order between competing elites after the signing of the OPA in 2007. However, whether these shifts resulted in a "reshuffling of the cards" or not depend on the coalitions between local rebel leaders and pre-conflict formed during the conflict, which are themselves determined by pre-conflict brokerage relations and existing hierarchical configurations rebels confront.

I 'dramatize' political power in post-OPA Côte d'Ivoire in this way by briefly examining some of the dominant narratives of elite political discourse used after the signing of the OPA through the lens of a series of interrelated dramatic events performed by elites. I show how Ivoirian elites used the peace process to legitimize and naturalize their role within it (as peace's legitimate brokers) and to delegitimize any subsequent political challenges to their authority and

political position (as a challenge to the peace process itself). Indeed, the ease with which actors on either side of the conflict who once so vehemently defended the legitimacy of their use of violence became the defenders of 'peace' in Côte d'Ivoire speaks to the political significance of these rhetorical acts. Specifically, I draw out two themes that emerge from these performative acts: the treatment of 'peace' as a declarative act and the idea of the newly won reunification and indivisibility of the Ivoirian nation. I suggest that, through these two narratives, political leaders attempted to delegitimize the episodic violence the former rebels confronted after the signing of the OPA. My analysis breaks with earlier uses of political dramas in that it downplays how these symbolic acts merely reproduce the power and authority of national-level elites. I view this socially constructed transition as a shifting discursive field that, while functioning to legitimize the remade national level coalition formed after the OPA, also created spaces used by subordinate groups to politically challenge dominant actors from below.

Casual conversations with Ivoirians about peace and conflict in Côte d'Ivoire generally revealed, on the one hand, deep aspirations for a return to the peace and prosperity experienced by older generations under Houphouët-Boigny, yet on the other, a marked hesitancy about discussing the specific political problems (conflicts over land, citizenship) that both led to the conflict and which should be addressed if a lasting peace is to be attained.[24] For everyday Ivoirians, such reluctance is certainly, in part, a reflection of the ongoing precariousness of the security situation across the country. For elites, this reluctance is perhaps better explained as an outcome of the potential political divisiveness of discussing some of these issues publically. For actors who have just crafted a highly tenuous political coalition emerging from the OPA, limiting public discussion over contentious issues would obviously seem prudent. What then emerges, however, from this collective hesitancy is a form of public discourse about 'peace' that was divorced from the everyday political and social realities experienced by most Ivoirians.

Rather than a set of objective conditions loosely linked to the absence of violence, 'peace' in the Ivoirian context might be better understood as what Lisa Wedeen has referred to as an "as if" condition, where all are expected to reproduce the dominant discourse no matter how far

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[24] In *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*, Mike McGovern (2011, 54) makes a similar point about the hesitancy of most Ivoirians to blame contemporary problems facing the country on the legacy of Houphouët-Boigny. He writes: "for most Ivoirians it remains unsayable (if not unthinkable) to blame today's predicament on what some saw from the 1960s onward as the inevitable collapse of the house (of cards) that Houphouët-Boigny built."

removed it appears from the reality it purportedly describes. The divorcing between rhetoric and reality regarding peace in Côte d'Ivoire can be seen in elite discourse surrounding symbolic events that celebrated peace after the signing of the OPA. The first is the *flame de la paix*, which was the national celebration of peace held after the signing of the OPA on the 30th and 31st of July 2007 in Bouaké in central Côte d'Ivoire, on the northern side of the old *zone de confiance* that had divided the country in two. The official ceremony included all of the principal actors in Côte d'Ivoire's civil war, as well as a host of other international actors, including France, the UN, Thabo Mbeki, Blaise Compaoré and the Presidents or representatives of a number of other African countries. Approximately 25,000 people were on hand to watch the ceremony at the *Stade de Bouaké* (or, in its subsequent incarnation, the *Stade de la Paix*). The second group of events, *les caravans de la paix*, was a series of nation-wide tours, organized by prominent politicians on either side of the old lines of the conflict, for the purpose of promoting peace between rival communities.

Official discourse surrounding 'peace' during the *flame de la paix* celebration suggested such expectations.[25] Addressing the thousands in attendance, Soro emphatically declared that "I want to make peace with all of you. Peace is here. Peace is here in Bouaké!" Additionally, "if yesterday we made war, today, with our common determination, we will build peace!" Finally, "just as there is a time to make war, there is a time to make peace, there is a time to fight, there is a time to reconcile with one another, there is a time to take up arms, and there is a time let them go…Peace is here!" Gbagbo echoed similar sentiments, stating that "we are heading towards peace! We are at peace!" At another point in his speech, Gbagbo emphatically proclaimed that "the war is finished," repeating this evocative phrase six times in front the raucous crowd. The symbolic content of Gbagbo's and Soro's performances reaffirmed the dominant discourse surrounding peace developed throughout the daylong ceremony. After the Speeches by Soro and

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[25] The entire ceremony can be watched on a series of six videos through the website *Dailymotion*. See: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2novg_flammedelapaix-1_news#, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2novv_flammedelapaix-2_news#, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2noxh_flamme-de-la-paix-3_news#, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2nowf_flammedelapaix-4_news#, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2noxl_flamme-de-la-paix-5_news#, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2nox9_flamme-de-la-paix-6_news#

Gbagbo, *la flamme de la paix* was itself run into the stadium, passed from carrier to carrier leading to its final destination. Afterwards, led by Gen. Bakayoko and Gen. Mangou, a number of FAFN and FANCI military members symbolically dismantled a canon to be piled with another 2,000 arms that were set aflame. Gen. Bakayoko and Gen. Mangou subsequently gave up their arms to their political counterparts, Soro and Gbagbo. Both Gbagbo and Soro raised their arms in celebration holding the deposed arms. *La flamme de la paix* was then passed through the hands of a number of prominent international actors on the central stage and finally on to Soro and Gbagbo. Finally, the stockpile of arms held at the stadium was dramatically put to flame using *la flamme de la paix*, symbolically ending the five-year long conflict.

The theme of peace in the official discourse after the signing of the OPA was also evident in the series of '*caravans de la paix*' organized by a number of prominent politicians on either side of the conflict. Of these, the most prominent was led and organized by the former leader of the *jeunes patriotes*, Charles Blé Goudé. Goudé was named an "*ambassadeur de la réconciliation et de la paix*" by the minister in charge of national reconciliation in the transitional government, Sébatien Dano (AFP 2007a). The aim of these tours was to "announce the return of peace" across ten different cities in Côte d'Ivoire, including those under the control of the FN (AFP 2007b). Not long after his nomination as a peace ambassador, Goudé also announced the planned creation of more than two hundred "*comités de paix*" that were to be constructed across all parts of Côte d'Ivoire. The aim of these committees was to promote non-violence, support the ongoing peace process and prevent the beginning of another political and social crisis (AFP 2007c).

Another prominent discursive theme which emerged from these events was the image of the Ivoirian nation as reunited and indivisible. Throughout the *flamme de la paix*, the city of Bouaké, the host of these celebrations, featured prominently in this respect. Bouaké mattered symbolically because of its geographic location (in the centre of the country), its place within the collective national imagination (as centre of the Baoulé heartland, ethnic group of father of the nation, Houphouët-Boigny), and its role as the administrative centre of the FN during the conflict. Bouaké's symbolic significance was additionally heightened given that these ceremonies represented the first time that Gbagbo had stepped onto 'northern' soil since the beginning of the conflict. Acknowledging Bouaké's significance in these respects, Soro emphatically declared that "peace is here. Peace is here in Bouaké." Later, he re-emphasized that "Bouaké was the capital of

peace!" He would again reiterate this point, suggesting that while "Abidjan was the economic capital of our country, and Yamoussoukro was the administrative, we declare that Bouaké is the capital of peace!" More explicitly, Soro concluded that "Côte d'Ivoire was reunited, we are at peace." Soro ended his speech by asking all in attendance to hold hands and pray to god for peace in Côte d'Ivoire." Gbagbo too appealed to god, thanking him for unifying Côte d'Ivoire. Respective references to one's old antagonists in the conflict also reflected the contemporary collective belief in the indivisibility of Côte d'Ivoire. Once enemies, 'rebels' and 'patriots' on either side of the conflict now publically celebrated each other as 'brothers' and 'partners'. Referring to his old adversaries at a meeting in Yopougon, former FN spokesperson Sidiki Konaté stated that "it is a partnership for peace that has no other objective other than to search, hand in hand, for peace" (AFP 2007d) Similarly, Blé Goudé too referred to his old enemies in familial ways, calling Soro "his brother" and instructing audiences to "no longer see your brothers from the north as rebels" (AFP 2007d).

These symbolic events had a mixed effect on the legitimacy of Ivoirian elites. As discussed above, changes in discursive fields can simultaneously legitimize the position of elites *and* present opportunities for the contestation of authority for subordinate groups. One consequence of the ways in which Ivoirian elites began to talk about peace in Côte d'Ivoire after the signing of the OPA was to throw into question the legitimacy of the FN's ongoing control over the north. If, as many FN leaders themselves claimed, peace had returned to Côte d'Ivoire, then how could the ongoing political and economic control over the north by the rebels be justified? Across the rebel-held north – in Bouaké (centre), Bouna (northeast, chapter 4), and Vavoua/Séguéla (west) – the FN confronted a series of episodic movements contesting their authority after the signing of the OPA. These movements were complex. They involved a number of different groups: former combatants, youth, and different ethnic groups.

FN leaders responded to these political challenges in familiar ways. FN elites used the same discursive frames – peace as a declarative act, and the image of a singular reunified nation – to ward off these challenges to their authority. In many cases, these two discursive strategies were used in concert to show that those who have chosen to take up arms against Côte d'Ivoire have done so fruitlessly against a now unified, undivided country. They suggested that irrespective of localized acts of violence, Côte d'Ivoire remained at 'peace' after the signing of the OPA.

Referring to these uprisings, FN bigwig Issiaka ('Wattao') Ouattara suggested that these "sabre rattlers are the enemies of peace. They are not like most Ivoirians," and that despite these threats, "peace is unavoidable in Côte d'Ivoire" (Gbané 2008). Referring to those who would consider taking up arms in the post-OPA period, FN spokesperson Konaté Sidiki suggested that "those who will take up arms and fire upon someone is a bandit. Because he does not defend a cause. All of our problems were addressed at Ouagadougou" (Gbané 2008). Finally, an ongoing theme of the political discourse in post-OPA Côte d'Ivoire was the potential threat and influence of external manipulators, particularly the influence emanating from some former high-ranking FN members, such as Ibrahim Coulibaly ('IB') and Koné Zakaria. One FN member responded to the recurrent uprisings in Bouaké, stating that "we ask the secretary general of the FN to be firm on the issue of manipulators of our demobilized fighters and the destabilizers of the ongoing peace process" (Tayaro 2008). In each of these cases, the FN used images of 'peace' and 'unity' to delegitimize political challenges to the new post-conflict political order established by the OPA.

Conclusion

This chapter presented a national-level background to the Ivoirian crisis that is necessary for understanding the local cases presented in the second part of this dissertation. Beyond this however, this chapter also advanced two important arguments regarding the Ivoirian peace process and the OPA in particular, linked to the larger theoretical argument. First, while the OPA ushered in greater security throughout Côte d'Ivoire, including the north, it did little to fundamentally challenge the authority of the rebel leaders or reform the administrative system installed by the rebels. Attempts to implement the stipulations of the agreement laid bare the varied extent to which different segments of the FN were indeed committed to advancing the peace. Soro and other former FESCI activists that formed the bulk of the administrative side of the FN had strong incentives to advance the implementation of the OPA. Their political futures – their reintegration into national-level political circles – more-or-less depended on it. Members of the FAFN, particularly the FN's zone commanders, had far more to lose from the OPA's goal of administrative reunification. The power to tax wielded by many of the FN's zone commanders was indeed the target of these proposed administrative reforms.

Second, although the goal of administrative reunification proposed by the OPA did not materialize, I argue that the way national level elites began to speak about peace after the signing

of the OPA attacked the legitimacy of any claims to authority made by FN members at local-levels. The national-level peace produced by the OPA threw into question the legitimacy of the FN's ongoing control of the north. The result was heightened contestation over authority in those areas controlled by the rebels. This dissertation focuses on these political struggles over authority in three northern towns: Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou. These cases illustrate the variety of episodic movements confronting the rebels throughout the north leading up to the 2010 Presidential elections. Before examining these cases in more detail, the next chapter explains the methods and data collection strategies employed in this dissertation, as well the logic behind my case selection strategy.

Chapter 3. Methodology and Case Selection

This study explains the coalitions that form between local-level rebel leadership and pre-conflict elites during periods of armed conflict as well as how coalitions influence the level of social control armed movements are able to establish in local arenas. As outlined in chapter 1, I argue that pre-conflict brokerage relations between local-level elites and the state influence coalition formation. Differences in local level hierarchical configurations influence the degree of social control armed movements establish. In order to demonstrate my argument, I assess the relationships of different pre-conflict elites to the state, as well as the historical processes that impact the basis of their authority at local levels. During the conflict period, I examine how these variables influence both the choice of coalitional partners and the patterns of political conflict over authority.

This chapter lays out the empirical strategy employed in this dissertation. It is divided into three sections. The first explains my research design and the logic behind my case selection. It justifies a country focus on Côte d'Ivoire, the selection of the three cases included in this study – Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou, and the non-random sampling of the selected cases. The second section explains my indicators and the operationalization of my variables. The third section focuses on data collection and sources.

Case Selection and Research Design

A country focus on Côte d'Ivoire makes sense, given my research objectives, for a number of reasons. First, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a civil war (and a subsequent enduring political crisis)

in which an armed movement gained and retained control over the northern half of the country for nearly ten years (2002-2011). The lengthy period the principal armed movement involved in the conflict (the FN) controlled northern Côte d'Ivoire permitted the study of interactions between rebels and unarmed actors over time. Second, the territory controlled by the FN demonstrated variation on the values of my independent and dependent variables. The territory controlled by the FN incorporated parts of northern Côte d'Ivoire that exhibited marked differences in brokerage relations and hierarchical configurations during the pre-conflict period. Finally, political struggles over authority during the FN's occupation of the north demonstrated spatial differences in the extent to which rebels could control local communities politically.

The selected cases within Côte d'Ivoire – Bouna (in the administrative region of Zanzan, in Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire), Korhogo (in the administrative region of Savanes, in North-Central Côte d'Ivoire), and Ouangolodougou (also in the administrative region of Savanes, in North-Central Côte d'Ivoire, on Côte d'Ivoire's border with Mali and Burkina Faso) – demonstrate variation in the pre-conflict authority of local elites, as well as the political relationships these actors formed with the FN during the de facto division of the country between 2002 and 2011. Random sampling is generally thought not to be an effective strategy in small-n studies because it cannot guarantee sufficient variation on the dependent variable (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 126). The potential for selection bias was minimized because cases were selected without full knowledge of their values on either the independent variables (social hierarchy and brokerage) or the dependent variables (coalitions between rebel leadership and pre-conflict elites). Although values on the independent or dependent variables informed the selection of cases, for no case did I know the values of *both* the independent and dependent variables prior to conducting field research. Incomplete prior knowledge of sub-national and sub-group dynamics made it impossible for the cases included in this study to correspond to my argument in a pre-determined way. Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou demonstrate significant variation in the coalitions that emerged between the rebels and pre-conflict elites, as well as the lines of contestation around which conflicts over authority were fought. Although these cases

demonstrate significant sub-national and sub-group variation in Northern Côte d'Ivoire, I make no claim about their representativeness.[26]

The study provides a detailed controlled comparison of three localities that fell under the control of a single rebel group during Côte d'Ivoire's almost ten year long armed conflict (2002-2011).[27] As explained in chapter 2, the *Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) organized the original September 2002 attacks. Two western-based movements, the *Mouvement pour la justice et la paix* (MJP) and the *Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO), joined the fighting soon after. Under the banner of the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN), the MPCI ultimately absorbed the western-based movements into a unified command structure. All of the cases included in this study are parts of the territory originally controlled by the MPCI, and later the FN. The organization of the FN into distinct administrative *Com'zones* facilitated comparisons across the different localities controlled by this armed movement. Each *Com'zone* was headed by a specific zone commander, and these commanders developed distinct relationships with different pre-conflict elites in the areas under their military control. The administrative organization of the FN into distinctive *Com'zones* influenced what I determined to be a sub-national or sub-group 'case' of rebel-civilian relations.[28]

Given the questions motivating this study, comparing different localities under the control of the same armed movement represents an effective research strategy because it can control for confounding factors emphasized by alternative theoretical approaches (Snyder 2001). This study controls for factors that are thought to influence rebel behavior such as the breakdown of state-centered patronage networks (Reno 2005, 2007) and the interests of group members (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Weinstein 2007). The factors emphasized by these alternative approaches remain constant across the three cases included in this study. Level of military control (Kalyvas 2006; Metelits 2010) presents a challenge despite this research design because military control can

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[26] This is a problem confronting all sub-national research designs in peace and conflict studies. The extent to which causal claims derived from small-n sub-national designs apply to the broader universe of cases is difficult to establish because the information regarding specific cases is generally not known prior to case selection (Simons and Zanker 2012, 5).

[27] 2002-2011 represents the time in which the FN formally controlled the north. However, the case material included in this dissertation discusses events up until 2013.

[28] However, as indicated above, two of my cases, Ouangolodougou and Korhogo were part of the same *com'zone*.

change over time during the course of a conflict. To confront this potential problem, my research design includes localities where, for the most part, levels of military contestation and control by the FN did not vary across space and over time. After the establishment the French enforced *zone de confiance* in 2004 that split the country in two, levels of military control remained fairly constant throughout the rebel controlled north. All three research sites were well behind this administrative division of the country. Bouna and Ouangolodougou were within 100km of Côte d'Ivoire's northern border with Burkina Faso. Ouangolodougou and Korhogo were part of the same administrative *com'zone*. Thus, factors such as the breakdown of state patronage networks, rebel interests and levels of rebel control do not easily account for cross-regional differences in relationships established between civilians and rebels under control of the same rebel movement. Overall, this study employs a research strategy similar to Mill's method of difference (see Ragin 1987, 38; George and Bennett 2005, 156) and what Przeworski and Teune (1970, 32-33) refer to as "most similar systems" research design where the cases under study are similar in many theoretically relevant ways (levels of military control, the absence or presence of natural resources, rebel organization, 'state-failure'), except for differences in the causal variable of interest.

Despite these efforts to control for cross-regional variation in rebel leadership and administration across the northern territory controlled by the rebels, there are some important differences between Bouna (part of *Com'zone* 1), Korhogo and Ouangolodougou (which were both part of *Com'zone* 10). Compared to Korhogo and Ouangolodougou, Bouna was unique because actors representing the political wing of the FN were not installed until well after the beginning of the conflict. This might suggest that organizational differences (Weinstein 2007; Johnson 2008), rather than the pre-conflict authority of local elites, were responsible for the different outcomes observed in Bouna, compared to Ouangolodougou and Korhogo. Similarly, Korhogo was the site of bloody clashes between pro-IB and pro-Soro factions of the FN (see chapter 2). Bouna and Ouangolodougou were spared from this factional fighting. I evaluate the relative causal influence of these other factors in the case chapters that follow.

Scholars have observed a number of significant limitations to research strategies relying solely on controlled comparison (see King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 128; Ragin 1987:39; George and Bennett 2005, 156-162; Van Evera 1997, 47). These strategies are limited in the

extent to which they can account and control for all possible causal factors, as well as problems related to multiple causation (equifinality). In order to mitigate some of these problems, this study also employs process-tracing. Process-tracing aims to link different types of evidence to illustrate the processes by which causal factors influence the outcome of interest (Tarrow 2004, 173; Bennett and George 2005, 206). Process-tracing requires in-depth knowledge of specific cases. An intimate familiarity with one or a few cases allows researchers to unpack the complex relationships between different causal factors, causal processes and the outcome to be explained. The narratives provided in each of the case studies are "deliberatively selective" (Bennett and George 2005, 211). They explain outcomes by purposely privileging the proposed set of causal factors and relationships outlined in the first part of this dissertation, specifically the relationship between the pre-conflict political authority of local elites and coalition-building. Process-tracing also allows me to consider some of the other potential causal factors not acknowledged or controlled for through cross-case comparison, such as differences in levels of violence or rebel organization building. I weigh the potential causal influence of any unique features of the cases that might also explain the outcomes observed. Overall, mapping the causal mechanisms through which pre-conflict brokerage relations and the political authority of local elites shapes processes on the ground will strengthen the inferences drawn from cross-case analysis.

Some cases considered for inclusion in the study, such as Man, Séguéla and Vavoua in the parts of Western Côte d'Ivoire controlled by the FN, were ultimately excluded because of security concerns. As became apparent after my arrival in Côte d'Ivoire, heightened violence and political tensions after the beginning of the 2010 electoral crisis made research in the western part of the country extremely difficult and risky. Of those remaining cases where field work remained possible, I included cases that demonstrated variation on either the values of independent or dependent variables. As a result, cases were selected during the course of my field-work as I began to grasp better the spatial and temporal variation in the relationships that had developed between the FN and civilian populations under their control.

Korhogo (chapter 5) was chosen because I had some familiarity with the political history of this region before arriving in the country. There is a substantial secondary literature in history, geography and political science focusing on the Korhogo region (Coulibaly 1964; Gunderson 1975; Launay 1982, 1992; Bassett 1988, 2001; Boone 2003). Korhogo was the only case for

which I had some prior understanding of the pre-conflict position of local elites as brokers. However, I knew little regarding the quality of the political order established by the FN in this part of the north prior to my field work. I selected two other field sites based on preliminary archival research and discussions with acquaintances and interviewees in Abidjan and Korhogo.

Figure 3.1: Côte d'Ivoire: Bouna, Ouangolodougou and Korhogo (original map source: Wikipedia.com, modified by Melanie Ferrara).

I included Bouna (chapter 4) as a case after initial newspaper and archival research suggested that the political order established by the FN was potentially far more fragile and contested there than in other parts of the north. Although newspaper and archival research provided some idea of the limited extent to which the FN mobilized political support around Bouna, I had no prior knowledge of the history of local politics in this part of Northern Côte d'Ivoire. Ouangolodougou (chapter 6) was selected in a similar way, with incomplete prior knowledge of the political authority of local elites and the coalitions and conflicts that emerged during the course of the conflict. After I explained my research project to a friend in Korhogo, he suggested that I include Ouangolodougou as a potential case because, in his opinion, relationships between elites and FN leadership were very different in Ouangolodougou than they were in Korhogo. Beyond this single conversation, I had little understanding of how Ouangolodougou compared to Korhogo and Bouna in terms of the pre-conflict political authority of elites or the political relationships established between the rebels and these actors during the conflict. Overall, the absence of prior knowledge of the value of one or both of the independent and dependent variables for each of the cases included in this study limited selection bias. If selecting cases on the values of both the dependent and independent variables causes problems because the results may match hypotheses in a predetermined ways (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 142-143), my case selection strategy avoids such problems.

The causal narratives in the case chapters demonstrate how brokerage relations and hierarchical configurations shape coalition formation and political struggles over local-level authority in each case. The first part of each chapter looks at the social, political and economic processes that influenced the political authority of local elites and their relations with the pre-conflict state. The second half of each chapter examines how these differences informed coalition-building, as well as the local-level struggles over authority ignited by the rebellion.

Operationalization and Indicators

This study examines the relationship between the political authority of pre-conflict elites and the kinds of coalitions and struggles over authority that emerge in rebel-controlled zones. To evaluate the political authority of pre-conflict elites, I privilege two variables: elite brokerage relations with the state and hierarchical configurations of elite groups. In the case chapters, I distinguish

groups according to a mix of different overlapping political and socio-economic categories: faction, ethnicity, class or stranger/native distinctions. In each case, groups are defined according to the predominant socio-political cleavages around which political contests are fought in each locality. In some cases political conflict was based on stranger-native distinctions; in others, factional divisions distinguished different groups.

My first independent variable is elite brokerage relations. As explained in Chapter 1, I understand brokerage relations as having two sources: dependence on the state and alignment. State dependence refers to the extent to which leaders are dependent on their relationships with the state for the reproduction of their local level authority. Alignment refers to whether leaders are political partners of the state, even if their authority is derived autonomously from it.

I operationalize brokerage relations by examining different aspects of the relationship between local elites and the central state. First, are local elites dependent on national-level actors to establish and maintain rules and institutions at local-levels? For instance, are the rules governing property the result of state settlement schemes? Does the enforcement of these rules depend on the coercive capabilities of the state (police, armed forces)? Does the maintenance of these rules depend on national level political support and the resources elites derive from their connections to the central state? Also, can local elites mobilize resources independently of the state? Or are they reliant on their relationship with national-level actors to gain access to resources through grants, subsidies, political rents and other kinds of resource transfers between national and local governments? Politically, are local elites members of ruling parties? Do they have official state titles? I consider elites 'brokers' at the time of civil war onset if elites exhibit any one of the following characteristics: they represent the ruling party, coalition, or state in some official capacity, they enforce institutions and rules produced by the state (such as private property rights regimes) or they are dependent on the state for gaining access to resources. Different broker attributes or combinations of attributes point to differences in brokerage relationships discussed above: dependence on the state and alignment. Dependent brokers will generally exhibit the last two characteristics (enforcement of rules produced by the state and reliance on the state for resources), while elites who are brokers through alignment, will only exhibit the first (formal representation of the state or government). In contrast to brokers, non-broker elites do not represent the ruling party or the state politically, they enforce local

institutions and rules independently of the state, and they have autonomous access to resources. In some of the cases included in this study, local elites were brokers in the past, but did not play this role at the time of civil war onset. I define elites as brokers for the sake of my analysis only if they play this role at the time of civil war onset.

To measure 'hierarchical configurations', I need to evaluate the social hierarchy of each group then compare the social hierarchy of each group within a given locality. I first categorize elite groups as having either 'high' or 'low' levels of social hierarchy. The concept social hierarchy is multidimensional. In this study, I consider three dimensions of social hierarchy: economic differentiation, political authority and levels of concentration. On the economic dimension, I code elite groups as having high levels of social hierarchy when elites have access to material resources *and* assume dominant positions in local economies. Elites exercise economic dominance when they control the commanding heights of the economy, as indicated by capital accumulation (land, factories and other factors of production) and the percentage of total local economic production attributed to elite groups. On the political dimension, I code groups as being hierarchical when subordinate groups follow political and social rules enforced by elites. Finally, in terms of relative concentration of authority, I consider elite groups as having high levels of social hierarchy when elites enforcing rules are relatively few in number and these rules apply to many people. The social hierarchy of elite groups is highest when authority is concentrated in the hands of a few, elites play prominent roles in local economies, and they have the capacity to enforce political and social rules over a large number of people. Conversely, elites in groups where social hierarchy is low play restricted roles in local economies and will have limited capacity to enforce rules. These groups typically feature a large number of elites, with each elite exerting relatively limited influence. In this study, I categorize groups as having high social hierarchy when they have high levels of social hierarchy on any two of these three dimensions. The social hierarchy of elite groups is considered to be low, when only one or none of these dimensions is coded as being high.

Hierarchical configurations reflect the relative social hierarchy of broker and rebel ally groups (non-brokers) within the same locality. Possible configurations are high/high, high/low and low/low (see Figure 3.1). The bottom right-hand cell of figure 3.1 represents those localities that are loosely governed by any group or the state. In these cases there is an absence of any elite

group (tied to the state or otherwise). These might be zones with very low population densities and highly decentralized forms of political organization. For these reasons we are unlikely to see coalition-building and so I have excluded this cell from my analysis.

Social hierarchy of pre-conflict state brokers	**Social hierarchy of rebel allies (non-brokers)**	
	High	Low
High	*Moderate social control*. Indirect resistance against rebels. Ongoing factional conflict between pre-conflict elites	*Low social control*. Substantial resistance against rebels
Low	*High social control*. Limited or weak resistance against rebels.	*Absence of local elites.* Absence of indigenous elite and limited state presence.

Table. 3.1: Levels of Social Control in Rebel Zones

As its dependent variables, this study explains two related aspects of patterns of political conflict: coalitions and levels of control armed movements establish in local arenas. In the context of civil war, coalitions are not easily observed (unlike in electoral competition where coalitions between political parties are often formally and publically declared). I consider a coalition to be present when the rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites express similar views or positions regarding political conflicts at local-level. To evaluate whether coalitions are present, I look at whether or not pre-conflict elites and rebels make public (in newspapers) or private (in interviews) statements that indicate whether they are supportive of each other regarding locally contentious issues (i.e. the authority to tax, chiefly succession). I consider coalitions to be absent when rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites express opposing positions regarding political conflicts at the local-level or when these actors express direct criticisms of one another.

I capture differences in levels of social control along a simple ordinal scale. Rebels exhibit either 'high', 'medium' or 'low' levels of social control in particular localities. In this study, I conceptualize social control as having two dimensions: levels of elite conflict and acceptance of rules governing social life (taxation, land use, etc.) by subordinate groups. Distinguishing levels of elite conflict and support for social rules is conceptually challenging

because, as discussed in chapter 1, all authority relationships are, to a degree, contested and open to renegotiation. Nonetheless, where levels of elite conflict are high, we should see intense competition between elites over authority and resources, manifest as prolonged public criticism of each other and even participation in or organization of social movements or episodic violence targeted at one another. Where elite conflict is low, heated, public conflict will be absent or episodic. In these cases, elite conflicts over authority and resources are resolved through mix of dialogue and coercion/political pressure. Where the acceptance of social rules is low, we should expect widespread disagreement over the basic rules and institutions that govern social life (land rights, taxation). Disagreement would be evident when there is widespread criticism and episodic violence directed at actors responsible for enforcing different social rules by non-elites or subordinate groups. Where the acceptance of social rules is high, there should be little resistance against rebels and widespread compliance to the rules enforced by armed groups or their pre-conflict elite allies. Instances of high levels of social control are those cases where there are low levels of elite conflict and widespread acceptance of rules. Low levels of social control are cases where the inverse is observed, where there are high levels of elite conflict and widespread rejection of the social rules. Medium levels of social control represent those cases where there is either high levels of elite conflict and widespread acceptance of rules or there is low levels of elite conflict and extensive rejection of rules.

I examine coalitions and control as two related aspects of political contestation by focusing on the power struggles precipitated by Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict transition over local taxation. After the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords in 2007, authority over taxation in the north emerged as one of the most contentious political issues. Many hardliners on the government side felt that issues such as disarmament, national identification and the fiscal and administrative reunification of the country should proceed before the holding of elections. However, resistance to change from many of the FN's zone commanders limited the impact of efforts at administrative unification, particularly in regards to the transferring of fiscal authority over taxation (see chapter 2).

Why focus on taxation? The politics of taxation has featured prominently in histories of comparative state building. Karl Marx (quoted in Campbell 1993, 164) suggested that taxes were the state's "source of life". Margaret Levi (1988, 1) wrote that "the history of state revenue

production is the history of the evolution of the state". Charles Tilly (1985, 1992) famously highlighted the intimate relationships between war, the collection of tax revenues and state building in the European experience. International political competition and war-making drove political leaders to ratchet up their effort and capacity to mobilize revenue. Generally, elites were forced to shift from a reliance on revenues derived from tax farming and private estates to those managed directly by the state and derived from increasingly broad segments of the population. The informational requirements for improving the legibility (and 'taxability') of subject populations demanded highly educated state agents and a professionalized bureaucracy characteristic of many contemporary developed states. Conversely, in Africa, states were generally relieved from the pressure to efficiently raise resources because of the international protection afforded to them by norms of non-intervention advanced by international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Herbst 2000). Resources derived from the international community through ties to commercial firms, international aid organizations and foreign governments all provided a further disincentive for African leaders to mobilize resources and build states akin to the European model (Guyer 1992; Clapham 1996; Moore 1998; Herbst 2000). Overall, across diverse state building experiences, taxes have played a central role in shaping the relationship between states and citizens.

This study joins more recent work that recognizes taxation by non-state actors and questions why citizens are willing to pay taxes to some authority figures and not others. Kristine Juul (2006, 823) tackles this question in rural Senegal where, in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential elections, "the Socialist Party lost its hegemonic position in the country, leaving local inhabitants uncertain as to who was worthy of their allegiance, and hence to whom it was safe to pay a tax". As an example of what von Benda-Beckmann (1981) termed "forum shopping," the decision to pay taxes to particular groups (and not to others) can confer both legitimacy on the authority relationship in question and create a set of obligations running from authorities to actors willing to pay taxes (Lund 2006; Juul 2006). In the case of Senegal, Juul shows how herders originally from the Fuuta region along the Senegal River Basin used the payment of taxes to local notables to signify their allegiance to these leaders and ensure that they be counted as citizens in the rural communities around Barkedji. The paying of taxes created a set of obligations surrounding citizen rights demanded by the herders. Nonetheless, these claims were still hotly

contested by some indigenous groups (2006, 838-839). Of course, the payment of taxes to dominant actors also works to confirm their claim to authority. Scholars in this literature have drawn broad distinctions between taxes procured through coercive means, and those gained through some social consensus or bargaining (Tilly 1992; Moore 2004). Most tax regimes fall between these two extremes. All taxes require some level of legitimation because social actors generally retain some autonomy regarding their decision to comply with tax demands (Braithwaite 2003).

Political struggles over the authority to tax direct attention to coalition formation. In this study, rebel leaders politically challenged some pre-conflict elites and forged alliances with others in order to buttress their claims to fiscal authority. Coalitional choices shaped the extent to which rebels could draw on popular support to defend their authority over taxation. In some cases, the rebels aligned with powerful elites to restrict the authority of the state. In others, the pre-conflict elite allies of the rebels were weaker. Here, the fiscal authority of the FN was far more effectively challenged by other groups mobilized against it.

Data Collection and Sources

This project requires observations demonstrating the causal relationship between brokerage relations and wartime coalition-building *and* the relationship between hierarchical configurations and levels of rebel control. To assess these relationships, this study analyzes data from a variety of sources including secondary materials, 'grey' documents (government and unpublished reports and theses), NGO reports, newspapers and interviews. Most of the material covering the civil war period was collected during an approximately six month field-trip to Côte d'Ivoire from August 2010 to March 2011. In this section, I discuss my data sources and the challenges associated with them.

The first section of each case chapter examines the regional academic and 'grey' literatures in political science, sociology and anthropology to reconstruct the social processes shaping brokerage relations and the political authority of local elites. My evaluations of wartime authority relations and levels of political support draw on data from two principal sources: Ivoirian daily newspapers (either in print or on-line) and field interviews. Newspapers were critical to selecting cases, as described above. My fieldwork began in Abidjan, where I spent over

a month collecting newspaper articles at the *Bibliothèque Nationale,* focusing primarily on the conflict period that began in 2002. The goal at this time was to accumulate materials that would highlight the sub-national variation of interest to this study. Topics included: local and regional politics in different parts of the north, protest movements, the then upcoming Presidential elections (which took place in October and November 2010), violence, factional conflict within the FN, economic issues, and specific prominent political actors in the FN or in Northern Côte d'Ivoire more generally.

Many newspapers in Côte d'Ivoire explicitly represent 'pro-government' or 'pro-opposition' sides of national-level political cleavages or are tied to specific political parties and political actors.[29] In sifting through the vast amount of available newspaper materials, I made a conscious effort to use newspapers representing all of the sides surrounding specific political issues. For example, when I required information on a certain political event, I searched for articles from newspapers on different sides of Côte d'Ivoire's political spectrum to get competing perspectives on the issue. In some cases, this was challenging given that regional identities underscored the dominant cleavages in Ivoiran political life. In particular, papers that focused more on local and regional issues in the north (such as *Nord-Sud Quotidien* for example) were also supportive of the northern-based opposition, namely the FN and the RDR. Where possible, however, I triangulated data derived from different newspapers, NGO documents and field interviews.

After the completion of my field interviews in Northern Côte d'Ivoire (in Korhogo, Ouangolodougou and Bouna) in March 2011, I spent another three weeks at the *Bibliothèque Nationale* to catch up on coverage during my stay in these regions. During this second round of archival research, I intentionally sought articles about events and political debates drawn to my attention during field interviews. After my return to Canada, I conducted internet research,

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[29] Lori-Anne Théroux-Benoni groups the dailies in Côte d'Ivoire into three broad categories including "pro-government or 'blue newspapers,'" "opposition or 'G7 newspapers,'" and "independent newspapers or 'Tightrope walkers.'" Pro-government newspapers include the state-owned *Fraternité Matin*, as well as *Notre Voie*, *Le Temps*, *Le Courier d'Abidjan*, *Le Matin d'Abidjan* and *L'Oeil du People*, which all have close ties to former President Gbagbo's party the FPI. Opposition parties have affiliations to a broader set of groups. *Le Patriote, Le Jour +, 24 heures, Nord-Sud Quotidien, Dernières Nouvelles d'Abidjan* all have close ties to the RDR. *Le Nouveau Réveil* and *L'Événement* have links to the PDCI-RDA. *Le Front* and *Dernières Heures Express* have direct connections to the rebellion itself. Independent newspapers include *Soir Info, L'Inter* and *L'intelligent d'Abidjan* (2009, 126).

primarily through *Abidjan.net*, to follow pertinent unfolding events such as the post-conflict appointments of former FN officials and the 2013 regional and municipal elections.[30] Thus, in addition to guiding case selection, articles from Ivoirian dailies provided much of the empirical material used to analyze the conflicts over authority described in each of the case chapters. They allowed me to fill in some of the gaps in information gleaned from secondary materials or NGO reports. Additionally, they helped to structure interview questions and corroborate testimonies provided in interview settings.

Field interviews and newspapers sources were critical in providing necessary descriptive material on which to base the inferences in this study. Outside of the case of Korhogo (see Förster 2010, 2012, forthcoming), there is very little academic research examining war-time political processes in the sub-national regions examined in this dissertation. Where geographic variation during Côte d'Ivoire's civil war has been considered at all, the focus has generally been on differences between the north (the territory under control of the FN) and the cocoa-growing regions of the southwest and the only differences examined have been relative levels of violence.

I conducted 59 interviews (around 20 at each research site) with a variety of actors, including international and local NGO workers, youth leaders, customary authorities (chiefs, kings or religious leaders), members of mayoral offices, local journalists, and actors representing the administrative, military and fiscal wings of the FN, as well as young men and women who joined the northern rebel movement (see appendix for list of interviews conducted). I conducted interviews in all three of the localities under focus in this study: Bouna, Korhogo, Ouangolodougou, as well as a small number of interviews in Abidjan. Most interviews were conducted in these major cities. Others took place in small villages in the peri-urban areas surrounding them. Time and financial constraints and, at times, security concerns limited my ability to conduct research in rural areas far from urban centers.

Field interviews supplemented data derived from newspaper sources. Two types of information were derived from interviews. First, they provided important insight into the types of conflicts over authority discussed in each case. In two of the cases – Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – my examination of local-level conflicts over authority was based entirely on

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[30] *Abidjan.net* is an online source which presents articles printed by the entire spectrum of Côte d'Ivoire's newspapers. Most of the major newspapers themselves do not have online databases.

information derived from interviews. Second, in combination with newspapers, field interviews were used to reconstruct wartime narratives for each of the sub-national cases, construct causal stories out of ostensibly distinct dynamics, and link differences in the political authority of pre-conflict elites to the observed variation in elite-rebel relationships established during the conflict period.

Conducting field interviews in highly politicized research settings such as Côte d'Ivoire can present a unique set of challenges for researchers (King 2009; Norman 2009; Thomson 2010). Insecurity and lingering suspicions about the reliability and true intentions of those asking questions in these types of contexts can make finding interviewees and conducting interviews difficult. Speaking about politics to anyone, let alone a stranger, can represent a substantial risk for participants. The time period of my field-work largely overlapped with Côte d'Ivoire's 'electoral crisis' and the subsequent military stalemate which followed (see Chapter 2). As a result, political tensions were particularly high. I employed a number of strategies to gain access to potential interviewees and to assuage any fears participants might have had about speaking to me.

Central to these strategies was my relationship with my host at each of the three research sites. Upon my arrival at a new research site, my host was always my initial contact and worked to facilitate my research in a variety of ways. They commonly provided basic amenities such as food and shelter (and even nursed me back to health during periods of illness!). They also represented my first contact into the social universes into which I was stepping. Robert Launay eloquently describes his experience as a 'stranger,' and his relationship with his host during the time of his research on Dyula traders in northern Côte d'Ivoire (Korhogo and Kadioha), paralleling my own experience:

> Anyone spending any time in a Dyula community necessarily has a host; it is a first and necessary step towards any meaningful integration into the community, in the short as well as the long term. It is the responsibility of the host to mediate between the incoming individual, his stranger, and the community at large. During my stay in the field in Korhogo and Kadioha, I was constantly relying on my hosts to establish contacts between myself and other members of the community. At times, the situation was constraining; I was identified with my hosts for the worse as well as for the better, at least in those instances where they were themselves in conflict with other members of the community. But it would have been unthinkable to try and work myself out of the situation by dissociating myself from my

> hosts: who could trust a stranger who would try and stab his host in the back? I hasten that I had no reason to complain, as my hosts repeatedly went to a great deal of trouble in trying to help me with all the various aspects of my research, however incomprehensible my motives may have seemed; without them, I would have considerable difficulty accomplishing anything at all in the field (Launay 1979, 76).

In Korhogo and Bouna, I established contact with the persons who would become my host only upon my arrival. In Korhogo, I met my host while looking for a room to rent. In Bouna, I was introduced to my host while being detained by the FN at a checkpoint on the outskirts of the city. In both cases, the social background of my host was very similar: they were both male, Senoufo, Muslim, in their mid-30s, and small businessmen. My host in Korhogo was politically active. He was an RDR member and community organizer for the party. My host in Bouna was self-employed and was not politically active. In Ouangolodougou, my relationship with my host was established beforehand (by my host in Korhogo). In contrast to my hosts in Bouna and Korhogo, my host in Ouangolodougou was an important political actor in the city. He was from Ferkessédougou and had fought for the FN in Western Côte d'Ivoire during the early stages of the conflict (see Chapter 2). During my time in Ouangolodougou, he worked as part of the FN's financial wing. Close ties to an actor such as this could have had potentially negative consequences for my research. For instance, this relationship could make interviewees think twice about expressing any negative sentiments regarding the FN's management of the city. However, I found my relationship with my host encouraged interviewees to speak critically because they knew that he approved of my presence in the city. My host's approval of my presence reassured my interviewees that there would not be any negative consequences resulting from their participation in my research.

My hosts helped me establish relationships with actors whose permission I required to begin field-work. These were either local political actors (mayors or traditional leaders, *chefs des quartiers*) or members of the FN. In some cases, all I needed was verbal confirmation that I was permitted to stay; in others, written authorization was provided. Being able to show participants that I was authorized to conduct interviews by these different actors often went far in easing any concerns they might have had about speaking with me (see Thompson 2010, 23). These relationships were also important in scheduling interviews themselves as they were often deeply embedded in the network of people with whom I was interested in speaking. They were often

more than willing to point to the buildings or offices where I could find someone or even give out the cell phone numbers of potential interviewees.

More generally, my research strategy entailed building on the webs of social relationships in which my hosts were embedded.[31] Participants who had established relationships with my host were almost always willing to speak with me. Sometimes my hosts would use these relationships to help me schedule interviews with individuals whom they did not directly know. More often than not, they had a cousin, colleague or a neighbor who knew someone who could schedule an appointment with someone with whom I wanted to speak. In other cases, I let them more directly guide my interview schedule. Fears of potential bias were assuaged when I felt that my hosts had a good sense of the diversity of actors I wanted to interview and it became evident they were introducing me to actors with opposing views on local and national politics (for example, members of all the major political parties). My hosts often recommended speaking with individuals about whom I had no prior knowledge, but who proved to be invaluable sources of information (e.g., specific NGO workers or local journalists).

Finally, simply making an effort to be part of everyday life in these settings went far in gaining the confidence of participants. While in the field, I always tried to go to church[32], play soccer, walk to the market, or have dinner at friends' (or friends' of friends) homes whenever I was invited. On a four day bus ride from Ferkessédougou to Bouna (which was scheduled to take six hours), I never complained and always helped 'push start' the small bus we were travelling on whenever it broke down. I can safely say that the notoriety I earned in Bouna as a result of this voyage furthered my research. The net impact of these everyday acts was to build genuine human relationships based on trust and mutual respect. This in turn encouraged individuals to speak their mind in interview settings without the fear of reprisals or any other negative consequences (Thompson 2010, 25). Guarantees of confidentiality given at the beginning of each interview also worked to assuage any lingering fears that participants might have had about speaking to me.

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[31] This is a form of "Snowball Sampling," or "link-tracing" methodologies "which use social networks of interviewees to expand the researcher's contacts" (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 427).

[32] Although Northern Côte d'Ivoire is predominantly Muslim, many of the families that I stayed with were mixed in terms of religious affiliation. I was often asked to accompany Christian family members to church on Sundays.

The interviews themselves were structured around a series of questions tailored around the specific roles of the interviewees. The principal objective of interview questions was to probe actors regarding what they thought were the prominent local-level debates and conflicts in their sub-region during the civil war period, the reactions of different actors and groups to these conflicts, and the tentative outcomes of these contests. Other questions focused on personal histories, institutional dynamics (examining the rise and decline of state and rebel authority in the north), and opinions regarding a host of local and national-level political processes. Responses to these questions gave me important insight into the nature of the cleavages which underwrote contestations over authority in each of the three research sites while under control of the FN. Interviews themselves were conducted in different settings. In some instances, interviews took place as a one-on-one discussion, including just me and the participant. In other instances, participants indicated that they would feel more comfortable with my host present in the room. In these cases, interviews often devolved into very informal small group discussions. In a minority of instances, interviews took place in larger group contexts. For example, some local level leaders often had a group of advisors who commonly surrounded them during discussions about politics. Debates that emerged within these groups were often fruitful in themselves for my research.

The following case chapters – focusing on the conflicts over authority in Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou during the FN's time in control of the north – build on the theoretical argument introduced in Part I of this dissertation and draw on the diverse empirical material introduced above. In each case, I focus on the coalitions formed between the local rebel leadership and segments of the pre-conflict elite, as well as how these alliances informed political contestations over the authority to tax during the post-OPA period. This study provides compelling evidence of the causal impact of differences in the pre-conflict authority of local elites on the coalitions and political conflicts that emerge in regions under rebel control during armed conflict.

PART II

Chapter 4. Rebellion and Revolt in Bouna's Contested *Com'zone*

Of all the regions under the control of the FN after the failed coup d'état in 2002, Bouna was the place where the authority of the rebels was arguably the most contested. The region's largest ethnic group, the Lobi community, generally viewed the FN with great disdain. Many Lobi felt that the new tax regime installed by the rebels specifically targeted them as a group. Tensions quickly emerged between the region's zone commander, Morou Ouattara and the prominent Lobi politician, Palé Dimaté. These tensions culminated in a 2007 tax revolt organized by some segments of the city's Lobi youth, as discussed briefly in Chapter 1. This chapter suggests that the limited capacity of Morou Ouattara and the rest of the FN in Bouna to mobilize support for their local-level authority stemmed from a lack of any strong social partner. In Bouna, Lobi elites were by far the most influential group. However, their status as state brokers precluded this group as a potential local ally of the rebels. The hierarchical configuration confronted by the FN restricted their efforts to politically control local populations. Based on my framework, this chapter identifies Bouna as a case where the rebels established *limited social control*.

Beginning during the colonial period, diverse state interventions in northeastern Côte d'Ivoire politically supported the Lobi as a group. Lobi migration to Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire began prior to the onset of French colonialism and intensified over the course of the 20th century during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Prior to their migration to Côte d'Ivoire, Lobi social organization was highly decentralized (Savonnet 1962, 86-87; Fiéloux 1980, 41-43 de Rouville 1987, 14). Diverse economic and social practices inhibited the development of social hierarchies within Lobi communities. To this day, hierarchies running through Lobi communities

appear far less pronounced compared to other cases examined in this study (the Senoufo in Korhogo or Ouangolo's traders). The key factor differentiating Bouna from the other cases in this study was that in Côte d'Ivoire's northeast, state interventions worked to directly *produce* or *constitute* social hierarchies that emerged within Lobi communities. State interventions during the colonial and post-colonial periods restructured social relations in a number of significant ways. State efforts at settling the Lobi and ensuring Lobi access to land facilitated economic development and class differentiation.

State interventions also altered the relationship between the Lobi and the Koulongo, the ethnic group native to Bouna and its surrounding rural areas. As a group, the Koulongo witnessed it's relative political and economic clout decline dramatically after the turn of the 20th century. In particular, as a result of increasing state sanctioned Lobi migration, elites representing the old Koulongo monarchy in Bouna witnessed a precipitous decline in their control over the allocation and use of land. Consequently, the Lobi fared much better economically than the Koulongo during this time. Many Lobi male lineage heads became wealthy through the cultivation and export of yam to markets in Abidjan and elsewhere in the south. Over the course of the post-colonial period, wealthy Lobi family heads eventually began to displace the old Koulongo elite as representatives of the then single party, the PDCI, in Bouna and the surrounding region. Lobi elites simultaneously became the principal enforcers (as the key representatives of the party-state apparatus) and beneficiaries (as wealthy farmers) of the institutional order imposed by the PDCI's national-level leadership in Abidjan.

Although their relationship with the PDCI effectively consolidated the position of the Lobi elites as the principal set of interlocutors between state and society in the Ivoirian northeast, hierarchies within the Lobi community and the relative status of the Lobi and the Koulongo in Bouna remained highly dependent on the ongoing support of the state. Without this backing, Lobi elites possessed few autonomous means of controlling or subordinating other community members. The lingering threat of national level leaders *reversing* the institutional order through which they ruled this part of the north necessitated that Lobi elites retained the good graces of national-level elites.[33] As a result, Lobi dominance remains contingent upon their sustained

[33] The threat of reversal is, in a sense, a problem confronting different kinds of institutional orders. The local status quo can be challenged anywhere by reforms introduced from above. The argument here is that reform is far more

relationship with national-level political actors. This is not to say that the Lobi politicians discussed in this chapter did not draw or benefit from local support for their positions of authority. Rather, this support itself stemmed from the fact that all Lobi (not just elites) depended on the continuation of the institutional order enforced by the state (for example, for access to land).

Strong ties between Lobi elites and the central state meant that, at the onset of the conflict, the most numerous and politically and economically influential group in the northeast was immediately placed in a position of opposition to the rebellion. Moreover, rebels viewed Lobi elites such as Palé Dimaté, a prominent long-time PDCI politician, as government sponsored opponents to the rebellion. Overall, many Lobi felt the rebellion represented a direct threat to their interests. Close ties established between the FN and elites linked to the old Koulongo monarchy contributed to the unpopularity of the FN because they supported the view held by many in Bouna's Lobi community that they were unfairly bearing the brunt of the rebellion. Rightly or wrongly, these feelings were reinforced by the perception that FN management of day-to-day life in Bouna (management of aid projects, conflicts over land) unfairly benefited the Koulongo as a group. Resistance to the rebellion from the Lobi – culminating in a 2007 tax revolt – ultimately stemmed from the unequal balance of power between those elites with whom the rebels chose to ally (Koulongo elites) and the state brokers whom they opposed (Lobi elites).

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likely in cases such as Bouna because the political institutions governing social and political life are themselves very much creatures of the state to begin with.

Figure 4.1. Map of the administrative Region of Zanzan, Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire (original map source: reliefweb.int, modified by Melanie Ferrara).

The events observed in Bouna could plausibly support other explanations as to why armed movements might confront difficulties in mobilizing support. One could make the claim that, because members of the FN were primarily interested in accumulating material wealth (rather than advancing the ideological claims of the movement, or larger community goals), its relationship with Bouna's population not surprisingly deteriorated over time. Quite simply, the case of FN in Bouna might accurately represent a case of what Weinstein (2007) termed "opportunistic rebellions". This explanation has some merit but does not explain the whole picture. Taxation was a common complaint across the north. In Bouna, rebel interventions that

were interpreted as unevenly targeting one group over the other were also important sources of popular discontent with the movement. Rather than focusing on rebel behavior, this chapter contends that the high level of resistance confronted by the rebellion was a product of the specific ways in which local elites mediated state/society relationships in the Ivoirian northeast *prior to* the conflict.

The first part of this chapter provides greater detail on the colonial and post-colonial historical origins and organizational characteristics of the two principal ethnic communities in Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire – the Koulongo and Lobi – as well their interactions. It explains how Lobi elites, rather than the 'indigenous' Koulongo, became the principal intermediaries between state and society in this part of the north. The second half of the chapter shows how the status of the Lobi elite as brokers obstructed the FN's efforts to build local support and establish control.

State-Building and the Dynamics of Lobi-Koulongo Relations in Pre-Conflict Bouna

Bouna was one of a handful of powerful West African city-states that emerged beginning in the 13th century after the expansion of Mandé dominated networks, which connected trans-Sahelian trade to the forest zones of West Africa. Bouna itself was established later in the 16th century in reaction to the increase in inter-African and Afro-European trade in gold. Its importance stemmed from its function as a central node within this regional trade network linking other city-states to its north (Djenné, Sya and Timbuktu), east (Wa, Tamalé and Daboya), west (Nassian, Kong, Dabakala and Bouaké) and south (Bondoukou, and later, European coastal traders). Political centralization and the formation of the Koulongo dynasty in Bouna represented a political response to the spread of Mandé traders (also known as Wangala or Dyula) and increased regional commercial activity. Political and military centralization was deemed necessary to protect trade caravans from marauders between the urban nodes in these trading networks (Boutillier 1969, 4, 8; 1993, 22-24).

Bouna was founded in the mid-16th century by Bunkani, the son of a hunter/slave raider from the adjacent Wa kingdom and the sister of a local Goro chief. Bunkani's founding of Bouna had nefarious beginnings: Bunkani usurped chiefly power from his uncle, killed his brother, attempted to kill his mother, and used gold stolen from his family to buy horses for his growing political coterie in order to impose his dominance on neighbouring chieftaincies (Boutillier 1993,

29-31). The limited military capacity of surrounding chieftaincies facilitated the political expansion of Bunkani's incipient monarchy (Boutillier 1993, 53). Prior to the dynasty's founding, the territory of present-day Bouna was inhabited by a mixed population comprised of recently arrived Mandé-Dyula traders and the indigenous Loron. The label 'Koulongo' was largely a colonial invention first used by the French army lieutenant Braulot to describe the language spoken in the region. Anthropological debates continue regarding the origins of Koulongo as a 'people' (Boutillier 1993, 32-38). 'Koulongo' can also simply refer to members of the aristocratic class in Bouna, who are descendents of the founding dynastic family. Other non-dynastic family members began to identify themselves as 'Koulongo' as the kingdom slowly eroded other previously autonomous local-level sources of authority and belonging that structured the social life of indigenous groups (Boutillier 1993, 42-43).[34]

Pre-colonial dynastic Bouna was socially organized in strict hierarchical terms: there existed clear distinctions between the relatively small number of royal family members who were direct descendants of Bunkani, and a numerically larger plebeian class who had no direct ties to the royal family. The king, the Bouna *isié,* maintained centralized control and political cohesion of the monarchy using a number of organizational mechanisms. The most important of these concerned elite power-sharing and the monarchy's relationship with strangers.

First, the monarchy was designed to ensure the sharing of political, economic and military power so as to prevent challenges from within the aristocratic class. Specifically, three founding lineages (*Gago*, *Piawari*, and *Koungan*) descending from Bunkani shared monarchical authority. The entire administrative system was set up in a way to share the benefits of political power between these lineages, through rotational kingship and the sharing of other prominent political positions (Boutillier 1993, 263). The other important organizational characteristic of the monarchy was the politico-administrative system it established, particularly in the rural areas surrounding Bouna. The kingdom was hierarchically organized according to a nested set of chiefdoms. Members of the royal family occupied provincial chieftaincies. Territorial chieftaincies were occupied by royal family members as well, but not those derived from the three founding lineages (such as those claiming descendence from Bunkani's siblings, but not

[34] Boutillier explains that the term '*Koulango*' actually refers to vassals or subjects of the aristocracy while members of the aristocratic or princely class were referred to as '*ibuo*' (1993, 160).

from Bunkani himself). There were also a number of chieftaincies directly controlled by the King (Boutillier 1993, 214-215). Yet the key organizational feature of the kingdom was that, unlike many feudal social systems, these chieftaincies were not hereditary. Local chiefs could be moved from one chieftaincy to another. They could be promoted and demoted by the king, and descendants were never guaranteed local positions after the death of ancestors. Decisions could be based on merit or political exigencies. This enhanced the king's authority over local level actors and centralized control over the administration of justice, the distribution of land, and taxation at local levels (Boutillier 1993, 211-218).

Second, the kingdom regulated its relationship with strangers in ways that helped prop up its centralized political system. Not unlike other Sahelian city-states, slavery was prominent in Bouna, and trade in slaves represented an important component of the material base underpinning the monarchy. Slaves were procured either through capture in war or through markets controlled by Dyula traders. Slaves performed the majority of agricultural and infrastructural labour. Nonetheless, while newly captured or purchased slaves (*djon*) had few rights and could easily be resold, the descendents of slaves (*uruso*) could have substantial economic and social rights and could fully integrate into dominant lineages after some generations (Boutillier 1993, 320). Dyula traders occupied a unique place within the monarchy that appealed to their interests as traders but limited any political threat they may have represented. Bouna's monarchy always attempted to lessen the fiscal demands on the Dyula community in order to attract them to Bouna. There were a number of important social bridges between the Dyula and the native Koulongo: members of these different groups often intermarried and in many cases, Dyula traders were relied upon as political advisors because they were often highly educated, experienced and well-traveled. Yet, at the end of the day, these two communities had distinct functions that enabled their coexistence. The Dyula comprised much of the commercial class in Bouna. Koulongo elites formed the political class, occupying most of the administrative positions in Bouna and the surrounding rural areas. They were responsible for all legal and security related issues. Dyula traders were ultimately expected to behave in ways that were strictly 'non-Jihadist' and non-political. Traders were not in a position to confront their Koulongo hosts because, for one reason, they were hardly a unified group. More importantly, their dependence on the king for dispute resolution, the

enforcement of the rule of law, security, and access to land ensured that Dyula traders had a vested interest in propping up, not challenging royal authority (Boutillier 1993, 336-346).

The Lobi: A History of a 'Shatter Zone'

By the end of the 19th century, the political future of the Koulongo monarchy in Bouna would be significantly shaped by a number of interrelated historical processes. The emergence of Samory Touré's *sofa* army, the spectre of European colonization, and increased Lobi migration to what would become Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire all served to substantially circumscribe the political clout Koulongo elites had previously enjoyed. All three processes worked to reshape the relationship between the Koulongo and the Lobi. Historically, *'Le pays Lobi'* represented an amorphous geographic zone breaching the contemporary borders of Ghana, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. The shifting territory inhabited by the Lobi represents a striking example of what James Scott has termed a "shatter zone" (2009, 7). For Scott, shatter-zones are non-state spaces characterized by the peopling of territories by social groups seeking to escape and check the development of centralized political authority. Much like the 'hill-peoples' of South-East Asia examined by Scott, the Lobi communities of West Africa have struggled to mitigate a series of indigenous and foreign sponsored state-building projects. This sub-section draws on Scott and suggests that the key aspects of Lobi history, social organization, familial relations, and agricultural production collectively reflect resistance to both the external imposition of political hierarchies onto Lobi communities as well as the development of such hierarchies within them.

Most of the Lobi currently situated in Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire arrived beginning in the early 20th century from Burkina Faso. Although they share many linguistic characteristics with neighbouring groups, particularly the Birifor (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire) and the Dagara (Ghana), the Lobi do represent a distinct linguistic group (*lobiri*). Nonetheless, the specific social boundaries of the Lobi community as an ethnic or cultural group have been contested and obscured by competing definitions of what being 'Lobi' represents. The Mossi of what is now Burkina Faso use the term Lobi in a broad sense to demarcate themselves from ethnic strangers living within the '*pays lobi*', which constituted the stretch of territory between Dano and Burkina's southern border with Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, the British anthropologist Jack Goody suggested that the Lobi did not represent a distinct ethno-cultural group but rather that the term Lobi (specifically the prefix 'lo') was used by local groups as a label for societies which organize

themselves in terms of bilinear rather than patrilineal descent. The term 'Lobi' in this usage actually encompassed and overlapped with a number of diverse cultural groups, including the Dagara, Birifor, Dian, Gan, Dorossié and Téguessié (de Rouville 1987, 15-23).

Lobi history has been one of constant movement and migration. Lobi origins have been traced back to what is now Ghana, on the eastern side of the Black Volta. Since the late 18th century, the Lobi have migrated from Ghana into Burkina Faso and subsequently on to Côte d'Ivoire. Lobi migration to Northern Côte d'Ivoire did not commence until the late 19th century after the Franco-Samory war (1882-1898) and the onset of French colonialism in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire (Fiéloux 1980, 17). Colonialism was a significant reason for the migration of the Lobi into Côte d'Ivoire at the turn of the 20th century. The *pays lobi* surrounding Gaoua (in Southern Burkina Faso) was one of the last regions to resist French colonialism. Despite gaining formal control over this part of West Africa in 1898, by 1915 the French still had little administrative presence in the region. Lobi communities refused to pay taxes or obey French colonial law and continued to ambush trade caravans running through French territory in West Africa (Kambou-Ferrand 1993, 17; Fiéloux 1980, 27). In response, the French head colonial officer (and cultural anthropologist) Henri Labouret began a harsh pacification program against the Lobi (Kambou-Ferrand 1993, 85-86). This prompted Lobi movement southward into Côte d'Ivoire where the colonial presence remained limited and far less severe (Fiéloux 1980, 25). Although French colonial practice was an important reason for the Lobi's push southward into Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the 19th century, political and social conflicts within Lobi communities (explained in more detail below) and economic incentives (searching for new lands or work in southern plantations) were also important factors (de Rouville 1987, 51; Savonnet 1986, 5).

Conflicts within Lobi communities and individual and collective decisions to migrate reflect in large part the absence of legitimate authority capable of resolving social conflict above the village level. Other Ivoirians perceived the Lobi as being tenacious workers, independent and fiercely defensive of their autonomy. Savonnet cites the common Lobi proverb "a monkey cannot order another monkey" (*une singe ne peut commander une autre singe*) as highlighting the firm belief held by many Lobi that, when in opposition to decisions made by others, individuals have little obligation to obey (Savonnet 1986, 12). Reflecting this belief, Lobi society includes few sources of authority above the village level, making social mobilization, social control and the

resolution of conflicts between and within villages challenging. At the regional level, comprising of groups of small villages, the *Didar* (*di*=land, *dar*=master or chief) plays the most significant role. Formally, the *Didar* is responsible for fulfilling diverse functions including the allocation of land and the setting up of religious-cum-sacrificial sites in newly established villages, as well as the management of everyday social conflicts (bride wealth payments, violence between and within communities) (de Rouville 1987, 114-115; Savonnet 1986, 11-12). The *Dithildar* (dithil= land alter, dar=master or chief) is expected to fulfill a very similar role but at the level of the village (de Rouville 1987, 128). Yet, as a number of observers have noted, there are important limitations to the actual powers of both the *Didar* and the *Dithildar*. Since the end of the 19th century the authority of these actors have declined significantly over time due to various political and social factors (Savonnet 1962, 87, 1986, 12; de Rouville 1987, 14). The capacity of the *Didar* and the *Dithildar* to resolve social conflicts at the village level is limited. Inter- and intra-clan conflicts were typically resolved through acts of vengeance equivalent to the crime committed (Bonnafé and Fiéloux 1993, 110). The legitimacy of interventions by these authorities into family matters remains hotly contested by community members. Generally, collective decision-making is only possible through the fashioning of consensus between family heads (Savonnet 1986, 12). And rather than submitting, losers in the court of public opinion typically just picked up and left (Savonnet 1962, 87). Finally, over the 20th century, increased integration into crop markets, the decline in the availability of virgin lands, increasing migration, and government sponsored settlement schemes all weakened further the authority of village and regional actors vis-à-vis others, such as family heads and agents of the colonial and post-colonial state (de Rouville 1987, 14).

Conflict is further inscribed into the social order of Lobi communities in rural areas through their system of bilinear descent. All Lobi identify themselves in terms of both their patrilineal and matrilineal lineages. Different social rights and economic assets are granted to community members according to their matrilineal and patrilineal lineage. For the purposes of this section, there are two important consequences of this form of social organization. The first is that, because different, contrasting rights are granted according to affiliation with each of these groups, conflicts between descendants are commonplace after the death of family heads. For instance, after the death of a family head, rights granting access to land are accorded to the sons

of the deceased while all economic assets (cattle, money) are granted agnatically, to the sons of the deceased father's sister. This system of inheritance significantly constrains the reproduction and growth of founding villages for two reasons. First, because members of the founders' matriclan do not have access to land according to this system of descent, they are generally forced to go elsewhere for land. Second, because members of the founders' matriclan do not inherit economic assets beyond land, the stakes and rivalries over inheriting and controlling land between sons of deceased male village heads are significantly heightened. Such conflicts over succession were an important reason why Lobi villages broke apart after the death of village heads (Savonnet 1986, 5). The other important aspect of this bilinear descent system is that identification with patrilineal and matrilineal lines is highly unequal; most Lobi identify themselves predominantly in terms of their matrilineal line. All Lobi belong to one of four large matriclans (*tyar*) and over sixty patriclans (*kuon*). As Fiéloux has shown though, the acknowledgement of patrimonial descent (stemming from male village founders) is strictly frowned upon in Lobi society (Fiéloux 1980, 41-43, see also Savonnet 1962, 86-87). As a strategy for eschewing the development of social hierarchy, these features of social organization support James Scott's general claim that "if, then, lineage histories are abbreviated or ignored altogether, it amounts to something of a cultural discouragement, if not prohibition, of historical claims to superiority. To have little or no history is, implicitly, to put every kin group on roughly the same footing" (2009, 276). In Lobi society, prohibiting the reference of one's *kuon* in the public sphere also functions as another means by which the Lobi disconnect themselves from any authority or set of hierarchical social relationships beyond the village level. The result has been a shared collective amnesia regarding patrilineal descent (Fiéloux 1980, 41-42).

Another factor influencing the decision to migrate that impedes the development and imposition of hierarchical political forms is the dominant agricultural practices employed by Lobi communities. In the past, the Lobi have produced a number of different cereals including sorghum, millet and corn. More recently, Lobi producers have concentrated more and more on export crops, specifically yam (discussed in more detail in the next section). Lobi agricultural systems are land intensive and rely upon few technological inputs. Crop fields are in use for relatively long periods of times – between five and six years – and are left fallow for a relatively

short time – between six and eight.[35] Lobi farming practices originally developed in a context of land abundance where, once existing plots were used up, individuals and communities could just move on to adjacent land. By the early independence period, these practices contributed to increasing environmental degradation and heightened land scarcity (Savonnet 1962, 86). Growing desertification, population growth and political processes (the civil war and its aftermath) may close off migration as a solution to these problems in the future. As access to available land diminishes, the ability of everyday Lobi to escape power relations through migration is restricted.

Bouna's Fall: Samory Touré, French Colonialism and Lobi migration

By the late 1880s the kingdom of Bouna found itself in a delicate political position, simultaneously confronting the French and English colonial empires as well as the armed resistance to European forces led by Samory Touré. Touré represented a formidable foe for the French in what would become Northern Côte d'Ivoire. The fate of many of West-African city-states – including Bouna – would ultimately be determined by the position taken by their leaders vis-à-vis the three sides of the politico-military struggle between the French, English and Samory Touré's forces. Although Bouna would ultimately become part of France's colonial empire, its first European contact was the British envoy Georges Ferguson. The kingdom's initial decision to side with the British rather than the French stemmed largely from the fact that Samory had already gained control of a number of other urban centres – Kong, Dabakala, Mango, Bobo-Dioulasso – along trade routes previously connected to Bouna from the west. Although the French continued their struggle against Samory, Bouna sided with the British in order to safeguard its remaining connections to trade networks towards the east (Boutillier 1993, 116-117). In the end, this would not save the kingdom from Samory's war machine.[36] Bouna was

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[35] Georges Savonnet contrasts the Lobi agricultural system to that of the indigenous Koulongo, where fields were in use for very short periods of time, a maximum of two years, and were left fallow between thirty and forty years (1968, 100).

[36] Why did Bouna become a military target of Samory's *sofa* army? This is an important question because, as I discuss in the next chapter, the origins of Korhogo's strength during the colonial and post-colonial periods is explained, in part, as the result of the original alliance forged between the old paramount chief in Korhogo, Gbon Coulibaly and Samory Touré. Moreover, as in Korhogo, Bouna's king, Degbango, and Samory maintained a fairly amicable relationship right up until his army's invasion in 1896. Boutillier offers three reasons for the fairly sudden change in relations between Samory and Bouna's monarchy (Boutillier 1993, 125-132). The first contributing factor

taken by Samory's forces in December 1896. Tacitly supported by Bouna's Dyula-Muslim community, which was for the most part spared from the violence, Samory put an effective end to whatever autonomous political and economic power the kingdom still enjoyed. Much of the aristocratic class, including the king, was killed in the attack. Bouna's population dropped from an estimated 10,000 inhabitants before the conflict to no more than an estimated 1,000 inhabitants in 1904. The majority of the surrounding villages simply ceased to exist after Samory's attack; the overall drop in population in Bouna's surrounding rural areas was equally precipitous (Boutillier 1993, 135-137). In the end, Bouna ultimately became part of French West Africa, as a result of bilateral accords signed between France and Britain in June of 1898 (Boutillier 1993, 141-155).

Not surprisingly, the overall effect of Samory's military conquest of Bouna and its subsequent formal colonization by the French drastically weakened the autonomous political position of the old Koulongo monarchy. By putting an end to the slave trade and destroying networks of trade that connected Bouna to surrounding city-states, Samory's war and French colonialism effectively robbed the kingdom of any autonomous economic base (Boutillier 1971, 246-253). Drastic depopulation challenged the capacity of the French to integrate this part of Côte d'Ivoire into the colonial economy and presented difficult choices for French administrators vis-à-vis the question of Lobi migration and settlement. Encouraging the settlement of Lobi migrants was, on the one hand, necessary economically given Bouna's depopulation after Samory's invasion. Yet, on the other hand, politically controlling the Lobi and integrating them into colonial markets came with its own set of challenges. Indeed, Lobi migration into this part of Côte d'Ivoire initially threatened the colonial project. The Lobi took advantage of the absence of any credible political authority immediately following Samory's invasion to enact revenge on

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was the king's decision to enslave two soldiers (*les captifs de Tiéba*) sent by Samory to accompany the imam Saléa Cissé back to Bouna after a meeting with Samory in Bondoukou. Samory demanded their immediate release, but Degbango refused. A second reason was the number of *commerçants* tied to Samory who were attacked or taken prisoner while passing through territories controlled by Bouna. There is some debate as to whether these attacks were sanctioned by Degbango. However, in the end, this did not seem to matter in terms of swaying Samory's decision to invade Bouna. A third reason was the kingdom's decision to buy guns and ammunition in preparation for future conflict. Whether this preparation was in reaction to Samory's approach to Bouna or not, it gave the impression to Samory's commanders that Bouna was decidedly pro-French. The larger sum effect of these events was the political divisions they created in Bouna vis-à-vis Touré's forces. Many Dyula based in Bouna remained supportive of Samory right up until his decision to invade the city. Indeed, much of Bouna's Dyula population was spared the worst of the violence directed towards this region during Samory's invasion in 1896 (Boutillier 1993, 125-132).

former Koulongo and Dyula slave traders and began raiding for slaves themselves (Boutillier 1993, 358). More generally, the Lobi hindered the development of the colonial economy by using violence to attack trade caravans, kill ethnic enemies (the Koulongo and the Dyula), and seize cattle, slaves and other economic assets (Boutillier 1969, 13-14).

European colonizers responded to the challenge of politically controlling the Lobi in a variety of sometimes contradictory ways. First, the French undertook an extensive village-to-village military campaign to disarm the Lobi and pacify the countryside surrounding Bouna (Boutillier 1993, 365; Fiéloux 1980, 27). The mixed results of the French pacification program,[37] coupled with the growing realization that it was only through encouragement of further Lobi migration that the colonial project could be economically viable, demanded other solutions to the problem of controlling the Lobi. Another strategy was to regroup the Lobi into larger settlements so that they could be more easily monitored, controlled and taxed (Fiéloux 1980, 26). In the 1960s and 1970s, the post-colonial state continued this policy of Lobi resettlement through the creation of ZKB (Zone Kolodio-Binéda), located near Doropo, just southwest of Bouna. ZKB was a state led villagization plan which aimed to stem the tide of Lobi migration southward and promote economic growth. The appeal of ZKB for colonial administrators was that these lands, between the Kolodio and Binéda rivers, were 'empty' in the sense that they were scarcely populated. As a result, Lobi settlement in ZKB lessened conflicts over land between immigrants and the native Koulongo. Lobi villages created by the state in ZKB were for the most part larger than Lobi villages found elsewhere in the Ivoirian Northeast, averaging between 1,000 and 2,000 individuals (Chalèard and N'Daw 1992, 1; Chalèard 1998, 479).

The colonial and post-colonial state also strengthened its control over Lobi settlers by relying on the Koulongo as political intermediaries. Despite the fact that Samory's invasion and subsequent French colonization drastically weakened the kingdom's internal mechanisms of social control, the Koulongo still retained some bases of political power that could be harnessed by the colonial administration. As Boutillier has argued, although the Lobi universally resisted the imposition of French colonization, they did submit to the Koulongo rather easily. Ideologically, the authority of the Koulongo was underpinned by the widely held view – by both

[37] Boutillier details how, after the French colonial administrator himself was ambushed by the Lobi, he ordered the colonial service to stop trying to collect taxes from Lobi villages (1993, 361; see also Fiéloux 1980, 26).

Lobi and Koulongo – that they were the economically, educationally, and militarily superior group, and as indigenes, retained rightful control over the land (Boutillier 1993, 362). In addition, the Koulongo fulfilled a number of institutional roles within the new colonial order that underpinned their continued political dominance. They were used to collect taxes directly from Lobi villages (Boutillier 1969, 15). In terms of land, Koulongo land chiefs (*sako tesié*) played an important role in the installation of new Lobi villages. In Koulongo territory, the *sako tesié* supplanted the role previously played by the *didar* in the creation of villages. The *sako tesié* became responsible for blessing and installing the *dithil* in new villages. This enhanced the ability of Koulongo authorities to make demands on Lobi communities because the *sako tesié* had the power to remove the *dithil*, an action which was believed to have significant supernatural effects (Fiéloux 1980, 141). In usurping the role previously played by the *didar*, Koulongo land chiefs also played a prominent role in mediating social conflicts within Lobi communities and performing ceremonial rites of passage. For all of these functions, Koulongo chiefs could and often did demand payment (Fiéloux 1980, 142; Savonnet 1986, 24; 1968, 96; Boutillier 1993, 361-363).

Despite the hierarchy between these groups that was inscribed within the heart of the colonial (and post-colonial) order, the relationship between the Koulongo and the Lobi was not always contentious. Georges Savonnet has labelled the period between 1900 and 1965 as one of 'complementarity' between these two groups: the Lobi required the blessing of the Koulongo to remain on their land and the Koulongo required Lobi settlement in order to finance the kingdom's social and political functions (Savonnet 1986, 23-24). Yet, after 1965, there was a marked deterioration in the relationship between the Lobi and their hosts. The change resulted from a number of inter-related factors, including heightened competition over land, increased demographic pressures (as a result of the cumulative number of migrants that had settled in the region, particularly the Lobi), land degradation (stemming from over-use) and environmental change, particularly drought (Savonnet 1986, 25-26). Increasing Lobi migration from Burkina Faso after 1965 magnified the influence of these changes (Savonnet 1986, 51). Together, these factors contributed to increasing conflicts between these communities, particularly over land. Chalèard (1998, 482) reported that in Nassian, the Koulongo successfully chased the Lobi from living in the city after increasing tension over land use. In a number of cases, the *dithil* was

removed from Lobi villages as punishment for using lands left fallow by Koulongo communities. In others, the Koulongo prevented the Lobi from expanding their villages or blocked off access to roads, which prevented Lobi farmers from bringing their crops to market (Savonnet 1986, 52; Chalèard 1998, 482). The tension between these communities was particularly acute where drought and land degradation were extensive and in contexts where Lobi and Koulongo villages were geographically situated proximate to each other (Savonnet 1986, 50-51; Chalèard 1996, 421-422).

Significant demographic and economic changes during the 20th century also heightened the political tensions between these two groups. During this time, the demographic make-up of the northeast gradually shifted, resulting in the ascendency of the Lobi as the numerically dominant group. Boutillier estimated (1993, 370) that between 1904 and 1980, the Koulongo/Dyula population in the region of Bouna increased incrementally from 5,250 to 7,000. During this same period, the number of Lobi living in the region rose far more dramatically, from 5,000 to 45,000.[38] The reasons for this growing imbalance are numerous. Lobi migration grew consistently throughout the 20th century. Relative land abundance and a comparative lack of political administration in the northeast compared to other parts of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso drew Lobi migrants to this part of the north. Koulongo families were simply not having as many children as their Lobi counterparts. Additionally, many young Koulongo left rural areas in search of jobs and a more comfortable lifestyle in urban centres such as Bouna and Abidjan in the south. In many cases, Lobi migrants just assumed control of empty Koulongo villages left behind (Boutiller 1993, 371-372; Savonnet 1962, 98).

These demographic shifts paralleled significant economic changes in this part of Côte d'Ivoire. Over the 20th century, the Lobi also became the dominant economic group, largely because of their demographic weight in the countryside. This dominance is most starkly reflected in the production and export of yam in the Ivoirian northeast. In 1990, Chalèard reported that the Lobi accounted for approximately 98% of all profits derived from yam sales. Yam sales by Lobi farmers were sixteen times greater than sales by Koulongo farmers (1990b, 133). At the turn of the century, yam represented an important commercial crop for the Koulongo; however, their

[38] For Bouna-Téhini, Georges Savonnet estimated that in 1975 there were ten times more Lobi living in the region than Koulongo, putting the numbers at 75,000 to 80,000 for the Lobi, versus 7,500 for the Koulongo (1986, 23).

dominance in this sector was abruptly undercut when colonialism put an end to their system of forced labor (Chalèard 1993, 135). Subsequent efforts to renew economic development in this part of Côte d'Ivoire focused on the development of other crops, such as rice or cotton, because of how the production of these crops, unlike yam cultivation, can contribute to heightened political control over peasant populations.[39] In the 1980s, with the financial assistance of the World Bank, the Ivoirian government embarked on an extensive state-led development plan that drastically increased agricultural inputs to the region. The aim, argued Chalèard, was as political as it was economic: to "stabilize the Lobi" (1990a, 19). Investment in cotton production – fertilizer subsidies, the building of roads, bridges, and extensive irrigation systems – all sought to geographically fix Lobi economic production by rendering them dependent on inputs provided by the state. Economically, the development of cotton in the northeast ultimately failed, largely because of high labor requirements, low crop prices, and the rising costs of inputs (Chalèard and N'Daw 1992, 20). Politically, the state-led development of cotton did not radically transform agricultural production in the northeast because of the absence of any political intermediary above the village level. There were no actors capable of mobilizing the labor and resources necessary for the development of a labor intensive crop such as cotton (Savonnet 1962, 65-66).[40]

Yam exports, on the other hand, grew at very high rates without any substantial government support. Yam, unlike sorghum or millet, was not considered a 'sacred product' in the Lobi moral universe and thus could be sold on the market without any cultural restrictions (Chalèard 1990b, 133). In addition, numerical superiority allowed the Lobi to fulfill the labor requirements for the production of this crop. The Lobi relied on their numbers and a system of mutual aid to clear land, remove weeds and plant yams far more efficiently than other groups,

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[39] James Scott makes this point in the *Art of Not Being Governed*. He writes: "Particular crops have characteristics that make them more or less resistant to appropriation. Cultivars that cannot be stored long without spoiling, such as fresh fruits and vegetables, or that have low value per unit weight and volume, such as most gourds, rootcrops, and tubers, will not repay the efforts of a tax gatherer.

In, general, roots and tubers such as yams, sweet potatoes, potatoes and cassava/manioc/yucca are nearly appropriation-proof. After they ripen, they can be safely left in the ground for up to two years and dug up piecemeal as needed. There is thus no granary to plunder. If the army or the taxmen wants your potatoes, for example, they will have to dig them up one by one" (2009, 195).

[40] Catherine Boone has made a similar argument regarding the decision of the French to initiate the production of cotton in central Côte d'Ivoire around Bouaké. Only in the north (around Korhogo) was there a social system in place that could mobilize labor at the price and quality required by French exporters (2003, 274-276).

particularly the Koulongo (Chalèard 1996, 428). The growth of yam sales also worked to undercut Koulongo authority over land. Expanding yam cultivation fuelled Lobi encroachment onto Koulongo lands. Growth in the sale of yam provided the material resources that allowed Lobi migrants to challenge Koulongo chiefs politically. In some cases, Lobi settlers simply refused to pay Koulongo authorities. In others, Lobi chiefs began installing the village *dithil* themselves, thereby subverting the role played by Koulongo chiefs in the allocation of land (Chalèard 1998, 482-483).

In addition to economic development through yam production and the growing demographic imbalance between the Lobi and the Koulongo, growing connections between the Lobi and national level political circles greatly enhanced the ability of this community to challenge Bouna's old aristocratic class for political supremacy. The wealth gained from yam sales allowed aspiring Lobi politicians to build connections with national-level actors and further circumvent the authority of Koulongo chiefs. Although yam production proceeded without extensive state intervention in the countryside, the political backing of national-level actors was important for the Lobi community in the northeast given their position as 'strangers' (or non-natives) to this region. By the late 1980s, middle aged Lobi family heads who were capable of supporting larger family units through yam sales controlled a growing share of the most prominent local political positions such as village chiefs, heads of collective work projects (GVC's, *Groupements à Vocation Coopérative*), and the local branches of the then single party, the PDCI (Chalèard 1996, 425).

Despite these changes, political conflict in this region did not always revolve around native/stranger distinctions (between the Koulongo, the Lobi and other settler groups). Complex conflicts over land and authority revealed shifting alliances within and across stranger/native distinctions. In the ZKB for example (described above), where Koulongo presence was limited, intense political conflicts developed between Lobi elites. Chalèard (1998, 484; 1996, 446-447) provides the example of the village Kpamidouo, just south of Bouna (in the ZKB). Kpamidouo was founded by a Lobi settler, Kpami, in 1972. Under the PDCI one-party system, Kpami was forced to share power with the largest of the Lobi farmers in the region, Kimate, who was also the secretary of the local branch of the PDCI. In 1989, Kimate sought to further entrench his power and authority by replacing Kpami as chief with his father, Mebo. Kimate used the sizable

material resources that were at his disposal to build a political clientele, including some Koulongo who agreed to support his rival claim. Accompanied by their Koulongo supporters, Kimate and Mebo installed the *dithil* in order to publically confirm Mebo's claim to the chieftainship. Kpami fought back by drawing on his connections with the local préfet. He mobilized support amongst Kpamidouo's Christian population in order delegitimize Mebo's 'traditional' claim to authority (through the installation of the *dithil*). These local political conflicts interacted with party politics. With the onset of multiparty politics in Côte d'Ivoire in 1990, Kpami stayed loyal to the PDCI while Kimate decided to break off and join the political opposition (Chalèard 1998, 484; 1996, 446-447).

Overall, the social and political changes described in this section have had two significant interrelated effects, given the purposes of this study. First, in contrast to the other cases examined in this dissertation, the strategies employed by national-level leaders to consolidate state power in the Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire worked to directly produce social hierarchies linking elites to subordinate groups. Historically, Lobi society included few institutionalized measures through which elites could control subordinate groups. The enforcement of user rights to land by the central state formed the basis of the institutional order that underpinned class differentiation within Lobi communities. The position of all Lobi – elites and masses (representing the majority of the population in the northeast) – was rendered dependent on the institutional order enforced by the central state. Second and not surprisingly, heads of large Lobi lineages increasingly became the central representatives of the old single party, the PDCI, in Bouna. This drastically undercut the authority once held by the Koulongo monarchy, and the Koulongo elite in Bouna. Overall, as brokers, Lobi elites were far more dependent on the institutional order enforced by the state than other examples of brokers examined in this dissertation. Put another way, social hierarchies in Bouna were not produced independently of the state (and then absorbed into state structures, as in cases of 'indirect' rule). They were a direct product of state interventions in rural areas. The implications of these changes for the wartime order established by the FN in Bouna will be discussed below.

Rebellion and Resistance in Bouna

One of the striking features of the FN in Bouna, compared to elsewhere in Côte d'Ivoire, was how the movement positioned itself very differently vis-à-vis local struggles surrounding autochthony and belonging. For much of the movements' leadership, armed opposition to Laurent Gbagbo was originally justified as a strategy for defending immigrants targeted by government-led efforts at restricting Ivoirian citizenship. In other parts of the country, autochthones were commonly the political *targets* of the northern rebellion because these were the constituencies from which Gbagbo drew much of his support. In the region around Man (Western Côte d'Ivoire), native groups such as the Guéré and the Wobé were commonly viewed with suspicion by the rebels. Not surprisingly, these groups often demonstrated reluctance to support the rebellion, and in some instances, organized armed resistance directly against it (Heitz 2013, 64, 204-205). In contrast to Man, in Bouna the cleavages driving the conflict at the national level aligned with local debates over belonging in a far more counterintuitive way. Overall, the FN appeared to target the Lobi and other non-native groups in Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire. During the conflict period, many in the Lobi community felt that the conflict and the installation of the FN administration burdened their community disproportionately. The Lobi viewed the rebellion as a means by which the Koulongo could temporarily limit or reverse the gap in political and economic power that had been growing between these two communities since before independence. Part of this stemmed from the ethnic makeup of the FN in Bouna. Although most of the movements' leadership was Senoufo (from the central part of the north, around Korhogo), Morou Ouattara, the region's zone commander, was a Koulongo from Doropo, just north of Bouna. Yet, similar to the case of Man, it appears unlikely that the FN was driven by 'ethnic' considerations per se (Heitz 2014, 204), but rather, they were responding the fact that the Lobi were the demographically and economically dominant group *and* the political affiliation of many prominent Lobi elites to the PDCI.[41] Overall, it seems that strategic considerations trumped the

[41] Although much of the PDCI would ultimately side with the Ouattara and the RDR after the first round of the presidential elections in 2010, it is important to remember that Bedié was one of the principal political architects of the policy of *ivoirité* during the 1990's. Only after the formation of the RHDP in 2005 was it fairly certain, on which side of this conflict, Bedié and the rest of the PDCI would position itself. Leading up to the 2010 elections, Bedié embarked on a tour of the north in an effort to distance himself from the nationalist agenda now advanced by Gbagbo (Ignace 2009, Jacob 2009).

position taken by the rebels on debates surrounding political community and belonging in this part of the north. This section briefly explores the political implications resulting from the FN's alliance-building strategy in this part of the north.

In many ways, the *Com'zone* headed by Morou Ouattara was not entirely different from those established in other parts of the north. In Bouna, as in some other localities, garbage collection stopped, schools closed, and health services were limited. For what was already one of the more economically disadvantaged parts of the country, the overall economic impact of the conflict was dramatic (Kouamé 2007a).[42] And, as in other parts of the north, complaints about the tax regime enforced by the rebels were commonplace. However, the political order established by the FN in Bouna was distinct in that it was perceived to unfairly privilege specific groups at the expense of others. During the conflict period, many in the Lobi community felt that the conflict and the installation of the FN administration in Bouna burdened their community disproportionately. Firmly established ties between wealthy Lobi family heads and the former single party, the PDCI (Chaléard 1996, 425), ensured that many of these actors became *the* principal targets of the rebellion. Coalition formation between the local FN administration and the Lobi elite in Bouna was inhibited as a result of the pre-conflict relationship between these actors and the state. Additionally, Lobi farmers in the rural areas surrounding Bouna had been the primary beneficiaries of state efforts to promote migration and settlement in the northeast. As a result, this group retained powerful motivations to resist the authority of the rebels throughout the conflict. The rebels were seen as a direct threat to an institutional order of which the Lobi community was the principal beneficiaries. Collectively, the sections that follow explore Lobi grievances vis-à-vis the northern rebellion in more detail.

Not unlike in other parts of Côte d'Ivoire that fell under FN military control, a common target of criticism of the rebels in Bouna was the extensive set of roadblocks and taxes they had put in place. Shopkeepers occupying booths in the city's commercial areas were expected to pay 8,000 CFA per month to the rebels (Kouamé 2007a).[43] At checkpoints set up around the

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[42] This is a feature of the rebellion Bouna shares with other parts of the north, including Ouangolodougou, which is the subject of chapter 6. Korhogo escaped these problems largely as result of the substantial presence of international NGO's, which sponsored the provision of many basic public services.

[43] During the time of my fieldwork (2010-2011), 1 $USD equaled approximately 500CFA.

perimeter of the city, individuals paid between 200 CFA and 1,000 CFA in order to enter or exit the city (Abalo 2007). Trucks carrying cashews leaving Bouna were required to pay an exit fee of 400,000 CFA. Those carrying yams were expected to pay an amount of 205,000 CFA (Abalo 2007).[44] Tax rates at these levels are high, especially for a region that had been economically depressed before the war and especially during it.

The system of taxation installed by the FN in this part of the north became one of the principal sources of contention between the former rebels and the civilian population not only because of the high cost of these demands, but also because of how it was perceived to unfairly target the Lobi community. It is difficult to say if this interpretation derived from the *intention* of the FN in Bouna to target the Lobi community or simply that, as explained in previous sections, the Lobi were by far the dominant economic and demographic group. Regardless, a number of interviewees and observers have suggested that it was the Lobi who were specifically targeted:

> When they come into the city today it is the Lobi as a group who are against the rebels, since it is the rebels who are present in the corridor[45] and it is the Lobi who have the money. It is the Lobi who have suffered a lot by the presence of the rebellion, as a result of the rebellion. They have been broken, bullied and exploited by the rebellion (interview, NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11).

> Since the beginning of the rebellion, the Lobi, who come to the market every Sunday pay much more, because each time they have to pay 100 CFA or 200 CFA. They even have to pay twice [on their way into market and on their way out] and if they don't have the money they [the FN] will just take two yams. This has been the cause of the problem (interview, local politician, Bouna, 01.25.11).

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[44] Incomplete data sources make comparing tax rates across different *Com'zones* extremely challenging. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the cost of taxes were comparable to other parts of Northern Côte d'Ivoire controlled by the FN (see chapters 2 and 5 in this study for comparisons). Bassett (2011b) describes the experience of one cashew merchant in Korhogo (see chapter 5). He writes "The merchant sent buying agents to rural towns across the north to buy nuts from farmers whose orchards averaged five hectares in size. After filling a forty-ton truck, each driver headed south to the Port of Abidjan via Bouaké. The merchant paid road taxes and rackets that amounted to 615,000 CFA francs ($1,305.00) per truck. Forty percent of these receipts went to the New Forces' Centrale. Another 20% was collected in Katiola for the benefit of the ten *Com'zones*. In Bouaké, the center of New Forces operations, the merchant paid three separate "tickets" to pass through the city, accounting for 20% of total costs." In terms of the marketing of cashews, the total costs documented by Bassett exceed the values documented above in Bouna. However, these costs were born across different territorial and administrative jurisdictions.

[45] There are two principal routes leading in and out of Bouna. *Corridor nord* refers to the northward route leading from Bouna to Doropo, and ultimately Burkina Faso. *Corridor sud* refers to the southward route leading from Bouna to Bondoukou, and ultimately Abidjan.

> The Lobi did not create the rebellion, but they have the impression that the rebels have come to humiliate them (Abalo 2007).

Many within the Lobi community have expressed frustration with the specific means by which the FN extracted money and goods. A common complaint in Bouna was that, for passage through this part of the north, the FN required the presentation of Ivorian identity cards. In late 2010 and early 2011, this author observed a number of individuals who were pulled off of buses because they lacked adequate national identification. Payment was often required if identification could not be provided. This was at the very least a puzzling feature of the rural order established by the FN in this part of the north, given that strict definition and enforcement of Ivoirian citizenship was one of the principal reasons cited by FN leadership for beginning the rebellion in the first place. As some suggested, rather than reflecting a commitment to the enforcement of national citizenship, demanding proper identification represented just another means of extracting resources from the local population (NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11, Radio station manager, Bouna, 01.19.11). Yet for the Lobi community (particularly those in rural areas), demanding identification represented a direct attack on a population who, despite their long time residency in Côte d'Ivoire, had never acquired the necessary documents for proof of national citizenship and were in fact hardly aware of what Ivoirian citizenship *was*. One NGO worker explaining his work to me emphasized the important task of "approaching the (Lobi) population and explaining to them that the times have changed and that you can no longer live with being identified by the *état civil* and thus help them obtain a birth certificate for the first time in sixty years" (NGO Worker, Bouna, 01.27.11).

Opposition also grew because the FN often targeted some of the most vulnerable of the Lobi community, specifically women carrying yams to the market on the pathways linking Bouna to the surrounding countryside:

> When a poor woman who comes with the yams she is going to sell at the market for 1000 CFA or 1500 CFA, they take 1000 CFA or 500 CFA or they take some of her yam. Thus, young people from one neighbourhood…opposed this and returned to the corridor to tell them to stop (interview, local politician, Bouna, 01.17.11).

> When there are women who come to the market with their products, they (the FN) take a yam or two, and in all the cases it was the young soldiers. Therefore the youth tell them [the soldiers] that things are difficult and that they are putting a lot of pressure on the peasants (interview, radio station manager, Bouna, 01.19.2011).

> As for women with yams, at each roadblock, they are obliged to give up two yams per woman and per bowl (of yams) when they happen not to have enough money (Abalo 2007, see also Arouna 2007).

Preying on women in these ways illustrates the informal extractions that existed side-by-side with the formalized/institutionalized set of taxes enforced by the FN. To target women, FN members would often position themselves along many of the narrow pathways surrounding Bouna that women take to bring their yams to market. Most Lobi women do not have a strong command of French and thus they were hard pressed to negotiate their position with sometimes intimidating FN combatants. Many Lobi saw these tactics as morally incomprehensible because the FN appeared to target the most vulnerable of the Lobi population.

The issue of taxation was arguably the most important issue underpinning the contentious relationship between the Lobi and the FN throughout the conflict, but it was not the only factor. At the onset of the conflict, many complained about the decision of the rebels to meet with the current Koulongo King after they first gained control over the city:

> Because when the rebels came, they were welcomed by the Koulongo and then after by the Malinké who were also there, and this is why the Lobi rejected the rebellion. Also, the rebels pushed the Peul and the Koulongo to attack and bully the Lobi community (interview, NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11).

> As I was saying earlier, here in Bouna there is a group who are the customary landowners and that group is the Koulongo. Thus, it is logical that if the FN would want to install themselves in a city they have to officially address the customary land owners, and thus, what happened was that they addressed the Koulongo and automatically it was seen as if Koulongo was welcoming the FN because they are the customary land owners. You can't set up in a place without first addressing the customary land owners, who are the Koulongo (interview, NGO worker, Bouna 01.26.11).

Other complaints revolved around the provision and consumption of collective goods. Some objected to the fact that, under the FN, the Lobi were paying the lion's share for community

projects. In the past, costs for the construction and maintenance of new housing, health clinics, schools and stores were shared between the Koulongo, Lobi and Peul communities. However, under the FN, many Lobi felt that they were the only ones paying for these projects; the Koulongo and Peul were paying very little, yet everyone benefitted from them. Nonetheless, the Lobi have remained hesitant to state these complaints publically because "around their homes there is only the FN, who has the guns. They are for the Koulongo and against them" (interview, NGO worker, Bouna 01.27.11).

There were also some complaints about how the Koulongo used their customary authority over land to derive a disproportionate share of the benefits of international relief efforts. It was widely perceived that the Koulongo were empowered to make these claims because of the political and coercive backing they received from the FN. This was the case in Bania, a small village southwest of Bouna. Soon after the beginning of the conflict, UNICEF initiated an agricultural production project in Bania to which all community members contributed equally during its initial stages. However, when it came time to harvest, Koulongo chiefs, citing their position as the customary owners of the land, claimed a disproportionate share for themselves. In other cases, the Koulongo used the context of the war to push Lobi back from lands that encroached onto Koulongo villages. One observer explained that "all these frustrations piled on to each other, and as a result the Lobi cut all ties to the Koulongo: no more funerals together, no governance together, and no funding the constructions of schools and *voila*, that's how things began to change and the Koulongo even threatened to chase away the Lobi from their communities" (interview, NGO worker, Bouna, 01.27.11).

All of this contributed to a growing frustration with the rebels. This frustration was evident on October 21, 2007 when a number of young people from the Lobi community violently confronted the FN after they were informed that a number of Lobi women were harassed for money on their way to the market. This group of sixteen Lobi youth first lodged their complaint with the FN at a checkpoint leading southward out of the city towards Bondoukou on the government side of the old '*zone de confiance*'. Not satisfied with the response of the rebels, the group left the checkpoint and headed towards the UNOCI (United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire) base in Bouna, which was manned by a Ghanaian contingent. Together, the Ghanaian General and the group left the UNOCI headquarters to discuss the situation with three members

of the local FN military hierarchy. Frustrated with the progress of this meeting, some of the group of Lobi youth armed themselves and attacked the FN checkpoint controlling the *corridor-nord* between Bouna and Doropo in the direction of Ghana to put an end to the system of exactions the FN had put in place. The FN responded by opening fire on this group of Lobi youth and chasing them back to Bouna. Some ultimately fled eastward to Ghana or to the south in the direction of Bondoukou. The attacks resulted in a number of injuries and one death for the Lobi youth. Bouna residents commonly refer to this day as the '*dimanche noir*' (Radio station manager, Bouna, 01.19.11; Local politician, Bouna 01.17.11; Arouna 2007).

Authority and Elite Politics

At the core of the conflict between the FN and Lobi community in Bouna during the conflict period was that the Lobi had few actors or institutions they could turn to who could credibly represent their interests in any fair way. Until Gbagbo's removal in 2011, there remained a profound distrust between the Lobi community in Bouna and the FN. In addition, the 2002 civil war and the subsequent political stalemate also had the effect of politically marginalizing elites who were willing and capable of defending Lobi interests. Before the onset of the civil war, changing demographics and the increasing economic clout of the Lobi community in Bouna allowed the Lobi to augment their power and cement their position in the northeast by capturing an increasing number of local level political positions, particularly the local branches of the former single party, the PDCI. But with the beginning of the civil war, the security of the Lobi at the local level became seriously compromised as a result of Lobi elites' pre-conflict connections to national-level political circles. Most Lobi politicians with national level ties to the PDCI were either prevented from returning to Bouna from Abidjan due to security concerns or just no longer had access to the resources necessary to enact their authority in any meaningful way. Ultimately, the absence of any political actors representing Lobi interests on the ground, ongoing conflicts between the state (and hence most Lobi politicians) and the FN hierarchy in Bouna, and the appearance that the rebels were siding with and militarily backing the native Koulongo, all collectively worked to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the rebellion in the eyes of many Lobi living in this part of the north. This section compliments the previous; it highlights how the

everyday actions of the rebel administration in Bouna were linked to larger debates over authority relations during the war, as well as the post-conflict period over state reconstruction.

Insecurity, uncertainty and apprehension by parties on both sides of the conflict characterized the initial days of the civil war in Bouna. Sorting out the interests of the different parties involved and who supported who was a delicate process that took time. Initially, there were many suspicions and accusations regarding who supported the different sides of the national level conflict. *Notre Voie*, one of the 'blue' or pro-government newspapers in Côte d'Ivoire made quick work of deciphering the 'sides' of the civil war in Bouna, accusing Bouna's 1st assistant to the mayor, a Lobi, of openly supporting the rebels:

> The specificity of the attack on Bouna resides in the welcome that was reserved for the assailants. At the head of the people happy to welcome the insurgents was Mr. Hien Kodio Wailley, the 1st assistant to the mayor and resident mayor of the commune of Bouna…The mayor offered them breakfast at the *maquis*[46] *Lababa* and offered them beef at his home (L.B 2002).[47]

Similarly, another local level Lobi politician described how he was initially accused of siding with the government by the FN leadership during the early stages of the conflict:

> Me for example, he (the *commandant de zone*, Morou Ouattara) said that I was part of the gendarmerie! I was not part of the gendarmerie! Those guys, they knew exactly who the gendarmerie was. The guys that came, they didn't understand many things before we started to meet with them…there you go, the relationship between us, there was little confidence, really, you know, you doubt, you doubt and you doubt, it was a bit difficult. But now, everyone knows who is who, and voila, we understand now. Everyone understands (Local politician, Bouna, 02.01.11).

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[46] *Maquis*' are small restaurants where you can order food and drinks that are popular throughout Côte d'Ivoire.

[47] This article was described to me by members of the mayor's office as being an outright lie (interview, member of mayor's office, Bouna, 17.01.2011). It was pointed out to me that the photo attached to the article, which is supposedly of the 1st assistant to the mayor, is a fabrication; the man who is said to be the 1st assistant is far too young and skinny to be the actual 1st assistant. However it remains useful in highlighting the lies and accusations thrown around during the initial stages of the conflict.

And although there were accusations and uncertainties on both sides of the conflict, attacks on Lobi politicians appeared more common because their political power and authority was derived largely from their relationship to the central state.

One of the more prominent examples of elite conflict lasting throughout the duration of the FN occupation of Bouna was the conflict between the *commandant de zone*, Morou Ouattara and the Lobi politician, PDCI member, deputy and president of the *conseil general*, and National Assembly member, Palé Dimaté. Dimaté, saw his powers drastically cut by the beginning of civil war. The civil war precipitated a sharp decline in the resources made available to National Assembly members, and at some points during the conflict Dimaté was allegedly not permitted to return to Bouna from Abidjan by the FN. This obviously put him at odds with Ouattara, who had some political and economic interests in maintaining control over Bouna and prolonging the *de facto* partition of the country. These conflicts came to the forefront during the visit of the former US ambassador to Côte d'Ivoire, Aubrey Hooks, to Bouna during his 2006 tour of the rebel-held north. The embassy report describing Hooks' brief stay in Bouna highlights the political conflicts between Ouattara and Dimaté during private conversations with the ambassador:

> In separate conversations with the Econ Chief, Dimaté expressed anger over the FN's high-handed administration of the region. Accusing them of pocketing money levied from merchants and real estate, as well as funnelling the cashew crop through their hands, without spending anything on civil works or administration, Dimaté said that the *Com'zone* and his immediate entourage gets wealthy while average FN soldiers are exploited for their loyalty to the northern cause. Dimaté said that the FN have been a bane in the areas they control, that everyone feels that way, but were intimidated to say so in the public meeting. Dimaté also said that the FN has been hostile to the Lobi (some 45% of the region's population) who are more heavily taxed as a result…Mayor Ouattara agreed with much of what Dimaté had to say concerning the FN's management of the region, while also castigating Dimaté himself for failing to aid the region, in his sixteen years as the region's representative in Parliament and obliquely accusing him of corruption. The *Com'zone* repeatedly made the same accusations about Dimaté to the Ambassador during the course of the visit (US Embassy Abidjan 2006).

Perhaps more important was how Dimaté was implicated by the FN in the planning and staging of the attacks on the FN on *dimanche noir*. No one interviewed by this author, except members of the FN, suggested that Dimaté had anything to do with the planning of *dimanche noir*. Moreover,

the FN leadership in Bouna has not presented any evidence they might have proving that Dimaté was involved. Nonetheless, the FN military leadership in Bouna has been adamant in claiming that "the youth were manipulated," (Kouamé 2007b) and that "it (*dimanche noir*) was organized by the politicians, with the objective of destabilizing the regime of the FN in Bouna. They created a problem out of nothing" (FN member, Bouna, 01.26.11). In a communiqué issued by the FN in Bouaké, the former rebels claimed that that attack was organized by a small number of youth leaders in Bouna who had direct ties to Dimaté (Kouamé 2007c). The significance of this strategy of explicitly tying Dimaté to *dimanche noir* was twofold. First, this strategy obviously functioned as an attempt to delegitimize the political position of Dimaté; it rendered him an external actor situated on the other side of the *zone de confiance,* just like the other enemies in government that the rebels have fought. But perhaps more importantly, it delegitimized the anti-FN movement itself, implying that it was exclusively externally sponsored, with no legitimate grievances underpinning it locally. Indeed, this strategy has strong parallels with government efforts to delegitimize the 2002 rebellion in the early stages of war by claiming it was merely an externally sponsored movement backed by its patrons in Burkina Faso.

The marginalization by the FN of Lobi politicians such as Dimaté created a context where there were few political actors on the ground capable of legitimately representing the Lobi community. This was explained to me by one NGO worker and youth organizer in terms of the problem of taxes:

> They (the Lobi) are without a voice, they are a people without a voice, thus the intellectuals, the politicians can't defend their cause. Sadly, for them it isn't that way. They say everything is OK? Meanwhile, the peasants are still suffering (NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11).

The larger consequence of the marginalization of Lobi political representatives was that the FN itself was forced to play some role in the management of everyday social conflicts such as those over land, marital disputes and the distribution of aid. Some NGO workers in Bouna explained to me that the capacity and legitimacy of the rebels to play this role was limited:

> In fact, the FN, for when they arrived, they did not have the aptitude for understanding these relations (between the Koulongo and the Lobi); they came because of the war. They managed security issues, how to advance or how to

> secure the territory. That was their competence. For the rest they didn't have a lot of competence. In this zone there was some sort of organization that used to exist, but now the authority of the chief is gone, the authority of the prefect isn't there; the authority of the judge isn't there. Thus, the population had to rapidly invent new mechanisms, but all of that had to be made under the authority of the FN (NGO worker, Bouna, 01.27.11).

> At the beginning, the FN even had to manage land issues, and they did that, but after they ceded to the pressure because when the Koulongo kingdom was reestablished, the problems over the land question, women problems, all of that returned to the customary chief. But at the beginning, the rebels managed everything, land problems, any problems; they managed everything (NGO worker, Bouna, 01.22.11).

In Bouna, the rebels were effectively thrust into a 'political' role they themselves felt very uncomfortable playing. One former rebel commander consistently reaffirmed the military mandate of the movement in the early days of the rebellion (FN member, Bouna, 01.26.11). Nonetheless, in the eyes of the local population, many decisions taken by the rebels – over land, women and divorce, and tax payments – appeared to be *ad hoc* and self-interested. In many cases, rebel decisions resulted in the exacerbation of these conflicts rather than their resolution (NGO worker, Bouna, 01.27.11). The military presence of the FN in Bouna heightened tension between themselves and local populations and between the different ethnic groups in the region, not only because the demands they placed on this community were high (this would describe much of the north), but because they lacked any credible set of intermediaries with whom they could govern. Koulongo elites lacked authority and the Lobi community opposed the rebellion altogether.

After 'Dimanche Noir': Reconfiguring Authority in Post-Conflict Bouna

After *dimanche noir*, the FN administration, at both the local and national levels, recognized the challenge Bouna posed in terms of governance and the maintenance of political stability, as well as the subsequent need for organizational reform. One of the more pronounced changes was the reform to the organizational structure of the rebellion in Bouna initiated by Soro at the national level. Since the signing of the OPA in 2007, Soro had put substantial public pressure on the military wing of the FN to hasten the dual political processes of military demobilization and administrative reunification in the territory under FN control (Bakayoko 2007; Didi 2008; Stanislas 2008).

Occurring not long after the signing of the OPA, the events in Bouna represented a stark reminder that Soro's calls to push the peace process forward in northern zones were being resisted by some groups within the FN. *Dimanche noir* drew attention to the fact that some elements within the FN were still using their political position in the north as a strategy for self-enrichment. Minimally then, the confrontation between Lobi youth and the local FN in Bouna showed that Soro did not have complete control over certain elements within the movement. The burdensome tax system installed by the rebels, particularly "*le racket sur la routes*" – the system of checkpoints manned by the FN across the north – remained in place despite Soro's calls for their abolition. However, far more problematically for Soro, these events suugested to others, both in the international community and in Gbagbo's camp, that either Soro was himself not fully committed to the peace process or that he could not credibly commit to the peace process on behalf of the military wing of the movement, particularly the *commandants des zones*.

As a way of correcting this image, Soro committed to re-organizing the rebellion in this part of the north. As explained in Chapter 2, the FN extended its reach over local areas through its three principal organizational bodies: the *Forces Armée de Forces Nouvelles* (FAFN), the *Etat-major* and *La Centrale*. In practice however, these bodies were unevenly inscribed across the northern zones under the control of the FN. The failed 2002 coup attempt and the military stalemate that followed often required that the FN establish at least minimal military control over the vast territory it now controlled. The *Com'zones* were generally the first institutions put in place. For a long time, *Com'zones* remained poorly monitored (if at all) by the national level political and military leaders of the movement. Like other regions in the north, the *Com'zone* in Bouna remained largely autonomous from national level leaders throughout the conflict. The FN's minimal effort to politically mobilize this part of the country in support of the rebellion contributed to the perception of rebel control over the northeast as an occupation, rather than a liberation movement. As stated above, one reason for this was that the local FN leadership in Bouna was drawn largely from other parts of the north, particularly from the Senoufo heartland around Korhogo. However, another equally important reason was that the FN administration in this part of the north was comprised solely of its military wing – headed by the *commandant de zone* Morou Ouattara. Offices for *La Centrale* and the *etat major* were not established until after 2007, and only after Bouna's *dimanche noir*. Indeed, one way of reading the ultimate installation

of *La Centrale* and the *etat major* was that they were in fact organizational responses to the eroding legitimacy of the FN in this part of the north that had culminated in *dimanche noir*.

The very absence of these institutions also contributed to the confrontation between the Lobi community and the FN in Bouna, and the overall illegitimacy of the FN in the northeast more generally. In other parts of the north, the *Délégant General* (the representative of the *état major* in each com'zone) played a vital role in politically mobilizing civilian populations and legitimizing the movement. Interviews in Korhogo, for instance, revealed that the *Délégant General* fulfilled a number of important administrative and political functions. These included: addressing questions regarding public welfare, including problems related to healthcare provision, education and agricultural production, establishing external relations with NGOs and foreign governments working in Korhogo and the surrounding rural areas and communicating to the public the aims and strategies of the movement (through television and radio broadcasts). The distinctly 'political' function played by the *Délégant General* in Korhogo was absent in Bouna. Military leaders positioned in Bouna since the beginning of the rebellion understood their position as concerned strictly with military issues and problems, which had very little to do with the political aims of the movement. This had two implications for the legitimacy of the rebellion in this part of the north. First, the FN made little effort to mobilize support and explain the aims of the rebellion.[48] This was particularly problematic in a part of the country where ideas about citizenship, nationalism and the national level cleavages driving the conflict were poorly understood, particularly within the rural areas surrounding Bouna. As a result, the FN confronted a political environment where fear of and scepticism about the rebellion predominated (NGO worker, Bouna, 01.27.11). The absence of a *Délégant General,* as part of the movement, also forced its military wing to function 'politically' in ways that they viewed as being well beyond their strict military mandate.

Between 'dimanche noir' in October and the end of 2007, the FN established offices for both *La Centrale* and the *état major* in Bouna. Representatives for these distinct wings of the FN expressed mandates directly related to improving the relations between the FN and the local

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[48] For instance, in contrast to Korhogo, the radio station was looted and rendered inoperable by FN soldiers during the early days of the rebellion. This drastically weakened the ability of Ouattara to convey any political message justifying the presence of the rebels in Bouna. Radio station manager, Bouna, 01.19.11.

population, particularly the Lobi community. For agents of *La Centrale*, regulating the taxes imposed on goods and services in Bouna functioned as a strategy for depoliticizing their application. This included decisions on what could be taxed. Although difficult to verify, there was a prominent perception that the tax demands of the FN in Bouna prior to these changes were particularly high (FN member, Bouna, 01.28.11).[49] By establishing *La Centrale*'s authority in Bouna, the FN sought to alter the perception that tax levels for goods and services in Bouna were not in line with rates in other regions under control of the FN.[50]

Likewise, the intended function of the *Délégant General* in Bouna was to play an intermediary role both between the FN and the local population, and between different segments within this population. Soon after their arrival, members of the office of the *Délégant General* met with the representatives of the key constituencies in Bouna: the King (Koulango), the Imams (Dyula, Mossi) and the Lobi chief. They also met with a number of youth leaders in the community, even some involved in the organization of the fight against the FN. These meetings aimed to both provide a forum for the expression of grievances against the FN and also to facilitate the expression of the larger local and national level aims of the rebellion to local community members. The *Délégant General* also functioned as a mouthpiece for the local population vis-à-vis the military wing of the movement. One member of the office for the *Délégant General* suggested that some of the most complained about taxes, like the levies on motorcycles passing between Bouna and the surrounding countryside, had declined or been abolished as a result of their insistence vis-à-vis *commandant* Ouattara (FN member, Bouna, 01.22.11). This political wing of the FN has also functioned as a forum for the resolution of disputes within local populations. After 2007, the office of the *Délégant General* assumed some responsibilities for regulating conflict over the payment of bride-wealth and divorce. The branch of the FN was also responsible for resolving land use conflicts in rural areas. Here, the FN helped negotiate the adequate payment of compensation to Koulango and Lobi landholders whose farms had been damaged by cattle owned and managed by Peul pastoralists (FN member, Bouna, 02.06.11).

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[49] While this was certainly the perception in Bouna, it is difficult to establish whether this was actually the case. See footnote 43.

[50] Efforts at institutional reform were common is other localities controlled by the FN. See chapter 5, pg. 155.

The sum of these institutional reforms represented what I believe to be a concerted effort at resolving the tensions that emerged between the FN and the Lobi community in Bouna during the conflict period. Additionally, the organizational dynamics described above might also suggest that organizational factors themselves played a role in shaping the relationships that emerged between the rebels and Bouna's Lobi community over time; that the initial absence of any political arm of the FN limited its capacity to mobilize political support. As explained above, this is certainly an important part of the story in Bouna, but it remains incomplete for two central reasons. First, as I suggest above, as well as in more detail in chapter 2, the incomplete and uneven character the FN's organization building strategies was the norm throughout the north. The military side of the movement, the *Com'zones*, was typically the first, and for some time the only, organizational body implanted in the liberated zones controlled by the FN. These reforms were emphasized in this chapter because they represented both a recognition of and a response from the FN to their declining legitimacy in Bouna; the root of which was, as this chapter suggests, the structural position of the Lobi elite as intermediaries for the pre-conflict state. Second, as I discuss in greater detail below, despite these reforms, many within the Lobi community in Bouna retained a deep resentment towards the rebels. The debatable extent to which organizational reform placated these grievances suggest that their underlying structural roots were not, or could not, be fundamentally addressed by changes to the organizational makeup of the movement itself.

Contentious State-Making in Post-Conflict Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire

During fieldwork in January 2011 soon after the contested presidential elections in late 2010, it became clear that many in the Lobi community retained a heavy resentment towards the former rebels. Leading up to the elections, representatives of the Lobi community in Bouna repeatedly expressed their desire for the FN to give up their control over this part of the north (Abalo 2007; Arouna 2007; Kouamé 2007a). Soon after *dimanche noir*, a prominent Lobi youth leader in Bouna claimed that "since they have not won their war against the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, we are going to make them leave Bouna" (Kouamé 2007a). Another stated that "if the FN does not find a solution to all the problems raised by the people, next time, it will be all of Bouna who will revolt to request that the FN leave" (Abalo 2007). These public statements reflect the general

sentiments held by the majority of Bouna's Lobi community. The views of the Koulongo were less clear. As a group, the Koulongo benefitted from the rebellion because of how it temporarily checked the political clout of prominent Lobi politicians such as Dimaté. However, the Koulongo and Lobi both recognized that regulating the tensions between them generated by the rebellion required the strengthening of state institutions. As explained above, the rebels themselves lacked the legitimacy and capacity required to manage these conflicts. The authority of the Koulongo, particularly their authority over the management of land use, declined dramatically over the post-colonial period. The fact that the FN was doing little to expedite the process of administrative reunification reinforced collective feelings of frustration in Bouna. The office of the *préfet*, headed by Kouassi Aka Bio officially opened in September 2007, soon after the signing of the OPA. In order to enact his authority, Bio initiated a political structure that he calls the "summit of the authorities" as a forum through which all of the key political actors in Bouna – all elected officials, bureaucrats, and the FN – could work to collectively solve the important problems confronting the city. Despite these efforts, Bio, like most other political actors outside of the FN in Bouna, recognized that power still lay in the hands of the former rebels. The fact that the FN still controlled the lion's share of the tax revenue greatly restricted the autonomy of other political groups and actors (AFP 2009b).

Towards these terminal stages of the conflict, the most prominent political challenge to Morou Ouattara and the position of the FN in the northeast came from Dimaté. The already tense relationship between Ouattara and Dimaté reached new heights in October 2010 after the first round of the Presidential elections, when Dimaté publically stated his support for Gbagbo heading into the second round. The controversy began after President Gbagbo's decision to name Dimaté the *Haute autorité chargée du développement du Zanzan Nord*. According to Dimaté, in accepting this post, he was subsequently charged with supporting Gbagbo and kicked out of the PDCI. It was only after being sidelined from his old party that Dimaté actually publically stated his intention to support Gbagbo in the second round of elections ('*Je dis que je suis Pdci mais je vote pour Gbagbo'*) instead of Alassane Ouattara, the candidate backed by Henri Bedié and the rest of the PDCI (Doualy 2011).

What are the implications of Dimaté's decision to side with Gbagbo for the argument presented in this chapter? These dynamics might suggest Dimaté and other Lobi elites were less

dependent on a single set of national level actors than suggested earlier in this chapter. If Dimaté was able to break with Bedié and the PDCI and side with Gbagbo, why could he have not as easily shifted alliances and sided with the FN earlier in the conflict? Dimaté's decision to side with Gbagbo require explanation. However, they largely confirm rather than contradict the basic logic of the argument presented in this chapter. Dimaté's strategic alliance with Gbagbo does not reflect lessened dependence on the state, but rather, shifting coalitional arrangements between different political actors and groups at the national level. As discussed in chapter 2, despite the introduction of multiparty politics in 1990, the PDCI remained in power until the 1999 military coup led by General Robert Guéï, which removed former President Bédié from power. After the contested 2000 elections through which Gbagbo gained the Presidency, Bédié and the rest of PDCI were put in a difficult position. Allying with Alassane Ouattara and the RDR had obvious strategic advantages. Both Dyula and Baoulé planters in the cocoa growing regions of Southwestern Côte d'Ivoire (the principal 'ethnic' constituencies of the RDR and PDCI respectively) were the target of the anti-immigrant rhetoric espoused by the FPI, Gbagbo and his supporters. Yet, Bédié himself was no stranger to playing up these kinds of divisions to his own advantage. He was one of the principal architects of *ivoirité,* the ultra-nationalist discourse used to exclude Alassane Ouattara from the 1995 elections.

Nonetheless, strategic considerations, and the shared goal of defeating Gbagbo appeared to trump ideology as the political crisis wore on. In 2005, a pre-electoral coalition, *des Houphouétistes pour la démocratie et la Paix* (RHDP), was formed between four political parties: the RDR, the PDCI, *L'Union pour la democratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire* (UDPCI), and *Le Mouvement des Forces de L'Avenir* (MFA). And leading up the 2010 presidential elections, Bédié embarked on a tour of the north, disavowing his past association with the nationalist, discriminatory policies now embraced by Gbagbo and his supporters (Ignace 2009; Jacob 2009). All the parties agreed to vote for the party and candidate that advanced to the second round of the presidential elections. After Ouattara finished second (to Gbagbo) in the first round of the elections, questions about the strength of this new alliance were laid to rest when Bédié called upon his supporters to vote "'massively' for Ouattara" (Bassett 2011a, 472). Yet the PDCI's shift from party in power to opposition put someone like Dimaté in a very vulnerable political position. On the one hand, as this chapter suggests, Lobi politicians gained substantial

political protection from their alliance with the PDCI over the course of the post-colonial period. On the other hand, through its membership in the RHDP, Bédié and the rest of the PDCI had joined a group largely sympathetic to the political mission advanced by the FN. Remember, many FN members had joined the movement to fight for the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara. Dimaté, it seemed, was forced to choose between Bédié and his old PDCI patrons, and the Lobi community in Bouna, who had so vehemently opposed the presence of the rebels. In siding with Gbagbo, Dimaté appeared to side with the latter. The fact that the PDCI swung its allegiance to the political opposition in Côte d'Ivoire meant that they could no longer provide the political protections on which the Lobi community has relied upon in the past. In fact, quite the opposite, the PDCI had shifted its support to the national coalition that *supported* nativist politics in Bouna. In sum, although the identity of Dimaté's national level partner changed (from the PDCI to the FPI), the dependence of the Lobi on the state remained.

Initially, Dimaté payed a heavy price for his decision. In addition to being marginalized within his old party, his homes in Abidjan, Bondoukou, Bouna and Doropo were all attacked and pillaged by pro-Ouattara militants after the removal Gbagbo in April 2011. Between April and December 2011, Dimaté was exiled in Paris, largely because of ongoing threats from Ouattara supporters stemming from his decision to side with Gbagbo during the presidential elections (Baikeh 2010; Tété 2010; Doualy 2011; Hyacinthe 2011). In December 2011, Dimaté returned and ran as an independent in legislative elections, ultimately losing the seat to a member of the RDR. And, in part of the country where they had enjoyed continued success since the transition to multiparty politics in 1993, the PDCI was for the first time shut out of the region of Bunkani (Bouna, Doropo, Nassian and Tehini). This suggests that the success of the PDCI in the northeast depended at least in part on Dimaté's political pull in the region.

Nonetheless, by the summer of 2012, Bedié and other party leaders subsequently permitted Dimaté to rejoin the PDCI. Despite some ongoing sentiments that Dimaté's support was 'bought' by Gbagbo during the Presidential Elections, many high-ranking PDCI members continue to acknowledge Dimaté's enduring political pull in the northeast. "Palé Dimaté is the leader of our region," commented one PDCI member. Another suggested that Bedié gave Dimaté another opportunity to join the PDCI ranks because of his role as a "unifier" ("*Dimaté est un rassembleur"*) (Didi 2012; N'Guessan 2012). Dimaté's acceptance back into the PDCI represents

an important step in regenerating the party whose popularity has declined significantly since his departure. Subsequently, Dimaté and some of the PDCI's national-level leadership including Bedié and Alphonse Djédjé Mady toured the northeast hoping to bring this region back into the PDCI fold. The re-inclusion of Dimaté represented an important part of the party's efforts to remobilize its supporters in preparation for the municipal and regional elections in early 2013 (*L'intelligent d'Abidjan* 2012; N'Guessan 2012; *Le Mandat* 2012).

In contrast to Dimaté, Ouattara and the local branch of the FN in Bouna have shown some willingness to disentangle the movement from the local level conflicts that had been the source of so much criticism from Bouna residents, particularly from members of the Lobi community. One important move in this respect was that soon after *dimanche noir*, the powers of taxation over the local market were officially granted back to the mayor's office rather than to agents of the FN. Although the former rebels retained control over the most lucrative tax bases in the city, specifically those on long distance trade, this delegation of authority represented an important political move. The reason for this move was simple: it signalled to local populations (specifically the Lobi and Lobi women) that goods brought to the market on market day will not be taxed by the rebels. Overall, in recognizing their declining legitimacy, the rebels began to limit their role as part of the system of everyday governance in Bouna. Maybe the more telling sign in this respect was Morou Ouattara's early admission that he did not plan to seek a political position in Bouna after his work with the FN was over. In an interview with the Ivoirian daily *Nord-Sud*, Ouattara claimed that "he is fighting for the development of Bouna, not for a political position," and that "I am not at all interested by an elected post in Bouna" (Kouamé 2007b). Ouattara would later accept a position within the *Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire* (FRCI) as the *commandant de l'Unité d'Attingué*, stationed just northwest of Abidjan. In a last attempt to control ongoing violence and economic predation in the Ivoirian Northeast, Tuo Fozié, the old head of the police and gendarmerie for the FN during the conflict, was named *le chef de l'Unité de lute contre le racket* and administrative *préfet* for the region of Zanzan by the Ivoirian government (Bamba 2012). It remains unclear whether the government's decision to appoint an FN member *not* stationed in Bouna during the conflict has placated resentment against the rebels or the tensions between the Lobi and Koulongo communities generated by the conflict.

Conclusion

The case of Bouna could easily support explanations of rebel-civilian relations other than the one presented in this dissertation. The FN in Bouna did not create any novel institutional structures. They did not engage or seek to mobilize Bouna residents in any meaningful way. They did however go to great length to extract resources from the groups under their control. In Bouna, payment to the rebels was required at roadblocks entering and exiting the city. If an Ivoirian identity card could not be provided, more was expected. Trucks exporting yams and agricultural products were taxed heavily, as were the stores and venders in the cities' central market. Women carrying yams between the city and the surrounding countryside were also required to pay. The resulting tensions that developed between the rebels and Bouna's civilian population, particularly the Lobi community, might be explained simply by the fact that the FN had significant economic stakes in keeping the rebellion alive and that economic motivations trumped any political or ideological goals the movement might have had.

However, the key point to take away from this chapter is that this was only *part* of the explanation of why the rebellion generated so much resistance in this part of the north. As the other two case chapters will make clear, the tax demands on civilian populations were a constant throughout the north while under rebel occupation. The fact that the FN confronted such resistance to their wartime authority is not easily explained by interests or motivations at the root of the actions themselves. This chapter shows that the coalitional choices made by the FN in Bouna worked to heighten resistance against it. These choices were shaped by the fact that the most powerful group in Bouna, the Lobi, brokered Bouna's relationship with the central state in the pre-conflict period. The position of the Lobi community and the power of Lobi elites remained conditional on the state's protection of user rights to land in Côte d'Ivoire's northeast. For the purposes of this study, this had two significant implications.

First, the sense that the Lobi community was being targeted by the rebels stemmed from the fact that representatives of the Lobi community were viewed as agents of the very state that the rebels had committed to fighting. As a result, the rebel tax regime, as well as other actions taken by the FN, appeared to unevenly target the Lobi as a group. Taxes seemed to target the Lobi because they were the dominant economic group and the primary cultivator and exporter of yams. Fines levied for not having appropriate national identification were seen to be directed at

the Lobi and other migrants or non-native populations (of which the Lobi were the largest group). Conversely, the Koulongo stopped contributing to community infrastructural projects. Many Lobi felt the Koulongo could do so because they were politically and military backed by the rebels. Together, these actions convinced many Lobi that they were the target of the rebellion. Feelings of resentment ultimately led to a revolt against the FN led by a number of Lobi youth in Bouna.

Second, the dependence of the Lobi on the state meant that the FN had few credible intermediaries through which to control this part of the north. An underlying cause of the contentious relationship between the rebels and the civilian population in Bouna was that the FN had no credible social intermediary through which they could draw support. In the first part of this chapter I explained how the autonomous political power of the Koulongo monarchy had gradually eroded beginning around the colonial period. The migration of the Lobi furthered this process. In siding with the Koulongo, the rebels allied with a group that exhibited little capacity to enforce rules (particularly those surrounding land) and political order. Overall, neither the monarchy nor the emergent Lobi elite (who were tied to the PDCI) could fulfill this role, absent the political backing of the state. Consequently, Morou Ouattara, the zone commander in Bouna, could draw on little popular support. He did not have a strong social base from which to launch a political challenge against the likes of Pale Dimaté. In the cases that follow, hierarchical configurations that favored rebel allies (non-broker elites) directly lessened the conflict between the FN and the communities they governed.

Chapter 5. Civil War and Enduring Factionalism in Korhogo

After the failed coup d'état in 2002, rebels established control over the northern half of Côte d'Ivoire including the major cities of Korhogo and Bouaké. Situated in the middle of the country and on the border of the *zone de confiance* dividing north and south, Bouaké quickly emerged as the administrative capital of the northern rebellion. Korhogo played an equally important strategic role as a showcase to others – to other northerners, the government in the south, as well as international observers (especially inquiring researchers!) – of the quality of governance delivered by the FN. One FN administrator emphatically challenged me to compare what the FN had done administratively in Korhogo and the north more broadly to other cases of civil war in West Africa (particularly in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone). To a degree, my interviewee had a point. The rebels had embarked on an extensive campaign to clean up the city, sponsored a number of public art projects and repaired a number of buildings that had been damaged in the early stages of the conflict. With the aid of a number of international NGOs in the city, public services such as health care, education and garbage collection continued to be provided. Given the significant steps taken by the FN to try and normalize life during the conflict, it is not surprising that the *commandant de zone* in charge of the city, Fofié Kouakou Martin, gained some support for his authority amongst certain groups in Korhogo. After the removal from power of former President Laurent Gbagbo in 2011, Martin drew on this support and was named by Alassane Ouattara to the new position of *commandant de la Compagnie Territoriale* in Korhogo.



Figure 5.1: Map of the administrative Region of Savanes, North-Central Côte d'Ivoire (original map source: reliefweb.int, modified by Melanie Ferrara).

Yet this was only part of the story in Korhogo during the conflict period. Although the FN as a whole directed relatively limited violence at civilians during the conflict, Martin was the only FN member charged with human rights violations by the UN. In fact, Martin was the only actor tied to the movement accused of human rights abuses. The political order established by the FN in Korhogo was unique compared to the other cases included in this dissertation in terms of the quality of wartime governance (which was comparatively superior to other cases) and the levels of violence witnessed (which was comparatively higher than in other cases).

In this chapter, I argue that the level of support garnered by the FN in Korhogo was not reducible solely to the behavior of the rebels, which on the surface seemed both conducive and counterproductive to mobilizing support. Instead, this chapter suggests that the political environment in Korhogo created a distinct set of political opportunities for the rebellion's local-

level leadership. These opportunities were themselves a function of the specific position of pre-conflict elites in Korhogo as brokers between local and national arenas prior to the start of the 2002 civil war. Since the late 1960s, the Senoufo elite functioned as the principal intermediaries through which competing national-level political actors have mobilized support in this part of the north. As Boone (2003, ch.5) argues, decisions by national governments to mobilize support through Senoufo intermediaries was a direct reflection of the high level of ongoing influence – over land, over labour, and over blocks of voters – this group wields up until the present day.

According to my framework, pre-conflict state brokers are unlikely to ally with rebels during armed conflict. Does the fact that the Senoufo elite functioned as brokers during much of post-colonial period contradict my argument? I argue that the fact that Senoufo elites have historically functioned as brokers in Korhogo does not contradict my argument for two important reasons.

First, since independence, state recognition significantly heightened factional conflict between would-be brokers within Senoufo society. In contrast to their Lobi counterparts in Bouna, Senoufo elites in Korhogo derived their authority from both an autonomous set of social institutions governing land and labour *as well as* their recognition as local authorities by national-level political networks based in Abidjan. Lobi elites in Bouna and Senoufo elites in Korhogo both benefitted from relatively broad support from the communities they represented. However, the fact the Senoufo elites sat atop social hierarchies formed independently of state interventions meant that elites in Korhogo could at least *potentially* function as allies of the rebels after they established military control over the city. This potential existed as a result of this group's autonomy from the state and also because state recognition of Senoufo custom promoted conflict between competing elite factions who derived their authority from their customary control over land and labour. Additionally, the hierarchical configuration confronted by the FN was more balanced in Korhogo than in Bouna because competing factions derived their political authority from the same set of hierarchical social relationships between elites and subordinate groups.

Second, beginning in the 1990s, the shift to multiparty politics in Côte d'Ivoire fundamentally altered the political landscape in Korhogo. Prior to the 1990s, competing elite factions struggled to become the principal set of brokers representing the old single party, the PDCI, in Korhogo. Beginning in the 1990s, political liberalization presented opportunities for

Senoufo factions to align themselves with incumbents or competing opposition parties, specifically the RDR, whose principal ethno-regional base of support was the north. In the 1995 presidential elections for example, popular support in Korhogo and the allegiance of different Senoufo factions was evenly split between the RDR and the PDCI. By the beginning of the civil war, some segments of the Senoufo elite had already distanced themselves from those national-level politicians whom the FN had committed to removing from power. As this chapter explains, zone commander Fofié Martin aligned with the 'conservative faction' of the Senoufo elite, a group that largely aligned itself with the RDR prior to the beginning of the civil war (such as Amadou Gon Coulibaly). Conversely, the ruling FPI sought to mobilize support through elites tied to the 'reformist faction' of the Senoufo elite (such as Dr. Issa Malick Coulibaly and Kassoum Coulibaly). Based on my framework, this chapter identifies Korhogo as a case where the FN established *moderate* social control. The rebels confronted resistance *and* obtained support from a set of elites who derived their authority from pre-existing social hierarchies.

The first half of this chapter examines the history of state-society relations in the Senoufo heartland around Korhogo. Specifically, it focuses on two aspects of this history. First, it examines the historical processes by which Senoufo elites emerged as brokers in the Korhogo region. Resistance to European colonialism, the ultimate imposition of colonial rule, the politics of the independence period and the processes of post-colonial state-building all conditioned the relationship of the Senoufo elite in Korhogo with communities under their authority and national level political circles. The second half of this chapter focuses explicitly on the effects of these conflicts on the ability of the FN to garner support for its authority in this part of the north during the conflict period (2002-2011). Factional conflict between pre-conflict Senoufo elites in Korhogo presented a distinct set of opportunities and constraints that shaped the extent to which the FN could build support for its authority in and around Korhogo. As with the other case chapters included in this dissertation, the focus of this chapter is on how the unique constellations of pre-conflict power and authority confronted by the FN in Korhogo shaped the ability of the rebels to garner support.[51]

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[51] The case of Korhogo differs from the other cases included in this study in terms of how closely these conflicts overlap with other forms of political conflict and competition, including conflict between different FN factions as well as electoral competition occurring at both local and national-levels. Does the presence of these sorts of conflicts detract from the argument made in this dissertation? I argue that it does not. Others have suggested that heightened

Despite the litany of shifting, overlapping conflicts presented in this chapter, the other characteristic of Korhogo that stands out is that conflicts over taxation – the principal source of conflict in the other two cases discussed in this dissertation – were comparatively muted. In Bouna (chapter 4) and Ouangolodougou (chapter 6), conflicts over the authority to tax were waged largely between state actors and the rebels challenging them (and the constituencies supporting each side). In Bouna, conflicts emerged between the FN and the principal intermediaries through which the state governed the northeast, the Lobi elites. And, as the next chapter illustrates, the FN allied with a group of prominent traders in Ouangolodougou to block efforts made by the mayor's office to reclaim their authority over local taxation. Conflicts waged directly between the state and rebel forces were absent in the case of Korhogo. Instead, the most prominent political debate that emerged during the conflict was between competing coalitions that were each comprised of different segments of the FN and factions of the pre-conflict Senoufo elite. Rather than taxation, questions of succession divided competing elite factions after the death of Korhogo's cantonal chief in 2008.

The Historical Origins of Korhogo's Senoufo Elite

Since its submission to French rule at the turn of the 20th century, Korhogo has remained the heart of Senoufo society as well as the broader administrative, political and economic center of Northern Côte d'Ivoire. Yet, unlike Bouna, which had relatively deep historical roots going back to the 16th century, Korhogo's existence was a direct product of the sweeping changes wrought by French colonialism and resistance to it led by Samory Touré's *sofa* army. Over the last quarter of the 19th century, three competing empires controlled Korhogo at different moments: the Kénédugu empire (based in Sikasso, in what is now Southern Mali) between 1883 and 1894, the Wassoulou empire (founded by Samory Touré) between 1894 and 1898, and the French

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factional conflict at the local level could also shape patterns of cooperation and conflict in these distinct political arenas (electoral completion, and rebel group organization and fragmentation). There is an extensive literature examining the link between cleavage structures and national party systems. See Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Zuckerman (1982), Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) and Deegan-Krause (2006). Regarding the organization of rebellion, Paul Staniland (2012, 148) argues that "the structure of social ties on which an organization was originally built shapes the new institutions that emerge. Social divisions and cleavages that existed at the time of organizational founding create enduring internal fissures and indiscipline, whereas overlapping social networks makes it possible to create new institutions able to control violence".

following Samory's capture in 1898. In contrast to Bouna – which had its autonomous political powers drastically curtailed as a result of Samory's invasion and subsequent French colonialism – the cumulative effect of this series of external occupations was the expansion and reinforcement of the social bases of political power enjoyed by the political class in Korhogo. Gbon Coulibaly, Korhogo's old paramount chief, consolidated the political position of his descendants through a strategic alliance formed during the late colonial period with future President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. Although the colonial and post-colonial history of Korhogo might be considered a representative case of "indirect rule," the ability of the Coulibaly family to fill this role during this extended period also testifies to the enduring local-level legitimacy this group enjoyed leading up to the beginning of Côte d'Ivoire's civil war in 2002.

Historically, the political clout of Senoufo elites stems from their social control over land as well as the labour power of young men. In pre-colonial Senoufo society, farmers employed the majority of their labour working large communal fields called *segnon* or *segbo* that were controlled by senior male lineage (*katiolo*) heads (Bassett 2001, 98). Access rights – either through the opening up of new land or the establishment of new villages by strangers to Senoufo communities – required the permission of Senoufo land (*tarfolo)* chiefs, who were typically senior male lineage heads (Coulibaly 1964, 22; Boone 2003, 249). Land in Senoufo villages remained perpetually under the control of *tarfalo* chiefs, who could at any time use their authority to reallocate rights and access to land. After the death of village founders, descendants of founding lineages were required to get renewed permission to remain on land distributed by *tarfalo* chiefs (Coulibaly 1964, 23-24). This ensured the ongoing authority of *tarfalo* land chiefs over the descendants of settlers within Senoufo communities.

The authority of elders in traditional Senoufo society was also underwritten by their control over the labour power of young men. This control was maintained through a number of social institutions, the most prominent of which was the age-grade society, *Poro*. *Poro* was an initiation process whereby young males passed through successive seven-year stages in order to prepare them for senior adult status. During the final stage, junior males were generally expected to work the fields of lineage heads and village chiefs. Young men had few choices in terms of fulfilling the obligations placed on them by elders during *Poro*. Through fines or outright expulsion from *Poro* initiation, elders could penalize young men who were unwilling or

incapable of fulfilling the duties expected of them. The inability to fulfill these obligations could also be met with larger social opprobrium. Not progressing through initiation stages meant that young men would never be granted the privileges and esteem reserved exclusively for senior males in Senoufo society (Coulibaly 1964, 28-29; Gunderson 1975, 31; Bassett 2001, 98). Ultimately, however, what legitimized *Poro* in the eyes of Senoufo youth was that eventually all men who successively passed through all the stages of *Poro* initiation would be rewarded with the status of seniority and the control over the labour of juniors that came with senior status (Boone 2003, 251).

A related mechanism by which elders in Senoufo society could control junior members was through their authority over arranged marriage. Bassett suggests that control over women and the institution of marriage was the "principal trump card" in the ongoing control over the labour power of young men for senior community members (2001, 102). Although there were a number of different means by which young men could obtain a wife, all marriages were arranged by senior males (usually chiefs or lineage heads). The different means of obtaining a wife were all tied to the fulfillment of agricultural work (Bassett 2001, 99). As long as elders were able to manage marriage and the access to women for young men, they retained sufficient leverage to force young males to labour on collective fields. Bassett suggests that, in instances where more direct means of controlling rural labour waned, Senoufo elders could always "recapture the labour of young men through their control of marriage arrangements" (2001, 102).[52]

By the late 19th century, however, social relations in the Senoufo heartland around Korhogo began to change as a result of geopolitical struggles occurring throughout West Africa. In particular, village level leaders (lineage heads and village chiefs) confronted challenges to their authority over land and labour. Fighting between the Kénédugu leader Babemba Traoré and Samory, and later between Samory and the French, exacted a great toll on the rural communities surrounding Korhogo. During the fighting, warring parties burnt villages, looting rose, and many in rural areas fled their homes. After forming a brief alliance with Babemba Traoré against the

[52] For example, Bassett explains that this was the case during the era of forced labour in Côte d'Ivoire when relations between senior and junior males came under intense strain. In many cases, changes in the resulting labour requirements demanded by *Poro* or the outright dissolution of *Poro* societies themselves seriously threatened social powers previously enjoyed by senior males in Senoufo society. Labour requirements tied to marriages arranged by senior males were a means by which these actors could mitigate these changes (Bassett 2001, 102-103).

French, Samory eventually gained total control over the Korhogo region by 1896. Gbon Coulibaly, the head of the Tiembara chiefdom near Korhogo, used these geopolitical shifts to extend the reach of his own authority. Coulibaly met with Samory and explained that he had no intention of challenging Samory's military ascendency in the region. Samory's acceptance of Gbon's submission formed the basis of a strategic alliance between these two actors. Korhogo would eventually become an important source of slaves and food for Samory's army. In exchange, Korhogo was spared the worst of the violence resulting from Samory's war-making.

Overall, this alliance would have significant implications for the spatial distribution of human settlement around Korhogo, as well as the quality of authority relations in the city and its surrounding rural areas (Gunderson 1975, 38; Bassett 2001, 34-44; Boone 2003, 248). Korhogo's status as a safe zone from Samory's war efforts made the city an attractive destination for migrants from the surrounding countryside looking to escape insecurity. As a result, what had been a previously scattered rural population surrounding Korhogo became increasingly concentrated in the 15 km circle, or '*zone dense*,' around Korhogo and the rural villages to the south and west of the city. Korhogo's population became far more concentrated than what could be found in other parts of Côte d'Ivoire (Fauré and Labazée 2002, 315; Boone 2003, 248). By 1975, 60-80% of the villages surrounding Korhogo had more than 700 inhabitants (Bassett 2001, 47). The significant political implication of these demographic changes was that migrants who were looking to settle in the safe zone around Korhogo were forced to submit to the authority of Gbon and his subordinate chiefs. Previously, political authority over land and rural labour in Senoufo communities had resided solely in the hands of village elders. However, for new arrivals to Korhogo, these Senoufo "were thrown into a strange environment where a hierarchy of chiefs determined what lands were to be worked and whose granaries should be filled" (Gunderson 1975, 40). In this emerging local political order, Gbon and his auxiliaries at the village level controlled the distribution of land and an increasing share of the rents derived from the economic surpluses produced by the labour of young men (Gunderson 1975, 40-42; Fauré and Labazée 2002, 315). Overall, the changes in authority relations associated with Samory's wars in the Korhogo region contrasted greatly with the experience of Bouna. In Bouna, drastic population decline and displacement significantly limited the autonomy of the old kingdom. In Korhogo,

Samory's occupation enhanced the political power of the chiefly establishment headed by the patriarch of the Coulibaly family, Gbon.

Colonialism and the Threatened Legitimacy of the Chiefly Class in Korhogo

Korhogo was officially brought under colonial rule soon after Samory Touré's defeat and capture by French forces in 1898. In reaction, and sensing the inevitability of French dominance at this moment, Samory's former ally in Korhogo, Gbon Coulibaly, switched his allegiance to the emerging colonial power and welcomed them "as liberators" of the Ivoirian North (Lawler 1993, 207, quoted in Boone 2003, 252). France responded positively to this overture. Gbon was named as the Paramount Chief in Korhogo. Administrative units were drawn largely in line with the boundaries established by the pre-existing chiefly hierarchy. As Paramount Chief, Gbon retained the powers to name chiefs in colonial cantons and villages under his control. Overall, as Boone writes, the French sought "to harness Senoufo chiefly hierarchies to the colonial cause" (Boone 2003, 252).

Alliances with the chiefly establishment in the Senoufo heartland were particularly important in terms of colonial efforts in expanding cotton production in this part of the north. French colonial administrators drew on pre-existing chiefly administrative structures to mobilize resources and labour and stimulate cotton production. Material incentives won the allegiances of Senoufo chiefs and align their interests with that of the colonial state. Colonial chiefs were permitted to keep 10% of the head taxes they collected from the villages they controlled (Bassett 1988, 272). Chiefs were also given credit extensions and gifts from European merchant houses to stimulate the demand for commercial goods and provide increased incentives for chiefs to ultimately find ways to ratchet up cotton production (Bassett 1988, 273). In addition, chiefs who did not meet production or revenue demands set by the colonial state were commonly beaten and publically humiliated by French administrators (Bassett 1988, 273; 2001, 61-62). Together, these features of colonial polity ensured that chiefs and their subordinates would, for the most part, follow French directives. These political arrangements underpinned the development of the cotton sector in the Senoufo heartland during the first quarter century of colonial rule (Bassett 2001, 80-81).

Yet the legitimacy of this political system and the place of the Senoufo chiefly hierarchy within it became seriously jeopardized as the colonial project wore on. Seemingly irresolvable

conflicts quickly emerged between the economic interests of the colonial state and the political system colonial administrators used to control and manage cotton production in the north (Fauré and Labazée 2002, 316). The declining legitimacy of the chiefly hierarchy in Korhogo was caused by two specific aspects of the system of land and labour allocation put in place by the colonial state. First, as a result of the global economic downturn in the 1920s and subsequent increased French dependence on American cotton, French administrators began to increase cotton production requirements for rural producers. As a strategy for furthering cotton production, French administrators increased head taxes to force famers to produce more (in order to pay them). They also built a number of official market places where farmers were forced to sell their cotton in the hopes of stemming sales through black market channels where prices for cotton were typically higher (Bassett 1988, 276). In 1926, colonial administrators also increased the labour obligations of young men working on public infrastructure projects and the rapidly growing southern cocoa-growing zone. Since establishing colonial rule at the turn of the 19th century, French officials widely viewed the north as an important source of labour for southern plantations. The French relied on local intermediaries tied to the colonial state to mobilize the labor power of young men. In the 1920s, these colonial labour requirements began to increase dramatically. In 1928, 7,803 young men from the Korhogo region were sent to work in the south (Bassett 1988, 277). In the 1930s, the colonial state forced 6,000 men to leave their villages every six months as conscripted labourers to work on southern plantations (Bassett 1988, 279-280).

The cumulative effect of these labour obligations on the Senoufo heartland was disastrous. The labour requirements of the colonial state directly challenged the capacity of northern communities to produce adequate food crops. By 1929, food shortages were reported in many parts of the north. Food costs skyrocketed. Bassett writes that there were some reports in Korhogo and Boundiali of individuals selling themselves into slavery for 100 francs as a strategy for dealing with the inflated cost of food (Bassett 2001, 77). Forced labour and the resulting food shortage also directly undermined the traditional social basis of production in Senoufo society. Bassett reports that by 1930 many *katiolo* (production units controlled by senior male lineage heads) began to dissolve and break into smaller units of production comprised of maternal brothers and their families. Food production was managed by these smaller social groupings while cotton continued to be cultivated on communal fields controlled by colonial chiefs. Simply

put, the excesses of the French forced-labour regime enforced by the chiefly hierarchy were undermining the very institutions on which the system itself depended. The crisis in food production severely undercut any remaining legitimacy enjoyed by colonial chiefs. Conflicts emerged between village elders and chiefs tied to the colonial state over control over economic surpluses generated by the labour of village youth. Overall, colonial administrators increasingly complained about "the declining authority of village chiefs, which 'too often' required administrators to intervene to ensure their orders were being carried out" (Bassett 1988, 278). Together, the intertwined crises of food production and rural leadership in the Senoufo region seriously threatened colonial economic interests in the region. In the Kong district, south of Korhogo, cotton production was abandoned in 1931 and 1932. Cotton exports from Côte d'Ivoire as a whole in 1932 represented only one quarter of the tonnage exported in 1927 and 1928 (Bassett 2001, 78).

By the 1930's, in recognizing the declining legitimacy enjoyed by the cantonal chiefs, France enacted some reforms to the system of native rule in the Korhogo region. First, colonial administrators reorganized the marketing of cotton production in ways that largely bypassed the chiefs. Lineage heads and village elders began to play a more prominent role in this respect. Harvests were purchased directly from village-level leaders. Inputs such as seeds were also distributed directly to these actors. The goal was to create incentives for producers to increase output and improve the quality of cotton. To meet these objectives, colonialists aimed to bolster the legitimacy of customary institutions on which cotton production so heavily relied. French administrators provided cantonal chiefs monthly salaries to limit the arbitrary amounts they appropriated directly from peasant production. While the aim was to enhance the legitimacy of these actors, this move had mixed effects in this respect because it ultimately rendered chiefs almost entirely dependent on resources derived from the state for their political survival (Boone 2003, 256-257).

Not surprisingly, many of the cantonal chiefs openly supported France during the nationalist period beginning in the 1940s (Gunderson 1975, 81). Their colonial-era dependence on the French made cantonal chiefs, as a group, generally hesitant to openly support the nationalist movement led by Felix Houphouët-Boigny and the Ivoirian branch of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*

(PDCI). The important exception here was the widely revered Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly. Once the strategic ally of both Samory Touré and the French in the region, Gbon finally broke with the French and the rest of the chiefly establishment in Korhogo in 1945 as a result of the growing excesses of the French forced labour regime. Gbon's call to support the ascendant Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI against the French won most Senoufo over to the nationalist side. The PDCI relied heavily on the political support from the Korhogo region to win seats in the French National Assembly in 1945 and 1946. When forced labour ended in 1946, Houphouët-Boigny and his local ally, Gbon Coulibaly, gained celebrity status, particularly in the Senoufo heartland around Korhogo (Boone 2003, 258-259).

With the exception of Gbon, the chiefly establishment in this part of the north supported France's initial opposition to the nationalist movement led by the PDCI-RDA. For these actors, the old system of forced labour represented one of the last remaining mechanisms of accumulating resources independently of the colonial state. Many colonial chiefs recognized that supporting the growing nationalist movement would jeopardize the backing they received from the colonial state for their local positions of authority. Colonial chiefs had much to lose largely because they enjoyed little legitimacy amongst the broader northern population. But the exception again was Gbon. For his unwavering support of Houphouët-Boigny, Gbon was removed from his position as Paramount Chief in Korhogo by the French and replaced by his son, Bema Coulibaly (Labazée 1993a, 228; Boone 2003, 260). Thus, while the autonomous power of much of the Senoufo elite declined dramatically as result of abuses during the colonial period, two groups appeared to retain significant political influence in the region. First, Gbon Coulibaly remains revered to this day by the Senoufo for his stance against the forced-labour regime imposed by the French. His descendants too, have benefitted from this legitimacy. Second, male lineage heads retained significant social control over land and labour and, at this moment, represented the central partners through which the French sought to economically 'develop' the Senoufo heartland.

Nonetheless, the PDCI chose to build its base of support around a variety of disaffected, 'anti-elite' forces in the Korhogo region. Gunderson (1975, 83) writes that, "during most of the 1950s, PDCI militants recruited from the ranks of the civil service, the Dyula community and disaffected Senoufo who used the memory and abuses of the colonial era, such as forced labour,

to advance their cause among the general population". In 1962, the PDCI designated another one of Gbon's sons, Dramane Coulibaly, as their key representative in the region. In sharp contrast to Bema, however, Dramane, who was eighth in the line of succession, had little opportunity to advance in the local political arena without external support (Gunderson 1975, 85).[53] As a result, Dramane and the PDCI built up a political network of support from other politically marginalized groups, particularly Dyula traders based in Korhogo and elsewhere in the North (Gunderson 1975, 81; Boone 2003, 260-261). These constituencies would form the basis of PDCI's emerging political order in the Korhogo region leading into the early post-colonial period.

Marginalizing the Dyula Community in Early Post-Colonial Korhogo

In the context of the late colonial period, the PDCI's strategy of mobilizing support through Dramane and Korhogo's community of Dyula traders made sense. Chiefly opposition to the PDCI, as well as the declining legitimacy of this group as a whole, necessitated that Houphouët-Boigny mobilize support through an alternative set of actors. Yet the underlying assumption of this strategy was that the Senoufo elite was uniformly threatened by this legitimacy crisis. This sub-section highlights that this was clearly not the case. The descendants of Gbon benefited from the legitimacy bestowed upon them as result of the reverence for Korhogo's founder that continues to this day. Senior male lineage heads in the Senoufo region surrounding Korhogo also enjoyed ongoing authority over land and labour. Enduring support for these actors ultimately meant that any effort to bypass or restrict the political clout of this group as intermediaries would provoke significant resistance. This sub-section describes these dynamics and suggests that, while the authority of these groups was indeed threatened during this period, they ultimately emerged as the key brokerage group bridging Korhogo with national-level political circles.

Throughout the north, Dyula merchants have played prominent roles within local political and economic landscapes. The word Dyula can mean a number of things. For most observers, Dyula as a social category refers to Manding speaking Muslim traders who have migrated throughout West Africa from what is now Mali, beginning as far back as the 13th century. In

[53] Although Bema was originally installed by the French after their removal of Gbon Coulibaly as the Korhogo Paramount Chief, he was Gbon's eldest son, and thus widely recognized as the legitimate heir to the Paramount Chieftaincy after Gbon's death.

some cases, Dyula can also refer to a distinct cultural or ethnic category, describing people who are Malinké (Launay 1982, 1-3). Overall, the label 'Dyula' can refer to social, religious, occupational, or linguistic differences depending on the context in which the reference is used.

In Northern Côte d'Ivoire, Dyula relationships to their Senoufo hosts varied. In some cases, as in Kadioha or Boron to the south of Korhogo, or Nielle to the north, Dyula migrants founded chiefdoms that were largely independent of their Senoufo hosts (Launay 1982, 20; 1988). In other cases, such as Koko, the principal Dyula neighbourhood in Korhogo, Dyula traders established themselves as clients of Senoufo chiefs. Not unlike in pre-colonial Bouna, coexistence between these groups was predicated on the different occupational functions they fulfilled. While most Senoufo are widely considered to be "a farming people," most Dyula were preoccupied with one of three principal pursuits: warfare, Islamic scholarship or trade (Launay 1982, 19, 41).

Despite their prominent position in Korhogo as nodes in regional trading networks, the political influence of Dyula traders was typically restricted in a variety of ways. Most important, and in contrast to their Senoufo hosts, Dyula authority was far more decentralized. While Senoufo elders drew upon a host of shared organizational mechanisms (*Poro*, arranged marriage) to support their local positions of authority, Dyula communities were commonly divided internally along a number of different horizontal and vertical cleavages. Dyula communities (in Koko in Korhogo and elsewhere) are traditionally organized according to distinct *kabilas,* or extended family units, headed by a senior male and constituted by attached wives, slaves and children. Dyula communities could be made up of a number of different *kabilas* defined according to occupational categories (trade, warfare, scholarship). They are also divided at the leadership level. Individual *kabilas* have both a religious/intellectual head (*imam*) and a political chief (*mansa*), which despite their distinct functions, "both assumed leadership over the entire community" (Launay 1982, 29). Additionally, Dyula communities could also be divided according to waves of migration. In Koko, Imams from Kadioha and Boron (Dyula villages to the south of Korhogo), Kong, Dia, Nioro, Siakasso and Bobo-Dioulasso have all come to Korhogo and competed for religious and political dominance. Labazée writes that, by actively promoting rivalries amongst these different factions, Gbon Coulibaly limited the political threat of Dyula

elites. After Samory's capture, this was one important reason why there was no "Islamic resistance" to colonialism in Korhogo (1993a, 224; 1993b, 130).

Moreover, Dyula traders and religious figure heads had little incentive to resist the colonial project largely because they, along with the chiefly class in Korhogo, were the principal beneficiaries of European rule. Dyula traders used their position within existing regional trade networks, as well as their access to capital to exploit new economic opportunities that the development of the colonial cotton sector opened up. Many Dyula played significant roles in the growth of the cotton sector either directly as producers of cotton or as intermediaries purchasing crops for export (Gunderson 1975, 63; Boone 2003, 260). However, in contrast to the colonial chiefs who eventually became direct political targets of the nationalist movement, the Dyula community in Korhogo saw their privileged position protected, or arguably enhanced, during the late colonial period. During this period, the Dyula community became the central ally of the local branch of the PDCI and the reformist, anti-chief faction of the Coulibaly family led by Dramane Coulibaly (Gunderson 1975, 80-81; Boone 2003, 260). Alliances with national level PDCI politicians provided the Dyula community some political autonomy vis-à-vis traditional power brokers (namely Senoufo chiefs) at the local level.

One important implication of this alliance was that many Dyula and other ethnic "strangers" to the Korhogo region began to use their ties to the PDCI to challenge the traditional Senoufo hierarchy for local-level authority and control. Gunderson (1975, 86) explains how, during the run-up to National Assembly elections of 1956, "the harassment of village chiefs intensified. Party secretaries at the subprefecture and village level began to replace chiefs as the major intermediaries between the government and the people". The political challenge to the Senoufo establishment intensified in the early post-colonial period. Cissé Mory Kounandi, a prominent Dyula politician from Koko became the PDCI Secretary General of the Korhogo sub-section (Labazée 1993b, 133). Dramane Coulibaly remained the key political intermediary between Korhogo and the national-level PDCI (Boone 2003, 261). Pierre-Koblan Huberson, a key ally of Dramane and a PDCI central-committee member since the 1940s, was appointed as the departmental prefect of Korhogo (Gunderson 1975, 112-113). Conversely, the mobilization strategies employed by the PDCI in Korhogo politically excluded many prominent Senoufo notables. In 1963, National Assembly member Gon Coulibaly (grandson of Gbon) and others

were charged with plotting against the government of Houphouët-Boigny. Paramount chief Bema Coulibaly was also implicated. Although his rivals were eventually acquitted of these charges, Dramane used this context to politically side-line many within the Senoufo establishment. Gbon's eldest son Bema chose self-imposed exile over continued persecution by the local branches of the PDCI (Gunderson 1975, 114-115). Dramane used the legal and coercive backing of his allies in Abidjan to punish any behaviour that was deemed to inhibit "economic and social development" in the North, thereby furthering the marginalization of the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite (Gunderson 1975, 115; see also 124-125).

As Boone explains, Abidjan's attempts at 'usurping' the political and social privileges that were previously reserved for lineage heads and senior males in Senoufo society ultimately had a number of significant political and economic costs (2003, 262). This was because key segments of the Senoufo elite in Korhogo still retained significant influence (particularly the Coulibaly family and senior lineage heads). Dyula dominance of the local branches of the PDCI resulted in increasing resentment from the majority Senoufo population, who began to feel that these 'strangers' were effectively blocking their own avenue for success (Gunderson 1975, 121). The strategy of marginalizing Senoufo notables also ran at cross-purposes with the goal of promoting economic development in the north. After independence, the post-colonial state aimed to expand cotton production to encourage economic development in this part of the north. Extension agents recognized early on that the key to achieving this goal was stemming the tide of emigration of young Senoufo men. This had remained a significant ongoing problem since the colonial period. PDCI leaders agreed that gaining the support of village elders and customary authorities was central to this goal. Unlike the Dyula administrators within the local branch of the PDCI, the elders in Senoufo could potentially limit the outflow of young men by drawing on the authority they continued to wield at the community level. The crux of the problem was that "the Korhogo PDCI was antagonizing and fomenting discontent among the old Senoufo elite just when the agricultural services were attempting to work through the old social institutions to expand commodity production in this region" (Boone 2003, 267).

By 1970, the national-level PDCI announced that the party leadership would be touring the country to discuss upcoming elections at the sub-section and village committee level. The goal of these elections was to renew local party leadership at the sub-section and village

committee levels to quell political dissent in Korhogo and elsewhere (Gunderson 1975, 129). In the Korhogo region, the national party took drastic measures to address political tensions generated by the party's policy of sidelining the Senoufo nobility. The result of these changes was a stark reversal in power relations between competing factions at the local level. National level party leaders removed Dramane and the majority of his subordinates in the villages surrounding Korhogo from their administrative positions. In contrast, national elites promoted members of the old Senoufo establishment to positions of local leadership within the PDCI party-state. These changes started in 1970 when the PDCI replaced Pierre-Koblan Huberson as prefect with the high-ranking PDCI politician Fily Cissoko. Cissoko was charged with reconciling the competing Korhogo factions. Soon after Cissoko's appointment, the national party ramped up the pace and scope of reform. Gon Coulibaly (the grandson of Gbon, and victim of the party purges in the 1960s) became one of three Vice-Presidents of the National Assembly during the Fifth Party Congress in October 1970 (Gunderson 1975, 130). Lanzeni Coulibaly, a close friend of Gon and Korhogo native, was appointed to the PDCI political bureau. Poro Silué, a close friend of Houphouët-Boigny and native of the town Sirasso (40 miles southwest of Korhogo) succeeded in getting the important Senoufo town of Sirasso, rather than neighbouring Kanaroba, named as the site of a newly created sub-prefecture. Silué also successfully spearheaded a movement to replace a Dramane lieutenant residing in Kanaroba as the new Secretary General of the new prefecture (Gunderson 1975, 131). Bema Coulibaly, who, like Gbon before him, had once been a powerful ally of the French, returned from exile and gained renewed popularity as the cantonal chief in Korhogo. Overall, the PDCI completely overhauled the political machine they had originally implanted in the Korhogo region led by Dramane and comprised of many Dyula and other traditional political 'outsiders'. The party replaced this group with members the old Senoufo aristocracy. Rather than confronting the village establishment, political leaders began to work with Senoufo elders. In effect, the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite headed by Gon and Bema Coulibaly captured the local branch of PDCI. The political influence of Dyula notables linked to Dramane was substantially circumscribed at this time. From this point on, the Senoufo elite has functioned as the state's principal brokers in Korhogo.

Factional Conflict in Post-Colonial Korhogo

The re-ascendance of the Senoufo notables and their incorporation into the local branches of the PDCI party-state did not quell political conflict in the Senoufo heartland. While this group, specifically the direct descendants of the old Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly, would emerge as the dominant set of actors over the coming decades within the local Korhogo political milieu, their ascendency would not lessen factional conflicts within this group. Even the political conflicts that led to the 1970 reforms to local-level leadership were, at their core, conflicts between opposing Senoufo factions looking to gain advantage vis-à-vis each other through appeals to different national (the colonial and post-colonial state) and local level constituencies (the Dyula, marginal Senoufo elites or the Senoufo establishment). During the late colonial and the early independence periods, the Dyula community in Korhogo supported one of these Senoufo factions (the reformist faction led by Dramane) over another (the conservative faction led by Bema and Gon).

Factional conflicts between Gbon's descendants endured largely as a result of three factors. First, because of the limited historical depth of the Paramount Chiefdom in Korhogo, rules over succession and inheritance from one generation to another were hardly clear. There were few broadly accepted rules, norms or social institutions capable of resolving these conflicts at the local level. As a consequence, contests over the rules governing succession were typically resolved through the intervention of national-level actors based in Abidjan. Thus, a common feature of Korhogo politics during the post-colonial period was how local level actors used relationships with national-level actors to gain advantage over rivals (Labazée 1993a, 220, 234). Second, authority gradually dispersed itself amongst Gbon's descendants. As Labazée explains, Gbon's sons and grandsons used their privileged social positions to gain economic, political and educational prominence. Throughout the post-colonial period, Coulibaly family members used their footings in these different backgrounds to establish some autonomy from one another and the hierarchical gerontocratic order first established by Gbon (Labazée 1993a, 220).[54] Finally,

[54] Lenardo Villalon (1999, 134) describes similar processes related to maraboutic authority in Senegal. He writes: "In the 1990s, new tensions have arisen as the transition to the third generation approaches. The large number of potential heirs among the grandsons of the founders, uncertainties about seniority and ambiguities in the rules of succession have fueled intense competition among the younger generation for the allegiance of disciples of the order. In the Mouride order, the transition to the next generation is imminent, as only one living son of the founder remains

factionalism between rival elements within the Coulibaly family heightened as the political system in Côte d'Ivoire gradually opened up through the holding of municipal and legislative elections, beginning in the 1980s. Electoral competition created space for heightened conflict at the local-level because (a) it legitimized political competition at the local-level that was not directly regulated by the Coulibaly hierarchy itself and (b) because local level politicians could enhance their autonomy vis-à-vis (or jump ahead of others in) the Coulibaly family hierarchy by seeking protection from other potential political patrons based in Abidjan.

By 1980, the PDCI was already under domestic and international pressure to democratize the political system that had been tightly controlled by the party-state since independence. The 1980 municipal and legislative elections represented an important turning point in Korhogo as well, because it was the first time that the Coulibaly family was not able to completely informally regulate the selection of candidates behind closed doors.[55] From this point on, electoral success would depend on the extent to which Coulibaly family members could mobilize broad local support for their candidatures. In the 1980 municipal and legislative elections, there were two principal candidates, the young lawyer Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, who represented the reformist tradition inherited from Dramane, and the more experienced Gon-Pilé Coulibaly, who embodied the conservative faction. The key themes and bases of support of the respective candidates also echoed these older divisions. Lanciné Gon ran under the banner *Korhogo nouveau* and drew support from educated but disaffected Dyula and Senoufo youth. Gon-Pilé, of course, drew heavily on support from the conservative faction of Senoufo elite (Gaye 1998, 126). Although Lanciné Gon emerged victorious in both the municipal and legislative elections in 1980, the implications of these victories were short-lived because of interventions by Gon-Pilé's capital-based allies.

The national PDCI displayed dissatisfaction with the political instability caused by these conflicts. As a result, and not unlike the politico-administrative reforms introduced in 1970, in

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in addition to the aged reigning caliph. The Tijanis in Tivaouane faced the transition to the third generation at the death of the caliph in September 1998. In both of these cases, the generational tensions surrounding succession have had important consequences in terms of the movements I will discuss below."

[55] Gaye writes that " …on observe de façon générale que cette ouverture politique, même, contrôlée, bouleverse la hiérarchie et surtout des habitudes déjà bien établie. Ensuite, la chefferie n'a pu empêcher l'émergence de candidatures 'sauvages' et éviter un conflit fratricide dans la famille Gon Coulibaly. La violence des affrontements n'avait aucune motivation idéologique entre des candidates se réclament de même parti de la famille" (1998, 119).

1980 and 1981, the national party sent a number of delegations (*missions de réconciliations*) to localities across Côte d'Ivoire in an attempt to quell the factionalism unleashed by the 1980 municipal and legislative single party elections. Proposed reforms aimed to mitigate the perceived threat Lanciné Gon and his supporters posed to the Korhogo political machine that had been relied upon by the state to mobilize support and resources in this part of the north since the 1960s. In August of 1981, the PDCI replaced two figures – Jean Baptiste Elloh (the Korhogo prefect), and Mamadou Sylla (the head of the Korhogo sub-prefect), both of whom had strong ties to Lanciné Gon – with actors that were more acceptable to the national party and the chiefly establishment in Korhogo. Lanciné Gon found himself in a precarious position. Hostilities came to the forefront when the newly elected mayor refused to meet high ranking PDCI minister Balla Keïta at the Korhogo airstrip during his visit to the north. Lanciné Gon was ultimately removed as mayor for alleged corruption and replaced by Yéo Ténéna Victor (Gaye 1998, 135-137). Not forgetting the lessons learned in 1980, the national party worked closely with the Korhogo cantonal chief, Tiémoko Coulibaly, leading up the 1985 municipal and legislative elections to devise an electoral list (*Union pour la paix et le progress de Korhogo*) deemed acceptable by the national PDCI as well as the conservative faction in Korhogo. This list was imposed on Korhogo voters rather than allowing different family members to run against each other (Gaye 1998, 139-142). In order to heal the divisions within the Coulibaly family holding over from the 1980 elections, Lanciné Gon was on the ticket for one of the two Korhogo seats in the National Assembly in 1985 (Gaye 1998, 140-141). Nonetheless, the message was clear: after a brief opening, the single party had effectively clamped back down on political competition because of the perceived risks to political order it presented.

Nonetheless, the national PDCI could not prevent the re-emergence of these conflicts forever. By the 1990s, Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI conceded to intense domestic and international pressure and committed to hold democratic elections. Political competition revived factional rivalries that had been briefly contained by the PDCI and the Korhogo establishment during the 1980s. Lanciné Gon once again figured prominently in these debates. In 1990, the initial opposition rose from a coalition of political parties (*Coordination de la Gauche Démocratique*), which included the *Parti Ivoirian des Travaillers* (PIT), *L'Union des Sociaux Démocratique*, the *Parti Socialiste Ivoirien* (PSI) and the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) led by

future Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo. The FPI represented the principal party in the *Coordination*. Lanciné Gon's decision to join the FPI radically altered the Korhogo political landscape and earned the scorn of much of the Korhogo establishment, which still overwhelmingly supported the old single-party. As a result, Lanciné Gon soon found himself again ostracized from both the Senoufo elite in Korhogo and the national-level PDCI; so much so that, by the time of the elections in November 1990, he switched sides again and made his way back to the PDCI. This ultimately left the FPI without any real local footing in Korhogo. Despite his decision to return, many PDCI loyalists doubted Lanciné Gon's loyalty to the ruling party (Gaye 1998, 168-170, 190, 194, 200).

More than the 'controlled' democratic openings in 1980, 1985 and 1990, the presidential elections in 1995 significantly heightened factional conflict between Coulibaly family members for one important reason. The founding of the *Rassemblement des Republicains* (RDR), led by Alassane Ouattara in 1994 represented a strong, credible political alternative to the PDCI for northern voters. Although the RDR did not begin necessarily as a 'northern' party, the north quickly became the base for the RDR's opposition to the PDCI largely because of Henri Bedié's efforts to marginalize Ouattara from competing in the 1995 elections through the promotion of *ivoirité* (Crook 1997, 226-229). Overnight, the citizenship status of many 'northerners' (particularly those living in the southern part of the country) was thrown into question. For northerners, the RDR was widely perceived as the one party defending equal citizenship rights for all Ivoirians. Moreover, the presence of two credible political alternatives, the PDCI and the RDR (as well as the FPI) drastically weakened the ability of the Coulibaly hierarchy to control factional divisions between its members (Gaye 1998, 230). The challenge for political rivals within the Coulibaly family, as well as for the voting public, was to pick and side with the winning party of the elections at the national level.

To make inroads into Korhogo political networks, Ouattara chose to ally with a relative upstart in Amadou Gon Coulibaly. Amadou was young, under 40 at the time, and the son of the long-time National Assembly member in Korhogo, Gon-Pilé Coulibaly (see above). The PDCI leader Henri Bedié sided with Kassoum Coulibaly. Like Amadou Gon, Kassoum was grandson the old Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly. However, unlike Amadou Gon, Kassoum gained his wealth and notoriety as a businessman and head of the *Syndicat National des Transporteurs et*

Marchandises et Voyageurs de Côte d'Ivoire (SYNTMVCI). Lanciné Gon was overlooked by each of the two major parties largely because of his breaks with the Coulibaly family (in 1980) and the PDCI (in 1990), and the resultant decline in his credibility with the population in Korhogo (Gaye 1998, 229-230, 256). In the end, the battle for the Korhogo vote pitted Kassoum and his running mate, Kafana Coulibaly against Amadou Gon and his running mate Adama Coulibaly. The FPI fielded a slate of political 'nobodies' and had little impact on the outcome of the vote in this part of the north. Amadou Gon, Adama and the RDR eventually won the legisltative elections.[56] In the election for the Korhogo prefecture, the candidate tied to Amadou Gon emerged victorious. In the 1996 municipal elections, Adama Coulibaly ran and was elected mayor of Korhogo (Gaye 1998, 262-264). Amadou Gon Coulibaly was voted in as mayor during Côte d'Ivoire's 2001 municipal elections, just prior to the beginning of the 2002 civil war. Overall, the emergence of the RDR and the ascendency of Amadou Gon during this election represented a dramatic shift in terms of factional and party politics in the Korhogo region. The alliance between the RDR and the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite meant that some elements of the Senoufo elite could potentially ally with the rebels during the conflict because they did not function as brokers immediately prior to the civil war.

The Civil War in Korhogo

During numerous frank conversations, Bouna residents listed a variety of criticisms related to the northern rebellion and the quality of governance provided by the FN, often contrasting and comparing the city's situation to that of Korhogo. Many in Bouna and elsewhere across the north suggested that Korhogo represented an exceptional case of rebel governance compared to elsewhere in Côte d'Ivoire and in West Africa more broadly (specifically the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia). Surely any observer in Korhogo, particularly during the later stages of the rebel occupation, would be struck by the level of investment, at least at a superficial level, that the rebel leadership headed by *commandant* Fofié Martin Kouakou put into the city.

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[56] The RDR won the Korhogo commune with 56.56% of the vote. The PDCI received 46.11% and the FPI 1.33% (Gaye 1998, 362).

Commandant Fofié's policy of 'developing the city' included a variety of things. The FN under his command invested in the city's infrastructure (Förster 2010, 715). Fofié built a new vegetable market for women selling their produce in the central commercial area in Korhogo (see fig. 7.2). He also established a new cultural center in the downtown area and repaired the building housing the mayor's office, which had been heavily damaged during the initial stages of the conflict (see fig. 7.3). In terms of basic services and public goods, Fofié's initial legitimacy emerged from his capacity to control crime and violence in the city, which had been a growing problem even before the beginning of the civil war (see below). During the partition of the country, electricity was free for Korhogo residents and water supplies remained fairly reliable. The creation of the *comité de surveillance des examens* ensured the functioning of schools and the holding of exams for students in Korhogo (Molle-Laurencon 2007). While the city was under his control, Fofié also invited popular participation in a movement to clean-up the city through the picking up and removal of trash. Finally, Fofié oversaw a number of cultural projects in the city. The "Monument to the Unknown Soldier" (*monument du soldat inconnu*) was erected in 2009 during celebrations of the sixth anniversary of the rebellion and depicted a rebel with a Kalashnikov and grenade in hand (fig. 7.4, Förster 2012). The FN in Korhogo also erected monuments to celebrate Senoufo culture and the important social roles of women in Ivoirian society (fig. 7.5). Fofié Martin sponsored the painting of several murals on the walls lining major roads. Each image captured themes related to Senoufo culture, youth, gender or the northern rebellion itself (see Figures 7.6 and 7.7 as examples).

Despite these contributions, the *Com'zone* headed by Fofié Martin in Korhogo did generate some dissatisfaction regarding its management of the city, not unlike elsewhere in the north. During the decade-long de facto partition of the country, Fofié was the only leader on the FN side to have sanctions imposed on him by the UN Security Council. The charges against him were many: recruitment and use of child soldiers, imposition of forced labour, sexual violence against women, and arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial killings. Additionally, Fofié became the principal beneficiary of the lucrative war economies controlled by the FN in this part of the north. Korhogo and *Com'zone* 10 more broadly (of which Ouangolodougou was a part, see the following chapter) represented central nodes in the commercial networks in cocoa, coffee, diamonds and other natural resources running through the territory under the FN's control.

According to the NGO Global Witness, Fofié "exploited to the full the strategic location of Korhogo" (2007, 38). Fofié had interests in almost every aspect of the Korhogo and broader northern economies. He had investments in real estate, mining, telecommunications, transport and fuel. He owned a total of twelve homes, including two in Bouaké as well as a number in Burkina Faso and Korhogo. Additionally, he owned a number of bars, hotels and dance-clubs in Korhogo and elsewhere. From his assets in real estate, hotels, bars and diamonds, the UN Security Council's Group of Exports on Côte d'Ivoire reported that in 2011 Fofié earned an estimated 439,900,000 CFAs, or approximately 860,500 USD (United Nations Security Council 2011, 67; Global Witness 2007, 38).

An elaborate local system of taxation contributed greatly to the wealth accumulated by Fofié and the rest of the rebel leadership in Korhogo. In this sense, the *Com'zone* headed by Fofié was not entirely different from other administrative *Com'zones* established by the FN elsewhere in Northern Côte d'Ivoire. During the conflict, the local administration as well as the national level leadership in Bouaké through La Centrale, increasingly regulated the set of taxes demanded by the FN in Korhogo. Amounts required for passage through Korhogo for trucks, as well as amounts for individual cars and motorcycles, were maintained at rates comparable to elsewhere in the north. Residents paid 7000 CFAs per truck, or 16 USD and 400 to 500 CFAs per car and 200 to 300 CFAs per motorcycle (Förster, forthcoming, 20).[57] Bassett (2011b) writes that cashew trucks leaving Korhogo for ports in Southern Côte d'Ivoire paid a total 490,000 CFAs in taxes to the rebels (plus 125,000 CFAs to government agents in the south).[58] Locally, Fofié tried to control the resources procured by soldiers at military checkpoints by naming a series of administratively recognized checkpoints (distinguished from informal ones established by elements within the rebellion looking to earn some extra money) and by fixing the amount that was demanded at each one (Förster, forthcoming, 20; Mazola 2005).Yet, as the rebellion wore on

[57] For individuals, these rates were comparable to those observed in Bouna where individuals entering and exiting the city were taxed anywhere between 200-1000 CFAs. Women bringing yams to market were charged 500-1000 CFAs.

[58] Tax rates for trucks exporting agricultural commodities in Korhogo were also similar to those found in Bouna. In Bouna trucks carrying yams were charged an exit fee of 205,000 CFA. The FN charged an exit fee of 400,000 CFA for trucks carrying cashews. This is lower than the amount listed above trucks carrying cashews in Korhogo. However this total represents *all* the taxes paid to the rebels during the course of an average trip across FN controlled territory, including an exit fee (paid *La Centrale* agents in Korhogo) and personal 'tickets' enforced by different FN leaders in Korhogo and elsewhere (see chapter 2).

and soldiers fighting for the FN began to increasingly recognize the disparities in wealth that were emerging between themselves and the rebel leadership, they started to use their relatively minor positions of authority to demand money for themselves. As a result, by 2009, Förster (forthcoming, 24) suggests that "more and more unofficial checkpoints were erected… [and] the 'fees' collected were much more arbitrary again and often higher than what many drivers could afford to pay". As a result of this increasing financial toll, many in Korhogo became increasingly resentful towards Fofié's management of the city. Yet, unlike what transpired in Bouna, there was no popular backlash against the rebels in Korhogo. Quite the opposite, Fofié Martin remains a political force to this day as the head of the military company (Compagnie territoriale) in Korhogo.

Fofié's efforts at 'developing' the city, as well as the absence of any popular resistance to the increasing arbitrariness of his rule – can both be explained by a similar set of factors linked to the interaction between factional conflicts emerging from within the rebel movement and the lasting schisms within the Coulibaly family described above. One plausible reason why the FN in Korhogo invested so much into the city was that Fofié faced – more than the other local leaders included in this study (and probably compared to most other local level commanders) – a number of threats emanating from within the FN. At the initial stages of the conflict, Korhogo (along with Bouaké) was the site of intense factional fighting between groups loyal to the original founder of the movement, Ibrahim Coulibaly ('IB'), and soldiers supporting the political wing of the movement headed by the former FESCI leader, Guillaume Soro (see chapter 2).

Figure 5.2: Korhogo vegetable market. Photo by J. Speight

Figure 5.3: Korhogo mayor's office. Photo by J. Speight

Figure 5.4: *Monument du soldat inconnu*. Photo by J. Speight

Figure 5.5: *Monument en hommage à femme noire*. Photo by J. Speight.

Figure 5.6: Korhogo wall mural. Photo by J. Speight

Figure 5.7: Korhogo wall mural. Photo by J. Speight

This chapter argues that Fofié Martin's ability to establish social control in Korhogo was enhanced as a result of the hierarchical configuration they confronted. The following section briefly diverges from my argument and shifts analytical attention to FN factional violence that occurred in Korhogo in 2004. This brief shift in focus is necessary for two reasons. First, FN factional conflict is an important part of the larger historical narrative explaining the political rise of the FN zone commander, Fofié Martin. Second, this section is significant because it presents an important challenge to my argument. In the section that follows, I show how factions within the FN allied with competing groups and actors within the local Korhogo political arena, *including* those allied with the state in the pre-conflict period. I consider the implications of this evidence for my argument in greater detail later in this chapter and in the conclusion.

FN Factionalism in Korhogo and the emergence of Fofié Martin

Fofié Martin emerged as a key political actor within the local Korhogo milieu amidst factional fighting that engulfed the city in mid-2004, almost two years after the failed coup turned northern based rebellion. These conflicts were the products of the interaction of cleavages within the FN and local socio-political cleavages that had been the basis of local political life in Korhogo since the nationalist period leading up to independence in 1960. This section will focus on the relationship between the conflicts within the FN and historical tensions between the Senoufo and Dyula communities in Korhogo. The subsequent section will examine the interplay between the FN, Martin's ascendency in the region, and factional conflict between the Coulibaly family during the conflict and post-conflict period.

Fofié Martin's politico-military rise in Korhogo was a product of a conjuncture of a number of national and local developments. Martin was not the original *commandant de zone* in Korhogo (which was the center of the administrative *Com'zone* zone 10). Fofié was first stationed in the city as the chief of security for the FN. The first *commandant* charged with managing Korhogo on behalf of the rebels was Koné Messemba. Messemba was a high-ranking member within the FN and owed his position to his close ties to the founder of the northern rebellion, Ibrahim Coulibaly ('IB'). Messemba's standing within the movement in its early days became evident when he was named as minister responsible for the Victims of War, the Displaced and Exiled (*minister des Victimes de guerre, des Déplacés et Exilés*) in the transitional government established by the Linas-Marcoussis peace accords in 2003 (Touré 2003; Arouna 2004; see

Chapter 2 on the peace process). Quickly, political debates emerged within the FN and in Korhogo about who would become Messemba's successor. Fofié had gained some level of credibility and legitimacy as the chief of security for the FN in Korhogo and rose as a contender for the position (interview, local journalist, Korhogo 11.02.2011). Long before the civil war began, Korhogo and the north more generally were suffering under conditions of increased insecurity and banditry. Crime had grown in the north (as well as elsewhere in Côte d'Ivoire) as a result of the deterioration of the formal economy beginning in the 1980s. After the FN gained control of the city, the security climate improved, as described by Till Förster:

> Soon after they took control of the city, the rebels established a curfew and aimed at putting an end to the repeated robberies that had marked civic life for so long. If somebody was caught red-handed, they did not hesitate to shoot him on the spot. Though there were abuses of power, the rebels were seen as just or at least as fair-minded social actors who brought a new and better social order. The central point was that they did not allow criminals to get away with what they had done – a stark contrast to police officers who were making a living from the bribes that they received from the criminals: 'Whether or not you take a thief to [the police office], it does not matter. He slips money to the policeman, and the next day, you will see him in the same spot you saw him before. It doesn't make sense – one has to kill them, that's the only solution' (2010, 706).

However, Fofié's growing popularity in Korhogo created some reservations among other FN brass, including Messemba himself, about promoting him as a replacement when Messemba entered the transitional government in 2003. Messemba's choice was another local commander named Yssouf Diarrassouba. As one local reporter explained to me, because Diarrassouba lacked the charisma and autonomous military legitimacy and control Fofié enjoyed in the eyes of his troops as well as the wider community in Korhogo, he became the more desirable choice because he could be more easily controlled by Messemba and the rest of the FN hierarchy from Bouaké/Abidjan (interview, local journalist, Korhogo 11.02.2011). Again, as it was explained to me, control over Korhogo was left in the hands of Diarrassouba largely because many within the FN remained fearful of appearing to oppose the wishes of IB or his agents like Messemba (interview, local journalist, Korhogo 11.02.2011).

Nonetheless, Fofié's standing locally shifted with the relative balance of power between competing factions within the FN. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Ibrahim Coulibaly

(or 'IB') was the widely recognized mastermind behind the 2002 coup d'état attempt. However, IB's clout within the FN declined for two reasons. The first factor was IB's decision to remain in Burkina Faso and not directly participate in the fighting. Additionally, on August 27th 2003, IB was arrested in France on suspicion of planning another coup against the government of national reconciliation established through the negotiations at Linas-Marcoussis (Mohamed 2003; ICG 2004, 22). Each of these factors contributed to the isolation of IB from other FN leaders and foot-soldiers who directly participated in the fighting during the initial stages of the conflict. The final straw for the pro-IB faction came after an alleged assassination attempt on the life of Guillaume Soro as he was travelling between Bouaké and Korhogo. A number of parties was thought to be behind the attempted assassination of Soro, including the then president of Guinea, Lansana Conté, the president of Côte d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo and one high-ranking FN leader, Kassoum Bamba ('Kass'), who himself was a close ally of IB.[59]

The attempted assassination prompted Soro to take drastic measures to "get his house in order" ("*mettre de l'ordre dans la maison,*" Depeyla 2004a). On June 20th and 21st 2004, attacks led by pro-Soro forces against the pro-IB faction of the FN in Bouaké and Korhogo left a total of 22, including Kassoum Bamba, dead (14 in Korhogo and 8 in Bouaké) (ICG 2004, 22; Depeyla 2004a; Depeyla 2004b; Bouabre 2004). A violent purge of IB supporters from the FN followed. Moreover, given that IB drew much of his support from Dyula elements within the rebellion, these purges paralleled ethnic divisions running through the support base of the movement. As a result, many Dyula FN leaders and supporters of the movement with supposed ties to IB were arrested or killed during this time (Depeyla 2004b).[60]

In Korhogo, the elimination of the Dyula, pro-IB faction from the FN was particularly gruesome. In February 2004 (well before the June purges), a local commander in Korhogo with strong ties to IB, Adama Coulibaly ('Adams'), was assassinated by pro-Soro forces. Moreover, in

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[59] After IB's arrest in France and his subsequent falling out with Guillaume Soro, he began to develop close ties with his former enemy, Laurent Gbagbo. Leading up to the 2007 peace talks, Gbagbo dropped the charges against IB for his participation in the 2002 attacks. IB was also invited by President Gbagbo to take part in the peace talks themselves, presumably as a way of dividing his political opponents and encouraging further conflict within the FN (Bamba 2008).

[60] It should be noted that Koné Messemba, the old military *commandant* in Korhogo was also suspected of planning the attacks on Soro, if only because of his close relationship to IB. He avoided arrest and remained with the FN until the final days of the rebellion. In 2012, he was named the prefect of the region of Guiglo by Alassane Ouattara (Arouna 2004; Nimaga 2012). Yssouf Diarrassouba also survived these purges.

addition to the 14 dead in Korhogo resulting from the factional fighting in June 2004, on August 2nd of the same year, ONUCI investigators confirmed the discovery of mass graves in the city containing 99 bodies. Many had been shot; others were believed to have died from asphyxiation and dehydration after being detained in large shipping containers for several days. The international community viewed Fofié Martin and the pro-Soro faction he commanded (FANSANA 110, named after the prison cell he was kept in before the rebellion) as being responsible for these acts (Global Witness 2007, 38). The majority of the victims found in these graves were Dyula youth; many were from the neighbourhood of Koko in Korhogo. Given their marginalization from the existing social order (see part I of this chapter), many youth from Koko were drawn to IB during the initial stages of the war as a patron who could potentially promise them employment and social/political mobility. Once the balance of power between pro-IB and pro-Soro factions of the movement shifted, however, many from Koko were left in a vulnerable position. Fofié Martin and other pro-Soro elements of the FN viewed Dyula youth from Koko as political opponents (interview, Korhogo, FN soldier, 13.02.2011).[61] The enduring tensions between the pro-Soro faction of the FN led by Fofié Martin and Korhogo's Dyula population remained palpable right up until the presidential elections in 2010 and 2011. Many in Koko remained very hesitant to speak of the violence during this stage of the conflict (author observations). Moreover, IB's marginalization from the dominant leadership group within the FN did not diminish the connections forged between him and many Dyula youth from Koko. It was rumoured that many left Korhogo for Abidjan during the terminal stages of the civil war to join IB in the fight to dislodge Laurent Gbagbo from power.[62]

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[61] It could be argued more broadly, that the Dyula community was largely against the rebellion, particularly after the conclusion of the factional conflict between pro-IB and pro-Soro forces. In discussing differing responses to the ceremonial unveiling of the Monument for the Unknown Soldier in 2008, Till Förster (2012, 15) writes that "the Muslim traders, however were far more critical (than others in Korhogo of the ceremony and Fofié's order more general). They saw this and other, similar events much more as a kind of annexation of statehood by actors who were not authorized to do so".

[62] IB re-emerged on the Ivoirian political scene after Gbagbo's refusal to step down after the contested 2011 elections. During the final assault on Abidjan in March and April 2011 by the French military and armed forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara, IB – who was then only recognized as the "invisible commando" (*commando invisible*) – gathered troops still loyal to him and organized attacks from his base in the Abidjan neighbourhood of Abobo. After the forced removal of Gbagbo, IB was killed by armed forces loyal to Ouattara and Guillaume Soro (see *Le Monde* 2011).

Senoufo factionalism, Presidential Politics and Political Order in Korhogo under the FN

The interplay between ethnic cleavages (Dyula, Senoufo) and those premised on factional allegiances within the FN (pro-Soro, pro-IB) only tell part of the story of the nature of the coalition underpinning Fofié's position of authority in the city. Unlike the situation confronted by Marou Ouattara in Bouna, in Korhogo, segments of the powerful local Senoufo elite were available as potential allies of Fofié Martin because of the autonomy they enjoyed from the state during the pre-conflict period. One of Fofié Martin's most powerful allies was the late cantonal chief in Korhogo, Drissa Coulibaly.

Even after Fofié's service to the pro-Soro faction of the FN in mitigating the threat of forces loyal to IB, many within the FN apparently remained fearful of appointing Fofié as *commandant* because of the autonomous political, economic and military power he commanded. Despite the violence for which Fofié was directly responsible, his record of fighting crime and his success in suppressing Dyula pro-IB elements in Korhogo won over the chiefly class in Korhogo, particularly Drissa Coulibaly. Drissa's support was potentially *the* key reason why Fofié gained the position of *commandant* in Korhogo. As one journalist explained to me:

> After these events, there was a lot of pressure, and remember his seat [Fofié's] was one from which he could easily be removed. It was Chief Drissa Coulibaly who warned Guillaume Soro and said that 'if you remove Fofié [from Korhogo] you will no longer have our moral support. We think he is the man given the current situation.' And so at this moment, the FN ceded, because there were a lot of rumours going around that Drissa had thrown his support squarely behind Fofié [interview, journalist, Korhogo, 11.02.2011].

From this moment on, Fofié retained a close relationship with Drissa (and much of the Senoufo chiefly establishment) until the cantonal chief's death in 2008.

I argue that there were two key consequences of the alliance that formed between Fofié and Drissa soon after the factional conflicts and violence that consumed the city in June 2004. Both are linked to the limited extent to which the rebels attacked or attempted to undercut existing social hierarchies and social relations in Korhogo and the surrounding rural areas. The first refers to the social and political domains actually affected by the new forms of governance introduced by the FN in the Senoufo heartland. In Bouna, it was suggested that, because of the absence of the state *and* the inability of either Lobi or Koloungo elites to manage social conflict at the local

level (particularly those over land and other resources), the rebels were forced to play a far more interventionist role in attempting to resolve them, especially in the early stages of the civil war (see chapter 4 pg. 121). While there were certainly functional roles previously played by the state that the rebels were forced to fill (in policing and the administration of justice for instance), the FN in Korhogo took a hands off approach when it came to issues that were typically regulated by Senoufo elites, especially land and bride-wealth/divorce. Deference to existing elites over these issues was particularly noticeable in rural areas. According to a village chief with whom I spoke, the people in his village had very little interaction with the rebels, if they had contact with them at all (interview, village chief, Nahouokama, 24.10.10). This is largely in line with Till Förster's (forthcoming, 14) observation that "rebel governance is characterized by what I call partial presence. It is a kind of governance that links the bigger cities in the area, but often leaves rural villages aside". A spokesperson for the Coulibaly family and the cantonal chief highlighted the respect the rebels had for the authority of 'traditional' actors such as village chiefs and elders:

> There is not a land problem here. The process starts, and then we call them [those involved in land conflicts] so they can hear what we have to say, we make a judgement and that's it, it's done. There are not land conflicts here. Normally, it is us who regulate them. But in the other regions [of Côte d'Ivoire], you see these kinds of problems over there, land conflicts. And then with the FN, we really tipped our hats to them because they said that they have come to manage other problems, they didn't come because of problems related to land, or social disintegration or even water. For them, they were concerned with problems related to crime and theft, but we still regulated the issue of land (interview, Coulibaly family member, Korhogo, 12.10.2010).

Again, the positive relationship between the local traditional Senoufo hierarchy and the rebels contrasts greatly with the observed efforts of the FN in Bouna to marginalize or mitigate the autonomous authority of leaders in the Lobi community, particularly the PDCI politician Palé Dimaté. Although there are parallels between the conflicts witnessed in each case (Dyula versus Senoufo, Lobi versus Koulongo), what distinguished Bouna and Korhogo was that in Korhogo, there was a hierarchically organized group with which the rebels could potentially ally.

As shown through Fofié's close ties with Drissa Coulibaly, the FN's political strategy largely mimicked the post-1970 strategy employed by the PDCI single-party state of aligning itself with elements of the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite (in the tradition of Bema, Gon

and Amadou Gon), rather than reformists looking to upset the status quo (in the tradition of Dramane). However, the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite were available as allies because of the fact they had politically repositioned themselves against the PDCI and FPI governments in the 1990s and early 2000s. The political relationship between this group and the FN in Korhogo was evident towards the terminal stages of the conflict by the position taken by the FN in the successional disputes that were ignited by Drissa Coulibaly's death in 2008.

There were two sides to the conflict over who would succeed Drissa as the Korhogo cantonal chief. Some of the central actors in this drama figured prominently in the intra-Coulibaly factional struggles before the beginning of the 2002 civil war. In addition to Drissa, Kassoum Coulibaly was one of the key actors involved in this conflict. Kassoum was a grandson to the old Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly, the former head of the *Syndicat National des Transporteurs et Marchandises et Voyageurs de Côte d'Ivoire* (SYNTMVCI), and a PDCI party member. In the 1990s, he was thwarted in his efforts to become Korhogo's mayor by the RDR representatives in the city, Amadou Gon Coulibaly and Adama Coulibaly.[63] By the beginning of the civil war, Kassoum was undoubtedly one of the more powerful and prominent Coulibaly family members. He drew support from an extensive network of Dyula traders (Förster 2010, 714). His authority was rooted in his expansive economic interests as well as the prerogatives granted to him as one of Gbon's grandsons. Till Förster (2010, 714) highlights how Kassoum exploited "the privileges his father's social status afforded him," including the highly criticized "habit of claiming any plot and strip of land in the city if it was to his advantage". Indeed, by all accounts Kassoum was a master at drawing on resources derived from 'customary' and 'modern' social universes.

To expand his already substantial political influence, Kassoum attempted to proclaim himself cantonal chief after the death of the former chief Drissa Coulibaly in 2008. This sparked an intense debate between different segments of the Korhogo elite. Some interviewees who obviously opposed Kassoum claimed that he could never legitimately become the cantonal chief in Korhogo according to the rules and procedures governing succession. In principle, the position of cantonal chief in Korhogo is passed down through a system of agnatic succession, whereby authority is granted to the brothers of the existing chief (before his sons), from oldest to youngest.

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[63] Kassoum Coulibaly was elected as a PDCI national assembly member in 2001.

For Kassoum's opponents, Drissa's younger brother Bafowa Coulibaly was the rightful heir. From Kassoum's perspective, there was more to this story. Certainly, some ambiguity existed regarding the procedures guiding succession to the cantonal chief in Korhogo. Bema Coulibaly, Gbon Coulibaly's *son* was appointed as the cantonal chief during the late colonial period by the French. Bema was succeeded by his younger brother, Souleymane Coulibaly, and then by his oldest *son* (and Kassoum's older brother) Tiémoko Coulibaly. Thus, there was clearly some recent precedent supporting Kassoum's claims that he should be the next cantonal chief in Korhogo.

The conflict unfolded as follows. First, although Drissa was widely regarded as the head of the Coulibaly family (*doyen de la famille Gbon*) because he was the oldest living descendent of Gbon Coulibaly, he was not the cantonal chief (Niangoran 2007). In 2002, Tiémoko Coulibaly, Kassoum's older brother, was still cantonal chief and remained so, until his death in 2004 (Niangoran 2007). Following Tiémoko's death, Drissa Coulibaly, Bema's brother and Kassoum's uncle, was appointed as cantonal chief. Drissa's claim to be cantonal chief was supported by many of Korhogo's elite, as well as by Fofié Martin and other high-ranking members of the FN. Nonetheless, Kassoum still played a prominent role in local Korhogo politics as the *interim* cantonal chief in the years leading up to Drissa's passing in 2008. This was the case because Drissa was, for approximately 10 years, bed-ridden with illness. Kassoum pointed to the apparent inconsistency of the decision to appoint his uncle, Drissa as the replacement for his older brother, Tiémoko Coulibaly. For Kassoum, "a father cannot inherit from his sons" (*un père ne peut hériter de son fils*) (Niangoran 2007). More specifically, "Coulibaly Drissa can't inherit a position that is the right of his nephews" (*Coulibaly Drissa ne peut donc hériter d'un poste qui revient de droit à ses neveux)* (Niangoran 2007). However, upon Drissa Coulibaly's death in 2008, Kassoum was once again by-passed as a potential successor in favor of Drissa's younger brother Bafowa Coulibaly (who himself was 81 years old). Kassoum challenged Bafowa and attempted to mobilize support to block his ascendency to the position of cantonal chief.[64] It is

[64] The exact political content of Kassoum's claim was not clear. Some interviewees suggested that simply because Kassoum was rich and well known, he felt he could impose his views on others (interview, Coulibaly family member, Korhogo, 17.02.2011). Others have suggested that there is no accepted 'traditional' basis by which the position of cantonal chief is passed on through the Coulibaly family. The position itself was a political/colonial invention and hence any 'traditional' rules surrounding succession can, at least, be called into question (Koffi 2008).

obviously difficult to measure, but it appeared that most within the Coulibaly family hierarchy opposed Kassoum's stance. One representative of the Coulibaly family explained this to me in these terms:

> Drissa was the father. He was our father. A good child never rivals his father. And Kassoum, that's what he did! He insulted our father because he did not give up cantonal chieftaincy, but we wouldn't have it. We supported our father because we were all children of Gbon, and we were all stacked against him. Kassoum has some brothers, and they were stacked against us. Us and our brothers, we are on the side of the children of Gbon, specifically the side of Drissa Coulibaly, and after that the conflict started (interview, Coulibaly family member, Korhogo, 17.02.2011).

Although the breadth of support garnered by each side in this conflict is admittedly unclear, the position taken by Fofié Martin and the FN significantly altered the balance of power.

By most accounts, the FN was firmly on the side of the pro-Bafowa faction (which, as described above, seemed to include most of the established chiefly hierarchy) in this dispute. There are a number of potential factors explaining the decision of the FN to support this side and work to prevent Kassoum Coulibaly's controversial attempt to become Korhogo's next cantonal chief. One important reason had to do simply with the decision of Kassoum to flee Korhogo during the early stages of the conflict. Despite his role as interim chief, Kassoum only returned to Korhogo in 2007, just before his attempt to challenge Bafowa's claim to the cantonal chieftaincy. One interviewee explained why the FN supported Drissa and most of those Coulibaly family members linked to Bafowa in these terms:

> When everything began in Côte d'Ivoire, and when the war broke out and the FN came [to Korhogo], everybody fled. But, Drissa Coulibaly, the cantonal chief, he was there. It was him who received them like they were his children. All those who were with Kassoum fled. That's why it was difficult, when someone returns just to say 'I am the new cantonal chief'. And when the shots were being fired he fled, he disappeared. It was them [Kassoum's followers] who were behind all that. But Drissa stayed with us. He received the FN like they were his children. He made [religious] sacrifices for them, so that our ancestors would save them and protect them. And they [the FN] knew this, and they were grateful. And they were not ingrates. They knew well that Drissa was their father, and that he did everything for him. Thus, they had to support him. Kassoum, he sold out the FN. Thus, why would they [the FN] support him? And this wasn't just some policy. Everyone saw this

> happening. Everyone who followed him [Kassoum] was against the rebels (Interview, Coulibaly family member, Korhogo 17.02.2011).

In short, Drissa's decision to stay in Korhogo and welcome the rebels to the city after the onset of fighting signalled some solidarity with the movement. Kassoum's decision to leave had the opposite effect, creating some suspicion amongst FN member as to where his loyalties lay.

Additionally, there was a handful of other reasons why the FN supported the pro-Drissa/pro-Bafowa elements after Drissa's death. First, there was some overlap between the bases of support drawn on by Kassoum and those who supported IB during the intra-FN factional conflict that consumed Korhogo in 2004. As indicated above, Kassoum's own political and economic authority rested in part on his position as a trader within regional trade networks and the support he drew from Dyula traders. Indeed, as indicated previously, drawing on the support of the Dyula community has been a recurring strategy employed by those marginalized from power within the local Korhogo political milieu. At some points during the civil war (including even the debate over succession described above), it became difficult to even distinguish the coalitions formed on each side of these traditional intra-Coulibaly divisions from those that ran through the FN itself. As indicated above, although divisions within the FN were for the most part 'settled' in the aftermath of the purging of pro-IB elements within the movement, suspicion between the FN in Korhogo and the city's Dyula population (particularly young people living in Koko) remained. Thus, when Kassoum sought to mobilize political support for his claim to the cantonal chieftaincy by exploiting divisions between the Malinké and the Senoufo in villages surrounding Korhogo, the FN apparently reacted harshly and suggested that Kassoum's actions represented an attempt to 'destabilize' the political order established by the FN in Korhogo. In the end, Kassoum's contested claim to the cantonal chieftaincy as well as his attempts to actively mobilize support amongst marginalized groups in the Senoufo heartland (Dyula, Malinké) apparently provoked a 2008 night time meeting between Kassoum, Fofié Martin and the FN Delegate General in Korhogo, Soro Kanigui Mamadou. During the course of this meeting, Kassoum was allegedly pressured to stop pursuing actions that ran at cross purposes with the interests of the rebellion in the north (interview, journalist, Korhogo, 11.02.2011). My interviewee suggested there was a subtle coercive effect to this night-time meeting, forcing Kassoum to cease his opposition to Bafawo's succession to the cantonal chieftaincy, as well as

any other political activities that might be perceived to be at odds with the interests of the northern rebellion more generally.[65]

The 2010 Presidential Elections, Factionalism, and the Emergent Political Order in Korhogo

The presidential elections in October and November 2010 reinforced rather than challenged the wartime coalitions formed in Korhogo during the crisis period between Fofié Martin and the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite. Consequently, these elections strengthened rebel social control during this transitional period.

After numerous delays since the signing of the OPA in 2007, Côte d'Ivoire held presidential elections on 31 October 2010. This was the country's first presidential election in over a decade since Gbagbo's contested victory back in 2000. In some ways, the kinds of partnerships that formed in the Korhogo region in the run-up to the elections were predictable. The RDR relied on its old interlocutor, and arguably the most important figure in Korhogo and national politics at that moment, Amadou Gon Coulibaly. Since the 1995 elections, Amadou Gon's star-power had been rising steadily. He served as the Minister of State and the Minister of Agriculture in the Government of National Reconciliation established in 2003, soon after the beginning of the conflict. During the presidential elections in 2010 and 2011, Amadou Gon remained highly visible, serving as the National Campaign Manager for Alassane Ouattara. In Amadou Gon, Alassane Ouattara and the RDR drew squarely upon the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family and the partnership it had formed with the pro-Soro wing of the FN, personified by Fofié Martin. The bigger question was precisely how Gbagbo's efforts at mobilizing support in Korhogo would alter the political landscape. Above, I showed that, at its creation, the FPI had little success in mobilizing support in this part of the north. The last chapter showed that Gbagbo was in fact quite successful in winning the allegiance of arguably the most prominent 'big-man' politician in the Ivoirian Northeast, Palé Dimaté. In many ways, Gbagbo was able to seize upon the wellspring of discontent with the FN that had been generated in Bouna over the preceding eight years. In Korhogo, the authority of the FN was instead substantially strengthened by the alliances it had established with segments of the Korhogo elite. During the terminal stages of the

[65] Kassoum Coulibaly passed away soon after in 2009.

conflict, the electoral success of the RDR in Korhogo and the victory of Alassane Ouattara nationally reinforced the coalition formed during the conflict that underwrote the authority of Fofié Martin in Korhogo.

Historically, national-level opposition leaders have attempted to mobilize support in the Korhogo region by allying with disaffected elites upset with their positions within the local political hierarchies. The central problem for the FPI (and past opposition parties) was that, once local social hierarchies are absorbed as part of rival party structures, it becomes very difficult for alternative movements to tap into them. As one FPI party member put it, the central "problem with the Coulibaly family is that they are not open" (interview, FPI party member, Korhogo, 14.10.2010). The inability to rally ruling factions of the Senoufo elite in Korhogo has meant that the second best strategy for the FPI in this part of the North has been to mobilize support from Coulibaly family members dissatisfied with their standing within these local social hierarchies. As explained above, the local ruling coalition formed during the conflict – between the FN members supporting Guillaume Soro, and the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family (with Amadou Gon Coulibaly as its figurehead) – did have its opponents. As a result, the FPI mirrored the dominant strategy of past opposition parties (including the FPI itself in the early 1990s) of drawing on these factional disputes to mobilize political support in the North.

FPI's efforts to mobilize northern politicians and constituencies began well before the 2010 presidential elections (K. Marras 2007). During this time, the FPI experienced some success in attracting defectors away from both the RDR and the PDCI-RDA. A number of prominent national examples include Lanzéni Coulibaly, Samba Coulibaly and Zémogo Fofana[66] from the RDR and Silue Kagnon Augustin, Soro Sinali and Issa Ouattara from the PDCI-RDA (K. Marras 2007; P.A.T. 2009). This strategy appeared particularly effective vis-à-vis the PDCI-RDA, whose support has declined in the north since the death of Houphouet-Boigny and as a result of Bedié's instrumental use of *ivoirité* to retain the Ivoirian Presidency in the 1990's.

In Korhogo, two prominent examples of the FPI's strategy of mobilizing disaffected Senoufo elites stand out: Lanzéni Coulibaly and Dr. Issa Malick Coulibaly. When it appeared that Lanzéni had the support of a majority of the city counsellors to become the next 4th assistant to

[66] Zémogo Fofana left the RDR in 2007 to start a new party: *l'Alliance pour la nouvelle Côte d'Ivoire (*Anci*)*.

the mayor, the decision was reversed by Amadou Gon and Lanzéni Coulibaly's main competitor, Salimou Coulibaly, was appointed instead (Mazola 2008).[67] Lanzéni's decision to join the FPI stemmed precisely from these efforts on the part of the Senoufo hierarchy in Korhogo to block Lanzéni's independent political ambitions.[68] Not unlike the past strategies historically employed by other elites disaffected with their standing within the local Korhogo hierarchy, Lanzéni drew heavily on support from the Dyula community in Korhogo (specifically Dyula youth in Koko) to advance his political position.

The highest profile example was the former PDCI member and 2010 FPI national campaign manager, Dr. Issa Malick Coulibaly. Looking for a political foothold in the north, Gbagbo had originally approached Amadou Gon Coulibaly's old rival and Malick's cousin, Kassoum Coulibaly (prior to his efforts to become the next cantonal chief in Korhogo), to lead the FPI's campaign in Korhogo and the north. Approaching Kassoum, of course, made sense; he had a serious axe to grind with fellow Coulibaly family member Amadou Gon Coulibaly, who had defeated Kassoum in the 2001 mayoral elections. Kassoum declined, but introduced Gbagbo to his cousin, Issa Malick Coulibaly, who eventually became the assistant director of the presidential cabinet for the FPI (Airault 2010). Although Malick stayed with the FPI up until the beginning of the 2010 elections, some FPI politicians that I spoke with seriously questioned his loyalty to the party, suggesting that he was not "really FPI" (interview, FPI party member, Korhogo, 14.10.2010). The assumption here was that, although the FPI gave Malick access to substantial resources to gain advantage over factional rivals, he was not willing to commit long-term to a party that had limited access to social networks at local levels. Abandoning these

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[67] The reliance on appointments rather than elections by senior members in the Coulibaly family hierarchy worked as part of a larger strategy to block political threats in constituencies with numerically large Dyula populations. This was apparently the case in 2008 when Eric Ouattara was appointed president of the youth wing of the RDR by Amadou Gon. It was Amadou Gon's lack of faith in Dyula youth to make the 'right' choice that was supposedly behind this decision (Mazola 2008).

[68] This has strong parallels with past methods of managing political selections that illustrated and buttressed the authority of those on top of the political hierarchy in Korhogo. Boone writes that "one particularity in the rules of local party competition also underscores the specificity of this region: in Korhogo PDCI secretaries-general at the *sous-préfectural* level were elected (via queuing) rather than appointed to office. This represented a measure of devolution of prerogative that was specific to this region: it seems that the regime counted on hierarchical cohesion at the local level to produce acceptable electoral results" (2003, 271).

networks completely could have serious long-term political consequences (interview, FPI party member, Korhogo, 14.10.2010; Dossa 2009).[69]

Whatever successes the FPI has had in mobilizing and attracting defections from more established parties in the north, the limitations of this strategy are highlighted by the number of politicians that defected to the FPI *only to return* to their original party, particularly the RDR, before the presidential elections in 2010. Zémogo Fofana, Adama Coulibaly, and Jean-Jacques Becho are some of the more prominent examples. Not surprisingly, the RDR triumphed in the Senoufo heartland around Korhogo. In the region of Savanes (which included the departments of Boundiali, Ferkessedougou, Korhogo, and Tengrela) the RDR won just under 85% of the vote in the first round of the elections.[70] The FPI won under 7% of the vote. The numbers were similar in the second round, with Ouattara garnering almost 94% of the vote and Gbagbo receiving less than 7%.[71] After the country-wide results were announced, the votes cast in these departments were annulled by the *Commission électorale indépendante* (CEI) President, Paul Yao N'Dré, due to the suspicion of large-scale voting irregularities. However, following the removal of Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, Alassane Ouattara was named President of the Republic. Amadou Gon Coulibaly's close ties with Alassane Ouattara cemented his status within the RDR and at the apex of Korhogo politics. Not surprisingly, Amadou Gon renewed his mandate as mayor after Côte d'Ivoire's municipal and regional elections. It would not be a stretch to say that Amadou Gon is, at present, one of the most influential political figures in Côte d'Ivoire.

Moreover, the electoral successes of the RDR, Alassane Ouattara and Amadou Gon in the Senoufo heartland around Korhogo have only reinforced the authority of their old wartime ally in Korhogo, the former FN *Com'zone* commander, Fofié Martin. In 2011, Fofié Martin was named by Alassane Ouattara as the head of the military company (*Compagnie territoriale*) in Korhogo. In the period immediately following the forced removal of Laurent Gbagbo, Martin was charged

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[69] As in the case of Dimaté in Bouna, there is some evidence to suggest that decisions to side with Gbagbo and the FPI represented a risky decision in the short term as well. Prior to the elections, the FPI headquarters in Korhogo was burnt down. After it became apparent that Gbagbo would resist stepping down (after the results of the second round of the Presidential elections were announced), the house of Malick Coulibaly was looted and covered with anti-FPI graffiti (author's observations).

[70] See http://www.abidjan.net/elections/presidentielle/2010/resultats/1ertour/

[71] See http://www.abidjan.net/elections/presidentielle/2010/resultats/2emetour/CC.html#Savanes

with guarding the former president until his ultimate transfer to the International Criminal Court in November 2011. Martin has retained his appointment as head of the *Compagnie territoriale* in Korhogo until the present day.

Conclusion

In both Bouna and Korhogo, conflicts emerged between some of the most prominent pre-conflict political actors, Palé Dimaté in Bouna and Kassoum Coulibaly in Korhogo, and their FN counterparts, *commandants* Morou Ouattara and Fofié Martin. Open hostility emerged between these groups of actors largely because of the threat the northern rebellion posed to the political power and authority pre-conflict elites previously enjoyed. These dynamics support Pierre Englebert's (2009, 139) claim that armed movements in Africa are often motivated by the marginalization and replacement of local or regional elites. Yet struggles to replace local elites do not tell the whole story. The rebels in the two localities differed in their ability to socially control local populations given the elite coalitional choices available to them and the distinct hierarchical configurations they confronted. Morou Ouattara and the FN were the object of much scorn from not just Dimaté and other Lobi politicians in Bouna, but from the Lobi community in Bouna as a whole. Ouattara had few bases of support from which to draw in this part of the North. Martin and the local FN in Korhogo proved far more capable of mobilizing support for their authority in Korhogo, despite the obvious threat the rebels' posed to established politicians such as Kassoum Coulibaly. In Korhogo, there was no popular backlash against the rebels. What explains these differences?

My argument focuses attention on differences in the position of local elites as state brokers and elite hierarchical configurations. In contrast to Bouna, in Korhogo, some segments of this influential group were available as potential allies to the rebels when the civil war began. In Korhogo, some segments of the local elite were available as allies to the FN in part because of how this region was governed by local and national actors since independence. Since the end of colonialism, the authority of Senoufo elites in Korhogo has been rooted in their autonomous control over land and labour *and* their position as agents of their national-level party bosses, first the PDCI, then the RDR. As explained in this chapter, the authority of Senoufo elites has historically stemmed from social control over land, marriage and the labour power of young men. In partnership with Côte d'Ivoire's long-serving President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Gbon

Coulibaly won the admiration of many across the Senoufo heartland in taking a stand against France's forced labour regime during the late colonial period. Gbon's descendants benefitted greatly from the legitimacy his legacy bestowed upon them. Since independence, these actors have constituted the bulk of the political class in Korhogo. Since the 1970s, the legitimacy enjoyed by this set of actors has been recognized and harnessed by their national-level political counterparts. As Boone argued, the old PDCI single-party did not attempt to challenge or dismantle these local social hierarchies. Rather, they aimed to incorporate them as an integral part of the state apparatus. After the 1960s, working with the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite represented the primary means by which national-level political actors mobilized support in the Korhogo region.

One of the significant implications of this ruling strategy was how it heightened factional conflicts at the local-level during the *pre-conflict* period, between elites looking to become the principal set of interlocutors through which state power was exercised in Korhogo. Comparing Kassoum Coulibaly and Palé Dimaté highlights the implication of ongoing factional conflict in Korhogo for coalition-building during the conflict period. Overall, Kassoum Coulibaly and Palé Dimaté drew on very similar bases of support. In the Dyula and Lobi, each drew on the support of 'strangers' (or non-natives) to their respective communities. What differed was how state structures mediated the relationships between these elites and their principal backers. For elites like Dimaté, retaining the support of the Lobi community required state backing as a means of *mitigating* the customary authority of the Koulongo monarchy (particularly its authority over land). This meant that social hierarchies in Bouna were tied directly to the state *and* that there was no other set of elites with comparable levels of authority. Since the colonial period, state interventions gradually worked to curb the autonomous power of the Koulongo monarchy.

By contrast, Kassoum used support from Dyula traders in Korhogo to attempt to harness customary institutions (as cantonal chief) to his own advantage; customary institutions that were recognized and politically buttressed by the pre-conflict state. Ongoing factional conflict created a unique set of opportunities for the FN to mobilize support in this part of the north. In Korhogo, there existed more than one potential elite group with which the rebels could ally. Overlapping divisions within the Senoufo elite (between a conservative side and a reformist faction, tied to the Dyula community in Korhogo) and within the FN (between elements loyal to Soro and IB)

produced a predictable set of alliances in the city by the time of the 2010 Presidential elections. Fofié Martin, the FN Korhogo zone commander, was by no means in a position to displace Senoufo elites, but he used support drawn from the conservative faction of this group to consolidate his position in the city by war's end. This relationship was in the end mutually beneficial. The conservative faction of the Coulibaly family also used the support it garnered from the pro-Soro group within the FN to marginalize its political opponents and in particular Kassoum Coulibaly. Overall, the case of the FN in Korhogo represents a case of what my framework referred to as *moderate social control*.

Chapter 6. Rebellion in the Borderlands: The FN and *les commerçants* in Ouangolodougou

Ouangolodougou (or 'Ouangolo' as it is commonly called) is located in the extreme northern part of Côte d'Ivoire, where the borders of Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso meet. On the surface, the experience of Ouangolo during the conflict mirrored that of Korhogo. After the rebels established control over the North, both cities were administered as part of *Com'zone* 10 and fell under the authority of zone commander Fofié Martin. In both Ouangolo and Korhogo, the local FN was able to gain some support from some of the most powerful actors in the city. In Korhogo, Fofié Martin proved successful in winning support from Amadou Gon Coulibaly, Drissa Coulibaly and other members of the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite. In Ouangolo, the local FN drew on support from many of the city's traders including Issaka ('Potcho') Sawadogo, the most prominent trader and head of the *Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de* l'*UEMOA*[72] (COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). Unlike the FN in Korhogo, the FN in Ouangolo did *not* confront brokers with levels of political authority comparable to their principal ally, Issaka Sawadogo. This chapter argues that, as a result, the FN in Ouangolo was able to establish higher levels of social control than elsewhere in Northern Côte d'Ivoire.

Prior to the civil war, the central state did not have a powerful ally or broker in Ouangolo. Before the 1990s, Ouangolo's traders had a fairly positive relationship with the state. State investment in the border region around Ouangolo contributed, in part, to the attractiveness of

[72] UEMOA refers to the *Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine.*

Ouangolo as a base of operations for West African traders. This changed during the era of multiparty politics in the 1990s when attacks on ethnic 'strangers' living in Côte d'Ivoire intensified (see chapter 2). This shift directly threatened Ouangolo's traders because the bulk of the city's population were immigrants from Mali and Burkina Faso. Like migrants elsewhere in Côte d'Ivoire,[73] Ouangolo's traders became the targets of state efforts to restrict the rights and benefits associated with Ivoirian citizenship. By attacking Ouangolo's migrant-traders, the state was left without a powerful ally in the city. As pre-conflict brokers, the state allied with a group of local political officials who lacked support from any social base comparable to Ouangolo's traders. The absence of any set of strong state brokers also enabled rebel control over the Ouangolo.

Moreover, the north-south division of the country and the rebel occupation of the city arguably enhanced the authority of the FN's chief interlocutor, Issaka Sawadogo. As this chapter explains, the rebellion created new opportunities for wealth creation for influential traders such as Sawadogo. Additionally, during the crisis, Sawadogo mobilized support based on his capacity to shield other traders from state efforts to regulate and control flows of peoples and goods across the northern border (through Ouangolo). Many of the organizations headed by Sawadogo, particularly the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, aimed to protect Malian and Burkinabe traders with operations in Côte d'Ivoire. Most of Ouangolo's traders lacked Ivoirian citizenship and occupied a precarious position as 'strangers', especially during the conflict when debates about citizenship and belonging were at their highest pitch. Even Sawadago himself came under intense criticism as a result of his (contested) status as a non-Ivoirian citizen. Thus, while Sawadago drew on his authority as nominal leader of Ouangolo's Malian and Burkinabe trading community, his authority also become the target of different state interventions (surrounding the enforcement of Ivoirian citizenship or taxation) during the conflict that sought to curb his political power and attack the position of Ouangolo's traders. Together, these attacks, and the economic opportunities the crisis created buttressed Sawadogo's authority in Ouangolo. This, in turn, enhanced the FN's control over the city given that Sawadogo was the chief ally of the rebels.

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[73] As discussed in Chapter 4, Lobi migrants in Bouna represented the important exception in this regard.

The hierarchical configuration confronted by the FN in Korhogo differed because the political clout of state brokers and rebel allies was relatively equal. Since the political and administrative reforms introduced in the late 1960s, members of Coulibaly family became the principal group through which the PDCI mobilized political support in Korhogo. As the previous chapter argued, the dual function of Senoufo elites in Korhogo as both legitimate community representatives *and* agents of PDCI (and later RDR) politicians based in Abidjan fanned factional conflict in Korhogo amongst descendants of the town's founder, Gbon Coulibaly. These conflicts continued unabated into the conflict period. Competing factions of the Senoufo elite struggled to determine who would succeed as Korhogo's Cantonal Chief after the death of Drissa Coulibaly in 2008. During the conflict, the FN in Korhogo confronted elite factions *and* allied with others, both of which were capable of exerting comparable levels of political power and authority.

Despite their shared status as migrants, Ouangolo's traders also occupied a different position vis-à-vis the pre-conflict state than Lobi migrants in Bouna. Bouna's Lobi community were migrants to the northeast but remained tied to political networks based in Abidjan throughout the crisis period. In northeastern Côte d'Ivoire, both the colonial and post-colonial state sponsored Lobi migration as a strategy to promote economic development and mobilize political support. The state's promotion of Lobi migration to northeastern Côte d'Ivoire also circumscribed the authority of Koulongo elites, particularly their control over land. Overall, Lobi elites remained dependent on the political backing of what would become a diverse set of national-level patrons (first Hophouët-Boigny, then Bédié and Gbagbo) throughout the post-colonial period. National-level politicians depended equally on Lobi elites as agents of the state in northeastern Côte d'Ivoire. Through Lobi brokers, the state controlled local populations and mobilized support. In Bouna, the hierarchical configuration favored state brokers, the Lobi. In Ouangolo, the configuration was reversed. Rebel allies were far more powerful than their state backed counterparts.

What were the implications of this hierarchical configuration for establishing rebel control? The autonomy of Sawadogo and the rest of the Ouangolo's immigrant-traders created significant opportunities for the FN to build support for the movement. In order to minimize potential barriers to trade created by the conflict, the FN worked closely with many of Ouangolo's traders, especially Sawadogo. The alliance between these groups was also on display

when, after the signing of the OPA, Ouangolo's mayor took steps to re-establish control over local taxation. These efforts were resisted heavily by many in Ouangolo's trading community and, in the end, were successfully blocked by the FN. Overall, the FN and Ouangolo's community of traders demonstrated a shared vested interest in restricting the reconstitution of the state's authority over taxation.

Additionally, the rebellion seemed to have propelled far more significant political changes in Ouangolo than those observed in Korhogo or Bouna because national level actors based in Abidjan did not have any local political base or set of political partners they could call upon to contest the alliance formed between the rebels and Ouangolo's community of traders. In this sense, the case of Ouangolo differs greatly from Korhogo and Bouna, where national-level actors could call upon sets of local-level partners with substantial (albeit varying) levels of political clout. The contrast with Korhogo is particularly illustrative because, while there, like in Ouangolo, the FN was able to garner substantial support for the movement, the local leadership of the rebellion was never in position to displace the Senoufo elite as the principal intermediaries through which national level actors ruled this part of the North. In Ouangolo, more pronounced changes were evident in the outcomes of the municipal and legislative elections in 2013. One former FN leader based in Ouangolo ran as an independent candidate during Ouangolo's mayoral election and finished second, with nearly 30% of the vote. Although for very different reasons, the very thought of a former FN member running in Korhogo or Bouna seems farfetched. Additionally, during the political transition initiated by the signing of the OPA, the state relied on former rebels as administrators to tax and regain control over trans-border trade. The state was forced to draw upon the legitimacy the rebels had built up among the trading community in Ouangolo because of the absence of any other social base on which to build.

Figure 6.1: Map of administrative Region of Savanes, North-Central Côte d'Ivoire (original map source: reliefweb.int, modified by Melanie Ferrara).

Overall, Ouangolo represents a case of what my framework described as *high social control*. In these cases, we expect there to be the greatest opportunity for establishing social control because the hierarchical configuration favours armed groups. Rebel allies are politically stronger than their broker counterparts. This chapter supports this argument through the case of Ouangolo and proceeds in four sections. The first provides a short history of Ouangolo and Côte d'Ivoire's northern border. The second examines the kinds of opportunities and constraints for cross-border trade created by the conflict. This section also provides a brief background to arguably the most influential of the Ouangolo-based traders, Issaka Sawadogo. It details the origins of the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA and the efforts of Sawadogo and other West Africans to overcome the trade barriers presented by the Ivoirian crisis. The third section examines debates surrounding Sawadogo's authority and control over livestock marketing during

the conflict period. The final section looks at the local conflicts over the authority to tax in Ouangolo during the post-OPA period and describes how the alliance between Ouangolo's traders and the FN rebuffed efforts by the mayor's office to re-establish its authority over taxation. Overall this section demonstrates the enduring authority of the FN in Ouangolo after the signing of the OPA and the subsequent removal of Laurent Gbagbo in 2011. It highlights the FN's lasting influence in Ouangolo through a focus on the strategies employed by the state to re-establish their authority over their border and the outcomes of the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in this part of the north. I argue that the FN's ability to cement its political position during the transitional period after the removal of Laurent Gbagbo stemmed from the strength of the FN's elite coalitional partner relative to the state's broker counterpart.

Trade, Migration and Brokerage in West Africa

Ouangolo currently functions as an important node in trans-West African trading networks. Nonetheless, Ouangolo's significant role in facilitating West African trade developed only recently. This section provides a brief historical background of trans-West African trade and Ouangolo's emergent role in it. It examines three interrelated aspects of this history. First, I describe two types of brokerage relationships that have facilitated the expansion of Dyula-trading networks across West Africa: the *diagiti* and indigenous hosts. *Diagiti* refers to Dyula resident traders who have historically played an important role in welcoming and enabling new traders in local arenas. The other set of brokers are those indigenous hosts that facilitate West African trade by providing local political protection. In the case of north-central Côte d'Ivoire, the first set of broker relationships emphasizes intra-Dyula or Dyula-Dyula relations and the second refers to relations between the Dyula and their indigenous, largely Senoufo hosts. For the purposes of my argument, this distinction is important because it illuminates some basic differences between my cases, specifically Korhogo and Ouangolo. While Dyula merchants have been historically dependent on their Senoufo hosts in Korhogo, equivalent indigenous actors are absent in Ouangolo. As a result, Dyula brokers (*diagiti*) have historically played a more prominent political role in Ouangolo. As a result of their status as 'strangers', Dyula brokers (vis-à-vis other Dyula

merchants) were positioned very differently vis-à-vis the state compared to their Senoufo counterparts in Korhogo.[74] Without protection from Senoufo hosts (such as, for example, Kassoum Coulibaly in Korhogo), Dyula merchants are more susceptible to attacks from the state given their status as strangers.[75]

Second, this section examines the history of inter-West African trade in livestock, given the importance of this commodity to many of Ouangolo's traders, especially Sawadogo, during the conflict period. Finally, this section explains the historical processes that led to the emergence of Ouangolo as an important town within the larger network of transnational West African economic exchange. It highlights the state's role in promoting the development of Ouangolo as a trading center, as well as the brokering relationships established over time by local elites.

Dyula Expansion and the History of Brokerage Relations in Northern Côte d'Ivoire

Ouangolo is a city populated overwhelmingly by Dyula merchants with origins elsewhere in West Africa. The previous chapter briefly introduced the history of the Dyula in West Africa, focusing primarily on debates surrounding the meaning of the term 'Dyula', the character of social organization within Dyula communities, and the specific relationships formed between Dyula traders and their Senoufo hosts in Korhogo. What follows below overlaps with the material presented in the previous chapter, but emphasizes the regional and international trade relationships Dyula merchants have built and sustained up until the contemporary period.

Prior to colonization, West Africa had long been the site of well-developed regional (within West Africa) and trans-regional (between West Africa and the rest of the world) trade linkages. Trade linkages criss-crossed a variety of ecological zones, each of which specialized in

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[74] In the case of Ouangolo, the term brokerage relations actually refers to two distinct sets of social relationships. The first refers to how local elites broker relationships between localities and the wider network of trans-West African trade. I am referring to these types of brokerage relations in discussing differences between Dyula-Dyula relations (*diagiti,* or stranger-stranger brokerage ties) and Senoufo-Dyula relations (or stranger-native brokerage ties). The other types of brokerage examined in this chapter are those discussed throughout this dissertation, specifically the relationships between local elites and the central state. In this chapter, I suggest that brokerage relations between local elites and the wider network of trans-West African trade shaped both the hierarchical configurations and the brokerage relations between local elites and the state confronted by the rebels.

[75] However, non-indigenous brokers are less susceptible to attack when their authority is protected and supported directly by the state (as in the case of Bouna). In these cases, the position of non-indigenous elites is less precarious, even without the protection from local indigenous patrons.

the production of different commodities. The realization of profits through trade motivated successive waves of southward migration of Manding speaking peoples from western Mali to the savannah zones of what is now Guinée, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, beginning around the fifteenth century. However, migration to what is now northern Côte d'Ivoire did not begin in earnest until the seventeenth century (Launay 1982, 13). The gradual southward migration of the Manding ultimately created a dense set of economic ties that traversed the different climatic zones of West Africa. Various commodities were exchanged across these distinct regions. Gold from Northern Ghana was sent northward to Timbuktu and then, ultimately, to the coasts of North Africa. Kola was sent from coastal forests northward up the Niger River. Clothes from the Sahel were exchanged for other commodities across the network of city-states spanning West Africa (Lewis 1971, 276; Quarrels van Ufford 1999, 39).

'Dyula' trading networks remained remarkably resilient to political change. For instance, European colonialism did not always work to weaken these networks and in many cases, actually strengthened them. Robert Launay (1979, 73) explains how, across Manding regions, resident trader/landlords known as *diatigi* guarded their entrenched positions in frontier areas and their privileged relationship with the producers of kola in the southern forest-zones. French colonialism in Côte d'Ivoire effectively broke the monopoly of the *diatigi* over kola production and trade. Launay writes that "once the *pax colonia* was established, Dyula living up to the north of the ethnic frontier were quick to avail themselves of the opening of the Guro markets, bypassing the landlords wherever direct access was made possible" (see also Launay 1982, 15). Additionally, many Dyula traders played a privileged role in the systems of export crop marketing managed by colonial states in Africa (Lewis 1971, 287-290).

Despite their weakened control over trade in southern forest zones, *diatigi* still played important roles in the maintenance of Dyula trading networks. These landlords had a number of important social and economic roles, including: providing food and accommodation, connecting sellers coming from afar to potential buyers, wholesaling (by buying from foreign traders and selling goods at set prices to local retailers), and providing credit to retailers (so that foreign traders could sell their goods quickly) (Perinbam 1973, 428-429; Launay 1979, 72). Landlords or brokers facilitated economic exchanges and functioned as powerful intermediaries between the trading networks to which they belonged and the local communities in which they were

embedded. The authority of these actors was derived from a number of sources. Material factors, such as their strategic positioning vis-à-vis different commodity flows, their own success as traders, and their ability to dispense credit all played a role. Their investment in social ties with other traders and prominent political actors buoyed their position as brokers between these groups. Finally, Quarles van Ufford (1999, 45) writes that the symbolic capital accrued by brokers from "being a devout Muslim" also played an important role in securing the role of specific traders as intermediaries. He writes that "investments in mosques and Koranic schools as well as the distribution of gifts among religious authorities equally belong to this category and contribute to the status of a trader". Perinbam (1973, 430) effectively summarizes these attributes, suggesting that "regardless of the type of authority which brokers exercised, in theory, they supplemented their economic role by moral authority, which reinforced their effectiveness as local market officials. Authorized by customary law, brokers theoretically protected public interest by exercising social and moral constraints over local market prices."

One of the central challenges confronting networked trading groups such as the Dyula in West Africa, both historically and presently, has been the absence of any centralized political system capable of enforcing the rule of law. As a result, traders relied upon pre-existing social institutions to manage expanding trade relationships much more than official market mechanisms or sets of accepted standardized rules regulating trade (Perinbam 1973, 418-419).[76] One implication of drawing on pre-existing trans-local social ties in order to facilitate market exchanges is that traders across West Africa, including the Dyula, were commonly viewed as 'strangers' in the communities in which they lived (Quarrels van Ufford and Zaal 2004, 136). Maintaining some social autonomy from host communities served two purposes. First, in many African societies, where profit making and social differentiation through the market were traditionally frowned upon, maintaining social distinctions prevented the negative social sanction these activities would otherwise provoke. Second, indigenous elites used their relations with foreign traders in order to mobilize resources to support their local position of authority (Launay

[76] Perinbam writes that "In the absence of reliable communications and effective central institutions of control, merchants from dominant ethnic groups were able to overcome certain technical problems, and control trade at every level, by working through ethnic-based trading institutions. They therefore formed a kind of ethnic community with corporate economic interests and institutions whose members exercised constraints on individual behaviour, thus ensuring loyalty and a measure of conformity in non-contractual or verbal agreements" (1973, 419).

1983, 3; Launay and Soares 1999, 500; Quarrels van Ufford 1999, 41). Nonetheless, traditional social distinctions differentiating the Dyula from their indigenous hosts have changed over time. Islam was one of the principal means by which the Dyula identified themselves (Perinbam 1973, 426). However, religious conversion and the spread of Islam across much of northern Côte d'Ivoire meant that the membership of the community of traders became increasingly heterogeneous and that Islam itself became a less precise standard by which to distinguish stranger/trader and host. Alternatively, traders themselves have also relied on narrower sets of identities – particularly ethnic identities associated with different Dyula *kabilas* – to exclude others and work to preserve particular trading privileges for certain more narrowly defined identifiable groups (Perinbam 1973, 425; Harre 1993, 249-250; Labazée 1993b, 133-138; Launay and Soares 1999, 498; Quarrels van Ufford 1999, 43; Quarrels van Ufford and Zaal 2004, 138).

Overall, Dyula traders have historically struggled to balance efforts to socially embed themselves within local communities *and* maintain some social autonomy from their hosts. Generally speaking, these actors went to great lengths to ameliorate threats to their local position through the construction of ethnic or social ties with host communities (through institutions such as marriage) (Quarles van Ufford and Zaal 2004, 139). Nonetheless, as Launey and Soares (1999, 514) suggest, these generalizable social categories (ethnicity, race, or religious identifications) often overlook "a host of 'particular' allegiances to kin groups, villages, chiefdoms, military alliances, trading partnerships, marriage networks etc." (1999, 514). In northern Côte d'Ivoire, the local position of the Dyula commonly varied in terms of their relationships to their Senoufo hosts. For example, Launay identifies two historic clusters of concentrated Dyula populations which enjoyed substantial political autonomy vis-à-vis Senoufo hosts compared to other Dyula living in the North: Kadioha and Boron to the south of Korhogo (that was part of the old frontier that regulated the trade in Kola nuts with the forest zones of the south) and in Mbengue, Nielle and Ngandana to its north (Launay 1988, 358-363). The relationship between everyday Dyula and political authorities in areas of high Dyula concentration, versus those where Dyula were politically subordinate to Senoufo hosts, generally took radically different forms, limiting or enabling the political autonomy enjoyed by the Dyula.[77] As the last chapter highlighted, Dyula

[77] Referring to the Dyula village of Kadioha, Launay writes that "like any Dyula community Kadioha was divided into a number of clan barrios, called *kabilaw*…The *kabilaw* were themselves loosely grouped into larger associations

communities in Korhogo have largely remained dependent on their Senoufo hosts. In Ouangolo, Dyula traders enjoyed far more autonomy, largely because comparable indigenous political actors and institutions were absent.

As indicated above, historically, West African trade specialized in a variety of commodities, including clothes, gold and kola. Present-day cross border trade is characterized by an equal level of diversity. Merchants specialize in the trade in electronics, cars and motorcycles, clothing, cigarettes and livestock. This chapter focuses on the trans-West African trade in cattle/livestock as an example of the more general phenomenon of regional West African trade and because the trade in livestock emerged as an important regulatory issue during the conflict period in Côte d'Ivoire.

History of the Cattle Trade in West Africa

Although there has been a long history of trading in livestock in Côte d'Ivoire, researchers have typically focused on higher value commodities, such as ivory or slaves. The significance of the regional livestock trade in West Africa was limited by the absence of large markets and high demand for meat (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 56). Not unlike the trade in other commodities in West Africa, the trade in livestock was controlled largely by Haussa and Dyula traders. As a result, the central actors in the marketing of livestock at the national level were also typically 'foreign' (Quarles von Ufford and Zaal 2004, 136). Consequently, these traders remained fairly dependent on the political and military protection of the number of city-states that dotted the pre-colonial West African landscape (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 57).

European colonialism strengthened existing supply chains and established new regional trade relationships. The growth in agricultural export crops such as cocoa, oil palm and peanuts had the effect of rapidly increasing the demand for food crops and livestock in many African colonies. Indeed, demand was highest in those sub-regions and urban areas that were at the heart

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known as *makufo*, comprising three to five *kabilaw*, one of whom was always 'host' to the others who had subsequently settled in the community, While the original nature of the 'host'/'guest' bond was generally that of patron to client, the strength of this political dependence was not invariably maintained over many generations. Essentially, each *kabila* was fiercely jealous of its own autonomy [which] seriously limited the power of the chief" (1988, 360-361).

of colonial export-crop marketing project (Southern Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, and the groundnut basin in Senegal) (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 57). For instance, Quarles van Ufford writes that the imports of cattle to southern Nigeria increased from 8,000 head in 1906 to around 200,000 in the 1930s (1999, 57). In addition to increasing the demand for meat products, colonialism stimulated livestock production and trade in West Africa in two other distinct ways. First, in contrast to the marketing of agricultural export crops destined for Europe, which colonial administrators controlled tightly through official state marketing boards and channels, the set of policy and administrative controls constructed to manage domestic food production remained minimal (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 58). Second, colonial administrators boosted regional livestock trade and production through investments in transportation infrastructure. Railways in particular strengthened ties between centres of livestock production and sale, between different national sub-regions within the same colony, as well as across different West African colonies (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 58-59).

A different set of exogenous shocks shaped livestock trade patterns during the post-colonial period in West Africa. Parts of West Africa that experienced particularly intense periods of economic growth (the 'economic miracle' in Côte d'Ivoire, oil-led growth in Nigeria) drove the development and direction of the livestock trade. Periods of declining economic growth had the opposite effect by restricting the regional demand for livestock. Increased imports of frozen beef, particularly from Latin American, also decreased the demand for regionally produced livestock (Quarles van Ufford 1999, 61).

Finally, the beginning of the 2002 armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire presented a different set of opportunities and constraints for actors involved in West Africa's regional livestock trade. As this chapter explains, the political crisis initially limited access to slaughterhouses, markets and ports in Southern Côte d'Ivoire, particularly Abidjan, for regional traders. Nonetheless, the regulatory framework governing trade during the conflict also worked to promote the marketing of cattle. This chapter uses the trade in livestock as a backdrop for its discussion of wartime coalition-building and conflict over authority. I emphasize the trade in livestock because its regulation and promotion represented a key interest for many big traders in Ouangolo, including Sawadogo, *and* because it highlights challenges confronted by many traders in Côte d'Ivoire during the crisis period (2002-2011).

The History of Ouangolodougou and Northern Côte d'Ivoire's Border Regions

Ouangolodougou is an important frontier town situated where the borders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire meet. On the Ivoirian side of the border, Ouangolodougou is roughly 625km from Abidjan, 30km from Côte d'Ivoire's border with Burkina Faso, and 84km from the country's border with Mali. Compared to Bouna and Korhogo, Ouangolo's history is distinguished by an overall absence of any enduring indigenous authority structure. This section suggests that, again in contrast to Bouna and Korhogo, the emergence of Ouangolo was a direct by-product of the foundation of the current West African state system. It has been and remains today a town of immigrant traders whose attraction to Ouangolo stems from its strategic position at the nexus of the borders dividing Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. To this day, Ouangolo's traders enjoy independence from, not only the Ivoirian state (distinguishing them from the Lobi in the case of Bouna), but also from any indigenous social or political system (which contrasts with the experience of the Dyula in Korhogo).

Ouangolo's growth remained fairly modest until the 20th century, when it gained advantage from its strategic economic positioning as a frontier town along Côte d'Ivoire's northern border with Burkina Faso and Mali. Although Côte d'Ivoire's eastern and western political boundaries (with Liberia and Ghana respectively) were established fairly early on after its foundation as a French colony, Côte d'Ivoire's northern border remained in flux as a result of the shifting status of *Haute Volta* (present day Burkina Faso) within French West Africa. Indeed, the political boundaries dividing West Africa were altered dramatically during the colonial period. All contemporary French West African countries were originally administered as a larger federation under colonial rule, *l'Afrique Occidentale Française* (AOF). After the AOF's borders with the British colonies were eventually established in 1898 (see the chapter on Bouna), French colonial administrators began to demarcate boundaries between its West African colonies. Côte d'Ivoire was officially made a French colony in 1893. French Upper Volta (*Haute Volta*) was not established as a separate colony until 1919.

By 1929, the economy of the French colony of *Haute Volta* was in decline. The production of cotton for export experienced a precipitous drop, tax rates were viewed by much of the population as unbearable, and, in response, most laborers left for the southern cocoa

plantation zones in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, where economic conditions were far better (Skinner 1989, 174). As a result, in September 1932, the French Colonial Minister Sarraut ordered the dismemberment of the colony, dividing its territory between three other French colonies: Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and French Sudan (present-day Mali) (Skinner 1989, 174). However, by the mid-1940s, pressure to reinstate Upper Volta as an independent French colony was growing within French West Africa. Mossi chiefs called for the re-recognition of Upper Volta in order to bolster their own power. When candidates picked by the Mossi establishment seriously threatened the election of Houphouët-Boigny to the French parliament in June 1946, Houphouët-Boigny quickly sought to shore up the support of this group by promising to push for the reinstatement of Upper Volta as a separate colony if the Mossi chief, Moro Naba, agreed to support a PDCI-RDA electoral list in the November 1946 elections (Boone 2003, 201).[78] French administrators responded with an about face: recognizing Upper Volta was understood as a direct means of undercutting the political power of the PDCI-RDA by "removing it from (their) influence" (Boone 2003, 201; see also Skinner 1989, 185-187). Upper Volta once again became a separate colony of France in September 1947 (Skinner 1989, 186). Mali (under colonial rule: Sudan), Côte d'Ivoire's other northern neighbour, also experienced reforms to its borders after its inception as a French colony, acquiring its present-day shape in 1944 (Nassa 2008, 5). However, these changes did not affect its border with Côte d'Ivoire (Nassa 2008, 5).

Ouangolo's emergence as an important political and economic center in northern Côte d'Ivoire was a direct consequence of colonial state-formation and the positioning of the border dividing Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso. In this respect, the history of Ouangolo contrasts with that of both Korhogo (although its significance was also in part a product of fairly recent historical processes) and especially Bouna (which functioned as an important city-state in West Africa prior to the beginning of European colonialism). In contrast to Ouangolo, the interplay between colonial and indigenous or pre-colonial political forces shaped the systems of governance established in Bouna and Korhogo. By 1975, Ouangolodougou still remained a fairly

[78] The other key reason for the French administration's appeasement of the Mossi chiefly class in Upper Volta was their interests in the labor power of young men, over which this group had direct control. Recognizing their authority through the recreation of Upper Volta was one way the French administration could ensure that migration of young men from Upper Volta flowed southward to the cocoa plantations in southern Côte d'Ivoire rather than to Ghana (Nassa 2010, 4).

modest city in terms of population, at 5,402 residents. After its transformation into a *sous-préfecture* the same year, the town's population grew to 12,175 by 1988 and 18,015 by 1998 (Nassa 2008, 9). The percentage of non-Ivoirians living in Ouangolodougou was an important feature of the city's population. Nassa estimates that, by 1998, almost half of the entire population of Ouangolodougou lacked Ivoirian citizenship (43%). Nationals from countries on Côte d'Ivoire's northern border, Burkina Faso (77%) and Mali (20%), made up much of this foreign population (Nassa 2008, 9).

The attraction of migrants and traders from neighboring Sahelian countries to Ouangolodougou stemmed largely from its advantages as a frontier town on Côte d'Ivoire's Northern border. Ouangolodougou presented different kinds of opportunities to Malian and Burkinabè traders (Nassa 2008, 5-9). The city functioned as a base for foreign traders looking to gain access to and embed themselves in lucrative Ivoirian marketing networks. Ouangolodougou also benefitted these actors as a result of its position as a strategic node in trans-Sahelian trade. The city is situated within a network of roads linking Niger to the east with Senegal. It is also on a railway line constructed during the colonial period, linking Abidjan to Burkina Faso (which, as discussed above, had enjoyed a shared colonial status briefly during the colonial period). The central market in Ouangolodougou played a central role in the system of local markets established on the Burkinabè, Malian and Ivoirian sides of the border including Pogo (Côte d'Ivoire), Zégoua (Mali), Kadarvogo (Burkina Faso), Bakomi (Burkina Faso), Seribadjan (Côte d'Ivoire), Kawara (Côte d'Ivoire), Niangoloko (Burkina Faso, directly across from Ouangolodougou), and Nabingué (Côte d'Ivoire). According to Nassa (2008, 6-7), other markets in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire border region that occur during the week (from Monday to Saturday) allow traders to observe pricing dynamics and build up stocks of different commodities (gasoline, agricultural exports, cigarettes, second hand clothing, fabrics) in preparation for potential transactions to be made on the principal market day, Sunday, in Ouangolodougou and Niangoloko. Institutional development also contributed to Ouangolodougou's emergence as an important border town. A central train station, warehouses for the *La Compagnie Cotonnière Ivoirienne* (LCCI), *La Société Internationale des Transports par Rail* (SITARAIL), as well as the offices for Ivoirian border customs helped to facilitate

regional West African trade, particularly for those traders based in Ounagolodougou (Nassa 2008, 7).

Finally, prior to the conflict, the state politically controlled the border by allying with a group of educated Ivoirian nationals who were not directly tied to Ouangolo's trading community. Many of Ouangolo's traders lacked Ivoirian citizenship and thus could not run for public office or assume formal political appointments. However, prior to the transition to multiparty politics in Côte d'Ivoire, Ouangolo's traders had a positive relationship with the state. During the single-party period, the PDCI promoted migration and defended the rights of migrants in Côte d'Ivoire. As I discuss in greater detail below, the adoption of *ivoirité* and promotion of anti-immigrant policies by successive governments in the 1990s (see chapter 2) altered the relationship between migrants in Ouangolo (and elsewhere in Côte d'Ivoire) and national-level leadership. In sharp contrast with the case of Bouna, the PDCI (and later the FPI) did not rule directly through migrant populations in Ouangolo.[79] Migrant-traders did not assume prominent positions in government. Prior to the beginning of the civil war, these positions were filled largely by educated Ivoirian nationals who were not part of Ouangolo's trading community. Ouangolo's mayor, Nagnin Ouattara was originally elected in 1990 and held this position until his death in 2011. Although mayor, he split his time between Ouangolo and Abidjan where he taught history and sociology at *l'Ecole Normale Supérieure d'Abidjan.* Other representatives of the state came from a similar social milieu: they were formally trained at universities in Abidjan and elsewhere (Europe, etc.). They did not derive their authority or status from trade or being part of Ouangolo's trading communities (member of mayor's office, Ouangolo, December 2nd, 2010a; member of mayor's office, Ouangolo, December 2nd, 2010b). They were somewhat equivalent to what Tessy Bakary (1986) described as educated "nobodies" or those actors lacking any local base of support independent of the state. This is, to a degree, an overstatement. State representatives based in Ouangolo maintained positive relations with the traders for much of the post-colonial period. Nonetheless, anti-immigrant rhetoric promoted by successive governments at the national-level drove a wedge between local representatives of the state and Ouangolo's largely foreign trading community.

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[79] As explained in Chapter 4, during the post-colonial period, prominent Lobi lineage heads became the principal representatives of the PDCI in Bouna.

Opportunities and Constraints for Commerce During the Crisis Period

The political-military crisis that began in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 posed immediate threats to commercial networks that extended across Côte d'Ivoire's northern border. To weaken the rebellion, the Gbagbo government blocked goods from being shipped to the North (Nassa 2010). Additionally, within weeks of the rebels' assuming control over the North, passage across Côte d'Ivoire's northern borders with Mali and Burkina Faso came to an abrupt halt. Both the rebels and the southern government became immediately suspicious of trucks that could potentially smuggle arms to either side under the guise of trans-border trade. Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict, trucks headed to Abidjan were held up in Niangoloko, directly across from Ouangolodougou on the Ivoirian side of the border with Burkina Faso (Gouly 2002, Niangoran 2008). Rather than the Ouangolodougou-Ferkessédougou-Bouaké-Abidjan corridor relied on in the past, traders from other West African countries increasingly turned to Burkina Faso's border with Ghana (at Paga) as an entry-way into the South. Many traders based in Ouangolodougou relocated to Ghana in the initial days of the crisis and remained there for its duration.

As the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire wore on, initial tensions and suspicions between traders and the political administration of the rebels as well as the Gbagbo government based in Abidjan, gradually subsided. Nonetheless, serious impediments to cross-border trade remained. In particular, the financial costs of conducting trade in Côte d'Ivoire increased considerably after the beginning of the conflict. Two factors merit attention. The first was the set of informal taxes imposed on traders throughout Côte d'Ivoire and particularly in the North. Bribes demanded at checkpoints along the Ouangolodougou-Ferkessédougou-Bouaké-Abidjan corridor significantly raised the costs of trade (USAID ATP 2010a). The checkpoints themselves resulted in significant delays in the marketing of agricultural commodities. The second factor relates to the set of formal taxes established by the financial arm of the FN, *La Centrale*, which fiscally regulated the shipment of goods across the northern zones under the control of the rebels. The rebels established this system of taxation in part to formalize and regulate the costs associated with transporting goods across Northern Côte d'Ivoire (i.e. minimizing the cost of informal taxation through bribes and checkpoints). Such agreements will be discussed in more detail in later sections of this chapter.

Whatever the efforts of traders and political administrators in the North and the South to mitigate the costs of informal taxation, such costs remained high until the terminal stages of the conflict. Data from the USAID funded Improved Road Transport Governance (IRTG) Initiative suggests that the costs of transportation in Côte d'Ivoire remained high throughout the conflict relative to other principal West African trade routes (crossing Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Togo, as well as Côte d'Ivoire). Between April 1st and June 30th 2010, Côte d'Ivoire was ranked first by the IRTG in terms of the density of controls per 100km (3.23, Senegal was second at 2.93). Roughly half of the stops were conducted by actors tied to the FN. Compared to other West African countries, traders passing through Côte d'Ivoire were also forced to pay larger bribes. Per 100 km, drivers were forced to pay on average 5,928CFA in bribes in Côte d'Ivoire (including regions controlled by the government in the south and the FN in the north). Mali was second at 4,022 CFA on average. The majority of these bribes (3,786 CFA) were paid to FN actors. Côte d'Ivoire also led in terms of the average time of delays confronted by drivers (USAID ATP 2010a, 5-9). Overall, these financial and time costs represented significant impediments to trade and powerful incentives to rely on alternative trade routes, specifically through Ghana.

Beyond negotiating directly with both the FN and Gbagbo's government in the South, traders had other strategies for reducing these additional costs. The time and financial costs associated with transportation during the crisis period were partially made up for by passing them along to consumers and to other actors who were part of the commodity chains in question. In the case of livestock marketing, per kilogram meat prices in Côte d'Ivoire rose gradually from 800 or 900 CFAs at the beginning of the conflict to 2,000, 2,500 and finally to 3,000 CFAs by 2008 (Z.K. 2008). In the end, slaughterhouses and consumers bore the brunt of these prices. Indeed, as will be discussed later in this chapter, high prices for meat generated substantial political opposition to Issaka Sawadogo, the president of the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, who was seen as benefiting from high tax rates and high production costs just as much as those regulatory authorities who were responsible for imposing them (Z.K. 2008). These conflicts will be discussed in more detail below.

However, the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire did not simply create barriers to trans-border trade. It also created new opportunities for wealth acquisition. Many of the commodities

(principally cocoa, cashews, cotton and diamonds) that were previously directed towards Abidjan and the coast for export were now being rerouted to other countries on the Gulf of Guinea (Benin, Ghana and Guinea) as well as to those in the Sahel (Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali). Ouangolodougou served as the principal exit point for these commodities (Nassa 2008, 10). By reorienting commodity markets towards Ouangolo and Côte d'Ivoire's northern border, the rebellion created new avenues for wealth generation for actors who could position themselves strategically at different nodes of these commodity chains and play leading roles in the regulatory structures devised to manage them in this new environment. Interviews with COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA members suggest that profit margins in the trade in livestock increased during the later stages of the political crisis (see also COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA 2008, 1). However, no comprehensive data exist comparing levels of livestock sales in the pre-conflict period to those after the beginning of the political crisis.[80] As tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicate, sales of cattle in Côte d'Ivoire from Mali[81] varied slightly year-to-year between 2008 and 2010 (there was more variation month to month). Again, interviews suggested that cattle sales between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire also increased between 2005 and 2008, after trade was initially halted during the early days of the conflict, but no data are available to support this claim.

One actor widely perceived to have thrived during the conflict was the president of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Issaka Sawadogo (aka 'Potcho') (Z.K. 2008). Sawadogo was born in 1961 in the political capital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou. Upon first moving to Ouangolodougou with his family at the age of ten, Sawadogo began his commercial career by selling bags of potable water and cigarettes. Later, as an employee of the border services in Ouangolodougou, he sold small goods on a table outside of the border office. He subsequently moved into the trade of more high-value goods, including cars and car parts (Sidwaya 2009). Later, he branched out as a money lender to other businessmen looking to expand cross-border trade. Although at the time of the armed conflict, Sawadogo's principal interest was in the regional trade in livestock, his business ventures remain varied (Sidwaya 2009). He was the part

[80] Data acquired from COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA only covered the period between 2008 and 2010. As explained below, the organization itself was not created until late 2004.

[81] I emphasize Mali because 2010 country data is missing for other West African cattle exporting countries, specifically Burkina Faso.

owner of INFONET, an internet café in Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina-Faso), which sells up-to-date technologies and provides a host of teleconferencing services to local businesses. He also owned two gas stations in Bobo-Dioulasso and a hotel in Niangoloko, Burkina Faso. His most recent business group (*le groupe SIK*, Sawadogo Issaka Kombaya) is involved in a number of different sectors, including transportation and the cotton trade, as well as trading in a number of different agricultural commodities. Due to the diversity of his commercial interests, Sawadogo is also linked to a number of groups and organizations in addition to COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA including the *Société de commerce Côte d'Ivoire – Burkina* (SOCOCIB), *Société Ivoiro-malienne de transport de bétail* (SIMTB), the Union transport SOCOCIB-COBOF (UTSC, COBOF: *Compagnie Bocoum et Frères*) and the *Coopérative agricole Djiguiya de Ouangolodougou* (CADO) (Rouamba 2006). Overall, Sawadogo wielded substantial wealth and political influence prior to the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. During the crisis, his connections to political and economic organizations, as well as his close connections to the governments of both Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire made Sawadogo a valuable ally for many, particularly the Malian and Burkinabe traders based in Ouangolodougou and the FN, who had vested political and economic interests in maintaining trade flows across Côte d'Ivoire's northern border (Rouamba 2006). The following sub-section will focus on COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA to highlight how the organization underpinned Sawadogo's authority and how his authority influenced political conflict in Ouangolodougou during the conflict.



Figure 6.2 Yearly Number Cattle Sold from Mali to Côte d'Ivoire (2008-2010). Source: COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA (2008, 2009, 2010).



Figure 6.3 : Monthly Number of Cattle Sold from Mali to Côte d'Ivoire (2008-2010). Source: COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA (2008, 2009, 2010).

Commerce in Times of Crisis : Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l'UEMOA (COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA).

COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA was created on 27 December 2004 in Bamako, Mali, roughly two years after the beginning of Ivoirian crisis in 2002. It was formed by representatives from four

member countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. However, the number of member countries and country representatives quickly expanded. By 2010, COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA included all fifteen West African countries, with each country represented by seven delegates in the federation's governing assembly (totalling one hundred and five). The principal body responsible for governance within the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA was the board of directors. In 2010, the board itself expanded from fifteen to twenty-five members who were elected by country delegates. Issaka Sawadago was one of the founders of the federation and functioned as its President since its inception in 2004. In 2010, he was elected to another five year presidential mandate by COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA's board of directors.

COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA's financing comes from two principal sources. Dues paid by its members covers about 20% of the federation's costs. However, the USAID's Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP) project in West Africa covers the lion's share of the costs of the federation's activities. The central aim of ATP is to "increase the value and volume of intra-regional agricultural trade in West Africa in order to contribute to achieving the six percent agricultural growth target" (USAID ATP 2010b, 1). To accomplish this, ATP focuses on a number of specific trade corridors linking Sahelian countries, specifically Mali and Burkina Faso, to large coastal markets, namely those in Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan), Ghana (Tema and Accra), and Nigeria (Lagos). ATP also focuses on a number of specific value chains linking these different countries, including ruminant livestock and meat, onions and shallots, as well as maize. Given these broad, overarching objectives, ATP pursues a number of specific goals that largely overlap with the interests and objectives of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. These include objectives related to production (cost-effective cattle fattening, enhancing storage capacities and feed capacity), reduction of transportation costs, increased access to financing, creation of market information systems and organizational development of local partners. The national and federal offices for COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA represented one of the two principal interlocutors[82] for ATP's activities in West Africa and in Côte d'Ivoire specifically (USAID ATP 2010b, 1-4).[83]

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[82] The other is the *Observatoire régional pour le bétail/viande d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre* (ORBV/AOC).

[83] See below. At the time of the foundation of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Côte d'Ivoire did not have a national body charged with the management of the livestock/meat industry.

COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA's very creation represented a popular response to the impediments to cross-border and regional trade created by the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. Incentives to better organize the trade in livestock increased after the beginning of the conflict. For traders in livestock – particularly those in Burkina Faso and Mali – the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire created significant barriers to trade by cutting off the key corridor leading to the lucrative Abidjan market in the south through the northern centers of Ouangolodougou, Korhogo and Bouaké. The federation had three interrelated strategies for encouraging the trade in livestock despite the barriers presented by the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. The first was simply to reduce the rates of taxation on cross-border trade. The onset of the political conflict in Côte d'Ivoire magnified the general problem of taxation in two ways. First, as a result of the conflict, traders now confronted two administrative entities with which they were forced to bargain, the government in the South and the rebels in the North. The second challenge was managing the problem of bribery and corruption. In addition to the official levies on cross-border trade applied by both the bureaucratic apparatus of the government controlled south and the rebel controlled North, demands for bribes from soldiers and administrative personnel significantly ate into the profitability of regional trade. This was a problem throughout Côte d'Ivoire (See Chelpi-den Hamer 2010; McGovern 2011; Bassett 2011b); particularly in the rebel-held North where levels of bribery and corruption increased because of the series of checkpoints erected by FN soldiers throughout the north-south axis connecting Ouangolodougou to Abidjan. Finally, the federation and in particular its President, Issaka Sawadago, showed delegates from other member states that the problems created by the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire were not insurmountable. As President of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Sawadago played an important diplomatic role for other traders and the organization's member states (USAID ATP 2010b, 24-29).

COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA's relationship with the FN was central to its ability to facilitate trans-border trade. As indicated above, bribery at rebel checkpoints remained an ongoing impediment to trade. However, there is some evidence suggesting that bribes paid to FN soldiers declined over time (Trader, Ouangolodougou, December 16th, 2010; Trader, Ouangolodougou, December 25th, 2010). An important reason for this was the good working relationship between the rebels and COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. It required that certain 'guarantees' be made by each side. As president of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, Sawadogo

played a central role in the foundation and maintenance of this working relationship. In the end, the rebels committed to lower rates of taxation for shipping across Northern Côte d'Ivoire and agreed to control bribery along the major north-south axis between Abidjan and Ouangolodougou. For their part, the federation assured the FN that their trucks would not be used to ship arms to the Gbagbo government in the South. As long as this promise was upheld, the FN would do its part to ensure the accessibility of these trade networks. Indeed, it had a vested interest in ensuring the growth of north-south trade given the large sum of tax revenue it generated. As was explained to me, Sawadogo operated as the key broker between the Ouangolo's trading community, the FN and the Ivoirian government in efforts to maintain trade routes potentially threatened by the political crisis (interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 16.12. 2010; interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 25.12. 2010).

Belonging and Conflict in Ouangolodougou: National-Local Connections

Much of Sawadogo's popularity in Ouangolodougou among the town's trading community stemmed from the support he gave to immigrant communities based in Côte d'Ivoire, specifically those from Mali and Burkina Faso. Sawadogo's popularity among other traders goes far in explaining why he emerged as the principal intermediary between the FN and this group. His role as broker during the conflict only reinforced the support he received from Ouangolo's traders because of the threats the nativist policies of the Gbagbo government posed to this group. Overall, the experience of Ouangolo's traders bears a striking resemblance to that of migrants living in other parts of Côte d'Ivoire during the crisis period. In interviews, traders repeatedly showed their keen awareness of their precarious position as 'immigrants' to Ouangolo, no matter how long ago they had established themselves on the Ivoirian side of the border (for many, this was a period of 30+ years). Sawadogo's status as a wealthy trader and as a privileged partner working with the FN as well as the Ivoirian government in the South made him a valuable ally for many of the non-Ivoirian traders based in Ouangolodougou. Yet, Sawadogo's own contested status as an Ivoirian citizen also put obvious restrictions on his ability to directly 'represent' this group vis-à-vis the emergent post-conflict state. Indeed, questions surrounding Sawadogo's citizenship underlay criticisms of his leadership of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA that emerged during the later stages of the conflict.

For some time, Sawadogo has been widely viewed as the principal defender of the Burkinabé and Malian trader population in Ouangolodougou. One of the organizations formed by Sawadogo, the *Coopérative agricole Djiguiya de Ouangolodougou* (CADO), was created directly in response to the marginalization of ethnic strangers living in this part of the North. Sawadogo intervened in December 2000 when a cooperative of cotton producers refused to pay what was owed to some of its members because of their Burkinabè and Malian origins. This was soon after Laurent Gbagbo's contested electoral victory, when politicized resentment against foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire was at its peak. Sawadogo fought this 'flagrant injustice' and worked to ensure that these farmers were paid what they deserved (Rouamba 2006). In just a few years, CADO's profits grew as it attracted an increasing number of farmers looking to mitigate the effects of the divisive politics employed by some politicians during this period. For such acts, Sawadogo has earned the nickname "*le chef du Nord*" (Rouamba 2006).

Anti-immigrant attacks during the conflict period reinforced relationships between Sawadogo and Burkinabè and Malian traders in Ouangolo. Indeed, for all the problems associated with the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire listed above, one silver lining for the traders based in Ouangolodougou was that the administrative system installed by the rebels effectively shielded them from Ivoirian citizenship requirements and government demands for proper identification. Indeed, uncertainty over the outcome of the political crisis given Gbagbo's continued reluctance to hold elections and give up power since 2000 meant that issues linked to citizenship and belonging remained ongoing concerns for many of Malian and Burkinabè traders based in Ouangolodougou.

Overall, narrow definitions of Ivoirian citizenship supported by some national-level political actors posed an equally credible threat to traders based in different parts of the north. Sawadogo and the rest of Ouangolo's traders became the targets of state intervention (attempts to regain fiscal control over the border, enforcement of Ivoirian citizenship) during the conflict period. The susceptibility of 'strangers' to state-led attacks on non-Ivoirians was shaped by who these actors could potentially ally with to shore up their own position locally. The previous chapter showed how the Dyula community in Korhogo aligned themselves with different segments of the ruling elite, the Coulibaly family, throughout the post-colonial period. Strong ties remained between some segments of the Senoufo elite (Kassoum Coulibaly) and the Dyula

population in Korhogo during the political crisis. These relationships shielded traders from the worst of the discrimination resulting from the debates over citizenship and belonging that remained at the heart of the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. In Ouangolodougou, however, the absence of an equivalent set of 'indigenous' elites rendered impossible the emergence of similar set of coalitional arrangements. Despite the legitimacy bestowed on Sawadogo by many in Ouangolodougou, he was by no means immune to attacks regarding his status as an Ivoirian citizen. As the final two sections of this chapter will explain, the susceptibility of Sawadogo to these kinds of attacks ultimately strengthened the political position of actors tied to the FN in Ouangolodougou. Despite the authority Sawadogo wielded as leader of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, his status as a non-Ivoirian severely restricted his ability to broker the relationship between Ouangolo and Abidjan in formal political life. I suggest later that this provided more space – than in either Korhogo or Bouna – for the rebels to fill this role.

During the course of the political-crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, Sawadago's growing control over the marketing of livestock was challenged by others. Objections over what was perceived to be his 'dictatorial' or single-handed control over COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA came from a number of sources. First, as indicated previously, complaints grew over the extent to which Sawadogo was using his positions of authority – as both the president of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA and as one of the key arbiters of the livestock regulatory system – to manage the trade in livestock for his own benefit and at the expense of the majority of the federation's members. Critics noted that, of the total per truck cost of shipping livestock, roughly 642,000 CFA, only 35,000 CFA went to the state as tax revenue.[84] Critics felt that Sawadogo was appropriating a disproportionate share for himself. Others felt that COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA also used its position as an intermediary between the rebels and the state to inflate shipping costs via rail. A train wagon containing livestock was charged only 333,333 CFA by the Ivoirian parastatal *Sitarail* (an organization with which Sawadogo also has close links). However, traders were forced to pay 800,000 CFA, with the lion's share of the difference going to COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. Overall, the steepness of this cut has garnered criticism from other actors involved in the livestock commodity chain, including traders, slaughterhouses, state actors, as well as other

[84] At the time of my field work (2010-2011), $1USD equaled roughly 500CFA.

executive members of the federation. Another important part of this story was the fact that, at the time that COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA was formed, Côte d'Ivoire itself did not have a national regulatory body charged with managing the marketing of livestock (Zabril 2008). Given its status as a regional organization, the privileged role of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA in the setting of livestock prices as well as its growing control over many other aspects of livestock marketing represented a significant threat to national livestock interests. Indeed, the very creation of the *Fédération nationale des coopératives, associations et societies de la filière bétail viande de Côte d'Ivoire* (FENACOFB-CI) represented an attempt led by 'Ivoirian' traders to loosen Sawadogo's grip over livestock marketing in Côte d'Ivoire (Coulibaly 2010). Sawadogo substantiated the perception of COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA as threat to national livestock interests in Côte d'Ivoire when, in reaction, he attempted to create a rival national organization under his control (Ba 2010; Bakayoko 2010).

Ultimately, however, Sawadogo's efforts to consolidate his control over the livestock trade in Côte d'Ivoire were limited by his own contested status as an Ivoirian citizen. In early 2010, Ivoirian police picked up Sawadogo in the Abidjan neighbourhood of Yopougon on charges of identity fraud. The problem stemmed from the fact that Sawadogo was found carrying two national identity cards that had conflicting information surrounding his place of birth as well as his birth parents.[85] Sawadogo's rivals seized upon this incident and used it to limit the growing authority over the regulation of the trade in livestock in Côte d'Ivoire enjoyed by COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. During a February 2010 meeting in the Abidjan suburb of Adjame, the President and Vice-President of FENACOFB-CI, Koné Vafing and Charles Kossonou, publically denounced Sawadogo's ability to credibly represent the interests of Côte d'Ivoire in COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA, stating that "Issaka Sawadogo was called out for nationality fraud. He was holding two pieces of identity. He can no longer represent Côte d'Ivoire within the confederation as a result of his questionable nationality" (Ba 2010). Ultimately, attacks on Sawadogo's status as an Ivoirian citizen represented part of a larger strategy of undercutting the

[85] One card was from Côte d'Ivoire and the other from Burkina Faso. The Ivoirian card claimed that Sawadogo was born on November 26th, 1961 in Kong (Côte d'Ivoire), to his father Sawadogo Tongolo (born January 1st, 1912), and mother, Ouattara Tongolo (born January 1st, 1931). In contrast, the Bukinabè card stated that Sawadogo was born on April 6th, 1961 in Zongo (Burkina Faso), to the same father as indicated in the Ivoirian nationality card, but to a different mother, Sawadogo Sommanagré (Depry 2010).

existing authority over taxation and price-setting held by Sawadogo and COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA and shifting these powers under the authority of the 'legitimate' national organization, the FENACOFB-CI (Ba 2010).

Taxation, Authority and Political Contestation in Post-OPA Ouangolodougou

As migrants, many Ouangolodougou-based traders were fully aware of the precariousness of their local position as a result of government efforts to restrict Ivoirian citizenship during the crisis period even while under the administrative control of the FN. The common self-reference of traders as 'strangers' evoked the insecurity felt about their future in Ouangolodougou (interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 16.12.2010). Traders expressed concerns over everyday state practices such as the enforcement of national identity requirements and procurement of taxes at pre-conflict rates. The threatened citizenship of Ouangolo's traders, including Sawadogo himself, shaped the post-OPA political transition in this part of the North in two interrelated ways. The first feature of the political transition in Ouangolodougou that stands out was the relatively broad support the FN received, particularly from the traders. In Ouangolo (as elsewhere in Northern Côte d'Ivoire), the OPA prompted efforts by public officials to shift authority over taxation from the rebel administration to state agencies. However, the FN, Sawadogo and the rest of the Ouangolo's traders collectively resisted the renewal of the authority of the state because these actors were all threatened by the exclusionary politics promoted by the Gbagbo government during the crisis period. Second, and relatedly, the relationship between the FN and the mayors' office was far more antagonistic here than in the previously discussed cases of Bouna and Korhogo. In Korhogo, the winner of the 2013 mayoral elections, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, was a member of the local faction that had supported the zone commander Fofié Martin during the conflict. In Bouna, we saw how the local branch of the FN actually sought to shift some authority over local taxation back to the mayors' office in order to buttress the legitimacy of the rebels.[86] In Ouangolo, we see quite the opposite; the local arm of the FN expressed a genuine mistrust of the mayor's office up until the terminal stages of the conflict.

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[86] In order to re-legitimize the movement, the FN's strategies for reform in Bouna went two ways. On the one hand, the central organizers of the rebellion aimed to shift authority away from the military wing of the movement, the *Com'zone* headed by Morou Ouattara, by investing the power to tax in the hands of agents of *La Centrale.* In this way, these reforms heightened the control of the movement over local taxation (although the locus of authority

By 2010, Ouangolo still struggled with many of the administrative challenges confronted by other northern towns. Being cut off from the central government for the better part of the decade seriously restricted the ability of local political institutions – namely the mayor's office, the prefecture and sub-prefecture – to perform even the most day-to-day administrative tasks. One particularly irksome and illustrative problem was the rather large piles of garbage that were a common sight throughout the city at this time. In 2008, a number of prominent political actors in the city, including members of the mayor's office, the *conseil municipaux*, and a number of traditional chiefs, finally confronted the local FN administration and complained about the declining state of the city since the rebels had assumed control over it.

The sequence of events that followed illustrates well the alliances that had formed during the conflict between the FN and local traders, who were largely of Burkinabé or Malian in origin. Following the complaint filed by a number of prominent actors in the city, Fofié Martin, the *commandant de zone* in zone 10, agreed to come from his base in Korhogo to Ouangolodougou and listen to their concerns. Fofié Martin took some pride in the quality of governance provided throughout the zone under his control (interview, FN member, Korhogo, 4.1.2011). He travelled to Ouangolodougou to "make an example" of what *should* be done in terms of rebel governance, in light of criticisms directed against the local FN administration by Ouangolo residents (interview, FN member, Korhogo, 4.1.2011). After the meeting between Martin, members of the mayoral office and a number of other prominent political actors in Ouangolodougou, it was agreed that the mayor should re-establish control over certain tax bases in the city, particularly the local market. Soon after, however, many traders in Ouangolodougou were up in arms regarding this shift in authority over local-level taxation. In reasserting its authority over the taxation of the local market, the mayor's office provoked outrage from many local traders in two distinct ways. First, the mayor sought to collect back payments for the years that resident traders were paying taxes not to the mayor's office but to the FN. Second, the tax rate the mayor's office enforced were equivalent to pre-conflict (pre-2002) tax rates and were far higher than those established by the FN and what traders were accustomed to paying for the better part of the conflict (interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 16.12.2010). Together, these aspects of the tax

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shifted from one administrative wing to the other). However, as the chapter 4 explains, the FN also outright ceded some authority to tax in Bouna to the mayor's office in order to buttress the dwindling legitimacy of the movement.

demands seriously delegitimized the claims made by the mayor in the eyes of many Ouangolodougou based traders. The following quotes, one from a trader and another from a member of the mayor's office based in Ouangolodougou, reflect these sentiments:

> Because the mayor came, and he said to the FN that before, the traders worked with the mayor, it was us who paid the taxes to the mayor. But right now, we don't get anything from this [from working with the mayor]. There was some dialogue between the FN and the mayor, that they would continue to control the border, etc. and the mayor would begin to tax the traders at the market, all the small merchants. He says that the stores that are there now, when he went there, for all of the past year, all of the merchants have to pay. The merchants responded by saying 'what do we get'? They get nothing! (interview, trader, Ouangolodougou, 16.12.2012).

> In 2007, there were steps taken by the FN that would allow the mayor's office to function. However, despite all this, we had taxes that needed to be paid, over the market, over the buildings in the market provided by the mayor's office, and the taxes for the slaughterhouse. Sadly however, there were business people who, for them, it was more advantageous to have the FN in power because they were not yet ready to pay taxes, and submit to the taxes issued by the mayor (interview, member of the mayor's office, Ouangolodougou, 12.12. 2010).

Not surprisingly, traders immediately called for the FN to re-intervene. This time, the FN sent the *Delegate Generale* based in Korhogo, Soro Kanigui Mamadou, to calm tensions between the traders and mayor's office in Ouangolodougou. Ultimately, the FN retracted its original decision for the mayor to reassume authority over taxation, siding with the traders in this local-level conflict (interview, member of the mayor's office, Ouangolodougou, 12.12.2010; interview, FN member, Korhogo, 4.1.2011).

The obvious effect of the FN's decision was to marginalize the influence of the mayor over the collection of taxes in Ouangolodougou. The mayor himself told me that:

> This is reality. Me, I am the mayor. But I have practically no authority over the population since the presence of the FN. I was saying that with the taxes, me when I speak with the populations they simply don't listen. At the market, when I go and speak to the people at the market and say 'that you have to pay,' they don't listen (interview, member of the mayor's office, Ouangolodougou, 12.12.2010).

Another important part of this story, however, was the position taken by the FN towards the institution of the mayor's office towards the end of the conflict. In contrast to the other cases of local FN administration in Bouna and Korhogo, in Ouangolo, the local FN administration remained suspicious of the mayor's office during the post-OPA period. Below is a segment of the conversation I had with the highest-ranking FN administrator in Ouangolo in 2010.

> JS: Can you explain to me your relationship with the mayor?
>
> FN: OK OK, in terms of our relationship with the mayor, we don't work together. However, it must be said that after the political crisis began the mayor's office ceased to function. Thus the mayor's office was not functioning; there were some mayors in other zones who did return. But in terms of the different taxes, it must be said at the level of mayor, in terms of the theme of taxes, when we finish working, the money will pour in as taxes. We can't let the mayor do his work because he is going to send his money where? We can't work, at the moment that the country is divided in two; we can't let the mayor send the money to the other government. Thus, at this time, the mayor's office is not functioning…
>
> JS: Others have informed me about a conflict that occurred between the FN, the mayor, and the *commerçants* in Ouangolodougou. Can you explain this conflict to me?
>
> FN: OK, in fact, the problem is simple. As I was saying earlier, when the FN administratively installed themselves in Ouangolodougou, we assumed control over the administration of taxes. As I was saying, we could not let the mayor function because he could send the money back to the other side. As a result, we took the situation into our own hands, to allow our administration to function. Let me give you an example. One store under the authority of the mayor would pay a monthly tax of 20,000CFA. However, when the FN arrived we said no! The mayor cannot work and then share information with Abidjan, and send money back to Abidjan. Also, we didn't take the same amount of money as the mayor from the stores, instead of 20,000CFA; it's now 10,000CFA, and it is this 10,000CFA that allows the FN to function (interview, FN administrator, Ouangolodougou, 7.12.2010).

Just as in Bouna, political conflict during the post-OPA period in Ouangolo revolved centrally around the issue of taxation. However, the coalitions underpinning these struggles differed in these cases. In Bouna, I argued that the fusion of the authority of the authority of Lobi elite and the state pitted the FN and the Lobi community against each other. The specific position of Lobi politicians such as Palé Dimaté, as brokers, structured conflicts over authority in Bouna as being principally between the rebels and some of the city's most prominent political and economic actors. Because the FN's principal allies in Bouna, the Koulongo, lacked comparable levels of political clout, the FN ceded some powers over taxation to the mayor's office towards the end of the conflict in order to renew the legitimacy of the rebellion. Events played themselves

out differently in Ouangolo where shared opposition to the state formed the basis of the alliance between the traders and the FN.

Ouangolodougou's Rebel-Trader Alliance and the Incipient Post-Conflict Order

The FN in Ouangolo mobilized comparatively high levels of support. Ouangolo differed from Bouna, where the FN was viewed with some suspicion up until the end of the conflict by a large segment of the population, specifically the Lobi community. There are more similarities between the Ouangolo and Korhogo cases. The social control of the FN in Korhogo was enhanced by the wartime alliance formed between the FN's *commandant de zone* Fofié Martin and the conservative faction of the long ruling Coulibaly family. The coalition between Martin and this faction of the Senoufo elite was demonstrated at different points of the conflict, especially during the debates over chiefly succession after the death of Drissa Coulibaly in 2008. Support was also evident after the appointment of Fofié Martin by Alassane Ouattara as the head of the military company (*Compagnie territoriale*) in 2011.[87] In Ouangolo, like in Korhogo, there is some, albeit mixed evidence illustrating the support received by the local FN after the removal of Laurent Gbagbo in 2011. Like in the pre-conflict period, Senoufo elites in Korhogo occupied most of the prominent political positions after the conflict. The resounding success of Amadou Gon Coulibaly in the 2013 mayoral elections suggests continuity rather than change. In Ouangolo, the rebels arguably played a more prominent role in the incipient post-conflict order given the precarious position of the intermediaries on which the northern rebellion itself depended for support.

After the removal of Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, actors directly involved in reconstituting the authority of state institutions in Ouangolo (such as the mayor's offices and customs offices) quickly sought to re-establish control over economic activity running across the

[87] Although Martin was appointed by Ouattara, there are two reasons why one might infer a relationship between this appointment and local-level support mobilized by Martin during the conflict. First, chapter 5 presented some evidence suggesting that during the conflict period, local interests and alliances informed the decision made by FN leadership to appoint Fofié Martin as zone commander in the first place. FN leader Guillaume Soro bent to the opinion of the then Korhogo Cantonal Chief, Drissa Coulibaly, in making this decision. Thus, there is some precedent showing how local interests influence national decisions regarding local-level appointments. Second, as also discussed in chapter 5, there were a number of prominent Senoufo elites in the RDR led by Alassane Ouattara. This could have influenced the decision to appointment Martin to this position as well.

Ivoirian, Malian and Burkinabe borders. Government administrators recognized the importance of currying the favor of traders hesitant to work with the state apparatus, which has long been the object of some suspicion. In July 2011, three months after the removal of Laurent Gbagbo, the new Ivoirian government appointed Fofana Bhouakeye as the head of the customs office in Ouangolo. In an interview conducted with *Nouveau Réveil*, Bhouakeye explains his efforts to target the traders as a strategy for implementing the new regulatory order enforced by the state:

> It is true that the people (in Ouangolodougou) had spread the rumour that we were going to tax them. Thus, most of trucks did not cross. As a result, I tried to make contacts with certain members of the network of traders. And after this, there were a number of them who began to come timidly. The problem that was posed was when we told them that it has to be our regulations over the border that need to be applied. I examined their existing tax payment schedule. And I tried to align ours with theirs. On this basis, and the calculations I made, this permitted many of the traders to return. It has to be said that, today, things are going well (Sory, Konan, and Touré 2012).

This passage highlights some level of suspicion within the trading community in Ouangolo over efforts at state reconstruction, even after the removal of former President Laurent Gbagbo in early 2011. Not surprisingly, former members of the FN organized resistance to state efforts at regaining control over border flows. After Bhouakeye's appointment, the former rebels expressed some hesitation about giving up their position at the border. As a result, tensions and threats of violence ran high. The strategy employed by Bhouakeye to re-establish the presence of the state in the border regions was influenced by the high levels of support garnered by the rebels in Ouangolo, particularly in terms of their relationship with the cross-border traders. He explains that:

> After I saw the demobilized soldiers dragging their feet, I said to myself that I can't leave them angered, fearing an attack on our position one day. There were certain individuals that I saw, and those who would shoot into the air, and I said to them that they could function as an intermediary between the traders and us. So they began to work as lobbyists. So if you had let's say 50.000CFA's, this would allow you to leave with it. Thus, they began to work as lobbyists for us. As they came to work for us, we made day to day evaluations. Sometimes they were given 50 or 100CFA's by the traders which would allow the trucks to go through the border quickly, this was good for them. And they were happy. Thus when others (other FN members) would bring actions against us, they began to oppose it (quoted in Sory, Konan and Touré 2012).

The comparison with Bouna is again instructive here. In Bouna, the FN intentionally restricted the movement's authority over taxation, by granting some authority over taxation back to the

mayor's office, in order to preserve the legitimacy of the rebellion in the post-OPA period. In contrast, in Ouangolo the state itself built upon the FN's legitimacy as a strategy for post-conflict reconstruction by drawing on their already established relationship with the town's community of traders.

In contrast to both Bouna and Korhogo, support was shown to the FN at the polls during the 2013 mayor elections. Conversations with FN members, traders and local politicians in Ouangolodougou revealed that one high-ranking FN member, Kanté Ibrahima, planned to challenge the incumbent mayor in the next round of municipal and regional elections (which were eventually held in April 2013). That a high ranking member of the FN would even consider running as a candidate for mayor itself speaks to the level of support garnered by the FN, as well as the political opportunities present for rebel leaders in Ouangolodougou, compared to Bouna and Korhogo. For very different reasons, the very idea of a FN member running for mayor in either Bouna or Korhogo is rather farfetched. In Bouna, any candidate formerly tied to the FN would face insurmountable challenges mobilizing support, particularly from the region's majority Lobi population.[88] In Korhogo, it is difficult to foresee an actor or group (including former FN members) displacing the Coulibaly family as the principal representatives of the Senoufo heartland around the city. In Ouangolo, the coalition formed between the city's community of traders and the FN created opportunities for the political advancement of former FN members because (a) of the high levels of support they received from the traders and (b) because the most prominent of the FN's backers, Issaka Sawadogo could not run for political office himself.

After the removal of Gbagbo, a window of opportunity opened up for Kanté Ibrahima when Ouangolo's incumbent mayor, Ouattara Nagnin, passed away in November 2011 (AIP 2011). Kanté himself was well respected in the city. He was the head of finances for the FN for the border region surrounding Ouangolodougou (including Koronani, Nielle, and Kaouara). Kanté had fought for the FN in the early days of the conflict and helped purge Liberian fighters from the movement in 2003. He proudly displayed a photograph of himself with the Kalashnikov assault rifle he used out west in the living room of his home (many residents of Ouangolodougou refer to him simply as *'le soldat'*). He housed a number of younger men and their small families,

[88] In chapter 4, I suggested that Marou Ouattara's decision not pursue a political position in Bouna after the termination of the conflict reflected an acknowledgement that the FN was not very popular in the region.

many of whom had joined the FN as either soldiers or financial agents working at the border. Although he is from Korhogo, Kanté worked for the RDR in Ouangolodougou before the conflict. He was also the second in charge of Alassane Ouattara's 2010 presidential campaign in Ouangolodougou. Although Kanté did not win the 2013 elections, the results certainly testified to his popularity, as well as the political changes that occurred during the conflict period. Kanté eventually ran as an independent and finished second in the election, behind another independent, Toungara Moussa. Moussa was himself a Ouangolo-based trader born in Ouangolo. Like Kanté Ibrahima, Moussa had close ties to Sawadogo. During Moussa's inauguration speech, he was backed and celebrated by Sawadogo as "one of the great sons of Ouangolo, a builder, an altruist, and a great businessman who employs more than 300 young people in the commune through his businesses" (Traore 2014).

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Name	Party	Votes	Percentage
Toungara Moussa	Independent	2,407	46.39
Kante Ibrahima	Independent	1,392	26.83
Ouattara Tiekorobagnouma	RDR	1,320	25.44
Ouattara Drissa	PDCI	70	1.35

Table 6.1 : Municipal Election Outcomes : Ouangolodougou 2013. Source: http://www.abidjan.net/ELECTIONS/municipales/2013/.

Admittedly, the outcome of the 2013 municipal elections in Ouangolo raise more questions than it answers. As a prominent member of Ouangolo's trading community (albeit one with Ivoirian citizenship), Toungara Moussa's victory does support this chapter's claim that the state lacked, and still lacks, any social base in Ouangolo. The RDR, a party that garnered massive support throughout the North (including Ouangolo) during the 2010-2011 Presidential elections, finished a disappointing third in the mayoral elections. The 2013 mayoral election results suggest that the traders did not uniformly support a single candidate (either a trader or a former FN member). This indicates there were significant divisions within this community that were not addressed by this chapter. For example, there may be divisions amongst the traders according to country of origin (as discussed above, most of the non-Ivoirian traders are from Mali or Burkina Faso) or

even between traders according to citizenship (from Côte d'Ivoire or elsewhere). Important questions stemming from these voting patterns remain. They will be reserved for future research.

Conclusions

This chapter argued that the hierarchical configurations confronted by the FN in Ouangolo created significant opportunities for the FN to build support and establish political control. In contrast to the other cases, the political power of pre-conflict brokers was comparatively limited in Ouangolo. Not unlike migrants in other parts of Côte d'Ivoire, migrant traders in Ouangolo maintained a positive relationship with the state. The PDCI encouraged migration and drew support from migrant communities in Côte d'Ivoire. Infrastructural investments in the city added to the attractiveness of Ouangolo as a strategic node in West African trade. The largely positive relationship between the state and Ouangolo's traders soured over the course of 1990s, after Côte d'Ivoire's transition to multiparty politics, as political attacks on the citizenship of migrants increased. The shift to exclusionary politics in Côte d'Ivoire left the state without a powerful political ally in Ouangolo. Consequently, the state was forced to rely on political actors who did not have strong ties to Ouangolo's traders and lacked an independent social base of its own.

Sawadogo and other traders based in Ouangolo were able to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the state during the conflict period because their authority emerged autonomously from their relationship to political networks based in Abidjan. As in Ouangolo, Lobi elites in Bouna drew support from a community of migrants that benefitted from their demographic and economic dominance. However, unlike in Ouangolo, the status of the Lobi community in Bouna was reinforced by the support they received from national-level elites under the rule of the old single party, the PDCI. In Korhogo, the authority of local elites was recognized and ultimately absorbed into the local party-state constructed by the PDCI and subsequently the RDR over the course of the post-colonial period.

Although Issaka Sawadogo – who is arguably the most prominent member of Ouangolo's Malian and Burkinabé trading community – has had a long history as a cross-border trader, the chapter suggests that his authority rapidly expanded as a result of the 2002 civil war. In 2004, Sawadogo became the president of the *Confédération des Fédérations des Filières Bétail Viandes des Pays Membres de l'UEMOA* (COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA). Indeed, COFENABVI-PAM-

UEMOA emerged largely in response to the challenges to trans-border trade posed by the conflict. As its president, Sawadogo's regulatory authority over pricing and taxation increased. As the principal interlocutor between Ouangolo's traders and the rebels, this subsequently strengthened the FN's political control over the city. While the authority of pre-conflict elites discussed in the two previous chapters either declined (as the case of Palé Dimaté in Bouna) or proved resilient to the national-level changes precipitated by the conflict (as in the case of pro-chiefly faction of the Coulibaly family in Korhogo), the conflict expanded and entrenched Sawadogo's authority in Ouangolo. Sawadogo's heightened influence during the conflict developed despite the fact that he became the target of state efforts to curb his political authority. In different ways, the state worked hard to prop up the authority of Lobi elites in Bouna, as well as their Senoufo counterparts in Korhogo. In contrast, efforts by the Ivoirian state (particularly during the transitional phase of the conflict after the signing of the OPA) to tax traders and enforce national citizenship laws were seen to directly target the interests of Sawadogo as well as the larger community of Ouangolo based traders.

Overall, the hierarchical configuration in Ouangolo shaped rebel control in two interrelated ways. First, not surprisingly, the FN and Ouangolo's traders emerged as allies during the conflict. Traders benefitted from the new political order established by the rebels. Tax rates were seen to be lower than during the pre-conflict era. And given that most of the traders in Ouangolo were from Mali and Burkina Faso and were not Ivoirian citizens, the presence of the FN also shielded this group from the enforcement of national citizenship. For the rebels, encouraging trade across Côte d'Ivoire's northern border, as well as the *de facto* border separating the North from the government controlled South, was important for financing and sustaining the rebellion. Taxes derived from regional trade fed the FN's coffers. To this end, the rebels sought support from Ouangolo's trading community.

Second, given this alliance, conflicts over authority in Ouangolo were waged to restrict the power of the mayor's office over local taxation. In Korhogo, the fusion of the state and the social power of the Coulibaly family drastically restricted the conflicts between the rebels and the state. Instead, the principal conflict was between competing elite factions. In Bouna, the declining legitimacy of the rebels resulted in efforts to re-establish the authority of the mayor's office over the taxation of the local market. The exact opposite was the case in Ouangolo. Reservations about

the tax rate to be imposed on the traders and what the mayor might do with the resources gave both the rebels and the traders ample reason to block efforts to reassert the mayor's authority over local-level taxation after the signing of the OPA. Overall, the post-OPA political transition presented greater opportunities for the FN to mobilize support than in Bouna or Korhogo, largely because Ouangolo's foreign traders could not legitimately assume public office (either as elected officials or government administrators) given their status as non-Ivoirian citizens. This chapter suggests that this limitation of Sawadogo's authority is one reason why some FN members were able to play prominent roles within the emergent post-conflict order.

PART III

Chapter 7. Conclusions

Since the end of the Cold War, scholarship has grappled with the larger meaning of the kinds of violent and non-violent political contestations described in this dissertation. In some pockets of Sub-Saharan Africa – in the Great Lakes Region (Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda), West Africa, and the Horn – the declining capacity and legitimacy of post-colonial states has given way to decentralized forms of governance involving a host of different actors (Young 2004, 43-46). Rebel movements have commonly played prominent roles in these systems of what Achille Mbembe (2002) refers to as "private indirect governance." What are the larger meanings of these transformations?[89] Does civil war and rebellion signify an end point of a process of long-term political decay? Or, despite the violence commonly associated with these transitions, do they represent the development of an alternative, more legitimate post-colonial order? Are they, as Niemann writes (2007, 23), representative of "the painful and difficult efforts of developing a new form of political community from the shards of a repressive colonial state"? By no means does this project offer definitive answers to such 'big' questions. However, by looking at these processes through a comparative lens, it points to conditions under which we might expect organized violence to produce different, and more or less legitimate forms of political order in its wake.

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[89] I am not implying that civil war has been a problem for all Sub-Saharan countries or that this problem is increasing over time. Evidence shows that there was an increase in the number of civil wars immediately after the end of the Cold War, but the number of civil wars occurring across the continent has declined steadily since then (Straus 2012, 6). My point is that where civil war has occurred, organized violence can function as an important 'critical juncture', potentially propelling significant political change (Wood 2008).

Given that local communities often feature competing groups of elites, this dissertation began with a straightforward question: what explains the coalitional choices rebels make in the zones under their control? Questions about local coalition formation in armed conflict are important because coalitional choices influence the extent to which armed movements are able to control politically the civilian populations they govern. In each of the localities examined in this dissertation, whether the political order imposed by rebels on local communities was broadly supported or conversely, met with stiff resistance depended on the alliances that formed between local rebel leadership and pre-conflict elites.

My argument explains coalition-building and levels of rebel control in two steps. First, coalition-building is shaped by whether local elites acted as brokers between the state and local communities before the onset of the political conflict. Brokers are elite actors that bridge local communities with national-level political networks. I argue that where elites function as brokers during the pre-conflict period, they are less likely to ally with armed movements. Coalitions are less likely to form between pre-conflict brokers and rebel leadership because (a) the political position of brokers is likely to be threatened by the presence of the rebels and (b) because they are more likely to be viewed with some suspicion by rebel leaders, as result of their proximity to the pre-conflict state. Second, I argue that the distribution of political power between state brokers and rebel allies shapes rebel control. I describe differences in these distributions in terms of what I call 'hierarchical configurations'. Hierarchical configurations refer to the relative extent to which rebel ally and broker groups are organized hierarchically. Organizational differences shape the political influence of different sets of elites. Put together, brokerage influences whether rebels ally with strong or weak allies relative to their broker counterparts. Where rebel allies are weak, they should confront serious obstacles to mobilizing support and controlling local populations. Where rebel allies are stronger, systems of rebel governance should confront less resistance.

In making this argument, this dissertation complements dominant explanations of civilian support for armed movements and political order in civil war. The literature on rebel-civilian relations offers two kinds of explanations for variation in civilian support for armed movements. Structural explanations focus on the conditions under which civilians are most likely to support or join rebellion (Johnson 1964; Huntington 1968; Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Ranger 1985).

Agency-centric perspectives focus on the choices available to civilian populations in violent conflict (Arjona 2008; Baines and Paddon 2012; Barter 2012). The empirical material presented in the case chapters challenge these perspectives because some level of conflict *and* cooperation between rebels and civilians was always present. Neither of these approaches explains why, within the same local arena, certain groups and actors ally with armed movements and others resist.

Another stream of research focuses on the relationship between group behavior and civilian support and explains why groups pursue more or less effective mobilization strategies. This literature identifies sets of exogenous factors (the availability of material resources, conflict dynamics, and the pre-conflict relationship between the organizers of rebellion to the state) that shape the kinds of strategies armed groups employ vis-à-vis civilian populations (Reno 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Metelits 2010). Much of this research focuses on questions regarding the use of violence. This body of research asks, under what conditions do armed movements employ violence indiscriminately and when do they show more restraint? Others look instead at mobilization and legitimizing strategies from a broader perspective, in terms of whether armed movements provide public goods (education, health care, etc.). These studies argue that the more armed movements can control the use of violence or legitimize this violence through the provision of public goods or the use of different ideological or discursive appeals, the more support these groups are likely to receive. The level of support received is thought to be a direct product of the strategies employed by these groups. A focus on the group-wide mobilizational strategies employed by armed groups offers a useful starting point in examining the variation observed in this dissertation; however any explanation rooted solely in these aspects of rebel behavior remains partial. In the cases included in this dissertation, whether or not groups limited the use of violence and economic predation represented an imperfect predictor of the kinds of relationships that emerged between the rebels and those communities. This study shows that social control stems not only from these features of armed group behavior, but also from the coalitions established between rebel leaders and local elites during the course of armed conflict.

Summary of Findings

What explains coalition formation between rebel leaders and local elites? How do coalitional choices influence the ability of armed movements to establish social control in particular localities? Under what conditions were local rebel leaders able to gain some support for their wartime authority? This dissertation responds to these questions by focusing on variation in the political authority of the pre-conflict elites and the relationship of these actors to the state.

There are two justifications for focusing on the impact of pre-conflict elites on these wartime processes. First, as others have noted, for both leaders and recruits of armed movements, attacking local social and political hierarchies often represents an important motivation for participation in rebellion in the first place (Chauveau and Richards 2008, 533; Englebert 2009, 168; McGovern 2011, 55; Peters 2011, 88). This is especially the case across instances of armed conflict in Africa, where local struggles are often couched in generational terms. Armed conflict represents a means by which juniors can escape the authority of senior community members, who commonly enforce and manipulate rules governing land, women and the labor power of young men to their own advantage. And as Englebert (2009, 168) has argued, armed conflicts create opportunities for leaders of armed movements to replace existing elites as local intermediaries with the central state.

The second justification for focusing on pre-conflict local elites is that these actors often represent significant strategic allies in enforcing political order. Herein lies the tension confronting many African rebellions. Even as armed movements in Africa represent significant challenges to existing hierarchies at the local level, rebel leaders also rely on these social structures as they seek to govern civilian populations. More often than not, across comparative cases of rebellion in Africa, old elites retain their authority over diverse issue areas after civil war onset and the establishment of rebel held zones. This study aimed to unpack this apparent contradiction by showing how brokerage relations and hierarchical configurations result in distinct and predictable patterns of conflict and cooperation between local leaders of armed movements and pre-conflict elites.

How do coalitions influence control? My explanation calls attention to the distribution of political authority across pre-conflict elites within local communities. I argue that elites derive their authority from hierarchical social relationships, or whether authority and material resources

are concentrated in the hands of a few. Hierarchical configurations refer to the relative levels of social hierarchy of elite groups within a given locality. My framework outlines four possible configurations based on the social organization of brokers and rebel allies. I label these configurations: *low social control*, *moderate social control*, *high social control* and *absence of local elites* (see Fig. 7.1). The case chapters examined the first three of these ideal type scenarios, for which my framework predicts high, moderate, and low social control. The fourth scenario predicts an absence of rebel-pre-conflict elite interaction and was not examined in this dissertation. Did the evidence presented correspond to the expectations laid out in my theoretical framework? I consider each step of the argument in turn.

Social hierarchy of pre-conflict state brokers	**Social hierarchy of rebel allies (non-brokers)**	
	High	Low
High	*Moderate social control*. Indirect resistance against rebels. Ongoing factional conflict between pre-conflict elites. **Korhogo**	*Low social control*. Substantial resistance against rebels. **Bouna**
Low	*High social control*. Limited or weak resistance against rebels. **Ouangolodougou**	*Absence of local elites.* Absence of indigenous elite and limited state presence.

Table. 7.1: Levels of Social Control

Brokerage Relations and Coalition Formation

The case chapters presented convincing evidence supporting the causal relationship between brokerage relationships and coalition-building in civil war. This step of my argument responded directly to the puzzle introduced in chapter 1: that rebels sometimes make what are, on the surface, counterintuitive coalitional choices. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the FN justified the use of violence to fight against the nativism advanced by Gbagbo and his supporters. Yet, in two of my three cases – Bouna and Korhogo – the rebels allied with autochthones and politically opposed non-indigenous elites and groups. These alliances marginalized and antagonized non-native groups in these localities (the Lobi in Bouna and the Dyula merchants and youth allied with Kassoum Coulibaly in Korhogo). In Bouna, the alliance between the Koulongo and the FN

was especially puzzling given that the Koulongo were far weaker than their non-native counterparts, the Lobi. Why would a group fighting on behalf of immigrants and the equality of all Ivoirians ally with politically weak, indigenous elites? Empirical material presented in the case chapters supports my claim that pre-conflict brokerage relations explained these counterintuitive coalitional choices.

As migrants to northeastern Côte d'Ivoire, the Lobi seemed to be natural local allies of the FN. Furthermore, Lobi control over the local economy meant that this group had significant political influence. However, since the early post-colonial period, the Lobi brokered Bouna's relationship with the central state. Since the colonial period, the state has played an active role in sponsoring Lobi migration and distributing land to Lobi migrants. An important consequence of this was the reversal in economic and political influence between the Lobi and the native Koulongo. Access to land facilitated the rise of the Lobi as the dominant economic group. By the 1980s, large Lobi family heads had become the principal representatives of the old single party, the PDCI, in this region. For Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI, allying with the Lobi politically shored up their relationship with a group whose economic ascendency was itself a by-product of state interventions. For the Lobi, tying themselves to the PDCI guaranteed access to land and, more generally, effectively shored up their otherwise precarious position as 'strangers' in the Ivoirian Northeast. The Lobi elite's pre-conflict role as brokers discouraged coalition formation between this group and the FN.

As in Bouna, the FN opted to ally with an indigenous group in Korhogo, the Senoufo, rather than the Dyula. Here, the FN confronted a set of brokers, the Senoufo elite, who, like the Lobi in Bouna, buttressed their political position through their alliance with the central state over the course of the post-colonial period. Yet, in the case of the Senoufo elite, the state supported and drew upon this group's *pre-existing* authority over land, labor and women as a strategy for governing. The first half of chapter 5 claimed that the relationship between the state and the Senoufo elite in Korhogo enflamed factional competition between local elites looking to establish themselves as the principal brokers, linking local communities to national level political networks based in the capital.[90] After the transition to multiparty politics, competing Senoufo factions

[90] Sara Berry (1992, 333) has claimed that this is common effect of indirect rule in Africa. In reference to the colonial period, she writes that "in general, colonial regimes imposed themselves on societies already engaged in

forged alliances with either governing (the PDCI, then the FPI) or opposition parties (the FPI, PDCI or the RDR). Alliances constructed during the period of multiparty politics influenced coalition formation between Senoufo elites and the FN during the conflict period. Elites that allied with the RDR in opposition to the government (such as Amadou Gon Coulibaly) became allies of the FN, whereas those that did not (such as Kassoum Coulibaly) were viewed by the FN as opponents of the rebellion (and supporters of the Gbagbo government).

In contrast to Bouna and Korhogo, the FN did ally with immigrant groups in Ouangolo. In Ouangolo, the FN confronted a community of traders, the majority of whom were from elsewhere in West Africa, particularly Mali and Burkina Faso. Not unlike elsewhere in Côte d'Ivoire during the post-colonial period, the Ivoirian state supported this migration and hence had a positive relationship with Ouangolo's traders. However, the adoption of nativist politics by successive governments in the 1990s severed this relationship. The most prominent of these immigrant-traders, Issaka Sawadogo, was the principal representative of a community of 'strangers' in Ouangolo. Yet, unlike his counterpart in Bouna, Sawadogo's relationship to the larger community of traders in Ouangolo was not supported by the central state. Quite the opposite, Sawadogo (as well as the rest Ouangolo's traders) were the target of state efforts to enforce rules surrounding taxation and citizenship. As a result, Sawadogo and other elites belonging to this group were available as potential allies for the FN after they assumed military control over northern Côte d'Ivoire. During the conflict, Sawadogo served as the FN's principal ally. Conversely, after the signing of the OPA, the state relied on a small number of educated but politically weak elites as brokers who lacked direct ties to Ouangolo's towns trading community.

A number of the FN's allies during the war did function as brokers *at some point*, but not immediately prior to the conflict. In Bouna, the Lobi emerged as brokers as a result of state interventions and broader changes to the regional economy over the course of the 20th century. In Korhogo, the Senoufo elite functioned as the principal broker group for much of the post-colonial

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struggles over power and the terms on which it was exercised. By announcing their intention to uphold 'traditional' norms and structures of authority colonial officials were, in effect, declaring their intention to build colonial rule on a foundation of conflict and change. The result was 'a blizzard of claims and counterclaims' to rights over land and people which served as 'a mechanism for generating factional struggle' rather than elimination it." I am not arguing that factional struggles are altogether absent in contexts where states circumvent customary institutions (such as in the case of Bouna). Factional pressures are lessened in these cases because class differentiation is determined more by economic behavior rather than highly contestable customary rules and practices.

period. Still, some of these elites who joined the political opposition in the pre-conflict period allied with the FN during the course of the rebellion. And although migrant-traders in Ouangolo never formally functioned as brokers prior to the conflict, they did benefit from long-time support for migrants under Houphouët-Boigny until successive governments began to promote *ivoirité* during the multi-party period in the 1990s. My argument does not seek to explain *why* some groups could and did shift to a position of opposition (and no longer function as brokers) prior to the conflict while others did not. One explanation might be that the type of brokerage relations matters. Chapter 1 introduced a distinction between two kinds of brokerage relations: dependence and alignment. Dependence refers to the extent to which leaders rely on their relationships with the state for the reproduction of their local level authority. Alignment is when elites choose to ally with the state even if their authority is derived independently of it. Dependent brokers should be less prone to switching and supporting opposition movements because they require the ongoing support of the state for the reproduction of their local level authority. This could explain why Lobi elites such as Dimaté continued to support the PDCI over the course of the 1990s (and during the conflict) despite their attacks on migrant populations. Whatever drives it, elite switching – from broker to non-broker elites and vice versa – does have implications for my argument regarding coalition formation *during* armed conflict. If elites retain agency regarding their relations vis-à-vis the state as brokers during the pre-conflict period, then were they necessarily 'locked in' to these relationships during the course of civil war? I revisit this point in the limitations section of this conclusion.

Hierarchical Configurations and Social Control

The second step of my argument posits that hierarchical configurations influence rebel social control. Overall, the empirical material presented in the case chapters supported this causal claim, but did not rule out alternative explanations. Generally, where pre-conflict brokers were part of relatively hierarchical groups, rebels confronted serious challenges in establishing social control. Balanced social hierarchy or social hierarchy favoring rebel allies (non-broker elites) lessened these challenges. Nonetheless, the establishment and maintenance of political order (as well as its breakdown) is a complex political process influenced by an array of different factors. The case chapters present evidence supporting the causal argument regarding the relationship between

hierarchical configurations and social control. However, they also showed that different factors unique to each case also influenced control.

Between the three cases, my framework most accurately predicted outcomes in Ouangolo, where the authority of the rebels was the least contested. As indicated above, the adoption of nativist politics by successive governments in the 1990s severed the relationship between Ouangolo's traders and the state. As a result, during the conflict period, the state could only draw on the support of a small number of educated elites who had no direct ties to Ouangolo's immigrant-trader community. In the case of Ouangolo, hierarchical configurations favored rebel allies (non-brokers). The most prominent of these immigrant-traders, Issaka Sawadogo, served as the principal ally of the FN amidst efforts to minimize disruptions to cross-border trade. Despite being the target of state efforts to enforce rules concerning taxation and citizenship, Sawadogo's authority was arguably enhanced during the crisis period because of his role as the president of the COFENABVI-PAM-UEMOA. The FN gained substantial support from Sawadogo and the rest of the trading community in Ouangolo. The alliance between the local FN administration and Ouangolo's community of traders was evident after the signing of the OPA, when the mayor's office attempted to reclaim local level authority over taxation. Ouangolo's community of traders used their relationship with the FN to push back against the mayor. The absence of any indigenous social structure in Ouangolo, coupled with the alliance that formed between the rebels and the traders, left the state with few choices for mobilizing support. In Ouangolo, pre-conflict brokerage relations facilitated coalition formation between the FN and the most powerful actors in the city: immigrant-traders such as Sawadogo. The hierarchical configuration favoring rebel allies buttressed the FN's control over the city.

In chapter 4, I argued that the FN administration in Bouna represented a case of *low social control* because relative levels of hierarchical social organization favored the region's pre-conflict brokers: the Lobi elite. The FN viewed Lobi elites with some suspicion because of their ties to the pre-conflict state. Similarly, many in the Lobi community viewed the system of governance installed by the rebels (concerning taxation, enforcement of property rights, public good provision) as disproportionately favoring the region's indigenous group: the Koulongo. Without the support of the Lobi, the FN was forced to seek support from Koulongo elites, who lacked the political and economic clout of their Lobi counterparts. As a result, the Lobi

community outright rejected the political system installed by the rebels. In 2007, Lobi youth organized an armed revolt (*dimanche noir*) to protest the tax regime installed by the armed movement. Additionally, the prominent Lobi politician Palé Dimaté sided with Laurent Gbagbo (the head of a government the rebels had fought against for almost ten years) in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections. Overall, the case of Bouna largely supports my framework. In Bouna, the state effectively crowded out the rebels and prevented them from mobilizing support for their authority from any strong social base. Possible options were either too weak (the Koulongo) or allied with the state (the Lobi). Nonetheless, in addition to the hierarchical configurations confronted by the FN, other factors potentially contributed to the hostile relationship between the Lobi and the rebels. Bouna differed from Korhogo and Ouangolo in that the political wing of the movement was installed very late (after the signing of the OPA in 2007) and thus the movement lacked a legitimate forum for resolving social conflict generated by the rebellion. However, the ambiguous effects of the FN's organizational reforms after 2007, suggest that alliance patterns established during the conflict continued to circumscribe rebel efforts at establishing social control.

My framework identifies Korhogo as a case of *medium social control*. Like in Bouna, the outcome in Korhogo was influenced by factors not included in the original framework. Among the three cases included in this study, levels of violence were highest in Korhogo. There were more casualties in the conflict between the pro-IB and pro-Soro factions of the FN around Korhogo than in the tax revolt in Bouna. While in Bouna the absence of the FN's political organization potentially contributed to the declining legitimacy of the movement (and ultimately *dimanche noir*), in Korhogo factional conflicts led to levels of violence not seen in either of the other cases. Violence between Dyula youth and the pro-Soro faction of the FN in Korhogo differed from those between Lobi youth and the FN in Bouna because, in Korhogo, violent clashes were led by elites *within* the rebellion (between pro-IB and pro-Soro FN factions). This aspect of the Korhogo case highlights potential limitations of my explanatory framework because FN factions drew support from competing segments of the pre-conflict Senoufo elite. The pro-Soro faction of the FN allied with the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite (Drissa Coulibaly, Amadou Gon Coulibaly), a group that did not function as brokers with the state immediately prior to the beginning of the civil war. However, the pro-IB faction of the FN allied with the

reform faction of the Senoufo elite (Kassoum Coulibaly, Issa Malick Coulibaly and their Dyula supporters), a group that *did* function as brokers with the state immediately prior to the beginning conflict. Although the alliance between pro-Soro elements and the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite is consistent with my theoretical expectations, the alliance between pro-IB elements of the FN and the reform faction of Senoufo elite obviously contradicts the expectations of my framework. This raises important counterfactual questions: what would we have observed had IB secured control over the FN during the factional fighting in 2004? Would the alliance between IB and the reform faction have held throughout the duration of the conflict? Although not part of my framework, there are reasons to suspect that the FN might have been forced to change coalitional partners in this case. There certainly would have been substantial political pressure on the FN from the RDR to switch alliances because the RDR itself originally aligned with the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite prior to the beginning of civil war. Another way of thinking about this is that the actual coalition formed in Korhogo – between the pro-Soro faction of the FN and the conservative faction of the Senoufo elite – was reinforced (and was less susceptible to change) because it mirrored the strategy used by the RDR to mobilize political support in the region.

In the end, the ability of the FN to establish social control in Korhogo was strengthened by the fact that the pro-Soro faction of the FN effectively sidelined pro-IB elements within the movement. Although my approach does not explain the violence associated with rebel factionalism, it does explain the level of social control achieved by the rebels once rebel factional conflict was resolved. Hierarchical configurations confronted by the movement in Korhogo also presented the rebels with significant opportunities to mobilize support and establish social control. During his time in control of the city, FN zone commander Fofié Martin established strong ties with the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family. Fofié Martin's alliance with this group prevented conflict over the FN's authority surrounding taxation. Debates over authority later in the conflict period (after the defeat to the pro-IB faction) did not directly implicate the FN in Korhogo (in contrast to Bouna and Ouangolo) but instead implicated competing local elite factions (specifically, factions of Coulibaly family members).

Each of the case chapters drew on diverse sources – field interviews, newspaper articles, NGO reports and second sources – to support the causal claims being made in this dissertation.

Where possible, the cases considered numerous causal influences, beyond those emphasized by my argument. Despite the idiosyncrasies of each case, brokerage relations consistently appeared to influence coalition formation. And in each case, coalition-building shaped the ability of the FN to mobilize support and establish political control within local communities, given differences in hierarchical configurations.

Limitations

What are the potential limits to the model advanced in this dissertation? I identify three potential criticisms. First, there are questions regarding the exhaustiveness of the typology generated by my model, specifically whether it captures all the plausible scenarios armed movements might confront in local communities. A second potential limitation concerns the generalizability of my framework. Finally, as a structural explanation of coalition formation and rebel social control, this study downplays elite agency and the capacity of local elites to recraft political coalitions during the course of armed conflict. I address each of these potential limitations in turn.

In term of exhaustiveness, my approach does not directly account for wider variation in the relationships between pre-conflict elites and the communities they claim to represent. For example, my framework does not incorporate variation in the legitimacy of these actors. Across the three cases included in the dissertation – Bouna, Korhogo and Ouangolodougou – pre-conflict elites are presumed to benefit from some local support and recognition of their authority, albeit to varying degrees. As discussed in chapter 1, there are significant ontological and methodological challenges to differentiating coercion, self-interest and legitimacy as alternative reasons for compliance. Any specific individual behavior or action might reflect one or any combination of these reasons for obeying rules and accepting relations of political inequality. One objective of this dissertation was to consider the spectrum of reasons why unarmed actors might support rebel movements, beyond just coercion. Nonetheless, in doing so, my approach downplayed these differences in its description of the relationship between pre-conflict elites and the populations they governed. For example, my model ignores situations where elites enjoy no popular support and are in fact resented by the majority of the population they claim to represent. These would be cases akin to what Mahmood Mamdani (1996) referred to as "decentralized despotism," where exploitative or repressive local leaders rule with little popular support from the communities they govern (an example from this study might be Korhogo's colonial chiefs up until the 1930s).

Where elites enjoy little legitimacy, subordinate groups may be less inclined to follow elite decisions to support or not to support armed movements. In these cases, civil wars could provide opportunities for subordinate groups to heighten autonomy vis-à-vis pre-conflict elites by throwing their support behind the rebels. Or, vice versa, subordinate groups could support government forces despite the decision of pre-conflict elites to ally with the rebels. My framework does not explicitly address such differences because I do not evaluate levels of legitimacy as part of my operationalization of social hierarchy.

Also, although part of my framework, this study did not examine rebel-civilian interactions in contexts that Catherine Boone described as zones of "non-incorporation" (2003, 33). These are instances where social hierarchy is missing altogether. This is not a damning omission. Little can be learned about interactions between elites and rebels where pre-conflict elites are not present.

Another possible criticism speaks more to the potential generalizability of the model. Although my approach examines the interaction between local patterns of governance and national-level discursive opportunity structures, my framework may not describe outcomes in cases of rebel governance with different trans-local dynamics and significant international ties. The subnational regions focused on in this study were less internationalized than other parts of Côte d'Ivoire (particularly the cocoa growing regions of the southwest, see chapter 2) or other cases of armed conflict. International ties might have significantly altered the outcomes described in each of the cases included in this study. For example, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Timothy Raeymaekers (2013, 608) explains Hema landlords in Ituri gained prominence throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods by using their ties to the state to accumulate land formerly under the control of Lendu farmers. The pre-conflict dependence of Hema landlords on the state put these actors in a precarious position after the beginning of the Second Congolese War (1998-2007). The collapse of state patronage networks and increasing violence and insecurity in Ituri eventually left Hema landlords with "no alternative but to search for the protection of Ugandan army units, who thus started to behave like the private guards of their ill-gotten property" (2013, 608). The story of the Hema in Ituri clearly parallels the case of the Lobi in Bouna presented in this study. The key difference is that, unlike the Lobi, the Hema had an international partner to turn to in order to defend their position as landholders in Ituri.

When they occur, these kinds of trans-border, international partnerships are likely to have significant consequences for the maintenance of political order. As a scope condition, my framework should apply only to instances of rebel governance where transnational ties are less pronounced.

Finally, my approach downplays possible coalitional realignments between armed and unarmed elites that might occur during the course of armed conflict. This speaks to the point regarding elite agency made earlier in this conclusion. There are actually two distinct points related to this criticism. The first relates to how my approach under-theorizes coalitional continuity over time. My model did not specify potential reasons why coalitions formed between rebel and pre-conflict elites hold over time. As mentioned earlier, differences in the basis of brokerage relations (dependence versus alignment) appeared to have an effect on the ability of local elites to shift their allegiance, either prior to the conflict or during it. Senoufo elites in Korhogo were able to alter their allegiances to oppositional movements easily (the RDR after the beginning of multiparty politics, and the FN during the civil war) because the basis of their authority remained partially independent of the state. Conversely, Lobi elites proved less capable of abandoning the state (even after a change in government at the national-level, from PDCI to the FPI) because of their reliance on the state to shore up their political position locally.

The second related point to this criticism is that my approach is, at its core, overly deterministic. It ignores elite strategies and behavior that do not conform to the structural expectations of my model and downplays changes in elite coalition-building over time. As discussed above, this limitation was particularly evident in the case of Korhogo. There is ample comparative and historical evidence showing how armed groups and civilian actors overcome collective action problems and construct rules and institutions to govern diverse aspects of social, economic and political life (Ostrom 1990; Arjona 2014). Nonetheless, in focusing on the relationship between coalition-building and control, my point is not that elites completely lack the agency required to change strategies and remake ruling coalitions over time, but that agency is constrained by the local political configurations armed groups confront in the early stages of civil war. In the case of Bouna for instance, FN attempts to construct wartime institutions was circumscribed by their ongoing opposition to Lobi politicians such as Dimaté. By pointing to

structural impediments to effective institution building, I hope to highlight distinct kinds of strategies and interventions actually required to overcome them in different contexts.

Implications and Future Directions

What are the larger theoretical and policy-related lessons that can be derived from this study? Although the line between peace and war is rarely clear, my approach focuses principally on interactions between rebels and pre-conflict elites *during* armed conflict. Wartime coalitions between rebel leaders and pre-conflict elites should also have important implications for the establishment and maintenance of political order in post-conflict contexts, after the cessation of fighting.

Regarding post-conflict reconstruction, scholars and practitioners debate whether international peacekeeping missions and transitional governments should work with or against violent non-state actors. In Africa as elsewhere, rural constituencies have generally played integral roles in the construction and maintenance of political order throughout the post-colonial period. In reference to the political challenges confronted by African leaders after the introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s, Catherine Boone has argued that rural elites and their backers provided national-level leaders with the "ballast they needed" to defend themselves from political challenges posed by rivals based in urban areas (2003, 318; see also Koter 2013b). This study showed that these alliances are critical to understanding the sources of political order and disorder in civil war as well. Mobilizing the support of key constituencies in rural areas becomes equally important in post-conflict contexts, when the stability of national-level coalitions forged between former combatants is at its most precarious (Spears 2000). Across diverse cases of post-conflict reconstruction, national-level leaders have allied with 'warlords' or former leaders of armed groups, rather than with rural elites such as chiefs, marabouts or business leaders (Beswick 2009; Giustozzi 2003, 2007; Mukhophadyay 2009; Marten 2006/7, 2012; Reno 2009a, 2009b; Utas 2012).

The appropriate role of former rebel leaders in processes of post-conflict reconstruction is currently the subject of heated debate in contemporary Côte d'Ivoire. In early October 2012,

three former *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) zone commanders were named as administrative *préfets* in different regions across Côte d'Ivoire by Ivoirian President Alassane Ouattara.[91] These moves complement the preceding appointments of former FN leaders Chérif Ousmane as the second-in-command responsible for presidential security (*Group de sécurité de la Presidence de la présidence de la République*) and Fofié Martin as the head of the military company (*Compagnie territoriale*) in Korhogo (see chapter 5). Ouattara appointed these actors because they wield sizable political clout. However, these appointments have attracted some criticism, largely because of the human rights violations committed by much of the FN's former military leadership (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2006, 7; Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2011). Observers have been critical of the decision to reward those accused of perpetrating these acts. In the longer term, critics suggest that efforts at reconciliation could very well be endangered by not holding these actors accountable for their role in the violence.

Similar debates exist in the academic literature. This scholarship acknowledges that in diverse cases of post-conflict reconstruction, strongmen have often retained or even enhanced their political influence in the post-conflict period by fostering a cooperative relationship with the central state (see Mukhopadyay 2009; Beswick 2009; Marten 2006/7, 2012; Reno 2009a, 2009b). Does working with rural strongmen tied to former insurgencies enhance the authority of the central state? Or do such alliances undermine state institutions capable of providing long-term political order in peripheral areas? Marten (2012, 15-16) best represents the skeptical view. She defines warlords, in part, by their ability to manipulate "state structures to their advantage, often penetrating bureaucracies." According to her "they face an incentive to continue this behavior." As a result, "warlordism in today's world leads to ongoing state-failure, not state building." Others are less inclined to support state-building projects that run at cross-purposes with the interests of warlord actors who wield sometimes considerable political clout and legitimacy (Beswick 2009; Mukhopadyay 2009; Reno 2009a, 2009b). From this perspective, re-establishing centralized statehood is viewed as a source of political disorder because of how these political projects threaten the authority of warlords. Without denying the significance of these questions,

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[91] Ousmane ("Ben Laden") Coulibaly was named the *préfet* of San-Pedro, Tuo Fozié was named the *préfet* of Bouna (see chapter 4), and Koné Messamba was named the *préfet* of Cavally à Guiglo (see chapter 5).

my dissertation highlights some potential limitations to focusing exclusively on the implications of relationships between states and local strongmen.

First, this literature tends not to differentiate among different types of warlord governance (see Jackson 2003; Marten 2006/7, 2012; Ahram and King 2012) and the potential outcomes that come from constructively working with these kinds of actors (for an important exception, see Giustozzi 2003, 2007). At the very least, this study reaffirms the need for a comparative approach to studying these types of actors because, as I have shown, the ways in which former warlord actors and former rebel leaders integrate into the societies they govern can vary dramatically. Consequently, the effects of decisions to work with (or not to work with) these types of actors during post-conflict reconstruction should vary according to the kinds of coalitions established between rebels and pre-conflict elites during the conflict. For instance, post-conflict reconstruction efforts that drew on the local FN administration in Bouna as a local partner would presumably exacerbate the social tensions generated by the rebellion. Conversely, the choice to constructively engage Fofié Martin in Korhogo could conceivably support the development of the long-term peace given the coalitions established between Martin and the conservative faction of the Coulibaly family.

Another problem stemming from this lack of acknowledgement of variation is that warlord-based systems of governance are presented as a distinct *alternative* (for better or worse, depending on the perspective) to pre-conflict modes of governance. This study suggests that drawing such hard distinctions might conceal more than it explains. This limitation could be thought of in two ways. First, it is questionable whether armed groups actually govern in ways that break with patterns of governance established prior to the onset of armed conflict. Myriam Denov, for example, argues that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone did little to challenge the corrupt, patriarchal patron-client system in place before the war, but instead reproduced it in the zones under its control (2010, 105, 114-15, 119). Despite the violence and limited institution-building in zones controlled by Africa's armed movements(Englebert 2009), overall, it is hard to say if they have been any better or worse than the post-colonial states that preceded them. Second, 'warlord-as-alternatives' models tend to imply that the rise of these kinds of actors necessarily replaces or displaces established structures of authority and political hierarchies (Jackson 2003, 132). The cases included in this dissertation collectively demonstrate

that the new systems of governance introduced by armed actors did not necessarily displace older institutions and actors. Indeed, one striking similarity across each of these cases is that rebel rule largely reinforced (and in many cases intensified) existing, pre-conflict patterns of political conflict and cooperation. A more productive way of thinking about the political changes introduced by armed conflict might be in terms of what institutionalist approaches refer to as "layering," which "involves the partial renegotiation of some elements of a given set of institutions while leaving others in place" (Thelen 2003, 225). In this vein, Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2003, 152) refer to the "sedimentary" character of local political life in Sub-Saharan Africa. They highlight how successive waves of institutional innovation at the national level – during colonialism, the post-colonial period, democratization or decentralization – produce different, parallel political hierarchies that reorganized themselves along different configurations in response to macro-level changes. My research demonstrates how rebellion can simultaneously reinforce and undercut distinct institutional orders at the local level while also adding another institutional layer to this sedimentation.

More research is required regarding the implications of the kinds of coalitional arrangements described in this dissertation. My focus on coalitions mirrors some recent critical work on 'hybridity' and post-conflict reconstruction (Meagher 2012; Raeymaekers 2013). Rather than promoting the rebuilding of centralized states after conflict or uncritically accepting the hybrid forms of governance that commonly emerge from violent conflict, scholars and practitioners require more research at the micro-level to understand the conditions under which different kinds of hybrid systems of government form. As Meagher (2012, 1074) writes, "there is a need for a more nuanced, comparative approach to informal governance that is capable of distinguishing between constructive and corrosive forms of non-state order, and that clarifies rather than blurs the relationship between local order and local legitimacy." My dissertation provides empirical insights into the varied manifestations of informal governance under the FN, but additional research is required to draw out their long-term implications. What are the larger political effects of the rebel-local elite coalitions described in this dissertation? For instance, are these coalitions working to 'democratize' access to the state patronage networks that have long been monopolized by pre-conflict brokers such as the Coulibaly family in Korhogo or the Lobi elite in Bouna? Put another way, will the presence of the rebels in these localities promote the

redistribution of material resources and political power? Generally speaking, we still lack knowledge concerning the conditions under which 'militarized' actors either reconfigure or possibly further entrench existing political hierarchies in local arenas. Future comparative research should focus on general questions regarding the diverse effects of warlordism on political order, conflict and representation over the *longue durée*. Such research directions should help guide interventions during war-to-peace transitions aimed at promoting security and democracy across diverse local post-conflict contexts.

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Appendix: List of Interviews

Number	General	Date	Place
1	RDR Party Member	11-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
2	*Chef de quartier*, retired	12-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
3	Cantonal Chief	12-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
4	Member of Mayor's Office	14-Oct-10	Korhogo. Savanes
5	FPI Party Member	16-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
6	FPI Party Member	16-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
7	UNOCI Staff Member	18-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
8	PDCI Party Member	18-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
9	*Chef de quartier*	20-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
10	NGO worker	21-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
11	*Chef de village*	24-Oct-10	Nahouokama, Savanes
12	*Chef de Dozos*	25-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
13	FN Soldier	25-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
14	NGO worker	26-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
15	Municipal Administrator	30-Oct-10	Korhogo, Savanes
16	NGO worker	10-Nov-10	Korhogo, Savanes
17	FN Administrator	10-Nov-10	Korhogo, Savanes
18	FN Administrator	11-Nov-10	Korhogo, Savanes
19	*Chef de village*	14-Nov-10	Korhogo, Savanes
20	*Chef de village*	14-Nov-10	Korhogo, Savanes
21	FN Administrator	04-Jan-11	Korhogo, Savanes

22	FN Soldier	09-Jan-11	Korhogo, Savanes
23	Journalist	11-Feb-11	Korhogo, Savanes
24	Trader	12-Feb-11	Korhogo, Savanes
25	FN Soldier	13-Feb-11	Korhogo, Savanes
26	FPI Party Member	01-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
27	PDCI Party Member	01-Dec-10	Ouangolodougo, Savanes
28	Member of Mayor's Office	02-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
29	Member of Mayor's Office	02-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
30	Member of Mayor's Office	08-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
31	Trader	06-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
32	FN Administrator	07-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
33	Member of Mayor's Office	09-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
34	NGO Worker	13-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
35	Trader	14-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
36	Trader	16-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
37	Trader	17-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
38	Trader/*Chef de village*	21-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
39	FN administrator	24-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
40	NGO worker	25-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
41	FN Administrator	28-Dec-10	Ouangalodougo, Savanes
42	Trader	03-Mar-11	Abidjan, Lagunes
43	Member of Mayor's Office	17-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
44	Member of	18-Jan-	Bouna, Zanzan

	Mayor's Office	11	
45	Member of Monarchy	19-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
46	Radio Station Worker	19-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
47	NGO Worker	20-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
48	NGO Worker	20-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
49	FN Administrator	22-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
50	NGO Worker	22-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
51	Public Administrator	25-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
52	NGO Worker	26-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
53	FN Administrator	26-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
54	NGO Worker	27-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
55	NGO Worker	28-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
56	Traditional Chief	31-Jan-11	Bouna, Zanzan
57	Public Administrator	02-Feb-11	Bouna, Zanzan
58	Public Administrator	05-Feb-11	Bouna, Zanzan
59	FN Administrator	05-Feb-11	Bouna, Zanzan