What Makes Them Tick?

A Global Comparative Analysis of the Tactics and Deadliness of Terror Organizations

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Abstract

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This study analyzes the connection between the ideological affiliation of terror organizations and the nature of their violent activity. Utilizing large-scale databases cross-referenced with additional coding regarding group ideological affiliation, it's purpose is, first, to determine whether ideology has an influence on the activities of terror groups; and second, to analyze the nature of this influence is, if it is indeed found to be of significance.

The findings indicate that: 1) there is a clear connection between ideological affiliation and the violent activities of terror organizations; and 2) of the primary ideological affiliations motivating terror organizations (nationalist, communist, religious etc), religious ideology has the most extreme impact on group actions, influencing the tactics of violent activity and resulting in greater numbers of casualties. These findings are corroborated by additional tests controlling for region, religious affiliation, and time periods, further establishing the critical importance religious ideology has as an influence on the violent activity of terror organizations.

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Introduction

The intensified wave of violence and terrorism brought about by sub-state actors towards the end of the 20th century and continuing into the 21st has been well documented and explored. Theories ranging from rational choice calculations, outbidding and spoiler incentives, psychological or relational dynamics, as well as newly constructed or resurging identities, have all been offered to explain this rise, each focusing on different aspects which lead organizations to engage in such violent activity. However, despite the existence of a rich and varied literature that substantiates the conditions which engender violence, and explores the reasons why some groups may turn to specific types of violence while others don't, two factors remain heavily contested and require further empirical testing.

The first factor, surrounded by controversy but not adequately tested, is the connection between ideological stances and the tactics utilized by terror organizations. Some scholars suggest that ideological stance has little influence on the activity of terror organizations, arguing that the tactics of all types of terror organizations should be attributed to strategic decisions aimed at maximizing the group's political power and leverage. Whether a strict means of coercion on the opposing side (Pape 2003, De-Mesquita and Dickenson 2007), a means to compete with rival organizations for constituency support and prestige (Bloom 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006), or a means of derailing ongoing political processes (Stedman 1997), this approach suggests that in similar circumstances all organizations will undertake similar types of violent actions, as it is these circumstances that motivate such strategic decisions. Concurrently, however, are scholars championing ideational arguments, suggesting that it is the nature of organizational ideology that dictates the organization's use of violence and terrorism. Whether looking at specific ideological stances that promote specific types of violence (Hoffman 1998; Aran forthcoming) or more broadly at general world views which may promote deadlier violence compared to others (Asal and Rethmeyer 2008; Piazza 2009), this approach suggests that it is the group's position and agenda that dictates its violent actions, and thus even given similar circumstances groups will carry out violence based on their respective ideology. While these arguments regarding the role of ideological position in influencing the tactics of terror organizations are well established, they have scarcely been tested in comparative ways, and the

empirical evidence supporting them is often contextualized case studies substantiating the proposed theory alone.

A second factor, which has been theorized and debated in the scholarship but also not yet subjected to a rigorous empirical test, relates to the changing nature of local and international terrorism. Over the past forty years the weight of religiously-motivated groups engaged in terrorism has shifted greatly: while religiously-motivated organizations were responsible for 5.7 percent of all documented terror attacks between 1970 and 1979, their relative weight in the terrorist activity around the world has been substantially rising each decade, such that between the years 2000 and 2012 47.18 percent of documented terror attacks were perpetrated by such religiously-motivated organizations.[1] This change has also sparked intensive scholarly work, and many have theorized that there are inherent differences between the violent tactics of secular and religious terrorism. Some have suggested that religiously-motivated terror organizations utilize more violent and deadly tactics compared to secular organizations, as the group believes it is bound by radical tactics sanctified by God (Hoffman 1998; Rapoport 1984). Similarly, others have argued that the religious terror group radicalizes its tactics as a result of the sanctified goals it perceives, being assured of its ultimate victory and having no earthly political pressure to reach compromise with the enemy (Juesgensmeyer 2000; Stern 2003). However, while compelling theoretically, these theories too have yet to be empirically tested through a systematic comparison between religious and secular terror activity, and the data upon which the theories are developed has always been either contextualized case studies or the exploration of very limited time periods or countries.

Situated within these two debates regarding both the influence of ideology on terrorist tactics in general and the difference between secular and religious terrorism in particular, the current study pursues the following questions: *Does the nature of terror organizational ideology influence the group's violent tactics? Do organizations guided by different ideologies adopt different violent strategies and use deadlier tactics?* Finally, *is there a difference in the violent tactics utilized by secular and religious organizations, and what is the nature of that difference?*

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[1]See figure 4 below.

Addressing these questions, I adopt a large-N approach, utilizing internationally complied databases such as the Global Terrorism Database, Terror Organization Profiles and Big Allied and Dangerous, which combined with additional coding drawn from both primary and secondary sources, allow me to explore the validity of different theories regarding what influences the tactics and deadliness of terror organizational activity. The findings reveal that not only does ideological affiliation in general have a critical impact on the violent tactics adopted by terror organizations, but among the different ideological positions tested religion has the greatest exacerbating influence, leading organizations to adopt more violent and deadly tactics. Furthermore, the findings show that the extent to which religion is embedded into an organization's ideology has significant consequences as well. I thus argue not only that ideology has a substantial influence on the tactics of terror organizations, but that religious ideology has a cumulative exacerbating influence on the violence and deadliness of terror organizations: the more religion dominates an organization's ideology, the deadlier that organization becomes.

In the following section, the main arguments regarding the influence of ideological positions on the violent tactics of terror organizations are detailed. Next is the methodology section, elaborating on the definitions, data collection methods and hypotheses. The analysis chapter follows, detailing the tests conducted and illustrating the validity of the arguments made. Lastly, the discussion and conclusion evaluate the findings, discuss both the strengths and weaknesses of the study conducted, and suggest avenues for future development of the research

Literature review

This study focuses on the tactics and violent actions of terror organizations, exploring the role of ideological affiliation as a factor influencing the group's violent tactics in general, and the role of religion as a distinct exacerbating factor in particular.[2] As stated above, theories regarding the connection between ideological affiliation and terrorist tactics range from rational choice variants which argue for little to no connection between ideology and tactics, to ideational approaches which suggest that terrorist tactics are inherently determined by the ideology the group champions.

The first camp of theories views terror organizations as fundamentally strategic actors, attributing their violent tactics solely to the group's means-ends calculation. Underplaying the influence of ideology, at the base of the strategic camp is the rational choice theory, arguing that actor's actions are a result of calculated cost-benefit analyses, leading the actor to undertake the action that is most likely to maximize his/her gains (Levi 2009). Accordingly, such rational choice advocates suggest that violent tactics of terror organizations - the type of violence utilized, targets, timing, deadliness, willingness to stop violence (etc.) - are all strategic decisions undertaken contingent upon what an actor believes will maximize his/her potential gain. Ideology, in turn, plays little if any role in this decision-making process, as the cost-benefit analysis of the organization revolves around how much pressure (the gain the group gets from the violent act) can be achieved vs. the potential backlash – repression, loss of support, etc. (De-

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[2] For the purposes of this study, I embrace the definition of terrorism used by the main database this study draws upon, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Accordingly, a terrorist act is understood as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (GTD codebook, 8).Several elements within this definition should be highlighted: 1) The limitation to non-state actors excludes state terrorism in its various forms, most of which would fall into the categories of war crimes or crimes against humanity; 2) The violence is meant to advance a goal through sending a message of "fear, coercion or intimidation", i.e. the violent act itself cannot achieve the goal of the group, and there must be a target audience larger than the immediate victims of the violent act (on this distinction see Bergesen 2007). Accordingly, acts of insurgency in which illegal violence is utilized by sub-state actors would be included if the violent act is utilized in order to (for example) destabilize a region as part of an insurgency campaign – a tactic currently being utilized by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant; however, the act would be excluded if the violence is utilized to attain an immediate goal alone, such as physically occupying land (on such distinctions see Yadlin 2004, 12-14; Mampilly 2013). For broader discussions on the definitions of terrorism see as well Schmidt and Jogman 1988; White 1991, 3-20; Gibbs 1989, 329-331; Tilly 2005; Provitzer 1987.

Mesquita and Dickenson 2007; Pape 2003, 2005).[3] Thus, while ideology may still have a significant role in mobilization, justifying violence and the nature of the demands expressed by the group, the violent tactics themselves are not shaped by ideology, but rather by a calculated analysis whereby the group hopes to achieve enough pressure to coerce rivals (or potential rivals) into acting according to the group's desired action (Kalyvas 1999).

Associated with the rational choice approach, a second strand of theorists within this strategic camp attributes the tactics of terror organizations to outbidding dynamics with competing actors within the conflict. Often the focus of civil war literature, the outbidding theory suggests that groups competing for domination of the conflict or for the same constituency will often try to outflank each other, signalling themselves as the 'true representatives of the people' as opposed to other organizations (Cunninghman, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Kydd and Walter 2006). Regarding terrorist tactics, an outbidding perspective suggests that violent tactics will be taken up by terror organizations in response to the actions of other competing organizations from within the same camp, either attempting to challenge the domination of a more moderate actor or in response to harsher violence embraced by competing organizations and the fear of losing prestige (Bloom 2004). While attributing a specific rationality of competition to the actions of organizations, the root of this approach remains a rational choice one – regardless of group orientation and ideology, violent tactics will be determined by what will garner the greatest returns when competing with rival groups.[4]

Thus, whether relying on rational choice principles more broadly or suggesting a specific cost-benefit calculation more narrowly, the strategic approach argues that violent tactics of organizations are a result of the group's cost-benefit calculation regarding how much gains it can achieve through its use of violence. Accordingly, this approach suggests that organizations guided by different ideologies should not utilize inherently different tactics, as it is the political circumstance and potential gains that motivates a group's violent tactics, not a particular

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[3] It must be noted that not all rational choice advocates underplay the influence of distinct ideological motivation. Perry and Hasisi (2015), for example, illustrate how religious ideology (along with personal and social motivations) plays a key role in creating a world view whereby suicide bombing becomes a rational action.
[4] Similar to the outbidding theory, Stedman (1997) illustrates how groups may also embrace harsher violent tactics in response to the actions of a competing actor within the resistance camp 'selling out' and negotiating with the enemy. While not synonymous to outbidding, the underlying rationale of violent tactics undertaken in response to competing actors within the camp remains the same.

ideological stance. Given similar political circumstances, groups from all ideological background should carry out similar violent actions.[5]

Opposing the strategic camp is the group of ideational theories. Privileging perceptions and ideas as the main driving force of political actors, for ideationalists, ideology comprises the main motivator underscoring why actors undertake specific actions. As ideology structures who the actors are, identifies the problems of reality as well as the ways of solving these problems, this ideological lens is seen as a key causal factor dictating what actions should be taken by the organization (Van Dijk 2006; Sewell 1985). Guided by this approach, the ideationalist camp distinguishes between terror organizations guided by a more limited ideology advocating for tangible change and those guided by agendas that advocate world-wide change and overthrowing the entire existing order, suggesting that this difference has a crucial impact on the violent tactics undertaken by the different groups.

Sprinzak (1998), for example, suggests that extreme left-wing terror organizations undergo a three-phase process of radicalization, culminating in a "crisis of legitimacy". During this final stage of radicalization, all members of the group's surrounding society are dehumanized and are viewed as part of an entire system which itself must be destroyed, and as such more extreme radical, violent, terrorist actions are legitimized as the only mechanism to bring down the entire existing social structure. Similarly, Hafez (2004) identifies "anti-system framing" as key in explaining the path an organization undergoes towards the use of more extreme terrorism, and it has also been suggested that even among the different Islamist groups operating simultaneously in Iraq it is the organizations that are motivated by abstract or "universal" goals that adopt more radical and extreme forms of violence, compared to the more strategic nationally-motivated organizations (Piazza 2009). Accordingly, terror organizations inspired by more general visions of how the entire existing system must be destroyed will adopt deadlier and more extreme violent tactics, compared to organizations with more tangible

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[5] Other approaches undermining the role of ideology as a factor influencing terror organization tactics include the psychological approach, which suggests that terror organizations utilize violence as an expressive tool aimed at preserving an image of a freedom fighter against a demonic foe (Post 2007; Aly and Striegher 2012); and the contentious politics approach, which argues that terrorist tactics are a product of relational dynamics, and are contingent upon interactions between group leadership, the constituency, surrounding groups, and enemy responses (Alimi, Bosi and Dimitrio 2012; Tilly 2005). While not a focus of this study, their arguments similarly underplay ideological influence on the violent tactics of terror organizations, and thus by extension are also tested in the first and second hypotheses below.

immediate goals which – reminiscent of the strategic arguments – are not trying to destroy the system but rather to compel the system to concede to their demands.

A derivative of the ideational approach, a final theory tested in this study suggests that religiously-motivated ideologies specifically, not all anti-system positions, exacerbate the deadliness of terrorist tactics, causing the organization to become more radical and violent compared to secularly-motivated organizations. Theorists championing this position point to the contrasting worldviews secular and religious organizations construct, emphasizing the influence these worldviews have over the goals of the organization and the resulting available means and tactics utilized. Secular extremist organizations, according to this approach, identify an injustice that has been committed by a competing political actor, and see themselves as operating to undo this historical political wrong. Ranging from demands for policy change, through territorial alterations, to demands for regime change, the secular organization views the conflict as resulting from an act committed (or not committed) by the opposing side towards the group (or people the group claims to represent), and therefore demands its undoing. Similar to the strategic approach, the tactics of secular terror organizations are thus a result of a cost-benefit calculation, with violent actions aimed at coercing the opposing side into acquiescence on the one hand, while not being too radical so as to avoid alienating potential supporters and possible political gain on the other (Hoffman 1998; Rapoport 1998).

Conversely, according to this approach, while the liberation of territory perceived as homeland may still be at the top of a religious group's agenda, the religious terror organization does not perceive itself as fighting 'purely' in the name of earthly political goals, but rather as leading a battle in the name of God Himself. While the earthly manifestations of the war may be to liberate land perceived as holy or to institute a version of religious law,[6] the conflict is understood to result from a religious decree and is waged against the enemies of God (Juergensmeyer 2003; Stern 2003). Accordingly, the tactics of violence and terrorism are perceived differently by religious organizations. First, while they may still have the additional intention of coercion, violent tactics become imbued with their own religious symbolic meaning, as they are understood to have been prescribed and sanctified by the Almighty (Rapoport 1984). As such, tactics are not alterable or negotiable and cannot be supplanted due to a political need to

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[6]Such as in the cases of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Kashmiri Hizbul Mujahidun or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

scale down spirals of radicalization or to avoid specific types of violence or targets.[7] Second, the religious extremist organization is not seeking to win the support of sympathizers from the opposing society; rather, similar to the tenets of the 'anti-system' approach, the religious group sees itself in an absolute war against the opposing society's very existence. As such, rather than coercion, the terrorist tactics are often aimed at both punishing and destroying the opposing side on the one hand, while in addition serving as recruitment spectacles for adherents from the group's own population on the other (Ranstorp 1996).[8] This facet as well leads to an exacerbation of violence and lethality as the group's enemies are subjected to a process of dehumanization and demonization, since it is understood that God Himself has sent the group to fight these enemies (Hansenclever and Rittberger 2000). These factors, combined with the divine sanctification of the goals of the organization which also become non-negotiable and unalterable,[9] impel religious terror organizations to carry out more extreme violent attacks compared to their secular counterparts. While secular organizations are attempting to attain tangible political gains, religious organizations are fighting a religiously-mandated war guided by transcendent calculations and dictated by an active God, leading to a starkly different use of violent tactics.

While laying promising foundations the various arguments above have rarely been tested comparatively, with most empirical analyses limited to in-depth case studies which, while effective in developing the theory itself, have limited comparative ability to draw generalized conclusions. The small number of studies which have attempted to test these theories more broadly have still done so with great limitations.

Findley and Young (2012), for example, test the outbidding theory rigorously, exploring both if the number of organizations present in the same country increases the use of suicide terrorism in particular (as Bloom 2004 suggests), or if the number of organizations increases the terror events within the country more generally. However their study, while "find[ing] scant support for the idea that the number of insurgent groups increases the likelihood of suicide terror

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[7] It is noteworthy, in this regard, that this approach does not suggest that all religiously-motivated terror groups will carry out the same types of actions. Rather, that each religious group perceives itself bound to the specific types of actions it sees as prescribed by God to carry out His divine mission.

[8] Basedau et al. (2011) also illustrate how religion creates sharp in-group out-group lines imbued with a transcendental decree, making these lines impossible to negotiate or compromise on, facilitating carrying out more radical violent actions.

[9] For an interesting discussion of the various common goals structured by religiously-motivated terror organizations see Gregg 2014.

and no support for the notion that outbidding increases terrorism generally" (707), relied solely on counting the number of organizations within a country during a conflict. As such, it did not take into account elements which have been theorized to be critical in exacerbating the violence among outbidding organizations, specifically the notion that the organizations would be fighting over the same constituency and combating each other over leadership of the same (overarching) ideological camp (Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012, 6-7, 12). Thus while their finding places doubt in the outbidding theory, it requires more refined testing before the approach may be rejected.

Examining the theory that religious ideology exacerbates terrorist tactics, Capell and Sahliyeh (2007) offer an interesting preliminary comparison of violent religious and secular organizations; however their sole focus on suicide attacks along with the limited number of religious groups analyzed leaves much to be explored. With similar limitations, Santana, Inman and Birnir (2013) compared the violent campaigns of secular and religious minorities. While they do find compelling evidence that for a minority religion offers a good basis for contentious mobilization and can exacerbate inter-communal violence, their study is limited to democratic countries with active minorities, focusing specifically on election years within these countries. Comparing different theories regarding what influences terror organizational tactics, including size, age, territorial possession, alliances and state sponsorship, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) lay a promising foundation for the exploration undertaken here, however their study is limited both by its (generally) inconclusive results, as well as by the small number of organizations and time-span included in the dataset (covering an eight year period between 1998 and 2005).

Accepting the call of King, Keohane and Verba (1994) to increase the N of observations in order to generalize and reconcile theoretical approaches, I suggestthat a large-N empirical analysis testing and comparing each of the aforementioned approaches is an essential, yet thus far absent, part of the puzzle. Conducting such an analysis and developing the theory regarding religiously-motivated terror organizations further, my findings show that not only does religious ideology have a crucial impact on the violent tactics of terror organizations, but that the exacerbating influence of religious perceptions is contingent upon the relative weight religious components have in the group's ideology: the more religion dominants the ideological composition of the organization, the greater the exacerbating effect over the organization's

violence will be. The following section details the methodology this study undertakes, elaborating how the various arguments are tested and reconciled.

Methods and hypotheses

While not undervaluing the large contribution of in-depth qualitative explorations in developing the theories analyzed, the current study embraces a quantitative large-N approach, testing the merit of the aforementioned theories regarding what influences terror organization tactics. This is done through a rigorous process of combining several existing datasets regarding both terror activity and the ideological background of different organizations, at detailed below.

The first camp, the strategic approach, argues that different ideological predispositions should not be the cause of the use of different types of violent tactics. Regardless of the specific goals the group states that it is fighting to achieve, in similar circumstances groups of all ideological affiliations should utilize similar violent tactics, as at the root of their violence is the same cost-benefit calculation regarding coercing their opponents. Testing this approach, the first hypothesis of this study is:

H1: ideological denomination has little influence over terror organizational violent tactics.

Still within the strategic camp, the second major theoretical line tested is the outbidding theory. While conducting a global analysis of groups actually locked in an outbidding contest would prove beneficial, it extends far beyond this study, and would require a qualitative assessment of all contexts and underlying factors involving the interaction between such groups.[10] Previous datasets compiled for such an examination, such as the UCDP None-State Conflict (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012), focus on violence occurring between sub-state actors themselves, and not on the possibility that violent tactics of an organization are altered or exacerbated due to groups attempting to outshine each other.

In order to test whether organizations competing with other organizations utilize deadlier violent tactics, I expand on previous analyses which relied solely on comparing group numbers (see, for example, Findley and Young 2012), and compare organizations with greater potential to outbid each other due to their vying for recognition from the same constituency or aspiration for

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[10] For an analysis of the contexts which are likely to lead organizations to try to outmatch each other, including number of groups present, degree of institutionalization of the main groups, and concentration of power, see Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012.

similar outcomes (on how these factors may increase outbidding potential see Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012 6-7; Kydd and Walter 2006, 77). The underlying logic guiding this expansion was to avoid a situation in which two organizations would be incorporated in the outbidding analysis simply because they were in the same country at the same time, despite their having different constituencies, different aims and different target audiences, giving them little incentive to actually outbid each other.[11] Accordingly, the second hypothesis examined in this study is:

H2: Terror organizations operating in the same year, in the same country, and championing a similar ideological background as another organization, will become more violent and carry out more deadly attacks compared to organizations operating without such a competing actor.

While admittedly this analysis explores the potential for outbidding rather than situations of outbidding themselves, it facilitates a deeper exploration than simply counting the number of groups active within a certain country at a similar time period, focusing the analysis on organizations which would have an interest in outshining each other and positioning themselves as the 'true leaders' of their constituency.

Turning to the second camp, the ideationalist theories are also tested through two hypotheses. The first tests the 'anti-system' approach, which argued that organizations guided by an ideology which professes a deterministic more generalized view against the entire system's very existence will be prone to more violent and deadly attacks compared to organizations championing a more grounded politically-attainable goal. Operationalizing this to a concrete hypothesis for examination, two main ideologies identified may be understood as absolutist in such a way. First, organizations guided by a communist ideology fall under such a category, as a communist vision incorporates both a predetermined perspective on ultimate victory on the one hand, along with a generalized perspective against all aspects of the existing system as embodying an imposed super-structure on the other. Second, according to this approach, terror

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[11] For example, if the KKK carried out an attack against a black church in the United States during the same time period as al-Qaeda's attacks of 9/11, this should not be included as an outbidding situation, as it can hardly be assumed that the groups were trying to 'outshine each other' or to fight for the same recognition or constituency. However, if the KKK carried out a similar attack during a time period when another racist organization was operating in the U.S., or if al-Qaeda carried out attacks in the U.S. during the same time period that ISIS did, it is plausible that an outbidding situation could be influencing the groups' tactics.

organizations guided by a religious ideology should also be equally motivated towards more radical and violent actions, as they too see their conflict as transcending daily political calculations, moving towards a predetermined victory of the forces of God against all that stands against Him.[12] As such, this approach would suggest that:

H3: Communist or religious terror organizations will carry out more violent and deadly attacks compared to organizations guided by a more earthly / grounded ideology.

Lastly, the theory regarding the influence of religious ideology on the tactics and violent actions of terror organizations suggests that religiously-motivated organizations will embrace deadlier more violent actions compared to all other organizations. Compounding the anti-system approach, the belief of religious organizations in an active divine force guiding their actions, sanctifying their goal and prescribing their violent tactics will lead such organizations to embrace even deadlier modes of operation compared to all other organizations (including both anti-system and non anti-system organizations). As such, the final hypothesis examined is:

H4: the more religious components are found in an organization's ideology, the more violent and deadly its attacks will become.

In order to test the dependent variables of the hypotheses, the violent tactics of terror organizations, data was drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). A part of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the GTD is one of the largest available sources of data and information regarding terror activity and violence available today. Offered as an open source, the GTD has systematically documented and coded over 110,000 violent terror attacks (and attempted attacks) carried out since 1970,[13] breaking down each event into over sixty variables. Its data is collected from a variety of open sources and accessible information, with questions regarding the reliability of data or coded information documented as well.

For each hypothesis, the dependent variable includes both the sheer deadliness of organizational attacks – i.e. the casualties resulting from the actions organization attacks, as well

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[12] While a case can certainly be made that many nationalistic terror organizations also frame their ideology in absolutist terms, they are still usually guided by a demand for recognition from the existing international arena, rather than seeking to supplant the arena itself.

[13] The GTD dataset used in this study is the 2013 version, updated until the end of 2012.

as the use of different types of tactics, such as suicide attacks, forms of weapons used, targeting property, etc. While for brevity sake the variety of elements included in organizational tactics was not elaborated in each hypothesis, the analysis details the elements which may fall under the exploration of terror organizational 'tactics'.

Two main factors comprised the independent variables of the hypotheses: the ideological position and composition of the grouping[14] carrying out the attack (for H1, H3 and H4), and the potential that the grouping was engaged in an outbidding situation with another grouping (H2). While the GTD offers a very complete and updated picture of terror activity, the dependent variable, it does not offer any background context or information about the group or the context of the conflict, and the name (or alias) of the organization is often the only information provided about each group.

In order to code the ideological position of the groupings a list of all the groupings identified in the GTD was assembled (a total of 3,008 by the end of 2012), and this list was cross-referenced with datasets which include a coding of organizational ideology, specifically the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) and Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD), and their information crossed with other analyses such as the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) and the US State Department "Patterns of Global Terrorism" reports. While this cross-referencing limited the number of organizations utilized in the data (excluding groups that were identified in the GTD but were not present in the other datasets - see appendix), the groups coded for analysis were responsible for 70.65% of all identified attacks, allowing for an effective exploration. In cases where groups were identified in the dependent-variable datasets yet information was contradictory between the various sources (such as group aliases or splinter factions reported with distinct ideological positions, or a different ideological coding among the different datasets) the group's founding texts or statements were located and analyzed in order to code its ideological stance, following social movement theory's development of frame analysis.[15]

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[14] I use the term "groupings" as the GTD classifies attacks carried out by unorganized people as well. These unorganized people were coded as belonging to a distinct ideological camp if the nature of the grouping indicated an ideological stance, such as "Islamists", "radical leftists", etc. Such groupings are included in the analysis of the different types of organizations, but excluded from the appendix as they do not constitute a specific organization (see note 35 below).

[15] Henne (2012), exploring the influence of religion on the severity of suicide attacks, demonstrates the utility of utilizing social movement theory to unpack organizational ideology. Accordingly, in such cases of contradiction

Combining these datasets, along with the additional coding conducted, formed the data utilized to test the hypotheses.

While the current study adds a much needed empirical analysis of the hypotheses, constituting the first time such theories regarding what influences the violent tactics of terror organizations is conducted on a global level, the method of data collection is not without limitations. First, while the classification of organizational ideologies is broken down in the analysis section into eight different sub-groupings, as with any large-N study this oversimplifies the vast nuances and emphases which may be found in the ideological constructs of each terror organization. More is said about this in the conclusion and suggestions are made for future research avenues. Second, while the classification of organizations within the datasets (and subsequent readings added) relies heavily on foundational texts and statements of organizations, for some active groups these statements are over twenty and thirty years old. Nonetheless, this factor may be seen as potentially strengthening the tests conducted rather than as a drawback, as if groups classified as holding a particular ideology based on texts that are 20-30 years old still operate differently compared to other terror organizations, this adds credence to the awesome power such ideological positions have as an influential factor on the organization's tactics.

Returning to the dependent variable, the use of the GTD as a primary source also has its limitations. First, the data of the GTD is incomplete for the year 1993, due to technical malfunctions of the data assembly.[16] Second, reflecting the caution with which the coding was undertaken by the GTD, a large number of events are coded as "unknown perpetrator", even in cases where circumstantial evidence points to a specific group as directing or as being responsible for the attack. Attempts were made to overcome both of these drawbacks by supplementing the GTD with other data sources regarding terror activity, conducting searches for specific events with the Lexis-Nexis newspaper archive, and utilizing information drawn from

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groups were coded and fit to their respective categorization based on their *diagnostic framing* (identifying the grievance committed, including the origins of the conflict or the identities of the warring sides); on their *prognostic framing* (articulating the 'solution', i.e. the aspirations of the organization when addressing the grievance); and on their *motivational framing* (calling on adherents to act, i.e. the justification of the organization in calling followers to carry out specific actions). For an elaboration on the facets of these core framing tasks see Snow and Byrd 2007, as well as Benford and Snow 2000.

[16] See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/

the US State Department "Patterns of Global Terrorism" reports published annually since 1980. All data sources mentioned are available online.

<u>Analysis</u>

This section tests the hypotheses outlined above, dividing each into an examination of the specific tactics utilized by the organizations, as well as examining the deadliness of the attacks carried out.

H1: ideological denomination has little influence over terror organizational violent tactics.

The first hypothesis suggested that ideological background should have an insignificant influence on the violent activity of terror groupings. Evaluating this hypothesis, the tactics and violent actions of groupings championing a distinct ideological background were compared against the total sum of actions carried out, exploring if on a general level distinct ideological stances led organizations to deviate from the general trend of activity. Such deviations, forming the basis of the other hypothesis, are explored thereafter.

Combining the various datasets utilized, 595 groupings have been identified for analysis between the years 1970-2012 (see appendix for a list of organizations).[17] Combined, these 595 organizations carried out 45,680 attacks, resulting in 122,121 deaths and 152,574 injuries. Table 1 shows the central tendencies of casualty rates resulting from the attacks of all organizations compared to those of attacks carried out by organizations with distinct ideological stances, allowing for an initial analysis of the influence of ideological denomination on the deadliness of terror groupings.

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[17] While the Global Terrorism Database contains 3,008 groupings which carried out operations during the 42 year period of 1970 and 2012, the 595 are those which were located in the other datasets detailed in the methodology section, allowing for the exploration of the hypotheses regarding their ideological stance, outbidding possibilities, etc. For elaboration see the methodology chapter above.

Table 1: General trends of casualty rates

	No. of groupings	Deaths	Mean deaths	Median deaths	Injuries	Mean injuries	Median injuries
Total	595	122,121	Including 9/11: 2.85 Excluding 9/11: 2.78	0	152,574	Including 9/11 3.75 Excluding 9/11: 3.69	0
Communist / socialist groupings[18]	92 (15.46%)	38,643 (31.64%)	2.30	0	30,610 (20.06%)	1.85	0
Groupings with any nationalist / separatist ideology[19]	313 (52.6%)	45,404 (37.17%)	2.59	0	62,799 (41.15%)	3.92	0
Religious groupings[20]	190 (31.93%)	38,074 (31.17%)	Including 9/11: 4.45 Excluding 9/11: 4.10	1	59,166 (38.77%)	Including 9/11 7.33 Excluding 9/11: 7.0	0

While a more in depth discussion and analysis of the numbers is found in the following hypotheses, the clustered descriptive statistics do point to a preliminary influence of ideological position on the deadliness of terror organizations. First, the marked differences in the average injuries resulting from the attacks should be noted, as religious attacks have a vastly higher average of injuries compared to national / separatist attacks, which are themselves higher than the injuries resulting from communist / socialist attacks. Second, the median deaths resulting from religious attacks is one, compared to all other medians which are zero. In other words, religious attacks are the only ones in which at least half of the attacks resulted in at least one death. Third, despite constituting over half of the organizations identified, the national/separatist groupings are responsible for less than 40% of all deaths, and just over 40% of all injuries identified. Finally, communist / socialist groupings are proportionately responsible for double the deaths they 'should be' given their overall weight in the dataset.

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[18] Includes all groupings coded as either "communist / socialist" or "communist / socialist and other" ideological components, such as anarchist etc. Excluded from this category are groups combining a communist/socialist and national ideology, which are found in the second category.

[19] Includes all groupings championing any ideological combination which includes a nationalist / separatist stance. This general category is broken down further in the following hypotheses.

[20] Includes all groupings coded either "religious" or "religious and other" ideological components, such as racist views, etc. Excluded from this category are groups combining a religious and national ideology, which are found in the second category.

Extending beyond the deadliness of attacks, the analysis of organizational tactics incorporates a variety of factors, including weapons and target selection, inflicting property damage, taking responsibility for attacks, etc., all of which may be analyzed as part of exploring this study's hypotheses. While the general comparison showed little influence of the different ideological stances on certain factors such as attacking in multiple events, the success rate, the taking of hostages or the demand for ransom,[21] some outstanding factors were observed when comparing the attack tactics of groupings clustered according to their ideological affiliation to the total tactics used.

Figure 1 illustrates the influence of ideological stances on certain tactical aspects of terror groupings – aspects which are all discussed further in hypotheses 3 and 4. As can be seen, religiously-motivated groupings carry out far more suicide attacks compared to the general trends, specifically compared to the insignificant amount carried out by communist / socialist organizations (communist/socialist groupings conducted a total of 4 suicide attacks in 42 years). Second, while nationalist and religious groupings actively claim responsibility for their attack nearly twice as often as communist / socialist groupings do, the credibility of their responsibility is doubted far more often. Third, important differences are identified in targeting property, a factor also discussed further later on.

Furthermore, some characteristic differences were also found among the various groupings in the targets selected for attack. First, nationalist and (expectedly) communist / socialist groupings targeted business establishments twice as often as religiously-motivated groupings. Concurrently, 12.6% of attacks carried out by communist / socialist groupings were aimed at state utilities, compared to 2.1% of nationalist attacks and less than 1% of religious attacks. Alternatively, while 16.2% of communist / socialist attacks were aimed at private citizens or property, these numbers climbed to 22.2% of nationalist attacks, and 26% of religiously-motivated attacks.

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[21] Thus substantiating the claims made by Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2011) regarding hostage taking.

Figure 1[22]

Comparing total % of attacks to attacks of each ideological category

Legend: ■ Total ■ (Communist / socialist (and other ■ All nationals ■ (Religious (and other

Category	Total	Communist/socialist	All nationals	Religious
Is it a suicide attack ((yes	2.5	0	2.7	7.3
Is there doubt in the confirmation of the (group (yes	20.6	16	19.5	32.6
Is the attack claimed (by the group (yes	31.8	16.1	35.3	37.4
is there property (damage (yes	68.8	76.9	66.5	53.5

A more in-depth analysis, along with suggestions for the underlying reasons motivating the different groupings to undertake different, more/less deadly attacks, is explored in hypotheses 3 and 4 which take a closer look at the tactical nuances found among the different ideological camps. For now, H1 which suggested that ideological orientation should have negligible influence on the deadliness of tactics utilized by different organizations, may be rejected, and the other hypotheses pursued. Regardless of which ideology leads to what type of violent action (deadly or not), the differences between the groups indicates that there is some connection between ideological orientation and terrorist tactics.

H2: Terror organizations operating in the same year, in the same country, and championing a similar ideological background as another organization, will become more violent and carry out more deadly attacks compared to organizations operating without such a competing actor.

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[22] See notes 18-20 above regarding the "other" categories.

The second hypothesis tests the argument that groups engaged in outbidding will pursue more violent and deadly tactics, attempting to both 'stay relevant' regarding other potential groups assuming leadership roles, as well demonstrating that they are the true fighters willing to undertake violence in the name of their constituency. As stated in the methodology above, the hypothesis testing this argument is designed to capture situations in which outbidding would be likely, comparing the tactics and deadliness of organizations operating with competitors from within their own ideological camp in the same time period and same conflict zone to those operating without such competition.[23]

Five different ideological clusters were examined in this hypothesis. For each cluster, a comparison was done between the violent tactics of organizations operating without any other rival group from within the cluster, and those operating with competitors. For example, the first cluster was comprised of all groupings espousing a strictly communist/socialist ideology, or a communist/socialist ideology combined with other nationalist or anarchist agenda. Accordingly, the analysis of this cluster compared the violent tactics of these extreme left-wing organizations operating with a competitor from within their cluster to those operating without a competitor, examining if a potential outbidding scenario exacerbated the deadliness of the terror organization attacks.[24] The second cluster comprised all strictly nationalist/separatist groupings. Next were nationalist/separatist groupings that combine a religious element in their ideology. However, due to the very small number of cases that ended up being tested in this cluster, it was split into two: cluster 3 tested outbidding situations between these nationalist/separatist groupings that combine a religious agenda and between strictly nationalist groupings, whereas cluster 4 tested outbidding situations between nationalist/separatist groupings that combine a religious agenda and between strictly religious groupings. In other words, cluster three explored differences in violent tactics between nationalist/separatist combined with religious groupings operating alone and those competing with strictly nationalist/separatist groupings, and cluster 4 compared violent tactics between nationalist/separatist combined with religious groupings operating alone and those competing with strictly religious groupings. Cluster 5 was comprised of all groupings espousing either a strictly religious ideology or those with a religious and 'other' non-nationalist ideological

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[23] While in the interest of brevity this section refers to groups "outbidding" and "not outbidding", it must be again emphasized that the examination is of groups with a *potential* for outbidding compared to those without that potential.

[24] See note 11 above for further elaboration.

component (as those groups were analyzed in clusters 3-4). Table 2 summarizes the different clusters analyzed.

Table 2: Clusters for outbidding analysis

	Groupings	
Cluster 1	- Communist / socialist - Communist / socialist combined with national / separatist - Communist / socialist combined with other[25] (often anarchist)	
Cluster 2	- Strictly national / separatist	
Cluster 3	- National / separatist combined with religious	* Outbidding with strictly nationalist groupings
Cluster 4	- National / separatist combined with religious	* Outbidding with strictly religious groupings
Cluster 5	- Strictly religious or combined religious and 'other'[26]	

The comparison within the different clusters did not reveal a direct connection between outbidding and deadliness or a more lethal style of attack. While outbidding potential did cause some interesting patterns to emerge, as discussed below, groupings within the different clusters often responded in different, opposing manners to outbidding situations, weakening the claim that as a rule outbidding causes distinct tactical responses.

As figure 2 shows, a potential for outbidding caused strictly nationalist / separatist organizations outbidding with each other (cluster 2), national / separatist and religious groups outbidding with nationalist groups (cluster 3), and strictly religious groups outbidding with each other (cluster 5) to vastly increase taking responsibility for attacks, a fact that strengthens the notion that groups are aware of their competitors and want to ensure that they, rather than other groupings, get credit from their respective constituencies for their actions. However, it must be noted that the potential for outbidding had little influence on communist / socialist groupings (cluster 1) claiming responsibility for their actions, and had the reverse effects on national / separatist and religious groups when outbidding with other religious groups (cluster 4), causing them to take far less credit for attacks. Similarly, of those groups claiming responsibility for their attacks outbidding caused a rise in the method of calling after the attack (in all clusters except for communist / socialist), however outbidding yielded mixed results in all other methods of

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[25]Non national / separatist.
[26]Non national / separatist. Nearly all "other" groupings in this category combined religious along with racist views.

claiming responsibility, causing some clusters to increase a particular method and others to decrease that same method.

Figure 2

% of attacks claimed by the grouping

Continuing the mixed results observed, outbidding potential caused distinctly different outcomes among the different clusters regarding both the attack type and targets chosen. Regarding the attack type utilized, while situations of outbidding caused the first "communist / socialist" cluster as well as strictly nationalist groups outbidding with each other to largely increase their use of assassinations, possibly signalling a desire for more high-profile attacks rather than random ones, religious groups in outbidding situations saw a sharp decrease in the use of assassinations compared to religious groups operating without a competitor. Concurrently, outbidding had no influence on the communist or nationalist clusters regarding the use of kidnapping, yet caused religiously-motivated groups to use this tactic far more often.

Regarding targets chosen, outbidding situations caused only the groupings in the first cluster (communist / socialist) as well as the groupings in clusters 3 and 4 (national / separatist and religious outbidding both with national or religious groups) to drastically decrease their targeting of military targets, not influencing the other clusters in the same way. Furthermore, outbidding situations caused all clusters to increase their targeting of private citizens / property

(in moderate to extreme ways), with the exception of the strictly religious cluster, where outbidding caused a sharp decrease in the targeting of private citizens / property.

Turning to some of the more uniform responses to outbidding, clusters 1, 2 and 4 all targeted property far less during outbidding situations, possibly reflecting the previously identified focus on private citizens rather than on government installations during outbidding scenarios. In addition, clusters 3 and 4 (nationalist / separatist and religious outbidding either with nationalist or religious groups) used combined multiple attacks far more often than when operating without a competitor. Finally, substantiating Bloom's (2004) claim, across all clusters (with the exception of the second – strictly nationalist / separatist groups) outbidding caused a slight increase in the use of suicide attacks.

It can safely be stated thus far that when it comes to violent tactics utilized, while outbidding certainly has a clear influence over the actions of terror organizations, this influence is not uniform across groups guided by a different ideological stance, nor does outbidding inherently lead to 'more violent' tactics. However, the question of the deadliness of actions remains.

The comparison of the deadliness of attacks carried out by groupings in a potential outbidding situation to those operating without a competitor, as seen in table 3, showed no evidence supporting the argument that outbidding causes an increase in the deadliness of actions. On the contrary – all tests showed either that attacks carried out by groups operating alone were deadlier than if that same group type was in an outbidding situation, or showed no statistically significant difference between the casualty rates of outbidding compared to not outbidding scenarios.

Table 3: Average casualties per attacks: outbidding vs. not outbidding

		Average fatalities per attack	Significance of difference: fatalities	Average injuries per attack	Significance of difference: injuries
Communist / socialist	Not outbidding	3.05	t=6.63*	3.43	t=1.32**
	Outbidding	1.96		1.02	
Communist / socialist, Nationalist / separatist	Not outbidding	1.48	t=.17**	3.24	t=3.08*
	Outbidding	1.44		1.81	
Communist / socialist, others[27]	Not outbidding	0.38	t=0.70**	0.59	t=0.73**
	Outbidding	0.61		0.94	
Nationalist / separatist	Not outbidding	5.02	t=8.39*	4.89	t=4.06*
	Outbidding	1.43		2.56	
Religious, Nationalist / separatist	Not outbidding	2.81	t=1.7**	6.74	t=.30**
	Outbidding	3.50		7.08	
Nationalist / separatist, other	Not outbidding	3.68	t=6.1*	1.24	t=1.11**
	Outbidding	1.0		1.91	
Religious, others[28]	Not outbidding	.27	t=.28**	.73	t=.10**
	Outbidding	.21		.83	
Religious	Not outbidding	6.56	t=2.14*	13.37	t=1.53**
	Outbidding	3.96		6.01	

* p<.05 ; ** p>.05

Two conclusions may be drawn from the analysis H2: first, while it is certain that outbidding does cause organizations to embrace certain tactical actions as opposed to others, the exact changes seem to be subordinated to the ideological composition of the organization, as groups championing different ideological positions across the spectrum responded differently to outbidding scenarios. Second, the argument that outbidding will cause organizations to become more violent and deadly, at least in regards to terror organizations (as opposed to civil war situations), may be rejected. As such, the next hypotheses focus more on the ideological position, exploring what ideologies cause groupings to become more radical and deadly.

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[27] A total of 446 attacks were carried out by groupings classified in this category, accounting for the low casualty rate.

[28] A total of 66 attacks were carried out by groupings classified in this category, accounting for the low casualty rate.

H3: Communist or religious terror organizations will carry out more violent and deadly attacks compared to organizations guided by a more earthly / grounded ideology.

Analyzing H3, two different comparisons were conducted: The first compared the tactics of those groupings classified as strictly "communist / socialist" or "religious" to those classified as "nationalist / separatist", and the second compared those classified as "communist / socialist, nationalist / separatist" or "religious, nationalist / separatist" to those classified as strictly "nationalist / separatist". The objective was to explore if those groups guided by a larger anti-system framing, a communist or religious one, operate distinctly from the nationalist groupings.

H3 would be substantiated if a similarity was found in the violent tactics or deadliness of anti-system ideologies, communist and religious ones, separating them from the more grounded nationalist grievance. As figure 3 illustrates, while there are marked differences among the ideological clusters, there is little similarity found in the tactics utilized by the anti-system groupings. In nearly all categories analyzed one of the anti-system groupings appeared to be closer to the nationalist / separatist tactics rather than clustered together with the other anti-system grouping, and together they did not favour any particular more radical form of violence. This finding extends to the second comparison as well, as those groupings blending nationalist / separatist along with anti-system framing never appear to favour a specific tactic uniformly, and across nearly all categories one of them is more similar to the nationalist / separatist grouping.

Turning to the analysis of the deadliness of attacks, table 4 – displaying the proportionate amount of attacks and casualties inflicted by the different types of groupings – yields mixed support for H3. On the one hand, focusing on the first two columns suggests that communist ideology, and only communist ideology, drives groupings to carry out more numerous violent attacks, as the first two types of groupings carried out vastly more attacks compared their relative weight. On the other hand, the last two columns tell a slightly different story regarding the deadliness of said attacks: despite the fact that the two communist-affiliated categories are responsible for 50% of all attacks, they are only responsible for 36.82% of all fatalities and for nearly 26% of all injuries. Comparably, while the religiously-motivated groupings are responsible for 28.1% of attacks, they caused 42.31% of all fatalities, and 56.83% of all injuries.

Figure 3: tactics utilized by different group types (%)

Table 4: Attacks carried out by different organizations: 1970-2012

	Number of groupings	Number of attack carried out: 1970-2012	Number of fatalities caused: 1970-2012	Number of injuries caused: 1970-2012
Communist / socialist	69 (11.59%)	18,104 (39.6%)	38,410 (31.45%)	30,325 (19.87%)
Communist / socialist, Nationalist / separatist	21 (3.5%)	4773 (10.4%)	6,567 (5.37%)	9,245 (6.05%)
Nationalist / separatist	146 (24.53%)	8,690 (19.0%)	23,189 (18.98%)	25,127 (16.46%)
Religious, Nationalist separatist	125 (21.0%)	4,179 (9.1%)	13,617 (11.15%)	27,605 (18.09%)
Religious	175 (29.41%)	8,686 (19.0%)	38,060 (31.16%)	59,116 (38.74%)
Total:	**595 (100%)**	**45,680 (100%)**	**122,121 (100%)**	**152,574 (100%)**

Thus, while H3 is supported by the fact that the strictly nationalist / separatist group is the only one where the level of casualties matches what is proportionately expected from the amount of attacks, the increased deadliness of the anti-system ideologies cannot be fully substantiated by table 4. Table 5 offers a final rejection for H3, and leads this study into the fourth hypothesis. As can be seen, groups possessing strictly anti-systemic ideologies do not stand out together as more deadly, and communist/socialist groupings are either found to be on average less deadly (p<0.1, see * beneath table) or insignificantly different compared to nationalist / separatist groupings.

Table 5: average casualties per attack of each organization by major ideological cluster: 1970-2012

	Communist / socialist	Nationalist /separatist	Religious	F (df)	P
Average fatalities per attack	2.35	2.79	4.48	(2, 33164)= 52.409	.000*
Average injuries per attack	1.88	3.57	7.38	(2, 31180)= 15.911	.000**

* p=.000 between religious and all other categories; p=.098 between communist/socialist and nationalist/separatist
** p=.000 between religious and communist/socialist categories; p=.003 between religious and nationalist/separatist categories; no significance found between communist/socialist and nationalist/separatist groupings

H4: the more religious components are found in an organization's ideology, the more violent and deadly its attacks will become.

The analysis of the first two hypotheses suggested that ideology has a crucial part in the selected tactics and in the deadliness of terror organization attacks, and the third hypothesis indicated that rather than a generalized anti-system framing, a religious ideology is likely at the core of increased deadliness of attacks. The following section deviates from the previous ones as rather than comparing various competing ideological positions it singles out religious ideology as a key variable, analyzing the influence of religion on organizational tactics by comparing those groups which combine religion and nationalist/separatist ideologies, and those who possess a more strictly predominant religious ideology, to all other secular groupings.[29]

While already in the previous hypotheses some of the tactical differences between religiously-motivated and secularly-motivated organizations were observed, such as differences in the targeting of utilities or the slight variations observed in attack and weapons usage, three specific observations can be made when the data is evaluated comparing religiously-motivated groupings to all secular ones.

First, regarding the use of suicide terrorism, while figure 3 showed that both the "nationalist and religious" as well as the "religious" groupings favour the use of suicide attacks compared to the various secular organizations, it did not show the proportion of suicide attacks these groups are responsible for out of the total: while constituting 21% of all groupings the "nationalist and religious" organizations were responsible for 26.9% of all suicide attacks, and while constituting 29.41% of all identified groupings the religious groupings carried out 56.1% of all suicide attacks recorded. This leaves the secular ones, 49.59% of the groupings, responsible for only 17% of all suicide attacks.

Second, an interesting finding is revealed when analyzing groupings assuring that their responsibility for an attack is known: compared to secular attacks there was a reasonable doubt in confirmation of the group's identity twice as often for both categories of religiously-motivated groupings. Third, regarding the targeting of property, the influence of religion is seen even more substantially: while 73% of all secularly-motivated attacks resulted in property damage, for the

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[29] The number of groupings and attacks of the strictly religious category varies slightly from the previous analyses, as those 15 groups combining religion along with 'other', not nationalist or separatist components, are excluded from the current analysis.

nationalist / separatist and religious category 61.1% of all attacks targeted property, compared to 53.4% of all strictly religious attacks, lending credence to the notion that religiously-motivated groupings prefer to focus on human casualties rather than on property. Continuing this exploration, I now turn to analyzing the casualties from the groups' various actions.

Table 4 (above) already illustrated that the religiously motivated organizations are the only ones who are responsible for proportionately more casualties than their relative weight of attacks, indicating that their attacks should be more deadly compared to secular organizations. Table 6 substantiates this argument, demonstrating that it is consistent when observing religious influence along a larger spectrum as well: the more religious components are found within an organization's ideology, the deadlier its attacks become. It is noteworthy that this pattern is not altered when controlling for the events of September 11, 2001, and these unique attacks do not significantly influence the results observed.

As H4 predicted, religious ideology appears to motivate organizations to carry out deadlier attacks, and the more religious components are within a grouping's ideology, the deadlier its attacks become. Substantiating this further, several more analyses were conducted to ensure other external factors, beyond outbidding already examined above, are not influencing the results.

Table 6: average casualties per attack of each organization, secular vs. religious: 1970-2012

	Secular	**Nationalist /separatist, Religious**	**Religious**	**F (df)**	**P**
Average fatalities per attack	2.33	3.36	4.48	(2, 42780) = 76.23	.000*
Average injuries per attack	2.30	7.02	7.38	(2, 40582) = 25987	.000**

* Statistical significance found in post-hoc test among all groups at .05
** Statistical significance found in post-hoc test at .001 level between secular and all other categories; not found between secular/religious and religious category (when controlling for secular category).

The first validation, observable in table 7, compared secular and religious attacks[30] in each decade since 1970, exploring whether the fact that religious group activity has soared

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[30] Using a dichotomous secular vs. religious categorization which combined any group that has a religious tendency in its ideology into the "religious" category. This was done primarily for brevity purposes, as adding further

specifically at a time when technology and other innovations have changed could be at the root of the above findings. As can be seen, religious attacks appear to have always been deadlier compared to their secular counterparts. This difference became statistically significant regarding fatalities of attacks already since the decade of 1980, when religious terror attacks constituted only 4.7% of all terror attacks identified, and has been consistently statistically significant regarding injuries caused since the decade of 1990 as well.

A second validation conducted focused on controlling for different regions where religious terrorism is concentrated.[31] The rationale behind this test was that it is possible that certain regions where religious terrorism is concentrated may unto themselves be prone to more violent/hostile terrorism, and as a result the concentration of religious terrorism in their area is inflating the deadliness previously observed. As such, the analysis comparing the deadliness of secular and religious attacks was conducted while controlling for each of these regions individually, exploring whether any specific region distorted the results.

Table 7: average casualties per attack by decade: secular vs. religious

	Fatalities	**Significance of difference: Fatalities**	**Injuries**	**Significance of difference: Injuries**
1970-1979	Secular: 0.95 Religious: 2.67	t=1.53, p>.05	Secular: 1.30 Religious: 1.61	t=.58, p>.05
1980-1989	Secular: 2.58 Religious: 3.69	t=1.9, p<0.1	Secular: 2.35 Religious: 4.02	t=.55, p>.05
1990-1999	Secular: 2.70 Religious: 3.27	t=2.04, p<.05	Secular: 2.09 Religious: 8.61	t=2.48, p<.05
2000-2012	Secular: 2.0 Religious: 4.47	t=8.58, p<.05	Secular: 2.93 Religious: 7.27	t=10.76, p<.05

denominations and incorporating the "religious, nationalist / separatist" category across each decade complicated the overall picture.

[31] The regional division is based on the GTD's divisions, see http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf

Table 8: Average number of fatalities and injuries per secular and religious attack controlling dominant regions

		Average fatalities per attack	t (df)	Average injuries per attack	t(df)
International	Secular	2.33	(15,222) = 8.95*	2.30	(19976) = 6.77*
	Religious	4.10		7.22	
Region controlled for					
Southeast Asia	Secular	2.32	(13473) = 9.11*	2.32	(17325) = 6.44*
	Religious	4.30		7.48	
South Asia	Secular	2.03	(8153) = 7.82*	1.97	(9710) = 5.88*
	Religious	4.38		8.49	
Sub Saharan Africa	Secular	2.18	(12952) = 8.34*	2.22	(19359) = 7.16*
	Religious	3.96		7.32	
Middle East and North Africa	Secular	2.30	(9156) = 6.36*	2.24	(10392) = 4.79*
	Religious	4.07		7.20	

* p<.000

A total of 94.5% of all nationalist/religious or religious attacks occurred in the regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. As indicated in table 8, controlling for the various regions had little to no influence on the previous findings, and in no case was it found that secular terrorism ever surpasses religious terrorism in its deadliness. On the contrary – controlling for the regions of Southeast and Southern Asia even increased the disparity between secular and religious attacks, once again confirming that religious ideology has a substantial influence on the deadliness of terror organizations' attacks, regardless of where the grouping is located.

A final test of the results regarding the influence of religion on the deadliness of terror attacks was a comparison among different religions motivating organizations for violence. While the claim forwarded has been that any type of religious ideology drives organizations to embrace deadlier violence, within the dataset 87.9% of all religious attacks were carried out by Muslim-affiliated groupings.[32] As such, it is possible that it is Muslim groups which tend to be more violent compared to all other groupings, rather than 'religious groups' as a whole.

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[32] This does not suggest that there are not vast ideological denominations among religiously-motivated Muslim groupings as well. Such a nuanced comparison, however, exceeds beyond the scope of the current study.

The first test exploring if Muslim groups, rather than all religiously-motivated groupings, are responsible for the increased deadliness, was a comparison of casualties caused by groupings affiliated with different religions. This examination further confirmed the argument that it is religion, not a particular religious denomination, which is responsible for the increased deadliness of terror attacks: no statistically significant difference was found between the average casualties caused by Muslim attacks and those caused by Christian, Jewish, or Sikh attacks, strengthening the argument that it is religious ideology, not a particular religious stream, which drives the organizations to deadlier actions.

Further validating this, the second test compared the casualties caused by secular and religious groupings while controlling for Muslim organizations, exploring whether the remaining 12.1% of religious attacks were still deadlier than their secular counterparts. As table 9 reveals, the average fatalities per religious attack remains substantially higher than the average fatalities caused per secular attack. Regarding injuries, while the average injuries caused by religious attacks is still substantially higher compared to secular attacks the difference found is not statistically significant, likely a result of the smaller amount of cases remaining in the data following the control for Muslim groupings.

Table 9: Average casualties per attack excluding Muslim groupings

	Secular	Religious	t	P
Average fatalities per attack	2.33	4.09	4.68	.000
Average injuries per attack	2.30	7.14	1.12	.26

Concluding the analysis, a religious ideology has been found to have the most substantive influence over the deadliness of terror organizational attacks. While little evidence was found that a specific type of target, weapon or tactic is exclusively used by religiously-motivated organizations (with the exception of suicide terrorism which is predominantly the tactic of religious groupings), across all hypotheses tested religious ideology was the only one found to exacerbate the targeting of people rather than property, and the only factor which consistently caused the organization to carry out deadlier types of actions. The following section summarizes

the analysis, evaluating its strengths and weaknesses and suggesting future avenues which may be developed following these findings.

Discussion and conclusion

Figure 4 demonstrates the consistent increase in terror attacks being carried out by religiously-motivated organizations over the past three decades. Exploring the factors that influence the violent tactics of terror organizations, this study demonstrated the consequences of this increase, finding that religious ideology has a significant impact on the violence employed by terror organizations.

Figure 4

Proportion of attacks carried out by Secular, Secular/religious and Religious organizations per decade

Contrasting different arguments regarding what influences the violence adopted by terror organizations and adding a much needed empirical examination of the different theories advocated, religious ideology was found to be the only factor which had a consistent exacerbating effect on the deadliness of terror attacks, and – while not causing an overwhelmingly distinct use of violent tactics – also caused organizations to utilize vastly more suicide attacks, and to favour human casualties rather than property. Corroborated with additional tests controlling for time period, religious denomination and geographical region, it was further substantiated that religious groupings tend to carry out deadlier attacks compared to their secular counterparts.

The rejection of hypotheses 1-3 by this study does not entirely invalidate the theories upon which those hypotheses are based. For example, it is certainly possible that the strategic approach simply needs to be augmented to account for more cases of bounded rationality, analyzing the rationality underscoring organizational tactics based upon the grouping's ideological persuasion.[33] Concurrently, it is possible that even if not exacerbating organizational deadliness the anti-system ideologies will cause different types of radicalization, such as for example refusals to negotiate or recognize compromises. What was established, however, is that when it comes to analyzing specific tactics and the deadliness of attacks, religious ideology is the key factor which should be focused on. Furthermore, while not the main focus of the study, it was also observed that the influence of religious ideology may be understood along a spectrum of religious influence rather than dichotomously: regarding both the difference in tactics and the deadliness of attacks, it was observed (table 4; figure 3 above) that *the more religious* the ideology of a terror organization is, *the more* it adheres to the characteristics identified. In this regard, three avenues in particular may be further explored in order to increase our understanding of the causes and mechanisms through which religious ideology has such an influence on the activity of terror organizations.

First, the spectrum of ideologies incorporated with religious components should be further widened and expanded to incorporate a more nuanced measurement of different degrees of religion imbedded within organizational ideology. While the current study limited itself to a three level secular, secular/religious, and religious measurement, future studies should

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[33]An interesting attempt at such an endeavor was conducted by Perry and Hasisi 2015.

disaggregate these components further, exploring the activity of organizations containing a wider more nuanced variety of ideological tenets which may be blended with religious guidance. These categories may include ideologies which contain a religious classification of identities combined with secular grievances, a religious significance imbued to territory along with national or racial grievance, a religious significance attributed to specific violent acts combined with tangible earthly political goals, etc.[34]

A second avenue for future research is refining the conceptualization of organizational ideology in a more dynamic way, viewing it as continuously developing and evolving. While religious components in foundational ideologies may be critical in exploring organizational activity, the expansion to a spectrum of religiosity allows for the measurement of ongoing changes and adjustments within organizations as well, as groups may become more or less religious as their conflict endures. Accordingly, it may be possible to trace the varying predominance of religion within an organization's ideology across critical junctures in the organization's struggle, and explore the resulting impact of such ongoing developments on the organization's actions. For example, a good illustration of how a conflict may evolve to incorporate a more religious / secular outlook is offered by Garner (2013), who focuses on the Chechen and Kashmiri conflicts. While his study points to the changing dynamics of group composition and domination within a conflict, this may be expanded to explore how organizations themselves, such as the Free Syrian Army or the Lebanese Hizballah, can move along the spectrum of religiosity as well.

A third direction for further research involves expanding the dependent variable – i.e. the outcome of different levels of religiosity. While this study examined the influence of different religious levels on the violent activity of organizations, this may be extrapolated further in order to explore the influence of more/less religious guidance on many other factors, including willingness to enter into negotiations with adversaries, in-group / out-group dynamics and alliances, and the use of human and resource mobilization strategies, among other things.

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[34] Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), for example, posit that the combination of an ethno national and religious identity may be particularly deadly compared to other ideological components. While their study did not show conclusive evidence of this, the type of hypotheses they put forth and test are a positive step in this direction.

A note in closing. The data utilized in this research extended from 1970 until the end of 2012. Since then, to take but a few examples, the Syrian Civil War has continued to take its toll with regard to terror attacks and civilian losses, the Islamic State has taken over vast territories in Syria and Iraq and committed countless genocidal acts, Boko Haram has expanded its control in parts of Nigeria and continues to carry out mass atrocities, and the Palestinian Hamas has engaged in several successive flare-ups with Israel and Egypt. As organizations which adhere to different levels and types of religious guidance continue to wage violent campaigns, research must be devoted to understanding the nuances of how different levels of religious ideology engender and encourage different organizational activity, facilitating the exploration of how such radicalism may be confronted as well.

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TOPs: "Terror Organization Profiles": http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/

TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/

Appendix: Classification of organizations analyzed[35]

Communist / socialist

23rd of September Communist League	Croatian Revolutionary Cell-Bruno Busic Dept	National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	Red Brigades Fighting Communist Union (BR-UCC)
Action Directe	Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (Bolivia)	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Red Flag (Venezuela)
All Nepal Free Nationalist Students Union	Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ERP) (Argentina)	Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ)	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Anarchist Liberation Brigade	Ejercito Revolucionario Guevarista (Guevarist Revolutionary Army)	New People's Army (NPA)	Revolutionary Leninist Brigades
Anti-Authority Group (Greece)	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM)	Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
Anti-Imperialist International Brigades	First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)	Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA)	Revolutionary Struggle
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)	Grupo de Combatientes Populares	People's Command	Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of the People Party (PROCUP)
Arab Communist Organization	Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)	People's Liberation Forces (FPL)	Roque Dalton Commando
Baader-Meinhof Group	Japanese Red Army (JRA)	People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	Sandinistas
Black and Red Anarchist and Anti-Authoritarians Initiative (Greece)	KabataangMakabayan (KM)	People's War Group (PWG)	Shining Path (SL)
Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC)	Khmer Rouge	Popular Forces of April 25	Terai Madheshi Mukti Morcha (TMMM)
Chilean Committee of Support for the Peruvian Revolution	Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)	Popular Liberation Army (EPL)	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction)	Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)	Popular Resistance (Laiki Antistasi)	Tupamaros (Uruguay)
Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) (Belgium)	Maoist Communist Center (MCC)	Proletarian Nucleus	Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	Maruseido (Marxist Youth League)	Purbo Banglar Communist Party	Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF)(THKP-C)
Communist Party of India- Marxist-Leninist	Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH)	Red Army Faction (RAF)	Weather Underground, Weathermen

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[35] This list includes groups as they appear in their original spelling in the Global Terrorism Database. Omitted from the list are groupings which were included in the research due to their identification, however do not form a cohesive group unto themselves (see note 14 above).

Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M)	Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Venezuela)	Red Brigades	Workers' Revolutionary Party

Communist / socialist, Nationalist / separatist

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	Ninth of June Organization	Terra Lliure
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Omar Torrijos Commando for Latin American Dignity	United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
Dev Sol	National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)	Republic of New Afrika	Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)
Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)			

Communist / socialist, Other

2nd of June Movement	Conscientious Arsonists (CA)	November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)	Revolutionary Nuclei
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)	International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)	People's Revolutionary Organization	Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)
Anarchist Faction	Lebanese National Resistance Front	Peykar	United Popular Action Movement
Anarchists Attack Team	May 19 Communist Order	Popular Revolutionary Army (Mexico)	Zapatista National Liberation Army
Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ)	National Front (Greece)	Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR)	Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation
Black Revolutionary Assault Team	New Revolutionary Popular Struggle (NELA)	Proletarian Nuclei for Communism	

Nationalist / separatist

15th May Organization	Catholic Reaction Force	Karenni National Progressive Party	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Gen Cmd (PFLP-GC)
28 May Armenian Organization	Colonel Karuna Faction	Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	Puerto Rican Resistance Movement
Abu Musa Group	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	Kuki Liberation Army (KLA)	Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)	Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)	Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)	Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)
Adivasi National Liberation Army (ANLA)	Croatian Freedom Fighters	Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)	Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
African National Congress (South Africa)	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)	Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	Revolutionary Action Organization of the Arab Resistance Front
Al Faran	Dima Halao Daoga (DHD)	Lebanese Liberation Front	Revolutionary Eelam Organization (EROS)
Al Hadid	Egypt's Revolution	Liberation Battalion	Revolutionary Outburst Movement
Al Zulfikar	Eritrean Liberation Front	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front	Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front	Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)	Revolutionary Violence Units
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	Fatah Hawks	Macheteros	Sardinian Autonomy Movement
al-Fatah	Fatah Uprising	Martyr Sami al-Ghul Brigades	Save Kashmir Movement
Al-Mansoorian	Force 17	May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine	Shahin (Falcon)
Albanian National Army (ANA)	Free Democratic People's Government of Laos	MayiMayi	South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	South Moluccans
Amal	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)	Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)	South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA)
Arab Revolutionary Army	Front for the Liberation of the French Somali Coast	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Sovereign Panama Patriotic Front
Arab Struggle	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP)	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
Arab Unionist Nationalist Organization	Gazteriak	National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	Support of Ocalan-The Hawks of Thrace
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan	Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (EAN)	National Liberation Union	Syrian Social Nationalist Party
ArmataCorsa	Guadeloupe Liberation Army	New Armenian Resistance	Tanzim
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN)	Hector Rio De Brigade	Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC)	The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave – Renewed (FLEC)
Armed Commandos of Liberation	Ijaw militants	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	The World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI)
Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA)	Indigenous People's Federal Army (IPFA)	Omar Bin Khattab Group	Tontons Macoutes

Armenian Red Army	Iparretarrak (IK)	Omega-7	Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)
Armenian Revolutionary Army	Iraqi Liberation Army	Orange Volunteers (OV)	Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Orly Organization	Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP)	Oromo Liberation Front	United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) - India
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)	Islamic Renewal Movement	Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	United Nasirite Organizaiton
Black December	JanatantrikTeraiMuktiMorcha (JTMM)	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) - Bangladesh
Black Liberation Army	Jordanian National Liberation Movement	Pan-Turkish Organization	United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
Black September	Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide	Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) - Bangladesh	United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC)
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)	Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO)	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	Young Liberators of Pattani
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)	Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (KLNLF)	People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)
Canary Islands Independence Movement	Karen National Union	Polisario Front	Zviadists

Religious, Nationalist / separatist

1920 Revolution Brigades	Dagestani Shari'ahJamaat	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Mujahedeen Corps in Iraq
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	East Turkistan Liberation Organization	Islamic Party (Somalia)	Mujahedeen Shura Council
Afghan Mujahideen	Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK)	Mujahideen Islam Pattani
Agudat Israel Party	GiladShalhevet Brigades	Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	Mujahideen Kashmir
Ahrar Al-Jalil (Free People of the Galilee)	God's Army	Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh)	Mullah Dadullah Front
Al-Arifeen	God's Oppressed Army	Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan)	Muslim Separatists
Al-Badr	Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Jamiatul-Mujahedin (JuM)	Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)
Al-Madina	Hanafi Muslims	Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front	Palestinian Hezbollah
Al-Mujahedin Brigades (Palestine)	Harakatul-Mujahidin (HuM)	Jaysh al-Muslimin (Army of the Muslims)	Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Al-Nusrah Front	Harkatul Ansar	Jenin Martyrs Brigades	Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

Al-Qassam Brigades	Hizb-I-Islami	Jewish Armed Resistance	People's United Liberation Front (PULF)
Al-Umar Mujahideen	Hizballah	Jewish Committee of Concern	Phillipine Moslems
Algerian Islamic Extremists	Hizballah Palestine	Jewish Defense League (JDL)	Popular Resistance Committees
Algerian Moslem Fundamentalists	Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)	Jewish Fighting Organization (Eyal)	Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
Algerian Moujahideen for Moslems	Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	Jewish Terror	Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)
Allah's Tigers	Holders of the Black Banners	Jihad Pegah	Saif-ul-Muslimeen
Ansar al-Din	Imam Hussein Brigade	Jund Al-Tawid	Salah al-Din Brigade
Ansar al-Jihad	Indian Mujahideen	Jundallah	Somali National Alliance
Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)	Iraqi Moslems	Kach	Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Ansar al-Sunna	Iraqi Mujahideen	Kata'ib al-Khoul	Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
Ansar al-TahwidwalSunna	Iraqi Sunni Extremists	Komando Jihad (Indonesian)	Sword of Islam
Ansarul Islam (Pakistan)	Islambouli Brigades of al-Qa'ida	Kurdish Islamic Unity Party	Tawhid and Jihad
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT)	Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)	Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
Banner of Islam	Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq)	Lashkar-e-Omar	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Bersatu	Islamic Companies	Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	Temple Mount Faithful Movement
Black Widows	Islamic Courts Union (ICU)	Laskar Jihad	Thai Islamic Militants
Caucasus Emirate	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain	Mahaz-e-Inquilab	The Islamic Revolution to Liberate Palestine
Christ Chaos	Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)	Mahdi Army	Turkestan Islamic Party
Christian Palestinian group	Islamic Jihad Union (Uzbekistan)	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	Turkish Islamic Commandos
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA)	Islamic Movement of Kashmir	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	United Company of Holy War
Dagestan Liberation Army	Islamic Movement of Martyrs	Moslem opponents of Gemayel	United Jihad Council

Nationalist / separatist, Other

Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries	Fourth Reich Skinheads	National Bolshevik Party (Partiya Natsionalnikh Bolshevikov – PNB)	Resistenza Corsa
Al Borkan Liberation Organization	Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka)	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)	Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist)
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	Group for Martyred Isam as-Sartawi	Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU)	Spanish National Action
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	Kanglei Yawol KannaLup (KYKL)	Red Army for the Liberation of Catalonia	Terror Against Terror
Breton Liberation Front (FLB)	M-19 (Movement of April 19)	Republic of Texas	Union of Peaceful Citizens of Algeria

Religious, Other

Anti-Communist Command (KAK)	Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA)	Islamic Swords of Justice in the Land of Ribat	Protectors of Islam Brigade
Anti-Zionist Movement	Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	Kahane Chai	Right Wing Christian extremists
Christian Group for the Respect for Life	Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT)	Movement for the Protection of Jerusalem	World Church of the Creator
Christian Liberation Army	Imam Ali Brigade	Phineas Priesthood	

Religious

Abdullah Azzam Brigades	Brigades of Iman Hassan-al-Basri	Islamic Mujahidin	Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)
Abu al-Abbas	Brigades of Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman	Islamic Revenge Organization	Muslim Brotherhood
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades	Committee for the Safeguard of the Islamic Revolution	Islamic Revival Movement	Muslim United Army (MUA)
AdanAbyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	Deccan Mujahideen	Islamic Revolutionary Command	Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO)
Al Jihad	Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	Islamic Struggle Front	Nahzat e Eslami
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)	Egyptian Tawhid and Jihad	Islamic Tendency	Organization of Mujahadin of Islam
Al-Haramayn Brigades	Fatah al Islam	Islamic Unification Movement	Organization of Soldiers of the Levant
al-Intiqami al-Pakistani	Generation of Arab Fury	Jadid Al-Qa`idah Bangladesh (JAQB)	Partisans of the Sunni
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami(AIAI)	God our Father Cult	Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura	Saad bin AbiWaqas Brigades
Al-Qa`ida	Guardians of the	Jaish Usama	Salafi Abu-Bakr al-

	Islamic Revolution		Siddiq Army
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq	Guardsmen of Islam	Jaish-e-Islam	Salafia Jihadia
Al-Qa'ida in Lebanon	Gulbuddin Hekmatyar group	Jamiat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan	Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)
Al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia	Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami	Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)	Saudi Hizballah
Al-Qa'ida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division	Harakatul-Mujahidin Al-Almi	Jamaat-al-Fuqra	Secret Organization of al-Qa'ida in Europe
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Harakat-i-Inqilahi-i-Islami	Jama'atulMujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)	Servants of Islam Organization
Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)	Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan	Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	Shield of Islam Brigade
Al-Qa'ida Organization for Jihad in Sweden	HikmatulZihad	Jihad Islamic League Front	Sicarii
Al-Qa'ida in Yemen	Holy Spirit Movement	Jihadi Movement of the Sunna People of Iran	Sipah-I-Mohammed
Al-Shabaab	International Justice Group (Gama'a al-Adela al-Alamiya)	Jordanian Islamic Resistance	Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin	Iraqi Islamic Vanguards for National Salvation (IIVNS)	Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad	Soldiers of the Caliphate
Al-SunnawalJamma	Iraq's Jihadist Leagues	Junaid Jihadist Battalion	Soldiers of the Prophet's Companions
Ananda Marga	Islamic Action Organization	Katsina Muslim Society	Somali Islamic Front
Ansar Al Sunnah (Palestine)	Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)	Khorasan Jihadi Group	Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)
Ansar al-Islam	Islamic Defense Force	Lashkari-e-Adam (Army of Adam)	Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Ansar Allah	Islamic Fateh	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Supreme Islamic Council
Ansar al-Sunnah Army	Islamic Front	Liberation Army Fifth Battalion	Takfirwal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus)
Ansar Jerusalem	Islamic Glory Brigades in the Land of the Nile	Islamic Holy War Group	Taliban
Ansaru (Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan)	Islamic Jihad Brigades	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Tawhid and Jihad (Palestine)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)	Tayeb Al-Afghani's Islamist Group
Army of God	Islamic Jihad Organization (Yemen)	Movement of Islamic Action of Iraq	Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami (TTI)
Army of Islam	Islamic Liberation Organization	Movement of the Islamic State (MEI)	Turkish Hizballah
Asbat al-Ansar	Islamic Movement for Change	Mujahedeen Army	Turkish Islamic Jihad
AumShinriKyo	Islamic Salvation Front	Mujahedin Kompak	Uganda Democratic

	(FIS)		Christian Army (UDCA)
Black Brigade	Islamic Salvation Movement	Mujahedeen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem	Wolves of Islam
Black Friday	Islamic Shashantantra Andolon (ISA)	Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)	Youth of Islamic Awakening
Boko Haram	Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	Mujahidin Ambon	