

Can't Have Politics without the Party:

The relationship between public opinion and the elections to the European Parliament

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This is to certify that the thesis prepared

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Abstract

The objective of this thesis is two-fold: first, to determine how parties get elected to the European Parliament (EP); second, how they vote, once in power. I compare two founding member states (France and the Netherlands) to two newer ones (Poland and Hungary). In order to investigate the degree of disconnection between public opinion and the votes of these countries' delegates, I measure the former through the so-called Eurobarometer surveys. I count the bills voted on, broken down by political party for the time between May 2014 and March 2016.

Dedication

Thank you for my loving parents, sister and nonna for their everlasting support

Thank you to my girlfriend for her understanding and belief in me every step of the way

Thank you to Dr. Axel Huelsemeyer for his guidance and teachings throughout the process

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Introduction

Within the European Union (EU), the European Parliament (EP) is the only body that is directly elected since 1979. Elections take place in each of the member states separately, and the number of seats allotted is divided according to the size of their respective populations. I selected two founding member states in France and the Netherlands and two newer member states with Poland and Hungary accounting for size variation as well. The purpose of my thesis is twofold; first to determine how they get elected and then to assess how they vote in the EP.

The dependent variable in my study has two parts, the first is the European Parliamentary election results with the aim of finding out how parties get elected (see Appendix 1) and the second is voting of the political parties of the European Parliament and the goal is to understand what happens once they are elected to this body. The two elections I will be looking at as points of comparison are the 2009 and 2014; the two most recent ones to have taken place. I then also use the VoteWatch website to count on all bills in two specific issue areas which are the economy and foreign and security policy. The independent variable of my study is public opinion and I gauge it by using the Eurobarometer (EB) for four member states prior to the 2014 elections and after to determine if any changes are present and what the relationship is to the results.

The first section provides the methodology. Secondly, I present the results from the two elections, as well as the Eurobarometer prior to and post the 2014 elections. In the third section, I examine the results of voting in the European Parliament for the four member states. Finally, I examine the results theoretically. I conclude with the implications of the study.

Methodology

I begin this chapter by presenting my variables as well as their indicators. I will provide an overview of the four countries I selected for my study and how they allow me to account for possible variations in multiple ways.

DV

I put forth two parts to my dependent variable (DV). These are aimed at providing insight into the variation or stability between the two most recent elections and what occurs once the representatives take their seats in the EP. The first part of my DV is the European parliamentary election results for June 2009 and May 2014 (the two most recent ones). The indicators are the seat share in the EP after the 2009 and 2014 elections, respectively. I gather this data from the European Parliament's (European Parliament 2017) website (i.e. what individually members got elected from which party in my four countries).

The second part of my DV (see Appendix 2) is how European parliamentarians vote on particular bills (on the economy and on foreign policy) from the 2014 election until March 2016. The former is one that is commonly understood as part of the European portfolio, while the latter falls traditionally under the jurisdiction of the member states¹. The timeline begins after the 2014 EP election and ends at the point in which I began gathering data which was March 2016. In order to gather these votes for each bill, I used the only database that contains this type of information, VoteWatch.eu (2016). With this website I can access each bill for a specific date range and a particular issue area. I chose to focus on two issue areas.

IV

The independent variable is about public opinion; it seeks to determine if public opinion leads to the election of political parties or alternatively that the election of political parties lead public opinion. The indicator is public opinion in the EU; as a measurement I use the surveys by the so-called Eurobarometer (EB). The EB is a survey conducted by public opinion firms on behalf of the European Commission; its main product is the so-called Standard EB, which takes place twice a year by engaging in a thousand representative phone interviews for each member state. The purpose is to determine how the public in the four member states felt prior to the 2014 EP election and then how they felt after. I use the EB surveys from November 2013 and 2014ⁱⁱ. I selected the following questions (European Commission 2016):

- Trust in the European Union?
- A common foreign policy of the 28 member states of the EU?
- A common defence and security policy among EU member states?ⁱⁱⁱ
- What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation of the European Union?
- Trust or tend to trust the European Parliament?

Country Selection

I compare France, Poland, the Netherlands and Hungary in order to capture any possible variation along three lines: (a) between a large founding member (France) and a big country of the most recent 2004 enlargement wave (Poland); (b) between a small founding state (the Netherlands) and an equally-sized addition in 2004 (Hungary); as well as (c) between the original member states (France and the Netherlands) versus new ones (Poland and Hungary).^{iv} Within the European

Parliament, France has the second-largest EP seat share (after Germany) with 74. By contrast, Poland holds 51 seats. The Netherlands have 26 seats, whereas Hungary's EP share is 21 (European Parliament 2017).

The Path to Getting Elected

This section is about the first part of my dependent variable. According to Hix et al. (2007, 134-35), the role national parties have in the voting of the political parties and their decisions remains strong in the face of their placement in the European Parliament.

France

The *Front National (FN)* has a long history within France. Founded in 1972 and led from its inception until 2011 by Jean-Marie LePen put forth a nationalistic French vision. The FN made its first breakthrough in the late 1980s by increasing its vote share at both the national and EP levels. In the following decades, the divisiveness of its leader made it difficult to attain success. That changed in 2011 when Marie LePen differentiated herself from her father and took over the party's leadership. (Ray 2017)

The *Front National* wants to take France out of the European Union. Much of its time is spent explaining the need and desire for the country to become more independent and while it does not often explicitly state its desire to remove itself from the EU it is classifiable as Eurosceptic (Front National 2016), although not as extreme as some of its European counterparts.

Les Républicains, on the other end of the spectrum, is a party that fits within the country's mainstream politics. It is important to note that they are a renamed version of the Union for a Popular Movement but their ideals remained the same. The newly named party's platform makes

direct mention of their desire for an open and democratic Europe as well as a European citizenry (Les Républicains 2016). It is without question that they fit within the middle part of the political spectrum in France and they are open advocates for the European Union. At the national level they had immense success in the 2012 having won the official opposition and they were the majority party in 2007 (Election Resources on the Internet 2017b). Their success at both levels makes the FN's success that much more unique.

At the national level the *FN* managed to collect a total of only two of the total of 577 seats while *Les Républicains* garnered 194 (Election Resources on the Internet 2017b). In 2009, the party with the most seats was *Les Républicains* at 29 and the least was the *Front National* with only three, but that changed with the 2014 election (see Appendix 3). The *Front National* became the strongest party with 23 seats while the previous majority holder, *Les Républicains*, saw themselves relegated to second with 19 members elected (European Parliament 2017).

Poland

The party that has recently emerged is *Law and Justice*. It has not progressed through its history without a share of controversy. While its elected officials have expressed negative opinions about minorities, the party has still attained success at the national level. *Law and Justice* won a national election in 2005 and it has been able to translate this success to the EP level. (The Democratic Society 2017c)

Law and Justice has emerged as the one of the leading parties in the European Parliament after trailing the governing party by ten seats after their inaugural election. Not only did it gain at the EP level but it also won the national government in 2015 (Smith 2015). While its views are not extreme in any sense, it is Eurosceptic to a similar degree as its French counterpart, the *Front*

National. Its view is that control over economic affairs and immigration should remain out of the hands of the EU, but it is by no means completely against the European Union or its institutions (Smith 2015).

Civic Platform is the first party in the country's history to hold back to back terms in power; however, it began as the opposition party to *Law and Justice*. While not a deep history, it does have a recent reputation of holding power in the country and evidently at the European level.^v It is centred on economic strength, social justice and many liberal ideas that are not present in the opposition parties. *Civic Platform* believes less in nationalistic values and more in the need to be part of a thriving Europe; its party leader has been touted for the Presidency of the European Commission. It has also shown interest in joining the Eurozone, but has not yet set a schedule to do so (The Democratic Society 2017b).

Congress of the New Right and *KORWiN* hold nearly exactly the same set of values, especially their views of the European Union. The *Congress of the New Right* was founded by Janusz Korwin-Mikke as Eurosceptics (PECOB 2016). After apparently fathering two children out of wedlock, he was removed as a member of the Congress of the New Right (Radio Poland 2015). In the face of this event he founded a new party. *The Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic - Freedom and Hope (KORWiN)* was his new platform to promote the same Eurosceptic ideas (Nardelli 2015).

The situation in Poland is slightly different. There was not one party that grew its seat share the way *FN* did but there was a shift in the same direction. Prior to the 2014 EP election *Civic Platform* had 25 of the 51 Polish seats while *Law and Justice* had 15 and both the *Congress of the New Right* and *KORWiN* had none. This changed in 2014 when *Civic Platform* and *Law and Justice* now both held 19 seats, while the latter had two each (see Appendix 4).

The Netherlands

Led at the time by Geert Wilders, the *Party for Freedom* took an anti-EU position and obtained enough seats nationally to have influence as the balance of power (The Democratic Society 2017d). The role of its longtime leader shaped the party's position. Wilders advocates for the Netherlands leaving the EU as well as the return of the country's old currency (Hale et al. 2017).

The *Party for Freedom* is the polar opposite of its mainstream counterpart *CDA*. Led by Geert Wilders, it managed to obtain increased popularity in the March 2017 Dutch election. While an important proclamation of the party is that the Netherlands must remove themselves from the European Union, it also holds an anti-Islamic position (Evans 2017).

Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) came from the formation of three of the most dominant parties in Dutch history. Their paths were closely tied together having worked hand in hand on many occasions and the *CDA* quickly emerged as a party able to appease many sides. While the party is built on different factions, one of the key tenants is its commitment to the European Union. Its performance at the national level has been anything but consistent however it still holds part of the popular vote and with the most seats at the EP level it has proven to be able to obtain a high enough level of support to make it relevant (The Democratic Society 2017a).

Christian Union-Reformed Political Party offers the Dutch population a more moderate option than the *Party for Freedom*. While extreme in its own right, its focus has not been attacking the European Union, it has chosen more value based elements. The party leadership, in the face of a court ruling against its refusal to allow women as members, emphasized that its belief is based solely on the teachings of the bible (BBC News 2005).

Its 26 seats are shared by eight different political parties from different parts of the spectrum (European Parliament 2017). The first aspect that stands out is the even distribution of seats, the most held by one party is five while the least is two (see Appendix 5). The seats won by each party and how they are divided help to tell a story just as was the case for the prior two countries. *Christian Democratic Appeal* has managed to maintain a five seat share in both of the past elections while the highly Eurosceptic *Party for Freedom* held four for two consecutive elections. It is the less Eurosceptic and more mainstream *Christian Union - Reformed Political Party* who obtained only a couple of seats but sits right in between the two governing parties ideologically.

Hungary

The current national governing party, *Fidesz*, gained success shortly after its founding in 1988. The party leader, Viktor Orbán, brought *Fidesz* to power in 1997 which it held until 2002. In the wake of the financial crisis, it returned to power in 2008. (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2014)

Fidesz has been able to maintain also in the EP elections^{vi} (Election Resources on the Internet 2017a). While mainstream nationally, the party considered Eurosceptic in the EP. Viktor Orbán, opposes the way the Union is currently designed and even doubts its ability to last if it does not change its ways (Mudde 2015). This rhetoric carries more doubt in the EU than the supporting Hungarian parties.

Jobbik: Movement for a Better Hungary is clearly Eurosceptic (Jobbik 2017). Its leader believes that the EU is a body for the rich countries to take advantage of the poorer ones. These words have also translated into actions; party President Gábor Vona, has staged multiple protests and has also made the symbolic gesture of burning the flag of the European Union (The Orange

Files 2016). It rejects the various EU treaties and suggests that Hungary could leave and join forces with a country such as Iceland (The Orange Files 2016).

The situation in Hungary is very similar to that of the Netherlands in terms of political stability at the EP level. The main difference is that the seat distribution is not as even and there are only four main parties represented with over half of its 21 seats going to *Fidesz* (European Parliament 2017). Three of the other main parties hold less than three seats each, and those parties are *Jobbik*, *Democratic Coalition* and *Hungarian Socialist Party* (see Appendix 6). The uniqueness for Hungary is that the main seat holder over the last two elections has been a party that holds moderately-Eurosceptic views.

2013 Eurobarometer Results

Now that I have identified first part of my DV, I will present the results for my IV. The first of my EB questions is *Trust in the European Union* (European Commission 2013). In the 2013 Eurobarometer survey^{vii} of my four countries, with the lowest levels of trust^{viii} were in France with only 28% of their population expressing support (see Appendix 7). Levels of support for the EP are slightly more positive but follow the same trend as the EU (see Appendix 8). France has the lowest levels of trust for the European Parliament at 38% and the highest in terms of not trusting that institution with 47%.

The Eurobarometer asks the respondents what their expectations are for the next year on the Union's economic situation (European Commission 2013). The country that had the lowest positive view (see Appendix 9) was France with 17% feeling as though it would be better in the coming twelve months while also holding the highest negative view at 29% (the EB distinguishes votes between positive and negative views).^{ix}

Respondents are asked for their view of a need for a common foreign policy of the 28 member states (European Commission 2013). For this question, the overall trend is that the respondents for all four countries are much more in favour of such a policy than against (see Appendix 10). The citizens of the Netherlands are the lowest of that group with 54% and also the highest against with 42%, the trend is similar when it comes to the question of a common defence and security policy for all EU member states (European Commission 2013). For this question (see Appendix 11) Hungary has the lowest levels of support.

2014 Eurobarometer Results

Trust in the European Union was lowest in France at 36% (see Appendix 12). In terms of the other three member states, there was an increase in support as well. Support for the EP was once again lowest in France (see Appendix 13). Overall support for the EP has also increased. Trust in this supranational institution remained the same in France at 38%, but distrust dropped to 44%. The greatest swing occurred in the Netherlands. The view of respondents on the economic situation for the next twelve months^x (see Appendix 14) demonstrates that France remained stable, which was not the case for any of the other three member states. In relation to a common foreign policy for the 28 member states, France was remained stable while the Netherlands and Poland saw increased levels of support and Hungary more opposition (see Appendix 15). In terms of support for a common defence and security policy (see Appendix 16), there has been movement in three of the four member states; the only one left fairly unchanged is France. The trend between the two years is that; the people of France have the most stable opinions between the two EB surveys with increased satisfaction coming only in relation to support for the EU in general and the EP concretely. In the other three member states, the trends were not as stable and variation did occur.

Actions in the European Parliament

The actions of political parties and what it means for the European Union continues during their time in office. The results thus far have brought about specific trends based on party placement and public opinion in each country. Now that that has been established the objective is to better understand what the parties do once in power. There are two issues areas on which I focus; the economy and foreign and security policy.^{xi} In this chapter I begin by presenting the results for the economic bills and then proceed to compare that to what occurred in the area of foreign and security policy.

Economy

The economy of the European Union has not been as stable as the member states would have hoped for. The Eurozone crisis from September 2009 caused high levels of uncertainty and put the economies of all countries involved at risk. Inaction on this issue was not an option because it would have led to a possible collapse of the system. It was therefore necessary to find a way to bounce back from this crisis and react in a way that would ensure that this type of event is prevented in the future. The argument is that if the Euro were to fail it could lead to the ultimate failure of the European Union as well (Bastian and Rossi 2011, 10-11).^{xii}

I expect that the mainstream political parties would reflect in their voting higher support for the bills presented. In terms of the extreme and moderately Eurosceptic parties, I would expect variation but overall a lower level of support across the board. The results for the economic bills are broken down individually by country (see Appendices 17-20).^{xiii}

It is evident that all mainstream parties voted highly in favour of economic bills. While the percentages varied between 73% on the low end and 89% on the high end, the main trend is that across the board they voted very minimally against these types of bills. Evidenced from this is a desire to further cement, or in certain cases increase, the power that the European Union has over the economy by political parties. In France, Poland and the Netherlands, the pro-EU parties hold either the most or second most. Although in Hungary the situation is different, with the two pro-EU parties holding the least amount of seats. However, they did still vote overwhelmingly in favour of the economic legislation put before the European Parliament. On the other end of the spectrum, the highly-Eurosceptic parties ranged in support for these bills at 7% on the low end to 46% on the high end. The 46% is still support less than half of the time, which is vastly different from what we saw with the pro-EU. In this group of parties, *Jobbik* in Hungary was the party that voted most in favour of all of those in this group. In the middle of these two sets of parties are the moderately-Eurosceptic ones who range from 46% to 93% in support for this legislation. The *Front National*, as the outlier of the first part of my DV, was on the low end of support at 46%. The trend is that a newly elected moderately-Eurosceptic party is on the low end of support for economic bills, while the party that has been able to hold on to this power for multiple elections has established itself on the high end. I will now examine the voting results for bills on foreign and security policy.

Foreign and Security Policy

The European Union has been far from immune to the terrorist threats that have faced the globe in the 21st century. Since 2013 the threat to the EU has come in a multitude of forms and warrants serious consideration. Further to this issue is that the dangers are not coming from a singular

source, these groups are diverse (Europol 2014). This reality means that the European Parliament has had to consider what the Union could do to protect all member states from these threats.

Integration has traditionally not developed to the same extent for foreign and security policy as it has for economic matters. There was not even a discussion of a common foreign policy in any of the treaties, even into the early 2000s (McCormick 2008, 337-339). Both the founders and the subsequent developers of the EU had little intention to increase the bloc's jurisdiction in this area. I expect that even those most strongly supporting the Union would be hesitant to give up some of their own power and transfer it to the supranational body. The results for the votes in this issue area are divided the same way as the economic ones (see Appendices 21-24).

There first trend that emerges is that all of the parties voted in favour less than they did on economic bills. The pro-EU parties were in support of these bills but the range was slightly lower with a high of only 82% and a low of 73%. The highest levels of support came from all four countries. The trend is similar on the low end as well and overall there is not much variation in terms of the results for the pro-EU parties. There is more variation among the highly-Eurosceptic parties with the lowest level of support coming from the Netherlands and the highest at 50% from France, with Hungary not far behind at 45%. The least support comes from the *Front National* in France while the highest is *Fidesz* from Hungary. The variation is once again present and in the case of the pro-EU and moderately Eurosceptic parties levels of support are generally lower for foreign and security policy relative to the economy.

Theoretical Foundations

In order to address both parts of my DV I will employ the theory of neofunctionalism. The alternative theory would have been historical institutionalism.^{xiv} I begin by providing an overview

of the theory and then focus on the specific elements that are most relevant for my study. I use the rationale of actors aspect to answer the first part of my dependent variable and then the third section applies the spillover effects and how that explains the results of the second part of my DV. Finally, I address the theory's future expectations.

Overview of Neofunctionalism

Haas took functional workings with the objectives of federalists. The main tenants of this theory are founded upon “technocratic decision making, incremental change and learning process” and it was Jean Monnet who added the importance of the spillover effect. As it relates to supranational institutions, and more specifically the EU, this theory would, at the outset, be able to shed light on how decisions are taken, what changes over time and how the actors within these institutions learn from the occurrences. While the theory itself has varying definitions due to its somewhat broad explanations it does have five basic assumptions^{xv} but there are two that specifically apply to my study and the results that I am explaining. The first is the rationale of actors which directly answers the first part of my dependent variable and the second is the spillover effect which lends itself perfectly to the ladder DV.

The rationale of actors portion of neofunctionalist theory emphasizes the ability on the part of elected officials^{xvi} to be able to learn and change as they progress through various institutions and situations (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 45-49). This addresses how parties get elected and why the changes can occur between various election cycles. Therefore neofunctionalism can help to explain why a group of parties in one country or generally across the board may gain power in one year when they failed to hold much after the previous election. Haas argues that actors learn

through processes of decision making and negotiating how to come up with policy that ensures their continued power and also benefits their region (Haas 1968, 291). With the recognition that the national government cannot solve all of the country's issues and knowing that the European Union holds a key to power and solutions (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 48) parties can shift their focus to the supranational level and aim to capture power there to make the changes they desire. Shifting their focus though has intrinsic in it the fact that the representatives come with a predetermined notion of the role of government, policy and the electorate (Haas 1968, 289).

The second element of the theory is the spillover effect. At its foundation it is the idea that there are some areas that rely on each other to such a degree that they are interconnected and therefore what happens in one will have an effect on the other (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 49). This led to the argument made during the early days of the European Union which was that the integration on which the Union was founded led to a realization that other areas would come into the fold as well (Haas 1968, 292). While this spillover may be recognized by the actors and they are aware of what is occurring, the argument made by neofunctionalists is that this is something that occurs by virtue of the systems and the way they are built (Haas 1968, 383). As the EU gains increased powers, the national governments give in and relinquish some of their own (Schmitt 1968, 229). The spillover aspect of neofunctionalism argues that the way in which institutions are built leads to an inevitable connection between areas which will lead to similar developments occurring.

Analysis of the Results

The neofunctionalist argument for the first part of my study is that the ability for parties to learn and grow in the way they think likely led them to be able to adjust and obtain the levels of success

that they did. This idea further posits that actors are self-interested and it's most foundational level the objective of all politicians and political parties is to get elected and stay in power. However, a desire to get elected would not in and of itself lead to electoral success and a change of seats in the EP. The second relevant element of the rationale of actors is that they have the ability to learn and adjust their beliefs or policies (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 48). This leads to the most likely conclusion that the highly and moderately-Eurosceptic parties in all four countries were able to identify the desire of their populations for someone to oppose the current EU establishment.

Once elected the political parties are faced with the challenge of voting for and deciding on legislation that comes before them on a daily basis. This was therefore the focus of the second part of my dependent variable, understanding what occurs once these representatives are elected. The voting across both issue areas divided greatly along the types of parties with the pro-EU ones being most in favour, highly-Eurosceptic ones least in favour and the moderately-Eurosceptic ones were right in the middle. The first trend that emerged was that the support levels across the board were lower for foreign and security policy than they were for the economy but what can be seen is that there is still some support for further EU power in the former. The fact that the voting trend though was the same in both areas is best explained by the concept of spillover. With the elected officials having established an understanding of the expansive role of the European Union in the area of the economy, as expected by neofunctionalists, this focus likely shifted to a different area and in this case it was foreign and security policy (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 48). The lower support levels demonstrate that they are not fully at the same level yet, but the similar voting trends point to the most likely conclusion of spillover having occurred. Since this is a fairly new development, the continued advancement will take time. According to neofunctionalists, it is only

once the lobbying groups and other elites join in the fight, that this support gap will continue to close (Haas 1968, 292).

Future Expectations

The results for Hungary are a counterweight for those in France. The former has a moderately-Eurosceptic party that has had long term success at both levels of government^{xvii} and then the latter has a newly elected party of that same mindset and their majority seat share at the EP level is their first widely achieved success. Comparing the two extremes helps to assess what the future may hold once a moderately-Eurosceptic party gets newly elected at the EP level. The results for voting in both issue areas demonstrated that the *Front National* from France was on the low end of support for the bills presented in the EP while *Fidesz* from Hungary was on the high end for the moderately-Eurosceptic parties. This demonstrates that, as argued by neofunctionalism, actors learn and grow and since their aim is to remain in power they learn what it takes to ensure they still stay true to their base but that they do not come off too extreme and get voted out. The expectation then is that if the *Front National* wishes to remain in power and guarantee their continued success then they cannot abandon their opposition to elements of EU power but they will need to adapt slightly and become slightly more supportive, if they do not then their void will likely be filled by another party of the same political mindset.

Conclusion

This study had two main questions: first, how do political parties get elected? Second, how they vote on bills once elected. For the first one, a link developed between lower support for the specific Eurobarometer questions and an increased electoral success for the moderately-Eurosceptic

parties, although success levels varied. The moderately-Eurosceptic *Front National* for France had the highest level of seat increase between the 2009 and 2014 EP elections. For Poland, there was a slight rise in the seat share for the moderately-Eurosceptic *Law and Justice* party. The seats were equally divided among the EP parties represented in the Netherlands, including the moderately-Eurosceptic ones. Hungary saw little change between elections in the seat distribution, but only here did a moderately-Eurosceptic party have past success. Overall, France was the only country in which public backing was lower for all EB questions, both prior to and after the 2014 EP election. Citizen support varied in the other three member states, depending on the EB question. Therefore, to answer the first research question (DV, first part) and using the neofunctionalist theory, when the politicians of these parties see this low support across EB questions, they are able to rationally use this to gain power by highlighting their stance on these issues. Due to the less extreme positions of the moderately-Eurosceptic parties they are able to fill this void due with a wider reach.

On my second research question (DV, second part), it became clear that the parties vote according to their party's support for the European Union. In calculating the voting patterns of each party in my four member states, the trend is that support levels were much higher on average for the pro-EU parties than for the highly-Eurosceptic and moderately-Eurosceptic ones. The former were on the lowest end of support and the latter were in the middle. This was true for all four member states and for each party. There was variation between the two issues areas that I examined. Support for all parties was higher for economic bills than it was for those on foreign and security policy. Although the same trend existed for both issue areas, and it demonstrates that spillover has occurred. This spillover will continue to occur - according to neofunctionalists - until foreign and security policy becomes an EU portfolio and another area emerges and the same thing

occurs (e.g. taxation). The *Front National* had the lowest levels of support among the moderately-Eurosceptic parties, while *Fidesz* had the highest. This is explained by the rationale of actors; they learn as they are in the position for a longer period of time, and their opinions might change.

The results of my independent variable made it more likely that public opinion in the four member states led to the electoral results observed. The success of the moderately-Eurosceptic party in France is matched by stability across EB questions with an increase only in the favourability of the economic outlook of the next 12 months. The lack of significant change in the other three countries was equaled by no observable trends in their EB results. This reaffirms the argument that it was public opinion that led to the election of these parties and not the other way around.

The implications of my study are two-fold: first, it is highly plausible that the results of the Eurobarometer determine the electoral success of political parties in the European Parliament (IV). Second, Eurosceptic parties are stable in three of my countries; only in France did an increase for a moderately-Eurosceptic party occur (DV, first part). In other words, Eurosceptic parties have little electoral success outside of France; therefore, the EB should be used prior to the next EP election.

Notes

ⁱ Despite this, there were 29 pieces of the legislation on the economy, but a total of 101 on foreign and security policy.

ⁱⁱ The standard Eurobarometer survey with the general public opinion questions is done twice per year and these were the last ones prior to and the first ones post 2014 EP election.

ⁱⁱⁱ Voting in the EP has foreign and security policy as one issue area while in the EB the questions are divided differently. There is one relation to foreign policy and one relating to security policy which is the reason for selecting these two.

^{iv} Of course, whether or not either one of these potential cleavage lines materialize is an empirical question, captured in the next two chapters.

^v This though is still early on since 2009 was their first ever EP election but *Civic Platform* did manage to capture that first victory.

^{vi} While this may seem like a veto power it is not in fact one. Even with their majority when it comes to the Hungarian delegation, *Fidesz's* 12 seats are not enough to have any effect on their own in the EP as a whole.

^{vii} This was the last EB prior to the 2014 EP election.

^{viii} While my study's focus is the European Union, I use this question to get an overall baseline of levels of support in each of my countries

^{ix} I left out those that felt it would be the same because my aim, as with previous questions, is to compare the positive versus negative opinions of the EU, EP and its future.

^x Asking about the respondents expectations for the next twelve months of the EU's economic situation assesses an outlook that was not present in the other questions.

^{xi} I chose these two because the former is an area widely considered to already be under EU jurisdiction while the latter is one that is still understood to be mostly of national control. There are 28 economic bills that were voted on during this period while there were 101 that fell under the Foreign and Security Policy issue area.

^{xii} While this happened, whether or not this influenced public opinion is unclear.

^{xiii} I only counted the parties with at least two EP seats and if even one MEP voted differently than the rest of the party than it is counted as a split vote.

^{xiv} Historical institutionalism does not fit as well as neofunctionalism because of the short timeline employed in my study. As well, neofunctionalism allows me to better understand the thinking of the political parties as well as the link between the two issue areas.

^{xv} 1) actors are rational and self-interested, 2) institutions develop on their own and in a way that may be unplanned, 3) decisions are taken incrementally, 4) zero-sum games are not always the case, 5) spill over occurs between issue areas (Niemann and Schmitter 2016, 45-49).

^{xvi} For my study I will discuss this theory in relation to elected officials but the theory itself can apply more broadly to everyday individuals.

^{xvii} By long term success I simply mean that they have been relevant as part of the conversation for the past few election cycles.

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
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
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Appendices

Appendix 1



Appendix 2



Appendix 3

France EP Election Results

	2009	2014
Front de Gauche	4	3
Front National	3	23
Europe Écologie	14	6
Les Républicains	29	19
Mouvement Démocrate	6	4
Parti Socialiste	14	12

Appendix 4

Poland EP Election Results

	2009	2014
Congress of the New Right	0	2
KORWiN	0	2
Law and Justice	15	19
Civic Platform	25	19
Democratic Left Alliance - Labour Union	7	4
Polish People's Party	3	4

Appendix 5

The Netherlands EP Election Results

	2009	2014
Party for Freedom	4	4
Socialist	2	2
Christian Union - Reformed Political Party	2	2
People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	3	3
Green Left	3	2
Democrats	3	4
Christian Democratic Appeal	5	5
Labour Party	3	3

Appendix 6

Hungary EP Election Results

	2009	2014
Jobbik	3	3
Fidesz	14	12
Democratic Coalition	0	2
Hungarian Socialist Party	4	2

Appendix 7

Trust for the European Union 2013

	Tend to Trust	Tend not to Trust
France	28%	63%
Poland	45%	39%
Netherlands	38%	55%
Hungary	47%	46%

Appendix 8

Trust for the European Parliament 2013

	Tend to Trust	Tend not to Trust
France	38%	47%
Poland	51%	32%
Netherlands	47%	46%
Hungary	58%	36%

Appendix 9

Economic expectations for next 12 months 2013

	Better	Worse
France	17%	29%
Poland	22%	18%
Netherlands	34%	22%
Hungary	27%	21%

Appendix 10

Common foreign policy of the 28 member states 2013

	For	Against
France	61%	30%
Poland	71%	19%
Netherlands	54%	42%
Hungary	69%	24%

Appendix 11

Common defence and security policy 2013

	For	Against
France	77%	14%
Poland	78%	16%
Netherlands	74%	24%
Hungary	71%	23%

Appendix 12

Trust for the European Union 2014

	Tend to Trust	Tend not to Trust
France	36%	52%
Poland	49%	29%
Netherlands	46%	45%
Hungary	48%	43%

Appendix 13

Trust for the European Parliament 2014

	Tend to Trust	Tend not to Trust
France	38%	44%
Poland	52%	24%
Netherlands	53%	39%
Hungary	52%	36%

Appendix 14

Economic expectations for next 12 months 2014

	Better	Worse
France	16%	24%
Poland	18%	12%
Netherlands	27%	24%
Hungary	21%	20%

Appendix 15

Common foreign policy of the 28 member states 2014

	For	Against
France	62%	28%
Poland	71%	11%
Netherlands	61%	34%
Hungary	64%	29%

Appendix 16

Common defence and security policy 2014

	For	Against
France	78%	15%
Poland	83%	8%
Netherlands	80%	17%
Hungary	69%	26%

Appendix 17

Economy (France)				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote*	Bills Split Vote**
Front de Gauche	32%	39%	25%	4%
Front National	46%	36%	14%	4%
Front National/Rassemblement Bleu Marine	43%	32%	21%	4%
Europe Écologie	79%	21%	0%	0%
Les Républicains	89%	7%	0%	4%
Mouvement Démocrate	89%	11%	0%	0%
Parti Socialiste	93%	7%	0%	0%

Appendix 18

Economy (Poland)				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote	Bills Split Vote
Congress of the New Right	14%	68%	18%	0%
KORWiN	14%	75%	11%	0%
Law and Justice	64%	14%	11%	11%
Civic Platform	93%	7%	0%	0%
Democratic Left Alliance - Labour Union	89%	7%	4%	0%
Polish People's Party	93%	7%	0%	0%

Appendix 19

Economy (Netherlands)				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote	Bills Split Vote
Party for Freedom	7.1%	92.9%	0%	0%
Socialist	28.6%	42.8%	28.6%	0%
Christian Union - Reformed Political Party	67.9%	25%	7.1%	0%
People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	85.7%	14.3%	0%	0%
Green Left	82.1%	17.9%	0%	0%
Democrats 66	85.7%	14.3%	0%	0%
Christian Democratic Appeal	92.9%	7.1%	0%	0%
Labour Party	85.7%	7.1%	3.6%	3.6%

Appendix 20

Economy Hungary				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote	Bills Split Vote
Jobbik	46.4%	39.3%	14.3%	0%
Fidesz	92.9%	7.1%	0%	0%
Democratic Coalition	89.3%	10.7%	0%	0%
Hungarian Socialist Party	89.3%	7.1%	3.6%	0%

Appendix 21

Foreign and Security Policy (France)				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote*	Bills Split Vote**
Front de Gauche	50%	40%	6%	4%
Front National	24%	60%	15%	0%
Front National/Rassemblement Bleu Marine	27%	51%	12%	10%
Europe Écologie	76%	16%	5%	3%
Les Républicains	75%	18%	1%	6%
Mouvement Démocrate	80%	12%	7%	1%
Parti Socialiste	82%	12%	5%	1%

Appendix 22

Foreign and Security Policy (Poland)				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote	Bills Split Vote
Congress of the New Right	27%	40%	33%	0%
KORWiN	26%	39%	34%	1%
Law and Justice	63%	25%	5%	7%
Civic Platform	74%	18%	2%	6%
Democratic Left Alliance - Labour Union	80%	12%	7%	1%
Polish People's Party	73%	18%	8%	1%

Appendix 23

Foreign and Security Policy (Netherlands)				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote	Bills Split Vote
Party for Freedom	14.9%	75.2%	6.9%	3%
Socialist	38.6%	29.7%	31.7%	0%
Christian Union - Reformed Political Party	52.5%	31.7%	12.9%	2.9%
People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	73.3%	13.9%	10.9%	1.9%
Green Left	77.2%	15.8%	5.9%	1.1%
Democrats 66	83.2%	15.8%	0%	1%
Christian Democratic Appeal	80.2%	16.8%	3%	0%
Labour Party	82.2%	10.9%	5.0%	1.9%

Appendix 24

Foreign and Security Policy (Hungary)				
Party	Bills For	Bills Against	Bills No Vote	Bills Split Vote
Jobbik	44.6%	30.6%	24.8%	0%
Fidesz	75.2%	19.8%	5%	0%
Democratic Coalition	76.2%	8.9%	12.9%	2%
Hungarian Socialist Party	82.2%	8.9%	7.9%	1%