

The Myth of the Soviet Soldier: Envisioning the “Other” in Late-Cold War
American Military Training Materials

Dillon Rice

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
History

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts (History) at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

April 2017

© Dillon Rice, 2017

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the thesis prepared

By: Dillon Rice

Entitled: The Myth of the Soviet Soldier: Envisioning the “Other” in Late-Cold War American Military Training Materials

and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (History)

complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Signed by the final Examining Committee:

_____ Chair

Dr. Barbara Lorezkowski

_____ Examiner

Dr. Elena Razlogova

_____ Examiner

Dr. Gavin Taylor

_____ Supervisor

Dr. Alison Rowley

Approved by _____

Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director

_____ 2017

Dean of Faculty

Abstract

The Myth of the Soviet Soldier: Envisioning the “Other” in Late-Cold War American Military Training Materials

Dillon Rice

To date, there has been an astonishing dearth of analysis on the ways in which enlisted personnel within the United States are presented with concepts of the outside world, and even less so on how this drastically differs from an American cultural zeitgeist. As Cold War ramifications continue to guide our modern contexts, this investigation looks into the split between American civilian and military representations of an ephemeral Soviet identity. This contrasting application of ethnography allows a new opportunity to examine how the United States military – an entity typically thought of as monolithic and unwieldy – navigated complex issues of identity politics and national antagonisms through internal educational publications. Embodied in their training materials, the Department of the Army demonstrates itself as surprisingly complex, agile, and measured in its portrayal of the Soviet and Russian opponent – especially when contrasted against certain exaggerations and stereotypes present in twentieth-century cultural products.

Acknowledgments

As any author knows, no undertaking would be complete without the input of the many people, pets, and inanimate objects that take the time out of their day to listen to our repeated and often chaotic ramblings. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of those who have both encouraged and critiqued the following work.

Particular recognition must of course go to my Master's supervisor, Professor Alison Rowley. Without her critical eye, stirring direction, and calming words, this project would not have survived the drastic fluctuations and personal tribulations on the journey from application to submission. Nor would I have found my current path. Спасибо.

Throughout this project, I have had the privilege of working alongside a fantastic cohort of academic inspirations, patient friends, and the occasional captive audience provided by my loving family. Regardless of whether our connection was transient or long-lasting, you have all left your mark on both this work and my own history. Thank you.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Section 1 – Historiography	4
Section 2 – Military Training Manuals as Sources	21
Section 3 – Antagonistic Culture versus Military Positivity.....	24
Section 4 – Critiques and the issue of <i>Maskirovka</i>	36
Section 5 – Training and Soviet Identity	45
Section 6 – Encapsulation: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.....	58
Legacy and Concluding Thoughts	70
Bibliography	72
Appendix.....	80

Introduction

Imagine the year is 1988. You are in your late teens, and you are out one last time with friends to see the movie *Red Heat* before heading off to basic training.¹ The next morning a jovial driver in a drab green bus picks you up from your hometown, and you spend some time being shuttled to the nearest United States Army base. After arriving you bid farewell to your civilian clothes and don your own personal Battle Dress Uniform. Your newly trimmed hair seems light, leaving you feeling somehow more exposed. You are herded into a classroom filled with long tables and folding chairs. Other recruits, all from vastly different walks of life, are seated there. You settle in as your instructor walks in toward the dark green chalkboard, a bulky manual underneath his arm. In small barely legible print he simply writes “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” in stark white chalk. Immediately, you wrack your brain trying to remember everything you have heard about the Soviets. You have seen some news reports about their presence in Afghanistan – pretty gruesome stuff. They are the usual bad guys in some of your favorite books and movies. A couple of your acquaintances in school may have been members of the local Communist Party USA chapter, but you were never quite sure. You knew that some of their supporters cheered them on – they were the saviors of blue collar workers. But didn’t President Reagan just have the embassy in Moscow torn down? With all of these pictures floating in your mind, you lean back and listen as your gruff-looking instructor begins to lecture you on who exactly the Soviets are.

The final decades of the Cold War saw a precipitous collapse of the global dichotomy between two seemingly immovable superpowers. Prior to this point, however, the fate of the world was often couched in the outcome of this struggle. Terms like “mutually assured destruction”, “non-aligned”, “democratic”, “interventionist”, “socialist”, and “communist” all became points of contention on a scale where two national identities were at stake. Before George H.W. Bush could announce communism’s death in 1992, there was the threat of mutually assured destruction and nuclear winter. Prior to Germany’s reunification in 1990, millions of United States citizens signed on to defend democracy and freedom on a global scale. Thousands of films, songs, movies, and newspapers were crafted in the American cultural crucible in reaction to a conflict that never quite got officially started. It was an era of

¹ *Red Heat*, directed by Walter Hill (1988; Culver City, CA: TriStar Pictures, 2001) DVD.

oppression, suspicion, fear and accusation. Almost every aspect of American Cold War culture has been picked apart in a global attempt to understand how the world was able to walk to – and step away from – the precipice of nuclear annihilation and total war. One aspect of American life, however, has been surprisingly absent from these studies: the perspective of the military itself. While scholars and analysts have picked apart the military industrial complex, foreign policy, and Cold War conflicts across the world in detail, the social and lived experiences of the US citizen-soldier and his instructors have been left by the wayside. This thesis seeks to delineate the complex ways in which American military training in the final decades of the Cold War vastly diverged from the larger civilian cultural narrative, notably in the ways in which it represented a nebulous Soviet identity.

I will begin by examining the contents of a number of different military manuals published throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. By signalling out their language, I will show how they craft a depiction of the Soviet ‘Other’ which diverges greatly from the stereotypes found in some Cold War popular culture. This will then be followed by an examination into the evolution of scholarship on military training within Western nations in order to demonstrate that, while the field has evolved, there are still significant gaps that need to be filled. Training manuals, and what they reveal about military education, are one such lacunae. Next I briefly describe the successive waves of American popular culture which established a certain construction of the Soviet soldier in the minds of average Americans. Finally, through a close reading of the manuals produced by the American military, I show how these presented a much more reasoned and dispassionate analysis of the Soviet ‘Other’. This involves a specific focus on the positive rhetoric, restrained critique, recognition of Soviet difference, and the measured description of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons within the manuals themselves. Ultimately, my analysis reveals not only a divergence between the martial and civilian spheres of understanding the Soviet Union and its inhabitants, but that the American military understood – and thus portrayed – their opponents as complex entities worthy of respect and admiration instead of as cartoonish stereotypes.

The task of imagining the typical Soviet soldier was not an easy one; it was a subjective, relative, and ultimately transient exercise. Yet despite this, there were some common associations which remained in all of the abstract personifications written about Soviet military

forces. Soviet soldiers were assumed to be a diverse group, but united across an almost unimaginably vast territory by a core sets of beliefs and a domineering leadership. They had endured some of the most horrific violence and brutal fighting in recorded human history. The soldiers had contradictory moments of both brilliant tactical and technological advancement, as well as of corrupt abuse and stagnation-inspiring neglect. As musician Paul McCartney said in 2003, as he reflected on the wild popularity of the 1969 single “Back in the USSR,” the Soviet Union “was a mystical land then,”² and its inhabitants were just as foreign to Western audiences as the land itself.

In American popular culture, the Soviets were surrounded by an air of mystery. Despite a world-encompassing competition in technology, sports, and culture, it seemed that very few Westerners truly understood what life was like beyond the Iron Curtain. Inevitably, the lack of knowledge led to fear and suspicion in certain circles. Following the uneasy division of post-war Germany, the Soviets began appearing in various mediums as a familiar boogeyman, ranging from overt bringers of nuclear death, to much more subtle and undermining communist infiltrators of United States society. The anti-Soviet zeitgeist diffused and ingrained itself into the minds of the Western public, producing cultural touchstones like Bert the Turtle, who taught young students to ‘duck and cover’ during an anticipated nuclear attack from the Soviet side of the world.³ Plays, films, newspapers, music, and cartoons – almost every medium showed some signs of Cold War influences. A children’s board game, for example, instructed members of the free world to “find a way to keep war-makers like Mao” from “shedding the blood of innocent people.”⁴ Advertisements followed a similar path, as companies such as the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation described socialism with derision and hatred. While we must be careful not to generalize all (or even a majority) of society as sharing these perspectives, it is at least safe to say that few who grew up under the shadow of the Cold War could claim to be immune to its influence. However, while the civilian side of Cold War culture has been examined at length, the militarized aspect of it presents a different, less-studied, narrative.

² Kevin O’Flynn, “Paul McCartney Finally Back in the U.S.S.R.,” *The Moscow Times*, May 26, 2003, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <http://old.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2003/5/article/paul-mccartney-finally-back-in-the-ussr/238263.html/>

³ Bryan Hubbarb, “Civil Defense: More than Duck and Cover,” *Military.com: Military Headlines*, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent1/?file=cw_cd_story

⁴ “War-Maker,” *Fight the Red Menace* (Philadelphia: Bowman Gum, 1951), board game, PDF.

Alon Confino, in his 1997 work *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, stated that veterans became the “custodians of the history”⁵ for subsequent generations during Germany’s unification. The same sentiment could be argued to pervade Western societies in the post-war period, as militarization increasingly became a foundational aspect of American national policy and daily life. Annually, the United States has spent more on its military forces than the next 7 nations combined – \$596 billion to the comparative \$567.2 billion of China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, France, Japan, and Germany in 2015 alone.⁶ With over 1.3 million active personnel, a return to civilian life diffuses service members into a range of post-tour positions, ranging from successfully managing Fortune 500 companies, running for presidential office, returning to previous hobbies and professions, or along the difficult roads of psychological and/or physical recovery. Yet, all members of the United States Armed Forces, past or present, are perceived to speak with an authority given to them by their unimaginable experiences. As Christopher J. Fettweis notes, the influence of regional commanders in chief – America’s warrior-diplomats – have “steadily grown in importance in all levels of U.S. foreign affairs” since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986.⁷ Culturally, American militarism has allowed armed forces and soldiers to regularly rank highly positive in public opinion polls.⁸ The term ‘veteran’ is invoked with veneration, and one need only look toward the immaculate Tomb of the Unknown Soldier or the restrained celebrations of November 11 to gauge the respect given to enlisted men and women in twentieth and twenty-first century America.

Section 1 – Historiography

Despite this ability to influence thinking in both everyday conversation and national discourse, little critical assessment has been made of one of the fundamental hallmarks of the typical soldier’s experience – his or her beginnings at military educational institutes. The field of

⁵ Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wurttemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 43.

⁶ “Military expenditure,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, Web accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-expenditure>

⁷ Christopher J. Fettweis, “Militarizing Diplomacy: Warrior-Diplomats and the Foreign Policy Process,” in *America’s Viceroy: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 47. Further discussion can also be found in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

⁸ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23.

military history has always been rife with descriptive surveys and theoretical debate on esoteric tactics and strategy. Traditional historiography provides a vast array of top-down political interpretations of global or local conflicts, and the cultural turn of the late twentieth century has spurred many forays into a social examination of war experience, trauma, and an ongoing interaction between war and society. Nevertheless, there is a surprising dearth of attempts by historians to investigate an aspect of military life that may have a large impact on service members and their post-service lives. To date, what little that has been written on military education has primarily been a commentary on contemporary American national contexts, rather than investigations into, or critical assessments of, the actual content of training manuals, college curricula, and educational methods. Before delving into what specific myth of the Soviet soldier has been fostered in American military communities, we must first turn toward what has been written on armed forces training in the past seventy-odd years. While military theorists, officers, and educators have spent countless man-hours researching and debating how and why to train soldiers in a specific manner, historians have largely fallen behind in this regard, releasing a scant few works on the subject. What does exist in terms of Armed Forces curricula analysis, however, can be organized into six separate phases.

Phase One: The Post-War Political Focus [1945-1960]

To borrow the words of David Ludden, the post-war era experienced a form of imperialism in an entirely “new format under American leadership.”⁹ Throughout this era of decolonization, the United States seemed to be the first among equals. It portrayed itself as the champion of democracy, founding a “project of [...] hegemony within the Western world.”¹⁰ In supposed opposition to this was the rising influence of the USSR – an ideological adversary the likes of which American leadership had only just recently faced in the defeated Third Reich. In an effort to similarly stymie Soviet power, political advisor George F. Kennan proposed a policy of global control – a “patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”¹¹ Political lines were drawn and President Harry S. Truman declared that every

⁹ David Ludden, “America’s Invisible Empire,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, No. 44 (Oct. 30 – Nov. 5, 2004): 4776.

¹⁰ Ian Tyrrell, “Empire in American History,” in *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern State*, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 546.

¹¹ George F. Kennan [Under pseudonym ‘X’], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, No. 4 (Jul., 1947), 575.

nation “must choose between alternative ways of life,” and, if having chosen correctly, could rely on American support to maintain their “freedoms.”¹² Faced with the Truman Doctrine of global intervention, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin condemned the “dollar imperialism” and hypocritical attitudes of American politicians.¹³

This juxtaposition between democracy and communism – perceived freedom versus totalitarianism¹⁴ – invariably led to a series of indirect pushes for power. Entire organizations, such as the Office of International and Cultural Affairs (later branded in 1953 as the United States Information Agency), were founded in the service of this narrative.¹⁵ Academics were similarly recruited into the service of this new political dichotomy as “Sovietology” – the study of the Soviet Union through the meagre evidence that escaped the Iron Curtain – became an ongoing field of scholarship.

John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radwar’s volume, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (1957), acts as one of the first academic forays into Armed Forces curricula in the immediate post-war period. Aiming to rectify the “paucity of published material on military education” - which has largely been “little more than descriptive accounts”,¹⁶ Masland and Radwar critically analyzed the scholastic programs of defense institutes throughout the United States. With a specific focus on the Army, Naval, and Air War Colleges, 300 interviews and 550 questionnaires of active-duty personnel were used to obtain a small glimpse into the capabilities and faults of these pedagogical organizations. Little theoretical basis was given by the authors – only that the investigation was solidly entrenched in

¹² Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947, Web, Accessed April 4, 2015, *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>.

¹³ Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 30.

¹⁴ The terms “communism” and “totalitarianism”, in the case of American educational rhetoric, were often used synonymously. Little (if any) mention was made toward concepts of socialism or Marxist-Leninism in lieu of the umbrella term “communism”. Understanding the socio-political organization of the U.S.S.R. was evidently left to Sovietologists and Kremlinologists.

¹⁵ While explanation of this topic would be extensive, the successes and controversies of public diplomacy are well documented in both Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Yale Richmond, *Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).

¹⁶ John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radwar, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), xvi.

a civilian “philosophy of education.”¹⁷ Supposedly, Radwar and Masland used their experiences as professors in liberal arts colleges as a jumping-off point for evaluating their military counterparts, hoping to apply similar rubrics to find faults and methods of improvement.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the work lies in its overarching theme of how Armed Forces officers have increasingly broad, non-military roles in the developing Cold War context. Graduates of military institutes found themselves entwined with the development of national and foreign policy. Supervision of conquered territories like Japan and Germany put the three services on the same footing as the diplomatic branch of the Department of State. Typical soldiers became less conventional as the 1940s and 1950s passed, gathering knowledge of economic development and diplomatic mediation to supplement their technical military training. They would be active facilitators of propaganda and not passive targets of it. The domestic situation was similarly fluid, and it became much more difficult to “locate a dividing line between [...] military and civilian personnel.”¹⁸ Masland and Radwar argue that World War II “drastically changed the role of the United States in world affairs,”¹⁹ and contemporary educational programs were adapting to fit and exceed these new requirements of the everyday officer and soldier.²⁰ Not only were soldiers being molded with these concepts in mind, they were specifically contrasted against a “rise of hostile forces in the Far East and Europe.”²¹ The adapting role of military leaders necessitated a “heightened awareness of the principles of our democratic society.”²² It is through this lens that schools and colleges were judged in the late 1950s.

Two years later *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C* (1959) was also released by Masland, this time in partnership with Gene M. Lyons. The focus of the work turned towards the Reserve Officer Training Corps – a training program that was (and continues to be) embedded within traditional university campuses. With similar frameworks, questions, and methods as its predecessor, *Education and Military Leadership* examined how the civilian source of career officers had also adapted to changing national contexts. As with the previous work,

¹⁷ Masland and Radwar, *Soldiers and Scholars*, xvi.

¹⁸ Masland and Radwar, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 10.

¹⁹ Masland and Radwar, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 100.

²⁰ Masland and Radwar, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 503.

²¹ Masland and Radwar, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 6.

²² Masland and Radwar, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 10.

Lyons' and Masland's arguments were once again couched in the rhetoric of national security as well as the preservation and survival of democratic freedom. It was of the utmost importance that the "human resources of the nation [...] be utilized effectively for the highest national purpose."²³ Military education was thus viewed purely in those terms –of creating the armed branch of political (democratic) forces. Analysis was solely for the purpose of assessing how each college lived up to the new requirements of complex post-war years. Success or failure improved or weakened American global standing, and very little regard was given to the faceless soldiers who entered and left military institutions.

Phase Two: The Economic Nod [1960s]

The next stage of analysis took the form of an economic understanding of the military's educational system. The post-war trade and industry boom catapulted the American economy into a new age of expansion, referred to as the "Golden Age of Capitalism" wherein businesses flourished, employment rates were high, the stock market began to recover, and inflation remained stable.²⁴ President John F. Kennedy ran and served on a platform that supported economic growth, and Lyndon B. Johnson followed suit during his succession in 1963. However, many of the systems and programs that facilitated this growth began to deteriorate in the second half of the 1960s, and budgetary concerns increasingly drew attention to the vast financial burden of the Department of Defense (DoD). Catalyzed by Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1961 farewell address, the "military-industrial complex,"²⁵ and the scholastic institutes attached to it, were brought into question by the academic thinkers.

In writing *Education in the Armed Forces* (1965), James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves illuminated the exact cost of educating and training one of the most powerful military forces on the planet. Bemoaning the naivety of the average American taxpayer, the two authors attempted to show just how far the defense budget went to produce competent and knowledgeable enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers. Essentially, the purpose of the

²³ Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 210.

²⁴ Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor, *The Golden Age of Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 13.

²⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," January 17, 1961, Web, Accessed April 4, 2015, *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12086>.

volume was to describe the “expensive, expansive, and most effective educational system” in the United States.²⁶ Rather than beg the public to take heed of changing political contexts, Shelburne and Groves examined budgetary reports and financial estimates to inform readers of the U.S. military’s bankroll. At the time of its publication, *Education in the Armed Forces* noted that half of every tax dollar paid was allotted to the military budget, with more than \$50 billion intended purely for education and training.²⁷ While paying tribute to the United States’ continued role as a global leader in military advancement, Shelburne and Groves nonetheless warned against the reality of inter-service redundancy and “costly training and education facilities.”²⁸ The military juggernaut was producing soldiers and technology at peak efficiency, but at what cost?

One notable aspect of this work, however, is that it provides one of the few early examinations into the ideological justifications present in military curricula. Shelburne and Groves examined the Armed Forces Information and Education program, which was occasionally called “why-we-fight” instruction.²⁹ Perhaps inspired by the historiographical turn towards social history that developed in the 1960s, *Education in the Armed Forces* was an early instance of probing how the personal opinions of ordinary soldiers were shaped during their training. With classes touching on national American goals, international affairs, and the nature and purpose of Communism,³⁰ each trainee was shown to have a significant amount of time dedicated towards forming an image of what role they played on a global stage. The faceless soldiers of Lyons, Masland, and Radwar now had personal goals, aspirations, and justifications for their enlistment. Though in a brief and early form, Shelburne and Groves’ economic exploration of military education actually hinted toward greater examination of social and cultural aspects of military life and training, something which would not fully come to fruition for some time. This, however, was side-tracked by the emerging crisis in Vietnam.

Phase Three: An Issue of Identity [1970s]

As the United States became entangled in the ideological and military quagmire in Southeast Asia, domestic critics voiced their opposition to involvement in foreign conflicts. The

²⁶ James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves, *Education in the Armed Forces* (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1965), vii.

²⁷ Shelburne and Groves, *Education in the Armed Forces*, 2.

²⁸ Shelburne and Groves, *Education in the Armed Forces*, 107.

²⁹ Shelburne and Groves, *Education in the Armed Forces*, 43.

³⁰ Shelburne and Groves, *Education in the Armed Forces*, 43.

Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to re-examine their approach to the changing military and political contexts of a world in which a superpower had been defeated. The 1970s represented a period of reflexive examination not only for the American military, but the Cold War at large. The domino theory of communist expansion as well as Robert McNamara's zero-sum body-count approach to war had both been brought into question. Though initially proffered by Nikita Khrushchev to Eisenhower in the 1950s,³¹ a détente between President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev represented a thaw in global tensions. Classified as *razriadka* (Разрядка) in Russian, détente was a low point of aggression through which the United States and USSR saw increased levels of cultural exchange, communication, and mutual understanding.³² This was not a permanent relationship, but it nonetheless brought the climactic dichotomy between superpowers into question - as well as the large military establishments meant to enforce it. In light of this new line of examination, and in failing to prevent the socialist unification of Vietnam, the Department of Defense and its training organizations were drawn into ongoing public disputes, and by extension, newly shaped academic inquiry.

As a case study of the United States Military Academy at West Point, *School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms* began with an ostensibly benign research question: "how does West Point train the nation's future military leaders?"³³ Underneath this inquiry, however, authors Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore unearthed a near "schizophrenic" issue of identity within the academy.³⁴ Unlike previous historians such as Lyons, who glorified a merger of civilian and military life, Ellis and Moore highlighted the problematic aspects of integrating dual systems of ideals. In attempting to be "both Athens and Sparta,"³⁵ West Point embodied contrary ideals of inclusivity and insularity. With the knowledge that post-war contexts have increasingly placed military men and women in the "bureaucracy" rather than the "battlefield,"³⁶ West Point faced issues of producing officers capable of surviving in the business and professional communities just as well as in the jungles of Southeast Asia. The faculty all agreed that the military academy should provide "something called general education, but they

³¹ Erik P. Hoffmann, et al., *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 750.

³² Belmonte, *Selling the American War*, 69.

³³ Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore, *School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), vi.

³⁴ Ellis and Moore, *School for Soldiers*, 30.

³⁵ Ellis and Moore, *School for Soldiers*, 30.

³⁶ Ellis and Moore, *School for Soldiers*, 194.

disagree over what that term means.”³⁷ The end result was a split mentality, where some department heads advocated for progressive and “sophisticated electives,” while others pushed for “withdrawal, consolidation, and retrenchment.”³⁸ If nothing else, Ellis and Moore put forth an argument on the post-war difficulties of merging civilian and military ideals of the typical soldier, a new understanding within the field of Armed Forces education. The graduates of military life were now beginning to be seen and analyzed for their individuality and life after service.

Phase Four: Indoctrination as Pedagogy [1980s]

As Soviet T-62 tanks rumbled through the Afghan towns of Kushka and Termez in December of 1979, détente fell by the wayside as a failed episode of mutual understanding. Signalling an unsuccessful reconciliation between Leonid Brezhnev and both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, the Cold War ‘thaw’ had reached its end in the 1980s as America took on a more aggressive form of foreign policy.³⁹ Just as political arenas ignited with debate on shifting world issues, so too did the historical field look inwards and reflect on its own assumptions. Cold War and Soviet historiography at this time was still struggling with the ramifications of revisionist and post-revisionist debates, arguing over the complicity or agency of Soviet peoples in a vast teleological Marxist process.⁴⁰ Similarly, debates within the field of military and education history created one of the most influential and relevant monographs of the 1980s, stemming from an interdisciplinary conference at the University of Chicago in 1981. In a surprising contrast with Cold War historiography – which at this point was moving away from concepts of overarching, controlling ideology⁴¹ – scholars of American military education were just now beginning to examine indoctrination as a meaningful influence in Cold War contexts.

³⁷ Ellis and Moore, *School for Soldiers*, 58.

³⁸ Ellis and Moore, *School for Soldiers*, 60 and 220.

³⁹ Steven W. Hook, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power* (Washington, CQ Press, 2011), 53.

⁴⁰ Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Introduction,” in *Stalinism: New Directions, Rewriting Histories*, eds. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000), 6.

⁴¹ Specifically, a group of social historians emerged in the 1980s who challenged previous interpretations of Stalinism, Communism, and other Marxist-inspired typologies. This marked a concerted effort to bring ground-level analysis into a top-heavy political understanding of Soviet society at large. See Ronald Grigor Suny, “Writing Russia: The Work of Sheila Fitzpatrick,” in *Writing the Staling Era: Sheila Fitzpatrick and Soviet Historiography*, 1-20, edited by Golfo Alexopoulos, Julie Hessler, and Kiril Tomoff (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 11.

Thirty-five social scientists convened and set out to explore the “issues and problems dealing with indoctrination and civic education in the military.”⁴² The fruits of this conference emerged two years later in the monograph collection of essays entitled *The Political Education of Soldiers*. By examining the training of multiple military services – ranging from the Israeli, British, and American to the Vietcong and Soviet Armed Forces – the investigators sought to judge the efficacy and combat effectiveness of strong ideological and political curricula. Importantly, this revolved around the concept of indoctrination and the process of “fashioning attitudes and behaviour [...] by emphasizing a preconceived – and unified – symbolic content.”⁴³ Based on this understanding of military training, the combined authors argued that despite the “manipulative” and even “illogical” content of indoctrination, it has been demonstrated to dramatically improve combat effectiveness.⁴⁴ “The inescapable fact,” Stephen D. Wesbrook claimed, “is that no fully developed communist army has ever disintegrated in battle.”⁴⁵ In creating good communist soldiers instead of simply good soldiers, a system of “coercion and persuasion” in fact limited the military’s “vulnerability to physical and psychological collapse as long as the party remains intact.”⁴⁶ In essence, the work came to the conclusion that there were significant benefits to be derived from socio-political and civic training throughout the armed forces of any nation. Adamantly, the authors ended their work with a condemnation of the US Army’s neglect of this subject stating that the military could not “continue to ignore the significance of socio-political factors” and “expect success in battle.”⁴⁷ Just as civilian and military relations were promoted in the 1950s, *The Political Education of Soldiers* looked to endorse a coercive type of educational indoctrination to facilitate combat effectiveness.

First and foremost, at least in the academic community, this work brought the issue of mentality and soldier psychology to the vanguard of military education. Published a scant three years after the Iranian hostage crises, and as the United States still struggled with the memory of failure in Vietnam a decade earlier, *The Political Education of Soldiers* offered a defensible

⁴² Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, eds., *The Political Education of Soldiers* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), 9.

⁴³ Janowitz and Wesbrook, eds., *The Political Education of Soldiers*, 10.

⁴⁴ Stephen D. Wesbrook, “Sociopolitical Training in the Military: A Framework for Analysis,” in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, ed. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), 44.

⁴⁵ Wesbrook, “Sociopolitical Training,” 49.

⁴⁶ Wesbrook, “Sociopolitical Training,” 49.

⁴⁷ Stephen D. Wesbrook, “Historical Notes,” in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, ed. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), 279.

reason for a perceived decline in American military prowess. The virtues and ideals of democracy were not at fault in the struggle against socialism and communism, but rather they were not being properly imposed on the minds of those on the ideological and physical front lines. Indoctrination theory brought individual men and women to equal footing with the stressed American importance of tactics, technology, and strategy.⁴⁸ This became one of the explanations as to why a technologically superior force was required to evacuate in the face of a smaller and less conventional military, such as the Viet Cong. A widespread and systemic fault had been found in the American military education system; and it was one that could not be solved by small variations in academic syllabi. For the first time – in American military historiography, at least – the concept of a soldier’s belief (or lack thereof) was purported to be a fundamental aspect of combat effectiveness. In order to win wars, nations had to imprint systems of belief into their enlisted soldiers and officers.

Indirectly, this same argument created a harsher distinction between Soviet and non-Soviet value systems. If a military succeeded or failed based on its faith in an ideological structure, any groups that did not adhere to an identical structure were thus categorized as the ‘other.’ The monograph demonstrated this same type of thinking, as the authors subconsciously narrated the aspects of indoctrination in terms of ‘the West’ and ‘the Soviet bloc.’ Portrayals of communist soldiers, in the form of both Vietnamese and Soviet troops, were transformed from ominous and unknown external threats into very real individuals coerced into being dogmatic believers. By extension, the Soviet Union itself was more readily evaluated than in previous monographs. The Soviets were portrayed as naturally inclined toward “distortion and half-truth” indoctrination methods.⁴⁹ The organizational structure of the Soviet government allowed for complete civilian control of the military, something which was argued to not occur “in states using the liberal or democratic model.”⁵⁰ They relied on *Vospitanie* (upbringing / Воспитание), *Obuchenie* (training / Обучение) and *Obrazovanie* (education / Образование) to make supposedly unquestioning Marxist-Leninist zealots.⁵¹ The ominous external threats of the 1950s thus took the shape of militant defenders of the Soviet Union, standing guard against threats from

⁴⁸ Morris Janowitz, “Civic Consciousness and Military Performance,” in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, ed. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), 13.

⁴⁹ Wesbrook, “Sociopolitical Training,” 16.

⁵⁰ Wesbrook, “Sociopolitical Training,” 19.

⁵¹ Deane, “The Soviet Armed Forces,” 189-190.

the capitalist world. In a notable example of subject and analyst exemplifying similar modes of thinking, both the military educational institutes and the historians who studied them began to form a skewed perception of the USSR and its representative soldiers. As one of the first historical works to bring up a discussion of ideology and indoctrination, *The Political Education of Soldiers* also acted as a prime example of a confluence between military and propaganda studies. This tack would soon be taken up by succeeding scholars, albeit with a much more self-reflexive mentality.

One tangential comment must be made concerning the 1988 publication of *Soviet Military Power: The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected*, by Tom Gervasi. Though it does not fit easily into this trend of indoctrination study, Gervasi's monograph reflects an attempt at analyzing government-produced instructional products on the Soviet military. Throughout the 1980s, the Department of Defense published an annual report entitled *Soviet Military Power*.⁵² This work was self-described as an unclassified report on the USSR's military developments created in an effort to inform "the Free World" and give them the necessary information to "appreciate the tremendous size and scope of the security challenges before us."⁵³ Gervasi, in response, viewed the publication as possessing offensive levels of misrepresentations and even outright lies, which he sought to correct in his lengthy annotated reprinting of the DoD work.⁵⁴ Despite being a longstanding member of the intelligence community, and a prolific publisher for organizations like *Harper's* and the *Columbia Journalism Review*, military critics found his corrections to be largely inconsequential, while simultaneously arguing for an extensively malicious deception on the part of the United States government as it sought to portray the Soviets as supremely powerful. Lieutenant Commander John A. Roberts, for instance, took Gervasi to task in his graduating thesis at Fort Leavenworth. In over 70 pages of meticulous and well-reasoned argument, Roberts posited that while *Soviet Military Power* understandably had its weaknesses, Gervasi's critique was predominantly trivial, overly sarcastic, and ultimately deceptive in order to pursue his own political agendas. Simply

⁵² Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1st – 10th ed. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981-1991).

⁵³ Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 5.

⁵⁴ Tom Gervasi, *Soviet Military Power: The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected* (New York City: Vintage Books, 1987), vi.

put, Roberts argued that Gervasi not only misinterpreted the purpose of *Soviet Military Power*, but also did not successfully provide evidence for his claim that it was an intentionally deceptive piece of propaganda.⁵⁵

While this spat over technicalities did not largely affect the historiographic trend, it remains quite relevant to this investigation into American training manuals. If *Soviet Military Power* demonstrated a certain portrayal of the Soviet Union and its military branches, it is worth including as a publically disseminated version of our training doctrine. On the other hand, although Gervasi's contribution to the field is a needed and valuable attempt to question government publications, it ultimately becomes muddled in the details and inconsistencies rather than overarching themes. For the purposes of this investigation, we can sidestep Gervasi and Roberts' focus on the minutia of *Soviet Military Power*, and use it to lend credence and context to other aspects of this investigation. Gervasi's work can then be seen as a venture outside the purview and scope into military training specifically, and instead one of validity and technical veracity. A discussion into whether the Sukhoi Su-24 'Fencer' bomber had a range of 1300km or 1500km simply is not relevant when concepts of representation, identity, and Cold War national image disputes.⁵⁶

Phase Five: Partial Opening of the Soviet Archives,

Widening Interpretations [1991-2000]

Ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Russian Federation in 1991 did not reflect the culmination of a generation-long Cold War, but rather an internal revolt and disruption from which the vast political union could not recover. As Boris Yeltsin, through brilliant political strategy and timely power plays, became the first elected president of Russia,⁵⁷ the United States seemed at first to lose a fundamental component of its understanding of the global political system. With the supposed antagonism deflated, American scholars surged into the Russian archives in search of primary source material with which to challenge previous

⁵⁵ See John A. Roberts, *AD-A227 470 The Validity of 'Soviet Military Power'* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990).

⁵⁶ A 'contradiction' caught by Gervasi, though *Soviet Military Power* did not specify the conditions of this range, such as altitude, fuel, airspeed, and so on, which would allow both ranges to be correct "depending on the conditions," Roberts, *AD-A227 470*, 44.

⁵⁷ David R. Marples, *The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991* (London: Pearson Longman, 2004), 108-109.

assumptions of Sovietology and Cold War relations.⁵⁸ Paradoxically, a similar enthusiasm has not been demonstrated by the analysts of American military education. After nearly 46 years of framing instruction in opposition to Soviet forces, the collapse of the USSR appears to have forced historians to marginalize the communist role in enlisted training. Instead, the fruits of cultural and social movements in history allowed for a broader analytical framework within which to view the educational aspects of martial life. Paramount among these was a closer examination of the interactions between war (and by extension, the military) and society, a topic only briefly explored in earlier phases.

The best representation of this trend is Michael S. Neiberg's *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service* (2000). Returning to the subject of campus-embedded officer programs, Neiberg greatly differentiated himself from the works of Masland or Lyons. *Making Citizen-Soldiers* established itself as a work on war and society rather than pure military history or top-down political analysis. Neiberg was intently focused on the "nature of American attitudes toward the military," and ongoing reforms present within the ROTC.⁵⁹ Through his nuanced exploration, Neiberg argued that a Moderate Whig ideology influenced public understanding of the ROTC.⁶⁰ This allowed the program to exist in a space between stark opposition to standing professional armies (in Radical Whig fashion), and the alternative complete surrender to civilian oversight. Initially, the attempted infusion of liberal and non-elite campus students was met with some measure of resistance on the parts of both educational institutes and the Armed Forces. Yet, despite these difficulties in reconciling military and civilian life, universities still widely supported the ROTC program over time regardless of its contemporary incarnation and political leanings.⁶¹ In this valuable social history of the ROTC's interaction with academic institutes, Neiberg demonstrated that there was a significant number of theoretical lenses which authors like Lyons and Masland did not utilize when examining military education.

Various motifs were touched on which would be familiar to current readers of historical scholarship. Collective memory and public perception were paramount in Neiberg's analysis of

⁵⁸ Suny, "Writing Russia: The Work of Sheila Fitzpatrick," 12.

⁵⁹ Michael S. Neiberg, *Making Citizen Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of the American Military Service* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 10. ROTC is an acronym for the Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

⁶⁰ Neiberg, *Making Citizen Soldiers*, 202.

⁶¹ Neiberg, *Making Citizen Soldiers*, 154.

the ongoing relationship between higher education and the ROTC programs. Issues of American identity and nationalism were utilized to explain why this first inroad to a reciprocal relationship between the Department of Defense and the American public was so problematic and fraught with difficulty, as the United States grappled with the seemingly contrary values of democracy and traditionalist militarism.⁶² The military-industrial complex finally emerged as a topic worthy of inquiry forty years after Eisenhower's distressing warning.⁶³ All told, *Making Citizen-Soldiers* acted as the most comprehensive and well-formed theoretical approach to military educational history to date.

Conversely, in whole-heartedly following the path of social and cultural history, an integral part of military education has seemingly been relegated to Cold War periodization. Neiberg had no inclination towards including commentary on the opponents of ROTC training. This introspective into American identity and military-civilian relationships marginalized the possibly skewed and powerful representation of Soviet forces, and by extension, Soviet existence. While not the stated objective of the work, an opportunity may have been missed in not exploring the issues of American identity when contrasted against those of the USSR. After all, if Cold War events influenced the ROTC's perception, would that not necessitate an examination of the rhetoric understood to pit the democratic United States against the expanding communist USSR? As post-war America imagined itself as one half of a global struggle of super powers, any examination of Cold War military training seems inadequate without at least tangentially addressing this point. Similarly, in attempting to move forward from the Cold War as a lens of analysis, authors like Neiberg unfortunately ignore drastic changes in Soviet leadership – such as Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives of *Glasnost*, *perestroika*, and amiable foreign policies with the Western world⁶⁴ – and how they affected the development of the American military in the closing years of the ideological conflict. Evidently, the most recent incarnations within the field of American military education have been found wanting, and the subject's theoretical and methodological frameworks are demonstrably inadequate.

⁶² Neiberg, *Making Citizen Soldiers*, 107 – 115.

⁶³ Neiberg, *Making Citizen Soldiers*, 8.

⁶⁴ Importantly, Gorbachev was instrumental in not only allowing non-communist leaders to ascend in Hungary and Poland, but aiding in their success. Mark Kramer, "Gorbachev and the demise of east European communism," in *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations*, eds. by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 190-192.

Phase Six: Filling Gaps [2000-2017]

Great strides have been made in Cold War historiography since the partial opening of the Soviet archives, with historians benefiting not only from improved access to primary sources but the development and inclusion of interdisciplinary theoretical approaches. The Cold War itself has been examined and re-examined as a historical framework, and the field is currently argued to have never been more varied in its “methods and concerns.”⁶⁵ Publications are continuously released which portray American-Soviet relations in surprisingly fresh ways, constantly finding new positions with which to mine the Cold War epoch and relate them to modern contexts. Laura A. Belmonte’s *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (2010), for instance, finds a confluence between military and cultural history by examining the inherent contradictions in America’s public diplomacy programs, something which the nation still struggles with today. In another example, Chalmers Johnson’s *The Sorrows of Empire* tracks the complex dynamics between a new form of US imperialism fostered by the creation of a comprehensive network of military bases across the globe.⁶⁶ By drawing parallels between the transitioning republics of Rome and the United States, Johnson attempts to hang the imperial purple on a newly fashioned American form of empire.

However, the same forms of inventiveness and scholarly creativity are not being applied to the field of military education. Entire topics, motifs, and theoretical questions have remained untouched by investigators within the field. Unlike their counterparts in other academic specialities, authors studying military education have left powerful frameworks alone in pursuit of pure military analysis. For instance, race is absent despite a long history of scholarship on the Cold War’s impact on American racial tensions.⁶⁷ Gender within the military is also relegated to a position of irrelevancy. The study of nationalism, which has undergone significant progress in the previous few decades, is only tangentially posited as a reason for ideological loyalty, rather

⁶⁵ Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, “Introduction,” in *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War*, eds. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.

⁶⁶ Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (London: Verso, 2004); A similar theme has been pursued more recently in Catherine Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts* (New York: New York University Press, 2009).

⁶⁷ Of particular note is Penny Von Eschen, who follows the unique lives of musicians such as Dizzy Gillespie or Louis Armstrong as they are used to spread American ideals internationally while being subject to segregation and inequality domestically. See Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up The World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

than as a possible framework for the conflict as a whole.⁶⁸ While these perspectives could be argued to have drastic implications for both our historical understanding and the modern realities of the American soldier, there is an unexpected dearth of explorative scholarship within the field. United States Armed Forces education history exists in a theoretical bubble, isolating it not only from current historiographic trends, but those preceding them as well. Ideological tensions between America and Tsarist Russia, for example, predate the Cold War conflict by nearly half a century – something which military education historiography has failed to highlight, despite correlations between Eastern and Western divides on nineteenth century modernization theory and twentieth century democracy.⁶⁹ Most pertinent to this work, however, is the surprising absence of the Soviet soldier.

In 1991, the United States Congress passed the Defense Appropriations Act which included \$10 million dollars for the formation of an archival program to “inventory, protect and conserve the physical and literary property of the Cold War so that future generations could understand and appreciate its meaning and significance.”⁷⁰ The Cold War had apparently come and gone, and historians of military education seemed to have taken that message to heart. Yet on March 12, 2015, Admiral William E. Gortney of the United States Navy warned the Senate Armed Services Committee of an increased Russian “military assertiveness”⁷¹ and expanding nuclear capabilities – a commentary which seems more fitting in the 1980s, and such a perception has only increased based on continued Russian expansion in Eastern Europe and alleged influence in current American politics. In pursuit of commenting on non-linear combat

⁶⁸ On nationalism, the works of Rogers Brubaker and Benedict Anderson vis-à-vis Cold War groupism and constructed identity are relevant. See Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 2006 [1983]). On ideological loyalty, military historians of both France and America have made significant strides towards understanding the personal opinions and motivations of soldiers leaving for war. For example, Alan Forrest, *Soldiers of the French Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); and more recently, Richard D. Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁶⁹ David Foglesong, for instance, demonstrates that the vilification of Russia began long before the emergence of the Soviet Union as an entity. See David Foglesong, *The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁷⁰ Jon Wiener, *How We Forged the Cold War: A Historical Journey Across America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 1.

⁷¹ Phillip Swarts, “NORAD alarmed over Russia’s ‘military assertiveness,’ heavy bomber patrols,” *The Washington Times*, March 14, 2015, Accessed April 4, 2015, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/14/william-gortney-nato-commander-alarmed-over-russia/>

put into favour by modern counter-insurgency training,⁷² scholars of the War Colleges have left some meaningful Cold War sources, and their modern ramifications, relatively untouched. Current historiography is still attempting to reconcile the ‘past’ conflict with its modern ramifications – counteracting what is described as a generation that has “grown accustomed to dangerous denial” on the Cold War’s true impacts.⁷³ Other fields within the social sciences continuously find ways of explaining modern Russian-American relations and global interventionism through their possible origins in Cold War contexts.⁷⁴ It seems only fitting that analysts of military education attempt to follow suit. Yet, unless used as an ideological foil or as a referenced shadowy opponent, historiography has made no attempt to analyze America’s faithful ground-level opponent.

In an effort to fill in one of these academic gaps, this investigation seeks to extract and analyze the changing representation of the Soviet soldier within American military education systems. Despite being significantly represented within the primary source materials, scholars have made no attempt to critically examine how the members of the Soviet armed forces were depicted within Cold War contexts. The skewed and falsified myth of the Soviet soldier in American military training has consequently been neglected by the academic community. This fictional distortion of the average Soviet combatant reflects a long history of America’s attempts to grapple with its post-war role as a global leader, the emphasized dichotomy between democracy and communism, as well as the social and cultural ramifications of creating soldiers in service of these struggles. Just how pervasive was propaganda in the final decades of Cold War military education? How did that contrast with previous incarnations of the “Red Menace”? In what ways have those representations influenced current Russian-American relations? Is there a persistent Soviet myth perpetuated by military institutions? In answering these question and more, the following work aims not only to demonstrate a pervasive constructed myth of the Soviet soldier, but also to extrapolate that representation’s modern ramifications. As Cold War

⁷² Despite being focused on Canadian Special Forces, Spencer is still representative of larger scholarly themes. Emily Spencer, *Special Operations Forces: Building Global Partnerships* (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2012), 19.

⁷³ Odd Arne Westad, “Exploring the Histories of the Cold War: A Pluralist Approach,” in *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War*, eds. by Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). For similar Cold War reassessments, see Richard Saull, *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power and Social Revolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2001); and Ellen Schrecker, ed., *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism* (New York: The New Press, 2004).

⁷⁴ Such as the previously mentioned Wiener, *How We Forgot the Cold War*.

rhetoric has resurfaced in the wake of Russian involvements in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, there are ample opportunities to dissect the conflict's continuing influence. Examining the myth of the Soviet soldier is perhaps just one step toward fulfilling that goal.

Section 2 – Military Training Manuals as Sources

In order to pick apart the experience of American recruits during their military education (hypothetical or otherwise), this analysis uses a selection of training manuals released throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. The publishing agencies behind these works were intelligence and military organizations such as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Soviet Studies Office/Foreign Military Studies Office (SSO/FMSO), which each provided its own style, format, and perspective of the Soviet soldier. Attached are some selected covers from my self-made source library; the examples include **Figure 1** which shows *FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics*, released in 1984 (and subsequently updated in 1991), as well as 1989's *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union: A Country Study*. While the majority of these works were released - and related to - the Department of the Army (DA), for the purposes of this examination's scope we can assume that the evidence displayed here reflects similar treatment within the larger Department of Defense umbrella. Combined, these manuals represent thousands of pages of what the military considered to be the "definitive source of unclassified information" on Soviet forces at the time.⁷⁵ To examine them is to take a look through the perspective of American military analysts, publishers, and students during the twilight years of the Cold War. But to keep a handle on the various acronyms, numerical codes, and similarly-named titles attached to these manuals, let us examine one in particular so it can act as a representative for the remainder.

The starting point for this thesis was my discovery of *FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment*.⁷⁶ *FM 100-2-3* was the final piece of a field manual tripartite which included the previously mentioned *FM 100-2-1* and *FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support*.⁷⁷ Found in a second hand bookstore, *FM*

⁷⁵ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, i.

⁷⁶ *FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1991).

⁷⁷ *FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1991).

100-2-3 was published in Washington, DC, but its main proponent was HQ TRADOC in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the home of multiple US Army establishments. As we can see from **Figure 2**, which gives a sample of its contents, the manual has over 400 pages of lists, descriptions, and theory on the skills and operations of the Soviet military. From the descriptions of conscription and pre-military/paramilitary training in chapter three to the meticulous analysis of equipment in chapter five, each page provides something of value to the interested reader. *FM 100-2-3* epitomizes the kinds of analyzed sources whose primary goals were teaching students about the technology and abilities of the USSR. Hidden amid esoteric charts and weapon specifics is a subtle formation about what and who the Soviet soldier truly was. Field manuals such as *FM 100-2-3* and *FM 100-2-1* would be updated every few years as information and knowledge developed. For our purposes, selections from both the 1984 and 1991 generation of publications will be used. Other such manuals which follow a similar format of overt technological and operational discussion with hidden commentaries are the 133 page *DDI-1100-77-76 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company* (1976) and the 442 page *PAM 350-14 Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Operation Art Handbook* (1994).⁷⁸

Another grouping of primary sources speaks more directly about Soviet character, mentality, and ideology. Simply put, the manuals in this category are much more text heavy and impart blunt descriptions of the Soviet soldier directly. Examples include the 507 page *FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe* (1977) and the 1132 page *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union: A Country Study* (1989). *A Country Study* is particularly noteworthy, for it was compiled by a “multidisciplinary team of social scientists” adhering to “accepted standards of scholarly objectivity,” whatever that means.⁷⁹ While it claims to not represent official US policy, an earlier pamphlet (*PAM 550-55 Area Handbook for South Vietnam*) stated that the series purpose was to be “useful to military [...] personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political and military institutions and practices of various countries.”⁸⁰ As

⁷⁸ Robert M. Frasc e, *DDI-1100-77-76 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company* (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976); *PAM 350-14 Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Operational Art Handbook* (Fort Monroe: U.S. Army TRADOC, Department of the Army, 1994). Other manuals that follow a similar pattern will be cited when referenced.

⁷⁹ Raymond E. Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union: A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Department of the Army, 1991), iii.

⁸⁰ Harvey H. Smith et al., *PAM 550-55 Area Handbook for South Vietnam* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), iii.

such, it covered numerous political, cultural, and economic motifs in an attempt to explain a nation to typical military personnel, and thus presented a much more complicated and in-depth analysis than works from the previous grouping.

While this separation into two categories helps to differentiate the sources, it must be remembered that all of the above works – and those yet to be mentioned – share attributes of both groupings. This is simply a helpful method of understanding the collection as a whole. I did consult other publications for my research – ones that do not easily fit into the categories denoted above since they are shorter and generally written by a solitary author. Therefore, they speak less to an overarching policy and interpretation by the DoD as a whole, and more to the views of the individual. This selection of works is best exemplified by publications like the 40 page report *Soviet Non-Linear Combat* (1990) by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, and the 9 page article entitled *A Commander's Guide to the Soviet Forward Detachment* by Major James F. Holcomb.⁸¹ Despite being shorter and less authoritative, I found these pieces nonetheless helped to flesh out a general perception of the Soviet soldier that circulated during the later decades of the Cold War.

Lastly some tertiary sources, such as *Soviet Military Power* by the Department of Defense and the *Annual Report to the Congress* by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, shall be used to provide contextual information and another frame of reference within which to couch the purely military publications.⁸² Both series of works were written with the express purpose of informing the public and government, respectively, on the balance of power between the United States and the USSR. Although they fall outside the scope of an internalized, military understanding of the Soviets, they are still useful in noting some commonalities between the narratives framed for public consumption and those produced for internal military instruction and education.

The challenge then becomes taking this spontaneously collected home archive and examining a relatively unmined repository of historical information. Cold War civilian

⁸¹ Lester W. Grau, *Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s* (Fort Leavenworth: Soviet Army Studies Office, Department of the Army, 1990); and James F. Holcomb "A Commander's Guide to the Soviet Forward Detachment," *International Defense Review* (1989): 73-81.

⁸² Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, 1984 and 1985* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, 1985).

propaganda and military jingoism played a large role in American history – both on the part of lived experience and in scholarly analysis. When supplemented by a wealth of secondary sources of Cold War culture and propaganda, my research into the content of the U.S. military educational system answers some questions about the ways in which civilian and service spheres diverge. In order to do so, let us turn toward the popular culture basis which we must traverse to gain a complex and multifaceted understanding of the Soviet Other.

Section 3 – Antagonistic Culture versus Military Positivity

In the final scenes of 1984's *Red Dawn*, two American freedom fighters make a last desperate attack against a combined occupying force of Russian and Cuban communist invaders.⁸³ With little hope of survival, the two brothers engage in a suicidal attempt on the Soviet encampment so that their allies can escape into the great inner plains – dubbed “Free America.” The film’s main antagonist, Russian General Bratchenko (Vladek Sheybal), follows a red blood trail in the white snow, chasing the brothers, before ending up in a standoff with the older Jed Eckert, played by Patrick Swayze. In a standoff reminiscent of spaghetti westerns, Jed and Bratchenko exchange gunfire before the Russian falls to the American’s old-fashioned six-shooter. As he carries his wounded brother to safety, Jed comes upon Cuban Colonel Ernesto Bella, who mercifully puts down his rifle to let the brothers escape. With Bratchenko dead, Colonel Bella looks down in disgust at his hands and receives a form of redemption which his deceased Russian commander never could. The film ends with a final narrative of the monument dedicated to the fallen Wolverines – invoking Lincoln’s Gettysburg address to commemorate those who perished “so that this nation [...] should not perish from the Earth.”⁸⁴

While it would may be presumptuous to highlight *Red Dawn* as a prime example of Russian – and by extension Soviet – representation, it is symbolic of a larger American zeitgeist which presented the USSR as a foreign entity that stood in direct opposition to the very existence of the United States. Through the highs and lows of Cold War tensions, there has been a consistent trend within both the civilian and government portrayal of the Soviet opponent; the enemy is depicted as inscrutable, domineering, and ominously threatening. In what is perhaps a

⁸³ *Red Dawn*, directed by John Milius (1988; Beverly Hills, CA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 2015), DVD.

⁸⁴ Abraham Lincoln, “The Gettysburg Address,” *Abraham Lincoln Online*, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm>

self-fulfilling prophecy, the dichotomy between East and West became a familiar trope and motivating tactic.

Before there was *Red Dawn*, however, there was a half century of both physical and theoretical line drawing in which a vast Cold War framework was formed. Perhaps best embodied within – and catalyzed by – the 1950s rhetoric of United States Senator Joseph McCarthy, American propaganda has led a lengthy and antagonistic path throughout Cold War history. Stemming from tensions between the Eastern and Western Blocs, the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact and the United States of America’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), respectively, entire institutions were founded in order to shape and subvert cultural perceptions of the so-called ‘menace’ originating from behind the Iron Curtain.⁸⁵ The enemy was branded as “Socialists”, “Communists”, “Bolsheviks”, “Reds”, “Ruskies”, “Pinkos”, and everything in-between. This foreign (or internal, depending on your perspective) influence on the lives of the American people ebbed and flowed with the shifting global political tides. To date, numerous historians have spent their entire careers investigating American-Soviet relations during this period. Others such as David S. Foglesong have also impressively demonstrated that this mercurial positioning can trace its roots back long before George F. Kennan posited the idea of communist containment in 1947. The tenuous relationship between the two powers would only be exacerbated by a continuous rise and fall of each respective nation’s prosperity, often times at odds with the other; America’s decadence of the 1920s was seemingly balanced by the Russian famine of the early 1920s, with the situation reversing itself during Wall Street crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, since these contrasted with the newly-industrialized and recovering Soviet Union.⁸⁶ The cataclysm of the Second World War only dragged this tension even further into the light, as disagreements over fronts, invasions, and occupied territory led President Harry Truman to state in April 1945 that the Russians “don’t know how to behave. They are like bulls in a china shop. They are only 25 years old. [...] We have got to teach them how to behave.”⁸⁷ This antagonistic relationship continued for the remainder of the twentieth

⁸⁵ The most important of these institutions was the United States Information Agency (USIA), which had an active role in foreign non-aligned nations within Africa, Asia, and South America. See previously mentioned Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency* for an extensive breakdown of these government programs.

⁸⁶ M. K. Dziewanowski, “Death of the Soviet Regime: A Study in American Sovietology by a Historian,” *Studies in Soviet Thought* 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1972): 368

⁸⁷ Quoted in Omar H. Ali, *In the Balance of Power: Independent Black Politics and Third-Party Movements in the United States* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 125.

century, becoming embodied in almost every aspect of American culture: from film to comic books, marketing ads to political campaigns. The battle for hearts and minds took place on an imaginary playing field – one couched in the somewhat ephemeral language of identity, perception, and representation.

While one must always be careful to generalize about an entire society's mentality through only a select few works of popular culture, there is still some value in highlighting what items bubbled to the surface amidst Cold War era fears of communism. In the same year that saw the release of *The Pearl* and *A Streetcar Named Desire*, works such as *Is This Tomorrow: America Under Communism* (1947) showed a vision of the United States engulfed in flames; it sought to render readers "more alert to the menace of Communism."⁸⁸ 1960's *To Kill a Mockingbird* and *Green Eggs and Ham* was accompanied by *The Red Iceberg*, which similarly warned against the impending unforeseen dangers of an oncoming and unshakeable Soviet Union.⁸⁹ Robert Conquest and Jon White's instructional *What to Do When the Russians Come* (1984) was followed up with a beguiling *Neuromancer* and the stirring *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*.⁹⁰ Unarguably the American national consciousness, spreading Soviet influence abroad, and the uncertainty of a world on the brink of conflict influenced creative mediums in all their forms.

Marketing advertisements were also similarly active within this cultural battlefield, as American businesses took many opportunities to strike at the threatening Soviets and their perceived hatred for capitalism even as they hawked the most mundane of products to the public. The caption of a poster for the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation reads, "It looked safe, but it was deadly poison. A dose of socialism can be just as deadly. It kills freedom... Leads to Communism. Would you risk a little POISON?"⁹¹ A second example hawks with Scot Tissue Towels. The main blurb at the bottom states that "wiping your hands on harsh, cheap paper

⁸⁸ John Steinbeck, *The Pearl* (New York City: Viking Press, 1947); Tennessee Williams, *A Streetcar Named Desire* (New York City: New Directions Publishing, 1947); and *Is This Tomorrow: America Under Communism* (St. Paul: Catechetical Guild Educational Society, 1947).

⁸⁹ Harper Lee, *To Kill a Mockingbird* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1960); Dr. Seuss, *Green Eggs and Ham* (New York City: Random House, 1960); and *The Red Iceberg* (St. Paul: Impact Publishing, 1960).

⁹⁰ Robert Conquest and Jon Manchip White, *What To Do When the Russians Come: A Survivor's Guide* (New York City: Stein and Day, Inc., 1984); William Gibson, *Neuromancer* (New York City: Ace Books, 1984); and Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* (New York City: Harper & Row, 1984).

⁹¹ Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corporation, "It Looked Safe," Advertisement, April 12, 1962, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/write_light/11965346/173668/173668_original.jpg

towels” would make you grumble and complain too, perhaps fomenting capitalist antipathy and encouraging communist thoughts.⁹² Almost any event could be skewed into a negative spotlight. Even the world expo in Montreal was portrayed as allowing for Soviet construction rather too close to the United States border.⁹³ Finally, to conclude my limited sample, advertising concerned Americans were guided into purchasing ‘Truth Dollars.’ These would support Radio Free Europe, which broadcast messages of freedom across the Iron Curtain.⁹⁴ The market was as much a battlefield for Cold War identity as the wide landscape of entertainment products.

These local anti-Communist sentiments were also supplemented by campaigns abroad that often received official American government sponsorship. Founded in 1953, the United States Information Agency saw itself as performing public diplomacy throughout the world in the pursuit of sharing American virtues of freedom with other nations in order to hinder communism’s spread. The USIA’s battle was one of public image as well as diplomacy. Selling the United States narrative, way of life, and humanitarian image was another means of taking a national story and transposing it onto the transnational world. One of the most interesting examples of this was their attempt to use musicians as ambassadors of US life and culture abroad. Believing that the improvised and flowing nature of jazz embodied America’s freedom of thought and that it could act as a symbolic counter to Soviet structure and totalitarianism, the Information Agency repeatedly sent trumpeter Louis Armstrong to perform across Europe and Africa.⁹⁵ On the one hand, this type of cultural exchange opened up some avenues for American diplomacy in beleaguered third world nations trying to navigate the between superpowers. On the other, Soviet authors were quick to highlight the hypocrisy of sending a man out to promote freedom when he returned home to a segregated nation. Public image, perception, and representation became an international priority for the United States.

⁹² Scot Tissue Towels, “Is Your Washroom Breeding Bolsheviks?” Advertisement, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <http://i.bnet.com/blogs/scot-tissue-blosheviks.jpg>

⁹³ This was perhaps a rather ingenious marketing move to play on American fears to promote tourism and attendance at Expo 67. The Universal and International Exhibition of 1967, “Look What the Russians are Building,” Advertisement, *Life*, 17 February 1967, 15.

⁹⁴ Crusade for Freedom, “Truth Dollars,” Advertisement, July 1955, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <http://www.designer-daily.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/fight-communism.jpg>

⁹⁵ See previously mentioned Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up The World*. Other artistic campaigns include touring a collection of Chicago industrialist Lawrence Fleischman through Latin America. Greg Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 68.

Inevitably, the promotion of the Self would have best been supported by the detraction of the Other – the Soviets. While this occurred both officially and unofficially throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the best example comes during the chaos surrounding the 1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Throughout that year, the Afghanistan government faced armed revolt roughly based on their domineering attempts to quickly modernize and centralize the country. The Soviet Union was called on to provide military support to the current government and repress a rebellious group of mujahedeen based on prior Afghan-Soviet treaties. At the time, the United States saw this as an opportunity to draw the USSR into a political and military quagmire.⁹⁶ Advisors within the Carter administration promoted the idea of “giving to the USSR its Vietnam war.”⁹⁷ With funding and military aid from NATO countries, the propaganda shifted towards rebel fighters painted in a traditional Islamic light, fighting to stem the red tide from reaching their country. The conflict was portrayed in an extremely negative light, and has since been referred to as an invasion rather than a violent repression. At the time of the incursion, the now infamous Osama Bin Laden was praised by British paper *The Independent* as a “Saudi businessman” who recruited mujahedin and “put his army on the road to peace.”⁹⁸ This type of anti-Soviet sentiment led to a limited movement to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Dispersing the proper American image throughout the world was just as important as maintaining military bases and defense treaties. Questioning the Soviet identity became as vital as funding anti-Communist factions in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.

Of course, it goes without saying that this reductive anti-Soviet rhetoric did not go unnoticed or uncriticised by the American people. In politics, both the left and right found reasons to support or decry the so-called Communist threat. The general population could be thought of as having a similarly diverse perspective. Yet the commonality of Soviet agents, oppressive mentalities, and unknown threats from beyond still took hold and remained a dominant motif of late twentieth century popular culture in the Western world. In the United

⁹⁶ Though only one of multiple examples, Afghanistan demonstrates how easy it was to subsume local issues into the constructed global dichotomy between superpowers. The Cold War essentially provided both “ideological certainty” and a “structure for managing international conflict” which allowed for the placing of any event into a specific niche, category, and system of analysis for both the United States and the Soviet Union. James E. Cronin, *The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos, and the Return of History* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 241.

⁹⁷ Bill Blum, trans., “The CIA’s Intervention in Afghanistan,” *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 15-21 January, 1998, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html>.

⁹⁸ Robert Fisk, “Anti-Soviet warrior puts his army on the road to peace,” *The Independent*, December 6, 1991.

States specifically, we can return to perhaps the most overt and accessible forms of this tension embodied through films like *Red Dawn*. In the early years of the Cold War, *The Red Menace* (1949) followed two once-dedicated American communists before they realized the true, evil nature of the political group before attempting to quit the party.⁹⁹ Three years later, John Wayne veered away from his iconic roles in Wild West to instead play a HUAC investigator tracking down communists in 1952's *Big Jim McLain*.¹⁰⁰ As author Patricia Bosworth notes, over fifty anti-Communist films were produced “very quickly between 1949 and 1954,”¹⁰¹ and these would also be followed by works that would disguise their themes through the trappings of science fiction, such as 1953's *It Came From Outer Space*.¹⁰² 1952's *Invasion, U.S.A.*, had the United States besieged by a force known only as ‘The Enemy,’ heavily implied to be the Soviet Union.¹⁰³ Of course this should not be confused with 1985's *Invasion U.S.A.*, when Matt Hunter (played by Chuck Norris) fended off a Soviet-led incursion on the Florida coastline.¹⁰⁴ Though the 1960s and 1970s saw a dip in direct anti-communist films amidst an emerging stream of anti-war pictures such as *Mickey Mouse in Vietnam* (1969), *The Deer Hunter* (1978), and *Apocalypse Now* (1979), there were still occasional contributions to the fearful stream.¹⁰⁵ Most notably was John Wayne reprising his anti-communist role as a soldier (and director) in *The Green Berets* (1968), the untrustworthy Boris Vaslov (Ernest Borgnine) in *Ice Station Zebra* (1968), and the manipulative Mrs. Iselin of *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962).¹⁰⁶ Though suffering through a low point of Eastern European villains, the motif still endured this tumultuous period of debate within American culture.

⁹⁹ *The Red Menace*, directed by R.G. Springstee (Los Angeles: Republic Pictures, 1949), Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KWHNDNPdCg>

¹⁰⁰ *Big Jim McLain*, directed by Edward Ludwig (Burbank: Warner Bros., 1952), Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.amazon.com/Big-Jim-McLain-John-Wayne/dp/B003GAD73I>

¹⁰¹ Patricia Bosworth, “FILM; Daughter of a Blacklist That Killed a Father,” *The New York Times*, September 27, 1992, Web, Accessed March 8, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/27/movies/film-daughter-of-a-blacklist-that-killed-a-father.html?pagewanted=1>

¹⁰² *It Came From Outer Space*, directed by Jack Arnold (1953; Universal Studios, 2012), DVD.

¹⁰³ *Invasion, U.S.A.*, directed by Alfred E. Green (1952; Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures, 2002), DVD.

¹⁰⁴ *Invasion U.S.A.*, directed by Joseph Zito (1985; Cannon Films, 2016), Blu-Ray.

¹⁰⁵ *Mickey Mouse in Vietnam*, directed by Whitney Lee Savage (1969; New York City: Max Cats and Whittesey Sledge Studios, 2017), Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5uaaO57dTbg>; *The Deer Hunter*, directed by Michael Cimino (1978; Universal City: Universal Studios Home Entertainment, 2005), DVD; and *Apocalypse Now*, directed by Francis Coppola (1979; Beverly Hills: United Artists, 2017), Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.amazon.com/Apocalypse-Now-Marlon-Brando/dp/B0045INOD8>

¹⁰⁶ *The Green Berets*, directed by John Wayne (1968; Batjac Productions, 2007), DVD; *Ice Station Zebra*, directed by John Sturges (1968; Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 2005), DVD; and *The Manchurian Candidate*, directed by John Frankenheimer (1962; Beverly Hills: United Artists, 2006), DVD.

In the 1980s, however, there was a resurgence of overtly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist films. Around the same period that this thesis's manuals were being published, a slew of films were released which spoke toward the perceived binary between the United States and the USSR. Perhaps as a reaction to the end of détente and the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, works like *Firefox* (1982), *Red Dawn* (1984), *Rocky IV* (1985), and *No Way Out* (1987) found themselves following in the tracks of their 1940s and 1950s predecessors.¹⁰⁷ Others, like *Rambo III* (1988) and *Red Scorpion* (1988), utilized the context of Afghanistan to put more negative light on the Soviet forces.¹⁰⁸ Not only do both of the films portray the local resistance as justified in fighting against an oppressive Soviet military invasion, *Rambo III* went so far as to dedicate the film to “the brave mujahideen fighters of Afghanistan.”¹⁰⁹ The cultural battle for public perception was still occurring in earnest through the 1980s; and the medium of film was only the tip of the iceberg. Just as was occurring in Communist affiliated countries, the American cultural machine produced works that justified a narrative of justice and righteousness to any who would listen.

Outside this battle for hearts and minds was also one of strategy and military dominance, as the U.S. Department of Defense attempted to quantify and document the martial capabilities of this abstract and culturally skewed rival. Over nearly half a century, organizations like the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Soviet Studies Office (SSO) have released a vast amount of training documents to help officers and soldiers alike better understand and defeat their Soviet counterparts.¹¹⁰ The question then becomes, however, whether these instructional manuals followed the same pattern that has historically been seen in American propaganda, cultural products, or public government releases. By examining manuals like *FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* or *FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, readers can begin to pick apart just

¹⁰⁷ *Firefox*, directed by Clint Eastwood (1982; Burbank: Warner Bros., 2010), DVD; *Rocky IV*, directed by Sylvester Stallone (1985; Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayers, 2014), DVD; *No Way Out*, directed by Roger Donaldson (1987; Los Angeles: Orion Pictures, 2012), DVD, which is a remake of *The Big Clock*, directed by John Farrow (1948; Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 2004), DVD.

¹⁰⁸ *Rambo III*, directed by Peter MacDonald (1988; Culver City: TriStar Pictures, 2002), DVD; *Red Scorpion*, directed by Joseph Zito (1988; Studio City: Amsell Entertainment, 2002), DVD.

¹⁰⁹ End credits of *Rambo III*, directed by Peter MacDonald (1988; Culver City: TriStar Pictures, 2000), VHS. Following the events in New York of September 11th, 2001, this dedication was changed to “the gallant people of Afghanistan” for subsequent editions.

¹¹⁰ Seth Bonder, “Army Operations Research: Historical Perspectives and Lessons Learned,” *Operations Research* 50, No. 1 (Jan. – Feb., 2002): 25.

how vast the divergence between civilian and military representation of the Soviet world truly was. By examining a piece of work from each generation of manuals (1984, 1991, and 1994), this investigation can lay a baseline understanding for the general portrayal and representation of the Soviet forces within the manuals. Once this baseline is achieved, I can then move on toward a closer examination of deeper trends in later sections.

What would first strike our hypothetical soldier-in-training and any current readership is the language of respect and admiration that is diffused throughout the manuals, as it is so different from the cultural products of the same era that were just discussed. Initially, it may seem that this type of language only pertains to the combat capabilities and lethality of the Soviet ground forces. In the introductory pages of the 1984 version of *FM 100-2-1*, written at the height of Afghanistan incursion, military authors described the Soviet army as “highly modernized, well equipped,” possessing both the manpower and materiel to make them “a very formidable land army.”¹¹¹ They continuously upgraded their material, allowing for more efficient fighting force with cuts away the necessity of a second echelon or mobile groups. As Secretary of Defense Weinberger put it, this was no longer the “ponderous Soviet Army of the past.”¹¹² 1991’s *FM 100-2-3* goes one step further, stating that the “unprecedented flexibility, mobility, and firepower” made the Soviet ground forces “the most powerful land army in the world.”¹¹³ Again, readers can note how the use of terms like “unprecedented” and “most powerful” could affect a new American military inductee. Even the 1994 *PAM 350-16 Heavy Opposing Force Tactical Handbook*, released years after the official dissolution of the USSR, touched on the FSU (Former Soviet Union, the basis for OPFOR) by continuing this trend of increasing respect and acknowledgement through the use of key adjectives and descriptors. An OPFOR commander would be “very conscious” of specific vulnerabilities such as an open flank during fire support missions,¹¹⁴ would be “keenly aware” of a dependence on communications,¹¹⁵ and would be able

¹¹¹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 1-1. Page citations for these manuals, when using a hyphen, refers to a specific page within a section rather than a range. 1-1 refers to the first page of the first section, 5-8 indicates the eighth page of the fifth section, and so on. This is the numbering scheme used in the manuals and is adopted here for ease of use and reference.

¹¹² Weinberger, “Annual Report to the Congress, 1984,” 27.

¹¹³ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 1-1.

¹¹⁴ *PAM 350-16 Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Tactical Handbook* (Fort Monroe: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1994), 5-65.

¹¹⁵ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 14-1.

to act “decisively and with initiative.”¹¹⁶ These few examples highlight the frequent complimentary terminology that was used in every manual in our sample. While the military force it portrayed is certainly idealized, this terminology nonetheless accounted for a certain amount of respect and admiration on the part of the American authors. Even if the language was truly neutral and aloof, which it most certainly was not, it was still wildly more diplomatic than the horror and fear promulgated in popular culture or in fear mongering government statements. Words like “decisive” and “keen” were used instead of “ominous” and “menacing.” These Soviets were not presented as monsters, but rather as formidable foes that one needed to respect.

Those in charge of the rank and file – the officer corps – were also one of the most lauded subjects within the manuals. As the Soviet Union was described as having “the world’s most extensive network of military schools and reserve officer commissioning programs,”¹¹⁷ officers were referred to as “well-educated,” “well-trained,” and even though they have experienced a lifetime of political dogma, “they are not ignorant nor incapable of professional, purely military judgment.”¹¹⁸ The comment of professional judgment sticks out here, as this sentiment also surfaced in the 1991 generation with *FM 100-2-3*, stating that “[above] all, Soviet military training fosters professionalism.”¹¹⁹ As time went on and changes developed within the USSR, their command staff procedures were described as only continuously “being streamlined,” allowing initiative to be taken both at high- and low-levels of leadership.¹²⁰ Even if the vast control network should break down, the faith in higher authority permitted tactical-level decision to continue in a “constructive direction.”¹²¹ This, as a result, allowed for continual “troop discipline and unity.”¹²² Of course, it goes without saying that many of these implications of efficiency, order, and effectiveness were idealized. Faults within the system will be touched on later, but for now only the language surrounding description of the Soviet army must be noted.

This same type of admiration was also given to the technology that the Soviet military possessed. Previous comments on modernization of the army were overshadowed when each

¹¹⁶ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 2-4.

¹¹⁷ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 1-1.

¹¹⁸ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-12.

¹¹⁹ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-6.

¹²⁰ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 2-2.

¹²¹ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 2-3.

¹²² *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 2-4.

manual began to speak of Soviet materiel in detail, allowing free use of even more supportive terminology. When it came to chemical protective and decontamination equipment, for instance, Soviet forces simply had the best equipment “in the world,” and they “know that their chemical capability greatly exceeds that of any other nation.”¹²³ This theme of comparison on a global scale continued with specific vehicles like the HOKUM A (Kamov K-50 Black Shark) which was a coaxial-rotor helicopter “for which no Western counterpart exists.”¹²⁴ The HOOK (Mil Mi-6) heavy-lift helicopter was also described as being “twice the size of any Free World helicopter.”¹²⁵ This is our first instance of any negative terminology invading the manuals, as the authors imply the Western world as being inherently free. However, it seems to be an isolated case in a vast sea of neutral and even admirable terminology. So, it might be the largest assumption to infer that it might be just an adopted term used by producers of such vehicles, like Boeing, Sikorsky, or Lockheed Martin. Repeated contrast between “the free world” and “the Soviet Union” did indeed set up a dichotomy, but one in which the USSR was first among equals and did not carry the same negative connotations as in mainstream cultural products.¹²⁶

Other equipment and vehicles were similarly praised. The RPG-18 increased all squad’s effectiveness against armored vehicles and tanks, and the GIANT (SA-12b) surface-to-air missile systems could intercept “aircraft at all altitudes, cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and possibly some types of strategic ballistic missiles.”¹²⁷ The T-55 tank had a “highly mobile chassis, a low silhouette, and exceptional long-range endurance.”¹²⁸ Its successor, the T-80, had “improved mobility” due to a gas-turbine engine and increased capability with a smoothbore main gun.¹²⁹ The integration of BMDs (an acronym for the Russian *Boevaia Mashina Desanta / Боевая Машина Десанта*) in airborne regiments “substantially increases the division’s

¹²³ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-9. According to Library of Congress researcher John M. Collins, the Soviet command was more likely to use chemical weapons due to their understanding that the U.S. lacked the “ability to reciprocate in kind” and believed American defenses to chemical weapons were “permeable.” John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985), 138.

¹²⁴ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-224.

¹²⁵ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-214.

¹²⁶ *Soviet Military Power* follows a similar trend of presenting a dichotomy between the Soviet Union and the remainder of the globe, but the work’s language implies a deficiency on the part of the United States – a need to catch up and offset Soviet advantages. An example of this would be increasing the production of nuclear-capable bombers and submarines to balance out the “Soviet advantage in ICBMs.” *Soviet Military Power, 1990*, 66.

¹²⁷ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-97, 5-135.

¹²⁸ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-45.

¹²⁹ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-53.

firepower and maneuverability.”¹³⁰ The 7.62 mm Kalashnikov assault rifles were described as “very dependable weapons.”¹³¹ In both extreme temperatures and after total immersion in mud and water, both the AK and AKM variants were found to “function normally.”¹³² They produced a high volume of fire and were “simple to maintain.”¹³³ The 14.5 mm heavy machine gun was also “simple in design and rugged in construction. It is considered to be reliable.”¹³⁴ Much like their interpretation of the Soviet army in general, the manuals stated that the technology the soldiers possessed was rugged, reliable, and uniquely Russian.

Their nuclear, chemical, and biological equipment in general was also apparently dependable and in good supply.¹³⁵ Some aspects of it were even described as “rather ingenious.”¹³⁶ Another creative and remarkably simple aid in technical logistics was the “extensive and effective” standardization of equipment.¹³⁷ As the parts of multiple vehicles, weapons, and equipment were interchangeable as the technology moves forward, the benefits were twofold. First, repairs could be done quite easily through cannibalization of damaged or surplus goods on the front lines. Secondly, obsolete vehicles and weapons could be used for training while not necessitating a ‘legacy’ stockpile of repair parts. Almost all moving parts of RPK machine guns and AK/AKM assault rifles are interchangeable no matter the era of production, for example.¹³⁸ If a damaged rifle was discarded, it could be taken apart and used to repair other weapons if needed. Certainly, this would sound quite appealing to any American soldier familiar with cleaning and maintaining their own service weapon on the front line. The negative language vis-à-vis the enemy that one would expect in a militarily-focused work was simply not present on a large and overt scale in our sources.

In fact, a significant amount of the manual’s content was dedicated to the deconstruction of flawed Western modes of thinking about the Soviet Union and its military. Many instructional paragraphs were written to dissuade readers from adopting traditional ways of thinking, and

¹³⁰ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-38.

¹³¹ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-4.

¹³² *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-4.

¹³³ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-4.

¹³⁴ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-20.

¹³⁵ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-6.

¹³⁶ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-6.

¹³⁷ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 13-2.

¹³⁸ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-13.

instead to force recruits to understand a Soviet mindset. First, this appeared with regards to classifying the basic structure of a Soviet attack. *FM 100-2-1* bemoaned that “[too] many US analysts have used US tactical terms [...] to describe Soviet offensive actions.”¹³⁹ This had inevitably resulted in a “distorted image of Soviet actions.”¹⁴⁰ In perhaps one of the most prescient and relevant comments, the manual went on to state that in order “to fully understand the Soviet military thought process [...], the Soviet categorization must be adhered to.”¹⁴¹ For example, a “breakthrough” attack was often described by Western authors as the main avenue taken by the Soviet military when facing a defensive opponent. This would be an incorrect categorization which ignored “all options available” to a unit’s commander, and reduced this adversary into facile choices.¹⁴² Granted, this type of instruction specifically pertained to operations and tactics of the Soviet Union, which the manual quickly highlights was “not as thoroughly rigid as is perceived by many Western analysts.”¹⁴³ When combined with the other choices of language, however, this points towards a common problem of American military authors who chose to impart their own views on the foreign agent, often “incorrectly and too freely.”¹⁴⁴ This sentiment was echoed in our other manuals such as *PAM 350-15*, which argued that a vital task in training against the OPFOR opponent was to understand their terminology and thought processes.¹⁴⁵ In 1984 Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger explained this concept in his annual report to Congress, stating that it was not enough to outspend the Soviets, but rather to “determine the nature and extent” of their threat.¹⁴⁶ *DDI 1100-77-76*, for example, instructs readers on Motorized Rifle Company maneuvers based on the definitions used in “Soviet military literature,” not American perceptions of combat.¹⁴⁷ Not only were the manuals passively using language which did not reify the demonic portrayal; they actively highlighted the ways in which trainees could look into the mind of Soviet soldiers and adopt their perspective in order to better understand their approach to war and peace. True knowledge of the purported foe was more beneficial than any propaganda.

¹³⁹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-5.

¹⁴⁰ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-5.

¹⁴¹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-5.

¹⁴² *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-13.

¹⁴³ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 2-12.

¹⁴⁴ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 2-5.

¹⁴⁵ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 1-2.

¹⁴⁶ Weinberger, “Annual Report to the Congress, 1984,” 3.

¹⁴⁷ Frasché, *DDI-1100-77-76 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company*, 8.

As can be seen, the fear of the unknown did not corrupt military representations of the Soviet Other. Rather, those who drafted our manuals embraced and exhorted it. The language may have been idealized, embellished, or polished, but it avoided being vitriolic, condescending, or patronizing. As they tried to deconstruct or altogether ignore tropes of the Soviet Union, military authors instead focused on presenting the varied components of the Communist armed forces as complex entities. Negativity would even be dangerous for any new American recruits. To overestimate or demonize their foes might inspire fear or hesitation, rather than create the intended lust for vengeance and honorable defense of democracy and freedom. To be an under or uninformed recruit would harm a soldier by fostering an ignorant worldview, possibly resulting in fatal consequences. Portraying the Soviets as monsters was counterproductive to training. Still, the commentary that was present within the training manuals is only tangentially captured through specific key words, descriptors, and phrases hidden amongst technical and tactical paragraphs.

By skirting around issues of direct commentary and instead embracing it within the margins of their content, military authors were allowed to implicitly show their preconceptions of the Soviet soldier without providing overt, and perhaps easily critiqued, narratives which did not agree with what had come before. As a function of their environment, military authors – whom we sadly know very little about – certainly played a role in filtering a specific portrayal of the Soviet Other, just as their fellow authors did in civilian mediums. They were in a position of power for their inductees, and served as both literal and figurative authorities. Consequently, they had an inescapable and direct influence on how the Soviets were seen. The difference, however, is that the depictions in the military manuals differed from the biting, vitriolic, and manipulative constructions present in films, books, art, music, and civilian government productions. Evidently, American military training cannot be understood as just another simple case of regurgitating anti-Soviet rhetoric. Instead, as we will see, it was much more complex.

Section 4 – Critiques and the issue of *Maskirovka*

The training manuals that form the source base for this thesis, however, were not purely filled with admiration, respect, and veneration of the Soviet military's capabilities. The Soviet soldier were not solely described as impervious juggernauts. Our hypothetical trainee, once shown the positive aspects and defused of some previous conceptions of the Soviet military,

would then be taught about flaws and faults to exploit. As will be seen in the following section, the Department of Defense and its subdivisions did not abstain from highlighting the flaws, ideological pitfalls, and technological weaknesses of their counterparts on the other side of the globe. While the rhetoric did not inherently contain the same vitriol as some civilian/cultural attacks against the USSR, there remained a pattern of careful critique, estrangement, and othering within late Cold War American military doctrine. By examining how this critique was spread throughout our training manuals, ultimately encapsulated through the use of the term *maskirovka* we are able to balance the positivity and admiration of the previous section with a healthy amount of skepticism. While some authors, such as Tom Gervasi in *Soviet Military Power*, entered into a dialogue on the veracity of these critiques (and commendations), this section simply seeks to map out the existence of such discussions and the resulting stereotypes. Trainees were simultaneously presented with a knowing commentary of the Soviet force's faults alongside the praise. And, interestingly, this was presented in a much more subtle manner which lacked the explicit bite of widespread mainstream propaganda.

The source base for American critiques undeniably had a large pool of evidence and subject matter to draw from, all of which could be described in opposition to the experience within the United States. Russians, Kazakhs, Georgians, and people from a multitude of other nationalities within the Soviet Union were indoctrinated into a militarily-focused and pseudo-communist life at an early stage, with wildly varying levels of academic quality and focus.¹⁴⁸ A large number of soldiers were conscripts, which presented another problem of uniformity as not only was the standardization of belief incongruent, so too were those drawn into the standard military. The majority of recruits did not enter service voluntarily, so it could be argued that they did not share similar goals, mindsets, and drives for their military training. Alcoholism was portrayed as rampant due to unfettered boredom and isolation. There was a high turnover rate for non-commissioned officers and lower ranks, leading to an absence of a solid intermediary between officers and conscripts. Outdated tanks, jets, and ships were used into much later generations. Equipment, such as rifles, grenades, and so on, were often sold or exchanged for personal goods on the black market. Ideologically, the Soviet Union's leadership did not place as high a value on individual lives in comparison to their NATO opponents – leading to a much

¹⁴⁸ Though, “data gaps” have often left analysts with a necessary level of speculation on the results Soviet training. Fräsché, *DDI-1100-77-76 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company*, 2.

higher degree of mortality for Soviet soldiers. This, perhaps only when placed in contrast with Western values, was depicted as sacrificing too much life for too little gain. An overriding emphasis was placed on offensive maneuvers, almost continuously discarding consideration of defensive positions. Soviet communication systems were often complex, and loyalties were split between commanders and the party itself. At the top level, and in the late 1980s specifically, leadership in the General Staff (*Stavka / Ставка*) faced numerous documented problems in efficiency, principal direction, purpose, and basic unity. After entering the military and turning toward doctrine instead of popular description, American soldiers were presented with evidence of their opponent's alleged inadequacies.

A fitting starting point lay with the purely technological aspects of the Warsaw Pact cache – weapons, vehicles, and equipment. This provided the most overt and surface-level scrutiny available within the training manuals. Prior to enlisting, American personnel may have had some assumptions or familiarity with Soviet technology – whether it be through films, news media, or just popular fiction. As we have seen, overt military action involving the Soviet Union was prevalent in films of the 1980s such as *Rambo III*, *Red Dawn*, and *Firefox*, or TV series like *Airwolf* and *MacGyver*.¹⁴⁹ Mock-up Hind gunships or T-72 MBTs were forged out of Western helicopters and armored tractors for viewers. Those with more of an espionage leaning could tune in to *Mission: Impossible*, and *Octopussy*, or pick up one of numerous Robert Ludlum or John le Carré novels to delve into a story featuring the USSR or some East European spy antagonists.¹⁵⁰ As is quite evident, Soviet influence, militancy, and technology was represented across varying mediums of American popular culture.

Despite the wealth of information in fiction, real world examples may have been even more prevalent. Because of their production in the 1980s, the manuals targeted a generation of officers and service personnel that would have heard of, or even lived through, the crises of the Cold War such as the Cuban blockade or the Vietnam War. It would not be a too large an assumption to imagine that these students of military arts recognized the rugged and uniquely Soviet shapes of an AK-47/AKM rifle, a MiG-25 fighter, or a T-55 tank. They had ample

¹⁴⁹ *Airwolf*, created by Donald P. Bellisario (1984-1987; Golden Valley: Mill Creek Entertainment, 2016), DVD; and *MacGyver*, created by Lee David Zlotoff (1985-1992; Hollywood: Paramount Pictures Home Entertainment, 2015), DVD.

¹⁵⁰ *Mission: Impossible*, created by Bruce Geller (1966-1973; Hollywood: Paramount Home Video, 2006), DVD; and *Octopussy*, directed by John Glen (1983; Beverly Hills, 2000), DVD.

opportunity to have seen or heard of them in action in various isolated or proxy conflicts in previous decades. Moreover, the technology of the Soviet Union had been packaged and sold to the world as something distinctly other to that of the West. It came to possess a type of symbolism and reputation that was wholly unique, so much so that Mozambique, for example, incorporated a Kalashnikov-type rifle into their official emblem and national flag, stating that it represented both “defense and vigilance.”¹⁵¹ As a result of this real world knowledge, combined with the environment created by popular culture, many American trainees enlisting in the military would have had at least some preconceived notion of what the Soviets were armed with.

Any mystique quickly dissipated in the harsh and sometimes monotonous light of American analytics. The mainstay of the Soviet arsenal, the Kalashnikov rifle and its numerous variants, was highlighted for the numerous drawbacks inherent in its design. Typical AK-47s and AKMs had a large 7.62 x 39 mm bullet cartridge and a muzzle velocity of 710 meters per second. This was described as creating a “looping trajectory” for the bullet, resulting in difficulties with accuracy and “clumsy sight adjustment”¹⁵² that had to be compensated for. In contrast with the 5.56 x 45 mm NATO version (with a muzzle velocity of 948m/s in the M16 branch/family/tier), the Soviet rifle sacrificed weight, speed, and aerodynamics for more impact energy.¹⁵³ Further, the rifles experienced some possible design flaws in an exposed gas cylinder, which was “easily dented,” or a quickly overheating barrel which could cook off and prematurely explode rounds while still in the chamber.¹⁵⁴

Other handheld weapons, like the PK series of general-purpose machine guns, were similarly critiqued.¹⁵⁵ The closing remarks concerning the handheld weapons did state that the PKS/PKT/PKB/PKM tiers were “easier to handle during firing, easier to care for,” and were “lighter” while still using a “more powerful cartridge.”¹⁵⁶ These comments were balanced by other inadequacies: the choice of a non-disintegrating belt could interfere with a gunner’s

¹⁵¹ Central Committee of the Mozambique Liberation Front, *Constitution of Mozambique: Article 194* (Maputo: Republic of Mozambique, 1990), 26.

¹⁵² *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-4.

¹⁵³ Though it must be noted that this larger cartridge was being phased out by the smaller 5.45 x 39 mm, used in the AK-74 and its iterations post-1974.

¹⁵⁴ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-4.

¹⁵⁵ PK is transliterated from the Russian *Пулемёт Калашникова*, which translates to “Kalashnikov’s Machinegun,” named after the Soviet weapon designer.

¹⁵⁶ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-16.

movements, and barrel changing was not as “fast and effective” as Western machine guns.¹⁵⁷ Warsaw Pact armaments – with all their intrinsic faults – gave American forces a vulnerability to exploit, making it more plausible for narratives where a rag-tag group of high school students could fend off invading Communist forces in *Red Dawn*. If nothing else, it is evident that doctrinal instructors wanted to impart the knowledge that these weapons were deadly, functional, and rugged, but they were not infallible, despite the praise given to the Soviet forces in other sections of the manuals.

As *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment* moved on from the man-portable weapons, critique was similarly scattered throughout the descriptions of vehicles and aircraft from the USSR. The curved shape of the T-55’s turret, for example, was said to have good ballistic qualities, but created “cramped working environments” which resulted in a “slow rate of fire.”¹⁵⁸ The T-55 had a lower silhouette than the American M60, but the armor was considered “thin by Western standards.”¹⁵⁹ Its loading and aiming equipment was crude; it possessed no chemical or biological air filtration; could fire effectively from defilade due to low depression angles; and the positioning of the crew, ammunition, and fuel storage provided vulnerable axes of attack. As a result of the Afghanistan conflict, the T-55/62 was also cited by analysts for its inadequacy in the mountainous terrain, who stated that they were “of little use” to Soviet forces.¹⁶⁰ Perhaps due to its popularity and production numbers, the T-55 received the most numerous criticisms in the Soviet arsenal. Less prolific vehicles, such as the PMP bridge builders, received only a solitary mention of how they were “extremely vulnerable to air attack and artillery.”¹⁶¹

Another popular piece of equipment was the iconic Soviet helicopter, the Mil Mi-24 Hind-D. Nicknamed “Satan’s Chariot” by the mujahedeen, this double-bubble canopy aircraft received a similar amount of disparaging as the T-55 main battle tank.¹⁶² Similar to the American experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan put a larger emphasis on rotary craft rather than tracked or

¹⁵⁷ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-16.

¹⁵⁸ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-46.

¹⁵⁹ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-46.

¹⁶⁰ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 683. It also must be noted that while the newly developed T-72 was available, the 40th army which was deployed in Afghanistan only had T-55s and T-62s.

¹⁶¹ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-140.

¹⁶² Greg Goebel, “[1.0] Hind Variants / Soviet Service,” *In The Public Domain*, 1 April, 2007, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20080120022008/http://www.vectorsite.net:80/avhind_1.html

wheeled ground vehicles for the Soviet forces. However, this increased reliance also resulted in an opportunity for outsiders to witness the helicopter's disadvantages. The Hind, remolded into an attack variant from an initial troop-carrying design, presented a large profile which made it easier to detect and target by opposition.¹⁶³ This made it especially vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles, like the Soviet SA-7, British Blowpipe, and later American-supplied FIM-92 Stinger, which all "posed a grave threat" throughout the conflict.¹⁶⁴ Its rotor configuration was also described as making it less agile than the "Soviets would like," and the craft was similarly difficult to maneuver at low speeds or in hover states.¹⁶⁵ At high speeds it had a wide turning radius, which made it struggle when fighting enemy helicopters. While not relevant for the specific case of Afghanistan, it is notable that American doctrine continuously hypothesized how equipment like the Hind would fare against equally-developed forces.

The picking apart of the Hind, the T-55, and the AK/AKM highlights a pattern within the American doctrinal scholarship. As was shown in the previous section, analysts were more than willing to respect, and even praise, the abilities of the technology that was employed by Soviet soldiers. But here, the ominous Hind had its reputed fangs removed, the rugged T-55 was shown to be a clunking detriment, and the iconic Kalashnikov was dragged through the mud. What we must extricate from these esoteric analytics is that there was a concerted effort by the Department of Defense to bring notions of Soviet weapons and technology down to reality. Especially noteworthy is that this was a matter of understanding, not projecting dominance or fear mongering. The goal with these documents appears to be highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy – not debating who was better, stronger, or more able.¹⁶⁶ Though there were direct comparisons between the Eastern and Western blocs, they were predominantly cases of using something American soldiers were familiar with to get a framework within which to understand the foreign weaponry. On average, it appeared that when discussing technology, the US experts presented a similar amount of critique alongside their praise and respect. It is,

¹⁶³ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 5-220.

¹⁶⁴ For stinger and other MANPAD supplies, see William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 80; Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 683.

¹⁶⁵ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment* p.220

¹⁶⁶ *Soviet Union: A Country Study* does a good job of demonstrating this. It attempts to explain these weapons as "incremental with limited capabilities, but always gradually improving and easy to use." It delineates their capabilities in a simple manner without overtly complicating the descriptions. It appears to be an attempt at theoretical understanding rather than projected dominance. Zickel, eds., *Soviet Union*, 735-737.

however, when moving toward a discussion of tactics that a more distinctly “Soviet” personality begins to appear amidst the previous language of neutrality. It revolved around the idea of something called *maskirovka*.

In 1987, Major Daniel W. Krueger of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth released a short monograph titled *Maskirovka—What’s in it for Us?* In the text, Krueger explains that:

The amalgamated concept of camouflage, concealment, and deception is expressed by the Soviets with the term “maskirovka.” While direct translations of the single word “maskirovka” may vary, the Defense Intelligence Agency considers “deception” as the closest single word English language translation. Interestingly, the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia parenthetically defines the term “maskirovka” as “military *khitrost*,” a term for which Clausewitz’s “cunning” would be an acceptable translation.¹⁶⁷

Khitrost’ can also be translated as a ‘stratagem.’ Therefore, readers can take away that *maskirovka*, when used in the context of American military manuals, referred to the deceptive qualities of the Soviet (and later Russian) forces.¹⁶⁸ As the title of the work implied, Major Krueger compared United States doctrine with Soviet *maskirovka* practices, reasoning that American forces had something to learn from the scope and implementation of their opponent’s abilities. Before delving into his analysis, Krueger stated that there was a possible perception among analysts that Soviet deception was “the factor to be reckoned with should war break out between the two nations.”¹⁶⁹ With this in mind, Krueger pushed forward to see what lessons the Defense Intelligence Agency could garner from comparing two vastly different approaches to disguise, deception, and diversion.

According to his research, Krueger concluded that the United States had a much more limited scope, range, understanding of, and overarching goals in regards to deception within the armed forces – especially when contrasted with the Soviets. Both militaries understood that the “Crux of the issue is hiding the real and displaying the false”; Krueger, however, concluded that

¹⁶⁷ Daniel W. Krueger, *AD-A190 836 Maskirovka—What’s in it for Us?* (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1987), 3.

¹⁶⁸ Prior to the use of the term “*maskirovka*,” manuals like 1977’s *FM 30-102* simply emphasized how the Soviet Union/Opposing Force would use “cover and deception (C&D) in every situation and every level of command when it is to their advantage.” *Maskirovka* would then go on to become the umbrella term to cover this deceptive approach to combat. *FM 30-102 Opposing Force Europe*, 2-5.

¹⁶⁹ Krueger, *Maskirovka*, 5.

the Soviets emphasized the former while American doctrine emphasized the latter.¹⁷⁰ Further, the belief in surprise was reinforced as being predominantly respected beyond the Iron Curtain, but faltering in the West. Drawing on the 1984 version of the Soviet strategic manual *Taktika*, Krueger highlighted that “the element of surprise has long been the most important principle of the art of war” from the USSR’s perspective.¹⁷¹ In the United States, however, Krueger admitted that “[skepticism] is likely to remain in much of the army until it sees that deception is indeed executable.”¹⁷² There was a demonstrable hole in American training and literature in regards to the topic – something which Krueger hoped to change with his short monograph.

The most important takeaway from Krueger’s analysis is the knowledge that there was a severe disparity between Soviet and American understandings, implementation, and desire for deception on a grand scale. In the United States, there was a rooted skepticism which higher-echelon theorists like Krueger needed to dispel and assuage. In Warsaw Pact nations, *maskirovka* was respected, widely implemented, and lauded as an important force multiplier. Simply put, the Soviets were understood – and portrayed – as a more deceptive fighting force. To return to one of Major Krueger’s opening lines, some facets of the American civilian or military communities believed *maskirovka* to be a reckoning actor throughout the Cold War. Deception could therefore be understood, in the minds of American analysts, as integral to the Soviet identity. As a counterbalance to the praise and respect of the previous chapter, *maskirovka* represented a divergent narrative of critique and suspicion. While it may be argued that *maskirovka*, as understood by Krueger and like-minded individuals, represented a further nod toward the ability of the Soviets, the need for a positive spin on the concept against a skeptical military community might instead be seen as an exception to the rule. Krueger was arguing against a community which saw *maskirovka* as something separate and distinctly Soviet. In other words, *maskirovka* was the epitome of othering within Cold War American military training.

With this in mind, we can turn back toward our training manuals to see how these perceptions were embodied in the guiding doctrine of the United States. As we know from an earlier reference, the 1984 *FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* spoke toward

¹⁷⁰ Krueger, *Maskirovka*, 33.

¹⁷¹ Krueger, *Maskirovka*, 35. This was taken from a version translated by the CIS Multilingual Section Canadian National Defense Headquarters; V.G. Kezhichenko, *Taktika* (Bolling Air Force Base: Directorate of Soviet Affairs/U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service, 1984), 46.

¹⁷² Krueger, *Maskirovka*, 38-39.

the “general purpose ground forces” of the Soviet Union.¹⁷³ As is familiar, the authors began by laying out a basic understanding of the Soviet approach to war and its underlying tenets. What immediately stands out to readers in this context is the ideal to “[deceive] the enemy. Attack from an unexpected direction at an unexpected time.”¹⁷⁴ A few lines later, American analysts commented these principles serve “as a basis from which any examination of Soviet operations and tactics must start,” and it seems the authors took this lesson to heart.¹⁷⁵ When commenting on the generalized withdrawal of Soviet troops, *Operations and Tactics* stated that a security echelon will be left whose sole mission was to “delay and deceive the enemy” for as long as possible, hopefully forcing pursuers to deploy prematurely.¹⁷⁶ The remainder of the withdrawing force “can be expected to resort to deception, movement at night” and periods of reduced visibility, as well as enacting “cover preparations.”¹⁷⁷ In discussing diversionary tactics, both “dummy” observation posts and “decoy” flights have been observed, requiring a wary apprehension to both reconnaissance and radar detection. Smoke doctrine and capabilities were also described as “impressive”; they could range from blinding smoke, camouflage engine exhaust, or decoy deployments.¹⁷⁸ Essentially, a continuous motif of Soviet deception was spread throughout the manuals – something which did not have a direct equivalent in American military doctrine at the time.

Interestingly, the *maskirovka* descriptor itself endured long past the collapse of the USSR. After 1991, American military manuals still referred to deceitful tactics by any and all enemies through this familiar Russian term. The TRADOC Pamphlet *350-14 Heavy OPFOR Operational Art Handbook*, for example, purported in 1994 that it is “not simply [an] unclassified [handbook] on the forces of a particular nation.”¹⁷⁹ Rather, the pamphlet described a generalized force composed of multiple composites, which could broadly be applied to any foreign army as needed for training purposes. However, the work continued to refer to operations involving disinformation or deception simply as *maskirovka*.¹⁸⁰ Perhaps *maskirovka* persisted

¹⁷³ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 1-1.

¹⁷⁴ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-4.

¹⁷⁵ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-5.

¹⁷⁶ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 6-2.

¹⁷⁷ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 6-10.

¹⁷⁸ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 13-4 to 13-4

¹⁷⁹ *PAM 350-14 Operational Art Handbook*, ii.

¹⁸⁰ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 12-30; *PAM 350-14 Operational Art Handbook*, 12-13, 13-9.

into the 1990s and 2000s as a simple shorthand borrowed from the Cold War, or it could be just one facet of a composite faux military force to theoretically train against. Despite both these reasonable claims, the term *maskirovka* inherently possesses an association born out of its origins in the Cold War, and the word denotes a distinctly Soviet way of thinking. Invocation of the word automatically attaches itself to a foreign style of warfare that, while adopted by American forces, was officially viewed as something separate and distinct from the Western sphere.

Through *maskirovka*, we are able to see that even in their attempts to balance praise with censure, more complex disparities are being highlighted. This is not abject fear mongering or bravado-filled denouncements. Presented alongside the admiration for the armed forces of the USSR was a necessary amount of criticism. Just as new trainees would be intimidated by an unstoppable red menace, so too would they be ineffective and overconfident against a flimsy, rough-shod military stricken by alcoholism and corruption. Manuals such as *FM 100-2-1* were attempting to teach their soldiers, rather than to indoctrinate them. Trainees were presented with a realistic and ultimately balanced evaluation of the Soviet soldier – something which could be seen as being in direct conflict with the portrayals found in popular culture. However, as *maskirovka* hints at, there was still a looming issue beyond the surface spectrum of technology and ability. Attached to evaluations of weaponry, training, and tactics, American service personnel were being guided and trained on the importance of another facet of their opponents: the Soviet identity.

Section 5 – Training and Soviet Identity

When American trainees flipped through their manuals, they came upon this transcribed passage from the Soviet military oath. Interestingly, it was only slightly longer than the American Oath of Enlistment, and shared some common terminology. While its inclusion here may seem a bit out of place, it does provide an important template for understanding the values and notions that were impressed upon Soviet oath-takers and American readers.

I, [Name], a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by joining the ranks of the armed forces; take an oath and solemnly swear to be an upright, brave, disciplined, vigilant soldier, to strictly preserve military and

*government secrets, and to execute without contradiction, all military regulations and orders of commanders and superiors.*¹⁸¹

As we have seen so far, typical American service personnel would be (re-)introduced to their Soviet opponent in both positive and critical ways. The significant takeaway from the previous section, however, is the underlying current of difference that the rhetoric and language surrounding *maskirovka* hints at. Soldiers may recognize the iconic but flawed Kalashnikovs, but what about the people holding them? How did they train? Why did they fight? What was their culture like, or how different was their upbringing? Why were they, at their core, set up as diametric opposites to the Americans reading our manuals? By examining the ways in which Russian or Soviet forces were described and portrayed as different, we can measure precisely how military instruction either adopted to, or forged away from, the dominant American zeitgeist at the time of their publication.

Presenting your opponent as someone otherworldly and only vaguely recognizable is a concept as old as warfare itself, and the epistemological foundation of the Soviet soldier as an ‘other’ was one that has been crafted over a period of time long before the emergence of the post-World War II Cold War. Almost a full century before containment-advocate George F. Kennan authored *The Sources of Soviet Conduct* in 1947, his great-uncle George Kennan trekked across the Siberian expanse before returning to the United States to repudiate the Russian imperial system.¹⁸² Before Korea and Vietnam, there were the American expeditionary forces in Vladivostok and Arkhangelsk. As historians like David S. Foglesong have demonstrated, the mercurial relationship between the United States and both Imperial and Soviet Russia began long before the supposed rift between communist and capitalist superpowers. Whether perceived as a product of clashing ideology or the vying of two developing global forces, this relationship was also tied to global pre- and post-war national trajectories and identity. As such, this complex

¹⁸¹ Excerpt of the Soviet Military Oath, the entirety of which is transcribed for instruction within *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 2-2. The remainder of the oath is used, in italicized snippets, throughout the following section.

¹⁸² George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1947); and Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani, *Distorted Mirrors: Americans and Their Relations with Russia and China in the Twentieth Century* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009). Two primary source accounts can be seen in George Kennan, *Siberia and the Exile System* (London: James R. Osgood, McIlvaine & Co., 1891); or George Kennan, *Vagabond Life* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015 [1870]). See also Frederick F. Travis, *George Kennan and the American-Russian Relationship, 1865-1924* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990).

relationship can be seen as being catalyzed – not created – by the power dynamics left in the wake of the Second World War.

As the world ostensibly left imperialism behind, the relatively new nation-state became the dominant polity for many emerging constructed communities. In lieu of vast tracts of lands, peoples, and cultures overseen by a centralized metropole, the vertically composed nation-state was being drawn up amid the skeletons of empire. In the Russian case, an imposed uniformity became the norm under Soviet rule, as the country's leadership pitched a global workers revolution stemming from their union of republics. The United States, similarly breaking bonds with old empire, began its own pursuit of global ambitions by utilizing a narrative of interventionism in the name of democracy and freedom. As Theodore Geiger wrote for the Council on Foreign Relations in 1967, "the security of Western society rests predominantly upon the power and will to action of the United States."¹⁸³ In both cases, it became increasingly important to justify the unity of local homogenous groups through imagined national communities. Defining a nation-state's individuality and difference, naturally, became one way of fulfilling this goal.

These fragile identities were more easily supported if one could provide an outside, foreign foil. The leaders of the USSR viewed their nation as a bastion of democracy and advocate for the progressive force of socialist and communist revolution. American officials, similarly, considered their country the hub of democracy and progressivism under the banner of liberty and entrepreneurship. The power of difference emphasized an outsider in order to maintain and justify an internal conformity or shared identity. For the purposes of this analysis, the veracity of the portrayals are secondary to the performances themselves. Accurate or exaggerated, acts of othering are the key factors which must be delineated from paragraphs of tactical detail and technical data. As both fresh and experienced American personnel sat down and studied their opponent, they asked what kind of person may face them across the battlefield. Who were these soldiers? The answers they came up can be discerned in the military training manuals they created.

¹⁸³ Theodore Geiger, *The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 21.

I swear to learn conscientiously the trade of war, to protect with all means the military and peoples' property, and to be devoted to my people, my Soviet homeland, and the Soviet Government to my last breath.

If Cold War America could be seen as fostering business acuity in its encouraging paper routes and lemonade stands, then the USSR could be argued to have taken an approach that pushed its population towards a military outlook on life. At least, that is how enlisted Americans were presented with the Soviet Union's approach to its population. Allegedly, civilian and military life was interchangeable. Military needs unilaterally superseded those of the civilian sphere. One example comes from 1968, when our manuals described a large rear-force mobilization which drew "directly from the civilian economy of cargo trucks and other specialized equipment."¹⁸⁴ Though the passage was in actuality a comment concerning preparations for the Operation Danube invasion of Czechoslovakia, it stands as a presumed example of how willing the USSR was to siphon resources from one sphere of life to another. This practice became so routine within the Soviet Union that outside analysts determined that multiple divisions could be conjured up within a few months using "civilian trucks and large stockpiles of older weapons and equipment."¹⁸⁵ These makeshift civilian detachments could then be used "effectively" against second and lower tier NATO forces.¹⁸⁶ The emphasis on easing the transition between civilian and military life also supposedly reflected the USSR's view of the civilian world as coming second to military needs. Though Soviet leaders may not desire war, they were said to "prepare for it continuously," so much so that their political and economic systems "give priority to military requirements."¹⁸⁷ On paper, the society presented to American service personnel was undoubtedly a battle-ready one, even if that came at the expense of the republic itself.

As a result, many facets of the non-combatant world were inexorably entwined with the martial one. The national economy was viewed as a single unit, whereas in the United States there was still some semblance of separation between the Department of Defense and the private sector, no matter the concerns over a powerful, growing military-industrial complex. If people in the United States feared a military juggernaut supplied by a civilian economy, just such a

¹⁸⁴ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 2-10.

¹⁸⁵ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 750.

¹⁸⁶ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 750.

¹⁸⁷ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-2.

situation was presented as normally occurring in the Soviet Union at the time. Rather than an end in itself, the civilian (or national) economy was the engine driving the armed forces of communism and socialism forward.¹⁸⁸ The *Heavy OPFOR Tactical Handbook* described how Soviet society utilized centralized planning to ensure “coordination of civilian production with military requirements.”¹⁸⁹ According to *The Soviet Union: A Country Study*, many servicemen “were assigned non-military duties that in many other countries were performed by civilians.”¹⁹⁰ Construction, repair, and transport groups, loosely labeled as the Soviet reserves, continued transporting, repairing, and constructing during peacetime. Further, until the early 1990s, the Soviet General Staff was still heavily involved with planning how best to use “military force for civilian control.”¹⁹¹ To see armed or uniformed infantrymen in a Russian city or working locally was normal and their presence would not be given much notice. In the United States, however, such an event would raise quite an alarm – unless some kind of training exercise was underway nearby or the National Guard had been deployed. Simply put, American service personnel were being taught that in the USSR, the border between civilian and military spheres was porous and fluid, if it existed at all. The two ways of life just did not have the same air of separation that was present in the United States.

American readers were then presented with a wealth of information on just how early Soviet citizens were integrated into this nationwide preparation for war. Long before a man or woman swore the military oath quoted earlier, citizens were supposedly well on their way to learning the “trade of war.” At age ten, Soviet children entered the Vladimir Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization. Activities within this Scout-like group included discipline and physical training, as well as “military-patriotic indoctrination.”¹⁹² In 1967 the system was further entrenched by the Law on Universal Military Service, which “established a compulsory system of premilitary training for all young men and women aged 16 through 18.”¹⁹³ The manuals described how this later training took place in high schools, specialized secondary schools, trade

¹⁸⁸ This type of sentiment is rife within *Soviet Military Power* descriptions, citing that throughout “all lower levels of party and government decisionmaking [sic] there exist institutional mechanisms to enforce defense production priorities.” Economic problems are portrayed as threatening “future military requirements” rather than the republics or citizens themselves. *Soviet Military Power*, 1988, 32-33.

¹⁸⁹ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 13-1.

¹⁹⁰ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 697.

¹⁹¹ Grau, *Soviet Non-Linear Combat*, 1.

¹⁹² Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 739.

¹⁹³ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 22.

schools, factories, offices, and farms. At every stage in life the Soviet system was evidently determined to provide its people with a “fundamental knowledge of the military” and “military-technical skills” to ease their eventual transition.¹⁹⁴ Refresher courses to maintain acquired abilities were administered until an individual was removed from the pool of service at age 50 (65 if you were an officer).¹⁹⁵ Deferment from service was infrequent. Educational, hardship, and compassionate deferments were also reduced with the 1967 service law.

While the infrastructure necessary to impart paramilitary skills began in elementary school, it received even more attention at the secondary level since DOSAAF (the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet, an organization which focused on sports, physical activities, and paramilitary training for its inductees) then became involved. DOSAAF worked in conjunction with the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education, and the Ministry of Education, which had entire departments dedicated to pre-military training.¹⁹⁶ As the manuals detailed, as early as ages 15 and 16 students had classes on wheeled and tracked vehicles, parachuting, radio maintenance, and rifle drills.¹⁹⁷ Their instruction could be equated to that given to fresh Soviet Army draftees before the pre-military system was put in place in 1967. Accordingly, this was also done with the “maximum possible cooperation of local military forces,”¹⁹⁸ in an interesting use of terminology and imagery. A similarly unique word choice indicated that an extensive “toughening” of pre-draft youths occurred under the banner of the Komsomol’s “Ready for Labor and Defense” program in attempt to ensure that citizens were in peak physical condition.¹⁹⁹ To American trainees, this could be seen as an exaggerated and extremely militarized version of the Boy Scouts of America or Reserve Officer Training Corps initiative. At its core, the Soviet Union was presented as a society deeply entrenched with the perceived virtues of militarization and physical prowess. To achieve its goal the USSR had created a vast network within which to forge able citizens to defend the motherland. And it certainly had the raw material to pass through the flames.

¹⁹⁴ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-1.

¹⁹⁵ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-1; Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 750.

¹⁹⁶ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-1.

¹⁹⁷ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 2-1.

¹⁹⁸ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-2.

¹⁹⁹ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-3.

I will always be ready to report, by order of the Soviet Government, as a soldier of the armed forces for the defense of my homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Covering over one-sixth of the earth's inhabited land mass, and possessing a population of just over 286 million in 1989, the USSR had huge pool from which to draw its citizen-soldiers.²⁰⁰ And, unlike the (shifting) all-volunteer American forces, the Soviets had no qualms about drawing from it unabashedly. In their seventeenth year, all men headed to the military commissariat in February and March to register for military service. In emergency situations women were also conscripted to fill typically non-combat roles, thereby allowing more men to transfer to active operations. At the release of *FM 100-2-3*, it is indicated that there were approximately 10,000 women in the Soviet armed forces, but those numbers had gone as high as 800,000 during WWII.²⁰¹ As we have seen, the majority of the population were simply seen as active service personnel waiting in limbo for a call to arms.

Those comprising this group come from all cultures, faiths, and geographic parts of the Soviet Union, so not surprisingly the American manuals touched on the specifics of how this diversity informed an overall combat effectiveness. According to *FM 100-2-3*, the "quality" of the Great Russian element "is generally good." Youths were "physically hardy" and were overall "better educated, more sophisticated, and substantially better trained than their World War II predecessors." A conscript was sternly disciplined, received few luxuries, and was the target of intense indoctrination. On the other hand, the morale of the Soviet soldier was "relatively high" based on a "genuine love of his native land," and he supposedly had a high capacity to "withstand deprivations." Ultimately, the draftees were understood as "on par with their counterparts in the West." Hence, a narrative was created that underscored the respectable quality of Soviet recruits.²⁰² The earliest manual in our collection, from 1977, highlights the discipline and drive of these recruits. The typical recruit has "no civilian clothes, no privately owned vehicle, little money, and no nearby girlfriend. He is a 24 hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week

²⁰⁰ John Dewdney, "Population change in the Soviet Union, 1979-1989," *Geography* 75, no. 3 (July 1990): 274. By comparison, the United States had a population of just over 246 million in 1989. Wendell Cox Consultancy, "US Population From 1900," *Demographia*, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <http://www.demographia.com/db-uspop1900.htm>

²⁰¹ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 2-3; Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 747. In general, however, these manuals tend to imply the consideration of both men and women in their descriptions.

²⁰² *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 2-0.

soldier.”²⁰³ On average their dedication is unparalleled. To be conscripted into the Soviet military is both “an honor and a duty.”²⁰⁴

Despite this overall strong core, some negative light was shed on the faults that inevitably stemmed from the problems of attempting to train a population as large and diverse as that of the Soviet Union. Incompetent teachers, overbearing superiors, language conflicts, padded numbers, and non-combat assignments were all noted as hindering the efforts of the military cadre. Further, racial inequality was also highlighted as inhibiting the creation of a strong unified force. Military administrators were deemed to view non-Slavs as “potentially unreliable frontline troops.”²⁰⁵ Leadership positions were also similarly skewed, as Slavs comprised 95% of the officer corps.²⁰⁶ Rather than succeed in imposing homogeneity among the forces of the communist revolution, service in the armed forces was “reportedly more likely to increase ethnic and linguistic consciousness,”²⁰⁷ a large inconvenience to revolutionary conformity.

Even in highlighting these faults, however, the manuals maintained a balanced critique. In a paragraph depicting these issues that plague the Soviet military – if not the Union itself – the anonymous authors ended by saying that these “shortcomings are the same as those found in any army throughout the world,” and that there is “no doubt” that the Soviet armed forces are some of the most professional and best trained in the world. At least in terms of their different composition, military integration, and training approach, the Soviet military faces similar problems to other professional forces around the world. The issue of a differentiation, however, intensified when it came to violence and the USSR’s general approach to war.²⁰⁸

I swear to defend it bravely and wisely with all my strength and in honor, without sparing my blood and without regard for my life if achieve a complete victory over the enemy.

With a history so meaningfully entwined with violence and death, it seems natural to contain within the oath a willingness to sacrifice oneself in the service of a larger good – in this case, the complete victory over the enemy. As described in *FM-100-2-1*, the Soviets as a nation

²⁰³ *FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe* (Fort Monroe: HQ TRADOC, 1977), 1-1 to 1-2.

²⁰⁴ *FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe*, 1-2.

²⁰⁵ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 747.

²⁰⁶ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 747.

²⁰⁷ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 746-747.

²⁰⁸ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-7.

had suffered more than 40 million deaths in the three decades between the Russian Revolution and the end of the Second World War. In what seems like a knowing understatement the manual ended its description of this loss by noting that the “[USSR’s] tolerance for sacrifice is high.”²⁰⁹ As was explored in a wider scope throughout Russian and Soviet history, the populace had faced and become intimately familiar with death and violence, accepting it as a normalized part of life. In other sections of the manuals, we can see this attitude reflected in brief commentary on willingness to expend resources at any cost to achieve battlefield objectives. For example, Soviet air power was described as “willing to accept great losses” using old or obsolete aircraft if they believed it could succeed in “crippling enemy tactical air power.”²¹⁰ Similarly, it was assumed that heavy losses of deep-penetration forces would be acceptable if they could result in the “collapse of an enemy’s defensive structure before he could resort to use of nuclear weapons.”²¹¹ Loss of life was not an honorable possibility but a necessary sacrifice, and American analysts evidently used this notion to justify painting the Soviet people as an altogether different sort. It was assumed that the Soviets were well acquainted with using – and being the target of – violence, which had led to a certain level of desensitization.

The personal statement of sacrifice within the oath also reflects the larger Soviet battle plan and approach to large scale conflict. According to American analysts, the Soviets “have determined that the only way to win such a war is by offensive operations.”²¹² In its opening lines, *The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* described the Soviet basic principle of land warfare as “violent, sustained, and deep offensive action.”²¹³ In the Department of the Army’s own *Operations* manual, Soviet doctrine was similarly described as based on the “principle of mass” and victory through “relentless offensive operations,”²¹⁴ and that defense was only a “temporary” form of combat.²¹⁵ If placed in such a position as needing to defend and repel opponents, Soviet forces would “stubbornly [hold] key defensive positions” before “decisively

²⁰⁹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-3.

²¹⁰ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 4-6.

²¹¹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 4-8.

²¹² *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization and Equipment*, 1-4.

²¹³ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 1-1.

²¹⁴ *FM 100-5 Operations* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986), 85.

²¹⁵ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 6-32.

counterattacking to defeat enemy penetrations.”²¹⁶ A real world illustration of objectives may help clarify the difference between the Soviet and American approaches to war.

In the non-linear combat of the late 20th century, commanders highlighted objectives for their subordinates to focus on by circling key points on a map, termed “goose-eggs”. In the United States, as described by the *Heavy OPFOR Tactical Handbook*, commanders would circle key terrain for their troops to capture and hold - take a specific hill or overlook, for example. OPFOR commanders, on the other hand, would highlight enemy troops. To American military authors, the Soviet battle plan did not “rely heavily upon the seizure and consolidation of key terrain.”²¹⁷ The goal was not the capture of abstract objectives. It was to find and eliminate enemy forces wherever they were. Whether one strategy or the other was more practical is outside the scope of this analysis. However, the conduct of fighting was evidently different. One side was clearly portrayed as indelibly focused on the destruction of its opponent as the main process of war. The historical legacy of violence informed the approach to combat itself.

This might have had twofold effect on the mind of the American soldier. First, the notion spoke to an enemy who was willing to give up their own life for the pursuits of the greater union. Purportedly, this was undertaken with much less stigma and hesitation than in the United States. Though there is no reason to think that an American soldier was any less willing to sacrifice himself for the greater good, but the portrayal of motivation, willingness, and dressings surrounding the act are markedly different. Secondly, the idea also implied that Soviet commanders were willing to utilize their population in such ways to achieve their war goals. Massive, relentless, and violent fronts were favored over slow encroachment. The USSR would overwhelm its opponents with a seemingly unlimited amount of manpower. Again, the difference may not be in the action – willingness to use military force with all its ramifications – but in the narrative surrounding such an action. Human lives were another resource to be shaped, expended, and discarded in service of larger goals.

Should I break my solemn oath, may sever penalties of the Soviet Law, the overall hatred, and the contempt of the working masses strike me.

²¹⁶ James F. Gebhart, *Soviet Battalion in the Defense* (Fort Leavenworth: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989), 55.

²¹⁷ *FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe*, 2-3.

According to American military instructors, these driving forces related to the largest aspect of differentiation between the superpower blocs at the time: ideology. Purportedly the main factor separating the USSR and the USA, the clash of political and social ideology was put forth as the core tenet for why Soviet soldiers were so strikingly different than their American counterparts. Here, we can also see how this idea was embodied in the final lines of the military oath, in which failure inflicts the wrath of the working masses on an inadequate servant. Of course, while there is much to debate over the implementation or reality of communism, socialism, or any other structure of power within the USSR, here we need only understand it as a label applied to outsiders by the American military sphere. The intricacies and weight surrounding the term are not as relevant as the justifications ideology allowed Department of Defense authors to make about the citizens under its effect.

In a direct and upfront manner, multiple publications put out by the American military training department articulated that war for the Soviets was “a manifestation of the class struggle.”²¹⁸ War was regrettable but inevitable given the harsh divide between the “progressive forces of socialism” and the “reactionary forces of imperialistic capitalism.”²¹⁹ War was a continuation of politics, not the last effort when politics failed. Interestingly, it seems that American descriptions posited that this dichotomy was crafted on the opposing side of the Iron Curtain. Whether or not Americans actually believed in this contrast was tacitly left unsaid. Instead this construction is laid at the feet of Soviet political and military theorists who purportedly set up a “correlation of forces” between the capitalist and communist camps.²²⁰ A reactionary force indeed, Americans perceived – or at least portrayed – themselves as existing and fighting in this new superpower dynamics only as a consequence of foreign perspectives. The blame was put on the USSR rather than both power blocs for creating the global struggle. Despite these issues, however, the Soviet concept of war (and society itself) was definitively couched in the idea of social revolution according to American military authors. In their eyes, socialism would progress by both violent and nonviolent means, but war in favor of socialist

²¹⁸ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-1.

²¹⁹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-1.

²²⁰ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-1

objectives would always be considered warranted by Soviet officials since they believed that class wars were just, and predatory wars were unjust.²²¹

Similarly, the vast military training system in the Soviet Union was only rivaled by the political structure which was tasked with instructing, clarifying, and enforcing the perspective of the Party. The Pioneers, Komsomol, DOSAAF, and other paramilitary groups spent significant effort on the political indoctrination of their membership prior to these young people actually joining the armed forces.²²² In the military itself, the Main Political Directorate (MPA) diffused the same political outlook throughout the higher tier chain of command.²²³ At lower levels the MPA are represented by a *zampolit*, a political officer, who was placed in each regiment, battalion, and company. Importantly, the *zampolit*'s authority was independent to that of the military commander as they were primarily responsible for improving the "political loyalty" and the "patriotism" of the troops.²²⁴ Before an offensive, political officers would exhort soldiers "to be brave and complete the unit task with 'uplifted spirits.'"²²⁵ While this political officer did not make military decisions, they did have a "considerable influence" on the general policy and political direction of the unit.²²⁶ If a Soviet citizen had somehow escaped or lost faith in the Party's interpretation of Marxist-Leninism, there were safeguards in place to reinforce that perspective within the armed forces as well as a larger, societal-level inculcation of the proper mode of thinking. The global development of communism and socialism, which had allegedly been fomented by the minds of Soviet thinkers, was then taken all the way down to the level of a private and dispersed amongst all ranks of the USSR's war machine. As the much more eloquent 1977 *FM 30-102* puts it, the "opposing forces soldier receives political indoctrination from birth to grave."²²⁷

²²¹ Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union*, 655.

²²² Interestingly, the brief mentions of indoctrination belie just how strongly this was emphasized in non-military sections of American society. The entrenchment into a 'Soviet' outlook was portrayed as a combat benefit and completely bucked the notion of dehumanization and terminology like "slaves, pawns, automatons, puppets, drones, and zombies" used by civilian authors. See Matthew W. Dunne, *A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 57.

²²³ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization and Equipment*, 2-5.

²²⁴ *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization and Equipment*, 2-5 to 2-6.

²²⁵ Major A. E. Hemesley, *DDI-1120-10-77 Soviet Tank Battalion Tactics* (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1977), 22.

²²⁶ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 3-3.

²²⁷ *FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe*, 1-3.

In 2001, Ron Robin released his monograph *The Making of the Cold War Enemy*, which detailed how behavioral scientists of the era took part in perpetuating an image of the Soviets which “reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic.”²²⁸ In their own capacity, they were both “observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War.”²²⁹ The authors of our training manuals served a similar function in defining a specific aspect of the American Cold War narrative. Though not the sole arbiters of the Soviet image, military instructors (and their writings) had a significant role in filtering a specific concept of the USSR down to the developing troops. Soldiers were instructed in the methods and means of their opponent: how they fought, how they were equipped, and most importantly, how they supposedly thought. Just as politicians, policymakers, academics, and cultural figures took part in crafting an image of the Soviet enemy, so too did military authors and instructors participate in consolidating an abstract construction of the Soviet other. The Soviet forces had both positive and negative aspects to their abilities, equipment, and function, but they were altogether portrayed as something different than the soldiers of the United States. Their identity - who they were and what they believed - was distinct and separate.

By highlighting what aspects of Soviet life these authors deemed necessary to convey to students, we can infer what type of image they were hoping to create. Authors chose to emphasize societal-military composition, ethnic unity or disunity, ideology, and other topics which seem tertiary to the conduct of war itself. But, their inclusion speaks to the idea that these aspects of the Soviet society and psyche were precisely what influenced their conduct of Soviet troops in combat. And in a clever narrative construction, American authors found a way to perform and describe a global power confrontation while simultaneously excusing themselves from its creation. In this perspective, the Soviet approach to war – the very existence of their nation – was based on a rhetoric of differentiation from the reactionary West. Americans were simply performing their part in a play they seemingly had no hand in creating. This is a much more nuanced approach than the overt vilification present in other Cold War cultural products. It did not involve a blatant attempt to paint the opponent as “wrong” or “evil,” but rather a rewriting of the narrative. The Self was a product of the Other, rather than the other way around.

²²⁸ Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Industrial Complex* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 15.

²²⁹ Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy*, 15.

Section 6 – Encapsulation: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

With this concept of a unique Soviet identity in our mind, we (as well as our hypothetical soldier) can turn toward our final topic: nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBCs) within the Soviet arsenal. Throughout the Cold War, Western culture arguably perceived itself as continuously teetering on the brink of nuclear Armageddon. In a social environment where bomb shelters were widely advertised, “duck and cover” was taught in elementary schools, and novels like *Fail-Safe* to say nothing of films such as *Dr. Strangelove* were released, the American populace was undeniably left with a perception of Soviet leaders with their fingers on the literal button. But what were American soldiers taught about those piloting the nuclear armed bombers? Or about the decontaminators working in the chemical divisions and the scientists in hidden biological research facilities? Here we can gain some insight into just how divergent the internal teachings of the US Armed Forces were from the larger cultural narrative of the Cold War.

Examples of NBC weapons include hydrogen bombs, genetically engineered anthrax, and Sarin nerve gas, respectively. Surprisingly, this subject received relatively little analysis on the part of the Department of Defense; its comments were predominantly encapsulated only in isolated or closing chapters of manuals such as *FM-100-2*, *FM-100-3*, *PAM-350-16*, and *The Soviet Union: A Country Study*. Even *FM-101-31-1*, the staff officer’s field manual on the employment doctrine and procedures for nuclear weapons, relegated discussion of Soviet policy to a short paragraph. However, what was written about them speaks towards a more realistic understanding of NBC weapons than would initially be assumed. While we might be quick to think of the Cold War as intrinsically associated with mushroom clouds, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and mutually assured destruction, the evidence suggests that the US military viewed NBC weapons as simply another facet of combat. Not only does the language surrounding Soviet NBCs echo the respect and objectivity seen in previous sections, but also gives a very balanced examination of the USSR’s reluctance to utilize weapons of mass destruction.²³⁰ The concept of a menacing red threat possessing biological, chemical, and atomic weapons only barely held in check by retaliation is completely absent. What is present, however, is an altogether respectful – and somewhat detached – appreciation for the abilities of the unconventional Soviet arsenal. We

²³⁰ The classification of “WMD” is based on the need to protect troops and equipment from their use and employment, as opposed to conventional weapons which does not require the same levels of preparation. *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-1.

may also keep in mind that, as in the previous sections, there is no fear mongering or glorification. Instead, within the pages of American training manuals readers find a complicated portrayal of Soviet perspective, ideology, and ability based on their nuclear, chemical, and biological agents. We can therefore use the discussion of NBCs as a final case study of how the United States military would present one aspect of Soviet military life – including all the praise, admiration, othering, and measured critique present in our previous discussions. New to us, however, is exactly how different NBC weapons were presented in contrast to public perception, civilian instructions, and popular culture.

It can be argued that the NBC category is one of the most effective, efficient, and morally questionable part of any military's arsenal. While the awe-inspiring power of fusion, fission, and combination weapons have only changed the face of warfare in the previous century, chemical and biological warfare have been known for quite some time. During the Peloponnesian War, Sparta is recorded as having ignited sulfur to envelope Athenian defenses. Hannibal filled clay pots with venomous snakes, and the Mongols launched plague-infected corpses over the walls of besieged settlements. As the industrial era took hold, venomous arrowheads and toxic plants transitioned into a weaponized form on a much larger scale. Artillery utilized shells filled with nightshade, tallow, rosin, saltpeter, and eventually chlorine during World War I. Weaponized anthrax, botulism, and typhoid were present in both great wars of the 20th century. As a result of the Manhattan Project in the United States, and the work of Igor Kurchatov, Andrei Sakharov and other researchers in the USSR, nuclear weapons rounded out the NBC category into what are predominantly known as weapons of mass destruction.

In United States military training, pre-1945 wars were described as having a slow ebb-and-flow. The changing of fronts, battle lines, and theatres of combat were based on the relatively stable numerical ratio of personnel and equipment. This is what was known as the correlation of forces and means (COFM),²³¹ and it could only be changed through a slow process wherein more men and gear were funneled into a specific sector.²³² However, the introduction of NBC weapons brought with them the ability to change the COFM in a “matter of minutes,”²³³ which necessitated new ways of thinking about battles between superpowers. The horrors of the

²³¹ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-1.

²³² *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-8.

²³³ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-7.

atom and the organic compound could upset the balance of forces drastically on any axis and along the entire depth of the enemy positions.²³⁴ Fronts were replaced by meeting zones, corridor battles, and non-linear combat. Both American and Soviet forces adapted to this new perspective of conflict – one that was constantly under the menace of NBCs. It is through this context of changing warfare that we see an interesting American interpretation of the Soviet perspective.

During the summer of 1979, United States intelligence verified that there had been an accidental release of anthrax from a “highly secured military installation in Sverdlovsk.”²³⁵ This was the first confirmation that the Soviet Union was pursuing micro-organic supplies great enough to be weaponized, rather than purely for research or protective purposes, which would have gone against the signed and ratified 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. According to *FM-100-2-1*, the biological weapons employed by the USSR include pathogens, such as cholera and encephalitis, modified toxins to incite smallpox and diphtheria, and some live forms of micro-organisms like bacteria, fungi, or rickettsia.²³⁶ These can all be delivered through various means including rockets, artillery, airdropped packages, infected animals, and aerosols. Soviet research into biological warfare (and it can be assumed the United States was similarly following suit) extended into related areas such as “aerobiology, cloud physics, airborne infections and disease agent stabilization.”²³⁷ To a soldier who was instructed against poisoning or manipulating their own weapons in manuals like *FM 27-2 Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War*, the threat of horrifying disease and infection evidently existed within the Soviet arsenal, and would be intimidating to say the least.²³⁸ To someone outside this training, an outbreak of plague, anthrax, or cholera would seem unimaginable amid other horrors of war; they could lead to debilitating stress, hopelessness, and death.

Yet this type of language was not fostered within the training manuals. Just as was the case with earlier descriptions of Soviet weaponry in the manuals, biological weapons are portrayed as simply another tool to accomplish the task. In describing their possible use, *FM 100-2-1* merely stated that toxins were particularly potent, and could retain that usefulness for “many weeks and, in some cases, for months.”²³⁹ The OPFOR noted that the use of biological

²³⁴ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-1.

²³⁵ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-3.

²³⁶ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-3.

²³⁷ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-4.

²³⁸ *FM 27-2 Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War* (Fort Monroe: HQ TRADOC, 1984), 10.

²³⁹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-3.

weapons on strategic targets such as food supplies or population centers would “create panic” and “disrupt mobilization plans.”²⁴⁰ If inserted into water supplies, like reservoirs, wells, or natural systems, they would be “extremely potent and provide wide area coverage.”²⁴¹ While it might be harder to imagine the effects of chemical or nuclear weapons hitting close to home, the interaction of the public with disease makes biological weapons perhaps one of the most easily imaginable and disconcerting unconventional weapon. Yet here it was discussed plainly for its ability to disseminate over a wide area and retain potency for long periods of time, ultimately disrupting the movement of troops and weakening rear-area resolve. On the one hand, these could be seen as understatement. On the other, the comments point towards a fundamentally more objective view of NBC warfare.

If its personnel so desired, the Department of Defense could have emphasized the pursuit of biological weapons in the Soviet arsenal; they could have played up the Red Menace by underscoring a Soviet army with an array of deadly toxins, venoms, and diseases at its disposal. However, they abstained from doing so. Defense specialists chose to present NBCs in the same manner, rhetoric, and tone as any other weapon - not only of those in the USSR’s possession, but in the American repertoire as well. Similarly, this decision reappears in further sections on chemical and nuclear warfare in our various handbooks. While radiation exposure and poisoning, as well as acute reactions to blood, blister, and nerve chemical agents were well quantified, the language surrounding them remained clinical and detached. They were just possible tools up to the discretion of the Soviet soldier. As the section on biological weapons epitomizes, TRADOC and other military organizations rejected fear mongering of NBC weapons and instead normalized their use. While some discretion may go into their employment (as the upcoming nuclear section will show) they were ultimately discussed, trained for, and deployed without any inherently negative or positive connotation.

With this came a lack of association with the Soviet soldier as an individual. The communist military personnel did not have a predilection towards NBCs and unconventional weapons; they did not eagerly await their use. The Soviet soldier was – echoing earlier sentiments – an equal opponent to be acknowledged and portrayed in a respectful, if not praising, way. According to the training manuals, they were not to be underestimated and begrudged for

²⁴⁰ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-4.

²⁴¹ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-4.

their ability and armaments. If that were the case, a similar line of thought would have had to have been directed against America's own research and stockpiling of radically dangerous weapons. The negative connotation was absent from biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons, and so too was it absent from discussions of the Soviet soldier. The USSR was simply researching, creating, and using another weapon of war – just as if it were a new form of rifle or supersonic bomber.

In fact, the NBC section was where the most overt and prevalent praise was put upon the Soviet military forces. Most notably in the chemical weapons chapters, the American military manuals seemed to portray the USSR as vastly superior, and it is here that readers can notice the most direct evidence of respect out of the three primary NBC categories. As *FM 100-2: The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* stated, “the Soviets have the largest and most effective array of chemical weapons and equipment in the world.”²⁴² Their stockpiles alone “greatly exceed those available to the West” and were numerous enough to “sustain large scale use.”²⁴³ A significant portion of Soviet artillery could simultaneously fire conventional and chemical munitions, and to not utilize these weapons would rob the military of “a decisive advantage.”²⁴⁴ Further, *FM-100-2* noted that despite knowledge of the USSR's “overwhelming advantage, [the Soviets] continue to steadily improve” their capabilities.²⁴⁵ In essence, the chemical weapons program was portrayed as an unprecedented achievement in NBC warfare. Whether these portrayals were overstated, or belied greater American capabilities, the narrative of a feared chemical weapons compound saturated the training of the American soldier.

In combination with lethal synthetic combinations, the Soviets were also equipped with what was described as “the best chemical protective and decontamination equipment” and they were portrayed as altogether “unmatched by any other military force.”²⁴⁶ This terminology covered protective gear, such as suits and filters, as well as decontamination through mobile cleaning trucks, ad-hoc NBC centers, and “ingenious” early detection equipment.²⁴⁷ This rhetoric again reinforced the concept that the average soldier was backed by an expansive network of chemical arms and protective gear engineered with conflict in mind – that is to say, it was

²⁴² *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 1-1.

²⁴³ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-4.

²⁴⁴ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-9.

²⁴⁵ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-3 to 16-4.

²⁴⁶ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-9.

²⁴⁷ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-6.

durable, relatively simple, and interchangeable.²⁴⁸ The Soviet soldier (or OPFOR, in this specific case) was confident in the effectiveness of his equipment. The gear matched the weapons they were intended to protect against, bringing with it a security in one's own ability. After all, the doctrine for the Soviet army reinforced the idea that any organization "must be prepared to fight in the environment it creates."²⁴⁹ To employ apocalyptic weapons, a soldier must be willing, able, and perhaps even eager to face it himself, even if that meant continuing to fight for days or weeks in contaminated environments.²⁵⁰ This reflects a certain degree of mental fortitude and determination which could be seen as wildly different from perceptions constructed in non-military contexts – something which reappears numerous times in the training of these NBC soldiers, officers, and other service personnel.

As mentioned in earlier sections, military training for Soviet citizens began at a very early part of their lives, almost universally taking place before they reached draft age. According to American manuals, by introducing military technology, weapons, regimented scheduling, and basic physical competitiveness early on, those who were selected for NBC training had a foundational knowledge to build on as they headed into the program. As would be expected in the most optimistic scenarios, this allowed for a much smoother transition, and much more in-depth instruction in chemical, nuclear, and biological warfare. Even before he was drafted, the typical Soviet male already knew how to put on protective gear, provide first responder aid to NBC symptoms, and find adequate shelter depending on the weapon being used. This knowledge was only enhanced when a soldier entered formal NBC training, which was described as "comprehensive and realistic."²⁵¹ Live NBC agents (albeit diluted) were used to enhance the dangerous pseudo-reality of training – another reappearing motif which was highlighted numerous times in the American manuals.²⁵² Chemical weapons practice, for example, utilized nerve, blood, blister, choking, psycho-chemical, and irritant agents. The inherent danger of using live agents in simulation brings with it a lesson for actual NBC use: failure has drastic consequences.

²⁴⁸ However, as was covered in previous sections, there are noticeable deficiencies such as a lack of human engineering and ergonomics, specific weather calibration, and so on.

²⁴⁹ *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-4.

²⁵⁰ This seems to be based on the reliance on decontamination procedures at the front line, as it is specified that the "OPFOR does not believe its forces can continue operations for any length of time while contaminated." *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-7.

²⁵¹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-6; as well as the later *PAM 350-16 Tactical Handbook*, 15-1.

²⁵² *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 15-11; *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 3-6.

This fatalism was something undoubtedly portrayed in the American manuals as a uniquely Soviet perspective of war, fostered by both their military leanings and violent history. Evidence within this specific section also spoke to a further mental moulding of Soviet inductees. Two important word choices encapsulate this American understanding of their opponents; the first states that while “Soviet soldiers are taught to respect the destructive power of NBC weapons, they are also *indoctrinated* against viewing combat in an NBC environment as hopeless.”²⁵³ Secondly, they also “place a heavy emphasis on individual NBC protective training which attempts to *psychologically temper* personnel to the demands of NBC warfare.”²⁵⁴ As was touched on in my section on historiography, indoctrination and psychological training within the military was understood as a fairly new concept at the time. Similarly, it was portrayed as something the American military could borrow from the Soviets. The mind of a nation’s soldier was deemed just as noteworthy as a newfound atomic weapon, Kalashnikov variant, or improved aircraft.

War, however, must go on, and the process of physical training and mental preparation facilitated the “continuation of combat operations despite the presence of contaminants.”²⁵⁵ This training seemingly represented the physical embodiment of the Soviet ideological and doctrinal thought process of chemical, biological and nuclear environments. Soviet commanders, as portrayed through the American manuals, were willing to put their soldiers in danger to better prepare them for the realistic employment of catastrophic NBC weaponry. American soldiers were thus presented with a force – and leadership – that was markedly prepared for unconventional warfare. This was an opponent that would not be stopped by an outbreak of plague, mustard gas, or nerve agents. They would don their masks, go through decontamination procedures, administer antidotes, and keep on fighting. Unlike other possible opponents, such as the Viet Cong, NVA, Khmer, Iraqi, Iranian, or North Korean forces, the Soviets were portrayed as equal and perhaps better prepared to fight in “contaminated” or “irradiated” environments. This perhaps spoke towards a communal Soviet identity which was comprised of resilience, fatalism, and an acknowledgement of the necessity and inevitability of violence. At least, that is

²⁵³ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-7. Emphasis added.

²⁵⁴ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-14. Emphasis added.

²⁵⁵ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 16-1.

what an American soldier might come to assume after reviewing chemical and biological warfare tactics presented to him.

As the manuals move onto nuclear weapons themselves, however, there seems to be a divergence from this narrative. It becomes reined in by a discussion on the unique Soviet perspective of conflict being escalated to the level of fission and fusion atomic detonations. While it may not be the purpose of these works to discuss NBC weapons at length, the absence of thorough analysis – especially vis-à-vis nuclear weapons – suggests that these tools of destruction were not the principal or future direction of American (and Soviet) military thought.²⁵⁶ Certainly, their advent changed the face of war forever, but the manuals themselves portrayed a much higher level of trepidation and respect for their destructive powers than other more popular media would imply. In order to highlight this divergence, however, we must demonstrate how the nuclear sections mimic the other NBC descriptions.

Relating to training, it seems that Soviet soldiers and the greater forces surrounding them were just as well prepared for nuclear warfare as they were for chemical, biological, and conventional environments. As *FM-100-2-2* indicated, the Soviets have “moved toward a doctrine and force capability to fight decisively at all levels of conflict.”²⁵⁷ The prediction of nuclear war in the 1960s made its presence known in overarching USSR training departures of the 1970s and 1980s. This was such an extensive initiative that even the most basic doctrinal and tactical assumptions were made that the enemy (NATO forces) may escalate at any moment, and to prepare accordingly. In an interesting juxtaposition of common Western nuclear narratives, the Soviets were portrayed as expecting a detonation from NATO rather than the other way around. Therefore, they prepared to fight in the corridors between blast zones, with fragmented forces, and rapid meeting engagements through non-linear combat.²⁵⁸ Whether of their own volition or otherwise, when Soviet command wished to transition to nuclear war it did not have to “make a complex transition.”²⁵⁹ Orders contained contingency plans for nuclear blasts, fallout, protection, and most importantly, continuation of combat. In the Staff Officers Field Manual regarding their

²⁵⁶ Further, very little reference is made to experimental or in-development weapon systems. While more publically available works like *Soviet Military Power* go to great lengths in discussing particle beams, high-energy lasers, space-based kinetic energy, or radiofrequency weapons, these are simply absent from our training manuals altogether. *Soviet Military Power*, 1985, 44.

²⁵⁷ *FM 100-2-2 Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support*, 2-8.

²⁵⁸ Grau, *Soviet Non-Linear Combat*, 2.

²⁵⁹ *FM 100-2-2 Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support*, 2-9.

use, an example of Soviet policy dictated that there is “little distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear operations.”²⁶⁰ That is not to say that the Soviets viewed all war as eventually nuclear, but rather that their standard deployment and combat operations required very small modifications to react to – or employ - NBC weapons. Just as would later occur with the development of high-precision weapon systems, the development of nuclear weapons forced a doctrinal shift in the Soviet Armed Forces. The soldier and his entrenched theoretical system was adaptive just as well as it was resolute. What remained was to surround him in the proper equipment.

Similar to the chemical and biological arsenals, gear and protection were also described as very capable. The majority of nuclear weapons described at length were what are known as tactical nuclear weapons – those that would be used on the battlefield to take out a target, an opponent, clear defenses or slow an advance, and so on. These could be launched from cannons, rockets, and planes. Opposite to these are strategic nuclear weapons, which are used to eliminate the enemy’s ability to wage war with targets such as factories, cities, or other larger installations. In essence, one can imagine an artillery-fired nuclear shell as tactical – it is intended to influence a specific battlefield. The alternative is an intercontinental ballistic missile – intended to influence the entire war. Tactical nuclear weapons, smaller in yield but much more mobile, were assigned at “all levels from division up,”²⁶¹ with all of the self-propelled, towed guns, and howitzers being nuclear-capable.²⁶² Despite this preparedness, there were no descriptions of Soviet leaders being willing to use nuclear weapons with the same promptness as they would chemical weapons. The unease that surrounded biological weapons was similarly absent. Instead, there was a large focus on the both the unwillingness of the Soviets to use their arsenal of nuclear weapons and their determination to persevere if they were in fact forced to launch their warheads.

At the time of our manuals’ publication, United States national policy on nuclear warfare was “to deter it by means of a strong nuclear warfare capability.”²⁶³ Nuclear weapons should only be used when authorized by the President in an attempt to “forcibly change the perceptions

²⁶⁰ *FM 101-31-1 Staff Officers Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures* (Washington: TRADOC/Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1986), 1.

²⁶¹ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 1-1.

²⁶² *FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment*, 1-7.

²⁶³ *FM 101-31-1 Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures*, 1.

of enemy leaders about their ability to win,” demonstrate an undesirable escalation of conflict, and “encourage negotiations.”²⁶⁴ But to avoid any notion of a passive nuclear policy the *Staff Officers Field Manual* also reminded readers that this “does not preclude the first use of nuclear weapons.”²⁶⁵ The United States had the ability and the will to use nuclear force if necessary, but was also careful to portray its likely actions as primarily defensive in nature. The creation and stockpiling of weapons was a necessary part of the new world order, but it was something that was done with a certain amount of trepidation and quiet resolve, rather than with a dominant display of power.

A similar theme of destructive ability joined with apprehension followed in descriptions of Soviet nuclear policy and tactics. In plain words, the American military described that the Soviets “would prefer to avoid nuclear warfare.”²⁶⁶ They would not pursue it as an avenue of conflict unless there were indications that the enemy was utilizing atomic weapons first. In fact, the overriding aim of a Soviet front during the offensive was to stop war from going nuclear by “swift, early destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear weapons by nonnuclear means.”²⁶⁷ Researcher Lester W. Grau also reiterates this belief, highlighting that by the 1980s and early 1990s, the members of the Soviet General Staff were instead seeing these weapons of mass destruction being replaced by high-precision systems and weaponry.²⁶⁸ There was the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS), the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS), and the Joint Surveillance and Target Radar System (JSTARS) on the NATO side of the battlefield,²⁶⁹ with Warsaw Pact equivalents on the other. Apparently the Soviet Union (and later the Russian Federation) decreasingly saw nuclear weapons as an inevitability in war.²⁷⁰ While *The Soviet Union: A Country Study* presented a more intricate view of nuclear policy – such as the debate on what means should be used when fighting a “just” war in pursuit of Marxism-Leninism – on average the other manuals presented a fairly one-track interpretation of Soviet policy and understanding which mirrored the American version. Despite possibly being more prepared,

²⁶⁴ *FM 101-31-1 Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures*, 1.

²⁶⁵ *FM 101-31-1 Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures*, 1.

²⁶⁶ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 2-9.

²⁶⁷ *FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics*, 4-1.

²⁶⁸ David M. Glantz, *The History of the Soviet Airborne Forces* (Park Drive: Taylor and Francis, 1994), 371.

²⁶⁹ Grau, *Soviet Non-Linear Combat*, 2.

²⁷⁰ This apprehension was apparent as early as the 1950s, where both Dwight D. Eisenhower and Georgy Zhukov discussed how hydrogen and atomic weapons “made war even more senseless than before.” Gordon S. Barrass, *The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors* (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2009), 103.

better trained, and mentally fortified American training manuals portrayed the USSR as being just as risk-averse as the USA when it came to nuclear weapons. Even in the worst-case scenarios, and the bleakest and jaded example of Cold War mentality, *PAM 550-95* describes that the USSR believed that if nuclear war were to break out, it would “be fought in and confined to Western and Central Europe,” so that both “the United States and Soviet territory might escape nuclear devastation.”²⁷¹ Realistically, there was sentiment on both sides to “build-down” what was believed to be “the most dangerous arsenal ever to threaten mankind.”²⁷² Strategically, nuclear weapons had the power to end wars and the world as we knew it. Tactically, they were prepared for and produced by military cadres. In the end, perhaps nuclear weapons were simply not feasible as tools of war. They became the purview of political rather than military leaders, since while armed forces may develop and maintain them, ultimately they refrained from using nuclear weapons and instead left their employment in the hands of American and Soviet heads of state.

Following our discussions of praise, critique, and identity, the discussion of NBC weaponry acts as an example case for all three avenues of analysis. Here, the praise was laid on the amazing abilities of the Soviet chemical divisions. Tutting appeared against hidden and faulty biological research facilities. And, ultimately, the altogether deterministic response to possible use of NBC weapons spoke toward a familiarly dogged Soviet mentality: no matter what happens, they will persevere and continue. But, absent was the imagery of a paranoid silo commander with his finger on the button. From the evidence presented here, American trainees and officers would have to see the Soviets in a light distinct from the civilian and cultural life. Though there was significant variation between the presentation of nuclear and biological/chemical weapons, altogether it was a very tempered amount of respect and admiration with a tinge of wariness. NBCs were neither dishonourable nor completely acceptable. Not only were the effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons explained and quantified in detail, but they were discussed in a matter-of-fact tone which belied the truth of their use. No matter how destructive a new weapon is, there will always be someone to use it, and hopefully someone to survive, and continue on to fight another day. Therefore any trainee must be prepared to fight on in the event of disaster. NBC war may end the world as we know it,

²⁷¹ Zickel, ed., *A Country Study*, 662-663.

²⁷² Weinberger, “Annual Report to the Congress, 1985,” 4.

but the world will continue. American soldiers were taught that their Soviet foes were prepared to go along with it.

Unfortunately, such a grand issue like weapons of mass destruction and their employment raises more questions than it answers, and, ultimately, highlights an ongoing theme within this thesis itself. Did the nuclear policy demonstrate a certain amount of restraint on the Soviet side, or did it reflect a quiet confidence in their massive amount of manpower? Was it a skewed American presentation set to drum-up more funding? Did such detached and clinical descriptions normalize the horror of NBC weapons? While American military authors took little credence from their civilian compatriots, the complexity and depth of such a representation forces readers to acknowledge that a Cold War opponent like Soviets soldiers could be reduced to flat characters at the end of a shooting range, or representatives of an omniscient and omnipresent communist threat that sought to invade American households and minds. This also speaks to the amount of restraint, respect, and mental acuity on the party of American military authors who presented the Soviets as such complex entities.

Further, it is essential to note that a concept of commonality between the Self and the Other, the American and the Soviet soldier, has been found and taught to fresh recruits despite the differences highlighted between culture, ideology, belief, and political directorate. The camaraderie of soldierly life and the lived experience of training and indoctrination has evidently fomented a reasoned and mediating discourse. While this may not take into account unofficial commentaries, undocumented training, and personal experiences, there is still some meaning to be found in the tomes of a military which has long since been left behind during a new War on Terror. According to official doctrine, at least, Cold War recruits were not fed meaningless propaganda and tuned to hate their opponent. Instead, they were pushed toward learning about the complexities of the Soviets, their unique strengths and weaknesses, their communist ideologies and how all of these things affected their fighting capability. While the manuals provide great insight into how the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s American military viewed fusion weapons, USSR training, or Kalashnikov rifles, their enduring legacy is one that demonstrates how the United States – or any global power – should view an opponent that they are seemingly committed to combatting.

Legacy and Concluding Thoughts

I began this investigation based purely out of an interest in how American soldiers, in the midst of a global and seemingly apocalyptic Cold War, were taught about their imagined and real opponents. Initially, I assumed that their training would simply reinforce stereotypes found in popular propaganda where notions of the Red Menace, the evil empire, and the communist threat were commonplace. Academics, politicians, entertainers, businessmen, and popular culture producers all played a role in fostering a sense of danger, so why would this not be the case in military scholarship as well? Instead, analysis into the archive of training manuals opened up a complex and inviting spectrum of imagery. Here, Americans were instructed that, yes, Soviet servicemen and women were different, but the tone that was used to impart this idea was understated. Framing an entire culture in measured (albeit complex) tones was a welcome reprieve from the jingoism of specific cultural products. The manuals wound up not being dogmatic regurgitations of propaganda; nor did they seem to exaggerate threats in order to increase funding to the military. They provided information - not doses of ideology – to American citizens and soldiers-in-training.

A close examination of the language and content of these works tells us something interesting about the Cold War itself. It seems facile to say, but they demonstrate that the conflict was more complicated and less one-dimensional than people who lived through the era might remember. Perhaps more intriguingly, these sturdy tomes suggest that military institutions, which are often considered monolithic and unimaginative in nature, were able to cut through the fears that resonated in popular and political discourse to offer reasoned, balanced, and respectful assessments of their foe. Out of the myriad of possible source bases and lenses through which to examine the Cold War, that the American military educational system could stand out as a bastion of judicious rhetoric and balanced portrayal is fascinating in its own right. When reflecting on the military's status and influence for both American individuals and society itself, this evidence adds yet another layer to the complex legacy of the Cold War.

Contextualized in our own pressing times, however, it seems more relevant than I had ever hoped it could be. A little over a year ago, Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Adelberg of the Strategic Studies Institute stated that, in light of Russia's internal politics and external activities in Ukraine, Crimea, and Syria, U.S. leaders and policymakers "should remain ever-cognizant of

the Soviet background of Russian foreign policy.”²⁷³ As the United States military reassess the importance of training for high-intensity conflicts and ramps up NATO exercises in the Black Sea, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe at large, there is some solace to be taken from the moderated analysis of Soviet-era Department of Defense publications. Likened to a new Cold War, expansionism and brinkmanship have retained their weighty implications in an era of draining propaganda campaigns, “fake news,” and the fevered pitch of national, cultural, and identity politics. In the time it took to research and compose this work, our world has become increasingly divided by more imaginary lines in the sand. However, it is heartening to know that even when the world perceived itself to be on the brink of annihilation, there were still mediums where this type of polarizing rhetoric was eschewed for common sense understanding. Just as it persevered during the Cold War, sound scholarship might still prevail in the end – even if some of it stems from unexpected sources in the blood and muck of military contexts.

²⁷³ Michael A. Adelberg, “What’s Old Is New – Kennan, Putin, and the Russian Competitive Viewpoint,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, November 30, 2015, Web, Accessed March 8, 2017, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Whats-old-is-new/2015/11/30>

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Airwolf*. Created by Donald P. Bellisario. 1984-1987; Golden Valley: Mill Creek Entertainment, 2016. DVD.
- Apocalypse Now*. Directed by Francis Coppola. 1979; Beverly Hills: United Artists, 2017. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <https://www.amazon.com/Apocalypse-Now-Marlon-Brando/dp/B0045INOD8>
- The Big Clock*. Directed by John Farrow. 1948; Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 2004. DVD.
- Big Jim McLain*. Directed by Edward Ludwig. Burbank: Warner Bros., 1952. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <https://www.amazon.com/Big-Jim-McLain-John-Wayne/dp/B003GAD73I>
- Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corporation. "It Looked Safe." Advertisement. April 12, 1962. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/write_light/11965346/173668/173668_original.jpg
- Bonder, Seth. "Army Operations Research: Historical Perspectives and Lessons Learned." *Operations Research* 50, No. 1 (January – February, 2002): 25-34.
- Central Committee of the Mozambique Liberation Front. *Constitution of Mozambique: Article 194*. Maputo: Republic of Mozambique, 1990.
- Collins, John M. *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985.
- Conquest, Robert and Jon Manchip White. *What To Do When the Russians Come: A Survivor's Guide*. New York City: Stein and Day, Inc., 1984.
- Crusade for Freedom. "Truth Dollars." Advertisement. July, 1955. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <http://www.designer-daily.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/fight-communism.jpg>
- The Deer Hunter*. Directed by Michael Cimino. 1978; Universal City: Universal Studios Home Entertainment, 2005. DVD.
- Department of Defense. *Soviet Military Power*, 1st – 10th editions. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981-1991.
- Dr. Seuss. *Green Eggs and Ham*. New York City: Random House, 1960.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," January 17, 1961. *The American Presidency Project*. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12086>
- Firefox*. Directed by Clint Eastwood. 1982; Burbank: Warner Bros., 2010. DVD.

- Fisk, Robert. "Anti-Soviet warrior puts his army on the road to peace." *The Independent*. December 6, 1991.
- FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics*. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1984.
- FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support*. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1991.
- FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment*. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1991.
- FM 100-5 Operations*. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986.
- FM 101-31-1 Staff Officers Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures*. Washington: TRADOC/Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1986.
- FM 27-2 Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War*. Fort Monroe: HQ TRADOC, 1984.
- FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe*. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1977.
- Frasché, Robert M. *DDI-1100-77-76 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company*. Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976.
- Gebhart, James F. *Soviet Battalion in the Defense*. Fort Leavenworth: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989.
- Geiger, Theodore. *The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967.
- Gibson, William. *Neuromancer*. New York City: Ace Books, 1984.
- Grau, Lester W. *Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s*. Fort Leavenworth: Soviet Army Studies Office, Department of the Army, 1990.
- The Green Berets*. Directed by John Wayne. 1968; Batjac Productions, 2007. DVD.
- Hemesley, A. E. *DDI-1120-10-77 Soviet Tank Battalion Tactics*. Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1977.
- Holcomb, James F. "A Commander's Guide to the Soviet Forward Detachment." *International Defense Review* (1989): 73-81.
- Ice Station Zebra*. Directed by John Sturges. 1968; Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 2005. DVD.
- Invasion, U.S.A.* Directed by Alfred E. Green. 1952; Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures, 2002. DVD.
- Invasion U.S.A.* Directed by Joseph Zito. 1985; Cannon Films, 2016. Blu-Ray.

- Is This Tomorrow: America Under Communism*. St. Paul: Catechetical Guild Educational Society, 1947.
- It Came From Outer Space*. Directed by Jack Arnold. 1953; Universal Studios, 2012. DVD.
- Kennan, George F. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25, No. 4 (Jul., 1947): 566-582.
- Kennan, George. *Siberia and the Exile System*. London: James R. Osgood, McIlvaine & Co., 1891.
- Kennan, George. *Vagabond Life*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015 [1870].
- Kezhichenko, V.G. *Taktika*. Bolling Air Force Base: Directorate of Soviet Affairs/U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service, 1984.
- Krueger, Daniel W. *AD-A190 836 Maskirovka—What's in it for Us?* Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1987.
- Kundera, Milan. *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*. New York City: Harper & Row, 1984.
- Lee, Harper. *To Kill a Mockingbird*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1960.
- Lincoln, Abraham. "The Gettysburg Address." *Abraham Lincoln Online*. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <https://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm>
- MacGyver*. Created by Lee David Zlotoff. 1985-1992; Hollywood: Paramount Pictures Home Entertainment, 2015. DVD.
- The Manchurian Candidate*. Directed by John Frankenheimer. 1962; Beverly Hills: United Artists, 2006. DVD.
- Mickey Mouse in Vietnam*. Directed by Whitney Lee Savage. 1969; New York City: Max Cats and Whittesey Sledge Studios, 2017. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5uaaO57dTbg>
- Mission: Impossible*. Created by Bruce Geller. 1966-1973; Hollywood: Paramount Home Video, 2006. DVD.
- No Way Out*. Directed by Roger Donaldson. 1987; Los Angeles: Orion Pictures, 2012. DVD.
- Octopussy*. Directed by John Glen. 1983; Beverly Hills, 2000. DVD.
- PAM 350-14 Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Operational Art Handbook*. Fort Monroe: U.S. Army TRADOC, Department of the Army, 1994.
- PAM 350-16 Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Tactical Handbook*. Fort Monroe: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1994.
- Rambo III*. Directed by Peter MacDonald. 1988; Culver City: TriStar Pictures, 2000. VHS.
- Rambo III*. Directed by Peter MacDonald. 1988; Culver City: TriStar Pictures, 2002. DVD.
- Red Dawn*. Directed by John Milius. 1988; Beverly Hills, CA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 2015. DVD.

- Red Heat*. Directed by Walter Hill. 1988; Culver City, CA: TriStar Pictures, 2001. DVD.
- The Red Iceberg*. St. Paul: Impact Publishing, 1960.
- The Red Menace*. Directed by R.G. Springsteen. Los Angeles: Republic Pictures, 1949. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KWHDNpdoCg>
- Red Scorpion*. Directed by Joseph Zito. 1988; Studio City: Amsell Entertainment, 2002. DVD.
- Rocky IV*. Directed by Sylvester Stallone. 1985; Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayers, 2014. DVD.
- Scot Tissue Towels. "Is Your Washroom Breeding Bolsheviks?" Advertisement. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <http://i.bnet.com/blogs/scot-tissue-blosheviks.jpg>
- Smith, Harvey H. et al.. *PAM 550-55 Area Handbook for South Vietnam*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
- Steinbeck, John. *The Pearl*. New York City: Viking Press, 1947.
- Swarts, Phillip. "NORAD alarmed over Russia's 'military assertiveness,' heavy bomber patrols." *The Washington Times*, March 14, 2015. Web. Accessed April 4, 2015. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/14/william-gortney-nato-commander-alarmed-over-russia/>
- Truman, Harry S. "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine." March 12, 1947. *The American Presidency Project*. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. Web. Accessed April 4, 2015. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>
- The Universal and International Exhibition of 1967. "Look What the Russians are Building." Advertisement. *Life*, 17 February 1967, 15.
- "War-Maker." *Fight the Red Menace*. Philadelphia: Bowman Gum, 1951. Board game, PDF.
- Weinberger, Caspar W. *Annual Report to the Congress, 1984 and 1985*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, 1985.
- Willaims, Tennessee. *A Streetcar Named Desire*. New York City: New Directions Publishing, 1947.
- Zickel, Raymond E., editor. *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union: A Country Study*. Washington: Federal Research Division, Department of the Army, 1991.

Secondary Sources

- Adelberg, Michael A. "What's Old Is New – Kennan, Putin, and the Russian Competitive Viewpoint." *Strategic Studies Institute*. November 30, 2015. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Whats-old-is-new/2015/11/30>
- Ali, Omar H. *In the Balance of Power: Independent Black Politics and Third-Party Movements in the United States*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008.

- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. New York: Verso, 2006 [1983].
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Barnhisel, Greg. *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
- Barrass, Gordon S. *The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors*. Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2009.
- Belmonte, Laura A. *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
- Blum, Bill, translator. "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 15-21 January, 1998. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017.
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html>
- Bosworth, Patricia. "FILM; Daughter of a Blacklist That Killed a Father." *The New York Times*, September 27, 1992. Web. Accessed March 8, 2016.
<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/27/movies/film-daughter-of-a-blacklist-that-killed-a-father.html?pagewanted=1>
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Ethnicity Without Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Challener, Richard D. *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Confino, Alon. *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wurttemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Cronin, James E. *The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos, and the Return of History*. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Cull, Nicholas J. *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Davis, Donald E and Eugene P. Trani. *Distorted Mirrors: Americans and Their Relations with Russia and China in the Twentieth Century*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009.
- Deane, Michael J. "The Soviet Armed Forces." In *The Political Education of Soldiers*. Edited by Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, 175-208. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983.
- Dewdney, John. "Population change in the Soviet Union, 1979-1989," *Geography* 75, no. 3 (July 1990): 273-277.
- Dunne, Matthew W. *A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society*. Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013.

- Dziewanowski, M.K. "Death of the Soviet Regime: A Study in American Sovietology by a Historian." *Studies in Soviet Thought* 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1972): 367-379.
- Ellis, Joseph and Robert Moore. *School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Fettweis, Christopher J. "Militarizing Diplomacy: Warrior-Diplomats and the Foreign Policy Process." In *America's Viceroy: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Edited by Derek S. Reveron, 47-70. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "Introduction." In *Stalinism: New Directions, Rewriting Histories*. Edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Forrest, Alan. *Soldiers of the French Revolution*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.
- Foglesong, David S. *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire."* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Gervasi, Tom. *Soviet Military Power: The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected*. New York City: Vintage Books, 1987.
- Glantz, David M. *The History of the Soviet Airborne Forces*. Park Drive: Taylor and Francis, 1994.
- Goebel, Greg. "[1.0] Hind Variants / Soviet Service." In *The Public Domain*, 1 April, 2007. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017.
https://web.archive.org/web/20080120022008/http://www.vectorsite.net:80/avhind_1.htm
 1
- Hoffmann, Erik P., and Robbin Frederick Laird, Frederic J. Flernon. *Soviet Foreign Policy*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991.
- Hook, Steven W. *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*. Washington, CQ Press, 2011.
- Hubbarb, Bryan. "Civil Defense: More than Duck and Cover." *Military.com: Military Headlines*. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017.
http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent1/?file=cw_cd_story
- Isaac, Joel and Duncan Bell. "Introduction." In *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War*. Edited by Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, 3-17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Janowitz, Morris and Stephen D. Wesbrook, editors. *The Political Education of Soldiers*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983.
- Janowitz, Morris. "Civic Consciousness and Military Performance." In *The Political Education of Soldiers*. Edited by Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, 55-82. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. London: Verso, 2004.

- Kramer, Mark. "Gorbachev and the demise of east European communism." *In Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations*. Edited by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, 179-200. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
- Ludden, David. "America's Invisible Empire." *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, No. 44 (Oct. 30 – Nov. 5, 2004): 4776-4777.
- Lutz, Catherine, editor. *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*. New York: New York University Press, 2009.
- Lyons, Gene M. and John W. Masland. *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Maley, William. *The Afghanistan Wars*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Marglin, Stephan A. and Juliet B. Schor. *The Golden Age of Capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Marples, David R. *The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991*. London: Pearson Longman, 2004.
- Masland, John W. and Laurence I. Radwar. *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- "Military expenditure." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-expenditure>
- Neiberg, Michael S. *Making Citizen Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of the American Military Service*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Nielsen, Suzanne C. and Don M. Snider, editors. *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
- O'Flynn, Kevin. "Paul McCartney Finally Back in the U.S.S.R." *The Moscow Times*, May 26, 2003. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <http://old.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2003/5/article/paul-mccartney-finally-back-in-the-ussr/238263.html/>
- Richmond, Yale. *Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2008.
- Roberts, John A. *AD-A227 470 The Validity of 'Soviet Military Power.'* Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.
- Robin, Ron. *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Industrial Complex*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Saull, Richard. *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power and Social Revolution*. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

- Schrecker, Ellen, editor. *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism*. New York: The New Press, 2004.
- Shelburne, James C. and Kenneth J. Groves. *Education in the Armed Forces*. New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1965.
- Spencer, Emily. *Special Operations Forces: Building Global Partnerships*. Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2012.
- Suny, Roger Grigor. "Writing Russia: The Work of Sheila Fitzpatrick," in *Writing the Stalin Era: Sheila Fitzpatrick and Soviet Historiography*. Edited by Golfo Alexopoulos, Julie Hessler, and Kiril Tomoff, 1-20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Travis, Frederick F. *George Kennan and the American-Russian Relationship, 1865-1924*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990.
- Tyrrell, Ian. "Empire in American History." In *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern State*. Edited by Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano, 541-556. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.
- Von Eschen, Penny. *Satchmo Blows Up The World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Wendell Cox Consultancy. "US Population From 1900." *Demographia*. Web. Accessed March 8, 2017. <http://www.demographia.com/db-uspop1900.htm>
- Wesbrook, Stephen D. "Historical Notes." In *The Political Education of Soldiers*. Edited by Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, 251-284. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983.
- Wesbrook, Stephen D. "Sociopolitical Training in the Military: A Framework for Analysis." In *The Political Education of Soldiers*. Edited by Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, 15-53. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983.
- Westad, Odd Arne. "Exploring the Histories of the Cold War: A Pluralist Approach." In *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War*. Edited by Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, 51-61. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Wiener, Jon. *How We Forgot the Cold War: A Historical Journey Across America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Appendix




Figure 1. Created by author using cover pages of *FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1977); *FM 27-2 Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War* (Fort Monroe: HQ TRADOC, 1984); Robert M. Frasché, *DDI-1100-77-76 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company* (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976); *PAM 350-16 Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Tactical Handbook* (Fort Monroe: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1994); Lester W. Grau, *Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s* (Fort Leavenworth: Soviet Army Studies Office, Department of the Army, 1990); James F. Holcomb, “A Commander’s Guide to the Soviet Forward Detachment,” *International Defense Review* (1989); Raymond E. Zickel, ed., *PAM 550-95 Soviet Union: A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Department of the Army, 1991); John A. Roberts, *AD-A227 470 The Validity of ‘Soviet Military Power’* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990).




Figure 2. Created by the author using cover and selected pages from *FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1991).