

A Study on the 'Intervals of Perception' and the 'Architectures of Experience': towards
Schizosomatics

Diego Nicolas Gil

A Thesis
In the Humanities Program

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Humanities-Fine Arts)
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

March 2019

©Diego Nicolas Gil, 2019

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

This is to certify that the thesis prepared

By: Diego Nicolas Gil

Entitled: A Study on the 'Intervals of Perception' and the 'Architectures of Experience': towards Schizosomatics

and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor Of Philosophy (Humanities-Fine Arts)

complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Signed by the final examining committee:

_____ Chair
Dr. Warren Linds

_____ External Examiner
Dr. Christine Greiner

_____ External to Program
Dr. Carolina Cambre

_____ Examiner
Dr. Brian Massumi

_____ Examiner
Dr. Alanna Thain

_____ Thesis Supervisor
Dr. Erin Manning

Approved by _____
Dr. Erin Manning, Graduate Program Director

27 of May 2019

Dr. Rebecca Taylor Duclos, Dean
Faculty of Fine Arts

ABSTRACT

A Study on the ‘Intervals of Perception’ and the ‘Architectures of Experience’: towards Schizosomatics.

Diego Nicolas Gil, Ph.D

Concordia University, 2019

This thesis is a study on movement. Movement is defined as the relational and transitional activity of ecologies of experience that can not be recognized in legible categories of subject and object nor knower and known. Movement is what happens at the interstices of what can be recognized in clear and distinct sense perception. Through these indistinct relations and transitions in return, movement generates perceptions, environments, and bodies. The disciplines lending techniques to study the indistinct quality of movement are those of process and affect philosophy, somatic practices, and choreography. These carry conceptual and practical techniques to live the research immanently, without establishing a distance from experience that would return to a clear and distinct perspective.

This lived research is done through three separated but mutually included scenarios: the ‘intervals of perception’, the ‘architectures of experience’, and the ‘schizosomatics’. Every scenario researches while it gives shape to techniques: the interstices of perception, the emergent architectures of the ecologies of experience, and transversal modes of embodiment.

If this study were to be a proposition for certain questions, it can be said, retrospectively, that the questions would be the following ones: assuming there are ontogenetic power operations shifting the way in which the relational and transitional movements emerge to generate perceptions, environments, and bodies, could these techniques shaped be of help to those movements that are less capacitated to emerge? And secondly: assuming that today’s theories of perception — influenced by the separation between the ‘conceptual’ and the ‘physical’ (rationalism, empiricism) and also influenced by the internalization of experience inside a distinct category of

the human (phenomenology)— give fewer chances to register the ontogenetic operations in movement, can this study offer an alternative philosophical frame to register emergent power?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Firstly, I would like to thank all the supervisors for following closely this research.

Thank you, Professor Massumi, for your advice to come up with a strong question for the comprehensive examination and also for the brilliant classes taught at Université de Montreal that I had the honor to take part in. Your writings have been enormously inspiring for my thinking, much in advance of the beginning of this thesis.

Thank you, Professor Thain, for your precise dramaturgical questions that helped to shape the body of the comprehensive examination and all of the thesis. Your advice has been dramaturgical in that it always changed the movement quality of the thesis' sections while proposing new angles to go through its many passageways. You are a true dramaturge of thought.

Thank you, Professor Manning, for pretty much ... everything. If everything is understood as the unlimited potential to think and feel the world, a world that in turn becomes a book, a choreography, a workshop, a body, etc. How would you thank someone that taught you to become more-than-yourself *with* collective events of affective facts? There are no words for that, only the promise that the moving collectively just began.

Besides the supervisors. I would like to thank the Sense Lab. The more-than-human space, haunted by creatures of the future ready to pull diagrams for creatives project at any moment of the day.

I would also like to thank the more-than-human Sense Lab people, who are amazingly capable to become group subjects and architect the appetites of the environment into a reading group, a set of techniques, transversal embodiments, a journal, a dinner, etc.

Thank you, Csenge Kolozsvári, for your somatic intensity, for the capacity to play *as* and *with* a multiplicity of bodies and always find the way to tweak the play into a consistent (and open/schizzed) practice.

Thank you, Mayra Morales, for your choreographic embodiments. They are open, paradoxical and close to the contingencies of what is happening. You choreograph as you live, as you think, as you feel. I learned how to register the movements of contingencies as more-than-actual.

Thank you, Ramona Benveniste, for architecting and dressing our somatic explorations. There are not thought refrains that you can't transform into material textures. There are not thought that can resist your ejecting into looping and shaping an architecture of futurity.

Thank you, Celine Pereira, Leslie Plumb, Erik Bordeleau, Joel Mason, Christopher Brunner and Halbe Kuipers for being so close affectively, even if some times at long distances. Thank you as well to the much more than copy editors Flo Sophia Dacy-Cole and Liz McLellan.

Lastly, I would like to thank my partner Berly Lelièvre Acosta and my literally more-than-human companion, Cactus Lopez, you wrote this thesis with me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Outroduction.	1
Intervals of Perception.	28
Interval 1: The Interval.	29
Interval 2: The Extensive Continuum.	32
Interval 2B: Relations.	42
Interval 2C: Quality.	47
Interval 3: Interconnectedness.	51
Interval 3B: Play.	56
Interval 3C: Tools and Weapons.	58
Interval 3D: Affective Expressions.	62
Interval 4: Choreographic Intuition.	65
Interval 5: Friday Night.	70
Interval 6: The Concept and the Plane of Immanence.	71
Interval 7: Ontopower.	76
Architectures of Experience.	84
Architecture 1: Architectures of Experience.	85
Architecture 2: Feelings.	93
Architecture 2B: Re-Enaction.	98
Architecture 3: Propositions.	107
Architecture 4: Ecological Intensity.	113
Architecture 5: Euclidean and Topological Spaces.	118
Architecture 5B: Mentality.	121
Architecture 5C: Desire	125

Architecture 5D: Schizoanalysis and Schizo-somatics.	131
Architecture 5E: Genetic and Morphological Theories of Actualities.	135
Architecture 6: Mexico.	140
Architecture 7: Affective Signs.	141
Architecture 8: Abstract Desire.	150
Architecture 9: Diagrammatic Affectability.	163
Architecture 10: Signs of Power and Signs of Potential.	168
Architecture 11: Renee Gladman.	172
 Schizosomatics.	 179
 Schizosomatics: Un-Archived Notes.	 180
Schizosomatics: Getting (Almost) There.	182
Schizosomatics: Workshops Series.	185
 References.	 198

OUTRODUCTION

A Study on the ‘Intervals of Perception’ and the ‘Architectures of Experience’: towards
Schizosomatics.

To write on the topics of the ‘intervals of perception’, the ‘architectures of experience’ and ‘schizosomatics’ is a lived research on the immediate movements of experience. This lived research entails the creation of somatic practices by way of finding a style of writing that can follow the ecological aspect of these immediate movements of experience: what is happening in this room, at this moment of the day, with this particular atmospheric quality. To follow these immediate movements, the style of writing is endowed by a study of process and affect philosophy and borrows as well the dynamic quality of choreography.

The ‘intervals of perception’ and the ‘architectures of experience’ function as two different but interwoven platforms with their specific ecologies offering diverse scenarios to experiment with the style of writing. One series of scenarios writes with the ecology of the room and the day of the week in which the actual process of writing is happening (intervals of perception). The other series of scenarios unfolds across various urban landscapes of the everyday (architectures of experience). The activity—to follow by writing the ecology of movements—is inseparable from the immediate generation of a mode of embodiment, which is also ecological. Thus, to research a style of writing is equally to give shape to somatic practices embodying these immediate movements. The scenarios of the ‘writing room’ and the ‘urban landscapes’ —such as the scale of an iconic city, an alleyway, a boulevard or flying in an airplane— allow the registration of the manners in which embodiment is called forth by the choreography of the “elements in relation” of each specific ecology. And because the immediate movements are what follow the elements in relations, the embodiments called forth are experienced as multiple, more-than temporally linear and spatially decentered, as if pulled by many angles.

Moreover, while shaping a style of writing —that is as well the shaping of somatic practices for embodiment— by way of studying process and affect philosophy, a third experimentation was

grown in parallel: the schizosomatics workshop series, initiated and curated by visual artist and somatics practitioner Csenge Kolozsvári and myself. The schizomatics sessions were held from January until December 2018, mostly every Wednesday of the week, at the SenseLab at Concordia University.¹ Each session asked invitees (choreographers, visual artists, poets, musicians, theorists) to bring a practice that lured the participants to collectively research the manners in which embodiment can be felt as an ecology, moving beyond the categories that understand the body as contained by the limits of a human subject. What differentiates the schizomatics sessions from the intervals and architectures is that the practices are not necessarily shaped by a ‘style of writing’ with the immediate ecologies of experience, though some of the practices had a literary and/or poetic component. The practices came from the people invited and thus were as varied as practices for voicing, sculpting, meditating, cutting, choreographing and playing with a baby, just to mention a few. What the intervals, architectures and schizomatics share is a same plane of study (an ecology of questions felt through qualities that spread the limits of what embodiment can be) from which their different movements of inquiry cross-pollinate each other nourishing their parallel growing.

¹ The schizomatics workshops series grew up out of a series of previous somatic experimentations that combined the theoretical frame of process and affect philosophy with scores and exercises inspired by the performing arts, together with somatic techniques mostly coming from the discipline of Body Mind Centering (an experiential study of the major body systems —skeletal, muscular, fluid, organ, neuroendocrine— and the evolutionary patterns of human movement) created by Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen. These previous iterations were the ‘Knots of Thought’ (organized by choreographer and philosopher Mayra Morales and myself by request of the SenseLab, during Fall 2014 at Usince C, Montreal), the ‘Cartographies of the Immediate’ (workshop lead by media theorist Christoph Brunner and myself during Fall 2015 at HZT BA Dance School in Berlin), and the ‘Somatic Warm Up for Conceptual Work’ (organized by myself with the assistance of visual artist Ramona Benveniste during Summer and Fall 2015 at SenseLab, Montreal). These events carried in bud, many of the questions that now take shape in this thesis. Just to mention a few of what those questions were: a) How to choreograph the contingent movements of arriving and leaving an event in search of a quality of excess that drifts from the actual conditions of the encounter, without ever canceling the experiential rhythms of the quotidian? b) How to think and register the choreographies of the everyday as composts made of somatic activities not limited to human agency? c) How to share a technique in its micro form? This is a ‘partially formed’ technique that is open to the contingencies of the ecology of the encounter to move with the indeterminacy of the generated effects, rather than imposing a predetermined result. More information about the genealogy of the schizomatics concept and practice can be found in the third section of the thesis.

Ecologies of processes

In the context of theses lived experimentations, the immediate movements of experience are understood as an ecology of processes made of potential and actual entities with the capacity to shift, define and bring into life worlds of experience. The potential entities—carrying the most complex side of the ecological processes— can be felt as immediate momentums affecting the limits of human perception. Affective momentums allow humans to register the potential processes, though the complexity always remains at the limit of what a human can perceive consciously. The potential processes remain at the limit of human consciousness because their processual force is transitional. The ecology of relations is in a complex web of movement transits in which the positions of subject and object, knower and known are not settled and contained. In short, at the scale of human perception there is not yet a formed category to think and feel the transitional processes. The present scale of human perception is surrounded and thus collectively accompanied by the transitional process that would then, in a proximal future, calibrate new modes of perception for the human as much as for the ecology. In this sense, the limit of human perception is not a radical abyss— it indexes the soft edges in which the everyday or the habitual is already fully populated of ecological process ready to create alternative modes of perception.

The philosopher who conceptualizes the ‘world of experience’ as an ecological transition of relations is William James. James conceptualizes a life of experience exceeding a kind of philosophical analysis that subtracts that life as a datum to be contained by the subject. This type of analysis qualifies the subject as the conscious knower of thing or object, and by this gesture gives the subject the power to capture and subtract life. This form of capture is understood in this thesis as the imposition of habitual modes to repeat the same modes to come into relation within the ecology of perception. This is an imposition because it ignores by pushing to the background the ecological transitional processes full of rich yet vague and not clearly legible modes of perception. This thesis argues that there are dominant powers that restrict the further proliferation of nascent process of perception that are more contrasting, ecological, and hence, with a

movement complexity capable of destabilizing those very dominant and habitual ways to come to perception (more about this later). Now, back to James, these dominant habitual powers bracket the life force of the relations, because for James *life* is mostly in the ‘relations’ between portions of experience, beyond the aforementioned conscious categories. Below he gives us a sense of the ecological world of the life of the experience:

Experience itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges. That one moment of it proliferates into the next by transitions which, whether conjunctive or disjunctive, continue the experiential tissue, can not, I contend, be denied. Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it seems to be there more empathically, as if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle, were like the thin line of flame advancing across the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to burn (James 2003, 45).

The aim of this research is to intensify the potential momentum of the ecology with the belief that it will generate future worlds of experience instead of bringing its complexity back at the level of human conscious perception. Affectively registered but at the limit of the human, the ecology of experience will ask for modes of living that are trans-individual: a life *of* experience moving through the relations across and beyond the category of the human. This force of futurity is pursued by affectively registering the transitions of experience, which by not having settled in the aforementioned position of subject-object, knower and known, still carry an intense processual force of indeterminacy. At the level of the transitions of experience the human is a disentangled, exploded and spread out category from where to perceive the world of experience.

Futurity

The style of writing in the ‘intervals of perception’ and the ‘architectures of experience’ follows the affective register of the movements that define the actual conditions of what is immediately occurring (this table, that street, these qualities). By moving *with* the transitions it attempts to unfold the force of futurity folded in the immediate imperatives of the contingent situation. This

is done by following the relational feelings of the ecology of immediate movements as indeterminate categories of experience: not finished epistemological dynamic shapes to think-feel. The style of writing drifts through, along and away the actual givens of the situation to preserve the ‘portions of experience’, so that they continue their autonomous movement of coming into and out of relations. The belief is that the force of futurity, while less interfered by a conscious capture and more affirmed by an affective register, will compose potential worlds of experience to come in which the human subject is not considered the centre of experience, but rather one of the many ecological limits “growing by its edges”. As it was previously mentioned, the style of writing to liberate the force of futurity is inseparable from the research of somatic practices that attune a type of embodiment. The pragmatic concept of ‘schizosomatics’ — written, studied, invented, and collectively researched at the workshops series at the SenseLab— articulates the modes of embodiment that are generated by the transitional force of futurity of the ecology of experience. ‘Schizosomatics’ is the mode of embodied transitional feelings created by the world of experience in excess of the imperatives of the present situation: an embodiment *of the world for the world* that launches alter-time lines, alter-bodies and alter-spaces.

Somatic practices

Somatic is the concept that speculates what it means to carry a body through the immediate movements of experience. Though, again, this concept of somatic practices is mainly explored at the angles of experience in which embodiment remains the most unknown: the most slippery and transitional to complete epistemological categories. This somatic concept spreads out and moves away from knowledge categories that match embodiment with a structure of experience located inside of the human subject. Consequently, this perspective on embodiment by slipping beyond the human subject as a category to structure the processes of experience, evades the perspectives that gives to the human the central position of willingly controlling the ecology of worlds of experiences. Embodiment is considered one of the many activities that shifts the movement quality of the ecology of experience —speed, weight, connectivity— but is not the human subject who guides, contains and assimilates those activities. It is the transitional and relational

world of experience doing. How the human can register the transitional movements of the world of experience is in affective perception, one that follows the relational movements as ‘feelings’.

In this thesis ‘feelings’ are understood through Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, as nexuses of relations that generate worlds (events), entities (the more-than human elements populating the event), and their modes of perception (their taking account of each other). Whitehead, like James, foregrounds an epistemology that values the potential complex process occurring at the transitions, which can’t be perceived by clear and distinct conscious states of perception because the modes of perception and knowing are in a phase of processual generation. Affective perception is a mode of embodiment of feelings that does not contain in a complete shape what can be known, but allows what is happening to continue to drift for some form of knowledge to crystallize in the future, maybe. Likewise, affective perception is a mode of embodiment generated by the transitional life of experience and thus, it does not close a body around the human subject; instead, it distributes the body as portions and points of contact affectively resonant with the relational nexus of the ecology of experience. Hence, when the human affectively perceives the relational feelings, she becomes a distributed embodiment along the portions of experience of the ecology. The human becomes a more-than human relational entity *of the* ecology of experience, where it looks more like a distribution at the edges of a world of experience without centre.

That the concept of somatic practices shifts its point of view rapidly and unstoppably throughout the thesis tells the story of a pragmatic speculation that follows closely the assumptions around this term coined by philosopher, teacher and somatic practitioner Thomas Hanna. Hanna developed a theory of somatology and of the field he named somatics in the United States during the 1970’s. In his first essay ‘Bodies in Revolt’, Hanna defines somatics as the field which studies the *soma*: “the body as perceived from within by first-person perception”, in contrast from an observation from the outside or “from a third-person viewpoint” (Johnson 1995, 341). Although the term somatics is coined in the 1970’s, according to somatic practitioner and scholar Martha Eddy, “due to a global communication explosion and the cultural shifts of this period” (Eddy 2009, 7), somatic practices refer to a vast group of ‘practices of embodiment’ emerging already at the end of the nineteenth century with a focus on heightening sensory motor awareness

for self-healing or self-knowing (Eddy 2009,8). Eddy explains that at the turn of the century rationalism began to be influenced by existentialism and phenomenology and “a gradual shift towards theoretical support for experiential learning and sensory research occurred in parts of academy and scholar culture” (Eddy 2009, 6). She names the theories of John Dewey, Merleau-Ponty and Whitehead as the responsible for this shift of paradigm.

Here it needs to be clarified that in the contexts of this thesis Whitehead’s philosophy is not considered as ‘phenomenological’, but as ‘process philosophy’. The fact that Eddy describes Whitehead’s philosophy as phenomenology indicates that both theories and practices create their own ‘field of research’ in accordance to the way they are approached. The philosophical worlds emerging out of a research depend upon the way in which the research is conducted.

Eddy traces two generations of somatic practitioners growing from the beginning of the century until our times. The first generation includes: F.M. Alexander (1869-1955), Moshe Feldenkrais (1904-84), Gerda Alexander (1904-1994), Ida Rolf (1896-1979) and Irgmard Bartenieff (1900-81). The second generation includes: Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, Joan Skinner and Anna Halprin just to mention a few. One point to keep in mind from Eddy’s analysis is that both generations of practitioners share an exploration of movement. This leads to the fact that the second generation of practitioners are all involved in dance somatic education. She states that “dance professionals have especially driven the development of somatic movement and the field of Somatic Movement Education and Therapy” (Eddy 2009, 7). This is to stress that somatic practices are inseparable from an exploration of movement, whether for therapeutic or artistic purposes. Hence, the interest in this thesis to think movement inseparably from the thinking on modes of embodiments.

The cultural shift in the 1970’s that Eddy refers to as the cause for the boom of somatic practices in the United States, which motivated in turn the creation of the terms somatics by Thomas Hanna, is further articulated by Body Mind Centering practitioner and theorist Carla Bottiglieri. Bottiglieri argues that somatic practices’ emergence has been part of a history of resistance to traditional methods to think the relation between body and health. She explains that these practices have been designed “towards the resolution of problems that traditionally available

methods in medicine, dance, physical education and psychology could not offer” (Bottiglieri 2013, 120). She adds that these practices were developed into training programs and schools “most often refusing to frame their methods as therapies, and preferring to highlight their self-educational and pedagogical dimension (...) in order to preserve their autonomy with regards to the institutional field of care” (Bottiglieri 2013, 120). As we will see, what Bottiglieri argues by remarking the ‘quality of resistance’ to previous institutional ways to think the body and therapy, in connection with the ‘self-educational’ and ‘pedagogical’ aspects inherent to somatic practices, is that these practices boomed in the United States at the historical moment in which the necessity for alternative ways to be and sustain a community, through an experimentation with knowledge and learning, was increasingly being felt.

Bottiglieri articulates together with Thomas Hanna the revolutionary potential that somatics “brought about in the history of dance, theatre and performance, by transforming the uses of and representations of the body” (Bottiglieri 2013, 120) with the potential for sustainability that these practices brought to the declining American counterculture of the 1970’s. In ‘Bodies in Revolt’ Thomas Hanna situates the increasing proliferation of the somatic practices in the United States at the moment in which the Militant movements began to feel the toll in their bodies due to their ways of enacting resistances. This shows that for Hanna, somatic practices connect to an exploration on alternative modes of sustainability in which the body is the main axis.

Underlying the various techniques and schools [of practices of embodiment], one finds a desire to regain an intimate connection with bodily processes: breath, movement impulses, balance, and sensibility. In that shared impulse, this community is best understood within a much broader movement of resistance to the West’s long history of denigrating the value of the human body and the natural environment (...) Just as solar engineers and organic farmers have developed alternatives to the technologies that alienated us from the earth, these somatics innovators have challenged the dominant modes of exercise, manipulation and self-awareness that alienated people from their bodies (Johnson 1995, xvi).

Bottiglieri expands on the topic of somatics and sustainability introduced by Thomas Hanna, but she diverts from his further discourses on adaption and assimilation, based in evolutionary arguments, such as the following one:

The short-lived destiny of these two groups-expressions [Hippies and Militants] of proto-mutation is due to the fact that they have one foot in the technological environment (a positive adaption factor) and one foot in the moribund cultural tradition (a negative adaptational factor) upon which they must depend in order to orient themselves (Bottiglieri 2013, 121).

For Bottiglieri, sustainability comes from “the proliferation of micropolitical experiences: the creation of communities, experimentation with various healing techniques (...) attempts in construing new pathways of relations that might weave collective and individual experiences, in a new genealogy of filiations and alliances that questions the inadequacy of the traditional nuclear family” (Bottiglieri 2013, 122). She offers an argument that, instead of putting the weight in the evolutionary adaptation of the human body to the technological and cultural changes —an argument that follows closely the very logics “with which capitalism annexes the myth of the ‘individual emancipation’” (Bottiglieri 2013, 121) —, translates the power of sustainability towards the creation of collectivities through the use of somatic practices. Bottiglieri also bypasses a phenomenological reading of somatics (based in the interiority and intentionality of the human subject of experience) and proposes to follow somatics as techniques for ‘trans-individuality’ (transitional, relational, more-than human).

With Bottiglieri and beyond Hanna, this thesis is interested to think somatics as practices of embodiment which are helpful for collectively creating modes of sustainability: modes in which capacities for living in relation are intensified. The collective means the actual coming together of a group of practitioners — as it happens in the schizosomatics workshop series held at SenseLab— though the collective is also considered a force of futurity of the transitional relations that are more-than human and so in principle, the collective stands also for the lonely process of searching a style of writing, seating at the table and moving through the everyday — as in the case of the ‘intervals of perception’ and ‘architectures of experience’. In short, the

search for the collective include the individual and the group of humans but is mostly opened to the more-than human entities (qualities, atmospheres, patterns of relations, etc.) inhabiting the ecology of experience and offering a proposition for future modes of being in relation, more capaciously.

This research, still following Bottiglieri, also moves *with* and *further* away from the phenomenological influences that brought into existence the term of somatics. This research does not separate experience as that that happens to the subject, which is the intentional agent that extracts the experience from the object. Movement is not pre-determined by a subject-object, knower-known structure of experience. And the subject is not a self-contained category that can be perceived from within (Hanna's "first-person view from within"). It bears repeating one more time that in the frame of this thesis, the practices of embodiment are a spread out question that launches the research on what it means to cultivate ecologies of movements when the embodiment is tending to the more-than and not contained in the individual body of the human subject.

Something important to be remarked about the connection between 'somatics' and 'phenomenology' is that the pragmatic use of the practices is what unfolds and defines their philosophical world. In this sense, somatics disciplines such as Alexander technique and Body Mind Centering can structure experience inside the anatomical and intentional containment of the subject [tending towards phenomenology] as much as they can open cartographies for experiences beyond the present body and environment [tending towards process philosophy]. In short, what carries the philosophy of the experiential world is the very way of *practicing the practice*.

The questions of immediacy

Throughout the 'intervals of perception' and the 'architectures of experience' there is a persistent return to Whitehead's process philosophy analysis of the construction of the modern theories of knowledge. Whitehead's analysis on modern traditions of knowledge —with their consequent

theories of perception— is followed closely throughout this thesis because these modern theories are still influencing the ways in which language is used to categorize the experience of immediate movement. Language carries certain assumptions about the way in which experience takes form. The above mentioned phenomenological assumptions on the categories of experience carry within them some of these modern traditions of knowledge—to be soon explained below— such as the structuring of experience under a subject-object binary and the assumption of a movement of interiority or introspection of experience inside of the subject. Because of the persistence of these assumptions in the present, one of the vital practices of this thesis is that of finding a style of writing *with* and *through* the immediate movements of experience. And this is why the exploration of somatic practices is one with the exploration of a way of writing that perceptually feels what happens with the ecology of experience. In sum, to find a way of writing equals to *attune* to a way of moving of experience.

One of the modern assumptions analyzed with Whitehead is that of the separation between substances and accidents (Whitehead 1978, 77-82). This is a modern categorization of knowledge established by Descartes' philosophy (Whitehead 1978, 77). In this perspective, substances are given an essential attribute that allows them to remain self-identical. Accidents are what suffer the qualitative change through the relationships between substances. Following this logic, change is something accidental which does not transform the identity of the substance: the qualitative color infusing the atmosphere is an after-effect attributable to the numerical self-identity of the room. The color is only an accidental change that transforms neither the present nor the future of the room. The room remains always the same, with or without colors, in winter, or haunted by heavy thoughts. What this assumption does is to qualify change as a force without power of transformation. There is no indeterminacy in the way in which the future of the ecology could be played out. There is a transcendental law of identity that will always prevent change from actually *changing*, mutating, and transforming anything.

Another effect following directly the previous one, is to think 'movement' as one of the accidental effects between the subjects and objects of a situation. Whitehead helps to articulate a concept of movement (as becoming) through a dialogue full of agreements and disagreements with Newton's physics (Whitehead 1978, 70-73). Whitehead agrees with Newton that when

motion is understood as accidental, it becomes the measure of external displacements between entities. Hence, movement is seen as the displacement from point ‘a’ to ‘b’ of that subject towards that object. What Whitehead disagrees with Newton is to theorize movement as a transcendental category (Absolute movement) separated from the accidental movement used to measure (Relative movement). Whitehead disagrees with Newton, because by making movement an Absolute category he separates the possibility for change into a Transcendental realm. As we will see, for Whitehead the potential to transcend what is given is enmeshed in the concrete. This assumption about the concept of movement has a direct influence on how to think the role of movement embodiment (somatic practices).

Performance studies theorist Andre Lepecki follows a similar critique to that of Whitehead, but he connects the tradition of knowledge of ‘classical physics’ to the development of Western choreography. Lepecki argues that Western choreography was born of a kineticism based in the epistemology of classic physics, sustaining a transcendental law of movement. This epistemology formed “a conception and perception of the dancer’s body and the dancer’s agency as being subservient to transcendental laws of (fluid) motion” (Lepecki 2016, 145). He elaborates further that classical physics formulated laws governing the motion of the bodies and, by extension, regulated conceptions of physical labor, which in turn had a direct impact on “those whose work embodies most directly the physicality of physics: dancers” (Lepecki 2016, 144-5). In this perspective, movement becomes again, a tool to measure the efficacy of the labor of the bodies. In other words, the embodiment of movement functions as a tool to regulate, respond, and resolve, with more or less efficacy, the labor forces imposed upon those very bodies.

Contrary to this regulatory use of embodiment, this thesis understands movement as an immanent becoming of relations between different entities. Its potential to transcend the conditions of the given actual situations is folded *with* and *through* the actual. Hence, movement is not thought as a transcendental force that could be exercised by a subject in a higher rank of authority over others: the choreographer of work and learning — think Enterprises and Universities. Moreover, movement does not give agency to the end term of a relation (subject-object), it distributes *with* and *through* the relations the capacity to produce collective agencies:

agencement (the term coined in French by Deleuze and Guattari (1987)). Lastly, movement is not theorized as a labor force, but as a playful aesthetic-political quality in excess of the given: movement is something that plays and to play *with*.

Another assumption of the modern traditions of knowledge which Whitehead articulates in dialogue with Hume and Descartes, is what Whitehead calls the ‘error of introspection’. This assumption divides the ‘conceptual’ from the ‘physical’. The conceptual is understood as the abstract thought inside of the human mind, and the physical is seen as the material field in which the changes occurs for the mind to pick them up, through sense perception. Change is the accidental quality of the relationship between physical objects and the concept is what subtracts an essential law out of that change via the senses. Hence, sense perception is the activity that if approached consciously allows a transfer of knowledge to the conceptual mind. In all of those assumptions mentioned above, ‘movement’, ‘quality’ and ‘relation’ are the accidents that happen to the world, a world in which the human subject is capable to extract (as introspect or introject) an essential law from them and thus, perpetuate its power and separation from it.

This thesis stands for ‘movement’, ‘quality’ and ‘relation’ as concrete facts (and if you want ‘accidental’ facts) that carry a force of potential (a transient force from what is given). These activities are what open the world towards the indeterminacy of the future, towards the autonomy of the portions of experience for coming into trans-individual relation. In turn, these activities do not introject (introspect) the autonomy of the portions of experience of the world inside the human, if anything, these activities extroverts the entities towards the coming into relation towards the others. The entities traversed by movements, qualities and relations are launched towards the indeterminacy of being with others, to become alter.

This is the paradox of movement. If one is asked about the immediate experience of how one moves through environments, the *feeling* of it is totally different from any ‘modern’ categories of knowledge. The movements’ momentums propel an affective atmosphere that *feels* decentered and uncontained. However, when verbal language begins to explain the experience sequentially, the old ways of organizing the elements of it come back: ‘I’ walked to the kitchen, the yellow light out there painted the chair, it made ‘me’ feel happy inside. This is to say that when an

experience is verbally articulated after the immediate moment of its occurring, there is a habit to sort it out retrospectively through categories that assume: 1) the room is separated from the body and both remain untransformed by their mutual relation 2) the atmospheric quality given by the yellow colour is understood as something accidental and separated from the body and 3) the affective quality of happiness is introjected inside the body. In sum, the embodiment of movement became a narrative to express the centrality of the human in the ecology of the situation —due to a clear and distinct perception of the relations— as well as a regulation (delimitation) of the affective surplus of happiness —again inside of the limited contours of the human body and not as an ecological quality in excess of the elements in relation. There is nothing wrong with it. It does not kill the immediate experience. The question is, if the past notions of movement, body and environment, keep coming back to reorganize our experiences retrospectively, what other modes of organizing experiences are not allowed to return? In other words, if historical past categories of knowledge come back time and time again to sort out immediate experiences, what other types of sorting out patterns of experience could benefit from the same power of repetition? And secondly, if immediate experience has a lived quality that is quickly organized by categories that do not seem to correspond with it anymore, why are those categories still so useful? Meaning, which types of communities benefit from the repetition of a category of experience that is out of sync with the immediacy of living?

To move and to return time and time again to an immediate experience was pursued in this research by a practice of writing instead of dancing in a studio. This choice is explained by the fact that to give shape to a new vocabulary, it was necessary to not capture the experience again under those past theories. Process and affect philosophy concepts provided the language to move with the experience without categorizing it with habits of the past. In this sense, this thesis is an exercise on dancing process and affect philosophy. Doing it not only for the fun of it, but for the cultivation of other modes of experience that would be otherwise denied. The new vocabulary had to have the agility of a choreographic drawing, the enticement of an architecting of time closer to poetry, and the technical rigor to lend enough stamina to the concepts that is proper to philosophy. In return, the concepts will carry their stamina to the modes of ecological embodiment and thus offer techniques for further and future sustainability.

Alter-therapeutics

Process and affect philosophy and somatic practices: all these disciplines play a strategic game, taking turns, making alliances, moving one in front of the other, sometimes one of them disappears for a while to come back later and surprise the other disciplines with polemic news. The strategic game played by these disciplines aims to study an alternative take on therapy. What is ‘alter’ about this study in the therapeutic is an *affirmation* of the ‘connectedness of experience’.

Whitehead articulates the concept of the ‘connectedness of experience’ to demonstrate that philosophy needs to deal with the paradox that “the world within experience is identical with the world beyond experience, the occasion of experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion” (Whitehead 1967, 228). Whiteheads interconnects experiences through their ‘beyond’: *there* where they connect to other experiences and also *then*, when they include past and future timelines within and through them. For Whitehead philosophy needs to give account of the mutual inclusion of the ‘transient’ —the beyond— within the ‘concrete’. And to do this philosophy should follow the immediate experiences, what in this ‘outroduction’ is called the ‘immediate movements’ of experience. Hence, for Whitehead, each immediate movement is a multiple ecology of time-lines and space-lines. Immediate movement carries the potential enmeshed in the actual in various degrees. Immediate movement passes and leaks experiences anytime and everywhere. Patterns of experiences already culminated in the past gloss over the actual situation, future imagined worlds of experiences fold an extra membrane as well through the already complicated mixture tendencies of the present: the incipient tendency to respond to an email, the dizziness of the just finished physical exercise, the anxiety for a task to be delivered tomorrow, all of these experiences interconnect and co-habitate through the immediate movements. Whitehead would add that each time that experience is perceived as an unitary (only of one type: just this sitting at the table) and easy continuation (only one present situation: just this timeline moving towards finishing the reading of the paragraph) in fact, that simple perception is generated by multiple occasions of experience. These multiple occasions of experience include many types (seating at the table, with the poking of the social media, with the

dog wining for a walk, with the University listening for theoretical rigor) and multiple times and spaces in passing (moving towards the finishing of the paragraph, with the conversation with a grandmother dead fifteen years ago, with the rooms of the apartment of the city to be visited next month). All these multiple experiences coexist at each immediate movement of the cresting of experience. Affect philosopher Brian Massumi would say that immediate experience carries the capacity for ‘ontopower’: the power to generate the emergence of experience by inviting the return of events of experience that already expired and others that did not take place yet (Massumi 2015, 221).

The entryway to the multiplicities of experiences actual and potential (transient) occurring at every immediate movement is possible when the unitary understanding of a category of experience is leaked out. This breaking of the unitary and easy going continuation of experience (just this seating at the table to advance the reading towards the end of this paragraph) is what throughout this thesis is called the ‘schizz’, the ‘cut’ or the ‘interval’. At the ‘cut’ of the unitary containment of experience it is that the multiple ecologies of experiences make feel their intertwined and contrastive cohabitation. At the ‘cut’ the re-shuffling of time-lines and time-spaces for worlds of events that happened and did not happen can be tweaked to intensify life with more capaciousness. At the cut it is that the ontogenetic power of experience to emerge differently than it was and would be, resides. How exactly to do this? How to tweak processes of intertwined experiences at the cusp of what be consciously perceived to register and act on the immediate movements? This is what this thesis ask time and time again, one page after another. A way to begin with, is to think the affirmation of the inter-connectedness of experience as the affirmation of an ‘autonomous doing’. This is to say that the activities of experiences themselves have a transformative capacity that, if possible, shouldn’t be blocked. This autonomous capacity is what the thesis calls the ‘artfulness of experience’, a concept that is similar to what Whitehead calls the ‘creative advance’ (Whitehead 1978, 21) or ‘creative urge’ (Whitehead 1967, 192).

When trigger warnings pop up regularly throughout the thesis concerning the phenomenological use of somatic practices, or in respect to the assumptions that structure the movement of experience in clear and distinct categories (Whitehead analysis of the European tradition of knowledge based upon sense perception), what is being warned about is the understanding that

therapy (an intensity for living) can be found and contained inside the centered, present and balanced human being. Practices of embodiment do a good job at healing by way of balancing the anatomic structures of the body or by quieting the time and space-lines into the meditative present. But by highlighting the identity of relations between the anatomical image and an energetic and experiential state (balance), as well as by managing the flux of time and space lines in another experiential state (presence), they become less effective at allowing the ingress of the interconnectedness of experience. They do good. They feel good and do produce health. What is being problematized in this thesis, is the ability of those practices to tweak the emergent ontopower of the multiple occasions of experiences for events of the past and the future to return. What is a ‘balanced and present’ health that cannot play with the incessant transformation of the ecologies of experience? What is the value of an ‘individual’ state of health that has less capacity to renew the relations *with* and *of* the world of experience, ‘collectively’?

Moreover, when the power to tweak the incessant emergence of multiple occasions of experiences is purposefully utilized to shape the continuation of certain worlds of experience by locking away the contrastive ingression of many other worlds, this thesis launches another trigger warning, this time under the names of ‘dominant powers’ and even ‘neoliberal powers’! The cultural contexts in which those powers are cultivated are only suggested in this thesis. Because at this phase, this study is investing all its focus on using a philosophical vocabulary, a style of writing and somatic practices to intensify the capacity to register the autonomous doings of experience overflowing those dominant powers rather than denouncing them.

Lastly, it needs to be stated that this problematization of somatics is done with the belief these practices are also *practiced*, in ways that they drift the experience of embodiment through the interconnected field, beyond the here and now. There are countless ways in which somatic practices move through the portions of experiences, beyond the human anatomy and the concrete architecture of the room, and they register the power of improvisation of the connectedness of the worlds of experiences: their entryways and passageways, their intensity. When somatic practices *practice* through the interconnections and do not return to a structure of experience of just the actual (with little beyond) they function ‘diagrammatically’: like an immediate ‘choreographic spread’.

Study

This ‘outroduction’ is being written after the experience of dancing philosophy has finished, because at the immediate past moments of those dances, these explanations given presently were not yet clear. At that past moment, there was a strong intuition and necessity that the dance had to happen while sitting in front of a table, accompanied by certain philosophers. There was a strong intuition that in order to keep cultivating the movement with the immediacy of experience, a process of studying by dancing with process and affect philosophy had to be simultaneously happening. But since the writing had to take place while the immediacy of the experience was happening, the dancing of it had to be a movement of concepts. However, not just any concept could dance the movement of the immediacy of experience and in turn, not just any mode of writing could appear with this immediacy. This is to say the mutual relation between movement and concepts began to shape the ecology of the modes of experience while the writing was happening. The composition between writing, moving and conceptualizing became the centre of attraction, giving shape to a technique to allow modes of immediate experience to intensify their trans-individual life. The technique to cultivate immediate movements of experience could only be articulated if the process of studying was already happening. And thus ‘to study’ feel together with the transitional pulses that brought experiences to life, while moving with conceptual writing. Study was done with the intuition that it was not about accumulating knowledge about a certain topic, but to attune, shape and test one time after the other, a technique to live immediacy. You could feel that the technique was being shaped by the process of study when, once you left the writing table and walked into the city, the immediate movements of experience continued to grow. Once the process of study became portable—from the writing table to any everyday experience— then the technique would give the feedback of being well underway. The technique would be well underway because through various ecologies of the everyday the trans-individual movement of experience would make feel their momentum, affectively. The momentum would be felt affectively as a nascent embodiment propelled by the trans-individual ecology. The study would continue to go on through different situations as a

nascent embodied feeling, going on autonomously from the will of the human being experimented by this very process of study.

The feeling of a process of study connects with the vision of Fred Moten and Stefano Harney on a particular mode of sociality that they call the ‘undercommons’ —what here is called a collective generated by the trans-individual life *of* experience. In *The Undercommons* Harney and Moten elaborate the concept of study as a process that if occurring through the ‘undercommons’ of the University, produces social debt. Social debt is a mode of relationality that diverts to Neoliberal credit, which aims to make the interest of the student transparent (legible) to connect her —lending credit — to the capitalist apparatus of policy (control). To study for social debt is to study not to get to know something already known, but to move through relations with and towards the other of knowledge and the other of sociality: “debt to each other in a study group, to others in a nurses’ room, to others in a barber shop, to others in a squat, a dump, a woods, a bed, an embrace” (Harney and Moten 2013, 67-8). To study is to cultivate relations for future modes of coming together in relation, not necessarily to accumulate knowledge about a particular topic. These undercommon relations are not ‘transparent’ or ‘legible’, they are at the transparent (as conscious) limit of what can be embodied, thought and felt and thus, resist the capture of the capitalist apparatus. In the context of this thesis, together with Harney and Moten, study is done with the urgency to recompose the undercommons (subterranean, imperceptible) relations (social in the making) with the immediacy of the worlds of experience (in the writing room, like a portable activity composing with the everyday, and in a schizosomatics session), as a way to make less legible and thus, more intense the force for potential alter-relations.

The study of shaping a technique to cultivate immediate ecologies of experience is done in three phases, divided in the three sections of the thesis: the ‘intervals of perception’ the ‘architectures of experience’ and the ‘schizosomatics’. The intervals of perception are the intensive seeding of the technique. The investment happens mainly around the writing table and the visiting of the intervals of process that can’t be consciously perceived is done very persistently. In the second phase, ‘the architectures of experience’ bring the interval for a walk through several spaces across the city. The portability of the technique is tested across spaces for experience beyond the

writing room. If the spaces change their ecology, when the technique plugs to the intervals that hold them, then a sign of the study's technical growth becomes palpable. The schizosomatics is the space for research-creation where many of the studied concepts of the previous phases became techniques to be tested with a group of persons.

From technique to technicity

An alternative landscape to think the different operations done via the intervals and the architectures is given by Erin Manning's concepts of 'technique' and 'technicity' (Manning 2013, 33). It can be said, assuming the mutual transversal flows between intervals and architectures and thus, not imposing an excluding divide, that the intervals of perception are the 'technique' that becomes 'technicity' along the architectures. Manning gives us the image of gardening for an early spring planting. She asks us to consider the relation between the knee-hand-garden as an operative logic that is an active technique for creating a taste of spring. "Technique engages the repetitive practice that form a composing body- be it organic or inorganic- technicity is a set of enabling conditions that exact from technique the potential of the new for co-composition" (Manning 2013, 33). The intervals of perception persistently and repetitively, research the tools for the techniques to be generated together with their world of experience (ecology). The architectures of experience invest in the qualitative excess opened up by the intervals and brings it to visit various urban everyday event of experience: "Technicity captures the affective tonality of a process, a tendency, and catapults it toward new expression" (Manning 2013, 33).

That the 'intervals' are the intensive cartography for the 'architectures' can be proved by the fact that both movements of study drifted through similar conceptual paths: from movement to affect and from affect to an alternative envisioning of somatic environments. The crafting of a place to host the cultivated ecology of movement of the intervals and of the architectures is the most urgent activity appearing towards the end of the arc of both studies. The hosting place speculates around the form of experience that could move with an alternative notion of somatics, and that becomes the concept of 'schizosomatics'. At this moment of the study is when the

schizosomatics workshops sessions at the Sense Lab began to happen. The schizosomatics workshops series began to study the links between the concept of the ‘schizz’ —coming from the theoretical frame on ‘Schizoanalysis’ by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari — and the ways to somatically tap into the ecologies of experience and their actual and potential interconnectedness.

Conceptual Cartography: One of Many

Even if an overall arc of study can be described, the sections of the intervals, architectures and schizosomatics can be read in any order, because the nature of every partial section is to begin and end a particular train of thoughts that is called forth by the singular movement of the day or the space. Consequently, every partial section is a universe of study on its own, though simultaneously, it contains in potential all the others, because every singular movement of study affects the other sections by way of resonance. For instance, one partial section will move with a cadence around one particular concept, and that particular quality of moving will touch upon other associated concepts. In turn, these conceptual accompaniments to the main cadence would usually return later, whether holding the movement of another concept or, as the main concept to surround the dance.

The spirit in which the study has been pursued is one that followed the necessity of the processual immediacy of movement. You would know the movement of study was necessary because you felt that the processes wanted you to learn something that didn’t have a shape. Funnily enough, the unknown shape became present in the space not when you didn’t have words to mention it, but when it felt like something that you had never thought about but was always there, in a sense haunting you. Therefore, it was necessary for the process of study to always decrease its speed to reach the end of the section before a knowledge would be crystallized into a complete form. In such a way that to study somatically meant to inhabit the ecological angles of the unknown.

What follows is a conceptual cartography for a possible drifting across the courses of the ‘intervals of perception’, the ‘architectures of experience’ and ‘schizosomatics’. The drifting described here is traced from the beginning to the end of the three separated texts. Nevertheless, in this path from the beginning to the end, the trace already enters, passes and leaves many conceptual entanglements that are multilinear. Hence, the conceptual cartography is given as a suggestion to go through the three texts and their sections, in the most open, playful and criss-crossed way.

Intervals of perception

The intervals of perception begin by opening the question of how an alternative concept of somatics can shape a technique that does not accumulate knowledge in the room, but that instead mobilizes knowledge— to make felt through qualities— the intervals holding a seamlessly continuous perceptual feeling of the room. The quality of a Friday afternoon—which is the real day in which the shaping of the somatic practices started—stands as an indication for all the intervals to come, of the importance to research the ‘qualitative’ rather than ‘quantitative’ side of experience. The qualitative is suggested as a movement of experience that gives more than what it takes to be activated. The qualitative is thought as the dispersed minor and immediate movements pulsing affectively through less perceptible modes of felt embodiment and thus, they are un-quantifiable (illegible, unmeasurable, non-based in a labor logic, but playful). From this, the intervals begin a critique of the assumptions carried by modern traditions of knowledge on the immediate movements of experience, engaging with the work of Whitehead as well as with Massumi, James and Manning. This critique aims to articulate the movements along the intervals of experience as something generative (qualitative) rather than regulative (quantitative). Later on, the quality of the Friday afternoon of the intervals is tackled through a different angle, that of ‘play’. The concepts of ‘play’ and ‘work’ are operationalized to attune the somatic practices of the interval, towards the investment of modes of life continuation that are not based in extractive labor, but, to emphasise it again, through a qualitative playful immersion in the relational life *of* experience. Then, the concept of ‘technological lineages’ allows us to question the genealogical ways in which certain ecologies of experience repeatedly give birth to techniques to live in the

world. Since these technological lineages traverse bodies, the question of the alternative modes to host a concept for ‘transversal bodies’ (nascent embodiments across various ecologies of experience) begins to resurge. The next question posed is that of the use of the ‘conceptual’ by neoliberal operations to colonize the ‘technological lineages’ that in turn, produces bodies and environments. The conceptual is articulated not as the thought that thinks inside of the human mind but instead as technique operated at the nascent intervals of perception (in the trans-individual life *of* experience). Therefore, in the last intervals the questions gyres around the ways in which the trans-individual life of experience is given a capacity to proliferate or not, due to the conceptual operations occurring in them.

Architectures of Experience

The first architecture of experience asks how to plunge in an ecology of experience that exceeds what is given concretely to sense perception. Through this plunge, the first architecture launches all the concepts to be dealt subsequently: ‘transversality’, the ‘diagram’ and ‘affective signs’, among others. Soon the question of how to plunge into a transversal experience of an architecture becomes a question of ‘feeling’. The concept of feeling is articulated minutely by way of Whitehead. The ‘conceptual’ and the ‘physical feelings’ do the work of undoing the modern theories of knowledge that separate the ‘potential’ from the ‘actual’. Right away, the ‘antecedent phases’ of feeling formations become the topology to understand the power of the ecologies of experience in cultivation, beyond human consciousness and beyond concrete times and spaces. Can the interval of perception be considered the locus where to tap for the complexity of feelings in formation to intensify their architecture-*ing*? If yes, how to register an architecture of feeling in formation that feels like nothing yet? These questions snowball towards the concept of ‘proposition’ to have a term for those potential vectors calling from the future, to the architectures of experience not actually existing. Consequently, another argument against the modern traditions of knowledge is introduced by the concept of the ‘interconnectedness’ of the future in the past. Can feelings be understood as entryways and passageways to ecology of experiences that move beyond the present and thus actual time and space? Feelings are approached as tools to unlock the entryways of dimensions of experience backgrounded in the

foreground that is habitually considered the actual. From then on, a conceptualization of the space is developed: Euclidean and Topological spaces and the ‘mentality’ of those spaces is reconnected with the theory of schizoanalysis. What would mean to schizoanalyze the ‘mind’ of ecological process? Being the mind the vector towards the future, or the ‘desire’, *of* and *for* ecological architecting? Towards the end of the writing, the ‘affective signs’ make their entrance, as a way to help register those vectors of the future encapsulated at the intervals of perception, where the processual phase of feeling formations happens. The affective signs are the zones of ecological experience capable of being actually experienced across the most imperceptible intervals of perception. They are the diagram of affects spread by the intervals of the actual. Along the arc of the last written architectures of experience, the concept of ‘schizosomatics’ comes back, this time linked to the spaces hosting it. The concept of schizosomatics returns this time hosted by the space in order to help to ask some questions of the affective signs: how can they be registered as they are immediately and immanently generating the architecting of a felt embodiment that is distributed and decentered? The last architecture listens to the writing of Renee Gladman, and understands with her the aesthetic-political power that carries the gesture to return, time and time again, to those processual movements that cultivate the plasticity of experience. Gladman’s style of writing indexes the ways in which the entryways and passageways towards the complex and multiple emergence of feeling can be blocked. That gesture to block the diversity of the multilinear processual movements is what Gladman calls the experience of the atrocities of the political and social present. What comes to mind at this moment, is if then the schizosomatics practices—by way of re-schizing and re-bridging experience to its transitional and relational field—can function as an antidote against those gestures that manipulate and block up the bodies and environments from their source of regeneration.

Schizosomatics

This last section speaks about the concrete play with the questions that emerged through the study of the ‘intervals of perception’ and ‘architectures of experience’. Using examples based in the interventions made by the invitees activating the workshops, conceptual parallelisms are

being drawn to the theory of ‘schizoanalysis’ by Deleuze and Guattari and the ‘interpersonal and developmental psychology’ of Daniel Stern. The aim of this section is to reinforce the connections between schizosomatics and schizoanalytic practices. One of the question reiterated through practical examples asks about the capacity of the schizzed somatic practices to generate a surplus of experience that detaches from the present moment of encounter in order to come back, as a relay. The relays for the future of experience are unveiled through the concept of ‘affective contours’ by Stern. The surplus detachments of experience become portable and imperceptible ‘contours’ that facilitate the access—as much as they promote the evasion—to worlds of experiences to come. Another question that returns is that of the force of play of experience understood in itself, as an autonomous force that can be affirmed through schizosomatics: is it possible to engage in an indeterminate experience—one that feels almost like nothing at the human scale of perception—and still to support the belief that such ‘nothingness’ is full of rich and complex doings able to come back later as relays? If yes, what are the conditions for a space for research creation that cares for those processes that feel like nothing but are always already contouring us? How to deviate the critical habit to dismiss indeterminate modes of experience? These questions are pragmatically answered while writing about ways of inviting the participants, ways to affectively care for the collective event, and ways of crafting the entrances and exits to the event, so that it slips towards the future, beyond the Lab.

Thesis: un-archived

The thesis of the research is the generous personage that emerges out of the compost, made of the kneaded elements that have been studied. The personage is fat, its skin shiny and its feet are well grounded in the compost. At the same time, the personage carries an agility that allows it to move with the complexity of the ecology composted, this time around, with ease. The ground of the earth gives it the levity to move through processual knotted complicities as if it were a twister: with physical improvisation and un-anchored into a human body.

This fat and twisting personage is there, waiting to be re-shaped through the readings of the intervals, architectures and schizosomatics. It is ready to appear again and again, called forth by the incantation of reading, this time thin and with long hands, the other time bulky and short, and some other day as a swampy tempest. Honoring its apparition, what remains now is to mention the past archived thesis, the one that launched the process of composting that brought it to life:

The thesis for that research creation project was to explore the interstices of sense perception and non-conscious modes of thought, through the use of somatic practices and process and affect philosophy. This with the aim to design pedagogic interdisciplinary events with an emphasis in the performing arts, and as a way to develop skills to read signs of change concerning artistic process.

INTERVALS OF PERCEPTION

Interval 1: The Interval.

The interval can be explored with somatic practices and the surplus that can be found is similar to the surplus that can be gained through other ecologies of practices: philosophical, aesthetic, and schizoanalytic practices. Nevertheless, now is not the moment to dig into the surplus, nor is it the moment to delve into the transversal connections between somatic practices, art, philosophy and schizoanalysis. Right now it is Friday afternoon, the perfect moment to begin writing a thesis: imbuing its future with a festive quality, which instills in it the promise that anything written will function as a playful platform, one that gives more than what it takes to be recorded.

The Friday afternoon swells with the weight of numerous texts, accumulating their thoughts in the space. The snowballing density of thoughts erases the contrast between the tactile texture of the uneven floor, the luminous green of the climbing plant, and the fur of the dog. If today wasn't a Friday afternoon, the atmosphere of the room would get devoured by the digested knowledge of the texts. So, Friday afternoon moments will function as a platform to be returned to each day in the coming weeks, so that a festive quality will preserve each day's atmosphere from the abundant density of thoughts, begging to be recorded.

The specific quality of the Friday interval allows a somatic experience to be expressed. The movement of the interval allows this expression to come forth, along with a festive quality: at any moment, over any previous knowledge, they press away the presence of the surrounding known environments. Thus, the perception of the movement of the interval opens the room as a site of somatic practices. In turn, the body, when experienced as a quality of a Friday interval, can also be considered a site of somatic practices. The body is not one thing, but more of a site — opened by the interval — composed of many practices. This body has the capacity to register intervals through the perception of movement, since movement is what allows the interval to take place. What, then, is the particular type of movement perception that looms up in the space of the room as weeks pass by?

The perception of movement is a kind of listening, one that is linked to the vestibular nerves located in the inner ear. The vestibular nerves are the first to myelinate, starting at uterine life; even before touch is formed. The founder of Body Mind Centering, Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen says that “We learn first through the perception of movement. Not only is movement a perception, but as the first perception of learning, it plays an important role in establishing the baseline for our concept or process of perceiving” (Cohen 1993, 115). She goes on to describe how these nerves are accompanied by the ‘proprioceptors’ and ‘kinesthetic receptors’ in the bones, joints, ligaments, muscles and fascia, the ‘interoceptors’ in the organs, glands, blood vessels and in each ‘cell’ (Cohen 1993, 115). Vestibular perception of movement registers the contingencies of movement, the pull of gravity, the shape of luminosity, the pockets of distances carried by sound. This perception is not concerned with the inner or outer vision of the body, the categorization and division of the body into inside and outside, nor with the exploration of the body through supplementing an experiential pathway with mental visualization. Vestibular perception slides over the intervals of the pathways of physiological perception. It registers the transmission of the skin, the peripheral nerves of the limbs, and the circulatory fluids as sounds; as movements shaping an emerging undefined partitur. Through somatic listening to the contingency of movement, an ecology of activities is opened up: beyond the exact positions of physiological layers of a body (skin, nerves, and fluids), and beyond the activities of the architecture of spaces—as well as the atmospheric memories carried on by the habits inhabiting them. In this manner, the dance of the body, supported by the register of movement perception, finds incisive openings that decompress the pressure of the years of accumulated read and lived knowledge. These are the years that today—active as a memory force—push away the luminosity that covers the walls creating a fluid rhythm with the floor.

Movement perception finds and registers the intervals that sort out a mode of choreography. Movement perception composes with a force of habit surpassing the givens in the room. The intervals separate and recompose habitual modes of perception, filtering the pitch of the architecture, the body and the ecology of knowledge around us, as they re-occur, continuing now and then and now again back then. Intervals autonomously re compose the habitual activities of daily life, and re-choreograph them with and more-than the body.

This Friday afternoon hears at the distance the rumbling sound of a storm. Process philosophy sounds at the distance its wish to say something about movement. The air smells tick, electricity crisps the angles of the room. These are meteorological signs indicating that a gentle clash between somatic practices and process philosophy is about to start.

Interval 2: The Extensive Continuum.

Process philosophy has something to say about the perception of movement, dressing the almost imperceptible dynamic of the interval. Intuition suggests that the vocabulary of process philosophy can help to express, with more precision, the sensitivity awoken by the interval. The concept of ‘movement’ becomes the entry point into process philosophy, as it registers the interval through a somatic sensitivity. Yet, the atmosphere of this Friday begins to be stormed right now. Because in principle, the concept of ‘movement’ in process philosophy does not seem to match the movement of the interval. The main reference of process philosophy throughout this thesis, is the English philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead affirms in several sections of his magnum opus book *Process and Reality*, and especially in Chapter II, ‘The Extensive Continuum’, that an ‘actual entity does not move’. Does this imply that when the interval makes felt the qualities of the room, nothing is really moving? Or, does the movement of the interval, which elongates the qualities of the room, become static at the actual moment of perception?

These questions will be answered slowly. By engaging in a precise and lengthy dialogue with Isaac Newton and Renee Descartes, Whitehead articulates the concept of the ‘extensive continuum’ from which his own concept of movement—as becoming—derives. He considers these authors as major examples of the scientific and philosophic traditions of the seventeen century. Whitehead argues that Newton and Descartes’ contributions with their theories of ‘Absolute and relative space’ and the ‘Material bodies’, respectively, have become common ideas shaping the modern philosophies of perception. Thus, Whitehead will tackle those assumptions, while conceptualizing the ‘extensive continuum’—a notion that has the strongest parallel to the somatic experience of the interval in this thesis— and simultaneously stating his view on theories of perception.

The concept of the extensive continuum allows Whitehead to expose the problems of the modern European traditions of thought, based in perceptive modes, that have a conscious and distinct perception of the extensive world: its extensive time and space. For Whitehead, at the human

scale of perception, when a sensory perception with the extension of time and space is consciously registered — the touch of a table, the sound coming from next room, or the light diffused through the balcony window— in fact, a selective process of abstraction has been operative. This selective process has abstracted —as subtracted— the perception of the table, the sound coming from the other room and the light of the balcony while selecting out —as excluding— other elements that the human has not become habituated to register. For Whitehead, there are always more-than-human activities that are ‘abstracted out’ from the surroundings, in order for the extensive human perception to appear seamlessly unitary and continuous. If it weren’t for this operation of abstraction the perception of the world would appear atomized and discontinuous.

As we will see, Whitehead gives to the body’s senses the function of perceiving continuity. But this perception is not just something given and granted for once and for all. This perception of continuity through the senses is a generation, a creative act that produces the perception of a world at each immediate moment. For Whitehead, the concept that launches the generation of the continuity of sense perception is ‘potentiality’. Thus, when Whitehead will engage in conversation with Newton and Descartes, he will show us how his own concept of potentiality lends to a different theory of perception than theirs.

“The contemporary world as perceived by the senses is the datum for contemporary actuality, and is therefore continuous — divisible but not divided. The contemporary world is in fact divided and atomic, being a multiplicity of definite actual entities” (Whitehead 1974, 62).

Another point to have in mind is that ‘potentiality’ operates the perception of the extensive continuously by way of ‘relating’ the elements that come together in that event of continuation. This is to say that ‘potentiality’ operates the continuation perceived through the body senses in an assemblage of relations distributed by it. The operation of potentiality is one that ‘gives’—as make ingress— the capacity to sense and ‘relates’—as distributes— the sensed elements.

Thus the sense-data are eternal objects [potentiality] playing a complex relational role; they connect the actual entities of the past with the actual entities of the contemporary world (...) For instance, we see the contemporary chair, but we see it with our eyes, and we touch the contemporary chair, but we touch it with our hands. Thus colours objectify the chair in one way, and objectify the eyes in another way, as elements in the experience of the subject (Whitehead 1978, 62-3). [Text modified]

Potentiality is what gives and distributes the sense-data that forms the extensive perception of qualities of the world. When the quality of colour appears in between the sense-data perception of a human body and a zone of the room, it is because a potential has ingressed. The component parts of the human body such as the visual apparatus, the architectural frame of the window, and the light waves, are being related by the potential. All the elements have actualized their relation, generating a duration and place in the process of sensing a quality. ‘Potentiality’ is relational, meaning that it gives elements the capacity to interconnect each other as sense-data, and to generate through qualities.

The elements that come together through sense perception, at each place and duration, are in fact from and part of an atomic and divided physical world. Potentiality relates the sense-data of the environment, meaning that each processual step of perception is an act of assembling separated components. A potential relates sense-data, meaning that at each processual step of perception there is a call to assemble from separation. On the other hand, the perception of the contemporary world is not divisible into other contemporary actualities because once an act of perception takes form — like the act of walking beside the light of the window towards the sound of the kitchen — that act is in itself independent from other acts: present, and future. The act of walking remains independent from the other act of plants receiving sunlight on the balcony, which is also independent of the proceeding act of opening the fridge to get a refreshment.

In short, when the act of perception passes from the phase of emergence into full actualization, it carries with it an independence (elbow room) from the other perceptual acts in its immediate surroundings: becoming a singularity: just *that* act. This is to say that ‘potentiality’ makes

ingress the capacity to ‘sense’ and to ‘assemble’ through ‘qualities’, while at the same time maintaining certain ‘independence’ between the elements assembled or interconnected.

Whitehead calls this capacity of potentiality to keep the interconnection and independence of the events of perception the ‘solidarity of the universe’. Before going further, it is important to highlight that through the philosophical journey studied above, Whitehead is already showing us that his theory of perception tends to more-than clear and distinct data as given to the senses. Perception carries the capacity to make ingress, to relate, and to maintain an independence of the elements assembled. This capacity carried by the potential element of perception is not ‘clear and distinct’ to the human intellect, because its operations exceed the merely presented sense-data. Each sense-data presented carries the operations of making ingress, relating and keeping independence beyond its presentation: it moves from the antecedent past to the anticipated future.

Now, without going deeper into the temporal consequences of Whitehead’s theory of perception, let’s see how his theory of the ‘solidarity of the universe’ brings him in conversation with Newton. It is in Chapter II, ‘The Extensive Continuum’, where Whitehead articulates his theoretical frame on the ‘solidarity’ of the universe — the interconnectedness of elements — and shows how it can’t be thought without philosophizing sense perception. In addition, we will finally see how the concept of ‘movement’ is involved in this problem of perception.

To tackle the problem of sense perception (how modern tradition conceptualizes it through the direct connection with the ‘present and sensible’) Whitehead will visit Newton’s distinction between ‘Absolute time and space’ and ‘Relative time and space’. As we will see, Whitehead will affirm with Newton that sense perception can’t be directly and completely linked to the Relative time and space —because something of the Absolute always remains in reserve (the excess of potentiality). Nevertheless, we will also see that Whitehead will not agree with Newton’s radical disconnection between the Absolute and the Relative—because for Whitehead they are both mutually included.

To tackle the problem of sense perception Newton proposes the distinction between ‘Absolute time and space’ and ‘Relative time and space’. ‘Absolute’ time and space are immovable and not apprehended through the senses. Newton says that common vulgar opinion understands ‘relative’ time and space as quantitative measures, made in relation to sensible objects:

I do not define time, space, place, and motion, as being well known to all. Only I must observe, that the vulgar conceive those quantities under no other notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise certain prejudices, for the removing of which it will be convenient to distinguish them into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and common (Whitehead 1978, 70).

Common vulgar opinion confuses ‘relative time’ as ‘absolute time’ because it measures time by means of a sensible motion, through the quantity of an hour, a day, a month, and a year (Whitehead 1978, 70). It also misunderstands ‘relative space’ as ‘absolute space’ because it measures space by the movable and quantified positions between bodies (Whitehead 1978, 70).

Whitehead identifies his “atomized quantum of extension correlative to an actual entity- with Newton’s absolute place and duration” (Whitehead 1978, 73), agreeing with Newton’s proof that motion does not apply to absolute place “which in its nature is immovable”. He concludes that “an actual entity never moves, it is what it is” (Whitehead 1978, 73). He departs from Newton, however, in that he “confused what is ‘real’ potentiality with what is actual fact” (Whitehead 1978, 73).

Little by little through Whitehead’s conversation with Newton, we get to see what the connection is between movement, perception and the extensive continuum. We will soon see that this conflict with the notion of movement is what entices the next conversation with Descartes. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let’s continue with Whitehead’s Newton.

Whitehead seeks to preserve the experience of the actual as something beyond quantitative measure and, in return, to release the notion of movement and sense perception from the duty to quantify and measure. Whitehead proposes another take on sensible perception by embedding

the extensive continuum in the capacity to transform potentiality into an act, without confusing them. The extensive continuum functions as a passageway from potentiality to actuality through scales of gradations: from 'general potentiality' (Absolute space and time) to 'real potentiality' and to 'actuality (Relative space and time)'. When the 'potential eternal object' ingresses the capacity of 'sense-data' to hold a relation between independent elements, the 'general potentiality' becomes defined by its relation with actuality. The actual elements that enter in relation to one at other come to define how the potential can make ingress. Thus, the potential loses its 'generality' and becomes a 'real potentiality'. Potentiality and actuality are not philosophically confused, but are folded into each other, and constitute one another.

The prehension of this scheme is one more example that actual fact includes in its own constitution real potentiality which is referent beyond itself (Whitehead 1978, 72).

In this paragraph, the word 'beyond' describes what makes the sense perception of the actual something more-than measurable and quantifiable. When the sense of stability in the room is experienced by the rhythm of the floor, the actual experience is enmeshed with the potential to walk and transform the quality of stability into something else, perhaps into the quality of appetite enticed by the food in the fridge luring the subject to begin walking. Sense perception, therefore, is always enmeshed into a 'potential' surplus that functions as a vector, sliding away from its 'actuality'. Sense perception is always blurred by the process of emergence into actuality, and once it is satisfied, is still blurred by the next proximal act.

Moreover, since actuality is constituted by potentiality, place and duration emerge from the potentiality of the extensive plenum. In the process of temporalization and extensiveness, each sense perception is an atomization, a sensed portion, or a cut from the plenum from where it arises. At each atomization, at each sense perceptible act, time and extension emerge. In the immediacy of this sensed emergence, perception does not have time to measure or perceive relative movement. It is simply in the process of an act, sensed but immeasurable.

Little by little this Friday afternoon begins to recover its faith in the concept of movement, as that dynamic which makes the interval felt. The philosophical impetus, however, keeps on knocking on the door to the room of the extensive continuum: echoing thoughts that, paradoxically, can only be kept at bay from the room if discussed in philosophical writing style. The Friday, therefore takes on a philosophic dimension as the festive and the philosophic become mutually included differential qualities. The interval becomes a room for proximity, in which philosophy belongs to the festive because it enacts the unmeasurable.

In the same chapter of 'The Extensive Continuum', Whitehead conducts a conversation with another representative of the modern traditions of the seventeenth century, Descartes. In the same fashion as with Newton, Whitehead adjusts his 'philosophy of the organism' with Descartes' theory of 'material bodies' in order to offer alternatives to the modern theories of sense perception and in return, to tackle the problematic connection between movement and sense perception from a different angle.

Whitehead affiliates with Descartes by saying that his "(...) doctrine of the physical world as exhibiting an extensive plenum of actual entities is practically the same as the 'organic doctrine.'"; and continuous in disagreement by adding: "but Descartes' bodies have to move, and this presupposition introduces new obscurities. It is exactly at this point that Newton provides for Whitehead a clear conception in comparison with Descartes. "In the 'organic' doctrine, motion is not attributable to any occasion" (Whitehead 1978, 77). Again, it seems that 'movement', as considered by the modern philosophical tradition, is not of help to understand Whitehead's extensive continuum. In what comes after, Whitehead explains what is at stake by affirming an immobile physical perspective of the extensive perception of the world, as does Newton, differently than Descartes.

Whitehead explains the consequences following the Cartesian theory of the material bodies, together with its logic of sense perception:

In the perception of a contemporary stone (...) the separate individuality of each actual entity in the nexus constituting the stone is merged into the unity of the extensive plenum, which for Descartes and for common sense is the stone. (Whitehead 1978, 77).

The next logical step is to effect a complete objectification — instead of a partial objectification of the atomized continuum — by the extensive perception of the stone, which is then “specialized into the specific perspective of a sense-datum, such as colour, for example” (Whitehead 1978, 77). From then on, this logic of perception understands the material stone as something complete and unchanged — as always the same extensive whole — which is perceived through its colour (quality): in return, what is capable of occasional change.

Whitehead stresses the problem of the theory of perception that separates ‘substances’ and ‘accidents’. In his opinion, modern philosophy falls into this separation each time it goes beyond the immediate deliverance of direct perception (This is a relational mode of perception, which in fact, is in accordance with Descartes: “one perceives *with* these hands and feet” (Whitehead 1978, 75)). Through the modern logic of separation, ‘substances’ are granted an essential and undifferentiated attribute, where activities are explained through their ‘accidental’ qualities and relationships. Change only occurs through the accidental qualities and relationships of substance, but substance remains numerically self-identical in essence.

“Thus the imaginations of men are dominated by the quiet extensive stone with its relationship of positions, and its quality of colour- relationships and qualities which occasionally change” (Whitehead 1978, 78).

In this actual moment, this Friday interval gets the answer about movement that it deserves. When Whitehead separates movement from participation with the actual, and freezes movement into immobility—which is towards the side of the Absolute, and in line with Newton’s work—he protests the modern notions of movement and change as accidental qualities referring to essential identical substances. Though, Whitehead also protests Newton’s isolation of the Absolute, because it is eternal and self-identical too:

“From the point of view of the philosophy of the organism, there is a great merit in Newton’s immovable receptacles. But for Newton they are eternal” (Whitehead 1978, 81).

Whitehead replaces the concepts of ‘absolute and relative space’ from Newton and ‘substance, movement, and change’ from Descartes for those of ‘extensive continuum’ and ‘becoming’. He is less interested in conceptualizing ‘movement’ as something accidental and isolated. As he says later, movement is the relational difference across independent elements coming together in the extensive continuum (Whitehead 1978, 80). Whitehead utilizes the concept of ‘becoming’ to index the singular act of formation of each act of perception (just *this* singular act). In this sense, the actual dynamic of formation is not an accidental motion (external displacements), but a growing into concreteness (internal concrescence).

The physical field is, in this way, atomized with definite divisions; it becomes a nexus of actualities. Such a quantum (i.e., each actual division) of the extensive continuum is the primary phase of the creature. This quantum is constituted by its totality of relationships and cannot move. Also the creature cannot have any external adventures, but only the internal adventure of becoming. Its birth is its end. (Whitehead 1978, 80)

What is perceived in the quantum of each actual division is a ‘creature’: something emerging out of the datum of potentiality and limited by the already existing actualities. At each immediate perceptual experience, something is being created into and through perception. Perception of the actual is not perception of a world of separate material bodies with a quantifiable space and time between them. Perception is a creation of the world in the making. As it is being created it has a ‘perception in the making’ of what is happening: time and space do not pre-exist the moment of perception, so there is no pocket of stable time-space where the commotion of motion can be externally registered.

Through the concept of relation, the connection between the ‘solidarity’ of the universe and the value of the ‘perception in the making’ becomes clear. The extensive continuum of the world *is created as perceived* through ‘relation’ itself. It is not external and accidental relation, but an

inter-connected relation across the actualities that co-habit the extensive quantum. Another word for relation is event:

An event is a nexus of actual occasions inter-related in some determinate fashion in some extensive quantum (...) The most general sense of the meaning of change is ‘the differences between actual occasions; and such a route is an ‘event’. (Whitehead 1978, 80)

By now it can be understood that the festive quality of the Friday happens not in one individual interval, but across many. Then, the movement of the interval allows it to become a quality, spreading across the many intervals of independent elements co-habiting the event. To cultivate a festive quality is to stay attuned to the relations and movements of atomized elements in the event of experience. The intervals of perception make perception vague — beyond a clear and distinct indication of the stable accidental material world — and allow it to register the movement of the event. In order to not anger Whitehead, let’s say that the movement of the event is its becoming.

Interval 2B: Relations.

Last Friday afternoon had a long conversation with process philosophy as a way to friend philosophy with the festive. It worked, yet the long conversation with philosophy left a toll in the room. Today can feel like a repetitive loop of Wednesdays with no weekend in sight. So, the question posited by the room is how to activate one more time the technique of the last interval so that the interval opens again to the festive quality. In fact, today's question is the basic question that drives every writing of the intervals: can philosophy be a somatic technique to register the abstractions immanent to the contingencies of the living without flying away from its constitutive festive quality?

The last interval 2 said that the topic of the interval quality in the room is inseparable from a mode of understanding perception. This is to say that the extensive time, space, and quality of the room generates its own perception. Though the extensive time, space and quality are also generated at the moment of perception. Thus, a paradox arises, where the extensive place and duration are not pre-existing elements of the experience, but also not an unbounded infinity, which was dealt with in the last interval 2 via the concepts of the potential and the actual. The extensive continuum is the plane that transduces the passage from potentiality to actuality. In the plane potentiality ingresses the relational element of eternal objects: the capacity for sense-data to be felt as a quality. In return, the actualities in the plane that the process of ingression has already ended are what limit the unbounded potentiality of the eternal objects, transforming it into 'real potentiality'. The perception generated by the extensive continuum is not limited to the modern theories of sense perception based in a register that is distinctive and conscious. With the extensive continuum, there is not a measure of quantities of external change from the event of perception. In it, what is changing is a process internal to the relations of elements, not of an individual actuality, but of a nexus of actual occasions — which is exactly Whitehead's definition of the event (Whitehead 1978, 73). That which is perceived in the extensive continuum emerges out of an atomization or division of the extensiveness of time, space and quality. Then, the perception emerging with no pre-existing extensiveness of the room is an atomic perception, one that emerges out of the quantum that divides the extensive continuum. Perception in the

making is alternative to modern theories of sense perception in that it registers the divisions of the extensive continuum. At each time that the perception of the room appears as seamlessly continuous, this processual perception is capable of registering what is truly happening: the atomization of continuity that populates intervals.

From now on, an answer begins to arise to the question of how philosophy can be a somatic technique to register the festive quality of the interval. Philosophy can be approached as a technique to feel the population of the intervals rather than the common overall sense of flowing continuity. Philosophical thought can be a mode of feeling the manner in which the sense of continuation emerges, together and with interruptions. To pursue the crafting of this philosophical felt technique the focus should be, again, in the concept of the potential relational objects, because they are what allows continuity to re-emerge or to re-continue. They are what interrupts and re-continues events of perception, by giving a lure to continue from the end of one act to the other and by defining each act of perception as a singular that: related but independent from the other. In short, what is to be analyzed is ‘relation’. ‘Relation’ is what continuous the link with today’s interval. It is what helps to craft the philosophical felt technique of the interval.

In the next paragraph, affect philosopher Brian Massumi adds some more vocabulary to envision the role of relation. He conceptualizes it as an operation immanent to the event of perception, through the actual and yet exceeding it (potential). He stresses the fact that perception of relation is non-sensuous: it is *with* and *beyond* what conscious and distinct modern perception can catch. It is a perception of movement that does not subtract quantitative measure but feels the qualities emerging via the sense-data ingressed.

The linkage is what the objects share through their combination: implication in the same event. The felt perception of continuing movement is qualitative because it directly grasps the changing nature of the shared event ‘behind’, ‘across’ or ‘through’ its objective ingredients and their observable combinations. It is simply: relationship. Directly perceptually-felt’ “nonsensuously” perceived (Massumi 2011, 107).

To feel through intervals the non-sensuous emerging perception is to perceive more-than what is presented to the senses in the act of the now. It is to feel the *behind*, *across* and *through*, not only of the many divided entities that already took form, but also of the time vectors moving through them. Paradoxically, to feel this way is to feel along the act of perception a quality that gets everything at once, but through pieces.

Feeling the non-sensuous along the act of the now is an act of listening to quality as a mosaic of elements, separated and together, carried by vectors of continuations, which are indeed vectors of re-continuations and re-energizing. They are vectors of re-continuations instead of simple continuation, because the becoming of extensiveness — the changing nature of the event — is not something happening just for once and forever, but every time in the physical atomized contemporary world. Whitehead is very clear about this: he says that “there is a prevalent misconception that ‘becoming’ involves the notion of a unique seriality for its advance into novelty. This is the classic notion of ‘time’, which philosophy took over from common sense” (Whitehead 1978, 35). For him, the “‘creative advance’ is not to be construed in the sense of a uniquely serial advance” (Whitehead 1978, 35). What becomes is continuity itself, in a non-serial fashion. Continuity is created at each moment of the processual operations of the extensive continuum. It is not that the process of becoming just continues, but again that becoming generates endless continuities. This point is resumed in the famous Whiteheadian formula: “there is a becoming of continuity, but not continuity of becoming” (Whitehead 1978, 35).

Therefore, if continuations are created every time, how do they preserve their quality from non-serial actualization to non-serial actualization? How is it possible that the process of relation keeps repeating its mode of relation in such a way as to feel like an overall continuation? Or, how is it that at each second the experience is not of the everyday world, then of a chaos of atoms, then of the atmosphere of the moon, etc.? There is an active memory of relations that relays form in the process of relations. Under this perspective, the continuations are modes in which the activities - the modes of feeling entities - come to know how to relay themselves in different rhythmical patterns for inter-relation. The continuations are how the world has crafted an active memory that keeps re-ingressing relations — non-serially — to feel the seamlessly unitary event of perception. Relation, when it is not felt in its temporal, spatial and qualitative

actualization, is felt as the relaying force that capacitates the extensive continuum to go on. In other words, if subtracted from feeling, relation is a patterned memory that allows the extensive continuum to go on with its continuity, despite the non-serial atomization populating it at every single atomic step.

The memory of inter-relation subtracted from the capacity to be felt is what Whitehead also calls the ‘general scheme of relationships’:

Extension, apart from its spatialization and temporalization, is that general scheme of relationships providing the capacity that many objects can be welded into real unity of one experience (...) These extensive relationships are more fundamental than their more spatial and temporal relationships (Whitehead 1978, 67).

When an act of feeling occurs temporality, spatiality, and quality are foregrounded in the processual making, yet there is something else that is backgrounded: the inherited capacity for acts of feeling to continue to relate and to reconnect through their atomicity. There is an excess of ‘relation’ that did not become a quality to be felt. Whitehead uses the concept of ‘negative prehensions’ to express the influence of the general scheme of relationships in the feel of the extensive continuum (Whitehead 1978, 41). Negative prehensions are like a tone for relation that add something to the way in which the event of perception is qualitatively felt. They are themselves not felt, only negatively prehended: somehow registered as an intuition or *déjà vu*, as an overall atmosphere of something familiar to our feelings but just resting on the tip of the tongue. Negative prehensions add their patterned relations (linkage) for the non-sensuous perception to be perceptually felt “‘behind’, ‘across’ or ‘through’ its objective ingredients” (Massumi 2011, 107). If non-sensuous perception is perceptually felt beyond and across individual body senses, negative prehension adds a relational pattern to that limit perception, but not a feeling.

Thus, if actual felt perceptions are capacities that are inherited from modes of patterned relations between inherited activities, we can say that there is an ecology of relations reactivated at each moment in which an act re-plunges into the extensive continuum. We can also say that there is an

ecology of relations that always re-continues more or less in the same inter-related patterns in such a way as to create a sense of perception of smooth continuation, as usual. Then, the following question would be: if the cut of the continuum is a re-emergence, a re-becoming, how does it arise that we humans re-perceive always more or less the same? What are the operations of inter-related patterning occurring at the non-actually perceivable ecology of activities, which continue to foreground the repetition of the same identical types of sense perception and, for that matter, which type of stable community of acts are favoured?

This is still the same old foot and floor, they are the same lazy people, this is the inevitable catastrophic environment. Are we confusing the actual facts of perception with the excess of ecological richness that generates its continuity? What are the ecological processes that recorded our habits to see the quantitative product of perception over the creative qualities, working like hell to keep our boring repetitive sense of stability together?

And most important, how can the philosophical technique to feel the interval not only register the operations for continuation but intensify the differential force of the cut, so that the quantum of emergence records differently the memory of the ecology of relations for new and non-dominant communities of perceptual acts, to intensify their re-energization?

Interval 2C: Quality.

After some days, on this grey Sunday, the Friday returns carrying certain affirmations found along the experiential writing sessions of the past intervals: ‘quality’ is what makes felt the ecological richness of relationship, which is not limited to the quantifiable perception of experience. Operating as a relational memory, the ecological relationship re-continues through the cuts of the extensive continuum to reappear with the emerging quantum of the actualities. This Sunday midday, recalls the question posited some days ago: if philosophy could be a somatic technique to feel the quality of the interval, how could it register not only the re-continuations of the self-identical, but also the differential force of the cut of the quantum?

The concept of ‘quality’ will be useful to understand the differential quantum that re-continues with increasing variation, from self-identical repetition. For the Friday to overcome the gravity of the Sunday midday, it needs to feel ‘quality’ as something concrete, grounded, in short: chewable. Quality is how the abstract movement of potential relationality re-continues the process of extensiveness, yet it is also an expression of the palpable enmeshment of the abstract potential with the actual, concrete, and concise event from which perception emerges.

William James is another philosopher who describes the expression of quality in a process of becoming perception. The concept he uses to name the process of becoming is ‘bare activity’, or in his words: “the bare fact of event or change” (James 2003, 84). Thus for him, activity equals the Whiteheadian process of enmeshment of potential, which occurs through the actual in the plane of the extensive continuum.

He feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or swiftness or intensity, the movement, the weight and colour, the pain and pleasure, the complexity or whatever remaining characters the situation may involve (...) If we suppose activities to go on outside of our experience, it is in forms like these that we must suppose them (...) for the word “activity” has no imaginable content whatever these experiences of process,

obstruction, striving, strain, or release, ultimate qualia as they are of the life given us to be known (James 2003, 87).

Activity — the bare process of change — is felt through very concrete qualities, like the *gravity* of today's room and the *strain* that exercises over the force of Friday, attempting to kick in the calendar. James continues to say that whatever principle that brings the effect of quality to experience, should be understood not as something that transcends the qualitative act of experience. It "is just what we feel it to be" (James 2003, 97). On this topic, he continues saying that philosophy should "leave off grubbing underground for what effects effectuation, or what makes action act, and to try to solve the concrete questions of where effectuation in this world is located..." (James 2003, 97).

There are two important points to be subtracted for the research of the interval out of this short compilation of James's thoughts: the force of *movement* and the *agency* indexed by quality.

On the one hand, James underlies the fact that if there are activities outside of our conscious experience, they should be similar to the concrete effects carried by quality. When quality transpires in an extensive perception, it makes felt a 'form of process' that indexes the relational memory of the extensive continuum. Quality in its actual effect indexes a form of process that is more-than the extensive, but is mutually included in it. The form of process is double: it makes felt a qualitative aspect, while indicating something of the patterned memory that is part of the relational nexus, which re-continues along the atomization of the physical field. Now, what the quality indexes in its form of process is a *form of movement*: form should be understood as something dynamic, open and in transit. The dim light across the furniture of the room, the rhythmic sounds in the street, and the thickness of the air pressure are qualities that index the overall movement of pulling the day in two: a Sunday-Friday.

Quality, as defined by James, is felt and carried by a form of movement, making the agency in the event of perception come to the forefront. The event is not individual but a nexus of actual occasions: a multiplicity. Quality is the medium by which an ecology of agencies is felt. Quality

is not only that colour, that sound, or that brightness, but also their inextricable, relational, moving, and expressive autonomy.

This link between the feeling of quality and the agency of an ecology of relations is beautifully articulated by Philosopher Erin Manning: “{the feeling} defines the quality of the event in the event” (Manning 2016, 133), it “is that which moves the event toward what Whitehead calls its satisfaction. It is the event’s agency” (Manning 2016, 134). Manning articulates the operation of the ecology of relations through the very concept of non-sensuous perception (interval 2B) that “describes the folding of past tonalities into present events” (Manning 2016, 133): “it is a ‘pastness’” (Manning 2016, 134) that runs through the event. Non-sensuous perception is the force of ‘pastness’ luring other feelings: feelings that in return will actualize novel forms of experience.

By remaining proximate to this Sunday interval, James’ and Manning’ findings on the concept of ‘quality’ can bring something new to the table. The autonomous agency of the ecology of relations re-continues — from pastness to futurity — to be expressed through qualities. It brings an ‘excess’ to the extensive experience, one ‘excess’ that is ‘free’. Quality is in excess of what can be quantifiable in the actual world of perception, therefore, it is what *gets free* from the satisfied actual form, to return and re-energize other processes of form taking. Quality plunges back to the extensive continuum to give force to other quantum cuts in the process of actualization. Quality is what gets freed from the actual satisfaction of form and modulates the memory of relationships. Quality feeds forward the force of memory of the world to keep capacitating patterning for actual perception, to keep delineating ecologies of feeling. Quality is a dynamic blueprint that feeds the force for future encounters.

In the perception of quality, there are signs of freedom. Freedom understood as more than a human thought or action — as the ecological force of relation beyond actual forms of perception, which injects their agency with the quantum for actualization. The way in which the quality of the event resolves (or satisfies) itself, is a sign of freedom that feeds forward other modes of actual living, feeling, and perceiving the contemporary. It is a freedom from quantity, from staying once and for all in the actual world: allowing the subject to become a non-sensuous force

at the edge of space-time, a ghost forcing the quantum of the extensive continuum to re-emerge. Manning undertakes the concept of 'freedom' through another philosopher, Henri Bergson:

The activation of change in quality is what Bergson defines as freedom. Freedom is here not linked to human volition, nor is it allied to intentionality or agency. Freedom is instead allied to the in-act, to the decisional force of movement-moving, to the agencement that opens the event to the fullness of its potential. Freedom is how the event express its complexity, in the event (...) Freedom, for Bergson, is dynamic, ecological. (Manning 2016, 23)

Freedom describes the nature of quality to inject change from the contemporary state of affairs of perception: it moves through and across an event, instead of being limited to a singular self-identical thing, object, or entity. The question, therefore, of the philosophical somatic technique of registering a differential, can be answered through the movement of a quality, not an attempt of capturing the same.

Through registering the movement with an alien agency, the habitual movements patterned in the contemporary state of affairs can become palpable. This alien agency is a part of an ecology of relations, which is a memory of freedom that returns as 'pastness' (present and future). It can be understood as an 'appetite': a Whiteheadian concept to explain the urge of processes towards actualization. The perception of movement parallels a feel for appetites with a quality for the alien. This alien quality is not non-existent, but something that is already at play in the ecology of relations: if it were to take form in the act, it would shift the quantum of the field of actualization beyond its predominant forms. To experiment with philosophical somatic techniques that register the qualitative movement of the interval, is to yearn for ecological appetites already almost in the act. The techniques are a mode of experimenting with what it means to have an appetite, less as an individual human, but as a choreographic event: more an ecology than a person.

Interval 3: Interconnectedness.

Today the night has come. It is hard to say if it is the night of Friday or if by a non-linear jump today is the night of a Sunday or a Monday. In any case, despite the promise to keep philosophy at bay from too much overthinking, some stubborn problems have come to stay for a while, demanding some even slower philosophical study to be blown into this experimental writing.

So, here is the affirmation of the fact that against the wall of stubbornness, an ‘ecology of relationships’, ‘excessive and free qualities’ and the ‘choreographic appetites’ had come to crash; and at the crash a quantum of possibility glowed, some new problems screaming through the fractal bits and pieces the following sentences: ‘what is the pedagogy of the event?’ and ‘how is the (pedagogy) of the event implicitly signaling to the inherent capacity of perception to play’? To make these new sentences heard more intensively, a descent into the night of process philosophy has to be undertaken in one, two, three seconds...

Whitehead, in his chapter on ‘Philosophic Method’ in *Adventure of Ideas* articulates the function of process philosophy “to discover some of the major categories under which we can classify the infinitely various components of experience” (Whitehead 1967, 226). He posits the problem of the imperfection of philosophical language to discover those categories, insofar as language is inadequate to tackle precisely - with the technical vocabulary accumulated until the moment - “the paradox of the connectedness of things: the many things, the one world without and within” (Whitehead 1967, 228).

To illustrate the inadequacy of language to tackle the paradox of interconnectivity, Whitehead develops a conversation with idealist philosopher F.H. Bradley that shows the different conceptual terminology they use to apparently deal with a similar perspective on experience. For Whitehead, the concept that articulates the interconnectedness of experience is ‘relation’, where for Bradley, the concept is ‘feeling’. For Bradley, the concept of relation does not really relate but instead, it functions as the ‘abstract universal’ of ‘betweenness’ (Whitehead 1967, 230), what is in between the cities of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, for example. In other words,

Bradley sees the charge in the concept of relation to function as an ‘external relation’ instead of a concept belonging immanently to an ‘inclusive whole’. On the other hand, Whitehead prefers the concept of ‘relation’ than (only) ‘feeling’, because he wants to bypass another additional problem attached to philosophy, which is to assume that the data for perception is clearly cut between the ‘emotional’ or ‘conscious’. He calls this problem the error of introspection, which pushed to the background the vague aspects of experience that are mostly derivative from the body.

What is interesting about this conversation between Whitehead and Bradley, despite this Sunday-Monday-night atmospheric loop, is the explanation of how their concepts differ and overlap through the example of a puzzle, since from the puzzle, intuition immediately emerges that there is something ludic about how the experience lends eyes and hands to perception.

Whitehead then continues sorting out the conceptual distances and proximities with Bradley by using a short sentence that illustrates his take on ‘feeling’.

“These puzzles are insoluble unless that which I feel, and which is not an object before me, is present and active. This felt element is used and it must be used in the constitution of that object which satisfies me” (Whitehead 1978, 232).

Whitehead says that the component of feeling “which is not an object before me” equals his concept of “subjective form”. The “subjective form” is the manner in which the feeling of the event determines the process of integration of the experience. The manner in which each single piece of the puzzle, together with the human in front of it, generates the arching affective atmosphere of ‘insolubility’, which is paradoxically the way in which the event resolves itself: connecting the disparate elements. In this way, Whitehead makes ‘feeling’ free from human internal emotion and lends it to the distributed and relational dynamic of disparate elements. In sum, the feeling is of the relation, not of the human subject, but of the subjective form.

Whitehead also reads out from the phrase “that which I feel, and which is not an object before me”, his own concept of ‘negative prehension’. He explains that “such a prehension is active via

its contribution of its subjective form to the creative process, but it dismisses its ‘object’ from the possibility of entering into the datum of the final satisfaction” (Whitehead 1978, 232). The negative prehension is a way of taking account of processes that don’t become feelings, but which add their patterned memory of relationships — indeed their negative subjective form — to the finally emerging felt, actual, and positive subjective form. A negative prehension can be considered the magic element of the process, the memory relationships of the past and future momentums adding something extra to the actually felt elements of experience (interval 2B).

Whitehead concludes that Bradley’s concept of ‘feeling’, if understood in connection with the concepts of subjective form and prehension, is similar to his own concept of ‘relation’, if ‘relation’ is apprehended as ‘immanent’: that which gives the inclusive whole or the connectedness of the components of experience, beyond sense perception.

Before this Sunday-Monday loop makes the connection with the inherent capacity of perception given by play, there is something else that begs to emerge from the puzzle: the beginning of the thought on the pedagogy of the event.

In perceiving experience as something inter-connected and emerging from an immanent memory of relationship, we can understand what can be done through the process of learning and teaching process philosophy. After the example of the puzzle, Whitehead continues explaining that philosophy deals with “the ascent from a particular fact, or from a species to the genus exemplified” (Whitehead 1978, 235), and that the inverse procedure, the descent from genus to particular facts or species, would be impossible, “for facts and species are the product of the mingling of genera” (Whitehead 1978, 235). A telling argument is carried through the example of the notion of a backbone, which Whitehead explains, alone does not indicate anything about the notion of suckling or of swimming in water: “Thus no contemplation of the genus vertebra, taken by itself, can suggest mammals or fishes, even as abstract possibilities” (Whitehead 1978, 235). In other words, the role of philosophy is not deconstructing the complexity of a mingling of experience (or event) in its individual elements, looking for an origin that caused its production, but to continue to combine the mingling with other genus, to see the contrast of the combined events and give something novel to be learnt. Whiteheads position is similar to James (interval

2C), when he says that philosophy should “leave off grubbing underground for what effects effectuation (...) and to try to solve the concrete questions of where effectuation in this world is located...” (James 2003, 97).

“The metaphysics implicit in this speculative philosophy is of an ‘Immanent Creativity’ (versus a transcendental metaphysical external to the events) that follows the processes of individual disparate activities in their growing together, a ‘concrescence’” (Whitehead 1978, 236).

Whitehead’s metaphysics gives a pedagogic perspective of the event, pursued by the now overfull philosophical somatic technique of the interval, which states that when an event happens, to register it does not mean to dissect the individual facts that made it possible. To register an event is to attend to the specific global force of its effect, the interconnectedness of its elements that affect this intensity, this rhythm, this shape, which in return speaks of a memory of relationships that will keep on returning, as further modes for combination.

In other words, the intuition of what happens in an event is not to get to know the history of the past, but the immanent generative forces of a future about to come. A future, not as a new individual fact, but more as the echo of multiple ‘mingling of experiences’ to resolve into events that in turn would be able to inject more quantum of possibilities through their combinations: event plus event plus event. To feel the quality of the affective tone of an event is to listen to the force of the genus, to be inter-laced for uncertain but irrevocable future entanglements. The pedagogic function of a philosophical somatic technique is to register the interval, relaying the possibility of combining events of experience from one context to another. The immanent creativity of an event, through mingling disparate individual entities into the subjective form of one event, shows that what holds the relation in a partial world of experience (an inclusive whole) is not the share of self-identity of the elements, but the subjective form that carries them in difference. Thus, there is a radical value to otherness and multiplicity in what constitutes each single event. The subjective form, therefore, of one event can match the affective tone (atmospheric arc) of other events, even when the individual components of each single event do not have any obvious connection. The connection would happen through the affective tone and

not through the common self-identity of each individual element to an ever bigger group identity. In short, an event can match with affective tones of other events across distant contexts from where it was created. For example, an event of dancing can match with the affective tone of the event of reading a queer book, and also with an everyday walk in the city. The contrast between the modes of coming together in difference of each event — their genus — is what makes it possible to learn something new. The power of this singular knowledge would be less in its content — again, in the individual identities that it signifies or denotes — but in the moving affective tone of relationships transferred between each singular inclusive whole experience of the events.

Interval 3B: Play.

Let the event of the Sunday-Monday night loops intensify, as the loop breaks away to another day - hopefully another Friday - and moves towards what it wanted to say in the first place during the last interval 3: an immanent creative metaphysic has an irrepressible capacity for play.

The immanent creative metaphysic was discovered through the example of the puzzle given by Whitehead. The example in which a person stood in front of the puzzle's pieces and played with it through the relational feelings. Those feelings that were given by a subjective form—an event distributed beyond the individual person — and that carried unfelt relations—the negative prehensions that were the memory of relations that didn't become feelings, but added something to the subjective form of the event. Therefore, let's return to the puzzling event example to discover the inherent capacity for play holding the event.

We can think that the puzzle would be unsolvable if the materiality of the puzzle pieces didn't have the capacity to entice a perception of play. The dentate shape of the piece of the puzzle and the segment of the image printed on it are the design of a technology that takes into account the capacity of perception to couple one section of space with another and to look for the other part of an image. This designed technology also takes into account the capacity of fingers to grasp them and of the eyes to include them in their visual range. The materiality of the pieces of the puzzle and of the body are kicked away from the mere perception of thingness and are always already agitated by desires to play.

Perception of play activates a perception of things, plus the force of capacity that runs through it. A hand, the eyes, the ears and the puzzle's pieces in their assembling — their knotted genus — bring forward the felt relation of potential: what can be done. The mistake is to assume that the potential of "what can be done" is a verbal thought post-facto. If the felt relation of the subjective form is the antecedent potential that composes the actual perception, then a perspective of potential arises prior to the fact. In this sense, potentiality is prior to the actual perception of a static thing, as a hand and a bunch of puzzle pieces. What perception of play does is to reawaken

us, humans, to the immediate perception of potential — the complexity of the genealogy of processes — in which the perception of an actual felt thing is vectored through a force of habit (antecedent processes) and a force of capacity (immediate novel future process).

If perception begins from play, then what are stable, common and everyday things in a room begin to fly. The mug does not come through as the perception of a coloured thing, but as the potential through to the wall disseminating an octopus-like ink stain. The set of keys become inseparable from the twist of the wrist and the burst of fresh air welcomed by the open door. And the light hitting the window entangled with the tunes emitted by the laptop displaces at once the repetitive night of a Sunday-Monday loop to a playful Friday afternoon, again.

Interval 3C: Tools and Weapons.

By following in the repetitive night of a Sunday-Monday loop, the importance of conceptualizing the perception of play as adding to a world of festive experiences or to a repetitive world of hard work becomes more palpable. The importance lies in finding concepts that can tell of the difference of play, which can add to a memory of relationships to search for alien appetites or, contrary to it, the type of difference that instead, remains in a perception of relationships that can only concretize the world that we already know: the repetitive loop of Sunday-Monday night atmospheres commonly known as ‘hard work’, the manifestation of ideas of contemporary successful modes of life.

Therefore, what this interval is exploring today - by paradoxically resonating in a mode of hard work - are concepts for differentiating between a perception of play for alien appetites and festive experiences, and the perception of play that instigates more of the same mode of hard-work life. In the past interval perception of potential preceded a conscious awareness of what can be done in the midst of an event, and thus perception of play was the immanent living of the necessity of the past technologies for modes of life, which fortunately could be played differently. There was a flow of technologies operating across things and bodies: this flow was a kind of intermediary between things and bodies, and it operated beyond modes of conscious emotion, knowledge or perception.

Philosopher Gilles Deleuze and philosopher and psychoanalyst Guattari provide a set of concepts to understand the connection between play and technology as an intermediary of potentials (antecedent processes making something actual at the qualitative in-between of things and bodies). According to their analysis in the chapter “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - The War Machine” from their book *A Thousand Plateaus*, a technology is a set of genealogical relations across assemblages - understood here as events - which captures and designs forces expressed through things and matter.

“We speak of a machinic phylum or technological lineage, wherever we find a constellation of singularities, prolongable by certain operations, which converge, and make operations converge upon one or several assignable traits of expression.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 448).

A technology is a flow of matter-movement whose operation repeats and invents forms of things and matters together with their affects. So, a technological lineage is less an ‘object’ than a ‘potential’ that is repeated in actual things, enmeshed by their singular expressed affects (more about the affects expressed by technologies later).

Deleuze and Guattari, through the above mentioned chapter, work around a main distinction of technical objects and their affects, namely the ‘tools’ and ‘weapons’ (in connection to the differences between the State apparatus, which controls and quantifies processual forces, and the War machine, which makes forces drift qualitatively). What is interesting to subtract from this distinction between tool and weapon is a set of characteristics attached to them which are helpful to sort out the perception of emergent experience as something adding to *alien* or to repetitive *hard work* relationships.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the *tool* has a relation with introjection “it prepares a matter from a distance, in order to bring it to a state of equilibrium or to appropriate it for a form of interiority.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 436). By introjecting the forces in relation to matter, the tool has a quantitative relation to movement or to speed. The quantitative tendency to movement is modelled through a structure of work: “In work what counts is the point of application of a resultant force exerted by the weight of the body considered as “one” (gravity), and the relative displacement of this point of application (...) Linear displacement from one point to the another constitutes the relative movement of the tool...” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 438).

On the contrary, the *weapon* has a relation to projection and therefore its tendency to movement is qualitative and its model is that of “free action” instead of work. “Anything that throws or is thrown is fundamentally a weapon, and propulsion is its essential moment (...) the weapon invents speed, or the discovery of speed invents the weapon (the projective character of weapons

is the result.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 436). The weapon is of the model of “free action” in which the body escapes gravity, its relation is with an absolute movement. The weapon moves itself while the tool needs to be moved.

When the experience of something inter-connected, given by a memory of relationships, follows the logic of the ‘tool’ and the function of ‘work’, there is an introjection of feelings that gives form to the subject of perception. This logic of experience quantifies its feelings as sentiments that measure the felt processual forces as a way to frame them: introjecting them into the scale of the category of human perception, it gives human meaning to the digestion of free processual forces. “The work regime is inseparable from an organization and a development of Form, corresponding to the formation of the subject. Feeling implies an evaluation of matter and its resistances: a direction (*sens*, also “meaning”)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 441).

On the other hand, the assemblages under the logic of “free action” are of the forces of affect (projectile affects): the exteroceptive discharges beyond form and the interiority of a subject capable of assimilating its meanings. Free action of processual forces un-codes the meaning of feelings, it effectuates the passions of the assemblage. These are experiences of processes that tend to the excess of activity beyond the categories of bodies, subjects and things. “affects (...) relate only to the moving body in itself, to speeds and composition of speeds among elements” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 441).

After the exploration of the technological object of tools and weapons, the characteristics to be extracted to help take into account the inter-connected elements of the event have become more palpable. One of the characteristics is ‘speed’ and the other is ‘exteroception’. The *speed* of perception of the event, while being maintained, gyres with an absolute movement across all the disparate elements, without resting inside of them, without introjecting them, but by keeping an *exteroceptive* quality, a quality moving at the edges of the individual.

When perception of play is thought as the continuation of a technological lineage (a genealogy of processes) that returns as a potential intermediary (at the edges of the self-identical individual) and thus qualifies as a ‘weapon’, it can be said that the weapon cuts further at the interval of

perception. To perceive the experience of the technology of potentials, returning as a weapon in an event, is to exteroceptively distribute perception through all the interstices in which movement drifts across the elements, so that the force of the interstitial intensifies. Resulting, is a weaponized mode of perception that cuts once, while simultaneously moving through multiple bleedings.

It can be asserted that the movement perception of the interval is a perception that tends towards the search for weapons. There are angles of perception that kick off more absolute movement: the displacement of certainty and knowledge, where the earth, the body, the thing, the animal, and the plant are not perceived as inert objects, but as exterior (as exteroceptive) surfaces of the speed of bleeding affect. Absolute movement is the movement at the interstices of the actual, the more than the actual that Whitehead would say is not possible to be perceived if it is not in relation to many occasions of experience, or in other words, if it is not grasped at the level of interconnected events rather than of particular entities (Whitehead 1978, 73).

Perception of movement and play is a weaponizing of perception: the catch of the rush and the arrest, conjunction, and intensity of the assemblage of activities glowing more despite the actual form of the pseudo inert matter.

Therefore, attending the interval is not as it seems an attention to something immobile. It is an attention to the speeds that are exteroceptive to the coalesced and introjected perception of unity. Whatever that which now seems to be one united atmosphere of Sunday night, with one room and one tone of obscure luminosity, by attending to the interval, begins to be perceived as an atmosphere full of autonomous and disparate activities playing beyond “I”: the human introjecting them. There it is, the luminous sun, the air pressure, and the orange surface of the table playing themselves independently and breaking open a Saturday afternoon out of the unitary perception of Sunday night.

Interval 3D: Affective Expressions.

Saturday afternoon atmosphere, finally. Kaitlyn Aurelia Smith sounds through the speakers. A diffuser spreads eucalyptus and the sun of autumn heats still with enough force to imbue the room with a quality of levity. The thought that the room is the perception of all the movements that escape through windows and walls beyond the visual range and through the corners where the sound does not reach, somehow a complicated thought (a thought of the unfinished and of the non-unitary, perhaps) is delayed in favour of levity.

What matters now is the continuation of another thought: the very thought of ‘continuation’, or the operation that allows activities to continue by the very play of ‘assembling’. There is a world capacity for activities to ‘assemble’, allowing for activities to return and sustain themselves, appearing here and there as that one form of perception with the overall semblance of a Saturday afternoon. The capacity to assemble is what allows autonomous activities such as pressure, gravity and circulation to feel each other, allowing a singular semblance of perception to emerge.

Then, when the experience of a portion of the world, like the feedback between pressure, gravity and circulation taking form in the perception of this room - with a Saturday afternoon atmosphere of levity - happens, it is through the genealogy of *techniques for relation*: techniques of matter in movement which listen to the call to *assemble*. The technological genealogies express the modes of operations to continue, through a call to assemble. Let’s re-visit the Deleuze and Guattari quote from the last interval:

“We may speak of a machinic phylum or technological lineage, wherever we find a constellation of singularities, prolongable by certain operations which converge, and make operations converge upon one or several assignable traits of expression” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 448) [the underline is mine].

Every world activity, like that pressure, gravity and circulation would be an operation of its technological lineage, expressed at the very mattered moment in which they converge or

assemble. When the flow of the machinic phylum or technological lineage cuts itself and converges in an assembled event, the operations express themselves: this Saturday, this levity, this sunset.

The assemblage is a cut or an interval from the world activities' operations, which expresses the activities' technological lineages: their modes to come into relation (in this occasion as Saturday sunset-*ing*). So, we return to Whitehead. The extensive continuum actualizes its potential while atomizing the actual (interval 2). The actual perception of the assembled world, however, seems to coalesce precisely because through the gaps of the atomized actual, a mode of continuation is figured, which is operated and propelled by no other than the technological lineages: the very processual flow that forwards the atomized actual elements assembled.

The choreography of continuation, through the gaps of what is actually perceived, is the capacity to play with the technologies of relation. For instance, there is an Aikido trouser drying up on top of the heater and in front of it there is a human body. What lends a seamlessly continual tone to this everyday situation, is the implicit technology that gives the capacity to play with relations to both, the trouser and the body. That the trouser is capable of crawling into and dressing the human legs, and that the human legs could walk, dance or defend an attack with them, tells a story told by a genealogy of techniques for relation. If the human legs are considered something to be assembled with the trouser, it may be because the technology for trousers was flowing in the world of activity and then designed some legs to be dressed. It may have been all the other way around. In any case, each assembled actual situation of the world is a choreographic play of technologies for relation, which expresses a mode of active re- continuation, a mode of re-appearing under the semblance of a seamlessly uninterrupted continuation.

What expresses the mode of re-continuation is the affective capacity of the elements at play. The affective capacity is what Deleuze and Guattari called above the 'traits of expression'. The technological lineage carries a singular operation that by re-continuing it assembles matters to take form. For instance, to produce the technical element of a dagger, there are singular operations assembling the processes of the melting of iron and of the decarbonation. Once those processes constitute the dagger, the dagger expresses its affective quality of hardness, sharpness

and undulation. The genealogical process of the constitution of the dagger is expressed in a relational field *with* and *for* other constituted technical elements. The affective expression is what charges, with desire, the relation between the technical elements (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 448).

Therefore, to attune to the choreography of technologies would mean to become sensitive to the affective qualities ghosting matters with an already constituted form. Affect is non-sensuous but directly perceived in matter. How do you feel the capacity of the dagger to cut and to rise its speed quickly? Not by deduction, but by abduction, philosopher of pragmatism Charles Sanders Peirce would say. In any case, before diving into Peirce's semiology in this *Sunset-ing* Saturday afternoon, we can acknowledge that to be sensitive to the non-sensuous affect of the technology of matter, the body needs to be intuited as a taking form of techniques as well.

The affective quality of the dagger (cutting, and fast) immanently tells its technological story (its genealogy) to the technology of the body: the mode in which the body knows how to bleed, coagulate and circulate. The technological world-matter tells its genealogical story through an immanent re-activation of the expressive affect between matters. To intuit the techniques of the world-matter equals feeling the techniques immanent to the composition of the body. It is an intuition that undoes the body as a single technique. The body, through its affective capacity, touches the limits of experience of its multiple genealogies. The genealogies are a story of the many techniques operating to actualize a world-matter into feelings: that which can melt slowly, that which can crawl in no time, that which can press, etc.

Interval 4: Choreographic Intuition.

In every past interval there was an explicit and sometimes implicit critique of the European modern theories of knowledge based in sense perception. Whitehead proposed not to assume that the data given to sense perception was the ultimate data to build up a theory of knowledge but that instead, there should be a turn towards unclear and unconscious forms of perception. With concepts such as ‘extensive continuum’, ‘potential’ and ‘subjective form’ Whitehead avoided the error of introspection. He avoided internalizing experience as something *of* and *for* the ‘human subject’. Instead, he proposed a ‘subjective form’ of experience that gets to concretize its potential with a dynamic form and affective tone, across the usual divides of knower/known, and subject/object structures of experience. In short, his concepts are always ‘relational’: what operates in between more-than one element.

In this interval the aim is to further conceptualize perception as something emergent and relational by adding another critique to modern theories of perception, this time by way of Deleuze and Guattari. The critique touches the divide between ‘form’ and ‘matter’ and proposes a new angle to think the relation between these two concepts, which is the concept of the ‘intermediary’. What is remarkable about the intermediary is that Deleuze and Guattari describe it as a ‘corporeality’. The ‘intermediary’ as a form of process of relation, considered as a ‘corporeality’, allows an understanding of the body as something spread beyond the internality of the human subject or the stable materiality of a thing. ‘Corporeality’ is a form of processual relation that can be thought as choreographic. Thus, in this interval the search is for an intensification of the concept of the choreographic, which was already suggested in the interval 3D. The intensification may drag the choreographic beyond the introspection of the human, beginning to suggest the techniques to grasp this particular take on choreography as something corporeal and intermediary.

Deleuze and Guattari develop the critique of the division of form and matter and introduce the concept of the intermediary corporeality by way of Husserl and Simondon. With Husserl, they uncouple the modern philosophical idea that the metric and formal ‘essence’ — as something

eternal and immutable — pertains to form, and ‘existence’ — as something mutable and perishable — to matter. For Deleuze and Guattari ‘form’ becomes the manner in which the technological genealogy in potential effects its relational patterns *with* and *through* ‘matter’. ‘Matter’ *with* and *through* ‘potential’ is full of movements enticed by the forms of process passing between each other. The movements are mutually inclusive forms of process in which matter limits the potential genealogies of relation. Thus, it is a double movement going back and forth from form to matter, without stopping in any end. The movement of the technological lineage effects a call to assemble by the limitation of the actual matters. Deleuze and Guattari call this passage a matter-movement.

So how are we to define this matter-movement, this matter-energy, this matter-flow, this matter in variation that enters assemblages and leaves them? It is a destratified, deterritorialized matter. It seems to us that Husserl brought thought a decisive step forward when he discovered a region of vague and material essences (in other words, essences that are vagabond, anexact and yet rigorous distinguishing them from fixed, metric and formal, essences. We have seen that these vague essences are as distinct from formed things as they are from formal essences. They relate to a corporeality (materiality) that is not to be confused either with an intelligible, formal essentiality or a sensible, formed and perceived, thinghood (...) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 449-50).

It is important to stress that for Deleuze and Guattari the double movement between the potential patterns of relation and their taking shape into concreteness relates to a vague ‘anexact’ essence, which is also a corporeality. Moreover, this vague corporeal essence is a movement that is ‘anexact’, because it is contained neither in a pure general potential nor in a concrete property given to a thing. Here is where Deleuze and Guattari connect the ‘corporeality with the ‘intermediary’: the vague corporeal essence is ‘inter’, in that it escapes a single location. It can be thought of as the excess of ‘essence-corporeality’, in between each single particular thought and felt perception. It is the more-than individual in excess of the parts:

Husserl had a tendency to make the vague essence as a kind of intermediary between the essence and the sensible, between the thing and the concept, a little like a Kantian schema

(...) But it is only “intermediary” to the extent that what is intermediary is autonomous, initially stretching itself between things, and between thoughts, to establish a whole new relation between thoughts and things, a vague identity between the two (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 450).

The excess between form and matter, thought and feeling, potential and concrete, is not a byproduct coming out of the distinction of any of these binary terms. The vague corporeal essence is an autonomous movement that passes — in its own terms — through the play of form and matter. Now, this is where the ‘choreographic’ connects with the movement of the intermediary. If the ‘intermediary’ is articulated as an autonomous matrixial metaphysical entity in excess of its parts, then it can be thought as the singular manner in which movement organizes itself. It is an autonomous and collective movement made of passages. The movement choreographs itself with and away (in excess) of what can be perceived individually: with only that idea, with only that body sense, with only that feeling. It is like a choreographic spread in excess of the individual. It is minor, spreading everywhere but hidden (anexact) from overarching views. It spreads through the portions of what is usually considered a totalitarian thought-perception.

Deleuze and Guattari continue the critique of the theories of perception based in the separation of form and matter. With the work of Simondon, they offer some clues about what could be that other alternative mode to think and perceive through the ‘intermediary’: in excess of binaries and beyond the clear and conscious. They will call this alternative mode of perception simply, ‘intuition’.

In short, what Simondon criticizes the hylomorphic model for is taking form and matter to be two terms defined separately, like the ends of two half chains whose connections can no longer be seen (...) The critique of the hylomorphic schema is based on “the existence, between form and matter, of a zone of medium and intermediary dimension,” of energetic, molecular dimension — a space unto itself that deploys its materiality through matter, a number unto itself that propels its traits through form. We always get back to this definition: the machinic phylum is materiality (...) it is matter in movement,

in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of expression. This has obvious consequences: namely, this matter-flow can only be followed (...) To follow the flow of matter is to itinerate, to ambulate. It is intuition in action (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 451-2).

The matter flow can only be followed, it can only be thought and perceived by becoming a movement, moving with it. This movement is of a molecular intermediary dimension, grasping the imperceptible processes spread that activate the event of perception. The molecular agitates the process for perception, making it graspable, as something vague.

Deleuze and Guattari exemplify intuition in action with the figure of the artisan. The artisan follows the fibres of the wood while working it by hand. The artisan does not follow the wood itself, but the movement of the wood, through its fibres. It is less about what the wood feels and looks like, but about the movement it capacitates. Those movements are what tell something about the molecular dimension, where the choreographic spread agitates the passages towards form-matter taking. The artisan intuites not the wood but the vague corporeal essence that is in excess of her body, and the wood is what capacitates a concrete relation between these two matters and indexes the more-than of those two elements: the capacity to curve, to friction, to displace, to gravitate; across the human body, the wood, and the environment.

This mode of intuition is a movement with the technological genealogy of matter. Following the vague corporeal essence of the artisan, playing the role of a philosopher of the intermediary becomes herself an intermediary that is in excess of its constitutive technological systems. It is in this sense that what is followed is not a human individual category of the artisan-philosopher (an introjection: an error of introspection), because this would mean to climb up again towards the categorical thought that imposes a law on the form of variation. Instead, what is followed is something vague, it is a perception of 'inter': that which confuses blood gravity with the rhythm of a murmured thought, which listens to the figure of bleeding, not of the skin, but as an event-action of the world. Hence, intuition would be of a portioned spread, choreographing itself as something autonomous and at the same time inseparable, from matter and thought and feeling.

To intuit with the vague corporeal essence would be like moving with the relational techniques, capacitating the event of perception in which the philosopher is immersed. To intuit would mean to be moved by techniques, and to philosophize the intermediary (relation) would demand a technical approach. Not, however, in the sense of approaching intuition with an already known technique. Instead, approaching intuition as a taking shape of technique. One technique that is moved by the patterned relation of the 'technological lineage (active memory of relations), simultaneously generates a surplus technique to follow that very process more intensively. Paradoxically, to follow the movement of the intermediary is to emerge at the end of the process with a technique that permitted following the movements better, or more intensively. In this improvement, more of the resonance of the 'inter' passages can be grasped, as they are cresting into what usually feels like one individual event of perception.

For instance, to become a philosopher of the somatic feel of the interval means to read and write about process philosophy in search of a technique. The search is not done as if looking from above the books, but as being propelled by the movements of the concepts, so that their movements are felt through the corporeality they can infuse into the room. The movement of corporeality effected by the concepts are the ones that carry the affective force of the technological lineage that created them. The room is also full of techniques, like the technique to energize legs with speed by the play enticed by Aikido trousers. The combination of these techniques operating through the materiality of the book, the room and the body are what propose the choreography of corporeality that is intuited as the inter-zones of experiences. The inter-intuitions of speed, density, ablations and conjunctions begin to give shape to a technique of philosophy as a manner of corporeal feeling. Remembering that corporeality is not of a self-identical body, but again, of the inter and exteroceptive experiences, active in the environment. To philosophize corporeality is becoming a technique of the environment: the potential techniques enacting qualities.

Interval 5: Friday Night.

Now is a real Friday night. The intensity of the interval brought this day forward. The interval intensifies its pulse of continuation and expands a zone of qualitative perception for the thick of night to enter. Philosophy has become a mode of play with qualities. The darkness of night is not just any darkness, but one that has been welcomed by the technique of the interval. The silence is not just any silence, but a proprioceptive listening that stretches the atmosphere of the room. In this room, there will be a birthday party tomorrow. Today's interval is intensified enough through the long playful conceptualizations, so the quality of the Saturday birthday party can populate this Friday atmosphere without pushing it towards another day. Something of tomorrow's birthday party is vital for today's quality. When the intervals carry their intensity with enough force, they allow for an ample range of contrasts to shape the dynamic form of the quality of a day. The room wishes this Friday night to stay forever, especially if tomorrow there will be a strawberry cake.

Interval 6: The Concept and the Plane of Immanence.

So far all the past intervals' sections dealt with concepts from process and affect philosophy that helped to articulate what a perception of the interval was. The writing of the intervals has opened a field of study to search for a philosophy that, as a somatic technique, is capable of registering the festive quality of experience. The population of concepts pulled the research into the interval towards a high level of abstraction with few specific examples. For instance, how can a body dance the interval? What does a choreography of the interval look like? What are the voices of other dance performance theorists around the same topics?

With this practice of writing, the study of 'concepts' is taken very seriously. Exploring concepts is not an exercise of an analytic mind in which the effects culminate in a couple surprising discourses around the philosophy of movement. To explore concepts is to plunge into movement, into its emerging choreography, with the belief that they activate and are activated by a mode of relational movement, with specific operations. As was mentioned in the interval 2C, through the example of William James, the qualities of movement of the event are situated with global activities such as "obstruction, striving, strain or release." (James 2003, 87). As was added in the interval 3D, through Deleuze and Guattari, these effects of movements of the events are expressed through affective qualities such as "resistance, hardness, weight." (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 450). So, when concepts are circulated around, dug, and launched through the practice of writing a qualitative global movement, an event-affect couple occurs (an assemblage of technological lineages expressing themselves), such as gluing and glowing the ever-changing atmosphere of the day.

Moreover, it was mentioned in the past interval 4 that "matter and form" are not binary terms separated in a hierarchical scale in which formal thought 're-presents' inert matter. Form and matter are animated by the autonomous relation of the "intermediary". This co-host operation of the intermediary transforms any separated 'idea of matter' as an impossibility. In this way, any idea that occurs while not being concretely besides a matter, will carry the mixed qualities and forces of it. For instance, the idea of metal, without the physical presence of a piece of metal,

carries (the qualities) and vectors (the forces) towards the materiality of metal, immersing thought with a vague sense of matter. The thought of metal spreads with the relational affects of metal, it moves with the assembled expressions of metal, even when the concrete metal is nowhere to be found. William James will say that “thing and thought, indicate a practical distinction, which is of the utmost importance, but which is merely of a functional order, in no way of an ontological order, as classical dualism conceives of it...” He goes on saying that “things and thoughts are not fundamentally heterogeneous, but are made of the same stuff (...) the stuff of experience in general.” (James 2003, 122).

What is at stake in this particular interval today, is to articulate the connection of the research on *abstract concepts* with a *pragmatics of movement*: to speak about the way concepts eventuate affective movements, even if only in the form of expression through writing. Through this non binary perspective, the writing of these intervals should be approached as modes of intuiting corporeality: the autonomous intermediary catching the many interactions at the mix of thoughts and matters, just to mention some entangled entities. Thus, there will be no later state in this research in which a human body will go to dance at the studio. The research on movement is the event of writing through the technique not of ballet, not of release, not of yoga, but the *technique of process and affect conceptualization*. Again, this is the technique in the making of a philosophy that is felt as the somatic quality of the interval.

Now, to further grasp how this research on movement, through concepts, is finding its immanent technique while writing, we turn again to this Tuesday dawn. It brings the hissing light, slow clumsy sounds, and the very concept of “concept”, as well as the “plane of immanence” into the mix, by way of Deleuze and Guattari.

According to Deleuze and Guattari the concept “speaks the event, not the essence or the thing (...) It is like a bird as event.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21). They clarify that the components of the concept don’t have a relationship of comprehension or extension, but they are variables according to their zone of neighbourhood. “The concept of a bird is found not in its genus or species but in the composition of its postures, colors and songs ...” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 20). The concept is the movement, moving between its components, tracing the differences

between its components of posture, colour and song, but without occupying an extensive time and space. The concept is intensive in that moves between the neighbourhoods of the components: by that very movement it expresses the event as that singular mode of assembling its components. It expresses a mode of inseparability of the heterogeneous features assembled. It is also intensive because it is in a state of survey [survol] “in relation to its components, endlessly traversing them according to an order without distances.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 20). The state of survey is guaranteed by the infinite speed of the concept and the concept is infinite in that acts thinking are not held in time nor extensive containment: it is always open to variation. At the same time, the concept is finite in its consistency, gained through the singular movement along the components that assemble: “It is infinite through its survey or its speed but finite through its movement that traces the contours of its components” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21). The concept is an act of thinking of the event: a dynamic gesturing, which the act of thought delimits a perimeter around, going through heterogeneous elements while gaining consistency. The process is like that of lightning assembling in clouds. Back to the example of the bird, a concept is what in thought links an inseparable relation along the speed of the flapping wings, the intense quality of colour and the tone of the singing.

Complementary with the concept of the “concept”, the “plane of immanence” is the ground through which the concepts move, “its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it {philosophy} creates its concepts.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 41). The plane of immanence is the line of drift of the thought of lightning, where conceptual thought has even less determination. The conceptual thought has less determination because, through the plane, the concept relates less to other concepts, but instead to non-conceptual understandings (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 40). The plane is the reverberation of the lightning going through heterogeneous elements, and this indeterminate reverberation is the earth. The earth, understood as the plane which grounds philosophy, is besides the non-conceptual or the limit of the concept: adding to the concept formation, but not conceptual itself. Similar to Whitehead’s ‘negative prehension’, which adds the subjective form to the positively formed feeling, but not an objective data. It adds more of a dynamic ground that does not take form as an act of thought.

Hence, “concepts” are thoughts of the event and the “plane of immanence”, going through the limits of thoughts: the infinite speeds that are more-than intensive and that give a limit horizon to thoughts. The plane of immanence is the earth that, as a limit for the concepts, envelops them.

{The}...elements of the plane are *diagrammatic features*, whereas concepts are *intensive features*. The former are movements of the infinite, whereas the latter are intensive ordinates of these movements, like original sections or differential positions: finite movements in which the infinite is now only speed and each of which constitutes a surface or a volume, an irregular contour making a halt in the degree of proliferation (...) The former are *intuitions*, and the latter *intensions*. The grandiose Leibnizian or Bergsonian perspective that every philosophy depends upon an intuition that its concepts constantly develop through slight differences of intensity is justified if intuition is thought of as the envelopment of infinite movements of thought that constantly pass through a plane of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 39-40).

After this paragraph, shaking the imperceptible absolute movement of this Thursday, —long ago away from its dawn and now, welcomed by the sunset—the connection can be made between the “concept” and a *choreographic intuition* of the diagrammatic features of the “plane”. The choreographic intuition speculates the infinite horizon of movement, which is thinking. The intuition is of an earth, but an earth that speculates with what matter means (and what it means to matter), escaping a conventional take on stable and inert materiality, and launching matter to the indeterminate ‘essence-matter’ couple, mentioned the past interval 4. It is an intuition of the movements at the limit of thought and feeling. Like the intuition that the artisan gained by following the fibres of the wood (interval 4), the intuition of the plane needs to be followed through the movements assembled by the concept. In this case, when the artisan thinks and feels the movement of the wood fibres, she finds a horizon at the edge of movement. As if the movement of the fibre would diminish its momentum to feel the zone of neighbourhood with the incipency of other movements beside the wood, the arm, and the chisel. She thinks and feels those other movements in particles surrounding and feeding the dynamic form assembling the act of chiseling.

Hence, the movement through concepts is a speculation that stirs the vague resonances, murmurs, and a-perceptions that intuit the earth as nascent processes. Whatever is felt corporeally by the lightning thought of the event is an intuition of the earth, of that which is immanently re-emerging: the diagrams of the world of activity. The earth is a re-emerging speculation of what can be known as the ground to think, live and move.

If the plane of immanence is pre-philosophic: “if philosophy begins with concept creation the plane of immanence should be considered pre-philosophic.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 40), so a choreographic intuition would be pre-philosophic as well. Thus, to intuit the earth choreographically would be to grasp the infinite movements of processes and to apprehend them as nascent thoughts, as feral pre-philosophies. Not ruling out the possibility of determining or constructing anything, but intuiting the singular and qualitative infinite movements - their diagrammatic indeterminate choreographies - as indeterminate concepts, as experiences already full of a complexity, though unformed, shakes what it means to think and feel, what it means to matter.

To intuit choreographically would not consist in rejecting what is already constructed in order to look for a tabula rasa, but to re-plug into the complexity of the world activity: an atmosphere of thought disseminating by way of disintegration what was supposed to be the lateral zone of the body. It would produce a sound movement, tickling, while the window keeps advancing to posit luminosity on its frame, the greenness of the vegetal world sustaining itself by way of looping its recurrence despite the enormity of architectural and physiological noises.

Choreographic pre-feral intuition plugs to the plane of immanence to intuit what philosophy can do as a way of dance. It thrives on sustaining the coupling of the incipency of philosophy and movement. How can we humans follow infinite movements as if we were amateur choreographers to continue to talk, think, and indicate the problems already brought by their very movement? How to become a choreographer philosopher of the earth?

Interval 7: Ontopower.

Today's interval has the quality of a Monday morning. The concepts continue to get free on the diagrammatic plane of the world. They became something else than a trophy inside of the human mind when the brain works hard. They became an improvisatory play with modes of feeling as generations of the earth. The concepts' festive quality has never been more potentiated like today. But the snore of the dog echoing through the room tunes in the body towards another quality. The redness of the can of Coca-Cola resisting, with tenacity, the grey tones of January's Winter in Montreal indexes a situation that is too much for a Friday quality to be welcomed in. There is an overall feeling that today's interval needs to play more intensively with the concepts populating the intervals in order to get away with a Friday festive quality in the deep of Montreal Winter. In addition, a realization appears with this Monday morning: a realization that also bogs down the quality towards a Monday rather than Friday. The realization that each written interval opens to more or less the same group of thoughts. In principle, each written interval seems to be talking about the same phenomenon one time after the other. There is no escape from this realization. It is inherent to the interval to host complex activities and hence, to be prone towards confusion. It is inherent to the interval to choreograph the complexity of its activities according to the way in which the entries and exits from the intervals happen. Today's realization is that the intervals need to be entered and exited many times and through many angles. In this way, each visit to the intervals moves with a different choreography of questions. Each entrance and exit moves with a slightly different diagrammatic plane of the earth and the concepts that bring us to intuition. Each visit to the intervals comes up with a different but inter-related concept. Through the intervals, each movement is through the diagrammatic plane of the earth – the plane that today shows its effects as a Winterish Monday morning – carrying the intuition of a different concept, of a different manner to be affected by the plane. That's why some days the interval gives earth to the concept of the 'extensive continuum', at other times to the concept of the 'intermediary' and another day to the 'ecology of qualities'. The concepts are modes of moving with the diagram of the earth activated by each singular interval.

Today's interval gives earth to the concept of 'non-sensuous perception': a conceptual movement that has been diagramming the plane of thoughts-feeling of every past interval. Today, non-sensuous perception is called again (interval 2B) in order to stress the connection between two of the most important recurrent operations along the intervals. These are the operations of 'continuation' and the operation of the 'concepts' occurring in the diagrammatic plane, as was just mentioned in interval 6. Therefore, the aim of this Wednesday interval is to understand more about the interrelation between the operation of 'concepts', in the midst of the intervals of perception, and how they effect a mode of continuation of the actualized experiences. In short, the aim is to understand that each interval is operated by a 'concept' that shapes how experience gets to be actualized, one time after the other, continuously so to speak. Let's remember that 'concepts' were defined not as ideas inside of a mind, but as a 'movement moving' and keeping the differential quality of each component taking part in the same event (i.e. the composition of sounds, colours, and gestures composing the concept of bird (interval 5)). In interval 2B, it was said that the active 'memory of relations' is responsible for generating the continuation from one act to the next in a non-serial fashion. The concept of 'relation' relates to a force of time, a mode of continuation, rather than to a concrete element or sense-perception. 'Relation' expresses the patterns of the force of time, capacitating certain acts of experience to reemerge. Relation is the manner in which a Friday quality has become, through infinitesimal conceptual passages, this silent Monday morning.

The importance of Whitehead's non-sensuous perception is that it allows a registering of the continuation from one actualization of experience to the next. This mode of perception registers the force of time of the active memory of relations. It registers the force of anticipation running through and beyond the concrete sense data perceived. Non-sensuous perception moves with the force of continuation immanent to each interval of perception. It is what is immanent to each interval and what is carried by an antecedent act and the anticipation of others intervals. In short, non-sensuous perception indicates something about the force of continuation of the immanent interval and of the other past and future ones.

Whitehead introduces the concept of 'non-sensuous perception' in order to challenge, one more time, the modern theories of knowledge based in sense perception. In *Adventure of Ideas* he

explains the assumptions made by those modern theories of knowledge regarding the ‘structures of experience’, giving the data to their foundations. The assumptions are 1) that factors of experience lent themselves for clear cut and distinct discrimination and 2) that experience is directly observed by sense perception, by the “mediation of our bodily sense-organs, such as eyes, palates, noses and ears and the diffused bodily organization furnishing touches, aches, and other bodily sensations...”, with the subsequent supposition that “all percepta are bare sense, in patterned connections, given in the immediate present” (Whitehead 1967, 177-8). Whitehead does not want to limit the data given by the structures of experience as something only registered in the immediate perception of the *here and now*, by means of a *clear and distinct* category of discernment. Non-sensuous perception has the function to register experiences that go beyond that limited mode of philosophizing structures of experience.

In human experience, the most compelling example of non-sensuous perception is our knowledge of our immediate past. I am not referring to our memories of a day past, or of an hour past, or of a minute past. (...) our immediate past is constituted by that occasion, or by that group of fused occasions, which enters into experience devoid of any perceptible medium intervening between it and the present immediate fact. Roughly speaking, it is the portion of our past lying between a tenth of a second and half a second ago. It is gone and yet it is here (Whitehead 1967, 182).

Whitehead describes two situations to exemplify how non-sensuous perception functions as a force of time in the making, unlimited to the sensuous limits of perception. First, is the example of the speaker pronouncing the phrase “United Fruit Company” and the other of the man transferring anger from one occasion of experience to the other. In the first example the speaker utters the word ‘United’ with the non-sensuous anticipation of an immediate future of the sensum of ‘Fruit’ and at the moment he utters the word ‘Fruit’ he does it with the non-sensuous perception of the immediate past of the word ‘United’. With this example Whitehead shows the infinitesimal momentum that gives shape to the event of pronunciation of a verbal sentence. He shows the force of time taking shape in the incipient, and then completed, interval of perception of the event of speech. For the sentence ‘United Fruit Company’ to be completed, a transfer of at least two separated elements, like ‘United’ and ‘Fruit’ needs to anticipate each other and come

together as one singular act of perception. In short, the relational force of time taking shape envelops a multiplicity of individual elements. The relational force perceives the relation of the two elements and brings them together as one single event. In addition, Whitehead says that “this is an instance of direct intuitive observation, which is incapable of reduction to the sensationalist formula. Such observations have not the clear cut sharp-cut precision of sense-perception” (Whitehead 1967, 182-3). The infinitesimal generation of this event of speech is an intuitive and complex operation that does not separate its elements in a clear and distinct way. The term ‘United’ and the term ‘Fruit’ get glued together without much of a rational decision. By the time the word Fruit is pronounced, the sense perception of the word ‘United’ is not anymore in the moment of the here and now: the present is filled by the force of anticipation in its dawning phase. Non-sensuous perception is a force of time that escapes the containment of its elements, evading their fixation in a precise time. It is a drifting force in excess of the sum of elements that it relates.

Whitehead describes the similar operation of ‘relational drifting’ through the example of the angered man. The angered man embodies the past as a datum in the present by transferring the emotion of anger in the present from a cause that is in the past. The anger is a non-sensuous perception because it does not indicate the cause or the moment of its production (a quarrel?), but indexes the continuation from one act or phase of experience to the next. The sensation of anger does not say much about the self-identity of the emotion and the subject that contains it, but mostly traces the movement from the past to the future. Non-sensuous perception indexes the force of continuation at each infinitesimal moment of time taking the shape of an affective event (anger). Whitehead adds that “this continuation is the continuity of nature” and “thus non-sensuous perception is one aspect of the continuity of nature” (Whitehead 1967, 183-4).

The continuation of nature is the life operation that gives the capacity for patterns of experience - of events that already took shape and perished- to reanimate actual or present events. At the infinitesimal interval, right where the act is in an incipient phase, is where the continuation of nature makes its entry. At each infra phase of brewing experience, the continuation of nature contributes to the potential of relational patterns. The continuation of nature contributes a mode

of gluing the elements, a style of relating what is in transfer: this verbal event (choreographing words), that affective event (choreographing the transition of an emotion).

Now, Brian Massumi brings an understanding of how the infinitesimal interval in which the continuity of nature ingresses can be colonized. The force of continuation immanent to the interval can be colonized, in the sense of being modulated for certain choreographic outcome to emerge. Most importantly, the shaping of the interval is effectuated by what Massumi describes as the operative logic of a concept. In the book *Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception*, Massumi researches at length what he calls the ‘infra-colonization’ by Neoliberal power on the potential force of the continuation of nature (naturing nature). Through the book he gives account of the pre-emptive power that capacitates bodies to continue to perceive a world situation from one moment to the other. The main protagonist using this technical power is the military complex of the United States, working side by side with Neoliberal politics. The operative logic designs a technique to modulate the relation between past and future. It has an impact on what in intervals 3C, D and 4 were called technological lineages. The ‘technological lineage’ is another name for the ‘memory of relations’ or the ‘force of time’. It is a concept that highlights the fact that the continuation of processes depends upon a mix of natural and artificial technologies, which attune the modes of experience to re-continue to actualize. In short, there is nothing pure or organic in the memory of relations. Under the umbrella of ‘Ontopower’ the operative logics of the concepts are techniques that create the modes of relation of the soldier’s body with the plane of the earth. The operation is a technique into the interval and from this infinitesimal interval, the technique shifts the plane of the earth, which in this case is the battlefield.

The enemy has blinked. Its lines of action are in potentiating suspense. Its perception-action is in the bare-active interval where multiple alternate action-lines are co-present in pressing futurity. The mission of the full-spectrum war machine is to compress its own operation into that interval to the greatest extent possible: to contract its battlespace into a smaller-than-smallest adversarial interval of perception. Hit them where they potentiate. What comes out of the enemy bare-active interval will then be different than it otherwise would have. You have productively preempted (Massumi 2015b, 148).

In the context of this Wednesday interval - which is slowly reaching its dawn - the analysis will not centre on the military capture of the pre-emptive force, but again, articulate this force as ‘conceptual’. This last analysis appears through the last chapter of Massumi’s book, called ‘A Retrospective Introduction’. What is remarkable is that the operative logic of the concept generates a type of body or a somatic diagram, in the sense that it re-shapes what the plane of the earth (whether a battlefield, a financial market or the everyday) is. The concept re-shapes a body with its ground because in the case of the soldier, the techniques applied in the interval of perception have an effect in the way that the body-battleground is diagrammed: as an experiential environment that sorts out its elements in a singular style. It shapes the way in which future actions paths can be created – the preemptive win of a fight before it even begins.

Conceptual persuasion in this connection cannot mean a persuasive use of concepts that we personally deploy, mediating between our subjective intentions and the world “out there”. It can only mean a persuasive force exerted directly *by* the conceptual, in the interval. It asserts that there is an abstract force of history immanent to its in-the-making. The analysis of this book orbit around this concept of a strangely effective force immanently inflecting events, abstractly energizing their verging onto self-completion. The deceptively mundane name given to such forces in this book is “operative logics” (Massumi 2015b, 209).

The effective force immanently inflecting events is a type of somatic choreography. It abstractly, or non-sensuously, effects the type of somatic affectabilities diagramming the plane of the earth to be experienced. In the case of the soldier, the conceptual operation composes the affective capacity of his body at once *with* the future path of actions trespassing the battleground. The battleground becomes a somatic diagram that folds and undoes the limits of the physiological body into a cartography of future paths of potential acts. The somatic affectability is the capacity to relate with the patterns of the force of time (non-sensuous), allowing certain continuations of experience through time, rather than others. This is to say that this immanent force, by impinging a type of somatic affectability, can in turn be registered by a mode of somatic attunement.

This is why Foucault asserts the need for an effective history that is a “history of the present: (Foucault 1979, 31). “Effective history...shortens its vision to the things nearest it – the body, the nervous system...energies (Foucault 1977b, 155). Only an immanent critique can effectively “observe” what is energetically not taking place, coeval with a moment’s effective self-completion: in the interval of history’s in-the-making (Massumi 2015b, 208).

A philosophy to somatically feel the interval is one that deals with the conceptual operations, effecting a mode of affectability. It is a philosophy that feels how modes of affectability are forced to continue to actualize certain types of experiences over others. Paradoxically, this philosophy of the somatic feelings registers, works and researches that which is not possible to be sensed: the non-sensuous force of time. The philosophy of the interval deals with the complex forces at the limit of sense perception that carry forward actual and conscious sensory perception data. This philosophy is an intuition of what is at the limit of sense perception and conscious thought. Though again, it is not the after the fact intuition of lived experience, but rather an immanent re-conceptualization of those operative logics that re-energize the events at each imperceptible interval.

The philosophy of the somatic feel of the interval does not separate the ‘conceptual’ and the ‘somatics’ operations. To conceptualize is to be at once in the immanent plane of feeling: the plane in which non-sensuous forces have multiple techniques that open the plane of experience for certain mode of livings. To somatically improvise with the non-sensuous forces also accounts for a *hands-on* work on the conceptual operative logics, infra-colonizing the modes of somatic affectability in the smaller-than-smallest intervals.

The conceptual work of writing the intervals is in itself a somatic experimentation. The writing of the intervals emerges from a mode of transforming somatic diagrams that *feels with* the conceptual operations colonizing the marginal modes of living. To move with the transformations of the somatic affectabilities is to give words to the concepts operating the incipient choreography of such a journey. To go through a writing journey from a winter Monday morning to night is a strategic play to escape the sad affects, those that limit the

capacities for living. The sad affects are not only effectuated by meteorological conditions, but by those conditions for life continuation that give less elbow room to a certain mode of living.

There is one last reminder to be expressed before this Monday interval comes to an end. Somatic methodologies following Neoliberal logics of perceptions, those that generate a mode of somatic composition, which do not engage with an immanent critique of the interval, need to be approached with caution. Every time that a somatic technique is publicized for the attainment of ‘wellness’ — based in ‘internalism’ and ‘individualism’ —, the alarm of a Neoliberal capture on the somatic and operative logics of the concept need to be rung. Somatic conceptualization should always be referred to the immanent forces of the interval. Those immanent forces that are extremely infra-politicized, beyond the sensuous or clear and distinct (conscious) thought, so that Mondays as well as Fridays could be lived with grace.

ARCHITECTURES OF EXPERIENCE

Architecture 1: Architectures of Experience.

You know those moments in which you walk in a city, and the city has an important magnitude in the way you perceive it—let's say the city is New York, in which the vertical planes, its heights, and the rhythm to produce appetites to consume, are notorious—and even despite (and because of) the magnitude of the city, another architecture of experience trespasses you?

Well, this writing is about those moments intersecting an actual action such as the vigorous walk through a city. A walk composed by the qualities of heights and exhilarating rhythms, together with the transversal accompaniments that feel like an immaterial pulverization of perception, eyes, ears, touch and proprioception. This transversal accompaniment, in turn, is what proposes an alternative hold to more-than-one experiential architecture in an everyday moment.

This writing is about the plunge that un-couples a mode of urban experience, at least duplicating it, if not multiplying it, like a perceptual dissemination. A perceptual dissemination breaking open that one simple unidirectional perception in action of the walk with the tendency to look up, and along the rush to get more of those immaterial appetites impregnating the air.

Step, step, step, the neck stretches to catch the vertex of that tall building, and the visceral feeling of a leather jacket exhibited in the just-passed display window, when all of a sudden, a plunge happens, without a logical sense of continuation linked to the just expressed facts. At the very moment of the plunge, what is experienced is not yet more than one architecture of experience, but mostly a swarming of small orientations that soon will draw the space with multilayered planes.

The small orientations beginning to populate the actual urban environment are experienced affectively. Tiny orientations of memories, desires and actions other than the ones just happening, appear first like abstract movements that fold, knot, stick and rebound. The ghosting of color patterns of another city, more pastel green, red and purple (was it Montreal?) begin to

mismatch in counterpoint the actual walk, the feeling of a memory delineating the imperceptible desire to revisit an author's book sticks out from the bolder desire for a leather jacket, and the reminder to later call a friend living abroad, neither in New York or Montreal (maybe Berlin), makes itself almost present.

That's what affect does. Affect registers not the content or the container of an experience, call it a new memory, desire or action, but the immediate trace, drawing towards a form of experience. It is not that experiences do not exist because they don't have a stable container or form. Those overlapping transits which are commonly pushed towards the background of a foregrounded clear and distinct experience are already qualified as experiences by affect. Affect registers brewings of experience. It is a felt-beginning-tendency, or a feeling in transit.

Threshold. The concept of affect mobilized here is adapted from Spinoza (1632-1677) via Deleuze (1925-1975). Spinoza speaks of the body in terms of its capacity for affecting or being affected. These are not two different capacities—they always go together. When you affect something, you are opening yourself up to being affected in turn, and in a slightly different way than you might have been the moment before. You have stepped over a threshold. Affect is this passing of a threshold, seen from the point of view of the change in capacity (Massumi 2015a, 103).

More specifically, the felt affects are signs of the micro orientations without content, towards form (maybe without ever reaching it). They are affective signs of the potential for the appearance of an architecture of experience. They are signs indicating the un-contained tendencies brewing, out of focus at the background of the fore.

What is exciting about them is that they index to a plunge that breaks the continuity of experience, thus offering alternative paths for continuation of what was just going on; it is also exciting that the affective signs are more than one series of chained perceptions—such as the series step, step, neck, visceral feeling—and thus they offer a multiple mode of perception, which in turn demand a way of living that is more than individual, possibly tending to collective

groupings and attending to the complexity of the plural tendencies from which experience takes form.

Affective signs then, carry in their function an excitement for multiplicity. They act in more than one way: they begin to make felt, they detach from the actual urban experience, and they transit towards other planes by way of assembling (in the sense of bringing together) micro orientations.

Because affective signs function by pulling on more than one line of orientation at the same time, they have a diagrammatic function. They are diagrams that orient movement at the edge of perception, because their containers are still on the go. They are like multiple choreographies of perceptions in the making, because they are moving towards a contained feeling, thought, perception, but they are still uncontained and thus register at the limit of the forms already taken.

Now, if you jump into your car to drive through New York you have the chance to understand better what the diagrammatic functions of the affective signs are, through the words of Felix Guattari:

It is only when there is another kind of process, another kind of usage – which I would call the “molecular usage of multiplicities” that there is an act, there is an event, a transformation. And this register is what Gilles Deleuze and I call a ‘diagrammatic function’, which is to say we oppose representation to diagrammatic expression. To understand it better, take for example a simple form of cybernetic enslavement. When you drive a car you are generally enslaved – in the cybernetic sense – to the functioning of the car, your reflexes, your perception. The signals you receive from the road allow you to function without thinking, without having a representation of what you should be doing (Guattari 2015, 38).

Felix Guattari invites us to think the diagrammatic function of the affective signs as something that does not function with a representative model of interpretation. As much as the diagram functions at the limit of conscious perception (what is brewing in the background), it also functions at the limit of conscious choice. In this sense, there is not a time to mediate

consciously, and to sort out the activities that are driving the form of the architecture of experience. The architecture-*ing* of experiences are operating the formation of time, so that the human consciousness receives this formation as a given, like something besides, under, all around but paradoxically, beyond it. In other words, the plunge of the diagram of affective signs is an unconscious activity, but one that animates very concrete actions.

A diagrammatic formation of architectures of experience allows us to think that quotidian and alternative experience takes form through multiple more-than-perceptive and more-than-conscious operations. These operations are more environmental than individual. Guattari uses the world ‘assemblage’ (agencement in French) to show how the agency to form a plane of living is made of micro agencies that pass through wider and more multiple planes than the human conscious mind (Guattari 2013, 18). The concept of ‘assemblage’ is better than ‘the environment’, because it encompasses activities that are not limited to the conventional entities called ‘natural’, or ‘artificial’. The concept of the assemblage also points to the fact that activities are never pure, they are always mixed; for instance, the oxygen of Manhattan is partially assembled through the technologies of the buildings (window glasses materials, pavement, electricity for AC equipment, and the lung cells and proprioceptive rhythm of humans and animals). To think with assemblages is to feel modes of relations, if relations are thought more as uncontained stickings, foldings and ejectings, than lines drawn from point a to point b.

Now to complicate our train of thought, let’s think that any actual and emergent architecture of experience is perceived as a fully perceptual form because of the assemblages of multiple micro orientations. In other words, as much as an *emergent* architectural form of experience allow us to register the micro orientations as affective signs, any *actual* series of actions perceived as fully formed—such as the walking series of step, step, neck pull up with the visceral feeling for a leather jacket—is made by already contained multiple micro orientations.

This is to say that there is actually no difference in the ontological formation of any architecture of experience, the ones that are most regularly foregrounded and the ones pushed to the background. As seen in the example of the car drive, such a quotidian and banal action—as much

as the action of window shopping through the streets of New York—are composed by a “molecular usage of multiplicities”, that assembles.

Therefore, if any architecture of experience whatsoever, takes form through a ‘molecular usage of multiplicities’, what is important to register is which architectures persist in their coming together and which don’t.

The type of register for alternative architectures of experience would be a sort of contrast to the rhythms that compose assemblages everywhere. It is a register emphasizing the architectural experiences pushed to the background from the experiences commonly foregrounded, which are those experiences usually poking appetites towards coffees, shoes and museums. In other words, this is a kind of register that parts water between hegemonic and dominant modes of assembling.

Since the appetites or desires are not of us humans, but belong to an assembled production, maybe the most difficult task for this type of registering is how to, unconsciously and more than perceptibly, know or intuit the shreds of living that are exploitative and alienating and the ones that are not. How to know that the assemblage is drifting towards another propensity (to use an alternative word for appetite or desire) which counterpoints an exploitative model?

That last question can be too difficult to answer and indeed its very unresolvable characteristic is what transforms the question in a refrain that searches for propositions here and there, one time after the other. It is this sort of question that makes the research of a technique to register architectures of experience necessary.

Felix Guattari’s overall conceptual frame of Schizoanalysis is in itself a question-refrain that generates propositions for alternative modes of living and experiencing other than the Capitalistic, which are based in exploitation and alienation. The notion of the assemblage, among many others, allows him to uncouple the (un)conscious from the function to represent the Ego and the unity of a person, exactly with the purpose of showing that the idea of a totalizing (or totalitarian) consciousness “participates in a founding myth of capitalist subjectivity”. What he wanted to show is that “in fact, there are only diversified processes of consensualization,

resulting from the deterritorialization of existential Territories that are themselves multiple and tangled” (Guattari 2013, 26).

The deterritorialization of existential territories happens through a shift of the assemblages composing the modes of experiencing. Something shifts, a point of pressure occurs, and by themselves, the assemblages, at an unconscious and imperceptible level, work out a transformation. Guattari is interested in showing how every concrete situation is enmeshed with potentializing processes. Put differently, every situation foregrounds and backgrounds processes with the power to shift the assemblages, potentially.

In the following long paragraph, Guattari explains how the fluid characteristic of the assemblage—versus a fixed notion of the subject—allows for the creation of a new existential territory.

A singer loses her mother. The following week, she also loses two octaves in her tessitura; she starts going out of tune; her abilities to interpret suddenly seem to become useless. This woman’s singing was established on the basis of several Assemblages, certain of which exceeded the limit of the person.

(...)

An a-signifying index – the restriction of vocal performance—marks the stopping of something, without, as the context reveals, preventing something else from occurring.

(...)

Every transferential induction (...) which would allow guilt of an Oedipal origin to be supposed to exist behind this symptomatic manifestation, could have devastating effects, or, at least, bring us back to the depressive tableau that is ‘normally’ expected in similar circumstances by a psychoanalyst. Is it not preferable to ask oneself about the material qualities of this component of expression, which perhaps allowed the singer to avoid other damage? Wouldn’t the fact of having a component as luxurious as singing have allowed an alarm to be sounded and to induce the bifurcation of the Assemblage? (...) Everything in this domain is, I repeat, a question of the threshold of consistency, of the quanta of transformation, of the probability of accumulation of effect (Guattari 2013, 24-5).

It seems that the ‘meta-modelling’ is the immanent capacity for the assemblages to reorganize their planes, whereas the ‘a-signifying index’ is the constrain or the point of pressure—which without conscious interpretation—agitates the planes in search of a surplus, instead of fixing the planes in a state of lack, of gyiring around what is missing. The ‘a-signifying index’ recomposes the modules of the puzzle, so that there is never an empty place, but always a return to the fullness of complexity from where a new form of living the assemblages can be found.

There are incorporeal or immaterial processes running and activating themselves, a whole incorporeal universe giving form to actual experience, and with them there are trigger points which moreover seem to be related with an *aesthetic activity*, as exemplified by the case of the singer. Both the ‘meta-modelling’ (the relational activity of the assemblages) and the ‘a-signifying index’ (the constraints that plunge a reorientation of the assemblages) have an *artistic quality*, or a *play with artistic qualities*. This means that what is artistic about processes transcend the figure of the subject, there is a force of processes artistically playing, and they have something to do with an alternative way for therapeutics. This particular type of alternative therapeutics is understood through Guattari’s vocabulary, as that which generates new existential territories, territories which are not limited to concrete and quantifiable facts, but enmeshed with incorporeal universes of value (Guattari 2013, 25).

The reflection of the last paragraph underlines the fact that there is a plane of experience full of aesthetic and therapeutic processes that accompany everyday pedestrian modes of living (and here the adjective ‘pedestrian’ points to the most banal and everywhere contexts of living, not only the walks in cities). Then, there is a question to keep repeating. This question has the power of a refrain to keep searching for propositional answers. The question is: what are the unconscious and imperceptible modes to register—if not to tap—on that plane, to enrich from there, aesthetic practices with the power to produce new existential territories and therefore to include a therapeutic power alternative to the predominant modes to relate to the world based in the centrality, hierarchy and separation of the subject from it? But also how to avoid discarding entirely the everyday serial rhythms of Capitalism that propose appetites for coffee, museum and shoes? And instead affirm them as a plane where a plunge can happen to overlap and double

other architectures of experience? How to affirm the plunge and transit across assembled architectures of experience, instead of the pure and radical eradication of one or the other?

Maybe a more modest question to continue is: how can affective signs be registered for the artfulness of entangled assembled processes to generate new existential territories? Territories that are more enmeshed, hyper-complicated and collective?

Architecture 2: Feelings.

If everyday and everywhere experiences are reservoirs for potential plunges towards multiple planes for living, and moreover, such multiple activities happen at non-conscious and non-sensible levels of human perception, what kind of modes can, not only register these plunges towards multiplicity, but also activate them? Which body capacity can be unconsciously and insensibly ready to follow a plunge towards multiplicity, in order to listen to the echoes that can intensify through their artful quality, a future dance, photograph, or collective gathering?

It may be too early to come up with an already finished technique to register and to activate the more-than-perceptible multiple activities. What can be done at this moment is to search through the materials of Whitehead's process philosophy, to find a concept of 'feeling' that can give account to the more-than-perceptible angles of experience.

Perhaps the philosophical research on the concept of feeling will operate as a gesture to plunge into the manners in which the complexity of the more-than-perceptible permeates the everyday. The very research process could begin to lend a quality of activation to the way we feel the 'artfulness of the alter-therapeutic'. The quality of activation can later be relayed in the form of a technique for living, at the margins of dominant and hegemonic powerful manners to assemble life patterns. In other words, the very philosophical research can be experienced as a mode of becoming more sensitive to the actual doings of the more-than-felt, in order to compose a conceptual but physically more-than-felt plane to register the signs for alter-living: the affective signs. So, let's leave the architectures of speculation around the walk of a city, and get immersed in Alfred North Whitehead's rich and complex take on the concept of feeling.

The concept of feeling is of utmost importance for Whitehead's philosophy of organism, because it allows him to find an alternative perspective on what he calls the 'traditional philosophies' of knowledge. The traditional philosophers of knowledge include Descartes, Hume, Kant and Locke. All of these philosophers fixed their theories of knowledge in the conceptual side of perception, which they categorize as a conscious perception.

Traditional philosophy in its account of conscious perception has exclusively fixed attention on its pure conceptual side; and thereby has made difficulties for itself in the theory of knowledge (Whitehead 1978, 243).

With this philosophical gesture, these philosophers separated the various elements of experience, in order to explain the concrete facts as those elements “that are built out up of universals” (Whitehead 1978, 20). In Whitehead’s vocabulary, they separated the conceptual and physical side of experience, and gave to the conceptual side the power to abstract itself from the physical side and to organize experience through universal categories. For Whitehead, the conceptual side and the physical side of an experience can’t be separated.

Moreover, when Whitehead talks about the conceptual side of experience, he is not referring to the concept residing inside of the mind of the human being. At the processual level of experience, the conceptual is a mode of feeling that is inseparable from physical feelings. The conceptual and the physical are *modes of feeling* the data of experience.

For Whitehead consciousness is the peak of a process that emerges out of the coming-into-relation of conceptual and physical feelings. Consciousness is folded in the intricacy of the feelings of experience and *emerges out* and *with* it. The paradox is that by itself, consciousness does not say much about the richness of the germinal phases of experience from where it emerges. It is for this reason that Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism articulates a theory of feelings from where this richness can be analyzed.

Furthermore, when a feeling becomes conscious, is when it includes an ‘abstract element’. Consciousness of feeling happens through the inclusion of abstraction in the feelings of experience, and the type of feeling that feels abstraction is the conceptual one. For Whitehead, this is an important point, because he is showing that what his alternative theory of knowledge should analyze is: the folding of abstraction into the concrete facts of experience. As we will see further down in the text, Whitehead is not giving ‘abstraction’ the role of being a separated transcendental realm whose function is to organize in ‘clear and distinct’ ways the chaos of

experience. Instead Whitehead is giving ‘abstraction’ the power to bring change in the midst of the concrete experience. What the philosophy of organism analyses is the “emergence of the more abstract things from the most concrete things” (Whitehead 1978, 20).

Here we maintain the doctrine that, in the analysis of the origination of any conscious feeling, some component physical feelings are to be found; and conversely, whenever there is consciousness, there is some component of conceptual functioning. For the abstract element in the concrete fact is exactly what provokes our consciousness. The consciousness is what arises in some process of synthesis of physical and mental operations (Whitehead 1978, 242).

We need to talk more about what a ‘feeling’ (physical and conceptual) is and does together with what Whitehead call its subjective form. But for the moment, let’s look at another important point that Whitehead is stating by coupling the ‘consciousness of feeling’ with a conceptual operation that feels an ‘abstract element’. This is the point about the ‘abstract element’ being itself, the potential for a feeling to be defined in this or that manner. It is the element that in the process of formation of feelings, ensures how the feeling will define its dynamic form (or the subjective form).

Now, further on in the text about the theory of feelings, Whitehead adds an extra remark about the function of this ‘abstract element’. Strictly speaking for Whitehead, a feeling has the capacity to become conscious only when the process of generation can feel a becoming of feelings ‘differently’ from the actual feelings initially at play. The capacity for the feelings to feel a difference in the process of formation is facilitated by the very ingression of the ‘abstract element’. Whitehead calls this operation folded with the ‘abstract element’ (an ‘eternal object’) a ‘propositional feeling’. A propositional feeling is a ‘lure for feeling’ - a process of feeling taking shape towards something that has not yet been felt (we will read more about this concept in architecture 3).

“It will be found later that this doctrine implies that there is no consciousness apart from propositions as one element in the objective datum” (Whitehead 1978, 243).

Whitehead adds that the propositional feeling reaches consciousness by means of its ‘alliances’. We will see in the southern architecture 2B that what Whitehead means by ‘alliances’ is that the process of feeling needs to shape a nexus of relations, with the multiplicity of feeling taking form.

A pure conceptual feeling in its first mode of origination never involves consciousness. In this respect a pure mental feeling, conceptual or propositional, is analogous to a pure physical feeling. A primary feeling of either type, or a propositional feeling, can enrich its subjective form with consciousness only by means of its alliances (Whitehead 1978, 242).

With the concept of alliances, Whitehead is making a reference to a modified Platonic theory of reminiscence, which he calls ‘recollection’. Different from Plato, Whitehead is not recalling universal modes of feelings but as we will see later, is recalling the earlier phases of feeling in formation. To be remarked is that:

- 1) these early phases are at the level of the nexus of feelings—the level of how feeling relates to ‘other’ feelings—they can be energized by a potential that shapes the process of relations taking form into something novel.
- 2) And, as was mentioned previously, novelty emerges from the manner in which a process anticipates something different from what is advancing.

Therefore, it can be said that at the ‘early phases’, feelings feel their limits. Limits named ‘otherness’. Otherness surrounding them. If feelings end up proposing a different combination to feel these limits, then something ‘novel’ — or more-than what is expected to be felt — is created.

At the ‘early phases’, feelings feel their limits, limits which name is ‘otherness’, and if they end proposing something ‘novel’, or more-than what is expected to be felt, then they become conscious. This means that human consciousness of feelings is of something ‘other’, not of our

own identical patterns for perception, but of the momentum towards something that begins to be more-than-felt. To feel is to choreograph a felt relation with alterity.

Architecture 2B: Re-Enaction.

This architecture continues the thoughts on feelings of the architecture 2. The aim is to articulate the early phases of feeling in emergence, together with what was called in architecture 2 the activities of ‘recollection’. So that the dynamic of recollection of the early phases of feeling formation can be understood as generative operations of experience that are ‘more-than-human’, ‘out of determinate time and space’ and as portal for the ‘ingression of change’.

What is being analyzed in this architecture 2B, is a theory of feeling that shows the complexity of autonomous doings occurring before something is consciously perceived and, in addition, that signals toward the amount of creativity and indeterminacy that is in reserve at that emerging phase. So that a mode to register feelings in formation could become a technique to tap into the creativity of processes (the artfulness of experience), a technique which in turn, could feed the ‘alter-therapeutics’ permeating each architecture-*ing* of experience.

So, let’s see how the activity of re-enaction (or recollection) happens through the indivisible physical and conceptual feelings. Let’s remember that re-enaction is not a Platonic reminiscence—in the sense that is not a human subjective memory process— but a phase of emerging experience without determinate time and space yet, in which dynamic operations for feelings happens. We can think that the phase of recollection is a phase of qualitative improvisation: when the water begins to change the orientation of its movement by the intuition of a rock, when the tree leafs begin to twist the clapping wings of the bird. By being at the edge of the actual time and space and affecting how the actual takes shape, the process of recollection can be understood through the analogy of a suspension of movement: when in a given event nothing is determined in advance, but is full of micro movements negotiating their actual displacements.

Having in mind that for Whitehead the physical and conceptual feelings are inseparable, let’s begin by describing the rich activities happening only at the level of the ‘physical feelings’. This

division of activities is only made at a philosophical level. One more time, the goal is to have an intuition of the different movement operations encapsulated at the emerging phase of feelings.

A ‘simple physical feeling’ entertained in one subject is a feeling for which the initial datum is another single actual entity, and the objective datum is another feeling entertained by the latter actual entity (Whitehead 1978, 236).

So, for a physical feeling to happen at least two actual entities are needed, one actual entity in accordance to the situation will become the subject of the feeling and the other the initial datum of the feeling. At the same time, a physical feeling comes with a second feeling, which is the feeling felt by the other actual entity that is not a subject and which, thus, takes the perspective of being the objective datum. This second feeling turns the ‘initial datum’ into an ‘objectification’, and it configures the perspective in which the feeling relates. The perspective in which the feelings relate is what Whitehead calls the ‘subject’, or more appropriately, the ‘subjective form’ since it is something dynamic.

Therefore, for feelings to happen there has to be a boomerang-like movement between at least two entities. This is to say that feelings happen always through a movement across what Whitehead call a ‘nexus’ that relates entities. For instance, a cell can’t feel itself if not by taking or being taking into account by another cell. On the other hand, the physical feeling functions as a boomerang not only between two entities, but immanent to its own generative process: it sorts out a perspective from the initial datum. This is what Whitehead calls re-enaction. A physical feeling is a re-enaction from the cause to the effect. It boomerangs from the initial datum as a cause, back from the immanent effect and generates an objective perspective. Whitehead calls this vector character of feeling that resolves into a perspective operation, not only re-enaction but also ‘reproduction or conformation of feelings’. (More about this soon).

In order to give a sense of the complexity of relations of a simple feeling dynamic formation, we have to have in mind another Whiteheadian concept, that of ‘prehensions’. Prehensions are the primitive mode of taking into account. There are positive and negative prehensions and each of them influences the movement of emergence of feelings differently. We can think that the

positive prehensions are the ones that follow a boomerang-like movement between the entities: that elasticize their perspective of subject and object. Whereas the negative prehensions add something only to the subjective form, but do not feel the datum of the objective perspective.

It adds to the emotional complex, though not to the objective data. The emotional complex is the subjective form of the final satisfaction (Whitehead 1978, 41).

Strictly speaking, the prehensions (the bond between each entity in the universe) are positive when the bond is ‘felt’, and are negative when the bond is positively excluded—and thus do not link to the subject and object perspective, it remains unfelt—but the exclusion of the felt bond adds an emotional tone to the dynamic process. Both types of prehensions are sensitive to each other. Feelings that do become actual, carry the emotional tone of the bond of expressions that did not actualize:

“...there is a mutual sensitivity of the subjective forms of prehensions, so that they are not indifferent to each other ...” (Whitehead 1978, 42).

The way we can think how a negative prehension adds something to the feeling, is like a proximal resonance. Imagine the topological distance between cells that did not come to take into account each other into feeling. Imagine how the gap between their non-relation, functions as an echo chamber for other cells beside them. Think that gap as what makes possible for a resonance influencing the way in which cells feel each other.

Another example is given by Erin Manning. Her description allows us to continue to envision the activities that made up a ‘recollection’, as an autonomy choreography of feelings, since Manning describes ‘negative prehensions’ like choreographic cues:

They propel tendencies that may or may not reach the surface of their articulated expression in the field of the actual. They float at the threshold of perception, they field surroundings, landing narrowly and widely, affecting, imaging, dimensionalizing (...)

Active virtually and actually, cues move movement, and, in doing so, they catalyze event-time (Manning 2013, 107).

We can see now how the quality of reenaction inherent to feeling's formation through prehensions, involves and generates 'time', or what more precisely Erin Manning calls 'event time'. As a feeling feels more than one actual entity, as a field of resonance, it transfers the immediate past to the immediate present. But what is that element or operation that makes 'event-time'? This is to say that, without getting into the specific details about the difference between 'metric' and 'event time', the following question to be asked is: what is the processual operation of prehensions and feelings that snowball towards a change of the actual conditions?

For Whitehead, strictly speaking, a process of 're-enaction' does not snowball towards change. Whitehead also uses the categories of 'reproduction' or 'conformation of feeling' as synonyms of 're-enaction'. These terms refer to the generation of feelings conforming to the inherent anticipation of the data playing out from the antecedent phases of the subjective form. A reproduction, or conformation of feeling, is the process of feeling formation that repeats its antecedent-anticipation pattern of feeling along the process of its subjective form (its arcing process of feeling formation). A 'conformation of feeling' is a lesser deviation from the incipient impulse of emergence towards a resolution that could had brought more contrast.

The definition of 'conceptual feeling' is what begins to answer the question about the processual feeling that snowballs towards change. The conceptual feeling is a feeling of an eternal object, and an eternal object is "the potentiality for ingression into the becoming of actual entities (Whitehead 1978, 23)". The eternal object is what was called in the northern architecture 2, the ingression of the 'abstract element'.

"A conceptual feeling is feeling an eternal object in the primary metaphysical character of being an 'object', that is to say, feeling its capacity for being a realized determinant process" (Whitehead 1978, 239)

The conceptual feeling is what defines—in the sense of setting the cues for the choreography—the formation of feelings through the means of potentiality. Potentiality ingresses adding something more-than the nexuses of actual feelings at their emerging phase, they pierce the resonance and boomerang-like dynamic of re-enaction with something more-than-actual. The ingression of the more-than-actual, defines the initial phase in which physical and conceptual feeling mix together with a more contrastive—in the sense of more different—dynamic qualities of relations, than what the elements at play suggested at the initial phase.

Conceptual feelings of eternal objects are what make ingress the previously mentioned ‘event-time’. The time in excess of metric causation. If we have in mind that Whitehead also calls the ‘physical and conceptual feelings’, the ‘physical and mental poles’ of experience, the next paragraph helps us to understand how the mixture of both poles is what gives time a more-than-metric quality, a paradoxical halo of (in)-definiteness.

Every actual entity is ‘in time’ so far as its physical pole is concerned, and is ‘out of time’ so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is the union of two worlds, namely the temporal world and the world of autonomous valuation. The integration of each simple physical feeling with its conceptual counterpart produces in a subsequent phase a physical feeling whose subjective form of re-enaction has gained or lost subjectivity intensity, according to the valuation up, or valuation down, in the conceptual feeling (Whitehead 1978, 48).

The choreography of re-enaction, travelling as a boomerang resonance of prehensions— some of which are felt (positively) and other contributing an emotional tone (negatively)—valuates its process immanently. The operation of valuation can be understood as a gesture of accompaniment of the physical feelings, with something more than carries their process of formation — up and down — with more or less potential to advance the processual phases with contrast.

The processual phases of feelings do not stop with ‘conceptual valuation’, but continue operating immanently and immediately, as if the processual phases were orchestrating various

articulations, following each other, as a growing bindweed. The following operations are those of ‘conceptual reversion’ and ‘transmutation’.

Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual reproduction, and the second phase is a phase of conceptual reversion. In this second phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives. There is a conceptual contrast of physical incompatibles (...) (Whitehead 1978, 249).

This immediate operation, folded in the first phase of ‘conceptual valuation’, generates conceptual feelings that add an alternative to the just accompanying conceptual feelings, linked to the potential of the eternal object. We can also think conceptual reversion as a boomerang-like movement, from which the conceptual feelings —again those that ingress the more-than-actual—gain more momentum. It is a movement that elasticizes feelings, and kicks the ingression of potentials with even more force, so that a new — more than physical — quality suffuses the process. As if the mental pole of the process would redouble itself. As if the water intuiting the hit of the rock will complicate the force of its current to the point that the impact with the rock will or will not happen, but something new in the event will definitely be added. Maybe that new thing will be the jump of a fish out of the water, due to the gained momentum from the turbulence.

In respect to ‘transmutation of feelings’, what this operation does is to transmute the datum of the reverted conceptual feeling—accompanying the physical feelings—into a nexus of relations. This nexus of relation contains, not only the conceptual and physical feeling, but most importantly, the initial nexus of the prehended actual entities from where the feelings were emerging. In this sense, the operation of transmutation is giving a nexus shaped by the relational resonances of physical and conceptual feelings. We can say that what is offered is a shape of the transitions between feelings, the manner in which they choreograph their tendencies. In other words, what is felt with this operation is less the multiplicity of feelings but the quality of their

differences, moving through their transitions. Whitehead calls the process of a transmutation a ‘contrast’.

When one and the same conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities, then in a subsequent phase of integration—of these physical feelings together with the derivative conceptual feeling—the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a contrast with the nexus of those prehended actual entities, or some part of that nexus; so that the nexus (or its part), thus qualified, is the objective datum of a feeling entertained by this prehending subject (Whitehead 1978, 251).

At this corner of architecture 2B is where we can feel all the collected concepts so far in order to get a glimpse of what this specifically at stake in this architecture. This architecture focus in the initial phase of feelings origination, to show the complex dynamic choreography happening at each processual moment in which a feeling could be later actually felt. But most importantly, the aim of this architecture is to show that the feelings originate from an antecedent moment that is already anticipating a future. Put differently, the emergence of feeling has a vector character that pulls towards the future. The pull towards the future is the ‘anticipation’ of feelings already immanently folded in the ‘antecedent’ phases of re-enaction. At each phase of feeling formations, that are still out of determinate (metric) time and location, there is already a choreography of time in the making about to define how an experience will come to be felt, with its own event-time. Whitehead calls this characteristic of feeling a ‘subjective intensity’:

The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling in the immediate subject, and in the *relevant* future. This double aim—at the *immediate* present and the *relevant* future is less divided than appears on the surface. For the determination of the *relevant* future, and the *anticipatory* feeling respecting provision for its grade of intensity, are elements affecting the immediate complex of feeling. (Whitehead 1978, 27).

For Whitehead there is a rich dynamic of processual feelings incipiently distributing cartographies for the future. The complex generation of world feelings is what distributes modes of human perception, even if the human is not aware of it. Most importantly, as we had said, conscious feelings are only possible out of propositional feelings (architecture 2), which were shortly explained as ‘lure for feelings’, this is to say, as a pull from the future towards something that has not been felt.

This is to say again, that to be conscious of a feeling means to reach towards novelty (an alien ‘mental pole’ of experience). To get to feel a feeling consciously, is not to feel the identity of the event of perception—how the elements have been set to play out the emergence of this or that perception without change—but it is to feel an *excess of feeling*, that which does not feel like anything. This *excess of feeling* is what Whitehead named in the last quote above as the ‘subjective aim’ of the process: the *intensity of feeling*.

Coming back to our topic on architectures of experience, what can be said now after the recollection of these Whiteheadean concepts, is that a mode of intuition of the choreography of ‘feelings’, ‘time’ and ‘location’ shaping, equals to a mode of becoming sensitive to the abstract elements of experience. Again, abstract not as a transcendence element separated from the concrete, but as the excess that creeps with each fold of the concrete.

The plunge towards the architecture-*ing* of experiences is a concrete plunge to the abstract flux of feelings. What is registered in the plunge, is registered with an affirmative sensitivity towards the *autonomous* doings of feelings. This is a mode of affirmation that registers the actual physical feelings and the potential intensity of conceptual feelings. It is an affirmative sensitivity towards the unknown of feelings: their other angles. It is an affirmative sensitivity that like a boomerang returns (a re-enaction) to the immediate moment in which feelings are sorting out their creative advance along a future anticipation. It is a felt register of the a-temporal, non-local and more—than—felt, which re-shapes what is *about to* be felt. And since feelings are a continuous a-temporal, non-local and more than sensible topology *of the* ‘creative advance’, they are where the ‘alter-therapeutic artfulness of experience’ can be tapped. This choreography of

feelings re-ingresses the movement of generation of feeling usually backgrounded in typical human perception. Thus, this choreography undoes typical perception.

The felt register of the autonomous choreography of feelings can be called the register of an ecology of intensities (subjective aims). The intensity would be that extra tension in the atmosphere palpable along the contours of what seems just simple concrete facts. Let's come back to the example of the felt relations between the stone, the water and the fish. The stone and water prehended each other, the subjective form of their feelings reached a mentality for a turbulence to happen which resolved the anticipation of the water and the stone bump. The water and stone subjective form of relation proposed a futurity that the fish carried on to jump out of the water (maybe to eat an insect?). In the meantime, a kid with the legs in the water, standing beside the stone, was so absorbed throwing pebbles that he missed the jump of the fish. But he felt something: an intensive shift in the ecology of the landscape. He did not see the fish, much less he knew anything about the dramatic resolution between the feelings of the stone and water. But beyond the concrete tranquility suggested by the affective atmosphere of his background, he caught up a shift. He may have thought that a snake was moving along the crack of the rocks, or that a fairy was playing a trick to him. In any case, it does not matter the narrative imposed over the ecology of intensity. What matters is the intuition that something is autonomously going on, playfully, distributing innumerable shifts all along the intermingling ecological planes.

Architecture 3: Propositions.

If the ‘architecture 2’—the one that is a little bit more south-east than this architecture—was a conceptual study that allowed one read about the autonomous complexity of the production feelings, and ended up expressing the mutable character of them—which radically speaking, qualifies what it means to feel as always partially unknown—then, this ‘architecture 3’ is about the registering not of feelings, but of the ‘propositions’ for feelings.

The focus of the study of the two other architectures (1 and 2), was the immanent emergence of feelings (what were called affective diagrams in architecture 1). For architecture 3, the focus is on how to register the ‘propositions’ for feelings distributed in the everyday, for a plunge of complex feelings to immanently emerge. The focus is less to be in the midst of the plunge, but to be attentive to its call.

We can be walking through an alleyway in Montréal, and a plunge may not happen at all; what may happen is the register of a proposition for a plunge to come. There is a double momentum of the legs using the muscular force to advance the crunchy gravity of the ice spreading through the ground, at the same time, the cold wind does not indicate itself through the movement of the nonexistent leaves and the quiet snow, rather, it makes itself present as an overall atmospheric quality of shrinkage.

Then the tapping sound of a wooden door, a hanging internet cable, the rustling of a green plastic bag, some barking, and the overall direction of the alley-way twisted sideways. A proposition was stored across the angles of those activities. A vital seed for a future funny plunge. Before proceeding to explain how and where the proposition was stored, let’s hear some thoughts on the concept of proposition, one more time, by Alfred North Whitehead.

Whitehead says that propositions are the “tales that perhaps may be told about particular entities (Whitehead 1978, 256)”. We have to understand that the tale is a tale of feeling, not necessarily a verbal sentence. They “are neither actual entities, nor eternal object, nor feelings (Whitehead

1978, 256)”. “A proposition enters into experience as the entity forming the datum of a complex feeling derived from the integration of a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling (Whitehead 1978, 256)”. The main contribution of a proposition is to indicate the conceptual feeling carrying the determination of the eternal object to a particular set of actual entities, physically felt. Since the eternal object has an absolute ‘general’ characteristic concerning the mode in which actual entities are determined (more about this general characteristic below), the proposition of the conceptual feeling selects particular actualities for the novelty of physical feelings to come. The particular actual entities physically felt are the ‘logical subjects’ of the proposition. And again, the ‘logical subjects’ are not to be confused with a verbal thought. The ‘logical subjects’ are a selected-out distribution of felt actualities, energized by the conceptual feeling, which is the feeling that brings a force of determination that is more-than-actual, out of time, but immediate and immanent to the act of time making.

The force of the more-than-actual brought by the conceptual feeling is a ‘predicative pattern’. We can say that, in a way, there is a mutual call from actual entities to eternal objects. The immediate sorting-out of a series of actual facts produces a reorientation for an eternal object to tweak the actual with its definiteness. By juxtaposition, the ‘predicative pattern’ is a mode of the eternal object (the potential) that accompanies the selected out actual entities or ‘logical subjects’.

Whitehead explains that when “the datum of the conceptual feeling reappears as the predicate of the proposition” (...) the eternal object suffers the elimination of its absolute generality of reference (Whitehead 1978, 258)”. And most remarkably, he says that there is also an elimination of the datum of the physical feeling: “for the peculiar objectification of the actual entities, really effected in the physical feeling, is eliminated, except in so far as it is required for the service of the indication. The objectification remains only to indicate that definiteness which the logical subjects must have in order to be hypothetical food for that predicate (Whitehead 1978, 258)”.

This last quote is tricky. For the context of this writing, I understand it to mean that under the perspective of a proposition, the physical feeling does not relate to its own actual entity, but

orients towards the propositional feeling, towards pure potentiality. And due to the very turning of the physical feelings towards ‘pure potentiality’, potentiality becomes less general and undetermined.

Before continuing unpacking the implications of the last quote it is important to know some more about what it means for pure potentiality to be general and undetermined. This will allow to shine light into the unpredictable feature of the eternal objects. Pure potentiality is the characteristic of the eternal object to refer “to the purely general *any* among undetermined actual entities. In itself, an eternal object evades any selection among actualities or epochs” (Whitehead 1978, 256). Pure potentiality is the general indeterminacy of the eternal object, because its ingression to the actual can’t be explained by the history of the actual condition. The ingression of the eternal object can’t be explained because its reason to ingress at a certain time and location exceeds the given conditions set by the actual elements. This is way, strictly speaking, the eternal objects are ‘pure potentials’, because they can return at *any* time and location, as an excess of what is given.

Now, when the selected out actual entities become ‘logical subjects’ of a proposition, they do limit the general abstract potential of the eternal object. ‘Logical subjects’ are what become *food to predicate* something about the conditions of the actual, which then limits the general scope of ingression of the potential. By becoming a logical subject that can predicate something of the eternal object, the actual entity gyres less around the physical feelings and more towards the pure potential that in turn, gets limited. What the proposition does, is to re-orient the physical feelings from the feeling of the actual entities among themselves, towards the excessive quality of the eternal object. The actual entity feels the capacity to call, assemble, bring into a patchwork, the feelings of other actual entities.

In resume, the proposition—by selecting out the possibility for divergence to specific indexed actual entities—transfers a quality of abstraction to the actualities from the abstract eternal objects, while also transferring a quality of concrete possibility to the eternal objects. Simultaneously, the abstracted actual entities make the concrete mutual relatedness of the environment more intensively felt. As if each quantum of possibility which abstracts from

actuality pulls with it the ripple effect of an advancing concrete realized environment, surrounding that particular zone of abstraction.

At the level of human perception, the encounter with the proposition is felt as a paradoxical mixture of an excess of realized surrounding actuality, which folds a rift that feels like nothing... yet. The alley-way gives sky blue iron back stairs, rounded windows, square light reflections, bricks, snow slopes, *a fully intensive not felt like nothing fold*, a brown cat, a voice and a set of not locked swinging rear doors.

The propositions are a quantum of possibilities, with a degree of abstraction masked in the actual by the folded intensive environment of concreteness around it, which in turn lends anchor to its otherwise too abstract levity. The proposition is where the feeling is more unknown, because it is only an indication for a change that is in bud, to come. It is an actual call to feel for the future. It is a datum for feeling, not yet a feeling: “a proposition has neither the particularity of a feeling, nor the reality of a nexus. It is a datum for feeling, awaiting a subject feeling it” (Whitehead 1978, 259).

Another relevant aspect of a proposition is that, by remaining folded in the concrete world as something more-than actual, it can be activated later by other actual entities with similar logical subjects (similar pattern of selection of actualities). Processes set up some logical subjects as predicative patterns. And propositions can return later after their processes have satisfied their processual arc because of the predicative patterns.

Any subject with any physical feeling which includes in its objective datum the requisite logical subjects can in a supervening phase entertain a propositional feeling with that proposition as a datum. It has only to originate a conceptual feeling with the requisite predicative pattern as its datum, and then to integrate the two feelings into the required propositional feeling (Whitehead 1978, 259).

The supervening phase of a proposition can happen immediately, at the very moment of feelings feeling their way into actualization. But it can also happen much later. The creative advance of

the world composes actualities that will later be ready to resonate to the call of the proposition. The logical subjects—the group of the actual entities—would later attune to the predicative pattern of the potential. In other words, the elimination of the absolute generality of the eternal object, together with the indication of the rippled abstraction into the actual (again, the ‘logical subject-predicative pattern’ relation) could be relayed across processes. Processes which happened not now and not here, but at another time, and somewhere else. There is no chicken and egg narrative here. Sometimes the actual world is ready to catch up with a potential presence. Sometimes the potential presence is ready to call an actual world into form.

Evidently new propositions come into being with the creative advance of the world. For every proposition involves its logical subjects; and it cannot be the proposition which it is, unless those logical subjects are the actual entities which they are. Thus, no actual entity can feel a proposition, if its actual world does not include the logical subjects of that proposition (Whitehead 1978, 259).

The fact that propositions are like potential choreographic indexes is to be emphasized. Indexes that are vector-like—like a dance—living in potential and ready to activate something. However, they are also called by an actual world in creation. Their activation is a surplus of the world: ‘actual’ *and* ‘potential’. One of the world poles can call the other. No chicken and egg. The proposition is a choreographic gesture that meets where the pure indetermination of the eternal objects (potential) and the stubborn determination of actual facts meet halfway. A proposition is a relational gesture which choreographs the shape of the actual and the potential.

Regarding the study of the architectures of experience, what can be said at this point is that any processes started at any plunge of the everyday, never exhausts themselves. Even if the planes of the everyday find themselves in a frictional match, and no plunge into an architecture of experience happens, something of the processes could prepare a ‘supervening’ mutual propositional call of the actual and the potential. There is a choreographic excess ready for propositions to activate the composition of feelings. Feelings that re-compose an actual and potential world. An actual and potential world that re-compose modes of feelings. Again. No egg. No chicken.

What this complex philosophical vocabulary is trying to say is that ‘propositions’ are seeds for feelings that remain at the middle (or in the midst or in the mix), on the ever actual and potential creative advance of the world. They are autonomous choreographic vectors loose in the jungle of the world creative advance, ready to lure actual and potential ‘predicative pattern-logical subject’ relations through feelings. So that feelings are re-continued to generate, differentially, with the novelty of a new eventful world. So that feelings are always lured to the limit of their complexity, there where they don’t know themselves what it means and what it feels like to feel. So that feelings are not considered as the creative element of the creative advance of the world, but they are thought as the non-created, that lures for more autonomous creativity.

Architecture 4: Ecological Intensity.

The world within experience is identical with the world beyond experience, the occasion of experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion. The categories have to elucidate this paradox of connectedness of things: the many things, the one world without and within (Whitehead 1968, 228).

Four people have been camping for over three days. This afternoon there is an intensive shift in the ecology of experiences of the camping event. The campfire lightens its flames with a descendent curve, as if knowing that no more wood will feed it. Besides the circular group of rock delimiting the campfire there is a pair of shoes drying. The shoes are tending somewhere else, as if they were already rolling away from the fire. A dog moves between the improvised benches around the fire with an uncertain cadence, its ears are attentive and slightly depressed. Its point of orientations had begun to rotate their constellation, imperceptibly. The dog's favorite bush, slope, the tree with noisy squirrels began to be somewhere else. The people continue with their seamlessly habitual rituals. They prepare coffee and share some bread. Their movements, however, are slower than the previous days, elasticized by a sense of suspension of what is about to come.

That an ecology of intensity depends on a dynamic of antecedent and anticipation (re-enaction), means that the feelings that feel it are feelings of continuity. Continuity is the passage between the antecedent initial data towards the pull of anticipation. As we will soon see, continuity is the prehension of the force of the future immanent to the past of the felt occasion of experience.

Whitehead speaks of the immanence of the future in the past, as a way to demonstrate the transient characteristic of the world folded in the concrete. He explains that this transient characteristic goes way back to the *Sophist*, “where Plato states that ‘not-being’ is a form of ‘being’” (Whitehead 1967, 222). The paradox of something transient (not being) in the concrete (being), is what Whitehead also calls the ingression of something ‘other’ in the ‘self-identity’ of

an occasion of experience. What Whitehead is after, is the analysis of the ‘interconnectedness’ of entities, both transient and concrete.

Therefore, Whitehead introduces the argument of the *interconnectedness* of the ‘future with the past’ as a way to demonstrate the *interconnection* of the ‘transient with the concrete’. His argument avoids explaining the connection through philosophies that makes a ‘clear and distinct’ separation of the data used as evidence (philosophies that assume a type of non-interconnection or dualism); as we have already mentioned, philosophies like the ones of Descartes, Hume, Locke and Kant (Whitehead 1967, 224).

For Whitehead, all kinds of experiences permeate the actual and concrete, with transient presences which are not in existence actually, but that add to the overall affective arcing tone of the experience (subjective form). He famously said that in order to classify the various components of experience “nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience sober, experience sleeping and experience waking, experience drowsy and experience wide-awake...” (Whitehead 1967, 226).

This is to say that a philosophy that speaks of the characteristic of interconnectedness of experience, is a philosophy that registers the ingression (at the transient and actual level) of various components of experience. These various components complicate the ground of experience — as if experience were a glass labyrinth with many unlimited angles. The complication is simplified or synthesized at the conscious perception of the human, in order to be digested.

We can think that Whitehead is proposing to register actual and present situations of experience as a dynamic mosaic composed of many occasions of trespassing experiences. The experiences trespassing the actual are adding variation, not only through the difference of their actual existence (that campfire, those shoes, that dog), but also through the difference of their non-actual existence (the city pulling the campfire, the media providing the data to search for a route home, the daydreaming thoughts about staying at the lake for couple of days more).

Again, what is remarkable in Whitehead's proposition is that the argument of the ingression of the future in the past, is itself an 'interconnected' argument which includes the interrelation of the many occasions of experience at their transient and concrete level. His proposition is a radical heterogeneous take on an ecology of time and species of experiences, in the processual making.

Now, going back to the specific argument by Whitehead of the interconnectedness of the future and the past, he would ask us to analyze such interconnectedness avoiding long-range time-spans of centuries or decades. He would ask us to concentrate in the direct observation of "time-spans of the order of the magnitude of a second, or even a fraction of a second" (Whitehead 1967, 192). Therefore, a philosophy based in the processual generation of feelings should analyze (as to be intuitive) the short span of continuity of an occasion of experience.

The process of continuity occurs all the time, and should be felt as a technique to access the register of the various components of experience. We can think that Whitehead is proposing a philosophical technique to feel the manyness of the various components through their entryways and passageways, texturing an overall arch of experience, like the campfire. (More about this soon).

This is the account of the creative urge of the universe as it functions on each single individual occasion. In this sense, the future is immanent in each present occasion, with its particular relations to the present settled in various degrees of dominance. But no future individual occasion is in existence. The anticipatory propositions all concern the constitution of the present occasion and the necessities inherent in it. This constitution necessitates that there be a future, and necessitates a quote of contribution of re-enaction in the primary phase of future occasions (Whitehead 1967, 193).

The feelings in the camping-event are registering an intensive shift in the ecology, because the interconnectedness—the antecedent/anticipation urge— of the many occasions of experience, are smashing themselves towards the necessity of the future: that of going back to the city. Each occasion of experience—that of the campfire, that of the shoes, that of the dog and people—are

smashing in the sense of snowballing their transitions towards a novel arc. The non-existent ingress of the idea of the city is thickening the membranes of the present occasions of experiences. Their individual choreography of re-enaction and anticipation is intensifying their mode of continuing being what they are being (their activity continuing to go on), because of the ingress of the city. The city (Montreal), and the time of departure of the camping (5PM); both function as elements of the future, they are elements of abstraction inflecting the concrete things composing the ground of the camping.

The city is not making ingress into the actual alone. The telephone data use is also intensified in the search for a route, in the messages sent for people expecting the arrival, in the photos shared on Social Media. The phones make ingress a potentiality for arms to reach towards them, for thought to organize as digital passages, and they make ingress as an affective presence shaping the texture of the lake and trees around the campfire.

Moreover, at the level of human perception, the feeling of the shift of the ecology is something global and happens more or less around certain moments. However, it can't be parsed out into one specific mode of feeling or at an exact time: was the shift due to that person stopping to throw wood on the fire? Was the shift happening at the exact time that the dog changed its strolling course? Was it felt through the skin or the eyes?

The shifts in the ecology are feelings of a global apprehension (prehensions) of multiple orchestration of experiences, continuing their transitions. The formula for this global and complicated feeling will be something like this: feelings + movements (transitions) + multiple interconnected occasions.

Moreover, the feel of continuity is ecological, in that it affirms the ingress of many landscapes of experience in the actual; though is not only the manyness of the landscapes, but their many entryways for passages and transitions. This is to say that a philosophy of feeling is one with a philosophy of interconnectedness: understood as the co-habitation of diverse planes of experiences, and their open entryways.

Through this philosophy of feeling, there should be a way to analyze the entryways of universes of experience that are more than actual; again, in that they add something to the actual that influences the affective texture, without being concretely *in* it, but transiently *with* it. The philosophy of feeling should find a way to analyze experience with an openness to the mixture of choreographic compositions of the daydreaming universes, the echoes of a playful pseudo theoretical interaction, the leaking of the digital world and the fatigue of a dance routine. Is it possible to do philosophy through feeling the transitions between universes of experience happening simultaneously? Is it possible to get the one global feeling that launches the immediate process of philosophizing through the nuanced feelings composed by the many universes cohabiting the actual situation? Could philosophy be practiced as a technique to become transformed by the entryways and passages of the complicated various components of experience? Can a philosopher become a traveler through entryways and passageways?

A shift in the ecology of intensity reads like this: when the fire diminished its flames and the dog couldn't find its bush, the abstract presence of the phone was mutually included around the flames and the short legs of the dog were already in a disjunctive contact with the pavement of the city streets.

Architecture 5: Euclidean and Topological Spaces.

It may be a little bit late to talk about this, but, since ‘time’ is not what is really at stake in these architectures, it is important to highlight that what matters for the readers is the creation of their own ‘virtual spaces’ in which to accommodate the scrambled information being set up along the pages. Simply put, the research on the ‘architectures of experience’ takes one step forward to the *spatialized plane* in which movement, perception and feeling take form. The ‘architectures of experience’ research something different to the ‘intervals’. If the ‘interval’ focuses in the micro-forces in which movement is perceived as an emerging ecology, at the sensory limit of human experience; then the study on the ‘architectures of experience’ shifts the focus from the *cut* itself towards the *ecological plane* holding activities around the cut. In this sense, the plunge to the architectures of experience is not to find the micro cut, but to feel the horizon surrounding it, through feelings and their propositions.

The horizon surrounding the cut is an architecture of feelings as speculations: feelings of actualities incessantly in a process of becoming—or in a process of ever advancing concrescence—while mutually including each other. In this sense, the study of the surrounding horizon, even if is more *spatialized* than the study on the cut, still follows the qualitative formations of ecologies of experience. Lastly, this spatial study refers to what was called in previous architectures the ‘ecological intensity’ or the ‘choreographic excess’ that indexed a proposition folded along the layers of the actual.

Then, at this point, is that the architecture of experience takes a step towards the complex activities passing and holding a space that is between an Euclidean and a topological space. Whereas the Euclidean space is the quantitative space ready to be measured, the topological space is a qualitative space in the making. The conceptualization of these spaces comes from the research done by philosopher Brian Massumi in his chapter ‘Strange Horizon’ from the book *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. In this chapter, Massumi articulates the definition of the ‘space of experience’ as “physically a topological hyperspace of transformation”. (Massumi 2002, 184). He articulates the definition of the ‘space of experience’,

as transformative, by using the example of the habitual orientation of the body in an architectural setting (a building, the metro, the street). He argues that body orientation happens, not through an Euclidean perception of the space, one that follows visual static indexes or a cognitive map stored in the head. Instead, body orientation is a process of habits accumulated proprioceptively, across the body. Where proprioception is “a self-referential sense, in that what it most directly registers are displacements of the body relative to each other” (Massumi 2002, 179). This proprioceptive perception is “a qualitative space of variation referenced only to its own movement, running on autopilot” (Massumi 2002, 183).

The argument Massumi conveys is that body orientation depends more in the proprioceptive experience of movement, “*the referencing of movement to its own variation (...) than the exoreferential visual-clue system* (Massumi 2002, 180)”. To explain orientation, one of the examples Massumi uses is to make your way to the fridge with your eyes closed. He says that the map of your visual cues will begin to fade but that nevertheless you will find your way to the fridge intuitively —especially if you begin to get hungry, he clarifies—using the memory of habits stored proprioceptively, as a lived experiential cartography enacted step by step. “The way we orient is more like a tropism (tendency plus habit) than a cognition (visual form plus configuration)” (Massumi 2002, 180).

Hence, the space of experience is the result of two different dimensions of experience mutually including each other. On the one hand, it is the result of a system based on Euclidean perception— “Cartesian intuition of space as a triple-axis, coordinate box that contains things” (Massumi 2002, 185). On the other hand, it is based on topological perception: “synesthetic” “self-referential” “and self-varyingly monadic (Massumi 2002, 182)”. What is remarkable is that Massumi explores the passing from one side of perception to the other, without separating the topological from the Euclidean space and without studying merely the potentials actualized in the topological, but always across the Euclidean. He considers both theories of space as mutually inclusive. Though the strong point of his argument tilts the balance towards a higher valuation of topological perception, since the study of the passages between the Euclidean and topological, can’t be done with Euclidean theoretical frames, only with topological ones.

That folding of the Euclidean and non-Euclidean into and out of each other is itself understandable only in topological terms. This hinge-dimension between quantitative and qualitative space is itself a topological figure-to the second degree, since topology already figures in it (Massumi 2002, 184).

Massumi challenges the usual understanding of the Euclidean perception of space. He does this by introducing the topological figures for orientation: based in rhythm and fused sensations that don't belong to any specific body sense. He overlaps the qualitative side of experience taking shape, taking shape not in the prefigured Euclidean space, but *shaping with and through* Euclidean space. Thus, even if the two dimensions of experience mutually include each other, ontogenetically speaking, topological perception is prior to Euclidean, since is the perception that generates the passages from one to the other, from quality to quantity and all the way around.

Moreover, the very back and forth passages from topological to Euclidean perception generate spaces in between. To move out of one stable quantitative space to a fluid qualitative one is to generate a differential space. At that differential space generated, the elements included can't be there without undergoing a transformation in themselves. When you walk in the darkness of your apartment towards your fridge, your movement habits transform due to darkness: the edges of the body soften in readiness to absorb a bump, the fridge transforms its rectangular materiality into an attracting diagram of vectors, due to the call of the visceral appetite, and time slows down to elasticize the walls of the room for a more careful journey.

The dimension of becoming—which is the ecology of mutual perceptual passages tending to an Euclidean and Topological dwelling—is a differential space, in that it makes it necessary for the activities at stake to be recalibrated, and to function only by leaving behind some habits that cannot continue to function without another.

Architecture 5B: Mentality.

With this ‘architecture of experience’ —across a low hill from the architecture 5A— the aim is to articulate the ‘differential space’ generated by the interlacing of topological and Euclidean perceptual activities as a ‘mentality’. The activity of ‘mentality’ will be linked specifically with the synesthetic function of the diagram, soon to be redefined via Massumean vocabulary as the ‘biogram’. In such a way that the generation of a differential shaping space could be understood as a diagram itself, in order to avoid categorizing a diagrammatic experience as something happening only at the level of the human body, and belonging only to a topological perception. Instead, the aim is to directly register the diagram as the mixing taking shape of a differential space— in the sense that moves activities towards a more-than-feeling itself, across the nexus towards others, across qualitative and quantitative experiences and across the topological and Euclidean.

Finally, today’s architecture wants to give to this newly concept of ‘mentality’ a flair of desire, via the theoretical frame shared by Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze. The interest is to bring together process philosophy and Guattari’s theoretical frame of schizoanalysis, into a simple vocabulary of the everyday. The vocabulary is simple, because uses few words to carry the complexity indexed by both disciplines. In a way, the simple vocabulary tells of the trans-disciplinary flirtations between philosophy and schizoanalysis. Not in the sense that these disciplines pre-assume or pre-exist the plane of lived experience. But, in the sense that the richness and inventiveness of the plane of experience can be registered, accompanied and luckily tweaked, with the help of the concepts lent by those disciplines.

Previous to the articulation of the concept of ‘mentality’ that will bring the study towards the discipline of schizoanalysis, let’s follow the connection Brian Massumi does between the ‘diagram’ and its ‘synesthetic’ function. When Massumi argues for a “space of experience” that is “literally, physically a topological hyperspace of transformation (Massumi 2002, 184)”; he is gesturing toward the bodily experience of orientation as a proprioceptive memory working in tandem with Euclidean visual cues. Now, this proprioceptive quality of memory is what defines

the experience of the diagram as a type of synesthetic perception, not reduced to clinical synesthetes, but that includes ‘regular’ perceivers.

The hinging of the proprioceptive on the visual in the movement of orientation is synesthetic interfusion. It is not the only one. Each side, for example, enters into its own synesthetic fusion with the tactile: a determinate, positioned sight is a potential touch; the tropism of proprioceptive twisting and turning is assisted by past and potential bumps and the tactile feedback of our feet. There are many other synesthetic conjunctions, involving all the senses in various combinations, including smell and hearing (Massumi 2002, 186).

The diagrams are a fusion of Euclidean visual cues with the topological proprioceptive sense memory of the bodies. In a sense, the fusion transpires in each sense data ingression of the event of perception. A visual cue fuses with a potential touch, which in turn fuses with the potential twist of the arms, head and hearing. It is through this interpretation of the diagrams that this architecture 5B understands sense data as more than the individual body, more than topological and Euclidean and across the usual divides of the inside and outside. Each sense activity becomes with another in an indeterminate relation which does not yet sort out the resolution of the overall arc of the action. This is the ontogenetic moment in which inside, outside, sensible, insensible, movement and position become indeterminate.

That the space of becoming goes beyond dual divides is one of the reasons why Massumi changes the name of the diagram to the biogram. He says that they are less maps than cartographies. And that they are not maps inside of the head of the synesthete. Instead, they are cartographies of the peri-personal space between the eyes and objects of the world.

This liminal non-place has been characterized as “peri-personal”. It lies at the border of what we think of as internal, personal space and external, public space. (...) They are event-perceptions combining senses, tenses and dimensions on a single surface (Massumi 2002, 187).

Although the biograms have a life of their own, since they are activated beyond voluntary

decision, Massumi says that clinical synesthetes have trained themselves to consciously elicit them so that biograms perform on signal. Biograms are “involuntary and elicited (Massumi 2002, 189)”. What is remarkable in this ‘involuntary and elicited’ feature in relation to the study of the ‘architecture of experience’, is to think that the surplus of the space is not only registered when they involuntarily emerge out of an everyday experience, but that experience can be re-elicited across other contexts. There is something to learn about the moment in which these spaces of interfusion emerge, because the quality of the fusion can be reiterated to intensify the creative process of a choreographic project, or the teaching process of a theoretical text. To resume, there is a pedagogical dimension of the biogram to be explored in performing arts and theoretical praxis.

Now with the intention of slowly approaching the concept of ‘mentality’, let’s continue with a question by Massumi to certain aspect of the biogram:

Is it so far-fetched to call the unseen out of which biograms are ‘other’s people minds’? Not particular other people’s mind, of course. The other of them all: another of particular mindedness from which everyone’s individuated perceptions, memories and cognitions emerge and to which they return in a twisting rhythm of appearance and dissolve: a shared incipency that is also a destiny. What is the other of mindedness? (...) Simply matter. (...) It is the hinge-plane not only between senses, tenses, and dimensions of space and time, but between matter and mindedness: the involuntary and the elicited (...) It is to catch the becoming-minded of the movements of matter in the act (Massumi 2002, 190).

To experience a biogram is to experience the ontogenetic force of matter taking form through the determination (anticipation) of the antecedent processes of formation—that which Whitehead calls the feeling of the eternal object. And let’s remember that Whitehead also calls the feeling of the eternal object the *mental* pole of the physical experience (Whitehead 1978, 45). Massumi is saying with Whitehead that the biogram is the ‘minded’ incipient movement of emergence among the conjunctions of ‘matters’. The mindedness is ‘unseen’ because it is the more-than of senses, memories and cognitions. In this context the mind is the more-than-actual ontogenetic

force that ingresses the event and defines the choreographic composition of individual senses, memories and cognitions. One more time, the ‘biogram’ is the hinge-plane, or the entryway where the passages between mind and matter can be registered. The biogram is an entryway into the dynamic arcs of mind-matter-mind.

We can say then, that the biogrammatic event of experience, is a multiple touch of matters at the limit of a minded dynamic which animates it. At the limit means at the junction of many matters, at the hyphens in which multiple zones of experience overlap into each other. The mattered limits are what allow the registration of the force of mindedness, which is more than actual and thus, at the limit of perceptibility. Hence, across those junctive limits is where the dynamic of mentality makes palpable its forces of ingressions toward form.

The mattered touch, the palpable, is of course, synesthetic: inseparable from the incipency of a leg curving and the growing stretch into dimensionality of the horizon. The synesthetic touch is an immanent flight through all the mattered junctions—compressing, overlapping, expanding rejecting—which comes to be expressed as a dynamic that, at the level of the human body, is easier to understand as a proprioceptive expression.

The architecture of experience, now qualified as biogrammatic, and then characterized as a mixing of activities to become through feelings more than themselves, reads like this: an intense light is drawing the oval horizon that carries many propulsive habits that reappear at each step taken by legs. In the meantime, last night is re-evoked as a vague figure around the arms that flies towards next week’s nightmare. Something finds a solution. Many other things remain irresolvable. Something about the cadence of the hand and pencil to be enacted back at home, in a few minutes. Something about the thickness of the atmosphere to be reproduced at the dance studio. A belief in irrational thoughts with the consistency to undo the traditional way to perform philosophy by means of ‘clear and distinct’ categories. A research-creation practice that is a biogrammatic space of experience; one that remixes qualities of lived experience— differential, multiple or collective—to problematize and resolve aesthetic doings beyond the here and now, ready to be relayed across strange horizons.

Architecture 5C: Desire.

At the surface of this architecture 5C, the word desire begins to gain tone beside the previously discussed concept of mentality. Through the writings on the previous architecture of experience, the ‘biagrammatic space of experience’ became a hyperspace that remixed qualities of life surrounding the actualized moment to resolve aesthetic tendencies—to conclude an arc of intensity —and to re problematize them, in the sense to re-pattern them for later. On these previous architectures of experiences, the aesthetic tendencies were understood as qualitative patterns (rhythms, shapes, intensities) registered at the intersection of Euclidean and topological perception.

It was said that the biogram’s aesthetic tendencies could be relayed through different experiential contexts without being limited and determined to any one of them, because they preserved a dynamic of passage-*ing* in excess of their arrival into content. It was also added that biograms could be relayed involuntarily, as bursting accidents, or by eliciting them, through techniques; and that the contexts in which they operate could be as varied as those of a dance project, the preparation of an art theory class, or the explanation of an everyday event to a partner. Moreover, it was thought that the activities across the biagrammatic space of experience gained multiple functions (walking was not only moving a leg, but also softening the room due to a potential bump of a wall, while orchestrating a rhythm between tactility and listening), since each activity reached towards the feeling not of themselves, but others. Lastly, what was concluded through architectures 1, 2, 3 and 4 was that to feel the aesthetic tendencies of the biogram, was to carry the feeling towards something other than self-identity (other than feeling the same), and it was added that the study of the felt experience beyond self-identity would be pursued with the help of concepts of process philosophy and schizoanalysis, because both disciplines orient their feeling to what becomes, rather than to what already is.

Considering the conceptual landscape just mentioned, the dynamics to follow during this architectural plane are those that continue to hyphen the concept of ‘mentality’ and ‘desire’. The first sentence that can reach the two concepts together, in order to take the sideways step from

‘mentality’ to ‘desire’ is again written by Brian Massumi, this time from the book *What Animals Teach Us About Politics*:

For Whitehead, mentality is an ultimate factor of nature, co-constituting the given, defining it in terms of the origination of novelty (“a flash of novelty among appetitions”) and the “growth of intensity” (Whitehead 1978, 184). He uses “appetition” as a synonymous for the mental pole. To which he also gives the technical term “conceptual prehension”: “The basic operations of mentality are ‘conceptual prehensions’ (Massumi 2014, 103).

Mentality is the flash of novelty that arises out of the perceptual activities surrounding the biogrammatic space of experience. Here I take ‘perceptual’ to mean as taking into account, prehending and/or feeling. Mentality is the dynamic of past tendencies for seeing, touching, listening, smelling that proprioceptively fuse each other into a synesthetic relation with matter, for a novel tone and dynamic rhythm of orchestration to assemble. In the overfull mix of biogrammatic experience, mentality is the desire for a novel pattern not of one thing, body, sensation or idea, but of an immanent flight which can transversally shift something in all of them. Mentality is a general desire for novelty immanent to the plane of experience. Novelty to feel besides and beyond one’s own actuality. To fly the feelings, so that the feelings feel more than the actual subjective form generating them, but also the nexuses around and beyond them.

The second quote by Massumi directly links mentality with desire, by way of Deleuze and Guattari:

“An inventiveness immanent to the topology of experience, one with its lived qualities (...) For this immanent inventiveness, some give the name “desire”” (Massumi 2014, 18).

Massumi goes on to explain that desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, is an “immanent, self-driving principle, productive of the real” (...) “If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality” (Massumi 2014, 103). Desire is not only the surplus, capable of being registered synesthetically and proprioceptively through a biogrammatic experience. Desire is what produces the everyday reality, even the one in which matter seems to be static and repetitive (Euclidean). Therefore, to register biogrammatically this self-driving

principle is not to diverge from everyday reality, but to plunge into its force of creation. Through this conceptualization, it can be further added that desire functions as the very force that energizes the passages from Euclidean to topological spaces of experience. Desire produces reality and the capacities to transit either way, one stable Euclidean labyrinth, or a hallucinogenic topological puzzle.

The generative force of desire is further conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari through the concept of ‘desiring machines’. The latter concept allows them to give consistency to the force of desire and at the same time move it outside of the fixed categories of subject and object. The ‘desiring machines’ allow Deleuze and Guattari to register desire as a more-than human force, constituting reality and trespassing the planes of life. Hence, machinic desire distributes the production and the force of desire in the plane of life experience, out there, in which what is commonly understood as subject and object, get folded.

For Gilles Deleuze and me desire is everything that exists before the opposition between subject and object, before representation and production. It’s everything whereby the world and affects constitute us outside of ourselves in spite of ourselves. It’s everything that overflows from us. That’s why we define it as flow (Guattari 2007, 142).

Deleuze and Guattari have a different notion of desire to the one given by psychoanalysis with Freud and Lacan. The logic of desire is not construed between *production* and *acquisition*. Desire is not on the side of acquisition, which puts it in the side of an ideal, a primary lack of a real object that needs to be acquired. Nor is desire on the side of the production of fantasies that are in counterpoint to the primary lack of a real object (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 26-7). As it was mentioned before, for Deleuze and Guattari desire produces the real, the real is its end product. What Deleuze and Guattari are after is an immanent logic of desire, in which desire becomes the production of production, which records and consumes its production all in the same arcing movement. Through this logic they conceptualize desire without divide between nature and industry, and moreover between nature and human.

That desire is production of production immanent to its own recording (or registering) and consumption, is what makes it an ontogenetic force which is natural and artificial. This is because, at the level of being a force of processual production, desire does not distinguish its doing in a discrete product of nature (like a tree) or technology (like a laptop); its mixed patterns of doings are what operate at the junctures of the effects of a tree and a laptop, without ever ending in a final categorization of an entity. The consumption is of an enjoyment, but not necessarily of a human subject. This notion of enjoyment has parallélisme with Whitehead's concept of subjective aim. When an occasion of experience prehends (as taking into account entities), feels and satisfies its process, it enjoys itself. The arc of experience runs through its nexus of prehended relations and registers, producing prehensions which positively transform into feelings. Feelings then feel themselves (physically) and the eternal objects (mentally). The arc of experience consumes itself into a satisfaction of the process.

For Deleuze, Guattari and Whitehead, production of desire consumes its enjoyment in partial and diverse arcs, which do not necessarily involve human consciousness and voluntary decision. Enjoyment is of processes that are partial and connected, in lines of connection that are much more molecular than the human perspective, in that they fold the commonly agreed category of the human but at the same time surpasses it.

Here is where the concept of the desiring machines allows us to understand how the processual arcs of enjoyment happen as distributions. Paradoxically they are arcs of production that enjoy themselves by becoming part of something else than one self-identical discrete thing.

A machine may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks (...) Every machine, in the first place is related to a continual material flow (*hyle*) that cuts into. (...) The machine produces an interruption of the flow insofar as it is connected to another machine that supposedly produces its flow (...) in relationship to a third machine that (...) produces a continuous, infinite flux: for example, the anus-machine and the flow of milk of a herd of dairy cattle ("and then ... and then...") (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 38-9).

But what is there to be found in this particular architecture 5C, at the site of the biagrammatic architecture of experience, with the activities of mentality and desire? What is the relevant gesture to attend, given the fact that the ontogenetic force of the production of desire is always attached from break machine to break machine, in an ecology of artificial and natural processes that undo the attachment of desire to the human subject? What can the breaks and connections between arcs of enjoying matters - at scales beyond conscious human will - say about the architectures of experience?

Transversal desires. Transversal enjoyments. It is along the transversal passages, which are those that are not 'structural' but 'machinic' (immanent and instant connections of connections), that the coupling between process philosophy and schizoanalysis gives us another variation on the point of view of what an 'alter-therapeutic' activity could be. At the transversal passages is where the common sense of the 'mind'—as that which is the human center of control, whether consciously or unconsciously— is shattered and distributed as minded matters of the world. Along those transversal passages is where a concept of intensive and distributed matter gets to qualify the body as a site of schizoanalytic speculation, since it is understood as inseparable from the animation of mindedness. Each play with the minded matter adds to an alter-therapeutic gesture: one that liberates novel modes of improvisation around the categories for living (unknown feelings, memories of potentials, intermittent subject and object positionalities).

This is the take on the concept of the transversal by Deleuze and Guattari. By using the example of Marcel Proust *In Search of Lost Time*, they show how the narrator of the novel has to move with transverse communications. This is because the narrator is not able to take a unity of points of view, —due to an incapacity to rest in the perception of a total or partial experience— has to move with transverse communications. The narrator who is travelling in a train “traces from one window to the other, “in order to draw together, in order to reweave intermittent and opposite fragments”. This drawing together, this reweaving is what Joyce called *re-embodiment*” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 47).

When the biogram re doubles the architectural planes of experience passing between Euclidean and topological logics of organization, the body opens to a synesthetic perception in which

reweaves fragments of body senses and perceptual data through dynamic linkages. The plunge, in-between, planes allows the unitary body to become more than itself. It becomes an embodiment not of its self-identity—based in its Ego or in its visual anatomical image—but an embodiment of desiring machines connecting and interrupting each other through disparate sense data. Biagrammatic experience is a becoming which is linked to sense data. It is a becoming dynamic of perception in and out of actuality in which the linkages do not have to cut and return themselves to the interiority of a subject, but they can relink from one portion of perceptual data to the next.

Here is where the new definition of desire as mentality comes in handy. Because the body becoming embodiment is stretched out of its self-identity (out of its structures of containment), lured by the partial enjoyments operating across the interrupting desiring machines. Desire as mentality invites us to think the concept of embodiment as the elastic line between points of attraction and repulsion of the junctions of experience. Embodiment as a line of flight that embroiders the lures of partial desires distributed along planes. Again, not to stop the transversal flight to be able to say “I”, but to keep moving transversely along the mattered junctions that call *with* and *as* desire.

To understand embodiment as a minded capacity to move as a line of flight, gives the possibility to think embodiment as a technique to move in an alternative way, in which feelings are assembled by dominant and totalitarian modes, by assembling of feelings that block away the messy multiplicity of the emergent feelings. Embodiment can be thought as an intensification of the capacity to improvise along the margins of totalitarian machines of identity (containment) production. This mode to think embodiment is an alter-therapeutics.

Finally, we can say as well that the study of architectures of experience is a speculation on how the pull of desire is a force of giving more intense modes of living transversally, improvisationally free.

“Movements are not ‘*effected*’ by a ‘*cause*’: that would be the old concept of soul again! – they are the will itself, but not wholly and completely! (Nietzsche 2003, 57).

Architecture 5D: Schizoanalysis and Schizo-somatics.

This architecture channels many of the thought pulses running across the planes of architectures 5, 5B and 5C, and at the same time thinks again the concept of feeling (as was done in the architectures 2 and 3 via the use of Whiteheadian vocabulary), but this time in close connection with the aforementioned concept of ‘transversality’ (as embodiment *at-and-of* the junctures of the planes) by Guattari. At the crossroad of Whitehead’s ‘theory of feelings’ and Guattari’s concept of ‘transversality’, is where the strong overlaps between process philosophy and schizoanalysis happen. And at that crossroad is where the power of the ‘artful-alter therapeutic’ can be continued to be conceptualized. Therefore, the aim of this architecture is to reinforce the links between process ‘philosophy’ and ‘schizoanalysis’ via further introduction of the latter.

In *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, the first definition of schizoanalysis given by Guattari is: “the analysis of the impact of Assemblages of enunciation on semiotic and subjective productions in a given problematic context” (Guattari 2013, 18). The concept of the Assemblage allows Guattari to expand the field of psychoanalysis beyond the frames that were concentrated to interpret the Unconscious through verbal expressions, such as it was the case of Freud and Lacan—and perhaps most importantly, beyond the concept of transference. In words of Guattari, the assemblage is useful “to avoid, as far as possible, getting bogged down in the concept of the ‘unconscious’” (Guattari 2013, 18). This is important since for Guattari there are assemblages that do not include components of the semiotic of signification, and others that neither have subjective nor conscious components.

One graphic image of the Assemblage given by Guattari is the following:

I once said, I no longer remember where, that we wanted to construct a science in which dishcloths and napkins could no longer even be encompassed under the general rubric of lines. A science in which one would be prepared instead to accept with good grace that dishcloths are differentiated in singularized becomings and have a cortege of contextual repercussions, in which it could just as easily be a question of a landlord drying glasses

with a dishcloth as of soldiers launching a cleanup operation [a ‘coup de torchon’] on a pocket of resistance (Guattari 2013, 18).

The assemblage is an image of thought that allows Guattari to register the passages between planes of enunciation, displacing the analytic problems from pre-formed subjectivities under the influence of a system of signification. It needs to be clarified that the enunciation of the assemblage cannot be reduced to a verbal expression, instead the enunciation can be understood more as the ‘call’ of desire to assemble certain plane with consistency.

In the context of the writing of this architecture, the assemblage enunciates ‘signals’ for partial and distributed desires, that keep the immanent flight of embodiment – becoming more than a body falling into itself, rather stretching out towards multiple modes of feelings. Therefore, the concept of the assemblage allows to register distributed desires through feelings, and thus, feelings are understood less as the perception of the interior of the body but as the perception of exteroceptive points of intensities. As it was mentioned in other architectures, feelings are peri-personal, at the juncture of matters, and thinking with the force of their folded — but also distributed — mentality. Moreover, thinking-feelings are a call from desire. Desire asks them to transit, to register the passage of the transit, but without logically or verbally knowing what is exactly the feeling about.

Here is where the connection between desire as a call for feelings to transit passages, can be made with the concept of ‘proposition’ by Whitehead. Let’s remember that for Whitehead a ‘proposition’ was a lure for feeling, one that effected a crossfade of potential abstraction into a selected nexus of actualities — which was technically called a ‘transmuted feeling’ (Whitehead 1978, 251). The next paragraph bridges this concept of ‘proposition’ with what Guattari calls the ‘a-signifying mutations of the Assemblage.

The presumed analytic effect no longer resides in a derivation of interpretable signifying chains, but in an ‘a-signifying’ mutation of a ‘Universe-context’ (...) Thus the schizoanalytic undertaking will never limit itself to an interpretation of ‘givens’; it will

take a much more fundamental interest in the ‘Giving’, in the Assemblages that promote the concatenation of affects of sense and pragmatic effects (Guattari 2013, 19).

That the focus in schizoanalysis is on the ‘giving’ and not limited to the ‘givens’, shifts the focus to the ‘propositions’ or the ‘potentials to feel’ at the junctures of an assemblage. This means that the register of the ‘potential feeling’ happens at the juncture of the assemblages, or at the nexuses of entities. There, an opacity or a swollenness of abstraction folds an actual group of matters, pressing some precise potentials for feelings to become a blueprint.

The feel for the transversal propositions speaks of a mode of embodiment which is juncture-like, and like a plane porous to the concatenations of affects. A radical mode of thinking would be one that thinks ‘embodiment’ and ‘architectures’ as processual feelings that take actual shape as they intensify their nexus (as becoming more propositional or more charged by latent abstraction in concreteness). This is to say that to become with an architecture-*ing* of experience would be to become an embodied transversality. An embodiment of multi-linear concatenations that is always affected by something that is not actually there, but that resonates from somewhere else, or some other time. This also means that a practice of schizoanalysis would be inseparable from a practice of transversal embodiment, or in another words, from a schizo-somatics practice: one that feels the body as taking shape through the junctures of feelings.

The radical thought of transversal embodiment in the making, is of helping to find movements of relay between architectures of experience, in the case that one of them would suffer a crisis. In this context a crisis of creativity—or a crisis of the creative advance, in Whiteheadian terms—is understood as the smash of the potential to feel into flat and stable affective arcs that already know themselves, or as the unidirectional funneling for processes to become habitual routines for interaction (juncture-actions). The study of the feel of the transversal passages is not to register the givens of what happens, but the movements of embroidery called by partial desires that allow the registration of the relay between the desire machines—the breaks and connections between disparate elements—such a generative relay is the ‘giving’. It is the surplus of mentality that is to be schizoanalyzed through a radical take on embodiment, a schizo-somatics practice: transversal of the more-than actual, linear and known.

How are the potentialities for the constitution of new Assemblages to be explored in a context that appears totally blocked? How are the relations of production, proliferation and the micropolitics of these new Assemblages to be aided in such a case? This is the kind of question that schizoanalysis will be led to be posed (Guattari 2013, 20).

Architecture 5E: Genetic and Morphological Theories of Actualities.

This architecture is close: Northeast from the 5D, it returns to the paradox of thinking the ‘spaces of experience’ as the movement of mutual inclusion between Euclidean and topological spaces. Now, if we add our newly found concept of embodiment as a transversal flight along junctures of planes of experience, we realize that this concept is bound to be thought through a paradox as well. Embodiment would have to be thought as a rippling transmission taking shape immanently to the planes that are being transversed, but also as a more stable notion of a body, as something Euclidean. Having in mind that we are thinking embodiment as a necessary concept to register the sites of the distributed minded matter where schizoanalysis could operate, and that what counts is to register the movements of feelings that generate this transversal embodiment. Let’s then visit a pair of Whiteheadian concepts that will allow us to learn something about the modes of embodiment passing through topological and Euclidean spaces.

In the chapter of ‘The Theory of Feelings’ of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead uses a double frame of thought to analyze the such a theory of feelings (Whitehead 1978, 219-35). This double frame is the one that allows us to think actualities in an intensive—topological—and extensive—Euclidean—way. The two frames are that of the ‘genetic cell-theory’ and the ‘morphological cell-theory’ of actualities.

Now let’s see what Whitehead really means with the ‘genetic’ and ‘morphological’ theories of actualities. To start with, Whitehead clarifies that the “philosophy of organism is a cell theory of actuality. Each ultimate unit of fact is a cell-complex, not analyzable into components with equivalent completeness of actuality” (Whitehead 1978, 219). For Whitehead the cell is not something necessarily small, but is a thought-image that refers to the multiple activities included in the formation of the unit of fact of actuality. Most importantly, the cell unit formation cannot be analyzed through analogous (equivalent) processes, but only through the manner in which that singular process is immanently coming to be. Finally, Whitehead is saying that the cell-complex cannot be analyzed into ‘complete’ components of actualities. In other words, whether through a genetic or morphological perspective, the actualities can never be reduced to a closed totality.

They are never ‘totally’ completed processes. We will see that even after a process into a unit of an actual formation has finished, it remains open to make ingress into other processes.

Whitehead explains that, in the genetic cell-theory of actuality, the cell appropriates “for the foundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe out of which it arises” (Whitehead 1978, 219). What it appropriates are other already constituted actualities and the eternal objects. Remember here that the eternal objects inflect a definition to the actual entity, but they remain as something more-than actual. The genetic perspective analyzes the actual entity that is working itself towards form but did not complete its process towards it, it did not reach its satisfaction yet. Here satisfaction should not be misunderstood with the human satisfaction of a pleasure. For Whitehead ‘satisfaction’ is a concept that tells of the urge for the process of feelings to reach a unit of subjective form. ‘Satisfaction’ is the conclusion of the appetite into a unit of feeling through the composition of the many elements in the mix.

“An actual entity is a process in the course of which many operations with incomplete subjective unity terminate in a completed unity of operation, termed the ‘satisfaction’” (Whitehead 1978, 219).

The genetic theory lays out conceptual tools to follow the incomplete processes towards form taking. Again, they are processes open to other components—such as other already constituted actualities—but singular to the unique manner in which the various component dynamics are pacing their journey towards the satisfaction of their creative urge. The genetic theory of actualities understands the components of the process as immanently singular (with *this* specific tone) and at the same time relational (porous to the inclusion of constituted actualities that add something to *that* specific tone).

On the other hand, the morphological theory of actuality analyses processes of formation already culminated and thus, evaporated, that are used for the process of formation of other actualities rather than its own. These already-satisfied processes become ‘objects’ for the ‘superjects’ (subjects as projectiles) processes that are immanently becoming. The morphological theory is a transcendent perspective, in which actual entities function for the processes of another.

Its own process, which is its own internal existence, has evaporated, worn out and satisfied; but its effects are all to be described in terms of its ‘satisfaction’. The ‘effects’ of an actual entity are its intervention in concrescent processes other than its own. Any entity, thus intervening in processes transcending itself, is said to be functioning as an ‘object’ (Whitehead 1978, 220).

At this point we can say that the main difference between a ‘genetic’ and ‘morphologic’ perspective is that the mutual inclusion of other actual entities in formation are more or less intimate to the arcing dynamic. The morphologic perspective would place the actualities as less intimate to the carried momentum of generation, since their momentum has already perished. The morphologic perspective has a different ‘timing’ in becoming for another actuality: less dynamic. The morphologic perspective allows to think a culminated object as an ‘objectile’, this is to say as a perspective or a point of elasticized reference for a feelings process on its way towards form.

In this way, the objective perspective of a settled process operates as a resonance box for further generation. Thus, when we use traditional notions of a body, such as a notion that understands it as the containment of five senses and an ego, we use them as points of reference to go somewhere else. When we stand in a space and we cannot avoid perceiving it with an Euclidean grid containing rigid bodies and strong egos inside of minds in the body, we are just being bogged down by habits that are always about to turn somewhere else, creatively.

Now, through the architectures of experience we have been thinking the processes of experience as modes of spatializing ecologies of feelings, we thus must also think the process of experience that are spatialized with Whitehead.

The actual entity as described by the morphology of its satisfaction is the actual entity ‘spatialized’, to use Bergson’s term. The actual entity, thus spatialized, is a given individual fact actuated by its own ‘substantial form’” (Whitehead 1978, 220).

We can use this last paragraph that reinforces the concept of space and objects as satisfied processes of feelings to re-think their inclusion on processes of feelings on the way. And, as we will see, we must rethink space and objects without forming a ‘totalitarian or completed perspective’: one in which the stable perished categories take control.

A final note on ‘feelings’ is that, for Whitehead, the subject of feeling is *causa sui*: the cause of the feeling depends in the mutual inclusion of the ecology of elements adding to it, including the ‘objects’ that are the perspectives of already satisfied and perished process, and that still remain as patterned nexuses for new feelings. This is to say that through a morphological perspective of the space and body—when feelings add to processes that are perished—they don’t form a totality. Feelings don’t function as a *final cause* that depends on a pre-established harmony.

Through the genetic and morphologic analysis of actualities, Whitehead gives us an ecological perspective that mutually includes all the ‘partial’ interconnected elements to form a feeling *with* the concept of subjective form, as a ‘whole’.

The partial nature of feeling, other than the complete satisfaction, is manifest by the impossibility of understanding its generation without recourse to the whole subject (PR 221).

The subjective form boomerangs the feelings in the making with the past perished categories, but includes them under the logic of partial processes, or what Whitehead calls the logic of ‘contemporary independence’ (Whitehead 1967, 195-6). Past patterns for feelings add something to the immanent generative process, and they do it with the quality of ‘junctures and breaks’ (using Guattarian vocabulary), or as nexuses. Moreover, these past feelings are by nature, as transitional as the feeling on the generative route towards form, even if their creative urge has already perished.

Remember that in architecture 2B, we saw how the category of ‘transmutation of feelings’ offered a new nexus (and not only a new feeling), shaped by the initial nexus of the physical and conceptual feelings, propelling the generation of further feelings. This allows us to think how the

openness of the subjective form includes the potential to re-shape novel nexuses like ‘junctures and breaks’ out of already formed actualities, into its own processual whole—whether to be satisfied in this singular subjective form, or another yet to come. In short, the subjective form offered by Whitehead is a transversal whole. It knots every process (past, present and on the way) that is local and a-local, temporal and a-temporal.

Then again, to feel the transversal embodiment (the schizo-somatics) in which schizoanalysis could operate means not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. But every time the risk to think-feel in a totalitarian manner surrounds us, we have to remember the technique to embody the genetic *and* morphologic, so that inside the totality making the movements of experience rigid, we could register the transversal wholes swallowing the totalitarian forces in return. We need to remember the ways to become schizo-bodies: to remember the movements that revert totalities, shattering them as food for multiplicities for transversal w/holes.

The ‘genetic’ and ‘morphologic’ are two philosophical techniques to schizoanalyze the situations in which the nexuses feeling us are completed and closed in patterns of relations, which surely orient capacities for living towards hegemonic organizations, and away from minor modes of feelings. The schizoanalytic technique given by the process philosophy of Whitehead is a felt reminder of the transversal w/holes, which are the global but not total, sited but a-local, felt but ‘amodal’ (as a full impact of intense feeling indiscernible in one extensive body sense mode), movements that are always undoing totalitarian and selective patterns for feelings. The transversal w/holes are the creative advance that artfully phagocyte totalities, breaking and re-connecting total elements into an immanent transversal schizzed w/hole: a subjective form.

Architecture 6: Mexico.

Mexico City keeps singular architectures of experience in its boulevards. They curve imperceptibly, pulling the corpulent trees towards the walkway. The pace of the walk with the rear vision of the trees slices the fall of light. Colors inhabit the spaces with force, but they are placated by the thick geometries of low buildings. The curvilinear geometrical plane strongly calls the rear vision of the body, and if despite that pull, one continues to look forwards, one can observe that the plane gets divided infinitely by frame inside frame. Red, green and blue are drawn by wide sidewalk lines and again by the perspectival spaces inside of spaces of a tree, a car, a lamp and a window.

The sidewalk is quite uneven, with tiny slopes and holes, in such a way that the steps are ready to negotiate the surface of contact. This fact does something to the rhythm of the visual planes, it grounds the visual slicing with impartial weight distributions. When the body walks, it does so through a rich thickness of perceptual activities. What the population of tree leaves emphasize are the ground planes. The emphasis comes through the contrast of textural patches extended through the ground, and the irregular insertion of many directional slopes.

If the body wanted to rest, it would find many spaces to contain it. It could lay on a park bench, as well as in an ample waste-basket risen from the ground, or even on the threshold of a house. Embodied by one of this containments, one can get more of one regular cadence while still listening to the murmurs of the polyrhythms arced by the many architectures around.

Architecture 7: Affective Signs.

Flying in an airplane also qualifies as an architecture of experience. Through the windows on each side, the cloudy and mountainous landscape moves slowly backwards. The gravitational force with its force and speed pulling forwards and, moving along the circular shape of the airplane cabin, seems to be out of time with the downtempo passing movement of clouds, stars and mountains.

Simultaneously, the force not only disseminates vectors moving forwards—like vectors being circularly drawn towards the tip of a pencil which is the airplane nose—but also pulls the rows of seats backwards. There are vectors of forces moving along the rounded cabin towards the airplane nose and towards the airplane tail. These double forces produce an effect of suspension to the numerous packed passengers' bodies.

A triplication of feeling is then produced by the pulling forces: forwards, backwards and suspended feelings. A middle line slices the axis of the body at a distance from the spine. The middle line shifts along the peripersonal space of the 'cabined body'. If attention could fall and follow the movement of the peripersonal line pulled now forwards and now backwards, then a plunging into a variation of architectures of experience could be registered. Because along the movement of the peripersonal line that slices up the limit of the body is where the affective signs populate. These are signs given by the force of movement and their function is to entice more movement propositions. They are signs that, as soon as they are registered, entice a continuation of movement: a sliding with the forces effected through the materiality making the signs felt. The forces effecting materiality are the ontogenetic forces that were qualified as 'mentality' in connection with the 'biogram' at the architecture 5B. A mentality is a hinge-plane or an entryway in which the incipency of the movements of perception can be felt. Thus, the affective signs begin to be registered where the movement animating matters are felt through their operations of slicing, distancing and narrowing: bodies, cabins, oxygen and plane.

In today's architecture of experience of an airplane journey, the concept of the affective sign will

be unpacked with the concept of ‘idea’ and other accompanying Spinozean concepts. The aim is to explore capacities for affective signs—inseparable from a dynamic perspective—that have not yet been thought in the pages of these architectures; and to find these capacities through a pragmatic speculation on Spinoza’s philosophy. In short, the aim is to not know much in advance about what an affective sign is, but to begin to give form to an idea of it by the close conversation with Spinoza, as if dancing with his philosophy will have the effect of allowing a choreography to emerge, with a corporeal dynamic which will compose what the capacities of the affective sign could be.

For Spinoza “the object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body or a certain mode of Extension which actually exists, and nothing else” (Spinoza 1985, 457). The idea occurs to the Mind because of a body affection. When one body affects the other, an idea is produced by the Mind. But what is tricky is that the Mind for Spinoza is not associated with the human brain and its cognitive abilities. The Spinozan Mind is similar to the Whiteheadian one. Mind can be interpreted as the activity of Matter (as Body) thinking itself. Mind is the mode in which a process of matters resolves its coming into existence and perseveres towards its future continuations.

Spinoza says that “the idea of the body and the body i.e., the Mind and the Body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension” (Spinoza 1985, 467). As an encounter of bodies produce an affective quality, this affect is an activity of immanent reflection of the very encounter. In other words, the fact that affect asks for a mode of being to be registered, is what qualifies it as thought. Therefore, an idea is the activity of Extension becoming Thought, or thought implicated in Extension. Thought is the surplus of body commotions transformed into their affectability. Thought is a micro loop that immanently registers how bodies are implicated to result in this immediate affective encounter. Thought is the immanent reflection of body encounters.

This is the first phase of an idea for Spinoza: just the registering (as thinking) of a mode of existent Extension in act, and nothing else (Spinoza 1985, 457). For Spinoza, at this early phase, ideas are ‘inadequate’, they only ‘indicate’ the presence of an external body affecting another. In

a second phase, ideas become ‘adequate’ because they ‘express’ another idea as the cause of the body affection.

Then, let’s see how Spinoza defines the different phases of the ‘inadequate’ (indicative) and ‘adequate’ (expressive) ideas with the help of Gilles Deleuze’s book on Spinoza *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*.

Deleuze says that the ‘inadequate idea’ “*represents* to our body, the effect of another body on ours (Deleuze 1988, 73).”; he adds that they are “the corporeal affections themselves, the traces of an external body on our body. (Deleuze 1988, 73-4).” For Deleuze these ‘ideas’ are “signs” since “they are not *explained* by our essence or power, but *indicate* our actual state and our incapacity to rid ourselves of a trace; they do not *express* the essence of the external body but indicate the presence of this body and its effect on us” (Deleuze 1988, 74).

According to Deleuze, the ideas are signs of affect when they just merely ‘indicate’ the affection of external bodies in a given situation, without knowing the cause of the affection. Here in the airplane, when the pulling forces forward and backward slicing up an undefined zone of the body limit, indicate themselves through the effects affecting the body, they qualify as signs: as an ‘indication’ (index) of what is going on at the level of bodies, that’s all. There is no further knowledge of the causes of the forces. Just a mere micro registration, or a type of micro reaction.

Deleuze says that ideas are ‘adequate’ when they not only *indicate* what is happening but also *express* another idea as the cause of what is happening. Adequate ideas are interconnected ideas: “They cannot be separated, therefore, from an autonomous connection of ideas in the attribute of thought”. They “represent the order and connection of things” (Deleuze 1988, 74).

Adequate ideas are ‘expressions’ of the cause carrying the bodies towards an affective encounter, and they are explained by the power of knowing or comprehending. But again, this mode of knowing is “not sought in a psychological consciousness but in a logical power that surpasses consciousness”. The “material of the idea” is “an epistemological material through which ideas refer to other ideas” (Deleuze 1988, 75). It can be said that adequate ideas emerge out of a bodily

encounter that this time does not only ask for the register of its *extension* but also for its expression of. In other words, to think adequately is a function of thought to express the *intensities* that bring together the extensive encounter. This is to say that, to comprehend the causes of affection is to perceive (to intuit) the *intensity* of the forces of the *extensive* encounter and to explain them: as to follow their vectors *beyond* the actual locus of affection towards *other* ideas of *other* bodies' affections. In short, adequate ideas represent the cause of the body affection, but this cause is not an external and linear cause, but the immanent cause from which the affects emerge in relation. As we will see below, the adequate cause refers to the emergent 'diagram'.

The way this conceptual panorama is understood in the context of this airplane journey through outer space goes as follows: the peripersonal limit of the body registers the immediate force of suspension on the first hand as an 'inadequate idea', but it also speculates on the diagrammatic forces accompanying the locally and singly indicated effect, so that the materially expressed idea begins to be expressed (as unfolded) and, becomes thus 'adequate'.

This is to say that: an adequate idea would be a sign followed to the limit of the local effect. As the body is impinged by a sign, the thought of the body unfolds beyond its limit to intuit the dynamic forces producing that effect. The body is affected and thinks in return, *with* the causes effecting it, beyond. It thinks beyond of what can be felt and perceived in the actual situation. In this context an adequate idea is the transformation of an affective sign into an environmental intuition of the generative forces at stake. It is the transformation of an implicated body to an expressed as explicated (or untangled) one; or a body becoming an immanent and immediate environment.

To understand better how affects becomes signs and diagrammatic expressions of them, we can continue thinking with the question posited by Deleuze after developing his explanation of the adequate ideas. Deleuze asks: how, at the human level of comprehension can we have adequate ideas, since our natural condition determines us to have only inadequate ones?

He answers that the way to acquire adequate ideas for Spinoza, is through the 'common notions'.

A “common notion is the representation of a composition between two or more bodies and a unity of this composition. Its meaning is more biological than mathematical; it expresses the relations of agreement or composition between existing bodies.” (Deleuze 1988, 54). One of the examples presented by Deleuze to demonstrate that common notions are more biological than mathematical is the one given by Spinoza concerning the relation between the chyle and lymph, as parts of the blood. What Deleuze is pointing at, is that common notions are modes of embodiment; they are not ‘abstract ideas’ but ‘general ideas’ of existing bodies. He adds that common notions capture relations not in abstraction, but “as they are, that is, as they are necessarily embodied in living beings” (Deleuze 1988, 57).

For Deleuze common notions refer to a biological rather than a mathematical or abstract level because they are a mode of embodiment, or a mode of thinking extension. Common notions are embodied ideas, thought through bodies implicated with an environment of forces. The body thinks a common notion that represents the environmental composition of forces effecting the airplane cabin, because the body with its cells, tissues, and fluid circulations agrees and thus respond to the plastic forces shaping the distribution of gravity. “Common” is an agreement with the environment in which the extraterrestrial atmosphere, the airplane and the cellular body can embody themselves in a play of infinite but limited folds. This agreement is the first step for Spinoza to create a common notion; it is the moment in which the affection of one body over the other increases the power capacities to affect and to think. This is a joyful inter-affection.

Deleuze will add that after the affective agreement between body compositions, the body can even think the *commonness* with the bodies that disagree with ours. For instance, the air pressure that pushed the tympanum to a point of unbearable pain, or the structure of the seats which menace the knee articulations towards poor fluid enough circulation. Here we find a glimpse of the ethics implied in the notion of commonness. When Extension thinks the common, it is reflecting on the modes in which a body can continue to endure, even around other bodies that diminish their capacity.

Since Deleuze says that the first step to form a common notion is to agree with other bodies that empower our capacity (give us joy), thereby facilitating the second step towards common notions

that are more general and include the bodies that disagree with us (give us sadness). The common thought is the thought that allows bodies to find their life capacity despite environments that diminish them. The thought of a common notion is a thought that proposes to transform the circulation of affects between bodies, in such a way that a less capacious environment becomes a more capacious one. The thought of a common notion is a choreographic proposition for the affective relations that can be dynamized for a more capacious composition of bodies.

Common notions can be understood as choreographic, particularly so if we attend to how Spinoza conceptualizes the body. For Spinoza, a body like the human body should not be limited to a 'single' organism contained by skin. A body is the sum of multiple dynamics transversing and folding it, with and besides numerous other bodies. An 'Individual Body' stands for the union and composition of many bodies due to a similar manner in their movement and rest, size or constraint (Spinoza 1985, 460). The common notions are a mode of embodiment in the midst of body encounters, in which the main factor is the way in which the movement of speed and rest determine their co-composition.

Thus, common notions are an embodiment of the more-than 'individual' body. This is a register of the environment of affects' circulation that mostly agree (but also disagree) with the more-than 'individual body'. Common notions are a choreography of affected thoughts or of the affection of extension thinking through its environ-mentality: again a mentality of the circulation of affects moving towards a more capacious environment for living. In short, after all this theorization around 'common notions, they should be understood not as a comfortable place to be, like common sense or consensus, but as the choreographic feeling always open to the beyond of what can be perceived in the here and now and to the affects that challenge the affective capacity. They are the (more-than) feeling of a style of environ-mentality, one that has enough joyful affective hold to move with the unrest of the unknown.

There is one more aspect that turns affective signs and their adequate expression into a relevant technique for more capacious modes of living. This is the aspect of *memory* or *habit* concerning inadequate ideas. Through the play of memory, the affective signs (although inadequate) can be understood as seeding the future for more capacious (and this time adequate) immanent and

immediate environments.

This is Spinoza's take on affective memory. In the *Ethics*, while he explains that the movement of a body is determined by other bodies in movement ad infinitum, he elaborates the definition of three types of bodies characterizing the manners of determination: 'hard', 'soft' and 'fluid'. 'Hard' are the bodies "which parts apply one to the other through large surfaces"; 'soft' are the bodies "which parts are applied through small surfaces" and 'fluid' are the bodies which parts move between themselves" (Spinoza 1985, 460).

The 'fluid' body parts in their encounter with other body movements, are what mutate the 'soft' body surfaces. The encounter changes the way in which the 'fluid' parts reflect their movement to each other. And the change of the 'fluid' body parts is what conditions a later encounter with other bodies. The 'fluid body parts' create a 'memory' as a result of being the most sensitive to the 'traces' of other external bodies. Through this memory capacity of the fluid body parts, Spinoza goes so far as to say that affects can be reflected (as produced) without the actual existence of external bodies. If the movement of existent bodies share a similarity with the fluid encounter of other antecedent bodies not in existence, the affects bring into actuality the thought of not existing bodies. (Spinoza 1985, 464). At the same time, the affective encounter can be registered (as to be inadequately thought) because the body brings with it the past capacity to move with an actual pattern. In this sense, past traces of composite movement encounters determine a present actual encounter too. This means that each actual body's encounter stores a trace that can be reflected in the future, when a similar manner of movement (and body size and constrain) occurs.

After this long journey through such a complicated landscape at each side of the airplane window, what can be recapitulated about the affective signs is the following:

The affective sign is a thought of the fluidity of movement composing bodies, that traces something of the interconnected order of the situation (something of the adequate idea). The interconnected order across bodies' composition is equal to the concept of and embodied 'transversality' touched upon in past 'architectural chapters' (5C, D and E). The embodied

transversal intuition of what is happening, is an intuition that searches for a ‘common notion’; that notion that allows us to form ‘adequate ideas’. To search for the common notion in the midst of what is happening is to embody an attunement of the forces affecting the power capacities of the situation. The attunement is to the movements of body that give more power and capacity (joy) for a compositional increase; so that the power will have enough force to include and transform in turn the relational forces that decrease such a capacity (sad).

The ethics of the architectures of experience is based in the search of affective signs that intensively think (as they express and unfold beyond the local effects) modes of encounter that give an increase in the capacity for further interconnected composition. As was mentioned before, this ‘thought-affected-movement-idea’ is not contained in a verbal sentence or a “psychological consciousness” (Deleuze 1988, 75). These ideas are thoughts of transitional affects, are movement intuitions that remain fluid entities ready to hook up in the future to a novel interconnected encounter, and to go through it preserving the life of the bodies passing it, and maybe falling into the containment of a clear and distinct conscious thought. And the plunge into a future body composition is not just an adaptation into what is happening, but an active transformation of the sad affective relations.

Lastly, according to Spinoza the affective signs which are inadequate ideas—since they did not yet explain the causes of affection—are not errors of imagination (Spinoza names the affective presence of non-existent bodies ‘images’). Imagination in itself does not err, it only misses an idea of an existent body. It misses an idea that shows to Mind that, the actual affective idea, does not correspond to an existent actual body. In this sense affective signs are the “lowest degree of our power of understanding” (Deleuze 1988, 75), and they are at their emerging level ‘imaginings’, but they carry with them in germ (in imagination and inadequately and obscurely) the power to intensify and become a dynamic image (a diagram), a true idea which translates the movement of what is going on, into a lived concept.

This is to say that affective signs begin in the imagination of what is happening, in the obscurity of confused knowledge, precisely because knowledge can be given shape through the pursuit of this obscurity, without a presumed form for it. To begin to know what is happening affectively

by the indication of affective signs, is to move with a dance of obscure uncertainty. A dance that is about to choreograph a novel thought for what it means pragmatically, to know.

In any case, this architecture begins to fade with the pulling forces changing their vectors one more time; this time tilting the many body parts of the extraterrestrial atmosphere and the cabin full of packed bodies, towards landing.

Architecture 8: Abstract Desire.

This architecture of experience is somatic in that it experiments with the ligamentous physiology of the body. The ligamentous physiology includes the experience of actual ligaments in bodies, as well as the potential processes operating through the actual experience which refers to embryological patterns. Body Mind Centering explores the embryological patterns as the kind of developmental movements occurring during the first eight weeks of life. These are dynamic structures that keep informing adult life after the embryonic stage has been completed (Cohen 2014). In the context of this architecture, the embryological development is thought as a topology of qualitative dynamics adding a surplus of experience, to what is usually understood as a simple and functional use of a body ligament: i.e. the ligament flex, rotation and keep the different segments of the arm assembled.

The embryological or processual experience of ligaments will sound something like this: the arm grows as a whole unit, in the unit a space is created, like an inter-zone, in which cells and fluids orbit around and segment the unit while simultaneously linking it to other segments. For instance, the whole unit of the arm generates an orbital space which segments and links what would be later the shoulder blade; from this inter-zone the units calibrate a distance and generate another orbital space for cells and fluids which will segment and link again the unit of the arm, this time in that which will become the elbow; and later on more segments and links will become orbital and calibrating spaces for what will become the wrist and hand. Through every segment along the arm unit, there is a play of polarizing forces which distance themselves, so that the joints and ligaments will be created. Each body segment gains the consistency of a unit through the polarizing forces simultaneously distancing and linking, along all the other segments of the body.

This processual dynamic keeps occurring through adult life. Ligaments are segmented angles of relation which transmit information about orientation to bones and muscles through fascia—that thin layer of connective tissues covering muscles, organs and other soft structures of the body. Ligaments are local angles of experience which inform more traditional structures (like the

muscular one) where they are, and this is because the angular zones of ligaments always operate conjunctively, transmitting information through fascia with the other angles.

A ligamentous experience is not limited to the body understood as a whole structure, but in this particular case, it is felt as a dynamic of environmental segments and conjunctions. A room becomes a play of qualitative forces, which polarize distances between different angles while calibrating zones of pressure. There is a force of pressure around the ankle which calibrates a distance between the lower leg and the foot and which extends across the inter-zone of the contour of the plant in front of the desk. That the contour of the plant in front of the desk is attended as linked somewhere down in the ankle, means that a segmentation of the room has happened, one that registers the differentiation between the elements constituting plant-desk-ankle: a growing differentiation through interconnection.

That the ankle differentiates through the ligaments and fascia from the desk-plant-floor, means that a space is becoming shaped, one that differentiates, segments as it links. The contour of greenness, in the sagittal plane, curves the space of experience towards the density of gravity, polarizing the whole of the ankle with the ground and the longitudinal plane curving even more. Finally, where the space is created through segmentation and interconnection, energy is registered. Energy in the form of a change of quality, a shift of the body physiological fluids and a shift of the room mode of relation. Or, it can be said that the interconnection of matters themselves become a surface where energy become registrable.

This ligamentous introduction of an architecture of experience aims to think the affective signs as intensive points in which a kind of energy is tapped and felt through underground interconnections beyond conscious perception, and it also aims to think about the unconscious investments (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 205) which are indicated by this found energy.

What comes now is the bridge towards process philosophy. This bridge will open a conceptual landscape to research these two themes. These are the themes referring to the ‘affective signs’ as indices of an abstract subterranean energy and, as indicators of a nonconscious type of ‘investment’ which in turn, animate the operations that generate spaces for living.

In the ‘Introduction to Schizoanalysis’ from their book *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe the energy specific of the desiring-machines as Libido (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 320). We have to remember that ‘desiring-machines’ is a concept that values production or processes over the products to be consumed in the midst of a Capitalistic context. This concept also undoes the distinction between man, machine and nature, since in its philosophical frame: “the essence of man becomes one within nature in the form of production or industry” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 2). Desiring-machines are machines in the strict sense, because they proceed by breaks and flows (...) in a generalized schizo-genesis, whose elements are schizzesflows” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 315). Machines are transversal connections of connections of connections, in which flows are interrupted (or schizzed) while connected, along organs, technology, etc.

Deleuze and Guattari recognize the discovery of this ‘abstract energy of desire’ in Freud’s psychoanalysis, but they reproach its capture under the forms that represent them in the theatrical complex of Oedipus. For Deleuze and Guattari the containment of the ‘abstract energy of desire’ in the closed context of the family is essential to the advancement of capitalism, which in turn discovers the ‘abstract energy of labor’. Together with Michel Foucault, they date the end of the classical art period of representation as the moment in which the ‘abstract essence of labor’ and the ‘abstract energy of desire’ are discovered (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 329). Hence, they make a parallel between the end of representational practices in art and the rise of psychoanalysis and capitalism. This point indicates the capacity of artful abstract techniques (as non-representative: not functioning as re-presenters of something, but functioning as moving with something happening) to follow the ‘abstract energy of desire’. In other words, there is a parallel to be drawn between techniques shaped to register abstraction— such as somatic and choreographic techniques— with the techniques needed to register—through affective signs— the abstract subterranean desire energy and its investments.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the sexual energy of the desiring machines is everywhere. They exemplify it through cosmic phenomena, as well as the way a bureaucrat fondles his records and a businessman causes money to circulate: “desire does not take as its objects persons or things,

but the entire surrounding that it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined, introducing therein breaks and captures” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 322).

Deleuze and Guattari also notice that psychoanalysis makes ‘procreation’ the function of ‘sexuality’, instead of the other way around. This is to say that psychoanalysis thinks the processual force of sexuality as directed to the goal of procreation. Ontologically speaking, psychoanalysis thinks first procreation and then the abstract force of sexuality. It thinks the ‘product’ (of procreation) as ontologically first, instead of the process (of abstract sexual energy), which is uncontainable in the figure of man, woman, child. In short, for Deleuze and Guattari the abstract force of sexuality can’t be contained in the structural category of the family. Additionally, psychoanalysis needs to repress or castrate the abstract essence of desire in order to capture the force of desire and bring it forth to consciousness, as procreation. This is an anthropomorphic representation of sexual energy, which in capitalistic terms represent the surplus value extracted from the desiring machine in the form of ‘private property’.

This is why, for Deleuze and Guattari, the first task of schizanalysis (the alternative to psychoanalysis) is to liberate desire from the theatre of representation, in psychoanalysis as well as in capitalism: “the discovery of an activity of production *in general and without distinction*, as it appears in capitalism, is the identical discovery of *both* political economy *and* psychoanalysis, beyond the determinate systems of representation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 333).

As mentioned above, what is relevant about this abstract energy, is not only that it is not contained in anthropomorphic categories, but also that it indicates the unconscious investments produced by the desiring-machines. These unconscious investments are not contained in a symbolic representation (a representation that stands for what is missing in desire or its the lack). These investments are ‘machinic doings’: they are not contained in an anthropomorphic category like the ‘human’ or in a specific ‘object’. They are the incessant doings of the flows, connecting, segmenting (territorializing) and dissolving (deterritorializing). The doings of the desiring machines are more-than human, though they can be re-subjectified in anthropomorphic figures. This is to say that desiring-machines have an autonomous doing that generates investments despite the human categories imposed upon them. One of the tasks of schizoanalysis is to

analyze the ‘indices’ of the investments, in order to check which types of choreography of flows of desire are prevalent: whether the flows circulate a cartography of repression—since they extract the surplus value of desire’s process to capture it in the subjective category of the ‘family’ or the objective category of ‘private property’—or whether the flows elude repression, producing unfamiliar and non-appropriative ‘schizo choreographic movements’.

Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize an inseparable relation between the social and the desiring machines. The social is the ‘molar’ or ‘large aggregate’, in which the molecular or imperceptible transversal flows of desiring-machines are transduced into anthropomorphic categories; whereas the desiring-machines are the “non-human sex, the molecular machinic elements, their arrangements and their syntheses, without which there would be neither a human sex specifically determined in the large aggregates, nor a human sexuality capable of investing these aggregates” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 324).

Hence, there is a relation of ‘included disjunction’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 374) between the flows of desire across molar (social) and molecular elements (desiring machines); and, as Deleuze and Guattari further elaborate: “the duality of the poles passes less between the molar and the molecular than to the interior of the molar social investments, since *in any case* the molecular formations are such investments” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 373). Following this line of thought, we get to see that what matters for schizoanalysis is not to avoid the molar functions of desire in favor of an approach solely concentrated in the molecular functions, but to schizoanalyze the molar social investments in order to get to the choreography of the modes of functioning trespassing both. So that in the end, a social molar aggregate could be exploded by the molecular charges in which it is invested.

From the perspective of the molar investments, what needs to be schizo-analyzed are the indices given through the objects of love or desire. The person or object to whom love is dedicated intervene as a point “of connection, of disjunction, of conjunction of whose libidinal tenor of a properly unconscious investment they translate” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 323). As we will see below, the love indices found in the molar investments per se, are not enough, but what matters are the type of movements carried by the indices, since the movements are what define

whether the investment is 'repressive' or 'revolutionary'. Thus, before to get into the love indices let's see how Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize these types of movements of investment.

One of the types of the social molar investment is called the 'preconscious investment of interest or class' and the other 'unconscious libidinal investments'. Under the regime of the 'preconscious investment of class', there is the production of a desire for social connections which are global, extensive, and which tend towards a single manner of coding desire. Desire is associated with a dominant class of the population that extracts its surplus value. Under the regime of the 'unconscious libidinal investments' there is a desire production that is not extensive but imperceptible and which primes the incipient force of desire towards further non-subjective/objective 'proliferation' of desire (non-figurative, more-than human), though it also risks priming desire towards its own repression.

In both social investments, the operation of desire can remain or can become repressive. At the level of the 'preconscious investment of class', the operation of desire can remain repressive if the desire's indices follow the above mentioned trend towards global and totalizing connections. This investment's trend orients towards the formation of more 'personal' or individual 'subjective' categories of interest. At the level of the 'unconscious libidinal investments', desire can become repressive if the revolutionary desire against a dominant class, desires to generate a counter interest, but this interest in its germinal form follows the steps towards the formation of a new category that nevertheless encloses the subject in a totalitarian way. At this level of investment a revolutionary desire, opposing a dominant class, can turn desire against itself (by capturing its abstract revolutionary force into a new subjective category) and thus reproduce the repressive power operations of the dominant class. Deleuze and Guattari say that a reactionary production of desire needs to follow the quality of 'included disjunction' inherent to the desiring-machine (the more-than human autonomous production of desire), and find a way to coexist with the desires they revolutionize against, along the social molar aggregate.

The task of schizanalysis is therefore to reach investments of unconscious desire of the social field, insofar as they are differentiated from the preconscious investment of

interest, and insofar as they are not merely capable of counteracting them, but also of coexisting with them in opposite modes (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 383).

Deleuze and Guattari show the danger of a repressive unconscious desire that, in principle, aims for the revolution of dominant powers of subjugation, with the example of the ways in which categories such as ‘homosexuality’ and ‘heterosexuality’ can get trapped in the categorical web of Oedipus.

For example, no “gay liberation movement is possible as long as homosexuality is caught up in a relation of exclusive disjunction with heterosexuality, a relation that ascribes them both to a common Oedipal and castrating stock, charged with ensuring only their differentiation in two noncommunicating series, instead of bringing to light their reciprocal inclusion and their transverse communication in the decoded flows of desire (included disjunctions, local connections, nomadic conjunctions) (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 384).

The ‘unconscious investment’ can be truly revolutionary if its operation of desire follow the transverse communication of the decoded flows. We will talk more about the concept of ‘transverse communication’ below. So far what is important to highlight is that the truly revolutionary ‘unconscious investment’ is the one that invests in the ‘schizzes’ or ‘cuts’ inherent to the desiring machine. This is a revolutionary unconscious that, through the investment *in* the ‘schizzes’, breaks open the Oedipal category of the subject. This type of investment is, again, more-than ‘human’ and thus, more-than subjective. It generates a more-than individual subject: a ‘subject- group’. The ‘subject-group’ is made of partial (as broken open) individuals, which do not pre-exist the collective molecular forces that brought them together. And the subject-group is durational, because it lasts while that the forces of the desiring-machines hold the consistency of the desire agglomerating the group’s parts.

Subject-groups are continually deriving from subjugated groups through the rupture of the latter: they mobilize desire, and always cut its flows again further on, overcoming the

limit, bringing the social machines back to the elementary forces of desire that form them (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 383).

What Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate through the conceptual analysis of these two types of preconscious and unconscious investments, are the dangers entailed in thinking revolution through ideological frames of thought. Because at the ideological level of the ‘preconscious investment of interest’ one group of a class could be desiring revolution and still at the ‘unconscious libidinal investments’ the power operations for the development of desire can be working towards the formation of further repression, in the germinal form of a new totalitarian formation.

Now let’s see how Deleuze and Guattari describes the operation of ‘transverse communication’, that moves through the social molar aggregates. Keeping in mind that transverse communication ‘moves through’ the social by way of *disjunction* (breaking it open), but that at the same time by remaining *included* (cohabitating with it). As we have seen before, this type of transverse movement re-activates the *inclusive disjunctive* quality proper to the desiring-machine working on the plane of the social. Then, returning to the concept of the ‘love indices’, let’s see how to schizoanalyze these indices of transverse communication.

Deleuze and Guattari say that in order to schizoanalyse the social molar aggregates through the ‘love indices’, we need to follow the transverse movements of communication so that all the molar “planes are traversed until their molecular line of escape is reached (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 350)”, like Marcel Proust *In Search of Lost time*. What matters is to move with “the word of transverse communication where the finally conquered nonhuman sex mingles with the flowers a new earth where desire functions according to its molecular elements and flows” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 350).

Through the transverse movement of communication, the ‘love indices’ escape the extensive parts of the total body of the social, towards partial and molecular intensities. Throughout *In Search of Lost time*, the transversal movement that occurs through the jumps across many extensive planes, is the operation that produces an opening to the molecular formation of desire:

“thus in the kiss where Albertine’s face jumps from one place of consistency to another, in order to finally come undone in the nebula of molecules” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 350).

What the intensive indices become are ‘signs of desire’. They are the reverse of the symbolic representation—whether the symbol is repressive or revolutionary—and they do not find something lacking (they do not find the absence of a loved one), instead they find the positive multiplicity of the real loving production of desire (abstract desire).

If the ‘indices of love’ at the ‘molar level’ of signification signal towards a form of desire for that particular person, object, or property, at the ‘molecular level’ the ‘signs of desire’ compose a *signifying chain*, that properly speaking does not signify anything in particular.

“At the molecular limit of the molar aggregates, the chain no longer has any function other than that of deterritorializing the flows and causing them to pass through the signifying wall, thereby undoing the codes” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 361).

This is to say that the *signifying chain* of the ‘signs of desire’, functions as a transversal line made of many signs points or singular points (now that face, then that kiss, then that garden) which function is not to represent or to denote one particular thing, but to generate a transduction—like a porous membrane—for the molecular flows to pass to the level of the molar, in order to decode the individual points of formation or codes.

For if the corresponding chain effectively forms codes, inasmuch as it folds into exclusive molar configurations, it undoes the codes by unfolding along a molecular fiber that includes all possible figures (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 361).

The movement of the signs of desire goes from the molar formations that were recorded (as formed) in the total body of the socius and generates a passage through a molecular fiber that undoes the recording of codes. This movement through the molecular does not join flows, pushing them to take form in molar objects, persons and landscapes. Instead, it passes them to

the side, where they are unrecorded, disjuncted, able to become again potentials: *all possible figures* (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 361).

Now, bringing together the vocabulary of the past architectures of experience with schizoanalytic vocabulary, we can say that ‘affective signs’ are ‘signs of desire’. If affective signs are followed, they detour attention through the ‘molecular fiber’ that undoes codes through the flows of desire. When a movement of experience signals its force of desire, it tells something about the energetic investment of desire: how it is circulating, giving feedback to complete forms of thoughts-feelings or to reverse ones—those which continue passing through un-registrable topologies.

Returning to the ligamentous architecture of experience, somatics modes of moving through the world can have a feedback effect on the investments of desire too. Through the segmented link of the plant, desk and ankle, an affective sign tells the story of an unconscious investment that is more than human, of a non-human sexuality. The reversal of the affective sign, in this moment and location, unregisters the disjunctive vectors of the flows of desire. This disjuncted flow can reconfigure its unstructured configuration, later again and tell something about others affective signs, this time along the place of the left wrist-elbow-shoulder, table, plant and the whole garden of the first floor yearning for spring to finally blow. Something of that choreography between intensive and extensive movements can ingress a future experience and inflect its mode of taking shape.

This is to say that the register of affective signs can tell us something about our human and individual unconscious investments: are we by force of habit relating and segmenting, following the logic of containments that subtract value energy towards private property and closed group enjoyment, or are we intuiting the logic of abstract energies that slips back to the generation of spaces which are not configured, with no human identities in mind yet?

One of the challenges to think the affective signs as indices of investments, is that it’s hard to tell when an investment could become totalitarian. The only possible choice is to keep releasing the flows that are invested in the actual levels of body encounters. This is to say that the actual and concrete encounters are relevant. The only possible choice is to keep finding other bodies—there

the plant, desk and ankle; a day after, a conversation with two other philosophers about finances; and just before this moment, a walk through the streets of Montreal that encountered the bodies colored by the purple light of the sunset—so that these bodies acted as surfaces of reflection or registration, so that the flows of unconscious investment got feedback from the actual encounter. The actual encounter between segmented bodies are surfaces of registration, in that they give feedback about the subterranean flows of association. The registration of bodies (as intensive and extensive environments) offers the investment of desire, which is trespassed by a rhythm of association which is molecular, in the sense of un-registrable, but almost palpable as the ‘surplus value’ of the encounter.

Now what is relevant to remark from this simple somatics technique for encounters, is that the only way to prevent totalitarian investments is to keep releasing the investments of actual desire towards their un-registrable flows. Namely, to believe that from the actual assembled encounter, there is a surplus of movement, still and always in a germinal (or embryological) level, which keep occurring underway. What is important is to do nothing with that surplus, to value it for what it does not do at the moment, so that it can be free and escape with more force, for a whiplash to come. That force of escape could prevent a totalitarian becoming (a discriminatory subjectivity or any form of rejection towards the world) from ever taking form in a proximal actual life. When a next actual life takes form seamlessly without a totalitarian grasp of the world, it still brings with it the more-than-actual operations that prevented that totalitarian outcome from growing. The more-than actual brings what Whitehead calls the ‘negative prehensions’ (Whitehead 1978, 41). Put differently, the more-than-actual operations (negative prehensions) will carry with them the antidote of totalitarian becomings, in what otherwise, seems to be a seamlessly easy continuation of life. What is released can be relayed to ingress in the future as an antidote for dominant becomings.

Paradoxically, the pragmatic of doing nothing with the surplus of abstract desire, is a pragmatic that implies a lot of activities are going on, but that those activities are not registered at rational and conscious levels. They *feel like nothing* but they *are not just nothing*. This pragmatic functions as a somatics attunement to the actual movements of conjunctions, by allowing them to be released from the conjunction, they become disjuncted, so that new contrasts for intuition can

be grown again into conjunction. Intuition grows into modes of actual thinking-feelings (or feelings that think with little use of rationality or consciousness). So that future manoeuvres across bodies can intuitively find more capacity, or surplus of life, or more doings of abstract work, with little actual labor effort done. It is following this frame of thought that somatic practices are inseparable from an alternative mode of thinking and feeling.

Lastly, the un-register of affective signs for indices of desire is not just a play of pure deterritorialization aiming for the pure destruction of the contained and repressed totalitarian figures. This un-register is a plunge to the subterranean desiring-machines, which are already planning words, but in levels of perception that are yet uncatchable.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari allow art and science to break from causality and infuse revolutionary potentialities. In this sense, what counts the most for them is the ‘break’ from the causality of the molar aggregates, deterritorializing them. The ‘break’, or the ‘schizz’ has no reason, meaning or logical cause, “it came to existence only by means of a desire” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 413).

This means that the schizz, or the break, is of the desiring machines, and let’s remember that desiring machines are conceptualized as connections of connections of connections, through breaks and flows. But as Deleuze and Guattari stressed “desire is an exile [but] never an individual exile, never a personal desert, but a collective exile and a collective desert” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 412). What this architecture wants to emphasize is that the technique of the ‘schizz’ (the schizo-somatics technique) is not for an absolute deterritorialization, but for an immersion into the irrational machines. This is an immersion into the dynamic of flows and breaks already occurring, already pulsing relations, already undertaking a cartography of potential worlds. Worlds which can only become actual if the abstract operations that are choreographing them are carefully listened to, so that they become inhabited by a population that truly believe in the power of abstract desire and labor, in the power of their creation without effort. This is a plunge, again, towards the artful alter-therapeutic potential running underway through the abstract desire of the machines.

“Undoing the realms of personas and the ego, not on behalf of a pre-oedipal undifferentiated, but on behalf of anoedipal lines of singularities, which does not concern objects, aims, or sources, but only machinic forms of indices” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 401) [The underline is mine].

To schizoanalyze does not mean to have a ‘total’ break from the world, but to reinvent what it means to have an experience that invents itself *with the machinic* becoming of the world. This machinic experience invents what it means to have an embodied experience, or what in the frames of these architectures is called a ‘schizo-somatics’ experience. It is a schizo-somatics experience because as we have seen, to schizoanalyze means to follow the ‘indices of love’ affectively. Because affect is what makes palpable the shape of the signifying wall—which is less a wall but more of a tapestry-like membrane—from where the choreography of flows from the molar and the molecular occurs. Again, affect is of the resonance of the membrane’s agitation due to the passages from the molar (the actual extensive individual indication) to the molecular (the intensive excess of it). Hence, the feeling of the membrane is a distributed feeling through many world points or locations. It is a feeling that is not located inside of a body, but it is already a passage through extensive points. Moreover, the membrane is a feeling of the passage to the intensive excess of all those points. Thus, to feel the membrane at the moment of encounter with the ‘indices of love’ means to experiment with a mode of feeling the *extensive* distribution *and* the *intensive* passage towards the more-than sensible. To experiment what it means to reinvent simultaneous with what it means to feel, and what it means to have a body to feel that way.

Architecture 9: Diagrammatic Affectability.

One of the most complicated features of the affective signs to think about is that they emerge as signs of an individual event, and simultaneously they draw links with other events that pop up in different places. Moreover, in the midst of the registration of affective signs, even without attending to the other events linked with this immanent one, the complicated thing is that these signs are not perceived as a single actuality or a single body, but they are perceived as an affective arc that resonates through actualities (What was called in the architecture 8 following Deleuze and Guattari, a 'signifying chain': a membrane-like texture that filters processual passages). Lastly, the affective signs are inseparable from an architecture of experience that calls forwards the mutation of feelings shaping a body, in other words, they call forwards a mode of embodiment. What is special about this mode of embodiment is that is unlimited and transversal. It is a dispersed distribution of feelings lured by the thinking physicality of the world.

Due to the amount of brain twisting paradoxes, the aim of this small-scale architecture 9 is to add some concepts to move through the paradoxes fluently, and also, to gather up some of the characteristics of the 'affective signs' encountered in past 'architectures'. In a way, throughout the architectures, a journey can be traced that began with conceptualizing what the 'architectures of experience' were, and that ended with researching how the 'affective signs' operated through them. This 'architecture 9' highlights some of the features of the 'affective signs' that could have been overshadowed by the conceptual focus put in the 'architectures'.

In a hidden footnote of the book *Semblance and Event*, Brian Massumi writes about the paradox intrinsic to the concept of the 'subjective form' by Whitehead in ways that foreshadow answers to the modes in which affective signs manifest themselves. For Whitehead, a subjective form of experience is a 'sheer individuality' which enjoys itself and simultaneously is open to more than itself. What is remarkable is that what opens a subjective form of experience to other actualities is its capacity for 'affectability': the capacity to affect its own subjective form with the more-than actual. This capacity is what allows for 'conceptual reversion', which is the origination of the conceptual feelings as an extra something from the physical feelings (what is just being felt

through actual entities) (Whitehead 1978, 249). The function of the ‘conceptual reversion’ is to ‘value’ the patterns for nexuses that conform more and less with other past patterns for feelings. The degree of conformity between past and present patterns for feelings is that which a novel relational pattern (a proposition for feeling) adds to the individual subjective form.

Affectability is the capacity for feelings to open the ‘sheer individual’ subjective form to other activities: to the relational patterns of other processes. When affects are theorized as signs, signs are perceived as entryways to processes of change (propositional feelings). And the openings are transversal, in that they draw resonances with actual and non-actual entities, beyond a linear logic of cause and effect. This is why an architecture of experience, as a subjective form, is ‘causa sui’, and simultaneously open to the resonance of other processes that are (or were) ‘causa sui’ of themselves. That’s why the manner in which subjective forms resolve their form taking is not based on a final cause (a predestined aim), but in an improvisation with the elements that determine their potential.

The only way the inclusion of the more-beyond can belong to the constitution of the occasion is in the form of *capacities* of infolding (and techniques for bequeathing the formative activity of the occasion to others – diagrams). The only way capacities can infold is if they are at the same time *affectabilities* (Massumi 2011, 182).

This last quote shows once again that the affective signs are unthinkable without considering their diagrammatic quality. The diagrammatic dimension of affect *is* what opens the individual subjective form of experience towards something beyond, towards other relational patterns. With Spinoza, we saw that a sign of affect was merely an inadequate idea, a mere registration of matter that animates its own mindedness, and that it needed the expression of other affective ideas to understand the diagrammatic causes of the initial sign (architecture 7). It was said that the adequate ideas were diagrammatic because they expressed the intensive forces of the other affects composing the extensive encounter of the inadequate affect. In brief, the adequate ideas were diagrammatic because they followed the affective vectors beyond the locus of the actual initial affect. The diagrammatic intensive forces followed the interconnection of the affective ideas infolding the actual one.

The diagram goes beyond the actual. The diagram doesn't travel in an extensive manner but intensively, in that it taps into the patterns of relation (nexuses) giving shape to the actual affect. The diagram is what contrasts patterns of relations. The patterns of relation that conform more or less with the feelings relations in process of actualizing their form (conceptual valuation). In this sense, the diagram is an immanent relation of this singular process taking form, with other patterned relations that can be considered as active 'pastness'. Here, the word 'pastness' does not refer to a category belonging to metric time: something that happened exactly two days or two years ago. This concept of 'pastness' refers to the active accompaniment of patterns of relations of processes that already took form together with the actualizations generating a present, or strictly speaking a 'presentness'. A match carries the capacity to light a fire in the same manner as the active 'pastness' in-folds the act. At the moment of lightning fire, the match actualizes the 'pastness' of its nexus of relations with the rough surface of the matchbox. It is a 'pastness' *for* and *in* the act. Whitehead would say that is the continuation of the immediate past in the present.

This is to demonstrate that the diagram does not exist in an empty space from which the actual affective encounter shapes a pattern out of nothing. The past patterned nexuses of relations are what activate the resolution into a singular dynamic form in the act. In this sense, the patterns of relations (nexus) are one with the actual, but they are with the actual at the immanent limit of sense perception (more about "nonsensuous perception" below).

The signs of affect (the mere actual affect) are inseparable from the diagram, which is the entryway to the pastness of relations. The pastness of relations, in turn, is what enacts the affective arc of the subjective form. That's why the subjective form signals towards the beyond of its sheer individuality. Therefore, the actual sign of affect is fanned out through the arc that includes its patterns of relations signaling elsewhere than the individual event. To perceptually feel the affective signs is to intuit through the diagram the multiplicity of other relations resonating with the individual subjective form. Again, the diagram is what keeps the interstices open to dimensions of experience alternative to the individual subjective form. And it bears repeating that the diagram should not be misunderstood with a stable image, like a map or a drawing inside of the head. The diagram is an intuition of a sort of embodiment that opens the

containment of what is commonly considered the individual physiological or psychological self. The diagram is a transversal thought-feeling of the vectors of relations beyond the focal points of conscious perception (nonsensuous perception).

In summary, the first paradox concerning the affective signs let us know that in each architecture of experience, there is a singular space of experience selected, and that other spaces elsewhere are included in that architecture through the real effects enacted by their patterns of relation, patterns of relation which in turn are expressed by the diagrammatic affectability.

The second complication that was noted on the conceptualization of the affective signs, that of being registered as an arc across bodies or matters, finds a natural answer through the concept of the diagram. Since the diagram operates as the opening for feeling relations in excess of the many actualities involved in one event, since they fold nexuses across more-than discrete entities. The diagrammatic embodiment is transversal because it is called to feel what can't be felt in the actual occasion of experience, but only grasped beyond sense perception, as an intuition that resonates. The body loses its individual ability to feel nexuses that do not feel like anything discrete, because the nexuses carry the resonance of patterns that tell about the other occasions of experience, not of the time and space of the here and now.

(...) resonance involves a nonsensuous perception by the event under way of its affective co-implication with other events—an intuition of their mutual immanence in each other's arising. In Deleuze's reading of Leibniz, the corresponding concept to the affective capacity or resonant infolding is the *vinculum* (bond) – the “unlocalizable primary link that borders the absolute interior” of a monad with its outside; “a supple and adherent membrane coextensive with everything inside” that enables the event of experience to “recover the other side, not as exterior to the monad, but as the exterior or outside *of* its own interiority (Deleuze 1993, 111) (Massumi 2011, 183).

Massumi moves along the conceptual interconnections between ‘non sensuous perception’, ‘affect’ and ‘relations’, all the terms introduced thus far in this architecture. He stresses that affect is the capacity to resonate with the nonsensuous, which is the force of ‘pastness’ of the

nexus of relations arriving in the event of experience from an outside that in fact, is interior—as immanent—to it. Nonsensuous perception can be understood as the presence of the nexus of relations arriving from other events, a presence at the edge of conscious perception, because the relations infold the actual event, but they remain at the limit of actualization themselves. That's why nonsensuous perception is perceived as an affective resonance, as Massumi says, of the co-implication of the actual event with others. Nonsensuous perception feels like an overall atmosphere of the event—like its perceptual tone—carrying the cohabitation with more than one time (pastness) and location (other events).

Hence, to intuit a sign of affect is to resonate with the multiple vectors slipping into the architecture of experience from elsewhere. Having this nonsensuous resonance in mind is why a rich and complicated study on the theory of feelings by Whitehead was done (architecture 2), in order to begin to have an intuition of what it means to embody the nonsensuous, and to believe in its real effects. And this is why a becoming sensitive to the nonsensuous is also a becoming body of the more than physical, a becoming movement, transversally: a schizo-body.

Architecture 10: Signs of Power and Signs of Potential.

There is something more to be said about the nonsensuous atmosphere of any architecture of experience, since the quality of *nonsensuousness* is the entryway towards the artfulness of experience (or the creative advance of experience), which is indexed by the affective sign. There is something about embodiment resonating with the process of architecturing, being part of the same but differential movement. As if an atmospheric mood is a movement of stretching a space of experience at the same time as an elasticizing of a body in the shape of a tentacular feeler. The perceptual feeling of the affective sign is a movement of process undoing and redoing space, body and the patchwork of feelings. All of this as an act. All of this as a performative event. All of this as doings immanent to the subjective arc of the experience. But what does it mean for a human to perform in the event of a subjective form architecting itself, having in mind that what is happening includes a dimension of nonsensuousness beyond? It means that the intuition of the affective sign is a blurring of the contour of the capacity of the human to feel, to be felt by something else, something alien that is more than one thing, but a multiplicity.

In *What Animal Teach Us About Politics*, Brian Massumi describes the situation of animal play of combat, giving us some information to understand the connection between signs of affect and the performance of the event. Massumi conceptualizes the concept of ‘pure sign of affect’ in conversation with Gregory Bateson who calls this sign ‘pure mood signs’, so ... there is something *moody* about these signs:

When we say “pure” in relation to a sign, it can only mean a sign whose sense is inseparable from its performance, and thus whose expression is inseparable from its content. Pure signs are nondenotative signs that refer to nothing outside their own enactment, that are one with the enactment of their meaning. Pure signs are pure events, simultaneously reflexive (metacommunicational) and relational (occasioning a mutual inclusion of levels, forms, and arenas of activity) (Massumi 2014, 25).

Following this paragraph, it can be said that an affective sign is also inseparable from its

performance. It indexes an atmosphere in the process of its own enactment. This is to say that the sign emerges out of an enactment and indexes a quality immanent to it. Moreover, what performs is the event, not a person, though a person can be included. William James would say that what perform is the activity of the event, the “somethings *doing*” (James 2003, 84).

What a pure sign of affect is, in the context of *What Animal Teach Us About Politics*, is the ‘ludic gesture’ (Massumi 2014, 4) of a fight between animals. The performance happens in the subjective form of an event: the play of combat between two animals. What the ‘ludic gesture’ does is to signal to the *other* dimension of combat, which is that of the dimension of play ‘as if’ the animals were in a real combat. The ludic gesture, as an affective sign, makes doubly felt the performative event of play of combat: on one hand with the affect of ‘fear associated with the dangerous situation of combat and in the other hand with the arcing affect of a conditional ‘as if’ this were a real combat.

The atmospheric mood of the event of play signals to an extra dimension of experience that doubles the affect of fear with something else, that is the ‘as if’, which opens the event to the creativity of the acting relations between the animals. The atmospheric mood is nonsensuous enough to double the feel for fear with something less categorizable in terms of feeling, which is the affective arc of play ‘as if’. This is to say that what qualifies the atmospheric mood as an entryway to the potential of creativity is its nonsensuous dimension of affectability. Because what it is felt nonsensuously are processes transpiring the occasion of combat, bringing the outside of it, into the midst of its own limit capacity. Whitehead would say that the nonsensuous processes are the influx of the ‘other’ (the double) into the self-identity of the event of perception, in this case, the self-identity of the categorical emotion of ‘fear’.

The present moment is constituted by the influx of *the other* into that self-identity which is the continued life of the immediate past within the immediacy of the present (Whitehead 1967, 181).

Massumi specifies that the signs that only indicate to the affect of fear are ‘signs of power’. They indicate the imperatives of the situation, how a situation of combat habitually organizes the

feelings around. There are other signs, those that indicate the manner in which the situation plays with a quality that is ‘extra’ from the habitual. These are the ‘signs of potential’, such as the sign of the ‘ludic gesture: as if’ (Massumi 2014, 41).

Taking into account this conceptualization, we can say that as a human, when one is attending to the affective signs, one needs to enter into a dimension of experience where the activities perform themselves and demand our individual agency to plunge into the affective capacity of the subjective form of the event, to become an ‘*agencement*’ (assemblage).

We can say that there are a variety of ways to register the affective signs. The subjective form of an architecture of experience is composed by the movement of multiple activities—some more actual than others—that include, but are not limited to, a mode of spacing, embodying and feeling. Since, in this particular architecture, what most suffuses the conceptual landscape is the idea of a nonsensuous atmospheric mood, let’s see what are the modes to register the affective signs through this ambiance.

Between a series of slopes in the midst of the forest of the Mont-Royal park, intermittent luminous reflections, humid odors and distributed sounds dragging tactility all-around, sum up into a relative serene atmosphere. The affective arc is somehow relatable, a tranquil though vibrant ambient tone. But there is something extra: there are interstices from which a nonsensuous mood permeates and mixes with the tranquil atmosphere. The overlapping of a categorical affective mood with another one that feels very present but shakes containment with a soft cadence is what enriches the architecture of experience with some kind of potential, with something that signals that thinking is being done through the material feelings around.

What is the technique to keep registering the affective signs of potential, so that more mattered thinking exceeds the habitual and the local event? So that mattered thinking could be continued at the limit of perception? This could be a technique to transversally follow the unknown of the atmospheric mood, dancing through the tranquil known quality of it, to slip into that feeling that does not know how to feel, while blurring the experience of what it takes to embody. What is relevant is to attend to the atmospheric mood. Wherever you are, don’t think that you are

surrounded by inert things. Plug into the space through its atmosphere. To register an atmosphere is the first strategy to challenge the limits of the habitual feelings and the separation of the body senses. The second strategic step is to actively forget the atmosphere, to free it from the function of consciousness to attach it to an individual time and location.

Walk again through the Mont-Royal park. Move through the relative serene atmosphere permeated by a nonsensuous mood. Let the felt attention to diversify and change the tone when following the interstitial mood, as if the tone of feeling could drip through the plane of attention, figuring a kind of nonsensuous texture. Allow that felt-thought to unveil its orientation, let it be a choreographic movement. Keep this process for a while. Bring it with you all the way to the streets. At one point be okay with forgetting all of it. Something happened. That architecture choreographed a mode of affectability that is now ready to work out the entryways of the more than actual entities of another event. Allow that process to become a more-than perceptible process that keeps at bay the ossification of the entryways of the novel in the events of life. Believe in the schizoanalytic effects of the artful movements of experience that are nonsensuous. Believe in the modes of embodiment that are schizzed, transversal, that make the body a platform for schizosomatics. At each actual step, let the body be a leakage of choreographed processes of the beyond.

Architecture 11: Renee Gladman.

Renee Gladman writes about architectures of experience. Every one of her sentences designs an architecture while it's read. As if the reader will find the architecture together with the writer's thoughts. Her words seamlessly fold the qualities of environments, bodies and daily actions. When the noun of the sentence seems to be the color of buildings, a sudden but soft passage displaces it towards the moment a word gets caught in a breath.

She explains her novel *Houses of Ravicka* as:

a layering of multiple concepts of space within 120-page expanse. These spaces took shape as time, topography, tones of feelings, signals for events, figures crossing, and were like folds convulsing simultaneously through language. To write was to wander through these folds, to try to see space as each of these things, always shifting, undoing, and to make the texts I built through this seeing vibrate (Gladman 2017, 146).

In the afterword of this novel, Gladman talks about a writer's block that lasted for almost ten years, delaying the publication of the novel from its beginning in 2008 to 2017. The story of House of Ravicka follows the life of Jakobi, a 'Comptroller' in the city of Ravicka, whose job is to take measurements of buildings, keeping track of the subtle changes and movements over time. He also supports the topographical alignment between a visible or hard building and its invisible counterpart which normally existed in another part of the city. Throughout the story Jakobi is looking for the visible building 96 that is aligned at a distance with the invisible building number 32, but 96 is nowhere to be found. Hence, Jakobi can't track invisible building 32 because its companion in alignment, building 96, has disappeared.

Gladman explains that the writing progression ground to a halt, because she, as her character Jakobi, did not know where building 96 was, and did not know how to find it. She returned to the book in 2015, with a new relationship to architecture. She transformed this relation with architecture by changing the writing of the character's experience from being around and outside

architectures, to the moment in which they learned how to enter them; “no longer running my hand along the exteriors or standing outside looking up at the verticality of them, but inside now, occupying space that is not visible from the other side of the wall” (Gladman 2017, 149).

What Gladman found was not merely a metaphorical way to describe the inside architecture of buildings; she found a technique to move with writing that allowed her to shift her architectural experience in order to be capable of being folded by the architecting of sentences. The technique that she found was one that curved the movement of buildings, bodies and words onto one plane.

Apart from the prologue, in the novel itself, she describes with more specificity what the change of the relation with architecture consisted of:

What I’m saying is that it began to be clear to me that some hard buildings were embodying a material state that was neither exclusively hard nor invisible (...) These were the categories I had to negotiate: there were the exclusively hard buildings that were migrating; there were the invisible buildings, which mostly stayed where they were (though obviously changing their architecture depending on which hard buildings were laid against them); and newly added was this mutant strand of buildings that wavered between visibility and invisibility. How did I know it wavered if I saw it when it was both visible and not? Again, because when it was visible the lines that determined its boundaries were not luminous (Gladman 2017, 131).

The change of the relation with architecture was a change in a mode of perception, one that could now perceive an architecture of experience that was intermediary between visibility and invisibility. It can be said that what became important for Gladman was not so much to indicate at a distance, the movement of passages between invisible and visible architectures, but to feel the activities reflecting themselves that occur and fabricate the very intermediary space for those passages. The mutant architectures became not only passages between two limits of human perception, but a propositional site to fabricate architectures together, which limits were unknown.

As with the concept of the ‘transversal’ in Deleuze and Guattari (architecture 5C), this propositional site implies a mode of embodiment. One which uses the body as a form of attunement with a processual space, rather than making the body the central subject of attention. A body that is not the main character of the story, but a ghost animated by the architectures shaping themselves. And the ghost proceeds to be embodied via the activity of listening to the murmur between the two limits modes for experience to be architected, hardly and invisibly. Where murmuring happens is also where the intermediary space recalibrates the contrast that elasticizes the distances and proximities between hard and translucent qualities. The qualities stretched while shaping the space are what imbue the ghosted body with the capacity to attune to reflections, duplications and reverberations. Architecture and bodies get shaped at the instant in which qualitative effects determine their topology, or typology.

You’d sit on the rocks to look down over the water, and at certain times of the day the surface of the water would reflect images of your thinking. Shapes would emerge from my seeing, shapes resembling structures for living: large squares sitting on top of rectangles, rectangles cut through with lines, tiny squares in a stack towering but lying flat on the water (Gladman 2017, 132).

The qualitative events shaping bodies and, haunting the intermediary architectures in their cohabitation—in their inseparable circuits of relation to bring each other into actuality—are for Gladman, ‘structures for living’. They are modes of living going on, while architecting, while ghosting bodies so that their feelings are haunting the space, rather than being distinct from it. The body is inseparable from its taking architectural shape together with the feelings that haunt it. To haunt is to irremediably inhabit the space in formation, immediately and immanently. To haunt is to ghost the body with the architectural feelings. It is to affirm the irresolvable character of the intermediary architectures that live through ghosted feelings. It is to live because of ghosts; it is to speculate on modes of living because of them.

First, I left my invisible structure and then I walked. No, first I breathed to descend my structure and then I set out to walk. My immediate neighbors did not seem to notice that my living differed from theirs in that my flat of rooms existed in a geometric

impossibility. My rooms opened and closed depending on how air moved through my body, and their rooms did not open and close” (Gladman 2017, 138).

(...)

When I’m at home, everywhere I stand is the center space, a space surrounded by objects, and no matter how far I walk in one direction, the room comes and settles itself around me, until I breathe and am in another room, the room for sleeping, the room where I draw (Gladman 2017, 139).

There is an indistinguishable continuation between a mode of living, acting and architecting with this newly found ghosted body. To walk acts the breathing and the generation of a room. Or the room begins to ask the body to breathe and walk, to soon shape its hardness towards a half translucent architecture. Hard and translucent are elements in incessant murmur that whisper feelings to animate ghosted bodies into life. The body can be itself, without being accompanied by any ghost, and as it is asked by the room to walk, the feelings ghost it through a dynamic of reverberations which is at the same time a distributed structure for living. Or, the sentence can begin to be written through the perspective of a hard angle, and as it unfolds into action gets ghosted by the pull of translucent feelings and makes it ghostly.

In the book *Calamities*, the body for Gladman gets a function other than being something to ghost between architectures. It gets the function of being a sort of ‘affective sign’ as well (as described in architectures 1, 7, 9 and 10). In fact, ‘scarring’ is the name Gladman gives to the event that resembles an ‘affective sign’.

The ‘scarring’ is a sign of the interrelation of independent facts in which the body finds in the world the beginning of an expression that Gladman denominates *act of location*. When the body finds in the world the beginning of an *act* occurring in a specific *location*—which is indeed the concept of the ‘event’—and expresses it, the expression functions an emergent conjunction that signals the interrelation of the independent facts being expressed. And thus, this is an expression

of the event in which the body is involved and expressed by it, not an expression *of the* body, but *for the* body.

I wanted to express, within the object world, a series of acts of location that needed only the body (and the world) in that moment of expression. Yet I also wanted to find the variables of the expression as independent facts in the world and, between them, to recognize some form of visible scarring that would indicate not only that I found those facts but their interrelation as well. The scarring would act like a body (though not mine), which one approached with a world that functioned like a name but didn't have to be the name that the body put on for a time then took off to hand back to one. It needed to be a name that could be worn by most bodies, because the idea was that you'd find scarring everywhere, between every gesture and the space that manifested around it. I was trying to see location the way I saw wind blowing the small branches of the city. I tried to have it sync up with the incessant sparrowing I heard (Gladman 2016, 69).

Scarring is not just an instant sign of an event (how an actuality of experience emerges in a location), but a recurring apparition of the event in other events with similar factual patterns. What architectures of experience haunt are not only bodies, but also the events folding those bodies. Certain facts like the blowing of the small branches happened and scarred the architecture of experience for it to again express the interrelation in other forms, now that sparrowing, then the imperceptible agitation of water.

That the body moves in the city while becoming scarred by the recurring interrelations of facts, means that a body is not a containment inside itself (maybe the containment understood as the limit of the skin or the strength shaping the ego) but a transition of the world's scars. The scars are felt relations of the facts of the world that impinge and entice a body to become something else. They are a platform haunting the body so that it becomes a different composition of feelings than what it is—feelings understood here through Whitehead, as 'taking accounts' of the processes of the environment.

Therefore, to become a body is to be sensitive to the scarring of the world matters, or to be sensitive to the feelings of the relations that recur in time, so that the rumbling of the small branches is not something that just happens, or that happened once, but that happens now because it revisits the billions of time that it already happened.

An act was everything and location was everywhere, which made the whole thing hard to break down, but when you said “acts of location”, you didn’t think all possible things at once. Rather, you narrowed in one feeling, a specific event that made a boundary in time. (Gladman 2016, 70).

What can be considered an aesthetic walk in the city, that feels the scars of interrelated process so that their embodiment invites a process of becoming more sensitive, is also a political gesture. The scars are not only a poetic sign of beautifully felt everyday experiences, but also an index of the breaks in experience in which the transversal links between disparate facts are most difficult to be sensitized, due to an environment in which the embodiment habits generated can’t register the transversal. Breaks throughout the facts of experience—those branches, those sparrows, those rhythms of thoughts and breathings—are everywhere, but not every place and location hosts a platform for environments that asks embodiment to feel the link along the breaks. In such a way that the rumbling of the small branches does not link to a thought on sparrows which in turn shifts a rhythm of breathing-thinking. The *aesthetic gesture* of becoming sensitive to the scars of the breaks that compose the actuality of worlds, is simultaneously a *political gesture*. It is an *aesthetic and political gesture* because proposes a mode of linking —of grouping or populating—what otherwise would be a scattered world on the hands of environmental platforms that produces habits to recognize only individual, separated and instant facts.

Renee Gladman’s writer’s block was not only an aesthetic problem, but a political one. The impossibility of inhabiting a house of translucent qualities that was beside hard buildings, correlated with the impossibility to find techniques to survive a political climate that forced the bodies in one habitual pattern of individual living without disclosing the polyvalent relations with the houses surrounding it. The political atmosphere used a force upon bodies applied through environments without disclosing the plasticity of transmissibility of the very

environment. As if the environmental force would hit the body to instantly close the angles from which the hit emerged. Or, as if the story told about the body needed to be the story of an individual so that the hit could be strongly felt, while the forces choreographing the act of hitting were multiple and more than individual, but remained hidden.

But the revelation (...) was not only about finding entry into architecture and developing notions for composing interior space; it was, on a profound level, a level on which one survives the atrocities of the political and social present, a way for me to put a map as to where I am in the world. (...) I understand where the house n.96 was. It is where I am, where many of us probably feel that we are: somewhere where the boundary between places has broken. The reason this is not an annihilating recognition is because the place where the boundary has broken is also a place of refracting light, of impossible angles, of beautiful breathing presences gathering, of music becoming language becoming lines becoming dance, the dance of the angles and light of spaces, and all of this changing all the time that there is too much to say about it, too much to see to want to stop seeing” (Gladman 2017, 149-50).

SCHIZOSOMATICS

Schizosomatics: Un-Archived Notes.

Purpose: make the body more sensitive to differences, to the interstices of sense perception, thoughts, feelings and the desires that are pre-given by a dominant social production. Again. Purpose: a frame for politics thought as the resistance of the habitual by way of tapping into the continuity of 'a life', with its chaos of connections and disconnections. Remember again. Purpose: resistance = oscillations. Stepping aside of how physiology organizes sense perception. Experiment with it. Again. Remember one more time. Purpose: philosophy + somatics = to give accounts of the interstices of experience. One more time. Experience. Again. Purpose: one and many multiplicities: to experience the multiplicity of being one body. To feel all the background of what it seems to be 'one experience': differentiation, impersonal, event. One more time. Again. Purpose. Therapy: finding the qualitative time to be uncompleted. To feel the embodiment of the one and the many and to stay with the pole that it is needed at the moment. To find a way to move with grace. Again. Therapy? Again. Alter-Therapeutics. One more time. Purpose: making the body movement a production machine of the figural (diagrams) that are not 'absorbed' back into the body or into any 'axiomatic' (anatomy, ego). Again. Instead, the machine just keeps on producing relations between movements without recognizing/reflecting about their effective use. Instead. One more time. Schizz the body's movement productions towards pure processual figures (diagrams). Again. One more time. And. Remember. Purpose? Play: as certain quality of attention distant from the quality of efficient labor. Jumpiness, steadiness, sleepiness. Again? One more time. Purpose? Play.

Prototype. *Knots of thought*. Mayra Morales (philosopher, choreographer) and myself ask invitees to bring an irresolvable problem in their performing, somatic or theoretic practices to collectively unknot it with the participants at Usine C. Knots. Thoughts. Knots. And thoughts. Not presentational but processual. Not. Knots. Not as tiny traumas. Vectors. Productive processes. Notice the pool of techniques already carried by the participants to unknot the knot. Not presentational. Not prepared. Let the participants propose what to do with the knots. Not the invitee. What knots happens. What happens knots. What happens happens.

Prototype. *Somatic warm up for conceptual work*. Somatic work out for conceptual warm up. Activated with Body Mind Centering techniques by myself together with props, materials and dresses by Ramona Benveniste at SenseLab. Cartographies of attention to choreograph oneself around the somatic reading of philosophy. Attention as the almost of action. Almost. Warm up. Work out. Work. Out. Contact. Concrete and virtual. Zones. Out. Word out. Words. From cellular transmission to feelings transmission. Transmission as landscape. There is no body only feelings. Transmit. Read. Transmit. Somatics as transmission for reading. Reading as transmission for somatics. Forty minutes. Max. Micro practices. Time unfold effects. Effects unfold time. After time. After time. After.

Prototype. *Cartographies of the immediate*. Workshop lead by Christoph Brunner and myself at the HZT (Hochschule Tanz Zentrum) BA program 'Dance, Context, Choreography'. Cartographies of the immediate movements. Cartographies of the everyday. Cartographies of the everyday carried by somatics practices. Somatics practices carried through the everyday. Everyday somatics practices as pedagogies for the performing arts. Missing links. Missing. Links. Missing links to break open habitual modes of closing up experience. Links as the force of relations to reproduce beyond humans. Links. Missing. Links missing to release the life of experience to go on by its own.

Prototype. *Intervals of perception*. Feeling the transmission of the room as the landscape populated by intervals in sense perception. Writing the feelings into the room. Writing the room into the feelings. Writing the concepts as feelings. Feeling the concepts as writings. Philosophy as somatics. Somatics as philosophy. Micro practices. Short writing sessions. Interval when the room loses momentum to write. Interval.

Prototype. *Architectures of experience*. Plunging through the transmission of feelings as landscapes. Transmission as landscapes. There is no body only feelings that transmits. There is no feeling only feelings that transmits. Landscapes as transmission. Transmission as experience. Experience as architectures. Architectures as experiences. Writing the feelings into architectures. Writing the architectures into feelings. Writing the transmission. Transmitting the writing. Write if it architects. Architect until it writes. Architect.

Schizosomatics: Getting (Almost) There.

When the ‘micro’ is the activity to find elbow room of the portions of experience then studying the immediate movement of experience is equivalent to attuning to what it means to feel the micro. The ‘room’ in gaining more ‘elbow’ movement is the ecology of experience that the ‘micro’ gestures towards. The room has a dance, a physicality and thus a way of carrying its own somatics practices. The movements’ doings of the room — the spreading of luminosity and levity, through windows and a lamp, crisscrossed by the positing of snow in the garden and balcony— are the practices of the room’s somatics. If the human inhabits the room and feels like registering the somatics practices going on, then she needs to calibrate a sensitivity to the micro. To think-feel the micro elbows for movements of the room, the human is asked by the ecology of experience to become micro herself; think-feel the somatic practices with no divide from the room and its very needed elbows. Less to think-feel the room and its elbows as being absorbed into the human. More like ejecting herself immediately through the elbowing movements of the room. More like becoming a part of the ecology of movements of ejecting, or crisscrossing, or positing of the room, elbowing. When movement is of the elbowing of the room, there is not a stable position to register. Immediately the ejecting, holding, curving become the register allowing the elbow room for the portions of experience.

To be in a room through the ‘schizz’ is to register the micro gestures of experience elbowing to move more. The ‘schizz’ is the practice that ejects the human from the movements of the ecology of experience. That the room has micro gestures that can be registered through the ‘schizz’ does not mean that the gestures are small. The ‘schizz’ is a practice to eject the stable perception of the human body through the activities of the ecology of experience that are ongoing. To schizz is to move immediately —almost all at once— through the arcs of the activities of the ecology of experience, across its many elements. Thus, to ‘schizz’ is not to fall into a small portion of experience, but to be launched through many elements at once, via the arcs of activities such as positing, hanging and encompassing. And then again, the ‘schizz’ follows immediately the movements of experience while simultaneously registering the elbow room cultivated by the ecological doings. In short, to practice the ‘schizz’ is to immediately

move with the arcs of experiences and simultaneously become sensitive to the elbow room gained by the ecological doings. Elbowing the rooming for more capacious movement to come.

To follow the room through ‘somatics’ is a practice that reminds one that what is happening in the ecology of movement is already fully populated by activities. The arcs of activities pulling and rejecting the elements in the room happen through the ‘somatic practices’ of the ecology. They are active doings, operating through the physicality of the room and improvising qualitative movements in excess of that very physicality. The excessive qualities are the style in which the physicality of doings surprise with an unexpected quality: the movement of the room sinks and disperses due to the echoing of sounds, although the vertical things standing over the floor seem to be pretty quiet. To follow the room with a somatic sensitivity means as well to follow the arcs of activities of the room through feelings. It means to follow through feeling and to consider as feelings the very arc of activities moving their elbow rooming; feeling thought as movements in excess of their physicality.

Schizosomatics, as a concept and as a practice, slowly took shape out of the compost of prototypes of workshops, events and studies accumulated during the last five years. Before it took shape, it was the intuition of a thought, a feeling and a doing. This intuition gyred around the careful dosification of Body Mind Centering techniques through environments and bodies, the transposition of process and affect philosophy into the research of somatics practices and the various collaborations with intellectuals and artists to bring into feeling half-baked questions. In sum, if it took this long to get to talk about schizosomatics in this thesis, that is due to the fact that its coming into conceptual and practical shape was a journey of mostly non-transparent processes for language. This journey took its time to be able to follow those non-transparent processes and to translate them into a language with a minimum amount of consistency to transmit them.

Schizosomatics came into existence through the proposition of visual artist and somatic practitioner Csenge Kolzsvári to organize at the SenseLab a series of workshops by inviting people working around notions of the body, performing and visual arts. The aim was to activate one more time the previous encounters around somatics, performing and visual arts such as the

Knots of Thought, Movements of Thought and the Somatic Warm Up for Conceptual Work. Since at the time in the SenseLab we have been working on the notion of a schizo-economy (an alternative economy based in abundance rather than in scarcity), and the questions of the ‘schizz’ have been brought forwards regularly—influenced by the theories of Deleuze and Guattari—the most precise way to name the workshops series that came to mind was schizo-somatics. The composted experimentations of the past prototypes began to take shape in the curation of the workshops, without any of us being directly conscious of it. The intuition that the practices shared needed to be carried with a sensitivity to the micro (to the intervals of perception), in order to move with the arcs of activities already operating in the ecology of the room (the architectures of experience), became one of the propositions for curating the workshops. The feeling of somatics activities considered as passageways *through* and *of the* ecology of experience, beyond the containment of somatics inside the anatomy of the human body, became one of the research questions that arose along the series of encounters. The strongest intuition was that the intensive study of process and affect philosophy at the SenseLab needed a ‘somatics platform’ to multiply the experiential angles from where to learn. In this sense, schizosomatics can be thought as the way in which embodiments calibrate the movement speed of the concepts populating an ecology—usually de-accelerating the speed of the conceptual force through friction. And in turn, the conceptual movements of the ecology—which are the improvisations of the qualities in excess of the givens of the physicality—can be regarded as that which breaks open embodiment beyond the human body and ejects it towards the commingling *with* and *through* the arcs of activities of the ecology.

What comes next is a description of how the composted past half-baked ideas grounded the shared experiences during one year of the schizosomatics workshops series at SenseLab. As it is mentioned below, the aim of this next section is to articulate the coming together of the schizosomatics pragmatics with the schizoanalytic ideas of Felix Guattari that had been populating the SenseLab since its beginnings.

Schizosomatics: Workshops Series.

From January to December of 2018 Csenge Kolozsvári and myself organized the schizosomatics workshop series at the SenseLab. Every second Wednesday of the month—if not every Wednesday—performing artists, theoreticians, visual artists, and poets, among others, were invited to activate a session. At the beginning of the series, the participants were given a short verbal explanation about what the ‘schizz’ and the ‘somatic’ meant. The ‘schizz’ was explained with Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual frames, as an interruption that operated a passageway through the multiplicity of experiential planes—instead of staying in only one plane of experience, usually foregrounded as a normal or typical mode of experience. The ‘somatic’ was described as the affective swarming of the planes of experience that included the body—and its typical containment in a physiological or psychological category—but that was not limited to it. These descriptions were meant to launch a collective and practice-based speculation, rather than to teach how those concepts should be deployed or felt. The people invited to activate the sessions were asked to bring an unfinished practice (a ‘schizzed practice’). By a schizzed practice, we were referring to a technique that was not yet complete. One of the examples given was that of a meditation practice. Although infinite and presumably unbounded in regard to its effects, a meditation practice might be considered a complete technique since the methods to lead a meditation practice are mostly known and well settled. Instead what was asked of the activators, was to bring a technique-in-process, a technique that would be less than 80 percent crafted. If possible, the activators were invited in pairs or in trios, so that the technique would be ‘schizzed’ by their partial and multiple perspectives. The technique needed to be ‘schizzed’ to carry the capacity of moving with the contingencies of the event—the time quality carried by the group of participants and the atmosphere and vitality surrounding that particular day—rather than imposing the manner to move towards a pre-determined form of learning. To ask for a ‘schizzed’ technique was to ask the invitee to enter the event through the manners in which the event was already doing something, through its multiple activities, even before it started. It can be said that the event offered the manner to enter, move and exit the workshop session, rather than the invitees or participants. In this way, the ‘schizzed’ technique functioned as a way to enter the event with a kind of compass that could orient towards the desires expressed by the

trans-individual ecology of experience. The ‘schizzed’ technique operated as a tool to become sensitive to the care for the event. This gesture shifted the mode of attunement towards the collective, that is, if the collective is understood, again, not only as the group of people but as the temporal, spatial and affective qualities of the ecology in excess of the people. Lastly, the participants were told that the experimentation of the schizz at SenseLab was part of a larger group of study around the schizo-economy (an alter-economy based in abundance and trans-individuality), the anarchive (techniques to archive seeds of potential, capable of activating future and alter-events) and the ‘spazze’ (the material platform to play in order to code the digital anarchive).

Now, the aim of this section is to connect some of the procedures employed during the schizosomatics session with schizoanalytic concepts by Felix Guattari, in order to enrich some of the procedures shared during the schizo sessions. The concepts are not used to categorize the schizosomatic experiences. The concepts are vectors that follow the movement-moving between the various elements of the procedures, that index the limit of the diagrammatic plane of the earth, or plane of experimentation. In short, the concepts are used as a launching platform to allow us keep on experimenting with what a schizosomatic practice can be.

As was previously mentioned, for Guattari the schizz is an operation of interruption, or break of a flow that disconnects and reconnects the flows from one machine of desire to another. Here again, we have to remember that desire is not the intention of the subjective person, but is a machinic desire, in the sense that is an abstract force that assembles its consistency through connections between several flows: here this social media input, there that meteorological condition, and on the other side certain habits incorporated through social groups. Abstract machinic desire is the capacity of the montage of the techniques— because of their genealogy of relations (interval 3C)—for assembling heterogeneous elements, beyond the containment inside individual and concrete components.

Therefore, the schizz is the operation that re-energizes the relay of patterned techniques for relation, that give consistency to the production of machinic assemblages. In turn, these machinic assemblages produce types of subjectivities. Now, carrying this machinic frame of thought

further, Guattari intends to show that subjectivity is not contained inside of the human self. For Guattari, subjectivity is a field of transversal relations beyond the subject-object and essence-materiality divides. Subjectivity creates worlds (existential territories) and modes of perceptions (incorporeal universes) that are transversal (as multi-linear and multi-componential) and that, as we will later see, can be ‘dominant’ or ‘liberating’. The schizz is what re-energizes the relational-transversal field of experience beyond the binary divides, and gets in contact with what Guattari conceptualizes as ‘chaosmosis’.

The concept of chaosmosis stands for the processual force of ‘chaos’ and ‘complexity’ enmeshed in every production of subjectivity. The traditional idea of the subject contained in its own psychosomatic self-identical category is undone in a “massive and immediate ensemble of contextual diversity, a fusion of undifferentiated, or rather de-differentiated whole” (Guattari 1995, 80). At the same time, this experience of de-differentiation is the node of heteropoetic (more-than ‘autopoetic’, open to the heterogeneity of relations) processes, that entangles existential territories and incorporeal universes, full of virtual potentiality. The opening of the contained subject towards the force of chaosmosis operates as a passageway to a field for creative processes.

With the concept of ‘chaosmosis’, Guattari is critiquing traditional psychoanalysis. He differs from psychoanalysis in that it refers this chaotomic processes—full of virtual elements in the formation of the real—to universal referents such as the Imaginary of neurosis and the Symbolic of normality (Guattari 1995, 78). For Guattari, the virtual potential of chaosmosis is immanent to the concrete elements of expression of the actual. It is not in a separate and unchangeable transcendent universe of reference. It is a mode of experience, capable of registering the ontological diverse texture of the enmeshment of virtual (as potential) brewing the real. Moreover, Guattari also indicates the production of dominant subjectivities that pathologize ‘schizophrenic’ processes, against their produced context of the normopathic. In Guattari’s words, “there are *schizo* processes that traverse society and not only through psychopathology, but also through invention and all of those situations in which one encounters a rupture with dominant forms of signification” (Guattari 2015, 35).

When the schizo processes re-plug into to the complex and chaotic forces of chaosmosis, they re-energize the function of what Guattari calls ‘partial enunciators’. The ‘partial enunciators’ are what enunciate (as in express) nascent subjectivities. Nascent in the sense that they are partial expressions distributed along transversal planes, not yet completely enunciated by one assemblage of enunciation (more about this soon). What is most remarkable about the partial enunciators is that they operate through an aesthetic quality that is inherent to chaosmosis. This is to say that there is an aesthetic quality operating not only beyond the individual category of the subject, but also beyond the category of the here and now (the actual). The aesthetic quality of chaosmosis, carried by the partial enunciators, moves transversally through timelines too. The aesthetic quality can modify an experience of the future. The partial enunciator can generate what later in this text will be described as an ‘activation contour’. The partial enunciator detaches an aesthetic quality forming a dynamic pattern (contour) and, if the future conditions of an event are similar—such as the dynamic feeling in which elements come into relation—it can be called forth again and infuse (activate) the way in which that future event takes shape. Another remarkable feature of the partial enunciator is that it expresses the ‘autonomy’ of the aesthetic operation. What the partial enunciator does, it does it beyond the agency of a single entity. In French, the word for assemblage is ‘agencement’, which gives a better feeling about the autonomy of the partial enunciator. The autonomy of the partial enunciator is an autonomy generated by the transversal passage of a multiplicity of entities. Lastly, the autonomous partial enunciator is a detachment from an actual composition. It detaches from the actual and carries—in potential—something of the multiple ontological texture from which emerged.

Guattari describes the function of the partial enunciator through the context of art. He says that “there is a transference of subjectivation operating between the author and the contemplator of a work of art (Guattari 1995, 14)”. He adds that this operation results “through the device of an isolating or separating function, of such a kind that the expressive material becomes formally creative (Guattari 1995 14)”. In this example, we can see that the partial enunciator is a fragment of content that detaches from the formal determinism of the art material, from the intention of the author and the expectation of the public. It becomes a detachment that is in excess of the actual elements in constellation (art work, author, consumer) and, at the same time, carries the potential for further creativity. One more time, this is to say that the partial enunciator carries an aesthetic

force to transform and generate future modes to come in relation. It bears repeating that this aesthetic force is not just a simple ‘excess’ overflowing the actual—like a decoration on top of the imperatives elements conditioning the present situation— but is a lived index following the ontological texture of the autonomous creativity *of* experience (not of the human, not of the art-object).

Guattari links the autonomisation of the partial enunciator to aesthetics in order to enlarge the psychoanalytic frame that detaches the partial enunciator from the subjective unconscious. Guattari wants to go beyond the concept of the unconscious as being a property of the human subject. For him, the unconscious is machinic, and the machinic assemblages are traversed by the aesthetic movements of chaosmosis. Movements that, as we have seen, are not property of an individual entity. Guattari then, borrows from the psychoanalytic theories of Klein and Lacan, who call the partial enunciator the ‘transitional object’ or ‘object a’. He affirms the charge of potentiality they give to the object at the transition between subjectivity and alterity. But he does not agree about the causal and intentional frame in which they present the concept: “they never removed it from a causalist, pulsional infrastructure; they never conferred it (...) with a machinic creativity of boundless potential” (Guattari 1995, 94). He confers autonomous creativity to the ‘partial enunciator’ that is not limited to the ‘causal infrastructure and to the superstructure representative of the psyche” (Guattari 1995, 95)”. For Guattari, the ‘partial enunciator’ carries the alterity towards *other* modes experience, but the *other* does not pre-exist as a categorical structure that represents experience, instead, the partial enunciator *is immanent with* alterity.

In sum, the capacity of the partial enunciators to be autonomous—in the sense of detaching from the author, consumer, and the artwork, with a potential and multilinear logic beyond cause and effect—is the capacity that energizes the production of alternative nascent subjectivities. And since these subjectivities are enmeshed with the concrete, but are more than it due to their own alter autonomy of detachment, they qualify as subjectivities not only beyond the human subject, but also beyond the human body. In this sense these subjectivities are ‘corporeal essences’, partially actual and partially potential. They are a ‘corporeal intermediary’ (interval 4) that fragments (schizzes) and qualifies as a passageway the individual category of the body (somatic).

Hence, these subjectivities operate as tools to experiment with schizosomatics: the body immanently enmeshed with alter chaosmotic forces.

Before further elaborating the connection between the production of subjectivity and schizosomatics, there is another concept that requires introductions: the concept of the refrain. The 'refrain', 'ritornello', or 'leitmotif', is the transverse pattern of the relay (as relational repetition) that gives consistency not to one partial enunciator, but to a multiplicity of them. The refrain is what carries the partial expressions into an assemblage of enunciation. And the assemblage of enunciation is the collective expression that gives birth to a nascent subjectivity. Here again, the collective does not equal the sum of human subjects, but stands for the multiplicity of activities that pulverize the usual divides between subject-object binaries.

Further on, Guattari extends the examples of the partial enunciators from the art context to ethology and to the everyday. Through the example of a bird song sequenced to seduce a sexual partner, or to announce the arrival of predators, Guattari affirms the 'refrain' as the rhythm of the relation between the partial enunciators such as the bird's feather colors, posture, and the use of the environment, like the leaves and branches. And through the example of watching, t.v. he demonstrates how the refrain gives consistency to the human subjectivity being carried away, as if hypnotized, by the screen's luminous animation, and the surrounding events of water boiling and the distant sound of a telephone. In both examples, the refrain is what knots together the partial enunciators generated by the machinic assemblages of the planes of experience. And in both examples, the refrain functions, as that which keeps the full chaotic complexity at bay. It is what filters and gives shape to the chaotic complexity; forming an assemblage that enunciates the subjectivity: the subjectivity of an event of animal seduction and the subjectivity of an event of quasi hypnotism.

Furthermore, as we can see with the example of the t.v., every production of subjectivity is not necessarily liberating. Guattari is pointing to the fact that the production of subjectivity has been colonized by Capitalistic powers, though it does not appear just in this historical moment, it is a genealogical relay emerging since Archaic societies (Guattari 1995, 46). That's why the concepts of the 'partial enunciators' and of the 'refrain' are crucial for Guattari, because they help him to

analyze the ways in which subjectivity is alienated or given the autonomy to create itself. Guattari aims to entice the autonomy of the partial enunciators—found in art but not limited to it (or ‘art’ thought in an expanded sense as the ‘artfulness of experience’)—in order to promote the production of mutant subjectivity, one that is not captured by dominant forms of expression.

In “The Machinic Unconscious”, Guattari articulates how the narrator of Marcel Proust’s *In Search of Lost Time* plays with lived semiotic segments until he reaches a subjectivity that creates itself. Throughout all the book’s chapters’, the narrator finds the semiotic schizz (the partial enunciators) that shuffle the timelines of his memories, as in the first example of the dip of the madeleine in the cup of herbal tea, and in the later example of Vinteuil’s music. The experimentation with the semiotic schizo segments, accumulated through life, will allow the narrator to create a literary machine. This machinic creation will finally happen when throughout all these found schizo experiences, the narrator will not only open scattered passages to a chaosmotic dimension but also generate a new type of refrain:

One still needs to establish, contrary to what Proust suggests, that this is in no way a question of a hidden dimension, of a world of essences whose discovery is to be carried out in the manner of an explorer, but of a fundamentally micropolitical dimension leading to a subjective “reversal” and which involves the entry of a new type of refrain that works to empty the dominant redundancies of their content and deterritorializes and disindividuates the enunciation (Guattari 2011, 320).

If we consider an isolated subjectivity to be that which still matches subject with identity, the creation of a new type of refrain is what creates a non-isolated subjectivity. In this context identity is considered the ‘identity of relation’. This is the unidirectional relation that projects a quality of experience to a fixed category of subject and object, following a linear logic of cause and effect. For instance, relation is thought of as identitarian when it relates a ‘sensation’ to the inside of a subject, from the outside of an object.

The semiotic segment (the partial enunciator) liberates (deterritorializes) the relation from the role of representing the projection of an effect to a cause, such as the effect of the human

memory to the cause of the madeleine. It goes beyond the representation of the cause and the effect, towards the intensity of the movement of relation between the elements. This is the movement moving (absolute movement (interval 3)), its intensive rhythm that composes the consistency of the event of perception across all the elements: madeleine, herb tea, cup, psychosomatic habits, etc. This is the refrain holding up the affective event; and again, not through identity but through the co-habitation of differences.

What is remarkable is that the narrator finds the creative literary machine—the one that does not passively suffer the phenomenon of the schizo semiotic segment—at the moment in which his body is entirely shaken by the affective event. This is the moment in which the narrator, arriving at the court of the Guermantes' hotel, does not notice a car coming towards him, and as the driver shouts out, he steps back and stumbles over a paving-stone. When he recovers his balance, a flow of chaomic time suffuses the atmosphere. But this time, he is able to repeat the unfurling flow of chaomic memory by moving the feet as if they were pressing the paving-stone. He finds the movement-moving of the refrain that gives consistency to the event of gaining balance. In turn, he finds the movement moving of the refrain that liberates the autonomous force of the chaomotic time. The body of the narrator is possessed by the refrain as a 'corporeal intermediary' (interval 4). The autonomy of the refrain is found through the experimentation of a body trespassed by the movement moving across the schizo semiotic segments. What is found together with the autonomy of the refrain, is a schizosomatic experience of the body. An experience of corporeality that is inseparable from the intermediary quality that makes it part of the whole event (assemblage). In this sense, to have a schizosomatic experience is to follow the movement moving of the assemblage of enunciation throughout all the partial semiotic segments. These allow the assemblage to become a collective (as more than individual) enunciator.

The creative instrument no longer rests upon one or several semiotic components; it involves the entirety of the subjective assemblage which constitutes it (...) This process of discernibilization of matters of expression has no other finality: the clang of a spoon against a dinner plate, the vibrations of a flow of water, the evocation of the noise of a hammer against the wheel of a train on the way to the station are so many instruments of transformation of the subjective assemblage of enunciation (...) (Guattari 2011, 322).

During the schizosomatics sessions at SenseLab, there were countless moments in which the techniques offered by the invitees generated the detachment of partial enunciators (schizo semiotic segments), that made-felt the movement moving of the refrain. Usually, the detachment of partial enunciators was experienced in a casual manner, almost as a banal occurrence, but their capacity to carry the movement moving indexed the undercurrent refrain that, if followed, would propose an alternative subjectivity (an alternative collective event of enunciation). And the movement-moving of the partial enunciators always demanded that the individual body would be distributed as an environmental force, as a corporeal intermediary.

For instance, one Wednesday afternoon Csenge Kolozsvári and Mariana Marcassa activated a workshop through voicing and sculpting. The participants were seated around one long piece of clay that was constantly kept wet with water. They were asked to sound voice by pressing horizontally the clay with their hands, trying to keep the contact with the clay as continuous as possible. The rhythm of the voices echoing the room, and the dynamic of thirty-something hands moving along the clay produced a collective feeling in which the individual parts of the bodies were blurred. Some sound reverberating the room would influence the tone of contact with the clay, and some pressure point in the clay would result in the calibration of the voice spread through the air. The partial enunciators expressed by the rhythm of voicing and of contact, together with the multiplication of arms moving across the clay—through all their enmeshed movement—generated an alternative subjectivity, like a corporeal intermediary. This corporeal intermediary was felt collectively as a ‘pathic subjectivity’.

Guattari calls a ‘pathic subjectivity’ an “absorbent subjectivity given immediately in all its complexity (Guattari 1995, 25)”. When the subject is decentered by undoing the individual body limits, the generation of subjectivity feels the experience in a pathic manner, because the limits of sense perception overflow. Following Daniel Stern, Guattari would say that the absorbent and immediate feeling, is felt in an ‘amodal’ way (Guattari 1995, 65). Amodal perception is the perception felt by infants during their first eight weeks of life, when they are in the ‘emergent self’ phase of development. Stern argues that, in this phase, the infant is active, hyper relational and already emergently social, contrary to the traditional knowledge (Piaget) that considers this

period of the infant as presocial, precognitive and preorganized (Stern 1985, 36-7). Through ‘amodal perception’, the child registers the global quality of perceptual events, such as shapes, intensities and temporal patterns, without dividing the perceptual event into separate sense modalities (touch, sound, sight). One of the examples used by Stern is that of a child’s perception of a patch of yellow sunlight on the wall. For the infant, the patch of ‘yellow’ color (sight) does not qualify the perceptual experience as mainly visual. Because “the child is engaged in a global experience resonant with a mix of all the amodal properties, the primary perceptual quality, of the patch of light- its intensity, warmth, and so on (Stern 1985, 176)”. Furthermore, amodal perception is not lost after the initial eight weeks of life, but is carried throughout adult life, backgrounded because of the separation of perceptual senses.

One of the conversations we had after the experiment with the clay, centred the haptic experience of ‘sliding’. As the activity of sliding intensified through the surface of the clay, the eyes, the voice, and overall thoughts and feelings in germ began to slide as well. There was a third entity generated between the collective bodies of persons and clay. It was the amodal perception of sliding. It was felt as a haptic image because it happened through all the senses (touch, sight, sound) and in excess of all them, as if floating in-between of all them. An amodal perception was enunciated and detached by the machinic assemblage. The partial enunciators of the clay, hands, and sounds knotted by a refrain that carried their different rhythms generated an amodal perception *from* and *out of* the collective-machinic assemblage.

At another schizosomatics session, Maria Kefirova and myself proposed a workshop on cutting. Each participant was given a pair of scissors and was asked to cut the contour of the things in the room (sofas, chairs, tables, cables, lamps, etc) then to pause for a short while to absorb the resonant effects, to then continue again. After a while, the participants were given colorful cardboards and were asked to cut through them as they cut the contour of the things in the room. Finally, the participants were asked to couple two by two, and cut the cardboard following the contour of the parts of the back of the body of the other participant. They were then asked to give the person standing in the front the cut pieces, by reaching for them from the back, along the sides of the bodies. In such a way that the person standing would receive a hand from the back with a cut piece of cardboard, as if the pieces were appearing from an invisible dimension.

The conversation on this particular experiment moved around the feeling of decompressing the connective tone of the things in the room, including the physical human bodies. As if each action of cutting around the contour of things would make felt an invisible reorganization of the space between. In turn, the bodies felt like if they were being cut into pieces, and they carried the same experience of decompression, especially in the moments of receiving the cardboard piece from the back. Finally, the partial enunciators generated a refrain that expressed an ‘amodal perception’. This was an amodal perception of ‘decompression’, of un-knotting and re-knotting. This perception did not exist in any single perceptual sense. It was felt with a global and collective body, one that speculated with its perceptual capacity. It was a corporeal subjectivity fully immersed in the chaotic textures emerging *with* it.

Throughout the entire year, during the schizosomatic sessions, many partial enunciators were detached in order to generate this pathic subjectivity that registered amodal perceptions. It is hard to say when these partial detachments such as the ‘sliding’ and ‘decompressing’ snowballed into a new mutant subjectivity. As was mentioned before, at times the experience of a collective subjectivity was already there, together with the partial enunciators. At other times, the experience would trigger something after the persons carried into their life beyond the SenseLab. For sure, many partial detachments fed forward into other schizosomatics sessions. For instance, something of the amodal perception of ‘sliding’ snowballed into the rhythm in which we were playing with the schizo-session lead by Sean Smith, k.g Guttman and her six-month-old baby, Twila. At the beginning of the session, through simple physical techniques, Sean introduced three different topologies of perception: the stone (vertical plane of architecture), the oceanic (cosmic durations), and the digital (the flat-plastic surface that opens to the multilinear planes of the internet). By then the bodies of the participants in the room had been elasticized towards less familiar corporeal limits. This is when k.g and baby Twila arrived with the concept of ‘affective attunement’, borrowed as well from Daniel Stern. We were asked to hold Twila for as long as we could match our attunement with her. This meant passing Twila to another person, or holding her along with two or three other persons around the moment in which she would begin to feel uneasy. Different collective bodies, in numbers and attunements (smiles, bounces, patings), were required to get, practically, what an ‘affective attunement’ meant. The topology of the

collective was ready to shift through several modes of attunement, not only because of the real imperative brought by the affective mood of Twila, and not only because of the topologies of perception distributed by Sean, but also due to the lived ‘amodal perception’ of ‘sliding’ that capacitated the bodies to slide away from their interiority, towards speculation. The collective topology of the room carried the contour of ‘sliding’, and probably many other past schizosomatics; and it/they were felt as a lived contour holding the affective shape of the room. This is to say, that the amodal perceptions carried their rhythmic refrain beyond the actual moment of their crystallization into consistency.

In Daniel Stern’s vocabulary, the perceptions generated by the partial enunciators operated as ‘activation contours’:

An activation contour can be abstracted from one kind of behavior and can exist in some amodal form so that it can apply to another kind of overt behavior or mental process. These abstract representations may then permit intermodal correspondences to be made between similar activation contours expressed in behavioral manifestations. Extremely diverse events may thus be yoked, so long as they share the quality of feeling ... (Stern 1985, 58).

This is to say, that something of the feeling of ‘sliding’ carried its quality of a collective opening towards the future. Another schizosomatic experience could match the dynamic feeling of the amodal perception of sliding and then activate the contours of relation. The experience in-process would be co-influenced by the dynamic pattern of sliding. The body of the participants would carry some rhythmic refrain of sliding (the concatenation of points of pressures, the qualities of relation) that would make ingress—as an invisible membrane—to shape the actual event in process. Another example: when Andre Fogliano would talk about the presence of the schizzes in the Capoeira movements, something of a past ‘amodal perception’—maybe of ‘decompression’—would pop in and make them felt along the curvy duration of a kick.

At the end of the year, while preparing a second workshop on the ‘extra-economical body’, we had a last conversation about the pedagogic potential of the schizosomatics practices. There was

a very simple conclusion about the topic: each time we learn something we need a new body. After that day Erik Bordeleau sent us the following quote: “To what are we dedicated if not to those problems which demand the very transformation of our body and our language?” (Deleuze 1994, 192).

REFERENCES

Bottiglieri, Carla. *Bodily semblances, temporary dwellings: somatic moulding of spaces and subjectivities*. Nanopolitics Handbook. Edited by Paolo Plotegher, Manuela Zechner and Bue Rübner Hansen. Compositions Wivenhoe / New York / Port Watson 2013.

Cohen, Bonnie Bainbridge. *Sensing Feeling and Action: The Experiential Anatomy of Body-Mind Centering*. Contact Editions, Northampton, Massachusetts 1993.

Cohen, Bonnie Bainbridge. *Ligamentous System*. DVD 2014.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Spinoza. Practical Philosophy*. Trans. Robert Hurley. City Lights, San Francisco 1988.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*. Trans. Tom Conley. Columbia University Press, New York 1994.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus*. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R.Lane. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1983.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus*. Trans. Brian Massumi. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1987.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. *What is Philosophy*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Bruchell. Columbia University Press 1994.

Eddy Martha. *A brief history of somatic practices and dance: historical development of the field of somatic education and its relationship to dance*. Journal of Dance and Somatic Practices Volume 1 Number 1. Editor Whatley Sarah. 4edge UK 2009.

Gladman, Renee. *Calamities*. Wave Book, Seattle-New York 2016.

Gladman, Renee. *Houses of Ravicka*. Dorothy Project, St. Louis, MO 2017.

Guattari, Felix. *Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm*. Trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis. Indiana University Press 1995.

Guattari, Felix. *Soft Subversions. Texts and interviews 1977-1985*. Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series, Los Angeles 2007.

Guattari, Felix. *The Machinic Unconscious. Essays In Schizoanalysis*. Trans. Taylor Adkins. Semiotext(e), Los Angeles- New York 2011.

Guattari, Felix. *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*. Trans. Andrew Goffey. Bloomsbury Academic, London-New York 2013.

Harney, Stefano & Moten, Fred. *The Undercommons – Fugitive Planning & Black Study*. Autonomedia, Brooklyn 2013.

Guattari, Felix. *Machinic Eros: Writings On Japan*. Edited by Gary Genosko and Joy Helfric. Univocal, Minneapolis 2015.

James, Williams. *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. Dover, Mineola, New York 2003.

Lepecki, André. *Singularities. Dance in the Age of Performance*. Routledge, London and New York 2016.

Manning, Erin. *Always More Than One: Individuation's Dance*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2013.

Manning, Erin. *The Minor Gesture*. Duke University Press, Durham and London 2016.

Massumi, Brian. *Parables for the Virtual. Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Duke University Press, London 2002.

Massumi, Brian. *Semblance and Event. Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts*. MIT Press, 2011.

Massumi, Brian. *What Animals Teach Us About Politics*. Duke University Press, Durham and London 2014.

Massumi, Brian. *The Power at the End of the Economy*. Duke University Press, Durham and London 2015a.

Massumi, Brian. *Ontopower. War, Power, and the State of Perception*. Duke University Press, Durham and London 2015b.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*. Notebook 35 to 44. Trans. Kate Sturge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003.

Spinoza, Baruch. *The Collected Works of Spinoza*. Trans Edwin Curley. Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1985.

Stern, Daniel. *The Interpersonal World of the Infant. A View From Psychoanalysis And Developmental Psychology*. Karnac Books, London 1985.

Whitehead, Alfred North. *Adventure of Ideas*. Free Press, New York 1967.

Whitehead, Alfred North. *Process and Reality*. Free Press, New York 1978.