

The Effects of Satisfaction with Pay and Satisfaction with Relational Returns on
Turnover Intentions and Organizational Citizenship Behaviours

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ABSTRACT

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Shumin Yuan

The purpose of this research was to provide new insights into the effects of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and organizational citizenship behaviours. Both the independent and the interactive effects of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and organizational citizenship behaviours were examined. In addition, the moderating influences of positive and negative affect on the independent effects of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and organizational citizenship behaviours were also considered. Data were collected from two countries using different sampling procedures. Study 1 ($N = 175$) was conducted in a single organization in China and targeted full-time employees working in various departments at the organization's corporate headquarters. Study 2 ($N = 300$) was conducted via Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform and targeted full-time employees living in the U.S. and working in different organizations across a variety of industries. Results from both studies confirmed that satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns are multidimensional constructs. Consistent with the hypothesized effects, all dimensions of satisfaction with pay and all dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns were negatively associated with turnover intentions, and positively associated with organizational citizenship behaviours. Moreover, some dimensions of satisfaction with pay interacted with some dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns to predict turnover intentions and organizational citizenship behaviours. Finally, negative affect, but not positive affect, moderated the independent effects of a few dimensions of satisfaction with pay and a few dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and organizational citizenship behaviours. These findings have practical implications for both compensation and staffing decisions.

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INTRODUCTION

With their potential to satisfy human needs, reward systems are generally viewed as an essential strategic tool to motivate employees (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992). Most organizations provide a wide range of rewards that are meant to increase employee performance (Gardner, Dyne, & Pierce, 2004), and to attract and retain desired employees (Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997). Compensation refers to income in exchange for one's labour, and represents a critical component of the many rewards given by organizations in return for their employees' contributions (Dreher, Ash, & Bretz, 1988).

The combination of all monetary and non-monetary rewards that are made available to employees in exchange for their work is usually described as a total rewards system. As such, total rewards encompass all forms of human resource investments that are valued by employees. Specifically, they include cash compensation (e.g., base pay, short-term incentives, long-term incentives, etc.), benefits (e.g., pension, work/life programs, life, medical, and disability insurance, etc.), and relational returns (e.g., learning opportunities, challenging work, recognition and status, etc.) (Milkovich, Newman, Cole, Yap, & Gerhart, 2013). Relational returns play a particularly important role within the total rewards system, which is strategically used by many organizations to leverage the combined effects of the various types of rewards that it contains (Hoole & Hotz, 2016; Tsede & Kutin, 2013).

Pay satisfaction is an attitude that employees have about their pay (Miceli & Lane, 1991). Employees feel satisfied with their pay if they develop positive perceptions when making comparisons between their ratios of compensation received to contributions offered and equivalent ratios of other employees (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). As an expression of fairness and justice, pay satisfaction has a direct effect on employees' organizational commitment (Williams, McDaniel, & Ford, 2007). Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) suggests that when employees are satisfied with their pay, they are more likely to enhance their commitment toward their organizations (Haar & Spell, 2004). In turn, organizational commitment is related to turnover intentions (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Thopolnytsky, 2002; Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006) and organizational citizenship behaviours (OCBs) (Deckop, Mangel, & Cirka, 1999; Morrison, 1994; Kim & Chang, 2014).

Employee turnover is a key concern for many organizations because of the resources involved in addressing it (Singh & Loncar, 2010). Turnover can be very costly. When employees

quit their jobs, organizations are forced to spend both time and money to either replace them or to get other employees to cover their jobs (Hinkin & Tracey, 2000). OCBs represent a set of discretionary behaviours that go beyond one's formal work requirements, and are performed without any compensation for the betterment of the organization (Organ, 1988a). Put simply, OCBs refer to employees' willingness to engage in positive work behaviours voluntarily. Because they play an important role in the better functioning of organizations, OCBs are widely considered to be both critical and beneficial to organizations (Wei, Han, & Hsu, 2010).

Even though there are many studies about the influence of pay satisfaction on turnover intentions and OCBs, the impact of satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs has received much less attention. Moreover, the potential interactive effects of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs have also been largely overlooked. This is particularly surprising given the current emphasis of many organizations on total rewards systems, which include both monetary and non-monetary rewards. Examining the potential interactions between the two types of rewards may reveal alternative ways in which organizations could leverage their available resources to optimize their total rewards systems. Such alternatives may prove particularly useful for companies that are unable to offer competitive compensation packages (i.e., pay above the market). It is therefore important that research studying the impact of reward satisfaction on employees' attitudes and behaviours should not be exclusively concentrated on satisfaction with pay, and also examine the role of satisfaction with relational returns.

The main objective of this research is to examine the independent effects of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns on employees' turnover intentions and OCBs. Implicit in this examination is an assessment of the relative importance of the two dimensions of the total rewards system. A second objective of this research is to explore the extent to which satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns interact in predicting employees' turnover intentions and OCBs. These interactive effects make it possible to assess a more complex interplay between the two dimensions of the total rewards system. A third objective of this research is to investigate the moderating influences of positive and negative affect on the independent effects of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs. Taken together, these analyses have implications for the optimal design of total rewards systems and the proper selection of employees best suited for these systems.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Pay Satisfaction and Turnover Intentions

The Concept of Pay Satisfaction

Pay is defined as compensation in exchange for one's labour or contributions to one's organization (Lawler, 1971). It is the major source of income through which employees satisfy their basic needs for survival and security, and includes both direct and indirect monetary rewards (Milkovich et al., 2013). The total rewards framework proposed by Milkovich et al. (2013) categorizes the returns that people receive from work as total compensation and relational returns. Total compensation refers to the rewards that employees receive directly as cash (e.g., base pay, short-term and long-term incentives, etc.) and indirectly as benefits (e.g., pension, medical and life insurance, etc.), whereas relational returns refer to the psychological returns that employees believe that they receive in the workplace, and include, among other things, learning opportunities, recognition and status, and employment security (Milkovich et al., 2013).

Pay satisfaction can be broadly defined as an employee's overall perception of pay (Miceli & Lane, 1991; Williams et al., 2006). The study of pay satisfaction began with the work of Adams (1963, 1965), who pointed out that the source of employees' pay satisfaction lies in their sense of fairness with respect to pay, which is a complex process of perception and comparison. Heneman and Schwab (1985) suggested four dimensions of pay satisfaction (pay level, pay raises, benefits, and pay structure and administration), and developed the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire to capture the multidimensionality of the construct (Heneman & Judge, 2000).

Pay satisfaction can be described as a feeling of equity with respect to pay (Adams, 1963, 1965). Employees compare their contributions and rewards to those of other employees inside and outside their organizations and, based on these comparisons, form their perceptions of pay equity, which, in turn, shape their feelings of pay satisfaction (Greenberg, 1987; Livingstone, Robert, & Chonko, 1995). Therefore, pay satisfaction is influenced not only by perceptions of the amount of pay, but also by judgments about the relative allocation of pay (Gerhart & Ryne, 2003). Furthermore, pay satisfaction is the result of a perceptual and comparative process (Adams, 1963, 1965). Employees seek an equilibrium between inputs, such as effort, knowledge, and skills, and outcomes, such as monetary and non-monetary returns (Greenberg, 1987, 1990a, 1990b). The discrepancy between inputs and monetary outcomes forms the basis of pay satisfaction (Lawler, 1971; Heneman & Schwab, 1985). In particular, the gap between what

employees perceive that they should receive in exchange for their contributions to their organizations and what they actually receive from their organizations determines their levels of pay satisfaction (Lawler, 1971). Therefore, pay satisfaction can also be described as a discrepancy between two perceptions. One perception is about how much one feels one should be paid, and the other is about the value of what one is actually paid. Employees feel satisfied with their pay when the gap between these two perceptions is minimized.

In conclusion, pay satisfaction is the result of social comparisons with relevant referents (Law & Wong, 1998). When employees compare their outcomes-to-inputs ratios to those of others, they experience one of three feelings: they may feel over-rewarded, they may feel under-rewarded, or they may feel that their pay is equitable (Greenberg, 1990a, 1990b). Employees feel over-rewarded when they perceive that their outcomes exceed their inputs; they feel under-rewarded when they perceive their inputs exceed their outcomes; and they feel that their pay is equitable when they perceive that their outcomes are equal to their inputs. When employees believe that they are over-rewarded, they may experience feelings of guilt, which may result in stress; when they believe that they are under-rewarded, they may attempt to lower their inputs by reducing effort, increasing absenteeism and/or quitting their jobs (Greenberg, 1990a, 1990b).

The Concept of Turnover Intention

Turnover is a key concern for many organizations because of the time and money involved in addressing it (Singh & Loncar, 2000). Recruiting, selecting, onboarding, and training new employees to replace those who are leaving an organization can cost up to 70% of their annual salaries (Blomme, van Rheede, & Tromp, 2010). In addition, some important costs associated with turnover, such as the disruption of daily operations and the emotional stress related to the additional work entailed by vacancies, are difficult to capture in tangible terms (Singh & Loncar, 2000). For these reasons, turnover has a significant negative influence on an organization's productivity and profits, and may also have a negative impact on the reputation of the organization.

Turnover is generally measured by the number of employees who have left an organization divided by the average number of employees in the organization during the reference period (Price, 1977). March and Simon (1958) proposed the concept of turnover intention to measure a related construct: employees' tendency to leave their current jobs for new jobs. Turnover intention has been described as an employee's conscious and premeditated

willfulness to leave the organization (Matz, Woo, & Kim, 2014; Tett & Meyer, 1993), and therefore terminate the exchange relationship with the employer (Cao, Chen, & Song, 2013). As such, turnover intention is an important expression of employees' dissatisfaction with their organizations (Wang, Yang, & Wang, 2012), and the best predictor of their actual turnover behaviour (Kivimaki, Vahtera, Elovainio, Virtanen, & Siegrist, 2007; Steel & Ovalle, 1984; Tekleab, Takeuchi, & Taylor, 2005). Moreover, when employees intend to leave their organizations, they may become less efficient and effective at their jobs (Mobley, 1982). Although intention is different from actual behaviour, minimizing turnover intentions has the potential to minimize actual turnover behaviours. Thus, turnover intention functions as a mediator between attitudes affecting the intention to leave an organization and the act of actually leaving the organization (Tett & Meyer, 1993).

Pay Satisfaction and Turnover Intentions

Job attitudes have significant effects on turnover intentions and, ultimately, actual turnover behaviours (Mobley, 1977). Employees' perceptions of equity and justice affect their levels of motivation (Eby, Freeman, Rush, & Lance, 1999) and organizational commitment (Wu & Wang, 2008), thereby increasing their absenteeism and turnover intentions and behaviours (Chambel & Curral, 2005; Greenberg, 1987; Williams et al., 2006). Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) suggests that when employees are satisfied with their pay, they are more likely to enhance their commitment toward their organizations (Haar & Spell, 2004). Organizational commitment refers to the degree to which employees believe and accept the goals and values of their organizations, and are willing to maintain organizational membership and contribute to their organizations (Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974). Organizational commitment has been linked to job performance, absenteeism, and turnover (Finegan, 2000), and therefore the development and maintenance of organizational commitment is critical for productivity and retention (Wheeler, Gallagher, Brouer, & Sablynski, 2007).

The concept of organizational commitment has three major components: affective commitment, which refers to an employee's attachment to the organization based on an emotional bond with the organization, continuance commitment, which refers to an employee's attachment to the organization based on perceived material benefits of staying with the organization, and normative commitment, which refers to an employee's attachment to the organization based on a feeling of moral or ethical obligation toward the organization (Meyer &

Allen, 1991). Pay satisfaction affects organizational commitment through different mechanisms that are related to both affective commitment and normative commitment (Dhawan & Mulla, 2011; Newman & Sheikh, 2012; Vandenberghe & Tremblay, 2008). On the one hand, affective commitment is influenced by work experiences and perceptions of organizational support and justice (Newman & Sheikh, 2012; Vandenberghe & Tremblay, 2008). On the other hand, normative commitment is related to feelings of satisfaction with pay raises and benefits (Vandenberghe & Tremblay, 2008). Pay satisfaction can also affect continuance commitment, but the direction of this relationship is less clear (Vandenberghe & Tremblay, 2008). All in all, when employees feel satisfied with their pay, they may experience higher levels of organizational commitment, which, in turn, may decrease their intentions to leave their organizations.

Hypothesis 1: Pay satisfaction has a negative effect on turnover intentions.

Pay Satisfaction and Organizational Citizenship Behaviours

The Concept of Organizational Citizenship Behaviour

OCB is an important dimension of employee performance that affects organizational effectiveness (Mekpor & Dartey-Baah, 2017). OCB refers to situations in which employees voluntarily undertake special behaviours that are beneficial to their organizations and go beyond their regular duties (Organ, 1990) or the prescribed job requirements dictated by organizational policies and job descriptions (Wong, Yik, & Kwong, 2006). OCB has been shown to contribute indirectly to organizational performance by strengthening the “social and psychological context that supports task performance” (Organ, 1997, p. 91). OCB has been defined as an “individual behaviour that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization” (Organ, 1988a, p. 4). In addition, OCB reflects the flexible and discretionary nature of an employee’s role in the organization (Van Scotter, Motowidlo, & Cross, 2000).

Organ (1988a) proposed five dimensions of OCB: altruism, conscientiousness, courtesy, civic virtue, and sportsmanship. Altruism refers to helping or cooperating behaviours; conscientiousness refers to behaviours that go beyond minimal job requirements and compliance with organizational rules; courtesy refers to behaviours aimed at preventing or minimizing errors; civic virtue refers to responsible involvement in the broader governance of the organization; and sportsmanship refers to the ability to accept changes and tolerate minor inconveniences without complaining. Williams and Anderson (1991) suggested a two-dimensional conceptualization of

OCB, explaining that OCB can be described in terms of behaviours directed toward individuals (OCB-I) and behaviours directed toward the organization (OCB-O). Their conceptualization combines altruism and courtesy into OCB-I, and civic virtue and sportsmanship into OCB-O. OCB-I includes behaviours that benefit particular organizational members directly and contribute to organizational effectiveness indirectly, such as helping colleagues with work-related issues (Williams & Anderson, 1991). OCB-O refers to behaviours that benefit the organization in general without being directed at any particular organizational members, such as adhering to informal rules (Williams & Anderson, 1991).

Pay Satisfaction and Organizational Citizenship Behaviours

Social exchange is an important aspect of OCBs (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bacharch, 2000). Organ (1977) linked the mechanism behind the satisfaction-performance relationship to social exchange theory. He proposed that job performance is a form of employee reciprocation to the organization for feelings of job satisfaction (Organ, 1977). He also suggested that OCBs represent inputs to employees' equity ratios that can be more easily and more safely altered than inputs involving formal job duties (Organ, 1988b, 1990). Based on this reasoning, positive employee attitudes such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment can be conceptualized as direct determinants of OCBs (Ackfeldt & Coote, 2005). Indeed, if employees feel satisfied at work, they are likely to express their satisfaction by engaging in more OCBs (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Bolino & Turnley, 2003; Kim, 2006). Similarly, if they feel attached to their organizations, they are likely to reciprocate by engaging in more OCBs (Meyer et al., 2002). This relationship is particularly evident for affective commitment, which refers to employees' emotional attachment to their organizations (Meyer & Allen, 1991). In conclusion, given the aforementioned direct link between pay satisfaction and organizational commitment (Williams et al., 2007), it follows that employees who are more satisfied with their pay are more likely to engage in OCBs.

Hypothesis 2: Pay satisfaction has a positive effect on OCBs.

Satisfaction with Relational Returns and Turnover Intentions

The Concept of Satisfaction with Relational Returns

Organizational rewards represent a significant tool to attract, retain, and motivate employees (Boyd & Salamin, 2001). Elizur (1984) proposed three general types of rewards: extrinsic, intrinsic, and social rewards. Extrinsic rewards refer to tangible, material rewards such

as pay, fringe benefits, and promotional opportunities (Elizur, 1984; Williamson, Burnett, & Bartol, 2009). They are derived from the context of the job, and satisfy lower-order employee needs (e.g., survival, security, recognition, etc.). Intrinsic rewards refer to intangible rewards such as autonomy and feedback (Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Williamson et al., 2009). They are derived from the content of the job, and satisfy higher-order employee needs (e.g., self-esteem, achievement, growth, etc.) (Mehta, Anderson, & Dubinsky, 2000). Social rewards refer to the positive interpersonal relationships that develop in the workplace, such as having good working relationships with colleagues (Williamson et al., 2009).

De Gieter, De Cooman, Pepermans, and Jegers (2008) proposed an alternative classification of rewards that includes financial rewards, material rewards, and psychological rewards. Financial rewards refer to direct monetary rewards that employees receive at work, such as base pay and bonuses. Their value comes from their exchange function (i.e., employees can exchange money for goods and services that they desire). Material rewards refer to rewards that have indirect identifiable monetary value, such as employee benefits and training opportunities. Such rewards cannot be exchanged for their monetary value. Psychological rewards refer to all non-monetary rewards that are positively evaluated by employees, such as professional recognition and satisfying workplace relationships (De Gieter et al., 2008).

The combination of all rewards received at work can be described as total rewards. More specifically, total rewards represent the sum (of the values) of all components of the reward packages that organizations use to attract, retain, and motivate their employees, and that employees perceive as important within the work context (Bussin & van Rooy, 2014; Tsede & Kutin, 2013). Of note, total rewards include not only monetary rewards, but also non-monetary rewards such as pleasant working conditions, training and promotion opportunities, supportive work environment, recognition and status, etc. (Smit, Stanz, & Bussin, 2015). Therefore, a total rewards system can be envisioned as an “employee-oriented holistic remuneration design system” (Cao et al., 2013, p. 63).

The total rewards framework proposed by Milkovich et al. (2013) categorizes the rewards that employees receive at work as total compensation and relational returns. Total compensation includes rewards that employees receive directly as cash (e.g., base pay, merit increases, short-term and long-term incentives, etc.) and indirectly as benefits (e.g., pension, medical and life insurance, work-life balance programs, etc.). Relational returns refer to the psychological

rewards that employees believe that they receive in the workplace (e.g., learning opportunities, recognition and status, challenging work, employment security, etc.) (Milkovich et al., 2013). The definition of relational returns is similar to the definition of psychological rewards proposed by De Gieter et al. (2008), and combines, to some extent, the definitions of intrinsic rewards and social rewards proposed by Elizur (1984).

This research will follow the total rewards framework suggested by Milkovich et al. (2013), and will use total compensation to include all types of direct and indirect monetary rewards (i.e., all forms of compensation and benefits), and relational returns to include all types of non-monetary rewards. This conceptualization aligns well with the pay satisfaction construct proposed by Heneman and Schwab (1985), which captures satisfaction with total compensation. A key implication of the total rewards framework is that pay is just one of the many rewards that influence employee attitudes and behaviours (Chiang & Birtch, 2011). Because pay satisfaction only measures the degree to which employees feel satisfied with their total compensation (Williams et al., 2006), a complete picture of their attitudes toward the totality of the rewards that they receive at work is not possible without an understanding of their satisfaction with relational returns. However, despite several studies that have examined the effects of pay satisfaction on turnover intentions and OCBs, very little research has investigated the effects of satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs (De Gieter, De Cooman, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2010).

Satisfaction with Relational Returns and Turnover Intentions

Employees' perceptions of the various non-monetary rewards offered by their organizations can affect their attitudes and behaviours (Chiang & Birtch, 2011). From a social exchange perspective, employees invest effort and time into their jobs, and, in return, their organizations provide them with psychological rewards. A perceived lack of organizational support may increase absenteeism (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986), while a perceived lack of career development opportunities may increase turnover intentions and, ultimately, turnover behaviours (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). Conversely, perceptions of promotion opportunities may enhance perceptions of work security, which, in turn, may reduce turnover intentions (Halaby, 1986). All in all, consistent with the social exchange perspective, employees' commitment to their organizations is influenced by their perceptions of their organizations' commitment to them, as manifested by the various relational returns offered to

them. Therefore, when employees feel satisfied with the relational returns received from work, they may experience higher levels of organizational commitment, which, in turn, may decrease their intentions to leave their organizations.

Hypothesis 3: Satisfaction with relational returns has a negative effect on turnover intentions.

Satisfaction with Relational Returns and Organizational Citizenship Behaviours

A key aspect of total rewards management is to influence employees' attitudes and behaviours through the value that they attach to rewards (Vroom, 1964). This is possible because employees' satisfaction with the various rewards that they receive at work is an important determinant of their attitudes and behaviours (Lawler, 1971). Employees who feel dissatisfied with the rewards offered by their organizations will respond by engaging in withdrawal behaviours. In contrast, employees who experience feelings of satisfaction with the rewards available to them will respond by increasing their contributions to their organizations. Of note, because monetary and non-monetary rewards serve similar functions, it is important to consider employees' satisfaction with both total compensation and relational returns when examining how their perceptions of rewards influence their attitudes and behaviours (De Gieter et al., 2010). As mentioned earlier, employees' satisfaction with relational returns is based on their social exchange experiences involving psychological rewards, and therefore is likely to affect their levels of organizational commitment. For example, in response to perceptions of psychological safety, employees may develop feelings of obligation toward their organizations, which may increase their levels of organizational commitment (De Clercq & Rius, 2007). Moreover, when employees feel more attached to their organizations, they tend to increase their organizational contributions by engaging in more OCBs. In conclusion, employees who are more satisfied with their relational returns from work are more likely to engage in OCBs.

Hypothesis 4: Satisfaction with relational returns has a positive effect on OCBs.

Interactive Effects of Pay Satisfaction and Satisfaction with Relational Returns

According to social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), there are two types of exchanges that take place between employees and their organizations: an economic exchange and a social exchange. The economic exchange occurs when employees carry out work duties in exchange for monetary rewards from their organizations. Unlike the economic exchange, which focuses on elements of total compensation, the social exchange is based on employees' beliefs that their

relationships with their organizations involve unspecified obligations (Blau, 1964). Relational returns entail such obligations, and therefore constitute the basis of the social exchange between employees and their organizations. While the economic exchange elicits reactions based on calculations and comparisons, the social exchange elicits affective reactions (Blau, 1964).

The demarcation between total compensation and relational returns is also reflected in Herzberg's two-factor theory (Herzberg, 1968), which distinguishes between extrinsic rewards (hygiene factors) and intrinsic rewards (motivators). Research has emphasized the importance of both types of rewards for organizational commitment (Young, Worchel, & Woehr, 1998), but has also pointed out to the salience of intrinsic rewards, particularly for affective commitment (O'Driscoll & Randall, 1999), and to the moderating role of cultural values (Williamson et al., 2009). The increasing role of intrinsic rewards within total rewards systems is consistent with these findings, and highlights employees' growing preference for relational returns (Rumpel & Medcof, 2006). That being said, Herzberg's theory also suggests that intrinsic rewards may be less effective when extrinsic rewards are deemed unsatisfactory.

All in all, as part of the social exchange relationship, employees expect to receive not only monetary rewards, but also non-monetary rewards such as support and recognition (Shore, Tetrick, Lynch, & Barksdale, 2006). In addition, their overall assessment of the exchange relationship may involve conscious trade-offs between different types of rewards (Shapira, 1981). For example, employees may accept lower pay in return for higher intrinsic rewards (Berkowitz, Fraser, Treasure, & Cochran, 1987), although there may be limits on the extent of such trade-offs. When the exchange relationship involves trade-offs between extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, employees' perceptions of the total rewards system are likely to change such that their positive reactions (toward their organizations) on account of higher satisfaction with one type of rewards may become stronger when satisfaction with the other type of rewards is also high. This is because the anticipation of trade-offs may lower their expectations of being highly satisfied with both types of rewards. Alternatively, and in line with Herzberg's theory, when employees' satisfaction with extrinsic rewards is low, their positive reactions (toward their organizations) on account of higher satisfaction with intrinsic rewards are likely to be weaker. This is because the value of intrinsic rewards may become less salient when extrinsic rewards are deemed unsatisfactory. Both arguments suggest that pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relationship

returns may have a positive interactive effect on organizational commitment, and thereby a negative interactive effect on turnover intentions and a positive interactive effect on OCBs.

Hypothesis 5a: Pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns have a negative interactive effect on turnover intentions, such that at high levels of pay satisfaction (or satisfaction with relational returns), the negative effect of satisfaction with relational returns (or pay satisfaction) on turnover intentions becomes stronger.

Hypothesis 5b: Pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns have a positive interactive effect on OCBs, such that at high levels of pay satisfaction (or satisfaction with relational returns), the positive effect of satisfaction with relational returns (or pay satisfaction) on OCBs becomes stronger.

Moderating Effects of Positive and Negative Affect

So far, the discussion has assumed that the effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs are the same for all types of people. However, it is possible that differences in individuals' affective traits may strength or weaken some of these effects. Affect refers to a mental state involving evaluative feelings, and its domain includes both trait-based individual differences and state-based reactions (Eby, Maher, & Butts, 2010). Trait-based affect captures systematic individual differences in tendencies to respond to stimuli. Individuals who are high in trait-based positive affect (PA) tend to experience positive emotions, such as happiness and enthusiasm, whereas individuals who are high in trait-based negative affect (NA) tend to experience negative emotions, such as sadness and anxiety (Watson, 2000; Watson & Clark, 1984). Such affective dispositional traits influence how individuals interpret and respond to stimuli in the workplace. Although PA and NA were initially conceptualized as opposites on a continuum, research has demonstrated that they represent distinct dimensions of affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).

Individuals also differ in the intensity of their emotional reactions to stimuli (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Research has indicated that when exposed to the same emotion-eliciting stimuli, individuals high in affect intensity consistently show more intense emotional reactions than individuals low in affect intensity, regardless of the nature of the affective stimuli (i.e., positive or negative) (Larsen, Diener, & Cropanzano, 1987). These individual differences in affect intensity are linked to positive and negative affect through the operation of two motivational

systems: the behavioural inhibition system (BIS) and the behavioural activation system (BAS) (Gray, 1970, 1987; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). The main purpose of the BIS is to help individuals avoid negative stimuli (e.g., punishments), while the main purpose of the BAS is to help individuals seek positive stimuli (e.g., rewards). As a result, individuals who are high in PA tend to have stronger affective reactions to rewards and weaker affective reactions to punishments, while individuals who are high in NA tend to have stronger affective reactions to punishments and weaker affective reactions to rewards (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Watson et al., 1999).

Based on this reasoning, both positive and negative affect may influence the effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on affective organizational commitment, and, ultimately, turnover intentions and OCBs. Because pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns capture feelings associated with rewards, high-PA individuals are likely to be more reactive to them than low PA-individuals, whereas high-NA individuals are likely to be less reactive to them than low-NA individuals. This suggest the PA may strengthen, while NA may weaken, the independent effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs. Consistent with this argument, previous research has provided evidence that NA moderates the relation between pay satisfaction and affective organizational commitment (Panaccio, Vandenberghe, & Ben Ayed, 2014).

Hypothesis 6a: PA moderates the negative effect of pay satisfaction on turnover intentions, with the effect being stronger for high-PA individuals.

Hypothesis 6b: NA moderates the negative effect of pay satisfaction on turnover intentions, with the effect being weaker for high-NA individuals.

Hypothesis 7a: PA moderates the positive effect of pay satisfaction on OCBs, with the effect being stronger for high-PA individuals.

Hypothesis 7b: NA moderates the positive effect of pay satisfaction on OCBs, with the effect being weaker for high-NA individuals.

Hypothesis 8a: PA moderates the negative effect of satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions, with the effect being stronger for high-PA individuals.

Hypothesis 8b: NA moderates the negative effect of satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions, with the effect being weaker for high-NA individuals.

Hypothesis 9a: PA moderates the positive effect of satisfaction with relational returns on OCBs, with the effect being stronger for high-PA individuals.

Hypothesis 9b: NA moderates the positive effect of satisfaction with relational returns on OCBs, with the effect being weaker for high-NA individuals.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

The proposed hypotheses (summarized in Figure 1) were tested in two studies set in different contexts. Study 1 was conducted in a large organization in China and targeted full-time employees working in various departments at the organization's corporate headquarters. Study 2 was conducted via Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform and targeted full-time employees living in the U.S. and working in different organizations across a variety of industries. Study 1 was designed to test Hypotheses 1 through 4. Study 2 was designed to test all proposed hypotheses, thereby providing both a constructive replication (Lykken, 1968) and an extension of Study 1.

STUDY 1: METHOD

Data and Sample

Data were collected from a Chinese communications technology company that designs, manufactures, sells, and services datacom and telecom network products. The organization is a national high-tech enterprise that has received ISO 9001 Quality Management System certification, ISO 14001 Environmental Management System certification, OHSAS 18001 Occupational Health and Safety Management System certification, and GB/T 29490-2013 Intellectual Property Management System certification. Email invitations containing links to an online survey were sent out by an HR manager to employees working in various departments at the organization's corporate headquarters. A total of 205 invitations were sent out, and 175 employees agreed to participate in the study, for a response rate of 85.37%. In terms of sample demographics, 9.14% of participants were 25 years old or younger, 29.71% of them were between 26 and 30 years old, 53.14% of them were between 31 and 40 years old, and 8.00% of them were 41 years old or older. Moreover, 51.43% of respondents were female, 83.43% of them were married, and 25.71% of them had no children. For those who were parents, the average number of children was 1.21 ($SD = .41$). The majority of respondents (73.71%) had bachelor's

degrees, and 32.57% of them held managerial positions. In addition, 32.00% of them worked in the Product Design and Development Department, 17.14% of them worked in the Human Resource Department, 12.57% of them worked in the Accounting Department, and 11.43% of them worked in the Marketing Department. Finally, their average number of hours worked per week was 42.82 ($SD = 3.97$), their average number of years with the organization was 7.22 ($SD = 5.85$), and their average number of years in their current positions was 4.59 ($SD = 3.86$).

Measures

Pay satisfaction. Pay satisfaction was assessed using the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire (PSQ) developed by Heneman and Schwab (1985), which is the most widely used measure of pay satisfaction (Heneman & Judge, 2000). The PSQ includes 18 positively worded items measuring satisfaction with 4 pay dimensions: pay level, pay raises, benefits, and pay structure and administration. Participants were asked to state how satisfied or dissatisfied they felt about these items using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *Very Dissatisfied*, 5 = *Very Satisfied*). Sample items include “My overall level of pay”, “My most recent raise”, “The amount the company pays towards my benefits”, and “Pay of other jobs in the company”. The complete list of items can be found in Appendix B. Previous research has already validated the PSQ in the Chinese context (see, for example, Wu & Wang, 2008).

Satisfaction with relational returns. Satisfaction with relational returns was assessed using the Job Satisfaction Survey (JSS) developed by Spector (1985). The JSS includes 36 items measuring satisfaction with 9 job dimensions: pay, promotion, supervision, fringe benefits, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, and communication. To avoid overlap with the pay satisfaction measure, all items related to pay (4 items) and fringe benefits (4 items) were removed from the scale. Participants were asked to state their agreement or disagreement with the remaining 28 items using a 6-point Likert scale (1 = *Disagree Very Much*, 6 = *Agree Very Much*). Sample items include “Those who do well on the job stand a fair chance of being promoted”, “My supervisor is unfair to me”, “When I do a good job, I receive the recognition for it that I should receive”, “Many of our rules and procedures make doing a good job difficult”, “I like the people I work with”, “I sometimes feel my job is meaningless”, and “Communications seem good within this organization”. The complete list of items can be found in Appendix B. Previous research has already validated the JSS in the Chinese context (see, for example, Chou, Fu, Kröger, & Ru-yan, 2011).

Chinese organizational citizenship behaviour. Chinese OCB was assessed using the scale developed by Farh, Earley, and Lin (1997). The scale includes 20 items measuring five dimensions of OCB in the context of Chinese society: identification with the company, altruism toward colleagues, conscientiousness, interpersonal harmony, and protecting company resources. Research has shown that cultural context shapes not only the types of behaviours deemed to contribute to organizational effectiveness, but also the very criteria for organizational effectiveness (Farh et al., 1997; Farh, Zhong, & Organ, 2004). Participants were asked to state their agreement or disagreement with the 20 items using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 7 = *Strongly Agree*). Sample items include “Makes constructive suggestions that can improve the operation of the company”, “Willing to cover work assignments for colleagues when needed”, “Takes one’s job seriously and rarely makes mistakes”, “Uses position power to pursue selfish personal gain”, and “Views sick leave as benefit and makes excuse for taking sick leave”. The complete list of items can be found in Appendix B.

Turnover intention. Turnover intention was assessed using the Chinese scale developed by Yin-Fah, Foon, Chee-Leong, and Osman (2010) based on research conducted by Mobley, Horner, and Hollingsworth (1978). The scale includes 3 items, and participants were asked to state their agreement or disagreement with them using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *Highly Disagree*, 5 = *Highly Agree*). The items are “I often think about quitting my present job”, “I will probably look for a new job in the next year”, and “As soon as possible, I will leave the organization”.

STUDY 1: RESULTS

Confirmatory Factor Analyses

To evaluate the construct validity of the measures, several confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were conducted using Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015). The first analysis focused on the (multi)dimensionality of the pay satisfaction construct (see Table 1). The default four-factor model assumed that the four dimensions of pay satisfaction will load onto separate factors. The model showed a very good fit to the data: chi-square (129) = 183.37, CFI = .97, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .05. Comparing this model to a series of alternative models revealed that the default four-factor model provided a superior fit to the data. For instance, a three-factor model in which pay level and benefits were collapsed onto one factor yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (3) = 136.55, $p < .01$, chi-square (132) = 319.92, CFI = .89, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .09. Moreover, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded an

even worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (6) = 229.82, $p < .01$, chi-square (135) = 413.19, CFI = .83, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .11.

The second analysis focused on the multi(dimensionality) of the satisfaction with relational returns construct (see Table 2). The default seven-factor model assumed that the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns will load onto separate factors. The model showed an acceptable fit to the data: chi-square (329) = 693.82, CFI = .85, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .08. Comparing this model to a series of alternative models suggested that the default seven-factor model provided a better fit to the data. For instance, a five-factor model in which promotion and contingent rewards were collapsed onto one factor, and operating procedures and nature of work onto another factor yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (11) = 76.91, $p < .01$, chi-square (340) = 770.73, CFI = .82, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .09. Furthermore, a three-factor model in which promotion, contingent rewards, and supervision were collapsed onto one factor, and operating procedures, nature of work, and communication onto another factor also yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (18) = 159.85, $p < .01$, chi-square (347) = 853.67, CFI = .79, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .09. Finally, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded the worst fit to the data: chi-square difference (21) = 236.98, $p < .01$, chi-square (350) = 930.80, CFI = .76, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .10.

To confirm that the four dimensions of satisfaction with pay are distinct from the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, an additional analysis was conducted that included all the items of the two scales (see Table 3). The default eleven-factor model assumed that the eleven dimensions of satisfaction with pay and relational returns will load onto separate factors. The model showed a reasonably good fit to the data: chi-square (934) = 1585.15, CFI = .86, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .06. Compared to this model, a two-factor model in which the four dimensions of pay satisfaction were collapsed onto one factor, and the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns onto another factor yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (54) = 532.18, $p < .01$, chi-square (988) = 2117.33, CFI = .75, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .08. In addition, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded an even worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (55) = 786.97, $p < .01$, chi-square (989) = 2372.12, CFI = .69, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .09.

To assess the validity of all study measures, a final analysis was conducted that included all the items of the four scales (see Table 4). The default seventeen-factor model assumed that

the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, the five dimensions of OCB, and turnover intention will load onto separate factors. The model showed a rather poor fit to the data: chi-square (2141) = 3556.20, CFI = .78, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .06. Compared to this model, a thirteen-factor model in which the five dimensions of OCB were collapsed onto one factor yielded a slightly worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (58) = 377.83, $p < .01$, chi-square (2199) = 3934.03, CFI = .74, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .07. However, a four-factor model in which the four dimensions of pay satisfaction were collapsed onto one factor, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns onto another factor, and the five dimensions of OCB onto another factor yielded a much worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (130) = 936.99, $p < .01$, chi-square (2271) = 4493.19, CFI = .66, SRMR = .09, RMSEA = .08. Moreover, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded the worst fit to the data: chi-square difference (137) = 1508.34, $p < .01$, chi-square (2277) = 5064.54, CFI = .58, SRMR = .09, RMSEA = .08. Although the seventeen-factor model that treated OCB as a multidimensional construct provided a slightly better fit than the thirteen-factor model that treated OCB as a one-dimensional construct, two of the five dimensions of OCB—altruism and conscientiousness—had very low reliabilities ($\alpha = .62$ and $.59$, respectively), which prevented their use as separate variables. For this reason, subsequent analyses included a single (global) measure of OCB, along with four measures of pay satisfaction, seven measures of relational returns, and one measure of turnover intention.

Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliabilities

Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and reliabilities for all study variables are presented in Table 5. For the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, all reliabilities were acceptable ($\alpha = .86$ for pay level, $.79$ for pay raises, $.89$ for benefits, and $.81$ for pay structure). For the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, six of the seven reliabilities were acceptable ($\alpha = .82$ for promotion, $.73$ for supervision, $.83$ for contingent rewards, $.71$ for coworkers, $.79$ for nature of work, and $.70$ for communication). Because satisfaction with operating procedures had weak reliability ($\alpha = .68$), it was deemed to have unacceptable psychometric properties, and was excluded from further analyses. Finally, both the reliability of the turnover intention measure and the reliability of the global OCB measure were good ($\alpha = .80$ and $.85$, respectively).

The intercorrelations among the four dimensions of pay satisfaction revealed that most dimensions were highly correlated, with the strongest link being observed between pay raises

and pay structure ($r = .74, p < .01$). A similar pattern emerged for the six remaining dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns (operating procedures not included), with the strongest links being observed between promotion and contingent rewards ($r = .77, p < .01$), supervision and contingent rewards ($r = .74, p < .01$), supervision and coworkers ($r = .73, p < .01$), and supervision and communication ($r = .72, p < .01$). With regard to the intercorrelations among the four dimensions of pay satisfaction and the six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, although their magnitudes proved somewhat smaller, most of them were also rather strong, with 7 of the 24 correlation coefficients being between .60 and .70 ($p < .01$), and 8 of them being between .50 and .60 ($p < .01$). In fact, all intercorrelations among promotion, supervision, contingent rewards, and the four dimensions of pay satisfaction were above .50 ($p < .01$).

Tests of Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1 and 2 proposed that pay satisfaction has a negative effect on turnover intentions and a positive effect on OCBs. In view of the results of the previous confirmatory factor analyses, both hypotheses were tested separately for each of the four dimensions of pay satisfaction. As indicated by the bivariate correlations in Table 5, all four dimensions of pay satisfaction were negatively associated with turnover intentions ($r = -.49, p < .01$ for pay level; $r = -.47, p < .01$ for pay raises; $r = -.50, p < .01$ for benefits; and $r = -.53, p < .01$ for pay structure) and positively associated with OCBs ($r = .39, p < .01$ for pay level; $r = .46, p < .01$ for pay raises; $r = .33, p < .01$ for benefits; and $r = .46, p < .01$ for pay structure). Therefore, both hypotheses received full support.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 proposed that satisfaction with relational returns has a negative effect on turnover intentions and a positive effect on OCBs. As before, both hypotheses were tested separately for each of the six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns. The bivariate correlations in Table 5 revealed that all six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns were negatively associated with turnover intentions ($r = -.55, p < .01$ for promotion; $r = -.58, p < .01$ for supervision; $r = -.62, p < .01$ for contingent rewards; $r = -.49, p < .01$ for coworkers; $r = -.50, p < .01$ for nature of work; and $r = -.56, p < .01$ for communication) and positively associated with OCBs ($r = .52, p < .01$ for promotion; $r = .66, p < .01$ for supervision; $r = .53, p < .01$ for contingent rewards; $r = .57, p < .01$ for coworkers; $r = .54, p < .01$ for nature of work; and $r = .63, p < .01$ for communication). Therefore, both hypotheses received full support.

Hypotheses 5a and 5b proposed that pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns have a negative interactive effect on turnover intentions and a positive interactive effect on OCBs. Both hypotheses were tested separately for several combinations of dimensions of pay satisfaction and dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns using moderated multiple regression analyses (Gardner, Harris, Li, Kirkman, & Mathieu, 2017) in Stata 14. To keep the analyses manageable, and to avoid multicollinearity problems (Wooldridge, 2009), only combinations of dimensions with correlations below .50 were considered. As such, nine interaction terms were created using the following combinations of dimensions: pay level and coworkers, pay level and nature of work, pay level and communication, pay raises and coworkers, pay raises and communication, benefits and coworkers, benefits and nature of work, benefits and communication, and pay structure and coworkers. For the turnover intention models (see regression results in Table 6), all interaction terms turned out statistically non-significant. For the OCB models (see regression results in Table 7), the interaction terms between pay level and nature of work ($b = .16, p < .01$) and between benefits and nature of work ($b = .15, p < .05$) proved statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 5a was not supported, and Hypothesis 5b was only partially supported.

STUDY 2: METHOD

Data and Sample

Data were collected using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online crowdsourcing platform that contains a large participant pool and an integrated participant compensation system (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Previous research has shown that MTurk data are as reliable as those obtained through traditional methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). Only U.S. residents who were working full-time (i.e., at least 35 hours per week) were invited to participate in the study, and the survey stayed open until 300 complete responses were received. In terms of sample demographics, 42.67% of respondents were female, 41.00% of them were married (and 12% divorced or legally separated), and 55.00% of them had no children. For those who were parents, the average number of children was 2.11 ($SD = 1.07$). The average age of participants was 39.87 years ($SD = 11.29$), and 13.67% of them had associate degrees, 42.67% of them bachelor's degrees, and 16.67% of them graduate degrees. Moreover, they worked an average of 42.17 hours per week ($SD = 5.04$) in various industries such as educational and health services (21%), professional and business services (14.67%), wholesale

and retail trade (13.33%), information (11.00%), and financial activities (10.33%), among others. Their most common occupations were professional and related occupations (26.33%), management, business, and financial occupations (19.00%), office and administrative support occupations (16.00%), sales and related occupations (14.33%), and service occupations (14.00%). Finally, 38.67% of respondents held managerial positions, and their average number of years with their organizations was 6.97 ($SD = 5.36$), while their average number of years in their current positions was 5.44 ($SD = 4.49$).

Measures

Pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns were assessed with the original versions of the scales used in Study 1. Turnover intention and OCB were assessed with scales commonly used in North American studies. As already mentioned above, Study 2 was designed to test all proposed hypotheses, and therefore also included measures of trait PA and NA.

Turnover intention. Turnover intention was assessed using the scale developed by Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, and Klesh (1983). The scale includes 3 items: “How likely is it that you will actively look for a new job in the next year?”, “I often think about quitting”, and “I will probably look for a new job in the next year”. For the first item, participants were asked to answer the question using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *Very Unlikely*, 5 = *Very Likely*), and for the second and third items, they were asked to state their agreement or disagreement with the statements also using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 5 = *Strongly Agree*).

Organizational citizenship behaviour. OCB was assessed using the scale developed by Lee and Allen (2002). The scale includes 16 items measuring two dimensions of OCB: OCB directed at individuals and OCB directed at the organization. Participants were asked to indicate how often they engaged in various behaviours captured by these items using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *Never*, 7 = *Always*). Sample items include “Help others who have been absent”, “Give up time to help others who have work or nonwork problems”, “Defend the organization when other employees criticize it”, and “Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization”. The complete list of items can be found in Appendix B.

Positive and negative affect. Trait PA and NA were assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) developed by Watson et al. (1988). The PANAS includes 20 items that describe different feelings and emotions (10 items for positive affect and 10 items negative affect). Participants were presented the list of items and were asked to state the extent to

which they felt that way in general using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *Very Slightly or Not at All*, 5 = *Extremely*). Sample items include “Interested”, “Inspired”, “Guilty”, and “Nervous”. The complete list of items can be found in Appendix B.

STUDY 2: RESULTS

Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Similar to Study 1, several CFAs were conducted to evaluate the construct validity of the measures. Again, the first analysis focused on the (multi)dimensionality of the pay satisfaction construct (see Table 8). The default four-factor model assumed that the four dimensions of pay satisfaction will load onto separate factors. The model showed a good fit to the data: chi-square (129) = 317.61, CFI = .97, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .07. Comparing this model to a series of alternative models revealed that the default four-factor model provided a superior fit to the data. For instance, a three-factor model in which pay level and benefits were collapsed onto one factor yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (3) = 933.05, $p < .01$, chi-square (132) = 1250.66, CFI = .80, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .17. Furthermore, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded an even worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (6) = 1361.92, $p < .01$, chi-square (135) = 1649.52, CFI = .72, SRMR = .09, RMSEA = .19).

The second analysis focused on the multi(dimensionality) of the satisfaction with relational returns construct (see Table 9). The default seven-factor model assumed that the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns will load onto separate factors. The model showed an acceptable fit to the data: chi-square (329) = 1141.36, CFI = .87, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .09. Comparing this model to a series of alternative models suggested that the default seven-factor model provided a better fit to the data. For instance, a five-factor model in which promotion and contingent rewards were collapsed onto one factor, and operating procedures and nature of work onto another factor yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (11) = 443.62, $p < .01$, chi-square (340) = 1584.98, CFI = .80, SRMR = .10, RMSEA = .11. In addition, a three-factor model in which promotion, contingent rewards, and supervision were collapsed onto one factor, and operating procedures, nature of work, and communication onto another factor also yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (18) = 898.47, $p < .01$, chi-square (347) = 2039.83, CFI = .72, SRMR = .10, RMSEA = .13. Finally, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded the worst fit to the data: chi-square difference (21) = 1159.29, $p < .01$, chi-square (350) = 2300.65, CFI = .68, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .14.

To confirm that the four dimensions of satisfaction with pay are distinct from the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, an additional analysis was conducted that included all the items of the two scales (see Table 10). The default eleven-factor model assumed that the eleven dimensions of satisfaction with pay and relational returns will load onto separate factors. The model showed a reasonably good fit to the data: chi-square (934) = 2116.70, CFI = .90, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .07. Compared to this model, a two-factor model in which the four dimensions of pay satisfaction were collapsed onto one factor, and the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns onto another factor yielded a worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (54) = 2636.22, $p < .01$, chi-square (988) = 4752.92, CFI = .69, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .11. Moreover, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded an even worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (55) = 3669.84, $p < .01$, chi-square (989) = 5798.54, CFI = .60, SRMR = .09, RMSEA = .13.

To assess the validity of all study measures, a final analysis was conducted that included all the items of the four scales (see Table 11). The default sixteen-factor model assumed that the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, the two dimensions of OCB, as well as turnover intention, PA, and NA will load onto separate factors. The model showed an acceptable fit to the data: chi-square (3365) = 6455.92, CFI = .86, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .06. Compared to this model, a fifteen-factor model in which the two dimensions of OCB were collapsed onto one factor yielded a slightly worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (15) = 848.71, $p < .01$, chi-square (3380) = 7304.63, CFI = .83, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .06. Furthermore, a six-factor model in which the four dimensions of pay satisfaction were collapsed onto one factor, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns onto another factor, and the two dimensions of OCB onto another factor yielded a much worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (105) = 3654.30, $p < .01$, chi-square (3470) = 10110.22, CFI = .71, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .08. Similarly, a four-factor model in which the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, and the two dimensions of OCB were all collapsed onto one factor also yielded a much worse fit to the data: chi-square difference (114) = 6687.62, $p < .01$, chi-square (3479) = 13143.54, CFI = .58, SRMR = .11, RMSEA = .10. Finally, a one-factor model in which all items were loaded onto one factor yielded the worst fit to the data: chi-square difference (120) = 9958.89, $p < .01$, chi-square (3485) = 16414.81, CFI = .43, SRMR = .12, RMSEA = .11. Based on these results, subsequent analyses

included four measures of pay satisfaction, seven measures of relational returns, one measure of PA, one measure of NA, one measure of turnover intention, and two measures of OCB.

Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliabilities

Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and reliabilities for all study variables are presented in Table 12. Consistent with the findings of Study 1, all four dimensions of pay satisfaction and six of the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns had acceptable reliabilities ($\alpha = .96$ for pay level, $.88$ for pay raises, $.96$ for benefits, $.89$ for pay structure, $.91$ for promotion, $.89$ for supervision, $.88$ for contingent rewards, $.81$ for coworkers, $.90$ for nature of work, and $.84$ for communication). Furthermore, both the reliabilities of the outcome measures ($\alpha = .95$ for turnover intention, $.92$ for OCB-I, and $.94$ for OCB-O) and the reliabilities of the affect measures ($\alpha = .93$ for both PA and NA) were very good. As before, because satisfaction with operating procedures had weak reliability ($\alpha = .69$), it was excluded from further analyses.

Also consistent with the findings of Study 1, the intercorrelations among the four dimensions of pay satisfaction revealed that most dimensions were highly correlated, with the strongest link being observed between pay raises and pay structure ($r = .81, p < .01$). A similar pattern emerged for the six remaining dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, with the strongest links being observed between promotion and contingent rewards ($r = .75, p < .01$), supervision and coworkers ($r = .73, p < .01$), and supervision and contingent rewards ($r = .72, p < .01$). As for the intercorrelations among the four dimensions of pay satisfaction and the six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, although their magnitudes proved somewhat smaller, most of them were also rather strong, with 2 of the 24 correlation coefficients being between $.70$ and $.80$ ($p < .01$), 4 of them being between $.60$ and $.70$ ($p < .01$), and 7 of them being between $.50$ and $.60$ ($p < .01$). In fact, all intercorrelations among promotion, contingent rewards, and the four dimensions of pay satisfaction were above $.50$ ($p < .01$).

Tests of Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1 and 2 proposed that pay satisfaction has a negative effect on turnover intentions and a positive effect on OCBs. In view of the results of the previous CFAs, both hypotheses were tested separately for each of the four dimensions of pay satisfaction. Moreover, Hypothesis 2 was also tested separately for each of the two dimensions of OCB. As indicated by the bivariate correlations in Table 12, all four dimensions of pay satisfaction were negatively associated with turnover intentions ($r = -.56, p < .01$ for pay level; $r = -.54, p < .01$ for pay raises;

$r = -.53, p < .01$ for benefits; and $r = -.60, p < .01$ for pay structure), and positively associated with both OCBs-I ($r = .21, p < .01$ for pay level; $r = .20, p < .01$ for pay raises; $r = .22, p < .01$ for benefits; and $r = .23, p < .01$ for pay structure) and OCBs-O ($r = .46, p < .01$ for pay level; $r = .44, p < .01$ for pay raises; $r = .32, p < .01$ for benefits; and $r = .45, p < .01$ for pay structure). Thus, both hypotheses received full support.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 proposed that satisfaction with relational returns has a negative effect on turnover intentions and a positive effect on OCBs. As before, both hypotheses were tested separately for each of the six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns. In addition, Hypothesis 2 was also tested separately for each of the two dimensions of OCB. The bivariate correlations in Table 12 revealed that all six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns were negatively associated with turnover intentions ($r = -.62, p < .01$ for promotion; $r = -.57, p < .01$ for supervision; $r = -.69, p < .01$ for contingent rewards; $r = -.58, p < .01$ for coworkers; $r = -.71, p < .01$ for nature of work; and $r = -.62, p < .01$ for communication) and positively associated with both OCBs-I ($r = .22, p < .01$ for promotion; $r = .29, p < .01$ for supervision; $r = .21, p < .01$ for contingent rewards; $r = .30, p < .01$ for coworkers; $r = .40, p < .01$ for nature of work; and $r = .20, p < .01$ for communication) and OCBs-O ($r = .51, p < .01$ for promotion; $r = .43, p < .01$ for supervision; $r = .46, p < .01$ for contingent rewards; $r = .40, p < .01$ for coworkers; $r = .63, p < .01$ for nature of work; and $r = .38, p < .01$ for communication). Thus, both hypotheses received full support.

Hypotheses 5a and 5b proposed that pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns have a negative interactive effect on turnover intentions and a positive interactive effect on OCBs. Similar to Study 1, both hypotheses were tested separately for several combinations of dimensions of pay satisfaction and dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns using moderated multiple regression analyses in Stata 14. In addition, Hypothesis 5b was also tested separately for each of the two dimensions of OCB. Again, to keep the analyses manageable and to avoid multicollinearity problems, only combinations of dimensions with correlations below .50 were considered. As such, eleven interaction terms were created using the following combinations of dimensions: pay level and supervision, pay level and coworkers, pay level and communication, pay raises and supervision, pay raises and coworkers, benefits and supervision, benefits and coworkers, benefits and nature of work, benefits and communication, pay structure and supervision, and pay structure and coworkers. The majority of these combinations were the

same as those used in Study 1. For the turnover intention models (see results in Table 13), the interaction terms between pay level and supervision ($b = -.14, p < .01$), pay level and coworkers ($b = -.12, p < .01$), pay raises and supervision ($b = -.10, p < .05$), pay raises and coworkers ($b = -.12, p < .01$), benefits and nature of work ($b = -.09, p < .05$), and pay structure and supervision ($b = -.09, p < .05$) proved statistically significant. For the OCB-I models (see results in Table 14), only the interaction terms between pay level and communication ($b = .12, p < .05$) and benefits and communication ($b = .13, p < .05$) turned out to be statistically significant. Finally, for the OCB-O models (see results in Table 15), none of the interaction terms proved statistically significant. Thus, Hypotheses 5a and 5b were only partially supported.

Hypotheses 6a through 9b were tested separately for each of the four dimensions of pay satisfaction and each of the six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns using moderated multiple regression analyses in Stata 14. As before, the hypotheses involving OCBs, were tested separately for OCBs-I and OCBs-O. Hypotheses 6a and 7a proposed that PA moderates the negative effect of pay satisfaction on turnover intentions and the positive effect of pay satisfaction on OCBs, while Hypotheses 8a and 9a proposed that PA moderates the negative effect of satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and the positive effect of satisfaction with relational returns on OCBs. Contrary to expectations, the interaction terms between PA and all dimensions of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns turned out statistically non-significant in all models (see regression results in Tables 16, 18, and 20). Therefore, Hypotheses 6a, 7a, 8a, and 9a did not receive support.

Hypothesis 6b and 8b proposed that NA moderates the negative effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions. The interaction terms between pay level and NA ($b = .09, p < .05$), coworkers and NA ($b = .12, p < .05$), and nature of work and NA ($b = .12, p < .01$) proved statistically significant, thereby providing partial support for Hypothesis 6b and 8b (see regression results in Table 17). Hypotheses 7b and 9b proposed that NA moderates the positive effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on OCBs. For the OCB-I models (see regression results in Table 19), the interaction terms between benefits and NA ($b = -.12, p < .05$), contingent rewards and NA ($b = -.14, p < .05$), and communication and NA ($b = -.13, p < .05$) proved statistically significant. In addition, for the OCB-O models (see regression results in Table 21), the interaction terms between supervision and NA ($b = -.12, p < .05$), contingent rewards and NA ($b = -.13, p < .05$), and communication

and NA ($b = -.18, p < .01$) also proved statistically significant. Taken together, these results provided partial support for Hypotheses 7b and 9b.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

CFA results from both studies indicated that pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns are multidimensional constructs. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies conducted in both American and Chinese contexts (for pay satisfaction, see Heneman & Schwab, 1985, Judge, 1993, Judge & Welbourne, 1993, and Wu & Wang, 2008; for satisfaction with relational returns, see Spector, 1995, 1997, and Chou et al., 2011). Moreover, the intercorrelations among the four dimensions of pay satisfaction and the six dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns were fairly high in both studies, with some of the highest being among promotion, contingent rewards, supervision, and the four dimensions of pay satisfaction for Study 1, and among promotion, contingent rewards, nature of work, and the four dimensions of pay satisfaction for Study 2. This seems to suggest that many companies do emphasize both monetary and non-monetary rewards in their total rewards systems.

Hypotheses 1 through 4 received full support in both studies. These findings are congruent with social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), and lend support to the notion that when employees are satisfied with certain aspects of their jobs (either monetary or non-monetary), they reciprocate by strengthening their commitment to their organizations, which, in turn, decreases their turnover intentions and increases their engagement in OCBs. In study 1, the five strongest effects on turnover intentions came from contingent rewards, supervision, communication, promotion, and pay structure. In Study 2, the five strongest effects on turnover intentions came from nature of work, contingent rewards, communication, promotion, and pay structure. In both cases, only one the five satisfaction dimensions was related to total compensation, a finding that is suggestive of the growing importance of relational returns within the total rewards system (Rumpel & Medcof, 2006). With regard to OCBs, the strongest effects in Study 1 came from supervision, communication, coworkers, nature of work, and contingent rewards, and the strongest effects in Study 2 came from nature of work, coworkers, supervision, pay structure, and promotion (or benefits) for OCBs-I, and nature of work, promotion, contingent rewards, pay level, and pay structure for OCBs-O. Although the pattern of results for OCBs is less consistent across studies (which could be the result of different OCB measures), satisfaction with relational returns still seems to play a more important role than pay satisfaction. Interestingly enough, the

differences in results between OCBs-I and OCBs-O seem to be well aligned with the conceptual distinction between the two OCB dimensions (Lee and Allen, 2002).

The findings related to the interactive effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs (Hypotheses 5a and 5b) were rather different across the two studies. In Study 1, all interactive effects on turnover intentions turned out statistically non-significant, and only the interactive effects of pay level and nature of work and of benefits and nature of work on OCBs proved statistically significant. In Study 2, all interactive effects on OCBs-O turned out statistically non-significant, and only the interactive effects of pay level and communication and of benefits and communication on OCBs-I proved statistically significant. However, for turnover intentions, six of the eleven interactive effects were statistically significant: pay level and supervision, pay level and coworkers, pay raises and supervision, pay raises and coworkers, benefits and nature of work, and pay structure and supervision. Although some of these differences are difficult to reconcile, one interesting point emerging from these findings is that some dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns (in particular, nature of work and communication) might be used strategically to strengthen the effects of some dimensions of pay satisfaction (in particular, pay level and benefits) on OCBs.

Finally, the hypotheses regarding the moderating effects of PA (6a, 7a, 8a, and 9a) did not receive any support, and the hypotheses regarding the moderating effects of NA (6b, 7b, 8b, and 9b) only received partial support. In particular, NA was found to weaken the effects of satisfaction with pay level, coworkers, and nature of work on turnover intentions, the effects of satisfaction with benefits, contingent rewards, and communication on OCB-I, and the effects of satisfaction with supervision, contingent rewards, and communication on OCB-O. These findings are consistent with the argument that high-NA individuals tend to have weaker affective reactions to rewards (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Watson et al., 1999). One explanation for the lack of support for the hypotheses involving PA could be that the moderating effects of PA are much weaker than the moderating effects of NA, which would make them more difficult to detect in a small sample (Stone-Romero & Anderson, 1994). Another explanation could be that only large individual differences in PA could produce the hypothesized moderating effects, and that the sample used in Study 2 did not have enough variation in PA to detect them (McClelland & Judd, 1993). Indeed, the coefficient of variation for PA was 26.30%, while the coefficient of variation for NA was 43.23%. Of note, even though PA did not moderate the effects of any

dimension of pay satisfaction or satisfaction with relational returns on either turnover intentions or OCBs, it did have significant direct effects on both turnover intentions and OCBs ($r = -.43, p < .01$ for turnover intentions; $r = .35, p < .01$ for OCBs-I; and $r = .58, p < .01$ for OCBs-O). In addition, after accounting for the direct effects of PA on OCBs-I and OCBs-O, many of the previously observed effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on OCBs-I and OCBs-O became weaker, and some of the previously observed effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on OCBs-I became statistically non-significant. In particular, the effects of pay level, pay raises, pay structure, promotion, contingent rewards, and communication on OCBs-I disappeared after controlling for PA. This suggests that these effects might have been driven by individual differences in trait-based positive affect.

LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Despite many similarities in the findings of Studies 1 and 2, some discrepancies also emerged. One obvious explanation for these discrepancies is related to the methodological differences between the two studies. On the one hand, the studies were set in different cultural contexts, which might have triggered some of the diverging findings. One direct consequence of this was the use of different measures of OCBs. Specifically, the Chinese OCB scale (Farh et al., 1997) includes two dimensions—interpersonal harmony and protecting company resources—that are reflective of Chinese societal values (Farh et al., 2004; Yang, 1993), and are not present in American OCB scales (Lee & Allen, 2002; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990). On the other hand, Study 1 was conducted in a single organization in China, which lowered the amount of variation in all its dimensions of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns. This, in turn, might have hindered the ability to detect significant effects. Moreover, limiting the sample to a single company reduced the generalizability of the Chinese findings. Although this problem was addressed in Study 2 through a sample of U.S. workers employed in various organizations across a wide range of industries, future research should re-examine the hypothesized effects in the Chinese context using a more diverse sample of employees from different organizations offering different total reward packages.

Another limitation that pertains to both studies is to be found in their cross-sectional design. Although reverse causality is less of a concern for the proposed effects, it is still possible that unobserved variables affecting both the independent and the dependent variables at the same time might have been the driving force behind the observed effects. As already discussed above,

one such variable is positive affect, whose inclusion as a control variable weakened many of the positive effects of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with relational returns on OCBs (and even made some of them disappear). Therefore, future research should consider using a larger set of control variables guided by existing research. Related to this, using a longitudinal design that would allow for temporal separation in the measurement of variables would make it possible to also assess the role of organizational commitment (and, in particular, affective commitment) as a linking mechanism between the various dimensions of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns, on the one hand, and turnover intentions and OCBs, on the other.

A final limitation relates to the measurement of some variables. In Study 1, even though OCBs were measured through a scale specifically developed for the Chinese context, two of the five OCB dimensions had low reliabilities, which led to the use of a global OCB measure instead of specific OCB measures. The weak psychometric properties of the two OCB dimensions also appeared to be the reason behind the poor fit of the CFA model that included all Study 1 variables. Future research should thus continue to assess this scale. Moreover, in both Study 1 and Study 2, the scale for satisfaction with operating procedures also had low reliability, which prevented its use in the main analyses. This unsatisfactory reliability was consistent with those reported in previous studies (Spector, 1997; Chou et al., 2011), and therefore future research should continue to refine this scale.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

An important implication for companies is that increasing employees' pay satisfaction is not the only way to retain and motivate them. Indeed, the findings of both studies indicate that some dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns may have stronger effects on both turnover intentions and OCBs than any of the four dimensions of pay satisfaction. Specifically, satisfaction with nature of work and satisfaction with contingent rewards may have the strongest effects on both turnover intentions and OCBs in both countries. Companies should therefore assign greater importance to these types of relational returns when designing their total rewards systems. Moreover, if they are unable to provide competitive compensation packages, creating total rewards systems focused on the relational returns with the largest effects on turnover intentions and OCBs should help them retain and motivate their workers.

Another implication for companies is that emphasizing certain combinations of monetary and non-monetary rewards in their total rewards systems may lead to additional gains in terms of

their employees' organizational commitment. This is because certain dimensions of pay satisfaction interact with certain dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns to decrease turnover intentions or increase OCBs above and beyond the independent effects of the respective dimensions. For example, in Study 1, satisfaction with pay level and satisfaction with nature of work were found to have a positive interactive effect on OCBs. This suggests that by increasing satisfaction with nature of work, it may be possible to obtain comparable increases in OCBs with relatively smaller increases in satisfaction with pay level. Similarly, in Study 2, satisfaction with pay level and satisfaction with coworkers were found to have a negative interactive effect on turnover intentions. This suggests that by increasing satisfaction with coworkers, it may be possible to obtain comparable decreases in turnover intentions with relatively smaller increases in satisfaction with pay level. Therefore, companies could leverage such combinations of monetary and non-monetary rewards to further optimize their total rewards systems. As before, such an approach may prove particularly useful for companies that are unable to offer competitive compensation packages.

A final implication for companies is that the benefits resulting from increases in their employees' levels of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns may be less noticeable when some of these employees are high in NA. In fact, for some dimensions of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns, such benefits may be severely reduced. To avoid these situations, whenever possible, companies should consider re-evaluating their staffing practices to ensure that high-NA applicants (all else being equal) are screened out. Of course, any changes to existing staffing practices should be made in compliance with human rights legislation to ensure that they do not have adverse effects (i.e., unintended, negative impacts on members of protected groups). For existing high-NA employees, companies should consider alternative mechanisms to reduce their turnover intentions and increase their OCBs that are less susceptible to negative affective reactions.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research was to examine the independent and interactive effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs, and to assess the moderating influences of PA and NA on the independent effects of pay satisfaction and satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs. Results from two methodologically different studies confirmed the multidimensionality of both pay satisfaction

and satisfaction with relational returns, and provided support for many of the hypothesized effects. In particular, all dimensions of pay satisfaction and all dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns proved to be negatively associated with turnover intentions, and positively associated with OCBs. Moreover, some dimensions of pay satisfaction and some dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns interacted to predict turnover intentions and OCBs. Finally, negative affect, but not positive affect, moderated the independent effects of a few dimensions of pay satisfaction and a few dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns on turnover intentions and OCBs. These findings have practical implications for the optimal design of total rewards systems and the proper selection of employees best suited for these systems.

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APPENDIX A: FIGURES AND TABLES OF RESULTS

Figure 1: Conceptual Model




Table 1: Study 1 CFA Results for Pay Satisfaction

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Four factors	183.37	129			.97	.04	.05
Model 2: Three factors	319.92	132	136.55**	3	.89	.06	.09
Model 3: Two factors	329.54	134	146.17**	5	.88	.06	.09
Model 4: One factor	413.19	135	229.82**	6	.83	.07	.11

Notes: $N = 175$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default model with pay level, pay raises, benefits, and pay structure loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Three-factor model with pay level and benefits loaded onto one factor. Model 3: Two-factor model with pay level and benefits loaded onto one factor, and pay raises and pay structure loaded onto another factor. Model 4: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 2: Study 1 CFA Results for Satisfaction with Relational Returns

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Seven factors	693.82	329			.85	.07	.08
Model 2: Six factors	735.33	335	41.51**	6	.84	.07	.08
Model 3: Five factors	770.73	340	76.91**	11	.82	.07	.09
Model 4: Four factors	817.44	344	123.62**	15	.81	.08	.09
Model 5: Three factors	853.67	347	159.85**	18	.79	.08	.09
Model 6: Two factors	875.40	349	181.58**	20	.78	.08	.09
Model 7: One factor	930.80	350	236.98**	21	.76	.08	.10

Notes: $N = 175$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default model with promotion, supervision, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, and communication loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Six-factor model with promotion and contingent rewards loaded onto one factor. Model 3: Five-factor model with promotion and contingent rewards loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures and nature of work loaded onto another factor. Model 4: Four-factor model with promotion, contingent rewards, and supervision loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures and nature of work loaded onto another factor. Model 5: Three-factor model with promotion, contingent rewards and supervision loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures, nature of work, and communication loaded onto another factor. Model 6: Two-factor model with promotion, contingent rewards, and supervision loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, and communication loaded onto another factor. Model 7: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 3: Study 1 CFA Results for Pay Satisfaction and Satisfaction with Relational Returns

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Eleven factors	1585.15	934			.86	.07	.06
Model 2: Two factors	2117.33	988	532.18**	54	.75	.08	.08
Model 3: One factor	2372.12	989	786.97**	55	.69	.08	.09

Notes: $N = 175$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default model with pay level, pay raises, benefits, pay structure, promotion, supervision, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, and communication loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Two-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction loaded onto one factor, and the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns loaded onto another factor. Model 3: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 4: Study 1 CFA Results for All Measures

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Seventeen factors	3556.20	2141			.78	.07	.06
Model 2: Thirteen factors	3934.03	2199	377.83**	58	.74	.08	.07
Model 3: Four factors	4493.19	2271	936.99**	130	.66	.09	.08
Model 4: Three factors	4769.16	2274	1212.96**	133	.62	.09	.08
Model 5: Two factors	4998.77	2276	1442.57**	136	.59	.09	.08
Model 6: One factor	5064.54	2277	1508.34**	137	.58	.09	.08

Notes: $N = 175$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default seventeen-factor model with pay level, pay raises, benefits, pay structure, promotion, supervision, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, communication, identification with the company, altruism, conscientiousness, interpersonal harmony, protecting company resources, and turnover intention loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Thirteen-factor model with the five dimensions of OCB loaded onto one factor. Model 3: Four-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction loaded onto one factor, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns loaded onto another factor, and the five dimensions of OCB loaded onto another factor. Model 4: Three-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction and the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns loaded onto one factor, and the five dimensions of OCB loaded onto another factor. Model 5: Two-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, and the five dimensions of OCB all loaded onto one factor. Model 6: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 5: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics, Bivariate Correlations, and Reliabilities

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Pay level	3.35	.84	1	5	.86												
2. Pay raises	3.26	.84	1	5	.66	.79											
3. Benefits	3.50	.98	1	5	.63	.60	.89										
4. Pay structure	3.37	.81	1	5	.67	.74	.56	.81									
5. Promotion	3.85	1.13	1	6	.68	.67	.59	.66	.82								
6. Supervision	4.37	.88	1	6	.52	.59	.51	.60	.69	.73							
7. Contingent rewards	4.19	1.08	1	6	.64	.57	.60	.62	.77	.74	.83						
8. Operating procedures	3.72	1.01	1	6	.49	.51	.45	.60	.62	.53	.64	.68					
9. Coworkers	4.50	.88	1	6	.42	.43	.42	.47	.56	.73	.59	.43	.71				
10. Nature of work	4.54	.88	1	6	.47	.51	.43	.53	.60	.61	.58	.59	.51	.79			
11. Communication	4.39	.95	1	6	.39	.42	.37	.51	.54	.72	.67	.56	.68	.65	.70		
12. Turnover intention	2.40	.89	1	5	-.49	-.47	-.50	-.53	-.55	-.58	-.62	-.46	-.49	-.50	-.56	.80	
13. OCB	5.34	.66	1	7	.39	.46	.33	.46	.52	.66	.53	.44	.57	.54	.63	-.42	.85

Notes: $N = 175$. All correlations are significant at $p < .01$ (two-tailed). Reliabilities are on the diagonal in bold.

Table 6: Study 1 Regressions Results for Interactive Effects on Turnover Intentions

	Turnover intention		
<i>Pay level models</i>	<i>Model 1a</i>	<i>Model 2a</i>	<i>Model 3a</i>
Pay level	-.34**	-.32**	-.32**
Coworkers	-.35**		
Pay level × Coworkers	.02		
Nature of work		-.34**	
Pay level × Nature of work		.02	
Communication			-.44**
Pay level × Communication			.08
<i>Pay raises models</i>	<i>Model 1b</i>	<i>Model 2b</i>	
Pay raises	-.32**	-.29**	
Coworkers	-.35**		
Pay raises × Coworkers	-.01		
Communication		-.44**	
Pay raises × Communication		-.01	
<i>Benefits models</i>	<i>Model 1c</i>	<i>Model 2c</i>	<i>Model 3c</i>
Benefits	-.36**	-.34**	-.32**
Coworkers	-.34**		
Benefits × Coworkers	-.03		
Nature of work		-.34**	
Benefits × Nature of work		.05	
Communication			-.45**
Benefits × Communication			.11
<i>Pay structure models</i>	<i>Model 1d</i>		
Pay structure	-.38**		
Coworkers	-.31**		
Pay structure × Coworkers	-.02		

Notes: $N = 175$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed).

Table 7: Study 1 Regression Results for Interactive Effects on OCBs

	OCB		
<i>Pay level models</i>	<i>Model 1a</i>	<i>Model 2a</i>	<i>Model 3a</i>
Pay level	.17**	.16**	.16**
Coworkers	.50**		
Pay level × Coworkers	.03		
Nature of work		.51**	
Pay level × Nature of work		.16**	
Communication			.57**
Pay level × Communication			.01
<i>Pay raises models</i>	<i>Model 1b</i>	<i>Model 2b</i>	
Pay raises	.26**	.23**	
Coworkers	.49**		
Pay raises × Coworkers	.10		
Communication		.53**	
Pay raises × Communication		.08	
<i>Benefits models</i>	<i>Model 1c</i>	<i>Model 2c</i>	<i>Model 3c</i>
Benefits	.11	.13	.12
Coworkers	.53**		
Benefits × Coworkers	.02		
Nature of work		.52**	
Benefits × Nature of work		.15*	
Communication			.59**
Benefits × Communication			.08
<i>Pay structure models</i>	<i>Model 1d</i>		
Pay structure	.24**		
Coworkers	.47**		
Pay structure × Coworkers	.06		

Notes: $N = 175$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed); * $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Table 8: Study 2 CFA Results for Pay Satisfaction

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Four factors	317.61	129			.97	.03	.07
Model 2: Three factors	1250.66	132	933.05**	3	.80	.08	.17
Model 3: Two factors	1304.59	134	986.98**	5	.79	.08	.17
Model 4: One factor	1649.52	135	1361.92**	6	.72	.09	.19

Notes: $N = 300$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default model with pay level, pay raises, benefits, and pay structure loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Three-factor model with pay level and benefits loaded onto one factor. Model 3: Two-factor model with pay level and benefits loaded onto one factor, and pay raises and pay structure loaded onto another factor. Model 4: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 9: Study 2 CFA Results for Satisfaction with Relational Returns

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Seven factors	1141.36	329			.87	.08	.09
Model 2: Six factors	1343.16	335	201.8**	6	.84	.08	.10
Model 3: Five factors	1584.98	340	443.62**	11	.80	.10	.11
Model 4: Four factors	1880.41	344	739.05**	15	.75	.11	.12
Model 5: Three factors	2039.83	347	898.47**	18	.72	.10	.13
Model 6: Two factors	2152.54	349	1011.18**	20	.71	.08	.13
Model 7: One factor	2300.65	350	1159.29**	21	.68	.08	.14

Notes: $N = 300$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default model with promotion, supervision, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, and communication loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Six-factor model with promotion and contingent rewards loaded onto one factor. Model 3: Five-factor model with promotion and contingent rewards loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures and nature of work loaded onto another factor. Model 4: Four-factor model with promotion, contingent rewards, and supervision loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures and nature of work loaded onto another factor. Model 5: Three-factor model with promotion, contingent rewards and supervision loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures, nature of work, and communication loaded onto another factor. Model 6: Two-factor model with promotion, contingent rewards, and supervision loaded onto one factor, and operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, and communication loaded onto another factor. Model 7: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 10: Study 2 CFA Results for Pay Satisfaction and Satisfaction with Relational Returns

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Eleven factors	2116.70	934			.90	.06	.07
Model 2: Two factors	4752.92	988	2636.22**	54	.69	.08	.11
Model 3: One factor	5798.54	989	3669.84**	55	.60	.09	.13

Notes: $N = 300$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default model with pay level, pay raises, benefits, pay structure, promotion, supervision, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, and communication loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Two-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction loaded onto one factor, and the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns loaded onto another factor. Model 3: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 11: Study 2 CFA Results for All Measures

<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA
Model 1: Sixteen factors	6455.92	3365			.86	.07	.06
Model 2: Fifteen factors	7304.63	3380	848.71**	15	.83	.07	.06
Model 3: Six factors	10110.22	3470	3654.30**	105	.71	.08	.08
Model 4: Five factors	11196.75	3475	4740.83**	110	.66	.09	.09
Model 5: Four factors	13143.54	3479	6687.62**	114	.58	.11	.10
Model 6: Three factors	14269.48	3482	7813.56**	117	.53	.11	.10
Model 7: Two factors	15759.71	3484	9303.79**	119	.46	.12	.11
Model 8: One factor	16414.81	3485	9958.89**	120	.43	.12	.11

Notes. $N = 300$. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. Model 1: Default sixteen-factor model with pay level, pay raises, benefits, pay structure, promotion, supervision, contingent rewards, operating procedures, coworkers, nature of work, communication, OCB-I, OCB-O, turnover intention, PA, and NA loaded onto their intended factors. Model 2: Fifteen-factor model with the two dimensions of OCB loaded onto one factor. Model 3: Six-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction loaded onto one factor, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns loaded onto another factor, and the two dimensions of OCB loaded onto another factor. Model 4: Five-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction and the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns loaded onto one factor, and the two dimensions of OCB loaded onto another factor. Model 5: Four-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, and the two dimensions of OCB all loaded onto one factor. Model 6: Three-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, the two dimensions of OCB, and PA all loaded onto one factor. Model 7: Two-factor model with the four dimensions of pay satisfaction, the seven dimensions of satisfaction with relational returns, the two dimensions of OCB, and PA loaded onto one factor, and turnover intention and NA loaded onto another factor. Model 8: One-factor model with all items loaded onto one factor. ** $p < .01$.

Table 12: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics, Bivariate Correlations, and Reliabilities

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Pay level	3.15	1.11	1	5	.96															
2. Pay raises	3.01	1.00	1	5	.75	.88														
3. Benefits	3.16	1.24	1	5	.63	.59	.96													
4. Pay structure	3.15	.88	1	5	.76	.81	.63	.89												
5. Promotion	3.43	1.39	1	6	.67	.75	.56	.76	.91											
6. Supervision	4.51	1.24	1	6	.47	.47	.37	.50	.59	.89										
7. Contingent rewards	3.71	1.40	1	6	.66	.68	.51	.66	.75	.72	.88									
8. Operating procedures	3.81	1.11	1	6	.33	.34	.28	.42	.41	.47	.59	.69								
9. Coworkers	4.54	1.08	1	6	.45	.46	.35	.50	.56	.73	.65	.49	.81							
10. Nature of work	4.27	1.30	1	6	.56	.54	.46	.56	.61	.54	.62	.38	.55	.90						
11. Communication	4.22	1.20	1	6	.44	.52	.38	.57	.58	.63	.69	.57	.68	.58	.84					
12. Positive Affect	3.32	.87	1	5	.45	.39	.34	.43	.49	.38	.43	.23	.38	.57	.41	.93				
13. Negative Affect	1.46	.63	1	5	-.23	-.17	-.22	-.20	-.21	-.31	-.31	-.31	-.38	-.35	-.41	-.25	.93			
14. Turnover intention	2.76	1.37	1	5	-.56	-.54	-.53	-.60	-.62	-.57	-.69	-.50	-.58	-.71	-.62	-.43	.37	.95		
15. OCB-I	4.83	1.23	1	6	.21	.20	.22	.23	.22	.29	.21	.06	.30	.40	.20	.35	-.10	-.19	.92	
16. OCB-O	4.38	1.48	1	6	.46	.44	.32	.45	.51	.43	.46	.23	.40	.63	.38	.58	-.13	-.43	.64	.94

Notes: $N = 300$. Correlations greater than $|.18|$ are significant at $p < .01$ (two-tailed); those greater than $|.12|$ are significant at $p < .05$ (two-tailed). Reliabilities are on the diagonal in bold.

Table 13: Study 2 Regressions Results for Interactive Effects on Turnover Intentions

	Turnover Intention			
<i>Pay level models</i>	<i>Model 1a</i>	<i>Model 2a</i>	<i>Model 3a</i>	
Pay level	-.39**	-.38**	-.36**	
Supervision	-.43**			
Pay level × Supervision	-.14**			
Coworkers		-.43**		
Pay level × Coworkers		-.12**		
Communication			-.47**	
Pay level × Communication			-.08	
<i>Pay raises models</i>	<i>Model 1b</i>	<i>Model 2b</i>		
Pay raises	-.35**	-.35**		
Supervision	-.44**			
Pay raises × Supervision	-.10*			
Coworkers		-.44**		
Pay raises × Coworkers		-.12**		
<i>Benefits models</i>	<i>Model 1c</i>	<i>Model 2c</i>	<i>Model 3c</i>	<i>Model 4c</i>
Benefits	-.38**	-.37**	-.26**	-.34**
Supervision	-.45**			
Benefits × Supervision	-.08			
Coworkers		-.46**		
Benefits × Coworkers		-.06		
Nature of work			-.61**	
Benefits × Nature of work			-.09*	
Communication				-.49**
Benefits × Communication				-.03
<i>Pay structure models</i>	<i>Model 1d</i>	<i>Model 2d</i>		
Pay structure	-.41**	-.40**		
Supervision	-.39**			
Pay structure × Supervision	-.09*			
Coworkers		-.39**		
Pay structure × Coworkers		-.07		

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed); * $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Table 14: Study 2 Regression Results for Interactive Effects on OCBs-I

	OCB-I			
<i>Pay level models</i>	<i>Model 1a</i>	<i>Model 2a</i>	<i>Model 3a</i>	
Pay level	.09	.08	.15*	
Supervision	.25**			
Pay level × Supervision	.01			
Coworkers		.26**		
Pay level × Coworkers		-.06		
Communication			.13*	
Pay level × Communication			.12*	
<i>Pay raises models</i>	<i>Model 1b</i>	<i>Model 2b</i>		
Pay raises	.08	.07		
Supervision	.25**			
Pay raises × Supervision	.02			
Coworkers		.26**		
Pay raises × Coworkers		-.05		
<i>Benefits models</i>	<i>Model 1c</i>	<i>Model 2c</i>	<i>Model 3c</i>	<i>Model 4c</i>
Benefits	.14*	.13*	.05	.18**
Supervision	.25**			
Benefits × Supervision	.04			
Coworkers		.25**		
Benefits × Coworkers		-.03		
Nature of work			.38**	
Benefits × Nature of work			.01	
Communication				.14*
Benefits × Communication				.13*
<i>Pay structure models</i>	<i>Model 1d</i>	<i>Model 2d</i>		
Pay structure	.12	.11		
Supervision	.24**			
Pay structure × Supervision	.05			
Coworkers		.25**		
Pay structure × Coworkers		.01		

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed); * $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Table 15: Study 2 Regression Results for Interactive Effects on OCBs-O

	OCB-O			
<i>Pay level models</i>	<i>Model 1a</i>	<i>Model 2a</i>	<i>Model 3a</i>	
Pay level	.33**	.35**	.36**	
Supervision	.27**			
Pay level × Supervision	-.01			
Coworkers		.23**		
Pay level × Coworkers		-.08		
Communication			.22**	
Pay level × Communication			.03	
<i>Pay raises models</i>	<i>Model 1b</i>	<i>Model 2b</i>		
Pay raises	.31**	.33**		
Supervision	.28**			
Pay raises × Supervision	-.03			
Coworkers		.24**		
Pay raises × Coworkers		-.05		
<i>Benefits models</i>	<i>Model 1c</i>	<i>Model 2c</i>	<i>Model 3c</i>	<i>Model 4c</i>
Benefits	.19**	.21**	.05	.21**
Supervision	.38**			
Benefits × Supervision	.05			
Coworkers		.32**		
Benefits × Coworkers		-.05		
Nature of work			.62**	
Benefits × Nature of work			.03	
Communication				.30**
Benefits × Communication				.06
<i>Pay structure models</i>	<i>Model 1d</i>	<i>Model 2d</i>		
Pay structure	.31**	.34**		
Supervision	.29**			
Pay structure × Supervision	.03			
Coworkers		.22**		
Pay structure × Coworkers		-.03		

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed).

Table 16: Study 2 Regression Results for Moderating Effects of PA (Turnover Intentions)

	Turnover Intention		
Pay level	-.56**	-.46**	-.47**
PA		-.22**	-.21**
Pay level × PA			-.02
Pay raises	-.54**	-.45**	-.45**
PA		-.25**	-.25**
Pay raises × PA			.00
Benefits	-.53**	-.44**	-.44**
PA		-.28**	-.27**
Benefits × PA			-.06
Pay structure	-.60**	-.51**	-.51**
PA		-.21**	-.21**
Pay structure × PA			.01
Promotion	-.62**	-.54**	-.54**
PA		-.16**	-.16**
Promotion × PA			.04
Supervision	-.57**	-.48**	-.49**
PA		-.25**	-.24**
Supervision × PA			-.07
Contingent rewards	-.69**	-.62**	-.62**
PA		-.16**	-.16**
Contingent rewards × PA			-.02
Coworkers	-.58**	-.49**	-.50**
PA		-.24**	-.24**
Coworkers × PA			-.04
Nature of work	-.71**	-.70**	-.72**
PA		-.02	-.02
Nature of work × PA			-.07
Communication	-.62**	-.54**	-.54**
PA		-.21**	-.20**
Communication × PA			-.04

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed).

Table 17: Study 2 Regression Results for Moderating Effects of NA (Turnover Intentions)

	Turnover Intention		
Pay level	-.56**	-.50**	-.50**
NA		.26**	.28**
Pay level × NA			.09*
Pay raises	-.54**	-.49**	-.50**
NA		.29**	.30**
Pay raises × NA			.05
Benefits	-.53**	-.47**	-.47**
NA		.27**	.28**
Benefits × NA			.03
Pay structure	-.60**	-.54**	-.54**
NA		.26**	.27**
Pay structure × NA			.04
Promotion	-.62**	-.56**	-.57**
NA		.25**	.25**
Promotion × NA			-.02
Supervision	-.57**	-.50**	-.50**
NA		.22**	.25**
Supervision × NA			.07
Contingent rewards	-.69**	-.64**	-.64**
NA		.17**	.17**
Contingent rewards × NA			.00
Coworkers	-.58**	-.52**	-.52**
NA		.17**	.24**
Coworkers × NA			.12*
Nature of work	-.71**	-.66**	-.67**
NA		.14**	.18**
Nature of work × NA			.12**
Communication	-.62**	-.56**	-.55**
NA		.14**	.19**
Communication × NA			.07

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed); * $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Table 18: Study 2 Regression Results for Moderating Effects of PA (OCBs-I)

	OCB-I		
Pay level	.21**	.06	.06
PA		.32**	.32**
Pay level × PA			-.01
Pay raises	.20**	.07	.07
PA		.32**	.32**
Pay raises × PA			-.05
Benefits	.22**	.12*	.11
PA		.31**	.31**
Benefits × PA			-.02
Pay structure	.24**	.11	.11
PA		.30**	.30**
Pay structure × PA			.00
Promotion	.22**	.06	.06
PA		.32**	.32**
Promotion × PA			.01
Supervision	.29**	.18**	.19**
PA		.28**	.28**
Supervision × PA			.08
Contingent rewards	.21**	.08	.08
PA		.32**	.31**
Contingent rewards × PA			.10
Coworkers	.30**	.20**	.20**
PA		.27**	.27**
Coworkers × PA			.05
Nature of work	.40**	.30**	.31**
PA		.18**	.17**
Nature of work × PA			.06
Communication	.20**	.06	.06
PA		.32**	.31**
Communication × PA			.07

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed); * $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Table 19: Study 2 Regression Results for Moderating Effects of NA (OCBs-I)

	OCB-I		
Pay level	.21**	.19**	.19**
NA		-.06	-.09
Pay level × NA			-.10
Pay raises	.20**	.18**	.19**
NA		-.07	-.08
Pay raises × NA			-.07
Benefits	.22**	.20**	.21**
NA		-.06	-.09
Benefits × NA			-.12*
Pay structure	.24**	.22**	.23**
NA		-.06	-.07
Pay structure × NA			-.05
Promotion	.22**	.20**	.19**
NA		-.06	-.07
Promotion × NA			-.09
Supervision	.29**	.28**	.28**
NA		-.02	-.05
Supervision × NA			-.08
Contingent rewards	.21**	.20**	.17**
NA		-.04	-.12
Contingent rewards × NA			-.14*
Coworkers	.30**	.31**	.31**
NA		.02	-.00
Coworkers × NA			-.04
Nature of work	.40**	.42**	.42**
NA		.04	.02
Nature of work × NA			-.06
Communication	.20**	.18**	.16**
NA		-.03	-.12
Communication × NA			-.13*

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed); * $p < .05$ (two tailed).

Table 20: Study 2 Regression Results for Moderating Effects of PA (OCBs-O)

	OCB-O		
Pay level	.46**	.25**	.25**
PA		.47**	.47**
Pay level × PA			.03
Pay raises	.44**	.26**	.26**
PA		.48**	.48**
Pay raises × PA			-.02
Benefits	.32**	.14**	.15**
PA		.53**	.53**
Benefits × PA			.04
Pay structure	.45**	.25**	.24**
PA		.48**	.47**
Pay structure × PA			.04
Promotion	.52**	.30**	.31**
PA		.43**	.43**
Promotion × PA			-.02
Supervision	.43**	.25**	.26**
PA		.49**	.48**
Supervision × PA			.07
Contingent rewards	.46**	.26**	.26**
PA		.47**	.47**
Contingent rewards × PA			.05
Coworkers	.40**	.21**	.21**
PA		.50**	.50**
Coworkers × PA			-.01
Nature of work	.63**	.44**	.45**
PA		.33**	.32**
Nature of work × PA			.03
Communication	.38**	.17**	.17**
PA		.51**	.51**
Communication × PA			.02

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed).

Table 21: Study 2 Regression Results for Moderating Effects of NA (OCBs-O)

	OCB-O		
Pay level	.46**	.45**	.45**
NA		-.03	-.05
Pay level × NA			-.07
Pay raises	.44**	.43**	.44**
NA		-.06	-.06
Pay raises × NA			-.05
Benefits	.32**	.31**	.31**
NA		-.06	-.07
Benefits × NA			-.04
Pay structure	.45**	.44**	.44**
NA		-.04	-.05
Pay structure × NA			-.04
Promotion	.52**	.51**	.51**
NA		-.02	-.02
Promotion × NA			.02
Supervision	.43**	.44**	.44**
NA		.01	-.04
Supervision × NA			-.12*
Contingent rewards	.46**	.47**	.44**
NA		.02	-.06
Contingent rewards × NA			-.13*
Coworkers	.40**	.41**	.41**
NA		.03	.00
Coworkers × NA			-.05
Nature of work	.63**	.67**	.67**
NA		.10*	.09
Nature of work × NA			-.03
Communication	.38**	.39**	.36**
NA		.03	-.09
Communication × NA			-.18**

Notes: $N = 300$. ** $p < .01$ (two tailed); * $p < .05$ (two tailed).

APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SCALES

Pay Satisfaction (Heneman & Schwab, 1985)

Pay Level

- 1) My take-home pay
- 2) My current salary
- 3) My overall level of pay
- 4) The size of my current salary

Pay Raises

- 1) My most recent raise
- 2) Influence my supervisor has on my pay
- 3) The raises I have typically received in the past
- 4) How my raises are determined

Benefits

- 1) My benefit package
- 2) The amount the company pays towards my benefits
- 3) The value of my benefits
- 4) The number of benefits I receive

Pay Structure and Administration

- 1) The company's pay structure
- 2) Information the company gives about pay issues of concern to me
- 3) Pay of other jobs in the company
- 4) Consistency of the company's pay policies
- 5) Differences in pay among jobs in the company
- 6) How the company administers pay

Satisfaction with Relational Returns (Spector, 1985)

Promotion

- 1) There is really too little chance for promotion on my job (R)
- 2) Those who do well on the job stand a fair chance of being promoted
- 3) People get ahead as fast here as they do in other places
- 4) I am satisfied with my chances for promotion

Supervision

- 1) My supervisor is quite competent in doing his/her job
- 2) My supervisor is unfair to me (R)
- 3) My supervisor shows too little interest in the feelings of subordinates (R)
- 4) I like my supervisor

Contingent Rewards

- 1) When I do a good job, I receive the recognition for it that I should receive
- 2) I do not feel that the work I do is appreciated (R)
- 3) There are few rewards for those who work here (R)
- 4) I don't feel my efforts are rewarded the way they should be (R)

Operating Procedures

- 1) Many of our rules and procedures make doing a good job difficult (R)
- 2) My efforts to do a good job are seldom blocked by red tape
- 3) I have too much to do at work (R)
- 4) I have too much paperwork (R)

Coworkers

- 1) I like the people I work with
- 2) I find I have to work harder at my job because of the incompetence of people I work with (R)
- 3) I enjoy my coworkers
- 4) There is too much bickering and fighting at work (R)

Nature of Work

- 1) I sometimes feel my job is meaningless (R)
- 2) I like doing the things I do at work
- 3) I feel a sense of pride in doing my job
- 4) My job is enjoyable

Communication

- 1) Communications seem good within this organization
- 2) The goals of this organization are not clear to me (R)
- 3) I often feel that I do not know what is going on with the organization (R)
- 4) Work assignments are not fully explained (R)

Items denoted with (R) are reverse scored.

Chinese Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (Farh, Earley, & Lin, 1997)

Identification with the Company

- 1) Willing to stand up to protect the reputation of the company
- 2) Eager to tell outsiders good news about the company and clarify their misunderstandings
- 3) Makes constructive suggestions that can improve the operation of the company
- 4) Actively attend company meetings

Altruism Toward Colleagues

- 1) Willing to assist new colleagues to adjust to the work environment
- 2) Willing to help colleagues solve work-related problems
- 3) Willing to cover work assignments for colleagues when needed
- 4) Willing to coordinate and communicate with colleagues

Conscientiousness

- 1) Complies with company rules and procedures even when nobody watches and no evidence can be traced
- 2) Takes one's job seriously and rarely makes mistakes
- 3) Does not mind taking on new or challenging assignments
- 4) Tries to self-study to increase the quality of work outputs
- 5) Often arrives early and starts to work immediately

Interpersonal Harmony

- 1) Uses illicit tactics to seek personal influence and gain with harmful effect on interpersonal harmony in the organization (R)
- 2) Uses position power to pursue selfish personal gain (R)
- 3) Takes credits, avoids blame, and fights fiercely for personal gain (R)
- 4) Often speaks ill of the supervisor or colleagues behind their backs (R)

Protecting Company Resources

- 1) Conducts personal business on company time (e.g., trading stocks, shopping, going to barber shops) (R)
- 2) Uses company resources to do personal business (e.g., company phones, copy machines, computer, and cars) (R)
- 3) Views sick leave as benefit and makes excuse for taking sick leave (R)

Items denoted with (R) are reverse scored.

Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (Lee & Allen, 2002)

OCB Directed at Individuals

- 1) Help others who have been absent
- 2) Willingly give your time to help others who have work-related problems
- 3) Adjust your work schedule to accommodate other employees' requests for time off
- 4) Go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group
- 5) Show genuine concern and courtesy toward coworkers, even under the most trying business or personal situations
- 6) Give up time to help others who have work or nonwork problems
- 7) Assist others with their duties
- 8) Share personal property with others to help their work

OCB Directed at the Organization

- 1) Attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image
- 2) Keep up with developments in the organization
- 3) Defend the organization when other employees criticize it
- 4) Show pride when representing the organization in public
- 5) Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization
- 6) Express loyalty toward the organization
- 7) Take action to protect the organization from potential problems
- 8) Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization

Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988)

Positive Affect

- 1) Interested
- 2) Excited
- 3) Strong
- 4) Enthusiastic
- 5) Proud
- 6) Alert
- 7) Inspired
- 8) Determined
- 9) Attentive
- 10) Active

Negative Affect

- 1) Distressed
- 2) Upset
- 3) Guilty
- 4) Scared
- 5) Hostile
- 6) Irritable
- 7) Ashamed
- 8) Nervous
- 9) Jittery
- 10) Afraid