

Temporary Institutions: The dynamism of beer regulations in
Brazil before, during and after the 2014 World Cup

Stijn Kruidenier

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By: Stijn Kruidenier

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_____	Chair
<i>Joel Bothello</i>	
_____	Examiner
<i>Sunah Kim</i>	
_____	Examiner
<i>Joel Bothello</i>	
_____	Supervisor
<i>Alex Bitektine</i>	

Approved by _____ *Zeynep Arsel*
Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director

September 11th, _____ 2019 _____
Kathleen Boies
Dean of Faculty

Abstract

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Stijn Kruidenier

The purpose of this study is to present the phenomenon of temporary institutions. Institutional theorists generally describe institutions as permanent and resistant to change. However, in practice, temporary institutions exist and challenge the perceived stability that scholars suggest institutions to have. By presenting temporary institutions, we explain how they are conceived from transnational organizations and can have lasting effects on a host nations endemic institutional framework. We further justify that the phenomenon is inadequately explained by related theories and therefore is a unique construct. Via an inductive case study design we present a temporary institution by observing and analyzing the institutional framework using institutional indicators (regulative, normative, cognitive) to evaluate changes in beer consumption laws in Brazilian football stadia before, during and after the FIFA World Cup 2014. Our findings support our initial propositions surrounding temporary institutions. First, FIFA as a transnational organization implemented a temporary institutional framework in Brazil replacing previous beer consumption laws in football stadia to support its sponsor, Budweiser. Second, after the World Cup key figures in states of Brazil questioned the institutional framework surrounding beer consumption in football stadia that existed before the World Cup. Finally, we observe that our findings cannot be described by related theories suggesting its uniqueness in institutional studies. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

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Introduction

A temporary institution. Amongst most institutional theorists this would be considered an oxymoron. An oxymoron, since “nearly all definitions of institutions treat them as relatively enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) that structure behavior and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 4). Yet, temporary institutions do exist and can be an important element of social life, for many nations. In this paper, we will address the previously underexplored phenomenon of temporary institutions and offer meaningful practical and theoretical implications.

Institutions are typically understood to be permanent. Permanence is one of the most commonly observed properties of institutions described by theorists. This perception is shared across a number of domains, in politics (Clemens & Cook 1999; Moe, 1987; Riker, 1962; Ingram & Clay, 2000), sociology (Cooley, 1956; Hughes, 1936; Scott, 2008) and organizational theory (Selznick, 1948; Parsons, 1960; Simon, 1945). They are perceived to be impermeable to change, since institutions are generally conceived from reciprocated interpretations, and repeated actions among actors from generation to generation (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Zucker 1977). Furthermore, if institutions do change, it is often reflected as previous institutional arrangements on newly created institutions (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott, 2008).

Since a common understanding of institutional theory is that institutions persist, temporary institutions fundamentally contradict institutional persistence. Temporary institutions contradict how institutions are often conceived since, they are created for events to replace national endemic institutions for a specified temporal period of time. For example, temporary institutions

are often introduced into a host nation by “mega events” such as cultural events (World fair / World EXPO), sports events (World Cup and Olympics) and political gatherings (IMF and World Bank conferences). Each of these events comes to a host country with their own institutional framework (temporary institution) to host a successful event. For example, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), the organizing body of football (soccer), hosts its flagship event “The World Cup” every four years. The World Cup, hosted in a single country has to meet FIFA’s standards for a successful event. In order for an event to be “successful”, the hosting nation must implement certain institutional reforms to FIFA’s liking, outlined within the “Guide to bidding document” (FIFA, 2018; FIFA, 2007). Some of these “reforms” require tax exemptions to FIFA and third parties related to FIFA, national protection of FIFA’s commercial rights, upgrades in national security, developments in transportation, improved stadia, availability of hotels and many other structural changes. One notable example in South Africa, FIFA pressured for the introduction of a stricter, swifter, criminal justice system or as labeled in South Africa “instant justice courts”. South Africa introduced 56 of these courts across the country to provide “swift, summary and severe deterrents during the month-long World Cup” (Hughes, 2010). In our study, we investigate how FIFA introduced beer sales into Brazilian stadia which was previously banned due to violence concerns. It is the demanded change in norms and rules and replacement of endemic institutional structures orchestrated by a transnational organization like FIFA that we label as a temporary institution.

This study contributes to theories on social objects (institutions, institutional change, transnational corporations) in several ways. First, we empirically identify and describe the phenomenon of temporary institutions. Second, by comparing and contrasting temporary institutions with existing theories in the institutional domain (institutional theory, process of

institutional change and work on multinational corporations in relation with institutions) we justify temporary institutions to be a unique construct. Third, we highlight how transnational organizations implant temporary institutions into a host nation. Finally, we explore the effects that temporary institutions have on a host's nations endemic institutional environment.

By presenting temporary institutions as a unique construct, we suggest the contributions extend beyond theory but also are important in practice. Primarily, by introducing the institutional impact and existence of temporary institutions we address certain conflicted understanding of the impact of "mega events". For example, some researchers studying the World Cup point to its benefits: employment (Goodman & Stern, 1994), revenue (Goodman & Stern, 1994; Matheson & Baade, 2005; Sterken, 2006). While others point to the same flaws, employment (Hagn & Maennig, 2007) or revenue (Liu, 2013; Feddersen, Grötzinger & Maennig, 2008). By acknowledging the presence and impact of temporary institutions, national governments could potentially better anticipate the institutional impact of temporary institutions. Second, local and international organizations, by being aware of temporary institutions impact, could use temporary institutions to obtain favorable institutional outcomes.

Using an inductive case study design, we explore changes in beer laws before, during and after the FIFA World Cup 2014 in Brazil. The subsequent section justifies temporary institutions by presenting in greater detail the similarities and differences with theories on institutions, institutional change, and transnational organizations. We then use our empirical observations to demonstrate our proposed phenomena. We conclude by proposing a model of temporary institutions to validate our proposed theoretical and practical contributions.

Theoretical Background

Institutions

To introduce our proposed phenomena, we 1) establish how institutions are generally conceived, 2) introduce that temporary institutions exist 3) and show that they are in fact institutions. Therefore, we suggest that what may have been overlooked in institutional research is the concept of temporariness and to a certain extent institutional change.

Institutions as defined by Scott (2008: 48) are “comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”. Within this dense definition there are a number of concepts that define institutions, 1) institutional pillars (regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive) and 2) activities/resources. Institutions are considered to comprise of three pillars (regulative, normative and cognitive). These three pillars exist to structure actors within an institutional framework via “legal, moral and cultural boundaries” (Scott; 2008: 58), defining acceptable and unacceptable behaviour (Scott; 2008). It is the combination of explicit regulative boundaries with “the more or less a taken-for-granted part of ... social reality” (Zucker, 1997: 728) that “control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would be theoretically possible” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 55). Further, activities and resources empower these “patterns of conduct” for “schemas not empowered or regenerated by resources would eventually be abandoned and forgotten, just as resources without cultural schemas to direct their use would eventually dissipate and decay” (Sewell 1992: 13). As previously introduced a feature deeply engrained in institutional theory is that institutions are often considered stable and resistant to change (Hughes, 1936; Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Sine & David, 2003; Zucker 1977). This understanding is shared across different

streams of institutional domains. In political studies, institutions are commonly seen as durable (Clemens & Cook 1999; Moe, 1987; Riker, 1962; Ingram & Clay, 2000). In sociology, despite some theorists suggesting that institutions are evolving entities (Spencer 1876, 1896, 1910; Sumner 1906) others suggest they are rather permanent (Cooley, 1956). Hughes (1936: 180), for example, noted that institutions are: “establishment of relative permanence of a distinctly social sort”. Finally, within the organizational field, organizations are limited to rigid institutional boundaries suggesting institutions are inflexible (Selznick, 1948; Parsons, 1960; Simon, 1945). Stability and resistance to change is shared across the disciplines and the characteristics of institutions. Primarily, institutions are the result of reciprocated interpretations and/or repeated actions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Second, institutions in the case of change are reflections of previous institutions thus still suggesting permanent unchanging values (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott, 2008). There are many examples suggesting the permanence, replicability and continuity of institutions, but this fundamentally contradicts the proposed phenomena. Therefore, to describe a temporary institution is an oxymoron, given the enduring nature of institutions (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott 2008).

But, as previously introduced, temporary institutions exist and are often introduced into a host nation by “mega events” such as cultural events (World fair / World EXPO), sports events (World Cup and Olympics) and political gatherings (IMF and World Bank conferences). It is the multi-level nature of these organizations and the lack of isomorphism across its levels which allows temporary institutions to become a reality (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Rousseau, 1985). Carriers of institutions exist at two levels, permanently as a transnational governance organization and temporarily during periodic mega events at national/municipal levels. At the transnational level, the institutional criterion of persistence is met, for example organizations

such as FIFA continue to exist before and after its World Cup events. However, during mega events, temporary institutions exist as an “alien” institution, temporarily transforming endemic institutions of the host country for the duration of the mega-event. This naturally presents significant institutional challenges, as the institutional environment over which a nation usually has sovereignty is for a certain duration “invaded”. While an institution usually requires legitimacy (Scott, 2008) and taken-for-grantedness (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Temporary institutions when entering a host nation only have one form of legitimacy, which is that they are legitimized by the host nations government, which had bid to host the event. However, temporary institutions lack taken-for-grantedness at the national level by local actors. Tourists and local fans of the sport may take certain institutional changes for granted, however this is not necessarily true for national actors who have little interest in the event. Therefore, temporary institutions have one form of legitimacy, but lack the legitimacy that is usually additionally provided by all local actors (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Tost, 2011) which could lead to conflict. However, since temporary institutions exist only for a short period of time, contestation is often too late (during the event) and is restricted by the regulative boundaries imposed by local authorities that invited the event. Thus, as long as mega-events are bid for by a host nation, temporary institutions can exist.

Thus, temporary institutions can be defined as *institutions that exist for a set period of time, replacing sections of a national endemic institutions to complete a task*. They can be conceived as institutions, for they share key characteristics of common definitions of institutions. Primarily per the definition of Scott (2008), enforce certain “pillars” of institutions. For example, the Olympics and the World Cup ensure compliance to regulative demands when nations bid for the event through their bid documents (COHRE, 2007; FIFA, 2018; FIFA, 2007). These events

sometimes even pressure for normative boundaries, for example, the Boston municipal government and city employees were initially not allowed to criticize the Olympics for its 2024 bid (Cassidy, 2015). Further temporary institutions are “legitimate” as per the authorization of the host country’s government. Temporary institutions are, like normal institutions, thus able to “control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 55). Yet they are different from commonly observed durable institutions, 1) temporary institutions replace endemic institutions for a period of time; 2) temporary institutions lack cognitive taken-for-grantedness that typically characterizes institutions, and 3) temporary institutions are neither reflections of past national institutions nor necessarily reflect future national institutions, as suggested by institutional theory/institutional change literature (Grief, 2006; Riker, 1995; Scott, 2008).

Temporary institutions are institutions, yet they are not constituted by all elements of more permanent institutions. The following sections identify two research streams that bear similarities with temporary institutions but cannot fully explain the phenomenon.

Institutional change

While institutions are typically considered by most scholars as facets of society that are symbols of stability and persistence, some theorists have suggested that institutions are dynamic making them permeable to change (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Meyer 1994; Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995) Institutional change is similar to temporary institutions in that they both challenge the permanence of institutions. Despite sharing resemblance, institutional change literature fails to explain temporary institutions. The following section addresses the similarities and differences between temporary institutions and institutional change. By outlining the differences, we suggest

what might be overlooked in work on institutional change and how temporary institutions fills that void.

Most theorists who study institutional change suggest that institutions change slowly, “Once created, institutions often change in subtle and gradual ways over time” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 1). Of those who theorize on institutional change, reasoning for change is often divided into supply or demand side explanations (Scott, 2008). Meyer (1994) offers a supply side explanation to institutional change suggesting that certain actors embedded within an institutional framework (sciences/professions) have institutional roles which enable them to devise new schemes, tendencies, norms and values without the change being questioned. Examples of supply side causes for institutional change may be actors such as: the state, professional occupations, associations, corporate elites, marginal actors, social movements and all actors whom participate within an institution (Scott, 2008: 97-103). When comparing supply side explanations of institutional change with temporary institutions there are a number of similarities. Primarily, temporary institutions are a result of independent actors (transnational organizations) whom similarly to institutional entrepreneurs have a stake in changing/replacing an endemic institution. However, temporary institutions are distinctly different as they are 1) not “embedded” within an institutional framework 2) and they do not change an endemic institution but rather replace it temporarily.

An opposing view for institutional change is offered by Suchman (1995) who posits a demand side explanation. Suchman (1995) suggests that institutions are created based on problems facing a society to which there are no current solutions. There are a number of demand side variables that explain institutional change: the absence of clear boundaries (Clemens & Cook; 1999), internal contradictions in the institutional structure (Clemens & Cook; 1999, Hiatt,

Sine, & Tolbert; 2009), multiple institutions competing or that are not properly established (Clemens & Cook; 1999, Mahoney & Thelen; 2010), institutionalized assumptions (Sine & David; 2003) and/or unexpected relationships between institutionalized practices (Sine & David; 2003). But the demand side reasoning for institutional change fails to explain temporary institutions. Although temporary institutions when entering a host nation may bring to the surface institutional flaws of endemic institutions, they do not exist to solve problems facing a society to which there are no solutions. Rather temporary institutions emerge to complete a task divorced from a potentially existing void from a flaw in a host nation institutional arrangement. Temporary institutions cannot be explained by demand side explanations for institutional change since they exist outside a host nation and are not created as a result of flaws/problems in a host nation endemic institution.

A final comparison between temporary institutions and institutional change is the phenomenon of a jolt/shock. Meyer (1982: 515), defines environmental jolts as: “transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impact on organizations are disruptive and often inimical”. Although most scholars who study institutional change perceive institutions to change slowly (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), some scholars point to exogenous shocks and or environmental shifts as reasons for institutional change. Some examples may include: war, environmental shifts, economic change and/or new laws (DiMaggio, 1997; Fligstein 1990; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Sewell, 1992; Sine & David, 2003). While some “shocks and jolts” may come from within an institutional framework, at other times these might spring from phenomena exterior to endemic institutions. It is for the reason that shocks and jolts can exist outside of an institutional framework that it is important to compare it with temporary institutions. Despite both being exogenous to a national institutional environment, temporary

institutions are not a single “occurrence” such as a jolt or shock but rather exist temporarily. Further temporary institutions do not necessarily impact endemic institutions after they have departed.

It is important to understand all relevant theories of institutional change as it allows the paper to identify the gap in institutional change literature and position temporary institutions as a unique construct. To summarize the key differences between temporary institutions and institutional change is that 1) it does not necessarily change endemic institution but rather temporarily replaces it 2) temporary institutions are not reflections of previous institutions as suggested by institutional theory/institutional change (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott, 2008) and, 3) they cannot be explained by supply and demand side rationales. The following section looks at multinational enterprises (MNE) and demonstrates that, despite temporary institutions being organized by a multinational enterprise, they are distinctly different.

MNE’s and institutions

Multinational enterprises (MNE) or multinational corporations (MNC) have become increasingly prevalent in institutional research (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008). Since temporary institutions exist as a result of transnational organizations, it is important to distinguish MNEs from temporary institutions. Furthermore, previous research suggests that MNEs can in certain situations influence national institutional frameworks (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008).

Therefore, MNEs at face value share resemblance with temporary institutions. But, as we now show, they fall short of explaining the phenomenon of temporary institution.

Typically, MNEs are not able to have direct influence at a national level. Primarily, an MNE is not provided legitimacy by local governments when entering a nation but must conform

with the institutional framework (regulative, normative and cognitive) of a host nation to gain legitimacy (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008; Doh & Guay, 2004; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). For example, Dacin, Kostova, & Roth (2008: 996) state: “(national) institutional environments grant legitimacy of organizations based on organizational compliance with institutional requirements”. MNEs may have institutional agendas, but some cannot as easily achieve institutional change, while others are able to do so. For example, according to Dacin, Kostova, & Roth (2008), MNEs can achieve institutional change in transitional economies where there is institutional instability. But this limitation does not apply to MNEs imposing temporary institutions or piggy backing on temporary institutions when entering national institutional environments.

As previously identified transnational organizations such as FIFA are multinational enterprises at the international level. However, at a national level, FIFA creates its own temporary institution to successfully host its flagship event: The World Cup. And they do so with the accord of the nation in which the World Cup is hosted: when a host nation bids to host an event such as the Olympics or the World Cup, they must be organizationally compliant with FIFA’s institutional requirements. The temporary institutions brought about by MNEs such as FIFA thus present a unique case within MNE research where nations adapt institutions to organizational demands rather than the other way around.

In summary, previous research on MNEs in the institutional domain have potentially overlooked certain abilities of MNEs. Despite research suggesting that MNEs are able to influence institutional environments, it has thus far overlooked how MNEs via temporary institutions are able to achieve this. Theorists have suggested MNEs’ activities should become isomorphic with a host nations institutional requirements, but they have not identified how

certain host nations become isomorphic with MNEs institutional demands. This is where our research contributes to the extant literature on MNEs.

Temporary institutions

The objective of the theoretical framework was to identify gaps in literature on social objects (institutions, organizations, etc.) and explain how temporary institutions fill that void. We introduced how transnational organizations might impose temporary institutions into a host nation. To position the following sections, the key gaps previously identified are summarized.

Institutions are commonly perceived as durable and resistant to change. The notion of a temporary institution is therefore an oxymoron, yet they do exist. Temporary institutions, *institutions that exist for a set period of time, replacing sections of a national endemic institutions to complete a task* share similarities and differences to institutions as previously defined in institutional theory. Temporary institutions like institutions are similar in that they are: “comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2008: 48) and “control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 55). However, unlike institutions, temporary institutions appear for a limited period. When doing so, they replace endemic institutions as their features do not necessarily reflect previous or future institutions.

Despite many theories indicating the durability of institutions, some theorists identify that institutions change. Temporary institutions could be considered as a form of institutional change as it replaces and therefore changes endemic institutions. However, the majority of institutional change literature looks at either institutional actors embedded within an institution as sources of

change (supply) or change due to flaws in institutional environments that need solving (demand). Temporary institutions are neither. Temporary institutions are not embedded in the endemic institutional environment and do not have the purpose of permanently changing an institution (supply). Also, temporary institutions do not exist due to flaws of endemic institutions (demand). Other literature suggests shocks/jolts to cause institutional change but again fail to explain a temporary institution for its impact is for a set period of time not necessarily changing an endemic institution after it has departed.

Finally, MNEs have become increasingly prevalent in institutional research. Research into MNEs suggests that MNEs have limited institutional impact and that companies should conform to national institutional values. This fails to explain how temporary institutions transform an endemic institution as nations respond to MNEs institutional demands to secure bids for international events, and how this can create institutional change via temporary institutional frameworks.

From the literature review, we suggest that temporariness is novel to the institutional field. The concept of temporariness exists within the organization field (temporary organizations) (Burke & Morley, 2016), where organizations set up temporary organizations to complete a task. Although similar in definition, this stream of research only focuses on organizations, not institutions. Work that is semantically related to temporary institutions includes a study from Ambrus & Wessel (2015). By looking at how legal structures are often unable to undergo rapid change, the authors found examples on the international domain where organizations stepped in to work with institutions to apply justice. This is sometimes necessary as law is complicated for it “must be responsive and indeterminate, capable of extending to the infinite variety that confronts it ... and be saturated in temporality.” (Fitzpatrick, 2014: 185). Therefore, its

relationship with change and time is odd as it often takes centuries of struggle, long lasting practice and/or effort by a number of actors to change a legal system (Ambrus & Wessel, 2015). Ambrus & Wessel (2015) identified examples such as UN operations in Kosovo and East Timor. In these cases, the UN took direct action in administering justice, training police and re-establishing law therefore bypassing the usual long process of legal change. This work, despite being semantically related, does not explain temporary institutions since these temporary legal amendments worked together with national institutions defining future regulative structures, rather than replacing institutional environments, such as in the case of temporary institutions.

It is important to recognise and understand temporary institutions for they exist in practice but lack acknowledgment and understanding in theory. The following section presents our methodology for testing for the existence of temporary institutions, how transnational organizations introduce temporary institutions into a host nation and the effects it has on endemic institutions.

Data & Methodology

Research Design

As temporary institutions are conceived as temporarily changing/replacing endemic institutions, we explore the phenomenon using a process case study (Langley, 1999). It is based on a historical narrative of the changes in an institutional environment before, during and after a temporary institution's presence. An inductive embedded case study design (Yin, 2003) is used, triangulating a single institutional change (primary unit of analysis) through developments in time at a regulative, normative and cognitive level.

Case selection

The institutional change measured as a representative of temporary institutions had to represent a critical case for the above-mentioned theory. To be able to describe the institutional change that happened, it had to be able to describe a change in an endemic institutions regulative, normative and/or cognitive institutional structures. Therefore, it had to meet a number of methodological requirements: 1) it had to have had an impact before, during, and after the presence of the temporary institution to identify observable changes; 2) yet, it also had to be recent in history so that it still had a current impact so both informants and information sources would be able to cover topics sufficiently at all three-time frames.

Changes in beer regulations in stadia during and after the 2014 FIFA World Cup met the criteria specified. FIFA is sponsored by Budweiser and at all World Cups its beer must be present. As the case will demonstrate, beer was not allowed in Brazilian stadia before the event. It began to be sold during the World Cup, which to this day has left regulative, normative and cognitive impacts on Brazilian society. This phenomenon was sufficiently covered in the media as the ban existed not very long before Brazil was awarded the World Cup, because during the event the international media criticized changes associated with beer in stadia, and after the event beer legalization within stadia still remains a very controversial topic that is of interest to the press. Therefore, this case is methodologically relevant as it had a measurable impact across all three-time frames, is still is “fresh” in the memory of participants, and benefit from intense media coverage. It is for these reasons that the case may be able to provide supporting evidence to our propose theoretical and practical contributions.

Data collection

Following Yin (2003), triangulation methods were used to develop converging lines of inquiry (Patton, 1987). The exploration of changing beer laws as a result of temporary institutions was based on secondary sources and complemented by interviews with stakeholders such as employees of Budweiser/Anheuser-Busch InBev, local journalists, professors and activists. Secondary data sources include translated state and national legal documents, interviews, images, FIFA documents and news articles covering changes in beer laws from a variety of different sources. 166 documents were collected in total (Appendix D).

The sampling of informants was performed via a judgement sample (Marshall, 1996). Since key stakeholders continuously expressed their opinions publicly, it was possible to use media records and public documents to stratify participants into different public attitudes towards the institutional transformations. A snowball sampling method was used, where participants were able to suggest other informants. This is adequate due to participants proximity and knowledge of the case (Marshall, 1996). This method ensured that several perspectives on the topic from all stakeholders were recorded. These were then further analyzed using secondary sources. Ideally more interviews would have been collected, but time limitations, difficulties in accessing stakeholders and language barriers were important factors that precluded from recruiting more interviewees.

From March until July 2019, we performed 6 interviews. All interviewees gave consent to recording, interviews were audiotaped and subsequently transcribed using Sonix (an audio to text transcribing device). Audio recordings fed into Sonix were subsequently re-listened and edited to match the exact phrasing of participants. Further, notes were taken during the

interviews to further substantiate audio recordings where necessary. The interviews lasted on average 24 minutes. The questions were open-ended, with the same general structure of questions often following the narrative of the case before, during and after World Cup. The content of the questions was similar for key historical information yet different depending on the specific knowledge of each stakeholder. The archival data spanned across the three-time frames of interest: before, during and after the event. For the timeframe *before the event*, we collected 31 articles from the period before March 2014. These files are further substantiated by legal documents, interviews, FIFA documents and imagery. Key phrases to find documents within this section include *lei do torcedor* (Statute of the fan), *lei geral da copa do mundo* (general law of the World Cup) and *leis de cerveja e a copa do mundo* (beer laws and the World Cup). For the timeframe *during the event*, we collected 23 articles from the period before March 2014 to August 2014. These files are further substantiated by legal documents, interviews, FIFA documents and imagery. Key phrases to find documents within this section include *leis de cerveja durante a copa do mundo* (beer laws during the World Cup), *para consumo de cerveja em estádios de futebol* (for beer consumption in football stadia) and *contra o consumo de cerveja em estádios de futebol* (against beer consumption in football stadia). Finally, for the timeframe *after the event*, we collected 83 articles from the period after August 2014. These files are further substantiated by legal documents, interviews, FIFA documents and imagery. Key search avenues used for this section were individual searches for beer laws per state. Key phrases used for searching for articles used across all three periods were, *leis de cerveja* (Beer laws), *cerveja nos estádios de futebol* (beer in football stadia) and *a favor e contra o consumo de cerveja nos estádios de futebol* (for and against beer consumption in football stadia). Three major sources

used were Brazilian news websites Universo Online (UOL), O Globo and Estadão as they covered the topic across all three-time frames with sufficient depth.

Data analysis

The historical narrative, mainly based on the secondary sources collected, allowed us to separate the events of the case study into three stages: 1) A period of institutional stability in the years before the World Cup, 2) a period of presence of a temporary institution during the World Cup, and 3) a period of institutional change following the World Cup. Using Scott's (2008) pillars of institutions (regulative, normative and cognitive), media records are chronologically separated into the three time periods and analyzed. Further, for clarity and since key regulative activities triggered changes in the institutional environment, a timeline was created (Appendix A) to chronologically reflect regulative changes in Brazil. Using this timeline, normative and cognitive changes can be identified against the regulative changes. Regulative changes are demonstrated via the timeline in Appendix A, while normative and cognitive sentiment changes were measured by media coverage, mainly demonstrated by quotes and images. According to Dowling & Pfeffer, (1975) norms and values are reflected in public communications and can be measured via news articles.

This analytical approach enabled us to use multiple sources of evidence to establish a chain of events (regulative changes) and measure opinions (normative & cognitive) of key stakeholders. The following case study presents evidence in chronological order to identify changes in institutional indicators and describes institutional transformations due to the entry of an MNE in a nation's institutional environment.

Findings

FIFA and the World Cup: contextual background

Fédération Internationale de Football Association or more commonly known as FIFA has complete autonomy over the governance of football globally (Garcia & Meier, 2015). Every four years FIFA organizes the FIFA World Cup, which is the largest watched sports event in the world (Shazi, 2018). Football, and specifically the World Cup, has become a sign of cohesion or exclusion, which is important in identity politics (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2012). A number of states have used FIFA as a political arena (Garcia & Meier, 2015). For example, East Germany used athletes to get international recognition (Balbier 2005), while Taiwan's appearance in any sport event could be perceived by China as an attack on its sovereignty (Homburg 2006). Similarly, one of Bosnia-Herzegovina first actions after independence was to apply to be part of FIFA (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998a: 305). The World Cup, therefore, has an important role in identity politics as hosting the event allows a nation to be temporarily in the international spotlight (Garcia & Meier, 2015).

Although the World Cup is enticing to host for nations, the host nation also has to comply with FIFA's standards for the event. By presenting a successful bid to host the World Cup, host nations accept a number of conditions all described within the "Guide to bidding document" (FIFA, 2018). Some notable changes include: tax exemptions to FIFA and third parties related to FIFA, national protection of FIFA's commercial rights, upgrades in national security, developments in transportation, improved stadia (which in the past has led to forced eviction) (Amaral, 2013), availability in hotels and many other large structural changes to cater to FIFA's demands. Host countries must give up many norms, laws and values to the World Cup during the event. Finally, it is important to understand that supporting FIFA are a number of sponsors

ranking from primary tier to tertiary tier. Primary tier sponsors have exclusive rights at all FIFA events. Secondary sponsors right extend solely to the World Cup and Confederations Cup and tertiary sponsors are local brands present for only the current World Cup (FIFA.com, 2018). FIFA names these brands its family, and like a family, FIFA takes care of them, more specifically of their commercial interests (Gornall, 2014). The case of beer regulations is particularly illustrative of this case.

In the following sections, we analyze how beer was reintroduced into Brazilian stadia. This was the result of a condition imposed on Brazil by FIFA via the World Cup (which we qualify as a temporary institution) because Budweiser was a sponsor of FIFA during that time.

Institutional stability: Before the World Cup

Beer brands in Brazil have always had a strong regulative presence and power. As an example, Professor Mauricio Murad on the topic of breweries stated that “breweries are very strong, the lobby next to the legislature is very large” (Bonsanti, 2015). Notably, according to Godoy (2014), beer brands back in 1996 convinced the Brazilian state that only liquids containing over 13% of alcohol content were categorized as alcohol, therefore exempting beer from that label. This law in turn allowed beer to be sold at night and in stadia. The Law 9294/1996 states that alcohol cannot be associated with sports, but since beer, according to the law, is not “alcohol” it does not fall under that provision of the law. Beer and football went so hand in hand that “according to a study by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) of 2012, one in every four beers consumed in Brazil is related to soccer” (De Moraes and Braziliense, 2015)

However, beer consumption in stadia came under scrutiny. Due to violence and mismanagement within sports stadia across Brazil, a law was created for Brazilian football

(soccer) stadia with the goal to protect its fans. The law Fan Statute/*Lei do torcedor* (Law 10.671 / 2003), addressed violence in stadia and better protection of the fans (Bentzen, 2014). Under this law, beer was prohibited as further described in the subsequent section. Beer was associated with violence in states prior to this law, for example in a match between Corinthians and Flamengo in 1991, labeled the “Night of the Bottles”, fans threw beer bottles at players, which motivated a ban on the sale of beer in São Paulo stadia (Appendix C: Picture 2) (Zancheta, 2014). As stated by Paulo Castilho a public prosecutor in Sao Paulo, “with alcohol, people lose their moral brakes, and are more prone to violence.” (Association of the Public Prosecutor of Espirito Santo, 2009). Further, statements from the group for the Prevention and Combat of Violence in Stadia, Antônio Baêta states “As much as there are those who drink and do nothing, there are many who are braver, braver, because of it. And that potentiates the fights” (Winckler, 2013). In summary, alcohol consumption was normatively and cognitively associated with violence and the sales of beer became restricted.

Due to violence in Brazilian football stadia, the Brazilian Government adopted the federal law, *Lei do torcedor* (Law 10.671 / 2003). One of the conditions of this new federal law was the prohibition of beer in stadia through Art-13A: “one should not carry objects, drinks or substances which could cause or create possibilities the practice of acts of violence” (Planalto.gov.br, 2012). In 2008, the Brazilian Football Federation followed along signing a document supporting the beer ban in stadia for all matches hosted by the Brazilian Football Federation (Pinsky, 2014; de Moraes and Braziliense, 2015). The success of these regulative changes in reducing violence were seen in Mineirão where “the president of the National Council of Attorneys General (CNPAG), Marfan Vieira” stated “that there was a 70% reduction in violence rates, which shows the correctness of the measure” (Antonio Cruz, 2011). Further, Marfan Vieira

said that the changes in beer laws substantially reduced violence in where the Brazilian Football Federation imposed beer bans (Antonio Cruz, 2011). From that time forward, there was a normative and cognitive consensus within Brazilian society that alcohol and football were a bad combination resulting in violence. This observation is further supported by a conversation with a member of Anheuser-Busch InBev whom stated:

“it's that image that beer with soccer or with football gets a negative thing. And this is what the company was really concerned of not letting this association happen <...> Yeah that's right. There were video and media campaigns about how to behave and to drink with moderation” (Interviewee four, Appendix E)

Brewers were left with little option as going against this decision was perceived to go against public welfare. This position was validated by the reduction of violence in states and the perception of members of society that beer in stadia was normatively unacceptable and cognitively unthinkable.

The Brazilian World Cup Bid. In 2006, between the adoption of *Lei do torcedor* and Brazil Football's Federation ban on alcohol consumption in football stadia, Brazil placed a bid to host the FIFA World Cup. A year later, by unanimous decision, Brazil was chosen in 2007 to host the World Cup for 2014. With this bid Brazil accepted all conditions of FIFA for the World Cup (Gornall, 2014). A detailed report of all these conditions is outlined in Brazil's bid document (Fifa.com, 2007). As previously mentioned, FIFA, which is sponsored by a number of companies including Budweiser, had stakes in this event. FIFA required a number of changes to Brazilian laws. Of interest, FIFA demanded alcohol to be allowed in stadia during the World Cup (2014) and the Confederations Cup (2013). Because Brazil bid to host the event and was chosen for the World Cup, beer which had been prohibited in stadia for over a decade, had to be

re-introduced. This regulative change in favour of Budweiser (MNE) may have never been achieved via individual action. However, because of the World Cup and FIFA, Brazilian President Rousseff signed the bill: The general law of the World Cup (Law of the World Cup Brazil: Law 12.663, 2012). This decision was largely considered as counter-normative and caused a strong backlash. Certain politicians accused the central government of playing politics with FIFA, while health minister, Alexandre Padilha urged for the ban to be maintained (BBC News, 2012). Other notable examples include members of parliament publicly protesting against alcohol in football stadia (Appendix: B, Picture 1). While a member of the chamber of deputies, Carmen Zanotto stated that “the release sends a wrong message about the consumption of alcohol in football matches and can lead to a similar future measure in the national championships. It's not just the danger of fans, of rivalry, but of associating the Cup with alcohol consumption,” (Larcher & Oliveira, 2012).

However, FIFA’s communication was clear in demanding institutional reforms in favour of beer laws: “Alcoholic drinks are part of the FIFA World Cup, so we’re going to have them. . . ., that’s something we won’t negotiate. The fact that we have the right to sell beer has to be a part of the law” (Pinsky, 2014). Thus, beer was re-allowed into Brazilian stadia much to the dismay of certain Brazilian public figures. For example, Ronaldo Laranjeira, a professor at the Federal university of Sao Paulo, was “shocked that FIFA can come to a country and makes it change its laws” (Sturgeon, 2014). While, Heloisa Reis, an assistant professor at the State University of Campinas said: “It's absurd! A sporting entity to dictate the rules of what should and should not be changed in a country for a sporting event to occur is to injure national sovereignty” (Iglesias, 2009). Despite public backlash, the regulative change was maintained and offered brewers the opportunity to have beer alongside football again and potentially sway

normative and cognitive opinions. Statements by the Federal Senate suggested that this was but a temporary change: "They will only be able to sell them during the World Cup; we're not going to allow it in general" (BBC News, 2012) reducing the potential opposition to the temporary change, explicitly communicating it was not something to get used to.

Temporary institution: During the World Cup

The World Cup 2014 lasted for a month from the 12th of June till the 13th of July, during which beer was back on the menu. Since Budweiser is a sponsor of FIFA, it was the only brand allowed in football stadia for the duration of the World Cup. Other beer brands, despite not being able to use official FIFA logos, advertised their product in relation to the event. The reintroduction of beer into stadia resulted in two factions: those who were for beer and those who were against. Table one as well as supporting imagery (Appendix C: Image: 3,4,5) covers some of the campaigning and discourse used for and against beer consumption.

Insert table one about here

Normative campaigning: Against beer consumption. The World Cup ensured that beer could be consumed in Brazil during the event. The anti-beer campaigners tried to sway public opinion on alcohol consumption. An example of their endeavors to sway national opinions was the "Beer is alcohol campaign" (Appendix C: Image 4) set up by the Public ministry of the state of Sao Paulo. They sent a petition to the National Congress to amend the law 9.294 / 96 to change restrictions on the advertising of alcohol to beverages with alcohol content higher than 0.5% (Godoy, 2014). The campaign was backed by major institutions including Tobacco Control

Alliance, Federal Council of Medicine, General Convention of God in Brazil and others (Public Ministry of the State of São Paulo, n.d.).

The World Cup, a global event, was in the international spotlight. TV shows like *Last Week Tonight* criticized FIFA and Brazil for changing beer laws (FIFA and the World Cup: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver [HBO], 2014). Further, an article by Gornall (2014) in the British Medical Journal which received attention stated: “Public health may be one of the biggest losers in the World Cup” (Collucci and Nublat, 2014) and “whichever country hoists aloft the World Cup trophy on 13 July, the real winner will be the alcohol industry” (Gornall, 2014).

This normative campaigning against beer consumption challenged the legitimacy of alcohol consumption in general and questioned FIFA in imposing policies that are a setback to public health. They used the temporary institution of the World Cup as a platform for their initiatives. Given that beer was temporarily allowed a small misstep or case of violence due to alcohol could further amplify the cognitive assumptions that alcohol and football do not belong together.

Normative campaigning: For beer consumption. The pro-beer stakeholders participated in their own normative campaigning. Now that alcohol was in the stadia, beer brands were seen everywhere. For example, in the bleachers Budweiser and Brahma cups were seen (Appendix C: picture 3), halftime commercials were heavily centralized around beer, Budweiser had a beer themed hotel (Appendix C: picture 4) and one of the stadia where the most goals were scored was named after a beer brand (Godoy, 2014). Furthermore, Anheuser-Busch InBev fought back decisively against the British Medical Journal article saying that it is always open with the press and “which is why the incorrect company-related information reported in the British medical journal is a source of surprise” (Collucci and Nublat, 2014). It supported this claim with

a number of points: Refuting fiscal incentives, shallow assessment and disproving the harm of alcohol. In our interviews we found that the normative impact during the World Cup was significant. One of our informants said that the World Cup was

“...an event or an occasion where people are fond of having a beer and having fun and have a good time. There is a direct emotional association between what you are consuming and how you're feeling, right? So the whole concept of having such a well-oiled organization as the World Cup where people really have a good time I mean 90 plus percent of the people to have a good time because the spirit is there somewhere else and they go to the stadium and there's all the organization etc.. this legacy ... it's an important legacy it is a relevant legacy because people see an emotional attachment to the brand”
(Interviewee four, Appendix E)

This quote shows how the World Cup rekindled positive relationships between alcohol and football. Budweiser (MNE) accompanied by other local beer brands used FIFA's demands for the World Cup to enter and reform public opinion. Through the temporary practice of beer consumption in stadia, there was a normative repositioning in favour of beer consumption. This trend was reflected by certain members of Brazilian society. For example, the sport minister backed the beer back into the stadia campaign stating the following "How will the stadium operator get an income by granting a bar that cannot sell beer, which cannot sell drink?" (Amazonianarede.com.br, 2014). Further, the shift in public opinion was also reflected by opinions of "Brazilian health professionals" who say that "the alcohol industry is now "running the show" and fear that the changes may become permanent" (Hosford, 2014).

The very fact that both factions tried to sway public opinion on beer consumption in stadia suggests that this regulative issue could be legitimately re-evaluated due to lack of

violence during the event. As the next section demonstrates, certain saw an opportunity to effect changes in Brazilian endemic institutions for good. The World Cup's temporary institution replaced the laws existing in Brazil before the World Cup. The lack of violence during the World Cup revealed that the cognitive template that existed before the event, that beer resulted in violence in stadia, may be flawed.

Institutional instability: After the World Cup

The World Cup for the beer industry was a normative legitimacy defibrillator, beer and football fusion resulted in no noticeable violence, football stadia from the World Cup were far too large to afford foregoing beer sales revenue, and people now had re-experienced consuming beer in stadia.

After the World Cup, many states started questioning the framework that existed before the World Cup. Certain states started to re-introduce beer into their stadia and others did not. Figure one demonstrates that, since the World Cup, many but not all have introduced beer into stadia. This image, despite being currently up-to-date, is still changing to this day. For example, in Sao Paulo, teams are currently on rare occasion joining forces to try and sway state officials to have beer re-introduced (GloboEsporte.com, 2019) (Appendix C: Image 7).

Insert figure one about here

After the World Cup, state officials started questioning the federal law (Lei do torcedor) for its ambiguity: "One should not carry objects, drinks or substances which could cause or create possibilities the practice of acts of violence" (Planalto.gov.br, 2012). As one of our informants pointed out,

“Yes. Yes. Very weird. It seems like they had just realized that the law is very fragile. They didn't notice before. <...> It does not specifically prohibit alcohol but can be interpreted this way, that's a federal law”. (Interviewee five, Appendix E)

The state of Bahia was the first to re-allow alcohol into its stadia. Bahia was already active in deregulation even before the beginning of the World Cup. The beer brand Itaipéva made a deal in 2013 for 10 million dollars to secure the naming rights of the stadium being built for the World Cup. Months after this was announced, beer was re-accepted into the stadium (Bonsanti, 2015; Xavier, 2014). The president of Bahia defended the new law: "we did not have problems, with drink or without drink, and we already had several classics" (de Moraes and Braziliense 2015). Since Bahia's deregulation, many other states have re-introduced beer into its stadia: Acre, Amapá, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande de Norte, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina, Mato Grosso. Other states still comply with the federal law for normative and regulative reasons which will be described subsequently.

The World Cup destabilized the idea that alcohol and football resulted in violence. The World Cup showed the Brazilian population that beer and football could coexist:

“During the Confederations Cup and the World Cup, the General Law of the World Cup created an exception for one of FIFA's sponsors to sell their products during matches.

This text served the interests of the organization of the World Cup, and created a vacuum that is being used by the legislators to release the consumption and commercialization of alcohol in the arenas, from Rio Grande do Sul to Rio Grande do Norte” (Bonsanti, 2015).

The World Cup as a temporary institution introduced members of society to a different reality and changed their taken-for-granted assumptions. In certain states, fans of football were found publicly mocking laws that were still in place. As an example, in Minas Gerais where beer

is allowed till the end of the 1st half, fans publicly mocked the law in place and continued to consume after the first half (Paulucci, 2015). While in other states fans made posters (Appendix C: image 9) and attended public hearings to try and sway state officials' opinions (Appendix C: image 8 and 6)

The discourse surrounding beer re-introduction has been lively since the World Cup, as summarized in table two below. Those against beer reintroduction were challenging its legitimacy. A regulative argument was that it was unconstitutional as national law does not permit alcohol in stadia, while the normative argument was to remind state officials that alcohol causes violence. As an example, in the state Pernambuco, where a new law allowed beer into stadia, certain stakeholders criticized this change calling it a setback, “a pressure cooker for more violence” and were also challenged on the legality of the new regulation as it "exceeds the limits of the concurrent legislative competence" (Bonsanti, 2015; Pernambuco, 2016). According to one of our informants, states choice of regulation or deregulation stems from their political orientation for or against the change (Interviewee five, Appendix E). The states whom are in favour of change often claimed that 1) beer did not lead to violence at the World Cup 2) beer sales were an economic motor 3) the emotional nostalgic appeal that beer and soccer go hand in hand 4) and the regulative argument that Lei do torcedor does not explicitly regulate beer consumption. From this reasoning, many states and fans had changed their perception and questioned previous institutional rules prior to the World Cup.

Insert table two about here

In summary, the temporary institution provided by FIFA at the World Cup in Brazil changed the institutional framework that prohibited beer consumption in stadia. Prior to the World Cup, normative and cognitive perceptions were that football and alcohol lead to violence and therefor, a regulative restriction was in place. Members within this same institutional framework during the World Cup saw institutional change happen, which led to previous taken-for-granted assumptions to be questioned.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this exploratory case study, we set out to investigate an important phenomenon which occurs globally on a relatively frequent basis: the creation of temporary institutions and ensuing transformations. Temporary institutions are introduced in a given country *for a set period of time, replacing sections of a national endemic institutions to perform a task*. By exploring the dynamics of the reintroduction of beer in Brazil before, during and after the World Cup 2014, we show how temporary institutions as a result of a transnational corporation replace an endemic institution for the period of the event. Further we demonstrate how temporary institutions leave remnants of their institutional framework in the host country once the event is over. We contribute to institutional theory, institutional change and MNE's relation with institutions, by demonstrating primarily that there may be theoretical limitations to what is currently understood in the respective theoretical domains. Our theoretical model of the process of institutional change following the introduction of a temporary institution is summarized in figure two.

Insert Figure two about here

Institutional theory

Institutions are generally conceived as relatively permanent and resilient to change. However, temporary institutions in practice exist and challenge that common perception. In the case study, prior to the World Cup, Brazil had an institutional framework that by law (regulative boundary) did not allow beer consumption in stadia since it was associated by members of society with violence (normative and cognitive pillars). By bidding for the World Cup, Brazil had to surrender certain regulative boundaries to address FIFA's demands. As represented in figure two by the red box, during the World Cup, the regulative framework changed to accommodate beer consumption. The change was legitimized via the Brazilian government when bidding for the event, but lacked a certain taken-for-grantedness and normative acceptance by at least some members of the Brazilian society (normative & cognitive legitimacy). Thus, the temporary institutions created institutional turmoil in the host country by introducing an alternative institutional reality that prior to the World Cup may have been unthinkable. Returning to Berger & Luckmann (1966: 55), if institutions "control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would be theoretically possible", temporary institutions unlock directions that become part of the realm of possibilities for human conduct. Further, "if institutions involve cognitive templates that individuals unconsciously enact, then actors presumably do not think about not complying. In fact, it is their very taken-for-grantedness that makes these institutions self-enforcing." (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 10). Temporary institutions put into question the taken-for-grantedness of some institutional practices. By introducing members of society to new realities, stakeholders of beer consumption in stadia molded to their new environments and used it as a platform for normative campaigning. Therefore, a finding is that features of a temporary

institution introduced by a transnational corporation can sometimes stick after temporary institutions have departed if interested stakeholders can mobilize to make the temporary transformations permanent and potentially to bring about further transformations in endemic institutional structures. Therefore, metaphorically speaking, the World Cup is a month-long party but when the party is over it can leave a country with an institutional “hangover” as found in institutional changes of endemic institutions of a host nation. This is not necessarily always the case as in South Africa, during the World Cup, “instant justice courts” existed for the event but the legal framework returned to status quo after the event departed (Hughes, 2010). However, by exposing members of society to new realities and destabilizing an endemic institution, temporary institutions can lead to the re-evaluation of the legitimacy and validity of previous institutional arrangements and potentialize lasting institutional transformations.

Within institutional theory, we suggested that temporary institutions are in fact institutions but are sufficiently distinct from typical perceptions of institutions. Figure two demonstrates how temporary institutions replace regulative institutional frameworks and are legitimized by national governments, suggesting that they are to a certain extent institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Scott, 2008). However, we argue they are different because they 1) they are a source of institutional change/replacement, 2) lack taken-for-grantedness from members of an institutional framework and 3) are not a reflection of past nor future institutions. Primarily, temporary institutions during the World Cup displaced endemic regulative institutional framework surrounding beer consumption, since the government had to adopt regulations demanded by FIFA. This demonstrates how temporary institutions can be a source of institutional change. Second, since temporary institutions by definition lack natural taken-for-grantedness that is usually associated with typical conceptions of institutions, the normative

legitimacy of temporary institutions is often questioned and contested. Finally, temporary institutions are not usually reflections of future nor past institutions, a characteristic which is usually associated with institutions (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott, 2008). Despite our case study showing that the national endemic institution after the World Cup reflected institutional arrangements of the World Cup, it is not a condition we deem to be true for all cases of temporary institutions.

Practically, temporary institutions demonstrate new realities that may have previously be unimaginable or illegal. This gives a unique opportunity for members of a society to compare and act in a new institutional environment. This is valuable to local and international institutional stakeholders by recognizing the influence of mega events on host nations endemic institutions. Stakeholders can strategically benefit and leverage new institutional realities as Budweiser and other beer brands did during the World Cup.

Institutional change

It is generally accepted that institutions tend to persist and if they change, they usually change slowly. For example, Mahoney & Thelen write: “once created, institutions often change in subtle and gradual ways over time” (2010: 1). Figure two demonstrates how the common perception of gradual change does not apply for temporary institutions. Where the arrows in the diagram across time in the host nation institution reflect the sudden temporary changes that comes as a result of a mega event. It is FIFA that over its month-long event imposes boundaries which leaves a host country with a sudden short change in many endemic institutional domains. This contradicts the perception that institutions change slowly as the change at the World Cup was neither subtle or changing gradually over time.

Other arguments to explain institutional change are often separated into supply and demand side explanations. Supply side explanations suggest that institutional change is a result of actors whom have roles which enable them to create new schemas within an institution (Meyer; 1994), while demand side explanations suggest that institutional change aims at resolving problems facing a society and for which there are no solutions (Clemens & Cook; 1999). Despite temporary institutions sharing some resemblance to both of these sets of explanations, these approaches fundamentally cannot explain temporary institutions. Temporary institutions do emerge from individual actors (FIFA). However, FIFA's goal of hosting a successful World Cup did not have the goal of permanently changing an endemic institution but rather to replace it temporarily. Therefore, as demonstrated, FIFA exists outside a national institutional framework and exists permanently at a transnational level. When entering a host nation, it is there as a "visitor". Thus, unlike typical conceptions of demand side explanations for change, temporary institutions are neither embedded in the institutional framework nor necessarily have an interest in the future of an endemic institutions structure. The case demonstrated that demand side explanations of institutional change exist since institutional actors (beer brands & anti-alcohol campaigners) attempted and succeeded in changing the endemic institution via normative campaigning. Temporary institutions do not support the supply side logic either. Despite the World Cup demonstrating that the endemic institutional framework might have been flawed (the legal framework was ambiguous [regulative] and alcohol combined with football did not necessarily lead to violence [normative & cognitive]), temporary institutions do not exist because the nation was facing a problem for which no solution existed.

Shocks and jolts, a final approach to explain institutional change, are "transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impact on organizations are

disruptive and often inimical” (Meyer; 1982; 515). But, temporary institutions are not difficult to foresee as country’s bid to host them. Further, it does not always lead to lasting changes in endemic institutions but rather replaces them temporarily. It is this temporality which does not suit any description of change as temporary institutions replace and leave, rather than changing a current endemic institutional structure.

In summary, temporary institutions cannot be explained by accounts of institutional change as they fundamentally lack certain characteristics that define institutional change. Temporary institutions do not correspond to demand nor supply side explanations, temporarily replace rather than providing lasting changes in endemic institutions and are foreseen and wanted by institutional actors.

Practically, this concept is important to understand as acknowledging temporary institutions as a source of change for endemic institutions allows host nations to possibly be able to better address the impacts that follow from the entry of temporary institutions. For example, the lack of understanding of temporary institutions is potentially demonstrated by many researchers offering conflicting opinions on the benefits and pitfalls of hosting mega events. Some researchers point to positives associated with hosting a mega event, rise in birth rates (Liu, 2013), happier citizens (Allmers & Maennig, 2009), short term employment and revenue (Goodman & Stern, 1994). However, other researchers find there are many negatives as well, forced resettling (COHRE, 2007), operating costs higher than income (Kim & Morgan, 2017), or loss of citizen trust (Müller, 2015). We now turn our attention to implications for work on MNEs and institutions.

MNE's and institutions

Figure 4, shows that outside FIFA's mega-event, the World Cup, FIFA is a transnational company that is a latent carrier of institutions. From a multi-level perspective, on a transnational level they are relatively permanent, and on a national level they exist and enforce regulative demands temporarily every four years. This special arrangement carries with it some theoretical contributions on our understanding of multinational enterprises (MNE) relationship with institutions.

Research into MNEs has become increasingly prevalent in institutional research. The case study demonstrated that certain relationships between a host nation and an MNE do not necessarily apply to temporary institutions. For example, typically an MNE when entering a nation usually must conform with the institutional framework (regulative, normative and cognitive) of a host nation to gain legitimacy (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008; Doh & Guay, 2004; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and are often limited in their ability to change endemic institutions. Further, MNEs can often only achieve institutional change in transitional economies where there is institutional instability (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth 2008). Temporary institutions challenge this premise: 1) the case study demonstrates that an MNE (FIFA) via temporary institutions can enforce regulative change in endemic institutions and are often rigid against host nations request for institutional flexibility. This is unique to how MNE's usually enter host nations as they typically do not come upon invitation. FIFA via having countries bid for the privilege to host the event can make certain demands; 2) By sponsoring organizing entities of mega events, MNEs can achieve favourable legislative outcomes for the duration of the event. Budweiser by piggybacking on FIFA's

temporary institutions was able to achieve favourable legislative outcomes by being the exclusive beer vendor inside Brazilian stadia during the World Cup.

Practically this is a new avenue for MNEs to enter a host nation by creating an event that countries wish to host. While another option is sponsoring mega-events and leveraging that relationship to enter and temporarily exist in a favourable institutional environment such as Budweiser did in our case study.

Conclusion

To summarize, this paper contributes to our understanding of institutional theory in a number of ways. First, we establish that temporary institutions exist in practice and that they are a specific instantiation of institution. Second, we show how certain transnational organizations carry temporary institutions that at a national level cause temporary institutional change. Third, temporary institutions are unique in the institutional field and are different to institutional theory, institutional change theory, and MNE's relation with institutions. Finally, we found that, despite temporary institutions existing for a set period of time, they expose local actors to new institutional arrangements, which can lead to remnants of the temporary institution to exist in national endemic institutional arrangements after the temporary institution has departed. Practically, this has important implications as these events identified happens relatively often and have the potential to have large regulative, normative and cognitive impacts on endemic institutions, which is valuable to a plethora of potential stakeholders.

Limitations and future research

Limitations

Many of the limitations of this study largely are due to the qualitative, exploratory nature, which may limit the generalization of our findings to other institutional contexts. Despite certain flaws we believe our findings still hold in other contexts similar to the one described in this paper. The following section attempts to outline these flaws meticulously so that future research can better approach these phenomena. The study largely followed best practices for case study design (Yin, 2003). Despite triangulating and laying out a chain of events, ideally the draft should be reviewed by key informants and have a number of additional interviews to further validate our findings. We struggled to do so as many informants located in Brazil only spoke Portuguese and were hard to access, which limited our number of interviews. We attempted to compensate by having multiple sources of evidence (pictures, legal documents and news articles). Further, we would have liked to replicate our study in another context (i.e., for another temporary institution). Future research could extend this current study to other World Cups and transformations such as instant court justice system in South Africa 2010 (Hughes, 2010), the “Gay propaganda law,” or changes in visa procedures in Russia 2018 (Harvey, 2018). Alternatively, the study can be replicated to examine adjustments in alcohol laws in Qatar 2022 (Rowe, 2019). These cases are extremely interesting as our study looked at a change in the matter of public health. But changes in visa applications is a concern for national security in Russia, while change in beer laws in Qatar are an overhaul of national values since alcohol is not allowed, even outside stadia. Finally, many allegations and prosecutions for bribery and corruption have come to the surface regarding the World Cup and Olympics in Brazil (Chade, 2017). The question is if any of the results of our study were influenced by unlawful actions, this

is why further studies replicating or mimicking our study can further validate our findings to alleviate these concerns.

Future research

The limitations presented in the previous section are a note of caution for future researchers when studying temporary institutions. This section looks at a number of avenues for future research. First, as previously suggested future research could replicate this study at the World Cup in 2022, in addition future research should further explore other contexts (Legal system in South Africa, Gay propaganda laws in Russia) or other types of temporary institutions. It is important to look at other contexts to be able to observe the degree of change and impact that can result from a temporary institution. Further, it is important to differentiate how different mega-events may have variable abilities in causing institutional change depending on their popularity in host nations. Second, future studies should look into transnational organizations that act as latent carriers of such institutions. Studies could look at how changes at the transnational level affect the temporary institutions they carry. One of our informants told us how the Olympics have become more flexible with its institutional request due to international pressure (Interviewee six, Appendix E). Further, studies into organizations that sponsor mega-events may be useful. Example of research questions include: to what extent do sponsoring enterprises dictate changes in the temporary institutions in a host nation? Finally, future studies should investigate the impact of temporary institutions after they have departed. Studies could look at industries that most significantly benefit from temporary institutions existing and those who suffer the most. While other studies could investigate if events such as the World Cup leave similar impacts on national endemic institutions after they have departed. These are some of the

topics that our study touched tangentially, and therein offer potential avenues to further add consilience to the phenomenon that is temporary institutions.

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
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Appendix A: Timeline of beer consumption in stadia



Appendix B: tables and imagery used in text

Figure 1: Beer legalization in Stadia after World Cup in Brazil




Table 1: Normative campaigning for and against beer re-introduction in Brazil during the World Cup


Strategies	Examples- discourse in favour of beer re-introduction	Examples- discourse against beer re-introduction
<p style="text-align: center;">Normative Campaigning</p>	<p>“Budweiser stores, open to all ages, boasted a large screen at the airports of the host cities of the FIFA World Cup” (Godoy, 2014)</p> <p>“The soil of Granja Comary, the training center of the Brazilian team, was also used to plant barley from a special edition of Brahma, announced by the then popular Luiz Felipe Scolari.” (Godoy, 2014)</p> <p>“The stadium with the highest goal average of the Cup was that of the Arena Itaipava, in Salvador. The carioca brewery also gives name to the stadium that received the games in Recife” (Godoy, 2014)</p> <p>“Filled in the bleachers of the World Cup arenas, fans would display Budweiser or Brahma cups, customized for each of the 64 World Cup duels.” (Godoy, 2014)</p> <p>Sports minister, Aldo Rebelo: "How will the stadium operator get an income by granting a bar that cannot sell beer, which cannot sell drink?" (Amazonianarede.com.br, 2014).</p> <p>“Budweiser hotel” used as advertising for the brand (Brown, 2014)</p>	<p>The Alana Institute when asked about the World Cup: "The fight against alcohol should be taken more seriously. Of course, children are directly influenced by the culture of alcohol, encouraged by advertising, especially beer. There should be at least a time restriction and a ban on sponsorship. (Consciencia, 2014)</p> <p>“An important step in spreading this debate is the strengthening of the "Beer is also Alcohol " campaign, sponsored by the Public Prosecutor's Office of São Paulo. With more than 75 thousand signatures” (Godoy, 2014)</p> <p>“Public health may be one of the biggest losers in the World Cup” (Collucci and Nublat, 2014)</p> <p>“Whichever country hoists aloft the World Cup trophy on 13 July, the real winner will be the alcohol industry” (Gornall, 2014).</p>

Table 2: Discourse surrounding beer re-introduction in Brazil after the World Cup

		Quotes	States using argumentation
Arguments against Beer legalization	Unconstitutional	<p>"We are totally against it, because we think it's a setback, because it is an affront to the supporter's right, to the right to safety and an offense to the Fan Statute as well," (Opovo online, 2018)</p> <p>"It is clear that the sale of alcoholic beverages at stadiums is currently prohibited, so that the Union has already exercised concurrent legislative competence on the matter related to consumption and sport" (Barbosa, 2019)</p> <p>"Sandra Malta says that the action of trying to release the sale and consumption inside the stadiums is "unconstitutional" and should not be approved" (Manoel, 2019)</p>	Ceara, Pariba, Alagoas, Minas gerais, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande Do sul
	Cause for violence	<p>"Evidence remains that alcohol consumption increases violence," says Angelo Campana, president of Abeam. "The interest of the federations is commercial," (Junior, 2017)</p> <p>"It is important to point out that with excessive consumption of alcohol in the stadiums (football and alcohol = national passion), the rate of violence will increase considerably" (Perrone, 2019)</p> <p>"since the ban on the sale of beverages in stadiums, there has been a significant reduction in incidents during games." (BeerArt, 2019)</p> <p>"As a doctor, I can say that drinking causes more accidents, more fighting. It will increase hospital expenses with vandalism. This project is an affront to society" (Espinoza, 2017)</p>	Ceara, Pariba, Alagoas, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande Do sul, Mato Grosso do sul, Santa Catarina
Arguments For beer legalization	The World Cup showed beer does not cause violence	<p>"The success of the beer sales during the World Cup and the Olympics is causing some states of the Federation to be changing the law ... and all informed us that they are not occurring problems related to violence" (Junior, 2016)</p> <p>Evandro Leitã, Ceara sporting club: "In basketball games, too, why would only football be harmed?" "There was a sale in the World Cup itself," (Diario, 2017)</p> <p>I've always seen the fans drinking their beer, chatting and eating our famous tropeiro. Alcohol has never been a source of violence in the stadiums. " (Dolzan, 2015)</p>	Acre, Alagoas Bahia, Espirito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Para, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio de janeiro Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande Do sul, Santa Caterina, Goiás, Mato Grosso

		<p>“The World Cup show that the Brazilian knows how to cheer and drink civilly” (Rech, 2018)</p> <p>"Violence has nothing to do with beer sales in stadiums. Many developed countries maintain this trade and have never had this problem" (Parrode, 2016)</p>	
	Finance needed to support operations	<p>“Lion of the Island loses about \$ 30,000 per game because he cannot market beer at the stadium.” (Junior, 2016)</p> <p>"It is important to emphasize that the fundamental issue of this discussion is the revenue for the teams .." (Rodrigues, 2019)</p> <p>"With the release, this could open up more revenue for the club and the FAF itself," (Manoel, 2019)</p> <p>“It's a club win. Our football is undergoing many difficulties and needed an extra attraction. The trend is that the games have more public and that the clubs have more possibilities to get sponsors.” (Dias, 2014)</p> <p>“The marketing of drinks in the stadiums represents an important source of revenue for our clubs.” (FCF.com, 2017)</p> <p>"The return of the commercialization of alcoholic beverages is a way to contribute to the collection of income of the clubs, mainly for the teams of the interior of the State.” (BeerArt, 2019)</p>	Santa Caterina, Amazonas, Alagoas, Bahia, Espirito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Caterina, Rio Grande Do sul, Mato grosso
	Nostalgia of fans	<p>“The more haughty in the bleachers feel the nostalgia of being able to drink alcoholic drink in the Trapichão” (Manoel, 2019)</p> <p>“56% of the supporters favored the sale of sports drinks at the stadiums, 43% against” (Junior, 2017)</p> <p>“In Brazil and in many other countries, there is still the cultural factor that involves football and beer consumption. We will have a great Championship Catarinense in 2018 and with the return of beer also more fans prestige our sport.” (FCF.com, 2017)</p>	Alagoas, Bahia, espirito santo, Sao Paulo, Santa Caterina
	Statute of the fan is vulnerable	<p>“Argued that the Fan Statute does not explicitly prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages at sporting events and does not agree with the association of commercialization with violence at stadiums.” (GloboEsporte.com, 2017)</p> <p>“The Statute of the Fan, federal law that addresses the theme, allows for different interpretations.” (Junior, 2017)</p>	Para, Sao Pualo

Figure 2: Temporary institutions and institutional change, a process model



Appendix C: Supporting imagery empirical context

Before the World Cup

Image 1: “No alcohol sales at football stadiums”: Members of parliament protest alcohol in football stadia, addressing FIFA’s demand for beer sales in football stadia’s (Segalla, 2012)



Image 2: “Match between Corinthians and Flamengo in the 1991 Libertadores, known as “Night of the Bottles”” where fans through beer bottles at players “motivated ban on the sale of drinks in São Paulo stadiums” (Zancheta, 2014)



During the World cup

Image 3) World Cup themed cups from Brazilian beer brand Brahma (red) and golden cups from official World Cup sponsor Budweiser (Teixeira, 2015)



Image 4) Beer is alcohol campaign, by the the Public Prosecution Service of the State of São Paulo (Public Ministry of the State of São Paulo, n.d.)



Image 5) Budweiser takes over the five-star hotel, Pestana for the duration of the World Cup for exclusive events (Brown, 2014)



After the World Cup

Image 6) Leaders and fans of clubs in Espirito Santo took banners to the plenary assembly (Photo: Sidney Magno Novo / GloboEsporte.com)



Image 7) Corinthians, Palmeiras, Sao Paulo and Santos on rare occasion join in action to pressure beer liberation in stadia of Sao Paulo (GloboEsporte.com, 2019)



Image 8) “No beer, empty stadium”. In the state of Santa Catarina demonstrations for and against beer liberation in stadia were observed (Espinoza, 2017)



Image 9) “Free the beer”. Atletico-PR fans' place banner at Arena da Baixada. Coritiba and Paraná fans also protest in similar manner in their respective stadia. (Ramos, 2017)



Appendix D: Files used in the case study

	Number of files retrieved	Information
News articles		Major sources include: UOL, Globo, Estadao
Before the World Cup	31	Period: Prior to May 2013 English and Portuguese sources
During	23	Period: May-August 2014 1 audio file English and Portuguese sources
After the World Cup	83	Period: After August 2014 All sources in Portuguese
Legal documents	17	Documents include: alcohol restrictions before the World Cup, the general law of the cup for the World Cup, state beer laws after the World Cup, proposed changes in beer laws.
Interviews	6	
FIFA Documents	5	Bidding process, public guidelines, current and past regulations, inspection report Brazil
Images	9	images per period, Before (3), during (2) and after the World Cup (4)
Total	166	

Appendix E: Aliases for individuals whom we interviewed

	Individual information	Length of conversation
Interviewee one	Activist in brazil, works for vice news and was featured in vice news documentary on the World Cup 2014 in Brazil	30 minutes
Interviewee two	Employee at Budweiser UK, lead execution of 2018 World Cup activities in the United Kingdom	23:49 minutes
Interviewee three	A sports journalist on international and domestic football in Brazil	12:02 minutes
Interviewee four	Employee of Anheuser-Busch InBev who worked for the company for 27 years and worked for the company during the 2014 World Cup	28 minutes
Interviewee five	Brazilian Craft Beer journalist whom founded a beer-oriented website in 2013	25 minutes
Interviewee six	Senior lecturer at Loughborough university in sports sciences, sport management and sociology in sports. Further published articles surrounding FIFA and the World Cup.	28:23