Is and Ought: Mother-Child Disagreements about Facts and Values when Discussing Peer Conflicts

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ABSTRACT

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This study investigated interpersonal disagreements in conversations between mothers and their children with a focus on distinctions between disagreements about facts and values. We aimed to examine: (1) how the frequency and quality of disagreements between mothers and children varied across age and domain of disagreement; and (2) how parenting style was associated with these patterns. The study was based on a sample of 102 mother-child dyads, subdivided in three groups based on the child's age (i.e., 6 to 7, 10 to 11, or 15 to 16 years). Each dyad discussed two conflictual events that the child had experienced with their peers; disagreements within these conversations were coded. Mothers also completed a measure of parenting style. Results demonstrated that older children had more disagreements with their mothers. In general, dyads had more disagreements about facts rather than values. When disagreements were based on basic-event related facts, the child was more likely to prevail, whereas mothers were more likely to prevail when disagreements were based on values. Parenting styles were not significantly linked to the quantity or quality of mother-child disagreements. These findings shed light on how mother-child interpersonal disagreements in different domains arise and are resolved across childhood and adolescence. Findings are considered in light of epistemological frameworks, and implications for parents are discussed.

Keywords: mother-child relationships, interpersonal disagreements, discussing peer conflictual events, facts and values, parenting styles, conflict resolution

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Appendices

Is and Ought: Mother-Child Disagreements about Facts and Values when Discussing Peer Conflicts

Mother-child disagreements are a common occurrence at varying ages throughout a child's development (Birditt et al., 2009). Specifically, due to the mother and the child's differing perspectives and beliefs, interpersonal disagreements may arise for various reasons. For instance, these disagreements might be a result of conflicting understandings or goals regarding daily activities, rules, the parent-child relationship, among numerous other possibilities (Adams & Laursen, 2007; Birditt et al., 2009). Mothers and children might also disagree in conversations with one another about their children's conflicts with other agemates; although these interactions are less frequently studied, they have unique features that make them a meaningful conversational context to examine (see Wang & Song, 2014). Specifically, when parents and children have an interpersonal conflict, they are both directly involved in the situation. In contrast, although children discuss peer conflicts with their mothers, parents are rarely present during the conflicts themselves. Consequently, they may be less well-informed about what actually happened, but nevertheless serve an important role as socialization agents in promoting particular lessons to be learned from children's experiences. In this case, the parents play a role as social coaches in helping their children to navigate peer experiences, since children disclose information with their parents during their conversations. As children get older, children's autonomy must also be taken into account in guiding the manner in which parents offer advice (Poulin et al., 2012). In sum, disagreements within such conversations may have some unique features, since the parents are situated within a third party role, but nevertheless potentially influencing their children's understandings of the truths and values emerging from peer conflict

experiences. Thus, the current study focused on mother-child disagreements in conversations about children's conflictual interactions with their peers.

The quality and quantity of disagreements between mothers and children might vary depending on the domain in which the disagreement occurs – in this study, I was particularly interested in distinctions between disagreements about facts (i.e., what is) and values (i.e., what should be; Hatch, 1983; Wainryb, 2004). As elaborated below, the frequency and type of mother-child disagreements in different domains may vary as a function of the child's age (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005; Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002; Wainryb 2004), and these patterns may also be moderated by the mother's parenting style (Baumrind, 1996; 2005; Sorkhabi & Middaugh, 2014). Thus, the aim of this thesis was twofold: first, to examine how the frequency and quality of disagreements between mothers and children vary across age and domain of disagreement (Wainryb et al., 2004; Wainryb et al., 2001); and second, to assess how parenting style is associated with these patterns (Baumrind, 1996; 2005; Sorkhabi & Middaugh, 2014).

While research has examined parent-child conflict, there is little work applying an epistemological lens to the examination of this issue. Theory and scholarship on children's epistemological development served as a guiding framework for this thesis, and the following sections will focus on how epistemological development may inform conflict processes.

Epistemological Development and Theory of Mind

Over the years, researchers in the field of psychology and philosophy have examined different aspects of individuals' epistemological development (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). According to developmental and educational psychologists, epistemology is defined as "individuals' beliefs about the nature of knowledge

and the nature of knowing" (Muis et al., 2006, p. 6). Initially, research on epistemology was mainly focused on adults. Perry's (1970) pioneering work focused on how young adults reasoned at different epistemological levels (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).

Perry's (1970) work laid the groundwork for Kuhn's (1991) research, which focused on epistemological understanding through the lens of argumentative reasoning. Specifically, Kuhn (1991) suggested an argumentative reasoning model of epistemological understanding, which focused on using epistemological levels of understanding to build strong arguments, in order to be able to challenge another person's claims (Kuhn et al., 2016). Based on her research, Kuhn (1991) found similar results to her predecessors regarding epistemological levels of understanding, which she labeled absolutist, multiplist and evaluativist. Each of these levels, as well as developmental shifts in their prevalence, is elaborated below, as they formed the basis for the present investigation.

Kuhn and Park (2005) defined epistemological understanding based on the individual's ability to manage subjective and objective knowledge. This connected epistemological development with children's theory of mind research. That is, in early childhood (i.e., preschool) children typically perceive knowledge as realistic (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). At this age, children tend to be more certain about their beliefs, which they view passively as copies of the world. That is, realists more often perceive the same information and thus share the same beliefs (Kuhn & Park, 2005). In the late preschool years (around age 4), children increasingly recognize that individuals have varying internal mental states, which are not inevitably replicated from one individual to another (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005; Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002). Nevertheless, 4-year-olds still have a more passive theory of the mind as compared to

older children, characterized by a more *absolutist* stance on beliefs, which implies that beliefs are dependent on the accessibility of information in the external world (Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002).

These epistemological patterns are reflected in research on theory of mind. Specifically, Astington (1991) and Wellman (1990) claimed that a child had developed a theory of mind if the child was capable of "(a) understand[ing] that others have mental states, such as knowledge and intentions and (b) predict[ing] and explain[ing] behavior in a coherent fashion by ascribing these mental states to oneself and/or another" (as cited in Montgomery, 1992, p. 410). Research suggests that children have general precursors to theory of mind by age 2 to 3, since they show signs of understanding the difference between internal thoughts and the external world (Laguttata & Weller, 2014; Montgomery, 1992; Thompson, 2014). However, in order to develop a theory of mind, children need to understand what it means to know. This involves being able to differentiate a true claim from a false claim (i.e., being able to successfully complete false-belief tasks; Montgomery, 1992). False-belief tasks, which assess theory of mind, intend to capture whether young children understand that other people have a mind, and whether the contents of others' minds might differ from the contents of their own mind. For example, Keil (2014) explains the classic Sally-Anne task, wherein Sally puts her toy in a basket and then leaves the room; Anne thereafter moves Sally's toy from the basket to the box and also leaves the room; when Sally returns, she should look in the basket to find her toy (i.e., which is a false-belief). To be able to complete this false-belief task, the child must understand that Sally had a belief that was wrong (i.e., thinking the toy was in the basket, where she left it) and is different from the children's own current knowledge (i.e., knowing that Anne moved the toy from the basket to the box; Keil, 2014).

The development of a theory of mind, based on this classic false-belief task, is apparent by age 4 or 5. Therefore, this provides evidence for their understanding that individuals have a mind and the contents of the mind vary from person to person, bringing forth the notion that one person can have the right answer and another person can have the wrong answer (Dahl, 2019; Kuhn & Park, 2005). To draw a connection to epistemological development, at this point, realists become absolutists in their epistemological understanding, where children believe that facts (i.e., having the right or wrong answer) represent reality (Kuhn et al., 2000). In this sense, absolutists are also certain in their beliefs, because they tend to believe that there is only one right or wrong answer, which is centered on objectivity. Relatedly, they also privilege the knowledge of experts as arbiters of truth.

Around age 7 or 8 there is another shift in children's understanding, where they increasingly question expert opinions. This leads to an emerging *multiplist* level of epistemological understanding that is clearly evident by early adolescence. That is, adolescents more fully recognize variations in understanding, depending on one's background and individuality (Chandler et al., 2018; Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002). At the multiplist level of epistemological understanding, youth tend to be guided by notions of subjectivity; beliefs of fact are reconsidered as beliefs of opinion. Thus, in late childhood and early adolescence, it is more often believed that all opinions could be right, therefore, tolerance of differences in opinion is required (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Consequently, up until the multiplist level of epistemological understanding, critical thinking tends to be deemed less relevant, due to youths' tendency not to take into account more complex and evaluative arguments.

Finally, there is a shift from multiplism to *evaluativism*. Specifically, by late adolescence, the reintegration of objectivity in beliefs is evident. That is, evaluativists simultaneously consider

both a subjective and objective dimension in their view of knowledge. They believe that although different people can have legitimate opinions, there are some opinions that are more reasonable than others, as a result of better arguments and evidence to support claims (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Critical thinking in the evaluativist level of epistemological understanding is necessary, in order to justify judgments, which allows for better arguments. Hence, at the evaluativist level, judgments "require support in a framework of alternatives, evidence and argument" (Kuhn & Park, 2005, p. 114).

In sum, *absolutist* thinking implies that knowledge is based on certainty and objectivity, where authority figures are viewed as having privileged access to what is correct and incorrect. On the other hand, *multiplist* thinking is characterized by a recognition of the uncertainty and subjectivity of knowledge, as individuals can have differing viewpoints and both be equally correct in their thinking. Finally, *evaluativist* thinking simultaneously considers both subjective and objective dimensions of knowledge in forming judgments (Kuhn & Park, 2005), and recognizes it is vital to use critical thinking and analysis to determine if one judgment is more warranted (i.e., based on comparative merits) than another. Thus, Kuhn's (1991) model is a condensed version of the epistemological development models from previous research in the field (e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).

Domain-Specific Judgments

Notwithstanding these overall age-related trends, there are debates in the field regarding whether epistemological development is based on domain-general shifts across development (i.e., steady increases with age) or whether these patterns vary across specific knowledge domains (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Early work by numerous researchers focused on general age-related shifts in epistemic beliefs (Muis et al., 2006). However, there is now an increasing

recognition of domain-specific epistemic beliefs that are not solely age-related. Muis and colleagues (2006) revealed that, in addition to variations across age, epistemological beliefs are formed based on domain-specific judgments. That is, children, adolescents and adults have varied epistemological forms of reasoning (i.e., realist, absolutist, multiplist or evaluativist), with regard to their perception of different domains (Kuhn et al., 2000). The primary focus of this thesis was on epistemological distinctions between facts and values, as well as how children's domain-specific judgments shift with age.

Facts and Values. Facts and values refer to the "judgment of reality" and the "judgment of value," respectively (Hatch, 1983, p. 4). Particularly, "judgments of reality" involve beliefs about what is, since the judgment comes from information present in the world, whereas "judgments of values" reflect what ought to be in the world (Hatch, 1983). Thus, facts (i.e., what is) and values (i.e., what ought to be) can be distinguished from one another, but scholars have noted that they are also intertwined (Hatch, 1983; Wainryb, 2004).

One important connection between facts and values is that people (including children) can consider an act, depending on the context, to be morally right or wrong (i.e., judgments of "ought"), due to their understanding of the relevant facts (i.e., judgments of "is"; Hatch, 1983; Wainryb, 2004; Wainryb & Ford, 1998). For example, Wainryb (1991) examined adolescents' and young adults' conflicting beliefs regarding corporal punishment. Although their findings revealed a consensus in the moral belief that imposing pain on others is wrong, people's factual beliefs regarding whether children learn through feeling pain are tied to their moral judgments about corporal punishment (Wainryb 1991; Wainryb & Ford, 1998). Therefore, one's factual judgments (i.e., regarding what is or is not true) are intertwined with their moral judgments (Wainryb & Ford, 1998). Relatedly, with respect to age-related change, children's understanding

of subjectivity becomes relevant as a basis for their varied moral judgments when they enter the multiplist level of epistemology, during late childhood and early adolescence (Wainryb & Brehl, 2006). Ultimately, Wainryb (2004) notes that there is a constant interplay between what is and what ought to be when trying to understand moral concepts, due to the fact that one's factual beliefs are relevant to how the child and adult consider moral issues. The following section will further elucidate how facts and values impact domain-specific beliefs.

Children's Domain-Specific Beliefs. Kuhn and colleagues (2000) examined epistemological levels of understanding across varying knowledge domains at different ages. The researchers assessed the opinions of participants in fifth grade, eighth grade, twelfth grade and undergraduates with regard to their perceptions in different knowledge domains, in order to link their responses with specific epistemological levels of understanding (i.e., realist, absolutist, multiplist and evaluativist). Specifically, Kuhn and colleagues (2000) found that youth made more subjective judgments in the context of personal tastes and aesthetics, due to the fact that these judgments dealt with personal preferences. In contrast, youth made fewer subjective judgments about social and physical truths (i.e., factual judgments). Similarly, Spence and Helwig (2013) found that subjectivity was more present in personal choice domain judgments, whereas decisions about social and physical truth judgments (i.e., what is) relied more heavily on evaluativist arguments, due to the fact that the goal is to determine if one claim was better than another by evaluating the situation and evidence present regarding the fact (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). On the other hand, objectivity is most present in judgments about social and physical truths (i.e., factual judgments) and least present in judgments of personal taste and aesthetics (Kuhn et al., 2000).

Judgments of values (i.e., what ought to be) are a unique domain, in that they might be based on both subjective and objective opinions. That is, understandings about value judgments (i.e., what ought to be) are mainly objective but can sometimes also be deemed subjective, depending on the context (Kuhn et al., 2000). Wainryb and colleagues (2004) were interested in determining how children thought about diversity in belief about four domains, which included morality (i.e., value judgments), as well as tastes (i.e., personal choice value judgments), facts (i.e., truth judgments), and ambiguous facts (i.e., judgments about social-conventions). Specifically, the researchers used interviews to assess 5-, 7- and 9 year-olds' judgments about relativism, tolerance and disagreeing persons (Wainryb et al., 2004). With regard to age-related shifts in development and its effect on disagreements, it was found that 5-year-old children were less likely than 7- and 9-year-old children to make relative and tolerant judgments across domains, as they still had an absolutist epistemological understanding. In contrast, the older children had already begun to transition to a multiplist understanding of reality, allowing for more tolerance of disagreement. They also found that judgments were domain-specific; children were more absolutist when judging factual and moral arguments, and more multiplist when judging personal taste and ambiguous arguments.

In sum, individuals' epistemological beliefs vary both with age and across domains. Specifically, children are most likely to be absolutist in their understanding of fact and value domains (as compared to preferences or tastes), with shifts towards greater subjectivity in late childhood and adolescence (Banerjee et al., 2007; Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn et al., 2016; Kuhn & Park, 2005). Once children grow older, they are able to move past the notion that they need to find one right or wrong answer and understand that individuals can have varying opinions about the same thing. This allows for the transition into the multiplist epistemic level of understanding

in certain domains (Banerjee et al., 2007; Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn et al., 2016; Kuhn & Park, 2005). Finally, adolescents shift to an evaluativist understanding in fact and value domains, where they begin to evaluate differing opinions, in order to determine which claim is better than another through justifications based on evidence (Banerjee et al., 2007; Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn et al., 2016; Kuhn & Park, 2005). In the next section, I elaborate on how these patterns may bear on children's and adolescents' interpersonal disagreements in different domains.

Children's Epistemological Development Informing Disagreements

The patterns of epistemological development described in the previous section are likely to inform the shifting ways in which children approach interpersonal conflict. For the purpose of this thesis, conflict is defined as a competitive opposition occurring between two parties (i.e., parent-child, child-child, adult-adult, etc.; Schmidt & Kochan, 1972), where in this case, the mother and child involved in a disagreement are both active agents with their own conflicting perspectives (Kuczynski & Kochanska, 1990; Smetana, 1989). In terms of how these conflicting perspectives are exercised within conflict interactions, in the early school-aged years, children become better able to express refusal of authority and to negotiate in conflict (Kuczynski & Kochanska, 1990). Specifically, as children get older, they increasingly exert their autonomy in conflict negotiations with their mothers, by expanding on their explanations during conversations and negotiating more; consequently, they are also reprimanded more by their mothers for not obeying their wishes (Kuczynski et al., 1987). Thus, as children age, they are more likely to actively disagree/negotiate with their parents in conflict, especially when conflict results from issues that they deem to be within their legitimate personal control (e.g., personal tastes and aesthetics; Smetana, 1989; 1994; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014).

Furthermore, older children's increasing understanding of other people's beliefs allow them to be better able to navigate more complex discussions that require an understanding of the other person's point of view (i.e., having a more multiplist epistemological understanding), which younger children sometimes lack (i.e., due to their more absolutist epistemological understanding; Wainryb & Brehl, 2006). As alluded to above, these processes are also likely to vary across domains of disagreement. That is, while children at all ages may be open to varied perspectives in the context of personal tastes/preferences, in other domains, they increasingly shift from an absolutist to multiplist to evaluativist orientation. Therefore, this will inform disagreements at different ages, since older children will be more likely to negotiate and accept that there might be more than one right or wrong answer with regard to fact and value judgments, whereas younger children will be less likely to negotiate and strive to find an absolute right or wrong answer (Kuhn & Udell, 2003). In other words, I expect to observe variations in tolerance of disagreement between younger and older children, alongside differences in argumentative skills (Wainryb et al., 2004; Kuhn & Udell, 2003).

Kuhn (1991) found that three specific argument skills increased with age, namely: "generation of genuine evidence, generation of alternative theories and generation of any form of counterargument" (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 105). These relate to epistemological stances, in that adolescents and adults who are evaluativists are more likely to use counterarguments than absolutists and multiplists (Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Thus, Kuhn's (1991) research demonstrates that an evaluativist understanding can underlie more complex argumentation skills, wherein youth are able to engage in more sophisticated disagreements and negotiations, due to the fact that they are able to recognize differing claims, as well as to analyze alternative claims (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Therefore, as a result of children's developing

epistemological understanding, disagreements are likely to arise and be negotiated in more complex forms.

Relatedly, with regard to age-related shifts in interpersonal disagreements, young children (i.e., 5- or 6-year-olds) are less likely to be tolerant of diversity in judgments across most domains, ultimately leading to increased disagreements with others who have differing points of view (Wainryb et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2016). Specifically, this occurs since young children still have an absolutist level of epistemological understanding, which causes them to seek one concrete right or wrong answer, with less room for diversity in judgments, as they are seeking certainty (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). Thus, these children might be most likely to simply comply with their parents after a disagreement in deference to their authority, due to the fact that they do not believe that two people can both be correct in their understanding of the same claim. In contrast, by adolescence, youth become increasingly tolerant of diversity in judgments across domains, as they have transitioned into the multiplist and evaluativist levels of epistemological understanding, which allows them to be more accepting of differences in judgments (Kuhn et al., 2000; Wainryb et al., 2004). Specifically, adolescents are also better able to negotiate and make counterarguments, due to their increased critical thinking skills, which allows them to engage in more sophisticated disagreements, while still respecting the diversity of judgments present in reality (Kuhn & Udell, 2003).

In a similar vein, children's deferral during conflicts with their mothers might vary across moral and non-moral domains, based on variations in how children judge their parents' authority in regulating their choices in different spheres. For instance, Nucci and Weber (1995) were interested in determining how mothers and their children, aged 3 and 4 years old, differentiated moral, conventional and personal situations. It was found that even in the preschool years,

children deemed the personal domain to be within their control, as opposed to the moral and conventional domains. Mothers also emphasized that they taught their children to freely express their personal choices, in order to allow their children to build autonomy and independence. In this case, mothers were more likely to negotiate with their children over personal event transgressions, whereas, they made more commands in response to moral and conventional transgressions (Nucci & Weber, 1995). Similarly, Smetana and Asquith (1994) asked adolescents and parents to rate conflicts and make judgments regarding parental authority in different domains. Issues within the personal domain were understood as legitimately regulated by youth, as they were seen as reflecting autonomy concerns. In contrast, adults' regulation of moral domain issues was viewed as acceptable (Smetana & Asquith, 1994). Therefore, conflicts about moral domain issues appear to be viewed as within the bounds of parental authority, so children and youth might be more likely to defer to their mothers during these interpersonal disagreements about value disagreements; in contrast, at least some non-moral domain issues are considered to be within the children's control, so it is increasingly likely that the children will not defer to their mothers during these interpersonal disagreements (Nucci & Weber, 1995; Smetana & Asquith, 1994).

Overall, the abovementioned sections provide the backdrop for the first aim of my study, which was to examine how mother-child conflict frequency and quality varied across age and domain of disagreement (Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Ronfard, et al., 2018; Wainryb et al., 2004; Wainryb et al., 2001). The following sections are intended to address the second aim, which was to determine how parenting style is linked to these conflict processes.

Parenting Styles Informing Disagreements

Types of Parenting Styles. Parents are typically one of the children's primary socializers from birth (Mitchell, 2018). Parenting styles can affect the parent-child relationship in various ways. Baumrind (1996) analyzed the different types of parenting styles, which include authoritative, authoritarian and permissive parenting. In particular, Baumrind (1996) categorizes parents as authoritative when they are demanding of their children, but also receptive and approachable. Authoritative parents are focused on maintaining a strong parent-child relationship by taking into account their children's desires, while also considering themselves responsible for their children's well-being and their own desires as parents. In contrast, authoritarian parenting refers to parents who are extremely demanding of their children and lacking approachability. Specifically, authoritarian parents tend to disregard their children's desires, as they instill strict rules, which the children have to obey and, if not, consequences are implemented. Finally, permissive parents are characterized as passive, because they are approachable yet not demanding of their children, in that they fail to establish boundaries (Baumrind, 1996). These specific variations in parenting styles have different repercussions on the children's upbringing.

Baumrind and colleagues (2010) examined how variations in parenting style were longitudinally associated with outcomes across childhood. They found that parenting styles were linked to adolescents' adjustment into society. Adjustment was operationalized by examining internalizing and externalizing behaviours over time (Baumrind et al., 2010). Specifically, authoritative parenting was most closely associated with adolescents' positive adjustment; the authors argued that this is because the parents are involved in their children's lives and are seen as a safe and reliable base, which creates a strong parent-child relationship (Baumrind et al., 2010). Thus, when adolescents are in need, they seek help and guidance from their parents, due

to the nature of their relationship. On the other hand, authoritarian parents are not as involved in their children's lives at a young age, as they are more focused on obedience, which ultimately increases the risk of maladjustment among youth. Finally, with permissive parents, adolescents are left to fend for themselves, as a result of the lack of boundaries put in place, which allows adolescents the freedom to do as they please, so they do not have a secure attachment with their parents, which is, in turn, associated with a risk for maladjustment. Overall, Baumrind and colleagues (2010) argued that authoritative parenting had positive outcomes for youth, since parents were reliable, affectionate and responsible for their children's well-being, which created a strong parent-child bond. In contrast, authoritarian parenting posed risks for youth, since they engaged with their children in coercive ways; in turn, permissive parents were passive in their role, which resulted in a weaker parent-child relationship.

Parenting Styles Informing Disagreements. Baumrind (2005) also examined how parenting styles were related to parental exercise of authority and children's autonomy development. Specifically, parent-child disagreement arises as a result of varying opinions regarding moral, social-conventional and personal domain issues (i.e., fact versus value disagreements). Baumrind (2005) found that as children enter adolescence, they had more disagreements with their parents with regard to personal choice issues, due to the fact that adolescents seek autonomy in making decisions in the personal domain. Therefore, authoritative parenting is most adaptive across this developmental shift, since it is associated with adjustments according to adolescent's increasing desire for autonomy; authoritative parents are able to balance between adhering to their children's desires while being demanding, responsive and non-intrusive (Baumrind, 2005). Authoritative parents created strong bonds with their children, which allows them to use punishments carefully while maintaining their receptive and approachable

relationship. Overall, then, authoritative parents, as opposed to authoritarian and permissive parents, are able to better negotiate with their children when disagreements arise, while taking into account their own and their children's well-being and desires (Baumrind, 1996; 2005).

Parenting Styles and Negotiations. Parent-child disagreements can be resolved in varied ways. At times, disagreements are left unresolved; other times, they end based on concession of the parent or the child; and sometimes they are negotiated to arrive at mutual agreements, which allow for a collective solution to the conflict. Ultimately, negotiations allow for stronger parent-child relationships, due to the fact that this creates a mutual understanding between parents and children, such that both parties can still have their needs met, regardless of conflicting points of view. Sorkhabi and Middaugh (2014) were interested in parent-child negotiations and how they varied according to parenting styles. The researchers found that adolescents in grades 10 and 12 were able to identify 37 parental practices that were associated with specific parenting styles (i.e., authoritative, authoritarian and permissive parenting). When adolescents rated their parents as authoritative, they had a stronger parent-child relationship, which allowed them to confide in their parents, have fewer conflicts, and engage in more negotiation. On the other hand, when adolescents rated their parents as authoritarian or permissive, they had a weaker parent-child bond, which resulted in more conflicts and fewer interactions with their parents, ultimately leading to maladaptive adolescent adjustment. Overall, Sorkhabi and Middaugh (2014) demonstrated that authoritative parenting allowed for stronger parent-child relationships and well-adjusted adolescents, who negotiated with their parents more in the context of conflict.

The Current Study

The current study involved examining mother-child interpersonal disagreements as they discussed two conflictual events that the child had experienced with their peer(s). The mother-child conversations were coded, in order to investigate mother-child interpersonal disagreements, with an eye towards how children's epistemological development may inform the shifting ways in which children approach interpersonal disagreements at varying ages and in different domains (Wainryb et al., 2004; Wainryb et al., 2001). Specifically, mother-child conversations involving 7-, 11-, and 16-year-old children were coded to identify the presence and length of the conflicts, who initiated the conflicts, the topic of disagreement, and how the conflicts were resolved. The mothers were also separately administered a measure of parenting styles, so as to examine how these styles were related to conflict negotiation processes.

Overall, based on the coded conversations and the parenting style questionnaire, this thesis addressed two research questions: (1) how do interpersonal disagreements between mothers and children vary across age and domain of disagreement?; and (2) how is parenting style associated with these patterns?

With regard to age-related trends, I hypothesized that older children would have more and longer interpersonal disagreements with their mothers. In particular, adolescents seem to be better able to negotiate conflicts and advance counterarguments, as a result of their critical thinking skills (Kuhn & Udell, 2003); more frequent and sustained disagreements may also reflect their efforts to establish autonomy from their parents (Helwig & Turiel, 2014; Killen & Smetana, 2015). In terms of conflict resolution, I expected that older children would be less likely to concede to their mother's point of view. Specifically, older children have increasing recognition of subjectivity with age and are less likely to privilege adults' authority (Helwig &

Turiel, 2014; Killen & Smetana, 2015), which may lead youth to "agree to disagree" with their mothers more often, thus resulting in more unresolved disagreements with age.

Additionally, with regard to overall differences across domains, I expected more conflicts within domains that are typically construed as straightforwardly objective in nature; in this case, basic event-related facts (i.e., who/what/where), since past research suggests less tolerance for interpretive diversity in this domain, thus prompting greater explicit disagreement (Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002). I did not expect value disagreements to frequently arise, because parents and children generally agree on moral values. With regard to psychological facts (i.e., how people involved in the conflict felt, what they believed, what they wanted), I predicted that psychological facts about the antagonist would allow for more potential disagreements compared to psychological facts about the child him/herself, which will be less frequently counterargued and negotiated. Due to the opacity of the other's perspective, the other's psychology is arguably more subjective, whereas both mothers and children may deem that the child has privileged access to their own psychology (Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002). Furthermore, in terms of the length of the disagreements, I hypothesized that conflicts about more subjective domains (i.e., psychological facts about the child, the psychological facts about the antagonist, and values) would be longer than conflicts about more objective domains (i.e., basic event-related facts). In particular, conflicts about subjective issues may be more complex and allow for negotiations, due to the different perspectives that could be brought to bear on these issues (Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Smetana et al., 1991). Furthermore, although conflicting values were expected to arise infrequently, when clashes in values were expressed, I anticipated that individuals would be likely to actively dispute their claims (Kuhn et al., 2000; Wainryb et al., 2004). Finally, it was also hypothesized that the child would be more likely to initiate disagreements with their mother

concerning basic event-related facts, since the child was present during the event and the mother is a third party who was not involved. In contrast, since the mother's role in the discussions was as a moral socialization agent and third party, I predicted that she would be more likely to initiate conflicts about values, or what ought to be learned from events (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017).

Moreover, with regard to intersections between age and domain in the pattern of disagreements, I hypothesized that the increase in conflict frequency and length with age might be largely driven by disagreements about values, as well as psychological facts about the antagonist and the psychological facts about the child him/herself. This is related to the notion that children are increasingly psychologically minded with age, and are better able to recognize the complexity in the relevance/application of values, since they are more evaluativist (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Therefore, with age, children may become better able to recognize the complexity of value disagreements. Relatedly, the tendency for the mother (versus the child) to predominantly initiate more conflicts about values might be attenuated as children get older, since the child might become more multiplist/evaluativist. Ultimately, in terms of the conflict resolution, I expected that the child would be more likely to prevail about basic event-related facts and psychological facts about him/herself, especially with increasing age. In contrast, I expected that mothers would be more likely to prevail during disagreements about values. However, with age, I also anticipated that mother-child dyads would be more likely to "agree to disagree" regarding conflicts about values and psychological facts about the antagonist, stemming from a recognition of the inherent subjectivity of some issues, leading to more unresolved disagreements (Kuhn et al., 2000).

Finally, with regard to the research questions concerning how parenting style will be linked to mother-child disagreement, I hypothesized that endorsement of authoritative parenting

would be linked to more frequent and longer disagreements with their children, since authoritative mothers negotiate with their children more during a disagreement compared to authoritarian mothers (who do not create a climate for children to disagree) and permissive mothers (who may be less likely to initiate conflicts; Baumrind, 1996; 2005). I also hypothesized that authoritarian parenting would be related to mothers' tendency to initiate and prevail in disagreements (as compared to their children), whereas permissive parenting would be linked to children's tendency to initiate disagreements and to prevail. Finally, I expected that when mothers endorsed authoritative parenting, both the mother and the child may initiate disagreements, as a result of their more receptive and approachable relationship (Baumrind 1996). Relatedly, I also expected that authoritative parenting would be linked to conflicts being resolved in more varied ways (with both the mother and child sometimes prevailing, as well as some conflicts left unresolved).

Method

The data that formed the focus of this thesis was part of a larger examination of children's moral development and socialization. Only the parts of the procedure that are relevant to the current thesis will be described here.

Participants

This study was based on a sample of 102 mother-child dyads from Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The sample was subdivided into three groups on the basis of the child's age: 6 to 7 years old (n = 35, M = 6.93, SD = 0.598), 10 to 11 years old (n = 34, M = 11.11, SD = 0.589), and 15 to 16 years old (n = 33, M = 15.89, SD = 0.668). Approximately 52% of the children were girls and 48% were boys. In addition, the children mainly spoke English (95.1%) and/or French (20.6%) regularly at home, as well as other languages (11.8%). Most children had siblings (88.2%).

The mothers participating in the study ranged in age between 30 to 58 years old (M = 42.98, SD = 6.317). The mothers were from various racial/ethnic background, including non-Hispanic White (74.5%), Latin American (5.9%), Arab (3.9%), African American (2.9%), South Asian (2%), Chinese (1%), Southeast Asian (1%), and/or another ethnicity (8.8%). In addition, with regard to the education of the participating mothers, some mothers had completed university (47.1%) and others were completing a post-graduate degree (26.5%); others had completed CEGEP (9.8%) or their high school education (4.9%), as well as others who had partially completed university (8.8%), CEGEP (2%) or high school (1%).

Procedure

The mother-child dyads were recruited to participate in this study using online advertisements, flyers, databases of previous participants, and word of mouth. Two trained research assistants conducted the study with each mother-child dyad, either in their home or a university laboratory, depending on the family's preference. Prior to commencing the study, the children gave assent and the mothers gave their signed consent to participate.

First, a research assistant asked the child, during a private conversation, to nominate two events they had experienced with their peer. In particular, the child nominated (a) a time when their peer made them feel hurt, upset and/or angry, and they felt like they had something to do with it, and (b) a time when their peer made them feel hurt, upset and/or angry, and they felt like they did not have something to do with it. These events were nominated in a counterbalanced order, and were discussed in the same order. This manipulation was not the focus of the current proposal, and the data were collapsed across the two events.

Secondly, once the child finished telling the research assistant about the two events they had experienced with their peer, the child was asked to recount the events to their mother. The

mother-child dyad was audio and video recorded during their conversations. The research assistant instructed the mother-child dyad to talk about one event at a time and discuss "everything that happened and see if there is something that could be learned" from the event. Once they finished discussing the first event, they then discussed the second event. The audio recordings of the mother-child conversations were all transcribed for the purpose of data analysis.

Following the conversations, the mothers completed questionnaires, including the parenting style questionnaire (the PSDQ; Robinson et al., 1995, 2001).

Measures and Coding

Measures. For the purpose of this study, the mothers completed a demographic questionnaire and a parenting style questionnaire (the PSDQ; Robinson et al., 1995, 2001). The questionnaire on their demographics was used to determine the participants' background. To assess parenting style, the mothers completed 26 items on the PSDQ (i.e., see Appendix A). Specifically, the scale included 13 authoritative items, 8 authoritarian items and 5 permissive items. Some examples of each subscale include, "I encourage our child to talk about the child's troubles" (authoritative); "When our child asks why (he)(she) has to conform, I state: because I said so, or I am your parent and I want you to" (authoritarian); and "I threaten our child with punishment more often than actually giving it" (permissive; Robinson et al., 1995, 2001). The response scale was based on 5 points, with 1 marked "Never"; 2 marked "Almost Never"; 3 marked "Sometimes"; 4 marked "Almost Always"; and 5 marked "Always" (Robinson et al., 1995, 2001). The internal consistency of the items was determined using Cronbach's alphas for each subscale. The internal consistency for the authoritative items was 0.84, for the authoritarian items was 0.84, and for the permissive items was 0.76. Parenting styles were measured on

dimensions, rather than categorizing mothers into one parenting style. For instance, a mother could obtain a high score on both the authoritative and permissive subscales.

Coding. For the purpose of this study, an interpersonal conflict between a mother and child was defined as a disagreement where there are opposing claims with regard to differences in the way they interpret reality (i.e., facts) and/or what they believe ought to be done (i.e., values; Adler et al., 2012). A complete coding scheme, which includes definitions and examples is included in Appendix B. The transcriptions of the conversations between the mother and child were coded for mother-child interpersonal disagreements, by identifying the presence and length of each conflict. Once the conflict was identified, it was coded for who initiated the disagreement (mother or child), based on who was the first person to make the disagreeing claim (e.g., the first person to say "no").

Thereafter, the domain(s) of each interpersonal disagreement were coded. It is important to note that, at times, disagreements could focus on multiple domains, and thus one conflict could be coded into two categories. Factual disagreements revolved around variations in the interpretation/understanding of reality (i.e., what is; Adler et al., 2012; Wainryb 2004) and value disagreements revolved around variations in prescriptive issues and beliefs (i.e., what ought to be; Adler et al., 2012; Wainryb 2004). Factual disagreements were further coded into various subcategories. Specifically, factual disagreements were based on conflicts with regard to: basic event-related facts (i.e., who was involved, what happened, where it happened and how it happened); psychological facts about the antagonist (i.e., what the peer was feeling/thinking/wanting); and psychological facts about the child him/herself (i.e., what the child was feeling/thinking/wanting; see Appendix B). It was also initially intended to code rules/social conventions (i.e., rules and social norms present in society), as a type of factual

disagreement, but due to the rare occurrence of this coding category, it was removed or collapsed with other categories depending on the context of the situation.

In turn, value disagreements about what ought to be (Hatch, 1983; Wainryb, 1991) were also coded into various subcategories. For instance, value disagreements were based on conflicts with regard to: prioritizing different values (i.e., any disagreement that is related to one's view of the priority of a particular value in relation to the event); and disagreeing on the importance or relevance of a value (i.e., any disagreement that is related to one's view of the importance or relevance of a value in relation to the event; see Appendix B). It was also initially intended to code want versus should disagreements (i.e., any disagreement that is related to a desire for one person and a prescriptive statement for another person), as a type of value disagreement, but due to the infrequency of this coding category, it was collapsed with the prioritizing different values category.

Finally, how each conflict was resolved was coded, in terms of whether the mother's perspective prevailed, the child's perspective prevailed, or if the conflict was left unresolved (see Appendix B).

Interrater Reliability. Interrater reliability was established by having two raters (one of whom was blind to hypotheses) code independently approximately 24% (N = 24/102) of the transcripts of the mother-child conversations. The first round of reliability was based on the percent of agreement when coding for the presence or absence of a conflict. In this case, the interrater reliability for the total conflicts present was determined by computing agreements divided by agreements plus disagreements (i.e., agreements/[agreements + disagreements]) for an overall percent agreement of 84%. Additionally, interrater reliability for the conflict length was determined using an intraclass correlation (ICC), which was found to be .99. Thereafter,

once the corpus of conflicts had been identified, the second round of reliability was based on Cohen's kappas for type of conflict initiation, type of conflict resolution, and the type of factual and/or value disagreement (i.e., domain of disagreement; see Table 1). Separate *kappas* were computed for the presence or absence of each topic inasmuch as multiple domains could be coded within one conflict. When disagreements arose, the two raters discussed the disagreement and came to a consensus about the coding.

Table 1

Cohen's Kappas for Interrater Reliabilities

	Cohen's *kappa*
Conflict initiation	1.00
Conflict resolution	.95
Basic event-related facts (BF)	1.00
Psychological facts about the antagonist (PA)	1.00
Psychological facts about the child him/herself (PC)	1.00
Prioritizing different values (DV)	1.00
The importance or relevance or a value (IR)	1.00

Results

Plan of Analysis

A series of analyses were completed, in order to address the two main research questions, which were to determine: (1) how interpersonal disagreements between mothers and children varied across age and domain of disagreement and (2) how parenting style was associated with these patterns. An alpha level of $p < .05$ was used for all tests. Analyses to address the first research question were based on mixed-model ANOVAs examining the unique and interactive effects of age group and conflict domain as predictors of conflict frequency, length, initiation and resolution. Child gender was included as a control variable, in order to examine gender effects in

an exploratory manner. In cases where the sphericity assumption was violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied and adjusted degrees of freedom (*df*) and *p*-values are reported below. A Bonferroni correction was applied to post hoc pairwise comparisons. In addition, partial eta-squared (η^2) was used to report the effect size for significant effects. With respect to the second question, links with parenting style were examined via correlation/regression techniques controlling for other demographic variables (child's age and gender).

Variations in Interpersonal Disagreements Across Age and Domain of Disagreement

Associations Between Age, Conflict Frequency, and Conflict Length. The first analysis examined whether older children had more disagreements with their mothers compared to younger children. A univariate ANOVA was conducted with age and gender as between-subjects predictors and conflict frequency entered as the dependent variable. As expected, a significant main effect was found for age group, F (2, 96) = 5.762, p = .004, η^2 = .107. Follow-up tests revealed that 16-year-old children had significantly more disagreements with their mothers compared to 7-year-old children, whereas 11-year-old children fell in between and were not significantly different from either of the other two groups (see Table 2).

Table 2

Means and Standard Errors for the Average Frequency of Conflicts for 7-, 11-, and 16-year-old Children

	M Frequencies (SE)
Age Group	
7-year-old children	1.948 (.359)
11-year-old children	2.524 (.364)
16-year-old children	3.673 (.369)

A similar analysis was conducted to examine how conflict length (i.e., average lines per conflict) was associated with children's age and gender. In this case, contrary to my expectations, there was no significant age group effect, but a significant gender effect was found, F (2, 78) = 4.508, p = .037, η^2 = .055. Post hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that boys had longer conflicts with their mothers than girls (see Table 3).

Table 3

Means and Standard Errors for the Average Lines per Conflict for Boys and Girls

	M Frequencies (SE)
Gender	
Girls	5.214 (.458)
Boys	6.575 (.448)

Associations Between Age, Conflict Initiation, and Conflict Resolution. It was also of interest to analyze the associations between children's ages and patterns of conflict initiation and resolution. A mixed-model ANOVA was first conducted, where the dependent variable was the number of conflicts, the within-subjects factor was conflict initiation (i.e., mother or child initiation), and the between-subjects factors were age and gender. I aimed to determine if there was a main effect of conflict initiation, with regard to who was initiating more conflicts. In this case, there was not a significant effect of conflict initiation. There were also no unique or interactive effects of age or gender.

A similar mixed-model ANOVA was conducted to examine associations with types of conflict resolutions. In this case, the dependent variable was the number of conflicts, the within-subjects variable was the type of conflict resolution (i.e., child prevails, mother prevails, or the conflict is left unresolved), and the between-subjects factors were children's age and gender. As

expected, the analysis revealed a significant effect of type of conflict resolution, F (1.736, 166.634) = 20.447, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .176$. Overall, conflicts were more likely to end with the child prevailing, as compared to the mother prevailing or the conflict being left unresolved; the latter two resolutions did not differ significantly from each other (see Table 4).

Table 4

Means and Standard Errors of Conflict Resolution Frequencies

	M Frequencies (SE)
Conflict Resolution	
Child prevails	1.512 (.164)
Mother prevails	.731 (.097)
Unresolved conflict	.477 (.083)

However, this effect was also moderated by age, F (3.472, 166.634) = 4.169, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .080$ (see Figure 1). Specifically, 16-year-old children ($M = 2.392$, $SE = .288$) were more likely to prevail in conflicts with their mother, as compared to both 7-year-old ($M = 1.028$, $SE = .279$) and 11-year-old children ($M = 1.118$, $SE = .284$) who did not differ significantly from each other. The age groups did not differ significantly in terms of the frequencies of mothers prevailing or conflicts being left unresolved.

Figure 1

Mean Frequencies for the Age Group by Conflict Resolution Interaction



Note. The * denotes a significant difference between the age groups for a particular type of conflict resolution at a $p < .05$ with a *post hoc* Bonferroni correction.

Associations Between Age and Domain of Disagreement. I was also interested in determining how the frequencies of disagreements in different domains were related to children's ages. In this case, a mixed-model ANOVA was conducted, where the dependent variable was the number of conflicts, the within-subjects variable was the domain of disagreement (i.e., basic event-related facts, psychological facts about the antagonist, psychological facts about the child him/herself, prioritizing different values, and the importance or relevance of a value), and the between-subjects factors were children's age and gender. This analysis revealed only a significant main effect of the domain of disagreement, F (3.035, 291.368) = 14.991, $p < .001$,

η^2 = .135. Specifically, it was found that the most common domain of disagreement was basic event-related facts, followed by disagreements about the psychological facts about the antagonist, the psychological facts about the child him/herself, the importance or relevance of a value, and prioritizing different values (see Table 5 for specific details regarding pairwise comparisons). Thus, these findings demonstrated that mother-child dyads were more likely to disagree about the facts that bear on what is right and wrong, and less about values themselves.

Table 5

Means and Standard Errors of Conflict Domain Frequencies

	M Frequencies (SE)
Conflict Domain	
Basic event-related facts (BF)	1.058 (.122)
Psychological facts about the antagonist (PA)	.605 (.079)
Psychological facts about the child him/herself (PC)	.550 (.085)
Prioritizing different values (DV)	.242 (.051)
Disagreeing on the importance or relevance of a value (IR)	.396 (.071)

Note. With respect to pairwise comparisons between means that were significant at $p < .05$ with a Bonferroni correction: BF > (all other types); (PA=PC) > DV.

Variations in Conflict Initiations and Resolutions Across Domains. I was also interested in determining whether conflicts in different domains were initiated and resolved in varied ways. Contrary to my expectations, with respect to conflict initiation, a mixed-model ANOVA did not reveal an interaction between conflict initiation and domain, nor was this effect moderated by age group or gender.

In contrast, a similar analysis examining conflict resolution across domains revealed a significant interaction between type of resolution and domain of disagreement, F (3.894, 373.806) = 14.713, $p < .001$, η^2 = .133. Thus, as expected, this analysis revealed that the way

conflicts are resolved depends on the domain of the disagreement (see Figure 2). Specifically, for basic event-related facts, the child prevailed (M = .821, SE = .112) more often than the conflict was left unresolved (M = .119, SE = .035) or the mother prevailed (M = .118, SE = .043). In contrast, for psychological facts about the antagonist or the children themselves, there were no significant differences among the three resolutions. On the other hand, for prioritizing different values, the mother prevailed (M = .141, SE = .036) more often than the child prevailed (M = .051, SE = .021), although p = .05. In turn, for disagreements on the importance or relevance of a value, the mother prevailed (M = .195, SE = .043) more often than the conflict was left unresolved (M = .071, SE = .025); the child prevailing (M = .130, SE = .046) fell in between the two and was not significantly different from either. These patterns were not moderated by the child's age or gender.

Figure 2

Mean Frequencies for the Domain of Disagreement by Conflict Resolution Interaction



Note. The * denotes a significant difference between types of conflict resolutions within a particular domain of disagreement at $p < .05$ with a *post hoc* Bonferroni correction. The ᵀ denotes a significant difference between types of conflict resolutions within a particular domain of disagreement at $p = .05$ with a *post hoc* Bonferroni correction.

Associations Between Conflict Initiation and Resolution. Finally, I was interested in exploring associations between who initiated conflicts and how they were resolved. A mixed-model ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between conflict initiation and conflict resolution, F (1.683, 161.577) = 15.261, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .137$. Post hoc simple effects tests indicated that, when children initiated the conflict, they were also more likely to prevail in that same conflict ($M = 1.037$, $SE = .140$), compared to the mother prevailing ($M = .257$, $SE = .054$),

or the conflict being left unresolved (M = .210, SE = .042; see Figure 3). In contrast, when the mother initiated the conflict, there were no significant differences between the child prevailing (M = .476, SE = .076), the mother prevailing (M = .474, SE = .076), or the conflict being left unresolved (M = .267, SE = .063; see Figure 3).

Figure 3

Mean Frequencies for the Conflict Initiation by Conflict Resolution Interaction



Note. The * denotes a significant difference between the conflict resolutions for a particular type of initiation at $p < .05$ with a *post hoc* Bonferroni correction.

Associations with Measures of Parenting Style

Analyses for parenting style were based on 101 dyads for whom complete data were available on the PSDQ. In preliminary analyses, associations between age, gender, and measures of parenting style were first examined. A series univariate ANOVAs were carried out (i.e., separately for authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive dimensions of parenting style) as a function of children's age and gender. The analyses did not reveal any significant unique or

interactive associations with age or gender for ratings of authoritative and permissive parenting. However, there was a significant age group by gender interaction for authoritarian parenting, $F(2, 95) = 4.020$, $p = .021$, $\eta^2 = .078$. Follow-up tests indicated that the mothers of 16-year-old sons reported more authoritarian parenting as compared to mothers of 16-year-old daughters (see Table 6). However, there were no significant gender differences in families with 7-year-old and 11-year-old children.

Table 6

Means and Standard Errors for the Age Group by Gender Interaction for Ratings of Authoritarian Parenting

	M Frequencies (SE)
7-year-old children	
Girl	2.424 (.135)
Boy	2.059 (.139)
11-year-old children	
Girl	2.238 (.135)
Boy	2.305 (.143)
16-year-old children	
Girl	1.838 (.139)
Boy	2.267 (.148)

With regard to how parenting style was linked to the mother-child disagreements, a subsequent series of regression analyses were carried out. Age and gender were controlled in the first step, and scores for the three dimensions of parenting style (authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive) were entered simultaneously in the second step. None of the regressions revealed significant associations between parenting styles and the conflict frequencies, lengths, initiations, resolutions, or domains of mother-child disagreements; the R^2 change statistics for the second step of these regression models were < .116.

Discussion

The goal of this study was to investigate interpersonal disagreements between mothers and their 7-, 11-, and 16-year-old children, as they discussed two conflictual events that children had experienced with their peer(s). I considered the presence and length of the conflicts, who initiated the conflicts, how the conflicts were resolved, and the domain of the disagreements. I also examined how parenting styles were related to conflict negotiation processes. Thus, two research questions were addressed, namely: (1) how do interpersonal disagreements between mothers and children vary across age and domain of disagreement? and (2) how is parenting style associated with these patterns? The following sections include an in-depth interpretation of the findings, as well as limitations, implications, and future directions.

How do Conflict Processes Vary with Children's Increasing Age?

With regard to age-related trends, I expected that older children would have more and longer disagreements with their mothers compared to younger children. In line with my predictions and with past research (e.g., Smetana, 1989, 1994; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014), 16-year-old children had more disagreements with their mothers compared to 7-year-old children, with 11-year-old children falling in between the older and younger age groups. One explanation for this finding might hinge on adolescents' burgeoning conflict negotiation skills, in line with their developing capacity for critical thinking and an age-related shift towards an evaluativist stance (Kuhn & Park, 2005; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). This finding may also relate to the development of autonomy and individuation from parents in adolescence. In this case, according to Kuczynski and colleagues (1987), Smetana (1989; 1994), and Wainryb and Recchia (2014), as children get older, they seem to be exercising more of their autonomy, so they appeared to be actively disagreeing more with their parents during conflicts. Therefore, as children get older,

they ostensibly engage in more disagreements with their mothers compared to younger children. In contrast, contrary to my expectations, the children's age was not significantly associated with the length of the disagreements. Thus, while older children were having more conflicts with their mothers, it was not the case that these conflicts were longer or more drawn out than those of younger children. This might be the case due to the features of the conflicts in this study, as many the conflicts were seemingly minor and fairly brief in length.

Furthermore, I tested gender effects in an exploratory way. These analyses revealed that boys seemed to have had longer conflicts with their mothers compared to girls. In this case, it is vital to note that this one finding should be interpreted with caution, due to the large number of gender effects tested and the overall absence of significant findings. Nevertheless, anecdotally, the observations of the transcripts seem to suggest that mothers were somewhat more directive in conversations with sons as compared to daughters (e.g., they seemed to have asked more questions when a conflict arose). In a study by Guerrero and Afifi (1995), the researchers found that mother-daughter dyads seemed to disclose the most, compared to mother-son dyads, with regard to personally relevant topics (i.e., about friendships and relationships). In contrast, sons were more likely to avoid discussing personally relevant topics (i.e., about friendships and relationships) or negative events they experienced with their mothers. Thus, it is possible that mothers and daughters had shorter conflicts, since they had more intimate relationships, as compared to mother-son dyads. For example, in some mother-son conversations, the mother would say: "You didn't tell me that"; "I think you tend to tell me all the good stuff, but you never tell me the bad stuff"; or "You tell [me what happens] after a while, not when something happens to you… You always tell me superficial stuff [in the moment]." These excerpts from some mother-son conversations appear to indicate similarities with Guerrero and Afifi's (1995)

findings. However, this is simply a speculation, and due to the overall absence of gender effects, this one significant finding should be replicated in future studies.

I was also interested in examining how conflict resolutions varied across age groups. It was predicted that older children would be less likely to concede to their mother's point of view. Results were broadly consistent with this prediction – as compared to the two younger age groups, 16-year-old children were particularly likely to prevail in conflicts with their mothers. Adolescents' developing epistemological abilities to critically think about their own and other's judgments (Hatch, 1983; Kuhn & Park, 2005; Kuhn & Udell, 2003) could potentially shed light on the reason as to why they were more likely to prevail in conflicts with their mothers, compared to their mothers prevailing or the conflicts being left unresolved. That is, as compared to younger children, adolescents may have more sophisticated justifications for their arguments (Kuhn & Park, 2005).

It is important to note that I anticipated that older youth might also be more likely to "agree to disagree" with their mothers, but this expectation was not borne out in my data, in that unresolved disagreements did not increase with age. These findings might hinge upon the way the conflicts were left unresolved, in that it is not clear that families were always "agreeing to disagree". For instance, unresolved disagreements could reflect standoffs in which there is a draw, but it is also possible that one person could simply withdraw from the disagreement by choosing to no longer discuss the situation (see Vuchinich, 1987). While it is difficult to sometimes distinguish between these possibilities, it would be interesting to further explore the context of how conflicts are left unresolved in future research.

These findings might also be linked to the fact that the mother-child dyads were discussing two conflictual events that the child experienced with their peer(s). In this context, the

mothers were not present during the initial event, so they are acting as a third party listeners in the conversation whereas the children were present, so it is possible that adolescents might have prevailed more often due to their privileged access to the facts of the event, as combined with their ability to convey these arguments effectively to their mothers (Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Kuhn & Park, 2005). Consistent with this, my findings also revealed an interaction between who initiated the conflict and how the conflict was resolved. When a child initiated the conflict, the child was also more likely to prevail in that same conflict, in comparison to the mother prevailing or the conflict being left unresolved. However, when the mother initiated a conflict, all three conflict endings were equally likely. Thus, again, when children objected to their mothers' statements in the conversation, it is perhaps more likely for them to prevail since they were present during the initial event, so they might have had more knowledge about the situation compared to their mothers.

This section focused generally on how conflict processes vary with children's increasing age. However, findings also revealed variations in disagreements across different domains that further qualify some of the above findings. In particular, children were particularly likely to prevail in the context of disagreements about basic event-related facts, which makes sense in terms of their privileged access to the what/who/where of the initial event, as opposed to mothers being more likely to prevail about value disagreements. These findings will be further discussed in the next section.

What are the Variations in Disagreements Across Different Domains?

With regard to the overall frequencies of conflicts in different domains, I expected that there would be more conflicts about domains typically construed as more objective (in this case, basic event-related facts), since past research suggested less tolerance for interpretive diversity in

these domains (Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002). The results partially supported these expectations: the most common domains of disagreements in descending order, were basic event-related facts, followed by disagreements about psychological facts about the antagonist, the psychological facts about the child him/herself, the importance or relevance of a value, and prioritizing different values. Thus, I found the most interpersonal disagreements between the mother-child dyads to be based on basic event-related facts, and the least to be based on values. This coincided with previous research in the field examining how youths' epistemological reasoning varies across domains, wherein children appeared to be more absolutist when judging factual and moral arguments (Wainryb et al., 2004). In this case, while mothers and children may, at times, show variations in their understandings of the facts, the findings implied, consistent with my expectations, that mother-child dyads tended not to frequently disagree about values. Thus, this is in line with research on social domain theory, where parents and children have similar understandings of morality based on "welfare, fairness and rights" (Smetana et al., 2014, p. 24).

I also anticipated that with regard to psychological facts concerning emotions, cognitions, and goals, that there would be potentially more disagreements concerning the antagonist's perspective as compared to the perspective of the child him/herself. In this case, the hypothesis was not supported, in that the frequency of disagreements on each type of psychological facts were similar. Therefore, contrary to Mansfield and Clinchy's (2002) research, my data did not imply that other's psychology was deemed to be more open to interpretive diversity, at least in terms of the issues that formed the focus of conflict. Nevertheless, findings indicated that mother-child dyads, on average, engaged in more conflicts about psychological facts, as opposed to prioritizing different values. Apparently, then, the contestable aspects of events centered more on how people involved in the conflict felt, what they believed, what they wanted, etc., as

opposed to which values they were prioritizing during the interpersonal disagreement. In sum, mother-child dyads were more likely to disagree based on observable and psychological facts that bear on what is right and wrong, as opposed to the values themselves (Wainryb, 2004).

The manner in which conflicts were resolved also varied across domains of disagreement. As noted in the previous section and consistent with hypotheses, children were found to be more likely to prevail regarding disagreements about basic event-related facts, compared to the conflict being left unresolved or the mother prevailing. This finding emphasized that since the children were present during the events, they had greater knowledge about who was involved, what, when, where, why and how it happened, so it is unsurprising that they were evidently more likely to prevail in these types of conflicts. In these interpersonal disagreements, the mothers were in a third party perspective, so consistent with my expectations, the children were more likely to prevail.

In contrast, my findings revealed that the three conflict resolutions occurred with similar frequency when disagreements concerned psychological facts about the antagonist or psychological facts about the child him/herself. This was surprising, since I had expected the children to be more likely to prevail in conflict surrounding their own wants, feelings, and thoughts. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the mothers sometimes prompted the children to reconsider the psychological perspectives about the antagonist and themselves. For example, in an excerpt of a conversation between an 11-year-old boy and his mother, the dyad had a conflict regarding the psychological facts about the child, where the mother was questioning her son's feelings about being "trash", because he was struggling how to learn how to play basketball. The mother seemed to have wanted her son to realize that he is a valuable person and always has been. For instance, the mother said, “No, but you're not trash … You're valuable”. This is an

example of how the mother was constructively prompting the child to reconsider his own feelings and realize that he was a valuable person regardless of his struggles in basketball. Similarly, in another example from a conversation between a 7-year-old boy and his mother, the dyad had a conflict regarding the psychological facts about the antagonist where the mother was questioning the peer's intentions about wanting to play with the child's brother instead of the child. The mother said, “I know but you have your brother around all the time and he doesn't get to have an older brother around, so he probably really wanted your brother’s help and attention, because it's different for him”. This is another example of how the mother was questioning the child’s understanding of his peer’s feelings, by seemingly prompting her son to put himself in his peer’s shoes. Ultimately, these two examples both demonstrate that the mother was encouraging the child to think about the antagonist’s or their own internal states in a new way; these suggestions could be either accepted or resisted, which might partially explain why all three conflict resolutions were possible. It also underscores the ways in which mother-child dialogues may serve as a forum for children’s epistemological development, inasmuch as children are encouraged to consider new and different perspectives on their experiences.

Finally, in terms of value disagreements regarding prioritizing different values and disagreeing on the importance or relevance of a value, mothers tended to prevail most often. This was consistent with my expectations. Specifically, the children might have conceded to their mother’s claims, due to the fact that they might consider their mother to be a moral socializing agent who plays a legitimate role in teaching them about right and wrong. This is linked with research on social domain theory suggesting that children recognize their parents’ authority in the moral domain (Smetana, 1999; Smetana & Asquith, 1994). Relatedly, these conflicts were rarely left unresolved, implying that dyads rarely “agreed to disagree” about values. This is

associated with Wainryb and colleagues' (2004) research, which suggested that people tend not to be tolerant of diversity in value judgments. For example, in an excerpt of a conversation between an 11-year-old boy and his mother, the dyad had a conflict in which the child insinuated that it was inappropriate for him, as a preadolescent, to be sleeping with a stuffed animal (i.e., "I am an 11-year-old that sleeps with a stuffed animal"). Ultimately, in this conflict the mother prevailed. The mother said:

> "I will tell you something, [your stuffed animal] is never going to the garbage. Even if one day you decide you don't want to sleep with [your stuffed animal], I know for a fact that even if there is an age group, [for example, like when you are a] teenager and adult where you decide to [say,] "I'm not sleeping with [my stuffed animal], it's so not cool". […] You know there is going to be an age, somewhere on the adult side again, where [you are] going to[say …], "That was my stuffed animal when I was a kid. […] I love it, I missed it" and [your stuffed animal] is [going to] be on a shelf in a place of pride". […] I know the older you is going to want [your stuffed animal], even just to have somewhere special, even if you don't sleep with him, but just to [say], "This was mine from when I was a baby". […] So I promise you […] if ever you decide that getting teased is too much, or that you don't want to deal with it, or your friends come over and you don't want them to see [your stuffed animal] in your room and make fun of you, and you decide [to say] "No, I'm too cool for that, I don't want to sleep with him anymore". Don't throw him out."

The child responded: "Put him on the shelf". In this example, the mother appeared to be focused on making her son realize that regardless of what other people think, if you deem something (i.e., in this case a stuffed animal) to be important to you, then it should always be important to you no

matter what other people might say. In this case, the mother seemed to prevail, since the child appeared to concede to his mother's point of view by telling his mother to put his stuffed animal on the shelf. Indeed, even as the children got older, they did not seem to be more likely to "agree to disagree" with their mothers about values, but were just as likely to concede to their mothers. This is consistent with previous research examining adolescents' willingness to acknowledge their parents' authority in the moral domain (Smetana & Asquith, 1994).

Parenting Styles

Finally, I also made predictions about how parenting style would be linked to interpersonal disagreements within the mother-child dyad. Although I advanced a number of hypotheses, none were supported, as there were no significant associations between the conversational coding of conflicts and a questionnaire-based parenting style. It is possible that the PSDQ (Robinson et al., 1995, 2001) was not an adequate measure to assess my research questions and hypotheses, since it focused on mothers answering questions broadly related to their parenting style tendencies, rather than more specific indices of how such styles are manifested in conflict discussions. Therefore, it is plausible that if I had measured parenting style in different ways, perhaps based on patterns within the transcripts themselves, I would have found significant results.

The one significant finding that emerged involved an interaction between children's age and gender in predicting parenting style. Specifically, I found that mothers of 16-year-old boys were more likely to endorse authoritarian parenting, as compared to mothers of 16-year-old girls. This finding should be interpreted with caution, due to the relatively small sample size involved in the comparison. However, it is possible that mothers endorsed lower levels of authoritarian parenting with their teenage daughters, perhaps since they were lessening their control.

Conversely, mothers were ostensibly not letting go of their control over their teenage sons to the same extent. This is perhaps because mother-son dyads have been shown to exhibit less intimacy in discussions of more personal and negative topics (Guerrero & Afifi, 1995), so mothers might appear to be more worried about their sons at this age. This speculation is also in line with Sorkhabi and Middaugh's (2004) research, which indicated that teenagers who rated their parents as authoritarian or permissive seemed to have a weaker bond with their parents, and that this was also linked to more conflicts and fewer interactions with their parents. Nevertheless, this is simply a speculation, and future studies should aim to explore this gender-based finding.

Limitations and Future Directions of the Study

My study had a number of limitations. Firstly, the findings were based on a relatively homogenous middle class White sample, which limits the generalizability of the results. My sample also did not include fathers, which is also a limitation for similar reasons. Therefore, in future studies, it would be interesting to study a more heterogenous sample with individuals from various cultural backgrounds and socioeconomic levels, as well as fathers.

Secondly, it was, at times, a challenge to correctly identify mother-child interpersonal disagreements, although interrater reliability for the categorization of features of these disagreements (once identified) was quite high. Specifically, perhaps due to the fact that the mother-child dyads were having conversations about two conflictual events with a peer, the disagreements were, at times, more subtle than those that might have been evident in conflicts between mothers and children themselves.

Thirdly, these patterns of conflict cannot be generalized to mother-child conversations pertaining to other topics. In this case, it would be intriguing to further examine similarities and differences between mother-child interpersonal disagreements in the context of conversations

about different kinds of events. For example, comparing mother-child disagreements when discussing peer versus sibling conflicts, or when having a disagreement between themselves, as mothers might have more of a direct connection with the events in these latter cases. Ultimately, this would allow for a more in-depth understanding of the nature of mother-child interpersonal disagreements about a wider range of events.

Fourthly, different subcategories of fact and value disagreements might arise in future studies; I was constrained by the types of disagreements that appeared in this dataset. For instance, in this study, I had originally planned to assess disagreements about rules/social conventions (i.e., whether a rule or social convention exists, and what the nature of the rule is), as well as want versus should disagreements (i.e., the desire (want) of the child or mother for something to happen versus whether what is occurring is justified (should)), but these types of disagreements did not arise with sufficient frequency. Therefore, in future studies, perhaps with a larger sample size, other domains of disagreements could be investigated, in order to gain more information about the ways in which different types of disagreements arise and are resolved within mother-child dyads.

Finally, using the PSDQ (Robinson et al., 1995, 2001) measure for parenting style was also potentially a limitation, as use of a global self-report questionnaire-based measure may not have been optimal. As noted above, in a future study, it would be interesting to see how parenting style expressed in situations is linked to the features of interpersonal disagreements (e.g., mothers' strategy use in the conflicts themselves). Another related direction for future research is considering different operationalizations of some of my other variables of interest, such as conflict length. For instance, in the future, conflict length could be analyzed based on the proportion of the total conversation that involves conflict. In sum, these future directions

stemming from how I operationalized and coded my variables of interest could potentially yield differing results.

Conclusion and Implications of the Study

In conclusion, this study provided a broader understanding of the ways in which interpersonal disagreements occurred during mother-child conversations about children's past experiences of peer conflict. I assessed how interpersonal disagreements varied across age and domain of disagreement; and how parenting style was associated with these patterns. The findings imply a number of interesting implications.

Overall, this study has provided insight into the ways in which interpersonal disagreements occur during mother-child discussions of conflicts with peer(s). The findings are consistent with past research (Smetana, 1989, 1994; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014) indicating that older children may have more frequent disagreements with their mothers compared to younger children. Interpersonal disagreements in this context were also more likely to end with children prevailing, especially when the child also initiated the conflict. Additionally, my study shed light on the domains of mother-child conflicts in this context. The findings indicated the mother-child dyads disagreed most often about facts that bear on values and not the values themselves. When the mother-child dyad disagreed on basic event-related facts, then the child was more likely to prevail compared to the mother or the conflict being left unresolved. However, when the mother-child dyad disagreed on values (i.e., prioritized different values or disagreeing on the importance or relevance of a value), the mother tended to prevail.

In this case my research expands on the literature in the field (Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Ronfard, et al., 2018; Wainryb et al., 2004; Wainryb et al., 2001), since I applied an epistemological lens to this issue. For instance, I was able to connect the research on

epistemological development and theory of mind with domain-specific judgments, in order to denote how children's epistemological development informed the features of mother-child interpersonal disagreements. Furthermore, in terms of implications of my study, the findings underscored that as children got older, they were evidently becoming more autonomous; in this respect, age-appropriate forms of autonomy support should be taken into consideration. For instance, the findings make apparent that as children age, they have the capacity to lead the conversation with their mothers, and perhaps especially when they were present during the events but mothers were not. Therefore, in terms of scaffolding, as children get older, mothers should reduce the level of structure in their conversations with their children. This is in line with the idea that when parents are acting as social coaches with older children, it is vital for parents to acknowledge and respect the child's autonomy (Poulin et al., 2012). Thus, parental coaching must allow for older children's increasing autonomy, as opposed to a more intrusive approach, since this might result in a less productive interaction (Gregson et al., 2015).

My research is also useful for guiding practice, inasmuch as the findings indicated the ways in which parents and children tended to agree and disagree when having conversations with one another. For instance, children still appear to respect their parents' authority with regard to value judgments, whereas disagreements tend to stem from their different understandings of the facts. Therefore, when interpersonal disagreements may arise, it is important for the mother-child dyad to communicate their differences and understand each other's point of view, while discussing the truths and values emerging within the conversation. In this case, my research has implied that parents may act as social coaches with children of different ages, but that children are also experts on their own experiences, since they have lived through these events. Ultimately, my research can help parents better navigate conversations with their children, especially when

conflicts arise, since they will be able to better consider similarities and differences between their own and their child's legitimate point of view on complex experiences.

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Appendix A

Parenting Styles and Dimensions

Reference: Robinson, C. C., Mandleco, B., Olsen, S. F., & Hart, C. H. (1995). Authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive parenting practices. Development of a new measure. *Psychological Reports*, *77*(3), 819-830. https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1995.77.3.819

Response Scale: 1=Never/2=Almost Never/3=Sometimes/4=Almost Always/5=Always

- **Authoritative:** PSD05 PSD10 PSD01 PSD18 PSD21 PSD25 PSD02 PSD23 PSD07 PSD17 PSD04 PSD15 PSD09
- **Authoritarian:** PSD08 PSD11 PSD19 PSD24 PSD13 PSD26 PSD22 PSD03
- **Permissive:** PSD06 PSD20 PSD16 PSD14 PSD12

PSD01	I am responsive to our child's feelings or needs
PSD02	I take our child's desires into account before asking the child to do something
PSD03	When our child asks why (he)(she) has to conform, I state: because I said so, or I am your parent and I want you to
PSD04	I explain to our child how we feel about the child's good and bad behavior
PSD05	I encourage our child to talk about the child's troubles
PSD06	I find it difficult to discipline our child
PSD07	I encourage our child to freely express (himself)(herself) even when disagreeing with parents
PSD08	I punish by taking privileges away from our child with little if any explanations
PSD09	I emphasize the reasons for rules
PSD10	I give comfort and understanding when our child is upset
PSD11	I yell or shout when our child misbehaves
PSD12	I give into our child when the child causes a commotion about something
PSD13	I explode in anger towards our child
PSD14	I threaten our child with punishment more often than actually giving it
PSD15	I take into account our child's preferences in making plans for the family
PSD16	I state punishments to our child and do not actually do them
PSD17	I show respect for our child' s opinions by encouraging our child to express them
PSD18	I allow our child to give input into family rules
PSD19	I scold and criticize to make our child improve
PSD20	I spoil our child

PSD21	I give our child reasons why rules should be obeyed
PSD22	I use threats as punishment with little or no justification
PSD23	I have warm and intimate times together with our child
PSD24	I punish by putting our child off somewhere alone with little if any explanations
PSD25	I help our child to understand the impact of behavior by encouraging our child to talk about the consequences of his/her own actions
PSD26	I scold or criticize when our child's behavior doesn't meet our expectations

Appendix B

Coding Scheme

Definition of a Conflict

- Some implied difference on how they see things (i.e., facts) or how they value things (i.e., value).
- An interpersonal conflict between a mother and child is defined as a disagreement where there are opposing claims with regard to differences in the way they interpret reality (i.e., facts), and/or what they believe to be moral (i.e., values; Adler et al., 2012).

The following table below includes the coding categories and examples from the CAPS dataset.

Factual Disagreements

Coding Categories for Factual Disagreements	Examples of Factual Disagreements	Context of the Conflict
Basic Event-Related Facts - Related to the event that is the focus of the study, such as who, what, where and how	**Example of a disagreement between a mother and a 7-year-old child:** "**M:** Well [what] did you tell – Did you tell [the] RA? **C:** Sorry, maybe? **M:** You said sorry? **C:** Maybe, I forgot **M:** Or did you let him go in front? Or no? **C:** I don't know, I forgot. I forgot. I forgot if I let him go in lunch. **M:** No in the front of the line. **C:** No, I forgot. And then when we were going down I said, when we – when we come up. Done. Are we done? **M:** So sorry. Um, so you – He – You didn't – You forgot and so he didn't go in the front – He didn't go in front of you when you went upstairs is that right? **C:** Yeah. Yeah." **Conflict Initiation:** Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Mother's perspective prevails	The child explains a situation where he was in front of the line to go outside, but his peer wanted to be first. The child told his peer, "you can go in front outside when we come back to class". However, when going back to class, the child did not remember telling his peer to go in front of the line, so the child put himself in front of the line both times. The basic event-related factual disagreement is centered on the mother not understanding what happened.

	Example of a disagreement between a mother and an <u>11-year-old</u> child: "**M:** Uhm, I think it was more like grade 2 or 3. **C:** No! It was not grade 3! **M:** No? Maybe 2. I feel like it wasn't as far back as grade 1, but who knows maybe it was. **C:** Well it was grade 1 or 2. **M:** Okay. You want to tell me what happened, cause you remember it." **Conflict Initiation:** Child **Conflict Resolution:** Child's perspective prevails	The child explains when the situation with his peer happened (i.e., in grade 1, grade 2, or grade 3). The basic event-related factual disagreement is centered on when the event happened.
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>16-year-old</u> child: "**C:** No, no, not, FRIEND 1, not FRIEND 1. **M:** Oh okay. **C:** See I knew you would think that. Not FRIEND 1, FRIEND 2. **M:** Oh I don't know FRIEND 2. **C:** See, I said FRIEND 1 at first cause I instinctively whenever there's something bad, I think FRIEND 1 (both laugh). **M:** No kidding, I think there's a thousand FRIEND 1 stories (child laughs). So who's FRIEND 2, I don't even know who FRIEND 2 is. **C:** FRIEND 2. The guy I did my project with. Tall guy. Skinny. **M:** Which? The science project?. **C:** Science fair. **M:** Okay, yeah, yeah, yeah. **Conflict Initiation:** Child **Conflict Resolution:** Child's perspective prevails	The child explains who was involved in the situation, in this case FRIEND 2, not FRIEND 1. The disagreement about the basic event-related facts is centered on who was involved in the situation.

Psychological Facts about the Antagonist - Emotions, intentions, beliefs, goals, motivations, understandings, desires, likes, personality characteristics, possibility of becoming a different person, or why a person felt/thought/wanted what they did	**Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>7-year-old</u> child:** "**C:** The teacher did put her in punish. **M:** Okay. But you guys know sometimes, you know, when you play and FRIEND 1, she tends to get out of hand a little bit. She gets overexcited like you sometimes, when you play with FRIEND 2. Right? **C:** (No response). **M:** You sure she pushed you on purpose and it wasn't because she was overexcited? Accidents do happen when you guys are all running around in the school yard, eh? … Mm? **C:** Yeah (hesitantly)." **Conflict Initiation:** Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Mother's perspective prevails	The child explains a situation where her friend pushed her and says, "but it was by accident, by purpose". The conflict is centered on the psychological facts about the antagonist where the mother questions the child's account of the peer's motivations.
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and an <u>11-year-old</u> child: "**C:** I know. I know. But because she said like 'Okay FRIEND 1 is nice even though, even if he didn't like FRIEND 2' and I'm like 'first of all that's not what I said' but like that, that's not that mean! **M:** (Laughs). Yeah. What's really bothering you I think is that she didn't believe you, Yeah. And that might be something you want to talk to her about. **C:** That she didn't believe me, but I can't. She won't believe me! **M:** (Laughs). But do you think if maybe in a separate time say 'You know what FRIEND 3, do you remember that time you didn't believe me? It kinda bothers me and it still bothers me that you didn't believe me'. You know what I mean, like you can say, 'I tell you something. I really, really –'. **C:** But [with] her, when something is over, something is over (emphasis on the word over). **M:** Yeah.	The child explains a situation where her friend (i.e., FRIEND 3) did not believe that she was humming and did not say anything mean about her other friends. The conflict is centered on the psychological facts about the antagonist (i.e., FRIEND 3) where the mother questions the child's perspective on the peer's beliefs.

	C: And she won't believe me, because she don't believe that happens." **Conflict Initiation:** Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Child perspective prevails	
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>16-year-old</u> child: "**M:** If you want to call me stupid, don't call me stupid, call me sweet. **C:** He's just going to laugh in my face and be like, 'What?'. **M:** Well remind him that you don't like it. **C:** Yeah, he knows." **Conflict Initiation:** Child **Conflict Resolution:** Child's perspective prevails	The child explains how her peer calls her, "stupid". The conflict is centered on the psychological facts about the antagonist where the mother questions the peer's intentions, regarding calling her daughter "stupid".
Psychological Facts about the Child Him/Herself - Emotions, intentions, beliefs, goals, motivations, understandings, desires, likes, personality characteristics, possibility of becoming a different person, or WHY a person felt/thought/wanted what they did	**Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>7-year-old</u> child:** "**M:** She said that maybe she thought you did it on purpose. **C:** (Loudly and emphatically). But I didn't! You're not believing me! **M:** I believe you. If you said you didn't do it on purpose then I believe you didn't do it on purpose. Okay? And now you don't have any problems with FRIEND anymore right? **C:** (Nods)." **Conflict Initiation:** Child **Conflict Resolution:** Child's perspective prevails	The child explains how she did not do it on purpose to hurt her peer by stepping on her foot when they were trying to take off their shoes. The conflict is centered on the psychological facts about the child, where the mother questions her daughter's intentions.
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and an <u>11-year-old</u> child: "**M:** I don't think you enjoyed going to the beach that much too; and that might not have helped the situation. **C:** No, I kind of like going to the beach.	The child explains the situation with his peer and the mother mentioned how she thought her son did not like going to the beach. The conflict is centered on the psychological facts about the

	M: Yeah? Okay. Do you remember how, how the incidence finished? How did it finish in the end? Did you get to make the hole or did FRIEND?" **Conflict Initiation:** Child **Conflict Resolution:** Child's perspective prevails	child, where he explains his likes.
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>16-year-old</u> child: "**C:** I could have just not said anything. **M:** Yeah, that's another way. **C:** But then, no because I care about FRIEND and I was like, 'Okay, well you should do it'. **M:** Well was it the way you said it or what you said? **C:** No, it was what I said. I said it in a really calm way. I was like, 'You should put your iPad away' (in a gentle, quiet voice). Like there was no mean or intonation in my voice that made it sound rude." **Conflict Initiation:** Child **Conflict Resolution:** Child's perspective prevails	The child explains the situation with her peer, where she told her peer to put away his iPad and do his homework to practice for their upcoming test. The conflict is centered on the psychological facts about the child, where the child explains her intentions regarding if she spoke to her peer in a harsh way.

<u>Value Disagreements</u>

Coding Categories for Value Disagreements	Examples of Value Disagreements	Context of the Conflict
Prioritizing Different Values - Can be a disagreement about what principle/value/ lesson to be learned, when two different	**Example of a disagreement between a mother and an <u>7-year-old</u> child:** "**M:** So you keep playing the same that you don't like to play, just so that he doesn't win? **C:** Yes and when FRIEND 1 doesn't want to play, I'll be like, "I don't want to play this now, okay then, I automatically win!". **M:** "So, you're just doing exactly as him. **C:** Yes.	The conflict is centered around two different values regarding how to handle the situation differently. The mother focuses on how it is not nice to hurt others, but if the peer hurts the child in return not to complain about it, since the child hurt his peer first. Whereas, the child

possibilities are being contrasted - Two distinct values that are being discussed/ compared	**M:** And so the game is going on forever. **C:** (Laughs). **M:** Can you think of a better way to solve it? **C:** No (laughs). **M:** You can't? **C:** A least it's a funny way, right? **M:** Well, it's not funny when you come in and say that you got hurt because FRIEND 1 keeps pushing you. **C:** Yes, but then FRIEND 1 will say, "But he did it to me". **M:** Yes, and what did I say, "You can't complain if he's doing it to you, if you're doing it back to him". **C:** (Laughs). **M:** Right? **C:** Yes, so next time, I might just stay on the jungle gym. Number one rule, and if I see him coming up, but FRIEND 1 doesn't see me, I'd zoom down before he sees me." **Conflict Initiation:** Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Unresolved	focuses on the fact that it is part of the continuous game he was playing and that if he thinks his peer is trying to hurt him, he will just avoid him by running off the jungle gym.
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and an <u>11-year-old</u> child: "**M:** What did you learn that you can do differently next time, hopefully it won't happen but if it did? **C:** Not wear a pink sweater. It's true. **M:** No. I don't think that the right solution. **C:** That's what I would do. **M:** Okay, but what do you think another solution is? If somebody called you a name and you knew it wasn't nice, what do you think a proper solution would be? **C:** Tell a teacher. **M:** Right. Or? What about saying to the person you know, 'what you just said hurt my feelings. I thought you're my friend.' Don't you think that's something that can stick in someone's head?"	This conflict is centered around two different values. The child focuses on how he would avoid the problem in the first place by not wearing the offending colour. Whereas, the mother focuses on the issue that another solution is possible, by telling an adult or speaking to his peer about the situation.

	Conflict Initiation: Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Mother's perspective prevails	
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>16-year-old</u> child: "**M:** So? You don't put your stuff in other people's lockers. **C:** Yeah I would've been late for class if I didn't though. **M:** Well tough! You should've stopped playing basketball quicker and then you wouldn't have been late for class! **C:** (Laughs). **M:** So, I mean it's your fault that you were too late, leaving, and being the last person out! **C:** But he said I could keep my shoes in his locker. I asked, he was like 'Yes sure'. **M:** I know and then later on he thought, 'Well this would be funny'. **C:** Yes exactly." **Conflict Initiation:** Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Mother's perspective prevails	This conflict is centered around two different values. The mother focuses on how the child should not depend on his peer next time. Whereas, the child focuses on the fact that he trusted his peer, by putting his shoes in his locker and did not want to be late for class.
Disagreeing on the Importance or Relevance of a Value - Disagreement in whether a principle/value/lesson is to be learned (e.g., one person omitted it) - One value being discussed	**Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>7-year-old</u> child:** "**M:** Did you learn anything from that experience? **C:** (shakes head no). **M:** You didn't learn that it's not nice to push? **C:** Mm. **M:** Eh? **C:** Yeah." **Conflict Initiation:** Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Mother's perspective prevails	The conflict is centered around the fact that the child thinks she did not learn anything from the situation, but the mother tries to make the child realize that it is not "nice to push" her peer.

	Example of a disagreement between a mother and an <u>11-year-old</u> child: "**M:** Okay. FRIEND was telling some girls. FRIEND is your friend right and she's a girl? She was telling some girls that she liked a boy and you told her to stop it and she got angry with you? I think you should have ignored her. **C:** Yeah like I should have minded. **M:** No you shouldn't have, not that. I always tell you when you have issues like that, most time you come home with this cause. Is that not what happens? I'm surprised you didn't tell me but now you're telling me, fine. But you shouldn't have ignored her because if anything happened to her, would you be happy with yourself? **C:** No. What she told me is I should like, I should leave her alone. That you know she knows what she is doing and I left her. **M:** She's a child just like you. Do you, is there always a time you know what you're doing? **C:** (Shakes head)." **Conflict Initiation:** Mother **Conflict Resolution:** Mother's perspective prevails	The conflict is centered around if the child should be involved by telling his friend not to discuss who she likes with the other girls at school; or if the child should have simply not told his friend anything and "minded" his business.
	Example of a disagreement between a mother and a <u>16-year-old</u> child: **"M:** So when somebody doesn't understand something what do you do? Do you say it's their fault? **C:** No. **M:** Or do you say it in a different way? **C:** No, Like I said to you, I'm only responsible for what I say, not for what you understand. **M**: But if he doesn't understand it, do you want him to understand? **C:** Well yeah, but it's his fault if he doesn't understand it in the right way because it's his mind – **M:** Yeah.	The conflict is centered around other people's understanding of the situation and how it is their responsibility to interpret what is being said, and not the speaker's responsibility.

	C: – That's not seeing it the way I told him. So I can explain it to him and he can be hurt, but I know what I said and it wasn't meaning to be hurtful. **M:** Because when I'm at work, if BOSS says to me, 'You have to do this, this, and this.' And I don't understand, then there's, there could be a problem. **C:** Year because you don't understand. She's telling you want to do and you don't understand. **M:** Yeah so… **C:** Okay, so that's your problem, but she could always explain it. **M:** But it would be her problem too cause I would get the work done. **C:** No. But she could explain it to you. (Frustrated tone). **M:** In a different way. **C:** Yeah." **Conflict Initiation:** Child **Conflict Resolution:** Mother's perspective prevails	

Conflict Initiation Codes

- Note the first person to express disagreement
    - Mother
    - Child

Conflict Resolution Codes

- Mother's perspective prevails
- Child's perspective prevails
- Unresolved

Criteria of what is NOT being coded

- Procedural facts: Anything unrelated to the discussion of the events
    - Basic clarification questions that are framed in conflictual ways but that do not address substantive issues related to the events.
        - Example:
            - "**M:** Yeah or no?

- **C:** No.
- **M:** Tell me! Yeah or no?
- **C:** No"

- Conflicts about the procedures related to the study, such as child's posture or behavior during the conversation itself.
  - Example:
    - "**M:** Sit down and talk properly, please.
    - **C:** No.
    - **M:** CHILD.
    - **C:** No."