

# The Dynamics of Containment: Alliance Cohesion and American Domestic Politics in Foreign Policy

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## Abstract

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Containment policy has been the dominant grand strategy of the United States throughout the second half of the twentieth century. This dissertation answers the following question: What variation is likely given different structural alliance configurations and domestic constraints? This dissertation will test the relationship between the cause, e.g. alliance cohesion (and domestic structures as the intervening variable) and resulting effect, type containment (proto-, containment, rollback) implemented by US. Through case study methodology and primary source textual analysis, I will test this argument against the Cold War historical record.

This dissertation finds that the dependent variable of foreign policy, specifically the typology of containment is largely determined by the independent variable, alliance cohesion (e.g. whether the alliance partners are balancing or intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, or if the state fears the leader will not fulfill its defensive commitments). This relationship, with the inclusion of executive autonomy or constraint in domestic structures (IVV) is largely responsible for the foreign policy output by the United States in all but one of the case studies used to test this dissertation's argument. The deviating case study demonstrates that the Carter Administration's neglecting the alliance cohesion – containment policy axis led to, in effect, being selected out of American leadership and the Ronald Reagan reset with alliance politics and containment foreign policy at the forefront of the Administration's foreign relations.

The discussion of containment strategies is a critical contemporary issue given the recent rise of the People's Republic of China threatening to surpass the United States as the most powerful state in the international system, likely with hegemonic ambitions. Given that

containment is a foreign policy short of war, makes this a strategy worth considering when confronting the reality of a rising nuclear revisionist power. At the time of this writing, there is no model that lays out the theoretical conditions which decision-makers will implement a policy of containment. This dissertation builds this theory. In demonstrating containment as a grand strategy that resides within a theoretical framework of a security policy short of war will open up possible foreign policy alternatives for states to consider.

## Acknowledgements

To my boys, Brennan and Aidan, and Abigail, who taught me just how important it is to strive to make this world a better and safer place for everyone.

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All errors are mine.

## **Dedication**

This dissertation is dedicated to my Mother, Darlene Priest-Brown; without your love, support, and unshakable faith, none of this would have been possible.

“It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” –

George F. Kennan.

“You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background.” – George F. Kennan

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

### Project Summary

Containment policy has been the defining grand strategy of the United States throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Since George Kennan, writing as Mr. X and published by *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, penned his famous article outlining a strategy of containment, there has been a multitude of academics, policymakers, and political commentators who are interested in foreign affairs and strategic studies has spilt much ink in analysing, dissecting, advocating, and critiquing this policy. While the strategy has occasionally cropped up (such as the idea of 'Dual Containment' towards Iraq and Iran during the mid-1990s), containment policy has been largely relegated to the dustbin of historical strategy, a remnant of the Cold War.

This dissertation seeks to answer the following question: What variation of containment is likely, given different structural alliance configurations and domestic constraints?

I will be using a neorealist framework to argue that the variation in structural alliance configurations is the primary criteria by which decision makers choose between the typology of containment foreign policies; to a lesser extent, domestic constraints (such as whether or not the branches of government are divided or unified). The result is a containment strategy which ranges from (1) Proto-containment, where the conditions are structured so that containment may be implemented in the near future; (2) Containment; or (3) Rollback, which is implemented to

coerce the targeted state to a previously held relative power position or a retreat to national (or regional) boundaries.

The selection of a specific containment strategy is dependent upon the alliance structure that is available. Alliance structures heavily influence the ability of a state to contain a target, and largely determine what type of containment is feasible. The alliance structures that are most likely to influence a range of dynamic containment options are: (i) the fear of abandonment; (ii) *intra*-alliance balancing; and (iii) *intra*-alliance bargaining. The types of containment are, namely, (a) proto-containment (or early/weak containment); (b) containment; and (c) roll-back. It is the argument of this dissertation that the type of containment outcome will depend upon the alliance structure, creating a dynamic mechanism for grand strategic outcomes and a range of foreign policy options. Said in other words, it is the level of alliance cohesion that is the causal factor that determines which variant of containment will be the strategic response. The majority of this dissertation will test how these alliance structural variables will determine which type of containment that will be implemented.

While external stimuli will largely determine the selection and form of containment as a foreign policy outcome, domestic politics plays an intervening role in the ability of an alliance leaders' executive to select grand strategy, which is the dependent variable. The intervening variables will be drawn from the neoclassical realist tradition, where the structure of the international system is the main causal determinant (independent variable), but internal politics at the state level may play an important role in the ability of foreign policy decisionmakers' to implement a grand strategy they consider to be optimal and will be thus considered as the intervening variable in the model. This is due to the amount of structural autonomy/constraint that the executive branch experiences within the state. Structural autonomy determines how

much of an effect domestic opinion has on the decision maker's ability to implement what they consider to be the optimal strategy given the prevailing external stimulus. There are two intervening variables, drawn from the domestic level of analysis, that affect foreign policy choices, namely: (1) how much opposition there is to the preferred foreign policy of the executive branch within the legislature, measured through the degree to which Congress is divided along party lines; and (2) legislative norms on the importance of foreign policy as an issue area (this will largely be done via historical examination of the political and social context of the case study under investigation).

I will test these propositions through the use of case study methodology in order to establish the high degree of internal validity that is necessary in theory building. Case study methods are appropriate, furthermore, in assessing the causal mechanism pathways associated with the predicted outcome, as well as theory testing on heterogeneous case studies. Additionally, case studies are particularly important when establishing complex causal mechanisms, which are likely to be significant in assessing the interplay between international systemic levels of analysis combined with the domestic political realities that the executive branch faces. Furthermore, process tracing will be available to test the intervening variables at the domestic level (listed above), which serve to mitigate the causal international structural determinants of foreign policy outcome. In other words, process tracing will be enlisted to test the intervening variables, since this dissertation proposes that domestic politics and institutions (the intervening variables) mitigate the causal variables at the international level (the independent variables), which in turn, structure foreign policy outcomes (the dependent variable). Process tracing techniques offers the researcher a way to identify the causal steps in a

process leading to foreign policy outcome, while taking into consideration the particularistic historical contexts and potential eccentricities.

The case studies that will be used in theory testing will be driven by establishing the effect of variations in alliance political structures (an independent variable) in order to assess the effect they have on foreign policy outcome. While brief sketches and justifications will be elaborated upon below, I will be drawing from the following case studies: (1) the middle Cold War (NATO internal dissent with American foreign policy); (2) the early Cold War (NATO fear of abandonment, but categorized by little internal opposition to American grand strategy and the establishment of forward operating bases in Western Europe); (3) Jimmy Carter's presidency (the first half of the late Cold War, highlighted by the alteration of the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union and waning confidence in American leadership);<sup>1</sup> and (4) Ronald Reagan's late Cold War (characterized by resurgent American leadership and the re-establishment of American strategic superiority). Lastly, this dissertation will conclude with the finding's application to contemporary American-Sino relationship, which is likely to dominate the middle of the 21st century.

It should be noted that the Carter presidency illustrates a deviation from this dissertation's predictions but, as we will see, these deviations led to significant results. Carter's deviation in foreign policy strategies given the disintegration of the Western Alliance's faith in superpower leadership would ultimately encourage America's adversaries to take advantage of it in several high-profile international incidents, as well as strongly contributing to the incumbent president's electoral loss in 1980. The Jimmy Carter presidency, despite not following the predictions of this dissertation's model is very important. The administration illustrates the peril

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the Carter presidency illustrates a deviation from this dissertation's predictions but, as we shall see, these deviations led to the USSR regaining a superior strategic position with respect to the United States and was utilized to unseat the incumbent president.

of *not following* the lessons other presidents had learnt during the Cold War: the superpower is constrained by the influence of junior alliance partners' disposition (and therefore cohesion of the alliance itself) towards the Great Power, as well as the current structure of domestic institutions (which may be favourable or unfavourable).


### Implications and Significance

The discussion of containment strategies has begun to see resurgence since the rise of the People's Republic of China during the first decade of the twentieth century. This is intriguing because, except for a few instances (as mentioned above), Containment has been largely viewed through the lens of an historical case study, not a general mode of strategy. As the United States has been discussing (and arguably implementing) a 'softer' version of containment towards the People's Republic of China (PRC), a growing (albeit small) universe of cases is beginning to emerge.

Strikingly, there have been few attempts to place Containment strategies in a theoretical context. At the time of writing, there exists no model that lays out the conditions under which foreign policy decisionmakers will likely implement a policy of containment, let alone what conditions lead to more or less forceful forms of containment. This dissertation seeks to build this theory. Additionally, given that grand strategy must be highly flexible to account for real world events, crises, domestic constraints and alliance structures, it is likely that containment strategies will exist on a continuum from Proto-containment to Rollback. Currently, there exists no explanation as to what containment policy would look like, given the different strategic realities a state faces at the time of implementation. The likely forms of containment may vary from a 'soft' version (which I classify as proto-containment, as it resembles setting the

geopolitical pieces for later implementation of traditional containment), to the 'traditional' form we saw during much of the Cold War, and Rollback (which occupies a middle ground between patiently isolating the target-state and direct war). This dissertation will propose and test the effect of alliance cohesion and domestic political constraints on what type of containment policy is implemented.

The significance in demonstrating that containment as grand strategy resides within a theoretical construct means that this policy short of war extends beyond the twentieth century, as well as American context, which opens up possible foreign policy alternatives for states to consider.



## Chapter 2: Argument

### **Conventional Wisdom**

#### *The Balance of Power*

It is in the balance of power logic that containment and its variants exist. Strategies of containment seek a long-term strategic approach to shifting the balance of power in the favour of the state practicing them. Where war in many cases is an especially costly and risky business, a containment grand strategy is an affordable, long term investment to shift power and influence towards a state or coalition's pole. In a balance of power system, competitive security-seeking behaviour tends to produce an equilibrium, whereby no power or faction (e.g. state or alliance pole) is able to dominate the system. According to Glenn Snyder, "if any state or alliance becomes dangerously power or expansionist, others will mobilize countervailing power through arms or alliances."<sup>2</sup> According to balance of power theory, states balance according to two strategies: (1) internal balancing (e.g. acquiring military capabilities); or (2) external balancing (e.g. forming alliances with the purpose of serving as balancing coalitions).<sup>3</sup> When there is a potential threat to remake the international system with a dominant power or alignment, balance of power predicts that others (be they weaker states, great powers allied with weaker powers, or some combination thereof) balance to preserve the autonomy and survival of states. According to Brzezinski et al., "during the 1980s, the United States strove to maintain a de facto balance of power between Iraq and Iran so that neither would be able to achieve a regional hegemony that might threaten American interests" within the framework of "Dual Containment."<sup>4</sup> In fact, even

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<sup>2</sup> Glenn H. Snyder. *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997 [2007]): 17.

<sup>3</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1954 [2001]); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

<sup>4</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May - June 1997): 22.

the variation of detente/engagement strategies such as arms control should be placed within the balance of power framework, as these agreements are successful when they allow states to balance against preponderant threats to the existing balance of power system.<sup>5</sup>

While there is a dearth in the literature explicating the causes for variation in containment policy, the conventional wisdom for American strategic posture is based upon the balance of power scholarship. This dissertation will make use of Stephen Walt's *balance of threat* hypothesis that attempts to explain balance of threat, as both a 'power-based' construct with the addition of 'ideological-based' criteria in his explanation for alliance response to a rival or threat.

Walt's balance of threat argument contributes and expands the balance of power literature by positing that "states ally to balance against threats [and ideologies] rather than against power alone."<sup>6</sup> This is especially significant for the Cold War case studies in this dissertation given the ideological components of the East-West confrontation. The conventional wisdom for the Cold War period is generally a combination of balance of power theory, given the struggle over Eastern-Western Europe, regionally, and disparate spheres of influence, globally. Balance of power in tandem with the added dimension of ideological communist-democratic (and capitalist) variable comprises the conventional wisdom for scholarship pertaining to this period. Therefore, this dissertation will utilize Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory as the alternative explanation.

According to Walt, not only do states balance far more often than they take part in intra-alliance bargaining, they tend to balance according to *threat* rather than against raw power alone. While balance of threat acknowledges that power distribution remains an extremely important

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<sup>5</sup> Julian Schofield, "Arms Control Failure and the Balance of Power," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 2000): 747-777.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987):5.

factor, "the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions."<sup>7</sup>

*Aggregate power* for Walt represents an important factor, as he notes that "the greater a state's total resources (e.g., population, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others."<sup>8</sup> Here, we can see Walt's theoretical schism from traditional balance of power theorists, as power becomes a sophisticated and complex calculation. Furthermore, he claims that Walter Lippmann and George Kennan recognized the priority of threat over power, enlisting the argument that Kennan "defined the aim of U.S. grand strategy as that of preventing any single state from controlling more industrial resources than the United States did. In practical terms, it means allying against any state that appears powerful enough to dominate the combined resources of industrial Eurasia."<sup>9</sup>

*Geographic proximity* represents an important contribution that is lacking in traditional balance of power theory. Similar to Mearsheimer's later work, which argues the stopping power of large bodies of water,<sup>10</sup> Walt's argument that power projection is dampened by distance. In other words, "because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away."<sup>11</sup> Colourfully, Walt enlists an early twentieth century repartee from the British Foreign Office to German complaints that Britain paid much closer attention and scrutiny to German naval ambitions and expansion: "If the British press pays more attention to the increase of Germany's naval power than to a similar movement in

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<sup>7</sup> Walt (1987): 5.

<sup>8</sup> Walt (1987): 22.

<sup>9</sup> Walt (1987): 22; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*: 25-88; George Kennan, *Realities in American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ, 1954): 63-5; Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1947).

<sup>10</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> Walt (1987): 23; See also, Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 4 (1976); Kenneth A. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York, 1962): 229-30, 245-47; Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 2 (1968).

Brazil...this is no doubt due to the proximity of the German coasts and the remoteness of Brazil."<sup>12</sup>

*Offensive power*, as in the work of Robert Jervis, Van Evera, and George Quester, Walt argues that the nature of military power represents a considerable marker when considering power. Intuitively, he argues that "states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than are those that are incapable of attacking because of geography, military posture, or something else."<sup>13</sup> While this addition does not seem controversial, the *type* of power in the traditional theory does not distinguish defensive power from offensive power, treating the two as one and the same. It is important to note that "offensive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost."<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the effect of offensive power creates a strong incentive for states to balance and regard as a threat.<sup>15</sup>

Lastly, Walt points out that "states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them."<sup>16</sup> This is important to note, as the perception of a state's intent is an important factor to consider in addition to how much power they are able to muster (offensive or otherwise). Walt argues that "even states with rather modest capabilities may prompt others to balance if they are perceived as especially aggressive."<sup>17</sup> The effect of this is that states are quite unlikely to intra-alliance bargain with a state that appears to have aggressive intentions. This is

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<sup>12</sup> Walt (1987): 23; Quoted in Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London, 1980): 421.

<sup>13</sup> Walt (1987): 24; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 3 (1978); Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (dissertation, University of California, Berkley, 1984); George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York, 1977); See also, Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 2 (1984).

<sup>14</sup> Walt (1987): 24.

<sup>15</sup> Walt (1987): 24; See also, William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments* (New York, 1950): 3-5; Raymond J. Sontag, *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932* (New York, 1933): 4-5; Jervis (1978): 189; Quester (1977): 105-6.

<sup>16</sup> Walt (1987): 25.

<sup>17</sup> Walt (1987): 25.

because "if an aggressor's intentions cannot be changed by an alliance with it, a vulnerable state, even if allied, is likely to become a victim."<sup>18</sup>

The balance of threat framework provides a good jumping off point for an alternative explanation, yet it falls short in offering a predictive model that explains the conditions under which a state would alter its form of containment with respect to the evidence of the Cold War. In other word, while Walt's theory is theoretically sound and explains some cases, it does not stand up to the Cold War case. If Walt's framework were correct, we would expect the type containment outcome to vary in relation to changes in the distribution of power, especially offensive power, geographic proximity to the threat, and changes in doctrinal or ideological aggressiveness. However, this is not the case, as we will come to see that changes in the containment dependent variable are caused by changes in the cohesiveness of the alliance and institutional domestic dynamics.

Walt's theory offers a snap-shot explanation for states who are confronted with an ideological threat. The problem is that the balance of threat hypothesis is that it only offers a static response to an ideological threat. *A priori*, this does not seem to be the case if one takes into account the different measures employed by the United States against its communist adversaries in the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Nixon Administration had a very different approach for communist China, compared to what was extended to the Soviet Union.

The balance of threat hypothesis, furthermore, is useful in explaining whether or not a state should be considered a threat (and therefore balanced against). Again, Walt offers a static explanation and offers a less compelling reason as to why the target is less than an ideological threat (e.g. the PRC-USSR comparison, where ideology was not a determinate of what constituted a threat to the United States). In other words, the theory being tested offers a causal

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<sup>18</sup> Walt (1987): 26.

explanation that is more useful for variation. Ultimately, Walt's model does not explain the Cold War history; in fact, the balance of threat model does not follow the expectations outlined in A1-A3 and is falsified.

The theory offered in this dissertation, by contrast, explains how and why states implement different responses to the emergence or alterations in both ideological threats, changes within the alliance itself, and the domestic politics within the alliance leader. The dynamics of containment model seeks to show the life-cycle of containment, as well as the re-adaptation of the containment measure to changes in the international system, both within and outside the alliance.

#### *Alternative Hypotheses*<sup>19</sup>

**A1:** The greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it.

**A2:** The nearer a powerful state, the greater the tendency for those nearby to align against it.

**A3:** The more aggressive a state's perceived intentions, the more likely others are to align against that state.

#### The Argument

This dissertation sets out to answer the question, how does the structure of the alliance accomplish this goal (i.e. what form of containment foreign policy does the output take)?

*External Conditions as the Independent Variable: How Do Alliance Structure Determine the Type of Containment Policy?*

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<sup>19</sup> The alternative hypotheses for this dissertation are taken from Stephen Walt's work on Balance of Threat. Please see Walt (1987): Chapter 2.

The research question that concerns this dissertation is what type of containment strategy is likely to be implemented. This dissertation will argue that the primary cause, the independent variable, will be that alliance structures and alliance concerns will largely determine what type of containment policy will be implemented. Additionally, domestic politics and structure will act as an intervening variable to either constrain or grant decision making autonomy to foreign policy elites and executives. Firstly, the type of available (or predicted) alliance dysfunction (especially the level of alliance cohesion) will heavily influence what type of containment grand strategy is feasible. These are, namely, (a) balancing; (b) intra-alliance bargaining; and (c) fear of abandonment.

Table 3: Alliance configuration determines the type of containment foreign policy

<b>Alliance Issue (IV)</b>	<b>Foreign Policy Strategy (DV)</b>
Balancing	Proto-Containment
Intra-alliance bargaining	Rollback
Fear of Abandonment	Rollback

The alliance structure, or predicted alliance concerns largely (IV) determine the type of containment strategy (DV) that is available to the alliance leader. (a) When the alliance is experiencing internal balancing, that is when there is significant intra-alliance opposition to the coalition leader, there is likely to be a foreign policy of proto-containment, due to the fact that there is not enough power within the alliance to fully implement active containment; (b) When coalition members intra-alliance bargain with the alliance leader, there is enough power in the coalition to (relatively) easily confront the target. Furthermore, the incentives are such that the offense has a greater cost/benefit payoff structure to join in a coalition that pushes the target back into its national boundaries. These offensive alliance incentives are expected to result in a rollback strategy; and (c) The fear of abandonment is likely to result in a rollback strategy, as an

offensive grand strategy demonstrates commitment and, therefore, eases the fears of abandonment.

### Model 2: Alliance Theory Determines Containment Form

Balancing (IV) --> Proto-containment (DV)

- Causal logic: Although states are balancing in accordance with the alliance leader, there is significant internal opposition (or concern or hesitation) that limits the alliance's power to forcibly contain the target. Therefore, the outcome is short of the full/traditional containment variant.

Intra-alliance bargaining (IV) --> Rollback (DV)

- Causal logic: When states intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, there is enough power in the coalition to easily confront the target.
- The incentives are such that offense has a greater payoff structure to join in a coalition pushing the target back into its national boundaries. Offensive alliance structures are expected under these conditions.

Fear of Abandonment (IV) --> Rollback (DV)

- Causal logic: Foreign policy needs to demonstrate commitment. Containment causes escalation, as formal defensive alliances are more costly. Strength of action, in this context, allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partners that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger partner will honour its promise to coalition members.

Table 4: Alliance Theory effect on containment strategies

Alliance Structure (IV)	Operationalization	Foreign Policy Output (DV)	Empirical Example(s)
Balancing (within the alliance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formation lag</li> <li>• Resistance to alliance leader</li> <li>• Free-riding</li> <li>• Buckpassing</li> <li>• Low support of leader in IOs</li> </ul>	Proto-Containment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Middle Cold War, NATO dissent with US policy (especially France)</li> <li>• US current proto-containment towards PRC</li> </ul>
Intra-alliance bargaining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alliance leader encounters little internal resistance</li> <li>• Support of leader in IOs</li> <li>• Buckpassing and free-riding are a possibility</li> <li>• Possibility of internal dissent</li> </ul>	Containment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early Cold War. NATO formation and America as the 'indispensible' nation</li> </ul>
Fear of Abandonment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Junior member petitions leader</li> <li>• Junior threatens to act unilaterally</li> <li>• Leader demonstrate commitment to outcome (fate-tying)</li> <li>• Leader demonstrates strength and resolve.</li> </ul>	Rollback	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Early Cold War</li> <li>• The Late Cold War</li> <li>• Taiwan Straits Crisis</li> <li>• Berlin Crisis US FOBs in Western Europe during early Cold War</li> </ul>

### Domestic Level Intervening Variables Shape Executive Constraint or Autonomy in the Availability of Foreign Policy Responses.

While an external stimulus largely determines the selection and form of containment as grand strategy, domestic politics plays a mitigating role in the ability of alliance leaders' executives to select its foreign policy. This is especially due to the amount of structural autonomy/constraint that the executive experiences. Structural autonomy, as an intervening variable, determines how much of an effect domestic opinion has on the decision maker's ability to implement the foreign policy strategy (s)he most prefers, or is the most optimal foreign policy given the external stimulus.

There are two intervening variables that effect foreign policy choices, namely: (1) legislative norms on the importance of foreign policy as an issue area; and (2) how much oversight on foreign policy is a norm within the legislature. When there is a legislative norm that places foreign policy in the highest issue-area position (IVV1), domestic opinion is likely to be stifled. Therefore, when foreign policy is not regarded as the most important issue, the effects of public opinion are at its strongest, making war averse or inflexibility effects the strongest in constraining foreign policy. Alternatively, when foreign policy is not viewed as a crucial issue area, we should expect to see the executive insulated from domestic opinion, leading grand strategy to correspond almost exclusively external stimuli. Lastly, the degree to which legislative oversight is a norm causes the executive to either enjoy autonomy (if the foreign policy oversight norms are strong) or constraint (when the norm of foreign policy oversight is high) in grand strategy selection. When foreign policy is subject to a low degree of legislative oversight, the executive enjoys decision-making autonomy and grand strategy corresponds to external stimuli. However, when there is a substantial degree of legislative oversight, the executive is constrained and foreign policy is also affected by an institutional political opposition. When the degree of

legislative oversight is high, congressional and/or senate is opposed to the executive's agenda. This usually occurs when the branches of government are divided (e.g. the executive branch and legislative branch belong to different political parties), however this need not be the case because the executive may find itself (at least theoretically) standing in opposition to the legislature in terms of agenda, but from the same political party. When there is a low degree of legislative oversight, the executive finds itself in an autonomous position and able to freely respond to external stimuli coming from the international system (e.g. alliance structures). This may occur in cases where the branches of government are unified (e.g. the legislative branch and executive branch are from the same political party) or in the case of divided government (e.g. when the legislative branch and the executive branch are from different political parties). What is important here for the independent variable to activate is whether or not the legislative branch stands in opposition to the executive branch's foreign policy agenda.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> It should be noted that IVV1 and IVV2 are exogenous variables meant for analysis with respect to its expected result. In other words, these intervening variables will tell us how autonomous or constrained the executive is through the historical domestic context. In this sense, the intervening variables in this model are not being tested, but analysed within the model's IV-DV framework.

Table 6: Domestic politics as intervening variable

Intervening Variable		Structural Autonomy Outcome
Legislative norms on the importance of foreign policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FP is the least important</li> <li>• FP is the most important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effects of public opinion is strongest, making war averse/inflexibility effects strongest</li> <li>• Executive is insulated and domestic opinion is stifled, leading FP to correspond to external stimuli</li> </ul>
Legislative Oversight (this tends to coincide with divided government, e.g. when the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch are from different political parties).	<p>Minor congressional oversight norm</p> <p>Major congressional oversight norm</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Executive is autonomous, FP corresponds to external stimuli</li> <li>• Executive is constrained, FP is affected by constellation of parochial interests</li> </ul>

Argument Summary

To summarize, this dissertation has two distinct research questions resulting in the models outlined above. Firstly, *when are states (and alliance coalitions) likely to implement a containment grand strategy?* The assumption for the model theorized in this dissertation is that states and alliance implement containment when two conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (1) the threat environment is characterized as "high"; and (2) large-scale armed conflict is likely to result in an unacceptable degree of destruction. The Cold War case studies fulfill these two conditions.

Secondly, *how do alliances select the appropriate containment foreign policy response?* In short, the level of alliance cohesion determines the strategic response for the alliance. The first predictive hypothesis to be tested in this dissertation is that intra-alliance balancing, that is when junior alliance partners oppose the alliance leader's preferred foreign policy response, and the coalition is likely to have the traditional Containment variant as the outcome. The second

predictive hypothesis is that weaker alliance members' fear of abandonment will likely cause a stronger alliance response, e.g. Roll Back. This is done to demonstrate commitment and fate-tying to convince the alliance that the alliance leader will honour its promise of support. The third predictive hypothesis that will be tested in this dissertation is that alliances that intra-alliance bargaining with the stronger partner will result in a strong, Rollback foreign policy strategy. This is because the power increase found in alliances that are most tightly unified. Furthermore, intra-alliance bargaining alliance partners, that is when smaller states acquiesce to the alliance leader, the latter will have few obstacles blocking its will and will likely, therefore, implement a strong strategic response, namely Roll Back.

There is a caveat to this model, however, and that is domestic politics may play a factor in mitigating what type of containment strategy is selected by the alliance leader. This comes in the form of two intervening variables, as domestic politics and institutions may either constrain or grant autonomy to foreign policy elites and executives, reshaping the availability of certain strategic responses. In the first intervening variable, the importance of legislative norms on the importance of foreign policy may play a role in constraining executive autonomy from selecting its most preferred foreign policy option. When this is the case, such as the early Post-War era or Vietnam War, conflict and security are certainly priorities for the Congress and the Public - therefore, public opinion sentiment may stymie a particularly aggressive foreign policy or reinforce the need for such measures.

Secondly, when legislative oversight is particularly strong as a norm, this may have a constraining effect on the executive's ability to implement its most preferred foreign policy option. Heightened legislative oversight tends to occur in divided branches (e.g. when the legislature and executive branches are controlled by different political parties), as opposed to

when the branches are unified (e.g. when the legislature and executive branches are controlled by the same political party). When this occurs, and the executive is unable to mitigate this opposition (e.g. by convincing the legislature that the executive's strategy is best, or out politicking the legislature), then the executive branch's autonomy to select its preferred strategy is constrained.

*Independent Variable: Institutional Oversight and Executive Autonomy*

**IVV1:** When foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance in the legislative branch, the executive will be constrained in selecting its most preferred foreign policy.

Foreign Policy is the most significant issue (IVV) --> Executive Constraint (DV)

When foreign policy is not the most important issue on the national agenda, the effects of public opinion are strongest, making war averse or inflexibility exerting its strongest influence on the executive. However, when foreign policy is (among) the most important issues on the national agenda, the executive will be insulated from domestic opinion, leading to a foreign policy that corresponds almost exclusively to external stimuli.

**IVV2:** When legislative-branch oversight on foreign policy is at its strongest, the executive will be constrained in selecting foreign policy.

Strong Foreign Policy Oversight (IVV) --> Executive Constraint (DV)

When there are minor congressional norms for foreign policy oversight, the executive is autonomous and foreign policy will correspond (almost) exclusively to external alliance and security stimuli. When there are major congressional norms of oversight, however, the executive is constrained and foreign policy is affected by a constellation of party politics.

## Literature Review

*“In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”* (George F. Kennan)<sup>21</sup>

### *Grand Strategy*

Following in the tradition of Clausewitz, grand strategy is necessarily ‘a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best “cause” security for itself.’<sup>22</sup> It is in this sphere that grand strategy identifies what potential threats the state may face and it devises political, economic, and military solutions to remedy these threats.<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, grand strategy must prioritize national goals since there are a large number of potential threats, given the anarchic nature of international system; furthermore, states are constrained by economic, technological, and manpower limitation: resources are scarce.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, grand strategies must devise the most pragmatic remedies and goals in order to advance the national interest and maximize national security.

### *Constructive Engagement Policy*

Constructive engagement likewise stems from neorealist assumptions about the international system. Also termed *selective engagement*, is a pacific foreign policy designed to preserve peaceful relations among states that possess "substantial industrial and military potential"<sup>25</sup> - e.g. Great Powers. Advocates of this policy recognize that states balance, especially

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<sup>21</sup> George F. Kennan (X) “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 4 (July 1947), p. 575.

<sup>22</sup> Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984): 13.

<sup>23</sup> Posen (1984): 13.

<sup>24</sup> Posen (1984): 13.

<sup>25</sup> Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-1997): 14; Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold

great powers of equal strength to stalemate each other. However, constructive engagement takes into account that "balancing may be tardy, statesmen may miscalculate, and nuclear deterrence could fail."<sup>26</sup> As a result, states that employ this grand strategy will be highly selective in where they will engage, placing resources where the consequences may be most serious.<sup>27</sup> Attempts will be made to balance early; although nuclear deterrence is likely, placing strategic forces in support of status quo powers with the intention of simplifying the calculations of a potential revisionist. With simplicity of calculations, according to neorealist scholars, peace is more likely to be preserved because most wars are started over miscalculations and misperceptions.<sup>28</sup>

Constructive engagement is premised on the conclusion that resources are finite and scarce, therefore it is not possible to "muster sufficient power and will to keep domestic and international peace worldwide."<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, constructive engagement seeks to perpetuate the state's relative power and values.<sup>30</sup> While it is inevitable that a great power will rise to challenge the existing international or regional order, this policy calls for suppressing rivals through the assertion of dominance within the engaging state's sphere of influence, particularly by embedding it in security and economic frameworks that are dominated by the status quo.<sup>31</sup>

Constructive engagement can be thought of as a form of detente. Detente is the "relaxation of tension between adversaries" and "grew out of the search for a balance of

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War," *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991): 5-53; Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 13, no. 2 (June 1990): 1-51; Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).

<sup>26</sup> Posen (1996-97):18; Art (1991): 45. See also, Jonathan Clarke, "Leaders and Followers," *Foreign Policy*, no. 101 (Winter 1995-96): 37-51.

<sup>27</sup> Posen (19956-97): 18.

<sup>28</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1954 [2001]); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

<sup>29</sup> Posen (1996-97): 18.

<sup>30</sup> Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 91.

<sup>31</sup> Layne (1997): 91.

power - and that balance could only be maintained on the basis of the cold calculations of *realpolitik* [during the Cold War]."<sup>32</sup> In *detente*, 'a pluralistic East-West security system'<sup>33</sup> in which the superpowers would normally compete to advance their national interests. The *detente* strategy, according to containment theory, would eventually alter the adversary's approach to international relations. Through interdependence and contact between the two great powers, the authoritarian superpower would begin to adopt the democratic norms and values of its adversary. As Peter Schlotter discusses Karl Deutsch:

"One precondition is absolutely necessary for a pluralistic security system; the basic values in the societies of the security system such as are important for political behaviour must be mutually compatible or at least they must not exclude each other."<sup>34</sup>

The *detente* strategy, according to theory, would bring about this compatibility of values. As the American-Soviet rivalry achieved something resembling relative parity in nuclear capability, with similar yields with the hydrogen thermonuclear bomb and comparable delivery systems (including range and second-strike survivability), the prospect of a nuclear war became a pressing concern.<sup>35</sup> The Cuban Missile Crisis saw the introduction of the "crisis hot line" between the White House and the Kremlin, and was utilized during the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967.<sup>36</sup> Both governments had a vested interest in preserving the immediate status quo: the United States wanted to curtail the USSR's expanding strategic nuclear forces by negotiating arms control during this period; the Soviets, since the Potsdam Conference, had sought to seek assurances that the NATO would not attempt to disrupt their control of

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<sup>32</sup> Gordon S. Barrass, *The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009): 151.

<sup>33</sup> Peter Schlotter, "Detente: Models and Strategies," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 20, no. 3 (Sep., 1983), p. 215

<sup>34</sup> Peter Schlotter, "Detente: Models and Strategies," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 20, no. 3 (Sep., 1983), p. 216

<sup>35</sup> Barrass: 151.

<sup>36</sup> Barrass: 151.

Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe.<sup>37</sup> According to Barrass, Soviet loss of prestige during the Arab-Israeli Six Day War, the splintering in the Communist world between the Kremlin and Mao Zedong added to the USSR's loss of prestige (as well as potentially a new dynamic in the balance of power: a possible tripolar system), as well as the economic stress the rising military expenditures created by the arms races of the 1960s for both the Americans and Soviets gave ample incentives to normalize diplomatic relations between East and West.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, as Brzezinski writes of the 'Nixon Doctrine' in 1971:

*Many traditional nations have regained their energy and their position in the world, the Communist bloc has become fractured, and at the same time a new relationship of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union has emerged. All of this compels a basic reassessment, all the more so since the war in Vietnam has prompted widespread domestic dissatisfaction with the scale, character, and thrust of American global involvement...dissatisfaction has reached such a level that the major danger today is no longer over-involvement but rather isolationist under-involvement. The President (Richard Nixon) thus sees himself engaged in an effort to strike a proper balance, correcting both the excesses of the past and the overreactions of the present.*<sup>39</sup>

From the Kremlin, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev displayed a willingness to be "consistent, could be open and convivial, disliked confrontation and wanted to keep East-West tension low... [while, like Khrushchev] was keen to make the Soviet Union the world's pre-eminent superpower."<sup>40</sup> However, unlike Stalin and Khrushchev, according to Anatoly Chernyaev, "Brezhnev genuinely believed in the possibility of making peace with the

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<sup>37</sup> Barrass: 151-2.

<sup>38</sup> Barrass: 152-3.

<sup>39</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon," *Foreign Policy*, No. 3 (Summer 1971): 4-5.

<sup>40</sup> Barrass: 154.

imperialists... [and was, therefore,] a driving force for detente."<sup>41</sup> With this departure in the Soviet leadership style, along with the loss of reputation, economic strain, and weakening position of the splintering Communist bloc, Brezhnev was able to insist that "peaceful coexistence" with Western Capitalist democracy did not necessarily pose a threat to undermine the "Soviet support for national liberation and class struggle."<sup>42</sup> Lastly, Brezhnev's willingness towards a detente doctrine was strategic, designed to weaken the Western capitalist world and "revitalize the 'socialist camp' that had been so badly damaged by the Sino-Soviet split."<sup>43</sup>

Detente can be thought of being comprised of two variants: (1) proactive; and (2) defensive. In the proactive formulation, which is most typical of constructive engagement, relative values (e.g. ideology) are pushed towards the targeted state. In the defensive variant, which is more akin to neo-isolationism, the status quo power defends against competing ideological values.

In the proactive variant of detente, there is an attempt to perpetuate compatible values and ideology towards the target state. In an attempt to transform the state towards ideological compatibility to lessen points of conflict, policies of cooperation and engagement are employed. An example of this can be seen in the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe between the United States and the USSR, culminating in the Helsinki Accords. In this case, the U.S. sought to relax tensions and push for human rights reforms and the introduction of American radio and media into the Soviet sphere of influence, which would insert values consistent with liberalism.

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<sup>41</sup> Anatoly Chernyaev quoted in Barrass: 154.

<sup>42</sup> Barrass: 154.

<sup>43</sup> Barrass: 154.

Alternatively, defensive detente or neo-isolationism seeks to retreat or disengage from a peer competitor. This grand strategy involves "a withdrawal from global security affairs and a restricted use of force, limited to guaranteeing" survival and securing territory.<sup>44</sup> In this strategy, the state retreats from alliance commitments with the goal of disentangling from strategic-military issues beyond its borders. This "cheap-riding" strategy may be pursued for a variety of reasons: reducing military budgets that come from a forward strategy, securing them from potential chinganging, or in response to allied free-riding (either perceived or actual).<sup>45</sup>

### *Containment Policy*

Containment theory flows from the defensive variant of structural realism, following the balance of power logic. The containment of a state, almost by definition cedes the initiative to the state being contained. The containment of a revisionist, or potentially revisionist state includes pushing them back when strides are made that would upset the current distribution of power in either the global or regional system. In essence, the status quo power's policy is to 'quarantine' the revisionist from spreading its interests, ideology, and influence in a sense similar to physiologically halting a 'contagion' from undermining the power of the stronger power. In effect, the status quo is isolating the revisionist until it breaks down internally, taking a confrontational approach only when the 'contagion' threatens to become transnational. Grand strategy within this approach would be to counter "enemy provocation at the location, time, and in the manner of its original occurrence, without surrendering, but also without setting off a wider war."<sup>46</sup> There is, however, a tacit acceptance that recognizing the opposing state as a revisionist power, as a member of the international system, and accept that outright military

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<sup>44</sup> Nuno P. Monteiro, *Theory of Unipolar Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 66.

<sup>45</sup> Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New U.S. Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014): 35-8.

<sup>46</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: Its past and Future," *International Security*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Spring, 1981), p.81.

destruction may be both unnecessary and excessive.<sup>47</sup> In other words, this acceptance transfers legitimation to the revisionist state.

Containment policy does not, however, immediately rule out military operations to counter the revisionist power that has exceeded its sphere of influence. The underlying background political, economic, and "psychological"<sup>48</sup> power may be used, and the use of force remains a necessary component of interstate diplomacy. At a National War College speech in 1946, George Kennan said to the audience that "you have no idea...how much it contributes to the general politeness of and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a quiet armed force [sic] in the background."<sup>49</sup> Military capabilities and contingencies may not be the primary driving mechanism of diplomacy; instead it determines which state has escalation dominance.

Partially underlining containment is a confrontational psychological element. The penultimate goal was "to produce in the minds of potential adversaries, as well as potential allies...attitudes that would facilitate the emergence of an international order more favourable to the interests of the United States."<sup>50</sup> The argument is that the revisionist power would come to adopt liberal democratic attitudes over time. Furthermore, containment policy establishes a framework that reduces the transaction costs of coalition building for even the most difficult alliance structure, for both the long term and durable arrangements. An example of this is the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was built to contain the Soviet Union, which proved durable beyond the immediate post-war threat during the Berlin Crisis.

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<sup>47</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford University Press, New York: 1982, 2005), p. 39.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37-8.

The traditional containment model argues that ideological transformation occurs at the domestic level. In cases where containment has an ideological dimension (such as during the Cold War), the non-commensurability of democratic-authoritarian (or even non-democratic) regimes can be problematic, especially if the status quo is democratic. The non-commensurability of regime type produces an “innate antagonism,”<sup>51</sup> in which the status quo power views the non-democratic state as operating in secrecy, lacking honesty, “duplicitous”, suspicious, and with a “basic unfriendliness of purpose.”<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, because the non-democratic revisionist power is an inherently illegitimate political system by this logic, a popular uprising will occur and transform the state from within, given an appropriate amount of time.

Contextually, containment policy is an exercise in patience. Given the argument that internal transformation is inherently unavoidable, the status quo power need not embark on aggressive policies to overturn the non-democratic regime. As Kennan argues that “it would be an exaggeration” to say that democratic great power “unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over” the non-democratic state and induce its collapse.<sup>53</sup> Ultimately, a more appropriate grand strategy seeks to maintain equilibrium in the balance of power and domestic politics will erode the opposition over time.

The status quo ultimately accepts the revisionist state’s share in the distribution of power and there is a tacit willingness to engage with the adversary; it is only during periods in which the revisionist state attempts to push beyond their sphere of influence and alter the balance of power that a direct (or proxy) military response will be warranted. Alternatively, the status quo may seek a violent redistribution of relative power or bides time until a third pole emerges, or, failing this, awaits fragmentation in the adversary's coalition.

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<sup>51</sup> George Kennan (X), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 4, (Jul., 1947), p. 572.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

### *Variants of Containment*

Containment should not be considered a monolithic grand strategy. While this approach to foreign policy was broadly outlined by George Kennan in 1947, there have been subsequent attempts to disaggregate containment into variations on the strategy, namely *global containment* and *finite (or partial) containment*. Containment, however, is not a singular concept, as several variants of this grand strategy have been utilized by foreign policy makers.

### *Finite Containment*

This version is the most traditional variant of the containment grand strategy, as advocated by George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans Morgenthau.<sup>54</sup> This is the form of containment as outlined above, whereby the United States exercised a grand strategy during the Cold War with the goal of containing the Soviet Union from directly expanding "on the Eurasian landmass."<sup>55</sup>

A finite containment strategy is not reducible to a perpetuation of the status quo, but also advocates preventing expansion limited to areas that Kennan was to identify as "key centers of industrial power."<sup>56</sup> As Walt argues, this grand strategy advocates a rejection of a substantial projection of military power into the third world, as would those who purport a policy of *Rollback*<sup>57</sup> (which will be outlined below). Furthermore, a policy of finite containment would not require a "global crusade" against a rival ideology, as would be proposed by rollback.<sup>58</sup> Lastly, an advocate of finite containment would allow a status quo state to maintain power projection on

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<sup>54</sup> See George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954): 63-5; Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown, 1943): 108-113; Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1982 [1951]): 5-7; Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1942);

<sup>55</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989): 9.

<sup>56</sup> Walt (1989): 10.

<sup>57</sup> Walt (1989): 10.

<sup>58</sup> Walt (1989): 10.

a large scale, with global military power, however this grand strategy would also allow for reductions in military capabilities, as the burdens of systemic maintenance will ultimately weaken the state.<sup>59</sup>

### *Rollback*

An explanation of rollback is proposed by the offensive realists. Whereas containment seeks to maintain the equilibrium in the balance of power (at least in the short term), rollback seeks to actively confront the opposing superpower and push it back in a bid for hegemony.

The goal of rollback is the maximization of accumulative power, or the creation of neutral powers (such as the U.S. encouraging the People's Republic of China and Yugoslavia to move away from the Soviet sphere of influence). As argued by Mearsheimer, and stated above, "offensive realists...believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system."<sup>60</sup>

If the opposing great power has extended itself beyond its territorial borders (e.g. in a sphere of influence), then rollback requires that the state be pushed back into their national borders. While containment accepts balance of power logic and only pushes back when there is an alteration in the equilibrium of the system, rollback will not tolerate the opposing great power to have exogenous influence. However, it must be noted that there is a loss of strength gradient that comes with military action. According to Boulding,<sup>61</sup> "the perceived dangers of

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<sup>59</sup> Walt (1989): 10.

<sup>60</sup> John J. Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company: 2001): 21

<sup>61</sup> Boulding is discussing hypothetical, that is some unnamed state considering military adventurism in the Middle East in order of securing oil and other natural resources. However, Boulding's observation here is generalizable to

military intervention seem to have created a situation where the strength of the system has been greater than the strain, though at one or two moments we seem to have come perilously close to the phase boundary."<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, Boulding articulates his theory of "loss-of-strength gradient:"

A system of unconditional viability is only possible if each organization [e.g. state] is stronger than any other or any reasonable combination of others. This paradoxical result is attainable if the organizations [e.g. states] are far enough apart and if their strength, that is, their threat capability, diminishes rapidly enough for each one as he goes away from home, that is, if there is what I call a high loss-of-strength gradient. A system of stable unconditional viability is threatened either by an increase in the number of organizations [e.g. actors] in a given field or by diminution of the loss-of-strength gradient. The less the loss-of-strength gradient, the fewer organizations can coexist is unconditional viability.<sup>63</sup> In effect, Boulding notes that it would be wise to remember that the use of strength is subject to the laws of diminishing returns and anything expended beyond that event horizon is likely to result in a loss of their overall strength.

Containment theory argues that the change will occur at the domestic level, thus weakening the opposing great power. Rollback is strictly a relative power calculation and pure competition between the great powers. As such, a policy consistent with this theory would be to engage the adversary in minor conflict so that it is no longer profitable to retain

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the idea that military action, especially when it takes the form of adventurism, is likely to provoke a loss of gradient strength for the attacking force.

<sup>62</sup> Kenneth E. Boulding, *Stable Peace* (University of Texas Press, 1978): 62.

<sup>63</sup> Kenneth E. Boulding, "Towards a Pure Theory of Threat Systems," *the American Economic Review*, vol. 53, no. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May 1963): 431.

its sphere of influence; it becomes too costly to defend exogenous territory under these conditions.

It is at this point that the rival great power has been pushed back into its national territory; the prediction is that the successful state has achieved primacy. This occurs because the great power that has been 'rolled back' and no longer has access to the resources that used to be within its spheres of influence, and has been weakened to such an extent that their opposition may now push for hegemony (if the adversary is not already the hegemon at this stage). This is desirable because the weakened regime will no longer be a threat because: (1) the state will no longer be able to draw resources (raw material as well as manpower) from satellite states (which the state no longer has access to now that military means have eroded, as well as the built up resentment from occupation makes it unlikely that the former satellite state would retain a working relationship with its superpower); and (2) the state is no longer focused on external expansion, as their attention has become inward-looking during political upheaval. The net effect of such a complete re-ordering of a state's political system will last for several years. The state that has engaged these policies will no longer be challenged, thus achieving primacy.

### *Global Containment*

According to this variant of a containment grand strategy, the status quo power would commit to an expansive and active foreign policy. In the case of a revision power having sufficient capability to assert itself beyond any local geopolitical region, the status quo would seek to contain the revisionist or its allies on a global basis. Furthermore, advocates of a global containment grand strategy view many challenges across the globe as potential threats to the status quo's relative position in the international system and, therefore, requires increasingly

large military capabilities and power projection, as well as a willingness to use force to achieve foreign policy objectives.<sup>64</sup> However, this variant of grand strategy hinges on "ideological preferences rather than an overriding concern for military security."<sup>65</sup> In this conceptualization of containment, it is not simply the halting and isolation of a competing ideology or sphere of influence, but the elimination of the adversary as a "significant political force."<sup>66</sup>

In this global containment strategy [or on the basis of] that the United States pushed back against expansions of Marxist spheres of influence, forcing them back within Soviet national borders. The policies included in this 'global' containment strategy included incidences of the Reagan administration giving support to the anti-communist guerrillas, such as the Nicaraguan *contras*,<sup>67</sup> Cambodia in the 1980s, Grenada 1983, Ethiopia during the 1980s, and the *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

### ***Alliance Theory***

#### *Balancing*

Balancing behaviour is the cornerstone of balance of power theory (see below). If any state becomes too powerful, that is, able to threaten domination of the system, defensive realists predict that balancing will occur. In other words, states will engage in either internal balancing or external balancing; states will often increase their military capability to confront and resist the systemic challenger (also known as the revisionist power). This is what is known as internal balancing. In external balancing, states will form alliances, or *balancing coalitions* that will

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<sup>64</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989): 8. See also: Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security* (Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger, 1982); Aaron Wildavsky, ed., *Beyond Containment: Alternative American Policies Toward the Soviet Union* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983); Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, *Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], January 1988); Colin S. Gray, *Geopolitics of Super Power* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1988).

<sup>65</sup> Walt (1989): 9

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

oppose the revisionist power. Defensive realists believe that balancing behaviour is the standard response to systemic threats.

### *Intra-alliance bargaining*

Intra-alliance bargaining is an alternative strategy to balancing, whereby the state allies *with* the more powerful or threatening state. This may be done for multiple reasons. On the one hand, a state may intra-alliance bargain with a more powerful partner in the hopes of continued benign intent. In this scenario, the intra-alliance bargaining state recognizes that it has little hope in confronting the more powerful. Alternatively, *jackal intra-alliance bargaining* occurs when a state aligns with a dominant partner in the hopes of sharing in the benefits associated with victory in the post-war.

### *Fear of Abandonment*

In the anarchic world of international relations seen through the prism of realism, states exist in system without a hierarchical ruling power, as well as in a world where enforcement mechanisms simply do not exist that are capable of compelling states to honour their alliance/deterrent commitments. While internal balancing is much more dependable during an international incident, military build up is very expensive and states must also rely on external balancing, e.g. countries form alliances.

However, given that an anarchic international system is primarily a self-help one, states cannot be assured that their coalition partners will come to their aid in a given security crisis. Would the United States risk a nuclear war with the Peoples' Republic of China to fulfill its alliance commitment to Taiwan? During the Cold War, would the United States potentially sacrifice Washington, D.C. to protect Berlin from Soviet invasion? These questions are at the

heart of the issue. Since the fear of abandonment is essentially a commitment and credibility issue, a state that guarantees a security commitment to another must demonstrate resolve, often in the form (but not limited to) of ensuring a shared fate (the U.S. would be pulled into a war to defend its West German allies if American troops were to die alongside Germans in a Soviet attack on Berlin – the West German Chancellor was satisfied by Washington’s demonstration of commitment with this fate-tying exercise).

### Conclusion

Containment policy has been the dominant grand strategy doctrine of the United States since the earliest days of the Cold War. Containment was written by George Kennan in the "long telegram" and his famous 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article under a pseudonym, adopted by the Policy Planning Staff, and implemented by the State Department. Being the defining foreign policy by the United States, it has been dissected, analysed, and commented upon by decision makers, policy makers, political commentators, and academics more than any grand strategy.

Containment has taken on various forms since Kennan's article: under the Harry S. Truman administration, there was the traditional variant as outlined in the 1947 article; the Dwight D. Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan administration formulated a more aggressive implementation known as Rollback; the Barack Obama administration thought of the Containment towards the People's Republic of China as a sort of Containment-in-Waiting (what I term proto-Containment), which sets the chess pieces in place should this strategy become necessary should a rising power develop revisionist ambitions.

While Containment has been a mainstay topic of discussion in both domestic and international relations literature, there is no "theory" of Containment as a foreign policy. There has been a dearth in the literature with respect to two surprising aspects: (1) when is Containment

likely to be implemented, and (2) what form it is likely given to take. Stated another way, the research questions that are of central concern to this dissertation are: (1) When are states most likely to implement a grand strategy of Containment? (2) What form of Containment is likely, given the structural alliance configuration of the coalition and the domestic political and institutional constraints (or autonomy) of the senior alliance partner?

To answer the first research question, the expected findings of this dissertation is that a Containment grand strategy is likely when two variables combine (in an additive nature): the threat environment is categorized as 'high' and when the cost of war is prohibitively 'high' or 'risky.' If the threat environment variable is classified as 'high,' it may contain contentious territorial disputes, security and military considerations are placed on a hierarchy and are deemed to be more significant than other issues (such as trade), offensive military capabilities are prominent (and therefore Jervis' Security Dilemma is a crucial consideration), and/or when foreign policy decision makers perceive that the targeted state has hostile intentions. When the cost of war variable is 'high' or 'risky,' offensive/defensive doctrines and postures may be indistinguishable (another prominent consideration of Jervis' Security Dilemma), the opponent's military capability is either equal or greater, and/or the general population is war averse. When these two variables combine, they create an outcome where decisionmakers are compelled to consider a foreign policy where engagement and war are inappropriate strategies for implementation. The expected result is a range of Containment options, running the spectrum from: (1) proto-containment, where the conditions are structured so that Containment may be implemented in the near future; (2) Containment in the 1947 traditional variety; or (3) Rollback, which is implemented to coerce the targeted state to a previously held relative power position, or to retreat to either national or regional boundaries.

The selection of the specific Containment option is expected to be heavily dependent, and largely deterministic, upon the alliance structure that is available to the coalition. Alliance cohesion is expected to heavily determine the ability of a state or coalition to contain an adversary, and therefore determines what form Containment is feasible to implement. These are: (a) intra-alliance balancing; (b) intra-alliance bargaining; and (c) the fear of abandonment. The majority of this dissertation will be dedicated to test how these coalition structures will determine what form Containment is likely to take.

Lastly, international politics, especially foreign policy decision making, does not occur in a vacuum. Therefore, domestic political and institutional constraints (and grants of autonomy) will be the *intervening variable*, which may cause deviation between the external variable (alliance cohesion) and the dependent variable (Containment foreign policy). This is due to the fact that domestic politics and institutions may either limit or grant freedom to the alliance leaders' executive foreign policy decision makers' ability to select an appropriate grand strategy output. Utilizing domestic politics and institutions as an intervening variable is drawn from the neoclassical realist tradition, where the structure of the international system is the main explanatory variable, but internal politics at the domestic level may indeed play an important role in the ability of foreign policy decisionmakers' to implement a grand strategy that they consider to be optimal. This is, largely, due to the amount of institutional and political autonomy or constraint that the executive branch experiences within the state.

In this dissertation, institutional and political constraints that have an intervening effect on foreign policy outcome are: (IVV1) legislative norms about the importance of foreign policy, and (IVV2) whether or not legislative oversight is present to a major or minor degree.

This project is significant in demonstrating that Containment, as a grand strategy, extends well beyond the twentieth century historical record, as well as not being limited to the American foreign policy context. Once this American-centric view of Containment is opened up beyond this context-specific lens, it becomes possible to build a theory of Containment. This will lead to a better understanding as to how and when Containment is implemented. Additionally, it is the hope of this dissertation that a nuanced understanding of Containment as a theory will ultimately give foreign policy decision makers an additional strategic option between engagement and war between an adversaries.

### **Chapter 3: Methodology**

#### *Methods of Analysis*

This dissertation will rely on qualitative methods, focusing on case studies. The qualitative method of utilizing case studies provides the research with a high degree of internal validity, assessing the causal mechanism pathways associated with the phenomena under investigation, as well as looking at heterogeneous case studies.<sup>68</sup> Qualitative case study method is particularly necessary here, as the causal factors and, indeed, the case studies themselves will be decidedly heterogeneous. In terms of causal factors, this dissertation will establish the effect of differing alliance issues and structures (such as coalition size, coalition type - intra-alliance bargaining versus balancing, as well as alliance issues such as dysfunctional buckpassing and free riding, and the fear of abandonment. Similarly, very different case studies will be examined. It would be difficult to control for spurious statistical variables in cases as heterogeneous as Napoleonic France, the pre-war and post-war United States, the United States operating in a bipolar and unipolar international system (in different case studies, of course), Wilhelmine and Bismarckian Germany, and the Arab League. Furthermore, with the intervening variable of the domestic political effect on foreign policy strategy, these heterogeneous cases would be very difficult to compare statistically, given the large variation in regime type. This is further appropriate, especially given the theory generation goal of this research project, as well as assessing the different conditions under which different types of Containment are likely to occur. Furthermore, as Gerring notes, case studies are particularly important when studying complex causal mechanisms, which is likely to be evident in this project.<sup>69</sup> Similarly, Brady, Collier, and Seawright note that large-n statistical analysis has difficulty making valid inferences about the

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<sup>68</sup> John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 43-63.

<sup>69</sup> Gerring (2006), *Ibid.*

highly complex causal processes on the basis of data-set type observations, which is what this dissertation expects to encounter.<sup>70</sup> This project is likely to result in highly complex relationships, dealing with both external stimuli in the alliance structures, international security environment, and domestic politics as an intervening variable.

In determining whether quantitative or qualitative methods are more appropriate for this dissertation, it is important to note Gerring's analysis that the researcher must decide the scope of proposition: deep versus broad. He argues that qualitative case study methods offer intensive and deep analysis, whereas quantitative large-n statistical analysis offers extensive breadth.<sup>71</sup> Utilizing qualitative case study analysis would allow the researcher to incorporate crucial historical contextual analysis in assessing causal links to foreign policy decisions.

Additionally, the universe of cases in which a strategy of Containment is used is insufficient to take a large-n, quantitative approach. While the argument of this dissertation stems from the point that Containment occurs more often (and further back historically) than has been recognized by scholarship, the number of cases would not allow for anything approaching a law-like generalization.<sup>72</sup> Echoing Przeworski and Teune, Gerring notes that the distribution of evidence should be a key determining factor in choosing quantitative versus qualitative. This is known as the rare versus common distribution of "useful variation." If "useful variation" is relatively rare, such (e.g. limited to a few number of cases), which is relevant for the number of cases involving the implementation of Containment policy, small-n case studies are most appropriate.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> David Collier, Henry Brady and Jason Seawright, "Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology" in Brady and Collier, eds. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1994).

<sup>71</sup> Gerring (2006)

<sup>72</sup> Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry: Comparative Studies in Behavioral Science* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970): 25.

<sup>73</sup> Gerring (2006).

According to Collier, Brady and Seawright, the quantitative framework in which we find "data-set observations lend themselves to statistical tests within the framework of what we have called 'thin analysis,' causal-process observations offer an alternative source of inferential leverage through 'thick analysis.'"<sup>74</sup> Especially when assessing potential multicausal mechanisms, such as the international system, alliance structures and issues, as well as domestic political constraints a so-called 'thick analysis' is particularly beneficial.

As this is a dissertation that is, in large part, theory-building, qualitative case studies offers several very important opportunity, as noted by George and Bennett. (1) the ability to model and assess highly complex causal relationships (which was discussed previously); (2) the exploration of causal mechanisms without leaving out historical contextualization and intervening variables, whereas statistical analyses omit these contextual issues (with the exception of the ones that are coded in the variables selected); (3) the ability to derive new hypotheses. Qualitative case studies are able to identify new variables via the study of outlier and deviant cases during the analysis process, while large-n studies are do not have a clear way for the identification of new hypotheses.<sup>75</sup>

Furthermore, this dissertation largely focuses on process tracing methods to test the causal effect of variables on the dependent variable. According to George and Bennett, process tracing techniques offers researchers a way to identify the causal steps in a process leading to the outcome under investigation, along with taking into consideration particularistic historical contexts.<sup>76</sup> This will allow the researcher the ability to take into account the various causal

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<sup>74</sup> David Collier, Henry Brady and Jason Seawright, "Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology" in Brady and Collier, eds. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1994): 252.

<sup>75</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004).

<sup>76</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004).

pathways and processes leading to foreign policy output, as well as taking into consideration historical factors that may have had a significant effect on the outcome.

Firstly, *textual analysis*<sup>77</sup> will be a major method in the analysis of this dissertation. Through identifying the main scholastic work that addresses foreign policy of the type that is relevant to this work, historical context, key data points will be assessed with the falsifiable hypotheses and indicators outlined below. Key data points will consist of (but not limited to), the empirical analysis of the international systemic (and regional) issues taking place at the time of the case study. Secondly, data points will be drawn from the analysis of the alliance structure (and the intra-alliance issues within the coalition) that may be a crucial causal variable in the determining whether or not the foreign policy output of Containment (and what variant thereof) occurred. Lastly, domestic political constraints will be assessed where relevant; that is, when the domestic political structure and climate is a significant factor within the country under observation in the case study. Data points will be drawn from two sources: (1) utilizing secondary sources to glean the raw data from historical texts and case studies; and (2) the utilization of primary sources in order to analyse policy statements and doctrines, memoranda addressing foreign and domestic policy/political concerns (as well as potential motivations expressed by foreign policy elites), and institutional debates outlining the aforementioned process tracing techniques advocated by George and Bennett. This dissertation will make use of open source documents, which are documents that were publicly available at the time of the case. There are limitations to this type of source. As elaborated upon below, decisionmakers and policy elites will hedge their statements when they are consumable by the public. They are of use, however, as "open sources are particular interest when they record a line of argument at

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<sup>77</sup> Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006): 58-60.

odds with what you think people at the time probably wanted to hear - when, for example, a policy maker pushes the envelope a bit and runs a certain political risk by taking a certain line in public."<sup>78</sup> This type of source is expected to be of particular utility when assessing the intervening variable of domestic political and institutional constraint. The falsifiable hypotheses and indicators that will structure this process are elaborated upon in the following section.

Much of this dissertation will make use of *primary source documents*. According to Trachtenberg, "the documentary record - the body of material generated at the time and kept under wraps for many years - is far and away the best source there is. Yes, you sometimes need to read the open sources - that is, the sort of material that entered the public record at the time - but you can't be too quick to take what someone said in public as representative of his or her real thinking... [When speaking in public] they know what constitutes acceptable public discourse...they know they cannot be too frank."<sup>79</sup> These documents will be analysed, by and large, via the process training method discussed above and elaborated more specifically here. In terms of guiding the search through the archives available, certain central questions are useful to keep in mind. Trachtenberg advocates keep in mind "the basic *story*,"<sup>80</sup> meaning: what are the goals and motivations within the alliance and by the alliance members that are affecting policy output? What foreign policy are the coalition and/or the foreign policy elite of senior state favoring? What is the thinking is guiding the foreign policy as articulated by the elites and advisors, as evidenced by the debates, memoranda, minutes of various council meetings? What sort of foreign policy is being pursued initially? Did it need to be altered or changed? What were

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<sup>78</sup> Trachtenberg (2006): 154.

<sup>79</sup> Trachtenberg (2006): 153.

<sup>80</sup> Trachtenberg (2006): 141.

the reasons expressed for those alterations and changes -- what considerations led up to this reappraisal of how foreign policy would be implemented?<sup>81</sup>

Trachtenberg has some suggestions on assessing the reliability of certain primary sources: multi-archival work, which allows the researcher "to get more than one record of the same meeting. As you do the comparisons, you not only arrive at conclusions about the reliability of the specific accounts you examined but also reach general conclusions about the reliability of particular kinds of sources."<sup>82</sup> This is a safeguard against minutes, debates, and memorandum that *a priori* seem to be outlier data. Additionally, comparing "these accounts, you get a fairly clear sense for what the gist of the discussion was."<sup>83</sup> This is also important if the primary source is a memoir or bibliographical in nature, or deviations between minutes and transcripts. Furthermore, multi-archival research is particularly important in the textual analysis of foreign policy. This is because, as Trachtenberg (and many others including Putnam) have pointed out, foreign policy occupies a two-level game. What is meant by this is that "on the one hand, they [foreign policy elites] live in the world of international politics. They're more exposed to the realities of international politics than most of their compatriots are, so they're under a certain pressure to adjust their thinking to the realities of that world. But they also live in the world of domestic politics and thus need to defend their policies to people at home, people who are more shielded from the realities of the international system than they are and who thus tend to approach foreign policy in a more parochial way - that is, people whose approach to foreign policy is more rooted in the values of their own national culture."<sup>84</sup> Said another way, "the rhetoric they adopt, in other words, corresponds to what the public expects to hear and does not

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<sup>81</sup> These questions are based on Trachtenberg (2006): 140-2 and adapted for the specific scope of this project.

<sup>82</sup> Trachtenberg (2006): 147-150.

<sup>83</sup> Trachtenberg (2006): 150.

<sup>84</sup> Trachtenberg (2006): 153.

necessarily reflect the real thinking of the policy maker...The real thinking is more likely to be revealed by what people say in private, as recorded in documents they believe will not become publicly available for many years."<sup>85</sup>

### *Hypotheses and Indicators*

#### *Independent Variables: Alliance Cohesion and Foreign Policy*

**H1:** If the junior partners in the alliance are balancing against the coalition leader, a Proto-Containment strategy is the most likely outcome.

Balancing (IV) --> Proto-containment (DV)

- Causal logic: Although states are balancing in accordance with the alliance leader, there is significant internal opposition (or concern or hesitation) that limits the alliance's power to forcibly contain the target. Therefore, the outcome is short of the full/traditional containment variant.

**H2:** If the junior partners are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome.

Jackal Intra-alliance bargaining (IV) --> Rollback (DV)

- Causal logic: When states intra-alliance bargain with the alliance leader, there is enough power in the coalition to easily confront the target.
- The incentives are such that offense has a greater payoff structure to join in a coalition pushing the target back into its national boundaries. Offensive alliance structures are expected under these conditions.

**H3:** If the junior partners of the coalition bloc are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome.

Fear of Abandonment (IV) --> Rollback (DV)

- Causal logic: Foreign policy needs to demonstrate commitment. Containment causes escalation, as formal defensive alliances are more costly. Strength of action, in this context, allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partners that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger partner will honour its promise to coalition members.

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<sup>85</sup> Trachtenberg (2006): 153-4.

*Intervening Variables: Domestic Institutions and Executive Constraint*<sup>86</sup>

**IVV1:** When foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance in the legislative branch, the executive will be constrained in selecting its most preferred foreign policy.

Foreign Policy is the most significant issue (IVV) --> Executive Constraint (DV)

When foreign policy is not the most important issue on the national agenda, the effects of public opinion are strongest, making war averse or inflexibility exerting its strongest influence on the executive. However, when foreign policy is (among) the most important issues on the national agenda, the executive will be insulated from domestic opinion, leading to a foreign policy that corresponds almost exclusively to external stimuli.

**IVV2:** When legislative-branch oversight on foreign policy is at its strongest, the executive will be constrained in selecting foreign policy.

Strong Foreign Policy Oversight (IVV) --> Executive Constraint (DV)

When there are minor congressional norms for foreign policy oversight, the executive is autonomous and foreign policy will correspond (almost) exclusively to external alliance and security stimuli. When there are major congressional norms of oversight, however, the executive is constrained and foreign policy is affected by a constellation of party politics.

*Alternative Hypotheses*<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> It should be noted that IVV1 and IVV2 are exogenous variables meant for analysis with respect to its expected result. In other words, these intervening variables will tell us how autonomous or constrained the executive is through the historical domestic context. In this sense, the intervening variables in this model are not being tested, but analysed within the model's IV-DV framework.

**A1:** The greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it.

**A2:** The nearer a powerful state, the greater the tendency for those nearby to align against it.

**A3:** The more aggressive a state's perceived intentions, the more likely others are to align against that state.

### *Case Selection*

The case studies included in this dissertation will be drawn primarily to test the second model, namely how alliance structure and coalition issues will determine the type of containment strategy that was implemented. In selecting the cases, there were several motivations that were considered.

Firstly, an *a priori* assessment was made to determine whether or not the case selected was an instance of containment. Given that this project is specifically designed to develop and build a theory of containment, it was appropriate to select cases where this is the foreign policy output. However, to avoid selection bias, the cases were selected based on the independent variable (i.e. alliance structure and intra-coalition issues), however the relationship between the independent and dependent variable (i.e. the causal effect between the alliance structure and the containment output) were not assessed during case selection.

Secondly, given that alliance politics is the main causal variable for the research question and subsequent model, it was important to select cases that included a range of coalition structures and intra-alliance issues. Specifically, case studies in which the alliance is suffering from cohesion-related issues, e.g. intra-alliance balancing (i.e. junior alliance partners opposing

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<sup>87</sup> The alternative hypotheses for this dissertation are taken from Stephen Walt's work on Balance of Threat. Please see Walt (1987): Chapter 2.

the agenda of the bloc leader), fear of abandonment, and intra-alliance bargaining (i.e. junior alliance partners fall in line with that of the strongest member of the coalition). Therefore, selecting on the independent variable allowed me to control for selection bias as much as possible (instead of a preliminary assessment that a particular alliance structure/issue historically led to the expected foreign policy output). As such, variations with respect to the typology coalition variables are represented.

Table 7: Case Study Selection based on the Independent Variable.

Case Study	Independent Variable (i.e. Alliance Cohesion)
Early Cold War I: Harry S. Truman	Intra-alliance bargaining; Fear of Abandonment
Early Cold War II: Dwight Eisenhower	Intra-alliance bargaining; Fear of Abandonment
Middle Cold War: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon	Intra-Alliance balancing
Late Cold War I: Jimmy Carter	Balancing; Fear of Abandonment
Late Cold War II: Ronald Reagan	Balancing; Fear of Abandonment

The Cold War is the prototypical, most obvious case to begin a discussion on Containment Foreign Policy strategies. In fact, it makes sense to test this model against the Cold War historical record as a crucial case. From the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Western European countries looked to tie America's fate to that of the Continent. The United States, in turn, looked to ascend to a position of dominant leadership, firmly locking in Western Europe to its sphere of influence and blocking any Soviet recidivism into communism. Fissures, however, soon opened which threatened to undercut NATO cohesion. As

nuclear strategy and sharing was opened to NATO planning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, tensions and fissures in the alliance began to appear. While the Anglo-American special relationship allowed for nuclear sharing, other alliance partners came to view this as "Anglo-Saxon hegemony."<sup>88</sup> As a result of this special treatment, France took steps to develop a national nuclear deterrent in *force-de-frappe* to balance Anglo-American influence. Within the Cold War case studies, we find a high degree of variation with respect to the independent variables (e.g. alliance cohesion), as well as diversity of outcome: a longitudinal range from proto-containment, traditional containment, and roll back foreign policy strategies. This makes the Cold War a crucial case from which to study alliance cohesion's impact on coalition foreign policy outcomes, while making sure to include a high degree of variation between discrete cases, but casting some attention to changes over time.

While the Cold War was characterized by a high threat environment and high risk of destructive war, NATO members may be seen to be reticent to defect from the American pole, especially given the crucial importance of foreign policy as an issue area for Western states and a high degree of legislative oversight constricting decision-makers in the United States. Even early on (as we shall see), there were schisms within the alliance from the Cold War. Under the Eisenhower administration, the blockade of Berlin threatened to draw West Germany closer towards the Soviets; France's Charles de Gaulle flirted with the USSR as early as the Kennedy presidency; and France, Italy, and West Germany considered splintering from NATO's multinational nuclear structure led by the United States and almost formed its own bloc along the lines of a national deterrent structure. Alternatively, Western states were forced to prioritize security policies as paramount. NATO members, therefore, would be very hard-pressed to

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<sup>88</sup> Jan Melissen. 1994. "Nuclearizing NATO, 1957-1959: The 'Anglo-Saxons', Nuclear Sharing and the Fourth Country Problem,' *Review of International Studies* 20(3): 254.

abandon the coalition, even during very unpopular and adventurous foreign policy excursions, such as Vietnam. What occurred, as a result of this is junior alliance members grumbling, but not hard balancing against the United States.<sup>89</sup>

The growing consensus among western policy makers by the end of the Truman administration was that once NATO's nuclear monopoly was coming to an end, the strategic balance would shift in Moscow's favour. According to National Security Council (NSC) 68, policymakers "believed that America's atomic monopoly was the one thing that had balanced Soviet superiority in ground forces; the concern was, therefore, that with growing Soviet atomic capabilities, America's nuclear edge was being neutralized more rapidly than conventional forces could be created to fill the gap: hence the sense of a danger zone."<sup>90</sup> The authors of NSC 68, furthermore, were predicting that the first age of American primacy was quickly coming to an, as early as 1954:

It is estimated that, within the next four years, the USSR will attain the capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the United States, provided it strikes a surprise blow and provided further that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than we now have programmed. Such a blow could so seriously damage the United States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential.<sup>91</sup>

Eisenhower's presidency began in this strategic context. In addition to the bipolar strategic assessment of NSC 68 under Truman, French, Italian, and West German alliance members were strongly considering partial defection from NATO central command. This primarily took the form of national nuclear weapons programs outside of the alliance and without

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<sup>89</sup> Robert A. Pape. 2005. "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30(1) : 21

<sup>90</sup> Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," *International Security*, vol. 13, no. 3 (Winter, 1988-1989): 11-12.

<sup>91</sup> National Security Council, 14 April 1950. NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>. Accessed 4 May 2016.

American influence. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conceived the 'New Look' grand strategy, as outlined in NSC 162/2. According to the document:

The coalition also suffers from certain other weaknesses and dilemmas. A major weakness is the instability of the governments of certain NATO partners, such as Italy and France...Moreover, allied opinion, especially in Europe, has become less willing to follow U.S. leadership. Many Europeans fear that American policies, particularly in the Far East, may involve Europe in general war, or will indefinitely prolong cold-war tensions. Many consider U.S. attitudes toward the Soviets as too rigid and unyielding and, at the same time, as unstable, holding risks ranging from preventive war and "liberation" to withdrawal into isolation. Many consider that these policies will fail to reflect the perspective and confidence expected in the leadership of a great nation, and reflect too great a pre-occupation with anti-communism.<sup>92</sup>

There are multifaceted and opposing forces at work in terms of alliance structure. According to Glenn Snyder, "the alliance dilemma is mostly a function of *tension* between the risk of abandonment and the risk of entrapment,"<sup>93</sup> where the strategy of alliance entrapment (e.g. chainganging) is "dissociation from the ally's policy, or by various means of restraining the ally," while there is the concern of "finlandization" or "neutralization" for the junior partner in the alliance.<sup>94</sup>

In the 'New Look' strategic doctrine, domestic politics is an intervening variable. According John Lewis Gaddis, the goal of NSC 162/2 was to "achieve the maximum possible

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<sup>92</sup> National Security Council, 30 October 1953. NSC 162/2: A Report to the National Security Council. <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf>. Accessed 4 May 2016.

<sup>93</sup> Snyder (1984): 484.

<sup>94</sup> Snyder (1984): 484-486.

deterrence of communism at the minimum possible cost."<sup>95</sup> Eisenhower took domestic economic politics into consideration with 'New Look', taking the form of reducing the strain on American defense expenditure by implementing a reduction in land forces capabilities. Dulles' inflammatory "massive retaliation" speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1954 raised the ire of decisionmakers and academics. As a result, Congressional examinations of the New Look doctrine in concert with institutional hearings on the FYI 1955 Defense Budget.<sup>96</sup> The Eisenhower Administration, as a result, broke continuity with the Truman Doctrine, which actually advocated for Rollback. The Eisenhower Doctrine with its focus on the 'New Look' shows, however, the former General's preference for even stronger and bellicose forms of Rollback, even if that strategy relied on the Soviets action as first-mover.

## Conclusion

Containment policy has been the dominant grand strategy doctrine of the United States since the earliest days of the Cold War. Containment was written by George Kennan in the "long telegram" and his famous 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article under a pseudonym, adopted by the Policy Planning Staff, and implemented by the State Department. Being the defining foreign policy by the United States, it has been dissected, analysed, and commented upon by decision makers, policy makers, political commentators, and academics more than any grand strategy.

Containment has taken on various forms since Kennan's article: under the Harry S. Truman administration, there was the traditional variant as outlined in the 1947 article; the Dwight D. Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan administration formulated a more aggressive implementation known as Rollback; the Barack Obama administration thought of the

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<sup>95</sup> Gaddis (1982): 162.

<sup>96</sup> Douglas Kinnard, "President Eisenhower and the Defense Budget," *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 39, no. 3 (Aug., 1977): 601-2.

Containment towards the People's Republic of China as a sort of Containment-in-Waiting (what I term proto-Containment), which sets the chess pieces in place should this strategy become necessary should a rising power develop revisionist ambitions.

While Containment has been a mainstay topic of discussion in both domestic and international relations literature, there is no "theory" of Containment as a foreign policy. There has been a dearth in the literature with respect to two surprising aspects: (1) when is Containment likely to be implemented, and (2) what form it is likely given to take. Stated another way, the research questions that are of central concern to this dissertation are: (1) When are states most likely to implement a grand strategy of Containment? (2) What form of Containment is likely, given the structural alliance configuration of the coalition and the domestic political and institutional constraints (or autonomy) of the senior alliance partner?

To answer the first research question, the expected findings of this dissertation is that a Containment grand strategy is likely when two variables combine (in an additive nature): the threat environment is categorized as 'high' and when the cost of war is prohibitively 'high' or 'risky.' If the threat environment variable is classified as 'high,' it may contain contentious territorial disputes, security and military considerations are placed on a hierarchy and are deemed to be more significant than other issues (such as trade), offensive military capabilities are prominent (and therefore Jervis' Security Dilemma is a crucial consideration), and/or when foreign policy decision makers perceive that the targeted state has hostile intentions. When the cost of war variable is 'high' or 'risky,' offensive/defensive doctrines and postures may be indistinguishable (another prominent consideration of Jervis' Security Dilemma), the opponent's military capability is either equal or greater, and/or the general population is war averse. When these two variables combine, they create an outcome where decisionmakers are compelled to

consider a foreign policy where engagement and war are inappropriate strategies for implementation. The expected result is a range of Containment options, running the spectrum from: (1) proto-containment, where the conditions are structured so that Containment may be implemented in the near future; (2) Containment in the 1947 traditional variety; or (3) Rollback, which is implemented to coerce the targeted state to a previously held relative power position, or to retreat to either national or regional boundaries.

The selection of the specific Containment option is expected to be heavily dependent, and largely deterministic, upon the alliance structure that is available to the coalition. Alliance structures, especially issues of cohesion, are expected to heavily determine the ability of a state or coalition to contain an adversary, and therefore determine what form Containment is feasible to implement. These are: (a) intra-alliance balancing; (b) intra-alliance bargaining; and (c) fear of abandonment. The majority of this dissertation will be dedicated to test how these coalition structures will determine what form Containment is likely to take.

Lastly, international politics, especially foreign policy decision making, does not occur in a vacuum. Therefore, domestic political and institutional constraints (and grants of autonomy) will have to be considered as an intervening variable, which may cause deviation between the external variable (alliance structure) and the dependent variable (Containment foreign policy). This is due to the fact that domestic politics and institutions may either limit or grant freedom to the alliance leaders' executive foreign policy decision makers' ability to select an appropriate grand strategy output. Utilizing domestic politics and institutions as an intervening variable is drawn from the neoclassical realist tradition, where the structure of the international system is the main explanatory variable, but internal politics at the domestic level may indeed play an important role in the ability of foreign policy decisionmakers' to implement a grand strategy that

they consider to be optimal. This is, largely, due to the amount of institutional and political autonomy or constraint that the executive branch experiences within the state.

This project is significant because there have been few attempts to explain containment in theoretical terms, and even less in terms of establishing the causal link between alliance politics and containment policy. This dissertation provides the theoretical starting point that containment is a broad strategy undertaken by a major power when there is a threat and that the threat needs to be stopped and isolated. Furthermore, this project is significant because it shows the life-cycle between alliance cohesion and different types of containment policy, as well as the re-adaptation and adjustment of the containment measures as a response to changes not only in the external environment, but also within the alliance.

Additionally, it is the hope of this dissertation that a nuanced understanding of Containment as a theory will ultimately give foreign policy decision makers an additional strategic option between engagement and war when confronting an adversary.

#### **Chapter 4: Rising from the Ashes: The Emergent Post-War Order**

## Intra-Alliance Intra-alliance bargaining - The Early Cold War Era

In the wake of the Second World War, Europe was faced with the challenge of reconstructions following the most destructive war in human history. Economies and infrastructure were in shambles. Furthermore, the second global war of the century overturned the international order; the old world great powers, Great Britain and France, were in decline and the United States emerged as the dominant superpower, encompassing "half of the world's manufacturing capacity and an economy roughly five times larger than its nearest competitor."<sup>97</sup> Additionally, the US military occupied the dominant position as a result of the buildup occurring during World War Two: "America accounted for nearly *three-quarters* of world military spending in 1945, and it alone possessed the atomic bomb, an air force with global striking power, and a navy that outclassed all of its peers combined."<sup>98</sup>

To make matters more complicated, Western Europe faced reconstruction in the shadow of the Soviet Union, eager to establish its place as a revisionist superpower with a political ideology incompatible with that of the West. Significantly, Western Europe would be overpowered in the event of a Soviet invasion, which presented 175 divisions plus an additional 75 divisions from Eastern Europe compared to less than 20 Western European divisions, making "the prospects for a nonnuclear defense of Western Europe appear bleak."<sup>99</sup> According to contemporary sources, "Russia, at this stage, is the world's No. 1 military power. Russia's armies and air forces are in a position to pour across Europe and into Asia almost at will."<sup>100</sup> Soviet

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<sup>97</sup> Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014): 18.

<sup>98</sup> Brands (2014): 18.

<sup>99</sup> Matthew A. Evangelista. "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Winter, 1982-1983): 110

<sup>100</sup> "Russia's Edge in Men and Arms," *U.S. News and World Report*, April 2, 1948: 23-25 quoted in Evangelista (1982-1983): 18-9.

strength in 1948, according to U.S. intelligence predictions from the Joint War Plans Committee Reports, was between 4.5-4.75 million men<sup>101</sup> (combined Navy, Air Force, Ground and Security Forces).<sup>102</sup>

The Soviet-backed communist coup in Czechoslovakia on 25 February 1948 represented an indication of Moscow's expansionist intention and gave Western European powers a "great impetus to the development of an Atlantic alliance."<sup>103</sup> In fact, that same day President Truman told the U.S. Congress "that events in Czechoslovakia showed that the Soviet Union had a clear design to take the rest of Europe. This was 'one of those moments in world history,' he said, when 'it is far wiser to act than to hesitate.'"<sup>104</sup> Truman's speech guided Congress to approve measures of selective conscription to the military and the Marshall Plan.<sup>105</sup>

This dissertation, however, predicts that the degree to which the alliance is a cohesive bloc largely determines the type of foreign policy output. In this chapter alliance cohesion most closely follows the H2 prediction, namely that if the junior alliance partners are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely foreign policy output. The newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) most closely resembles intra-alliance bargaining, as the junior partners fell in line with Washington, largely out of necessity but definitely in no position to balance (or oppose) the superpower benefactor on their side in the post-WWII emergent world order.

Secondly, this dissertation will need to test for H3, that if the junior partners of the coalition bloc are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be

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<sup>101</sup> While current scholarship indicates that Soviet divisions were not at full strength post-WWII (therefore these numbers were higher than actual Soviet strength), perception may be more important in terms of security policy planning.

<sup>102</sup> Joint War Plans Committee Reports, June 18, 1946; May 15, 1947 in Evangelista (1982-1983): 113.

<sup>103</sup> Gordon S. Barrass. *The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009): 54-5.

<sup>104</sup> Barrass (2009):55; Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Doc. 52.

<sup>105</sup> Barrass (2009): 55.

the most likely outcome. The causal logic here is that the alliance leader needs to demonstrate commitment to the junior partners. In this formulation, the alliance leader (United States) was able to signal to NATO junior partners that it will not abandon them even in tenuous scenarios that the stronger partner will continue to honour its promise to her coalition allies.

The alternative explanation from the *balance-of-threat* model predicts that the Western allies would take strong balancing strategies in order to counter Soviet threat in the balance of power system. Revisiting this dissertation's alternative hypotheses, we would expect the outcome to be "strong balancing" against the USSR due to the Soviet Union's aggregate power (A1), geographic proximity of Western Europe to Moscow's centre of gravity or power base (A2), and Moscow's (perceived) aggressive intentions (namely the formation of the Warsaw Pact and Berlin Blockade). If the Walt's *balance-of-threat* model were accurate, we should expect that the lion's share of discussion as to which foreign policy strategy to employ would revolve around Soviet increase in power, as well as shifts to the geographic proximity of threats to be of paramount importance as we use process tracing methods. While certainly shifts in global East-West balance was discussed and remained an important factor in determining foreign policy strategy, most of the discussions circulated around alliance politics -- especially when it came to how cohesive NATO was at the time and whether or not the junior members of the coalition would support American-led strategic policy. This, of course, falls in line this dissertation's **H2**, *when the junior partners of the alliance are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome*, and **H3**, *when the junior partners of the coalition are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome*.

The prediction of this dissertation's model in this chapter (namely, **H2** and **H3** are confirmed with supporting evidence), we *ought to expect* the Truman administration proceed with a strategy of Rollback; especially since the confirmation of both **H2** and **H3** predictions are empirically satisfied. In this case, there was little to no Congressional oversight present. Firstly, both the Senate and House of Representatives were of the same Democratic Party as Harry Truman during the latter part of his time in the Oval Office. Therefore, Congress and the Executive Branch formed a "unified government," which had the effect of Democratic lawmakers overseeing the foreign policy of a Democratic president. Secondly, Democratic lawmakers were highly supportive of Truman's NSC 68 (e.g. the Truman Doctrine), going so far as to couch their language in exceptionalist and universalist tones, offering little room for compromise with the East. This confirms the inverse predictions of **IVV2**, namely that when the legislative branch oversight of foreign policy is at its weakest, the executive will experience a great degree of autonomy.

#### *The Marshall Plan: Reconstructing Europe*

The Economic Recovery Plan (ERP), known informally as the Marshall Plan, was implemented in 1948, with the goal of reconstructing Europe in the aftermath of WWII. The ERP "was to use a massive jolt of financial and technological assistance -- ultimately some \$13 billion -- to restore self-confidence, kick-start recovery, and combat the exhaustion and desperation that might lead to Communist triumphs."<sup>106</sup> The overarching purpose was that by rebuilding economic and infrastructure of Europe to avoid the calamity that ensued after the Great War and the dubious reconstruction proscriptions outlined in the Treaty of Versailles. Furthermore, the US hoped to avoid laying the chaotic conditions of poverty and uncertainty that would be the conditions necessary for the cropping up of revolutionary movements such as

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<sup>106</sup> Brands (2014): 26.

communism by rebuilding the economies of Europe. In that sense, the Marshall Plan was presented to the Congress in national interest and security terms: "in their testimony before congressional committees, in their public speeches, and in their confidential discussions, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman, and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal emphasized in terms of the fundamental national security interests of the United States."<sup>107</sup> In addition to the Marshall Plan's goal of influencing the new balance of power in Europe,<sup>108</sup> the ERP "sought to revive the western zones of Germany and to integrate them into a Western economic and political orbit."<sup>109</sup>

These plans developed within the chaotic climate in the years following WWII. While US policy makers did not predict immediate Soviet aggression towards Western Europe,<sup>110</sup> they "did fear the prospect of European economic disintegration, social demoralization, and political upheaval."<sup>111</sup> In fact, senior military commanders and senior political policymakers and advisors described Europe and Germany in ominous terms: "never seen German morale so low," that Europe was "sinking," and that "there will be a revolution" unless the United States were to intervene in economic recovery and assistance.<sup>112</sup> To make matters worse, not only were the

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<sup>107</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer, 1968): 278.

<sup>108</sup> Melvyn (1968):278.

<sup>109</sup> Melvyn (1968): 277-8.

<sup>110</sup> Melvyn (1968): 279; George C. Marshall speech, 13 February 1948, box 21, James Forrestal Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey; President's Committee on Foreign Aid [Harriman Committee], *European Recovery and Foreign Aid* (Washington, 1947): 19-22. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Emergency Foreign Aid, Hearings*, 80th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1947): 3-10; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *European Recovery Program, Hearings, 80th Congress, 2nd Session* (Washington, 1948): 245-6; cabinet meetings in box 1, Matthew Connelly Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; minutes of the meetings of the National Security Council (NSC), 1947-1948; Records of the National Security Council, Record Group 273, National Archives, Washington. Joint War Plans Committee 474/1, "Strategic Study of Western and Northern Europe," 13 May 1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), sect 20, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Record Group 218, National Archives.

<sup>111</sup> Melvyn (1968): 279.

<sup>112</sup> Melvyn (1968): 279; Jean Edward Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius DuBignon Clay*, 2 vols. (Bloomington, 1974), 1: 337-38; Robert Murphy to Marshall, 11 May 1947, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947* (Washington, 1972), 2: 868 (hereafter, FRUS); Marshall's radio broadcast, 28 April 1947, U.S.

European economies and infrastructure in shambles, but bad harvests and unusually heavy winter snowfalls and icy temperatures during 1945 and 1946, added to the widespread shortages of food and fuel. Since Europe was short of money to support importing these necessities, the general populations were more likely to seek political help from non-traditional and revolutionary political parties as a result of malnutrition and hunger, inflation, cutbacks and unemployment.<sup>113</sup> The major impetus for the Marshall Plan was that "economic dislocation was the fundamental source of Communist strength and that its remediation was the key to a favorable balance of power in Europe."<sup>114</sup>

Within George Kennan's plan for containment, it was vital that Western Europe recover its confidence as a major partner in the defense against the Soviets. The Marshall Plan encouraged an interdependent economic structure which, policymakers hoped, would guard against the schisms and potential splits between Western European states. While it is undoubtedly true that American policymakers designed post-war reconstruction around reestablishing Europe as a great power, it may be assumed that there would be a measure of reliance on the United States to ensure policymaking dominance; that is, the preference of American decisionmakers was that, while Europe would be independent powers, they would listen to US plans within the alliance.<sup>115</sup>

In the early postwar era, recovering Western European powers were reliant on American foreign aid for reconstruction. According to Alan Bullock, "the British were financially dependent on the Americans for their economic survival, yet wanted to be treated as an equal

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Department of State Bulletin (DSB) 16 (11 May 1947): 919-24; Clayton's memorandum, 27 May 1947, *FRUS, 1947* (Washington, 1972), 3: 230-32.

<sup>113</sup> Melvyn (1968): 280; See also Milward, *Reconstruction of Western Europe*, 1-125; Seymour E. Harris, *The European Recovery Program* (Cambridge, MA, 1948): 3-142; Wexler, *Marshall Plan Revisited*, 3-23; Marshall to Georges Bonnet, 7 May 1947; Marshall to Clinton Anderson, 15 May 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, 3: 707-8 and 2: 1149-50.

<sup>114</sup> Melvyn (1968): 287.

<sup>115</sup> We can see this throughout the later history of NATO, where American policy was to guard against independent nuclear forces within the alliance, etc.

partner in dispensing aid to the Europeans."<sup>116</sup> The French were grudgingly reliant on the United States, demonstrated through Hervé Alphand, the Director of Economic Affairs at the Foreign Ministry: "[Alphand] wanted to avoid a prolonged reliance upon American credits that would entangle France in a 'western bloc.'"<sup>117</sup>

While Western Europe policymakers were hesitant about the idea of being reliant on American foreign aid and assistance in rebuilding, focus was primarily reconstruction and the threat of Soviet expansion (as we will see). This alliance-member's dependence was not necessary, however, for implementing US decisionmakers' policy preference (e.g. containment) given that European rebuilding of self-confidence and re-establishment of the traditional great powers to build a postwar balance of power system ultimately relied on reconstruction.

#### *North Atlantic Treaty: Establishing Commitment*

Roosevelt's vision of a liberal economic post-war world order with the great power victors, the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France working concert within Security Council and United Nations broke down shortly after the war. During the war, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact allowed Stalin to invade and annex what would become the Eastern Bloc, namely, eastern Poland, Belorussia, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, and Romania. With the war now over, the Kremlin consolidated power by converting former independent countries, most of which had been liberated by Nazi occupation, into satellite states between 1946 and 1949: Poland (now in its entirety on 19 January 1947), Albania (11 January

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<sup>116</sup> Timothy Healey. "Will Clayton, Negotiating the Marshall Plan, and European Economic Integration," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 35, no. 2 (April, 2011): 236; Alan Bullock. *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951* (London, 1984): 414.

<sup>117</sup> John S. Hill. "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan," *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 64, no. 3 (Sept., 1992): 515-17; See also, Richard Kuisel. *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993): 222-23; Annie Lacroix-Riz, "C.G.T. et <<Bataille de la Production>> de septembre 1944 au printemps de 1946," *Cahier d'histoire de l'Institute de recherche marxistes* 10 (1982): 53-78.

1946), Bulgaria (15 September 1946), Czechoslovakia (9 May 1948), Hungary (20 August 1949), and the German Democratic Republic (7 October 1949).

As a result of lessons learnt from the WWII to oppose revisionist powers and Soviet expansionism, the conception of American postwar interests expanded dramatically and expansively from its traditional role. Military decisionmakers and planners "emphasized the need for assured access to vital raw materials and resources, and for an enlarged 'strategic frontier' composed of military bases from which American forces could project power and interdict approaching enemies. Above all, they argued that the United States must prevent any unfriendly country from dominating the Eurasian landmass."<sup>118</sup> According to a report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, "[the United States] must have the support of some of the countries of the Old World unless our military strength is to be overshadowed by that of our enemies."<sup>119</sup> In other words, the US military would not be able to unilaterally prevent the domination of Europe without the critical military support of the Western alliance. The Soviet Union was poised to become a dominant postwar threat as, in a report from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS): "Russia will emerge from the present conflict as by far the strongest nation in Europe and Asia -- strong enough, if the United States should stand aside, to dominate Europe and at the same time to establish her hegemony over Asia."<sup>120</sup> Furthermore, as the Kremlin perceived Washington's large military and economic power as a threat, as well as what Stalin considered "Moscow's legitimate security requirements" in the east, as well as a series of American-Soviet bilateral

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<sup>118</sup> Brands (2014): 19.

<sup>119</sup> Brands (2014): 19; Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 29 April 1947, *FRUS 1947*, 1: 739. See also, Melvyn Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," *American Historical Review*, vol. 89, no. 2 (April 1984): especially pp. 350-359.

<sup>120</sup> Brands (2014): 20; OSS, "Problems and Objectives of United States Policy," 12 April 1945, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS); William Curtis Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993): 121-122.

disputes, the relationship began to slide into a spiral downward.<sup>121</sup> In January 1946, Truman wrote: "Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making...I do not think we should play compromise any longer."<sup>122</sup> The security competition and lines of division were set shortly after the war, while American military planners were convinced that the United States would need to rely on a western coalition to either hold the line or push back against a revisionist Kremlin.

American policymakers had based much of postwar grand strategy on the ERP, hoping that the Marshal Plan would be enough to stabilize Western Europe through economic tools of statecraft, hoping that this measure would serve to restore the global balance of power.<sup>123</sup> This strategy, however, "hinged on the Europeans' willingness to take bold and potentially dangerous steps, and that willingness hinged on a sense of security that was evaporating by the moment,"<sup>124</sup> with Soviet expansion and the East and the Berlin Blockade in 1948.

European leaders came to look to Washington to take the leading role in the collective security strategy that Roosevelt had envisioned. According to Brands, by the middle of 1948, the situation had become "apparent that leaders in France and elsewhere had little desire to be made into an autonomous European 'third force' that would someday have to face Moscow alone. What they wanted were stronger guarantees against the various threats they confronted in the here and now- the threat from their own Communists, from the potential resurgence of German power, from the looming Soviet menace to the east."<sup>125</sup> What we see is Europe looking for the United States to demonstrate some "fate tying" mechanism, which would be seen in the deployment of

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<sup>121</sup> Brands (2014): 21.

<sup>122</sup> Brands (2014): 21; Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997): 80; See also, Melvyn Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007): 11-83.

<sup>123</sup> Brands (2014): 34.

<sup>124</sup> Brands (2014): 34.

<sup>125</sup> Brands (2014): 34.

US troops in Western Europe, as well as some tangible demonstration to settle what Schelling would call "fear of abandonment," which came in the form of Rollback in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. According to American State Department official Philip Jessup's assessment, "The Marshall Plan provided for [the 'economic revival' of Europe] but not for [the feeling of security and hope without which a man can't put his heart into his work']; something more would be necessary to fulfill American aims."<sup>126</sup>

This is the scenario that came to be the beginning of American fate tying to Western Europe. According to Brands, the first point of "this was the genesis of the major security commitments that would come to define U.S. policy towards Western Europe. By late 1947, British, French, and Benelux officials were making plans for a collective defense pact, and they pushed insistently for U.S. support of the initiative."<sup>127</sup> Secondly, the United States began sending military assistance to the French and Italians. Thirdly, and most significantly, "the [Truman] administration agreed to full U.S. participation in a transatlantic military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and pledged to defend Western Europe at the Rhine in case of war."<sup>128</sup> In the words of President Truman, the new alliance represented "a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression," through tying Washington's fate to that of Europe.<sup>129</sup>

While NATO became the cornerstone of American policy in Europe, it was a logical development from policy trends since the end of WWII, as noted by Charles Bohlen, counselor

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<sup>126</sup> Brands (2014): 34; Philip Jessup, "The United States Goal in Tomorrow's World," *Department of State Bulletin*, 27 February 1949: 246; see also, Robert A. Lovett's comments in "Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security," 6 July 1948, *FRUS 1948*, 3: 152-155; William Averell Harriman to George Marshall and James Forrestal, 14 June 1948, box 272, Harriman Papers, Library of Congress (LC):( Policy Planning Staff) PPS 27/1, "Western Union and Related Problems," 6 April 1948, PPSP, 2: 165-174.

<sup>127</sup> Brands (2014): 34.

<sup>128</sup> Brands (2014): 35; At first, the new alliance would be known as the North Atlantic Treaty. The usage of the term NATO began during the early 1950s after the outbreak of the Korean War.

<sup>129</sup> Brands (2014): 34; Harry S. Truman quoted in "Address on the Occasion of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949, APP; see also, Memorandum of Conversation, 3 April 1949, box 12, Lot 53D444, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001): 194-199.

of the State Department: "[NATO was] the very logical development of almost everything that has happened since the end of war."<sup>130</sup> However, because Truman and his military advisors did not believe that an unprovoked or surprise attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe was on the horizon, the deployment of additional troops beyond what was already stationed in Europe would be redundant and unnecessary.<sup>131</sup> For the Washington, the purpose of NATO was "not to make Western Europe an impregnable military bastion (for this was impossible, given resource constraints), but simply to offer the ironclad, long-term security commitment that would revive local confidence and enable the Europeans to push ahead with economic reconstruction, political stabilization, and the rehabilitation of Germany."<sup>132</sup> According to Ikenberry, "throughout the postwar period, European leaders were more concerned with American abandonment than with domination; and they consistently pressed for a formal and permanent American security commitment."<sup>133</sup>

This formal and permanent American commitment to European security commitment was established with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Bohlen noted that the goal was to "instill the sense of security in the people which they felt so essential if recovery was to go forward."<sup>134</sup> In other words, the United States solved the problem of European fear of abandonment with the guaranteed commitment that the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty

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<sup>130</sup> Brands (2014): 35; Charles Bohlen quotation in "Notes for Off-the-Record Remarks," undated, box 8, Bohlen Records, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration; See also, Harriman to Marshall and Forrestal, 14 June 1948, box 272, Harriman Papers, LC; Timothy Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).

<sup>131</sup> Brands (2014): 35.

<sup>132</sup> Brands (2014): 35.

<sup>133</sup> Ikenberry (2001): 165.

<sup>134</sup> Brands (2014): 35; Bohlen quotation in "Notes for Off-the-Record Remarks," undated, box 8, Bohlen Records, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration; See also, Harriman to Marshall and Forrestal, 14 June 1948, box 272, Harriman Papers, LC; Timothy Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).

demonstrated. The difficulty going forward would be to maintain the credibility and capability of that security commitment -- this would prove to be a major challenge, as we will see.

*Psychosis of Fear: Demonstrating Commitment through Rollback*

The widespread fear that the United States would not honour its promises to defend Western Europe from Soviet invasion was omnipresent from the beginning of the Cold War. In a top secret memo to under secretary of state, Robert Lovett, Jefferson Caffery (American ambassador in France) wrote that "there is a widespread fear psychosis in Western Europe and particularly in France, that in the event of Russian aggression the United States does not plan to defend Western Europe and therefore it will be occupied by the Russians."<sup>135</sup> The assessment of a "fear psychosis" by the ambassador is misleading, as the threat of abandonment was very much a rational assessment, given the nature of at least weak deterrence in the missile age.

The widespread "fear psychosis" was not limited to the hypothetical defense of Europe from Soviet invasion. The old powers were in the grip of uncertainty and fear over any threat to national security. Even congressional delays in funding for Military Assistance Program (MAP) legislation had a "seriously adverse effect on [the] total situation in Western Europe." This should not be surprising in the wake of the unprecedented scale of destruction and devastation twice in the last half century, with bids for hegemonic control and the overturning of peacetime balance of power appeared contemporaneously commonplace. As the American ambassador to the United Kingdom wrote, "although confidence has steadily strengthened, there still remains in Western Europe a deep latent feeling of insecurity, a feeling which springs from the fear that

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<sup>135</sup> "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)," 30 January 1948, *FRUS, 1948, Western Europe*, vol. 3: 386. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d386>, accessed 9 November 2018; for the domestic instability and opportunism this caused in NATO members and internal communist parties, see also "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State," 23 March 1949, *FRUS, 1949, Western Europe*, vol. 4: 358. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v04/d358>, accessed 9 November 2018.

Western Europe cannot now be defended against Soviet invasion and that our military power cannot be brought to bear in Western Europe in time to prevent forcible occupation...delay now in MAP [the Military Assistance Program] would bring back old fears that our [American] intentions are not to help defend but only to accept the necessity for another liberalization of Western Europe. The people of Western Europe know that their civilization will not survive Soviet occupation."<sup>136</sup> These insecurities, furthermore, were having a tangible effect on the internal politics of NATO members, as domestic communist parties attempted to seize the opportunity to increase their power base in France and Italy:

Relapse into this fear and insecurity would retard economic recovery, and would play into hands of Communist and fellow-travelling elements. In view of Communist strength in France and Italy, and the sensitivity of large segments of population to propaganda, political instability as well as economic recovery might be jeopardized in these countries by seeming slackening of US interest in MAP.<sup>137</sup>

The Military Assistance Program (MAP) was a major commitment by Washington for Western Europe, shipping materiel to France and Italy. MAP was carefully committing to not compete with ERP and was designed to be an "important factor in developing [a] level of confidence in future Western Europe necessary to insure continuing viability beyond [the] end [of] ERP in 1952."<sup>138</sup> According to Brands, "between 1951 and 1953, the United States provided some \$20 billion in military assistance to its NATO allies, in effect sponsoring a European buildup to complement the arrival of additional American forces on the continent. By 1952, the alliance

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<sup>136</sup> "The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State," 5 June 1949, *FRUS, 1949, Western Europe*, vol. 4: 161. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v04/d161>, accessed 9 November 2018.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> "The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe Under the Economic Assistance Act of 1948 (Katz) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Hoffman)," 31 March 1949, *FRUS, 1949, Western Europe*, vol. 4: 137. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v04/d137>, accessed 9 November 2018.

boasted fifteen well-equipped divisions, anchored by 180,000 U.S. troops. The southern flank of NATO received attention as well, with the administration extending military aid to Yugoslavia and bringing Turkey and Greece into the alliance in the early 1950s."<sup>139</sup> The resulting American expenditures and aid could not, of course, be known in 1949 as the European powers feared that U.S. promises may not come to the fruition of action.

The fear of abandonment by the United States was a persistent issue for Western European powers even at the time of the Ambassador's meeting in Rome in 1950. Taking central prominence was the necessity for the Americans, not only to *pledge* commitment, but to *demonstrate* commitment. For Europe, this demonstrated meant action as well as expansion of that the U.S. would not abandon its allies, even with the threat of war with the Soviet Union (when European NATO members needed the alliance most). According to a declassified top secret document, there was a concern within NATO that the United Kingdom would be unwilling or unable to fulfill its commitments, especially with the election of the Labor Party. Stated candidly by Ambassador Douglas, "England was restrained in the degree to which she could participate in the conflict [between communism and the western world] but she could and should give leadership and encouragement. In this regard the Conservative Party had been the prodder and the Labor Party had been the laggard. In 1947 Bevin had behaved with alacrity and courage when he picked up the ball thrown by General Marshall but since that time had lagged. England's freedom of action was further limited by her other overseas commitments such as the

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<sup>139</sup> Brands (2014): 52; Eisenhower to Harriman, 14 December 1951, box 278, Harriman Papers, LC; Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1984): 496; George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008): 646; Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): chapter 4.

colonies and by what she conceived to be her special relationship to the U.S."<sup>140</sup> Continuing, Douglas noted that the conflict between a socialist society and an international society, "the British had been led to renege on commitments they have made in 1947, 1948 and 1949." To keep the newly created NATO alliance, the United States would have to be the panacea to resolve the cohesion issues within the coalition. The American were expected to demonstrate commitment "[by] expanding the political scope of the North Atlantic Treaty institution, this fear of a half-hearted U.K. participation and of a resuscitated Germany would be largely banished since the continental powers would be reassured by the commitments of the United States and Canada to the NAT [North Atlantic Treaty]."<sup>141</sup> The type and extent of this political and military commitment demonstration, however, was left an ambiguous question. Accordingly, "the extent of these commitments however is something that the United States for its part would have to clarify."<sup>142</sup>

*Rollback: The Cohesive Effects of Confrontation*

The rollback variant of containment would be directed towards pushing back Soviet spheres of influence towards national borders. The strategic thinking behind this concept was that if the USSR could act as an imperial power by extracting resources from their satellite states, they would be able to raise their relative power to that of (or approaching) the United States. According to Christopher Layne, "from the end of World War II until the early 1950s U.S. policymakers wanted to neuter the Soviet Union as a peer competitor. Washington aimed to accomplish this task by rolling back the Soviet sphere of influence, reducing drastically the

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<sup>140</sup> " Summary Record of a Meeting of Ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950," Undated. *FRUS, 1950, Western Europe*, vol. 3: D437. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d437>, accessed 15 November 2018.

<sup>141</sup> "Summary Record of a Meeting of Ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950," Undated. *FRUS, 1950, Western Europe*, vol. 3: D437. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d437>, accessed 15 November 2018.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

Soviet Union's power relative to that of the United States, and bringing about a regime change in the Kremlin."<sup>143</sup> Layne, furthermore, draws upon NSC-20/4 as evidence of the Truman Administration's formal policy in 1948 of rolling back the Soviet Union, which argued that the goal of the United States was:

*to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constituted a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations [and] bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.*<sup>144</sup>

That was a *peacetime* policy should be demonstrative of U.S. commitment to the idea of rolling back Soviet power relative to that of the United States. According to Layne, NSC 20/4 advocated "rolling back Soviet power from Eastern Europe, fomenting regime change inside the Soviet Union, and eliminated the Soviet Union as a peer competitor."<sup>145</sup> This document illustrates, in very stark terms, that the security objective of the United States was to achieve primacy, not equilibrium, and therefore the Truman administration was engaging in a policy of rolling back the Soviet Union early in the Cold War.

According to the NSC, that "today, barring some radical alteration of the underlying situation which would give new possibilities to the communists, the communists appear to have little chance of effecting at this juncture the political conquest of any countries west of the

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<sup>143</sup> Christopher Layne. *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 2006): 62

<sup>144</sup> Layne (2006): 62; "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," 23 November 1948, *General; The United Nations*, vol. 1, part 2: D60. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d60>, accessed 14 November 2018; *FRUS 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1: p. 27

<sup>145</sup> Layne (2006): 63.

Luebeck-Trieste line."<sup>146</sup> In other words, the threat of actual conquest or territorial and political in-roads into Western Europe was not a tenable proposition in the judgment of Council. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was becoming a status quo power that was motivated by defensive considerations (while the NSC admitted that Soviet "capabilities for subversion and political aggression [would] decrease in the next decade" should not be assumed): "The unsuccessful outcome of this political offensive has in turn created serious problems for [the Soviets] behind the iron curtain, and their policies are today probably motivated in large measure by defensive considerations."<sup>147</sup>

What, then, was the purpose of military opposition from the United States in Western Europe? According to NSC-20/4, "the Soviet capabilities and the increases thereto set forth in this paper would result in a relative increase in Soviet capabilities vis-a-vis the United States and the Western democracies unless offset by factors such as the following:

- a. *The success of ERP [the European Recovery Plan/Marshall Plan].*
- b. *The development of Western Union and its support by the United States.*
- c. *The increased effectiveness of the military establishments of the United States, Great Britain, and other friendly nations.*
- d. *The development of internal dissension within the USSR and disagreements among the USSR and orbit nations*<sup>148</sup>

As is apparent, the National Security Council believed that the main threat to increases in Soviet capabilities was the inability of Western European members of NATO to remain in a cohesive

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<sup>146</sup> "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," 23 November 1948, *General; The United Nations*, vol. 1, part 2: D60. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d60>, accessed 14 November 2018.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. While the USSR would not be able to overturn the status quo that had built up in Europe during the postwar period, the NSC recognized that the Soviets were capable of a serious military threat in terms of "serious submarine warfare and of a limited number of one-way bomber sorties." The Kremlin remained a military threat, if a limited one.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

alliance, as well as the unsuccessful reconstruction of the region and the military effectiveness of old world Great Powers, such as the United Kingdom and France.<sup>149</sup> In fact, the National Security Council explicitly noted the effect of American unpreparedness and its adverse effect on Western European allies in the pivotal NSC 68 document. According to a report (e.g. the report prepared for President Truman pertaining to NSC 68), "in our present situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional weapons, such a declaration [of a nuclear no-first use doctrine] would be interpreted by the U.S.S.R. as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication that we intend to abandon them."<sup>150</sup>

#### *NSC 68: The Truman Doctrine*

The National Security Council's aggressive concept of rolling back the Soviet Union was formally outlined and implemented as the Truman Administration's doctrine in the spring of 1950. NSC 68 is widely held to be one of the most important policy documents in American foreign policy. Paul Nitze, director of Policy Planning for the State Department and principal author of NSC 68, argued that "changes in the balance of power...could occur not only as the result of military action, but also from such intangibles as intimidation, humiliation, or even loss of credibility."<sup>151</sup> NSC 68's "main purpose," according Lawrence Freedman, "was to impress upon its bureaucratic readership the Soviet threat to world peace, best blocked through increased military preparedness in the non-Soviet world" and showed a worldview characterized by the

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<sup>149</sup> The fourth method of containing the Kremlin's capability to threaten American and Western security was to foster dissension and cohesion in Eastern Europe. This will be further discussed in the Titoism section.

<sup>150</sup> "A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)," 14 April 1950, *FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1: D85. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>, accessed 15 November 2018; "A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950," 7 April 1950. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>, accessed 15 November 2018.

<sup>151</sup> John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," *International Security*, vol. 4, no. 4 (Spring, 1980): 166.

"prospect of persistent East-West hostility, with a danger of war not only from miscalculations in the midst of a crisis, but as a consequence of premeditated Soviet aggression."<sup>152</sup>

NSC 68 accepted as proposition that the most "natural way to fight a nuclear war was to get in a surprise attack and that totalitarian states enjoyed a comparative advantage over open societies in the ability to 'strike swiftly and with stealth'."<sup>153</sup> As a result, a nuclear strategy would be more appropriate for the USSR and, given parity, an advantage in a nuclear war.<sup>154</sup> Therefore, the logical policy conclusion would be to build up conventional forces. This was a result of the fact that "until conventional forces had been built up, the United States had no choice but to rely on its nuclear arsenal, and extend its breathing space by maintaining, for as long as possible, a clear superiority in nuclear capabilities over the Soviet Union."<sup>155</sup> Furthermore, NSC 68 was bound to reject the proposed no-first use (of nuclear weapons) policy due to the fact that "the imbalance in conventional capabilities meant that the United States was not even able to hold back nuclear weapons as a last resort."<sup>156</sup> According to the NSC 68 report and following recommendations, "in our present situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional weapons, such a declaration [of no first-use of atomic weapons] would be interpreted by the USSR as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication that we intended to abandon them."<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Lawrence Freedman. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, third edition*. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) : 66

<sup>153</sup> Freedman (2003): 67.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Freedman 2003): 67; "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68," 12 April 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers. Retrieved from [https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf](https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf), accessed 15 November 2018; "A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)," 14 April 1950, *FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1: D85. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>, accessed 15 November 2018.

The overall argument of NSC 68 was to advocate an American bid for primacy. Although the report does not explicitly use "preponderant power" in its language, Nitze did in a Memorandum to the Deputy Undersecretary of State in 1952,<sup>158</sup> an unsigned State Department Policy Planning Staff memorandum in 1952, and a Policy Planning Staff draft paper titled "Basic Issues Raised by Draft NSC 'Reappraisal of U.S. Objectives and Strategy for National Security.'"<sup>159</sup> Nitze's argument was that the United States should lean towards primacy, as opposed to the maintenance of the bipolar international order. This was a dramatic break from the George Kennan method of containment, and one that involved a more forceful and active role in confronting the Soviet Union.

George Kennan advocated an acceptance of the USSR as a long-term great power, but NSC 68 argued that American policy should not be "a static, or passive, grand strategic posture that aimed merely at repelling Soviet geopolitical thrusts or deterring the Kremlin." Rather, NSC 68 stated that containment was "a policy of calculated and gradual coercion."<sup>160</sup> This is a sharp break from the original conception of containment. As conceptualized by Nitze the "aim of U.S. grand strategy was, by means short of hot war, to eliminate the Soviet Union as a peer competitor by using preponderant U.S. power to force the retraction of Soviet influence and control from regions beyond the borders of the Soviet Union itself."<sup>161</sup>

The logic of NSC 68 was that the United States could attain overwhelming preponderance by putting sufficient pressure on the USSR through confrontation and intense

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<sup>158</sup> Layne (2006): 229; "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)," 14 July 1952, *FRUS, 1952-54, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: D13.

Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d13>, accessed 14 November 2018.  
<sup>159</sup> Layne (2006): 229; "Paper Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff. Basic Issues Raised by Draft NSC 'Reappraisal of U.S. Objectives and Strategy for National Security,'" Undated. *FRUS 1952-54, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: D24. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d13>, accessed 14 November 2018.

<sup>160</sup> Layne (2006): 63.

<sup>161</sup> Layne (2006): 63.

competition, while taking away the resources and manpower at their disposal in satellite states. It is at this point that the Soviet Union would be "compelled to adjust" and the Cold War would end on American terms.<sup>162</sup> The USSR would be compelled to adjust relative power expectations, as the United States would demonstrate through sustained competition and sporadic competition superior resources, far outstripping Soviet potential. In other words, "Moscow would realize that it could not prevail in long-term competition in the face of superior U.S. resources" when "confronted with the preponderant power of the United States."<sup>163</sup> NSC 68 would become the basis for American commitments to NATO as well as the "long-range plan" for "JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] basis for the development of military requirements" for implementing the new doctrine.<sup>164</sup>

The 1951 policy document contained a shift in terms of how much the United States intended to defend Europe, largely in order to pacify the abandonment concerns of NATO members. American policy shifted "from a minimum defense of Europe to a full defense of Europe" as a result of NSC 68. According to one of Truman's key advisers, Charles E. Bohlen, the new strategy "would appear to imply a defense establishment in time of peace which would involve almost full-time war mobilization in the United States and the Atlantic Pact countries."<sup>165</sup> In effect, the new policy was "an attempt to support the commitments the United

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<sup>162</sup> Layne (2006): 64.

<sup>163</sup> Layne (2006): 64.

<sup>164</sup> "Memorandum by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Symington) to the President," Undated. *FRUS, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1: D6. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v01/d6>, accessed 14 November 2018.

<sup>165</sup> Brands (2014):46; Bohlen to Nitze, 5 April 1950, box 6, Bohlen Records, RG, National Archives and Records Administration; "Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)," 5 April 1950. *FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1: D82. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d82>, accessed 15 November 2018.

States had made through such measures and pronouncements as the Marshall Plan and NATO, all intended to fortify Western Europe against aggression."<sup>166</sup>

*Uncompromising Universalism in the House: The Cold War as Theology in Congress*

What made NSC 68 such a large development in grand strategy, one which involved near full-time war mobilization in Europe, was its exceptionalist and universalist tone. Much of the report read for bureaucratic guidance as a philosophical, indeed a theological explanation of good versus evil instead of either between two opposing political systems or two opposing alliance blocs. In the section outlining the underlining conflict between Washington and Moscow, for example, the authors of NSC 68 state:

*The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the achievement of its fundamental design. There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power...The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state [is] to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.<sup>167</sup>*

Along with the theological tone as the background for the ideological conflict between the two superpowers was an unwavering universalism that the free and democratic western states that

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<sup>166</sup> "Memorandum by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Symington) to the President," Undated. *FRUS, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1: D6. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v01/d6>, accessed 14 November 2018.

<sup>167</sup> "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68," 12 April 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers. Retrieved from [https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf](https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf), accessed 15 November 2018; "A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)," 14 April 1950, *FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1: D85. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>, accessed 15 November 2018.

made up NATO had an obligation to oppose the "tyrannical" "slave-state" of the Soviet Union.

In the language of NSC 68:

*The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.<sup>168</sup>*

This should not be surprising because once framed in terms of *good versus evil*, it would be inherently difficult to implement Kennan's vision of containment, to be selective on where and when to oppose the Kremlin:

*Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and powerful evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.<sup>169</sup>*

### *Conclusion*

The Truman administration set to the work of rebuilding Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. But, more than that, it had to weigh the task the necessity of reconstructing the Western portion of the continent with balancing the USSR as an emerging revision power, seemingly bent on taking Germany's place in their pursuit of European regional hegemony (if not

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

global hegemony through the spread of Communism). The conventional wisdom says that the United States, and by extension NATO was responding to the emerging menace, as per Stephen Walt's *balance of threat* theory. However, this chapter has illustrated that this was not the proximate cause of the foreign policy path undertaken by the Truman administration. Instead, it was the newly constituted North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Western European cohesion, coupled with its fear of abandonment by its American security guarantors that propelled the administration to pursue a policy of *Rollback*, the strongest variant stemming from George Kennan's *Containment* policy.

Firstly, Truman's Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) was implemented in 1948 was tasked with the reconstruction, recovery, and re-assertion of a devastated Western Europe. However, the \$13 billion pledged for the rebuild, while restoring Western European self-confidence and kick-starting recovery, it had a secondary effect of creating dependency from the Old World upon the New World. Once accepting this money, the old powers were placed in the uncomfortable position of reliance on their non-European cousins. With this came the fear that should the United States chose not to fulfill their promise to help rebuild the continent, the European community would be hard pressed to rebuild their great power security system. While the ERP was successful in mitigating the possibility that war-torn Europe had the potential for "economic disintegration, social disintegration, and political upheaval," notably it was pursued with the assumption that Soviet aggression towards Western Europe was not an immediate threat.

According to Kennan's plan for Containment, the Marshall Plan was designed to advance cohesiveness among Western European states (some of which, just three years ago were on opposing sides during WWII), the regeneration of self-confidence in order to establish themselves as a viable and strong alliance partner with the United States, which they had just tied

their reliance upon. In other words, the fact that Europe was reliant upon the US for recovery put them in a position of intra-alliance bargaining behaviour and allowed Washington to lead the way for the alliance in terms of the security policy they had begun to foot the bill for. This would fulfill Hypothesis 2, namely that as the junior partners intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of *Rollback* will be the most likely outcome. This is especially likely given that this scenario creates enough military power and resources within the coalition to confront the shared adversary. The incentive here is such that the offense has a greater payoff structure to push the enemy target back to within its national boundaries.

In order to mitigate Western European fears of abandonment, the United States was forced into demonstrating some sort of fate tying mechanism, an explicit showing that the US would be as committed to continental defense as those fighting on their own national soil. This came in the form of *Rollback*, as predicted in the third hypothesis: if the junior partner(s) of the coalition bloc are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome. This, of course, is because the goal of foreign policy in this scenario is to demonstrate commitment. Strength of action, not containment's reactionary method of ceding initiative to the adversary, allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partners that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger partner will honour its promise to coalition members. This model is confirmed in the fate-tying mechanism of American deployed troops in Western Europe, which would undoubtedly chain-gang the US into war with the Soviet Union should they be attacked on the continent. This was the genesis of the security commitments that would define American security foreign policy towards Europe. Furthermore, the US began sending military assistance to their French and Italian NATO allies. Thirdly, and most significantly, Truman agreed to full American "participation in a transatlantic military

alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and pledged to defend Western Europe at the Rhine in case of war."<sup>170</sup> In Truman's words, the newly constituted NATO alliance was "a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression" by tying Washington's fate to that of Western Europe.<sup>171</sup>

In the spring of 1950, the National Security Council formally outlined the Truman Doctrine as a commitment to *Rolling Back* the Soviet Union through an increase in military in areas that were not under the Soviet sphere of influence, with Moscow as the primary aggressor. The doctrine outlined in NSC 68 argued that "until conventional forces had been built up, the United States had no choice but to rely on its nuclear arsenal, and extend its breathing space by maintaining, for as long as possible, a clear superiority in nuclear capabilities over the Soviet Union."<sup>172</sup> In the memorandum's advocacy for American primacy, we can see the preponderance of military power in the strongest possible language of foreign policy output, even if that meant confrontation and intense competition. The US committed to not just minimum defense and deterrence, but to the full defense of the European theatre; America's European allies were signaled an overt promise that they would honour their commitment to their continental allies. Furthermore, with an American bid for primacy, with the support of their alliance partners through NATO members, Washington had accumulated enough power to implement a policy of Rollback, which confirms the first hypothesis of the model being tested.

This dissertation predicted that the degree to which the alliance is cohesive and functional largely determines the type of foreign policy strategy. In the preceding chapter, alliance cohesion

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<sup>170</sup> Brands (2014): 35; At first, the new alliance would be known as the North Atlantic Treaty. The usage of the term NATO began during the early 1950s after the outbreak of the Korean War.

<sup>171</sup> Brands (2014): 34; Harry S. Truman quoted in "Address on the Occasion of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949, APP; see also, Memorandum of Conversation, 3 April 1949, box 12, Lot 53D444, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001): 194-199.

<sup>172</sup> Freedman (2003): 67.

most closely follows the **H2** prediction. As we have just seen, the junior alliance partners were highly amenable to foreign policy of the coalition leader and could be described as our intra-alliance intra-alliance bargaining model. The outcome was a foreign policy strategy of Rollback, as is consistent with this dissertation's prediction. The newly formed NATO most closely resembles intra-alliance bargaining, as the junior partners fell in line with Washington, largely out of necessity but definitely in no position to balance (or oppose) the superpower benefactor on their side in the post-WWII emergent world order.

Secondly, this dissertation tested for **H3**, that if the junior partners of the coalition bloc are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome. The causal logic here is that the alliance leader needs to demonstrate commitment to the junior partners. In this formulation, the alliance leader (United States) was able to signal to their junior partners that it will not abandon them even in tenuous scenarios that the stronger partner will continue to honour its promise to their coalition allies, thus confirming the third hypothesis in the dissertation's model.

The alternative explanation comes from Stephen Walt's *balance-of-threat* model, which predicts that the Western allies would take strong balancing strategies in order to counter Soviet threat in the balance of power system. Revisiting this dissertation's alternative hypotheses, we would expect the outcome to be "strong balancing" against the USSR due to the Soviet Union's aggregate power (**A1**), geographic proximity of Western Europe to Moscow's centre of gravity or power base (**A2**), and Moscow's aggressive intentions (namely the formation of the Warsaw Pact and Berlin Blockade). If the Walt's *balance-of-threat* model were accurate, we should expect that a large part of internal discussion as to which foreign policy strategy to employ would revolve around Soviet increase in power, as well as shifts to the geographic proximity of threats,

especially with the formation and expansion of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe and East Berlin, to be of supreme importance in the process tracing methods. While certainly shifts in global East-West balance was discussed and remained an important factor in determining the direction of foreign policy strategy, most of the discussions circulated around alliance politics -- especially when it came to how cohesive NATO was at the time and whether or not the junior members of the coalition would support American-led strategic policy. This, of course, falls in line this dissertation's **H2**, *when the junior partners of the alliance are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome*, and **H3**, *when the junior partners of the coalition are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome*.

The prediction of this dissertation's model in this chapter (namely, **H2** and **H3** are confirmed with supporting evidence), we should expect that the Truman administration proceed with a Rollback strategy, especially since the confirmation of both **H2** and **H3** predictions are empirically satisfied. In this case, there was little to no Congressional oversight present. Firstly, both the Senate and House of Representatives were of the same Democratic Party as Harry Truman. Therefore, Congress and the Executive Branch formed a "unified government," which had the effect of Democratic lawmakers overseeing the foreign policy of a Democratic president. Secondly, Democratic lawmakers were highly supportive of Truman's NSC 68 (e.g. the Truman Doctrine), going so far as to couch their language in largely theoretical tones (especially invoking American exceptionalist and universalist themes of East-West/Communism-Capitalism/Soviet-American), offering little room for compromise with the East. This confirms the inverse predictions of **IVV2**, namely that when the legislative branch oversight of foreign policy is at its weakest, the executive will experience a great degree of autonomy.

## **Chapter 5 - Dwight D. Eisenhower**

When Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated in 1953, he inherited an aggressively anti-Soviet grand strategy. In East Asia, the United States was becoming increasingly embroiled in what was becoming to be seen as an unwinnable and worsening quagmire of Indochina, largely due to being pulled into the conflict by their French allies. According to one State Department analysis, "The French, through their folly...have left us with the choice of the following two ghastly courses of action:"

1. To wash our hands of the country and allow the Communists to overrun it; or,
2. To continue to pour treasure (and perhaps eventually lives) into a hopeless cause in which the French have already expended about a billion and a half dollars and about fifty thousand lives -- and this at a cost of alienating vital segments of Asian public opinion.

This policy choice would become a commitment that would sap the U.S. government's attention through the early 1970s.<sup>173</sup>

However, Eisenhower's inherited position in Europe was one of maintaining a functional, responsive, and most importantly, cohesive NATO alliance with the capability of defending American and European interests in the event of a Soviet invasion. Truman shored up this account at the end of his administration, deciding in 1950 to send at least four additional American divisions, along with additional tactical air power to be stationed in Western Europe. According to Dean Acheson, President Truman needed to send these additional units "at the

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<sup>173</sup> Ogburn to Dean Rusk, August 18, 1950, *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6: 863, cited in Brands (2014): 52-54; "Memorandum by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)," [Washington] 18 August 1950, *FRUS 1950, East Asia and the Pacific*, vol. 6: Document 552. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d552>, accessed 30 January 2019; see also, Allison to Acheson, February 11, 1952, *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, part 1: 28-34; "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State," [Washington] 11 February 1952, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 13, part 1: Document 14. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d14>, accessed 30 January 2019; NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] 35/2, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1953," [Washington] 29 August 1952, *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, part 1, especially 243-244. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d109>, accessed 30 January 2019.

earliest feasible date in order that any doubts of American interest in defense, rather than the liberation, of Europe will be removed, thus increasing the will of our allies to resist."<sup>174</sup> In other words, American forces, which in turn would be able to be used to rollback the Soviet Union (or at least threaten a more aggressive form of containment than hitherto implemented) were being deployed in the Western European theatre as a signal to NATO allies that the United States would not abandon their allies, as well as in the hope that they would increase their resolve in resisting the USSR.

The prediction of this dissertation's model in this chapter (namely, **H2** and **H3** are confirmed with supporting evidence), we *ought to expect* the Eisenhower administration proceed with a strategy of Rollback; especially since the confirmation of both **H2** and **H3** predictions are empirically satisfied. The party divisions were controlled by the opposition Democratic Party for all but the first two years of the (Republican) Eisenhower Administration; we should expect to see the dissertation's **Intervening Variables (IVVs)** to be of greater effect. As we shall see, **H2** most closely resembles the predicted outcome. In this dissertation's model, **H2** predicts that should the junior partner are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome. Indeed, the junior members of the Western Alliance were hard-pressed to display much in the way of autonomy, as the Soviet Union established and solidified the Communist sphere of influence in Europe under the Warsaw Pact by 1955.

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<sup>174</sup> Brands (2014): 48; Acheson and Johnson to Truman, 8 September 1950 *FRUS*, vol. 3: 273; "The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Louis Johnson) to the President," [Washington] 8 September 1950, *FRUS, 1950, Western Europe*, vol. 3: Document 172. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d172>, accessed 4 February 2019; see also, Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), undated (September 1950), *FRUS 1950*, vol. 3: 291-92; Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Top Secret], "United States Views on Measures for the Defense of Western Europe," [Washington] undated (September 1950), *FRUS, 1950, Western Europe*, vol. 3: Document 178. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d178>, accessed 4 February 2019; Philip Jessup to James Lay, 9 October 1950, box 181, NSC, HSTL; "Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Executive Secretary Council (Lay)," [Washington] 9 October 1950, *FRUS, 1950, Western Europe*, vol. 3: Document 216, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63D 351: NSC 82 Series. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d216>, accessed 4 February 2019.

Additionally, several successive early Cold War confrontations (such as the Berlin Blockade, the First Indochina War, the 1953 East German Uprising, Hungarian Revolution, Suez Canal Crisis, and the Hungarian Uprising of 1956) proved to the old Great Powers the need of a Superpower benefactor in the post-war era. Therefore, America's junior partners were most likely to follow Washington's lead, thus confirming the second hypothesis of this dissertation's model.

The so-called "German question" preoccupied much of the Cold War. Keeping in mind that Germans had been the enemy of almost all of NATO less than a decade previous, the issue gathered greater import due to Moscow's stubborn policy to retain their half of the partitioned country within their control. In looking at **H3**, e.g. if the junior partner of the coalition becomes fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome. Once again, the causal logic is that foreign policy often times needs to demonstrate commitment, and this is especially the case when an ally fears abandonment should conflict escalate. However, it is because Containment causes conflict escalation, partially because formal defensive alliances are most costly, strength of action allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partner(s) that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger senior partner of the alliance will honour its promise to come to the military aid of other coalition members.

In fact, Eisenhower's attempt to reconcile Germany (and perhaps Italy) with their former adversaries turned allies (especially the French) to unite through compromise in the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC). While the EDC made it clear that French reticence to trust Germany contributed to both the infeasibility of the EDC and, more significantly, the near fracture of the relationship between Paris and Washington (which will come to a head in the next chapter under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations). While Eisenhower's push for EDC

ratification was ill-fated, the Eisenhower Doctrine outlined in NSC 162 established the conceptual strategy of *Massive Retaliation*, which certainly acted as the nuclear component of a complete Rollback strategy (especially given that this became the most comprehensive and destructive deterrent threat under the Containment context) appeased and allayed German concerns over abandonment (especially with US forces deployed in West Germany).

The alternative explanation would posit that the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence solidifying the East-West border in Germany brought the threat within close proximity to NATO members (**A2**: the nearer a powerful state is geographically, the greater the tendency to balance against it) would lead to a strong balancing response from the West. Similarly, the Eisenhower decade of the 1950s saw the USSR not only cross the hydrogen bomb threshold, thus able to threaten the West with its first thermonuclear-capable nuclear ordinance, but were able to pull ahead of the Americans in terms of delivery systems with the successful launch of Sputnik demonstrating that the Kremlin was capable of intercontinental strikes via ballistic missiles. This development raised security stakes and, therefore, the actual relative power and capability of the Soviet faction (**A1**: the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it). Again, the NATO response to **A1** (like **A2**) should be an even more bellicose foreign policy and even an attempt to strong-arm the Kremlin to balance the emergent threat.

The Eisenhower Administration, despite proclaiming a more aggressive Rollback approach than his predecessor (which *would* be consistent with **A1** and **A2**) was far more status quo and "stay the course" than the rhetoric suggested. In fact, we will see the administration supporting the Hungarian Uprising rhetorically, but providing very little in the way of materiel support for the intra-Warsaw Pact insurrection, which would have been a grand opportunity to

implement Rollback. In fact, the Eisenhower Doctrine outlined in NSC-162/2 with 'Massive Retaliation' was more concerned itself with social and economic costs driving the transition from conventional to nuclear forces to prevent the militarization of the American economy and not due to *balance of threat* considerations expected with **A1** and **A2**, but the virtual status quo in alliance issues provided the incentive to approach American Doctrine as more in-line with Truman and not extended the scope of Rollback.

With the relative shock of the Cold War at the start of the Truman Administration and becoming the "new normal" in international politics during the Eisenhower Presidency, the US Congress provided a great deal of pressure to recall American troops deployed in Western Europe and called for a better balance of payment deal for the United States. In fact, Congress was indeed calling for greater oversight in foreign affairs and security issues. As we will see, this will lead to the confirmation of **IVV2**, e.g. when the legislative branch's oversight on foreign policy is strong, the executive branch will be constrained in selecting its preferred foreign policy option.

During the FY 1955, Congressional oversight (**IVV2**) called for cutting back military aid earmarked for European defense, arguing that America's NATO allies needed to be greater contributors to Western Defense and also indicated that the Administration should push for the European powers to ratify membership in the European Defense Community (EDC). Furthermore, Congress pushed the Executive branch to stress diplomatically that many more security solutions must be found from within the European community (EDC) and that Europe, once again, needed to establish a balance of payment system that is more fair to the United States, which had been paying the lion's share of expenses. This confirms **IVV2** that increased Congressional Oversight restrained the Executive branch and partially explains (along with the

primary causal factors of **H2** and **H3**) why Eisenhower's inclination to implement Rollback was limited.

*Maintenance of NATO & Raising the German Question: The European Defense Community*

The issue of Western European defense had been, in large part, solved during the Truman administration with the formation of NATO. Furthermore, the Korean War is often pinpointed as the watershed moment when the "O" for "organization" was reinforced in NATO, transforming from a theoretical, alliance-on-paper to a functioning alliance, as an organization in other words. However, alliance cohesion would continue to be an issue that would plague the western alliance for decades. According to Brady, the European Defense Community (EDC) was "conceived as a vehicle for bringing German soldiers into the NATO force structure, while simultaneously reassuring Germany's neighbors by placing those soldiers under a multinational command, the EDC represented to Washington policy makers a kind of alchemy that could transmute French fears into German divisions."<sup>175</sup> The conception of the EDC stemmed from addressing the issue of German rearmament, in terms of the "framework, pace, and extent," especially in the face of French reticence to allow for the re-formation of a German national army.<sup>176</sup> Under the multinational force framework of the EDC, however, the idea of German rearmament would take place within what French Premier René Pleven would propose as a "European Army" with the purpose of advancing Western European security and not German national interests.<sup>177</sup> According to the Pleven Plan, each force contributions to European defense would parallel their national army counterparts, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), therefore ensuring that German forces would not include the creation of a German general staff

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<sup>175</sup> Steven J. Brady. *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance Under Pressure, 1953-1960* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010) : 11.

<sup>176</sup> Brady (2010): 11.

<sup>177</sup> Brady (2010): 11.

that could advance its national interests.<sup>178</sup> The plan, however, would institutionalize an "infinite delay" in the rearmament of Germany allowed for widespread French support but, unsurprisingly, created problems with the United States, which had been able to secure Congressional support via the promise to integrate direct German military contribution within NATO. Furthermore, Germany supported integration within the EDC as a major step towards obtaining equal status among its Western allies, as well as re-establishing sovereignty in the new post-war system.

German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer would come to insist that the FRG's adoption of the EDC was contingent upon nondiscrimination of West Germany, thus forcing the United States, Great Britain, and France to fundamentally change their relationship vis-a-vis their former adversary. To Chancellor Adenauer, German adoption of the European Defense Community was inextricably linked to the full transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, which was still occupied by the former allies. According to Brady's analysis, "from the beginning, then, the EDC's political implications took precedence over its military implications, especially in Bonn. For as long as the EDC remained a potential but unrealized defense option for NATO, the political status of occupied West Germany would remain on ice."<sup>179</sup> While hesitancy from American allies was a stumbling block for the Bonn regime, it was then-General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, who "lent his substantial prestige to the idea of a European army, as opposed to simply national contingents within NATO, in June 1951, Eisenhower had come to

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<sup>178</sup> Brady (2010): 11; *New York Times*, 26 October 1950: 3; Thomas A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) : 141; Michael A. Creswell, *A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006): 29-33.

<sup>179</sup> Brady (2010): 12; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, vol. 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1963); See also, James McAllister, *No Ext: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002): 201.

favor German rearmament within the European framework."<sup>180</sup> In fact, General Eisenhower would come to argue along similar lines to McCoy, coming to view European unification as a sort of:

skeleton key, unlocking the solution to a number of problems at once, and most important, providing a type of "dual containment." The Soviet Union could be kept out, and Germany kept in Europe, but with neither able to dominate the Continent.<sup>181</sup>

While Eisenhower supported German political rehabilitation as General, but both he as President and Secretary of State Dulles largely continued Truman's policies, especially with regards to the German Question. In fact, Dulles told High Commissioner-designate James B. Contant, prior to his first European trip as Secretary of State, that his meeting with the Chancellor Adenauer "would be a courtesy visit" and that his reason for going to Bonn was "to accumulate information from those who were already on the spot to ascertain the political trend in Germany."<sup>182</sup>

Furthermore, Secretary of State in the Chancellery Otto Lenz reported that he had received reports prior to 8 January that the Eisenhower administration "would completely retain the course of the Truman administration in foreign policy."<sup>183</sup>

While the new Eisenhower administration demonstrated continuity with its predecessor regarding the EDC, the United States supported the pursuit of *Westindung*, "the integration of Germany into the western community" as progress towards political, economic, and military integration.<sup>184</sup> According to Dulles, "Germany must become strong" so that the Soviets would

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<sup>180</sup> Brady (2010): 12.

<sup>181</sup> Brady (2010): 12; Thomas A. Schwartz, "Eisenhower and the Germans," in Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995): 215

<sup>182</sup> Brady (2010): 13; Dulles/Eisenhower Library materials: Telephone Conversations, Box 1, Folder 4. John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University.

<sup>183</sup> Brady (2010): 13; Otto Lenz, *Im Zentrum der Macht: Das Tagebuch von Staatssekretar Lenz, 1951-1953* (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1989): 517.

<sup>184</sup> Brady (2010): 14; Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945-1953* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965): 553, 557.

not be able to "blackmail" the FRG.<sup>185</sup> Brody's cogent analysis is in line with *si vis pacem, para bellum*; "military strength would make reunification *more* likely" and it was this view of Dulles that served to be reassuring to Adenauer that the Bonn had American support.<sup>186</sup> In other words, the integration of West Germany into the military infrastructure for the defense of Europe "implied American leadership of the West, which Adenauer took to imply America's continued commitment to Western Europe," which was also evidenced by the Chancellor's analysis that Dulles "was governed by the idea of an inexorable deepening of the East-West conflict."<sup>187</sup>

Adenauer's play for German re-integration into European politics is demonstrative of Bonn's fear of abandonment by American allies, and so pressed even in the face of French and, to a lesser extent, British opposition. French opposition to the rearming of Germany so soon after the Second World War forced Dulles to propose a significant scaling-down in proposals that would serve to ratify the EDC in parliaments in London and Paris. Dulles pressed Adenauer, who was facing a general election, to meet with the Soviet Union to discuss the 'German Question,' largely due to the effect of the so-called "Peace Offensive" strategy being employed by the Kremlin. In other words, because Moscow was dangling detente with respect to the West, the FRG could not afford to be viewed as inflexible in the eyes of the French, British, and American general public who were fatigued with the Korean War as well as the continuing insecurity of East-West tensions. Dulles impressed upon Adenauer the necessity of appearing

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<sup>185</sup> Brady (2010): 14.

<sup>186</sup> Brody (2010): 14; Adenauer, *ibid.*, 552-59; Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, 6 February 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 5, part 2: 1572; Telegram, The Secretary of State to the President, [The Hague] 6 February 1953 [Secret], *FRUS, 1952-1954, Western European Security*, vol. 5, part 2: Document 276. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v05p2/d276>, accessed 5 February 2019.

<sup>187</sup> Brody (2010): 14; Brody notes that his analysis of the Adenauer-Dulles relationship has been influenced by Felken, *Dulles und Deutschland*, see especially 148-49; quote from Waldemar Besson, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und Maßstabe* (Munich: R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1970): 143; See also, Clay Clemens, *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989): 28-30.

flexible to meeting with the Soviet Union, all the while resisting overtures of German reunification under a Soviet banner.<sup>188</sup>

Dulles's solution was to advise Adenauer that the status quo needed to be continued for the next four years following the election, particularly with respect to the EDC.<sup>189</sup> In other words, Adenauer's administration should not press too hard nor too for reintegration. Adenauer agreed, but pressed his American allies that some measure of his *Westbindung* policy was indeed leading towards political reintegration, and therefore suggested that the German High Commissioner to the United States be "given the rank of ambassador prior to the ratification of the Paris agreements"<sup>190</sup> in order to retain his own public support.

The Eisenhower administration was indeed facing two opposing alliance maintenance issues. On the one hand, Secretary Dulles needed to assuage West German fears of abandonment through a more aggressive, rollback-like military posture, increased deployment of American troops in Western Europe, and an aggressive push to join the European Defense Community to structurally secure the FRG's status within the alliance. On the other hand, the Americans had to present a policy of weaker containment in the form of detente vis-a-vis association, given French and British intra-alliance balancing since the Kremlin was employing their strategy of a "Peaceful Offensive," as well as France's reluctance to accept German rearmament so shortly after being the initiators of two world wars. The United States would end up publicly supporting

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<sup>188</sup> Brady (2010): 26-7; National Archive and Records Administration (Hereafter NARA), State Department Central Decimal File, 611.62a/4-853; Adenauer (1965): 570; according to Brady, "the perpetually anxious chancellor at this time found himself trying to ease the fears of his American allies. Such was the administration's commitment to EDC as the key to a secure, friendly Europe." Brady (2010): end note p. 51; see also, McAllister (2002): 237-38.

<sup>189</sup> Brady (2010): 28.

<sup>190</sup> Brady (2010): 28; Adenauer (1965): 570; "United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower," *The White House*, 7 April 1953. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Germany and Austria*, vol. 7, part 1: Document 178. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v07p1/d178>, accessed 7 February 2019; NARA, State Department Decimal File, 611.62a/4-853; "United States Delegation Minutes of the First General Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles," 7 April, 1953: *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 7: 431-32.

the FRG's policy of *Westbindung*, however Dulles strongly warned that the Americans were "willing to do what it could to help Adenauer politically, unless such help implied harm to America's relations with France, and, thus, harm to the prospect of EDC ratification."<sup>191</sup>

Eventually, the debate between a more aggressive rollback policy to appease the Federal Republic versus a weaker containment detente to appease the France was fairly superficial. By the summer of 1953, the Soviet Union's foreign policy actions betrayed their declared ambition for a "Peaceful Offensive." In June 1953, Moscow suppressed a worker's uprising in East Berlin, as well as other places in East Germany. This "reinforced in the minds of many in the West the impression that Moscow was unwilling to make any real concessions that might help to mitigate the tensions between the superpower blocs. The Kremlin, in sending tanks into the streets, had indicated the limits of their flexibility."<sup>192</sup> On June 1953, Western allies met to negotiate with representatives from Moscow with the specter of the June 17 East German uprising looming. In fact, negotiations fell apart when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was not willing to accept the allies' insistence that it would not be possible to achieve a resolution to the 'German Question' if unification was not achieved through a free and open election through both parts of Germany.<sup>193</sup>

#### *From Operation Solarium to the New Look*

During the summer of 1953, the Eisenhower administration looked to consider every available foreign policy option and grand strategy. Operation Solarium, so-called because the meeting which authorized the planning exercise took place in the White House solarium room,

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<sup>191</sup> Brady (2010): 28; See also, Telegram, Paris to State Department, 9 April 1953: NARA, State Department Central Decimal File, 611.62a/4-953. See also, Brady (2010): 46 for more of Adenauer's fear of American abandonment of its military commitments.

<sup>192</sup> Brady (2010): 57.

<sup>193</sup> Brady (2010): 58; Melvyn F. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007): 148; Christian Ostermann, *Uprising in East Germany, 1953* (New York: Central European University Press, 2001).

began in 1953. As per Eisenhower's instructions, three separate study groups were convened at the National War College:

"(1) continuation of the Truman strategy of 'containment' -- strangely enough, given the fact that [Secretary of State, John Foster] Dulles had dropped him from the State Department the previous March, [George F.] Kennan was asked to chair this group; (2) a strategy of 'deterrence,' which involved drawing lines around the periphery of the communist world, with the implied threat of nuclear retaliation against those who crossed them; and (3) 'liberation' - the use of political, psychological, economic, and covert means to attempt to 'roll back' existing areas of Soviet influence."<sup>194</sup>

It should be noted that the first option, that of the continuation of President Truman's strategy of containment chaired by George Kennan resembled NSC-68 and not the theoretical terms penned by the study group's chair as in the Long Telegram. As argued by both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, Truman's aggressive containment variant relied on ever-increasing budgetary expenditures and a reactionary-heavy willingness to fight everywhere and where the enemy chose. According Secretary Dulles' speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on 12 January 1954, President Truman's containment variant "would have required readiness to fight 'in the Arctic and in the Tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.' It could not have been kept up for very long 'without grave budgetary, economic, and social consequences."<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War [2nd Edition]* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 143-44.

<sup>195</sup> Gaddis (2005): 144-45; Eisenhower speech to New York State Republicans Committee, 7 May 1953, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower* [hereafter *EPP*], 1953, p. 265; Notes, Eisenhower meeting with bipartisan legislative leaders, 5 January 1954, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File: DDE Diary, Box 3, "Staff Notes, Jan.-Nov., 54"; Notes, Eisenhower meeting with Republican legislative leaders, 30 April 1953, *ibid.*, Box 2, "Staff Notes, Jan.-Dec. 53"; Dulles speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, 12 January 1954, *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 30 (25 January 1954): 108.

These three groups, named Task Force A, B, and C, would end up being deconstructed to form the basis of NSC 162, which Eisenhower remarked on their inherent many similarities. In effect, the discussion of each Task Forces centred on a few differentiating issues. Task Force A relied on the 'German Question' of rearmament and reunification; Task Force B relied heavily on nuclear brinkmanship; and Task Force C argued that "the current international environment made it imperative that the United States move rapidly and aggressively to fracture the communist empire."<sup>196</sup> However, crucially, Task Force C assessed Europe as being "politically-weak" and had lost it's "elan vital, and its leadership." Therefore, it concluded that while more aggressive behavior would end up causing "added strains upon our ties with our Allies," it would similarly compel the United States into bold action in order to "command respect, not necessarily love and devotion" in order restore Western Europe's "faith in America's leadership" which would grow and create renewed confidence. In other words, Task Force C argued that bold and aggressive action was required to restore European confidence, resolve, and faith in Washington. In other words, while NATO members would push back against American hyper aggressiveness, this policy was required in order to bring them back into the fold. The assumption resting behind this assessment is that Europe's political malaise, weak self-confidence, and weakening faith in American leadership was largely due to fears of abandonment that Washington was not capable of 'winning' the Cold War, which would have to be quickly demonstrated.<sup>197</sup>

By the end of discussion for all three task forces, Eisenhower challenged the conclusions of each, instead looked to combine the analysis and foreign policy prescriptions of all three into a unified policy. When the president was not persuaded by the task force members, special

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<sup>196</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 137;

<sup>197</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 136; Report of Task Force "C"; "Project Solarium - A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "C" of Project Solarium," 16 July 1953, see especially pages 172, 13, 6, 101, 58-9, and 5.

assistant for national security affairs Robert Cutler called for a summary of all three groups and then present them to the NSC "with a view toward, a. designating the areas which the Council wishes to have worked on further, and b. directing the Planning Board to prepare recommendations in those areas."<sup>198</sup>

*NSC 162/2: New Look - Massive Retaliation*

From the beginning as Operation Solarium through the Meeting of the National Security Council to synthesize the three task forces, the result was NSC 162/2, the culmination and redirection of the Truman Doctrine in NSC 68 to the Eisenhower Doctrine of Rollback outlined in *The New Look*. In the new American grand strategy, NSC 162/2 outlined the necessity to keep "a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power."<sup>199</sup> By the end of the review of national security strategy, the document was specific in what would be considered. The president had the ultimate decision on whether or not he would launch a nuclear strike; it stated that "in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be available for use as other munitions." According to Divine, Eisenhower's "assent to NSC 162/2 amounted at least to a promise to the Joint Chiefs that he would authorize nuclear retaliation in case of overt Communist aggression."<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 138; *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2: 396, 398; "Minutes of the 155th Meeting of the National Security Council," [Top Secret] Thursday, 16 July 1953. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 79. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d79>, accessed 7 February 2019.

<sup>199</sup> Robert A. Divine. *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981): 36; *The Pentagon Papers*, Senator Gravel Edition (4 volumes; Boston, 1971): I, 416, 426; Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York, 1962): 436-37.

<sup>200</sup> Divine (1981): 35-6; *The Pentagon Papers*, Senator Gravel Edition (4 volumes; Boston, 1971): I, 416, 426; Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York, 1962): 436-37.

With its reliance on strategic power, NSC 162/2, which was dubbed the "New Look," the Eisenhower administration would significantly reduce force levels and defense spending, calling for the U.S. Army to reduce strength in its post-Korean War stance from twenty divisions to fourteen. By 1957, in other words, the United States would reduce its standing army by almost half a million men by relying on atomic responses.<sup>201</sup> The United States Navy (USN) would similarly reduce, however to a lesser extent. This was to become the American reliance on the Air Power in the post-World War Two era, increasing from 115 to 137 aircraft and 30,000 men.<sup>202</sup> With the utilization in both strategic strikes and tactical nuclear weapons, NSC 162/2 placed the United States' emphasis on a massive retaliatory strike in order to deter Soviet acts of aggression. The basic decision of the National Security Council, according to Secretary Dulles was that the United States would be able to retain the initiative by depriving the Kremlin of the ability and freedom to "pick the time, place and method of warfare" and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would not have to plan to meet every probe made by Moscow with conventional, non-nuclear forces; in other words, the United States would be able to "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."<sup>203</sup>

New Look would appeal to American budget oversight committees with its cut to standing armies, as well as to the British and French junior alliance partners who had begun to push back against Washington, calling for easing of East-West tensions shortly after Moscow's

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<sup>201</sup> Divine (1981): 37.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid; for further discussion of Massive Retaliation, see also: Brent Thomas Gerchicoff, *The Rockets' Red Glare: The Impact of Technology on U.S. Nuclear Strategy from Eisenhower to Carter* (MA Thesis, Concordia University, 2012): Chapter 2, 59-61; David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring, 1983): 160-1; Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960* (Ann Arbor, MI: Air Force University Press, 1971); "Memo for General Eddleman et al., Subject: Use of Large Weapons, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45), Sec. 9C, JCS; and Memo, Nathan Twining to Chairman, JCS, 8 May 1957, Subject: Studies of Large Yield Weapons, Subject File, Top Secret, 1952-1957, Folder 4, Box 122, Nathan Twining Papers, LC.

<sup>203</sup> Divine (1981): 38-9; Snyder (1962): 451-55, 464; see also, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, 1960): 58; Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1977) : 140-41, n. 56.

Peaceful Offensive. Germany, with Bonn's fear of American abandonment to the East was a different story. According to Brady, "Chancellor Adenauer chose to treat the situation as a full-blown crisis between Bonn and Washington."<sup>204</sup> Further to his analysis, he notes that "Kohler, who clearly thinks that Adenauer overreacted, labels the chancellor's reaction 'unique' and credits Dulles for his 'thorough' 'well thought-out' and 'sympathetic' attempts to reassure Adenauer that his worries were misplaced."<sup>205</sup> True to Dulles' implications, American foreign policy makers were willing to be sympathetic to Adenauer and the Federal Republic, but unwilling to alter strategy if it meant increasing friction with France and Great Britain.

Eisenhower's New Look may have advocated a greater push back against the Soviet sphere of influence with rollback, but force reductions illustrated that this was more rhetorical than actual policy during mid-1950s. In fact, Democratic opponent Harriman noted that he felt that Eisenhower's policy towards the Soviets was "soft" and promised to "sharply attack the Eisenhower government on account of the weakness to which it showed with regard to the Soviet Union."<sup>206</sup> According to Brady, "the United States had to take into consideration the needs and demands of increasingly assertive European allies when attempting to lead NATO"<sup>207</sup> and Paris was pushing back against German full-reintegration and rearmament, all the while looking to ease the often crisis level of tension in Western Europe in East-West relations. The price of alliance maintenance with Great Britain and France was that, at times, the Adenauer government perceived that Washington was not opposing Moscow strenuously enough.

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<sup>204</sup> Brady (2010): 171; See also, Schwarz, Hans-Peter. *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann* (2nd Edition), Two volumes (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994): 291-96; Henning Kohler. *Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main: Propylaen, 1994): 942-945.

<sup>205</sup> Brady (2010): 193, n. 58; Kohler: 942-45.

<sup>206</sup> Brady (2010): 172.

<sup>207</sup> Brady (2010): 172.

*The New Look and Collective Security: Nuclear Support and Collective Defense*

According to Rosenberg, Wampler, and Trachtenberg, there was a great deal of continuity between the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies with respect to foreign security policy related to Western Europe.<sup>208</sup> As we have seen, both Truman and Eisenhower believed that combat troops stationed in Europe and Germany were necessary, even essential, to be able to resist the Soviet conventional threat.<sup>209</sup> Where the administrations differed was the extent to which they relied on strategic nuclear weapons or conventional forces in order to offset NATO allies providing insufficient military manpower.<sup>210</sup>

The concept of a European collective security project would come to present complex problems for the in-coming Eisenhower Republican administration. According to Dockrill, there were three major problems stemming from this:

1. Firstly, the European Defense Community treaty, begun by the Truman administration, still needed to be ratified by the six countries that were supposed to participate;
2. Secondly, the success or failure of collective security needed two US assumptions come to fruition under the New Look doctrine: NATO allies would have to accept that defending Western Europe was primarily up to them, and that they would have to support American nuclear strategy;

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<sup>208</sup> Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy 1953-1961* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) : 72; See also, David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," in Norman A. Graebner (editor) *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice 1945-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986): 123-195; Robert A. Wampler, "Conventional Goals and Nuclear Promises: The Truman Administration and the Roots of the NATO New Look," in F. Heller and J. Gillingham (editors), *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1992): 353-380; Marc Trachtenberg, "The Nuclearization of NATO and U.S.-West European Relations," in Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991): 153-168.

<sup>209</sup> Dockrill (1996): 72.

<sup>210</sup> Dockrill (1996): 72; Eisenhower placed heavy reliance nuclear forces, in what Gaddis termed "an asymmetrical response," while Truman relied on conventional forces to a much greater extent.

3. Thirdly, once the goals of collective security had been achieved, American foreign policy makers believed that they would be able to withdraw a significantly large number of US forces from the continent.<sup>211</sup>

However, while these complex issues would obviously be imperfectly implemented in practice, British and other Western European leaders were closely observing to see whether or not there were any alterations in American grand strategy in Europe since the 1952 election, which saw US domestic power shift from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party<sup>212</sup> -- in other words, European leaders were closely watching American foreign policy debate to determine if fears of abandonment were justified. As Dockrill notes, "the American commitment to collective security in Europe since 1949 was a revolutionary phenomenon and the western allies were bound to feel uneasy about the consequences for their defense of any change in US leadership. Furthermore, by 1953 the United States had become a truly global power and every official US statement was taken seriously by its allies. Therefore the Eisenhower administration would have to deploy considerable diplomatic finesse in explaining its plans to its European allies."<sup>213</sup>

Upon inauguration, Dulles and the Eisenhower administration viewed the ratification of the EDC treaty as "the most pressing current problem in Europe,"<sup>214</sup> given the hope that the project would bring European unity, push Germany and France into rapprochement, and serve to ensure that the Federal Republic of Germany would significantly contribute to the defense of the west, while US military presence in Europe would be able to finally decrease.<sup>215</sup> In reality, already in 1953 the EDC showed strains, particularly from Paris. "The French had still to

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<sup>211</sup> Dockrill (1996): 72.

<sup>212</sup> Dockrill (1996): 72-3.

<sup>213</sup> Dockrill (1996): 73.

<sup>214</sup> Dockrill (1996): 73; See also, Draper (Paris) to the Department of State, telegram 1246, 26 January 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 5: p. 709; The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Department of State, [Top Secret], Paris, 26 January 1953. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Western European Security*, vol. 5, part 1: Document 373. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v05p1/d373>, accessed 11 February 2019.

<sup>215</sup> Dockrill (1996): 73.

overcome their fear of the resurgence of West Germany, whose strength in western Europe was once more growing in comparison with that of France, distracted and weakened as they [were] by their military efforts in Indo-China. Nor would Britain agree to become a full member of the EDC and thus help to allay French anxiety about the predominance of a rearmed West Germany in the projected community."<sup>216</sup> Adding to the complications was the fact the Republican controlled Congress was not likely to devote much funding for new aide bills for their European allies, should the prospect of the EDC collapse.<sup>217</sup>

The planning to extend the American nuclear shield into Europe began planning in 1946, when Strategic Air Command (SAC) was empowered as the primary nuclear strike force and in 1949; the strategic concept accepted by NATO's defense committee agreed that the United States would be primarily responsible for so-called strategic bombing, "with all types of weapons, without exception."<sup>218</sup> Concurrent with the creation of the Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) in April of 1951, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US scientists at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), the development of *Project Vista* was being conducted. The group, sponsored by three armed services branches of the US government, had been developing the use of tactical nuclear weapons and their future within NATO strategic planning.<sup>219</sup> The president of Caltech, Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, supervised the project and reported directly to SACEUR General Eisenhower in 1951 and, subsequently, the coordination of SAC

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<sup>216</sup> Dockrill (1996): 73; Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 102-12 ff.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Dockrill (1996): 75; David C. Elliot, "Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *International Security*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Summer, 1986): 163, 177; Wampler (1990): 4; "Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area," enclosed in Colonel C. H. Donnaelly's minute, Paris, 1 December 1949, *FRUS 1949*, vol. 4, p. 355; Rosenberg (1986): 143; Note by the Secretary of the North Atlantic Defense Committee (Donnelly) to the Committee; Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area. [Top Secret], Paris, 1 December 1949. *FRUS, 1949, Western Europe*, vol. 4: Document 204. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v04/d204>, accessed 11 February 2019.

<sup>219</sup> Dockrill (1996): 75.

missions with SACEUR operational plans and the establishment of SACEUR's overall authority in the employment of nuclear weapons in the European theatre.<sup>220</sup> However, US domestic legislation impeded strategic nuclear planning and development, as the 1946 McMahon Act restricted the ability of American officials from sharing information and strategic planning about US nuclear weapons with its European allies.<sup>221</sup>

By the time Eisenhower's Republican administration took office, the US had difficulty exerting pressure on their European allies. The Truman administration had fully committed the United States to the defense of Europe, appointing then-General Eisenhower as the supreme allied commander in Europe, NATO (SACEUR) at the end of 1950, as well as deploying three more US divisions at the end of 1951; furthermore, 80 per cent of all funds earmarked for military assistance with the Defense Department were sent to Europe; combined, total military and economic assistance amounted to approximately 12 billion dollars.<sup>222</sup>

Significantly, after the French appealed in February 1952, the US agreed to extend security guarantees for the European Defense Community in the future. To this point, the United States, British, and French declared a joint declaration at the signing of the EDC treaty in Paris on 27 May 1952: "if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the community', it would 'regard this as a threat to' its 'own security' and 'act in accordance with

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<sup>220</sup> Dockrill (1996): 75; Elliot (1986): 164; Wampler (1990): 4-8.

<sup>221</sup> Dockrill (1996): 75; See, also Julian Schofield, *Strategic Nuclear Sharing* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014): chapter 9: Sharing Within the Western Alliance; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (third edition) (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003): 36-37, 289-297.

<sup>222</sup> Dockrill (1996): 76; See also, Robert Watson, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954*, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986): 286; *Secretary of Defense Report, January-June 1953*: p. 53; "Dulles's notes for Senate Foreign Relations," 10 February 1953, Box 67, Dulles papers, *SML: Secretary of Defense Report January-June '53*: p. 57; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-51* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 1980).

Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty."<sup>223</sup> However, while the US was losing methods to gain leverage over their allies and the EDC Treaty signed but not yet ratified, FRG Chancellor Adenauer, Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, along with Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the 'Benelux' states) expressed their trepidation over French reticence to sign the EDC and pushed Secretary Dulles to actively assist with expanding European unity via foreign policy encouragement and economic support.<sup>224</sup>

French support for both the EDC and their American allies was in stark decline by mid-1952 and it was becoming more and more clear that the Treaty would not be ratified. This was due to several factors: the rise of nationalist sentiment by the Gaullist faction, the perception that French sacrifices in Indochina were not sufficiently appreciated within American circles, and lastly, the continued pressure by Washington for EDC ratification.<sup>225</sup> This fissure between Paris and Washington would threaten to tear NATO apart and fracture the alliance during the Kennedy administration, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

There were considerable strains between the American and British, in addition to that of France. Apart from the less than warm relationship between Dulles and Churchill, the Eisenhower administration tended to view Europe as a unitary actor, as opposed to a collection of single entities. According to Dockrill, "Dulles believed that the key to future European stability was a Franco-German reconciliation, preferably with a 'considerable' British

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<sup>223</sup> Dockrill (1996): 76; 'Declaration by the Governments of the USA, the United Kingdom and France on their interest in the strength and integrity of the European Defense Community' published at the time of the signature of the EDC Treaty in Paris, 27 May 1952; see also, Denise Folliot (editor), *Documents on International Affairs, 1952* (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955): 169.

<sup>224</sup> Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs 1945-1953* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966): 428-33ff; Dockrill (1996): 77; for the official record of Secretary Dulles' visit to Western Europe between 31 January - 8 February 1953, see *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 5, pp. 1548-81 ff.

<sup>225</sup> Dunn (Paris) to the Department of State, telegraph 7991, 20 June 1952, *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 5: pp. 688-90; Acheson (Bonn) to Truman (letter), 26 May 1952, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 5: pp. 680-683; Acheson to Dunn, telegram 1305, 6 September 1952, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 5: pp. 690-692; Anglo-American talks, 12 November 1952, *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 5: pp. 698-699; See also, Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-1954*, vol. 6 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1971): 106-7; Francois Seydoux, *Memoires* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1975): 168-70; Rene Massigli, *Une Comedie des Erreurs* (Paris: Plon, 1978): 322-26; Dockrill (1996): 77.

commitment," while viewing Great Britain as a nation in decline, and not regarding any special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>226</sup> However, Churchill would make it clear to Eisenhower and Dulles that, despite reticence to appear as though they were a "satellite" state for the Americans, Great Britain would fully support the EDC ratification in continental Europe.<sup>227</sup>

In order to maintain a viable defense of the continent, NATO members had pledged to contribute 43 2/3 divisions, each with 13,000 men to constitute the European army. However, actual troop contribution was decidedly lower: 14 French divisions, 12 divisions each from the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, as well as 5 2/3 divisions from the Benelux nations.<sup>228</sup> According to Liddell Hart's observations during a July 1952 visit to Europe: the "'menace of a sudden Russian advance' had been diminished because of allied rearmament efforts, and that 'the Russians could no longer be sure of a rapid success with the forces they have on the scene.' However, he also pointed out that there were 'no better prospects of lasting resistance' owing to the 'lack of [allied] reserves to reinforce the defense anything like proportionately to the Russians' probable reinforcement o the attack.'"<sup>229</sup> In other words, NATO members had become stagnant and confident, perhaps over-confident, due to conventional deterrence between East and West. Should the Soviets launch an attack on NATO, however, it would very likely result in a *fait-accomplis*, according to Liddell Hart. Furthermore, European economic growth began to

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<sup>226</sup> Dockrill (1996): 78; Leonard Mosley, *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978): 292-353; Gerson, *Dulles*: 71; Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (London: Andre Deutsch): 166; See also, D. Cameron Watt, "Demythologizing the Eisenhower Era," in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (editors), *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989): 65-85.

<sup>227</sup> Robert Rhodes James, *Anthony Eden* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986): 352; Dockrill (1996): 79; Victor Rothwell, *Anthony Eden: A Political Biography, 1931-1957* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992): 4, 128-9.

<sup>228</sup> Dockrill (1996): 79; Dockrill (1991) *West German Rearmament*: 89.

<sup>229</sup> Dockrill (1996): 80; 'Impressions from my Continental Tour,' July 1953, 11/1952/12, Liddell Hart papers, LHCMA.

stagnate towards the end of the Truman administration, creating an economic imbalance between the United States and their NATO allies, which created a "vicious circle" in which "American pressures on Europe to continue re-arming caused the latter to press for increased American military aid. During the Truman years, the amount of US military aid to Europe, which was initially small, began to increase rapidly so that by 1952 80 per cent of US assistance to western Europe for 1952 consisted of military aid."<sup>230</sup>

Adding to the push and pull of alliance pressures on American contribution to the defense of Europe, domestic forces complicated matters. While European partners were forcing the United States to fund the lion's share of military strength to oppose Soviet expansionism, Congress exerted strong pressure to reduce America's military aid programme. Not only did Congress cut military aid in the Financial Year (FY) 1954 revised budget, but also appropriated only \$1.3 billion for FY 1955 under the heading of military aid, contrasted with 5.3 billion pounds sterling during FY 1952 under the Truman administration.<sup>231</sup> In fact, Congress was becoming impatient with the progression of NATO member ratification, or lack thereof, of the European Defense Community Treaty. By the beginning of 1953, General Bradley argued that "Eisenhower recommended that we push the EDC. The real problem is that getting German participation. Anything which does not accomplish that doesn't mean very much. In hearings before the Congress, I have always had to face the question as to when we were going to get German help in defending Europe. It would be difficult to justify Congressional appropriations for Europe if there were no such prospect."<sup>232</sup> Furthermore, Congress impressed on the

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<sup>230</sup> Dockrill (1996): 80; Robert A. Pollard, "The National Security State Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1945-1950," in M. J. Lacey (editor), *The Truman Presidency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 233.

<sup>231</sup> Dockrill (1996): 80; Burton I. Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982): 58.

<sup>232</sup> Memorandum of Discussion of State - Mutual Security Agency - Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Held at the Pentagon Building, 28 January 1953, 10:30 p.m. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Western European Security*, vol. 5, part 1:

administration that progress needed to be forthcoming in order to be able to appropriate funding of NATO programmes, stressing solutions must be found regarding European unity and resolution of the German question:

The Secretary emphasized that time is now a very important factor and not a matter of convenience. Time was running out. While we all have parliamentary difficulties, the US Congress was now in such a mood that unless positive action toward continental European unity within NATO occurs within the next two or three months, any appropriations voted would be so rigid as to have very adverse repercussions on NATO programs now contemplated...If there is no likelihood of early action - and particularly the creation of a strong Franco-German kernel of strength for NATO - it will be very difficult to obtain further appropriations.<sup>233</sup>

By 1954, Congress began to press the issue even further, demanding more congressional oversight with respect to appropriations and funding for NATO in which European unity and collective security was lagging and the United States was left paying disproportionately for the alliance:

The French negative action, without the provision of any alternative, obviously imposes on the United States the obligation to reappraise its foreign policies, particularly those in relation to Europe. The need for such a review can scarcely be questioned since the North Atlantic Council of Ministers has itself twice declared with unanimity that the EDC was of paramount importance to the European defense it planned. Furthermore, such review is

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Document 374. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v05p1/d374>, accessed 18 February 2019.

<sup>233</sup> Knight Minutes, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184. Place and Date of Meeting with Soviets [Secret], 6 December 1953 [Bermuda]. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Western European Security*, vol. 5, part 2: Document 343. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v05p2/d343>, accessed 18 February 2019.

required by conditions which the Congress attached this year and last year to authorizations and appropriations for military contributions to Europe.<sup>234</sup>

This is all in line with times of heightened Congressional oversight as an intervening variable: due to the lack of progress in regards to European unity, collective security, and the resolution of the German question, all proceeded to force the Eisenhower administration to have greater difficulty securing funds for maintaining security in Western Europe.

It is in this atmosphere that NSC 162/2, Eisenhower's "New Look," created a wave of reaction amongst its allies. At the best of times, many European leaders associated Eisenhower's Republican Party with the tradition of American isolationism.<sup>235</sup> This fear of abandonment by the United States was coupled with a perception in Europe that American decline in terms of prestige would at once limit Eisenhower's "ability to influence other people because of their attitudes towards us," as the administration defined prestige as "the weight other people give to our views in forming their own" and was linked to how much cooperation could be summoned.<sup>236</sup> Congressional members, especially Republicans, cutting back expenditures abroad did not allay fears that the United States was reverting to a policy of isolationism.<sup>237</sup> Secretary

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<sup>234</sup> Statement by the Secretary of State, 31 August 1954. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Western European Security*, vol. 5, part 2: Document 5. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v05p2/d5>, accessed 18 February 2019.

<sup>235</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 208; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. 1: 1484-86; *ibid.*, vol. 2: 592, 586; Report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council Planning Board [Top Secret], 30 September 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 93, S/S - NSC files, lot 63, D 351, NSC 162, 30 September 1953; Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d93>, accessed 20 February 2019; Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), [Top Secret], 30 October 1953. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 101, S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101>, accessed 20 February 2019.

<sup>236</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 23 July 1953. *FRUS, 1952-1954, General: Economic and Political Matters*, vol. 1, part 2: Document 219. Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "President." Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d219>, accessed 20 February 2019; Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council, [Secret] 24 September 1953. *FRUS, 1952-1954, General: Economic and Political Matters*, vol. 1, part 2: Document 225. Eisenhower Library, files of the Office of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d225>, accessed 20 February 2019.

<sup>237</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 23 July 1953.

Dulles, however, believed that the Eisenhower Doctrine, outlined in New Look, would "reestablish confidence" through its policy recommendations of tying American deterrence to the fate of its Western European allies.<sup>238</sup> In order to address some of the specific concerns of NATO members' fear of abandonment, the future of American hegemony and hawkishness, the NSC executive recommended US foreign policy be guided in several aspects:

- Stress that American intentions are peaceful and would welcome a summit with the Soviet Union and express willingness to compromise.
- Emphasize that the United States would work cooperatively in non-military matters with other nations.
- Establish a "genuine partnership relationship with allies abroad" and avoid the perception of "unilateralism" through consultation on important issues, as well as encouraging "greater initiative by allies and give sympathetic treatment to their proposals."
- Establish trade liberalization.
- Avoid reinforcing the perception that U.S policies were associated with "militarism" and make sure not to "sound belligerent" or view war as inevitable.
- Establishing a more selective attitude in "exerting pressures on foreign governments."<sup>239</sup>

We can see American concern for alliance perception towards US policy, both in terms of the fear of abandonment, as well as potential chain-ganging through belligerence, unilateralism, and non-consultation. This would establish a difficult tightrope for the Eisenhower administration to maintain: allay fears of abandonment through the policy of rolling back Soviet expansionism, however being cautious not to demonstrate belligerence and that East-West general war was inevitable. What resulted was the New Look, which called for selectivity in terms of

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<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council, [Secret] 24 September 1953.

confrontation to Soviet expansion, establishing greater alliance coordination and participation in defense, while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent that communicated American resolve to tie its fate with its NATO partners. In trying to strike this balance, Eisenhower had to limit Rollback to be largely rhetorical, and even then the Policy Planning Staff recommended against that should the United States announce such a policy "as an overt goal prematurely would risk provoking the Soviets into overrunning Europe to augment their strength before it could be defended."<sup>240</sup>

### *Rolling Back in Action or Words?*

The State Department's position was that aggressively rolling back the Soviet Union in order to foment internal change via the imposition of pressures on the regime was not a desirable strategy. Members of the State Department argued that the policy of forceful rollback through "aggressive actions would be futile, dangerous, divisive, and counterproductive."<sup>241</sup>

Rollback was *futile* due to the fact State determined that "limited actions within our capabilities would not materially reduce the Soviet threat even if successful." The fourth paragraph of the NSC 162/2 draft assessment was that Moscow would retain control of their satellite states "so long as the USSR maintains adequate military forces in the area," and additionally that "detachment of any major European satellite ... does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or by war."<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 30; *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2: 58-68; Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff [Top Secret], 19 May 1952. PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Review of NSC 68& 114," *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 8. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d8>, accessed 21 February 2019; Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) [Top Secret], 13 May 1952. PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Review of NSC 68 & 114," *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 7. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d7>, accessed 21 February 2019.

<sup>241</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 160.

<sup>242</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 160; *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2, part 1: 492, 580; Report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council Planning Board [Top Secret], 30 September 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 93. Retrieved from

The strategy would be *dangerous*, because in the State Department's estimation, such "actions are likely materially to increase the risk of general war." While Paragraph 5a of the draft strategy indicated that rollback would be improbable to start general war, indeed it assert that the "Soviets will not, however, be deterred by fear of general war from taking measures they consider necessary to counter Western actions which they view as a serious threat to their security."<sup>243</sup> Such forceful and potentially violent course of actions against states within their sphere of influence would, of course, be very likely to consider as a "serious threat to their security."

Furthermore, rolling back the USSR was judged to be *divisive*, since the necessary actions to implement the strategy "would place serious strains on the coalition." Bowie and Immerman note that in paragraph 14c of the drafted NSC 162/2 document, NATO members "feared U.S. policies toward the Soviets were 'too rigid and unyielding,' entailing risks that preventive war or liberation might involve them in general war. A policy of rollback would

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<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d93>, accessed 22 February 2019; Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State [Top Secret], 28 October 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2 part 1: Document 99. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d99>, accessed 22 February 2019; Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay) [Top Secret], 30 October 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 101. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101>, accessed 22 February 2019.

<sup>243</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 160; *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2, part 1: 493, 580-81; Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium [Top Secret], 1 June 1953. PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Review of the Basic National Policy." *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 69. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d69>, accessed 22 February 2019; Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) [Top Secret], 31 July 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 66 D 148, "Solarium." *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 82. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d82>, accessed 22 February 2019; Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State [Top Secret], 28 October 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2 part 1: Document 99. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d99>, accessed 22 February 2019.

confirm and reinforce those fears." Therefore, the rollback strategy "could imperil the coalition" that was judged essential in the East-West struggle.<sup>244</sup>

Lastly, roll back was *counterproductive*, since implementation "might well destroy the chances of agreement with the USSR on the more fundamental aspects of the Soviet threat." Bowie and Immerman identified the position that the growing Soviet nuclear capability constituted the greatest threat to the United States, which could only be reduced through a series of arms control agreements. The State Department felt that, in time, the Kremlin would come to the conclusion "that armament limitations will also serve their own interests and security."<sup>245</sup> The CIA advisor elaborated the point:

The Soviets are more likely to become amenable to reason as a result of finding the West strong and united but willing to live with peaceful Russia than they are by an accumulation of minor damage that would not affect their vitals but would tend to reinforce their dogmatic belief in the inevitability of an all-out clash with the capitalist states.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 160; *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2, part 1: 499, 495, 586, 583; Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State [Top Secret], 28 October 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2 part 1: Document 99. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d99>, accessed 22 February 2019; Report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council Planning Board [Top Secret], 30 September 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 93. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d93>, accessed 22 February 2019; Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay) [Top Secret], 30 October 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 101. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101>, accessed 22 February 2019;

<sup>245</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 160; *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2, part 1: 496-97, 584-85; Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State [Top Secret], 28 October 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2 part 1: Document 99. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d99>, accessed 22 February 2019; National Intelligence Estimate [Secret], 23 October 1953. INR - NIE files. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 97. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d97>, accessed 22 February 2019; Report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council Planning Board [Top Secret], 30 September 1953. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 162. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 93. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d93>, accessed 22 February 2019.

<sup>246</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 160-61; Robert Amory, memorandum to director, Central Intelligence on paragraph 43 of NSC 162, 1 October 1953, Lot 54 D563, S/P.

In fact, American foreign action was restricted by alliance concerns and the appeasement of their NATO partners as a priority, lest the western alliance become even less cohesive. During the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis of 1954-1955, Eisenhower deemed the loss of Quemoy and Matsu would swing the balance of the Chinese civil war in making Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces of Taiwan easier to capture by the communist-held Mainland Chinese. While the United States would lose a great deal of prestige in the East-West global struggle, the administration felt that their European allies would "not react favorably" to American interventionism, instead viewing it as yet "another example of 'recklessness, impulsivity and immaturity' in U.S. foreign policy."<sup>247</sup> In a letter from the President to SACEUR General Gruenther, Eisenhower argued that if the Americans pursued a military response off the coast of China, the Russians "would want to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in an effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from our major allies."<sup>248</sup> This indicates that American strategy was largely dependent on the concerns of junior members of the coalition bloc.

### *French Indochina: Intractable Allies, Quagmires, and Vietnam*

While European allies were at once nervous that even limited war would spiral into a nuclear conflagration under the new doctrine of Massive Retaliation and the growing concern within NATO that the United States may withdraw troops in Western Europe, the French were embroiled in their own conflict with Communist forces in Indochina. The United States had been providing financial assistance for their fight against the Vietminh in Indochina since the Truman

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<sup>247</sup> Bennett C. Rushkoff. "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 96, no. 3 (Autumn, 1981): 472-73; Eisenhower to Gruenther, 1 February 1955, Eisenhower Diary; Letter From the President to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Gruenther), 1 February 1955. *FRUS, 1955-1957, China*, vol. 2: Document 71. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v02/d71>, accessed 25 February 2019.

<sup>248</sup> Letter From the President to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Gruenther), 1 February 1955. *FRUS, 1955-1957, China*, vol. 2: Document 71. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v02/d71>, accessed 25 February 2019.

administration, spending \$10 billion in the process. According to Dockrill, "with the rapidly increasing quantity of United States assistance during the fiscal year 1954, the American Treasury was covering two-thirds of the entire costs incurred by the French in the Indo-China war."<sup>249</sup>

During the first quarter of 1954, a major push by the Vietminh threatened to overrun the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, in northern Vietnam. One of the primary concerns from Eisenhower was that a French defeat in Indo-China would critically undermine Paris' commitment to resisting communism throughout Southeast Asia.<sup>250</sup> In fact, Dulles attempted to rally for a "united action" from the Western alliance to save the garrison at Dien Bien Phu, however Congress and the United Kingdom were resolved not to intervene, with the UK making their position abundantly clear:

The British people would not be easily influenced by what happened in the distant jungles of South East Asia; but they did know there was a power American base in East Anglia and

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<sup>249</sup> Dockrill (1996):93; See also, "Outline of Major US Statements and Actions Reflecting Recent US Policies Toward Indochina," drafted by Stegmaier and revised by John Foster Dulles, 27 July 1954, Box 8, Subject series, John Foster Dulles Papers, *Dwight D. Eisenhower Library*.

<sup>250</sup> Dockrill (1996): 93; Donald Heath, the ambassador to Saigon, to the Department of State, telegram 1683, 14 March 1954. *FRUS, 1952-1954: Indochina*, vol. 13, part 1 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1982): 1119-20; Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State [Top Secret], 5 August 1953, Washington. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Indochina*, vol. 13, part 1: document 367. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d367>, accessed 25 February 2019; The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State [Top Secret]. 16 March 1954, 16:00, Saigon. 751G.00/3-1654: Telegram. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Indochina*, vol. 13, part 1: Document 613. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d613>, accessed 25 February 2019; The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State [Secret]. 31 March 1954, midnight, Saigon. 751G.00/3 - 3154: Telegram. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Indochina*, vol. 13, part 1: Document 661. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d661>, accessed 25 February 2019; see also, George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, "'The Day We Didn't Go to War': Revisited," *Journal of American History*, vol. 71 (September, 1984): 343-63; George Herring, "'A Good Stout Effort': John Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1954-1955" in Immerman (editor), *Dulles and the Cold War*: 213-33; Richard Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 14, no. 1 (Winter, 1990): 43-66.

that war with China, who would invoke the Sino-Russian Pact, might mean an assault by Hydrogen bombs on these islands.<sup>251</sup>

Unsurprisingly, Dulles call for "united action" did not come to fruition and the French fell at Dien Bien Phu to Communist forces on 7 May 1954. However, it is important to note that US foreign policy was guided by a trying to mediate and accommodate the junior coalition members, France in this case. In fact, the lesson taken away from this episode was that NATO member-states did not want a "tough policy" and a "strong response," so it is unsurprising that the policy of Rollback, in this context, was not appropriate if the US was to maintain alliance cohesion, despite the position that Dulles' preference was clearly a confrontational approach to Soviet action.<sup>252</sup> According to Eisenhower, himself, "it would be better to continue to emphasize constructive peace" (as opposed to preparing American and allied public opinion for the use of nuclear weapons) because an "attempt to educate public opinion now on the weapons that might have to be used in war might produce very great strain on our alliances."<sup>253</sup> According to Dockrill's analysis, "it was clear that the Eisenhower administration had been compelled to

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<sup>251</sup> Dockrill (1996): 93-4; A Record of the Conference with Congressional Leaders, 5 April 1954. *FRUS, 1952-1954, Indochina*, vol. 13: 1224; Eden's Minute, C (54) 134, 7 April 1954 CAB 129/67, *Public Record Office*; Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960): 99-106; Colville minute (for Shuckburgh, 27 April 1954, PREM 11/645, *Public Record Office*; see also, Eisenhower's Diary on 27 April 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, *Liddel Hart Centre for Military Archives*.

<sup>252</sup> Dockrill (1996): 94; NSC 204th meeting, 24 June 1954. *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2: p. 690; *Ibid.*, 694-95; unsigned memo, "United States Foreign Policy," 16 May 1954, Reel 5, *The Papers of John Foster Dulles and Christian A. Herter 1953-61 - The White House Correspondence and Memoranda Series* (Maryland: University of Publications of America, Inc., 1986); *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 2: p. 696; Memorandum of Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 24, 1954 [Top Secret, Eyes Only], 24 June 1954. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 120. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d120>, accessed 25 February 2019; Memorandum of Discussion at the 209th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday August 5, 1954 [Secret, Eyes Only], 5 August 1954. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 123. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d123>, accessed 25 February 2019; Statement of Policy by the National Security Council [Top Secret], NSC 5422/2, 7 August 1954. S/S - NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5422. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 124. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d124>, accessed 25 February 2019.

<sup>253</sup> Dockrill (1996): 95; NSC 209th Meeting, 5 August 1954. *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2: pp. 700-15; Memorandum of Discussion at the 209th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday August 5, 1954 [Secret, Eyes Only], 5 August 1954. *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 123. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d123>, accessed 25 February 2019.

soften its approach to the use of nuclear weapons, and this was bound to reduce the psychological impact on the Soviet Union of emphasizing nuclear deterrence. Given, however, the crucial importance of retaining allied loyalty, this compromise, even if mainly rhetorical, was inevitable."<sup>254</sup>

### *The 1956 US Presidential Election*

The 1956 US Presidential election saw a landslide victory for Eisenhower, capturing 457 electoral votes, over Democratic nominee Adlai E. Stevenson. Eisenhower ran on a more restrained and less militaristic foreign policy. Eisenhower stated at a March 7<sup>th</sup> press conference that the cost of a potential war was becoming too dangerous and that the East-West conflict carried with it the possibility of spiraling out of control was risky. Eisenhower reiterated at the press conference “his conviction that ‘global war is getting well nigh unthinkable.’... We were ‘going to get a very great broadening of the contest,’ one which ‘doesn’t carry always the inherent threat of major war...” In fact, Eisenhower directly stated that “the policy of ‘trying to answer specific thrusts’ had ‘carried always the threat of major war.’”<sup>255</sup>

This new restrained foreign policy, although keeping with much of rollback’s strong push-back policies, is in part responsible for America’s restrained response during the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 (as will be demonstrated below). This is consistent with this dissertation’s model and intervening variables (**IVV2**): that foreign policy had become an increasingly important factor (especially in the post-war era, after both WWII and Korea) and public opinion was becoming war-averse (or at least war-fatigued), contributing to the constraint of the executive branch in implementing a stronger foreign policy.

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<sup>254</sup> Dockrill (1996): 95.

<sup>255</sup> D.F. Fleming. *The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960: Vol. 2: 1950-1960* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1961): 776

*Yugoslavia, Tito, Fomenting Dissent, and the Hungarian Uprising of 1956*

The encouragement of national liberation movements was one of the hallmark strategies, as outlined by the Truman administration in NSC 68, was to encourage fissures or emerging schisms within the communist world. Dulles, a one-time member of the Truman administration, favored the president's "favored harassing the communist alliance" largely due to his "rigid, moralistic rhetoric [that] did not rule out the possibility that virtue and the Lord's work could be advanced by duping Lucifer's agents into confounding each other."<sup>256</sup> In fact, John Foster Dulles in a "Meet the Press" interview in February 1952 stated something approaching a general rule:

If your major objective is to get a break between a given Marxist state and Moscow, the way to get that is to make the going tough, not easy. The only reason Tito broke with Moscow was that conditions in Yugoslavia became intolerable as a result of the resistance we were getting up in Greece to their program there, the blockade that they were subjected so they couldn't get any goods or machinery out of this country, Russia couldn't supply it, and the situation finally got to be one where they just couldn't go on.<sup>257</sup>

Fomenting a Sino-Soviet split was deemed to be untenable by the National Security Council due to the belief that "powerful ties of common ideology" secured their coalition ties,<sup>258</sup> the defection of Yugoslavian president Josip Tito presented perhaps a more tractable situation. In 1948, Tito split Yugoslavia from the Stalin's communist bloc - the first defection from the USSR. At the centre of the issue in Yugoslavia was whether or not Tito had the right to rule in the self-interest of Yugoslavia, and not the communist bloc. Stalin did not approve of Tito's 1948 five-year plan, which favored projects that promoted industrialization (stressing machine construction

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<sup>256</sup> David Mayers, "Eisenhower's Containment Policy and the Major Communist Powers, 1953-1956," *The International History Review*, vol. 5, no. 1 (February, 1983): 63.

<sup>257</sup> John Foster Dulles interview on "Meet the Press," 10 February 1952 cited in Mayers (1983): 63.

<sup>258</sup> Mayers (1983): 63-65.

and locating factors in underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia).<sup>259</sup> Instead, Stalin insisted that "Yugoslavia's productive capacity be adjusted to the needs of the bloc"<sup>260</sup> and refused Tito's plan to build a self-sufficient army.<sup>261</sup> Stalin retaliated by recruiting members of the Yugoslavian government as spies and had the Soviet Politburo charge him with anti-Soviet policy when Tito refused to allow Yugoslavia from turning into a Soviet satellite state.<sup>262</sup> The American response was not forceful, but did seek to splinter the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact; Truman's Policy Planning Staff recommended assisting Yugoslavia with "materiel that did not endanger American security" and removing "prohibitions on munitions and other war material," but under the caveat that Tito cease providing aid to the communist guerrillas fighting in the Greek civil war.<sup>263</sup> The strategy paid off: Tito was perceived as an advocate of 'peaceful coexistence' with the West, the concept of "National Communism" contributed to unrest through the Warsaw Pact, led to the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and "as a result, the Soviet Union once again imposed conformity on the satellite states and adopted a critical position toward Yugoslavia."<sup>264</sup>

It is within this context in which Eisenhower's perhaps greatest opportunity to further splinter the Soviet sphere of influence behind Eastern Europe's Iron Curtain: the Hungarian Uprising of 1956. While Stalin pressured satellite states to unanimously condemn Tito's pushback, the Yugoslavian leader was not substantially weakened. In fact, by 1954 Moscow

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<sup>259</sup> Lorraine M. Lees, "The American Decision to Assist Tito, 1948-1949," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall, 1978): 408; Bennett Kovrig, *The Myth of Liberation: East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941* (Baltimore, 1973): 92; George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York, 1962): 96-7.

<sup>260</sup> Lees (1978): 408; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Tito and Goliath* (New York, 1951): 47-8; Stevan Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (New York, 1971): 194.

<sup>261</sup> Lees (1978): 408; Armstrong (1951): 115-16.

<sup>262</sup> Lees (1978): 408; Armstrong (1951): 48; Hoffman and Neal (1962): 194.

<sup>263</sup> Lees (1978): 415; Policy Planning Staff no. 49, Economic Relations Between the United States and Yugoslavia, 10 February 1949, National Archives.

<sup>264</sup> Lees (1978): 421; See also, "Yugoslavia, A Current Problem," November 1949, Personal Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library; George Janinovich, *The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia* (Baltimore, 1968), especially p. 78.

lifted their own trade restrictions and attempted rapprochement with Belgrade.<sup>265</sup> Additionally, this gave rise to a new concept of "Titoism," which could be best described as adherence to the socialist political and economic system, but existed in diplomatic and political nonalignment with the Soviet Union.<sup>266</sup> According to Lees, "Tito's example of 'National Communism' appealed to the satellites and contributed to the unrest that culminated in the Hungarian uprising of 1956. As a result, the Soviet Union once again imposed conformity on the satellite states and adopted a critical position toward Yugoslavia."<sup>267</sup>

When Stalin died in 1953, Secretary Nikita Khrushchev sought rapprochement, once again, in July 1955. However, despite this new thawing of relations with Belgrade, Secretary Khrushchev may be obscured by the fact that he, "his colleagues, and the East European leaders had remained tense beneath the surface in the months preceding the Hungarian conflict."<sup>268</sup> Moscow and the movement started by Tito was once again on a collision course, as Khrushchev's *destalinisation* aimed to replace the Stalinist cult of personality and centralization of Soviet leadership, Tito's objective was a fundamental restructuring of the Soviet system, placing equal footing between Moscow and Belgrade. Previous, Tito wrote in an October 1946 article that:

The people of Yugoslavia were not fighting only against the invaders but also against their allies the local traitors - the gangs of Pavelic, Nedic, Rupnik and Draza Mihailovic. Despite the fact that the invaders and domestic traitors joined forces, the people prevailed in their great struggle. Therein lie the specific features of the liberation struggle of the nations of

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<sup>265</sup> Lees (1978): 421.

<sup>266</sup> Lees (1978): 421.

<sup>267</sup> Lees (1978): 421.

<sup>268</sup> Johanna Granville, "Hungary, 1956: The Yugoslav Connection," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 50, no. 3 (May, 1998): 494.

Yugoslavia, therein lies its greatness. No other occupied country in Europe can boast of such a struggle and our people have a right to be proud of it.<sup>269</sup>

Tito's argument here of Yugoslavian exceptionalism was rooted in the state's historical achievements, as well as the struggle against fascist aggressors and domestic traitors, earned the nation a special place within the communist sphere. Clearly, this view brought into question Moscow's legitimacy over their satellites. In fact, the Soviets and the Moscow-loyal Hungarian authorities were concerned about a potential "spillover effect, or ideological contagion of the Hungarian people via the Yugoslav media."<sup>270</sup>

Taking cues from Khrushchev's Secret Speech, which denounced Stalin's political crimes and cult of personality, Polish and Hungarian rehabilitated Stalin's Purge victims in February 1956.<sup>271</sup> In many communist satellite states there was corresponding demoralization and strains in relations with Moscow following the details of Stalin-era political prisoners were released, as part of Khrushchev's process of *destalinisation*. This caused far-reaching societal rifts between "so-called Stalinist 'Muscovites' (communist leaders who stayed in the USSR during World War II) and the 'home communists' (those who had languished in Stalinist prisons at home).<sup>272</sup> In Hungary, pro-Stalinist leader Matyas Rakosi, nicknamed "the Last Mohican of the Stalinist Era" and "Stalin's Best Disciple," retained power until July 1956, longer than all but Walter Ulbricht in the German Democratic Republic.<sup>273</sup> Given that Rakosi, had formed strong ties and loyalty to

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<sup>269</sup> Granville (1998): 494; Josip Broz Tito, "Features Peculiar to the Liberation Struggle and Revolutionary Transformation of the New Yugoslavia," *Kommunist* (Organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia), 1946. Granville (1998) cited quote in *Military Thought and Work: Selected Writings* [of Josip Broz Tito] (1936-1979), edited by Boro Pejcinovic (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavacki Zavod, 1982): 294.

<sup>270</sup> Granville (1998): 495-96; Granville notes that it has not been ascertained how much influence Tito's ideas had on the Hungarian general population and the Soviet concerns may have been unwarranted, especially given the recent animosity between the two states as a result of WWII atrocities committed by the Hungarians in Bacska against Yugoslavians. See also, Paul Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962): 179n.

<sup>271</sup> Granville (2001): 1052.

<sup>272</sup> Granville (2001): 1052.

<sup>273</sup> Granville (2001): 1055.

the elites in Moscow, used the 1948 Tito-Stalin schism as a pretext to authorize "a particularly cruel wave of purges within his own party, beginning with his innocent rival, Laszlo Rajk."<sup>274</sup> Rajk was "sentenced to death in a show trial in September-October 1949, which marked the beginning of the anti-Titoist campaign."<sup>275</sup>

During the riots in East Berlin in 1953, Moscow attempted to limit Rakosi's monopoly of power by forcing him to resign his position as prime minister and share power with the Imre Nagy, the incoming prime minister of Hungary. At this point, the Soviet leadership associated Rakosi's excesses being due to "overzealousness" and hoped that Nagy could alter this trajectory, perhaps with the help of increasing the production of consumer goods, relax the atmosphere of terror, and making concession to the peasants of Hungary -- policies associated with the New Course.<sup>276</sup> However, this was not to be case as splitting political power ultimately caused increased tension in both the political elite class and the general population, as Rakosi undermined and sabotaged Nagy's policies.

In February 1955, both Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov and Nagy were removed from power due to "rightist deviation." Rakosi, once again, became the head of the party, but these actions caused deep animosity and resentment among the workers and intellectuals who came to view Nagy as an increasingly attractive alternative.

Criticism of the Soviet elite became increasingly radical and numerous in both Poland and Hungary after Secretary Khrushchev's Secret Speech. Rakosi admitted that Laszlo Rajk was an innocent victim of "provocation" in a speech on 29 March, claiming that the Hungarian police "misled" his government. Rakosi was forced to retire in July, but not before promoting his

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<sup>274</sup> Granville (2001): 1055; According to Granville, Rajk was an important official during the underground Hungarian communist party during World War II and subsequently Rakosi's Minister of the Interior, then Foreign Minister.

<sup>275</sup> Granville (2001): 1070n.

<sup>276</sup> Granville (2001): 1055.

successor who shared many of his views, Erno Gero.<sup>277</sup> Unsurprisingly, there was widespread resentment and hatred for what the Hungarian population termed the "Rakosi-Gero clique," likening the duo to something approximating Stalin's 'cult of personality.'<sup>278</sup>

As a result of this heavy-handed political corruption and draconian retention of power, on 23 October, approximately 10,000 students marched to Budapest in a silent demonstration to protest "their grievances against the Stalinist leaders and Soviet domination."<sup>279</sup> The protesting students listed their so-called "sixteen points," boldly demanding that Rakosi's successor, Gero, be removed from power and reinstate Imre Nagy, who was a reformer. Furthermore, they demanded all Soviet troops leave Hungary, as well as an independent hand and equal footing between Budapest and Moscow.<sup>280</sup>

The rebellion turned violent and the Hungarian authorities called upon Soviet troops to suppress the demonstrations. According to Granville, "the first Soviet intervention in Hungary on 23-24 October was actually an invasion by invitation. Although Nagy was later blamed for inviting the troops, and Hegedus (the former Prime Minister) actually signed the official written invitation ex post facto, it was Gero who verbally requested them."<sup>281</sup>

The situation soon got out of hand, as the Soviet intervention on 23-24 October made things worse, as waves of lynching of AVO agents by insurgents demonstrates the increased propensity to extreme violence. When Nagy was voted in to become the Prime Minister in October and issued a wide range of reformist policies, Moscow was shown the need for a second intervention, lest the Kremlin loosen their grip on their Warsaw Pact satellites.<sup>282</sup> Taking a look

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<sup>277</sup> Granville (2001): 1056; See also, Teresa Toranska, *"Them": Stalin's Polish Puppets* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987): 78.

<sup>278</sup> Granville (2001): 1056.

<sup>279</sup> Granville (2001): 1056.

<sup>280</sup> Granville (2001): 1056;

<sup>281</sup> Granville (2001): 1056.

<sup>282</sup> Granville (2001): 1056.

at Nagy's reforms, it is easy to see why the Kremlin felt the need to intervene. On 28 October alone, "the Nagy government declared a cease-fire, amnesties for those involved in the uprising, a rise in salaries and pensions, and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and follow-up negotiations for a full troop withdrawal from Hungary. He also rejected previous characterizations of the uprisings as a 'counterrevolution' and promised to dissolve the AVO and create new state security organs."<sup>283</sup> In fact, Nagy planned to push not only for the elimination of the secret police, but also a complete Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

### *American Response*

In considering American response to the uprisings in Hungary and Poland, the National Security Council and the State Department both considered its implications upon alliance politics. The NSC considered the Hungarian uprising from the perspective of demonstrating that the United States did not seek to poach potential military allies from the Soviet sphere of influence. In fact, NSC 5616 articulated the position that the harsh repression of demonstrations, the Americans should aim to prevent intervention from Moscow into Hungary through international pressure -- in effect, the NSC was advocating a *soft power* approach.

In pursuing our immediate objectives of discouraging and, if possible, preventing further Soviet armed intervention in Hungary as well as harsh measures of repression or retaliation, mobilize all appropriate pressures, including UN action, on the USSR against such measures [, while reassuring the USSR we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies].<sup>284</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> Granville (2001): 1056; The State Security Department was known as Allamvedelmi Osztaly, or AVO.

<sup>284</sup> Draft Statement of Policy by the Planning Board of the National Security Council, NSC 5616, 31 October 31 1956. *FRUS, 1956-1957, Eastern Europe*, vol. 25: Document 151. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25/d151>, accessed 4 March 2019. See also, Memorandum from the JCS to Secretary of Defense Wilson, 31 October transmitted to the NSC by Lay on 6 November, and Memorandum from Bowie to Dulles, 6 November; both from the Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5616 Series. These documents include discussion of the wording of the bracketed portion of the NSC

NSC 5616 advocated cautious pressure towards the USSR.

In a telephone call between Eisenhower and the Secretary of State, the discussion revolving around US response focused on a different alliance consideration: how NATO countries would react and whether or not they would support intervening in the Soviet sphere.

The Pres[ident] does not think we should walk in this alone. He thinks it would look as if we were doing it for internal...<sup>285</sup> He thinks we could concert with NATO countries and certainly with the big ones. The Sec[retary] thinks they will be reluctant to come along with us - as they will interpret it as being an election move. The Pres[ident] said some agreement from our allies no matter who puts it in would take the noose off. The Pres[ident] said to tell them we have it seriously in mind and to reply promptly. Monday would not be fatal...The Pres[ident] said if they are friends enough and would do it, he would be happy. He would not do it alone. The Sec[retary] explained just what circulating a letter means. The Pres[ident] said he would like to hear from our allies - even a grudging assent. The Pres[ident] said he will be there first thing in the a.m. so let's talk to them. The Pres[ident] thinks it a good idea but thinks we should explore it.<sup>286</sup>

In fact, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to take too active a hand in the Hungarian Uprising, even when Soviet armed repression of the movement took place. In a meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, the US government took pains to avoid being implicated within the Warsaw Pact sphere of influence. The Chairman of the Committee,

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5616 draft seen above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that instead of what was in the draft, it should be written that "assurances as proposed would tend to undermine such influence as the United States may have on the government which is established in Hungary, and could in the future operate to our military advantage." The Bowie Memo, however, argued that the JCS suggestion "opposes a sound diplomatic move already made by the President." What we can see here is two perspectives on how forcefully worded the American response should be.

<sup>285</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>286</sup> Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President in New York and the Secretary of State in Washington, 5 October 1956 [5:02 p.m.]. *FRUS, 1955-1957, Eastern Europe*, vol. 25: Document 111. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25/d111>, accessed 4 March 2019.

Jacob Beam from the State Department noted that the American had been working on a "circulating [a] letter to the Security Council. [But] It will not take any stand on the action of the Hungarian Government itself. It will go after the idea that the Soviets have used their troops. It might even strengthen the hand of the Hungarians against Russia. It should make it possible for anyone to open debate."<sup>287</sup> In other words, the United States was willing to bring the situation in Hungary to the attention of the United Nations Security Council, but was by no means willing to embroil itself by taking a firm position.

Recalling the phone conversation between President Eisenhower and the Secretary of State, the administration predicted on 5 October that NATO allies would be reluctant to back the Hungarians, they still seemed to be reluctant to providing support that would sway the outcome of the conflict once the fighting started and the rebels were wildly overmatched. On 25 October, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Murphy wrote that Austria was uncertain what course of action the nation would provide, but "visualized that possibly a group of Western countries would each agree to take a fixed percentage of new refugees. He pointed out that these people had shown the independence and aggressiveness to take part in the uprising. They would constitute a particularly desirable group for any country to take." However, the Austrian position was not particularly enthusiastic about this policy: "Besides relieving Austria of the problem it would be most important psychologically to the West that this group not remained couped [SIC] up under unsatisfactory conditions in Austria for a long period of time. This would provide an additional discouragement to anyone to make a future show of independence." Furthermore, when Murphy suggested that Austrian Ambassador Gruber place these refugees in

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<sup>287</sup> Notes on the 38th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, 25 October 1956. Department of State, Central Files, 100.4 - OCB/10 - 2556. Top Secret. *FRUS, 1955-1957, Eastern Europe*, vol. 25: Document 107. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25/d107>, accessed 11 March 2019.

"concentration camps" with as much liberty as was possible, the ambassador declared that "he did not know whether it would be possible to do this."<sup>288</sup>

The views of the Austrian Ambassador are representative of the overall sentiment within discussion circles of the NATO alliance. In Germany, Foreign Minister Brentano noted that "it would have been impossible to render military assistance to rebels [in Hungary] and furthermore felt that economic aid as had been proposed [by the] German Ministry [of] Agriculture (Embassy telegram 1716, November 3) no longer feasible at this stage since such food supplies as might be sent to Hungary would fall into hands of pro Soviet elements...[The] immediate task before us was to recreate Western unity and to counteract as best we could affect [the] Hungarian situation on other satellite peoples, including East Germany."<sup>289</sup> Similarly, Ambassador Luce of France wrote to the Department of State, recommending solely rhetorical support that was largely symbolic but by no means inflammatory. According to Ambassador Luce, "I respectfully submit some suggestions: 1) You can appear in person before the UN General Assembly; 2) NATO can be called into general sessions; 3) We can offer assistance to Austria in case of aggression; 4) We can confine all USSR diplomatic personnel in the USA until ours in Hungary are release; 5) We can notify Moscow we will break diplomatic relations if the Soviet Army continues to fire on

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<sup>288</sup> Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State. Subject: Call of the Austrian Ambassador regarding the handling of Hungarian refugees in Austria. Washington, 29 October 1956. Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/10-2956. Confidential. *FRUS, 1955-1957, Eastern Europe*, vol. 25: Document 133. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25/d133>, accessed 11 March 2019.

<sup>289</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State, Bonn, 5 November 1956 (9 p.m.). Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11-556. Secret; Priority. *FRUS, 1955-1957, Eastern Europe*, vol. 25: Document 170. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25/d170>, accessed 11 March 2019.

the Hungarian population coupling this threat with an immediate offer to discuss guarantees for Soviet security from the satellites."<sup>290</sup>

The tepid response from France, Germany, and Austria indicated unwillingness by America's western allies to risk their security by backing the rebels in Hungary against Moscow. The revolt failed in just over two weeks, with very little response from the United States. Most of Eisenhower's response revolved around political rhetoric, but offered very little in the way of direct aid -- which was the doctrinal response outlined in the Truman administration and would be consistent with a policy of Rollback. In effect, the concern from junior members of the North Atlantic alliance that the United States would drag Europe into a major war with Russia left Eisenhower with little help from his allies. The United States was restrained by the lesser powers in the alliance limiting American aspirations of a Rollback policy to strike a blow against, at best the power of the Soviet Union and, at worst the prestige of the Communist world.

#### Conclusion

The Eisenhower administration inherited a functional, responsive, and cohesive NATO alliance that was capable of defending the Americas and Western European interests in the event of a Soviet invasion. However, it did not take long for transatlantic cohesion to be called into doubt. With the conception of the European Defense Community (EDC), there was an attempt to establish a multinational force framework in order to address the issue of German rearmament (a strategic necessity), while at the same time be sensitive to the French reluctance to allow a re-formation of a German national army. German Chancellor Adenauer's support for the EDC was contingent on full transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and a non-discrimination clause for the West Germans, which of course meant a fundamental change in

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<sup>290</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, Paris, 4 November 1956 (5 p.m.). Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11-456. Confidential. *FRUS, 1955-1957, Eastern Europe*, vol. 25: Document 165. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25/d165>, accessed 11 March 2019.

American, British, and French in their relationship with their former enemy. This controversial policy was inherited from the Truman administration with Eisenhower as General, but came to a head with Eisenhower as President.

The new Eisenhower administration supported its predecessor for a strong Germany, unable to be blackmailed by Moscow, paving the way for the integration of the FRG into the military framework for the defense of Europe. Adenauer took this to mean an implied American leadership of Western security and its continued commitment to Western Europe. This play for German integration into European politics demonstrates Adenauer's (and indeed the Bonn's) fear of abandonment by their American allies. Additionally, with Moscow dangling detente in front of the FRG in the "Peace Offensive," Adenauer could not afford to appear inflexible in the eyes of the other European great powers, especially in the wake of the Korean War. As a result of this hint of thawing of East-West relations, American Secretary Dulles was pushed to appear flexible in meeting with the Kremlin, while at the same time resisting the possibility of German reunification under the Soviet banner. In other words, waning alliance cohesion resulted in the necessity of American foreign policy being weakened, as predicted in the model being tested.

In the end, Dulles' solution was to advise Chancellor Adenauer to support the status quo until he was up for re-election and not to press too hard or too quickly for reintegration (which he agreed to). Here we see the need for Dulles to assuage FRG fears of abandonment through a more aggressive rollback military posture (including a push to join the EDC and deploy more troops on the continent) on the one hand, while on the other Washington had to present a weakened version of containment (detente) given British and French intra-alliance balancing in the wake of the Kremlin's "Peaceful Offensive" and France's reluctance to accept German rearmament. All of this ended up being for naught, as Moscow's suppression of a worker's

uprising in East Berlin reinforced the Soviet's unwillingness to make any real concessions and, therefore, the 1950s superpower detente never came to pass. The episode, however, remains instructive and a point of confirmation of the model being tested.

In 1953, the Eisenhower administration wrapped up its review of defense strategy in Project Solarium, culminating in the National Security Council (NSC) memo 162/2, dubbed *New Look*. In this new doctrine, the United States would put less emphasis on conventional forces in Western Europe, calling for the reduction of force levels by nearly half a million men and instead relying on air power and nuclear weapons. The focus on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in *New Look* came to be known as the *Massive Retaliation* doctrine in order to deter Soviet acts of aggression. The Eisenhower Doctrine was in response to America's British and French junior alliance partners who had already begun to push back against Washington, asking for an easing of East-West tensions shortly after the Kremlin's failed *Peaceful Offensive* with the FRG. While *Massive Retaliation* was obviously not akin to detente, the call for large scale conventional troop withdrawal was indeed de-escalatory and represented America's first attempt to thaw relations with their former ally. In this important sense, we have confirmation of the first hypothesis, namely that intra-alliance balancing would result in weakening of containment.

While Eisenhower's *New Look* was not directly a transition from Truman's Rollback to a somewhat weaker form of containment, this is largely due to the fact that the administration also had to accommodate Chancellor Adenauer's fear of that the United States would abandon Berlin. Furthermore, *New Look's* reliance on nuclear weapons while calling for the withdrawal of conventional forces was done to make American defensive position more cost effective due to increased Congressional oversight and the concern over ever-increasing defense spending. Again, this confirms the intervening variable in our model. However, it should be noted that

Congressional pressure to cut back defense spending and return to a normalized American economy echoed Eisenhower's own thinking and preference. This should not be unexpected, as this period was characterized by a unified government, that is the Executive branch and Congress were both Republican. Frustrated with the lack of progress in NATO members ratifying the EDC Treaty agreed to cut military aid from \$5.3 billion in FY 1952 to only \$1.3 billion for FY 1955 and demanding greater congressional oversight.

It was in this context that NSC 162/2, Eisenhower's *New Look* created a stir among NATO allies. Fear of abandonment coupled with the perception of American decline limited Eisenhower's influence as US prestige was drained. However, when *New Look* was released, also hoping to "reestablish confidence" through tying American deterrence to European fate. The document also established foreign policy guidelines meant to allay concerns in several areas, demonstrating that junior alliance partners and the desire for NATO cohesion was a driving force behind foreign policy goals and outcomes.

What resulted was the New Look, which called for selectivity in terms of confrontation to Soviet expansion, establishing greater alliance coordination and participation in defense, while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent that communicated American resolve to tie its fate with its NATO partners. In trying to strike this balance, Eisenhower had to limit Rollback to be largely rhetorical, and even then the Policy Planning Staff recommended against that should the United States announce such a policy "as an overt goal prematurely would risk provoking the Soviets into overrunning Europe to augment their strength before it could be defended."<sup>291</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> Bowie and Immerman (1998): 30; *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. 2: 58-68; Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff [Top Secret], 19 May 1952. PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Review of NSC 68& 114," *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 8. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d8>, accessed 21 February 2019; Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) [Top Secret], 13 May 1952. PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Review of NSC 68 & 114," *FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. 2, part 1: Document 7. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d7>, accessed 21 February 2019.

During the 1956 Hungarian Uprising and subsequent "Titoism," the United States took more of a *soft power* approach to the situation, despite the Eisenhower *rollback* rhetoric and the *New Look* doctrine. In fact, the administration was reluctant to play too heavy a hand, even taking pains to avoid being implicated in the Warsaw Pact's sphere of influence. The Eisenhower Administration was reticent to embroil itself in the Eastern European sphere of influence because of the concern expressed by its allies, namely that American belligerence and adventurism would chain-gang NATO allies into a global superpower conflict. This confirms the second hypothesis, namely that *if the junior partners are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome*. Certainly, we can see the falsification of the *balance-of-threat* hypothesis, since we ought to have expected stronger balancing coordination with such an aggressive turn by Moscow on one of its satellite states. Instead, America's tepid response to Titoism is indicative of Western allies, namely: France, Germany, and Austria's unwillingness to risk their security by backing the rebels in Hungary against Moscow. In effect, Eisenhower's rhetorically strong Rollback policy, the administration implemented as strong a form of Containment that the United States could reasonably put into practice, but would not risk fracturing the young NATO alliance, nor irresponsibly risk inflaming Moscow towards the precipice of a general war which would likely be nuclear in orientation.

The prediction of this dissertation's model in the preceding chapter (namely the confirmation of **H2** and **H3**), we expected that the Eisenhower administration proceed with a Rollback strategy. The party divisions were controlled by the opposition Democratic Party for all but the first two years of the (Republican) Eisenhower Administration; we should expect to see the dissertation's **Intervening Variables** (especially **IVV2**) to be of greater effect. As we have seen, **H2** most closely resembles the predicted outcome. In this dissertation's model, **H2** predicts

that should the junior partner are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome. Indeed, the junior members of the Western Alliance were hard-pressed to display much in the way of autonomy, as the Soviet Union established and solidified the Communist sphere of influence in Europe under the Warsaw Pact by 1955.

Additionally, several successive early Cold War confrontations (such as the Berlin Blockade, the First Indochina War, the 1953 East German Uprising, Hungarian Revolution, Suez Canal Crisis, and the Hungarian Uprising of 1956) proved to the old Great Powers the need of a Superpower benefactor in the post-war era. Therefore, America's junior partners were most likely to follow Washington's lead, thus confirming the second hypothesis of this dissertation's model.

The "German question" preoccupied much of the Cold War. Keeping in mind that Germans had been the enemy of almost all of NATO less than a decade previous, the issue gathered greater import due to Moscow's stubborn policy to retain their half of the partitioned country within their control. In looking at **H3**, e.g. if the junior partner of the coalition becomes fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome. Once again, the causal logic is that foreign policy often times needs to demonstrate commitment, and this is especially the case when an ally fears abandonment should conflict escalate. However, it is because Containment causes conflict escalation, partially because formal defensive alliances are most costly, strength of action allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partner(s) that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger senior partner of the alliance will honour its promise to come to the military aid of other coalition members.

The alternative explanation predicted that the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence solidifying the East-West border in Germany brought the threat within close proximity

to NATO members (**A2**: the nearer a powerful state is geographically, the greater the tendency to balance against it) would lead to a strong balancing response from the West. Similarly, the Eisenhower decade of the 1950s saw the USSR not only cross the hydrogen bomb threshold, thus able to threaten the West with its first thermonuclear fusion bombs, but were able to pull ahead of the Americans in terms of delivery systems with the successful launch of Sputnik demonstrating that the Kremlin was capable of deploying intercontinental strikes via ballistic missiles. This development raised security stakes and, therefore, the actual relative power and capability of the Soviet faction (**A1**: the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it). Again, the NATO response to **A1** (like **A2**) should be an even more bellicose foreign policy and even an attempt to strong-arm the Kremlin to balance the emergent threat.

The Eisenhower Administration, despite proclaiming a more aggressive Rollback approach than his predecessor (which *would* have been consistent with **A1** and **A2**) was far more status quo and "stay the course" than the rhetoric suggested. In fact, the administration supported the Hungarian Uprising rhetorically, but provided very little in the way of materiel support for the intra-Warsaw Pact snubbing of Moscow, which would have been a grand opportunity to implement Rollback. In fact, the Eisenhower Doctrine outlined in NSC-162/2 with 'Massive Retaliation' was more concerned itself with social and economic costs driving the transition from conventional to nuclear forces to prevent the militarization of the American economy and not due to *balance of threat* considerations expected with **A1** and **A2**, but the virtual status quo in alliance issues provided the incentive to approach American Doctrine as more in-line with Truman and not extended the scope of Rollback.

With the relative shock of the Cold War at the start of the Truman Administration and becoming the "new normal" in international politics during the Eisenhower Presidency, the US Congress provided a great deal of pressure to recall American troops deployed in Western Europe and calling for a better balance of payment deal for the United States. In fact, Congress was indeed calling for greater oversight in foreign affairs and security issues. As we will see, this will lead to the confirmation of **IVV2**, e.g. when the legislative branch's oversight on foreign policy is strong, the executive branch will be constrained in selecting its preferred foreign policy option.

During the FY 1955, Congressional oversight (**IVV2**) called for cutting back military aid earmarked for European defense, arguing that America's NATO allies needed to be greater contributors to Western Defense and also indicated that the Administration should push for the European powers to ratify membership in the European Defense Community (EDC). Furthermore, Congress pushed the Executive branch to stress diplomatically that many more security solutions must be found from within the European community (EDC) and that Europe, once again, needed to establish a balance of payment system that is fairer to the United States, which had been paying the lion's share of expenses. This confirms **IVV2** that increased Congressional Oversight restrained the Executive branch and partially explains (along with the primary causal factors of **H2** and **H3**) why Eisenhower's inclination to implement Rollback was limited.

## **Chapter 6: Intra-Alliance Balancing - The Middle Cold War Era**

*"The forces that one wants for war are not necessarily those which one may want diplomatically." -- McGeorge Bundy, 1962.<sup>292</sup>*

American grand strategy during the majority of the Cold War period is ultimately best characterized as the traditional Containment variant throughout most of period. There was a high degree of cohesiveness during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) having been just formed. While Truman had to negotiate with divided government institutions (IVV), the newly-formed NATO alliance were intra-alliance bargaining (IV2) with the United States, beneficiaries of the State Department's Marshall Plan for reconstructing war-torn Western Europe and looking to mitigate the fear of abandonment (IV3). As a result, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower had their political battles to fight in Washington to get their preferred Roll Back policy, but the hypotheses under scrutiny held with their prediction of Roll Back.

As nuclear strategy and sharing was opened to NATO members for planning purposes under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander - Europe (SACEUR), however, tensions and fissures in the alliance began to appear in the late 1950s and 1960s. While the Anglo-American "special relationship" allowed for the sharing of nuclear technology, other members of the alliance bloc came to view this as "Anglo-Saxon hegemony."<sup>293</sup> In a response to the special relationship, France took steps to develop a national nuclear deterrent in their *force-de-frappe* to balance Anglo-American influence. Similarly, the French convinced dissatisfied junior alliance

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<sup>292</sup> Daily White House Staff Meeting, 23 January 1962, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8, microfiche supplement, document 287; Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012): 41.

<sup>293</sup> Jan Melissen. 1994. "Nuclearizing NATO, 1957-1959: The 'Anglo-Saxons', Nuclear Sharing and the Fourth Country Problem," *Review of International Studies* 20 (3): 254.

partners to consider defecting from the NATO nuclear umbrella in favour of forming cooperative agreement in the "development of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles."<sup>294</sup> The cooperative pact between France, Italy, and Germany (F-I-G) was ultimately short-lived when de Gaulle was elected, but the growing schisms among Western powers were apparent. As a result of internal alliance pressure working against the United States, NATO moved towards a detente posture towards the Soviet Union. As such, the middle Cold War period can be looked at through the lens of a proto-containment (or weaker variant of containment strategy) for this reason. This chapter will look at the French-led alliance schism that nearly tore the Atlantic Treaty apart and the Harmel report that formalized NATO's role as a political institution with the detente strategy at the forefront of the East-West relationship, nuclear control and the doctrine of Flexible Response.

During the Middle Cold War (e.g. the Presidents Kennedy and Johnson administrations), international politics was a mixed bag. The Soviet Union was ready to cross the thermonuclear threshold and needed to be addressed as a peer competitor, rather than from a position of American strength and nuclear hegemony. Furthermore, Moscow did not appear content with its borders at the Warsaw Pact, as seen through the on-going Berlin crises. In other words, the Soviets represented a revisionist power for both Kennedy and Johnson.

According to Walt's *balance of threat* theory (A1), the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it. One would expect NATO to produce a stronger balancing position with these alterations in the international system during the early 1960s. In other words, the expected result of America's wasted nuclear supremacy (and thermonuclear monopoly) is that NATO alliance members would seek to formulate a more

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<sup>294</sup> Ibid: 267.

cohesive, stronger response if they were to balance against the threat with an enlargement in both offensive weapons and aggregate power.

Furthermore, the second alternative variable looks to reinforce the predictions that align with the first. The prediction made in **A3**, that is, the more aggressive a state's perceived intentions, and the more likely others are to align against that state. According to this prediction, Moscow's status as a clear revisionist power attempting to continuously push the West's boundaries in Berlin, the attempted installation of Soviet IRBMs in the Western Hemisphere, etc., we would expect strong opposing balancing behaviour from NATO.

This chapter will show that Walt's predictions do not hold under the empirical record. In fact, our alliance cohesion variables (especially **H1**) are more accurate in predicting the foreign policy outcome during the Middle Cold War period. According to **H1**, if the junior partners in the alliance are balancing against the coalition leader, a weak containment or proto-containment strategy is the most likely foreign policy strategy.

Additionally, the domestic part of the model for the intervening variable predicts that the executive should be constrained, because the increased pressure from the Soviet Union was viewed as being of critical concern for the legislative branch. According to **IVV1**, when foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance in the legislative branch, the executive will be constrained in selecting its most preferred foreign policy.

### *Flexible Response: The Nuclear Dimension*

Nuclear strategy from the outset of the missile age had been *Massive Retaliation* since the Eisenhower administration. That is, should the Soviet Union attack Western Europe, the United States would respond by launching an all-out nuclear strike. The doctrine of Massive Retaliation formed the backbone of American nuclear strategy for most of the 1950s, until the Kennedy

administration implemented *Flexible Response*. As Kennedy said to Congress, the new doctrine would place an "emphasis on minimizing risks by giving the United States sufficient flexibility to respond without either escalation or humiliation. This would require a capacity to act at all levels, ranging from diplomacy through covert action, guerrilla operations, conventional and nuclear. Equally important, though, it would require careful control: 'We believe in maintaining effective deterrent strength...but we also believe in making it do what we wish, neither more nor less.'"<sup>295</sup>

The new Kennedy administration was sworn into office with the purpose of lowering the risk of war with the Soviet Union, while taking care not to take a weak foreign policy position. In the early 1960s, the Soviets were supplementing their military power both in strategic nuclear assets and conventional military forces. However, the Kennedy administration looked to have options for de-escalation, as a range of responses to Soviet action that did not necessarily include full-scale nuclear strikes on Russian cities.

The conventional wisdom behind the doctrinal shift was "designed to increase the ability of the United States and its NATO allies to hold out against at least the initial stages of a Soviet-led thrust into Western Europe without resorting to the widespread use of nuclear weapons."<sup>296</sup> In other words, the reason why the Kennedy administration shifted policy away from Massive Retaliation was two-fold. Firstly, the Soviet Union was rapidly increasing military power, especially with its quickly approaching nuclear parity with the US (if they had not already achieved this point with the successful thermonuclear RDS-6/Joe-4 test in 1954 and achieving

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<sup>295</sup> Gaddis, 213; Kennedy message to Congress, 28 March 1961, *Kennedy Public Papers: 1961*: 231; Kennedy remarks to the Military Committee of NATO, 10 April 1961, *ibid*: 255; See also, Kennedy radio-television address, 25 July 1961: 535; address at the University of North Carolina, 12 October 1961, *ibid*: 668; Brent Thomas Gerchicoff, *The Rockets' Red Glare: The Impact of Technology on U.S. Nuclear Strategy from Eisenhower to Carter*, (MA Thesis, Concordia University: 2012): 59.

<sup>296</sup> Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 71.

intercontinental range rockets with Sputnik in late 1957). In fact, the conventional prediction with the balance of threat would be that as the rival state grew in military/aggregate power, we should expect stronger balancing opposition. This did not occur. In fact, the United States took pains to mitigate danger when shifting from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. In other words, instead of more strongly opposing the Soviet Union as predicted in balance of power, what happened is a pull-back from Eisenhower's Roll Back in favour of a less forceful Containment strategy.

However, recent archival work demonstrates the shift was "motivated in large part by the need to ease difficult intra-alliance tensions over the two fundamental, intertwined questions of the Cold War in Europe: the German question and the nuclear question."<sup>297</sup> We will see this play out in the section below.

The doctrine of *flexible response* was the Kennedy administration's idea to move away from what many had come to view as an "excessive" or "reactionary" strategic reliance on nuclear weapons in favour of a more controlled and limited response, including a much broader range of options. "Stronger conventional forces would allow NATO to respond credibly and effectively to Soviet provocations that did not merit full-scale nuclear attack, such as the seizure of a 'hostage city' like Hamburg, or even a surprise Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. In the narrower area of nuclear strategy, the idea was to shift away from a single all-out nuclear attack toward a policy of considering a controlled, discriminate nuclear war."<sup>298</sup> In other words, "the strategy of flexible response demanded the ability to carry out limited nuclear options during a conflict. Flexible response was supposed to give the president the ability to

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<sup>297</sup> Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012): 31.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid: 33; See also, Gregory Pedlow, "The Evolution of NATO Strategy, 1949-1969," *NATO Strategy Documents*, <http://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm>; Airgram from NAC delegation to State, 17 December 1960, *FRUS: 1958-1960*, vol. 7, pt. 1, 674-82.

deviate from preprogrammed attack packages in the 'single integrated operational plan' (SIOP) with a less than all-out response."<sup>299</sup>

According to Gavin's extensive archival research, however, the ability of American strategic forces to carry out the 'graduated' and 'controlled' responses, as outlined in the new doctrine, was not possible during either the Kennedy or Johnson administrations.<sup>300</sup> In fact, McNamara was told by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that a strategy of controlled response and pauses to allow negotiations was simply not possible.<sup>301</sup> Additionally, the Hickey Group presented a study that found that technical constraints would preclude the implementation of a controlled response would be unavailable until the late 1960s.<sup>302</sup> In fact, according to David Rosenberg, actual alterations to basic American war planning during both the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies were fairly superficial.<sup>303</sup> It is important to note that this precludes the possibility that since the major strategic innovation could not be accomplished at the implementation level; the policy shift could not be done with the purpose of countering the increasing Soviet menace.

Given that the Kennedy administration would not be able to implement flexible response on a strategic level, what was the political goal that the doctrinal shift was meant to precipitate? Flexible response was targeted towards the political question of possession and control of nuclear weapons in NATO.<sup>304</sup> While Eisenhower understood and was sympathetic towards

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<sup>299</sup> Gavin (2012): 33.

<sup>300</sup> Gavin (2012): 34.

<sup>301</sup> Gavin (2012): 34; Wainstein, L. et al., "Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945-1972," (June, 1975): 288. Retrieved from <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb403/docs/Doc%20%20-%20strategic%20command%20and%20control---%20evolution%20of.pdf>, accessed on 16 January 2018; see also, Lemnitzer to McNamara, 18 April 1961, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8: 74 (found in Gavin).

<sup>302</sup> Gavin (2012): 34; see also, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8, 1965 which describes "A Study of Requirements for U.S. Strategic Systems: Final Report," 1 December 1961 (found in Gavin).

<sup>303</sup> Gavin (2012): 34; see also, David Rosenberg, "Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-68," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Winter, 1986): 35-52.

<sup>304</sup> Gavin (2012): 38.

European ambitions for national nuclear forces during the 1950s, Kennedy was stringently opposed to Western European allies possessing an independent force.<sup>305</sup> Kennedy's thinking was in line with strategic logic during the missile age, as "small independent forces were unstable, invited preemption from the Soviets, and could only be effective against cities - not the types of military targets US strategists were emphasizing in their new counterforce plans. Most importantly, to successfully implement a strategy of graduated response and damage limitation, nuclear decision making had to be centralized."<sup>306</sup> In other words, flexible response aimed at creating the necessity for a centrally controlled nuclear decision making apparatus within NATO (and controlled by the American executive), which would make an independent national nuclear capability redundant (and unstable) for alliance partners. This line of thinking was laid out by McNamara during the NATO conference in Athens in May 1962: "In short, then, weak nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. It is for these reasons that I have laid such stress on unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction."<sup>307</sup> Gavin interprets this even more directly: "if flexible response was to be taken seriously, the United States could under no circumstances aid independent forces and should have made efforts to force the Europeans to abandon their nuclear programs."<sup>308</sup> If accepted, this would solve the 'German question.' At the least, it illustrates that Kennedy was not as confident as Eisenhower in NATO's cohesion and ability to efficiently and effectively communicate with each other during a nuclear crisis.<sup>309</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Gavin (2012): 38.

<sup>307</sup> "Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962, Restricted Session," 5 May 1962, OSD-FOIA, 79-481: 12," quoted in Gavin (2012): 38.

<sup>308</sup> Gavin (2012): 38.

<sup>309</sup> Further evidence of this is the abandoned attempt to implement a multinational nuclear force, manned and commanded by multinational personnel.

Therefore it appeared prudent to the administration to wind down pressure from Massive Retaliation in light of the disparate attitudes and interests within the alliance itself.

An American attitude towards European independent nuclear forces was determined by political considerations, specifically those surrounding West Germany. The United States had assisted British under Eisenhower during the 1950s. Anglo-American cooperation (at least until the 1946 McMahon Act) stemmed from collaboration during World War Two, where they shared nuclear and bomber-delivery programs, and continuing during the postwar period, as Britain had stored American nuclear weapons and made airbases available for the United States, as well as a Polaris submarine base in Scotland.<sup>310</sup> However, this 'special relationship' came to be viewed as "Anglo-Saxon hegemony" by the French during negotiations between Kennedy and France over signing the Test Ban Treaty in 1962-3<sup>311</sup> and was particularly harmful to US-French relations, where France took the view that Washington gave privileged access to London.<sup>312</sup> However, the American no-sharing policy towards European allies had its roots in how American assistance would be interpreted by the West Germans:

The United States however had not supported the French in the nuclear field and the result of this policy had been to sour American relations with France. Rightly or wrongly they had taken this attitude because of Germany...The United States were concerned at what would happen in Germany after Dr. Adenauer left the scene...They regarded Germany as potentially the most powerful country in Europe and one whose future was in some

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<sup>310</sup> Malcolm W. Hoag. "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 41, no. 2 (Jan., 1963): 293-4.

<sup>311</sup> Jan Melissen, "Nuclearizing NATO, 1957-1959: The 'Anglo-Saxons', Nuclear Sharing and the Fourth Country Problem," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3 (July, 1994): 274; see also Bernard Ledwidge (ed.). *De Gaulle et les Américains: Conversations avec Dulles, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Rusk, 1958-1964* (Paris, 1984); Report on Secretary Dulles' conversation with de Gaulle, 5 July 1958, PRO. PREM 11/2573; Dulles to Lloyd, 8 July 1958, PRO. PREM11/2573.

<sup>312</sup> Andrew J. Pierre, "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 49, no. 2 (Jan., 1971): 291

doubt...And if the United States did help France then pressure in Germany for similar help would rise.<sup>313</sup>

According to Gavin, most civilian policy makers were uncomfortable and hesitant with fielding tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe and beyond, but they served an important alliance function.<sup>314</sup> Demonstrating American commitment to the defense of Western Europe through the deployment of tactical or theater nuclear weapons "served a fundamental political purpose - reassuring the Europeans, and particularly the West Germans, that the Americans would not attempt to 'de-nuclearize' Europe."<sup>315</sup> This is not surprising, considering the concern that the United States would not fulfill its alliance commitment if it came down to fighting Soviet forces in the Western Europe theatre. Furthermore, this further confirms the model's third hypothesis: if the junior partner of the coalition fears that their superpower ally will abandon them, a Roll Back strategy will be used to signal alliance commitment. While the Kennedy administration did not go so far as to implement Roll Back, nuclear weapons in Western Europe was to remain a cornerstone of US strategic policy for the rest of the decade, as it would serve as a signal that American security was inextricably tied to the fate of the other NATO alliance members.

McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to President Kennedy, recognized that American foreign policy had to be malleable to these alliance pressures. When the discussion of tactical nuclear weapons for Europe arose, he stated that "the forces that one wants for war are not necessarily those which one may want 'diplomatically.'"<sup>316</sup> As Gavin succinctly summarizes, "the number of tactical nuclear weapons was dramatically increased during the Kennedy/Johnson

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<sup>313</sup> Meeting between President Kennedy, Macmillan (and others) at Nassau, 19 December 1962, Record of the Nassau Conference, Prem 11/4229, PRO, quoted in Gavin (2012): 40.

<sup>314</sup> Gavin (2012): 41.

<sup>315</sup> Gavin (2012): 41.

<sup>316</sup> Daily White House Staff Meeting, 23 January 1962, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8, microfiche supplement, document 287; Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012): 41.

period. In the end, America's tactical nuclear posture in Europe was determined, not by military needs, but by political - and in particular - alliance management demands."<sup>317</sup> This is further evidence of the third hypothesis that Kennedy's willingness to implement a nuclear hard-line in Western Europe was precipitated by allied fears of abandonment if the Soviet Union were to push the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact.

#### *Flexible Response: Conventional Forces*

Crucial to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' doctrine of *flexible response* was the need to place conventional or non-nuclear capabilities in Western Europe to provide the president and NATO with a range of strategic options. "By making a quick Soviet takeover of the continent more difficult and a forward defense of West Germany more realistic, increased conventional forces would both enhance deterrence and raise the nuclear threshold in the event of hostilities with the USSR."<sup>318</sup> While Kennedy did benefit from a sizeable conventional force in Europe due to buildup from the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara did not request additional funds for new non-nuclear force in Europe.<sup>319</sup> This is surprising, given the domestic pressures placing national defense with regards to the Soviet Union as a major issue of the 1960 election.<sup>320</sup> In fact, several key administration officials complained about the lack, and planned cutbacks, of American conventional forces dedicated to Europe. General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was "sorry to note the intention to cut back the level of conventional forces."<sup>321</sup> Secretary of State Dean Rusk complained that McNamara's defense budget "projects a cutback in force levels, principally in

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<sup>317</sup> Gavin (2012): 41; see also, J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, Rand paper R-2964-FF, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1983): 16. Retrieved from <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2964.pdf>, accessed 22 January 2018.

<sup>318</sup> Gavin (2012): 41.

<sup>319</sup> Gavin (2012): 41.

<sup>320</sup> Gavin (2012): 41.

<sup>321</sup> Gen. Taylor memo for Robert McNamara, "Preliminary Comments on the Department of Defense FY '63 Budget and 1963-1967 Program," NSF, Department and Agencies, box 275, JFK Library in Gavin (2012): 41.

the Army, below those currently approved."<sup>322</sup> Deputy National Security Advisor Carl Kaysen called attention to the fact that the Secretary of Defense's "five-year budget plan kept 'limited war' forces static until FY 1969."<sup>323</sup> Despite the intense lobbying from defense advocates, Robert McNamara "'showed no great increase in his receptivity' to permanently increase America's conventional force strength" and refused to include the million man permanent expeditionary army that was called for by flexible response advocates.<sup>324</sup>

The refusal by the Kennedy administration to pour more conventional troops into Western Europe runs counter to the predictions of the conventional wisdom. Firstly, one would expect that the greater the Soviet's growth in terms of aggregate and military power there would be a tendency for the United States, indeed all of NATO, to counter by balancing acts. In other words, to balance forces on the continent, more military manpower and weaponry. The fact that domestic pressure was supportive of sending additional forces is indicative of this. Secondly, given Moscow's continued aggressive stance towards Western Europe (especially over Berlin and over other spheres of influence); one would similarly expect a strong balancing and military buildup as a result.

President Kennedy often threatened to pull large contingents of American troops from Europe as leverage to rectify the balance of payment issue from NATO allies. "Almost from the start of his [Kennedy's] administration, he linked the continued presence of America's conventional forces in Europe to important US political and economic interests, particularly a

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<sup>322</sup> Dean Rusk to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, 29 October 1961, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, VOL. 8, 191 in Gavin (2012): 41-2.

<sup>323</sup> Gavin (2012): 42.

<sup>324</sup> Carl Kaysen to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, 23 January 1962, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8, microfiche supplement, document 258 in Gavin (2012): 42.

resolution to the vexing problem of the US balance-of-payments deficit."<sup>325</sup> Kennedy spoke candidly about the economic free-riding of NATO members:

Bundes minister Heinrich Krone was warned that the United States would be forced to withdraw troops because of America's dollar and gold outflow. In January 1963, the president told his National Security Council (NSC), "We cannot continue to pay for the military protection of Europe while NATO states are not paying their fair share and living off the 'fat of the land.'" It was time to "consider very hard the narrower interests of the United States." And, in May 1963, General Franco told the German ambassador to Spain that the American president had warned that "the question of the American balance of payments constituted one of his greatest concerns." If he did not resolve the dollar and gold problem, Kennedy would be forced to "change his whole policy" and "dismantle the military support of Europe."<sup>326</sup>

The balance-of-payments deficit was not the only catalyst that sparked Kennedy's threat to withdraw troops from Europe. As of 1962, France and West Germany had become "openly critical" of American defense policies vis-a-vis Western Europe, frustrating Kennedy with intra-alliance balancing against his administration. Kennedy went so far as to tell the defense minister of Great Britain that should a Franco-German bloc form to cooperate on the development of a nuclear program, the United States may consider "haul[ing] out" of Europe. Germany had signed

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<sup>325</sup> Gavin (2012): 42; See also Gavin, "Gold Battles within the Cold War: American Monetary Policy and the Defense of Europe, 1960-1963," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 26, no. 1 (January, 2002): 61-94 <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00300>; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1965): 601; W.W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History* (New York: Macmillan, 1972): 136; Memo of Conversation between Kennedy and Adenauer, 24 June 1963, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 9: 170; George Ball Oral History, no. 2, AC 88-3: 29, LBJ Library.

<sup>326</sup> Gavin (2012): 42; Gespräch des Botschafters Freiherr von Welck mit Staatspräsident Franco in Madrid, 29 May 1963 *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1963, vol. 1, #185, fn. 9; Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Meeting, 22 January 1963, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 13: 486; Gespräch des Botschafters Freiherr von Welck mit Staatspräsident Franco in Madrid, 29 May 1963, *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1963/1, no. 185; See also, Gavin (2002): 61-64.

the 1954 Brussels Treaty, which prevented production of nuclear weapons and, should the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); the U.S. would "have to consider whether they should regard themselves still committed to their own obligations for keeping troops in Europe."<sup>327</sup> Kennedy, furthermore, warned Andre Malraux, the French cultural affairs minister, "that if de Gaulle preferred a Europe dominated by Germany, then Kennedy would bring the troops home and save \$1.3 billion, an amount that 'would just about meet our balance of payments deficit.'"<sup>328</sup> In fact, Kennedy maintained that "economic relations" may in fact be "even more important to us now than nuclear matters" because the strategic position of NATO and Western Europe were sufficient to deter Soviet attack, a point that he addressed FRG chancellor Konrad Adenauer.<sup>329</sup> Lastly, during a September 1963 meeting with FRG foreign minister Gerhard Schroeder, Kennedy said that "the U.S. does not want to take actions which would have an adverse impact on public opinion in Germany but does not wish to keep spending money to maintain forces which are not of real value."<sup>330</sup>

As one can see, Kennedy's decision to refuse to send more conventional forces to Western Europe to balance the Soviet threat, as would be expected by the conventional explanation, was not motivated simply by the deficit in the balance of payment concern. Kennedy was strongly motivated by the fact that West Germany and France were openly critical of the administration, threatening to pull out of Europe altogether. With two of America's most vital allies in Western Europe effectively balancing against and fearing US hegemony and threatening to splinter Western cohesion, Kennedy lacked the will and perhaps means to tie the

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<sup>327</sup> Visit to the United States, 9-17 September 1962, DEFE 13/323, PRO cited in Gavin (2012): 42.

<sup>328</sup> Memo of Conversation, "Trade and Fiscal Policy Matters," 24 June 1963, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 9: 187 cited in Gavin (2012): 42.

<sup>329</sup> Memo of Conversation, "Trade and Fiscal Policy Matters," 24 June 1963, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 9: 187 cited in Gavin (2012): 42.

<sup>330</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, "U.S. Troop Reductions in Europe," 24 September 1963, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 9: 187 cited in Gavin (2012): 42.

NATO coalition to a strong Rollback policy to balance Russia's ambitions to sway allies to its own sphere of influence.

While this falsifies the conventional wisdom as argued above, it confirms the expectations writing in this dissertation's model. According to the model being tested, when the junior partners of the alliance balances against the coalition leader, a proto-containment strategy is the most likely outcome. Although the Kennedy administration did not strictly pursue a proto-containment strategic posture, given the standing Eisenhower policy of Rolling Moscow back, containment policy was in effect stepping a rung down on the strength of response ladder in the proto-containment, containment, rollback typology of responses. In fact, the fact the United States would (as we will see) flirt with further weakening of containment to consider detente during the Kennedy administration illustrates confirmation evidence for the first hypothesis in this dissertation.

Many members within the administration were concerned and puzzled by Kennedy's threats to withdraw troops from Western Europe, given that this directly contradicted the flexible response doctrine. J. Robert Schaetzel, an official in the State Department, asked how would it be possible for the U.S. to demand "greater European contribution to a flexible strategy" while at the same time initiating steps "toward a detente with the Soviet Union," while "[moving] unilaterally toward significant cutbacks in our present commitments and drift[ing] back toward the plate glass doctrine"?<sup>331</sup> Kaysen also pointed out that "McNamara's troop withdrawal plan in the Far East would require US strategy to shift toward 'an immediate nuclear response.' Wouldn't

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<sup>331</sup> Schaetzel to Kitchen, "Balance of Payments and Force Withdrawal," 24 July 1963, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8, microfiche supplement, document 336 cited in Gavin (2012): 43. According to Gavin, the plate glass doctrine was "similar to 'tripwire; strategy - the idea that conventional forces were not in place to offer a legitimate, robust defense against a Warsaw Pact invasion; rather, they were to 'trigger' a nuclear response by the United States" (fn. 70, pg 182).

troop cutbacks in Europe require the same shift in strategy?"<sup>332</sup> As noted above, taking steps towards a detente with the Kremlin represents both a refutation of Walt's model (especially the alternative explanation's first hypothesis) and a confirmation of the model presented here (namely the first hypothesis).

The contradiction in Kennedy's attitude towards troop deployment in Europe within the context of the flexible response doctrine needs to take into account his concern that American "political and economic interests"<sup>333</sup> were more problematic than the balance-of-force calculus by 1962. According to a December 1962 Memorandum, President Kennedy stated that the US "had gone from \$44 billion up to \$49 billion and that we are now at \$52 billion, making a more intensive effort in free world defense than had ever been planned."<sup>334</sup> Consistent with alliance cohesion and dysfunction issues, the president concluded the conversation by saying that it "almost seem[ed] that Europe is getting a 'free-ride' and that on both the political and defense side, this situation with our NATO allies had to be changed this year."<sup>335</sup>

Ultimately, Kennedy did not implement his threat to withdraw troops from Europe, but this had less to do with the military strategic situation, but geopolitical interests and an economic resolution by 1963. The United States continued to maintain the six divisions deployed in NATO Europe from the Eisenhower Administration "because his two great concerns - the Franco-German revolt and the dollar and gold outflow - had been largely resolved by October 1963."<sup>336</sup> Additionally, "by agreeing to sign the partial test ban treaty the West Germans agreed to remain a nonnuclear state. This concession relaxed tensions between the West and the Soviets over the

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<sup>332</sup> Kaysen to Bundy, 10 May 1963, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8, microfiche supplement, document 326, cited in Gavin (2012): 43.

<sup>333</sup> Gavin (2012): 43.

<sup>334</sup> JCS Conference with President Kennedy, 27 December 1962, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8: 121; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS/Kennedy 12/62-1/63. Top Secret.

<sup>335</sup> JCS Conference with President Kennedy, 27 December 1962, *FRUS: 1961-1963*, vol. 8: 121; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS/Kennedy 12/62-1/63. Top Secret.

<sup>336</sup> Gavin (2012): 46; see also, Gavin (2002).

status of Berlin."<sup>337</sup> The trade-off for the Federal Republic of Germany was conceding their nuclear ambitions for the guarantee that went along with the deployment of American troops.

*President Johnson, Charles de Gaulle, the French Crisis, and the Harmel Report*

The origins of the Harmel Report, which set forth the establishment of NATO's major tasks for the rest of the decade, stems from De Gaulle's policies and the French approach to East-West relations. While the Harmel Report indicated that "a robust military capability was considered essential if NATO and its members were to engage in detente diplomacy with the East," the report indicated that the alliance would seek the "modest goal of gradually improving relations with the Soviet Union, based on minor modifications in the political status quo, including the implicit assumption that Communist regimes would remain in power in Eastern Europe."<sup>338</sup> From this summary of the report, we can already see confirming evidence of the first hypothesis of this dissertation. The Harmel Report noted the preference for a strong balancing response towards the USSR to mitigate some of America's alliance partners flirting with becoming closer to Moscow's sphere of influence but warned the administration that it would recommend "modestly" and "gradually" improving relations with the Kremlin, thus watering down America's foreign policy. The Harmel Report would guide policy for the rest of the decade.

The politics of the Harmel Report was based on internal alliance disagreements, specifically between American leadership within NATO and especially France with respect to the future direction of approaches to the Soviet Union. To be sure, much of the spark that spurred the initiative to the study that led to the report was due to the alteration of the international context which, "by the mid-1960s, was dominated by the war in Vietnam and the emerging

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<sup>337</sup> Gavin (2012): 46.

<sup>338</sup> Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. "NATO's Future Role: An American View," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 38, No. 1, *The New Europe: Revolutions in East-West Relations* (1991): 179.

detente in Europe, as well as the internal setting within NATO countries, which was increasingly seen by decision-makers and politicians with a growing awareness, or fear, of an eroding support the Alliance in the public opinions of their respective nations."<sup>339</sup> In fact, it would be fair to point out that the Harmel Report was conducted largely because of growing lack of cohesion within the alliance and fear that some allies, especially the French, would defect from NATO in favour of forging closer relations with the Kremlin. According to Bozo "France's increasingly disruptive policy was perhaps the most direct and immediate origin of the Harmel exercise, if only because de Gaulle's actions had, by then, become the most evident symptom and the most effective catalyst of the overall crisis in the Alliance."<sup>340</sup> This crisis, of course, was the possible breakdown of NATO cohesion and potential schism that would tear the alliance apart.

Upon returning to French leadership in 1958, President de Gaulle had been set to challenge NATO's established order. Firstly, until 1960-61, his so-called 'memorandum' diplomacy, as well as his push towards tripartite leadership of NATO between the United States, Great Britain, and France; and secondly, from 1960-1963, de Gaulle promoted the concept of a European strategic entity among the Six nations in the Fouchet plan, and especially between France and the Federal Republic of Germany in the Elysee Treaty.<sup>341</sup> Bozo argues that de Gaulle had raised two major themes of concern within NATO:

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<sup>339</sup> Frederic Bozo, "Detente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report (1964-1968)," *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Theme Issue: Changing Perspectives on European Security and NATO's Search for a New Role. From the 1960s to the Present, (November 1998): 344; Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-1967* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996): 320 ff.

<sup>340</sup> Bozo 1998: 344; Frederic Bozo, *Deux Strategies pour l'Europe. De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l'Alliance atlantique 1958-1969* (Paris: Plon, 1996); Maurice Vaisse, Pierre Melandri and Frederic Bozo, eds., *La France et l'OTAN 1949-1996* (Brussels: Complexe, 1996); Haftendorn, NATO, 1-24.

<sup>341</sup> Bozo 1998: 344; Maurice Vaisse, "Aux origines du memorandum de 1958," *Relations internationales*, Vol. LVIII (1989), 253-68; Bozo 1996: 31-43, 61 ff; Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politiques et strategiques franco-allemands 1954-1996* (Paris, Fayard, 1996), 149 ff.

- a) "The problem of military integration, which he intended to call into question through a series of moves starting as early as 1959."<sup>342</sup>
- b) "Nuclear strategy which by 1962 had turned into a 'great debate' between massive relation and flexible response."<sup>343</sup>

Furthermore, de Gaulle approached these problems from two disparate perspectives:

- a) The nationalist perspective, "by stressing the primacy of states, and France to begin with, in military and strategic decision-making within NATO;"<sup>344</sup> and
- b) Western European perspective, "by emphasising the need for the Six, and specifically France and Germany, to organise themselves into an entity capable of checking the United States' dominance in the Alliance and making it evolve into a more balanced Euro-American relationship."<sup>345</sup>

In both the nationalist and Western European perspectives, France was taking a position of classic balancing behaviour to check American dominance. The notable difference here being the balancing behaviour to check dominance and the primacy of independence among states occurred internally *within* the alliance, as opposed to externally *between* alliance blocs. In effect, de Gaulle was demonstrating the presence of the independent variable for the first hypothesis: a junior partner balancing against the alliance leader. The result was a movement towards the alteration of the status quo NATO grand strategy (which had been Rollback under Truman and Eisenhower) in favour of a weaker strategy of containment or even detente, demonstrating (as we will further see) confirmation of the first hypothesis.

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<sup>342</sup> Bozo 1998: 344

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

<sup>344</sup> Bozo 1998: 344-5.

<sup>345</sup> Bozo 1998: 345.

After the failure of the Fouchet plan to establish multilateral control of nuclear command and control and the relative failure of the Elysee Treaty to form national nuclear deterrent programs between France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, de Gaulle was forced to move from his policies centered on Western European strategic military (especially nuclear) integration and Franco-German reconciliation as a power bloc to check and balance American supremacy and maximize their own national decision-making influence.

President de Gaulle's new policy formulation, beginning in late 1963, was aimed towards a pan-European strategic cooperation, as well as "Franco-Soviet rapprochement,"<sup>346</sup> the genesis of the East-West detente grand strategy and, thus, a weaker variant of containment: "We will automatically get closer to the Russians as the Germans move away from us," he said to one of his ministers.<sup>347</sup> This, of course, further fits with the first hypothesis. Accordingly, "the interaction between East-West and West-West relations, that is, between detente and the Alliance, was clear from the outset in de Gaulle's grand vision was clear from the outset in de Gaulle's *politique a l'Est*.<sup>348</sup> de Gaulle's France was attempting to construct a challenge to both main pillars of the postwar European regional system, Yalta and NATO.<sup>349</sup> Given the previous attempts of the Fouchet plan and the Elysee Treaty, this latest policy of restructuring East-West relations was an attempt by de Gaulle to balance American hegemony within NATO, with the declared intention of pushing the Western alliance into weakening its Rollback strategy in favour of a further weakened formulation of containment.

The Harmel committee was formed within the context of NATO reorganization and expansion of the alliance's focus beyond a strictly military bloc, clearly being influenced by de

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<sup>346</sup> Bozo 1998: 345.

<sup>347</sup> Quoted in Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, Vol. 2 (Paris: de Fallois-Fayard, 1997): 62; Bozo 1998: 345.

<sup>348</sup> Bozo 1998: 345.

<sup>349</sup> Bozo 1998: 345.

Gaulle's 1966 visit to Moscow, promoting the French vision of East-West detente. Johnson agreed with the Belgian Foreign Minister's, Harmel, that "the moment has come to develop, within as well as outside of the Alliance, humanitarian and cultural ties between Eastern and Western Europe,"<sup>350</sup> further weakening American containment response to the Soviet Union. Clearly, the United States was attempting to publicly signal the junior members of the alliance that "NATO, as an organization, [was] seeking an expansion of its political role in augmenting East-West contacts,"<sup>351</sup> but also that it was willing to weaken containment strategy for the sake alliance cohesion. In other words, the Harmel Commission's informal purpose was to reorganize NATO's mandate to stymie the intra-alliance fracturing and the disintegration of cohesion within the coalition that had already begun to take place. According to Dean Acheson, the "emphasizing, clarifying, and implementing [of] NATO's political function is central to its *cohesion* during the present strains."<sup>352</sup>

#### *NATO Nuclear Forces*

By the spring of 1966, President Johnson envisioned the expansion of NATO's role from a purely military alliance to linking political nuclear planning with the military authorities of alliance members, largely due to de Gaulle's balancing American supremacy within the coalition. According to National Security Action Memorandum 345 (NSAM-345), "the President wishes to have developed recommendations for enlarging the participation in and understanding of nuclear planning by both the political and military authorities of our major NATO allies."<sup>353</sup> It is in within this context that the Johnson Administration considered two potential approaches: "one in

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<sup>350</sup> Bozo 1998: 348; FRUS 1964-1968, 396.

<sup>351</sup> Bozo 1998: 349; FRUS 1964-1968, 399.

<sup>352</sup> FRUS 1964-1968: 407.

<sup>353</sup> FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region, 159. "National Security Action Memorandum No. 345," (Washington, D.C., April 22, 1966). <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d159>, retrieved 8 January 2018; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316. Secret; Nodis.

which assumes the creation of a 'NATO Nuclear Force' and one which does not."<sup>354</sup> The motivation behind the consideration of these proposals was consistent with the context of the French Crisis, as discussed above. As articulated in NSAM-345, these proposals were designed to "increase the cohesion of NATO and the North Atlantic community... [And] should embrace two kinds of measures<sup>355</sup>:

- a. Military and non-military programs affecting primarily the affairs of the Free World;
- b. Constructive political, diplomatic, and economic initiatives addressed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.<sup>356</sup>

The NATO Nuclear Force would have prospectively seen the creation of a "permanent body" of certain members of NATO being included in "intensive consultation" and "the direction of U.S. and U.K. nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles assigned to NATO and/or collectively owned."<sup>357</sup> This consideration represented a dramatic shift in strategic policy away from tight American control of nuclear forces at both the strategic planning and operational levels, granting other members of NATO direct responsibility for the defense of Western Europe. Stemming from the recommendations of the Harmel Report due to de Gaulle's France balancing American supremacy influenced this consideration with a purpose of repairing the cohesiveness of NATO. The proposals were to cover the "full range of nuclear activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment,

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<sup>354</sup> Ibid.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, research, development, production and budgeting, etc."<sup>358</sup>

NSAM-345 was considered at a time in which there was the "first real allied appreciation of the problems associated with the use of nuclear weapons."<sup>359</sup> While Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk proposed "tripartite talks between the U.S., British and German foreign and defense ministers to narrow differences" and repair cohesiveness by planning a program that could be supported by the three participants in the talks.<sup>360</sup> This would be coming off the heels of Working Group III consultations, which outlined "the increasing grasp of the realities of nuclear warfare."<sup>361</sup> Working Group III determined that, although "sufficient strategic forces exist for deterrence, but that if used they cannot protect NATO countries from unacceptable damage...[and] that enough tactical weapons are on hand, that tactical nuclear war in NATO Europe requires more study and planning, and, most significantly, that it is 'difficult to predict whether it would of net advantage to NATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in aggression less than general war in Allied Command Europe.'"<sup>362</sup> In other words, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were only useful within a deterrent strategy and not in a meaningful war-fighting in the defense of Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, while NATO possessed enough tactical nuclear weapons, war-planning was still insufficiently studied and planned for to the point where both Rusk and McNamara were uncertain whether or not initiating the use of nuclear weapons would be advantageous or not. In other words, it would

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<sup>358</sup> Ibid.

<sup>359</sup> FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region, 171. "Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson. Subject: The Nuclear Problem in NATO," (Washington, DC., 28 May 1966). <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d171#fn:1.5.6.2.468.14.2>, retrieved on 8 January 2018; Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, US-Fr Bilateral Discussions. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid.

seem that NATO did not possess the same relative nuclear strength to offset Soviet power as had been initially thought during previous administrations.

According to the McNamara-Rusk Memorandum, further studies by Working Group III would uncover "gaping holes" in "all strategic options."<sup>363</sup> These holes in strategic options were pivotal in nature:

1. "The threat of instant and massive retaliation is a deterrent, but in execution may be virtually suicidal.
2. The conventional defense - that is, a non-nuclear defense adequate to require an enemy to mount so substantial an attack as to assume the onus of nuclear war - by reason of recent events, seems less attainable than heretofore.
3. Tactical nuclear war, as Working Group III concluded, is full of uncertainties. Further study may produce elements which both strengthen and remain controllable, such as nuclear demolition defenses, air defenses, and antisubmarine tactics, used in friendly territory or at sea. Other similar tactical nuclear plateaus may emerge. All such measures, however, have obvious limits of effectiveness.
4. The war at sea, based on naval blockade, is feasible and has political leverage, but cannot in itself apply sufficient pressure to stop land operations."<sup>364</sup>

Given the "gaping holes" in NATO strategic options in the defense of Western Europe from Soviet and the Warsaw Pact, the administration's goal in 1966, as seen in the Working Group and NSAM-345 was alliance-centric. The strategic gap, combined with the NATO-French crisis, made defection from NATO (or at least aloofness) a concern of paramount importance during

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<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid.

"NATO negotiations with the French," as it increasingly looked as though de Gaulle would walk away from the Transatlantic alliance.

The French crisis was severe enough for McNamara and Rusk to *not* include initial French participation in either options outlined in the memo (e.g. NATO nuclear consultation without a multilateral NATO Nuclear Force, nor alternative possibilities for NATO Nuclear Forces), however the door would be left open for France to join "when and if she wished."<sup>365</sup> The goal, according to both Rusk and McNamara, was "to develop now as comforting a common goal as possible, and to produce a sense of movement toward it. This is the primary purpose of the measures proposed in this paper."<sup>366</sup> In other words, nuclear planning in 1966 was, largely, directed towards the goal of appeasing the concerns of alliance partners who may have considered defecting from NATO (and, in effect, balancing against American interests of a cohesive and unified Western Alliance countering Soviet influence).

The Working Group and NSAM-345 concluded that NATO the schism with the French and the assessment that the bloc was not as strong as originally thought heightened concerns for ever weakening cohesiveness. While the potential of forming a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MNF) was the subject being studied, conspicuously not mentioned was consideration for ramping up Western power to balance Soviet forces. Given that the alliance was not as militarily strong in strategic and theatre terms than was previously thought, it was weaker than previously considered in *relative* terms. The expected response under the conventional wisdom of balance of threat would be that the more overpowered the threatening state is should cause the alliance to commit resources to mount stronger balancing measures (alternative hypothesis 1). However, this was not evident in this case, disconfirming the alternative hypothesis.

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<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid.

*Johnson and Conventional Forces*

Many of the same concerns and questions that caused President Kennedy to consider pulling American troops out of Europe were still present during the Johnson Administration. "Would the Germans continue to accept their nonnuclear status? Would they continue to make onerous payments to offset the foreign exchange cost of US troops? On the American side, would worsening balance-of-payment deficits and the war in Vietnam increase domestic pressures to redeploy troops? Could this three-layered game - deterring the Soviets, restraining the FRG, and winning domestic support for an expensive overseas commitment - be maintained in the face of an emerging US-Soviet detente, increased German resentment, and domestic pressures to return American troops from Europe?"<sup>367</sup> Paradoxically, according to Gavin, the move towards detente only called attention to the dilemmas revolving around United States military doctrines and strategies in the West, especially whether or not the deployment of conventional forces under NATO command in Europe.<sup>368</sup>

Furthermore, the fracturing of NATO put American foreign policy in a difficult position. According to Gavin:

In 1966, France announced its intention to leave the integrated command, Great Britain declared that it would drastically cut the size of the British Army on the Rhine because of its own balance-of-payments problem, and the West Germans unilaterally abrogated the financial arrangement with the United States that had been the *quid pro quo* for America's expensive conventional force commitment.<sup>369</sup>

With the European powers seemingly backing out of NATO, it became increasingly difficult for the United States to, politically and economically, maintain security in Western Europe while the

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<sup>367</sup> Gavin (2012): 47.

<sup>368</sup> Gavin (2012): 47.

<sup>369</sup> Gavin (2012): 47.

alliance was free-riding. Most importantly, NATO cohesion was at its lowest yet with France leaving integrated command in 1966, the United Kingdom pulling troops back, becoming less militarily invested in continental defense, and the West Germans shunting from their alliance commitments financially. The Johnson administration, already heavily embroiled in Vietnam, found itself in an increasingly difficult position to maintain even containment and began considering detente, roughly the equivalent of proto-containment in the model being tested.

In addition to alliance cohesion issues, Johnson experienced domestic pressures to a far greater extent than Kennedy; "a worsening situation in Vietnam, a deteriorating payments deficit, and calls within Congress for a reduction in the number of US forces in Western Europe. Given these pressures, a US troop withdrawal from Europe could not be avoided."<sup>370</sup> In fact, in August 1966, "Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield along with twelve other senators offered a nonbinding resolution recommending unspecified cuts in US forces in Europe."<sup>371</sup> These cuts, of course, would severely weaken American containment posture on the European continent and leaving Western allies dangerously exposed to Soviet Union pulling away American allies. At best, Western European allies could potentially be pulled from American influence and into a non-aligned posture towards the Soviets and, at worst, leaving them exposed for a political realignment with Moscow. In the nightmare scenario, further weakening of containment and troop numbers in Western Europe would potentially embolden the Soviets to a military takeover of some parts of Western Europe, giving Moscow European dominance (as we will see below). In a telephone conversation with Senator Russell Long, President Johnson responded to the nonbinding resolution and his overall position at length:

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<sup>370</sup> Gavin (2012): 47.

<sup>371</sup> Gavin (2012): fn. 92, p. 183.

I sent a special messenger to [John McCloy] to get him to talk to the Germans, to try to get him back from vacation, preparatory to Rusk saying to [Ambassador] Gromyko, when he comes to the United Nations, that if you consider removing some of your 22 divisions, we'll consider removing some of ours. And by God, right in the middle of it, so far as I can see without doing a bit of good to anybody, we've got every Democratic leader in the Senate, all 13 of them, to serve notice on the President that, by God, they ought to reduce. Now, I'm just an old Johnson City boy, but when I'm playing bridge and I show the other fellow my whole hand, I can't make a very good deal with him. And I wish that on these international things that have such terrible consequences, where you are committing me to meet with de Gaulle it puts me in a hell of an embarrassing position.<sup>372</sup>

With Senators taking to undermining President Johnson's bargaining position with the Soviets, it is apparent that foreign policy had become a highly significant issue within Congress. The fact that not only did a resolution to recommend American troop withdrawal was highly irregular, but the undermining of the President came from his own Democratic caucus. This provides strong evidence that foreign policy had taken on a greater status as one of the most important issues in the legislature and President Johnson was constrained in terms of American bargaining position and feared that the Soviets would interpret this as lack of US resolve. This is clear indication of the first intervening variable of the alliance model, namely that during times in which foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance to the legislative branch, the executive branch will be constrained in selecting it's most preferred foreign policy. Indeed, Johnson preferred to maintain containment and leave US forces in Western Europe, but he was being

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<sup>372</sup> Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Russell Long, 1 September 1966, *FRUS: 1964-1968*, vol. 15: 165; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Long, September 1, 1966, 10:07 a.m., Tape F66.22, Side A, PNO 1. Secret.

pressured by his own party in the legislative branch to all but abandon containment by pulling out American troops.

Johnson, similar to Kennedy, was concerned with the balance-of-payment situation with its economic implications; however the Mansfield resolution weakened American bargaining positions for a joint force reduction that would preserve the established balance of power with the Soviet Union. Perhaps most importantly, the president was highly concerned that conventional force reduction would embolden Russia to seize parts of Western Europe if the United States did not demonstrate its commitment as a counterweight on the continent:

These sense resolutions, I don't believe are going to change the course of things very much and I'm more anxious than any man on that goddamn committee on the balance of payments to get troops out. But I sure as hell don't want to get them out with 22 divisions there and kick off World War III. And every damn man on that resolution will run and hide, by God, when you say 'You kicked this thing off pulled a goddamned Chamberlain and you ran out and said you were going to pull out....And I think the biggest notice you can do is just say 'Uncle Sam is tired and wants to come home. We're going to follow John Stennis and Fullbright.' And I think those sons of bitches will do worse than what Hitler did.<sup>373</sup>

However, the domestic pressures and splintering of NATO allies pushed Secretary of Defense McNamara, as well as other officials in the administration into a position in which they "were quite willing to pull troops out of Europe even if it contradicted the strategy of flexible response."<sup>374</sup> In other words, because of the splintering, balancing behaviour being taken by

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<sup>373</sup> Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Russell Long, 1 September 1966, *FRUS: 1964-1968*, vol. 15: 165; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Long, September 1, 1966, 10:07 a.m., Tape F66.22, Side A, PNO 1. Secret.

<sup>374</sup> Gavin (2012): 48.

NATO members, the United States was forced to consider altogether pulling out of Europe and virtually abandoning containment. The first hypothesis of the alliance cohesion model, therefore, has been confirmed by the empirical record.

In fact, Heinrich Kappstein, ambassador for the Federal Republic of Germany warned those in Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's administration of the very real possibility of American withdrawal:

The reasons included the balance-of-payments problem, the Vietnam War, 'increasing discontent' with US-European attitudes, and even an alarming 'neo-isolationist trend' that believed the United States 'could defense itself only with the missile potential.' Beyond these substantive issues, there was an 'emotional position' that was not entirely new but that 'gains weight and momentum' about the Europeans as 'fat and lazy' and wanting to merely 'enjoy their prosperity' under 'the protection of the American nuclear shield.'<sup>375</sup>

In fact, conventional balance of threat motivations factored very little in to the troop withdrawal discussions, as archival evidence shows very little discussion about any Soviet increase in terms of military power (alternative hypothesis number one), nor did discussions generally speak to any indication that Moscow was becoming more aggressive (alternative hypothesis number three). In contrast, the presence of alliance cohesion issues and domestic pressures to pull out of Europe are present to a much greater degree in declassified archival files. Indeed, it was "Atlantic politics and US-German relations" combined with "domestic politics" which were at "the heart" of these debates over the scope and potential withdrawal of American conventional forces in Western Europe.<sup>376</sup> These combination of forces and the willingness to undermine the

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<sup>375</sup> Knapstein to Schroeder, 10 June 1966, *Akten zur Auswaertigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1966/2, document 189 in Gavin (2012): 48-9.

<sup>376</sup> Bator to LBJ, "The U.S. Position in the Trilateral Negotiations," 23 February 1967, NSF, Trilateral Negotiations and NATO, box 51, LBJ Library in Gavin (2012): 49. According to Gavin, "Bator ended the memo by telling the

flexible response doctrine as a strategy, but also led chancellor Erhard to tell the American special envoy, John McCloy, that the doctrine was "no longer believed in" by Germany.<sup>377</sup>

President Johnson provides an interesting case study. While he was dubious about withdrawing American conventional force presence in Europe for fear of emboldening the Soviet Union into a more aggressive, expansive policy, he did so anyways. The tenuous state of transatlantic cohesion pushed the administration towards a detente, or proto-containment policy. Furthermore, domestic pressures in the form of an intra-party decision to place foreign policy at the top of the legislative agenda in the House (as well as the pressure of the war expanding in Vietnam) pressed President Johnson into a policy shift that he was clearly uncomfortable with implementing.

#### *The Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968*

The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is largely considered a watershed moment for Cold War historians, particularly those who focus their work from the perspective of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact satellites. In essence, the legacy of the August 1968 invasion is seen as an internal fracture within the communist sphere, leading ultimately to Brezhnev's agreeing to Détente with Nixon in 1972.

Interestingly, however, the incident was not nearly as significant in the West. According to Gaddis, "the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia also caught the [Johnson] administration off guard, able to do little in response but to postpone (and then only briefly) talks on strategic

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president 'my bad dream is another Skybolt,' which is a clear indication that 'European and German politics,' rather than the Soviet threat, was the main issue when considering US troop withdrawals from Europe. Skybolt was an intra-alliance crisis." Gavin (2012): fn. 102, p. 184.

<sup>377</sup> Gavin (2012): 49; Conversation between Federal Chancellor Erhard and American Special Envoy McCloy, 20 October 1966, *Akten zur Auswaertigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1966/2, document 342.

arms limitation.”<sup>378</sup> This was largely due to the Johnson administration’s focus on multiple late-term events: the Six Day War in which the Israeli occupation of Arab territory (including the Gaza Strip and the Sinai) in 1967 (in which the Soviets exerted influence on behalf of Egypt), De Gaulle’s continued debate over nuclear strategy and the serious strains within NATO, and (perhaps most significantly) the escalating violence in Vietnam. The crisis in Eastern Europe was taken up by Washington officials (seemingly almost under duress) as they “had to take time away from Vietnam to deal with [successive crises]. As a consequence, they [e.g. international crises such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia] tended to be handled on an *ad hoc*, crisis-management basis, with little attention to the context in which they had occurred, and only minimal reflection upon their long-term implications.”<sup>379</sup> In the end, the United States and NATO largely ignored the invasion.

### *The Nixon Doctrine*

The Nixon administration was faced with similar issues that had characterized earlier presidents during the 1960s, but with growing scope. In 1969, the United States was faced with Western European becoming increasingly critical and opposing the United States at several turns, a declining economy, the rise of China as a great power, and growing domestic displeasure over the worsening situation in Vietnam. As a result of these factors, the strategies of containment were reshaped into the Nixon Doctrine, which stressed the importance of detente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, disengagement from Vietnam, and Western security through supporting independent nation defense of alliance partners while maintaining

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<sup>378</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 2005): 267-68.

<sup>379</sup> Gaddis: 267

the American nuclear umbrella.<sup>380</sup> This section will test whether the alliance cohesion model or Walt's balance of threat model has more explanatory power for the Nixon Doctrine.

As we will see, the Nixon Doctrine was driven primarily by three causal factors: (1) great power revitalization in Europe and therefore intra-alliance pressure on the US, (2) American waning capabilities, and lastly, (3) domestic unpopularity and increased Congressional oversight due to the quagmire in Vietnam. What the Nixon strategy sought to implement, according to Gaddis, "would combine the tactical flexibility of the Kennedy-Johnson system with the structure and coherence of Eisenhower's, while avoiding the short-sighted fixations that had led to Vietnam or the ideological rigidities of a John Foster Dulles."<sup>381</sup> However, largely due to the dramatic extent to which power became concentrated in the executive branch, Nixon was faced with "an uninformed, sullen, and at times sabotage-minded bureaucracy, a Congress determined to reassert its eroded constitutional authority without any sense of how far that authority could feasibly extend, and, ultimately, the resignation of a president certain otherwise to have been impeached and convicted for abusing the overwhelming power his own system had given him."<sup>382</sup>

The Nixon Doctrine advocated striking a balance between what he considered "overextension" during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations with neo-isolationist reactions that sprang up as a result of domestic turmoil, anti-establishment sentiment, and the deepening Vietnam quagmire. According to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, "the Nixon

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<sup>380</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon," *Foreign Policy*, no. 3 (Summer, 1971): 3-21; Paul M. Kattenburg, "The Nixon 'New Look' in Foreign Policy," *World Affairs*, vol. 135, no. 2 (Fall, 1972): 115-127; John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," *The National Interest*, no. 10 (Winter, 1987/8): 34.

<sup>381</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 2005): 273; Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Simon & Schuster, 1977): 41-3.

<sup>382</sup> Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (2005):273.

Doctrine sought to navigate between overextension and abdication by establishing three criteria for American involvement:

- The United States would keep its treaty commitments.
- The United States would 'provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.'
- In cases involving non-nuclear aggression, the United States would 'look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for defense.'<sup>383</sup>

Nixon's departure from the driving force of American ideological factors, which Kissinger thought had become dogmatic in American foreign policy during the 1960s.<sup>384</sup> Assessing the problems with previous administrations, Kissinger believed that "conceptual coherence had broken down," resulting in too many *ad hoc* decisions made without reference to larger objectives, too much reliance by excessively pragmatic leaders upon excessively self-centered bureaucracies<sup>385</sup>. In other words:

Problems are segmented into constituent elements, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special difficulty it involves. There is little emphasis or concern for their inter-relationship. Technical issues enjoy more careful attention, and receive more sophisticated

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<sup>383</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994): 708; Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon*, 1969 vol. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972): 905-6 (Hereafter referred to as *Nixon Papers*). See also, Nixon's First Annual Report to the Congress of the United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 18, 1970, in *Nixon Papers*, 1970 vol.: 116ff.

<sup>384</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: chapter 28.

<sup>385</sup> Gaddis (2005): 274.

treatment, than political ones...Things are done because one knows how to do them and not because one ought to do them.<sup>386</sup>

What was replaced was a return to geopolitically-driven *realpolitik* and balance of power politics. In this view, Nixon would approach the Soviet Union, not through a Capitalist-Communist struggle, but instead a "substantive" approach:<sup>387</sup>

We will regard our Communist adversaries first and foremost as nations pursuing their own interests as *they* perceive these interests, just as we follow our own interests as we see them. We will judge them by their actions as we expect to be judged by our own. Specific agreements, and the structure of peace they help build, will come from a realistic accommodation of conflicting interests.<sup>388</sup>

Kissinger and Nixon felt that this would relieve tensions and increase cooperative ventures. During discussions on formulating the Nixon Doctrine, the administration put forward that US foreign policy was directed to two major goals:

- Achieving a broader sharing of responsibility and a new equality of partnership with our friends and allies throughout the world as the foundation of a durable collaboration to achieve a world of peace with security and a higher quality of life; and toward

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<sup>386</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, third edition (New York: 1977): 29,79, 97; Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structures and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, vol. XCV (Spring, 1966): 503-29; Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues in American Foreign Policy," in Kermit Gordon, ed., *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington: 1968): 585-614; Gaddis (2005): 274; Kissinger, *White House Years*: 66-7.

<sup>387</sup> Kissinger, *ibid*: 712.

<sup>388</sup> Kissinger, *ibid*: 712; First Annual Report to the Congress of the United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 18, 1970, in *Nixon Papers*, 1970 vol.: 179.

- Approaching all international issues and conflicts in an atmosphere not of contention but of negotiation and with a desire to improve our relations with all countries of the world, whatever our differences may be.<sup>389</sup>

Nixon's method of implementing Containment differed from that of the Eisenhower administration, where Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that a Soviet domestic societal transformation was a pre-condition for negotiation.<sup>390</sup> Instead, the president "believed that the process of negotiations and a long period of peaceful competition would accelerate the transformation of the Soviet system and strengthen the democracies."<sup>391</sup> Nixon explicitly both the theoretical orientation and preferred course of policy in a 1972 interview with *Time* magazine:

The only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises...I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a stronger, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other not playing one against the other, an even balance.<sup>392</sup>

In other words, whether consciously or not, Nixon's strategy "was a return to Kennan's 1948 concept of five centers of industrial-military power, and to the need to keep any one of them

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<sup>389</sup> *FRUS*, 1969-1976, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon: Suggestions on a Basic Approach for your Review of American Foreign Policy," (Washington, D.C.: 24 December 1969). Accessed from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d48>, Retrieved 5 February 2018; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 325, Subject Files, President's Annual Review of U.S. Foreign Policy. Confidential.

<sup>390</sup> Kissinger, *ibid*: 713.

<sup>391</sup> Kissinger, *ibid*: 713.

<sup>392</sup> *Time*, vol. 99, no. 1 (January 3, 1972): 15 (available from <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,879010,00.html>) in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (2005): 278.

from dominating the others."<sup>393</sup> Gaddis lucidly notes that "Nixon's vision of a pentagonal world operating on balance of power principles does appear consistent with what Kissinger - and Kennan some quarter of a century earlier - had been trying to accomplish."<sup>394</sup>

Much of Nixon's approach to the Containment strategy was guided by the changing balance of capabilities in the late 1960s bipolar landscape: the United States no longer enjoyed the unchallenged nuclear supremacy over the Soviet Union; strategic parity was the new reality. In other words, the United States entered the 1970s in a period of declining power relative to the Soviet Union. Additionally, lack of alliance cohesion played a dominant role in the crafting of Nixon's foreign policy strategies for the 1970s. Whereas Kennedy threatened conventional withdrawal from Europe over a combination of increasingly fracturing NATO cohesion, as well as balance of payment considerations, and Lyndon Johnson implemented some withdrawal, the Nixon Doctrine decisively declared that allied states would be primarily responsible for the manpower required for their own national security. Put another way, while the Nixon administration did not overtly declare further retreat from the continent, the United States was in effect ceding alliance leadership and a further weakening/degrading of the established American grand strategy that was in effect throughout the 1960s. During a discussion with Special Assistant Patrick Buchanan, Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado told the president that "the NATO countries had not, were not, and are not doing their share and there was a general feeling in the Senate that the only way they could be forced to do is for the reduction of American contribution to the effort."<sup>395</sup>

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<sup>393</sup> Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*: 278-9.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid*: 279.

<sup>395</sup> *FRUS*, 1969-1976, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, "Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon," (Washington, D.C.: 18 February 1970). Accessed from, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d59>, retrieved 5 February 2018; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 80, Memoranda from the President, January 4 - May 31, 1970.

While Nixon appreciated the difficult position presented with regards to free-riding, he was quick to remind Allott leadership that "if the US were to withdraw now under the pressure of this [Mansfield] resolution, the whole thing [NATO] would unravel. On the other hand, we do have a new attitude. And we must remember we are there in Europe not to defend Germany or Italy or France or England, we are in Europe to save our own hides."<sup>396</sup> The position from the Senate was to pressure the president to withdraw a huge portion of American troops due to alliance incohesion (specifically the free-riding behaviour demonstrated by European allies); Nixon's preferred policy with respect to Containment was guided by what he viewed as American national security interests by retaining conventional forces in Europe.

Nixon envisioned a traditional containment strategy that shifted the focus of responsibility onto Europe. In fact, "Kissinger favored a united but *independent* Western Europe: unlike most '*Atlanticists*' in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, he had sympathized with De Gaulle's insistence on achieving unity by reconciling the sovereign interests of European states, rather than by subordinating them to an integrationist 'grand design' devised in Washington."<sup>397</sup> In other words, De Gaulle's position was that alliance cohesion could only be restored if the United States became an equal partner within NATO, rather than the Superpower nation that dictated security policy to subservient states bound within America's sphere of influence. In a radio address from February 1971, Nixon announced that, "in Western Europe, we have shifted from predominance to partnership with our allies."<sup>398</sup> In effect, Nixon all but ceded American leadership within NATO in order to reestablish cohesion within the coalition.

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<sup>396</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>397</sup> Gaddis (2005): 279; Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* New York: 1965): 41-64; Kissinger, *White House Years*: 68-9.

<sup>398</sup> "Radio Address by President Nixon," *FRUS*, 1969-1976, vol. 1 (Washington, 25 February 1971): 85; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971*: 213-214.

This shift away from American guarantees of European security to a partnership took place during a period where NATO members were concerned about US commitment, as well as domestic pressures to appear either opposed to American foreign policy preferences or demonstrations of independence. As Kissinger writes in his memoirs, this was tied to America's ability to extricate itself from Vietnam:

...foundations were laid for new approaches after we had extricated ourselves from Indochina. Only then would we be able to overcome the European ambivalences: doubt about American constancy coupled with the unwillingness to assume a larger burden of the common defense; pressures for detente side by side with fears of a US-Soviet condominium; insistence on consultation over any American global move while catering to domestic popularity through the appearance of independence from and sometimes opposition to American preferences.<sup>399</sup>

As predicted, the Nixon Doctrine correlated with intra-alliance balancing in terms of opposition to American foreign policy or demonstrations of independence from Washington. European members of NATO, while desiring American commitment to the common defense, denied Nixon a cohesive alliance structure and the resulting external balancing strength that would have assisted a stronger version of containment. In other words, the United States had lost the trust of her allies because of the in Vietnam, which multiple administrations could not extricate them from a war that had become to be seen as "illegitimate." However, American pull back from Western Europe (especially in terms of conventional troop withdrawal) brought back an old issue: the fear of abandonment. In this case, we see two opposing independent variables with different outcomes. On the one hand, Europe's fear that the United States would withdraw from its guarantee to the common defense would, *ceteris paribus*, result in an aggressive Rollback

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<sup>399</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years, 1968-72*: 1135.

strategy to demonstrate commitment. On the other hand, United States' perceived failures in not only rooting out communism in Vietnam, but America's inability to extricate herself from the conflict challenged the desirability that Washington continued to be the appropriate and trusted leader of the alliance. This second issue required a lighter American foreign policy touch in order to demonstrate that the United States would not operate with ideological rigidity, risking the chain-ganging of NATO into adventurist conflict with Moscow. This case has one variable predicting the hard-line demonstration of commitment in the form of Rollback, while the other variable predicted a softer strategy designed to at once convince allies that the Pentagon did not have bellicose intentions *and* because the United States could not continue to singularly foot the bill for Western European defense, requiring a strategy that is weaker than Containment.

In the end, this case is somewhat an outlier, given that the balancing forces that needed proof that an alliance with the United States would not pull Europe into premature conflict with the Soviet Union. Therefore, US strategy took the form of detente or a form of proto-balancing as opposed to the stricter containment in the Kennedy or Johnson administrations. Resolving the balancing behaviour within NATO was a more critical variable than the fear of abandonment in this scenario because: (1) losing NATO allies would weaken the United States in terms of aggregate power, restraining how forceful foreign policy options *could be* in the future, and (2) there was a widespread belief that the United States had lost the moral authority to lead NATO because of the ongoing quagmire in Vietnam.

French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou was concerned with three major foreign policy questions: (1) withdrawal from Europe and fear that the Western Alliance would abandon the French; (2) incompatible strategy objectives between nuclear deterrence and West European security and; (3) the possibility of German defection towards the Soviet sphere of influence.

These triple concerns serve to highlight broader themes of European ambivalence to US foreign policy strategies.

Firstly, Pompidou feared American abandonment of its declared stated commitment to the common defense of West Europe. Due in large part to Congressional opposition, highlighted by the Mansfield resolution calling for a reduction of 150,000 troops from Western Europe, led Pompidou to become increasingly concerned that the "United States' internal dynamics would induce it sooner or later to withdraw from Europe."<sup>400</sup> Both Pompidou and de Gaulle recognized that institutional pressures within the United States would end up constraining the president's ability to prioritize European defense. This confirms the presence of the model's intervening variable. Furthermore, this issue of 'internal dynamics' was shared by de Gaulle and was well founded, as Senator Henry Jackson by 1974 became "the most implacable opponent of the Administration's Soviet policy," opposing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, calling for a return to American strategic superiority and was concerned about a worsening missile gap leading to strategic vulnerability.<sup>401</sup> In other words, both de Gaulle and Pompidou recognized the increasing importance of foreign policy in conducting the business of the legislative branch, strategic decisions would constrain the president's preferred foreign policy, which had traditionally been the support of Western Europe from Soviet advances. With American support thrown into jeopardy by advanced Congressional oversight, the French wanted to prepare an alternative to US-led security apparatuses. Therefore, the French Prime Minister was in favour of the creation of a European political union, where common defense would be one of the foundational doctrines.<sup>402</sup> Nixon was amenable to the creation of this measure of common defense and European unity, which could work in conjunction with the strategic partnership doctrine he

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<sup>400</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*: 1135-6.

<sup>401</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 747-751.

<sup>402</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*: 1135-6.

proposed, but he felt that planning a European move away from U.S. leadership based on American troop withdrawal would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.<sup>403</sup>

The French, furthermore, feared that the goals of American and European strategy diverged in a nuclear crisis. According to Kissinger, "Pompidou saw a potential incompatibility between our [American] strategy of nuclear deterrence and the requirements of European security."<sup>404</sup> This is illustrated in Pompidou's quote: "we want to [be] protected, not avenged...Revenge would be small consolation to us in a cemetery."<sup>405</sup> As with de Gaulle, Pompidou's demonstrated that France looked to push back against American strategic leadership, once again threatening alliance cohesion. American credibility waned as the United States fell into strategic parity with the Soviet Union and the French "urged Nixon toward conciliation with the Soviet Union when they first met in February 1970."<sup>406</sup>

This further highlights European ambivalence towards US foreign policy, as NATO members at once required demonstrations of commitment from the United States, while also urging Washington to relax tensions with the Moscow. While the United States wanted to avoid a major confrontation with the Soviet Union, President Nixon's long-standing anti-communist vitriolic rhetoric demonstrates his uneasiness in seeking out a more cordial relationship with the USSR. Be that as it may, with French pressure to once again tear at the cohesion of NATO, the administration needed to relax tension with the Kremlin for the sake of alliance internal politics. In fact, as Nixon had adopted the Prime Minister's advice and had scheduled a summit in Moscow to normalize relations and relax tensions by 1971, "Pompidou shared also de Gaulle's long-standing distaste for a US-Soviet condominium; and he remained profoundly suspicious

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<sup>403</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*: 1136.

<sup>404</sup> Ibid: 1136.

<sup>405</sup> Pompidou cited in Kissinger, *The White House Years*: 1136.

<sup>406</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*: 1136.

that in the long run German nationalism would respond to the siren calls from the East."<sup>407</sup> This episode both confirms our model's first hypothesis while falsifying the alternative explanation. On the one hand, France's intra-alliance balancing pushed the Nixon administration to further weaken containment to the point of detente with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the shifts in the balance of capabilities favored the Soviet Union, which should have the expected result of spurring a stronger response from NATO to balance against the Soviet Union. Instead, we see NATO members attempting to pacify their relationship with the growing threat.

This episode highlights one of the important issues in American foreign policy during the Cold War: how US strategy would develop in the face of European allies changing expectations and attitudes to American strategic plans. In Kissinger's view, "in times of tension Europeans advocated detente; in periods of relaxation they dreaded condominium. In crisis they looked to us to maintain the equilibrium outside of Europe, and under the umbrella of the risks we were running they did not hesitate to seek special advantages for themselves."<sup>408</sup> This push-and-pull shifting ambivalence both pushed and restrained American strategy, in terms of external balancing and maintaining NATO cohesion. In other words:

These attitudes acted at once as a spur and a brake to our [American] European policy. It impelled us to a degree of sharing of views unprecedented among allies, but it left us finally face to face with the necessity of making the ultimate decision on the most critical issues, especially outside of Europe. And it provided an additional incentive for us to develop our own strategy for detente. In its absence European leaders would make their own forays to Moscow and be tempted to gain the support of their left by pretending to act as a brake on an alleged American bellicosity, which they secretly welcomed. If we had

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<sup>407</sup> Kissinger: *The White House Years*: 1136.

<sup>408</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*: 1136.

our own option toward the East, these tendencies would be restrained by the fear that if pushed too far we could outstrip our allies in a race to Moscow.<sup>409</sup>

Democratic opposition, however, continued to pressure the administration for major force withdrawal from Europe. In May 1971, Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mt) submitted a non-binding resolution for the United States to cut by half (150,000 troops) the number of troops stationed in Europe by the end of 1971 to "ease the dollar outflow abroad and economize at home."<sup>410</sup> This was contrary to studies conducted by the White House that, according to Kissinger, "indicated that our conventional forces in Europe needed to be enhanced, not reduced."<sup>411</sup> Republican representatives showed stringent opposition from the White House, when Senator Gordon Allott (R-Co) said the same week, "after a meeting of the Senate Republican Policy Committee that Mr. Nixon would probably veto the whole Selective Service bill, already extended for two years by the House of Representatives, if the troop reduction proposal was accepted."<sup>412</sup>

#### *The German Question Revived: Ostpolitik*

This brings us to a long-standing alliance concern within NATO: the German question. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger notes in his memoirs that President Nixon expressed to President Georges Pompidou that he shared his "fears about the long-range implications of *Ostpolitik*."<sup>413</sup> *Ostpolitik*, or the 'new Eastern policy,' centers on the idea that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) should normalize its diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe, especially with respect to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Social Democratic Party

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<sup>409</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*: 1136-7.

<sup>410</sup> Tad Szulc, "Mansfield Asks 50% Cut in U.S. Forces in Europe," *The New York Times*, (12 May 1971). Accessed from <http://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/12/archives/mansfield-asks-50-cut-in-us-force-in-europe-says-reduction-by-end.html>, retrieved 5 February 2018.

<sup>411</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years, 1968-1972*.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid.

<sup>413</sup> Kissinger: *The White House Years*: 1136.

leader Willy Brandt, elected Chancellor of West Germany in 1969, put forward the idea that "since reliance on the West had produced stalemate, unification should be sought through German rapprochement with the communist world."<sup>414</sup> The closest advisers to Chancellor Brandt were said to have a "single-minded obsession with the Ostpolitik."<sup>415</sup> This apparent lack of flexibility and intransigence led Nixon to become increasingly concerned for the unity and cohesion of the Western alliance bloc, which had already become strained when de Gaulle pulled France out of the NATO nuclear planning group and established a separate French national diplomatic policy of detente with Moscow.

The German policy of *Ostpolitik* raised some important strategic concerns. In a memorandum from William Hyland of the NSC to Kissinger, while "Brandt's aims are compatible with our own," "there is a basic contradiction between the German view of Ostpolitik, and what the Soviets want out of it."<sup>416</sup> Hyland warns of a potential looming crisis "when German expectations of a loosening of Soviet domination and restoration of cultural and economic unity are not realized."<sup>417</sup>

The German question was once again revived among the European allies and, predictably, threatened the cohesion of NATO unity (as it had during the Eisenhower Administration). The lack of clear definition or means-ends strategy was a "striking...and

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<sup>414</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 734-5.

<sup>415</sup> *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972*. Document 150. "Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," 19 December 1970. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v40/d150>, accessed 22 February 2018; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 58, Country Files, Europe, Berlin, vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive.

<sup>416</sup> *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972* (Washington: 25 August 1970). Document 109. "Memorandum from William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v40/d109>, accessed 22 February 2018; National Security Council, SRG Meetings Files, Box 96, Senior Review Group, 8-31-70, European Security. Secret.

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*

dangerous" concern.<sup>418</sup> The lack of precision in the Federal Republic of Germany's policy of *Ostpolitik* threw Western Europe into a growing sense of "unease," as the "long suppressed but still present fears and suspicions of Germany are being revived by the FRG's inability to explain in detail precisely what it seeks and how far it is prepared to go get it."<sup>419</sup> Some European members of the alliance were "worried that this latest German "Drang nach Osten"<sup>420</sup> ("Drive to the East") would lead to a weakening of Germany's ties with the West, an increasingly independent FRG foreign policy, and rising pressure within the Federal Republic for a place in the sun more in keeping with Western European political 'realities'."<sup>421</sup> Hence, the concern that West Germany's flirtation with the Soviet Union would threaten to unravel the cohesion of the Western Alliance.

Secondly, NATO members feared that the FRG would open itself to "the most blatant forms of blackmail,"<sup>422</sup> as the Soviets took advantage and played on West Germany's desire for normalization of relations with the German Democratic Republic, and, eventually, German unification of East and West. In fact, according to the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ellsworth, "the latest Soviet statement that concessions on Berlin would be forthcoming *after* ratification of the FRG-Soviet Treaty."<sup>423</sup> This served as a case in

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<sup>418</sup> *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972*. Undated. Document 97. "Memorandum from the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Ellsworth) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v40/d97>, accessed 22 February 2018; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 6, Chronological File, 1969-75, 1 June - 8 July 1970. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>420</sup> Translated in footnote 3 as "Drive to the East."

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*

point to highlight this concern that Brandt would be open to accepting concessions that would be dangerous to broader Western interests.<sup>424</sup>

Washington was able to utilize the West German position to American and European advantage, due in large part to the administration's focus on linkage politics. Nixon "insisted on strict linkage between *Ostpolitik* and access to Berlin, and between both of these issues and overall Soviet restraint. Since *Ostpolitik* was based on concrete German concessions - recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line and of the East German regime in return for such intangibles as improved relations - Brandt would never obtain parliamentary approval unless concrete guarantees for access to Berlin and its freedom were linked with it."<sup>425</sup> With the four-power agreement in 1971 between the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, "Berlin disappeared from the list of international crisis spots. The next time it appeared on the global agenda was when the wall came down and the German Democratic Republic collapsed."<sup>426</sup> Furthermore, *Ostpolitik* was able to produce "friendship treaties" between Poland and the Federal Republic, East and West Germany, as well as between the FRG and the Soviet Union.<sup>427</sup>

The new state of affairs for East-West relations gave incentive to the Kremlin for foreign policy restraint in order to guarantee recognition as a legitimate European power. Therefore, "when Nixon decided to mine North Vietnamese harbors and to resume the bombing of Hanoi, Moscow's response was muted. As long as Nixon was domestically in a strong position, detente

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<sup>424</sup> See *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972*. 16 February 1970. Document 55. "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon." Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v40/d55>, accessed 22 February 2018; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. IV. Confidential; Nodis.

<sup>425</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 736.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*

successfully linked the whole range of issues between East and West around the world."<sup>428</sup> While the German Question and *Ostpolitik* threatened alliance cohesion and pushed the Nixon administration further towards detente, which would be expected in our first hypothesis, Washington was able to mitigate this constraint through linkage politics and trading foreign policy restraint for legitimization of the Soviet Union as a European power. In other words, West Germany threatened NATO cohesion, which forced the United States into a restrained foreign policy outcome. The difference between this and previous administrations is President Nixon was able to strike a bargain that traded on the weakened American response in exchange for the Kremlin's need to be treated as a legitimate continental power.

#### *Domestic Pressure*

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had been in the works since April 1970, but had taken on a different character in the wake of domestic pressure from Congressional leaders. The Kissinger-Nixon strategy of arms control agreements had been conceived of as an opportunity for "Linkage" politics, within the greater context of the overall Containment grand strategy. However, the national debate over security and national defense issues soon became calls by Congress to cut the defense budget. This occurred in the wake of the Vietnam wind-down, as Nixon attempted to extricate American forces embroiled in the highly unpopular war. According to Kissinger, "the plethora of amendments to restrict the use of funds for Vietnam was soon extended to specific weapons systems. Senator George McGovern (Democrat - South Dakota) proposed cutting off the B-1 bomber; Senators William Proxmire (Democrat - Wisconsin) and Richard Schweiker (Republican - Pennsylvania) urged postponing the C-5A transport plane until the end of an investigation of financial ailing Lockheed; Senator Birch Bayh (Democrat - Indiana) wanted to

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<sup>428</sup> Ibid.

limit the total size of our armed forces. Senator Edward Brooke (Republican - Massachusetts) was engaged in his annual campaign against ABM and MIRV [Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles]."<sup>429</sup>

Congressional pressure to cut the defense budget stems from the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, as Congress reasserted its role in foreign policy oversight. According to Williams, "so long as there had been a national consensus and so long as they [Congress] were convinced that the executive knew best, members of Congress were content to acquiesce in the cold war policies of successive presidents."<sup>430</sup> The war in Vietnam, however, was so unpopular that "these preconditions [were destroyed] and ended the period of congressional abdication from foreign policy. The new assertiveness was directed in large part against traditional policies, with Congress cutting the defense budget well beyond the level the administration regarded as desirable."<sup>431</sup> In simple terms, the senate picked up the mantle of foreign policy oversight as a result of nearly a decade of executive branch failures in South Asia. According to Williams, once Congress had reasserted its oversight role, the management of detente became difficult, as the reassertion of the legislature was virtually impossible to control.<sup>432</sup> In other words, we have the expected intervening variable's result that increased foreign policy oversight in the legislature will serve as a constraint for the executive branch.

Domestic pressure from the legislature constrained the Nixon administration to "appear responsive to the pressures for trimming the defense budget and reducing the percentage of the Gross National Product devoted to military purposes"<sup>433</sup> in order to retain any support for

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<sup>429</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years, 1968-72*: 636.

<sup>430</sup> Phil Williams, "Detente and US Domestic Politics," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, vol. 61, no. 3 (Summer, 1985): 435-6.

<sup>431</sup> Ibid: 436.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid.

<sup>433</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years, 1968-72*: 636.

national defense plans. This occurred in spite of Kissinger's misgivings over the proposed drastic cuts to national defense during a time when the United States was rapidly losing their relative strategic superiority.<sup>434</sup> Here we have yet another intervening variable, namely that when the legislative branch considers foreign policy to be a crucial issue, the executive branch will be constrained in selecting its preferred foreign policy option. We can see this intervening variable confirmed, as the Nixon presidency was very much at the mercy of public opinion in terms of foreign policy, which stemmed from the handling of the war from Vietnam by successive administrations over the previous decade.

Furthermore, Nixon's administration conducted diplomacy directly from the White House, instead of continuing the norm and established procedure of handling much of the contact with the Soviet Union through the professional bureaucracy. This caused a great deal of friction with the bureaucracy. Additionally, in Nixon's vision of linking the opening of the strategic arms limitation summit to building on other geopolitical issues ran contrary to bureaucrats in the arms control departments, as well as the so-called 'Kremlinologists'.<sup>435</sup> Arms control professionals "who were eager to limit the arms race, and the Kremlinologists, who were convinced that American foreign policy should strengthen the Kremlin doves against the Kremlin hawks" became strange bedfellows, as they "chipped away at the policy outlined in the President's letter by emphasizing arms control as an end in itself to the press."<sup>436</sup> This came in the form of leaks to the press, which were neither disavowed nor authorized:

In *The New York Times* of April 18, 1969, "officials" described arms agreements with the Soviet Union as "an overriding goal of the Nixon foreign policy." On April 22, the *Times* had "American diplomats" predicting Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in June. On

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<sup>434</sup> Ibid.

<sup>435</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 717.

<sup>436</sup> Ibid: 717.

May 13, *The Washington Post* quoted Administration sources to the effect that, by May 29, a date for the opening of talks would be set.<sup>437</sup>

While the bureaucrats did not directly challenge the president directly, what these series of nearly daily comments amounted to was an attempt by the bureaucracy to pressure and constrain Nixon into their preferred policy option.<sup>438</sup> Once this unorthodox interjection from the bureaucracy occurred, those in the press began launching critiques of their own. According to Kissinger:

On June 3, 1969, *The New York Times* called American trade restrictions linked to other issues "self-defeating." They were "cold-war policies" which were "inconsistent with the Nixon Administration's theory that it is time to move from an era of confrontation into one of negotiation and cooperation." *The Washington Post* deployed the same argument.

"Reality is too complex and sticky," it wrote on April 5, "to permit any President to believe he can line up so many different ducks in a row. Arms control has a value and urgency entirely apart from the status of political issues."<sup>439</sup>

The combined opposition by government in public and the press, according to Kissinger, served to force Nixon "expend assets" and made it altogether difficult to "broaden the dialogue with Moscow by delaying the SALT talks."<sup>440</sup>

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<sup>437</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 718; Peter Grose, "U.S. Warns Soviet on Use of Force Against Czechs," *The New York Times*, April 18, 1969. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1969/04/18/archives/us-warns-soviet-on-use-of-force-against-czechs-soviet-cautioned-by.html>, accessed 1 March 2018; Peter Grose, "A Series of Limited Pacts on Missiles Now U.S. Aim," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1969. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1969/04/22/archives/a-series-of-limited-pacts-on-missiles-now-us-aim-series-of-limited.html>, accessed 1 March 2018; Chalmers M. Roberts, "U.S. to Propose Summer Talks on Arms Curb," *The Washington Post*, May 13, 1969.

<sup>438</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 718.

<sup>439</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 718; "Clear it with Everett," editorial, *The New York Times*, June 3, 1969. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1969/06/03/archives/clear-it-with-everett.html>, accessed 1 March 2018; "Start the Missile Talks," editorial, *The Washington Post*, April 5, 1969.

<sup>440</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*: 718.

## *Conclusion*

The middle cold war confirms our model's hypotheses, while disconfirming the alternative explanation. The Truman and Eisenhower presidencies were marked by a sustained period of alliance cohesion, with the end of WWII and formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to establish a united front of the emerging Soviet menace and Warsaw Pact coalition. From the Kennedy administration onwards, however, moments of unraveling cohesiveness began to chip away at American leadership within the alliance, coming in the form of constraining the president's foreign policy objectives towards the East.

During the Kennedy administration, for example, because the junior partners within the alliance (especially France, West Germany, and Italy) balanced against American leadership, the United States weakened its foreign policy output from Eisenhower's Rollback and Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. This policy was designed to mitigate the enormity of the risk of nuclear war with the USSR, while taking care not to present a weak foreign policy position; in effect, Kennedy's foreign policy moved from an aggressive Rollback strategy during the previous decade to something more in line with George Kennan's original version of Containment. The administration stressed less on display of power and more with an eye towards options for de-escalation.

This need not have been the case, however. During the same period, the Soviet Union challenged American leadership in Berlin and Cuba, as well as their first successful detonation of a thermonuclear fusion device. The alternative explanation being tested here, namely Stephen Walt's balance of threat model, would expect a strong balancing trend from both the United States and its NATO allies, as the Kremlin grew in both capabilities and displayed an increasingly threatening doctrinal disposition. Instead, Kennedy (as well as Johnson and Nixon) took steps

moving towards detente with Moscow instead of a bold position of strength, which refutes Walt's model and a confirmation of this dissertation's hypotheses.

Indeed, the summary of the Harmel Report under the Johnson administration noted its preference for a strong balancing response towards the USSR in order to mitigate America's alliance partners (especially French President Charles de Gaulle softening disposition towards the Soviet Union), but ultimately was forced to recommend a modest and gradual improvement of Washington's relationship with Moscow, thus watering down US foreign policy, but demonstrating restraint to the Western allies. In fact, President Johnson was being pressured by domestic colleagues to bring troops back from continental Europe, concerned with balance of payment issues and the worsening situation in Vietnam, but it was only the concern that this military vacuum would embolden the Soviet Union towards adventurist attempts to bring parts of Western Europe under its dominion that stopped the requested massive troop reduction.

In fact, it was the renewed balancing behaviour from the newly elected Georges Pompidou in France re-committed to balancing against American leadership and flirting with detente with Moscow that ultimately pushed the virulently anti-Communist Richard Nixon to develop a policy of detente with the Soviet Union. The Nixon administration was characterized by the utilization of linkage politics to normalize America's relationship with the Soviet Union, as well as rewarding (or shaming) the Kremlin for violation of international norms (such as oppressing Eastern European states from rising in insurrection against their Soviet occupiers, etc). This, furthermore, illustrates the confirmation of the first hypothesis of our model.

Additionally, shifts in the balance of capabilities favored the USSR during the Nixon administration. This ought to have provoked a stronger balancing response from the Western allies towards the Soviet Union, in line with Walt's balance of threat model. However, the Nixon

administration's steadfast move towards detente and arms control agreements demonstrated that this model offers a less compelling explanation than the thesis presented in this dissertation.

According to Walt's balance of threat, the US-led NATO coalition would be likely to oppose the Soviet Union with greater strength as the former was experiencing a declining economy in the West, while the latter was growing increasingly stronger to the United States (in relative terms). In fact, both balance of threat and the more traditional balance of power theories indicate that the prudent course of action to retain sovereignty, security, and to deter Moscow would be to strengthen resolve and stringently oppose the Kremlin and Warsaw Pact. This, of course, is not what happened. President Nixon did not move to roll the USSR back into national boundaries.

Instead, President Nixon and Kissinger moved towards detente (or weak containment). This was for a number of reasons presented in this chapter. Firstly, the revitalization of Western European powers at once fulfilled Kennan's vision of containment and strengthened the alliance as a whole. On the other hand, European revitalization increased the clout and severity of increasingly critical and oppositional attitudes from the Continent towards the US. Largely because the lack of cohesion within the alliance and rise of Soviet capabilities, Nixon looked towards detente and weak containment as a solution to mitigate Western European criticism. This, of course, validates our model's first hypothesis, namely that *if the junior partners in the alliance are balancing against the coalition leader, and a weak Containment strategy is the most likely outcome.*

Furthermore, domestic opinion and the resultant political pressure placed on congressional oversight committees over the escalating quagmire in Vietnam pushed the Nixon Administration to further water down even perceptions of bellicosity coming from the White

House and Pentagon. The administration, therefore, pushed through foreign policies that were among the weakest in the containment typology: the importance of detente towards the USSR, rapprochement with China, disengagement from Vietnam in South Asia, and a more supportive Washington role in maintaining national defense of America's alliance partners (while still upholding the American nuclear umbrella guarantee). Furthermore, we can also see that this was not the first foreign policy choice for the ardently anti-communist Richard Nixon. In conclusion, it was a combination of intra-alliance balancing of the United States and its resultant in-cohesion as the causal factor, as well as the additional effect of domestic and congressional displeasure over Vietnam which influenced Nixon towards a less assertive foreign policy towards Moscow.

According to Stephen Walt's *balance-of-threat* theory, the first alternative hypothesis tested in this dissertation (**A1**), the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it. One would have expected that NATO produce a stronger, more bellicose as a response to Moscow's attempt to revise the international system throughout the 1960s. In other words, the expected result of America's wasted nuclear supremacy (and fusion-based thermonuclear monopoly) is that NATO alliance members would seek to formulate a more cohesive, stronger response if they were to balance against the threat with an enlargement power, in terms of both offensive weapons and aggregate power.

Furthermore, the third alternative variable looks to reinforce the predictions that align with the one described above (**A1**). The prediction made in **A3**, that is, the more aggressive a state's perceived intentions, and the more likely others are to align against that state. According to this prediction, Moscow's status as a revisionist power attempting to continuously push the West's boundaries in Berlin, the attempted installation of Soviet IRBMs in Cuba, etc., we would expect strong opposing balancing behavior from NATO.

The findings in this chapter demonstrate that Walt's predictions do not hold under the empirical record. In fact, our alliance cohesion variables (especially **H1**) are more accurate in predicting the foreign policy outcome during the Middle Cold War. According to **H1**, if the junior partners in the alliance are balancing against the coalition leader, a weaker form of containment strategy is the most likely foreign policy. In fact, given the large number of fissures that emerged during these years of the Cold War (over balance of payment issues during all three administrations, America's war policy in Vietnam, Western Europe's desire to attempt more symbolic dialogues -- especially during the Helsinki Accords in the early 1970s), the United States was never able to stay away from a weakly containing the USSR and never able to attempt the more offensive-minded Rollback strategy.

Additionally the domestic set of predictions of the model for the **intervening variable** predicts that while the executive would be constrained due to the increased pressure from the Soviet Union was viewed as a critical concern for oversight for the legislative branch, the executive was constrained from selecting Rollback. For example, Congressional oversight led to pressuring the executive to withdraw troops from Western Europe due to balance of payment and balance of forces issues within the alliance during all three presidencies. This seriously constrained America's security capabilities, as well as constraining the president's foreign policy options at critical moments for all three presidents this chapter looked at. This indicates that congressional oversight was strongly confirmed as an intervening variable.

## **Chapter 7 - Jimmy Carter: Circling Back to Containment**

The scenario inherited by Jimmy Carter when he assumed the presidency in 1977 was one defined by collapsing detente with the Soviet Union. Confidence in American leadership at an all time low in the wake of the conclusion of the Vietnam War and Soviet power on the rise. Carter was faced with crumbling detente, as the Kremlin had little incentive to bargain with their Washington counterparts, especially following a series of Third World successes, with Marxist movements sweeping and seizing power in various locations, Nicaragua, Angola, South Yemen, etc. The Soviet military had achieved strategic parity, innovations in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) accuracy, had placed the brand new SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (ICRMs) worryingly close to NATO allies, all the while improving and modernizing conventional military forces in the Soviet Navy and Air Force.<sup>441</sup> By the time Reagan was sworn into office in 1981, the Soviets seemed on the rise (definitely on the march with the invasion of Afghanistan), and the United States seemed to be at its lowest point of the Cold War.

The solution to the current situation would be to devise a new strategy of containment that would serve as the new American doctrine guiding its grand strategy with a rapidly devolving situation. The new strategy needed to be "neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical in character, drawing upon the strengths of each approach while rejecting their weaknesses."<sup>442</sup>

When Jimmy Carter was inaugurated in 1977, he brought a dramatic new vision to the White House, that the Cold War grand strategy of containment needed to be reversed. President Carter wanted to move past the tenet "that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it

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<sup>441</sup> Brands (2014): 105.

<sup>442</sup> John Lewis Gaddis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 343.

must be contained,' beyond 'that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear,' beyond the tendency 'to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs,' beyond the 'crisis of confidence' produced by Vietnam and 'made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.'" According to Carter, this "new world" should not be feared by the United States, as "it is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy - a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision."<sup>443</sup>

Less than three years after inauguration, however, President Carter found himself "praising past efforts at containment, calling for steps toward reconstituting the draft and lifting 'unwarranted restraints' on intelligence collection capabilities, increasing defense spending by 5 percent annually, expressing a determination to make the Russians 'pay a concrete price for their aggression,' and even proclaiming his own 'Carter doctrine': that 'any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.'"<sup>444</sup> Carter's initial dovish world view and policy goals had transformed to a reassertion of containment by the end of his presidency.

In the *balance-of-threat*, the United States and NATO would entrench themselves in a confrontational doctrine towards the Soviet Union. With Moscow's deployment of the SS-20 "Saber" missiles and adventurist Soviet foreign incursions (especially in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, etc.) one ought to have expected push back from NATO, resulting in matching the

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<sup>443</sup> Gaddis (2005): 343; Speech at the University of Notre Dame, 22 March 1977. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977*: 956-57.

<sup>444</sup> Gaddis (2005): 343-44; Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address," 23 January 1980, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980*: 196-98.

Kremlin tone-for-tone, willing to risk escalation. According to **A1**, the greater the threatening state's aggregate power (especially with the modernization of Soviet strategic nuclear forces), the greater the tendency for others to align against it; and **A3**, the more aggressive an adversary's perceived intentions, the more likely others are to align against that state. However, the Carter Administration continued to approach East-West relations with the same noble, but ultimately ill-matched detente approach, which called for "a policy based on constant decency in its values."<sup>445</sup> In fact, Carter even refused to link SALT negotiations to halt Soviet bellicosity.

However, we can see the beginnings of a problematic result for this dissertation's model. America's western allies and domestic political institutions were highly critical of Carter's approach in light of increasingly bellicose foreign and domestic policy propagated by the Kremlin. In this sense, Carter's natural allies demonstrated willingness to intra-alliance bargaining with the United States to confront and rollback Moscow. This was especially the case as America's European allies recognized their growing insecurity because of Soviet modernization and deployment of new weapons system and policies. According to **H2**, if the junior partners are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome. Clearly, Carter eschewed this traditional Cold War approach in favour of holding to the construction of a new containment strategy as his new American doctrine.

However, Carter's approach was very much unsuccessful, as Moscow continued to push the Americans deeper and deeper into retreat and displayed an increasing willingness to clamp down on dissent within their sphere of influence (especially in Poland). By the end of the Administration, Carter was forced to make an about-face, recognizing the political need for a

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<sup>445</sup> Gaddis (2005): 343; Speech at the University of Notre Dame, 22 March 1977. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977*: 956-57.

strong American military presence in Western Europe, indeed returning at least to the Containment doctrine. But this was too very little, too very late. Junior alliance partners like British PM Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor Schmidt stopped taking their cues from Washington, losing faith in their Superpower benefactor.

Jimmy Carter ended up losing the election to Ronald Reagan, largely on the heels of the latter's platform to restore American leadership in East-West relations, promising to meet Soviet bellicosity with the intention of *Rolling Back* the Kremlin, as predicted by **H2**. In essence, while Carter did not conduct foreign policy as predicted in this dissertation's model, he was selected out of leadership by the American public in favour of Reagan, whose vow was indeed to approach East-West relations consistent with the model's prediction.

#### *Arms Buildup, SS-20, and Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe*

The first section of this case study will examine the Carter administration's decision to embark on a major new program of deploying U.S. IRBMs in Europe in order to bolster its theater nuclear forces (TNF). According to Garthoff, the decision was made "not because it was believed by most policymakers to be necessary for deterrence or defense against the Soviet Union, but because it would demonstrate to the Allies the responsiveness of the United States to their concerns, as well as American leadership in organizing a positive Alliance decision."<sup>446</sup> In other words, the decision was made not for geopolitical reasons or shifts in the East-West balance of forces, but "involved complex internal dynamics of domestic and alliance politics at least as much as considerations of military requirements vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact."<sup>447</sup>

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<sup>446</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff. "The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 98, no. 2 (Summer, 1983): 197.

<sup>447</sup> Garthoff (1983): 197.

By the mid-1970s, there was a growing concern in alliance circles that the American-led detente movement under the leadership of Nixon-Kissinger-Ford was collapsing and that it was not a tenable strategy to offset the growing Soviet buildup of military power in Europe, which included conventional, tactical nuclear weapons, and intermediate to long range nuclear forces. American response was tepid, at best, as the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) recommended that there had to be a NATO-led military effort to redress the balance in the European theatre. In May 1977, Carter worked out an agreement stating that three percent annual increase in the defense budgets of all NATO countries would be targeted to reinforce the continent.<sup>448</sup> This was codified in the Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) and was mainly focused on conventional arms and reinforcement. The diluted response was in keeping with the Administration's preference to wind down containment strategy and appeared to be a minimum response.

One of the stipulations in the LTDP, however, was that the theatre nuclear forces (TNF) would be subject to review, with a series of task forces established to examine its standing (namely, Task Force 10).<sup>449</sup> This was keeping with a 1975 special report authored by then-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to Congress on the necessity of modernizing the TNF.<sup>450</sup> Task Force 10 was reconstituted as a High-Level Group (HLG) during the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting of defense ministers in Bari, Italy during the autumn of 1977. The HLG was chaired by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert with the mandate of "examin[ing] the need for NATO long-range TNF modernization and the technical, military, and political implications of alternative NATO TNF postures."<sup>451</sup>

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<sup>448</sup> Garthoff (1983): 198.

<sup>449</sup> Garthoff (1983): 198.

<sup>450</sup> Garthoff (1983): 198; Department of Defense, *The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe*, a report to the United States Congress in compliance with Public Law 93-365 (Washington, D.C.: 1975).

<sup>451</sup> Garthoff (1983): 198.

The Carter Administration, at first appeared to make progress in East-West relations. Carter's early goal was to continue the course of detente with the USSR, as begun by Nixon and Kissinger. Carter placed himself against Kissinger's utilization of "linkage politics" to insist upon connecting the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) with other issues, which were then used as a bargaining chip to pursue arms control agreements.<sup>452</sup> In his first year, Carter brought the Soviets to discuss issues that were long-ago taken off the table: talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty between the US, UK, and USSR, negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which the West had unsuccessfully demanded since 1973 -- resulting in the Kremlin accepting, in principle, equal ceilings on military forces, and progress towards SALT II.<sup>453</sup>

The reactions among America's western allies (and domestically) placed Carter's detente policy as very much controversial, especially in light of Soviet conduct. There were three main points of contention vis-a-vis Soviet policy which were troubling to NATO allies and within American domestic circles:

- a) "The continuation of 'the Soviet military building-up' in the strategic nuclear area, in forces deployed facing NATO in Central Europe and in the Soviets' capacity for intervention in the Third World, all of which showed, according to groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger in the United States, that the Soviet Union was aiming not at military parity with the United States but at superiority."
- b) "The continued apparent disregard by the Soviet Union of the obligations it had assumed under the 1975 Helsinki Accords toward the human rights of its own citizens, highlighted during the course of the year by the intransigence of the Soviet

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<sup>452</sup> Hedley Bull. "A View from Abroad: Consistency under Pressure," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 57, no. 3, America and the World 1978 (1978): 442.

<sup>453</sup> Bull (1978): 442-43.

Union at the conference that met in Belgrade from October 1977 until March 1978 to review the Helsinki agreements."

- c) "Soviet and Cuban military intervention in support of Ethiopia in its conflict with Somalia over the Ogaden region January-March and its long-standing conflict with the Eritrean secessionists, together with the alleged involvement of Cuba in the incursion of insurgent forces based in Angola into the Zairean province of Shaba in May. These events showed that Soviet military intervention in Africa was a continuing factor, the more alarming because of the bearing upon the conflicts under way in Namibia and Zimbabwe and expected ultimately to break out in the Republic of South Africa."<sup>454</sup>

The Carter administration was vociferous in its response to these developments, as well as domestic pressures within the US. In several speeches and statements made by the White House, the point was made that the United States would not tolerate falling behind a rival in military power; Washington would continue to denounce Moscow's interventions in Africa, but that the President would not link SALT issues to pressure the Soviet Union to cease its bellicosity. In effect, Carter's response was largely rhetorical and symbolic; "while making clear to the Soviets that the United States, too, was prepared to act on the principle that detente does not imply the cessation of ideological struggle, it was careful not to antagonize the Soviet Union in ways that might have endangered the detente process itself. After the high point of the sentencing of the dissidents in July, there was a certain cooling of the 'human rights offensive' against Moscow."<sup>455</sup>

Within bureaucratic circles during 1977, new deployment of in Europe was not on the radar of the armed services or Pentagon. Instead, the American military establishment would

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<sup>454</sup> Bull (1978): 443-44.

<sup>455</sup> Bull (1978): 444.

have preferred projects favoring new delivery systems for its long-range nuclear assets, in which research and development teams were working on several of these weapons systems (especially land-based and sea-based intermediate range cruise missiles, as well as a more modern version of the Pershing tactical land missile).<sup>456</sup> In fact, the Carter administration had been modernizing the capabilities of its strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMs) platforms, which were to be at the availability of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), which involved "changing the force allotted from five Polaris submarines (with 80 missiles capable of attacking 80 targets) to 400 Poseidon warheads capable of attacking 400 targets. In 1977, the number of American F-111 long-range fighter bombers based in Great Britain capable of all-weather delivery of nuclear weapons deep into the Soviet Union was doubled, from 80 to 164. Another decision, which 'leaked' into the public domain in June 1977 and stirred up a major controversy for a year, was the plan to produce and deploy shorter-range enhanced radiation or 'neutron' weapons."<sup>457</sup>

At the same time as the TNF review and American modernization was the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which was an attempt to stabilize the East-West strategic nuclear balance. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed the European concern "that the stabilization of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance through SALT would leave the military and deterrence balance in Europe unsecured."<sup>458</sup> Schmidt had been advised by several "defense intellectuals," who argued that the SALT treaties "damaged the 'extended' deterrence umbrella over Europe that traditionally had relied on (or at least enjoyed) American strategic superiority. In addition, there were rumblings of discontent (not only on the part of this group or of Schmidt) with the American movement in SALT to include

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<sup>456</sup> Garthoff (1983): 198.

<sup>457</sup> Garthoff (1983): 198-99.

<sup>458</sup> Garthoff (1983): 199.

limitations on cruise missiles which, it was believed, might prove useful or even necessary for defense and deterrence in Europe."<sup>459</sup>

In his October 1977 speech, Schmidt argued that the "changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. Schmidt's concerns that the concept of US-Soviet *strategic parity* raised the issue of different interests and issues regarding how nuclear weapons should be utilized: the countervalue (strategic) versus counterforce (tactical) question. Largely, the concern focused on that "when Americans talked of 'limited options,' Europeans heard 'limited war,' with their own states as the battleground and the Soviets, presumably, reticent to fire strategically against American territory in response US/NATO use of battlefield nuclear weapons."<sup>460</sup> To put it another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear and conventional weapons."<sup>461</sup> While Schmidt was more moderate in his approach than the hard-line intellectuals, who opposed the SALT II treaty, European concerns that Carter would accept technological limitations on the cruise missiles, which were being considered for deployment to redress the balance of forces. The Americans attempted to protect their "Alliance cruise missile interests by agreeing only to a ban on deployment (but not on development and testing) of ground- and sea- launched cruise missiles of greater than 600-km range, and only for the three years of the protocol."<sup>462</sup> The U.S. would be allowed to pursue cruise missiles in terms of research and development for long-range weapons, many European allies were becoming increasingly concerned about the precedent these

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<sup>459</sup> Garthoff (1983): 199; Fred Kaplan. "Warring Over New Missiles for NATO," *New York Times Magazine*, 9 December 1979.

<sup>460</sup> Gregory F. Treverton. "Managing NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring, 1983): 100.

<sup>461</sup> Garthoff (1983): 200; Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival* 20 (1978): 3-4.

<sup>462</sup> Garthoff (1983): 200.

sacrifices meant and that the inertia for the three year moratorium would continue for longer than the period specified.

Yet another concern felt by America's European allies was that the observed increased rate of modernization and buildup of Soviet long-range theatre nuclear weapons raised greater insecurity. The Soviets were getting ready to deploy the new Backfire bomber was confirmed to be set for staging in Western Europe and that it would be a powerful addition to Moscow's long-range TNF (although the Backfire was not to be considered as a strategic intercontinental delivery system during the SALT conference debates).<sup>463</sup>

By far the most important development for the European allies was that the Soviets were ready to deploy their SS-20 missile systems. The SS-20 "Saber" was based on the Pioneer missile system designed for intermediate-range ground-launched mobile weapons systems that were newly developed in the mid-1970s.<sup>464</sup> The maximum range of the Pioneer missile system was 5,000 km and the SS-20 Saber system was mobile, mounted on a "transporter-launcher" on a six-axle wheeled truck.<sup>465</sup> This Soviet system was designed with the ability to launch on warning, as it was "equipped with systems and assemblies to keep the missile in a state of constant combat readiness, to make the necessary preparations for its launch, and to launch the missile. The missile could be launched either from a special shelter (with a sliding roof) in the garrison or from a geodetically prepared field site."<sup>466</sup> All in all, the Saber possessed "greater range, accuracy, and above all, less vulnerability, than its predecessors."<sup>467</sup> What is more is that the delivery system, or bus, was fitted with three multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV)

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<sup>463</sup> Garthoff (1983): 200.

<sup>464</sup> Pavel Podvig. *Russian Strategy Nuclear Forces*, second edition (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2004): 224.

<sup>465</sup> Podvig (2004): 224-6.

<sup>466</sup> Podvig (2004): 224-6.

<sup>467</sup> Garthoff (1983): 200-201.

warheads, meaning that it had "increased target coverage for a comparable number of launchers"<sup>468</sup> and the SS-20 was operational by 1977.

NATO's response was to review its nuclear policy on the continent. While there were a small contingent of "ultra-liberal" Europeans who clung to the unrealistic hope that arms control and detente would prevail (although detente was in a state of collapse),<sup>469</sup> the majority view centred around TNF modernization and tactical nuclear research and development aimed at upgrading the alliance's nuclear and conventional defenses.<sup>470</sup> For Europe, the function of nuclear weapons was imperative for the maintenance of a robust deterrence of the Soviet Union from initiating *any* war, regardless of whether or not that war was limited in nature. This was because NATO leaders lacked faith in deterrence by conventional weapons, where the threshold of achieving this goal is much higher than its strategic counterpart. In other words, America's alliance partners believed that the potential of an early tripwire of US strategic nuclear weapons was the only way to rely on deterring the Kremlin from initiating direct combat operations.<sup>471</sup>

Moscow rejected Carter's proposal for a "comprehensive" SALT agreement in March 1977, which sought to address US security concerns but would have onerous implications for European interests as it would have solved the issue of strategic at the expense of tactical weapons systems (therefore confounding European concerns). This proposal would have advocated that the Kremlin accepted "deep cuts" on the strategic nuclear forces for both East and

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<sup>468</sup> Garthoff (1983): 201.

<sup>469</sup> Robin Ranger. "Nato's New Great Debate: Theatre Nuclear Force Modernization and Arms Control," *International Journal*, vol. 36, no. 3, Arms Control (Summer, 1981): 557-58.

<sup>470</sup> The so-called "Ultra-Liberal" European view was essentially limited to the less powerful nations in NATO: Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Holland, which President Reagan once decried as "outright pacifist." The more mainstream view of upgrade and modernization was shared by Great Britain, France, and most of the Federal Republic of Germany. While there were some schisms in European views, the power differentials between France-UK and Germany was much greater than the so-called Scandilux nations in NATO. For this reason, I will consider the majoritarian or mainstream European view along the lines of the British, French, and German. In this way, I will consider the "Ultra-Liberal" perspective as dissenting from majoritarian NATO views.

<sup>471</sup> Gregory F. Treverton. "Managing NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring, 1983): 93.

West, but on the condition that NATO allies scrap the deployment of 572 long-range tactical, or *theatre*, missiles. Of course, this would have been advantageous to American security, but at the price of "sacrificing European interests to achieve American ones, in appearance if not in fact."<sup>472</sup>

Ultimately, the SALT-II treaty left the issue of cruise missiles to protocol status, as it was deemed "too important to defer yet too difficult to solve definitively in the treaty."<sup>473</sup> The protocol would ban the deployment of both ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) "with ranges of more than 600 kilometers, and limit air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to 2,500 kilometers."<sup>474</sup> While the protocol status of these bans was limited in duration, European allies were increasingly concerned with the provisions developed in SALT II. In fact, "it became clear that the Soviet SS-20 would be excluded but that the protocol would ban [NATO] GLCM and SLCM deployment, although in any case such weapons could not be deployed before the end of the protocol."<sup>475</sup>

Throughout 1977 and 1978, the Carter administration argued that the protocol would not be a precedent in future SALT negotiations and "argued that the language only made explicit what was implicit in any treaty - which the parties agree not to evade its terms by helping other countries do what they themselves had agreed not to do in the treaty."<sup>476</sup> However, these arguments did not allay the security concerns of alliance partners. In fact, the West Germans went so far as to argue that the protocol "would not only put cruise missiles on the agenda for future SALTs but would also suggest one possible way to treat them. When, in June 1977, the

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<sup>472</sup> Treverton (1983): 105.

<sup>473</sup> Treverton (1983): 105.

<sup>474</sup> Treverton (1983): 105.

<sup>475</sup> Treverton (1983): 105-6.

<sup>476</sup> Treverton (1983): 106.

U.S. made the decision to add ALCMs to the bomber component of its strategic triad, it seemed to be saying that cruise missiles were good for the United States but not for Europe."<sup>477</sup>

The theatre nuclear force issue was, by and large, a political alliance issue. It should be noted that NATO's concern in the SALT II agreement was more political than military. According to Treverton, "it plainly made little sense to negotiate limits on the Soviet SS-20s while Soviet intercontinental systems - the SS-17s, -18s, and -19s - might be left unconstrained."<sup>478</sup> According to a memorandum written by Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter in May 1979, "we will face greater risks -- for us and for the Alliance -- if we do not take a strong lead now in forging the Alliance consensus. Because they are uncertain that you are willing to take the lead, Cy [Vance] and Harold [Brown] are seeking your guidance."<sup>479</sup> The indication here is that Carter needed to signal to his NATO allies his commitment to lead European security, especially in light of his campaign promises to alter the path of traditional American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Brzezinski indicated that decision-making with respect to NATO TNF issues would be sought through consensus with European allies, as opposed to American top-down mandates. For this to be successful, the Carter administration would need to demonstrate NATO commitment during a period in which U.S. allies were concerned that he would negotiate away nuclear modernization during the SALT-II arms control agreement (as seen in the Schmidt speech).

Similarly to Chancellor Schmidt's speech discussed earlier, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown summarized major issues in the disparity of the

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<sup>477</sup> Treverton (1983): 106.

<sup>478</sup> Treverton (1983): 104.

<sup>479</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski Memo to President Carter on the Vance/Brown Memo on TNF [*declassified 1997*], 17 May 1979. Carter Library (NSC Brzezinski Files, Box 20). Retrieved from <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110473>, accessed 2 April 2019.

balance of strategic forces in Europe, coupled with this being more overtly political tone during the late 1970s (it had been a predominantly military issue earlier in the Cold War). According to a memorandum authored by Vance and Brown:

Soviet theater nuclear modernization efforts, coupled with Soviet attainment of strategic parity, enhance the significance of the situation in which NATO does not have missiles on the continent of Europe that can strike Soviet territory. Although this situation has existed since the early 1960s, it now has political, as well as military, significance: vocal allied -- (especially West German) concerns about the SS-20 and Backfire and about the SALT II protocol constraints on US cruise missiles manifest this. Chancellor Schmidt defined this issue politically in a 1977 speech.<sup>480</sup>

In fact, the Vance/Brown recommendation for politically signaling to America's NATO allies was to deploy modernized forces on the continent in order to shape perception of Carter's commitment to European defense. This was stressed prominently in the memo:

In order to meet both political and military requirements, we believe that the US needs to take the step of deploying new long-range nuclear systems on the European continent -- either Pershing ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, or perhaps some combination. This would maintain a perception of a firm US commitment to the defense of Europe, forge Alliance unity, and strengthen deterrence by providing credible escalation options. Without prodding from us, the NPG High Level Group (HLG) has reached the same conclusion.

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<sup>480</sup> Vance-Brown Memo to Carter (Urging TNF modernization [*declassified 1997*], 9 May 1979. Carter Library (NSC Brzezinski Files, Box 20). Retrieved from <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/110473>, accessed 2 April 2019.

The HLG believes that deployments of 200-600 additional long-range warheads are all that is needed...<sup>481</sup>

This is direct confirmation that American foreign policy was shaped, largely, by the alliance concerns raised by junior partners. In this case, Carter was pushed away from his initial policy wish to move away from containment but ended up being recommended (from multiple agencies) to present a traditional containment nuclear posture in Europe to demonstrate commitment to America's alliance partners.

According to the Vance/Brown memo, the authors note that President Carter's role needed to take on a dual private-public role in influencing consensus on modernization and TNF deployment among European allies, especially in the wake of the "neutron bomb affair."<sup>482</sup> It is clear that many NATO allies, along with many of Carter's own advisors deemed the neutron bomb and cruise missile production and deployment to be highly recommended.<sup>483</sup> The President's Assistant for the NSA, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was a major supporter of Neutron weapon testing. He writes, "As a final point you should be aware that [Project] FULCRUM II<sup>484</sup> includes proof tests of enhanced radiation for LANCE<sup>485</sup> and a new eight-inch artillery shell. I

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<sup>481</sup> Vance-Brown Memo to Carter (Urging TNF modernization [*declassified 1997*], 9 May 1979. Carter Library (NSC Brzezinski Files, Box 20). Retrieved from <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/110473>, accessed 2 April 2019.

<sup>482</sup> Vance-Brown Memo to Carter (Urging TNF modernization [*declassified 1997*], 9 May 1979. Carter Library (NSC Brzezinski Files, Box 20). Retrieved from <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/110473>, accessed 2 April 2019.

<sup>483</sup> Many of the internal discussions and memoranda are currently unavailable, as the Foreign Relations of the United States are conducting a declassification review for the following volumes in the Carter Administration records: National Security Policy, European Security 1977-1983, and Western Europe.

<sup>484</sup> Project FULCRUM II was the code name for the American nuclear weapons test program for the second half of Financial Year (FY) 1977. It included tests related to the development of the warheads for new strategic and tactical/theater bombs, the M-X cruise missile, improvements to the 8-inch artillery shell, as well as other tactical weapons systems, along with many related advanced development tests for research and development purposes.

<sup>485</sup> The MGM-52 LANCE was a mobile field artillery theater surface-to-surface missile, purposed for dual use (conventional and nuclear warheads). It was a road-mobile, short-range ballistic missile launcher. The MGM-52 LANCE was also an important delivery vehicle for the neutron bomb.

recommend that you permit ERDA<sup>486</sup> to complete these tests in order to maintain flexibility for your decisions on production and deployment of these weapons in the context of a review of our theater nuclear strategy."<sup>487</sup> It should be noted that Brzezinski was persuasive in this argument, as Carter checked "approve" next to this section of the memorandum. However, Brezhnev was 2 November proposal called for a halt in producing nuclear weapons,<sup>488</sup> starting with a "ban on 'neutron weapons,' [which] carries obvious difficulties for the US"<sup>489</sup> since the United States and her allies stood to gain significant ground in being able to continue testing nuclear weapons in wake of the Soviets achieving nuclear parity. Additionally, Secretary of Energy Schlesinger was internally vocal in the administration about his concern over the cancellation of the neutron project and, more broadly, in his concern over Brezhnev's Comprehensive Test Ban. In a memo to Brzezinski, he writes:

I am concerned that we have been unable to reach a consensus on these issues,<sup>490</sup> and that if we do not, the ability of the Administration to win Senate ratification may be

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<sup>486</sup> The Energy Research and Development Administration was formed in 1975 in the wake of the split of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and retained the functions of the AEC that were not taken over by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

<sup>487</sup> Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, Washington: 28 June 1977. Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 145, Folder 4, JEC IFG [2] 7702109-7702951. Secret. *FRUS: 1977-1980, Arms Control and Nonproliferation*, vol. 26: Document 161. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v26/d161>, accessed 2 April 2019.

<sup>488</sup> The "Address by President Brezhnev Before the Central Committee of the CPSU: Halting the Production and Testing of Nuclear Weapons," 2 November 1977, in *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 679-680 in Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to President Carter, Washington, 27 March 1978. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 1, Chronological File, 1978 Apr. 1-22. Secret; Restricted Data. *FRUS, 1977-1980, Arms Control and Nonproliferation*, vol. 26: Document 482. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v26/d482>, accessed 2 April 2019.

<sup>489</sup> Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to President Carter, Washington, 27 March 1978. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 1, Chronological File, 1978 Apr. 1-22. Secret; Restricted Data. *FRUS, 1977-1980, Arms Control and Nonproliferation*, vol. 26: Document 482. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v26/d482>, accessed 2 April 2019.

<sup>490</sup> E.g. (1) Ensuring the ability to certify and maintain American nuclear stockpiles; (2) Ensure the verification provisions which would give the US a high confidence assurance of Soviet compliance; (3) Maintain linkage between permitted experiments, verification, and peaceful nuclear explosives; and

significantly lessened. In the present climate - with controversy growing regarding SALT, and in the wake of the neutron warhead deferral and the B-1 cancellation - the Administration must ensure that stockpile risks are minimized, and that verification and compliance prospects are improved as a result of any such treaty if we are to hope for ratification.<sup>491</sup>

We see, once again, Carter's own senior advisors strenuously recommended alliance adoption of force deployment as consensus, addressing particular concerns of America's junior partners. In fact, Carter's administration drifted from scrapping containment in favour of a strong stance in Europe. As to the deployment policies, Carter came to appreciate the political necessity of a particularly strong deployment stance in Western Europe which, in addition to military benefits and redressing balance of forces issues, was largely to demonstrate US capability, NATO resolve, unity, and American commitment. This was revealed in a declassified letter from President Carter to West German Chancellor Schmidt:

I have concluded that the Alliance needs to deploy new, long-range nuclear systems in Europe capable of reaching Soviet territory -- such as the Pershing II ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or a combination of them. This would demonstrate Alliance unity, strengthen deterrence by providing credible escalation options, and maintain the perception in both East and West of a firm US commitment to the defense of Europe.<sup>492</sup>

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(4) Ensure compliance provisions of the agreement on the above three issues improve, as opposed to complicate, American-Soviet relations with respect to Arms Control.

<sup>491</sup> Memorandum From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski). Subject: Comprehensive Test Ban Concern, (Washington, 2 May 1978). Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, James Schlesinger Papers, Subject File, Box 2, Energy Department, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, General, 1978 May. Secret. *FRUS, 1977-1980, Arms Control and Nonproliferation*, vol. 26: Document 196. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v26/d196>, accessed 2 April 2019.

<sup>492</sup> Carter Letter to Schmidt (Cruise & Pershing) [*declassified 1999*], 1 June 1979. *Carter Library (Plains Files, Box 1)*. Retrieved from <https://c59574e9047e61130f13->

In the correspondence to Chancellor Schmidt, President Carter again stressed the need "to obtain an Alliance consensus," which he noted "could provoke a major political debate in Europe" on the nature of nuclear weapons, East-West relations, and the fears that both "humanitarian gains of detente and *ostpolitik*, and to arms control progress" would be irrevocably damaged with American missile deployment and strategic and theater modernization. While Prime Minister Thatcher requested that the Americans sell them Trident missiles for their SSBN submarine fleets as an alternative to TNF modernization,<sup>493</sup> Carter made it clear in a letter to Chancellor Schmidt and President Valery Giscard that the fostering of a British independent strategic missile force and more general TNF modernizations did not betray the new SALT II treaty. While Carter expected "that the Soviets will react negatively," he stressed that "during the negotiations of the SALT II Treaty, the U.S. has made clear that the Treaty does not preclude cooperation with our Allies, including cooperation on force modernization."<sup>494</sup>

In effect, the Carter administration did not do a particularly good job managing alliance partners' concerns during arms control. In fact, NATO members came to see the United States less in a position of leadership until Prime Minister Thatcher pressured the American president and pushed the issue of European deployment. In the end, the Carter presidency was short and the reaction from the American general population was to elect a Republican president, one who mirrored the British Margaret Thatcher. President Reagan, as we will see, was much more in tune with the security concern of NATO junior partners.

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<sup>493</sup> Carter Letter to Thatcher (Trident Missile) [*declassified 1997*], 8 June 1979. *Carter Library* (Brzezinski Donated Files, Box 20). Retrieved from <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/DB9C7C455A8D4EB980CA8CF9546D81EA.pdf>, accessed 4 April 2019.

<sup>494</sup> Carter Letter to Schmidt and Giscard (Selling Trident to UK) [*declassified 1999*], 11 June 1980. *Carter Library, NSC Brzezinski Files, Tab 3: Box 6*. Retrieved from <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/B101205FF20344B689178F57BC0BEB95.pdf>, accessed 4 April 2019.

*Solidarity and Poland, 1980*

By the mid-1970s, Eastern Europe was, by most accounts, a neglected issue in East-West relations with the protracted war in Vietnam, arms control summits concluding with the SALT Treaty, and the thawing of Washington-Moscow relations, as detente took centre stage. Some even declared that "the Helsinki Accords were a Yalta-like sell-out of Eastern Europe" and accused the Nixon-Ford administrations of an off-record "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," named after a Kissinger aide named Helmut Sonnenfeldt, that the United States had "abandoned Eastern Europe to an 'organic' relationship with the Soviet Union."<sup>495</sup>

When President Carter was inaugurated, he named Zbigniew Brzezinski as his National Security Advisor. Brzezinski was an ardent critic of Kissinger and the detente movement, which he argued granted that Moscow control over Eastern Europe, was given a "tacit acceptance" by U.S. foreign policymakers. His critique of the Nixon-Kissinger policy was that it was littered with "moral indifference and benign neglect" with respect to Eastern Europe.<sup>496</sup> In fact, Brzezinski advised Candidate Carter, during the second Presidential debate, "to refrain from criticizing the Helsinki process as a whole and to turn his focus on the failure of the Warsaw Pact nations to live up to the still little known 'Basket III' clause which committed all signatories to respect 'civil, economic, social, cultural, and other rights and freedoms.'"<sup>497</sup> This strategy was employed because the invasion of Czechoslovakia had quashed any ideas of evolutionary, organic reform in Eastern Europe. By the 1970s, however, opposition groups sprang up utilizing nonpolitical dissent (referred to as anti-politics) which demanded that regimes follow the laws

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<sup>495</sup> Patrick G. Vaughan, "Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980," *The Polish Review*, vol. 44, no. 1 (1999): 4-5.

<sup>496</sup> Vaughan (1999): 5; See also, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: 1970): 123-193; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Communism is Dead," *The New Leader*, vol. 16, no. 30 (17 July 1967): 10-13.

<sup>497</sup> Vaughan (1999): 6; See also, Robert Shalet, "Human Rights and Civil Society in Eastern Europe," *Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain?*, edited by William Griffith (Boulder: 1989): 156-177.

and rules outlined in their own constitutions and, significantly, those agreements that were signed in Helsinki.<sup>498</sup>

In the spring of 1977, Brzezinski developed the Carter administration's approach towards Eastern Europe by decoupling the satellites from Moscow as a signal that "the road to Eastern Europe did not necessarily go through Moscow."<sup>499</sup> This approach became formalized in Presidential Directive 21, which set forth three guidelines:

- 1) "The United States should cultivate a closer relationship with Eastern Europe for its own sake rather than as a byproduct of detente with the Soviet Union;
- 2) "The criteria for favorable treatment should now include domestic moderation *as well* as deviation from the Soviet foreign policy agenda;
- 3) "The administration would maintain regular contacts with representatives of the 'loyal opposition' in Eastern Europe, that is, liberal intellectuals and religious leaders in addition to government officials."<sup>500</sup>

While President Carter was reticent to invoke containment as administration policy, one can hear the echo of George Kennan's theoretical strategy to weaken communism from within and facilitating that end. However, Brzezinski was careful to indicate that measures should be taken *not* to go so far as to destabilize Soviet satellites to the point "which might provoke another Hungarian uprising,"<sup>501</sup> which would be sure to necessitate a strong, international response from

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<sup>498</sup> Vaughan (1999): 6, n. 9.

<sup>499</sup> Vaughan (1999): 6; "Mischief in Moscow's Frontyard," *Time*, 12 June 1978: 22.

<sup>500</sup> Vaughan (1999): 6; Bennett Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe* (New York: 1991): 125; Presidential Directive/NSC-21, 13 September 1977. Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 16, PD-21. Secret; Sensitive. *FRUS, 1977-1980*, vol. 20, Eastern Europe, 1977-1980. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v20/d16>, accessed 29 April 2019.

<sup>501</sup> Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter: Policy Toward Eastern Europe, 9 September 1977. Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 16, PD-21. Secret; Sensitive. *FRUS, 1977-1980*, vol. 20, Eastern Europe, 1977-1980. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v20/d15>, accessed 29 April 2019.

the Kremlin. The goal, as stated by Brzezinski was very much in line with Kennan: to achieve "a measure of international independence or internal liberalization."<sup>502</sup> More broadly, "this policy is aimed at producing stability, progress and the enhancement of security throughout the region, pointing toward reconciliation between both halves of Europe."<sup>503</sup>

However, by 1980 Poland was on the precipice of economic collapse which the government sought to remedy by implementing austerity policies, which culminated in labor strikes when the government attempted to increase food prices. By mid-August, 16,000 striking workers, led by Lech Walesa and encouraged by the Roman Catholic Church, spread to the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk. When members from the Moscow Politburo arrived to negotiate a settlement, "the strikers presented a list of 21 demands which challenged the fundamental institutions of communist authority and, by extension, Soviet rule over Poland."<sup>504</sup> The result of this episode was the first independent trade union within the communist sphere, which the Polish workers named "Solidarity."<sup>505</sup> The government conceded to nearly all the workers' demands.

While this was welcome news in the United States, the Carter administration was already overwhelmed with the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, revolution in Nicaragua, and a strong domestic campaign launched by Ronald Reagan. In other words, the Carter administration did not have the political capital to engage an agenda for yet another crisis. When the Politburo arrived to negotiate with Solidarity in August, the State Department maintained a low profile to make sure not to provoke an anti-American response from

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<sup>502</sup> Ibid.

<sup>503</sup> Presidential Directive/NSC-21, 13 September 1977. Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 16, PD-21. Secret; Sensitive. *FRUS, 1977-1980*, vol. 20, Eastern Europe, 1977-1980. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v20/d16>, accessed 29 April 2019.

<sup>504</sup> Vaughan (1999): 10.

<sup>505</sup> Vaughan (1999): 10.

Moscow.<sup>506</sup> With all of this, combined with Brzezinski's coming under "increasing criticism for his backchannel maneuverings vis-a-vis Muskie's State Department, mishandling the Iranian revolution, and for poisoning relations with Western Europe over the significance of Afghanistan,"<sup>507</sup> Carter's NSC advisor was even internally isolated from the Democratic Party. With its hands tied, the Carter Administration was forced to treat the Soviet Union and moderate regimes in Eastern Europe and announced that it would "increase foreign credits to Poland to \$670 million" as a symbolic gesture.<sup>508</sup>

This weak response drummed up domestic criticism, beginning with Reagan who accused Carter of abandoning the Polish workers of Solidarity. Furthermore, the American trade unions threw their support, especially financially, behind Solidarity. In fact, AFL-CIO leader Lane Kirkland announced that they would boycott Polish shipping and channel funds directly in support of Solidarity. This further split Brzezinski from the State Department, even though he warned the President that this would be seen by the Kremlin as a provocative stance by Washington.<sup>509</sup>

With domestic rivals and an American general public rather uninterested to the administration's global human rights agenda, Brzezinski looked to build support from the Western allies, although they had been reticent to become involved in the Afghanistan invasion. In fact, "while the Gdansk negotiations were still underway in late August, Brzezinski advised Carter to send letters to the Pope, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, French President

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<sup>506</sup> Vaughan (1999): 12.

<sup>507</sup> Vaughan (1999): 14.

<sup>508</sup> Ibid.

<sup>509</sup> Vaughan (1999): 15.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in an effort to develop a common Western policy."<sup>510</sup> According to Vaughan, support was expected to align:

Though the Vatican had no "divisions" to speak of, the moral impact of the Polish Pope would be enormous in the crisis. Britain was expected to be the most cooperative toward United States interests as Thatcher had generally followed the United States lead after Afghanistan. In Paris, Giscard was expected to take a stronger stand over Poland than Afghanistan given his upcoming election campaign and the historic nature of Polish-French relations.<sup>511</sup>

However, the unpredictable and critical key to a unified West would come to centre on West Germany. A strained, contentious relationship had already emerged between Brzezinski and Chancellor Schmidt, and had become worse in the wake of Solidarity, in which the latter would be hesitant to risk detente for Poland at the potential expense of eventual German unification. The Bonn's *Ostpolitik* was coupled with a long-standing implicit understanding that West Germany would not rock the boat by challenging the political or territorial status quo of Eastern Europe.<sup>512</sup> In fact, the relationship between Schmidt and Brzezinski was so strenuous that he attempted to persuade Carter to dismiss his National Security Advisor in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and what he perceived as Brzezinski's hard-line attitude towards American strategy with respect to Eastern Europe.<sup>513</sup>

Additionally, Washington was concerned with the political ramifications of a growing economic relationship between Moscow and Bonn during 1980. The Soviet Union was providing favorable interest rates (7.75% over 10 years) for West German banks to build a \$5.3 billion

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<sup>510</sup> Vaughan (1999): 16; See also, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: 1983): 464.

<sup>511</sup> Vaughan (1999): 16.

<sup>512</sup> Vaughan (1999): 16-7.

<sup>513</sup> Vaughan (1999): 17-8.

credit to build a 3,000 mile natural gas pipeline linking Siberia to West Germany.<sup>514</sup> In fact, it was expected that by 1984 the Soviets would supply West Germany with 30 percent of its natural gas, making the Bonn increasingly economically dependent on Moscow.<sup>515</sup> With all these territorial, political, and economic interests, Schmidt came to view the United States as an unreliable guarantor of Mideast oil supply to Europe, especially after the Iranian crisis.<sup>516</sup>

Within the next two months the Soviet leadership was becoming increasingly concerned with the Polish crisis, as Solidarity created a great deal of momentum by early October. According to Vaughan, "the possibility of a Soviet invasion looked increasingly ominous" as conditions became more and more similar to those that precipitated Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.<sup>517</sup> Erich Honecker, East German leader, released a statement that Poland "belongs inseparably to the socialist world" and that "we together with friends will make sure of that," in reference to the Brezhnev doctrine.<sup>518</sup> Additionally, a member of the Czechoslovakian Politburo (Vasil Bilak) made the observation that what was occurring in Poland was the "worst of all developments, counter-revolution."<sup>519</sup>

While the Carter administration was hopeful that it would be able to secure support from some key NATO allies, a unified Western response was severely damaged by the West Germans. During an October meeting of major European allies, the West German representative declared to the United States that the Federal Republic of Germany would be unwilling to sacrifice East-West detente if the Kremlin were to intervene in Poland. This provided clear implication that

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<sup>514</sup> Vaughan (1999): 18.

<sup>515</sup> Ibid.

<sup>516</sup> Ibid.

<sup>517</sup> Vaughan (1999): 18.

<sup>518</sup> Vaughan (1999): 18; Erich Honecker quoted in Minton F. Goldman, "Soviet Policy Toward The Political Turmoil in Poland During the Fall of 1980," *East European Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 3 (September 1986): 342.

<sup>519</sup> Vaughan (1999): 18-9; "Vasil Bilak Implies Counter-Revolution in Poland," *Radio Free Europe, Background Report 247* (20 October 1980).

West Germany would continue economic and political relations with the Soviet Union unabated.<sup>520</sup>

The Carter Administration failed to implement a strategic response from either unilaterally by the United States or from the Western world. Carter was pressed into defending his human rights agenda in Eastern Europe, but was unable to mount much support both domestically and internationally. Admittedly, this was partially due to an overloaded agenda burdened by major issues and crises (the invasion of Afghanistan, the SALT II Treaty negotiations, and the revolution in Nicaragua), and the Polish Crisis would take a backseat to the Iranian Hostage situation in November 1980, before being defeated by Ronald Reagan. However, that Carter was unable to mount any significant alliance or domestic support made for limiting the options to counter Soviet action relegated to symbolism.

### *The Carter Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*

#### *Public Opinion*

In 1977, President Carter pledged to implement a foreign policy "that the American people both support...and know about and understand."<sup>521</sup> In the wake of intense public scrutiny following the widespread anti-war sentiment during the Vietnam era just a few years earlier, Carter recognized that winning public support would be especially important in foreign policy considerations, perhaps more so than in recent memory. It is ironic, however, that while gaining public support was a key goal early in the administration, President Carter was not able to build

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<sup>520</sup> Vaughan (1999): 19.

<sup>521</sup> Andrew Z. Katz, "Public Opinion and the Contradictions of Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 4 (December, 2000): 662; Jimmy Carter, *Commencement address at Notre Dame University*. In *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter, 1977* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977): 955.

popular foreign policy support and the White House did not do a particularly good job of explaining the agenda to the population.<sup>522</sup>




FIGURE 1. Approval of Carter's Foreign Policy.

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* Poll.

General consensus states that Jimmy Carter's presidency was unpopular, and his average approval rating at forty-seven percent was lower than any of his predecessors since Harry Truman.<sup>523</sup> As Katz illustrates, only the 1978 Camp David accords stand out as the only time a foreign policy issue was handled by Carter to the approval of a majority of those that were surveyed.<sup>524</sup>

While much of the scholarship in the 1970s through the 1990s argued that the general public was largely ignorant of foreign policy, too emotional in assessing public opinion, largely irrelevant to policymakers, or insulated from public criticism,<sup>525</sup> Jimmy Carter largely took a

<sup>522</sup> Katz (2000): 662.

<sup>523</sup> Katz (2000): 663.

<sup>524</sup> Katz's analysis of CBS News/*New York Times* Poll reproduced in Katz (2000): 663.

<sup>525</sup> Katz (2000): 665-66; See Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 36 (1992): 439-66; Ole R. Holsti, *Public opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Bernard C. Cohen, *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); Thomas W. Graham, "Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making," In *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy*, (ed.) David A. Deese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Ronald H. Hinckley, *People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security* (New York: Lexington, 1992); John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: John

populist spirit. In fact, Carter praised the American general public for their "good sense," and pledged that his administration would be willing to "let them share in the process of making foreign policy decisions."<sup>526</sup> Furthermore, Carter was critical that political and intellectual elites were prone to "underestimate the competence and intelligence and sound judgment of the American people."<sup>527</sup> According to Katz, however, while Carter was committed to pursue a more "democratic" foreign policy, the scholarship largely could be expected that the public would be compliant with the message that presidential leadership crafted.<sup>528</sup> However, Katz illustrates that much of Carter's failures in winning public support was not as susceptible to presidential leadership.

The Carter administration was presented with a model that lacked the necessary nuance to give the President much insight to the general public. The White House made the incorrect assumption that the American population was divided into two camps: *conservatives*, who were highly focused on what is typically referred to as high security issues that were framed in the East-West struggle of the Cold War, and *liberals* who tended to favour an internationalist, world-order agenda that focused mostly on human rights, opted against the use of force as a policy instrument, and a dialogue that largely focused on the dynamic of North-South (as opposed to East-West).<sup>529</sup> Carter was "advised to steer between liberals and conservatives when that distinction was no longer crucial for understanding foreign policy opinion."<sup>530</sup> In the post-

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Wiley & Sons, 1973); John E. Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Richard Sobel (ed.), *Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Controversy Over Contra Aid* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993); Andrew Z. Katz, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Administration and the Pursuit of Peace With Honor in Vietnam," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* vol. 27 (1997): 496-513.

<sup>526</sup> Carter (1977): 956 quoted in Katz (2000): 666.

<sup>527</sup> Katz (2000): 666; Carter cited in Richard Melanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton*. Second Edition (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996): 91.

<sup>528</sup> Katz (2000): 666.

<sup>529</sup> Katz (2000): 667.

<sup>530</sup> Katz (2000): 667.

Vietnam War environment, however, what was critical to the general public's belief systems, reflecting a "complex belief structure" which the administration would have to appeal to in order to secure majority approval for *either* Carter's human rights agenda or his approach to East-West Superpower geopolitics<sup>531</sup> -- Carter could only be expected to secure majority approval by "reaching across these belief systems."<sup>532</sup> In other words, "Carter's difficulties in building support for his foreign policy resulted from a failure to appreciate that the public was less susceptible to presidential leadership and more politically potent than top-down models imply."<sup>533534</sup>

Carter's human rights agenda was founded on his belief that the United States had lost its moral global leadership position as a result of the Vietnam War. During his commencement speech at Notre Dame on 22 May 1977, the president announced that the war in Vietnam had "produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life."<sup>535</sup> Carter's human rights policy was his attempt to redress this assessment, and place it as the cornerstone of the administration's foreign policy agenda.<sup>536</sup> A contemporary poll indicates

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<sup>531</sup> Katz (2000): 667; Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990); William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsly, and Rick Travis. "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 39 (1995): 313-331; Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley. "How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model," *American Political Science Review* vol. 81 (1987): 1099-120.

<sup>532</sup> Katz (2000): 667.

<sup>533</sup> Katz (2000): 667.

<sup>534</sup> While this is an interesting question to explore more deeply, e.g. tracing the *how* and *why* the Carter administration failed to secure public support, I will instead switch focus towards the goal of assessing the *impact* that losing public support had on U.S. foreign policy. Katz asserts that because the Carter administration operated "under the assumption that public foreign policy attitudes were incoherent and politically impotent, the Carter White House was denied the opportunity to uncover patterns in opinion to help its legitimization efforts and build popular support for its foreign policy." (Katz 2000: 666).

<sup>535</sup> Katz (2000): 671; Carter (1977): 957.

<sup>536</sup> Katz (2000): 671.

that public support for the White House condemnation of states that consistently violated human rights had an approval rating of 50 percent or greater.<sup>537</sup>

If the Carter administration had found a foreign policy agenda that had widespread popular support, then why did it not transpire that there was a corresponding support for the president's continued mandate of moving away from cold war containment policies that were Carter's initial preference? Why did the popularity of the human rights plank not translate into broader support and approval of his overall foreign policies? According to Katz, "the Carter White House never explored the part human rights played in the public's view of the U.S. international role."<sup>538</sup> In effect, Carter was able to tap into the idealism that had always been a traditionally pillar of American internationalist thought, but he "failed to locate a possible connection between attitudes toward human rights and security." In other words, the popularity of Carter's human rights foreign policy was negated by the administration's failure to portray the leadership skills necessary to garner mass support, rendering "a public perception of incoherence."<sup>539</sup> As a result, with the lack of broad public support and the many crises in which he was forced to expend political capital, Carter was forced to adopt a foreign policy strategy that was more akin to containment and thus, further away from the President's policy preference which would have been expected in our model.

#### *Conclusion: Return to Containment*

The Carter Administration came to office with the goal of moving the United States away from its traditional post-war containment policy. While the President was motivated to transition towards a human rights-centred foreign policy, however, the failure of the administration to

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<sup>537</sup> Katz (2000): 671; Anne E. Geyer and Robert Y. Shapiro. "The Polls - A report: Human Rights," *Public Opinion Quarterly* vol. 52 (1988): 392-93.

<sup>538</sup> Katz (2000): 671.

<sup>539</sup> Melanson (1996): 104; Katz (2000): 669.

effectively pacify the security concerns of America's Western European allies (especially the West Germans) and effectively communicate the overarching strategic vision of the administration led to re-circling to containment and, ultimately, electoral defeat. This case tells us what happens should the alliance leader ignores the elements of cohesion and coalition maintenance, while experiencing intra-alliance balancing, fear of abandonment, and/or a divided legislative branch that regarded foreign policy as a domain worth significant oversight.

In one of the few case studies that demonstrate a sitting president actively advocating a massive shift in American foreign policy and, indeed, grand strategy, we also have the same president who arguably is saddled with the worst track record for global affairs. Certainly, the Carter Administration was hamstrung with externalities outside of its own agency (e.g. international crises in Nicaragua, the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the Polish Solidarity Movement, etc), but Carter failed to effectively recruit his alliance partners to transition towards his own policy preferences. Instead, the old German Question reared its head within NATO. As a result, the United States remained on the sidelines during the Polish Crisis, unable to reassert soft power as the leader of the Western world.

Carter, furthermore, was insensitive to the security needs of his NATO partners in arms control negotiations. The Carter administration took the view of reducing East-West tension through continuing the Nixon-Kissinger arms control summits, specifically designed to reach an agreement on a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union. However, American timing for this was dubious, as Moscow had begun to deploy their new SS-20 Saber, an intermediate-ranged ballistic missile that posed a definite security threat to President Carter's Western allies. NATO members, especially Chancellor Schmidt was highly critical of the

administration and what was needed was prioritizing the already-in-development cruise missile systems and other theater nuclear forces (TNF) to bolster the defense and deterrence of Europe.

The result of these insensitivities to the needs of American alliance partners created schisms within the Western Alliance. As a result of being unable to secure a consensus from the junior members of the alliance, the Carter Administration was unable to reassert its leadership position. Furthermore, as a result of being unable to secure public opinion support for a grand policy shift from Containment to Carter's Human Rights policy, the administration was forced to circle back to containment and largely cost the election. Ronald Reagan won the next presidential election and his administration enjoyed a decisively pro-Containment mandate, as we will see in the next chapter.

If the *balance-of-threat* explanation was more compelling, the United States and NATO would be expected to entrench themselves in a confrontational doctrine towards the Soviet Union. With Moscow's deployment of the SS-20 missiles and the Soviet Union's aggressive push into Middle Eastern (Afghanistan, Iran), African (Ethiopia and Angola), and Latin American (Cuba, Nicaragua) countries, Stephen Walt would have predicted a strong balancing approach from the Western Alliance. According to **A1**, the greater the threatening state's aggregate power (especially with the modernization of Soviet strategic nuclear forces), the greater the tendency for others to align against it; and **A3**, the more aggressive an adversary's perceived intentions, the more likely others are to align against that state. However, President Carter continued to approach the USSR with an agenda of Human Rights and an unswerving adherence to a normative liberal and Western values approach to foreign policy. This approach decidedly contravened the predictions of the alternative explanation in this dissertation.

America's western allies and domestic political institutions were highly critical of Carter's approach in the context of increasingly bellicose foreign and domestic policy propagated by the Kremlin. In this sense, Carter's natural allies demonstrated willingness to intra-alliance bargaining with the United States to confront and rollback Moscow. This was especially true with America's European allies recognized their growing insecurity was partially because of Soviet modernization and deployment of new weapons system and policies. According to **H2**, if the junior partners are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome. Carter eschewed this traditional Cold War approach in favour of holding to the construction of a new containment strategy as his new American doctrine.

Carter's approach, however, was both unpopular with the American public and unsuccessful in its practical results. Moscow continued to push Washington deeper into retreat and displayed an increasing willingness to implement draconian counter-revolutionary measures towards dissent around the world, especially with respect to the Polish Solidarity movement. By the end of Carter's term, he was forced to reverse his doctrine, acknowledging the political need for a strong US military presence in Western Europe, in fact, returning to the very Containment doctrine he vowed to displace. This was not enough, however, as junior alliance partners like British PM Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor Schmidt stopped taking their cues from Washington, losing faith in their Superpower benefactor. This episode is further evidence that this dissertation's model is supported by the historical record: Carter resisted implementing containment, but the interests and demands of the alliance (as well as domestic public opinion) shaped and shoved the administration back into the United States' traditional Cold War foreign policy.

Jimmy Carter ended up losing the election to Ronald Reagan, largely on the heels of the latter's platform to restore American leadership in East-West relations, promising to meet Soviet bellicosity with the intention of *Rolling Back* the Kremlin, as predicted by **H2**. In essence, while Carter did not conduct foreign policy as predicted in this dissertation's model, he was selected out of leadership by the American public in favour of Reagan, whose vow was indeed to approach East-West relations consistent with the model's prediction.

## **Chapter 8 - Ronald Reagan: The Ash-Heap of History**

"Strength and Realism can deter war, but only direct dialogue and negotiation can open the path toward lasting peace." - Chancellor Schultz<sup>540</sup>

"Like Sisyphus, who was condemned in Hades to push a rock up a hill only to see it roll back down, causing him to repeat the task, the Soviet General Staff seems to see the rock of its military labor rolling back to the bottom of the hill, presenting the Soviet military with a repetition of the same task: a long-term new force building task." - William Odom, U.S. Army's assistant chief of staff for intelligence.<sup>541</sup>

When Ronald Reagan took the oath of office in 1981, the United States was in a state of decline relative to the Soviet Union and America's allies were stuck in a defense mindset, having lost the initiative.<sup>542</sup> Reagan's grand strategy was "premised on the idea that the Soviet Union was far weaker than it had looked in the late 1970s, and that the United States could take advantage of that weakness by exerting pressure in the military, economic, political, and ideological realms. This was the unifying rationale behind the major elements of Reagan's statecraft, from his enormous military buildup, to his eponymous doctrine of supporting anti-Soviet insurgents in the Third World, to his strident rhetorical condemnations of Moscow and other measures."<sup>543</sup> Put another way, the Reagan Administration would *roll back* the Soviet Union's sphere of influence back to its national borders, using an aggressive form of containment utilizing all the elements of American national power to gain "diplomatic leverage that could be

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<sup>540</sup> Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014): 117; Jack F. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004): 61.

<sup>541</sup> Brands (2014): 121; William Odom, "Dilemmas and Directions in Soviet Force Deployment Policy," 28 February 1985, box 29, Odom Papers, Library of Congress.

<sup>542</sup> See previous chapter.

<sup>543</sup> Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014): 103.

used to moderate Soviet behavior and reduce Cold War tensions on terms favorable to the United States."<sup>544</sup>

According to Stephen Walt's *balance of threat*, ostensibly a defensive realist theory (as opposed to Mearsheimer's offensive realist variant) and, therefore, predicated on the notion of sufficient security and not maximum security. In fact, Walt's theory reflects the notion that should Moscow decline in relative strength; NATO's response would decline downwards on the escalation ladder. Given that the first alternative hypothesis, **A1**, states that the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it, we can assume that the converse would hold true: the *weaker* the state's aggregate power (and, therefore, the weaker the threat), states are less likely to align against it (and with lesser intensity -- given that the opposing states is less of a threat). This alternative hypothesis comes to be falsified in this subsequent chapter. In fact, the converse holds true: NATO opposed Moscow with greater strength than at most opportunities during the 1970s.

Carter's presidency came to signify a low point in American strategic leadership in the geopolitical security system. So much was American power waning that its NATO allies, especially West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl questioned whether or not Washington would fulfill its security commitment to Berlin. This fits nicely with the third hypothesis in this dissertation's model: **H3** states that if the junior partner(s) of the coalition bloc are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a *Rollback* strategy will be the most likely outcome. This, of course, is because foreign policy under this condition needs to demonstrate commitment to alliance partners. The strength of action necessary to rollback an adversary allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partners that it will not abandon them that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger partner will honour its promise to coalition members.

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<sup>544</sup> Brands (2014): 103.

One of the early major moves under the Reagan Administration was to issue NSDD-32 (and refined in NSDD-75) was to strengthen American strategy influence throughout the world, encourage long-term liberalization and nationalism that was designed to ultimately weaken Moscow's satellite states within its own spheres of influence (thus, *rolling back* the Soviet Union to its own Russian boundaries). This is confirmation of **H3**.

Similarly, Secretary Haig was dispatched to demonstrate to European allies that, despite continental fears, Washington had no intention of abandoning its role as the Western leader of arms control negotiations. In fact, even Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, also known colloquially as 'Star Wars'), was received in Europe with a dual concerns: while the Western allies were hesitant to take action that Moscow would deem belligerent, therefore taking East-West tensions up the escalation ladder towards open warfare, and their so-called "intense concern" that the Kremlin would come to surpass NATO capabilities in advanced strategic defense programmes. In the end, several European allies supported Reagan's SDI, at least during the research and modernization phases of the initiative, judging the project to be consistent with the 1972 ABM Treaty and that it would ultimately enhance both stability and lower level deterrence.

According to **IVV1**, when foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance in the legislative branch, the executive will be constrained in selecting its most preferred foreign policy -- and thanks to the international failures of the Carter Administration, foreign security policies were on the Congressional radar. In partial deference to congressional opposition, the Administration was pressured to produce National Security Decision Directive 119 (NSDD 119), in which the National Security Council (NSC) that pursuing SDI research would not be done in a way that would threaten the Kremlin and would conduct itself within all existing arms control

agreements. While it may not be surprising, in hindsight, that one of the Superpowers would agree to adhere to an international agreement; it represented a significant constraint to President Reagan's ambitious project. Furthermore, because of the backdrop of the so-called 'Vietnam Syndrome' -- e.g. widespread public opposition to US military involvement in Third World conflicts,<sup>545</sup> the Reagan Administration was forced to find an alternative route for *Rollback* in Latin American countries that aligned with the Soviets and, more broadly, Marxist-Leninist ideology. Instead of conventional warfare, the Administration opted for CIA-led covert operation, this way bypassing the constraining effect of Congress and public opinion. Therefore, the President was constrained by Congress and public opinion in terms of methods, as predicted by **IVV1**, however with a little ingenuity, Washington was able to pursue ways to advance the national interest and policy preferences, without becoming overly constrained and inhibited by Congressional opposition.

*Re-Establishing American Ascendancy: Re-Containment and Roll Back*

President Reagan's grand strategy was crafted in two major directives released in 1982-83. Outlined in NSDD-32, the administration looked towards the "development and integration of a set of strategies, including diplomatic, informational, economic/political, and military components." The directive argued that U.S. strategic objectives needed to be informed with a mind to "strengthen the influence of U.S. throughout the world," "to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world," to "discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its

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<sup>545</sup> Kornbluh (1987): 1120; See also, Sarah Miles, "The Real War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America," North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), May/June 1986.

economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries."<sup>546</sup>

Reagan inherited an international system in which the United States' influence was in decline, while the Soviet Union appeared to be approaching the zenith of their powers, as we saw in the previous chapter. What NSDD-32 outlined was not only that it was imperative to return to Western Containment, but a strategy that may alter the fundamental balance of power in the superpower relationship. Accordingly, the eventual payoff for the Reagan Administration's grand strategy was that while "the decade of the eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II and our response could result in a fundamentally different East-West relationship by the end of this decade."<sup>547</sup>

The ideas and pathways outlined in NSDD-32 were elaborated, refined, and set forward in NSDD-75 in January 1983. By and large the document was written by Pipes, the NSC staff, and signed off on by President Reagan and set out the crucial goals and stages of the administration's policy in explicit terms:

1. "To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansion by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas - particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States...
2. "To promote within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced...

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<sup>546</sup> Brands (2014): 118; NSDD-32, "U.S. National Security Strategy," 20 May 1982, Box 1, NSDD File, ESF, RRL; "U.S. National Security Strategy," April 1982, Box 4, Related Documents, Records Declassified and Released by the National Security Council, RRL; NSC Meeting, 27 April 1982, Box 91284, NSC ESF, RRL.

<sup>547</sup> *Ibid.*

3. "To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest."<sup>548</sup>

Like Kennan's containment circa 1947, Reagan's *Roll Back* was one in which the United States would triumph in "the long-haul," not one that would necessarily yield immediate results.

According to Brands, Reagan's grand strategy "would require persistent efforts in the military, economic, political, diplomatic, covert, and ideological realms. The desired result was not an 'open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow,' but rather to find a more 'stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations."<sup>549</sup> In action, President Reagan's actions in the previous year combined both positive diplomatic interludes, such as lifting the grain embargo placed in response to the Kremlin's invasion of Afghanistan and seeking a summit between himself and Secretary Brezhnev's successor, as well as a more bellicose tone: "'the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union.' If the Soviets acted 'in a responsible fashion,' Reagan affirmed, 'they will meet a ready and positive response in the West.'"<sup>550</sup> The obvious threat in the President's tenor was implicit.

Reagan's first goal, reversing Moscow's expansionism and re-asserting Washington's strength and leadership, was successful. When the Reagan administration took office in 1980, the consensus was the United States was in retreat and the Soviet Union was marching toward

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<sup>548</sup> Brands (2014): 118-19; NSDD-75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," NSC Meeting, 16 December 1982, Box 91285, NSC ESF, RRL; see also, Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003): 201.

<sup>549</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>550</sup> Brands (2014): 117-19; Reagan quoted in NSDD-75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," 17 January 1983, Box 91287, NSDD File, NSC ESF, RRL; "Radio Address to the Nation on East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions," 13 November 1982, APP. See also, Jack F. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004): 66; Douglas Brinkley, (editor) *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007): 220.

primacy; by 1983-84, it was generally agreed this perception was flipped.<sup>551</sup> According to Brands, "Soviet officials no longer evinced confidence that the 'correlation of forces' was in their favor, and American policy now boasted a spirit of power and confidence. The United States, Reagan declared in 1984, was 'in its strongest position in years.'<sup>552</sup> At once, Reagan had exercised Washington's demons that drained self-confidence in the post-Vietnam era, re-asserted American leadership in the West, and highlighted Moscow's reality of the Potemkin village, wherein the Communist economy had slipped into stagnation and unrest.<sup>553</sup>

The Reagan administration redressed the Carter-era concern of America's NATO allies vis-a-vis Moscow's deployment of their mobile SS-20 nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe. While President Carter's weak position regarding Washington's response (namely cruise missile deployment) to the emerging threat (as seen in the last chapter), Reagan fulfilled the 1979 NATO decision that called for the United States deploy nuclear missiles in Europe, known as the "dual track decision." Furthermore, the administration called for NATO and their allies to push for arms control discussions with Warsaw Pact nations to reduce the threat posed by the SS-20s. Additionally, Reagan would assent to the deployment of IRBM Pershing II rockets and cruise missiles in Western Europe to counter the Soviet SS-20 threat, which was slated for implementation in 1983.<sup>554</sup>

Perhaps most importantly, the newly-elected Reagan administration pushed for partnership with their NATO junior alliance partners. Washington was displeased with the lack

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<sup>551</sup> Brands (2014):119.

<sup>552</sup> Brands (2014): 119; "Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations," 16 January 1984, APP. See also, Robert Patman, "Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Emergence of the 'New Political Thinking,'" *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4 (October: 1999): 591-599; Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third-World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 336-337; Vojtech Mastny, "How Able Was 'Able Archer'?: Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective," *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter: 2009): 115-16.

<sup>553</sup> Brands (2014): 119.

<sup>554</sup> Beth A. Fischer. "Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 112, no. 3 (Autumn, 1997): 483.

of a united front during the Iranian hostage crisis, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. In essence, Washington and the American general population demanded the NATO allies "do more for the common defense and get tougher with the Russians...President Reagan promised firmness and coherence in U.S. leadership of the alliance. The Europeans welcomed coherence, but they were less at ease with firmness as defined by the Reagan officials."<sup>555</sup> Reagan's National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen purported that the European allies were threatened by internal "outright pacifist sentiments" and *The New York Times* likened the Europeans to "Vichyites," similar to the French collaborators who looked to appease Hitler. Crucially, Reagan's Secretary of State and former NATO commander-in-chief Alexander M. Haig Jr. "worked overtime to smooth ties." Secretary Haig was well-respected by European leaders for his work in NATO was able to "repudiate the sharp public attacks from the right wing of the Administration."<sup>556</sup>

European sentiment was skeptical towards the Reagan administration's rhetoric, and trust needed to be earned; anti-Americanism was on the rise in Western Europe. This could have been predicted with the dramatic turn from Carter's lethargic foreign policy to Reagan's aggressive *roll back*. This view was partially reversed by Reagan's cruise missile response to "the highly accurate SS-20 [which] endanger[ed] every Western military facility from Norway to Italy. Schmidt, Thatcher and other NATO leaders agreed with the United States that the alliance must counter Soviet nuclear weaponry to maintain deterrence in Europe." It was in this capacity that NATO allies consented to the building of an American-controlled theater nuclear force (TNF) "of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 long-range Pershing II missiles."<sup>557</sup>

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<sup>555</sup> Foreign Policy Association. "Western Europe and the U.S.: Friction Among Friends," *Great Decisions, eat Decisions* (1982): 24.

<sup>556</sup> Ibid.

<sup>557</sup> Ibid.

Likely just as important to intra-alliance trust-building was Reagan's stance vis-a-vis arms control. When the administration expressed that it was committed to implement a major military buildup in order to negotiate from a position of strength, European allies were openly concerned that Washington was to abandon the arms control strategy altogether. In a July 1981 speech, however, "Secretary Haig stated that the Administration intended to begin negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe before the end of the year. The first meeting was set for November 1981."<sup>558</sup> While friction still remained, especially with the far left-leaning factions who protested nuclear strategy altogether, the British, German, and Italian national governments held firm to a policy of weapons modernization and negotiations.<sup>559</sup>

### *Roll Back*

The Reagan strategy was to establish a hard line stance towards Moscow which could then be relaxed in future iterations, that is once the Soviets were persuaded to moderate their behavior and engage with the West in a less confrontational manner.<sup>560</sup> First, however, Washington needed to reestablish American ascendancy and reverse the Cold War momentum that had been building since the mid-1970s. The administration was successful in this first goal as consensus held Washington in retreat and Moscow moving forward in 1980, but by 1983-84, the perceived balance held the opposite. American strategy regained vigor and confidence in her strength.

The Reagan administration bought into American intelligence, which argued that the Soviet Union was a Potemkin Village: the USSR was far weaker than it appeared by the 1980s. According to Reagan's policymakers, "the Soviet economy was gradually but unmistakably slipping into stagnation and obsolescence, while Soviet society was wracked with ills ranging

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<sup>558</sup> Ibid.

<sup>559</sup> Ibid: 24-5.

<sup>560</sup> Brands 2004: 116.

from rampant alcoholism to signs of incipient civil unrest. These problems were compounded by a bloated military budget that soaked up badly needed resources, and by the dismal leadership of a feeble and rigid gerontocracy."<sup>561</sup> According to an upper level American intelligence official, by 1984 "Soviet leaders [were] starting to recognize that something [had] gone hideously wrong" and that "History [was] no longer on Moscow's side - if ever it was - and Soviet leaders sense they lack[ed] the wit, the energy, the resources and above all the time, to win it back...The Soviet Union is the world's last empire, and after 67 years of communism it [had] entered its terminal phase."<sup>562</sup>

While the Reagan grand strategy did not cause this decline in Soviet power, it did produce conditions in which the United States could exploit the geopolitical effects associated with Moscow's decline.<sup>563</sup> For example, American involvement in Central America altered the perception that Soviet momentum marched in the Western Hemisphere, as Washington assisted in the prevented of governmental collapse in El Salvador and the Moscow-backed regime in Nicaragua.<sup>564</sup> More crucially, however, was the Reagan Doctrine's effect of strengthening the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Under the Reagan strategy, Washington was able to embolden Afghanistan's Mujahideen and helped to ensure that "this particular conflict became a bloody, expensive, and thoroughly demoralizing quagmire for the Soviet Union. Indeed, the costs that U.S. policies imposed on Moscow were ideological as well as material. As the attractiveness of the Soviet economic model faded and U.S. pressure on Kremlin clients from Kabul to Managua increased, Moscow's view of the Third World dimmed considerably. In the late 1970s, Soviet

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<sup>561</sup> Brands 2004: 119.

<sup>562</sup> Brands 2004: 119; Herbert Meyer to DI, "What Should We Do about the Russians?" 28 June 1984, CIA Freedom of Information Act; National Intelligence Council, "Dimensions of Civil Unrest in the Soviet Union," April 1983; National Intelligence Estimate, "Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System," November 1985, CIA Freedom of Information Act; See also, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," *International Security* vol. 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/2001): 13-28.

<sup>563</sup> Brands 2004: 119-20.

<sup>564</sup> Brands 2004: 120.

officials had looked forward to further socialist gains; by 1983-84, their assessments had grown pessimistic."<sup>565</sup>

*Moscow: A Potemkin Village; the Kremlin Has No Clothes*

Moscow's burst of expansionism since the Vietnam War (and culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan) seemed to have signaled a western crisis with "America in Retreat."<sup>566</sup>

According to some estimates, the Soviet military was said to be spending up to 12-14% of its GNP in defense spending (up 70% more than the equivalent in U.S. dollar terms for defense spending).<sup>567</sup> When President Reagan was inaugurated in 1980, "Soviet leaders stated with growing confidence that the correlation of forces had shifted in their favor."<sup>568</sup>

Carter's defense spending proposal before he left office was increased by the Reagan administration. American spending for defense in 1980 was in excess of \$134 billion, but had ballooned to \$253 billion by 1985 -- an increase of 42%.<sup>569</sup> The three most important sectors of this defensive buildup were: (1) strategic nuclear modernization, (2) conventional force buildup, and (3) improvements in force readiness and force mobility.<sup>570</sup> According to Andrew Busch, "the strategic buildup had several objectives: to maintain the strategic balance threatened by Soviet strategic modernization; to make possible a 'counterforce' targeting strategy; and to restore American negotiating leverage."<sup>571</sup> By 1983, Congress and the Reagan administration implemented plans to put most strategic modernization programs into effect: increasing

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<sup>565</sup> Brands 2014: 120; See also, Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004), esp. 55-90; James Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996): 40-81, 221.

<sup>566</sup> Andrew E. Busch, "Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* vol. 27, no 3, The Presidency in the World (Summer, 1997): 451; Ben J. Wattenberg, *New York Times Magazine*, 22 July 1979: 14-16

<sup>567</sup> Busch (1997): 451; *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1981): 9.

<sup>568</sup> Busch (1997): 451; Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall, 1980): 86.

<sup>569</sup> Busch (1997): 452.

<sup>570</sup> Busch (1997): 452.

<sup>571</sup> Busch (1997): 452.

conventional forces, adding to the number of tactical fighter wings, and commissioning new ships to serve in the U.S. Navy, as well as special and covert operations forces.

Reagan's renewed buildup tactic was at once a cost-imposing strategy on the USSR, as well as adhering to the old *si vis pacem, parabellum*<sup>572</sup> dictum. The president expressed the purpose and ultimate goal of this strategy: "I think I'm a hard-line & will never appease but I do want to try & let them see there is a better world if they'll show *by deed* they want to get along with the free world."<sup>573</sup> Secretary of State George Shultz seconded the President's thoughts, even if he was a strong believer in the value of eventual negotiations with the Kremlin: "Strength and realism can deter war, but only direct dialogue and negotiation can open the path toward lasting peace."<sup>574</sup>

The Reagan strategy of negotiating from a position of strength was coupled with improving the relative power dynamic in America's favour. According to Brands and others, "the idea of using a confrontational approach now to enable the relaxation of tensions later was most evident in Reagan's approach to arms race. In other words, the United States would confront the Soviet Union when they were violators, but incentivize cooperation when they adhered to western-laden values (and ultimately, interests). For example, when Reagan sent signals to Moscow that Washington was interested in a new round of SALT talks, the United States lifted the embargo on grain put in place in the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion to incentivize President Brezhnev to join Reagan for a "meaningful and constructive dialogue which will assist

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<sup>572</sup> If you want peace, prepare for war.

<sup>573</sup> Brands (2014): 117; Douglas Selva, "The Politics of the Lesser Evil: The West, the Polish Crisis, and the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid, 1981-1983," in *The Crisis of Detente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, ed. Leopoldo Nuti (New York: Routledge, 2009): 46; Douglas Brinkley, ed. *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007): 142; Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003): 193; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third-World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 354.

<sup>574</sup> Brands (2014): 117; Matlock (2004): 61.

us in fulfilling our joint obligation to find lasting peace."<sup>575</sup> However, the president approved a directive from the NSC stating that "the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains."<sup>576</sup>

From the start, Reagan believed that a determined arms buildup would force the Soviets to embrace an economically disastrous competition or else accept deep cuts in existing arsenals."<sup>577</sup> Reagan's buildup strategy to cause the Soviet Union difficult economic decisions was predicated on his belief that Moscow was much weaker than it appeared - a veritable Potemkin village. According to Brands, "the Soviet economy was gradually but unmistakably slipping into stagnation and obsolescence, while Soviet society was wracked with ills ranging from rampant alcoholism to signs of incipient civil unrest. These problems were compounded by a bloated military budget that soaked up badly needed resources, and by the dismal leadership of a feeble and rigid gerontocracy."<sup>578</sup> According to some estimates, for example, "Soviet military expenditures...were no consuming between 15 and 20 percent of gross domestic product; the comparable figure for the United States, through the last half of the 1970's, had averaged slightly under 5 percent."<sup>579</sup>

The new strategy of pushing back against the Soviet Union was tying raw military power with economic stress, as Reagan believed that the American economy was deeper and so far

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<sup>575</sup> Brands (2014): 117; "Text of President Reagan's Handwritten Message to President Brezhnev," April 1981, Box 38, HOS, Ronald Reagan Library. For domestic motivations for the grain embargo with respect to the Republican-voting agricultural sector, please see "Our agriculture here was in a tailspin," National Security Council Meeting, 16 October 1981, Box 91282, NSC ESF, Ronald Reagan Library

<sup>576</sup> Brands (2014): 117-18; NSDD 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," 17 January 1983, Box 91287, NSDD File, NSC ESF, RRL; "Radio Address to the Nation on East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions," 13 November 1982, APP.

<sup>577</sup> Brands (2014): 117.

<sup>578</sup> Brands (2014): 119.

<sup>579</sup> Gaddis (2005) : 356; Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000* (New York: 2001), especially pp. 10-30; Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the U.S.S.R., and the Successor States* (New York: 1998): 436-42; Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton: 2000): 82-3; William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven: 1998): esp. 49-64.

advanced relative to the Soviet that a renewed arms race would have a destructive impact on their rival. In fact, Reagan told the National Security Council that "the message to the Soviets is that if they want an arms race, the U.S. will not let them get ahead...Their choice is to break their backs to keep up, or to agree to reductions."<sup>580</sup> Certainly the Reagan administration did not cause the economic and leadership crisis within the Soviet Union, but this grand strategy did allow Washington to exploit its effects within the geopolitical sphere.

Western Europe responded positively to the Reagan Administration's policy of military modernization and actively participated in the West's challenge to the Soviet Union's force readiness and balance of forces. During the first few years of the Reagan Administration, for example, Alliance support increased significantly in terms of burden-sharing indicators, whereas the United States was able to withdraw some resources out of the common defense. This was significant because the United States carried the vast majority of the defensive burden for West and this became a major point of contention and friction between America and their Western European allies, as indicated in the Middle Cold War sections (especially the Kennedy, Johnson, and Ford chapters). According to some sources, "between 1971 and 1981, real U.S. defense spending declined by around 7 percent, whereas defense spending of the Allies increased by 27 percent. For the same period, U.S. civilian defense manpower declined by almost 20 percent, while that of the Allies declined by around 3.5 percent."<sup>581</sup> It should further be noted that this occurred during a period of worldwide economic recession.

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<sup>580</sup> Brands (2014): 117; NSC Meeting, 30 November 1983, Box 91303, NSC Executive Secretariat Files, Ronald Reagan Library; Paul Johnson, "Europe and the Reagan Years," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no.1, America and the World 1988/89 (1988/1989): 30; Robert McGeehan, "The Atlantic Alliance and the Reagan Administration," *The World Today*, vol. 37, no. 7/8 (July - August, 1981): 257.

<sup>581</sup> Lawrence J. Korb and Linda P. Brady, "Rearming America: The Reagan Administration Defense Program," *International Security*, vol. 9, no. 3 (Winter, 1984-1985): 5; U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense - A Report to the United States Congress*, June 1983: 1.

*"A Pistol Held to Our Head": American Strategic Modernization, the Pershing II Missile, and Star Wars (SDI: Strategic Defense Initiative)*

The military buildup continued through the Reagan administration. Moscow had operated with the assumption that their ongoing buildup would hand over definitive strategic superiority with "increased coercive leverage" during the Carter presidency (and indeed, the 1970s), this proved to not be the case during the Reagan years.<sup>582</sup> In fact, with the American arsenal undergoing its own modernization under Reagan, the Kremlin was confronted with their own "window of insecurity," as the American Pershing II missiles were both faster and much more accurate than their SS-20 counterparts. Therefore, "the Soviets were thus coming out of the 'Euromissile' episode *more* vulnerable than before. The Pershing deployment, Gorbachev later wrote was 'a pistol held to our head.'"<sup>583</sup>

More threatening than the Pershing II was Reagan's *Strategic Defense Initiative* (SDI), also known as the *Star Wars* programme. Star Wars was, ostensibly, a technologically advanced version of the missile defense shield. Defense officials in Moscow feared that it would now be possible to "render Moscow's ICBM force irrelevant and potentially expose the Soviet Union to a debilitating first strike." Furthermore, according to a high-ranking KGB general, SDI demonstrated that the struggling Marxist economy could not compete with the robustness of the Americans in a high-technology arena. He continued, "It underlined still more our technological backwardness. Kremlin officials attempted to counter SDI with their own major offensive buildup in the hopes of overwhelming Star Wars' sensors, but this simply led to increased military expenditures during a period in which Russian resources were becoming increasingly

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<sup>582</sup> Brands (2014): 121; see also, BDM Corporation, *Soviet Intentions, 1965-1985*, vols. 1-2, EBB 285, NSA

<sup>583</sup> Brands (2014): 121; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1995): 444.

scarce.<sup>584</sup> In fact, because the Pentagon believed that the Kremlin was building up its military for offensive purposes, SDI consisted of a means to defend the United States against a Soviet nuclear attack. In other words, the SDI missile shield, in effect, mitigated the Soviet military burgeoning superiority over the United States.<sup>585</sup> William Odom, the U.S. Army's assistant chief of staff for intelligence, summarized the trajectory of the Soviet predicament from working towards strategic equality, attaining advantage, and quickly fading towards the second-place superpower in terms of strategic plenty:

Like Sisyphus, who was condemned in Hades to push a rock up a hill only to see it roll back down, causing him to repeat the task, the Soviet General Staff seems to see the rock of its military labor rolling back to the bottom of the hill, presenting the Soviet military with a repetition of the same task: a long-term new force building task.<sup>586</sup>

For the Soviet Union, it appeared that Reagan's competitive armed forces modernization placed the Kremlin back somewhere near square one: trying to catch up to American reassertion of its superiority and obligated to pour more resources into overtaking their adversary. President Reagan's announcement of his plans to pursue SDI, however, opened conflict within NATO. When the president announced his plans for SDI in March 1983, European officials were concerned with how sudden the announcement was made and the lack of allied consultation:

Virtually every official of an allied government...complained that the Reagan administration had failed to consult his government... [A French official said] "When it's a

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<sup>584</sup> Brands (2014): 121; Quoted in Robert Patman, "Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Emergence of the 'New Political Thinking,'" *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4 (October 1999): 596-97; see also, Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995): 528; Gorbachev (1995): 455; Pavel Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997): 41; Peter J. Westwick, "Space-Strike Weapons' and the Soviet Response to SDI," *Diplomatic History* vol. 32, no. 5 (November 2008): 955-979.

<sup>585</sup> Beth A. Fischer, "Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 112, no. 3 (Autumn, 1997): 483

<sup>586</sup> Brands (2014): 120; William Odom, "Dilemmas and Directions in Soviet Force Development Policy," 28 February 1985, Box 29, Odom Papers, Library of Congress.

question of our strategic defense and our future survival, we have to hear it on television like everyone else."<sup>587</sup>

Furthermore, it was more than the unexpected nature of SDI's announcement; European allies were concerned with the project's implications for deterrence: "West European leaders have spent three decades persuading their people that deterrence is the cornerstone of NATO defense policy. Suddenly, officials of the Reagan administration announced that nuclear weapons are 'immoral.'"<sup>588</sup> In other words, the position of the United States shifted in tone in its message towards its European allies from nuclear weapons are beneficial as a deterrent to nuclear weapons may very well be useable.

European attitudes towards SDI were complex. Firstly, there was a belief that the Western allies needed due to their "intense concern" that the Kremlin would surpass NATO members' abilities in the advanced strategic defense programmes. The need to keep apace of the Soviet Union was of paramount concern.<sup>589</sup> Hans Ruhle, West Germany's head of the Federal Republic's Policy Planning Staff in the Ministry of Defense argued that allied leaders had been attempting to "bring the Soviets' efforts in strategic defense to the attention of the Western European public. Frequently referring to the US Defense Department's publication *Soviet Military Power*, Ruhle discussed the impressive efforts in the USSR to exploit or violate the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which severely restricted the superpowers' ability to defend silos and urban centers."<sup>590</sup> This, of course, was worked out in the

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<sup>587</sup> William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Consensus Lost?: Domestic Politics and the 'Crisis in NATO,'" *World Politics*, vol. 39, no. 3 (April, 1987): 404; Paul E. Gallis et al, *The Strategic Defense Initiative and United States Alliance Strategy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1 February 1985): 27.

<sup>588</sup> Domke et al (1987): 404; Gallis et al (1985): 40.

<sup>589</sup> Anthony Gardner, "US-European Relations and SDI," *Harvard International Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (November/December, 1988): 36.

<sup>590</sup> Anthony Gardner, "US-European Relations and SDI," *Harvard International Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (November/December, 1988): 36.

1972 Treaty in order to fulfill the mutual vulnerability criterion necessary for the maintenance of a robust, bilateral, and stable nuclear deterrent between the two superpowers. In summary, many of the Western allies supported (if reluctantly) the continued research towards a viable Western missile shield even though the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibited its deployment (if not its actual research), given that evidence pointed to the conclusion that the Kremlin was either hedging, cheating, or attempting to defect from the terms outlined in the ABM.

Secondly, Britain's Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary-General was an ardent supporter of alerting the Western public that the USSR was making strides in space technology and in the area of strategic nuclear defense. Lord Carrington's view was that the Western alliance could potentially be strained by Soviet pressure over how strictly NATO would adhere to the ABM Treaty. In fact, the NATO Secretary-General argued quite vociferously the alliance "withstand Soviet pressure to ban research on missile defense in negotiations on space and nuclear arms."<sup>591</sup> The reasons for this position were quite clear: (1) the Soviet Union was far ahead of the United States and their allies in terms of Anti-Ballistic Missile technology and did not have as great a need to test, (2) research into ABM technology is unverifiable, so there is little fear of being caught "cheating"; and (3) the ABM Treaty only prohibits *field* testing and the deployment of ABM systems.<sup>592</sup>

Thirdly, all of the Western Allies (including West Germany) had a fairly nuanced position when it came to ABM research for NATO. According to a communiqué disseminated by NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) from Luxembourg actually supported the research phase of SDI, finding that it was still consistent with the ABM Treaty and it would continue to "seek to find methods of enhancing stability and deterrence at lower levels of offensive nuclear

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<sup>591</sup> Gardner (1988): 36.

<sup>592</sup> Gardner (1988): 36.

forces."<sup>593</sup> However confident the scientific and technocratic members of the NPG were towards ABM research, many Western European statesmen were not as confident, as they considered the strong possibility (according to them) that Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative would result in the Soviets cancelling the treaty and spurring a renewed arms race and, therefore, greater instability.<sup>594</sup>

Illustrative of the wariness of the statesmen class, British Foreign Secretary Howe's speech to the Royal United Services Institute in London raised several "diplomatically phrased" questions about potential consequences, both anticipated and unanticipated. Howe asked "whether there was a danger that newly developed exotic technologies might determine political choices and whether a very costly research program might assume a bureaucratic momentum of its own."<sup>595</sup> In fact, the speech was delivered at the behest of Prime Minister Thatcher, who believed that the Reagan Administration was not respecting the four conditions that she laid out for the United States in order to secure British support of SDI, as laid out at Camp David in December 1984. These conditions were that (1) SDI would not seek superiority over the Soviet Union, but establish and maintain a balance of power or balance of force; (2) while the Prime Minister supported SDI at the research phase, actual field deployment would remain an open question for the alliance to negotiate and deliberate over; (3) the deterrent function of nuclear arms would be enhanced, remaining robust, rather than supplanted by ABM technology; and (4) the East-West negotiation for the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons should continue.<sup>596</sup> Additionally, in Thatcher's address to a joint session of the US Congress she stated that:

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<sup>593</sup> Gardner (1988): 36.

<sup>594</sup> Gardner (1988): 36.

<sup>595</sup> British Foreign Secretary Howe paraphrased in Gardner (1988): 36.

<sup>596</sup> Gardner (1988): 36.

There should be no commitment to an operational system and no plan to overturn current NATO nuclear deterrent strategy. The ambiguities of the agreement - over the means of consultation in particular - may become a point of contention if they lead to conflicting interpretations and misunderstandings across the Atlantic.<sup>597</sup>

Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, laid out his set of conditions for US support, which were very much similar to Prime Minister Thatcher's requirements. Overall, Chancellor Kohl's requirements retained the motivation guiding his conditions were to preserve nuclear deterrence as the backbone of the NATO security paradigm.<sup>598</sup> According to his article from *NATO Review*, he argued that Western Europe's security strategy must refrain from becoming "de-coupled" from their American allies "and uniform levels of security within the Alliance must prevail; NATO's flexible response strategy, according to which the Soviet threat will be matched and defeated at the battlefield, tactical and strategic stages of a conflict must not be replaced until a more promising solution to vulnerability is found; and the result from the research program must lead to allied negotiations and cooperative policies. Most significantly Kohl proposed that the superpowers continue to observe the ABM Treaty until they sign another accord in Geneva to replace it."<sup>599</sup> In fact, Chancellor Kohl advocated that the United States renew a personal relationship between the President and General Secretary, if only to stop the Soviets from defecting from their arms control obligations. Kohl's position was to ensure coordination and cohesion between the Americans and their Western European allies, continue researching anti-ballistic missile technology but not push deployment to where the Soviets could justifiably defect from the ABM Treaty, and finally

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<sup>597</sup> Thatcher, paraphrased in Gardner (1988): 36.

<sup>598</sup> Kohl, paraphrased in Gardner (1988): 36-7.

<sup>599</sup> Kohl, paraphrased in Gardner (1988): 36-7.

It is our common aim to place relations with the Soviet Union on a firmer basis than in the past. In this connection I advocate a renewed meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. We need to be watchful, however, so the Soviet leadership does not make use of agreements of this kind to cover up an arms buildup or to take advantage of detente for further political and military expansion as was the case in the 1970s. The Soviet Union will have to change its ways if it wants to gain the confidence of the West. Nothing could serve this purpose better than a withdrawal from the bloody and senseless Afghanistan adventure with which it has damaged its image and severely strained foreign relations.<sup>600</sup>

Chancellor Kohl's argument was in a similar vein to the "keep your enemies close" dictum, in that personal guarantees and closer ties renewed in the Superpower arms summit negotiations would serve to keep Kremlin ambitions in check and dissuade the Soviets from defecting or cheating from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (or a renewed arms buildup and/or further Soviet expansionism and adventurist policies).

While Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl had grave concerns about the Reagan Administration's pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative, they were firmly in support of the American superpower. This would serve to allow the Reagan Administration to freely pursue SDI and, therefore, a particularly strong form of Containment (e.g. Rollback) without fear of splintering NATO or threatening the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. In fact, Chancellor Kohl went so far as to praise the American President for his economic policy and not reverting to a protectionist economic policy that would threaten its ties with Western Europe: "The large US current deficits which the decline in the dollar exchange rate has not yet been able to correct, has strengthened protectionist tendencies in the United States. We owe a debt of thanks to President

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<sup>600</sup> Kohl (1986): 12.

Reagan for having effectively resisted protectionist initiatives thus far. The prosperity of the Western nations is based on the freedom of world markets" (which Kohl referred to as a "danger of disturbances" between Europe and the United States).<sup>601</sup>

After having established Western European supports for the Strategic Defense Initiative, albeit with lukewarm reception and reservations (at best), the Reagan Administration turned its sights toward the Congress to secure approval and funding. Partisanship had increased during the 1980s, especially on defense issues (as well as many others, besides).<sup>602</sup> In the case of support for the SDI, "the Reagan administration pressed Republicans to support the program while Democrats faced pressure to remain loyal to their party."<sup>603</sup> According to Lindsay's excellent study, both ideology (especially dovishness versus hawkishness) and partisan politics (e.g. party affiliation) are strong causal variables on weapons votes<sup>604</sup> in both Congress and the Senate, while he concludes that there is "solid ground for arguing that partisanship influenced voting on SDI."<sup>605</sup>

Reagan's pursuit of SDI inflamed tensions with Moscow. Secretary Andropov viewed the programme as provocative, denouncing SDI while "claiming that the Americans were 'devising one option after another in their search for best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it."<sup>606</sup> In short order, SDI demonstrated that the issue could present a conflict spiral, as a rapid succession of potentially provocative incidents occurred. First, the Soviet air force mistook

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<sup>601</sup> Kohl (1986): 12.

<sup>602</sup> James M. Lindsay, "Parochialism, Policy, and Constituency Constraints: Congressional Voting on Strategic Weapons Systems," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34 (1990): 936-960; Peter Trubowitz, "Ideology, Party, and U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy: An Analysis of Senate Voting, 1947-1984," Ph.D diss. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 1986).

<sup>603</sup> James M. Lindsay, "Testing the Parochial Hypothesis: Congress and the Strategic Defense Initiative," *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 53, no. 3 (August, 1991): 861-62.

<sup>604</sup> Lindsay (1990); Trubowitz (1986); Lawrence S. Rothenberg, "Do Interest Groups Make a Difference? Lobbying, Constituency Influence, and Public Policy," Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago: 1989).

<sup>605</sup> Lindsay (1991): 867.

<sup>606</sup> Gaddis (2005): 359; Andropov quoted in Mira Duric, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: US Policy and the Soviet Union* (Aldershot, England: 2003): 41.

and shot down a civilian airliner over Sakhalin, mistakenly thinking the aircraft was an American reconnaissance airplane. Two months later, the West German Bundestag voted to deploy American Pershing II and cruise missiles caused Andropov to break off arms control negotiations. Andropov had long held the belief that the Reagan Administration was planning a nuclear first-strike and the *Able-Archer 83* incident reinforced this belief, as a number of high ranking and top officials the US and their NATO allies participated in a major military exercise in November 1983. According to Gaddis, "Soviet intelligence concluded that Able-Archer might be a ruse to cloak preparations for an actual attack - in which case Soviet war plans called for launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States."<sup>607</sup> However, in February 1983, Reagan revealed to Secretary of State Shultz that he wanted to resume talks with the Russians (despite his own staff holding reservations).<sup>608</sup> In fact, President Reagan revealed to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that "[while] people in the Soviet Union regard me as a crazy warmonger...I don't want a war between us, because I know it would bring countless disasters. We should make a fresh start."<sup>609</sup> While it may have appeared that Reagan's rollback of the Soviet Union was producing greater geopolitical tensions, the President's agenda made progress in renewing communications with Moscow, this time through a stronger negotiating position.<sup>610</sup>

President Reagan's communication with Dobrynin did not greatly thaw relations with Andropov, however, and another hardline Soviet took office, Konstantin Chernenko and his

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<sup>607</sup> Gaddis (2005): 359-61; Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)* (New York: 1995): 599-601; Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, Mo.: 1997): 122-31; Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991, updated edition* (Baltimore, Md.: 1998): 65-68; Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: 1996): 266-73.

<sup>608</sup> George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: 1993): 163-67; See also, Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991, updated edition* (Baltimore, Md.: 1998): 15-21; Gaddis (2005): 359.

<sup>609</sup> Dobrynin (1995): 517-18; Gaddis (2005): 359.

<sup>610</sup> For example, a group of Pentecostal evangelists were released after of having to take refuge at the U.S. embassy for five years; the release was negotiated, of course, by the American government and took place in July 1983.

foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko. Reagan looked to continue his campaign of reassurance towards the Russians in order to calm nuclear tensions that arose as a result of SDI and several successive crises mentioned above. In a speech made on 16 January 1984, President Reagan looked to directly appeal to Soviet leadership in order to reassure hardliners and reformers alike:

Just suppose with me for a moment that an Ivan and an Anya could find themselves, say, in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain or a storm with Jim and Sally, and that there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they then deliberate the differences between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a living? Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions and hobbies and what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, maybe Anya would say to Ivan, "wasn't she nice, she also teaches music." Maybe Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon. Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars.<sup>611</sup>

Andropov, however, was dead within three weeks of Reagan's speech and the hardliner, Chernenko, maintained the prevalent sentiment within the Kremlin. In a Kennan-esque strategy, President Reagan and Secretary Shultz agreed to a stratagem of patience with respect to altering the status quo with the Russians. During the summer of 1984, Shultz told the President that "sooner or later...the Soviets would have to face the hurdle of a generational turnover when the senior members of the Politburo retired or died and would be replaced with younger men who might have a significantly different outlook... [These would be] post-World War II people. I

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<sup>611</sup> Gaddis (2005): 360-61; Reagan television address, 16 January 1984, *Public Papers of the Presidents, 1984*: 45; See also, Jack F. Matlock, Jr. *Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: 1995): 83-86.

suspect that ideology will be less of a living force for them, that they will believe more in technology and will look for policies that are genuinely effective...It will pay dividends to treat them with civility, whatever our differences might be and to recognize the importance of their country."<sup>612</sup>

The lukewarm support and halting reservations by key NATO allies, partisan and ideological opposition within the Congress, increasing geopolitical tensions with the Soviet Union in the years leading to Secretary Gorbachev's rise to power, and lack of feasible technology ultimately slowed Star Wars down to a crawl. While the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was established in 1984 to oversee the programme, SDI appeared to be stuck in the research phase. In fact, by the time President Reagan left the Oval Office, national missile defense was still far away from being a practical policy reality (even the *Brilliant Pebbles* conceptual breakthrough would not be brought to presidential attention until after the Reagan Administration and was still of limited utility). In National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) Number 119, the NSC tacitly acknowledged concerns similar to those brought by America's key western allies, namely that "the SDI will be pursued in a manner consistent with all existing arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty" and that "it is part of the President's vision that, eventually, effective strategic defenses could help promote additional agreements to reduce offensive [nuclear weapons] systems."<sup>613</sup> Additionally, "the threat of having to compete with SDI led to greater toleration of reform by the military. Indeed, former Soviet officials have indicated that in many respects, *perestroika* was a military initiative, aimed at redressing the military implications of Soviet technological weakness. Gorbachev's two

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<sup>612</sup> Gaddis (2005): 361-62; Shultz (1993): 478.

<sup>613</sup> National Security Decision Directive Number 119, "Strategic Defense Initiative," 6 January 1984 (Washington, D.C.) in Christopher Simpson (editor), *National Security Directives of the Reagan & Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political & Military Policy, 1981-1991* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1995): 374-78.

foreign ministers, Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, have both attested to the catalytic impact of SDI on Soviet internal reform."<sup>614</sup>

*National Liberation Movements: Reagan and Third World Superpower Competition*

Reagan's grand strategy did not cause the crisis of power and economy within the Soviet Union, however it did serve to allow Washington to exploit severe geopolitical effects within the Kremlin's spheres of influence. For example, American policies were a significant causal factor in worsening the problems that confronted both the Soviet Union and its allies.<sup>615</sup> American policies in Central America served strategic functions, however they were oftentimes little more than garden-variety local anti-communist thugs.<sup>616</sup> Nevertheless, U.S. interventionism in Central America served its purpose in breaking the perception that the USSR was increasingly gaining momentum in the Western Hemisphere, especially in El Salvador and Nicaragua, where the United States stopped the Salvadoran government from regime collapse and inflicting constant pressure on the Kremlin-backed Nicaraguan regime during the 1980s.<sup>617</sup>

Alternatively, the Reagan Doctrine was implemented to strengthen and embolden the Afghani Mujahideen, pushing the conflict to a "thoroughly demoralizing quagmire" for the Kremlin, with a similar loss of status and prestige the Americans suffered as a result of the protracted war in Vietnam.<sup>618</sup> In the Latin America and Afghanistan cases, the Reagan Doctrine was implemented with the effect of being costly in terms of material, but also ideological,

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<sup>614</sup> Busch (1997): 456; Ilya Zemtsov and John Farrar, *Gorbachev: The Man and the System* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989): 182-83; See also, Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: The Free Press, 1991): 80-1; Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's remarks at a Princeton University conference in February 1993, cited in the *National Review* (29 March 1993): 12.

<sup>615</sup> Brands (2014): 120.

<sup>616</sup> Brands (2014): 120.

<sup>617</sup> Brands (2014): 120.

<sup>618</sup> Brands (2014): 120; see also, Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004): especially pp. 55-90; James Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996): pps. 40-81, 221.

lessening the attractiveness of Moscow's Communist economic model. In fact, by 1983-84, the view of the Third World had dimmed considerably amongst Soviet officials, including Andropov who said that "it is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's goal...and it is quite another to build it." In fact, "a leading Soviet specialist on the Third World put it more explicitly, citing Reagan's 'universal anti-Soviet strategy' as a reason why 'there is no guaranteed 'automatic' revolutionary potential there."<sup>619</sup> Even Reagan's economic warfare in terms of the U.S.-Saudi collusion over oil prices was used to place rhetorical pressure on the Soviet economic system, as well as the sabotage of the Siberian pipeline, leading scholars to note that the "Soviet subsidies to the region were becoming an intolerable burden."<sup>620</sup> Furthermore, Reagan's rhetoric pushed forward the narrative "to Moscow, to the West, to dissidents within the bloc - of just how morally and economically bankrupt the Soviet system had become."<sup>621</sup>

The Reagan Administration had restored American primacy in military strength, the commitment to a containment-based grand strategy, and retightening the Western Alliance restored the strategic balance to a favorable position. However, it was apparent that as long as the United States and its allies used containment as the sole objective of their foreign policies, the West would be in a permanent reactionary state and therefore on the defensive. According to Busch, "the great strategic innovation of the 1980s was the combination of containment with an attempt to break the stalemate of the Cold War with a complementary policy of *offense*."<sup>622</sup> Between 1982 and early 1983, three secret classified National Security Decision Directives

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<sup>619</sup> Brands (2014): 120; Robert Patman, "Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Emergence of the 'New Political Thinking,'" *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4 (October 1999): pp. 588-89; William Curtis Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993): 240-41.

<sup>620</sup> Brands (2014): 120-1; See also, Randall Stone, *Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): 42-3.

<sup>621</sup> Brands (2014): 120-1; Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995): 527.

<sup>622</sup> Andrew E. Busch, "Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 3, The Presidency in the World (Summer, 1997): 454.

(NSDDs) established the theoretical framework for America's non-nuclear offensive policy to Rollback the Soviet Union. According to Busch, NSDD-32 "proclaimed that it was U.S. policy to 'neutralize' Soviet control of Eastern Europe by supporting underground movements against the Soviet regime."<sup>623</sup> More broadly, NSDD-32 had set out to outline the "development and integration of a set of strategies, including diplomatic, informational, economic/political, and military components." The directive pursued the argument that U.S. strategic objectives needed to "strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world" and "to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet and allied countries."<sup>624</sup> NSDD-32 was the first step *en route* to the Reagan Doctrine, as consolidated in NSDD-75, but at the time, NSDD-32 was signed with the expectation that its strategy would take time to come to successful fruition: "the decade of the eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II and our response could result in a fundamentally different East-West relationship by the end of this decade."<sup>625</sup>

*Time* magazine reporter Carl Bernstein, moreover, was later to reveal that "the public persuasion campaign was to be underpinned by covert operations designed to 'neutralize efforts of the USSR' to maintain control of Eastern Europe."<sup>626</sup> NSDD-66 "outlined a strategy of

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<sup>623</sup> Busch (1997): 454; "U.S. National Security Strategy," *National Security Decision Directive Number 32*, 20 May 1982. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf>, accessed 4 November 2019.

<sup>624</sup> Brand (2014): 118; Quoted in NSDD 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," 17 January 1983, box 91287, NSDD File, NSC ESF, RRL; "Radio Address to the Nation on East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions," 13 November 1982, APP.

<sup>625</sup> Brand (2014): 118; NSDD-32, "U.S. National Security Strategy," 20 May 1982, box 1, NSDD File, ESF, RRL; See also, "U.S. National Security Strategy," April 1982, box 4, Related Documents, Records Declassified and Released by the National Security Council, RRL; NSC Meeting, 27 April 1982, box 91284, NSC ESF, RRL.

<sup>626</sup> Simpson (1995): 63-4; Carl Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance," *Time*, 24 February 1992: 28-35; See also, Adrian Karatnycky, "How We Helped Solidarity Win," *Washington Post*, 27 August 1989.

economic warfare against the Soviet regime."<sup>627</sup> This was spurred by the unraveling of the American embargo of Western technology to the Soviet natural gas pipeline project outlined in NSDD-24 and NSDD-41 during the summer of 1982. Key European allies, particularly Prime Minister Thatcher refused to support and cooperate with the Reagan Administration, citing that the embargo was "an ideologically driven attempt to force U.S. domestic licensing laws onto European corporations and governments."<sup>628</sup> Instead, the Reagan administration was forced to alter the embargo strategy due to lack of alliance support, having to settle on a longer-term campaign to create financial havoc for the Soviet security and economic apparatus while "avoiding a political rupture with U.S. allies in Europe and Japan."<sup>629</sup> Lastly, "NSDD-75 declared roll-back of Soviet influence around the world, and ultimately a change in the Soviet system itself, to be a key U.S. policy objective."<sup>630</sup> According to NSDD-75, the strategic tasks of the United States were:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States.
2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced.

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<sup>627</sup> Busch (1997): 454.

<sup>628</sup> Simpson (1995): 80-1; See also, National Security Decision Directive 66, "East-West Economic Relations and Poland-Related Sanctions," Washington (29 November 1982). *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988*, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981 - January 1983. Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981-1987. Secret. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03/d246>, accessed 4 November 2019.

<sup>629</sup> Simpson (1995): 80-1.

<sup>630</sup> Busch (1997): 454.

3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.<sup>631</sup>

Outlined in these three documents (NSDD-32, NSDD-66, and NSDD-75), the Reagan Administration articulated its intent to *Rollback* the Soviet Union and actively push towards the fruition of the "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies"<sup>632</sup> outlined in George Kennan's foreign policy and grand strategy recommendations in 1947. As rightly pointed out, "The United States had taken the strategic offensive for the first time in the Cold War. This policy radically changed the complexion of the East-West struggle, both tangibly and psychologically."<sup>633</sup>

The *Reagan Doctrine* looked to add an offensive counterpart to the reactive policy of containment, which "consisted of policy of attempting to roll back the periphery of the Soviet empire by assisting anti-Communist guerrillas in many of the countries that had recently fallen [as well as Eastern Europe, which was not revealed until 1994]."<sup>634</sup> The *Reagan Doctrine* would attempt to overthrow regimes sympathetic to the Soviet Union, comprising their communist sphere of influence, especially in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia. The shift in strategy was conveyed in Reagan's 1985 State of the Union address:

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<sup>631</sup> National Security Decision Directive 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," Washington (17 January 1983). *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988*, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981 - January 1983. Reagan Library, Matlock Files, NSDDs [32, 54, 75, 130, 133]. Secret; Sensitive. Retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03/d260>, accessed 4 November 2019; See also, Simpson (1995): 227-28, 255-63.

<sup>632</sup> X [George Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 4 (July, 1947): 545; see also, "George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'," February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246; Reprinted in US Department of State, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, Vol. VI, Eastern Europe: The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969): 696-709. Retrieved from <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf>, accessed 4 November 2019.

<sup>633</sup> Busch (1997): 454.

<sup>634</sup> Busch (1997): 457.

We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that's not innocent; nor can we be passive when freedom is under seige [sic]...We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives -- on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua -- to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth...Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.<sup>635</sup>

Secretary of State George Shultz echoed the President's words two weeks later, when he argued that the Soviet empire was in the process of "weakening under the strain of its own internal problems and external entanglements...When the United States supports those resisting totalitarianism, we do so not only out of our historical sympathy for democracy and freedom but also, in many cases, in the interests of our national security."<sup>636</sup>

The Reagan Doctrine articulated three objectives, broken down into short, medium, and long term planning. In the first, short-term objective, the United States would provide "aid to resistance forces [which would] blunt Soviet advances by forcing the Soviets and their allies onto the defensive, and could deter future Soviet adventurism by making it clear that they would incur heavy resistance." The second objective, in the medium-term, it became crucial to successfully implement this strategy in at least one or two states. This "victory would demonstrate that 'communism is not, as the Soviets propagate, the 'wave of the future' and that communist rule, once installed, is reversible.'" Lastly, the third objective, the long-term goal would be "to use a series of such successes to achieve a secure peace by ultimately prevailing over the Soviet empire."<sup>637</sup>

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<sup>635</sup> Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union Address," 6 February 1985, *Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986): 146; Busch (1997): 457.

<sup>636</sup> George Shultz, "America and the Struggle for Freedom," address to the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, 22 February 1985: 2-4; Busch (1997): 457.

<sup>637</sup> William R. Bode, "The Reagan Doctrine," *Strategic Review*, vol. 14, no. 1 (Winter, 1986): 26; Busch (1997): 457.

The *Reagan Doctrine* was perceived by contemporary critics as being a high risk proposition, but it also carried great reward. While notably undermining and impinging upon state sovereignty of Soviet clientele states and potential shortcomings of the guerrilla forces the administration was aiding and abetting, skeptics also feared that the Doctrine would prove to be either too much or too little. If American support was too little, the rebels would fail and would ultimately lead to fruitless bloodshed; however, if the United States were to give too much support to rebel factions, it could very easily provoke a dangerous and direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.<sup>638</sup> While supporting rebel factions via aid or covert direct action would become the Reagan Administration's form of proxy conflict with the Soviet Union, meaning to dampen superpower confrontation, the covert nature of the doctrine served its purpose of retaining alliance cohesion and retaining congressional support. The rest of this section will examine some such incidents.<sup>639</sup>

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) derived its authority to conduct covert operations from the 1947 National Security Act, which (in vague language) allowed the Agency to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."<sup>640</sup> Accordingly, it was upon this authority during the first meeting of the NSC in 1947 to approve NSC Directive No. 4 (and its annex 4/A) which "ordered the CIA to engage in covert actions designed to discredit

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<sup>638</sup> Busch (1997): 457-58; See also, Stephen F. Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July," in *The Reagan Foreign Policy*, ed. William Hyland (New York: New American Library, 1987).

<sup>639</sup> The Polish-Solidarity case has been omitted, as it was discussed in previous sections of this paper.

<sup>640</sup> Loch K. Johnson, "Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 1 (March, 1989): 90.

international communism. The quiet option attracted broad support among the NSC principles because 'it held the promise of frustrating Soviet ambitions without provoking open conflict.'<sup>641</sup>

Early NSC directives issuing covert actions were actually subject to little oversight, minimal discussion and supervision (until the December 1974, when Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Act).<sup>642</sup> In fact, so little oversight existed that the Agency's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) were seen to provide a forum for discussion of covert operation proposals among representatives from the Department of Defense and Department of State, but that the CIA already had all the approval it required via NSC-4 and 4-A. In other words, these meetings were not needed to grant approval, but to bring in outside departments for a consultation and guidance function. In fact, the Church Committee concluded that in this early period (e.g. prior to 1974), "loose understandings rather than specific review formed the basis for CIA's accountability for covert operations."<sup>643</sup>

The Kennedy Administration introduced more frequent NSC meetings, with more clearly spelt out criteria for the CIA as a result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. However, this reform stood at odds with the *plausible denial* doctrine, which allowed the president and other high officials to be shielded from responsibility for covert actions that were "blown."<sup>644</sup>

In the post-Watergate climate of 1974, Congress looked to confront the lack of accountability in covert action. Sponsored by Senator Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa) and Representative Leo J. Ryan (D-California), the House approved the Hughes-Ryan Act just before the end of the 1974 legislative session. The law required the president to issue his approval for

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<sup>641</sup> Johnson (1989): 90; Church Committee, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence*, Book IV (April 23, 1976a): 26; Church Committee, "Foreign and Military Intelligence," *Final Report*, Book I, Report No. 94-755, U.S. Senate (April 23, 1976b): 48-9

<sup>642</sup> Johnson (1989): 90; Church Committee (1976a): 36.

<sup>643</sup> Johnson (1989): 90; Church Committee (1976b): 50.

<sup>644</sup> Johnson (1989): 90; H.A. Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action*. Reader's Digest (1977): 153.

all covert operations (which was understood to be in writing at the time), as well as establishing a procedure for informing Congress of the decision. The law required that "no funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the [CIA] for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress."<sup>645</sup> In effect, the provision attempted to move away from plausible deniability doctrine, as it forbade covert operations that were not approved by the president.<sup>646</sup>

The passing of the Intelligence Accountabilities Act in 1980 looked to further tighten Congressional control over intelligence operations, requiring the president to inform the appropriate committees about all important covert operations, and do so *before* the action was taken. In emergency situations, moreover, the president was allowed to limit prior notice to the eight leaders in Congress (the so-called 'Gang of Eight'). In other words, the president could not insulate himself from accountability even in emergency or crisis conditions. The wording of the 1980 statute was essentially clear, presumably having been prior bitten by vague language: "if the President determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States, such notice shall be limited to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate."<sup>647</sup>

Despite the clarity and lack of ambiguity of the language in both the 1974 and 1980 statutes, CIA directors have skirted around Congressional obligation for prior notice for covert

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<sup>645</sup> Johnson (1989): 91.

<sup>646</sup> Johnson (1989): 91.

<sup>647</sup> Johnson (1989): 92.

action. In fact, the Reagan Administration indeed failed to report many covert actions to Congress at all (especially the Iran-*contra* scandal).<sup>648</sup> Moreover, the Reagan Administration attempted to even the tighten secrecy surrounding covert actions, abolishing the norm of interdepartmental consultation that pervaded the NSC meetings and proceedings on covert operations that was present in prior administrations.<sup>649</sup> Instead of military and diplomatic experts comprising the Special Operations Committee, the new NSC committee for covert action -- which was named the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) -- included more of the president's own personal advisers in the room (namely the White House chief of staff and deputy, as well as the president's counselor).<sup>650</sup> According to Gelb and a former senior official, however, "the Reagan changes were actually made less to preserve secrecy -- very few of the total number of covert actions have been disclosed to the public -- than to assure that the President had 'his senior advisers to focus on the issues themselves and not have people around always saying why things could not be done."<sup>651</sup>

Covert operations, also discussed euphemistically as 'the quiet option,' became a way for the use of force to fly under the radar of the general public and Congressional oversight (as seen above). In May 1987, former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane explained to Congress (after the fact) that the Reagan Doctrine needed to be applied in Nicaragua, since failure to respond to Soviet influence so close to American shores would encourage the Kremlin to more adventurous policies elsewhere in the Third World superpower competition. As McFarlane put it, "If we could not muster an effective counter to the Cuban-Sandinista strategy in our own backyard, it was far less likely that we could do so in the years ahead in more distant

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<sup>648</sup> Johnson (1989): 92.

<sup>649</sup> Johnson (1989): 93.

<sup>650</sup> Johnson (1989): 93.

<sup>651</sup> Johnson (1989): 93; L. H. Gelb, "Shift is Reported on C.I.A. Actions," *New York Times*, (June 11, 1984): 1.

locations...We had to win this one."<sup>652</sup> This statement echoed President Reagan's framework of a greater grand strategy to reassert American power throughout the globe, as articulated in the *Santa Fe Document*:

America's basic freedoms and economic self-interest require that the United States be and act like a power of the first order. The crisis is metaphysical. America's inability or unwillingness either to protect or project its basic values and beliefs has led to the present nadir of indecision and impotence and has placed the very existence of the Republic in peril...It is time to seize the initiative. An integrated foreign policy is essential.<sup>653</sup>

While early NSC meetings, Secretary of State Alexander Haig (amongst others) advised President Reagan towards a course of action that would demonstrate "a determined show of American will and power" and a "high level of intensity at the beginning,"<sup>654</sup> most of the President's advisers cautioned against this option. In effect, Secretary Haig's call for high intensity war was vetoed by Vice-President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Any overt display of force, they reasoned, would conjure up the image of 'another Vietnam' in the mind of the public, divert resources from more important battlefields in Europe and the Middle East, and jeopardise the Administration's efforts to garner congressional support for its domestic and foreign policy agenda."<sup>655</sup> The president's top advisers argued that it would be a more prudent course of action to conduct covert actions in

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<sup>652</sup> Peter Kornbluh, "Test Case for the Reagan Doctrine: The Covert Contra War," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 4 (October, 1987): 1119; Also see McFarlane's testimony before the special committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives investigating the illegal arms sales to the *Contras*, 11 and 13 May 1987.

<sup>653</sup> Kimbra Krueger, "Internal Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy toward Central America: An Analysis of the Reagan Era," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 4, *Intricacies of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Fall, 1996): 1035-36; Deborah Barry, Raul Vergara, and Jose Rodolfo Castro, "Low Intensity Warfare: The Counterinsurgency Strategy for Central America," in *Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and U.S. Policy in the 1980s*, Nora Hamilton, Jeffrey A. Friedman, Linda Fuller, and Manuel Pastor, Jr. (editors), (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985): 78.

<sup>654</sup> Kornbluh (1987): 1119; For a further description of these early debates, see the *Wall Street Journal* (New York), 5 March 1985; See also, William M. LeoGrande, "The United States and Nicaragua," in Thomas W. Walker (editor), *Nicaragua: The First Five Years* (New York: Praeger, 1985): 425-46.

<sup>655</sup> Kornbluh (1987): 1119; Alexander Haig, *Caveat* (New York: Macmillan, 1984): 129-30.

Nicaragua as the 'quiet option.' rather than risk the support of the general population and bypass Congressional oversight. According to Kornbluh:

The decision to opt for a covert tack against the Sandinistas reflected the tension between Reagan's commitment to 'project American power abroad' and the political constraints on sending US troops into a Central American quagmire. Against the backdrop of the 'Vietnam Syndrome' - widespread public opposition to US military involvement in Third World conflicts - CIA operations emerged as the centerpiece of a low intensity warfare strategy that incorporated economic destabilization, psychological operations, and diplomatic pressures.<sup>656</sup>

Said another way, covert operations were a means by which the President was able to advance the national interest and pursue policy preferences, all the while bypassing the constraining effect of Congress and public opinion.

In this case, Congress was able to demonstrate only its limited ability to influence the president's foreign policy goals. While Congress focused on the human rights abuses in El Salvador (inextricably tied to the Sandinistas of Nicaragua), it adopted as requirements that the Salvadoran government had to meet in order to qualify for American military aid. "The Reagan administration complied with the letter of the law by issuing certifications based on its own reading of Salvadoran events."<sup>657</sup> Moreover, Secretary of State George Shultz argued that the certification for military aid "represented an attempt by Congress to micro-manage U.S. economic and security programs":

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<sup>656</sup> Kornbluh (1987): 1120; See also, Sarah Miles, "The Real War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America," North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), May/June 1986.

<sup>657</sup> Krueger (1996): 1038-39; Cynthia J. Arnson, "The Reagan Administration, Congress, and Central America: The Search for Consensus," in *Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and US Policy in the 1980s*, Hamilton, Frieden, Fuller, Pastor, Jr. (editors) (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985): 40-41.

The Secretary of State had to certify that progress was being made on the human rights and rule-of-law aspects of life in El Salvador. We were constantly struggling with an excruciating dilemma: on one hand, we could point to progress; on the other hand, there were still great and disturbing problems. So we would certify the progress, but we realized that many thorny and deeply troublesome difficulties remained.

From the standpoint of the Salvadoran military, certification created a problem. The military had funds and resources available to them for six months; they did not know whether these resources would be renewed for another six months. Because of this uncertainty, quite predictably they husbanded their resources and therefore did not use them as effectively as possible to contend with the guerrillas. And as a result, Congress said that the security was wasted because it was not effectively used. It was a vicious circle.<sup>658</sup>

In the case of American intervention in Afghanistan, there was widespread external and internal opposition to the proposal which would send Surface-to-Air Stinger missiles to aid the Afghan *Mujahideen* combat Soviet invaders. In terms of external opposition, Clarence Long (D-Maryland) and Charlie Wilson (D-Texas) raised the matter with Zia Ul-Haq, the Pakistani President. Pakistan rejected the introduction of American-made high tech weapons to Afghanistan, noting that the Soviets would almost certainly trace them back to Pakistan.<sup>659</sup> According to Kuperman, "When the American legislators raised the matter with Pakistani President Zia Ul-Haq, however, he instead suggested the alternative of an air cannon like the

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<sup>658</sup> Krueger (1996): 1038-39; Shultz (1993): 290-91.

<sup>659</sup> Alan J. Kuperman, "The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 114, no. 2 (Summer, 1999): 222; Bob Woodward and Charles R. Babcock, *Washington Post*, 13 January 1985.

Swiss-made Oerlikon and rejected any U.S.-made weapons. 'If it was American-made the Soviets would trace it to Pakistan and he [Zia] didn't want that,' recalled Long."<sup>660</sup>

For the Central Intelligence Agency, especially the cautious Deputy Director John McMahon, was reticent to provide assistance that was directly traceable to American involvement which would raise the specter of public exposure. This had the potential to be particularly damaging, especially in the wake of the Church Committee (mentioned above), which led to Congress pushing for much greater oversight and restriction, namely the weakening of 'plausible deniability' for covert actions in the 1974 and 1980 statutes. In fact, by 1984, the "only American officials calling for supply of high-tech U.S. weapons to the Mujahedin were in Congress or private advocacy organizations, while the administration remained strongly opposed to any escalation that would affect the 'deniable' nature of U.S. assistance."<sup>661</sup> According to a report by the *Washington Post* in January 1985, moreover, "congressional supporters wanted initially to supply U.S.-made Redeye or Stinger ground-to-air, heat-seeking missiles, but the CIA blocked that because those missiles could be traced too easily to the United States."<sup>662</sup>

By early 1985, however, the Reagan Administration was compelled to reassess its approach to the *Mujahideen*. Combination of forces, including Soviet escalation in Afghanistan and along the Pakistan border, as well as U.S. Congressional pushing public pressure for increased aid lent support to increased American aid in Afghanistan. Indeed, the final version of the Tsongas resolution of October 1984 recorded that, "it would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of

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<sup>660</sup> Ibid.

<sup>661</sup> Kuperman (1999): 225.

<sup>662</sup> Kuperman (1999): 225; Woodward and Babcock, *Washington Post*.

freedom."<sup>663</sup> Interestingly, according to Kuperman, that "while Congress repeatedly emphasized the immorality of inadequately arming the rebels, this argument does not appear to have figured prominently in the administration's internal deliberations, which hinged on strategic concerns."<sup>664</sup> In other words, while the War Powers Act of 1973 was intended to limit the Executive's power to commit the United States to armed conflict through a joint resolution only after a declaration of war was made by Congress, covert action had a much less stringent requirement (see above for the Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974).

The formal policy shift was reached in March 1985, when President Reagan signed NSDD 166, which authorized expanded American aid to the Afghan guerrillas. In presentation to the Congressional intelligence committees around the new year of late-1985 or early-1986, Reagan spoke of the American covert military aid program to the *Mujahideen* rebels was aimed at forcing out Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by any means available" according to some Administration officials in a *New York Times* article written by Leslie Gelb.<sup>665</sup> National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166, in essence, "committed the United States to support a significant escalation in the guerrilla war in Afghanistan, which had sputtered since the USSR's military occupation of the capital city of Kabul in late 1979. The directive authorized greater funding for the guerrillas, provision of much more advanced weapons, more sophisticated intelligence support, and expanded U.S. cooperation with the Pakistan and Chinese governments on behalf of the guerrillas."<sup>666</sup> Furthermore, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane

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<sup>663</sup> Kuperman (1999): 226-27; Pear, *New York Times*, 18 April 1988.

<sup>664</sup> Kuperman (1999): fn 227; see also, Woodward and Babcock, *Washington Post*, 13 January 1985.

<sup>665</sup> Leslie H. Gelb, "85 Reagan Ruling on Afghans Cited," *New York Times*, 19 June 1986: Section A, Page 7. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/19/world/85-reagan-ruling-on-afghans-cited.html>, accessed 20 November 2019.

<sup>666</sup> Simpson (1995): 446-47; See also, "U.S. Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan," NSDD 166. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-166.pdf>, accessed 20 November 2019.

outlined that the goal in Afghanistan had moved beyond assisting the *Mujahideen* rebels to "harass" the Red Army, but would not seek to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan completely.<sup>667</sup>

It should be considered that the situation in Afghanistan was notably vicious at the time NSDD-166 was signed off on by President Reagan. According to Soviet military expert Alex Alexiev in March 1985, "Actual physical occupation of the country is almost unthinkable...escalation is not really a meaningful concept. Short of open genocide, it cannot get much worse."<sup>668</sup> However, the Americans needed a measured approach, even in the proxy conflict setting with its key regional alliance as Pakistan threatened by its contiguous border with Afghanistan, as noted by one official's warning in January 1985: "Consider what they [the Soviet Army] haven't done to Pakistan...You have to believe the Soviets could, if they chose, march in with sufficient troops to do the job."<sup>669</sup> In other words, the United States at once could not afford to inflame tensions by direct confrontation with the Soviets, but also could not allow the Kremlin a free hand in its occupation of Afghanistan, which was on a near-genocidal course.

These factors made the plausible deniability and the quiet, discrete option afforded by covert action. The Americans, in the end, did not send battalions of fighting troops, but did increase aid significantly between fiscal year (FY) 1984 and FY 1987. "The dollar value of U.S.," according to Kuperman, "climbed in successive years from \$122 million in fiscal year 1984, to \$250 million, \$470 million, and \$630 million in FY 1987,<sup>670</sup> generally matched by equal contributions from Saudi Arabia.<sup>671</sup> The Stinger missile, however, as well as other high-tech

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<sup>667</sup> Kuperman (1999): 227.

<sup>668</sup> Kuperman (1999): 227; Alex Alexiev, Rand Corporation, testimony before Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan. U.S. Senate, typescript transcript, 11 March 1985: 93, 112-13.

<sup>669</sup> Kuperman (1999): 227; Woodward and Babcock, *Washington Post*.

<sup>670</sup> Kuperman (1999): 228; Olivier Roy, *The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War*, Adelphi Papers 259 (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991): 35; See also, David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 8 February 1987.

<sup>671</sup> Kuperman (1999): 228; Kathy Evans, *The Guardian*, 2 January 1992.

weaponry directly traceable to the United States, were conspicuously absent from the annex."<sup>672</sup>

The US-made Stinger missiles were kept out of Afghanistan until late in the summer of 1986, after the Soviets had already signaled their intention to withdraw from the country.

### *Conclusion*

The Reagan Administration inherited declining American relative positioning, as the Soviet Union looked to surpass long established expectations of U.S. nuclear and strategic supremacy, waning American reputation and influence, and Western Europe's fear of abandonment while at the same time distancing themselves publicly from Washington's political and ideological entrenchment. In other words, Reagan came to office after the disastrous mid-1970s and what followed in the Carter Administration that continued the trend of draining American self-confidence. What followed was a dramatic turnaround, which ultimately culminated in the fall of the Soviet Empire itself.

The Administration coupled arms control with the advancement and modernization in the form of the MX Cruise Missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to stymie the approaching Soviet nuclear and technological advantage. Largely done with the purpose of mitigating European fears of Moscow's deployment of new, threatening strategic assets capable of striking Western European territory, SDI was allowed to continue in the midst of arms control talks. This was largely due to the (albeit halting) support of Britain and West Germany. Most importantly, Reagan was able to mitigate the intra-alliance balancing dynamic by addressing the issue that most significantly threatened NATO cohesion: concern that American bellicosity and/or adventurism would drag the alliance into destructive conflict with the USSR. Reagan's focus on arms control mitigated that fear. Furthermore, Reagan's alliance with Margaret Thatcher formed an ideologically-aligned cohort that was tempted to be supportive in the first place.

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<sup>672</sup> Kuperman (1999): 228.

The NATO alliance was severely incohesive and on the verge of splintering. For example, junior alliance members declined to form a united front during the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the American-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. In other words, America's junior partners were balancing against their superpower magnate. This was largely due to the rhetorical bellicosity from the early Reagan administration, which coincided with an uptick in Anti-American sentiment in Western Europe, giving further strength to the balancing variable in the first hypothesis. Crucially, however, the administration mitigated alliance incohesion and stopped further blowback balancing by assuring her European allies that U.S. military buildup was strategically meant to allow Washington to negotiate from a much stronger position -- an assurance that would be backed up with action by President Reagan's commitment to the arms control during the early 1980s. This was done early in the administration and especially through Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (as discussed in this chapter). This strategy of introducing some measure of *detente* (in the form of arms control) to implement the overall strategy of Rollback was ultimately made successful by Reagan minimizing the independent variable of intra-alliance balancing through diplomacy within the alliance.

Moreover, we can observe the falsification of the alternative hypothesis during this episode. In **A1**, we expect that because the threatening state's aggregate power (especially with the introduction of Soviet SS-20s on the Continent) constituted a threat to Western Europe, NATO junior members would be expected to balance with the United States. This is especially likely in Balance of Threat given Moscow's perceived aggressive intentions (**A3**) and geographic proximity (**A2**) to Western Europe. However, the Reagan Administration was only able to shore

up support from her junior alliance partners was by introducing *less* oppositional strategies (e.g. arms control) to contrast with American military buildup.

While Reagan was able to advance Rollback, a particularly strong form of containment, the United States Congress was able to limit the strength and scope of the programme; SDI would be delayed until the late 1980s, but the MX Cruise Missile was deployed to counter the Soviets. This confirms the intervening variable, namely that domestic legislature may oppose the executive branch and stymie the president's preferred foreign policy outcome. This domestic intervening variable of oversight served to minimize the likely destabilizing effect of the introduction of SDI, which was built on dubious technological potential during the early 1980s (e.g. Star Wars was unlikely to work). While Congress was able to stem the more inflammatory effects of a very strong version of Rollback that would have likely taken place with SDI, the administration was able to implement and deploy the MX Cruise Missile on the Continent to balance offensive Soviet SS-20s. In other words, Congressional oversight in this matter was negligible because domestic politics stopped Star Wars from becoming operational policy, but did not successfully oppose the more critical MX Cruise Missile.

The Reagan Doctrine, with its support of freedom fighters and national liberation movements with the Soviet sphere of influence was a defining cornerstone for the Administration's *Rollback* plan. American covert support in Central America, Afghanistan, Poland, and African nations (namely Angola and Libya) was able to bypass (to a large extent) much of scrutiny of alliance members, allowing for Washington to strain the Soviet economy, waste the Kremlin's increasingly limited assets, and altogether push the Soviet sphere of influence closer to Russian borders. Initially, the plan outlined in NSDD-66 looked to engage in economic warfare against Moscow.

However, this was scrapped when it appeared that the Thatcher-led opposition would balance against the United States. Instead, the administration abandoned the controversial strategy in favour of a longer-term campaign to destabilize Moscow's economic security, which was much more palatable to America's junior alliance partners. In essence, Reagan was able to change the independent variable from balance to intra-alliance bargaining with the senior alliance partner through NSDD-75, primarily to avoid a further *incohesion* and the political rupture with junior alliance partners within NATO (and Japan). With the Prime Minister Thatcher's support (and others from Europe), this shift to intra-alliance bargaining resulted in a Rollback foreign policy strategy, albeit modified to win support within the alliance. Therefore, we can confidently demonstrate that **H3** is confirmed in this episode.

According to Stephen Walt's *balance of threat*, ostensibly a defensive realist theory (as opposed to Mearsheimer's offensive realist variant) and is, therefore, predicated on the notion of sufficient security and not maximum security. Walt's theory reflects the notion that should Moscow decline in relative strength, NATO's response would decline downwards on the escalation ladder. Given that the first alternative hypothesis, **A1**, states that the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it, we can assume that the converse would hold true: the *weaker* the state's aggregate power (and, therefore, the weaker the threat), states are less likely to align against it and with lesser intensity. This alternative hypothesis comes to be falsified in this subsequent chapter. In fact, the converse holds true: NATO opposed Moscow with greater strength than at most opportunities during the 1970s.

Carter's presidency came to signify a low point in American strategic leadership in the geopolitical security system. So much was American power waning that her NATO allies, especially West German Chancellor Kohl questioned whether or not Washington would fulfill

her security commitment to Berlin. This is consistent with the dissertation's third hypothesis, e.g. **H3** states that if the junior partner(s) of the coalition bloc are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a *Rollback* strategy will be the most likely outcome. This is because foreign policy under this condition needs to demonstrate commitment to alliance partners. The strength of action necessary to rollback an adversary allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partners that it will not abandon them that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger partner will honour its promise to coalition members.

One of the early major moves under the Reagan Administration was to issue NSDD-32 and refined in NSDD-75 (largely establishing the Reagan Administration's commitment to *Rollback* as grand strategy) was to strengthen American strategy influence throughout the world, encourage long-term liberalization and nationalism that was designed to ultimately weaken Moscow's satellite states within her own spheres of influence (thus, *rolling back* the Soviet Union to her own Russian boundaries). This is confirmation of **H3**.

Similarly, Secretary Haig was dispatched to demonstrate to European allies that, despite continental fears, Washington had no intention of abandoning her role as the Western leader of arms control negotiations. In fact, even Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, also known colloquially as 'Star Wars'), was received in Europe with a dual concerns: while the Western allies were perennially hesitancy to take action that Moscow would deem belligerent, therefore taking East-West tensions up the escalation ladder towards open warfare, and their so-called "intense concern" that the Kremlin would come to surpass NATO capabilities in advanced strategic defense programmes. In the end, several European allies supported Reagan's SDI, at least during the research and modernization phases of the initiative, judging the project to be

consistent with the 1972 ABM Treaty and that it would ultimately enhance both stability and lower level deterrence.

According to the first intervening variable (**IVV1**), when foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance in the legislative branch, the executive will be constrained in selecting its most preferred foreign policy -- and thanks to the international failures of the Carter Administration, foreign security policies were on the Congressional radar. In partial deference to congressional opposition, the Administration was pressured to produce National Security Decision Directive 119 (NSDD 119), in which the National Security Council (NSC) that pursuing SDI research would not be done in a way that would threaten the Kremlin and would conduct itself within all existing arms control agreements. While it may not be surprising, in hindsight, that one of the Superpowers would agree to adhere to an international agreement, it represented a significant constraint to President Reagan's ambitious project. Furthermore, because of the backdrop of the so-called 'Vietnam Syndrome' -- e.g. widespread public opposition to US military involvement in Third World conflicts,<sup>673</sup> the Reagan Administration was forced to find an alternative route for *Rollback* in Latin American countries that aligned with the Soviets and, more broadly, Marxist-Leninist ideology. Instead of conventional warfare, the Administration opted for CIA-led covert operation, this way bypassing the constraining effect of Congress and public opinion. Therefore, the President was constrained by Congress and public opinion in terms of methods, as predicted by **IVV1**, however with a little ingenuity, Washington was able to pursue ways to advance the national interest and policy preferences, without becoming overly constrained and inhibited by Congressional opposition.

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<sup>673</sup> Kornbluh (1987): 1120; See also, Sarah Miles, "The Real War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America," North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), May/June 1986.

## **Chapter 9: Conclusions**

Containment policy has been the dominant American grand strategy throughout the second half of the twentieth. Since George Kennan's anonymous 1947 publication, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in *Foreign Affairs* outlining what would become Containment, there have been multitudes of academics, policymakers, and political commentators who have written volumes analyzing, dissecting, advocating, and critiquing this American strategy. Containment has cropped up as recently as President Clinton's *Dual Containment* towards Iran and Iraq during the mid-1990s, as well as current advocates suggesting the implementation of the grand strategy towards Iran. Be this as it may, however, Containment strategy has come to be closely associated with the Cold War, relegated to historical analyses, rarely contemporary issues. As a result, the theoretical work for the grand strategy has been largely neglected. In fact, very little has been written about the impact of alliance structures on how Containment is implemented.

*This dissertation sought to answer the following question: What variation of Containment is likely, given different structural alliance configurations and domestic constraints.*

The selection of a specific Containment strategy is dependent upon the alliance structure that is available to the alliance leader. Alliance structures heavily influence the ability of the lead state to *contain* a target and largely determine what type of containment is indeed feasible. The alliance structures likely to influence a range of dynamic containment options are the following, and will be the independent variables (IVs), or causes to be tested in the model this dissertation will submit: (i) the fear of abandonment; (ii) *intra*-alliance balancing in opposition to the coalition leader; and (iii) *intra*-alliance bargaining, e.g. acquiescing the alliance leader's preferred grand strategy configuration. The types of containment, which were this dissertation's dependent variable (DV), or outcome: (a) proto-containment (similarly referred to

as early or weak containment); (b) containment (namely, the traditional formulation of Containment most closely resembling George Kennan's 1947 variant), and (c) roll-back. This dissertation argued that the type of Containment implemented (DV) will depend upon the alliance structure (IV), creating a dynamic mechanism for grand strategic outcomes and a range of grand strategy policy foreign policy outcomes. In other words, it is the level of *alliance cohesion* that is the primary causal factor that determines which variant of Containment will be the strategic response.

While alliance cohesion largely determined the selection and form of Containment as a foreign policy outcome, domestic politics plays an intervening role (IVV) in the ability of an alliance leaders' executive to select grand strategy. The intervening variables were drawn from the *neoclassical realist* tradition, where the structure of the international systems is the main causal determinant (IV), but internal politics at the state level may play an important role in addressing the ability of the foreign policy decision-maker to implement a grand strategy they consider to be optimal. This will be the intervening variable in the model. This is due to the amount of structural autonomy or constraint that the executive branch experiences within the state. Structural autonomy determines how much of an effect domestic opinion has on the decisionmaker's ability to implement what they consider to be the optimal strategy given the prevailing external stimuli. There are two possible intervening variables outlined in this model, drawn from the domestic level of analysis: (IVV1) When foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance in the legislative branch, the executive will be constrained in selecting its most preferred foreign policy; and (IVV2) When legislative branch oversight on foreign policy is at its strongest, the executive will be most constrained in selecting foreign policy.

This dissertation tested these propositions through the use of case study methodology in order to establish the high degree of internal validity that is necessary in theory building. Case study methods are appropriate, furthermore, in assessing the causal mechanism pathways associated with the predicted outcome, as well as theory testing on heterogeneous case studies. Additionally, case studies are particularly important when establishing complex causal mechanisms, which were likely to be particularly important in assessing the interplay between international systemic levels of analysis combined with the domestic political realities that the executive branch faces. Furthermore, process tracing was used to test the intervening variables at the domestic level, which served to mitigate the causal international structural determinants of foreign policy outcome. In other words, process tracing was enlisted to test the intervening variables, since this dissertation proposed that domestic politics and institutions (the intervening variables) mitigate the causal variables at the international level (the independent variables), which in turn, structure the outcomes of foreign policy (the dependent variable). Process tracing techniques offers the researcher a way to identify the causal steps in a process leading to foreign policy outcome, while taking into consideration the particularistic historical contexts and potential eccentricities.

The case studies that were used in theory testing were driven by establishing the effect of variations in alliance political structures (an independent variable) in order to assess the effect they have on foreign policy outcome. While brief sketches and justifications were elaborated upon, I made use of the following case studies: (1) the early Cold War (NATO fear of abandonment, but categorized by little internal opposition to American grand strategy and the establishment of forward operating bases in Western Europe); (2) the middle Cold War (NATO internal dissent with American foreign policy); (3) Jimmy Carter's presidency (the first half of

the late Cold War, highlighted by the alteration of the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union during the 1970s and waning confidence in American leadership); and (4) Ronald Reagan's late Cold War (characterized by resurgent American leadership and the re-establishment of American strategic superiority). Lastly, this dissertation will conclude with the finding's application to contemporary American-Sino relationship, which is likely to dominate the middle of the 21st century.

### *Argument*

This dissertation has argued that the primary cause (IV) is that alliance structures and alliance concerns, e.g. the degree of alliance cohesion, will by and large determine what type of Containment policy will be implemented. The type of available alliance dysfunction (specifically, the level of alliance cohesion) will largely determine what type of Containment grand strategy is feasible. These alliance cohesion issues are the following: (a) intra-alliance balancing (e.g. the junior partners of the alliance resisting the leader); (b) intra-alliance bargaining (following the alliance leader); and (c) the fear of abandonment.

The alliance cohesion structure, or predicted alliance concerns largely (IV) determine the type of containment strategy (DV) that is available to the alliance leader. These different alliance issues come to form a typology of resultant foreign policy outcomes:

- (a) When the alliance is experiencing internal balancing, that is when there is significant intra-alliance opposition to the coalition leader, there is likely to be a foreign policy of proto-Containment (or weak-Containment), due to the fact that there is not enough power within the alliance to fully implement active containment;
- (b) When coalition members intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, there is enough power in the coalition to (relatively) easily confront the target. Furthermore, the

incentives are such that the offense has a greater cost/benefit payoff structure to join in a coalition that pushes the target back into its national boundaries. These offensive alliance incentives are expected to result in a rollback strategy; and

(c) The fear of abandonment is likely to result in a rollback strategy, as an offensive grand strategy demonstrates commitment and, therefore, eases the fears of abandonment.

Additionally, domestic politics and structure, especially the amount of foreign policy oversight and/or the relative importance of contemporaneous foreign policymaking, will act as an intervening variable (IVV) that will either constrain or grant the executive decision-making autonomy. While the external stimuli resulting from the international political system largely determines the selection and form of Containment as grand strategy, domestic politics plays a mitigating role in the ability of the executive branch in leading state within the alliance to select their preferred foreign policy. This is especially due to the amount of structural autonomy or constraint that the executive experiences. Domestic structural autonomy, as an intervening variable, determines the level of constraint or autonomy experienced by the executive in selecting foreign policy.

There are two intervening variables that effect foreign policy choices, namely: (1) legislative norms on the importance of foreign policy as an issue area; and (2) how much oversight on foreign policy is a norm within the legislature. When there is a legislative norm that places foreign policy in the highest issue-area position (IVV1), domestic opinion is likely to be stifled. Therefore, when foreign policy is not regarded as the most important issue, the effects of public opinion are at its strongest, making war averse or inflexibility effects the strongest in constraining foreign policy.

In other words, when foreign policy is not the most important issue on the national agenda, the effects of public opinion are strongest, making war averse or inflexibility exerting its strongest influence on the executive. However, when foreign policy is (among) the most important issues on the national agenda, the executive will be insulated from domestic opinion, leading to a foreign policy that corresponds almost exclusively to external stimuli.

Secondly, when foreign policy is not viewed as a crucial issue area, we should expect to see the executive insulated from domestic opinion, leading grand strategy to correspond almost exclusively external stimuli. When foreign policy is subject to a low degree of legislative oversight, the executive enjoys decision-making autonomy and grand strategy corresponds to external stimuli. However, when there is a substantial degree of legislative oversight, the executive is constrained and foreign policy is also affected by an institutional political opposition. When the degree of legislative oversight is high, congressional and/or senate is opposed to the executive's agenda. This usually occurs when the branches of government are divided (e.g. the executive branch and legislative branch belong to different political parties), however this need not be the case because the executive may find itself (at least theoretically) standing in opposition to the legislature in terms of agenda, but from the same political party. When there is a low degree of legislative oversight, the executive finds itself in an autonomous position and able to freely respond to external stimuli coming from the international system (e.g. alliance structures). This may occur in cases where the branches of government are unified (e.g. the legislative branch and executive branch are from the same political party) or in the case of divided government (e.g. when the legislative branch and the executive branch are from different political parties). What is important here for the independent variable to be activated is whether or not the legislative branch stands in opposition to the executive branch's foreign policy agenda.

### *Argument Summary*

To summarize, this dissertation has the following research question resulting in the models that were tested in the preceding chapters. This question is as follows: *How do alliances select the appropriate Containment foreign policy response?* In short, the level of alliance cohesion determines the strategic response for the alliance. The first predictive hypothesis to be tested in this dissertation is that intra-alliance balancing, that is when junior alliance partners oppose the alliance leader's preferred foreign policy response, and the coalition is likely to have the traditional Containment variant as the outcome. The second predictive hypothesis is that weaker alliance members' fear of abandonment will likely cause a stronger alliance response, e.g. Roll Back. This is done to demonstrate commitment and fate-tying to convince the alliance that the alliance leader will honour her promise of support. The third predictive hypothesis that was tested in this dissertation is that alliances that intra-alliance bargaining with the stronger partner will result in a strong, Rollback foreign policy strategy. This is because the power increase found in alliances that are most tightly unified. Furthermore, intra-alliance bargaining alliance partners, that is when smaller states acquiesce to the alliance leader, the latter will have few obstacles blocking its will and will likely, therefore, implement a strong strategic response, namely Roll Back.

There is a caveat to this model, however, and that is domestic politics may play a factor in mitigating what type of containment strategy is selected by the alliance leader. This comes in the form of two intervening variables, as domestic politics and institutions may either constrain or grant autonomy to foreign policy elites and executives, reshaping the availability of certain

strategic responses. In the first intervening variable, the importance of legislative issues may, in fact, play a role in constraining executive autonomy from selecting its most preferred foreign policy option. When this is the case, such as the early Post-War era or Vietnam War, conflict and security are certainly priorities for the Congress and the Public - therefore, public opinion may stymie a particularly aggressive foreign policy or reinforce the need for such measures.

Secondly, when legislative oversight is particularly strong, this may have a constraining effect on the executive's ability to implement its most preferred foreign policy option.

Heightened legislative oversight tends to occur in divided branches (e.g. when the legislature and executive branches are controlled by different political parties), as opposed to when the branches are unified (e.g. when the legislature and executive branches are controlled by the same political party). When this occurs, and the executive is unable to mitigate this opposition (e.g. by convincing the legislature that the executive's strategy is best, or out politicking the legislature), then the executive branch's autonomy to select its preferred strategy is constrained.

#### *Alternative Explanation*

This dissertation used Stephen Walt's *balance of threat* hypotheses as the alternative explanation on which to test the Cold War historical record against the alliance cohesion model. Walt's argument contributes and expands the balance of power literature by positing that "states ally to balance against threats [and ideologies] rather than against power alone."<sup>674</sup> This is especially significant for the Cold War case studies in this dissertation, especially given the ideological components of the East-West confrontation. The conventional wisdom for the Cold War period is generally a combination of balance of power theory, given the struggle over Eastern-Western Europe, regionally, and disparate spheres of influence globally. Balance of power in tandem with the added dimension of ideological communist-democratic (and capitalist)

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<sup>674</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987):5.

variable comprises the conventional wisdom for scholarship pertaining to this period. Therefore, this dissertation has utilized Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory as the alternative explanation. According to Walt, not only do states balance far more often than they intra-alliance bargaining, they tend to balance according to *threat* rather than against raw power alone. While balance of threat acknowledges that power distribution remains an extremely important factor, "the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions."<sup>675</sup>

*Aggregate power* for Walt represents an important factor, as he notes that "the greater a state's total resources (e.g., population, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others."<sup>676</sup> Here, we can see Walt's theoretical schism from traditional balance of power theorists, as power becomes a sophisticated and complex calculation. Furthermore, he claims that Walter Lippmann and George Kennan recognized the priority of threat over power, enlisting the argument that Kennan "defined the aim of U.S. grand strategy as that of preventing any single state from controlling more industrial resources than the United States did. In practical terms, it means allying against any state that appears powerful enough to dominate the combined resources of industrial Eurasia."<sup>677</sup>

*Geographic proximity* represents an important contribution that is lacking in traditional balance of power theory. Similar to Mearsheimer's later work, which argues the stopping power of large bodies of water,<sup>678</sup> Walt's argument that power projection is dampened by distance. In other words, "because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby

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<sup>675</sup> Walt (1987): 5.

<sup>676</sup> Walt (1987): 22.

<sup>677</sup> Walt (1987): 22; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*: 25-88; George Kennan, *Realities in American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ, 1954): 63-5; Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1947).

<sup>678</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

pose a greater threat than those that are far away.<sup>679</sup> Colourfully, Walt enlists an early twentieth century repartee from the British Foreign Office to German complaints that Britain paid much closer attention and scrutiny to German naval ambitions and expansion: "If the British press pays more attention to the increase of Germany's naval power than to a similar movement in Brazil...this is no doubt due to the proximity of the German coasts and the remoteness of Brazil."<sup>680</sup>

*Offensive power*, as in the work of Robert Jervis, Stephen Van Evera, and George Quester, Walt argues that the nature of military power represents a considerable marker when considering power. Intuitively, he argues that "states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than are those that are incapable of attacking because of geography, military posture, or something else."<sup>681</sup> While this addition does not seem controversial, the *type* of power in the traditional theory does not distinguish defensive power from offensive power, treating the two as one and the same. It is important to note that "offensive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost."<sup>682</sup> Therefore, the effect of offensive power creates a strong incentive for states to balance and regard as a threat.<sup>683</sup>

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<sup>679</sup> Walt (1987): 23; See also, Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 4 (1976); Kenneth A. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York, 1962): 229-30, 245-47; Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 2 (1968).

<sup>680</sup> Walt (1987): 23; Quoted in Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London, 1980): 421.

<sup>681</sup> Walt (1987): 24; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 3 (1978); Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (dissertation, University of California, Berkley, 1984); George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York, 1977); See also, Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 2 (1984).

<sup>682</sup> Walt (1987): 24.

<sup>683</sup> Walt (1987): 24; See also, William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments* (New York, 1950): 3-5; Raymond J. Sontag, *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932* (New York, 1933): 4-5; Jervis (1978): 189; Quester (1977): 105-6.

Lastly, Walt points out that "states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them."<sup>684</sup> This is important to note, as the perception of a state's intent is an important factor to consider in addition to how much power they are able to muster (offensive or otherwise). Walt argues that "even states with rather modest capabilities may prompt others to balance if they are perceived as especially aggressive."<sup>685</sup> The effect of this is that states are quite unlikely to intra-alliance bargaining with a state that appears to have aggressive intentions. This is because "if an aggressor's intentions cannot be changed by an alliance with it, a vulnerable state, even if allied, is likely to become a victim."<sup>686</sup>

The balance of threat framework provides a good jumping off point for an alternative explanation, yet it fell short in offering a predictive model that explained the conditions under which a state would alter its form of containment with respect to the evidence during the Cold War, as we have seen throughout this dissertation. In other words, while Walt's theory is theoretically sound and explains some cases, it does not stand up to the Cold War case. If Walt's framework were correct, we would expect the type containment outcome to vary in relation to changes in the distribution of power, especially offensive power, geographic proximity to the threat, and changes in doctrinal or ideological aggressiveness. However, this is not the case, as we came to see that changes in the containment dependent variable are caused by changes in the cohesiveness of the alliance and institutional domestic dynamics.

Walt's theory offers a snap-shot explanation for states who are confronted with an ideological threat. The problem is that the balance of threat hypothesis is that it only offers a static response to an ideological threat. *A priori*, this does not seem to be case if one takes into account the different measures employed by the United States against its communist adversaries

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<sup>684</sup> Walt (1987): 25.

<sup>685</sup> Walt (1987): 25.

<sup>686</sup> Walt (1987): 26.

in the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Nixon Administration had a very different approach for communist China, compared to what was extended to the Soviet Union.

The balance of threat hypothesis, furthermore, is useful in explaining whether or not a state should be considered a threat (and therefore balanced against). Again, Walt offers a static explanation and offers a less compelling reason as to why the target is less than an ideological threat (e.g. the PRC-USSR comparison, where ideology was not a determinate of what constituted a threat to the United States). In other words, the theory being tested offers a causal explanation that is more useful for variation.

The theory offered in this dissertation, by contrast, explains how and why states implement different responses to the emergence or alterations in both ideological threats, changes within the alliance itself, and the domestic politics within the alliance leader. The dynamics of containment model seeks to show the life-cycle of containment, as well as the re-adaptation of the containment measure to changes in the international system, both within and outside the alliance.

### *Findings*

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Europe was faced with the heady task of reconstruction while their economies and infrastructures were in shambles following the most destructive war in history. Making matters more complicated, Western Europe faced this challenge in the shadow of the Iron Curtain, which was eager to establish its role as a revisionist power to the new world order, albeit with an ideology that was incompatible with the West.

In Chapter 4, this dissertation argued that the intra-alliance bargaining in the Early Cold War period was a crucial factor in allowing President Harry S. Truman to pursue

security policy tailored to geopolitical systemic forces and needed little in the way of intra-alliance consensus that would come to constrain the Executive during other Cold War periods.

During the Truman Administration, the model (namely **H2** and **H3**) was found to be confirmed, as we ought to have expected the United States to precede with a strong strategy of Rolling Back the USSR. The junior partners of the alliance were very much amenable to the foreign policy preferences of their American coalition leadership and could be described as the intra-alliance bargaining that this dissertation was testing as the **H2** prediction. The outcome was Rollback, which is consistent with the model.

Secondly, this dissertation tested that if the junior partners of the alliance bloc are fearful that the leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome, as the Superpower benefactor needs to demonstrate commitment to its weaker alliance partners (**H3**). The alliance leader, the United States in this case, was able to signal to its partners that it would not abandon them even in dangerous security scenarios and that America will continue to honour its promise to the coalition, which confirms the **H3** hypothesis in this dissertation's model.

In the Truman case, there was little to no Congressional oversight present. Firstly, the branches of government were unified (the executive and legislative branch were from the same political party) and offered a virtually free path to passing the President's foreign policy preference. Secondly, Democratic lawmakers were highly supportive of President Truman's NSC 68 (e.g. the Truman Doctrine), going even so far as to couch their support in the language of American Exceptionalism and universalist tones, which offered little room for compromise with Eastern Europe. This, furthermore, confirms the predictions of **IVV2**, that when the legislative branch's oversight of foreign policy is at its weakest, the executive will experience a high degree of autonomy.

In Chapter 5, this dissertation similarly tested the alliance cohesion model during the Eisenhower Presidency. Eisenhower's inherited position in Europe was one of maintaining a functional, responsive, and most importantly, cohesive NATO alliance with the capability of defending American and European interests in the event of a Soviet invasion. American forces, which in turn would be able to be used to rollback the Soviet Union (or at least threaten a more aggressive form of containment than hitherto implemented) were being deployed in the Western European theatre as a signal to NATO allies that the United States would not abandon its allies, as well as in the hope that they would increase their resolve in resisting the USSR.

The prediction of the model in this chapter, namely **H2** and **H3** were confirmed, as we ought to have expected that the Eisenhower Administration proceeded with a strategy of Rollback, especially since the confirmation of both **H2** and **H3** predictions were empirically satisfied. The party divisions were controlled by the opposition Democratic Party for all but the first two years of the (Republican) Eisenhower Administration, we should expect to see the dissertation's **Intervening Variables (IVVs)** to be of greater effect. **H2** predicts that should the junior partner are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely outcome. Indeed, the junior members of the Western Alliance were hard-pressed to display much in the way of autonomy, as the Soviet Union established and solidified the Communist sphere of influence in Europe under the Warsaw Pact by 1955. Additionally, several successive early Cold War confrontations (such as the Berlin Blockade, the First Indochina War, the 1953 East German Uprising, Hungarian Revolution, Suez Canal Crisis, and the Hungarian Uprising of 1956) proved to the old Great Powers the need of a Superpower benefactor in the post-war era. Therefore, America's junior partners were most likely to follow Washington's lead, thus confirming the second hypothesis of this dissertation's model.

The so-called "German question" preoccupied much of the Cold War. Less than decade previous, Germany was (of course) the enemy of almost all the countries that would come to form NATO and distrust naturally persisted. The issue, moreover, gathered greater importance because of Moscow's insistence to keep half of partitioned Germany under its sphere of influence. In looking at **H3** (if the junior partner of the coalition becomes fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a Rollback strategy will be the most likely outcome), once again we see a story similar to the Truman Administration. The causal logic is that foreign policy often times needs to demonstrate commitment, and this is especially the case when an ally fears abandonment should conflict escalate. However, it is because Containment causes conflict escalation, partially because formal defensive alliances are most costly, strength of action allows the alliance leader to signal to its junior partner(s) that it will not abandon them in tenuous scenarios and that the stronger senior partner of the alliance will honour its promise to come to the military aid of other coalition members.

In fact, Eisenhower's attempt to reconcile Germany (and perhaps Italy) with their former adversaries turned allies (especially the French) to unite through compromise in the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC). While the EDC made it clear that French reticence to trust Germany contributed to both the infeasibility of the EDC and, more significantly, the near fracture of the relationship between Paris and Washington (which will come to a head in the next chapter under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations). While Eisenhower's push for EDC ratification was ill-fated, the Eisenhower Doctrine outlined in NSC 162 established the conceptual strategy of *Massive Retaliation*, which certainly acted as the nuclear component of a complete Rollback strategy (especially given that this became the most comprehensive and

destructive deterrent threat under the Containment context) appeased and allayed German concerns over abandonment (especially with US forces deployed in West Germany).

With the relative shock of the Cold War at the start of the Truman Administration and becoming the "new normal" in international politics during the Eisenhower Presidency, the US Congress provided a great deal of pressure to recall American troops deployed in Western Europe and calling for a better balance of payment deal for the United States. This led to the confirmation of **IVV2**, e.g. when the legislative branch's oversight on foreign policy is strong, the executive branch will be constrained in selecting its preferred foreign policy option.

During the FY 1955, Congressional oversight (**IVV2**) called for cutting back military aid earmarked for European defense, arguing that America's NATO allies needed to be greater contributors to Western Defense and also indicated that the Administration should push for the European powers to ratify membership in the European Defense Community (EDC). Furthermore, Congress pushed the Executive branch to stress diplomatically that many more security solutions must be found from within the European community (EDC) and that Europe, once again, needed to establish a balance of payment system that is fairer to the United States, which had been paying the lion's share of expenses. This confirms **IVV2** that increased Congressional Oversight restrained the Executive branch and partially explains (along with the primary causal factors of **H2** and **H3**) why Eisenhower's inclination to implement Rollback was constrained.

The alternative explanation predicted that the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence solidifying the East-West border in Germany brought the threat within close proximity to NATO members (**A2**: the nearer a powerful state is geographically, the greater the tendency to balance against it) would lead to a strong balancing response from the West. Similarly, the 1950s

saw the USSR not only cross the thermonuclear threshold, but were able to pull ahead of the Americans in terms of delivery systems with the successful launch of Sputnik demonstrating that the Kremlin was capable of deploying intercontinental strikes via ballistic missiles. This development raised security stakes and, therefore, the actual relative power and capability of the Soviet faction (**A1**: the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it). Again, the NATO response to **A1** (like **A2**) should be an even more bellicose foreign policy and an attempt to confront the Kremlin to balance the emergent threat.

The Eisenhower Administration, despite proclaiming a more aggressive Rollback approach than his predecessor (which *would* have been consistent with **A1** and **A2**) was far more status quo and "stay the course" than the rhetoric suggested. In fact, the administration supported the Hungarian Uprising rhetorically, but provided very little in the way of materiel support for the intra-Warsaw Pact snubbing of Moscow, which would have been a grand opportunity to implement Rollback. In fact, the Eisenhower Doctrine outlined in NSC-162/2 with 'Massive Retaliation' was more concerned itself with social and economic costs driving the transition from conventional to nuclear forces to prevent the militarization of the American economy and not due to *balance of threat* considerations expected with **A1** and **A2**, but the virtual status quo in alliance issues provided the incentive to approach American Doctrine as more in-line with Truman and not extended the scope of Rollback.

Chapter 6 tests the alliance cohesion model against the empirical record of the Middle Cold War (ranging between John F. Kennedy's administration and Richard M. Nixon), which could be best categorized as a period of intra-alliance balancing as NATO members bucked at following Washington's leadership and resulted in the traditional Kennan version of Containment

through virtually the entirety of the 1960s. In effect, Chapter 6 confirms the alliance cohesion model while invalidating Walt's balance-of-threat model.

From the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, cohesion started to unravel and therefore began the chipping away of American leadership within the alliance, which in turn constrained the president's foreign policy objectives towards the Communist world.

During the Kennedy Administration, the junior alliance partners (namely France, West Germany, and Italy) balanced against U.S. leadership, thus constraining President Kennedy into weakening the formerly assertive American foreign policy that defined the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. The doctrines of Massive Retaliation and New Look were replaced by Flexible Response, which consisted of a range of options designed to limit strategic options short of full scale nuclear warfare. Flexible Response was designed to mitigate the risk of nuclear war with Moscow, while taking care not to present an overly weak foreign policy position from the young and as-yet untested Kennedy Administration; in effect, Kennedy's foreign policy moved from an assertive Rollback strategy during the 1950s to a containment strategy that more resembled that of George Kennan.

During this same period, the Kremlin challenged American leadership in Berlin and Cuba, as well as successfully testing Moscow's first thermonuclear (fusion) device. The alternative explanation, e.g. Walt's balance-of-threat model, would expect a strong balancing posture from the United States and especially its NATO allies, as the Soviet Union grew both in terms of capabilities to wage full-scale nuclear war, as well as displaying an increasingly belligerent doctrine. Instead, Kennedy set a trend that would find continuity in the administrations of Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and, indeed, Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s: steps were taken that moved American strategy towards detente with Moscow instead of holding

a bold disposition of strength within U.S. doctrine, which refutes Walt's model and confirms the alliance cohesion model being tested in this dissertation.

The summary of the Harmel Report, issued under the Johnson Administration, noted its preference for a strong balancing response towards the Soviet Union in order to mitigate America's alliance partners (especially French President Charles de Gaulle and his softening disposition towards detente with the Kremlin), but ultimately the report was forced to recommend a more modest and gradual improvement of Washington's relationship with Moscow, therefore watering down U.S. foreign policy (but with an eye towards demonstrating to the Western allies that the Pentagon was capable of restraint). In fact, President Johnson was pressured by domestic lawmakers to withdraw troops from continental Europe, ever concerned with balance-of-payment issues, NATO free-riding, and the worsening situation in Vietnam, but it was only the concern that this military vacuum would embolden the USSR towards adventurist attempts to bring parts of Western Europe under its sphere of influence that ultimately but an end towards the requested massive troop reduction.

In continuity from the previous Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Nixon similarly followed a detente/rapprochement policy towards Moscow. Based on the renewed balancing policies of the newly elected French President Georges Pompidou, which committed his government to balance in opposition to Washington's leadership and continued de Gaulle's halting steps towards flirting with detente to normalize the Western relationship towards the East, ultimately pushed the virulently anti-Communist Richard Nixon to develop Washington's policy of detente. Nixon's detente established a policy of utilizing linkage politics to normalize America's relationship with the Soviet Union, while at the same time rewarding or shaming the Kremlin when it was found in violation of international norms (e.g. the oppression of Eastern

European states from rising in insurrection against Soviet occupiers, etc.). This, furthermore, illustrates the confirmation of **H1**.

Furthermore, shifts occurring in the international systemic balance of capabilities heavily favored the Soviet Union during the Nixon Administration. The relative growth between East and West balance of capabilities was such that, for the first time, experts began talking of American decline and the Soviet Union having military superiority over the West. This ought to have provoked a strong balancing response from NATO countries towards the USSR, which would line up with Walt's balance-of-threat model, thus falsifying the alternative explanation's prediction. The Nixon Administration, however, steadfastly moved towards detente and arms control agreements, which demonstrate that the alternative explanation offers a less compelling model than this dissertation's thesis.

Additionally, according to Walt's balance-of-threat, the American-led NATO coalition would be likely to oppose the Kremlin with greater strength, as Western allies were experiencing a declining economy while Moscow was increasingly moving on a trajectory towards overtaking their rivals in terms of relative strength. In fact, both balance of threat and the traditional balance of power theories indicate that the most prudent course of action in order to retain sovereignty, security, and to deter the Soviet Union would be to strengthen Western resolve and stringently oppose the Kremlin and their sphere of influence in the Warsaw Pact. This, of course, was not what happened; President Nixon did not move to Rollback the USSR into their national boundaries -- it would be about a decade before President Reagan pressed this issue.

Instead, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger continued a policy of detente (or weak containment). This was for a few reasons outlined in Chapter 6. On one hand, the revitalization of the Western European powers fulfilled George Kennan's original containment argument while

at the same time strengthened the NATO alliance as a whole. On the other hand, European revitalization increased the clout and severity of increasingly critical attitudes from Western Europe towards the United States. Because of the lack of cohesion within the alliance the rise of Soviet military capabilities, Nixon looked towards detente and weak containment as a solution to mitigate Western European criticisms, as opposed to calculations of an increasingly threatening Soviet Union. This validates this dissertation's first hypothesis (**H1**), namely that *if the junior partners in the alliance are balancing against the coalition leader, and a weak Containment strategy is the most likely outcome.*

Domestic opinion and the resulting political pressure placed on the congressional oversight committees, especially over the hot political issue of the Vietnam quagmire pushed the Nixon Administration to further weaken even allusions to a bellicose disposition coming from the White House and the Pentagon. Therefore the administration pushed through foreign policies that were among the weakest options in the containment typology: placing increasing importance on East-West detente, rapprochement and the opening of the People's Republic of China, disengagement from Vietnam and withdrawal from South Asia, and a more supportive role from Washington in terms of maintaining the national defense capabilities of American allies (while still upholding the American nuclear umbrella). Furthermore, we can see that this was not the preference of the virulently anti-Communist Richard Nixon. In conclusion, it was a series of intra-alliance balancing behaviour towards the US and its resultant in-cohesion as the causal factor, as well as the additional effect of critical domestic and congressional attitudes over Vietnam that influenced Nixon towards a much less assertive foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

If the first alternative hypothesis tested in this dissertation (**A1**), we ought to have expected that the NATO alliance would have produced a stronger, more bellicose response to Moscow's attempt to revise the international system by altering the balance of capabilities and balance of power structure throughout the 1960s. Said another way, the expected result of America's wasted nuclear supremacy (as well as its early thermonuclear monopoly) is that the Western Alliance members would seek to formulate a more cohesive, stronger response if NATO were to balance against the Soviet threat with increasing power (in terms of offensive weapons and aggregate power).

Furthermore, the third alternative variable looks to reinforce the predictions that align with the one described as **A1**. The predictive hypothesis made in **A3**, e.g. *that the more aggressive a state's perceived intentions, the more likely others are to align against that state*. According to this prediction, the Soviet Union's status as a revisionist power attempting to continuously push the boundaries in Berlin and the attempted installation of Soviet IRBMs in Cuba (as two examples), we would expect NATO members to foment a fairly strong response of opposition and balancing behaviour from the Western allies towards Moscow.

The findings in Chapter 6 falsify Walt's balance-of-threat predictions under the empirical record. In fact, our alliance cohesion variables (especially **H1**) tested in this dissertation is more accurate in predicting the foreign policy outcome and grand strategy during the Middle Cold War of the 1960s. According to **H1**, *if the junior partners in the alliance are balancing against the coalition leader, a weaker form of containment strategy is the most likely foreign policy outcome*. In fact, given the large number of intra-alliance fissures that emerged during the 1960s (over balance of payment issues during all three presidencies, America's seemingly never-ending war in Vietnam, Western Europe's desire to attempt more symbolic dialogues including those in the

Helsinki Accord in the early 1970s), the US was never able to stray from weakly containing the Kremlin and was never able to attempt a more offensive-minded Rollback campaign.

Lastly, the domestic predictions outlined in the **intervening variable** predicts that while the executive would be constrained due to increased external pressure from Moscow was viewed as being of critical concern for heightened oversight in the legislative branch. Congressional oversight, for example, led to the pressuring of the executive to withdraw troops from Western Europe due to the balance of payment and balance of forces issues within the alliance (which was present through all three presidencies, which demonstrates an in-case comparison). This very serious constrained Washington's security capabilities, as well as constraining the three Middle Cold War presidents' foreign policy options at critical moments throughout the 1960s period outlined in Chapter 6. This indicates that congressional oversight is strongly confirmed as an important intervening variable, especially during the Nixon Administration.

In Chapter 7, we find Jimmy Carter coming to office in the midst of waning American leadership in the Western democratic world in the aftermath of the particularly bloody (and messy) end to the highly unpopular Vietnam War. Furthermore, by 1977 Soviet power was on the rise, reaping the benefits of the zero-sum Cold War bipolar competition as America's reputation faltered and the Kremlin modernizing strategic and conventional military assets. It is in this moment that President Carter attempted to alter American international security policy mid stream.

When the Carter Administration took Office it was with the goal of shifting the United States from its traditional Cold War containment policy and transition foreign affairs towards a human rights-centred strategy. The administration, however, failed to effectively satisfy the security concerns of America's NATO allies in Western Europe (especially the West Germans)

and effectively communicate Carter's new strategic vision, which led Washington to circle back to containment and ultimately contributed to electoral defeat. This case tells us what happens if the alliance leader ignores cohesion and coalition maintenance while intra-alliance discord, fears of abandonment, and internal balancing was threatening to cause a schism that would threaten to tear NATO apart.

In one of the few cases that show the executive advocating a massive shift in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, we also have the same president who is often equated with the worst global affairs performance. Certainly, the Carter Administration was stymied with external factors outside of its own control (e.g. international crises in Nicaragua, the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the Polish Solidarity Movement, etc), but President Carter failed to effectively recruit NATO partners to transition their foreign affairs strategy to compliment his own policy preference. Instead, the old German Question was once again at issue within NATO and, as a result, the United States was on the sidelines during the Polish Crisis, unable to reassert their lost soft power as the leader of the Western world.

The Carter Administration was not sensitive to the security necessities of America's NATO partners in arms control negotiations. The administration took the path of reducing East-West tensions via continuation of the Nixon-Kissinger Superpower summits and shuttle diplomacy, specifically designed to reach agreement on a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with Moscow. American timing was dubious, however, as Moscow had begun to deploy their newly developed SS-20 Saber, an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that posed a fundamental threat to American allies in Europe, which would now suddenly be in range of a Soviet short-range (and therefore without warning). NATO allies, especially Chancellor Schmidt was highly critical of Carter and pressured Washington to prioritize the already-in-development

MX-cruise missile system and other theater nuclear forces (TNF) to bolster the defense of Europe and to make deterrence robust again.

Schisms within the Western alliance were deepened as a result of President Carter's insensitivity to the needs of America's alliance partners. As a result of being unable to secure consensus from the junior members within the alliance, the Carter Administration was unable to reassert its leadership position among Western democratic states. Furthermore, as a result of being unable to secure public opinion support for such a grand foreign policy shift from Containment to Carter's Human Rights Agenda, the administration was forced to circle back to Containment and contributed to losing the Democrats the election in 1980. Ronald Reagan won the next presidential election and his administration enjoyed a definitively pro-Containment mandate.

If the *balance-of-threat* explanation were applicable here, the United States and NATO would have been expected to entrench themselves in a more bellicose (or confrontational at least) doctrine towards the USSR. With Moscow's deployment of the SS-20 Saber IRBMs and the Soviet Union's aggressive push into the Middle East, as well as Africa and Latin American states, Walt's theory would have us predict as a response a strong balancing approach from NATO towards the USSR. According hypothesis **A1**, the greater the tendency for others to align against it; and hypothesis **A3**, the more likely others are to ally against that country. President Carter, however, continued to approach the Soviet Union with his vision of an American Human Rights strategy and an unswervingly faithful adherence to a *normative* liberal and Western values approach to foreign policy. This approach decidedly contradicts the predictions of the alternative explanation in this dissertation.

This episode is further evidence that this dissertation's model is supported by the historical record: Carter resisted implementing containment, but the interests and demands of the alliance (as well as domestic public opinion) shaped and shoved the administration back into the United States' traditional Cold War foreign policy. America's Western allies and domestic political institutions were very critical of Carter's approach in the context of an increasingly bellicose foreign and domestic policy being implemented by the Kremlin. In this sense, President Carter's natural allies demonstrated a willingness to intra-alliance bargaining with the United States in order to confront Moscow and Rollback the USSR. This was especially true with America's European allies, who recognized their growing insecurity was (at least in part) due to the Soviet Union's modernization and development of new weapons systems (e.g. the SS-20) and policies. According to hypothesis **H2**, if the junior partners are intra-alliance bargaining with the alliance leader, a strategy of Rollback will be the most likely foreign policy outcome. President Carter eschewed the traditional Cold War approach here in favour of holding to the construction of a new Containment strategy as his "new" American doctrine.

Carter's approach, however, was unpopular with the American public and was unsuccessful in its practical results. Moscow continued to push Washington deeper into retreat and displayed an increasingly willing attitude to implement draconian "counter-revolutionary" tactics to suppress dissident factions around the world, especially as we saw with respect to the Polish Solidarity movement. By the end of President Carter's term, he had to reverse his Human Rights doctrine, acknowledging the political need for a strong US military presence in Western Europe. In fact, Carter was forced to return to the very policy he vowed to replace when elected: Containment. This was not enough, as junior alliance partners such as British Prime Minister

Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor Schmidt stopped taking their cues from the United States, as they lost faith in their Superpower benefactor.

Jimmy Carter ended up losing the election to Ronald Reagan, largely on the heels of the latter's promise to restore American leadership in East-West relations, promising to meet Soviet bellicosity with the intention of *Rolling Back* Moscow, as predicted by hypothesis **H2**. In essence, while Carter did not conduct foreign policy as predicted in this dissertation's model, he was *selected out* by the American public in favour of Reagan, who vowed to approach East-West relations consistent with our model's prediction.

When the Reagan was sworn in as president in 1981, his administration inherited declining American relative positioning, as the USSR sought to surpass the long established Western expectations that the United States would retain nuclear and strategic supremacy. America was experiencing its most dramatic waning of reputation and influence, while Western Europe's fear of abandonment drove the junior alliance partners in NATO to distance themselves from Washington's political and ideological entrenchment towards the East. In other words, Reagan came to office after the disastrous mid-1970s and what followed in the Carter Administration, which continued the trend of sinking American self-confidence. What occurred next was a dramatic turnaround, which ultimately culminated with the fall of the Soviet Empire itself.

The Reagan White House coupled arms control with the advancement and modernization in the form of the MX Cruise Missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to stymie the approaching Soviet nuclear and technological advantage. Largely done with the purpose of mitigating European fears of Moscow's deployment of new, threatening strategic assets capable of striking Western European territory, SDI was allowed to continue while in the midst of arms

control discussion. This was largely made possible by the support of the United Kingdom and West Germany. Most importantly, Reagan was able to mitigate the intra-alliance balancing dynamic by directly addressing the issue that most significantly threatened the cohesion of the NATO alliance: concern that the bellicosity of the United States and/or its military adventurism would chaingang the entire alliance into a destructive conflict with the Soviet Union, a lesson bitterly learnt in WWI. Reagan's strong focus on arms control negotiations mitigated this fear, however. Furthermore, Reagan's alliance and close relationship with Margaret Thatcher formed an ideologically-aligned cohort that was supportive in the first place.

NATO was on the verge of splintering, largely due to the lack of intra-alliance cohesion. For example, junior alliance members declined to form a united front during the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the American-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. America's junior partners were balancing against their superpower magnate. This was largely due to the rhetorical bellicosity from the early Reagan administration, which coincided with an uptick in Anti-American sentiment in Western Europe, giving further strength to the balancing variable in the first hypothesis. Crucially the administration mitigated NATO's waning intra-alliance cohesion issues and halted further blowback balancing by assuring its European allies that the U.S. military buildup was meant to allow Washington to negotiate from a much stronger position -- an assurance that would be backed up with action by President Reagan's commitment to the arms control during the early 1980s. This strategy of introducing a few interludes of *detente* (in the form of arms control) to implement the overall strategy of Rollback was ultimately made successful by Reagan minimizing the independent variable of intra-alliance balancing through diplomacy within the alliance.

We can, moreover, observe the falsification of the alternative hypothesis during this episode. In **A1**, we expect that because the threatening state's aggregate power (especially with the introduction of Soviet SS-20s on the Continent) constituted a threat to Western Europe, NATO junior members would be expected to balance with the United States. This is especially likely in Balance of Threat given Moscow's aggressive intentions (**A3**) and proximity (**A2**) to Western Europe. However, the Reagan Administration was only able to shore up support from its junior alliance partners was by introducing *less* oppositional strategies (e.g. arms control) to contrast with American military buildup.

While Reagan was able to advance the strongest form of containment policy, e.g. Rollback, the U.S. Congress was able to limit the strength and scope of the Star Wars programme, but the MX cruise missile was deployed in Europe to counter the Soviet deployment of SS-20 Sabers. This confirms the intervening variable, namely that domestic legislature may oppose the executive branch and stymie the president's preferred foreign policy outcome. This IVV of oversight served to minimize the likely destabilizing effect of the introduction of SDI, which was built on dubious technological potential during the early 1980s (e.g. Star Wars was unlikely to work). While Congress was able to stem the more inflammatory effects of a very strong version of Rollback that would have likely taken place with SDI, the administration was able to implement and deploy the MX Cruise Missile on the Continent to balance offensive Soviet SS-20s. In other words, Congressional oversight in this matter was negligible because domestic politics stopped Star Wars from becoming operational policy, but did not successfully oppose the more critical MX Cruise Missile.

The Reagan Doctrine, with its support of freedom fighters and national liberation movements with the Soviet sphere of influence was a defining cornerstone for the

Administration's *Rollback* plan. American covert support in Central America, Afghanistan, Poland, and African nations (namely Angola and Libya) was able to largely bypass much of the scrutiny of alliance partners, therefore allowing Washington to put a strain on the Soviet economy (which was already under stress from the Kremlin's push for military modernization), waste the Kremlin's increasingly limited assets, and altogether push the Soviet sphere of influence closer to Russian borders, the ultimate goal of Rollback. Initially, the plan outlined in NSDD-66 looked to engage in economic warfare against Moscow.

However, this was scrapped when it appeared that the Thatcher-led opposition would balance against the United States. Instead, the administration abandoned the controversial strategy in favour of a longer-term campaign to destabilize Moscow's economic security, which was much more palatable to America's junior alliance partners. In effect, Reagan was able to change the independent variable from balance to intra-alliance bargaining with America's senior alliance partner through NSDD-75, primarily to avoid further internal *incohesion* and political ruptures with junior alliance partners within NATO. With the Prime Minister Thatcher's support (and others from Europe), this shift to intra-alliance bargaining resulted in a Rollback foreign policy strategy, albeit modified to win support within the alliance. Therefore, we can confidently demonstrate that **H3** is confirmed in this episode.

According to Walt's *balance of threat*, ostensibly a defensive realist theory is predicated on the notion of sufficient security and not maximum security. Walt's theory reflects the notion that should Moscow decline in relative strength, NATO's response would decline the escalation ladder. . Given that the first alternative hypothesis, **A1**, states that the greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it, we can assume that the converse would hold true: the *weaker* the state's aggregate power (and, therefore, the weaker

the threat), states are less likely to align against it and with lesser intensity. This alternative hypothesis comes to be falsified in Chapter 8. In fact, the converse holds true: NATO opposed Moscow with greater strength than at most opportunities during the 1970s.

Carter's presidency came to signify the lowest point in American strategic leadership in the geopolitical security system. So much was American power waning that its NATO allies, especially West German Chancellor Kohl questioned whether or not Washington would even fulfill its security commitment to Berlin. This is consistent with the dissertation's third hypothesis on the fear of abandonment, e.g. **H3** states that if the junior partner(s) of the coalition bloc are fearful that the alliance leader will abandon them, a *Rollback* strategy will be the most likely outcome. This is because foreign policy under this condition needs to demonstrate commitment to alliance partners.

One of the early major moves under the Reagan Administration was to issue NSDD-32 and refined in NSDD-75 (largely establishing the Reagan Administration's commitment to *Rollback* as grand strategy) was to strengthen American strategy influence throughout the world, encourage long-term liberalization and nationalism that was designed to ultimately weaken Moscow's satellite states within its own spheres of influence (thus, *rolling back* the Soviet Union to its own Russian boundaries). This is confirmation of **H3**.

Similarly, Secretary Haig was dispatched to demonstrate to European allies that, despite continental fears, Washington had no intention of abandoning its role as the Western leader of arms control negotiations. In the end, several European allies supported Reagan's SDI, at least during the research and modernization phases of the initiative, judging the project to be consistent with the 1972 ABM Treaty and that it would ultimately enhance both stability and lower level deterrence.

According to the first intervening variable (**IVV1**), when foreign policy is considered to be of the utmost importance in the legislative branch, the executive will be constrained in selecting its most preferred foreign policy -- and thanks to the miscues of the Carter Administration, foreign policy had increased domestic political salience and greater oversight in the U.S. Senate. In partial deference to congressional opposition, the Administration was pressured to produce National Security Decision Directive 119 (NSDD 119), in which the National Security Council (NSC) that pursuing SDI research would not be done in a way that would threaten the Kremlin and would conduct itself within all existing arms control agreements. With the backdrop of the so-called 'Vietnam Syndrome' -- e.g. widespread public opposition to US military involvement in Third World conflicts,<sup>687</sup> the Reagan Administration was forced to find an alternative route for *Rollback* in Latin American countries that aligned with the Soviets and, more broadly, Marxist-Leninist ideology. Instead of conventional warfare, the Administration opted for CIA-led covert operation, this way bypassing the constraining effect of Congress and public opinion. Therefore, the President was constrained by Congress and public opinion in terms of methods, as predicted by **IVV1**, however with a little ingenuity, Washington was able to pursue ways to advance the national interest and policy preferences, without becoming overly constrained and inhibited by Congressional opposition.

### *Significance*

The discussion of containment strategies has begun to see resurgence since the rise of the People's Republic of China during the first decade of the 2000s. This is interesting because, except for a few instances, Containment has been largely viewed through the lens of an historical case study and not a general mode of strategy. As the United States has been discussing (and

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<sup>687</sup> Kornbluh (1987): 1120; See also, Sarah Miles, "The Real War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America," North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), May/June 1986.

arguably implementing) a 'softer' version of containment towards the People's Republic of China (PRC), a growing (albeit small) universe of cases is beginning to emerge.

Strikingly, there have been few attempts to place Containment strategies in a theoretical context. At the time of writing, there exists no model that lays out the conditions under which foreign policy decisionmakers will likely implement a policy of containment, let alone what conditions lead to more or less forceful forms of containment. This dissertation seeks to build this theory. Additionally, given that grand strategy must be highly flexible to account for real world events, crises, domestic constraints and alliance structures, it is likely that containment strategies will exist on a continuum from Proto-containment to Rollback. Currently, there exists no explanation as to what containment policy would look like, given the different strategic realities a state faces at the time of implementation. The likely forms of containment may vary from a 'soft' version (which I classify as proto-containment, as it resembles setting the geopolitical pieces for later implementation of traditional containment), to the 'traditional' form we saw during much of the Cold War, and Rollback (which occupies a middle ground between patiently isolating the target-state and direct war). This dissertation proposed and tested the effect of alliance cohesion and domestic political constraints on what type of containment policy is implemented.

The significance in demonstrating that containment as grand strategy extends well beyond the twentieth century American Cold War context opens up possible foreign policy alternatives for states to consider.



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