The Relationship Between the Immigration Department and Community Organizations in the Integration of Immigrants in Quebec

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ABSTRACT

The Relationship Between the Immigration Department and Community Organizations in the Integration of Immigrants in Quebec

Catherine Bruneau

This thesis is about the contemporary relationship between the Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration (MIFI) and community organizations (COs) delivering immigrant integration services in Quebec. More precisely, it investigates the role of COs as central actors in the governance processes associated with immigrant integration policies in Quebec.

The literature on the relationship between the Quebec government and COs points to the distinct recognition that autonomous community action (ACA) enjoys in the province. Although similar to other jurisdictions in its use of New Public Management (NPM) principles, the Quebec model is praised for the central role dedicated to civil society actors in governance processes. Based on a theoretical framework that synthesizes ACA and NPM as two opposing modes of action, this thesis presents an analysis of 10 semi-structured interviews with the leaders of COs active in this sector.

First, the results of this research show that COs understand themselves as service providers in their relationship with the MIFI. This is present across the diverse COs analyzed, hinting at a powerful trend that may apply to the whole sector. Second, findings document that the COs interviewed experience difficulties in pursuing their social mission. The limited mission funding and the rare mechanisms COs have developed to foster citizen participation contribute to this situation. These results open the door to a broader reflection on the specificities of the Quebec model and on the changes in the value given to citizen participation in the development of public policies in the province.

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Introduction

This thesis is about the contemporary relationship between the Quebec Immigration Department and community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services. The integration of newcomers has been on Quebec's political agenda since the province began to define itself as a nation distinct from the rest of Canada (Anctil 2005, 44; Fontaine 1993; Paquet 2019). Indeed, starting in the 1960s, immigration became a central issue as part of Quebec's demands to the federal government. Over time, the province negotiated the expansion of its powers to select and integrate immigrants to affirm its distinct cultural and political identity through the control of relevant areas of jurisdiction (Venne 2001 as cited in Blad & Couton 2009, 656). To successive Quebec governments, immigration appeared as a vector that could contribute to demographic recovery, economic prosperity, and the sustainability of the French fact (e.g.: Anctil 2005; Blad & Couton 2009, 647; Chiasson & Koji 2011, 154; Daniel 2006; McGrath & McGrath 2013; Paquet 2016; 2019). Over time, these interests were reflected in the 1991 Canada—Quebec Accord relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens which provides "Quebec with new means to preserve its demographic importance in Canada, and to ensure the integration of immigrants in Quebec in a manner that respects the distinct identity of Quebec." (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 1991)

Given the large number of newcomers that were at that time turning to the English community for integration, Quebec believed that the ability to attract and retain candidates selected by the province according to its own criteria would facilitate their integration into the francophone Quebec society (Blad & Couton 2009, 654). Through the 1991 Canada-Quebec Accord, the province was given partial powers for the admission and selection of immigrants to the province, including the selection of eligible applications in Canada and abroad (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 1991). It obtained full responsibility for the management of integration programs and a full financial compensation to cover their costs, in the form of a federal annual grant (Ibid.). Thus, Quebec is the only province in the country to have negotiated such extensive agreements in the area of newcomer reception and integration (Anctil 2005, 47; Daniel 2006, 43). Chiasson & Koji (2011) confirm that "(w)hat makes Quebec unique is the fact that the province plays a central role in immigrant settlement in Quebec, whereas the federal government is the principal actor in other Canadian provinces." (164)

This agreement led observers to conclude that the distinctive character of the Quebec "nation" is protected by the implementation of integration policies aimed, first and foremost, at preserving the French fact in the province (Juteau 2002, McAndrew et al. 2000 as cited in Blad & Couton 2009, 652). Of course, immigrant integration policies formulated by Quebec have a much broader scope than linguistic integration (Paquet & Xhardez 2020). They include objectives such as: immigrant economic integration, immigrant social integration, immigrant cultural integration and socialization into core values of Quebec society and institutions. To understand the dynamics surrounding integration policies in Quebec, it is important not lose sight of the fact that successive governments and multiple stakeholders consider the integration of immigrants as contributing to Quebec's contemporary "nation-building" project (Blad & Couton 2009, 646; Paquet 2016). At the scale of Canada, this makes Quebec's integration policies unique and hard to compare to those implemented in the rest of the country.

The mandate to develop, implement and monitor immigrant integration policies has been the purview of the provincial departments responsible for immigration since late 1960s (Anctil 2005, 49; Symonds 2002, 29). Since 2019, this department is called the *Ministère de*

l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration (MIFI) of Quebec. The implementation of these policies, however, is not carried out solely by the Department. In the immigrant integration sector, community organizations (COs) are central actors tasked with delivering programs (Immigration, Francisation et Intégration Quebec 2021). As non-profits and community-based organizations, COs act as intermediaries between, on one hand, the immigrant populations and, on the other hand, the Quebec Department of Immigration (Gilbert, Viswanathan & Saberi 2013, 27; Garon 2015, 501). Their position places them at the centre of governance processes associated with immigrant integration in Quebec. As service providers, they are directly involved in policy decisions that have an impact on the lives of the populations they serve. As implementers for the Immigration Department, they are potentially dependent of the will of the government to meet their objectives. As representative of on-the-ground realities, they must attempt to represent the views of their clients to the Department and try to influence policy decisions (Garon 2015, 492). In other words, COs are key actors to study in order to develop a better understanding of the dynamics associated with immigrant integration policies in Quebec.

Yet, although the question of newcomers' integration from the perspective of the host society has been extensively studied in the Quebec literature[1], the same cannot be said of the predominant role of COs in immigrant integration, let alone their interactions with the Quebec government. Among the very few authors who address the topic of the relationship between government and COs in the context of the delivery of integration services in Quebec, there is no consensus as to whether COs are able to translate the needs of newcomers to government officials or to influence the direction of policies. While some authors argue that COs have been able to maintain a critical distance in their relationship with the Immigration Department of Quebec and to fulfill their social mission (e.g.: Fisher & Shragge 2017; Garon 2015), others contend that this function has been compromised by government dominance in the management processes of COs (e.g.: Chiasson & Koji 2011; Fiore 2013; Fontaine 1993; Garon 2015; Germain & Trinh 2011; Gonzales Castillo 2015; Noel & Martin 2002; Poirier & Gagnon 2010; Urtnoski, O'Donnell, Shragge, Robineau & Forgues 2012).

This lack of consensus paves the way for more research on the relationship between the government and COs in the context of integration services delivery in Quebec. Given the primary role played by these organizations in the integration of newcomers (Gilbert, Viswanathan & Saberi 2013, 26; Chiasson & Koji 2011, 165; Garon 2015, 501), as well as the issues surrounding their sound governance (Hamel & Jouve 2006), the need for a research that empirically documents the nature of this relationship is undeniable. 10 years ago, Germain & Trinh (2011) already noted the need for further research in this way by stating that: "(p) erhaps it is time to conduct a sound investigation into the work conditions of NGO or community groups." (271) An empirical research rooted in the specific context of Quebec will contribute to a novel analysis of

[1] Research has focused on the following topics: the economic situation of newcomers and their insertion in the labour market (e.g.: Alaoui 2006, Bourdabat & Grenier 2017, Cousineau & Boudarbat 2009, Dioh & Racine 2017, Gagné 1989, Girard, Smith & Renaud 2008, Kilolo Malambwe 2017, Piché Renaud & Gingras 2002), the sociopolitical integration of ethnic minorities (e.g.: De la Sablonnière, Debrose & Benoît 2010, Mc Andrew & Bakhshaei 2012), opinions of the host society towards immigrants (e.g.: Bilodeau, Turgeon & Karakoç 2012, Herrera & Lachapelle 2010, Turgeon & Bilodeau 2014), interculturalism and diversity (e.g.: Bouchard 2011, Couton 2010, Gagnon & Iacovino 2003, Salée 2010, Piché 2002), nationalism (e.g.: Barker 2010, Blad & Couton 2009), French learning (e.g.: Allen 2006, Oakes 2004), the division of powers (e.g.: Daniel 2006, Pâquet 1997, Paquet 2016) and regionalism (e.g.: Hanley 2017, Laaroussi 2011, Simard 1995, 1996, Vatz Laroussi & Bezzi 2010).

the conditions under which immigrant integration services are implemented in the province, at a time when the government is concerned with expanding service accessibility (Travail, Emploi et Solidarité sociale 2019).

The themes of government/COs relations and the questions of the role of these organizations in representing the needs of their users have largely influenced studies in the field of health and social services in Quebec following the reforms of the early 2000s (e.g.: Hamel & Jouve 2006; Proulx, Bourque & Savard 2005). This work, however, has not extended to the field of immigration, let along immigrant integration. Yet, it is possible to gain several insights and to formulate hypotheses based on studies in other policy sectors in Quebec, especially regarding the evolution of the collaboration between the Quebec government and COs. Indeed, exploring these concerns demands to take into consideration the specific context in which COs interact with the state in Quebec.

In order to qualify the relationship between the Quebec government and COs in the immigrant integration sector, this research is guided by two main questions:

1—Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services perceive themselves as service providers or as autonomous partners in their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration*?

2- Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services pursue of an autonomous social mission?

Interviews conducted with COs' leaders revealed that, despite their differences in several aspects, COs primarily see themselves as service providers in their relationship with the MIFI. In addition, it is argued that the pursuit of an autonomous social mission is undermined by the emphasis that both COs and the MIFI put on service delivery, leaving little room for democratic practices specific to the community sector.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Given the importance of understanding the context in which the relationship between the Immigration Department and COs active in the integration of newcomers is embedded, this chapter will review the literature addressing the relationship between the government and COs in Quebec. While very few authors have addressed this issue in the immigrant integration sector, the question of the relationship between the Quebec government and the community sector in general has been the subject of numerous studies. In this respect, authors agree to say that Quebec's particular situation has given rise to a distinct Quebec model of public policy (Bourque 2000; Lévesque 2002; Venne 2003 as cited in Hamel & Jouve 2006, 14). One of the specific features of this model is the place occupied by COs in governance processes, as well as the autonomy of action they have acquired over time, resulting in a unique partnership with the state (Jetté 2011; Dufour & Montigny 2020, 10).

The first part of this chapter will therefore focus on capturing the main characteristics of this relationship by reviewing the role played by organizations in the evolution of the Quebec public policy model. As Hamel & Jouve (2006) explain, the Quebec model has taken various institutional configurations over time, reflecting compromises that have evolved (14). Thus, this section will aim to explore the evolution of the role played by COs in Quebec, with the specific objective to understand the origin of the contemporary characteristics of their relationship with government. Indeed, authors argue that the neoliberal shift of the 1990s undermined the institutional compromise that had hitherto underpinned the relationship between these two actors (Jetté 2011, 68). According to Vaillancourt (2012), "(…) policies were reconfigured to bring them into line with the dominant current on new public management, which subordinated the principles of cooperation specific to the social and solidarity economy to the principles of competition specific to the market economy" (Jetté & Goyette 2010; Jetté & Vaillancourt 2011 as cited in Vaillancourt 2012, 142-43). The recourse to New Public Management (NPM) by government authorities thus appears to have weakened the foundations on which the relationship with the community sector had previously been built (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013), an issue that will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. While the consequences caused by the adoption of this new paradigm is debatable, the fact remains that organizations are faced with two logic of action that seem to run counter to each other. The tension resulting from these two different modes of action may also be seen in the policy governing community action in Quebec adopted in 2001, which will be introduced in the final section of this first chapter.

The Quebec Model of Public Policy

In describing governance and policy in Quebec, scholars often point to the existence of a province-specific model (e.g.: Bouchard, 2013; Klein et al., 2013; Mathieu et al., 2020; Noël, 2020; Papillon and Turgeon, 2003; Vaillancourt, 2012 as cited in Daigneault, Birch, Béland & Bélanger 2021, 2). A governance model is understood as the configuration of relations between the state and society in its various modes of intervention and regulation (e.g.: Côté, Lévesque & Morneau 2005; Hamel & Jouve 2006, 8; Lachapelle & Bourque 2020, 115; Lévesque 2004, 2; Noel 2015; Vaillancourt 2012, iv). The notion of model can include many dimensions such as: the context, the main social actors, the societal paradigm, the mode of regulation, the form of the state, economic and social policies, forms of governance, the respective place of the state, the market and

civil society, the productive system, the system of collective services, and the relationship with the territory (Lipietz 1989 as cited in Lévesque 2004, 2).

The Quebec model of public policy has been described as "a system of social innovation based on consultation" (Klein et al., 2014 as cited in Lachapelle & Bourque 2020, 115), having specific characteristics that are both linked to the historical evolution of the province, to its cultural particularities, as well as to external factors (Vaillancourt 2012). In this respect, Daigneault, Birch, Béland & Bélanger (2021) show that "[…] Quebec has a distinct welfare state that appears to be more generous and more extensive than in other provinces, especially for families." (8) Authors comparing the Quebec model to that of other Canadian provinces generally reach this common finding. In comparison to the rest of Canada, the Quebec welfare state bolsters more redistributive policies that have a greater impact on poverty reduction, in particular for families with children (Haddow 2014; Jenson 2002 as cited in Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004, 10; Noel 2018; Proulx et al. 2011; van den Berg et al. 2017 as cited in Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020, 176). The specific characteristics that account for these differences include Quebec's higher public expenditures (Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004; Dinan & Noel 2020), its more accessible and generous parental leave regime (Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020), its improved family support and services (Noel 2018, 74), its high investments in employment support measures (Morel et al. 2012 355-56 as cited in Dinan & Noel 2020, 474), its public prescription drug insurance plan (Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004; Noel 2018, 74) and its poverty-reduction policies (Noel 2013 as cited in Noel 2018, 74). Taken together, these policies have limited, to a certain extent, the rise of inequalities in the province as compared to what has been observed elsewhere in Canada (Banting & Myles 2013 as cited in Noel 2018, 73).

Beyond the qualitative differences in public policies, some authors have sought to quantify interprovincial variations (e.g.: Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004; Haddow 2014; Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020; Daigneault, Birch, Béland & Bélanger 2021). The findings of these studies also support the argument of a distinct welfare state for Quebec in comparison to other Canadian provinces. Although sometimes described as limited or modest, these variations were found to be significant and real (Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004). Haddow's (2014) findings even show that the distance between Quebec's welfare state and that of other provinces is comparable to the distance separating international welfare regimes (727).

In reference to Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) well-known typology of welfare regimes (liberal, conservative and social democratic), authors agree that the Quebec model has more of the social-democratic characteristics of the northern European countries than of the liberal regimes (e.g.: Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004; Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020; Vaillancourt 2011, 2012; van den Berg et al. 2017 as cited in Noel 2018, 83). This association is made in relation to certain features of the Quebec model that are similar to those of social democratic regimes. For example, using a broad set of indicators representing public policies, social conditions, and the level of civic participation, Bernard & Saint-Arnaud (2004) concluded that the high level of public expenditure (health and education), revenue and employment in the public administration bring Quebec closer to the social democratic model (17). In general, Quebec's generous social policies and its commitment to better redistributive programs are the basis on which authors argue that the province is similar to Nordic countries, in comparison to other Canadian provinces that tend to embrace the

liberal market-oriented model (Mahon et al. 2016; Paquin 2016 as cited in Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020, 177).

As for the factors that led to the development of a distinct Quebec model, they are mainly attributed to differences in cultural identity, language and values related to the affirmation of Quebec nationalism (Béland & Lecours 2006), to the strong mobilization of associative movements and the resulting political concertation (Noel 2007, 24-25; Haddow 2014, 727), and more generally, to the leadership of the Parti Québécois (PQ) from 1976 to 1985, and then from 1994 to 2001 (Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004). Indeed, the PQ is known for putting forward programs and policies that promoted the socio-economic advancement of Francophones through an approach that is more interventionist, redistributive and egalitarian than that of the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) that succeeded it (Dufour & Montigny 2020; Noel 2018).

Multiple researchers have argued that successive Quebec liberal party governments – first under Premier Jean Charest and then under Premier Philippe Couillard – have implemented policies that weakened this model. These included the increased use of NMP principles and upward accountability measures, in addition to a set of austerity-led program reforms. (e.g.: Bourque & Verreault 2017; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Lachapelle & Bourque 2020; Noel 2015; Vaillancourt 2011, 2018). On the other hand while, in recent years, the Quebec redistribution model has suffered some setbacks (Vaillancourt 2018), many authors argue that it has been resilient and marked by continuity (e.g.: Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Noel 2018, 2020). This can be seen through policy outcomes which, in many respects, still show better scores for Quebec compared to other Canadian provinces. According to Mathieu, Doucet & McKay (2020), "[…] Québec consistently stands out as the province with the most effective income distribution policies and, consequently, the lowest Gini coefficients (Statistics Canada 2019)." (187) For instance, its poverty and unemployment rates are lower compared to other Canadian provinces (Dinan & Noel 2020; Noel 2018). Thanks to its family policy, the province presents an increased employment rate for young women (Noel 2018, 76) and has the greatest coverage with regards to parental leave (Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020). Quebec also has a low infant mortality rate, comparable to that of social democratic countries (Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004, 17).

These outcomes can be understood as the legacy of decades of implementing innovative public policies that are said to be more progressive, collectivist, generous and egalitarian compared to other Canadian provinces (Béland & Lecours 2006, 78). One of the ways in which this tradition is entrenched is through the opposition that political parties encounter when they attempt to implement neoliberal reforms or less redistributive policies (Ibid., 84). Moreover, polls show that Quebeckers are more inclined to support state intervention and the redistribution of resources than their counterparts in other provinces (Noel 2007, 24-25). It is also manifested in the fact that, despite their competing vision of governance, polarization between parties around redistributive policies is fairly moderate (Haddow 2014, 727). As Noel (2018) contends, "[t]hese differences, however, remained within the bounds of a broad consensus over the welfare state itself, which the two parties contributed to build." (84) In other words, there is a consensus among Quebec political elites to perpetuate the tradition of a generous welfare regime in the province, aligned with Quebec society's lack of appetite for a neoliberal agenda (Haddow 2015, 40 as cited in Noel 2018, 84).

In summary, although it cannot be argued that the Quebec model is unique, or even exceptional as some might suggest (Bushell & Shields 2018; Raïq et al. 2012, Raïq and van den Berg 2014, van den Berg et al. 2017 as cited in Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020, 170), it remains distinct in the Quebec context. Thus, for all the reasons discussed above supporting the fact that Quebec represents "the road not taken by the rest of Canada" (Banting & Myles 2013,18 as cited in Noel 2018, 73), the focus of this thesis will be on Quebec's literature addressing its governance model, while keeping in mind that some trajectories and social policies may be fairly similar to those observed elsewhere in Canada (Béland & Lecours 2006) and shaped by the influence global trends (Côté & Simard 2012, 106). This is not a matter of ignoring the similarities that exist between Canadian provinces or in relation to the Canadian model, but rather of considering the specificities of the Quebec model that have shaped its "distinctiveness".

Thus, analysts point to the fact that Quebec's public policy model has evolved following three major periods during which the roles of social actors and of the state have greatly changed. The next few lines will discuss each of these three models with an emphasis on the configuration of the relationship between the government and COs, and more specifically on the role of these organizations in Quebec governance processes.

First Model

Between the end of the 19th century and the start of the Quiet Revolution (1960s), the dominance of the Catholic Church in the social sphere, in conjunction with a distrust of the state, limited the intervention of the Quebec government. According to Vaillancourt (2012), the undervaluation of state intervention was in phase with the ideology of economic liberalism present in Canada and in other countries at that time (119). Social ills and needs were mostly taken care of by the Church and families (Ibid.). Thus, Côté, Lévesque & Morneau (2005) associate this first model of governance with a minimal state, e.g., a laissez-faire type that intervenes very little in the various societal domains, limiting its protection to the weakest (2).

Given the traditional nationalism in place during this first period, the relationship between the government and COs was almost non-existent. As the Catholic Church maintained a special relationship with civil society, the third sector—mostly comprised of religious-based cooperatives—was also strongly influenced, if not controlled, by the Church (Vaillancourt 2012, 118–119). However, Vaillancourt (2012) mentions that between 1945 and 1960, "(…) traditional nationalism began to lose way with the rise of a new nationalism that was more modern, independent of the Church, and open to state intervention" (124). Indeed, with the advent of the Quiet Revolution—a process of catching up and modernization of the state aimed primarily at addressing the inequalities between the French minority and the English majority (Noel 2010)—COs started to gain importance in the provision of public services (e.g.: Noel 2010; Jetté 2011; René 2009).

Second Model

In the wake of the Quiet Revolution, the Quebec government repatriated social issues under its aegis by intervening massively in the economic, cultural and social fields (Hamel & Jouve 2006, 14). By positioning itself as a vector of emancipation, it implemented a close to social-democratic type of welfare system through regional development policies, the recognition of unions and free access to social services (Lévesque, 2004 as cited in Bouchard, Lévesque & St-Pierre 2005, 3–4).

This model, deeply vested in Keynesianism, was institutionalized from the 1960s until the 1980s (Côté, Lévesque & Morneau 2005; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010, 237). During this period, the Quebec government acted as a leader by centralizing power and relying mainly on experts to develop public policies (Bourque & Verreault 2017; Côté, Lévesque & Morneau 2005; Hamel & Jouve 2006). In this sense, Hamel & Jouve (2006) contend that this second Quebec model of public policy is based on an institutional configuration centered on the state (15), as COs were "[s] een at the outset as providers of residual services operating on the fringe of the system […]" (Jetté 2011, 62).

While the Quebec state was repatriating power and leadership on social issues, COs mobilized to replace the Catholic Church as social service providers (Vaillancourt 2011). The Quebec government recognized this, in addition to the society-building role of COs. According to White (2012b) during this period, the funding of organizations was primarily based on global mission grants (101), which allowed for minimal reporting that respected the organizations' methods (Jetté 2011, 65). It is in this climate of social transformation that Quebec COs were able to emerge as a collective actor organized under a collective and shared identity (White 2012b, 102). Through their mobilization seeking to build alternatives to provide resources and local services, COs also "[…] offered political representation, stimulated democratic life, and systematized innovative practices." (Côté & Simard 2012, 106) For these reasons, during this second phase, the community sector is said to embody the ideals of participatory democracy and social responsibility, in addition to playing the role of political opposition to the government (Ibid., 105).

The 1980s' crisis in public finances and the transformation of Quebec's welfare state abruptly put an end to this state-centered period, as Quebec transitioned to a more open state model. This third model involved the participation of civil society not only in the implementation of public policies, as was the case in the second model, but also in their formulation (Vaillancourt 2011). According to Hamel & Jouve (2006), the appropriation of the decision-making spheres by civil society consisted of taking over the collective emancipation project that had until then been under the control of the state (15).

Third Model

The series of socio-economic and political shock waves of the 1980s—e.g. the crisis in public finances and the questioning of the state monopoly in the production of public services—gave way to a neoliberal shift (Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010, 237). Despite this shift, new openings for civil society participation became features of the Quebec model (Hamel & Jouve 2006). Indeed, this third period of the Quebec model of public policy is associated to a subsidiary state (Côté, Lévesque & Morneau 2005): a state that acts as a partner of civil society by facilitating its participation in co-constructing public policies (Vaillancourt 2012). The impetus of social movements and the expansion of COs through citizen initiatives (Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Jetté 2008 as cited in Lachapelle & Bourque 2020, 117) have thus given rise to a form of shared governance combining social-democratic and neo-liberal policies that has characterized the Quebec model since the 1990s (Vaillancourt 2011).

At first, from the early '80s to the early '90s, the model of centralized welfare state characteristic of the second phase retreated to make room for the opening of the decision-making spheres to the participation of civil society actors (Jetté 2011, 66). This approach based on policy

decentralization gave more leeway to COs and placed great importance on forms of governance involving citizen participation (Vaillancourt 2011). Thus, COs gained an informal capacity to formulate policies and programs on the ground. This change reflected the place given to COs at the negotiating table with the government following a tradition of participatory democracy (Lachapelle 2007, 178). Moreover, their official recognition was facilitated by requests from the *Coalition des organismes communautaires du Quebec* to maintain funding adapted to the specificity of community action (Lachapelle 2007, 177). Through these demands, they affirmed their refusal to let their activities be reduced solely to government programs (Ibid., 178) and defended the interests of Quebec's COs through their collective identity (Jetté 2011).

Since the 1990s, the community sector has become the main actor responsible for the provision of multiple social services to the population (Hamel & Jouve 2006). According to Hamel & Jouve, COs have become a full partner of the state and their fates have never been more closely linked (16). In this regard, Choudry & Shragge (2011) argue that the factors that contributed to their dominant role in service provision are: "the permanence of community organizations, the securing of more regular funding, pressures from staff seeking to improve their working conditions, and demands for recognition of expertise." (118) More than before, however, the defence of their autonomy of action and the recognition of their specificity have become the centrepiece of COs mobilization (White 2012b). As implementation agents in the third model, they face challenges in maintaining their independence and their capacity to experiment, in the face of pressures from their main funder—the Quebec government—who has the power to set the agenda, provide the resources and to decide on the benchmark for success (Fontaine 2013, 214).

Specific Characteristics of the Relationship Between the Quebec Government and COs

COs have remained a central actor of the Quebec model over time, even as this model has evolved and transformed. Over time, Quebec COs have been able to gain a prominent place in governance and in implementation processes (Jetté 2011). White (2012b) argues that the success of COs in their relationship with government lies in the agency exercised by community actors to advance the values and practices of the community sector.

When compared to other configurations in other parts of Canada and around the world, analysis points to the recognition of the role of COs as a source of social innovation as a distinct feature of the Quebec model (Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010). This is the element that constitutes the essence of the Quebec model of public policy from its conception (Hamel & Jouve 2006, 15) and that has been preserved against external forces primarily by the mobilization of COs (White 2012b). Even today, the relationship between the government and COs in Quebec is based on an approach that favours the participation of different parts of civil society in the co-construction of public policies (Vaillancourt 2012). COs are recognized as crucial actors in fostering the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes (Vaillancourt 2011 ; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010 ; Jetté 2008 as cited in Lachapelle & Bourque 2020). With a view to achieving the ideals of democracy and social responsibility, these organizations put forward alternative practices based on citizen initiatives (Jetté 2011). In addition, COs in Quebec enjoy official recognition from the Quebec government for their expertise and the representative role they play with the community they serve (White 2012b; Laforest & Phillips 2001). They also act as a force of political opposition, through their social mobilization (Côté & Simard 2012; Klein, Fontan, Harrison & Lévesque 2010; White 2012b). All these characteristics, combined with the regular funding they receive from government, gives them a great autonomy of action, and leads

them to occupy a prominent place in terms of consultation and participation in governance processes in the province (White 2009, 5; Lachapelle 2007, 178).

As mentioned in the section on the third period, Quebec's model of social policy is also said to be distinct because of the way it combines social-democratic and neoliberal ideas (Dufour 2004 as cited in White 2009; Noel & Martin 2002). Indeed, according to Jetté (2011), the dynamics of reciprocity resulting from the "compromise between certain traditional demands of the Left and principles originating in the cultural revolution of the 1970s, constituted an innovative alternative to both the traditional welfare state and neoliberalism." (69) Yet, the combination of these two different types of policies is not without ambiguity. As Lachapelle (2007) points out, the distinct nature of the Quebec model does not reduce the strength of the influence of the neoliberal ideology in Quebec society (176), as it will be discussed in the following section.

The Managerial Governance Shift

The third "Quebec model" corresponds with the 1990s, a decade in which the use of austerity policies became very popular across the globe. Neoliberal reforms—such as the ones implemented by Thatcher, Reagan and Mulroney (Choudry & Shragge 2011)—spared very few spheres of public policy. Even in Quebec, "some of the political players (…) flirted with the idea of a more marked application of the market, neoliberal orientation to the health and social services system." (Jetté 2011, 67). Government action became guided by "zero deficit" ideals (White 2009, 13; Vaillancourt 2012) and the recovery of public finances (Parazelli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017, 204), which ultimately led to cuts in funding and access to social programs (Choudry & Shragge 2011). Thus, the era of unprecedented welfare programs and state generosity was now giving way to fiscal restraints and policies that promoted the concept of individual responsibility, as opposed to social responsibility (e.g.: Dufour & Montigny 2020, 12; Côté & Simard 2012 ; Choudry & Shragge 2011 ; Parazelli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017, 205).

Moreover, the introduction of this new paradigm in the public sphere is marked by an increased withdrawal of the state from social issues. The decentralization shown by the state in this neoliberal era is not only part of a sharing of responsibilities with organizations as social providers. This disengagement, which goes hand in hand with cuts in social programs and the funding associated with them, is mainly part of a logic aimed at reducing the costs of public services (Côté & Simard 2012, 80; Laforest & Phillips 2001, 37). COs are not only more flexible and more capable to respond to the needs of immigrants, but can also deliver program at smaller costs, which explains why the Quebec government was so prompt to use them at the onset of the financial crisis of the 1980s (Reichhold 2010) In other words, the withdrawal of government from the social services sphere and its takeover by the community sector was not only for practical reasons, but mainly for its cost-effectiveness (Laforest & Phillips 2001, 56). It has had the effect of shifting state's responsibilities to the community sector while simultaneously putting at stake the very survival of COs (Côté & Simard 2012, 108). Under neo-liberal restructuring, COs have thus evolved to fill gaps and absorb cuts in public services, which the public sector used to provide, while the government reduced its role and shifted his focus on policy setting and coordination (Choudry & Shragge 2011, 506; Evans 2005, 77 as cited in Bushell & Shields 2018, 13; Laforest & Phillips 2001, 55).

Some of the measures that have been introduced during this period are often described as aligned with NPM principles. These correspond to the introduction of private sector logic and

mechanisms in the provision of public goods and services (Côté & Simard 2012, 111, Jetté 2011, 67). The adoption by the Quebec state of these principles has spread not only within government organizations but it has also had an effect on government-related organization, including COs (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013). Indeed, organizations funded by the Quebec government are now subject to a market logic through the imposition of standards and controls specific to NPM principles (Côté & Simard 2012, 112).

In practice, these principles are translated through the contracting of services, the implementation of strict evaluation and performance measures, and the imposition of precise and measurable objectives to be met (Amar & Berthier 2007 as cited in Jetté 2011, 68). Qualitative evaluation measures have been replaced by quantitative indicators based on performance and results (Dufour & Montigny 2020, 12; Côté & Simard 2012, 111). Through the application of these measures, governments seek to achieve greater transparency in the spending of public funds, and a higher level of efficiency in the delivery of public services (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013, 17). In terms of accountability, these mechanisms emphasize individual responsibility, based on the "neoliberal injunction" that calls for the empowerment of individuals to become autonomous and responsible for their own lives (Fontaine 2013; Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau 2017). Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau (2017) contend that the injunction to individual accountability and the acquisition of skills adapted to socioeconomic conditions has been internalized by many organizations (218) and constitutes an ideological paradox to the founding discourse of community action (Fontaine 2013, 208–209; Côté & Simard 2012, 119).

Consequences

Paradoxically, this situation generates a new dependence of COs on the government and undermines their ability to carry out democratic actions (e.g.: Choudry & Shragge 2011 ; Côté & Simard 2012 ; Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013 ; Fontaine 2013). Indeed, the imposition of a NPM framework increases the administrative burden of COs that must respond to the government's many requests for accountability (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013 ; Fontaine 2013). Also, considering that funding criteria and reporting guidelines are based on business practices, COs must sometimes hire managers from this sector or created new staff positions in order to meet government's complex requirements (Choudry & Shragge 2011; Côté & Simard 2012). This has had the effect of reinforcing the hierarchy between employees and volunteers within organizations (Côté & Simard 2012; Choudry & Shragge 2011, 507). This "professionalization" of COs demonstrates the organizational changes that need to be put in place in response to government requirements, illustrating the spread of NPM principles beyond the boundaries of the public sector.

According to some, one of the impacts of these organizational changes is that COs become more invested in bureaucratic practices than in building movements for social change (Choudry & Shragge 2011, 507). Other documented impacts also include limits to the pursuit of COs' advocacy mission and a dilution of the strength of their political opposition (Côté & Simard 2012; Orsini 2006). This further contributes to the erosion of social change and democratic practices within COs (Côté & Simard 2012 ; René 2009 ; Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013), which ultimately, creates challenges to the exercise of their autonomy (Fontaine 2013, 213).

For many authors (e.g. Craig & Manthorpe 1999; North 2000; Beaumont 2003; Casey & Dalton 2006; Phillips 2006 as cited in White 2012, 204; Côté & Simard 2012, 111), these negative impacts are accentuated by the normalization of COs' dependence on the state for funding and

recognition. Indeed, considering that most COs' funding comes from government sources (White 2009, 11), authors contend that this leads to an asymmetry in the distribution of power that is inevitably marked by government dominance (Craig and Manthorpe 1999; North 2000; Beaumont 2003; Casey and Dalton 2006; Phillips 2006 as cited in White 2012a, 204). Organizations thus find themselves in a position where they cannot ignore measures imposed in exchange for funding.

Tensions Between the Modes of Action of Government and COs

As discussed in the previous section, the primacy accorded to COs in the Quebec model of social policy is not categorical. Indeed, authors contend that the neoliberal shift has had the effect of jeopardizing the role played by COs by undermining the foundations on which the relationship between the Quebec government and the community sector was built (e.g.: Choudry & Shragge 2011 ; Côté & Simard 2012 ; Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013 ; Fontaine 2013). Emerging from an approach favouring social innovation based on citizen initiatives, organizations are now facing a mode of governance that risks relegating them to the role of mere service providers.

Although a consensus emerges in the literature around the fact that the neoliberal shift has affected the pursuit of the social mission of COs, the exact extent of its consequences is less clear. While some authors argue that this "reengineering" of governance in Quebec has failed to eliminate the social innovation practices of COs (e.g.: Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010), others contend that NPM practices are now an integral part of organizations (e.g.: Fontaine 2013). While it remains to be determined to what extent the implementation of neoliberal measures has affected the foundations on which the relationship between the two actors was founded, one thing is certain: the contemporary relationship between government and COs in Quebec is subject to two opposing modes of governance that give rise to tensions (Dufour & Montigny 2020, 12). The ambivalence around the nature of the relationship present in the literature thus reflects the singularity of the Quebec model, that is, the combination of social-democratic and neoliberal policies. In the following lines, these concerns will be explored by assessing how the resulting tensions may run counter to the actions of COs as described in the first part of this chapter.

Hybrid Model of Governance

The introduction of NPM principles contradicts the specificity of community action and confronts organizations with two opposing logic of action (Dufour & Montigny 2020, 12; Jetté 2011, 64). Thus, while the state increasingly directs its actions towards a market logic, organizations are obliged to find a way between the requirements related to the funding of their actions and the primary mission of the community sector, namely their social mission. Reconciling these two paradigms may prove difficult as the more democratic bottom-up approach of COs is challenged by the top-down dynamic inspired by the private sector (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013, 5). In other words, the tensions arising from the confrontation of these two different modes of action compromise the maintenance of a safe distance from the state, as COs' ideal of autonomy is undermined by government austerity policies (Parazelli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017, 203). In this regard, Lachapelle (2007) argues that the challenge rallying the entire Quebec community movement is to contribute to the renewal of democracy and the social state, despite the global neo-liberal context (176).

The changes brought about by this shift in the 1990s are now pervasive in the governance processes of the Quebec state (Fontaine 2013). This means that we are currently in an era in which neo-liberal policies must be combined with the ideals of autonomy of the community sector. Thus, the current relationship between COs and government largely depends on how the former manage to navigate between the requirements of government and the specificities of community action. Indeed, as Choudry & Shragge (2011) contend, despite the constraints faced by organizations, some manage to manipulate funding arrangements and pursue their political opposition activities (511). What needs to be understood, however, is how COs active in the immigrant integration sector understand their relationship to the state and their role in this changing context.

Policy on the Recognition and Support of Community Action (PRSCA)

The tensions between the neo-liberal model and demands for autonomy of the community sector were very palpable in the formulation of the overarching policy governing community action in Quebec. In 2001, Quebec adopted a policy on the recognition and support of community action (PRSCA). This policy is the result of a 5-year process of negotiation between the community sector and the Quebec government. The PRSCA is a unique social contract recognizing and institutionalizing the essence of community action in Quebec (White 2012b). It defines the parameters governing relations between the Quebec government and COs (White 2012b, 94) and establishes the basis of a harmonious relationship (Laforest & Phillips 2001, 60). Doing so, the PRSCA institutionalizes existing community action practices in Quebec and reiterates the government's support and promotion of community action (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001; Dufour & Montigny 2020, 11). As such, it cuts across all sectors of community action as it applies to all government departments (White 2012b, 96).

In this respect, an essential element of the policy is its formal recognition of COs' autonomy by the state, something that is reiterated many times in the policy document. In the PRSCA, the concept of "autonomy" is defined as: "[Autonomy] requires that a crucial distance be maintained between the community movement and the state in order to create a genuinely dynamic relationship in which the community sector safeguards its identity and retains a certain leeway in its ties with the government." (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001, 17) This definition reflects the demands made by COs attached to the Autonomous Community Action (ACA) movement during the process of policy development. The ACA emerged in response to the diffusion of NPM as a dominant model orienting public policies towards what some COs perceived to be a "contract culture" (White 2012b). Organizations involved in ACA distance themselves from other COs, which they perceived as being too influenced by the objective of responding to government priorities (Laforest & Phillips 2001, 58). Instead of accepting what they consider to be a service provider role for the government, organizations subscribing to ACA principles seek a formal recognition of their autonomy, of their identity as well as a protection of their self-defined missions, orientations, and practices (White 2009, 16).

The PRSCA thus includes a clear definition of what is an autonomous community organization, making it possible to distinguish these organizations from other non-profit (e.g.: social economy enterprise). The policy demands that COs meet the following four characteristics in order to be recognized as autonomous: 1) "They must have been created through a community initiative"; 2) "They must pursue a social mission that promotes social change and that is specific to the organization"; 3) "They must use active citizenship practices and broad-based approaches rooted in a comprehensive view of the issues at stake"; 4- "They must have a board of directors

independent from the public network" (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001, 21). These criteria reflect the very foundation of ACA, namely the pursuit of a social emancipatory practice based on the power that individuals have over their own actions (Parazelli 1995, 215). It is therefore through an approach based on citizen participation that autonomous COs, estimated at more than 4,000 organizations across the province, are able to put forward an offer of alternative services aimed at social transformation (Réseau québécois de l'action communautaire autonome 2019). These principles highlight the importance of their role in the collective defence of rights through the values of justice, democracy and citizenship (Métivier 2017). It is in support of this mission, and with respect for their autonomy, that autonomous COs called for specific funding provisions at the time that the policy was developed (Leclerc 2018). As St-Germain, Grenier, Bourque & Pelland (2017) mention it, being able to preserve their autonomy from their funders gives organizations freedom of direction, policy and approach (105).

In response to the mobilization of organizations to have their autonomy of action recognized (White 2012b), the policy distinguishes between three different types of funding: 1) funding for the overall mission of organizations; 2) funding for services that complement public services, and 3) funding for one-time and short-term projects (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001). Moreover, the PRSCA states that funding in support of the overall mission of autonomous COs should constitute a preponderant part of the overall funding (Ibid.). The adoption of this policy marked a victory for the community sector in Quebec since it creates tools for COs to keep a safe distance from the state and to resist government attempts to integrate them into public programs (White 2012b; Laforest & Phillips 2001; Richmond & Shields 2005). The result is a policy that protects the autonomy of COs by funding their social mission—including advocacy—thus leading to the establishment of an original partnership promoting social innovation generated by the community sector and responding to collective problems (Jetté 2011; Lachapelle 2007).

The PRSCA in practice

Although the recognition of ACA principles is transversal to the PRSCA, there remains important tensions between the prerogatives of government and those of COs. These tensions inherent in the relationship between the government and COs in Quebec are the subject of what Fontaine (2013) calls the "paradoxes of the actualization of the principle of autonomy". According to the author, achieving COs' autonomy is made difficult, if not impossible, by the framework that governs their actions. As service providers for the state, the actions of COs are necessarily shaped by the ideology of the government, despite any formal recognition of their autonomy. In this sense, it is argued that COs' autonomy and the scope of social changes are limited to maintaining the power to negotiate the terms of reference of their relationship with government, without existing structural constraints over-determining the outcome of their orientations and practices. (Fontaine 2013, 215; Choudry & Shragge 2011, 510).

This conception of the activation of the principle of autonomy is very different from the way it is presented in the PRSCA. In the policy, the autonomy of organizations seems to emanate from the simple fact that they identify and structure themselves as autonomous. Indeed, the policy assumes that labelling organizations as "autonomous," while providing them with financial support for the overall mission, instantly generates independence from government. This misconception partly explains a paradox of the policy: by assuming that funding for their mission will be sufficient to guarantee the organizations' autonomy of action, it ignores the structural constraints to which

they are subject. As will be seen in the following lines, this paradox is embodied as much in the formulation as in the implementation of the policy.

On the one hand, although the text of the policy acknowledges the specificity of autonomous COs, this recognition was initially made without incorporating the specific demands of ACA. Indeed, White (2012b) demonstrated how, throughout the formulation of the policy, the ACA movement had to continually fight against the instrumentalization of autonomous COs by the government. Thus, it appears that government recognition is limited to the use of a label rather than the actual acceptance of distinct principles and modes of operation of ACA. On the other hand, according to Garon's (2015) study, most of the funding provided to organizations in the immigration sector is characterized by service agreements (502). These funding arrangements contradict the overall approach of the policy favouring mission-based funding, instead reinforcing a form of contractual relationship (Bourque 2004, 9 as cited in René 2009, 117). In addition, with respect to the imbalance in the distribution of power discussed above, the government is able to exercise discretion over the distribution of funds. For example, the PRSCA text repeatedly states that the commitment to provide funding for the overall mission does not preclude the government from maintaining contractual relationships through agreements for services (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001, 25).

These paradoxes are further reinforced by an uneven implementation of the policy. In this respect, White (2009) highlights the varying application of the PRSCA across government departments by mentioning that "the extent to which the various ministerial programs eventually reflected the dominant ACA discourse found in the policy was highly variable." (20) Indeed, according to the author, "(s) ome have adopted the letter, but not the spirit of the frame of reference, while others clearly rejected both." (White 2009, 21) This finding is also supported by Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau (2017) who contend that, in many cases, the policy is not applied at all (203).

In summary, the paradox that characterizes the PRSCA is that, although autonomous COs have received an official recognition from government, they are anchored in a governance structure that hampers their autonomy of action. As Lachapelle (2007) argues, the actual funding arrangements favour consensual approaches rather than allowing organizations to position themselves as an opposition actor representing the interests of the population (181). The paradox of the PRSCA can therefore be understood as reflecting the difficult conciliation between the ideals of ACA and the strong state interventionism associated with the introduction of NPM principles. Yet, it is not surprising to observe such a contradiction in the policy governing community action in Quebec as the very relationship between government and COs is subject to this same tension.

Conclusion

All along this chapter we have seen how the contemporary relationship between the government and COs in Quebec is characterized by tensions surrounding the two opposing modes of governance to which organizations are subject: ACA and NPM. Through the literature review, it was noted that the Quebec model of public policy has greatly evolved over the years, leading to a reconfiguration of the role of the two actors. Although the legacy of the Quebec model—e.g. the approach involving the participation of civil society in state governance processes—is still recognized as a specificity of the province (Hamel & Jouve 2006), it has been significantly modified by the introduction of a market logic in the management of COs and of government programs (e.g.: Choudry & Shragge 2011 ; Côté & Simard 2012 ; Depelteau, Fortier &

Hébert 2013 ; Fontaine 2013). The combination of organizational forms thus testifies to the difficult compromise resulting from the combination of social-democratic and neo-liberal ideas (Lévesque 2001; Fontan, Klein & Tremblay 2005 ; Bouchard, Bernier & Lévesque 2003 as cited in Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010, 237). Yet, the literature tells us very little about how COs, particularly those active in the integration of newcomers in Quebec, manage in practice to reconcile these two paradigms and negotiate the terms of their relationship with the government. It is to provide an answer to this question that this study will be conducted.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

This chapter lays the theoretical foundation on which the assessment about the type of relationship that exists between the Immigration Department and community organizations (COs) active in the integration of newcomers in Quebec will be made. Given the challenges to community practices raised in the preceding chapter, examining the nature of this relationship will allow to assess whether organizations are able to maintain their autonomy and pursue their primary social mission despite the contemporary neoliberal context. Beyond their role as service providers for the government, it is important to remember the traditional role played by COs in our liberal democracies, which is that of addressing the unequal distribution of resources, filling unmet needs, and providing mechanisms for political expression and advocacy (Edwards, Rosenblum & Lesch 2011). Thus, it is essential to determine whether the relationship they have with the government allows them to maintain their autonomy in the pursuit of their social mission or whether, on the contrary, their activities are merely the reflection of their funders' priorities. One can only imagine how detrimental the consequences of this last option could be, both for the democratic life of COs and for meeting the needs of immigrants.

As seen in the first chapter, the relationship between the two actors largely depends on how COs manage to navigate between the requirements of the government and the specific realities of community action. Thus, determining the nature of their relationship requires taking into consideration the perspective of the actors involved. Considering that COs are subject to two opposing logics of action (Jetté 2011, 64)—e.g. the principles of ACA and those of NPM—it is expected that they will see themselves as somewhere between autonomy and dependence in their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration* (MIFI), while being able to pursue an autonomous social mission. The role of organizations in their relationship with the MIFI in the context of newcomers' integration in Quebec will be determined according to six of the most discussed dimensions of their relationship with the government in the literature: recognition, representation, participation, consultation, funding and accountability. Operationalizing these dimensions according to the two main modes of governance to which the actors in the field are subject will allow to anchor the analysis of the relationship in the reality of Quebec. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, the specificities of the Quebec model require that the analysis be positioned in the distinct context in which it takes place (e.g.: Côté, Lévesque & Morneau 2005; Hamel & Jouve 2006; Lachapelle & Bourque 2020; Vaillancourt 2012; Noel 2015).

Research Questions

The main finding to be drawn from the first chapter is that it is difficult to anticipate the exact nature of the relationship between the MIFI and COs in the integration sector in Quebec. On the one hand, organizations carry a long history of collaboration with the Quebec state in governance processes (e.g.: Côté & Simard 2012, Hamel & Jouve 2006, Jetté 2011, Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010, Lachapelle & Bourque 2020, Vaillancourt 2012) and have received a formal recognition of their contribution as a source of social innovation through the Policy on the Recognition and Support of Community Action—PRSCA (e.g.: Laforest & Phillips 2001, White 2012b). On the other hand, the introduction of NPM principles in the management of public services and its related organizations eroded the practices of the community sector by subordinating it to a market logic (e.g.: Choudry & Shragge 2011 ; Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013 ; Jetté 2011, Lachapelle 2007). While it remains difficult to evaluate the exact extent

of its consequences, analysts contend that this shift had the effect of weakening organizations' autonomy. Furthermore, the difficulty to predict the nature of the relationship between the Quebec Immigration Department and COs is exacerbated by the application of the PRSCA. Although the policy explicitly protects the autonomy of COs in addition to ensuring them funding for the pursuit of their overall mission, the power asymmetry between the two organizations reinforces the dependence of COs on government (Fontaine 2013). This paradox in which organizations evolve prevents them from fully exercising their autonomy, not to mention the disparate implementation of the policy across departments (Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau 2017, White 2009).

Considering the uncertainties related to the opposing modes of governance that frame the actions of COs and the paradox surrounding their quest for autonomy, the question arises as to "how do organizations manage to give meaning and form to their actions?" (Fontaine 2013, 216). More specifically, it remains to be seen whether and how organizations manage to negotiate the terms of the pursuit of their social mission, in combination with their role as service providers for government, in the precise context of service delivery for newcomers in Quebec. An approach centered on community actors will thus make it possible to account for the perspectives of the organizations involved in the relationship with respect to their vision of governance and the importance they attach to maintaining their autonomy. It is not excluded, as René (2009) contends that many stakeholders may not understand the place that collective action should occupy in COs, nor the importance of democratic ownership (115).

As such, this research project will seek to understand how COs active in the delivery of integration services in Quebec perceive and experience their relationship with the MIFI. Given the findings that organizations may come to adopt the government's action framework, the first step of this research project will consist of understanding COs' perceptions of their relationship with the Quebec Immigration Department. Then, a second research question will aim to qualify the extent to which COs are able to exercise their social mission, despite the agreements signed with the government. Therefore, this research will seek to answer the following two questions:

1. Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services perceive themselves as service providers or as autonomous partners in their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration*?
2. Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services pursue an autonomous social mission?

Theoretical Framework

Attention to the topic of the relationship between the state and the third sector gained worldwide importance following the rise of governance as a paradigm as well as due to the increasing decentralization of service provision and the conclusion of partnerships between the two actors (Brinkerhoff 2002). As a consequence, there is an abundant body of literature on the topic of qualifying the relationship between government and non-government organizations. In order to better understand the complex nature of this relationship, authors developed a variety of typologies (e.g.: Brinkerhoff 2002; Coston 1998; Bebbington & Farrington 1993; Green and Matthias 1997; Maxwell and Riddell 1998; McLoughlin 2011; Najam 2000). This allowed to structure the analysis of the different possible types of relationships by providing a framework to help conceptualizing the interaction between government and non-government organizations (Najam 2000, 379; Savard, Harvey & Tremblay 2008, 569).

The broader literature on the typology of the relationship between government and non-government organizations, however, hardly captures the specificities of the Quebec context. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Quebec model is recognized as being distinctive in large part because of the special place accorded to COs in governance, as well as for its combination of social-democratic and neoliberal ideas (e.g.: Dufour & Montigny 2020, 12; Jetté 2011; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Noel & Martin 2002; Vaillancourt 2011). Most importantly, the Policy on the Recognition and Support of Community Action (PSRCA) formalized the demands of the ACA movement through the recognition of specific criteria for the autonomy of COs and a type of funding specifically designed to preserve it. This institutional arrangement which, as White (2012b) argues, is unique in the world (90), provides organizations with state financial support specifically dedicated to their role of challenging public policies (White et al., 1992; Lamoureux 1994; Jetté 2008 as cited in Dufour & Montigny 2020, 11). Thus, the formal recognition of the ACA movement and its related characteristics is such a force in Quebec civil society that we cannot afford to ignore it in qualifying the relationship between the MIFI and immigrant integration organizations. In addition, given the broader context in which the variety of typologies were developed, many of the types of relationship put forward by the authors simply do not correspond to the Quebec model of governance in which a large place is allocated to civil society organizations. Their scope is thus limited, since relationship types such as "repression" (Coston 1998), "confrontation" (Najam 2000) or "competition" (Green and Matthias 1997 in Ullah et al. 2006 as cited in McLoughlin 2011, 243) are simply unlikely to exist in the Quebec context. Therefore, the need to anchor the analysis in the reality of Quebec calls for the use of a framework that will allow to identify the specific characteristics of the relationship between the Immigration Department and COs in the immigrant integration sector in the context of the Quebec governance model.

In the absence of a typology specific to Quebec to characterize the relationship under study, this research project will be based on an operationalization of the two opposing modes of governance identified in the literature: autonomous community action (ACA) and New Public Management (NPM). The use of ACA—a movement specific to the Quebec community network—will allow for the capture of the reality of the Quebec community sector. An engagement with NPM, will allow the analysis to be based on a framework that has been the subject of numerous studies in the field, both theoretical and empirical.

In this synthesis-based framework, the types of relationship resulting from a strict application of the principles of ACA and NPM will represent two ideal types for conceptualizing the "extreme cases" of the relationship, namely autonomy and dependence. According to the literature, a full application of ACA principles would allow organizations to pursue their own mission of social transformation and emancipation in a completely autonomous manner, e.g. without any influence from funders on their orientations, approaches, practices, political actions and management modes (e.g.: Leclerc 2018 ; Métivier 2017 ; Parazelli 1995 ; St-Germain, Grenier, Bourque & Pelland 2017). This autonomous relationship allows them to put forward an alternative service offer that is not limited to the mere provision of government services, unlike organizations whose relationship with the government is characterized by dependence. The pure application of NPM principles, in a utilitarian vision that instrumentalizes COs through the conclusion of contracts, limits the role of organizations to the provision of services for the government (Choudry & Shragge 2011 ; Côté & Simard 2012 ; Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013 ; Fontaine 2013).

Theoretical Expectations

In practice, it is not expected to observe either of these two ideal types of relationships between the MIFI and COs active in the integration of newcomers in Quebec. It would be utopian to expect a perfectly dependent relationship given the history of COs in the province. With the recognition that COs enjoy from the Quebec government and their ongoing fight for autonomy, it is unlikely that the relationship would be characterized solely by COs' dependence on the government. As Hamel & Jouve (2006) argue, this would amount to calling into question part of Quebec's collective identity. On the other hand, it is also clear that "NPM prompted a re-evaluation of the institutional compromises that led historically to the deployment of social innovations generated by community practices." (Jetté 2011, 62) Thus, the weakening of the fundamental elements of the Quebec model of social policy sets the expectation that it would also be utopian to observe a perfectly autonomous relationship between COs and the government. The imbalance of power between the two actors implies that COs are necessarily constrained by government's modes of action financially, structurally, in terms of accountability, etc. (Fontaine 2013). In addition, many authors argue that, notwithstanding their pursuit of the ideal of autonomy, COs still seek recognition by the state as key actors in the public sphere (Ibid.). Hence, the expectation is that COs active in the delivery of integration services in Quebec will perceive their relationship with the MIFI as standing somewhere in-between autonomy and dependence.

Furthermore, given the various types of COs, it is expected that the degree of autonomy/dependence will vary accordingly. Indeed, organizations differ in terms of the funding they receive, the size of their organization, their service offer, but also in terms of the mission and values they pursue. Therefore, using this synthesis-based framework, we expect that the answer to our first research question will be that COs have different perceptions of their relationship with the MIFI, varying in the degree of autonomy and dependance. We also expect that our answer to our second question will be that, while not being entirely autonomous from the government because of the service agreements between them, the pursuit of an autonomous social mission remains at the heart of COs' activities.

Operationalization

The two modes of governance will be operationalized through six dimensions drawn from the literature on the relationship between government and COs in Quebec: recognition, representation, consultation, participation, funding and accountability. They constitute the organizing themes on which the analysis of the relationship between the two actors in the province focuses. First, "recognition" is drawn from studies dealing with the place of civil society actors – often referred to as the third sector or the community sector in the present case – in the governance structure, that is, the sharing of responsibilities between the state and other sectors of society. They include, among others, those of Rachel Laforest, Deena White, Annie Fontaine, Christian Jetté, Michel Parazelli and Yves Vaillancourt. Second, in relation to the dimensions of "representation" and "participation", we rely on studies on the place given to the representation and participation of citizens in liberal democracies. Starting from the premise that the legitimacy of liberal democracies lies in representing and serving the interests of the electorate (Hamel & Jouve 2006, 8), this research stream addresses the issues of the exercise of citizenship and the participation of civil society in decision-making, particularly in the neoliberal era. In the Quebec literature, this includes the study of Noel & Martin (2002), the collective work of Côté, Lévesque & Morneau (2009), as well as the studies of these same three authors addressing the evolution of citizen participation

modes in the Quebec model. The research that led to the writing of the book by Hamel & Jouve (2006) entitled “Un modèle québécois? Gouvernance et participation dans la gestion publique” is also part of this theme. As for the “consultation” dimension, although it can be understood as a variation between representation and participation, it is presented in the literature as a distinctive characteristic on which the Quebec model is based (Klein et al., 2014 as cited in Lachapelle & Bourque 2020, 115), which explains why it is treated separately. Among the studies on Quebec’s consultation mechanisms are those by Laforest (2000) and Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau (2018) in which consultation is presented as a means of involving organizations in governance processes. Fourth, the “funding” dimension encompasses studies on the evolution of funding arrangements, including criteria for its obtention and its impacts on organizations. Studies by Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013), Métivier (2019) and Côté & Simard (2012) precisely target this dimension. Finally, “accountability” refers to studies on how organizations report on their actions. Often discussed as a dimension related to funding, particularly from a “good governance” perspective, studies such as those of St-Germain, Grenier, Bourque & Pelland (2017), Choudry & Shragge (2011), and Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013) focus on how accountability measures structure organizations’ activities.

The choice to include multiple dimensions in order to structure the analysis is based on the desire to establish a synthesis-based framework that is encompassing. Although each of these six dimensions is equally important in characterizing the relationship, studies on the neoliberal shift in Quebec and the impact of the imposition of NPM measures on COs tend to focus more on the contractual aspects of the relationship, i.e., funding arrangements and accountability measures (e.g.: Côté & Simard 2012; Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013; Jetté 2011; Métivier 2017; Orsini 2006; René 2009). In contrast, research on COs’ autonomy places greater emphasis on the dimensions of the relationship related to shared governance, i.e., recognition, representation, participation and consultation (e.g.: Fontaine 2013; Laforest & Phillips 2001; Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau 2018; White 2012b). We do not claim that studies with a primary concern for COs’ autonomy ignore their funding and accountability arrangements, and vice versa for research on NPM. On the contrary, it is a matter of recognizing that the focus of the analysis varies according to the perspective adopted, without denying the potential interaction between the different dimensions of the relationship. This is the bias that this research project will attempt to avoid by operationalizing all six dimensions according to the two modes of governance to which organizations are subject. By building bridges between the two literatures, this approach will allow us to qualify the relationship based on indicators of all six dimensions and to take into account the different positions that organizations may occupy with respect to the various aspects of their relationship with the MIFI. The nature of the relationship will therefore be assessed in terms of the correspondence between the organizations' experiences and the indicators – discussed in the following sections – of the two ideal-types of relationships (see Appendix A).

The difference in the emphasis on the contractual dimensions of the relationship versus those related to shared governance can be compared to the distinction made between hard and soft processes. These concepts originating from the field of international relations (Nye 1990) respectively designate constraining economic and military measures (hard power) and the use of diplomacy and culture as means of convincing (soft power). When applied to the study of governance, hard processes refer to “(...) the imposition by government of constraining technical arrangements and rules, such as contracting and funding frameworks, accountability procedures and other formal parameters that, in various ways, limit the autonomy of [COs] by means of

hierarchical control." (White 2012a, 204). On the other hand, soft processes refer to "[…] the extent to which governments consider and respect [COs]' positions, as well as the extent to which they are willing to accept challenges to their own positions." (White 2012a, 204)

The analogy can thus be made between funding and accountability as markers of hard processes, and recognition, representation, consultation and participation as manifestations of soft processes. The point of this analogy lies in the influence that both hard and soft processes can exercise on the relationship, even though studies tend to focus on hard processes (North 2000 as cited in White 2012a, 204). On the one hand, studies such as White's (2012b) have successfully demonstrated how the fight for the recognition of COs can influence their relationship with the government by the adoption of funding arrangements securing the organizations' autonomy. This is also the argument of all authors who contend that the recognition of the practices specific to the community sector, including social innovation and advocacy, has shaped the contours of the partnership between COs and the state (e.g.: Jetté 2011; Dufour & Montigny 2020; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010) On the other hand, because of their constraining nature and the asymmetry of power between the two actors discussed in the first chapter, the dimensions of funding and accountability are identified as exerting a strong influence on the relationship between the government and COs. In this regard, many authors have shown how funding arrangements and accountability measures aligned with NPM may constrain organizations in their relationship with the government and prevent them from carrying out their social mission (e.g.: Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013). Thus, while all six dimensions all have the potential to influence the relationship and even interact with each other, funding and accountability may be expected to have a greater influence on the relationship given their constraining nature.

However, it is important to remember that the purpose of this research is to qualitatively characterize the relationship between government and COs along these dimensions, and not to test for the relative influence of each dimension. Thus, although we can expect, based on the literature, that some dimensions may exert a greater influence than others and that there can be a form of interdependence between them, this question is beyond the scope of this study. The relationship between the dimensions will thus remain a limitation of this research since the objective is primarily to qualify the little-known relationship between the MIFI and COs in the immigrant integration sector in Quebec. Herein lies the importance of gathering the perspective of the actors involved in the relationship, i.e., in order to develop a better understanding of how the dimensions of the relationship unfold in practice, and especially of how they are experienced by those concerned.

In the following lines, a definition of each dimension derived from the literature will be given and operationalized in relation to the two ideal types of relationship, namely autonomy—represented by the principles of ACA—and dependence—represented by the principles of NPM.

Recognition.

Recognition refers to the legitimization of the role devoted to the community sector and depends on how rights, responsibilities, and access to political power are defined in society (Laforest & Phillips 2001, 39). Laforest & Phillips explain that the definition of the role of COs is influenced by two factors: 1—The attitude of the state, which influences the legitimacy of organizations and claims recognized in the political process 2—The way in which the community sector defines its own identity (40). In this respect, authors contend that the definition of the role of organizations is closely linked to the citizenship regime in place in a national context

(e.g.: Laforest & Phillips 2001; White 2001)—e.g. pathways between citizens and institutions through which social rights are defined, designed and distributed (White 2001, 29).

For autonomous COs, the recognition of their autonomy is at the heart their preoccupations. The mobilization of the ACA movement contributed to their legitimization as representatives of the interests of the civil society in the political decision-making process (Laforest & Phillips 2001, 54). As a result, the formal recognition of the specific and distinct identity of autonomous COs—including the pursuit of their own missions through alternative modes of service delivery based on citizen participation (Côté & Simard 2012; Jetté 2011)—has been institutionalized in the policy governing their relationship with the Quebec government (e.g.: Fontaine 2013; Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau 2017; White 2012b). For the ACA movement, the concept of recognition also has another dimension, namely that of the beneficiaries of community action. This aspect is illustrated by Fontaine (2013) when explaining that autonomous COs aspire to the recognition of the existence and dignity of those who are less favoured by the social order (208).

Conversely, in a relationship characterized by COs' dependence on government, the recognition of organizations is based on their utilitarian purpose, that is on their expertise as service providers (Côté & Simard 2012, 109). COs are thus expected to provide services through a subcontracting relationship, devoid of any mobilization or advocacy for social change (Choudry & Shragge 2011, 510). As "partners" of the state, their recognition rests entirely on their legitimization by the government, which is why authors refer to it as a "state-conferred legitimacy" (Côté & Simard 2012, 108). Given that service provider organizations do not enjoy the recognition of an identity distinct from that of their funder, Côté & Simard (2012) argue that "[the] Quebec government has created new nonprofit agencies entrusted with government mandates." (115)

Representation.

Representation refers to the means by which the needs and interests of the population are transmitted to the state. According to Laforest & Phillips (2001), the community sector acts as an intermediary that provides an organizational structure for a form of citizen representation and serves as a conduit to the government for their concerns (40). In the literature, the distinction is often made between representative democracy and participative democracy (e.g.: Noel & Martin 2002; Hamel & Jouve 2006; Côté & Lévesque 2009). While representative democracy is said to be the cornerstone of modern democracies by allowing the exercise of the people's sovereignty based on the law of the majority and the recognition of citizens as free and equal (Côté & Lévesque 2009, 45), the authors also point out its limitations. As White (2009) argues, representative democracy may be less likely to promote social justice when the plurality of actors is poorly represented or when their representation is insufficient to have the necessary political power to orient public policy (3).

The representation role of autonomous COs relies on their social advocacy mission by which they voice the needs of the populations they serve (Fontaine 2013). Autonomous COs are recognized for standing as a political opposition defending the needs of those in lack of representation and for objecting political decisions that would go against the interests of their beneficiaries (Parazelli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017; Fontaine 2013; Côté & Lévesque 2009). Their representation role is therefore based on the ethical ideal of social responsibility, which is to create the capacity, especially for marginalized citizens, to democratically combat shared social problems and to increase their power over the decisions that affect their lives (Côté & Simard 2012, 76). In other words, the role of autonomous COs in representing the needs of populations implies the

government's acceptance to share its vision and negotiate public policies with the beneficiaries of community action (Parazellli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017).

In a relationship in which COs serve as service providers for the government, their role is that of representing the needs of their "clients" with a view to promoting their individual responsibility (Choudry & Shragge 2011; Côté & Simard 2012). In this context, as Vatz-Laaroussi & Charbonneau (2001) contend, the responsibility for integration rests almost entirely on immigrants alone. Furthermore, the formulation of population's needs is based on the expertise of community workers who are hired as professionals to represent their organizations at negotiating tables with the government (René 2009). Indeed, the hierarchy that results from the professionalization of the community sector under NPM valorizes academic and professionalized knowledge, and tend to subordinate or silence other forms of knowledge emerging from the field (Choudry & Shragge 2011, 507). This led Côté & Simard (2012) to contend that COs are lulled into the illusion that they are defending the interests of the less privileged, whereas in practice there is an erosion of democratic practices within organizations (120).

Participation.

Participation includes "all forms of politically relevant mobilization as well as the effective translation of citizens' demands into the political process via institutional channels such as political parties." (Huber et al 1997, 326 as cited in White 2009, 3) The concept of "effective translation" is important in this definition as the ability of COs to channel the transfer of ideas to governing officials constitutes a test of effective participative democracy (White 2009). In this study, an important distinction will be made between the participation of COs in the implementation versus in the formulation of integration policies for newcomers. Authors contend that the participation of COs in the design of public policies, and not only in their implementation, contributes to a process of "co-construction" whereby policies are defined jointly by government and civil society (Vaillancourt 2016). Thus, "co-construction" is defined as a process promoting the consideration of the concerns and demands of populations in the development of social policies and programs, as well as in the orientation and implementation of intervention practices that concern them (Jetté 2008; Clément 2009 as cited in Fontaine 2013, 208). Moreover, it is important not to confuse inclusive citizen participation with a form of participation reserved exclusively for "professionals" in the field. With the professionalization of COs, the expertise of managers is increasingly solicited to the detriment of that of community workers (Orsini 2006; Parazelli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017).

For the ACA movement, citizen participation should first and foremost promote the participation of beneficiaries in both the implementation and formulation of public policies (Parazelli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017). Indeed, the principles of transparency and direct democracy are at the heart of the organizational culture of autonomous COs (Côté & Simard 2012, 108). These organizations seek to materialize their participation as a form of political opposition that allows their beneficiaries to formulate their own problems and solutions (White 2009, 15). As Fontaine (2013) mentions, the fulfillment of a direct and extended form of democracy relies on the capacity of citizens to participate to the definition of public services and the associative life of COs, thus reducing hierarchical relationships and dynamizing the space for deliberation and decision-making (212). However, the promotion of COs as areas of deliberation and social innovation (Jetté 2011; Côté & Simard 2012; Fontaine 2013) also requires that the government recognizes their contribution to the common good by preserving their autonomy (Côté & Lévesque 2009, 51).

In a relationship characterized by the dependence of COs on government, their participation is intrinsically linked to their mandate of service providers for the state (Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau 2017). In other words, COs are seen as mere implementers of public services undertaking the economic objectives of the government (Côté & Simard 2012, 117; White 2009, 17; White 2012a, 204). Consequently, their participation is limited to the implementation process, as social actors are often instrumentalized and programs are designed by people outside the community sector (Parazelli et al. 2003, 108 as cited in Fontaine 2013, 210). As Côté & Lévesque (2009) put it, when they are not simply recognized as users, clients or consumers, citizens are seen as stakeholders who can only intervene in the production and delivery of services (20). In this regard, White (2009) argues that the kind of participation that is sought is one based on the concerted action of COs with the government, as opposed to a "contentious" collaboration that challenges the government's vision.

Consultation.

In terms of consultation, the literature distinguishes two main streams of research. The first refers to consultations as an aid to political decision-making, e.g. as an instrument at the service of the government whose value lies solely in its ability to reach a compromise (Laforest 2000, 28). As a process of consultation initiated by the government, this first conception is also referred to as the top-down approach (Choudry & Shragge 2011, 505) since the government first formulates policies on its own, and then consults COs to obtain their input. In the second stream of the literature, consultations are understood as a democratic exercise putting the emphasis on the political and social dimensions of the process (Laforest 2000, 28). This second conception, also referred to as the bottom-up approach, is understood as a negotiating process by which the parties recognize each other as authors and actors, oblige each other to exchange their contradictory points of view, seek satisfactory joint solutions and bind themselves to respect the agreements reached (Larose 2009, 154).

In a relationship of autonomy, the bottom-up approach is favoured in the sense that consultations primarily concern the beneficiaries of the policies (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013). Through this process, the needs of the population are being defined by the community itself, and then translated to the government. As Fontaine (2013) explains, for the ACA movement, it is important to involve individuals in the debates surrounding the processes of defining problems, analyzing causes, and defining needs and solutions in order to collectively negotiate the norms of social existence (210). In this sense, the role of COs relies in providing consultation venues that encourage collective decision-making based on the participation of their beneficiaries (Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau 2018).

Conversely, in a relationship of dependence, consultations follow a top-down approach in that they are primarily initiated by the government and participants are often limited to COs' board-of-director members (Côté & Simard 2012, 121; Choudry & Shragge 2011, 504). As Côté & Simard (2012) highlight, in this approach, the representation of the "clients" by organizations serves more as a means of legitimizing public policies than as a way of surveying the populations concerned (112). In addition, authors contend that government relies on a tradition of consultation by which it seeks to build a consensus in pursuit of common goals. Thus, organizations tend to mimic government practices, abandoning the culture of social movement (Choudry & Shragge 2011; White 2009, 15; Côté & Simard 2012, 117). As a result of this top-down logic of consultation, "[…] the issues put on the table of consultation committees do not necessarily correspond to the different interests or approaches of all the community organizations."

(Gonzales Castillo 2015, 174). Therefore, in a relationship in which COs act as service providers for the state, differences in the issues of the populations they serve are set aside (Chiasson & Koji 2011) in favour of a centralized approach focused on service excellence to "clients" (Fontaine 2013; Choudry & Shragge 2011).

Funding.

Funding arrangements include the different modalities by which COs receive financial support and the constraints related to it (e.g.: objective, duration, frequency, amount, eligibility criteria, etc.). As stated in the PRSCA, the type of funding may have a significant impact on the nature of the relationship between government and COs, and can be critical to the ability of COs to maintain their autonomy (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001, 26). In this respect, Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013) argue that the terms and conditions of funding for COs can guarantee their autonomy, just as they can serve to coerce them to the point of distorting them (13). Côté & Simard (2012) also highlight how funding practices may affect the organizational culture of COs as "[when] a group receives funding, it then integrates the ideological content of the project for which it was mandated by government." (117) Considering that COs in Quebec are primarily funded by the government (White 2009), the present research will look at funding arrangements in terms of the financial support provided by the Immigration Department. Thus, the PRSCA provides for three different types of funding, that is for the overall mission of organizations, for services that complement public services, and for special initiatives, and one-time/short-term projects (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001). However, it is important to note that the policy does not prevent COs from receiving funding from other sources (e.g. private donors).

In view of the search for autonomy of COs belonging to the ACA movement, the method of funding that is advocated for is that which supports its overall mission. According to the PRSCA, this funding arrangement should constitute a preponderant part of the overall funding as to protect the crucial role of autonomous COs and to facilitate the maintain a safe distance with the state (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001, 11). Moreover, in the eyes of Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013), this type of funding is in itself a recognition of the particularities of the community sector's environment (19). Indeed, funding in support of the overall mission is conducive to the development of the autonomy of COs since it financially supports organizations specifically for the purpose of pursuing their social mission of change (Evans & Shields 2014, 124 as cited in Bushell & Shields 2018, 25). In addition, this type of funding is renewed on a regular basis, which provides stability in the long-term planning of the activities of COs by ensuring them secure funding (Choudry & Shragge 2011).

In a relationship characterized by the dependence of COs on the government, funding for service agreements is favoured since it is part of the increased devolution of the state and allows the government to adjust funding according to its own priorities (Côté & Simard 2012, 117). As mentioned by Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013), the official recognition of COs in Quebec does not necessarily come with a guarantee of financial sustainability (13). Rather, the allocation of funds to service provider organizations reinforces a contractual form of relationship between the government and COs (Bourque 2004, 9 as cited in René 2009, 117). The contracting of services is further reinforced by the PRSCA that, in addition to funding for the overall mission, also formalized one-time funding and service agreements. According to Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013), this marked the advance of a representation of the community sector inspired by market

dynamics (19). Therefore, the imposition of this funding logic on organizations implies a growing dependence of COs on public grants and project funding (Côté & Simard 2012; Jetté 2011).

Accountability.

The policy (PRSCA) defines the concept of accountability as follows:

> Accountability is the process whereby a community organization gives itself the tools it needs to openly answer questions from interested parties while respecting the confidentiality of personal files. This means that information on the missions, orientations, goals and activities made possible through public funds must be available and accessible. This information must also show that community organization administrators have acted responsibly in performing their duties. (Secrétariat à l'action communautaire autonome 2001, 36)

Despite the fact that many authors note an increase in accountability as an instrument of control towards funders (e.g.: Choudry & Shragge 2011 ; Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013 ; Vaillancourt 2018), not all organizations share this upwardly oriented vision of accountability. Indeed, the bottom-up approach advocated by the community sector, and in particular by autonomous COs, rather conceives accountability as a form of obligation to the community (e.g.: Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013, 21 ; St-Germain, Grenier, Bourque & Pelland 2017, 106).

A founding principle of autonomous COs is that their accountability is directed to the members of the community in which they operate (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013, 21). From this perspective, accountability measures for autonomous COs must require a minimum of reporting, while respecting the organizations' methods (Jetté 2011) and being based on a qualitative evaluation of the services rendered (Métivier 2017, 189). Indeed, the complex nature of community practices relies on flexibility and adaptability, two concepts that should be built into the accountability process (Fontan et Lachance, 2005 ; Zuniga, 1994 as cited in St-Germain, Grenier, Bourque & Pelland 2017, 106) In practice, this means that autonomous organizations are evaluated according to the extent to which they meet the needs of the populations they serve through collective and democratic modes of action (René 2009).

On the contrary, in a relationship in which COs depend on government, accountability measures are exclusively tied to their role as service providers, rather than being directed toward the beneficiaries of community action (Fontaine 2013). As Choudry & Shragge (2011) mention, "Professionalization' tends to lead to formal rules for practice with common forms of governance and similar expectations for formal accountability upwards to funders." (508) In this perspective, the accountability of COs is measured by government's imposition of standards and controls specific to the private sector inspired by a market logic (Côté & Simard 2012, 111–112). Based on "sound governance", the recourse to these principles induces the use of evaluation criteria that invoke economic efficiency through the achievement of measurable objectives, quality assurance mechanisms and a tight control over resource allocation (Depelteau, Fortier, Hébert 2013).

Conclusion

The observations drawn from the first chapter led us to build the analysis on a theoretical framework that allows to take into consideration the specific characteristics of the relationship between government and COs in the Quebec context. Indeed, since the community sector in Quebec is subject to a hybrid form of governance combining the principles of ACA and NPM (e.g.:

Jetté 2011; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Noel & Martin 2002; Vaillancourt 2011), these two opposing modes of action have been operationalized through the recognition, representation, participation, consultation, funding and accountability of organizations. The operationalization of these modes of governance thus made it possible to define the characteristics specific to each of the ideal types of relationship—e.g. autonomy and dependence—and serves as a gauge for defining the relationship between the Quebec Immigration Department and COs in the context of the integration of immigrants in the province. To the research question of if COs perceive themselves as service providers or as autonomous partners in their relationship with the MIFI, the answer is expected to be situated between autonomy and dependence, depending on the different types of organizations. Regarding the pursuit of an autonomous social mission, it is expected to remain at the heart of COs' activities, despite their reliance on the Immigration Department for funding. The subjective nature of organizations' perceptions of their relationship with the MIFI therefore requires taking into account the actors' perspective, which will be discussed in the next chapter on methodology.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Given the objective of this research to gather the perspective of community organizations' (COs) leaders regarding their relationship with the Quebec Immigration Department, the collection and analysis of data relied on a qualitative methodology. Indeed, qualitative methods present the advantage of being able to reveal the meaning and interpretation of experiences from the perspective of research participants (Chantler 2014; Durand 2014; Gallagher 2013). More specifically, data collection was based on semi-structured interviews with COs' leaders at the head of organizations receiving funding from the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration* (MIFI), located in Montreal and having the integration of newcomers as their core activity. The conduct of the interviews was guided by the six dimensions of the relationship between government and COs in Quebec discussed in chapter 2. A total of ten interviews were conducted and transcribed to facilitate their coding and analysis through a deductive approach based on the application of our thematic framework. In the following lines, the methodology will be described in more details by highlighting how it corresponds to the research objectives, while acknowledging its limitations.

Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Traditions

The principle underlying the choice of a research methodology should always be its correspondence to the research questions and objectives in order to reflect the purpose of the analysis and its intended outcome (Goodrick & Rogers 2015, 588). This should therefore lead researchers to guide their choice of research method by the principle of the best possible match between the research objectives and the respective characteristics of each research tradition, namely quantitative and qualitative.

In this regard, many authors contend that the divide that characterizes the debate between quantitative and qualitative methods is artificial, since what distinguishes the two is rather the pursuit of a different objective (Durand 2014, 10). Indeed, while qualitative methods are more apt to reveal the "meaning" of experience for individuals, often referred to as "depth over breadth", quantitative methods are, on the other hand, better suited for purposes such as the discovery of causal relationships and the generalization of phenomena (Durand 2014, 9; Gallagher 2013, 181). However, authors caution researchers against defining qualitative methods exclusively in comparison to quantitative ones. In fact, this runs the risk of attributing characteristics to qualitative methods solely on the basis of what quantitative methods *are not* (Bryman 2012). It is thus important to consider that qualitative methods are not only the opposite or the complement of quantitative methods but are also and above all a method in their own right.

Considering the objective of the present research project, which is to gather the views of COs leaders on their role in their relationship with the Immigration Department of Quebec, qualitative methods were used for the collection of data and its analysis. Indeed, qualitative methods present many advantages related to the purposes of this research and allowed for the collection of relevant data on the relationship at stake, from the point of view of COs themselves.

First, one of the strengths of qualitative methods is that they allow for a flexible structure (Lynch 2013, 33; Bryman 2012, 404). Given that the perspective of research participants is at the forefront of the analysis, these methods provide some flexibility to adjust the collection of data to what appears as the most relevant to the participants (Gallagher 2013). This further allows

researchers to refine the question, generate new concepts, draw on theoretical insights and raise issues of concern (Chantler 2014, 47, 90). Second, these research methods allow for an understanding of participants' experiences in a way that cannot be achieved through surveys (Lynch 2013, 33; Durand 2014, 9). This emphasis on understanding processes through the eyes of those being studied is in fact at the heart of qualitative methods which, by their very nature, seek to interpret social phenomena from the perspective of the people who experience them (Bryman 2012, 401) Third, and probably the most important for this research, Fitzpatrick and Boulton (1994) point out how qualitative methods can be designed to convey the experiences of the population targeted by the policies to policymakers (as cited in Chantler 2014, 44). This is in line with our research objective of knowing whether COs are able to carry out their social mission and effectively translate the needs of immigrant populations to government officials. Finally, through these methods, concepts and theories are grounded in data, which according to many authors, increases the validity of the findings (Bryman 2012, 567).

On this last point, it should be mentioned that not all authors agree on the exclusive role that grounded theory should play in qualitative research as some argue that qualitative data are as well important for testing theories (Bryman 2012, 387). This concern manifest itself in the existence of different models for collecting and analyzing qualitative data. While some qualitative methods are oriented towards deriving theory from data (grounded theory), others instead apply a thematic framework to the data set in order to test the theory. This will be discussed in more detail in the "data analysis" section below.

Semi-Structured Interviews

Among the main methods associated with qualitative research—e.g. ethnography/participant observation, qualitative interviewing, focus groups, language-based approaches, texts and documents (Bryman 2012, 383)—qualitative interviewing, and more precisely semi-structured interviews, was retained as the method of data collection for this research project. This method involves the use of a semi-structured guide in order to explore the way that respondents experience, conceptualize and construct their social worlds (Chantler 2014, 50). Moreover, this method allows to reach a deep knowledge of the way people interpret the world (Chantler 2014, 51). Weiss (1994) supports this finding by arguing that "[i] nterviews allow us to gather information to generate detailed, holistic descriptions, capture varying perspectives, discuss processes, unearth competing interpretations of events, identify the micro-foundations of macro-patterns, and frame hypotheses." (Weiss 1994. 9–11 as cited in Kapiszewski, MacLean and Read 2015, 190) Therefore, considering the objective of this research—characterizing the relationship between the Immigration Department and COs in the context of the delivery of integration services in Quebec—semi-structured interviews were chosen for their ability to capture COs leaders' perspectives of this relationship. The following lines detail the format of these interviews, including the sampling method, the development of the interview guide, as well as the actual conduct of the interviews.

Sampling Framework

Contrary to quantitative research methods in which there is an emphasis on probability (random) sampling, in qualitative and interview research, sampling is most often characterized by a non-random sample (Bryman 2012, 416). Indeed, given the objectives pursued by qualitative interviews, the conduct of the inquiry is most often done on a narrow population of relevant actors

(Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, 90). As Bryman (2012) puts it, qualitative researchers generally want to ensure that they have access to a wide range of people in order to represent the many perspectives relevant to their research questions (416). Therefore, this research project relied on purposive sampling, namely "[…] a form of non-random sampling that involves selecting elements of a population according to specific characteristics deemed relevant to the analysis […]." (Lynch 2013, 41) Bryman (2012) concurs with Lynch, noting that this sampling method seeks to strategically select participants in such a way that they are relevant to the research questions (418).

Sector Profile.

The *Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes* (TCRI), namely the umbrella organization for COs in the Quebec immigrant integration sector, includes more than 160 organizations across the province. Its members are involved in working with all categories of newcomers to Quebec, including refugees, immigrants and non-status people. The activities of member organizations focus on reception and integration, employability, women, youth and their families, protection of asylum seekers and refugees, and regionalization. While not all of its members are funded by the MIFI to provide integration services—some of them have a mission focused exclusively on advocacy—the TCRI provides a good overview of organizations working in the immigration and integration sector in Quebec (Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes 2021). For those who are funded by the Immigration Department to provide integration services, their activities are part of the MIFI's service offer which includes: "assistance in finding housing; information on how to obtain documents, cards and essential permits; settlement and integration support; information on public services; information on opportunities for settling in the regions; full-time and part-time French courses; group session called Premières démarches d'installation (First settlement steps) ; session called Objectif Intégration ; support for special clienteles (youth, women in difficulty, disadvantaged families, etc.); intercultural mediation." (Immigration, Francisation et Intégration Quebec 2021)

Sample.

Departing from the expectation that COs' perception of their relationship with the MIFI varies depending on the different types of organizations active in the delivery of integration services in Quebec, the sample was drawn by purposefully selecting participants using the following criteria:

1. Receiving funding from the Immigration Department of Quebec for the delivery of integration services to immigrants;
2. Being located in Montreal;
3. Having the integration of immigrants as a core activity of the organization.

The first criterion, that is to receive funding from the Immigration Department, was intended to eliminate organizations that have a relationship with the MIFI but do not face the funding constraint. Indeed, since the hypothesis is based on the fact that organizations are constrained in their relationship with the Department, in part because of their dependence on the government for the funding of their activities (e.g. Craig & Manthorpe 1999; North 2000; Beaumont 2003; Casey & Dalton 2006; Phillips 2006 as cited in White 2012, 204; Côté & Simard 2012, 111), it was necessary to eliminate any organization that does not face this kind of

constraint. In order to do so, the list of potential participants was developed based on the list of integration service providers available on the website of the Immigration Department. This repertoire lists all COs delivering integration services financed by the MIFI (Immigration, Francisation et Intégration Quebec 2021). The list of potential participants thus started with 126 COs, after excluding educational and municipal institutions from the initial list of 194 organizations. Indeed, despite their important role in the delivery of integration services for immigrants, public institutions had to be excluded from the analysis. The reason for this exclusion is that these organizations are considered to be part of the public sector, which implies that they may not be subject to the same power dynamics that govern the community sector.

Second, COs were sorted according to the city in which they are located. Considering that most COs active in the delivery of integration services are located in the city of Montreal—40% (Immigration, Francisation et Intégration Quebec 2021), only these have been retained in order to control for regional variation. Once organizations located outside the city of Montreal were removed from the list, 39 potential participants remained.

From these 39, any organization that does not have the integration of newcomers as its core activity was also discarded from the list of potential participants since it is not representative of the target population. Indeed, the purpose of the present research is to investigate the political relationship surrounding integration policies in Quebec in the context where the Immigration Department relies on COs for their implementation. Thus, organizations that do not have the integration of immigrants as their primary mission are of less interest, since they are embedded in a larger network that may influence the conduct of their activities. In order to do so, each website of these 39 organizations were visited to validate, based on the organization's mandate statement, whether it was eligible for an interview for this research. For instance, the *Centre de la communauté sourde du Montréal Métropolitain* is financed by the MIFI to offer francization courses on a part-time basis but its mandate is mainly focused on services to deaf people in the community in general and not specifically to newcomers. Thus, after applying this criterion, only 24 potential participants remained.

Given the different funding arrangements for COs in Quebec, the list of potential participants was organized as follows in order to provide an initial scan of the diversity of funding methods and amounts for the 24 organizations retained:

1. Those who receive funding for the provision of public services *(Programnme mobilisation diversité* — PMD — *Programme réussir l'intégration* — PRINT — *Programme d'intégration linguistique pour les immigrants* —PILI);
2. Those who receive funding for the provision of public services, in addition to funding in support of the overall mission (Programme soutien à la mission —PSM);

Although this data is available on the website of the Quebec National Assembly through the documents related to the examination of the 2019–2020 estimates of expenditure (Immigration, Diversité et Inclusion Quebec 2019), the information was revalidated with each participant at the beginning of the interviews. In this regard, it is interesting to note that none of the organization on the list receives funding solely to support its overall mission. Indeed, this funding arrangement is always tied to one of the programs funding the provision of public services. Thus, from these 24 organizations, half (12) fall under the first criterion, while the other half receive funding from both types.

Given the particular context in which the research took place, namely the COVID-19 pandemic, and the potential for a low response rate, all 24 organizations have been contacted after obtaining ethical clearance from Concordia University. A first recruitment email was sent to those 24 potential participants stating the approach, the research objectives and the type of participation sought (see Appendix C for the model recruitment email). Then, a second reminder email was sent 3 weeks after the first email to all organizations' leaders that had not responded to the first invitation. Email addresses were obtained from the organizations' websites, targeting the email of the Director general (DG). When necessary, calls were also made to the organizations in cases where the DG's email address was not available directly from their website. Participants who favourably answered (10) were invited to an interview via the Zoom platform.

Regarding the sample size, the criterion that is often put forward by authors is that of reaching the saturation point (e.g.: Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, 91). Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) define this threshold as the point at which each new interview reveals no new relevant information (cited in Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, 91). However, the authors also mention that not all researchers may adopt this strategy, depending on the purpose and goals of the research. Considering the time and resources allocated to the present research (master's thesis), the targeted number of interviews was set at 10, which was reached after the second round of emails. Indeed, 10 organizations accepted the invitation and participated in the interview, 1 accepted but could not participate for personal reasons, 1 declined the offer, and 12 organizations never responded to the two emails sent to them.

Interview Design

The development of a topic guide is a key aspect of the preparation that precedes the interviews. Indeed, it should be designed to include all the main points to be covered during the interview so that the essential elements (data) that can provide answers to the research questions can be generated (Chantler 2014, 55). However, in qualitative interviews, the pre-defined topic guide should not be seen as a rigid tool to be followed step-by-step. Rather, it should be seen as a flexible tool that guides the conversation, while remaining open to prompt more information, or even change direction when necessary. In this regard, Adams (2015) emphasizes that no matter how extensive the preparation of the interview guide, it should always be considered an ongoing work (499). Another consideration when writing the guide is the importance of maximizing neutrality and minimizing leading questions to avoid influencing the participants' responses (Martin 2013,117).

As part of this research project, questions were therefore formulated based on the six dimensions of the relationship between government and COs in Quebec, e.g. recognition, representation, participation, consultation, funding and accountability. These dimensions were operationalized through the indicators described in the previous chapter (see chapter 2 for more details). Thus, "recognition" was measured by the legitimacy accorded to COs, "representation" by their role in the representation mechanisms in which they take part (e.g.: consultation tables), "participation" by their involvement in the formulation and implementation of integration policies, "consultation" by the type of consultation in which they participate (top-down/bottom-up), "funding" by the type of funding agreement they benefit from, and "accountability" by the kinds of measures to which they respond. For the detailed version of the interview guide, please refer to Appendix B.

With respect to the conduct of the interviews, ethical approval was granted by Concordia College of Ethics Reviewers on May 3rd, 2020 and amended on July 30th, 2020 to move to online rather than face-to-face interviews, given the circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. For each CO that agreed to participate in the interview, a fact sheet was developed based on the content available on the organization's website to avoid asking questions about information already available. Informed consent was sought from all individuals participating in the interviews. Upon obtaining their consent, all interviews were all audio-recorded, with the exception of one interview for which only handwritten notes were taken at the request of the participant. Audio-recording was preferred because it allows the researcher to concentrate more on the flow of the interview rather than on note-taking (Adams 2015, 500). In terms of duration, interviews lasted an average of 55 minutes, with the shortest being 31 minutes and the longest being 1 hour 14 minutes. As Adams (2015) contends, an hour-long interview is quite reasonable in order to minimize fatigue both for the interviewer and the respondent (493). As recommended by some authors (e.g.: Chantler 2014, 79; Adams 2015, 501), after the end of each interview, time was also taken to write down key remarks, recall any non-verbal cues relevant to the analysis, and consider any new topics raised during the interview. Finally, as will be discussed in the section below, all interviews were fully transcribed to facilitate the subsequent coding of the interview material.

Data Analysis

As discussed previously, in qualitative methods, data analysis is usually done in parallel with data collection, which can lead to making adjustments along the way. (Durand 2014, 10) The advantage of starting the analysis early in the process is directly linked to the flexibility of the method: it allows the researcher to adjust the collection of data and its analysis to emerging patterns. This means that the analysis begins as soon as the first interview is completed and is continuously being refined throughout the process.

The first step of data analysis was to fully transcribe all the interview recordings. To allow for adjustment to emerging patterns throughout the process, the audio-recording was transcribed within a week of the conduct of the interview. Since nine of the ten interviews were conducted on a weekly basis from July 30th to September 23rd, 2020, transcribing them within a week of the interview allowed patterns to begin to emerge early in the process. In addition, despite the fact that the tenth interview could not be conducted before November 14th, 2020, having all transcripts up to date allowed for the second step of the analysis, namely coding, to proceed as soon as most interviews were completed.

In a second step, the entire interview material was coded, that is "[t]he process by which data extracts are labelled as indicators of a concept." (Chantler 2014, 76) As discussed earlier, there are two processes by which qualitative data may be collected and analyzed: by induction or by deduction. In the literature on qualitative methods, there is an emphasis on the inductive method by which theory emerges from the data (grounded theory). However, in this research project, the analysis relied on a method called "framework analysis", that is a deductive approach by which theory is applied to the data set (Chantler 2014, 83). In practice, the main difference between an inductive and a deductive method of analysis is that, while the former develops a coding scheme based on the patterns that emerge from the data, the deductive method instead identifies a thematic framework from the literature and applies this coding scheme to the data set (Chantler 2014, 84; Goodrick & Rogers 2015, 564). Yet, it is important to mention that, while framework analysis is mainly a deductive method by its application of a thematic framework, it does not preclude that the

key themes from the coding scheme may also reflect themes emerging from the data (Chantler 2014, 84). Therefore, in the present research project, the coding scheme that was applied to the data set was that of the six dimensions (key themes) of the relationship between government and COs in Quebec. Thus, the comments of the DGs of the COs interviewed were coded according to whether they referred to the recognition, representation, participation, consultation, funding and accountability of their organization.

Once the coding of the interview material was done, the following step consisted of *charting*, which means "[…] that data are then rearranged according to appropriate thematic references in charts, so that themes can be compared across cases." (Chantler 2014, 84) In the present research, a thematic chart has been developed for each of the 6 dimensions of the relationship between government and COs. The grouping of the results of the interviews by theme made it possible to compare the responses of the various organizations interviewed and to associate them with the indicators of the two ideal types of relationships that constitute the theoretical framework of the analysis.

Finally, the last step of data analysis is referred to as *mapping and interpretation*. In Chantler's words, "[t]his process involves defining concepts, mapping the range and nature of phenomena, creating typologies and making provisional explanations of associations within the data." (Ibid.) In short, based on the charting of the six dimensions (themes) of the relationship, the last stage of the analysis consisted of defining and analyzing the role of COs active in the delivery of integration services in their relationship with the Quebec Immigration Department by taking into account the different positions that organizations occupied in terms of the correspondence with the indicators of the two ideal-types of relationship with the MIFI.

Limits

The limits of interview data, and qualitative methods in general, are manifold. However, it is important to keep in mind that, in using these methods, the researcher is not seeking to achieve the same objectives as those sought by quantitative researchers. Indeed, it would be easy to say that the results of qualitative data cannot be applied to the entire population, or even that it is not possible to find causal relations. Yet, these are research objectives that are associated with quantitative rather than qualitative methods, and therefore the limitations of the qualitative methods must be assessed separately.

First, as mentioned above, qualitative analysis cannot address questions about causation. Rather, it simply reveals that there is an association within the data. As Chantler (2014) explains, "[q]ualitative research does not aim to find statistical associations, but nevertheless explores connections within the data by comparing patterns in accounts of attitudes, behaviors and experiences. " (78)

Second, the conduct of interviews is time- and resource-consuming given the tremendous volume of notes and hours of transcripts to analyze, which requires hard thinking and dedicated time (e.g.: Adams 2015 493; Chantler 2014, 90; Lynch 2013, 37) For this reason, the number of cases under study is limited to a small *n*, with the consequence that interviews are unlikely to give an estimation of the whole population from which cases are (Adams 2015, 366). In other words, it is often not feasible to conduct enough interviews as to have a representative sample (Lynch 2013, 37). In addition, given that the data collected through the interview process are the result of the

interaction between the researcher and the participant, findings are most often difficult to replicate (Bryman 2012, 405).

Third, considering that interviews were led with COs leaders only, the findings are limited to the perspective of these actors only. In other words, findings reflect a relationship that is the result of the subjective perspective of ten COs' DGs. It neither shows the relationship from an objective stand, nor from the MIFI's.

Finally, several authors question the reliability and validity of qualitative results (e.g.: Bryman 2012, 405). More specifically, these concerns are often related to the role of the interviewer's subjectivity in the process and the interpersonal nature of the interview which are said to undermine the objectivity and reliability of data (Lynch 2013, 37). This concern around subjectivity also gives rise to fears regarding the representativeness of the sample, the inaccuracy of the information gathered, and the distortion of findings through the selective presentation of data that corresponds to the researcher's expectations (Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, 84). This led Bleich & Pekkanen (2013) to suggest that reliability issues in qualitative interviews revolve around three key problems, namely: the representativeness of the sample, the type and quality of information obtained, and the accuracy of reporting (86–89).

To allay these concerns, several authors have proposed tips and tricks to make the qualitative interview process more transparent. For example, Bleich & Pekkanen (2013) argue that qualitative researchers should document carefully the entire interview process, that is from the selection of the sample to the final steps of the analysis. Another way, as was done in this chapter, is to report the response rates (Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, 90) But most importantly, it is commonly agreed that it is essential to convey the meaning of a quote by addressing its representativeness in the whole (Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, 94). Indeed, the accuracy of reporting is at the heart of qualitative data analysis in the sense that researchers must be careful not to "[…] cherry— picked the most eye— catching statement without regard to its representativeness." (Bleich & Pekkanen 2013, 93)

In this regard, authors listed different criteria that may be used to assess the good quality of a qualitative analysis. Examples of these include its authenticity, accuracy, feasibility, comprehensiveness, thoroughness, transparency, trustworthiness, reliability and utility (Chantler 2014, 88; Bryman 2012, 390; Goodrick & Rogers 2015, 589). However, the role of the interviewer in the data collection process cannot be ignored, which raises the questions of positionality and the qualities of a good interviewer. Indeed, since the researcher acts as the primary instrument of data collection, he/she must possess certain qualities to ensure the proper conduct of the interviews and the collection of compelling data.

Conclusion

The qualitative methodology employed in this research project made it possible to meet with actors in the field and obtain their perspectives on how they experience their relationship with the MIFI with respect to the delivery of integration services in Quebec. Although the method chosen has its limitations, conducting semi-structured interviews with ten organization leaders that work with newcomers allowed to shed light on the specific characteristics of their relationship with the Immigration Department. These results will be discussed in the next two chapters.

Chapter 4: Organizations Profile

This chapter presents a profile of the community organizations (COs) who participated in the research. Using data from interviews with leaders of the organizations, it describes the main activities of each CO before focusing on their own description of their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration* (MIFI). To describe this relationship, this chapter uses the six dimensions identified in the theoretical framework, namely: recognition, representation, consultation, participation, funding and accountability. This descriptive chapter therefore provides an overview of each of the ten organizations in the sample and concludes with an analysis of the main differences between these COs. This chapter lays the foundation to answer our first research question, which foregrounds the analysis discussed in chapter 5.

The central finding of is this first step of analysis is a large degree of heterogeneity amongst COs involved in the delivery of immigrant integration services in Quebec. While differences in the perceptions of their relationship with the Immigration Department were to be expected given the variation inherent to our sampling strategy, what this chapter shows is that COs diverge in more than their size, budget or main client base. Differences emerge when it comes to how organizations define their mission: some see it as being exclusively focused on service delivery while others present it as a combination of advocacy and service provision. COs in the sample also embrace varying conceptions of ACA. While some relate deeply with ACA founding principle, others see it as a simple checklist to be followed. There are also important differences in whether COs have a direct link with the Immigration Department and whether they see themselves as participating in policy development or not. Moreover, interviews demonstrate that COs attach varying degrees of importance to consultations with the MIFI and assess their impact on policy development differently. With respect to citizen participation, participating COs do not all place the same value on initiatives aimed at including beneficiaries in decision-making processes. Finally, while some recognize that current accountability measures run counter to the autonomy of COs, this diagnostic was far from being shared by the ten organizations interviewed.

Organization A

This community organization offers all kinds of reception and settlement services including employment integration, French and English courses, help with administrative procedures, socio-cultural activities, psychological support, etc. In addition, the organization's activities also include an anti-discrimination and advocacy component. In this respect, when asked whether its mission is more oriented towards defending immigrants' rights or providing services, it defined itself both as a service provider and as an advocacy organization. The organization mentions pursuing a mission in which it defends its beneficiaries and asserts its independence from the government. According to the Director General (DG), the Immigration Department recognizes its advocacy mission, as it is widely affirmed by the organization and sometimes even supported by governmental funding. Furthermore, the organization recognizes itself as an autonomous CO under the Policy for the Recognition and Support of Community Action (PRSCA).

The organization's representation role relies on its very good knowledge of the needs of immigrants on the ground. It also involves the *Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrates* (TCRI) as an intermediary for advancing immigration issues with the Department, in addition to the many other groups in which it participates – e.g. : *Alliance*

des communautés culturelles pour l'égalité dans la santé et les services sociaux (ACCÉSSS), *Corporation de développement communautaire de Rosemont* (CDC de Rosemont), *Regroupement des organismes en francisation du Quebec* (ROFQ), *Regroupement des organismes communautaires québécois de lutte au décrochage* (ROCLD), *Regroupement des organismes du Montréal ethnique pour le logement* (ROMEL), *Table de concertation sur la faim et le développement social du Montréal métropolitain* (TCFDSMM), *Table Jeunesse Villeray-La Petite Patrie*. The organization also participates in working committees set up by the MIFI, in collaboration with the TCRI. In case of disagreement with the Department's policies, the organization opts for mobilizations such as demonstrations, letters to the press and interventions with Members of Parliament (MPs). On rare occasions, the organization's DG deals directly with employees from the Immigration Department, including its partnership advisor, the DG of the francization program, and even the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM). When this occurs, the organization maintains that the MIFI listens carefully and that comments are welcomed. At the same time, the DG deplores that these discussions are only a formality since the Department is not bound by their opinion. The DG does not consider that the organization participates in the elaboration of immigration policies, partly because it is a political issue, but also because it is a matter of "government sovereignty".

In terms of funding and accountability, 60% of the organization's annual budget comes from the MIFI, including an amount in support of the overall mission. Mission funding is mainly used to fund everything that is not financed by services such as electricity, the Internet or the rent. Like all other organizations that have service agreements with the MIFI, it must complete the Cériges database following an agreement between COs and the Immigration Department. This database lists all the services provided to "eligible clients", in addition to socio-economic and statistical data to provide the MIFI with information on the profile of the populations served. A report must be generated and sent quarterly, informing the Immigration Department if the target number of clients has been reached. Organization A mentions that this data is compiled by employees on a daily basis. Therefore, according to the DG, meeting these accountability measures does not require the mobilization of additional resources, since data entry is integrated into the routine work of employees. Although accountability to the Department is largely quantitative, the organization also receives visits from its partnership advisor two to three times a year. MIFI partnership advisors, who offer individualized support to COs implementing the Department's programs (Immigration, Francisation et Intégration Quebec 2020), inquire about the way organizations work through an open-ended questionnaire. In addition, the organization conducts an internal service evaluation with its beneficiaries three times a year.

Organization B

This organization defines itself as an integration enterprise that is part of the social economy ─ e.g. "(…) a particular form of enterprise that combines an association and a business, based on a certain number of rules regarding democratic operation (participation of users and/or employees), activities (profitable and socially useful), nature of membership (low-income areas), the distribution of surpluses (collective wealth)." (Favreau 2000, 46). The activities of this organization are mainly focused on the provision of labour market integration services for immigrants. It also provides other integration services such as francization courses and a referral service.

With regard to the representation role of immigrant populations, the DG contends that it is part of herself in the sense that, when representing the organization in consultative bodies, she always puts this issue forward so that immigrants are taken into account in decision-making. At the same time, the DG mentions that her organization does not defend the rights of immigrant populations by organizing demonstrations, as she prefers to leave this task to those specialized in the field. Moreover, during the interview, the DG claimed not to be familiar with the term "autonomous community action". As such, this organization obviously does not identify with the ACA movement.

While noting their decreasing frequency, the organization sometimes participates in meetings with the MIFI, in addition to its involvement in other groups such as the *Collectif des entreprises d'insertion du Qubec*, the *Table de concertation et d'action en employabilité du Centre Nord* and the *Table des groupes de femmes de Montréal*. In these venues, the DG focuses on bringing attention to the of labour market integration challenges encountered by newcomers. In spite of the Department's willingness to listen, she deplores the lack of action and the fact that decisions are made without taking into account what is happening on the ground. This leads the DG of Organization B to contend that consultations are useless.

In terms of funding, as a social economy enterprise, the organization relies primarily on self-generated sources, in addition to relying on foundations and private donors. As such, the MIFI's funding represents only a small portion of its annual budget. In this respect, the organization criticizes the inadequacy and stringent requirements of MIFI funding for services focused on labour market integration. According to the DG, this is especially jarring considering the situation of labour shortage in the province. In addition, as with other organizations providing services for the MIFI, the accountability in the Cériges database is built into the day-to-day work of employees. In this regard, the organization is in full agreement with the accountability measures put in place by MIFI. The DG even mentions the need for highly structured evaluations to monitor COs' answer to immigrants' needs, especially in the interest of transparency in the use of public funds. Finally, when asked about measures of accountability to its beneficiaries, the organization mentions that it conducts a qualitative assessment of the progress of newcomers to see if the way of doing things and the projects are beneficial to immigrants.

Organization C

Organization C is a popular education organization, whose work aims at developing citizenship through empowerment. It therefore defines itself both as a service provider and as an advocate for the rights of immigrants. Organization C provides integration services to newcomers while maintaining an essential component of advocacy and work on citizenship. With respect to the advocacy mission, the DG states that advocacy is the raison d'être of the organization, even if this is not recognized by the Immigration Department. Indeed, according to the DG of Organization C, the more militant and political aspect of their mission rests entirely on their shoulders and it receives no support from the MIFI. According to the DG, the Department is solely interested in the delivery of services.

In terms of consultations, the organization is very active at the local level, namely in the neighborhood, where proximity to citizens is greatest. For example, their most important venue for citizen participation is their neighborhood round table, *Vivre Saint-Michel en santé*, followed by the *Sommet socio-économique pour le développement des jeunes des communautés noires* (SdesJ)

and the *Regroupement des groupes populaires en alphabétisation du Quebec* (RGPAQ). Yet, the DG also identifies the TCRI as an intermediary that plays the role of representing COs to the MIFI. At the TCRI, the organization discusses the needs of newcomers on the basis of the organization's experience and knowledge of the field. Differing opinions are also heard and welcomed with a view to reaching a democratic consensus. It is also through the TCRI that the organization considers that it can contribute to the elaboration of immigration policies, thanks to the group's activist positions, as well as mobilizations such as the sending of open letters. The organization is also very active in forming coalitions and organizing demonstrations with other COs on various immigration issues affecting its beneficiaries. While the organization mentions that it is well listened to by the Department, it acknowledges the difficulty in asserting whether the recommendations are transformed into action.

The funding received from the MIFI is identified by the organization as one of the most recurrent, along with that received from the Department of Education, and as having increased over the past year. In spite of its advocacy mission, Organization C does not receive any funding in support of its overall mission from the MIFI, as it claims that this is organic to all of its actions. Since the MIFI's funding takes the form of service agreements, as opposed to grants, it is governed by fix criteria that the organization must adhere to. To this end, data entry into the Ériges database requires the employment of a full-time person. Also, the quality of service delivery is assessed through individual meetings with the MIFI partnership advisor two to three times a year, as well as through the satisfaction questionnaire distributed to beneficiaries. During the interview, the DG mentioned that the meeting with the partnership advisor gives the opportunity to have an open discussion and to express what she sees as a problem.

Organization D

This organization was founded as a result of a collaborative project with the community and has recently become a partner with the MIFI as the main delivery point for facilitating access to integration services in the neighborhood. As a result, the organization sees its mission as rooted in service provision, rather than focused on the defence of immigrants' rights. Yet, the organization occasionally takes part in mobilizations, as a last resort, under the leadership of its Community Council (e.g.: the neighborhood round table) or the TCRI. As for the ACA movement, the DG mentions that he knows what the concept of "autonomous community action" implies in theory. However, he mentions that in practice, funding for the pursuit of the social mission is granted on the basis of the correspondence between the organization's mission and that of the Department for a project at the discretion of the organization. This has the effect of penalizing some organizations whose mission is not perfectly in line with the MIFI's orientations.

The organization carries out its role of representation through its good knowledge of the needs of immigrant populations, based on assessments made at the time of service delivery. Along with the importance given to consultations at the local level, the organization identifies the TCRI as a democratic space for discussing integration issues. It also attributes it the role of relaying these issues to the MIFI, while direct contact with the Immigration Department is very rare. In this matter, the organization does not consider itself to be involved in the elaboration of integration policies because, despite good relations with its MIFI partnership advisor. According to the DG, these decisions are taken unilaterally by the Department, and are sometimes even contrary to what is discussed with groups and organizations.

Organization D is one of the very few interviewed who, while recognizing the challenge it represents, mentions implementing concrete measures to increase the inclusion of its beneficiaries in decision-making. An example of these includes a twinning program to facilitate the integration of new members into the organization's Bord of Directors. This program is conducted in addition to their participation in the general assembly and the distribution of questionnaires to evaluate the quality of services.

MIFI funding represents 80% of the organizations' annual budget, a situation that the board of directors deplored as financially unhealthy. Although the DG identified the MIFI funding as a facilitator for consolidating other sources, the board decided to encourage agreements with other funders given the risk of losing the MIFI funding. With respect to accountability measures, the organization conducted an assessment of the time required to complete the Cériges database. It was estimated at 10–15% of all the employees' time, not to mention the measures related to the francization program. According to the DG of Organization D, these measures are very demanding and the management of this program represents the full-time workload of two employees. Finally, regarding the quality of services, the DG considers that it is the role of the organization to validate it internally.

Organization E

This organization offers a wide range of integration services at the local, regional and provincial levels. It pursues the mission of helping immigrants and refugees in a perspective of personal assistance, accompaniment and support. Moreover, the organization presents itself as a complementary partner and ally of the state. According to its DG, the organization considers itself as a necessary instrument for the implementation of the Department's intervention plan. As such, the organization's role is to ensure, together with the MIFI, that departmental programs adequately support immigrants in their integration process, while meeting the needs of organizations and government. The DG of Organization E also mentions that it is the responsibility of COs to ensure that their autonomy is maintained by controlling the means used for their interventions. In addition, the organization also pursues an advocacy mission focused on access to resources for problems encountered by immigrants. In this regard, the DG mentions that he supports the PRSCA and that his organization meets the criteria to be considered autonomous (independent board and mission, organization not created by the MIFI), a mission that is also recognized by the Immigration Department.

Organization E conceives of its representation role in relation to its in-depth knowledge of the profile of immigrants it serves. The DG would even like to take this asset further by relying on more precise quantitative measures to assess the social impact of their services, in order to better allocate resources. In this respect, the organization is personally banking on the concept of strategic negotiation and on a close relationship with the MIFI. Through this approach, it aims at conducting discussions on policy and programs with the Department, using the organization's developed analytical capacities as a resource. Although this does not guarantee that the Department will follow up on the recommendations made, the DG argues that it gives the organization the capacity to argue and challenge the nature of Quebec's integration policies. Organization E considers that it contributes to the elaboration of integration policies through its participation in joint committees with the MIFI. The organization is also very active at the consultation tables in which it participates. The DG identifies the TCRI as a particularly important venue for the development of collective strategies to respond to the MIFI with other organizations in the sector.

With respect to funding, the organization recognizes that there is a delicate balance to be struck between achieving funding objectives and maintaining autonomy. The organization is fortunate in this regard, as 60% of its resources come from the government (mainly *Emploi Quebec*, MIFI, *Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité* [MTESS]), while 40% are self-generated revenues. The DG mentions that the diversification of funding sources gives the organization the capacity to see things differently. In terms of accountability, the DG stresses the importance of these measures to ensure the proper disposition of funds. As with many other organizations, the consolidation of data in the Cériges database is part of the semi-automated operations of the employees and is not considered a time-consuming activity when done on a daily basis. Internally, the organization even has two project managers to analyze the data and adjust the service offer and planning framework accordingly. In addition, client satisfaction is assessed through evaluation cycles throughout the year.

Organization F

With several points of service on the Island of Montreal, Organization F offers a range of complementary services to facilitate the integration of immigrants and their families. Examples of these include services related to reception and integration, French and English language courses, basic computer training, as well as family support. In this regard, the organization's mission is exclusively focused on service delivery. In fact, the DG mentions leaving the advocacy of immigrants' rights to other organizations and expresses a preference for finding solutions so that people are served. Yet, the organization considers itself as an autonomous CO because of its independent board of directors, the holding of a general assembly, the fact that its beneficiaries are surveyed to develop their action plan, their participatory management style and their autonomy in general.

Contrary to all the other organizations interviewed, Organization F believes that it would an exaggeration to say that it acts as the representative of immigrant populations. Yet, at the various consultation tables in which it participates, it is committed to finding solutions to immigration-related issues, such as the lack of funding for asylum seekers. More specifically, with respect to consultations with the TCRI, the DG highlights the existence of a power dynamic whereby the most influential organizations sometimes push others to rally to their position. The same type of issue was raised with regard to the MIFI committees. As the DG observes through his participation, these committees are reserved for a limited number of organizations, thus opening the door to disparities in representation. Despite this drawback, the DG still feels he contributes to the elaboration of integration policies through these committees and has even observed concrete responses to the recommendations made by the organization. However, the DG also noted that policies are mainly developed by the Department itself, in the sense that the final decision comes from "above." In the DG's view, policy decisions are primarily motivated by the opinions, thirst of power and personal interests of those working within the Department.

With regard to the MIFI's funding, it represents 55% of the organization's annual budget. The DG recognizes the importance of not relying solely on the Department and of diversifying its sources of funding in the event of budget cuts. Also, the organization deplores the limited amount allocated for funding in support of the overall mission, which is seen as being far from sufficient. In addition, it complains about the various restrictions related to how the funds can be spent, as well as the strict eligibility criteria for clients. With respect to accountability, the organization strongly agrees with the measures imposed in relation to MIFI funding given the importance of

controlling how taxpayers' money is spent. The DG also considers that it is not complicated to fill in the Cériges database and does not believe that there is a problem of interference at this level, except for the MIFI's request for nominative data. Finally, the organization prefers to survey its beneficiaries directly in small groups to identify potential avenues for improvement, rather than proceeding through an evaluation questionnaire.

Organization G

This organization is mainly dedicated to the integration of immigrant women, with the aim of improving their living conditions and their independence. Organization G defines its mission as being more oriented towards the provision of services (e.g.: assistance in finding furniture, drop-in childcare and creative art workshops) than towards defending the rights of immigrants. This orientation was taken by the board of directors in response to the multiple needs of women observed upon their arrival in Quebec. Within the organization, there is a good participation of members in the general assembly, in addition to the satisfaction questionnaires distributed to them. The DG also mentions always being present and supportive of the mobilizations made by groups. According to the DG, the MIFI does not recognize this organization as an integration organization as it only provides French language courses. Indeed, the DG states that calls for one-time and short-term projects issued by the MIFI do not correspond to the organization's mission and that, as a result, organization G is not "in the loop." In her view, only a few privileged organizations have access to these funds.

The organization considers itself to be part of the ACA movement because of its involvement in consultation tables and groups. Thus, the organization's representation role inevitably passes through the groups it participates in, such as the TCRI, the *Table des Groupes de femmes de Montréal*, the *Table de concertation en petite enfance de Parc-Extension* and the *R des centers de femmes du Quebec*. It sees the role of these groups as helping organizations meet the needs of their clients on the ground and giving them a voice to advocate for their issues "up there" (within the Department). These groups therefore play a very important intermediary role for organization G, as it deplores the fact that it has no direct link with the MIFI. The DG, however, raises the fact that even the issues brought by the groups to the MIFI are not always heard and it often takes a long time before seeing results. In order to get around this impasse, the DG often turns to MPs to successfully bring issues to the attention of the Department. In terms of participation in policy-making, the DG sees its involvement as being through the provision of services that the organization sets up itself. However, since Organization G is not directly involved in the development of MIFI policies, the DG wonders what these policies are based on. In this regard, the DG deplores the fact that employees of the Department never leave their offices to come and identify needs on the ground.

With respect to funding, the only MIFI program for which the organization is funded is that of francization courses. It provides $3000 each quarter, an amount that is declared insufficient by the DG. In addition, she points out the many complications related to the program, which makes her want to end the collaboration with the Department. These are related to the way the program operates and the lack of coordination within the Department (e.g.: the minimum threshold of 20 participants to start a class, the lack of MIFI support for the courses, cumbersome email communications and time-consuming accountability measures). The organization's other sources of funding are the Department of Health and Social Services, the city of Montreal and private foundations. The DG mentions that obtaining support from these funders is much easier and that

their reporting requirements are less demanding. In terms of accountability for the francization program, the DG decries that the forms to be filled out are not clear, that the terminology is complex even for a highly educated person, and that the work is laborious.

Organization H

Organization H offers a wide range of integration services based on client needs, ranging from francization, tax clinic, preparation for the citizenship exam, family services, etc. Although the organization sees itself more as a service provider than an advocate for the rights of immigrants, the DG is outraged by the fact that people who visit the organization have the impression that it is an annex of the MIFI. Indeed, the DG would like to change this and to make the organization become a living space for its users, by offering them an environment to create links with the community, beyond the mere delivery of services. With respect to ACA, the DG firmly adheres to the movement but believes that in practice the organization is far from meeting its definition because of the highly standardized funding agreements that force organization to follow funders' fixed criteria.

The organization exercises its role of representing immigrant populations at the various consultation tables in which it participates, particularly at the local level where it is very solicited (e.g. the Youth Concertation Table, the Parent's Association, the Senior's Table and the Community Development Corporation). Interestingly, the DG mentions that it is easier for the organization to go directly to the MIFI than to the TCRI to deal with problems. This is largely the fact of the positive relationship they have with their MIFI partnership advisor. With regard to the TCRI, the Organization H emphasizes its lack of listening and action. Moreover, the DG deplores the fact that its representatives are not present enough to defend the autonomy of organizations, for example during the negotiations surrounding the implementation of the new integration program, the PASI. Yet, the organization does not hesitate to question the democratic process and to criticize certain things during consultation meetings with other COs, for instance at the TCRI. In addition, she mentions that these comments are generally well received both by the TCRI and the MIFI. In terms of participation in the elaboration of integration policies, the organization considers itself to be far from being involved. As the DG points out, programs are developed by the Department without knowledge of the field and decisions are made in the greatest vagueness.

On the other hand, at the level of members' participation in the organization's decision-making processes, initiatives have been put in place to encourage their involvement. Examples of these include a pre-General Assembly to explain members how to adopt resolutions and make proposals. The organization also carries out service evaluations using a popularized tool in ten languages to determine the level of member satisfaction.

With regards to funding, the MIFI is the organization's main funder, a situation that is of concern to the DG because of the precariousness of this source of funding. The only recurring funding received by the organization is from the Department of Health and Social Services and from Centraide, all the others being linked to service agreements. In this respect, the DG deplores the lack of funding for the overall mission, as the organization does not receive any funding of this type. Finally, with respect to accountability, the DG considers that reporting via the Cériges database is not difficult to do as long as the work is integrated into operations on a regular basis.

Organization I

The mission of this organization was, until recently, mainly focused on the economic integration of immigrants. However, with the arrival of the MIFI's new integration program, the PASI, Organization I now delivers reception and settlement services. Although the DG would like to do more in terms of defending immigrants' rights, the organization's activities are mainly focused on the provision of services. It considers itself as an autonomous CO according to the following criteria: it emanates from the community and responds to its needs, it proposes responses to those needs according to its freely determined mission, it has complete autonomy in terms of its orientations and mode of operation, and it has an independent board of directors. It is interesting to note that Organization I's definition of ACA is the closest to the literature of all responses obtained in the interviews. When asked about financial dependence on government agencies, the DG responded that this perilous but possible balance between the constraints of government programs and the needs of clients is an ongoing challenge that can never be taken for granted. The DG also adds that it is the responsibility of COs to ensure that their autonomy is maintained and to remind the Immigration Department of this, when necessary.

With respect to the role of representing immigrant populations, the DG contends that it is a matter of people in power. In his view, while some government officials are convinced of the importance of COs' role in the integration process of newcomers, others completely undermine it and consider they could do without them. The DG explains that, over time, this has resulted in variations in terms of the importance that the MIFI places on the representative role of COs. Organization I identifies the needs of its beneficiaries through the work of its community workers on the field. It communicates this information to the Department through the TCRI Board of Directors. This board is identified by the DG as the main consultation venue through which the COs' collective strategy is developed. The DG is himself a member of the TCRI Board of Directors and even mentions having direct contact with the MIFI on an individual basis for the more technical aspects of programs. In this respect, the organization considers that it participates in the elaboration of integration policies of the Department. However, it recognizes that it is not characterized by a co-construction process since the Department has the big end of the stick and decisions are ultimately made at the top. Nevertheless, the DG believes in the importance of collective action, such as mobilizations, to defend the issues shared by the organizations. According to him, this is the way in which COs manage to exert some influence with the Immigration Department. He also contends that in the event of disagreement, the organization always maintains its independence in its position vis-à-vis the MIFI.

In terms of funding, 95% of the organizations' resources come from the MIFI and the Department of Employment and Social Solidarity. Naturally, this situation forces the organization to take into account the constraints related to government programs. Among this funding, the organization receives an amount from the MIFI to support its mission, which allows it to consolidate its funding and finance anything that cannot be funded through service agreements. In addition, given the recent significant increase in mission funding, the DG intends to use it to put forward initiatives to increase the participation of members in the organization. This is something that is proving to be a challenge at the moment and that is limited to an annual client satisfaction survey. Finally, with respect to accountability, the organization is seeing an increase in the time required to complete these measures. Indeed, this has necessitated the hiring of two new employees in recent years, in addition to the regular work of the other employees. The DG also mentions that the accountability measures are mainly quantitative, since the qualitative aspect of service delivery

is not really a primary concern of the MIFI. The Immigration Department rather seeks to verify whether service agreements' targets have been met or not.

Organization J

Organization J's service offer is distinguished by its school intervention component. Through its intercultural school community worker, it offers support to parents and coordinates school projects. This service is part of the overall mission of the organization, which seeks to reach out more particularly to the neighborhood communities that are generally neglected and least reached, mostly asylum seekers. As such, it focuses primarily on providing services through an alternative service offer that complements that of the other partner organizations in the neighborhood (e.g. the Local Concertation Table, the Employability Table and the Youth Concertation Table). Thus, this organization develops its own modes of intervention, relying heavily on the ideas of community workers. Examples include pilot projects with partner organizations, such as employment assistance for young immigrants in reception classes and coffee meetings. The DG shares that although the defence of newcomers' rights and interests should normally be part of the organization's activities, it has been neglected in recent years due to a lack of time and staff following its restructuring. In spite of this, the organization sees itself as pursuing ACA because of its capacity to respond to the needs of immigrants through an approach that is intended to be free of the constraints of funders.

With regard to its role of representation, the DG of Organization J states that its greatest influence is at the neighborhood level where it advocates for a greater representation of immigrants in its partner organizations. By supporting and encouraging its partners to work closely with asylum seekers, Organization J has the opportunity to speak on behalf of these populations and to create networks that allow its community workers to occupy the space. However, it does not see itself as playing a representative role within the TCRI given its low level of involvement at this table. Similarly, this prevents it from feeling like it influences the development of MIFI integration policies. According to the DG of Organization J, there is a specific internal dynamic of competition between immigrant integration organizations because of the potential profit to be made from francization courses. The organization's DG highlights the power dynamic that characterizes the TCRI Board of Directors, which leads to problems of representation and participation for small and medium-sized organizations, as is the case for J. For all these reasons, Organization J finds it easier to contact directly the staff of the Immigration Department in case of difficulties. In terms of mobilizations, the DG is not fond of them, on the one hand, because he finds it futile to denounce injustice without proposing a solution, but also because he does not believe that taking the ministry head-on is the right way to proceed.

As mentioned above, the funding raised by the organization is intended to finance projects that it puts forward in response to needs on the ground. From this perspective, the DG describes his role as finding the necessary funds and the criteria to be met to ensure the sustainability of their activities, without community workers having to worry about where funding comes from. Thus, he emphasizes the importance of mission support that gives him the capacity to deploy actions flexibly to meet the needs of newcomers, something that would otherwise be difficult. In this regard, the funding in support of the overall mission received from the MIFI and Centraide represents one quarter of the organization's annual budget of just over $1 million. Since the Immigration Department is the main funder, the remainder is mainly composed of service agreements, with the exception of contracts with the City of Montreal and $44,000 from Centraide for the provision of

services to asylum seekers. Finally, in terms of accountability, the DG promotes a philosophy of being the only person accountable, which allows his team to focus on the beneficiaries rather than on the targets to be achieved. In addition, he describes his relationship with funders as a client approach based on business development.

Differences Between Community Organizations

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the description of the ten organizations' profiles highlights their differences in areas such as their mission, their conception of ACA, their involvement in policy development, their understanding of the outcome of government consultations, the place they give to their beneficiaries, and their vision of accountability measures.

The diverse understandings that COs in our sample have about their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration* (MIFI) is reflected in the different degree of autonomy sought by each organization in the sample. While the ACA principles are completely absent from the activities of some organizations, others are committed to pursuing them by developing alternative services based on the needs of newcomers in consultation with the community in which they operate. Although the maintain of their autonomy is sometimes made difficult by COs' funding constraints, the spirit around which the activities of these organizations revolve recall the primary role played by COs in the Quebec model: social innovation (Jetté 2011). For other organizations, excellence in the delivery of integration services is central to their actions, aligning with NPM principles and the client-centered approach put forward by the MIFI (Côté & Simard 2012). This reflects the concern raised by René (2009) that, for many organizations, no great emphasis is placed on collective action and democratic ownership. Interestingly, the results suggest that COs that are more critical of their relationship with the MIFI tend to identify themselves as mere service providers for the Department. In addition, COs that adhere to this vision of "partnership" promoted by the MIFI appear less likely they to perceive infringements on their autonomy.

However, among the differences in how organizations conceive of their relationship to the Immigration Department, one of the most striking is the variation in the closeness with the MIFI in terms of representation, consultation and participation. As the overview of the different profiles of the organizations showed, while some have difficulty knowing whom to contact to get in touch with the MIFI, others feel like they have a front row seat and are personally invited to consultations on integration programs with those at the head of the Department.

This finding highlights the power dynamic between organizations in the immigrant integration sector to which the DGs of organizations F and J referred (Organization F 2020; Organization J 2020). Interviews show that COs whose activities fall within the Department's objectives have the advantage of having a direct and frequent contact with the MIFI in terms of consultation, representation and participation. This dynamic may be compared to a virtuous circle in which organizations that adhere to the MIFI vision gain greater legitimacy, are more included in decision-making processes, exercise more influence, and are more aware of funding opportunities. On the other hand, organizations that seek to maintain a more autonomous relationship tend to be excluded from this group of influencers and kept at the margins of decision-making on MIFI integration policies.

Thus, it appears that the "safe distance from the state" for which COs have fought for (White 2012b; Laforest & Philips 2001; Richmond & Shiels 2005) is not a guarantee of their autonomy but may rather be a marker of their exclusion from the decision-making sphere. This also leads us to observe that the role of intermediary played by COs is not necessarily part of a logic of democratic representation of the needs of immigrant populations, but rather of an entrepreneurial logic articulated around the management of resources, e.g. obtaining funding. [2]

Conclusion

Given the limited research on the relationship between COs and the government in the immigrant integration sector, the empirical contribution of this chapter is to describe, from the point of view of COs, their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration* (MIFI). Doing so, we highlight that, consistent with the expected answer to our first research question, COs have diverse conceptions of this relationship. While some of them give primacy to the principles of ACA, others have no objection to serving as mere service providers for the state. However, one of the central findings is the difference in the proximity that COs have with the MIFI in terms of representation, consultation, and participation. Described by the DG of Organization J as an internal dynamic of competition among COs specific to the immigrant integration sector (Organization J 2020), organizations that do not have access to these spheres of influence seem to be left out of decision-making surrounding integration policies.

Thus, it is not surprising to observe that the service provider role of organizations tends to take precedence over that of an autonomous partner. Indeed, even for organizations seeking to maintain their autonomy, their funding and their very existence are conditional on their recognition by the MIFI (Fontaine 2013). Since the legitimacy and means of survival of COs rests on their recognition by the Department as an efficient service provider, achieving ACA in practice is made difficult by the strict eligibility criteria for funding, as mentioned by the DGs of organizations D and H (Organization D 2020; Organization H 2020). This highlights the consequences of the imbalance in the distribution of power to which COs are subject and recalls the "paradoxes of the actualization of the principle of autonomy" identified by Fontaine (2013). As the author contends, it is difficult for COs to avoid modulating, or even converting, their discourse and practices according to the criteria imposed on them (Fontaine 2001 as cited in Fontaine 2013, 210).

These findings therefore lay the foundation for following chapter, a sector analysis that reveals the strength of the similarities characterizing the relationship at stake. Despite the expected variations that were observed throughout this chapter—which are important for understanding the heterogeneity in the degree of autonomy/dependence of immigrant integration organizations in Quebec—it constitutes only a partial answer to our first research question. Indeed, the strong similarities that emerge among organizations can be interpreted as applying to the immigrant integration sector as a whole.

[2] Of course, given the qualitative methodology used, it is not possible to correlate the differences in proximity between the MIFI and the organizations to particular organizational characteristics (e.g.: size of the organization, amount of funding, type of service offer).

Chapter 5: The Relationship as Seen from the Organizations

This chapter provides an answer to our first research question: Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services perceive themselves as service providers or as autonomous partners in their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration*? Despite the heterogeneity of COs experiences, a power trend that emerges from this relationship in the immigrant integration sector is characterized by a predominance of service delivery over the role of social transformation. Indeed, while most of the organizations interviewed have internalized the Department's approach to service delivery based on NPM principles, few critically examine the implications of applying these principles for their organization's autonomy and their ability to define and meet the needs of the populations they serve along with them. In the following sections, these findings will be discussed in more detail along the six dimensions of the relationship, while linking empirical results to the theoretical framework opposing service provider to autonomous organizations.

Recognition

Among the sample, organizations identify themselves more as service providers than as advocates, except for two organizations for which both roles are equally important, namely A and C. As explained by Organization I, in the newcomer integration sector, a clear distinction is made between organizations focused on service delivery and those focused on advocacy related to immigration issues (Organization I 2020). This fragmented view of the mission of organizations is reflected in the discourse of the DGs who do not see these two missions as compatible and tend to prioritize service delivery and relegate the pursuit of their social mission to a secondary role. For example, Organization G mentions that: "So that's why we, as an organization, found it good, instead of advocating for these immigrants, but instead we dug into the services to give them the services that they, they want those necessary services when they arrive in this country." (Organization G 2020) Thus, for many organizations, the defence of immigrants' rights is either presented as a compromise to be made with service provision or as something that is nice to have when time and resources allow. In this respect, the DG of Organization J mentioned that it would be beneficial to free some time for advocacy, but that currently, due to a lack of staff and structure, the organization's mission is focused on service delivery (Organization J 2020). As a result, none of the organizations interviewed identified the pursuit of a social mission focused on immigrant advocacy as their primary mission, which may be explained in part by the fact that all the organizations in the sample receive funding for the provision of services. In fact, service agreements signed with the MIFI are often used as an explanation to why the pursuit of a social advocacy mission is relayed to the background, as Organization I explains: "Well clearly, we are mainly a service provider since our resources are essentially dedicated to that, the first line. But I think that in doing so, we contribute, so maybe sometimes indirectly, but still, we participate, at the very least, to the issue of advocacy." (Organization I 2020)

MIFI's recognition of COs is also strongly focused on service delivery and the vision of organizations as "partners" of the Department, rather than as a force of social change. For Organization C, it even goes so far as to say: "I think that for the Department of Immigration, I think that for them, it's essential to provide services, to welcome newcomers. And the whole aspect that is more militant, and more political, in quotes I would say, that's our business." (Organization C 2020) While it is clear that the MIFI tells organizations that they are recognized as their partners in the delivery of integration services, not all organizations agree that, in practice, this title is

applicable. In fact, many organizations expressed their discomfort with this notion of "partner" by stating that: "they tell you: you're partners, etc., we need to work together, etc. But behind the scenes, we tend to operate more like a client and service provider relationship." (Organization I 2020) Or again: "The Department always tells us that we are the partners. And we have talked about it at the TCRI several times and said, maybe we are the service providers. Yeah, instead of partners." (Organization D) Although exceptions exist[3], generally, organizations that mention that the Department recognizes their social defence mission are doing so more from a perspective of non-repression. This vision of the recognition of COs' social mission is far from ACA's perspective of supporting and encouraging the role of social transformation and the development of alternative services (Côté & Simard 2012; Jetté 2011).

For the organizations in the sample that consider that they are pursuing a social advocacy mission, they see this mission as including making demands or mobilizing in the face of decisions made by the MIFI that, according to the organizations, go against the interest of newcomers. For example, Organization E's advocacy mission has two components: it aims to help newcomers access recourse for the problems they encounter (advocacy for specific individuals) and it leads or participate in collective contestations about policy changes (collective advocacy).

Ultimately, when asked about their advocacy mission, none of the organizations' descriptions were consistent with the spirit of ACA principles, with the exception of organizations C and J. Indeed, Organization C mentioned having an approach based on citizen participation, a principle dear to the ACA movement, and Organization J also has an approach to service provision that is rooted in the needs of the community (Organization C 2020; Organization J 2020). Not only do the majority of organizations perceive their social mission as one of protest rather than social transformation, but several of them state that it is the role of organizations to ensure that they maintain a certain autonomy in their practices (e.g.: Organization C 2020; Organization E 2020; Organization H 2020; Organization I 2020). In other words, the quest for recognition by the Immigration Department of a social mission as advocated by the ACA movement is absent among the organizations interviewed, not to mention the fact that it is often decontextualized from its original purpose.

From this perspective, while many organizations claim to meet the criteria of an autonomous community organization, few base their claim on a substantive discussion of what ACA actually entails. In fact, except for Organization I, when asked how their organization positions itself in relation to the ACA movement, many responded based on a list of objective criteria. Therefore, their assertion of being an autonomous community organization is not necessarily linked to the pursuit of a social mission. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Organization F identified itself as an autonomous community organization because of its independent board of directors, the holding of a general assembly, the fact that its beneficiaries are surveyed to develop their action plan, their participatory management style and their autonomy in general (Organization F 2020). The same findings apply to Organization E which contends that:

> Well, absolutely, because we meet the criteria. So I don't have a council that is formed by […], or that has a representative of the state. We are completely autonomous in our mission, completely autonomous in our selection of the objectives we want to pursue. And if we

[3] As an example, Organization E mentions feeling like a complementary partner and even an ally of the state.

> want, we can simply not work with the Immigration Department, I mean. We are not created by the Department. (Organization E 2020)

Still, several organizations, namely D, E, H and I, recognize the difficulty of combining ACA with service delivery. For instance, the DG of Organization H states that she adheres to the movement 100% but that in practice, the organization is far from this "[b]ecause we have service agreements that are very standardized. We have to fit into boxes, and we don't fool around with that." (Organization H 2020)

Representation & Consultation

The representation role of COs has been described by many being continent on political factors and, in particular, on the interest of the government in power. As Organization I mentioned: "clearly, we can sometimes deal with people [elected officials] who are convinced that COs do indeed play a role and are an essential partner in achieving the Department's missions. And then, at the other end of the spectrum, well you've got elected officials who don't believe in the role of COs at all […]" (Organization I 2020) These comments were more than often addressed to the former CAQ Quebec immigration minister, Simon Jolin-Barette, for whom the organizations' opinions are unanimous: under his leadership, policies were developed without consultation and the representation role of COs was denied. Indeed, Mr. Jolin-Barette received comments such as:

> There are some ministers like the one who left, and we are very happy that he left, who was more […]... he does what he wants. […] But there are others on the other hand […], I'm speaking to you as president of the ROFQ [Regroupement des organismes en francization du Quebec], each new minister, we make a request for him to receive us. Except […] Mr. Jolin-Barette, everyone received us. Him, he did not receive us. Perhaps, he probably had a lot of work. Or something else. But the others, when we saw them, we told them what our point of view was. (Organization A 2020)

The same kind of comments were made by Organization D, when questioned about its level of involvement in policy development : : "we will see with the new minister how it goes, but with Mr. Barette, Jolin-Barette, not at all. Not at all, not at all. He just, I think he made the decision with a specific group of people, without consulting anyone." (Organization A 2020) Despite the change of minister on June 22nd, 2020 (Lessard 2020), it was too early at the time of the interviews to see the impact of this change on the place given to COs in terms of representation and consultation.

In terms of how the needs of immigrant populations are identified within organizations for representation to government officials, the COs interviewed mainly emphasized their good knowledge of the needs of their beneficiaries as a basis for playing this role. In fact, most organizations base their representation role on the expertise developed through the knowledge that community workers have of the field, but also on the client evaluations made during individual meetings. Thus, rather than defining needs and problems in collaboration with beneficiaries, as advocated by the ACA movement, the organizations interviewed rely primarily on their quality as experts in the field and on formal needs assessments. In addition, some organizations mentioned that it is the responsibility of COs to ensure that the MIFI's programs meet the needs of immigrants (e.g.: Organization E 2020; Organization I 2020). By putting this burden on organizations alone, this negates the Department's responsibility to share its vision and negotiate public policies jointly with the beneficiaries of community action (Parazelli, Campeau, Gaudreau 2017).

In this regard, when asked exactly how the needs of immigrants are identified, Organization D responded "Every integration service we provide requires a needs assessment. Yes, so, and all that is recorded in Cériges, in the database. So it's easy for us to just start filling out, to really consult the database to see if the needs are related to housing, education, childhood, (…)." (Organization D 2020) While most of the organizations interviewed base their assessment on their very good knowledge of immigrants' needs thanks to their proximity with their beneficiaries, Organization E stands out with its will to better quantify the needs of its clients as can be seen in the following quote: "we try to develop a global vision of needs. Then, in essence, for us to do that, it's not just to follow information, it's to generate a vision of emerging needs, which remain relevant. Because we're sticking to that, are our services always in response to that?" (Organization E 2020) According to this organization, COs' increasing use of quantitative measures to assess the needs of their clients can only be positive in that it demonstrates the ability of the community sector to better grasp the full range of client needs, which, according to the DG, was proving to be difficult in the 1990s and even in the early 2000s (Organization E 2020).

In this respect, the main contribution of beneficiaries to the definition of needs and problems is limited to consultations consisting of satisfaction evaluations and the participation of some members in the general assembly. Indeed, all the organizations interviewed indicated that they conduct some form of evaluation of the services provided, which they then use to adjust their service offer based on the feedback they receive. The general assembly is also seen by most organizations as an opportunity to share the organization's annual accomplishments with their members and to allow them to ask questions and receive feedback as illustrated by Organization G:

> Members normally have very nice suggestions that we take note of. The board takes note. (…) And the members participate in the general assembly, ask questions at each point. And then there is the vote. So there are some members who will be part of, who will be part of the board if there is a vote. […] and after the vote, there is still a varia time where members are asked questions. What do they want for the organization, what is it? (Organization G 2020)

Although these are the most common mode of operation among the sample for obtaining the views of beneficiaries, it should be mentioned that some organizations propose alternatives to encourage the contribution of their members in decision-making processes. Examples were given in the previous section on the profile of organizations and mainly concern organizations D, H and J with their initiatives such as a twinning program to facilitate the integration of beneficiaries into the board of directors, the holding of a pre-general assembly and coffee meetings to encourage participants to become involved in the organization's projects.

As discussed in chapter 4, some organizations in the sample have a direct access to the MIFI, either to represent the needs of immigrant populations or to participate in program consultations. These organizations, namely A, E, H & I, represent a privileged class in political terms. They are distinct, from other organizations interviewed who must use the TCRI as an intermediary to bring their issues to the attention of the Department. Indeed, while some organizations favour consultations at the local level, all but organization H identified the TCRI as playing an advocacy role in representing organizations active in the field of newcomers' integration to the Department. More specifically, the board of directors of the TCRI embodies this role, as well as the working committees, as described by Organization I:

> Depending on the needs, […] so there are committees, and that's where consultation takes place. And then, when we actually identify things that we would like to see changes in policies and programs or in ways of doing things, well, that's where we decide on the demands, and then, well, the board of directors, of which I am member, is the body that in principle represents members, and the TCRI, in discussions with the Department. (Organization I 2020)

Thus, the organizations overwhelmingly described the TCRI as a democratic decision-making space where all interventions are welcomed and discussed. The group is particularly praised for its good listening skills and its ability to relay information to the Department. According to the organizations interviewed, its approach consists of sounding out the needs of organizations and, by sharing common problems, making decisions by consensus on the approach to be taken. Despite the many differences among the organizations in the group, divergent opinions are heard and discussed, leading to agreement and a common understanding of the issues. Moreover, the intermediary role played by umbrella organizations is particularly important for those organizations that do not have a direct access to the MIFI, as illustrated by Organization G:

> Umbrella organizations, us we consider, as an organization, perhaps the umbrella organizations are there to defend us. So they are there to defend us. We bring the causes and we see the causes. Afterwards, we see results. […] because it is the ROFQ [Regroupement des organismes en francization du Quebec] that defends us up there. As for me [Organization G], I would definitely go and talk to someone, [but] I'm an individual in an ocean here. […] But the ROFQ, when we go through the ROFQ, it reaches, that's for sure. (Organization G 2020)

However, it should be noted that the strength of collective action deployed through the TCRI is also subject to the centralization of issues identified by Chiasson & Koji (2011), Choudry & Shragge (2011) and Gonzales Castillo (2005). In fact, the need to build consensus among organizations around common issues in order to maximize the strike force with the Department is detrimental to the representation of the plurality of the actors and has the effect of concentrating demands around the most "popular" issues. For instance, Organization F referred to this dynamic by giving the example of the replacement of the PRINT program by the PASI, where the less influential organizations had to join the position of the stronger ones in relation to the MIFI's request for nominative information. The DG of Organization J also supports this point by mentioning the following: "Well, in the community sector, it is the consensus that prevails. [...] but not everyone is comfortable with consensus. Some people want to move forward, and say: enough fooling around, can we vote?" (Organization J 2020) Yet, these are the only two organizations in the sample that raised this concern, as the other organizations were quite satisfied with having a collective strategy to defend their interests.

Despite these efforts, all the organizations interviewed, regardless of whether they have a direct link with the MIFI or not, mentioned that the final decision rests with the Department, and more specifically with the Minister himself. Often, when asked if they see the results of their recommendations, the DGs giggled and replied that it is difficult to say. For example, Organization A mentioned: "There is listening. It's never authoritarian relationships or anything. There is listening. Now, do they listen to us and apply? That's something else. [laughs] That's it." (Organization A 2020) In the same line, Organization B maintains that: "Still, the Department, it considers. It's not, it's not… they agree. But the actions do not follow this statement. That's what

makes me sick." (Organization B 2020) For its part, Organization D deplores the Department's lack of consistency in its consideration of the recommendations of COs, as can be seen with the following example:

> For example, all parts of the reformulation of the Quebec Experience Program for foreign students and temporary workers. That, the Department just made a completely different decision than what the TCRI recommended. And when we say the TCRI, we, together, we discussed that, we said that, we have to change. No, the Department just took the decision as... Yes. So […] sometimes yes, sometimes no. (Organization D 2020)

The MIFI's unilateral policymaking will be discussed in more detail under the theme of participation. However, at this point, it is important to note that perceptions of the impact of consultations vary from one organization to another in that, while some describe them as totally useless and a mere formality (e.g.: Organization A), others mention seeing results on some issues (e.g.: Organization E). In all cases, when COs disagree with departmental policies, DGs mention that they do not hesitate to manifest their disagreement and to challenge the decisions made. This is illustrated by organization A in what follows: "But here, when we disagree, we react elsewhere. For example, when there was the immigration brokers' story, we wrote letters everywhere, to the press, a little bit everywhere. It's only when we feel that the Department is taking a direction that we don't consider to be entirely beneficial to immigration." (Organization A 2020) Therefore, organizations consider that their role of representing the needs of immigrants is not limited to formal consultative bodies but also entails the use of alternative platforms which, as Organization E mentions, ensure that the organizations are not powerless when it comes to challenging policies (Organization E 2020).

Participation

As discussed above, COs recognize that the ultimate decision on the making of policies rests with the Department. As such, no organization feels it is involved in processes of policy co-construction with the MIFI. At best they are able to influence certain things, as mentioned by Organization I: "Well it's clear that the big end of the stick is more the Department that has it. But still, we have managed to influence certain things here. I think we've made some good gains over the years." (Organization I 2020) While no organization is in a situation where it formulates integration policies for newcomers hand in hand with the government, the interviews have revealed not only varying degrees of involvement in policy development, but also different understandings of what participation in the formulation process entails.

Among the three organizations that mention not being involved in the formulation of integration policies, two (Organizations D and H) cite the MIFI's unilateral decision-making as a reason. For example, when questioned about its participation in the formulation of integration policies, the DG of Organization D responded: "Now, sometimes, it's just, the decision making, it comes directly from, from the Department. We don't have anything to say about certain things, yes." (Organization D 2020) As for those who consider that their organization does participate in the formulation of policies, it is mainly attributed either to their involvement with the TCRI and its board of directors (Organizations C and I), or their participation in joint TCRI-MIFI working committees (Organizations E and F). For instance, when asked about whether it plays a role in policy formulation, organization E replied: "Well, […] yes. In the sense that, yes, when we sit on joint program review committees, we are connected, and I'm just talking about the Department of

Immigration, […] But with the Department, when we sit on joint committees, I think that, yes, we are able to move forward." (Organization E 2020) A final conception of participation in the formulation of integration policies is that of Organization G. Although this organization does not have a close relationship with the MIFI in the sense that communication between the two is very difficult, the organization's DG still considers to be involved in policy formulation given the services that the organization develops for the good of the community, as can be seen in the following passage:

> These are services, I say, [in response] to the needs we have created the creative art workshops, to break the isolation of [our beneficiaries] and so that they don't get sick afterwards. […] So, we are an integration organization in these services. I think that at first glance, we should be recognized as such by the Immigration Department. But we don't even have a single project with the Immigration Department in this regard. […] But there are still certain services that we do and that we put in place for the good settlement of the immigrant. (Organization G 2020)

Despite its lesser influence on MIFI integration policies, Organization J also sees its involvement in policy development outside of the Department, e.g., by developing new ways of intervening to reach newcomers (Organization J 2020). One example is the pilot projects developed by Organization J's community workers discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, we can consider their vision as an alternative form of participation in the development of integration policies whereby, rather than implementing the policies formulated by the Department, organizations develop their own alternative service offer according to the needs observed in the field. Although this is not a direct form of participation in the development of government policy, this corresponds to the ACA principle according to which organizations are an important player in the search for solutions and the implementation of alternative services adapted to the needs of populations (Côté & Simard 2012; Jetté 2011).

Moreover, this form of participation is often put forward in response to the MIFI's lack of knowledge of the field, e.g. the fact that programs are designed by people outside the community sector (Parazelli et al. 2003, 108 as cited in Fontaine 2013, 210). Indeed, organizations B, G and H deplored the fact that departmental policies are formulated in total ignorance of what is happening in the field. As the DG of Organization H mentions: "But what's a bit deplorable is the fact that, it's as if the programs are being laid without policy knowledge, […] not knowing the terrain at all." (Organization H 2020) Organization G also deplores the Department's lack of knowledge of the field and asks that officials leave their cubicles, as illustrated by the following quote: "It's a problem I have. I say why the Department is always in its offices […] and never comes. You must come and see what we are doing in the field. We would like them to come in the field and try to see what we really do." (Organization G 2020) This observation thus leads the DG of organization G to wonder what the government's integration policies are based on.

Another alternative form of participation consists of mobilizations as a lever of opposition to policies that go against the interests of immigrants. For example, Organization E mentions that "there are steps that are taken with users, which can also be collective, because we can form coalitions with organizations, especially when there is more than one user involved, more than one immigrant." (Organization E 2020) As discussed in the section on the recognition of COs, the mobilizations carried out by organizations is focused primarily on individual or collective advocacy as opposed to forms of political opposition that would allow beneficiaries to formulate their own

problems and solutions (White 2009, 15). In addition to coalition-building, other modes of participation used by organizations include demonstrations, open letters, speaking to the Press and Members of Parliament (MPs). Three organizations mentioned the use of these forms of participation as a means of influencing policies, as illustrated by Organization A: "It's with party members that people discuss. But we intervene with parties. We are in regular contact with the, […], our local MP is, […] Nadeau-Dubois. So every time we get the chance to see him, we talk to him about it." (Organization A 2020) Although mobilizations are alternative forms of participation that are very popular among COs, two of the organizations interviewed stated that they do not want to be associated with these forms of protest action, namely B and F.

Finally, very few organizations encourage the participation of their beneficiaries in the decision-making process, e.g. organizations D, H and J. For those few organizations that attempt to promote their participation rather than simply viewing them as clients seeking a service, the hurdles to beneficiaries' participation remain very high. Beyond the fact that, as mentioned by Organization I, service agreements do not provide funding to support the mission but only to provide services (Organization I 2020), Organization D identifies several barriers to their inclusion:

> Well that's a challenge, okay? […] It's a really intense commitment. And not everyone is in the same situation, the same availability, and even the same skills. […] It's not easy for that. Okay, even […] the language barrier sometimes. There are people who are in the process of improving their communication skills, and in a board, you just have to talk, yes. That's it, that's the goal of a board: to talk, discuss and exchange. So it's not easy. (Organization D 2020)

Besides those few organizations who try to put forward initiatives to encourage the participation of their beneficiaries, the other COs in the sample rather tend to focus on empowering individuals and making them responsible for their actions. For example, the DG of Organization E maintains:

> Because the goal of all of this is to ensure that we are able to accompany immigrants quickly to find their way through society, in connection with all the resources and services to which they are entitled. And to support them as quicky as possible to be able to become autonomous and to continue their efforts, but with the needs, with the means, we also hope with advice that we have given them and that allows them to do it on their own. (Organization E 2020)

This notion of individual responsibility echoes findings from Côté & Simard (2012), Choudry & Shragge (2011), Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau (2017), and Fontaine (2013) that the neoliberal injunction to individual responsibility has been internalized by COs leadership and in their services.

Funding

Organizations in our sample present a high degree of dependence on government funding, including that of the Department of Immigration. For some organizations, such as Organization D, funding received from the MIFI can represent up to 80% of the total annual budget. This situation of dependence is the case for most COs in the immigrant integration sector, as noted by Organization I: "And we understand that, in terms of resources, it's 95% of the resources. So we

can say to ourselves, objectively, is there still a dependency link? Yes. That's the reality of the whole, well, more and more organizations." (Organization I 2020) Although some of the organizations interviewed have a self-generated source of funding or rely on private donors, there is a consensus that dependance on MIFI funding is a source of instability and precariousness, making it difficult to ensure the continuity of service delivery. In this regard, Organization H, whose primary funder is the MIFI, mentions the following about service agreements:

> All our funding, except for the PSOC of the Department of Health and Social Services which is about 60 000$ and Centraide which is 133 300$, out of a budget of about 1 400 000$, these are the only two that are recurrent. Which come back every year. All the other funders are actually service agreements, unfortunately. So despite the size of our budget, it is not recurring and that is still a complicated and difficult situation. (Organization H 2020)

The instability of MIFI's service agreements is completely at odds with the funding in support of the overall mission, which is intended to be renewed on a regular basis to ensure a certain stability for COs (Choudry & Shragge 2011). This also points to the need for some organizations to diversify their sources of funding. For instance, when Organization D analyzed the preponderance of the MIFI as its main source of funding, its board of directors made the following recommendation: "the board said, it's not right because it can happen, like in 2008, when the Immigration Department just decided to take the funding away from the other organization. […] And the board decided to really encourage other funders, but also private funders." (Organization D 2020)

Furthermore, funding for service agreements is subject to strict eligibility conditions for organizations, as well as for the clients to be served. In fact, in addition to being in good financial health and having to meet the program objectives set by the Department, organizations may only serve individuals designated by the MIFI. Thus, since this type of funding is per capita, any person receiving a service must be validated in the database in order to constitute a "paying client", as mentioned by Organization D (Organization D 2020). However, this mode of operation presents several challenges for organizations, the most important of which is the fact that some immigrants, because of their status, cannot be covered by the Department's programs. It is therefore incumbent on COs to serve these individuals at their own expense, as in the following case of asylum seekers:

> […] in the last few years, things have become clearer with the Department where it was necessary to deal only with those for whom the Immigration Department wanted to receive. That is to say, people who were, as we say, landed residents, accepted. But (Organization A) continues, because it is a principle with us. It is our foundation, we have always welcomed asylum seekers who had no support from anyone. (Organization A 2020)

Organizations F and H also mentioned facing the same problem of having to find alternative sources of funding in order to be able to serve those populations that do not meet the MIFI eligibility criteria. In this respect, the DG of Organization J contends that there is a need for ingenuity and to find a way out of the constraints of departmental funding (Organization J 2020).

Another important related challenge is the need for organizations to "fit into boxes" – e.g. to follow funders' fixed criteria because of the highly standardized agreements – to obtain the funding provided by the MIFI, as mentioned by the DG of Organization H: "Well, for each program, we have to fit into boxes, okay. To be able to get the funding, we manage to do that." (Organization H 2020) The standardized aspect of service agreements, which causes COs to have

to adapt to criteria set by the Department, tends to jeopardize the maintain of the organizations' autonomy, as illustrated by this quote: "So once you understand a little bit where you're getting in line with the Department, it's just a matter of making sure that you can actually meet objectives to maintain some funding, but at the same time, the area of autonomy should not be restrained to the point where you can't move on that." (Organization E 2020) As a result, some of the organizations interviewed (e.g.: E, H & I) characterized this situation as a fragile balance between providing services for the MIFI and maintaining their autonomy, or as in the words of Organization E's DG, an eternal dynamic between the state and COs (Ibid.).

With regards to funding in support of the overall mission, six of the organizations interviewed receive this type of funding. However, contrary to what the PRSCA states, it is far from constituting a preponderant part of the organizations' overall funding. Indeed, despite its significant increase over the past year, this amount still does not represent a major share of the funding granted to organizations active in the delivery of integration services in Quebec. For example, among organizations in the sample, this funding arrangement now amounts to $115 000, whereas the total funding granted by the MIFI is over $1 million for several of them (e.g.: organizations F, H and J). This situation raises the concern of the organizations interviewed about the lack of funding for their overall activities, as is the case for organizations F and H (Organization F 2020; Organization H 2020).

Moreover, the use made of this mission funding by COs demonstrates either a situation of underfunding or a deviation from the primary purpose of this type of funding. Instead of being used to pursue a social mission of change, it rather serves to finance anything that cannot be funded through service agreements. For instance, Organization D mentions that, to obtain this funding, all it has to do is to carry out a project at its discretion, for example to pay rent, electricity, directors' or managers' salaries (Organization D 2020). More broadly, Organization I states the following about funding for the overall mission: "So it's a program, I won't hide it from you, that is used to fund anything that cannot be funded through regular programs. […] But more seriously, it allows us to consolidate our funding and to have the adequate financial and material resources to be able to […] finally realize our mission, in the best conditions too" (Organization I 2020) In other words, funding in support of the overall mission granted to COs active in the delivery of integration services in Quebec is not conducive to the development of their autonomy. In fact, only Organization J mentioned that "(a)t $115,000, we are able to have something more structural. And with a funding in the order of $140,000 to support the mission of [our organization], there we have an interesting envelope of almost $250,000 where we can carry out actions related to the mission, which are not in the priorities announced by the funders." (Organization J 2020)

Accountability

As noted in the previous chapter on the organizations' profiles, the main accountability measure associated with MIFI service agreements is the Cériges database. This instrument, which is designed to quantitatively verify the achievement of targets according to criteria pre-established by the Department tends to direct the accountability of COs upwards, to the government. Organization C mentioned that Cériges measure does not provide accountability metrics to community members (Jetté 2011). Given that funding for service delivery is provided on a per capita basis, all interactions must be accounted for in the database, as mentioned by Organization C: "And so this software, you have to, in fact, you have to register all the people who come to see, who come to meet us. [And] their status, see if they are eligible, because there are all kinds of

criteria... that they are eligible at that time. Every time we give them a service, we have to enter it in, in the software […]" (Organization C 2020) Following that, a report is generated and sent to the MIFI every quarter, as discussed in chapter 4. Furthermore, this evaluation in terms of effectiveness and efficiency does not consider the quality of the services rendered, which, according to organization A, B and D, is the responsibility of COs. The only action by the Department identified in this regard is the biannual meeting with the partnership advisor reported by organizations A and C.

In doing so, the organizations act practically as a provider of statistical data for the MIFI, as illustrated by the following quotation: "[…] there is also […] an accountability that is done […] though […] the transmission of socio-economic data, and therefore statistical, more statistical, on the people we serve. […] the objective being to provide a profile, a little bit, of the people reached by the services, within the framework of the programs." (Organization I 2020) In this respect, several organizations (e.g.: organizations A, E, and I) highlighted the issue of data anonymization following the MIFI's request to provide nominative information on the clients served, a demand to which the organizations interviewed strongly objected. Indeed, organizations A, F and I described this situation as interference by the Department, whereas the transmission of personal information is not necessary to better understand the needs of clients.

Yet, the evaluation measures imposed by the MIFI are far from being opposed by COs and decreed as being in contradiction with their mission. On the contrary, they are considered essential to ensure good results management. The organizations interviewed tend to agree with these measures, considering them as essential to ensure transparency in the spending of public funds (e.g.: Organizations B, E & F). For example, Organization E insisted on the importance not only of conducting evaluations on the issues for which organizations are funded, but also of using tools and frameworks adapted to the need for better management (Organization E 2020). In fact, some organizations even mentioned using these reports for internal statistical purposes, or to produce their annual activity reports (e.g.: organizations G and H) Moreover, organizations in the sample do not consider this exercise to be an additional workload[4], as data entry is integrated into the daily work of employees, as stated by organizations A, B, E, F and H. Only organization I, which had to reinforce its administrative support by two people, noted the impact of such measures, as can be seen in the following passage:

> […] in fact, because in relation to all this, well, then you have to put in place internal tools, forms, information sheets that people fill out. Then you have to transcribe them into the various information systems, computerized. There are data transmissions to be made, reports, in short, quarterly. […] But I won't hide from you, it's true that the trend here is towards an increase in the time required to devote to this whole issue of accountability. And

[4] It is important to mention, however, that this idea that accountability measures via the Cériges database are not a burden for organizations does not apply to the francization program which, in many ways, is a class of its own. Indeed, some organizations referred to this program as madness (Organization D 2020), or even as a Department of its own (Organization J 2020), which gave rise to the following comments from Organization G on its accountability: "Because sometimes it's complicated, it's not understandable, it's not readable, sometimes you don't understand much. And the terminologies are not simple. And for people who have studied, like me again, you see it's not simple. So, I wonder for other people again, how are they going to understand?" (Organization G 2020).

> that's certainly something we tend to deplore. Because we consider ourselves to be first and foremost field and intervention resources. (Organization I 2020)

Finally, in terms of accountability to beneficiaries, the measures are mainly summarized in satisfaction questionnaires and service evaluations, in addition to the transmission of the activity report at the general assembly. These measures are a significant departure from the principle of autonomous COs according to which their accountability is primarily directed towards the members of the community in which they operate. The most eloquent example is that of Organization C, which, when asked whether it has accountability measures in place for its beneficiaries, responded as follows: "[…] no, we are not accountable to them, on the other hand, we ask them, we have a kind of satisfaction questionnaire that we pass on to the people who come to see us, who come to visit us, so I think we also take into account what they say. Their opinion, yes." (Organization C 2020) Thus, among the organizations interviewed, the accountability practices take the form of client satisfaction assessment and other performance measurements, as opposed to collective practices of deliberation and evaluation (René 2009). Of course, there are some exceptions to the rule, for example Organization G, which indicates that the organization belongs to its members – e.g. they have a say in the decisions made (Organization G 2020) – but, generally speaking, the accountability measures to which organizations in the sample respond are primarily aimed at their funders.

Image and Summary of the Relationship

In response to our first question, the results of the interviews suggest that, from the standpoint of COs active in the delivery of integration services, their relationship with the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'intégration* (MIFI) is characterized by an emphasis on service delivery rather than on advocacy for newcomers. Based on the indicators of the two ideal-types of relationships, the content analysis of the interviews reveals that, overall, the relationship is more consistent with the service provider type.

First, both in terms of the government's attitude and the way in which the organizations interviewed define themselves, their recognition is primarily based on their expertise as service providers, as a reflection of the funding and priorities received from the MIFI. The recognition of a distinct identity and of an autonomous social mission does not appear to be a central concern of the organizations in the sample. Rather, they see the pursuit of a social advocacy mission as a secondary responsibility of COs, rooted in protest rather than in the development of an alternative service offer for their beneficiaries. In short, in relation to the dimension of recognition, the organizations position themselves very close to the ideal-type of dependence, since they present practically no characteristics of the autonomous relationship, with the exception of advocacy when time and funding allow.

With regards to the "representation" dimension, it is mainly through objective assessments of the needs and the good knowledge of their community workers that COs exercise their representation of newcomers. This situation is far from the collective identification of needs by the beneficiaries aimed at in a relationship of autonomy. Instead, it approaches the ideal type of dependence by privileging professional knowledge to represent the needs of clients, especially with the large place occupied by the TCRI's board of directors. The capacity to increase the representation and power of citizens in decisions is undermined both by the form of representation

put forward by COs, and by the Immigration Department's limited acceptance of negotiating the terms of integration policies and to allow the exercise of COs' direct representation role.

As for the dimension of "consultation", it must be analyzed in three parts. First, the participation of beneficiaries in consultations is limited to their presence at the general assembly and the satisfaction questionnaires they fill out. We are thus far from an autonomous relationship in which consultations serve to define the needs of the community through a bottom-up approach. On the other hand, most organizations identified the TCRI as a democratic decision-making space that is one of the few avenues through which integration policies can be slightly influenced. However, some organizations show dissidence on this point, deploring the consensus-building that some organizations seek to impose at this table. Third, with regards to consultations led by the MIFI, most organizations see them as a mere formality to legitimize policies, especially given that COs recommendations are not systematically taken into account, as the Department rather tends to make decisions unilaterally. In short, the characteristics of consultations mainly correspond to the indicators of a relationship of dependence, except for the experience of some organizations at the TCRI.

With regards to "participation", social innovation practices are very limited among organizations in the sample and the participation of beneficiaries in the decision-making process is limited to their presence at the general assembly and the satisfaction questionnaires filled out by users. Needless to say, the situation experienced by the organizations is very far from the co-construction of policies involving the participation of beneficiaries, which is sought in a relationship of autonomy. Nevertheless, the participation experienced by the COs in the sample presents varying degrees of involvement, with some organizations considering that they participate in the formulation process through the TCRI and working committees. Thus, while not close to the ideal of co-construction, neither is the organizations' involvement reduced to the mere implementation of integration policies, which places them in-between the two ideal-types of relationship.

With regards to the dimension of funding, it is mostly composed of service agreements, in comparison to the small amount received for the overall mission, for the few organizations who benefit from this funding arrangement. This is not to mention the dependance of COs on government-based funding and the strict eligibility criteria that they must meet. Contrary to funding in support of the overall mission that, in an autonomous relationship, provides stability and safeguards the autonomy of COs, the financial situation experienced by participants in the sample indicates a relationship that is marked by dependence.

Finally, regarding accountability, the associated measures mainly revolve around a quantitative assessment of the organizations' effectiveness through the Ceriges database that seeks to validate the achievement of pre-set objectives by the MIFI. These upwardly oriented accountability measures aimed at controlling the expenditure of public funds correspond to the indicators of the "dependence" ideal type. In fact, the characteristics specific to an autonomous relationship in which accountability is directed towards beneficiaries, for example through the qualitative evaluation of the services offered, are not very common among the organizations interviewed and almost non-existent at the Department.

To summarize, according to the analysis based on the two ideal-types of relationships, the experience reported by the organizations interviewed of their relationship with the MIFI indicates that it is more characteristic of the "service provider" than of the "autonomous" type. This is

particularly true for the dimensions of recognition, representation, funding and accountability for which very few indicators of "autonomy" were identified. However, the position of the organizations is less clear-cut for the dimensions of participation and consultation, which, although they mostly correspond to the indicators of the type "dependence", also show some traits of "autonomy". Overall, in all its dimensions, the relationship between COs and the MIFI is much closer to dependence than autonomy, although some features specific to the "Quebec model of governance" can be detected, namely the participation and consultation of COs.

These findings were illustrated by organizations in the interviews when asked to describe their relationship with the Immigration Department of Quebec, either through a picture or in their own words. The answers given to this question mirror the results discussed in this chapter. In fact, for some, the relationship is like a "beggar reaching out for help" (Organization B 2020), or "a forced marriage that ended well" (Organization C 2020). For others, it represented a partnership relationship that must be maintained to avoid the risk of subordination (Organization E 2020). Despite differences in the closeness of their relationship with the Department, our answer to the first research question is that organizations feel more like service providers than like autonomous partners of the MIFI. Thus, while the analysis in Chapter 4 confirmed our theoretical expectation that COs have different perceptions of their relationship with the MIFI, the sector analysis presented in Chapter 5 appears to mitigate the variation in the degree of autonomy/dependence among organizations. Taken as a whole, COs in the immigrant integration sector in Quebec are more akin to the "service provider" type than the "autonomous" type.

Chapter 6: Pursuing an Autonomous Social Mission

The results presented in the previous chapter suggest that the relationship between the *Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration* (MIFI) and COs active in the delivery of integration services is more aligned with NPM principles than ACA ideals. This does not mean that organizations in the sample have completely internalized government's norms or that the government is constantly interfering in their practices. While pessimists would see these results as testifying of an attack on the preservation of the values, democratic practices and specificity of ACA, optimists would see it as the emergence of a new social contract between the community and the public sector (Parazelli 1995).

In order to provide an answer to the second research question – Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services pursue an autonomous social mission? – it is important to take a critical and nuanced view, beyond the organizations' perception of their relationship with the MIFI. In response to this question, our research shows that the pursuit of an autonomous social mission is more than often relegated to the background. Indeed, the interviews revealed that COs' discourse is less about reflection on the functioning of ACA than it is about responding to the needs of clients through a service logic similar to that of the private sector. For example, issues related to mechanisms that allow beneficiaries to take ownership of their social actions, as advocated by ACA, were far from central in the responses to the interview questions. The same is true for discussions about democratic spaces that allow members not only to express their point of view, but also to have real control over the activities that concern them. In general, the COs participating in this study are more concerned with implementing services that precisely target client needs and meet them as efficiently as possible.

This is further illustrated by the fact that some of the organizations interviewed congratulate themselves on having adopted a more efficient management approach that is consistent with the practices promoted by the Department (e.g.: Organizations E, F). Thus, the integration of NPM principles is presented as an achievement for some COs, who consider that it has allowed them to have successfully overcome the disorganization they felt was characteristic of the community sector at the end of the 20th century (Organization E 2020; Organization F 2020).

Because of the emphasis on service provision, the power of social transformation and the autonomy of organizations tend to be diminished in favour of greater state control over the development of integration policies. Indeed, although some of the organizations interviewed pursue a social advocacy mission, this is most often done in parallel rather than in combination with the delivery of integration services. In other words, despite the signing of the policy in 2001, some organizations mentioned that the Immigration Department does not recognize their advocacy role in the integration of newcomers (e.g.: Organization C 2020; Organization G 2020). In addition, the provision of the PRSCA that promotes the autonomy and the pursuit of COs' social mission, e.g. the preponderance of funding in support of the overall mission, is not applied to organizations in the sample. The lack of funding for the overall mission raised by several DGs (e.g.: Organization F 2020; Organization G 2020; Organization H 2020) compromises the maintenance of a safe distance between the public and the community sectors.

Therefore, it is not surprising that organizations interviewed consider the maintenance of their autonomy and the pursuit of a social advocacy mission to be their own responsibility. Faced with these structural constraints, the capacity of COs to put forward initiatives that contribute to

social democratization and the participation of beneficiaries in governance processes is limited given the importance of the place occupied by the Department's services. Still, some organizations manage to get around these many pitfalls and minimally anchor their actions in the community rather than being guided by funders (e.g.: organizations C, D, G, H & J). As far as possible, these organizations try to put forward ingenious practices that allow them to break free from the constraints of contract funding and respond to needs that emerge directly from the community[5]. Nevertheless, given the institutional context in which they are operating, it remains extremely difficult for most COs to contribute, on the basis of needs identified by the community, to the development of integration policies with the Department.

Discussion

While results suggest an imbalance toward service provision over the pursuit of a social mission, attention should be paid to the actual meaning that organizations give to their mission. Indeed, although the present study bases its analysis on a more traditional definition of autonomy (e.g. that of ACA), it may be understood differently by community actors, or its meaning may even vary over time. For instance, Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau (2018) demonstrated that organizations have different representations of autonomy, demand to expand the boundaries of the concept, not only in terms of the organizational dimension (management of organizations) but also to include the issue of the autonomy of beneficiaries. Therefore, future studies should focus on how organizations in the immigrant integration sector define autonomy and the pursuit of their social mission. However, given that the interviews highlighted the fact that many organizations have an instrumental reading of ACA, precautions should be taken to take into account the context in which these organizations operate. Indeed, in defining COs' autonomy, one should not be blinded by pressures pushing COs to become an extension of state services. As expressed by Parazelli, because community action has difficulty demonstrating its autonomy in the current context, it is more important than ever to recall the foundations of the specificity of ACA in order not to suffer from voluntary amnesia caused by the increasing pressures to join partnership (230).

In the remaining of this chapter, two of the greatest barriers to the pursuit of an autonomous social mission among COs active in the delivery of integration services in Quebec will be discussed, namely the distribution of funding and the issue of citizen participation. This will be followed by a brief discussion on the manifestation of the specific characteristics of government's relationship with the community sector in Quebec before concluding the chapter.

Distribution of Funding

During the interview, Organization A mentioned that immigrant integration did not benefit from the same kind of support as other policy sectors: "(…) we were the forgotten sector for a very long time. Many other organizations in other sectors had better support for the mission except the Immigration Department." (Organization A 2020). Without necessarily knowing, the DG of this organization was pointing out one of the main obstacles to the autonomy of COs in the immigration sector in Quebec, namely the lack of funding in support of the overall mission.

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[5] For example, the pilot projects developed by Organization J's community workers that promote new ways of accompanying newcomers that clearly meet the needs identified in the field (Organization J 2020).

As an example, in February 2019, the Réseau québécois de l'action communautaire autonome (RQ-ACA) published a document on the evolution of the Quebec government's financial support for community action over a 14-year period, from 2001 to 2015. This document provides data on the distribution of funding by the department according to the three types of funding provided for in the policy, e.g. for the overall mission, for service agreements, and for one-time and short-term projects. In the section of this document devoted to the Immigration Department, it is indicated that support for the overall mission has not exceeded 9% over the last five years and that, conversely, the proportion of service agreements is very high, between 75% and 84%. Furthermore, the author mentions that the number of organizations receiving funding in service agreements (91) or for projects (41) greatly exceeds the number funded in support of the mission (31), which strongly contravenes the spirit of the PRSCA (Métivier 2019, 51). Unfortunately, this situation is not unique to the immigrant integration sector. Although the proportion of financial support for the overall mission is around 58% across all departments, 97% of this type of funding is concentrated in a small group of five departments: *Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux*; *Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale*; *Ministère de la Famille*; *Ministère de la Culture et des Communications*; *Ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport* (6).

Therefore, as expected and as mentioned in the previous chapter, funding in support of the overall mission does not constitute a preponderant part of the budget of COs in the immigrant integration sector, despite the increase in this type of funding in the past year.[6] Not only does this situation contravene to the PRSCA, but more importantly, it has the effect of depriving Quebec organizations active in the delivery of integration services of one of the only safety nets they have to ensure their autonomy. Indeed, funding for the overall mission is intended to ensure the autonomy of COs and the maintenance of a safe distance from the state by specifically supporting the pursuit of their social mission of change (Evans & Shields 2014, 124 as cited in Bushell & Shields 2018, 25). However, when they have no funding option other than service agreements, COs risk sacrificing some of their autonomy to meet funding criteria (Savard et al. as cited in René 2009, 117), which was also observed through the interviews. Furthermore, failure to use this fundamental pillar of the autonomy of COs tends, as expected, to affect not only the way organizations operate, but also their role in political opposition and social change. This can be seen in the results showing that advocacy for immigrant rights is often relegated to the background, giving priority instead to what the organizations are funded for, e.g. service delivery.

In addition, the fact that the Immigration Department relies primarily on service agreements rather than mission support to fund integration organizations is closely associated with the spread of managerial and entrepreneurial governance within government-related organizations, as shown by Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013). In this regard, interviews suggest that the use of NPM principles related to these service agreements may be on the rise in the immigrant integration sector. Evidence pointing to increased demand from government for more efficient service delivery

[6] The current situation is characterized by an important increase in funding to organizations coupled with lower levels of immigration. In the words of Premier François Legault and Immigration Minister Simon Jolin-Barette, this direction taken by the Quebec government in 2019 aims to welcome fewer immigrants in order to better integrate them (Schué 2019). During the interviews, the opinion of organizations was mixed regarding this policy. On the one hand, organizations deplore the decrease in immigration levels, but on the other hand, they welcome the increase in funding. It should also be noted that immigration levels dropped sharply in the year 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent closure of borders (Buzzetti 2020).

includes the adoption of the Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale (MTESS) accountability model, the stricter criteria of Stream 1 of the PASI program, and the creation of a new evaluation directorate. Indeed, Organizations E and I both mentioned that the MIFI is currently importing the MTESS accountability structure which is more rigorous and robust than the one currently used by the Immigration Department (Organization C 2020; Organization I 2020). In addition, even though some aspects remain to be clarified, Organizations E and J agree to say that the accompaniment component (Stream 1) of the new integration program promises to be much more restrictive and constraining than the PRINT has ever been (Organization E 2020; Organization J 2020). Finally, Organizations A and F highlighted the creation of a new evaluation division at MIFI, responsible for monitoring and auditing COs on a regular basis (Organization A 2020; Organization F 2020).

Thus, these new developments all contribute to increasing the control of COs by the Immigration Department, through efficiency and performance evaluation measures. The imposition of these new measures, which seem little contested by the organizations interviewed, raises concerns that the top-down approach inspired by the business sector (Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert 2013, 5) may intensify in the coming years. Given the current difficulty for COs active in the integration of newcomers to reconcile the pursuit of their social mission with the provision of services for the MIFI, these new requirements risk further weakening this difficult reconciliation.

In observing this trend, the question arises as to whether the immigration sector has always been more service-oriented with the Immigration Department, or whether the specificities of ACA were more present among organizations in this sector in the past. As mentioned in the introduction, since the vast majority of studies on the relationship between COs and government in Quebec focus on the health and social services sector, it is more difficult to identify the evolution of this relationship in the immigration integration sector. However, some elements of the interviews suggest that the social mobilization of immigration organizations has been stronger in the past. For instance, when asked how his organization showed its disagreement to MIFI policy, the DG of Organization I recalled past mobilization actions by stressing the abundance of social movements in the 1990s (Organization I 2020). Also, Organizations B, C, D, G and H all expressed the opinion that, before, it used to be easier to relay the needs of the community and communicate with the Department, thus suggesting a change in the relationship between COs and the Quebec Immigration Department. Although this question is beyond the scope of the present study, future research should focus on the evolution of this relationship over time.

Citizen Participation

Other than the lack of funding for the overall mission, the limited, and sometimes even non-existent, place given to citizen participation in the governance processes surrounding integration policies emerges as a significant barrier to the pursuit of an autonomous social mission. Indeed, it was observed that the inclusion of beneficiaries is an issue at the level of COs, whose activities offer few inclusion mechanisms. Our interviews also point that this is a challenge for the MIFI where decision-making tends to be unilateral and without good knowledge of the field. This vision of the different dimensions of citizen participation helps to highlight the multiple problems of representation faced by immigrants.

As discussed in the literature review, ACA is based on citizen involvement through practices of inclusion of those concerned by the social issues in question (Métivier 2017). These

initiatives aim to enable the beneficiaries of community action to define the problems themselves and identify solutions with a view to their emancipation (Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau 2018). Although this objective of appropriation of social acts is specific to ACA (Parazelli 1995), community intervention in general is also characterized by the involvement of the population, contrary to the clientelist logic put forward by NPM (Caillouette 1994, 167). Thus, citizen action is one of the main pillars of the autonomy of organizations which, through their alternative practices, contribute to social transformation with the community in which they are anchored (e.g., Lachapelle 2007, Jetté 2011, Fontaine 2013).

The interviews highlighted some of the organizations' initiatives aimed at the inclusion and participation of immigrants in decision-making processes. Although these few examples are indicative of the idea of inclusion of beneficiaries, citizen participation as advocated by the ACA is far from being a reality in the immigrant integration sector. Indeed, the creation of democratic spaces in which problems and solutions may be identified by immigrants themselves appears to be very difficult for many reasons, including the type of funding received (e.g.: Organization I), the difficulties related to the participation of beneficiaries (e.g.: Organization D), or simply the fact that organizations focus more on service provision (e.g.: Organization G). Given the lack of involvement of newcomers, the definition of their needs tends to rely instead on the expertise that practitioners have gained from working with these populations, as discussed in the previous chapter.

The little representation enjoyed by immigrant populations through COs is further weakened by the scarce participation of organizations themselves in the development of integration policies. As intermediaries between newcomers and the Quebec Immigration Department, COs must in turn rely on an additional intermediary to represent them to the MIFI, namely the TCRI. The board of directors umbrella organization acts as a point of contact to translate the needs of COs to the Department. However, interviews highlighted the limited influence of the TCRI during the elaboration of integration policies, which further undermines the participation of COs in policymaking. Indeed, many organizations in the sample deplored the MIFI's unilateral decision-making, its failure to take recommendations into account and its lack of knowledge of the field.

The result of this situation can be compared to a dialogue of the deaf between, on the one hand, the poor representation of the needs of immigrants and, on the other hand, presumably, a department responding to its own priorities. While it is debatable whether the interests and needs of the host society should take precedence over those of immigrants, the fact remains that the public policy model put forward by the Quebec government is largely recognized as one that favours the participation of civil society in state governance processes and in the democratic construction of public policies (e.g.: Bourque & Verrault 2017 ; Côté, Lachapelle & Bourque 2020 ; Dufour & Montigny 2020; Hamel & Jouve 2006; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Lévesque & Morneau 2005 ; Noel 2015 ; Vaillancourt 2011). In light of the results of this study, one may therefore wonder what has become of the Quebec policy model that values the role of COs in the co-construction of public policies.

Presence of the specific characteristics of the Quebec model

The findings described in the previous sections clearly demonstrate that the pursuit of an autonomous social mission based on alternative practices that promote the participation of beneficiaries in governance practices is not prominent among organizations in the sample.

According to organizations in the sample, this approach is resource-consuming and can difficultly be achieved in the current context in which the quantity of services, rather than their quality, is valued (e.g.: Organization D 2020; Organization H 2020; Organization I 2020). On the contrary, the results of the interviews suggest that the organizations' actions mainly rely on implementing the Department's integration policies according to its own criteria. Beyond the limited social innovation, interviews revealed that COs in the sample do not seek the recognition of a social mission by the MIFI, nor do they oppose the current conditions. In fact, as mentioned before, most of the organizations interviewed do not see any drawbacks to being managed through NPM principles; on the contrary, they derive certain advantages from it. Thus, in addition to the absence of citizen participation and mission-based funding, the passivity of organizations in the face of this context – i.e. the limited social mobilization and political opposition – further reinforces the limitation in pursuing an autonomous social mission. In sum, the pursuit of an autonomous social mission by organizations in the integration sector appears to be weakened not only by the absence of features specific to the Quebec model that are supposed to foster it (citizen participation and mission funding), but also because of the conformity to which COs are committed with the MIFI.

Considering the absence of the core characteristics identified in the literature as distinctive features of the Quebec model, questions may be raised about its specificity. As discussed in the first chapter, authors agree to say that the years in power of the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) marked a break in the social consensus that had been previously established by the Parti Québécois (PQ) (Vaillancourt 2011 ; Noel 2015 ; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010 ; Lachapelle & Bourque 2020 ; Bourque & Verreault 2017) Yet, authors contend that this "reengineering" of governance in Quebec has not succeeded in eliminating the social innovation practices introduced in the 1980s (Haddow 2015 as cited in Noel 2015; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Noel 2018, 2020). In light of our results that suggest the limited, or even non-existent, place dedicated to the pursuit of an autonomous social mission among organizations interviewed, there certainly is reason to question the extent to which progressive social policies have shown resilience. Although this study does not allow us to draw conclusions about the Quebec model per se, there is reason to be concerned about the emergence of a new model of public policies that evacuates the very specificity of the Quebec model, namely the involvement of COs as a source of social change in the governance process. As Hamel & Jouve (2006) explain, the role of organizations is now limited to accompanying or questioning public policies, rather than participating in their construction, which the results of this study seem to illustrate.

As some might rightfully question the relevance of using the Quebec model as a framework for analysis, it is important to recall the initial reasons that motivated this choice. Although it is not unique, the Quebec model presents certain characteristics that distinguish it both in terms of public policies – which are more redistributive and prevented the rise of inequalities (e.g.: Banting & Myles 2013 as cited in Noel 2018, 73) – and in terms of governance – which is intended to be inclusive of civil society actors, particularly with regards to COs (e.g.: Jetté 2011). While the results of this study paint a rather bleak picture of the presence of characteristics specific to the Quebec model in the relationship between government and COs in the immigrant integration sector in Quebec, it appears even more important to conduct the analysis through the lens of this model. Indeed, it allows us to highlight the distance that exists between the relationship as described on paper (i.e., PRSCA) and the way it is experienced by the actors in practice. In theory, we expected the pursuit of an autonomous social mission to be at the heart of COs' relationship with the state. In practice, we observe the strong influence exerted by the government on the activities of COs,

and their compliance with it. The relevance of using the Quebec model therefore lies in that it allows us to position the current role played by COs in the immigrant integration sector compared to what the large body of literature on the Quebec distinctiveness tells us it should be, or rather what it once was.

Although the relationship observed through the results of this research does not correspond to the expectations of the Quebec model as described in the literature, this does not necessarily mean that it is outdated. The potential explanations mentioned throughout this discussion are multiple and not necessarily directly related to the end of a Quebec model – i.e. a dynamic specific to the immigrant integration sector, the devolution of social innovation practices within COs, the closure of the MIFI towards the recognition of organizations, etc. – but unfortunately cannot be tested in the current research design. What we can affirm, however, is that the pursuit of an autonomous social mission as advocated by the ACA movement does not figure prominently among the organizations interviewed.

Conclusion

In an effort to provide an answer to our second research question, this chapter provided a critical and nuanced analysis of the extent to which COs active in the delivery of immigrant integration services in Quebec are able to carry out their social mission. It was argued that the pursuit of an autonomous social mission is hampered by the lack of attention paid to citizen participation mechanisms, as well as the lack of funding for the overall mission. The service delivery role of organizations thus tends to take precedence over their social mission through increased state control in the development of integration policies and the management of COs through NPM principles. While suggesting that, contrary to our theoretical expectation, COs have difficulty pursuing their social mission in combination with their role as service providers for the government, the analysis of this chapter has opened up reflections on the definition of autonomy, the temporality of the service orientation in the immigrant integration sector, and the evolving place of citizen participation in the Quebec model of public policy.

Conclusion

Throughout this research we have attempted to qualify the relationship between the Quebec Immigration Department and community organizations (COs) active in the integration of newcomers. Indeed, given the important place occupied by COs in the governance processes surrounding immigrant integration in the province, two major questions remained unanswered

following the review of the literature on the subject: 1— Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services perceive themselves as service providers or as autonomous partners in their relationship with the Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration? 2—Do Quebec community organizations active in the delivery of immigrant integration services pursue an autonomous social mission?

Based on a theoretical framework reflecting the tensions between the two main modes of governance in the Quebec model of public policy, this study provided an empirical portrait of the immigrant integration sector in Quebec. The qualitative methodology used allowed to gather the perspective of ten COs' leaders with regards to their organization's relationship with the MIFI. Interviews highlighted the tension between their activities as service providers and their role as advocates.

The individual portraits of the organizations interviewed revealed, as expected in response to the first question, heterogenous conceptions of their relationship with the Immigration Department. While for some organizations in the sample the maintain of their autonomy remains a central part of their actions despite the constraints of their commitments to the Department, others conceive of their role as relying solely on the provision of integration services. These differences manifest themselves, among other things, in the proximity that COs have with the MIFI in terms of representation, consultation and participation.

Amidst this diversity, however, the analysis of the overall relationship between COs interviewed and the Immigration Department revealed strong similarities that may be interpreted as to apply to the immigrant integration sector as a whole. Thus, in answer to the first question, organizations in the sample perceive themselves more as service providers than as autonomous partners of the Quebec Immigration Department. In general, the characteristics of their relationship with the MIFI in terms of recognition, representation, consultation, participation, funding and accountability present more traits of the principles of New Public Management (NPM) than those of autonomous community action (ACA). Regarding the answer to the second question, results tend to show that the top-down dynamic inspired by the business sector overrides the bottom-up logic of community action in the immigrant integration sector in Quebec, making it difficult for COs to pursue an autonomous social mission, contrary to expectations.

In an attempt to explain this trend observed in the sample, the discussion highlighted two main lines of inquiry. The first brings to light how the funding of immigrant integration COs in Quebec contravenes the Policy on the Recognition and Support of Community Action (PRSCA) and may thus constitute a barrier to their autonomy. The second concerns the participation of beneficiaries both in organizations' governance and with the MIFI. The lack of space and initiatives granted to citizen participation on both sides leads us to question the Quebec model of public policy. Although this model serves only as a framework for analysis and, therefore, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the evolution of the model itself, there is reason to reflect on this subnational specificity.

Indeed, the literature on the Quebec model highlights the particularities of the province that make it possible to consider it as a model in its own right, distinct from the configurations found elsewhere in Canada (e.g.: Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004; Daigneault, Birch, Béland & Bélanger 2021; Côté, Lévesque, Morneau 2005; Dinan & Noel 2020; Haddow 2014; Hamel & Jouve 2006; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Vaillancourt 2012). More specifically, in the immigrant integration sector, a first notable distinction relates to the fact that Quebec has exclusive

control over integration policies, giving it unparalleled autonomy (e.g., Anctil 2005; Bushell & Shields 2018; Chiasson & Koji 2011; Daniel 2006). Other features specific to the Quebec model include the unique partnership characterizing the relationship between the government and COs that is embodied in the PRSCA (White et al., 1992; Lamoureux, 1994; White, 2012 as cited in Dufour & Montigny 2020, 10). The provision of funding in support of the overall mission dedicated to advocacy for organizations is also identified as a characteristic found only in Quebec (Evans & Shields 2014, 124 as cited in Bushell & Shields 2018, 25). These characteristics specific to the Quebec model support authors' arguments that Quebec COs have greater latitude for advocacy and autonomy (e.g., Germain & Trinh 2011; Jetté 2011; Richmond & Shields 2005; White 2012b). Quebec organizations therefore tend to be positioned as a social force distinct from the state, pursuing their own social mission (e.g., Bachellerie, Shields & Preston 2020; Côté & Simard 2012; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Lachapelle & Bourque 2020).

While the Quebec model is distinct in many respects, the pattern that emerges from the results of this study is that the relationship between the Immigration Department and organizations providing immigrant integration services is more characteristic of the principles of NPM than those of ACA specific to Quebec. Congruent with trends elsewhere that show the limited capacity of organizations to provide holistic settlement services due to pressures from the funder's agenda, the relationship described by Quebec integration COs appears very similar. This finding conflict with the work of many researchers that argue that the Quebec model has demonstrated resilience and continuity (Haddow 2015 cited in Noel 2015; Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Noel 2018, 2020), and that Quebec's subnational differences are still quantifiable today (Bernard & Saint-Arnaud 2004; Haddow 2014; Mathieu, Doucet & McKay 2020; Daigneault, Birch, Béland & Bélanger 2021) despite the rise of neoliberalism that has affected the province. Although the abundance of literature pointing to the specificities of the Quebec model forces us to consider distinctions specific to the province, our findings raise questions about whether and how these structural differences materialize in reality.

One of the major strengths of this study is that the interviews with community leaders allowed us to verify the concrete application of the literature and government policies on the ground. As mentioned earlier, few studies have focused on how the relationship between the government and Quebec COs unfolds in practice, particularly in the area of immigrant integration. Thus, most of the literature is based on an analysis of official policies and the changing societal context, without necessarily measuring their application empirically. For example, a recent study was conducted by Bachellerie, Shields & Preston on the role of organizations in the immigrant integration process in Quebec. Based primarily on an analysis of official documents, it revealed similar results to the present research. The converging findings relate to the inequalities between organizations in terms of accessibility to the MIFI and obtaining regular funding, the prominent role of the TCRI as an intermediary for representation and consultation, the marginality of mission-based funding, and changes pointing to future dynamics focused on greater efficiency (Bachellerie, Shields & Preston 2020). However, unlike this study, the effect of neoliberalism on COs is only identified as one of the major trends affecting the Quebec community sector. The article concludes that Quebec remains a province apart from the rest of Canada in terms of its legislation and its relationship with the community sector, in large part because of its tradition of recognizing community action and its activist past. Similar findings were highlighted in studies by Bushell & Shields (2018) and White (2012a) who, comparing the relationship of organizations with

government between Quebec and Ontario, conclude that the Quebec community sector is exceptionally autonomous.

Without generalizing to the Quebec community sector or to the immigrant integration sector as a whole, the discrepancies between the results of this research and those of studies concluding that the Quebec case is exceptional may well lie in the possible gap between theory and practice. Indeed, when put into perspective with previous research on community organizations in Quebec, the results of the present study highlight the importance of gathering the perspectives of the actors involved in order to identify possible gaps between the relationship as it is described on paper and the way it is experienced in the field. While based on the literature, public policy documents and the historical evolution of the Quebec model, one would believe in an autonomous relationship between immigrant integration organizations and the MIFI, the experience reported by the leaders of the organizations interviewed seems to be closer to that of the Immigrant Serving Agencies (ISAs) in the other Canadian provinces in that it is characteristic of the "service provider" type and virtually free of the pursuit of an autonomous social mission.

However, before concluding that the specificities of the Quebec model favouring the autonomy of COs are not applicable to the immigrant integration sector in Quebec, it would be necessary to take this research further. Indeed, it should be noted that the results reflect the experience of the ten DGs interviewed. To strengthen our understanding of the experience of COs in the immigration integration sector, additional cases should be added to the sample and, more importantly, a variety of perspectives should be collected, including those of the MIFI, the TCRI and the immigrants themselves. Taking into account the various perspectives of the different actors involved would help to nuance and put everyone's words into perspective, as well as to provide an overall view of the relationship. Second, it is important to reiterate that, unlike other community sectors (e.g., health and social services), little research has previously been published on the relationship between integration COs and the Quebec government. Thus, the relationship between organizations and the Immigration Department as described in this research is a snapshot in time when the interviews were conducted and cannot be compared over time. Furthermore, our results do not explain whether the immigrant integration sector is different from other sectors where organizations are heavily involved in service delivery in Quebec. Nor is it possible to determine whether the trends identified in this research are due to the characteristics of users of immigrant integration services. Thus, beyond comparison over time, a research including the different community sectors in Quebec would allow for comparison of the dynamics between sectors and to determine whether the "service provider" type observed is a reality unique to the immigrant integration sector or a general trend.

The ultimate test of the specificity of the Quebec model, however, would be to compare the relationship between the organizations and the Quebec Immigration Department to that of IAAs in other Canadian provinces. Like the research of, for example, Daigneault, Bernard & Saint-Arnaud (2004), Birch, Béland & Bélanger (2021), Haddow (2014) and Mathieu, Doucet & McKay (2020), an interprovincial study would allow us to put the specificities of the Quebec model into perspective by comparing the relationship between COs and the government elsewhere in Canada. Thus, beyond testing the application of Quebec's policy governing the relationship with the community sector in practice, it would make it possible to put the results obtained into perspective regarding the way it is experienced by organizations across the country.

Despite these limitations and possible improvements, one aspect that emerges from this study is the importance of collaboration between COs and the government in ensuring the successful integration of newcomers in the province. As mentioned by several organizations interviewed in relation to the dimension of representation, community workers have the best knowledge of the needs of immigrants because of their close interaction with them in the delivery of services (Organization A 2020; Organization B 2020; Organization C 2020; Organization D 2020; Organization G 2020; Organization I 2020; Organization J 2020).

Although it may seem to belong to a bygone era, we should not forget the origins of the Quebec model and the precepts that underlie it. The participation of civil society and the important role played by COs in the governance process were the bearers of a democratic ideal that sought to include all society actors in the management of public affairs. Perceived as ensuring the legitimacy of liberal democracies, consultation and partnership with civil society actors, which was at the heart of public power in Quebec, served to integrate the preferences and aspirations of individuals in the management of public services (Côté & Lévesque 2009; Hamel & Jouve 2006).

Therefore, some authors argue that community practices are currently too often associated with inefficiency when they are not subject to the principles of NPM. They call for a renewal of social innovation in Quebec based on democratization and the participation of all actors in collective decision-making, as it was valued in the 1980s (e.g. Klein, Fontan, Harrisson & Lévesque 2010; Lachapelle & Bourque 2020; Hamel & Jouve 2006; Vaillancourt 2018). Considering the results of the present research project, it is clear that it is neither conceivable nor desirable to completely eradicate the principles of NPM from the management of COs. However, it would be appropriate to rethink the relationship between the Quebec government and the community sector in terms of the institutional conditions that promote the autonomy of organizations, starting with respect for the provisions of the policy (PRSAC), particularly the predominance of mission-based funding. The results pointing to a relationship of dependence therefore open the door to a reflection on the application of and compliance with the terms of this policy, or even to the renewal of the policy to ensure the autonomy of the community sector in Quebec.

Ensuring a better alignment between the needs of the host society and those of immigrants by allowing them to participate in negotiating the conditions of their integration could prove doubly beneficial for the Quebec government. On the one hand, it would allow it to ensure the best possible integration of newcomers into Francophone society (Blad & Couton 2009, 654). On the other hand, it would allow Quebec to shine on the national and international scenes as a regional government implementing an integration model based on citizen participation (Gagnon 2009, 40). In a context where the province of Quebec will increasingly have to rely on immigration to address serious labour shortages (Ducas 2021), a successful integration would meet not only the needs of immigrants, but also those of the Quebec population.

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Appendix A

Summary table of relationship dimensions

Dimensions	Indicators		Examples of studies in Quebec literature
Recognition	ACA	Autonomous social mission; specific and distinct identity; alternative service offer; recognition of beneficiaries	Laforest & Phillips (2001); White (2012b); Fontaine (2013); Jetté (2011); Parazelli (1995); Vaillancourt (2011)
	NPM	Expertise as service providers; state-conferred legitimacy; identity that is not distinct from the funder's	
Representation	ACA	Political opposition; collective identification of needs; citizen capacity to increase power in decisions	Hamel & Jouve (2006); Noel & Martin (2002); Côté, Lévesque & Morneau (2009);
	NPM	Individual responsibility; professional knowledge in the identification of clients' needs	
Participation	ACA	Formulation + implementation; co-construction with beneficiaries	
	NPM	Implementation only; CO's instrumentalization; programs designed by outsiders	
Consultation	ACA	Bottom-up; aid to political decision-making	Laforest (2000); Parazelli, Campeau & Gaudreau (2018)
	NPM	Top-down; to legitimize policies; limited to board-of-director members; consensus-building	
Funding	ACA	In support of the overall mission	Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013); Métivier (2019); Côté & Simard (2012)
	NPM	Service agreements; one-time funding	
Accountability	ACA	Directed towards the community; qualitative evaluations; minimum reporting respecting CO's methods	St-Germain, Grenier, Bourque & Pelland (2017); Choudry & Shragge (2011); Depelteau, Fortier & Hébert (2013)
	NPM	Directed upwards to the funders; quantitative and measurable objectives; to control the spending of resources	

Appendix B

Introduction

Je commencerai l'entrevue en me présentant et en demandant au gestionnaire de se présenter et de décrire son rôle au sein de son organisation. Ensuite, le gestionnaire sera invité à faire une brève présentation de son organisation et de son histoire. L'entretien se poursuivra avec les questions suivantes :

1. Mis à part le financement octroyé par le MIFI, quelles sont les autres sources de revenu de votre organisme?
    - Quelles sont les modalités reliées à l'obtention de ces autres sources de revenu?
    - En ce qui concerne le financement du MIFI, quelles en sont les conditions d'octroi?

2. Veuillez décrire les mesures de reddition de compte et d'évaluation auxquelles votre organisme est soumis.
    - Pourriez-vous décrire les ressources que votre organisme doit mobiliser afin de rencontrer ces attentes?
    - Votre organisme met-il en place des mesures de reddition de compte à l'égard de ses bénéficiaires?

3. Diriez-vous que la mission de votre organisme est davantage axée sur la défense des droits des personnes immigrantes ou sur la prestation de services d'intégration? Veuillez expliquer.
    - Diriez-vous que le MIFI reconnaît la mission poursuivie par votre organisme?
    - Comment votre organisme se positionne-t-il par rapport au mouvement d'action communautaire autonome?

4. Pourriez-vous énumérer les principales instances de consultation auxquelles votre organisme prend part, tant au niveau des populations que vous desservez qu'au niveau du gouvernement?
    - Dans ces instances, votre organisme joue-t-il un rôle de représentation des besoins des populations immigrantes? Veuillez expliquer.
    - Dans ces instances, votre organisme participe-t-il à l'élaboration des politiques d'intégration d'une quelconque façon? Veuillez expliquer.
    - Lors de ces consultations, diriez-vous que les opinions divergentes sont davantage encouragées ou découragées?

5. Omis les instances formelles que vous avez énumérées, y a-t-il d'autres instances plus informelles de consultation, représentation et/ou élaboration de politiques d'intégration auxquelles votre organisme participe? Veuillez expliquer.

6. Dans vos propres mots, comment décririez-vous la relation que votre organisme entretient avec le MIFI?
    - Si vous pouviez m'expliquer cette relation à l'aide d'un dessin, à quoi cela ressemblerait-il?

Appendix C

TEMPLATE: INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE DELIVERY OF INTEGRATION SERVICES IN QUEBEC

Cher (*insérer le nom du participant potentiel*),

Je mène actuellement une recherche de maîtrise à l'Université Concordia sur le thème de la relation entre le gouvernement et les organismes communautaires dans le contexte de la prestation de services d'intégration au Québec.

En tant que DG de (*insérer le nom de l'organisme*), je désirerais mener une entrevue avec vous, via la plateforme Zoom, à une date et heure qui vous conviennent. Je suis consciente des contraintes de temps auxquelles vous faites face et apprécie toute durée de temps que vous serez en mesure de m'allouer.

L'entrevue portera sur vos expériences concernant les relations de votre organisme avec le ministère de l'Immigration du Québec dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des politiques d'intégration. Ainsi, vous devrez répondre aux questions au meilleur de vos connaissances et aucune recherche ne sera requise de votre part.

Comme pour d'autres études universitaires qui reposent sur la coopération de divers acteurs politiques, votre participation est entièrement volontaire et vos propos demeureront confidentiels en tout temps. Avant le début officiel de l'entrevue, je repasserai en détail avec vous les moyens mis en place pour protéger votre confidentialité. De plus, il est possible, avec votre permission, que l'entrevue soit enregistrée. Si tel est le cas, le protocole de stockage et de collecte des données vous sera expliqué en détail.

Votre participation contribuera grandement à la connaissance des processus de gouvernance entourant la mise en œuvre des politiques d'intégration et, par le fait même, à la compréhension des processus façonnant l'intégration des nouveaux arrivants au Québec.

Je vous remercie de votre considération et attendrai votre réponse avec impatience.

Meilleures salutations,

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