

Attunement and Individuation: Existential Tonality in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

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## Abstract

### **Attunement and Individuation: Existential Tonality in Heidegger's *Being and Time***

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In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in attempting to provide a thinking of individuation within the bounds of Heidegger's early thought. Common to such attempts is the key insight that Dasein's individuality is not simply given, and thus requires an existentially-validated account which determines how individuality is essentially constituted as a component of being-in-the-world. The question of individuation, taken in this light, analyzes the nexus which links the manifestation of Dasein's ontic individuality to the unfolding of a field of articulated relationality, in which Dasein is constitutively embedded. It is the sketches of this primary field, as they determine the process of individuation, that this essay intends through an analysis of the existential role of attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) in *Being and Time*. As such, we will demonstrate how attunement, as the primary layer of Dasein's being-in, constitutes the field of articulation which individuates Dasein through a dynamic process of relational differentiation. Thus, attunement, prior to both understanding and discourse, denotes the aspect of being-in-the-world through which Dasein's individuality is primarily articulated. In addition, by proposing a more general reading of the relationship between individuation and attunement, we supplement the existing scholarship which (following Heidegger's lead) privileges the *Grundstimmung* of anxiety in the question of Dasein's individuality.

## Attunement and Individuation: Existential Tonality in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

“Just things are by nature stronger than their contraries” - Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 4.

“We are moments of an Open field”- Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limit of Phenomenology*, x.

In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in attempting to provide a thinking of individuation within the bounds of Heidegger's early thought.<sup>1</sup> Common to such attempts is the key insight that Dasein's individuality is not simply given, and thus requires an existentially-validated account which determines how individuality is essentially constituted as a component of being-in-the-world. The question of individuation, taken in this light, analyzes the nexus which links the manifestation of Dasein's ontic individuality to the unfolding of a field of articulated relationality, in which Dasein is *constitutively* embedded. It is the sketches of this primary field, as they determine the process of individuation, that this essay intends through an analysis of the existential role of attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) in *Being and Time*. As such, we will demonstrate how attunement, as the *primary* layer of Dasein's being-in, constitutes the field of articulation which *individuates* Dasein through a dynamic process of relational differentiation. Thus, attunement prior to both understanding and discourse, denotes the aspect of being-in-the-world through which Dasein's individuality is primarily articulated. Our thesis is similar in type, but different in dimension, to Stiegler's claim that the “already-there of historicity” is “very close to the Simondonian pre-individual” (Stiegler 2009, 46).<sup>2</sup> The connection is found in the fact that both attunement and historicity refer back to a dimension of “bringing-before,” in which the individual is *constituted* in relation to a context which exceeds and precedes it. In other words, the dimension of bringing-before highlights the *originary* of dispossession and the relation to the other in the constitution of Dasein's individuality. In addition, by proposing a more general reading of the relationship between individuation and attunement, we supplement the existing scholarship which (following Heidegger's lead) privileges the *Grundstimmung* of anxiety in the question of Dasein's individuality.<sup>3</sup>

Our analysis will proceed in three parts. First, we will demonstrate how a deconstruction of the notion of substance is necessary for approaching the problem of individuation in *Being and Time*. We will

show how this passes through a *positive* resignification of possibility, which conditions the diverse manifestations of Dasein's modal structure. Second, we will demonstrate how the primary field of Dasein's being-in is constituted via the modalization of attunement. With this in place, we will attempt to analyze and develop the role of this field of affective modality in the articulation of concrete individuality. Third, to demonstrate the strength of this reading, we will provide a re-interpretation of Dasein's *being-with* on the basis of affective modalization.

Before proceeding, a couple of notes on translation and methodology are necessary. Throughout, we follow Stambaugh's translation of *Befindlichkeit* as "attunement." This translation, vastly preferable to "state-of-mind" in the Robinson translation, has the advantage of more readily signaling a *relational context* as crucial for determining the existential structure of attunement. As Dewell notes in his study, *The Semantics of German Prefixes*, the German "be-" implies a structure of signification characterized by a field of open, multiplex and diffuse *paths* (Dewell 2015, 54). It does not intend a "compact object" that would occupy a single defined portion of space, but rather a "mass or multiplex with a flexible shape" (Dewell, 55).<sup>4</sup> Thus, the "be-" indicates that a dynamic and open field of attuned relations, a *polyphony* of Being, is determinant in the constitution of Dasein.<sup>5</sup> However, in gaining this relational connotation, the translation of *Befindlichkeit* as "attunement" loses the crucial German resonance of *Befinden*, which appears in everyday usage as part of the expression "*Wie befinden Sie sich?*" and is roughly equivalent to the English "*how are you?*". The use of *Befinden*, a compound of the "be-" prefix and the word *Finden* or finding, more literally asks about how one *finds oneself* situated, and thus makes reference to the multiplex space of relations in the process of self-finding. This semantic analysis indicates the preliminary space of our question.

In addition, we for the most part follow Stambaugh's translation of *Stimmung* as "mood." This translation has the advantage of clearly signifying the ontic phenomena that Heidegger is interested in. However, the everyday nearness of "moods," and the subjective connotations that arise from this "ontic clarity," has the potential to obfuscate the *non-subjective* being of moodedness. Thus, we will sometimes re-translate *Stimmung* as "tonality." This translation, inspired by Jean-Luc Nancy's translation of

*Stimmung* as the French *tonalité*, has the benefit of de-psychologizing the phenomena of moods, as well as calling attention to a secondary meaning of *Stimmung*, which refers to the tuning of an instrument.<sup>6</sup> The audiological or *tonographical* translation of *Stimmung* amplifies the connotations of sonority which are already present in the root *stimme*, which can be translated as “voice.” Thus, this emphasis has the benefit of plugging in to the sonorous web of attunement, listening, and resonating that will become increasingly important for Heidegger as his thought develops.<sup>7</sup>

Another major advantage of the Stambaugh translation is the inclusion of Heidegger’s marginal comments from 1967. Given the constructive aims of this project, we will make use of these comments as points of orientation for our own interpretation, without intending to resolve or treat explicitly the tensions that arise between the existential analysis of Dasein and the later work on the history of Being. Rather, it is our intention to approach *Being and Time* as a text of open paths, many of which diverge from Heidegger’s own developments. It is also for this reason that we avoid the convention of foregrounding the mood of *anxiety* in our analysis.<sup>8</sup> Despite the fact that all modes of existence are predicated on the originarity of finite time, a dimension that is primordially disclosed in anxiety, we think that the analysis of attunement in Division I foregrounds a field of existentiality which calls for further development.<sup>9</sup>

### **Section 1: Method, Substance, Dasein**

In this section, we will explicate Heidegger’s account of existential analysis, and demonstrate how a critique of substantialist individuality is necessitated therein. I will begin by examining Heidegger’s definition of Dasein at the outset of *Being and Time*. I will then turn to the deconstruction of the privilege of the present-at-hand or *objective presence* (*Vorhandenheit*) to demonstrate how it determines the traditional account of the being of the individual as *subject*. Following this, I will show how a rethinking of Dasein passes through a deconstruction of coextensivity of the present, the subject, and *actuality*. By clearing the space for a re-interpretation of Dasein in terms of *possibility* and *relationality*, rather than

pure self-contained actuality, we will show how Heidegger delineates the task of ontological phenomenology in specifically *modal* terms, as possible ways of being-in relation.

Given that the analytic of Dasein is produced as preparatory step in the approach to fundamental ontology or the meaning of Being in general, Heidegger's introduction to the theme of Dasein takes the form of a justification of its exemplarity as a "guide" for ontological interpretation. As Heidegger writes,

Dasein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being. Thus it is constitutive of the being of Dasein to have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being. It is proper to this being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its being (Heidegger 2010, 11/12).

Thus, Heidegger argues that Dasein is *ontically* distinct in that it is *already* related to its own being. In other words, Dasein is ontico-ontological in its essence because it *is* in such a way as to be related to its "own" being. Contrary to things which simply occur, Dasein is essentially defined by this concern for Being. However, the passage cited above contains a possible ambiguity pertaining to the clause "concerned about *its very being* [my emphasis]." How is this being to be interpreted? In a later marginal comment, Heidegger writes, "But in this case, being not only as the being of the human being (existence)... Being-in-the-world includes *in itself* the relation of existence to being-in-the-whole" (Heidegger 2010, 11/12). This footnote develops a key theme already at work in *Being and Time*: the critique of subjective interiority. The being which Dasein is *concerned* about is not its "own" being understood as a self-contained individuality. Concern or understanding does not take the form of self-apprehension or reflection, either mediated or immediate. Rather, as being-in-the-world, Dasein's being is *in its essence* individuated in relation to Being as such. It *is* insofar as it dwells concernedly (Da) in the clearing of Being (Sein). Thus, the developed meaning of the ontico-ontological essence of Dasein is determined by this relation of Dasein's existence to the openness of Being. Dasein is as receptively

thrown into the trans-individual openness in which it finds itself. It follows that an account of individuation must be primordially determined by this being-opened in relation to Being.

This interpretation of the ontic-ontological priority of Dasein is supported by two further marginal comments. Allow us to quote them together:

Dasein is exemplary because it is the co-player [*das Bei-spiel*, which literally means ‘example’] that in its essence as Da-sein (perduring [*wahrend*] the truth of Being) plays to and with being - brings it into the play of resonance [*Anklangs*] (Heidegger 2010, 6/7).

Da-sein: as held out into the nothingness of beyng [*Seyn*], held as relation (Heidegger 2010, 7/8).

These quotations both signal the necessity of thinking Dasein’s individuation in *resonance* (*Anklang*) with the unfolding of Being as the open time-space of relationality. To say that Dasein is “held-as-relation” is to indicate that the being which Dasein is concerned with is *inseparable* from the field of relationality in which it is “held.” This holding is a holding-open which is essentially a holding-with. The resonance of Dasein and Being, their co-playing, cannot be thought of in oppositional terms, which would contrast an already individuated subject and an individuated domain of objects. Rather, to be held-as-relation is to be always-embedded in a field of resonances, to be constituted in the play of *resonating* itself. In this claim, we approach the verbal mood of the *middle voice*, insofar as Being is to be thought as a field of relational (and thus, differential) resonating prior to and constitutive of determinate individuation, and thus is neither active nor passive, subject nor object.<sup>10</sup>

It is particularly striking, and important for our purposes, that Heidegger deploys a field of auditory terms in this later self-interpretation. It is our view that this is indicative of a deeper movement, well identified on the path of Heidegger’s thought, that begins to privilege a unique mode of listening “receptivity” *over* the activity and remnants of *willfulness* in *Being and Time*.<sup>11</sup> With this frame in mind, we will now turn more directly to the existential analytic.

The space of existential analysis is grounded in a distinction between two modes of Dasein's relation to its existence. Heidegger terms the first mode of understanding *existentiell*. Existentiell understanding delineates the everyday self-understanding of Dasein, in which it interprets itself in terms of its factual existence and particularized field of possibility. This is a pre-theoretic dimension for which, thankfully, the "transparency of the ontological structure of existence is not necessary" (Heidegger 2010, 11/12). By contrast, *existential* understanding, and its correlate method of existential analysis, is aimed at the structure of "what constitutes existence" as such (Heidegger 2010, 11/12). This distinction is derivative of the distinction between the ontic and the ontological; *existentiell* understanding is concerned with beings, whereas existential understanding approaches the Being of said beings. However, despite the distinction, it is important to note how tightly linked the *existentiell* and the existential dimensions are in Heidegger's analysis: the being of Dasein is, in a certain sense, to *be* ontically individuated. As Heidegger writes, "The roots of the existential analysis, for their part, are ultimately *existentiell*, *i.e. they are ontic*" (Heidegger 2010, 12/13). The existential question, then, is to determine the Being of this ontic individuation, its *constitutive* structure. Thus, it is important to note that onticity is the *manifestation* of existential-structural modality; it is the ontic variation of existential structure itself.

The structure of existentiality is for the most part concealed from Dasein. As Heidegger writes,

Dasein is ontically not only what is near or even nearest - we ourselves *are it*...Nevertheless, or precisely for this reason, it is ontologically farthest. True, it belongs to its most proper being to have an understanding of being and to sustain an interpretation of it. But this does not at all mean that the most readily available pre-ontological interpretation of its own being could be adopted as a guideline (Heidegger 2010, 15/15).

One of the major methodological difficulties of *Being and Time* follows from this point: the vague, pre-ontological understandings of Being that we carry constantly crop up in the process of interpretation. Consequently, the methodological demands of existential analysis require an intense and vigilant self-



critique to prevent ontologically unclarified notions from imposing themselves in the path of analysis.<sup>12</sup> Thus, via an operation which might be termed an existential reduction, Heidegger seeks to allow the existentiality of Dasein to come light as it shows itself “on its own terms,” in which no arbitrary “self-evident” ideas of Being and reality are applied without “ontological deliberation” (Heidegger 2010, 16/16).

With the aim of getting our themes of attunement and individuation properly in view, we will now treat one of the most persistent pre-interpretations of being: the interpretation of existence (*existentia*) as being-present. Heidegger writes:

According to the tradition, *existentia* ontologically means being-present [*Vorhandensein*] a kind of being which is essentially inappropriate to the being which has the character of Dasein. We can avoid confusion by always using the interpretive expression *objective presence* [*Vorhandenheit*] for the term *existentia*, and by attributing existence [*Existenz*] as a determination of being only to Dasein (Heidegger 2010, 41/42).

Thus, the traditional interpretation of being as *existentia* concerns a privileging of the *temporal* modality of the present. Directly following from this is a privileging of *actuality* as the meaning of Being. Despite Stambaugh’s translation of *Vorhandenheit* as objective presence, this privileging of actuality is actually most pernicious in its determination of the being of subjectivity. As Heidegger writes:

Historiographically, the intention of the existential analytic can be clarified by considering Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the *cogito sum* as the point of departure for all modern philosophical questioning.” He investigates the *cogitare* of the *ego* - within certain limits. But the *sum* he leaves completely undiscussed, even though it is just as primordial as the *ego*. Our analytic raises the question of the being of the *sum*. (Heidegger 2010, 45/45).

Thus, for Heidegger, Descartes' analysis of the *cogito sum* is supplemented by a covert pre-interpretation of the *sum* as *existentia* or being-present. In other words, the relation of the being of the *Cogito* to actuality remains unquestioned. This is crucial, for as we will show, Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein hinges on a rethinking of the ontological status of *possibility*. However, this critique of the *Sum* as being-present also necessarily implicates the *form* of egoity as restrictive determination of Dasein's being. As Heidegger writes,

One of our first tasks will be to show that the point of departure from an initially given *ego* and subject totally fails to see the phenomenal content of Dasein. Every idea of a "subject" - unless refined by a previous ontological determination, still posits the *subjective ontologically* along with it, no matter how energetic one's ontic protestations against the "substantial soul" or the "reification of consciousness" (Heidegger 2010, 45/46).

Thus, egoity itself, as the determination of the subject, emerges out of the privileging of present actuality. On this view, the subject is a determinate and closed region, bounded by the solidity of substance. By contrast, for Heidegger, Dasein is irreducible to an objectively present entity, and "the characteristics to be found in this being are thus not present "attributes" of an objectively present being...but rather possible ways for it to be *and only this* [my emphasis]"(Heidegger 2010, 41/42). Thus, Dasein's individuality is to be found in the dimension of ways and modes, and not in the presence of a given actuality. As such, individuality itself must be divorced from an identification with simple *numerical* unity or indivisibility.

For the classical view, subjectivity as the form of *individuality* is foundationally determined by identity, interpreted as the actuality of its being-present. Heidegger's analysis contests the privileging of actuality and identity *over* possibility and variation. This implies a rethinking of the essence of subject-property structure. For Dasein's individuality is not to be found in a *subjectum* that relates itself to a multiplicity of attributes. Rather, multiplicity and variation, as diverse *modes* (or ways) of Being, constitute the primary existential field of Dasein's *individuation*. Crucially, this is unthinkable *without*

*engaging the question of Being*, and the deconstruction of being as being-present. In other words, the privileging of *actuality* has foreclosed primacy of variation, which, for Heidegger, constitutes the dimension of Dasein's individuation. Thus, a displacement occurs which is not a simple reversal: the individual maintains its being, but the *primacy* of its identity with itself as the *ground* of its individuality is put in question. As Heidegger writes,

But if the self is conceived “only” as a way of being of this being, then that seems tantamount to volatilizing the authentic “core” of Dasein. But such fears are nourished by the distorted presumption that the being in question really has, at bottom, the kind of being of something objectively present, even if one avoids attributing to it the solidifying element of a corporeal thing (Heidegger 2010, 114/117).

It is on this basis that we reject Wrathall's reading of Dasein's individuality on the basis of what he terms “ontological intuitionism” (Wrathall 2017, 74). Though obviously aware that Dasein is not an existent substance, Wrathall's use of the notion of *intuition* belies a certain positivism at the heart of his account of authenticity. For Wrathall, authentic self-hood concerns a kind of “sight” “unmediated by concepts” in which Dasein *perceives* its radical individuality, and achieves a “perspicuous view of being a self as a whole” (Wrathall, 83). In our view, however, this achievement of *radical* individuation (conditioned by the attunement of *Angst*, which is rarely mentioned in Wrathall's argument) occurs on the basis of a *limit* experience: the nullity of Dasein at its most individuated is not an “intuition” but a *threshold of feeling*, in which Dasein's solitude is manifest. It emerges in an *interruption* of understanding, and discloses Dasein as menaced by nullity in its very constitution. This lack of engagement with the disruptive mood of angst, as the attuned disclosure of essential *nullity and incompleteness* of Dasein's process of individuation, is the condition for a covert reassertion of an intuitionistic conception of individuality.

Before turning more closely to the question of possibility, we would like to clarify our understanding of the relation between individuality and relationality. As Heidegger writes, echoing earlier passages on ontic distinctiveness of Dasein,

The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The being of this being is always *mine* [*Jemeinigkeit*]. As the being of this being, it is entrusted to its own being. It is being about which this being is concerned. [Translation added] (Heidegger 2010, 41-42/41-42).

The late Heidegger provides a series of marginal comments that aim to dispel any trace of the subjectivizing interpretations of Dasein that emerged after the publication of *Being and Time*.<sup>13</sup> The first mention of “being” in the claim “it is being about which this being is concerned” is re-interpreted as “historical being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 2010, 42/42). Thus, as we demonstrated at the beginning of this section in the analysis of co-playing, the being with which Dasein is concerned is essentially determined by its being-held by a process of a transindividual differentiation. Historicity, then, cannot be conceived as a linking-up of present-at-hand subjects by a trans-historical operation of synthesis, but rather the sharing of an open field, a multiplex space of trans-mission. In a second marginal comment, Heidegger defines “mineness” as “being appropriated” (Heidegger 2010, 42/42). In other words, the mineness of Dasein *is* insofar as it is appropriated by a field that constitutes and exceeds it. There is no individualized interiority because Dasein is being-in-the-world as being-in-the-whole. Individuation thus must be thought via the being-appropriated of Dasein by Being.

It is not simply a historical curiosity that the 20th-century’s paradigmatic thinker of individuation, Gilbert Simondon, also performs an operation similar to the de-struction of the history of Being, which centers on a critique of substantialist conceptions of individuality, handed down by Aristotle and Democritus. In consonance with Heidegger, this reconceptualization also passes through a major re-evaluation of the ontological status of *possibility*.<sup>14</sup> Dasein *is* “primarily being-possible” (Heidegger 2010, 139/143).

This being-possible, which “Dasein always is existentially” is critically distinguished from the conception of *empty* possibility of something present-at-hand which has not yet happened (Heidegger 2010, 139/143). This definition of possibility as empty and contingent is derived from a partial negation of actuality, and thus, determines possibility as a *lower degree of being*, “less than reality and necessity” (Heidegger 2010, 139/143). By contrast, the existentiality of the possible signifies “the most primordial and the ultimate *positive* ontological determination of Dasein” [emphasis added] (Heidegger 2010, 139/143).

It is our view that the *positive* resignification of possibility as the primordial determination of Dasein implicates the entire task of existential analysis in its wake. For when Heidegger claims that “Ontology is only possible as Phenomenology,” phenomenality - the being of beings - is *itself* interpreted in terms of “modifications and derivatives” (Heidegger 2010, 18/19). Thus, the existential-ontological analysis of Dasein must take the form of articulating a dense, layered field of modality, in which modal structure is determined as the *nexus* of phenomenally-differentiated streaming unfoldings of possibility. Crucially, then, *structure and possibility are not antithetical determinations*.<sup>15</sup> Existential structures *are not* present-at-hand, definitive *systems* of pure actuality, but rather, variation is the constitution of structure and structure is the articulation of variation. Their reciprocity opens the individuation of the possible.<sup>16</sup> It is this dynamic of constitution which we will identify in the primary sketches of attunement. Furthermore, is not the trajectory of phenomenology itself defined by an increasingly renewed meditation on the theme of possibility, up to its constitutive limit in im-possibility?<sup>17</sup> Consider the prevalence of notions of the Open in later Heidegger, later Merleau-Ponty, as well as freedom in Nancy, which aim at the *possibility of possibility itself*.<sup>18</sup> Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is operative at a more preliminary, factual level than on a transcendental reflection on the gift of possibility itself. It is thus that Division 1 provides the path towards an *exploration* of modalization, the intimacy of field-work, rather than a meditation on the opening of opening itself. This is not a strict contrast, but rather a matter of emphasis, for Dasein’s modal structure bears within itself a necessary dependence on the reception and taking-up of this gift.

The previous reflections conclude our methodological reflection on existential analysis. Before turning to attunement, we would like to briefly stage the question of individuation, everydayness and being-with. Concerning the deconstruction of subjectivity, and the primordially of being-with, Heidegger writes: “The clarification of being-in-the-world showed that a mere subject “is” not initially and is also never given. And thus, an isolated I without others is in the end just as far from being given initially” (Heidegger 2010, 113/116). As we have shown, the idea of a pre-given substantial individuality, which would then have to enter into relations with others and the world, is denied as a result of the basic critique of *Vorhandenheit*. In fact, Heidegger claims that, *for the most part*, Dasein’s everydayness is constituted by a constant dis-individuation. He writes:

At the beginning of the analysis, Dasein is precisely not to be interpreted in the differentiation of a particular existence; rather it is to be uncovered in the indifferent way in which it is initially and for the most part. This indifference [*Indifferenz*] of the everydayness of Dasein is *not nothing*; but rather, a positive phenomenal characteristic. All existing is how it is out of this kind of being, and back into it. We call this everyday indifference of Dasein *averageness* [*Durchschnittlichkeit*] (Heidegger 2010, 43/43).

It is our view that this *in-differentiation* in which Dasein’s particularity is folded into the averageness of the everyday must be read as an *existential-ontological* mode. It speaks to the very being of Dasein. In averageness, Dasein *is* in the mode of being dis-individuated. This “strong” ontological reading of the differentiation-indifferentiation spectrum is opposed to a kind of reading which would argue that Dasein’s individuated being is ontologically prior or more “basic,” and that averageness “hides” it like a cloak covers an object.<sup>19</sup> This type of reading is ruled out by the fact that Dasein’s being is essentially determined *as* modes of possibility, not present-at-hand actuality. It is thus our view that Dasein exists in *degrees* of individuation, in which it is more or less individuated in relation to others and the world. We will return to this in Section 3.

## Section 2: Attunement, Modes, Variation

In this section, we will demonstrate how attunement articulates the *primary* modal field of Dasein's individuation. First, we will clarify the role of attunement in the constitution of being-in. Second, we will examine the three "existential-ontological characteristics" that Heidegger analyzes in his account of attunement. Of particular importance for our analysis of individuation is the role that attunement plays in the articulation of *mattering*. As we will show, this mattering is the *primary* exposition of Dasein's relational unfolding, and thus, individuates Dasein in relation to beings and the World.

Before turning directly to the existential structure of attunement, it is necessary to situate Heidegger's analysis within the broader context of clarifying Dasein's being-in-the-world. First, it is crucial to note that, despite being broken up into its "components" in the process of existential analysis, being-in-the-world intends a "unified phenomenon" that "must be seen as a whole" (Heidegger 2010, 53/53). However, this wholeness does not prevent it from having a "multiplicity of constitutive structural factors." These factors are analytically determined out of the compound expression: "the being" [*seind*], "in-the-world" and "*Being in* as such" (Heidegger 2010, 54/53). Each term necessarily overlaps with the others, and so, "any analysis of one of these constitutive factors involves the analysis of the others; that is, each time seeing the whole phenomenon" (Heidegger 2010, 54/53).

Our question, of the relation between individuation and attunement, moves primarily between the question of Dasein's being and being-in, though it is easy to see that the *world*, as the relational totality of significance, is always already implicated by the in-ness of Dasein's being. However, it is our view that Heidegger reserves a certain privilege for the analysis of being-in, terming it the "sustaining structural moment" which encloses the analysis of the individual moments (Dasein, World) within the structural whole of "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 2010, 127/131). It is for this reason that being-in receives both an "anticipatory" treatment prior to the analysis of Dasein and World, as well as the most detailed full analysis in Division I. Thus, the privilege of being-in indicates that, despite being methodologically

necessary to separate Dasein and World, ontologically, being-in marks the nexus of their irreducible relational differentiation.

In determining the structure of this relational co-playing, Heidegger warns against an interpretation that would too quickly identify Dasein as the being of the “between” (Heidegger 2010, 128/132). For despite a certain fidelity to the phenomenal content of being-in-the-world, the notion of betweenness implicitly pre-interprets the “in” on the basis of *Vorhandenheit*. Heidegger writes:

Nonetheless the orientation toward the “between” would still be misleading. It colludes unaware with the ontologically indefinite approach that there are beings between which this between as such “is.” The between is already understood as the result of the *conventia* of two objectively present things. But this kind of approach always *splits* the phenomenon beforehand and there is no prospect of putting it back together from the fragments. Not only do we lack the “cement,” even the “schema” according to which this joining together is to be accomplished has been split apart (Heidegger 2010, 128/132).

This passage demonstrates how the *present-at-hand* conception of individuality imposes itself in our language, and dissimulates the nexus of differentiation constitutive of Dasein and world. Thus, even stating that Dasein is the being of the “between” falls back upon already-individuated substantial entities. In other words, the analysis of being-in approaches Dasein and World in their *concrete process* of individuation, prior to any operation of abstraction and analysis. It is for this reason that Heidegger makes an implicit reference to the Kantian problem of the *schematism*. For the question of being-in approaches the relationship between intelligibility and space-time generativity, which is at the heart of the question of concrete *individuation* in Kant. For in opposing the sensible and the intelligible, Kant relies on the obscurity of schematism to constitute the *relation* of the particular material content to the universal forms of the understanding. For Heidegger, as we will show, the process of individuation precedes this distinction.



Thus, rather than indicating a synthesis between Dasein and World, being-in is interpreted on the basis of *disclosedness*. Heidegger writes:

This being bears in its ownmost being [*Sein*] the character of not being closed off [*Unverschlossenheit*]. The expression “there” means this essential disclosedness [*Erschlossenheit*]. Through disclosedness this being [*Dasein*] is “there” for itself together with the there-being [Da-sein] of the world (Heidegger 2010, 129/132).

Thus, Dasein, in its character of not-being-closed-off, is *always* embedded *in* a field of constitutive relationality. This embeddedness, being “held-as-relation,” is not to be interpreted as a subjective openness to objects, but as a standing-out into the openness of Being. This “standing-out” or disclosedness is to be understood as a *process* of individuation, in which Dasein *is* its standing-out into an open field of differential relations. It is key to our claim that this field of dynamic differential relations, out into which Dasein stands *as individual Dasein*, is primarily disclosed by attunement.

Before turning directly to our analysis of attunement and mood, it is necessary to justify our privileging of this specific layer of Dasein’s being-in. For as the attentive reader will have noticed, the other two existentials present in Heidegger’s analysis - understanding and discourse - have not yet been explicitly thematized. This silence is justified by our intention to work out the *primary* field of Dasein’s individuation. In his discussion of “being-in,” Heidegger claims both primacy for attunement, which “*first makes possible* being-in-the-world as a whole,” while also claiming that attunement, understanding and discourse are *equiprimordial* in the constitution of being-in (Heidegger 2010, 133/137). This apparent tension is resolved by our acknowledgement of a subtle distinction between equiprimordiality and primacy: the being-given together primordially of understanding and attunement (their equiprimordiality) does not preclude the possibility of their being *structural* orders of priority within equiprimordial givenness (primacy). It is our view that the variation of attunement is structurally primary, without being temporally “given first” or “given alone.”<sup>20</sup>

With this in mind, let us turn directly to the existential structure of attunement. Heidegger writes,

What we indicate *ontologically* with the term *attunement* is ontically what is most familiar and an everyday kind of thing: mood, being in a mood. Prior to all psychology of mood....we must see this phenomenon as a fundamental existential and outline its structure (Heidegger 2010, 130/134).

Thus, despite our everyday familiarity with moods, Heidegger argues the constitutive existential role of being-mooded has not yet been sufficiently worked out. This constitutive function is contrary to a determination of moods as a derivative phenomenon, as simply variable properties or attributes of an essential or core individuality. It is our view that these “phenomena remain unnoticed as what is supposedly most indifferent and fleeting in Dasein” due to the privilege accorded to substantiality analyzed in Section 1 (Heidegger, 2010, 131/134). For the subordination of moods to the level of “attribute” is conditioned by the determination of being as being-*present*, in which the dimensions of time, difference, change and becoming are relegated to a secondary status in relation to what substantially *is*. This link, between the form of existents as *being-present* and subordination of moodedness to substantiality, is a prime example of how our most familiar interpretations of “ontic” phenomena are played out on the grid of the history of being.

As such, Heidegger argues the *existential-ontological* characteristics disclosed in moods are critical to determining Dasein’s being-in. He identifies three characteristics, which we will treat now in sequence.

First Ontological Characteristic of Attunement: “*Attunement discloses Dasein in its Thrownness, and initially and for the most part, in the mode of evasive turning away.*” (Heidegger 2010, 133/136).

By disclosing thrownness, moodedness reveals a dimension of *receptivity* constitutive of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In other words, the passivity of moods, the fact that they “come over us,” indicates our

being-thrown into a field of variation that we do not constitute or control. In the same way, they demonstrate our dependency on a world that exceeds our individual, finite grasp. Heidegger develops this dimension of receptivity through the notion of *facticity*. In the facticity of moodedness, Dasein is brought before the pure “that-it-is and has to be,” which discloses the *fact* of its being-delivered-over to Being. The *nudity* of being-in-the-world, its pure “that it is-ness,” indicates that facticity is *prior* to any schema of self-interpretation or order of reasons in which Dasein could determine its *raison d’etre*. It is thus that Heidegger claims that “mere mood discloses the there more primordially, but it also *closes* it off more stubbornly” (Heidegger 2010, 133/136). In bringing Dasein before the disclosedness of its there, moodedness articulates the primary, factual receptivity of Being which precedes any act of will or understanding, and *demand*s that Dasein be. For Heidegger, receptivity “reaches deeper” than the horizon of active cognition because it articulates the fact that Dasein always-already finds itself in *response* to the world. Moodedness, our being-thrown into responsivity, manifests the *upsurge* of Dasein’s being-in-the-world in its brutal factual nudity.

This burdensome character of Being, which Dasein must take over in self-finding, is particularly evident in bad moods. In a bad mood, “Dasein becomes tired of itself. The being of the there has, in such a bad mood, become manifest as a burden [*Last*]” (Heidegger 2010, 131/134). In a marginal comment, Heidegger later emphasizes the import of this burdening through a re-interpretation of *das Zu-tragende*, “what bears” or “to bear” [*tragen*]. This bearing indicates the being-appropriated of Dasein as it is called to stand in the openness of Being, that it must “take over something from out of the belonging to being itself” (Heidegger 2010, 131/135). In other words, Dasein always finds itself *already* bearing a mood, or undergoing a passion. In our view, this notion of bearing, or *enduring* the openness of Being demonstrates that Dasein is *given itself* in the receptivity of Being. Thus, the receptive-disclosive function of attunement, which conditions the inextricable co-appearance of Dasein and World, opens onto the importance of the middle-voiced genitivity of the “receptivity of Being” in which Dasein *receives* and *is received* in being-attuned. In essence, though the coarse language of history conceals this, attunement

signals the primacy of the process of relational *attuning* prior to the distinction between constituting acts and constituted objects.

On the surface, this self-interpretation of bad moods is in tension with the account given on the following page. Here, Heidegger writes:

In bad moods, Dasein becomes blind to itself, the surrounding world of heedfulness is veiled, the circumspection of taking care is led astray. Attunement is so far from being reflected upon that, in the unreflected devotion to and giving to the “world” of its heedfulness, assails Dasein. Mood assails” (Heidegger 2010, 133/136).

In our view, this tension between disclosing our constitutive deliverance to Being and self-blinding emerges from what we will term the *bi-valence* of moodedness. This bi-valence of concealment and unconcealment is implied in the structure of *evasive* turning away that Heidegger identifies in our relation to thrownness. In being-assailed by moods, Dasein flees the brute facticity of its being-delivered over to the *tone* of the there and is *pulled* into the world in the mode of everyday absorption. Thus, Heidegger argues that attunement is most often disclosed in the mode of *avoidance*. This is evident in the way one busies oneself with errands and tasks after the death of a loved one, or “throws oneself” into work after a break-up. Thus, the disclosure of thrownness is two-fold: it discloses our factual thrownness into the openness of Being as something we must bear *and* our thrownness into everyday-being-absorbed which attempts to avoid and tranquillize this primary dimension. Thus, rather than follow the path of individuating attunement, which condenses and discloses our singular thrownness into Being, for the most part, Dasein loses itself in dispersion and avoidance.

Second Ontological Characteristic of Attunement: “*Mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something*” (Heidegger 2010, 133/137).

As we saw above in the analysis of bad moods, moodedness articulates the *disclosure* of the world itself. Thus, attunement does not subjectively “colour experience” but rather discloses the *mode* of Dasein’s individuation in relation to the world.<sup>21</sup> Heidegger writes,

Mood assails. It comes neither from “without” nor from “within,” but arises from being-in-the-world itself....Being attuned is not initially related to something psychological, it is itself not an inner condition which then reaches out and leaves its mark on things and persons.” (Heidegger 2010, 133/136)

Thus, moodedness emerges out of the relational nexus of being-in-the-world itself. It is our view that attunement thus constitutes the *pre-individual modal field* of Dasein’s concrete individuation. To refer to attunement as *pre-individual* is to claim that it articulates and regulates the space of possibility for the individuation of concrete Dasein. The “priority” of attunement over the constituted individual, indicated by the prefix “pre,” is evident in the way that Heidegger plays on the term *finden*. He writes: “In attunement, Dasein is always-already brought before itself, it has always already found itself, not as perceiving oneself to be there but as one finds one’s self in attunement.” (Heidegger 2010, 132/135). In other words, it is *brought* to the field of relations that precede it, that make its self-finding possible. This distinction between perceiving and finding flows from the critique of *intuition* and substantial individuality articulated in Section 1. For Dasein does not *perceive* itself as a present-at-hand entity, but *finds itself* being-individuated in response to its attuned being-in. In other words, Dasein’s self-finding is determined by the tonality of being-in-the-world, and thus, is produced in an interaction with a context *from* which it stands out. Crucially, this interactive dynamic of individuation implies that, as long as Dasein is, its *individuation is never complete*. Rather, self-finding is always produced in variance with the unfolding openness of world. Thus, attunement indicates the variable process of the mutual individuation of self and world in concrete *tones* or moods.

Third Ontological Characteristic of Attunement: “*In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to a world out of which things that matter to us can be encountered*” (Heidegger 2010, 133/137-138).

Just as there is no unfeeling world prior to variable moodedness of attunement, there is no worldedness prior to its disclosure as a differentiated field of significance. Dasein always-already finds itself thrown in a field of meaningful relations, which are encountered in the modes of circumspection and concern outlined in Heidegger’s analysis of World and Being-With. Heidegger writes,

Letting something be encountered is primarily *circumspective*, not just as sensation or staring out at something. Letting things be encountered in a circumspectful heedful way has - we can see this now more precisely in terms of attunement - the character of being affected or moved. (Heidegger 2010, 133/137).

Thus, attunement is the existential structure for the *emergence* of “mattering.” It is only because we are touched by the world in its mattering to us that things are freed for their disclosure. The mode of being-afraid frees the fearsome, being-in-joy frees the joyful. For our purposes, it is critical to recognize that this constitutes a refinement of the notion of concern or circumspection on the basis of attunement, as the field of individuation which frees beings in their being. Thus, it is through attunement that existence can be concerned, that it can find itself in a *polyphonic* field of relations that call for its care in the world. Furthermore, this does not just imply the freeing of beings *other* than Dasein, but includes Dasein’s care-for-self. In the reception of mattering, Dasein’s care for world, other and self are mutually illuminated. As such, we can claim that attunement indicates the primary genesis of concern.<sup>22</sup>

With this analysis in place, we can now return to the question of the Kantian *schematism* anticipated above. For Heidegger’s rethinking of moodedness through attunement also contests the relegation of affect to empirical sensibility. Critical of the mechanistic or physicalist resonances of the

term affect or *sensation*, Heidegger argues that the bruteness of “impression” would “be essentially undiscovered” if “attuned being-in-the-world were not already related to things in the world that matter to it in a way *pre-figured* by moods [our emphasis]” (Heidegger 2010, 134/137). It follows that affective *matter*, which frees and thus, individuates *concrete* beings in their meaningfulness, indicates a field *prior* to the Kantian distinction between sensibility and intelligibility. Particular beings are not determined by a schema which links intelligible form to material content, but are rather disclosed in a process of relational in-form-ing pre-figured or sketched by attunement. The distinction between cognition and sensibility is derivative of this more primordial phenomenal field, for, as Heidegger writes, “we must *ontologically* leave the primary discovery of the world to “mere mood” (Heidegger 2010, 134/138). Thus, the individuation of significance itself occurs in the dimension constituted by variation of attunement.

This also demonstrates a key point of divergence from Husserl. In her excellent essay on the late Husserl’s account of affect, Ali Al-Saji writes:

This temporalization of sensation allows us to ask how sensations come to constitute, to evolve into, one’s particular affective attitude toward the world, one’s habits and dispositions. When sensations are inserted within the history and genesis of the embodied subject, motivations and associative tendencies appear within the nexus of sensations...In this way “paths of affections” are opened up in the embodied subject, which define one’s particular Body and the way which one experiences and moves in the world (Al Saji 2001, 56).

For Heidegger, contrary to this Husserlian picture, the “paths of affection” opened by attunement are not predicated on the prior *synthesis* of unmooded sensations. Thus, it is not the case that being-touched by a beautiful piece of music is ontologically or existentially dependent on the subjective or bodily faculty of sensibility. Rather, attunement existentially signifies the primary resonating or ringing-out of mattering itself, prior to the imposition of a schema of bodily impressions. One might say that Heidegger privileges

the “subtle body” of mattering and meaning *over* the corporeal-intentional body of life, which, in his view, is ontically derivative.<sup>23</sup> For Heidegger, the notion of a bodily “sensation” would consist in an unwarranted abstraction, which prioritizes an existentially severed physical corporeality from the primary ex-expression of attunement as *sense*.<sup>24</sup> Thus, prior to any bodily or biological account of drives or motivation, attunement represents the *primordial drive-field* of significance.

This integral link between attunement and sense brings us to the heart of our exposition on individuation. For the “production” of sense, dynamically constituted in the formative center of being-in, manifests itself primarily in the *tonal* variance of attunement. Crucially, this variance of existence indicates a field prior to the intelligibility of articulated discourse. This is demonstrated in a particularly striking passage where attunement is linked to the primary dimension of the poetic.

Being-in and its attunement are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, in the tempo of talk, “in the way of speaking.” The communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the disclosing of existence, can become the true aim of “poetic speech” (Heidegger 2010, 157/162).

Thus, prior to all “poetry” in the literal sense, attunement is the dimension of a *poetics* of individuation, the in-toning of existence as it unfolds in the play of the world. Existence is these *local* and *concrete* fluctuations: the intimacy of the tone of a moment, a conversation or a day, the way that moods oscillate with their own tempo and pace. These variances of time and space, of nearness and dispersion, of gaiety and sorrow, are the weave of individuation in which Dasein always finds itself. This field is *traced* in poetic language, which has its wealth in the possibility of this indication, and speaks into, and out of, the concrete emergence of being-there.

With the existential-ontological characteristics of attunement worked out, we will now turn more closely to the ontic *structure of variation*. Rather than analyze Heidegger’s account of fear for itself, we



will instead abstract from this example towards the general structure of affective modality, which will allow us to pose some tangential questions.

In his analysis of fear, Heidegger presents numerous variations and derivatives that constitute further individuated modes of fearing, such as *alarm*, *terror*, and *horror*. Each of these implies a specific variation of the relational context. In the case of alarm, there is a time-dimension variation, in which the fearful “suddenly bursts into heedful being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 2010, 138/142). In the case of horror, there is a variation of the familiarity-dimension, in which the thing feared has the character of being “something completely unfamiliar” (Heidegger 2010, 138/142). Heidegger then further derives the mode of *terror* from the combination of these two dimensions in the revelation of something unfamiliar suddenly bursting into heedful being-in-the-world. He then alludes to the possibility of determining further variations and refinements which constitute the modes of shyness, timidity, nervousness, misgivings (Heidegger 2010, 138/142).

Disclosed in these examples is a complex structure of affective modalization, in which the *tonality* of a mood changes in tandem with variance of ontic *field dimensions*. Though this problem is too forbidding to be treated in this context, it approaches the very heart of the question of ontological difference. For can we simply say that modes of attunement are *prior* to the field of ontic variation? Are existential modalities themselves not determined by the interaction of these *a posteriori* ontic dimensions? Furthermore, does not the field of ontic *variation* contain an indefinite or infinite number of possible dimensional variations of the type “more-or-less sudden, more-or-less unfamiliar?” In other words, is not every context, and thus, every attunement inhabited by *absolute singularity*?<sup>25</sup> And if so, is the articulation of the total structure of existentiality (and thus the structure of meaning itself) open to infinity?

Heidegger is very clear, however, that these different variations are to be understood as *existential modes*. He writes: “It is not a matter here of degrees of “feeling-tones,” but of existential modes. “Fearing for...does not lose its specific genuineness when it is “really not afraid” (Heidegger 2010, 138/142). The distinction between quality and quantity, of modes and “feeling-tones” or degrees, opens upon a

conspicuous absence in Heidegger's account of moods: the question of their strength or intensity. How is a degree of strength related to a mode of attunement? Are different modes to be differentiated, at least in part, on the basis of their intensive factors? Is it possible to identify an *intensive continuum* of the type of pleasantness, happiness, joy, ecstasy, which include along the spectrum of intensity shifts in the modal-disclosive configuration? Furthermore, could we not argue that the pure "that-it-is" disclosed in thrownness is *primarily* an experience of *intensity*, the impulsion of Being? More closely linked to our thesis on individuation, does not Dasein always find itself polarized and *stimulated* by the world?<sup>26</sup> In our view, these questions would be best worked out via an engagement with Simondon, who interprets the primary level of being-in-the-world in terms of "intensity, the grasping and organization of intensities in the relation of the world to the subject" (Simondon 2020, 269).

### **Section 3: Being-With, Dilation, Concern**

Given the importance of the question of being-with in the reception and determination of Heidegger's legacy, it is noteworthy that there has never been a sustained reflection on co-attunement in *Being and Time*. Thus, in this section we will present a preliminary application of our analysis of individuation and attunement in a re-reading of Heidegger's account of being-with. This is in consonance with Heidegger's own claim that the notion of attunement constitutes a refinement of the notion of concern. First, we will briefly outline the modal structure of being-with (*Mitsein*) in relation to the concrete individuation of *co-attunement* in Dasein-with. Then, we will conclude with an analysis of the dilations of concern in being-with, as well as present a novel analysis of the "they" on the basis of attunement.

Before moving directly to the role of attunement, it is necessary to move the structure of modalization and individuation "up a level" from *individualized* Dasein to *communalized* being-with. Thus, in this case, being-with existentially signifies the modal field for the constitution of concrete Dasein-with. Thus, it is our view that what can be said about the modality of individual Dasein (that it *is* its possibility) can be equally claimed of communal *Mitsein*. The relation of possibility and structure, determined above as the individuation of the possible, is therefore repeated at the level of *Mitsein's*

*transindividuality*. It is our contention that this field has its *own* attunement dynamics which govern the unfolding of *co-attunement* as the primary field of being-with.

The possibilities of co-attunement, in which Dasein is affectively individuated in relation to another Dasein, is only briefly indicated at the end of the analysis of fear. Heidegger writes:

But fearing about can also involve others, and we then speak of fearing for them. This fear for...does not take the other's fear away from him. That is out of the question because the other for whom we are afraid does not even have to be afraid on his part. We are afraid for the other most of all precisely when *he* is *not* afraid and blunders recklessly into what is threatening. Fearing for...is a mode of co-attunement with others, but it is not necessarily being afraid with them or even being afraid together (Heidegger 2010, 137-138/141-142).

This passage reveals a number of the crucial aspects of co-attunement. First, co-attunement can be *differentially articulated*. In other words, it does not necessarily imply a *unity* of attunement, in which each Dasein is attuned in the same fashion.<sup>27</sup> Though one can always fear for another who is also afraid, the example Heidegger gives demonstrates that communal feeling does not always take the form of unified sentiment. This is important given Levinas's misinterpretation of Heidegger's *Mitsein* as a "faceless" generality. In no way does *Mitsein* denote an abstract or *generalized* aspect of Dasein: rather it indicates the primary dimension in which Dasein is *opened* to the Other in their concrete singularity, and thus called to respond to them in their being. This being-called by the Other yields a second critical insight given in the passage above: co-attunement is *modulative*. The modality of this standing-out is affected or modulated by the attunement of others without *fusing* with them. In the case given, it is the other's not-being-afraid which inflects my attunement as fearing-for. Thus, the way the other calls me from their attunement shapes both my mode of response and the field of being-with in which we cross paths. In the mode of "fearing-for," Dasein is disclosed as both affected and unaffected, differentiated yet related. In

differential co-attunement, Dasein's being "knitted-together" with others, as the very fabric of everyday being-with, is primordially disclosed.

Analogous to the tonal structure of individuation proposed above, the affective structure of Being-With is constituted as a field of modal variations, in which differing modes of existence can be operative in relation to one another. In other words, being-with can be more or less individuated within itself. being-with, as a primordial existential, is thus a modal field where individuation processes interact and modulate the ontic constitution of Dasein-with. There is a certain reciprocity or recursivity here between the individuation process of Dasein's being-a-self and the *collective* individuation processes of Dasein-with, in which individuals within the collective have the possibility of modulating the possibilities of the collective. A strong tone of anger can reshape a joyful evening for all present. This is implied in the phenomena of public oratory, an example which Heidegger borrows from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in which the speaker speaks both *to* and *from* the mood of the crowd. By being both sharing in collective attunement, and yet remaining individuated in relation to it, the orator can make use of "an understanding of the possibilities of the mood of the crowd in order to arouse and direct it in the right way" (Heidegger 2010, 135). Thus, it is our view that a *politico-poetics* of attunement, which governs the interaction between the collective and the individual, is indicated here in Heidegger's analysis.<sup>28</sup>

The implicit role of attunement is particularly evident in Heidegger's account of *concern*. We will first treat what Heidegger terms the "deficient modes" of concern, which are constitutive of Dasein's *everyday* individuation as *they-self* (Heidegger 2010, 118/121). Deficient concern is defined by the indifference of Dasein-with, in such a way that the others "blend in" to the background, and only appear insofar as they are the mode of passing-one-another-by. To put this another way, the others are not individuated or articulated in their mattering - they simply flow by without drawing near.

In our view, this indifference can be derived directly from the first existential-ontological characteristic of attunement, in which Dasein, for the most part, evades its thrownness. Heidegger links this evasion of being-with, which we interpret as the existential dissociation of Dasein from concerned co-attunement, to the theoretical constitution of present-at-hand subjects. In both cases, there is an

*indifference* which severs the primary relationality of Dasein in favour of a dissociated, autonomous subject. In the indifference of the everyday, we avoid listening-in to the disclosure of co-attunement, which, in its essence, reveals the primordial dependence of individuated Dasein on being-with.

This dissociation from co-attunement does not result in Dasein being-by-itself. Rather, in indifference, Dasein loses itself in the dispersion of the *they-self*. As Heidegger writes,

In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of "the others" in such a way that others, as distinguishable and explicitly, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the they unfolds its true dictatorship. The they, which is nothing definite, and which all are, thought not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness" (Heidegger 2010, 123/126).

Thus, in the indifference of the they, Heidegger identifies a collapse of individuated Dasein-with. Neither one's own Dasein nor the Dasein of others stand out in their individual particularity. In this way, Dasein-with disperses into the monotonous flow of the *they-self*. It is thus that we return to our prior claim of a strong "differentiation-indifferentiation" spectrum concerning Dasein's degree of individuation: the "they-self," in its ambiguity between collectivity and individuality, articulates the essential instability at the heart of Dasein's ability to find and be itself.<sup>29</sup> It is here that the strangeness of Heidegger's thought of the *they* comes into view. For it is neither a "universal subject which hovers over a plurality of subjects" nor a "genus of individual Dasein" but an existential *impulsion*, at the heart of being-with, that drives the averageness and indifference of the everyday (Heidegger 2010, 125/128). Despite being physically, ontically individuated, Dasein as "they-self" loses its particularity in the endless flow of everyday being-in-the-world, governed by a "given" framework of mattering.

As such, the *they* has, in itself, "various possibilities of concretion," which modulate and articulate the field of being-with (Heidegger 2010, 125/129). As Heidegger writes, "the being of the they

not only has its attunedness, it needs mood and “makes” it for itself” (Heidegger 2010, 135/138-139). These moods vary from the unburdened tranquilization of idle talk, in which everything is already understood, to the tense and violent tones of distantiality and ambiguity, articulated as a field of competition, alienation and war. By shaping this primary field, in which it levels-out the possibilities of attunement, the they articulates the referential context of significance in which everyday Dasein moves. In this way, the *they* delineates the primary *patterns* of absorption which keep Dasein within a certain range of understanding and attunement. In response to the question “how are you?” it is most often the *they* who speaks.

In this regulation, the *they* prescribes a kind of *constancy* of dis-attunement or an-aesthesis. However, it is important to note that this constancy, the *droning* of the they, is not to be confused with the notion of *identity*. As shown above, the *they* is not a genus in which individual Dasein finds itself “swallowed-up” in the form of identification. Rather, the *they* regulates Dasein’s individuation *as* dis-individuated they-self. In this way, the singular possibilities of Dasein are “covered-over” and its ability to “stand-within-the-there” as *itself* is reduced by the impulsion toward absorption in pre-delineated patterns of feeling and understanding. Thus, we disagree with Nelson’s contrast between the *they* as “identity” and authentic selfhood as “difference” (Nelson 2007, 279). For the notion of identity refers back to the constant presence of the *Vorhandenheit*, and in doing so, misses the specific unfolding of the *they* as a constrained or hollow logic of differentiation and repetition. The they is a force of integration and homogenization which regulates individuation by constraining possibility. The constancy of the *they* is existentially determined by the way it constricts the field of collective and individual modalization, not by the categorical opposition of identity and difference.

It is our view that, by contrast, the positive modes of concern *unfold* more concretely the singular possibilities of the field of relational attunement. Importantly, this positivity is not immediately linked to goodness or genuineness. The first positive mode described by Heidegger concerns a mode of relation in which Dasein “leaps in” for the other to take their care away from them. In this way, Dasein takes an “existentiell possibility” of the other upon itself. Though this is for the most part benign, it carries within

itself the threat of developing into affective logics of subjugation and domination. It is for this reason that being-tuned-in can open possibilities for manipulation and deceit. In this case, the dominating party would be attuned to the modal structure of interactivity and collective individuation, and, like the orator, attempts to *guide* its unfolding for their own benefit or pleasure. The second positive mode of concern pertains to what Heidegger terms “authentic care,” which, rather than attempting to restrict, dominate or “leap-in,” pertains directly to the Other in their singular existence. In this being-attuned to the Other understandingly, authentic care “helps the other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and *free* for it” (Heidegger 2010, 119/121).

Between the positive and negative modes of concern, we identify a dilation of *articulated mattering*. In the modes of indifference, the Other does *touch* us: we are anesthetized, taken in by the anaesthetic of the everyday. In the passing-one-another-by of the they, the mattering of the Other, one might even dare to say, the *face* of the Other, is integrated into a process of regulation and normalization, so that “everything runs smoothly” without the interruption of moods.

But *within* this possibility of the everyday lies another dimension, which resists the closing-down of indifference and allows for the *opening-up* of co-attunement to blossom in the concretion of Dasein-with. The possibility of authentic care, always under threat by the impulsion towards the indifference of the *they*, brings forth the poetics of being-with into the clearing of the world, for “one does not enter into truth except through charity.”<sup>30</sup>

## Conclusion

In this essay, we have sought to show how *attunement* indicates the primary existential field for Dasein’s individuation. Through this analysis, we have demonstrated 1) that Dasein’s individuality must be conceived in terms of relationality and possibility 2) that this unfolding of relational possibility occurs *primarily* at the level of attunement, which discloses the *concrete* and *mutual* individuation of Dasein and World in their mattering 3) that this analysis of individuation provides a novel perspective of affectivity and being-with, which focuses on the dilations of concern in everyday being-in-the-world. It is our view

that this line of argumentation is fruitful for re-developing a number of key themes in Heidegger, and we hope to pursue in the future an analysis of 1) death and *Angst* as the *limit* of individuation. In our view, this terminology (the limit of individuation) speaks to the *non-relationality* of death. In angst, what we *are* “beyond” the field of world-relations is disclosed as a *nullity* and thus, our dependence on the world for our individuality is equiprimordially disclosed 2) a further development of the *poetics* of individuation into a *politics* of individuation. This would require a close reading of Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, which works out the role of *pathos* in everyday being-with-one-another.



## Endnotes

1. See Stiegler 2009, Nelson 2011, Hui 2017, Wrathall 2017.
2. We will not, however, explicitly treat the theme of temporality in our analysis. For two excellent examinations of the relation between originary “pastness” and *Befindlichkeit*, see Slaby 2015 and Elpidorou and Freedman 2015b.
3. See Mulhall 2011, Senderowicz 2011.
4. Despite the utility of Dewell’s analysis in this context, for the purpose of existential clarification, we must be wary of the privilege given to ontic presence in his discourse. In this case, the ontological framework of Dewell’s analysis requires that the “path vectors” which define the multiplex space of signification emerge from a “source” which is an “objective entity other than the path vectors” themselves. Given that what is found in *Befindlichkeit* is prior to all objectivity, we must reserve a middle-voiced view of unfolding. For an account of the middle-voice and how it pertains to the destruction of metaphysics, see Scott 1989.
5. Though we will often speak of attunement in the singular for reasons of simplicity, there is no reason to suppose that Dasein cannot be attuned in multiple ways at once, and is thus in itself a multiplicity. It would be interesting to work out the interaction of such “infra-individual” modality in relation to the group-level dynamics analyzed in Section 3.
6. See Nancy 1993, 203.
7. For a truly exemplary analysis of this point, see Derrida 1993.
8. Furthermore, there is some ambivalence in Heidegger concerning the privileged role of anxiety for disclosing being-in-the-world as a whole. He writes, “It is true that it is the nature of every kind of attunement to disclose being in the world as a whole” (Heidegger 2010, 184/185). However, for Heidegger, anxiety is privileged because it *radically* individuates Dasein in relation to its own death (the limit of its relationality, and thus, the limit of individuation). We wonder, however, whether finite time is not disclosed in other dimensions of affective modality. Does not the affirmation of loss lie at the heart of true love, and the impossibility of return live at the height of regret? In a further study, we would like to develop the relationship between anxiety as the *limit* of individuation and the revelation of nullity. For it is when Dasein is *most individuated* that significance collapses.
9. Heidegger repeatedly makes similar claims in *Being and Time*, which demonstrate the field of attunement is a direction for the development of existential analysis. On this point, it is our view that the late Guattari is the *true heir* of Division I, whereby an analysis of existential modes is put to work for therapeutic and political gains and is no longer subordinated to the question of *fundamental ontology*. Guattari writes “It is a plurality of beings as machines which give themselves to us the moment we acquire the pathic and cartographic means of reaching them. The manifestations - not of Being, but of multitudes of ontological components - are of the order of the machine. And this, without semiological mediation, without transcendent coding, directly as “being’s giving of itself” as giving” (Guattari 1995, 53). It is in this direction that our final section tends.
10. For a further elaboration of the middle-voice in Heidegger, as well as Levinas and Derrida, see Llewlyn 1991.
11. See Brett Davis’s book on *Gelassenheit*, and on remnants of voluntarism in *Being and Time* (Davis 2007, 24-60).
12. As Derrida writes, at the beginning of *Being and Time*, Dasein is *exclusively* defined in terms of its *proximity* to the question (Derrida 2016, 86).
13. This is the major thrust of Heidegger’s response to Sartre, see a *Letter on Humanism* in Heidegger 2008.
14. On this point, see Jacques Garelli’s preface to the recently published *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information* (Simondon 2020).
15. Yuk Hui develops the relation between structure, the openness of possibility and individuation through an analysis of *rhythm* in Heidegger’s reading of Rimbaud (Hui 2017). This analysis, which posts rhythm as integral to the forming-unfolding of structure (*Gefüge*), will return in a *tonalized* manner in our analysis of attunement in S2.
16. This individuation of the possible is implicitly at work in Slaby’s excellent analysis of the relationship between affectivity and boredom. Despite the fact that Slaby does not engage individuation as a theme, the individuation of the possible is clarified in the way that profound boredom modifies the temporal ecstasies. He writes, ““Profound boredom...fuses the the three ecstases of individual temporality into the virtually unbearable experience of crystalline duration” (Slaby 2015, 201)
17. For an account of the conditional relations between the possible and the impossible, see Derrida, *Aporias*, 74-77 and Derrida, *On the Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event*.
18. As Merleau-Ponty writes in his *Course Notes on Husserl*, “[To think: to encircle an *ungedachte* <“unthought”>, Open and not “unhappy” thought.” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 14). Or in Nancy’s *Experience of Freedom*: “The fact of freedom, or the practical fact, thus absolutely and radically “established” without any establishing procedure being

able to produce this fact as a theoretical object, is the fact...*that there is* something to be done” (Nancy 1993, 31). In other words, that there *is* possibility.

19. This spectrum is also identifiable in Nelson’s reading of an *ethics* of individuation. He writes “The transition from being lost in the facticity of the indifference, conformity, and compulsion of the “they” (*das Man*) to the self-individuation involved in what Heidegger calls authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) requires that the self can be a question to and for itself precisely in and through its facticity.” (Nelson 2011, 273).

20. Heidegger makes a similar claim in his reading of Kant, where he writes, “The necessary way in which sensibility and understanding belong together in the essential unity of finite knowledge, however, does not exclude but rather includes an order of precedence in the structural grounding of thinking in intuition.” (Heidegger 1997, 25).

21. Thus, we are wary of the usage of a “lens metaphor” to describe attunement, as is presented in Elpidorou and Freedman otherwise incisive article, which has the danger of explicitly invoking an unmooded Dasein and World which are then mediated by a mood (Elpidorou and Freedman, 2011a).

22. We agree with Elpidorou and Freedman that this places attunement at the heart of Heidegger’s existential analytic. They write, “Dasein, according to Heidegger, is the being for whom its Being is an issue. In order for its Being to be an issue for Dasein, worldly entities as well as Dasein itself must and do matter to it. It is only on account of moods that such mattering is possible.” (Elpidorou and Freedman, 666).

23. There is a notable absence of any discussion of the embodiment of *Stimmung* in Heidegger’s account. This lack of bodily Dasein in *Being and Time* is well-known, and has spawned numerous developments and critiques. We will simply multiply references to indicate the centrality of this problem. For a more Husserlian account of emotionality and the body, see Merleau-Ponty 2010, 28-30. For a deconstructive take, see Nancy’s *Corpus*: “The body delights in being touched. It delights in being squeezed, weighed, thought by other bodies, and being the one that squeezes, weighs and thinks other bodies. Bodies delight in and are delighted by bodies.... Touch creates joy and pain...” (Nancy 2008, 117). It is interesting to note Heidegger’s ambivalence around the question of affectivity and life. He writes “Ontologically, affection presupposes making present in such a way that in it Dasein can be brought back to itself as having-been. How the *stimulation* and *touching* of the senses in beings that are simply alive are to be ontologically defined, for example, how and where in general the being of animals is constituted by a “time,” remains a problem for itself” (Heidegger 2010 330/346). Exposed and pushed aside here is the integral relation between attunement and sexuality, as well as the problem of pleasure and pain, as well as the relation of Dasein to animality. For an account of Heidegger’s generalized repression of this issue, see (Derrida 2008, 11-12).

24. To bring our analysis beyond this distinction, we could claim with Nancy that mattering articulates bodies in the ex-tension of their *meaning*. (Nancy 2008, 23-24)

25. Importantly, this would mean, against Hegel, that singularity is not the ‘immediate undetermined’ but rather the *concretion of Being in the process of its forming*, a singular and momentary condensation of the relational field. In our view, it is this that the notion of *Augenblick* approaches in Division II (Heidegger 2010, 313). See also Simondon, where he equates information and singularity (Simondon 2020, 32).

26. Thus, we can agree with Wrathall’s claim that “self is a particular polarizing of affordances into solicitations to act” and thus is found by “turning out toward the surrounding world” while arguing that attunement articulates the primary “field” which polarize and stimulates Dasein’s individuation (Wrathall 2017, 81).

27. Derrida takes Levinas to task on this point in “Violence and Metaphysics,” where he argues that Heidegger’s thought approaches “a *Mitsein* much more original than any of the eventual forms with which it has often been confused: solidarity, the team, companionship. Implied by the discourse of *Totality and Infinity*, alone permitting to *let* be others in their truth, freeing dialogue and the face to face, the thought of Being is thus as close as possible to non-violence.” (Derrida 1978, 146).

28. The recent documentary on the music “Woodstock 99” demonstrates the incendiary potential embedded within the processes of collective attunement. Structured around a poetics of violence and rage, nu-metal performances brought to expression *and* amplified the collective co-attunement of white, male American rage to the point of rioting, destruction and sexual violence. It is our contention that every mass movement taps into a collective process of attuning, which it amplifies and focalizes: consider the tones of peace in the MLK led civil rights movement. Perhaps a certain collectivity of attunement is a condition for the opening of *kairoic* temporality.

29. This is what Stiegler refers to as the “fragility of individuation” indicative of the *Verfallen* in Heidegger. For Stiegler, this problem has no corollary in Simondon, who does not see the “this possibility of fall inscribed in facticity” and thus, “does not see that it is a question of struggling, between these two tendencies, for their articulation and against their decomposition, which is the fact of disindividuation.” (Stiegler 2009, 51). However, Stiegler does not link this problem of falling away from mutual articulation to attunement or affectivity, despite the fact that, even for Simondon, “collective groups are constituted at the level of affecto-emotive themes” (Simondon

2020, 275). Thus, we are in agreement with Stiegler about the necessity of thinking the disjunction between the Heideggerian *They* and the Simondonian *We*, but in our view, this must pass through a thinking of an *infrastructure* of collective attunement. (Stiegler 2009, 55)

30. With this Augustine quote, the primordial possibility of attunement, relationality and genuineness alights under the heading of *the heart*. For an analysis of the increasing prevalence of the role of heart in Heidegger's thought, see Wood 2015.

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